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Onerous Contracts – Amendments to Ind AS 37

This article explains the recent amendment to Ind AS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets with respect to the measurement of onerous contracts.

An onerous contract is defined under paragraph 10 of Ind AS 37 as “a contract in which the unavoidable costs of meeting the obligations under the contract exceed the economic benefits expected to be received under it.”

Paragraph 68 further elaborates, “The unavoidable costs under a contract reflect the least net cost of exiting from the contract, which is the lower of the cost of fulfilling it and any compensation or penalties arising from failure to fulfil it.”

The example below explains the above requirements.

EXAMPLE – Measurement of Onerous Contract

Let’s say, the revenue on a contract is Rs. 100, cost of the contract is Rs. 120, and cost of exiting or cancelling the contract is a penalty of Rs. 10. In this case, if the contract is executed, the cost of fulfilling the contract is Rs. 20, but if the contract is cancelled, the cost is Rs. 10. Therefore, a provision for an onerous contract of Rs. 10 is made, being lesser of Rs .20 and Rs. 10. On the other hand, if the cost of the contract is Rs. 120, and cost of exiting or cancelling the contract is a penalty of Rs. 30, a provision of Rs. 20 is made, being lesser of Rs. 20 and Rs. 30.

Prior to the amendment, there was no clarity on how the cost of fulfilling the contract would be determined. Paragraph 68A was added to Ind AS 37 and paragraph 69 was modified to provide that clarity.

Amendment vide MCA Notification No. G.S.R 255 (E) dated 23rd March, 2022

68A The cost of fulfilling a contract comprises the costs that relate directly to the contract. Costs that relate directly to a contract consist of both:

a. the incremental costs of fulfilling that contract — for example, direct labour and materials; and

b. an allocation of other costs that relate directly to fulfilling contracts – for example, an allocation of the depreciation charge for an item of property, plant and equipment used in fulfilling that contract among others.

Amendment

69 Before a separate provision for an onerous contract is established, an entity recognises any impairment loss that has occurred on assets used in fulfilling the contract.

The Amendment shall bring the much-needed uniformity and clarity while assessing the cost of fulfilling a contract and the allocation of common cost, e.g., management and supervision time. Besides, it will also clarify that, before an onerous contract provision is established, an entity should recognise any impairment loss on the asset used to fulfil the contract. This will apply even when the asset is not dedicated exclusively to that contract, but is used across several contracts.

Let us understand with an example, how this amendment will help in uniformity of practice while calculating cost to fulfil a contract:

Example
– Measurement of onerous contract provision under pre-revised Ind AS 37

Entity A (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
equipment is hired)

 

Entity B (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
own asset is

used)

 

Entity C (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
own asset is used)

 

 

R

 

R

 

R

Materials

100

Materials

100

Materials

100

Direct variable cost

50

Direct variable cost

50

Direct variable cost

50

Equipment

hiring cost

30

Use of own

equipment*

Use of own

equipment**

25

Total

180

Total

150

Total

175

Contract

revenue

150

Contract

revenue

150

Contract

revenue

150

Onerous

contract

provision

30

Onerous

contract

provision

Onerous

contract

provision

25

* same equipment is used in other contracts as well
and
depreciation has not been considered by
the Entity for cost estimate

**same equipment is used in other contracts as well
and
depreciation has been considered by
the Entity for cost estimate

As can be seen from the above example, in the pre-revised Ind AS 37, the difference in practices yielded different results, when an entity used third party equipment as against its own equipment. Revised Ind AS 37, will require common costs such as the depreciation cost to be allocated for determining the cost. This will ensure that the onerous contract provision considers all costs when determining onerous contract provision. Additionally, in pre-revised Ind AS 37, entities that used own equipment, could establish onerous provisions differently, depending on whether or not they allocated depreciation to the contract. Under revised Ind AS 37, it is mandatory to allocate all common costs when determining onerous contract provision. The above example under pre-revised Ind AS 37 will be recast as follows under revised Ind AS 37.

Example
– Measurement of onerous contract provision under revised Ind AS 37

Entity A (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
equipment is hired)

 

Entity B (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
own asset is

used)

 

Entity C (Estimate of cost to fulfil a contract when
own asset is used)

 

 

R

 

R

 

R

Materials

100

Materials

100

Materials

100

Direct variable cost

50

Direct variable cost

50

Direct variable cost

50

Equipment

hiring cost

30

Use of own

equipment*

25

Use of own

equipment*

25

Total

180

Total

175

Total

175

Contract

revenue

150

Contract

revenue

150

Contract

revenue

150

Onerous

contract

provision

30

Onerous

contract

provision

25

Onerous

contract

provision

25

* same equipment is used in other contract as well
and
depreciation has been considered by
the Entity for cost estimate as required under revised paragraph 68A of Ind
AS 37

An entity shall apply the amendments for annual reporting periods beginning on or after 1st April 2022. An entity shall apply those amendments to contracts for which it has not yet fulfilled all its obligations at the beginning of the annual reporting period in which it first applies the amendments (the date of initial application). The entity shall not restate comparative information. Instead, the entity shall recognise the cumulative effect of initially applying the amendments as an adjustment to the opening balance of retained earnings or other component of equity, as appropriate, at the date of initial application.

Retention in Escrow Account – Liability to Capital Gains

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
In most merger and acquisition transactions involving sale of a business or controlling interest in a company, a certain part of the sale consideration is not directly paid to the seller but is kept aside to meet certain contingencies which may arise in the next few years, such as contingent liabilities. This amount is retained in an escrow account with an escrow agent, with instructions as to how the amount is to be utilized and paid out to the seller, depending upon the happening of certain events. Similar contingent payments may prevail in ordinary non-merger cases, too.

An Escrow Arrangement is a monetary instrument whereby a third-party, i.e. an Escrow Agent, holds liquid assets for the benefit of two parties who have entered into an exchange/transaction, and disburses the liquid assets upon the fulfilment of a specific set of obligations on the part of both the parties under a contract i.e. on happening or non-happening of the contingent event.
 
The issue has arisen before the courts whether, in a situation where the monies kept in escrow are not released to the seller, pending the contingency, at all or released in a year subsequent to the year of transfer of the capital asset, the amount until certain obligations or conditions are fulfilled, would form a part of the consideration accruing or arising to the seller on transfer of the capital asset in the year of transfer of the asset for the purposes of computing the capital gains on transfer of the asset. While the Madras High Court has held that such an amount, so held in escrow, forms a part of the sale consideration for computing the capital gains; the Bombay High Court has held that such an amount cannot be included in the full value of consideration for computing the capital gains in the year of transfer of the capital asset.

CARBORUNDUM UNIVERSAL’S CASE

The issue first came up for the Madras High Court in the case of Carborundum Universal Ltd vs. ACIT 283 Taxmann 312.

In this case, the assessee sold an Electrocast Refractories Plant on a slump sale basis to another company for a total consideration of Rs. 31.14 crore. Out of the total consideration, an amount of Rs. 3.25 crore was deposited in an escrow account by the purchaser to meet any contingent liabilities. The assessee disclosed a long-term capital gain of Rs. 23.58 crore, taking the sale consideration at Rs. 27.89 crore instead of Rs. 31.14 crore.
 
The Assessing Officer noted that while it had sold the plant for a total sale consideration of Rs. 31.14 crore, it had considered only Rs. 27.89 crore as the consideration for computation of long-term capital gain and asked the assessee to show cause as to why Rs. 31.14 crore should not be considered for computation of long-term capital gains. The assessee explained that the difference between the consideration taken for computation of capital gains and that for which the plant was sold was an account of the fact that an amount of Rs. 3.25 crore was kept in an escrow account to meet any contingent liabilities.

The Assessing Officer recomputed the capital gains taking the consideration as Rs. 31.14 crore, on the grounds that the amount of Rs. 3.25 crore kept in escrow account would only constitute an application of income, and that the full consideration of Rs. 31.14 crore had accrued to the assessee immediately on the execution of the agreement for sale.

In first appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) noted that the amount in the escrow account had been kept by the purchaser to indemnify against breach of warranty or other losses or on account of further litigation as a result of non-compliance to the conditions of the agreement by the assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) therefore was of the view that the sum retained in the escrow account had not accrued to the assessee in the year under consideration. He therefore held that amount of Rs. 3.25 crore kept in escrow account had neither been received or accrued by/to the assessee during the year, and since the said amount had been subsequently received by the assessee after the stipulated period of agreement, it had been offered to tax by the assessee under the head capital gains in the year of its receipt. Therefore, holding that the Assessing Officer was not justified in taxing the amount in the year under consideration, the Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition of Rs. 3.25 crore.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that the amount kept in escrow account represented application of income and keeping the amount in escrow account was only a formality, as the entire amount of Rs. 3.25 crore had been received without any deduction towards claims/warranties, and had been offered to tax in a subsequent year.

The Tribunal, after examining the Business Sale Agreement, held that, the agreement had given legally enforceable rights to the parties with respect to the transfer of undertaking, the assessee had a right to receive the lump-sum consideration upon effecting the sale in the previous year, and there was effective conveyance of the capital asset to the transferee. The Tribunal further noted that the monies kept in the escrow account were for meeting claims that may arise on a future date, and that the interest which accrued on the sums retained in the escrow account had been agreed to be belonging to the seller, i.e., the assessee, and had to be paid to the assessee as per the instructions in the escrow account. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the assessee always had a right to receive the sums kept in the escrow account. Though they were to be quantified after a specified period, they did not change the agreed lump-sum sale consideration finalized based on the agreement between the parties. Therefore, the quantification of deductions to be made from the sums lying in the escrow account would not postpone the charge of such income which was deemed to be taxed in the year of transfer.

The Tribunal rejected the argument of the assessee that the entire sale consideration was not received during the relevant year and could not be deemed as income of that year, holding that it was sufficient if, in the relevant year, profits had risen out of sale of capital assets, i.e. when the assessee had a right to receive the profits in the year under consideration, it would attract liability to capital gains tax. According to the Tribunal, it was not necessary that the whole amount of lump-sum consideration should have been received by the assessee in the previous year, and whatever the parties did subsequent to that year would have no bearing on the liability to tax as deemed income of the year under consideration. Reliance was placed by the Tribunal on the Madras High Court decision in the case of TV Sundaram Iyengar and Sons Ltd vs. CIT 37 ITR 26, while upholding the order of the Assessing Officer.

Before the Madras High Court, on behalf of the assessee, attention was drawn to the Business Sale Agreement, and in particular, covenant No. 14 dealing with indemnities for other losses and covenant No. 15 dealing with retention sum for indemnities. The attention of the Court was also drawn to a second supplementary agrement where there was a reference to a charge of theft of electricity and demand raised by the State Electricity Board from the purchaser of the asset. These facts demonstrated that the intention behind retention of a certain sum in escrow account was to meet liabilities which may be fastened on to the purchaser on conclusion of the sale transaction.

On behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the following decisions:

•    The Bombay High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Hemal Raju Shete 239 Taxman 176, which was a case where certain amounts were set apart to meet contingent liabilities, and it was held that this amount was neither received nor accrued in favour of the assessee.

•    The Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd 161 ITR 524, where a similar view was taken.

•    The Madras High Court decision in the case of PPN Power Generating Co (P) Ltd vs. CIT 275 Taxman 143 in support of the alternative submission that in the subsequent year the amount had been offered for taxation.

•    The Gujarat High Court decision in the case of Anup Engineering Ltd vs. CIT 247 ITR 457.

•    Cases of CIT vs. Ignifluid Boilers (I) Ltd 283 ITR 295 (Mad), CIT vs. Associated Cables (P) Ltd 286 ITR 596 (Bom), DIT(IT) vs. Ballast Nedam International 215 Taxman 254 (Guj), and Amarshiv Construction (P) Ltd vs. Dy CIT 367 ITR 659 (Guj), in the context of treatment of retention money withheld by the contractee.

On behalf of the Revenue, before the Madras High Court, it was argued that the Tribunal order was well considered and the factual aspects thoroughly analyzed. It was clearly brought out by the Tribunal on the facts that the retention money kept in the escrow account had accrued in favour of the assessee in the year under consideration. It was pointed out that the entire amount of Rs. 3.25 crore retained in the escrow account had been received by the assessee and offered for taxation in a subsequent year, with no deduction towards claims/warranties from the amount kept in escrow account. Attention was also drawn to the provisions of section 48, with the submission that if either the full value of the consideration had been received by the assessee during the year or it had accrued, that alone would be sufficient, and the subsequent act of the assessee and the purchaser by creating an escrow account would not change the character of receipt of the consideration.

Referring to the various clauses of the Business Sale Agreement, it was submitted that the facts clearly demonstrated that the amount retained in the escrow account, which was a subsequent arrangement between the parties, would have no impact for the purpose of computation of capital gains on the total sale consideration fixed under the agreement. On behalf of the Revenue, reliance was placed on the following decisions:

•    The Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Attilli N Rao 252 ITR 880 in the context of full price realised for the purpose of computation of capital gains.

•    CIT vs. N M A Mohammed Haniffa 247 ITR 66 (Mad).

•    CIT vs. George Henderson and Co Ltd 66 ITR 622 (SC).

•    CIT vs. Smt Nilofer I Singh 309 ITR 233 (Del).

•    Smt D Zeenath vs. ITO 413 ITR 258 (Mad).

The decisions relied upon by the Revenue were rebutted by the assessee’s counsel, that all those were cases relating to mortgage, and that the agreement between the assessee and the purchaser clearly showed that the retention money was neither received nor accrued in favour of the assessee during the relevant year.

The Madras High Court examined the provisions of the Business Sale Agreement and noted that the retention amount had been retained for the purpose of ensuring that sufficient funds would be available to indemnify the purchaser against any damages or losses arising from indemnification for breach of warranty, indemnification for other losses, unpaid accounts receivables, and other obligations to pay or reimburse the purchaser as provided under the agreement. It noted that admittedly, no indemnification had to be given under either of the four heads, and the entire amount was received by the assessee without any deduction and was offered for taxation by the assessee in the subsequent year. The High Court noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had not specifically examined as to whether the entire amount of Rs. 3.25 crore had been received by the assessee without any deduction and offered for taxation, but had solely proceeded on the basis that the escrow account had been opened and amount retained as retention money to be utilized by the purchaser for indemnification or breach of warranty for any other losses. On this basis, the Commissioner (Appeals) had concluded that the retention sum retained in the escrow account had not accrued to the assessee during the relevant year.

According to the Madras High Court, the Terms and Conditions of the Business Sale Agreement were vivid and clear, the total sale consideration having been clearly mentioned. After fixing the full and final sale consideration, the parties mutually agreed to retain a specified quantum of money in an escrow account to meet any one of the exigencies as mentioned in the agreement. Therefore, according to the High Court, for all purposes, the entire sale consideration had accrued in favour of the assessee during the year under consideration. Possession of the asset was also handed over by the assessee. Besides, no deductions were made from the escrow account and the entire amount was received by the assessee and offered to tax.

According to the Madras High Court, the purchaser, retaining a particular amount of money in the escrow account could not take away the amount from the purview of full consideration received or accruing in favour of the assessee for the purpose of computation of capital gains u/s 48. Besides the assessee had received the entire amount of Rs. 3.25 crore without any deduction. The right of the assessee over the amount retained in the escrow account had not been disputed. The Madras High Court observed that assuming certain payoffs were to be made from the retention money, that would not in any manner alter the full and total consideration received by the assessee pursuant to the business sale agreement. Given the factual position, according to the Madras High Court, undoubtedly the entire sale consideration had accrued in favour of the assessee during the relevant assessment year and, assuming that certain payment had been made from the amount retained in the escrow account, it would not change or in any manner reduce the sale consideration.

The Madras High Court therefore upheld the order of the Tribunal, holding the assessee liable to capital gains tax during the relevant year on the entire sale consideration as per the agreement.

DINESH VAZIRANI’S CASE

The issue again recently came up before the Bombay High Court in the case of Dinesh Vazirani vs. Pr CIT 445 ITR 110.

In this case, the assessee, who was a promoter of a company, agreed to sell shares of the company held by him along with other promoters for a total consideration of Rs. 155 crore. The Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) provided for specific promoter indemnification obligations. To meet such promoter indemnification obligations, the SPA provided that out of the sale consideration of Rs. 155 crore, Rs. 30 crore would be kept in escrow. If there was no liability as contemplated under the specific promoter indemnification obligations within a particular period, the amount of Rs. 30 crore would be released by the escrow agent to the seller promoters. A separate escrow agreement was entered into between the sellers, the buyers and the escrow agent.

The assessee filed his return of income in July, 2011 by computing capital gains on his proportion of the total sale consideration of Rs. 155 crore, including the amount kept in escrow, which had not been paid out but was still parked in the escrow account till the time the return was filed. The assessment was selected for scrutiny, and an assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) on 15th January, 2014 accepting the returned income.

Subsequent to the passing of such assessment order, certain statutory and other liabilities arose in the company amounting to Rs. 9.17 crore relatable to the period prior to the sale of the shares. This amount of Rs. 9.17 crore was withdrawn by the company from the escrow account, and therefore the assessee received a lesser amount from the escrow account.

The assessee thereafter filed a revision petition u/s 264 with the Commissioner, stating that the assessment had already been completed taxing the capital gains at higher amount on the basis of sale consideration of Rs. 155 crore without reducing the consideration by Rs. 9.17 crore. It was claimed that since the amount of Rs. 9.17 crore had been withdrawn by the company from the escrow account, what the assessee received was lesser than that mentioned in the return of income, and therefore the capital gain needed to be recomputed by reducing the proportionate amount deducted from the escrow account. It was pointed out that since the withdrawal from the escrow account happened after the completion of assessment proceedings, it was not possible for the assessee to make such a claim before the Assessing Officer or file a revised return. The assessee therefore requested the Commissioner to reduce the long-term capital gains by the proportionate amount withdrawn by the company from the escrow account of Rs. 9.17 crore.

The Commissioner rejected the revision petition on the ground that, from the sale price as specified in the agreement, only cost of acquisition, cost of improvement or expenditure incurred exclusively in connection with the transfer could be reduced in computing the capital gains, and that the agreement between the seller and buyer for meeting certain contingent liability which may arise subsequent to the transfer could not be considered for reduction from the consideration. The Commissioner further held that in the absence of a specific provision by which an assessee could reduce the returned income filed by him voluntarily, the same could not be permitted indirectly by resorting to provisions of section 264. The Commissioner relied on the proviso to section 240, which stated that if an assessment was annulled, the refund would not be granted to the extent of tax paid on the returned income. According to the Commissioner, this showed that the income returned by an assessee was sacrosanct and could not be disturbed, and even an annulment of the assessment would not impact the suo moto tax paid on the returned income. The Commissioner further was of the view that the contingent liability paid out of escrow account did not have the effect of reducing the amount receivable by the promoters as per the agreement.

The assessee filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court against such order of the Commissioner rejecting the revision petition.

The Bombay High Court held that the order passed by the Commissioner was not correct and quashed the order. It observed that the Commissioner had failed to understand that the amount of Rs. 9.17 crore was neither received by the promoters nor accrued to the promoters, as this amount was transferred directly to the escrow account and was withdrawn from the escrow account. In the view of the High Court, when the amount had not been received by or accrued to the promoters, it could not be taken as the full value of consideration in computing capital gains from the transfer of shares of the company.

The Bombay High Court observed that the Commissioner had not understood the true intent and content of the SPA, and not appreciated that the purchase price as defined in the agreement was not an absolute amount, as it was subject to certain liabilities which might arise to the promoters on account of certain subsequent events. According to the Bombay High Court, the full value of consideration for computing capital gains would be the amount ultimately received by the promoters after the adjustments on account of the liabilities from the escrow account as mentioned in the agreement.

The Bombay High Court referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Shoorji Vallabhdas & Co 46 ITR 144, where the Supreme Court had held that income or gain is chargeable to tax on the basis of the real income earned by an assessee, unless specific provisions provide to the contrary. The Bombay High Court noted that in the case before it, the real income (capital gain) would be computed only by taking into account the real sale consideration, i.e., sale consideration after reducing the amount withdrawn from the escrow account.

The Bombay High Court observed that the Commissioner had proceeded on an erroneous understanding that the arrangement between the seller and buyer which resulted in some contingent liability that arose subsequent to the transfer could not be reduced from the sale consideration as per section 48. As per the High Court, the liability was contemplated in the SPA itself, and had to be taken into account to determine the full value of consideration. If the sale consideration specified in the agreement was along with certain liability, then the value of consideration for the purpose of computing capital gains u/s 48 was the consideration specified in the agreement as reduced by the liability. In the view of the High Court, it was incorrect to say that the subsequent contingent liability did not come within any of the items of reduction, because the full value of the consideration u/s 48 would be the amount arrived at after reducing the liabilities from the purchase price mentioned in the agreement. Even if the contingent liability was to be regarded as a subsequent event, then also, it ought to be taken into consideration in determining the capital gain chargeable u/s 45.

The Bombay High Court expressed its disagreement with the Commissioner on his statement that the contingent liability paid out of escrow account did not affect the amount receivable as per the agreement for the purposes of computing capital gains u/s 48. As per the High Court, the Commissioner failed to understand or appreciate that the promoters had received only the net amount of Rs. 145.83 crore, i.e., Rs. 155 crore less Rs. 9.17 crore, and that such reduced amount should be taken as full value of consideration for computing capital gains u/s 48.

The Bombay High Court also rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the assessee’s returned income could not be reduced by filing a revision petition u/s 264. According to the High Court, section 264 had been introduced to factor in such situation as the assessee’s case, because if income did not result at all, there could not be a tax, even though in bookkeeping, an entry was made for hypothetical income which did not materialise. Section 264 did not restrict the scope of power of the Commissioner to restrict a relief to assessee only up to the returned income. Where the income can be said not to have resulted at all, there was obviously neither accrual nor receipt of income, even though an entry may have been made in the books and account. Therefore, the Commissioner ought to have directed the Assessing Officer to recompute the income as per the provisions of the Act, irrespective of whether the computation resulted in income being less than the returned income. The Bombay High Court stated that it was the obligation of the Revenue to tax an assessee on the income chargeable to tax under the Act, and if higher income was offered to tax, then it was the duty of the Revenue to compute the correct income and grant the refund of taxes erroneously paid by an assessee.

The Bombay High Court therefore held that the capital gain was to be computed only on the net amount actually received by the assessee, and that he was entitled to refund of the excess taxes paid by him on the returned capital gains.

OBSERVATIONS

Section 45(1) provides that any capital gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year shall be chargeable to tax under the head “Capital Gains” and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place. Undoubtedly, in both these cases, discussed herein, there was no dispute about the year of transfer or the amount of consideration. The consideration had been agreed upon, and the payment was made by the purchaser. The issue was really whether the amount retained with the escrow agent was retained on behalf of the seller, or was consideration withheld on behalf of the purchaser, and whether the amount so kept in escrow could be reduced from the full value of consideration and the taxable capital gains.
 
While the Madras High Court has taken the view that the amount retained in the escrow account was received by and accrued to the assessee, the Bombay High Court has taken the view that such amount in escrow cannot be said to have been received by or accrued to the assessee. To understand the tax effect of an escrow arrangement, it is necessary to understand the legal implications of such an arrangement.

The Bombay High Court, in the case of Hira Mistan vs. Rustom Jamshedji Noble & Others 2000 (1) BomCR 716, has observed:

“An escrow has been held to be a document deposited with the third person to be delivered to the person purporting to be benefited by it upon the performance of some condition, the fulfillment of which is only to bring the contract into existence… Escrow has also been explained as an intended Deed after sealing and any signature required for execution as a deed, be delivered as an escrow, that is as a simple writing which is not to become the deed of the party expressed to be bound by it until some condition has been performed. Escrow has also been defined to mean that where an instrument is delivered to take effect on the happening of a specified event or upon condition that it is not to be operative until some condition is performed then pending the happening of that event or the performance of the condition the instrument is called an escrow.”

The Bombay High Court, in Jeweltouch (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Naheed Hafeez Quraishi And Ors 2008 (3) BomCR 217, has observed:

“When parties to an agreement or the executants of a document place the agreement or, as the case may be, the document in escrow, parties intend that pending the fulfillment of certain conditions which they stipulate, the document will be held in custody by the person with whom it is placed. Notwithstanding the execution of the agreement or the execution of the document, the act of placing the instrument in escrow evinces an intent that the document would continue to lie in escrow until a condition which is precedent to the enforceability of the document comes to exist. The instrument becomes valid and enforceable in law only upon the due fulfillment of a prerequisite and often the parties may stipulate the due satisfaction of a named person on the fulfillment of the condition. An Escrow agent may be appointed by the parties as the person who will determine whether a promise or condition has been fulfilled so as to warrant the release of the document from escrow. In Wharton’s Law Lexicon, the effect of an escrow is stated thus: Escrow, a writing under seal delivered to a third person, to be delivered by him to the person whom it purports to benefit upon some condition. Upon the performance of the condition it becomes an absolute deed; but if the condition be not performed, it never becomes a deed. It is not delivered as a deed, but as an escrow, i.e. a scrowl, or writing which is not to take effect as a deed till the condition be performed.”

In Halsbury the effect of the delivery of a document as escrow is explained thus:

“1334. Effect of delivery as escrow. When a sealed writing is delivered as an escrow it cannot take effect as a deed pending the performance of the condition subject to which it was so delivered, and if that condition is not performed the writing remains entirely inoperative. If, therefore, a sealed writing delivered as an escrow comes, pending the performance of the condition and without the consent, fault, or negligence of the party who so delivered it, into the possession of the party intended to benefit, it has no effect either in his hands or in the hands of any purchaser from him; for until fulfillment of the condition it is not, and never has been, the deed of the party who so delivered it. When a sealed writing has been delivered as an escrow to await the performance of some condition, it takes effect as a deed (without any further delivery) immediately the condition is fulfilled, and the rule is that its delivery as a deed will, if necessary, relate back to the time of its delivery as an escrow; but the relation back does not have the effect of validating a notice to quit given at a time when the fee simple was not vested in the person giving it.”

While these views are in the context of a document placed in escrow, the views might help to understand the impact of money placed in escrow also and may impact the final computation of capital gains until such time consideration payable attains finality based on the fulfillment of the conditions of the escrow . However, once the conditions are fulfilled, the payment would relate back to the date when the payment was deposited with the escrow agent. In substance therefore, the escrow agent is holding the amount on behalf of the seller, but the funds are released only after fulfilment of the conditions of escrow.

If one examines the facts of the two cases discussed, in the case before the Madras High Court, there was no deduction or reduction from the amount placed in escrow, and therefore the question of amendment of the consideration did not arise at all. Since capital gains is chargeable in the year of transfer, the Madras High Court held that the entire capital gain, including amount placed in escrow was taxable in that year itself.

The facts before the Bombay High Court were that there was actually a deduction from the amount placed in escrow, and the amount of consideration therefore underwent a change. The amount withdrawn from the escrow account was ultimately never received as income by the seller as the amount was returned to the buyer. The issue before the Bombay High Court was whether a revision of the assessment order was possible in view of the facts, which arose due to subsequent events impacting the taxable capital gains. It was in that context that the High Court took the view that the real income had to be considered, and not a notional income.

Viewed in this light, there is no conflict between the decisions of the two Courts. Both have rightly decided the cases before them on the merits of the cases before them. In one case, the fact was that the amount eventually was paid in full to the seller as was agreed while in the other case, a part of the agreed consideration, though paid, was returned to the buyer. Therefore, deferment of the liability to capital gains tax was not intended nor was it suggested by the Bombay High Court, and what was suggested was the downward revision of the consideration that was offered for taxation.

Therefore, to take the view that the amount placed in escrow should be taxable if and only when released from escrow on fulfillment of the conditions does not appear to be the attractive position in law.

The moot question that arises in such circumstances is as to what should be the manner of correction of the capital gains offered for taxation when the consideration so offered subsequently undergoes a change, as per the conditions provided in the sale agreement itself. The assessment of the capital gains legally cannot be held back, as that would take away the time bound finality of an assessment. There is presently no provision in law that permits the deferment of taxation to the later year on receipt of the amount released from the escrow account. No transfer in law can be said to have taken place in such later year, and the charge of capital gains would fail in that later year for want of transfer required for application of s. 45.

The only possibility therefore is that while the income be offered in the year of transfer based on the agreed consideration, without factoring in the events subsequent to the filing of the return, which have modified the actual consideration, the assessee can, as per the law applicable today, only take recourse to the existing provisions for filing a revised return (which time is generally inadequate after the reduced time limits),or for filing a revision petition with the Commissioner u/s 264, which time is also inadequate in many cases to revise the claim.

It is therefore essential that the law take cognizance of the difficulty arising on account of the subsequent revision of the consideration being redefined due to subsequent events by permitting rectification, revision or fresh claim without affecting the primary liability of offering the full value of consideration. This may be made possible by amending section 155 to permit rectification, by adding to the many existing situations therein, requiring the assessee to demonstrate the contingency actually happened, resulting in amendment of the consideration.

S. 271(1)(c) – The Assessee had wrongly claimed a long-term capital loss in respect of a property which had been gifted by him to his son. Since the amount of capital loss had duly been disclosed in the computation of income and the Assessee had also accepted at the time of assessment proceedings it had considered gift made to son as a transfer by mistake, and there was no concealment of any material fact by the Assessee and thus, levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) was not justified.

33 Pawan Garg vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
[2022] 94 ITR(T) 159 (Chandigarh -Trib.)
ITA No.: 1475(CHD) of 2018
A.Y.: 2014-15
Date of order: 17th January, 2022

S. 271(1)(c) – The Assessee had wrongly claimed a long-term capital loss in respect of a property which had been gifted by him to his son. Since the amount of capital loss had duly been disclosed in the computation of income and the Assessee had also accepted at the time of assessment proceedings it had considered gift made to son as a transfer by mistake, and there was no concealment of any material fact by the Assessee and thus, levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) was not justified.

FACTS

The Assessee is a partner in a firm engaged in the dyeing and finishing of textile yarn. The return of income was filed declaring an income of Rs. 8,11,800. The Assessee had claimed Long Term Capital Loss at 20 per cent amounting to Rs. 7,14,554 in respect of a property gifted by him to his son Shri Akhilesh Garg on 20th July, 2013. The Assessee was asked by the Assessing Officer to explain as to why this loss, which had wrongly been claimed, may not be disallowed. In response, the Assessee accepted that there was a mistake due to some typographical error and, therefore, the amount was added to the income of the Assessee. Subsequently, the impugned penalty was imposed on the said addition.

Aggrieved, the Assessee filed an appeal challenging the levy of penalty before the CIT(A). However, the appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved, the Assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The Assessee submitted that no penalty was imposable as he had only made a wrong claim and not a false claim inasmuch as all the facts were before the Assessing Officer at the time of assessment proceedings, and for the reason that all the figures were duly reflected in the computation of income. It was also submitted that the mistake had occurred due to some error at the end of the Chartered Accountant who had filed the return of income and that the Assessee should not be burdened with the penalty as it was a genuine mistake.

The ITAT observed that the mistake was noticed by the Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings, and on being confronted on the issue, the Assessee surrendered the Long Term Capital Loss. It also observed that the amount of capital loss has been duly mentioned in the computation of income. Therefore, it finds that there is no concealment of any material fact by the Assessee. It can be said that the claim made with respect to the Long Term Capital Loss was an incorrect claim or a wrong claim but it was not a false claim by any measure inasmuch as there was only a mistake in the legal sense that the gift made by the Assessee to the son was considered as a transfer in the computation of income and the resultant figure was shown as a capital loss. It was also a fact on record that the Assessee had accepted the same at the time of assessment proceedings.

The ITAT held that it is not a case where the particulars of income in relation to which the penalty has been levied were either incorrect or were concealed. The amount of capital loss has duly been disclosed in the computation of income and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a case of the Assessee attempting to make a false claim. The ITAT held that it was a bonafide mistake on the part of the Assessee and it would not attract levy of penalty as all the particulars of income were duly disclosed. The appeal of the Assessee was allowed.
 
The ITAT placed reliance on the following decisions while deciding the matter:

1. CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd.  [2012] 322 ITR 158
    
2. Price Waterhouse Coopers Pvt. Ltd vs. CIT  [2011] 348 ITR 306.

S. 36(1)(iii) – Where interest free funds had been lent by the Assessee to its wholly owned subsidiary for business, no disallowance of interest will be made u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

32 Moonrock Hospitality (P.) Ltd vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax
[2022] 94 ITR(T) 185 (Delhi – Trib.)
ITA No.: 5895 (Delhi) of 2019
A.Y.: 2016-17
Date of order: 22nd September, 2021

S. 36(1)(iii) – Where interest free funds had been lent by the Assessee to its wholly owned subsidiary for business, no disallowance of interest will be made u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

FACTS

The Assessee company had investments in wholly owned subsidiaries, and had also advanced loans to these companies out of borrowed funds. During the A.Y., the Asssessee company had advanced an interest free loan to one of its wholly owned subsidiaries. Based on the same, the Assessee was asked to explain as to why no disallowance of interest expenses should be made as per section 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

The Assessee furnished an explanation stating that the said funds were advanced for the purpose of business. Not satisfied with the same, the Assessing Officer contended that the said arrangement was a diversion of interest bearing funds towards interest free advances to related parties. A disallowance of interest at 9 per cent (being the rate of interest on loans taken by the Assessee) on such interest free deposits was made u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the Assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A), however, the appeal was dismissed. Aggrieved, the assessee filed further appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The Assessee submitted that the said loans had been advanced to its wholly owned subsidiary for business. A reference was drawn to the Object Clause of the Memorandum of Association of the Assessee wherein the object was to establish or promote or concur in establishing or promote any company for the purpose of acquiring all or any of the properties, rights and liabilities of such an entity.

Reliance was placed on the ruling of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Tulip Star Hotels Ltd. [2011] 16 taxmann.com 335/[2012] 204 Taxman 11 (Mag.)/[2011] 338 ITR 482, wherein it was held that where an Assessee engaged in the business of hotels, an advanced loan to its subsidiary to gain control over other hotel, interest paid on borrowed capital was allowable u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act

Further, reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court ruling in Hero Cycles (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT (Central) [2015] 63 taxmann.com 308/[2016] 236 Taxman 447/[2015] 379 ITR 347, wherein it was decided that once a nexus between expenditure and purpose of business is established, the Revenue cannot step into the shoes of the businessman to decide how much is reasonable expenditure having regard to circumstances of case.

The ITAT considered the above decisions and concurred with the view of the Assessee company stating that where interest free advances made to a wholly owned subsidiary, no disallowance of interest paid on borrowed fund could be made. Further the ITAT also observed that once a nexus between the expenditure and the business of the subsidiary is established, no disallowance of interest paid on borrowed funds could be made.

Accordingly, the ITAT allowed the appeal of the Assessee and deleted the disallowance of interest u/s 36(1)(iii) of the Act.

Addition made due to wrong reporting in return of income deleted in an appeal against rectification order. Revised return held not necessary.

31 Heidrick and Struggles Inc. vs. DCIT
TS-679-ITAT-2022 (DEL.)
A.Y.: 2018-19
Date of order: 26th August, 2022
Sections: 139(5), 154

Addition made due to wrong reporting in return of income deleted in an appeal against rectification order. Revised return held not necessary.

FACTS

The Assessee, a tax resident of USA, filed its return of income declaring total income of Rs. 23,60,54,860 and claiming a refund of Rs. 53,56,620. The return of income was processed by CPC, vide order dated 14th June, 2019, and a demand of Rs. 80,58,000 was raised for the reason that service income is taxable at 40 per cent plus applicable surcharge and cess and consequential interest u/s 234B and 234C was levied.

Against the order dated 14th June, 2019, the Assessee filed a rectification application which was disposed of vide order dated 22nd August, 2019, passed by CPC, raising a demand of Rs. 2,78,10,114. This demand arose as service income was held to be taxable at 40 per cent and TDS credit of Rs. 2,78,10,114 was denied. The Assessee filed one more rectification application on 15th October, 2019. The CPC vide its order dated 24th October, 2019 raised a demand of Rs. 1,06,73,750 by taxing service receipts of Rs. 2,84,40,475 at 40 per cent along with applicable surcharge and cess and denied TDS credit of Rs. 22,54,771.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who without going into the merits of the case, dismissed the appeal holding that the relief could have been claimed by filing revised return of income.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where on behalf of the revenue it was contended that the demand has been raised considering the details furnished by the Assessee in the form of return of income. Therefore, the Assessee cannot find fault with processing the order or rectification order passed. The Assessee ought to have claimed relief sought by filing revised return of income for which statutory time limit has expired. The relief now sought by the Assessee was not found in the return of income. Therefore, CIT(A) was right in holding against the Assessee.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the Assessee has claimed a service income of Rs. 2,84,40,475 received from Heidrick and Struggles Pvt. Ltd. to be taxable as Other Sources. As per India US Tax Treaty, service rendered by the Assessee did not satisfy ‘make available clause’ of India US Treaty. Also, in the case of a group concern of the Assessee, for A.Y. 2018-19, CPC made a similar adjustment i.e. it taxed service receipt at 40 per cent. The said Assessee preferred rectification application which was allowed. The Tribunal held that it is not in dispute that as per India US Tax Treaty the impugned income is not chargeable to tax as per Article 12.

The Tribunal noted CBDT Circular No. 14 and also that the Calcutta Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Madhabi Nag vs. ACIT [ITA No. 512/Kol/215] held that the revenue authorities ought not to have rejected rectification application u/s 154 on the ground that the Assessee has not filed revised return of income. Further, in the case of CIT vs. Bharat General Reinsurance Co. Ltd. 81 ITR 303 (Delhi), the High Court held that merely because the Assessee wrongly included the income in its return for a particular assessment year it cannot confer jurisdiction on the department to tax that income in that year even though legally such income did not pertain to that year.

The Tribunal held that the addition had been made only due to wrong reporting of income by the Assessee and the same cannot be sustained. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) has committed an error in dismissing the appeal filed by the Assessee.

Interest granted u/s 244A(2) cannot be withdrawn by passing a rectification order u/s 154 when PCCIT / CCIT / PCIT / CIT has not decided exclusion of period for interest.

30 Otis Elevator Company (India) Ltd. vs. DCIT
[2022] 141 taxmann.com 391 (Mum. – Trib.)
A.Y.: 2010-11
Date of order: 18th August, 2022
Section: 244A(2)

Interest granted u/s 244A(2) cannot be withdrawn by passing a rectification order u/s 154 when PCCIT / CCIT / PCIT / CIT has not decided exclusion of period for interest.

FACTS

The assessment was finalized u/s 143(3) on 4th February, 2014. Subsequently, however, the Assessing Officer (AO) withdrew the interest granted u/s 244A(2) on the ground that “it is undisputed fact that in the income tax return filed u/s 139(1) on 30th September, 2010, the TDS claim was Rs. 10,62,11,325 which was enhanced to Rs. 13,70,80,237 by filing revised return on 29th March, 2012” and “thus, the delay was on the part of the Assessee to make correct claim of refund”. The interest payment of Rs. 43,71,038 was thus withdrawn, disregarding the plea of the Assessee that on merits such a claim could not have been declined, and, in any event, such a withdrawal of interest is beyond what is permissible u/s 154. The assessee carried the matter in appeal but without any success. The assessee is in second appeal before us.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the dispute between the Assessee and the revenue was whether or not the Assessee is responsible for delay in refund. It noted that the guidance to deal with such situations is provided in 244A(2) which inter alia provides that “where any question arises about the period to be excluded (for which interest is to be declined), it shall be decided by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, whose decision thereon shall be final”. The Tribunal held that, therefore, the final call about the period to be excluded for grant of interest is to be taken by the higher authority and that exercise is admittedly not done in the present case. Referring to the observations in a co-ordinate bench decision in the case of DBS Bank Ltd. vs. DDIT [(2016) 157 ITD 476 (Mum)] wherein it has inter alia been held that:

(i)    The delay in making of the claim by itself, without anything else, cannot lead to the conclusion that the delay is attributed to the Assessee.

(ii)    Even if the interest u/s 244A could be declined for this period on merits, not declining the interest u/s 244A could not be treated as a mistake apparent on record within the inherently limited scope of Section 154.

(iii)    When a question arises as to the period for which such interest under section 244A is to be excluded, this is to be decided by the Commissioner or the Chief Commissioner.

The Tribunal found itself in agreement with the views of the co-ordinate bench and following the same upheld the plea of the Assessee to the extent that given the limited scope of section 154 for rectification of mistakes apparent on record and given the fact that the period to be excluded for grant of interest has not yet been taken a call on by the PCCIT/CCIT/PCIT or the CIT, the impugned withdrawal of interest u/s 244A(2) is beyond the scope of rectification of mistake u/s 154.

The Tribunal set aside the order of rectification passed by the AO u/s 154 of the Act.

Advances received by an Assessee landlord who has converted land into stock-in-trade, following project completion method, are not taxable on receipt basis.

29 ACIT vs. Suratchandra B. Thakkar (HUF)
TS-648-ITAT-2022 (Mumbai)
A.Y.s: 2006-07 to 2008-09
Date of order: 12th August, 2022
Section: 28

Advances received by an Assessee landlord who has converted land into stock-in-trade, following project completion method, are not taxable on receipt basis.

FACTS

The assessee was a 25 per cent owner of a land in respect of which development agreement was entered into with K. Raheja Universal Pvt. Ltd. Under the terms of the Development Agreement, the land owners and developers were to share sale proceeds in the ratio of 45.5 per cent and 54.5 per cent respectively. The Assessee had a 25 per cent share in land, and was entitled to 25 per cent of 45.5 per cent share receivable by the land owners. The project consisted of construction of four towers of which two were completed in previous year relevant to A.Y. 2008-09 and two were completed in previous year relevant to A.Y. 2009-10.

The Assessee received advances of Rs. 1,78,68,399, Rs. 96,04,258 and Rs. 2,77,19,807 against sale of flats in A.Ys. 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09 respectively. However, no income was offered on the ground that the Assessee was following the project completion method of accounting, and entire income was declared in A.Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10 on completion of the project, receipt of occupancy certificate and execution of conveyance deed in favour of buyers.

According to the Assessing Officer (AO), as the entire cost of construction was being met by the developer, the project did not require any contribution from the Assessee. Therefore, the advances received became final and certain. The AO also observed that the Assessee had not shown any work-in-progress in the balance sheet. Also, since there was no risk attached to the Assessee, the advances, according to the AO, became income in the year of their receipt.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by the Assessee and held that the land was not transferred by the land owners to the developers till the completion of construction and therefore entire risk of the project remained with the land owners including the Assessee.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the Assessee has already paid tax on advances received in A.Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10. The Tribunal concurred with the following findings of the CIT(A):

(i)    Since the land in question was treated as stock-in-trade by the Assessee in its books of account, transfer of the same was not liable to be taxed as capital gain.

(ii)    The Supreme Court, in the case of Seshasayee Steel Pvt. Ltd. 115 taxmann.com 5 (SC), held that executing a development agreement granting permission to start advertising, selling and construction and permitting to execute sale agreement to a developer does not amount to granting possession u/s 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

(iii)    Possession of land has been handed over to the prospective buyers consequent to the conveyance in favour of co-operative society of flat owners.

(iv)    The assessee was regularly and consistently following completed contract method.

(v)    In case of the developer also, the completed contract method has been accepted by the revenue.

The Tribunal did not find any error in the finding of the CIT(A) in upholding the project completion method or the completed contract method followed by the Assessee for declaring the income from the project under reference.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue for all the three years.

Proviso to section 43CA providing for tolerance limit of 10 per cent, being beneficial in nature, is retrospective.

28 Sai Bhargavanath Infra vs. ACIT
TS-658-ITAT-2022 (Pune)
A.Y.: 2014-15
Date of order: 17th August, 2022
Section: 43CA

Proviso to section 43CA providing for tolerance limit of 10 per cent, being beneficial in nature, is retrospective.

FACTS
The Assessee, a builder and developer, filed its return of income for A.Y. 2015-16 declaring therein a total income of Rs. 47,17,490. The Assessing Officer (AO) while assessing the total income of the assessee made an addition of Rs. 19,58,875 u/s 43CA of the Act, being difference between sale value of the flats sold and their stamp duty value.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the Assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that the stamp duty value was at an uniform rate without taking into consideration the peculiar features of a particular property. It was also contended that the difference of Rs. 19,58,875 was less than 10 per cent and therefore, not required to be added. For this proposition reliance was placed on the decision of Pune Tribunal in IT No. 923/Pun/2019 for A.Y. 2016-17, order dated 4th August, 2022 and also on the Assessee’s own case in ITA No. 2417/Pun/2017 for A.Y. 2014-15, the Tribunal on the very similar issue had remanded the matter back to the file of the AO for fresh consideration.

HELD

The Tribunal noted the proviso to section 43CA which provides for a tolerance limit of 10 per cent has been introduced by the Finance Act, 2020 w.e.f. 1st April, 2021 and that the assessment year under consideration is before the date when the amendment took place and therefore, the question is whether the proviso can apply to assessment years prior to its introduction as well.

The Tribunal observed that the decision of the Pune Bench in ITA No. 2417/Pun/2017 for A.Y. 2014-15 (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the Assessee has held the proviso to be retrospective but in the said decision reliance has been placed on the decision of Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Maria Fernandes Cheryl vs. ITO (2021) 187 ITD 738 (Mum) which relates to section 50C of the Act. On behalf of the Assessee it was submitted that section 43CA and section 50C of the Act are pari materia provisions and therefore, holding of retrospective application of section 50C is even applicable making retrospective application to section 43CA of the Act as well. The Tribunal observed that the AR was unable to place on record any direct decision where first proviso to section 43CA has been held to be retrospective.

The Tribunal noted that the judgment of the full bench of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 466 (SC) has held that if any liability has to be fastened with the Assessee taxpayer retrospectively then the statute and the provision must spell out specifically regarding such retrospective applicability. However, if the provision is beneficial for the Assessee, in view of the welfare legislation spirit imbibed in the Income-tax Act, such a beneficial provision can be applied in a retrospective manner. The Tribunal examined the insertion of the first proviso to section 43CA in the light of the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in Vatika Township (supra) and held the intent of the legislature is to provide relief to the Assessee in case such difference is less than 10 per cent which has been brought into effect from 1st April, 2021 thereby providing benefit to the Assessee. This being the beneficial provision therefore will even have retrospective effect and would apply to the present A.Y. 2015-16.

The Tribunal observed that Pune Bench of the Tribunal in Shri Dinar Umeshkumar More vs. ITO [ITA No. 1503/PUN/2015 for A.Y. 2011-12 dated 25th January, 2019] has considering the proposition of applicability of a beneficial provision in light of Hon’ble Apex Court decision in the case of Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has held that if a fresh benefit is provided by the Parliament in an existing provision, then such an amendment should be given retrospective effect.

The Tribunal allowed the ground of appeal by holding that the first proviso to section 43CA has retrospective effect.

PMLA – Magna Carta – Part 2

Part – I of the article on PMLA – Magna Carta was published in the September 2022 issue of the BCAJ. In this concluding part, the author has answered some interesting and important questions arising from the Supreme Court decision in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India [2022] 140 taxmann.com 610 (SC). For a detailed analysis of the case, please refer to the September 2022 issue of the BCAJ.

1.    Whether investigation under PMLA can automatically be extended under other Statutes like the Black Money Act or the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act by the authorities under PMLA?
“Investigation” is a crucial term which has a bearing on the interpretation of all substantive aspects of PMLA. It is defined in section 2(1)(na) of PMLA, as under:

(na) “investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Act conducted by the Director or by an authority authorised by the Central Government under this Act for the collection of evidence.

The term “investigation” has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned decision. The Supreme Court has held that:

•    the term “proceedings” [section 2(1)(na) of PMLA] is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include the inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court.

•    the term “investigation” does not limit itself to the matter of investigation concerning the offence under PMLA, and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the authorities under PMLA.

It is apparent from the above mentioned interpretation of the term “investigation” by the Supreme Court that the word “proceedings” which is a part of the term “investigation” is contextual and must be given wider meaning to include the inquiry conducted by the Director or by an authority authorised by the Central Government under PMLA for collection of evidence. The “authority” referred to in section 2(1)(na) are all the authorities mentioned under sections 48 and 49 of PMLA.

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 49(1), the Central Government has notified the appointment of the following officers:

•    Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India under the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, to exercise the exclusive powers conferred under section 49.

•    Director of Enforcement holding office immediately before 1st July, 2005 under FEMA.

The scope of the powers of Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India and the Director of Enforcement have been specified respectively, in Notification No. GSR 440(E) dated 1st July, 2005 and Notification No. GSR 441(E) dated 1st July, 2005. A review of the powers listed in the said two notifications suggests that the investigation under PMLA may be extended to other statutes.

•    This view is fortified by the powers of section 45 of PMLA authorising the Director of Enforcement or other authorised officer to file a complaint to the Special Court.

•    Reference may also be made to section 66 of PMLA which authorises the Director of Enforcement and other authorities specified by him to disclose information to authorities under “other laws”.

2. Whether fees received by a Chartered Accountant or a lawyer from an offender under PMLA be regarded as proceeds of crime?
The expression “proceeds of crime” is defined in section 2(1)(u), as under:

(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

A review of the above mentioned definition would show that it is very widely worded. However, with the passage of time, even such a widely worded definition was found inadequate to cover a number of situations faced by the authorities. Accordingly, the Explanation was added w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 to expand the parameters of “proceeds of crime”. The purpose of adding the Explanation was to bifurcate the definition into the following two types of properties on a stand-alone basis:

•    Property derived or obtained from a scheduled offence.

•    Property which is directly or indirectly derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity related to a scheduled offence.

The opening words of the Explanation suggest that the Explanation is intended to apply retrospectively.

Wordings of the Explanation leave open a possibility that the Enforcement Directorate may consider the fees received by the Chartered Accountant or lawyer from an offender under PMLA as “proceeds of crime”. In terms of section 24 of PMLA, the burden of proving that the fees received from the offender do not constitute “proceeds of crime” will be on the CA or the lawyer.

It may be noted that the constitutional validity of section 24, which mandates a reverse burden of proof, has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the recent decision.

[However, the matter has been sent by SC for review by a larger Bench].

3. Can a legitimate property acquired by a person be attached or appropriated by the authorities, if later it is found that the said property was acquired by the seller from the proceeds of crime? To what layers the officers can go to attach the property?

Section 8(5) of PMLA deals with confiscation of property on the conclusion of the trial of an offence under PMLA as a result of which the Special Court gives a finding that the offence of money-laundering has been committed. Consequently, the Special Court will pass an order that the following properties stand confiscated to the Central Government:

•    The property involved in money-laundering; or

•    The property which has been used for the commission of the offence of money-laundering.

Accordingly, the property legitimately acquired may be attached and confiscated under PMLA if the Special Court finds that such a property was acquired by the seller through the proceeds of crime. The categorical finding of the Special Court that the property is involved in money- laundering does not leave any doubt that the property described in the captioned issue is liable to confiscation. As regards the second part of the captioned issue, namely; up to what layers the officers can go, a reference may be made to the definition of “offence of money-laundering” in section 3 which is very comprehensive. This definition is clarified and strengthened by the Explanation added w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. Being clarificatory, the Explanation is retrospectively applicable.

Clause (ii) of the Explanation clarifies that the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is a continuing activity which continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime.

In the Supreme Court decision, all nuances of the definition of money-laundering were examined and it was categorically held that the said definition has a wider reach so as to capture every process and activity, direct or indirect, connected with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy.

4. In the event it is found that the legitimate property acquired by an innocent person was out of the proceeds of crime what remedies does he have? How can a person or a consultant safeguard his interests from handling proceeds of crime?

Section 24 of PMLA which deals with the reverse burden of proof gives the right of defence to the person charged with the offence to prove to the contrary. In this connection, a similar situation was noticed by PMLA Appellate Tribunal.

In S. Ramesh Pothy vs. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 102 taxmann.com 314 (PMLA-AT), the appellant had purchased the property from one ‘D’ for business. Enforcement Directorate alleged that the appellant purchased the property out of proceeds of crime since the father of ‘D’ was facing criminal prosecution for offences committed under provisions of PMLA. On that ground, the provisional attachment of said property was confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The appellant produced bank statements and individual tax returns to prove the source of funds for the purchase of property.

It was held by PMLA Tribunal that the appellant was the bonafide purchaser of the property and was not involved in any crime relating to money-laundering. The gist of the Tribunal’s decision is:

•    There was no cogent and clear material on record even prima facie that the appellant had any knowledge of any FIR against the accused vendor. There was no mechanism to know if any FIR was registered against any vendors, or their family members and other relatives.

•    While purchasing the property from any vendor, due diligence does not lead to knowledge about the registration of FIR against the vendor or his family members and other relatives.

•    Under the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act, there is no method or process to find out about the existence of any FIR nor is there any provision to mandatorily disclose the existence of any FIR against the vendor or his family members.

•    The “No Encumbrance Certificate,” issued in the State of Tamil Nadu, did not have any clause whereby the FIR against the relatives or family members of vendors is reflected.

The above mentioned decision gives sufficient clues to discharge the reverse burden of proof and the relevant remedies to discharge such burden.

Indeed, the person charged, or his consultant can safeguard his interest by proper study of section 3 and section 24 in light of the minutest facts of the case. Indeed, while presenting a reply to the show-cause notice, the facts have to be properly articulated and succinctly presented in defence.

[Section 24 has been under review by a larger Bench of SC.]

5. What are the beneficial provisions of section 436A of CrPC that can be invoked by the accused arrested for an offence punishable under PMLA?

Section 436A of CrPC deals with the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained. To understand the substance of section 436A, it is necessary to refer to its following background.

Prior to June 2006, there were instances where undertrial prisoners were detained in jail for periods beyond the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence. Therefore, section 436-A was inserted in the Code to release an undertrial prisoner [other than the one accused of an offence for which death has been prescribed as one of the punishments], who has been under detention for a period extending to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the alleged offence, on his personal bond, with or without sureties.

The intention was also to provide that in no case should an undertrial prisoner be detained beyond the maximum period of imprisonment for which he can be convicted for the alleged offence.

Accordingly, w.e.f. 23rd June 2006, section 436-A was inserted in CrPC. The benevolent provisions of section 436-A are clear and evident from its following language.

“436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained –


Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties.

Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:

Provided further that no such person shall, in any case, be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.

Explanation — In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.”

Indeed, the language of section 436-A of CrPC is self-explanatory and does not require any interpretation. However, to ensure that the case of the accused falls within the parameters of section 436A of CrPC so as to qualify him for the benefit thereunder, it is advisable for the accused to take the help of a professional having expertise in CrPC.

6. After this SC decision, what defences are still available to the litigants? Are they totally defenceless?

Reference may be made to Question No. 4 which gives a broad guideline for defence that may be formulated after a study of the case laws relevant to sections 3, 5, 8,19 and 24.

