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Welfare Kingdom

Once upon a time, there was a kingdom which had two different names in two languages. People were fighting among themselves about which name should be used in government communications. The king was very strict, selfless and disciplined. He wanted to make his country strong and very wealthy.

Once, he was sitting in his court discussing the situation in the country along with his ministers. Suddenly, he heard some people shouting and crying outside the court. The security person came in and reported that some people in very simple attire wanted to meet the king.

King : Who are they?

Security : Maharaj, I don’t know, but they appear to be some social workers.

King : You should have asked them what they want.

Security : I asked, but I didn’t understand what they were saying.

King : You are an idiot. Can’t you understand even simple things?

Security : I am sorry, Maharaj. Sometimes, even our bosses don’t understand what law they have made! And bosses say that sometimes even the ministers don’t understand!

King : Shut up.

Security : Maharaj, they were uttering the words like trust foundation, charity and so on.

Minister (politely intervenes) : Maharaj, they might be trustees of some charitable organisations.

King : Security, let them in.

Minister : Maharaj, I request that only they may come. If they are accompanied by some chartered accountant, please don’t allow him.

King : Why?

Minister : These CAs often make some logical arguments for which we may not have an answer!

King : I wonder why and how charity organisations still exist. I had asked you to make such laws that would force them to close their shops! I also wonder why these CAs continue to help the trusts. Anyway, Security, ask CAs to wait outside only.

Security : Ji Maharaj.

(Eight to ten persons enter.)

Minister : All of you, please introduce yourselves one by one.

Person 1 : Maharaj, I am running schools for poor students in villages and slum areas. They charge negligible fees or often give free education.

Person 2 : I provide medical and health services to people in remote villages and also in cities. We cater mainly to poor patients.

Person 3 : I am running yoga centres everywhere at a nominal charge.

Person 4 : I try to preserve monuments and heritage properties. It is honorary work.

Person 5 : I work to conserve the environment. I don’t take any remuneration.

Person 6 : I work for the upliftment of the poor and needy — like orphans, handicapped persons, destitute women, unsupported old people and the like.

Person 7 : Maharaj, I do general social work — like running libraries, spreading good moral values, running old age homes and so on.

King : What is your grievance?

People : We are doing selfless work for society. We raise funds by literally begging around.

King : Then what?

People : We are made to pay tax at a very high rate, even higher than business organisations.

King (to minister) : Is it true? Why so?

Minister : They may not have submitted a couple of forms. Maharaj, for my Ministry, their social work is not important. Paperwork is more important. There should be compliance.

People : Maharaj, we cannot afford the compliance cost. And our country’s infrastructure is so well developed that we have no electricity for hours together, no water for days together and no roads to approach our CA in the district place.

Minister : Who asked you to do all this work?

People : We do it voluntarily. We have been doing it for decades. Since ours is a Welfare Kingdom, many people are poor, and deprived of many things.
King : But we are becoming a superpower. We need revenue.

People : Maharaj, there is a lot of ambiguity and anomaly in the law.

Minister (stops them) : You can approach the judiciary.

People : Our grandfathers have already approached the judiciary. Our grandsons may get the decision.

Minister : Maharaj, please don’t worry. We will change the law from retrospective effect!

King : Good.

Minister : Maharaj, these CAs give us a lot of headaches.

King : Make such stringent regulations for CAs that they also will close their offices. Punish everybody.

Minister : Yes, Maharaj. The number of students has already reduced. Even those who pass dare not enter the profession.

King : Very good. So we will have peace of mind.

People (to minister) : What about ease of doing business?

Minister : It is for ‘business’ and not for ‘social work’.

Folks, we are scheduled to fly abroad to teach and guide other countries to improve their tax system.

Good bye!

Corporate Law Corner – Part A | Company Law

13. Case Law No. 01/October/ 2023

M/s. VINAYAK BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED

No. ROC/ PAT/ Inquiry/13665/834

Office of the Registrar of Companies,

Bihar-Cum-Official Liquidator,

High Court, Patna Adjudication Order

Date of Order: 18th August, 2023

Order for penalty for violation of section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 for non-disclosure in the Auditor’s Report by the Statutory Auditor.

FACTS

As per the documents available on MCA Portal, Mr SK was the auditor of the company for the financial year ending 31st March, 2017.

Registrar of Companies, Bihar (“RoC”) on inspection of the financial statements of M/s VBDPL for the financial year ending 31st March, 2017 observed that, in the column of details of Specified Bank Notes (SBNs) held and transacted during the period from 8th November, 2016 to 30th December, 2016 was mentioned as zero. However, the directors of M/s VBDPL in their reply dated 17th January, 2019 had enclosed a letter dated 16th January, 2019 from ICICI Bank in which the details of the deposit amount had been mentioned as follows:

Date Amount Denominations
14th November, 2016 150,000 1000 x 150
15th November, 2016 50,000 1000 x 50
24th November, 2016 200,000 1000 x 200
02nd December, 2016 150,000 1000 x 150

As per Ministry’s Notification No. G.S R. 307(E) dated 30th March, 2017, the following clause was inserted in rule 11 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 after clause (c), namely:

“(d) Whether the company had provided requisite disclosure in its financial statements as to holdings as well as dealings in specified Bank Notes during the period from 8th November, 2016, to 30th December, 2016, and if so, whether these are in accordance with the books of accounts maintained by the company.”

Hence, it appeared that the provisions of Section 143(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 had been contravened by the Auditor for the financial year 31st March, 2017 for Non-disclosure of Specified Bank Notes (SBN) held and transacted during the period from 8th November, 2016 to 30th December, 2016 and therefore he was liable for penalty under section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Based on the above facts, RoC had issued a show cause notice for default under section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013. However, no reply was received to the show cause notice from Mr SK, Auditor.

Further, RoC had also issued a “Notice for Hearing” to M/s SK, Auditor in default to appear personally or through an authorised representative under Rule 3(3), Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014 on 11th August, 2023 and also to submit their response, if any, one working day prior to the date of hearing.

On the date of the hearing, Mr SK neither appeared nor any submission was made regarding the aforesaid non-compliance. Hence, it was concluded that the provisions of Section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 had been contravened by the auditor and therefore he was liable for penalty u/s 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 for the financial year ended 31st March, 2017.

HELD

Adjudication Officer (‘AO’) after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and after taking into account the provisions of Rule 11(d) of Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 (as amended), imposed a penalty on Mr SK, Chartered Accountants as per the below mentioned table:

Further, it was directed to pay the penalty within 90 days of the order.

#Final Penalty was imposed pursuant to the provision of section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 since M/s VBDPL satisfied the criteria of being a Small Company where Mr SK was an auditor.

Nature of
default
Relevant section under the Companies Act, 2013

 

Name of

persons on whom the penalty is imposed

 

No. of

days of default

 

Penalty

for defaults as per Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 (₹.)

 

Total

penalty

(₹)

 

Final penalty imposed as per Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 (₹) #

 

Non-disclosure in Audit Report Section 143(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 Mr SK, Chartered Accountants NA 10,000 10,000 5,000

SEBI Acts Tough against Market Manipulators

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on 16th September, 2022, passed a stiff order of penalty, on a case involving, among others, allegedly synchronised trades. By the other order, it also debarred some of the parties from the securities markets. Soon thereafter, in June 2023, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) rejected the appeals against the order in an almost dismissive way to the appeal. What is noteworthy is that SEBI has shown that it means serious business in such cases. The penalty levied is fairly large, considering the facts and figures involved, apart from the order to restrain persons from the markets. This should hopefully show that SEBI now means business in tackling this almost uniform feature in cases of market manipulation. If this approach continues, this should mean that the manipulators see a strong deterrent to engaging in such activities.

SYNCHRONISED MANIPULATIVE TRADING

Price manipulation is rarely carried out without involving synchronised trading. But, such cases have seemingly gotten away without strong deterrent penal measures. The use of synchronised trades has been a regular feature for decades.

The pattern is almost consistent in such cases. The manipulators, using blatant or camouflaged techniques, use this modus operandi with successful results. Small investors rarely carry out the most basic efforts and work to check up on the history of price and volume, or the fundamentals of the company. So while investors pile on by being attracted to the prospect of quick and handsome, the manipulators sell and exit.

COMMON PATTERNS OF SYNCHRONISED MANIPULATIVE TRADING

The method may vary in small details, but some features are common. There is a circular on trading amongst a group of persons who also steadily increase the quoted price. This artificial spurt in price and volume is meant to create an image that something good is about to happen which selected people know and anticipate.

Another common pattern has been to project that the company is engaged in a business that is the latest fad. At one time, for example, we had the dotcom boom, then internet-based services and apps, infrastructure, etc. The advantage of using such methods from the point of view of the manipulators was that past fundamentals become totally irrelevant. There may be occasional star performers and some genuine but failed attempts. But smart manipulators recognised that this front would attract investors. This included changing the name of the company, passing resolutions to start such a business, etc.

What allegedly happened in this particular case? (Till there is a finality in the form of a Supreme Court, one cannot consider the matter as closed for this particular case.) The price of the shares was hiked up by a slow increase with small synchronised trades at successively higher prices. SEBI has also stated that thereafter, even SMSes were circulated about the potential of the company. And hence, yet again, as public interest grew, those who held shares in the company sold them at a high price. And, yet again, the price slowly crashed to as low as almost 2 per cent of the highest price.

WHETHER THE LAW IS LACKING?

It is not as if the law is lacking in this regard. Multiple provisions in the SEBI PFUTP regulations deal with such manipulative practices. The transactions have been dissected into individual steps and portions and make each of them specifically an offence. This includes circular trading, artificially jacking up the price, the price, spreading false news, etc.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW

That is the law. Next comes the investigation which plays an important role. These days, SEBI carries out very meticulous analysis of the parties, the trades, the bank accounts, etc., of the parties. These days much of the data is available almost instantaneously thanks to electronic trading. SEBI then takes it to the next level by meticulously investigating the background of the parties, including their relations, personal or commercial, and study of their bank statement and internal transactions. The parties may not even realise that they are being investigated since such information is available from stock exchanges or other authorities directly. Of course, at a later stage, SEBI may summon some or all of the parties to question them independently. Often, the weakest persons in the group, including those who are mules, may break down and confess. But even otherwise, too, many of the facts, available from credible independent third parties like banks, brokers, etc., cannot be so easily countered or explained away.

LOW DETERRENT ACTION IN THE PAST

What was perhaps lacking was the final step of a strong deterrent step which would make the wrongdoers feel the loss and even realise that such acts are simply not profitable enough. Unfortunately, in too many cases, while the penalty has been levied, it has rarely been proportionate to the severity of the crime.

A recent example that can be taken is of the brazenness of false trading in illiquid options. It was found that thousands of persons engaged in circular trades in illiquid options. The objective did not seem to be enticing and cheating investors. Rather, it was very likely to pass on profits or loss for tax evasion. A person who had profits and did not want to pay tax traded in the options by buying high and then selling very low and that too with the same counterparty and also, often, within a gap of barely minutes. Though this may not harm investors directly, it violates multiple SEBI regulations and, worse, creates an impression of stock markets as being a lawless jungle. When SEBI initiated proceedings, it was prolonged by the need to serve notice, give hearings to each party, etc. Quite a few parties went in to appeal the clogging of the dockets of SAT, which requested SEBI to come with a scheme of settlement. SEBI did so but for various reasons including Covid, it did not get the required response. So the dockets of SAT clogged again, which yet again requested SEBI to make another attempt. The second scheme of 2022 got a better turnout. However, the moral here was that since the parties got away effectively with barely a rap on the knuckles, it did not have any real deterrent effect.

Hopefully, orders like this one, assuming they attain finality, will make parties think really hard before contemplating such acts. And even if there is some change in appeal, it will be a lesson in principle generally.

A SIMILAR FIRM APPROACH IS NEEDED IN OTHER OFFENCES

Going a step further, I think a similar firm hand is needed in other categories of market evils, including insider trading, front running, etc., where often there is no real deterrent action. Fortunately, here too, the data generated is quick and SEBI’s investigation is often thorough. Law is also helpful and empowers SEBI to disgorge the illicit profits, debar parties, etc. SEBI has powers to levy very stiff penalties. Here, too, if some examples are set, there can be a fear and also a sense of inevitability of getting caught. Granted that parties can be more sophisticated here using mules, underhand passing of profits, use of sophisticated technology, etc. So establishing guilt may not always be easy. But here again, SEBI often interviews the weakest links in the chain who may spill the beans. That said, perhaps some changes could help.

CLOSING NOTE: PROPOSAL OF SEBI TO DEEM CERTAIN SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS AS VIOLATIONS UNLESS REBUTTED

Although discussed in great detail earlier in this column, it is worth mentioning that a group of radical proposals to deal comprehensively with the menace of insider trading, front running, etc., have been made by SEBI in a consultation paper issued in March 2023.

This aspect is worth mentioning since SEBI has proposed to deal particularly with those sophisticated manipulators where there is multiple evidence of crime committed all over but it is difficult to pinpoint the parties and find them guilty. Very specific examples of what had transpired in certain actual cases (names withheld in paper but not difficult to guess).

SEBI noted that while several Supreme Court rulings have generally supported the stand of SEBI in using circumstantial evidence of a clear pattern of suspicious transactions, it was also noted that this was not sufficient enough, and a generic set of enabling provisions was needed. The Supreme Court ruling allowed SEBI to use the lower benchmark of circumstantial evidence to indicate guilt. But that too required crossing certain hurdles which sophisticated market manipulators and legal technicalities could make the process difficult and delayed.

Hence, SEBI has proposed a set of provisions which would deem the parties involved as guilty if a certain pattern of suspicious trading is observed. This does not mean that this one-sided judgement of SEBI would close the matter. The parties would still get a chance to present their case and rebut the finding and allegation. In short, the onus shifts to the parties to rebut the allegations or be deemed guilty.

These provisions, if implemented, could certainly make the task of SEBI easier. But there is also a flip side to this. Presently, SEBI carries out extensive investigations to establish guilt. It is possible that these efforts may be diluted if such deeming provisions are available.

Also, such provisions are like putting a genie out of the bottle, which cannot be put back in. SEBI may be perceived to be exercising arbitrariness. While good benchmarks are provided before the provisions are applied, one would not know how they are applied in actual cases. Here again, considering the rewards, large sophisticated abusers of the law may continue to escape. Smaller parties on the other hand may find it difficult to hire expensive legal advice to present a credible and effective defence to shift the onus back.

It is also doubtful how courts would view such provisions, which almost give a one-sided power to SEBI to a large extent. Whether such provisions are held arbitrary and unconstitutional? This aspect becomes even more important when we consider that it is SEBI, who would make Regulations to implement this proposal and not Parliament made law or amendments. In the nearly six months after its introduction, there does not seem to be any indication from SEBI of whether and how it is going to implement these proposals. But, to conclude, a fair re-haul of the law is certainly needed to counter the brazen cases of market abuse.

Hindu Law: Rights of an Illegitimate Child in Joint Property

INTRODUCTION

The codified and uncodified aspects of Hindu Law deal with several personal issues pertaining to a Hindu. One such issue relates to the rights of an illegitimate child, in relation to inheritance to ancestral property, self-acquired property of his parents, right to claim maintenance, etc. This feature has earlier (March 2021) examined the position of the rights of an illegitimate child. However, recently a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun, C.A. No. 2844/2011, Order dated:1st September, 2023, has examined the position of such a child’s rights in respect of joint family / HUF property.

VOID / VOIDABLE MARRIAGE

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, applies to and codifies the law relating to marriages between Hindus. It states that an illegitimate child is one who is born out of a marriage which is not valid. S.16(1) of this Act provides that even if a marriage is null and void, any child born out of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be considered to be a legitimate child. Hence, all children of void/voidable marriages under the Act are treated as legitimate. The Act also provides that such children would be entitled to rights in the property of their parents.

SUCCESSION TO PROPERTIES OF OTHER RELATIVES

However, while such a child born out of a void or voidable wedlock would be deemed to be legitimate, the Act does not confer any rights on the property of any person other than his parents. This is expressly provided in s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

In JiniaKeotin&Ors. vs. Kumar SitaramManjhi&Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 730, the Supreme Court held that s.16 of the Act, while engrafting a rule of fiction in ordaining the children, though illegitimate, to be treated as legitimate, notwithstanding that the marriage was void or voidable chose also to confine its application, so far as succession or inheritance by such children is concerned to the properties of the parents only. It held that conferring any further rights upon such children would be going against the express mandate of the legislature.

This view was once again endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bharatha Matha & Anr vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan, AIR 2010 SC 2685 where it held that a child born of void or voidable marriage is not entitled to claim inheritance in ancestral coparcenary property but is entitled only to claim share in self-acquired properties, if any.

CONTROVERSY IN THE ISSUE

The above issue of whether illegitimate children can succeed in ancestral properties or claim a share in the HUF was given a new twist by the Supreme Court in 2011 in the case of Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun (2011) 11 SCC 1. The question which was dealt with in that case was whether illegitimate children were entitled to a share in the coparcenary property or whether their share was limited only to the self-acquired property of their parents under s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act? It disagreed with the earlier views taken by the Supreme Court in JiniaKeotin (supra), BharathaMatha (supra) and in Neelamma&Ors. vs. Sarojamma&Ors (2006) 9 SCC 612, wherein the Court held that illegitimate children would only be entitled to a share of the self-acquired property of the parents and not to the joint Hindu family property.

The Court observed that the Act uses the word “property” and had not qualified it with either self-acquired property or ancestral property. It has been kept broad and general. It explained that if they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be discriminated against and they will be at par with other legitimate children, and be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The prohibition contained in s. 16(3) will apply to such children only with respect to the property of any person other than their parents. Qua their parents, they can succeed in all properties! The Court held that there was a need for a progressive and dynamic interpretation of Hindu Law since Society was changing. It stressed the need to recognise the status of such children which had been legislatively declared legitimate and simultaneously recognisethe rights of such children in the property of their parents. This was a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who were as innocent as any other children.

The Supreme Court also explained the modus operandi of succession to ancestral property. Such children will be entitled only to a share in their parents’ property but they cannot claim it in their own right. Logically, on the partition of an ancestral property, the property falling in the share of the parents of such children would be regarded as their self-acquired and absolute property. In view of the Amendment, such illegitimate children will have a share in such property since such children were equated under the amended law with legitimate offspring of a valid marriage. The only limitation even after the Amendment was that during the lifetime of their parents such children could not ask for partition but they could exercise this right only after the death of their parents.

Hence, the Court in Revanasiddappa (supra) concluded that it was constrained to take a view different from the one taken earlier by it in JiniaKeotin (supra), Neelamma (supra) and Bharatha Matha (supra) on s. 16(3) of the Act. Nevertheless, since all these decisions were of Two-Member Benches, it requested the Chief Justice of India that the matter should be reconsidered by a Larger Bench.

CURRENT STATUS

After a long wait of more than 12 years, the Supreme Court Larger Bench has finally resolved the matter in the case of Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun, C.A. No. 2844/2011, Order dated: 1st September, 2023.The issue for determination, as framed by the Supreme Court, was “Whether such an illegitimate child, who has been deemed to be legitimate by virtue of s.16 of the Act, can succeed only to the self-acquired properties of his parents or even to their ancestral properties?” The Court was also examining whether such a child could become a coparcener in the HUF.

LEGITIMACY UNDER SECTION 16

The first issue settled by the Apex Court was that legitimacy bestowed by s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act was irrespective of whether (i) such a child was born before or after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1976 which introduced s.16; (ii) a decree of nullity was granted in respect of that marriage under the Act and the marriage was held to be void. Further, where a voidable marriage has been annulled by a decree of nullity, a child ‘begotten or conceived’ before the decree has been made, is deemed to be their legitimate child, notwithstanding the decree.

HUF AND HINDU SUCCESSION ACT

The Court examined the meaning of an HUF and its genesis under the Hindu Law. It also examined the rights of coparceners to succeed to the share of their father in the HUF in light of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This could be by way of a Will or by intestate succession. In the case of intestate succession, the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act provide for Class I heirs to succeed to the property of a Hindu male. In this situation, the Court noted that the Hindu Succession Act did not distinguish between legitimate Class I heirs and illegitimate heirs. The fact that legitimacy has been bestowed upon the children of a void marriage by virtue of s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act would mean that no distinction can be drawn between those children who were legitimate and those who are deemed to be legitimate.

INTESTATE PROPERTY INCLUDES SHARE IN HUF

All property of an intestate Hindu male was to be divided amongst his Class I heirs. The Apex Court observed that the phrase “all property” means all property belonging to the intestate and included the share in his HUF. The Hindu Succession Act also provided for a notional partition of the HUF to determine the share of the deceased in the HUF. The legislature had provided for the ascertainment of the share of the deceased on a notional basis. The expression ‘share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place’ indicated that this share represented the property of the deceased. Where a person died intestate, the property would devolve in terms of the Hindu Succession Act. The Court held that in the distribution of the property of the deceased who had died intestate, a child who was recognised as legitimate under the Hindu Marriage Act would be entitled to a share. Since this was the property that would fall to the share of the intestate after the national partition, it belonged to the intestate. Hence, where the deceased had died intestate, the devolution of this property must be among the children – legitimate as well as those conferred with legitimacy by the Legislature. The Court gave an illustration of a HUF with 4 coparceners. Of these, C2, one coparcener dies and is survived by his wife and two children. One of the two children is illegitimate but deemed to be legitimate as above. A notional partition of the HUF would take place, and C2’s share would be determined as 1/4th and this 1/4th would be split equally amongst his widow, his legitimate child and his illegitimate child. Each of them would get a 1/3rd share in C2’s 1/4th share, i.e., a 1/12th share in the HUF.

ENTITLED TO SHARE BUT NOT A COPARCENER

However, the Court held that the illegitimate child would not ipso facto become a coparcener in the HUF. He would get a share in his deceased father’s HUF share but not directly become a coparcener in the HUF. This is because the HUF property is not the exclusive property of his father. S.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act has an express carve out that a deemed legitimate child cannot succeed to properties of other relatives. To make him a coparcener would violate s.16(3). It noted several amendments during the year to the Hindu Succession Act to remove gender biases. But the legislature has not stipulated that a child whose legitimacy is protected by s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, would become a coparcener by birth.

The very concept of a coparcener postulated the acquisition of an interest by birth. If a person born from a void or voidable marriage to whom legitimacy was conferred by s.16 were to have an interest by birth in a HUF, this would affect the rights of others apart from the parents of the child. Holding that the consequence of legitimacy under s.16 was to place such an individual on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary would be contrary to the provisions of s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

CONCLUSION

The issue relating to HUF rights of illegitimate children has been quite contentious and litigation-prone. After a long wait, the issue has reached finality. The Court has aimed for a balancing approach by protecting the rights of the deemed legitimate child on the one hand and also preserving the rights of other HUF coparceners on the other hand!

Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) — Examining the Application of PARI-PASSU and PRO-RATA Concepts

Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) play a vital role in India’s economy. They provide risk capital in the form of equity/quasi-equity capital for pre-revenue stage companies, early and late-stage ventures, growth companies that wish to scale their operations, and even companies facing distress.

The size of AIFs has grown to a significant amount over the years. There are around 1,100 AIFs registered with SEBI with over 8.44 trillion INR in commitments (as of 30th June, 2023), witnessing an annual growth rate of over 30 per cent.

Considering the need of the economy for such funds, its growth and the huge amount committed, SEBI, aptly supported by its policy advisory committee, is continuously making sincere attempts to ensure transparency and good governance. Recently in May 2023 SEBI, in its consultation paper titled “Consultation paper on proposal with respect to pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors in Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs)”, has empathetically asserted:

“Considering that fair treatment of investors is a core and inherent principle for a pooled investment vehicle, as also evident from global references given above it is essential to expressly provide that AIFs shall not provide any differential treatment to investors which affects economic rights of other investors. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly provide for fair treatment of all investors as a principle under the AIF Regulations, from the perspective of investor protection.” (para 31 — emphasis supplied)

The objective of this article is to critically examine the extant regulations on pari-passu and pro-rata rights of investors in AIF and the fair treatment of all investors as regards investors joining a fund at different points in time.

What is pari-passu?

Pari-passu is a Latin term that means “ranking equally and without preference.” Applied in the context of investments, pari-passu means that multiple parties to an investment joining an investment scheme at different points of time with varying amounts are treated the same, “ranking equally and without preference — in the sense that the assets or securities would be managed with equal preference or a preference weighted on the value or amount invested and when invested in either the asset or securities.”

Fundraising by an AIF scheme/ fund:

SEBI Regulations governing AIFs viz. SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012, contemplate that a fund approved by SEBI may be able to attract investors to such a fund at different points of time, committing varying amounts (subject to the minimum prescribed). The terms used for investors joining at different points of time are (i) investors joining at the time of First Closing, (ii) investors joining at Subsequent Closing(s), and (iii) investors joining at the time of Final Closing. The Private Placement Memorandum (PPM — explained later) (in section VII) requires each scheme to specify indicative timelines for Initial closing, Subsequent closing(s), Final closing, Commitment Period and Term of the Fund/Scheme.

Considering the above, there is a need to place all these investors joining at different points of time with varying amounts on equal footing.

In mutual fund equity schemes where daily NAV based on the market prices is readily available, all subsequent investors join based on this daily NAV at the time of joining.

However, the investments by most AIFs are in private equity/ quasi equity. These investments have certain time frame depending on the period of nurturing required and success and growth of the ventures. They are illiquid investments and can’t have daily market value. Considering this limitation, the best way to put these investors joining at different points of time with varying amounts is by ensuring equal IRR (Internal Rate of Return) or equal RoI (Return on Investment) for all investors. The implementation of this system may be practically cumbersome and, therefore, in order to simplify the process, in cases of AIFs, this is ensured by what is popularly known as equalization method. In this method, there are three different types of contributions which investors joining during subsequent closing(s) and final closing have to pay — Catch-up Contribution, Compensatory Contribution and Management Fees Additional Contribution. The first two viz. Catch-up Contribution and Compensatory Contributions are meant to place subsequent investors on equal footing vis-à-vis earlier investors and therefore, are distributed by the fund amongst earlier investors on pro-rata basis.

In this article, I am making an attempt to specifically focus on the following:

• The precise nature of Catch-up Contribution and Compensatory Contribution.

• How they are quantified, collected from subsequent contributors (investors) and distributed pro-rata amongst original/ prior contributors.

In Annexure 1, I have brought out the key concepts and the regulatory framework that guides the functioning of AIFs.

The subject of the economic rights of investors during fundraising by AIF — specifically in the context of Category II AIF is very significant.

MODEL CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT:

Every investor investing in an AIF has to enter into an agreement which is called a Contribution / Subscription Agreement.

The format of PPM provided by SEBI in Part A in Section VII titled ‘Principal Terms of the Fund/Scheme’ requires the Investment Manager to specify the indicative timeline for various closings, the payments unitholders participating in subsequent closings have to make (like catch-up contribution, compensatory contribution).

SIDBI, which manages Fund of Funds, on its website, provides a model contribution agreement.

https://www.sidbivcf.in/files/new_announcement/Model per cent20Contrubution per cent20Agreement per cent20for per cent20AIFs.pdf

The relevant definitions for the present subject are:

• “Catch-up Contribution”

• “Compensatory Contribution”

• “Final Closing”

• “First Closing”

• “Subsequent Closing”

• “Subsequent Contributor”

Clause 3 of this model agreement deals with the “Induction of new contributors and the issue of Units.”

For brevity, the same are not reproduced here.

On reading the above definitions and clause 3 of the model agreement and requirements of PPM, it conveys:

1. At every subsequent closing up to the Final Closing, subsequent contributors shall pay Catch-up Contribution as well as Compensatory Contribution.

2. Both these amounts collected by the Fund shall be distributed amongst the contributors who were admitted prior to such subsequent closing pro rata in proportion to their respective capital contributions.

Considering the above-stated provisions usually contained in all contribution/ subscription agreements and similar provisions contained in PPMs, it is evident that AIFs have to collect catch-up and compensatory contributions from subsequent investors and distribute the same pro-rata amongst prior/ earlier investors.

The next step is to understand how these two contributions are quantified, collected and distributed.

The methodology of quantifying, collecting and distributing Catch-up Contributions and Compensatory Contributions are explained using case studies.

CATCH-UP CONTRIBUTION:

Before a private equity fund is launched, the IM solicits commitments to invest from potential investors. These soft commitments are not legally binding and do not represent future subscriptions. They, however, indicate as to how much capital might be raised.

Once the IM decides to launch the fund, the PPM is published and circulated amongst potential/prospective investors. Thereafter, hard commitments are made by investors with whom contribution/subscription agreements are signed.

The IM can seek to raise additional commitments and capital at any time between the First Closing and the Final Closing.

The above is illustrated below by a hypothetical case of Rahul Fund as at First Closing on 30th November, 2018 (Table no. 1):

 

Investor

COMMITMENT(INR)

OWNERSHIP

The IM 5,00,00,000 10 per cent
Investor1 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
TOTAL 50,00,00,000 100 per cent

The Fund issues a drawdown notice dated 1st December, 2018 calling upon the investors to contribute 10 per cent aggregating to Rs. 5,00,00,000 and all investors send their contributions by 31st December, 2018. Accordingly, the above data will appear as under (Table no. 2):

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1
The IM 5,00,00,000 10 per cent 50,00,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
TOTAL 50,00,00,000 100 per cent 5,00,00,000

One year after the Initial Closing, the IM decides to seek additional capital commitments and finds an investor (Investor 4 in the table below). Rahul Fund’s investor allocation will now be as under (Table no. 3):

 

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1
The IM 5,00,00,000 8.33 per cent 50,00,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 16.67 per cent NIL
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 100 per cent 5,00,00,000

 

With this additional investor’s commitment, the initial investors’ ownership has been diluted, yet the new investor hasn’t paid anything into the fund. Investor 4 could simply make the initial drawdown payment to balance things out, but this wouldn’t accurately compensate the initial investors and would eat into Fund’s IRRs.

Instead, an equalisation needs to be completed.

What is equalisation — catch-up contribution?

Equalisation is the process of truing up all investors as if they had all joined a fund on its initial closing date. The process of doing so is multi-pronged. This is called catch-up contribution.

First, Investor 4 pays in drawdown 1 on 31st December, 2019. But rather than making the payment to the fund, the payment is allocated across the initial investors, according to their percentage of ownership of the fund (Table no. 4).

 

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1 Returned/called Adj.Drawdown1 Per cent drawdown
The IM 5,00,00,000 8.33% 50,00,000 (8,35,000) 41,65,000 8.33
Investor1 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 16.67% NIL 83,35,000 83,35,000 16.67
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 100% 5,00,00,000 NIL 5,00,00,00 100

The magic of equalisation is putting Investor 4 as if Investor 4 had joined the Fund at the time of initial closing — at par with the IM and other three Investors 1, 2 & 3.
Clause 3.1.of the model agreement also states:

“The Investment Manager shall promptly distribute Catch-up Contributions amongst the Contributors who were admitted prior to such Subsequent Closing pro rata in proportion to their respective Capital Contributions and such amounts distributed to the Contributors shall be added back to their Unpaid Capital Commitments, ……….”

This provision is illustrated as under (Table no. 5):

INVESTOR COMMITMENT DRAWDOWN 1 Unpaid capital commitment Returned/called Adj.Drawdown1 Adjusted unpaid capital
The IM 5,00,00,000 50,00,000 4,50,00,000 (8,35,000) 41,65,000 4,58,35,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 NIL nil 83,35,000 83,35,000 9,16,65,000
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 5,00,00,000 45,00,00,000 NIL 5,00,00,00 55,00,00,000

From this Table No. 5, it is evident that the share in catch-up contribution received by The IM and Investors 1, 2 and 3 adds up to unpaid capital commitment by all four of them. This, in essence, means that the share in the catch-up contribution received is part refund of the amount they had already paid. This is relevant in deciding the taxability, if any, of this share in catch-up contribution received by original/ prior investors.

The cardinal principle of an AIF is — All investors have to be treated at par — equally treated (barring a few issues like set-up fees, and management fee structure). This ‘catch-up contribution’ has the effect of putting all investors on an equal footing. The outcome should be that, having re-balanced contributed capital, the amount of uncalled capital for each partner is consistent with the percentage ownership of each partner after this subsequent closing.

A basic premise in the treatment of subsequent closings is that subsequent investors should be treated as if they had invested at the beginning.

Following this principle, the new/subsequent investors who join at a later date are put at par with original/ prior investors following this system of catch-up contribution and its pro rata distribution amongst prior/ original investors.

Note that, so far, it appears that the fund does not receive cash on 31st December, 2019; the net effect of the cash flows shown is zero as the flows simply re-balance the investor’s capital

COMPENSATORY CONTRIBUTION:

However, there is one more area where also, both these types of investors need to be put at par — time value of money.

In the given case, the original three investors and the IM had put their money by December, 2018. Whereas the new investor 4 puts his pro rata contribution in December, 2019 — after a lapse of a year. This issue is addressed by what is called Compensatory Contribution in India and Equalisation Interest abroad. The same is amplified as under.

What is Equalisation Interest — called Compensatory Contribution in India?

In the given case, the IM and 3 original investors paid their first drawdown on 31st December, 2018. Whereas, Investor 4 pays Rs. 83,35,000 only on 31st December, 2019 — after a time lapse of 1 year. To compensate for this, Investor 4 also pays compensatory contribution at a specified rate per annum. Normally, this rate is the Hurdle Rate provided in the Contribution/ Subscription Agreement. This compensatory contribution is also distributed amongst original/ prior investors pro-rata.

The collection of Compensatory Contribution from the new investor and distribution of the same amongst the IM and original three investors will put all investors at par vis-à-vis each other. Any drawdown(s) thereafter will be paid by all the 5 investors as per their respective shares of unpaid capital commitments.

The impact of Compensatory Contribution is illustrated on the following page:

INVESTORS DATE AMOUNT Per cent HOLDING Equalisation Interest
Original Investors:
Investment Manager 31-12-2018  2,00,00,000 7.41 per cent  1,95,09,000
Investor 1 31-12-2018  20,00,00,000 74.07 per cent  19,50,11,000
Investor 2 31-12-2018  5,00,00,000 18.52  per cent  4,87,60,000
Final Closing:
Investor 3 30-06-2021  94,00,00,000 -26,32,80,000

Investor 3 pays interest at 10 per cent p.a. (compounded quarterly), being hurdle rate, from 31st December, 2018 to 30th June, 2021.

The readers will notice the loss original investors would suffer (almost close to 100 per cent of the invested amount) if an investment manager decides to waive this equalisation interest.

These calculations look relatively easy and straightforward, but it is easy to imagine how they quickly become increasingly complex as factors multiply. Funds might have multiple capital calls that they need to track between the initial and subsequent closing, as well as multiple closings with different investors on-boarding at different times.

Whether Investment Manager has the right to waive Catch-up and/or Compensatory Contributions?

Clause 3 of the Model Contribution Agreement deals with the Induction of new contributors and issue of Units). This clause states — “The Investment Manager shall however, have the power to waive or increase/reduce, subject to the consent of the Advisory Committee, the Compensatory Contribution on Catch-up Contributions to be received and accepted at such Subsequent Closings.”

In this context, readers’ attention is invited to SEBI’s Consultation paper with respect to pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors issued in May 20231. In this paper, inter alia, it is stated, “While the above principle is not explicitly stated in AIF Regulations, maintaining pro-rata rights of investors in each investment of the scheme of AIF, including while making distribution of investment proceeds, is an essential characteristic of the AIF structure.”


1. https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/may-2023/consultation-paper-on-proposal-with-respect-to-pro-rata-and-pari-passu-rights-of-investors-of-alternative-investment-funds-aifs-_71540.html

Considering the above, the right, if any, of the investment manager to waive catch-up and/ or compensatory contribution has to be subject to conditions, and the fund and the trustee are responsible for ensuring pari-passu rights of all investors — initial as well as subsequent — at all times.

As mentioned earlier, accounts of each fund have to be audited each year and the auditor may consider examining, during the course of audit, whether the fund has collected and distributed catch-up as well as compensatory contributions from subsequent investors or not. And, if not, the auditor needs to examine whether such an act affects the pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors or not. If the auditor finds that it affects this essential characteristic of the AIF structure, it may be his responsibility to suitably report the same.

Taxation of Catch-Up Contribution & Compensatory Contribution:

Also, considering that category II AIF enjoys pass-through status, it is important to understand the income-tax implications of the catch-up contribution and compensatory contribution collected from subsequent contributors and distributed by the Fund amongst prior/ original contributors.

No attempt is made here to analyse income tax implications of these two amounts either in the hands of the Fund or in the hands of contributors (both original as well as subsequent contributors).

However, the potential tax issues are listed as under:

1. The Fund:

• Whether it is a business income and therefore liable to be taxed in the hands of the Fund,

• If not, whether, while passing on both these amounts to original/ prior investors, whether the Fund is required to deduct tax at source? If yes, whether on both the amounts or only on equalisation interest (compensatory contribution)?

2. Subsequent contributors (new investors):

• Whether catch-up contribution as well as compensatory contribution will be treated as ‘cost’ while computing their taxable capital gain? If not, does it mean that same will not give any tax relief in respect thereof to such subsequent investors?

• Whether compensatory contribution which is in the nature of equalization interest (and not actual interest) can be claimed as deduction while computing gross taxable income of such a subsequent contributor in the year of payment?

3. Original / prior contributors:

• Whether these amounts are ‘capital receipts’ or ‘revenue receipts’?

• Whether catch-up contribution received can be adjusted against the amounts paid against earlier drawdown(s) to reduce that amount?

• If not, whether the catch-up contribution is liable to be taxed as capital gain or as income from other sources?

• Whether compensatory contribution (which is in the nature of equalisation interest) liable to be taxed as ‘interest income’? Or, whether the same too will go to reduce the cost already incurred? [NOTE: It is important to note that these so called ‘subsequent investors’ too will qualify to receive both ‘catch-up contribution’ as well as ‘compensatory contribution’ whenever there is any fresh round of fund-raising post their investment.]

CONCLUSION

Considering the above, I submit that it is the responsibility of the Investment Managers, PPM Auditors and Investors to assess if the true principles of catch up and compensatory contributions have been followed.

i. The investment managers have to decide whether to adopt equalisation method at the times of each subsequent closing(s) and final closing.

ii. The AIF PPM Auditors (who can be internal/external auditors or legal professionals), while conducing audits of PPM and annual accounts, have the responsibility to examine the actions and decisions of the IM and, if required, to report on the same.

iii. The investors too need to be vigilant as to their rights to receive catch-up and compensatory contributions whenever they notice that the fund in which they have invested has raised fresh commitments.

The writer has come across an instance where the IM, using its discretionary power, waived these contributions even though such a waiver negatively impacted the investor’s economic rights in his regard.

The annual audit of PPM compliance is mandated in the interests of investors. Considering this, SEBI regulations must provide that this annual audit report should also be shared with each investor along with corrective action(s) taken by AIFs. Considering the automation in back-office systems, the time allowed for conducting such an audit too needs to be reduced to maximum 90 days. SEBI also needs to take initiative to form an investors forum which can, on an on-going basis, disseminate information to investors in the matter of their economic rights and representatives of such a forum are included in alternative investment policy advisory committee.

ANNEXURE 1

The background on AIFs is briefly stated for readers’ quick references and understanding.

What is an Alternative Investment Fund (“AIF”)?

Alternative Investment Fund or AIF means any fund established or incorporated in India which is a privately pooled investment vehicle which collects funds from sophisticated investors, whether Indian or foreign, for investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy (stated in PPM) for the benefit of its investors.

AIF does not include funds covered under the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996, SEBI (Collective Investment Schemes) Regulations, 1999 or any other regulations of the Board to regulate fund management activities. Further, certain exemptions from registration are provided under the AIF Regulations to family trusts set up for the benefit of ‘relatives‘, employee welfare trusts or gratuity trusts set up for the benefit of employees, ‘holding companies‘ etc. [Ref. Regulation 2(1)(b)]

(source – SEBI FAQs)
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1471519155273.pdf

AIFs are regulated by the capital market regulator’s SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 as amended from time to time and circulars issued by SEBI.

https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/apr-2017/sebi-alternative-investment-funds-regulations-2012-last-amended-on-march-6-2017-_34694.html

SEBI’s Master Circular dated 31st July, 2023 on AIFs:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/master-circulars/jul-2023/master-circular-for-alternative-investment-funds-aifs-_74796.html

SEBI circulars on AIFs:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/home/HomeAction.do?doListingAll=yes&cid=25

SEBI also has formed Alternative Investment Policy Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Mr N R. Narayana Murthy. This committee has published three reports which are available on SEBI’s website.

Report dated 31st December, 2015:

https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1453278327759.pdf

Report dated 26th November, 2017:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/jan-2018/1516356419898.pdf

In terms of SEBI AIF Regulations it is mandatory to obtain certificate of registration from SEBI for enabling AIFs to operate under one of the following 3 categories:

• Category I — AIFs which invest in start-up or early stage ventures or social ventures or SMEs or infrastructure. Includes venture capital funds, SME funds, social venture funds, infrastructure funds, angel funds, etc.

• Category II — AIFs, which do not fall in Category I or Category III and which do not undertake leverage or borrowing other than to meet day-to-day operational requirements. Includes private equity funds or debt funds for which no specific incentives or concessions are given by the government or any other regulator.

• Category III — AIFs, which employ diverse or complex trading strategies and may employ leverage including through investment in listed or unlisted derivatives. Includes hedge funds or funds, which trade for short term returns, or open-ended funds, for which no specific incentives or concessions are given by the government or any other regulator.

Private Placement Memorandum (PPM):

The PPM is a risk disclosure document (akin to a prospectus issued by a company making public issue) used for marketing a fund to its potential/ prospective investors.

In terms of Regulation 12, AIF has to, at least 30 days prior to the launch of a scheme, submit Placement Memorandum with the Board and the Board may communicate its comments which will have to be incorporated in the placement memorandum before it can be released to prospective investors. Circular dated 5th February, 2020 issued by SEBI has prescribed format for PPM.

The PPM is divided into two parts — Part A requiring minimum disclosures in respect of 15 sections listed in annexure I to the circular and Part B where any additional information in relation to the Fund/Scheme, Manager, investment team which does not form part of the standard disclosures and the section-wise supplementary section under the earlier sections, can be indicated. Considering a sizable amount invested by each investor and high risks associated with such investments, investors should read the PPM and understand the precise nature of the fund where the amount is being invested, particularly provisions which directly or indirectly affect investors’ economic and legal rights.

http://www.aibi.org.in/Circulars/Disclosure per cent20Standards per cent20for per cent20Alternative per cent20Investment per cent20Funds per cent20(AIFs).pdf

https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/commondocs/feb-2020/an_1_p.pdf

Economic rights:

The parity of economic rights between investors of AIFs is necessary as well as critical. It is observed that at times, the PPMs adopt different practices which provide differential benefits/rights to certain investors over others. Few such terms on which differential economic rights are provided by AIFs are Drawdown timeline, Hurdle rate of return/performance linked fee, Transfer rights, Information rights, Compensatory contribution for investors on-boarded in subsequent closings including catch-up contribution for maintaining pro-rata rights of investors, and Co-investment rights.

Even though PPMs may provide equal rights to investors in these matters, the IMs may, using their discretion, give such preferential rights to a select group of investors or waive catch-up as well as compensatory contributions. As the minimum investment amount prescribed is rupees one crore, general perception is that the investors are sophisticated and capable of taking decision to invest after properly studying PPM and understanding its contents. However, this perception in reality may not be correct.

AIFs and AUDIT REQUIREMENTS:

To complement the measures prescribed by SEBI, chartered accountants as auditors and consultants, also have an important role to play to ensure orderly growth of AIFs and protection of investors’ economic rights.

The accounts of each fund managed by a registered AIF have to be audited annually by a qualified auditor. Each AIF has to provide Annual Report to all its investors including financial information of investee companies and detailed risk profiles. The auditor’s report along with audited accounts are shared with the investors in each such fund along with the annual report. In order to further protect investors’ interests, SEBI circular has introduced a specific requirement that the terms of a contribution or subscription agreement (by any name it may be called) signed with each investor must be aligned with the terms of the Private Placement Memorandum (PPM — what is PPM is explained earlier) and contribution agreement cannot go beyond the terms of the PPM. The Investment Managers are required to ensure that they carry out all activities of the AIF in accordance with the PPM and that they should maintain fairness in ensuring that investors economic and legal rights are of paramount importance.
Also, with a view to ensure that the management team has complied with the terms of PPM, SEBI has introduced a requirement for annual audits of PPM. The results of the audit and any necessary corrective action must be shared with (i) the Trustee, Board, or Designated Partners of the AIF; (ii) the Board of the Manager; and (iii) SEBI within six months of the financial year’s end.

AIFs that have not received any funding from investors are exempt from the requirement of audit compliance. However, within six months of the end of the financial year, a Certificate from a Chartered Accountant declaring that no money has been raised must be provided to support this claim.

Considering SEBI’s persistent attempts to increase good governance and risks management in the management of AIFs through compliances and disclosures, management teams face number of challenges in their functioning and time is not far when large sized funds will need external audit firms to conduct internal audits to assist the management.
Considering the above, such high risk non-traditional investments present number of challenges to chartered accountants as auditors, tax experts & consultants to ensure that they discharge their expected obligations with due care and caution.

Considering the huge amount generated by AIFs, the responsibilities cast on auditors are enormous and, therefore, the auditors need to be familiar with various special features of AIFs, particularly economic rights of investors. One such important feature is — investors joining a fund at different points of time and ensuring they all stand in equal footing — paripassu.

In May 2023, SEBI had come out with several proposals for stricter regulations of AIFs. SEBI issued four consultation papers.

AIF Taxation:

Category I and Category II AIFs enjoy pass-through status. This subject is known to most tax practitioners.
Government’s role in AIF Funding:

Fund of Funds:

Government of India (GoI) created access to a large capital of funds for startups in India, through the scheme “Fund of Funds for Start-ups” to create a nation of job creators than job seekers. This Fund is operated by SIDBI. https://www.sidbivcf.in/en

Self-Reliant India (SRI) Fund — Mother-Daughters Fund:

MSME Sector is very important for the Indian economy in terms of contribution to GDP and employment generation. Considering that the GoI has set-up SRI Fund (Mother Fund) to assist MSME sector through Daughters Fund in the form of Category II Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) who are oriented towards providing funding support to MSMEs as growth capital, in the form of equity or quasi-equity. The details are available at https://dcmsme.gov.in/Final per cent20SRI per cent20Operating per cent20Guidelines per cent20 per cent20approved per cent20by per cent20Minister per cent20 per cent2017 per cent2008 per cent202021.pdf

The SRI Fund is managed by NSIC Venture Capital Fund. The details are available at http://www.nvcfl.co.in/AboutUs

From Published Accounts

COMPILERS’ NOTE

Reporting on the impact of climate change and steps taken to mitigate the same and become ‘carbon neutral’ is today increasingly gaining importance. Auditors are also increasingly required to consider these impacts on the financial statements (in many jurisdictions, regulations also mandate auditors to do so) and modify the audit plan and reporting accordingly.

Given below is an instance of such reporting by auditors and corresponding disclosure in Notes to the financial statements.

A similar extract was given in this column on page 75 of BCAJ December, 2020. If a comparison is to be made, the level of disclosures and reporting has significantly increased since then.

BP P.L.C (UK)

From Independent Auditor’s Report on Consolidated Financial Statements for the year 31st December, 2022.

KEY AUDIT MATTER

The potential impact of climate change and the energy transition (impacting PP&E, goodwill, intangible assets, investments in joint ventures and provisions).

Climate change impacts BP’s business in several ways as set out in the strategic report on pages 1 to 76 of the Annual Report and Note 1 of the financial statements on page 185 (reproduced below). It represents a strategic challenge and a key focus of management. The related risks that we have identified for our audit are as follows:

Forecast assumptions used in assessing the value-in-use of oil and gas PP&E assets within BP’s balance sheet for impairment testing, particularly oil and gas price assumptions and their interrelationship with forecast emissions costs, may not appropriately reflect changes in supply and demand due to climate change and the energy transition (see ‘Impairment of upstream oil and gas PP&E assets’ below).

The timing of expected future decommissioning expenditures with respect to oil and gas assets may need to be brought forward with a resulting increase in the present value of the associated liabilities due to the impact of climate change.

In addition, there is an exposure to decommissioning obligations that may revert back to BP in respect of assets transferred to third parties through historical divestments. The risk of exposure is enhanced due to the impacts of climate change which have heightened long-term financial resilience concerns for many industry participants.

Furthermore, provisions for decommissioning refining assets, not generally recognised on the basis that the potential obligations cannot be measured given their indeterminate settlement dates, might need to be recognised if reductions in demand due to climate change curtail their operational lives; (see ‘Decommissioning provisions’ below).

The recoverability of certain of the group’s $4.2 billion total Exploration and Appraisal (E&A) assets capitalised as of 31st December, 2022 (2021 $4.3 billion) are potentially exposed to climate change and the global energy transition risk factors (see Note 15). This is because a greater number of E&A projects may not proceed as a consequence of the energy transition leading to lower forecast future oil and gas prices, BP’s intention to reduce its hydrocarbon production (by around 25 per cent by 2030 relative to 2019 — see page 186) and potentially increased objections from stakeholders to the development of certain projects. The determination of whether and when E&A costs should be written off, impaired, or retained on the balance sheet as E&A assets, remains complex and continues to require significant management judgement.

The carrying value of BP’s refining assets within PP&E may no longer be recoverable, due to changes in supply and demand which arise as a consequence of climate change and the energy transition, for example, the adoption of electric vehicles in markets where BP has significant fuel refining activity. Management identified impairment indicators in respect of certain refineries during the year. As a result, impairment tests were performed to assess the recoverability of the refineries’ carrying values. As disclosed in Note 4 to the accounts on page 208, management has recorded an impairment charge of $1,366 million in respect of the Gelsenkirchen refinery in Germany, driven by changes in economic assumptions.

BP’s intention to reduce its hydrocarbon production (by around 25 per cent by 2030 relative to 2019 and the group’s wider strategy includes potentially disposing of certain higher emissions intensity upstream oil assets and others. As a consequence, for certain assets and investments judgment is required in the determination of the recoverable amount as to whether it should consider the estimated disposal proceeds from a third party, as a key input. Management recorded $2.9 billion (2021 $1.1 billion) of pre-tax impairment charges in 2022 for such potential disposals as described in Note 4. There is a risk that management judgments taken to determine whether impairment charges are required based on BP’s view of whether transactions are likely to proceed or not, and BP’s strategic appetite regarding the value of disposal consideration that would be accepted, are not reasonable.

The carrying value of the group’s investments in low-carbon energy assets may no longer be recoverable due to an increase in the low-carbon energy discount rate, project development costs increasing as a result of higher inflation and the impact that the increased activity within the sector, as a result of the energy transition, has had on the demand for low carbon energy supply chain goods and services.

The useful economic lives of the group’s refining assets may be shortened as society moves towards ‘net zero’ emissions targets and BP seeks to achieve its net zero ambition, such that the depreciation charge is materially understated. Of the total refining assets carried in the balance sheet, all but an immaterial residual value relating primarily to land and buildings will be fully depreciated by 2050. As disclosed in Note 1 to the accounts, management concluded that demand for refined products is expected to remain sufficient for the existing refineries to continue operating for the duration of their remaining useful lives and hence no changes to the useful economic lives of its refinery assets were required.

The total goodwill balance as of 31st December, 2022 is $12.4 billion, of which $7.2 billion relates to upstream oil and gas assets. The carrying values of goodwill may no longer be recoverable as a consequence of climate change and therefore may need to be impaired. For oil production & operations (OP&O), goodwill is allocated to Cash Generating Units (CGUs) in aggregate at the segment level and for gas & low carbon energy (G&LCE) goodwill is allocated to the hydrocarbon CGUs within the segment. The most significant assumption in the goodwill impairment tests affected by climate change relates to future oil and gas prices (see ‘Impairment of upstream oil and gas PP&E assets’ below). Given the significant level of headroom in the goodwill impairment tests, management identified no other assumption that could lead to a material misstatement of goodwill due to the energy transition and other climate change factors. Disclosures about sensitivities for goodwill are included within Note 14 on page 221. The Contracting and Procurement (C&P) segment has a goodwill balance of $4.7 billion, of which the most significant element is $2.5 billion relating to the Lubricants business. Notwithstanding the expected global transition to electric vehicles which may reduce demand for Lubricants, due to the substantial headroom in the most recent impairment test (as described in Note 14), management has assessed as remote the likelihood that the recoverable amount of goodwill is less than its carrying value.

Climate change-related litigation brought against BP, as disclosed in Note 33 to the financial statements, may lead to an outflow of funds requiring provision.

The above considerations were a significant focus of management during the period which led to this being a matter that we communicated to the audit committee, and which had a significant effect on the overall audit strategy. We therefore identified this as a key audit matter.

HOW THE SCOPE OF OUR AUDIT RESPONDED TO THE KEY AUDIT MATTER

Overall response
We held discussions with management, with our Climate Change specialists and within the group engagement team to identify the areas where we felt climate change could have a potential impact on the financial statements.

We also continued to utilise a climate change steering committee comprising a group of senior partners with specific climate change and technical audit and accounting expertise within Deloitte to provide an independent challenge to our key decisions and conclusions with respect to this area.

Audit procedures
The audit response related to two of the audit risks identified is set out under the key audit matters for ‘Impairment of upstream oil and gas PP&E assets’ on pages 157–159 and ‘Decommissioning provisions’ on pages 160–161. Other procedures are as follows:

In respect of the recoverability of E&A assets capitalised as of 31st December, 2022:

• We obtained an understanding of the group’s E&A write-off and impairment assessment processes and tested relevant internal controls, which specifically consider climate change-related risks;

• We challenged and evaluated management’s key E&A judgments with regard to the impairment criteria of IFRS 6 and BP’s accounting policy. We corroborated key judgments with internal and external evidence for assets that remained on the balance sheet. This included analysing evidence of future E&A plans, budgets and capital allocation decisions, assessing management’s key accounting judgement papers, reading meeting minutes and reviewing licence documentation and evidence of active dialogue with partners and regulators including negotiations to renew license or modify key terms;

• We assessed whether the progression of any projects that remain on the balance sheet would be inconsistent with elements of BP’s strategy and in particular its net zero carbon commitments and BP’s intention to reduce its hydrocarbon production (by around 25 per cent by 2030 relative to 2019 — see page 186).

We have considered the impact of potential changes in supply and demand on the group’s refining portfolio and reviewed internal and external market studies of future supply and demand. In relation to the Gelsenkirchen refinery impairment test, we assessed the valuation methodology, tested the integrity and mechanical accuracy of the impairment model and assessed the appropriateness of key assumptions and inputs, notably forecast refining margins and energy input costs, challenging and evaluating management’s assumptions by reference to third party data where available. We also evaluated management’s ability to forecast future cash flows and margins by comparing actual results to historical forecasts and tested management’s internal controls over the impairment test and related inputs.

We challenged management’s analysis that identified the specific assets that are likely to be disposed of by BP as part of its strategy. Where relevant, we challenged BP’s asset impairment assessments based on their estimated disposal proceeds and whether transactions are judged likely to proceed or not. We obtained evidence of any negotiations with third parties, carefully considered BP’s strategic intent in this context and challenged management’s assessment of the recoverable amounts for material transactions. We also tested relevant controls which covered both the recoverable amounts determined and the likelihood of transaction completion.

In respect of the impairment tests performed on certain low-carbon energy investments, we tested the result by:

• Testing the relevant controls over low-carbon energy impairment tests including controls over key assumptions and the discount rate;

• Assessing the low carbon energy discount rate with input from our valuation specialists;

• Challenging and evaluating the key assumptions within the impairment tests, which included capital and operating cost assumptions, forecast yield and power price assumptions, debt and interest assumptions, and the applicability of the Inflation Reduction Act legislation on investment credit assumptions and

• Testing the mechanical accuracy of the impairment models.

We challenged management’s assertion that no changes are required to the assessed useful economic lives of refining assets as a consequence of climate change factors. In doing this, we obtained third-party reports assessing future refined petroleum product demand for those countries which are included in our group’s full audit scope for the C&P segment. In particular, we considered the forecasts as set out in the IEA World Energy Outlook 2022 which shows that demand for refined petroleum products is expected to remain sufficient for at least the current remaining useful economic lives of the refineries such that current depreciation rates are appropriate, including under the Announced Pledges Scenario which is associated with a temperature rise of 1.7°C in 2100 (with a 50 per cent probability).

We performed procedures to satisfy ourselves that, other than future oil and gas price assumptions, there were no other assumptions in management’s oil and gas goodwill impairment tests to which reasonably possible changes due to the energy transition and other climate change factors could cause goodwill to be materially misstated. We obtained evidence which supported management’s conclusion that goodwill relating to the C&P segment activities is not impaired due to climate change or other factors.

With regards to the climate change litigation, we designed procedures specifically to respond to the risks that provisions could be understated or that contingent liability disclosures may be omitted or be inaccurate including:

• Holding discussions with the group general counsel and other senior BP lawyers regarding climate change matters;

• Conducting a search for climate change litigation and claims brought against the group;

• Making written inquiries of, and holding discussions with, external legal counsel advising BP in relation to climate change litigation and;

• Reviewing the contingent liability disclosures in the annual report on pages 257–259.

We read the other information included in the Annual Report and considered (a) whether there was any material inconsistency between the other information and the financial statements; or (b) whether there was any material inconsistency between the other information and our understanding of the business based on audit evidence obtained and conclusions reached in the audit.

KEY OBSERVATIONS

Key observations in relation to oil and gas price assumptions used in oil and gas PP&E asset impairment tests and the impact of climate change on decommissioning provisions are set out in the relevant key audit matter below.

We concluded that the key E&A assessments had been appropriately determined and the judgments management had made were appropriately supported. We did not identify any additional impairments or write-offs from the work we performed. We also confirmed management’s view that they did not consider that the progression of any of their E&A assets would be inconsistent with BP’s current strategy and management’s capital frame and capital allocation intentions in light of climate change and the energy transition.

We are satisfied:

• with the results of our procedures relating to the carrying value of refining assets and that the impairments recorded are reasonable;

• that management’s planned disposal-related asset impairment assessments are reasonable and we did not identify any additional material impairment;

• with the results of the low-carbon energy impairment tests, noting that the investment valuations remain sensitive in particular to capital and operating cost assumptions, the ability to secure project financing at the interest rates assumed, and for certain projects the pricing that can be secured under future power purchase contracts. The discount rate used by management was lower than we would have expected but this did not impact the outcome of the tests;

• with the results of our procedures relating to the assessment of the useful economic lives of refining assets and therefore depreciation charges, based on the market studies we read;

• with the sensitivity analysis disclosures around the energy transition and other climate change factors performed in respect of the goodwill balances; and that the group’s goodwill balances are not materially misstated;

• with management’s assertion that no provision should currently be made in respect of climate change litigation. Based on the audit evidence obtained both from internal and external legal counsel, we concluded that management’s disclosure of the contingent liabilities in respect of these matters is appropriate and that management’s other disclosures in the Annual Report relating to climate change are consistent with the financial statements and our understanding of the business.

Whilst many of BP’s oil and gas properties and refining assets are long-term in nature, by 2050, the remaining carrying value of assets currently being depreciated will be immaterial, this date being the target set by the majority of governments with ‘net zero’ emissions targets and also by BP, being Aim 1 of the ‘Getting to net zero’ strategy set out on page 45. At current rates of depreciation, depletion and amortisation (DD&A), the average remaining depreciable life of the upstream oil and gas PP&E (within the OP&O and G&LCE segments) is just six years and the refining assets (within the C&P segment) is thirteen years.

FROM NOTES ON FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Significant accounting policies, judgments, estimates and assumptions.

Judgments and estimates made in assessing the impact of climate change and the transition to a lower carbon economy.

Climate change and the transition to a lower carbon economy were considered in preparing the consolidated financial statements. These may have significant impacts on the currently reported amounts of the group’s assets and liabilities discussed below and on similar assets and liabilities that may be recognized in the future. The group’s assumptions for investment appraisal form part of an investment decision-making framework for currently unsanctioned future capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment, and intangibles including exploration and appraisal assets that is designed to support the effective and resilient implementation of BP’s strategy. The price assumptions used for investment appraisal include oil and gas price assumptions, which are producer prices and are therefore net of any future carbon prices that the purchaser may be required to pay, and an assumption of a single carbon emissions cost imposed on the producer in respect of operational greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (carbon dioxide and methane) in order to incentivize engineering solutions to mitigate GHG emissions on projects. The group’s oil and gas price assumptions for value-in-use impairment testing are aligned with those investment appraisal assumptions, except for 2023 oil and gas prices which reflect near-term market conditions. The assumptions for future carbon emissions costs in value-in-use impairment testing differ from the investment appraisal assumptions, are described below:

Impairment of property, plant and equipment and goodwill

The energy transition is likely to impact the future prices of commodities such as oil and natural gas which in turn may affect the recoverable amount of property, plant and equipment and goodwill in the oil and gas industry. Management’s best estimate of oil and natural gas price assumptions for value-in-use impairment testing was revised in 2022. Prices are disclosed in real 2021 terms. The Brent oil assumption from 2024 up to 2030 was increased to $70 per barrel to reflect near-term supply constraints before steadily declining to $45 per barrel by 2050 continuing to reflect the assumption that as the energy system decarbonizes, falling oil demand will cause oil prices to decline. The price assumptions for Henry Hub gas up to 2035 and up to 2050 were increased to $4.00 per MMBtu and $3.50 per MMBtu respectively, reflecting increased demand for US gas production to offset reduced Russian gas flows. The revised assumptions sit within the range of external scenarios considered by management and are in line with a range of transition paths consistent with the temperature goal of the Paris Climate Change Agreement, of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.

As noted above, the group’s investment appraisal process includes a single carbon emissions price assumption for the investment economics which is applied to BP’s anticipated share of BP’s forecast of the investments assets’ scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions where they exceed defined thresholds and is assumed to be payable by BP as the producer or as a non-operator. However, for value-in-use impairment testing on BP’s existing Cash Generating Units (CGUs), consistent with all other relevant cash flows estimated, BP is required to reflect management’s best estimate of any expected applicable carbon emission costs payable by BP, including where BP is not the operator, in the future for each jurisdiction in which the group has interests. This requires management’s best estimate of how future changes to relevant carbon emission cost policies and / or legislation are likely to affect the future cash flows of the group’s applicable CGUs, whether currently enacted or not. Future potential carbon pricing and/or costs of carbon emissions allowances are included in the value-in-use calculations to the extent that management has sufficient information to make such an estimate. Currently, this results in limited application of carbon price assumptions in value-in-use impairment tests given that carbon pricing legislation in most impacted jurisdictions where the group has interests is not in place and there is not sufficient information available as to the relevant policy makers’ future intentions regarding carbon pricing to support an estimate.

Where we consider that the outcome of a value-in-use impairment test could be significantly affected by a carbon price in place in any jurisdiction, this is incorporated into the value-in-use impairment testing cash flows. The most significant instances where a carbon price has been incorporated in this way are for the UK North Sea and Gelsenkirchen refinery, where assumptions of approximately £100 / tCO2e and an average of approximately €70 / tCO2e were applied in the 2022 value-in-use impairment tests respectively.

However, as BP’s forecast future prices are producer prices, the group considers it reasonable to assume that if, in addition to the costs already in place, further scope 1 and 2 emission costs were partially to be borne directly by oil and gas producers including BP in future and the prevalence of such costs were to become widespread, the gross oil and gas prices realised by producers would be correspondingly higher over the long term, resulting in no expected overall materially negative impacts on the group’s net cash flows. See significant judgments and estimates: recoverability of asset carrying values for further information including sensitivity analysis in relation to reasonably possible changes in the price assumptions and carbon costs.

Production assumptions within the upstream property, plant and equipment and goodwill value-in-use impairment tests reflect management’s current best estimate of future production of the existing upstream portfolio. The group sees the expected reduction in upstream hydrocarbon production by around 25 per cent by 2030 from its 2019 baseline (see page 11) being achieved through future active management, including divestments, and high-grading of the portfolio. Changes in upstream production since 2019 will be included in the best estimate to the extent the divestments have been announced or completed however, as the specific future changes to the remainder of the portfolio are not yet known, the current best estimate used for accounting purposes does not include the full extent of the expected upstream production reduction. See significant judgments and estimates: recoverability of asset carrying values and Note 14 for sensitivity analyses in relation to reasonably possible changes in production for upstream oil and gas properties and goodwill respectively.

Impairment reversals were recognized on certain upstream oil and gas properties partly as a result of the higher near-term assumptions. See Note 4 for further information. For the customers & products segment, though the energy transition may impact demand for certain refined products in the future, management anticipates sufficiently robust demand for the remainder of each refinery’s useful life.

Management will continue to review price assumptions as the energy transition progresses and this may result in impairment charges or reversals in the future.

Exploration and appraisal of intangible assets

The energy transition may affect the future development or viability of exploration prospects. A significant proportion of the group’s exploration and appraisal intangible assets were written off in 2020 and the recoverability of the remaining intangibles was considered during 2022. No significant write-offs were identified. These assets will continue to be assessed as the energy transition progresses. See significant judgement: exploration and appraisal intangible assets and Note 8 for further information.

Property, plant and equipment — depreciation and expected useful lives

The energy transition may curtail the expected useful lives of oil and gas industry assets thereby accelerating depreciation charges. However, a significant majority of BP’s existing upstream oil and natural gas properties are likely to be fully depreciated within the next 10 years and, as outlined in BP’s strategy, oil and natural gas production will remain an important part of BP’s business activities over that period. The significant majority of refining assets, recognized on the group’s balance sheet on
31st December, 2022 that are subject to depreciation, will be depreciated within the next 12 years; demand for refined products is expected to remain sufficient to support the remaining useful lives of existing assets. Therefore, management does not expect the useful lives of BP’s reported property, plant and equipment to change and does not consider this to be a significant accounting judgment or estimate. Significant capital expenditure is still required for ongoing projects as well as renewal and / or replacement of aged assets and therefore the useful lives of future capital expenditure may be different. See significant accounting policy: property, plant and equipment for more information.

Provisions: decommissioning

The energy transition may bring forward the decommissioning of oil and gas industry assets thereby increasing the present value of associated decommissioning provisions. The majority of BP’s existing upstream oil and gas properties are expected to start decommissioning within the next two decades. The group’s expectation to reduce its upstream hydrocarbon production by around 25 per cent by 2030 from its 2019 baseline is expected to be achieved through future active management, including divestments, and high-grading of the portfolio. Any resulting increases or decreases to the weighted average timing of decommissioning will be driven by the profile of assets held in the revised portfolio. Currently, the expected timing of decommissioning expenditures for the upstream oil and gas assets in the group’s portfolio has not materially been brought forward.

Management does not expect a reasonably possible change of two years in the expected timing of all decommissioning to have a material effect on the upstream decommissioning provisions, assuming cash flows remain unchanged.

Decommissioning cost estimates are based on the known regulatory and external environment. These cost estimates may change in the future, including as a result of the transition to a lower carbon economy. For refineries, decommissioning provisions are generally not recognized as the associated obligations have indeterminate settlement dates, typically driven by the cessation of manufacturing. Management will continue to review facts and circumstances to assess if decommissioning provisions need to be recognized. Decommissioning provisions relating to refineries on 31st December, 2022 are not material. See significant judgments and estimates: provisions for further information.

Accounting of Export Incentives

Accounting for Government Grants can be complex because grants may be subjected to numerous conditions, some of which could provide conflicting signals as to what the grant is trying to compensate or incentivise. Additionally, Ind AS 20 is based on the legacy IAS 20, which has not been revised for many years and may have outlived its utility. The accounting of the grant should reflect what the grant is meant to do, on a broad level. Here, we look at an export incentive scheme and discuss the various accounting issues and the appropriate Ind AS accounting and presentation.

QUERY

Gopaldas Exports Ltd (GEL), the exporter, is eligible to receive export incentives for merchandise exports under the RoDTEP (Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products) Scheme under the Foreign Trade Policy of the Government of India. Under the scheme:

1. GEL is entitled to receive Duty Credit Scrips (DCS) ranging from 1.5 per cent to 2 per cent of the exported goods, depending on the type of product exported.

2. DCS can be used by the GEL for payment of import duty or it may sell it in the market. Typically, the DCS scrips would fetch 80 per cent to 95 per cent of the value in the market, depending upon the demand and supply for DCS at the time of sale.

3. DCS is allowed at the time of presentation of the shipping bill, but it is subject to receipt of foreign exchange. If foreign exchange is not ultimately collected, DCS will be deemed to be ineligible.

GEL has raised the following queries:

1. Is the DCS incentive a government grant or government assistance?

2. At what point in time should DCS be recorded as income?

3. At what amount should DCS be recorded as income?
4. Whether the incentive income is presented as revenue from operations, other income or other operating revenue?

RESPONSE

First, let us take a look at the various relevant references.

Ind AS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance

Definition

Government grants are assistance by the government in the form of transfer of resources to an entity in return for past or future compliance with certain conditions relating to the operating activities of the entity. They exclude those forms of government assistance which cannot reasonably have a value placed upon them, and transactions with the government which cannot be distinguished from the normal trading transactions of the entity.

7 Government grants, including non-monetary grants at fair value, shall not be recognised until there is reasonable assurance that: (a) the entity will comply with the conditions attached to them; and (b) the grants will be received.

9 The manner in which a grant is received does not affect the accounting method to be adopted in regard to the grant. Thus, a grant is accounted for in the same manner whether it is received in cash or as a reduction of a liability to the government.

29 Grants related to income are presented as part of profit or loss, either separately or under a general heading such as ‘Other income’; alternatively, they are deducted in reporting the related expense.

GN on Division II – Ind AS Schedule III to the Companies Act 2013

9.1.7. Revenue from operations needs to be disclosed separately as revenue from (a) the sale of products, (b) the sale of services and (c) other operating revenues. It is important to understand what is meant by the term “other operating revenues” and which items should be classified under this head vis-à-vis under the head “Other Income”.

9.1.8. The term “other operating revenue” is not defined. This would include Revenue arising from a company’s operating activities, i.e., either its principal or ancillary revenue-generating activities, but which is not revenue arising from the sale of products or rendering of services. Whether a particular income constitutes “other operating revenue” or “other income” is to be decided based on the facts of each case and a detailed understanding of the company’s activities.

9.1.9. The classification of income would also depend on the purpose for which the particular asset is acquired or held. For instance, a group engaged in the manufacture and sale of industrial and consumer products also has one real estate arm. If the real estate arm is continuously engaged in leasing of real estate properties, the rent arising from leasing of real estate is likely to be “other operating revenue”. On the other hand, consider a consumer products company which owns a 10 storied building. The company currently does not need one floor for its own use and has given the same temporarily on rent. In that case, lease rent is not an “other operating revenue”; rather, it should be treated as “other income”.

9.1.10. To take other examples, the sale of Property, Plant and Equipment is not an operating activity of a company, and hence, profit on the sale of Property, Plant and Equipment should be classified as other income and not other operating revenue. On the other hand, the sale of manufacturing scrap arising from operations for a manufacturing company should be treated as other operating revenue since the same arises on account of the company’s main operating activity.

RESPONSE TO QUERY 1

Government grants are assistance by the government in the form of transfer of resources to an entity in return for past or future compliance with certain conditions relating to the operating activities of the entity. They exclude those forms of government assistance which cannot reasonably have a value placed upon them and transactions with the government which cannot be distinguished from the normal trading transactions of the entity. For e.g., free access to water supply by the government, which is not subjected to any normal trading transaction or future condition, would qualify as government assistance.

A reasonable value can be placed on the DCS scrips and are earned basis conditions to be fulfilled and arise from normal trading transactions. Consequently, basis the Ind AS definition, the DCS scrips qualify as government grants. Additionally, as per paragraph 9, it does not matter if the incentive is received in cash or by way of scrips; that does not change the view that the incentive is a grant.

RESPONSE TO QUERY 2

As per paragraph 7, government grants, including non-monetary grants at fair value, shall not be recognised until there is reasonable assurance that: (a) the entity will comply with the conditions attached to them; and (b) the grants will be received.

The most important condition for earning the DCS incentive is the export of the merchandise. However, if the foreign exchange remittance is not received, GEL will be ineligible for the DCS incentive. It may be fair to assume that the export proceeds will be collected in due time since most of the exports are based on letters of credits or another form of guarantees. Therefore, the DCS incentive shall be recognised once the export is made and revenue is recognised in accordance with Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with Customers.

RESPONSE TO QUERY 3

As per paragraph 7, government grants, including non-monetary grants at fair value, shall not be recognised until there is reasonable assurance that: (a) the entity will comply with the conditions attached to them; and (b) the grants will be received. Therefore, the DCS incentive should be recognised at the full amount, subject to the following adjustments:

  • If DCS is intended to be sold rather than used for importing goods, appropriate adjustments should be made for the decline in the market value. For e.g., the value of DCS is Rs. 100, but it can be sold in the market only at R80, DCS should be recognised at Rs. 80, rather than Rs. 100.
  •  To the extent it is estimated that foreign exchange would not be received, the DCS incentive amount to be recognised should be reduced.

RESPONSE TO QUERY 4

In the extant case, the government is providing an incentive to export rather than paying any revenue amount on behalf of the importer. Therefore, treating this as revenue from operations is clearly incorrect. However, with respect to classification as other income or other operating revenue, there seems to be a debate.

Paragraph 29 of Ind AS 20 requires the presentation of the incentive as ‘other income’. On the other hand, as per the guidance (paragraphs 9.1.7 to 9.1.10 above) under the ICAI GN on Division II – Ind AS Schedule III to the Companies Act 2013, the incentive may be presented as ‘other operating revenue’ if those arise from the normal trading activities of the entity. Since DCS arises from GEL’s trading activities, the same is operating in nature, and hence may be presented as ‘other operating revenue’. Basis paragraph 29 of Ind AS 20, the incentive may even be presented as ‘other income’.

Sustainability Reporting and Opportunities for Practitioners

INTRODUCTION

The nations across the world are in a race to become the most developed economies. This race has not only exploited the resources to the extent of their near extinction, but also resulted in the world becoming a gas chamber of pollution. People are now realising the irreversible damage that they have done to the environment and are trying to gather as much information as possible to understand the causal-effect relationship of this never-ending race. Investors and other stakeholders are holding the industries and companies responsible for the depletion of the quality of the environment. Their expectations are being evaluated by the regulatory authorities, and in return, relevant regulations have been passed for adequate disclosures by the companies. G20 nations in New Delhi also reiterated their commitment to achieve global net zero GHG emissions / carbon neutrality by or around mid-century in the recently concluded G20 Summit.

Globally, the companies are now disclosing how their operations are making use of the natural resources and what is the impact of the same on the neighbouring environment. There are many sustainability reporting frameworks which are commonly used by companies for disclosing their sustainability-related information, viz. GRI Standards issued by the Global Sustainability Standards Board (GSSB), Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations issued by the Financial Stability Board, SASB standards issued by the Sustainability Accounting Standard Board (SASB)(now part of International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB)). Recently, ISSB has issued IFRS S1 (General Requirements for Disclosure of Sustainability-related Financial Information) and IFRS S2 (Climate-related disclosures), which will be effective for annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1st January, 2024, with a ‘climate first’ transition option available to entities, allowing them to provide only climate-related disclosures in the first year of applying IFRS S1 and IFRS S2.

Environmental-Social-Governance (ESG) disclosures have become a popular tool to attract investors and other stakeholders. Few companies are marketing their sustainability policies without executing the same in action at the ground level. By doing so, these policies may convey misleading information about how a company’s products / services and practices are environmentally sound. To avoid these instances of green washing, the regulators in various countries felt the need for assurance of ESG disclosures.

Assurance providers provide assurance on the ESG disclosures made by the company under various assurance frameworks and guidance like International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 (Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information) / ISAE 3410 (Assurance Engagements on Greenhouse Gas Statements) (issued by International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)), AA1000 Assurance Standard v3 issued by Account Ability Standards Board, etc.

The objective of this article is to provide the regulatory requirements on sustainability reporting in India and the mandatory reasonable assurance requirements from financial year 2023-24 onwards. It also covers the role of Chartered Accountants in Sustainability reporting and assurance.

SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN INDIA

Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR) for listed entities

India, in response to the worldwide changes, has come up with a sustainability framework of Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR), which helps the companies to meet the stakeholders’ expectations on disclosures relating to the area of ESG. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) vide circular1 dated 10th May, 2021 had issued the guidelines for the top 1,000 listed entities (by market capitalisation) to voluntarily provide BRSR disclosures in FY 2021–22 and mandatorily from FY 2022–23 as a part of their annual report. The goal of the new reporting format is to co-relate the financial performance of an entity to its sustainability performance. These disclosures are based on the principles covered in the National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct (NGRBC) issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs in 2019, which itself emanates from the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The circular also provided the format of BRSR along with guidance on certain aspects of some key performance indicators (KPIs) of BRSR.


1. https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/may-2021/business-responsibility-and-sustainability-reporting-by-listed-entities_50096.html

The BRSR disclosures are segregated into the following three different sections:

1. Section A: General Disclosures
Information relating to the listed entity, like products / services offered, operations, markets served by the entity, CSR details, etc., needs to be disclosed.

2. Section B: Management and Process Disclosures
This section is aimed at helping businesses demonstrate the structures, policies and processes put in place towards adopting the NGRBC Principles and Core Elements.

3. Section C: Principle Wise Performance Disclosures
This section is aimed at helping entities demonstrate their performance in integrating the Principles and Core Elements with key processes and decisions.

There are nine principles (mentioned below) under which an entity needs to provide ‘Essential’ and ‘Leadership’ disclosures. Essential indicators need to be provided mandatorily, and Leadership indicators are voluntary in nature.

ASSURANCE ON BRSR CORE FOR LISTED ENTITIES

To take the BRSR to the next level, SEBI has introduced the concept of “BRSR Core” as a subset of BRSR. It contains selected KPIs related to BRSR. To enhance the reliability of disclosures in BRSR, SEBI has mandated the reasonable assurance of BRSR Core to the top 150 listed entities (by market capitalisation) from FY 2023 – 24 onwards, which will be extended to the top 1,000 listed entities (by market capitalisation) by FY 2026 – 27 in a phased manner vide amendment in Regulation 34(2)(f) of SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirement) Regulations, 2015 (LODR Regulations). The format of BRSR Core has been prescribed by SEBI vide circular2 dated 12th July, 2023.


2. https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/jul-2023/brsr-core-framework-for-assurance-and-esg-disclosures-for-value-chain_73854.html

In line with the BRSR Core attributes, the format for BRSR has also been amended. BRSR Core consists of KPIs under the following nine ESG attributes:

ESG Attribute Description
Change in GHG footprint Scope 1 & 2 emissions & intensity
Change in water footprint Water consumption & intensity
Energy footprint Details of total energy consumed from renewable
Embracing circularity Break-up of waste management across 8 categories
Employee well-being & safety Amount spent (per cent of revenue) on employee wellbeing initiatives (including health insurance, daycare, maternity benefits, etc. and details on safety-related incidents)
Gender diversity  per cent of wages paid to women and complaints on POSH
Inclusive development  per cent of materials sourced from MSMEs, small producers and job creation opportunities in small towns
Fair engagement with customers & suppliers No. of days of accounts payable and per cent of negative media sentiment
Open-ness of business Conducting business with concentrated (limited) parties along with loans and investments made to related parties

 

BRSR CORE FOR VALUE CHAIN PARTNERS OF LISTED ENTITIES

SEBI has also mandated the disclosures as per BRSR core for value chain partners of the top 250 listed entities (by market capitalisation) from FY 2024–25 on a comply-or-explain basis. These value chain partners encompass top upstream and downstream partners of a listed entity, cumulatively comprising 75 per cent of purchases / sales (by value), respectively. A listed entity covered above will be required to report the KPIs in the BRSR Core for their value chain to the extent it is attributable to their business with that value chain partner.

Further, with effect from FY 2025–26, SEBI has directed the limited assurance of the disclosures in BRSR Core for value chain partners on a comply-or-explain basis.

Disclosing data with respect to value chain partners may involve several practical challenges, e.g., a compilation of data for entities outside the group, defining reporting boundaries, and assurance of such data.

BRSR FOR LISTED ENTITIES NOT COVERED ABOVE

As regards listed entities which are not covered within the ambit set in the abovementioned circulars, SEBI has provided that these entities, including the ones listed on SME Exchange, can voluntarily comply with the requirements to disclose their and their value chain’s disclosures in the BRSR / BRSR Core as the case may be, as a part of their annual report and to provide reasonable / limited assurance on such disclosures.

GENERAL GUIDANCE TO ASSURANCE PROVIDERS

Information provided by the companies in BRSR relates to both financial as well as non-financial information. Financial information like paid-up share capital, corporate social responsibility details, products / services sold by the entity, related party transactions, employee-related benefits, etc., can be referenced from the financial statements and notes / disclosures annexed to those. However, non-financial disclosures which relate to the information pertaining to the measure of greenhouse gas emissions (Scope 1 and 2), water discharge, circular economy, etc., require technical expertise. Assurance providers should have requisite knowledge of both financial and non-financial metrics for providing quality assurance services. Technical knowledge of planning, executing, and concluding the assurance engagement as per the auditing standards and framework governing the assurance of sustainability reports is also a prerequisite for providing effective and efficient assurance services.

The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has performed an annual benchmarking study3 on global practices in sustainability disclosure and its assurance for three consecutive years: 2019, 2020 and 2021. For 2021, a study on 1,350 companies across 21 jurisdictions was done. 1,283 of 1,350 companies reported ESG information in 2021 compared to 1,283 of 1,400 in 2020. Further, 63 per cent of the assurance engagements were provided by audit firms as against 61 per cent and 57 per cent in 2020 and 2019, respectively. For the remainder of the engagements, other assurance providers were appointed.


3. https://ifacweb.blob.core.windows.net/publicfiles/2023-02/IFAC-State-of-Play-Sustainability-Assurance-Disclosures_0.pdf

In the Indian context, according to a publication by a large firm, for the FY 2021–22, basis analysis of the data for the top 20 listed companies (by market capitalisation as on 31st March, 2023), 14 of these companies have disclosed information pertaining to BRSR. 13 Companies out of 14 (i.e., 93 per cent), have specifically disclosed that the sustainability report or integrated report have been subject to assurance in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000, Assurance Engagements Other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information (issued by International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)) / AA1000 Assurance Standard v3 issued by Accountability Standards Board. Some of the non-financial disclosures / metrics disclosed in the BRSR also form part of such an integrated report. The assurance providers on four companies are non-audit firms. Out of the remaining nine companies, one has not included the assurance report in its annual report. It is pertinent to note that only two companies out of the balance seven companies have appointed a Chartered Accountant (member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India) as the assurance provider.

To provide a reasonable / limited level of assurance on sustainability reporting, the Sustainability Reporting Standards Board (SRSB) of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has issued the following standards:

  • Standard on Sustainability Assurance Engagements (SSAE) 3000, ‘Assurance Engagements on Sustainability Information.’
  • Standard on Assurance Engagements (SAE) 3410, ‘Assurance Engagements on Greenhouse Gas Statements.’

SSAE 3000 is an umbrella standard applicable to all assurance engagements on sustainability information. In case there is subject matter information to which a specific assurance standard applies (e.g., GHG emissions), SSAE 3000 will apply in addition to the subject matter-specific standard (e.g., SAE 3410). The effective date of application of SSAE 3000 and SAE 3410 is as follows:

  • Voluntary basis for assurance reports covering periods ending on 31st March, 2023.
  •  Mandatory basis for assurance reports covering periods ending on or after 31st March, 2024.

SEBI’s recently issued FAQs4 has specified that assurance of BRSR is profession-agnostic. In its recent circular dated 12th July, 2023, SEBI clarifies that assurance providers should have the necessary expertise for undertaking assurance. However, what constitutes “necessary expertise” has not been defined in the circular. The Board of the listed entity shall ensure that the assurance provider appointed for assuring the BRSR Core has the necessary expertise for undertaking reasonable assurance in the area of sustainability.


4. https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/faqfiles/aug-2023/1691500854553.pdf

Furthermore, a person appointed as an assurance provider should have no conflict of interest with the listed entity. SEBI circular read with FAQs lays down the over-arching principle that there should not be any conflict of interest with the assurance provider appointed for assuring the BRSR Core. If an assurance provider sells its products or offers any non-audit or non-assurance services to a listed entity or its group entities, irrespective of whether the nature of the product / service is financial or non-financial, it will not be eligible to undertake assurance of the BRSR Core. The Circular does not mandate or recommend the use of any specific assurance standard. The assurance provider may appropriately use a globally accepted assurance standard on sustainability / non-financial reporting, such as the International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 or assurance standards issued by the ICAI. Whilst requiring certain prescribed entities to get an independent assurance of their data, the lack of clarity or uniformity in the qualifications/affiliations of the assurance service providers may result in different standards / yardsticks being adopted, thereby making it difficult for the stakeholders to assess the level of compliance by different entities. It would be desirable if SEBI lays down some common yardsticks / format of assurance reporting as well as the professional qualifications for the assurance service providers, other than CAs.

An assurance on sustainability-related disclosures can be at a limited level or reasonable level. For a limited assurance engagement, the assurance procedures are limited as compared to reasonable assurance but sufficient to express negative assurance. For a limited assurance engagement, we may place relatively greater emphasis on inquiries of the entity’s personnel and analytical procedures and relatively less emphasis, if any, on tests of controls and obtaining evidence from external sources than would be the case for a reasonable assurance engagement.

ROLE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING AND ASSURANCE

With the increasing focus on environmental sustainability, governance, and ethical practices, there is no better time than now for CAs to explore this area. Similarly, new regulatory standards and emerging requirements for non-financial reporting add a new layer to the demand. For effective implementation of the new framework prescribed by SEBI and to meet the increasing need of stakeholders for such information, it is essential for the companies to establish a comprehensive data management system, as such information needs to be collated and coordinated between various functional departments / units within the entity. Further, if the management decides to disclose information on a consolidated basis, then information relating to various components / affiliates needs to be accumulated in one place without any impact on the quality and reliability of the same. All these can be achieved only when the entity invests in designing and implementing adequate internal controls over the processes, systems and information produced by the company for disclosures in the BRSR.

A CA may support the management in designing and implementing the relevant internal controls to ensure that there are reduced or no instances of unintentional errors / intentional green washing. The professionals may also support the companies in assessing their readiness for BRSR. They may support in developing ways to measure the metrics in BRSR, developing processes and controls to produce and verify the information and supporting in preparation of BRSR reports. While the collection mechanisms are different, CAs are well-positioned to help companies design methods to track and analyse ESG data. However, they will have to comply with the provisions of the ICAI code of ethics and SEBI circular for listed entities (i.e., they cannot provide assurance on BRSR core in case they provide the above-stated services).

A CA in practice or statutory auditor has relevant knowledge of standards on auditing (SA) along with knowledge of how an assurance engagement is planned, executed, concluded, and documented. Considering SEBI circular permits even CAs to provide assurance services, they must involve subject matter experts in accordance with SA 620, ‘Using the Work of an Auditor’s Expert’ while providing assurance, primarily in respect of various environmental aspects like calculation of emissions, measures adopted towards “net zero” etc. Similarly, for reporting/disclosing data in respect of the value chain partners, practitioners may have to rely on the work of their auditors in accordance with SA-600, ‘Using the Work of another Auditor’. The regulators may issue suitable clarifications/guidance in this regard.

ICAI has already opened the doors of opportunities for Chartered Accountants by issuing SSAE 3000 for Chartered Accountants who can provide assurance under this standard. Moreover, ICAI has also announced a BRSR certificate course whose aim is to disseminate knowledge and awareness amongst its members on Global Trends in Corporate Sustainability Reporting, Disclosure requirements- BRSR and BRSR Lite and Assurance aspects of Sustainability Report.5


5. https://learning.icai.org/committee/business-responsibility-certificate-course-batch17/

CONCLUSION

India being the first country to mandate reasonable assurance on BRSR core from the FY 2023 – 24 onwards, companies should gear up and assess their readiness for independent assurance mandated by the regulator. The focus should be on establishing internal controls, systems, and processes akin to financial reporting systems. Assurance providers may enhance their understanding of the assurance framework and standards, a transition from limited to reasonable assurance, considering many companies were obtaining limited assurance on a voluntary basis, engage in timely discussions with the audit committees to identify the issues, if any and better plan their engagements.

Why Gen Z Should Be Chartered Accountants?

Born from 1997 to 2012, Gen Z — or Zoomers — have grown up with mobile phones, social media and, of course, the internet. With ease, they hop between the planet Earth, and the Metaverse in their digital ‘avatars’. These ‘digital nagriks (natives)’ are the most globally connected generation in human history. While the world gets older, India is getting younger, with Gen Z comprising 27 per cent of its population — higher than the world’s average of 24 per cent and much higher than the average Gen Z population of China, Europe and North America, at 17 per cent each1. This emerging generation is steering the future of work, in an environment where expectations change rapidly, where careers are being shaped by a multitude of issues, including shifting social behaviours and values.


1. NASSCOM Report – “Gen Z and Millennials: Reshaping the Future of Workforce” – December 2022

UNDERSTANDING GEN Z

The economic and societal backdrop of a developing nation have shaped their behaviours and their views on work. Yes, the remuneration package matter to Gen Z — but other things matter even more. As some members of this generation would be looking out for a professional qualification, it is imperative that we draw their attention towards chartered accountancy — which offers a lifetime of rewarding benefits. So, what does Gen Z expect from a professional career?

Job security

Gen Z is worried for job security, and their concern is certainly understandable. This generation witnessed their parents going through the global financial crisis and also experienced something that none of the previous working generations has ever seen — the full wrath of COVID-19 — which created a domino of mayhem and disruptions. Seeing their parents and families suffer from financial instability, they have a stronger focus on finding stable careers. They would obviously choose a career that would provide long-term employability, allowing them to earn, save, and expand their knowledge.

Continual skill acquisition

Gen Z attacks their stress about job security with a tried and tested strategy, i.e., they would choose a career that can provide them with continuous skill acquisition and opportunities to future proof their professional life. Gen Z would gravitate towards a career option that provides opportunities for continuous learning and aids the acquisition of new capabilities. Gen Z believes that new skills would bring multiple benefits: help generate new and innovative solutions, support the development of a more energised and committed workforce, and foster inter-generational learning opportunities.

Gaining international experience

Experience is the best teacher. As a truly connected global generation, it is not surprising that Gen Z sees opportunities to pursue international career experiences high on the priority list. Gen Z would step outside their comfort zone with ease to gain experience that would give them a competitive advantage, e.g., the experience of advanced business processes / practices, a higher level of confidence, opportunity to develop cross-cultural communication skills.

Technology — an enabler

Nowadays, Gen Zers can frequently be seen interacting with Artificial intelligence (‘AI’) powered conversational chatbots — the smart technology currently in rage. This chatbot learns and grow from the existing database, deliver humanised experiences by delivering bespoke answers to customer queries and providing relevant suggestions. AI technologies, natural language processing and blockchain are further boosting the speed and scale of decision-making and providing the tech architecture for collaborative working and better insights. These digital natives are interested in a professional qualification which will enable them to harness the potential of these smart technologies. Not surprisingly, they are also concerned about the impact of smart technology on their own job opportunities for the future.

Protecting the planet

Gen Z believes that solving today’s environmental/societal issues is just as important as making profits. Gen Zers are highly interested in finding work that is linked with social responsibility and that contributes to the betterment of our planet. They would like to bring their talent and tech know-how to pursue careers with higher purpose and do jobs that make a difference to the planet.

A SHOUTOUT TO GEN Z FOR CHARTERED ACCOUNTANCY

Chartered accountancy is deeply rooted in its strong heritage, and its contribution to Indian businesses and the global economy is indelible. It is purpose-driven with specific opportunities to make a real difference to broader issues. Chartered accountancy provides a breadth of skills and the portability of the finance roles and across industries. These factors can help mitigate Gen-Z concerns about job security and provide a passport to multiple careers and roles in varied businesses. Following broad career opportunities emerge for Gen Z.

Business entrepreneurs

From being the ‘Indian Warren Buffett’ or establishing the world’s fourth largest bank or being the Chairman of one of the largest global conglomerates, chartered accountants have emerged as prominent entrepreneurs. Their success stories not only underscore the value of chartered accountancy qualification but serves as an inspiration for Gen Z. Their professional background enables them to make well-informed decisions, negotiate deals, make strategic investments, manage finances effectively, and ensure the sustainability of businesses.

The explosive growth of digital payments and the success of fintech (start-up) companies are creating newer entrepreneurial opportunities. There has been an uptick in the number of entrepreneurs expressing interest in this field; most happen to be chartered accountants themselves, because they understand the ballgame best. Several chartered accounting aspirants seem to be gravitating towards fintech — being aided by the vibrant start-up culture in the country.

Modern finance leaders

A highly effective modern finance leader is someone who can ‘join the dots’ between functions in their organisation. This quality requires a broad mix of skills such as knowing the business inside out, achieving business agility, driving performance with the right key performance indicators, and ensuring insightful financial reporting to achieve short-term and long-term goals. The field of finance is buzzing — with India leading the adoption of some of the novel trends in financial inclusion, e.g., fintech is spearheading the country’s financial inclusion agenda through hyper-focused products for end consumers and embedded financial products and services like banking, payments, lending, co-branded cards, and more. Career-wise, being a chartered accountant is an ideal pathway to finance leadership roles for Gen Zers in any organisation. Gen Zers, as a Chief Financial Officer, would take a seat at the strategy planning table and help influence the future direction of the company.

Assurance champions

From auditing to risk management, from corporate governance to compliance roles, a dynamic and challenging environment is driving assurance needs across businesses. Increased stakeholder scrutiny of organisation performance and processes and the ever-growing need for reliable information is further fuelling the demand for high-quality assurance professionals.

The assurance profession is transforming the look and experience of roles of the future, with the usage of cutting-edge automated tools and techniques, e.g., anomaly detectors — which uses machine learning and AI for sensing anomalous entries in large databases. Though technology is an enabler, it takes human insight and professional experience to ultimately understand the context underlying the output as well as the causation of the output relative to the inputs provided. The bright future of assurance makes it a compelling career choice for Gen Z in any professional services firm.

Tax advocates

Tax policy plays an important role in any economy — from funding public services to incentivising public and organizational behaviour. The increasing digitalization of the global economy has seen greater focus by the OECD2 and its BEPS 2.03 project to address its impact on direct taxation, particularly when organizations and individuals operate in markets with limited physical presence. Unlike direct taxes, indirect taxes are not a bottom-line cost for many clients, but the compliance requirements can be complex and can impact cash flows.


2. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
3. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

When Gen Z train as tax practitioners, they will acquire skills that can be relevant to almost any domain of their choosing — including working in a firm providing tax advisory services or working as the tax head of an organisation operating in multiple tax jurisdictions. This will not only put their mathematical side of the brain at work but also encourage them to solve complex challenges using logic and tax expertise. Thanks to this, Gen Z won’t have to worry about being stuck in just one or two fields — and can explore as much as they want to.

Data explorers

Growing data sources present exponential analytics-led roles for driving improved and faster insight, formulating competitor strategies, or facing risk challenges. The true value of data analysis comes when decisions are made using insights derived from the data — given impetus by the growth in the volume of data and breakthroughs in technology, e.g., how cab-hailing companies identify demand for cab at any given time or location. Determination of the economic value of businesses using appropriate valuation models — especially for start-ups is an evolving area for chartered accountants. Backed by regulations e.g., the Companies Act, 2013 and valuation standards, the emergence of valuation professionals is on rise.

To uncover the economic value of businesses or provide deeper insights, a professional must first understand the business context. Not only do chartered accountants understand this context, but they also live it. Organisations foresee a great future in these emerging knowledge domains and call upon the tech-savvy Gen Z to plunge into big data analytics/valuation of businesses and leverage the huge opportunities available.

Trusted advisors

Organizations are capitalising on risks caused by disruption. They are updating their risk functions to generate fresh value and provide a competitive advantage. With growing capabilities in tools and technologies to support these changes, business and strategy consulting is a real opportunity.

As a qualified chartered accountant, Gen Z will be able to provide strategic advice to help achieve optimal — and sustainable — results. Whether a business is in crisis or is simply facing an operational challenge, Gen Z would be professionally equipped to help management teams identify and prioritise the most critical issues, stabilise the business, establish a leadership and stakeholder consensus around the solution, and deliver tangible results quickly. Merger and acquisition advisory is another attractive area where Gen Z can refine entity growth strategy, perform deal sourcing, conduct diligence, and achieve greater synergies during merger and acquisition integration.

Technology-centric roles are growing rapidly, and those in Gen Z who want to apply their ‘digital’ skills to help solve real business issues will have lots of opportunities. With increased digitisation comes the risk of cyber security. Gen Z can play a critical role in implementing and executing a strategy and overarching cyber program that allows for rigorous, structured decision-making and financial analysis of cyber risks.

HOW CAN EMPLOYERS HARNESS THE POTENTIAL OF GEN Z?

If an organisation is looking to attract, hire and retain incoming Gen Z talent, it will need a smart strategy in place. They should first try to understand them and then acknowledge the potential and ideas they have that can revolutionise the workplace and leave a mark on the organisation. Some recommendations include the following.

Mentor, but don’t teach

Gen Z expects to be led by example. If you can’t convince them with your approach, Gen Zers won’t follow your word. From their perspective, a title in the corporate hierarchy fails to impress them. An increasing number of CEOs and founders are giving up on the attributes of power (be it a separate office, a tie, or a badge in a gold frame). Humble leadership comes to the forefront for this generation because it matches Gen Z’s values perfectly.

Let them make mistakes

Gen Z sees mistakes more often as experiences and lessons learned. Experienced professionals should support them and observe them — but shouldn’t micromanage. Give feedback right away. When explaining what went wrong, be consistent and patient. Creating a culture of continual feedback and acknowledgement is essential in engaging Gen Z. Identifying new ways of recognising exceptional performance and sharing with peers and across the organisation, as well as articulating what their specific contribution, is essential to motivation. It’s really powerful for an organisation to visibly demonstrate how they have listened to Gen Z feedback by implementing ideas that help shape future strategies and policies.

Employers can create spaces such as “innovation hubs or sandboxes” within their organisations that allow for experimental thinking and flow of ideas that can positively impact the future of their organisation, drive change management and better engagement.

Integrate organisational purpose with individual needs

Gen Z is keen to understand the ‘big picture’ – what their contribution would be to the vision of the enterprise. Gen Z is attracted to organisations that can offer security through long-term career prospects. Strengthening this aspect with interventions that particularly support career development, such as regular career conversations, is powerful. Identifying opportunities for Gen Z to grow in a way that caters to their uniqueness is vital to their engagement and retention.

Exploit their digital mastery

Organisations should create roles that are tech-focused, as Gen Z is known to attack business problems differently by leveraging technology and rapidly creating solutions. Companies must institute a culture of constant innovation using digital solutions to keep pace with the societal changes that are impacting their future business. Boards can help management teams prioritise technology investment and iterative efforts with an eye towards the future. Enterprises should see Gen Z as fantastic ambassadors and early adopters to encourage the rest of the business to use digital.

Rethink learning: short and visual

Gen Z watches YouTube videos, listens to podcasts, and binges shows. Organisations need to create learning content that will grasp their attention. Mobile learning opportunities and new learning platforms continue to evolve, and everything from gamification to simulation and Augmented and Virtual Reality are becoming staple offerings for employers that understand how Gen Z want to acquire knowledge and learn. Peer-to-peer learning opportunities are also powerful.

Don’t forget to have fun!

For Gen Zers, work is part of life — the hard division into 9-5 work is blurred. The younger generation wants to feel good not so much at work as while working. Smile, play, have fun, organise social initiatives, charity runs, and donations etc. This is what interests and engages them. Create an excuse for integration, fun, and joint laughter.