It may be noted that the strategy for defence must be formulated in consultation with the Counsel who had dealt with the matter in the High Court or subordinate Court before it was carried to the Supreme Court in various civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, SLPs, etc. The order of the Supreme Court passed on 27th July, 2022 clarifies that the interim relief granted by the Supreme Court in the petitions/appeals will continue for a period of 4 weeks from 27th July, 2022, with the liberty to the parties to mention for an early listing of the case including for continuation/vacation of the interim relief.

7. What is the final take of this Supreme Court decision?

The final take of the decision may be summarised by a broad review of the following approach of the Supreme Court.

•    The Supreme Court was seized of 241 civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, special leave petitions, transferred petitions and transferred cases raising various questions of law.

The Government of India, too, had filed appeals and SLPs. There were also few transfer petitions filed before the Supreme Court under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India.

Questions in these petitions, appeals, etc. pertained to the constitutional validity and interpretation of certain provisions of PMLA and other statutes including the Customs Act, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

However, the Apex Court decided to confine to challenge to the validity of certain important provisions of PMLA and their interpretation.

•    In addition to challenges to Constitutional validity and interpretation of provisions of PMLA, there were also SLPs filed against various orders of High Courts and subordinate Courts all over the country with prayers for grant of bail or quashing or discharge.

All such SLPs were rejected by the Supreme Court.

•    Instead of dealing with facts and issues in each case on merits, the Supreme Court confined itself to examining the challenge to the relevant provisions of PMLA, being a question of law raised by parties.

• The question as to whether some of the amendments to the PMLA could not have been enacted by the Parliament by way of a Finance Act was not examined by the Supreme Court. The same was left open for being examined along with the decision of the Larger Bench (seven Judges) of the Supreme Court in Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1.


Identification of Related Parties and Significance of Related Party Transactions

INTRODUCTION
Related party transactions have always been under the scanner of various regulators. Recently, SEBI fined a large group for taking loans from a financial institution, which was its related party, in violation of SEBI regulations and not disclosing such related party transactions. SEBI also recently amended the definition of a related party by widening it to include certain large shareholders and requiring shareholders’ approval for material related party transactions (in terms of value or as a percentage of turnover). Once the party is identified as a related party, there are certain compliances for the company to follow, including provisions relating to approval and voting for such transactions. The Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) provides definition of the term ‘Related party’ u/s 2(76). On the basis of this definition, there are various compliances required under the Act for transactions with related parties. Schedule III to the Act, which prescribes disclosures required in the financial statements of a Company, also requires certain disclosures related to shareholding of promoters, changes in their shareholding during the year, loans or advances in the nature of loans granted to promoters, directors, key management personnel and the other related parties either severally or jointly with any other person, etc. Accounting Standard 18 and Ind AS 24 also define related party relationships.

There are differences in the definition of related party under the Companies Act and accounting standards. For listed entities, SEBI Regulations also define related parties which has additional relationships as compared to Companies Act and accounting standards. For examples, two companies with common director are related parties from the perspective of Companies Act and SEBI, but those may not be related parties under accounting standards.

Therefore, entities need to interpret this term on the basis of all the regulations that apply to them i.e., SEBI (in case of a listed entity), Companies Act (in case of a company) and relevant accounting standard (based on accounting standard framework applicable to the entity). Due to various regulatory requirements applicable to the entities, they are required to identify their related parties and transactions with them during the period. From the auditor’s perspective, such transactions are considered to carry a higher fraud risk due to the nature of relationship.

In this article, we look at the regulatory framework in respect of related party transactions and certain issues while applying the related requirements along with company’s and auditor’s perspective of implementing and auditing these compliances.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Companies Act, 2013

For companies, there are various sections in the Act that aim to ensure that the company’s interest is protected in such transactions. For example,

– Section 185 relates to provisions for giving loans to directors,

– Section 186 restricts the amount of loan or investment a company can make,

– Section 177 requires approval of audit committee for related party transactions,

– Section 188 requires consent of the Board of Directors for specified transactions,

– Section 192 requires approval of members for certain non-cash transactions with directors, etc.

Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 requires the auditor to report on transactions covered under the above sections of the Act. The Companies Act, 2013 also provides for the manner in which the directors are required to disclose their interest in the transaction. Failure to do so attracts penalties for such a director. The Companies Act, 2013 defines the term ‘related party’, but does not provide definition of ‘related party transactions’. However, Section 188 lists certain types of transactions. To protect the interest of the members, specified related party transactions under the Companies Act, 2013 require shareholders’ approval.

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

To achieve a true and fair view of the financial statements, disclosure of related party transactions and their terms is also considered as one of the necessary components. Therefore, accounting standard framework also defines related party relationships, and prescribes disclosures to be made in the financial statements for such transactions, with certain exemptions for government-related entities. With such disclosures, the users of the financial statements understand the impact of such transactions on the overall financial statements. However, accounting standards framework does not establish any recognition or measurement requirements for related party transactions. Such transactions are recognized and measured based on the requirements of the respective accounting standards. For example, if the parent company issues ESOPs to the employees of the subsidiary, the subsidiary shall record the transaction as per accounting standard applicable to ESOPs.

Accounting Standard (AS) 18 and Ind AS (Ind AS) 24 define related parties. Such parties could be other body corporates, individuals or employee benefit plans. However, there are differences in the definition of related party under AS 18 and Ind AS 24.  Definition in Ind AS 24 is wider in scope as compared to AS 18 in terms of close members of the family, key managerial personnel (KMP), control, joint control and significant influence, etc. Ind AS 24 also covers certain relationships  not covered under AS 18 such as joint ventures of the same venturer, joint venture and associate of the same party, certain post-employment benefit plans, parties providing KMP services, etc. Under Ind AS 24, post-employment benefit plans are related if those are for the benefit of employees of either the reporting entity or any entity related to reporting entity. It does not require any influence or control being exercised over such a plan for covering it as a related party.

However, some of the indirect relations may or may not be covered in the definitions of the applicable standard. Therefore, one needs to carefully evaluate the definition of a related party. For example, if A is a joint venture of B, and C is an associate of B, then A and C are related parties of each other under Ind AS 24.  However, C is not a related party of any other associate that B may have (fellow associates). Though this gives somewhat unexpected answer, but due to complexity of relationships, some of such indirect relationships may not get covered in the definition.

Major customers or suppliers are also not considered as related parties under the accounting standards, though in such business relationships, the transactions will have effect of the relationship on the performance of the entity as compared to the transactions with an unrelated party.

Control relationships (e.g., parent, ultimate parent, etc.) gain more importance in the disclosures for which the accounting standards require names of such related parties to be also disclosed. Such control may be with an individual in a promoter-controlled company. Disclosure of names of these parties is required even if there are no transactions with them.

While applying the accounting standards, entities need to understand the appropriate interpretation of certain requirements of the relevant accounting standard. Some of such requirements of Ind AS are discussed below.

WHO ARE KMPs UNDER IND AS 24?

Directors

Directors hold fiduciary capacity vis-à-vis the company. Therefore, they are not expected to use company’s assets or their power for personal gains. As they hold such a position, certain directors are considered as related parties of the company. Ind AS 24 defines KMP as persons having authority and responsibility for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the entity. With this definition, executive directors of the company will usually be covered since they carry such authority and responsibility. The definition also includes any director, whether executive or otherwise. Therefore, even non-executive directors who have such authority and responsibility are KMPs of the company.

CFO, Financial Controller, etc.

Will other senior management personnel such as CFO, Chief Marketing Officer, Chief Legal Officer, Financial Controller, etc. be covered as KMPs under Ind AS 24? There is no one answer here that fits all. KMPs are not restricted to directors. Other senior management members also may be KMPs. The company needs to evaluate their roles and determine whether they have the above-mentioned authority and responsibility or not. It is not the designation but the role that the individual plays that determines whether he / she is a KMP or not.

Members of Strategy Board

In some companies, the Strategy Board assists the Board of Directors to set the overall strategy for the company, and  also implements such a strategy. In such cases, members of the Strategy Board are also KMPs. Similarly non-directors who are responsible for key planning, directing and controlling key activities, such as treasury, investments, etc. can also be KMPs in cases of companies which have such functions as key operating functions.

Therefore, all directors may not be KMPs and KMPs need not be only directors.

KMPs for a group

The group consists of a parent and one or more subsidiaries. Each component of the group would have its own KMP, but the question is who are KMPs for the group as a whole. For example, an investment company invests in a subsidiary which is an operating company. In such case, KMPs of the subsidiary company will also be KMPs of the group because subsidiary contributes significantly to the group’s results.

Non-individual KMPs

Given that the definition of KMP does not restrict to individuals; non-individuals, such as another entity, that provides the functions as given in the definition of KMP, is also a related party as KMP for the reporting entity. For example, investment funds may have investment managers as KMPs which are entities and not individuals.

Once an individual is identified as a KMP, the scope of identification of related parties also expands to close members of that person’s family and certain related parties of such a close member of that person’s family.

TRANSACTIONS WITH KMPs

Accounting standards require specific disclosures for transactions with KMPs including specific elements of their remuneration. Usually, in practice, such disclosures are made on an aggregate basis, and not for each KMP. Though materiality is an overarching principle for making disclosures, sometimes it is incorrectly used by considering only quantitative measurement for not making such disclosures. However, one needs to consider qualitative aspects as well of such disclosure required by the accounting standard.

RELATIONSHIP PERIOD

Another interesting issue is what is the scope of requirement if the relationship ceases or new relationship gets established during the reporting period. Whether related parties should be considered as at the year end? Though accounting standards do not explicitly cover this matter, relationships should be considered during the period, and not only at the year end. Transactions taking place after cessation of relationship are not considered as related party transactions.

RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
Once related parties are identified, the next step is to identify related party transactions. AS 18 and Ind AS 24 both provide the definition of related party transactions. Both accounting standards explicitly clarify that transactions for which no price is charged are also covered in related party transactions. Accordingly, if the KMP of a holding company is also a KMP of its subsidiary company, for which no remuneration is paid by the subsidiary company, services received from such a KMP is also a related party transaction for the subsidiary and provision of services is a related party transaction for the holding company. In another example, if employees of subsidiary are used by the holding company for which no charge is made by the subsidiary company, transaction should be disclosed by both the companies as related party transactions.

SEBI REGULATIONS

For listed entities, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has included certain compliance requirements in its SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations. These regulations prescribe approval mechanism and require disclosure of specified transactions which are transactions between the listed entity and the related party. The investors obtain better perspective of the performance of the company, and their interests are protected through these requirements. This mechanism also helps  monitor funds movement between the listed entity and the related party.

In SEBI regulations, certain related party transactions are identified as material when they exceed the specified threshold given in Regulation 23(1). However, there are certain interpretational issues while applying such thresholds to the transaction such as what constitutes a transaction on which such limits are to be applied, whether group of related transactions are treated as a single transaction, etc. The definition of related party is revised in the regulations and the revised definition applies from 1st  April, 2023. The revised definition refers to purpose and effect of the transaction. In practical scenario, determining the purpose and effect of the transaction is going to be a challenge.

COMPANY’S PERSPECTIVE

Internal controls framework

Companies need to design and implement internal controls framework around:

–    Identification of related parties.

–    Approval process of related party transactions.

–    Accounting of related party transactions (especially when those are not at arm’s length).

–    Disclosure of related party transactions in the financial statements.

Such internal controls should be tested for their operating effectiveness throughout the year.

AUDITOR’S PERSPECTIVE

Audit of a related party transactions is always a challenge for the auditor. The skepticism for such transactions is set at higher limits for the auditor. The auditor needs to understand business rationale for such transactions. When such rationale is lacking, it may not meet the ‘smell test’ and would require additional audit procedures to be carried out to fulfil auditor’s responsibility and understand impact of such transactions on the financial statements. There is also a possibility of non-genuine transactions being recorded when the counter party is a related party. Standard on Auditing 550 – Related Parties deals with auditor’s responsibilities related to fraud risk, understanding the impact of related party transactions on the financial statements and obtaining audit evidence for such transactions.

As part of the audit process, apart from the business rationale as mentioned above, the auditor should also evaluate the consideration received or paid for such transactions to assess whether those transactions were carried out at arm’s length or not. If the transactions are not at arm’s length, then the reasons for determining such pricing, its impact on accounting of such transactions, etc. are additional factors that the auditor should consider.

As seen in some  corporate scandals, the challenge for the auditor in the audit process was to unearth the related party transactions due to the fact that such transactions were camouflaged to depict as transactions with non-related parties. Parties that have control, significant influence or power to take decisions of the transactions may use opportunity which is not in the interest of the company. As a result, to evaluate KMPs of the company and therefore other related parties is one of the high-risk area from the audit perspective.

As a part of the audit, the auditor shall audit the identification of related parties as well as adequacy and correctness of the disclosures made in the financial statements for related party transactions.

STANDALONE ENTITY

Consider the transactions which prima facie do not seem to be a commercial transaction. For example, loans given by the entity for which there are no agreed terms of repayments and repayment schedule, changing the supplier without inviting quotations from other players in the market, non-monetary transactions involving property of the entity, transactions outside the normal course of business, etc. It is likely that such transactions are entered with related parties which may lack commercial substance. In such situations, the auditor needs to remain more alert and obtain persuasive audit evidence to determine the nature and objective of such transactions.

GROUP STRUCTURES

As one would expect, identification of related parties is more complex in group structures with various subsidiaries, associates, etc., because each component of the group may have its own related parties. Therefore, group audits pose a higher challenge for the group auditor in audit of related party transactions. Usually, the group auditor, as part of his audit instructions, shall inform the component auditor of various related parties of the group entities. The component auditor is expected to exercise higher skepticism while auditing the transactions entered into with the parties that may not be related party of the component that has entered into the transaction but is a related party to the overall group or to some other component in the group.

CONCLUSION

Related party identification and transactions with related parties has always been a key concern for regulators across the world. Therefore, regulations around such transactions are being tightened over the period. Though on one side it undoubtedly protects the interests of the members and other stakeholders, on the other side, unless the principle is followed in substance as per its intent, no regulation can prevent misuse of relationships in the business transactions. Therefore, governance mechanism of the entity and its code of ethics are the real safeguards for protecting the interests of the entity. Management and those charged with governance, board of directors, audit committee, etc. are collectively guardians of the interest of the company. If they play their role responsibly, it is only then that the expected transparency of related party transactions will be achieved.

How Well Rounded are Rules about Rounding off Numbers in Financials Statements?

Financial Statements (FS) indicate a company’s financial performance and position. In case of Public Interest Entities (PIE), FS serves numerous people/bodies like shareholders, analysts, regulators, etc.

The idea behind any reporting, is to enable the reader to gather information in a way she can comprehend with ease. Comprehension by reader is the ultimate test that a preparer should measure up his reporting, so that it is of value. IASB has also stated that understandability is an important feature that preparers of financial statements must strive for.

This short article walks you through the rule regarding ‘rounding off’ of figures in the financial statements under the Companies Act, 2013 as required by Schedule III – the absurdities, excesses and anomalies.

PRESENT LAW

Schedule III lays out the manner of presentation of financial statements and other information to ensure they give a true and fair view. In relation to rounding off of numbers, Schedule III mandates:

(i) Depending upon the Total Income of the company, the figures appearing in the Financial Statements shall be rounded off as given below:-

Total Income

Rounding Off

(a) less than one hundred crore rupees

To the nearest hundreds, thousands, lakhs
or millions, or decimals thereof.

(b) one hundred crore rupees or more

To the nearest lakhs, millions or crores,
or decimals thereof.

(ii) Once a unit of measurement is used, it should be used uniformly in the Financial Statements.

Emphasis supplied for the word shall, as it replaced the word may on 24th March, 2021.

The aforesaid provisions and changes of 24th March, 2021 imply:

a.    Rounding off is a part of ‘disclosure’ requirements of the Act and compliance with accounting standards (as section and Schedule speak of them as the leading criteria).

b.    Rounding off is mandatory (so it appears from the language of the clause and the amendment).

c.    If you do not round off, you are in violation of the Companies Act, 2013.

d.    Fine of Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 5,00,000 and even imprisonment of up to 1 year is prescribed under Section 129(7) of the Companies Act, 2013.

It is important to find out about ‘global best practices’ which ministers and MPs speak of with confidence, for convenience and selective expediency. FASB and IASB do not mandate rounding off. The idea is to refrain from RULES and rather set PRINCIPLES, and hence Ind AS / IAS 1.51.e and 1.53 talk of disclosure of level of rounding off (thousands, lakhs, millions or crores) when an entity rounds off to make it ‘understandable’.

However, MCA has made it mandatory. Additionally, it came out with this change, without ‘disclosure’ of any reason behind the change! How about a discussion? How about giving some background? Are there any issues that this mandate will address? In a lighter vein such ‘notifications’ including parts of CARO or Schedule III without discussion appear to be ‘naughtyfications’ because there is more mischief than meaning.   

PURPOSE AND COMPREHENDING NUMBERS

Let’s keep the above legal requirement on the side for a moment and look at other facets of rounding off. Rounding off is a trade-off of precision for comprehension. The numbers are also used to compare them with similar numbers of other entities. So numbers allow us not only to read FS of a company but also help us compare with numbers of other companies.

Rounding off also helps unwieldy numbers to be readable and fit for grasping easily. However, in most cases, rounding off should be used for publishing financial information and may not be necessary in actual FS. FS adoption ideally should be with full numbers, but what is circulated / published can be different from it. The rounding off prescribed in Schedule III many a times defeats the very purpose of rounding off. Here is how:

The way people understand numbers is quite peculiar. This becomes difficult when the numbers are rounded off a certain way. Look at the following table:

Sr.
No.

Number

What is it

How we
comprehend it

1

10,00,00,000

This is the actual Number

It is understood just the way it is. Just as we understand a WORD –
Coconut – we understand this number to be
10 Crores.

2

1000,000

When rounded in hundred

Each of the numbers given against Sr. No. 2 to 5 are meant to be
understood as 10 Cr but only because the legend says so that they are rounded
to 100s or 1000s etc.

3

100,000

When rounded in lacs

4

10

When rounded in crores

5

100

When rounded in millions

What rounding off says is that items listed in Sr. No. 1 to 5 mean the same thing. When you read the number ALONG with the rounding off LEGEND in your brain you have to UNROUND it to understand. Why? Because the number gives scale, and the scale is known by quantum. So, one has to un-round it to understand how large or small the values are. Because when the brain reads 100 as given in Sr. 5 it cannot recognize it as 10,00,00,000 given in Sr 1. It will have to use a TRANSLATION of rounding off legend to arrive at the real value.

PROBLEM 1: ABSURD RESULTS

Let’s see if the FS of a company are in thousands – 4 digits. Now, some numbers in the FS are in hundreds. This will put all numbers in single or double digits or even decimals. Obviously, this doesn’t make it easier to ‘comprehend’. Say an Intangible is already fully depreciated and having WDV that is 5% of its value can disappear from PPE Schedule entirely due to rounding off.

PROBLEM 2: INCONSISTENT LAWS

While rounding off is mandatory for presentation of FS, under the same Companies Act, 2013, and when it comes to submission of FS annually to the MCA under Form AOC 4, you have to provide un-rounded figures. There is no choice to give numbers in ‘00 or ‘000. Only full numbers are permitted. The question is: for Form AOC4 – should one add 0s that were removed to round off to comply with the Schedule III or will AOC4 need exact figures full numbers which are not audited or are in an Excel?

How will the compliance professional certify the AOC4 – when actual signed FS are rounded or can he adopt un-rounding basis stated above?

Which are the final numbers – the one with rounded amounts or one with actual numbers that are not ‘signed’ or approved for all other legal purposes whether under the Act or other laws?

Consider the departments/boards under the same Ministry of Finance – will they accept rounded figures? Say, Income Tax returns need full figures. GST returns need full figures.

PROBLEM 3: TWO FS   

Some clients want two FS. One for meeting rounding off requirement, and the other for tax and other purposes. Their CS is asking; which numbers should he take to fill the form?

PROBLEM 4: ROUNDING OFF AND CASTING

For smaller enterprises, rounding off makes, preparing FS even more difficult. There is already a problem with matching totals in Notes to main pages of FS and ensuring casting is correct.

PROBLEM 5: MAKING NUMBERS LOOK SMALLER

More than the technical and accounting considerations, an unintended consequence of this mandate for small companies is YOU ARE MAKING ME SUDDENLY LOOK SMALLER. Full numbers when I carry in my balance sheet is a feel-good factor and a contributing factor to confidence and external respect. As a slightly extra rounded person, I would like to
look less rounded (pun intended), but would definitely not want my financials to look ‘leaner’. Soft factors do matter.

WHAT MCA SHOULD CONSIDER?

1.    Prescribe comma placement – this is the single most important factor for improving the readability of numbers. Not placing a comma is a catastrophe for number reading and shows careless disregard for the reader.

2.    Prescribe a minimum font size – it’s impossible to read small fonts, especially in printed material. But even for e-copies, there should be a minimum font size.

3.    Allow only lacs and crores, not millions and crores – Million is another way to put comma. India needs to decide where it stands, lacs/ crores or thousands/ millions. But this is not the most important point although the Companies Act, 2013 sections generally specify numbers in crores and lacs.

4.    Rounding off threshold can be raised –
When a number becomes unwieldy – say HPCL Income of Rs. 250,000 Crores – 25,00,00,00,00,000 (eleven zeros) then rounding off makes sense.

5.    Rounding off for publication and not adoption – For most companies allow actual numbers and for publication purposes, rounding off can be done by management. FS need not be rounded off in most cases. FS are used for FULL numbers by most stakeholders and full numbers have more meaning for purposes that are of regulatory consequence.

6.    Materiality should be the basis of rounding off – A Rs. 1,000 Crores assets company, with a turnover of Rs. 5,000 Crores, could have a materiality of say 5 per cent of assets or 1 per cent of sales – about Rs. 50 Crores. This company can round off in crores. Less than 3 digit crores, perhaps require no rounding.

7.    For private limited companies which are not public interest entities, they should be out of the tangles of rounding off. The preparers and readers are SAME and obviously, the government has NOTHING to read into those financials. Even if they wanted to, they can read from exact numbers.

8.    Form AOC-4 should permit expressly rounded amounts or allow 000xxs to be added instead of actual numbers.

Finally, ease of doing business should guide such decisions. ‘Shall’ we say, rounding off ‘may’ be unwound a bit to make it well rounded.


GLoBE Rules: Some Special Rules, Administrative and Compliance Aspects – Part 3

[This is the concluding part of a 3-part series on GloBE Rules. The first part was published in the August, 2022 issue of BCAJ (“Pillar 2: An Introduction to Global Minimum Taxation and the second part (“GloBE Rules – Determination of Effective Tax Rate (ETR) and Top-Up Tax (TUT”)) was published in September, 2022 BCAJ.]

TO REFRESH ON EARLIER PARTS
In the previous two articles, we discussed how GloBE Rules apply, when the effective tax rate (ETR) computed at a jurisdictional level is less than 15 per cent, and, how a top-up tax (TUT) is levied to achieve at least 15 per cent tax in each jurisdiction where the MNE Group has a presence in the form of a subsidiary or a permanent establishment (PE). For this purpose, each subsidiary or PE is referred to as a constituent entity (CE) of the MNE Group. We also discussed certain nuances around the computation of ETR – which, as aforesaid, is calculated on a country-by-country basis as a fraction of adjusted covered tax (numerator) upon GloBE income (denominator). While ETR is primarily linked to book results based on ‘fit for consolidation’’ accounts, specified adjustments, coupled with options/choices, make the exercise fairly complex and unique. Moreover, we also discussed hierarchical rules (i.e. top-down approach of income inclusion rule) for recovery of such TUT.

Having discussed the above, in this third and final part of this series, we shall discuss some special provisions under GloBE Rules dealing with business reorganizations, joint ventures, and PEs. Towards the end, we shall also discuss administrative and compliance aspects, which shall soon become a new way of life for MNE Groups covered by GloBE Rules.

NEGATIVE ADJUSTED COVERED TAX DUE TO SUPER/WEIGHTED DEDUCTIONS

In Part II of this series, we discussed how deferred tax accounting impacts adjusted covered tax in the calculation of ETR for a jurisdiction. We will now level up a notch further and discuss a specific complexity of the GloBE Rules associated with deferred tax accounting.

Ordinarily, a jurisdiction that has zero GloBE income or GloBE loss may not trigger any GloBE TUT liability. This is because the ETR cannot be computed as the denominator is zero or a negative amount. Still, it is possible that the tax loss is higher than the book loss (or GloBE loss) – if local tax rules allow a weighted deduction of specific expenses (to incentivize specific activities, such as R&D) in computing taxable income.

Assume that, in year 1, there is a book loss of 1,000, and tax loss of 1,500, the difference of 500 being on account of weighted deduction. Assume that, in year 2, there is a book profit of 1,500, and a tax loss of  year 1 is fully offset, resulting in zero local tax liability in year 2. Assume that such jurisdiction’s local tax rate is 15 per cent.

In books, DTA of 225 is recognized for tax loss in year 1 (i.e. 1,500 x 15 per cent), which is reversed in year 2. ETR of year 2 is calculated as 225 / 1,500. Since ETR (after reckoning reversal of DTA) is 15 per cent, there is no GloBE TUT liability in year 2. Thus, there is no requirement under GloBE Rules to exclude reversal of DTA attributable to tax loss arising on account of weighted deduction, while determining ETR of year 2.

To ensure that the TUT is collected in year 1 itself, when a tax incentive of weighted deduction is claimed, despite year 1 having zero GloBE income or GloBE loss, a special provision1 requires payment of GloBE TUT liability. Such a liability is not based on ETR formula. According to such provision, where adjusted covered tax (after reckoning generation of DTA) is less than [GloBE loss x 15 per cent], the difference straightaway becomes TUT liability. In the example on hand, in year 1, adjusted covered tax (after reckoning generation of DTA) is negative 225, and GloBE loss x 15 per cent is negative 150 (negative 1,000 x 15 per cent). The difference between negative 225 and negative 150 is 75, which straightaway becomes TUT liability in year 1.


1    Article 4.1.5

This provision has been perceived to be harsh because TUT liability is payable despite the jurisdiction having earned zero GloBE income or GloBE loss. Representations have been made to modify this provision, and OECD is evaluating the same.

In Indian Income-tax Act (ITA), weighted deductions [along the lines of s.35(2AB) of ITA] have been phased out. ITA has a weighted deduction only in the form of s.80JJAA, which is allowed only against positive gross total income – such an incentive cannot be availed in a case of tax loss. But, if a CE in India generates DTA on account of business reorganization (as illustrated in the ensuing paras), such a DTA can result in TUT liability under the above provision, despite the jurisdiction having zero GloBE income or GloBE loss in the year of generation of such DTA.

BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS TAKING PLACE AFTER GLOBE RULES ARE EFFECTIVE2

Where gain on account of tax neutral transfers is recognized in P&L account as prepared for the purpose of ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts, in absence of any specific adjustment in GloBE Rules, such a gain can trigger TUT liability. This may result in nullifying fiscal incentive provided under domestic tax laws of the jurisdiction for tax neutral transfers. GloBE Rules aim to avoid such an outcome, and preserve tax neutrality for transfer of assets and liabilities, if following cumulative conditions are met.

•    Consideration for transfer is, in whole or in significant part, discharged by way of equity interests.

•    The transferor’s gain is not subject to tax (under the domestic tax laws).

•    The transferee is required (under the domestic tax laws) to compute taxable income using transferee’s tax basis of the assets (i.e. no cost step-up).

If all the above three conditions are met – in GloBE calculations, for transferor, gain recognized in P&L account is excluded from the GloBE income – and therefore, is exempt from TUT liability. For transferee, carrying values of assets taken over, for the purpose of GloBE calculations, are pegged to those of transferor (i.e. no cost step-up in computation of GloBE income).


2 Readers may note that, this article only discusses GloBE Rules applicable to transfers of assets and liabilities, as per articles 6.3.1 to 6.3.32. There are separate rules for corporate transformations (such as conversion of company into another business vehicle such as LLP) or migration from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction, which are not discussed in this article.

However, if any one of the above three conditions are not met – gain on account of a transfer recognized in P&L account, which is tax-exempt as per domestic tax laws, cannot be excluded in computation of GloBE income of the transferor, and therefore, can trigger TUT liability. For transferee, carrying values for GloBE calculations are based on cost as recognized in the books (after step-up, if any).

Example 1: Business transfer by a holding company to a wholly-owned subsidiary

Assume that, the FCo (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group), has a holding company in India, which in turn has a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) in India. After GloBE Rules are applied to FCo, the holding company transfers a capital asset (e.g., an intangible asset) having a book value of 1,000 to WOS, at a fair price of 11,000, for cash consideration. In ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts, the holding company recognizes a gain of 10,000, whereas WOS recognizes such a capital asset at 11,0003.

For local tax purposes, the holding company claims capital gains tax exemption u/s 47(iv) of ITA on 10,000; and the cost in the hands of WOS is pegged to 1,000 on account of Explanation 6 to s.43(1) of ITA.


3 As per our understanding, and subject to confirmation of accounting experts, it is only for common control business transfer that IFRS/Ind-AS mandates the transferee to recognise at book value of transferor. This mandate may not apply to an asset transfer, which, the transferor and transferee may record at the transaction value.

In computing the GloBE income of the holding company in the year of the aforesaid transfer, a question arises, whether the gain of 10,000, recognized in P&L account can be excluded? The first condition (namely that consideration for the transfer is, in whole or in significant part, discharged by way of equity interests) is not satisfied in the present case. To recollect, for excluding gain from GloBE income, all the three conditions stated aforesaid need to be cumulatively satisfied. In the present case, only the second and third conditions are satisfied (namely, the ‘transferor’s gain is not subject to tax; and the transferee is required to compute taxable income using the transferee’s tax basis of the assets) and not the first condition. This may result in a gain of 10,000 being included in GloBE income and therefore, being subject to TUT liability.

In the case of WOS, the cost of capital asset as per books is 11,000. However, for the computation of a taxable income as per ITA, such cost is pegged to 1,000 on account of Explanation 6 to s.43(1) of ITA. Consequently, WOS is expected to have higher capital gains tax liability upon the sale of a such capital asset. Therefore, a question is whether WOS can recognize the provision for DTL of 2,500 (namely book to tax difference of 10,000 x 25 per cent applicable tax rate) in the year of acquisition of such capital asset? Under Ind-AS, WOS may not be able to recognize such a provision for DTL due to the “initial recognition exception” in para 15 of Ind-AS 12.

As a result, TUT liability is likely to arise in the case on hand – because, in the year of transfer of a capital asset, a gain of 10,000 recognized in P&L account of the holding company remains included in GloBE income as aforesaid (to recollect, GloBE income is computed at a jurisdictional level, by clubbing book results of the holding company and WOS). Still, there are no corresponding taxes payable on such a gain (either in the form of provision for DTL or provision for current tax because of exemption u/s 47(iv) of ITA).

In the future, assuming there is a violation of conditions of s.47(iv) of ITA and the holding company pays capital gains tax u/s 47A in the year of transfer to WOS, there is no clarity on the GloBE’s impact on the holding company and WOS. As GloBE Rules presently stand, such capital gains tax discharged by the holding company can be reckoned in adjusted covered tax (namely, numerator of ETR) only in a future year when such tax is provided for in the books of the holding company. Hence, there may be no ability to claim a refund of TUT liability already discharged in the year of transfer to WOS.

Example 2: Common control demerger

Assume that FCo (the ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group), has two wholly owned subsidiaries in India; namely DCo and RCo. DCo has two business undertakings, namely U1 and U2. U2 is demerged in favour of RCo under a tax-neutral demerger as per s.2(19AA) of ITA, where RCo issues equity shares to FCo as a consideration for such demerger. As DCo and RCo are considered entities under common control, in the ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts prepared as per IFRS/Ind-AS, both DCo and RCo would record the business transfer at book value. There is no gain recorded in the P&L account of DCo. Accordingly, the question of levying TUT liability as a consequence of tax-neutral demerger may not arise in the present  case.

Without prejudice to the above, even assuming DCo were to prepare ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts based on some other accounting standards other than IFRS/Ind-AS and recognize gain in P&L account w.r.t. tax neutral demerger, due to satisfaction of all three conditions specified aforesaid, such a gain may qualify for exclusion in computing GloBE income of DCo. To recollect, three conditions are as under:

•    Consideration for transfer is, in whole or in significant part, discharged by way of equity interests [namely; RCo issues equity shares to overseas parent of DCo].

•    The transferor’s gain is not subject to tax [namely; DCo’s gain, if any, is exempt from capital gains tax u/s. 47(vib) of ITA].

•    The transferee is required compute taxable income using transferee’s tax basis in the assets [namely; cost base in hands of RCo is pegged to that of DCo, as per Explanation 7A to s.43(1) of ITA and Explanation 2A to s.43(6) of ITA].

Example 3: Non common control demerger


 Tax neutral demerger of U2, by DCo to RCo.

Assume that, FCo1 (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group), has a subsidiary in India, namely, DCo. DCo has two business undertakings; namely U1 and U2. FCo2 (ultimate parent entity of another unrelated MNE Group), also has a subsidiary in India, namely, RCo. U2 (having book value of 1,000) is demerged by DCo in favour of RCo, pursuant to a tax neutral demerger as per s.2(19AA) of ITA. RCo issues equity shares (having fair value of 11,000) to FCo1 as consideration for such demerger.

DCo and RCo are considered to be entities not under common control. In ‘fit for consolidation ‘accounts’ of DCo, in terms of Appendix A of Ind-AS 10, DCo recognizes a dividend payable of 11,000 (by taking into account fair value of shares to be issued by RCo to FCo1) by debit to reserves or retained earnings. Such dividend payable of 11,000 is settled by transfer of business having book value of 1,000 and difference of 10,000 is credited to P&L account of DCo. D Co does not pay any capital gains tax [as per s.47(vib) of ITA] and DCo also does not pay any minimum alternate tax [as per s.115JB(2A)(d) of ITA] in respect of such gain credited to P&L account.

Where all the three conditions are met, gain of 10,000 credited to P&L account can be excluded from GloBE income of DCo. In the present case:

•    Consideration for transfer is, in whole or in significant part, discharged by way of equity interests [namely; RCo issues equity shares to FCo1, the overseas parent of DCo].

•    The transferor’s gain is not subject to tax [namely; DCo’s gain, if any, is exempt from capital gains tax
u/s 47(vib) of ITA as also from MAT tax u/s 115JB(2A)(d)].

•    The transferee is required to compute taxable income using the transferee’s tax basis in the assets, [namely; the cost base in the hands of RCo is pegged to that of DCo, as per Explanation 7A to s.43(1) of ITA and Explanation 2A to s.43(6) of ITA].

However, assuming RCo were to claim cost step-up in respect of assets received upon demerger while computing taxable income as per ITA [by relying on Supreme Court’s decision in case of Smiffs Securities (2012) (348 ITR 302)], the third condition is not satisfied. In such a case, a gain of 10,000, credited to the P&L account of D Co, cannot be excluded from the GloBE income of DCo and may be subject to TUT liability.

Example 4: Tax exempt transfer by LLP to company u/s 47(xiii) of ITA

Assume that the FCo (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group) has a 99 per cent interest in an LLP, where intellectual property assets are predominant. The enterprise value of such LLP is 11,000, comprising tangible assets of 1,000 and self-generated brand of 10,000. For diverse commercial considerations, the following reorganization is implemented after GloBE Rules are introduced:

•    FCo to incorporate ICo.

•    LLP to transfer business as slump sale to ICo for agreed monetary consideration of 11,000 i.e. fair value, to be discharged in the form of allotment of equity shares by ICo to FCo.

•    ICo is to allot equity shares to FCo at a premium, such that the aggregate issue price is 11,000.

LLP and partners comply with all conditions of s.47(xiii) of ITA, and thus qualify for exemption u/s 47(xiii) of ITA. ICo allocates 1,000 to tangible assets and 10,000 to identifiable intangible assets (being brand). For the present case study, one may proceed on the assumption that purchase price allocation is on a fair and reasonable basis and that ICo is entitled to claim depreciation u/s 32 on intangible assets of 10,000 over 4 years basis SLM (assumed for simplicity). In terms of s.49(1)(iii)(e) of ITA, ICo cannot claim any cost step-up while computing capital gains on transfer of brand.

In the ‘‘fit for consolidation’ accounts, in terms of IFRS/Ind-AS, accounting principles applicable to a common control business combination are applied. Accordingly, both LLP and ICo recognize business transfer at book value of the transferor. The following is the accounting treatment adopted in P&L account forming part of ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts:

•    LLP recognizes profits of 10,000 in partner’s capital a/c (or other equity a/c), and not in P&L a/c.

•    ICo recognizes LLP’s assets in books based on carrying values of transferor, at 1,000 – as this is a common control business combination. As ICo does not recognize brand in books, ICo does not provide any amortization of such brand in books, year on year.

•    Considering that tax base of assets is higher by 10,000 and having regard to applicable tax rate of 25 per cent, ICo recognizes DTA of 2,500.

•    Over next 4 years, DTA as recognized will be reversed by debit to P&L a/c as and when amortization for local tax purposes is claimed by ICo. In the facts of the case, such unwinding will be at 625 per annum (namely, yearly depreciation of 2,500 x 25 per cent tax rate) over next four years.

In GloBE calculations of LLP, no adverse implications are likely to arise, because, as aforesaid, LLP does not record any gain on business transfer in P&L account.

In GloBE calculations of ICo, unless the three conditions aforesaid are cumulatively satisfied, DTA recognized by ICo in the year of business acquisition is likely to reduce adjusted covered tax (numerator of ETR). To recollect, generation of DTA reduces adjusted covered tax (and consequently, reduces ETR), and can result in potential TUT liability. A negative ETR also attracts TUT liability4.

In the present facts, the third condition of non-grant of cost step-up (namely; the transferee is required to compute taxable income using transferee’s tax basis in the assets) is not fulfilled. As a result, in GloBE calculations of ICo, DTA generated of 2,500 at 25 per cent tax rate will be recast to 1,500 at 15 per cent tax rate. There could be potential TUT liability on this account, unless the same is shielded by other high-taxed incomes in India.


4  For e.g., assuming ETR is -10 per cent, TUT percentage is 25 per cent [calculated as 15 per cent – (10 per cent) = 25 per cent].

IMPACT OF NON-TAX NEUTRAL BUSINESS TRANSFER

Assume that FCo (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group) has two wholly owned subsidiaries in India, ICo1 and ICo2. ICo1 transfers business having a book value of 1,000 to ICo2, at fair price of 11,000. The business transfer is not tax neutral (i.e. it is taxable in India). However, in the present case, ICo1 does not pay any capital gains tax on the business transfer because ICo1 sets off capital loss incurred on account of the sale of shares of an associate. Thus, specific to this transaction, ICo1’s tax liability as per ITA is nil.

In ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts, as this is a common control business combination, ICo1 does not recognize any gain on business transfer, and ICo2 records business acquisition at a book value of 1,000. Absent recognition of a gain in the P&L account, there is no TUT liability concerning ICo1. Also, as discussed in the previous part of this article, the capital loss on account of sale of shares of an associate is ignored in computing GloBE income of ICo1. In other words, while such capital loss has gone to reduce capital gains tax liability as per ITA, such a capital loss does not enter the calculation of GloBE income (namely, the denominator of ETR).

As the business transfer is not tax-neutral, ICo2 is eligible for a cost step-up in computing taxable income as per ITA. In ‘fit for ‘consolidation’ accounts, ICo2 recognizes DTA to reflect tax benefit on account of higher depreciation u/s 32 of ITA on the stepped-up cost. In the present case, DTA recognized by ICo2 in the year of business acquisition is 2,500 (book to tax difference of 10,000 x 25 per cent tax rate). For GloBE calculations of ICo2, such generation of DTA will be recast to 1,500 at 15 per cent tax rate. As the generation of DTA reduces adjusted covered tax, there could be a potential TUT liability on this account, unless the same is shielded by other high-taxed incomes in India.

ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS FOR INTRA-GROUP ASSET TRANSFERS AFTER 30th NOVEMBER, 2021 BUT BEFORE APPLICABILITY OF GLoBE RULES

Article 9.1.3 provides that, in the case of intra-group asset transfers (i.e. amongst constituent entities of the same MNE Group) effected after 30th November, 20215 but before applicability of GloBE Rules, GloBE income of transferee will be calculated by taking into account the carrying values of transferor6.

5    30th November, 2021 is when GloBE Rules were expected to be published – though they actually got published on 20th December, 2021. Article 9.1.3 is a specific anti avoidance provision to control restructuring which may happen after 30th November 2021 but before applicability of GloBE Rules, with a view to dilute future GloBE TUT liability – while such restructuring by itself may not attract any immediate GloBE TUT liability because such restructuring happens when GloBE Rules are not yet effective.


6    Additionally, adjusted covered tax of transferee is computed by ignoring adjustments to deferred tax in books of transferee as a result of such intra-group asset transfers. This is also clarified by OECD Secretariat in virtual public consultation meeting held on 25th April, 2022.
The impact of article 9.1.3 is explained using a case study. Assume that, the FCo (ultimate parent entity of an MNE Group), has two subsidiaries, IPCo1 in nil tax jurisdiction and IPCo2 in high-tax jurisdiction (having tax rate of 15 per cent). IPCo1 owns self-generated brand that has book value of zero and fair value of 10,000. On 1st April, 2022 (i.e. after 30th  November, 2021 but before GloBE Rules are effective), IPCo1 transfers the brand to IPCo2 for fair value of 10,000. IPCo2 annually receives royalty income of 5,000 on such brand.

IPCo2 amortizes the cost of such a brand in ‘fit for consolidation’ accounts as also in computation of taxable income at 2,000 per annum over 5 years. The taxable income of IPCo2 for local tax purposes (after deduction of brand amortization) is 3,000, and the local tax liability of IPCo2 at 15 per cent tax rate is 450.

In the absence of article 9.1.3, GloBE income of IPCo2 would have been computed at 3,000, after considering deduction on account of brand amortisation. ETR of IPCo2 would have been 15 per cent (i.e. 450 / 3,000) – and there would have been no GloBE TUT liability in respect of IPCo2.  

Article 9.1.3 provides that, in the present case, the GloBE income of IPCo2 should be based on the carrying value of IPCo1. As a result, the carrying value of the brand is zero in computing the GloBE income of IPCo2. Thus, GloBE income of IPCo2 is 5,000, after disallowing brand amortization of 2,000 per annum. The ETR of IPCo2 is 9 per cent (i.e. 450 / 5,000), which attracts GloBE TUT liability of 6 per cent on GloBE income of 5,000. Article 9.1.3, therefore, seeks to control the cost step-up by shifting the assets from low tax jurisdiction to high tax jurisdiction after 30th November, 2021 but before the applicability of GloBE Rules.7


7    Assuming such a brand transfer happens after GloBE Rules apply, in year of brand transfer, IPCo1 is likely to trigger immediate GloBE TUT liability at 15 per cent on gain of 10,000. In subsequent years, brand amortisation can be deducted in computing GloBE income of IPCo2.

Article 9.1.3 applies, irrespective of whether the intra-group transfer was for business and commercial considerations, such that the test of domestic General Anti Avoidance Rule and/or treaty PPT is passed. Article 9.1.3 applies regardless of whether the transferor and transferee are within the same or in different jurisdictions. However, it does not apply to transfers of inventory.

Article 9.1.3 is agnostic to what may have been the capital gains tax liability of the transferor in its jurisdiction in respect of the intra-group transfer. To illustrate, assuming that the aforesaid transaction of the brand transfer happened between two wholly owned subsidiaries of FCo in India, the transferor WOS may have discharged capital gains tax liability as per ITA on the transfer of self-generated brand at ~20 per cent. A literal application of article 9.1.3 may prevent transferee WOS from deducting brand amortization in computing GloBE income – which may result in GloBE TUT liability because brand amortization is deducted in computing taxable income as per ITA. Representations are made to the OECD to restrict the applicability of Article 9.1.3 to intra-group transfer that is tax exempt in the hands of the transferor, or where the transferor is in low tax jurisdiction. UK HMRC has also acknowledged significant uncertainty on this provision and has stated that this issue is to be raised as part of the GloBE implementation framework.

SPECIAL RULES FOR JOINT VENTURES UNDER GLoBE RULES8

To recollect, GloBE Rules are generally applicable to recover TUT in respect of subsidiaries consolidated on a line-by-line basis in consolidated financial statements of the ultimate parent entity. Under Ind-AS/IFRS, only those entities over which UPE has unitary control qualify for line-by-line consolidation. A joint venture (where both co-venturers have joint or shared control, either equally in a 50:50 stake or unequally in a 51:49 stake) is accounted for as per the equity method in CFS, and not as line-by-line consolidation.

As discussed in the previous article, in computing the GloBE income of the co-venturer, gain/loss as per equity method of the joint venture (as also gain/loss on disposal of shares of the joint venture) is excluded. However, where all the following conditions are satisfied, there are special provisions in GloBE Rules that require the co-venturer to bear TUT liability in respect of his proportionate interest in a joint venture:  

•    JV is an entity accounted for under the equity method in CFS of UPE; and

•    UPE of the co-venturer group directly or indirectly holds >= 50 per cent (i.e. at least 50 per cent) ownership interest
 in such JV; and

•    JV Group (namely, JV and subsidiaries of such JV) is not subject to GloBE Rules.

Where all the above conditions are satisfied, the co-venturer group is required to compute jurisdictional ETR and TUT of the JV Group by treating such JV Group as a separate MNE Group. In other words, assuming the co-venturer group has a WOS in the same jurisdiction as JV, the profit/loss and adjusted covered tax of such WOS cannot be blended with JV while determining jurisdictional ETR and TUT of JV Group.


8    Article 6.4
9    The term ‘ownership interest’ is separately defined under GloBE Rules.

The above concept can be better understood using the following illustration.
Assume that the MNE Group A and MNE Group B are two separate MNE Groups whose consolidated revenue as per CFS crosses €750 million and to whom GloBE Rules are applicable. These MNE Groups have come together and formed a JV Co where each MNE Group has an equal 50 per cent ownership interest. The JV Co is accounted for under equity method in the CFS of these MNE Groups.

The JV Co is merely a holding company which operates through three subsidiaries abroad having operations in zero tax jurisdiction, namely JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3. JV Sub 1 has profit of 10,000. JV Sub 2 has loss of 15,000. JV Sub 3 has profit of 20,000.

JV Co itself prepares CFS to consolidate the results of these subsidiaries, and consolidated revenue as per such CFS is < € 750 million.

In this case, all three conditions specified above are satisfied qua both MNE Groups A and B. Hence, special provisions in GloBE Rules for JV are applicable qua both MNE Groups A and B. As per these special provisions, the jurisdictional ETR/TUT for JV Co Group is calculated separately, as if the JV Co Group is a separate MNE Group – de-hors any subsidiaries that MNE Groups A and B may have in the jurisdiction of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3. For example, assuming MNE Group A has a WOS in the same jurisdiction as JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3, and such WOS incurs a loss of 15,000 – while the aggregate profit of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 is 15,000 – loss of such WOS cannot be blended while determining ETR/TUT of JV Group as the JV Group is deemed as a separate MNE Group.

As per these special provisions, the ultimate parent entity of each co-venturer group that satisfies the three conditions specified above, is subject to TUT liability to the extent of his proportionate ownership interest in JV Co Group. In the present case, jurisdictional ETR of the JV Co Group is zero and its jurisdictional TUT is 15,000 x 15 per cent = 2,250. The MNE Group A is subject to TUT liability of 1,125 and likewise, the MNE Group B is also subject to TUT liability of 1,125. As per top-down approach, if the jurisdiction of the ultimate parent entity of the co-venturer group has not implemented GloBE Rules, such TUT liability can be recovered from the intermediate parent of such co-venturer group which directly or indirectly holds joint ownership interest in JV Co.

Contrastingly, assuming MNE Groups A and B each held 50 per cent ownership interest directly in JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 (without any holding company such as JV Co in between), ETR and TUT liability would have been calculated separately in respect of each of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 – because each of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 would be considered as a separate MNE Group. In this case, for JV Sub 3, MNE Group A would have been subject to TUT liability of 1,500 (namely, jurisdictional profit of 20,000 x 15 per cent x 50 per cent) and for JV Sub 1, MNE Group A would have been subject to TUT liability of 750 (namely; 10,000 x 15 per cent x 50 per cent).

Contrastingly, where MNE Groups A and B each held only 49 per cent ownership interest in JV Co – the remaining 2 per cent held by a third party – the second condition (of holding at least 50 per cent ownership interest) is not satisfied qua both MNE Groups A and B. Hence, special provisions in GloBE Rules for JV are not applicable for both MNE Groups A and B. Hence, neither MNE Group A nor MNE Group B needs to pay TUT liability in respect of JV Co Group.

Contrastingly, where consolidated revenue as per JV cCo’s CFS itself is > € 750 million and the jurisdiction of JV Co has adopted GloBE Rules – the third condition is not satisfied. Hence, special provisions in GloBE Rules for JV are not applicable for both M NE Groups A and B. In this case, the JV Co Group itself becomes an in-scope MNE Group – and the JV Co pays TUT in respect of each of JV Sub 1 to JV Sub 3 as per income inclusion rule. As TUT is recovered from JV Co itself, co-venturer groups are exempt from such TUT.

SPECIAL RULES FOR PEs UNDER GLoBE RULES

In order to ensure parity between different forms of overseas operations (whether through a subsidiary or through a branch), as well as to check the possibility of blending of low-taxed income earned in HO jurisdiction with high taxed income in jurisdiction where PE is situated, under the GloBE Rules, a PE is treated as a separate constituent entity, distinct from its HO or any other PE of such HO10.

In fact, HO with only one or more PEs can also constitute an MNE Group within scope of GloBE Rules even if there are no other subsidiaries (subject however to satisfaction of revenue threshold being >= € 750 million)11. For example, a large pharmaceutical MNE having only domestic manufacturing and R&D operations deriving revenue mainly from exports can constitute an MNE Group even in absence of overseas subsidiaries, if there are branch offices in overseas location/s which satisfy any of the four limbs of PE stated below.

What is a PE?12

For GloBE purposes, the term PE is defined broadly to have 4 legs (paragraphs) as below:

•    Para (a) – Treaty PE: Covers cases where a place of business is situated in the source jurisdiction, which is treated as a PE, following the applicable tax treaty (which has come into effect) between the HO-source jurisdiction and source jurisdiction taxes the income “attributable” to such PE in accordance with a provision “similar” to the business profits article of OECD Model Convention (MC) 2017 – irrespective of whether such applicable treaty between HO-source jurisdiction replicates the language or outcomes of Article 7 of OECD MC 2017. Treaty PE will typically include a Fixed PE and other forms of deemed PEs (like Service PE, Agency PE, Construction PE) which form a part of the HO-Source Jurisdiction tax treaty. However, cases where a place of business is not treated as a PE as per treaty due to a specific exception, such as the preparatory or auxiliary exception, may not be covered by Para (a). Similarly, the HO jurisdiction engaged in the operation of an aircraft in international traffic sets up a place of business in the source jurisdiction for such purpose, profits that are not taxed in the source jurisdiction due to specific exemption. This may not be covered by Para (a).


10    Article 1.3.1 and 1.3.2
11    Article 1.2.1 and 1.2.3
12    Article 10.1


•    Para (b) – Domestic PE: Covers cases where there is no tax treaty between the HO-source jurisdiction – and where the source jurisdiction has adopted a definition and taxation rules of PE (or a similar concept) in its domestic law, such that it taxes the income attributable to such PE on a net-basis, identical to the manner in which it taxes its residents. For example, business connection u/s 9(1) of ITA. Interesting questions may arise about whether Para (b) of the PE definition may extend to cover virtual presence (for example, SEP), assuming the same is taxed on a net basis.

•    Para (c) – Hypothetical PE: Covers cases where there is no tax treaty between the HO-source jurisdiction, and where the source jurisdiction does not have a corporate tax system, where a place of business in the source jurisdiction  would be treated as a PE under the OECD MC – and such PE would have been taxed under Article 7 dealing with business profits of such OECD MC13. Illustratively, this may be relevant for an HO in India which has a branch/presence/project in the Cayman Islands which passes the threshold of PE presence as per Article 5 of OECD MC 2017, which would have been taxed as per Article 7 of OECD MC 2017, but the Cayman Islands does not have a corporate tax system, and India does not have a treaty with Cayman Islands.


13    Interestingly, for this purpose, while the Model Rules define the OECD MC as referring to the 2017 update, the Commentary goes on to state that the “last version… of the year in which the analysis is made” to determine presence of PE

•    Para (d) – Stateless PE: This is a residual category applicable where none of the above legs of the PE definition are triggered, and yet, the HO jurisdiction exempts the income earned from activities in the source jurisdiction on account of their overseas nature and follows ?exemption method’ in order to provide relief from double taxation on such income. This category acknowledges that HO jurisdiction may provide exemption under domestic law for overseas operations in a situation where there is neither a treaty nor a domestic law in jurisdiction leading to double non-taxation for PE profits. A case where there is no treaty and no domestic tax law in source jurisdiction but HO jurisdiction does not provide exemption for overseas operations is covered by para (c) above – while Para (d) effectively deals with situations of double non-taxation as illustrated above.

Importantly, as contradistinguished from other types of PEs covered by Paras (a) to (c) above, a PE covered by Para (d) is considered stateless of the GloBE Rules, meaning that the income of the PE would be subject to the GloBE Rules on a standalone basis without the benefit of jurisdictional blending with profits/ losses of other constituent entities located either in HO or in source jurisdiction.

Generally, a PE is located in the jurisdiction where it is treated as a PE, and is subject to tax14 [except in case of Stateless PE at Para (d) of the definition above].

Determination of ETR of PE

Considering that the concept of PE is found in the taxation laws rather than in accounting (as is also acknowledged by the Commentary), accounts may typically not treat the profits of a PE any differently than the profits of HO jurisdiction, leading to questions on the determination of ETR especially in cases where any separate financial accounts of PE do not exist. Accordingly, GloBE Rules have special provisions for the same as below:

•  Determination of GloBE income of PE15

For types of PEs covered by paras (a) to (c) above, the starting point for determining GloBE income of PE is income or loss of PE as per separate financial accounts on a standalone basis prepared by the PE (either prepared or required to be prepared specifically for computing GloBE income) based on accounting standards used in CFS of UPE.


14    Article 10.3.3
15    Article 3.4 of the Model Rules

Thereafter, specified adjustments are made to arrive at GloBE income, based on the types of PEs described above, which may be tabulated as below:

Clause

Type of
PE

Adjustments
to determine GloBE income of PE

(a)

Treaty PE

Adjusted, if
necessary, to reflect only incomes and expenses
“attributable”
to the PE in accordance with relevant tax treaty
[for Para (a) PE] or domestic tax law of source jurisdiction [for Para (b)
PE] respectively
irrespective of the actual profits offered or subjected
to tax (say, – effects on account of disallowances as per domestic tax law
such as s.43B or accelerated depreciation in source jurisdiction are ignored
for determining GloBE income).