MAKING THE PROFESSION MORE ‘COOL’

With India targeting a USD 5 trillion economy by 2025, many finance professionals (auditors / corporates) are getting extremely jittery4. Reaching this goal would not only require a gargantuan amount of investments – ranging from USD 5 trillion to USD 7 trillion but, more importantly, would definitely require a reliable pipeline of modern financial professionals. Veterans are grappling with a chasm in talent gap as well as skill gap — as professionals lack the ability to support broader business goals across various industries. Addressing these challenges requires a collective effort from industry stakeholders, including firms, educational institutions, professional bodies, and recruiters.


4. The Gap in India’s Economy Worrying an Ex-Deloitte Boss — India edition of Bloomberg on 21st September, 2023

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India — our alma mater — has already formulated the new curriculum in line with International Education Standards and National Education Policy, 2020, after considering the inputs from various stakeholders. The new curriculum comes into effect from 1st July, 2023 and would equip future chartered accountants with the requisite technical knowledge and professional skills to perform well at the workplace. The new curricula emphasise more on the development of higher-order skills of application, analysis and interpretation. A special feature is the multi-disciplinary case study at the Final level, which would help students integrate professional knowledge in different subject areas, analyse and apply such knowledge in problem-solving. While implementing the new curricula, the Institute should make serious efforts to.

Dispel common misconceptions plaguing the profession: It is a very common belief that accountants just have to work on calculations, and creativity is not required for the same. However, this is untrue, as finding tax deductions and constructing a client’s financial portfolio benefit from creativity. Another common belief is that it is extremely difficult to clear the exams. Debunking the misconceptions about the profession would certainly invigorate the much-needed force into the talent pipeline.

Incorporate practical case studies: Case studies are effective ways to get students to practically apply their skills and their understanding of learned facts to a real-world situation. They are particularly useful where situations are complex, real-life case studies in the learning material will provide a more engaging experience for aspiring chartered accountants.

Provide career counselling: Career counselling should include personalised guidance and support to help the students make informed decisions about their career path. It should involve assessing one’s interests, skills, values, and personality traits to help identify potential career paths that align with their goals and aspirations.

Keep the curricula agile: Flexible, innovative and agile curricula offer many advantages over more traditional approaches. Agile curricula would deliver better results by focusing on learners and provide the flexibility to include employability skills matched to the market’s needs. The curriculum would also be open to incremental improvement, ensuring that it gets better and better.

CLOSING ENTRIES

Chartered accountants are the foundation base of the economy. Being nation-builders, the qualification of a chartered accountant would prepare Gen Z with the skills and knowledge to achieve anything they want in the field of finance. In the new world of work, career routes and opportunities for continuous learning and acquiring new capabilities will continue to open up for chartered accountants as pathways diversify further. Irrespective of role, sector, industry, or geography, it’s the application of these vital skills and the sheer diversity of future possibilities afforded by a background in chartered accountancy that be a key attraction for Gen Z. It seems that chartered accountancy remains a pretty good bet for Gen Z and continues to be a gateway to a good career with a positive image.

Natural Hedging – A Practical Approach to Designation and Effectiveness

A. Introduction

 

Predictability of cash flows is one of the primary goals of a business while charting its short-term as well as long-term capital management plan. For this, risk management is one of the important aspects. The company is exposed to various risks ranging from political, geographical, economical to natural risks. One of the risks that we are going to discuss is exposure to foreign exchange fluctuation risk and hedging through a non-derivative instrument. Foreign currency exposure in a business originates on various transactions such as import and export of goods/services, foreign currency borrowings, overseas investments, etc. A company can manage this risk with a clear risk management and treasury policy. If the company opts to hedge its foreign exchange risk, it can do it by passive hedging or active hedging.

 

B. Hedging

 

In simple terms, from a foreign currency risk perspective, it is a technique or an approach whereby an entity can secure or ring-fence its cash flows while the exchange rate may fluctuate in future till the expected foreign currency cash flows hit the bank account.

 

It is to be noted that hedging is not about gaining or losing. It is about fixing the price risk and freezing the volatility for the future. It can arise on account of interest rates, commodity prices, currency, etc.

 

“To hedge, in finance, is to take an offsetting position in an asset or investment that reduces the price risk of an existing position. A hedge is, therefore, a trade that is made with the purpose of reducing the risk of adverse price movements in another asset.” – Investopedia

 

An entity can protect its profits/cashflows by entering into various types of derivative contracts. Exposure to foreign currency can be hedged by forward contracts, future contracts and currency options, call options, swaps, etc. These contracts can be entered into with commercial banks / authorised dealers as counterparties.

 

Another way of viewing risk is net basis. The company could be exposed to the same foreign currency risk exposure on, say, trade receivables, highly probable revenue, loans, investments, etc., as well as on outflows arising on account of trade payables, borrowings, interest payments, etc. In this scenario, depending on the matching profile of cash inflows and outflows, the company may enter into derivative contracts to hedge its net open exposure on foreign currency. The strategy to hedge on a net basis brings in the concept of Natural Hedge.

 

C. Passive hedging

 

Passive hedging is not an accounting term but is used by businesses while formulating risk management policies. Passive hedging means taking hedge positions matching with underlying maturities and are held till maturity. With this approach, the company is insulated from unwanted volatility in the income statement at a minimal/no hedge cost. At the same time, it could miss a potential gain if that arises in the short term.

 

Passive hedging can be done by either taking a derivative instrument such as forward contracts or a non-derivative financial instrument such as trade receivables or trade payables / borrowings depending on the side of forex risk a company wants to hedge.

 

D. Active hedging

 

Active hedging, on the other hand, is undertaking a foreign currency position in the market with a derivative instrument which caps the loss and retains the potential of an upside in a derivative position, which again should be in line with the Company’s Risk Management and Treasury Policy. Here the position is not held till maturity of the underlying, but will be squared off if the trade hits the stop loss limits or becomes favourable at any point of time during the contract period. Given the dual objective of loss protection and trying to generate some returns, this cannot be done through non derivative instruments. 

 

Thus, from Company’s Risk Management and Treasury policy, Natural hedging will form part of its Passive hedging strategy. 

 

E. Regulatory framework

 

This section brings out some aspects which are allowed by regulators but may not strictly pass the accounting test.

 

RBI has issued comprehensive guidelines on derivatives vide RBI/FMRD/2016-17/31FMRD Master Direction No. 1/2016-17, where it defines hedging as an activity of undertaking a derivative contract to offset the impact of an anticipated or a contracted exposure. It allows an entity to take Short i.e., Sell position without having a corresponding purchase option. (“Written option”).

 

A written option does not qualify as a hedging instrument unless it is designated as an offset to a purchased option. [para B6.2.4 of Ind AS 109]

 

‘Specific Directions’ under the RBI guidelines allow domestic non-retail corporates having a rupee liability may, at their discretion, to convert the rupee liability into a foreign currency liability through a currency swap. This position can be taken by the entity with authorised dealers without proving any foreign currency exposure.

 

Thus, an entity having, say Rs. 500 crore loan from Indian institutions can approach the authorised dealer and take a rupee swap to US dollar / Japanese Yen / Swiss Franc / any other currency.

 

Further, it states that entities may take positions (long or short), without having to establish the existence of underlying exposure, up to a single limit of USD 100 million equivalent across all currency pairs involving INR, put together, and combined across all exchanges.

 

Attention is also drawn to Master Direction No.5, dated 1st January, 2016, on “External Commercial Borrowings, Trade Credit, Borrowing and Lending in Foreign Currency by Authorised Dealers and Persons other than Authorised Dealers”, as amended from time to time and A P (DIR Series) Circular No. 11 dated 6th November, 2018, in terms of which certain eligible borrowers raising foreign currency denominated External Commercial Borrowing (ECB), having an average maturity of less than five years, are mandatorily required to hedge 70 per cent their ECB exposure.

 

For hedge purposes, an ECB may be considered naturally hedged if the offsetting exposure has the maturity/cash flow within the same accounting year. (para 2.5.1 of Master Direction No 5, issued on 1st January, 2016, issued by RBI)

 

Under Ind AS 109, a derivative maturing, say on, 15th March, 2024, with underlying offsetting cashflow occurring on 15th April, 2023, would be difficult to qualify as an effective hedge on two counts, viz, 1) Timing mismatch, and 2) from 16th April, 2023, till 15th March, 2024, the derivative is without an underlying and thus, won’t qualify as a qualifying hedge during FY 23–24.

 

F. Chapter 6 Hedge accounting – Ind AS 109 Financial Instruments (Relevant extracts)

 

It is well understood that Ind AS 109 allows entities to designate non-derivative instruments under hedge relationships and hence in this article, we will focus on non-derivative instruments that are allowed to be designated under hedging relationships.

 

Hedging Instrument:

 

Para 6.2 of Ind AS 109 states that for a hedge of foreign currency risk, the foreign currency risk component of a non-derivative financial asset or a non-derivative financial liability may be designated as a hedging instrument provided that it is not an investment in an equity instrument for which an entity has elected to present changes in fair value in other comprehensive income.

 

Hedge Item:

 

As per para 6.3.1 of Ind AS 109, a hedged item can be recognised as asset or a liability, an unrecognised firm commitment or a highly probable forecast transaction or a net investment in a foreign operation.

 

Further, para 6.3.5 of Ind AS 109 states that for hedge accounting purposes, only assets, liability, firm commitments or highly probable forecast transactions with a party external to the reporting entity can be designated as hedge items.

 

Hedge Qualification:

 

6.4.1 “A hedging relationship qualifies for hedge accounting only if all of the following criteria are met:

 

(a) The hedging relationship consists only of eligible hedging instruments and eligible hedged items.

 

(b) At the inception of the hedging relationship, there is a formal designation and documentation of the hedging relationship and the entity’s risk management objective and strategy for undertaking the hedge. 

 

(c) The hedging relationship meets all of the following hedge effectiveness requirements:

 

(i) There is an economic relationship between the hedged item and the hedging instrument;

 

(ii) The effect of credit risk does not dominate the value changes that result from that economic relationship.

 

(iii) The hedge ratio of the hedging relationship is the same as that resulting from the quantity of the hedged item that the entity actually hedges and the quantity of the hedging instrument that the entity actually uses to hedge that quantity of hedged item……” 

 

Key takeaways from Ind AS 109 perspectives:

 

1. Hedging of only foreign currency risk elements can be done through non-derivative financial instruments i.e., borrowings, receivables.

 

2. The counterparty in a hedge relationship should be an external party from a reporting group perspective.

 

3. To be effective, there should be an economic relationship between the hedge item and the hedge instrument.

 

4. The company should have a formal risk management policy and strategy in place.

 

5. Formal designation and documentation should be in place at the inception of the relationship and in alignment with the management policy.

 

G. Hedge item vis-a-vis hedge instrument:

 

Table 1 tabulates the choice of hedging instruments available under both (derivative / non-derivative) categories for a qualifying hedge relationship under Ind AS 109.

 

Table 1
Sr. No Hedge item Derivative Instruments Non-Derivative instruments
1.  Interest-bearing foreign currency liability (FX risk) Forward contract, Interest rate swap, Principal swap, Cross currency swap, Call options, Floor options, etc. Foreign currency receivable on balance sheet, loan receivables, dividend receivables, etc
2. Highly probable foreign currency revenue (FX risk) Forward contract, Put options, etc. Foreign currency liability on balance sheet
3. Receivables (FX risk) Forward contract, Put options, etc. Foreign currency liability, etc.
H. Natural hedge accounting

 

Guidance is available in terms of testing effectiveness for a “derivative” instrument used for hedging foreign currency risk of an underlying exposure as compared to a “non-derivative” instrument. In this article, we will run through effectiveness testing for a non-derivative instrument.

 

If both the hedged item and non-derivative instrument as tabulated above, are on the balance sheet and monetary in nature, under Ind AS 21, both will be marked to market, thereby offsetting in P&L. (B5.7.4 of Ind AS 109)

 

To select a relationship which impacts P&L, we will take the example of designation for those relationships where the hedge item is off the balance sheet, such as point 2 in table 1. This is because if there is no designation, borrowing will be marked to market at every reporting date under Ind AS 21 while forecasted revenue will not, and thus impacting P&L if not hedge accounted.

 

Example: Company A, with INR as a functional currency, has a US$400 of borrowing @ 4.5 per cent p.a. interest, payable on a monthly basis, with bullet repayment in the ninth month. The company has highly probable forecasted US$ linked revenues on a monthly basis that match the cash flows linked to US$ borrowings, both for interest and repayment of principal.

 

Company A designates highly probable foreign currency revenue as a hedge item and existing foreign currency interest-bearing liability as a non-derivative hedging instrument under Cash Flow Hedge.

 

Foreign currency liability is measured at amortised cost in financial statements, while highly probable revenue is an off-balance sheet item.

 

In accordance with B6.5.4 of Ind AS 109, when measuring hedge ineffectiveness, Company A shall consider the time value of money of the Hedge item to make it comparable to the Hedging instrument, which is subject to amortised cost and is also a present value measurement.

 

The IASB noted that hedging instruments are subject to measurement either at fair value or amortised cost, both of which are present value measurements. Consequently, in order to be consistent, the amounts that are compared with the changes in the value of the hedging instrument must also be determined on a present-value basis. The IASB noted that hedge accounting does not change the measurement of the hedging instrument, but that it might change only the location of where the change in its carrying amount is presented. As a result, the same basis (i.e. present value) for the hedged item must be used in order to avoid a mismatch when determining the amount to be recognised as hedge ineffectiveness [BC6.281 IFRS 9].

 

In the given case, foreign currency liability is measured at amortised cost. Considering no outstanding interest payments, discounting the borrowing with its coupon rate, the present value of borrowing matches with its amortised cost. Refer to Table 2 on the right.

 

Similarly, Company A present values the expected designated revenue against each corresponding cash flow of the Hedge instrument, discounted at the same discount rate of the Hedge instrument, giving us the present value of the hedged item. Refer Table 3 below.

 

(Table 2 – The net present value of non-derivative hedging instrument)
(Table 3 – NPV of the hedged item at inception)
In Table 3, to provide a broader view of assessing effectiveness under different scenarios, the table considers three different sets of cash flows designated as Hedge items against the Hedge instrument, which is kept constant.

 

It can be seen that in scenario 2.1 of Table 3, the effectiveness is 100 per cent, which reduces to 98.92 per cent in scenario 2.2 and further goes down to 95.61 per cent in scenario 2.3, where we altered revenue designations assuming different revenue expectations. Table 3 reflects the effectiveness at the inception of the hedge.

 

As a first step to establish hedge qualification, apart from applying critical terms match test, the Company establishes an approach to test effectiveness at every reporting date. Though there is no 80-125 principle prescribed under Ind AS 109, Company A will have to document a logical range, beyond which Company A will not apply hedge accounting. Say in the above example, if the result of effectiveness was 72 per cent, then it would be subjective on the Company to adopt hedge accounting.

 

One may debate on what discount rate should be used to measure the change in fair value of the hedged item (forecast sale) for effectiveness testing. There is no explicit guidance on what rate should be used under Ind AS or in IFRS. An acceptable approach would be to use a risk-free rate / borrowing’s coupon rate to discount both the hedged item and the hedging instrument for the purposes of calculating ineffectiveness.

 

We now move towards splitting the effective and ineffective MTM in the above example. In accordance with paragraph 6.5.11 of IFRS 9, the lower of the cumulative gain or loss on the hedging instrument (borrowing) and the cumulative change in fair value of the hedged item (revenue) is recognised through other comprehensive income in a separate component of equity.

 

At every subsequent reporting date (say Month 6), Company A remeasures the NPV at a constant discount rate and arrives at the revised effectiveness percentage and the amount to be accounted in Other Comprehensive Income (‘OCI’) and Income Statement (‘P&L’). Refer to computation table 4.

 

(Table 4 – NPV of the hedged item at subsequent reporting rate with OCI vs. P&L impact)
*Month 0 - 1US$ = Rs. 80 and Month 6 - 1US$ = Rs. 82

 

NPV of the hedging instrument is assumed to be the same, considering no outstanding interest payments and borrowing accounted at amortised cost. The above is performed at every reporting date till Borrowing is settled. The MTM in OCI is recycled to the income statement when the underlying hedge item hits the income statement.

 

Disclosures:

 

21A of Ind AS 107, states the disclosure requirements for those risk exposures that an entity hedges and for which it elects to apply hedge accounting. Hedge accounting disclosures shall provide information about:

 

a. Entity’s risk management strategy and how it is applied to manage risk;

 

b. How the entity’s hedging activities may affect the amount, timing and uncertainty of its future cash flows.

 

c. The affect that hedge accounting has had on the entity’s balance sheet, statement of profit and loss and statement of change in equity.

 

I. Documentation for hedging of a foreign currency exposure using a non-derivative hedging Instrument:

 

Company: XYZ Limited

 

Functional Currency: INR Table 5
Hedging objective The objective of the transaction is to hedge currency exchange fluctuations with respect of forecasted foreign currency-denominated sales.
Date of designation (Date of designation of existing foreign currency liability or Date of designation of new foreign currency liability at inception)
Type of hedge Cash flow Hedge
Hedging instrument Interest-bearing foreign currency liability on the balance sheet (US$…..)
Hedged item The highly probable foreign currency revenue on the date of designation US$……. matches the outflow on the hedging instrument on a monthly basis. (tabulation of inflows to be done)
Hedged period Monthly expected (say, US$) revenue (tabulated as above)
How “hedge effectiveness” will be assessed As the cash flows of the underlying and the hedging instrument occur at similar times, changes in cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged are expected to be completely offset by the instrument.
How “hedge ineffectiveness” will be measured Effectiveness will be measured by using the offset method of testing.

The company shall consider the time value of money of the Hedge item to make it comparable to a Hedging instrument, which is subject to amortised cost (a present value measurement).

In accordance with paragraph 6.5.11 of IFRS 9, the lower of the cumulative gain or loss on the hedging instrument (borrowing) and the cumulative change in fair value of the hedged item (revenue) is recognised through other comprehensive income in a separate component of equity.

[Though there is no 80-125 principle prescribed under Ind AS 109, Company A will have to document a logical range, beyond which Company A will not apply hedge accounting. Say in the above example, if the result of effectiveness was 72 per cent, then it would be subjective on the Company to adopt hedge accounting]

 

COMPLETED BY: ______________________________DATE: ____________

 

J. Conclusion

 

a. Achieving the hedge objective with a non-derivative instrument is a cost-efficient way of hedging exposures while also addressing P&L volatility from reporting perspective.

 

b. Hedge accounting can be done even with mismatch in cashflows between hedge instrument and its designated underlying, using NPV approach.

 

c. Company’s results, that are reflective of its stated risk management policy have higher reliability and acceptability levels amongst its stakeholders.

Development Agreements under GST and Tax Implications

INTRODUCTION

It is now commonplace to undertake real estate development by entering into development agreements. Such development agreements typically involve multiple stakeholders, two typical stakeholders being the landowner and the developer. A popular manner of entering into a development agreement is a scenario where the land-owner grants development rights to the Developer in return for monetary consideration. At times, the monetary consideration is fixed and lumpsum, whereas, at times, the monetary consideration can be variable based on the final selling price of the developed property by the Developer. At times, the consideration for the grant of development rights is non-monetary in nature, in the sense that the Developer allots certain developed property back to the Owner for either self-consumption or further sale. In many cases, the development agreement may provide for a combination of both monetary as well as non-monetary considerations. In such a scenario, the development agreement is generally understood to be a barter agreement whereby:

a. The developer pays a monetary consideration for a grant of development potential to the owner.

b. The developer further allots some flats / units in the new building to the owner. The owner may further sell the units allotted either during construction or post-construction.

c. The developer generally sells / allots balance flats / units to prospective new purchasers who join in or become members of the proposed society during construction. Some flats/units may remain unsold at the time of receipt of the completion certificate and may be sold thereafter.

Therefore, the entire business arrangement can be summarised as under:

  • Transaction 1: Transactions between Developer and Owner
  • Transaction Set 2: Transactions between Developer and New Buyers
  • Transaction Set 3: Transactions between Owner and New Buyers

TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPERS AND BUYERS

In view of Entry 5(b) of Schedule II of the CGST Act, 2017, it is evident that the said transactions constitute services to the extent that some consideration is received prior to the completion certificate. However, in view of the retrospective amendment to Section 7 of the CGST Act, 2017, Schedule II has been relegated to merely a classification schedule rather than a deeming provision. It could, therefore, be argued that the said transactions would constitute transactions of the sale of immovable property and, therefore, not liable for GST. However, such a position could be litigated. Based on the settled industry position of conservatism, the applicable GST may be discharged on such transactions.

Depending on the nature of the units being developed, the transactions could be taxable under the different sub-clauses specified in Entry 3 of Notification No. 11/2017 — CT (Rate). Further, abatement in the value on account of land would be available. However, each of the tax rates mentioned in Entry 3 is conditional (except sub-clause (if) dealing with the construction of commercial apartments in a REP other than an RREP and construction of residential apartments in an ongoing project), and therefore, the following conditions need to be fulfilled:

  • No Input Tax Credit is available for inputs and input services.
  • The tax has to be paid through electronic cash ledger only.
  • 80 per cent of the value of inputs and input services are procured from registered suppliers only, and in case of a shortfall, the tax @ 18 per cent is discharged on such shortfall under the reverse charge mechanism.

It is a settled proposition that if no consideration is received prior to the receipt of the completion certificate, the transaction does not constitute a provision of service but is that of the sale of the building and therefore, no GST is payable if the residential unit is sold and the entire consideration is received after issuance of completion certificate.

TRANSACTIONS WITH LAND OWNER

At this juncture, it may be relevant to examine the tax implications of Transaction 1 i.e., the entering into the development agreement by the landowner with the developer. As far as Transaction 1 is concerned, it may be noted that there are two separate deliverables where the GST implications need to be analysed separately:

a. Deliverable by the Owner to the Developer — Here, the owner grants the development rights to the developer and, in turn, is compensated in the form of monetary consideration as well as constructed units. Essentially person to be tested as a supplier in these cases is the owner. One needs to examine whether the owner can be said to have supplied service in the nature of the transfer of the development rights and whether such service can be taxable in the hands of the promoter developer as a recipient of such service under the reverse charge mechanism in view of the specific recitals of Entry 5B of Notification 5/2019 — CT(Rate).

b. Deliverable by the Developer to the Owner — Here, to the extent of the area allotted to the Owner, the developer undertakes the activity of constructing the units for the Owner. The consideration received by the developer is in the form of development rights being granted to the developer. In the case of this leg of the transaction, the suspected supplier is the promoter developer himself, and the issue which needs examination is whether the Developer can be said to have provided services to the Owner warranting payment of GST.

TAXABILITY OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

Section 9 of the CGST Act, 2017 provides for a levy of CGST on all intra-state supplies of goods or services or both. In general, the tax is required to be paid by the taxable person being the supplier of the goods or services or both. However, Sections 9(3) and 9(4) empower the Government to notify cases where the recipient will pay the tax on a ‘reverse charge’ basis. It may be important to note that the provisions of Section 9(3) & 9(4) can operate only in a scenario where there is a levy created by Section 9(1) and in that sense, the provisions of Section 9(3) & 9(4) are subservient to the provisions of Section 9(1). At the cost of repetition, the levy is imposed under section 9(1) only on supplies of goods or services or both. It is therefore important to understand the scope of the terms “goods” and “services” and check whether the transactions contemplated fit within any of the said terms.

The term “goods” is defined under section 2(52) to mean every kind of movable property other than money and securities but includes actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply. Since, in the instant case, the subject matter of the transaction is an immovable property, it is evident that there is no supply of goods.

The term “service” is defined under section 2(102) to mean anything other than goods, money and securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination to another form, currency or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged.

On going through the above definition of service, it is evident that the term service has been very loosely defined under GST. A literal reading of the definition indicates that anything which is not classifiable as goods would be a service. However, the context requires that a purposive interpretation rather than a literal interpretation of the definition should be adopted. The purposive interpretation would suggest that the transaction should bear an essential character of service.

Prior to the introduction of GST, the term service was defined under section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 to mean any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration. It thereafter included declared services and excluded certain transactions. The basic meaning attributed to the concept of service as being any activity carried out by a person for another for a consideration provides the essence of the general understanding of the word service and a similar context should be applicable in the GST law as well especially considering the fact that the GST Legislation in effect is consolidating many erstwhile indirect taxes rather than imposing a tax on some activities/sectors which were not taxable earlier.

One can also read the definition of service as being anything other than goods in the context of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Tata Consultancy Services Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [2004 (178) ELT (022) SC] where the fundamental attributes of goods were listed. In the said case, the Hon’ble Court held that any property becomes goods if it satisfies the three conditions, namely utility, capability of being bought and sold and capability of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed.

As rightly held in the above decision, any property, whether tangible or intangible, is classifiable as goods if it has the following attributes, namely:

  • The item should have a utility,
  • The item should be capable of being bought and sold,
  • The item should be capable of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed.

In fact, the concept of transferability provides the attribute of anything becoming property. Such properties can be further classified into moveable properties, immovable properties, tangible or intangible. Some of these may constitute goods while some may not. When the concept of service is examined, it has to be examined vis-à-vis this aspect of transferability. If there is a possibility of transferability, it would not amount to a service.

In the instant case, since the transaction is one related to the transfer of rights in an immovable property, it can be contended that the same cannot amount to the supply of service. Therefore, the transaction does not qualify to be either a supply of goods or a supply of services and therefore, the levy under section 9(1) is not attracted. Accordingly, it can be argued that the moment the levy is not attracted, the further question of reverse charge mechanism does not apply.

It may further be noted that Section 7(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 stipulates that the activities or transactions specified in Schedule III shall be treated neither as the supply of goods nor a supply of services, thus excluding such transactions from the levy of CGST under section 9 of the Act. Schedule III Entry 5 specifies that the sale of land and sale of buildings as transactions which shall be treated as neither a supply of goods nor a supply of services. It can be argued that the purposive interpretation would further suggest that the exclusion provided vide Schedule III Entry 5 should be applicable in the instant case.

Further support can be drawn from Entry 1(b) of Schedule II, which classifies any transfer of right in goods or of undivided share in goods without the transfer of title thereof is a supply of services. It, however, falls short of specifically classifying the transfer of right in immovable property without the transfer of title within the scope of services.

At this point, it may be essential to elaborate on the fact that the taxability of every transaction has to be seen with reference to the dominant intention of the parties entering into the contract. To analyse any transaction, it may be of utmost importance to look at the intention of the parties to the contract. Section 8 of the CGST Act does provide that the tax implications of the principal supply will govern the tax implications of a composite contract. Therefore, the essence of the transaction, along with the dominant intention, has to be looked into before determining the taxability of any transaction.

In general understanding, a development right is a right to develop the land for agricultural, residential and commercial use. Essentially, land, like any other asset, is a bundle of several rights that accrue to it. Several rights one may identify with land are development rights, possession rights, cultivation rights etc.

By granting the development rights, one can argue that it shall not result in the transfer of ownership of the land in totality but only the aspectual right to develop the land has been transferred. Therefore, the moot question to be answered is whether the grant of development rights would amount to the transfer of title in an immovable property. If the said transfer amounts to a transfer in title, whether it is equivalent to either a sale of land or a transaction which cannot qualify as a service.

Blackstone defines the term “Title” to be “the means whereby the owner of lands has the just possession of his property. “Title” is the means whereby a person’s right to property is established. In Canbank Financial Services vs. Custodian, 2004 (8) SCC 355 – 2004 (7) SC 507, it was held by the apex court that the word “Title” generally used in the context to the property means a right in the property. The title of a property connotes a bundle of rights. The ‘Title’ in an immovable property is the means whereby a person’s right to such property in praesenti is established and does not include a bare expectancy to get such right in due course of time i.e., title means a present right or interest in an immovable property capable of being transferred. The expression Title conveys different forms of a right to a property, which can include a right to possess such property.

In Syndicate Bank vs. Estate Officer (AIR 2007 SC 3169), it was held by Supreme Court that:

“A jurisprudential title to a property may not be a title of an owner. A title which is subordinate to an owner and which need not be created by reason of a registered deed of conveyance may at times create title. The title which is created in a person may be a limited one, although conferment of full title may be governed upon fulfilment of certain conditions. Whether all such conditions have been fulfilled or not would essentially be a question of fact in each case”.

Based on the above arguments, it is possible to contend that the development rights granted by the owner to the Developer are not covered in the definition of service and accordingly cannot be subjected to GST.

Having said that on first principles and based on the legislative framework, a transaction of the grant of development rights by the owner to the developer does not amount to a rendition of service and therefore not liable for GST at all, it will be important to recognize the existence of the following notifications:

a) Notification No. 4/2019 — CT(Rate) amending exemption Notification No. 12/2017 — CT(Rate) to introduce an Entry 41A in the list of exempted services whereby services by way of transfer of development rights (herein refer TDR) or Floor Space Index (FSI) (including additional FSI) on or after 1st April, 2019 are exempted conditionally. Effectively the condition stipulates that the promoter-developer shall pay tax proportionate to the unsold units at the time of receipt of the completion certificate.

b) Notification No. 5/2019 — CT(Rate) which prescribes the reverse charge mechanism in this regard.

It is very likely that the Department may use a reverse analogy to contend that Notification No. 4/2019 — CT(Rate) grants conditional exemption and therefore to the extent of unsold units on the date of the completion certificate, the levy is attracted on a proportionate basis. It can be argued that such a contention of the Department would be incorrect due to various reasons.

It is a settled legal proposition that the existence of an exemption / reverse charge notification cannot by itself infer or presume the existence of a levy. In a particular case, the conduct of musical programs was excluded from the levy provisions of the Entertainment Tax Act. A notification issued under the said Act also granted an exemption, however, subject to certain conditions. When the authorities attempted to demand the entertainment tax citing non-compliance with the conditions mentioned in the notification, the Supreme Court held that if the transaction is excluded from the levy itself, the exemption actually becomes redundant and the conditions mentioned in the said exemption notification have no relevance. One may refer to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Gypsy Pegasus Limited vs. State of Gujarat 2018 (15) GSTL 305 (SC).

Even for a moment, if it is assumed that the scope of ‘service’ is wide enough to include a grant of development rights, it would be important to analyse whether the said ‘supply’ is covered under section 7(1) of the CGST Act. This is important because the scope of supply for the purposes of GST is restricted only to the supplies of goods or services made in the course or furtherance of business. In the instant case, the alleged supply of service is made by the owner. Based on the specific facts of each case, it may be possible for the owner to argue that he is not in the business of development of the real estate, but merely holds the land as an investment or capital asset and therefore the grant of the development right is more in the nature of a transfer of capital asset rather than business activity.

In the context of service tax, the Chandigarh CESTAT was examining the applicability of service tax on transferable development rights. Relying on various judicial precedents, the Tribunal held that there is no element of service in a transaction of transfer of development rights since the same pertains to immovable properties. (DLF Commercial Projects Corporation vs. Commissioner of Service Tax 2019 (27) GSTL 712 (Chandigarh Tribunal)). The said decision is pending before the Supreme Court.

Therefore, a view that no GST is payable by the developer on the development right granted to him is legally possible. However, the position will be litigative and will not be free from doubt. If the developer chooses to adopt a conservative stand and does not like to challenge the vires of the notifications issued in this regard, the tax liability would be determined based on the discussions in the subsequent paragraphs.

Having accepted a position that due to the specific notifications issued in this regard, the grant of development right through the development agreement constitutes a service, the immediate next questions would be the value of the development rights and the effective rate of tax applicable on the same.

Rule 27 of the CGST Rules, 2017 specifies that where the supply of goods or services is for a consideration not wholly in money, the value of the supply shall be the open market value of such supply. The execution of the development agreement attracts stamp duty. For the said purpose, the development right is valued by the respective authorities. The said value can be adopted for the purposes of GST. At this point, it may also be noted that para 2A of Notification No. 11/2017 — CT(Rate) prescribes a value for construction service and not the value for development rights and is therefore not applicable in the current case. The said para is analysed separately later.

Since there is no specific entry in the rate schedule dealing with the transfer of development rights, the same would get covered under the residuary entry for real estate services (HSN 9972) and be liable for GST @ 18 per cent.

Entry 41A of Notification No. 12/2017 — CT(Rate) provides for a conditional exemption in this regard. The said entry exempts service by way of transfer of development rights for construction of residential apartments by a promoter in a project, intended for sale to a buyer. The amount of GST exemption available for construction of the residential apartments in the project under this notification shall be calculated as under:

GST payable on TDR or FSI (including additional FSI) or both for construction of the project] x (carpet area of the residential apartments in the project ÷ Total carpet area of the residential and commercial apartments in the project)

The abovementioned exemption is subject to the condition that the promoter shall be liable to pay tax at the applicable rate, on a reverse charge basis, on such proportion of the value of development rights as is attributable to the residential apartments, which remain un-booked on the date of issuance of the completion certificate, or first occupation of the project, as the case may be, in the following manner:

GST payable on TDR or FSI (including additional FSI) or both for construction of the residential apartments in the project but for the exemption contained herein] x (carpet area of the residential apartments in the project which remain un-booked on the date of issuance of completion certificate or first occupation ÷ Total carpet area of the residential apartments in the project)

It is further provided that the tax payable shall not effectively exceed 1 per cent of the value in case of affordable residential apartments and 5 per cent of the value in case of residential apartments other than affordable residential apartments remaining un-booked on the date of issuance of completion certificate or first occupation.

Interestingly, the entry provides for an exemption for the development rights attributable to the residential apartments, but through a condition, imposes a tax to the extent of the unbooked apartments on the date of the completion certificate. This approach may again seem circumspect and could be challenged legally. However, the intention is clearly evident — to require payment of GST on the unsold apartments on the date of the completion certificate.

Entry 5B of Notification No. 13/2017 — CT(Rate) prescribes a reverse charge mechanism in the case of services supplied by way of transfer of development rights and accordingly, the promoter is made liable for payment of GST. In the instant case, the developer would be registered as a promoter under RERA and would become liable for payment of GST under the reverse charge mechanism.

Further, Notification No. 6/2019 — CT(Rate) prescribes that the liability to pay the tax shall arise on the date of issuance of the completion certificate for the project, where required, by the competent authority or on its first occupation, whichever is earlier.

The GST Implications on the development rights transferred under the development agreement are accordingly summarized below:

a) There is a school of thought to argue that no GST is attracted to the transfer of development rights under the development agreement. However, the said position would be litigative.

b) The value of the development rights is to be determined under Rule 27 as the open market value. Accordingly, the value adopted for stamp duty purposes can be considered to be the value.

c) The service would get classified under HSN 9972 and be liable for GST @ 18 per cent.

d) The tax is to be paid under the reverse charge mechanism by the developer.

e) The tax has to be paid on the date of issuance of the completion certificate for the project.

f) In view of a partial conditional exemption, GST is payable on a proportionate basis to the extent of the un-booked area as of the date of the completion certificate. For example, if 20 per cent of the developed area remains un-booked as of the date of the completion certificate, GST will be payable only to the extent of 20 per cent of the GST calculated amount.

TAXABILITY OF FLATS ALLOTTED TO OWNER

That brings us to the second leg of the question — as to whether GST is payable on the constructed units provided to the owner? In the instant case, it is evident that there is a supply of service of construction by the developer to the owner for a non-monetary consideration and therefore, the transaction does qualify as a supply liable for GST. This view was also followed by the Hon’ble Tribunal in the case of LCS City Makers vs. Commissioner [2013 (30) S.T.R. 33 (Tri. — Chennai)].

Notification No. 6/2019 — CT(Rate) prescribes that the promoter-developer will pay GST on the construction service provided by him against the consideration in the form of development rights at the time when the completion certificate is received. Further, para 2A of Notification No. 11/2017 — CT(Rate) specifies that the value of construction service in respect of such apartments shall be deemed to be equal to the total amount charged for similar apartments in the project from the independent buyers nearest to the date on which such development right is transferred to the promoter. Considering the ad hoc deduction provided towards the land value, effectively GST @ 5 per cent becomes payable on the date of the receipt of the completion certificate in the case of residential apartments, again without any input tax credit.

Further, when the construction is underway, the owner could enter into a further agreement for the sale of the under-construction unit with a third party on which the issue of taxability may arise. As far as the owner is concerned, there are multiple reasons to suggest that no GST liability is attracted. Clearly, the agreement is for the transfer of a title in an immovable property under construction. Even if full effect has to be given to Schedule II Entry 5(b), the said entry requires ‘construction’ as well as ‘sale’. In the instant case, admittedly, no construction activity is carried out by the owner, but by the Developer. Having said so, a doubt is created due to the fourth condition of the rate notification prescribed for the developers. The said condition reads as under:

Provided also that where a registered person (landowner-promoter) who transfers development right or FSI (including additional FSI) to a promoter (developer-promoter) against consideration, wholly or partly, in the form of construction of apartments, —

(i) the developer-promoter shall pay tax on the supply of construction of apartments to the landowner-promoter, and

(ii) such landowner-promoter shall be eligible for a credit of taxes charged from him by the developer-promoter towards the supply of construction of apartments by developer-promoter to him, provided the landowner-promoter further supplies such apartments to his buyers before issuance of completion certificate or first occupation, whichever is earlier, and pays tax on the same which is not less than the amount of tax charged from him on the construction of such apartments by the developer-promoter.

In view of the above condition, a presumption is sought to be created that the landowner would also be liable for payment of GST if he resells the property under construction. Since the landowner would also be entitled to input tax credit of the taxes charged by the developer, in the interests of conservatism, it may be preferable to adopt this position rather than litigate on the same. Therefore, in such a scenario, the owner can discharge GST @ 5 per cent on the consideration actually received by him. He would be eligible for the input tax credit of the GST @ 5 per cent charged by the developer on the notional value (i.e., as per the first sale agreement) and would be liable to pay the differential tax. It may be noted that as per the above condition, the output tax payable by the landowner cannot be less than the input tax credit.

While in general, the developer is entitled to defer the tax till the date of completion certificate, in the above instance, such deferment can result in blockage of credit since the said facility of deferment of tax is not available to the owner selling the flat. Therefore, in such a situation, it may be advisable for the developer to discharge the tax beforehand and issue a valid tax invoice to the landowner enabling him to claim the input tax credit.

The tax implications on the owner’s share can be summarised as under:

a) If not registered, the Owner should register himself with the GST Authorities.

b) The Developer should prepone the tax liability and discharge GST @ 5 per cent based on the first sale agreement value and issue a valid tax invoice to the owner.

c) The Owner should claim the input tax credit of the tax charged by the Developer to him.

d) The Owner should collect GST @ 5 per cent of the agreement value when he sells the under-construction unit to a third party.

e) The Owner should discharge the GST collected by utilizing the input tax credit charged by the Developer and balance in cash.

CONCLUSION

This Article deals with the basic provisions applicable to a development agreement and touches upon some of the controversial areas relating to GST. The Article has specifically avoided coverage of specific types of transactions like redevelopment projects, slum rehabilitation schemes and redevelopment of tenanted properties. Also, as could be seen from the article, the law has undergone a substantial change w.e.f. 1st April, 2019, and this article has also avoided discussion on the tax implications of ongoing projects. We intend to discuss these aspects in subsequent issues.

Section 9 r.w. Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Where Mauritius company had acquired CCPS prior to 1.4.2017 but they were converted into equity shares after said date, without there being any substantial change in rights of the assessee, LTCG derived from the sale of such equity shares were within the ambit of Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA, and hence, was exempt from tax in India.

7. Sarva Capital LLC vs. ACIT

[2023] 153 taxmann.com 618 (Delhi-Trib.)

ITA No.: 2289/Del./2022

A.Ys.: 2019–20

Date of Order: 10th August, 2023

 

Section 9 r.w. Article 13 of India-Mauritius DTAA – Where Mauritius company had acquired CCPS prior to 1.4.2017 but they were converted into equity shares after said date, without there being any substantial change in rights of the assessee, LTCG derived from the sale of such equity shares were within the ambit of Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA, and hence, was exempt from tax in India.

FACTS

The assessee was a tax resident of Mauritius. It was incorporated with the objective of investing in India in education, agriculture, healthcare, microfinance institutions and other financial services sectors. Mauritius tax authority had granted TRC to the assessee. The assessee had invested in CCPS of ‘V’ prior to 1st April, 2017. CCPS were converted into equity shares of ‘V’ as per the terms of their issue without there being any substantial change in the rights of the assessee. The conversion resulted in only a qualitative change in the nature of the rights of the shares but did not alter voting or other rights of the assessee.

The assessee sold the shares during the A.Y. 2019–20 and earned long-term capital gain (“LTCG”) from the same. The assessee claimed LTCG as exempt in terms of Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA. Subsequently, it revised its return and offered LTCG to tax in terms of Article 13(3B) of India-Mauritius DTAA.

AO denied the benefit of DTAA to the assessee and brought to tax, the entire LTCG under the IT Act.

HELD

(i) Valid TRC bars AO from questioning tax residency:

• The assessee was granted TRC by Mauritius Tax Authority. It is well settled that if an assessee is holding a valid TRC, the AO in India cannot go behind such TRC to question the tax residency of the assessee and deny benefits of DTAA.

• ITAT placed reliance on UOI vs. AzadiBachaoAndolan1 to support its view that DTAA benefit cannot be denied even if Mauritius does not levy capital gains tax.

• AO’s allegations that the assessee, (a) was set up for tax avoidance purposes through treaty shopping, (b) was a conduit company and there was an absence of commercial rationale or substance behind the setting up of the assessee were not supported by any material / evidence.

(ii) CCPS acquired prior to 1st April, 2017, converted to equity shares after that date:

• Since the assessee had acquired CCPS prior to 1st April, 2017, LTCG derived from the sale of equity shares after the conversion of CCPS was covered under Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA and not under Article 13(3A) or 13(3B) of India-Mauritius DTAA.

• Therefore, in terms of Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA, LTCG was taxable only in the country of residence of the assessee (i.e., Mauritius).

• A perusal of Article 13(3A) of India-Mauritius DTAA shows that the expression therein is ‘gains from the alienation of shares’. The term ‘shares’ has been used in a broader sense and will cover within its ambit all shares, including preference shares.

• Initially, the assessee had claimed LTCG as exempt in terms of Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA. Subsequently, it revised its return and offered LTCG to tax in terms of Article 13(3B) of India-Mauritius DTAA. However, that would not preclude the assessee from claiming benefit under Article 13(4) if LTCG were clearly within the ambit of Article 13(4) of India-Mauritius DTAA

Section 54B — Where assessee claimed capital gains arising on sale of agricultural land as exempted u/s 54B on purchase of another agricultural land, since the assessee had furnished all sales documents viz., agreement to sell and purchase, receipt, possession letter, GPA and affidavit, along with a copy of the return filed by the land owner, from whom new land was purchased, wherein she had declared capital gains arising from the sale of its land to assessee, the benefit of exemption u/s 54B was allowable.

34. ITO vs. Babita Gupta

[2022] 100 ITR(T) 252 (Delhi – Trib.)

ITA No.: 5313 (Delhi) of 2019

A.Y.: 2014–15

Date of Order: 18th October, 2022

 

Section 54B — Where assessee claimed capital gains arising on sale of agricultural land as exempted u/s 54B on purchase of another agricultural land, since the assessee had furnished all sales documents viz., agreement to sell and purchase, receipt, possession letter, GPA and affidavit, along with a copy of the return filed by the land owner, from whom new land was purchased, wherein she had declared capital gains arising from the sale of its land to assessee, the benefit of exemption u/s 54B was allowable.

FACTS

In the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that the assessee had sold agricultural land measuring 8 bighas situated in the Revenue Estate of Bakkarvala Village, Delhi for a consideration of ₹8,76,56,250 and claimed long-term capital gain of ₹8,48,80,881 as deduction u/s 54B of the Act. The assessee submitted the documentary evidences such as the copy of the agreement to sell, to purchase the agricultural land in the year 2000, copy of General Power of Attorney, copy of possession letter, affidavit of Shri Kali Ram Ganga Bishan (HUF) in proof of purchase of land by the assessee and copy of sale deed, dated 7th November, 2013, executed in the name of Pearls Life Style Developers (P) Ltd [Old Agricultural Land] and copy of the sale deed, dated 15th November, 2013, for the purchase of new agricultural land from Smt. Sumitra Devi Gupta, copy of General Power of Attorney, copy of possession letter, affidavit of Smt. Sumitra Devi Gupta in proof of purchase of land by the assessee[New Agricultural Land].

The AO while completing the assessment u/s 143(3) of the Act accepted the first transaction i.e., the sale of Old Agricultural land as genuine and fulfilled all the criteria and the second transaction i.e., the purchase of New Agricultural Land was not accepted on the ground that this transaction was made through General Power of Attorney only to claim deduction u/s 54B of the Act.

Aggrieved by the order of AO, the assessee filed an appeal before CIT(A). The CIT(A) considering the submissions of the assessee, the evidence furnished before him and following the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ram Gopal [2015] 55 taxmann.com 536/230 Taxman 205/372 ITR 498 allowed deduction u/s 54B of the Act as claimed by the assessee.

Aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the revenue filed a further appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

The ITAT observed that the assessee immediately upon receiving the payments (through the banking channel) on account of sale consideration in respect of old agricultural land the assessee had invested the whole of the sale consideration received in respect of her old agricultural land towards the purchase of new agricultural land. Since the assessee had purchased the new agricultural land by investing the whole of the sale consideration in respect of the old agricultural land within the next few days, she had become eligible and entitled to claim the deduction / exemption u/s 54B of the Act, and accordingly, the assessee had claimed the deduction / exemption u/s 54B in her ITR filed for A.Y. 2014–15, which was denied by the AO.

The Tribunal observed that the AO accepted the transactions pertaining to old agricultural land and disbelieved the transaction of purchase of agricultural land from Smt. Sumitra Devi Gupta made by the assessee during the assessment year under consideration for the reason that there was no mutation in the Revenue Records and the purchaser of the property, Smt. Sumitra Devi Gupta, did not respond to the notice issued u/s 133(6) of the Act.

The ITAT further observed that in the course of appellate proceedings, the assessee had furnished the Return of Income filed by Smt. Sumitra Devi Gupta from whom the land was purchased by assessee, wherein the capital gain was declared by Smt. Sumitra Devi Gupta in her return of income for the A.Y. 2014–15.

The ITAT relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ram Gopal (supra) wherein it was observed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd (340 ITR 1 SC) is of no consequence because the Hon’ble Apex Court had dealt with whether a sale or transfer based upon confirming a GPA amounted to sale / conveyance but the Hon’ble Apex Court did not consider and had no occasion to deal with section 2(14) and section 2(47) of the Act in the context of a claim of acquisition of rights of property and interest in a capital asset for the purpose of Income-tax Act, 1961. Applying the principles of this decision, the ITAT held that there was no infirmity in the order passed by the CIT(A) in allowing the exemption claimed u/s 54B of the Act as claimed by the assessee.

In the result, the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

Section 4 — Where pursuant to search upon assessee-company, an addition was made merely on the basis of statements recorded of ex-employees and where no incriminating material was recovered from premises of assessee, impugned addition made without giving assessee opportunity to cross-examine said ex-employees and dealers was unjustified. The department had failed to follow the cardinal principle of providing adequate opportunity for rebuttal of evidence being sought to be relied upon.

33. DSG Papers (P) Ltd vs. ACIT/DCIT

[2022] 99 ITR(T) 241 (Chandigarh – Trib.)

ITA No.: 82 to 86 (Chd.) of 2022

A.Ys.: 2013–14 to 2017–18

Date of Order: 29th July, 2022

 

Section 4 — Where pursuant to search upon assessee-company, an addition was made merely on the basis of statements recorded of ex-employees and where no incriminating material was recovered from premises of assessee, impugned addition made without giving assessee opportunity to cross-examine said ex-employees and dealers was unjustified. The department had failed to follow the cardinal principle of providing adequate opportunity for rebuttal of evidence being sought to be relied upon.

FACTS

The assessee-company was engaged in the business of manufacturing paper and paper products. For the A.Y. 2013–14, the assessee company’s case was selected for scrutiny proceedings u/s 143(3) and was completed on 20th March, 2016, at the returned income. Subsequently, the PCIT, Patiala set aside the assessment order and directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to pass a fresh assessment order vide order u/s 263, dated 31st August, 2017. The assessment subsequent to the revisionary proceedings was completed on 26th December, 2018, wherein the income of the assessee company as per the original assessment order passed u/s 143(3) on 20th March, 2016, was confirmed.

Meanwhile, there was a search and seizure operation on 5th August, 2016, on the business premises of the assessee-company, and the search was also conducted on Shri Sanjay Dhawan, an ex-president of the assessee company as well as three-four dealers of the assessee company and some ex-employees of the assessee company. During the course of the search at the residential premises of Shri Sanjay Dhawan, parallel invoices of goods manufactured and sold by the assessee-company were allegedly recovered. The evidence of undervaluation of sales was allegedly in the form of statements of third parties recorded u/s 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944. There was also allegedly evidence of unaccounted sales and undervaluation of accounted sales made to third parties in the form of e-mail communication between the assessee-company and third parties. The information was passed on by the Intelligence Wing of GST to the Income-tax Department that the assessee-company had been allegedly suppressing its turnover by way of not accounting for the sales by under-invoicing the sales. Relying upon the said information and the said statements, the AO had initiated the reassessment proceedings u/s 147.

During the course of reassessment proceedings, the assessee-company had specifically requested to cross-examine the persons on whose statements the AO had relied. However, the AO brushed aside the request of the assessee for the opportunity to cross-examine these persons by simply observing that since the assessee had no explanation to offer, there was no requirement for giving any such opportunity. The AO proceeded to reject the books of account maintained by the assessee-company u/s 145(3) of the Act and, thereafter, proceeded to complete the assessment after making an addition of ₹31,40,021 on account of additional net profit by applying the net profit rate of 4.42 per cent. The alleged undisclosed sales for the year were computed at ₹3,62,60,331.

Aggrieved, the assessee-company filed an appeal before CIT(A). The CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO in rejecting the books of account but gave partial relief with respect to additional net profit by holding that the average net profit rate of 3.64 per cent was to be applied rather than 4.42 per cent.

Aggrieved, the assessee-company filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The ITAT had observed that it was an undisputed fact that during the course of search proceedings conducted by the Central Excise Authorities, neither at the premises of the assessee-company nor from any other premises, any other evidence with regard to undisclosed sales was found except for the invoices recovered from the residence of Shri Sanjay Dhawan and the impugned additions on account of the undisclosed / additional net profit on alleged unaccounted sales have been made only on the basis of invoices recovered from the residence of Shri Sanjay Dhawan.

The ITAT also observed that it was an undisputed fact that the assessee-company had specifically requested the AO to provide an opportunity to it to cross-examine these persons but such an opportunity was not granted. The ITAT further observed the following:

i. the assessee–company had demonstrated with ample evidence that Shri Sanjay Dhawan was a disgruntled employee of the company whose intentions were to put the assessee-company into unnecessary financial trouble and litigation,

ii. that the allegation that the unrecorded goods were being transported by vehicles owned by the assessee-company is incorrect in as much as it was physically impossible for the same vehicle to have delivered goods at two different stations within a short span of time on the same day, when time is required not only for movement of goods from one station to another but time is also required for loading and unloading of goods,

iii. that the statement of one of the ex-employees was in contradiction to the statement of Shri Sanjay Dhawan and the Income-tax authorities had relied on both, which does not hold good.

The ITAT observed that the denial of cross-examination by the Income-tax authorities has a significant bearing on the final outcome of this batch of appeals for the simple reason that the AO has relied upon those statements which had been recorded at the back of the assessee and the assessee was not given any opportunity to effectively rebut. The department had failed to follow the cardinal principle of providing adequate opportunity for rebuttal of evidence being sought to be relied upon. The ITAT had relied on the following decisions:

i. Andaman Timber Industries vs. CCE [2015] 62 taxmann.com 3/52 GST 355 (SC),

ii. CIT vs. Rajesh Kumar [2008] 172 Taxman 74/306 ITR 27 (Delhi.),

iii. CIT vs. Dharam Pal Prem Chand Ltd [2008] 167 Taxman 168 / [2007] 295 ITR 105 (Delhi HC),

iv. Prakash Chand Nahta vs. CIT [2008] 170 Taxman 520 / 301 ITR 134 (Madhya Pradesh HC).

The ITAT held that in the absence of such cross-examination having been allowed to the assessee-company and also in view of no incriminating material having been recovered from any of the premises searched; coupled with the fact that the assessee-company had filed an FIR against Shri Sanjay Dhawan and the statement of ex-employee itself stated that the parallel invoices used to be destroyed after the delivery of the consignments, the Income-tax authorities should not have placed complete reliance without any corroborative evidence on such statements.

In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee-company was allowed.

Income from the business of consultancy qua stamp duty and registration would not be liable for taxation u/s 44ADA. The action of the assessee in offering profits of such business u/s 44AD was upheld.

32. Vishnu DattatrayaPonkshe vs. CPC

ITA No.: 1570/Mum./2023

A.Y.: 2017–18

Date of Order: 29th August, 2023

Sections: 44AD, 44ADA

 

Income from the business of consultancy qua stamp duty and registration would not be liable for taxation u/s 44ADA. The action of the assessee in offering profits of such business u/s 44AD was upheld.

FACTS

The Assessee e-filed its return of income declaring income, u/s 44AD of the Act, @8 per cent on receipts of ₹8,30,800 from the business of consultancy qua stamp duty and registration. The amount of ₹8,30,800 included the receipt of ₹4,81,280 on which TDS was deducted u/s 194J of the Act (fees for professional and technical services), and therefore, the AO / CPC added the income @50 per cent u/s 44 ADA of the Act, which resulted in making the addition of ₹2,40,640.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who by taking into consideration that all the deductors are big corporates and deducted tax u/s 194J of the Act, construed that the receipts of ₹4,81,280 related to professional and technical services and are covered u/s 44ADA of the Act and, therefore, taxable @50 per cent. The Commissioner ultimately computed the total income of the Assessee to the tune of ₹2,68,640 (₹2,40,640 + ₹27,982 @8 per cent of ₹3,49,500) and restricted the income of ₹3,49,500 u/s 139(1) of the Act to the tune of ₹2,68,602 only.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the amount of ₹4,81,280 on which TDS was deducted u/s 194J of the Act, in fact, is part of the total receipt of ₹8,30,800 on which the Assessee has declared income @8 per cent u/s 44AD. However, both the authorities below applied the provisions of section 44ADA of the Act, which deals with persons carrying on legal, medical, engineering or architectural profession or profession of accountancy, technical consultancy or interior decoration or any other profession as is notified by the Board in the official gazette. The Tribunal noted that, admittedly, the Assessee is just a 10th/matriculation passed and does not have any qualification to act as a legal, medical, engineering or architectural professional or professional accountancy or technical consultancy of interior decoration or any other profession as is notified by the Board in the official gazette, as prescribed u/s 44AA of the Act.

The Tribunal held that the Assessee’s case does not fall under the provisions of section 44ADA of the Act. It deleted the addition of R2,40,640 sustained by the Commissioner.

Where valuation, as done by a registered valuer, vide a valuation report furnished by the assessee is rejected, the AO should refer the valuation to Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO).

31. ND’s Art World Pvt Ltd vs. ACIT

ITA No.: 6850/Mum./2019

A.Y.: 2016–17

Date of Order: 23rd August, 2023

Sections: 56(2)(viib), Rule 11UA

Where valuation, as done by a registered valuer, vide a valuation report furnished by the assessee is rejected, the AO should refer the valuation to Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO).

FACTS

The assessee, a company engaged in the business of art direction, set construction, studio and equipment hire, filed its return of income on 17th October, 2016, declaring a total income of ₹8,41,17,500. The Assessing Officer (AO) vide order passed u/s 143(3) of the Act determined the total income at ₹23,68,86,730 by making various additions / disallowances.

During the year under consideration, the assessee had issued 1,780 shares of a face value of ₹10 at a premium of ₹98,280 per share. On perusal of the financials called for, the AO noticed that the assessee had in the financial year relevant to A.Y. 2015–16 revalued upwards the assets held by the assessee and had created a revaluation reserve. The immovable assets in the balance sheet pertained to land situated at Karjat along with the other assets, buildings, sets, etc., which were shown at WDV. Should the assessee while computing the book value of the assets for determining the fair market value of the shares consider the book value or should it be a revalued amount which is not reduced by the upward revaluation of the assets. The AO held that the assessee has increased the value of the assets in the previous year by creating an upward revaluation, and as a result, has determined the higher price per share. The AO stated that the valuer had not considered the prevailing stamp duty value at the time of the valuation of the land and building of the assessee and had not specified as to what methodology or reference was made to substantiate the value of the assets. According to the AO, the valuer has merely arrived at the market value of the land at ₹6,500 per square feet without considering the value of the land, current market price and various other criteria and has also not made a comparable analysis of nearby land sold during that period. The AO stated that the valuer has not justified the charging of an additional premium in his report and has merely increased the value of the sets and buildings which are depreciable assets, the value of which does not increase over a period of time. A similar observation was made by the AO on the value of the vehicles, plant and machinery, office equipment, etc., which are properties subject to depreciation. The AO held that the assessee has failed to substantiate the increase in the value. The AO further stated that the Rule 11UA specifies that the revaluation of the assets is not to be considered for the calculation of the share premium.

The AO calculated the fair market value of the shares after removing the revaluation value of the assets and arrived at the share price of ₹17,815 per share as against the assessee’s determination of the value per share amounting to ₹80,465. He made an addition to the difference of share premium of ₹80,465 per share aggregating to ₹14,33,27,700 u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act on the grounds that the premium value under Rule 11UA cannot be taken using the revaluation of the assets, thereby recomputing the premium value at ₹17,815 per share as against the assessee’s valuation of ₹98,280 per share.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended, on behalf of the assessee, that theassessee would not be covered u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act for the reason that the shares were transferred only amongst the family members of the assessee, and the assessee is a company. So then how can it have relatives? And even otherwise, neither the AO nor the CIT(A) has referred the matter to the DVO for the purpose of determining the valuation of the assets. It was submitted that Rule 11UA does not mention that the revaluation reserve is to be reduced and that only Rule 11UAA inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2018, lays down the Rules for valuation and that Rule 11UAA was not applicable to the assessee for the impugned year. Reliance was placed on the decision of the coordinate bench in the case of DCIT vs. Pali Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. [2019] 110 taxmann.com 310 (Mum)(Trib).

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the DR contended that AO had challenged the validity of the valuation report and that the AO is entitled with the power of the valuer and can determine the value himself. Without prejudice, he stated that this issue may be remanded to the file of the AO for determining the valuation after referring the same to the DVO. The DR relied on the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Agro Portfolio Pvt Ltd vs. ITO [(2018) 94 taxmann.com 112 (Del Trib)].

The Tribunal observed that the difference of share premium was added u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act since the AO has rejected the valuation determined by the assessee as per the valuation report submitted by the assessee vide letter, dated 13th December, 2018. The AO further has failed to accept the valuation report of the assessee for the reason that the valuer has not adopted any methodology or reference for the purpose of calculation of the land value without considering the factors such as value of the land as per stamp authority, land market price, location factors and the value at which the neighbouring lands were sold during that period, etc. It is observed from the said fact that the AO has not referred the said matter for valuation to the DVO while he has merely rejected the valuation report submitted by the assessee. The Tribunal found it pertinent to point out that the lower authorities have failed to exercise the option of referring the matter to the DVO for the purpose of valuation of the assets which are very much within the purview of the jurisdiction of the lower authorities.

The Tribunal considered it fit to remand this issue back to the file of the AO for the purpose of valuation of the assets by referring the same to the DVO and to consider the said issue in light of the valuation report of the DVO.

Provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(c) are not applicable on receipt of bonus shares / bonus units.

30. DCIT vs. Smt. Aruna Chandhok

ITA No.: 387/Del./2021

A.Y.: 2015–16

Date of Order: 5th September, 2023

Sections: 56(2)(vii)(c)

Provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(c) are not applicable on receipt of bonus shares / bonus units.

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, filed her return of income for the A.Y. 2015–16 on 16th October, 2015, declaring income under the head salary, house property, capital gains and other sources.

In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) noticed that the assessee had, during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, received bonus shares and bonus units from Tech Mahindra Ltd. and JM Arbitrage Advantage Fund – Bonus options. The assessee was given a show cause as to why the value of these bonus shares and bonus units should not be added u/s 56(2)(vii)(c) of the Act. The assessee submitted that the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(c) are not applicable to bonus shares / bonus units as these are received on capitalisation of profits. The value of the shares would remain the same, and there would be no increase in the wealth of the shareholders on account of bonus shares and his percentage of holding the shares in the company remains constant. Pursuant to bonus shares and bonus units, the share / unit gets divided in the same proportion for all the shareholders. There would be no receipt of any property by the shareholder and what is received is only split shares out of her own holding. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. General Insurance Corporation Ltd [286 ITR 232 (SC)], which held that the issuance of bonus shares by a company does not result in any inflow of fresh funds and nothing comes to the shareholders. It was also submitted that the market price of any share after the bonus issue gets reduced almost in proportion to the bonus issue, and hence, there would be no increase in the market value of shares held by the assessee pursuant to the bonus issue. The overall wealth of a shareholder post-bonus or pre-bonus remains the same. Hence, the assessee received no additional benefit or income on the allotment of bonus shares, because it is only a split of his total rights in the wealth of a company, which remains the same even after the bonus issue.

The AO did not accept the contentions made by the assessee and taxed ₹36,10,63,656 u/s 56(2)(vii)(c) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who distinguished the decisions relied upon by the AO and relied on the decision of the Delhi Tribunal, dated 27th January, 2017, in the case of Meenu Satija vs. PCIT. The CIT(A) held that the AO had misread the judgment of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Dr Rajan Pai.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal held that bonus shares are issued on capitalisation of existing reserves of the company. It noted that the AO had not disputed that the overall wealth of the shareholder post-bonus or pre-bonus remains the same. Having held so, the Tribunal observed that it was wrong on the part of the AO to invoke section 56(2)(vii)(c) on the grounds that there is a double benefit derived by the assessee due to the bonus shares. The Tribunal noted that the issue is covered by the ratio of the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of PCIT vs. Dr. Ranjan Pai in ITA No. 501 of 2016, dated 15th December, 2020. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had rightly appreciated the contentions of the assessee.

The Tribunal not finding any infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) dismissed the grounds of appeal filed by the revenue and upheld the relief granted by the CIT(A) to the assessee.

Section 68 of the Act — Long term capital gain treated by AO as unexplained cash credit.

18. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax – 31 vs. Indravadan Jain, HUF

[Income Tax Appeal No. 454 OF 2018; Dated: 12th July, 2023; A.Y.: 2005-06; (Bom.) (HC)]

Section 68 of the Act — Long term capital gain treated by AO as unexplained cash credit.

Assessee had shown sale proceeds of shares in scrip RamkrishnaFincap Ltd (RFL) as long-term capital gain and claimed exemption under the Act. The Respondent had claimed to have purchased this scrip at ₹3.12 per share in the year 2003 and sold the same in the year 2005 for ₹155.04 per share. It was AO’s case that investigation revealed that the scrip was a penny stock and the capital gain declared was held to be accommodation entries. A broker BasantPeriwal & Co. (the said broker) through whom these transactions have been effected had appeared and it was evident that the broker had indulged in the price manipulation through a synchronised and cross-deal in the scrip of RFL. SEBI had also passed an order regarding irregularities and synchronised trades carried out in the scrip of RFL by the said broker. In view thereof, the Assessee’s case was reopened under Section 148 of the Act.

The AO did not accept the Respondent’s claim of long-term capital gain and added the same to the Assessee’s income under Section 68 of the Act. While allowing the appeal filed by the Assessee, the CIT[A] deleted the addition made under Section 68 of the Act.

The Tribunal while dismissing the appeals filed by the Revenue observed on facts that these shares were purchased by the Assessee on the floor of the Stock Exchange and not from the said broker, deliveries were taken, contract notes were issued and shares were also sold on the floor of Stock Exchange.

The Honourable High Court observed that the CIT[A] and ITAT had observed that the AO himself has stated that SEBI had conducted an independent enquiry in the case of the said broker and in the scrip of RFL, through whom the Assessee had made the said transaction, and it was conclusively proved that it was the said broker who had inflated the price of the said scrip in RFL. The lower authorities also did not find anything wrong in the Assessee doing only one transaction with the said broker in the scrip of RFL. The lower authorities concluded that the Assessee brought 3000 shares of RFL, on the floor of the Kolkata Stock Exchange through a registered share broker. In pursuance of the purchase of shares, the said broker had raised an invoice and the purchase price was paid by cheque and the Assessee’s bank account has been debited. The shares were also transferred into the Assessee’sDemat Account where it remained for more than one year. After a period of one year, the shares were sold by the said broker on various dates in the Kolkata Stock Exchange. Pursuant to the sale of shares, the said broker had also issued contract notes cum bill for the sale, and these contract notes and bills were made available during the course of Appellate proceedings. On the sale of shares, the Assessee effected delivery of shares by way of Demat instructions slip and also received payment from the Kolkata Stock Exchange. The cheque was deposited in the Assessee’s bank account. In view thereof, it was found that there was no reason to add the capital gains as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Act. The ITAT therefore, rightly concluded that there was no merit in the appeal. In view thereof, the Appeal of Revenue was dismissed.

Section 37: Business expenditure — Commission payment — Wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business — Revenue cannot sit in judgment over the assessee to come to a conclusion on how much payment should be made for the services received by the Assessee.

16. The Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd Construction House vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central II
[ITXA No. 744 OF 2002; Dated: 31st August, 2023; (Bom.) (HC)]

Section 37: Business expenditure — Commission payment — Wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business — Revenue cannot sit in judgment over the assessee to come to a conclusion on how much payment should be made for the services received by the Assessee.

The Appellant-Assessee is a limited company listed on the stock exchange and is engaged mainly in the business of manufacturing and sale of R.C.C. Pipes, Steel Pipes etc., which are required for water supply and drainage systems. In the course of the assessment proceedings, the Appellant filed details of commission paid amounting to Rs. 26,90,104. The Appellant also filed copies of the agreements with the aforesaid parties and justified the allowability of the commission payment as business expenditure incurred in the course of its business. The Assessing Officer disallowed a sum of Rs. 22,89,941 on account of commission payment claimed as a deduction by the Appellant-Assessee.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the whole amount with respect to some parties and balance parties; the Assessing Officer allowed only 1/3rd as deductible expenditure and disallowed balance 2/3rd on the ground that the entire payment cannot be considered as laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business because neither the Appellant nor the recipients of commission could show that orders were procured with their assistance.

The Commissioner of the Income Tax (Appeals) disposed of the said appeal. With respect to ground relating to the disallowance of commission payment, the Commissioner (Appeals) followed his own order for the A.Y. 1985-86 and allowed the whole of the amount which was disallowed by the Assessing Officer, that is, Rs. 22,89,941.

Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Respondent-Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal disposed of the said appeal relating to the commission payment, and the Tribunal restricted disallowances to 2/3rd of the total commission. With respect to one party, the Tribunal directed to give relief of 1/3rd of the amount and with respect to other remaining parties, the Tribunal confirmed the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer on the ground that the Appellant-Assessee did not furnish any evidence in support of services rendered by these commission agents. The Tribunal further observed that there should have been a lot of correspondence between the Appellant-Assessee and the recipient of commission and in the absence of any evidence in this regard, the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer was justified. Being aggrieved by the Tribunal’s order, the Appellant-Assessee filed the appeal on a substantial question of law before the Hon. High Court.

The Appellant-Assessee consolidated appeals for A.Ys. 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1988-89 against common order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, dated 18th January, 2002, was admitted on the following substantial question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal’s conclusion that the commission agents had not rendered services to the Appellant company to warrant payment of commission is based on relevant and valid material and is sustainable in law?”

The Appellant-Assessee further contended that the commission agents are not related to the Appellant and further they have also produced the commission agreements with these agents in the course of the assessment proceedings. The payments have been made through a banking channel and there is no allegation that payments made to the commission agent have come back to the Appellant. The Appellant further submitted that the nature of services is such that there would not be any documentary evidence in support thereof.

The Respondent-Revenue contended that the Appellant-Assessee has failed to furnish any evidence to show that services have been rendered and therefore, the Assessing Officer was justified in disallowing the commission. The Respondent also brought to the notice of the Court Explanation 1 to Section 37(1) of the Act which was introduced by the Finance No. 2 Act of 1998 with retrospective w.e.f. 1st April, 1962. However, he fairly submitted that in the present appeal, the case of the Revenue is not based on Explanation.

The Hon. High Court held that the Assessing Officer, with respect to 4 parties, disallowed 2/3rd of the commission payment on the ground that the Appellant-Assessee could not furnish evidence about the services having been rendered. With respect to 3 parties, the AO disallowed the whole of the commission payment on the ground that they were acting as sub-contractors to the Appellant-Assessee and therefore no question arises to make payment of commission to these parties. With respect to 1, there was a discrepancy in the figures paid by the Appellant-Assessee and confirmed by the recipient and therefore the full amount was disallowed. The said disallowance was fully deleted by the First Appellate Authority. The Hon. Court observed that the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal both have not fully disallowed the commission payment but as partly allowed (1/3rd) and partly disallowed (2/3rd). If that be so, then the lower authorities have accepted the rendering of service by the commission agent and it is only on that basis that 1/3rd came to be allowed by the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal. The Court observed that the services are either rendered or not rendered and the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal having allowed partly the commission payment clearly indicate that both the authorities have accepted that the services have been rendered. The part disallowance confirmed by the Tribunal and the Assessing Officer would then amount to the Revenue venturing into the quantum of payment whether the commission payment was reasonable for rendering the services, which course of action, in the facts of the present case, is not permissible under the Act because the transaction is between unrelated parties. It is a settled position that the Revenue cannot sit in judgment over the assessee to come to a conclusion on how much payment should be made for the services received by the Appellant-Assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in confirming the disallowance of 2/3rd as made by the Assessing Officer and allowing the relief of only 1/3rd of the expenses.

The Court further noted that there was no allegation made in the assessment order of any flow back of the commission payment by the commission agent to the Appellant-Assessee. The commission agents had confirmed the receipt of the commission. The payments had been made through banking channels. Therefore, even on this account, the genuineness of the payment cannot be doubted.

The AO and the Tribunal were not justified in bifurcating the commission payment between the work done for assisting in getting the tender and the follow up action for obtaining the payment. The agreement has to be read as a whole and merely because the payment of the commission is deferred in tranches, it could not be said that partly the payments are justified and partly are not justified. The action of the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal on this account would amount to rewriting of the agency agreement which is not permissible. Therefore, the finding of the officer and the Tribunal for disallowing part of the commission payment on the above basis was also not justified.

The Court further observed that the Appellant-Assessee was in the business, which inter alia involves
contracts / works awarded by the public sector/government, which necessitates the Appellant to apply for various tenders issued by the public sector co. / government across the country. To apply for such public tenders the Appellant is required to engage the services of agents. As per the commission agency agreement, the services rendered by the commission agent are for supplying information for working out the tender and to give information about the competitive tenders. The said agreement further requires the commission agent to keep the Appellant-Assessee informed about various clarifications required by the companies who floated the tenders. The role of the commission agent does not stop at this, but if the Appellant-Assessee gets the contract, then the commission agent has to follow up with these corporations for realising the payments on account of bills raised by the Appellant-Assessee. It is for such composite services to be rendered by the commission agent that the Appellant-Assessee makes payment of the commission.

The Court observed that merely because the contracts awarded to the Appellant are by Government / Public Corporations does not mean that the Appellant-Assessee cannot obtain services of the commission agents to assist them in the tendering process and for the follow-up action for recovery of the money. For the Appellant, it is fully a commercial activity and engaging expert/specialised services is under a written contract entered between the commission agents and the Appellant. It was not the case of the Revenue that there is any legal prohibition for the Appellant-Assessee to avail services of such commission agents. It was also not the case of the Revenue that these commission agents within the meaning of the Act are entities/persons related to the Appellant-Assessee and/or they are government employees. Therefore, it was the business prerogative of the Appellant-Assessee as to whose services they should engage in the course of its business and on what terms and conditions. Most significantly, the fact that the Assessing Officer and the Tribunal have allowed part of the commission payment for the purpose of business also indicates that the Revenue has accepted the services rendered and this part of expenditure in that regard was held to be allowable. There cannot be a contradictory course of action as the Revenue needs to be consistent.

It was true that it is for the Assessing Officer to decide, whether, any commission paid by the Appellant-Assessee to his agents is wholly or exclusively for the purpose of his business and the mere fact that the Appellant-Assessee establishes the existence of an agreement between him and his agent and the fact of actual payment, the discretion of an officer to consider, whether such expenditure was made exclusively for the purpose of the business is not taken away. The expenditure incurred must be for commercial expediency. However, in applying for the test of commercial expediency for determining whether an expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the business, the reasonableness of the expenditure has to be judged from the businessman’s point of view and not from the Revenue’s perspective. In view thereof, the appeal of the Assessee was allowed.

Section: 276B r.w.s 278B of the Act — Offence and prosecution — Prosecution to be at the instance of Chief Commissioner / Commissioner (Compounding of Offences) — Whether there is no limitation provided under sub-section (2) of section 279 for submission or consideration of compounding application.

17. Sofitel Realty LLP vs. Income Tax Officer (TDS) – Ward 2(2)(4)

[WP (L) No. 14574 OF 2023

Dated: 18th July, 2023; (Bom.) (HC)]

 

Section: 276B r.w.s 278B of the Act — Offence and prosecution — Prosecution to be at the instance of Chief Commissioner / Commissioner (Compounding of Offences) — Whether there is no limitation provided under sub-section (2) of section 279 for submission or consideration of compounding application.

The Petitioner, a Limited Liability Partnership firm, for the period of A.Y. 2009-2010, for various reasons did not deposit the TDS amount that it had deducted with the income tax authorities. Petitioner deposited those TDS amounts on or about 23rd March, 2010 beyond the time provided for deposit. This was before Petitioners even received a show cause notice from the department. Thus there was no outstanding amount of TDS.

Petitioner and its partners received the show cause notice, dated 30th November, 2011 calling upon Petitioners to show cause as to why prosecution against them be not lodged for an offence under Section 276B read with Section 278B of the Act. On 26th March, 2012, Petitioners filed a compounding application, dated 5th March, 2012, (first application) in the prescribed format. As the Petitioners failed to deposit the compounding fees in time, therefore, the Petitioner’s application, dated
5th March, 2012, came to be rejected.

On 26th August, 2013, PCIT passed a sanction order for initiation of prosecution against Petitioners. A complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court at Esplanade under Section 276B read with Section 278B of the Act. On 14th July, 2014, Petitioner no.1 paid the entire compounding fees of ₹7,39,984/- as was indicated by the department. On 8th October, 2015, Petitioner filed a fresh compounding application (second application) and also agreed to pay any further or additional compounding fees as may be directed. Almost three years later, on 21st September, 2018, the Petitioner received a letter, dated 17th September, 2018, annexing the copy of the order, dated 17th July, 2013. The Petitioner addressed a letter requesting the department to provide a copy of the order passed in the second application. In response, the Petitioner received a letter, dated 13th April, 2023.

In the affidavit in reply filed through one Shashi Shekhar Singh, Income Tax Officer (TDS)-2(2)(4) Mumbai, affirmed on 7th July, 2023, it is stated that compounding application, dated 8th October, 2015, is barred by limitation of time as per the compounding guidelines, dated 23rd December, 2014 issued by CBDT. In paragraph 8(vii), it is provided that in respect of offences for which complaint had been filed with competent court 12 months prior to the receipt of the application for compounding, such offences generally not be compounded. According to the affiant, since a complaint had been filed on 20th August, 2013, and the fresh compounding application, dated 8th October, 2015, was beyond the period of 12 months, the application is null and void.

The Honourable Court observed that it is not for the Income Tax Officer to decide the compounding application. Section 279(2) of the Act provides that any offence under chapter XXII of the Act may, either before or after the institution of proceedings, be compounded by the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax or Commissioner of Income Tax or Principal Director General of Income Tax or Director General. The Income Tax Officer has no power to even state that the application is null and void.

There is no limitation provided under sub-section (2) of Section 279 of the Act for submission or consideration of the compounding application. What is relied upon by the Income Tax Officer is the Guidelines issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). CBDT by the Guidelines cannot provide for limitation nor can it restrict the operation of sub-section (2) of Section 279 of the Act. The Guidelines are subordinate to the principal Act or Rules, it cannot override or restrict the application of specific provisions enacted by the legislature. The Guidelines cannot travel beyond the scope of the powers conferred by the Act or the Rules. It cannot contain instructions or directions curtailing a statutory provision by prescribing the period of limitation where none is provided by either the Act or the rules framed thereunder. Moreover, the explanation merely explains the main section and is not meant to carve out a particular exception to the contents of the main Section. The Court observed that just because the first application was rejected for default, does not mean the second application should be rejected.

The Court further observed that the compounding application cannot be rejected on the grounds of delay in filing the application. Moreover, there is also no restriction on the number of applications that could be filed. The only requirement under sub-section (2) of Section 279 of the Act is that the complaint filed should be still pending.

The Court directed the compounding application to be disposed of within eight weeks, the proceedings pending before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court, Mumbai shall remain stayed until the department disposes of the Petitioner’s compounding application, dated 8th October, 2015.

Revision — Powers of Commissioner — Bonafide mistake by assessee including exempt income in the computation of income — Time for filing revised return barred — No restriction on the power of Commissioner to grant relief — Orders rejecting applications of the assessee for revision unsustainable — Matter remanded to Commissioner for reconsideration.

50. Ena Chaudhuri vs. ACIT

[2023] 455 ITR 284 (Cal.)

A.Ys. 2007–08 and 2008–09

Date of order: 18th January, 2023

Section 264 of ITA 1961

 

Revision — Powers of Commissioner — Bonafide mistake by assessee including exempt income in the computation of income — Time for filing revised return barred — No restriction on the power of Commissioner to grant relief — Orders rejecting applications of the assessee for revision unsustainable — Matter remanded to Commissioner for reconsideration.

For the A.Ys. 2007–08 and 2008–09 the assessee inadvertently offered to tax exempted income relating to dividend and long-term capital gains and realized this only upon receipt of the order passed u/s. 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since the filing of the original return itself was delayed she could not file a revised return u/s. 139(5) for claiming a deduction of the exempted income and therefore, she filed revision applications u/s. 264 before the Commissioner. The Commissioner held that since the orders passed u/s. 143(1) were not erroneous, that since the original returns of income were filed beyond the specified dates the assessee was debarred from filing revised returns and dismissed the revision applications.

The Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petitions filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) On the facts, the Commissioner had committed an error in law in dismissing the revision applications of the assessee filed u/s. 264 by refusing to consider on the merits the claim of the assessee that the income in question was exempted from tax and not liable to tax and was included in her return as taxable income due to a bona fide mistake and which she could not rectify by filing revised return since original return itself was belatedly filed and that she had no other remedy except filing of revision applications u/s. 264.

ii) The Commissioner while refusing to consider the claim of the assessee had misinterpreted Goetze (India) Ltd and also the scope of jurisdiction conferred upon him u/s. 264 by equating it with that of the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in considering the claim of any allowance or deduction claimed by an assessee in the return of income or without filing any revised return.

iii) The orders of the Commissioner u/s. 264 rejecting the revision applications of the assessee for the A.Ys. 2007–08 and 2008–09 were unsustainable and accordingly set aside. The matters were remanded back to the Commissioner for reconsideration.”

Recovery of tax — Stay of demand — Application for stay pleading financial hardship — Plea should be considered and speaking order passed thereon.

49. Tungabhadra Minerals Pvt Ltd vs. Dy. CIT
[2023] 455 ITR 311 (Bom.)
A.Y. 2008–09: Date of order: 30th September, 2022

Recovery of tax — Stay of demand — Application for stay pleading financial hardship — Plea should be considered and speaking order passed thereon.

Pursuant to search and seizure against the assessee u/s. 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessment for A.Y. 2008-09 was completed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Act after making an addition of R264.59 crores and consequently demand of R239.54 crores was raised. The assessment order was challenged in an appeal before the CIT(A) which was pending.

The assessee filed a stay application on 30th July, 2021 requesting for a stay of demand on the ground that the assessment order was bad and illegal. The assessee also pleaded financial difficulty. The assessing officer rejected the assessee’s application for stay of demand vide order dated 11th August, 2021 without assigning any reasons.

The assessee made an application before the Principal Commissioner largely on the grounds of financial stringency. However, vide order dated 17th November, 2021, the Principal Commissioner did not accept the plea of the assessee and directed the assessee to make payment of 10 per cent of the demand on or before 15th December, 2021. While passing the order, the Principal Commissioner did not deal with the assessee’s request for a stay on the basis of financial distress. Therefore, the assessee once again on 6th December, 2021 filed application before the Principal Commissioner categorically pointing out financial stringency and prayed for stay of demand. The application was once again rejected by the Principal Commissioner vide his order dated 29th December, 2021 and concluded that 10 per cent of the tax was required to be paid by the assessee.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged that order. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) In an application for stay of demand, the aspect of financial hardship is one of the grounds which is required to be considered by the authority concerned and the authority concerned should briefly indicate whether the assessee is financially sound and viable to deposit the amount or the apprehension of the Revenue of non-recovery later is correct warranting deposit.

ii) In the assessee’s application dated 30th July, 2021 the assessee had asserted a categorical case of financial hardship. However, the Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s application for stay of the demand, without assigning any reasons. The assessee approached the Principal Commissioner praying for the stay of the demand, reiterating the specific grounds in that regard contending that the Assessing Officer had not applied his mind to the aspect of financial stringency. However, the fate of the petition before the Principal Commissioner was not different. Although other issues on the merits had been considered by the Principal Commissioner, there were no reasons in the context of financial hardship, in both the orders passed by the Principal Commissioner being orders dated 11th August, 2021 and an order dated 29th December, 2021. Both orders were not valid.

iii) The Principal Commissioner of Income-tax is directed to hear the petitioner(s) on the stay application on the specific plea of the petitioner in regard to financial stringency and after granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner(s), pass an appropriate order on such issue. Let such exercise be undertaken as expeditiously as possible and in any case within two months from today.

iv) In the meantime, till a fresh decision on such an issue is taken, the impugned demands in question, relevant to these petitions, shall not be acted upon by the respondents.”

Recovery of tax — Interest for failure to pay tax — Waiver of interest — Effect of 220(2A) — Advance tax paid in time but mistakenly in the name and PAN of minor son — Amount credited to assessee’s account — Assessee co-operating in inquiry relating to assessment and recovery proceedings — Assessee entitled to complete waiver of interest.

48. FuaadMusvee vs. Principal CIT

[2023] 455 ITR 243 (Mad.)

A.Ys. 2009-10 and 2011-12

Date of order: 9th February, 2023

Section 220(2A) of ITA 1961

 

Recovery of tax — Interest for failure to pay tax — Waiver of interest — Effect of 220(2A) — Advance tax paid in time but mistakenly in the name and PAN of minor son — Amount credited to assessee’s account — Assessee co-operating in inquiry relating to assessment and recovery proceedings — Assessee entitled to complete waiver of interest.

The assessee, an individual, filed his returns of income for A.Y. 2009-10 declaring a total income of ₹88,37,380 and for A.Y. 2011-12 declaring a total income of ₹87,10,242. In the return of income, the assessee included the income of his minor son as per the provisions of section 64 of the Act. However, out of abundant caution, the assessee also filed the return of his minor son separately. The advance tax on the minor’s income was paid under the PAN of the minor son. The assessee, in his return of income, claimed credit of taxes paid of ₹21,27,450 and ₹25,41,037 which included the advance tax paid and tax deducted at source on account of the minor son also.

The return was processed u/s.143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and demand was raised since the credit for advance tax paid by the assessee in the PAN of the minor son was not granted. The assessee was informed that credit cannot be given for the amount paid under a different PAN and was asked to file a rectification application u/s. 154 of the Act.

However, since the assessee had paid the tax amounts, the assessee claimed a waiver of tax amounts and a total waiver of interest of ₹12,20,380 and ₹8,15,179 u/s. 220(2) of the Act for the period 29th December, 2012 to 25th November, 2018 as the assessee had paid the tax in 2011 itself, albeit under the PAN of the minor son. It was the contention of the assessee that since the amount was with the Department for all these years, there was no basis for the demand of interest. The Principal Commissioner, vide order dated 31st March, 2022 granted only a 20 per cent waiver of interest and directed the assessee to pay the balance of 80 per cent.

Aggrieved by the order of the Principal Commissioner, the assessee filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court. The High Court allowed the writ petition and held as follows:

“i) There was no lapse on the part of the assessee in the payment of his taxes and he had not committed any default; the taxes deposited under the assessee’s minor son’s account were duly credited to the assessee’s account immediately on the date of remittance. The petitioner had certainly suffered genuine hardship for no fault of his. Hence, interest could not be levied u/s. 220(2) of the Act when the advance taxes were in fact paid on time though mistakenly in the assessee’s minor son’s permanent account number.

ii) It was also not the case of the Department that the assessee did not cooperate in any enquiry relating to the assessment or any proceedings for recovery of the amount due from him. The Principal Commissioner had granted a partial waiver of interest to the assessee at 20 per cent without giving any reason as to how he arrived at that rate. There was no finding given by the Principal Commissioner that the assessee had not satisfied the three conditions required for waiver of interest u/s. 220(2A). He ought to have granted full waiver of the interest to the assessee, but, instead, erroneously had granted only a 20 per cent. waiver by non-speaking orders.”

Recovery of tax — Private Company — Recovery from the director — Non-recovery not shown to be attributable to neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on the part of the assessee — Tax is not recoverable from Director.

47. Geeta P. Kamat vs. PCIT

[2023] 455 ITR 234 (Bom.)

A.Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10

Date of order: 20th February, 2023

Sections 179 and 264 of ITA 1961

Recovery of tax — Private Company — Recovery from the director — Non-recovery not shown to be attributable to neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on the part of the assessee — Tax is not recoverable from Director.

A show cause notice was issued upon the assessee u/s.179 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) requiring the assessee to show cause why recovery proceedings should not be initiated upon her in her capacity as the director of Kaizen Automation Private Limited (KAPL) for the A.Ys. 2008–09 and 2009–10 due to non-recovery of taxes despite the attachment of the bank account.

In response to the show cause notice, the assessee submitted that the non-recovery of taxes could not be attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance, breach of duty on her part in relation to the affairs of the company. The assessee contended that even though she was the director of KAPL, she neither had any control over the affairs of the company nor did she have any authority or independence to take decisions for the benefit of the company. Further, the assessee did not have any authority to sign any cheques on behalf of the company. No functional responsibility was assigned to her or her husband who was also a shareholder and director in the company.

The Assessing Officer passed the order u/s. 179 of the Act rejecting the contentions of the assessee and held that the assessee had failed to prove that she was not actively involved in the management of the company for the F.Ys. 2007–08 and 2008–09 and that there was no gross neglect misfeasance or breach of duty on the part of the assessee.

Against the said order, the assessee filed a revision application u/s. 264 of the Act which was rejected on the ground that the assessee was a director for the relevant assessment years and hence was liable.

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the order passed u/s. 179 of the Act. The Bombay High Court, allowing the petition held as follows:

“i) If the taxes due from a private company cannot be recovered, then the same can be recovered from every person who was a director of a private company at any time during the year. Such a director can absolve himself if he proves that non-recovery cannot be attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty in relation to the affairs of the company.

ii) The assessee had discharged its burden by bringing material on record to demonstrate a limited role in the company and lack of authority in the management of the company.

iii) The assessing officer had not placed any material on record to controvert the material placed on record by the assessee based on which the assessee could be held to be guilty of gross neglect misfeasance or breach of duty in regard to the affairs of the company.

iv) Theassessee having discharged the initial burden, the assessing officer had to show how the assessee could be attributed to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty.

v) The order passed u/s. 179 by the assessing officer and the revision order passed u/s. 264 by the Principal Commissioner on similar grounds were unsustainable.”

Reassessment — Condition precedent — Service of valid notice — Notice sent to secondary email id though active primary email id given in the last return — No proper service of notice — Notice and subsequent proceedings and order set aside.

46. Lok Developers vs. Dy. CIT

[2023] 455 ITR 399 (Bom.)

A.Ys. 2015-16 to 2017-18: Date of order: 15th February, 2023

Sections 144, 144B, 147, 148, 156 of ITA 1961

Reassessment — Condition precedent — Service of valid notice — Notice sent to secondary email id though active primary email id given in the last return — No proper service of notice — Notice and subsequent proceedings and order set aside.

The petitioner a registered partnership firm which was carrying on a real estate development business. Notices u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for reopening of assessment was served upon the secondary email id as per the PAN Card i.e., on LOKTAX2008@REDIFFMAIL.COM, and not on the primary registered email id i.e., loktax201415@rediffmail.com. The Petitioner filed writ petitions and challenged the reassessment notices dated 28th March, 2021, for the A.Ys. 2015–16, 2016–17 and 2017-18 issued u/s. 148 of the Act, the show-cause notice for proposed variation in the draft assessment order dated 25th March, 2022 and assessment order under section 144B read with section 144, notice of demand under section 156.

The Bombay High Court framed the following questions for consideration:
“Whether subsequent proceedings initiated by the Revenue authorities for non-compliance of notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act would be vitiated on account of notice under section 148 of the Act being served on the secondary email id registered with permanent account number (PAN) instead of the registered primary e-mail id or updated e-mail id filed with the last return of income?”

The High Court allowed the writ petition and held as follows:

“i) The Assessing Officer ought to have considered the primary email id furnished by the assessee in the return filed for the A.Y. 2020–21 and had erred in issuing a notice on the secondary email id when there was a primary email id. The secondary email id had to be used as an alternative or in such circumstances when the authority was unable to effect service of any communication on the primary id. There was no prudence in issuing an email to the secondary email address. The Assessing Officer ought to have sent the notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to both the primary email address and the e-mail address mentioned in the last return of income filed to pre-empt a jurisdictional error on account of valid service.

ii) The assessee was not wrong in refusing to participate in a proceeding vitiated by lack of valid service of notice. Accordingly, the notice u/s. 148 and all consequential proceedings including the notice for proposed variation in income and assessment order u/s. 144B read with section 144 were quashed and set aside. The Assessing Officer was at liberty to proceed with the assessment after issuance of fresh notice in accordance with law.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s. 148 — Limitation — Law applicable — Effect of amendments by Finance Act, 2021 — Notice barred by limitation under un-amended provisions — Notice issued on 30th July, 2022 to reopen assessments for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 — Not valid.

45. SumitJagdishchandra Agrawal vs. Dy. CIT

[2023] 455 ITR 216 (Guj.)

A.Ys. 2013–14 and 2014–15: Date of order: 20th March, 2023

Sections 147, 148, 148A and 149 of ITA 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s. 148 — Limitation — Law applicable — Effect of amendments by Finance Act, 2021 — Notice barred by limitation under un-amended provisions — Notice issued on 30th July, 2022 to reopen assessments for A.Y. 2013-14 and A.Y. 2014-15 — Not valid.

In the present petitions filed under article 226 of the Constitution, the respective petitioners have called in question the notices issued by Respondent No. 2. Assessing Officer u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 seeking to reopen the assessment in respect of A.Ys. 2013–14 and 2014–15 and the corresponding orders u/s. 148A(d) of July 2022. The challenge is on the basis of limitation. The notices u/s. 148 of the Act were originally issued under the un-amended provisions during the period April to June 2021 and were treated as show-cause notices u/s. 148A(b) of the Act in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal [2022] 444 ITR 1 (SC); [2023] 1 SCC 617, and thereupon, the order u/s. 148A(d) was passed in July 2022.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petitions and held as under:

“i) Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, empowers the Assessing Officer to reassess the income of the assessee subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 151 of the Act in case any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Section 149 deals with the time limit for notice. By the Finance Act, 2021, passed on 28th March, 2021, and made applicable with effect from 1st April, 2021, section 148A was brought into force and section 149 was also recast. The first proviso to section 149 of the Act as introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, inter alia, stipulated that no notice u/s. 148 shall be issued at any time in a case for the assessment year beginning on or before 1st day of April 2021, if such notice could not have been issued at that time on account of being beyond the time limit specified under the provision as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2021. Due to the pandemic of 2020 the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 was passed. Various notifications were issued from time to time extending the time limits prescribed u/s. 149 of the Act for issuance of reassessment notice u/s. 148. The 2020 Act is a secondary legislation. Such secondary legislation would not override the principal legislation, the Finance Act, 2021. Therefore, all original notices u/s. 148 of the Act referable to the old regime and issued between 1st April, 2021, and 30th June, 2021, which stand beyond the prescribed permissible time limit of six years from the end of A.Y. 2013–14 and A.Y. 2014–15, would be time barred.

ii) The notices u/s. 148 of the Act relatable to the A.Y. 2013–14 or the A.Y. 2014–15, as the case may be, were beyond the permissible time limit, and therefore, liable to be treated as illegal and without jurisdiction.”

Reassessment — Notice — Charitable purpose — Registration — Law applicable — Effect of amendment of section 12A Charitable institution entitled to an exemption for assessment years prior to registration — Reassessment proceedings for earlier years cannot be initiated on account of non-registration.

44. Prem Chand Markanda SD College for Women vs. ACIT(E)

[2023] 455 ITR 329 (P&H)

A.Y. 2015-16: Date of order: 31st January, 2023

Sections 147 and 148 of ITA 1961

Reassessment — Notice — Charitable purpose — Registration — Law applicable — Effect of amendment of section 12A Charitable institution entitled to an exemption for assessment years prior to registration — Reassessment proceedings for earlier years cannot be initiated on account of non-registration.

The assessee was a society registered under the Registrar of Societies, Punjab running a college exclusively for girls since 1973. The assessee got substantial aid from the State Government in the shape of reimbursement of staff salary and therefore, prior to A.Y. 2016–17, it was entitled to blanket exemption from income tax in terms of clause (iiiab) of s.10 (23C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The assessee apprehended that it may not fulfill the condition given under Rule 2BBB, which required that for institutions to be substantially financed, the percentage of government grant should not be less than 50 per cent and therefore, the assessee applied for registration u/s. 12AA on 28th March, 2016, before the competent authority. The assessee was granted registration vide order dated 30th September, 2016, which was applicable from A.Y. 2016–17 onwards until withdrawn by the Commissioner. The assessee again applied for fresh registration as per 12AB of the Act. Vide order dated
15th October, 2021, the assessee was again registered for a period of five years from A.Y. 2022–23 to A.Y. 2026–27.

Subsequently, on 16th March 2022, the assessee received a notice u/s. 148A(b) of the Act for reopening the assessment for A.Y. 2015–16 on account of bank interest and cash deposit in two of its bank accounts. In response to the notice, the assessee relied upon the third proviso to 12A(2) to contend that there was a bar to take action u/s. 147 for A.Y. preceding the year in which registration was granted. The objections were rejected vide order dated 29th March, 2022 and notice u/s. 148 of the Act was issued.

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the notices issued under 148A(b) and section 148 of the Act. The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) Once the reply filed by the assessee pursuant to the notice had been rejected without examining the third proviso to section 12A(2) relegating the assessee to the alternative remedy would not be appropriate. After issuance of notice u/s. 148A(b) objections were filed by the assessee which were dismissed. A notice u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment u/s. 147 was issued wherein no reference was made to the third proviso to section 12A.

ii) Registration of the assessee was granted and was applicable from the A.Y. 2016–17. The registration was valid for claiming the benefit under sections 11 and 12. No proceedings u/s. 147 could be initiated for the A.Y. 2015–16. Hence, the show-cause notice u/s. 148A(b), the consequent order u/s. 148A(d) and the notice u/s. 148 being contrary to the third proviso to section 12A(2) of the Act, are set aside.”

Interest on refund — Additional Interest — Law applicable — Delay in granting refund pursuant to order of Tribunal as affirmed by the Court — Assessee is entitled to refund with interest and additional interest — Compensation awarded if process not completed within the prescribed period.

43. Bombardier Transportation India Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT

[2023] 455 ITR 278 (Guj.)

A.Y. 2005-06: Date of order: 23rd January, 2023

Sections 244 and 244A of ITA 1961

Interest on refund — Additional Interest — Law applicable — Delay in granting refund pursuant to order of Tribunal as affirmed by the Court — Assessee is entitled to refund with interest and additional interest — Compensation awarded if process not completed within the prescribed period.

The assessee filed an appeal against the order of penalty u/s 201(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The CIT(A) confirmed the penalty of ₹ 97,59,312. The assessee paid an amount of ₹ 90,46,000 in the F.Y. 2006–07. The Tribunal vide order dated 17th April, 2009 quashed the penalty levied upon the assessee. The department’s appeal before the High Court was dismissed vide order dated 4th August, 2016.

The assessee filed a complaint before the CPGRAMS on 19th June, 2017 for not giving effect to the order of the Tribunal and the High Court and for non-issuance of the refund. Though the replies were received on 11th June, 2017 and 2nd August, 2017, there was no whisper on the refund. Thereafter, on 16th October, 2017, 28th February, 2018, 7th March, 2018, 12th March, 2018, 16th March, 2018, 10th April, 2018 and 11th April, 2018 yet another complaint was filed before the CPGRAMS. The assessee submitted the details for the processing of the refund. However, the refund was not granted.

In such circumstances, due to the non-action on the part of the Department despite several complaints, the assessee filed a writ petition before the Gujarat High Court and prayed that the Assessing Officer be directed to give the refund due to the assessee and the interest and additional interest u/s. 244A due to the assessee shall be paid to the assessee.

The High Court allowed the petition and held as follows:

“i) Sub-section (1) of section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides for interest on delayed refund and sub-section (1A) inserted by the Finance Act, 2016 provides for additional interest.

ii) Two separate portals being available for day-to-day functions for the processing of returns of income and for the processing of the returns or statements of tax deducted at source could not be the reason for the court to overlook the period of five years that had been taken by the Department after the tax appeal had been decided by the court on 4th August, 2016 and there had been no further challenge by the other party. The Department was not sure of the exact outstanding demand against the assessee. Even if there had been a manual deposit prior to the online process sufficient time of five years had been taken by the Department.

iii) With regard to the refund to be returned with the interest, sub-section (1A) inserted in section 244A had to be applied prospectively for the period of delay after the introduction of the relevant statutory provision. Under sub-section (1) of section 244A the Department had to grant interest at the statutory rate and both the provisions, sections 244 and 244A, applied and the Department had to grant the refund accordingly.”

Charitable Trusts Exemption – Application in India or Purposes in India

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Under the provisions of section 11(1)(a), a charitable or religious trust is entitled to exemption of income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes, to the extent to which such income is applied to such purposes in India.

An issue has arisen before the courts as to whether exemption is available for such trusts in cases where income is spent outside India for the benefit of charitable purposes in India. In other words, whether for a valid exemption, the application of income is required to be made in India or it is sufficient that the purpose for which the income is applied is in India in order to be eligible for the benefit of exemption.

While the Delhi High Court has taken the view that the spending or application has to be in India, a contrary view has been taken by the Karnataka High Court, holding that the application has to be for purposes in India.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOFTWARE AND SERVICES COMPANIES’ CASE

The issue first came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of DIT(E) vs. National Association of Software and Services Companies 345 ITR 362.

In this case, the assessee, an association of Indian software companies, had spent Rs. 38,29,535 on
events / activities in connection with an exhibition in Germany. The assessee had claimed such amount as an application of income for charitable purposes, as it was in pursuance of its objects of promotion of the Indian software industry. The Assessing Officer (AO) did not allow such amount as an application of income, on the grounds that expenditure on activities outside India was not eligible to be treated as an application of income for charitable purposes under section 11(1)(a). The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the AO.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that while the AO and the CIT(A) were of the view that the expenditure should have been incurred in India in order to be eligible for exemption, it was not the case of the Revenue that the expenditure incurred was not for the purpose of the charitable activities of the assessee. The fact that the expenditure was incurred for attaining the objects of the assessee’s trust was not in dispute and the dispute centred only on the issue that the expenditure had been incurred outside India and not in India. The provisions of section 11(1)(a) envisaged the grant of exemption with respect to income applied for attaining the charitable purpose. Even though section 11(1)(a) used the word “in India”, what was intended was that the income was to be applied to such purpose in India, i.e., the purpose of the expenditure should be to attain the charitable objects in India. The expenditure need not be incurred in India and the benefit of the expenditure incurred should give the charitable benefit in India. If any expenditure was incurred even outside India to achieve the charitable objects in India, it should be allowed as application, as it had been expended for advancing charitable objects in India and for fulfilling the charitable purpose in India. The assessee was primarily looking after the interests of software development and software growth in India. The expenditure had been incurred outside India for attaining the primary objects of the assessee’s trust for the promotion and export of software for India which, needless to say, was advancement of charitable object in India and the fulfilment of charitable purpose in India.

Before the Tribunal, it was further argued on behalf of the assessee that it was the software industry in India which benefited from the expenditure incurred by the assessee on the event in Hanover, Germany. In fact, by incurring the expenditure which had compulsorily to be incurred at the event in Hanover, Germany, no other person had got any benefit whatsoever, other than the Indian software industry on whose behalf and for whom the charitable activities were carried out. Further, it was pointed out that in section 11(1)(a), the words “in India” followed the words “to such purpose” and the words used were not “applied in India”. The legislature intended that the application should be in India, it would have specifically stated so, which was conspicuous by the absence of the words “in India” after “applied”. On behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council vs. ITO 68 ITD 95 (Mum), wherein it was held that even if the expenditure was incurred outside India, but it was for the benefit of charitable purposes in India, it was an application of income for the purposes of section 11(1)(a).

The Tribunal observed that the fact the legislature had put the words “to such purposes” between “is applied” and “in India” showed that the application of income need not be in India, but that the application should result in and be for the charitable and religious purpose in India. It noted that the Revenue did not dispute that the benefit of the expenditure was derived in India. It, therefore, held that expenditure outside India was an application of income for the purposes of section 11(1)(a).

Before the Delhi High Court, on behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the expenditure, even if it was considered as an application of income, was outside India, and the mandate of the section was that the income should be applied in India to charitable purposes. The said condition not having been satisfied, it was urged that the Tribunal was wrong in holding that expenditure incurred outside India should be considered as an application of income of the trust in India.

The Delhi High Court referred to section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, and its amendment with effect from 1st April,1952. It noted the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of H E H Nizam’s Religious Endowment Trust vs. CIT 59 ITR 582, where the Court noted and contrasted the differences pre- and post-amendment. The Supreme Court observed:

“Under the said clause, trust income, irrespective of the fact whether the said purposes were within or without the taxable territories, was exempt from tax in so far as the said income was applied or finally set apart for the said purposes. Presumably, as the state did not like to forgo the revenue in favour of a charity outside the country, the amended clause described with precision the class or kind of income that is exempt thereunder so as to exclude therefrom income applied or accumulated for religious or charitable purposes without the taxable territories.”

The Delhi High Court noted that prior to 1st April, 1952, there was no difference between an application of income of the trust within and outside the taxable territories. The amendment after 1952 made a reference to application or accumulation for application of income to such religious or charitable purposes as relate to anything done within the taxable territories. Dealing with the argument on behalf of the assessee that these words clearly showed that the charitable purposes must be executed within the taxable territories, and that it was immaterial where the income was actually applied, the Delhi High Court observed that it was difficult to conceive of a situation under which the charitable purposes were executed within the taxable territories but the income of the trust was applied elsewhere in the implementation of such purposes.

According to the Delhi High Court, the position was put beyond doubt by the proviso to section 4(3)(i) of the 1922 Act, which stated that the income of the trust would stand included in its total income if it was applied to religious or charitable purposes without the taxable territories. This was indicative of the object of the main provision — in the main part it was provided that the income should be applied for religious or charitable purposes within the taxable territories and in the proviso, an exception was carved out to provide that if the income was applied outside the taxable territories, even though for religious or charitable purposes, the trust would not secure exemption from tax for such income. The Delhi High Court also noted that the provisions of section 11(1)(c) of the 1961 Act were similar to the provisions of the proviso to section 4(3)(i) of the 1922 Act, and therefore, the Supreme Court’s observations applied to section 11(1)(c) of the 1961 Act as well.

The Delhi High Court was also of the view that the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the assessee was opposed to the natural and grammatical meaning that could be ascribed to the language of the section. The Court noted that the term “income applied to such purposes in India” answers three questions which arise in the mind of the reader: apply what? applied to what? and where? According to the Court, the answer to the first question would be: apply the income of the trust, the answer to the second question would be: applied to charitable purposes, and the answer to the third question would be: applied in India. Therefore, according to the Delhi High Court, grammatically also it would be proper to understand the requirement of the provision that the income of the trust should be applied not only to charitable purposes but also applied in India to such purposes. The Delhi High Court rejected the submissions on behalf of the assessee that the words “in India” qualified only the words “such purposes” so that only the purposes were geographically confined to India, stating that that did not appear to be the natural and grammatical way of construing the provision.

The Delhi High Court also observed that if the assessee’s interpretation was correct, then section 11(1)(c) would become redundant and otiose. If the income of the trust could be applied even outside India, so long as the charitable purposes were in India, then there was no need for a trust which tended to promote international welfare in which India to apply to the CBDT for a general or special order directing that the income, to the extent to which it was applied to the promotion of international welfare outside India, should not be denied the exemption. The Delhi High Court was, therefore, of the view that the words “in India” appearing in section 11(1)(a) and the words “outside India” appearing in section 11(1)(c) qualified the word “applied” appearing in those provisions and not the words “such purposes”.

Dealing with the assessee’s argument that the Court would be changing the group of words appearing in section 11(1)(a) by displacing the words “in India” and transposing them between the words “applied” and the words “to such purposes”, redrafting the clause as “to the extent such income is applied in India to such purposes”, the Delhi High Court observed that it would make no difference to the meaning to be ascribed to the group of words. In that case, perhaps the meaning would have been brought out in still more precise or clear terms, but there were different ways of expressing the requirement that the income of the trust should be applied in India in order to get an exemption. Even assuming that the language was not sufficiently expressive of the idea, the Court should be able to set right and construe the provision in the manner in which it made sense, unless by such construction, there resulted an absurdity which could not be countenanced at all. Looking at the history of the provision, according to the Delhi High Court, it could not be said that by construing section 11(1)(a) in the manner that the requirement was that the income of the trust should be applied in India for charitable or religious purposes, it was doing any violence to the provisions nor could it be said that the Court was condoning an absurd result.

The Delhi High Court referred to various decisions of the Supreme Court and the House of Lords for the proposition that the statute should be read literally, by giving the words used by the Legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning and the construction of section 11(1)(a) by the Court was in accordance with the rules laid down in the judgments cited by it.

The Court then dealt with the assessee’s arguments that the time had now come to take a fresh look at the section. Having regard to the globalisation of commerce and the vast strides made in cross-border trade and flight of capital, it was the need of the hour to shed conservative thinking on the subject and adopt a bold and innovative approach, by dispensing with the requirement that the application of the income of the trust should be in India in order to secure exemption for the trust. On behalf of the assessee, it had been claimed that this could be achieved by construing or interpreting the section in the manner suggested on behalf of the assessee. The Delhi High Court stated that what was contended by the assessee was not without force or merit, but that the Court was required to interpret the statute as it was, and not in the manner in which it thought the law ought to be. Further, according to the Court, in the matter of exemption from tax in an all-India statute, judicial restraint, and not innovativeness or novelty, might be the proper approach to follow.

The Delhi High Court, therefore, held that since the application of income was outside India, such expenditure was not eligible to be considered for exemption of the income as an application of income for charitable purposes in India.

A similar view was taken by the Madras Bench of the Tribunal, but in a reverse situation, in the case of Bharat Kalanjali vs. ITO 30 ITD 161 (Mad). In that case, the assessee had paid travel expenses in India to an Indian travel agency to send a troupe for dance performances abroad. The tour was organised by the Government of India at the request of the foreign government. In the said case, the Tribunal held that the expression “applied to such purposes in India” referred only to the situs of the expenditure and not to the place where the purposes were carried out, and the fact that the troupe gave the performance abroad was not a disqualification for treating the amount actually spent in India as application for charitable purposes in India.

OHIO UNIVERSITY CHRIST COLLEGE’S CASE

The issue again came up before the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT(E) vs. Ohio University Christ College 408 ITR 352.

In this case, the assessee was a charitable trust registered under section 12A. It conducted MBA programs in India in collaboration with Ohio University, USA. The assessee trust had entered into an agreement with Ohio University, USA, whereby Ohio University sent its faculty to the assessee’s premises in India for teaching purposes, for which the assessee made payment to Ohio University for providing the faculty and other support services. In terms of the agreement, the assessee was required to pay a sum of USD 9,000 per student for the 18 months duration of the course (i.e., USD 3,000 per student for a 6-month period). At the end of the year, as the payments had not yet been made, the assessee had provided for / accrued the amount in its books of account, and the actual remittance was made in the subsequent year, from India to the overseas university. The assessee had claimed application of income in respect of expenditure incurred / provided by it, which included faculty teaching charges payable to Ohio University, USA.

The AO disallowed the claim of such faculty teaching charges payable to Ohio University on the grounds that mere making of an entry could not be considered as an application of income. The income had to be applied for charitable purposes only in India, and that the assessee had not proven that the payments made to Ohio University resulted in charitable purposes in India.

The CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim, observing that the application should be for charitable purposes in India, and if the payment was made outside the country in furtherance of charitable purposes in India, it could be counted as an application for charitable purposes in India.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the Revenue, it was submitted that the assessee had only made entries in the books of accounts in the relevant periods and had not utilised or spent the amount during the year. The actual payment of the same had happened in the subsequent year only, and as such, there was no application of income during the relevant year under consideration. It was submitted that the phrase “such income is applied to such purposes in India” appearing in section 11(1)(a) of the Act connoted “actual payment”, and since it had not happened, the assessee was not entitled to treat the provision as application of income.

On behalf of the assessee, it was urged that the assessee had actually incurred the said expenditure towards faculty teaching charges payable to Ohio University, USA, and therefore, it should be considered as having been applied under section 11(1)(a). It was submitted that the AO had misdirected himself in holding that the amounts had to be actually spent in the year under consideration for it to be considered as application of income. It was submitted that even if the payment was earmarked and allocated for charitable purposes, it should be taken to be applied for charitable purposes.

It was further submitted on behalf of the assessee, in response to the inquiry / contention that merely because the payment was made outside India, it did not mean that the charitable purpose was outside India. It was submitted that the charitable activities were rendered in India and just because the payment was made to parties outside India, it did not change the fact that the charitable activities were carried out in India. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the cases of Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council vs. Sixth ITO 69 ITD 95 (Mum) and National Association of Software & Services Companies vs. Dy. DIT (E), 130 TTJ 377 (Delhi).

The Tribunal noted that the services had been rendered by faculty members from Ohio University as the classes were taken in Bangalore. The services had been utilised for the trust’s objectives in India, viz., of imparting higher education in India. Ohio University had also offered the income earned by it from the assessee trust to tax in India. It was therefore clear that the activities of the assessee trust were conducted in India in accordance with its objects.

As regards the payments being made out of India, the Tribunal concurred with the view of the CIT(A) that merely because the payments were made outside India, it could not be said that the charitable activities were also conducted outside the country. The Tribunal further held that the decisions of the Mumbai and Delhi Tribunals (overruled on a different point) cited before it on behalf of the assessee squarely applied to the case before it.

The Tribunal further rejected the AO’s view that a specific exemption was required from CBDT for making a claim of application of income. The Tribunal noted that the said requirement had been specified only for those trusts that had as its objects, the promotion of international welfare. In the case of the assessee, the objects of charitable activities for imparting higher education in India had already been approved by the Department while granting the registration to the assessee trust.

Further holding that the amounts debited to the income and expenditure account, which were not actually disbursed during the year but in a subsequent year, amounted to application of income during the year, the Tribunal, therefore, held that the faculty charges payable to Ohio University amounted to an application of income for charitable purposes in India.

In further appeal, the Karnataka High Court took the view that the Tribunal had rightly held that section 11(1)(a) did not employ the term “spent” but used the term “applied” and the latter term had a wider connotation. The Karnataka High Court also held that the findings of the Tribunal, relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Thanthi Trust 239 ITR 502 and High Court judgments in the case of CIT vs. Trustees of H E H the Nizam’s Charitable Trust 131 ITR 479 (AP) and CIT vs. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha 25 ITR 472 (All), were correct and justified. The Karnataka High Court, therefore, upheld the view taken by the Tribunal, holding that the amount of faculty charges payable to Ohio University amounted to application of income for charitable purposes in India.

OBSERVATIONS

The Delhi High Court, in holding that for an expenditure to be qualified as an application, the expenditure should be incurred in India, has decided the matter based on a strict grammatical interpretation of the language of the section and based on the history of the section. The Karnataka High Court, though not faced with a case where the activity for which expenditure was incurred was performed outside India, has adopted a more purposive interpretation in the matter by holding that the objective of the exemption was to encourage charitable organisations to do charity in India — i.e., to benefit beneficiaries in India, and therefore, the mere fact that the amount was actually disbursed outside India should not make any difference, so long as the purpose of doing charity in India was achieved.

As regards the history of the section referred to by the Delhi High Court, by referring to the Supreme Court decision, it is to be noted that the language of section 4(3)(i) was “in so far as such income is applied or accumulated for application to such religious or charitable purposes as relate to anything done within the taxable territories”. This language indicates that the action of the charitable activities for which expenditure is incurred has to be within India, and not the actual payment. As regards the distinction noted by the Supreme Court before the 1952 amendment and post the 1952 amendment, the words used are “to exclude therefrom income applied or accumulated for religious or charitable purposes without the taxable territories”. The present provisions of section 11 are not as explicit to exclude an overseas payment for an expenditure incurred for the benefit made available in India.

It is important to note that one of the observations made by the Delhi High Court while analysing these observations, which seems to have partially led it to take the view that it did, was that it was difficult to conceive of a situation under which the charitable purposes were executed within the taxable territories but the income of the trust was applied elsewhere in the implementation of such purposes. The classic illustration of this is the situation which was before the Karnataka High Court — where the teaching was actually in India to Indian students but only the expenditure was remitted outside India.

An angle, though not relevant to the issue under consideration, is a confirmation by the Karnataka High Court that application could arise on accrual itself, and actual payment may take place at a later point in time. What is relevant for the issue under consideration is where the accrual of the expenditure took place — if the obligation in respect of the expenditure arose in India, due to approval of the expenditure in India and agreement to incur the expenditure in India, the mere fact that the payee is outside India should not impact the fact that application of the income was in India.

In the context of the issue of accrual and payment, the decisions noted with approval by the Karnataka High Court in the cases of Thanthi Trust (supra), H E H the Nizam’s Charitable Trust (supra), and Radhaswami Satsang Sabha (supra) all support the view that application does not necessarily mean the same thing as actually paid — the mere fact of payment outside India in the context should, therefore, not impact the fact that application is in India, particularly where the decision to incur the expenditure is taken in India, is approved and agreed upon in India and the services or goods are actually utilised for activities carried out in India for the benefit of beneficiaries in India.

In conclusion, we notice that there are two distinct situations: one where the amount is paid outside India for an overseas activity, and a second where the amount is paid outside India for an activity performed in India. In our respectful opinion, once the benefit for the payment, wherever made, is located / received / found in India, the application should be treated as eligible for exemption from tax, and the place of receipt of payment and the performance of the activity should not be an obstacle in the claim.

Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

46. CIT vs. AbhisarBuildwell Pvt Ltd
(2023) 454 ITR 212 (SC)

Search and seizure — Assessment u/s 153A —Procedure – (i) In case of search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A, the AO assumes the jurisdiction for block assessment under section 153A; (ii) all pending assessments / reassessments shall stand abated; (iii) in case any incriminating material is found / unearthed, even, in case of unabated / completed assessments, the AO would assume the jurisdiction to assess or reassess the ‘total income’ taking into consideration the incriminating material unearthed during the search and the other material available with the AO including the income declared in the returns; and (iv) in case no incriminating material is unearthed during the search, the AO cannot assess or reassess taking into consideration the other material in respect of completed assessments / unabated assessments, meaning thereby, in respect of completed/unabated assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in absence of any incriminating material found during the course of search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A of the Act, 1961 — however, the completed / unabated assessments can be reopened by the AO in exercise of powers under sections 147 / 148 of the Act, subject to fulfillment of the conditions as envisaged / mentioned under sections 147 / 148 of the Act and those powers are saved.

According to the Supreme Court, the question posed for its consideration was, as to whether in respect of completed assessments / unabated assessments, whether the jurisdiction of AO to make an assessment is confined to incriminating material found during the course of search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A or not, i.e., whether any addition could be made by the AO in absence of any incriminating material found during the course of search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A of the Act or not.

The Supreme Court noted that it was the case on behalf of the Revenue that in case of search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A, the assessment has to be done under section 153A of the Act. The AO thereafter has the jurisdiction to pass assessment orders and to assess the ‘total income’ taking into consideration other material, even though no incriminating material is found during the search in respect of completed/unabated assessments.

The Supreme Court, at the outset, noted that various High Courts, namely, Delhi High Court, Gujarat High Court, Bombay High Court, Karnataka High Court, Orissa High Court, Calcutta High Court, Rajasthan High Court and the Kerala High Court have taken the view that no addition can be made in respect of completed / unabated assessments in absence of any incriminating material. The lead judgment was by the Delhi High Court in the case of Kabul Chawla (2016) 380 ITR 573 (Del), which had been subsequently followed and approved by the other High Courts, referred to hereinabove. One another lead judgment on the issue was the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Saumya Construction (2016) 387 ITR 529 (Guj), which had been followed by the Gujarat High Court in the subsequent decisions, referred to hereinabove. Only the Allahabad High Court in the case of Principal CIT vs. MehndipurBalaji (2022) 447 ITR 517 (All) had taken a contrary view.

The Supreme Court observed that before the insertion of section 153A in the statute, the relevant provision for block assessment was under section 158BA of the Act. The erstwhile scheme of block assessment under section 158BA envisaged assessment of ‘undisclosed income’ for two reasons: firstly, there were two parallel assessments envisaged under the erstwhile regime, i.e., (i) block assessment under section 158BA to assess the ‘undisclosed income’ and (ii) regular assessment in accordance with the provisions of the Act to make assessment qua income other than undisclosed income. Secondly, the ‘undisclosed income’ was chargeable to tax at a special rate of 60 per cent under section 113, whereas income other than ‘undisclosed income’ was required to be assessed under regular assessment procedure and was taxable at the normal rate. Therefore, section 153A came to be inserted and brought into the statute. Under the section 153A regime, the legislation intended to do away with the scheme of two parallel assessments and tax the ‘undisclosed’ income also at the normal rate of tax as against any special rate. Thus, after the introduction of section 153A and in case of search, there shall be block assessment for six years. Search assessments / block assessments under section 153A are triggered by conducting a valid search under section 132. The very purpose of the search, which is a prerequisite / trigger for invoking the provisions of sections 153A / 153C is the detection of undisclosed income by undertaking extraordinary power of search and seizure, i.e., the income which cannot be detected in the ordinary course of regular assessment. Thus, the foundation for making search assessments under sections 153A / 153C can be said to be the existence of incriminating material showing undisclosed income detected as a result of the search.

According to the Supreme Court, on a plain reading of section 153A of the Act, it was evident that once a search or requisition is made, a mandate is cast upon the AO to issue a notice under section 153A to the person. The notice would require such person to furnish the return of income in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year, relevant to the previous year in which such search is conducted or requisition is made, and assess or reassess the same.

The Supreme Court noted that as per the provisions of section 153A, in case of a search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A, the AO gets the jurisdiction to assess or reassess the ‘total income’ in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years. However, as per the second proviso to section 153A, the assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years pending on the date of initiation of the search under section 132 or making of requisition under section 132A, as the case may be, shall abate. As per sub-section (2) of section 153A, if any proceeding initiated or any order of assessment or reassessment made under sub-section (1) has been annulled in appeal or any other legal proceeding, then, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or section 153A, the assessment or reassessment relating to any assessment year which has abated under the second proviso to sub-section (1), shall stand revived with effect from the date of receipt of the order of such annulment by the CIT. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the intention of the legislation seemed to be that in case of search, only the pending assessment /reassessment proceedings shall abate and the AO would assume the jurisdiction to assess or reassess the ‘total income’ for the entire six years period / block assessment period. The intention did not seem to be to reopen the completed / unabated assessments, unless any incriminating material is found with respect to the concerned assessment year falling within the last six years preceding the search. The Supreme Court, therefore held that, on the true interpretation of section 153A of the Act, 1961, in case of a search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A and during the search any incriminating material is found, even in case of unabated/completed assessment, the AO would have the jurisdiction to assess or reassess the ‘total income’ taking into consideration the incriminating material collected during the search and other material which would include income declared in the returns, if any, furnished by the assessee as well as the undisclosed income. However, in case during the search no incriminating material is found, in case of completed / unabated assessment, the only remedy available to the Revenue would be to initiate the reassessment proceedings under sections 147 / 148 of the Act, subject to fulfillment of the conditions mentioned in sections 147 / 148, as in such a situation, the Revenue cannot be left with no remedy. Therefore, even in case of block assessment under section 153A in case of unabated / completed assessment and in case no incriminating material is found during the search, the power of the Revenue to have the reassessment under sections 147 / 148 of the Act has to be saved, otherwise, the Revenue would be left without a remedy.

The Supreme Court further held that if the submission on behalf of the Revenue in the case of search even where no incriminating material is found during the course of the search in case of unabated / completed assessment, the AO can assess or reassess the income / total income taking into consideration the other material, is accepted then there will be two assessment orders, which shall not be permissible under the law.

For the reasons stated hereinabove, the Supreme Court was in complete agreement with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Kabul Chawla (supra) the Gujarat High Court in the case of Saumya Construction (supra) and the decisions of the other High Courts taking the view that no addition can be made in respect of the completed assessments in absence of any incriminating material.
In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the Supreme Court concluded as under:

(i) that in case of search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A, the AO assumes the jurisdiction for block assessment under section 153A;

(ii) all pending assessments / reassessments shall stand abated;

(iii) in case any incriminating material is found / unearthed, even, in case of unabated / completed assessments, the AO would assume the jurisdiction to assess or reassess the ‘total income taking into consideration the incriminating material unearthed during the search and the other material available with the AO including the income declared in the returns; and

(iv) in case no incriminating material is unearthed during the search, the AO cannot assess or reassess taking into consideration the other material in respect of completed assessments / unabated assessments. This means, with respect to completed/unabated assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material found during the course of a search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A of the Act, 1961. However, the completed / unabated assessments can be reopened by the AO in the exercise of powers under sections 147 / 148 of the Act, subject to fulfillment of the conditions as envisaged/mentioned under sections 147 / 148 of the Act and those powers are saved.

47. Maharishi Institute of Creative Intelligence vs. CIT (E)
(2023) 454 ITR 533 (SC)

Charitable Trust — Registration under section 12A — The assessee cannot be denied the exemption in the absence of a certificate of registration, since the year 1987, i.e., from the date on which the assessee applied for registration under section 12A (when there was no requirement of issuance of a certificate of registration), it continued to avail the benefit of registration under section 12A at least up to the A.Y. 2007–08.

The assessee applied for registration under section 12A of the Act as per the provisions of law prevailing in the year 1987. Thereafter, the assessee continued to be granted the exemption under section 12A of the Act.

Till 1987 there was no requirement of issuance of any certificate of registration of section 12A. Only filing an application for registration under section 12A and processing the same by the Department was sufficient. However, in the year 1997, there was an amendment, which required the issuance of the certificate of registration under section 12A also.

Despite the above, the assessee even after 1997 continued to avail of the exemption under section 12A of the Act even post 1987 till the A.Y. 2007-08.

The AO considering the facts as in earlier years up to 2007-08 and based on the registration under section 12A in the year 1987, granted the benefit of exemption under section 12A and accordingly passed an assessment order for the A.Y. 2010-11.

The assessment order came to be taken under suomotu revision by the CIT in the exercise of powers under section 263 of the Act. The CIT set aside the assessment order on the ground that the AO mechanically granted the benefit of exemption under section 12A without in fact verifying whether any registration in favour of the assessee was issued under section 12A of the Act or not. Therefore, the CIT thought that the assessment order was against the interest of the Revenue.

In appeal, at the instance of the assessee, the Tribunal set aside the order passed by the CIT.

The order passed by the Tribunal was the subject matter of appeal before the High Court at the instance of the Revenue. Taking into consideration the amendment in the year 1997, the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by the Revenue and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal by observing that as the assessee had failed to produce the certificate of registration, the assessee was not entitled to the exemption under section 12A.

The assessee filed the review application which was dismissed.

The judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the appeal preferred by the Revenue were the subject matter of the appeal before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court having heard the learned counsel appearing for respective parties noted that it was not disputed that since 1987 i.e. from the date on which the assessee applied for registration under section 12A, the assessee continued to avail the benefit of exemption under section 12A at least up to the A.Y. 2007-08. Even post-1997, the assessee continued to avail of the exemption under section 12A based on its registration in the year 1987.

In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court was of the view that the AO was justified in granting the benefit of exemption under section 12A for the A.Y. 2010-11. According to the Supreme Court, what was required to be considered was the relevant provision prevailing in the year 1987, namely, the day on which the assessee applied for the registration. At the relevant time, there was no requirement for the issuance of any certificate of registration.

The Supreme Court observed that for all these years after 1997 till the year 2007-08, the assessee continued to avail the benefit of exemption solely based on the registration in the year 1987. The Revenue and even the CIT never claimed that in the earlier years there was no certificate of registration or the registration was not granted at all. Even from the material on record, namely, a communication dated 3rd June, 2015 which was considered by the Tribunal, it was apparent that the assessee was granted registration on 22nd September, 1987. Therefore, it could not be said that there was no registration at all.

In view of the above, the Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court was erroneous and unsustainable and was quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Tribunal was restored.

The appeal was accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent.

BCAS — VOLUNTEERING — MAKING A DIFFERENCE

Dear Readers, BCAJ has completed over five decades of its illustrious journey. Publication of a monthly professional journal is a task in itself, as it entails wholesome responsibility and requires total commitment. BCAJ has had
10 editors so far. As the BCAS is celebrating its 75th year, it would be interesting to read what some of the editors have to share. In tune with the current Office Bearers’ Theme of “Change – Leaders – Charity” for the quarter ending December 2023, this issue carries a write-up by two of the editors who have shared their experiences of volunteering and leading the change. We hope that readers will find it interesting and youngsters will find it inspiring to volunteer with the highest degree of commitment and dependability.

ASHOK DHERE

Chartered Accountant

(Editor from August 2000 to July 2005)

Dear readers,

Our present editor CA Dr Mayur Nayak is making all-out efforts to popularise the journal amongst young professionals, and it is certainly a commendable effort in this special year for our BCAS. He has posed certain questions, and my job is to provide precise answers to the challenges which the B.C.A. Journal is going to face in the years to come. My thoughts are based on his questions but expressed randomly.

1. Immediately after qualifying in the CA examination, I became a member of the BCAS, thanks to the initial guidance and encouragement given by the seniors and active members of the BCAS like Shri Vasantbhai Kishnadwala, who was my teaching staff colleague in N. M. College of Commerce. Both of us were part-time lecturers. My initial attraction to the BCAS was the BCA Journal, which used to give a variety of knowledge and information in capsule form and in a manner helpful to young professionals. My association, therefore, with the BCAS and the journal is over 50 years old. I was first a member of the library committee and then the journal committee sometime in 1974 and the association continues even today, and certainly, it was a pleasure to work in different capacities for the journal.

2. Recently, I read a book on the classic epic Mahabharata. It depicts various characters in Mahabharata from a hitherto unknown angle. The principal lesson that we learn from the book is that the characters in Mahabharat are eternal and depict the sociology and psychology prevailing then and how it is present even today and will also be there tomorrow. It further states that your character is your destiny. By nature, I love working in an academic environment and the BCAS and BCAJ as I see it, is engaged in imparting professional education on a continuous basis. My own character is suited to this environment, and hence, my association with the BCAS was influenced by my character, and that is destiny. Monetary consideration for voluntary work in BCAJ was irrelevant, and its absence was never felt. I was, and I am, a happy and willing volunteer. There was a feeling that we must actively contribute to the educational activity here, and it does benefit us in the long run.

3. An editor of a professional journal has a tremendous responsibility, and it also becomes a delicate task because the principal participants and the contributors are rendering service voluntarily without expectation of any monetary reward. You sacrifice your time and energy because you want to be a partner in a professional development process.

4. Balancing one’s own professional work, the BCAS work and time for family and personal duties is always a tightrope walking. However, this is not only true for CAs, but it is also applicable in all walks of life. How one tackles this depends on an individual’s character. The best thing to do is work with pleasure; if you do it with pleasure, work becomes worship and does not remain a mere idiom.

5. The editor is actively involved in coordination between various contributors, printers and reviewers in a time-bound manner, and it is a task by itself. Each one is hard-pressed for time. Besides general difficulties, there are hidden egos. To manage all this is really the job of an editor. Fortunately, during my term of five years, I got a printer in Madhav Kanitkar who was also a keen student of English literature. Some of us write in vernacular English, which may contain grammatical errors. Madhav used to correct all this without any grumbling or extra charge. Our contributors are all devoted and fine people, but in their busy schedules, maintaining timelines used to pose problems. An editor has to maintain the timeline and also take care of the mood of the contributors. In such a situation, as a human being, at times, he is likely to lose his cool. How to remain cool and how to avoid tensions are things which are not available by way of guidance anywhere, and one has to learn it the hard way, and the editor is no exception to it. He needs to develop that skill. You succeed many times by efforts, but failure also must be tolerated. When I took over the charge, because of a variety of reasons, the monthly posting of the journal used to be delayed. Through the combined efforts of all, I was successful in restoring the timeliness of the journal.

6. My benefit as an editor is my own satisfaction, nothing else. You come in contact with various authors and prominent professionals with whom you develop a good rapport, and you remain updated with professional knowledge, and these are incidental but valuable benefits.

7. I honestly believe that this message to a younger generation is meaningless. This young generation is far more capable and knowledgeable and are masters in this digital world. It is enough that we should give them a feeling that in case they have any difficulty, we are always available for help. Such an assurance, in my opinion, is good enough.

8. The peculiarity of BCAJ is its ability to project the Chartered Accountant as not only a taxing and ticking professional, but as an ‘Independent Business Economic Advisor’. In my opinion, it enhances the reputation as a learned professional. The nature and the contents of the journal are such that it gives us a bird’s eye view of various professional issues.

9. At my age and in the time period I worked as an active professional, voluntary work did give satisfaction and other incidental benefits. The mindset of the younger generation will be different. In a new environment, it is a matter of further examination as to how the younger generation looks at the whole profession. The approach has to be different, and there should not be a cause to grumble.
10. Artificial intelligence is a certainty of the near future, and it is difficult to envisage in what way it will benefit. However, I would like to go with a belief that yesterday was bright, but tomorrow is pregnant with a new hope and a new life which is going to be brighter. There is no point in blowing the trumpet of the past.

11. Attracting youngsters to the journal would be a two-way traffic. We have no other alternative but to make constant improvements in the journal because everyone accepts that change is the only thing which is constant.

12. My best regards and best wishes for the journal.


GAUTAM NAYAK

Chartered Accountant

(Editor from August 2007 to July 2010)

At the request of the BCAJ Editor Mayur Nayak, I have put down a few thoughts on my journey with the Journal, and in particular, my period as the Editor.

I became a member of BCAS immediately after my qualification in January 1986, at the urging of my father, who was also a BCAS life member. I had, of course, become a fan of the BCA Journal during my articleship itself and aspired to one day write for the journal, which I so much admired.

I actually started my articleship two and a half years after my graduation and was therefore keen to learn as much as I could to make up for the lost time, as most of my contemporaries had already qualified as CAs one year after their graduation. While I was initially associated with the Publication Committee of BCAS, I also used to regularly attend study circle meetings as well as lecture meetings, besides attending as many seminars as I could.
Sometime in the late 1980s/early 1990s, I was fortunate to be requested to write reports in the form of summaries of these study circle discussions and lectures for the BCA Journal. Since this was something I was aspiring to do, I gladly took it up, jointly with other members who used to then contribute to these columns. This also gave me the benefit of gathering together and crystallising my thoughts on the subject discussed and cementing my knowledge on the subject. That was how my initial association with the Journal began.

In April 1996, I got the opportunity to join Pradip Kapasi as co-author of the column, ‘Controversy’, beginning a long inning, with both of us continuing as co-authors of this column till today. Writing for this feature has helped me immensely. Reading all case laws on a controversy, analysing the conflicting case laws and then applying one’s mind to arrive at a conclusion, besides discussing the complex issues with my co-author — though all this took a substantial toll on my time, it helped me be prepared for any client advice or representation before tax authorities since I was already aware of the intricacies of issues involved.

I was fortunate to take over the role of Joint Editor of the Journal after my term as President of BCAS, with Mr K C Narang as the Editor, for a couple of years. While I managed the editing of the text and production of the Journal, it was a privilege and treat to see the innovative thoughts and ideas that Mr Narang would come up with for the Journal. Every week, I would get three or four press clippings from him, with some news and his thoughts on how we could build on that for the Journal.

I was then the Editor of the Journal for a period of three years, from 2007 to 2010, with Sanjeev Pandit as my Joint Editor. It was indeed a challenge to live up to the exacting standards set by my predecessor, Mr Narang. When I started off, I was fortunate to have an experienced printer of the Journal, Mr Madhav Kanitkar, who took great pride in ensuring that the final product came out almost perfect in terms of language and layout. BCAS also had a Knowledge Manager, who was a CA Pinky Shah. The experienced Editorial Board, with stalwarts such as Mr K C Narang, Narayanbhai Varma, Kishor Karia, Ashok Dhere, and an enthusiastic convenor, Anup Shah, made my task easier in the initial stages.

Throughout my period as President of BCAS and then Joint Editor and editor of the Journal, I also continued my role as co-author of “Controversy”. Due to this, I ended up spending a substantial amount of time on the journal as a contributor writing for Controversy, chairing the monthly Journal Committee meetings and the Editorial Board meetings, and actually editing the journal every month. I spent about 15 to 20 per cent of my work time on the Journal! Fortunately, since I was by then part of a larger firm, I had a team to support my client work and could afford to spend that time.

More than half a day of the last few days and the first couple of days of each month were devoted to journal activities — writing the editorial, reading the proofs of the full journal, checking the index, coordinating with the printer, etc. Fortunately, being a speed reader, I could achieve all this. I had to plan all my travel to ensure that I was in Mumbai at that time of the month. Many times, my personal time on weekends (Saturdays as well as Sundays) would be taken up by this work. However, I found it thoroughly enjoyable since I would read the journal from cover to cover and thereby enhance my knowledge in the process, too.

The biggest challenge during my period as an editor was sometime in October 2009, when the long-time printer of the journal suddenly disappeared, possibly due to his financial difficulties. For the next two or three months, the production of the journal had to be managed directly with the staff of the printer, who could fortunately still continue with the proofreading, printing and mailing. Simultaneously, we had to finalise a contract with an alternative printer. Fortunately, we were introduced to an experienced printer, Spenta Multimedia, by Shri Narayan Varma. Spenta took over from the February 2010 issue, and we could continue publication of the journal without a break.

Editing the journal was indeed an enriching experience for me — not only in terms of enriching my knowledge, but also learning from and interacting with other stalwarts, contributors and members with whom I worked as a team. I had to necessarily review material on all areas of professional practice and different laws. Often, I would look up the relevant case laws or subjects on Google to verify a proposition or statement made by an author, the correctness of which I was unsure. Ultimately, it was the reputation of the Journal for correctness that was at stake. Today that would be much easier for an Editor with the aid of Artificial Intelligence. In those days, a large part of the production process, particularly the proofs were sent across manually for verification. Today, newer technologies facilitate sharing and speedier processing of data, e.g., online storage on Google Drive or MS One Drive facilitates simultaneous editing of a file by multiple persons working on different aspects of the same article.
The Journal may, of course, have to change to keep up with the changing times. With the younger generation now reading most literature online, with time constraints, and the desire for precise and concise material on any subject, the Journal also has been seeking to meet the challenge by catering to both — its older readership, who still need detailed analysis of a subject in physical form, as well as the younger online readership, who are more comfortable with a shorter, online version. Increasing specialisation has also meant that, sometime in the future, one may need to consider breaking up the journal into parts, each part dealing with a particular area of practice. That would also, of course, perhaps need multiple Editors, each dealing with their own area of specialisation.

Being a part of BCAS over the decades has been a thoroughly enriching experience in terms of gaining knowledge and making friends with other professionals. My experience has been that, so long as one wholeheartedly and sincerely contributes, you get more out of it in return than the loss of time that you devote to supporting it in its activities.

From The President

India is witnessing a telecom and IT revolution, and it is gaining prominence in its contribution to the world economy by providing state-of-the-art products and services to the world.

As per the NASSCOM report, the IT industry has a noticeable impact on improving the efficiency of almost every other segment of the economy.

The rollout of fifth-generation (5G) communication technology and the increasing adoption of artificial intelligence, cloud computing, Big Data analytics, and the Internet of Things (IoT) will further enlarge the size of the IT industry of India at the global level. India, with approximately 55 per cent of the world’s service-sourcing market, is poised to take a big leap in technology transformation in years to come.

However, certain myths about technology often arise from misconceptions, fears, or misunderstandings about how technology works and its impact on society. As technology is impacting our daily lives, it is time to clear certain myths about the use of technology. This myth-busting exercise is to provide insights to the readers on the ease of using technology and coming out of the fear syndrome while using technology in their daily lives.

TECHNOLOGY AND SOME OF ITS MYTHS

1. Myth: “incognito” and “private” keep everything secret
Fact: Incognito simply means the browser won’t keep track of your history, import your bookmarks or automatically log into any of your accounts. Basically, it’s good for keeping other people who use your computer from accessing links to what you’ve been doing. However, it won’t keep your identity hidden from the sites you visit or your ISP.

2. Myth: Leaving your phone unplugged the whole night destroys your battery
Fact: There’s no proof that this damages your phone’s battery in any way. Modern smartphones run on lithium-ion batteries, which are smart enough to stop charging when they’ve reached capacity.

3. Myth: More Megapixel means a better camera
Fact: The quality of an image is determined in large part by how much light the sensor is able to take in. Bigger sensors may come with larger pixels, and the larger the pixel, the more light it can absorb. So, it’s really the size of the pixels that matter as much or more than the sheer number of pixels.

4. Myth: You Shouldn’t shut down your computer every day
Fact: The truth is it’s actually good to turn off your computer regularly.

5. Myth: More Signal bar means more network
Fact: The bars just indicate how close you are to the nearest cell tower. But other factors impact how fast the internet on your phone performs.

6. Myth: Technology Always Makes Life Easier
Fact: While technology can simplify many tasks and improve convenience, it can also make life more complex and demanding. Constant connectivity, for example, can lead to information overload and stress.

7. Myth: Technology will solve all Education Problems
Fact: The belief that technology can completely revolutionise education and replace traditional teaching methods is a common myth. While technology can enhance learning, effective education also relies on skilled teachers and pedagogical strategies.

8. Myth: Technology may replace Chartered Accountants
Fact: Technology may not replace Chartered Accountants, but a technology-driven firm may, in the near future, replace a non-technology-driven firm.

The role of IT in India’s economic development is crucial. The Indian experts are most sought after across the world, and the future belongs to India with a great share of work from different parts of the world. Future education would also include courses being developed based on the latest technological advancements, knowledge, and skills. Our next generation will not just be job seekers but will be job creators.

BCAS AND ITS MYTH
As I kept meeting several chartered accountants in the last few months, a common query I hear from potential members is that the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society is for Chartered Accountants from Mumbai (formerly Bombay). To break this myth, I would like to share some data about the geographical coverage of our membership. We have approx. 5400+ members from Mumbai and 3200+ members from outside of Mumbai i.e. 60% from Mumbai and 40% from outside Mumbai.

BCAS has a presence in more than 350+ cities and towns of Bharat. This helps in breaking the myth that BCAS is only a Mumbai-based association. It is the largest voluntary body of professional Chartered Accountants in Bharat, and therefore, in essence, it is a “Bharatiya Chartered Accountants’ Society.”

REIMAGINE AND ITS MYTH
On the 4th, 5th, and 6th of January, 2024, BCAS is organising a mega-conference, ReImagining the Profession in the Changing Technological Environment. The event shall cover many thought-provoking ideas for the future of the finance, consulting, assurance, and taxation profession.

A myth regarding this event is that it is only for BCAS members. I would like to break the myth that this event is conceptualised keeping in mind, all kinds of finance professionals, whether Chartered Accountants or others, whether in Industry or in Practice, whether in Mumbai or outside, whether experienced or young, as this event talks about ReImagining the profession as a whole.

G20 SUMMIT 2023
Successful completion of the G20 Summit with a recommendation by India and acceptance of all members of G20 for inclusion of the African Union into the Group of nations, making the count G21 has established India’s prominence in driving the agenda of inclusive growth at the world level.

EVENTS AT BCAS
The theme for the July to September quarter was the impact of technology, and BCAS was at the forefront in organising a few workshops and Twitter Space Sessions related to the impact of technology on the profession.
A. Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society organised a workshop on the use of technology in GST compliance through a demonstration of various automation tools. Automation and use of software in compliance processes can help Chartered Accountants increase the efficiency of their team and improve compliance.

B. The Tech I Committee took the initiative to organise the Twitter Space Session on filing ITR for A.Y. 2023-24 from the BCAS Twitter handle.

This Twitter Space Session was conducted with the objective of sharing the crucial precautions and best practices for filing ITRs that professionals need to observe.

C. BCAS has always been at the forefront of arranging programs and seminars when any new provisions or standards are issued. A full-day seminar on Forensic Accounting and Investigation Standards (FAIS) was held in physical mode at the Hotel Parle International to introduce the participants to the framework governing these standards, the basic concepts covered in the standards, the legal framework, and report writing.

D. In a dynamic financial landscape, the event “Investing in Amrit Kaal” organised by BCAS shed light on the shifting paradigms of investment. The speakers meticulously navigated through the evolving asset classes, emphasising how Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), Commodities, Portfolio Management Services (PMS), and even Sovereign Gold Bonds are carving distinctive realms within the investment spectrum.

September month was the month of festivals, and I, on behalf of the entire BCAS, seek forgiveness and also forgive everyone from the heart, Michami Dukkadam. I also wish everyone a very happy Ganesh Chaturthi.

As we move into the October to December 2023 quarter, the theme will be “Charter for Change.”

Cursed Animals

The Kingdom of Gods was governed by the God of Gods – GOG. Thousands of gods and demi-gods stayed happily in this kingdom. All facilities to enjoy their lives were freely available to them.

However, GOG was not sure whether all gods were performing their roles properly, and discharging their duties diligently. Therefore, he thought that a certain degree of checking or verification was required.

GOG asked Brihaspati, the Guru of the Gods, to set up certain principles and define the duties of various gods. It was a very complicated document to regulate the functions of all.

The question was – who would check all this? So, a very difficult examination was conducted. Very few intelligent gods passed the examination. GOG authorised them to perform the duty of checking. They were called ‘Registered Gods’ – RGs. The picture painted before them was a very rosy picture.

The first point of checking was Kubera, the treasurer of gods. Whether all gods to whom offerings were made by human beings on earth deposited their collections in the Kubera’s treasury. Whether Kubera utilised it properly, and whether the accounts were properly drawn up and presented.

GOG found that the Sun has become irregular. He disappeared in between and suddenly generated too much heat. It led to global warming. So, GOG introduced energy conservation checking and the overall functioning of the Sun.

It was then found that Varuna – the God of rains also became irregular. Issues of environment and pollution arose. So, environment checking was introduced.

Likewise, many things were added every year within the scope of RG’s work. RGs got tired. They did not get any extra remuneration. Gods whose performance was checked by RGs continued to behave in the same manner despite the adverse findings of RGs. In short, no one really respected RGs.

GOG once openly said, “RGs are not doing their job properly!” RGs had to face trials in the Heaven. They were found guilty. So, GOG cursed them – You shall go to the earth. You will work like donkeys; but the Government and common people will expect everything from you as if you were Gods. Your earnings will be meagre as no one will recognise the value of your services. You will have only responsibilities, and no one will care for what you want.

At the same time, you will have to pass very difficult exams. You will get a feeling that our status is elevated; but in reality you will always remain ineffective. You will not get support from anyone. Finally, you will feel frustrated.

Thereafter, these RGs were born on earth and came to be known as ‘Cursed Animals’.

Insider Trading Regulations for Mutual Funds – SEBI Issues Draft Consultation Paper

BACKGROUND
SEBI released, on 8th July 2022, a consultation paper (“the Paper”) for provision for prohibition of Insider Trading in mutual funds. It may be recollected that the current regulations related to Insider Trading, (the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015, or “Insider Trading Regulations”) specifically state that they do not apply to mutual fund units. SEBI pointed out in the paper recently, two serious cases of alleged abuse by insiders of unpublished price sensitive information. Both included cases of redemption of units by insiders while having access to unpublished material information which allegedly helped them gain while the general public investors suffered. While the said persons acted against the SEBI rules under other generic provisions, there was clearly a void in terms of having specific provisions for insider trading in mutual funds.

Mutual funds have, as per Association of Mutual Funds of India, assets under management of – over Rs. 35 trillion. The stakes are clearly high and abuse of price sensitive information by trusted insiders could be of large amounts, as shown by the orders referred to (though not named) in the paper. Having a comprehensive set of regulations on insider trading for mutual funds thus was clearly overdue. SEBI thus took a quick step by issuing this Paper, that suggests detailed provisions for insider trading in mutual fund units, besides giving the draft wording of the new provisions as proposed.

A review of the proposed provisions can be made at this stage. A more detailed analysis of the notified regulations can be carried out once they are released.

BROAD FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS

SEBI does not propose to introduce separate insider trading regulations for mutual funds. Instead, it proposes to incorporate separate chapters in the existing Insider Trading Regulations for mutual fund units. Certain existing provisions have also been modified for this purpose.

The scheme of the proposed regulations, however, is broadly the same. There are similar definitions of an insider, connected persons, unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI), Code of Conduct, etc. These have been adapted to a significant extent to the unique features of mutual fund units. The offence of insider trading is on similar lines. The Code of Conduct for dealing in securities would also be laid down for mutual fund units. Even the concept of Trading Plan would be adopted and applied to mutual fund units.

Thus, the time tested, repeatedly amended current regulations and their framework is sought to be applied for mutual fund units. That can be good but also, in some ways, a bad thing, as later discussed herein.

It may be added here that, insider trading regulations for mutual fund units are not entirely new. There have been circulars/guidelines covering the subject in different ways that have been frequently amended over the years. But, clearly, these circulars/guidelines have relatively lesser legal standing as compared to the Regulations. Further, they are not as comprehensive. Now, as a part of the Regulations, they are intended to be comprehensive and carry the full force of the Regulations, thus inviting punitive/adverse actions as the consequences of their violations.

IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR MUTUAL FUND UNITS

To begin with, the definition of ‘securities’ would be amended. Earlier, it specifically excluded mutual fund units. Now this exclusion would be omitted.

The definition of trading in securities would be amended to also include redeeming, switching, etc of securities. This would be in addition to the already existing activities of subscribing, buying, selling, etc. of securities. The new definition may sound like a hotch-potch since different concepts are mixed. Redemption and switching are unique features of mutual fund units, and hence sound out of place with other terms such as buying, etc. which are general for all types of securities.

The concept of ‘insider’, however, is defined separately for mutual fund units. It includes a connected person, and a person in possession of UPSI.

Similarly, the definition of ‘connected person’ is separately made for mutual fund units and rightly so. Apart from those who generally are accepted to have access to UPSI, a list of persons deemed to be connected has been provided that includes persons whose connection is unique to this industry.

The term UPSI is also separately defined to include several items of information. These items are considered unique to this industry. For example, it was found recently, that restrictions on redemption of securities created serious inconvenience and uncertainty amongst unit holders of a fund. It was also alleged and found that certain insiders had redeemed before such restrictions were announced. Information regarding restrictions on redemption or winding up of schemes is thus deemed to be UPSI.

Trading in securities (which now include mutual fund units) would be a contravention. So would be sharing or procuring of UPSI, except for specified ‘legitimate’ purposes.

Then, a unique feature related to sharing of UPSI is sought to be created for mutual fund units. A critical aspect of insider trading regulations is, when can unpublished price-sensitive information said to have become published? What are the acceptable modes of publishing UPSI to make this information available to the public. One acceptable means is to share information through the stock exchanges. However, this makes sense for listed entities. It is seen that almost 98% of the mutual fund units, as this Paper too emphasises, are unlisted. Hence, sharing of UPSI on exchanges would not help in achieving the objective of reaching the intended public. SEBI therefore proposes that a separate and independent platform be created under the aegis of AMFI or collectively owned by asset management companies, etc. The UPSI could be shared here, and since such an independent platform would be able to reach the mutual fund unit holders and prospective holders/public generally, it could prove to be a better mode and alternative.

The ‘Code of Conduct’ for trading in securities by designated persons is broadly in line with the existing Code for other securities. Similarly, the coverage of ‘fiduciaries’ for making a Code is also similar with audit firms, accountancy firms, valuers, law firms, etc. being specifically included under this category.

CONCERNS

The primary concern is that, using a time-tested existing framework for insider trading can also, unfortunately, be a disadvantage since the existing framework was tailored for a different form of security. Undoubtedly, SEBI also may have wanted to move speedily since not only have skeletons been tumbling out of the closet, but the further litigation against the orders have also showed, the existing framework was neither specific nor comprehensive. Also, abuse of price sensitive information as a concept has not changed, and continues to apply as much to mutual fund units. However, there are several reasons to argue that SEBI could have taken a wholly fresh look from the ground up. Mutual fund units have several fundamental differences. These units are held in investment vehicles, and not in businesses as generally known. The primary information of schemes such as NAVs, portfolios, etc. is already fairly transparent in view of existing requirements to share such information regularly. In comparison, traditional businesses that regularly generate material/price sensitive information, offer a different scope for abuse despite listed entities being bound to disclose several categories of material information promptly.

The existing insider trading regulations have been drafted and repeatedly amended on recommendations by Expert Committees. In comparison, the present draft regulations appear to have been prepared internally, thus missing out on the benefits of deliberations and close study carried out by an Expert Committee.

It is submitted that even otherwise, mutual fund units have a different structure and are subject to abuse in a different manner. As earlier SEBI circulars themselves state, investments that a fund makes for itself can be subject to abuse of at least two kinds. First includes, using such information for making one’s own investments. The second and far more serious is front running, which too has been repeatedly caught though a valid fear may be that it may be far more rampant than even the large number of cases caught. Sadly, the serious offence of front running is covered in a small sub-clause of a different regulation that aims to cover all forms of front running. Thus, a separate set of Regulations specifically for malpractices in mutual funds covering insider trading, front running, etc. could have been the better alternative.

One hopes then, that, while SEBI notifies, after taking due feedback, the amendments, it also sets up an Expert Committee to holistically look at this field and puts into place a comprehensive set of regulations separately for mutual funds which factor in the unique circumstances of this industry.

WHETHER INSIDER TRADING WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SIGNIFICANT PENALTY? – A MAJOR LACUNA?

This apparent lacuna deserves a separate part to highlight it in more detail. Presently, SEBI notifies Regulations (subject to, of course, review by Parliament), and hence can draft and cover the subject comprehensively as an expert and specialised body. However, a penalty is levied under the Act made by the Parliament. The SEBI Act was drafted 30 years back, albeit frequently amended. Notably, Section 15G which governs penalty for insider trading, has remained unchanged since its inception, as far as the present issue is concerned. It primarily governs insider trading only in “securities of body corporate listed on any stock exchange’’. This squarely excludes most, if not all, mutual fund units.

This special section levies a stiff penalty of a minimum of Rs. 10 lakhs and a maximum of Rs. 25 crores or three times the gains made, whichever is higher.

Prima facie, this section may not apply to unlisted mutual fund units. Would this mean that the penalty then would be leviable only under the residuary clause which is limited in nature?

Granted, it is the Parliament that has power to amend the Act. But without a parallel amendment, would the new regulations be largely toothless?

CONCLUSION

Better late than never and better something than nothing can be the two adages that one could apply to the proposed regulations. It is high time this mammoth industry is subjected to strict regulations. But at the same time, Mutual funds represent a different framework that deserve a tailor made approach. As readers know, they are used more by persons seeking relatively secure returns, and having a different frame of mind than investors in equity shares. Further, even the existing insider trading regulations have seen that adverse orders for violations have often been set aside in appeal. Hence, all the more, the regulations for mutual funds need to be framed with a fresh outlook and by an expert committee consisting of members knowing the industry well. One hopes, that these regulations will see this very soon. Nonetheless, it is good news that the evil of insider trading will soon be subject to regulation and punishment.

Gift of Foreign Securities

INTRODUCTION
Who does not like to get a gift? More so, when it  comes from abroad? However, there are a variety of laws that apply to a gift of foreign securities received by a resident from a non-resident or vice-versa. Let us consider some of the important provisions in this respect.

FEMA, 1999

The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the recently enacted FEM (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022 permit a person resident in India to receive a gift of foreign securities as follows:

(a)    Without any limit from a person resident in India by way of inheritance (i.e., by way of a Will or intestate succession on death) if the donor has been holding the foreign securities in accordance with the applicable FEMA provisions;

(b)    Without any limit from a person resident outside India by way of inheritance;

(c)    By way of a gift (different than a receipt under inheritance) from a person resident in India if the donor is a relative (as per the definition under the Companies Act, 2013) of the donee, and has been holding the foreign securities in accordance with the applicable FEMA provisions; and

(d)    By way of a gift from a person resident outside India on compliance with the applicable provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010.

An Indian resident is permitted to gift foreign securities to another Indian resident only if the donor is a relative of the donee. Relative for this purpose means the following:

• Members of a Hindu Undivided Family
• Spouse
• Father (including stepfather)
• Mother (including stepmother)
• Son (including stepson)
• Son’s wife
• Daughter (including stepdaughter)
• Daughter’s husband
• Brother (including stepbrother)
• Sister (including stepsister)

An overseas investment by way of receipt of gift, and inheritance is to be categorised as Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) or Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI) based on the nature of the investment. ODI means investment through acquisition of unlisted equity capital of a foreign entity or investment in 10 per cent  or more of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity, or investment with control where investment is less than 10 per cent of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity. Anything which is not ODI is OPI. The donee needs to accordingly file Form FC in respect of the gift / inheritance constituting an ODI with the RBI through its Authorised Dealer. If the gift /inheritance constitutes OPI then a resident individual does not need to file Form OPI.

Acquisition of foreign securities by way of inheritance or gift is not to be reckoned towards the Liberalised Remittance Scheme limit of $250,000 and hence, need not be reported under the LRS.

It may be noted that a person resident in India cannot gift foreign securities to a person resident outside India.

FCRA, 2010

The FEM (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022 permit a person resident in India to receive a gift of foreign securities from a person resident outside India only if the applicable provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 have been complied with. Hence, it becomes important to understand the provisions of this Act also.

FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION

A person (individual / HUF/ company) resident in India who is a specified person u/s 3 of the FCRA cannot accept any foreign contribution, i.e., a gift from a foreign source of any security as defined under the Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956 or the FEMA. These specified persons include: election candidates, judges, civil servants, politicians, journalists, etc.

FOREIGN SECURITIES

The type of securities covered under these two Acts include:

•  shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock or other marketable securities of a company or other body corporate
•    derivatives
•    units or any other instrument issued by any collective investment scheme
•    security receipts
•    units under any mutual fund scheme
•    Government securities
•    rights or interest in securities
•    shares, stocks, bonds, debentures or any other instrument denominated or expressed in foreign currency
•    securities expressed in foreign currency, but where redemption or any form of return such as interest or dividends is payable in Indian currency

A gift, delivery or transfer of  foreign securities by a person receiving it from a foreign source, either directly or indirectly, is also deemed  as a foreign contribution.

FOREIGN SOURCE

The definition of foreign source includes a foreign citizen and an Indian company of which more than 50 per cent of the capital is held by a foreign Government/foreign citizens / foreign companies / foreign trusts, etc. Thus, a non-resident Indian (passport holder of India) residing abroad would not constitute a foreign source. However, a foreign citizen permanently resident in India would constitute a foreign source! This difference is very important and would determine whether or not the gift constitutes a foreign contribution.

The FAQs issued on the FCRA state that contributions made by a citizen of India living in another country (i.e., Non-Resident Indian), from his personal savings, through the normal banking channels, is not treated as foreign contribution. However, while accepting any donations from such NRI, it is advisable to obtain his passport details to ascertain that he/she is an Indian passport holder. Similarly, the FAQs state that a donation from an Indian who has acquired foreign citizenship is treated as foreign contribution.

An Overseas Citizen of India would also constitute a foreign source since an OCI cardholder is not an Indian citizen. An OCI card is granted by the Government of India to a person under the aegis of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Section7A of this Act provides for the registration of OCIs. An OCI cardholder is not a full-fledged India citizen under the Citizenship Act but he is only registered as an OCI.

Interestingly, under FEMA, citizenship has no relevance whereas under FCRA it is material. Hence, an NRI working abroad would be a person resident outside India under FEMA but he would not be a foreign source under FCRA. A gift of foreign securities from such a person would not trigger the FCRA since it would not constitute a foreign source.   

Exceptions: While specified person under Section 3 of the FCRA cannot accept any foreign contribution, Section 4 carves out an exception to this rule. Specified persons being an individual / HUF can accept a foreign contribution from his relative. Interestingly, the FCRA definition of the term relative refers to the extended list under the Companies Act 1956, and not the restrictive list under the Companies Act, 2013. Hence, a specified person can receive a gift of foreign securities from the following relatives who are foreign citizens:

• Members of a Hindu Undivided Family
• Spouse
• Father
• Mother (including stepmother)
• Son (including stepson)
• Son’s wife
• Daughter (including stepdaughter)
• Father’s father and mother
• Mother’s mother and father
• Son’s son
• Son’s son’s wife
• Son’s daughter
• Son’s or daughter’s husband
• Daughter’s husband
• Daughter’s son
• Daughter’s son’s wife
• Daughter’s daughter
• Daughter’s daughter’s husband
• Brother (including stepbrother)
• Brother’s wife
• Sister (including stepsister)
• Sister’s husband

It may be noted that the FEMA rules allow a gift of foreign securities from a person resident outside India provided the FCRA rules are complied with. Hence, as far as the FCRA is concerned, a person resident in India can receive a gift from a donor who is a relative under FCRA even if he is not a relative under FEMA.  

The FAQs have also clarified that individuals in general as well as those prescribed u/s 3 and an HUF are permitted to accept foreign contribution without permission from relatives.

Intimation: Any individual/HUF (whether or not covered u/s 3 of the FCRA), receiving foreign contribution in excess of R10 lakhs in a financial year from his relatives should inform the Central Government regarding the details of the foreign contribution received by him in Form FC-1 within 3 months from the date of gift. This provision applies to all persons and not just the persons specified u/s 3. This is an information provision and not a prohibitory section. The earlier threshold limit for intimation was Rs. 1 lakh but it has been enhanced to Rs. 10 lakhs from July 2022.  

INDIAN TAX TREATMENT

Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act taxes gifts received without / or for inadequate consideration. In such cases, the donee becomes liable to tax on the receipt of the gift. It also contains several exceptions under which this section does not apply. The relevant exceptions in this respect are:

• A gift from defined relatives
• A gift on the occasion of the marriage of the donee
• A gift under a Will / inheritance from any person (even a non-relative)
• Gifts made in contemplation of death of the donor

The tax position of the donee  needs to be examined keeping in mind the provisions of s.56(2)(x) and other provisions, such as, s.68 of the Income-tax Act.

Since the securities acquired would be foreign securities, necessary disclosures in Schedule FA of the Income-tax Return should be made. Failure to do so would entail a penalty under the Black Money Act, 2015.

FOREIGN TAX TREATMENT

In addition, if the country of the donor levies a gift tax then the same should be considered. For instance, the USA levies a gift tax on the donor on all gifts in excess of US$16,000 per donor per calendar year. Thus, a US couple can gift $32,000 per donor every year since US taxes a couples as one unit. Further, the donor can also utilise his lifetime estate duty-cum-gift tax credit to avoid paying the gift tax. Gifts in excess of $16,000 need to be reported by the donor in Form 709 in the USA. In the US, states are also empowered to levy a gift tax and hence, the same should also be examined. Connecticut is one such state which levies a state level gift tax.

The UK does not levy any gift tax but if the donor dies within 7 years of making the gift, then an inheritance tax on the gifts is  levied. However, certain gifts are exempt from this inheritance tax.

CONCLUSION

The law relating to gifts is myriad and one needs to consider various factors before contemplating a gift of foreign securities.

How an Apparent Relief Became a Burden for Government & Taxpayers?

INTRODUCTION
Goods & Service Tax in India is a destination-based consumption tax, i.e., the tax collected on a supply (taxing event) becomes revenue of the State in which the supply is consumed. This is evident on a reading of Article 269A(1) of the Constitution, which, while giving exclusive powers to the Parliament to levy and collect tax on inter-state supplies, also requires the apportionment of the said tax between the Union and the States.

Accordingly, Sections 10-13 of the IGST Act, 2017 lay down the rules for determining the place of supply, which in effect will aid in determining the State where the supply is being consumed.

Further, Section 17 lays down the manner of apportionment of tax and settlement of funds, being an integrated tax collected by the Parliament. Since GST works on the principle of value addition and availability of input tax credit for businesses, section 17 recognizes that for a B2B transaction, the tax collected does not accrue to any Government and accordingly provides for settlement of taxes only in cases of B2C transactions and B2B transactions where the corresponding credit is not available.

Section 17 of the IGST Act, 2017 accordingly deals with the following scenarios for the settlement of taxes between the Governments:

a)    In respect of supplies made to an unregistered person (B2C)/ composition dealers paying tax u/s 10.

b)    In respect of supplies made where the registered person is not entitled to claim the input tax credit.

c)    In respect of import of goods/ services by a registered person not entitled to claim the input tax credit.

d)    In respect of supplies made where the registered person does not claim input tax credit within the prescribed timelines.

e)    In respect of import of goods/ services by a registered person who does not avail the said credit within the prescribed timelines.

f)    In respect of import of goods/ services by an unregistered person or a registered person paying tax u/s 10 or a registered person not entitled to claim an input tax credit.

DATA POINTS FOR SETTLEMENT

Conceptually, the above settlement process, along with the provisions for inter-se settlement in case of cross utilization of credits, would seem adequate and logical. However, in a nation with millions of taxpayers and trillions (or even more) of transactions, compiling the relevant data could be a daunting exercise. This aspect was thought through at the time of the introduction of GST, and the detailed, elaborate transaction level uploading and two-way matching process was inter alia also designed to provide the said data points. As a quick recollection, an elaborate mechanism for filing returns was proposed involving the following steps:

•    GSTR 1:  wherein suppliers furnished details of outward supplies made by them to registered / unregistered persons. The details of supplies made to unregistered persons, though to be furnished at summary level, was to be provided supply-wise.

•    The supplies to registered taxable persons disclosed in GSTR-1 were intimated to the receiving taxable persons in GSTR-2A.

•    Based on the details intimated in GSTR-2A, the receiving taxable person was expected to carry out the matching exercise while furnishing GSTR-2, which is the details of inward supplies and marks each supply as either accepted (i.e., matched), rejected (i.e., incorrectly appearing or requiring amendment) or pending (appearing correctly but not credit eligible in terms of section 16 of the CGST Act, 2017). In addition, the receiving taxable person also had an option to add transactions, not disclosed by the supplier. The input tax credit on such transactions was provisionally subject to the supplier making the necessary rectifications.

•    The transactions marked as ‘rejected’ / ‘added’ were to be sent back to the supplier in GSTR-1A whereby they could take the corrective action for the mismatch to be rectified.

•    The information furnished in the GSTR-1 and GSTR-2 was to be auto-populated to the GSTR-3 wherein the taxable person was also required to report other adjustments, such as reversal on account of Rules 37, 38, 42, 43, etc., and details of blocked/ ineligible credits and discharge the tax liability by utilizing balances lying in electronic cash/credit ledgers.

The complex transaction-based return cycle was designed to ensure that the data could be collated for proper settlement of taxes among the States.

However, in August 2017, during the first return cycle under GST, the portal displayed unpreparedness to facilitate filing of the above returns. The delay in filing GSTR-3 meant a delay in collection of tax revenue. Therefore, as a makeshift arrangement, the above-detailed process was temporarily substituted by a disjoint process of filing GSTR–1 -> GSTR–3B. It was clarified in the press release that this was to be applicable only for two months where the tax would be payable based on a simple return containing a summary of inward and outward details. However, as time progressed and the portal failed to facilitate the filing of GSTR-2, which delayed the filing of GSTR-3, the proposed filing mechanism was scrapped, and the GSTR-3B replaced GSTR-3 instead of being a mere stop-gap arrangement.

This also meant that the matching process was never implemented on the portal though GSTR–2A was made available to taxpayers. In many cases, basis mismatch between credit claimed in GSTR–3B at a summary level and credit auto-populated in GSTR–2A, recovery notices were issued to the taxpayers alleging an excess claim of the input tax credit. In many cases, the taxpayers were forced to approach the High Court for relief against such exercises. But, ensuring compliance was perhaps just one of the challenges faced due to the makeshift arrangement. A lot has been talked about the same in various professional forums, and this column has also featured an article on the same. This article focuses on certain other challenges.

OTHER ISSUES EMANATING FROM THE MAKESHIFT ARRANGEMENT

Apart from the above, the failure to implement the proposed returns filing process meant that the information required to carry out the activity of apportionment and settlement of funds amongst the Union and the States was not readily available due to the following:

•    For supplies made to unregistered persons and composition dealers, if the supplier supplying goods or services to a dealer under composition scheme discloses the supply as B2B, based on the tagging of the recipient, the Government gets a report of supplies received by composition dealers where input tax credit is not available. Similarly, the information of supplies made to unregistered persons was supposed to flow from GSTR-1, which was expected to be the gross liability to be discharged by a taxpayer. However, the disjoint filing of GSTR-1-3B meant mismatches in the liability disclosed versus liability discharged. Therefore, GSTR-1 was no longer a reliable means for obtaining the said information. In fact, there were occasions where a taxpayer would file GSTR-1, i.e., disclose outward supply but not file GSTR-3B, resulting in a loss of revenue to the exchequer.

•    For data points listed at (b) to (e) earlier, the information was expected to flow from GSTR-2 and GSTR-3, which required furnishing of transaction level details for credit matched but not claimed as the same was ineligible, time-barred, etc. Non-operationalization of GSTR-2 and GSTR-3 meant that the accurate details required for apportionment/ settlement exercise were no longer available.

•    For (f) above, the source is the ICEGATE data. GSTIN must be mentioned in all import cases. Therefore, wherever importers are flagged as unregistered/ paying tax under composition scheme, details of ineligible credit can be obtained by the Government.

INPUT TAX CREDIT – WAY FORWARD

To rectify these shortcomings, vide Circular 170/02/2022-GST, the manner of disclosure of claim of the input tax credit is laid down. Let us understand what the changes are.

Under the format applicable till now, the figures appearing in the ‘taxpayers’ books of accounts were considered as the starting point, and basis of the matching (as required u/s 16(2) (aa)). He was required to disclose the credit. More importantly, there was no necessity to disclose the credit appearing in GSTR-2B but not accounted/ not appearing in books of accounts. This practice is now sought to be changed by making certain changes to the format of GSTR-3B. Let us first understand what the change is:

Old

New

4. Eligible ITC

4. Eligible ITC

Details

Details

(A) ITC
Available (Whether in full or part)

(A) ITC
Available (Whether in full or part)

 

(1)
Import of goods

 

(1)
Import of goods

 

(2)
Import of services

 

(2)
Import of services

 

(3)
Inward supplies liable to reverse change (other than 1 & 2 above)

 

(3)
Inward supplies liable to reverse change (other than 1 & 2 above)

 

(4)
Inward supplies from ISD

 

(4)
Inward supplies from ISD

 

(5) All
other ITC

 

(5) All
other ITC

(B)  ITC Reversed

(B)  ITC Reversed

 

(1) As
per rules 42 & 43 of CGST Rules

 

(1)  As per rules 38, 42
& 43 of CGST Rules and
sub-section (5) of section 17

 

2.
Others

 

2.
Others

 (C) 
Net ITC Available (A)-(B)

(C)  Net ITC Available (A)-(B)

(D)
Ineligible ITC

(D)
Other details

 

(1) As
per section  17(5)

 

(1) ITC
reclaimed which was reversed under Table 4(B(2) in earlier tax period

 

(2)
Others

 

(2)
Ineligible ITC under section 16(4) and ITC restricted due to PoS provisions

The changes can be primarily summarized as under:

a)    Disclosure of ITC covered u/s 17(5) shifted from 4D(1) to 4B(1).

b)    Complete change of information required to be disclosed at 4D.

On a first reading of the above, one may feel that it is a mere change in the details to be submitted. However, there is much more than what meets the eye. Under the new process, a taxpayer is expected to carry out the detailed matching process wherein the claim of the input tax credit is based on figures auto-populated in GSTR-2B. Indirectly, the taxpayer must mark each transaction either as accepted, pending, or rejected as initially envisaged at the time of introduction of GST, with the only variation being that the same is to be done manually. The reporting continues to be at a summary level, i.e., the Government still has no means to identify errant suppliers at an early stage.

More importantly, the amounts to be disclosed at 4B, which deal with other reversals, have now been classified as permanent and temporary reversals to be disclosed at (1) and (2), respectively. The permanent reversals are described as those that are absolute in nature and are not reclaimable, and refer to reversals required to be made under Rules 38, 42 and 43. While reference to Rule 38, an ad hoc reversal of input tax credit, by a bank or financial institution including NBFC is understandable, the same may not extend to Rule 42/43 since it contains a specific provision for reclamation in case of reversal of excess input tax credit. Therefore, to this extent, the circular seems to be ultra vires the Rules referred to, and taxpayers might still have an option to reclaim the excess credits reversed u/r 42/43.

This takes us to ‘temporary reversals’. Under the temporary reversal, what is required to be reported is the input tax credit appearing in GSTR-2B and auto-populated in GSTR-3B but not matching with the books of accounts and, therefore, liable to be reversed. The circular clarifies that this shall include, apart from credits reversible u/r 37, instances where restrictions under clauses (b) & (c) of Section 16(2) which restricts the claim of input tax credit in case the goods or services or both or the tax charged in respect of a supply has not been paid to the Government. More importantly, it refers to this as a reversal of input tax credit and proceeds to clarify that a taxable person shall be entitled to reclaim the credits so reversed on account of a mismatch as and when the same appears in GSTR-2B. This would mean that the credit disclosed at 4A.(5) as per GSTR-2B would mean availing of input tax credit at the first stage, which would be a contravention of conditions laid down in section 16. For instance, a supplier has issued an invoice to a taxable person and disclosed the same in his GSTR-1 of August, 2022. However, the taxable person has received the invoice and goods in the subsequent month, i.e., September 2022. Therefore, the question that remains is, can the recipient even disclose the credit to the extent of this transaction in 4A. (5), and then reclaim the same in September GSTR-3B? In that sense, it can be said that the Circular requires the taxable person to disclose availability of input tax credit which is contrary to the provisions of the Act.

There is one more issue in the above. The purpose of this exercise is to enforce proper reporting of ineligible credits/ blocked credits. However, many businesses have a practice whereby they do not recognize the tax separately in case of blocked credit and book the gross expenditure in the books of accounts. Therefore, the tax component of the blocked credits do not appear separately in their purchase register. As such, when matching between GSTR-2B and books is done monthly, such transactions always appear as unmatched transactions, and therefore, are reported as temporary reversals. Such transactions may never be reported as permanent reversal, and therefore, the details of such credit will be available to the Government only as time-barred credits.

One advantage of this clarification is that it can be used to bypass the provision of section 16(4). Let us take an example of an invoice appearing in GSTR-2B of September, 2022. For some reason, the invoice was never accounted by the taxable person (non-receipt of the invoice, dispute, etc.,) and therefore, while filing GSTR-3B of September, the credit was first shown at 4A.(5) and after that reversed at 4B.(2) as a temporary reversal. In December, 2023, the taxable person accounts for the invoice. The question is, can he claim this credit now as in terms of the above circular, the credit has already been availed & reversed, and now the same would amount to reclaim of the credit to which the provisions of section 16 (4) may not apply.

This takes us to the point 4D of the new format. At 4D.(1), the format expects a taxable person to disclose instances of reclaim of input tax credit which was reversed earlier in table 4B.(2). The intention behind this specific disclosure seems to be to track the difference in credits claimed in 4A.(5) of GSTR-3B and GSTR-2B on a month-on-month basis by probably using the following method:

Tax Period

ITC as per GSTR-2B

ITC as per 4A. (5)

ITC as per 4B. (2)

ITC as per 4D. (1)

2022-08

1,50,000

1,50,000

-75,000

–

2022-09

2,50,000

2,95,000

-1,00,000

45,000

2022-10

3,50,000

4,60,000

–

1,10,000

Total

7,50,000

9,05,000

-1,75,000

1,55,000

The above table demonstrates the need for separate disclosure of recredits at table 4D.(1). The various notices received to date based on GSTR-3B versus GSTR-2A/2B notices have focused on amounts disclosed in table 4A. (5). In view of the additional disclosure of input tax credit reclaimed at 4D.(1), it will be convenient for the taxable person to explain the difference to the tax authorities.

However, a question remains regarding the claim of credits appearing in GSTR-2B of July, 2022 and prior period and matched during August, 2022 and subsequent periods. This is because such credits were not disclosed as availment and subsequent reversals during the earlier GSTR-3B. Therefore, even if such credits are claimed on a matching basis, the same cannot be treated as reclaim of input tax credit, and therefore, reporting the same at 4D.(1) would appear to be grossly incorrect. Thus, the easy resolution of mismatch notices may not be on the horizon, at least till September, 2023 as credits for the period April, 2022 to July, 2022 can be claimed till the filing of GSTR-3B of September, 2023. Perhaps, either 4B.(1) should have been appropriately worded to cover this aspect, or a separate row for reporting such cases would have helped the taxpayers. To the least, had the new method been introduced in a new financial year, the mismatch could have been averted as a taxpayer is required to disclose the input tax credit of a particular F.Y. claimed in the next year at 8C and 12 and 13th GSTR-9 and 9C for each financial year.

PLACE OF SUPPLY: CAPTURING CUSTOMER DETAILS

Another issue faced by the Government was the perceived incorrect disclosure of the place of supply in GSTR-3B on which, the Board has clarified as under:

3.3. Accordingly, it is advised that the registered persons making inter-state supplies-

… …

(iii) shall update their customer database properly with correct State name and ensure that correct POS is declared in the tax invoice and in Table 3.2 of Form GSTR-3B while filing their return, so that tax reaches the Consumption State as per the principles of destination-based taxation system.

Let us try to understand the background of the above clarification with the help of an example. A telecom operator has roped in the services of a payment gateway. Under this arrangement, whenever a subscriber intends to renew his connection/ pay his bill, he will make the payment online through the payment gateway. For each transaction through the payment gateway, it charges a nominal fee plus applicable GST to the subscriber. While the telecom would have the subscriber’s details, termed as ‘address on record’ available with him, the payment gateway won’t. The issue that remains for the payment gateway is how to determine the place of supply and more importantly, pay the applicable tax. For instance, the payment gateway is registered in Maharashtra, while the person making the payment is in Gujarat. There can also be a scenario where the payment may be done for a connection obtained in an altogether different state.

In the above, the issue would originate regarding the determination of place of supply. This is because the services provided by the payment gateway are not covered under any of the exceptions provided u/s 12 of the IGST Act, 2017, and therefore, the place of supply will be determined under the general rule, which provides as:

(2)    The place of supply of services, except the services specified in sub-sections (3) to (14), –

(a)    made to a registered person shall be the location of such person;

(b)    made to any person other than a registered person shall be, –

(i)    the location of the recipient where the address on record exists; and

(ii)    the location of the supplier of services in other cases.

In most cases, it is likely that the payment gateways provide services to end consumers/ unregistered recipients; therefore, clause (b) above becomes applicable for determining the place of supply in case of charges recovered from them. The same provides that the recipient’s location shall be the place of supply when the ‘address on record’ exists. However, when no such address exists, it is the location of the supplier which becomes the place of supply. In such a scenario, it would therefore mean that the tax leviable on a supply being made to and consumed by a person in Gujarat shall be Maharashtra. Therefore, the tax authorities in Gujarat likely feel aggrieved that the tax revenue on a supply consumed in their state accrues to another state. The second option, i.e., to claim that no ‘address on record’ available is the appropriate solution with a supplier as it will help him reduce compliance on his hand. However, does a supplier have such an option or not is something which needs to be analyzed. It becomes important to understand what is meant by ‘address on record’.

The term ‘address on record’ is very loosely defined u/s 2 (3) of the CGST Act, 2017 to mean the address of the recipient as available in the records of the supplier. However, the definition does not define, either address or record. However, Chapter VIII of the CGST Act, 2017 deals with what Accounts and Records every registered taxable person must maintain under GST. Rule 56 (5) thereof requires every registered person to keep particulars of the following:

(a)    Name and complete addresses of suppliers from whom he has received the goods or services chargeable to tax under the Act.

(b)    Name and complete addresses of the persons to whom he has supplied goods or services where required under the provisions of this Chapter.

The above indicates that while it is mandatory to maintain the ‘complete address’ of all suppliers, the same does not apply when it comes to recipients. In the case of recipients, the requirement to maintain the name and complete address arises only when it is required under the provisions of this Chapter, i.e., Chapter VII of the CGST Rules, 2017. A detailed reading of this Chapter would indicate that there is no requirement for any taxable person to maintain the ‘name and complete address’ of the person to whom goods or services have been supplied. Therefore, a payment gateway is well within ‘its’ rights to claim that they do not have the ‘address on record’ of person using their services and therefore, they are right in treating their supplies as intra-state supply irrespective of the State where the recipient is located.

As pointed above, such a position in the law is certainly to be countered by the other states, who would feel aggrieved by the perception that they are losing out on the tax revenue. However, one may very well argue that the tax revenue never belonged to them as the consumption, by virtue of the exception provided u/s 12 (2), belonged to the originating State. However, many state tax authorities have already raised this issue during assessments/ proceedings on service providers.

The Circular goes on to presume that such suppliers are making an inter-state supply. However, when a taxable person claims that the supply made by him is an intra-state supply, the applicability of this circular/clarification/instruction on such taxable person can be questioned. Secondly, the Circular requires the service provider to update their database correctly with the correct State Name. For the same, the circular presumes the existence of a database. However, in the case discussed above, the supplier may not be maintaining a database in the first place, which would make the clarification not applicable.

The next question is whether the Board considers the name of the State as sufficient data for determining address on record, especially when the provision relating to ‘Accounts & Records’ refer to complete address. Even in common parlance, the address on record can be used for communication, i.e., sending notices, visited using such records, etc. More importantly, what would be the sanctity of the data captured by a service provider in his records when it only contains the name of State. A person can always make mistakes while entering the State data in the database.

Further, even if the suppliers start collecting the State details from their customers, their local tax authorities might question the non-availability of address on record and therefore allege that there is a wrong POS determined resulting in payment of wrong tax. This might trigger the initiation of recovery proceedings for applicable tax not paid, i.e., CGST/SGST. Already, the Hon’ble HC has held that internal adjustment of tax wrong paid would not be permissible, i.e., if a supply is classified as inter-state. and IGST is paid on the same, and subsequently, if it is determined that the supply was classifiable as intra-state supply, in such a case, recovery of CGST/SGST will be done separately. Tax wrongly paid under IGST will have to be claimed as a refund. The only saving grace in such a case would be that interest will not be leviable on the recovery. However, to what extent a refund can be claimed is also a subject matter of dispute, especially whether the time-barring provisions u/s 54 would apply to such refund claims or not? This is an important question as such instances of the wrong classification of the place of supply would arise only during audits, which take place much after the 2-year time limit prescribed u/s 54.

CONCLUSION

GSTR-3B was a temporary arrangement until the functionality to file GSTR-2 and 3 was enabled. However, the temporary arrangement soon became permanent, and a burden for both, the Government as well as taxpayers as is evident from the above. The further attempt to dictate the manner of disclosure of input tax credit/ place of supply in apparent disregard to the stated provisions means that the way ahead will be rocky. Perhaps, it is high time that the original process of filing GSTR-2 and 3 be reintroduced. This will ensure a proper trail for taxpayers and authorities and ensure smooth compliance and accurate filing.

Auditor’s Report and Related Disclosures in Financial Statements For a Non-Banking Financial Company under an Administrator

SREI INFRASTRUCTURE LTD.
(Y.E. 31st MARCH, 2022)

From Auditors’ Report on Standalone Financial Statements

Disclaimer of Opinion

We were engaged to audit the Standalone Financial Statements of Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited (SIFL or the Company), which comprise the Balance Sheet as at 31 March, 2022, the Statement of Profit and Loss (including Other Comprehensive Income), the Statement of Changes in Equity, Statement of Cash Flows for the year then ended and notes to the Standalone Financial Statements, including a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory information (hereinafter referred to as the Standalone Financial Statements). We do not express an opinion on the accompanying Standalone Financial Statements of the Company. Because of the significance of the matters described in the Basis for Disclaimer of Opinion section of our report and the uncertainties involved, we have not been able to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a basis for an audit opinion on these Standalone Financial Statements.

Basis for Disclaimer of Opinion

a)    We draw reference to Note No. 1.2, 1.3(i) and 59 to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains that the Administrator has initiated audits/reviews relating to the processes and compliances of the Company and has also appointed professionals for conducting transaction audit as per Section 43, 45, 50 and 66 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 (the Code). Hence, the Standalone Financial Statements are subject to outcome of such audits/reviews. Pending the outcome of the Transaction Audit, we are unable to comment on the impact, if any of the same on the Standalone Financial Statements. Note No. 59 explains that latest valuations from independent valuers in respect of assets/collaterals held as securities is in progress. Hence, pending completion of the process, we are unable to comment on the impact, if any of the same on the Standalone Financial Statements. Further the Notes also explains that since the Administrator has taken charge of the affairs of the Company on 4 October, 2021, the Administrator is not liable or responsible for any actions and regarding the information pertaining to the period prior to 4 October, 2021 and has relied upon the explanations, clarifications, certifications, representations and statements made by the existing officials of the Company, who were also part of the Company prior to the appointment of the Administrator.

b)    We draw reference to Note No. 51 to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains that during the financial year 2019-20, the Company accounted for the slump exchange transaction and consequently recognized and derecognised the relevant assets and liabilities in its books of account, pursuant to the Business Transfer Agreement (BTA) with its subsidiary, Srei Equipment Finance Limited (SEFL), with effect from 1 October, 2019, subject to necessary approvals. The superseded Board of Directors and erstwhile management of the Company obtained expert legal and accounting opinions in relation to the accounting of BTA which confirmed that the accounting treatment so given is in accordance with the relevant Ind AS and the underlying guidance and framework. The Note further explains that during the financial year 2020-2021, SEFL had filed two separate applications under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act), before the Hon’ble NCLT proposing Schemes of Arrangement (the Schemes) with all its secured and unsecured lenders. Since applications/appeals in connection with the Schemes were pending before NCLT/NCLAT, the superseded Board of Directors and erstwhile management had maintained status quo on the Schemes including accounting of BTA. Both the Schemes were rejected by majority of the creditors and an application of withdrawal was filed by the Administrator in this matter which has been allowed by the Tribunal vide order dated 11 February, 2022. As stated in the said note, the Administrator is in the process of filing consolidated resolution of SEFL and SIFL and hence no further action is being contemplated regarding establishing the validity of BTA or otherwise, consequent upon the withdrawal of Schemes. Accordingly, the status quo regarding BTA, as it existed on the date of commencement of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), has been maintained. In view of the uncertainties that exist in the matter of BTA, we are unable to comment on the accounting of BTA, as aforesaid, done by the Company and accordingly on the impact of the same, if any, on the Standalone Financial Statements.

c)    We draw reference to Note No. 53 to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains that the Administrator has invited the financial/ operational/other creditors to file their respective claims and that the admission of such claims is in process. Further, the note explains that the effect in respect of the claims, as on 8 October, 2021, admitted by the Administrator till 4 May, 2022 is in the process of being verified and updated from time to time as and when the claims are admitted and that the creditors can file their claims during CIRP. Accordingly, the figures of claims admitted and accounted in the books of account might undergo changes during CIRP. Hence, adjustments, if any, arising out of the claim verification and submission process, will be given effect in subsequent periods. We are unable to comment on the impact of the same, if any, on the Standalone Financial Statements.

d)    We draw reference to Note No. 54(b) to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains the reasons owing to which the Company was not able to comply with the requirements of Section 135 of the Act in relation to depositing unspent amount related to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). As stated in the said note, the Company has written to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (the MCA) seeking exemption from the obligations of the Company under portions of Section 135(5) and Section 135(7) of the Act. We are unable to comment on the impact of the same or any other consequences arising out of such non-compliance, if any, on the Standalone Financial Statements.

e)    We draw reference to Note No. 56 to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains that the Company, as per the specific directions from Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in relation to certain borrowers referred to as ‘probable connected parties/related parties’, was advised to re-assess and re-evaluate the relationship with the said borrowers to assess whether they are related parties to the Company or to SEFL and also whether transaction with these connected parties were in line with arm’s length principles. However, the said process was not concluded and meanwhile the Company and SEFL have gone into CIRP. As stated in the said Note, the Administrator is not in a position to comment on the views adopted by the erstwhile management in relation to the RBI’s directions since these pertain to the period prior to the Administrator’s appointment. As stated in point (a) above, the Administrator has initiated a transaction audit/review relating to the process and compliance of the Company and has also appointed professionals for conducting transaction audit as per sections 43, 45, 50 and 66 of the Code, which is in process. We are unable to comment on the impact of the same, if any, on the Standalone Financial Statements.

f)    We have been informed that certain information including the minutes of meetings of the Committee of Creditors, Advisory Committee and Joint Lenders are confidential in nature and cannot be shared with anyone other than the Committee of Creditors and Hon’ble NCLT. Accordingly, we are unable to comment on the possible financial effects on the Standalone Financial Statements, including on presentation and disclosures, if any, that may have arisen if we had been provided access to that information.

g)    In view of the possible effects of the matters described in paragraph 5(a) to 5(f) above, we were unable to determine the consequential implications arising therefrom and whether any adjustments, restatement, disclosures or compliances are necessary in respect thereof in the Standalone Financial Statements of the Company.

Material Uncertainty Related to Going Concern

We draw attention to Note No. 55 to the Standalone Financial Statements which states that the Company has been admitted to CIRP and that the Company has reported operational loss during the year ended 31 March, 2022 and earlier years as well. As a result, the Company’s net worth has eroded and it has not been able to comply with various regulatory ratios/limits etc. All this have impacted the Company’s ability to continue its operations in normal course in future. These events or conditions, along with other matters as set forth in the aforesaid Note, indicate that there is a material uncertainty which casts significant doubt about the Company’s ability to continue as a ‘Going Concern’ in foreseeable future. However, for the reasons stated in the said note, the Company has considered it appropriate to prepare the Standalone Financial Statements on a going concern basis.

Emphasis of Matters

We draw attention to the following matters in the notes to the Standalone Financial Statements:

a)    Note No. 50 to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains that considering the significant impact of COVID-19 on business activity, the Company had received consent for waiver of interest on Non-convertible Perpetual Bond from the Bond Holders. Accordingly, the Company has not accrued interest of Rs. 3,300 lacs for the year ended 31 March, 2022.

b)    Note No. 52 to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains that in view of the impracticability for preparing the resolution plan on individual basis in the case of the Company and SEFL, the Administrator, after adopting proper procedure, has filed applications before the Hon’ble NCLT, Kolkata Bench, seeking, amongst other things, consolidation of the corporate insolvency processes of the Company and SEFL. The application in the matter is admitted and the final order was received on 14 February, 2022 wherein the Hon’ble NCLT approved the consolidation of the corporate insolvency of SIFL and SEFL.

c)    Note No. 5(v) to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains that the Company is holding 18,80,333 units in Infra Construction Fund, managed by Trinity Alternative Investments Managers Limited (TAIML). TAIML is a 51% subsidiary of the Company. For the purpose of NAV of such units, TAIML, acting as fund manager has forwarded the valuation report as on 31 March, 2022 to the Company, valuing such units at Nil. As on 31 December, 2021, TAIML had reported value of these units as Rs. 53,065 lacs under the same circumstances which continue as on 31 March, 2022. The Company has not accepted the basis of such valuation and is currently enquiring the basis of the same. The Company, only for the purpose of compliance has given effect to the said valuation and such value of investment in Company’s books is subject to outcome of enquiry and explanations being sought from TAIML.

d)    Note No. 57 to the Standalone Financial Statements which explains that the Company during the quarter and year ended 31 March, 2022 on behalf of SEFL, had invoked 49% equity shares of Sanjvik Terminals Private Limited (STPL) which were pledged as security against the loan availed by one of the borrowers of SEFL. These shares appear in the Demat statement of the Company, whereas the borrower was transferred to SEFL pursuant to BTA. SEFL is in the process of getting these shares transferred in its name. Till such name transfer, the Company is holding these shares in trust for SEFL for disposal in due course. SEFL has no intention to exercise any control/significant influence over STPL in terms of Ind AS 110/lnd AS 28.

e)    Note No. 62 to the Standalone Financial Statements which states that the MCA vide its letter dated 27 September, 2021 has initiated investigation into the affairs of the Company under Section 206(5) of the Act and the same is in progress.

f)    Note No. 58 to the Standalone Financial Statements which states that based on the information available in the public domain, forensic audit was conducted on the Company and few lenders have declared the bank account of the Company as fraud. However, in case of some lenders, on the basis of petition filed by the promoters, Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has restrained the said lender from taking any further steps or action prejudicial to the petitioner on the basis of the order declaring the petitioner’s bank account as fraud. The next hearing in the matter has been listed on 23 August, 2022. Report of such forensic audit was not made available to us.

Our opinion is not modified in respect of the above matters.

From Notes to Financial Statements (Standalone)

Background and General Information

1.2. Supersession of Board of Directors and Implementation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) vide press release dated October 4, 2021 in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 45-IE (1) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (RBI Act) superseded the Board of Directors of the Company and appointed an Administrator under Section 45-IE (2) of the RBI Act. Further, RBI, in exercise of powers conferred under section 45-IE (5) (a) of the RBI Act 1934, constituted a three-member Advisory Committee to assist the Administrator in discharge of his duties. Thereafter RBI filed applications for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against the Company under section 227 read with clause (zk) of sub-section (2) of Section 239 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 (the Code) read with Rules 5 and 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019 (FSP Insolvency Rules) before the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench (Hon’ble NCLT). Hon’ble NCLT vide its order dated October 08, 2021 admitted the application made by RBI for initiation of CIRP against the Company. Further, Hon’ble NCLT gave orders for appointment of Mr. Rajneesh Sharma, as the Administrator to carry out the functions as per the Code and that the management of the Company shall vest in the Administrator. Further, NCLT also retained the three-member Advisory Committee, as aforesaid, for advising the Administrator in the operations of the Company during the CIRP.

1.3. Significant Accounting Policies

1.3(i) Basis of preparation and presentation

The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS) as notified under the Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules, 2015 as amended from time to time and notified under section 133 of the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) along with other relevant provisions of the Act, the Master Direction Non-Banking Financial Company Systemically Important Non-Deposit taking Company and Deposit taking Company (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016 (the NBFC Master Directions), as amended and notification for Implementation of Indian Accounting Standards vide circular RBI/2019-20/170 DOR (NBFC).CC.PD. No.109/22.10.106/ 2019-20 dated March 13, 2020 (RBI Notification for Implementation of Ind AS) issued by RBI. These financial statements have been prepared on the historical cost basis, except for certain items which are measured at fair values at the end of each reporting period, as explained in the accounting policies below. Historical cost is generally based on the fair value of the consideration given in exchange for goods and services. The preparation of these financial statements requires the use of certain critical accounting estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts of assets and liabilities, revenue and expenses and disclosed amount of contingent liabilities. Areas involving a higher degree of judgement or complexity or areas where assumptions are significant to the Company are discussed in Note No. 2.23 Significant accounting judgements, estimates and assumptions. The management believes that the estimates used in the preparation of these financial statements are prudent and reasonable. Actual results could differ from those estimates and the differences between the actual results and the estimates would be recognised in the periods in which the results are known/ materialised. The financial statements are presented in Indian Rupees (INR) and all values are rounded off to the nearest Lacs, except otherwise indicated. Comparative information has been regrouped/rearranged to accord with changes in presentations made in the current period, except where otherwise stated. The financial statements of the Company are presented as per Schedule III (Division III) to the Act applicable to NBFCs, as notified by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA). These audited financial statements of the Company for the year ended March 31, 2022 have been taken on record by the Administrator on May 27, 2022 while discharging the powers of the Board of Directors of the Company which were conferred upon him by the RBI press release dated October 4, 2021 and subsequently, powers conferred upon him in accordance with Hon’ble NCLT order dated October 8, 2021. It is also incumbent upon the Resolution Professional, under Section 20 of the Code, to manage the operations of the Company as a going concern. As a part of the CIRP, the Administrator has initiated audits/reviews relating to the processes and compliances of the Company and has also appointed professionals for conducting transaction audit as per section 43, 45, 50 and 66 of the Code. As such, these financial results are subject to outcome of such audits/reviews. Since the Administrator has taken charge of the affairs of the Company on October 4, 2021, the Administrator is not liable or responsible for any actions and has no personal knowledge of any such actions of the Company prior to his appointment and has relied on the position of the financial statements of the Company as they existed on October 4, 2021. Regarding information pertaining to period prior to October 4, 2021 the Administrator has relied upon the explanations, clarifications, certifications, representations and statements made by the company management team (the existing officials of the Company), who were also part of the Company prior to the appointment of the Administrator. The accounting policies for some specific items of financial statements are disclosed in the respective notes to the financial statements. Other significant accounting policies and details of significant accounting assumptions and estimates are set out below in Note No. 1.3(i) to 1.22.

50. Waiver of Interest on Non-convertible Perpetual Bond due to Covid-19

Considering the significant impact of COVID-19 on business activity, the Company had received consent for waiver of interest on Non-convertible Perpetual Bond from the Bond Holders. Accordingly, the Company has not accrued interest of Rs.3300 lacs for the year ended March 31, 2022.

51. Business Transfer Agreement

During the year 2019-20, the Company and its Subsidiary Company, Srei Equipment Finance Limited (SEFL) entered into a Business Transfer Agreement (BTA) to transfer the Lending Business, Interest Earning Business and Lease Business of the Company together with associated employees, assets and liabilities (including liabilities towards issued and outstanding non – convertible debentures) (Transferred Undertaking), as a going concern by way of slump exchange to SEFL pursuant to the Business Transfer Agreement, subject to all necessary approvals. Accordingly, the Company and SEFL passed the relevant accounting entries in their respective books of account to reflect the slump exchange w.e.f. October 1, 2019 while allotment of shares by SEFL was made on December 31, 2019. The superseded board of directors and erstwhile management of the Company, as existed prior to the Appointment of the Administrator, had obtained external expert legal and accounting opinions in relation to the accounting of BTA which confirmed that the accounting treatment so given is in accordance with the relevant Ind AS and the underlying guidance and framework. During the year 2020-2021, the Company had filed two separate applications under Sec. 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) before the Hon’ble NCLT (CA 1106/KB/2020 and CA 1492/KB/2020 at the Hon’ble NCLT Kolkata) proposing Schemes of Arrangement (the Schemes) with all its secured and unsecured lenders (Creditors). Business Transfer Agreement, constituted an integral part of the Schemes. The first scheme (i.e. CA 1106/KB/2020) sought for amongst other things formal consent to be obtained from the required majority of the creditors of SEFL to the completed acquisition by way of slump exchange of the Transferred Undertaking from SIFL in terms of the BTA and consequential formal novation of the loans and securities already forming part of SEFL liabilities and outstanding to the creditor. (as set out in the Scheme filed CA 1106/KB/2020). The second scheme (i.e. CA 1492/KB/2020) sought for amongst other things restructuring of the debt due to certain creditors of the Company including secured debenture holders, unsecured debenture holders, perpetual debt instrument holders, secured ECB lenders and unsecured ECB lenders and individual debenture holders. Pursuant to the directions of Hon’ble NCLT vide order dated October 21, 2020, the superseded board of directors and erstwhile management had maintained status quo on the Scheme including accounting of BTA. The final order/s in connection with the Schemes was awaited from Hon’ble NCLT at that time. Both the schemes of arrangement were rejected by the majority of the creditors during the meetings held pursuant to the Hon’ble NCLT’s directions (dated 21/10/2020 and 30/12/2020 respectively). Further, certain appeals were filed by rating agencies in the matter relating to the second scheme of arrangement (i.e. CA 1492/KB/2020). An application of withdrawal was filed by the Administrator in this matter in NCLAT which has been allowed by NCLAT by an order dated February 11, 2022. As stated in Note-52 below, the Company is in the process of consolidated resolution of SEFL and SIFL and hence no further action is being contemplated regarding establishing the validity of BTA or otherwise, consequent upon the withdrawal of Schemes as stated above. Accordingly, the status quo regarding BTA, as it existed on the date of commencement of CIRP, has been maintained. In accordance with the obligations imposed on the Administrator under Section 18(f) of the Code, the Administrator has taken custody and control of the Company with the financial position as recorded in the balance sheet as on insolvency commencement date on an ‘as-is where-is’ basis. The accounts for the quarter and year ended March 31, 2022 have been taken on record by the Administrator in the manner and form in which it existed on the insolvency commencement date in view of the initiation of the CIRP and this fact has also been informed by the Administrator to the stakeholders. Further, in line with the provisions of Section 14 of the Code, the Company cannot alienate any of the assets appearing on the insolvency commencement date.

52. Consolidated Resolution under CIRP

In view of the impracticability for preparing the resolution plan on individual basis in the case of the Company and SEFL, the Administrator, after adopting proper procedure, has filed applications before the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal- Kolkata Bench (Hon’ble NCLT) in the insolvency resolution processed of SIFL and SEFL (IA No. 1099 of 2021 under CP.294/KB/2021 and IA No. 1100 of 2021 under CP.295/KB/2021) seeking the following prayers:

•    Directing the consolidation of the corporate insolvency resolution processes of SIFL and SEFL;

•    Directing formation of a consolidated committee of creditors for the consolidated corporate insolvency resolution processes of SIFL and SEFL;

•    Directing and permitting the conduct of the corporate insolvency resolution processes for SIFL and SEFL in terms of the provisions of the Code in a consolidated manner including audit of transactions in relation to Section 43, Section 45, Section 50 and Section 66 of the Code, issuance of single request for submission of resolution plans by the Administrator and the submission and consideration of single resolution plan, for the consolidated resolution of SEFL and SIFL in terms of the provisions of the Code; and

•    Directing and permitting the submission and approval of one consolidated resolution plan for the resolution of SEFL and SIFL in terms of the provisions of the Code.

The application in this matter was admitted and the final order received on February 14, 2022 wherein the Hon’ble NCLT approved the consolidation of the corporate insolvency of SIFL and SEFL. Further, the Company has received Expression of Interest from various prospective Resolution Applicants and the Company has finalized the list of the prospective Resolution Applicants who are in the process of submitting the resolution plan in terms of the Code.

53. Payment to lenders/others and claims under CIRP

CIRP has been initiated against the Company, as stated in Note No. 1.2 and accordingly, as per the Code, the Administrator has invited the financial/operational/other creditors to file their respective claims as on October 8, 2021 (i.e. date of commencement of CIRP). As per the Code, the Administrator has to receive, collate and verify all the claims submitted by the creditors of the Company. The claims as on October 8, 2021 so received by the Administrator till May 4, 2022 is in the process of being verified/updated from time to time and wherever, the claims are admitted, the effect of the same has been given in the books of accounts. In respect of claims of creditors, which are rejected or under verification, the effect of the same in the books of accounts will be taken once the verification of the same is completed and it is admitted. Further, as aforesaid, since the creditors can file their claims during the CIRP, the figures of claims admitted in the books of accounts might undergo changes during the CIRP. Adjustments, if any arising out of the claim verification and admission process will be given effect in subsequent periods.