(b)

Domestic PE
(where corporate income tax law exists but no treaty)

(c)

Hypothetical
PE (no treaty and no corporate income tax law exists)

Adjusted, if
necessary, to reflect only incomes and expenses that would have been
“attributable” to the PE as per Article 7 of the OECD MC dealing with business
profits, which requires attribution based on functions performed, assets used
and risks undertaken.

In all such cases, any amount attributed to the PE and considered for GloBE income determination of PE is to be generally excluded16 while determining the GloBE income of HO.

For a stateless PE, GloBE income is the income exempted as per domestic tax laws of the HO jurisdiction, attributable to operations conducted overseas (namely; outside the HO jurisdiction). The expenses, which can be deducted against such income are those which are not deducted as per domestic tax laws of the HO jurisdiction. However,  nevertheless, they are attributable to operations conducted overseas.

 • Determination of Adjusted Covered Taxes of PE17

Tax paid on the income attributable to the PE as enumerated above (even if paid by the HO in the HO jurisdiction), is also allocated to the PE and considered for the determination of ETR of the location of the PE namely; the source jurisdiction18 [except in Para (d) PE namely; Stateless PE which does not qualify for jurisdictional blending]. In this regard, the determination of taxes paid in the HO jurisdiction related to the PE may be a complex exercise and is acknowledged by the Commentary as needing further work.

• Miscellaneous

The parameters of employees and tangible assets located in PE jurisdiction are not taken into account while computing the allocation keys for UTPR liability19 and substance-based income exclusion20 of HO jurisdiction.


16    In the context of jurisdictions like India which may permit HO to set-off losses of a PE, special rules are provided in Article 3.4.5 for allocation of income of the PE in future years. On a similar note, tax adjustments for determination of ETR in such case are also given at Article 4.3.4.
17    Article 4.3
18    Understandably, cross-border allocation is not a feature of Stateless PE as defined in Para (d) of the definition, as such PE in fact is identified based on exemption provided by the HO jurisdiction.
19    Refer Definition of Number of Employees and Tangible Assets at Article 10.1.
20    Refer Article 5.3.6


Case study on PE and presumptive taxation

Facts: To illustrate, assume FCo of Germany, part of an in-scope MNE Group for GloBE Rules, has a project office (PO) in India providing services in connection with extractive activities in the crude oil sector.

*FCo is part of in-scope MNE Group providing services in India  in connection with extractive activities in the crude oil sector.

Gross receipts of FCo from operations in India is 1,000. In India, FCo offers income to tax on presumptive basis u/s 44BB which deems profit from such operations to be 10 per cent of the gross income i.e. 100. Accordingly, corporate tax paid by FCo in India at 40 per cent21 is 40.

FCo has not availed the opportunity u/s 44BB(3) to offer a lower amount of income to tax in India. Accordingly, the FCo does not maintain any books of accounts in India. While FCo is required to maintain financial statements in Germany in accordance with German Accounting Standards, such financial statements do not require separate identification of revenue and expenditure attributable to the PE.


21    Approximate tax rates have been taken for ease of computation.

Based on internal MIS, the following revenue and expenditure is found attributable to the PE:

Particulars

Expenses

Particulars

Income

Direct expenses

400

Gross Revenue

1,000

Indirect expenses allocated by HO

200

 

 

Net profit (Bal Fig.)

400

 

 

Under the German domestic tax law, PE profits are exempt from tax. As per German domestic tax law, such PE profits are computed at 500.

Analysis: Para (a) of PE definition requires the following conditions to be satisfied for existence of PE thereunder:

•   Existence of place of business/deemed place of business.

•   Treatment as PE in accordance with relevant treaty (namely India-Germany) in force.

•   Source jurisdiction (namely India) to tax income “attributable” to PE in accordance with provisions “similar” to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017.

In this regard, there presently exist ambiguities whether presumptive taxation provisions in India as per s.44BB satisfies the last condition of taxation similar to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017. To recollect, taxation should be as per provision “similar” to and not “same as” Article 7 of OECD MC 2017. As per commentary, “similar” does not require the source jurisdiction “to replicate the language or outcomes” of Article 7 of OECD MC 2017, and can cover treaties based on OECD MC 2010 and UN MC 201722. Whether s.44BB merely provides an alternative mechanism for taxation of income “attributable” to PE which is “similar” to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017 resulting in satisfaction of Para (a) of the PE definition, or, does s.44BB go beyond that (and does not satisfy condition of being “similar” to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017), can be a matter of debate.


22    Refer para 102, pg. 210 of commentary.

Where, the conditions of Para (a) of PE definition are met, as indicated in the table above, the start point of GloBE income for Para (a) of PE definition is income or loss as per separate financial accounts of PE, as adjusted, if necessary, to reflect only incomes and expenses “attributable” to the PE in accordance with India-Germany treaty. The parameters of taxation as per domestic tax laws of source jurisdiction (India) as well as of HO jurisdiction (Germany) are irrelevant. S.44BB only determines taxable income, whereas GloBE income of PE needs to be based on revenue and expenses “attributable” to PE as per accounting principles as further adjusted in accordance with business profits article of relevant treaty. Accordingly, GloBE income of PE will be 400 and ETR 10 per cent (40/ 400). This may attract TUT liability at 5 per cent.

Alternatively, where conditions of Para (a) of PE definition are not met since taxation as per s.44BB is not considered to be “similar” to Article 7 of OECD MC 2017, Para (d) of PE definition namely; Stateless PE will trigger. In such case of Stateless PE, GloBE income will be amount exempted as per domestic tax laws of Germany i.e. 500. In such case, ETR is 8 per cent (40/500). This may attract TUT liability at 7 per cent. Again, for the purposes of Stateless PE, parameters of taxation as per domestic tax laws of source jurisdiction (India) are irrelevant.

DE MINIMIS EXCLUSION FOR THE JURISDICTION23

To avoid compliance burden of applying GloBE to all jurisdictions, jurisdictions having, in aggregate, average GloBE revenue of < € 10 million [Rs. ~80 Cr.] and average GloBE income < € 1 million [Rs. ~8 Cr.] or loss are excluded. The parameters of all CEs in a jurisdiction needs to be aggregated for testing this threshold.

To evaluate if this exclusion is applicable, MNE would need to compute GloBE revenue and GloBE income for the jurisdiction. The reference point is therefore income/revenue as adjusted for GloBE purposes. To minimize volatility, the exclusion is linked to average, determined by adopting simple average for current and preceding two fiscal years. In the computation of average:

•    Fiscal years that are not GloBE years (i.e. when GloBE Rules did not apply to the MNE – either because they are before applicability of GloBE Rules to in-scope MNE or because € 750 million threshold is not crossed) are excluded.

•    Fiscal years in which MNE had no presence in the jurisdiction (due to absence of CEs or such CEs were dormant) are also excluded.

To illustrate, for a newly formed MNE (to whom GloBE Rules did not apply in the past), a 3-year average may not be needed and GloBE revenue/income for evaluating the above exclusion is based on the current year alone. For year 2, the above exclusion is based on 2-year average i.e. current year as also preceding year.


23    Article 5.5


IMPLEMENTATION AND ADMINISTRATION – ACHIEVES THE PROFESSED OBJECT OF SIMPLICITY AND CERTAINTY?
Recognizing the gargantuan nature of BEPS 2.0 project potentially impacting MNE Groups worldwide, right from the initial days, OECD has time and again emphasized on the need for simplicity, certainty and objectivity, to ensure that business and growth is not stifled. Despite this, one may nevertheless perceive (and perhaps, justifiably) that the final shape taken by the GloBE Rules inherently necessitates a huge compliance burden on MNE Groups.

Every MNE Group is required to file a GloBE Information Return (GIR). While GIR needs to be filed only once internationally24, such GIR requires myriad data points, some of which are not otherwise captured for local tax or financial reporting purposes. Some of the data which is required to be filed in GIR are:

•    Data available from financial accounts: Revenue, deferred tax, profits, dividend and capital gains on investments, etc.

•    Data available from income tax filings: Income tax accrued, PE status of branches, WHT and dividend tax, ALP in respect of intra-group transactions, business reorganizations, income tax accrued in respect of incomes excluded from GloBE income, etc.

•    Other data specifically collected for GloBE Rules: whether provision for DTL has reversed within 5 years, recast DTA/DTL to 15 per cent tax rate, maintain track of DTA for tax loss recognized and reversed under GloBE Rules, maintain track of various elections and choices under the GloBE Rules, standalone financial results of PE, determine ownership interest in the constituent entity for  computing TUT liability, etc.


24    The jurisdiction where such GIR is filed needs to automatically share this information with all other jurisdictions where MNE Group operates [Article 8.1].

The authors believe that there are at least 50 data points which need to be computed and tracked exclusively for GloBE compliance. Various industry representatives have also alluded to the army of personnel required to ensure GloBE compliance.

While, at a conceptual level, this compliance burden is sought to be alleviated through the application of objective safe harbours, the actual design of such safe havens may be presently unclear and awaits clarity. The need to balance the request for simplicity by MNE Groups with the desire of tax authorities to ensure at least 15 per cent tax in each jurisdiction without leakage is a tightrope that OECD/BEPS IF needs to balance.

The Commentary gives many indications to evince that OECD/BEPS IF shall continually handhold implementation by developing a GloBE Implementation Framework and an Agreed Administrative Guidance, to guide jurisdictions for coherent and consistent implementation of GloBE Rules.

In this backdrop, as per ‘OECD’s economic analysis, GloBE Rules are estimated to generate $150 billion of additional tax revenues per year. One may wonder if this revenue is commensurate with the enhanced compliance costs and significant efforts that implementation of GloBE Rules may entail.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Considering the above, despite the OECD/BEPS IF setting an ambitious timeline of 2023 for implementation of the IIR, and 2024 for the implementation of the UTPR, various concerns have arisen over the short and ambitious implementation timeline, which may not have adequately factored in impact of such over-arching measures.

These concerns are evident from stalling of legislative developments within the US and EU. To address these concerns, the EU was the first to shift the timeline for implementation by a year – which is now also being replicated across jurisdictions like UK and Hong Kong.

Nonetheless, various jurisdictions (illustratively, Mauritius, Switzerland and Korea) are well ahead of the curve to legislate the GloBE Rules, and a plethora of other jurisdictions (such as Germany, France, Netherlands, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia) have indicated their intention to adopt GloBE Rules.

However, despite the growing acceptability of the GloBE Rules, Indian tax authorities, despite India being a signatory to the agreement of BEPS, that  released in July and October 2021, has not released any official statement stating India’s position on GloBE Rules. Rather, the focus of the Indian Government seems to be on the implementation of Pillar 1 and subject-to-tax rules (STTR). To an impartial observer, it may seem that India is on a wait-and-watch mode. Perhaps implementation may happen only after further guidance and clarifications are made available from OECD/BEPS IF.

[The authors are thankful to CA Geeta D. Jani and CS Aastha Jain (LLB) for their guidance and support.]

Charitable Trusts – Recent Amendments Pertaining to Books of Accounts and Other Documents – Part I

INTRODUCTION
Section
12A(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act 1961 (“the Act”) has been amended by
the Finance Act, 2022 w.e.f the assessment year 2023-24 to provide that a
charitable institution claiming exemption u/s 11 and 12 shall keep and
maintain books of account and other documents (“books of
account/documents”) in such form and manner and at such place, as may be
provided by rules.

BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE SECTION

(a)  
 On a literal reading, even a solitary point of difference between the
assessee and the Assessing Officer (“AO”) as to whether prescribed
books/documents are maintained or whether they are maintained at the
prescribed place or whether they are maintained in the prescribed form
or in the prescribed manner can result in denial of exemption u/s 11/12
and taxation u/s 13(10). On the other hand, it has been held that “when
there is general and substantive compliance with the provisions of a
rule, it is sufficient.” [CIT vs. Leroy Somer and Controls India (P.)
Ltd., (2014) 360 ITR 532 (Del),
cited in Worlds Window Impex (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT, (2016) 69 taxmann.com 406 (Del.-Trib.)]

Also see:

•    Arvind Bhartiya Vidhyalya Samiti vs. ACIT, (2008) 115 TTJ 351 (Jaipur)

•    CIT vs. Tarnetar Corporation, (2014) 362 ITR 174 (Guj)

•    CIT vs. Sawyer’s Asia Ltd., (1980) 122 ITR 259 (Bom)

•    CIT vs. Harit Synthetic Fabrics (P.) Ltd., (1986) 162 ITR 640 (Bom)

Applying
the principle, it could be argued that if there is substantial
compliance with the prescribed rule, then exemption u/s 11 cannot be
denied. Further, it is also a moot point as to whether it could be
argued that having regard to the onerous consequences, the AO should
give an opportunity to the assessee to make good the deficiency and only
if the assessee fails to do so that the AO should deny the exemption
u/s 11.

(b)    While books of account should be maintained
regularly as a good practice, there is no provision requiring the other
documents/records to be maintained contemporaneously. Also, there is no
provision prohibiting correction in the records.

RULE 17AA

The
CBDT has notified Rule 17AA (“the Rule”) specifying the books of
accounts and other documents to be maintained by a charitable
institution. [Notification No. 94/2022 dated 10th August, 2022 under the Income-tax (24th Amendment) Rules, 2022]

This article analyses the said Rule, which contains more than 50 requirements.

Brief analysis of the Rule as a whole

The
Rule requires record keeping of various receipts/payments in respect of
which, Courts/Tribunal could have taken different views and hence,
there could be a controversy as to their scope. To illustrate, the Rule
requires records of application of income outside India. For this
purpose, Courts/Tribunal are divided on what constitutes the application
of income “outside India”. Thus, in such cases, if the assessee adopts a
favourable interpretation based on a judicial precedent which is not
accepted by the tax department, the AO may hold that proper documents
have not been maintained. To mitigate this exposure, it is advisable
that the assessee keeps notes explaining why it has considered or not
considered a particular receipt/payment under the relevant Rule. Such
notes may be kept along with the record to which it is applicable.
Difficulty may arise if a subsequent ruling of the Courts/Tribunal takes
a view different from what has been adopted hitherto by the assessee in
maintaining the records. In such circumstances, the assessee may
continue the old practice with a note that the interpretation based on
the judgment has not been followed by it. In the alternative, the
assessee could maintain specified information with a note that it is
maintained without prejudice to its claim to the contrary.

Difference between amount as per records and as per computation of income for return of income: whether permissible?

Suppose
the assessee has maintained records on a particular basis, but for the
return of income, he is advised to adopt a different basis favourable to
him. For the following reasons, it appears that the assessee can adopt
such different basis:

•    If a particular income is not
taxable under the Income-tax Act, it cannot be taxed on the basis of
estoppel or any other equitable doctrine. [CIT vs. V. Mr. P. Firm, Muar,
(1965) 56 ITR 67 (SC); Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. JCIT, (2015) 7 SCC 540].
Hence, the assessee is not estopped from offering correct income instead of the income as per the documents maintained by him.

•    The AO is duty bound to guide the assessee and compute the correct income. See

•    CBDT Circular No. 14 of 1955.

•    CIT vs. Mahalaxmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., (1986) 27 Taxman 267 (SC).

If
the AO is duty bound to assess the correct income, surely, he is duty
bound to accept the right of the assessee to offer correct income
contrary to what is ascertained on the basis of the documents maintained
by him.

•    It is now well settled that an additional ground not raised before the AO can be raised before CIT(A) [Jute Corporation of India Ltd vs. CIT, (1991) taxmann.com 30 (SC)] and subject to fulfillment of conditions, a claim could be made for the first time before the Tribunal [see National
Thermal Power Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1998) 229 ITR 383 (SC), Ahmedabad
Electricity Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1993) 199 ITR 351 (Bom)].

If
claim could be made for the first time before appellate authorities,
there is no reason why a claim contrary to documents/records maintained
may not be made in the return of income.

Date from which the Rule is applicable

The Rule has “come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette”,
that is, 10th August, 2022. Since the Rule will be in force on the
first day of the A.Y. 2023-24, it may be contended that it is applicable
throughout the relevant previous year, that is, 1st April, 2022 to 31st
March, 2023. In other words, the books/documents are required to be
maintained for the entire period from 1st April, 2022. It could be
argued for the following reasons, that the Rule cannot apply to the
period prior to 10th August, 2022:

•    Section 295(4) provides
that a rule cannot have retrospective effect unless it is permitted
expressly or by necessary implication. In the instant case, the Rule
expressly mentions that it shall come into force from the date of
publication in the Official Gazette; in view of this express statement,
it appears that the condition for a Rule having a retrospective effect
is not satisfied by Rule 17AA.

•    The Supreme Court has observed as follows:

•    every
statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by
necessary implication made to have retrospective operations. [CIT vs.
Essar Teleholdings Ltd., (2018) 90 taxmann.com 2 (SC)]
(in the context of rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules);

•   
… one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a
legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective
operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern
current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the
past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of
today and in force and not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it. [CIT vs. Vatika Township P. Ltd., (2014) 367 ITR 466 (SC)].

In view of the above, the Rule cannot be said to require maintenance of books/documents for the period up to 10th August, 2022.

•  
 It appears that whenever a rule has to have a retrospective effect, it
clearly states that it shall come into force from a prior date.
Further, the Explanatory Memorandum in Notification dated 30th June,
2020 containing the Income-tax (15th Amendment) Rules, 2020 and
Notification dated 29th December, 2021 containing the Income-tax (35th
Amendment) Rules, 2021 also mention that the relevant rules have a
retrospective effect. It is pertinent that no such reference is made in
Rule 17AA. Further, the Rule explicitly states that it shall come into
force from the date of publication of Gazette; if it was to have
retrospective effect, it would have clearly stated 1st April, 2022.

Section
44AA(3) provides that the Board may prescribe the books of account and
other documents to be kept and maintained, the particulars to be
contained therein and the form and the manner in which and the place at
which they shall be kept and maintained. On the other hand, section
12A(b)(i) reads as follows:

(i) the books of account and other
documents have been kept and maintained in such form and manner and at
such place, as may be prescribed;

Thus, unlike section
44AA(3), section 12A(b)(i) does not provide for books/documents or the
particulars to be contained therein to be prescribed. It is a moot point
as to whether to the extent Rule 17AA requires the said details, it
conflicts with the section.

It may be noted that the Memorandum to Finance Bill 2022 reads as follows:
“However,
there is no specific provision under the Act providing for the books of
accounts to be maintained by such trusts or institutions…”.

Thus,
the Memorandum suggests that the amendment would list the books of
accounts to be maintained. However, an Explanatory Memorandum is usually
‘not an accurate guide of the final Act’, [Shashikant Laxman Kale vs. UOI, (1990) 185 ITR 104 (SC); Also see Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. CIT, (1994) 210 ITR 69 (Bom)]. Hence, it could be argued that a mere statement in Memorandum cannot override the Act.

The clauses of the Rule are now analysed, after reproducing the relevant text.

Rule 17AA(1)(a)(Text)

“Books of account and other documents to be kept and maintained—

(1)
Every fund or institution or trust or any university or other
educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution
which is required to keep and maintain books of account and other
documents under clause (a) of the tenth proviso to clause (23C) of
section 10 of the Act or sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1)
of section 12A of the Act shall keep and maintain the following,
namely:-

(a)    books of account, including the following, namely….”

(i)    cash book;

(ii)    ledger;

(iii)    journal;

(iv)  
 copies of bills, whether machine numbered or otherwise serially
numbered, wherever such bills are issued by the assessee, and copies or
counterfoils of machine numbered or otherwise serially numbered receipts
issued by the assessee;

(v)    original bills wherever issued to the person and receipts in respect of payments made by the person;

(vi)  
 any other book that may be required to be maintained in order to give a
true and fair view of the state of the affairs of the person and
explain the transactions effected;

Analysis

Clause
(a), on a literal reading, is an inclusive provision which means that it
includes not only the specified books of accounts but also any other
book which is understood in normal accounting parlance as books of
account. This makes the definition highly subjective (what is “books of
accounts” in normal parlance?) and may result in litigation. For
instance, there could be a case where the assessee may have maintained
the books specified in Rule 17AA(1)(a). However, the AO may be of the
view that the assessee has not maintained certain other books/documents
which are not specifically mentioned but which, in his opinion, are
books of account in normal parlance and are necessary.

As against the above, it could be argued that the definition is exhaustive, on the basis of the following reasons:

•    The Supreme Court has observed that “it is possible that in some context the word “includes” might import that the enumeration in exhaustive”. [Smt. Ujjam Bai vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621].

•  
 Rule 17AA(a)(vi) is a residuary clause which requires any “other” book
to give a true and fair view. The use of the expression “any other”
suggests that the list is exhaustive.

•    The clause uses the expression “namely” and it has been held that “… use
of the expression ‘namely’, … followed by the description of goods is
usually exhaustive unless there are strong indications to the contrary”.
[Mahindra Engineering and Chemical Products Ltd. vs. UOI, (1992) 1 SCR 254 (SC)].

Diaries or bundles of sheets are not books of account.

A mere collection of sheets or diaries cannot be regarded as books of account.

Please see:

•  
 A book which merely contains entries of items of which no account is
made at any time, is not a “book of account” in a commercial sense. [Sheraton Apparels vs. ACIT, (2002) 256 ITR 20 (Bom)]

•  
 A book of account… must have the characteristic of being fool-proof.
A bundle of sheets detachable and replaceable at a moment’s pleasure
can hardly be characterized as a book of account. [Zenna Sorabji vs. Mirabelle Hotel Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1981 Bom 446]

Bills and receipts in respect of income [Rule 17AA(1)(a)(iv)]

This sub-clause refers to income of the assessee.

Paraphrasing, books of account include:

•    copies of bills issued by the assessee where the  bills have to be machine numbered or serially numbered; and

•  
 copies of receipts or counterfoils of receipts issued by the assessee
where the receipts or counterfoils, as the case may be, have to be
machine numbered or serially numbered.

The expression “bills issued by the assessee” is wide enough to include bills.

•    in respect of sale of capital assets;
•    arising in the course of business or otherwise; and
•    not paid by the counterparty.

“Receipts” include those in respect of

•    payment received against sale of goods/services by the charitable institution; and

•    donations received.

In
the context, the expression “wherever” means in any case or in any
circumstances in which a bill is issued; in other words, books of
account include only those bills which are issued: it does not mean that
the assessee should always issue bills.

Bill

The expression ‘bill’ is an itemized account of the separate cost of goods sold, services rendered, or work done: Invoice
[Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, page 84]. In the context
of this sub-clause, ‘bill’ means an invoice for goods sold or services
rendered, or work done and should include a cash memo [see CST vs. Krishna Brick Field, (1985) 58 STC 336 (All)].

Original bills and receipts [Rule 17AA(1)(a)(v)]

In
the previous sub-clause, it is stated that books of account include
copies of bills issued by “the assessee” whereas this sub-clause
requires original bills issued to “the person”; it appears that the word
“person” here refers to the assessee himself and not a third party.
With this interpretation, the preceding sub-clause and this sub-clause
become complementary to each other: one covering income/receipts and
other covering expenditure/payments.

The term “payment bills” and
“receipts” are wide enough to cover revenue expenditure and capital
expenditure. On a literal reading, even bills for purchase of
investments, such as debentures, are covered.

Any other book in order to give a true and fair view and explain the transactions effected [Rule 17AA(1)(a)(vi)]

This
requirement is similar to the requirement in section 128(1) of the
Companies Act 2013. However, Rule 6F, prescribing books for
professionals, does not have such a requirement.

Rule 17AA(1)(b)(Text)

Books of account, as referred in clause (a), for business undertaking referred in sub-section (4) of section 11 of the Act.

Analysis

This
clause requires books of accounts for a business undertaking referred
to in section 11(4). It requires separate books of accounts for every
business undertaking owned by the assessee.

The term “business undertaking” is not defined in the Act.

“Business” is defined in section 2(13) as includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture;

Business ordinarily involves profit motive. See:

•    DIT(E) vs. Gujarat Cricket Association, (2019) 419 ITR 561 (Guj)

•    CIT(E) vs. India Habitat Centre, (2020) (1) TMI 21 – Delhi HC,

•    DIT(E) vs. Shree Nashik Panchvati Panjrapole, (2017) 81 taxmann.com 375 (Bom)]

The terms “undertaking/industrial undertaking” have been judicially explained as follows:

•  
 the existence of all the facilities including factory buildings,
plant, machinery, godowns and things which are incidental to the
carrying on of manufacture or production, all of which when taken
together are capable of being regarded as an industrial undertaking [CIT vs. Premier Cotton Mills Ltd., (1999) 240 ITR 434 (Mad)].

•    ‘Undertaking’ in common parlance means an ‘enterprise’, ‘venture’ and ‘engagement’. (Websters Dictionary). [P. Alikunju vs. CIT, (1987) 166 ITR 804 (Ker)].

Hence,
the expression “business undertaking” should mean an enterprise with
various assets and which is carried on with profit motive.

The
books of account are required to be maintained in order to be eligible
to claim an exemption u/s 11 [section 12A(1)]. If the business is such
that proviso to section 2(15) applies then there is no question of
obtaining the benefit of section 11 and maintaining the books is
irrelevant. However, on a literal reading, books of accounts are
required for every business undertaking, whether or not the profits of
the business undertaking are exempt under proviso to section 2(15).

The provision applies whether or not the profits of the business undertaking are exempt u/s 11(4A).

All
business undertakings irrespective of the object, that is, whether in
the course of medical relief or education or yoga or advancement of
general public utility, are covered by the clause.

Rule 17AA(1)(c)(Text)

Books
of account, as referred in clause (a), for business carried on by the
assessee other than the business undertaking referred in sub-section (4)
of section 11 of the Act;
[Rule 17AA(1)(c)].

Analysis

On
a plain reading, it refers to a business which is not carried on
through an undertaking. To illustrate, a one-off adventure in the nature
of trade could be regarded as a business; however, it may not be
carried on through an undertaking. The clause requires separate books of
accounts for such a business. Even in this case, it appears that the
profit motive ought to be there before the activity can be regarded as a
business.

The provision requires separate books of accounts for every business of the assessee.

On a literal reading, the provision covers all businesses:

(a)    whether or not the profits of the business are exempt under proviso to section 2(15) or u/s 11(4A); and

(b)    irrespective of the object pursuant to which the business is set up.

Rule 17AA(1)(d)(i)(Text)

(d) other documents for maintaining

(i) record of all the projects and institutions run by the person containing details of their name, address and objectives;

Analysis

This clause refers to “other documents”, which term has been explained by High Court as follows:

The
authorities can require production of accounts and other documents. The
words “other documents” in the section are vague and indefinite. Under
the Rules of construction of statutes, where general words follow
particular words, the general words will have to be construed in the
light of particular words. … the ejusdem generis Rule. Therefore, “other
documents” will be in the nature of account books, bill books etc.,
that have some relation to the accounts and not any correspondence etc. [P. K. Adimoolam Chettiar, In Re (1957) 8 STC 741 (Mad.)].

Applying
the principle, it appears that the provision enables the CBDT to
prescribe only those documents having some relation to books of account
and not any other correspondence, paper, documents etc.

The term “document” is defined in section 3(18) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as follows:

“document”
shall include any matter written, expressed or described upon any
substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of
those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used, for the
purpose or recording that matter.

Projects and institutions

The requirements under this sub-clause are perhaps, pursuant to section 2(15), section 11(4) and section 11(4A).

Project

The
term ‘project’ is neither defined in the Act nor used in section 11 to
section 13. In ITR – 7, the details of projects are required, although
even in the ITR the term is not explained. In the absence of a clear
definition, there could be conflicting views between the assessee and
the tax department as to what constitutes a ‘project’.

According to the dictionary, a project means ‘A
set of activities intended to produce a specific output, which has a
definite beginning and end. The activities are interrelated and must be
brought together in a particular order, based on precedence
relationships between the different activities. Examples of projects
include the building of the Channel Tunnel and the design of a computer
system for an ambulance service. Projects are usually based on bringing
together teams of specialists within relatively temporary management
structures. Project management techniques are increasingly being used to
manage such tasks as the introduction of total quality management
within organizations.
[Oxford’s Dictionary of Business and Management, pages 423 and 424].

Every project undertaken will have to be included since there is no de minimus clause.

Institution

Section 2(24)(iia) covers ‘institution’ established wholly or partly for charitable purposes.

The term “institution” has not been defined in the Act. It has been judicially explained as follows:
In
the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume V at page 354, the word
“institution” is defined to mean “an establishment, organisation, or
association, instituted for the promotion of some object, especially one
of public or general utility, religious, charitable, educational, etc.”

[CIT
vs. Sindhu Vidya Mandal Trust, (1983) 142 ITR 633 (Guj); Mangilal
Gotawat Charitable Trust vs. CIT, (1985) 20 Taxman 207 (Kar)].

The term would include schools, colleges, hospitals, etc.

Rule 17AA(1)(d)(ii)(Text)

record of income of the person during the previous year, in respect of, –

(I)  
 voluntary contribution containing details of name of the donor,
address, permanent account number (if available) and Aadhaar number (if
available);

(II)    income from property held under trust referred to under section 11 of the Act along with list of such properties;

(III)  
 income of fund or institution or trust or any university or other
educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution
other than the contribution referred in items (I) and (II);

Analysis

This
sub-clause requires maintenance of record of income during the previous
year. It applies only in the case of “income” and not receipts not
constituting income.

Voluntary contribution containing details of name of the donor, etc. [Item (I)]

The
requirement under this item is pursuant to section 11(1), including
section 11(1)(d) and section 115BBC (anonymous donations).

PAN and Aadhar number are to be recorded if available. Hence, they are not mandatory.

The
requirement regarding the name and address of donors also applies to a
religious trust, which gets donations in its donation box. In such
circumstances, obviously, it will not be possible for the Trust to
maintain such details and it should suffice if the assessee mentions
this fact. It may be noted that even section 115BBC, which deals with
anonymous donations, does not apply to a wholly religious trust.

The
requirement covers contributions in kind. Now, strictly speaking,
offerings in kind in a temple constitute voluntary contribution and
hence income (see CBDT Circular No. 580 dated 14th September, 1990).
There is no de minimis clause and to take an extreme example, all offerings made in a temple such as coconuts, pedhas,
etc. also constitute income whose details have to be recorded!
Similarly, record for donation of even rupees ten have to be collated!

Details of all voluntary contributions, corpus as well as non-corpus, are required.

It
appears that the documents supporting these details are not required to
be maintained; to illustrate, a photocopy of the Aadhar card is not
required to be maintained.

Income from property held under trust along with list of such properties; [Item (II)]

Section
12(1) provides that voluntary contributions (other than corpus
donations) shall, for the purposes of section 11, be deemed to be
“income derived from property held under trust”. On the other hand, this
item refers to “income from property held under trust”. Again,
voluntary contributions are already covered by Item I. Hence, for the
purpose of this item, the expression “income from property held under
trust” does not include voluntary contributions.

The term ‘property held under trust’ is very wide and includes:

(a) income earned by it in the course of carrying out its objects.

(b) assets acquired out of such income referred to in (i) above or out of donations received by it. [ACIT vs. Etawah District Exhibition and Cattle Fair Association, (1978) 1978 CTR 166 (All)]

Thus,
even an FD is ‘property held under trust’. Any change, such as
withdrawal of FD, would require alteration in the ‘list of such
properties’.

Property held under trust includes assets invested u/s 11(2).

The requirement under this item is also partially repeated in the following clause/sub-clause/item:

• (d)(iii)(VI)

• (d)(iv)(IV)/(V)

• (d)(v)(VI)/(VII)

Income other than the contribution referred in Items (I) and (II); [Item III]

The
requirement in this Item applies to all institutions including
religious trusts, which get donations in their donation box. It will
include anonymous donations.

Rule 17AA(1)(d)(iii)(Text)

(iii) record of the following, out of the income of the person during the previous year, namely:

(I)  
 application of income, in India, containing details of amount of
application, name and address of the person to whom any credit or
payment is made and the object for which such application is made;

(II)  
 amount credited or paid to any fund or institution or trust or any
university or other educational institution or any hospital or other
medical institution referred to in sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or
sub-clause (vi) or sub-clause (via) of clause (23C) of section 10 of the
Act or other trust or institution registered under section 12AB of the
Act, containing details of their name, address, permanent account number
and the object for which such credit or payment is made;

(III)  
 application of income outside India containing details of amount of
application, name and address of the person to whom any credit or
payment is made and the object for which such application is made;

(IV)  
 deemed application of income referred in clause (2) of Explanation 1
of sub-section (1) of section 11 of the Act containing details of the
reason for availing such deemed application;

(V)    income
accumulated or set apart as per the provisions of the Explanation 3 to
the third proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or sub-section (2) of
section 11 of the Act which has not been applied or deemed to be applied
containing details of the purpose for which such income has been
accumulated;

(VI)    money invested or deposited in the forms and modes specified in sub-section (5) of section 11 of the Act;

(VII)  
 money invested or deposited in the forms and modes other than those
specified in subsection (5) of section 11 of the Act;

Analysis

The
requirement under this item is pursuant to section 11(1), Explanation
1(2), Explanation 2, 3, 4 to section 11(1), 11(2), 11(5), etc.

Its main purpose is to identify the amount of application of income which is allowable u/s 11(1)(a).

Out of “income of the previous year”

It appears that for this purpose income excludes “corpus donations” received by the assessee and treated as exempt u/s 11(1)(d).

The
expression “income of the previous year”, used in this clause can lead
to computational issues. To illustrate, if a payment is made on 1st
April, is it out of the income of the previous year? Again, in the case
of mixed funds (income for the year as well as accumulated income,
corpus donations, borrowing, etc.), how to determine which fund has been
applied? Three principles set out by judgments are explained below:

•    In Siddaramanna Charities Trust vs. CIT [(1974) 96 ITR 275 (Mys)],
donation was made by the assesse on the first day of the accounting
year; The Court noticed that during the relevant previous year, there
was a profit and the sum donated was less than the amount of the
profits. It was also not shown that the said amount was paid out of the
capital account. Hence, it was held that the said donation was
application of income of the previous year, although when the donation
was given on the first day there was no profit of the previous year.

•    In Infosys Science Foundation vs. ITO(E), TS-453-ITAT-2018(Bang),
it has been held that once income is accumulated u/s 11(2) [say, in
year 1], the assessee can claim that application of income in year 2
should be split into two: initially, the application should first be
considered as having been made out of the accumulation of year 1 and
only the remainder should be considered as an application of income of
year 2. In this case, both the accumulation of unutilized income of year
1 u/s 11(2) as well as the income of year 2 were deployed in the form
of fixed deposits in bank, which were renewed and reinvested and it was
not possible to link the identity of the deposits with either one of the
accumulations or the current income.

•    For the purposes of other sections, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

•  
 Where interest-free own funds available with the assessee exceeded its
investments in tax-free securities; investments would be presumed to be
made out of assessee’s own funds, and proportionate disallowance was
not warranted u/s 14A although separate accounts were not maintained by
the assessee for investments and other expenditure incurred for earning
tax-free income [South Indian Bank Ltd. vs. CIT, (2021) 130 taxmann.com 178 (SC)].

•  
 If interest-free funds available to the assessee were sufficient to
meet its investment in subsidiaries, the assessee’s claim for deduction
was justified [CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd., (2019), 102 taxmann.com 52 (SC)].

The above judgments could be relevant in ascertaining whether the application is “out of income of the previous year” or not.

It
appears that what is required is that the assessee should choose a
reasonable method of determining the source from which the application
is made and follow it uniformly.

Application of income in India [Item (I)]

This item requires maintenance of details of the application.

The
term ‘application of income’ is very wide and includes, expenditure on
salaries, administrative expenses, establishment expenses, donations to
other institutions, capital expenditure, etc.

Every payment is a
different and separate application. Thus, a voucher for even a payment
of Rs. 10 (for say, conveyance) shall have to be recorded separately.

The Rule requires details of the “amount” of application, which term has been judicially explained by Courts as follows:

•   
…from the point of view of linguistics, the words “sum” and “amount”
are synonyms. But under the Income Tax Act, each of the words “sum”,
“amount”, “income” and “payment” have different connotations. [T. Rajkumar vs. UOI, 2016 (4) TMI 593 – Madras High Court]

•  
 The word “amount” is used here in a wider sense than usual and that it
includes the total quantity of the debtor’s liabilities in cash or in
kind. Consequently, the payment of these “amounts” can also be either in
cash or in kind. [Shridhar Krishnarao vs. Narayan Namaji, AIR 1939 Nag 227]

Thus,
the Item may require details of the amount of application in kind also.
To illustrate, if a hospital receives an ambulance as a non-corpus
donation, then the value of the ambulance is to be regarded as income of
the hospital and if it is used for the purposes of the hospital,
simultaneously the same amount is be regarded as application of income
[see CBDT Circular No. 580 dated 14th September, 1990)]. In such a
circumstance, the details of the ambulance will have to be recorded
under this item.

If an assessee is constructing a building, he
will have to maintain details of every payment made for purchase of
cement, sand, bricks, iron and steel, etc. and daily payment to
contractor!!!

Every TDS from payment is a separate application and hence, will have to be separately recorded.

If
more than one payment is made to a person for the same object, then it
appears that all the payments during the previous year to such person
can be aggregated.

Explanation 2 to section 11(1) provides that a
“corpus donation” to another specified institution shall not be treated
as application of income. Similarly, Explanation 3 provides cash
payments or payments without  deduction of tax at source will be
partially disallowable and not treated as application. Whether these
Explanations have to be considered in recording the details? It appears
that the requirement of the Rule is complete record keeping. It should
not be affected by the tax treatment of expenses in the computation of
income. Hence, it may be advisable to consider all such payments as
application of income with due disclosure by way of note.

Amount credited or paid to any other Trust etc. [Item (II)]

Explanation to section 11(2) uses the same language, that is, amount credited or paid to any other trust.
However,
such payments are not required to be recorded under this item. This is
because what is required is amount paid or credited out of the income of
the previous year, whereas Explanation to section 11(2) covers any
amount credited or paid to a charitable institution out of “accumulated
income of preceding years”: such payments are required to be recorded
under Rule 17AA(1)(d)(iv)(III).

The details of all
payments/credits to the specified institution are required, irrespective
of whether the payment is towards corpus of the payee or not.

Application of income outside India [Item (III)]

There
is a huge controversy on what constitutes application of income outside
India. The purpose is to identify the amount of application which is
not to be considered for exemption of income u/s 11(1)(a).

Deemed application of income referred in Explanation 1(2) to section 11(1) [Item (IV)]

An
assessee can decide whether to opt for deemed application of income or
not only after the finalization of accounts and computation of taxable
income. Hence, this record cannot be maintained contemporaneously during
the year but only after the amount of deemed application is determined.

The
item requires details of reasons for availing of deemed application.
Explanation 1(2) to section 11(1) provides that the option may be
availed “(i) for the reason that the whole or any part of the income
has not been received during that year, or (ii) for any other reason”.

It appears that the assessee need not give precise reasons but cite the aforesaid provision to justify the option availed of.

Income accumulated or set apart u/s 11(2) [Item (V)]

This
amount can also be recorded only after the end of the previous year
when the amount of income accumulated u/s 11(2) is determined.

Money invested or deposited in permissible modes of section 11(5) [Item (VI)]

If
a fixed deposit is placed during the year and it  matures before 31st
March, is it required to be recorded under this provision? On a literal
reading, record has to be maintained for each and every investment  or
deposit, whether continuing at the end of the year or not.

It appears that income for this purpose does not include corpus donations received during the year.

The details under this item are partially sought also under Rule 17AA(1)(d)(ii)(II).

Money invested or deposited in non-permissible modes [Item (VII)]

In
this case also, each and every investment or deposit in non-permissible
mode is required to be reported. This is because section 13(1)(d)
provides that income is not exempt to the extent of investment or
deposit in non-permissible mode.

[Some other interesting issues of this amendment will be discussed by the Author in part – II of this Article.]

[Author
acknowledges assistance from Adv. Aditya Bhatt, CA Kausar Sheikh, CA
Chirag Wadhwa and CA Arati Pai in writing this Article.]

Transfer Pricing – Benchmarking of Overdue Receivables and Payables – Complexities and Caution

Receivables and payables are inevitable parts of any business transaction. While group entities generally focus on the main transaction of import or export of goods or services, it is extremely important to keep track of the settlements of consequent receivables and payables. The delay in settlement of transactions could subject the MNE Group to onerous compliances, additional costs and penal consequences if there is a slippage in the appropriate disclosures.

Owing to rising disputes, while the CBDT brought the specific amendment to clarify this aspect with retrospective effect in Finance Act 2012, it is important first to understand the history and logic behind this controversial issue:

BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUE

Before the Finance Act 2012, a significant controversy erupted due to a lack of clarity as to whether the transaction of overdue receivables/ payables should be considered as a separate international transaction. The Indian revenue authorities astutely noticed instances of funding overseas group entities by delaying the settlement of the inter-company transaction. However, as there was no clear guidance to consider overdue receivables/payables as an international transaction, the legislature came up with the below-mentioned clarification vide the Finance Act 2012.

The definition of ‘international transaction’ u/s 92B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) was amended to widen its scope. Clause (c) was added to the sub-section (2) of section 92B, with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2002 as mentioned below:

“(c) capital financing, including any type of long-term or short-term borrowing, lending or guarantee, purchase or sale of marketable securities or any type of advance, payments or deferred payment or receivable or any other debt arising during the course of business.”

It is important to note that while the Memorandum contained reference as regards to the purpose of inclusion of various items in the definition, there was no specific mention of ‘capital financing’ and the purpose or implication of its inclusion within the definition of ‘international transaction’.

As per the Guidance note on Report under Section 92E of the Act issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (‘ICAI’):

“Advance payments received or made and debts arising during the course of business shall need to be carefully considered and reported by the accountant however ensuring that there is no duplication or overlap with reporting of the principal transactions to which such advances or debts relate to, unless the accountant identifies factors which cause such advances or debts as separate transactions.”

In view of the above, the issue to be considered is whether the trade advances/trade receivables / similar deferred payments should be treated as:

  • Arising in the ordinary course of the business of the taxpayer and hence would not constitute a separate ‘international transaction’ (the impact of the interest loss on account of the credit period would get offset by the higher profits earned on account of the increase in sales or pricing as a result of extending such credit terms to the customers);

OR

  • Separate lending or borrowing transactions liable to interest.


BENCHMARKING OF THE TRANSACTION

As mentioned above, since the overdue receivables issue is litigative, it is important to analyze it in detail and take appropriate actions beforehand.

On the basis the guidance provided by ICAI, one of the most important exercises is to delineate outstanding receivables arising in the ordinary course of business from the receivables for which the realization is intentionally delayed to fund the overseas associated enterprises (‘AE’). The following steps may be followed for the same:

Step 1 –
Identify receivables in the ordinary course of business. Since the principal transaction would already be benchmarked, separate benchmarking of such outstanding receivables may lead to duplication. Hence, an exercise needs to be conducted to separate the overdue receivables as per the contractual agreement with the overseas AE.

Step 2 – Post conducting of such an exercise, an analysis may also be conducted qua industry practice, on the basis of the information available in the public domain to identify the general credit period prevalent in such industry (e.g., textile and real estate enjoy higher credit period as compared to commodity and bullion) to determine the overdue receivables in comparison to the comparable companies.

Step 3 – The receivables overdue qua contract and qua industry need to be reported and benchmarked appropriately. To benchmark these overdue receivables, it is crucial to determine the reason for such a delay in realization. In case of genuine reasons beyond the control of the taxpayers, appropriate documentation should be maintained to prove such a bona fide reason. Certain common practical challenges faced by businesses recently are listed below (illustrative):

a)    Supply chain disruptions in view of COVID may cause a shortage of containers for transit of goods impacting the sale of goods sold on Free on Board (‘FOB’) basis.

b)    In cases where semi-finished goods are sold to the AE which further sells the goods to ultimate customers, due to a shortage of containers for shipment, the AE is unable to ship the goods and hence delays the sale and realization on an overall basis.

c)    Due to the ongoing geo-political reasons and point a) mentioned above, the transit time of shipments has significantly increased.

d)    Liquidity crunch or bankruptcy of AE may have led to write-off in the books of the taxpayer.

e)    Delay in realization of the amount from the ultimate customer may lead to delayed payment by the AE to the taxpayer.

f)    In certain cases, the taxpayer, at the time of finalization of books determines the true-up required to be recovered from AE as per the contractual agreement. Since the determination of true-up is done at the time of finalization of books, the payment of the same is realized after a long time as compared to the original timeline by which the taxpayer was supposed to realize such an amount.

g)    In some countries, any payment to an overseas party may lead to withholding tax implications requiring the payer to approach the tax authorities for seeking exemption on withholding tax on payment for non-taxable transactions to the taxpayer. Such approval from the tax department may take time and hence, result in the delay of realization.

h)    In certain cases, the taxpayer undertakes the transaction of purchase and sale with the same AE. In WNS Global Services Pvt Ltd – ITA No.1451/Mum/2012, the Mumbai ITAT held that the credit period provided by the AE vis-à-vis credit period provided by the taxpayer for such transactions respectively may require to be analyzed in aggregation, since analyzing the sales transaction in singularity may portray a distorted picture of delayed realization of proceeds to the taxpayer.

Step 4 – Post determining the reason for delayed realization, the next step is to benchmark the overdue receivables. The points mentioned below are important in this context:

a)    For calculating the credit period, the weighted average collection period could be computed (by assigning weights to the value of invoices) rather than computing simple average of collection period. This approach can be useful to put more weights to the high-value transactions. Further, in cases wherein the payment has been received in advance, such negative credit period invoices may also be considered to reduce the overall credit period.

b)    If the reason for a delayed realization is due to genuine business rationale beyond the control of the taxpayer as well as the AE, detailed documentation at an appropriate time is the key to benchmarking the transaction and creating a defense against potential adjustment. For instance:

– In case of long transit time for shipment of goods, a formal dialogue for renegotiating the credit period offered to the AE and the resulting amendment in the contract, along with documentation of detailed justification of such modification, can portray the genuineness of variation in credit period.

–  In case of a liquidity crunch or bankruptcy of an AE, formal documentation of various attempts made for the recovery and statutory documents supporting such a condition may create a substantial backup for benchmarking.

– In cases where the determination of a true-up at the time of finalization of books resulted in the delayed realization of receivables, one of the possible solutions can be that the AE provides an ad-hoc advance payment during the end of the financial year on the basis of the history of such true-up payments in earlier years. While the accurate amount gets determined at the time of finalization of books, such advance payment by the AE can create an important backup for the taxpayer to prove that there was a bona fide intention of the taxpayer for realizing the amount in time and only the differential amount can be settled at a later point of time.

– If the AE has funds but is unable to pay the taxpayer on time due to regulatory reasons, such an amount may be earmarked and deposited in the bank, and the interest earned on it may also be passed on to the taxpayer as and when the principal amount is paid to the taxpayer. Such an arrangement can justify that the taxpayer has not suffered any loss due to the delayed receipt of the amount.

Further, it may be separately noted that as per the FEMA regulations, the period of realization for exports is nine months from the date of export.

However, the RBI had extended the period of realization of export proceeds from the existing nine months to fifteen months from the date of export due to the COVID pandemic for exports made between 1st April, 2020 to 31st July, 2020. Such an extension of timeline for realization of proceeds by RBI can also be taken as a base to substantiate the delay in realization of proceeds during such period on an overall basis due to industry-wide and worldwide issues.

However, it is to be noted that the above timeline is the maximum period within which the export proceeds are required to be realized.

The above reasons, supported with the detailed backup documentation can also help the taxpayers avoid substantiate penal consequences, if any, as the same may prove the bona fide intent of the taxpayer to the tax administrators.

c)    If the taxpayer is unable to prove the genuine business reason for delayed receipt, the taxpayer may be required to receive an arm’s length interest income for the overdue period.

The above steps can be followed to comprehensively analyze the outstanding receivables and decide the need for separate disclosure and benchmarking.

CALCULATION OF THE ARM’S LENGTH INTEREST INCOME

Once it is determined that overdue receivables are not due to specific business reasons, and an arm’s length interest income is required to be recovered from AE, the next step would be to calculate the interest income. For such calculation, the most important criterion would be the determination of the basis of interest rate.

As per various judicial precedents in sync with the commercial logic:

A)    If the receivable is denominated in the foreign currency and upon realization of the same, the currency gain or loss due to the fluctuation in the exchange rate will be borne by the Indian taxpayer, then the appropriate reference rate for determining the arm’s length interest charge would be LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) / SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate) / SONIA (Sterling Overnight Interbank Average Rate), etc.

B)    If the receivable is denominated in the Indian currency, then the appropriate base rate would be the Indian bank reference rate such as PLR, base rate, etc.

Reference rates prescribed by the Indian tax and other regulatory authorities with respect to minimum interest income to be charged on loans and advances provided to AE for specific cases:

a)    As per safe harbour rule 10T of Income-tax Rules, 1962 (‘IT Rules’):

i.    If the intra-group loan is advanced in Indian Currency – the interest rate is to be charged on the one-year marginal cost of funds lending rate of State Bank of India plus prescribed basis points as per the credit rating of AE.

ii.    If the intra-group loan is advanced in Foreign Currency – the interest rate is to be charged on the six-month LIBOR of the relevant foreign currency plus prescribed basis points as per the credit rating of AE.

b)    As per rule 10CB of IT Rules, in case a transfer pricing adjustment is made, and such adjustment money is not repatriated back to India by the taxpayer within the prescribed period, the same gets recharacterized as advance provided to AE (secondary adjustment) and interest on the same is required to be levied at the rate of:

i.    In case the respective international transaction is denominated in Indian Currency – at one-year marginal cost of fund lending rate of State Bank of India as on 1st April of the relevant previous year plus 325 basis points.

ii.    In case the respective international transaction is denominated in Foreign Currency – at six-month LIBOR as on 30th September of the relevant previous year plus 300 basis points.

c)    As per Foreign Exchange Management (Overseas Investment) Regulations, 2022, loans advanced by an Indian entity should be backed by a loan agreement with an arm’s length interest rate charged on the same.

d)    In terms of Regulation 15 of Notification No. FEMA 23 (R)/2015-RB dated 12th January, 2016, where an exporter receives advance payment (with or without interest), from a buyer outside India, the exporter shall be under an obligation to ensure that the shipment of goods is made within one year from the date of receipt of advance payment; the rate of interest, if any, payable on the advance payment should not exceed LIBOR plus 100 basis points.

The above-prescribed interest rate may be considered as a guide. However, the exact computation of arm’s length interest rate will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

Further, in case an interest is charged to the AE, then such interest amount needs to be repatriated to India by the AE.

OTHER METHODS OF BENCHMARKING SUPPORTED BY JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS

Since the issue of overdue receivables has been in limelight for many years, there are several judicial precedents accepting certain methods of benchmarking. Such generally accepted benchmarking methodologies are provided below:

a) Working Capital Adjustment

A widely accepted method of benchmarking receivables and payables is undertaking working capital adjustment on the profit level indicator of comparable companies. Under this method, the level of working capital namely debtors, creditors and inventory of the comparable companies is compared against the working capital of the tested party (i.e., either Indian taxpayer or AE) and necessary adjustment is made in the profitability working of the comparable companies to account for the differences in payables, receivables and inventory using an imputed cost of finance for the differences identified. Also, items like advances to and from customers and unbilled revenue can be considered in the computation of a working capital adjustment if they impact the working capital position of the tested party and the comparables. This position has been upheld in certain judicial precedents including CGI Information System & Management Consultant1 and Infineon Technologies India Pvt Ltd2.

1 IT(TP) No. 346/Bang/2015
2 IT(TP)A No.474/Bang/2015

Once such an adjustment is carried out, the working capital adjusted margin of the comparable companies is compared with the profit margin of the tested party. In case the tested party has earned a margin at arm’s length against such working capital adjusted margin of comparable companies, it can be deduced that the outstanding receivables and payables are at arm’s length price.

One of the main features of such working capital adjustment is that it takes into account both debtors and creditors. In view of the same, in case any taxpayer is providing a high credit period in sales, but at the same time is also enjoying high credit period on purchase, such mutual credit period is taken into consideration and, hence it does not portray a distorted picture of only delayed realization of receivables to the taxpayer.

There are many judicial precedents that support the above method of benchmarking (e.g., Kusum Health Care Pvt. Ltd.3 and Visual Graphics Computing Services (India) Pvt Ltd4), and are also recommended by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) for benchmarking of debtors and creditors. In view of the same, it may be recommended to conduct this exercise on a regular basis to avoid any potential litigation.

b) Comparison of credit period to AE vis-à-vis unrelated entity

When the taxpayer has transactions with AE and an unrelated entity, in such cases the credit period offered to AE vis-à-vis an unrelated entity can be compared to benchmark the outstanding receivables of the AE. Further, one can evaluate whether the Indian taxpayer has levied interest on delayed receivables from the unrelated entity and whether the interest needs to be charged for delayed receivables from the AE. This approach has also been supported by certain judicial precedents (e.g., M/s Sharda Spuntex Pvt. Ltd5, M/s. DHR Holding India Private Ltd.6, and WNS Global Services Pvt Ltd7).

c) Taxpayer is a debt-free company

Another position favorably accepted in several judicial precedents is that the taxpayer is a debt-free company, and does not incur any interest on the amount stuck in the delayed receivables. Hence, the taxpayer is also not required to levy any interest on the delayed receipt of overdue receivables. This approach has also been supported by certain judicial precedents (e.g. Betchel India Pvt. Ltd8).

3 ITA 765 of 2016, Delhi High Court
4 T.C.A.No.414 of 2018, Madras High Court
5 D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 56 / 2017, Rajasthan High Court
6 ITA No.1614/Del./2018, Delhi ITAT
7 ITA No.1451/Mum/2012, Mumbai ITAT
8 ITA 379/2016, Delhi High Court

RECEIVABLES ARISING OUT OF SECONDARY ADJUSTMENT
The secondary adjustment has been defined as an adjustment in the books of accounts of the taxpayer and its AE to reflect that the actual allocation of profits between the taxpayer and its AE that are consistent with the arm’s length price as may be determined because of primary adjustment, thereby removing the imbalance between a cash account and actual profit of the taxpayer.

It is further provided that the excess money available with the AE due to the primary adjustment if not repatriated to the taxpayer into India within the prescribed time limit, then the primary adjustment will be deemed as an advance extended to the overseas AE and interest on such advance shall be computed in the manner as prescribed.

In view of the above provisions, receivables arising out of secondary adjustment need to be accounted for in the books along with the interest income as prescribed by CBDT. As mentioned above, since the interest rate has been prescribed by the CBDT, the same provides an indication of the interest rate which may be adopted by the tax authorities for benchmarking of overdue trade receivables as well.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

While the above sections cover the ways for benchmarking outstanding receivables, it is also very important to make appropriate disclosures in Form 3CEB and TP documentation to avoid any non-disclosure implications. The relevant clause where reporting of overdue outstanding receivables and payables is covered in Form 3CEB is provided below:

“Clause 14: Particulars in respect of
lending or borrowing of money:

Has the assessee entered into any international
transaction(s) in respect of lending or borrowing of money including any
type of advance, payments, deferred payments, receivable, non-convertible
preference shares/debentures or any other debt arising during business as
specified in Explanation (i)(c) below section 92B(2)?”

 

[If ‘yes’, provide the following details
in respect of each associated enterprise and each loan/advance:]

(a) Name and address of the associated
enterprise with whom the international transaction has been entered into.

 

(b) Nature of financing agreement.

 

(c) Currency in which transaction has taken
place.

 

(d) Interest rate charged/paid in respect
of each lending/borrowing.

 

(e) Amount paid/received or
payable/receivable in the transaction—

 

(i) as per books of account;

 

(ii) as computed by the assessee having
regard to the arm’s length price

 

(f) Method used for determining the arm’s
length price [See section 92C(1)]

 

i) Receivables – Disclosure
As mentioned above, outstanding receivables need to be bifurcated in the following categories:

a)    Receivables arising out of the ordinary course of business which do not necessitate that the transaction gets recharacterized as advance provided to AEs.

b)    Receivables in nature of debts which warrant the taxpayer to charge interest on such overdue receivables.

From the perspective of disclosure in Form 3CEB, in case of category a) mentioned above, if after carrying out the necessary exercise, as also suggested by ICAI Guidance Note, the receivables are in the ordinary course of business and not characterizable as advances, then reporting of such receivables separately may prove to be duplication of reporting the transactions by way of the principal transaction as well as trade receivables. However, on a conservative basis, such receivables
and payables may be reported in the notes section of Form 3CEB to avoid unnecessary litigation for non-disclosure.

However, in case of category b) mentioned above, it is important to disclose the transaction separately in Form 3CEB in Clause 14, and also to charge interest in line with Para 3 above in order to avoid litigation at a later stage.

Similar disclosures would also be required for receivables arising out of secondary adjustment along with disclosure of the interest income earned from it.

Further, since such overdue receivables are deemed as advance, the same should not trigger compliances under ODI (‘Overseas Direct Investment’) regulations applicable to loan transactions.

ii) Payables – Disclosure
Generally, outstanding payables are not a cause of concern for the Indian taxpayer, but it is important to analyze the same from the perspective of overseas AE.

From the Indian taxpayer’s perspective, if the credit period availed is in excess qua contract and qua industry, one possible interpretation can be that the Indian taxpayer is using such funds at the behest of the overseas AE. However, since it is beneficial from the Indian taxpayer’s perspective, any transfer pricing adjustment made by the Income-tax authorities on such a transaction would have an effect of reducing the income chargeable to tax or increasing the loss, as the case may be. Such adjustment is prohibited vide Section 92(3) of the Act since it leads to base erosion of tax from India.

Further, the outstanding payable of the Indian taxpayer would be outstanding receivable from an overseas AE perspective. It could result in adverse consequences for overseas AE, as the law mandates each taxpayer to demonstrate the arm’s length nature of its international transaction. Further, there are conflicting judgments on the applicability of the base erosion principle while dealing with disputes relating to overseas AE.

Hence, the exercise and steps mentioned for outstanding receivables above should also be followed for outstanding payables to the extent applicable. It would be advisable to make appropriate disclosures of identified overdue payables in Form 3CEB of the Foreign Company and undertake appropriate benchmarking of the same and maintenance of documentation.

CONCLUSION
One may need to review voluminous data to assess the rationale for delays, if any, and consequent interest costs. In case the impact of interest cost resulting from the delay is not significant, then there may be a temptation to ignore charging interest in the inter-company transaction to minimize administrative hassles. However, at this juncture, it is important to weigh the penal consequence of 2 per cent of the transaction value which gets triggered due to the non-disclosure of overdue transactions in the year-end compliances.

In the inter-company contracts, the clauses related to invoicing (i.e., budgeted cost or actual cost) invoice frequency, credit term, penal interest clause etc. should be carefully drafted. Further, aforesaid clauses should be regularly reviewed to ensure the conduct of the parties is in line with contractual arrangements. It is observed that MNCs sometimes mention a percentage of penal interest to be charged in case of delay in payments. However, in actual practice, such an interest is waived or not charged. It is critical that any such waiver is backed with appropriate justification and documentation. Further, in cases wherein parties don’t have the intention to charge penal interest for delays, then such clauses should be carefully drafted as the same can go against the taxpayer.

In the assessment proceedings, the tax officers have been specifically seeking details of the settlement of receivable and payable transactions throughout the year and scrutinizing ageing analysis of year-end debts closely. Thus, it is imperative that the taxpayer compiles the said information proactively and maintains adequate justification to defend stray situations of delays, if any, in settling inter-company debts.

As discussed above, the FEMA regulations permit nine months from the date of export to realize the proceeds from the overseas entity. However, the tax officers often consider a narrow credit period of 45 days to 90 days. It will be helpful if some guidance is provided by the government to field officers to consider the credit period in line with FEMA regulations.

Further, the taxpayer must be vigilant to ensure that the receivables and payables are settled in the normal credit period. In case of delays in settlement, the taxpayer should gather evidence to demonstrate his bona fide behaviour and situations beyond his control. Further, the documents should also clearly demonstrate there was no intention to fund the operation of overseas AE through an excess credit period.

Uncharitable Treatment to Charities?

“I slept and dreamt that life was a joy. I awoke and saw that life was service. I acted and behold, service was a joy.” – Rabindranath Tagore.

India is a land of philanthropists for ages. Karna and King Bali are glaring mythological examples of donors who never refused anyone coming to their door for any help. Those who have experienced the joy of giving would go all out to help others. And India is fortunate to have many such philanthropic people who are engaged in helping others in a big way.

In a country of 1.40 billion plus people with 25 per cent below the poverty line, a literacy rate of 77 per cent and an unemployment rate of about 8 per cent, the Government’s efforts need to be complemented by that of NGOs. According to World Poverty Clock, almost 83 million people in India live in extreme poverty. As per NITI (National Institution for Transforming India) Aayog’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Index, India ranked 66th among 109 countries in the Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2021, which considers factors like education, health, child mortality, nutrition, the standard of living, etc. Various Government schemes/programs launched with the objective of reducing poverty have been doing well. However, looking at the magnitude of the challenge, the role of NGOs is crucial.

The laws relating to Trusts, Trustees, Charities and Charitable Institutions are part of the Concurrent List of Schedule 7 of the Indian Constitution (under entries 10 and 28). Thus, both the Union and the State Governments have the power to enact laws governing Trusts. Public Charitable Trusts are primarily governed by the law of the State in which they are established.  There is a Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920, which has limited provisions and applications. Trusts set up in Maharashtra and Gujarat are governed by the Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950 and The Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950, respectively.  Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan have their own Public Trusts Acts. However, West Bengal, Bihar, Delhi, Jharkhand, etc. do not have any Act to regulate public Trusts. An NGO can also be registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or as a Section 8 company under the Companies Act, 2013.

In view of the wide disparities governing registration and regulation of Public Charitable Trusts, the Central Government is seeking to control or regulate Charitable Trusts through the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act. Therefore, both Acts have been amended from time to time.

The recent amendment applicable to the Charitable Trusts pertaining to Books of Accounts and other documents is one such measure. The CBDT has notified Rule 17AA (“the Rule”), specifying the books of accounts and other documents to be maintained by a charitable institution. This Rule casts onerous responsibility on every Charitable Trust registered u/s 12AB or an educational or medical institution registered u/s 10(23C) to maintain detailed books of accounts and other documents mentioned therein. While the rationale of the provisions appears to be to gather more details and/or information, their interpretation and administration are matters of concern. One wonders about the need for such elaborate specification of books and documents, when in any case every NGO had to maintain adequate books of account due to requirements of audit.

The threat of losing exemption due to difference in interpretation/non-compliance with this requirement is real, as experienced post amendment of the definition of “charitable purpose” in section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The problem is that small Trusts do not have the wherewithal to either comply or litigate the matter, as they are already struggling with lack of resources and volunteers. Under the circumstances, the very existence of small NGOs is under threat.

Achieving a balance between control and ease of compliance is necessary. Small Trusts can either be exempt or subject to less elaborate requirements along the lines of small companies under the Companies Act, 2013.

There is a need for introspection by Trusts as well. Charity demands purity of not only the end use (purpose) but also its means. The use of Trusts for dubious purposes or misuse of public funds brings disrepute to the beautiful vehicle of philanthropy – “Trust”. Where there is a breach of trust, it is no longer fit to be called a Trust and punishment of such an entity is justified. Shri Maha Avatar Babaji said, “To serve is the nature of Divine.” Those who genuinely serve will be out of pocket but will not pocket a single penny from the Trust. Let us introspect!

The month of October is also one for complying with Transfer Pricing Regulations (TPR). The essence of TPR is that any transaction between two Associated Enterprises (AEs) should be at arm’s length (i.e., at market price). A Trustee and his Trust are AEs by analogy; therefore, any dealing between them needs to be at arm’s length. Moreover, a Trustee is also a protector of property entrusted to him by the donors for the benefit/welfare of the public at large, and therefore he should follow the highest moral standards in discharging his duties. Just as we do a benchmarking exercise to determine the arm’s length pricing in TPR, a Trust may benchmark its practices and performance with other Trusts to adopt best practices and achieve better performance.

NGOs have done commendable work during the Pandemic and saved many lives. Many volunteers lost their lives while helping others. There is a general awareness and inclination towards helping poor and destitute people. Many youngsters are finding their calling in serving others and devoting their lives to social causes leaving lucrative jobs and comfortable lives.

Trustees should help Government to ensure transparency, and the tax administration should ‘trust’ the Trustees. The lack of ‘trust’ between the two is not good for charitable activities through a Trust Regime in India!

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

11th of September was ‘Vishwa-bandhutwa Din’ – World Brotherhood Day. On this day, Swami Vivekananda won the hearts of thousands of people assembled in Chicago for the World Congress of Religions. The amazing part was that he did it with just six words that he uttered “My brothers and sisters of America”. These words had an enchanting and electrifying effect on the audience. What was so magical about the words?

The World Congress of Religions was organised basically to establish the superiority of a particular religion over other religions of the world. Swami Vivekananda was an ordinary monk from India. He had no authentic or official document from any Hindu or other religious body. In normal course, he would not have been allowed to speak, but for the strong recommendation from Professor John Henry Wright of Harvard University, who wrote to the organisers, “Asking for authority letter from Swamiji is asking the authority of the Sun and Shine! All our scholars on one side and this unknown Hindu monk on the other, his side will be heavier!”

Born on 12th January, 1863, he lived only for 39 years and passed away on 4th July, 1902. He had five serious ailments – asthama, insomnia, diabetes, gastric trouble and blood pressure. Despite this, through his sheer will-power, he travelled throughout India and abroad. His father Mr. Vishwanath Dutt was a renowned lawyer, and mother Bhuvaneshwari, was a pious lady. His grandfather had taken Sanyas (renunciation). His mother believed that the son was the blessing of Lord Shiva. So, his name was Vireshwar but called Bille. After Sanyas, he became Vividishananda. However, once in an American Newspaper, his name was by mistake printed as ‘Vivekananda’.

The most favourite disciple of Shri Ramakrishna Paramahansa, initially he fought with the Guru about idol worship. However, he virtually surrendered to the Goddess Kalimata.

While studying in Scottish Church College, Kolkata, the principal of the college William Hasty told him that he knew only one person in the world who achieved Ecstatic Joy – the ultimate of spiritual attainments.

Swamiji wrote a treatise on classical music at the age of 23. His 90-page introduction to the book contained a detailed study of Indian and Western musical instruments. Many editions were sold in a short span of time, wiping off the accumulated loss of the publishing house! Once Swamiji said had he not gone into spiritualism, he would have become a great musician!

Marie Louise Burke has written 6 volumes of 500 pages each on Swamiji’s conquer of the West!

After his father’s death, Swamiji’s family experienced serious poverty. He studied law and did jobs for livelihood. After taking Sanyas, he travelled across India. At Kanyakumari (the south end of the country), he dived into the sea and reached a huge rock. He meditated there, alone for 3 days and saw the dream of a prosperous and powerful India. He took it as a mission of his life. At present, there is the Vivekananda Memorial constructed on the rock.

Many Kings and Nawabs were impressed by his knowledge and personality; and offered to sponsor his trip abroad. But he politely refused it by saying that he would collect funds from people at large. He went to represent India. His thoughts were very practical. Once, he said – playing football on the ground may take you closer to God rather than mere prayers. He wanted a strong India. He was proud that we Indians accommodated all invaders. He said, Hinduism is not a religion as other people understand the word ‘religion’. It is our way of life! Therefore, he never believed in ‘conversions’. He used to say ‘religion’ cannot be discussed with an empty stomach.

After his Guru–mentor – Shri Ramakrishna, he had great respect for Buddha. There were many contemporary Indians representing other sects who were jealous of his glamorous success. They tried to defame him. The World knew the truth.

During his travel, he also met Lokmanya Tilak, who appreciated his depth of knowledge.

In America, before reaching the World conference venue, he had to undergo lot of hardships. He had no money. He shivered in the chilled climate. He had to stay in a broken box in a godown, on an empty stomach and inadequate clothes. People around hated him and kept away from the ‘black’ stranger.

Gradually, his value was recognised by one and all. Prof. Wright said ‘Swamiji’ is one of the best-educated men in the world. The posters in America described him as a ‘Cyclonic’ Hindu monk! It was on his motivation that Rockfeller donated his wealth to charity and formed ‘Rockfeller Foundation’. He inspired many entrepreneurs of India, including Tatas.

In the conference, all leaders of other religions addressed the gathering by using highly scholastic difficult words.

But the words of Swamiji, “My brothers and sisters of America”, touched the hearts of the audience. It was the true expression of our Indian culture and thought of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’ – the whole world is one family. It is difficult to describe his greatness in such a short article.

Namaskaar to this all-time great person the world has ever witnessed!

Bharat’s Progress and Women’s Prowess

India, that is ‘Bharat’, has created history with the success of ‘Chandrayaan 3’. It became the first country to do a soft landing on the Lunar South Pole. The beauty of this achievement is its cost-effectiveness and precise landing timings. Within days of the successful Moon mission, ISRO launched Bharat’s first observation mission to the Sun, named, ‘Aditya-L1’, which is performing as planned. It was heartening to see the contribution of many women scientists in the success of Chandrayaan-3 and Aditya-L1. The dedication and expertise of women scientists propelled the mission forward and significantly contributed to its success. Their involvement not only underscores gender equality and inclusivity but also showcases the remarkable talent and capabilities of women in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields.

Bharat showed its capability and acumen by successfully organising the G20 Summit under its presidency with hundred per cent consensus on all developmental and geo-political issues, running into 38 paragraphs. G20’s theme was based on Vasudhaiv Kutumbakkam – One Earth – One Family – One Future. The importance of the G20 Summit can be understood from the fact that collectively, these countries account for 85 per cent of global gross domestic product, over 75 per cent of global trade and two-thirds of the globe’s entire population. With 9 invitee countries, 27 member countries of the European Union and 55 member countries of the African Union, this representation is still wider. The feather on Bharat’s cap was when it successfully convinced the Group’s member countries to admit the African Union as a permanent member, making the Group of 20 (G20) now G21. Bharat raised its status by becoming a voice for the developing nations of the Global South.

The New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration broadly focuses on the following five key areas:

  • Strong, Sustainable, Balanced and Inclusive Growth
  • Accelerating Progress on Sustainable Development Goals
  • Green Development Pact for a Sustainable Future
  • Multilateral Institutions for the 21st Century
  • Reinvigorating Multilateralism

Bharat grabbed the opportunity to showcase its great heritage and culture to the participants of various working group meetings of G20 throughout the year. It organised over 200 meetings at 50 different locations, which is, perhaps, a unique feature in the history of any G20 presidency. It not only made G20 popular across the nation but also won the hearts of the delegates. The spectacular success of the G20 Summit and its outcomes have been hailed by world leaders and media alike.

It is heartening to note that Bharat launched seven state-of-the-art stealth frigates in just four years from 2019–2023. Bharat stands 4th globally in Renewal Energy Installed Capacity (including Large Hydro), 4th in Wind Power and 4th in Solar Power capacity. Thus, Bharat is shining in all Panchmahabhuta, namely, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Space.

In the heart of our national capital, New Delhi, stands a new symbol of our democracy and progress — the new Parliament House of India. Inaugurated on the auspicious occasion of Ganesh Chaturthi, this architectural marvel stands as a testament to a resurgent India, symbolising our aspirations and commitment to uphold democratic values for the next 150 years. The passing of the Women’s Reservation Bill in this new Parliament is a significant step towards recognising and empowering the invaluable contribution of Nari Shakti in our nation’s governance and progress.

Yet, it is imperative to consider the notion of reservations. While acknowledging the need to empower and include all sections of society, we must also tread carefully, ensuring that reservations do not hinder meritocracy or perpetuate inequalities. Can Bharat think of becoming the world leader by increasingly ignoring meritocracy and extending reservations in various forms? Our beloved country has seen women hold pivotal roles across various spheres without reservations, highlighting the potential and competence of women in almost every field. The role played by women leaders in the success of G20 or women scientists in the success of space missions has been acclaimed. It is indeed a matter of pride that today, the highest office of the President of India is adorned by a woman, Smt. Droupadi Murmu. Recognising gender equality and the prowess of women, PM Modi rightly named the spot where Chandrayaan 3 landed as “Shiv-Shakti”. In a few days from now, we will celebrate Navaratri, a festival to respect and revere Goddess Durga – a symbol of Nari Shakti.

In the domain of Chartered Accountancy field also, women have made significant strides. Currently, over 40 per cent of the student population pursuing CA comprises young women, and their record of acquiring a high number of positions in the Merit Lists is really impressive. Moreover, approximately 28 per cent of CA members are women. These numbers depict a progressive trend where women are not only entering but excelling in the CA profession, showcasing their proficiency and determination.

As we reflect on these monumental achievements and Nari Shakti, we must also remain vigilant about the road ahead. Our progress should be marked by inclusivity, equity and sustainable development. It is our responsibility to ensure that every stride we take benefits all sections of society, leaving no one behind.

To this end, it is important to note that 25th September is celebrated in India as “Antyodaya Diwas” (अंत्योदय दिवस)to mark the birth anniversary of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya and remember his life and legacy. Even Mahatma Gandhi’s idea of Sarvodaya (Universal Uplift and Progress for All), was based on Antyodaya – uplifting the poorest of poor.

Let us continue to embrace innovation, collaborate on a global scale and celebrate the indomitable spirit of Bharat as we step into this promising month of October.

Together, let us forge a path to a brighter and more inclusive future, embodying the true essence of ‘Bharat’.

चांद पे उतरे, मंगल को देखा
अब सूरज की बारी है,
हर क्षेत्र में कौशल दिखाती
देखो भारतीय नारी है।।

एक धरती, एक कुटुंब,
एक नियति हमारी है
विश्व को एक करनेवाले,
भारत तेरी बलिहारी है।।

PARADOX

‘Oh, hell! What a disgusting profession! I wonder why I chose it!’ A Chartered Accountant was cursing his profession.

‘What happened?’ I asked in a sympathetic tone.

He continued, ‘It’s very easy to say from the dais – “A dignified profession”. But in reality nobody cares for our profession.’

‘But people feel very highly about a CA. Your course is so difficult. The passing percentage is so low.’

The CA: ‘But what’s the use? You become “out-dated” every six months! Many things change every day! Zindagi mein kitne saal padhate rahane ka ? (How long to keep on learning and studying in life?)’

I pointed out, ‘But your signature is valuable. Government requires your signature on many documents and certificates – Not only on financial statements.’

‘But that is only a responsibility, a burden without commensurate rewards. There’s too much of regulation. It is impossible to keep track…’

I said, ‘Audit is your monopoly.’

He countered: ‘That is killing us. Nobody really wants audit. Nobody wants to pay tax. So our services are unwelcome…’

‘But you alone can guide the clients to comply with all laws and the rules and regulations.’

‘The client has no value for all these things. He says that all that we are doing is for ourselves; just to save our skin. He never feels any value addition in those regulations and compliances’.

I ventured, ‘But since these things are mandatory, you get fees…’

‘Fees? Bah! This is the most unremunerative profession. Payment of our fees is at the bottom of the ladder. And they bargain even for small amounts.’

‘But due to the system of articleship, you get good assistants at low cost?’

‘Articles? The less said about them the better. Everybody dictates to us – clients, staff, articles, regulators – and also the wife at home!’

‘But you do get the satisfaction of rendering good service?’

‘Satisfaction? There is nothing but frustration. Don’t you know that without corruption you cannot give results.’

I pointed out that there are many opportunities in the corporate sector. There are many other avenues and a variety of other services that one can render.

The CA agreed with me and added, ‘But for that you need not be a CA. And in corporates there is slogging like glorified slaves… No personal life… No independence. There is hypocrisy everywhere. And now everything is technology-driven. There is no application of mind.’

I said, ‘But don’t your clients maintain a long relationship with you?’

The CA responded sceptically with, ‘As soon as the fees are increased, the relations come to an end! There is no loyalty.’

The discussion was endless. We stopped after two hours – with his final remark, ‘I wonder why people go for this course at all! It was a wrong decision on my part. This profession has no future’.

We dispersed.

Next morning, I received a WhatsApp massage from my CA friend: ‘Pleased and proud to inform you that my son has passed his CPT exam and will be joining the CA course…’

In the Mahabharat, there is a very interesting chapter called ‘Yaksha-Prashna.’ It is an enlightening dialogue between Yudhishtira and a ‘super’ human being, Yaksha. He asks, ‘What is the most paradoxical situation in the world?’

Yudhishtira replies, ‘Everybody knows that death is inevitable; yet they behave as if they are immortal’.

I think many CAs feel that this profession has no future, yet their next generation takes up the course. Perhaps this applies to all professions.

SUPREME COURT FORMULATES GUIDELINES FOR COMPOUNDING; HOLDS THAT CONSENT OF SEBI NOT REQUIRED

BACKGROUND
An interesting feature of the SEBI Act, 1992 is that one can potentially be prosecuted u/s 24 for violating any provision of the Act and even any of the rules and regulations made thereunder. Further, the punishment can be in the form of imprisonment for as long as ten years, or a fine of up to Rs. 25 crores. Non-payment of the penalty imposed is also punished stringently, with a minimum prison term of one month and a maximum of ten years; or with a fine of Rs. 25 crores. This is quite unlike other laws under which only specified serious violations can be prosecuted as offences. In a sense, the provisions of the SEBI Act, at least on paper, sound more stringent than even the Indian Penal Code that has varying punishments for different offences.

Fortunately, prosecution is not generally initiated indiscriminately under the SEBI Act. However, the fear of being prosecuted remains. The question that arises is how does a person, who is willing to make amends for the wrong he has committed get relief from prosecution? For this purpose, the SEBI Act has enabling provisions for compounding of offences. Section 24A provides that offences, other than those punishable with imprisonment only or with both imprisonment and fine, can be compounded by the Securities Appellate Tribunal or the court before which the proceedings are pending.

Considering that there is no violation in the Act that is punishable by imprisonment only or by both imprisonment and fine, the conclusion is that all offences are compoundable and thus any prosecution proceeding can be compounded (see later herein for certain remarks of the Supreme Court). This is because there is a common provision for prosecution u/s 24, unlike other laws that have separate punishments prescribed for different violations.

The question that came up before the Supreme Court in Prakash Gupta vs. SEBI (order dated 23rd July, 2021, [2021] 128 taxmann.com 362 [SC]) was whether, for compounding an offence by a Court / SAT, the consent of SEBI is a prerequisite? In other words, if SEBI vetoes the application for compounding and does not grant consent, can the offence still be compounded? The Supreme Court, while dealing with this question, ruled on several aspects and thereafter even laid down guidelines for compounding. These were made, the Court said, in the absence of explicit provisions in the law which gap it attempted to fill. Thus, the ruling has relevance on several aspects of the subject.

PROVISIONS OF LAW
As stated earlier, section 24A of the SEBI Act enables compounding of offences and the authority for this purpose is the SAT or the court before which the proceedings are pending. SEBI has notified settlement regulations which deal with settlement of civil proceedings and compounding of offences. The Regulations provide that the principles as applicable for settlement of civil proceedings would also apply for compounding. General principles have been laid down for three categories of proceedings. In respect of the offence of non-payment of penalty, such amount of penalty with interest and legal charges as deemed appropriate by SEBI would be proposed before the court. Generally, the amount for compounding the offence would be as per the guidelines laid down in the Schedule to the Regulations. If the application for compounding is made after framing of charges by the court, then this amount would be increased by 25%, apart from legal charges and other terms as approved by the whole-time panel of SEBI as set up under the Regulations.

However, there are many areas where there is silence or lack of clarity. Is there an inherent right to compounding? Can all offences be compounded as a matter of right? If there are some offences which cannot be compounded, which are those and who decides this? Whether such a decision can be questioned and, if so, on what grounds?

If the person rights the wrong, compensates the party that is wronged, etc., does compounding become a matter of right? In this context, is compounding of offences under the SEBI Act at par with compounding with, say, under the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonouring of cheques?

Finally, is the consent of SEBI necessary for compounding or is it solely at the discretion of the court to compound the offence? What is the relevance and weight of the views of SEBI in the matter?

These are some of the issues discussed in the decision.

IS THE OFFENCE OF NON-PAYMENT OF PENALTY COMPOUNDABLE?
Section 24(2) treats non-payment of penalty levied under the Act as an offence over and above the violation in respect of which the penalty is levied. The question is whether this offence is compoundable. In principle, considering that the offences of violation of the provisions of the Act / Regulations / Rules are compoundable, the answer should have been yes. However, the Court dwelt on what seem to be ambiguous words used in the provision. It appeared to the Court that since there was a minimum prison term of one month provided, one view could be that imprisonment is mandatory. Section 24 says that an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine cannot be compounded. In which case, as per this view, the offence of non-payment of penalty cannot be compounded. However, since this specific issue was not before the Court, it did not give a final ruling on it and kept it for consideration at a future date. In the author’s opinion, considering the framework not only of the section but also of the settlement regulations, the better view should be that non-payment of penalty should also be compoundable.

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES
In passing, and as a matter of academic interest, it is interesting to note that originally compounding itself was an offence and continues to be so to a certain extent. Compounding generally meant a person accepts consideration for not prosecuting an offence. This could be even by a police officer, or others in authority, and could thus be a bribe. However, the position has changed over time. There were less grave situations where it may not be worth the effort to prosecute a person. For offences such as under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the intention may be to make dishonouring of cheque an offence a means to make such a person honour the cheque. Hence, if the party is willing to pay off its dues, the court may generally be inclined to allow compounding. There may also be situations where the offence is not very grave, the offender may have realised his wrong and regretted it, and even the injured person may be willing to let the matter go (perhaps also on receipt of some compensation). Hence, compounding of offences could be lawfully done if the law provided for it. Different laws have provided for compounding in different ways and hence the question was how should the provisions of the SEBI Act be interpreted.

Serious wrongs that cannot be compounded
The Court noted that there may be offences that are not cured merely by compensating the injured person or even if the injured person is not interested in pursuing the proceedings. There are wrongs that are public in nature and have wider implications. The yardstick applied cannot be a single and uniform one.

WHETHER CONSENT OF SEBI IS NECESSARY FOR COMPOUNDING
In the matter before the Court, the appellant had applied for compounding before a lower court. When the views of SEBI were sought, SEBI refused to grant consent to such compounding and the Additional Sessions Judge before whom the proceedings were initiated thus rejected the application. The appellant approached the High Court which, citing earlier precedents, affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court held that the wording of section 24A is clear. There is no mandatory requirement of consent of SEBI for the Court to allow compounding. The Court would consider the views of SEBI but the decision of whether or not to compound the offence would rest with the Court. The important question, however, is what weight should the Court assign to the views of SEBI.

VIEWS OF SEBI ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW COMPOUNDING
The Court elaborately discussed the object of the SEBI Act and the role of SEBI as an expert body in the securities markets. It noted that SEBI has a duty to protect the interests of investors and generally the capital market. It also reviewed the mechanism laid down by SEBI for consideration of applications for compounding and also the independent High-Powered Advisory Committee (‘HPAC’) set up to provide advice on the matter. The Court held that the views of SEBI on whether or not compounding should be allowed should be respected and followed unless the view taken can be shown to be arbitrary or mala fide.

The Court also considered the aspects that SEBI takes into account and as laid down in the guidelines issued by SEBI. In particular, the matters in respect of which compounding / settlement would ordinarily not be allowed were noted.
All in all, the Court held that while the consent of SEBI is not a prerequisite, the views / recommendations of SEBI would ordinarily be followed.
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE COURT FOR CONSIDERING COMPOUNDING APPLICATIONS
As if to not only give the last word but provide a comprehensive framework for compounding, the Court laid down specific guidelines that would effectively fill the gap existing today. The Supreme Court laid down four guidelines that the Court / SAT should consider while disposing of applications for compounding:
a. The factors enumerated by SEBI in its Circular of 20th April, 2007 and accompanying FAQs should be considered, though not as exhaustive.
b. The application for compounding has to be made to SEBI which places the same before the HPAC. The recommendation of HPAC should be placed before the Court / SAT which should give due deference to such opinion. It should differ if it has cogent reasons and only if the reasons provided by SEBI / HPAC are mala fide or manifestly arbitrary.
c. The offences under the SEBI Act are not comparable with other laws where restitution of the injured party is a strong ground for allowing compounding. Most offences under the SEBI Act are of a public character and restitution may not always be enough. In any case, for this purpose the opinion of SEBI should be relied upon.
d. Finally, and this point is an extension of the third one, the Court / SAT should consider whether the offence is private or public in nature. If of a public nature, it would affect the public at large. Such offences should not be compounded even if restitution has taken place.
CONCLUSION

Not only has the Supreme Court given a categorical ruling on the role of SEBI and its views on compounding, it has also given a detailed framework on how compounding applications should be considered and what principles and considerations ought to be followed in the matter. The Court applied these principles also to the case before it and held that the matter did not deserve to be compounded, considering the facts and also the views of SEBI. With a fairly comprehensive framework laid down including the weight to be assigned to the opinion of SEBI, one can trust now that applications for compounding will be more transparent and reason-based.

GAMING NOT GAMBLING

INTRODUCTION
While the difference in the spelling of gaming and gambling is only of two letters, there is a world of difference between the two in reality. India’s online gaming market is growing by leaps and bounds and there is keen interest in setting up gaming ventures and investing in / acquiring Indian gaming companies. In India, gaming is a permissible activity, but gambling is either prohibited or heavily regulated. Some recent court decisions have helped clear the regulatory shroud covering gaming activities.

LEGAL ECOSYSTEM


Let us first understand the various laws which deal with this subject:
(a) Under the Constitution of India, the Union Government is empowered to make laws regulating the conduct of lotteries.
(b) Under the Constitution, the State Governments have been given the responsibility of authorising / conducting lotteries and making laws on betting and gambling.
(c) Hence, we must look at the Acts of each of the 28 States and seven Union Territories regarding gambling / gaming.
(d) The following are the various laws which regulate / restrict / prohibit gambling in India:

Public Gambling Act, 1867: This Central Legislation provides for the punishment of public gambling in certain parts of India. It is not applicable in Maharashtra and other States which have repealed its application.
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887: It applies in Maharashtra and regulates gaming in the State.
Other State legislations: Acts of other States, such as the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955, the Madras Gambling Act, etc., are more or less similar to the Public Gaming Act, 1867 as the object of these Acts is to ban / restrict gambling. The State Acts repeal the applicability of the Public Gambling Act in their respective States.

* Section 294-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section provides for punishment for keeping a lottery office without the authorisation of the State Government. Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: This Section prevents any person from bringing a suit for recovery of any winnings won by way of a ‘wager.’
* The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998: This Central Legislation lays down guidelines and restrictions on conducting lotteries.

* The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: It requires maintenance of certain records by entities engaged in gambling.

Some States which expressly permit gambling are

* Sikkim: The Sikkim Casino Games (Control and Tax Rules), 2002 permits setting up of casinos in Sikkim.

* The Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Act, 2008, along with the Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Rules, 2009 provides for licences to set up online gaming websites (for gambling and also betting on games like cricket, football, tennis, etc.) with the servers based in Sikkim. Other than this law, India does not have any specific laws targeting online gambling or gaming.

* Goa: An amendment to the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976 provides for casinos to be set up only at five star hotels or offshore vessels with permission. This is the reason Goa has floating casinos or casinos in five star hotels.

* West Bengal: The West Bengal Prize Competition and Gambling Act, 1957 excludes ‘skill-based’ card games like poker, bridge, rummy and nap from its operation. Thus, in West Bengal a game of poker is expressly excluded from the definition of gambling.

* Nagaland: The Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 regulates online games of skill in the State of Nagaland.

PUBLIC GAMBLING ACT
Since this is a Central Act on which several State Acts have been based, we may examine this Act. Section 1 of this Act has laid down three conditions all of which must be fulfilled in order that a place is treated as a common gaming house:
(a) It must be a house, walled enclosure, room or place;
(b) cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are kept in such place; and
(c) these instruments are used for profit or gain of the occupier whether by way of charging for the instruments or for the place.

It is a moot point whether these definitions can even be extended to online gaming ventures.

Section 3 of the Act levies a penalty for owning or keeping or having charge of a common gaming house. The penalty is a fine not exceeding Rs. 200 or imprisonment for any term up to three months. It may be noted that the public gaming house concept can even be extended to a private residence of a person if gambling activities are carried on in such a place. Thus, casual gambling at a house party may be treated, if all the conditions are fulfilled, as gambling and the owner of the house may be prosecuted.

Exception u/s 12: Even if all the above-mentioned three conditions are fulfilled, if it is a game of mere skill, the penal provisions do not apply. What is a game of skill is a question of fact and has been the subject matter of great debate. In Chamarbaugwalla vs. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, it was held that competitions which involve substantial skill are not gambling activities.

In State of AP vs. K. Satyanarayana, 1968 AIR 825 (SC), the Court analysed whether a game of rummy was a game of skill and held as follows:
• Rummy is not a game of mere chance like three cards;
• It requires considerable skill as fall of cards (is) to be memorised;
• The skill lies in holding and discarding cards;
• It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill;
• Chance is a factor but not the major factor.

The Court held that rummy is not a game of chance but a game of skill.

In Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs. State of TN, 1996 2 SCC 226, the Court analysed whether betting on horses is a game of chance or mere skill:
• Gambling is payment of a price for a chance to win. Gaming may be of skill alone or both skill and chance;
• In a game of skill chance cannot be entirely eliminated but it depends upon the superior knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of the players;
• A game of chance is one in which chance predominates over the element of skill, and a game of skill is one in which the element of skill dominates over the chance element;
• It is the dominant element which determines the game’s character;
• In horse-racing, the person betting is supposed to have full knowledge of the horse, jockey, trainer, owner, turf, race system, etc.;
• Horses are given specialised training;
• Books are printed giving details of the above, which are studied.

Hence, betting on horse-racing is a game of skill since skill dominates over chance.

In Bimalendu De vs. UOI, AIR 2001 Cal 30, it was held that Kaun Banega Carodpati, which was aired on TV channels, was not a game of chance but a game of skill. Elements of gambling, i.e., wagering and betting, were missing from this game. Only a player’s skill was tested. He did not have to pay or put any stake in the hope of a prize.

In M.J. Sivani vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770, video games parlours were held to be common gaming houses. Video games are associated with stakes of money or money’s worth on the result of a game, be it a game of pure chance or of mixed skill or chance. For a commoner it is difficult to play a video game with skill. Hence, they are not a game of mere skill.

In this respect, the Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 defines games of skill to include all such games where there is preponderance of skill over chance, including where the skill relates to strategising the manner of placing wagers or placing bets or where the skill lies in team selection or selection of virtual stocks based on analyses or where the skill relates to the manner in which the moves are made, whether through deployment of physical or mental skill and acumen. It further states that games of skill may be (a) card-based, (b) action / virtual sports / adventure / mystery, and (c) calculation / strategy / quiz-based. This is one of the first examples of a statutory definition of what constitutes a game of skill. ‘Gambling’, on the other hand, has been defined by this Act to mean and include wagering or betting on games of chance (meaning all such games where there is a preponderance of chance over skill) but does not include betting or wagering on games of skill.

Thus, the facts and circumstances of each game would have to be examined as to whether it falls within the domain of mere skill and hence is a game, or is it more a game of chance and hence gambling.

MAHARASHTRA PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT, 1887
This Act is similar in operation to the Public Gambling Act but has some differences. It defines the term ‘gaming’ to include wagering or betting except betting or wagering on horse races and dog races in certain cases.

‘Instruments of gaming’ are defined to include any article used as a subject matter of gaming or any document used as a register or record for evidence of gaming / proceeds of gaming / winnings or prizes of gaming.

The definition of common gaming house includes places where the following activities take place:
• Betting on rainfall;
• Betting on prices of cotton, opium or other commodities;
• Betting on stock market prices;
• Betting on cards.

The imprisonment under this Act extends up to two years and the fine is also higher. Police officers have been given substantial powers to search and seize and arrest under this Act.

INDIAN PENAL CODE
Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever keeps any office or place for drawing any lottery not authorised by the Government is punishable with a fine of up to Rs. 1,000. What is a lottery has not been defined. Courts have held that it includes competitions in which prizes are decided by mere chance. However, if the game requires skill then it is not a lottery. A newspaper contained an advertisement of a coupon competition which included coupons to be filled by the newspaper buyers with names of horses selected by them as likely to finish 1st, 2nd or 3rd in a race. The Court held that the game was one of skill since filling up the names of the horses required specialised knowledge about the horses and some element of skill – Stoddart vs. Sagar (1895) 2 QB 474.

Further, it must verify and maintain the records of the identity of all its clients / customers.

RECENT MADRAS HIGH COURT DECISION ON ONLINE RUMMY / POKER
In the recent case of Junglee Games India vs. State of Tamil Nadu, WP No. 18022/2020, the Madras High Court had occasion to consider whether an amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 which ended up banning online rummy / poker was unconstitutional. The amended statute prohibited all forms of games being conducted in cyberspace, irrespective of whether the game involved being a game of mere skill, whether such game was played for a wager, bet, money or other stakes. The High Court held that gambling is often equated with gaming and the activity involved chance to such a predominant extent that the element of skill that may also have been involved could not control the outcome. A game of skill, on the other hand, might not necessarily be such an activity where skill must always prevail; however, it would suffice for an activity to be regarded as a game of skill if, ordinarily, the exercise of skill could control the chance element involved in the activity such that the better skilled would prevail more often than not. It held that the wording of the amending Act was so crass and overbearing that it smacked of unreasonableness in its every clause and could be seen to be manifestly arbitrary.

Whatever may have been the pious intention of the Legislature, the reading of the impugned statute and how it might operate amounted to the baby being thrown out with the bath. It even held that broadly speaking, games and sporting activities in the physical form could not be equated with games conducted in virtual mode or in cyberspace. However, when it came to card games or board games such as chess or scrabble, there was no distinction between the skill involved in the physical form of the activity or in the virtual form. The Court held that such distinction was completely lost in the amending Act as all games were outlawed if played for a stake or for any prize.

It came out with a very interesting take on the difference – ‘Seen from the betting perspective, if the odds favouring an outcome are guided more by skill than by chance, it would be a game of skill. The chance element can never be completely eliminated for it is the chance component that makes gambling exciting and it is the possibility of the perchance result that fuels gambling.’

The Bench categorically held that there appeared to be a little doubt that both rummy and poker were games of skill as they involved considerable memory, working out of percentages, the ability to follow the cards on the table and constantly adjust to the changing possibilities of the unseen cards. The Madras High Court laid down the principle that the betting that a State can legislate on has to be the betting pertaining to gambling; ergo, betting only on games of chance. At any rate, even otherwise, the judgments in the cases of Chamarbaugwalla (Supra) and K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra) also instruct that the concept of betting in the Constitution cannot cover games of skill. It concluded that the amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 was capricious, irrational and without an adequate determining principle such that it was excessive and disproportionate.

RECENT DECISION ON FANTASY SPORTS LEAGUES
One of the biggest revolutions in the gaming industry has been that of Online Fantasy Sports Leagues, be it in cricket, football, hockey, etc. Time and again there have been writs filed before the High Courts to decree these as games of chance.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Varun Gumber vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2017 Cri LJ 3827 and the Order dated 15th September, 2017 passed by the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid judgment, have held that the fantasy games of Dream 11 were games of mere skill and their business has protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, i.e., freedom to carry out trade / vocation / business of one’s choice.

In Gurdeep Singh Sachar vs. Union of India, Cr. PIL Stamp No. 22/2019, the Bombay High Court held that success in Dream 11’s fantasy sports depended upon a user’s exercise of skill based on superior knowledge, judgement and attention, and the result thereof was not dependent on the winning or losing of a particular team in the real world game on any particular day. It was undoubtedly a game of skill and not a game of chance. The attempt to reopen the issues decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in respect of the same online gaming activities, which are backed by a judgment of the three-judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra), that, too, after dismissal of the SLP by the Apex Court, was wholly misconceived. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP [SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 43346 of 2019] against this decision inasmuch as it related to whether or not it involved gambling. Again, on 31st January, 2020, the Supreme Court reiterated on an application seeking clarification of its earlier Order, that it does not want to revisit the issue as to whether gambling is or is not involved.

In the cases of Ravindra Singh Chaudhary vs. Union of India, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20779/2019 and Chandresh Sankhla vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2020 SCC Online Raj 264, the Rajasthan High Court dismissed a petition against Dream11. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in D. Siluvai Venance vs. State, Criminal O.P. (MD) No.6568/2020 has passed a similar order. Recently, the Supreme Court in Avinash Mehrotra vs. State of Rajasthan, SLP (Civil) Diary No(s). 18478/2020, dismissed an SLP against the Rajasthan High Court Order in the Ravindra Singh case (Supra). It held that the matter was no longer res integra as SLPs have come up from the Punjab & Haryana and the Bombay High Courts and have been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

All of the above judgments analysed what was a fantasy league. They held that any fantasy sports game was a game which occurred over a pre-determined number of rounds (which may extend from a single match / sporting event to an entire league or series) in which participating users selected, built and acted as managers / selectors of their virtual team. The drafting of a virtual team involved the exercise of considerable skill as the user had to first assess the relative worth of each athlete / sportsperson as against all athletes / sportspersons available for selection. The user had to study the rules and make evaluations of the athlete’s strengths and weaknesses based on these rules. Users engaged in participating in fantasy sports read and understood the rules of the game and made their assessment of athletes and the selection of athletes in their virtual team on the basis of the anticipated statistics of their selection.

It was held that the element of skill and the predominant influence on the outcome of the fantasy league was more than any other incidents and, therefore, they were games of ‘mere skill’ and not falling within the activity of gambling. It did not involve risking money or playing stakes on the result of a game or an event, hence, the same did not amount to gambling / betting. It was even held that the fantasy sports formats were globally recognised as a great tool for fan engagement as they provided a platform to sports lovers to engage in their favourite sport along with their friends and family. This legitimate business activity having protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution contributed to Government Revenue not only vide GST and income tax payments, but also by contributing to increased viewership and higher sports fan engagement, thereby simultaneously promoting even the real world games.

FEMA
The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 and the Consolidated FDI Policy state that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of any sort is prohibited in gambling and betting, including casinos. Thus, no FDI is allowed in any gambling ventures, whether online or offline. However, if the ventures are gaming ventures, then there are no sectoral caps or conditions for the FDI and there are no restrictions for foreign technology collaboration agreements. And, 100% FDI is allowable in gaming ventures, online and offline. Thus, one comes back to the million-dollar question – is the venture one of gambling or gaming? The tests explained above would be applicable even to determine whether FDI is permissible in the venture.

Similar tests may also be used under the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 for overseas direct investments in a foreign company. If it is an online gaming company, then it would constitute a bona fide business activity and foreign investment should be permissible.

CONCLUSION
Recent judicial thinking seems to be changing along with the times. When one looks at the Court decisions delivered on new topics such as cryptocurrencies, fantasy sports, online poker, etc., it is clear that the trend is to allow businesses in these sunrise areas. If the Legislature also moves at the same speed and in the same direction, we would have a wonderful environment which could spawn exciting businesses!

 

PROPRIETY IN ADJUDICATION

Legacy laws were legislated independently and hence administered by their respective Governments. However, the GST law has been designed on the unique concept of ‘Pooled sovereignty’ between the Centre and the States. This dual nature of GST has made the administration of this novel legislation a critical challenge before the GST Council. Unlike the ‘origin-based’ Central Sales Tax law (also a Central legislation) where the collection and retention of taxes was with the respective State Governments, the GST design faces the peculiarity of implementing a ‘destination consumption law’ with revenue being collected and administered in the State of origin but ultimately accruing to the State of consumption. Moreover, the Central and State administrations are not only implementing their respective laws under which they have been appointed, but are also entrusted with implementing the parallel GST law. Intense discussions have taken place between the Central and State administrations and the final handshake was made as follows:

–    Single administrative interface;
–    Efficient use of respective administrative expertise;
–    Vertical and quantitative division of taxpayer base (except for enforcement and vigilance action); and
–    Cross-empowerment of critical administration functions (except matters involving the place of supply).

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION OF GST ACT
Sections 3, 4 and 5 provide for the administration of the Act – Section 3 handles appointments at various levels of officers and deemed officers appointed under the erstwhile enactment as GST officers; Section 4 empowers the Board / Commissioner to appoint such other persons as GST officers; Section 5 enables the Board to equip any officer appointed under sections 3 or 4 with functions and duties under the Act. It also enables the Commissioner to delegate his powers to any subordinate officer. Section 6 codifies the cross-empowerment principle as agreed by the GST Council, enabling the appointed GST officers to cross-administer the functions conferred under the correspondent enactments. In this background, three phrases have been adopted for the purpose of assignment of administrative functions, viz., ‘adjudicating authority’, ‘proper officer’ and ‘authorised officer’. This article attempts to decode whether these terms are mutually exclusive or overlapping with each other. It is to be noted that this article only decodes the Central Tax Notifications / Circulars. One may have to examine the flow of the respective State Notifications in order to fix the jurisdiction of said officers.

PROPER OFFICER – DEFINITION AND ROLE
As a starting point, let us look at the respective definitions under the GST Act:

Proper Officer – Section 2(91) defines ‘proper officer’ in relation to any function to be performed under this Act, which means the Commissioner or the Officer of the Central Tax who is assigned that function by the Commissioner in the Board;

Section 2(24): ‘Commissioner’ means the Commissioner of Central Tax and includes the Principal Commissioner of Central Tax appointed u/s 3 and the Commissioner of Integrated Tax appointed under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act;
Section 2(25) r/w/s 168, ‘Commissioner in the Board’… shall mean a Commissioner or Joint Secretary posted in the Board and such Commissioner or Joint Secretary shall exercise the powers specified in the said sections with the approval of the Board.
(Note – In Central Tax administration, NOT all Commissioners are empowered to perform the function of assignment. It is only that Commissioner who is posted in the Board who is entitled to perform such assignment of functions.)

In order to confer specific jurisdiction to individual officers, the respective Commissioners have, through instructions / Notifications, identified the ‘proper officers’ on the principle of cross-empowerment, functional and geographical division and vested them with the requisite functions. The role of proper officer has been envisaged as follows:

Section

Function

Issue
orders

Chapter VI

Registration / Amendment / Cancellation

Yes, for registration, cancellation,
suspension, revocation

Chapter X

Refunds

Yes, for sanction or rejection

Section 60

Provisional assessment

Yes, for finalisation of provisional
assessment

Section 61

Scrutiny of returns

No

Section 62

Assessment of non-filers

Yes, best judgement order

Section 63

Assessment of unregistered persons

Yes, best judgement order

Section 65

Audit

No

Section 66

Special audits

No

Section 67

Inspection, search and seizure

No

Section 68

Inspection of goods in movement

No

Section 70

Summon attendance

No

Section 71

Access of business premises

No

Section 73/74

Demands of taxes

Yes, for ascertaining raising demands

Section 79

Recovery of taxes

No

ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY – DEFINITION AND ROLE

Adjudicating Authority – Section 2(4) defines ‘adjudicating authority’ which means any authority, appointed or authorised to pass any order or decision under this Act, but does not include the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, the Revisional Authority, the Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, the National Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Tribunal and the Authority referred to in sub-section (2) of section 171.

The term ‘adjudicating authority’ has been used in ‘Chapter XVIII-Appeals & Revisions’. The section provides for the remedy of appeal only against the orders of the ‘adjudicating authority’. The critical point to be noted is that this phrase is being used for the first time under the Chapter of Appeals and is conspicuously absent in the provisions granting powers to issue orders under the Assessment / Adjudication provisions of the enactment. There seems to be a prima facie disconnect in empowerment of execution and decision-making functions under the Act. It appears that certain functions have been distributed to proper officers but the issuance of orders (decision-making) has been conferred on a separate category of officers called ‘adjudicating authority’. One therefore has to look into the enactment to identify whether the said terms are overlapping or mutually exclusive to each other.

Authorised Officer – Role
In several instances, the enactment empowers senior officer(s) to ‘authorise’ a Central Tax Officer with specific functions. Section 67 empowers the Joint Commissioner to authorise officers to inspect the premises of a taxpayer. Section 65 empowers the Joint Commissioner to authorise the audit of a taxpayer by a particular officer including visiting the said premises. Therefore, these are officers who are permitted to perform a specific task under an authorisation having a limited operation over a ‘particular taxpayer for a specific function’.

Identification – ‘Proper Officer’
An officer after having been appointed under the Act, is required to be granted jurisdiction to perform his task under the Act. Proper officers are conferred powers on the following basis: (a) Geography, (b) Cross-empowerment / division, (c) Functions, and (d) Monetary limits (if any).

A) Geographical jurisdiction
Notification 2/2017-CT dated 19th June, 2017
appoints Central Tax Officers for the purpose of section 3 of the CGST Act and assigns geographical jurisdiction to Commissioners (aka Executive Commissionerate), Commissioners (Appeals) and Commissioners (Audit). The said Notification divides the entire Central Administration at State / District levels for the purpose of administration. Each Commissioner has issued public notices assigning jurisdiction to various ranges based on geographical parameters (such as PIN codes, etc.). Correspondingly, State Commissioners are expected to exercise similar powers and assign such jurisdiction to officers in their administration. Similarly, Notification 14/2017-CT dated 1st July, 2017 seeks to appoint officers of the Directorate-General of GST Intelligence / Audit as Central Tax Officers with all-India jurisdiction and confers powers corresponding to the specified level of Central Tax Officers. Section 3 of the GST Act also deems officers appointed under the legacy laws as officers appointed under the said Act.

B) Cross-empowerment jurisdiction
In terms of the 9th GST Council minutes, the Centre and States have mutually agreed to a ‘vertical division’ of the taxpayer base in each State (except for enforcement and vigilance functions). Vertical division of the taxpayer base entails clear demarcation of taxpayers being administered by the Centre and the State at each State’s level. The GST Council vide CBEC Circular No. 1/2017-GST dated 20th September, 2017 provided for such division based on turnover, business and geographical parameters. State-level committees have issued trade notices demarcating the taxpayer base between both the administrations. Having been assigned respective administrative powers for a set of taxpayers, section 6 of the CGST Act empowers the ‘cross-empowered proper officer’ to administer in parallel the corresponding GST law, i.e., the proper officer issuing orders under the CGST Act shall be empowered to issue parallel orders under the SGST Act with due intimation to the jurisdictional officer1. The GST Council has also decided that cases involving ‘place of supply’ would have to be handled by the Central Tax administration even if the taxpayer has been assigned to the State administration.

Notification 39/2017 dated 13th October, 2017 has been issued u/s 6(1) of the CGST Act empowering State officers for the purpose of sanction of refund u/s 54 or 55 except Rule 96 of the CGST Rules, 2017 in respect of registered persons located in the territorial jurisdiction of the said State officers. CBIC letter dated 22nd June, 2020 states that the said Notification has been issued only to place a restriction on State officers from issuing refunds under Rule 96 of the CGST Rules. In the absence of a Notification it should be understood that all powers are cross-empowered to the corresponding administration by virtue of section 6.

C) Functional jurisdiction
CBEC Circular No. 3/3/2017 dated 5th July, 2017 has assigned functions to specified class of officers in exercise of powers u/s 2(91). The summary of the functions assigned to the Central Tax Officers is as follows:

Proper
officer

Powers
& functions

Principal Commissioner / Commissioner of
Central Tax

• Extension of period of seizure of goods
beyond six months

• Extension for payments of demands up to
three months

Additional or Joint Commissioner of Central
Tax

• Authorisation of inspection, search of
premises, seizure of goods, documents, books or things, inventory / disposal
of perishable goods

• Authorisation of access to business
premises for inspection of books of accounts, records, etc.

• Permission for transfer of properties by
defaulter

• Disposal of conveyance in detention
proceedings

Deputy or Assistant Commissioner of Central
Tax

• Processing of refund applications

• Provisional assessment proceedings

• Assessment of unregistered persons

Summary assessments in special cases

• Audit

• Adjudication above a specific limit

• Recovery of excess taxes collected

• Recovery of taxes

• Penalties under various sections

• Detention proceedings

• Confiscation of goods or conveyances

• Transitional provisions

• Re-credit of rejected refunds

• Other specified procedural matters

Superintendent of Central Tax

• Non-accountal of goods

• Scrutiny of returns

• Assessment of non-filers

• General audit / special audit
observations / findings

• Seizure of books of accounts

• Summon for submission of evidences

• Adjudication up to specific limit

• Other specified procedural matters

Inspector of Central Tax

Detention proceedings

(Note – Assignment of powers to a specified officer would include assignment of such powers to the superiors of the specified officers.)

CBEC Circular dated 31st May, 2018-GST, dated 9th February, 2018 has also clarified that Audit Commissionerates and DGGSTI shall exercise powers
of issuance of show cause notices but the adjudication of
the same would be done by the Executive Commissionerates having jurisdiction over the principal place of business.

D) Monetary jurisdiction
The Central Tax administration (vide CBEC Circular dated 31st May, 2018-GST, dated 9th February, 2018) has assigned monetary jurisdiction to Superintendents, Assistant / Deputy Commissioners and Additional / Joint Commissioners for the purpose of adjudication of matters. A significant point is that the said monetary limits would extend only to matters of adjudication and other powers (such as summary assessments, etc.) are not subjected to any monetary limits.

ANALYSIS
The prima facie observation emerging from the above Notifications / Circulars is that though ‘proper officers’ have been conferred certain powers, the phrase ‘adjudicating authority’ u/s 2(4) has not been mentioned anywhere. Generally, one may hasten to conclude that none of the officers have been empowered to adjudicate (i.e., issue orders) in terms of section 2(4) of the GST Act. The adjudication function, being a special and distinct function, has not been conferred on any officer and hence no orders can be issued until the adjudication function is conferred on officers.