54. Trust and Retention Account (TRA)

a)    The domestic lenders of the Company and SEFL stipulated Trust and Retention Account (TRA) mechanism w.e.f November 24, 2020, pursuant to which all the payments being made by the Company are being approved/released based on approval in the TRA mechanism. The Company has not accounted for interest of Rs. 2,686 Lacs for the year ended March 31, 2022 w.r.t. ICDs from SEFL nor accounted for rent of Rs. 703 Lacs from SEFL for the nine months ended December 31, 2021.The Audit Committee of SIFL and SEFL in their respective meetings dated August 14, 2021 and August 11, 2021 approved the waiver of aforesaid interest and rent between them.

b)    As at March 31, 2021 the Company was having funds amounting to Rs. 53 lacs in relation to the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) which were unspent. These unspent amounts as per the requirements of Section 135 of the Act were to be transferred to funds specified under Schedule VII to the Act within a period of 6 months. However, the domestic lenders of the Company had stipulated TRA mechanism effective November 24, 2020, pursuant to which all the payments being made by the Company were being approved/released based on the TRA mechanism. The Company was not able to transfer the aforesaid unspent CSR amount as per the requirements of Section 135 of the Act. The Company has written letter to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) seeking exemptions from the obligations of the Company under portions of Section 135(5) and Section 135(7) of the Act. The reply from MCA in this regards is awaited.

55. Going Concern

The Company had reported operating losses during the year ended March 31, 2022 and earlier year/periods as well. Hence, the net worth of the Company has fully eroded. There is persistent severe strain on the working capital and operations of the Company and it is undergoing significant financial stress. As stated in Note No. 1.2, CIRP was initiated in respect of the Company w.e.f. October 8, 2021. The Company has assessed that the use of the going concern assumption is appropriate in the circumstances and hence, these financial results have been prepared on a going concern assumption basis as per below:

a)    The Code requires the Administrator to, among other things, run the Company as a going concern during CIRP.

b)    The Administrator, in consultation with the Committee of Creditors (CoC) of the Company, in accordance with the provisions of the IBC, is making all endeavors to run the Company as a going concern. CIRP has started and ultimately a resolution plan needs to be presented to and approved by the CoC and further approved by the Hon’ble NCLT and RBI approval. Pending the completion of the said process under CIRP, these financial results have been prepared on a going concern basis.

56. Probable Connected / Related Companies

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in its inspection report and risk assessment report (the directions) for the year ended March 31, 2020 had identified certain borrowers as probable connected/ related companies. In view of the directions, the Company has been advised to reassess and re-evaluate the relationship with the said borrowers to assess whether they are related parties to the Company or to SEFL and also whether transactions with these connected parties are on arm’s length basis. The superseded Board and the earlier management had obtained legal and accounting views as per which these are not related party transactions. The Administrator is not in a position to comment on the views adopted by the erstwhile management of the Company in relation to the findings of RBI’s inspection report since these pertain to the period prior to the Administrator’s appointment. As a part of the CIRP, the Administrator has initiated a transaction audit/review relating to the process and compliances of the Company and has also appointed professionals for conducting transaction audit as per section 43, 45, 50 and 66 of the Code. Such audit/review is in progress; hence these financials results are subject to outcome of such audit/review.

57. During the year ended March 31st, 2022, SEFL has invoked 49% equity shares of Sanjvik Terminals Private Limited (STPL), which were pledged with SEFL as security against the loan availed by one of the borrowers of SEFL. As at March 31st, 2022, these shares appear in the demat statement of the Comapny, whereas the borrower was transferred to the Company pursuant to BTA, as stated in Note No. 51 above. The Company is in the process of getting these shares transferred in its name. Till such name transfer, The Company is holding these shares in trust for SEFL for disposal in due course. SEFL has no intention to exercise any control/significant influence over STPL in terms of Ind AS 110/Ind AS 28. SEFL has taken an expert opinion, which confirms that since it is not exercising any significant influence/control over STPL, hence, STPL is not a subsidiary/associate in terms of Ind AS 110/Ind AS 28 and accordingly is not required to prepare consolidated financial statements with respect to its holding of 49% of the equity shares of STPL.

58. Based on the information available in the public domain, few lenders have declared the bank account of the Company as fraud. However, in case of one of the lender, on the basis of petition filed by the ex-promoters, Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has restrained the said lender from taking any further steps or action prejudicial to the petitioner on the basis of the order declaring the petitioner’s bank account as fraud. The next hearing in the matter has been listed on August 23, 2022.

59. As a part of the ongoing CIRP process the Administrator has appointed two (2) independent valuers to conduct the valuation of the assets of the Company & SEFL and assets/collateral held as securities as required under the provisions of the Code. Accordingly, the financial results, disclosures, categorization and classification of assets are subject to the outcome of such valuation process.

62. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) vide its letter dated September 27, 2021 has initiated investigation into the affairs of SIFL and SEFL under Section 206(5) of the Act and it is under progress.

Section 148A – Reopening of assessment – Notice u/s 148A(b) – Firm Dissolved – duly intimated the department – Transaction duly recorded in proprietorship concern – Matter remanded for fresh consideration

Sanjay Gupta vs. Union Of India & Ors.
W.P.(C) 13712/2022
Date of order: 22nd September, 2022
Delhi High Court
A.Ys.: 2015-16, 2017-18 & 2018-19

Section 148A – Reopening of assessment – Notice u/s 148A(b) – Firm Dissolved – duly intimated the department – Transaction duly recorded in proprietorship concern – Matter  remanded for fresh consideration

The Present writ petition has been filed challenging the notice  issued u/s 148, 148A(b) and  orders passed u/s148A(d) of the Act.

The Petitioner stated that the impugned notices are without jurisdiction as the same have been issued in the name of a non-existent partnership firm – Railton Electronics. He states that the Petitioner, during the reassessment proceedings, duly informed the department vide replies dated 23rd March, 2022 and 19th January, 2022 that the partnership firm being M/s Railton Electronics having PAN Number AANFR1676E was dissolved as per the Deed of Dissolution dated 1st April, 2013 and thereafter, the firm was taken over by the Petitioner as a sole proprietor.

The Petitioner  stated that as per the letter obtained from the erstwhile partnership firm’s bank, the partnership firm’s bank account was closed on 19th July, 2013 itself. He contends that the Railton Electronics is now maintaining a proprietorship account opened on 25th July, 2013. In support of his contention, he relied upon the certificates issued by the Petitioner’s banker.

The Petitioner emphasises that the alleged transactions mentioned in the notices issued u/s 148A(b) of the Act are duly accounted for in the return of the sole proprietorship. He pointed out that there has been a scrutiny assessment in the account of the sole proprietorship firm in the name of the sole proprietor, Mr. Sanjay Gupta.

The Hon. Court, upon consideration of the above factual position, sets aside the orders dated 9th April, 2022 passed u/s 148A(d) of the Act for A.Ys. 2018-19 and 2015-16, the notices issued u/s 148 and directs the Petitioner to file supplementary replies before the Assessing Officer (AO) clearly stating that the transactions referred to in the notices issued  u/s 148A(b) of the Act have been duly accounted for in the account of the sole proprietorship firm, and have been offered to tax. Along with the replies, the Petitioner shall enclose all the relevant documents including certificates issued by Canara Bank, income tax returns, bank statements as well as the assessment orders passed in the name of a sole proprietorship for the said assessment years, within two weeks. The AO was directed to pass fresh orders u/s 148A(d) of the Act within a period of four weeks thereafter.

S. 260A – Additional grounds of appeal raised before High court – Revision order u/s 263 passed in case of dead person – Matter remanded

Bimal vs. Pala (Legal heir of Late Smt. Ranjana Pala) vs. ACIT – 26(2)
ITA No. 517 of 2018
Date of order: 16th September, 2022
Bombay High Court
[Arising from Mumbai ITAT order dated 17th March, 2017 – Bench “B” ITA No. 2735/Mum/2016 – A.Y.: 1996-97]

S. 260A – Additional grounds of appeal raised before High court – Revision order u/s  263 passed in case of dead person – Matter remanded

The appeal was filed u/s 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The  Appellant stated that one of the grounds which ought to have been taken, but was not taken before the Tribunal, was regarding the death of Ms. Ranjana Pala, on 22nd January, 2016, which was material to the case inasmuch as the order dated 16th March, 2016, came to be passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, after the death of the said assessee. It was stated that even in the present memo of appeal, this question has not been raised and, therefore, learned Counsel for the Appellant has tendered a schedule of amendment seeking to incorporate, the following:

“28AA Whether the order dated 16-03-2016 passed by the Respondent No. 2 under Section 263 of the Act in the case of “Ms. Ranjana Pala” who had passed away on 22-01-2016 was against non-existent person and hence illegal and bad in law?”

The aforesaid prayer made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant was allowed by the court. The Hon. Court observed that the assessee, Ms. Ranjana Pala, had expired on 22nd January, 2016, at Singapore. A copy of the death certifcate issued by the authorities at Singapore which was on record, confirms this fact. According to the certificate, the deceased assessee passed away on 22nd January, 2016, in the Mount Alizabeth Hospital, Singapore. It is stated that the factum of the death of the deceased assessee was brought to the notice of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, vide communication dated 7th March, 2016, which was not only acknowledged by hand receipt but also got reflected in the order dated 16th March, 2016 passed u/s 263 of the Act by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. It is thus stated that having the full knowledge about the factum of the death of the deceased assessee, the authority had proceeded to pass an order against a dead person, which was thus a nullity in law.

The Hon. Court observed that since the issue which is now sought to be raised before this Court in the appeal, was not an issue which was raised or agitated before the Tribunal, but nevertheless has a direct bearing on the controversy, therefore the Hon. Court deemed it necessary to remand the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh consideration on the above limited issue, keeping all other issues, which have been raised in the present memo of appeal, open.

Accordingly the appeal was disposed.

S. 68 – Identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions of purchases – Concurrent finding of the fact recorded by both the authorities- sales and purchase transactions, transfer pricing report at arm’s length and book results declared accepted – No substantial question of law arises for consideration

Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s Attire Designers Pvt. Ltd.
ITA 344 of 2022  
Date of order: 20th September, 2022
A.Y.: 2014-15
Delhi High Court  
[Arising from Delhi ITAT order dated
29th November, 2021 in ITA 5224/Del./2017]

S. 68 – Identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions of purchases – Concurrent finding of the fact recorded by both the authorities- sales and purchase transactions, transfer pricing report at arm’s length and book results declared accepted – No substantial question of law arises for consideration

The Assessing Officer (AO) treated the credit balance of the associate parties relating to purchase made by the assessee as non-genuine.

Before the CIT(A) the assessee furnished the  details of the payments of outstanding balance as on 31st March, 2014 along with confirmation for fair and proper disposal of the appeal. The assessee submitted details of parties as well as details of the transaction made with said parties during the Financial Year under consideration mentioned in transfer pricing report in Form 3CEB as well as transfer pricing study, which was submitted by assessee before the AO.

The CIT(A) noted that the said transactions of purchases were at arm’s length price and no adverse finding was brought on record by the AO who never doubted the purchases made by the assessee during the year which includes purchases made from sundry creditors, sale made by assessee during year and the book result declared by the assessee for the financial year under consideration.

During the appellate proceedings, the CIT(A) also observed that the sundry creditors have purchased goods during the year under consideration from different parties, and out of the said purchases, they have sold goods to the assessee company and as per general business practice, goods were purchased on credit basis and therefore, the allegation of AO that the financial statement of the sundry creditors do not support their creditworthiness, is not based on proper appreciation of the facts. The CIT(A) also perused the details of sale, purchase, trade payables and trade receivables for the financial year under consideration of the said sundry creditors and came to the conclusion that there are corresponding purchases against sales declared by them for the financial year under consideration, and there are also trade payables outstanding as on 31st March, 2014, which shows that the said companies also have trade payable against purchases of goods, therefore, the allegation made by the AO that such companies do not have creditworthiness to enter into large scale transaction of sale and purchase is factually incorrect. The CIT(A) held that once the AO has accepted sales and purchase transactions, transfer pricing report at arm’s length and book results declared by the Appellant, he is not justified in treating the credit balance of associate parties relating to sales to the assessee as non-genuine without bringing any adverse material on record. The identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions of purchases made by the assessee from sundry creditors is proved .

The ITAT upheld the findings of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue relying  on the judgment of the Delhi High  Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Ritu Anurag Aggarwal [2010] 2 taxmann.com 134 (Delhi).

The Hon. High Court observed that both the Appellate Authorities below have recorded concurrent findings of the fact on the issues.

The Hon. High Court relied on the Supreme Court decisions in the case of Ram Kumar Aggarwal & Anr. vs. Thawar Das (through LRs), (1999) 7 SCC 303, which reiterated that u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the orders passed by the Courts below is confined to hearing on substantial question of law and interference with finding of the fact is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence. Further, the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Khalsa Motor Lid & Ors., (1990) 4 SCC 659 held that the High Court was not justified in law in reversing, in second appeal, the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by both the Courts below. The Supreme Court in Hero Vinoth (Minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 also held that “in a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible.”

It has also held that there is a difference between a ‘question of law’ and a ‘substantial question of law’. Consequently, the Hon. Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal and accordingly the same was dismissed.

Reassessment — (A) Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice based on information during survey of third party that assessee beneficiary of contract with surveyed party — Reasons recorded for reopening assessment not mentioning information withheld by assessee or any new material found by assessing authority — Assessee disclosing all material facts fully and truly — Reasons cannot be improved upon or supplemented — Notice and order rejecting objections of assessee set aside

(B) Principles of natural justice — Failure to provide assessee copies of judgments relied upon by AO — Violation of principles of natural justice — Notice and order rejecting objections of assessee set aside

47 Patel Engineering Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT
[2022] 446 ITR 728 (Bom.)
A.Y.: 2012-13
Date of order: 25th January, 2022
Ss. 133A, 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — (A) Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice based on information during survey of third party that assessee beneficiary of contract with surveyed party — Reasons recorded for reopening assessment not mentioning information withheld by assessee or any new material found by assessing authority — Assessee disclosing all material facts fully and truly — Reasons cannot be improved upon or supplemented — Notice and order rejecting objections of assessee set aside

(B) Principles of natural justice — Failure to provide assessee copies of judgments relied upon by AO — Violation of principles of natural justice — Notice and order rejecting objections of assessee set aside

For the A.Y. 2012-13, in response to the notice u/s 142(1) r.w.s. 129 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee furnished the details required by the Assessing Officer which included the receipt of Rs. 14,92,47,452 from SECPL and submitted that the amount was declared as income. Thereafter, the assessment order u/s 143(3) was passed. After four years the Assessing Officer issued a notice against the assessee u/s 148 to reopen the assessment u/s 147 on the ground that according to a survey conducted u/s 133A on SECPL, the assessee had received a contract for an amount of Rs. 24,22,57,252. The objections raised by the assessee were rejected.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The reopening of assessment having been proposed after expiry of four years from the relevant A.Y. 2012-13 and since the assessment was completed u/s. 143(3) the proviso to section 147 applied. The onus was on the Department to disclose what was the material fact that the assessee had failed to disclose truly and fully. The reasons recorded for reopening did not disclose anywhere that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Assessing Officer had not even stated whether the assessee had executed the contract and received any income.

ii) The survey on SECPL had been conducted before the assessment order was passed against the assessee for the A.Y. 2012-13. Therefore, the Assessing Officer should have been aware of any such information but still chose not to raise it during the assessment proceedings and had not verified the facts with the data available with him and simply on the basis of information received from the Deputy Director had issued the notice to the assessee. Therefore the condition precedent for reopening the assessment u/s. 147 that mandated that it was exclusively the satisfaction of the assessing authority based on some direct, correct and relevant material had not been satisfied. To the reasons recorded, the Department has not annexed the information received by them. To the extent of not furnishing to the assessee the information received from the Deputy Director with the reasons recorded the action of the Department was in breach of the orders of the court in Sabh Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT [2017] 398 ITR 198 (Delhi).

iii) The reasons recorded for reopening could not be improved upon or supplemented. In the order disposing of the assessee’s objections, the Assessing Officer had relied upon various judgments of which copies were not provided nor were they brought to the notice of the assessee before the order rejecting the objections was passed so that the assessee could have suitably dealt with those judgments or orders. Therefore, there was breach of principles of natural justice by the Assessing Officer, who as a quasi-judicial authority had an obligation to adhere strictly to the principles of natural justice. He had also gone beyond the reasons recorded for reopening inasmuch as according to him no bank statements or works contract receipts were required or submitted during the original assessment proceedings based on which the actual amount and the nature and genuineness of the work done by the assessee for SECPL could have been verified.

iv) In the circumstances, the petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). (i.e., notice u/s. 148 and the order rejecting objections were quashed).”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Limitation — Law applicable — Effect of amendments with effect from 1st April, 2021 and CBDT Circular dated 11th May, 2022

46 Ajay Bhandari vs. UOI
[2022] 446 ITR 699 (All.)
A.Y.: 2014-15
Date of order: 17th May, 2022
Ss. 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Limitation — Law applicable — Effect of amendments with effect from 1st April, 2021 and CBDT Circular dated 11th May, 2022

For the A.Y. 2014-15 a notice u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued on 1st April, 2021. The recorded reasons read as under:

“I have reason to believe that an income to the tune of Rs. 2,63,324 has escaped assessment for the aforesaid year.”

The reassessment order dated 31st March, 2022 was passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act, 1961. The assessee filed writ petition and challenged the notice and the reassessment order.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i)    Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as it existed till March 31, 2021, empowers the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess or recompute the loss or depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year in the case of an assessee if he has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153. A precondition to initiate proceedings under section 147 is the issuance of notice under section 148. Thus, notice under section 148 is jurisdictional notice. Section 149 provides the time limit for issuance of notice under section 148. The time limit is provided under the unamended provisions (as existing till March 31, 2021) and the amended provisions (effective from April 1, 2021) as amended by the Finance Act, 2021. According to clauses 6.2 and 7.1 of the Board’s Circular dated May 11, 2022 ([2022] 444 ITR (St.) 43), if a case does not fall under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 149 of the Act for the assessment years 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16 (where the income of an assessee escaping assessment to tax is less than Rs.50,00,000) and notice has not been issued within limitation under the unamended provisions of section 149, then proceedings under the amended provisions cannot be initiated.

ii)    The notice u/s 148 of the Act issued on April 1, 2021 for the A.Y. 2014-15 and the notice dated January 13, 2022 u/s. 144 of the Act and the reassessment order dated January 13, 2022 u/s. 147 read with section 144B of the Act for the A.Y. 2014-15 were liable to be quashed.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Limitation — Doctrine of substantial compliance —Mere signing of notice is not sufficient — Date of issue would be date on which notice was served on assessee — Notice dated 31st March, 2018 served on assessee through e-mail on 18th April, 2018 for A.Y. 2011-12 — Notice barred by limitation — Order and notice set aside

45 Parveen Amin Bhathara vs. ITO
[2022] 446 ITR 201 (Mad.)
A.Y.: 2011-12
Date of order: 27th June, 2022
Ss. 147, 148 and 149 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Limitation — Doctrine of substantial compliance —Mere signing of notice is not sufficient — Date of issue would be date on which notice was served on assessee — Notice dated 31st March, 2018 served on assessee through e-mail on 18th April, 2018 for A.Y. 2011-12 — Notice barred by limitation — Order and notice set aside

On 18th April, 2018, the assessee writ petitioner received an e-mail from the Assessing Officer with a notice u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 31st March, 2018, proposing to reopen the assessment for the A.Y. 2011-12. The Assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice on the ground that the notice has been issued and served on 18th April, 2018, the date on which the limitation period of six years for reopening the assessment, came to an end.

The Single Judge Bench of the Madras High Court dismissed the writ petition by observing that it was sufficient if the notice u/s 148 of the Act had been signed and issued by the authority and that the delay in receiving the documents would not provide any ground for quashing the entire proceedings.

The Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)    U/s. 149 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 the issuance of notice u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment u/s. 147 is complete only when it is issued in the manner as prescribed u/s. 282 read with rule 127 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 prescribing the mode of service of notice under the Act. The signing of notice would not amount to issuance of notice as contemplated u/s 149 of the Act. The requirement of issuance of notice u/s 149 is not mere signing of the notice u/s. 148, but it has to be sent to the proper person within the end of the relevant assessment year.

ii)    The notice u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment was not sent to the assessee within the time stipulated u/s 149 and hence, the reassessment proceedings initiated u/s 147 were vitiated. The notice dated 31/03/2018 issued by the Assessing Officer was served on the assessee through e-mail, only on 18/04/2018. Though the Department produced the relevant pages of the notice server book maintained by it to show that the notice dated 31/03/2018 was within the limitation period, it only disclosed that the notice dated March 31/03/2018 was returned on 06/04/2018. The order on the writ petition and the notice issued u/s. 148 were set aside.”

Offences and prosecution — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Application for compounding of offences — Limitation — Show-cause notice issued for rejection of compounding of offences on ground of bar of limitation relying on circular issued by CBDT — Circular cannot override statutory provision — Authority to consider assessee’s application

44 G. P. Engineering Works Kachhwa vs. UOI
[2022] 446 ITR 563 (All.)
A.Y.: 1990-91
Date of order: 8th February, 2022
Ss. 276C, 277, 278B and 279(2) of ITA, 1961

Offences and prosecution — Wilful attempt to evade tax — Application for compounding of offences — Limitation — Show-cause notice issued for rejection of compounding of offences on ground of bar of limitation relying on circular issued by CBDT — Circular cannot override statutory provision — Authority to consider assessee’s application

A criminal case was filed against the assessee u/s 276C(1) read with sections 277 and 278B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground of wilful attempt to evade tax relating to the A.Y. 1990-91. The assessee filed an application for compounding of the offences before the Chief Commissioner who issued a show-cause notice for rejecting the application relying upon the Board’s Circular F. No. 285/08/2014-IT (Inv.V)/147 dated 14th June, 2019.

The Allahabad High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)    In terms of sub-section (2) of section 279 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 any offence under Chapter XXII of the Act may be compounded by the authorised officer either before or after the institution of the criminal proceedings. No limitation for submission or consideration of compounding application has been provided under sub-section (2) of section 279 of the Act. Therefore, the CBDT by a circular can neither provide limitation for the purposes of sub-section (2) nor restrict the operation of the sub-section in purported exercise of its power to issue circulars under the Explanation appended to section 279(2).

ii)    A circular is subordinate to the principal Act or Rules, and cannot override or restrict the application of specific provisions enacted by Legislature. It cannot travel beyond the scope of the powers conferred by the Act or the Rules. Circulars containing instructions or directions cannot curtail a statutory provision by prescribing a period of limitation where none has been provided by either the Act or the Rules. The authority to issue instructions or directions by the Board stems from the Explanation appended to section 279(2). The Explanation merely explains the main section and is not meant to carve out a particular exception to the contents of the main section. The object of an Explanation to a statutory provision has been elaborated by the Supreme Court.

iii)    A specific limitation has been provided by para 7(ii) of the compounding guidelines in the Board’s Circular F. No. 285/08/2014-IT (Inv.V)/147 dated June 14, 2019 in purported exercise of power under the Explanation to section 279(2). The Explanation merely enables the Board to issue instructions or directions to other Income-tax authorities for the proper composition of offences under that section. The instructions or directions may prescribe the methodology and manner of composition of offences to clarify any obscurity or vagueness in the main provisions to make it consistent with the dominant object of bringing closure to such cases which may be pending interminably in the court system. Such instructions or directions that are prescribed by the Explanation cannot take away a statutory right of an assessee or set at naught the working of the provision of compounding of offence.

iv)    On the facts and circumstances and the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 279 the compounding application of the assessee could not be rejected by the Income-tax authority concerned on the ground of delay in filing the application. It was not disputed by the respondents in the court or in the show-cause notice that the criminal case in question was still pending. The Income-tax authority was to consider the compounding application of the assessee in accordance with law.”

International transactions — Reference to TPO — (A) Limitation — Reference made to TPO beyond period of limitation — All further proceedings in furtherance of reference bad in law (B) Jurisdiction — Reference made to TPO beyond period of limitation — Participation of assessee in proceedings not a bar to challenging jurisdiction (C) Writ — Maintainability — Reference to TPO — Limitation — Question of limitation is legal plea and can be raised at any stage — Existence of alternate remedy not bar — Writ will issue

43 Virtusa Consulting Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. DRP
[2022] 446 ITR 454 (Mad.)
A.Y.: 2006-07
Date of order: 9th June, 2022
Ss. 92CA, 92CA(1) and 153(1) of ITA, 1961

International transactions — Reference to TPO — (A) Limitation — Reference made to TPO beyond period of limitation — All further proceedings in furtherance of reference bad in law (B) Jurisdiction — Reference made to TPO beyond period of limitation — Participation of assessee in proceedings not a bar to challenging jurisdiction (C) Writ — Maintainability — Reference to TPO — Limitation — Question of limitation is legal plea and can be raised at any stage — Existence of alternate remedy not bar — Writ will issue

The assessee was in the business of software development and rendered services to its wholly owned subsidiaries outside India and unrelated third party customers. For the A.Y. 2006-07, the Assessing Officer passed an assessment order dated 14th March, 2008 and refund was granted on 28th March, 2008. Subsequently, pursuant to proceedings of the Commissioner dated 25th August, 2008, the Additional Commissioner issued a notice dated 4th September, 2008 u/s 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against the assessee. The assessee furnished its books of account, including forms 3CA and 3CD in terms of section 44AB. It was found that the assessee had entered into international transactions exceeding Rs. 15 crores with its sister concern and on approval dated 18th November, 2008 u/s 92CA of the Act, the Additional Commissioner made a reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer u/s 92CA(1). The Additional Commissioner sent a communication dated 27th February, 2009 informing the assessee about the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer and requested it to furnish the annual reports for the previous three years and a copy of the computation of total income. The assessee sent a reply dated 12th May, 2009 with the documents sought for and after conducting enquiries, the Additional Commissioner passed a draft assessment order dated 31st December, 2009. Thereafter, the assessee filed its objections before the Dispute Resolution Panel and the Assessing Officer. Before the Dispute Resolution Panel, the assessee also raised an objection with regard to limitation. However, the Dispute Resolution Panel dismissed the objections by an order dated 24th September, 2010.

Challenging both the orders of the Additional Commissioner and the Dispute Resolution Panel, the assessee filed a writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge Bench of the Madras High Court holding that the Dispute Resolution Panel had rightly overruled the objections raised for the first time by the assessee regarding the limitation to proceed with the assessment. Therefore, the assessee could not challenge the jurisdiction of the Additional Commissioner’s reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer after 31st December, 2008.

The Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)    Though the provision of section 92B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not state as to when a reference is to be made u/s 92CA(1) to the Transfer Pricing Officer after an international transaction is found, section 153 would make it explicit that the reference is to be made during the course of the assessment proceedings before the expiry of the period to pass an assessment order. Thereafter, the Transfer Pricing Officer after considering the documents submitted by the assessee is to pass an order u/s 92CA(3). Section 92CA(3A) stipulates that this order has to be passed before the expiry of 60 days prior to the date on which the period of limitation u/s. 153 expires. According to section 153 no order of assessment can be passed at any time after the expiry of 21 months. Section 92CA(4) stipulates that the Assessing Officer has to pass a draft assessment order in conformity with the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer and the assessee has an option either to file acceptance of the variation of the assessment or file objections to any such variation with the Dispute Resolution Panel and also the Assessing Officer u/s 144C(2). In terms of sub-section (12), the Dispute Resolution Panel has no authority to issue any directions under sub-section (5) from the end of the month in which the draft assessment order is passed and not from the date when the assessee submits the objections. Sub-section (13) of section 144C provides that upon receipt of directions issued under sub-section (5) the Assessing Officer shall in conformity with the directions complete the assessment proceedings within one month from the end of the month in which the directions are received. Under the proviso to section 92CA(3A) if the time limit for the Transfer Pricing Officer to pass an order is less than 60 days, the remaining period shall be extended to 60 days. This implies that not only is the time frame mandatory but also the Transfer Pricing Officer has to pass an order within 60 days. Further, the extension in the proviso also automatically extends the period of assessment to 60 days under the second proviso to section 153. But for the reference u/s 92CA(1) to the Transfer Pricing Officer, the time limit for completing the assessment would only be 21 months from the end of the assessment year. It is only if a reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer has been made during the course of assessment and is pending, that the Department gets another 12 months in terms of the second proviso to section 153(1) and u/s 153(4) after amendment. Therefore, section 153(1) and its first two provisos provide that no order of assessment can be passed after 21 months and the extended period of limitation to pass an assessment order within a further period of 12 months or in other words within 33 months from the end of assessment year, applies only when a reference u/s. 92CA(1) is made during the course of assessment proceedings. The different timelines to be adhered to by the Transfer Pricing Officer, by the Assessing Officer to pass a draft order, by the assessee to file their objections, by the Dispute Resolution Panel to issue directions and by the Assessing Officer to pass the final order, would commence only on a reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer and not otherwise. The period of 33 months is to pass the final order of assessment after the directions from the Dispute Resolution Panel.

ii)    The proviso to section 153(1) inserted by amendment in Finance Act, 2006 altering the original time limit from 24 months to 21 months with effect from June 1, 2006 and the second proviso inserted by the Finance Act, 2007, extending the time for completion of assessment, when a reference has been made to the Transfer Pricing Officer, during the course of assessment proceedings have to be read in tandem and together. Section 153 was repealed and substituted with effect from June 1, 2016, where, under section 153(1) it is clearly mentioned that the period of assessment is 21 months and u/s 153(4) that in case of reference u/s 92CA(1) during the course of assessment proceedings, the period of assessment would be extended by twelve months clarifying the mischief caused on account of the interpretation adopted by the officials.

iii)    The writ petitions were maintainable and alternative remedy would not operate as a bar. The question of limitation was a legal plea which went to the root of authority or jurisdiction. There was no dispute on the facts about the date on which the reference was made or when the order was passed. The interpretation of the provision to be adjudicated is a pure question of law.

iv)    The extension had to be made before the expiry of the time limit prescribed for original assessment was applicable because the second proviso uses the words “and during the course of the proceeding for assessment”. The first two provisos to section 153(1) lay down that the time limit to pass the original assessment order is 21 months and when a reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer is made during the course of such proceedings, the time limit would be 33 months and that if no reference is made within the period provided for assessment, no reference can be made subsequently since the Assessing Officer becomes functus officio. The words used in section 153 are very clear as they lay down that “no order of assessment shall be made”. The order in the writ petition was to be set aside.

v)    Concurrence was obtained from the Commissioner before December 31, 2008 would not be of any assistance to the Department as indisputably the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer was made only on February 17, 2009. The proceedings would commence only when a reference is made to the Transfer Pricing Officer, which cannot be beyond the period provided u/s 153(1) and the first proviso thereunder. From the undisputed dates and events it was clear that not only was the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer made after the period of expiry of the period of limitation to pass assessment orders, but also that the Assessing Officer had failed to pass final assessment orders in time. The limitation to pass the original assessment order ended on December 31, 2008 being 21 months from the end of the A.Y. 2006-07, i.e., March 31, 2007. Then the last date for the Assessing Officer to pass the final assessment order would end on December 31, 2009, even considering the extension by 12 months. The order of the Dispute Resolution Panel itself was passed only on September 24, 2010 much beyond the permissible period. The Department though on the one hand contended that the reference could be made within 24 months, on the other contended that the extended period would be 9 months. If such contention was accepted, it would mean that the overall time to pass the assessment order in a case of reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer, would be 36 months and not 33 months, which was not the intention of the Legislature. The amendments brought into the Act would then turn redundant.

vi)    According to the timeline, when the time given to the Dispute Resolution Panel itself was 9 months from the date of the draft assessment order to complete the assessment and then a further time of one month to the Assessing Officer to complete the assessment from the end of the month in which the direction was received, it could not be said that the total additional time was 9 months and the provisos to section 153(1) had no connection. If the time limits provided to the Transfer Pricing Officer to pass an order and for the assessee to submit its objections in terms of section 144C(2) were also considered with the time period for the Dispute Resolution Panel and the Assessing Officer, the extended period was 12 months and not 9 months. When one proviso provides a time limit and when another proviso extends such time under certain circumstances, it cannot be held that the provisos are independent. Therefore, when the extended time provided for the Department was 12 months it could not be contended that it was only 9 months since the reference was not made in time. Since the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer had been made after the permissible period, the timeline had been missed by the Department at every stage. Therefore, as a sequitur, all further proceedings, in furtherance thereof were also bad.”

CBDT — Condonation of delay — Delay in filing application before Board — Circular dated 9th June, 2015 prescribing limitation period of six years — Cannot have retrospective effect on pending application filed prior to date of issue of circular — Order rejecting application on basis of circular set aside — Matter remanded to Board

42 R. Ramakrishnan vs. CBDT
[2022] 446 ITR 308 (Kar.)
A.Y.: 2003-04
Date of order: 7th April, 2022
S. 119(2)(b) of ITA, 1961

CBDT — Condonation of delay — Delay in filing application before Board — Circular dated 9th June, 2015 prescribing limitation period of six years — Cannot have retrospective effect on pending application filed prior to date of issue of circular — Order rejecting application on basis of circular set aside — Matter remanded to Board

The assessee filed a nil return for the A.Y. 2003-04 claiming exemption of capital gains u/s 54EC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 arising on sale of its property on 3rd August, 2002 having invested Rs. 25 lakhs in specific bonds on 5th February, 2003. The Assessing Officer was of the view that the investment should have been made on or before 3rd February, 2003 and denied the benefit of section 54EC. Thereafter, the assessee filed a revision petition u/s 264 before the Commissioner challenging the levy of tax on capital gains with a prayer to condone the delay of two days in investing Rs. 25 lakhs in bonds contending that he was in Australia at that time and accordingly, there was a short delay for advising the remittance towards the bond.

The Commissioner declined to condone the delay of two days in making the investment in specified bonds. The assessee filed an application on 24th May, 2011 before the CBDT to direct the Assessing Officer to consider the application u/s 154 and grant appropriate relief. The Board by an order dated 13th December, 2017 rejected the application. The writ petition challenging this order was dismissed by the Single Judge Bench of the Karnataka High Court mainly referring to clause 8 of the Board’s circular dated 9th June, 2015 which stated that the circular would cover all such applications and claims for condonation of delay u/s 119(2)(b) pending as on the date of issue of the circular.

The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)    The CBDT considered the application filed by the assessee u/s. 119(2)(b) on May 24, 2011 before issuance of the circular dated June 9, 2015 it would not have been rejected on the ground of delay, i. e., beyond the period of six years as specified in the Circular. No provisions of the Act and Rules prescribe the period of limitation for filing the application u/s. 119(2)(b) and it was only by virtue of such circular that the period of limitation of six years had been prescribed for the first time. Though the validity of the circular was not challenged directly by the assessee, that applicability of the circular was the main issue before the court and if the matter was perceived from the angle of delay caused in adjudicating the application filed on May 24, 2011 before the Circular dated June 9, 2015 came into force, the resultant effect would be different.

ii)    The assessee should not suffer where no default was committed by him in submitting the application u/s. 119(2)(b) on May 24, 2011, i.e., when there was no period of limitation prescribed. No application could be denied on technical grounds. The application was not disposed of within a reasonable period. The order in the writ petition was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Board for reconsideration of the application and to take an appropriate decision on the merits in accordance with law.”

Article 12 of India-USA DTAA, India-Canada DTAA and India-Mexico DTAA

10 Cadila Healthcare Ltd. vs. DCIT (Intl.Taxn) & ACIT vs. Cadila Healthcare Ltd.
[ITA No: 711 & 1140/Ahd/2019]
A.Y.: 2013-14
Date of order: 9th September, 2022

Article 12 of India-USA DTAA, India-Canada DTAA and India-Mexico DTAA –

(i) On facts, American and Canadian tax resident entities did not satisfy “make available” condition; they did not develop and transfer technical plan/design; they did not transfer ‘industrial or commercial experience’ – hence, payments were not taxable as either FTS/FIS or as royalty.

(ii) Mexican tax resident entity had provided ‘technical services’ – since India-Mexico DTAA does not incorporate “make available” clause, payments were taxable.

FACTS

The assessee is a global pharmaceutical company based in India. During the assessment year, the assessee had made payments to certain non-resident entities, comprising four entities tax residents in the USA, one entity tax resident in Canada and one entity tax resident in Mexico. The payments were made in consideration for the clinical trial services and consultancy services provided by them. The assessee did not withhold tax from the said payments.

According to the AO, the assessee was required to withhold tax u/s 195 of the Act from payments made to non-resident entities. Further, in respect of the fee paid to one entity in consideration for consultancy services, such fee was in the nature of FTS. Therefore, the AO concluded that the assessee had defaulted in its obligation to withhold tax and raised demand for tax and interest.

In appeal, CIT(Appeals) allowed relief in respect of payments made for clinical trials to entities tax resident in the USA and Canada holding that the facts did not show any intention that the payments were to “make available” technology to the assessee, which enabled it to apply the technology on its own in future. Therefore, the services did not satisfy the “make available” test under India-USA and India-Canada DTAAs. CIT (Appeals) also noted that on this same issue, ITAT Ahmedabad had decided the issue in favour of the assessee in A.Y. 2010-11.

As regards the alternate contention of the AO that, payments made to entities tax resident in USA and Canada were in the nature of Royalty, CIT(Appeals) held that it was evident from the very nature of clinical trials and testing services that such services could only be classified as a “fee for technical services” and not as “Royalty”.

In respect of payments made for the clinical trial services to the entity tax resident in Mexico, the assessee claimed benefit of exception in section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act, read with Explanation 2, relying on decision in DIT vs. Lufthansa Cargo India 60 Taxman.com 187 (Delhi), the assessee contended that since the services were both rendered as well as utilised outside India, the same were not chargeable to tax in India, and consequently, there was no withhold tax obligation vis-à-vis these payments.

Relying on decision in CIT vs. Havells India Ltd 21 Taxman.com 476 (Delhi), CIT(Appeals) held there was a distinction between the source of income, and the source of receipt, and that to fall within the said exception in section 9(1)(vii)(b), the source of income should be situated outside India. However, as the export had taken place from India, the source of income was located in India. To fall within the exception in section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act, the assessee should have utilised the services in the business carried on outside India or for making or earning income from any source outside India. In this case, the assessee had undertaken all activities related to the business in India, and had exported from India. Source of “income” cannot be said to be outside India, merely because customer was situated outside India. Payment received outside India was only a source of receipt, and not source of income, outside India. Hence, the assessee did not qualify for benefit under exception in section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act.


HELD

(i) Whether payments in consideration for “make available”1?

The Tribunal considered decision of ITAT Ahmedabad in case of the Assessee for A.Y. 2010-11 and also considered decisions in ITO vs. Cadila Healthcare Ltd. [2017] 77 taxmann.com 309 (Ahmedabad – Trib.), ITO vs. B.A. Research India (P.) Ltd. [2016] 70 taxmann.com 325 (Ahmedabad – Trib.) and ITO vs. Veeda Clinical Research 144 ITD 297 (Ahmedabad Tribunal).

The Tribunal noted that on facts, and having regard to the said decisions, the condition of “make available” under India- USA DTAA and under India-Canada DTAA was not fulfilled. Therefore, the services were not in the nature of “fee for technical services” or “fee for included services”.

(ii) Whether payments were in consideration for technical plan/design2?

The Department alternately argued that the payment was for development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design mentioned in second portion of FTS Article.

However, this contention is without any basis since there was no agreement for development or transfer of a technical plan or design. Hence, on facts, there was no scope for invoking the said provision.

(iii) Whether payments were royalty?

The department has further argued that the services may qualify as “royalty”.

In Diamond Services International (P.) Ltd. vs. UOI [2008] 169 Taxman 201 (Bombay),
Bombay High Court held that ‘royalty’ under Article 12 envisages transfer of ‘industrial or commercial experience’ from assignor to assignee for a consideration.

Payments made to non-residents by the assessee for clinical trials services did not qualify as FTS/FIS. The services also did not transfer ‘industrial or commercial experience’ from Mexican entity to the assessee.

Since the payment could not be termed as falling under any of the specific clauses of royalty under India-USA DTAA or India-Canada DTAA, on facts, the alternative argument of the Department that the services may qualify as “royalty” was not maintainable.

(iv) Payments made to Mexican tax resident entity3

Payments made by the assessee to the Mexican tax resident entity were for services which were “technical services” in terms of India-Mexico DTAA, which does not incorporate “make available” clause.

Further, as held by CIT (Appeals) in his Order, the assessee did not qualify under exception provided in section 9(1)(vii)(b) of the Act.

Therefore, the assessee was required to withhold tax from payments in respect of these services.


1 Article 12(4) of India-USA DTAA and Article 12(4) of India-Canada DTAA, respectively define FIS. Definitions under both DTAAs are similar. First part of sub-clause (b) of Article 12(4) mentions: “make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes or … …”


2 Canada DTAA mentions: “… … or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design”.

3 Article 12(3)(b) of India-Mexico DTAA mentions: “The term “fees for technical services” as used in this Article means payments of any kind, other than those mentioned in Articles 14 and 15 of this Agreement as consideration for managerial or technical or consultancy services, including the provision of services of technical or other personnel.”. Article 12(2) allocates taxing rights upto 10% tax to the source State.

Onerous Contracts – Amendments to Ind AS 37

This article explains the recent amendment to Ind AS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets with respect to the measurement of onerous contracts.

An onerous contract is defined under paragraph 10 of Ind AS 37 as “a contract in which the unavoidable costs of meeting the obligations under the contract exceed the economic benefits expected to be received under it.”

Paragraph 68 further elaborates, “The unavoidable costs under a contract reflect the least net cost of exiting from the contract, which is the lower of the cost of fulfilling it and any compensation or penalties arising from failure to fulfil it.”

The example below explains the above requirements.

EXAMPLE – Measurement of Onerous Contract

Let’s say, the revenue on a contract is Rs. 100, cost of the contract is Rs. 120, and cost of exiting or cancelling the contract is a penalty of Rs. 10. In this case, if the contract is executed, the cost of fulfilling the contract is Rs. 20, but if the contract is cancelled, the cost is Rs. 10. Therefore, a provision for an onerous contract of Rs. 10 is made, being lesser of Rs .20 and Rs. 10. On the other hand, if the cost of the contract is Rs. 120, and cost of exiting or cancelling the contract is a penalty of Rs. 30, a provision of Rs. 20 is made, being lesser of Rs. 20 and Rs. 30.

Prior to the amendment, there was no clarity on how the cost of fulfilling the contract would be determined. Paragraph 68A was added to Ind AS 37 and paragraph 69 was modified to provide that clarity.

Amendment vide MCA Notification No. G.S.R 255 (E) dated 23rd March, 2022

68A The cost of fulfilling a contract comprises the costs that relate directly to the contract. Costs that relate directly to a contract consist of both:

a. the incremental costs of fulfilling that contract — for example, direct labour and materials; and

b. an allocation of other costs that relate directly to fulfilling contracts – for example, an allocation of the depreciation charge for an item of property, plant and equipment used in fulfilling that contract among others.

Amendment

69 Before a separate provision for an onerous contract is established, an entity recognises any impairment loss that has occurred on assets used in fulfilling the contract.

The Amendment shall bring the much-needed uniformity and clarity while assessing the cost of fulfilling a contract and the allocation of common cost, e.g., management and supervision time. Besides, it will also clarify that, before an onerous contract provision is established, an entity should recognise any impairment loss on the asset used to fulfil the contract. This will apply even when the asset is not dedicated exclusively to that contract, but is used across several contracts.

Let us understand with an example, how this amendment will help in uniformity of practice while calculating cost to fulfil a contract:

Example
– Measurement of onerous contract provision under pre-revised Ind AS 37

Entity A (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
equipment is hired)

 

Entity B (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
own asset is

used)

 

Entity C (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
own asset is used)

 

 

R

 

R

 

R

Materials

100

Materials

100

Materials

100

Direct variable cost

50

Direct variable cost

50

Direct variable cost

50

Equipment

hiring cost

30

Use of own

equipment*

–

Use of own

equipment**

25

Total

180

Total

150

Total

175

Contract

revenue

150

Contract

revenue

150

Contract

revenue

150

Onerous

contract

provision

30

Onerous

contract

provision

–

Onerous

contract

provision

25

* same equipment is used in other contracts as well
and
depreciation has not been considered by
the Entity for cost estimate

**same equipment is used in other contracts as well
and
depreciation has been considered by
the Entity for cost estimate

As can be seen from the above example, in the pre-revised Ind AS 37, the difference in practices yielded different results, when an entity used third party equipment as against its own equipment. Revised Ind AS 37, will require common costs such as the depreciation cost to be allocated for determining the cost. This will ensure that the onerous contract provision considers all costs when determining onerous contract provision. Additionally, in pre-revised Ind AS 37, entities that used own equipment, could establish onerous provisions differently, depending on whether or not they allocated depreciation to the contract. Under revised Ind AS 37, it is mandatory to allocate all common costs when determining onerous contract provision. The above example under pre-revised Ind AS 37 will be recast as follows under revised Ind AS 37.

Example
– Measurement of onerous contract provision under revised Ind AS 37

Entity A (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
equipment is hired)

 

Entity B (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
own asset is

used)

 

Entity C (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
own asset is used)

 

 

R

 

R

 

R

Materials

100

Materials

100

Materials

100

Direct variable cost

50

Direct variable cost

50

Direct variable cost

50

Equipment

hiring cost

30

Use of own

equipment*

25

Use of own

equipment*

25

Total

180

Total

175

Total

175

Contract

revenue

150

Contract

revenue

150

Contract

revenue

150

Onerous

contract

provision

30

Onerous

contract

provision

25

Onerous

contract

provision

25

* same equipment is used in other contract as well
and
depreciation has been considered by
the Entity for cost estimate as required under revised paragraph 68A of Ind
AS 37

An entity shall apply the amendments for annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1st April 2022. An entity shall apply those amendments to contracts for which it has not yet fulfilled all its obligations at the beginning of the annual reporting period in which it first applies the amendments (the date of initial application). The entity shall not restate comparative information. Instead, the entity shall recognise the cumulative effect of initially applying the amendments as an adjustment to the opening balance of retained earnings or other component of equity, as appropriate, at the date of initial application.

Retention in Escrow Account – Liability to Capital Gains

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
In most merger and acquisition transactions involving sale of a business or controlling interest in a company, a certain part of the sale consideration is not directly paid to the seller but is kept aside to meet certain contingencies which may arise in the next few years, such as contingent liabilities. This amount is retained in an escrow account with an escrow agent, with instructions as to how the amount is to be utilized and paid out to the seller, depending upon the happening of certain events. Similar contingent payments may prevail in ordinary non-merger cases, too.

An Escrow Arrangement is a monetary instrument whereby a third-party, i.e. an Escrow Agent, holds liquid assets for the benefit of two parties who have entered into an exchange/transaction, and disburses the liquid assets upon the fulfilment of a specific set of obligations on the part of both the parties under a contract i.e. on happening or non-happening of the contingent event.
 
The issue has arisen before the courts whether, in a situation where the monies kept in escrow are not released to the seller, pending the contingency, at all or released in a year subsequent to the year of transfer of the capital asset, the amount until certain obligations or conditions are fulfilled, would form a part of the consideration accruing or arising to the seller on transfer of the capital asset in the year of transfer of the asset for the purposes of computing the capital gains on transfer of the asset. While the Madras High Court has held that such an amount, so held in escrow, forms a part of the sale consideration for computing the capital gains; the Bombay High Court has held that such an amount cannot be included in the full value of consideration for computing the capital gains in the year of transfer of the capital asset.

CARBORUNDUM UNIVERSAL’S CASE

The issue first came up for the Madras High Court in the case of Carborundum Universal Ltd vs. ACIT 283 Taxmann 312.

In this case, the assessee sold an Electrocast Refractories Plant on a slump sale basis to another company for a total consideration of Rs. 31.14 crore. Out of the total consideration, an amount of Rs. 3.25 crore was deposited in an escrow account by the purchaser to meet any contingent liabilities. The assessee disclosed a long-term capital gain of Rs. 23.58 crore, taking the sale consideration at Rs. 27.89 crore instead of Rs. 31.14 crore.
 
The Assessing Officer noted that while it had sold the plant for a total sale consideration of Rs. 31.14 crore, it had considered only Rs. 27.89 crore as the consideration for computation of long-term capital gain and asked the assessee to show cause as to why Rs. 31.14 crore should not be considered for computation of long-term capital gains. The assessee explained that the difference between the consideration taken for computation of capital gains and that for which the plant was sold was an account of the fact that an amount of Rs. 3.25 crore was kept in an escrow account to meet any contingent liabilities.

The Assessing Officer recomputed the capital gains taking the consideration as Rs. 31.14 crore, on the grounds that the amount of Rs. 3.25 crore kept in escrow account would only constitute an application of income, and that the full consideration of Rs. 31.14 crore had accrued to the assessee immediately on the execution of the agreement for sale.

In first appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) noted that the amount in the escrow account had been kept by the purchaser to indemnify against breach of warranty or other losses or on account of further litigation as a result of non-compliance to the conditions of the agreement by the assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) therefore was of the view that the sum retained in the escrow account had not accrued to the assessee in the year under consideration. He therefore held that amount of Rs. 3.25 crore kept in escrow account had neither been received or accrued by/to the assessee during the year, and since the said amount had been subsequently received by the assessee after the stipulated period of agreement, it had been offered to tax by the assessee under the head capital gains in the year of its receipt. Therefore, holding that the Assessing Officer was not justified in taxing the amount in the year under consideration, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 3.25 crore.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that the amount kept in escrow account represented application of income and keeping the amount in escrow account was only a formality, as the entire amount of Rs. 3.25 crore had been received without any deduction towards claims/warranties, and had been offered to tax in a subsequent year.

The Tribunal, after examining the Business Sale Agreement, held that, the agreement had given legally enforceable rights to the parties with respect to the transfer of undertaking, the assessee had a right to receive the lump-sum consideration upon effecting the sale in the previous year, and there was effective conveyance of the capital asset to the transferee. The Tribunal further noted that the monies kept in the escrow account were for meeting claims that may arise on a future date, and that the interest which accrued on the sums retained in the escrow account had been agreed to be belonging to the seller, i.e., the assessee, and had to be paid to the assessee as per the instructions in the escrow account. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the assessee always had a right to receive the sums kept in the escrow account. Though they were to be quantified after a specified period, they did not change the agreed lump-sum sale consideration finalized based on the agreement between the parties. Therefore, the quantification of deductions to be made from the sums lying in the escrow account would not postpone the charge of such income which was deemed to be taxed in the year of transfer.

The Tribunal rejected the argument of the assessee that the entire sale consideration was not received during the relevant year and could not be deemed as income of that year, holding that it was sufficient if, in the relevant year, profits had risen out of sale of capital assets, i.e. when the assessee had a right to receive the profits in the year under consideration, it would attract liability to capital gains tax. According to the Tribunal, it was not necessary that the whole amount of lump-sum consideration should have been received by the assessee in the previous year, and whatever the parties did subsequent to that year would have no bearing on the liability to tax as deemed income of the year under consideration. Reliance was placed by the Tribunal on the Madras High Court decision in the case of TV Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd vs. CIT 37 ITR 26, while upholding the order of the Assessing Officer.

Before the Madras High Court, on behalf of the assessee, attention was drawn to the Business Sale Agreement, and in particular, covenant No. 14 dealing with indemnities for other losses and covenant No. 15 dealing with retention sum for indemnities. The attention of the Court was also drawn to a second supplementary agrement where there was a reference to a charge of theft of electricity and demand raised by the State Electricity Board from the purchaser of the asset. These facts demonstrated that the intention behind retention of a certain sum in escrow account was to meet liabilities which may be fastened on to the purchaser on conclusion of the sale transaction.

On behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the following decisions:

•    The Bombay High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Hemal Raju Shete 239 Taxman 176, which was a case where certain amounts were set apart to meet contingent liabilities, and it was held that this amount was neither received nor accrued in favour of the assessee.

•    The Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd 161 ITR 524, where a similar view was taken.

•    The Madras High Court decision in the case of PPN Power Generating Co (P) Ltd vs. CIT 275 Taxman 143 in support of the alternative submission that in the subsequent year the amount had been offered for taxation.

•    The Gujarat High Court decision in the case of Anup Engineering Ltd vs. CIT 247 ITR 457.

•    Cases of CIT vs. Ignifluid Boilers (I) Ltd 283 ITR 295 (Mad), CIT vs. Associated Cables (P) Ltd 286 ITR 596 (Bom), DIT(IT) vs. Ballast Nedam International 215 Taxman 254 (Guj), and Amarshiv Construction (P) Ltd vs. Dy CIT 367 ITR 659 (Guj), in the context of treatment of retention money withheld by the contractee.

On behalf of the Revenue, before the Madras High Court, it was argued that the Tribunal order was well considered and the factual aspects thoroughly analyzed. It was clearly brought out by the Tribunal on the facts that the retention money kept in the escrow account had accrued in favour of the assessee in the year under consideration. It was pointed out that the entire amount of Rs. 3.25 crore retained in the escrow account had been received by the assessee and offered for taxation in a subsequent year, with no deduction towards claims/warranties from the amount kept in escrow account. Attention was also drawn to the provisions of section 48, with the submission that if either the full value of the consideration had been received by the assessee during the year or it had accrued, that alone would be sufficient, and the subsequent act of the assessee and the purchaser by creating an escrow account would not change the character of receipt of the consideration.

Referring to the various clauses of the Business Sale Agreement, it was submitted that the facts clearly demonstrated that the amount retained in the escrow account, which was a subsequent arrangement between the parties, would have no impact for the purpose of computation of capital gains on the total sale consideration fixed under the agreement. On behalf of the Revenue, reliance was placed on the following decisions:

•    The Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Attilli N Rao 252 ITR 880 in the context of full price realised for the purpose of computation of capital gains.

•    CIT vs. N M A Mohammed Haniffa 247 ITR 66 (Mad).

•    CIT vs. George Henderson and Co Ltd 66 ITR 622 (SC).

•    CIT vs. Smt Nilofer I Singh 309 ITR 233 (Del).

•    Smt D Zeenath vs. ITO 413 ITR 258 (Mad).

The decisions relied upon by the Revenue were rebutted by the assessee’s counsel, that all those were cases relating to mortgage, and that the agreement between the assessee and the purchaser clearly showed that the retention money was neither received nor accrued in favour of the assessee during the relevant year.

The Madras High Court examined the provisions of the Business Sale Agreement and noted that the retention amount had been retained for the purpose of ensuring that sufficient funds would be available to indemnify the purchaser against any damages or losses arising from indemnification for breach of warranty, indemnification for other losses, unpaid accounts receivables, and other obligations to pay or reimburse the purchaser as provided under the agreement. It noted that admittedly, no indemnification had to be given under either of the four heads, and the entire amount was received by the assessee without any deduction and was offered for taxation by the assessee in the subsequent year. The High Court noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had not specifically examined as to whether the entire amount of Rs. 3.25 crore had been received by the assessee without any deduction and offered for taxation, but had solely proceeded on the basis that the escrow account had been opened and amount retained as retention money to be utilized by the purchaser for indemnification or breach of warranty for any other losses. On this basis, the Commissioner (Appeals) had concluded that the retention sum retained in the escrow account had not accrued to the assessee during the relevant year.

According to the Madras High Court, the Terms and Conditions of the Business Sale Agreement were vivid and clear, the total sale consideration having been clearly mentioned. After fixing the full and final sale consideration, the parties mutually agreed to retain a specified quantum of money in an escrow account to meet any one of the exigencies as mentioned in the agreement. Therefore, according to the High Court, for all purposes, the entire sale consideration had accrued in favour of the assessee during the year under consideration. Possession of the asset was also handed over by the assessee. Besides, no deductions were made from the escrow account and the entire amount was received by the assessee and offered to tax.

According to the Madras High Court, the purchaser, retaining a particular amount of money in the escrow account could not take away the amount from the purview of full consideration received or accruing in favour of the assessee for the purpose of computation of capital gains u/s 48. Besides the assessee had received the entire amount of Rs. 3.25 crore without any deduction. The right of the assessee over the amount retained in the escrow account had not been disputed. The Madras High Court observed that assuming certain payoffs were to be made from the retention money, that would not in any manner alter the full and total consideration received by the assessee pursuant to the business sale agreement. Given the factual position, according to the Madras High Court, undoubtedly the entire sale consideration had accrued in favour of the assessee during the relevant assessment year and, assuming that certain payment had been made from the amount retained in the escrow account, it would not change or in any manner reduce the sale consideration.

The Madras High Court therefore upheld the order of the Tribunal, holding the assessee liable to capital gains tax during the relevant year on the entire sale consideration as per the agreement.

DINESH VAZIRANI’S CASE

The issue again recently came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of Dinesh Vazirani vs. Pr CIT 445 ITR 110.

In this case, the assessee, who was a promoter of a company, agreed to sell shares of the company held by him along with other promoters for a total consideration of Rs. 155 crore. The Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) provided for specific promoter indemnification obligations. To meet such promoter indemnification obligations, the SPA provided that out of the sale consideration of Rs. 155 crore, Rs. 30 crore would be kept in escrow. If there was no liability as contemplated under the specific promoter indemnification obligations within a particular period, the amount of Rs. 30 crore would be released by the escrow agent to the seller promoters. A separate escrow agreement was entered into between the sellers, the buyers and the escrow agent.

The assessee filed his return of income in July, 2011 by computing capital gains on his proportion of the total sale consideration of Rs. 155 crore, including the amount kept in escrow, which had not been paid out but was still parked in the escrow account till the time the return was filed. The assessment was selected for scrutiny, and an assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) on 15th January, 2014 accepting the returned income.

Subsequent to the passing of such assessment order, certain statutory and other liabilities arose in the company amounting to Rs. 9.17 crore relatable to the period prior to the sale of the shares. This amount of Rs. 9.17 crore was withdrawn by the company from the escrow account, and therefore the assessee received a lesser amount from the escrow account.

The assessee thereafter filed a revision petition u/s 264 with the Commissioner, stating that the assessment had already been completed taxing the capital gains at higher amount on the basis of sale consideration of Rs. 155 crore without reducing the consideration by Rs. 9.17 crore. It was claimed that since the amount of Rs. 9.17 crore had been withdrawn by the company from the escrow account, what the assessee received was lesser than that mentioned in the return of income, and therefore the capital gain needed to be recomputed by reducing the proportionate amount deducted from the escrow account. It was pointed out that since the withdrawal from the escrow account happened after the completion of assessment proceedings, it was not possible for the assessee to make such a claim before the Assessing Officer or file a revised return. The assessee therefore requested the Commissioner to reduce the long-term capital gains by the proportionate amount withdrawn by the company from the escrow account of Rs. 9.17 crore.

The Commissioner rejected the revision petition on the ground that, from the sale price as specified in the agreement, only cost of acquisition, cost of improvement or expenditure incurred exclusively in connection with the transfer could be reduced in computing the capital gains, and that the agreement between the seller and buyer for meeting certain contingent liability which may arise subsequent to the transfer could not be considered for reduction from the consideration. The Commissioner further held that in the absence of a specific provision by which an assessee could reduce the returned income filed by him voluntarily, the same could not be permitted indirectly by resorting to provisions of section 264. The Commissioner relied on the proviso to section 240, which stated that if an assessment was annulled, the refund would not be granted to the extent of tax paid on the returned income. According to the Commissioner, this showed that the income returned by an assessee was sacrosanct and could not be disturbed, and even an annulment of the assessment would not impact the suo moto tax paid on the returned income. The Commissioner further was of the view that the contingent liability paid out of escrow account did not have the effect of reducing the amount receivable by the promoters as per the agreement.

The assessee filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court against such order of the Commissioner rejecting the revision petition.

The Bombay High Court held that the order passed by the Commissioner was not correct and quashed the order. It observed that the Commissioner had failed to understand that the amount of Rs. 9.17 crore was neither received by the promoters nor accrued to the promoters, as this amount was transferred directly to the escrow account and was withdrawn from the escrow account. In the view of the High Court, when the amount had not been received by or accrued to the promoters, it could not be taken as the full value of consideration in computing capital gains from the transfer of shares of the company.

The Bombay High Court observed that the Commissioner had not understood the true intent and content of the SPA, and not appreciated that the purchase price as defined in the agreement was not an absolute amount, as it was subject to certain liabilities which might arise to the promoters on account of certain subsequent events. According to the Bombay High Court, the full value of consideration for computing capital gains would be the amount ultimately received by the promoters after the adjustments on account of the liabilities from the escrow account as mentioned in the agreement.

The Bombay High Court referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co 46 ITR 144, where the Supreme Court had held that income or gain is chargeable to tax on the basis of the real income earned by an assessee, unless specific provisions provide to the contrary. The Bombay High Court noted that in the case before it, the real income (capital gain) would be computed only by taking into account the real sale consideration, i.e., sale consideration after reducing the amount withdrawn from the escrow account.

The Bombay High Court observed that the Commissioner had proceeded on an erroneous understanding that the arrangement between the seller and buyer which resulted in some contingent liability that arose subsequent to the transfer could not be reduced from the sale consideration as per section 48. As per the High Court, the liability was contemplated in the SPA itself, and had to be taken into account to determine the full value of consideration. If the sale consideration specified in the agreement was along with certain liability, then the value of consideration for the purpose of computing capital gains u/s 48 was the consideration specified in the agreement as reduced by the liability. In the view of the High Court, it was incorrect to say that the subsequent contingent liability did not come within any of the items of reduction, because the full value of the consideration u/s 48 would be the amount arrived at after reducing the liabilities from the purchase price mentioned in the agreement. Even if the contingent liability was to be regarded as a subsequent event, then also, it ought to be taken into consideration in determining the capital gain chargeable u/s 45.

The Bombay High Court expressed its disagreement with the Commissioner on his statement that the contingent liability paid out of escrow account did not affect the amount receivable as per the agreement for the purposes of computing capital gains u/s 48. As per the High Court, the Commissioner failed to understand or appreciate that the promoters had received only the net amount of Rs. 145.83 crore, i.e., Rs. 155 crore less Rs. 9.17 crore, and that such reduced amount should be taken as full value of consideration for computing capital gains u/s 48.

The Bombay High Court also rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the assessee’s returned income could not be reduced by filing a revision petition u/s 264. According to the High Court, section 264 had been introduced to factor in such situation as the assessee’s case, because if income did not result at all, there could not be a tax, even though in bookkeeping, an entry was made for hypothetical income which did not materialise. Section 264 did not restrict the scope of power of the Commissioner to restrict a relief to assessee only up to the returned income. Where the income can be said not to have resulted at all, there was obviously neither accrual nor receipt of income, even though an entry may have been made in the books and account. Therefore, the Commissioner ought to have directed the Assessing Officer to recompute the income as per the provisions of the Act, irrespective of whether the computation resulted in income being less than the returned income. The Bombay High Court stated that it was the obligation of the Revenue to tax an assessee on the income chargeable to tax under the Act, and if higher income was offered to tax, then it was the duty of the Revenue to compute the correct income and grant the refund of taxes erroneously paid by an assessee.

The Bombay High Court therefore held that the capital gain was to be computed only on the net amount actually received by the assessee, and that he was entitled to refund of the excess taxes paid by him on the returned capital gains.

OBSERVATIONS

Section 45(1) provides that any capital gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall be chargeable to tax under the head “Capital Gains” and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place. Undoubtedly, in both these cases, discussed herein, there was no dispute about the year of transfer or the amount of consideration. The consideration had been agreed upon, and the payment was made by the purchaser. The issue was really whether the amount retained with the escrow agent was retained on behalf of the seller, or was consideration withheld on behalf of the purchaser, and whether the amount so kept in escrow could be reduced from the full value of consideration and the taxable capital gains.
 
While the Madras High Court has taken the view that the amount retained in the escrow account was received by and accrued to the assessee, the Bombay High Court has taken the view that such amount in escrow cannot be said to have been received by or accrued to the assessee. To understand the tax effect of an escrow arrangement, it is necessary to understand the legal implications of such an arrangement.

The Bombay High Court, in the case of Hira Mistan vs. Rustom Jamshedji Noble & Others 2000 (1) BomCR 716, has observed:

“An escrow has been held to be a document deposited with the third person to be delivered to the person purporting to be benefited by it upon the performance of some condition, the fulfillment of which is only to bring the contract into existence… Escrow has also been explained as an intended Deed after sealing and any signature required for execution as a deed, be delivered as an escrow, that is as a simple writing which is not to become the deed of the party expressed to be bound by it until some condition has been performed. Escrow has also been defined to mean that where an instrument is delivered to take effect on the happening of a specified event or upon condition that it is not to be operative until some condition is performed then pending the happening of that event or the performance of the condition the instrument is called an escrow.”

The Bombay High Court, in Jeweltouch (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Naheed Hafeez Quraishi And Ors 2008 (3) BomCR 217, has observed:

“When parties to an agreement or the executants of a document place the agreement or, as the case may be, the document in escrow, parties intend that pending the fulfillment of certain conditions which they stipulate, the document will be held in custody by the person with whom it is placed. Notwithstanding the execution of the agreement or the execution of the document, the act of placing the instrument in escrow evinces an intent that the document would continue to lie in escrow until a condition which is precedent to the enforceability of the document comes to exist. The instrument becomes valid and enforceable in law only upon the due fulfillment of a prerequisite and often the parties may stipulate the due satisfaction of a named person on the fulfillment of the condition. An Escrow agent may be appointed by the parties as the person who will determine whether a promise or condition has been fulfilled so as to warrant the release of the document from escrow. In Wharton’s Law Lexicon, the effect of an escrow is stated thus: Escrow, a writing under seal delivered to a third person, to be delivered by him to the person whom it purports to benefit upon some condition. Upon the performance of the condition it becomes an absolute deed; but if the condition be not performed, it never becomes a deed. It is not delivered as a deed, but as an escrow, i.e. a scrowl, or writing which is not to take effect as a deed till the condition be performed.”

In Halsbury the effect of the delivery of a document as escrow is explained thus:

“1334. Effect of delivery as escrow. When a sealed writing is delivered as an escrow it cannot take effect as a deed pending the performance of the condition subject to which it was so delivered, and if that condition is not performed the writing remains entirely inoperative. If, therefore, a sealed writing delivered as an escrow comes, pending the performance of the condition and without the consent, fault, or negligence of the party who so delivered it, into the possession of the party intended to benefit, it has no effect either in his hands or in the hands of any purchaser from him; for until fulfillment of the condition it is not, and never has been, the deed of the party who so delivered it. When a sealed writing has been delivered as an escrow to await the performance of some condition, it takes effect as a deed (without any further delivery) immediately the condition is fulfilled, and the rule is that its delivery as a deed will, if necessary, relate back to the time of its delivery as an escrow; but the relation back does not have the effect of validating a notice to quit given at a time when the fee simple was not vested in the person giving it.”

While these views are in the context of a document placed in escrow, the views might help to understand the impact of money placed in escrow also and may impact the final computation of capital gains until such time consideration payable attains finality based on the fulfillment of the conditions of the escrow . However, once the conditions are fulfilled, the payment would relate back to the date when the payment was deposited with the escrow agent. In substance therefore, the escrow agent is holding the amount on behalf of the seller, but the funds are released only after fulfilment of the conditions of escrow.

If one examines the facts of the two cases discussed, in the case before the Madras High Court, there was no deduction or reduction from the amount placed in escrow, and therefore the question of amendment of the consideration did not arise at all. Since capital gains is chargeable in the year of transfer, the Madras High Court held that the entire capital gain, including amount placed in escrow was taxable in that year itself.

The facts before the Bombay High Court were that there was actually a deduction from the amount placed in escrow, and the amount of consideration therefore underwent a change. The amount withdrawn from the escrow account was ultimately never received as income by the seller as the amount was returned to the buyer. The issue before the Bombay High Court was whether a revision of the assessment order was possible in view of the facts, which arose due to subsequent events impacting the taxable capital gains. It was in that context that the High Court took the view that the real income had to be considered, and not a notional income.

Viewed in this light, there is no conflict between the decisions of the two Courts. Both have rightly decided the cases before them on the merits of the cases before them. In one case, the fact was that the amount eventually was paid in full to the seller as was agreed while in the other case, a part of the agreed consideration, though paid, was returned to the buyer. Therefore, deferment of the liability to capital gains tax was not intended nor was it suggested by the Bombay High Court, and what was suggested was the downward revision of the consideration that was offered for taxation.

Therefore, to take the view that the amount placed in escrow should be taxable if and only when released from escrow on fulfillment of the conditions does not appear to be the attractive position in law.

The moot question that arises in such circumstances is as to what should be the manner of correction of the capital gains offered for taxation when the consideration so offered subsequently undergoes a change, as per the conditions provided in the sale agreement itself. The assessment of the capital gains legally cannot be held back, as that would take away the time bound finality of an assessment. There is presently no provision in law that permits the deferment of taxation to the later year on receipt of the amount released from the escrow account. No transfer in law can be said to have taken place in such later year, and the charge of capital gains would fail in that later year for want of transfer required for application of s. 45.

The only possibility therefore is that while the income be offered in the year of transfer based on the agreed consideration, without factoring in the events subsequent to the filing of the return, which have modified the actual consideration, the assessee can, as per the law applicable today, only take recourse to the existing provisions for filing a revised return (which time is generally inadequate after the reduced time limits),or for filing a revision petition with the Commissioner u/s 264, which time is also inadequate in many cases to revise the claim.

It is therefore essential that the law take cognizance of the difficulty arising on account of the subsequent revision of the consideration being redefined due to subsequent events by permitting rectification, revision or fresh claim without affecting the primary liability of offering the full value of consideration. This may be made possible by amending section 155 to permit rectification, by adding to the many existing situations therein, requiring the assessee to demonstrate the contingency actually happened, resulting in amendment of the consideration.

S. 271(1)(c) – The Assessee had wrongly claimed a long-term capital loss in respect of a property which had been gifted by him to his son. Since the amount of capital loss had duly been disclosed in the computation of income and the Assessee had also accepted at the time of assessment proceedings it had considered gift made to son as a transfer by mistake, and there was no concealment of any material fact by the Assessee and thus, levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) was not justified.

33 Pawan Garg vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
[2022] 94 ITR(T) 159 (Chandigarh -Trib.)
ITA No.: 1475(CHD) of 2018
A.Y.: 2014-15
Date of order: 17th January, 2022

S. 271(1)(c) – The Assessee had wrongly claimed a long-term capital loss in respect of a property which had been gifted by him to his son. Since the amount of capital loss had duly been disclosed in the computation of income and the Assessee had also accepted at the time of assessment proceedings it had considered gift made to son as a transfer by mistake, and there was no concealment of any material fact by the Assessee and thus, levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) was not justified.

FACTS

The Assessee is a partner in a firm engaged in the dyeing and finishing of textile yarn. The return of income was filed declaring an income of Rs. 8,11,800. The Assessee had claimed Long Term Capital Loss at 20 per cent amounting to Rs. 7,14,554 in respect of a property gifted by him to his son Shri Akhilesh Garg on 20th July, 2013. The Assessee was asked by the Assessing Officer to explain as to why this loss, which had wrongly been claimed, may not be disallowed. In response, the Assessee accepted that there was a mistake due to some typographical error and, therefore, the amount was added to the income of the Assessee. Subsequently, the impugned penalty was imposed on the said addition.

Aggrieved, the Assessee filed an appeal challenging the levy of penalty before the CIT(A). However, the appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved, the Assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The Assessee submitted that no penalty was imposable as he had only made a wrong claim and not a false claim inasmuch as all the facts were before the Assessing Officer at the time of assessment proceedings, and for the reason that all the figures were duly reflected in the computation of income. It was also submitted that the mistake had occurred due to some error at the end of the Chartered Accountant who had filed the return of income and that the Assessee should not be burdened with the penalty as it was a genuine mistake.

The ITAT observed that the mistake was noticed by the Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings, and on being confronted on the issue, the Assessee surrendered the Long Term Capital Loss. It also observed that the amount of capital loss has been duly mentioned in the computation of income. Therefore, it finds that there is no concealment of any material fact by the Assessee. It can be said that the claim made with respect to the Long Term Capital Loss was an incorrect claim or a wrong claim but it was not a false claim by any measure inasmuch as there was only a mistake in the legal sense that the gift made by the Assessee to the son was considered as a transfer in the computation of income and the resultant figure was shown as a capital loss. It was also a fact on record that the Assessee had accepted the same at the time of assessment proceedings.

The ITAT held that it is not a case where the particulars of income in relation to which the penalty has been levied were either incorrect or were concealed. The amount of capital loss has duly been disclosed in the computation of income and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of the Assessee attempting to make a false claim. The ITAT held that it was a bonafide mistake on the part of the Assessee and it would not attract levy of penalty as all the particulars of income were duly disclosed. The appeal of the Assessee was allowed.
 
The ITAT placed reliance on the following decisions while deciding the matter:

1. CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd.  [2012] 322 ITR 158
    
2. Price Waterhouse Coopers Pvt. Ltd vs. CIT  [2011] 348 ITR 306.

S. 36(1)(iii) – Where interest free funds had been lent by the Assessee to its wholly owned subsidiary for business, no disallowance of interest will be made u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

32 Moonrock Hospitality (P.) Ltd vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
[2022] 94 ITR(T) 185 (Delhi – Trib.)
ITA No.: 5895 (Delhi) of 2019
A.Y.: 2016-17
Date of order: 22nd September, 2021

S. 36(1)(iii) – Where interest free funds had been lent by the Assessee to its wholly owned subsidiary for business, no disallowance of interest will be made u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

FACTS

The Assessee company had investments in wholly owned subsidiaries, and had also advanced loans to these companies out of borrowed funds. During the A.Y., the Asssessee company had advanced an interest free loan to one of its wholly owned subsidiaries. Based on the same, the Assessee was asked to explain as to why no disallowance of interest expenses should be made as per section 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

The Assessee furnished an explanation stating that the said funds were advanced for the purpose of business. Not satisfied with the same, the Assessing Officer contended that the said arrangement was a diversion of interest bearing funds towards interest free advances to related parties. A disallowance of interest at 9 per cent (being the rate of interest on loans taken by the Assessee) on such interest free deposits was made u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the Assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), however, the appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The Assessee submitted that the said loans had been advanced to its wholly owned subsidiary for business. A reference was drawn to the Object Clause of the Memorandum of Association of the Assessee wherein the object was to establish or promote or concur in establishing or promote any company for the purpose of acquiring all or any of the properties, rights and liabilities of such an entity.

Reliance was placed on the ruling of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Tulip Star Hotels Ltd. [2011] 16 taxmann.com 335/[2012] 204 Taxman 11 (Mag.)/[2011] 338 ITR 482, wherein it was held that where an Assessee engaged in the business of hotels, an advanced loan to its subsidiary to gain control over other hotel, interest paid on borrowed capital was allowable u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act

Further, reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court ruling in Hero Cycles (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT (Central) [2015] 63 taxmann.com 308/[2016] 236 Taxman 447/[2015] 379 ITR 347, wherein it was decided that once a nexus between expenditure and purpose of business is established, the Revenue cannot step into the shoes of the businessman to decide how much is reasonable expenditure having regard to circumstances of case.

The ITAT considered the above decisions and concurred with the view of the Assessee company stating that where interest free advances made to a wholly owned subsidiary, no disallowance of interest paid on borrowed fund could be made. Further the ITAT also observed that once a nexus between the expenditure and the business of the subsidiary is established, no disallowance of interest paid on borrowed funds could be made.

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the Assessee and deleted the disallowance of interest u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

Addition made due to wrong reporting in return of income deleted in an appeal against rectification order. Revised return held not necessary.

31 Heidrick and Struggles Inc. vs. DCIT
TS-679-ITAT-2022 (DEL.)
A.Y.: 2018-19
Date of order: 26th August, 2022
Sections: 139(5), 154

Addition made due to wrong reporting in return of income deleted in an appeal against rectification order. Revised return held not necessary.

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of USA, filed its return of income declaring total income of Rs. 23,60,54,860 and claiming a refund of Rs. 53,56,620. The return of income was processed by CPC, vide order dated 14th June, 2019, and a demand of Rs. 80,58,000 was raised for the reason that service income is taxable at 40 per cent plus applicable surcharge and cess and consequential interest u/s 234B and 234C was levied.

Against the order dated 14th June, 2019, the Assessee filed a rectification application which was disposed of vide order dated 22nd August, 2019, passed by CPC, raising a demand of Rs. 2,78,10,114. This demand arose as service income was held to be taxable at 40 per cent and TDS credit of Rs. 2,78,10,114 was denied. The Assessee filed one more rectification application on 15th October, 2019. The CPC vide its order dated 24th October, 2019 raised a demand of Rs. 1,06,73,750 by taxing service receipts of Rs. 2,84,40,475 at 40 per cent along with applicable surcharge and cess and denied TDS credit of Rs. 22,54,771.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who without going into the merits of the case, dismissed the appeal holding that the relief could have been claimed by filing revised return of income.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the revenue it was contended that the demand has been raised considering the details furnished by the Assessee in the form of return of income. Therefore, the Assessee cannot find fault with processing the order or rectification order passed. The Assessee ought to have claimed relief sought by filing revised return of income for which statutory time limit has expired. The relief now sought by the Assessee was not found in the return of income. Therefore, CIT(A) was right in holding against the Assessee.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the Assessee has claimed a service income of Rs. 2,84,40,475 received from Heidrick and Struggles Pvt. Ltd. to be taxable as Other Sources. As per India US Tax Treaty, service rendered by the Assessee did not satisfy ‘make available clause’ of India US Treaty. Also, in the case of a group concern of the Assessee, for A.Y. 2018-19, CPC made a similar adjustment i.e. it taxed service receipt at 40 per cent. The said Assessee preferred rectification application which was allowed. The Tribunal held that it is not in dispute that as per India US Tax Treaty the impugned income is not chargeable to tax as per Article 12.

The Tribunal noted CBDT Circular No. 14 and also that the Calcutta Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Madhabi Nag vs. ACIT [ITA No. 512/Kol/215] held that the revenue authorities ought not to have rejected rectification application u/s 154 on the ground that the Assessee has not filed revised return of income. Further, in the case of CIT vs. Bharat General Reinsurance Co. Ltd. 81 ITR 303 (Delhi), the High Court held that merely because the Assessee wrongly included the income in its return for a particular assessment year it cannot confer jurisdiction on the department to tax that income in that year even though legally such income did not pertain to that year.

The Tribunal held that the addition had been made only due to wrong reporting of income by the Assessee and the same cannot be sustained. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) has committed an error in dismissing the appeal filed by the Assessee.

Interest granted u/s 244A(2) cannot be withdrawn by passing a rectification order u/s 154 when PCCIT / CCIT / PCIT / CIT has not decided exclusion of period for interest.

30 Otis Elevator Company (India) Ltd. vs. DCIT
[2022] 141 taxmann.com 391 (Mum. – Trib.)
A.Y.: 2010-11
Date of order: 18th August, 2022
Section: 244A(2)

Interest granted u/s 244A(2) cannot be withdrawn by passing a rectification order u/s 154 when PCCIT / CCIT / PCIT / CIT has not decided exclusion of period for interest.

FACTS

The assessment was finalized u/s 143(3) on 4th February, 2014. Subsequently, however, the Assessing Officer (AO) withdrew the interest granted u/s 244A(2) on the ground that “it is undisputed fact that in the income tax return filed u/s 139(1) on 30th September, 2010, the TDS claim was Rs. 10,62,11,325 which was enhanced to Rs. 13,70,80,237 by filing revised return on 29th March, 2012” and “thus, the delay was on the part of the Assessee to make correct claim of refund”. The interest payment of Rs. 43,71,038 was thus withdrawn, disregarding the plea of the Assessee that on merits such a claim could not have been declined, and, in any event, such a withdrawal of interest is beyond what is permissible u/s 154. The assessee carried the matter in appeal but without any success. The assessee is in second appeal before us.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the dispute between the Assessee and the revenue was whether or not the Assessee is responsible for delay in refund. It noted that the guidance to deal with such situations is provided in 244A(2) which inter alia provides that “where any question arises about the period to be excluded (for which interest is to be declined), it shall be decided by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, whose decision thereon shall be final”. The Tribunal held that, therefore, the final call about the period to be excluded for grant of interest is to be taken by the higher authority and that exercise is admittedly not done in the present case. Referring to the observations in a co-ordinate bench decision in the case of DBS Bank Ltd. vs. DDIT [(2016) 157 ITD 476 (Mum)] wherein it has inter alia been held that:

(i)    The delay in making of the claim by itself, without anything else, cannot lead to the conclusion that the delay is attributed to the Assessee.

(ii)    Even if the interest u/s 244A could be declined for this period on merits, not declining the interest u/s 244A could not be treated as a mistake apparent on record within the inherently limited scope of Section 154.

(iii)    When a question arises as to the period for which such interest under section 244A is to be excluded, this is to be decided by the Commissioner or the Chief Commissioner.

The Tribunal found itself in agreement with the views of the co-ordinate bench and following the same upheld the plea of the Assessee to the extent that given the limited scope of section 154 for rectification of mistakes apparent on record and given the fact that the period to be excluded for grant of interest has not yet been taken a call on by the PCCIT/CCIT/PCIT or the CIT, the impugned withdrawal of interest u/s 244A(2) is beyond the scope of rectification of mistake u/s 154.

The Tribunal set aside the order of rectification passed by the AO u/s 154 of the Act.

Advances received by an Assessee landlord who has converted land into stock-in-trade, following project completion method, are not taxable on receipt basis.

29 ACIT vs. Suratchandra B. Thakkar (HUF)
TS-648-ITAT-2022 (Mumbai)
A.Y.s: 2006-07 to 2008-09
Date of order: 12th August, 2022
Section: 28

Advances received by an Assessee landlord who has converted land into stock-in-trade, following project completion method, are not taxable on receipt basis.

FACTS

The assessee was a 25 per cent owner of a land in respect of which development agreement was entered into with K. Raheja Universal Pvt. Ltd. Under the terms of the Development Agreement, the land owners and developers were to share sale proceeds in the ratio of 45.5 per cent and 54.5 per cent respectively. The Assessee had a 25 per cent share in land, and was entitled to 25 per cent of 45.5 per cent share receivable by the land owners. The project consisted of construction of four towers of which two were completed in previous year relevant to A.Y. 2008-09 and two were completed in previous year relevant to A.Y. 2009-10.

The Assessee received advances of Rs. 1,78,68,399, Rs. 96,04,258 and Rs. 2,77,19,807 against sale of flats in A.Ys. 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09 respectively. However, no income was offered on the ground that the Assessee was following the project completion method of accounting, and entire income was declared in A.Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10 on completion of the project, receipt of occupancy certificate and execution of conveyance deed in favour of buyers.

According to the Assessing Officer (AO), as the entire cost of construction was being met by the developer, the project did not require any contribution from the Assessee. Therefore, the advances received became final and certain. The AO also observed that the Assessee had not shown any work-in-progress in the balance sheet. Also, since there was no risk attached to the Assessee, the advances, according to the AO, became income in the year of their receipt.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the Assessee and held that the land was not transferred by the land owners to the developers till the completion of construction and therefore entire risk of the project remained with the land owners including the Assessee.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the Assessee has already paid tax on advances received in A.Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10. The Tribunal concurred with the following findings of the CIT(A):

(i)    Since the land in question was treated as stock-in-trade by the Assessee in its books of account, transfer of the same was not liable to be taxed as capital gain.

(ii)    The Supreme Court, in the case of Seshasayee Steel Pvt. Ltd. 115 taxmann.com 5 (SC), held that executing a development agreement granting permission to start advertising, selling and construction and permitting to execute sale agreement to a developer does not amount to granting possession u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

(iii)    Possession of land has been handed over to the prospective buyers consequent to the conveyance in favour of co-operative society of flat owners.

(iv)    The assessee was regularly and consistently following completed contract method.

(v)    In case of the developer also, the completed contract method has been accepted by the revenue.

The Tribunal did not find any error in the finding of the CIT(A) in upholding the project completion method or the completed contract method followed by the Assessee for declaring the income from the project under reference.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue for all the three years.

Proviso to section 43CA providing for tolerance limit of 10 per cent, being beneficial in nature, is retrospective.

28 Sai Bhargavanath Infra vs. ACIT
TS-658-ITAT-2022 (Pune)
A.Y.: 2014-15
Date of order: 17th August, 2022
Section: 43CA

Proviso to section 43CA providing for tolerance limit of 10 per cent, being beneficial in nature, is retrospective.

FACTS
The Assessee, a builder and developer, filed its return of income for A.Y. 2015-16 declaring therein a total income of Rs. 47,17,490. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the assessee made an addition of Rs. 19,58,875 u/s 43CA of the Act, being difference between sale value of the flats sold and their stamp duty value.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the stamp duty value was at an uniform rate without taking into consideration the peculiar features of a particular property. It was also contended that the difference of Rs. 19,58,875 was less than 10 per cent and therefore, not required to be added. For this proposition reliance was placed on the decision of Pune Tribunal in IT No. 923/Pun/2019 for A.Y. 2016-17, order dated 4th August, 2022 and also on the Assessee’s own case in ITA No. 2417/Pun/2017 for A.Y. 2014-15, the Tribunal on the very similar issue had remanded the matter back to the file of the AO for fresh consideration.

HELD

The Tribunal noted the proviso to section 43CA which provides for a tolerance limit of 10 per cent has been introduced by the Finance Act, 2020 w.e.f. 1st April, 2021 and that the assessment year under consideration is before the date when the amendment took place and therefore, the question is whether the proviso can apply to assessment years prior to its introduction as well.

The Tribunal observed that the decision of the Pune Bench in ITA No. 2417/Pun/2017 for A.Y. 2014-15 (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the Assessee has held the proviso to be retrospective but in the said decision reliance has been placed on the decision of Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Maria Fernandes Cheryl vs. ITO (2021) 187 ITD 738 (Mum) which relates to section 50C of the Act. On behalf of the Assessee it was submitted that section 43CA and section 50C of the Act are pari materia provisions and therefore, holding of retrospective application of section 50C is even applicable making retrospective application to section 43CA of the Act as well. The Tribunal observed that the AR was unable to place on record any direct decision where first proviso to section 43CA has been held to be retrospective.

The Tribunal noted that the judgment of the full bench of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 466 (SC) has held that if any liability has to be fastened with the Assessee taxpayer retrospectively then the statute and the provision must spell out specifically regarding such retrospective applicability. However, if the provision is beneficial for the Assessee, in view of the welfare legislation spirit imbibed in the Income-tax Act, such a beneficial provision can be applied in a retrospective manner. The Tribunal examined the insertion of the first proviso to section 43CA in the light of the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in Vatika Township (supra) and held the intent of the legislature is to provide relief to the Assessee in case such difference is less than 10 per cent which has been brought into effect from 1st April, 2021 thereby providing benefit to the Assessee. This being the beneficial provision therefore will even have retrospective effect and would apply to the present A.Y. 2015-16.

The Tribunal observed that Pune Bench of the Tribunal in Shri Dinar Umeshkumar More vs. ITO [ITA No. 1503/PUN/2015 for A.Y. 2011-12 dated 25th January, 2019] has considering the proposition of applicability of a beneficial provision in light of Hon’ble Apex Court decision in the case of Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has held that if a fresh benefit is provided by the Parliament in an existing provision, then such an amendment should be given retrospective effect.

The Tribunal allowed the ground of appeal by holding that the first proviso to section 43CA has retrospective effect.

PMLA – Magna Carta – Part 2

Part – I of the article on PMLA – Magna Carta was published in the September 2022 issue of the BCAJ. In this concluding part, the author has answered some interesting and important questions arising from the Supreme Court decision in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India [2022] 140 taxmann.com 610 (SC). For a detailed analysis of the case, please refer to the September 2022 issue of the BCAJ.

1.    Whether investigation under PMLA can automatically be extended under other Statutes like the Black Money Act or the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act by the authorities under PMLA?
“Investigation” is a crucial term which has a bearing on the interpretation of all substantive aspects of PMLA. It is defined in section 2(1)(na) of PMLA, as under:

(na) “investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Act conducted by the Director or by an authority authorised by the Central Government under this Act for the collection of evidence.

The term “investigation” has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned decision. The Supreme Court has held that:

•    the term “proceedings” [section 2(1)(na) of PMLA] is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include the inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court.

•    the term “investigation” does not limit itself to the matter of investigation concerning the offence under PMLA, and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the authorities under PMLA.

It is apparent from the above mentioned interpretation of the term “investigation” by the Supreme Court that the word “proceedings” which is a part of the term “investigation” is contextual and must be given wider meaning to include the inquiry conducted by the Director or by an authority authorised by the Central Government under PMLA for collection of evidence. The “authority” referred to in section 2(1)(na) are all the authorities mentioned under sections 48 and 49 of PMLA.

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 49(1), the Central Government has notified the appointment of the following officers:

•    Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India under the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, to exercise the exclusive powers conferred under section 49.

•    Director of Enforcement holding office immediately before 1st July, 2005 under FEMA.

The scope of the powers of Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India and the Director of Enforcement have been specified respectively, in Notification No. GSR 440(E) dated 1st July, 2005 and Notification No. GSR 441(E) dated 1st July, 2005. A review of the powers listed in the said two notifications suggests that the investigation under PMLA may be extended to other statutes.

•    This view is fortified by the powers of section 45 of PMLA authorising the Director of Enforcement or other authorised officer to file a complaint to the Special Court.

•    Reference may also be made to section 66 of PMLA which authorises the Director of Enforcement and other authorities specified by him to disclose information to authorities under “other laws”.

2. Whether fees received by a Chartered Accountant or a lawyer from an offender under PMLA be regarded as proceeds of crime?
The expression “proceeds of crime” is defined in section 2(1)(u), as under:

(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

A review of the above mentioned definition would show that it is very widely worded. However, with the passage of time, even such a widely worded definition was found inadequate to cover a number of situations faced by the authorities. Accordingly, the Explanation was added w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 to expand the parameters of “proceeds of crime”. The purpose of adding the Explanation was to bifurcate the definition into the following two types of properties on a stand-alone basis:

•    Property derived or obtained from a scheduled offence.

•    Property which is directly or indirectly derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity related to a scheduled offence.

The opening words of the Explanation suggest that the Explanation is intended to apply retrospectively.

Wordings of the Explanation leave open a possibility that the Enforcement Directorate may consider the fees received by the Chartered Accountant or lawyer from an offender under PMLA as “proceeds of crime”. In terms of section 24 of PMLA, the burden of proving that the fees received from the offender do not constitute “proceeds of crime” will be on the CA or the lawyer.

It may be noted that the constitutional validity of section 24, which mandates a reverse burden of proof, has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the recent decision.

[However, the matter has been sent by SC for review by a larger Bench].

3. Can a legitimate property acquired by a person be attached or appropriated by the authorities, if later it is found that the said property was acquired by the seller from the proceeds of crime? To what layers the officers can go to attach the property?

Section 8(5) of PMLA deals with confiscation of property on the conclusion of the trial of an offence under PMLA as a result of which the Special Court gives a finding that the offence of money-laundering has been committed. Consequently, the Special Court will pass an order that the following properties stand confiscated to the Central Government:

•    The property involved in money-laundering; or

•    The property which has been used for the commission of the offence of money-laundering.

Accordingly, the property legitimately acquired may be attached and confiscated under PMLA if the Special Court finds that such a property was acquired by the seller through the proceeds of crime. The categorical finding of the Special Court that the property is involved in money- laundering does not leave any doubt that the property described in the captioned issue is liable to confiscation. As regards the second part of the captioned issue, namely; up to what layers the officers can go, a reference may be made to the definition of “offence of money-laundering” in section 3 which is very comprehensive. This definition is clarified and strengthened by the Explanation added w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. Being clarificatory, the Explanation is retrospectively applicable.

Clause (ii) of the Explanation clarifies that the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is a continuing activity which continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime.

In the Supreme Court decision, all nuances of the definition of money-laundering were examined and it was categorically held that the said definition has a wider reach so as to capture every process and activity, direct or indirect, connected with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy.

4. In the event it is found that the legitimate property acquired by an innocent person was out of the proceeds of crime what remedies does he have? How can a person or a consultant safeguard his interests from handling proceeds of crime?

Section 24 of PMLA which deals with the reverse burden of proof gives the right of defence to the person charged with the offence to prove to the contrary. In this connection, a similar situation was noticed by PMLA Appellate Tribunal.

In S. Ramesh Pothy vs. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 102 taxmann.com 314 (PMLA-AT), the appellant had purchased the property from one ‘D’ for business. Enforcement Directorate alleged that the appellant purchased the property out of proceeds of crime since the father of ‘D’ was facing criminal prosecution for offences committed under provisions of PMLA. On that ground, the provisional attachment of said property was confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The appellant produced bank statements and individual tax returns to prove the source of funds for the purchase of property.

It was held by PMLA Tribunal that the appellant was the bonafide purchaser of the property and was not involved in any crime relating to money-laundering. The gist of the Tribunal’s decision is:

•    There was no cogent and clear material on record even prima facie that the appellant had any knowledge of any FIR against the accused vendor. There was no mechanism to know if any FIR was registered against any vendors, or their family members and other relatives.

•    While purchasing the property from any vendor, due diligence does not lead to knowledge about the registration of FIR against the vendor or his family members and other relatives.

•    Under the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act, there is no method or process to find out about the existence of any FIR nor is there any provision to mandatorily disclose the existence of any FIR against the vendor or his family members.

•    The “No Encumbrance Certificate,” issued in the State of Tamil Nadu, did not have any clause whereby the FIR against the relatives or family members of vendors is reflected.

The above mentioned decision gives sufficient clues to discharge the reverse burden of proof and the relevant remedies to discharge such burden.

Indeed, the person charged, or his consultant can safeguard his interest by proper study of section 3 and section 24 in light of the minutest facts of the case. Indeed, while presenting a reply to the show-cause notice, the facts have to be properly articulated and succinctly presented in defence.

[Section 24 has been under review by a larger Bench of SC.]

5. What are the beneficial provisions of section 436A of CrPC that can be invoked by the accused arrested for an offence punishable under PMLA?

Section 436A of CrPC deals with the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained. To understand the substance of section 436A, it is necessary to refer to its following background.

Prior to June 2006, there were instances where undertrial prisoners were detained in jail for periods beyond the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence. Therefore, section 436-A was inserted in the Code to release an undertrial prisoner [other than the one accused of an offence for which death has been prescribed as one of the punishments], who has been under detention for a period extending to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the alleged offence, on his personal bond, with or without sureties.

The intention was also to provide that in no case should an undertrial prisoner be detained beyond the maximum period of imprisonment for which he can be convicted for the alleged offence.

Accordingly, w.e.f. 23rd June 2006, section 436-A was inserted in CrPC. The benevolent provisions of section 436-A are clear and evident from its following language.

“436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained –


Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties.

Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:

Provided further that no such person shall, in any case, be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.

Explanation — In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.”

Indeed, the language of section 436-A of CrPC is self-explanatory and does not require any interpretation. However, to ensure that the case of the accused falls within the parameters of section 436A of CrPC so as to qualify him for the benefit thereunder, it is advisable for the accused to take the help of a professional having expertise in CrPC.

6. After this SC decision, what defences are still available to the litigants? Are they totally defenceless?

Reference may be made to Question No. 4 which gives a broad guideline for defence that may be formulated after a study of the case laws relevant to sections 3, 5, 8,19 and 24.

It may be noted that the strategy for defence must be formulated in consultation with the Counsel who had dealt with the matter in the High Court or subordinate Court before it was carried to the Supreme Court in various civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, SLPs, etc. The order of the Supreme Court passed on 27th July, 2022 clarifies that the interim relief granted by the Supreme Court in the petitions/appeals will continue for a period of 4 weeks from 27th July, 2022, with the liberty to the parties to mention for an early listing of the case including for continuation/vacation of the interim relief.

7. What is the final take of this Supreme Court decision?

The final take of the decision may be summarised by a broad review of the following approach of the Supreme Court.

•    The Supreme Court was seized of 241 civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, special leave petitions, transferred petitions and transferred cases raising various questions of law.

The Government of India, too, had filed appeals and SLPs. There were also few transfer petitions filed before the Supreme Court under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India.

Questions in these petitions, appeals, etc. pertained to the constitutional validity and interpretation of certain provisions of PMLA and other statutes including the Customs Act, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

However, the Apex Court decided to confine to challenge to the validity of certain important provisions of PMLA and their interpretation.

•    In addition to challenges to Constitutional validity and interpretation of provisions of PMLA, there were also SLPs filed against various orders of High Courts and subordinate Courts all over the country with prayers for grant of bail or quashing or discharge.

All such SLPs were rejected by the Supreme Court.

•    Instead of dealing with facts and issues in each case on merits, the Supreme Court confined itself to examining the challenge to the relevant provisions of PMLA, being a question of law raised by parties.

• The question as to whether some of the amendments to the PMLA could not have been enacted by the Parliament by way of a Finance Act was not examined by the Supreme Court. The same was left open for being examined along with the decision of the Larger Bench (seven Judges) of the Supreme Court in Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1.


Identification of Related Parties and Significance of Related Party Transactions

INTRODUCTION
Related party transactions have always been under the scanner of various regulators. Recently, SEBI fined a large group for taking loans from a financial institution, which was its related party, in violation of SEBI regulations and not disclosing such related party transactions. SEBI also recently amended the definition of a related party by widening it to include certain large shareholders and requiring shareholders’ approval for material related party transactions (in terms of value or as a percentage of turnover). Once the party is identified as a related party, there are certain compliances for the company to follow, including provisions relating to approval and voting for such transactions. The Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) provides definition of the term ‘Related party’ u/s 2(76). On the basis of this definition, there are various compliances required under the Act for transactions with related parties. Schedule III to the Act, which prescribes disclosures required in the financial statements of a Company, also requires certain disclosures related to shareholding of promoters, changes in their shareholding during the year, loans or advances in the nature of loans granted to promoters, directors, key management personnel and the other related parties either severally or jointly with any other person, etc. Accounting Standard 18 and Ind AS 24 also define related party relationships.

There are differences in the definition of related party under the Companies Act and accounting standards. For listed entities, SEBI Regulations also define related parties which has additional relationships as compared to Companies Act and accounting standards. For examples, two companies with common director are related parties from the perspective of Companies Act and SEBI, but those may not be related parties under accounting standards.

Therefore, entities need to interpret this term on the basis of all the regulations that apply to them i.e., SEBI (in case of a listed entity), Companies Act (in case of a company) and relevant accounting standard (based on accounting standard framework applicable to the entity). Due to various regulatory requirements applicable to the entities, they are required to identify their related parties and transactions with them during the period. From the auditor’s perspective, such transactions are considered to carry a higher fraud risk due to the nature of relationship.

In this article, we look at the regulatory framework in respect of related party transactions and certain issues while applying the related requirements along with company’s and auditor’s perspective of implementing and auditing these compliances.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Companies Act, 2013

For companies, there are various sections in the Act that aim to ensure that the company’s interest is protected in such transactions. For example,

– Section 185 relates to provisions for giving loans to directors,

– Section 186 restricts the amount of loan or investment a company can make,

– Section 177 requires approval of audit committee for related party transactions,

– Section 188 requires consent of the Board of Directors for specified transactions,

– Section 192 requires approval of members for certain non-cash transactions with directors, etc.

Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 requires the auditor to report on transactions covered under the above sections of the Act. The Companies Act, 2013 also provides for the manner in which the directors are required to disclose their interest in the transaction. Failure to do so attracts penalties for such a director. The Companies Act, 2013 defines the term ‘related party’, but does not provide definition of ‘related party transactions’. However, Section 188 lists certain types of transactions. To protect the interest of the members, specified related party transactions under the Companies Act, 2013 require shareholders’ approval.

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

To achieve a true and fair view of the financial statements, disclosure of related party transactions and their terms is also considered as one of the necessary components. Therefore, accounting standard framework also defines related party relationships, and prescribes disclosures to be made in the financial statements for such transactions, with certain exemptions for government-related entities. With such disclosures, the users of the financial statements understand the impact of such transactions on the overall financial statements. However, accounting standards framework does not establish any recognition or measurement requirements for related party transactions. Such transactions are recognized and measured based on the requirements of the respective accounting standards. For example, if the parent company issues ESOPs to the employees of the subsidiary, the subsidiary shall record the transaction as per accounting standard applicable to ESOPs.