The said argument may face stiff resistance when one probes further into the enactment. Chapter II on Administration provides for identification of ‘proper officers’ for various functions of the Act. As tabulated above, various sections under the enactment empower the proper officers to perform certain functions. While some sections specifically empower officers with issuance of orders, others transfer the proceedings to its conclusion. For example, though sections 61, 65 and 66 entrust certain functions / powers, the respective provisions do not empower them to issue orders for the purpose of concluding the proceedings. Section 61 empowers the proper officer to scrutinise the GST returns and seek related clarifications from the taxpayers, but directs that any adverse observation should result in appropriate action such as audit, adjudication, etc. The proper officer does not derive the power of issuance of orders under the said section and the ascertainment of proper officer for issuance of orders would have to be performed under a separate section. Similar implications appear to operate in case of audits conducted u/s 65. The audit function may be entrusted to a specific group of officers but the section does not specifically empower them to adjudicate the matter, and the issue is required to be adjudged only by the proper officer empowered to issue orders in terms of section 73/74 of the GST Act.

The corollary is that all proper officers may not be adjudicating authorities but all adjudicating authorities would necessarily have to be proper officers under the section. The empowerment of a person as a proper officer is delegated to the respective Commissioner but the empowerment of the person as an adjudicating authority emerges from the provisions of the statute and is not the subject matter of delegation.

Another corollary of this approach is that not all actions of proper officers are appealable under the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the GST Act. It is only orders issued by an adjudicating authority which are eligible for a statutory appeal under the Chapter of Appeals / Revisions. For example, section 65(6) requires the proper officer performing the audit to issue his ‘findings’ from the audit. The Act has consciously used the phrase ‘findings’ in contradistinction to ‘orders’. These findings would not be appealable orders for the purpose of XVIII since these are not decisions of adjudicating authorities or arising out of an adjudication proceeding under the Act. However, orders which are issued under sections 62, 63 or 64 in the case of assessment of non-filers, summary assessments or protective assessments, are in the nature of a decision-making function (adjudication function) and hence would be appealable before the respective appellate authority.

To reiterate, assignment of ‘proper officer’ is a consequence of the Commissioner’s order but the assignment of a decision-making function is consequent to the statutory provision itself. Conferment of the status of adjudicating authority stands at a higher pedestal and cannot be altered by any order / Notification. Thus one may conclude that the carving out of a separate category of ‘adjudicating authorities’ is for the purpose of tagging their orders as appealable orders under the Act. Adjudicating authorities are a ‘sub-set’ of proper officers and not a distinct category of officers.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT IN THE SAYED ALI & CANNON INDIA CASES
The Supreme Court in Sayed Ali (2011) 265 ELT 17 (SC) examined the aspect of appointment of Customs (Preventive) officers and assignment of functions as proper officers for administration of the Act. The Court observed that appointment of officers of customs for a particular geographical area does not ipso facto confer powers of a ‘proper officer’ and in the absence of specific adjudication functions being assigned, Customs (Preventive) officers were held as incompetent to issue show cause notices.

Applying the Sayed Ali case, the Supreme Court once again in Cannon India [2021 (376) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)] examined a bill of entry assessed by the Customs Officer (Appraising) and cleared for home consumption. The Director of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) subsequently raised the issue of short assessment of duty in terms of section 28(4) of the Customs Act. Section 28(4) r/w/s 2(34) assigned the function of demands and recovery to ‘the proper officer’. The Court emphasised on the article ‘the’ as conveying that ‘the proper officer’ is the specified officer who has been assigned the function u/s 28(4) and not any other officer. Section 28(4) being a power of re-assessment of the original assessment ought to be conferred only on ‘the officer’ who performed the original assessment and not on any other officer. According to the Court, where the same powers are conferred to different officers on a particular subject matter, then the exercise of powers by one of the officers would be to the exclusion of the other, and hence any subsequent reassessment ought to be made by the original officer who exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter. Moreover, the Court stated that DRI officers were not conferred powers of administration of the Customs Act since the Notification conferring powers did not trace itself back to section 6 of the Customs Act which empowered the Central Government to appoint other Central officers for the purpose of the Customs Act. Accordingly, adjudication proceedings initiated by the DRI officers were quashed in the absence of jurisdiction. The analogy emerging from these decisions is that there has to be a specific conferment of powers for performance of a function under the law and once such power is conferred to a particular officer, it operates to the exclusion of all other officers even though they may exercise jurisdiction over the taxpayer.

The Proper Officer – As adjudicating authority
To understand the interplay between ‘Proper officer’, ‘Authorised officer’ and ‘Adjudicating authority’, one may take the example of audit proceedings. Section 65 specifies that the Commissioner may, by general / special order, authorise any officer to perform an audit of a taxpayer. The provision uses the phrase ‘authorised officer’ in the section, i.e., officer who has been assigned the audit of the taxpayer. However, in section 65(6) the provisions state that on conclusion of the audit, ‘the proper officer’ shall inform the audit findings and their reasons. In section 65(7), it has been stated that where audit results in short payment of taxes, ‘the proper officer’ may initiate action u/s 73/74 which states that the ‘proper officer’ in such cases shall issue a show cause notice directing the taxpayer to pay the said amount. The reference to ‘the proper officer’ continues in the said section and 73(9) enables the said proper officer to issue appropriate orders.

Two questions arise here: (a) Firstly, which Commissioner is authorised to perform the task of assignment of audit cases. While practically the Commissioner (Audit) performs this task, Notification 2/2017-CT does not specify such powers being granted to the Commissioner (Audit). The said Notification merely states that the Commissioner (Audit) would exercise powers over the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the corresponding Commissioner(s). The nature of the powers to be exercised has not been specified in the said Notification. Even Board Circular No. 3/3/2017 only appoints the Commissioners with the proper officer functions and does not specifically grant an audit function to the Commissioner (Audit). In contrast, the Central Excise law contained Notification 30/2014-CT dated 14th October, 2014 r/w Notification 47/2016 dated 28th September, 2016 which specifically granted Audit and SCN issuance functions (adjudication powers introduced subsequently) for conferring jurisdiction. The GST provisions appear to have some shortcomings to this extent;

(b) Secondly, who is the ‘proper officer’ for conclusion of audit proceedings and adjudication of the subject matter? It is fairly clear that ‘authorised officers’ u/s 65(1)/(2) are distinct from ‘proper officers’ referred in 65(6)/(7) and 73/74. It also appears that the proper officer referred to in both sections implies ‘the’ proper officer who is assigned the adjudication function. Therefore, ‘the proper officer’ referred to in 65(6)/(7) should be the same officer as is being referred to in 73/74. Notification 2/2017 r/w Circular 3/3/2017 dated 31st May, 2018 implies that the Executive Commissionerate has been vested with both powers, i.e., ‘conclusion of audit proceedings’ [section 65(6)/(7)] as well as ‘adjudication of demands’ (section 73/74). It appears that the function of the Audit Commissionerate / officers terminates with the performance of the audit (i.e., visit, examination, etc.) but reporting of audit findings and adjudication (where required) would need to be performed by the Executive Commissionerate only. Alternatively, it appears that the ‘proper officer’ who is assigned the function of conclusion of audit u/s 65(6)/(7) should be the same officer issuing the show cause notice u/s 73(1), and in view of Circular dated 3rd March, 2017, the proper officer for adjudication u/s 73(9) should be the officer functioning in the Executive Commissionerate. Despite this ambiguity, the conclusion remains that ‘authorised officers’ are distinct from ‘the proper officer’ and those proper officers functioning as decision-making authorities u/s 73/74(9) would function as adjudicating authorities, making their orders amenable to statutory appeal.

State Administration – CGST Act
State administration has been conferred with powers to administer the Central enactment in respect of taxpayers assigned to the State. Section 6(1) of the CGST Act considered ‘officers’ appointed under the SGST Act as being authorised to be ‘proper officers’ for the purpose of the CGST Act. The respective State Commissioners in terms of the powers drawn from section 3 of the respective State enactments have designated proper officers on functional and geographical basis. Though the Commissioner exercising powers from the SGST Act appoints them as proper officers for the purpose of the SGST Act, the said State officers have not been assigned functions for the purpose of the CGST Act. Moreover, section 6(1) does not explicitly confer the rights of assignment of proper officer functions to the Commissioners (State) for the purpose of Central enactment. This probably should continue to be the prerogative of the Commissioner (Central Tax) only. This is because the phrase ‘proper officer’ under the CGST Act is an appointment u/s 2(91) of the CGST Act and the said section only permits the assignment of functions by the ‘Commissioner in the Board’. Commissioner in the Board only refers to Commissioner as designated by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes. State Commissioners would not be the Commissioners as understood in terms of section 2(91) of the CGST Act and hence the assignment of functions to their subordinates for the purpose of the SGST Act does not automatically result in assignment of functions for the purpose of the CGST Act. In simple terms, section 6 enables the Central enactment to authorise the State administration as proper officers (i.e., borrow the man-power) but the power of assignment of functions (supervisory powers) to these sets of officers would continue to vest with the Commissioner in the Board and such power of assignment has not been delegated to the State Commissioner.

State Administration – IGST Act
Section 4 of the IGST Act is pari materia to section 6(1) of the CGST Act. A similar issue would emerge when a State officer administers the IGST Act. This would be so insofar as the State administration is presiding over the state of registration of the taxpayer. But an additional issue that also emerges is where a State administration exercises its powers over a taxpayer who is not registered in their State. For example, any movement of goods from Mumbai to Chennai could entail movement through an intermediate State (say, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, etc.). The ‘place of supply’ of such transaction would be Tamil Nadu and the taxable person would be administered in Maharashtra. Strictly speaking, no revenue accrues (directly or indirectly) from this transaction to the State of Karnataka, though in practice the State administration has exercised its power to intercept goods which originate from Mumbai and are destined for Chennai.

Section 4 of the IGST Act appoints officers of the SGST as proper offices for the IGST Act. SGST has been defined under 2(111) of the CGST Act as ‘respective’ State GST officers. Therefore, section 4 of the IGST Act borrows the State administration from the ‘respective’ State only and so the respective State GST officer should ideally refer to the State administration having jurisdiction over the registration of the taxpayer. Though the State of Karnataka cannot exercise its domain over the said movement by virtue of ‘place of business’ or ‘place of supply’, the practice has been to exercise domain by virtue of the ‘geographical presence’ of the goods under movement. None of the Central Tax notifications confer proper officer functions on the basis of geographical presence of goods. Rather, they appear to have been assigned with reference to the place of business of the taxpayer. On a reading of section 68 r/w/s 129 of the CGST Act, it appears that ‘the proper officer’ referred therein cannot extend to all States’ proper officers and would be limited only to the ‘respective State proper officers’ from the movement that emerges. But the High Court in Advantage India Logistics Private Limited vs. UOI (2018) 19 GSTL 46 (MP) held otherwise. The Court upheld the jurisdiction of an MP State officer to intercept goods moving from Gurgaon (Haryana) to Mumbai (Maharashtra). This results in a very precarious situation and it is important that all stake-holders take cognisance of this issue.

DGGSTI as ‘proper officer’
In this context, the Notifications empowering the Directorate-General GST Intelligence (an arm of DRI) would be worth examining:
– Notification 14/2017-Central Tax invokes its powers from sections 3 and 5 of the CGST Act and appoints the officers of the Director-General of GST Intelligence (erstwhile Director-General of Central Excise Intelligence) as officers with all-India jurisdiction;
– The said Notification invests them with all the powers as have been invested in the corresponding rank of officers under the Central Tax Administration;
– However, the Notification appointing DGGST officers as Central Tax officers has not been issued u/s 4 of the GST Act. The officers of the DGGI, which is a special wing of the DRI, have not been appointed as ‘Central Tax Officers’ in terms of section 4 of the CGST Act.
– Moreover, the Commissioner in the Board has not conferred the ‘proper officer’ function to the officers of the DGGI.
– This gives rise to a similar anomaly as was prevalent under the Customs legislation and under consideration in the Cannon India case.

Thus, DGGSTI being officers appointed directly by the Central Government, are not officers specified in section 3 of the GST Act though a Notification has been issued invoking the said power. Section 4 has not been invoked by the said Notification for appointment of the DGGSTI officer for purposes of the CGST Law. To this extent, Notification 14/2017 carries the similar lacuna as was being considered in the aforesaid case and consequently the said officers cannot be termed as ‘proper officers’ in terms of section 2(34) of the said Act.

COMPTROLLER & AUDITOR-GENERAL OF INDIA (C&AG)
There has been a recent trend where C&AG officers have been seeking information from taxpayers on the Transitional Credit Claim under GST. Neither section 3 nor 4 have appointed the officers of the C&AG as Central Tax Officers under the statute. Accordingly, such officers cannot be categorised as ‘proper officers’ under either the CGST or the SGST Act. Except section 108 of the CGST Act, none of the sections even mentions officers of the C&AG to verify the books of accounts of the taxpayer. It is only section 108 of the CGST Act which makes reference to the objections of the C&AG for the purpose of enabling the revisional authority to revise any orders of proceedings conducted under the GST Act. But this does not enable the C&AG to directly scrutinise, assess or even adjudicate the records of the taxpayers. Thus, the C&AG cannot be permitted to directly seek or audit the records of the taxpayers and form any conclusion on the legality of their tax liability.

CONCLUSION
The onus of proving sufficient jurisdiction is on the officer asserting it. Unless the jurisdiction has been conclusively established, the officer cannot proceed on the subject matter. In conclusion, one may recollect the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukum Chand Shyam Lal (1976 AIR 789) which observed as follows: ‘It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performances are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice.’ The complex legal and administrative systems adopted under GST have to be meticulously handled by the Administrators in order to ensure the smooth and efficient function of the administration. Though this has been undertaken to a large extent, certain gaps need to examined and addressed so that there is clarity on the proper officer before whom the taxpayers are answerable.

FAQs ON AMENDED SCHEDULE III-DIVISION II RELATED TO ‘APPLICABILITY’

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) notified the amendments to Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013 on 24th March, 2021. There are a few questions regarding the broader issue of applicability of the amendments. These are listed below and so are the responses thereto which are the personal views of the author.

The responses are provided with reference to Division II of Schedule III that applies to non-NBFC companies following Ind AS, but may mutatis mutandis apply to Division I (applicable to entities applying AS) and Division III (applicable to NBFC entities applying Ind AS) of Schedule III as well. The ICAI has issued an Exposure Draft (ED) for public comments on the Guidance Note on Schedule III. The discussions in this article are largely consistent with the ED.

Whether the amended Schedule III applies to consolidated financial statements (CFS), those that are prepared on an annual basis, or a complete set prepared for interim purpose?

Attention is drawn to the guidance available in the pre-amended Schedule III Guidance Note of the ICAI. Paragraph 12.1 of the pre-amended Schedule III Guidance Note states as follows: ‘However, due note has to be taken of the fact that the Schedule III itself states that the provisions of the Schedule are to be followed mutatis mutandis for a CFS. MCA has also clarified vide General Circular No. 39/2014 dated 14th October, 2014 that Schedule III to the Act read with the applicable Accounting Standards does not envisage that a company while preparing its CFS merely repeats the disclosures made by it under stand-alone accounts being consolidated. Accordingly, the company would need to give all disclosures relevant for CFS only.’

The Guidance Note further elaborates on what is to be included and what needs to be excluded in the CFS. However, those inclusions / exclusions are not based on clear and consistent principles. A somewhat similar position is also taken in the ED. However, those are subject to further discussions and may undergo a change in the final Guidance Note. Therefore, which additional Schedule III disclosures are to be included or excluded in the CFS will involve a lot of judgement and guesswork till such time as the ICAI publishes its Guidance Note on the amended Schedule III.

The author believes that since most of the incremental disclosures in the amended Schedule III are regulatory in nature and beyond the requirements of accounting standards, those should not be mandated to CFS which are prepared on an annual basis or a complete CFS set prepared for an interim purpose. Alternatively, the ICAI may consider the application of the principle of materiality, which should be applied by each entity, considering their facts and circumstances. The ICAI may only provide broad guidelines on how the materiality principle will apply, without being prescriptive.

In accordance with amended Schedule III an entity reclassifies lease liabilities presented as borrowings separately as lease liabilities, i.e., borrowings and lease liabilities are presented as separate sub-headings under financial liabilities. Should the entity present a third balance sheet in accordance with paragraph 40A of Ind AS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements?

As per paragraph 40A of Ind AS 1, an entity shall present a third balance sheet as at the beginning of the preceding period in addition to the minimum comparative financial statements if the retrospective application, retrospective restatement or the reclassification has a material effect on the information in the balance sheet at the beginning of the preceding period. If lease liabilities that were presented as borrowings, and under amended Schedule III, it is reclassified as current and non-current financial liabilities, the author does not believe that it is material enough that a third balance sheet would be required in such cases. Nonetheless, the author’s view is that the lease liabilities should be included in determining the debt-equity ratio which is required to be disclosed as per amended Schedule III. Since most of the other changes required under revised Schedule III are regulatory in nature and are additional information rather than reclassification, a third balance sheet may not be required.

In case a company has a non-31st March year-end, whether amended Schedule III shall apply to the 31st December, 2021 or the 30th September, 2021 year-end financial statements?

The MCA Notification that notifies the amendment to Schedule III states that ‘the Central Government makes the following further amendments in Schedule III with effect from 1st day of April, 2021.’ This creates confusion whether the amendments apply for the financial years beginning on or after 1st April, 2021 or the financial years that end after 1st April, 2021. The author’s view is that the amendments shall apply to financial statements relating to the financial year beginning on or after 1st April, 2021 for the following three reasons:

• Firstly, the amendments are made to align with CARO’s requirement and CARO 2020 is applicable for the financial year beginning on or after 1st April, 2021.
• Secondly, the amendments also align with the Companies (Accounts) Amendments Rules, 2021 which are applicable for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April, 2021. Consequently, amended Schedule III will not apply to the 31st December, 2021 or the 30th September, 2021 year-end financial statements.
• Lastly, going by recent experience, the regulators’ intent is to apply amendments on a prospective basis rather than on a retrospective basis.

Whether amended Schedule III applies to stand-alone interim financial statements that commence on or after 1st April, 2021?

The relevant paragraphs of Ind AS 34 Interim Financial Reporting are quoted below:

‘9. If an entity publishes a complete set of Financial Statements in its interim financial report, the form and content of those statements shall conform to the requirements of Ind AS 1 for a complete set of Financial Statements.
10. If an entity publishes a set of condensed Financial Statements in its interim financial report, those condensed statements shall include, at a minimum, each of the headings and sub-totals that were included in its most recent annual Financial Statements and the selected explanatory notes as required by this Standard. Additional line items or notes shall be included if their omission would make the condensed interim Financial Statements misleading.’

Based on the above, if a complete set of stand-alone interim financial statements is presented, all amended Schedule III disclosures are required, including their comparatives. When condensed financial statements are presented as interim financial statements, critical Accounting Standard disclosures that were not included in the last set of published financial statements are required to be provided. Distinction needs to be made between regulatory disclosures required as per Schedule III and those required by Accounting Standards. Therefore, considering the amended disclosures under Schedule III are other than accounting standard disclosures, these are not required to be included in condensed interim financial statements; but may be provided voluntarily.

With regard to quarterly and half-yearly SEBI results – SEBI LODR requires Schedule III format to be used for SEBI results. Schedule III amendments make no changes in the format of Statement of Profit and Loss. However, there are a few new line items inserted, or the grouping is changed in the format of the Balance Sheet, for example, lease liabilities to be shown as current and non-current financial liabilities on the face of the balance sheet, security deposits given to be shown under other financial assets instead of loans, current maturities of long-term borrowings to be shown separately within borrowings under the heading current liabilities instead of other financial liabilities, etc. These format changes need to be made in half-yearly results since the SEBI format is aligned to the Schedule III format. Comparative figures also need to be re-grouped / re-classified, wherever required, with appropriate notes.

Whether comparative numbers are required for interim or annual financial statements for periods / year commencing on or after 1st April, 2021 and contain the amended Schedule III disclosures in the current year / period for the first time?

Schedule III, Ind AS 34 Interim Financial Reporting, Conceptual framework for Financial Reporting under Ind AS and Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements, require comparative numbers to be presented. Comparative numbers are required for stand-alone financial statements, CFS, full set of interim financial statement and condensed interim financial statement.

CONCLUSION

The process of gathering the information for the incremental Schedule III disclosures and providing comparative numbers in the initial year or period of implementing amended Schedule III will be a cumbersome and onerous exercise, particularly aging
analysis of receivables, payables, or capital work in progress. Additionally, many of the disclosure requirements may be required at the CFS level. Therefore, proper planning and system modification is advised to comply with the amended Schedule III.

Section 148 read with section 148-A – Notice u/s 148 issued post 1st April, 2021 – Conditional legislation – The Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 whereby the application of section 148, which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meaning the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification

2 Palak Khatuja, W/o Vinod Khatuja vs. Union of India [Writ Petition (T) No. 149 of 2021; date of order: 23rd August, 2021 (Chhattisgarh High Court)]

Section 148 read with section 148-A – Notice u/s 148 issued post 1st April, 2021 – Conditional legislation – The Notifications dated 31st March, 2021 and 27th April, 2021 whereby the application of section 148, which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meaning the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification

The petitioners filed their income tax return for A.Y. 2015-16 and F.Y. 2014-15. Subsequently, on the basis of some information available, an initial scrutiny was done; however, no concealment was found but again a notice u/s 148 was issued. It was submitted that on 30th June, 2021 when the notice u/s 148 was issued, the power to issue the notice was preceded by a new provision of law and thereby section 148 is to be read with section 148A. It was contended that as per the amended Finance Act, 2021, which was published in the Gazette on 28th March, 2021, sections 2 to 88 were notified to come into force on the first day of April, 2021 and accordingly the new section 148A was inserted which prescribed that before issuing the notice u/s 148, the A.O. was bound to conduct an inquiry giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee with the prior approval of the specified authority and a show cause notice in detail was necessary specifying a particular date for hearing.

It was further submitted that since the operation of section 148A came into effect on 1st April, 2021, as such, the notice issued to the petitioner on 30th June, 2021 u/s 148, without following the procedure u/s 148A, that is, without giving an opportunity of hearing, would be illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 148A and it cannot be sustained. It was further submitted that although the Revenue has placed reliance on a certain Notification of the Ministry of Finance, but when the law has been enacted by the Parliament then in such a case the Notification issued by the Ministry of Finance would not override even to extend the period of operation of the section of the old Act of section 148. It was therefore submitted that the impugned notice is illegal and is liable to be quashed.

On its part, the Revenue contended that because of the pandemic and lockdown of all activities, including the normal working of the office, a lot of people could not file their returns and submit the necessary papers. As such, the Ministry of Finance, in exercise of its power under the Finance Act, issued the Notification whereby the application of the old provisions of section 148 was extended initially up to 30th April, 2021 and thereafter up to the 30th day of June, 2021. Therefore, the notice dated 30th June, 2021 would be within the ambit of the power of the Department in the extended time of its operation till 30th June, 2021. Thus, the notice u/s 148 is legal and valid.

The Court observed that the notice u/s 148 was issued for A.Y. 2015-16 on 30th June, 2021. The grievance of the petitioners was that the notice of like nature could have been issued till the cut-off date of 30th March, 2021 as subsequent thereto the new section 148A intervened before the issuance of notice directly u/s 148. The Finance Act, 2021 was Notified on 28th March, 2021 which purports that sections 2 to 88 shall come into force on the first day of April, 2021 and sections 108 to 123 shall come into force on such date as the Central Government notifies in the Official Gazette. The relevant part wherein section 148A is enveloped is covered u/s 42 of the Finance Act, 2021. By introduction of section 148A, it was mandated that the A.O. before issuing any notice u/s 148 shall conduct an inquiry, if required, with the prior approval of the specified authority, provide an opportunity of being heard, serve a show cause notice and prescribe the time. The question raised for consideration was whether, with the promulgation of the Act on the 1st day of April, 2021, the notice directly issued u/s 148 on 30th June, 2021 is valid or not as the bar of 148A was created by insertion of the section on 1st April, 2021.

The Court further observed that on account of the pandemic, Parliament had enacted the Taxation & Other Laws (Relaxation & Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. In the Act, any time limit specified, prescribed or notified between 20th March, 2020 and 31st December, 2021 or any other date thereafter, after December, 2021, gave the Central Government the power to notify. The necessity occurred because of the Covid pandemic lockdown in the backdrop of the fact that few of the assessees could not file their returns. Likewise, since the offices were closed, the Department also could not perform the statutory duty under the Income-tax Act. Considering the complexity, the Parliament thought it proper to delegate to the Ministry of Finance the date of applicability of the amended section. The delegation is not a self-contained and complete Act and was only made in the interest of flexibility and smooth working of the Act, and the delegation therefore was a practical necessity. The Ministry of Finance having been delegated with such power, this delegation can always be considered to be a sound basis for administrative efficiency and it does not by itself amount to abdication of power.

Reading both the Notifications, dated 31st March and 27th April, 2021, whereby the application of section 148 which was originally existing before the amendment was deferred, meant thereby that the reassessment mechanism as prevalent prior to 31st March, 2021 was saved by the Notification. The Notification is made by the Ministry of Finance, Central Government considering the fact of lockdown all over India and it can be always assumed that the deferment of the application of section 148A was done in a controlled way. It is a settled proposition that any modification of the Executive’s decision implies a certain amount of discretion and has to be exercised with the help of the legislative policy of the Act and cannot travel beyond it and run counter to it, or change the essential features, the identity, structure or the policy of the Act. Therefore, the legislative delegation exercised by the Central Government by Notification to uphold the mechanism as it prevailed prior to March, 2021 is not in conflict with any Act and Notification by the Executive, i.e., the Ministry of Finance, and would be a part of legislative function.

The Court relied on the principle as laid down in the case of A.K. Roy vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 710, wherein the Supreme Court held that the Constitution (Forty-Fourth) Amendment Act, 1978, which conferred power on the Executive to bring the provisions of that Act into force did not suffer from excessive delegation of legislative power. The Court observed that the power to issue a Notification for bringing into force the provisions of a constitutional amendment is not a constituent power, because it does not carry with it the power to amend the Constitution in any manner. Likewise, in this case, by the delegation to the Executive of the power to the Central Government to specify the date by way of relaxation of time limit, the main purpose of the Finance Act is not defeated. Therefore, it would be a conditional legislation. The Legislature has declared the Act and has given the power to the Executive to extend its implementation by way of Notification. The Legislature has resorted to conditional legislation to give the power to the Executive to decide under what circumstances the law should become operative or when the operation should be extended and this would be covered by the doctrine of the conditional legislation.

Thus, by the aforesaid Notifications, the operation of section 148 was extended, and thereby deferment of section 148A was done by the Ministry of Finance by way of conditional legislation in the peculiar circumstances which arose during the pandemic and lockdown and the Central Government cannot be said to have encroached upon the turf of Parliament.

By effect of such Notification, the individual identity of section 148, which was prevailing prior to the amendment and insertion of section 148A, was insulated and saved till 30th June, 2021.

Considering the situation for the benefit of the assessee and to facilitate individuals to come out of the woods, the time limit framed under the IT Act was extended. Likewise, certain rights which were reserved in favour of the Department were also preserved and extended at parity. Consequently, the provisions of section 148 which were prevailing prior to the amendment of the Finance Act, 2021 were also extended. The power to issue notice u/s 148 which was there prior to the amendment was also saved and the time was extended. As a result, the notice issued on 30th June, 2021 would also be saved. The petitions were dismissed accordingly.

Immunity u/s 270AA – No bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270 AA – Application u/s 264 against rejection of such application maintainable

1 Haren Textiles Private Limited vs. Pr. CIT 4 & Ors. [Writ Petition No. 1100 of 2021; Date of order: 8th September, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Immunity u/s 270AA – No bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270 AA – Application u/s 264 against rejection of such application maintainable

The petitioner, engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fabrics and a trading member of the National Stock Exchange, filed its return for the A.Y. 2017-2018 on 31st October, 2017 declaring a total income of Rs. 2,27,11,320. The A.O. initiated scrutiny assessment by issuing statutory notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act. He passed an assessment order dated 19th December, 2019 u/s 143(3) determining the total income of the petitioner at Rs. 7,41,84,730. He determined book profit under the provisions of section 115(JB) at Rs. 2,19,33,505. Following this, the A.O. issued a demand notice dated 19th December, 2019 u/s 156 raising a demand of Rs. 1,80,14,619. The petitioner noted that the A.O. had not correctly allowed the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) credit available to it while determining the tax liability. Hence it filed an application dated 6th January, 2020 u/s 154 seeking rectification of the assessment order. The A.O. accepted the submission of the petitioner and granted the MAT credit available and issued a revised Computation Sheet dated 14th January, 2020 determining the correct amount of tax liability of the petitioner. He also issued a revised notice of demand dated 14th January, 2020 u/s 156 raising a demand of Rs. 57,356 payable within 30 days from the service of the said notice.

The petitioner accepted the order passed by the A.O. u/s 154 and on 29th January, 2020 paid fully the tax demand of Rs. 57,356. Thereafter, on 30th January, 2020 it filed an application u/s 270AA in the prescribed Form No. 68 before the A.O. seeking immunity from penalty, etc. This application was rejected by the A.O. by an order dated 28th February, 2020. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an application dated 18th December, 2020 before the Pr. CIT under the provisions of section 264. The Pr. CIT rejected this application on the ground that sub-section 6 of section 270AA specifically prohibits revisionary proceedings u/s 264 against the order passed by the A.O. u/s 270AA(4). This order was challenged by the petitioner before the High Court.

The Court observed that under sub-section 6 of section 270AA, no appeal under section 246(A) or an application for revision u/s 264 shall be admissible against the order of assessment or reassessment referred to in clause (a) of sub-section 1, in a case where an order under sub-section 4 has been made accepting the application. This only means that when an assessee makes an application under sub-section 1 of section 270AA and such an application has been accepted under sub-section 4 of section 270AA, the assessee cannot file an appeal u/s 246(A) or an application for revision u/s 264 against the order of assessment or reassessment passed under sub-section 3 of section 143 or section 147. This does not provide for any bar or prohibition against the assessee challenging an order passed by the A.O. rejecting its application made under sub-section 1 of section 270AA. The application before the Pr. CIT was an order challenging an order of rejection passed by the A.O. of an application filed by the petitioner under sub-section 1 of section 270AA seeking grant of immunity from imposition of penalty and initiation of proceedings under sub-section 276C or section 277CC.

Therefore, the Pr. CIT was not correct in rejecting the application on the ground that there is a bar under sub-section 6 of section 270AA in filing such application. The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Pr. CIT to consider de novo.

TDS – Credit for tax deducted at source – Effect of section 199 – Assessee acting as collection agent for television network – Subscription charges collected from cable operators and paid to television network – Amounts routed through assessee’s accounts – Assessee entitled to credit for tax deducted at source on such amounts

7 Principal CIT vs. Kal Comm. Private Ltd. [2021] 436 ITR 66 (Mad) A.Ys.: 2009-10 to 2011-12; Date of order: 26th April, 2021 S. 199 of ITA, 1961

TDS – Credit for tax deducted at source – Effect of section 199 – Assessee acting as collection agent for television network – Subscription charges collected from cable operators and paid to television network – Amounts routed through assessee’s accounts – Assessee entitled to credit for tax deducted at source on such amounts

The assessee acted as the collection agent of a television network and collected the subscription charges and the invoices, raised in the name of the assessee on the subscription income from the pay channels during the relevant year, and remitted them to the network. For the A.Ys. 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12 the assessee was denied credit for the tax deducted at source on such amounts.

The Tribunal allowed the claim for credit of the tax deducted at source.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) Under section 199(2), credit for tax deducted at source can be allowed only when the corresponding income is offered for taxation in the year in which such tax deducted at source is claimed and deduction of tax at source was allowed without the corresponding income being declared in the profit and loss account.

ii) On a perusal of the agreement dated 14th October, 2002 entered into between the television network and the assessee, it is clear that the assessee was entitled to a fixed commission on the collection amount from the network. The agreement was entered into much prior to the A.Ys. 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2011-12. All these collection charges had been credited to the account “subscription charges” as and when they were billed and this account was debited at the end of the financial year when the sum was paid back to the network. Therefore, the amounts in question had been routed through the accounts maintained by the assessee, which formed part of the balance sheet and, in turn, formed part of the profit and loss account. Therefore, the amount received by the assessee was the collection of subscription charges on behalf of the principal, viz., the television network and did not partake of the character of income chargeable to tax in its hands.

iii) In the assessee’s case, the income chargeable to tax was only the commission income and interest income. Therefore, the subscription charges collected on behalf of the television network was chargeable as income only in the hands of the network and did not partake of the character of any expenditure, revenue or capital in the hands of the assessee. Merely because the income had been offered and processed in the hands of the network, credit for tax deducted in the name of the assessee could not be denied. The assessee was entitled to credit for the tax deducted at source.’

Recovery of tax – Attachment of property – Transfer void against the Revenue – Death of seller before executing sale of house property under agreement – Supreme Court directing seller’s heirs to execute sale – Attachment of property for recovery of income tax due from firms in which heirs were partners for periods subsequent to sale agreement – TRO cannot declare transfer void – Non-release of registered sale deed by sub-registrar – Not justified

6 J. Manoharakumari vs. TRO [2021] 436 ITR 42 (Mad) Date of order: 21st April, 2021 Ss. 226, 281 of ITA, 1961

Recovery of tax – Attachment of property – Transfer void against the Revenue – Death of seller before executing sale of house property under agreement – Supreme Court directing seller’s heirs to execute sale – Attachment of property for recovery of income tax due from firms in which heirs were partners for periods subsequent to sale agreement – TRO cannot declare transfer void – Non-release of registered sale deed by sub-registrar – Not justified

The petitioner, on payment of advance, entered into a sale agreement in respect of the house property (family property) with one JP, the mother of the third and fourth respondents, A and S, who were minors at the time of execution of the sale agreement. However, JP refused to execute the sale deed. During the pendency of the suit filed by the petitioner in the Additional District and Sessions Court, JP died and A and S, who by then had attained majority, were impleaded in the suit filed to execute the sale receiving the balance consideration. On dismissal of the suit, the petitioner filed an appeal before the High Court which directed A and S to refund the advance received by JP. The Supreme Court allowed the special leave petition filed by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition before the Additional District and Sessions Court. When A and S failed to execute the sale deed in terms of the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994 and the order dated 31st March, 2017 of the Supreme Court in the special leave petition, the Additional District Judge executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner on 29th June, 2018 and presented it before the Sub-Registrar for registration.

The petitioner was informed through a communication that the property in question was attached for recovery of arrears of tax due to the Income-tax Department from the firms in which S and her husband were partners and, therefore, the petitioner should obtain a certificate to the effect that there were no tax dues in respect of the said property from the Tax Recovery Officer of the Income-tax Department. The Tax Recovery Officer took the stand that the purported sale deed executed by the Court was contrary to section 281, that a copy of the attachment order was served on the office of the Sub-Registrar and an entry of encumbrance in respect of the property was also entered, that the petitioner could not perfect the title over the property, and that the Sub-Registrar could not release the registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner unless the tax arrears were cleared.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

‘i) Section 281 applies only to a situation where an assessee during the pendency of any proceeding under the Act, or after completion thereof, but before the service of a notice under rule 2 of the Second Schedule, creates a charge on, or parts with the possession (by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer whatsoever) of any of his assets in favour of any other person. Only such charge or transfer is void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of completion of such proceedings or otherwise. According to the proviso to section 281 such charge or transfer shall not be void if it is made (i) for adequate consideration and without notice of the pendency of such proceeding or, as the case may be, without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee; or (ii) with the previous permission of the A.O.

ii) Admittedly, the transfer of the property was on account of the final culmination of the litigation by the order of the Supreme Court. There was only a delay in the execution of the sale deed due to the pendency of the proceedings as the third and fourth respondent’s mother (since deceased) declined to execute the sale deed under the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994. The third and the fourth respondents, A and S, who were minors at the time of execution of the sale agreement on 30th June, 1994, ought to have executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner. The subsequent tax liability of the fourth respondent and her husband for the A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14 could not be to the disadvantage of the petitioner, since the petitioner had been diligently litigating since 2004. Therefore, the benefit of the decree in a contested suit could not be denied merely because the seller or one of the persons had incurred subsequent tax liability. The benefit of a decree would date back to the date of the suit. Therefore, the communication dated 6th July, 2018 which required the petitioner to obtain clearance could not be countenanced.

iii) The tax liability of the firms of which S and her husband were partners arose subsequent to the commitment in the sale agreement dated 30th June, 1994. The Sub-Registrar is directed to release the sale deed dated 29th June, 2018 and to cancel all the encumbrances recorded against the property in respect of the tax arrears of the firms of the fourth respondent S and her husband.’

International transactions – Draft assessment order – Procedure to be followed – Mandatory – Tribunal in appeal from final assessment order remanding matter to Assistant Commissioner / TPO – A.O. straightaway passing final order – Not valid – A.O. bound to have passed draft order first – Order quashed and matter remanded

5 Durr India Private Limited vs. ACIT [2021] 436 ITR 111 (Mad) A.Ys.: 2009-10 to 2011-12; Date of order:  27th May, 2020 Ss. 92CA(4), 143(3), 144C of ITA, 1961

International transactions – Draft assessment order – Procedure to be followed – Mandatory – Tribunal in appeal from final assessment order remanding matter to Assistant Commissioner / TPO – A.O. straightaway passing final order – Not valid – A.O. bound to have passed draft order first – Order quashed and matter remanded

For the A.Y. 2009-10, pursuant to the report of the Transfer Pricing Officer, the Assistant Commissioner passed a draft assessment order against which the assessee filed an application before the Dispute Resolution Panel u/s 144C. Pursuant to the order of the Dispute Resolution Panel, the Assistant Commissioner passed an assessment order u/s 144C read with section 143(3). On appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal remanded the case back to the Assistant Commissioner / Transfer Pricing Officer. Thereafter, pursuant to the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer on remand by the Tribunal, the Assistant Commissioner passed the final order.

The assessee filed a writ petition contending that such final order being not preceded by a draft assessment order was without jurisdiction. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) When the law mandated a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it had to be done in that manner. The final assessment order u/s 144C read with section 143(3) had been passed without jurisdiction.

ii) Once the case was remitted back to the Assistant Commissioner / Transfer Pricing Officer, it was incumbent on their part to have passed a draft assessment order u/s 143(3) read with section 92CA(4) and section 144C(1). They could not bypass the statutory safeguards prescribed under the Act and deny the assessee the right to file an application before the Dispute Resolution Panel.

iii) The final order is quashed and the case remitted back to the Assistant Commissioner to pass a draft assessment order.’

HUF – Partition – Scope of section 171 – Section 171 applicable only where Hindu Family is already assessed as HUF – Deceased father of assessees not assessed as karta of HUF when alive – Inherited property shared under orally recorded memorandum by legal heirs – Proportionate consideration out of sale thereof declared in returns filed by legal heirs in individual capacity and exemption u/s 54F allowed by A.O. – Reassessment to tax capital gains in hands of karta – Unsustainable

4 A.P. Oree (Kartha) [Estate of A.R. Pandurangan (HUF)] vs. ITO [2021] 436 ITR 3 (Mad) A.Y.: 2008-09; Date of order: 2nd June, 2021 Ss. 54F, 148, 171 of ITA, 1961

HUF – Partition – Scope of section 171 – Section 171 applicable only where Hindu Family is already assessed as HUF – Deceased father of assessees not assessed as karta of HUF when alive – Inherited property shared under orally recorded memorandum by legal heirs – Proportionate consideration out of sale thereof declared in returns filed by legal heirs in individual capacity and exemption u/s 54F allowed by A.O. – Reassessment to tax capital gains in hands of karta – Unsustainable

The assessee was one of the four legal heirs of the deceased ARP. Part of the inherited agricultural land was sold without physical division. The share of each heir was orally divided between them under a memorandum of oral recording and the sale proceeds were distributed in proportion with their respective shares in the land and the balance portion of the land continued to remain in their names without physical division. For the A.Y. 2008-09, they filed their returns of income as individuals and claimed exemption from levy of tax on capital gains u/s 54F which was allowed by the A.O. On the ground that there was no physical division of the property, that the memorandum recording oral partition did not amount to partition u/s 171, and that therefore the capital gains was to be assessed in the hands of the estate of the deceased ARP (HUF) and the exemption allowed u/s 54F was contrary to section 171, notice was issued u/s 148 to the estate of ARP (HUF) and a consequential order was passed in the name of the assessee as karta.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice u/s 148 and the order. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) Section 171 makes it clear that it is applicable only where a Hindu family is already assessed as a Hindu undivided family. Otherwise, there is no meaning to the expression “hitherto” in section 171(1).

ii) During the lifetime of ARP, the deceased father of the assessees, the family was not assessed as a Hindu undivided family. It was only where there was a prior assessment as a Hindu undivided family and during the course of assessment u/s 143 or section 144 it was claimed by or on behalf of a member of such family which was assessed as a Hindu undivided family that there was a partition whether total or partial among the members of such family, that the A.O. should make an Inquiry after giving notice of inquiry to all the members. Where no such claim was made, the question of making inquiry by an A.O. did not arise and only in such circumstances would the definition of “partition” in Explanation to section 171 be attracted. The definition could not be read in isolation. Where a Hindu family was never assessed as a Hindu undivided family, section 171 would not apply even when there was a division or partition of property which did not fall within the definition.

iii) The notice issued u/s 148 to the estate of ARP (HUF) coparceners and the consequential order issued in the name of the assessee as the karta were unsustainable.’

Exemption u/s 10B – Export of computer software – Assessee omitting to claim exemption in return – Rectification of mistake – Revision – Rejection of rectification application and revision petition on ground of delay in filing revised return – Unjustified – Assessee entitled to benefit

3 L-Cube Innovative Solutions P. Ltd. vs. CIT [2021] 435 ITR 566 (Mad) A.Y.: 2006-07; Date of order: 5th February, 2021 Ss. 10B, 139(5), 154, 264 of ITA, 1961

Exemption u/s 10B – Export of computer software – Assessee omitting to claim exemption in return – Rectification of mistake – Revision – Rejection of rectification application and revision petition on ground of delay in filing revised return – Unjustified – Assessee entitled to benefit

The assessee provided software services and was entitled to the benefit u/s 10B. It failed to claim this benefit in its return of income filed u/s 139 for the A.Y. 2006-07. The assessee received the intimation dated 28th March, 2018 u/s 143(1) on 18th May, 2008. Since the time limit for filing a revised return u/s 139(5) had expired on 31st March, 2008, it filed a rectification application before the A.O. u/s 154. The A.O. rejected the application and held that if there was any mistake found in the return the assessee ought to have filed a revised return on or before 31st March, 2008. Against this rejection, the assessee filed a first revision petition u/s 264 which was rejected; a second revision petition filed was also rejected.

The assessee then filed a writ petition challenging the rejection of the claim for deduction. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) The rejection of the revision application filed by the assessee u/s 264 was not justified as the Officers acting under the Income-tax Department were duty-bound to extend the substantive benefits that were legitimately available to the assessee.

ii) The rejection of the application for rectification by the A.O. u/s 154 was unjustified, since the assessee was entitled to the substantive benefits u/s 10B and the delay, if any, was attributed on account of the system. Even if the intimation dated 28th March, 2008 was despatched on the same day after it was signed, in all likelihood it could not have been received by the assessee on 31st March, 2008 to file a revised return on time. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to rectification u/s 154.’

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Condition precedent for making declaration – Application should be pending on 31st January, 2020 from order dismissed ‘in limine’ – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Appeal dismissed based on mistake on 22nd June, 2018 – Tribunal rectifying order and passing fresh order restoring appeal on 11th May, 2020 – Order passed by Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018 was ‘in limine’ – Appeal pending on 31st January, 2020

2 Bharat Bhushan Jindal vs. Principal CIT [2021] 436 ITR 102 (Del) A.Y.: 2011-12; Date of order: 26th April, 2021 Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Condition precedent for making declaration – Application should be pending on 31st January, 2020 from order dismissed ‘in limine’ – Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Appeal dismissed based on mistake on 22nd June, 2018 – Tribunal rectifying order and passing fresh order restoring appeal on 11th May, 2020 – Order passed by Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018 was ‘in limine’ – Appeal pending on 31st January, 2020

For the A.Y. 2011-12, the A.O. passed the assessment order on 21st March, 2014 increasing the taxable income considerably. The assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), which was allowed on 29th January, 2016. The Revenue filed an appeal on 10th March, 2016 before the Tribunal. The appeal was, however, dismissed by the Tribunal on 22nd June, 2018, based on a mistaken belief that in the earlier assessment years it had taken a view against the Revenue and in the favour of the assessee. This obvious mistake, once brought to the notice of the Tribunal, via a miscellaneous application preferred by the Revenue, was rectified by an order dated 11th May, 2020. The miscellaneous application was filed before the specified date, i.e., 31st January, 2020. As per the information available on the Tribunal’s portal, the miscellaneous application was filed on 13th November, 2018. The Tribunal, realising the mistake that had been made, recalled its order dated 22nd June, 2018 and restored the Revenue’s appeal and directed that the appeal be heard afresh. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal fixed the date of hearing, via the very same order, in the appeal on 6th July, 2020. The assessee filed Forms 1 and 2 with the designated authority under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 in the first instance on 21st March, 2020. The assessee filed revised Forms 1 and 2, on 27th January, 2021, and thereafter on 20th March, 2021. In the interregnum, both sets of Forms 1 and 2, which were filed on 21st March, 2020 and 27th January, 2021, were rejected.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) A careful perusal of the order dated 22nd June, 2018 would show that the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed at the threshold, based on a mistaken impression that the Tribunal had taken a view against the Revenue. Circular No. 21 of 2020 [(2020) 429 ITR (St.) 1] requires fulfilment of two prerequisites for an appeal to be construed as pending on the specified date (i.e., 31st January, 2020) in terms of the provisions of the 2020 Act. First, the miscellaneous application should be pending on the specified date, i.e., 31st January, 2020. Second, the miscellaneous application should relate to an appeal which had been dismissed “in limine” before 31st January, 2020.

ii) There was no dispute that the miscellaneous application was filed and was pending on the specified date, i. e., 31st January, 2020. As regards the second aspect, the order of the Tribunal dated 22nd June, 2-018 could only be construed as an order that dismissed the Revenue’s appeal “in limine”. The Revenue’s appeal was pending on the specified, date, i. e., 31st January, 2020. The order of rejection was not valid.’

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act – Scope of – Meaning of disputed tax – Difference between disputed tax and disputed income – Appeal against levy of tax pending – Declaration filed under Act cannot be rejected on ground that assessee had offered an amount for taxation

1 Govindrajulu Naidu vs. Principal CIT [2021] 434 ITR 703 (Bom) A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 29th April, 2021 The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act – Scope of – Meaning of disputed tax – Difference between disputed tax and disputed income – Appeal against levy of tax pending – Declaration filed under Act cannot be rejected on ground that assessee had offered an amount for taxation

The assessee filed a return of income for the A.Y. 2014-15 u/s 139(1) declaring a total income of Rs. 67,55,710. The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) assessing the income at Rs. 67,66,640. Thereafter, in 2019, a survey action was undertaken at the office premises of the assessee. However, no incriminating material was found. Under pressure, the assessee agreed to offer the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 allegedly received as his income. Later, he retracted from his statement under an affidavit filed before respondent No. 2. The assessment for the assessment year was reopened by a notice issued u/s 148. The assessee filed a return showing the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 as his income and declared a total amount of Rs. 6,43,69,719 and on reassessment the total amount was assessed at Rs. 6,44,09,400. The assessee filed an appeal u/s 246A before the Commissioner (Appeals) and raised the ground that the respondent had erred in taxing the amount of Rs. 5,76,00,000 as income of the assessee for the relevant assessment year. The appeal was pending. During the pendency of the appeal, the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 was enacted. As required under the provisions of this Act, the assessee filed a declaration to the designated authority in the prescribed form. The declaration was rejected on the online portal without giving an opportunity to the assessee observing that there was no disputed tax in the case of the declarant, as the declarant had himself filed a return reflecting the income.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 and the rules have been brought out with a specific purpose, object and intention to expedite realisation of locked up revenue, providing certain reliefs to assessees who opt to apply under the Act. Such an option is available only to a few persons. The preamble to the Act provides for resolution of disputed tax and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The emphasis is on disputed tax and not on disputed income. The term “disputed tax” has been assigned specific definition in the Act and would have to be appreciated in the context of the Act. The disputed tax means an income tax payable by assessee under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the income assessed by the authority and where any appeal is pending before the appellate forum on the specified date, against any order relating to tax payable under the Income-tax Act. It does not presumably ascribe any qualification to the matter / appeal except that it should concern the Income-tax Act. Further the definition of “dispute” as appearing under Rule 2(b) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Rules, 2020 shows that “dispute” means an appeal or writ petition or special leave petition by the declarant before the appellate forum. “Disputed income” has also been defined under clause (g) of section 2(1) to mean the whole or so much of the total income as is relatable to disputed tax.

ii) The scheme of the 2020 Act does not make any distinction and categorise the appeals. The Act does not go into the ground of appeal.

iii) The Department did not dispute that an appeal had been filed by the assessee before the appellate forum. There existed a dispute as referred to under the 2020 Act and the Rules. In such a scenario, the Department’s contention that the assessee had offered the income and as such the tax thereon could not be considered disputed tax, would not align itself with the object and the purpose underlying the bringing in of the 2020 Act. The rejection of the declaration under the 2020 Act was not valid.’

Artheon Battery [TS-863-ITAT-2021 (Pun)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 7th September, 2021 Section 28(iv)

8 Artheon Battery [TS-863-ITAT-2021 (Pun)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 7th September, 2021 Section 28(iv)

FACTS
The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacturing the complete line of lead-acid batteries, serving domestic and export markets as well. The A.O. found that the assessee had credited an amount of Rs. 25.19 crores being waiver of ECB loan amount. The assessee submitted that the ECB was availed to acquire capital assets and hence was capital in nature. The A.O. did not accept the assessee’s submissions and held that the amount was taxable u/s 28(iv). On appeal, the CIT(A) held the amount to be capital in nature.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal found that the assessee had transferred the waiver amount of ECB directly to its capital reserve. It referred to the Apex Court ruling in Mahindra & Mahindra (404 ITR 1) wherein it was held that ‘in order to invoke the provisions u/s 28(iv) of the Act, the benefit which is received has to be in some other form rather than in the shape of money’. The Tribunal held that the amount received as cash receipt due to the waiver of loan cannot be taxed under the provisions of section 28(iv), and noted that in the instant case the loan amount waived was credited to capital reserve. Therefore, it held that the ratio of the SC ruling would be applicable as the benefit was received in some form other than in the shape of money. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s order.
 

BUSINESS INCOME OF A CHARITABLE INSTITUTION

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 11 of the Income-tax Act confers exemption from tax in respect of an income derived from ‘property held under trust’, in the circumstances specified in clauses (a) to (c) of section 11(1), to a charitable institution or a trust or such other person registered u/s12A of the Act.

Section 11(4) provides that a ‘property held under trust’ includes a business undertaking held in trust and the income from such business, subject to the power of the A.O., shall not be included in the total income of the institution.

Sub-section (4A) provides for the denial of the benefit of tax exemption u/s 11(1) and prohibits the application of sub-sections (2), (3) and (3A) in relation to any income being profits and gains of business, unless the business is incidental to the attainment of the main objectives of the trust and separate books of accounts are maintained for the business.

The ‘property held under trust’ is required to be held for the charitable or religious purposes for its income to qualify for exemption from taxation. The term ‘charitable purpose’ is defined by section 2(15) and includes relief of the poor, education, yoga, medical relief, preservation of environment and of monuments or places or objects of artistic or historic interest, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility. A proviso to section 2(15) stipulates some stringent conditions in respect of an institution whose object is the advancement of general public utility, where it is carrying on any business to advance its objects. The said proviso does not apply to institutions whose objects are other than those of advancing general public utility, provided their objects otherwise qualify to be treated as charitable purposes.

The sum and substance of the aforesaid provisions, in relation to business carried out by an institution, is that a business run by it would be construed as a ‘property held under trust’ and its income, subject to the proviso to section 2(15), would be exempt from tax u/s 11. The conditions prescribed u/s (4A), where applicable, would require the business to be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust and separate books of accounts would have to be maintained in respect of the business by the institution.

Some interesting controversies have arisen around the true meaning and understanding of the terms ‘property held under trust’ and ‘incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust’ and in relation to the applicability of sub-section (4A) to cases where provisions of sub-section (4) are applicable. The Delhi High Court has held that a business carried on with borrowed funds and unrelated to the objects of the trust could not be held to be a ‘property held under trust’. It has also held that for a business to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, its activities should be intricately related to its objects. It also held that the provisions of sub-section (4A) and sub-section (4) cannot apply simultaneously. As against the above decision, the Madras High Court has held that a business carried on by the trust is a ‘property held under trust’ and such business would be construed to be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust where the profits of such business are utilised for meeting the objects of the trust and, of course, separate books of accounts are maintained by the trust.

Some of these issues have a chequered history and were the subject matter of many Supreme Court decisions, including in the cases of J.K. Trust, 32 ITR 535; Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, 121 ITR 1; and Thanthi Trust, 247 ITR 785. Besides the above, the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the meaning of the term ‘not involving the carrying out of any activity of profit’ and the concept of business held in trust in the cases of CIT vs. Dharmodayam Co., 109 ITR 527 (SC); Dharmaposhanam Co. vs. CIT, 114 ITR 463 (SC); and Dharmadeepti vs. CIT, 114 ITR 454 (SC).

MEHTA CHARITABLE PRAJNALAY TRUST’S CASE

The issue came up for consideration in the case of CIT vs. Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust, 357 ITR 560 before the Delhi High Court. The assessment years involved therein were 1992-93 to 1994-95; 2001-02; and 2005-06 to 2007-08. The trust was constituted in the year 1971 for promotion of education, patriotism, Indian culture and running of dispensaries and hospitals and many other related charitable objects with a donation of Rs. 2,100. Besides pursuing the above objects, the trust commenced Katha manufacturing business in the year 1972 with the aid and assistance of borrowings from banks and sister concerns in which the settlors, trustees or their relatives had substantial interest. At some point of time, the Katha manufacturing unit was leased to a related concern on receipt of lease rent. The trust made purchases and sales from its head office through the two related concerns.

The exemption u/s 11 claimed by the trust was denied by the A.O. for some of the years and such denial was confirmed by the CIT(A) on the ground that the Katha business was carried on by the trustees and not by the beneficiaries of the trust, as was required by the then applicable section 11(4A), and the exemption was not available to the trust in respect of the profits of the Katha business. In respect of some other years, the CIT(A) held that the business was held under trust and was covered by section 11(4) of the Act and on application of the said section, the provisions of sections 11(4A) were not applicable and therefore the trust was entitled for the exemption. For the years under consideration, the A.O. denied the exemption for the same reasons, besides holding that carrying on of the Katha business was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The orders of the A.O. for those years were sustained by the CIT(A) for reasons different from those of the A.O.

On appeal, the Tribunal, following its decision for the A.Y. 1989-90, held that the Katha business carried on by the assessee was incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, which were for charitable purposes. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thanthi Trust (Supra), in which the effect of the amendment was considered, the Tribunal held that the said decision squarely covered the controversy in the present case about the business being incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

The High Court noted that the Tribunal did not specifically address itself to the question which arose out of the order of the CIT(A), whether the business itself can be said to be property held under trust within the meaning of section 11(4). There was no discussion in the order of the Tribunal as to the impact of the various clauses of the trust deed which were referred to by the CIT(A) while making a distinction between the objects of the trust and the powers of the trustees. In respect of all the other assessment years, namely, 1993-94, 1994-95, 2001-02 and 2005-06 to 2007-08, the Tribunal followed the order passed by it for the A.Y. 1992-93.

On an appeal by Revenue, the Delhi High Court in appreciation of the contentions of the parties, held as under:
• There was no exhaustive definition of the words ‘property held under trust’ in the Act; however, sub-section (4) provided that for the purposes of section 11 the words ‘property held under trust’ include a business undertaking so held.

• The question whether sub-section (4A) would apply even to a case where a business was held under trust was answered in the negative in several authoritative pronouncements. Thus, if a property was held under trust, and such property was a business, the case would fall u/s 11(4) and not u/s 11(4A). Section 11(4A) would apply only to a case where the business was not held under trust. In view of the settled legal position, the contention of the Revenue, that the provisions of section 11(4A) were sweeping and would also take in a case of business held under trust, was not acceptable.

• In the facts of the present case, and having regard to the terms of the trust deed and the conduct of the trustees, it could not be said that the Katha business was itself held under trust. There was a difference between a property or business held under trust and a business carried on by or on behalf of the trust, a distinction that was recognised in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association (Supra), a decision of five Judges of the Supreme Court. It was observed that if a business undertaking was held under trust for a charitable purpose, the income therefrom would be entitled to the exemption u/s 11(1).

• In the case before the Court, the finding of the CIT(A), in his order for the A.Y. 1992-93, was that the Katha business was not held under trust but it was a business commenced by the trustees with the aid and assistance of borrowings from the sister concerns in which the settlors and the trustees or their close relatives had substantial interest, as well as from banks. It was thus with the help of borrowed funds, or in other words, the funds not belonging to the assessee trust, that the Katha business was commenced and profits started to be earned.

• There was a distinction between the objects of a trust and the powers given to the trustees to effectuate the purposes of the trust. The Katha business was not even in the contemplation of the settlors and, therefore, could not have been settled upon trust, even where they were empowered to start any business.

• There was thus no nexus or integration between the amount originally settled upon the trust and the later setting up and conduct of the Katha business. Moreover, the distinction between the original trust fund and the later commencement of the business with the help of borrowed funds should be kept in mind in the context of ascertaining whether the particular Katha business was even in the contemplation of the settlors of the trust.

• There was no connection between the carrying on of the Katha business and the attainment of the objects of the trust, which were basically for the advancement of education, inculcation of patriotism, Indian culture, running of dispensaries, hospitals, etc. The mere fact that the whole or some part of the income from the Katha business was earmarked for application to the charitable objects would not render the business itself being considered as incidental to the attainment of the objects. The Delhi High Court was in agreement with the view taken by the CIT(A) in his order for A.Y. 1992-93 that the application of the income generated by the business was not the relevant consideration and what was relevant was whether the activity was so inextricably connected to or linked with the objects of the trust that it could be considered as incidental to those objectives.

• Prima facie, the observations in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra) would appear to support the assessee’s case in the sense that even if the Katha business was held not to constitute a business held under trust, but only as a business carried on by or on behalf of the trust, so long as the profits generated by it were applied for the charitable objects of the trust, the condition imposed u/s 11(4A) should be held to be satisfied, entitling the trust to the tax exemption.

• The observations of the Apex Court, however, have to be understood in the light of the facts before it. The assessee in that case carried on the business of a newspaper and that business itself was held under trust. The charitable object of the trust was the imparting of education which fell u/s 2(15). The newspaper business was certainly incidental to the attainment of the object of the trust, namely, that of imparting education. The observations were thus made having regard to the fact that the profits of the newspaper business were utilised by the trust for achieving the object, namely, education. The type of nexus or connection which existed between the imparting of education and the carrying on of the business of a newspaper did not exist in the present case. There was no such nexus between the Katha business and the objects of the assessee trust that can constitute the carrying on of the Katha business, an activity incidental to the attainment of the objects, namely, advancing of education, patriotism, Indian culture, running of hospitals and dispensaries, etc.

• It would be disastrous to extend the sweep of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra), on the facts of that case, to all cases where the trust carried on business which was not held under trust and whose income was utilised to feed the charitable objects of the trust. The observations of the Supreme Court must be understood and appreciated in the background of the facts in that case and should not be extended indiscriminately to all cases.

The Delhi High Court held that a business carried on with borrowed funds and unrelated to the objects of the trust could not be held to be a ‘property held under trust’. It has also held that for a business to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, its activity should be intricately related to its objects. It also held that where a property was held under trust and such property was a business, the case would fall u/s 11(4) and not u/s 11(4A). Section 11(4A) would apply only to a case where the business was not held under trust. It therefore held that the Katha business was not a property held under trust, the provisions of section 11(4) did not apply, and the provisions of section 11(4A) would have to be applied. Since the business was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust as required by section 11(4A), the trust was not entitled to exemption in respect of the business income.

The Special Leave Petition filed by the assessee against this decision has been admitted by the Supreme Court as reported in Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust vs. CIT, 248 Taxman 145 (SC).

BHARATHAKSHEMAM’S CASE


The issue recently arose in the case of Bharathakshemam vs. PCIT, 320 CTR (Ker) 198, a case that required the Court to adjudicate whether the assessee trust was eligible for exemption from tax u/s 11, in respect of the business of Chitty / Kuri which was utilised for medical relief, an object of the trust, and could such business be considered as a business incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the objects of the trust. In that case, the Revenue had relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra) to support the contention that the business carried on by the trust had no connection or nexus with the charitable objects of the trust. It was the Revenue’s contention that the business, being run by the trust, should itself be connected or should have a nexus with the object of medical relief, for example, running a dispensary or a hospital or a drugstore or even a medical college; surely, running a Chitty / Kuri business was none of them and therefore could not be said to be incidental or ancillary to the objects of the trust, and the fact that the profit of such business was utilised entirely for medical relief was not sufficient for excluding the income of the business from taxation.

In this case, the facts gathered from the order of the High Court reveal that the claim for exemption of the trust in respect of its profit from its Chitty / Kuri business was denied by the A.O. on the grounds that such a business was not incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The A.O. had also evoked the proviso to section 2(15) which was held by the Court to be irrelevant in view of the finding that the said proviso had a restricted application to the cases where a business was being carried on for pursuing its object of carrying on an activity of general public utility. In the case before the Court, the main object was providing medical relief and the profits of the business were utilised for medical relief which was the main object of the trust.

The first appellant authority held that the business was carried out by the trust for the mutual benefit of the subscribers to the Chitty / Kuri and the substantial profit of the business was passed on to such subscribers and therefore such business, which retained minor profits, could not have been treated as incidental to the objects of the trust. It also held that the profit, even where applied fully to the objects of the trust, could not have deemed the business to be incidental to the main objects of the trust. On appeal by the assessee to the Tribunal, it agreed with the findings of the first appellate authority and also referred to the first proviso to section 2(15) to hold that the business of the trust was not incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

On further appeal to the High Court, relying on a few decisions of the courts, the Kerala High Court held that the proviso to section 2(15) had no relation to the case of the trust which had as its object providing medical relief. This part is not relevant to the issues under consideration here and is mentioned only for completeness.

The Court also observed, though not relevant to the issue before it, that in the aftermath of the deletion of section 13(1)(bb) and insertion of sub-section (4), the distinction between a business held in trust and one run by the trust was not very relevant and the observations in the minority judgment in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra) should not be applied in preference to the observations of the majority, more so when the court later on delivered a unanimous judgment of the five judges.

On the issue of satisfaction of the condition of sub-section (4A), relating to the business being incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust, the Kerala High Court exclusively relied on paragraph 25 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra) for holding that the business of Chitty / Kuri was incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. The said paragraph 25 is reproduced hereunder:

‘The substituted sub-section (4A) states that the income derived from a business held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the trust or institution if “the business is incidental to the attainment of the objective of the trust or, as the case may be, institution” and separate books of accounts are maintained in respect of such business. Clearly, the scope of sub-section (4A) is more beneficial to a trust or institution than was the scope of sub-section (4A) as originally enacted. In fact, it seems to us that the substituted sub-section (4A) gives a trust or institution a greater benefit than was given by section 13(1)(bb). If the object of Parliament was to give trusts and institutions no more benefit than that given by section 13(1)(bb), the language of section 13(1)(bb) would have been employed in the substituted sub-section (4A). As it stands, all that it requires for the business income of a trust or institution to be exempt is that the business should be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust or institution. A business whose income is utilised by the trust or the institution for the purposes of achieving the objectives of the trust or the institution is, surely, a business which is incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust. In any event, if there be any ambiguity in the language employed, the provision must be construed in a manner that benefits the assessee. The trust, therefore, is entitled to the benefit of section 11 for A.Y. 1992-93 and thereafter. It is, we should add, not in dispute that the income of its newspaper business has been employed to achieve its objectives of education and relief to the poor and that it has maintained separate books of accounts in respect thereof.’

The Kerala High Court, in paragraph 13, examined the facts and the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra) relied upon by the Revenue. In paragraph 14 it reiterated the above-referred paragraph 25 of the decision in the case of the Thanthi Trust (Supra) to disagree, in paragraph 15, with the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mehta Charitable Prajnalay Trust (Supra). The Court also held that the Chitty / Kuri business did not require any initial investment and therefore the facts in the case before it were found to be different from the facts in the case before the Delhi High Court. The Kerala High Court also noted that the example cited by the Delhi High Court was relevant only in the context of section 13(1)(bb), which became irrelevant on its deletion; on simultaneous insertion of sub-section (4A), the case was to be adjudicated by reading the substituted provision that did not stipulate any condition that business carried on by the trust should be connected or should have nexus with the charitable purpose for such business to be treated as being carried on as incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust. It held that the Chitty / Kuri business was incidental to the main object as long as its profits were applied for medical relief, which was the object of the trust. The trust was accordingly granted the exemption in respect of its profits of the Chitty / Kuri business.

OBSERVATIONS
The issue that moves in a narrow compass, is about the eligibility of a trust for exemption u/s 11 where it carries on a business, the corpus whereof is supplied by the borrowings from the sister concerns of the settlor / trustees and the profit thereof is used for the purpose of meeting the objects of the trust; should such business be treated as one ‘held in trust’ and if yes, whether the business can be said to be incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust.

A business run by a charitable institution, whether out of borrowed funds or from the funds settled on it, is surely a ‘property held under trust’ as is confirmed by the express provisions of sub-section (4) of section 11 and this understanding is confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Thanthi Trust (Supra). In this case, the Supreme Court observed ‘A public charitable trust may hold a business as part of its corpus. It may carry on a business which it does not hold as a part of its corpus. But it seems that the distinction has no consequence insofar as section 13(1)(bb) is concerned.’ The doubt, if any, was eliminated by the deletion of section 13(1)(bb) w.e.f. 1st April, 1983. Section 13(1)(bb) provided that nothing contained in section 11 or section 12 shall operate so as to exclude from the total income of the previous year of the person in receipt thereof, in the case of a charitable trust or institution for the relief of the poor, education or medical relief, which carries on any business, any income derived from such business, unless the business is carried on in the course of the actual carrying out of a primary purpose of the trust or institution.

The Supreme Court also stated in the Thanthi case:
 ‘Sub-section (4) of section 11 remains on the statute book and it defines property held under trust for the purposes of that section to include a business so held. It then states how such income is to be determined. In other words, if such income is not to be included in the income of the trust, its quantum is to be determined in the manner set out in sub-section (4).
Sub-section (1)(a) of section 11 says that income derived from property held under trust only for charitable or religious purposes, to the extent it is used in the manner indicated therein, shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the trust. Sub-section (4) defines the words “property held under trust” for the purposes of section 11 to include a business held under trust. Sub-section (4A) restricts the benefit under section 11 so that it is not available for income derived from business unless ……’

The Supreme Court therefore clearly indicated that both sub-sections (4) and (4A) of section 11 have to be read together.

The position now should be accepted as settled unless the A.O. finds that the business is not owned and run by the institution. It is difficult to concur with a view that a business owned and run by a trust or on its behalf may still not be held to be ‘a property held under trust’. Sub-section (4) should help in concluding the debate. Yes, where the business itself is not owned or run by the trust, there can be a possibility to hold that it is not ‘a property held in trust’, but only in such cases based on conclusive findings that the business belongs to a person other than the trust.

The fact that the business is a ‘property held in trust’ by itself shall not be sufficient to exempt its income u/s 11 unless the business is found to be incidental to attainment of the objects of the trust and further the institution maintains separate books of accounts for such business. These conditions are mandated by the Legislature on insertion of sub-section (4A) into section 11 w.e.f. 1st April, 1992. In our considered opinion, the compliance of the conditions of sub-section (4A) is essential even for a business held as a ‘property held under a trust’. A co-joint reading of sub-sections (4) and (4A) is advised in the interest of the harmonious construction of the provisions that enables an institution to claim the exemption from tax.

The term ‘property held under trust’ is not defined in the Act; however, vide sub-section (4), for the purposes of section 11, the words ‘property held under trust’ include a business undertaking held by the trust. This by itself shall not qualify the trust to claim an exemption from tax. In our opinion, it is not correct to hold that once the case falls under section 11(4), the conditions of section 11(4A) will not have to be satisfied. For a valid claim of exemption, it is necessary to satisfy the twin conditions: that the business is a property held in the trust and the same is incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust and that separate books of accounts are maintained of such business. It is also incorrect to hold that the provisions of sub-section (4A) would apply only to a business which is not a property held in trust; taking such a view would disentitle a trust altogether from claiming exemption for non-compliance of conditions of sections 11(1)(a) to (c) of the Act; the whole objective of insertion of sub-section(4A) would be lost inasmuch as it cannot be read in isolation of section 11(1)(a) to (c).

As regards the meaning of the term ‘incidental to the objects of the trust’, the better view is to treat the conditions as satisfied once the profits of the business are spent on the objects of the trust. There is nothing in section 11(4A) to indicate that there is a business nexus to the objects of the trust, for example, a business of running a laboratory or a school or a hospital w.r.t. the object of medical relief. The profit of the business of running a newspaper or printing press shall satisfy the conditions of section 11(4A) once it is utilised for the charitable purposes, i.e., the objects of the trust, even where there is no business nexus with the objects of the trust.

Attention is invited to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Wellington Charitable Trust, 330 ITR 24. In that case, the Court held that when a business income was used towards the achievement of the objects of the trust, it would amount of carrying on of a business ‘incidental to the attainment of the objects of the trust’. Importance is given to the application of the business income and not its source, its use and not its origin. Nothing would be gained by exempting an income which has a nexus with the objects of the trust but is not utilised for meeting the objects of the trust. The provisions of section 11(4) and section 11(4A) will have to be read together for a harmonious construction; it would not be correct to hold that section 11(4A) would override section 11(4) as doing so would make the very provision of section 11(4) otiose and redundant. The Court should avoid an interpretation that would defeat the provision of the law where there is no express bar in section 11(4A) that prohibits the application of section 11(4). The provisions should be construed to be complementary to each other.

Having said that, it would help the case of the trust, for an exemption, where the settlor of the trust has settled the business in the trust and the objects of the trust include the carrying on of such business for the attainment of the charitable objects of the trust.

Surbhit Impex [130 taxmann.com 315] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th September, 2021 Section 41(1)

7 Surbhit Impex [130 taxmann.com 315] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th September, 2021 Section 41(1)

FACTS
The assessee was engaged in the business of trading. During the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that it owed amounts of Rs. 1.25 crores and Rs. 1.88 crores, respectively, to two Chinese entities and which were outstanding. The assessee submitted that since the consignment received was not of good quality, the payment was not made. The A.O. treated the same as ceased liabilities and accordingly made an addition of Rs. 3.13 crores u/s 41(1). On appeal, the CIT(A) deleted the additions. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted the undisputed position that at the relevant point of time, proceedings against the assessee for recovery of these amounts were pending before the judicial forums and remarked that these amounts could not have been said to have ceased to be payable by the assessee. The Tribunal further remarked that the very basic, foundational condition that there has to be benefit in respect of such trading liability by way of ‘remission and cessation’ was not satisfied in the relevant year, and thus upheld the CIT(A)’s order.

The Tribunal observed that sometimes Departmental appeals are filed without carefully looking at undisputed basic foundational facts in a routine manner, and remarked that the Income-tax Authorities ought to be more careful in deciding matters to be pursued in further appeals.

Section 142(2A) – Reference to DVO cannot be made by an authority who is not empowered to do so – An invalid valuation report of DVO cannot be considered as incriminating material – In absence of any incriminating material for the unabated assessment years, additions cannot be made

6 ACIT vs. Narula Educational Trust [2021-86ITR(T) 365 (Kol-Trib)] IT(SS) Appeal Nos. 07 to 12 & 42 to 47(Kol) of 2020 A.Ys.: 2008-09 to 2013-14; Date of order:  5th February, 2021

Section 142(2A) – Reference to DVO cannot be made by an authority who is not empowered to do so – An invalid valuation report of DVO cannot be considered as incriminating material – In absence of any incriminating material for the unabated assessment years, additions cannot be made

FACTS
The assessee was an educational institution operating through various institutions. On 13th March, 2014, a search action u/s 132(1) was carried out at its administrative office. During post-search operations, the DGIT(Inv) made reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) for valuing the immovable properties. The DVO reported the value of the properties to be higher than the value disclosed by the assessee. Pursuant to the provisions of section 153A, an assessment for the A.Ys. 2008-09 to 2012-13 was undertaken and the A.O. proposed to make an addition based on the report of the DVO. The assessee objected to the valuation methodology adopted by the DVO; accordingly, the A.O. requested the DVO to reconsider the valuation. However, as the DVO did not submit the report within the statutory time limit of six months, the A.O. proceeded to make an addition based on the initial valuation report as called upon by the DGIT(Inv).

Before the CIT(A), the assessee raised the point that since the DVO did not furnish the report to the A.O. within the time limit, hence the reference stood infructuous. The CIT(A), exercising his co-terminus powers (as that of A.O.), himself made reference to the DVO; however, since the DVO did not furnish a reply within the time limit, the CIT(A) deleted the addition on the ground that since the DVO did not furnish a report, hence the earlier report of the DVO [as sought by DGIT(Inv)] stood non-est and could not be relied upon by the A.O.

On appeal by the Revenue before the ITAT, the assessee argued that, firstly, the DGIT(Inv) had no power at that point of time to refer to the DVO for valuation, and secondly, since there was no incriminating material found during the course of the search action, no addition can be made as the assessments for these years were unabated.

HELD
The DGIT(Inv) was empowered to make reference for valuation to the DVO only after the amendment in section 132 made vide the Finance Act, 2017 w.e.f. 1st April, 2017 and not prior to it. Thus, the DGIT(Inv) did not have jurisdiction to make a reference in the year 2014. Accordingly, the impugned additions were directed to be deleted relying on the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Amiya Bala Paul vs. CIT [2003] 262 ITR 407 (SC) where it was held that reference to the DVO cannot be made by an authority that is not empowered to do so.

It was observed that assessments for the relevant years were unabated because no assessments were pending for those years before the A.O. as on the date of the search. Further, the accounts of the assessee were audited, and that neither the search party nor the A.O. pointed out any mistake in the correctness or completeness of the books. On perusal of the panchnama it was evident that the search party did not even visit the educational institutions. Thus, the reference made by the DGIT(Inv) to the DVO was without any incriminating material that was unearthed during the search proceedings. There was no whisper of any incriminating material seized during the search to justify the addition in these unabated assessments other than the invalid valuation report. Such invalid valuation report of the DVO cannot be held to be incriminating material, since it was not a fallout of any incriminating material unearthed during the search to suggest any investment in the building which was over and above the investment shown by the assessee. Therefore, no addition was permissible for unabated assessments unless it was based on relevant incriminating material found during the course of search qua the assessee and qua the assessment year.

Principle of consistency – Where in earlier years in the assessee’s own case the benefit of exemption u/s 11 was allowed, the Revenue’s appeal against the order of CIT(A) was dismissed, thereby upholding the claim of exemption u/s 11, following the principle of consistency

5 ACIT (Exemptions) vs. India Habitat Centre [2021-86-ITR(T) 290 (Del-Trib)] IT Appeal No. 5779 (Del) of 2017 A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 1st February, 2021

Principle of consistency – Where in earlier years in the assessee’s own case the benefit of exemption u/s 11 was allowed, the Revenue’s appeal against the order of CIT(A) was dismissed, thereby upholding the claim of exemption u/s 11, following the principle of consistency

FACTS
The assessee-society was registered u/s 12A vide order dated 13th January, 1989. It had satisfied the requirements of Education, Medical Relief, Environment, Relief of Poor and Claim of General Public Utility and thus, its activities were charitable as mandated in section 2(15).

The Department had started disputing the nature of activities undertaken by the assessee and rejected the claim of exemption under sections 11 and 12 read with the proviso to section 2(15). As an abundant precaution, the assessee started making an alternate claim for exemption under the principle of mutuality, it being a members’ association.

For the relevant A.Y., the A.O. noted that its activities were hybrid, were partly covered by the provisions of section 11 read with section 2(15) and partly by the principle of mutuality. The A.O. denied the exemption u/s 11 and under mutuality since separate books of accounts were not maintained and income could not be bifurcated under the principle of mutuality or otherwise.

Aggrieved, the assessee challenged the assessment order before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) relied on the earlier decisions of the higher appellate forums in its own case and held that the assessee was engaged in charitable activities and granted the benefit of exemption u/s 11. Aggrieved by the order, the Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that a coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the A.Y. 2008-09 had reviewed all the case laws and various decisions on this aspect to reach the conclusion that when the society was registered as a charitable trust, its income cannot be computed on the principle of mutuality but was required to be computed under sections 11, 12 and 13. This decision was followed by another decision of a co-ordinate bench in ITA No. 4212/Del/2012 for the A.Y. 2009-10 in the assessee’s own case.

The Tribunal held that the history of the assessee as noted in the submissions of the counsel clearly showed that all the issues raised in the Departmental appeal had been considered and decided in earlier years, therefore, the principle of consistency applied to the same facts. The Tribunal observed that the facts in the relevant assessment year were identical to the facts in the earlier years in the assessee’s own case, the fact that the assessee was a registered society u/s 12A and that the nature of activities and objects of the assessee were the same as had been considered in earlier years.Considering the above background and history of the assessee in the light of various orders referred to by its counsel during the course of arguments and the Order of the ITAT and the Delhi High Court in A.Y. 2012-2013 in the assessee’s own case, the Tribunal did not find any infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) in allowing the appeal of the assessee-society and the Departmental appeal was accordingly dismissed.

In the case of an assessee who had not undertaken any activities except development of flats and construction of various housing projects, expenses incurred by way of professional fees are allowable while computing income offered during survey

4 Anjani Infra vs. DCIT [TS-825-ITAT-2021 (Surat)] A.Y.: 2013-14; Date of order: 26th July, 2021 Sections 37, 68, 115BBE

In the case of an assessee who had not undertaken any activities except development of flats and construction of various housing projects, expenses incurred by way of professional fees are allowable while computing income offered during survey

FACTS

The assessee firm was a part of Shri Lavjibhai Daliya and Shri Jayantibhai Babaria group on whom search action was carried out on 17th July, 2012. In the course of the survey action, a partner of the assessee offered additional unaccounted income of Rs. 8,00,54,000. In the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. noticed that the assessee has debited expenditure of Rs. 8 lakh from the income disclosed in the survey. In support of the claim, the assessee, in the course of assessment proceedings, submitted that the assessee is engaged only in the business of building construction and developing residential and other housing projects. No other activities or investments are carried out or undertaken by the assessee firm. The disclosure was made towards on-money in the business of real estate. The professional fee of Rs. 8 lakh was paid to their legal consultant. The A.O. treated the additional income declared in the survey as deemed income of the assessee u/s 68 and disallowed professional fees. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. The aggrieved assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal observed that the narrow dispute is whether the assessee can claim expenses of professional fees against additional unaccounted income disclosed during the survey. The Tribunal noted that while making disclosure of Rs. 8 crores, the partners gave the bifurcation of undisclosed income. In the statement there is no averment that the assessee will not claim any expense. The assessee had not undertaken any other activities except the development of flats and construction of various housing projects. On similar facts, in the case of DCIT vs. Suyog Corporation [ITA No. 568/Ahd/2012] the Tribunal confirmed the order of the CIT(A) allowing expenses against on-money to the assessee who was also engaged in similar business activities. A similar view was taken in the case of DCIT vs. Jamnadas Muljibhai [(2006) 99 TTJ 197 (Rajkot)] by treating on-money as business receipt of the assessee.

The Tribunal, considering the decisions of the co-ordinate benches and also the fact that professional fees were paid to the firm of consultants after deducting TDS, held that there is no justification in disallowing such expenses.

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16

3 National Building Construction Corporation Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [TS-815-ITAT-2021 (Del)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 11th August, 2021 Section: Explanation 2 to section 37(1)

Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16

FACTS

The assessee in its return of income claimed deduction of Rs. 5,72,32,442 incurred on account of expenses on corporate social responsibility (CSR). It was submitted before the A.O. that CSR expenses were incurred for the purpose of projecting its business and said the expenditure was incurred in accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry of Heavy Industry and Public Enterprises. It was also submitted that the expenses have enhanced the brand image of the company, which in turn has had a positive long-term impact on the business of the assessee.The A.O. held Explanation 2 to section 37(1) to be clarificatory and consequently disallowed the claim of the CSR expenses of Rs. 5,72,32,442.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal noted that the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal has in the case of Addl. CIT vs. Rites Limited [ITA Nos. 6447 and 6448/Del/2017; A.Y. 2013-14] held that Explanation 2 to section 37(1) is prospective in nature and applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2015-16. It also noted that the expenses have been incurred on the direction of the relevant Ministry / Government of India and neither the A.O. nor the D.R. have rebutted the contention of the assessee that expenses have been incurred for enhancing the brand image of the company which are wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee – but both the authorities have disallowed the expenses on the ground that Explanation 2 is clarificatory and retrospective in nature.The Tribunal, following the decision of the co-ordinate bench, held that Explanation 2 is prospective in nature and accordingly CSR expenses incurred in the year under consideration cannot be disallowed by invoking Explanation 2 to section 37(1).

This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Claim for deduction of interest u/s 24(b) is allowable even though assessee had not got possession of the house property

2 Abeezar Faizullabhoy vs. CIT(A) [TS-859-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 1st September, 2021 Section 24

Claim for deduction of interest u/s 24(b) is allowable even though assessee had not got possession of the house property

FACTS

The assessee purchased a residential house vide a registered agreement dated 20th September, 2009 for a consideration of Rs. 1,60,89,250. For acquiring the property, the assessee took a loan on which interest of Rs. 2,69,842 was paid by him during the year under consideration. In the return of income the assessee claimed deduction of Rs. 2,00,000 u/s 24(b) which was declined by the A.O. on the ground that the assessee had not taken possession of the property in question.Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the A.O. Still aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal on perusal of section 24(b) held that for claiming deduction of interest u/s 24(b) there is neither any such precondition nor an eligibility criterion prescribed that the assessee should have taken possession of the property purchased or acquired by him. The first and second provisos to section 24(b) only contemplate an innate upper limit of the amount of deduction qua properties referred to in section 23(2). These provisos by no means jeopardise the entitlement of the assessee to claim deduction of interest payable by him on capital borrowed for the purposes mentioned in the section, provided the property does not fall within the realm of section 23(2).

The view of the CIT(A), viz., that in the absence of any control / domain over the property in question the assessee would not be in receipt of any income from the same, therefore, the fact that allowing deduction u/s 24(b) qua the said property would be beyond comprehension was held by the Tribunal to be absolutely misconceived and divorced of any force of law. It held that the logic given by the CIT(A) for declining the claim for deduction militates against the mandate of sections 22 to 24.

The Tribunal further held that determination of annual value is dependent on the ‘ownership’ of the property, irrespective of the fact of whether or not the assessee has taken possession. As per the plain literal interpretation of section 24(b), there is no bar on an assessee to claim deduction of interest payable on a loan taken for purchasing a residential property, although the possession of the same might not have been vested with him.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the A.O. to allow the assessee’s claim for deduction of Rs. 2 lakh u/s 24(b).

Reassessment made merely on the basis of AIR information was quashed as having been made on invalid assumption of jurisdiction

1 Tapan Chakraborty vs. ITO [TS-644-ITAT-2021 (Kol)] A.Y.: 2009-10; Date of order: 7th July, 2021 Section: 147

Reassessment made merely on the basis of AIR information was quashed as having been made on invalid assumption of jurisdiction

FACTS

For the A.Y. 2009-10, the assessee, a transport contractor, filed his return of income declaring a total income of Rs. 1,85,199 u/s 44AE. Reassessment proceedings were commenced on the basis of AIR information that the assessee has deposited a sum of Rs. 10,64,200 in his savings account which deposit was held by the Revenue to be cash credit u/s 68.

In the reasons recorded, the A.O. noticed that the assessee has declared business income of Rs. 1,85,199 and has a savings bank account with Oriental Bank of Commerce, perusal of the bank statement whereof shows a deposit of Rs. 10,64,200 to be in cash out of the total deposits of Rs. 16,11,720.

According to the A.O., the assessee failed to substantiate the cash deposit with any supporting evidence and hence concluded the amounts to be cash credit u/s 68.

HELD


Quietus of the completed assessments can be disturbed only when there is information or evidence / material regarding undisclosed income or the A.O. has information in his possession showing escapement of income. The statutory mandate is that the A.O. must record ‘reason to believe’ the escapement of income. The Tribunal observed that if adverse information may trigger ‘reason to suspect’, then the A.O. has to make reasonable inquiry and collect material which would make him believe that there is in fact an escapement of income. ‘Reason’ is the link between the information and the conclusion. ‘Reason to believe’ postulates a foundation based on information and a belief based on a reason. After a foundation based on information is made, there must still be some reason which should warrant the holding of a belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court in M/s Ganga Saran & Sons (P) Ltd. vs. 130 ITR 1 (SC) has held that the expression ‘reason to believe’ occurring in section 147 is stronger than the expression ‘is satisfied’ and such requirement has to be met by the A.O. before he usurps the jurisdiction to reopen an assessment. The Tribunal held that the A.O. did not meet the conditions precedent in the reasons recorded by him and therefore, assumption of jurisdiction by the A.O. to reopen is invalid and consequently reopening was held to be bad in law and was quashed.

DIGITAL WORKPLACE: FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE

INTRODUCTION
In our previous article we discussed the Digital Workplace, its advantages and how the world is moving towards the ‘New Normal’. In India, we usually adjust to adversities very well and when the situation demanded, we quickly moved to the Work From Home (WFH) / Remote Working scenario. Now, as the restrictions on travel are being lifted, we will be back to working from the office. Many seniors with whom we have interacted told us that the remote working model was a temporary solution when there were restrictions, but it won’t work out in future. These statements have been further affirmed by The Future of Work Study 2021, released by LinkedIn. It said that one in three Indian professionals has burnt out, stressed due to remote working.

Remote working started with a bang and saw people preparing Dalgona coffee and playing various online games! But once travel curbs started to get relaxed, everyone started going back to office and people started explaining the benefits of working from the office! However, reality has started hitting us again. Those who are travelling daily are missing the WFH scenario, because it was not the WFH that was bad but it was the lack of a system to manage WFH that was telling. That was obviously because WFH started unexpectedly and everyone had to quickly adjust to so many things – statutory as well as internal processes.

When offices resumed, all the backlog started piling up. For example, audit documentation has become a bit more difficult considering that some data is available in physical mode and some in soft copies; employees have started realising the importance of WFH with the extra time they have to spend travelling daily to work; the additional expense they have to incur daily to reach office; having to eat lunch from a box and so on. Employers have also realised that giving people the WFH option saves a lot of infrastructure cost and the overheads have reduced significantly.

IMPORTANCE OF HAVING AN OFFICE

Despite all the benefits of remote working, the companies and firms prefer working from office because it used to be a set process before the pandemic, and that’s the only way all of us have worked since we started working. People are explaining the benefits of having an office at length and they are correct in many ways. Having an office in itself is a luxury. Many of us have spent years before getting into our dream office and many are still burning the midnight oil to ensure that they have an office which ensures smooth functioning of work as well as other features. However, as we are aware, physical offices also have their own limitations and with the growth of technology it will be foolish to ignore all the added advantages available at our disposal to make the Traditional Office more effective.

Through this article, we are trying to emphasise how having a Digital Workplace ready simultaneously (though we continue with physical offices) will help not only the employers, but also the employees, and what a Digital Workplace can offer with the help of technology. Let us look at some practical scenarios:

Scenario 1: Flexibility corresponding to savings in time, effort and money


Your office is located in the southern part of a metro city. Your employee has his residence in the north and visits the office in the morning; he has an important client meeting in the afternoon in the north. He travels to the client’s office for the meeting and gets done by early evening. In such a case, if you are not prepared with a Digital Workplace option for him, he will have to again travel back to the office in the south. This will impact him in multiple ways: stress of commuting back and then going back home in the evening, the time and effort wasted due to such travelling. Correspondingly, the overheads spent on such to and fro travel and the per hour cost that you will have to bear considering that the employee will lose two hours travelling during office hours – perhaps this may pinch you to give it (the DW) a serious thought.

If we prepare ourselves by having a Digital Workplace, the employees can lead a stress-free life and also save on time, effort and money.

Scenario 2: Telephone and zoom meetings correspond to savings in time and money
Your client has requested you to arrange a meeting to discuss some plan. The client’s office is in some other part of the city. To kick-start it, you have an initial face-to-face meeting with the client. However, as we know, this generally doesn’t stop at one meeting. You may have to catch up quite a number of times to ensure a smooth assignment. The client is prepared for some Zoom or virtual meetings, considering that you will be charging the reimbursements to the client.

Imagine a situation where you have not kept yourself ready with virtual meetings in terms of having some virtual presentation tools (like Prezi) or a dashboard which manages each stage of the assignment and discussion (like Trello). The meeting may not be as impactful as it would have been in physical mode. At this juncture, you are also in a state where you cannot refuse a client a Virtual Meeting. Also, a Virtual Meeting means you can attend more than one meeting in a limited time as the time saved from travelling can accommodate more such meetings.

The scenario emphasises how we cannot ignore a face-to-face meeting when it is absolutely required, but we also need to have a Digital Workplace ready to handle such situations. Needless to say, this will also help save a lot on time and money that you would have otherwise spent on every physical meeting.

Scenario 3: Work from office contaminating situations when employees need social breaks
We live in a very social country. Often, we have social functions to attend or have guests visiting our homes and whom we have to attend to. Let’s say your employee has a social function to attend at 4 pm for an hour. In case you have made physical presence at the office mandatory, the employee will have to request you for leave or a half day off (merely for an hour’s function). This will not only impact your work plan for the day but will also affect the employee’s leave balance and salary.

Alternatively, if you are ready with a Digital Workplace for such a specific situation, you can have your employee work from home till 4 pm, attend the one-hour function and then return back to work. This will not only make the employee stress-free from commuting, but also save his half-day leave. On the other hand, you would not have to compromise for the day or half day’s work.

Scenario 4: ‘Workation’ corresponding to employee welfare
This may not please everyone. But remember, ‘All work and no play, makes Jack a dull boy’. We have a scenario where your employees have been planning a vacation for a very long time. But the stress of being present physically in office is not letting them do so. This is impacting their mental health and productivity, as a break is a start to a more efficient environment.

If you have a Digital Workplace ready, you can, in certain situations, allow your employees to go on a ‘workation’. Though they might have to keep working on the vacation, but at least the change in location and atmosphere would give them space to breathe. This will not only contribute to better efficiency but also contribute to employee’s welfare and mental health management.

Scenario 5: Documents storage and security corresponding to threat of data loss
Having files and documents was a mandate earlier. However, with the Information Technology Act coming into force, we have seen a major shift in digital modes of data and document storage. We still see people comfortable with physical files, invoices and other documents, but imagine a situation where some natural disasters occur (we have often seen files getting damaged in floods, fires, etc.). If not damage, there is also a fear of unauthorised access to files in office lockers / cupboards. There are chances of data getting lost or compromised.

A Digital Workplace has the capability to store our data on cloud and also restrict the access. You can forget your fear of losing data or compromising it. Even if you prefer to have physical files, there is absolutely no harm in storing the data on the cloud. Even if a fire breaks out or there are floods and your files are damaged, you will still be able to have access to your files on the cloud. Additionally, with the data restriction option, you may ignore your fear of data getting leaked due to unauthorised access.

Scenario 6: Hiring / retaining best talent
How many times have we seen the woman who is taking care of an entire office and working diligently, having to leave not for professional but for personal reasons such as getting married to someone who is staying in another city, or whose family has moved to another city? In these cases, we are left with no choice but to bid adieu to the hardworking talent. Now, imagine having an active Digital Workplace system where you can accommodate the work of a dedicated employee on a remote basis and she can continue working on existing clients without having to actually leave the office. Since she has already been part of the system, adjusting to a remote system may not be that challenging, and you can retain the right talent instead of finding another one and teach / train her from scratch. A similar scenario is possible even when you have to hire an employee from a different State or location. In fact, the Digital Workplace enables your company to open multiple offices without actually having a physical presence at all these locations.

Hence, it is important to find the right balance
Physical offices are much like face-to-face (F2F) conversations. They can never be replaced with technology because no technology can replace the comfort of F2F conversations. However, technology has changed the way we communicate and the entire communication system has evolved. While F2F communication is still the key, gradually phone calls and now even messages and WhatsApp are added to the communication skills. We cannot imagine a person with good communication skills not being able to communicate via these new systems. So much so, that now WhatsApp groups are becoming an official communication channel and most of the decisions of firms, corporates, etc., are taken on WhatsApp and people meet very rarely except when issues are complex in nature, or it is a periodic meeting.

On the same lines, we do not believe that having an actual physical office where employees can work will be replaced anytime soon with a complete remote office. But looking at the way technology has changed everything, having a Digital Workplace today is as important as having a website used to be at the start of this century. As per The Future of Work Study 2021 released by LinkedIn, as many as 86% of respondents think that hybrid work will have a positive impact on their work-life balance. It will help them spend equal time on their personal and professional goals / lives.

To conclude, we feel that the choice is ours: either resist the change until it becomes mandatory and then accept it; in doing so, we could lag behind the world. Or simply embrace the change and start looking at the endless possibilities that technology can offer to maximise the advantage we have at our disposal and get the first mover’s advantage. While a physical workplace can help you stay, a Digital Workplace will help you grow.

 

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS LOANS & ADVANCES, GUARANTEES & INVESTMENTS

(This is the third article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

BACKGROUND

Investments, loans and advances and guarantees play an important role in commercial dealings and also expose companies to greater risk due to the possibilities of defaults which in turn can have an impact on the financial position and solvency of companies. The Companies Act, 2013 (‘the Act’) has laid down stringent provisions to regulate the same, especially in respect of non-financial companies. Although the earlier versions of CARO dealt with specific aspects thereof, CARO 2020 has substantially enhanced the reporting requirements.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

 
*Not discussed further

CLAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Applicable Transactions [Clause 3(iii) and Clause 3(iii)(a)]:
• The scope has been enhanced to cover investments made, guarantee or security provided and advances granted in the nature of loans in addition to loans granted (‘specified investments and loan transactions’).

• The reporting is extended to all parties and not just those covered in the register maintained u/s 189 of the Act.

• The reporting is required only if the above transactions have been entered into ‘during the year’.

Transactions not Prejudicial [Clause 3(iii)(b)]:
• The scope has been enhanced to cover investments made, guarantees provided, security given and also advances in the nature of loans and guarantee provided, in addition to loans.

• Replacement of the word ‘such’ by ‘all’ means that this clause applies to all loans / advances granted during the year.

Servicing of Loans [Clause 3(iii)(c)]:
The scope has been enhanced to cover advances in the nature of loans in addition to loans.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges, which are discussed below, in respect of the new Clauses as well as those where there are enhanced reporting requirements:

Applicable Transactions [Clause 3(iii)]:
a. There is significant widening in the scope of reporting of financial transactions undertaken with all classes of entities. Further, the reporting is applicable to all companies, except for the exemption provided to companies whose principal business is to give loans.
b. Clauses 3(iii)(a) and (e) dealing with aggregation of specified investments and loans transactions and evergreening of loans would not apply to companies which are primarily engaged in lending activities.

Aggregation of Specified Transactions [Clause 3(iii)(a)]:
a. Identifying subsidiaries: Since this Clause requires separately aggregating and reporting loans and advances in the nature of loans to subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates, the identification thereof is of paramount importance. The Guidance Note has clarified that these terms should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Act which could be different, in certain cases, from what is defined in the Accounting Standards in the case of subsidiaries which is examined as under:

Section 2(87) of the Act defines ‘subsidiary company’ or ‘subsidiary’ in relation to any other company, and means a company in which the holding company – (i) controls the composition of the Board of Directors; or(ii) exercises or controls more than one-half of the total voting power either on its own or together with one or more of its subsidiary companies. Thus, the Act emphasises on legal control which is similar to what is considered for the purpose of Accounting Standard 21 (AS 21) Consolidated Financial Statements for companies adopting Indian GAAP. The concept of control and, therefore, subsidiary relationship under Ind AS 110, is much broader. Existence of factors such as de facto control, potential voting rights, control through de facto agents, power to enforce certain decisions, etc., have to be considered, which are not considered for the purpose of section 2(87). Hence, for companies adopting Ind AS there could be differences between what is disclosed in the accounts and what is required to be reported under this Clause, which would need to be reconciled to ensure completeness of reporting. The auditors of Ind AS companies will need to take utmost care about this distinction while dealing with this Clause.

b. Tracking of transactions entered into and settled in the same year: This Clause requires reporting the aggregate of specific transactions entered during the year even if the same are settled during the year. This may provide challenges to ensure completeness of the transactions where the volumes are substantial and the auditor would in such cases have to test the design as well as operating effectiveness of the internal controls and undertake test-checking of the transactions. A specific representation should also be obtained that all such transactions which have been squared off / settled during the year have been considered in the details provided by the management.

c. Identifying advances in the nature of loans: This is by far the most far-reaching change since what constitutes ‘advance is in the nature of a loan’ would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and involve significant judgements which would need to be exercised by the auditors based on their past experience and the understanding of the business. The following guiding principles may be kept in mind; however, these are not to be considered as exhaustive:

  •  An advance against a purchase order, in accordance with the normal trade practice, would not be an advance in the nature of a loan.
  •  An advance given for an amount which is far in excess of the value of an order, or for a period which is far in excess of the period for which such advances are usually extended as per the normal trade practice, then such an advance may be in the nature of a loan to the extent of such excess.
  •  When a trade practice does not exist, a useful guide would be to consider the period of time required by the supplier for the execution of the order, based on the time between the purchase of the raw material and the delivery of the finished product. Any advance which exceeds this period would normally be an advance in the nature of a loan unless there is evidence to the contrary.
  •  A stipulation regarding interest may normally be an indication that the advance is in the nature of a loan but this by itself is not conclusive and there may also be advances which are not in the nature of a loan and which carry interest.

It is imperative that the auditor not only scrutinises all advances given but also old outstanding advances where further amounts are given during the year to ensure their propriety and reasonableness for the purposes of reporting under this Clause as well as under Clause 3(iii)(c) discussed later.

Specified investments and loans transactions are not prejudicial [Clause 3(iii)(b)]:
a. The auditor will have to evaluate design and test the operating effectiveness of controls over specified transactions as these could be highly subjective. For example, valuation based on which investments in unlisted securities are made specifically into equity. Also, the auditor will have to comment upon commitments made in the earlier years but the transaction is entered into during the reporting period.

b. Whether investments are prejudicial: The auditors will have to use their judgement judiciously while reporting under this Clause. They will have to evaluate adherence to the processes and controls discussed above at the time of making the investment and not evaluate based on hindsight, specifically for investments in unlisted securities. The auditor will consider the company’s financial position, its leverage, purpose of making the investment, valuation based on which the investment is made, if the valuation is based on third party valuation report, whether the investee is a related party and specifically if it is controlled by promoters, related party / employee of promoter, compliance with SA 620 Using the Work of Auditor’s Expert, compliance with regulations, etc., to determine whether investments are prejudicial to the company’s interest.

c. Transactions with entities which are consolidated: In many cases, companies infuse additional funds in subsidiaries / joint ventures / associates or other entities which are their strategic investments and which have financial difficulties, or to meet their financial commitments. Such infusion per se would not be construed as prejudicial to their interest, unless it is proved that it is not for genuine business purposes or not in accordance with the company’s policies or with the applicable legal and regulatory guidelines. Hence, each specified investment and loan transaction would need careful assessment by the auditor.

d. Transactions undertaken by NBFCs: Since NBFCs are also covered for reporting under this Clause, this would present a specific challenge since it is their business to undertake specified investments and loans transactions and hence such transactions are likely to be voluminous. In such instances, the auditor would need to ensure that all applicable and reportable transactions are undertaken in accordance with the guidelines issued by the RBI which would inter alia include the Board-approved policies for loans and investments as well as for risk assessment and other processes relating thereto laid down by the company since any material and significant deviation could result in transactions which are prejudicial to the company’s interest.

Hence, for reporting under this Clause apart from deviations in any specific significant transaction, any general non-compliance which is material would also need to be reported.

e. Salary and other similar advances to employees: In case of companies which have a policy of granting salary, festival, medical and similar advances, the same would be construed as advances and not advances in the nature of loans. However, the auditor should review the policy in respect thereof and in case of any material transaction, specifically with related parties who are employees or key managerial persons, which are not in accordance with the policy, or which may be considered as advances in the nature of loans, as the same may be required to be reported.

Servicing of Loans [Clause 3(iii)(c)]:
a. Transaction in the form of advances in the nature of loans:
Due to the reasons discussed under Clause 3(iii)(a) earlier, the auditors would have to use their judgement to identify whether servicing thereof is regular, or else they would need to indicate separately the names of such parties individually together with the amounts and the extent of delay. Further, in case no repayment term is specified, the auditor will have to report such fact.

b. Restructuring transactions undertaken by NBFCs: NBFCs undertake restructuring of loans and advances due to various reasons in accordance with RBI guidelines, including in terms of the Covid-19 Regulatory Package. This may result in a moratorium on repayments or conversion of overdue interest into funded interest term loans. In such cases, since the originally stipulated terms are not adhered to, it would need to be reported under this Clause.

As per the Guidance Note, the name of each entity which is not regular in repayment of principal and payment of interest needs to be disclosed separately. This may be a challenge to NBFCs in view of large number of delays and / or restructuring, specifically during Covid times. The better option in such cases would be to consolidate such entities into various logical buckets for the purpose of reporting under this Clause.

Evergreening of Loans and Advances [Clause 3(iii)(e)]:
Amendment of Disclosures in the Auditors Report

Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note that whilst reporting under this Clause the auditor would have to keep in mind the amendment in the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Amendment Rules, 2021 whereby the following additional matters need to be covered in their main audit report with effect from the financial year 2021-22:

(i) ‘Whether the management has represented that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, other than as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, no funds have been advanced or loaned or invested (either from borrowed funds or share premium or any other sources or kind of funds) by the company to or in any other person(s) or entity(ies), including foreign entities (“Intermediaries”), with the understanding, whether recorded in writing or otherwise, that the Intermediary shall, whether directly or indirectly, lend or invest in other persons or entities identified in any manner whatsoever by or on behalf of the company (“Ultimate Beneficiaries”) or provide any guarantee, security or the like on behalf of the Ultimate Beneficiaries’;

(ii) ‘Whether the management has represented that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, other than as disclosed in the notes to the accounts, no funds have been received by the company from any person(s) or entity(ies), including foreign entities (“Funding Parties”), with the understanding, whether recorded in writing or otherwise, that the company shall, whether directly or indirectly, lend or invest in other persons or entities identified in any manner whatsoever by or on behalf of the Funding Party (“Ultimate Beneficiaries”) or provide any guarantee, security or the like on behalf of the Ultimate Beneficiaries’;

(iii) ‘Based on such audit procedures that the auditors have considered reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances, nothing has come to their notice that has caused them to believe that the representations under (i) and (ii) above contain any material misstatement’.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements and certain other matters, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a. Identification of Ultimate Beneficiaries: Consequent to the above disclosures made in the financial statements, auditors need to check the details of those disclosures and check all such transactions with the respective documents and other correspondence to identify whether any such transaction gets covered for reporting under this Clause. In this regard, the auditors should also take a representation from the management.
b. Transactions within group entities / related parties: In case of complex group structures, it would be difficult to establish a clear audit trail for the transactions, thus making it difficult to identify any such transaction.
c. Determining the Total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans (‘the denominator’): This Clause requires reporting of the percentage of such transactions to the aggregate value of loans and advances in the nature of loans. However, determining the denominator could pose challenges especially for advances in the nature of loans for the reasons discussed earlier. Accordingly, it is imperative for the auditors to reconcile the denominator, especially for advances in the nature of loans with the financial statements to ensure completeness.
d. The auditor will also need to track loans which have fallen due for repayment up to the balance sheet date and which have been renewed / extended / settled post-balance sheet date but before the date of the audit report, as the same is required to be reported under this Clause during the year as well as the following year.
e. Finally, the RBI in the Master Circular dated 1st July, 2014 on Prudential Norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning Pertaining to Advances, has reiterated that the basic objective of restructuring of loans by banks was to preserve the economic value of the borrower units and not evergreening of problem accounts. Borrower Accounts should be taken up for restructuring by the banks if the financial viability is established and there is a reasonable certainty of repayment from the borrower, as per the terms of the restructuring package and looking into their cash flows of and assessing the viability of the projects / activity financed. Accordingly, the auditors should be vigilant with regard to all restructuring proposals requested for by the borrowers.

Demand Loans [Clause 3(iii)(f)]:
Additional Disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this Clause, the auditor will have to keep in the mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:

Following disclosures shall
be made where loans or advances in the nature of loans are granted to promoters,
directors, KMPs and the related parties (as defined under the Companies Act,
2013),
either severally or jointly with any other person that are:

(a) repayable on demand
or

(b) without specifying
any terms or period of repayment

Type of
borrower

Amount
of loan or advance in the nature of loan outstanding

Percentage
to the total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans

Promoters

 

 

Directors

 

 

KMPs

 

 

Related Parties

 

 

 

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a. Identification of Promoters: Promoter has not been defined under the Order. However, the amended Schedule III states that ‘Promoter’ will be as defined under the Companies Act, 2013. Although a few promoters could be traced to those named in the prospectus or identified in the annual return, the auditor will have to rely on secretarial and other records and / or management representation to determine those who have control over the affairs of the company directly or indirectly, whether as director or shareholder or otherwise or in accordance with whose advice, directions, or instructions the Board is accustomed to act upon, to be considered as promoters. In case there are no such persons, then also a specific representation should be obtained.

b. Identification of Related Parties (subsidiaries): Similar considerations as discussed earlier for reporting under Clause 3(iii)(a) would be relevant for reporting under this Clause. In this context, the auditor would need to reconcile the disclosures under this Clause with what is disclosed in the financial statements (for companies adopting Ind AS) as well as in terms of the disclosures under Schedule III as specified above, to ensure completeness.

c. Transactions undertaken by NBFCs: Since there is no specific exemption granted to NBFCs, the auditor should consider the specific guidelines issued by the RBI for granting of demand and call loans, which are summarised hereunder:
• The Board of Directors of every applicable NBFC granting / intending to grant demand / call loans shall frame a policy for the same.
• Such policy shall stipulate the following:

(i) A cut-off date within which the repayment of demand or call loan shall be demanded or called up;
(ii) The sanctioning authority shall record specific reasons in writing at the time of sanctioning demand or call loan, if the cut-off date for demanding or calling up such loan is stipulated beyond a period of one year from the date of sanction;
(iii) The rate of interest which shall be payable on such loans;
(iv) Interest on such loans, as stipulated, shall be payable either at monthly or quarterly rests;
(v) The sanctioning authority shall record specific reasons in writing at the time of sanctioning demand or call loan, if no interest is stipulated or a moratorium is granted for any period;
(vi) A cut-off date, for review of performance of the loan, not exceeding six months commencing from the date of sanction;
(vii) Such demand or call loans shall not be renewed unless the periodical review has shown satisfactory compliance with the terms of the sanction.

In case the auditor has identified any deviation, he may consider reporting the same under this Clause or cross-reference the same to the disclosures made in the financial statements depending upon the materiality of the transaction.

d. Determining the Total Loans and Advances in the nature of loans (‘the denominator’): This Clause requires reporting of the percentage of such transactions to the aggregate value of loans and advances in the nature of loans. However, determining advances in the nature of loans could pose a challenge, for the reasons discussed earlier.

Impact on the Audit Opinion:
Whilst reporting on these Clauses, the auditors may come across several situations wherein they may need to report exceptions / deviations. In each of these cases they would need to carefully evaluate the impact of the same on the audit opinion by exercising their professional judgement to determine the materiality and relevance of the same to the users of the financial statements. These are broadly examined hereunder:

Nature
of Exception / Deviation

Possible
Impact on the Audit Report / Opinion

The company has not maintained records to
identify and compile data required for reporting under Clause 3(iii)(a)

Reporting on
Internal Financial controls over Financial Reporting

Investments made, guarantees provided,
security given and the terms and conditions of the grant of all loans and
advances in the nature of loans and guarantees are prejudicial to the
company’s interest, there may be implications on the main audit report due to
non-compliance with the following SAs:

Consideration of laws and regulations (SA
250)

Fraud (SA 240)

Related party transactions (SA 550)

Modified
opinion under SA 706

Loans and advances on the basis of security
have not been properly secured and the terms thereof are prejudicial to the
interests of the company

Disclosure in the audit
report u/s 143(1) of the Act

If the auditor concludes that there are
loans or advances in the nature of loan granted which have fallen due during
the year have been renewed or extended or fresh loans granted to settle the overdues
of existing loans given to the same parties, there may be implications on the
main audit report, such as consideration of fraud risk factors as per SA 240

Modified
opinion under SA 706

If the auditor concludes that the company
has granted loans or advances in the nature of loans either repayable on
demand or without specifying any terms or period of repayment, there may be
implications on the main audit report due to non-compliance with the
following SAs:

Consideration of laws and regulations (SA
250)

Fraud (SA 240)

Related party transactions (SA 550)

Modified
opinion under SA 706

In such cases, it is imperative that the Board’s Report contains explanations / comments on every reservation / adverse comment in the audit report as per section 134(3)(f) of the Companies Act, 2013 and that there is no factual inconsistency between the two.