Accounting Standard (AS) 18 and Ind AS (Ind AS) 24 define related parties. Such parties could be other body corporates, individuals or employee benefit plans. However, there are differences in the definition of related party under AS 18 and Ind AS 24.  Definition in Ind AS 24 is wider in scope as compared to AS 18 in terms of close members of the family, key managerial personnel (KMP), control, joint control and significant influence, etc. Ind AS 24 also covers certain relationships  not covered under AS 18 such as joint ventures of the same venturer, joint venture and associate of the same party, certain post-employment benefit plans, parties providing KMP services, etc. Under Ind AS 24, post-employment benefit plans are related if those are for the benefit of employees of either the reporting entity or any entity related to reporting entity. It does not require any influence or control being exercised over such a plan for covering it as a related party.

However, some of the indirect relations may or may not be covered in the definitions of the applicable standard. Therefore, one needs to carefully evaluate the definition of a related party. For example, if A is a joint venture of B, and C is an associate of B, then A and C are related parties of each other under Ind AS 24.  However, C is not a related party of any other associate that B may have (fellow associates). Though this gives somewhat unexpected answer, but due to complexity of relationships, some of such indirect relationships may not get covered in the definition.

Major customers or suppliers are also not considered as related parties under the accounting standards, though in such business relationships, the transactions will have effect of the relationship on the performance of the entity as compared to the transactions with an unrelated party.

Control relationships (e.g., parent, ultimate parent, etc.) gain more importance in the disclosures for which the accounting standards require names of such related parties to be also disclosed. Such control may be with an individual in a promoter-controlled company. Disclosure of names of these parties is required even if there are no transactions with them.

While applying the accounting standards, entities need to understand the appropriate interpretation of certain requirements of the relevant accounting standard. Some of such requirements of Ind AS are discussed below.

WHO ARE KMPs UNDER IND AS 24?

Directors

Directors hold fiduciary capacity vis-à-vis the company. Therefore, they are not expected to use company’s assets or their power for personal gains. As they hold such a position, certain directors are considered as related parties of the company. Ind AS 24 defines KMP as persons having authority and responsibility for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the entity. With this definition, executive directors of the company will usually be covered since they carry such authority and responsibility. The definition also includes any director, whether executive or otherwise. Therefore, even non-executive directors who have such authority and responsibility are KMPs of the company.

CFO, Financial Controller, etc.

Will other senior management personnel such as CFO, Chief Marketing Officer, Chief Legal Officer, Financial Controller, etc. be covered as KMPs under Ind AS 24? There is no one answer here that fits all. KMPs are not restricted to directors. Other senior management members also may be KMPs. The company needs to evaluate their roles and determine whether they have the above-mentioned authority and responsibility or not. It is not the designation but the role that the individual plays that determines whether he / she is a KMP or not.

Members of Strategy Board

In some companies, the Strategy Board assists the Board of Directors to set the overall strategy for the company, and  also implements such a strategy. In such cases, members of the Strategy Board are also KMPs. Similarly non-directors who are responsible for key planning, directing and controlling key activities, such as treasury, investments, etc. can also be KMPs in cases of companies which have such functions as key operating functions.

Therefore, all directors may not be KMPs and KMPs need not be only directors.

KMPs for a group

The group consists of a parent and one or more subsidiaries. Each component of the group would have its own KMP, but the question is who are KMPs for the group as a whole. For example, an investment company invests in a subsidiary which is an operating company. In such case, KMPs of the subsidiary company will also be KMPs of the group because subsidiary contributes significantly to the group’s results.

Non-individual KMPs

Given that the definition of KMP does not restrict to individuals; non-individuals, such as another entity, that provides the functions as given in the definition of KMP, is also a related party as KMP for the reporting entity. For example, investment funds may have investment managers as KMPs which are entities and not individuals.

Once an individual is identified as a KMP, the scope of identification of related parties also expands to close members of that person’s family and certain related parties of such a close member of that person’s family.

TRANSACTIONS WITH KMPs

Accounting standards require specific disclosures for transactions with KMPs including specific elements of their remuneration. Usually, in practice, such disclosures are made on an aggregate basis, and not for each KMP. Though materiality is an overarching principle for making disclosures, sometimes it is incorrectly used by considering only quantitative measurement for not making such disclosures. However, one needs to consider qualitative aspects as well of such disclosure required by the accounting standard.

RELATIONSHIP PERIOD

Another interesting issue is what is the scope of requirement if the relationship ceases or new relationship gets established during the reporting period. Whether related parties should be considered as at the year end? Though accounting standards do not explicitly cover this matter, relationships should be considered during the period, and not only at the year end. Transactions taking place after cessation of relationship are not considered as related party transactions.

RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
Once related parties are identified, the next step is to identify related party transactions. AS 18 and Ind AS 24 both provide the definition of related party transactions. Both accounting standards explicitly clarify that transactions for which no price is charged are also covered in related party transactions. Accordingly, if the KMP of a holding company is also a KMP of its subsidiary company, for which no remuneration is paid by the subsidiary company, services received from such a KMP is also a related party transaction for the subsidiary and provision of services is a related party transaction for the holding company. In another example, if employees of subsidiary are used by the holding company for which no charge is made by the subsidiary company, transaction should be disclosed by both the companies as related party transactions.

SEBI REGULATIONS

For listed entities, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has included certain compliance requirements in its SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations. These regulations prescribe approval mechanism and require disclosure of specified transactions which are transactions between the listed entity and the related party. The investors obtain better perspective of the performance of the company, and their interests are protected through these requirements. This mechanism also helps  monitor funds movement between the listed entity and the related party.

In SEBI regulations, certain related party transactions are identified as material when they exceed the specified threshold given in Regulation 23(1). However, there are certain interpretational issues while applying such thresholds to the transaction such as what constitutes a transaction on which such limits are to be applied, whether group of related transactions are treated as a single transaction, etc. The definition of related party is revised in the regulations and the revised definition applies from 1st  April, 2023. The revised definition refers to purpose and effect of the transaction. In practical scenario, determining the purpose and effect of the transaction is going to be a challenge.

COMPANY’S PERSPECTIVE

Internal controls framework

Companies need to design and implement internal controls framework around:

–    Identification of related parties.

–    Approval process of related party transactions.

–    Accounting of related party transactions (especially when those are not at arm’s length).

–    Disclosure of related party transactions in the financial statements.

Such internal controls should be tested for their operating effectiveness throughout the year.

AUDITOR’S PERSPECTIVE

Audit of a related party transactions is always a challenge for the auditor. The skepticism for such transactions is set at higher limits for the auditor. The auditor needs to understand business rationale for such transactions. When such rationale is lacking, it may not meet the ‘smell test’ and would require additional audit procedures to be carried out to fulfil auditor’s responsibility and understand impact of such transactions on the financial statements. There is also a possibility of non-genuine transactions being recorded when the counter party is a related party. Standard on Auditing 550 – Related Parties deals with auditor’s responsibilities related to fraud risk, understanding the impact of related party transactions on the financial statements and obtaining audit evidence for such transactions.

As part of the audit process, apart from the business rationale as mentioned above, the auditor should also evaluate the consideration received or paid for such transactions to assess whether those transactions were carried out at arm’s length or not. If the transactions are not at arm’s length, then the reasons for determining such pricing, its impact on accounting of such transactions, etc. are additional factors that the auditor should consider.

As seen in some  corporate scandals, the challenge for the auditor in the audit process was to unearth the related party transactions due to the fact that such transactions were camouflaged to depict as transactions with non-related parties. Parties that have control, significant influence or power to take decisions of the transactions may use opportunity which is not in the interest of the company. As a result, to evaluate KMPs of the company and therefore other related parties is one of the high-risk area from the audit perspective.

As a part of the audit, the auditor shall audit the identification of related parties as well as adequacy and correctness of the disclosures made in the financial statements for related party transactions.

STANDALONE ENTITY

Consider the transactions which prima facie do not seem to be a commercial transaction. For example, loans given by the entity for which there are no agreed terms of repayments and repayment schedule, changing the supplier without inviting quotations from other players in the market, non-monetary transactions involving property of the entity, transactions outside the normal course of business, etc. It is likely that such transactions are entered with related parties which may lack commercial substance. In such situations, the auditor needs to remain more alert and obtain persuasive audit evidence to determine the nature and objective of such transactions.

GROUP STRUCTURES

As one would expect, identification of related parties is more complex in group structures with various subsidiaries, associates, etc., because each component of the group may have its own related parties. Therefore, group audits pose a higher challenge for the group auditor in audit of related party transactions. Usually, the group auditor, as part of his audit instructions, shall inform the component auditor of various related parties of the group entities. The component auditor is expected to exercise higher skepticism while auditing the transactions entered into with the parties that may not be related party of the component that has entered into the transaction but is a related party to the overall group or to some other component in the group.

CONCLUSION

Related party identification and transactions with related parties has always been a key concern for regulators across the world. Therefore, regulations around such transactions are being tightened over the period. Though on one side it undoubtedly protects the interests of the members and other stakeholders, on the other side, unless the principle is followed in substance as per its intent, no regulation can prevent misuse of relationships in the business transactions. Therefore, governance mechanism of the entity and its code of ethics are the real safeguards for protecting the interests of the entity. Management and those charged with governance, board of directors, audit committee, etc. are collectively guardians of the interest of the company. If they play their role responsibly, it is only then that the expected transparency of related party transactions will be achieved.

How Well Rounded are Rules about Rounding off Numbers in Financials Statements?

Financial Statements (FS) indicate a company’s financial performance and position. In case of Public Interest Entities (PIE), FS serves numerous people/bodies like shareholders, analysts, regulators, etc.

The idea behind any reporting, is to enable the reader to gather information in a way she can comprehend with ease. Comprehension by reader is the ultimate test that a preparer should measure up his reporting, so that it is of value. IASB has also stated that understandability is an important feature that preparers of financial statements must strive for.

This short article walks you through the rule regarding ‘rounding off’ of figures in the financial statements under the Companies Act, 2013 as required by Schedule III – the absurdities, excesses and anomalies.

PRESENT LAW

Schedule III lays out the manner of presentation of financial statements and other information to ensure they give a true and fair view. In relation to rounding off of numbers, Schedule III mandates:

(i) Depending upon the Total Income of the company, the figures appearing in the Financial Statements shall be rounded off as given below:-

Total Income

Rounding Off

(a) less than one hundred crore rupees

To the nearest hundreds, thousands, lakhs
or millions, or decimals thereof.

(b) one hundred crore rupees or more

To the nearest lakhs, millions or crores,
or decimals thereof.

(ii) Once a unit of measurement is used, it should be used uniformly in the Financial Statements.

Emphasis supplied for the word shall, as it replaced the word may on 24th March, 2021.

The aforesaid provisions and changes of 24th March, 2021 imply:

a.    Rounding off is a part of ‘disclosure’ requirements of the Act and compliance with accounting standards (as section and Schedule speak of them as the leading criteria).

b.    Rounding off is mandatory (so it appears from the language of the clause and the amendment).

c.    If you do not round off, you are in violation of the Companies Act, 2013.

d.    Fine of Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 5,00,000 and even imprisonment of up to 1 year is prescribed under Section 129(7) of the Companies Act, 2013.

It is important to find out about ‘global best practices’ which ministers and MPs speak of with confidence, for convenience and selective expediency. FASB and IASB do not mandate rounding off. The idea is to refrain from RULES and rather set PRINCIPLES, and hence Ind AS / IAS 1.51.e and 1.53 talk of disclosure of level of rounding off (thousands, lakhs, millions or crores) when an entity rounds off to make it ‘understandable’.

However, MCA has made it mandatory. Additionally, it came out with this change, without ‘disclosure’ of any reason behind the change! How about a discussion? How about giving some background? Are there any issues that this mandate will address? In a lighter vein such ‘notifications’ including parts of CARO or Schedule III without discussion appear to be ‘naughtyfications’ because there is more mischief than meaning.   

PURPOSE AND COMPREHENDING NUMBERS

Let’s keep the above legal requirement on the side for a moment and look at other facets of rounding off. Rounding off is a trade-off of precision for comprehension. The numbers are also used to compare them with similar numbers of other entities. So numbers allow us not only to read FS of a company but also help us compare with numbers of other companies.

Rounding off also helps unwieldy numbers to be readable and fit for grasping easily. However, in most cases, rounding off should be used for publishing financial information and may not be necessary in actual FS. FS adoption ideally should be with full numbers, but what is circulated / published can be different from it. The rounding off prescribed in Schedule III many a times defeats the very purpose of rounding off. Here is how:

The way people understand numbers is quite peculiar. This becomes difficult when the numbers are rounded off a certain way. Look at the following table:

Sr.
No.

Number

What is it

How we
comprehend it

1

10,00,00,000

This is the actual Number

It is understood just the way it is. Just as we understand a WORD –
Coconut – we understand this number to be
10 Crores.

2

1000,000

When rounded in hundred

Each of the numbers given against Sr. No. 2 to 5 are meant to be
understood as 10 Cr but only because the legend says so that they are rounded
to 100s or 1000s etc.

3

100,000

When rounded in lacs

4

10

When rounded in crores

5

100

When rounded in millions

What rounding off says is that items listed in Sr. No. 1 to 5 mean the same thing. When you read the number ALONG with the rounding off LEGEND in your brain you have to UNROUND it to understand. Why? Because the number gives scale, and the scale is known by quantum. So, one has to un-round it to understand how large or small the values are. Because when the brain reads 100 as given in Sr. 5 it cannot recognize it as 10,00,00,000 given in Sr 1. It will have to use a TRANSLATION of rounding off legend to arrive at the real value.

PROBLEM 1: ABSURD RESULTS

Let’s see if the FS of a company are in thousands – 4 digits. Now, some numbers in the FS are in hundreds. This will put all numbers in single or double digits or even decimals. Obviously, this doesn’t make it easier to ‘comprehend’. Say an Intangible is already fully depreciated and having WDV that is 5% of its value can disappear from PPE Schedule entirely due to rounding off.

PROBLEM 2: INCONSISTENT LAWS

While rounding off is mandatory for presentation of FS, under the same Companies Act, 2013, and when it comes to submission of FS annually to the MCA under Form AOC 4, you have to provide un-rounded figures. There is no choice to give numbers in ‘00 or ‘000. Only full numbers are permitted. The question is: for Form AOC4 – should one add 0s that were removed to round off to comply with the Schedule III or will AOC4 need exact figures full numbers which are not audited or are in an Excel?

How will the compliance professional certify the AOC4 – when actual signed FS are rounded or can he adopt un-rounding basis stated above?

Which are the final numbers – the one with rounded amounts or one with actual numbers that are not ‘signed’ or approved for all other legal purposes whether under the Act or other laws?

Consider the departments/boards under the same Ministry of Finance – will they accept rounded figures? Say, Income Tax returns need full figures. GST returns need full figures.

PROBLEM 3: TWO FS   

Some clients want two FS. One for meeting rounding off requirement, and the other for tax and other purposes. Their CS is asking; which numbers should he take to fill the form?

PROBLEM 4: ROUNDING OFF AND CASTING

For smaller enterprises, rounding off makes, preparing FS even more difficult. There is already a problem with matching totals in Notes to main pages of FS and ensuring casting is correct.

PROBLEM 5: MAKING NUMBERS LOOK SMALLER

More than the technical and accounting considerations, an unintended consequence of this mandate for small companies is YOU ARE MAKING ME SUDDENLY LOOK SMALLER. Full numbers when I carry in my balance sheet is a feel-good factor and a contributing factor to confidence and external respect. As a slightly extra rounded person, I would like to
look less rounded (pun intended), but would definitely not want my financials to look ‘leaner’. Soft factors do matter.

WHAT MCA SHOULD CONSIDER?

1.    Prescribe comma placement – this is the single most important factor for improving the readability of numbers. Not placing a comma is a catastrophe for number reading and shows careless disregard for the reader.

2.    Prescribe a minimum font size – it’s impossible to read small fonts, especially in printed material. But even for e-copies, there should be a minimum font size.

3.    Allow only lacs and crores, not millions and crores – Million is another way to put comma. India needs to decide where it stands, lacs/ crores or thousands/ millions. But this is not the most important point although the Companies Act, 2013 sections generally specify numbers in crores and lacs.

4.    Rounding off threshold can be raised –
When a number becomes unwieldy – say HPCL Income of Rs. 250,000 Crores – 25,00,00,00,00,000 (eleven zeros) then rounding off makes sense.

5.    Rounding off for publication and not adoption – For most companies allow actual numbers and for publication purposes, rounding off can be done by management. FS need not be rounded off in most cases. FS are used for FULL numbers by most stakeholders and full numbers have more meaning for purposes that are of regulatory consequence.

6.    Materiality should be the basis of rounding off – A Rs. 1,000 Crores assets company, with a turnover of Rs. 5,000 Crores, could have a materiality of say 5 per cent of assets or 1 per cent of sales – about Rs. 50 Crores. This company can round off in crores. Less than 3 digit crores, perhaps require no rounding.

7.    For private limited companies which are not public interest entities, they should be out of the tangles of rounding off. The preparers and readers are SAME and obviously, the government has NOTHING to read into those financials. Even if they wanted to, they can read from exact numbers.

8.    Form AOC-4 should permit expressly rounded amounts or allow 000xxs to be added instead of actual numbers.

Finally, ease of doing business should guide such decisions. ‘Shall’ we say, rounding off ‘may’ be unwound a bit to make it well rounded.


GLoBE Rules: Some Special Rules, Administrative and Compliance Aspects – Part 3

[This is the concluding part of a 3-part series on GloBE Rules. The first part was published in the August, 2022 issue of BCAJ (“Pillar 2: An Introduction to Global Minimum Taxation and the second part (“GloBE Rules – Determination of Effective Tax Rate (ETR) and Top-Up Tax (TUT”)) was published in September, 2022 BCAJ.]

TO REFRESH ON EARLIER PARTS
In the previous two articles, we discussed how GloBE Rules apply, when the effective tax rate (ETR) computed at a jurisdictional level is less than 15 per cent, and, how a top-up tax (TUT) is levied to achieve at least 15 per cent tax in each jurisdiction where the MNE Group has a presence in the form of a subsidiary or a permanent establishment (PE). For this purpose, each subsidiary or PE is referred to as a constituent entity (CE) of the MNE Group. We also discussed certain nuances around the computation of ETR – which, as aforesaid, is calculated on a country-by-country basis as a fraction of adjusted covered tax (numerator) upon GloBE income (denominator). While ETR is primarily linked to book results based on ‘fit for consolidation’’ accounts, specified adjustments, coupled with options/choices, make the exercise fairly complex and unique. Moreover, we also discussed hierarchical rules (i.e. top-down approach of income inclusion rule) for recovery of such TUT.

Having discussed the above, in this third and final part of this series, we shall discuss some special provisions under GloBE Rules dealing with business reorganizations, joint ventures, and PEs. Towards the end, we shall also discuss administrative and compliance aspects, which shall soon become a new way of life for MNE Groups covered by GloBE Rules.

NEGATIVE ADJUSTED COVERED TAX DUE TO SUPER/WEIGHTED DEDUCTIONS

In Part II of this series, we discussed how deferred tax accounting impacts adjusted covered tax in the calculation of ETR for a jurisdiction. We will now level up a notch further and discuss a specific complexity of the GloBE Rules associated with deferred tax accounting.

Ordinarily, a jurisdiction that has zero GloBE income or GloBE loss may not trigger any GloBE TUT liability. This is because the ETR cannot be computed as the denominator is zero or a negative amount. Still, it is possible that the tax loss is higher than the book loss (or GloBE loss) – if local tax rules allow a weighted deduction of specific expenses (to incentivize specific activities, such as R&D) in computing taxable income.

Assume that, in year 1, there is a book loss of 1,000, and tax loss of 1,500, the difference of 500 being on account of weighted deduction. Assume that, in year 2, there is a book profit of 1,500, and a tax loss of  year 1 is fully offset, resulting in zero local tax liability in year 2. Assume that such jurisdiction’s local tax rate is 15 per cent.

In books, DTA of 225 is recognized for tax loss in year 1 (i.e. 1,500 x 15 per cent), which is reversed in year 2. ETR of year 2 is calculated as 225 / 1,500. Since ETR (after reckoning reversal of DTA) is 15 per cent, there is no GloBE TUT liability in year 2. Thus, there is no requirement under GloBE Rules to exclude reversal of DTA attributable to tax loss arising on account of weighted deduction, while determining ETR of year 2.

To ensure that the TUT is collected in year 1 itself, when a tax incentive of weighted deduction is claimed, despite year 1 having zero GloBE income or GloBE loss, a special provision1 requires payment of GloBE TUT liability. Such a liability is not based on ETR formula. According to such provision, where adjusted covered tax (after reckoning generation of DTA) is less than [GloBE loss x 15 per cent], the difference straightaway becomes TUT liability. In the example on hand, in year 1, adjusted covered tax (after reckoning generation of DTA) is negative 225, and GloBE loss x 15 per cent is negative 150 (negative 1,000 x 15 per cent). The difference between negative 225 and negative 150 is 75, which straightaway becomes TUT liability in year 1.


1    Article 4.1.5

This provision has been perceived to be harsh because TUT liability is payable despite the jurisdiction having earned zero GloBE income or GloBE loss. Representations have been made to modify this provision, and OECD is evaluating the same.

In Indian Income-tax Act (ITA), weighted deductions [along the lines of s.35(2AB) of ITA] have been phased out. ITA has a weighted deduction only in the form of s.80JJAA, which is allowed only against positive gross total income – such an incentive cannot be availed in a case of tax loss. But, if a CE in India generates DTA on account of business reorganization (as illustrated in the ensuing paras), such a DTA can result in TUT liability under the above provision, despite the jurisdiction having zero GloBE income or GloBE loss in the year of generation of such DTA.

BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS TAKING PLACE AFTER GLOBE RULES ARE EFFECTIVE2

Where gain on account of tax neutral transfers is recognized in P&L account as prepared for the purpose of ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts, in absence of any specific adjustment in GloBE Rules, such a gain can trigger TUT liability. This may result in nullifying fiscal incentive provided under domestic tax laws of the jurisdiction for tax neutral transfers. GloBE Rules aim to avoid such an outcome, and preserve tax neutrality for transfer of assets and liabilities, if following cumulative conditions are met.

•    Consideration for transfer is, in whole or in significant part, discharged by way of equity interests.

•    The transferor’s gain is not subject to tax (under the domestic tax laws).

•    The transferee is required (under the domestic tax laws) to compute taxable income using transferee’s tax basis of the assets (i.e. no cost step-up).

If all the above three conditions are met – in GloBE calculations, for transferor, gain recognized in P&L account is excluded from the GloBE income – and therefore, is exempt from TUT liability. For transferee, carrying values of assets taken over, for the purpose of GloBE calculations, are pegged to those of transferor (i.e. no cost step-up in computation of GloBE income).


2 Readers may note that, this article only discusses GloBE Rules applicable to transfers of assets and liabilities, as per articles 6.3.1 to 6.3.32. There are separate rules for corporate transformations (such as conversion of company into another business vehicle such as LLP) or migration from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction, which are not discussed in this article.

However, if any one of the above three conditions are not met – gain on account of a transfer recognized in P&L account, which is tax-exempt as per domestic tax laws, cannot be excluded in computation of GloBE income of the transferor, and therefore, can trigger TUT liability. For transferee, carrying values for GloBE calculations are based on cost as recognized in the books (after step-up, if any).

Example 1: Business transfer by a holding company to a wholly-owned subsidiary

Assume that, the FCo (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group), has a holding company in India, which in turn has a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) in India. After GloBE Rules are applied to FCo, the holding company transfers a capital asset (e.g., an intangible asset) having a book value of 1,000 to WOS, at a fair price of 11,000, for cash consideration. In ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts, the holding company recognizes a gain of 10,000, whereas WOS recognizes such a capital asset at 11,0003.

For local tax purposes, the holding company claims capital gains tax exemption u/s 47(iv) of ITA on 10,000; and the cost in the hands of WOS is pegged to 1,000 on account of Explanation 6 to s.43(1) of ITA.


3 As per our understanding, and subject to confirmation of accounting experts, it is only for common control business transfer that IFRS/Ind-AS mandates the transferee to recognise at book value of transferor. This mandate may not apply to an asset transfer, which, the transferor and transferee may record at the transaction value.

In computing the GloBE income of the holding company in the year of the aforesaid transfer, a question arises, whether the gain of 10,000, recognized in P&L account can be excluded? The first condition (namely that consideration for the transfer is, in whole or in significant part, discharged by way of equity interests) is not satisfied in the present case. To recollect, for excluding gain from GloBE income, all the three conditions stated aforesaid need to be cumulatively satisfied. In the present case, only the second and third conditions are satisfied (namely, the ‘transferor’s gain is not subject to tax; and the transferee is required to compute taxable income using the transferee’s tax basis of the assets) and not the first condition. This may result in a gain of 10,000 being included in GloBE income and therefore, being subject to TUT liability.

In the case of WOS, the cost of capital asset as per books is 11,000. However, for the computation of a taxable income as per ITA, such cost is pegged to 1,000 on account of Explanation 6 to s.43(1) of ITA. Consequently, WOS is expected to have higher capital gains tax liability upon the sale of a such capital asset. Therefore, a question is whether WOS can recognize the provision for DTL of 2,500 (namely book to tax difference of 10,000 x 25 per cent applicable tax rate) in the year of acquisition of such capital asset? Under Ind-AS, WOS may not be able to recognize such a provision for DTL due to the “initial recognition exception” in para 15 of Ind-AS 12.

As a result, TUT liability is likely to arise in the case on hand – because, in the year of transfer of a capital asset, a gain of 10,000 recognized in P&L account of the holding company remains included in GloBE income as aforesaid (to recollect, GloBE income is computed at a jurisdictional level, by clubbing book results of the holding company and WOS). Still, there are no corresponding taxes payable on such a gain (either in the form of provision for DTL or provision for current tax because of exemption u/s 47(iv) of ITA).

In the future, assuming there is a violation of conditions of s.47(iv) of ITA and the holding company pays capital gains tax u/s 47A in the year of transfer to WOS, there is no clarity on the GloBE’s impact on the holding company and WOS. As GloBE Rules presently stand, such capital gains tax discharged by the holding company can be reckoned in adjusted covered tax (namely, numerator of ETR) only in a future year when such tax is provided for in the books of the holding company. Hence, there may be no ability to claim a refund of TUT liability already discharged in the year of transfer to WOS.

Example 2: Common control demerger

Assume that FCo (the ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group), has two wholly owned subsidiaries in India; namely DCo and RCo. DCo has two business undertakings, namely U1 and U2. U2 is demerged in favour of RCo under a tax-neutral demerger as per s.2(19AA) of ITA, where RCo issues equity shares to FCo as a consideration for such demerger. As DCo and RCo are considered entities under common control, in the ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts prepared as per IFRS/Ind-AS, both DCo and RCo would record the business transfer at book value. There is no gain recorded in the P&L account of DCo. Accordingly, the question of levying TUT liability as a consequence of tax-neutral demerger may not arise in the present  case.

Without prejudice to the above, even assuming DCo were to prepare ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts based on some other accounting standards other than IFRS/Ind-AS and recognize gain in P&L account w.r.t. tax neutral demerger, due to satisfaction of all three conditions specified aforesaid, such a gain may qualify for exclusion in computing GloBE income of DCo. To recollect, three conditions are as under:

•    Consideration for transfer is, in whole or in significant part, discharged by way of equity interests [namely; RCo issues equity shares to overseas parent of DCo].

•    The transferor’s gain is not subject to tax [namely; DCo’s gain, if any, is exempt from capital gains tax u/s. 47(vib) of ITA].

•    The transferee is required compute taxable income using transferee’s tax basis in the assets [namely; cost base in hands of RCo is pegged to that of DCo, as per Explanation 7A to s.43(1) of ITA and Explanation 2A to s.43(6) of ITA].

Example 3: Non common control demerger


 Tax neutral demerger of U2, by DCo to RCo.

Assume that, FCo1 (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group), has a subsidiary in India, namely, DCo. DCo has two business undertakings; namely U1 and U2. FCo2 (ultimate parent entity of another unrelated MNE Group), also has a subsidiary in India, namely, RCo. U2 (having book value of 1,000) is demerged by DCo in favour of RCo, pursuant to a tax neutral demerger as per s.2(19AA) of ITA. RCo issues equity shares (having fair value of 11,000) to FCo1 as consideration for such demerger.

DCo and RCo are considered to be entities not under common control. In ‘fit for consolidation ‘accounts’ of DCo, in terms of Appendix A of Ind-AS 10, DCo recognizes a dividend payable of 11,000 (by taking into account fair value of shares to be issued by RCo to FCo1) by debit to reserves or retained earnings. Such dividend payable of 11,000 is settled by transfer of business having book value of 1,000 and difference of 10,000 is credited to P&L account of DCo. D Co does not pay any capital gains tax [as per s.47(vib) of ITA] and DCo also does not pay any minimum alternate tax [as per s.115JB(2A)(d) of ITA] in respect of such gain credited to P&L account.

Where all the three conditions are met, gain of 10,000 credited to P&L account can be excluded from GloBE income of DCo. In the present case:

•    Consideration for transfer is, in whole or in significant part, discharged by way of equity interests [namely; RCo issues equity shares to FCo1, the overseas parent of DCo].

•    The transferor’s gain is not subject to tax [namely; DCo’s gain, if any, is exempt from capital gains tax
u/s 47(vib) of ITA as also from MAT tax u/s 115JB(2A)(d)].

•    The transferee is required to compute taxable income using the transferee’s tax basis in the assets, [namely; the cost base in the hands of RCo is pegged to that of DCo, as per Explanation 7A to s.43(1) of ITA and Explanation 2A to s.43(6) of ITA].

However, assuming RCo were to claim cost step-up in respect of assets received upon demerger while computing taxable income as per ITA [by relying on Supreme Court’s decision in case of Smiffs Securities (2012) (348 ITR 302)], the third condition is not satisfied. In such a case, a gain of 10,000, credited to the P&L account of D Co, cannot be excluded from the GloBE income of DCo and may be subject to TUT liability.

Example 4: Tax exempt transfer by LLP to company u/s 47(xiii) of ITA

Assume that the FCo (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group) has a 99 per cent interest in an LLP, where intellectual property assets are predominant. The enterprise value of such LLP is 11,000, comprising tangible assets of 1,000 and self-generated brand of 10,000. For diverse commercial considerations, the following reorganization is implemented after GloBE Rules are introduced:

•    FCo to incorporate ICo.

•    LLP to transfer business as slump sale to ICo for agreed monetary consideration of 11,000 i.e. fair value, to be discharged in the form of allotment of equity shares by ICo to FCo.

•    ICo is to allot equity shares to FCo at a premium, such that the aggregate issue price is 11,000.

LLP and partners comply with all conditions of s.47(xiii) of ITA, and thus qualify for exemption u/s 47(xiii) of ITA. ICo allocates 1,000 to tangible assets and 10,000 to identifiable intangible assets (being brand). For the present case study, one may proceed on the assumption that purchase price allocation is on a fair and reasonable basis and that ICo is entitled to claim depreciation u/s 32 on intangible assets of 10,000 over 4 years basis SLM (assumed for simplicity). In terms of s.49(1)(iii)(e) of ITA, ICo cannot claim any cost step-up while computing capital gains on transfer of brand.

In the ‘‘fit for consolidation’ accounts, in terms of IFRS/Ind-AS, accounting principles applicable to a common control business combination are applied. Accordingly, both LLP and ICo recognize business transfer at book value of the transferor. The following is the accounting treatment adopted in P&L account forming part of ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts:

•    LLP recognizes profits of 10,000 in partner’s capital a/c (or other equity a/c), and not in P&L a/c.

•    ICo recognizes LLP’s assets in books based on carrying values of transferor, at 1,000 – as this is a common control business combination. As ICo does not recognize brand in books, ICo does not provide any amortization of such brand in books, year on year.

•    Considering that tax base of assets is higher by 10,000 and having regard to applicable tax rate of 25 per cent, ICo recognizes DTA of 2,500.

•    Over next 4 years, DTA as recognized will be reversed by debit to P&L a/c as and when amortization for local tax purposes is claimed by ICo. In the facts of the case, such unwinding will be at 625 per annum (namely, yearly depreciation of 2,500 x 25 per cent tax rate) over next four years.

In GloBE calculations of LLP, no adverse implications are likely to arise, because, as aforesaid, LLP does not record any gain on business transfer in P&L account.

In GloBE calculations of ICo, unless the three conditions aforesaid are cumulatively satisfied, DTA recognized by ICo in the year of business acquisition is likely to reduce adjusted covered tax (numerator of ETR). To recollect, generation of DTA reduces adjusted covered tax (and consequently, reduces ETR), and can result in potential TUT liability. A negative ETR also attracts TUT liability4.

In the present facts, the third condition of non-grant of cost step-up (namely; the transferee is required to compute taxable income using transferee’s tax basis in the assets) is not fulfilled. As a result, in GloBE calculations of ICo, DTA generated of 2,500 at 25 per cent tax rate will be recast to 1,500 at 15 per cent tax rate. There could be potential TUT liability on this account, unless the same is shielded by other high-taxed incomes in India.


4  For e.g., assuming ETR is -10 per cent, TUT percentage is 25 per cent [calculated as 15 per cent – (10 per cent) = 25 per cent].

IMPACT OF NON-TAX NEUTRAL BUSINESS TRANSFER

Assume that FCo (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group) has two wholly owned subsidiaries in India, ICo1 and ICo2. ICo1 transfers business having a book value of 1,000 to ICo2, at fair price of 11,000. The business transfer is not tax neutral (i.e. it is taxable in India). However, in the present case, ICo1 does not pay any capital gains tax on the business transfer because ICo1 sets off capital loss incurred on account of the sale of shares of an associate. Thus, specific to this transaction, ICo1’s tax liability as per ITA is nil.

In ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts, as this is a common control business combination, ICo1 does not recognize any gain on business transfer, and ICo2 records business acquisition at a book value of 1,000. Absent recognition of a gain in the P&L account, there is no TUT liability concerning ICo1. Also, as discussed in the previous part of this article, the capital loss on account of sale of shares of an associate is ignored in computing GloBE income of ICo1. In other words, while such capital loss has gone to reduce capital gains tax liability as per ITA, such a capital loss does not enter the calculation of GloBE income (namely, the denominator of ETR).

As the business transfer is not tax-neutral, ICo2 is eligible for a cost step-up in computing taxable income as per ITA. In ‘fit for ‘consolidation’ accounts, ICo2 recognizes DTA to reflect tax benefit on account of higher depreciation u/s 32 of ITA on the stepped-up cost. In the present case, DTA recognized by ICo2 in the year of business acquisition is 2,500 (book to tax difference of 10,000 x 25 per cent tax rate). For GloBE calculations of ICo2, such generation of DTA will be recast to 1,500 at 15 per cent tax rate. As the generation of DTA reduces adjusted covered tax, there could be a potential TUT liability on this account, unless the same is shielded by other high-taxed incomes in India.

ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS FOR INTRA-GROUP ASSET TRANSFERS AFTER 30th NOVEMBER, 2021 BUT BEFORE APPLICABILITY OF GLoBE RULES

Article 9.1.3 provides that, in the case of intra-group asset transfers (i.e. amongst constituent entities of the same MNE Group) effected after 30th November, 20215 but before applicability of GloBE Rules, GloBE income of transferee will be calculated by taking into account the carrying values of transferor6.

5    30th November, 2021 is when GloBE Rules were expected to be published – though they actually got published on 20th December, 2021. Article 9.1.3 is a specific anti avoidance provision to control restructuring which may happen after 30th November 2021 but before applicability of GloBE Rules, with a view to dilute future GloBE TUT liability – while such restructuring by itself may not attract any immediate GloBE TUT liability because such restructuring happens when GloBE Rules are not yet effective.


6    Additionally, adjusted covered tax of transferee is computed by ignoring adjustments to deferred tax in books of transferee as a result of such intra-group asset transfers. This is also clarified by OECD Secretariat in virtual public consultation meeting held on 25th April, 2022.
The impact of article 9.1.3 is explained using a case study. Assume that, the FCo (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group), has two subsidiaries, IPCo1 in nil tax jurisdiction and IPCo2 in high-tax jurisdiction (having tax rate of 15 per cent). IPCo1 owns self-generated brand that has book value of zero and fair value of 10,000. On 1st April, 2022 (i.e. after 30th  November, 2021 but before GloBE Rules are effective), IPCo1 transfers the brand to IPCo2 for fair value of 10,000. IPCo2 annually receives royalty income of 5,000 on such brand.

IPCo2 amortizes the cost of such a brand in ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts as also in computation of taxable income at 2,000 per annum over 5 years. The taxable income of IPCo2 for local tax purposes (after deduction of brand amortization) is 3,000, and the local tax liability of IPCo2 at 15 per cent tax rate is 450.

In the absence of article 9.1.3, GloBE income of IPCo2 would have been computed at 3,000, after considering deduction on account of brand amortisation. ETR of IPCo2 would have been 15 per cent (i.e. 450 / 3,000) – and there would have been no GloBE TUT liability in respect of IPCo2.  

Article 9.1.3 provides that, in the present case, the GloBE income of IPCo2 should be based on the carrying value of IPCo1. As a result, the carrying value of the brand is zero in computing the GloBE income of IPCo2. Thus, GloBE income of IPCo2 is 5,000, after disallowing brand amortization of 2,000 per annum. The ETR of IPCo2 is 9 per cent (i.e. 450 / 5,000), which attracts GloBE TUT liability of 6 per cent on GloBE income of 5,000. Article 9.1.3, therefore, seeks to control the cost step-up by shifting the assets from low tax jurisdiction to high tax jurisdiction after 30th November, 2021 but before the applicability of GloBE Rules.7


7    Assuming such a brand transfer happens after GloBE Rules apply, in year of brand transfer, IPCo1 is likely to trigger immediate GloBE TUT liability at 15 per cent on gain of 10,000. In subsequent years, brand amortisation can be deducted in computing GloBE income of IPCo2.

Article 9.1.3 applies, irrespective of whether the intra-group transfer was for business and commercial considerations, such that the test of domestic General Anti Avoidance Rule and/or treaty PPT is passed. Article 9.1.3 applies regardless of whether the transferor and transferee are within the same or in different jurisdictions. However, it does not apply to transfers of inventory.

Article 9.1.3 is agnostic to what may have been the capital gains tax liability of the transferor in its jurisdiction in respect of the intra-group transfer. To illustrate, assuming that the aforesaid transaction of the brand transfer happened between two wholly owned subsidiaries of FCo in India, the transferor WOS may have discharged capital gains tax liability as per ITA on the transfer of self-generated brand at ~20 per cent. A literal application of article 9.1.3 may prevent transferee WOS from deducting brand amortization in computing GloBE income – which may result in GloBE TUT liability because brand amortization is deducted in computing taxable income as per ITA. Representations are made to the OECD to restrict the applicability of Article 9.1.3 to intra-group transfer that is tax exempt in the hands of the transferor, or where the transferor is in low tax jurisdiction. UK HMRC has also acknowledged significant uncertainty on this provision and has stated that this issue is to be raised as part of the GloBE implementation framework.

SPECIAL RULES FOR JOINT VENTURES UNDER GLoBE RULES8

To recollect, GloBE Rules are generally applicable to recover TUT in respect of subsidiaries consolidated on a line-by-line basis in consolidated financial statements of the ultimate parent entity. Under Ind-AS/IFRS, only those entities over which UPE has unitary control qualify for line-by-line consolidation. A joint venture (where both co-venturers have joint or shared control, either equally in a 50:50 stake or unequally in a 51:49 stake) is accounted for as per the equity method in CFS, and not as line-by-line consolidation.

As discussed in the previous article, in computing the GloBE income of the co-venturer, gain/loss as per equity method of the joint venture (as also gain/loss on disposal of shares of the joint venture) is excluded. However, where all the following conditions are satisfied, there are special provisions in GloBE Rules that require the co-venturer to bear TUT liability in respect of his proportionate interest in a joint venture:  

•    JV is an entity accounted for under the equity method in CFS of UPE; and

•    UPE of the co-venturer group directly or indirectly holds >= 50 per cent (i.e. at least 50 per cent) ownership interest
 in such JV; and

•    JV Group (namely, JV and subsidiaries of such JV) is not subject to GloBE Rules.

Where all the above conditions are satisfied, the co-venturer group is required to compute jurisdictional ETR and TUT of the JV Group by treating such JV Group as a separate MNE Group. In other words, assuming the co-venturer group has a WOS in the same jurisdiction as JV, the profit/loss and adjusted covered tax of such WOS cannot be blended with JV while determining jurisdictional ETR and TUT of JV Group.


8    Article 6.4
9    The term ‘ownership interest’ is separately defined under GloBE Rules.

The above concept can be better understood using the following illustration.
Assume that the MNE Group A and MNE Group B are two separate MNE Groups whose consolidated revenue as per CFS crosses €750 million and to whom GloBE Rules are applicable. These MNE Groups have come together and formed a JV Co where each MNE Group has an equal 50 per cent ownership interest. The JV Co is accounted for under equity method in the CFS of these MNE Groups.

The JV Co is merely a holding company which operates through three subsidiaries abroad having operations in zero tax jurisdiction, namely JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3. JV Sub 1 has profit of 10,000. JV Sub 2 has loss of 15,000. JV Sub 3 has profit of 20,000.

JV Co itself prepares CFS to consolidate the results of these subsidiaries, and consolidated revenue as per such CFS is < € 750 million.

In this case, all three conditions specified above are satisfied qua both MNE Groups A and B. Hence, special provisions in GloBE Rules for JV are applicable qua both MNE Groups A and B. As per these special provisions, the jurisdictional ETR/TUT for JV Co Group is calculated separately, as if the JV Co Group is a separate MNE Group – de-hors any subsidiaries that MNE Groups A and B may have in the jurisdiction of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3. For example, assuming MNE Group A has a WOS in the same jurisdiction as JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3, and such WOS incurs a loss of 15,000 – while the aggregate profit of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 is 15,000 – loss of such WOS cannot be blended while determining ETR/TUT of JV Group as the JV Group is deemed as a separate MNE Group.

As per these special provisions, the ultimate parent entity of each co-venturer group that satisfies the three conditions specified above, is subject to TUT liability to the extent of his proportionate ownership interest in JV Co Group. In the present case, jurisdictional ETR of the JV Co Group is zero and its jurisdictional TUT is 15,000 x 15 per cent = 2,250. The MNE Group A is subject to TUT liability of 1,125 and likewise, the MNE Group B is also subject to TUT liability of 1,125. As per top-down approach, if the jurisdiction of the ultimate parent entity of the co-venturer group has not implemented GloBE Rules, such TUT liability can be recovered from the intermediate parent of such co-venturer group which directly or indirectly holds joint ownership interest in JV Co.

Contrastingly, assuming MNE Groups A and B each held 50 per cent ownership interest directly in JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 (without any holding company such as JV Co in between), ETR and TUT liability would have been calculated separately in respect of each of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 – because each of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 would be considered as a separate MNE Group. In this case, for JV Sub 3, MNE Group A would have been subject to TUT liability of 1,500 (namely, jurisdictional profit of 20,000 x 15 per cent x 50 per cent) and for JV Sub 1, MNE Group A would have been subject to TUT liability of 750 (namely; 10,000 x 15 per cent x 50 per cent).

Contrastingly, where MNE Groups A and B each held only 49 per cent ownership interest in JV Co – the remaining 2 per cent held by a third party – the second condition (of holding at least 50 per cent ownership interest) is not satisfied qua both MNE Groups A and B. Hence, special provisions in GloBE Rules for JV are not applicable for both MNE Groups A and B. Hence, neither MNE Group A nor MNE Group B needs to pay TUT liability in respect of JV Co Group.

Contrastingly, where consolidated revenue as per JV cCo’s CFS itself is > € 750 million and the jurisdiction of JV Co has adopted GloBE Rules – the third condition is not satisfied. Hence, special provisions in GloBE Rules for JV are not applicable for both M NE Groups A and B. In this case, the JV Co Group itself becomes an in-scope MNE Group – and the JV Co pays TUT in respect of each of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 as per income inclusion rule. As TUT is recovered from JV Co itself, co-venturer groups are exempt from such TUT.

SPECIAL RULES FOR PEs UNDER GLoBE RULES

In order to ensure parity between different forms of overseas operations (whether through a subsidiary or through a branch), as well as to check the possibility of blending of low-taxed income earned in HO jurisdiction with high taxed income in jurisdiction where PE is situated, under the GloBE Rules, a PE is treated as a separate constituent entity, distinct from its HO or any other PE of such HO10.

In fact, HO with only one or more PEs can also constitute an MNE Group within scope of GloBE Rules even if there are no other subsidiaries (subject however to satisfaction of revenue threshold being >= € 750 million)11. For example, a large pharmaceutical MNE having only domestic manufacturing and R&D operations deriving revenue mainly from exports can constitute an MNE Group even in absence of overseas subsidiaries, if there are branch offices in overseas location/s which satisfy any of the four limbs of PE stated below.

What is a PE?12

For GloBE purposes, the term PE is defined broadly to have 4 legs (paragraphs) as below:

•    Para (a) – Treaty PE: Covers cases where a place of business is situated in the source jurisdiction, which is treated as a PE, following the applicable tax treaty (which has come into effect) between the HO-source jurisdiction and source jurisdiction taxes the income “attributable” to such PE in accordance with a provision “similar” to the business profits article of OECD Model Convention (MC) 2017 – irrespective of whether such applicable treaty between HO-source jurisdiction replicates the language or outcomes of Article 7 of OECD MC 2017. Treaty PE will typically include a Fixed PE and other forms of deemed PEs (like Service PE, Agency PE, Construction PE) which form a part of the HO-Source Jurisdiction tax treaty. However, cases where a place of business is not treated as a PE as per treaty due to a specific exception, such as the preparatory or auxiliary exception, may not be covered by Para (a). Similarly, the HO jurisdiction engaged in the operation of an aircraft in international traffic sets up a place of business in the source jurisdiction for such purpose, profits that are not taxed in the source jurisdiction due to specific exemption. This may not be covered by Para (a).


10    Article 1.3.1 and 1.3.2
11    Article 1.2.1 and 1.2.3
12    Article 10.1


•    Para (b) – Domestic PE: Covers cases where there is no tax treaty between the HO-source jurisdiction – and where the source jurisdiction has adopted a definition and taxation rules of PE (or a similar concept) in its domestic law, such that it taxes the income attributable to such PE on a net-basis, identical to the manner in which it taxes its residents. For example, business connection u/s 9(1) of ITA. Interesting questions may arise about whether Para (b) of the PE definition may extend to cover virtual presence (for example, SEP), assuming the same is taxed on a net basis.

•    Para (c) – Hypothetical PE: Covers cases where there is no tax treaty between the HO-source jurisdiction, and where the source jurisdiction does not have a corporate tax system, where a place of business in the source jurisdiction  would be treated as a PE under the OECD MC – and such PE would have been taxed under Article 7 dealing with business profits of such OECD MC13. Illustratively, this may be relevant for an HO in India which has a branch/presence/project in the Cayman Islands which passes the threshold of PE presence as per Article 5 of OECD MC 2017, which would have been taxed as per Article 7 of OECD MC 2017, but the Cayman Islands does not have a corporate tax system, and India does not have a treaty with Cayman Islands.


13    Interestingly, for this purpose, while the Model Rules define the OECD MC as referring to the 2017 update, the Commentary goes on to state that the “last version… of the year in which the analysis is made” to determine presence of PE

•    Para (d) – Stateless PE: This is a residual category applicable where none of the above legs of the PE definition are triggered, and yet, the HO jurisdiction exempts the income earned from activities in the source jurisdiction on account of their overseas nature and follows ?exemption method’ in order to provide relief from double taxation on such income. This category acknowledges that HO jurisdiction may provide exemption under domestic law for overseas operations in a situation where there is neither a treaty nor a domestic law in jurisdiction leading to double non-taxation for PE profits. A case where there is no treaty and no domestic tax law in source jurisdiction but HO jurisdiction does not provide exemption for overseas operations is covered by para (c) above – while Para (d) effectively deals with situations of double non-taxation as illustrated above.

Importantly, as contradistinguished from other types of PEs covered by Paras (a) to (c) above, a PE covered by Para (d) is considered stateless of the GloBE Rules, meaning that the income of the PE would be subject to the GloBE Rules on a standalone basis without the benefit of jurisdictional blending with profits/ losses of other constituent entities located either in HO or in source jurisdiction.

Generally, a PE is located in the jurisdiction where it is treated as a PE, and is subject to tax14 [except in case of Stateless PE at Para (d) of the definition above].

Determination of ETR of PE

Considering that the concept of PE is found in the taxation laws rather than in accounting (as is also acknowledged by the Commentary), accounts may typically not treat the profits of a PE any differently than the profits of HO jurisdiction, leading to questions on the determination of ETR especially in cases where any separate financial accounts of PE do not exist. Accordingly, GloBE Rules have special provisions for the same as below:

•  Determination of GloBE income of PE15

For types of PEs covered by paras (a) to (c) above, the starting point for determining GloBE income of PE is income or loss of PE as per separate financial accounts on a standalone basis prepared by the PE (either prepared or required to be prepared specifically for computing GloBE income) based on accounting standards used in CFS of UPE.


14    Article 10.3.3
15    Article 3.4 of the Model Rules

Thereafter, specified adjustments are made to arrive at GloBE income, based on the types of PEs described above, which may be tabulated as below:

Clause

Type of
PE

Adjustments
to determine GloBE income of PE

(a)

Treaty PE

Adjusted, if
necessary, to reflect only incomes and expenses
“attributable”
to the PE in accordance with relevant tax treaty
[for Para (a) PE] or domestic tax law of source jurisdiction [for Para (b)
PE] respectively
irrespective of the actual profits offered or subjected
to tax (say, – effects on account of disallowances as per domestic tax law
such as s.43B or accelerated depreciation in source jurisdiction are ignored
for determining GloBE income).

(b)

Domestic PE
(where corporate income tax law exists but no treaty)

(c)

Hypothetical
PE (no treaty and no corporate income tax law exists)

Adjusted, if
necessary, to reflect only incomes and expenses that would have been
“attributable” to the PE as per Article 7 of the OECD MC dealing with business
profits, which requires attribution based on functions performed, assets used
and risks undertaken.

In all such cases, any amount attributed to the PE and considered for GloBE income determination of PE is to be generally excluded16 while determining the GloBE income of HO.

For a stateless PE, GloBE income is the income exempted as per domestic tax laws of the HO jurisdiction, attributable to operations conducted overseas (namely; outside the HO jurisdiction). The expenses, which can be deducted against such income are those which are not deducted as per domestic tax laws of the HO jurisdiction. However,  nevertheless, they are attributable to operations conducted overseas.

 • Determination of Adjusted Covered Taxes of PE17

Tax paid on the income attributable to the PE as enumerated above (even if paid by the HO in the HO jurisdiction), is also allocated to the PE and considered for the determination of ETR of the location of the PE namely; the source jurisdiction18 [except in Para (d) PE namely; Stateless PE which does not qualify for jurisdictional blending]. In this regard, the determination of taxes paid in the HO jurisdiction related to the PE may be a complex exercise and is acknowledged by the Commentary as needing further work.

• Miscellaneous

The parameters of employees and tangible assets located in PE jurisdiction are not taken into account while computing the allocation keys for UTPR liability19 and substance-based income exclusion20 of HO jurisdiction.


16    In the context of jurisdictions like India which may permit HO to set-off losses of a PE, special rules are provided in Article 3.4.5 for allocation of income of the PE in future years. On a similar note, tax adjustments for determination of ETR in such case are also given at Article 4.3.4.
17    Article 4.3
18    Understandably, cross-border allocation is not a feature of Stateless PE as defined in Para (d) of the definition, as such PE in fact is identified based on exemption provided by the HO jurisdiction.
19    Refer Definition of Number of Employees and Tangible Assets at Article 10.1.
20    Refer Article 5.3.6


Case study on PE and presumptive taxation

Facts: To illustrate, assume FCo of Germany, part of an in-scope MNE Group for GloBE Rules, has a project office (PO) in India providing services in connection with extractive activities in the crude oil sector.

*FCo is part of in-scope MNE Group providing services in India  in connection with extractive activities in the crude oil sector.

Gross receipts of FCo from operations in India is 1,000. In India, FCo offers income to tax on presumptive basis u/s 44BB which deems profit from such operations to be 10 per cent of the gross income i.e. 100. Accordingly, corporate tax paid by FCo in India at 40 per cent21 is 40.

FCo has not availed the opportunity u/s 44BB(3) to offer a lower amount of income to tax in India. Accordingly, the FCo does not maintain any books of accounts in India. While FCo is required to maintain financial statements in Germany in accordance with German Accounting Standards, such financial statements do not require separate identification of revenue and expenditure attributable to the PE.


21    Approximate tax rates have been taken for ease of computation.

Based on internal MIS, the following revenue and expenditure is found attributable to the PE:

Particulars

Expenses

Particulars

Income

Direct expenses

400

Gross Revenue

1,000

Indirect expenses allocated by HO

200

 

 

Net profit (Bal Fig.)

400

 

 

Under the German domestic tax law, PE profits are exempt from tax. As per German domestic tax law, such PE profits are computed at 500.

Analysis: Para (a) of PE definition requires the following conditions to be satisfied for existence of PE thereunder:

•   Existence of place of business/deemed place of business.

•   Treatment as PE in accordance with relevant treaty (namely India-Germany) in force.

•   Source jurisdiction (namely India) to tax income “attributable” to PE in accordance with provisions “similar” to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017.

In this regard, there presently exist ambiguities whether presumptive taxation provisions in India as per s.44BB satisfies the last condition of taxation similar to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017. To recollect, taxation should be as per provision “similar” to and not “same as” Article 7 of OECD MC 2017. As per commentary, “similar” does not require the source jurisdiction “to replicate the language or outcomes” of Article 7 of OECD MC 2017, and can cover treaties based on OECD MC 2010 and UN MC 201722. Whether s.44BB merely provides an alternative mechanism for taxation of income “attributable” to PE which is “similar” to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017 resulting in satisfaction of Para (a) of the PE definition, or, does s.44BB go beyond that (and does not satisfy condition of being “similar” to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017), can be a matter of debate.


22    Refer para 102, pg. 210 of commentary.

Where, the conditions of Para (a) of PE definition are met, as indicated in the table above, the start point of GloBE income for Para (a) of PE definition is income or loss as per separate financial accounts of PE, as adjusted, if necessary, to reflect only incomes and expenses “attributable” to the PE in accordance with India-Germany treaty. The parameters of taxation as per domestic tax laws of source jurisdiction (India) as well as of HO jurisdiction (Germany) are irrelevant. S.44BB only determines taxable income, whereas GloBE income of PE needs to be based on revenue and expenses “attributable” to PE as per accounting principles as further adjusted in accordance with business profits article of relevant treaty. Accordingly, GloBE income of PE will be 400 and ETR 10 per cent (40/ 400). This may attract TUT liability at 5 per cent.

Alternatively, where conditions of Para (a) of PE definition are not met since taxation as per s.44BB is not considered to be “similar” to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017, Para (d) of PE definition namely; Stateless PE will trigger. In such case of Stateless PE, GloBE income will be amount exempted as per domestic tax laws of Germany i.e. 500. In such case, ETR is 8 per cent (40/500). This may attract TUT liability at 7 per cent. Again, for the purposes of Stateless PE, parameters of taxation as per domestic tax laws of source jurisdiction (India) are irrelevant.

DE MINIMIS EXCLUSION FOR THE JURISDICTION23

To avoid compliance burden of applying GloBE to all jurisdictions, jurisdictions having, in aggregate, average GloBE revenue of < € 10 million [Rs. ~80 Cr.] and average GloBE income < € 1 million [Rs. ~8 Cr.] or loss are excluded. The parameters of all CEs in a jurisdiction needs to be aggregated for testing this threshold.

To evaluate if this exclusion is applicable, MNE would need to compute GloBE revenue and GloBE income for the jurisdiction. The reference point is therefore income/revenue as adjusted for GloBE purposes. To minimize volatility, the exclusion is linked to average, determined by adopting simple average for current and preceding two fiscal years. In the computation of average:

•    Fiscal years that are not GloBE years (i.e. when GloBE Rules did not apply to the MNE – either because they are before applicability of GloBE Rules to in-scope MNE or because € 750 million threshold is not crossed) are excluded.

•    Fiscal years in which MNE had no presence in the jurisdiction (due to absence of CEs or such CEs were dormant) are also excluded.

To illustrate, for a newly formed MNE (to whom GloBE Rules did not apply in the past), a 3-year average may not be needed and GloBE revenue/income for evaluating the above exclusion is based on the current year alone. For year 2, the above exclusion is based on 2-year average i.e. current year as also preceding year.


23    Article 5.5


IMPLEMENTATION AND ADMINISTRATION – ACHIEVES THE PROFESSED OBJECT OF SIMPLICITY AND CERTAINTY?
Recognizing the gargantuan nature of BEPS 2.0 project potentially impacting MNE Groups worldwide, right from the initial days, OECD has time and again emphasized on the need for simplicity, certainty and objectivity, to ensure that business and growth is not stifled. Despite this, one may nevertheless perceive (and perhaps, justifiably) that the final shape taken by the GloBE Rules inherently necessitates a huge compliance burden on MNE Groups.

Every MNE Group is required to file a GloBE Information Return (GIR). While GIR needs to be filed only once internationally24, such GIR requires myriad data points, some of which are not otherwise captured for local tax or financial reporting purposes. Some of the data which is required to be filed in GIR are:

•    Data available from financial accounts: Revenue, deferred tax, profits, dividend and capital gains on investments, etc.

•    Data available from income tax filings: Income tax accrued, PE status of branches, WHT and dividend tax, ALP in respect of intra-group transactions, business reorganizations, income tax accrued in respect of incomes excluded from GloBE income, etc.

•    Other data specifically collected for GloBE Rules: whether provision for DTL has reversed within 5 years, recast DTA/DTL to 15 per cent tax rate, maintain track of DTA for tax loss recognized and reversed under GloBE Rules, maintain track of various elections and choices under the GloBE Rules, standalone financial results of PE, determine ownership interest in the constituent entity for  computing TUT liability, etc.


24    The jurisdiction where such GIR is filed needs to automatically share this information with all other jurisdictions where MNE Group operates [Article 8.1].

The authors believe that there are at least 50 data points which need to be computed and tracked exclusively for GloBE compliance. Various industry representatives have also alluded to the army of personnel required to ensure GloBE compliance.

While, at a conceptual level, this compliance burden is sought to be alleviated through the application of objective safe harbours, the actual design of such safe havens may be presently unclear and awaits clarity. The need to balance the request for simplicity by MNE Groups with the desire of tax authorities to ensure at least 15 per cent tax in each jurisdiction without leakage is a tightrope that OECD/BEPS IF needs to balance.

The Commentary gives many indications to evince that OECD/BEPS IF shall continually handhold implementation by developing a GloBE Implementation Framework and an Agreed Administrative Guidance, to guide jurisdictions for coherent and consistent implementation of GloBE Rules.

In this backdrop, as per ‘OECD’s economic analysis, GloBE Rules are estimated to generate $150 billion of additional tax revenues per year. One may wonder if this revenue is commensurate with the enhanced compliance costs and significant efforts that implementation of GloBE Rules may entail.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Considering the above, despite the OECD/BEPS IF setting an ambitious timeline of 2023 for implementation of the IIR, and 2024 for the implementation of the UTPR, various concerns have arisen over the short and ambitious implementation timeline, which may not have adequately factored in impact of such over-arching measures.

These concerns are evident from stalling of legislative developments within the US and EU. To address these concerns, the EU was the first to shift the timeline for implementation by a year – which is now also being replicated across jurisdictions like UK and Hong Kong.

Nonetheless, various jurisdictions (illustratively, Mauritius, Switzerland and Korea) are well ahead of the curve to legislate the GloBE Rules, and a plethora of other jurisdictions (such as Germany, France, Netherlands, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia) have indicated their intention to adopt GloBE Rules.

However, despite the growing acceptability of the GloBE Rules, Indian tax authorities, despite India being a signatory to the agreement of BEPS, that  released in July and October 2021, has not released any official statement stating India’s position on GloBE Rules. Rather, the focus of the Indian Government seems to be on the implementation of Pillar 1 and subject-to-tax rules (STTR). To an impartial observer, it may seem that India is on a wait-and-watch mode. Perhaps implementation may happen only after further guidance and clarifications are made available from OECD/BEPS IF.

[The authors are thankful to CA Geeta D. Jani and CS Aastha Jain (LLB) for their guidance and support.]

Charitable Trusts – Recent Amendments Pertaining to Books of Accounts and Other Documents – Part I

INTRODUCTION
Section
12A(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act 1961 (“the Act”) has been amended by
the Finance Act, 2022 w.e.f the assessment year 2023-24 to provide that a
charitable institution claiming exemption u/s 11 and 12 shall keep and
maintain books of account and other documents (“books of
account/documents”) in such form and manner and at such place, as may be
provided by rules.

BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE SECTION

(a)  
 On a literal reading, even a solitary point of difference between the
assessee and the Assessing Officer (“AO”) as to whether prescribed
books/documents are maintained or whether they are maintained at the
prescribed place or whether they are maintained in the prescribed form
or in the prescribed manner can result in denial of exemption u/s 11/12
and taxation u/s 13(10). On the other hand, it has been held that “when
there is general and substantive compliance with the provisions of a
rule, it is sufficient.” [CIT vs. Leroy Somer and Controls India (P.)
Ltd., (2014) 360 ITR 532 (Del),
cited in Worlds Window Impex (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT, (2016) 69 taxmann.com 406 (Del.-Trib.)]

Also see:

•    Arvind Bhartiya Vidhyalya Samiti vs. ACIT, (2008) 115 TTJ 351 (Jaipur)

•    CIT vs. Tarnetar Corporation, (2014) 362 ITR 174 (Guj)

•    CIT vs. Sawyer’s Asia Ltd., (1980) 122 ITR 259 (Bom)

•    CIT vs. Harit Synthetic Fabrics (P.) Ltd., (1986) 162 ITR 640 (Bom)

Applying
the principle, it could be argued that if there is substantial
compliance with the prescribed rule, then exemption u/s 11 cannot be
denied. Further, it is also a moot point as to whether it could be
argued that having regard to the onerous consequences, the AO should
give an opportunity to the assessee to make good the deficiency and only
if the assessee fails to do so that the AO should deny the exemption
u/s 11.

(b)    While books of account should be maintained
regularly as a good practice, there is no provision requiring the other
documents/records to be maintained contemporaneously. Also, there is no
provision prohibiting correction in the records.

RULE 17AA

The
CBDT has notified Rule 17AA (“the Rule”) specifying the books of
accounts and other documents to be maintained by a charitable
institution. [Notification No. 94/2022 dated 10th August, 2022 under the Income-tax (24th Amendment) Rules, 2022]

This article analyses the said Rule, which contains more than 50 requirements.

Brief analysis of the Rule as a whole

The
Rule requires record keeping of various receipts/payments in respect of
which, Courts/Tribunal could have taken different views and hence,
there could be a controversy as to their scope. To illustrate, the Rule
requires records of application of income outside India. For this
purpose, Courts/Tribunal are divided on what constitutes the application
of income “outside India”. Thus, in such cases, if the assessee adopts a
favourable interpretation based on a judicial precedent which is not
accepted by the tax department, the AO may hold that proper documents
have not been maintained. To mitigate this exposure, it is advisable
that the assessee keeps notes explaining why it has considered or not
considered a particular receipt/payment under the relevant Rule. Such
notes may be kept along with the record to which it is applicable.
Difficulty may arise if a subsequent ruling of the Courts/Tribunal takes
a view different from what has been adopted hitherto by the assessee in
maintaining the records. In such circumstances, the assessee may
continue the old practice with a note that the interpretation based on
the judgment has not been followed by it. In the alternative, the
assessee could maintain specified information with a note that it is
maintained without prejudice to its claim to the contrary.

Difference between amount as per records and as per computation of income for return of income: whether permissible?

Suppose
the assessee has maintained records on a particular basis, but for the
return of income, he is advised to adopt a different basis favourable to
him. For the following reasons, it appears that the assessee can adopt
such different basis:

•    If a particular income is not
taxable under the Income-tax Act, it cannot be taxed on the basis of
estoppel or any other equitable doctrine. [CIT vs. V. Mr. P. Firm, Muar,
(1965) 56 ITR 67 (SC); Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. JCIT, (2015) 7 SCC 540].
Hence, the assessee is not estopped from offering correct income instead of the income as per the documents maintained by him.

•    The AO is duty bound to guide the assessee and compute the correct income. See

•    CBDT Circular No. 14 of 1955.

•    CIT vs. Mahalaxmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., (1986) 27 Taxman 267 (SC).

If
the AO is duty bound to assess the correct income, surely, he is duty
bound to accept the right of the assessee to offer correct income
contrary to what is ascertained on the basis of the documents maintained
by him.

•    It is now well settled that an additional ground not raised before the AO can be raised before CIT(A) [Jute Corporation of India Ltd vs. CIT, (1991) taxmann.com 30 (SC)] and subject to fulfillment of conditions, a claim could be made for the first time before the Tribunal [see National
Thermal Power Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1998) 229 ITR 383 (SC), Ahmedabad
Electricity Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1993) 199 ITR 351 (Bom)].

If
claim could be made for the first time before appellate authorities,
there is no reason why a claim contrary to documents/records maintained
may not be made in the return of income.

Date from which the Rule is applicable

The Rule has “come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette”,
that is, 10th August, 2022. Since the Rule will be in force on the
first day of the A.Y. 2023-24, it may be contended that it is applicable
throughout the relevant previous year, that is, 1st April, 2022 to 31st
March, 2023. In other words, the books/documents are required to be
maintained for the entire period from 1st April, 2022. It could be
argued for the following reasons, that the Rule cannot apply to the
period prior to 10th August, 2022:

•    Section 295(4) provides
that a rule cannot have retrospective effect unless it is permitted
expressly or by necessary implication. In the instant case, the Rule
expressly mentions that it shall come into force from the date of
publication in the Official Gazette; in view of this express statement,
it appears that the condition for a Rule having a retrospective effect
is not satisfied by Rule 17AA.

•    The Supreme Court has observed as follows:

•    every
statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by
necessary implication made to have retrospective operations. [CIT vs.
Essar Teleholdings Ltd., (2018) 90 taxmann.com 2 (SC)]
(in the context of rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules);

•   
… one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a
legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective
operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern
current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the
past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of
today and in force and not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it. [CIT vs. Vatika Township P. Ltd., (2014) 367 ITR 466 (SC)].

In view of the above, the Rule cannot be said to require maintenance of books/documents for the period up to 10th August, 2022.

•  
 It appears that whenever a rule has to have a retrospective effect, it
clearly states that it shall come into force from a prior date.
Further, the Explanatory Memorandum in Notification dated 30th June,
2020 containing the Income-tax (15th Amendment) Rules, 2020 and
Notification dated 29th December, 2021 containing the Income-tax (35th
Amendment) Rules, 2021 also mention that the relevant rules have a
retrospective effect. It is pertinent that no such reference is made in
Rule 17AA. Further, the Rule explicitly states that it shall come into
force from the date of publication of Gazette; if it was to have
retrospective effect, it would have clearly stated 1st April, 2022.

Section
44AA(3) provides that the Board may prescribe the books of account and
other documents to be kept and maintained, the particulars to be
contained therein and the form and the manner in which and the place at
which they shall be kept and maintained. On the other hand, section
12A(b)(i) reads as follows:

(i) the books of account and other
documents have been kept and maintained in such form and manner and at
such place, as may be prescribed;

Thus, unlike section
44AA(3), section 12A(b)(i) does not provide for books/documents or the
particulars to be contained therein to be prescribed. It is a moot point
as to whether to the extent Rule 17AA requires the said details, it
conflicts with the section.

It may be noted that the Memorandum to Finance Bill 2022 reads as follows:
“However,
there is no specific provision under the Act providing for the books of
accounts to be maintained by such trusts or institutions…”.

Thus,
the Memorandum suggests that the amendment would list the books of
accounts to be maintained. However, an Explanatory Memorandum is usually
‘not an accurate guide of the final Act’, [Shashikant Laxman Kale vs. UOI, (1990) 185 ITR 104 (SC); Also see Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1994) 210 ITR 69 (Bom)]. Hence, it could be argued that a mere statement in Memorandum cannot override the Act.

The clauses of the Rule are now analysed, after reproducing the relevant text.

Rule 17AA(1)(a)(Text)

“Books of account and other documents to be kept and maintained—

(1)
Every fund or institution or trust or any university or other
educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution
which is required to keep and maintain books of account and other
documents under clause (a) of the tenth proviso to clause (23C) of
section 10 of the Act or sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1)
of section 12A of the Act shall keep and maintain the following,
namely:-

(a)    books of account, including the following, namely….”

(i)    cash book;

(ii)    ledger;

(iii)    journal;

(iv)  
 copies of bills, whether machine numbered or otherwise serially
numbered, wherever such bills are issued by the assessee, and copies or
counterfoils of machine numbered or otherwise serially numbered receipts
issued by the assessee;

(v)    original bills wherever issued to the person and receipts in respect of payments made by the person;

(vi)  
 any other book that may be required to be maintained in order to give a
true and fair view of the state of the affairs of the person and
explain the transactions effected;

Analysis

Clause
(a), on a literal reading, is an inclusive provision which means that it
includes not only the specified books of accounts but also any other
book which is understood in normal accounting parlance as books of
account. This makes the definition highly subjective (what is “books of
accounts” in normal parlance?) and may result in litigation. For
instance, there could be a case where the assessee may have maintained
the books specified in Rule 17AA(1)(a). However, the AO may be of the
view that the assessee has not maintained certain other books/documents
which are not specifically mentioned but which, in his opinion, are
books of account in normal parlance and are necessary.

As against the above, it could be argued that the definition is exhaustive, on the basis of the following reasons:

•    The Supreme Court has observed that “it is possible that in some context the word “includes” might import that the enumeration in exhaustive”. [Smt. Ujjam Bai vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621].

•  
 Rule 17AA(a)(vi) is a residuary clause which requires any “other” book
to give a true and fair view. The use of the expression “any other”
suggests that the list is exhaustive.

•    The clause uses the expression “namely” and it has been held that “… use
of the expression ‘namely’, … followed by the description of goods is
usually exhaustive unless there are strong indications to the contrary”.
[Mahindra Engineering and Chemical Products Ltd. vs. UOI, (1992) 1 SCR 254 (SC)].

Diaries or bundles of sheets are not books of account.

A mere collection of sheets or diaries cannot be regarded as books of account.

Please see:

•  
 A book which merely contains entries of items of which no account is
made at any time, is not a “book of account” in a commercial sense. [Sheraton Apparels vs. ACIT, (2002) 256 ITR 20 (Bom)]

•  
 A book of account… must have the characteristic of being fool-proof.
A bundle of sheets detachable and replaceable at a moment’s pleasure
can hardly be characterized as a book of account. [Zenna Sorabji vs. Mirabelle Hotel Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1981 Bom 446]

Bills and receipts in respect of income [Rule 17AA(1)(a)(iv)]

This sub-clause refers to income of the assessee.

Paraphrasing, books of account include:

•    copies of bills issued by the assessee where the  bills have to be machine numbered or serially numbered; and

•  
 copies of receipts or counterfoils of receipts issued by the assessee
where the receipts or counterfoils, as the case may be, have to be
machine numbered or serially numbered.

The expression “bills issued by the assessee” is wide enough to include bills.

•    in respect of sale of capital assets;
•    arising in the course of business or otherwise; and
•    not paid by the counterparty.

“Receipts” include those in respect of

•    payment received against sale of goods/services by the charitable institution; and

•    donations received.

In
the context, the expression “wherever” means in any case or in any
circumstances in which a bill is issued; in other words, books of
account include only those bills which are issued: it does not mean that
the assessee should always issue bills.

Bill

The expression ‘bill’ is an itemized account of the separate cost of goods sold, services rendered, or work done: Invoice
[Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, page 84]. In the context
of this sub-clause, ‘bill’ means an invoice for goods sold or services
rendered, or work done and should include a cash memo [see CST vs. Krishna Brick Field, (1985) 58 STC 336 (All)].

Original bills and receipts [Rule 17AA(1)(a)(v)]

In
the previous sub-clause, it is stated that books of account include
copies of bills issued by “the assessee” whereas this sub-clause
requires original bills issued to “the person”; it appears that the word
“person” here refers to the assessee himself and not a third party.
With this interpretation, the preceding sub-clause and this sub-clause
become complementary to each other: one covering income/receipts and
other covering expenditure/payments.

The term “payment bills” and
“receipts” are wide enough to cover revenue expenditure and capital
expenditure. On a literal reading, even bills for purchase of
investments, such as debentures, are covered.

Any other book in order to give a true and fair view and explain the transactions effected [Rule 17AA(1)(a)(vi)]

This
requirement is similar to the requirement in section 128(1) of the
Companies Act 2013. However, Rule 6F, prescribing books for
professionals, does not have such a requirement.

Rule 17AA(1)(b)(Text)

Books of account, as referred in clause (a), for business undertaking referred in sub-section (4) of section 11 of the Act.

Analysis

This
clause requires books of accounts for a business undertaking referred
to in section 11(4). It requires separate books of accounts for every
business undertaking owned by the assessee.

The term “business undertaking” is not defined in the Act.

“Business” is defined in section 2(13) as includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture;

Business ordinarily involves profit motive. See:

•    DIT(E) vs. Gujarat Cricket Association, (2019) 419 ITR 561 (Guj)

•    CIT(E) vs. India Habitat Centre, (2020) (1) TMI 21 – Delhi HC,

•    DIT(E) vs. Shree Nashik Panchvati Panjrapole, (2017) 81 taxmann.com 375 (Bom)]

The terms “undertaking/industrial undertaking” have been judicially explained as follows:

•  
 the existence of all the facilities including factory buildings,
plant, machinery, godowns and things which are incidental to the
carrying on of manufacture or production, all of which when taken
together are capable of being regarded as an industrial undertaking [CIT vs. Premier Cotton Mills Ltd., (1999) 240 ITR 434 (Mad)].

•    ‘Undertaking’ in common parlance means an ‘enterprise’, ‘venture’ and ‘engagement’. (Websters Dictionary). [P. Alikunju vs. CIT, (1987) 166 ITR 804 (Ker)].

Hence,
the expression “business undertaking” should mean an enterprise with
various assets and which is carried on with profit motive.

The
books of account are required to be maintained in order to be eligible
to claim an exemption u/s 11 [section 12A(1)]. If the business is such
that proviso to section 2(15) applies then there is no question of
obtaining the benefit of section 11 and maintaining the books is
irrelevant. However, on a literal reading, books of accounts are
required for every business undertaking, whether or not the profits of
the business undertaking are exempt under proviso to section 2(15).

The provision applies whether or not the profits of the business undertaking are exempt u/s 11(4A).

All
business undertakings irrespective of the object, that is, whether in
the course of medical relief or education or yoga or advancement of
general public utility, are covered by the clause.

Rule 17AA(1)(c)(Text)

Books
of account, as referred in clause (a), for business carried on by the
assessee other than the business undertaking referred in sub-section (4)
of section 11 of the Act;
[Rule 17AA(1)(c)].

Analysis

On
a plain reading, it refers to a business which is not carried on
through an undertaking. To illustrate, a one-off adventure in the nature
of trade could be regarded as a business; however, it may not be
carried on through an undertaking. The clause requires separate books of
accounts for such a business. Even in this case, it appears that the
profit motive ought to be there before the activity can be regarded as a
business.

The provision requires separate books of accounts for every business of the assessee.

On a literal reading, the provision covers all businesses:

(a)    whether or not the profits of the business are exempt under proviso to section 2(15) or u/s 11(4A); and

(b)    irrespective of the object pursuant to which the business is set up.

Rule 17AA(1)(d)(i)(Text)

(d) other documents for maintaining

(i) record of all the projects and institutions run by the person containing details of their name, address and objectives;

Analysis

This clause refers to “other documents”, which term has been explained by High Court as follows:

The
authorities can require production of accounts and other documents. The
words “other documents” in the section are vague and indefinite. Under
the Rules of construction of statutes, where general words follow
particular words, the general words will have to be construed in the
light of particular words. … the ejusdem generis Rule. Therefore, “other
documents” will be in the nature of account books, bill books etc.,
that have some relation to the accounts and not any correspondence etc. [P. K. Adimoolam Chettiar, In Re (1957) 8 STC 741 (Mad.)].

Applying
the principle, it appears that the provision enables the CBDT to
prescribe only those documents having some relation to books of account
and not any other correspondence, paper, documents etc.

The term “document” is defined in section 3(18) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as follows:
…
“document”
shall include any matter written, expressed or described upon any
substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of
those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used, for the
purpose or recording that matter.

Projects and institutions

The requirements under this sub-clause are perhaps, pursuant to section 2(15), section 11(4) and section 11(4A).

Project

The
term ‘project’ is neither defined in the Act nor used in section 11 to
section 13. In ITR – 7, the details of projects are required, although
even in the ITR the term is not explained. In the absence of a clear
definition, there could be conflicting views between the assessee and
the tax department as to what constitutes a ‘project’.

According to the dictionary, a project means ‘A
set of activities intended to produce a specific output, which has a
definite beginning and end. The activities are interrelated and must be
brought together in a particular order, based on precedence
relationships between the different activities. Examples of projects
include the building of the Channel Tunnel and the design of a computer
system for an ambulance service. Projects are usually based on bringing
together teams of specialists within relatively temporary management
structures. Project management techniques are increasingly being used to
manage such tasks as the introduction of total quality management
within organizations.
[Oxford’s Dictionary of Business and Management, pages 423 and 424].

Every project undertaken will have to be included since there is no de minimus clause.

Institution

Section 2(24)(iia) covers ‘institution’ established wholly or partly for charitable purposes.

The term “institution” has not been defined in the Act. It has been judicially explained as follows:
In
the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume V at page 354, the word
“institution” is defined to mean “an establishment, organisation, or
association, instituted for the promotion of some object, especially one
of public or general utility, religious, charitable, educational, etc.”

[CIT
vs. Sindhu Vidya Mandal Trust, (1983) 142 ITR 633 (Guj); Mangilal
Gotawat Charitable Trust vs. CIT, (1985) 20 Taxman 207 (Kar)].

The term would include schools, colleges, hospitals, etc.

Rule 17AA(1)(d)(ii)(Text)

record of income of the person during the previous year, in respect of, –

(I)  
 voluntary contribution containing details of name of the donor,
address, permanent account number (if available) and Aadhaar number (if
available);

(II)    income from property held under trust referred to under section 11 of the Act along with list of such properties;

(III)  
 income of fund or institution or trust or any university or other
educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution
other than the contribution referred in items (I) and (II);

Analysis

This
sub-clause requires maintenance of record of income during the previous
year. It applies only in the case of “income” and not receipts not
constituting income.

Voluntary contribution containing details of name of the donor, etc. [Item (I)]

The
requirement under this item is pursuant to section 11(1), including
section 11(1)(d) and section 115BBC (anonymous donations).

PAN and Aadhar number are to be recorded if available. Hence, they are not mandatory.

The
requirement regarding the name and address of donors also applies to a
religious trust, which gets donations in its donation box. In such
circumstances, obviously, it will not be possible for the Trust to
maintain such details and it should suffice if the assessee mentions
this fact. It may be noted that even section 115BBC, which deals with
anonymous donations, does not apply to a wholly religious trust.

The
requirement covers contributions in kind. Now, strictly speaking,
offerings in kind in a temple constitute voluntary contribution and
hence income (see CBDT Circular No. 580 dated 14th September, 1990).
There is no de minimis clause and to take an extreme example, all offerings made in a temple such as coconuts, pedhas,
etc. also constitute income whose details have to be recorded!
Similarly, record for donation of even rupees ten have to be collated!

Details of all voluntary contributions, corpus as well as non-corpus, are required.

It
appears that the documents supporting these details are not required to
be maintained; to illustrate, a photocopy of the Aadhar card is not
required to be maintained.

Income from property held under trust along with list of such properties; [Item (II)]

Section
12(1) provides that voluntary contributions (other than corpus
donations) shall, for the purposes of section 11, be deemed to be
“income derived from property held under trust”. On the other hand, this
item refers to “income from property held under trust”. Again,
voluntary contributions are already covered by Item I. Hence, for the
purpose of this item, the expression “income from property held under
trust” does not include voluntary contributions.

The term ‘property held under trust’ is very wide and includes:

(a) income earned by it in the course of carrying out its objects.

(b) assets acquired out of such income referred to in (i) above or out of donations received by it. [ACIT vs. Etawah District Exhibition and Cattle Fair Association, (1978) 1978 CTR 166 (All)]

Thus,
even an FD is ‘property held under trust’. Any change, such as
withdrawal of FD, would require alteration in the ‘list of such
properties’.

Property held under trust includes assets invested u/s 11(2).

The requirement under this item is also partially repeated in the following clause/sub-clause/item:

• (d)(iii)(VI)

• (d)(iv)(IV)/(V)

• (d)(v)(VI)/(VII)

Income other than the contribution referred in Items (I) and (II); [Item III]

The
requirement in this Item applies to all institutions including
religious trusts, which get donations in their donation box. It will
include anonymous donations.

Rule 17AA(1)(d)(iii)(Text)

(iii) record of the following, out of the income of the person during the previous year, namely:

(I)  
 application of income, in India, containing details of amount of
application, name and address of the person to whom any credit or
payment is made and the object for which such application is made;

(II)  
 amount credited or paid to any fund or institution or trust or any
university or other educational institution or any hospital or other
medical institution referred to in sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or
sub-clause (vi) or sub-clause (via) of clause (23C) of section 10 of the
Act or other trust or institution registered under section 12AB of the
Act, containing details of their name, address, permanent account number
and the object for which such credit or payment is made;

(III)  
 application of income outside India containing details of amount of
application, name and address of the person to whom any credit or
payment is made and the object for which such application is made;

(IV)  
 deemed application of income referred in clause (2) of Explanation 1
of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act containing details of the
reason for availing such deemed application;

(V)    income
accumulated or set apart as per the provisions of the Explanation 3 to
the third proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or sub-section (2) of
section 11 of the Act which has not been applied or deemed to be applied
containing details of the purpose for which such income has been
accumulated;

(VI)    money invested or deposited in the forms and modes specified in sub-section (5) of section 11 of the Act;

(VII)  
 money invested or deposited in the forms and modes other than those
specified in subsection (5) of section 11 of the Act;

Analysis

The
requirement under this item is pursuant to section 11(1), Explanation
1(2), Explanation 2, 3, 4 to section 11(1), 11(2), 11(5), etc.

Its main purpose is to identify the amount of application of income which is allowable u/s 11(1)(a).

Out of “income of the previous year”

It appears that for this purpose income excludes “corpus donations” received by the assessee and treated as exempt u/s 11(1)(d).

The
expression “income of the previous year”, used in this clause can lead
to computational issues. To illustrate, if a payment is made on 1st
April, is it out of the income of the previous year? Again, in the case
of mixed funds (income for the year as well as accumulated income,
corpus donations, borrowing, etc.), how to determine which fund has been
applied? Three principles set out by judgments are explained below:

•    In Siddaramanna Charities Trust vs. CIT [(1974) 96 ITR 275 (Mys)],
donation was made by the assesse on the first day of the accounting
year; The Court noticed that during the relevant previous year, there
was a profit and the sum donated was less than the amount of the
profits. It was also not shown that the said amount was paid out of the
capital account. Hence, it was held that the said donation was
application of income of the previous year, although when the donation
was given on the first day there was no profit of the previous year.

•    In Infosys Science Foundation vs. ITO(E), TS-453-ITAT-2018(Bang),
it has been held that once income is accumulated u/s 11(2) [say, in
year 1], the assessee can claim that application of income in year 2
should be split into two: initially, the application should first be
considered as having been made out of the accumulation of year 1 and
only the remainder should be considered as an application of income of
year 2. In this case, both the accumulation of unutilized income of year
1 u/s 11(2) as well as the income of year 2 were deployed in the form
of fixed deposits in bank, which were renewed and reinvested and it was
not possible to link the identity of the deposits with either one of the
accumulations or the current income.

•    For the purposes of other sections, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

•  
 Where interest-free own funds available with the assessee exceeded its
investments in tax-free securities; investments would be presumed to be
made out of assessee’s own funds, and proportionate disallowance was
not warranted u/s 14A although separate accounts were not maintained by
the assessee for investments and other expenditure incurred for earning
tax-free income [South Indian Bank Ltd. vs. CIT, (2021) 130 taxmann.com 178 (SC)].

•  
 If interest-free funds available to the assessee were sufficient to
meet its investment in subsidiaries, the assessee’s claim for deduction
was justified [CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd., (2019), 102 taxmann.com 52 (SC)].

The above judgments could be relevant in ascertaining whether the application is “out of income of the previous year” or not.

It
appears that what is required is that the assessee should choose a
reasonable method of determining the source from which the application
is made and follow it uniformly.

Application of income in India [Item (I)]

This item requires maintenance of details of the application.

The
term ‘application of income’ is very wide and includes, expenditure on
salaries, administrative expenses, establishment expenses, donations to
other institutions, capital expenditure, etc.

Every payment is a
different and separate application. Thus, a voucher for even a payment
of Rs. 10 (for say, conveyance) shall have to be recorded separately.

The Rule requires details of the “amount” of application, which term has been judicially explained by Courts as follows:

•   
…from the point of view of linguistics, the words “sum” and “amount”
are synonyms. But under the Income Tax Act, each of the words “sum”,
“amount”, “income” and “payment” have different connotations. [T. Rajkumar vs. UOI, 2016 (4) TMI 593 – Madras High Court]

•  
 The word “amount” is used here in a wider sense than usual and that it
includes the total quantity of the debtor’s liabilities in cash or in
kind. Consequently, the payment of these “amounts” can also be either in
cash or in kind. [Shridhar Krishnarao vs. Narayan Namaji, AIR 1939 Nag 227]

Thus,
the Item may require details of the amount of application in kind also.
To illustrate, if a hospital receives an ambulance as a non-corpus
donation, then the value of the ambulance is to be regarded as income of
the hospital and if it is used for the purposes of the hospital,
simultaneously the same amount is be regarded as application of income
[see CBDT Circular No. 580 dated 14th September, 1990)]. In such a
circumstance, the details of the ambulance will have to be recorded
under this item.

If an assessee is constructing a building, he
will have to maintain details of every payment made for purchase of
cement, sand, bricks, iron and steel, etc. and daily payment to
contractor!!!

Every TDS from payment is a separate application and hence, will have to be separately recorded.

If
more than one payment is made to a person for the same object, then it
appears that all the payments during the previous year to such person
can be aggregated.

Explanation 2 to section 11(1) provides that a
“corpus donation” to another specified institution shall not be treated
as application of income. Similarly, Explanation 3 provides cash
payments or payments without  deduction of tax at source will be
partially disallowable and not treated as application. Whether these
Explanations have to be considered in recording the details? It appears
that the requirement of the Rule is complete record keeping. It should
not be affected by the tax treatment of expenses in the computation of
income. Hence, it may be advisable to consider all such payments as
application of income with due disclosure by way of note.

Amount credited or paid to any other Trust etc. [Item (II)]

Explanation to section 11(2) uses the same language, that is, amount credited or paid to any other trust.
However,
such payments are not required to be recorded under this item. This is
because what is required is amount paid or credited out of the income of
the previous year, whereas Explanation to section 11(2) covers any
amount credited or paid to a charitable institution out of “accumulated
income of preceding years”: such payments are required to be recorded
under Rule 17AA(1)(d)(iv)(III).

The details of all
payments/credits to the specified institution are required, irrespective
of whether the payment is towards corpus of the payee or not.

Application of income outside India [Item (III)]

There
is a huge controversy on what constitutes application of income outside
India. The purpose is to identify the amount of application which is
not to be considered for exemption of income u/s 11(1)(a).

Deemed application of income referred in Explanation 1(2) to section 11(1) [Item (IV)]

An
assessee can decide whether to opt for deemed application of income or
not only after the finalization of accounts and computation of taxable
income. Hence, this record cannot be maintained contemporaneously during
the year but only after the amount of deemed application is determined.

The
item requires details of reasons for availing of deemed application.
Explanation 1(2) to section 11(1) provides that the option may be
availed “(i) for the reason that the whole or any part of the income
has not been received during that year, or (ii) for any other reason”.

It appears that the assessee need not give precise reasons but cite the aforesaid provision to justify the option availed of.

Income accumulated or set apart u/s 11(2) [Item (V)]

This
amount can also be recorded only after the end of the previous year
when the amount of income accumulated u/s 11(2) is determined.

Money invested or deposited in permissible modes of section 11(5) [Item (VI)]

If
a fixed deposit is placed during the year and it  matures before 31st
March, is it required to be recorded under this provision? On a literal
reading, record has to be maintained for each and every investment  or
deposit, whether continuing at the end of the year or not.

It appears that income for this purpose does not include corpus donations received during the year.

The details under this item are partially sought also under Rule 17AA(1)(d)(ii)(II).

Money invested or deposited in non-permissible modes [Item (VII)]

In
this case also, each and every investment or deposit in non-permissible
mode is required to be reported. This is because section 13(1)(d)
provides that income is not exempt to the extent of investment or
deposit in non-permissible mode.

[Some other interesting issues of this amendment will be discussed by the Author in part – II of this Article.]

[Author
acknowledges assistance from Adv. Aditya Bhatt, CA Kausar Sheikh, CA
Chirag Wadhwa and CA Arati Pai in writing this Article.]

Transfer Pricing – Benchmarking of Overdue Receivables and Payables – Complexities and Caution

Receivables and payables are inevitable parts of any business transaction. While group entities generally focus on the main transaction of import or export of goods or services, it is extremely important to keep track of the settlements of consequent receivables and payables. The delay in settlement of transactions could subject the MNE Group to onerous compliances, additional costs and penal consequences if there is a slippage in the appropriate disclosures.

Owing to rising disputes, while the CBDT brought the specific amendment to clarify this aspect with retrospective effect in Finance Act 2012, it is important first to understand the history and logic behind this controversial issue:

BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUE

Before the Finance Act 2012, a significant controversy erupted due to a lack of clarity as to whether the transaction of overdue receivables/ payables should be considered as a separate international transaction. The Indian revenue authorities astutely noticed instances of funding overseas group entities by delaying the settlement of the inter-company transaction. However, as there was no clear guidance to consider overdue receivables/payables as an international transaction, the legislature came up with the below-mentioned clarification vide the Finance Act 2012.

The definition of ‘international transaction’ u/s 92B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) was amended to widen its scope. Clause (c) was added to the sub-section (2) of section 92B, with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2002 as mentioned below:

“(c) capital financing, including any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance, payments or deferred payment or receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business.”

It is important to note that while the Memorandum contained reference as regards to the purpose of inclusion of various items in the definition, there was no specific mention of ‘capital financing’ and the purpose or implication of its inclusion within the definition of ‘international transaction’.

As per the Guidance note on Report under Section 92E of the Act issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (‘ICAI’):

“Advance payments received or made and debts arising during the course of business shall need to be carefully considered and reported by the accountant however ensuring that there is no duplication or overlap with reporting of the principal transactions to which such advances or debts relate to, unless the accountant identifies factors which cause such advances or debts as separate transactions.”

In view of the above, the issue to be considered is whether the trade advances/trade receivables / similar deferred payments should be treated as:

  • Arising in the ordinary course of the business of the taxpayer and hence would not constitute a separate ‘international transaction’ (the impact of the interest loss on account of the credit period would get offset by the higher profits earned on account of the increase in sales or pricing as a result of extending such credit terms to the customers);

OR

  • Separate lending or borrowing transactions liable to interest.


BENCHMARKING OF THE TRANSACTION

As mentioned above, since the overdue receivables issue is litigative, it is important to analyze it in detail and take appropriate actions beforehand.

On the basis the guidance provided by ICAI, one of the most important exercises is to delineate outstanding receivables arising in the ordinary course of business from the receivables for which the realization is intentionally delayed to fund the overseas associated enterprises (‘AE’). The following steps may be followed for the same:

Step 1 –
Identify receivables in the ordinary course of business. Since the principal transaction would already be benchmarked, separate benchmarking of such outstanding receivables may lead to duplication. Hence, an exercise needs to be conducted to separate the overdue receivables as per the contractual agreement with the overseas AE.

Step 2 – Post conducting of such an exercise, an analysis may also be conducted qua industry practice, on the basis of the information available in the public domain to identify the general credit period prevalent in such industry (e.g., textile and real estate enjoy higher credit period as compared to commodity and bullion) to determine the overdue receivables in comparison to the comparable companies.

Step 3 – The receivables overdue qua contract and qua industry need to be reported and benchmarked appropriately. To benchmark these overdue receivables, it is crucial to determine the reason for such a delay in realization. In case of genuine reasons beyond the control of the taxpayers, appropriate documentation should be maintained to prove such a bona fide reason. Certain common practical challenges faced by businesses recently are listed below (illustrative):

a)    Supply chain disruptions in view of COVID may cause a shortage of containers for transit of goods impacting the sale of goods sold on Free on Board (‘FOB’) basis.

b)    In cases where semi-finished goods are sold to the AE which further sells the goods to ultimate customers, due to a shortage of containers for shipment, the AE is unable to ship the goods and hence delays the sale and realization on an overall basis.

c)    Due to the ongoing geo-political reasons and point a) mentioned above, the transit time of shipments has significantly increased.

d)    Liquidity crunch or bankruptcy of AE may have led to write-off in the books of the taxpayer.

e)    Delay in realization of the amount from the ultimate customer may lead to delayed payment by the AE to the taxpayer.

f)    In certain cases, the taxpayer, at the time of finalization of books determines the true-up required to be recovered from AE as per the contractual agreement. Since the determination of true-up is done at the time of finalization of books, the payment of the same is realized after a long time as compared to the original timeline by which the taxpayer was supposed to realize such an amount.

g)    In some countries, any payment to an overseas party may lead to withholding tax implications requiring the payer to approach the tax authorities for seeking exemption on withholding tax on payment for non-taxable transactions to the taxpayer. Such approval from the tax department may take time and hence, result in the delay of realization.

h)    In certain cases, the taxpayer undertakes the transaction of purchase and sale with the same AE. In WNS Global Services Pvt Ltd – ITA No.1451/Mum/2012, the Mumbai ITAT held that the credit period provided by the AE vis-à-vis credit period provided by the taxpayer for such transactions respectively may require to be analyzed in aggregation, since analyzing the sales transaction in singularity may portray a distorted picture of delayed realization of proceeds to the taxpayer.

Step 4 – Post determining the reason for delayed realization, the next step is to benchmark the overdue receivables. The points mentioned below are important in this context:

a)    For calculating the credit period, the weighted average collection period could be computed (by assigning weights to the value of invoices) rather than computing simple average of collection period. This approach can be useful to put more weights to the high-value transactions. Further, in cases wherein the payment has been received in advance, such negative credit period invoices may also be considered to reduce the overall credit period.

b)    If the reason for a delayed realization is due to genuine business rationale beyond the control of the taxpayer as well as the AE, detailed documentation at an appropriate time is the key to benchmarking the transaction and creating a defense against potential adjustment. For instance:

– In case of long transit time for shipment of goods, a formal dialogue for renegotiating the credit period offered to the AE and the resulting amendment in the contract, along with documentation of detailed justification of such modification, can portray the genuineness of variation in credit period.

–  In case of a liquidity crunch or bankruptcy of an AE, formal documentation of various attempts made for the recovery and statutory documents supporting such a condition may create a substantial backup for benchmarking.

– In cases where the determination of a true-up at the time of finalization of books resulted in the delayed realization of receivables, one of the possible solutions can be that the AE provides an ad-hoc advance payment during the end of the financial year on the basis of the history of such true-up payments in earlier years. While the accurate amount gets determined at the time of finalization of books, such advance payment by the AE can create an important backup for the taxpayer to prove that there was a bona fide intention of the taxpayer for realizing the amount in time and only the differential amount can be settled at a later point of time.

– If the AE has funds but is unable to pay the taxpayer on time due to regulatory reasons, such an amount may be earmarked and deposited in the bank, and the interest earned on it may also be passed on to the taxpayer as and when the principal amount is paid to the taxpayer. Such an arrangement can justify that the taxpayer has not suffered any loss due to the delayed receipt of the amount.

Further, it may be separately noted that as per the FEMA regulations, the period of realization for exports is nine months from the date of export.

However, the RBI had extended the period of realization of export proceeds from the existing nine months to fifteen months from the date of export due to the COVID pandemic for exports made between 1st April, 2020 to 31st July, 2020. Such an extension of timeline for realization of proceeds by RBI can also be taken as a base to substantiate the delay in realization of proceeds during such period on an overall basis due to industry-wide and worldwide issues.

However, it is to be noted that the above timeline is the maximum period within which the export proceeds are required to be realized.

The above reasons, supported with the detailed backup documentation can also help the taxpayers avoid substantiate penal consequences, if any, as the same may prove the bona fide intent of the taxpayer to the tax administrators.

c)    If the taxpayer is unable to prove the genuine business reason for delayed receipt, the taxpayer may be required to receive an arm’s length interest income for the overdue period.

The above steps can be followed to comprehensively analyze the outstanding receivables and decide the need for separate disclosure and benchmarking.

CALCULATION OF THE ARM’S LENGTH INTEREST INCOME

Once it is determined that overdue receivables are not due to specific business reasons, and an arm’s length interest income is required to be recovered from AE, the next step would be to calculate the interest income. For such calculation, the most important criterion would be the determination of the basis of interest rate.

As per various judicial precedents in sync with the commercial logic:

A)    If the receivable is denominated in the foreign currency and upon realization of the same, the currency gain or loss due to the fluctuation in the exchange rate will be borne by the Indian taxpayer, then the appropriate reference rate for determining the arm’s length interest charge would be LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) / SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate) / SONIA (Sterling Overnight Interbank Average Rate), etc.

B)    If the receivable is denominated in the Indian currency, then the appropriate base rate would be the Indian bank reference rate such as PLR, base rate, etc.

Reference rates prescribed by the Indian tax and other regulatory authorities with respect to minimum interest income to be charged on loans and advances provided to AE for specific cases:

a)    As per safe harbour rule 10T of Income-tax Rules, 1962 (‘IT Rules’):

i.    If the intra-group loan is advanced in Indian Currency – the interest rate is to be charged on the one-year marginal cost of funds lending rate of State Bank of India plus prescribed basis points as per the credit rating of AE.

ii.    If the intra-group loan is advanced in Foreign Currency – the interest rate is to be charged on the six-month LIBOR of the relevant foreign currency plus prescribed basis points as per the credit rating of AE.

b)    As per rule 10CB of IT Rules, in case a transfer pricing adjustment is made, and such adjustment money is not repatriated back to India by the taxpayer within the prescribed period, the same gets recharacterized as advance provided to AE (secondary adjustment) and interest on the same is required to be levied at the rate of:

i.    In case the respective international transaction is denominated in Indian Currency – at one-year marginal cost of fund lending rate of State Bank of India as on 1st April of the relevant previous year plus 325 basis points.

ii.    In case the respective international transaction is denominated in Foreign Currency – at six-month LIBOR as on 30th September of the relevant previous year plus 300 basis points.

c)    As per Foreign Exchange Management (Overseas Investment) Regulations, 2022, loans advanced by an Indian entity should be backed by a loan agreement with an arm’s length interest rate charged on the same.

d)    In terms of Regulation 15 of Notification No. FEMA 23 (R)/2015-RB dated 12th January, 2016, where an exporter receives advance payment (with or without interest), from a buyer outside India, the exporter shall be under an obligation to ensure that the shipment of goods is made within one year from the date of receipt of advance payment; the rate of interest, if any, payable on the advance payment should not exceed LIBOR plus 100 basis points.

The above-prescribed interest rate may be considered as a guide. However, the exact computation of arm’s length interest rate will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

Further, in case an interest is charged to the AE, then such interest amount needs to be repatriated to India by the AE.

OTHER METHODS OF BENCHMARKING SUPPORTED BY JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

Since the issue of overdue receivables has been in limelight for many years, there are several judicial precedents accepting certain methods of benchmarking. Such generally accepted benchmarking methodologies are provided below:

a) Working Capital Adjustment

A widely accepted method of benchmarking receivables and payables is undertaking working capital adjustment on the profit level indicator of comparable companies. Under this method, the level of working capital namely debtors, creditors and inventory of the comparable companies is compared against the working capital of the tested party (i.e., either Indian taxpayer or AE) and necessary adjustment is made in the profitability working of the comparable companies to account for the differences in payables, receivables and inventory using an imputed cost of finance for the differences identified. Also, items like advances to and from customers and unbilled revenue can be considered in the computation of a working capital adjustment if they impact the working capital position of the tested party and the comparables. This position has been upheld in certain judicial precedents including CGI Information System & Management Consultant1 and Infineon Technologies India Pvt Ltd2.

1 IT(TP) No. 346/Bang/2015
2 IT(TP)A No.474/Bang/2015

Once such an adjustment is carried out, the working capital adjusted margin of the comparable companies is compared with the profit margin of the tested party. In case the tested party has earned a margin at arm’s length against such working capital adjusted margin of comparable companies, it can be deduced that the outstanding receivables and payables are at arm’s length price.

One of the main features of such working capital adjustment is that it takes into account both debtors and creditors. In view of the same, in case any taxpayer is providing a high credit period in sales, but at the same time is also enjoying high credit period on purchase, such mutual credit period is taken into consideration and, hence it does not portray a distorted picture of only delayed realization of receivables to the taxpayer.

There are many judicial precedents that support the above method of benchmarking (e.g., Kusum Health Care Pvt. Ltd.3 and Visual Graphics Computing Services (India) Pvt Ltd4), and are also recommended by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) for benchmarking of debtors and creditors. In view of the same, it may be recommended to conduct this exercise on a regular basis to avoid any potential litigation.

b) Comparison of credit period to AE vis-à-vis unrelated entity

When the taxpayer has transactions with AE and an unrelated entity, in such cases the credit period offered to AE vis-à-vis an unrelated entity can be compared to benchmark the outstanding receivables of the AE. Further, one can evaluate whether the Indian taxpayer has levied interest on delayed receivables from the unrelated entity and whether the interest needs to be charged for delayed receivables from the AE. This approach has also been supported by certain judicial precedents (e.g., M/s Sharda Spuntex Pvt. Ltd5, M/s. DHR Holding India Private Ltd.6, and WNS Global Services Pvt Ltd7).

c) Taxpayer is a debt-free company

Another position favorably accepted in several judicial precedents is that the taxpayer is a debt-free company, and does not incur any interest on the amount stuck in the delayed receivables. Hence, the taxpayer is also not required to levy any interest on the delayed receipt of overdue receivables. This approach has also been supported by certain judicial precedents (e.g. Betchel India Pvt. Ltd8).

3 ITA 765 of 2016, Delhi High Court
4 T.C.A.No.414 of 2018, Madras High Court
5 D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 56 / 2017, Rajasthan High Court
6 ITA No.1614/Del./2018, Delhi ITAT
7 ITA No.1451/Mum/2012, Mumbai ITAT
8 ITA 379/2016, Delhi High Court

RECEIVABLES ARISING OUT OF SECONDARY ADJUSTMENT
The secondary adjustment has been defined as an adjustment in the books of accounts of the taxpayer and its AE to reflect that the actual allocation of profits between the taxpayer and its AE that are consistent with the arm’s length price as may be determined because of primary adjustment, thereby removing the imbalance between a cash account and actual profit of the taxpayer.

It is further provided that the excess money available with the AE due to the primary adjustment if not repatriated to the taxpayer into India within the prescribed time limit, then the primary adjustment will be deemed as an advance extended to the overseas AE and interest on such advance shall be computed in the manner as prescribed.

In view of the above provisions, receivables arising out of secondary adjustment need to be accounted for in the books along with the interest income as prescribed by CBDT. As mentioned above, since the interest rate has been prescribed by the CBDT, the same provides an indication of the interest rate which may be adopted by the tax authorities for benchmarking of overdue trade receivables as well.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

While the above sections cover the ways for benchmarking outstanding receivables, it is also very important to make appropriate disclosures in Form 3CEB and TP documentation to avoid any non-disclosure implications. The relevant clause where reporting of overdue outstanding receivables and payables is covered in Form 3CEB is provided below:

“Clause 14: Particulars in respect of
lending or borrowing of money:

Has the assessee entered into any international
transaction(s) in respect of lending or borrowing of money including any
type of advance, payments, deferred payments, receivable, non-convertible
preference shares/debentures or any other debt arising during business as
specified in Explanation (i)(c) below section 92B(2)?”

 

[If ‘yes’, provide the following details
in respect of each associated enterprise and each loan/advance:]

(a) Name and address of the associated
enterprise with whom the international transaction has been entered into.

 

(b) Nature of financing agreement.

 

(c) Currency in which transaction has taken
place.

 

(d) Interest rate charged/paid in respect
of each lending/borrowing.

 

(e) Amount paid/received or
payable/receivable in the transaction—

 

(i) as per books of account;

 

(ii) as computed by the assessee having
regard to the arm’s length price

 

(f) Method used for determining the arm’s
length price [See section 92C(1)]

 

i) Receivables – Disclosure
As mentioned above, outstanding receivables need to be bifurcated in the following categories:

a)    Receivables arising out of the ordinary course of business which do not necessitate that the transaction gets recharacterized as advance provided to AEs.

b)    Receivables in nature of debts which warrant the taxpayer to charge interest on such overdue receivables.

From the perspective of disclosure in Form 3CEB, in case of category a) mentioned above, if after carrying out the necessary exercise, as also suggested by ICAI Guidance Note, the receivables are in the ordinary course of business and not characterizable as advances, then reporting of such receivables separately may prove to be duplication of reporting the transactions by way of the principal transaction as well as trade receivables. However, on a conservative basis, such receivables
and payables may be reported in the notes section of Form 3CEB to avoid unnecessary litigation for non-disclosure.

However, in case of category b) mentioned above, it is important to disclose the transaction separately in Form 3CEB in Clause 14, and also to charge interest in line with Para 3 above in order to avoid litigation at a later stage.

Similar disclosures would also be required for receivables arising out of secondary adjustment along with disclosure of the interest income earned from it.

Further, since such overdue receivables are deemed as advance, the same should not trigger compliances under ODI (‘Overseas Direct Investment’) regulations applicable to loan transactions.

ii) Payables – Disclosure
Generally, outstanding payables are not a cause of concern for the Indian taxpayer, but it is important to analyze the same from the perspective of overseas AE.

From the Indian taxpayer’s perspective, if the credit period availed is in excess qua contract and qua industry, one possible interpretation can be that the Indian taxpayer is using such funds at the behest of the overseas AE. However, since it is beneficial from the Indian taxpayer’s perspective, any transfer pricing adjustment made by the Income-tax authorities on such a transaction would have an effect of reducing the income chargeable to tax or increasing the loss, as the case may be. Such adjustment is prohibited vide Section 92(3) of the Act since it leads to base erosion of tax from India.

Further, the outstanding payable of the Indian taxpayer would be outstanding receivable from an overseas AE perspective. It could result in adverse consequences for overseas AE, as the law mandates each taxpayer to demonstrate the arm’s length nature of its international transaction. Further, there are conflicting judgments on the applicability of the base erosion principle while dealing with disputes relating to overseas AE.

Hence, the exercise and steps mentioned for outstanding receivables above should also be followed for outstanding payables to the extent applicable. It would be advisable to make appropriate disclosures of identified overdue payables in Form 3CEB of the Foreign Company and undertake appropriate benchmarking of the same and maintenance of documentation.

CONCLUSION
One may need to review voluminous data to assess the rationale for delays, if any, and consequent interest costs. In case the impact of interest cost resulting from the delay is not significant, then there may be a temptation to ignore charging interest in the inter-company transaction to minimize administrative hassles. However, at this juncture, it is important to weigh the penal consequence of 2 per cent of the transaction value which gets triggered due to the non-disclosure of overdue transactions in the year-end compliances.

In the inter-company contracts, the clauses related to invoicing (i.e., budgeted cost or actual cost) invoice frequency, credit term, penal interest clause etc. should be carefully drafted. Further, aforesaid clauses should be regularly reviewed to ensure the conduct of the parties is in line with contractual arrangements. It is observed that MNCs sometimes mention a percentage of penal interest to be charged in case of delay in payments. However, in actual practice, such an interest is waived or not charged. It is critical that any such waiver is backed with appropriate justification and documentation. Further, in cases wherein parties don’t have the intention to charge penal interest for delays, then such clauses should be carefully drafted as the same can go against the taxpayer.

In the assessment proceedings, the tax officers have been specifically seeking details of the settlement of receivable and payable transactions throughout the year and scrutinizing ageing analysis of year-end debts closely. Thus, it is imperative that the taxpayer compiles the said information proactively and maintains adequate justification to defend stray situations of delays, if any, in settling inter-company debts.

As discussed above, the FEMA regulations permit nine months from the date of export to realize the proceeds from the overseas entity. However, the tax officers often consider a narrow credit period of 45 days to 90 days. It will be helpful if some guidance is provided by the government to field officers to consider the credit period in line with FEMA regulations.

Further, the taxpayer must be vigilant to ensure that the receivables and payables are settled in the normal credit period. In case of delays in settlement, the taxpayer should gather evidence to demonstrate his bona fide behaviour and situations beyond his control. Further, the documents should also clearly demonstrate there was no intention to fund the operation of overseas AE through an excess credit period.

Uncharitable Treatment to Charities?

“I slept and dreamt that life was a joy. I awoke and saw that life was service. I acted and behold, service was a joy.” – Rabindranath Tagore.

India is a land of philanthropists for ages. Karna and King Bali are glaring mythological examples of donors who never refused anyone coming to their door for any help. Those who have experienced the joy of giving would go all out to help others. And India is fortunate to have many such philanthropic people who are engaged in helping others in a big way.

In a country of 1.40 billion plus people with 25 per cent below the poverty line, a literacy rate of 77 per cent and an unemployment rate of about 8 per cent, the Government’s efforts need to be complemented by that of NGOs. According to World Poverty Clock, almost 83 million people in India live in extreme poverty. As per NITI (National Institution for Transforming India) Aayog’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Index, India ranked 66th among 109 countries in the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2021, which considers factors like education, health, child mortality, nutrition, the standard of living, etc. Various Government schemes/programs launched with the objective of reducing poverty have been doing well. However, looking at the magnitude of the challenge, the role of NGOs is crucial.

The laws relating to Trusts, Trustees, Charities and Charitable Institutions are part of the Concurrent List of Schedule 7 of the Indian Constitution (under entries 10 and 28). Thus, both the Union and the State Governments have the power to enact laws governing Trusts. Public Charitable Trusts are primarily governed by the law of the State in which they are established.  There is a Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920, which has limited provisions and applications. Trusts set up in Maharashtra and Gujarat are governed by the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950 and The Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950, respectively.  Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan have their own Public Trusts Acts. However, West Bengal, Bihar, Delhi, Jharkhand, etc. do not have any Act to regulate public Trusts. An NGO can also be registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or as a Section 8 company under the Companies Act, 2013.

In view of the wide disparities governing registration and regulation of Public Charitable Trusts, the Central Government is seeking to control or regulate Charitable Trusts through the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. Therefore, both Acts have been amended from time to time.

The recent amendment applicable to the Charitable Trusts pertaining to Books of Accounts and other documents is one such measure. The CBDT has notified Rule 17AA (“the Rule”), specifying the books of accounts and other documents to be maintained by a charitable institution. This Rule casts onerous responsibility on every Charitable Trust registered u/s 12AB or an educational or medical institution registered u/s 10(23C) to maintain detailed books of accounts and other documents mentioned therein. While the rationale of the provisions appears to be to gather more details and/or information, their interpretation and administration are matters of concern. One wonders about the need for such elaborate specification of books and documents, when in any case every NGO had to maintain adequate books of account due to requirements of audit.

The threat of losing exemption due to difference in interpretation/non-compliance with this requirement is real, as experienced post amendment of the definition of “charitable purpose” in section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The problem is that small Trusts do not have the wherewithal to either comply or litigate the matter, as they are already struggling with lack of resources and volunteers. Under the circumstances, the very existence of small NGOs is under threat.

Achieving a balance between control and ease of compliance is necessary. Small Trusts can either be exempt or subject to less elaborate requirements along the lines of small companies under the Companies Act, 2013.

There is a need for introspection by Trusts as well. Charity demands purity of not only the end use (purpose) but also its means. The use of Trusts for dubious purposes or misuse of public funds brings disrepute to the beautiful vehicle of philanthropy – “Trust”. Where there is a breach of trust, it is no longer fit to be called a Trust and punishment of such an entity is justified. Shri Maha Avatar Babaji said, “To serve is the nature of Divine.” Those who genuinely serve will be out of pocket but will not pocket a single penny from the Trust. Let us introspect!

The month of October is also one for complying with Transfer Pricing Regulations (TPR). The essence of TPR is that any transaction between two Associated Enterprises (AEs) should be at arm’s length (i.e., at market price). A Trustee and his Trust are AEs by analogy; therefore, any dealing between them needs to be at arm’s length. Moreover, a Trustee is also a protector of property entrusted to him by the donors for the benefit/welfare of the public at large, and therefore he should follow the highest moral standards in discharging his duties. Just as we do a benchmarking exercise to determine the arm’s length pricing in TPR, a Trust may benchmark its practices and performance with other Trusts to adopt best practices and achieve better performance.

NGOs have done commendable work during the Pandemic and saved many lives. Many volunteers lost their lives while helping others. There is a general awareness and inclination towards helping poor and destitute people. Many youngsters are finding their calling in serving others and devoting their lives to social causes leaving lucrative jobs and comfortable lives.

Trustees should help Government to ensure transparency, and the tax administration should ‘trust’ the Trustees. The lack of ‘trust’ between the two is not good for charitable activities through a Trust Regime in India!

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

11th of September was ‘Vishwa-bandhutwa Din’ – World Brotherhood Day. On this day, Swami Vivekananda won the hearts of thousands of people assembled in Chicago for the World Congress of Religions. The amazing part was that he did it with just six words that he uttered “My brothers and sisters of America”. These words had an enchanting and electrifying effect on the audience. What was so magical about the words?

The World Congress of Religions was organised basically to establish the superiority of a particular religion over other religions of the world. Swami Vivekananda was an ordinary monk from India. He had no authentic or official document from any Hindu or other religious body. In normal course, he would not have been allowed to speak, but for the strong recommendation from Professor John Henry Wright of Harvard University, who wrote to the organisers, “Asking for authority letter from Swamiji is asking the authority of the Sun and Shine! All our scholars on one side and this unknown Hindu monk on the other, his side will be heavier!”

Born on 12th January, 1863, he lived only for 39 years and passed away on 4th July, 1902. He had five serious ailments – asthama, insomnia, diabetes, gastric trouble and blood pressure. Despite this, through his sheer will-power, he travelled throughout India and abroad. His father Mr. Vishwanath Dutt was a renowned lawyer, and mother Bhuvaneshwari, was a pious lady. His grandfather had taken Sanyas (renunciation). His mother believed that the son was the blessing of Lord Shiva. So, his name was Vireshwar but called Bille. After Sanyas, he became Vividishananda. However, once in an American Newspaper, his name was by mistake printed as ‘Vivekananda’.

The most favourite disciple of Shri Ramakrishna Paramahansa, initially he fought with the Guru about idol worship. However, he virtually surrendered to the Goddess Kalimata.

While studying in Scottish Church College, Kolkata, the principal of the college William Hasty told him that he knew only one person in the world who achieved Ecstatic Joy – the ultimate of spiritual attainments.

Swamiji wrote a treatise on classical music at the age of 23. His 90-page introduction to the book contained a detailed study of Indian and Western musical instruments. Many editions were sold in a short span of time, wiping off the accumulated loss of the publishing house! Once Swamiji said had he not gone into spiritualism, he would have become a great musician!

Marie Louise Burke has written 6 volumes of 500 pages each on Swamiji’s conquer of the West!

After his father’s death, Swamiji’s family experienced serious poverty. He studied law and did jobs for livelihood. After taking Sanyas, he travelled across India. At Kanyakumari (the south end of the country), he dived into the sea and reached a huge rock. He meditated there, alone for 3 days and saw the dream of a prosperous and powerful India. He took it as a mission of his life. At present, there is the Vivekananda Memorial constructed on the rock.

Many Kings and Nawabs were impressed by his knowledge and personality; and offered to sponsor his trip abroad. But he politely refused it by saying that he would collect funds from people at large. He went to represent India. His thoughts were very practical. Once, he said – playing football on the ground may take you closer to God rather than mere prayers. He wanted a strong India. He was proud that we Indians accommodated all invaders. He said, Hinduism is not a religion as other people understand the word ‘religion’. It is our way of life! Therefore, he never believed in ‘conversions’. He used to say ‘religion’ cannot be discussed with an empty stomach.

After his Guru–mentor – Shri Ramakrishna, he had great respect for Buddha. There were many contemporary Indians representing other sects who were jealous of his glamorous success. They tried to defame him. The World knew the truth.

During his travel, he also met Lokmanya Tilak, who appreciated his depth of knowledge.

In America, before reaching the World conference venue, he had to undergo lot of hardships. He had no money. He shivered in the chilled climate. He had to stay in a broken box in a godown, on an empty stomach and inadequate clothes. People around hated him and kept away from the ‘black’ stranger.

Gradually, his value was recognised by one and all. Prof. Wright said ‘Swamiji’ is one of the best-educated men in the world. The posters in America described him as a ‘Cyclonic’ Hindu monk! It was on his motivation that Rockfeller donated his wealth to charity and formed ‘Rockfeller Foundation’. He inspired many entrepreneurs of India, including Tatas.

In the conference, all leaders of other religions addressed the gathering by using highly scholastic difficult words.

But the words of Swamiji, “My brothers and sisters of America”, touched the hearts of the audience. It was the true expression of our Indian culture and thought of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’ – the whole world is one family. It is difficult to describe his greatness in such a short article.

Namaskaar to this all-time great person the world has ever witnessed!

Bharat’s Progress and Women’s Prowess

India, that is ‘Bharat’, has created history with the success of ‘Chandrayaan 3’. It became the first country to do a soft landing on the Lunar South Pole. The beauty of this achievement is its cost-effectiveness and precise landing timings. Within days of the successful Moon mission, ISRO launched Bharat’s first observation mission to the Sun, named, ‘Aditya-L1’, which is performing as planned. It was heartening to see the contribution of many women scientists in the success of Chandrayaan-3 and Aditya-L1. The dedication and expertise of women scientists propelled the mission forward and significantly contributed to its success. Their involvement not only underscores gender equality and inclusivity but also showcases the remarkable talent and capabilities of women in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields.

Bharat showed its capability and acumen by successfully organising the G20 Summit under its presidency with hundred per cent consensus on all developmental and geo-political issues, running into 38 paragraphs. G20’s theme was based on Vasudhaiv Kutumbakkam – One Earth – One Family – One Future. The importance of the G20 Summit can be understood from the fact that collectively, these countries account for 85 per cent of global gross domestic product, over 75 per cent of global trade and two-thirds of the globe’s entire population. With 9 invitee countries, 27 member countries of the European Union and 55 member countries of the African Union, this representation is still wider. The feather on Bharat’s cap was when it successfully convinced the Group’s member countries to admit the African Union as a permanent member, making the Group of 20 (G20) now G21. Bharat raised its status by becoming a voice for the developing nations of the Global South.

The New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration broadly focuses on the following five key areas:

  • Strong, Sustainable, Balanced and Inclusive Growth
  • Accelerating Progress on Sustainable Development Goals
  • Green Development Pact for a Sustainable Future
  • Multilateral Institutions for the 21st Century
  • Reinvigorating Multilateralism

Bharat grabbed the opportunity to showcase its great heritage and culture to the participants of various working group meetings of G20 throughout the year. It organised over 200 meetings at 50 different locations, which is, perhaps, a unique feature in the history of any G20 presidency. It not only made G20 popular across the nation but also won the hearts of the delegates. The spectacular success of the G20 Summit and its outcomes have been hailed by world leaders and media alike.

It is heartening to note that Bharat launched seven state-of-the-art stealth frigates in just four years from 2019–2023. Bharat stands 4th globally in Renewal Energy Installed Capacity (including Large Hydro), 4th in Wind Power and 4th in Solar Power capacity. Thus, Bharat is shining in all Panchmahabhuta, namely, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Space.

In the heart of our national capital, New Delhi, stands a new symbol of our democracy and progress — the new Parliament House of India. Inaugurated on the auspicious occasion of Ganesh Chaturthi, this architectural marvel stands as a testament to a resurgent India, symbolising our aspirations and commitment to uphold democratic values for the next 150 years. The passing of the Women’s Reservation Bill in this new Parliament is a significant step towards recognising and empowering the invaluable contribution of Nari Shakti in our nation’s governance and progress.

Yet, it is imperative to consider the notion of reservations. While acknowledging the need to empower and include all sections of society, we must also tread carefully, ensuring that reservations do not hinder meritocracy or perpetuate inequalities. Can Bharat think of becoming the world leader by increasingly ignoring meritocracy and extending reservations in various forms? Our beloved country has seen women hold pivotal roles across various spheres without reservations, highlighting the potential and competence of women in almost every field. The role played by women leaders in the success of G20 or women scientists in the success of space missions has been acclaimed. It is indeed a matter of pride that today, the highest office of the President of India is adorned by a woman, Smt. Droupadi Murmu. Recognising gender equality and the prowess of women, PM Modi rightly named the spot where Chandrayaan 3 landed as “Shiv-Shakti”. In a few days from now, we will celebrate Navaratri, a festival to respect and revere Goddess Durga – a symbol of Nari Shakti.

In the domain of Chartered Accountancy field also, women have made significant strides. Currently, over 40 per cent of the student population pursuing CA comprises young women, and their record of acquiring a high number of positions in the Merit Lists is really impressive. Moreover, approximately 28 per cent of CA members are women. These numbers depict a progressive trend where women are not only entering but excelling in the CA profession, showcasing their proficiency and determination.

As we reflect on these monumental achievements and Nari Shakti, we must also remain vigilant about the road ahead. Our progress should be marked by inclusivity, equity and sustainable development. It is our responsibility to ensure that every stride we take benefits all sections of society, leaving no one behind.

To this end, it is important to note that 25th September is celebrated in India as “Antyodaya Diwas” (अंत्योदय दिवस)to mark the birth anniversary of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya and remember his life and legacy. Even Mahatma Gandhi’s idea of Sarvodaya (Universal Uplift and Progress for All), was based on Antyodaya – uplifting the poorest of poor.

Let us continue to embrace innovation, collaborate on a global scale and celebrate the indomitable spirit of Bharat as we step into this promising month of October.

Together, let us forge a path to a brighter and more inclusive future, embodying the true essence of ‘Bharat’.

चांद पे उतरे, मंगल को देखा
अब सूरज की बारी है,
हर क्षेत्र में कौशल दिखाती
देखो भारतीय नारी है।।

एक धरती, एक कुटुंब,
एक नियति हमारी है
विश्व को एक करनेवाले,
भारत तेरी बलिहारी है।।

PARADOX

‘Oh, hell! What a disgusting profession! I wonder why I chose it!’ A Chartered Accountant was cursing his profession.

‘What happened?’ I asked in a sympathetic tone.

He continued, ‘It’s very easy to say from the dais – “A dignified profession”. But in reality nobody cares for our profession.’

‘But people feel very highly about a CA. Your course is so difficult. The passing percentage is so low.’

The CA: ‘But what’s the use? You become “out-dated” every six months! Many things change every day! Zindagi mein kitne saal padhate rahane ka ? (How long to keep on learning and studying in life?)’

I pointed out, ‘But your signature is valuable. Government requires your signature on many documents and certificates – Not only on financial statements.’

‘But that is only a responsibility, a burden without commensurate rewards. There’s too much of regulation. It is impossible to keep track…’

I said, ‘Audit is your monopoly.’

He countered: ‘That is killing us. Nobody really wants audit. Nobody wants to pay tax. So our services are unwelcome…’

‘But you alone can guide the clients to comply with all laws and the rules and regulations.’

‘The client has no value for all these things. He says that all that we are doing is for ourselves; just to save our skin. He never feels any value addition in those regulations and compliances’.

I ventured, ‘But since these things are mandatory, you get fees…’

‘Fees? Bah! This is the most unremunerative profession. Payment of our fees is at the bottom of the ladder. And they bargain even for small amounts.’

‘But due to the system of articleship, you get good assistants at low cost?’

‘Articles? The less said about them the better. Everybody dictates to us – clients, staff, articles, regulators – and also the wife at home!’

‘But you do get the satisfaction of rendering good service?’

‘Satisfaction? There is nothing but frustration. Don’t you know that without corruption you cannot give results.’

I pointed out that there are many opportunities in the corporate sector. There are many other avenues and a variety of other services that one can render.

The CA agreed with me and added, ‘But for that you need not be a CA. And in corporates there is slogging like glorified slaves… No personal life… No independence. There is hypocrisy everywhere. And now everything is technology-driven. There is no application of mind.’

I said, ‘But don’t your clients maintain a long relationship with you?’

The CA responded sceptically with, ‘As soon as the fees are increased, the relations come to an end! There is no loyalty.’

The discussion was endless. We stopped after two hours – with his final remark, ‘I wonder why people go for this course at all! It was a wrong decision on my part. This profession has no future’.

We dispersed.

Next morning, I received a WhatsApp massage from my CA friend: ‘Pleased and proud to inform you that my son has passed his CPT exam and will be joining the CA course…’

In the Mahabharat, there is a very interesting chapter called ‘Yaksha-Prashna.’ It is an enlightening dialogue between Yudhishtira and a ‘super’ human being, Yaksha. He asks, ‘What is the most paradoxical situation in the world?’

Yudhishtira replies, ‘Everybody knows that death is inevitable; yet they behave as if they are immortal’.

I think many CAs feel that this profession has no future, yet their next generation takes up the course. Perhaps this applies to all professions.

SUPREME COURT FORMULATES GUIDELINES FOR COMPOUNDING; HOLDS THAT CONSENT OF SEBI NOT REQUIRED

BACKGROUND
An interesting feature of the SEBI Act, 1992 is that one can potentially be prosecuted u/s 24 for violating any provision of the Act and even any of the rules and regulations made thereunder. Further, the punishment can be in the form of imprisonment for as long as ten years, or a fine of up to Rs. 25 crores. Non-payment of the penalty imposed is also punished stringently, with a minimum prison term of one month and a maximum of ten years; or with a fine of Rs. 25 crores. This is quite unlike other laws under which only specified serious violations can be prosecuted as offences. In a sense, the provisions of the SEBI Act, at least on paper, sound more stringent than even the Indian Penal Code that has varying punishments for different offences.

Fortunately, prosecution is not generally initiated indiscriminately under the SEBI Act. However, the fear of being prosecuted remains. The question that arises is how does a person, who is willing to make amends for the wrong he has committed get relief from prosecution? For this purpose, the SEBI Act has enabling provisions for compounding of offences. Section 24A provides that offences, other than those punishable with imprisonment only or with both imprisonment and fine, can be compounded by the Securities Appellate Tribunal or the court before which the proceedings are pending.

Considering that there is no violation in the Act that is punishable by imprisonment only or by both imprisonment and fine, the conclusion is that all offences are compoundable and thus any prosecution proceeding can be compounded (see later herein for certain remarks of the Supreme Court). This is because there is a common provision for prosecution u/s 24, unlike other laws that have separate punishments prescribed for different violations.

The question that came up before the Supreme Court in Prakash Gupta vs. SEBI (order dated 23rd July, 2021, [2021] 128 taxmann.com 362 [SC]) was whether, for compounding an offence by a Court / SAT, the consent of SEBI is a prerequisite? In other words, if SEBI vetoes the application for compounding and does not grant consent, can the offence still be compounded? The Supreme Court, while dealing with this question, ruled on several aspects and thereafter even laid down guidelines for compounding. These were made, the Court said, in the absence of explicit provisions in the law which gap it attempted to fill. Thus, the ruling has relevance on several aspects of the subject.

PROVISIONS OF LAW
As stated earlier, section 24A of the SEBI Act enables compounding of offences and the authority for this purpose is the SAT or the court before which the proceedings are pending. SEBI has notified settlement regulations which deal with settlement of civil proceedings and compounding of offences. The Regulations provide that the principles as applicable for settlement of civil proceedings would also apply for compounding. General principles have been laid down for three categories of proceedings. In respect of the offence of non-payment of penalty, such amount of penalty with interest and legal charges as deemed appropriate by SEBI would be proposed before the court. Generally, the amount for compounding the offence would be as per the guidelines laid down in the Schedule to the Regulations. If the application for compounding is made after framing of charges by the court, then this amount would be increased by 25%, apart from legal charges and other terms as approved by the whole-time panel of SEBI as set up under the Regulations.

However, there are many areas where there is silence or lack of clarity. Is there an inherent right to compounding? Can all offences be compounded as a matter of right? If there are some offences which cannot be compounded, which are those and who decides this? Whether such a decision can be questioned and, if so, on what grounds?

If the person rights the wrong, compensates the party that is wronged, etc., does compounding become a matter of right? In this context, is compounding of offences under the SEBI Act at par with compounding with, say, under the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonouring of cheques?

Finally, is the consent of SEBI necessary for compounding or is it solely at the discretion of the court to compound the offence? What is the relevance and weight of the views of SEBI in the matter?

These are some of the issues discussed in the decision.

IS THE OFFENCE OF NON-PAYMENT OF PENALTY COMPOUNDABLE?
Section 24(2) treats non-payment of penalty levied under the Act as an offence over and above the violation in respect of which the penalty is levied. The question is whether this offence is compoundable. In principle, considering that the offences of violation of the provisions of the Act / Regulations / Rules are compoundable, the answer should have been yes. However, the Court dwelt on what seem to be ambiguous words used in the provision. It appeared to the Court that since there was a minimum prison term of one month provided, one view could be that imprisonment is mandatory. Section 24 says that an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine cannot be compounded. In which case, as per this view, the offence of non-payment of penalty cannot be compounded. However, since this specific issue was not before the Court, it did not give a final ruling on it and kept it for consideration at a future date. In the author’s opinion, considering the framework not only of the section but also of the settlement regulations, the better view should be that non-payment of penalty should also be compoundable.

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES
In passing, and as a matter of academic interest, it is interesting to note that originally compounding itself was an offence and continues to be so to a certain extent. Compounding generally meant a person accepts consideration for not prosecuting an offence. This could be even by a police officer, or others in authority, and could thus be a bribe. However, the position has changed over time. There were less grave situations where it may not be worth the effort to prosecute a person. For offences such as under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the intention may be to make dishonouring of cheque an offence a means to make such a person honour the cheque. Hence, if the party is willing to pay off its dues, the court may generally be inclined to allow compounding. There may also be situations where the offence is not very grave, the offender may have realised his wrong and regretted it, and even the injured person may be willing to let the matter go (perhaps also on receipt of some compensation). Hence, compounding of offences could be lawfully done if the law provided for it. Different laws have provided for compounding in different ways and hence the question was how should the provisions of the SEBI Act be interpreted.

Serious wrongs that cannot be compounded
The Court noted that there may be offences that are not cured merely by compensating the injured person or even if the injured person is not interested in pursuing the proceedings. There are wrongs that are public in nature and have wider implications. The yardstick applied cannot be a single and uniform one.

WHETHER CONSENT OF SEBI IS NECESSARY FOR COMPOUNDING
In the matter before the Court, the appellant had applied for compounding before a lower court. When the views of SEBI were sought, SEBI refused to grant consent to such compounding and the Additional Sessions Judge before whom the proceedings were initiated thus rejected the application. The appellant approached the High Court which, citing earlier precedents, affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court held that the wording of section 24A is clear. There is no mandatory requirement of consent of SEBI for the Court to allow compounding. The Court would consider the views of SEBI but the decision of whether or not to compound the offence would rest with the Court. The important question, however, is what weight should the Court assign to the views of SEBI.

VIEWS OF SEBI ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW COMPOUNDING
The Court elaborately discussed the object of the SEBI Act and the role of SEBI as an expert body in the securities markets. It noted that SEBI has a duty to protect the interests of investors and generally the capital market. It also reviewed the mechanism laid down by SEBI for consideration of applications for compounding and also the independent High-Powered Advisory Committee (‘HPAC’) set up to provide advice on the matter. The Court held that the views of SEBI on whether or not compounding should be allowed should be respected and followed unless the view taken can be shown to be arbitrary or mala fide.

The Court also considered the aspects that SEBI takes into account and as laid down in the guidelines issued by SEBI. In particular, the matters in respect of which compounding / settlement would ordinarily not be allowed were noted.
All in all, the Court held that while the consent of SEBI is not a prerequisite, the views / recommendations of SEBI would ordinarily be followed.
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE COURT FOR CONSIDERING COMPOUNDING APPLICATIONS
As if to not only give the last word but provide a comprehensive framework for compounding, the Court laid down specific guidelines that would effectively fill the gap existing today. The Supreme Court laid down four guidelines that the Court / SAT should consider while disposing of applications for compounding:
a. The factors enumerated by SEBI in its Circular of 20th April, 2007 and accompanying FAQs should be considered, though not as exhaustive.
b. The application for compounding has to be made to SEBI which places the same before the HPAC. The recommendation of HPAC should be placed before the Court / SAT which should give due deference to such opinion. It should differ if it has cogent reasons and only if the reasons provided by SEBI / HPAC are mala fide or manifestly arbitrary.
c. The offences under the SEBI Act are not comparable with other laws where restitution of the injured party is a strong ground for allowing compounding. Most offences under the SEBI Act are of a public character and restitution may not always be enough. In any case, for this purpose the opinion of SEBI should be relied upon.
d. Finally, and this point is an extension of the third one, the Court / SAT should consider whether the offence is private or public in nature. If of a public nature, it would affect the public at large. Such offences should not be compounded even if restitution has taken place.
CONCLUSION

Not only has the Supreme Court given a categorical ruling on the role of SEBI and its views on compounding, it has also given a detailed framework on how compounding applications should be considered and what principles and considerations ought to be followed in the matter. The Court applied these principles also to the case before it and held that the matter did not deserve to be compounded, considering the facts and also the views of SEBI. With a fairly comprehensive framework laid down including the weight to be assigned to the opinion of SEBI, one can trust now that applications for compounding will be more transparent and reason-based.

GAMING NOT GAMBLING

INTRODUCTION
While the difference in the spelling of gaming and gambling is only of two letters, there is a world of difference between the two in reality. India’s online gaming market is growing by leaps and bounds and there is keen interest in setting up gaming ventures and investing in / acquiring Indian gaming companies. In India, gaming is a permissible activity, but gambling is either prohibited or heavily regulated. Some recent court decisions have helped clear the regulatory shroud covering gaming activities.

LEGAL ECOSYSTEM


Let us first understand the various laws which deal with this subject:
(a) Under the Constitution of India, the Union Government is empowered to make laws regulating the conduct of lotteries.
(b) Under the Constitution, the State Governments have been given the responsibility of authorising / conducting lotteries and making laws on betting and gambling.
(c) Hence, we must look at the Acts of each of the 28 States and seven Union Territories regarding gambling / gaming.
(d) The following are the various laws which regulate / restrict / prohibit gambling in India:

• Public Gambling Act, 1867: This Central Legislation provides for the punishment of public gambling in certain parts of India. It is not applicable in Maharashtra and other States which have repealed its application.
• Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887: It applies in Maharashtra and regulates gaming in the State.
• Other State legislations: Acts of other States, such as the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955, the Madras Gambling Act, etc., are more or less similar to the Public Gaming Act, 1867 as the object of these Acts is to ban / restrict gambling. The State Acts repeal the applicability of the Public Gambling Act in their respective States.

* Section 294-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section provides for punishment for keeping a lottery office without the authorisation of the State Government. Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: This Section prevents any person from bringing a suit for recovery of any winnings won by way of a ‘wager.’
* The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998: This Central Legislation lays down guidelines and restrictions on conducting lotteries.

* The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: It requires maintenance of certain records by entities engaged in gambling.

Some States which expressly permit gambling are

* Sikkim: The Sikkim Casino Games (Control and Tax Rules), 2002 permits setting up of casinos in Sikkim.

* The Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Act, 2008, along with the Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Rules, 2009 provides for licences to set up online gaming websites (for gambling and also betting on games like cricket, football, tennis, etc.) with the servers based in Sikkim. Other than this law, India does not have any specific laws targeting online gambling or gaming.

* Goa: An amendment to the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976 provides for casinos to be set up only at five star hotels or offshore vessels with permission. This is the reason Goa has floating casinos or casinos in five star hotels.

* West Bengal: The West Bengal Prize Competition and Gambling Act, 1957 excludes ‘skill-based’ card games like poker, bridge, rummy and nap from its operation. Thus, in West Bengal a game of poker is expressly excluded from the definition of gambling.

* Nagaland: The Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 regulates online games of skill in the State of Nagaland.

PUBLIC GAMBLING ACT
Since this is a Central Act on which several State Acts have been based, we may examine this Act. Section 1 of this Act has laid down three conditions all of which must be fulfilled in order that a place is treated as a common gaming house:
(a) It must be a house, walled enclosure, room or place;
(b) cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are kept in such place; and
(c) these instruments are used for profit or gain of the occupier whether by way of charging for the instruments or for the place.

It is a moot point whether these definitions can even be extended to online gaming ventures.

Section 3 of the Act levies a penalty for owning or keeping or having charge of a common gaming house. The penalty is a fine not exceeding Rs. 200 or imprisonment for any term up to three months. It may be noted that the public gaming house concept can even be extended to a private residence of a person if gambling activities are carried on in such a place. Thus, casual gambling at a house party may be treated, if all the conditions are fulfilled, as gambling and the owner of the house may be prosecuted.

Exception u/s 12: Even if all the above-mentioned three conditions are fulfilled, if it is a game of mere skill, the penal provisions do not apply. What is a game of skill is a question of fact and has been the subject matter of great debate. In Chamarbaugwalla vs. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, it was held that competitions which involve substantial skill are not gambling activities.

In State of AP vs. K. Satyanarayana, 1968 AIR 825 (SC), the Court analysed whether a game of rummy was a game of skill and held as follows:
• Rummy is not a game of mere chance like three cards;
• It requires considerable skill as fall of cards (is) to be memorised;
• The skill lies in holding and discarding cards;
• It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill;
• Chance is a factor but not the major factor.

The Court held that rummy is not a game of chance but a game of skill.

In Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs. State of TN, 1996 2 SCC 226, the Court analysed whether betting on horses is a game of chance or mere skill:
• Gambling is payment of a price for a chance to win. Gaming may be of skill alone or both skill and chance;
• In a game of skill chance cannot be entirely eliminated but it depends upon the superior knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of the players;
• A game of chance is one in which chance predominates over the element of skill, and a game of skill is one in which the element of skill dominates over the chance element;
• It is the dominant element which determines the game’s character;
• In horse-racing, the person betting is supposed to have full knowledge of the horse, jockey, trainer, owner, turf, race system, etc.;
• Horses are given specialised training;
• Books are printed giving details of the above, which are studied.

Hence, betting on horse-racing is a game of skill since skill dominates over chance.

In Bimalendu De vs. UOI, AIR 2001 Cal 30, it was held that Kaun Banega Carodpati, which was aired on TV channels, was not a game of chance but a game of skill. Elements of gambling, i.e., wagering and betting, were missing from this game. Only a player’s skill was tested. He did not have to pay or put any stake in the hope of a prize.

In M.J. Sivani vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770, video games parlours were held to be common gaming houses. Video games are associated with stakes of money or money’s worth on the result of a game, be it a game of pure chance or of mixed skill or chance. For a commoner it is difficult to play a video game with skill. Hence, they are not a game of mere skill.

In this respect, the Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 defines games of skill to include all such games where there is preponderance of skill over chance, including where the skill relates to strategising the manner of placing wagers or placing bets or where the skill lies in team selection or selection of virtual stocks based on analyses or where the skill relates to the manner in which the moves are made, whether through deployment of physical or mental skill and acumen. It further states that games of skill may be (a) card-based, (b) action / virtual sports / adventure / mystery, and (c) calculation / strategy / quiz-based. This is one of the first examples of a statutory definition of what constitutes a game of skill. ‘Gambling’, on the other hand, has been defined by this Act to mean and include wagering or betting on games of chance (meaning all such games where there is a preponderance of chance over skill) but does not include betting or wagering on games of skill.

Thus, the facts and circumstances of each game would have to be examined as to whether it falls within the domain of mere skill and hence is a game, or is it more a game of chance and hence gambling.

MAHARASHTRA PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT, 1887
This Act is similar in operation to the Public Gambling Act but has some differences. It defines the term ‘gaming’ to include wagering or betting except betting or wagering on horse races and dog races in certain cases.

‘Instruments of gaming’ are defined to include any article used as a subject matter of gaming or any document used as a register or record for evidence of gaming / proceeds of gaming / winnings or prizes of gaming.

The definition of common gaming house includes places where the following activities take place:
• Betting on rainfall;
• Betting on prices of cotton, opium or other commodities;
• Betting on stock market prices;
• Betting on cards.

The imprisonment under this Act extends up to two years and the fine is also higher. Police officers have been given substantial powers to search and seize and arrest under this Act.

INDIAN PENAL CODE
Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever keeps any office or place for drawing any lottery not authorised by the Government is punishable with a fine of up to Rs. 1,000. What is a lottery has not been defined. Courts have held that it includes competitions in which prizes are decided by mere chance. However, if the game requires skill then it is not a lottery. A newspaper contained an advertisement of a coupon competition which included coupons to be filled by the newspaper buyers with names of horses selected by them as likely to finish 1st, 2nd or 3rd in a race. The Court held that the game was one of skill since filling up the names of the horses required specialised knowledge about the horses and some element of skill – Stoddart vs. Sagar (1895) 2 QB 474.

Further, it must verify and maintain the records of the identity of all its clients / customers.

RECENT MADRAS HIGH COURT DECISION ON ONLINE RUMMY / POKER
In the recent case of Junglee Games India vs. State of Tamil Nadu, WP No. 18022/2020, the Madras High Court had occasion to consider whether an amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 which ended up banning online rummy / poker was unconstitutional. The amended statute prohibited all forms of games being conducted in cyberspace, irrespective of whether the game involved being a game of mere skill, whether such game was played for a wager, bet, money or other stakes. The High Court held that gambling is often equated with gaming and the activity involved chance to such a predominant extent that the element of skill that may also have been involved could not control the outcome. A game of skill, on the other hand, might not necessarily be such an activity where skill must always prevail; however, it would suffice for an activity to be regarded as a game of skill if, ordinarily, the exercise of skill could control the chance element involved in the activity such that the better skilled would prevail more often than not. It held that the wording of the amending Act was so crass and overbearing that it smacked of unreasonableness in its every clause and could be seen to be manifestly arbitrary.

Whatever may have been the pious intention of the Legislature, the reading of the impugned statute and how it might operate amounted to the baby being thrown out with the bath. It even held that broadly speaking, games and sporting activities in the physical form could not be equated with games conducted in virtual mode or in cyberspace. However, when it came to card games or board games such as chess or scrabble, there was no distinction between the skill involved in the physical form of the activity or in the virtual form. The Court held that such distinction was completely lost in the amending Act as all games were outlawed if played for a stake or for any prize.

It came out with a very interesting take on the difference – ‘Seen from the betting perspective, if the odds favouring an outcome are guided more by skill than by chance, it would be a game of skill. The chance element can never be completely eliminated for it is the chance component that makes gambling exciting and it is the possibility of the perchance result that fuels gambling.’

The Bench categorically held that there appeared to be a little doubt that both rummy and poker were games of skill as they involved considerable memory, working out of percentages, the ability to follow the cards on the table and constantly adjust to the changing possibilities of the unseen cards. The Madras High Court laid down the principle that the betting that a State can legislate on has to be the betting pertaining to gambling; ergo, betting only on games of chance. At any rate, even otherwise, the judgments in the cases of Chamarbaugwalla (Supra) and K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra) also instruct that the concept of betting in the Constitution cannot cover games of skill. It concluded that the amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 was capricious, irrational and without an adequate determining principle such that it was excessive and disproportionate.

RECENT DECISION ON FANTASY SPORTS LEAGUES
One of the biggest revolutions in the gaming industry has been that of Online Fantasy Sports Leagues, be it in cricket, football, hockey, etc. Time and again there have been writs filed before the High Courts to decree these as games of chance.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Varun Gumber vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2017 Cri LJ 3827 and the Order dated 15th September, 2017 passed by the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid judgment, have held that the fantasy games of Dream 11 were games of mere skill and their business has protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, i.e., freedom to carry out trade / vocation / business of one’s choice.

In Gurdeep Singh Sachar vs. Union of India, Cr. PIL Stamp No. 22/2019, the Bombay High Court held that success in Dream 11’s fantasy sports depended upon a user’s exercise of skill based on superior knowledge, judgement and attention, and the result thereof was not dependent on the winning or losing of a particular team in the real world game on any particular day. It was undoubtedly a game of skill and not a game of chance. The attempt to reopen the issues decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in respect of the same online gaming activities, which are backed by a judgment of the three-judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra), that, too, after dismissal of the SLP by the Apex Court, was wholly misconceived. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP [SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 43346 of 2019] against this decision inasmuch as it related to whether or not it involved gambling. Again, on 31st January, 2020, the Supreme Court reiterated on an application seeking clarification of its earlier Order, that it does not want to revisit the issue as to whether gambling is or is not involved.

In the cases of Ravindra Singh Chaudhary vs. Union of India, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20779/2019 and Chandresh Sankhla vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2020 SCC Online Raj 264, the Rajasthan High Court dismissed a petition against Dream11. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in D. Siluvai Venance vs. State, Criminal O.P. (MD) No.6568/2020 has passed a similar order. Recently, the Supreme Court in Avinash Mehrotra vs. State of Rajasthan, SLP (Civil) Diary No(s). 18478/2020, dismissed an SLP against the Rajasthan High Court Order in the Ravindra Singh case (Supra). It held that the matter was no longer res integra as SLPs have come up from the Punjab & Haryana and the Bombay High Courts and have been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

All of the above judgments analysed what was a fantasy league. They held that any fantasy sports game was a game which occurred over a pre-determined number of rounds (which may extend from a single match / sporting event to an entire league or series) in which participating users selected, built and acted as managers / selectors of their virtual team. The drafting of a virtual team involved the exercise of considerable skill as the user had to first assess the relative worth of each athlete / sportsperson as against all athletes / sportspersons available for selection. The user had to study the rules and make evaluations of the athlete’s strengths and weaknesses based on these rules. Users engaged in participating in fantasy sports read and understood the rules of the game and made their assessment of athletes and the selection of athletes in their virtual team on the basis of the anticipated statistics of their selection.

It was held that the element of skill and the predominant influence on the outcome of the fantasy league was more than any other incidents and, therefore, they were games of ‘mere skill’ and not falling within the activity of gambling. It did not involve risking money or playing stakes on the result of a game or an event, hence, the same did not amount to gambling / betting. It was even held that the fantasy sports formats were globally recognised as a great tool for fan engagement as they provided a platform to sports lovers to engage in their favourite sport along with their friends and family. This legitimate business activity having protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution contributed to Government Revenue not only vide GST and income tax payments, but also by contributing to increased viewership and higher sports fan engagement, thereby simultaneously promoting even the real world games.

FEMA
The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 and the Consolidated FDI Policy state that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of any sort is prohibited in gambling and betting, including casinos. Thus, no FDI is allowed in any gambling ventures, whether online or offline. However, if the ventures are gaming ventures, then there are no sectoral caps or conditions for the FDI and there are no restrictions for foreign technology collaboration agreements. And, 100% FDI is allowable in gaming ventures, online and offline. Thus, one comes back to the million-dollar question – is the venture one of gambling or gaming? The tests explained above would be applicable even to determine whether FDI is permissible in the venture.

Similar tests may also be used under the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 for overseas direct investments in a foreign company. If it is an online gaming company, then it would constitute a bona fide business activity and foreign investment should be permissible.

CONCLUSION
Recent judicial thinking seems to be changing along with the times. When one looks at the Court decisions delivered on new topics such as cryptocurrencies, fantasy sports, online poker, etc., it is clear that the trend is to allow businesses in these sunrise areas. If the Legislature also moves at the same speed and in the same direction, we would have a wonderful environment which could spawn exciting businesses!

 

PROPRIETY IN ADJUDICATION

Legacy laws were legislated independently and hence administered by their respective Governments. However, the GST law has been designed on the unique concept of ‘Pooled sovereignty’ between the Centre and the States. This dual nature of GST has made the administration of this novel legislation a critical challenge before the GST Council. Unlike the ‘origin-based’ Central Sales Tax law (also a Central legislation) where the collection and retention of taxes was with the respective State Governments, the GST design faces the peculiarity of implementing a ‘destination consumption law’ with revenue being collected and administered in the State of origin but ultimately accruing to the State of consumption. Moreover, the Central and State administrations are not only implementing their respective laws under which they have been appointed, but are also entrusted with implementing the parallel GST law. Intense discussions have taken place between the Central and State administrations and the final handshake was made as follows:

–    Single administrative interface;
–    Efficient use of respective administrative expertise;
–    Vertical and quantitative division of taxpayer base (except for enforcement and vigilance action); and
–    Cross-empowerment of critical administration functions (except matters involving the place of supply).

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION OF GST ACT
Sections 3, 4 and 5 provide for the administration of the Act – Section 3 handles appointments at various levels of officers and deemed officers appointed under the erstwhile enactment as GST officers; Section 4 empowers the Board / Commissioner to appoint such other persons as GST officers; Section 5 enables the Board to equip any officer appointed under sections 3 or 4 with functions and duties under the Act. It also enables the Commissioner to delegate his powers to any subordinate officer. Section 6 codifies the cross-empowerment principle as agreed by the GST Council, enabling the appointed GST officers to cross-administer the functions conferred under the correspondent enactments. In this background, three phrases have been adopted for the purpose of assignment of administrative functions, viz., ‘adjudicating authority’, ‘proper officer’ and ‘authorised officer’. This article attempts to decode whether these terms are mutually exclusive or overlapping with each other. It is to be noted that this article only decodes the Central Tax Notifications / Circulars. One may have to examine the flow of the respective State Notifications in order to fix the jurisdiction of said officers.

PROPER OFFICER – DEFINITION AND ROLE
As a starting point, let us look at the respective definitions under the GST Act:

Proper Officer – Section 2(91) defines ‘proper officer’ in relation to any function to be performed under this Act, which means the Commissioner or the Officer of the Central Tax who is assigned that function by the Commissioner in the Board;

Section 2(24): ‘Commissioner’ means the Commissioner of Central Tax and includes the Principal Commissioner of Central Tax appointed u/s 3 and the Commissioner of Integrated Tax appointed under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act;
Section 2(25) r/w/s 168, ‘Commissioner in the Board’… shall mean a Commissioner or Joint Secretary posted in the Board and such Commissioner or Joint Secretary shall exercise the powers specified in the said sections with the approval of the Board.
(Note – In Central Tax administration, NOT all Commissioners are empowered to perform the function of assignment. It is only that Commissioner who is posted in the Board who is entitled to perform such assignment of functions.)

In order to confer specific jurisdiction to individual officers, the respective Commissioners have, through instructions / Notifications, identified the ‘proper officers’ on the principle of cross-empowerment, functional and geographical division and vested them with the requisite functions. The role of proper officer has been envisaged as follows:

Section

Function

Issue
orders

Chapter VI

Registration / Amendment / Cancellation

Yes, for registration, cancellation,
suspension, revocation

Chapter X

Refunds

Yes, for sanction or rejection

Section 60

Provisional assessment

Yes, for finalisation of provisional
assessment

Section 61

Scrutiny of returns

No

Section 62

Assessment of non-filers

Yes, best judgement order

Section 63

Assessment of unregistered persons

Yes, best judgement order

Section 65

Audit

No

Section 66

Special audits

No

Section 67

Inspection, search and seizure

No

Section 68

Inspection of goods in movement

No

Section 70

Summon attendance

No

Section 71

Access of business premises

No

Section 73/74

Demands of taxes

Yes, for ascertaining raising demands

Section 79

Recovery of taxes

No

ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY – DEFINITION AND ROLE

Adjudicating Authority – Section 2(4) defines ‘adjudicating authority’ which means any authority, appointed or authorised to pass any order or decision under this Act, but does not include the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, the Revisional Authority, the Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, the National Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Tribunal and the Authority referred to in sub-section (2) of section 171.

The term ‘adjudicating authority’ has been used in ‘Chapter XVIII-Appeals & Revisions’. The section provides for the remedy of appeal only against the orders of the ‘adjudicating authority’. The critical point to be noted is that this phrase is being used for the first time under the Chapter of Appeals and is conspicuously absent in the provisions granting powers to issue orders under the Assessment / Adjudication provisions of the enactment. There seems to be a prima facie disconnect in empowerment of execution and decision-making functions under the Act. It appears that certain functions have been distributed to proper officers but the issuance of orders (decision-making) has been conferred on a separate category of officers called ‘adjudicating authority’. One therefore has to look into the enactment to identify whether the said terms are overlapping or mutually exclusive to each other.

Authorised Officer – Role
In several instances, the enactment empowers senior officer(s) to ‘authorise’ a Central Tax Officer with specific functions. Section 67 empowers the Joint Commissioner to authorise officers to inspect the premises of a taxpayer. Section 65 empowers the Joint Commissioner to authorise the audit of a taxpayer by a particular officer including visiting the said premises. Therefore, these are officers who are permitted to perform a specific task under an authorisation having a limited operation over a ‘particular taxpayer for a specific function’.

Identification – ‘Proper Officer’
An officer after having been appointed under the Act, is required to be granted jurisdiction to perform his task under the Act. Proper officers are conferred powers on the following basis: (a) Geography, (b) Cross-empowerment / division, (c) Functions, and (d) Monetary limits (if any).

A) Geographical jurisdiction
Notification 2/2017-CT dated 19th June, 2017
appoints Central Tax Officers for the purpose of section 3 of the CGST Act and assigns geographical jurisdiction to Commissioners (aka Executive Commissionerate), Commissioners (Appeals) and Commissioners (Audit). The said Notification divides the entire Central Administration at State / District levels for the purpose of administration. Each Commissioner has issued public notices assigning jurisdiction to various ranges based on geographical parameters (such as PIN codes, etc.). Correspondingly, State Commissioners are expected to exercise similar powers and assign such jurisdiction to officers in their administration. Similarly, Notification 14/2017-CT dated 1st July, 2017 seeks to appoint officers of the Directorate-General of GST Intelligence / Audit as Central Tax Officers with all-India jurisdiction and confers powers corresponding to the specified level of Central Tax Officers. Section 3 of the GST Act also deems officers appointed under the legacy laws as officers appointed under the said Act.

B) Cross-empowerment jurisdiction
In terms of the 9th GST Council minutes, the Centre and States have mutually agreed to a ‘vertical division’ of the taxpayer base in each State (except for enforcement and vigilance functions). Vertical division of the taxpayer base entails clear demarcation of taxpayers being administered by the Centre and the State at each State’s level. The GST Council vide CBEC Circular No. 1/2017-GST dated 20th September, 2017 provided for such division based on turnover, business and geographical parameters. State-level committees have issued trade notices demarcating the taxpayer base between both the administrations. Having been assigned respective administrative powers for a set of taxpayers, section 6 of the CGST Act empowers the ‘cross-empowered proper officer’ to administer in parallel the corresponding GST law, i.e., the proper officer issuing orders under the CGST Act shall be empowered to issue parallel orders under the SGST Act with due intimation to the jurisdictional officer1. The GST Council has also decided that cases involving ‘place of supply’ would have to be handled by the Central Tax administration even if the taxpayer has been assigned to the State administration.

Notification 39/2017 dated 13th October, 2017 has been issued u/s 6(1) of the CGST Act empowering State officers for the purpose of sanction of refund u/s 54 or 55 except Rule 96 of the CGST Rules, 2017 in respect of registered persons located in the territorial jurisdiction of the said State officers. CBIC letter dated 22nd June, 2020 states that the said Notification has been issued only to place a restriction on State officers from issuing refunds under Rule 96 of the CGST Rules. In the absence of a Notification it should be understood that all powers are cross-empowered to the corresponding administration by virtue of section 6.

C) Functional jurisdiction
CBEC Circular No. 3/3/2017 dated 5th July, 2017 has assigned functions to specified class of officers in exercise of powers u/s 2(91). The summary of the functions assigned to the Central Tax Officers is as follows:

Proper
officer

Powers
& functions

Principal Commissioner / Commissioner of
Central Tax

• Extension of period of seizure of goods
beyond six months

• Extension for payments of demands up to
three months

Additional or Joint Commissioner of Central
Tax

• Authorisation of inspection, search of
premises, seizure of goods, documents, books or things, inventory / disposal
of perishable goods

• Authorisation of access to business
premises for inspection of books of accounts, records, etc.

• Permission for transfer of properties by
defaulter

• Disposal of conveyance in detention
proceedings

Deputy or Assistant Commissioner of Central
Tax

• Processing of refund applications

• Provisional assessment proceedings

• Assessment of unregistered persons

• Summary assessments in special cases

• Audit

• Adjudication above a specific limit

• Recovery of excess taxes collected

• Recovery of taxes

• Penalties under various sections

• Detention proceedings

• Confiscation of goods or conveyances

• Transitional provisions

• Re-credit of rejected refunds

• Other specified procedural matters

Superintendent of Central Tax

• Non-accountal of goods

• Scrutiny of returns

• Assessment of non-filers

• General audit / special audit
observations / findings

• Seizure of books of accounts

• Summon for submission of evidences

• Adjudication up to specific limit

• Other specified procedural matters

Inspector of Central Tax

Detention proceedings

(Note – Assignment of powers to a specified officer would include assignment of such powers to the superiors of the specified officers.)

CBEC Circular dated 31st May, 2018-GST, dated 9th February, 2018 has also clarified that Audit Commissionerates and DGGSTI shall exercise powers
of issuance of show cause notices but the adjudication of
the same would be done by the Executive Commissionerates having jurisdiction over the principal place of business.

D) Monetary jurisdiction
The Central Tax administration (vide CBEC Circular dated 31st May, 2018-GST, dated 9th February, 2018) has assigned monetary jurisdiction to Superintendents, Assistant / Deputy Commissioners and Additional / Joint Commissioners for the purpose of adjudication of matters. A significant point is that the said monetary limits would extend only to matters of adjudication and other powers (such as summary assessments, etc.) are not subjected to any monetary limits.

ANALYSIS
The prima facie observation emerging from the above Notifications / Circulars is that though ‘proper officers’ have been conferred certain powers, the phrase ‘adjudicating authority’ u/s 2(4) has not been mentioned anywhere. Generally, one may hasten to conclude that none of the officers have been empowered to adjudicate (i.e., issue orders) in terms of section 2(4) of the GST Act. The adjudication function, being a special and distinct function, has not been conferred on any officer and hence no orders can be issued until the adjudication function is conferred on officers.

The said argument may face stiff resistance when one probes further into the enactment. Chapter II on Administration provides for identification of ‘proper officers’ for various functions of the Act. As tabulated above, various sections under the enactment empower the proper officers to perform certain functions. While some sections specifically empower officers with issuance of orders, others transfer the proceedings to its conclusion. For example, though sections 61, 65 and 66 entrust certain functions / powers, the respective provisions do not empower them to issue orders for the purpose of concluding the proceedings. Section 61 empowers the proper officer to scrutinise the GST returns and seek related clarifications from the taxpayers, but directs that any adverse observation should result in appropriate action such as audit, adjudication, etc. The proper officer does not derive the power of issuance of orders under the said section and the ascertainment of proper officer for issuance of orders would have to be performed under a separate section. Similar implications appear to operate in case of audits conducted u/s 65. The audit function may be entrusted to a specific group of officers but the section does not specifically empower them to adjudicate the matter, and the issue is required to be adjudged only by the proper officer empowered to issue orders in terms of section 73/74 of the GST Act.

The corollary is that all proper officers may not be adjudicating authorities but all adjudicating authorities would necessarily have to be proper officers under the section. The empowerment of a person as a proper officer is delegated to the respective Commissioner but the empowerment of the person as an adjudicating authority emerges from the provisions of the statute and is not the subject matter of delegation.

Another corollary of this approach is that not all actions of proper officers are appealable under the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the GST Act. It is only orders issued by an adjudicating authority which are eligible for a statutory appeal under the Chapter of Appeals / Revisions. For example, section 65(6) requires the proper officer performing the audit to issue his ‘findings’ from the audit. The Act has consciously used the phrase ‘findings’ in contradistinction to ‘orders’. These findings would not be appealable orders for the purpose of XVIII since these are not decisions of adjudicating authorities or arising out of an adjudication proceeding under the Act. However, orders which are issued under sections 62, 63 or 64 in the case of assessment of non-filers, summary assessments or protective assessments, are in the nature of a decision-making function (adjudication function) and hence would be appealable before the respective appellate authority.

To reiterate, assignment of ‘proper officer’ is a consequence of the Commissioner’s order but the assignment of a decision-making function is consequent to the statutory provision itself. Conferment of the status of adjudicating authority stands at a higher pedestal and cannot be altered by any order / Notification. Thus one may conclude that the carving out of a separate category of ‘adjudicating authorities’ is for the purpose of tagging their orders as appealable orders under the Act. Adjudicating authorities are a ‘sub-set’ of proper officers and not a distinct category of officers.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT IN THE SAYED ALI & CANNON INDIA CASES
The Supreme Court in Sayed Ali (2011) 265 ELT 17 (SC) examined the aspect of appointment of Customs (Preventive) officers and assignment of functions as proper officers for administration of the Act. The Court observed that appointment of officers of customs for a particular geographical area does not ipso facto confer powers of a ‘proper officer’ and in the absence of specific adjudication functions being assigned, Customs (Preventive) officers were held as incompetent to issue show cause notices.

Applying the Sayed Ali case, the Supreme Court once again in Cannon India [2021 (376) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)] examined a bill of entry assessed by the Customs Officer (Appraising) and cleared for home consumption. The Director of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) subsequently raised the issue of short assessment of duty in terms of section 28(4) of the Customs Act. Section 28(4) r/w/s 2(34) assigned the function of demands and recovery to ‘the proper officer’. The Court emphasised on the article ‘the’ as conveying that ‘the proper officer’ is the specified officer who has been assigned the function u/s 28(4) and not any other officer. Section 28(4) being a power of re-assessment of the original assessment ought to be conferred only on ‘the officer’ who performed the original assessment and not on any other officer. According to the Court, where the same powers are conferred to different officers on a particular subject matter, then the exercise of powers by one of the officers would be to the exclusion of the other, and hence any subsequent reassessment ought to be made by the original officer who exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter. Moreover, the Court stated that DRI officers were not conferred powers of administration of the Customs Act since the Notification conferring powers did not trace itself back to section 6 of the Customs Act which empowered the Central Government to appoint other Central officers for the purpose of the Customs Act. Accordingly, adjudication proceedings initiated by the DRI officers were quashed in the absence of jurisdiction. The analogy emerging from these decisions is that there has to be a specific conferment of powers for performance of a function under the law and once such power is conferred to a particular officer, it operates to the exclusion of all other officers even though they may exercise jurisdiction over the taxpayer.

The Proper Officer – As adjudicating authority
To understand the interplay between ‘Proper officer’, ‘Authorised officer’ and ‘Adjudicating authority’, one may take the example of audit proceedings. Section 65 specifies that the Commissioner may, by general / special order, authorise any officer to perform an audit of a taxpayer. The provision uses the phrase ‘authorised officer’ in the section, i.e., officer who has been assigned the audit of the taxpayer. However, in section 65(6) the provisions state that on conclusion of the audit, ‘the proper officer’ shall inform the audit findings and their reasons. In section 65(7), it has been stated that where audit results in short payment of taxes, ‘the proper officer’ may initiate action u/s 73/74 which states that the ‘proper officer’ in such cases shall issue a show cause notice directing the taxpayer to pay the said amount. The reference to ‘the proper officer’ continues in the said section and 73(9) enables the said proper officer to issue appropriate orders.

Two questions arise here: (a) Firstly, which Commissioner is authorised to perform the task of assignment of audit cases. While practically the Commissioner (Audit) performs this task, Notification 2/2017-CT does not specify such powers being granted to the Commissioner (Audit). The said Notification merely states that the Commissioner (Audit) would exercise powers over the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the corresponding Commissioner(s). The nature of the powers to be exercised has not been specified in the said Notification. Even Board Circular No. 3/3/2017 only appoints the Commissioners with the proper officer functions and does not specifically grant an audit function to the Commissioner (Audit). In contrast, the Central Excise law contained Notification 30/2014-CT dated 14th October, 2014 r/w Notification 47/2016 dated 28th September, 2016 which specifically granted Audit and SCN issuance functions (adjudication powers introduced subsequently) for conferring jurisdiction. The GST provisions appear to have some shortcomings to this extent;

(b) Secondly, who is the ‘proper officer’ for conclusion of audit proceedings and adjudication of the subject matter? It is fairly clear that ‘authorised officers’ u/s 65(1)/(2) are distinct from ‘proper officers’ referred in 65(6)/(7) and 73/74. It also appears that the proper officer referred to in both sections implies ‘the’ proper officer who is assigned the adjudication function. Therefore, ‘the proper officer’ referred to in 65(6)/(7) should be the same officer as is being referred to in 73/74. Notification 2/2017 r/w Circular 3/3/2017 dated 31st May, 2018 implies that the Executive Commissionerate has been vested with both powers, i.e., ‘conclusion of audit proceedings’ [section 65(6)/(7)] as well as ‘adjudication of demands’ (section 73/74). It appears that the function of the Audit Commissionerate / officers terminates with the performance of the audit (i.e., visit, examination, etc.) but reporting of audit findings and adjudication (where required) would need to be performed by the Executive Commissionerate only. Alternatively, it appears that the ‘proper officer’ who is assigned the function of conclusion of audit u/s 65(6)/(7) should be the same officer issuing the show cause notice u/s 73(1), and in view of Circular dated 3rd March, 2017, the proper officer for adjudication u/s 73(9) should be the officer functioning in the Executive Commissionerate. Despite this ambiguity, the conclusion remains that ‘authorised officers’ are distinct from ‘the proper officer’ and those proper officers functioning as decision-making authorities u/s 73/74(9) would function as adjudicating authorities, making their orders amenable to statutory appeal.

State Administration – CGST Act
State administration has been conferred with powers to administer the Central enactment in respect of taxpayers assigned to the State. Section 6(1) of the CGST Act considered ‘officers’ appointed under the SGST Act as being authorised to be ‘proper officers’ for the purpose of the CGST Act. The respective State Commissioners in terms of the powers drawn from section 3 of the respective State enactments have designated proper officers on functional and geographical basis. Though the Commissioner exercising powers from the SGST Act appoints them as proper officers for the purpose of the SGST Act, the said State officers have not been assigned functions for the purpose of the CGST Act. Moreover, section 6(1) does not explicitly confer the rights of assignment of proper officer functions to the Commissioners (State) for the purpose of Central enactment. This probably should continue to be the prerogative of the Commissioner (Central Tax) only. This is because the phrase ‘proper officer’ under the CGST Act is an appointment u/s 2(91) of the CGST Act and the said section only permits the assignment of functions by the ‘Commissioner in the Board’. Commissioner in the Board only refers to Commissioner as designated by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes. State Commissioners would not be the Commissioners as understood in terms of section 2(91) of the CGST Act and hence the assignment of functions to their subordinates for the purpose of the SGST Act does not automatically result in assignment of functions for the purpose of the CGST Act. In simple terms, section 6 enables the Central enactment to authorise the State administration as proper officers (i.e., borrow the man-power) but the power of assignment of functions (supervisory powers) to these sets of officers would continue to vest with the Commissioner in the Board and such power of assignment has not been delegated to the State Commissioner.

State Administration – IGST Act
Section 4 of the IGST Act is pari materia to section 6(1) of the CGST Act. A similar issue would emerge when a State officer administers the IGST Act. This would be so insofar as the State administration is presiding over the state of registration of the taxpayer. But an additional issue that also emerges is where a State administration exercises its powers over a taxpayer who is not registered in their State. For example, any movement of goods from Mumbai to Chennai could entail movement through an intermediate State (say, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, etc.). The ‘place of supply’ of such transaction would be Tamil Nadu and the taxable person would be administered in Maharashtra. Strictly speaking, no revenue accrues (directly or indirectly) from this transaction to the State of Karnataka, though in practice the State administration has exercised its power to intercept goods which originate from Mumbai and are destined for Chennai.

Section 4 of the IGST Act appoints officers of the SGST as proper offices for the IGST Act. SGST has been defined under 2(111) of the CGST Act as ‘respective’ State GST officers. Therefore, section 4 of the IGST Act borrows the State administration from the ‘respective’ State only and so the respective State GST officer should ideally refer to the State administration having jurisdiction over the registration of the taxpayer. Though the State of Karnataka cannot exercise its domain over the said movement by virtue of ‘place of business’ or ‘place of supply’, the practice has been to exercise domain by virtue of the ‘geographical presence’ of the goods under movement. None of the Central Tax notifications confer proper officer functions on the basis of geographical presence of goods. Rather, they appear to have been assigned with reference to the place of business of the taxpayer. On a reading of section 68 r/w/s 129 of the CGST Act, it appears that ‘the proper officer’ referred therein cannot extend to all States’ proper officers and would be limited only to the ‘respective State proper officers’ from the movement that emerges. But the High Court in Advantage India Logistics Private Limited vs. UOI (2018) 19 GSTL 46 (MP) held otherwise. The Court upheld the jurisdiction of an MP State officer to intercept goods moving from Gurgaon (Haryana) to Mumbai (Maharashtra). This results in a very precarious situation and it is important that all stake-holders take cognisance of this issue.

DGGSTI as ‘proper officer’
In this context, the Notifications empowering the Directorate-General GST Intelligence (an arm of DRI) would be worth examining:
– Notification 14/2017-Central Tax invokes its powers from sections 3 and 5 of the CGST Act and appoints the officers of the Director-General of GST Intelligence (erstwhile Director-General of Central Excise Intelligence) as officers with all-India jurisdiction;
– The said Notification invests them with all the powers as have been invested in the corresponding rank of officers under the Central Tax Administration;
– However, the Notification appointing DGGST officers as Central Tax officers has not been issued u/s 4 of the GST Act. The officers of the DGGI, which is a special wing of the DRI, have not been appointed as ‘Central Tax Officers’ in terms of section 4 of the CGST Act.
– Moreover, the Commissioner in the Board has not conferred the ‘proper officer’ function to the officers of the DGGI.
– This gives rise to a similar anomaly as was prevalent under the Customs legislation and under consideration in the Cannon India case.

Thus, DGGSTI being officers appointed directly by the Central Government, are not officers specified in section 3 of the GST Act though a Notification has been issued invoking the said power. Section 4 has not been invoked by the said Notification for appointment of the DGGSTI officer for purposes of the CGST Law. To this extent, Notification 14/2017 carries the similar lacuna as was being considered in the aforesaid case and consequently the said officers cannot be termed as ‘proper officers’ in terms of section 2(34) of the said Act.

COMPTROLLER & AUDITOR-GENERAL OF INDIA (C&AG)
There has been a recent trend where C&AG officers have been seeking information from taxpayers on the Transitional Credit Claim under GST. Neither section 3 nor 4 have appointed the officers of the C&AG as Central Tax Officers under the statute. Accordingly, such officers cannot be categorised as ‘proper officers’ under either the CGST or the SGST Act. Except section 108 of the CGST Act, none of the sections even mentions officers of the C&AG to verify the books of accounts of the taxpayer. It is only section 108 of the CGST Act which makes reference to the objections of the C&AG for the purpose of enabling the revisional authority to revise any orders of proceedings conducted under the GST Act. But this does not enable the C&AG to directly scrutinise, assess or even adjudicate the records of the taxpayers. Thus, the C&AG cannot be permitted to directly seek or audit the records of the taxpayers and form any conclusion on the legality of their tax liability.

CONCLUSION
The onus of proving sufficient jurisdiction is on the officer asserting it. Unless the jurisdiction has been conclusively established, the officer cannot proceed on the subject matter. In conclusion, one may recollect the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukum Chand Shyam Lal (1976 AIR 789) which observed as follows: ‘It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performances are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice.’ The complex legal and administrative systems adopted under GST have to be meticulously handled by the Administrators in order to ensure the smooth and efficient function of the administration. Though this has been undertaken to a large extent, certain gaps need to examined and addressed so that there is clarity on the proper officer before whom the taxpayers are answerable.

FAQs ON AMENDED SCHEDULE III-DIVISION II RELATED TO ‘APPLICABILITY’

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) notified the amendments to Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013 on 24th March, 2021. There are a few questions regarding the broader issue of applicability of the amendments. These are listed below and so are the responses thereto which are the personal views of the author.

The responses are provided with reference to Division II of Schedule III that applies to non-NBFC companies following Ind AS, but may mutatis mutandis apply to Division I (applicable to entities applying AS) and Division III (applicable to NBFC entities applying Ind AS) of Schedule III as well. The ICAI has issued an Exposure Draft (ED) for public comments on the Guidance Note on Schedule III. The discussions in this article are largely consistent with the ED.

Whether the amended Schedule III applies to consolidated financial statements (CFS), those that are prepared on an annual basis, or a complete set prepared for interim purpose?

Attention is drawn to the guidance available in the pre-amended Schedule III Guidance Note of the ICAI. Paragraph 12.1 of the pre-amended Schedule III Guidance Note states as follows: ‘However, due note has to be taken of the fact that the Schedule III itself states that the provisions of the Schedule are to be followed mutatis mutandis for a CFS. MCA has also clarified vide General Circular No. 39/2014 dated 14th October, 2014 that Schedule III to the Act read with the applicable Accounting Standards does not envisage that a company while preparing its CFS merely repeats the disclosures made by it under stand-alone accounts being consolidated. Accordingly, the company would need to give all disclosures relevant for CFS only.’

The Guidance Note further elaborates on what is to be included and what needs to be excluded in the CFS. However, those inclusions / exclusions are not based on clear and consistent principles. A somewhat similar position is also taken in the ED. However, those are subject to further discussions and may undergo a change in the final Guidance Note. Therefore, which additional Schedule III disclosures are to be included or excluded in the CFS will involve a lot of judgement and guesswork till such time as the ICAI publishes its Guidance Note on the amended Schedule III.

The author believes that since most of the incremental disclosures in the amended Schedule III are regulatory in nature and beyond the requirements of accounting standards, those should not be mandated to CFS which are prepared on an annual basis or a complete CFS set prepared for an interim purpose. Alternatively, the ICAI may consider the application of the principle of materiality, which should be applied by each entity, considering their facts and circumstances. The ICAI may only provide broad guidelines on how the materiality principle will apply, without being prescriptive.

In accordance with amended Schedule III an entity reclassifies lease liabilities presented as borrowings separately as lease liabilities, i.e., borrowings and lease liabilities are presented as separate sub-headings under financial liabilities. Should the entity present a third balance sheet in accordance with paragraph 40A of Ind AS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements?

As per paragraph 40A of Ind AS 1, an entity shall present a third balance sheet as at the beginning of the preceding period in addition to the minimum comparative financial statements if the retrospective application, retrospective restatement or the reclassification has a material effect on the information in the balance sheet at the beginning of the preceding period. If lease liabilities that were presented as borrowings, and under amended Schedule III, it is reclassified as current and non-current financial liabilities, the author does not believe that it is material enough that a third balance sheet would be required in such cases. Nonetheless, the author’s view is that the lease liabilities should be included in determining the debt-equity ratio which is required to be disclosed as per amended Schedule III. Since most of the other changes required under revised Schedule III are regulatory in nature and are additional information rather than reclassification, a third balance sheet may not be required.

In case a company has a non-31st March year-end, whether amended Schedule III shall apply to the 31st December, 2021 or the 30th September, 2021 year-end financial statements?

The MCA Notification that notifies the amendment to Schedule III states that ‘the Central Government makes the following further amendments in Schedule III with effect from 1st day of April, 2021.’ This creates confusion whether the amendments apply for the financial years beginning on or after 1st April, 2021 or the financial years that end after 1st April, 2021. The author’s view is that the amendments shall apply to financial statements relating to the financial year beginning on or after 1st April, 2021 for the following three reasons:

• Firstly, the amendments are made to align with CARO’s requirement and CARO 2020 is applicable for the financial year beginning on or after 1st April, 2021.
• Secondly, the amendments also align with the Companies (Accounts) Amendments Rules, 2021 which are applicable for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April, 2021. Consequently, amended Schedule III will not apply to the 31st December, 2021 or the 30th September, 2021 year-end financial statements.
• Lastly, going by recent experience, the regulators’ intent is to apply amendments on a prospective basis rather than on a retrospective basis.

Whether amended Schedule III applies to stand-alone interim financial statements that commence on or after 1st April, 2021?

The relevant paragraphs of Ind AS 34 Interim Financial Reporting are quoted below:

‘9. If an entity publishes a complete set of Financial Statements in its interim financial report, the form and content of those statements shall conform to the requirements of Ind AS 1 for a complete set of Financial Statements.
10. If an entity publishes a set of condensed Financial Statements in its interim financial report, those condensed statements shall include, at a minimum, each of the headings and sub-totals that were included in its most recent annual Financial Statements and the selected explanatory notes as required by this Standard. Additional line items or notes shall be included if their omission would make the condensed interim Financial Statements misleading.’

Based on the above, if a complete set of stand-alone interim financial statements is presented, all amended Schedule III disclosures are required, including their comparatives. When condensed financial statements are presented as interim financial statements, critical Accounting Standard disclosures that were not included in the last set of published financial statements are required to be provided. Distinction needs to be made between regulatory disclosures required as per Schedule III and those required by Accounting Standards. Therefore, considering the amended disclosures under Schedule III are other than accounting standard disclosures, these are not required to be included in condensed interim financial statements; but may be provided voluntarily.

With regard to quarterly and half-yearly SEBI results – SEBI LODR requires Schedule III format to be used for SEBI results. Schedule III amendments make no changes in the format of Statement of Profit and Loss. However, there are a few new line items inserted, or the grouping is changed in the format of the Balance Sheet, for example, lease liabilities to be shown as current and non-current financial liabilities on the face of the balance sheet, security deposits given to be shown under other financial assets instead of loans, current maturities of long-term borrowings to be shown separately within borrowings under the heading current liabilities instead of other financial liabilities, etc. These format changes need to be made in half-yearly results since the SEBI format is aligned to the Schedule III format. Comparative figures also need to be re-grouped / re-classified, wherever required, with appropriate notes.

Whether comparative numbers are required for interim or annual financial statements for periods / year commencing on or after 1st April, 2021 and contain the amended Schedule III disclosures in the current year / period for the first time?

Schedule III, Ind AS 34 Interim Financial Reporting, Conceptual framework for Financial Reporting under Ind AS and Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements, require comparative numbers to be presented. Comparative numbers are required for stand-alone financial statements, CFS, full set of interim financial statement and condensed interim financial statement.

CONCLUSION

The process of gathering the information for the incremental Schedule III disclosures and providing comparative numbers in the initial year or period of implementing amended Schedule III will be a cumbersome and onerous exercise, particularly aging
analysis of receivables, payables, or capital work in progress. Additionally, many of the disclosure requirements may be required at the CFS level. Therefore, proper planning and system modification is advised to comply with the amended Schedule III.

Section 148 read with section 148-A – Notice u/s 148 issued post 1st April, 2021 – Conditional legislation – The Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 whereby the application of section 148, which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meaning the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification

2 Palak Khatuja, W/o Vinod Khatuja vs. Union of India [Writ Petition (T) No. 149 of 2021; date of order: 23rd August, 2021 (Chhattisgarh High Court)]

Section 148 read with section 148-A – Notice u/s 148 issued post 1st April, 2021 – Conditional legislation – The Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 whereby the application of section 148, which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meaning the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification

The petitioners filed their income tax return for A.Y. 2015-16 and F.Y. 2014-15. Subsequently, on the basis of some information available, an initial scrutiny was done; however, no concealment was found but again a notice u/s 148 was issued. It was submitted that on 30th June, 2021 when the notice u/s 148 was issued, the power to issue the notice was preceded by a new provision of law and thereby section 148 is to be read with section 148A. It was contended that as per the amended Finance Act, 2021, which was published in the Gazette on 28th March, 2021, sections 2 to 88 were notified to come into force on the first day of April, 2021 and accordingly the new section 148A was inserted which prescribed that before issuing the notice u/s 148, the A.O. was bound to conduct an inquiry giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee with the prior approval of the specified authority and a show cause notice in detail was necessary specifying a particular date for hearing.

It was further submitted that since the operation of section 148A came into effect on 1st April, 2021, as such, the notice issued to the petitioner on 30th June, 2021 u/s 148, without following the procedure u/s 148A, that is, without giving an opportunity of hearing, would be illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 148A and it cannot be sustained. It was further submitted that although the Revenue has placed reliance on a certain Notification of the Ministry of Finance, but when the law has been enacted by the Parliament then in such a case the Notification issued by the Ministry of Finance would not override even to extend the period of operation of the section of the old Act of section 148. It was therefore submitted that the impugned notice is illegal and is liable to be quashed.

On its part, the Revenue contended that because of the pandemic and lockdown of all activities, including the normal working of the office, a lot of people could not file their returns and submit the necessary papers. As such, the Ministry of Finance, in exercise of its power under the Finance Act, issued the Notification whereby the application of the old provisions of section 148 was extended initially up to 30th April, 2021 and thereafter up to the 30th day of June, 2021. Therefore, the notice dated 30th June, 2021 would be within the ambit of the power of the Department in the extended time of its operation till 30th June, 2021. Thus, the notice u/s 148 is legal and valid.

The Court observed that the notice u/s 148 was issued for A.Y. 2015-16 on 30th June, 2021. The grievance of the petitioners was that the notice of like nature could have been issued till the cut-off date of 30th March, 2021 as subsequent thereto the new section 148A intervened before the issuance of notice directly u/s 148. The Finance Act, 2021 was Notified on 28th March, 2021 which purports that sections 2 to 88 shall come into force on the first day of April, 2021 and sections 108 to 123 shall come into force on such date as the Central Government notifies in the Official Gazette. The relevant part wherein section 148A is enveloped is covered u/s 42 of the Finance Act, 2021. By introduction of section 148A, it was mandated that the A.O. before issuing any notice u/s 148 shall conduct an inquiry, if required, with the prior approval of the specified authority, provide an opportunity of being heard, serve a show cause notice and prescribe the time. The question raised for consideration was whether, with the promulgation of the Act on the 1st day of April, 2021, the notice directly issued u/s 148 on 30th June, 2021 is valid or not as the bar of 148A was created by insertion of the section on 1st April, 2021.

The Court further observed that on account of the pandemic, Parliament had enacted the Taxation & Other Laws (Relaxation & Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. In the Act, any time limit specified, prescribed or notified between 20th March, 2020 and 31st December, 2021 or any other date thereafter, after December, 2021, gave the Central Government the power to notify. The necessity occurred because of the Covid pandemic lockdown in the backdrop of the fact that few of the assessees could not file their returns. Likewise, since the offices were closed, the Department also could not perform the statutory duty under the Income-tax Act. Considering the complexity, the Parliament thought it proper to delegate to the Ministry of Finance the date of applicability of the amended section. The delegation is not a self-contained and complete Act and was only made in the interest of flexibility and smooth working of the Act, and the delegation therefore was a practical necessity. The Ministry of Finance having been delegated with such power, this delegation can always be considered to be a sound basis for administrative efficiency and it does not by itself amount to abdication of power.

Reading both the Notifications, dated 31st March and 27th April, 2021, whereby the application of section 148 which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meant thereby that the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification. The Notification is made by the Ministry of Finance, Central Government considering the fact of lockdown all over India and it can be always assumed that the deferment of the application of section 148A was done in a controlled way. It is a settled proposition that any modification of the Executive’s decision implies a certain amount of discretion and has to be exercised with the help of the legislative policy of the Act and cannot travel beyond it and run counter to it, or change the essential features, the identity, structure or the policy of the Act. Therefore, the legislative delegation exercised by the Central Government by Notification to uphold the mechanism as it prevailed prior to March, 2021 is not in conflict with any Act and Notification by the Executive, i.e., the Ministry of Finance, and would be a part of legislative function.

The Court relied on the principle as laid down in the case of A.K. Roy vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 710, wherein the Supreme Court held that the Constitution (Forty-Fourth) Amendment Act, 1978, which conferred power on the Executive to bring the provisions of that Act into force did not suffer from excessive delegation of legislative power. The Court observed that the power to issue a Notification for bringing into force the provisions of a constitutional amendment is not a constituent power, because it does not carry with it the power to amend the Constitution in any manner. Likewise, in this case, by the delegation to the Executive of the power to the Central Government to specify the date by way of relaxation of time limit, the main purpose of the Finance Act is not defeated. Therefore, it would be a conditional legislation. The Legislature has declared the Act and has given the power to the Executive to extend its implementation by way of Notification. The Legislature has resorted to conditional legislation to give the power to the Executive to decide under what circumstances the law should become operative or when the operation should be extended and this would be covered by the doctrine of the conditional legislation.

Thus, by the aforesaid Notifications, the operation of section 148 was extended, and thereby deferment of section 148A was done by the Ministry of Finance by way of conditional legislation in the peculiar circumstances which arose during the pandemic and lockdown and the Central Government cannot be said to have encroached upon the turf of Parliament.

By effect of such Notification, the individual identity of section 148, which was prevailing prior to the amendment and insertion of section 148A, was insulated and saved till 30th June, 2021.

Considering the situation for the benefit of the assessee and to facilitate individuals to come out of the woods, the time limit framed under the IT Act was extended. Likewise, certain rights which were reserved in favour of the Department were also preserved and extended at parity. Consequently, the provisions of section 148 which were prevailing prior to the amendment of the Finance Act, 2021 were also extended. The power to issue notice u/s 148 which was there prior to the amendment was also saved and the time was extended. As a result, the notice issued on 30th June, 2021 would also be saved. The petitions were dismissed accordingly.

Immunity u/s 270AA – No bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270 AA – Application u/s 264 against rejection of such application maintainable

1 Haren Textiles Private Limited vs. Pr. CIT 4 & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 1100 of 2021; Date of order: 8th September, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Immunity u/s 270AA – No bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270 AA – Application u/s 264 against rejection of such application maintainable

The petitioner, engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fabrics and a trading member of the National Stock Exchange, filed its return for the A.Y. 2017-2018 on 31st October, 2017 declaring a total income of Rs. 2,27,11,320. The A.O. initiated scrutiny assessment by issuing statutory notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act. He passed an assessment order dated 19th December, 2019 u/s 143(3) determining the total income of the petitioner at Rs. 7,41,84,730. He determined book profit under the provisions of section 115(JB) at Rs. 2,19,33,505. Following this, the A.O. issued a demand notice dated 19th December, 2019 u/s 156 raising a demand of Rs. 1,80,14,619. The petitioner noted that the A.O. had not correctly allowed the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) credit available to it while determining the tax liability. Hence it filed an application dated 6th January, 2020 u/s 154 seeking rectification of the assessment order. The A.O. accepted the submission of the petitioner and granted the MAT credit available and issued a revised Computation Sheet dated 14th January, 2020 determining the correct amount of tax liability of the petitioner. He also issued a revised notice of demand dated 14th January, 2020 u/s 156 raising a demand of Rs. 57,356 payable within 30 days from the service of the said notice.

The petitioner accepted the order passed by the A.O. u/s 154 and on 29th January, 2020 paid fully the tax demand of Rs. 57,356. Thereafter, on 30th January, 2020 it filed an application u/s 270AA in the prescribed Form No. 68 before the A.O. seeking immunity from penalty, etc. This application was rejected by the A.O. by an order dated 28th February, 2020. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an application dated 18th December, 2020 before the Pr. CIT under the provisions of section 264. The Pr. CIT rejected this application on the ground that sub-section 6 of section 270AA specifically prohibits revisionary proceedings u/s 264 against the order passed by the A.O. u/s 270AA(4). This order was challenged by the petitioner before the High Court.

The Court observed that under sub-section 6 of section 270AA, no appeal under section 246(A) or an application for revision u/s 264 shall be admissible against the order of assessment or reassessment referred to in clause (a) of sub-section 1, in a case where an order under sub-section 4 has been made accepting the application. This only means that when an assessee makes an application under sub-section 1 of section 270AA and such an application has been accepted under sub-section 4 of section 270AA, the assessee cannot file an appeal u/s 246(A) or an application for revision u/s 264 against the order of assessment or reassessment passed under sub-section 3 of section 143 or section 147. This does not provide for any bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270AA. The application before the Pr. CIT was an order challenging an order of rejection passed by the A.O. of an application filed by the petitioner under sub-section 1 of section 270AA seeking grant of immunity from imposition of penalty and initiation of proceedings under sub-section 276C or section 277CC.

Therefore, the Pr. CIT was not correct in rejecting the application on the ground that there is a bar under sub-section 6 of section 270AA in filing such application. The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Pr. CIT to consider de novo.

TDS – Credit for tax deducted at source – Effect of section 199 – Assessee acting as collection agent for television network – Subscription charges collected from cable operators and paid to television network – Amounts routed through assessee’s accounts – Assessee entitled to credit for tax deducted at source on such amounts

7 Principal CIT vs. Kal Comm. Private Ltd. [2021] 436 ITR 66 (Mad) A.Ys.: 2009-10 to 2011-12; Date of order: 26th April, 2021 S. 199 of ITA, 1961

TDS – Credit for tax deducted at source – Effect of section 199 – Assessee acting as collection agent for television network – Subscription charges collected from cable operators and paid to television network – Amounts routed through assessee’s accounts – Assessee entitled to credit for tax deducted at source on such amounts

The assessee acted as the collection agent of a television network and collected the subscription charges and the invoices, raised in the name of the assessee on the subscription income from the pay channels during the relevant year, and remitted them to the network. For the A.Ys. 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 the assessee was denied credit for the tax deducted at source on such amounts.

The Tribunal allowed the claim for credit of the tax deducted at source.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) Under section 199(2), credit for tax deducted at source can be allowed only when the corresponding income is offered for taxation in the year in which such tax deducted at source is claimed and deduction of tax at source was allowed without the corresponding income being declared in the profit and loss account.

ii) On a perusal of the agreement dated 14th October, 2002 entered into between the television network and the assessee, it is clear that the assessee was entitled to a fixed commission on the collection amount from the network. The agreement was entered into much prior to the A.Ys. 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12. All these collection charges had been credited to the account “subscription charges” as and when they were billed and this account was debited at the end of the financial year when the sum was paid back to the network. Therefore, the amounts in question had been routed through the accounts maintained by the assessee, which formed part of the balance sheet and, in turn, formed part of the profit and loss account. Therefore, the amount received by the assessee was the collection of subscription charges on behalf of the principal, viz., the television network and did not partake of the character of income chargeable to tax in its hands.

iii) In the assessee’s case, the income chargeable to tax was only the commission income and interest income. Therefore, the subscription charges collected on behalf of the television network was chargeable as income only in the hands of the network and did not partake of the character of any expenditure, revenue or capital in the hands of the assessee. Merely because the income had been offered and processed in the hands of the network, credit for tax deducted in the name of the assessee could not be denied. The assessee was entitled to credit for the tax deducted at source.’

Recovery of tax – Attachment of property – Transfer void against the Revenue – Death of seller before executing sale of house property under agreement – Supreme Court directing seller’s heirs to execute sale – Attachment of property for recovery of income tax due from firms in which heirs were partners for periods subsequent to sale agreement – TRO cannot declare transfer void – Non-release of registered sale deed by sub-registrar – Not justified

6 J. Manoharakumari vs. TRO [2021] 436 ITR 42 (Mad) Date of order: 21st April, 2021 Ss. 226, 281 of ITA, 1961

Recovery of tax – Attachment of property – Transfer void against the Revenue – Death of seller before executing sale of house property under agreement – Supreme Court directing seller’s heirs to execute sale – Attachment of property for recovery of income tax due from firms in which heirs were partners for periods subsequent to sale agreement – TRO cannot declare transfer void – Non-release of registered sale deed by sub-registrar – Not justified

The petitioner, on payment of advance, entered into a sale agreement in respect of the house property (family property) with one JP, the mother of the third and fourth respondents, A and S, who were minors at the time of execution of the sale agreement. However, JP refused to execute the sale deed. During the pendency of the suit filed by the petitioner in the Additional District and Sessions Court, JP died and A and S, who by then had attained majority, were impleaded in the suit filed to execute the sale receiving the balance consideration. On dismissal of the suit, the petitioner filed an appeal before the High Court which directed A and S to refund the advance received by JP. The Supreme Court allowed the special leave petition filed by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition before the Additional District and Sessions Court. When A and S failed to execute the sale deed in terms of the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994 and the order dated 31st March, 2017 of the Supreme Court in the special leave petition, the Additional District Judge executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner on 29th June, 2018 and presented it before the Sub-Registrar for registration.

The petitioner was informed through a communication that the property in question was attached for recovery of arrears of tax due to the Income-tax Department from the firms in which S and her husband were partners and, therefore, the petitioner should obtain a certificate to the effect that there were no tax dues in respect of the said property from the Tax Recovery Officer of the Income-tax Department. The Tax Recovery Officer took the stand that the purported sale deed executed by the Court was contrary to section 281, that a copy of the attachment order was served on the office of the Sub-Registrar and an entry of encumbrance in respect of the property was also entered, that the petitioner could not perfect the title over the property, and that the Sub-Registrar could not release the registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner unless the tax arrears were cleared.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

‘i) Section 281 applies only to a situation where an assessee during the pendency of any proceeding under the Act, or after completion thereof, but before the service of a notice under rule 2 of the Second Schedule, creates a charge on, or parts with the possession (by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer whatsoever) of any of his assets in favour of any other person. Only such charge or transfer is void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of completion of such proceedings or otherwise. According to the proviso to section 281 such charge or transfer shall not be void if it is made (i) for adequate consideration and without notice of the pendency of such proceeding or, as the case may be, without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee; or (ii) with the previous permission of the A.O.

ii) Admittedly, the transfer of the property was on account of the final culmination of the litigation by the order of the Supreme Court. There was only a delay in the execution of the sale deed due to the pendency of the proceedings as the third and fourth respondent’s mother (since deceased) declined to execute the sale deed under the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994. The third and the fourth respondents, A and S, who were minors at the time of execution of the sale agreement on 30th June, 1994, ought to have executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. The subsequent tax liability of the fourth respondent and her husband for the A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14 could not be to the disadvantage of the petitioner, since the petitioner had been diligently litigating since 2004. Therefore, the benefit of the decree in a contested suit could not be denied merely because the seller or one of the persons had incurred subsequent tax liability. The benefit of a decree would date back to the date of the suit. Therefore, the communication dated 6th July, 2018 which required the petitioner to obtain clearance could not be countenanced.

iii) The tax liability of the firms of which S and her husband were partners arose subsequent to the commitment in the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994. The Sub-Registrar is directed to release the sale deed dated 29th June, 2018 and to cancel all the encumbrances recorded against the property in respect of the tax arrears of the firms of the fourth respondent S and her husband.’

International transactions – Draft assessment order – Procedure to be followed – Mandatory – Tribunal in appeal from final assessment order remanding matter to Assistant Commissioner / TPO – A.O. straightaway passing final order – Not valid – A.O. bound to have passed draft order first – Order quashed and matter remanded

5 Durr India Private Limited vs. ACIT [2021] 436 ITR 111 (Mad) A.Ys.: 2009-10 to 2011-12; Date of order:  27th May, 2020 Ss. 92CA(4), 143(3), 144C of ITA, 1961

International transactions – Draft assessment order – Procedure to be followed – Mandatory – Tribunal in appeal from final assessment order remanding matter to Assistant Commissioner / TPO – A.O. straightaway passing final order – Not valid – A.O. bound to have passed draft order first – Order quashed and matter remanded

For the A.Y. 2009-10, pursuant to the report of the Transfer Pricing Officer, the Assistant Commissioner passed a draft assessment order against which the assessee filed an application before the Dispute Resolution Panel u/s 144C. Pursuant to the order of the Dispute Resolution Panel, the Assistant Commissioner passed an assessment order u/s 144C read with section 143(3). On appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assistant Commissioner / Transfer Pricing Officer. Thereafter, pursuant to the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer on remand by the Tribunal, the Assistant Commissioner passed the final order.

The assessee filed a writ petition contending that such final order being not preceded by a draft assessment order was without jurisdiction. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) When the law mandated a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it had to be done in that manner. The final assessment order u/s 144C read with section 143(3) had been passed without jurisdiction.

ii) Once the case was remitted back to the Assistant Commissioner / Transfer Pricing Officer, it was incumbent on their part to have passed a draft assessment order u/s 143(3) read with section 92CA(4) and section 144C(1). They could not bypass the statutory safeguards prescribed under the Act and deny the assessee the right to file an application before the Dispute Resolution Panel.

iii) The final order is quashed and the case remitted back to the Assistant Commissioner to pass a draft assessment order.’

HUF – Partition – Scope of section 171 – Section 171 applicable only where Hindu Family is already assessed as HUF – Deceased father of assessees not assessed as karta of HUF when alive – Inherited property shared under orally recorded memorandum by legal heirs – Proportionate consideration out of sale thereof declared in returns filed by legal heirs in individual capacity and exemption u/s 54F allowed by A.O. – Reassessment to tax capital gains in hands of karta – Unsustainable

4 A.P. Oree (Kartha) [Estate of A.R. Pandurangan (HUF)] vs. ITO [2021] 436 ITR 3 (Mad) A.Y.: 2008-09; Date of order: 2nd June, 2021 Ss. 54F, 148, 171 of ITA, 1961

HUF – Partition – Scope of section 171 – Section 171 applicable only where Hindu Family is already assessed as HUF – Deceased father of assessees not assessed as karta of HUF when alive – Inherited property shared under orally recorded memorandum by legal heirs – Proportionate consideration out of sale thereof declared in returns filed by legal heirs in individual capacity and exemption u/s 54F allowed by A.O. – Reassessment to tax capital gains in hands of karta – Unsustainable

The assessee was one of the four legal heirs of the deceased ARP. Part of the inherited agricultural land was sold without physical division. The share of each heir was orally divided between them under a memorandum of oral recording and the sale proceeds were distributed in proportion with their respective shares in the land and the balance portion of the land continued to remain in their names without physical division. For the A.Y. 2008-09, they filed their returns of income as individuals and claimed exemption from levy of tax on capital gains u/s 54F which was allowed by the A.O. On the ground that there was no physical division of the property, that the memorandum recording oral partition did not amount to partition u/s 171, and that therefore the capital gains was to be assessed in the hands of the estate of the deceased ARP (HUF) and the exemption allowed u/s 54F was contrary to section 171, notice was issued u/s 148 to the estate of ARP (HUF) and a consequential order was passed in the name of the assessee as karta.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice u/s 148 and the order. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Section 171 makes it clear that it is applicable only where a Hindu family is already assessed as a Hindu undivided family. Otherwise, there is no meaning to the expression “hitherto” in section 171(1).

ii) During the lifetime of ARP, the deceased father of the assessees, the family was not assessed as a Hindu undivided family. It was only where there was a prior assessment as a Hindu undivided family and during the course of assessment u/s 143 or section 144 it was claimed by or on behalf of a member of such family which was assessed as a Hindu undivided family that there was a partition whether total or partial among the members of such family, that the A.O. should make an Inquiry after giving notice of inquiry to all the members. Where no such claim was made, the question of making inquiry by an A.O. did not arise and only in such circumstances would the definition of “partition” in Explanation to section 171 be attracted. The definition could not be read in isolation. Where a Hindu family was never assessed as a Hindu undivided family, section 171 would not apply even when there was a division or partition of property which did not fall within the definition.

iii) The notice issued u/s 148 to the estate of ARP (HUF) coparceners and the consequential order issued in the name of the assessee as the karta were unsustainable.’