CONCLUSION


The above changes have cast onerous reporting responsibilities on the auditor for various critical aspects of movement of funds as under:
• Evaluating design and operating effectiveness of internal controls around specified investment and loan transactions, whether with related parties or otherwise, including layering and round-tripping of funds, etc., if any.
• Detailed analysis of financing transactions, including advances in the nature of loans.
• Identifying sticky specified transactions and reporting.
Accordingly, it needs to be seen whether an audit remains an audit or becomes more of an investigative exercise requiring greater forensic skills!

 

GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT BY MANAGEMENT

(This article is the first of a two-part series on Going Concern)
The concept of going concern is understood as the ability of an entity to continue in the foreseeable future and is also one of the assumptions which management needs to make for the preparation of its general-purpose financial statements as per the requirement of Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements as also fundamental accounting assumptions prescribed in AS 1 Disclosure of Accounting Policies.

Ind AS 1 states that an entity shall prepare its financial statements on a going concern basis unless management either intends to liquidate the entity or to cease trading, or has no realistic alternative but to do so. However, to prepare its financial statements on a going concern basis, the management first needs to assess the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

The above requirement of Ind AS 1 acts as a trigger for performing going concern assessment by management through ascertaining whether the existing events and conditions are favourable enough to justify the going concern assumption for the preparation of its financial statements. When the use of the going concern basis of accounting is appropriate, assets and liabilities are recorded on the basis that the entity will be able to realise its assets and discharge its liabilities in the normal course of business.

The going concern assessment and reporting thereof require a high degree of professional judgement and has become more relevant and complex in the present Covid-19 pandemic, that has created greater economic uncertainty and due to which many organisations are seeing downturns in their revenue, profitability and cash flows.

 

This article attempts to explain

a) how management should do the going concern assessment by highlighting the events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and the evidence that management should consider to conclude the assessment, in case any such events or conditions are identified; and

b) scenarios that require disclosures in the financial statements.

 Preparers of financial statements, those charged with governance, users of the financial statements and their auditors may find this article helpful in understanding the concept of going concern and implications when the entity has a doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern.

 
Evaluation of going concern assessment by the auditor and reporting considerations in the audit report will be covered in the second part of this article.

 

GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT UNDERSTANDING

Before initiating a going concern assessment, one must first understand how the going concern assessment needs to be performed, i.e., what kind of events and conditions should be considered, what should be the period covered for making this assessment, and how to assess such events and conditions once identified, to conclude.

 
Ind AS 1 outlines the principle for performing the going concern assessment but does not provide an explicit guidance to address all the above questions; it states that the management should consider all available information about the future, which is at least, but not limited to, twelve months from the end of the reporting period and the degree of consideration depends on the facts in each case. For example, when:

 

Scenario

Assessment

The entity has a history of profitable operations and ready
access to financial resources

The entity may reach a conclusion that the going concern basis
of accounting is appropriate without detailed analysis, unless there are any
other indicators to the contrary

Other cases

Management may need to consider a wide range of factors relating
to:

 

(continued)

• current and expected profitability,

• debt repayment schedules, and


potential sources of replacement financing

before it can satisfy itself that the going concern basis is
appropriate

Considering limited guidance in Ind AS 1, management can draw reference from SA 570 (Revised) Going Concern, which illustrates events or conditions much in detail and, if they existed, may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

 

Apart from the guidance given in SA 570, reference can also be drawn from some of the following recent industry-specific events and conditions:

 

Industry

Particulars

Examples

Telecom

• Supreme Court judgment on telecom license fees

• Vodafone Idea Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

Aviation, Hospitality, Automobile, Logistics, Retail, etc.

• Covid-19 pandemic

• SpiceJet Limited for the year ended 31st March,
2021;

• The Indian Hotels Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

• Future Retail Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2020;

• Allcargo Logistics for the year ended 31st March,
2020

Real estate

• Significant inventory due to economic slowdown

• Delayed completion of projects due to Covid-19 pandemic

• Jaypee Infratech Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

• Peninsula Land Limited for the year ended 31st
March, 2021;

Automobile

• Amendments in government policies, and restrictions on using
specific technology

• Supreme Court judgment for banning BS3 and BS4 vehicles;

• Government policies with respect to electronic vehicles that
may adversely affect the present product line;

Banking

• Significant NPAs

• Yes Bank Limited for the year ended 31st March,
2020

Mining and Chemicals

• Restrictions imposed due to environmental issues

Vedanta’s subsidiary Sterlite Copper Smelter Plant shutdown

 

EVIDENCE TO ASSESS THE EVENTS AND CONDITIONS

Once the events and conditions are identified, management needs to assess the financial implications of these events and conditions to conclude the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Given herein below are examples of some of the evidence that management should consider while performing going concern assessment:

 

  •   Cash flow projections that show an ability to pay debts as and when they fall due after factoring realistic assumptions in the current market conditions;

  •   If current conditions deteriorate further, detailed business plans covering the period under consideration;

  •   Entity’s ability to obtain new funding upon the maturity of existing funding arrangements;

  •   Evidence that debt covenants have been assessed and any risk of breaching them has been managed, such that they do not provide significant risk;

  •   Ability to obtain a ‘financial support letter’ from the parent company for the next twelve months from the date of the latest balance sheet. However, a mere ‘Support Letter’ or ‘Comfort Letter’ will generally not constitute sufficient evidence to conclude on the appropriateness of going concern basis of accounting, unless the subsidiary’s operations are entirely dependent on the parent;

  •   Financial ratios like current ratio, debt-service coverage ratios, etc., indicating inadequate profit or liquidity position of the company;

  •   Covid-19 specific considerations1:

 

  1.  Whether the entity is operating in a sector which is highly impacted,

2.  Whether the entity has plans and ability to restructure its debt obligations if required to ensure short-term solvency,

3. Assessing the financial health of key / critical suppliers and customers and their impact on the entity’s operations,

4. Government policies and measures in the countries in which the company operates,

5. Changes in the entity’s access to capital, impacted by measures taken by regulators (industry and / or financial) or banks,

6. The entity’s ability to prepare timely financial statements or other required information / filings, including delays in receiving financial data from operations in other countries, or material investees for consolidated financial statement,

7. The ability of the business model to operate under current Covid-19 restrictions and whether the business model will be sustainable post-Covid.

 
Although all the above illustrative events, conditions and evidences give a fair idea to address the what and how questions, yet going concern assessment requires a significant management judgement while concluding in the real-world situation, and with the pandemic in place, concluding going concern assessment has become more challenging.

 
Ind AS 1 though do not provide detailed guidance on the going concern assessment, but it does make management’s job a little easy by requiring adequate disclosures of the events and conditions identified, the assumption used, and judgement made to conclude the going concern assessment.

 
The principle is to give clear visibility to the readers of the financial statements so that they can make their own interpretations with the help of the disclosures. Also, these disclosures are of greater relevance in the present economic environment where the regulators like Securities and Exchange Board of India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, European Securities and Markets Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission, etc., have placed significant focus on the going concern of the entities.

 
DISCLOSURE IN THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

The Table below summarises the broad category of scenarios and their disclosure requirement in the financial statements as per the requirement of Ind AS 12:

 

Scenario

Basis of preparation

Disclosure for material uncertainties

Disclosure for management assumptions

Events or conditions challenging going
concern do not exist

Going concern

Not applicable

Not applicable

Events or conditions challenging

Going concern

None

Significant management assumptions

(continued)

going concern exist but no material uncertainty concluded after
considering mitigating actions (e.g., strong turnaround strategy of
management that has started showing sufficient evidence of success, including
identifying feasible alternative sources of financing)

 

 

(continued)

and judgement

Significant doubts about going concern but
mitigating actions judged sufficient to make going concern appropriate.

Material uncertainties about going concern remain
after considering mitigating actions (e.g., considerable uncertainty about
the outcome of the management’s turnaround strategy to address the reduced
demand and to renew or replace funding)

Going concern

Material uncertainties

Significant management assumptions and judgement

Entity intends to liquidate or to cease trading, or no realistic
alternative but to do so

Alternate basis

(Not going concern)

Specific disclosure on why the entity should not be regarded as
a going concern

 

Further, section 134(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 also requires the Board of Directors to comment on the going concern assumption for the preparation of financial statements, as part of the Directors’ responsibility statement.

 
Similar to the Ind AS 1, AS 1 does not provide any such disclosure guidance on the material uncertainty and requires specific disclosure only in case the entity has intentions or requirement to liquidate or curtail materially the scale of its operation, and as a result of which the financial statement needs to be prepared on an alternate basis.

 Let us take an example to see the application of the above scenarios:

 
Illustration

Company A  is in the hotel business and known for its luxury hotels across the globe. The company is successfully serving its customers and running its operations for several decades. However, the Covid-19 pandemic and resultant global lockdown had a severe adverse effect on its operations.

 
Some of the key points reflecting the current financial position and business of the company are as under:

 
(a) There was no sale in the first nine months of the current financial year due to the lockdown and there was minimal sale in the remaining three months due to the Government advisory of lifting the lockdown in a few of the cities where the company has its properties;

(b) The company has significant borrowings, a portion of which is due for payment in the next financial year; the company has not defaulted in any of its borrowings so far. The management is in discussion with bankers to increase the moratorium period for a few of its term loans;

(c) The company has not retrenched its work force; however, a pay cut of 25% has been made by the management considering the present cash flow position;

(d) Management is expecting to incur a significant cost for ensuring continuous sanitization of its properties globally;

(e) Management at present is focusing on its restaurant business by introducing home delivery services. It has also introduced catering services for organisations that are covered under essential services, such as hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, manufacturing units of essentials commodities, etc.;

(f) Governments in various countries are imposing lockdowns on an intermittent basis considering the number of Covid-19 cases, and at present there is no visibility about how long the pandemic will continue.

 
ANALYSIS

In the given scenario it is evident that the pandemic is the event that cast significant doubt on the company’s ability to continue as a going concern and hence a detailed assessment is required to be performed to conclude on the going concern assumption.

Let us see the step-by-step approach that management needs to take to perform the assessment.

Step 1: Identification of events and conditions

In the present case, the pandemic is the identified event that has resulted in a significant deficiency in the regular cash flow of the company and thus created a question about how it will realise its assets and honour its liabilities in the foreseeable future.

 Step 2: Assessing the evidence to evaluate going concern

Under this step, management needs to assess the following points to conclude the going concern assessment:

(a) Cash flow projection from operations, i.e., with the present situation, how much cash flow the company will be able to generate from its operations in the next 12 months and whether it will be sufficient to meet its contractual obligations. In order to do the said projection, the management needs to make certain assumptions like:

  •  sales volume from restaurant business due to new home delivery and from catering services introduced by the management;

  •  transportation cost for home delivery;

  •  expenditure to develop a digital platform for placing online orders;

  •  estimate of sales from the room rent for properties where the lockdown is removed;

  •  estimate of additional cost that needs to be incurred to ensure sanitization;

  •  advertising cost for the new initiatives taken by the management;

  •  other operational costs;

  •  Recoverability slippages in the receivables; and

  •  Probability of getting additional credit period from the creditors.

 

The management also needs to be conscious that the above assumptions and projections should be based on the expected future trends and limited reliance should be placed on the historical performance and data. Given hereinbelow are the examples of evidence that management should consider to estimate the future trends:

  •  consider research reports of analysts and third parties on the hotel industry,

  •   data from World Health Organization or local institutions explaining the expected progression of the Covid-19 outbreak in the countries, and

  •   data from government agencies about the severity and estimated duration of the economic downturn in the country and the actions that government may take to mitigate the effects.

 

(b) Quantum of borrowings that are due in the next 12 months, and status of extending moratorium period with banks;

(c) Probability of getting additional borrowings from banks for working capital management;

(d) Additional capital infusion that can be done by the promoters;

(e) Losses due to assets like investments, that are measured at fair value through profit and loss;

(f) Any other contractual liabilities, like derivative contracts that are due for settlement in the next twelve months.

 

Step 3: Preparation of financial statements and disclosures

Based on the outcome of the assessment performed in Step 2, management may need to conclude on two aspects:

– whether the material uncertainty exists, and if yes, then

– whether going concern assumption holds good.

 
In the given scenario, if the company is able to get additional funding from the promoter group or banks to run its operations for at least the next twelve months, then the management may conclude that the material uncertainty does not exist and hence the going concern assumption holds good. Accordingly, management needs to prepare the financial statements on going concern basis and adequate disclosure will be made with respect to judgement made by the management to mitigate the material uncertainties.

 
On the other hand, if the company is unable to obtain additional or sufficient funding from the promoter group or banks and it has to depend on the materialisation of its present business plan and drawing additional credit period from the creditors and bankers, then it may conclude that the material uncertainty does exist and it may or may not be mitigated. Accordingly, management might prepare financial statements on going concern basis along with adequate disclosures with respect to material uncertainties, management turnaround plan and significant judgement and assumptions taken for concluding going concern assumption.

 
However, in rare circumstances, the management may also decide that the going concern assumption does not hold good. This may happen if the management believes that the bankers and creditors will not provide any extension for the payment of their contractual dues and the present business plan will not generate adequate cash flows to meet its contractual obligations in their entirety, when due, and to run its day-to-day operations.

 
In that case, management needs to use an alternative basis of accounting for the preparation of its financial statements, e.g., liquidation basis, and the disclosure of that fact and the reason thereof needs to be disclosed in the financial statements.

 

TO SUMMARISE

The presence of Covid-19 has created economic instability across industries and has made the going concern assessment more critical and challenging. However, this challenge can be countered effectively if management do the identification and assessment of all the possible events and conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, in the light of the available guidance on financial reporting, and support their conclusion with sufficient appropriate evidence.

 
Once the management is done with its going concern assessment, the second step will be the evaluation of the going concern assessment by the auditors and reporting thereof in the auditors’ report.

 
The said aspect of going concern will be covered in the second part of this article that will touch upon the various factors that an auditor should consider while evaluating the going concern assessment performed by the management, disclosure in the financial statements based on the outcome of the evaluation, and reporting considerations under various scenarios in the auditors’ report.

 

References

Readers should also refer to the Annual Reports as referenced above in different industries to gain a practical understanding of the disclosures required to be made in the financial statements under various scenarios.

MLI SERIES ARTICLE 13: ARTIFICIAL AVOIDANCE OF PE THROUGH SPECIFIC ACTIVITY EXEMPTION

INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 5(4) OF THE TAX TREATY (PRE-MLI)
In respect of business income [other than fees for technical services (FTS) and royalties], a foreign company would be subject to tax in India (i.e., the Source State) when it constitutes a business connection or a permanent establishment (PE) in India. When a PE / business connection is constituted, a foreign company is subjected to tax on income deemed to have accrued in India on a net level / deemed profit basis.

Provisions of PE are typically included under Article 5 of a tax treaty. While Article 5(1) to Article 5(3) provides for what constitutes a PE, Article 5(4) provides for a list of activities that do not constitute a PE, even if such activities are undertaken from a fixed place of business in the Source Country (generally known as ‘preparatory and auxiliary exemption’). At the same time, the OECD Commentary (2017) enlists a number of business activities which are treated as exceptions to the general definition of the term PE and which when carried on through fixed places of business, are not sufficient to constitute a PE.

In the above context, a question arises: Does ‘business connection’ include preparatory / auxiliary exemption? The term business connection is not defined under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) and is interpreted by placing reliance on judicial precedents (key reference provided by the Apex Court in the case of R.D. Aggarwal). Thus, ‘business connection’ draws meaning from the definitions pronounced by judicial precedents, and it may include carrying on a part of the main business, or merely a relation between the business of the foreign company and the activity in India which assists in carrying on the business of the foreign company. Thus, although not explicit, the term business connection includes preparatory and auxiliary activities (POA) when read with ‘contributes directly or indirectly to the earnings of the non-resident from its business’1.

This article aims at providing the effect of MLI (Article 13) on Article 5(4) where activities that do not constitute PE as per Article 5(4) will constitute a PE under MLI Article 13 if certain conditions are satisfied. Thus, Article 13 is a game-changer. In simple words, where in substance cohesive business activities of a foreign enterprise are broken down or fragmented to fit the definition of the exempted activities of erstwhile Article 5(4), they may no longer be able to escape PE status and therefore taxation. This will impact many multinational companies and hence is pertinent to note.

RATIONALE BEHIND THE MLI AMENDMENT
Nature of preparatory and auxiliary activities
Article 5(4) enlists a number of business activities which do not constitute a PE, even if the activities are carried out through a fixed place or office. These activities are generally termed as preparatory and auxiliary in nature2. Para 58 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that such a place of business may well contribute to the productivity of the enterprise, but the services it performs are so remote from the actual realisation of profits that it is difficult to allocate any profit to the fixed place of business in question.

The Table below classifies the negative list of Article 5(4):

As per the earlier OECD
Model Convention, 2014

As per BEPS Action Plan
(AP) 7

(Para 78 of the OECD
Commentary, 2017)

Notwithstanding the
preceding provisions of this Article, the

the term ‘permanent
establishment’ shall be deemed not to include:

a) the use of facilities
solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or
merchandise belonging to the enterprise;

b) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage, display or delivery;

c) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another enterprise;

d) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise;

e) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not listed in
sub-paragraphs a) to d), provided that this activity has a preparatory or
auxiliary character;

f) the maintenance of a fixed
place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or
auxiliary character

Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this
Article, the term  ‘permanent establishment’ shall be deemed not to
include:

a) the use of facilities
solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods or
merchandise belonging to the enterprise;

b) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of storage, display or delivery;

c) the maintenance of a
stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise solely for the
purpose of processing by another enterprise;

d) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing goods or
merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise;

e) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any other activity of a
preparatory or auxiliary character;

f) the maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the fixed place
of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or auxiliary
character,

provided
that such activity or, in the case of sub-paragraph f), the overall activity
of the fixed place of business is of a preparatory or auxiliary character

* Highlighted part is amended under BEPS AP 7

As can be observed from the above, initially, OECD was of the view that the enlisted negative activities from Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d) of the OECD Model Convention, 2014 would apply automatically to exclude the constitution of a PE, more so considering the erstwhile business models. For example, a non-resident company maintains warehouse facilities solely for the purpose of storage of its goods in the Source State. The delivery of goods would be undertaken through an independent third party in the logistic business. Under the erstwhile PE provisions, the foreign company is not required to substantiate that this activity is auxiliary in nature as the application of Article 5(4)(a) of the OECD Model Convention is automatic. Only Article 5(4)(e) and Article 5(4)(f) subject the specified activities to be of a ‘preparatory and auxiliary character’. In the above example, if a non-resident company maintains a warehouse for storage of finished goods [Article 5(4)(a)] and maintains an office for procurement activities, Article 5(4)(d) and Article 5(4)(f) would apply and the ‘overall activity of the fixed place of business resulting from this combination’ should be of a preparatory or auxiliary character to be exempted from constitution of a PE. In reality, the multinational enterprises (MNEs) have benefited from the automatic application of the enlisted negative activities by ensuring that their fixed place of business solely carries on the enlisted negative activity [Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d)].

The Executive Summary of the BEPS Action Report No. 7 (at point 10) states that ‘depending on the circumstances, activities previously considered to be merely preparatory or auxiliary in nature may nowadays correspond to core business activities. In order to ensure that profits derived from core activities performed in a country can be taxed in that country, Article 5(4) is modified to ensure that each of the exceptions included therein is restricted to activities that are otherwise of a “preparatory or auxiliary” character… BEPS concerns related to Article 5(4) also arise from what is typically referred to as the “fragmentation of activities”. Given the ease with which multinational enterprises (MNEs) may alter their structures to obtain tax advantages, it is important to clarify that it is not possible to avoid PE status by fragmenting a cohesive operating business into several small operations in order to argue that each part is merely engaged in preparatory or auxiliary activities that benefit from the exceptions of Article 5(4). The anti-fragmentation rule proposed in [this report] will address these BEPS concerns.’

In order to understand the above in detail, let us consider the following examples:

– The above example includes a company operating an online shop in Country A and selling goods to customers in Country B through a website.
– For delivery and storage of goods, the company maintains a warehouse in Country B.
– Erstwhile Article 5(4) included an exception wherein maintenance of a fixed place in India solely for the purpose of storage and delivery would not constitute a PE. This was based on the principle that such activities are considered as preparatory and auxiliary in the entire scheme of business operations.
– However, with the advancement of internet, the manner in which businesses are operated has evolved. Given this, since most of the business operations of the company are undertaken online, maintenance of a warehouse in Country B for storage and delivery may no longer be considered as preparatory and auxiliary in nature but the core activity. This therefore makes the exceptions provided under Article 5(4) redundant.
– BEPS AP 7 / MLI Article 13 seek to address the above challenges and amend the PE provisions to be in line with the advanced business model.

Anti-fragmentation: Splitting for creating preparatory and auxiliary activities
Earlier, the determination of PE and the enlisted negative activities was considered vis-à-vis the said enterprise which carried on such activities, and not that of the group companies assessed in totality
. The aggregation of ‘places of business’ carried on by other members of the group companies was specifically denied by the OECD Commentary (2014). So, the MNEs fragmented their business operations into various activities among different places and different related enterprises, with a view to fall within the negative list and avoid the existence of a PE in the Source State. For example, large multinationals can fragment their operations into smaller businesses (such as entity A storing goods, entity B delivering goods and entity C providing sales support activities), thereby arguing that each business part is just preparatory and auxiliary in nature.

MLI Article 13 provides for amendment in the PE provisions to avoid such situations by aggregating the activities provided by group companies in the Source State to determine whether or not a PE is constituted. The following examples can help in understanding fragmentation of activities by foreign companies:

Example 1:

Thus, in the above example F Co. has fragmented its business activities in Country B by incorporating two separate entities undertaking (i) warehouse and storage functions, and (ii) support services.

Example 2:

And in the above example, R Co. has fragmented its business activities in Country B by incorporating various entities undertaking (a) procurement functions, (b) bonded warehouse, (c) distribution centre, (d) processing department, etc. This sets a clear example of fragmentation of activities which, if considered individually, will qualify for the preparatory and auxiliary exemption.

MLI ARTICLE 13

Paragraph 1 of MLI Article 13
‘A Party may choose to apply paragraph 2 (Option A) or paragraph 3 (Option B) or to apply neither Option’.

The member State may choose to apply paragraph 2 of Article 13 (Option A) or paragraph 3 of Article 13 (Option B) or not to apply any option. Under Option A, the specific activities mentioned in the tax treaties will not constitute a PE, insofar as the activities of the PE are preparatory and auxiliary in nature. In other words, the activities of a PE, even if aligned with sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5(4), will only be exempt from being a PE if the overall conduct of the activities is preparatory and auxiliary in nature. A majority of the member States have agreed to this view.

Further, under Option B, paragraph 78 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that ‘some Member States consider that some of the activities referred to in Article 5(4) are intrinsically preparatory and auxiliary and, in order to provide greater certainty for both tax administrations and taxpayers, take the view that these activities should not be subject to the condition that they be of a preparatory or auxiliary character, and that concern about inappropriate use of the specific activity exemptions can be addressed through anti-fragmentation rules’. This option allows the member States to continue to use the existing language; however, at the same time they have agreed that an enterprise cannot fragment a cohesive business operation into smaller business operations in order to call it preparatory and auxiliary.

Paragraphs 2 & 3 of MLI Article 13
Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2017) is modified to provide for Option A or Option B. Both the options preserve the specific variant of listed activities under each Covered Tax Agreement (CTA). It does not replace the list of exempt activities in the current CTAs with the above BEPS AP 7-suggested Article 5(4). Hence, in order to accommodate the model version and the existing version, Article 13 of the MLI provides for the following:
• Option A – provides additional condition that the specific activity exemption would apply only if the listed activities are of preliminary or auxiliary nature (POA) (remains explicit);
• Option B – provides automatic exemption to listed activities, irrespective of the same being POA in nature (i.e., remains explicit);
• If member states decide to not choose any option: the provisions of Article 5(4) as existing under the CTAs will remain in force (i.e., remain implicit).

Option A

Option B

Notwithstanding the
provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that define the term ‘permanent
establishment’, the term

Notwithstanding the provisions of a Covered Tax
Agreement that define the term ‘permanent establishment’, the term

(continued)

 

‘permanent establishment’
shall be deemed not to include:

 

(a) The activities
specifically listed in the Covered Tax Agreement (prior to modification by
this Convention) as activities deemed not to constitute a permanent
establishment, whether or not that exception from permanent establishment
status is contingent on the activity being of a preparatory or auxiliary
character;

 

(b) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not described in sub-paragraph a);

 

(c) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) and b),

provided that such activity
or, in the case of sub-paragraph c), the overall activity of the fixed place
of business, is of a preparatory or auxiliary character

(continued)

 

‘permanent establishment’
shall be deemed not to include:

 

(a) The activities
specifically listed in the Covered Tax Agreement (prior to modification by
this Convention) as activities deemed not to constitute a permanent
establishment, whether or not that exception from permanent establishment
status is contingent on the activity being of a preparatory or auxiliary
character, except to the extent that the relevant provision of the Covered
Tax Agreement provides explicitly that a specific activity shall be deemed
not to constitute a permanent establishment provided that the activity is of
a preparatory or auxiliary character;

 

(b) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on, for the
enterprise, any activity not described in sub-paragraph a), provided that
this activity is of a preparatory or auxiliary character;

 

(c) The maintenance of a
fixed place of business solely for any combination of activities mentioned in
sub-paragraphs a) and b), provided that the overall activity of the fixed
place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or
auxiliary character

An alternative rule is designed for those countries that are of the opinion that the examples stated under Article 5(4)(a) to Article 5(4)(d) of the OECD Model (2014) should always be deemed as not creating a PE, without the need to further go into the deliberation of whether or not they meet the general preparatory and auxiliary nature standard.

Paragraph 4 of MLI Article 13
Article 13(4) of the MLI relates to the anti-fragmentation rule wherein, irrespective of the above options (i.e., Option A or Option B or none), the member States will have another option to implement the anti-fragmentation rule. The objective is to avoid fragmentation of activities between closely-related parties so as to fall within the scope of preparatory and auxiliary character, and thereby avoid constituting a PE in the Source State. It provides as under:

‘Para 4. A provision of a Covered Tax Agreement (as it may be modified by paragraph 2 or 3) that lists specific activities deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment shall not apply to a fixed place of business that is used or maintained by an enterprise if the same enterprise or a closely related enterprise carries on business activities at the same place or at another place in the same Contracting Jurisdiction and:
a) that place or other place constitutes a permanent establishment for the enterprise or the closely related enterprise under the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement defining a permanent establishment; or
b) the overall activity resulting from the combination of the activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at the two places, is not of a preparatory or auxiliary character,
provided that the business activities carried on by the two enterprises at the same place, or by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises at the two places, constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation.’

Accordingly, clause 4.1 is inserted to Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Convention and its commentary is provided in paragraphs 79 to 81 of the OECD Commentary (2017). Under Article 13(4) of the MLI (above), the scope for specific activity exemption is not available where there is at least one of the places where these activities are exercised (and) must constitute a PE or, if that is not the case, the overall activity resulting from the combination of the relevant activities must go beyond what is merely preparatory or auxiliary. Until now, the PE status remained embedded per se to its place of business through which the business activities were carried on. But now, the different places of business in the Source State would be combined and if at least one of the places constitutes a PE, then all places of business would constitute a PE for the enterprise as well as for its closely related enterprises carrying on activities in the said Source State. Accordingly, the profits attributable to the PE would be subject to tax in India.

BEPS AP 7 had made application of the anti-fragmentation rule mandatory for those opting for Option B, but the MLI has changed its applicability from mandatory to optional for all three options (including Option B).
India has opted for option A, i.e., wherein PE exemption to listed activities under Article 5(4) shall be subject to activities being preparatory-auxiliary in nature, whereas for the anti-fragmentation rule India is silent, indicating that this rule will be applicable if there is no reservation from the other contracting State in the CTA. It must be noted that in paragraph 51 of the Positions on Article 5, India states that it does not agree with the interpretation given in paragraph 74 because it considers that even when the anti-fragmentation provision is not applicable, an enterprise cannot fragment a cohesive operating business into several smaller operations in order to argue that each is merely engaged in a preparatory or auxiliary activity.

Understanding ‘complementary functions’ and ‘cohesive business operations’
In order to determine the preparatory and auxiliary character, the activity carried on would be compared with the main and core business of the enterprise. Further, based on Article 14 of the MLI, the activity so carried on would be combined with other activities that constitute ‘complementary functions’ that are part of a cohesive business carried on by the same enterprise or closely related enterprises in the same state. Neither MLI nor the OECD Commentary defines the terms ‘complementary functions’ and ‘cohesive business’. However, both these terms cannot be interpreted independently but together as a ‘part of’ the whole. Further, it refers to complementary functions, rather than complementary products or complementary business, etc., indicating interconnected (or closely connected) functions, or intertwined, or interdependent functions, with respect to technology, or value-added functions, or the nature of their ultimate purpose or use.

Paragraph 7 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March, 2018, provides that ‘the anti-fragmentation rule recommended in the Report on Action 7 (at paragraph 39) is contained in the new paragraph 4.1 of Article 5. It prevents paragraph 4 from providing an exception from PE status for activities that might be viewed in isolation as preparatory or auxiliary in nature but that constitute part of a larger set of business activities conducted in the source country by the enterprise (whether alone or with a closely related enterprise) if the combined activities constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation’.

Attribution of profits to PE
Paragraph 8 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March, 2018, provides that Article 5(4.1) is applicable in two types of cases. First, it applies where the non-resident enterprise or a closely related enterprise already has a PE in the source country, and the activities in question constitute complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation. A determination will need to be made as to whether the activities of the enterprises give rise to one or more PEs in the source country under Article 5(4.1). The profits attributed to the PEs and subject to source taxation are the profits derived from the combined activities constituting complementary functions that are part of a cohesive business operation. This is considering the profits each one of them would have derived, if they were a separate and independent enterprise performing its corresponding activities, taking into account, in particular, the potential effect on those profits of the level of integration of these activities. Examples of this type of fact pattern are contained in new paragraph 30.43 of the revised Commentary (at point 40-41 of the Report on AP 7).

Paragraph 9 of the OECD Report on ‘Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’, BEPS AP 7, dated March 2018, provides that the second type of case to which Article 5(4.1) applies is a case where there is no pre-existing PE but the combination of activities in the source country by the non-resident enterprise and closely related non-resident enterprises results in a cohesive business operation that is not merely preparatory or auxiliary in nature. In such a case, a determination will need to be made as to whether the activities of the enterprises give rise to one or more PEs in the source country under Article 5(4.1). The profits attributable to each PE so arising are those that would have been derived from the profits made by each activity of the cohesive business operation as carried on by the PE, if it were a separate and independent enterprise, performing the corresponding activities taking into account, in particular, the potential effect on those profits of the level of integration of these activities.

Understanding ‘preparatory and auxiliary character’
Paragraph 60 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that an activity that has a preparatory character is one that is carried on in contemplation of what constitutes an essential and significant part of the activity of the enterprise as a whole. It is usually carried on for a relatively short period, which, depending on the circumstance, could be carried on for a longer duration. Auxiliary activity supports the essential and significant part of the activity. In absolute terms, auxiliary activities would not require significant proportion of the assets or employees, when compared with the total assets or employees of the enterprise.

Further, Paragraph 61 of the OECD Commentary (2017) provides that the activity purported to be covered under the specified activity exemptions ought to be carried on for the enterprise itself. If the activity is undertaken on behalf of the other enterprises at the same fixed place of business, the said activity would not be exempt from the PE status in the garb of Article 5(4) of the applicable tax treaty. The OECD Commentary (2017) provides an example that if an enterprise that maintained an office for the advertising of its own products or services, which was also engaged in advertising on behalf of other enterprises at that location, would be regarded as a PE of the enterprise.

Understanding ‘closely related enterprises’
Article 15 of the MLI defines the term ‘Closely Related Enterprises’ (CRE). The concept of CRE is distinguished from the concept of ‘Associated Enterprises’ of Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention. It is important to note that the term ‘control’ is not defined therein. Further, the member States that have made reservations to Article 12-14 of the MLI can opt out of Article 15.

‘Article 15 – Definition of a Person Closely Related to an Enterprise
1. For the purposes of the provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that are modified by paragraph 2 of Article 12 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through Commissionnaire Arrangements and Similar Strategies), paragraph 4 of Article 13 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through the Specific Activity Exemptions), or paragraph 1 of Article 14 (Splitting-up of Contracts), a person is closely related to an enterprise if, based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the other or both are under the control of the same persons or enterprises. In any case, a person shall be considered to be closely related to an enterprise if one possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest in the other (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) or if another person possesses directly or indirectly more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interest (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 per cent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) in the person and the enterprise.
2. A party that has made the reservations described in paragraph 4 of Article 12 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through Commissionnaire Arrangements and Similar Strategies), sub-paragraph a) or c) of paragraph 6 of Article 13 (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status through the Specific Activity Exemptions), and sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 3 of Article 14 (Splitting-up of Contracts) may reserve the right for the entirety of this Article not to apply to the Covered Tax Agreements to which those reservations apply.’

India has adopted Article 15 of the MLI. However, India has reserved its right to not include the words ‘to which it is closely related’ in Article 5(6) of the OECD Model Convention (2017). For instance, India has not reserved the right to paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the MLI, which means that it has accepted to bring the anti-fragmentation rule to the existing tax treaties. Again, this can only be confirmed if the other contracting state doesn’t create reservation to paragraph 4 of Article 13.

Paragraph 5 to 8 of MLI Article 13
Paragraph 5 contains compatibility clauses which describe the relationship between Article 13(2) through (4) and provisions of CTA. Paragraph 6 contains reservation rights of the member States, indicating that the provisions addressing the concerns of BEPS AP 7 are not required in order to meet a minimum standard test. The member State may reserve the right for the entirety of Article 13 of MLI not to apply to its CTAs.

Paragraph 7 requires that parties that opted for Option A or Option B to notify the depository of the Option so selected. Paragraph 180 of the Explanatory Statement further confirms that ‘An Option would apply to a provision only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification with respect to that provision’. For example, if a contracting State chooses Option A while the other chooses Option B, the asymmetrical decisions conclude in the non-application of the provision in its entirety. This is illustrated in paragraph 7 of Article 13, which states that ‘an Option shall apply with respect to a provision of a CTA only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification’. Accordingly, India has selected and notified Option A. Unless the other contracting State selects Option A, the tax treaty will remain unchanged.

Paragraph 8 requires each party that has not opted out of applying Paragraph 4 (anti-fragmentation rule) or for the entirety of Article 13, to notify the depository of each of its CTAs that includes specific activity exemptions. Paragraph 181 of the Explanatory Statement further confirms that ‘Paragraph 4 will apply to a provision of a CTA only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have made such a notification with respect to that provision pursuant to either paragraph 7 or paragraph 8.’

The extract of Article 13(5) to Article 13(8) is provided below:

‘Para 5. a) Paragraph 2 or 3 shall apply in place of the relevant parts of provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that list specific activities that are deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment even if the activity is carried on through a fixed place of business (or provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that operate in a comparable manner).
b) Paragraph 4 shall apply to provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement (as they may be modified by paragraph 2 or 3) that list specific activities that are deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment even if the activity is carried on through a fixed place of business (or provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that operate in a comparable manner).
Para 6. A Party may reserve the right: a) for the entirety of this Article not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements; b) for paragraph 2 not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements that explicitly state that a list of specific activities shall be deemed not to constitute a permanent establishment only if each of the activities is of a preparatory or auxiliary character; c) for paragraph 4 not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements.
Para 7. Each party that chooses to apply an Option under paragraph 1 shall notify the Depository of its choice of Option. Such notification shall also include the list of its Covered Tax Agreements which contain a provision described in sub-paragraph a) of paragraph 5, as well as the article and paragraph number of each such provision. An Option shall apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have chosen to apply the same Option and have made such a notification with respect to that provision.
Para 8. Each party that has not made a reservation described in sub-paragraph a) or c) of paragraph 6 and does not choose to apply an Option under paragraph 1 shall notify the Depository of whether each of its Covered Tax Agreements contains a provision described in sub-paragraph b) of paragraph 5, as well as the article and paragraph number of each such provision. Paragraph 4 shall apply with respect to a provision of a Covered Tax Agreement only where all Contracting Jurisdictions have made a notification with respect to that provision under this paragraph or paragraph 7.’

India context: Impact analysis of key India tax treaties:

India’s notification

Particulars of Article 13

Australia

UK

Singapore

France

Netherlands

Notified Option A, i.e., India’s tax treaties will be modified
with the language of Article 13(2)

Specific activity exemption

Notified Option A paragraph 13(2) modified India-Australia
Treaty Article 5(4)

Not selected Option A or B, Treaty remains the same

Notified Option B, the Treaty remains unchanged

Notified Option B, the Treaty remains unchanged

Notified Option A, paragraph 13(2) modified India-Australia
Treaty Article 5(4)

Remained silent to reserve Article 13(4), i.e., the provisions
will apply to the existing tax treaties

Anti- fragmentation rule

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

Reservation to Article 13(4) – No change in
the Treaty

Remained silent – Treaty changes

Notified paragraph 13(4), Treaty changes

CONCLUSION
The specific activity exemption provisions are important from the point of view of the relief they provide to non-resident entities who have only incidental activities in India. Hence, one needs to be careful while applying these provisions to a particular case. The amendment provided in Article 13 of the MLI is largely impacting industries such as e-commerce / EPC / consumer, wherein foreign companies have typically been taking exemptions from PE pursuant to the negative list / anti-fragmenting activities in India. However, on account of amendments made by Article 13, it is imperative for all foreign companies to revisit their existing PE positions.

LATENT ISSUES UNDER GST LAW ON INTERCEPTION, DETENTION, INSPECTION & CONFISCATION OF GOODS IN TRANSIT

It is a settled principle of law that the statutory power to levy tax includes all powers to prevent the evasion of such tax. The power to intercept the goods conveyance in transit and to detain, or seize, or confiscate the goods in the eventuality of evasion of tax, and the power to levy penalty, or fine, or forfeiture of goods, is meant to check tax evasion and is intended to operate as a deterrent against tax evaders and is therefore ancillary or incidental to the power to levy tax. The GST Law is an economic legislation which encompasses the fiscal transactions and activities, therefore it is essential to specifically and explicitly empower through plenary legislation the officers engaged in its administration with certain powers like inspection, search, seizure, confiscation, etc., to protect the interest of the Revenue.

Chapters XIV and XIX of the CGST Act, 2017 enumerate the governing statutory provisions as regards inspection, search, seizure and arrest from section 67 to 72, and offences and penalties from section 122 to 138, respectively. Section 68 of Chapter XIV more particularly provides for the requirement of certain documents including E-way bill to be carried by the person in charge of the conveyance while the goods are in movement. Further, Chapters XVI and XVIII of the CGST Rules, 2017 contain Rules as regards E-way bills from Rule 138 to 138E and Rules as regards demand and recovery from Rule 142 to 161. In addition, in order to regulate the activities related to road checks, interception, inspection, detention, etc., of the goods during their movement and also to keep a watch on the potential tax evasion at a micro level, CBIC has for the very first time exercised its executive powers u/s 168(1) and issued a Circular which could also be termed as Master Circular No. 41/15/2018 dated 13th April, 2018 with subsequent follow-up updates and amendments in Circular 49/23/2018 dated 21st June, 2018, 64/38/2018 dated 14th September, 2018 and 88/07/2019 dated 1st February, 2019. Hence, it can be stated that the entire set of provisions and procedures concerning road checks, inspection, etc., of goods in movement is intertwined and contained in the Act, Rules and Circulars as referred above.

However, it may be noted that the said Master Circular 41/2018 of CBIC issued u/s 168(1) was per se required only for the purpose of providing further clarification and guidance to the department officers as enablers in the implementation of the Act and Rules but it is baffling to note that this Circular actually muscled its way into matters beyond its statutory competence by providing substantive provisions and procedures as regards road checks, detention, inspection, etc., and so it is ‘required’ to be adhered to not only by the tax department but also by taxpayers.

In the context of goods in transit on a conveyance, the powers as regards interception, detention, inspection and confiscation are intrusive and invasive in nature and therefore it is incumbent on the part of officers to wield these powers with extreme care and caution with strict adherence to statutory provisions, rules and internal circulars as the improper exercise of such powers could lead to contravention of provisions of the very statute they are governed by and may also result in the violation of Articles 301 or 265, or 14, or 19(1)(g), as the case may be, of the Constitution of India.

Through this article, the author has endeavoured to decipher some of the latent legal issues in the gamut of provisions of the GST law as relevant in the chain of activities right from the stage of interception of conveyance and ending with the eventual confiscation of the goods / conveyance.

1) POWER OF INTERCEPTION OF CONVEYANCE U/S 68(3)

Although the heading of section 68 of the CGST Act, 2017 suggests that it is in relation to inspection of goods in movement, however, this section as a whole does not substantively deal with all the operating aspects in relation to the entire process which inter alia includes the fixation of powers of interception of the conveyance on the officers and also powers of performing subsequent detention by the officers if the situation so warrants in accordance with the law. The section as it reads provides for the need of carrying of E-way bill subject to threshold and also other documents like tax invoice, bill of supply, delivery challan, etc., along with the goods while they are in movement and also casts a duty on the person in charge of the conveyance to co-operate and produce the prescribed documents before the officer for verification and to allow the officer to inspect the goods. Although the requirement on the part of the person in charge of the conveyance is to stop the conveyance on interception and to co-operate with the officer as has been clearly spelt out in sub-clause 3, it is, however, bereft of any specific and explicit authority or power being conferred on the officer concerned to actually wield this power for interception and subsequently perform detention for the reasons explained below. The following is the extract of this section:

i) 68. Inspection of goods in movement.
(1) The Government may require the person in charge of a conveyance carrying any consignment of goods of value exceeding such amount as may be specified to carry with him such documents and such devices as may be prescribed.
(2) The details of documents required to be carried under sub-section (1) shall be validated in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) Where any conveyance referred to in sub-section (1) is intercepted by the proper officer at any place, he may require the person in charge of the said conveyance to produce the documents prescribed under the said sub-section and devices for verification and the said person shall be liable to produce the documents and devices and also allow the inspection of goods.

The expression ‘is intercepted by the proper officer’ is used in sub-clause 3 in the past tense which pre-supposes that the proper officer is already in possession of the necessary authority or power to intercept the conveyance and perform inspection. However, it is imperative to note that the statute as it stands today does not in any explicit, clear or specific words confer any such power or authority on the proper officer for interception of conveyance and inspection of goods. The anti-evasion tax provisions of an intrusive character of any fiscal legislation would generally confer express powers in clear and explicit terms on the specific officers to perform specific functions without leaving any room for ambiguity or doubt as regards the jurisdiction of such officers to perform those functions. For instance, section 106 of the Customs Act, 1962, power to stop and search conveyances, where the powers of the proper officer are clearly delineated to stop the conveyance during the movement and perform a search of the same. Also, as per section 67 of the CGST Act, 2017, the power of inspection, search and seizure is clearly and specifically conferred on a proper officer not below the rank of Joint Commissioner either to exercise those powers or to authorise any other officer to exercise those powers. Hence, it may be stated that any action taken or purported to be taken by Revenue under GST Law without proper statutory jurisdiction would fall foul of the GST Law and would not be sustained on challenge in a court of law. The provisions of the tax statutes are subject to strict construction by the courts in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply or presume anything which is not expressed, or it cannot look into the purpose or object of the Legislature while construing the provisions.

One possible argument could be that the proper officer having the power of inspection, search and seizure u/s 67 would also have power of interception u/s 68(3); however, this argument may sound far-fetched as section 67 is qua a specific taxable person or any person on the plank of articulation of reason to believe by the proper officer where no such pre-conditions are required to be fulfilled by the proper officer for interception as per section 68(3). With the evolution of time and with the development of jurisprudence on this law, this haze should also be cleared. Be that as it may, the expression ‘is intercepted by the proper officer’ does not seem to confer or assign any express or specific power of interception on the officer but it only seems to make an assumption or presumption about the currency of such powers. In the absence of any such powers being conferred through any other provisions, applying the strict principle of construction it may be construed that the powers of interception by the officer are completely absent in section 68(3).

In contrast, it is ironic to observe that Rule 138B(1) of the CGST Rules, 2017 by which the Commissioner or an officer empowered by him in this behalf, may delegate the authority of interception and inspection on to other proper officers. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, in the absence of specific and explicit powers having been conferred on the Commissioner or proper officer in the statute to perform the interception, detention, etc., it is difficult to comprehend how through the route of Rule 138B(1) (which is a delegated legislation) one can delegate or assign, and such powers could be delegated by the Commissioner or authorised officer to other subordinate officers. If some rules are to be framed, such rules must necessarily inherit the powers from its plenary legislation; however, this is not true here.

Be that as it may, in order to delegate powers by the Commissioner or other authorised officer, specific statutory provisions are already present u/s 5(2) or u/s 5(3) of the CGST Act, 2017. Where the specific mode of delegation of powers by the Commissioner has been already provided under plenary statutory legislation, there is no reason whatsoever for the Government to also use the route of issuing Rule 138B(1) to perform the very same delegation by the Commissioner which may render the said Rule otiose or infructuous. Further, through Circular No. 3/3/2017-GST issued u/s 2(91) and 5(3) dated 5th July, 2017, the Commissioner has already delegated the said powers of interception and u/s 68(3) to the ‘Inspector of Central Tax’. It is beyond comprehension how the Commissioner could delegate the power of interception when he himself does not possess that power under the statute. As rule 138B(1) is not in congruity with the overall scheme of the GST Law, it should be rendered otiose / meaningless.

2) POWER OF INSPECTION OF GOODS U/S 68(3)

The expression ‘and also allow the inspection of goods’ as used in sub-clause 3 of section 68 (Supra) is to be construed from the perspective of the person in charge of the conveyance who is required to render co-operation and allow the proper officer to perform inspection of the goods after the same are intercepted and detained. However, this provision again does not, in clear, specific and explicit words or expressions empower the proper officer to perform the activity of inspection of goods in transit. In contrast, this sub-clause gives power to the proper officer only to verify the prescribed documents under Rule 138A and the RFID device but does not in any way confer any power on the proper officer to inspect the goods in the conveyance. Again, applying the same analogy from the earlier discussion in the context of interception discussed above, the function of inspection also is of an intrusive nature where the properties of the citizens could be subjected to verification, causing prejudice; therefore, the officer concerned should have specific, explicit, unambiguous and clear power to perform the inspection of the goods in the conveyance. Without specific and explicit powers conferred on the proper officer under the statute for conducting inspection of goods in the conveyance, the delegated legislation has overstretched itself and framed Rule 138B(3) which is pari materia with Rule 138C and purports to provide that the powers of inspection of documents, conveyance and goods are residing with the proper officer and to also follow certain reporting requirements in Form EWB-03 on the GST Portal. Hence, these Rules operate contrary to the provisions of the statute and should be rendered otiose / meaningless.

Apart from the absence of the power of inspection of goods with the proper officer, section 68 is also silent on providing the machinery provisions as regards the time and manner in which the inspection of goods is to be conducted; nor does this section delegate powers to the Government to prescribe necessary enabling rules. In a way, although the Legislature may not have intended so, this provision is seemingly an open-ended ambiguous section without a clear path having been laid down as regards conferment of powers on officers to conduct inspection of goods, not providing for machinery procedures to be followed for inspection and to deal with other related collateral matters. It is imperative for the Legislature to be mindful of the eventuality wherein in the absence of clearly laying down through statute or rules the powers for inspection of goods and concomitant procedures as required to be followed, the mobile squad officers of the Government who are currently in operation may run amok causing unwarranted harassment to genuine taxpayers in the guise of Departmental Circulars, orders or instructions which are anyway not binding on the taxpayers.

Further, after the order of inspection being issued in MOV-02, the time and manner of conducting inspection of the goods in the conveyance is done completely in adherence with the said Circular and where after the completion of the inspection, Form MOV-04 is issued to the taxpayer giving quantitative details of the physical inspection. As there are no Rules prescribed for the inspection of the detained goods, in reality it has been left to the total prerogative and discretion of the Government to define the modus operandi to be followed for physical verification of goods detained via issue of Circulars.

3) VALIDITY OF CIRCULAR 41/2018 AND MOV FORMS
Before adverting to the validity of Circular 41/2018 and MOV Forms covered in the same Circular, it is imperative to read section 168(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 which is as follows:

168. Power to issue instructions or directions.
(1) The Board may, if it considers it necessary or expedient so to do for the purpose of uniformity in the implementation of this Act, issue such orders, instructions or directions to the central tax officers as it may deem fit, and thereupon all such officers and all other persons employed in the implementation of this Act shall observe and follow such orders, instructions or directions.

From the above extract of the provision, two analogies can be drawn:

a) The Circulars are issued by Government only for the purpose of ensuring that there is uniformity of procedure in the implementation of the Act across the country. So the Circulars are a natural concomitant of the existing Act or Rules framed under the Act and therefore the Circulars could not be issued in isolation or independent of the Act or Rules, but they are issued in extension of the existing Act and Rules which are under the domain of control of the Legislature. Further, the Circulars are issued only as supplementary documents and only to provide guidance / aid on the interpretation of certain provisions to be used by the executive wing of the Government responsible for the implementation of provisions of the Act and Rules to avoid the possibility of officers of field formations across the country taking different views on the very same provisions of the statute. Therefore, the Government cannot issue Circulars to prescribe new procedures, processes, methods, forms, applications, etc., not originally envisaged or contemplated in the statute or rules prescribed thereunder which would metaphorically mean ‘placing the cart before the horse’. Even when some provisions are missing in the Act or Rules, maybe for bona fide reasons, the Government even in such situations cannot usurp power u/s 168(1) and seek to fill those identified gaps by issuing Circulars not warranted by powers granted under this section. Wherefore the Government could not perforce enter into the shoes of the Legislature to make the laws through the route of Circulars as has happened in the case of this Circular 41/2018.

b) The officers and all other persons employed in the implementation of the law are required to observe and follow such Circulars, and not the taxpayers. Hence it can be inferred from the text of the provision that these Circulars are only meant to be followed by the internal staff of the tax Department administering the law and are in no way binding on the taxpayers, unless such a Circular has the effect of providing certain benefits or relaxations to the taxpayers. Therefore, the power of issuing Circulars under this section could not have been used by the Government as carte blanche to hold the taxpayers responsible or subject to any obligations under the Circular.

As the GST Law stands today, the Legislature virtually does not exercise any control on procedural matters related to verification of goods in transit which would include powers of officers qua procedures for interception, detention of goods, inspection of goods, post-inspection release of goods, confiscation of goods and adjudication of matters of contravention of provisions of the Act or Rules. The power of laying down the entire gamut of procedures right from the stage of interception of conveyance to eventual confiscation of goods has been completely usurped by the Government and is being controlled through CBIC Circular 41/2018 issued in conjunction with subsequent updated Circulars. Although by enactment of sections 68, 129, 130 and notification of rules 138, 138A, 138B, 138C and 138D the Legislature had retained with itself a few aspects related to these provisions, ironically, a substantial part of the procedures contained in Circular 41/2018 were not contemplated under the provisions of section 168 as explained above. The true fact or practical reality is that all the officers of the tax Department have been following these Circulars in the matter of interception, inspection, etc. That apart, the real tyranny is that even the taxpayers who are not bound by Circulars have been obliged to comply with certain requirements as contained in this Circular, like providing undertakings, signing, etc., in the MOV Forms as specified in the said Circular.

Coming to the various MOV Forms which are as specified in Circular 41/2018, in a metaphorical sense this Circular is the genus and all the MOV Forms coming out from it are its species. As for the justifications as discussed above, if the Circular is held bad in law and it is trumped, as a natural concomitant all the related MOV Forms would also fall. It is through these MOV Forms that the tax Department is bringing accountability and ownership on the part of the taxpayers by furnishing and taking necessary acknowledgements / signatures on these Forms which may become criminating evidence against the taxpayers in any subsequent legal proceedings. It is relevant to advert to section 160(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 where the taxpayer has been disabled or forbidden to assail the validity of the MOV Forms that he has received, or to raise any negative contentions or objections on them, upon which he has subsequently acted and participated in the adjudication process. So it may be imperative for taxpayers to raise objections or raise a dispute on the validity of MOV Forms or claims contained in the said Forms at the earliest opportunity on the ground that these MOV Forms are issued by exercising extra-legislative actions or filing a dispute on the contents of these Forms.

In terms of section 166 of the CGST Act, 2017, every notification, rule, regulation issued or made by the Government is required to be laid on the table of the House for 30 days for the purpose of examination, BUT no such requirement is envisaged for Circulars or Forms issued under Circulars for ensuring accountability as the overarching principle for issuing Circulars is only to regulate and enable the internal administration function of the Government. Specifying these MOV Forms through the route of Circulars can be depicted as an attempt to usurp power by the Government. As long as these MOV Forms do not create any obligation or liability on the persons or taxpayers who are the external parties to the Government, the validity of these forms cannot be called in question, as such forms are issued only to convey certain information without warranting any action from the recipients.

As already indicated earlier, strict interpretation or construction is applied to tax laws and as per the cardinal rule of law that we are governed under, the same level of moral rectitude is sought from the tax Department as it is sought from the taxpayers. The MOV Forms contained in Circular 41/2018, in the author’s view, do not hold any legal ground and are liable to be set aside. Recently, the Sales Tax Bar Association, Delhi has, under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenged before the Delhi High Court the statutory validity of these MOV Forms and prayed that the Court set these aside. It appears as though this is the first time someone has challenged the validity of the MOV Forms. The matter is pending disposal.

Be that as it may, as regards the Circular 41/2018 the procedures as specified in it have pain areas being encountered on a day-to-day basis by the taxpayers which result in undue harassment to them and loss of intrinsic value of the goods being detained or confiscated for an inordinate time. These are as follows:

a) Although section 68(1) read with Rule 138A requires the person in charge of the conveyance to only carry certain definite documents, in reality the conveyances are intercepted and unwarranted documents are sought to be produced for verification by the mobile squad and also unwarranted objections or infirmities in the documents are raised by the mobile squad.

b) The expression ‘prima facie, no discrepancies are found’ as mentioned in para (b) of Circular 41/2018 is a very broad and latent expression and the same could be subject to different interpretations in identical situations by officers of the Department. The basic purpose of the Circular is to clarify and clear the ambiguities if there are any; however, not expounding such ambiguous expressions quoted above and contained in the same Circular itself, would work contrary to the very purpose of the Circulars issued.

c) The expression ‘or where proper officer intends to undertake an inspection’ as mentioned in para (d) of Circular 41/2018 is again so loosely worded as to give full liberty to the officers concerned to decide whether or not to undertake an inspection. There are no fetters attached or conditions precedent defined for arriving at or having an intention to undertake inspection. The undertaking of inspection is of an intrusive character and the same should be ideally undertaken only based on hard evidence indicating tax evasion and not merely on conjecture, surmises, assumptions and presumptions of the officer concerned.