Exemption u/s 10B – Export of computer software – Assessee omitting to claim exemption in return – Rectification of mistake – Revision – Rejection of rectification application and revision petition on ground of delay in filing revised return – Unjustified – Assessee entitled to benefit

3 L-Cube Innovative Solutions P. Ltd. vs. CIT [2021] 435 ITR 566 (Mad) A.Y.: 2006-07; Date of order: 5th February, 2021 Ss. 10B, 139(5), 154, 264 of ITA, 1961

Exemption u/s 10B – Export of computer software – Assessee omitting to claim exemption in return – Rectification of mistake – Revision – Rejection of rectification application and revision petition on ground of delay in filing revised return – Unjustified – Assessee entitled to benefit

The assessee provided software services and was entitled to the benefit u/s 10B. It failed to claim this benefit in its return of income filed u/s 139 for the A.Y. 2006-07. The assessee received the intimation dated 28th March, 2018 u/s 143(1) on 18th May, 2008. Since the time limit for filing a revised return u/s 139(5) had expired on 31st March, 2008, it filed a rectification application before the A.O. u/s 154. The A.O. rejected the application and held that if there was any mistake found in the return the assessee ought to have filed a revised return on or before 31st March, 2008. Against this rejection, the assessee filed a first revision petition u/s 264 which was rejected; a second revision petition filed was also rejected.

The assessee then filed a writ petition challenging the rejection of the claim for deduction. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) The rejection of the revision application filed by the assessee u/s 264 was not justified as the Officers acting under the Income-tax Department were duty-bound to extend the substantive benefits that were legitimately available to the assessee.

ii) The rejection of the application for rectification by the A.O. u/s 154 was unjustified, since the assessee was entitled to the substantive benefits u/s 10B and the delay, if any, was attributed on account of the system. Even if the intimation dated 28th March, 2008 was despatched on the same day after it was signed, in all likelihood it could not have been received by the assessee on 31st March, 2008 to file a revised return on time. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to rectification u/s 154.’

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Condition precedent for making declaration – Application should be pending on 31st January, 2020 from order dismissed ‘in limine’ – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Appeal dismissed based on mistake on 22nd June, 2018 – Tribunal rectifying order and passing fresh order restoring appeal on 11th May, 2020 – Order passed by Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018 was ‘in limine’ – Appeal pending on 31st January, 2020

2 Bharat Bhushan Jindal vs. Principal CIT [2021] 436 ITR 102 (Del) A.Y.: 2011-12; Date of order: 26th April, 2021 Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Condition precedent for making declaration – Application should be pending on 31st January, 2020 from order dismissed ‘in limine’ – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Appeal dismissed based on mistake on 22nd June, 2018 – Tribunal rectifying order and passing fresh order restoring appeal on 11th May, 2020 – Order passed by Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018 was ‘in limine’ – Appeal pending on 31st January, 2020

For the A.Y. 2011-12, the A.O. passed the assessment order on 21st March, 2014 increasing the taxable income considerably. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), which was allowed on 29th January, 2016. The Revenue filed an appeal on 10th March, 2016 before the Tribunal. The appeal was, however, dismissed by the Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018, based on a mistaken belief that in the earlier assessment years it had taken a view against the Revenue and in the favour of the assessee. This obvious mistake, once brought to the notice of the Tribunal, via a miscellaneous application preferred by the Revenue, was rectified by an order dated 11th May, 2020. The miscellaneous application was filed before the specified date, i.e., 31st January, 2020. As per the information available on the Tribunal’s portal, the miscellaneous application was filed on 13th November, 2018. The Tribunal, realising the mistake that had been made, recalled its order dated 22nd June, 2018 and restored the Revenue’s appeal and directed that the appeal be heard afresh. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal fixed the date of hearing, via the very same order, in the appeal on 6th July, 2020. The assessee filed Forms 1 and 2 with the designated authority under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 in the first instance on 21st March, 2020. The assessee filed revised Forms 1 and 2, on 27th January, 2021, and thereafter on 20th March, 2021. In the interregnum, both sets of Forms 1 and 2, which were filed on 21st March, 2020 and 27th January, 2021, were rejected.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) A careful perusal of the order dated 22nd June, 2018 would show that the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed at the threshold, based on a mistaken impression that the Tribunal had taken a view against the Revenue. Circular No. 21 of 2020 [(2020) 429 ITR (St.) 1] requires fulfilment of two prerequisites for an appeal to be construed as pending on the specified date (i.e., 31st January, 2020) in terms of the provisions of the 2020 Act. First, the miscellaneous application should be pending on the specified date, i.e., 31st January, 2020. Second, the miscellaneous application should relate to an appeal which had been dismissed “in limine” before 31st January, 2020.

ii) There was no dispute that the miscellaneous application was filed and was pending on the specified date, i. e., 31st January, 2020. As regards the second aspect, the order of the Tribunal dated 22nd June, 2-018 could only be construed as an order that dismissed the Revenue’s appeal “in limine”. The Revenue’s appeal was pending on the specified, date, i. e., 31st January, 2020. The order of rejection was not valid.’

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act – Scope of – Meaning of disputed tax – Difference between disputed tax and disputed income – Appeal against levy of tax pending – Declaration filed under Act cannot be rejected on ground that assessee had offered an amount for taxation

1 Govindrajulu Naidu vs. Principal CIT [2021] 434 ITR 703 (Bom) A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 29th April, 2021 The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act – Scope of – Meaning of disputed tax – Difference between disputed tax and disputed income – Appeal against levy of tax pending – Declaration filed under Act cannot be rejected on ground that assessee had offered an amount for taxation

The assessee filed a return of income for the A.Y. 2014-15 u/s 139(1) declaring a total income of Rs. 67,55,710. The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) assessing the income at Rs. 67,66,640. Thereafter, in 2019, a survey action was undertaken at the office premises of the assessee. However, no incriminating material was found. Under pressure, the assessee agreed to offer the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 allegedly received as his income. Later, he retracted from his statement under an affidavit filed before respondent No. 2. The assessment for the assessment year was reopened by a notice issued u/s 148. The assessee filed a return showing the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 as his income and declared a total amount of Rs. 6,43,69,719 and on reassessment the total amount was assessed at Rs. 6,44,09,400. The assessee filed an appeal u/s 246A before the Commissioner (Appeals) and raised the ground that the respondent had erred in taxing the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 as income of the assessee for the relevant assessment year. The appeal was pending. During the pendency of the appeal, the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 was enacted. As required under the provisions of this Act, the assessee filed a declaration to the designated authority in the prescribed form. The declaration was rejected on the online portal without giving an opportunity to the assessee observing that there was no disputed tax in the case of the declarant, as the declarant had himself filed a return reflecting the income.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 and the rules have been brought out with a specific purpose, object and intention to expedite realisation of locked up revenue, providing certain reliefs to assessees who opt to apply under the Act. Such an option is available only to a few persons. The preamble to the Act provides for resolution of disputed tax and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The emphasis is on disputed tax and not on disputed income. The term “disputed tax” has been assigned specific definition in the Act and would have to be appreciated in the context of the Act. The disputed tax means an income tax payable by assessee under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the income assessed by the authority and where any appeal is pending before the appellate forum on the specified date, against any order relating to tax payable under the Income-tax Act. It does not presumably ascribe any qualification to the matter / appeal except that it should concern the Income-tax Act. Further the definition of “dispute” as appearing under Rule 2(b) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Rules, 2020 shows that “dispute” means an appeal or writ petition or special leave petition by the declarant before the appellate forum. “Disputed income” has also been defined under clause (g) of section 2(1) to mean the whole or so much of the total income as is relatable to disputed tax.

ii) The scheme of the 2020 Act does not make any distinction and categorise the appeals. The Act does not go into the ground of appeal.

iii) The Department did not dispute that an appeal had been filed by the assessee before the appellate forum. There existed a dispute as referred to under the 2020 Act and the Rules. In such a scenario, the Department’s contention that the assessee had offered the income and as such the tax thereon could not be considered disputed tax, would not align itself with the object and the purpose underlying the bringing in of the 2020 Act. The rejection of the declaration under the 2020 Act was not valid.’

Artheon Battery [TS-863-ITAT-2021 (Pun)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 7th September, 2021 Section 28(iv)

8 Artheon Battery [TS-863-ITAT-2021 (Pun)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 7th September, 2021 Section 28(iv)

FACTS
The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacturing the complete line of lead-acid batteries, serving domestic and export markets as well. The A.O. found that the assessee had credited an amount of Rs. 25.19 crores being waiver of ECB loan amount. The assessee submitted that the ECB was availed to acquire capital assets and hence was capital in nature. The A.O. did not accept the assessee’s submissions and held that the amount was taxable u/s 28(iv). On appeal, the CIT(A) held the amount to be capital in nature.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal found that the assessee had transferred the waiver amount of ECB directly to its capital reserve. It referred to the Apex Court ruling in Mahindra & Mahindra (404 ITR 1) wherein it was held that ‘in order to invoke the provisions u/s 28(iv) of the Act, the benefit which is received has to be in some other form rather than in the shape of money’. The Tribunal held that the amount received as cash receipt due to the waiver of loan cannot be taxed under the provisions of section 28(iv), and noted that in the instant case the loan amount waived was credited to capital reserve. Therefore, it held that the ratio of the SC ruling would be applicable as the benefit was received in some form other than in the shape of money. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order.
 

BUSINESS INCOME OF A CHARITABLE INSTITUTION

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 11 of the Income-tax Act confers exemption from tax in respect of an income derived from ‘property held under trust’, in the circumstances specified in clauses (a) to (c) of section 11(1), to a charitable institution or a trust or such other person registered u/s12A of the Act.

Section 11(4) provides that a ‘property held under trust’ includes a business undertaking held in trust and the income from such business, subject to the power of the A.O., shall not be included in the total income of the institution.

Sub-section (4A) provides for the denial of the benefit of tax exemption u/s 11(1) and prohibits the application of sub-sections (2), (3) and (3A) in relation to any income being profits and gains of business, unless the business is incidental to the attainment of the main objectives of the trust and separate books of accounts are maintained for the business.

The ‘property held under trust’ is required to be held for the charitable or religious purposes for its income to qualify for exemption from taxation. The term ‘charitable purpose’ is defined by section 2(15) and includes relief of the poor, education, yoga, medical relief, preservation of environment and of monuments or places or objects of artistic or historic interest, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility. A proviso to section 2(15) stipulates some stringent conditions in respect of an institution whose object is the advancement of general public utility, where it is carrying on any business to advance its objects. The said proviso does not apply to institutions whose objects are other than those of advancing general public utility, provided their objects otherwise qualify to be treated as charitable purposes.

The sum and substance of the aforesaid provisions, in relation to business carried out by an institution, is that a business run by it would be construed as a ‘property held under trust’ and its income, subject to the proviso to section 2(15), would be exempt from tax u/s 11. The conditions prescribed u/s (4A), where applicable, would require the business to be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust and separate books of accounts would have to be maintained in respect of the business by the institution.

Some interesting controversies have arisen around the true meaning and understanding of the terms ‘property held under trust’ and ‘incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust’ and in relation to the applicability of sub-section (4A) to cases where provisions of sub-section (4) are applicable. The Delhi High Court has held that a business carried on with borrowed funds and unrelated to the objects of the trust could not be held to be a ‘property held under trust’. It has also held that for a business to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, its activities should be intricately related to its objects. It also held that the provisions of sub-section (4A) and sub-section (4) cannot apply simultaneously. As against the above decision, the Madras High Court has held that a business carried on by the trust is a ‘property held under trust’ and such business would be construed to be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust where the profits of such business are utilised for meeting the objects of the trust and, of course, separate books of accounts are maintained by the trust.

Some of these issues have a chequered history and were the subject matter of many Supreme Court decisions, including in the cases of J.K. Trust, 32 ITR 535; Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, 121 ITR 1; and Thanthi Trust, 247 ITR 785. Besides the above, the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the meaning of the term ‘not involving the carrying out of any activity of profit’ and the concept of business held in trust in the cases of CIT vs. Dharmodayam Co., 109 ITR 527 (SC); Dharmaposhanam Co. vs. CIT, 114 ITR 463 (SC); and Dharmadeepti vs. CIT, 114 ITR 454 (SC).

MEHTA CHARITABLE PRAJNALAY TRUST’S CASE

The issue came up for consideration in the case of CIT vs. Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust, 357 ITR 560 before the Delhi High Court. The assessment years involved therein were 1992-93 to 1994-95; 2001-02; and 2005-06 to 2007-08. The trust was constituted in the year 1971 for promotion of education, patriotism, Indian culture and running of dispensaries and hospitals and many other related charitable objects with a donation of Rs. 2,100. Besides pursuing the above objects, the trust commenced Katha manufacturing business in the year 1972 with the aid and assistance of borrowings from banks and sister concerns in which the settlors, trustees or their relatives had substantial interest. At some point of time, the Katha manufacturing unit was leased to a related concern on receipt of lease rent. The trust made purchases and sales from its head office through the two related concerns.

The exemption u/s 11 claimed by the trust was denied by the A.O. for some of the years and such denial was confirmed by the CIT(A) on the ground that the Katha business was carried on by the trustees and not by the beneficiaries of the trust, as was required by the then applicable section 11(4A), and the exemption was not available to the trust in respect of the profits of the Katha business. In respect of some other years, the CIT(A) held that the business was held under trust and was covered by section 11(4) of the Act and on application of the said section, the provisions of sections 11(4A) were not applicable and therefore the trust was entitled for the exemption. For the years under consideration, the A.O. denied the exemption for the same reasons, besides holding that carrying on of the Katha business was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The orders of the A.O. for those years were sustained by the CIT(A) for reasons different from those of the A.O.

On appeal, the Tribunal, following its decision for the A.Y. 1989-90, held that the Katha business carried on by the assessee was incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, which were for charitable purposes. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thanthi Trust (Supra), in which the effect of the amendment was considered, the Tribunal held that the said decision squarely covered the controversy in the present case about the business being incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

The High Court noted that the Tribunal did not specifically address itself to the question which arose out of the order of the CIT(A), whether the business itself can be said to be property held under trust within the meaning of section 11(4). There was no discussion in the order of the Tribunal as to the impact of the various clauses of the trust deed which were referred to by the CIT(A) while making a distinction between the objects of the trust and the powers of the trustees. In respect of all the other assessment years, namely, 1993-94, 1994-95, 2001-02 and 2005-06 to 2007-08, the Tribunal followed the order passed by it for the A.Y. 1992-93.

On an appeal by Revenue, the Delhi High Court in appreciation of the contentions of the parties, held as under:
• There was no exhaustive definition of the words ‘property held under trust’ in the Act; however, sub-section (4) provided that for the purposes of section 11 the words ‘property held under trust’ include a business undertaking so held.

• The question whether sub-section (4A) would apply even to a case where a business was held under trust was answered in the negative in several authoritative pronouncements. Thus, if a property was held under trust, and such property was a business, the case would fall u/s 11(4) and not u/s 11(4A). Section 11(4A) would apply only to a case where the business was not held under trust. In view of the settled legal position, the contention of the Revenue, that the provisions of section 11(4A) were sweeping and would also take in a case of business held under trust, was not acceptable.

• In the facts of the present case, and having regard to the terms of the trust deed and the conduct of the trustees, it could not be said that the Katha business was itself held under trust. There was a difference between a property or business held under trust and a business carried on by or on behalf of the trust, a distinction that was recognised in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association (Supra), a decision of five Judges of the Supreme Court. It was observed that if a business undertaking was held under trust for a charitable purpose, the income therefrom would be entitled to the exemption u/s 11(1).

• In the case before the Court, the finding of the CIT(A), in his order for the A.Y. 1992-93, was that the Katha business was not held under trust but it was a business commenced by the trustees with the aid and assistance of borrowings from the sister concerns in which the settlors and the trustees or their close relatives had substantial interest, as well as from banks. It was thus with the help of borrowed funds, or in other words, the funds not belonging to the assessee trust, that the Katha business was commenced and profits started to be earned.

• There was a distinction between the objects of a trust and the powers given to the trustees to effectuate the purposes of the trust. The Katha business was not even in the contemplation of the settlors and, therefore, could not have been settled upon trust, even where they were empowered to start any business.

• There was thus no nexus or integration between the amount originally settled upon the trust and the later setting up and conduct of the Katha business. Moreover, the distinction between the original trust fund and the later commencement of the business with the help of borrowed funds should be kept in mind in the context of ascertaining whether the particular Katha business was even in the contemplation of the settlors of the trust.

• There was no connection between the carrying on of the Katha business and the attainment of the objects of the trust, which were basically for the advancement of education, inculcation of patriotism, Indian culture, running of dispensaries, hospitals, etc. The mere fact that the whole or some part of the income from the Katha business was earmarked for application to the charitable objects would not render the business itself being considered as incidental to the attainment of the objects. The Delhi High Court was in agreement with the view taken by the CIT(A) in his order for A.Y. 1992-93 that the application of the income generated by the business was not the relevant consideration and what was relevant was whether the activity was so inextricably connected to or linked with the objects of the trust that it could be considered as incidental to those objectives.

• Prima facie, the observations in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra) would appear to support the assessee’s case in the sense that even if the Katha business was held not to constitute a business held under trust, but only as a business carried on by or on behalf of the trust, so long as the profits generated by it were applied for the charitable objects of the trust, the condition imposed u/s 11(4A) should be held to be satisfied, entitling the trust to the tax exemption.

• The observations of the Apex Court, however, have to be understood in the light of the facts before it. The assessee in that case carried on the business of a newspaper and that business itself was held under trust. The charitable object of the trust was the imparting of education which fell u/s 2(15). The newspaper business was certainly incidental to the attainment of the object of the trust, namely, that of imparting education. The observations were thus made having regard to the fact that the profits of the newspaper business were utilised by the trust for achieving the object, namely, education. The type of nexus or connection which existed between the imparting of education and the carrying on of the business of a newspaper did not exist in the present case. There was no such nexus between the Katha business and the objects of the assessee trust that can constitute the carrying on of the Katha business, an activity incidental to the attainment of the objects, namely, advancing of education, patriotism, Indian culture, running of hospitals and dispensaries, etc.

• It would be disastrous to extend the sweep of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra), on the facts of that case, to all cases where the trust carried on business which was not held under trust and whose income was utilised to feed the charitable objects of the trust. The observations of the Supreme Court must be understood and appreciated in the background of the facts in that case and should not be extended indiscriminately to all cases.

The Delhi High Court held that a business carried on with borrowed funds and unrelated to the objects of the trust could not be held to be a ‘property held under trust’. It has also held that for a business to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, its activity should be intricately related to its objects. It also held that where a property was held under trust and such property was a business, the case would fall u/s 11(4) and not u/s 11(4A). Section 11(4A) would apply only to a case where the business was not held under trust. It therefore held that the Katha business was not a property held under trust, the provisions of section 11(4) did not apply, and the provisions of section 11(4A) would have to be applied. Since the business was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust as required by section 11(4A), the trust was not entitled to exemption in respect of the business income.

The Special Leave Petition filed by the assessee against this decision has been admitted by the Supreme Court as reported in Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust vs. CIT, 248 Taxman 145 (SC).

BHARATHAKSHEMAM’S CASE


The issue recently arose in the case of Bharathakshemam vs. PCIT, 320 CTR (Ker) 198, a case that required the Court to adjudicate whether the assessee trust was eligible for exemption from tax u/s 11, in respect of the business of Chitty / Kuri which was utilised for medical relief, an object of the trust, and could such business be considered as a business incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the objects of the trust. In that case, the Revenue had relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra) to support the contention that the business carried on by the trust had no connection or nexus with the charitable objects of the trust. It was the Revenue’s contention that the business, being run by the trust, should itself be connected or should have a nexus with the object of medical relief, for example, running a dispensary or a hospital or a drugstore or even a medical college; surely, running a Chitty / Kuri business was none of them and therefore could not be said to be incidental or ancillary to the objects of the trust, and the fact that the profit of such business was utilised entirely for medical relief was not sufficient for excluding the income of the business from taxation.

In this case, the facts gathered from the order of the High Court reveal that the claim for exemption of the trust in respect of its profit from its Chitty / Kuri business was denied by the A.O. on the grounds that such a business was not incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The A.O. had also evoked the proviso to section 2(15) which was held by the Court to be irrelevant in view of the finding that the said proviso had a restricted application to the cases where a business was being carried on for pursuing its object of carrying on an activity of general public utility. In the case before the Court, the main object was providing medical relief and the profits of the business were utilised for medical relief which was the main object of the trust.

The first appellant authority held that the business was carried out by the trust for the mutual benefit of the subscribers to the Chitty / Kuri and the substantial profit of the business was passed on to such subscribers and therefore such business, which retained minor profits, could not have been treated as incidental to the objects of the trust. It also held that the profit, even where applied fully to the objects of the trust, could not have deemed the business to be incidental to the main objects of the trust. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal, it agreed with the findings of the first appellate authority and also referred to the first proviso to section 2(15) to hold that the business of the trust was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

On further appeal to the High Court, relying on a few decisions of the courts, the Kerala High Court held that the proviso to section 2(15) had no relation to the case of the trust which had as its object providing medical relief. This part is not relevant to the issues under consideration here and is mentioned only for completeness.

The Court also observed, though not relevant to the issue before it, that in the aftermath of the deletion of section 13(1)(bb) and insertion of sub-section (4), the distinction between a business held in trust and one run by the trust was not very relevant and the observations in the minority judgment in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra) should not be applied in preference to the observations of the majority, more so when the court later on delivered a unanimous judgment of the five judges.

On the issue of satisfaction of the condition of sub-section (4A), relating to the business being incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, the Kerala High Court exclusively relied on paragraph 25 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra) for holding that the business of Chitty / Kuri was incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The said paragraph 25 is reproduced hereunder:

‘The substituted sub-section (4A) states that the income derived from a business held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the trust or institution if “the business is incidental to the attainment of the objective of the trust or, as the case may be, institution” and separate books of accounts are maintained in respect of such business. Clearly, the scope of sub-section (4A) is more beneficial to a trust or institution than was the scope of sub-section (4A) as originally enacted. In fact, it seems to us that the substituted sub-section (4A) gives a trust or institution a greater benefit than was given by section 13(1)(bb). If the object of Parliament was to give trusts and institutions no more benefit than that given by section 13(1)(bb), the language of section 13(1)(bb) would have been employed in the substituted sub-section (4A). As it stands, all that it requires for the business income of a trust or institution to be exempt is that the business should be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust or institution. A business whose income is utilised by the trust or the institution for the purposes of achieving the objectives of the trust or the institution is, surely, a business which is incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust. In any event, if there be any ambiguity in the language employed, the provision must be construed in a manner that benefits the assessee. The trust, therefore, is entitled to the benefit of section 11 for A.Y. 1992-93 and thereafter. It is, we should add, not in dispute that the income of its newspaper business has been employed to achieve its objectives of education and relief to the poor and that it has maintained separate books of accounts in respect thereof.’

The Kerala High Court, in paragraph 13, examined the facts and the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra) relied upon by the Revenue. In paragraph 14 it reiterated the above-referred paragraph 25 of the decision in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra) to disagree, in paragraph 15, with the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra). The Court also held that the Chitty / Kuri business did not require any initial investment and therefore the facts in the case before it were found to be different from the facts in the case before the Delhi High Court. The Kerala High Court also noted that the example cited by the Delhi High Court was relevant only in the context of section 13(1)(bb), which became irrelevant on its deletion; on simultaneous insertion of sub-section (4A), the case was to be adjudicated by reading the substituted provision that did not stipulate any condition that business carried on by the trust should be connected or should have nexus with the charitable purpose for such business to be treated as being carried on as incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. It held that the Chitty / Kuri business was incidental to the main object as long as its profits were applied for medical relief, which was the object of the trust. The trust was accordingly granted the exemption in respect of its profits of the Chitty / Kuri business.

OBSERVATIONS
The issue that moves in a narrow compass, is about the eligibility of a trust for exemption u/s 11 where it carries on a business, the corpus whereof is supplied by the borrowings from the sister concerns of the settlor / trustees and the profit thereof is used for the purpose of meeting the objects of the trust; should such business be treated as one ‘held in trust’ and if yes, whether the business can be said to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

A business run by a charitable institution, whether out of borrowed funds or from the funds settled on it, is surely a ‘property held under trust’ as is confirmed by the express provisions of sub-section (4) of section 11 and this understanding is confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra). In this case, the Supreme Court observed ‘A public charitable trust may hold a business as part of its corpus. It may carry on a business which it does not hold as a part of its corpus. But it seems that the distinction has no consequence insofar as section 13(1)(bb) is concerned.’ The doubt, if any, was eliminated by the deletion of section 13(1)(bb) w.e.f. 1st April, 1983. Section 13(1)(bb) provided that nothing contained in section 11 or section 12 shall operate so as to exclude from the total income of the previous year of the person in receipt thereof, in the case of a charitable trust or institution for the relief of the poor, education or medical relief, which carries on any business, any income derived from such business, unless the business is carried on in the course of the actual carrying out of a primary purpose of the trust or institution.

The Supreme Court also stated in the Thanthi case:
 ‘Sub-section (4) of section 11 remains on the statute book and it defines property held under trust for the purposes of that section to include a business so held. It then states how such income is to be determined. In other words, if such income is not to be included in the income of the trust, its quantum is to be determined in the manner set out in sub-section (4).
Sub-section (1)(a) of section 11 says that income derived from property held under trust only for charitable or religious purposes, to the extent it is used in the manner indicated therein, shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the trust. Sub-section (4) defines the words “property held under trust” for the purposes of section 11 to include a business held under trust. Sub-section (4A) restricts the benefit under section 11 so that it is not available for income derived from business unless ……’

The Supreme Court therefore clearly indicated that both sub-sections (4) and (4A) of section 11 have to be read together.

The position now should be accepted as settled unless the A.O. finds that the business is not owned and run by the institution. It is difficult to concur with a view that a business owned and run by a trust or on its behalf may still not be held to be ‘a property held under trust’. Sub-section (4) should help in concluding the debate. Yes, where the business itself is not owned or run by the trust, there can be a possibility to hold that it is not ‘a property held in trust’, but only in such cases based on conclusive findings that the business belongs to a person other than the trust.

The fact that the business is a ‘property held in trust’ by itself shall not be sufficient to exempt its income u/s 11 unless the business is found to be incidental to attainment of the objects of the trust and further the institution maintains separate books of accounts for such business. These conditions are mandated by the Legislature on insertion of sub-section (4A) into section 11 w.e.f. 1st April, 1992. In our considered opinion, the compliance of the conditions of sub-section (4A) is essential even for a business held as a ‘property held under a trust’. A co-joint reading of sub-sections (4) and (4A) is advised in the interest of the harmonious construction of the provisions that enables an institution to claim the exemption from tax.

The term ‘property held under trust’ is not defined in the Act; however, vide sub-section (4), for the purposes of section 11, the words ‘property held under trust’ include a business undertaking held by the trust. This by itself shall not qualify the trust to claim an exemption from tax. In our opinion, it is not correct to hold that once the case falls under section 11(4), the conditions of section 11(4A) will not have to be satisfied. For a valid claim of exemption, it is necessary to satisfy the twin conditions: that the business is a property held in the trust and the same is incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust and that separate books of accounts are maintained of such business. It is also incorrect to hold that the provisions of sub-section (4A) would apply only to a business which is not a property held in trust; taking such a view would disentitle a trust altogether from claiming exemption for non-compliance of conditions of sections 11(1)(a) to (c) of the Act; the whole objective of insertion of sub-section(4A) would be lost inasmuch as it cannot be read in isolation of section 11(1)(a) to (c).

As regards the meaning of the term ‘incidental to the objects of the trust’, the better view is to treat the conditions as satisfied once the profits of the business are spent on the objects of the trust. There is nothing in section 11(4A) to indicate that there is a business nexus to the objects of the trust, for example, a business of running a laboratory or a school or a hospital w.r.t. the object of medical relief. The profit of the business of running a newspaper or printing press shall satisfy the conditions of section 11(4A) once it is utilised for the charitable purposes, i.e., the objects of the trust, even where there is no business nexus with the objects of the trust.

Attention is invited to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Wellington Charitable Trust, 330 ITR 24. In that case, the Court held that when a business income was used towards the achievement of the objects of the trust, it would amount of carrying on of a business ‘incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust’. Importance is given to the application of the business income and not its source, its use and not its origin. Nothing would be gained by exempting an income which has a nexus with the objects of the trust but is not utilised for meeting the objects of the trust. The provisions of section 11(4) and section 11(4A) will have to be read together for a harmonious construction; it would not be correct to hold that section 11(4A) would override section 11(4) as doing so would make the very provision of section 11(4) otiose and redundant. The Court should avoid an interpretation that would defeat the provision of the law where there is no express bar in section 11(4A) that prohibits the application of section 11(4). The provisions should be construed to be complementary to each other.

Having said that, it would help the case of the trust, for an exemption, where the settlor of the trust has settled the business in the trust and the objects of the trust include the carrying on of such business for the attainment of the charitable objects of the trust.

Surbhit Impex [130 taxmann.com 315] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th September, 2021 Section 41(1)

7 Surbhit Impex [130 taxmann.com 315] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th September, 2021 Section 41(1)

FACTS
The assessee was engaged in the business of trading. During the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that it owed amounts of Rs. 1.25 crores and Rs. 1.88 crores, respectively, to two Chinese entities and which were outstanding. The assessee submitted that since the consignment received was not of good quality, the payment was not made. The A.O. treated the same as ceased liabilities and accordingly made an addition of Rs. 3.13 crores u/s 41(1). On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the additions. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted the undisputed position that at the relevant point of time, proceedings against the assessee for recovery of these amounts were pending before the judicial forums and remarked that these amounts could not have been said to have ceased to be payable by the assessee. The Tribunal further remarked that the very basic, foundational condition that there has to be benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of ‘remission and cessation’ was not satisfied in the relevant year, and thus upheld the CIT(A)’s order.

The Tribunal observed that sometimes Departmental appeals are filed without carefully looking at undisputed basic foundational facts in a routine manner, and remarked that the Income-tax Authorities ought to be more careful in deciding matters to be pursued in further appeals.

Section 142(2A) – Reference to DVO cannot be made by an authority who is not empowered to do so – An invalid valuation report of DVO cannot be considered as incriminating material – In absence of any incriminating material for the unabated assessment years, additions cannot be made

6 ACIT vs. Narula Educational Trust [2021-86ITR(T) 365 (Kol-Trib)] IT(SS) Appeal Nos. 07 to 12 & 42 to 47(Kol) of 2020 A.Ys.: 2008-09 to 2013-14; Date of order:  5th February, 2021

Section 142(2A) – Reference to DVO cannot be made by an authority who is not empowered to do so – An invalid valuation report of DVO cannot be considered as incriminating material – In absence of any incriminating material for the unabated assessment years, additions cannot be made

FACTS
The assessee was an educational institution operating through various institutions. On 13th March, 2014, a search action u/s 132(1) was carried out at its administrative office. During post-search operations, the DGIT(Inv) made reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) for valuing the immovable properties. The DVO reported the value of the properties to be higher than the value disclosed by the assessee. Pursuant to the provisions of section 153A, an assessment for the A.Ys. 2008-09 to 2012-13 was undertaken and the A.O. proposed to make an addition based on the report of the DVO. The assessee objected to the valuation methodology adopted by the DVO; accordingly, the A.O. requested the DVO to reconsider the valuation. However, as the DVO did not submit the report within the statutory time limit of six months, the A.O. proceeded to make an addition based on the initial valuation report as called upon by the DGIT(Inv).

Before the CIT(A), the assessee raised the point that since the DVO did not furnish the report to the A.O. within the time limit, hence the reference stood infructuous. The CIT(A), exercising his co-terminus powers (as that of A.O.), himself made reference to the DVO; however, since the DVO did not furnish a reply within the time limit, the CIT(A) deleted the addition on the ground that since the DVO did not furnish a report, hence the earlier report of the DVO [as sought by DGIT(Inv)] stood non-est and could not be relied upon by the A.O.

On appeal by the Revenue before the ITAT, the assessee argued that, firstly, the DGIT(Inv) had no power at that point of time to refer to the DVO for valuation, and secondly, since there was no incriminating material found during the course of the search action, no addition can be made as the assessments for these years were unabated.

HELD
The DGIT(Inv) was empowered to make reference for valuation to the DVO only after the amendment in section 132 made vide the Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 1st April, 2017 and not prior to it. Thus, the DGIT(Inv) did not have jurisdiction to make a reference in the year 2014. Accordingly, the impugned additions were directed to be deleted relying on the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Amiya Bala Paul vs. CIT [2003] 262 ITR 407 (SC) where it was held that reference to the DVO cannot be made by an authority that is not empowered to do so.

It was observed that assessments for the relevant years were unabated because no assessments were pending for those years before the A.O. as on the date of the search. Further, the accounts of the assessee were audited, and that neither the search party nor the A.O. pointed out any mistake in the correctness or completeness of the books. On perusal of the panchnama it was evident that the search party did not even visit the educational institutions. Thus, the reference made by the DGIT(Inv) to the DVO was without any incriminating material that was unearthed during the search proceedings. There was no whisper of any incriminating material seized during the search to justify the addition in these unabated assessments other than the invalid valuation report. Such invalid valuation report of the DVO cannot be held to be incriminating material, since it was not a fallout of any incriminating material unearthed during the search to suggest any investment in the building which was over and above the investment shown by the assessee. Therefore, no addition was permissible for unabated assessments unless it was based on relevant incriminating material found during the course of search qua the assessee and qua the assessment year.

Principle of consistency – Where in earlier years in the assessee’s own case the benefit of exemption u/s 11 was allowed, the Revenue’s appeal against the order of CIT(A) was dismissed, thereby upholding the claim of exemption u/s 11, following the principle of consistency

5 ACIT (Exemptions) vs. India Habitat Centre [2021-86-ITR(T) 290 (Del-Trib)] IT Appeal No. 5779 (Del) of 2017 A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 1st February, 2021

Principle of consistency – Where in earlier years in the assessee’s own case the benefit of exemption u/s 11 was allowed, the Revenue’s appeal against the order of CIT(A) was dismissed, thereby upholding the claim of exemption u/s 11, following the principle of consistency

FACTS
The assessee-society was registered u/s 12A vide order dated 13th January, 1989. It had satisfied the requirements of Education, Medical Relief, Environment, Relief of Poor and Claim of General Public Utility and thus, its activities were charitable as mandated in section 2(15).

The Department had started disputing the nature of activities undertaken by the assessee and rejected the claim of exemption under sections 11 and 12 read with the proviso to section 2(15). As an abundant precaution, the assessee started making an alternate claim for exemption under the principle of mutuality, it being a members’ association.

For the relevant A.Y., the A.O. noted that its activities were hybrid, were partly covered by the provisions of section 11 read with section 2(15) and partly by the principle of mutuality. The A.O. denied the exemption u/s 11 and under mutuality since separate books of accounts were not maintained and income could not be bifurcated under the principle of mutuality or otherwise.

Aggrieved, the assessee challenged the assessment order before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) relied on the earlier decisions of the higher appellate forums in its own case and held that the assessee was engaged in charitable activities and granted the benefit of exemption u/s 11. Aggrieved by the order, the Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that a coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the A.Y. 2008-09 had reviewed all the case laws and various decisions on this aspect to reach the conclusion that when the society was registered as a charitable trust, its income cannot be computed on the principle of mutuality but was required to be computed under sections 11, 12 and 13. This decision was followed by another decision of a co-ordinate bench in ITA No. 4212/Del/2012 for the A.Y. 2009-10 in the assessee’s own case.

The Tribunal held that the history of the assessee as noted in the submissions of the counsel clearly showed that all the issues raised in the Departmental appeal had been considered and decided in earlier years, therefore, the principle of consistency applied to the same facts. The Tribunal observed that the facts in the relevant assessment year were identical to the facts in the earlier years in the assessee’s own case, the fact that the assessee was a registered society u/s 12A and that the nature of activities and objects of the assessee were the same as had been considered in earlier years.Considering the above background and history of the assessee in the light of various orders referred to by its counsel during the course of arguments and the Order of the ITAT and the Delhi High Court in A.Y. 2012-2013 in the assessee’s own case, the Tribunal did not find any infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) in allowing the appeal of the assessee-society and the Departmental appeal was accordingly dismissed.

In the case of an assessee who had not undertaken any activities except development of flats and construction of various housing projects, expenses incurred by way of professional fees are allowable while computing income offered during survey

4 Anjani Infra vs. DCIT [TS-825-ITAT-2021 (Surat)] A.Y.: 2013-14; Date of order: 26th July, 2021 Sections 37, 68, 115BBE

In the case of an assessee who had not undertaken any activities except development of flats and construction of various housing projects, expenses incurred by way of professional fees are allowable while computing income offered during survey

FACTS

The assessee firm was a part of Shri Lavjibhai Daliya and Shri Jayantibhai Babaria group on whom search action was carried out on 17th July, 2012. In the course of the survey action, a partner of the assessee offered additional unaccounted income of Rs. 8,00,54,000. In the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that the assessee has debited expenditure of Rs. 8 lakh from the income disclosed in the survey. In support of the claim, the assessee, in the course of assessment proceedings, submitted that the assessee is engaged only in the business of building construction and developing residential and other housing projects. No other activities or investments are carried out or undertaken by the assessee firm. The disclosure was made towards on-money in the business of real estate. The professional fee of Rs. 8 lakh was paid to their legal consultant. The A.O. treated the additional income declared in the survey as deemed income of the assessee u/s 68 and disallowed professional fees. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. The aggrieved assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal observed that the narrow dispute is whether the assessee can claim expenses of professional fees against additional unaccounted income disclosed during the survey. The Tribunal noted that while making disclosure of Rs. 8 crores, the partners gave the bifurcation of undisclosed income. In the statement there is no averment that the assessee will not claim any expense. The assessee had not undertaken any other activities except the development of flats and construction of various housing projects. On similar facts, in the case of DCIT vs. Suyog Corporation [ITA No. 568/Ahd/2012] the Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) allowing expenses against on-money to the assessee who was also engaged in similar business activities. A similar view was taken in the case of DCIT vs. Jamnadas Muljibhai [(2006) 99 TTJ 197 (Rajkot)] by treating on-money as business receipt of the assessee.

The Tribunal, considering the decisions of the co-ordinate benches and also the fact that professional fees were paid to the firm of consultants after deducting TDS, held that there is no justification in disallowing such expenses.

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16

3 National Building Construction Corporation Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [TS-815-ITAT-2021 (Del)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 11th August, 2021 Section: Explanation 2 to section 37(1)

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16

FACTS

The assessee in its return of income claimed deduction of Rs. 5,72,32,442 incurred on account of expenses on corporate social responsibility (CSR). It was submitted before the A.O. that CSR expenses were incurred for the purpose of projecting its business and said the expenditure was incurred in accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry of Heavy Industry and Public Enterprises. It was also submitted that the expenses have enhanced the brand image of the company, which in turn has had a positive long-term impact on the business of the assessee.The A.O. held Explanation 2 to section 37(1) to be clarificatory and consequently disallowed the claim of the CSR expenses of Rs. 5,72,32,442.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal noted that the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Addl. CIT vs. Rites Limited [ITA Nos. 6447 and 6448/Del/2017; A.Y. 2013-14] held that Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective in nature and applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16. It also noted that the expenses have been incurred on the direction of the relevant Ministry / Government of India and neither the A.O. nor the D.R. have rebutted the contention of the assessee that expenses have been incurred for enhancing the brand image of the company which are wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee – but both the authorities have disallowed the expenses on the ground that Explanation 2 is clarificatory and retrospective in nature.The Tribunal, following the decision of the co-ordinate bench, held that Explanation 2 is prospective in nature and accordingly CSR expenses incurred in the year under consideration cannot be disallowed by invoking Explanation 2 to section 37(1).

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Claim for deduction of interest u/s 24(b) is allowable even though assessee had not got possession of the house property

2 Abeezar Faizullabhoy vs. CIT(A) [TS-859-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 1st September, 2021 Section 24

Claim for deduction of interest u/s 24(b) is allowable even though assessee had not got possession of the house property

FACTS

The assessee purchased a residential house vide a registered agreement dated 20th September, 2009 for a consideration of Rs. 1,60,89,250. For acquiring the property, the assessee took a loan on which interest of Rs. 2,69,842 was paid by him during the year under consideration. In the return of income the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 2,00,000 u/s 24(b) which was declined by the A.O. on the ground that the assessee had not taken possession of the property in question.Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. Still aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal on perusal of section 24(b) held that for claiming deduction of interest u/s 24(b) there is neither any such precondition nor an eligibility criterion prescribed that the assessee should have taken possession of the property purchased or acquired by him. The first and second provisos to section 24(b) only contemplate an innate upper limit of the amount of deduction qua properties referred to in section 23(2). These provisos by no means jeopardise the entitlement of the assessee to claim deduction of interest payable by him on capital borrowed for the purposes mentioned in the section, provided the property does not fall within the realm of section 23(2).

The view of the CIT(A), viz., that in the absence of any control / domain over the property in question the assessee would not be in receipt of any income from the same, therefore, the fact that allowing deduction u/s 24(b) qua the said property would be beyond comprehension was held by the Tribunal to be absolutely misconceived and divorced of any force of law. It held that the logic given by the CIT(A) for declining the claim for deduction militates against the mandate of sections 22 to 24.

The Tribunal further held that determination of annual value is dependent on the ‘ownership’ of the property, irrespective of the fact of whether or not the assessee has taken possession. As per the plain literal interpretation of section 24(b), there is no bar on an assessee to claim deduction of interest payable on a loan taken for purchasing a residential property, although the possession of the same might not have been vested with him.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the A.O. to allow the assessee’s claim for deduction of Rs. 2 lakh u/s 24(b).

Reassessment made merely on the basis of AIR information was quashed as having been made on invalid assumption of jurisdiction

1 Tapan Chakraborty vs. ITO [TS-644-ITAT-2021 (Kol)] A.Y.: 2009-10; Date of order: 7th July, 2021 Section: 147

Reassessment made merely on the basis of AIR information was quashed as having been made on invalid assumption of jurisdiction

FACTS

For the A.Y. 2009-10, the assessee, a transport contractor, filed his return of income declaring a total income of Rs. 1,85,199 u/s 44AE. Reassessment proceedings were commenced on the basis of AIR information that the assessee has deposited a sum of Rs. 10,64,200 in his savings account which deposit was held by the Revenue to be cash credit u/s 68.

In the reasons recorded, the A.O. noticed that the assessee has declared business income of Rs. 1,85,199 and has a savings bank account with Oriental Bank of Commerce, perusal of the bank statement whereof shows a deposit of Rs. 10,64,200 to be in cash out of the total deposits of Rs. 16,11,720.

According to the A.O., the assessee failed to substantiate the cash deposit with any supporting evidence and hence concluded the amounts to be cash credit u/s 68.

HELD


Quietus of the completed assessments can be disturbed only when there is information or evidence / material regarding undisclosed income or the A.O. has information in his possession showing escapement of income. The statutory mandate is that the A.O. must record ‘reason to believe’ the escapement of income. The Tribunal observed that if adverse information may trigger ‘reason to suspect’, then the A.O. has to make reasonable inquiry and collect material which would make him believe that there is in fact an escapement of income. ‘Reason’ is the link between the information and the conclusion. ‘Reason to believe’ postulates a foundation based on information and a belief based on a reason. After a foundation based on information is made, there must still be some reason which should warrant the holding of a belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in M/s Ganga Saran & Sons (P) Ltd. vs. 130 ITR 1 (SC) has held that the expression ‘reason to believe’ occurring in section 147 is stronger than the expression ‘is satisfied’ and such requirement has to be met by the A.O. before he usurps the jurisdiction to reopen an assessment. The Tribunal held that the A.O. did not meet the conditions precedent in the reasons recorded by him and therefore, assumption of jurisdiction by the A.O. to reopen is invalid and consequently reopening was held to be bad in law and was quashed.

DIGITAL WORKPLACE: FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE

INTRODUCTION
In our previous article we discussed the Digital Workplace, its advantages and how the world is moving towards the ‘New Normal’. In India, we usually adjust to adversities very well and when the situation demanded, we quickly moved to the Work From Home (WFH) / Remote Working scenario. Now, as the restrictions on travel are being lifted, we will be back to working from the office. Many seniors with whom we have interacted told us that the remote working model was a temporary solution when there were restrictions, but it won’t work out in future. These statements have been further affirmed by The Future of Work Study 2021, released by LinkedIn. It said that one in three Indian professionals has burnt out, stressed due to remote working.

Remote working started with a bang and saw people preparing Dalgona coffee and playing various online games! But once travel curbs started to get relaxed, everyone started going back to office and people started explaining the benefits of working from the office! However, reality has started hitting us again. Those who are travelling daily are missing the WFH scenario, because it was not the WFH that was bad but it was the lack of a system to manage WFH that was telling. That was obviously because WFH started unexpectedly and everyone had to quickly adjust to so many things – statutory as well as internal processes.

When offices resumed, all the backlog started piling up. For example, audit documentation has become a bit more difficult considering that some data is available in physical mode and some in soft copies; employees have started realising the importance of WFH with the extra time they have to spend travelling daily to work; the additional expense they have to incur daily to reach office; having to eat lunch from a box and so on. Employers have also realised that giving people the WFH option saves a lot of infrastructure cost and the overheads have reduced significantly.

IMPORTANCE OF HAVING AN OFFICE

Despite all the benefits of remote working, the companies and firms prefer working from office because it used to be a set process before the pandemic, and that’s the only way all of us have worked since we started working. People are explaining the benefits of having an office at length and they are correct in many ways. Having an office in itself is a luxury. Many of us have spent years before getting into our dream office and many are still burning the midnight oil to ensure that they have an office which ensures smooth functioning of work as well as other features. However, as we are aware, physical offices also have their own limitations and with the growth of technology it will be foolish to ignore all the added advantages available at our disposal to make the Traditional Office more effective.

Through this article, we are trying to emphasise how having a Digital Workplace ready simultaneously (though we continue with physical offices) will help not only the employers, but also the employees, and what a Digital Workplace can offer with the help of technology. Let us look at some practical scenarios:

Scenario 1: Flexibility corresponding to savings in time, effort and money


Your office is located in the southern part of a metro city. Your employee has his residence in the north and visits the office in the morning; he has an important client meeting in the afternoon in the north. He travels to the client’s office for the meeting and gets done by early evening. In such a case, if you are not prepared with a Digital Workplace option for him, he will have to again travel back to the office in the south. This will impact him in multiple ways: stress of commuting back and then going back home in the evening, the time and effort wasted due to such travelling. Correspondingly, the overheads spent on such to and fro travel and the per hour cost that you will have to bear considering that the employee will lose two hours travelling during office hours – perhaps this may pinch you to give it (the DW) a serious thought.

If we prepare ourselves by having a Digital Workplace, the employees can lead a stress-free life and also save on time, effort and money.

Scenario 2: Telephone and zoom meetings correspond to savings in time and money
Your client has requested you to arrange a meeting to discuss some plan. The client’s office is in some other part of the city. To kick-start it, you have an initial face-to-face meeting with the client. However, as we know, this generally doesn’t stop at one meeting. You may have to catch up quite a number of times to ensure a smooth assignment. The client is prepared for some Zoom or virtual meetings, considering that you will be charging the reimbursements to the client.

Imagine a situation where you have not kept yourself ready with virtual meetings in terms of having some virtual presentation tools (like Prezi) or a dashboard which manages each stage of the assignment and discussion (like Trello). The meeting may not be as impactful as it would have been in physical mode. At this juncture, you are also in a state where you cannot refuse a client a Virtual Meeting. Also, a Virtual Meeting means you can attend more than one meeting in a limited time as the time saved from travelling can accommodate more such meetings.

The scenario emphasises how we cannot ignore a face-to-face meeting when it is absolutely required, but we also need to have a Digital Workplace ready to handle such situations. Needless to say, this will also help save a lot on time and money that you would have otherwise spent on every physical meeting.

Scenario 3: Work from office contaminating situations when employees need social breaks
We live in a very social country. Often, we have social functions to attend or have guests visiting our homes and whom we have to attend to. Let’s say your employee has a social function to attend at 4 pm for an hour. In case you have made physical presence at the office mandatory, the employee will have to request you for leave or a half day off (merely for an hour’s function). This will not only impact your work plan for the day but will also affect the employee’s leave balance and salary.

Alternatively, if you are ready with a Digital Workplace for such a specific situation, you can have your employee work from home till 4 pm, attend the one-hour function and then return back to work. This will not only make the employee stress-free from commuting, but also save his half-day leave. On the other hand, you would not have to compromise for the day or half day’s work.

Scenario 4: ‘Workation’ corresponding to employee welfare
This may not please everyone. But remember, ‘All work and no play, makes Jack a dull boy’. We have a scenario where your employees have been planning a vacation for a very long time. But the stress of being present physically in office is not letting them do so. This is impacting their mental health and productivity, as a break is a start to a more efficient environment.

If you have a Digital Workplace ready, you can, in certain situations, allow your employees to go on a ‘workation’. Though they might have to keep working on the vacation, but at least the change in location and atmosphere would give them space to breathe. This will not only contribute to better efficiency but also contribute to employee’s welfare and mental health management.

Scenario 5: Documents storage and security corresponding to threat of data loss
Having files and documents was a mandate earlier. However, with the Information Technology Act coming into force, we have seen a major shift in digital modes of data and document storage. We still see people comfortable with physical files, invoices and other documents, but imagine a situation where some natural disasters occur (we have often seen files getting damaged in floods, fires, etc.). If not damage, there is also a fear of unauthorised access to files in office lockers / cupboards. There are chances of data getting lost or compromised.

A Digital Workplace has the capability to store our data on cloud and also restrict the access. You can forget your fear of losing data or compromising it. Even if you prefer to have physical files, there is absolutely no harm in storing the data on the cloud. Even if a fire breaks out or there are floods and your files are damaged, you will still be able to have access to your files on the cloud. Additionally, with the data restriction option, you may ignore your fear of data getting leaked due to unauthorised access.

Scenario 6: Hiring / retaining best talent
How many times have we seen the woman who is taking care of an entire office and working diligently, having to leave not for professional but for personal reasons such as getting married to someone who is staying in another city, or whose family has moved to another city? In these cases, we are left with no choice but to bid adieu to the hardworking talent. Now, imagine having an active Digital Workplace system where you can accommodate the work of a dedicated employee on a remote basis and she can continue working on existing clients without having to actually leave the office. Since she has already been part of the system, adjusting to a remote system may not be that challenging, and you can retain the right talent instead of finding another one and teach / train her from scratch. A similar scenario is possible even when you have to hire an employee from a different State or location. In fact, the Digital Workplace enables your company to open multiple offices without actually having a physical presence at all these locations.

Hence, it is important to find the right balance
Physical offices are much like face-to-face (F2F) conversations. They can never be replaced with technology because no technology can replace the comfort of F2F conversations. However, technology has changed the way we communicate and the entire communication system has evolved. While F2F communication is still the key, gradually phone calls and now even messages and WhatsApp are added to the communication skills. We cannot imagine a person with good communication skills not being able to communicate via these new systems. So much so, that now WhatsApp groups are becoming an official communication channel and most of the decisions of firms, corporates, etc., are taken on WhatsApp and people meet very rarely except when issues are complex in nature, or it is a periodic meeting.

On the same lines, we do not believe that having an actual physical office where employees can work will be replaced anytime soon with a complete remote office. But looking at the way technology has changed everything, having a Digital Workplace today is as important as having a website used to be at the start of this century. As per The Future of Work Study 2021 released by LinkedIn, as many as 86% of respondents think that hybrid work will have a positive impact on their work-life balance. It will help them spend equal time on their personal and professional goals / lives.

To conclude, we feel that the choice is ours: either resist the change until it becomes mandatory and then accept it; in doing so, we could lag behind the world. Or simply embrace the change and start looking at the endless possibilities that technology can offer to maximise the advantage we have at our disposal and get the first mover’s advantage. While a physical workplace can help you stay, a Digital Workplace will help you grow.

 

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS LOANS & ADVANCES, GUARANTEES & INVESTMENTS

(This is the third article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

BACKGROUND

Investments, loans and advances and guarantees play an important role in commercial dealings and also expose companies to greater risk due to the possibilities of defaults which in turn can have an impact on the financial position and solvency of companies. The Companies Act, 2013 (‘the Act’) has laid down stringent provisions to regulate the same, especially in respect of non-financial companies. Although the earlier versions of CARO dealt with specific aspects thereof, CARO 2020 has substantially enhanced the reporting requirements.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

 
*Not discussed further

CLAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Applicable Transactions [Clause 3(iii) and Clause 3(iii)(a)]:
• The scope has been enhanced to cover investments made, guarantee or security provided and advances granted in the nature of loans in addition to loans granted (‘specified investments and loan transactions’).

• The reporting is extended to all parties and not just those covered in the register maintained u/s 189 of the Act.

• The reporting is required only if the above transactions have been entered into ‘during the year’.

Transactions not Prejudicial [Clause 3(iii)(b)]:
• The scope has been enhanced to cover investments made, guarantees provided, security given and also advances in the nature of loans and guarantee provided, in addition to loans.

• Replacement of the word ‘such’ by ‘all’ means that this clause applies to all loans / advances granted during the year.

Servicing of Loans [Clause 3(iii)(c)]:
The scope has been enhanced to cover advances in the nature of loans in addition to loans.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges, which are discussed below, in respect of the new Clauses as well as those where there are enhanced reporting requirements:

Applicable Transactions [Clause 3(iii)]:
a. There is significant widening in the scope of reporting of financial transactions undertaken with all classes of entities. Further, the reporting is applicable to all companies, except for the exemption provided to companies whose principal business is to give loans.
b. Clauses 3(iii)(a) and (e) dealing with aggregation of specified investments and loans transactions and evergreening of loans would not apply to companies which are primarily engaged in lending activities.

Aggregation of Specified Transactions [Clause 3(iii)(a)]:
a. Identifying subsidiaries: Since this Clause requires separately aggregating and reporting loans and advances in the nature of loans to subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates, the identification thereof is of paramount importance. The Guidance Note has clarified that these terms should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Act which could be different, in certain cases, from what is defined in the Accounting Standards in the case of subsidiaries which is examined as under:

Section 2(87) of the Act defines ‘subsidiary company’ or ‘subsidiary’ in relation to any other company, and means a company in which the holding company – (i) controls the composition of the Board of Directors; or(ii) exercises or controls more than one-half of the total voting power either on its own or together with one or more of its subsidiary companies. Thus, the Act emphasises on legal control which is similar to what is considered for the purpose of Accounting Standard 21 (AS 21) Consolidated Financial Statements for companies adopting Indian GAAP. The concept of control and, therefore, subsidiary relationship under Ind AS 110, is much broader. Existence of factors such as de facto control, potential voting rights, control through de facto agents, power to enforce certain decisions, etc., have to be considered, which are not considered for the purpose of section 2(87). Hence, for companies adopting Ind AS there could be differences between what is disclosed in the accounts and what is required to be reported under this Clause, which would need to be reconciled to ensure completeness of reporting. The auditors of Ind AS companies will need to take utmost care about this distinction while dealing with this Clause.

b. Tracking of transactions entered into and settled in the same year: This Clause requires reporting the aggregate of specific transactions entered during the year even if the same are settled during the year. This may provide challenges to ensure completeness of the transactions where the volumes are substantial and the auditor would in such cases have to test the design as well as operating effectiveness of the internal controls and undertake test-checking of the transactions. A specific representation should also be obtained that all such transactions which have been squared off / settled during the year have been considered in the details provided by the management.

c. Identifying advances in the nature of loans: This is by far the most far-reaching change since what constitutes ‘advance is in the nature of a loan’ would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and involve significant judgements which would need to be exercised by the auditors based on their past experience and the understanding of the business. The following guiding principles may be kept in mind; however, these are not to be considered as exhaustive:

  •  An advance against a purchase order, in accordance with the normal trade practice, would not be an advance in the nature of a loan.
  •  An advance given for an amount which is far in excess of the value of an order, or for a period which is far in excess of the period for which such advances are usually extended as per the normal trade practice, then such an advance may be in the nature of a loan to the extent of such excess.
  •  When a trade practice does not exist, a useful guide would be to consider the period of time required by the supplier for the execution of the order, based on the time between the purchase of the raw material and the delivery of the finished product. Any advance which exceeds this period would normally be an advance in the nature of a loan unless there is evidence to the contrary.
  •  A stipulation regarding interest may normally be an indication that the advance is in the nature of a loan but this by itself is not conclusive and there may also be advances which are not in the nature of a loan and which carry interest.

It is imperative that the auditor not only scrutinises all advances given but also old outstanding advances where further amounts are given during the year to ensure their propriety and reasonableness for the purposes of reporting under this Clause as well as under Clause 3(iii)(c) discussed later.

Specified investments and loans transactions are not prejudicial [Clause 3(iii)(b)]:
a. The auditor will have to evaluate design and test the operating effectiveness of controls over specified transactions as these could be highly subjective. For example, valuation based on which investments in unlisted securities are made specifically into equity. Also, the auditor will have to comment upon commitments made in the earlier years but the transaction is entered into during the reporting period.

b. Whether investments are prejudicial: The auditors will have to use their judgement judiciously while reporting under this Clause. They will have to evaluate adherence to the processes and controls discussed above at the time of making the investment and not evaluate based on hindsight, specifically for investments in unlisted securities. The auditor will consider the company’s financial position, its leverage, purpose of making the investment, valuation based on which the investment is made, if the valuation is based on third party valuation report, whether the investee is a related party and specifically if it is controlled by promoters, related party / employee of promoter, compliance with SA 620 Using the Work of Auditor’s Expert, compliance with regulations, etc., to determine whether investments are prejudicial to the company’s interest.

c. Transactions with entities which are consolidated: In many cases, companies infuse additional funds in subsidiaries / joint ventures / associates or other entities which are their strategic investments and which have financial difficulties, or to meet their financial commitments. Such infusion per se would not be construed as prejudicial to their interest, unless it is proved that it is not for genuine business purposes or not in accordance with the company’s policies or with the applicable legal and regulatory guidelines. Hence, each specified investment and loan transaction would need careful assessment by the auditor.

d. Transactions undertaken by NBFCs: Since NBFCs are also covered for reporting under this Clause, this would present a specific challenge since it is their business to undertake specified investments and loans transactions and hence such transactions are likely to be voluminous. In such instances, the auditor would need to ensure that all applicable and reportable transactions are undertaken in accordance with the guidelines issued by the RBI which would inter alia include the Board-approved policies for loans and investments as well as for risk assessment and other processes relating thereto laid down by the company since any material and significant deviation could result in transactions which are prejudicial to the company’s interest.

Hence, for reporting under this Clause apart from deviations in any specific significant transaction, any general non-compliance which is material would also need to be reported.

e. Salary and other similar advances to employees: In case of companies which have a policy of granting salary, festival, medical and similar advances, the same would be construed as advances and not advances in the nature of loans. However, the auditor should review the policy in respect thereof and in case of any material transaction, specifically with related parties who are employees or key managerial persons, which are not in accordance with the policy, or which may be considered as advances in the nature of loans, as the same may be required to be reported.

Servicing of Loans [Clause 3(iii)(c)]:
a. Transaction in the form of advances in the nature of loans:
Due to the reasons discussed under Clause 3(iii)(a) earlier, the auditors would have to use their judgement to identify whether servicing thereof is regular, or else they would need to indicate separately the names of such parties individually together with the amounts and the extent of delay. Further, in case no repayment term is specified, the auditor will have to report such fact.

b. Restructuring transactions undertaken by NBFCs: NBFCs undertake restructuring of loans and advances due to various reasons in accordance with RBI guidelines, including in terms of the Covid-19 Regulatory Package. This may result in a moratorium on repayments or conversion of overdue interest into funded interest term loans. In such cases, since the originally stipulated terms are not adhered to, it would need to be reported under this Clause.

As per the Guidance Note, the name of each entity which is not regular in repayment of principal and payment of interest needs to be disclosed separately. This may be a challenge to NBFCs in view of large number of delays and / or restructuring, specifically during Covid times. The better option in such cases would be to consolidate such entities into various logical buckets for the purpose of reporting under this Clause.

Evergreening of Loans and Advances [Clause 3(iii)(e)]:
Amendment of Disclosures in the Auditors Report

Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note that whilst reporting under this Clause the auditor would have to keep in mind the amendment in the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Amendment Rules, 2021 whereby the following additional matters need to be covered in their main audit report with effect from the financial year 2021-22:

(i) ‘Whether the management has represented that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, other than as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, no funds have been advanced or loaned or invested (either from borrowed funds or share premium or any other sources or kind of funds) by the company to or in any other person(s) or entity(ies), including foreign entities (“Intermediaries”), with the understanding, whether recorded in writing or otherwise, that the Intermediary shall, whether directly or indirectly, lend or invest in other persons or entities identified in any manner whatsoever by or on behalf of the company (“Ultimate Beneficiaries”) or provide any guarantee, security or the like on behalf of the Ultimate Beneficiaries’;

(ii) ‘Whether the management has represented that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, other than as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, no funds have been received by the company from any person(s) or entity(ies), including foreign entities (“Funding Parties”), with the understanding, whether recorded in writing or otherwise, that the company shall, whether directly or indirectly, lend or invest in other persons or entities identified in any manner whatsoever by or on behalf of the Funding Party (“Ultimate Beneficiaries”) or provide any guarantee, security or the like on behalf of the Ultimate Beneficiaries’;

(iii) ‘Based on such audit procedures that the auditors have considered reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances, nothing has come to their notice that has caused them to believe that the representations under (i) and (ii) above contain any material misstatement’.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements and certain other matters, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a. Identification of Ultimate Beneficiaries: Consequent to the above disclosures made in the financial statements, auditors need to check the details of those disclosures and check all such transactions with the respective documents and other correspondence to identify whether any such transaction gets covered for reporting under this Clause. In this regard, the auditors should also take a representation from the management.
b. Transactions within group entities / related parties: In case of complex group structures, it would be difficult to establish a clear audit trail for the transactions, thus making it difficult to identify any such transaction.
c. Determining the Total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans (‘the denominator’): This Clause requires reporting of the percentage of such transactions to the aggregate value of loans and advances in the nature of loans. However, determining the denominator could pose challenges especially for advances in the nature of loans for the reasons discussed earlier. Accordingly, it is imperative for the auditors to reconcile the denominator, especially for advances in the nature of loans with the financial statements to ensure completeness.
d. The auditor will also need to track loans which have fallen due for repayment up to the balance sheet date and which have been renewed / extended / settled post-balance sheet date but before the date of the audit report, as the same is required to be reported under this Clause during the year as well as the following year.
e. Finally, the RBI in the Master Circular dated 1st July, 2014 on Prudential Norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning Pertaining to Advances, has reiterated that the basic objective of restructuring of loans by banks was to preserve the economic value of the borrower units and not evergreening of problem accounts. Borrower Accounts should be taken up for restructuring by the banks if the financial viability is established and there is a reasonable certainty of repayment from the borrower, as per the terms of the restructuring package and looking into their cash flows of and assessing the viability of the projects / activity financed. Accordingly, the auditors should be vigilant with regard to all restructuring proposals requested for by the borrowers.

Demand Loans [Clause 3(iii)(f)]:
Additional Disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this Clause, the auditor will have to keep in the mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:

Following disclosures shall
be made where loans or advances in the nature of loans are granted to promoters,
directors, KMPs and the related parties (as defined under the Companies Act,
2013),
either severally or jointly with any other person that are:

(a) repayable on demand
or

(b) without specifying
any terms or period of repayment

Type of
borrower

Amount
of loan or advance in the nature of loan outstanding

Percentage
to the total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans

Promoters

 

 

Directors

 

 

KMPs

 

 

Related Parties

 

 

 

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a. Identification of Promoters: Promoter has not been defined under the Order. However, the amended Schedule III states that ‘Promoter’ will be as defined under the Companies Act, 2013. Although a few promoters could be traced to those named in the prospectus or identified in the annual return, the auditor will have to rely on secretarial and other records and / or management representation to determine those who have control over the affairs of the company directly or indirectly, whether as director or shareholder or otherwise or in accordance with whose advice, directions, or instructions the Board is accustomed to act upon, to be considered as promoters. In case there are no such persons, then also a specific representation should be obtained.

b. Identification of Related Parties (subsidiaries): Similar considerations as discussed earlier for reporting under Clause 3(iii)(a) would be relevant for reporting under this Clause. In this context, the auditor would need to reconcile the disclosures under this Clause with what is disclosed in the financial statements (for companies adopting Ind AS) as well as in terms of the disclosures under Schedule III as specified above, to ensure completeness.

c. Transactions undertaken by NBFCs: Since there is no specific exemption granted to NBFCs, the auditor should consider the specific guidelines issued by the RBI for granting of demand and call loans, which are summarised hereunder:
• The Board of Directors of every applicable NBFC granting / intending to grant demand / call loans shall frame a policy for the same.
• Such policy shall stipulate the following:

(i) A cut-off date within which the repayment of demand or call loan shall be demanded or called up;
(ii) The sanctioning authority shall record specific reasons in writing at the time of sanctioning demand or call loan, if the cut-off date for demanding or calling up such loan is stipulated beyond a period of one year from the date of sanction;
(iii) The rate of interest which shall be payable on such loans;
(iv) Interest on such loans, as stipulated, shall be payable either at monthly or quarterly rests;
(v) The sanctioning authority shall record specific reasons in writing at the time of sanctioning demand or call loan, if no interest is stipulated or a moratorium is granted for any period;
(vi) A cut-off date, for review of performance of the loan, not exceeding six months commencing from the date of sanction;
(vii) Such demand or call loans shall not be renewed unless the periodical review has shown satisfactory compliance with the terms of the sanction.

In case the auditor has identified any deviation, he may consider reporting the same under this Clause or cross-reference the same to the disclosures made in the financial statements depending upon the materiality of the transaction.

d. Determining the Total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans (‘the denominator’): This Clause requires reporting of the percentage of such transactions to the aggregate value of loans and advances in the nature of loans. However, determining advances in the nature of loans could pose a challenge, for the reasons discussed earlier.

Impact on the Audit Opinion:
Whilst reporting on these Clauses, the auditors may come across several situations wherein they may need to report exceptions / deviations. In each of these cases they would need to carefully evaluate the impact of the same on the audit opinion by exercising their professional judgement to determine the materiality and relevance of the same to the users of the financial statements. These are broadly examined hereunder:

Nature
of Exception / Deviation

Possible
Impact on the Audit Report / Opinion

The company has not maintained records to
identify and compile data required for reporting under Clause 3(iii)(a)

• Reporting on
Internal Financial controls over Financial Reporting

Investments made, guarantees provided,
security given and the terms and conditions of the grant of all loans and
advances in the nature of loans and guarantees are prejudicial to the
company’s interest, there may be implications on the main audit report due to
non-compliance with the following SAs:

• Consideration of laws and regulations (SA
250)

• Fraud (SA 240)

• Related party transactions (SA 550)

• Modified
opinion under SA 706

Loans and advances on the basis of security
have not been properly secured and the terms thereof are prejudicial to the
interests of the company

Disclosure in the audit
report u/s 143(1) of the Act

If the auditor concludes that there are
loans or advances in the nature of loan granted which have fallen due during
the year have been renewed or extended or fresh loans granted to settle the overdues
of existing loans given to the same parties, there may be implications on the
main audit report, such as consideration of fraud risk factors as per SA 240

• Modified
opinion under SA 706

If the auditor concludes that the company
has granted loans or advances in the nature of loans either repayable on
demand or without specifying any terms or period of repayment, there may be
implications on the main audit report due to non-compliance with the
following SAs:

• Consideration of laws and regulations (SA
250)

• Fraud (SA 240)

• Related party transactions (SA 550)

• Modified
opinion under SA 706

In such cases, it is imperative that the Board’s Report contains explanations / comments on every reservation / adverse comment in the audit report as per section 134(3)(f) of the Companies Act, 2013 and that there is no factual inconsistency between the two.

CONCLUSION


The above changes have cast onerous reporting responsibilities on the auditor for various critical aspects of movement of funds as under:
• Evaluating design and operating effectiveness of internal controls around specified investment and loan transactions, whether with related parties or otherwise, including layering and round-tripping of funds, etc., if any.
• Detailed analysis of financing transactions, including advances in the nature of loans.
• Identifying sticky specified transactions and reporting.
Accordingly, it needs to be seen whether an audit remains an audit or becomes more of an investigative exercise requiring greater forensic skills!

 

GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT BY MANAGEMENT

(This article is the first of a two-part series on Going Concern)
The concept of going concern is understood as the ability of an entity to continue in the foreseeable future and is also one of the assumptions which management needs to make for the preparation of its general-purpose financial statements as per the requirement of Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements as also fundamental accounting assumptions prescribed in AS 1 Disclosure of Accounting Policies.

Ind AS 1 states that an entity shall prepare its financial statements on a going concern basis unless management either intends to liquidate the entity or to cease trading, or has no realistic alternative but to do so. However, to prepare its financial statements on a going concern basis, the management first needs to assess the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

The above requirement of Ind AS 1 acts as a trigger for performing going concern assessment by management through ascertaining whether the existing events and conditions are favourable enough to justify the going concern assumption for the preparation of its financial statements. When the use of the going concern basis of accounting is appropriate, assets and liabilities are recorded on the basis that the entity will be able to realise its assets and discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business.

The going concern assessment and reporting thereof require a high degree of professional judgement and has become more relevant and complex in the present Covid-19 pandemic, that has created greater economic uncertainty and due to which many organisations are seeing downturns in their revenue, profitability and cash flows.

 

This article attempts to explain

a) how management should do the going concern assessment by highlighting the events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and the evidence that management should consider to conclude the assessment, in case any such events or conditions are identified; and

b) scenarios that require disclosures in the financial statements.

 Preparers of financial statements, those charged with governance, users of the financial statements and their auditors may find this article helpful in understanding the concept of going concern and implications when the entity has a doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern.

 
Evaluation of going concern assessment by the auditor and reporting considerations in the audit report will be covered in the second part of this article.

 

GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT UNDERSTANDING

Before initiating a going concern assessment, one must first understand how the going concern assessment needs to be performed, i.e., what kind of events and conditions should be considered, what should be the period covered for making this assessment, and how to assess such events and conditions once identified, to conclude.

 
Ind AS 1 outlines the principle for performing the going concern assessment but does not provide an explicit guidance to address all the above questions; it states that the management should consider all available information about the future, which is at least, but not limited to, twelve months from the end of the reporting period and the degree of consideration depends on the facts in each case. For example, when:

 

Scenario

Assessment

The entity has a history of profitable operations and ready
access to financial resources

The entity may reach a conclusion that the going concern basis
of accounting is appropriate without detailed analysis, unless there are any
other indicators to the contrary

Other cases

Management may need to consider a wide range of factors relating
to:

 

(continued)

• current and expected profitability,

• debt repayment schedules, and

•
potential sources of replacement financing

before it can satisfy itself that the going concern basis is
appropriate

Considering limited guidance in Ind AS 1, management can draw reference from SA 570 (Revised) Going Concern, which illustrates events or conditions much in detail and, if they existed, may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

 

Apart from the guidance given in SA 570, reference can also be drawn from some of the following recent industry-specific events and conditions:

 

Industry

Particulars

Examples

Telecom

• Supreme Court judgment on telecom license fees

• Vodafone Idea Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

Aviation, Hospitality, Automobile, Logistics, Retail, etc.

• Covid-19 pandemic

• SpiceJet Limited for the year ended 31st March,
2021;

• The Indian Hotels Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

• Future Retail Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2020;

• Allcargo Logistics for the year ended 31st March,
2020

Real estate

• Significant inventory due to economic slowdown

• Delayed completion of projects due to Covid-19 pandemic

• Jaypee Infratech Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

• Peninsula Land Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

Automobile

• Amendments in government policies, and restrictions on using
specific technology

• Supreme Court judgment for banning BS3 and BS4 vehicles;

• Government policies with respect to electronic vehicles that
may adversely affect the present product line;

Banking

• Significant NPAs

• Yes Bank Limited for the year ended 31st March,
2020

Mining and Chemicals

• Restrictions imposed due to environmental issues

Vedanta’s subsidiary Sterlite Copper Smelter Plant shutdown

 

EVIDENCE TO ASSESS THE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS

Once the events and conditions are identified, management needs to assess the financial implications of these events and conditions to conclude the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Given herein below are examples of some of the evidence that management should consider while performing going concern assessment:

 

  •   Cash flow projections that show an ability to pay debts as and when they fall due after factoring realistic assumptions in the current market conditions;

  •   If current conditions deteriorate further, detailed business plans covering the period under consideration;

  •   Entity’s ability to obtain new funding upon the maturity of existing funding arrangements;

  •   Evidence that debt covenants have been assessed and any risk of breaching them has been managed, such that they do not provide significant risk;

  •   Ability to obtain a ‘financial support letter’ from the parent company for the next twelve months from the date of the latest balance sheet. However, a mere ‘Support Letter’ or ‘Comfort Letter’ will generally not constitute sufficient evidence to conclude on the appropriateness of going concern basis of accounting, unless the subsidiary’s operations are entirely dependent on the parent;

  •   Financial ratios like current ratio, debt-service coverage ratios, etc., indicating inadequate profit or liquidity position of the company;

  •   Covid-19 specific considerations1:

 

  1.  Whether the entity is operating in a sector which is highly impacted,

2.  Whether the entity has plans and ability to restructure its debt obligations if required to ensure short-term solvency,

3. Assessing the financial health of key / critical suppliers and customers and their impact on the entity’s operations,

4. Government policies and measures in the countries in which the company operates,

5. Changes in the entity’s access to capital, impacted by measures taken by regulators (industry and / or financial) or banks,

6. The entity’s ability to prepare timely financial statements or other required information / filings, including delays in receiving financial data from operations in other countries, or material investees for consolidated financial statement,

7. The ability of the business model to operate under current Covid-19 restrictions and whether the business model will be sustainable post-Covid.

 
Although all the above illustrative events, conditions and evidences give a fair idea to address the what and how questions, yet going concern assessment requires a significant management judgement while concluding in the real-world situation, and with the pandemic in place, concluding going concern assessment has become more challenging.

 
Ind AS 1 though do not provide detailed guidance on the going concern assessment, but it does make management’s job a little easy by requiring adequate disclosures of the events and conditions identified, the assumption used, and judgement made to conclude the going concern assessment.

 
The principle is to give clear visibility to the readers of the financial statements so that they can make their own interpretations with the help of the disclosures. Also, these disclosures are of greater relevance in the present economic environment where the regulators like Securities and Exchange Board of India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, European Securities and Markets Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission, etc., have placed significant focus on the going concern of the entities.

 
DISCLOSURE IN THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

The Table below summarises the broad category of scenarios and their disclosure requirement in the financial statements as per the requirement of Ind AS 12:

 

Scenario

Basis of preparation

Disclosure for material uncertainties

Disclosure for management assumptions

Events or conditions challenging going
concern do not exist

Going concern

Not applicable

Not applicable

Events or conditions challenging

Going concern

None

Significant management assumptions

(continued)

going concern exist but no material uncertainty concluded after
considering mitigating actions (e.g., strong turnaround strategy of
management that has started showing sufficient evidence of success, including
identifying feasible alternative sources of financing)

 

 

(continued)

and judgement

Significant doubts about going concern but
mitigating actions judged sufficient to make going concern appropriate.

Material uncertainties about going concern remain
after considering mitigating actions (e.g., considerable uncertainty about
the outcome of the management’s turnaround strategy to address the reduced
demand and to renew or replace funding)

Going concern

Material uncertainties

Significant management assumptions and judgement

Entity intends to liquidate or to cease trading, or no realistic
alternative but to do so

Alternate basis

(Not going concern)

Specific disclosure on why the entity should not be regarded as
a going concern

 

Further, section 134(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 also requires the Board of Directors to comment on the going concern assumption for the preparation of financial statements, as part of the Directors’ responsibility statement.

 
Similar to the Ind AS 1, AS 1 does not provide any such disclosure guidance on the material uncertainty and requires specific disclosure only in case the entity has intentions or requirement to liquidate or curtail materially the scale of its operation, and as a result of which the financial statement needs to be prepared on an alternate basis.

 Let us take an example to see the application of the above scenarios:

 
Illustration

Company A  is in the hotel business and known for its luxury hotels across the globe. The company is successfully serving its customers and running its operations for several decades. However, the Covid-19 pandemic and resultant global lockdown had a severe adverse effect on its operations.

 
Some of the key points reflecting the current financial position and business of the company are as under:

 
(a) There was no sale in the first nine months of the current financial year due to the lockdown and there was minimal sale in the remaining three months due to the Government advisory of lifting the lockdown in a few of the cities where the company has its properties;

(b) The company has significant borrowings, a portion of which is due for payment in the next financial year; the company has not defaulted in any of its borrowings so far. The management is in discussion with bankers to increase the moratorium period for a few of its term loans;

(c) The company has not retrenched its work force; however, a pay cut of 25% has been made by the management considering the present cash flow position;

(d) Management is expecting to incur a significant cost for ensuring continuous sanitization of its properties globally;

(e) Management at present is focusing on its restaurant business by introducing home delivery services. It has also introduced catering services for organisations that are covered under essential services, such as hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, manufacturing units of essentials commodities, etc.;

(f) Governments in various countries are imposing lockdowns on an intermittent basis considering the number of Covid-19 cases, and at present there is no visibility about how long the pandemic will continue.

 
ANALYSIS

In the given scenario it is evident that the pandemic is the event that cast significant doubt on the company’s ability to continue as a going concern and hence a detailed assessment is required to be performed to conclude on the going concern assumption.

Let us see the step-by-step approach that management needs to take to perform the assessment.

Step 1: Identification of events and conditions

In the present case, the pandemic is the identified event that has resulted in a significant deficiency in the regular cash flow of the company and thus created a question about how it will realise its assets and honour its liabilities in the foreseeable future.

 Step 2: Assessing the evidence to evaluate going concern

Under this step, management needs to assess the following points to conclude the going concern assessment:

(a) Cash flow projection from operations, i.e., with the present situation, how much cash flow the company will be able to generate from its operations in the next 12 months and whether it will be sufficient to meet its contractual obligations. In order to do the said projection, the management needs to make certain assumptions like:

  •  sales volume from restaurant business due to new home delivery and from catering services introduced by the management;

  •  transportation cost for home delivery;

  •  expenditure to develop a digital platform for placing online orders;

  •  estimate of sales from the room rent for properties where the lockdown is removed;

  •  estimate of additional cost that needs to be incurred to ensure sanitization;

  •  advertising cost for the new initiatives taken by the management;

  •  other operational costs;

  •  Recoverability slippages in the receivables; and

  •  Probability of getting additional credit period from the creditors.

 

The management also needs to be conscious that the above assumptions and projections should be based on the expected future trends and limited reliance should be placed on the historical performance and data. Given hereinbelow are the examples of evidence that management should consider to estimate the future trends:

  •  consider research reports of analysts and third parties on the hotel industry,

  •   data from World Health Organization or local institutions explaining the expected progression of the Covid-19 outbreak in the countries, and

  •   data from government agencies about the severity and estimated duration of the economic downturn in the country and the actions that government may take to mitigate the effects.

 

(b) Quantum of borrowings that are due in the next 12 months, and status of extending moratorium period with banks;

(c) Probability of getting additional borrowings from banks for working capital management;

(d) Additional capital infusion that can be done by the promoters;

(e) Losses due to assets like investments, that are measured at fair value through profit and loss;

(f) Any other contractual liabilities, like derivative contracts that are due for settlement in the next twelve months.

 

Step 3: Preparation of financial statements and disclosures

Based on the outcome of the assessment performed in Step 2, management may need to conclude on two aspects:

– whether the material uncertainty exists, and if yes, then

– whether going concern assumption holds good.

 
In the given scenario, if the company is able to get additional funding from the promoter group or banks to run its operations for at least the next twelve months, then the management may conclude that the material uncertainty does not exist and hence the going concern assumption holds good. Accordingly, management needs to prepare the financial statements on going concern basis and adequate disclosure will be made with respect to judgement made by the management to mitigate the material uncertainties.

 
On the other hand, if the company is unable to obtain additional or sufficient funding from the promoter group or banks and it has to depend on the materialisation of its present business plan and drawing additional credit period from the creditors and bankers, then it may conclude that the material uncertainty does exist and it may or may not be mitigated. Accordingly, management might prepare financial statements on going concern basis along with adequate disclosures with respect to material uncertainties, management turnaround plan and significant judgement and assumptions taken for concluding going concern assumption.

 
However, in rare circumstances, the management may also decide that the going concern assumption does not hold good. This may happen if the management believes that the bankers and creditors will not provide any extension for the payment of their contractual dues and the present business plan will not generate adequate cash flows to meet its contractual obligations in their entirety, when due, and to run its day-to-day operations.

 
In that case, management needs to use an alternative basis of accounting for the preparation of its financial statements, e.g., liquidation basis, and the disclosure of that fact and the reason thereof needs to be disclosed in the financial statements.

 

TO SUMMARISE

The presence of Covid-19 has created economic instability across industries and has made the going concern assessment more critical and challenging. However, this challenge can be countered effectively if management do the identification and assessment of all the possible events and conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, in the light of the available guidance on financial reporting, and support their conclusion with sufficient appropriate evidence.

 
Once the management is done with its going concern assessment, the second step will be the evaluation of the going concern assessment by the auditors and reporting thereof in the auditors’ report.

 
The said aspect of going concern will be covered in the second part of this article that will touch upon the various factors that an auditor should consider while evaluating the going concern assessment performed by the management, disclosure in the financial statements based on the outcome of the evaluation, and reporting considerations under various scenarios in the auditors’ report.

 

References

Readers should also refer to the Annual Reports as referenced above in different industries to gain a practical understanding of the disclosures required to be made in the financial statements under various scenarios.

MLI SERIES ARTICLE 13: ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PE THROUGH SPECIFIC ACTIVITY EXEMPTION

INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 5(4) OF THE TAX TREATY (PRE-MLI)
In respect of business income [other than fees for technical services (FTS) and royalties], a foreign company would be subject to tax in India (i.e., the Source State) when it constitutes a business connection or a permanent establishment (PE) in India. When a PE / business connection is constituted, a foreign company is subjected to tax on income deemed to have accrued in India on a net level / deemed profit basis.

Provisions of PE are typically included under Article 5 of a tax treaty. While Article 5(1) to Article 5(3) provides for what constitutes a PE, Article 5(4) provides for a list of activities that do not constitute a PE, even if such activities are undertaken from a fixed place of business in the Source Country (generally known as ‘preparatory and auxiliary exemption’). At the same time, the OECD Commentary (2017) enlists a number of business activities which are treated as exceptions to the general definition of the term PE and which when carried on through fixed places of business, are not sufficient to constitute a PE.

In the above context, a question arises: Does ‘business connection’ include preparatory / auxiliary exemption? The term business connection is not defined under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) and is interpreted by placing reliance on judicial precedents (key reference provided by the Apex Court in the case of R.D. Aggarwal). Thus, ‘business connection’ draws meaning from the definitions pronounced by judicial precedents, and it may include carrying on a part of the main business, or merely a relation between the business of the foreign company and the activity in India which assists in carrying on the business of the foreign company. Thus, although not explicit, the term business connection includes preparatory and auxiliary activities (POA) when read with ‘contributes directly or indirectly to the earnings of the non-resident from its business’1.

This article aims at providing the effect of MLI (Article 13) on Article 5(4) where activities that do not constitute PE as per Article 5(4) will constitute a PE under MLI Article 13 if certain conditions are satisfied. Thus, Article 13 is a game-changer. In simple words, where in substance cohesive business activities of a foreign enterprise are broken down or fragmented to fit the definition of the exempted activities of erstwhile Article 5(4), they may no longer be able to escape PE status and therefore taxation. This will impact many multinational companies and hence is pertinent to note.

RATIONALE BEHIND THE MLI AMENDMENT
Nature of preparatory and auxiliary activities
Article 5(4) enlists a number of business activities which do not constitute a PE, even if the activities are carried out through a fixed place or office. These activities are generally termed as preparatory and auxiliary in nature2. Para 58 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that such a place of business may well contribute to the productivity of the enterprise, but the services it performs are so remote from the actual realisation of profits that it is difficult to allocate any profit to the fixed place of business in question.

The Table below classifies the negative list of Article 5(4):

As per the earlier OECD
Model Convention, 2014

As per BEPS Action Plan
(AP) 7

(Para 78 of the OECD
Commentary, 2017)

Notwithstanding the
preceding provisions of this Article, the

the term ‘permanent
establishment’ shall be deemed not to include:

a) the use of facilities
solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or
merchandise belonging to the enterprise;

b) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage, display or delivery;

c) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another enterprise;

d) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise;

e) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not listed in
sub-paragraphs a) to d), provided that this activity has a preparatory or
auxiliary character;

f) the maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or
auxiliary character

Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this
Article, the term  ‘permanent establishment’ shall be deemed not to
include:

a) the use of facilities
solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or
merchandise belonging to the enterprise;

b) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage, display or delivery;

c) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another enterprise;

d) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise;

e) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any other activity of a
preparatory or auxiliary character;

f) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed place
of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary
character,

provided
that such activity or, in the case of sub-paragraph f), the overall activity
of the fixed place of business is of a preparatory or auxiliary character

* Highlighted part is amended under BEPS AP 7

As can be observed from the above, initially, OECD was of the view that the enlisted negative activities from Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d) of the OECD Model Convention, 2014 would apply automatically to exclude the constitution of a PE, more so considering the erstwhile business models. For example, a non-resident company maintains warehouse facilities solely for the purpose of storage of its goods in the Source State. The delivery of goods would be undertaken through an independent third party in the logistic business. Under the erstwhile PE provisions, the foreign company is not required to substantiate that this activity is auxiliary in nature as the application of Article 5(4)(a) of the OECD Model Convention is automatic. Only Article 5(4)(e) and Article 5(4)(f) subject the specified activities to be of a ‘preparatory and auxiliary character’. In the above example, if a non-resident company maintains a warehouse for storage of finished goods [Article 5(4)(a)] and maintains an office for procurement activities, Article 5(4)(d) and Article 5(4)(f) would apply and the ‘overall activity of the fixed place of business resulting from this combination’ should be of a preparatory or auxiliary character to be exempted from constitution of a PE. In reality, the multinational enterprises (MNEs) have benefited from the automatic application of the enlisted negative activities by ensuring that their fixed place of business solely carries on the enlisted negative activity [Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d)].

The Executive Summary of the BEPS Action Report No. 7 (at point 10) states that ‘depending on the circumstances, activities previously considered to be merely preparatory or auxiliary in nature may nowadays correspond to core business activities. In order to ensure that profits derived from core activities performed in a country can be taxed in that country, Article 5(4) is modified to ensure that each of the exceptions included therein is restricted to activities that are otherwise of a “preparatory or auxiliary” character… BEPS concerns related to Article 5(4) also arise from what is typically referred to as the “fragmentation of activities”. Given the ease with which multinational enterprises (MNEs) may alter their structures to obtain tax advantages, it is important to clarify that it is not possible to avoid PE status by fragmenting a cohesive operating business into several small operations in order to argue that each part is merely engaged in preparatory or auxiliary activities that benefit from the exceptions of Article 5(4). The anti-fragmentation rule proposed in [this report] will address these BEPS concerns.’

In order to understand the above in detail, let us consider the following examples:

– The above example includes a company operating an online shop in Country A and selling goods to customers in Country B through a website.
– For delivery and storage of goods, the company maintains a warehouse in Country B.
– Erstwhile Article 5(4) included an exception wherein maintenance of a fixed place in India solely for the purpose of storage and delivery would not constitute a PE. This was based on the principle that such activities are considered as preparatory and auxiliary in the entire scheme of business operations.
– However, with the advancement of internet, the manner in which businesses are operated has evolved. Given this, since most of the business operations of the company are undertaken online, maintenance of a warehouse in Country B for storage and delivery may no longer be considered as preparatory and auxiliary in nature but the core activity. This therefore makes the exceptions provided under Article 5(4) redundant.
– BEPS AP 7 / MLI Article 13 seek to address the above challenges and amend the PE provisions to be in line with the advanced business model.

Anti-fragmentation: Splitting for creating preparatory and auxiliary activities
Earlier, the determination of PE and the enlisted negative activities was considered vis-à-vis the said enterprise which carried on such activities, and not that of the group companies assessed in totality
. The aggregation of ‘places of business’ carried on by other members of the group companies was specifically denied by the OECD Commentary (2014). So, the MNEs fragmented their business operations into various activities among different places and different related enterprises, with a view to fall within the negative list and avoid the existence of a PE in the Source State. For example, large multinationals can fragment their operations into smaller businesses (such as entity A storing goods, entity B delivering goods and entity C providing sales support activities), thereby arguing that each business part is just preparatory and auxiliary in nature.

MLI Article 13 provides for amendment in the PE provisions to avoid such situations by aggregating the activities provided by group companies in the Source State to determine whether or not a PE is constituted. The following examples can help in understanding fragmentation of activities by foreign companies:

Example 1:

Thus, in the above example F Co. has fragmented its business activities in Country B by incorporating two separate entities undertaking (i) warehouse and storage functions, and (ii) support services.

Example 2:

And in the above example, R Co. has fragmented its business activities in Country B by incorporating various entities undertaking (a) procurement functions, (b) bonded warehouse, (c) distribution centre, (d) processing department, etc. This sets a clear example of fragmentation of activities which, if considered individually, will qualify for the preparatory and auxiliary exemption.

MLI ARTICLE 13

Paragraph 1 of MLI Article 13
‘A Party may choose to apply paragraph 2 (Option A) or paragraph 3 (Option B) or to apply neither Option’.

The member State may choose to apply paragraph 2 of Article 13 (Option A) or paragraph 3 of Article 13 (Option B) or not to apply any option. Under Option A, the specific activities mentioned in the tax treaties will not constitute a PE, insofar as the activities of the PE are preparatory and auxiliary in nature. In other words, the activities of a PE, even if aligned with sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5(4), will only be exempt from being a PE if the overall conduct of the activities is preparatory and auxiliary in nature. A majority of the member States have agreed to this view.

Further, under Option B, paragraph 78 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that ‘some Member States consider that some of the activities referred to in Article 5(4) are intrinsically preparatory and auxiliary and, in order to provide greater certainty for both tax administrations and taxpayers, take the view that these activities should not be subject to the condition that they be of a preparatory or auxiliary character, and that concern about inappropriate use of the specific activity exemptions can be addressed through anti-fragmentation rules’. This option allows the member States to continue to use the existing language; however, at the same time they have agreed that an enterprise cannot fragment a cohesive business operation into smaller business operations in order to call it preparatory and auxiliary.

Paragraphs 2 & 3 of MLI Article 13
Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2017) is modified to provide for Option A or Option B. Both the options preserve the specific variant of listed activities under each Covered Tax Agreement (CTA). It does not replace the list of exempt activities in the current CTAs with the above BEPS AP 7-suggested Article 5(4). Hence, in order to accommodate the model version and the existing version, Article 13 of the MLI provides for the following:
• Option A – provides additional condition that the specific activity exemption would apply only if the listed activities are of preliminary or auxiliary nature (POA) (remains explicit);
• Option B – provides automatic exemption to listed activities, irrespective of the same being POA in nature (i.e., remains explicit);
• If member states decide to not choose any option: the provisions of Article 5(4) as existing under the CTAs will remain in force (i.e., remain implicit).

Option A

Option B

Notwithstanding the
provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that define the term ‘permanent
establishment’, the term

Notwithstanding the provisions of a Covered Tax
Agreement that define the term ‘permanent establishment’, the term

(continued)

 

‘permanent establishment’
shall be deemed not to include:

 

(a) The activities
specifically listed in the Covered Tax Agreement (prior to modification by
this Convention) as activities deemed not to constitute a permanent
establishment, whether or not that exception from permanent establishment
status is contingent on the activity being of a preparatory or auxiliary
character;

 

(b) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not described in sub-paragraph a);

 

(c) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) and b),

provided that such activity
or, in the case of sub-paragraph c), the overall activity of the fixed place
of business, is of a preparatory or auxiliary character

(continued)

 

‘permanent establishment’
shall be deemed not to include:

 

(a) The activities
specifically listed in the Covered Tax Agreement (prior to modification by
this Convention) as activities deemed not to constitute a permanent
establishment, whether or not that exception from permanent establishment
status is contingent on the activity being of a preparatory or auxiliary
character, except to the extent that the relevant provision of the Covered
Tax Agreement provides explicitly that a specific activity shall be deemed
not to constitute a permanent establishment provided that the activity is of
a preparatory or auxiliary character;

 

(b) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not described in sub-paragraph a), provided that
this activity is of a preparatory or auxiliary character;

 

(c) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) and b), provided that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or
auxiliary character

An alternative rule is designed for those countries that are of the opinion that the examples stated under Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d) of the OECD Model (2014) should always be deemed as not creating a PE, without the need to further go into the deliberation of whether or not they meet the general preparatory and auxiliary nature standard.

Paragraph 4 of MLI Article 13
Article 13(4) of the MLI relates to the anti-fragmentation rule wherein, irrespective of the above options (i.e., Option A or Option B or none), the member States will have another option to implement the anti-fragmentation rule. The objective is to avoid fragmentation of activities between closely-related parties so as to fall within the scope of preparatory and auxiliary character, and thereby avoid constituting a PE in the Source State. It provides as under:

‘Para 4. A provision of a Covered Tax Agreement (as it may be modified by paragraph 2 or 3) that lists specific activities deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment shall not apply to a fixed place of business that is used or maintained by an enterprise if the same enterprise or a closely related enterprise carries on business activities at the same place or at another place in the same Contracting Jurisdiction and:
a) that place or other place constitutes a permanent establishment for the enterprise or the closely related enterprise under the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement defining a permanent establishment; or
b) the overall activity resulting from the combination of the activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at the two places, is not of a preparatory or auxiliary character,
provided that the business activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at the two places, constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation.’

Accordingly, clause 4.1 is inserted to Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Convention and its commentary is provided in paragraphs 79 to 81 of the OECD Commentary (2017). Under Article 13(4) of the MLI (above), the scope for specific activity exemption is not available where there is at least one of the places where these activities are exercised (and) must constitute a PE or, if that is not the case, the overall activity resulting from the combination of the relevant activities must go beyond what is merely preparatory or auxiliary. Until now, the PE status remained embedded per se to its place of business through which the business activities were carried on. But now, the different places of business in the Source State would be combined and if at least one of the places constitutes a PE, then all places of business would constitute a PE for the enterprise as well as for its closely related enterprises carrying on activities in the said Source State. Accordingly, the profits attributable to the PE would be subject to tax in India.

BEPS AP 7 had made application of the anti-fragmentation rule mandatory for those opting for Option B, but the MLI has changed its applicability from mandatory to optional for all three options (including Option B).
India has opted for option A, i.e., wherein PE exemption to listed activities under Article 5(4) shall be subject to activities being preparatory-auxiliary in nature, whereas for the anti-fragmentation rule India is silent, indicating that this rule will be applicable if there is no reservation from the other contracting State in the CTA. It must be noted that in paragraph 51 of the Positions on Article 5, India states that it does not agree with the interpretation given in paragraph 74 because it considers that even when the anti-fragmentation provision is not applicable, an enterprise cannot fragment a cohesive operating business into several smaller operations in order to argue that each is merely engaged in a preparatory or auxiliary activity.

Understanding ‘complementary functions’ and ‘cohesive business operations’
In order to determine the preparatory and auxiliary character, the activity carried on would be compared with the main and core business of the enterprise. Further, based on Article 14 of the MLI, the activity so carried on would be combined with other activities that constitute ‘complementary functions’ that are part of a cohesive business carried on by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises in the same state. Neither MLI nor the OECD Commentary defines the terms ‘complementary functions’ and ‘cohesive business’. However, both these terms cannot be interpreted independently but together as a ‘part of’ the whole. Further, it refers to complementary functions, rather than complementary products or complementary business, etc., indicating interconnected (or closely connected) functions, or intertwined, or interdependent functions, with respect to technology, or value-added functions, or the nature of their ultimate purpose or use.

Paragraph 7 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March, 2018, provides that ‘the anti-fragmentation rule recommended in the Report on Action 7 (at paragraph 39) is contained in the new paragraph 4.1 of Article 5. It prevents paragraph 4 from providing an exception from PE status for activities that might be viewed in isolation as preparatory or auxiliary in nature but that constitute part of a larger set of business activities conducted in the source country by the enterprise (whether alone or with a closely related enterprise) if the combined activities constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation’.

Attribution of profits to PE
Paragraph 8 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March, 2018, provides that Article 5(4.1) is applicable in two types of cases. First, it applies where the non-resident enterprise or a closely related enterprise already has a PE in the source country, and the activities in question constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation. A determination will need to be made as to whether the activities of the enterprises give rise to one or more PEs in the source country under Article 5(4.1). The profits attributed to the PEs and subject to source taxation are the profits derived from the combined activities constituting complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation. This is considering the profits each one of them would have derived, if they were a separate and independent enterprise performing its corresponding activities, taking into account, in particular, the potential effect on those profits of the level of integration of these activities. Examples of this type of fact pattern are contained in new paragraph 30.43 of the revised Commentary (at point 40-41 of the Report on AP 7).

Paragraph 9 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March 2018, provides that the second type of case to which Article 5(4.1) applies is a case where there is no pre-existing PE but the combination of activities in the source country by the non-resident enterprise and closely related non-resident enterprises results in a cohesive business operation that is not merely preparatory or auxiliary in nature. In such a case, a determination will need to be made as to whether the activities of the enterprises give rise to one or more PEs in the source country under Article 5(4.1). The profits attributable to each PE so arising are those that would have been derived from the profits made by each activity of the cohesive business operation as carried on by the PE, if it were a separate and independent enterprise, performing the corresponding activities taking into account, in particular, the potential effect on those profits of the level of integration of these activities.

Understanding ‘preparatory and auxiliary character’
Paragraph 60 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that an activity that has a preparatory character is one that is carried on in contemplation of what constitutes an essential and significant part of the activity of the enterprise as a whole. It is usually carried on for a relatively short period, which, depending on the circumstance, could be carried on for a longer duration. Auxiliary activity supports the essential and significant part of the activity. In absolute terms, auxiliary activities would not require significant proportion of the assets or employees, when compared with the total assets or employees of the enterprise.

Further, Paragraph 61 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that the activity purported to be covered under the specified activity exemptions ought to be carried on for the enterprise itself. If the activity is undertaken on behalf of the other enterprises at the same fixed place of business, the said activity would not be exempt from the PE status in the garb of Article 5(4) of the applicable tax treaty. The OECD Commentary (2017) provides an example that if an enterprise that maintained an office for the advertising of its own products or services, which was also engaged in advertising on behalf of other enterprises at that location, would be regarded as a PE of the enterprise.

Understanding ‘closely related enterprises’
Article 15 of the MLI defines the term ‘Closely Related Enterprises’ (CRE). The concept of CRE is distinguished from the concept of ‘Associated Enterprises’ of Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention. It is important to note that the term ‘control’ is not defined therein. Further, the member States that have made reservations to Article 12-14 of the MLI can opt out of Article 15.

‘Article 15 – Definition of a Person Closely Related to an Enterprise
1. For the purposes of the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that are modified by paragraph 2 of Article 12 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through Commissionnaire Arrangements and Similar Strategies), paragraph 4 of Article 13 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through the Specific Activity Exemptions), or paragraph 1 of Article 14 (Splitting-up of Contracts), a person is closely related to an enterprise if, based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the other or both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises. In any case, a person shall be considered to be closely related to an enterprise if one possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) or if another person possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) in the person and the enterprise.
2. A party that has made the reservations described in paragraph 4 of Article 12 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through Commissionnaire Arrangements and Similar Strategies), sub-paragraph a) or c) of paragraph 6 of Article 13 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through the Specific Activity Exemptions), and sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 3 of Article 14 (Splitting-up of Contracts) may reserve the right for the entirety of this Article not to apply to the Covered Tax Agreements to which those reservations apply.’

India has adopted Article 15 of the MLI. However, India has reserved its right to not include the words ‘to which it is closely related’ in Article 5(6) of the OECD Model Convention (2017). For instance, India has not reserved the right to paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the MLI, which means that it has accepted to bring the anti-fragmentation rule to the existing tax treaties. Again, this can only be confirmed if the other contracting state doesn’t create reservation to paragraph 4 of Article 13.

Paragraph 5 to 8 of MLI Article 13
Paragraph 5 contains compatibility clauses which describe the relationship between Article 13(2) through (4) and provisions of CTA. Paragraph 6 contains reservation rights of the member States, indicating that the provisions addressing the concerns of BEPS AP 7 are not required in order to meet a minimum standard test. The member State may reserve the right for the entirety of Article 13 of MLI not to apply to its CTAs.

Paragraph 7 requires that parties that opted for Option A or Option B to notify the depository of the Option so selected. Paragraph 180 of the Explanatory Statement further confirms that ‘An Option would apply to a provision only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification with respect to that provision’. For example, if a contracting State chooses Option A while the other chooses Option B, the asymmetrical decisions conclude in the non-application of the provision in its entirety. This is illustrated in paragraph 7 of Article 13, which states that ‘an Option shall apply with respect to a provision of a CTA only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification’. Accordingly, India has selected and notified Option A. Unless the other contracting State selects Option A, the tax treaty will remain unchanged.

Paragraph 8 requires each party that has not opted out of applying Paragraph 4 (anti-fragmentation rule) or for the entirety of Article 13, to notify the depository of each of its CTAs that includes specific activity exemptions. Paragraph 181 of the Explanatory Statement further confirms that ‘Paragraph 4 will apply to a provision of a CTA only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have made such a notification with respect to that provision pursuant to either paragraph 7 or paragraph 8.’

The extract of Article 13(5) to Article 13(8) is provided below:

‘Para 5. a) Paragraph 2 or 3 shall apply in place of the relevant parts of provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that list specific activities that are deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment even if the activity is carried on through a fixed place of business (or provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that operate in a comparable manner).
b) Paragraph 4 shall apply to provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement (as they may be modified by paragraph 2 or 3) that list specific activities that are deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment even if the activity is carried on through a fixed place of business (or provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that operate in a comparable manner).
Para 6. A Party may reserve the right: a) for the entirety of this Article not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements; b) for paragraph 2 not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements that explicitly state that a list of specific activities shall be deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment only if each of the activities is of a preparatory or auxiliary character; c) for paragraph 4 not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements.
Para 7. Each party that chooses to apply an Option under paragraph 1 shall notify the Depository of its choice of Option. Such notification shall also include the list of its Covered Tax Agreements which contain a provision described in sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 5, as well as the article and paragraph number of each such provision. An Option shall apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification with respect to that provision.
Para 8. Each party that has not made a reservation described in sub-paragraph a) or c) of paragraph 6 and does not choose to apply an Option under paragraph 1 shall notify the Depository of whether each of its Covered Tax Agreements contains a provision described in sub-paragraph b) of paragraph 5, as well as the article and paragraph number of each such provision. Paragraph 4 shall apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have made a notification with respect to that provision under this paragraph or paragraph 7.’

India context: Impact analysis of key India tax treaties:

India’s notification

Particulars of Article 13

Australia

UK

Singapore

France

Netherlands

Notified Option A, i.e., India’s tax treaties will be modified
with the language of Article 13(2)

Specific activity exemption

Notified Option A paragraph 13(2) modified India-Australia
Treaty Article 5(4)

Not selected Option A or B, Treaty remains the same

Notified Option B, the Treaty remains unchanged

Notified Option B, the Treaty remains unchanged

Notified Option A, paragraph 13(2) modified India-Australia
Treaty Article 5(4)

Remained silent to reserve Article 13(4), i.e., the provisions
will apply to the existing tax treaties

Anti- fragmentation rule

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

Reservation to Article 13(4) – No change in
the Treaty

Remained silent – Treaty changes

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

CONCLUSION
The specific activity exemption provisions are important from the point of view of the relief they provide to non-resident entities who have only incidental activities in India. Hence, one needs to be careful while applying these provisions to a particular case. The amendment provided in Article 13 of the MLI is largely impacting industries such as e-commerce / EPC / consumer, wherein foreign companies have typically been taking exemptions from PE pursuant to the negative list / anti-fragmenting activities in India. However, on account of amendments made by Article 13, it is imperative for all foreign companies to revisit their existing PE positions.

LATENT ISSUES UNDER GST LAW ON INTERCEPTION, DETENTION, INSPECTION & CONFISCATION OF GOODS IN TRANSIT

It is a settled principle of law that the statutory power to levy tax includes all powers to prevent the evasion of such tax. The power to intercept the goods conveyance in transit and to detain, or seize, or confiscate the goods in the eventuality of evasion of tax, and the power to levy penalty, or fine, or forfeiture of goods, is meant to check tax evasion and is intended to operate as a deterrent against tax evaders and is therefore ancillary or incidental to the power to levy tax. The GST Law is an economic legislation which encompasses the fiscal transactions and activities, therefore it is essential to specifically and explicitly empower through plenary legislation the officers engaged in its administration with certain powers like inspection, search, seizure, confiscation, etc., to protect the interest of the Revenue.

Chapters XIV and XIX of the CGST Act, 2017 enumerate the governing statutory provisions as regards inspection, search, seizure and arrest from section 67 to 72, and offences and penalties from section 122 to 138, respectively. Section 68 of Chapter XIV more particularly provides for the requirement of certain documents including E-way bill to be carried by the person in charge of the conveyance while the goods are in movement. Further, Chapters XVI and XVIII of the CGST Rules, 2017 contain Rules as regards E-way bills from Rule 138 to 138E and Rules as regards demand and recovery from Rule 142 to 161. In addition, in order to regulate the activities related to road checks, interception, inspection, detention, etc., of the goods during their movement and also to keep a watch on the potential tax evasion at a micro level, CBIC has for the very first time exercised its executive powers u/s 168(1) and issued a Circular which could also be termed as Master Circular No. 41/15/2018 dated 13th April, 2018 with subsequent follow-up updates and amendments in Circular 49/23/2018 dated 21st June, 2018, 64/38/2018 dated 14th September, 2018 and 88/07/2019 dated 1st February, 2019. Hence, it can be stated that the entire set of provisions and procedures concerning road checks, inspection, etc., of goods in movement is intertwined and contained in the Act, Rules and Circulars as referred above.

However, it may be noted that the said Master Circular 41/2018 of CBIC issued u/s 168(1) was per se required only for the purpose of providing further clarification and guidance to the department officers as enablers in the implementation of the Act and Rules but it is baffling to note that this Circular actually muscled its way into matters beyond its statutory competence by providing substantive provisions and procedures as regards road checks, detention, inspection, etc., and so it is ‘required’ to be adhered to not only by the tax department but also by taxpayers.

In the context of goods in transit on a conveyance, the powers as regards interception, detention, inspection and confiscation are intrusive and invasive in nature and therefore it is incumbent on the part of officers to wield these powers with extreme care and caution with strict adherence to statutory provisions, rules and internal circulars as the improper exercise of such powers could lead to contravention of provisions of the very statute they are governed by and may also result in the violation of Articles 301 or 265, or 14, or 19(1)(g), as the case may be, of the Constitution of India.

Through this article, the author has endeavoured to decipher some of the latent legal issues in the gamut of provisions of the GST law as relevant in the chain of activities right from the stage of interception of conveyance and ending with the eventual confiscation of the goods / conveyance.

1) POWER OF INTERCEPTION OF CONVEYANCE U/S 68(3)

Although the heading of section 68 of the CGST Act, 2017 suggests that it is in relation to inspection of goods in movement, however, this section as a whole does not substantively deal with all the operating aspects in relation to the entire process which inter alia includes the fixation of powers of interception of the conveyance on the officers and also powers of performing subsequent detention by the officers if the situation so warrants in accordance with the law. The section as it reads provides for the need of carrying of E-way bill subject to threshold and also other documents like tax invoice, bill of supply, delivery challan, etc., along with the goods while they are in movement and also casts a duty on the person in charge of the conveyance to co-operate and produce the prescribed documents before the officer for verification and to allow the officer to inspect the goods. Although the requirement on the part of the person in charge of the conveyance is to stop the conveyance on interception and to co-operate with the officer as has been clearly spelt out in sub-clause 3, it is, however, bereft of any specific and explicit authority or power being conferred on the officer concerned to actually wield this power for interception and subsequently perform detention for the reasons explained below. The following is the extract of this section:

i) 68. Inspection of goods in movement.
(1) The Government may require the person in charge of a conveyance carrying any consignment of goods of value exceeding such amount as may be specified to carry with him such documents and such devices as may be prescribed.
(2) The details of documents required to be carried under sub-section (1) shall be validated in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) Where any conveyance referred to in sub-section (1) is intercepted by the proper officer at any place, he may require the person in charge of the said conveyance to produce the documents prescribed under the said sub-section and devices for verification and the said person shall be liable to produce the documents and devices and also allow the inspection of goods.

The expression ‘is intercepted by the proper officer’ is used in sub-clause 3 in the past tense which pre-supposes that the proper officer is already in possession of the necessary authority or power to intercept the conveyance and perform inspection. However, it is imperative to note that the statute as it stands today does not in any explicit, clear or specific words confer any such power or authority on the proper officer for interception of conveyance and inspection of goods. The anti-evasion tax provisions of an intrusive character of any fiscal legislation would generally confer express powers in clear and explicit terms on the specific officers to perform specific functions without leaving any room for ambiguity or doubt as regards the jurisdiction of such officers to perform those functions. For instance, section 106 of the Customs Act, 1962, power to stop and search conveyances, where the powers of the proper officer are clearly delineated to stop the conveyance during the movement and perform a search of the same. Also, as per section 67 of the CGST Act, 2017, the power of inspection, search and seizure is clearly and specifically conferred on a proper officer not below the rank of Joint Commissioner either to exercise those powers or to authorise any other officer to exercise those powers. Hence, it may be stated that any action taken or purported to be taken by Revenue under GST Law without proper statutory jurisdiction would fall foul of the GST Law and would not be sustained on challenge in a court of law. The provisions of the tax statutes are subject to strict construction by the courts in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply or presume anything which is not expressed, or it cannot look into the purpose or object of the Legislature while construing the provisions.

One possible argument could be that the proper officer having the power of inspection, search and seizure u/s 67 would also have power of interception u/s 68(3); however, this argument may sound far-fetched as section 67 is qua a specific taxable person or any person on the plank of articulation of reason to believe by the proper officer where no such pre-conditions are required to be fulfilled by the proper officer for interception as per section 68(3). With the evolution of time and with the development of jurisprudence on this law, this haze should also be cleared. Be that as it may, the expression ‘is intercepted by the proper officer’ does not seem to confer or assign any express or specific power of interception on the officer but it only seems to make an assumption or presumption about the currency of such powers. In the absence of any such powers being conferred through any other provisions, applying the strict principle of construction it may be construed that the powers of interception by the officer are completely absent in section 68(3).

In contrast, it is ironic to observe that Rule 138B(1) of the CGST Rules, 2017 by which the Commissioner or an officer empowered by him in this behalf, may delegate the authority of interception and inspection on to other proper officers. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, in the absence of specific and explicit powers having been conferred on the Commissioner or proper officer in the statute to perform the interception, detention, etc., it is difficult to comprehend how through the route of Rule 138B(1) (which is a delegated legislation) one can delegate or assign, and such powers could be delegated by the Commissioner or authorised officer to other subordinate officers. If some rules are to be framed, such rules must necessarily inherit the powers from its plenary legislation; however, this is not true here.

Be that as it may, in order to delegate powers by the Commissioner or other authorised officer, specific statutory provisions are already present u/s 5(2) or u/s 5(3) of the CGST Act, 2017. Where the specific mode of delegation of powers by the Commissioner has been already provided under plenary statutory legislation, there is no reason whatsoever for the Government to also use the route of issuing Rule 138B(1) to perform the very same delegation by the Commissioner which may render the said Rule otiose or infructuous. Further, through Circular No. 3/3/2017-GST issued u/s 2(91) and 5(3) dated 5th July, 2017, the Commissioner has already delegated the said powers of interception and u/s 68(3) to the ‘Inspector of Central Tax’. It is beyond comprehension how the Commissioner could delegate the power of interception when he himself does not possess that power under the statute. As rule 138B(1) is not in congruity with the overall scheme of the GST Law, it should be rendered otiose / meaningless.

2) POWER OF INSPECTION OF GOODS U/S 68(3)

The expression ‘and also allow the inspection of goods’ as used in sub-clause 3 of section 68 (Supra) is to be construed from the perspective of the person in charge of the conveyance who is required to render co-operation and allow the proper officer to perform inspection of the goods after the same are intercepted and detained. However, this provision again does not, in clear, specific and explicit words or expressions empower the proper officer to perform the activity of inspection of goods in transit. In contrast, this sub-clause gives power to the proper officer only to verify the prescribed documents under Rule 138A and the RFID device but does not in any way confer any power on the proper officer to inspect the goods in the conveyance. Again, applying the same analogy from the earlier discussion in the context of interception discussed above, the function of inspection also is of an intrusive nature where the properties of the citizens could be subjected to verification, causing prejudice; therefore, the officer concerned should have specific, explicit, unambiguous and clear power to perform the inspection of the goods in the conveyance. Without specific and explicit powers conferred on the proper officer under the statute for conducting inspection of goods in the conveyance, the delegated legislation has overstretched itself and framed Rule 138B(3) which is pari materia with Rule 138C and purports to provide that the powers of inspection of documents, conveyance and goods are residing with the proper officer and to also follow certain reporting requirements in Form EWB-03 on the GST Portal. Hence, these Rules operate contrary to the provisions of the statute and should be rendered otiose / meaningless.

Apart from the absence of the power of inspection of goods with the proper officer, section 68 is also silent on providing the machinery provisions as regards the time and manner in which the inspection of goods is to be conducted; nor does this section delegate powers to the Government to prescribe necessary enabling rules. In a way, although the Legislature may not have intended so, this provision is seemingly an open-ended ambiguous section without a clear path having been laid down as regards conferment of powers on officers to conduct inspection of goods, not providing for machinery procedures to be followed for inspection and to deal with other related collateral matters. It is imperative for the Legislature to be mindful of the eventuality wherein in the absence of clearly laying down through statute or rules the powers for inspection of goods and concomitant procedures as required to be followed, the mobile squad officers of the Government who are currently in operation may run amok causing unwarranted harassment to genuine taxpayers in the guise of Departmental Circulars, orders or instructions which are anyway not binding on the taxpayers.

Further, after the order of inspection being issued in MOV-02, the time and manner of conducting inspection of the goods in the conveyance is done completely in adherence with the said Circular and where after the completion of the inspection, Form MOV-04 is issued to the taxpayer giving quantitative details of the physical inspection. As there are no Rules prescribed for the inspection of the detained goods, in reality it has been left to the total prerogative and discretion of the Government to define the modus operandi to be followed for physical verification of goods detained via issue of Circulars.

3) VALIDITY OF CIRCULAR 41/2018 AND MOV FORMS
Before adverting to the validity of Circular 41/2018 and MOV Forms covered in the same Circular, it is imperative to read section 168(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 which is as follows:

168. Power to issue instructions or directions.
(1) The Board may, if it considers it necessary or expedient so to do for the purpose of uniformity in the implementation of this Act, issue such orders, instructions or directions to the central tax officers as it may deem fit, and thereupon all such officers and all other persons employed in the implementation of this Act shall observe and follow such orders, instructions or directions.

From the above extract of the provision, two analogies can be drawn:

a) The Circulars are issued by Government only for the purpose of ensuring that there is uniformity of procedure in the implementation of the Act across the country. So the Circulars are a natural concomitant of the existing Act or Rules framed under the Act and therefore the Circulars could not be issued in isolation or independent of the Act or Rules, but they are issued in extension of the existing Act and Rules which are under the domain of control of the Legislature. Further, the Circulars are issued only as supplementary documents and only to provide guidance / aid on the interpretation of certain provisions to be used by the executive wing of the Government responsible for the implementation of provisions of the Act and Rules to avoid the possibility of officers of field formations across the country taking different views on the very same provisions of the statute. Therefore, the Government cannot issue Circulars to prescribe new procedures, processes, methods, forms, applications, etc., not originally envisaged or contemplated in the statute or rules prescribed thereunder which would metaphorically mean ‘placing the cart before the horse’. Even when some provisions are missing in the Act or Rules, maybe for bona fide reasons, the Government even in such situations cannot usurp power u/s 168(1) and seek to fill those identified gaps by issuing Circulars not warranted by powers granted under this section. Wherefore the Government could not perforce enter into the shoes of the Legislature to make the laws through the route of Circulars as has happened in the case of this Circular 41/2018.

b) The officers and all other persons employed in the implementation of the law are required to observe and follow such Circulars, and not the taxpayers. Hence it can be inferred from the text of the provision that these Circulars are only meant to be followed by the internal staff of the tax Department administering the law and are in no way binding on the taxpayers, unless such a Circular has the effect of providing certain benefits or relaxations to the taxpayers. Therefore, the power of issuing Circulars under this section could not have been used by the Government as carte blanche to hold the taxpayers responsible or subject to any obligations under the Circular.

As the GST Law stands today, the Legislature virtually does not exercise any control on procedural matters related to verification of goods in transit which would include powers of officers qua procedures for interception, detention of goods, inspection of goods, post-inspection release of goods, confiscation of goods and adjudication of matters of contravention of provisions of the Act or Rules. The power of laying down the entire gamut of procedures right from the stage of interception of conveyance to eventual confiscation of goods has been completely usurped by the Government and is being controlled through CBIC Circular 41/2018 issued in conjunction with subsequent updated Circulars. Although by enactment of sections 68, 129, 130 and notification of rules 138, 138A, 138B, 138C and 138D the Legislature had retained with itself a few aspects related to these provisions, ironically, a substantial part of the procedures contained in Circular 41/2018 were not contemplated under the provisions of section 168 as explained above. The true fact or practical reality is that all the officers of the tax Department have been following these Circulars in the matter of interception, inspection, etc. That apart, the real tyranny is that even the taxpayers who are not bound by Circulars have been obliged to comply with certain requirements as contained in this Circular, like providing undertakings, signing, etc., in the MOV Forms as specified in the said Circular.

Coming to the various MOV Forms which are as specified in Circular 41/2018, in a metaphorical sense this Circular is the genus and all the MOV Forms coming out from it are its species. As for the justifications as discussed above, if the Circular is held bad in law and it is trumped, as a natural concomitant all the related MOV Forms would also fall. It is through these MOV Forms that the tax Department is bringing accountability and ownership on the part of the taxpayers by furnishing and taking necessary acknowledgements / signatures on these Forms which may become criminating evidence against the taxpayers in any subsequent legal proceedings. It is relevant to advert to section 160(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 where the taxpayer has been disabled or forbidden to assail the validity of the MOV Forms that he has received, or to raise any negative contentions or objections on them, upon which he has subsequently acted and participated in the adjudication process. So it may be imperative for taxpayers to raise objections or raise a dispute on the validity of MOV Forms or claims contained in the said Forms at the earliest opportunity on the ground that these MOV Forms are issued by exercising extra-legislative actions or filing a dispute on the contents of these Forms.

In terms of section 166 of the CGST Act, 2017, every notification, rule, regulation issued or made by the Government is required to be laid on the table of the House for 30 days for the purpose of examination, BUT no such requirement is envisaged for Circulars or Forms issued under Circulars for ensuring accountability as the overarching principle for issuing Circulars is only to regulate and enable the internal administration function of the Government. Specifying these MOV Forms through the route of Circulars can be depicted as an attempt to usurp power by the Government. As long as these MOV Forms do not create any obligation or liability on the persons or taxpayers who are the external parties to the Government, the validity of these forms cannot be called in question, as such forms are issued only to convey certain information without warranting any action from the recipients.

As already indicated earlier, strict interpretation or construction is applied to tax laws and as per the cardinal rule of law that we are governed under, the same level of moral rectitude is sought from the tax Department as it is sought from the taxpayers. The MOV Forms contained in Circular 41/2018, in the author’s view, do not hold any legal ground and are liable to be set aside. Recently, the Sales Tax Bar Association, Delhi has, under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenged before the Delhi High Court the statutory validity of these MOV Forms and prayed that the Court set these aside. It appears as though this is the first time someone has challenged the validity of the MOV Forms. The matter is pending disposal.

Be that as it may, as regards the Circular 41/2018 the procedures as specified in it have pain areas being encountered on a day-to-day basis by the taxpayers which result in undue harassment to them and loss of intrinsic value of the goods being detained or confiscated for an inordinate time. These are as follows:

a) Although section 68(1) read with Rule 138A requires the person in charge of the conveyance to only carry certain definite documents, in reality the conveyances are intercepted and unwarranted documents are sought to be produced for verification by the mobile squad and also unwarranted objections or infirmities in the documents are raised by the mobile squad.

b) The expression ‘prima facie, no discrepancies are found’ as mentioned in para (b) of Circular 41/2018 is a very broad and latent expression and the same could be subject to different interpretations in identical situations by officers of the Department. The basic purpose of the Circular is to clarify and clear the ambiguities if there are any; however, not expounding such ambiguous expressions quoted above and contained in the same Circular itself, would work contrary to the very purpose of the Circulars issued.

c) The expression ‘or where proper officer intends to undertake an inspection’ as mentioned in para (d) of Circular 41/2018 is again so loosely worded as to give full liberty to the officers concerned to decide whether or not to undertake an inspection. There are no fetters attached or conditions precedent defined for arriving at or having an intention to undertake inspection. The undertaking of inspection is of an intrusive character and the same should be ideally undertaken only based on hard evidence indicating tax evasion and not merely on conjecture, surmises, assumptions and presumptions of the officer concerned.

4) POWER OF DETENTION AND CONFISCATION U/S 129 AND U/S 130:
Just like the issue of officers without statutory powers intercepting and inspecting as discussed above, even the powers for detention and subsequent confiscation if required by officers are not contained in the plenary GST legislation, that is, the CGST Act, 2017. Although sections 129 and 130 do make references to proper officers, but these references are restricted only for the limited purpose of adjudication of the demand by following the principle of natural justice on the proposed action of either detention or confiscation, a decision about which has already been made by the officer concerned based on the per se formation of opinion as per Circular 41/2018. Sections 129 and 130 also serve for the quantification of amounts payable by the taxpayers and to perform other incidental procedures qua the proposed detention or confiscation.

Based on the outcome of physical inspection of the goods by the officers as reported in MOV-04, in case any discrepancy is found or where the proper officer opines that any contravention of the Act or Rules is committed by the taxpayer, then u/s 129 the goods and conveyance are detained or seized by issuing MOV-06 – the order of detention along with MOV-07 – SCN with DRC-01 notified electronically.

Thereafter, the adjudication procedures would follow in accordance with Rule 142 and also in accordance with instructions contained in the Circular 41/2018 along with certain specific MOV Forms in manual mode as specified in the Circular. Therefore, the said Rule 142 on its own does not prescribe the entire adjudication procedure that is required to be followed but the entire process has been unnecessarily parted between Rule 142 and the manual MOV Forms specified in the said Circular which would only increase the compliance burden as well as complexity in compliance by the taxpayers not envisaged by the Central Government.

To issue Form MOV-06 – SCN for detention, or MOV-10 – SCN for confiscation [as per para (l) of Circular 41/2018], very wide carte blanche powers are conferred on the officers to initiate either or both these proceedings. Para (f) of the same Circular empowering the officer to initiate detention proceedings adverts to the expressions ‘Where the proper officer is of the opinion that the goods and conveyance need to be detained under section 129’ or para (l) empowering the officer to initiate confiscation proceedings, adverts to the expressions ‘Where the proper officer is of the opinion that such movement of goods is being effected to evade payment of tax, he may directly invoke Section 130’. In both these cases, the said empowerments are bereft of any guideline or threshold or condition precedent or sine qua non for the formation of such adverse opinion by the officer having the effect of initiating proceedings u/s 129 or 130 for detention or confiscation of goods, respectively. These wide powers qua the formation of opinion by the officers as referred to in the above-referred paras appear to be an attempt of the Government to have a parallel law through administrative Circulars which should go to the root of questioning the sanctity and the very purpose and meaning of the Circulars and why they are issued. This Circular does not seek to instil any checks and balances on the wide discretionary actions of the officers as contemplated in the Circular to hold them accountable, especially where such wide discretionary powers on the opinion formation are likely to trigger proceedings of detention or confiscation of the goods u/s 129 or 130, respectively.

It is pertinent to note that the invocation of detention u/s 129 and confiscation u/s 130 do not happen automatically but are a natural consequence of formation of adverse opinion by the officer under the highlighted paras of the said Circular.

To sum up the issue, Circular 41/2018 ought to have been used only to clarify and help in implementation of substantial or procedural provisions of the Act / Rules, but in actual fact it has taken primacy and it is purportedly operating like a plenary Act in the matter of detention and confiscation of goods, and sections 129 and 130 of the Act are virtually reduced to a machinery provision, or merely as a referencing placeholder for quantification of the amount of tax, penalty, fine, etc.

5) OTHER ISSUES

a) Whether sections 129 and 130 operate coterminous with each other?
Subject to section 118 of the Finance Act, 2021 not yet notified, both the said sections 129 and 130 are mutually exclusive, independent and operate in separate spheres for the simple reason that both start with the non-obstante clause at the beginning with the expression ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act’. The High Court of Gujarat had occasion to deal with several petitions in a group matter in Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat (order dated 23rd December, 2019), where the confiscation proceedings u/s 130 were initiated without concluding the existing on-going adjudication proceedings u/s 129. The Court held that both the sections 129 and 130 are not coterminous with each other, and hence are independent, in the following words:

‘(i) Section 129 of the Act talks about detention, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit. On the other hand, section 130 talks about confiscation of goods or conveyance and levy of tax, penalty and fine thereof. Although both the sections start with a non-obstante clause, yet, the harmonious reading of the two sections, keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the enactment thereof, would indicate that they are independent of each other. Section 130 of the Act, which provides for confiscation of the goods or conveyance, is not, in any manner, dependent or subject to section 129 of the Act. Both the sections are mutually exclusive.’

b) Detention on the ground of rate of tax, classification, etc.

An officer intercepting goods in transit cannot go into the unwarranted issues of valuation, classification of goods, rate of tax and so on and cannot high-handedly detain the goods for more than a few hours (up to six hours). However, the officer should collect relevant data during such short detention and transmit the same to the jurisdictional proper officer for initiating necessary assessment proceedings in relation to that supply by the taxpayer. Again, in Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), the Gujarat High Court held as under:

‘160. We are in full agreement with the aforesaid enunciation of law laid down by the Kerala High Court. Thus, in a case of a bona fide dispute with regard to the classification between the transporter of the goods and the Squad Officer, the Squad Officer may intercept the goods, detain them for the purpose of preparing the relevant papers for effective transmission to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. It is not open to the Squad Officer to detain the goods beyond a reasonable period. The process can, at best, take a few hours. It goes without saying that the person, who is in charge of transportation, will have to necessarily co-operate with the Squad Officer for preparing the relevant papers. [See Jeyyam Global Foods (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 64 GSTR 129 (Mad).]

CONCLUSION


In the author’s view, the formation of opinion as contained in Circular 41/2018 which is so critical, foundational and is of a substantive character, has the effect of affecting the rights or liabilities or obligations of the parties qua interception, detention, inspection or confiscation by their very intrusive or invasive nature; though meant to arrest tax evasions, these should never have formed part of the Rules and Circulars. Instead, these provisions which seek to check tax evasion incidents should have ideally been part of the plenary legislation espousing the principles of natural justice, equity, good conscience and fairness, analogous to instances of section 67 in the matter of inspection, search and seizure, or section 69 in the matter of arrest which have been couched in the CGST Act, 2017. However, the present form of operation of the provisions via enforcement of the said Circular seems to suggest that there is a complete abdication of power by the Legislature to the Executive to deal with matters in relation to interception, inspection, detention and confiscation of goods in movement. One hopes this Circular and MOV Forms which are at present in challenge before the Delhi High Court are struck down by the Court and such transgressions of the law by the Executive are discouraged and trumped down to set an example for the future and for assisting the cardinal principle of the rule of law to prevail.

EMPOWERING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

BACKGROUND
The concept of Independent Directors (IDs) had emerged from the need to have a certain number of Directors on the Board who would think and act independently and to bring a healthy balance between the interests of the promoters and those of other stakeholders, including minority and small shareholders. IDs are an important component in the overall framework of corporate governance.

SEBI has, over the years, strengthened the institution of IDs through the recommendations of various committees. But despite several measures, concerns about the efficacy of IDs have continued. To further strengthen the overall framework of IDs for equity listed entities, the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘Listing Regulations’) have been amended with effect from 1st January, 2022. The Listing Regulations have further been amended to specifically empower the IDs of ‘high value debt listed entity1’ which would apply on a ‘comply or explain’ basis until 31st March, 2023, and on a mandatory basis thereafter. This article seeks to provide an overview of the key aspects emanating from these amendments and the key considerations for the companies and the governance professionals.

DEFINITION OF AN ID

Regulation 16 of the Listing Regulations sets out certain objective conditions for determination of the independence of an ID. These conditions include areas of pecuniary relationship of self and of relatives with the listed entity, its promoter, or directors, etc. SEBI observed that scope exits to further strengthen the criteria for independence of IDs and harmonisation of certain requirements under the Listing Regulations, e.g., a cooling-off period while assessing the eligibility conditions for an ID. Further, an ID is also defined u/s 149 of the 2013 Act which provides that relatives of a proposed ID cannot have any pecuniary relationship including the pecuniary relationships as prescribed therein. The existing Listing Regulations do not provide a list of such pecuniary relationships. Hence, the definition of an ID under the 2013 Act and under the Listing Regulations is different.

To address the above concerns, especially harmonisation of requirements, SEBI has amended the Listing Regulations and has also inserted additional criteria as follows:

  •  Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID, apart from receiving Director’s remuneration, should not have / had any material pecuniary relationship with the prescribed entities, including the listed entity, its holding and subsidiaries during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations has been amended to extend the cooling-off period to three immediately preceding financial years. Let us consider the following example to better understand the amendment:

Ms Z is proposed to be appointed as an ID in Company XYZ in F.Y. 2021-2022. She noticed that in January, 2019 she had had a material pecuniary relationship (other than remuneration) with Company XYZ. As per the existing provisions, Ms Z could have been appointed as an ID as the relationship existed prior to the cooling-off period of two years. However, since the cooling-off has been extended to three years, she cannot be appointed as an ID.

  • Section 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act provides that a person cannot be appointed as an ID whose relatives have pecuniary relationships / transactions with the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or their promoters, or directors including holding any security of or interest and being indebted (in excess of the prescribed amount) during the immediately preceding two financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations does not prescribe a list of the pecuniary relationships similar to that provided under the 2013 Act but simply states that the relatives of such proposed ID should not have / had pecuniary relationship during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year in excess of the prescribed amount.

The list of pecuniary relationships as provided u/s 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act has been incorporated in Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations – with certain modifications; e.g., the period for determining pecuniary relationship is stated as three immediately preceding financial years (under the 2013 Act – two immediately preceding financial years), and the lower threshold (as per existing norms) for determining pecuniary relationship of relatives has been retained. Let’s understand these key differences with the help of the following examples:

– While assessing his eligibility conditions, Mr. Y noticed that one of his relative owes Rs. 60 lakhs to the Holding Company of the Company ABC. Company ABC is proposing to appoint Mr. Y as an ID in F.Y. 2021-2022. Mr. Y considered that the pecuniary relationships are permitted to the extent of the following:

Under the 2013 Act

Rs.

 

Under the Listing
Regulations (lower of following)

Rs.

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

Another threshold

50 lakhs

In the above situation the balance outstanding from the relatives is within the permissible limits under the 2013 Act. However, the outstanding is in excess of the limit prescribed under the Listing Regulations. Hence, Mr. Y cannot be appointed as an ID.

– Mr. X is assessing the eligibility conditions for his proposed appointment as an ID in Company DEF in March, 2022. He noticed that during F.Y. 2018-2019 one of his relatives held equity shares of the Company whose face value exceeded the permissible limit prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. A cooling-off period of two years and three years, respectively, has been prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. Accordingly, in this case even though the requirement of the two-year cooling period under the 2013 Act is met, Mr. X cannot be appointed as an ID because his relative had held securities during the three-year cooling period prescribed under the Listing Regulations.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID is a person who (neither himself nor whose relatives) holds or has held the position of a key managerial personnel or is or has been an employee of the listed entity or its holding, subsidiary or associate company in any of the three financial years immediately preceding the financial year in which he is proposed to be appointed. The amended Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations extends the restriction to employment in any promoter group company. However, the proviso to the Regulation further provides that the cooling-off period will not apply to relatives in employment of the stated entities, provided that they do not hold the position of a key managerial personnel. Accordingly, where relatives of a person holds employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) in the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary, or associate company or any company belonging to the promoter group of the listed entity in the preceding three financial years, such person can be appointed as an ID. The following example illustrates the amendment for better understanding:

While assessing her eligibility conditions, Ms Q noticed that her spouse is the Managing Director in a promoter group company of Company LMQ which is proposing her appointment as an ID in February, 2022. Since a relative of the proposed ID holds the position of a key managerial personnel in a promoter group company, Ms Q cannot be appointed as an ID in Company LMQ. If her spouse held an employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) such as Sales Executive, she can be appointed as an ID pursuant to the relaxation as per the proviso to Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) stated above.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(viii) of the Listing Regulations provides that ID is a person who is not a non-independent director of another company on the Board of which any non-independent director of the listed entity is an ID. An explanation has now been inserted to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a body corporate that has been mandated to constitute its board of directors in a specific manner as per the law under which it is established, the non-executive directors on its Board would be treated as IDs. Similar requirement has also been prescribed for ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a Trust.

• Pursuant to the amendment, the
Listing Regulation now provides a uniform cooling period of three years
across all eligibility conditions. Such a uniform cooling-off period strikes
a healthy balance of having a reasonable cooling-off period while also
upholding the independence of the proposed ID.

 

• It might be also noted that the
above amendments would require the listed entity to obtain revised
declaration of independence from the IDs since Regulation 25(8) of the
Listing Regulations requires IDs to provide such declaration whenever there
is any change in the circumstances which may affect the status as an ID.
Consequently, as required by Regulation 25(9), the Board of Directors would
be required to take on record such a declaration after undertaking due
assessment.

ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY IN THE ROLE OF THE NRC

At present, Regulation 19(1)(c) of the Listing Regulations provides that the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) should comprise of at least 50% of IDs and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares 2/3rd of the NRC should comprise of IDs. SEBI felt that there is a need to strengthen the composition of IDs in the NRC in order to reduce dependence on the promoters. Accordingly, Regulation 19(1)(c) was amended to provide that ‘at least 2/3rd’ of the Directors in the NRC of all listed companies (including listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise of IDs. Let’s understand this amendment though the following example:

The NRC of Company DEF comprises six members – with equal representation by IDs and other Directors. Company DEF does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. Hence the representation of IDs should be increased from the existing three to four IDs – so that 2/3rd of the NRC comprises IDs pursuant to the revised norms as stated above.

Clause A to Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations provides that the role of the NRC includes formulation of the criteria for determining qualifications and positive attributes of a Director. Notwithstanding such requirements, SEBI was of the view that there is a lack of transparency in the process followed by NRCs. Therefore, a need exists to prescribe disclosures for selection of candidates for the post of an ID. These disclosures are expected to increase the transparency in the functioning of NRCs and would also be good from the governance perspective. SEBI accordingly introduced Clause 1A in Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations to provide that:

  •     For every appointment of an ID, the NRC should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the Board of Directors;
  •     On the basis of such evaluation, the NRC should prepare a description of the role and capabilities of an ID. The person recommended to the Board for appointment should have the capabilities identified in such description;
  •     The NRC has the option of using the services of external agencies to consider candidates from a wide range of backgrounds (having due regard to diversity) and consider the time commitments of the candidates.

SEBI also introduced Regulation 36(f) in the Listing Regulations to provide that the shareholders’ notice should include the disclosures regarding the skills and capabilities required for the role and the manner in which the proposed person meets such requirements.

Further, amendments were made to Regulation 36(d) to provide that the shareholders’ notice for appointment of a new Director or reappointment of a Director should include the names of listed entities from which the person has resigned in the past three years.

• The Listing Regulations has
increased the number of IDs required in the NRC. Therefore, in case the NRC
of a listed entity does not meet the revised requirement, the NRC should be
reconstituted.

 

• The revised role of the NRC establishes
additional processes for appointment of an ID. As per the amended Schedule II
the NRC will be required to consider candidates from a wide range of
backgrounds. The databank of IDs as established under the 2013 Act might act
as a good reference point for selecting potential candidates.

COMPOSITION OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

The Listing Regulations cast specific responsibilities on the Audit Committee to review financial information, scrutinise inter-corporate loans and investments and the valuation of undertakings and assets of the listed entity, etc. At present, Regulation 18(1)(b) of the Listing Regulations provides that 2/3rd of the members of the Audit Committee should comprise of IDs, and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares the Audit Committee should comprise only of IDs. SEBI has amended this Regulation to provide that the Audit Committee of listed companies (which do not have outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise ‘at least 2/3rd of IDs’ instead of the existing composition of ‘2/3rd of IDs’. The amendment in the provision
relating to the constitution of the Audit Committee prescribes for a ‘minimum requirement’ of 2/3rd of the Committee to be comprised of IDs, thus allowing companies to appoint more IDs as members of the Committee. This amendment may not necessitate reconstitution of the Audit Committee.

For example, the Audit Committee of Company PQR comprises six members – four IDs and two other Directors. Company PQR does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. So it can continue with the present composition of the Audit Committee as it has the minimum number of IDs in the Audit Committee as per the revised Regulations. Since the revised Regulations prescribe the minimum composition, Company PQR may choose to appoint a higher number of IDs on the Audit Committee.

Regulation 23(2) of the Listing Regulations provides that all related party transactions require prior approval of the Audit Committee. SEBI felt a need to further enhance the scrutiny around related party transactions. Accordingly, a proviso was added to Regulation 23(2) which provides that only those members of the Audit Committee who are IDs should approve related party transactions.

As per the revised norms, only those
members of the Audit Committee who are IDs can approve related party
transactions. There may be transactions which have either been approved prior
to the effective date of the amendment, or there might be modifications to
the terms and conditions of existing related party transactions, thereby
requiring approval of the Audit Committee. Listed entities would need to
assess whether these transactions would require
approval of the Audit Committee as per the
amended provisions.

APPOINTMENT, REAPPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF IDS

Appointment of an ID is made through an ordinary resolution in a general meeting of a company as provided u/s 152(2) of the 2013 Act. However, reappointment of an ID requires the passing of a special resolution by the company. SEBI felt that the present framework of appointment of IDs may be influenced by the promoters – in recommending the name of IDs and in the approval process by virtue of their shareholding. This may hinder the independence of IDs and undermine their ability to differ from the promoter, especially in cases where the interests of the promoter and of the minority shareholders are not aligned. Additionally, considering that the role of IDs includes protecting the interests of minority shareholders, there is a need for minority shareholders to have a greater say in the appointment / reappointment process of IDs.

Accordingly, to give more say to the minority shareholders in the simplest manner possible, SEBI introduced Regulation 25(2A) in the Listing Regulations to extend the requirement to obtain shareholders’ approval through a special resolution for appointment and removal of an ID. Thus, as per the revised requirements, the appointment, reappointment or removal of an ID should be subject to the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution.

APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS WITHIN A STIPULATED TIMEFRAME

As per the current practice, companies appoint IDs as additional directors, subject to approval of the shareholders at the next general meeting. It is, therefore, possible that a person gets appointed as an additional ID just after an Annual General Meeting and then serves on the Board of Directors, without shareholder approval, till the next Annual General Meeting. SEBI also observed that there have been cases in the past where the shareholders have rejected the appointment of IDs even while these IDs had served on the Board for a few months. Hence, SEBI felt that reduction / elimination of the time gap may give more say to the shareholders in the appointment process. Further, in order to bring consistency and ease of compliance, SEBI felt that such a time frame may also be applied to approval of appointment of all Directors including IDs, Executive Directors, Non-Executive Directors, etc.

Accordingly, Regulation 17(1C) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that approval of shareholders for appointment of any person (including that arising due to casual vacancy) on the Board of Directors should be taken at the next general meeting or within three months from the date of appointment, whichever is earlier.

The revised norms require a listed
company to obtain shareholders’ approval at the next general meeting or
within three months from the date of appointment of the ID, whichever is
earlier. An issue arises where a person has been appointed as an ID (say in
November, 2021) but the shareholder approval is pending. The next general
meeting is expected to be held in September, 2022. One might argue that in
this case the shareholders’ approval should be obtained within three months
from the effective date of the amendments, i.e., by 31st March,
2022. However, under this approach the time gap between approval by the Board
and shareholders’ approval would exceed the time period prescribed under the
Listing Regulations. An authoritative clarification would be required from
SEBI to address these situations.

INSURANCE FOR IDS

The top 500 listed entities by market capitalisation are required under Regulation 25(10) of the Listing Regulations to undertake Directors and Officers insurance (‘D and O insurance’) for all IDs of such quantum and for such risks as may be determined by their Board of Directors. SEBI considered that due to increased expectation from IDs and the heightened regulatory scrutiny, adequate protection under a proper D and O insurance policy will help IDs perform their duties more effectively. Thus, the requirement of mandatory D and O insurance should be extended to a wider group of listed entities. Accordingly, SEBI has decided that with effect from 1st January, 2022 the requirement of undertaking D and O Insurance would be extended to the top 1,000 companies by market capitalisation.

The Listing Regulations were further amended to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ should undertake D and O insurance for all its IDs for such sum assured and for such risks as may be determined by its Board of Directors.

COOLING OFF PERIOD – TRANSITION OF AN ID TO AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The current provisions as prescribed under Schedule III (Part A)(A)(7B)(i) require the resigning ID (within seven days of resignation) to disclose to the stock exchanges detailed reasons for the resignation along with a confirmation that there are no other material reasons for resignation other than those already provided. SEBI observed that IDs often resign for reasons such as preoccupation, other commitments or personal reasons, and then join the Boards of other companies. There is, therefore, a need to further strengthen the regulations around the resignation of IDs.

Hence, Schedule III was amended to provide for disclosure of the resignation letter of an ID along with the names of listed entities in which the resigning Director holds Directorships, indicating the category of Directorship and membership of Board committees, if any. It may be noted that the new requirement to disclose the entire resignation letter is only an extension of the existing requirements which require disclosure of detailed reasons for resignation along with a confirmation as aforesaid.

SEBI also observed cases where IDs have resigned and have then joined the same company as Executive Directors. While there may be valid reasons for transition from an ID to an Executive Director, such instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in the company in the near future may practically lead to a compromise in independence. SEBI felt that a cooling-off period should be prescribed to reduce potential impairments to an ID’s impartiality in decision-making in instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in certain companies in the near future.

Thus, Regulation 25(11) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that an ID who has resigned from a listed entity cannot be appointed as an Executive / Whole-time Director on the Board of the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or on the Board of a company belonging to its promoter group, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of resignation as an ID.

The amended Regulation provides a
cooling-off period of one year in case of resignation by an ID. However, such
cooling-off period has not been prescribed where the ID is appointed as an
Executive
Director post expiry of his
term as an ID.

TIME-PERIOD FOR FILLING UP CASUAL VACANCY OF IDS

As per Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations, an ID who resigns or is removed should be replaced by a new ID at the earliest but not later than the immediate next meeting of the Board of Directors, or three months from the date of such vacancy, whichever is later. However, the time limit for filling of a casual vacancy prescribed under the 2013 Act [Schedule IV (VI)(2)] is different, i.e., three months from the date of resignation / removal. In order to avoid inconsistency, SEBI has modified Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations to align the time limits prescribed under the 2013 Act.

THE WAY FORWARD

 

• Listed companies might encounter
implementation challenges emanating from these amendments – some of them have
been highlighted above. Hence it is important that the listed companies
should engage with governance professionals, including auditors, to iron out
these challenges.

 

• Apart from the above amendments, SEBI
in its Board Meeting held on 29th June, 2021 had also decided to
make a reference to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for giving greater
flexibility to companies while deciding the remuneration for all Directors
(including IDs), which may include profit-linked commissions, sitting fees,
ESOPs, etc., within the overall prescribed limit specified under the 2013
Act. At present, ESOPs to IDs are prohibited under the Listing Regulations
and the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the implementation of the SEBI decision would
require modifications to the Listing Regulations and also to the 2013 Act.
Any positive development on this aspect would enable listed companies to
attract and / or retain talented IDs.
 

TLA 2021 – A DIGNIFIED EXIT FROM A SELF-SPLASHED MESS: AN ANALYSIS OF REVERSAL OF RETROSPECTIVE AMENDMENT

INTRODUCTION
The infamous amendment to section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect, dealing with the taxation of indirect transfers, had invited serious opprobrium in international fora and caused a serious dent in the image of India as an attractive investment destination.

Now, the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021 [TLA, 2021] has nullified the retrospective nature of the original amendment. The ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 candidly highlighted the ill-effects of the retrospective amendment.

BACKGROUND

In order to understand the purpose behind the latest amendment, it is necessary to draw the readers’ attention to the series of events that took place prior to the amendment.

It all started in the year 2007 in the landmark case of Vodafone International which entered the Indian telecom market by acquiring the telecom business of Hutchinson India. Vodafone International, a Dutch-based Vodafone entity, acquired indirect control in Hutchison Essar Limited (HEL), an Indian company, from a Cayman Islands-based company, viz., Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited (HTIL). It did this by acquiring a single share in CGP Investment (CGP), another Cayman Islands company, from HTIL in February, 2007. CGP held various Mauritian companies, which in turn held a majority stake in HEL.

In September, 2007 the Revenue authorities issued a show cause notice to Vodafone International for failure to withhold tax on the amount paid for acquiring the said stake as they believed that HTIL was liable for capital gains it earned from the transfer of the share of CGP, as CGP indirectly held a stake in HEL. Vodafone International was also sought to be treated as a ‘representative assessee’ u/s 163 and a capital gains tax demand of Rs. 12,000 crores was sought to be recovered from Vodafone International.

But Vodafone International claimed that the Indian Revenue authorities had no jurisdiction over the transaction as the transfer of shares had taken place outside India between two companies incorporated outside India and the subject of the transfer was shares, the situs of which was also outside India. The matter was litigated up to the Supreme Court which, in 2012, in the landmark judgment in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. Union of India1, absolved Vodafone of the liability of payment of Rs. 12,000 crores as capital gains tax in the transaction between it and HTIL.

The Court held that the Indian Revenue authorities did not have jurisdiction to impose tax on an offshore transaction between two non-resident companies wherein controlling interest in a resident company was acquired by the non-resident company.

But the Indian Government believed that the verdict of the Supreme Court was inconsistent with the legislative intent as they believed that India, in its sovereign taxing powers, was empowered to tax such indirect transfers of assets located in India. Thus, an amendment was brought about by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect, to clarify that gains arising from the sale of shares of a foreign company are taxable in India if such a share, directly or indirectly, derives its value substantially from the assets located in India. Section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012 also provided for validation of demand, etc., under the Income-tax Act, 1961 for cases relating to indirect transfer of Indian assets.

_______________________________________________________________________________
1          [2012]
341 ITR 1 (SC)

Pursuant to this amendment, an income tax demand has been raised in 17 cases which include the prominent cases of Vodafone and Cairn Energy. It is believed that the total estimated demand in these 17 cases totals up to an enormous sum of Rs. 1.10 lakh crores2.

In the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 it has been noted that in two out of these 17 cases, assessments are pending due to a stay granted by the High Court.

The ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021, observes that in four cases, arbitration under the Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty (BIT) with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had been invoked against the demands. Of these four cases, in two, Vodafone and Cairn Energy, the result of arbitration has been against the Income-tax Department.

In the case of Vodafone, the Singapore seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague ruled that India’s imposition of a tax liability on Vodafone, as well as interest and penalties, breached an investment treaty agreement between India and the Netherlands3. The Arbitral Tribunal held that the imposition of the asserted liability notwithstanding, the Supreme Court judgment is in breach of the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment laid down in Article 4(1) of the BIT between India and the Netherlands. The Arbitral Tribunal directed India to reimburse the legal costs of approximately INR 850 million to Vodafone.

The said arbitral award was challenged by the Indian Government in Singapore because according to it taxation is not a part of the BIT and it falls under the sovereign power of India.

Similarly, in the case of Cairn Energy, a Scottish firm, the Permanent Court of Arbitration having its legal seat in the Netherlands, in December, 2020 awarded it $1.2 billion (over Rs. 8,800 crores) plus costs and interest which totalled $1.725 million (Rs. 12,600 crores) as of December, 20204. The Tribunal held that India had failed to comply with its obligations under the India-UK BIT. India appealed against the said award in a court in The Hague, Netherlands.

_______________________________________________________________________________

2   https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/us-court-sets-timelines-for-cairn-india-legal-case-121082700964_1.html

3   https://wap.business-standard.com/article-amp/economy-policy/govt-to-amend-income-tax-act-to-nullify-retrospective-tax-demands-121080501146_1.html

4              https://wap.business-standard.com/article-amp/economy-policy/govt-to-amend-income-tax-act-to-nullify-retrospective-tax-demands-121080501146_1.html

Meanwhile, Cairn moved courts in nine jurisdictions, namely, the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Singapore, Japan, the UAE and Cayman Islands, to get the international arbitration tribunal award registered and recognised. Cairn also threatened seizure of the Indian Government’s assets in these jurisdictions in case India did not return the value of the shares seized and sold, dividend confiscated and tax refund held back to adjust a Rs. 10,247-crore tax demand raised using the retrospective legislation.

In June, 2021, the Tribunal Judiciaire de Paris, a French court, allowed Cairn’s application to freeze 20 residential real estate assets owned by the Indian Government. The properties directed to be frozen are worth approximately $23 million, a fraction of the Arbitral Award5. Cairn also filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking to make Air India liable for the Arbitral Award that was awarded to it. The lawsuit argued that the carrier as a state-owned company, being an alter-ego of the State, is legally indistinct from the State itself and was bound to discharge the duties of the State (India).

Thereafter, Cairn made a plea before the U.S. Court to make Air India deposit money under the apprehension that New Delhi may sell the airline by the time the decision seeking seizure of the national carrier’s aircraft is pronounced by the U.S. Court6. Despite the toughening stand taken both by Cairn and India before the U.S. Court, it has come to light that discussions are taking place between the officials of Cairn and the Income-tax Department whereby Cairn is hopeful of an amicable settlement in light of the recent amendment to the provisions of Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) vide TLA, 2021. The CEO of Cairn has also given a statement accepting the Government’s offer to settle the disputes and accept the refund of Rs. 7,900 crores and has also stated that the shareholders are in agreement with accepting the offer and moving on7.

And recently, on 13th September, 2021, Cairn and Air India jointly asked the New York Federal Court to stay further proceedings in Cairn’s lawsuit targeting Air India for enforcement of the $1.2 billion arbitral award awarded to Cairn by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in light of the amendment vide TLA, 2021. Both the parties requested for stay of any further proceedings in the matter till 31st October, 2021 and requested for new dates in November, 2021 by stating that the stay of proceedings would give them additional time to evaluate the effects and the implications of the TLA, 20218.

_______________________________________________________________________________

5   https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/business-laws/needed-framework-for-enforcement-of-investment-treaty-arbitration/article36302023.ece

6   https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/cairn-ups-ante-in-us-court-in-its-fight-against-india-on-tax-11630(news-item
dated 05.09.2021)

7   https://www.telegraphindia.com/business/cairn-energy-accepts-modi-governments-offer-to-refund-rs-7900-crore/cid/1829799
(news-item dated 07.09.2021)

Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, while indicating that the Government would appeal the Arbitral Award rendered in favour of Cairn Energy, also stated that ‘We have made our position clear on retrospective taxation. We have repeated it in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, till now. I don’t see any lack of clarity’, indicating the current Government’s stand of not raising any new demands on the basis of the retrospective amendment made vide the Finance Act, 20129.

TLA, 2021

Considering the adverse impact that the retrospective legislation had on the image of India in the International fora and in order to promote faster economic growth and employment, the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was proposed by the Ministry of Finance.

The said Bill was introduced by the Ministry of Finance in the Lok Sabha on 5th August, 2021 and was passed by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha on 6th August, 2021 and 9th August, 2021, respectively. Thereafter, the TLA, 2021 received the assent of the President of India on 13th August, 2021.

As per the said Act, the following amendments have been made to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:

A. Vide the newly-inserted 4th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that nothing contained in Explanation 5 shall apply to:

i. an assessment or reassessment to be made under sections 143, 144, 147,153A or 153C; or
ii. an order to be passed enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee u/s 154; or
iii. an order to be passed deeming a person to be an assessee in default under sub-section (1) of section 201,

in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012.

_______________________________________________________________________________

8   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/cairn-energy-air-india-seek-stay-on-new-york-court-proceedings/articleshow/86227073.cms
(news-item dated 15.09.2021)

9   https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/1-4-billion-cairn-arbitration-award-finance-minister-says-its-her-duty-to-appeal/articleshow/81348282.cms

B. Vide the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that where:

i. an assessment or reassessment has been made under sections 143, 144, 147,153A or 153C; or
ii. an order has been passed enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee u/s 154; or
iii. an order has been passed deeming a person to be an assessee in default under sub-section (1) of section 201; or
iv. an order has been passed imposing a penalty under Chapter XXI or u/s 221,

in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012 and the person in whose case such assessment or reassessment or order has been passed or made, as the case may be, fulfils the specified conditions, then, such assessment or reassessment or order, to the extent it relates to the said income, shall be deemed never to have been passed or made, as the case may be.

C. Vide the newly-inserted 6th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that where any amount becomes refundable to the person referred to in the 5th proviso as a consequence of him fulfilling the specified conditions, then, such amount shall be refunded to him, but no interest u/s 244A shall be paid on that amount.

Vide the Explanation inserted below the newly-inserted 6th proviso, the conditions to be satisfied for the purposes of the 5th and 6th provisos have been provided. To paraphrase, the following conditions have been provided:

• where the said person has filed any appeal before an appellate forum or a writ petition before the High Court or the Supreme Court against any order in respect of the said income, he shall either withdraw or submit an undertaking to withdraw such appeal or writ petition, in such form and manner as may be prescribed;
• where the said person has initiated any proceeding for arbitration, conciliation or mediation, or has given any notice thereof under any law for the time being in force or under any agreement entered into by India with any other country or territory outside India, whether for protection of investment or otherwise, he shall either withdraw or shall submit an undertaking to withdraw the claim, if any, in such proceedings or notice, in such form and manner as may be prescribed;
• the said person shall furnish an undertaking, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, waiving his right, whether direct or indirect, to seek or pursue any remedy or any claim in relation to the said income which may otherwise be available to him under any law for the time being in force, in equity, under any statute or under any agreement entered into by India with any country or territory outside India, whether for protection of investment or otherwise; and
• such other conditions as may be prescribed.

Necessary amendments have also been effected to section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012 which provided for validation of demand, etc., under the Income-tax Act, 1961 for cases relating to indirect transfer of Indian assets.

From the above amendments, one may clearly observe that a two-tier amendment has been made.

The first tier of amendment, consistent with the position of the Government not to levy or raise any new demands in light of the retrospective amendment vide the Finance Act, 2012, makes a necessary provision to that effect so as to provide that no tax demand shall be raised in future on the basis of retrospective amendment vide the Finance Act, 2012 for any offshore indirect transfer of Indian assets if the transaction is undertaken before 28th May, 2012 (i.e., the date on which the Finance Bill, 2012 received the assent of the President). It would be pertinent to note that in various instances, in the case of retrospective amendments, the law has expressly provided for provisions to ensure that past concluded assessments are not disturbed. In this regard, a useful reference may be made to the proviso to section 14A(1), section 92C(2B) and section 92CA(2C). Thus, the first tier of amendment made vide the newly-inserted 4th proviso is in line with the said provisions and provides protection in respect of transfers made prior to 28th May, 2012 from any fresh proceedings. It is rather wider than the said provisions, as it also provides protection from proceedings under sections 153A, 153C and 201(1).

As regards the second tier of amendment, it provides for nullification of assessments already made in respect of indirect transfer of Indian assets made before 28th May, 2012 (as validated by section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012) on fulfilment of certain conditions as specified.

Pursuant to such amendments, the CBDT has published the draft rules for implementing the amendments made by the TLA, 2021 on 28th August, 2021 inviting comments from all stakeholders latest by 4th September, 2021. Vide the said draft, CBDT has proposed to insert Rule 11UE along with Forms 1 to 4 which specify the conditions to be fulfilled and the process to be followed to give to the amendment made by the TLA, 2021.

The said rules provide for furnishing various undertakings including irrevocable withdrawal, discontinuance or an undertaking not to pursue any appeal / application / petition / proceedings. It is also required to forgo any awards received by it by virtue of any such related orders.

IMPACT OF TLA, 2021

The newly-inserted 5th proviso deals with nullification of assessment or reassessment. However, it does not deal with nullification of any demand raised or any interest levied u/s 234B or interest levied u/s 220(6) [which may have been levied due to non-payment of demand]. Thus, the question that would arise is whether nullification of assessment or reassessment would also lead to nullification of demands of tax and consequential interests. It may be noted that as per the legal jurisprudence that has evolved, ‘assessment’ has been held to be the entire process commencing from filing of return to passing of an assessment order and raising of consequential demand. Thus, when the ‘assessment’ is nullified, it would indicate that the demands along with interest would also get nullified. It may also be noted that the Supreme Court in ITO vs. Seghu Buchiah Setty [1964] 52 ITR 538 has held that there must be a valid order of assessment on which a notice of demand may be founded. Consequentially, when the assessment or reassessment to the extent it relates to income accruing or arising from indirect transfers is deemed to have never been made, the consequential demand and interest would also not survive.

It would be pertinent to note that by virtue of the amendment, the purchaser or payer who was liable to deduct tax at source by virtue of section 195 in respect of capital gains accruing to a non-resident assessee by virtue of indirect transfer under Explanations 5 to 7 to section 9(1)(i), can no longer be treated as an assessee-in-default u/s 201(1) if such purchaser or payer fulfils the conditions specified. However, it would be pertinent to note that the issue of treating a person as an assessee-in-default for non-deduction of tax at source in respect of past transactions in light of retrospective amendments, is no longer res integra in light of the decision in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited vs. CIT [2021] 432 ITR 471 (SC)/[2021] 125 taxmann.com 42 (SC), wherein it has been held that a person mentioned in section 195 of the Income-tax Act cannot be expected to do the impossible, namely, to apply retrospective provision at a time when such provisions were not actually and factually in the statute. Thus, from the payers’ point of view, the amendment nullifying its liability as an assessee-in-default u/s 201(1) is not of much relevance in light of the judgment in Engineering Analysis (Supra). As a result of the same, even if the deductors / payers who have been held to be in default choose not to comply with the conditions mentioned in the Explanation to the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos, the litigation continuing in the normal course as provided in the Income-tax Act would result in favourable verdicts for them in light of the judgment in Engineering Analysis (Supra). A deductor / payer may therefore not choose the option of the 5th proviso which requires him to forgo interest on refund. He would rather stay in the normal stream where he has more than a reasonable chance of success and in such event he need not forgo interest.

In certain cases, assessment may have been made by the Department on the purchasers or payers u/s 161 read with sections 160 and 163 in their capacity as agents (representative assessees) of the non-residents in respect of the income accruing or arising in respect of indirect transfers under Explanations 5 to 7 to section 9(1)(i) [for instance, the case of Vodafone]. In such case, the assessments made on such agents would be nullified if the conditions specified therein are satisfied.

It may be noted that clause (iii) of the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) only deals with an order deeming a person to be an assessee in default u/s 201(1) and does not deal with the case of deductors / payers in whose case disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) is made. It may also be noted that nullification of an order u/s 201(1) does not automatically absolve a person of the disallowance u/s 40(a)(i). However, the same may not be of much significance, given that the payment made towards acquisition of shares of a foreign company is not ordinarily claimed as revenue expenditure in respect of which a disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) may be made.

It may be possible that in certain cases, in order to put an end to litigation, the said person as specified in the newly-inserted 5th proviso may have made an application under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 and duly paid the amount as specified in the Form No. 3 issued by the designated authority u/s 5(1) of the said Act. Section 7 of the said Act provides that any amount paid in pursuance of a declaration made u/s 4 shall not be refundable under any circumstances. It may be noted that as per the later part of the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), the assessment or reassessment or order, to the extent it relates to the income in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012, shall be deemed never to have been passed or made. When the assessment or reassessment or order to the extent it relates to the said income is deemed never to have been passed or made, the question of the same being ‘disputed tax’ u/s 2(j) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 does not arise as the very demand ceases to exist in the eyes of law. In such circumstances, it cannot lie in the mouth of the Revenue to refuse the grant of refund of the amount paid as specified in the Form No. 3 issued by the designated authority u/s 5(1) of the said Act. If a sum is paid outside the aforesaid Act, the bar of refund should not apply to such payment as held in Hemalatha Gargya vs. CIT [2003] 259 ITR 1 (SC).

The newly-inserted 6th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) provides that where any amount becomes refundable to the person referred to in the 5th proviso as a consequence of him fulfilling the specified conditions, then such amount shall be refunded to him, but no interest u/s 244A shall be paid on that amount. The said proviso appears to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is discriminatory and arbitrary. It may be noted that though taxing statutes being fiscal legislations enjoy a greater presumption towards the constitutionality of the same, the same must nevertheless satisfy the tests of Article 14 of the Constitution in order to save them from the vice of unconstitutionality. The newly-inserted 6th proviso may be discriminatory on the following three fronts:

a) There appears to be a clear discrimination between persons referred to in the 4th and 5th provisos. It may be noted that as regards the persons referred to in the 4th proviso, no new assessment would be made in respect of indirect transfers which have taken place prior to 28th May, 2012. Thus, no prejudice would be caused to them. However, in respect of persons referred to in the 5th proviso, who have already been assessed and recoveries may have been made from them, such recoveries are refundable without interest u/s 244A. While persons covered in the 4th proviso would not have parted with any funds and hence are justifiably not entitled to any compensatory interest, the persons covered in the 5th proviso having parted with funds are justifiably entitled to compensatory interest. These two categories of persons are in unequal situations but are treated equally insofar as non-payment of compensatory interest is concerned. This causes discrimination.

b) There also appears to be discrimination between persons to whom a sum is refundable on account of any other provision of the IT Act and persons to whom a sum is refundable under the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos. In case of the former, interest u/s 244A being a normal incident of refund would automatically accrue as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [2014] 363 ITR 658 (SC). However, as regards the persons referred to in the 5th proviso, they would not be entitled to any refund despite there being a wrongful retention of sums by the Revenue in light of a non-existent demand.

c) The third type of discrimination occurs between persons who have effected indirect transfers but action is time-barred at the time when the TLA, 2021 was enacted and the persons referred to in the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos. As per section 149(1)(b) (as amended vide the Finance Act, 2021), the maximum time limit available to issue notice u/s 148 is ten years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Without going into the applicability of the said clause, it may be noted that even if the Department were to reopen past concluded assessments or assess any person in connection with income accruing or arising as a result of indirect transfer, it could at the maximum have done so in respect of A.Y. 2011-12 and for A.Y. 2012-13 (in respect of transfers concluded prior to 28th May, 2012 due to bar under the newly-inserted 4th proviso). Thus, in respect of transfers which have taken place prior to A.Y. 2011-12, no action under sections 147 and 148 would lie. However, in respect of persons who fall under the 5th and 6th provisos (which would include the above cases under sections 147 and 148), no interest on refund would accrue u/s 244A, leaving them in a position worse off than those who have escaped any action due to non-availability of any recourse under the provisions of the IT Act to the Department.

Thus, the validity and constitutionality of the 6th proviso being discriminatory on the above three counts may be subjected to challenge as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

It may be noted that the Draft Rule 11UE(3)(b)(I), in addition to furnishing of undertaking by the declarant, also requires furnishing of declaration by any of the interested parties which, as per Part K and Part L of the Form 1, refers to all the holding companies in the entire chain of holding as defined under the Companies Act, 2013 of the declarant, and all persons whose interest may be directly or indirectly affected by the undertaking in Form 1. Though Explanation (iv) to the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos is wide enough to empower the Board to prescribe any other conditions, such power does not extend to imposing conditions on persons other than the declarant assessee. Thus, the draft Rule 11UE(3)(b)(I)(ii) requiring such undertaking from interested third parties, if enacted without any change, may be subjected to challenge on the basis of being contrary to the provisions of the Act.

CONCLUSION


TLA, 2021 is a landmark step by the Indian Legislature in bringing about certainty in tax matters and restoring the faith of foreign investors in India as an attractive investment destination. It provides a great opportunity for various Multinational Groups or Companies who have been subjected to endless litigation to settle their disputes once and for all. It would enable them to receive refunds of huge amounts deposited with the Income-tax Department at various stages of litigation, thereby having a positive impact on their working capital situation.

CONSULTATION – CONCLUSION – CONSPIRACY

We live in a free society yet this editorial is written differently. You see, a newly-formed regulator (let’s call it NFR) brought out a paper with a view to seek comments. The NFR is funded by taxpayer money, the paper is in the public domain, the purpose of the paper is ‘consultation’ with stakeholders and the paper carries no proprietary inventions, secrets or exclusive material. Yet, the NFR has posted a notice on the report stating that no part of its report can be ‘reproduced’ or ‘circulated’ without its permission except for the purpose of making comments on that paper (that it is seeking or to NFR). So how should one deliberate the matter the paper seeks comments on, if one is forbidden from quoting it?

Often such ‘consultation’ is ‘conclusion’ in disguise. Papers like these are a spectacle of ‘superfluousness’ wrapped as ‘engagement’ (in case you didn’t know it, this is a typical Babucracy tactic where Delhi officials call for deliberations on a ‘pre-concluded’ agenda and the meeting is just for ‘due process’).

Take another trait: the paper doesn’t reveal what it will do with the comments! Place them in the public domain? What weightage will they have? Will they complete the ‘research’ and include responses as part of it? Well, a public body must at least demonstrate transparency, integrity and objectivity to the public. By publishing the comments from a wider audience of stakeholders, duly ‘appraised’ by an independent third party, will only add to their reliability, especially when these are meant for the purpose of policy!

Let’s look at the paper per se. The paper claims to give ‘research’ data. In the same breath, it qualifies the integrity of key data points by stating that there could be errors in that data which forms the basis of the NFR’s conclusions. For example, it states that about 1.8 lakh companies paid no audit fees for their audits; it also declares that this data could be erroneous and yet it says that payment of audit fees is a burden on ease of doing business! Could this be cognitive dissonance (confirmation bias)? The source data could be entirely wrong (in Form AOC 4 companies could have put several expenses including audit fees under one category rather than giving a break-up) which makes the paper’s conclusions absurd. A plain reasonableness test with meagre application of mind informs us that so many audits can’t be free! A slight effort to test this preposterous assumption with actual financials, even on a test basis, would have cured this fallacy.

Friends, the paper is a string of inaccuracies, false equivalences, cherry picking, baseless opinions and aspersions which show that it is casual and rather malicious.

Irrespective of the quality of the paper, should one ask a moot question: whether audit is not required for certain companies and jump to a Yes-No conclusion? In my view we cannot answer it till we can look at more data, do surveys and see what is achieved by audits for each type of entity depending on stakeholders’ needs, and the consequences of audit exemption. This, to be truly and honestly done, needs a wider discussion and not a paper from a regulator who has no ground level experience, no skin in the game and who is not even mandated.

Audit does a number of things for a wide spectrum of entities and more particularly SMEs and audited financials form the basis of several certificates and filings for various stakeholders. It’s a known fact that an audit adds value to SME entities in a real sense if they so desire. The NFR thinks the sole reason for audit is public interest.

Now let’s approach ease of doing business – as ‘ease of financial reporting and audit’ the NFR paper is cheesy: 1. No comments are carried about the numerous thresholds / exemptions for audit reporting – CARO, ICFR, Ind AS – AS, SMC, OPC. The Paper cherry-picks only one of these limits (the highest) and that too without assigning any reason. 2. Audit follows accounting and reporting; however, there are no comments about application of say Schedule III and other filings applicable to smaller companies. 3. No new ideas such as a Small Companies Act, 202X not just SME SA which has been talked about for years! 4. The paper lacks original ideas and conceals its lack of creativity with examples from the EU and the USA – from whom India is far away and much different. 5. The NFR paper gives references to state laws of the US and the EU, but no comparison with Indian parallels to see whether our business environments are even comparable. 6. It determines causality of low MCA filings by companies to lack of accounting professionals with them but without any reason or facts when filings could be arduous for small businesses. 7. It calls Rs. 50 crores as low turnover (NFR budget is less than that). 8. Says, banks do not rely on GPFS (I don’t know of a banker that doesn’t ask for GPFS before any conversation at all). 9. The NFR paper calculates imaginary standard audit costs and applies them to companies to make a point that is false and deceptive: audit costs are between 0.5% to 58% of PBT across various sizes of companies! It goes on to state that good quality audit will require an estimated standard COST of Rs. 1.50 lakhs (0.03%) to about Rs. 8 lakhs (0.16%) for companies with below Rs. 50 crores turnover. Fact: HPCL (a global Fortune 500 company with turnover of Rs. 2.98 lakh crores) in 2019-20 paid 0.000024% (Rs. 72 lakhs) as audit fees. By the NFR paper’s logic, the audit quality must be abysmal!

The paper is full of outlandish assumptions, fantasy, callousness, disregard for facts and bias.

While the reader should make her own judgement, let me leave you with the grand crescendo: about 3,500 out of six lakh active companies deserve audit as they fall within the Rs. 250-crore net worth benchmark.

I don’t even feel it is necessary to look at the effects of putting into practice what the paper construes. Why should NFR, which has never dirtied its hands in a real audit situation (and today auditors audit a market cap of $255 trillion plus the value of unlisted entities), give its brash verdict on audits and auditors? One can only extend the ‘logic’ and ‘verbiage’ of the NFR paper to infer that the amount paid for preparing this paper must be NIL since it cannot boast of any quality at all. As the title of this Editorial suggests, the reader can choose how much of this paper is about consultation, how much about conclusion and how much conspiracy!

Raman Jokhakar
Editor

 

TEACHERS’ DAY

The Fifth day of September is observed every year as Teachers’ Day to mark the birth anniversary of Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, the second President of India. He was a teacher (professor) and a great scholar of Indian Philosophy. ‘Palli’ means language. He knew many languages and he wrote treatises on Indian Philosophy, the Bhagavad Geeta, etc., which were acclaimed the world over.

In India, Ashadha Poornima (full moon) is observed as ‘Guru Poornima’ as a mark of respect to ‘Gurus’ or mentors. This is in honour of Maharshi Vyasa, the renowned sage. It falls sometime in the month of July every year. Let me take this opportunity to explain a few important and interesting thoughts on the Guru-shishya (teacher and student) relationship.

 (Shikshak) – We think that shikshak means one who teaches. However, interestingly, in the Sanskrit dictionary the first meaning of the word ‘Shikshak’ is ‘learner, student’. The root Shiksh (verb) means to learn. The second meaning is ‘teacher’.

– We think  (Acharya) means a teacher. However, the concept behind the word Acharya is he who teaches through ‘Aacharan’ (conduct). His conduct should be exemplary and worth emulating.

 (Acharya Devo Bhava) –  We think that this means a Guru is God. However, actually it means ‘you be the believer that Acharya is God and act accordingly’. It is a ‘command’ and not merely a statement. The same is the case with Matru Devo Bhava (mother) and Pitru Devo Bhava (father).

Teaching through example – There is an interesting quote, ‘Example is not the BEST way of teaching. It is the ONLY way of teaching.’ I feel the test of your having understood a concept is to be able to tell it with an example.

Good teacher – A good teacher is not the one who instantly solves all doubts of the student; but the one who teaches how to learn. He should develop among the students two main qualities – ‘Having a feel or judgement of the situation and ability to take decisions’.

 (Sadguru) – Literally, it means a good or righteous teacher. This term is generally used only in the field of spiritualism (Adhyatma).

The seven qualities of a good teacher are – (knowledge), (agility), (character), (art of explaining), (review), (sensitivity) and (pleasantness)(seven qualities).

 (Improper disciple) – Certain Stotras (prayers) and Mantras are not to be taught to an improper pupil. If one does it, one will be a sinner.

The ultimate test – There is one more beautiful and great thought. Ordinarily, one should always have a desire to succeed. However, your teaching should be so complete and whole-hearted that against two persons, one should always welcome a defeat – your son and your student.

—  This means that your son and student should become capable of surpassing you. This is the real test of a good teacher.

Friends, this is a very vast subject. Let us offer our ‘Namaskaars’ to such ideal ‘gurus’ or mentors.

REPRESENTATIONS

1.  Dated: 8th
September, 2020

     Subject: Request for making necessary legislative and procedural amendments
in the Income-tax Act, 1961 to ensure transparency in claim of Tax Deducted at
Source (TDS) and to reduce hardships to the taxpayers.

     To: The Chairman,
Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi

     Representation by:
Lucknow Chartered Accountants’ Society, Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,
Chartered Accountants Association, Ahmedabad, Chartered Accountants
Association, Surat, Karnataka State Chartered Accountants Association.

 

Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

2.  Dated: 23rd
September, 2020

     Subject: Request for taking up certain measures under Income-tax Act, 1961
in the backdrop of Covid-19 outbreak.

     To: Smt. Nirmala
Sitharaman, Hon’ble Minister of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi

     Representation by:
Lucknow Chartered Accountants’ Society, Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,
Chartered Accountants Association, Ahmedabad, Chartered Accountants
Association, Surat, Karnataka State Chartered Accountants Association.

 

Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

3.  Dated: 23rd
September, 2020

     Subject: Request for granting relief from provisions of Tax Collection at
Source (TCS) under section 206C(1H) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

     To: Smt. Nirmala
Sitharaman, Hon’ble Minister of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi

     Representation by:
Lucknow Chartered Accountants’ Society, Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,
Chartered Accountants Association, Ahmedabad, Chartered Accountants
Association, Surat, Karnataka State Chartered Accountants Association.

 

Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

4.  Dated: 24th
September, 2020

     Subject: Extension of dates for various provisions under Goods &
Services Tax Act, 2017.

     To: The Hon’ble
Finance Minister & Chairperson, GST Council North Block, New Delhi

     Representation by:
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society.

 

Note: For full Text of the above Representation,
visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

 

 

The structure of the atom has
been found by the mind. Therefore the mind is subtler than the atom. That which
is behind the mind, namely the individual soul, is subtler than the mind

—  Ramanna Maharshi

FRONT-RUNNING: SEBI RUNS EVEN FASTER AFTER PERPETRATORS

BACKGROUND

A recent order
of SEBI (dated 7th August, 2020 in the matter of dealers of Reliance
Securities Limited) on front-running is noteworthy on several grounds. Firstly,
it has been rendered in less than four months after the alleged front-running
took place. The transactions in question took place from December, 2019 to
April, 2020; SEBI completed the preliminary examination which, as we shall see,
involved numerous aspects and passed its order on 7th August, 2020.

 

Secondly, as the
order shows, a lot of detailed detective work has been carried out wherein the
alleged connections between more than 25 parties have been detected and
demonstrated. The connections are in various ways. They are through
transactions in bank accounts, they are through calls made to each other, there
are social media connections and also through family relations between the
parties concerned. SEBI then passed an interim order banning from the capital
markets the parties allegedly involved in the front-running and also ordered
them to deposit the profits made until a final order has been passed.

 

Front-running
cases, like insider trading, are notoriously difficult to detect. Investigation
and demonstration of guilt is even tougher. In view of this, the meticulously
detailed order at a preliminary stage is credit-worthy.

 

This order is in
the matter of certain dealers of Reliance Securities Limited in respect of
transactions by Reliance in their capacity as stockbrokers for Tata Absolute
Return Fund, a scheme of Tata AIF, a SEBI-registered Alternate Investment Fund
(‘Tata Fund’). The interim order finds these parties, along with various
associated persons, to have been involved in front-running and allegedly making
profits by trading ahead of the large orders of Tata Fund.

 

WHAT IS FRONT-RUNNING?

There have been
several cases of front-running in the past and in respect of which SEBI has
passed orders. However, earlier what amounted to front-running and even whether
it was a violation of securities laws, was in question. Indeed, the Securities
Appellate Tribunal had even held that front–running did not amount to violation
of the securities laws then existing [e.g., Dipak Patel (2012) 116 SCL
581 (SAT)], [Sujit Karkera (2013) 118 SCL 84 (SAT)].
However, the
Supreme Court decision in the case of SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldeobhai Patel
[(2018) 207 Comp Cas 416 (SC)]
laid the matter more or less to rest and
held that it was a violation of specified provisions of the securities laws.
Further, the relevant clause in the SEBI PFUTP Regulations has also been
amended to explicitly include front-running as it is generally understood.
Hence, today, it is more or less well settled that front-running is a violation
punishable under the securities laws.

 

However, there
is no specific definition in the Securities Laws of the term ‘front-running’. There
are clauses that do describe what is understood as front-running. There are
also several other dictionary definitions and also a fairly detailed
description in the decision of the Supreme Court. For guidance, although in a
different context, there is also a definition of front-running in a SEBI
Circular (dated 25th May, 2012).

 

Front-running is
also known as trading ahead. It essentially means that, armed with valuable
information of a proposed large transaction which would result in a change in
the price of a security, a person, in breach of trust, trades before such a
transaction takes place and makes personal illicit profits. To take an example,
a stockbroker has been given an order to buy a very large quantity of shares of
a particular company by his client. The experienced stockbroker knows that this
order will result in a rise in the price of that scrip in the market. He then
proceeds to first buy for himself these shares at the then prevailing price.
After doing this, he places the order of his client at the increased price.
Simultaneously, he sells the shares that he has just acquired, at this higher
price. The result is that his client ends up paying a higher price for the
shares – and the difference is pocketed by the stockbroker.

 

This is breach
of trust of the client. This also affects faith in the markets and its
integrity because, if permitted, there would be concerns that such malpractices
can happen on a regular basis and cause losses to the public. SEBI has alleged
in this case that front-running harms not just the client but the market and
the public in general.

 

Front-running is
thus similar to insider trading. In insider trading, a person in possession of
price-sensitive information which has been given to him in trust, abuses such
trust and trades and makes a profit for himself. So also in front-running.
However, interestingly, there are comprehensive regulations for insider trading
that define various terms, have several deeming provisions, etc. This, at least
in theory, should help inside traders to be caught and punished. It is another
thing that insider trading is still notoriously rampant and yet difficult to
catch. Front-running, in comparison, has just one specific provision under the
PFUTP Regulations. There are no definitions, no deeming provisions, no
explanations of how persons may be deemed to have been connected as insiders,
etc. In this context, the SEBI order in the present case is thus a good case
study for all on how the violation has been established, albeit by an
interim order.

 

WHAT ARE THE ALLEGED FINDINGS OF THIS
CASE?

As discussed
earlier, the Tata Fund used to carry out trades through its stockbrokers,
Reliance Securities Ltd. The orders were large and expectedly would result in a
change in the price of the ordered scrip. A large purchase order would thus be
expected to result in rise in prices, and vice versa in case of an order
of sale. The Fund also dealt heavily in derivatives where, again, the impact of
the orders would be similar.

 

Front-running in
such a circumstance, as the order also explains in detail, follows two
strategies. In case of a purchase order, it is the Buy-Buy-Sell (BBS) strategy.
In case of a sale transaction, it is the Sell-Sell-Buy (SSB) strategy. If the
Fund had placed a buy order, the front-runner would buy ahead, and then place
the order of purchase for the Fund. Against such purchase order of the Fund,
the front-runner would sell the shares bought by him earlier.

 

SEBI found
through its surveillance that transactions suspiciously of the nature of
front-running were taking place. An analysis of the data followed and the
various parties who allegedly did the front-running were investigated. Their
connections with the dealers of the stockbroker who had executed the
transactions of the Fund were looked into by checking the bank transactions,
inquiry with the brokers, their phone records and even their Facebook accounts.
Personal connections and relations were also looked into. It was established
that three such dealers had connections directly or indirectly with various
parties who had actually traded ahead of the orders of the Fund. This was seen
in the equity segment as well as the derivative segment. The timing of these
orders and how they matched with the orders of the Fund were analysed. Analysis
was also done of the volume of trading of such persons, particularly in the
derivatives segment before and during the period when such alleged
front-running took place. It was alleged that a significant proportion of the
transactions of such parties matched with those of the Fund and a large amount
of profit was made in a short time by these parties.

 

In view of these
findings, SEBI passed an interim order and prohibited the parties from dealing
in or being associated with the securities market.

 

SEBI also
ordered these parties to deposit the profits allegedly made from front-running
– of nearly Rs. 4.50 crores – pending further investigation, a hearing to the
parties and a final order. The parties have been required to deposit this
amount within 15 days of the order. Their assets have also been frozen.

 

SOME ISSUES IN THE ORDER

As stated
earlier, the order is credit-worthy on several grounds. It has detected, even
in an interim way and through an ex parte order, a difficult case of
front-running. Not only this, the speed of detection and investigation is indeed
very fast. It is expected to act as a warning to those who indulge in such
activities.

 

However, there
are some concerns, too. To begin with, the connections alleged are on
relatively flimsy basis. A few phone calls between the dealer and the alleged
front-runner have been held sufficient to establish a connection. Transfers of
funds of relatively small amounts between parties have also become the basis of
the connection. What is surprising is that even being a Facebook friend is seen
as a connection. While checking the Facebook profiles of persons is surely good
use of modern technology to go behind the scenes, it is also unrealistic. It is
very common for people active on social media to have hundreds or even
thousands of so-called Facebook friends. Facebook, Twitter and even LinkedIn
are generally used for exchange of information and ideas and do not necessarily
mean that there is also an off-line connection between the parties.

 

Interestingly,
this is not the first time SEBI has used online connections to allege
‘connections’. In another case of alleged front-running, SEBI had noticed a
‘connection’ through a matrimonial site and passed an interim order (dated 4th
December, 2019). There have been other cases, too, where a Facebook connection
has been relied upon to allege ‘connections’.

 

The connection
alleged on account of the calls made between parties may also not be sufficient
to uphold such serious allegations. Unless the calls are timed with the
transactions it may be difficult to say that this meant such a connection that
parties are engaged in front-running together. In this case, of course, SEBI
has also tabulated the data of transactions and alleged that the timing also
matched.

 

Then there is
the connection alleged on account of financial transactions. Being an interim
order, it appears that no further information has been collected as to the
reason for entering into such transactions. It may be possible that such
financial transactions may be for genuine reasons having no connection with
front-running and also not establishing any connection sufficient for
front-running.

 

Nevertheless,
all these parties have been debarred even in the interim by this order. They
have been made to deposit a very large sum of money being alleged profits of
front-running. Their assets are also barred from sale, etc.

 

There is another
angle here. As stated, at least on first impression, the basis for alleging
connections is shaky. What is possible is that in the future such parties may
ensure that even such connections are not there, or not evident. After all,
these are white-collar crimes committed by educated people having a level of
sophistication. Indeed, if such flimsy connections are relied on, it may mean
that many persons perpetrating front-running would not come under the radar.

 

To conclude,
being an interim order, it may happen that the explanation given by the parties
may result in it being set aside either wholly or in part. Nevertheless, this
order is a wake-up call and a warning to persons operating the markets that
SEBI by its market surveillance collects and analyses information that may
throw up white-collar frauds. The fact that such white-collar frauds have been
tackled in a timely manner should make one hope that other less sophisticated
orders would also be caught in larger numbers.

 

 

Do not wait; the time will never
be ‘just right.’
Start where you stand and work with whatever tools you may have at your
command, and better tools will be found as you go along

— 
George Herbert

 

LAW OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO WITNESSES TO A WILL

INTRODUCTION

One of the most crucial ingredients for a valid Will is the fact of it
being witnessed by two attesting witnesses. Many a Will has been found wanting
for the fact of improper attestation. However, what would be the state of a
Will where both the attesting witnesses are also dead and when it is being
proved in Court (say in a probate petition)? Would the Will suffer for want of
attestation or could it yet be considered valid? The Supreme Court was faced
with this interesting issue in the case of V. Kalyanaswamy (D) by LRs vs.
L. Bakthavatsalam (D) by LRs, Civil Appeal Nos. 1021-1026/2013, order dated 17th
July, 2020.
Let us analyse this case and other related judgments on
this issue.

 

FACTS AND THE ISSUE

In the Kalyanaswamy case (Supra) in the Supreme Court, both
the attesting witnesses to the Will were not alive. One of them was an
Income-tax practitioner and the other a doctor. The questions framed by the
Supreme Court for its consideration were as follows:

(a) When both the attesting witnesses are dead, is it required that the
attestation has to be proved by the two witnesses? Or

(b) Is it sufficient to prove that the attestation of at least one of the
attesting witnesses is in his handwriting and proving the testator’s signature?

 

Before we analyse the Court’s findings it would be worthwhile to understand
the requirements of witnessing a Will and the manner of proving the same.

 

WITNESSING A WILL

The mode of making a Will in India is provided in section 63 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925. This Act applies to Wills by all persons other than
Muslims. For a Will to be valid under this Act, its execution by a testator
must be attested by at least two witnesses. The manner of witnessing a Will is
as is provided in section 63 of the Indian Succession Act which requires that
it is attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has:

(a) seen the testator sign the Will; or

(b)   received from the testator a
personal acknowledgement of his signature.

 

It is trite that the witnesses need not know the contents of the Will. All
that they need to see is the testator and each other signing the Will ~ nothing
more and nothing less!

 

MANNER OF EVIDENCE

Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘the
Evidence Act’) explains how a document that is required to be attested must be
proved to be executed. In the case of a Will, if the attesting witness is alive
and capable of giving evidence, then the Will can be proved only if one of the
attesting witnesses is called for proving its execution. Thus, in the case of a
Will, the witness must be examined in Court and he must confirm that he indeed
attested the execution of that Will.

 

WHAT IF WITNESSES CANNOT BE FOUND?

However, section 69 of the Act provides that if no such attesting witness
can be found, it must be proved that the attestation by at least one of the
witnesses is in his own handwriting and that the signature of the person
executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. Thus, evidence
needs to be produced which can confirm the signature of at least one of the
attesting witnesses to the Will as well as that of the testator of the Will.

 

The Madras High Court in N. Durga Bai vs. Mrs. C.S. Pandari Bai,
Testamentary Original Suit No. 22 of 2010, order dated 27th
February, 2017,
has explained that u/s 69 of the Evidence Act, two
conditions are required to be proved for valid proof of the Will, i.e., the
person who has acquaintance with the signature of one of the attesting
witnesses and also the person executing the document should identify both such
signatures before the court. In that case, a person had identified the
signature of the testator. However, his evidence clearly showed that he was not
acquainted with the signature of both the attesting witnesses. Therefore, the
High Court held there was no compliance of section 69.

 

The Supreme Court in Kalyanaswamy (Supra)
explained that the attesting witness not being found refers to a variety of
situations ~ it would cover a case of an incapacity on account of any physical
illness; a case where the attesting witnesses are dead; the attesting witness
could be mentally incapable / insane. Thus, the word ‘found’ is capable of
comprehending a situation as one where the attesting witness, though physically
available, is incapable of performing the task of proving the attestation and,
therefore, it becomes a situation where he is not found.

 

In Master Chankaya vs. State and others, Testamentary Case No.
40/1999, order dated 12th September, 2019
the Delhi High
Court explained that it was not the case of the petitioner that the attesting
witnesses could not be found. In fact, the petitioner had throughout contended
that he was aware of their whereabouts and assured the Court that he would
produce them before the Court. Later, he dropped the said witnesses on the
ground that their whereabouts were not known and he was therefore unable to
produce them. The Court held that the petitioner did not exhaust all the
remedies for producing the witnesses before it. The petitioner could have
resorted to issuance of a summons to the witnesses under Order 16 Rule 10 of
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for the purpose of seeking their appearance. No
such assistance was taken from the Court and hence section 69 could not
automatically be invoked. Thus, all possible remedies must be exhausted before
resorting to this section.

 

The Calcutta High Court in Amal Sankar Sen vs. The Dacca Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. (in liquidation), AIR 1945 Cal 350,
observed:

 

‘…In order that Section 69, Evidence Act, may be applied, mere taking out
of the summons or the service of summons upon an attesting witness or the mere
taking out of warrant against him is not sufficient. It is only when the
witness does not appear even after all the processes under Order 16 Rule 10,
which the Court considered to be fit and proper had been exhausted, that the
foundation will be laid for the application of Section 69, Evidence Act………In
order that S.69, Evidence Act, may be applied ………….the plaintiff must move the
Court for process under Order 16 Rule 10 Civil P.C., when a witness summoned by
him has failed to obey the summons…’

 

Further, in Hare Krishna Panigrahi vs. Jogneswar Panda & Ors.,
AIR 1939 Cal 688,
the Calcutta High Court observed that the section
required that the witness was actually produced before the court and then if he
denied execution or his memory failed or if he refused to prove or turned
hostile, other evidence could be admitted to prove execution. If, however, the
witness was not before the court at all and the question of denying or failing
to recollect the execution of the document did at all arise… the plaintiff
simply took out a summons against the witness and nothing further was done
later on. The court held that in all such cases it was the duty of the
plaintiff to exhaust all the processes of the court in order to compel the
attendance of any one of the attesting witnesses, and when the production of
such witnesses was not possible either legally or physically, the plaintiff
could avail of the provisions of section 69 of the Evidence Act.

 

In this respect, the Supreme Court in Babu Singh and others vs. Ram
Sahai alias Ram Singh (2008) 14 SCC 754
has explained that section 69
of the Evidence Act would apply where the witness is either dead or out of the
jurisdiction of the court, or kept out of the way by the adverse party, or
cannot be traced despite diligent search. Only in that event the Will may be
proved in the manner indicated in section 69, i.e., by examining witnesses who
were able to prove the handwriting of the testator. The burden of proof then
may be shifted to others. The Court further propounded that while in ordinary
circumstances a Will must be proved keeping in view the provisions of section
63 of the Indian Succession Act and section 68 of the Evidence Act, in the
extraneous circumstances laid down in section 69 of the Evidence Act, the
strict proof of execution and attestation stands relaxed. However, in this case
the signature and handwriting, as contemplated in section 69, must be proved.

 

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court in the Kalyanaswamy
case (Supra) considered the question whether (despite the fact
that both the attesting witnesses were dead), the matter to be proved u/s 69 of
the Evidence Act was the same as a matter to be proved u/s 68 of the same Act?
In other words, section 68 of the Act mandatorily requires that in the case of
a Will at least one of the attesting witnesses must not only be examined to
prove attestation by him, but he must also prove the attestation by the other
attesting witness. The court held that while it was open to prove the Will and
the attestation by examining a single attesting witness, it was incumbent upon
him to prove attestation not only by himself but also the attestation by the
other attesting witness.

 

The Apex Court agreed with the principle that section 69 of the Evidence
Act manifests a departure from the requirement embodied in section 68. In the
case of a Will, when an attesting witness is available, the Will is to be
proved by examining him. He must not only prove that the attestation was done
by him, but he must also prove the attestation by the other attesting witness.
This is subject to the situation which is contemplated in section 71 of the Evidence
Act which allows other evidence to be adduced in proof of the Will among other
documents where the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the
execution of the Will.

 

Section 71 of the Evidence Act states that if the
attesting witness to a document denies or does not recollect the execution of
that document, its execution may be proved by other evidence. The Apex Court
held that the fate of the transferee or a legatee under a document (which is
required by law to be attested), is not placed at the mercy of the attesting
witness and the law enables corroborative evidence to be effected for the
document despite denial of the execution of the document by the attesting
witness.

 

One of the important rules laid down by the Supreme Court is that in a case
covered u/s 69 of the Evidence Act, the requirement pertinent to section 68 of
the same Act (that the attestation by both the witnesses is to be proved by
examining at least one attesting witness), is dispensed with. In a case covered
u/s 69 what was to be proved as far as the attesting witness was concerned was
that the attestation of one of the attesting witness was in his handwriting.
The language of the section was clear and unambiguous. Section 68 of the
Evidence Act contemplated attestation of both attesting witnesses to be proved
but that was not the requirement in section 69.

 

The Court also dealt with another aspect about section 69 of the Evidence
Act. Section 69 spoke about proving the Will in the manner provided therein.
The word ‘proved’ was defined in section 3 of the Evidence Act as follows:

 

‘Proved. – A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters
before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular
case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.’

 

According to the Supreme Court, the question to be asked was whether having
regard to the evidence before it, the Court could believe the fact as proved.
The Court held that in a case where there was evidence which appeared to
conform to the requirement u/s 69, the Court was not relieved of its burden to
apply its mind to the evidence and it had to find whether the requirements of
section 69 were proved. In other words, the reliability of the evidence or the
credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the Court to still ponder over.
In this case, one of the witnesses was an Income-tax practitioner and the other
was a doctor. Both of them were respectable professionals who were well known
to the testator and there was no reason to doubt their credibility. Applying
these principles, the Supreme Court found that based on external evidence
before it, the signature of one of the attesting witnesses and the testator
were proved.

 

The Court also considered the physical and mental
capacity of the testator to make a valid Will. It held that as far as his
health was concerned, it was well settled that the requirement of sound
disposing capacity was not to be confused with physical well-being. A person
who has had a physical ailment may not automatically be robbed of his sound
disposing capacity. The fact that a person was afflicted with a physical
illness or that he was in excruciating pain would not deprive him of his
capacity to make a Will. What was important was whether he was conscious of
what he was doing and whether the Will reflected what he had chosen to decide.
In this case, the testator was suffering from cancer of the throat but there
was nothing to indicate in the evidence that he was incapable of making up his
own mind in the matter of leaving a Will behind. The fact that he was being fed
by a tube could hardly have deprived him of his capacity to make a Will.

 

Accordingly, the Court opined that the requirements of section 69 were
fulfilled and, hence, the Will was a valid Will.

 

CONCLUSION

A Will is a very important, if not the most
important, document which a person may execute. Selecting an appropriate
witness to the Will is equally important. Some suggestions in this respect are
selecting a relatively younger witness. Further, one should consider having
respectable professionals, businessmen, etc., as witnesses so that their
credibility is not doubted. As far as possible, have people who know the
testator well enough. In the event that both the witnesses predecease the
testator, he must make a new Will with new witnesses. Always remember, that all
precautions should be taken to ensure that a Will should live longer than the
testator!

 

PRACTICAL GUIDANCE ON SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE

There
are numerous situations where, concluding whether an investor exercises
significant influence over the investee and consequently whether the investee
is an associate of the investor, requires considerable judgement to be
exercised. When there is no significant influence, and an entity incorrectly
interprets the relationship to be that of significant influence, it will end up
wrongly consolidating (using the equity method) the entity in the consolidated
financial statements, rather than measuring it in accordance with Ind AS 109 – Financial
Instruments
and vice versa.

 

In this
article, we discuss two examples. But before we do that, it is important to
understand the following key provisions in Ind AS 28 – Investments in
Associates and Joint Ventures
which is reproduced below.

 

Paragraph
3 defines the following terms:

 

‘An associate is an entity over which the investor has significant
influence.’

 

‘Significant influence is the power to participate in the financial and
operating policy decisions of the investee but is not control or joint control
of those policies.’

 

Paragraph
5:

 

‘If an entity holds, directly or indirectly (e.g.
through subsidiaries), 20 per cent or more of the voting power of the investee,
it is presumed that the entity has significant influence, unless it can be
clearly demonstrated that this is not the case. Conversely, if the entity
holds, directly or indirectly (e.g., through subsidiaries), less than 20 per
cent of the voting power of the investee, it is presumed that the entity does not
have significant influence, unless such influence can be clearly demonstrated.
A substantial or majority ownership by another investor does not necessarily
preclude an entity from having significant influence.’

 

Paragraph
6:

 

‘The existence of significant influence by an entity is usually evidenced
in one or more of the following ways:

a)  representation on the board of
directors or equivalent governing body of the investee;

b)  participation in policy-making
processes, including participation in decisions about dividends or other
distributions;

c)  material transactions between the
entity and its investee;

d)  interchange of managerial
personnel; or

e)  provision of essential technical
information.’

 

Example 1A – Significant influence in a group structure

 

Fact Pattern

 

The
parent has two subsidiaries, Sub 1 and Sub 2. Sub 1 has a 16% ownership
interest in Sub 2. The group structure is as follows:

 

 

 

 

The
parent has appointed two executives of Sub 1 as Directors to the Board of Sub
2. Thanks to the number of Directors on the Board, the two Directors are able
to have an impact on Sub 2’s Board. The parent has the right to remove the two
executives from the Board at any time. Sub 1 has also been directed to manage
Sub 2 in a way that maximises the return for the parent, rather than for Sub 1.
The parent can amend this directive at any time. Whether Sub 1 has significant
influence over Sub 2?

 

Response

 

Ind AS
28:5 indicates that ‘[a] substantial or majority ownership by another investor
does not necessarily preclude an entity from having significant influence’. In
this fact pattern, however, Sub 1 does not have significant influence over Sub
2, because although Sub 1 can participate in policy-making decisions, the
parent can remove Sub 1’s executives from Sub 2’s Board at any time. Therefore,
Sub 1’s apparent position of significant influence over Sub 2 can be removed by
the parent and Sub 1 does not have the power to exercise significant influence
over Sub 2. Since Sub 1 does not have significant influence over Sub 2, Sub 2
is not an associate of Sub 1. It is actually the parent that has 100% control
over Sub 2, directly and indirectly through Sub 1.

 

Example 1B – Board
participation alone does not provide significant influence

 

Fact pattern

 

Internet
Ltd.’s Board is the ultimate decision-making authority and has ten Directors.
The shareholder analysis of Internet Ltd. shows the following shareholders.
Other shares are widely held by the public.

 

Shareholding

Board
representation

Viz Ltd.

38%

4

Fiz Ltd.

36%

4

Ke Ltd.

9%

1

Individual M (Managing Director of Internet Ltd.)
appointed by Viz Ltd.

6%

1

Others – widely held

11%

none

 

100%

10

 

Board
decisions are passed by a 70% majority of voting Directors. Is a 9%
shareholding and representation of one Director on the Board enough to provide
Ke Ltd. with significant influence?

 

Response

 

Whether
Ke Ltd. has significant influence is a matter of judgement. Ke Ltd. has only
one Director out of the ten. The Board is dominated by Viz and Fiz who can make
decisions without the agreement of the other Board members. Under Ind AS 28,
the Board representation is an indicator of significant influence. However, it
does not provide any further guidance on


how to evaluate the representation in the context of the size of the Board,
voting patterns, significant transactions, exchange of managerial personnel and
the like. Ke Ltd. only has 10% of the Board seats and believes this is not
enough to exercise significant influence, given the presence of the two major
investors and the Managing Director on the Board. Although Ke Ltd. participates
in the policy-making processes and decisions, that alone does not enable it to significantly
influence those decisions as suggested under Ind AS 28.

 

Having a
representation on the Board of Directors is an indicator of significant
influence. It is not an automatic confirmation. Additional analysis would be
required and relevant facts and circumstances will need to be considered. Ke
Ltd., in this scenario, holds far less than 20% shareholding threshold
indicated in the standard. It therefore does not have significant influence
over Internet Ltd.

 

CONCLUSION

The
determination of significant influence is a matter of considerable judgement
and needs careful evaluation of all the details, the facts and circumstances of
the case.