4) POWER OF DETENTION AND CONFISCATION U/S 129 AND U/S 130:
Just like the issue of officers without statutory powers intercepting and inspecting as discussed above, even the powers for detention and subsequent confiscation if required by officers are not contained in the plenary GST legislation, that is, the CGST Act, 2017. Although sections 129 and 130 do make references to proper officers, but these references are restricted only for the limited purpose of adjudication of the demand by following the principle of natural justice on the proposed action of either detention or confiscation, a decision about which has already been made by the officer concerned based on the per se formation of opinion as per Circular 41/2018. Sections 129 and 130 also serve for the quantification of amounts payable by the taxpayers and to perform other incidental procedures qua the proposed detention or confiscation.

Based on the outcome of physical inspection of the goods by the officers as reported in MOV-04, in case any discrepancy is found or where the proper officer opines that any contravention of the Act or Rules is committed by the taxpayer, then u/s 129 the goods and conveyance are detained or seized by issuing MOV-06 – the order of detention along with MOV-07 – SCN with DRC-01 notified electronically.

Thereafter, the adjudication procedures would follow in accordance with Rule 142 and also in accordance with instructions contained in the Circular 41/2018 along with certain specific MOV Forms in manual mode as specified in the Circular. Therefore, the said Rule 142 on its own does not prescribe the entire adjudication procedure that is required to be followed but the entire process has been unnecessarily parted between Rule 142 and the manual MOV Forms specified in the said Circular which would only increase the compliance burden as well as complexity in compliance by the taxpayers not envisaged by the Central Government.

To issue Form MOV-06 – SCN for detention, or MOV-10 – SCN for confiscation [as per para (l) of Circular 41/2018], very wide carte blanche powers are conferred on the officers to initiate either or both these proceedings. Para (f) of the same Circular empowering the officer to initiate detention proceedings adverts to the expressions ‘Where the proper officer is of the opinion that the goods and conveyance need to be detained under section 129’ or para (l) empowering the officer to initiate confiscation proceedings, adverts to the expressions ‘Where the proper officer is of the opinion that such movement of goods is being effected to evade payment of tax, he may directly invoke Section 130’. In both these cases, the said empowerments are bereft of any guideline or threshold or condition precedent or sine qua non for the formation of such adverse opinion by the officer having the effect of initiating proceedings u/s 129 or 130 for detention or confiscation of goods, respectively. These wide powers qua the formation of opinion by the officers as referred to in the above-referred paras appear to be an attempt of the Government to have a parallel law through administrative Circulars which should go to the root of questioning the sanctity and the very purpose and meaning of the Circulars and why they are issued. This Circular does not seek to instil any checks and balances on the wide discretionary actions of the officers as contemplated in the Circular to hold them accountable, especially where such wide discretionary powers on the opinion formation are likely to trigger proceedings of detention or confiscation of the goods u/s 129 or 130, respectively.

It is pertinent to note that the invocation of detention u/s 129 and confiscation u/s 130 do not happen automatically but are a natural consequence of formation of adverse opinion by the officer under the highlighted paras of the said Circular.

To sum up the issue, Circular 41/2018 ought to have been used only to clarify and help in implementation of substantial or procedural provisions of the Act / Rules, but in actual fact it has taken primacy and it is purportedly operating like a plenary Act in the matter of detention and confiscation of goods, and sections 129 and 130 of the Act are virtually reduced to a machinery provision, or merely as a referencing placeholder for quantification of the amount of tax, penalty, fine, etc.

5) OTHER ISSUES

a) Whether sections 129 and 130 operate coterminous with each other?
Subject to section 118 of the Finance Act, 2021 not yet notified, both the said sections 129 and 130 are mutually exclusive, independent and operate in separate spheres for the simple reason that both start with the non-obstante clause at the beginning with the expression ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act’. The High Court of Gujarat had occasion to deal with several petitions in a group matter in Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat (order dated 23rd December, 2019), where the confiscation proceedings u/s 130 were initiated without concluding the existing on-going adjudication proceedings u/s 129. The Court held that both the sections 129 and 130 are not coterminous with each other, and hence are independent, in the following words:

‘(i) Section 129 of the Act talks about detention, seizure and release of goods and conveyances in transit. On the other hand, section 130 talks about confiscation of goods or conveyance and levy of tax, penalty and fine thereof. Although both the sections start with a non-obstante clause, yet, the harmonious reading of the two sections, keeping in mind the object and purpose behind the enactment thereof, would indicate that they are independent of each other. Section 130 of the Act, which provides for confiscation of the goods or conveyance, is not, in any manner, dependent or subject to section 129 of the Act. Both the sections are mutually exclusive.’

b) Detention on the ground of rate of tax, classification, etc.

An officer intercepting goods in transit cannot go into the unwarranted issues of valuation, classification of goods, rate of tax and so on and cannot high-handedly detain the goods for more than a few hours (up to six hours). However, the officer should collect relevant data during such short detention and transmit the same to the jurisdictional proper officer for initiating necessary assessment proceedings in relation to that supply by the taxpayer. Again, in Synergy Fertichem Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), the Gujarat High Court held as under:

‘160. We are in full agreement with the aforesaid enunciation of law laid down by the Kerala High Court. Thus, in a case of a bona fide dispute with regard to the classification between the transporter of the goods and the Squad Officer, the Squad Officer may intercept the goods, detain them for the purpose of preparing the relevant papers for effective transmission to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. It is not open to the Squad Officer to detain the goods beyond a reasonable period. The process can, at best, take a few hours. It goes without saying that the person, who is in charge of transportation, will have to necessarily co-operate with the Squad Officer for preparing the relevant papers. [See Jeyyam Global Foods (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 64 GSTR 129 (Mad).]

CONCLUSION


In the author’s view, the formation of opinion as contained in Circular 41/2018 which is so critical, foundational and is of a substantive character, has the effect of affecting the rights or liabilities or obligations of the parties qua interception, detention, inspection or confiscation by their very intrusive or invasive nature; though meant to arrest tax evasions, these should never have formed part of the Rules and Circulars. Instead, these provisions which seek to check tax evasion incidents should have ideally been part of the plenary legislation espousing the principles of natural justice, equity, good conscience and fairness, analogous to instances of section 67 in the matter of inspection, search and seizure, or section 69 in the matter of arrest which have been couched in the CGST Act, 2017. However, the present form of operation of the provisions via enforcement of the said Circular seems to suggest that there is a complete abdication of power by the Legislature to the Executive to deal with matters in relation to interception, inspection, detention and confiscation of goods in movement. One hopes this Circular and MOV Forms which are at present in challenge before the Delhi High Court are struck down by the Court and such transgressions of the law by the Executive are discouraged and trumped down to set an example for the future and for assisting the cardinal principle of the rule of law to prevail.

EMPOWERING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

BACKGROUND
The concept of Independent Directors (IDs) had emerged from the need to have a certain number of Directors on the Board who would think and act independently and to bring a healthy balance between the interests of the promoters and those of other stakeholders, including minority and small shareholders. IDs are an important component in the overall framework of corporate governance.

SEBI has, over the years, strengthened the institution of IDs through the recommendations of various committees. But despite several measures, concerns about the efficacy of IDs have continued. To further strengthen the overall framework of IDs for equity listed entities, the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘Listing Regulations’) have been amended with effect from 1st January, 2022. The Listing Regulations have further been amended to specifically empower the IDs of ‘high value debt listed entity1’ which would apply on a ‘comply or explain’ basis until 31st March, 2023, and on a mandatory basis thereafter. This article seeks to provide an overview of the key aspects emanating from these amendments and the key considerations for the companies and the governance professionals.

DEFINITION OF AN ID

Regulation 16 of the Listing Regulations sets out certain objective conditions for determination of the independence of an ID. These conditions include areas of pecuniary relationship of self and of relatives with the listed entity, its promoter, or directors, etc. SEBI observed that scope exits to further strengthen the criteria for independence of IDs and harmonisation of certain requirements under the Listing Regulations, e.g., a cooling-off period while assessing the eligibility conditions for an ID. Further, an ID is also defined u/s 149 of the 2013 Act which provides that relatives of a proposed ID cannot have any pecuniary relationship including the pecuniary relationships as prescribed therein. The existing Listing Regulations do not provide a list of such pecuniary relationships. Hence, the definition of an ID under the 2013 Act and under the Listing Regulations is different.

To address the above concerns, especially harmonisation of requirements, SEBI has amended the Listing Regulations and has also inserted additional criteria as follows:

  •  Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID, apart from receiving Director’s remuneration, should not have / had any material pecuniary relationship with the prescribed entities, including the listed entity, its holding and subsidiaries during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations has been amended to extend the cooling-off period to three immediately preceding financial years. Let us consider the following example to better understand the amendment:

Ms Z is proposed to be appointed as an ID in Company XYZ in F.Y. 2021-2022. She noticed that in January, 2019 she had had a material pecuniary relationship (other than remuneration) with Company XYZ. As per the existing provisions, Ms Z could have been appointed as an ID as the relationship existed prior to the cooling-off period of two years. However, since the cooling-off has been extended to three years, she cannot be appointed as an ID.

  • Section 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act provides that a person cannot be appointed as an ID whose relatives have pecuniary relationships / transactions with the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or their promoters, or directors including holding any security of or interest and being indebted (in excess of the prescribed amount) during the immediately preceding two financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations does not prescribe a list of the pecuniary relationships similar to that provided under the 2013 Act but simply states that the relatives of such proposed ID should not have / had pecuniary relationship during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year in excess of the prescribed amount.

The list of pecuniary relationships as provided u/s 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act has been incorporated in Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations – with certain modifications; e.g., the period for determining pecuniary relationship is stated as three immediately preceding financial years (under the 2013 Act – two immediately preceding financial years), and the lower threshold (as per existing norms) for determining pecuniary relationship of relatives has been retained. Let’s understand these key differences with the help of the following examples:

– While assessing his eligibility conditions, Mr. Y noticed that one of his relative owes Rs. 60 lakhs to the Holding Company of the Company ABC. Company ABC is proposing to appoint Mr. Y as an ID in F.Y. 2021-2022. Mr. Y considered that the pecuniary relationships are permitted to the extent of the following:

Under the 2013 Act

Rs.

 

Under the Listing
Regulations (lower of following)

Rs.

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

Another threshold

50 lakhs

In the above situation the balance outstanding from the relatives is within the permissible limits under the 2013 Act. However, the outstanding is in excess of the limit prescribed under the Listing Regulations. Hence, Mr. Y cannot be appointed as an ID.

– Mr. X is assessing the eligibility conditions for his proposed appointment as an ID in Company DEF in March, 2022. He noticed that during F.Y. 2018-2019 one of his relatives held equity shares of the Company whose face value exceeded the permissible limit prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. A cooling-off period of two years and three years, respectively, has been prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. Accordingly, in this case even though the requirement of the two-year cooling period under the 2013 Act is met, Mr. X cannot be appointed as an ID because his relative had held securities during the three-year cooling period prescribed under the Listing Regulations.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID is a person who (neither himself nor whose relatives) holds or has held the position of a key managerial personnel or is or has been an employee of the listed entity or its holding, subsidiary or associate company in any of the three financial years immediately preceding the financial year in which he is proposed to be appointed. The amended Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations extends the restriction to employment in any promoter group company. However, the proviso to the Regulation further provides that the cooling-off period will not apply to relatives in employment of the stated entities, provided that they do not hold the position of a key managerial personnel. Accordingly, where relatives of a person holds employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) in the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary, or associate company or any company belonging to the promoter group of the listed entity in the preceding three financial years, such person can be appointed as an ID. The following example illustrates the amendment for better understanding:

While assessing her eligibility conditions, Ms Q noticed that her spouse is the Managing Director in a promoter group company of Company LMQ which is proposing her appointment as an ID in February, 2022. Since a relative of the proposed ID holds the position of a key managerial personnel in a promoter group company, Ms Q cannot be appointed as an ID in Company LMQ. If her spouse held an employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) such as Sales Executive, she can be appointed as an ID pursuant to the relaxation as per the proviso to Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) stated above.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(viii) of the Listing Regulations provides that ID is a person who is not a non-independent director of another company on the Board of which any non-independent director of the listed entity is an ID. An explanation has now been inserted to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a body corporate that has been mandated to constitute its board of directors in a specific manner as per the law under which it is established, the non-executive directors on its Board would be treated as IDs. Similar requirement has also been prescribed for ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a Trust.

• Pursuant to the amendment, the
Listing Regulation now provides a uniform cooling period of three years
across all eligibility conditions. Such a uniform cooling-off period strikes
a healthy balance of having a reasonable cooling-off period while also
upholding the independence of the proposed ID.

 

• It might be also noted that the
above amendments would require the listed entity to obtain revised
declaration of independence from the IDs since Regulation 25(8) of the
Listing Regulations requires IDs to provide such declaration whenever there
is any change in the circumstances which may affect the status as an ID.
Consequently, as required by Regulation 25(9), the Board of Directors would
be required to take on record such a declaration after undertaking due
assessment.

ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY IN THE ROLE OF THE NRC

At present, Regulation 19(1)(c) of the Listing Regulations provides that the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) should comprise of at least 50% of IDs and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares 2/3rd of the NRC should comprise of IDs. SEBI felt that there is a need to strengthen the composition of IDs in the NRC in order to reduce dependence on the promoters. Accordingly, Regulation 19(1)(c) was amended to provide that ‘at least 2/3rd’ of the Directors in the NRC of all listed companies (including listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise of IDs. Let’s understand this amendment though the following example:

The NRC of Company DEF comprises six members – with equal representation by IDs and other Directors. Company DEF does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. Hence the representation of IDs should be increased from the existing three to four IDs – so that 2/3rd of the NRC comprises IDs pursuant to the revised norms as stated above.

Clause A to Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations provides that the role of the NRC includes formulation of the criteria for determining qualifications and positive attributes of a Director. Notwithstanding such requirements, SEBI was of the view that there is a lack of transparency in the process followed by NRCs. Therefore, a need exists to prescribe disclosures for selection of candidates for the post of an ID. These disclosures are expected to increase the transparency in the functioning of NRCs and would also be good from the governance perspective. SEBI accordingly introduced Clause 1A in Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations to provide that:

  •     For every appointment of an ID, the NRC should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the Board of Directors;
  •     On the basis of such evaluation, the NRC should prepare a description of the role and capabilities of an ID. The person recommended to the Board for appointment should have the capabilities identified in such description;
  •     The NRC has the option of using the services of external agencies to consider candidates from a wide range of backgrounds (having due regard to diversity) and consider the time commitments of the candidates.

SEBI also introduced Regulation 36(f) in the Listing Regulations to provide that the shareholders’ notice should include the disclosures regarding the skills and capabilities required for the role and the manner in which the proposed person meets such requirements.

Further, amendments were made to Regulation 36(d) to provide that the shareholders’ notice for appointment of a new Director or reappointment of a Director should include the names of listed entities from which the person has resigned in the past three years.

• The Listing Regulations has
increased the number of IDs required in the NRC. Therefore, in case the NRC
of a listed entity does not meet the revised requirement, the NRC should be
reconstituted.

 

• The revised role of the NRC establishes
additional processes for appointment of an ID. As per the amended Schedule II
the NRC will be required to consider candidates from a wide range of
backgrounds. The databank of IDs as established under the 2013 Act might act
as a good reference point for selecting potential candidates.

COMPOSITION OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

The Listing Regulations cast specific responsibilities on the Audit Committee to review financial information, scrutinise inter-corporate loans and investments and the valuation of undertakings and assets of the listed entity, etc. At present, Regulation 18(1)(b) of the Listing Regulations provides that 2/3rd of the members of the Audit Committee should comprise of IDs, and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares the Audit Committee should comprise only of IDs. SEBI has amended this Regulation to provide that the Audit Committee of listed companies (which do not have outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise ‘at least 2/3rd of IDs’ instead of the existing composition of ‘2/3rd of IDs’. The amendment in the provision
relating to the constitution of the Audit Committee prescribes for a ‘minimum requirement’ of 2/3rd of the Committee to be comprised of IDs, thus allowing companies to appoint more IDs as members of the Committee. This amendment may not necessitate reconstitution of the Audit Committee.

For example, the Audit Committee of Company PQR comprises six members – four IDs and two other Directors. Company PQR does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. So it can continue with the present composition of the Audit Committee as it has the minimum number of IDs in the Audit Committee as per the revised Regulations. Since the revised Regulations prescribe the minimum composition, Company PQR may choose to appoint a higher number of IDs on the Audit Committee.

Regulation 23(2) of the Listing Regulations provides that all related party transactions require prior approval of the Audit Committee. SEBI felt a need to further enhance the scrutiny around related party transactions. Accordingly, a proviso was added to Regulation 23(2) which provides that only those members of the Audit Committee who are IDs should approve related party transactions.

As per the revised norms, only those
members of the Audit Committee who are IDs can approve related party
transactions. There may be transactions which have either been approved prior
to the effective date of the amendment, or there might be modifications to
the terms and conditions of existing related party transactions, thereby
requiring approval of the Audit Committee. Listed entities would need to
assess whether these transactions would require
approval of the Audit Committee as per the
amended provisions.

APPOINTMENT, REAPPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF IDS

Appointment of an ID is made through an ordinary resolution in a general meeting of a company as provided u/s 152(2) of the 2013 Act. However, reappointment of an ID requires the passing of a special resolution by the company. SEBI felt that the present framework of appointment of IDs may be influenced by the promoters – in recommending the name of IDs and in the approval process by virtue of their shareholding. This may hinder the independence of IDs and undermine their ability to differ from the promoter, especially in cases where the interests of the promoter and of the minority shareholders are not aligned. Additionally, considering that the role of IDs includes protecting the interests of minority shareholders, there is a need for minority shareholders to have a greater say in the appointment / reappointment process of IDs.

Accordingly, to give more say to the minority shareholders in the simplest manner possible, SEBI introduced Regulation 25(2A) in the Listing Regulations to extend the requirement to obtain shareholders’ approval through a special resolution for appointment and removal of an ID. Thus, as per the revised requirements, the appointment, reappointment or removal of an ID should be subject to the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution.

APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS WITHIN A STIPULATED TIMEFRAME

As per the current practice, companies appoint IDs as additional directors, subject to approval of the shareholders at the next general meeting. It is, therefore, possible that a person gets appointed as an additional ID just after an Annual General Meeting and then serves on the Board of Directors, without shareholder approval, till the next Annual General Meeting. SEBI also observed that there have been cases in the past where the shareholders have rejected the appointment of IDs even while these IDs had served on the Board for a few months. Hence, SEBI felt that reduction / elimination of the time gap may give more say to the shareholders in the appointment process. Further, in order to bring consistency and ease of compliance, SEBI felt that such a time frame may also be applied to approval of appointment of all Directors including IDs, Executive Directors, Non-Executive Directors, etc.

Accordingly, Regulation 17(1C) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that approval of shareholders for appointment of any person (including that arising due to casual vacancy) on the Board of Directors should be taken at the next general meeting or within three months from the date of appointment, whichever is earlier.

The revised norms require a listed
company to obtain shareholders’ approval at the next general meeting or
within three months from the date of appointment of the ID, whichever is
earlier. An issue arises where a person has been appointed as an ID (say in
November, 2021) but the shareholder approval is pending. The next general
meeting is expected to be held in September, 2022. One might argue that in
this case the shareholders’ approval should be obtained within three months
from the effective date of the amendments, i.e., by 31st March,
2022. However, under this approach the time gap between approval by the Board
and shareholders’ approval would exceed the time period prescribed under the
Listing Regulations. An authoritative clarification would be required from
SEBI to address these situations.

INSURANCE FOR IDS

The top 500 listed entities by market capitalisation are required under Regulation 25(10) of the Listing Regulations to undertake Directors and Officers insurance (‘D and O insurance’) for all IDs of such quantum and for such risks as may be determined by their Board of Directors. SEBI considered that due to increased expectation from IDs and the heightened regulatory scrutiny, adequate protection under a proper D and O insurance policy will help IDs perform their duties more effectively. Thus, the requirement of mandatory D and O insurance should be extended to a wider group of listed entities. Accordingly, SEBI has decided that with effect from 1st January, 2022 the requirement of undertaking D and O Insurance would be extended to the top 1,000 companies by market capitalisation.

The Listing Regulations were further amended to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ should undertake D and O insurance for all its IDs for such sum assured and for such risks as may be determined by its Board of Directors.

COOLING OFF PERIOD – TRANSITION OF AN ID TO AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The current provisions as prescribed under Schedule III (Part A)(A)(7B)(i) require the resigning ID (within seven days of resignation) to disclose to the stock exchanges detailed reasons for the resignation along with a confirmation that there are no other material reasons for resignation other than those already provided. SEBI observed that IDs often resign for reasons such as preoccupation, other commitments or personal reasons, and then join the Boards of other companies. There is, therefore, a need to further strengthen the regulations around the resignation of IDs.

Hence, Schedule III was amended to provide for disclosure of the resignation letter of an ID along with the names of listed entities in which the resigning Director holds Directorships, indicating the category of Directorship and membership of Board committees, if any. It may be noted that the new requirement to disclose the entire resignation letter is only an extension of the existing requirements which require disclosure of detailed reasons for resignation along with a confirmation as aforesaid.

SEBI also observed cases where IDs have resigned and have then joined the same company as Executive Directors. While there may be valid reasons for transition from an ID to an Executive Director, such instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in the company in the near future may practically lead to a compromise in independence. SEBI felt that a cooling-off period should be prescribed to reduce potential impairments to an ID’s impartiality in decision-making in instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in certain companies in the near future.

Thus, Regulation 25(11) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that an ID who has resigned from a listed entity cannot be appointed as an Executive / Whole-time Director on the Board of the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or on the Board of a company belonging to its promoter group, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of resignation as an ID.

The amended Regulation provides a
cooling-off period of one year in case of resignation by an ID. However, such
cooling-off period has not been prescribed where the ID is appointed as an
Executive
Director post expiry of his
term as an ID.

TIME-PERIOD FOR FILLING UP CASUAL VACANCY OF IDS

As per Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations, an ID who resigns or is removed should be replaced by a new ID at the earliest but not later than the immediate next meeting of the Board of Directors, or three months from the date of such vacancy, whichever is later. However, the time limit for filling of a casual vacancy prescribed under the 2013 Act [Schedule IV (VI)(2)] is different, i.e., three months from the date of resignation / removal. In order to avoid inconsistency, SEBI has modified Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations to align the time limits prescribed under the 2013 Act.

THE WAY FORWARD

 

• Listed companies might encounter
implementation challenges emanating from these amendments – some of them have
been highlighted above. Hence it is important that the listed companies
should engage with governance professionals, including auditors, to iron out
these challenges.

 

• Apart from the above amendments, SEBI
in its Board Meeting held on 29th June, 2021 had also decided to
make a reference to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for giving greater
flexibility to companies while deciding the remuneration for all Directors
(including IDs), which may include profit-linked commissions, sitting fees,
ESOPs, etc., within the overall prescribed limit specified under the 2013
Act. At present, ESOPs to IDs are prohibited under the Listing Regulations
and the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the implementation of the SEBI decision would
require modifications to the Listing Regulations and also to the 2013 Act.
Any positive development on this aspect would enable listed companies to
attract and / or retain talented IDs.
 

TLA 2021 – A DIGNIFIED EXIT FROM A SELF-SPLASHED MESS: AN ANALYSIS OF REVERSAL OF RETROSPECTIVE AMENDMENT

INTRODUCTION
The infamous amendment to section 9(1)(i) by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect, dealing with the taxation of indirect transfers, had invited serious opprobrium in international fora and caused a serious dent in the image of India as an attractive investment destination.

Now, the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021 [TLA, 2021] has nullified the retrospective nature of the original amendment. The ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 candidly highlighted the ill-effects of the retrospective amendment.

BACKGROUND

In order to understand the purpose behind the latest amendment, it is necessary to draw the readers’ attention to the series of events that took place prior to the amendment.

It all started in the year 2007 in the landmark case of Vodafone International which entered the Indian telecom market by acquiring the telecom business of Hutchinson India. Vodafone International, a Dutch-based Vodafone entity, acquired indirect control in Hutchison Essar Limited (HEL), an Indian company, from a Cayman Islands-based company, viz., Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited (HTIL). It did this by acquiring a single share in CGP Investment (CGP), another Cayman Islands company, from HTIL in February, 2007. CGP held various Mauritian companies, which in turn held a majority stake in HEL.

In September, 2007 the Revenue authorities issued a show cause notice to Vodafone International for failure to withhold tax on the amount paid for acquiring the said stake as they believed that HTIL was liable for capital gains it earned from the transfer of the share of CGP, as CGP indirectly held a stake in HEL. Vodafone International was also sought to be treated as a ‘representative assessee’ u/s 163 and a capital gains tax demand of Rs. 12,000 crores was sought to be recovered from Vodafone International.

But Vodafone International claimed that the Indian Revenue authorities had no jurisdiction over the transaction as the transfer of shares had taken place outside India between two companies incorporated outside India and the subject of the transfer was shares, the situs of which was also outside India. The matter was litigated up to the Supreme Court which, in 2012, in the landmark judgment in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. vs. Union of India1, absolved Vodafone of the liability of payment of Rs. 12,000 crores as capital gains tax in the transaction between it and HTIL.

The Court held that the Indian Revenue authorities did not have jurisdiction to impose tax on an offshore transaction between two non-resident companies wherein controlling interest in a resident company was acquired by the non-resident company.

But the Indian Government believed that the verdict of the Supreme Court was inconsistent with the legislative intent as they believed that India, in its sovereign taxing powers, was empowered to tax such indirect transfers of assets located in India. Thus, an amendment was brought about by the Finance Act, 2012 with retrospective effect, to clarify that gains arising from the sale of shares of a foreign company are taxable in India if such a share, directly or indirectly, derives its value substantially from the assets located in India. Section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012 also provided for validation of demand, etc., under the Income-tax Act, 1961 for cases relating to indirect transfer of Indian assets.

_______________________________________________________________________________
1          [2012]
341 ITR 1 (SC)

Pursuant to this amendment, an income tax demand has been raised in 17 cases which include the prominent cases of Vodafone and Cairn Energy. It is believed that the total estimated demand in these 17 cases totals up to an enormous sum of Rs. 1.10 lakh crores2.

In the ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 it has been noted that in two out of these 17 cases, assessments are pending due to a stay granted by the High Court.

The ‘Statement of Objects and Reasons’ to The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021, observes that in four cases, arbitration under the Bilateral Investment Protection Treaty (BIT) with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had been invoked against the demands. Of these four cases, in two, Vodafone and Cairn Energy, the result of arbitration has been against the Income-tax Department.

In the case of Vodafone, the Singapore seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague ruled that India’s imposition of a tax liability on Vodafone, as well as interest and penalties, breached an investment treaty agreement between India and the Netherlands3. The Arbitral Tribunal held that the imposition of the asserted liability notwithstanding, the Supreme Court judgment is in breach of the guarantee of fair and equitable treatment laid down in Article 4(1) of the BIT between India and the Netherlands. The Arbitral Tribunal directed India to reimburse the legal costs of approximately INR 850 million to Vodafone.

The said arbitral award was challenged by the Indian Government in Singapore because according to it taxation is not a part of the BIT and it falls under the sovereign power of India.

Similarly, in the case of Cairn Energy, a Scottish firm, the Permanent Court of Arbitration having its legal seat in the Netherlands, in December, 2020 awarded it $1.2 billion (over Rs. 8,800 crores) plus costs and interest which totalled $1.725 million (Rs. 12,600 crores) as of December, 20204. The Tribunal held that India had failed to comply with its obligations under the India-UK BIT. India appealed against the said award in a court in The Hague, Netherlands.

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2   https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/us-court-sets-timelines-for-cairn-india-legal-case-121082700964_1.html

3   https://wap.business-standard.com/article-amp/economy-policy/govt-to-amend-income-tax-act-to-nullify-retrospective-tax-demands-121080501146_1.html

4              https://wap.business-standard.com/article-amp/economy-policy/govt-to-amend-income-tax-act-to-nullify-retrospective-tax-demands-121080501146_1.html

Meanwhile, Cairn moved courts in nine jurisdictions, namely, the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Singapore, Japan, the UAE and Cayman Islands, to get the international arbitration tribunal award registered and recognised. Cairn also threatened seizure of the Indian Government’s assets in these jurisdictions in case India did not return the value of the shares seized and sold, dividend confiscated and tax refund held back to adjust a Rs. 10,247-crore tax demand raised using the retrospective legislation.

In June, 2021, the Tribunal Judiciaire de Paris, a French court, allowed Cairn’s application to freeze 20 residential real estate assets owned by the Indian Government. The properties directed to be frozen are worth approximately $23 million, a fraction of the Arbitral Award5. Cairn also filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking to make Air India liable for the Arbitral Award that was awarded to it. The lawsuit argued that the carrier as a state-owned company, being an alter-ego of the State, is legally indistinct from the State itself and was bound to discharge the duties of the State (India).

Thereafter, Cairn made a plea before the U.S. Court to make Air India deposit money under the apprehension that New Delhi may sell the airline by the time the decision seeking seizure of the national carrier’s aircraft is pronounced by the U.S. Court6. Despite the toughening stand taken both by Cairn and India before the U.S. Court, it has come to light that discussions are taking place between the officials of Cairn and the Income-tax Department whereby Cairn is hopeful of an amicable settlement in light of the recent amendment to the provisions of Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) vide TLA, 2021. The CEO of Cairn has also given a statement accepting the Government’s offer to settle the disputes and accept the refund of Rs. 7,900 crores and has also stated that the shareholders are in agreement with accepting the offer and moving on7.

And recently, on 13th September, 2021, Cairn and Air India jointly asked the New York Federal Court to stay further proceedings in Cairn’s lawsuit targeting Air India for enforcement of the $1.2 billion arbitral award awarded to Cairn by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in light of the amendment vide TLA, 2021. Both the parties requested for stay of any further proceedings in the matter till 31st October, 2021 and requested for new dates in November, 2021 by stating that the stay of proceedings would give them additional time to evaluate the effects and the implications of the TLA, 20218.

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5   https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/business-laws/needed-framework-for-enforcement-of-investment-treaty-arbitration/article36302023.ece

6   https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/cairn-ups-ante-in-us-court-in-its-fight-against-india-on-tax-11630(news-item
dated 05.09.2021)

7   https://www.telegraphindia.com/business/cairn-energy-accepts-modi-governments-offer-to-refund-rs-7900-crore/cid/1829799
(news-item dated 07.09.2021)

Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, while indicating that the Government would appeal the Arbitral Award rendered in favour of Cairn Energy, also stated that ‘We have made our position clear on retrospective taxation. We have repeated it in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2020, till now. I don’t see any lack of clarity’, indicating the current Government’s stand of not raising any new demands on the basis of the retrospective amendment made vide the Finance Act, 20129.

TLA, 2021

Considering the adverse impact that the retrospective legislation had on the image of India in the International fora and in order to promote faster economic growth and employment, the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was proposed by the Ministry of Finance.

The said Bill was introduced by the Ministry of Finance in the Lok Sabha on 5th August, 2021 and was passed by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha on 6th August, 2021 and 9th August, 2021, respectively. Thereafter, the TLA, 2021 received the assent of the President of India on 13th August, 2021.

As per the said Act, the following amendments have been made to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:

A. Vide the newly-inserted 4th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that nothing contained in Explanation 5 shall apply to:

i. an assessment or reassessment to be made under sections 143, 144, 147,153A or 153C; or
ii. an order to be passed enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee u/s 154; or
iii. an order to be passed deeming a person to be an assessee in default under sub-section (1) of section 201,

in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012.

_______________________________________________________________________________

8   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/cairn-energy-air-india-seek-stay-on-new-york-court-proceedings/articleshow/86227073.cms
(news-item dated 15.09.2021)

9   https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/1-4-billion-cairn-arbitration-award-finance-minister-says-its-her-duty-to-appeal/articleshow/81348282.cms

B. Vide the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that where:

i. an assessment or reassessment has been made under sections 143, 144, 147,153A or 153C; or
ii. an order has been passed enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee u/s 154; or
iii. an order has been passed deeming a person to be an assessee in default under sub-section (1) of section 201; or
iv. an order has been passed imposing a penalty under Chapter XXI or u/s 221,

in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012 and the person in whose case such assessment or reassessment or order has been passed or made, as the case may be, fulfils the specified conditions, then, such assessment or reassessment or order, to the extent it relates to the said income, shall be deemed never to have been passed or made, as the case may be.

C. Vide the newly-inserted 6th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), it has been provided that where any amount becomes refundable to the person referred to in the 5th proviso as a consequence of him fulfilling the specified conditions, then, such amount shall be refunded to him, but no interest u/s 244A shall be paid on that amount.

Vide the Explanation inserted below the newly-inserted 6th proviso, the conditions to be satisfied for the purposes of the 5th and 6th provisos have been provided. To paraphrase, the following conditions have been provided:

• where the said person has filed any appeal before an appellate forum or a writ petition before the High Court or the Supreme Court against any order in respect of the said income, he shall either withdraw or submit an undertaking to withdraw such appeal or writ petition, in such form and manner as may be prescribed;
• where the said person has initiated any proceeding for arbitration, conciliation or mediation, or has given any notice thereof under any law for the time being in force or under any agreement entered into by India with any other country or territory outside India, whether for protection of investment or otherwise, he shall either withdraw or shall submit an undertaking to withdraw the claim, if any, in such proceedings or notice, in such form and manner as may be prescribed;
• the said person shall furnish an undertaking, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, waiving his right, whether direct or indirect, to seek or pursue any remedy or any claim in relation to the said income which may otherwise be available to him under any law for the time being in force, in equity, under any statute or under any agreement entered into by India with any country or territory outside India, whether for protection of investment or otherwise; and
• such other conditions as may be prescribed.

Necessary amendments have also been effected to section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012 which provided for validation of demand, etc., under the Income-tax Act, 1961 for cases relating to indirect transfer of Indian assets.

From the above amendments, one may clearly observe that a two-tier amendment has been made.

The first tier of amendment, consistent with the position of the Government not to levy or raise any new demands in light of the retrospective amendment vide the Finance Act, 2012, makes a necessary provision to that effect so as to provide that no tax demand shall be raised in future on the basis of retrospective amendment vide the Finance Act, 2012 for any offshore indirect transfer of Indian assets if the transaction is undertaken before 28th May, 2012 (i.e., the date on which the Finance Bill, 2012 received the assent of the President). It would be pertinent to note that in various instances, in the case of retrospective amendments, the law has expressly provided for provisions to ensure that past concluded assessments are not disturbed. In this regard, a useful reference may be made to the proviso to section 14A(1), section 92C(2B) and section 92CA(2C). Thus, the first tier of amendment made vide the newly-inserted 4th proviso is in line with the said provisions and provides protection in respect of transfers made prior to 28th May, 2012 from any fresh proceedings. It is rather wider than the said provisions, as it also provides protection from proceedings under sections 153A, 153C and 201(1).

As regards the second tier of amendment, it provides for nullification of assessments already made in respect of indirect transfer of Indian assets made before 28th May, 2012 (as validated by section 119 of the Finance Act, 2012) on fulfilment of certain conditions as specified.

Pursuant to such amendments, the CBDT has published the draft rules for implementing the amendments made by the TLA, 2021 on 28th August, 2021 inviting comments from all stakeholders latest by 4th September, 2021. Vide the said draft, CBDT has proposed to insert Rule 11UE along with Forms 1 to 4 which specify the conditions to be fulfilled and the process to be followed to give to the amendment made by the TLA, 2021.

The said rules provide for furnishing various undertakings including irrevocable withdrawal, discontinuance or an undertaking not to pursue any appeal / application / petition / proceedings. It is also required to forgo any awards received by it by virtue of any such related orders.

IMPACT OF TLA, 2021

The newly-inserted 5th proviso deals with nullification of assessment or reassessment. However, it does not deal with nullification of any demand raised or any interest levied u/s 234B or interest levied u/s 220(6) [which may have been levied due to non-payment of demand]. Thus, the question that would arise is whether nullification of assessment or reassessment would also lead to nullification of demands of tax and consequential interests. It may be noted that as per the legal jurisprudence that has evolved, ‘assessment’ has been held to be the entire process commencing from filing of return to passing of an assessment order and raising of consequential demand. Thus, when the ‘assessment’ is nullified, it would indicate that the demands along with interest would also get nullified. It may also be noted that the Supreme Court in ITO vs. Seghu Buchiah Setty [1964] 52 ITR 538 has held that there must be a valid order of assessment on which a notice of demand may be founded. Consequentially, when the assessment or reassessment to the extent it relates to income accruing or arising from indirect transfers is deemed to have never been made, the consequential demand and interest would also not survive.

It would be pertinent to note that by virtue of the amendment, the purchaser or payer who was liable to deduct tax at source by virtue of section 195 in respect of capital gains accruing to a non-resident assessee by virtue of indirect transfer under Explanations 5 to 7 to section 9(1)(i), can no longer be treated as an assessee-in-default u/s 201(1) if such purchaser or payer fulfils the conditions specified. However, it would be pertinent to note that the issue of treating a person as an assessee-in-default for non-deduction of tax at source in respect of past transactions in light of retrospective amendments, is no longer res integra in light of the decision in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited vs. CIT [2021] 432 ITR 471 (SC)/[2021] 125 taxmann.com 42 (SC), wherein it has been held that a person mentioned in section 195 of the Income-tax Act cannot be expected to do the impossible, namely, to apply retrospective provision at a time when such provisions were not actually and factually in the statute. Thus, from the payers’ point of view, the amendment nullifying its liability as an assessee-in-default u/s 201(1) is not of much relevance in light of the judgment in Engineering Analysis (Supra). As a result of the same, even if the deductors / payers who have been held to be in default choose not to comply with the conditions mentioned in the Explanation to the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos, the litigation continuing in the normal course as provided in the Income-tax Act would result in favourable verdicts for them in light of the judgment in Engineering Analysis (Supra). A deductor / payer may therefore not choose the option of the 5th proviso which requires him to forgo interest on refund. He would rather stay in the normal stream where he has more than a reasonable chance of success and in such event he need not forgo interest.

In certain cases, assessment may have been made by the Department on the purchasers or payers u/s 161 read with sections 160 and 163 in their capacity as agents (representative assessees) of the non-residents in respect of the income accruing or arising in respect of indirect transfers under Explanations 5 to 7 to section 9(1)(i) [for instance, the case of Vodafone]. In such case, the assessments made on such agents would be nullified if the conditions specified therein are satisfied.

It may be noted that clause (iii) of the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) only deals with an order deeming a person to be an assessee in default u/s 201(1) and does not deal with the case of deductors / payers in whose case disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) is made. It may also be noted that nullification of an order u/s 201(1) does not automatically absolve a person of the disallowance u/s 40(a)(i). However, the same may not be of much significance, given that the payment made towards acquisition of shares of a foreign company is not ordinarily claimed as revenue expenditure in respect of which a disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) may be made.

It may be possible that in certain cases, in order to put an end to litigation, the said person as specified in the newly-inserted 5th proviso may have made an application under the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 and duly paid the amount as specified in the Form No. 3 issued by the designated authority u/s 5(1) of the said Act. Section 7 of the said Act provides that any amount paid in pursuance of a declaration made u/s 4 shall not be refundable under any circumstances. It may be noted that as per the later part of the newly-inserted 5th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i), the assessment or reassessment or order, to the extent it relates to the income in respect of income accruing or arising through or from the transfer of an asset or a capital asset situate in India in consequence of the transfer of a share or interest in a company or entity registered or incorporated outside India made before the 28th day of May, 2012, shall be deemed never to have been passed or made. When the assessment or reassessment or order to the extent it relates to the said income is deemed never to have been passed or made, the question of the same being ‘disputed tax’ u/s 2(j) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 does not arise as the very demand ceases to exist in the eyes of law. In such circumstances, it cannot lie in the mouth of the Revenue to refuse the grant of refund of the amount paid as specified in the Form No. 3 issued by the designated authority u/s 5(1) of the said Act. If a sum is paid outside the aforesaid Act, the bar of refund should not apply to such payment as held in Hemalatha Gargya vs. CIT [2003] 259 ITR 1 (SC).

The newly-inserted 6th proviso to Explanation 5 to section 9(1)(i) provides that where any amount becomes refundable to the person referred to in the 5th proviso as a consequence of him fulfilling the specified conditions, then such amount shall be refunded to him, but no interest u/s 244A shall be paid on that amount. The said proviso appears to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is discriminatory and arbitrary. It may be noted that though taxing statutes being fiscal legislations enjoy a greater presumption towards the constitutionality of the same, the same must nevertheless satisfy the tests of Article 14 of the Constitution in order to save them from the vice of unconstitutionality. The newly-inserted 6th proviso may be discriminatory on the following three fronts:

a) There appears to be a clear discrimination between persons referred to in the 4th and 5th provisos. It may be noted that as regards the persons referred to in the 4th proviso, no new assessment would be made in respect of indirect transfers which have taken place prior to 28th May, 2012. Thus, no prejudice would be caused to them. However, in respect of persons referred to in the 5th proviso, who have already been assessed and recoveries may have been made from them, such recoveries are refundable without interest u/s 244A. While persons covered in the 4th proviso would not have parted with any funds and hence are justifiably not entitled to any compensatory interest, the persons covered in the 5th proviso having parted with funds are justifiably entitled to compensatory interest. These two categories of persons are in unequal situations but are treated equally insofar as non-payment of compensatory interest is concerned. This causes discrimination.

b) There also appears to be discrimination between persons to whom a sum is refundable on account of any other provision of the IT Act and persons to whom a sum is refundable under the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos. In case of the former, interest u/s 244A being a normal incident of refund would automatically accrue as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. [2014] 363 ITR 658 (SC). However, as regards the persons referred to in the 5th proviso, they would not be entitled to any refund despite there being a wrongful retention of sums by the Revenue in light of a non-existent demand.

c) The third type of discrimination occurs between persons who have effected indirect transfers but action is time-barred at the time when the TLA, 2021 was enacted and the persons referred to in the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos. As per section 149(1)(b) (as amended vide the Finance Act, 2021), the maximum time limit available to issue notice u/s 148 is ten years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Without going into the applicability of the said clause, it may be noted that even if the Department were to reopen past concluded assessments or assess any person in connection with income accruing or arising as a result of indirect transfer, it could at the maximum have done so in respect of A.Y. 2011-12 and for A.Y. 2012-13 (in respect of transfers concluded prior to 28th May, 2012 due to bar under the newly-inserted 4th proviso). Thus, in respect of transfers which have taken place prior to A.Y. 2011-12, no action under sections 147 and 148 would lie. However, in respect of persons who fall under the 5th and 6th provisos (which would include the above cases under sections 147 and 148), no interest on refund would accrue u/s 244A, leaving them in a position worse off than those who have escaped any action due to non-availability of any recourse under the provisions of the IT Act to the Department.

Thus, the validity and constitutionality of the 6th proviso being discriminatory on the above three counts may be subjected to challenge as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

It may be noted that the Draft Rule 11UE(3)(b)(I), in addition to furnishing of undertaking by the declarant, also requires furnishing of declaration by any of the interested parties which, as per Part K and Part L of the Form 1, refers to all the holding companies in the entire chain of holding as defined under the Companies Act, 2013 of the declarant, and all persons whose interest may be directly or indirectly affected by the undertaking in Form 1. Though Explanation (iv) to the newly-inserted 5th and 6th provisos is wide enough to empower the Board to prescribe any other conditions, such power does not extend to imposing conditions on persons other than the declarant assessee. Thus, the draft Rule 11UE(3)(b)(I)(ii) requiring such undertaking from interested third parties, if enacted without any change, may be subjected to challenge on the basis of being contrary to the provisions of the Act.

CONCLUSION


TLA, 2021 is a landmark step by the Indian Legislature in bringing about certainty in tax matters and restoring the faith of foreign investors in India as an attractive investment destination. It provides a great opportunity for various Multinational Groups or Companies who have been subjected to endless litigation to settle their disputes once and for all. It would enable them to receive refunds of huge amounts deposited with the Income-tax Department at various stages of litigation, thereby having a positive impact on their working capital situation.

CONSULTATION – CONCLUSION – CONSPIRACY

We live in a free society yet this editorial is written differently. You see, a newly-formed regulator (let’s call it NFR) brought out a paper with a view to seek comments. The NFR is funded by taxpayer money, the paper is in the public domain, the purpose of the paper is ‘consultation’ with stakeholders and the paper carries no proprietary inventions, secrets or exclusive material. Yet, the NFR has posted a notice on the report stating that no part of its report can be ‘reproduced’ or ‘circulated’ without its permission except for the purpose of making comments on that paper (that it is seeking or to NFR). So how should one deliberate the matter the paper seeks comments on, if one is forbidden from quoting it?

Often such ‘consultation’ is ‘conclusion’ in disguise. Papers like these are a spectacle of ‘superfluousness’ wrapped as ‘engagement’ (in case you didn’t know it, this is a typical Babucracy tactic where Delhi officials call for deliberations on a ‘pre-concluded’ agenda and the meeting is just for ‘due process’).

Take another trait: the paper doesn’t reveal what it will do with the comments! Place them in the public domain? What weightage will they have? Will they complete the ‘research’ and include responses as part of it? Well, a public body must at least demonstrate transparency, integrity and objectivity to the public. By publishing the comments from a wider audience of stakeholders, duly ‘appraised’ by an independent third party, will only add to their reliability, especially when these are meant for the purpose of policy!

Let’s look at the paper per se. The paper claims to give ‘research’ data. In the same breath, it qualifies the integrity of key data points by stating that there could be errors in that data which forms the basis of the NFR’s conclusions. For example, it states that about 1.8 lakh companies paid no audit fees for their audits; it also declares that this data could be erroneous and yet it says that payment of audit fees is a burden on ease of doing business! Could this be cognitive dissonance (confirmation bias)? The source data could be entirely wrong (in Form AOC 4 companies could have put several expenses including audit fees under one category rather than giving a break-up) which makes the paper’s conclusions absurd. A plain reasonableness test with meagre application of mind informs us that so many audits can’t be free! A slight effort to test this preposterous assumption with actual financials, even on a test basis, would have cured this fallacy.

Friends, the paper is a string of inaccuracies, false equivalences, cherry picking, baseless opinions and aspersions which show that it is casual and rather malicious.

Irrespective of the quality of the paper, should one ask a moot question: whether audit is not required for certain companies and jump to a Yes-No conclusion? In my view we cannot answer it till we can look at more data, do surveys and see what is achieved by audits for each type of entity depending on stakeholders’ needs, and the consequences of audit exemption. This, to be truly and honestly done, needs a wider discussion and not a paper from a regulator who has no ground level experience, no skin in the game and who is not even mandated.

Audit does a number of things for a wide spectrum of entities and more particularly SMEs and audited financials form the basis of several certificates and filings for various stakeholders. It’s a known fact that an audit adds value to SME entities in a real sense if they so desire. The NFR thinks the sole reason for audit is public interest.

Now let’s approach ease of doing business – as ‘ease of financial reporting and audit’ the NFR paper is cheesy: 1. No comments are carried about the numerous thresholds / exemptions for audit reporting – CARO, ICFR, Ind AS – AS, SMC, OPC. The Paper cherry-picks only one of these limits (the highest) and that too without assigning any reason. 2. Audit follows accounting and reporting; however, there are no comments about application of say Schedule III and other filings applicable to smaller companies. 3. No new ideas such as a Small Companies Act, 202X not just SME SA which has been talked about for years! 4. The paper lacks original ideas and conceals its lack of creativity with examples from the EU and the USA – from whom India is far away and much different. 5. The NFR paper gives references to state laws of the US and the EU, but no comparison with Indian parallels to see whether our business environments are even comparable. 6. It determines causality of low MCA filings by companies to lack of accounting professionals with them but without any reason or facts when filings could be arduous for small businesses. 7. It calls Rs. 50 crores as low turnover (NFR budget is less than that). 8. Says, banks do not rely on GPFS (I don’t know of a banker that doesn’t ask for GPFS before any conversation at all). 9. The NFR paper calculates imaginary standard audit costs and applies them to companies to make a point that is false and deceptive: audit costs are between 0.5% to 58% of PBT across various sizes of companies! It goes on to state that good quality audit will require an estimated standard COST of Rs. 1.50 lakhs (0.03%) to about Rs. 8 lakhs (0.16%) for companies with below Rs. 50 crores turnover. Fact: HPCL (a global Fortune 500 company with turnover of Rs. 2.98 lakh crores) in 2019-20 paid 0.000024% (Rs. 72 lakhs) as audit fees. By the NFR paper’s logic, the audit quality must be abysmal!

The paper is full of outlandish assumptions, fantasy, callousness, disregard for facts and bias.

While the reader should make her own judgement, let me leave you with the grand crescendo: about 3,500 out of six lakh active companies deserve audit as they fall within the Rs. 250-crore net worth benchmark.

I don’t even feel it is necessary to look at the effects of putting into practice what the paper construes. Why should NFR, which has never dirtied its hands in a real audit situation (and today auditors audit a market cap of $255 trillion plus the value of unlisted entities), give its brash verdict on audits and auditors? One can only extend the ‘logic’ and ‘verbiage’ of the NFR paper to infer that the amount paid for preparing this paper must be NIL since it cannot boast of any quality at all. As the title of this Editorial suggests, the reader can choose how much of this paper is about consultation, how much about conclusion and how much conspiracy!

Raman Jokhakar
Editor

 

TEACHERS’ DAY

The Fifth day of September is observed every year as Teachers’ Day to mark the birth anniversary of Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, the second President of India. He was a teacher (professor) and a great scholar of Indian Philosophy. ‘Palli’ means language. He knew many languages and he wrote treatises on Indian Philosophy, the Bhagavad Geeta, etc., which were acclaimed the world over.

In India, Ashadha Poornima (full moon) is observed as ‘Guru Poornima’ as a mark of respect to ‘Gurus’ or mentors. This is in honour of Maharshi Vyasa, the renowned sage. It falls sometime in the month of July every year. Let me take this opportunity to explain a few important and interesting thoughts on the Guru-shishya (teacher and student) relationship.

 (Shikshak) – We think that shikshak means one who teaches. However, interestingly, in the Sanskrit dictionary the first meaning of the word ‘Shikshak’ is ‘learner, student’. The root Shiksh (verb) means to learn. The second meaning is ‘teacher’.

– We think  (Acharya) means a teacher. However, the concept behind the word Acharya is he who teaches through ‘Aacharan’ (conduct). His conduct should be exemplary and worth emulating.

 (Acharya Devo Bhava) –  We think that this means a Guru is God. However, actually it means ‘you be the believer that Acharya is God and act accordingly’. It is a ‘command’ and not merely a statement. The same is the case with Matru Devo Bhava (mother) and Pitru Devo Bhava (father).

Teaching through example – There is an interesting quote, ‘Example is not the BEST way of teaching. It is the ONLY way of teaching.’ I feel the test of your having understood a concept is to be able to tell it with an example.

Good teacher – A good teacher is not the one who instantly solves all doubts of the student; but the one who teaches how to learn. He should develop among the students two main qualities – ‘Having a feel or judgement of the situation and ability to take decisions’.

 (Sadguru) – Literally, it means a good or righteous teacher. This term is generally used only in the field of spiritualism (Adhyatma).

The seven qualities of a good teacher are – (knowledge), (agility), (character), (art of explaining), (review), (sensitivity) and (pleasantness)(seven qualities).

 (Improper disciple) – Certain Stotras (prayers) and Mantras are not to be taught to an improper pupil. If one does it, one will be a sinner.

The ultimate test – There is one more beautiful and great thought. Ordinarily, one should always have a desire to succeed. However, your teaching should be so complete and whole-hearted that against two persons, one should always welcome a defeat – your son and your student.

—  This means that your son and student should become capable of surpassing you. This is the real test of a good teacher.

Friends, this is a very vast subject. Let us offer our ‘Namaskaars’ to such ideal ‘gurus’ or mentors.

REPRESENTATIONS

1.  Dated: 8th
September, 2020

     Subject: Request for making necessary legislative and procedural amendments
in the Income-tax Act, 1961 to ensure transparency in claim of Tax Deducted at
Source (TDS) and to reduce hardships to the taxpayers.

     To: The Chairman,
Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi

     Representation by:
Lucknow Chartered Accountants’ Society, Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,
Chartered Accountants Association, Ahmedabad, Chartered Accountants
Association, Surat, Karnataka State Chartered Accountants Association.

 

Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

2.  Dated: 23rd
September, 2020

     Subject: Request for taking up certain measures under Income-tax Act, 1961
in the backdrop of Covid-19 outbreak.

     To: Smt. Nirmala
Sitharaman, Hon’ble Minister of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi

     Representation by:
Lucknow Chartered Accountants’ Society, Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,
Chartered Accountants Association, Ahmedabad, Chartered Accountants
Association, Surat, Karnataka State Chartered Accountants Association.

 

Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

3.  Dated: 23rd
September, 2020

     Subject: Request for granting relief from provisions of Tax Collection at
Source (TCS) under section 206C(1H) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

     To: Smt. Nirmala
Sitharaman, Hon’ble Minister of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi

     Representation by:
Lucknow Chartered Accountants’ Society, Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,
Chartered Accountants Association, Ahmedabad, Chartered Accountants
Association, Surat, Karnataka State Chartered Accountants Association.

 

Note: For full Text of the above
Representation, visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

4.  Dated: 24th
September, 2020

     Subject: Extension of dates for various provisions under Goods &
Services Tax Act, 2017.

     To: The Hon’ble
Finance Minister & Chairperson, GST Council North Block, New Delhi

     Representation by:
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society.

 

Note: For full Text of the above Representation,
visit our website www.bcasonline.org

 

 

 

The structure of the atom has
been found by the mind. Therefore the mind is subtler than the atom. That which
is behind the mind, namely the individual soul, is subtler than the mind

  Ramanna Maharshi

FRONT-RUNNING: SEBI RUNS EVEN FASTER AFTER PERPETRATORS

BACKGROUND

A recent order
of SEBI (dated 7th August, 2020 in the matter of dealers of Reliance
Securities Limited) on front-running is noteworthy on several grounds. Firstly,
it has been rendered in less than four months after the alleged front-running
took place. The transactions in question took place from December, 2019 to
April, 2020; SEBI completed the preliminary examination which, as we shall see,
involved numerous aspects and passed its order on 7th August, 2020.

 

Secondly, as the
order shows, a lot of detailed detective work has been carried out wherein the
alleged connections between more than 25 parties have been detected and
demonstrated. The connections are in various ways. They are through
transactions in bank accounts, they are through calls made to each other, there
are social media connections and also through family relations between the
parties concerned. SEBI then passed an interim order banning from the capital
markets the parties allegedly involved in the front-running and also ordered
them to deposit the profits made until a final order has been passed.

 

Front-running
cases, like insider trading, are notoriously difficult to detect. Investigation
and demonstration of guilt is even tougher. In view of this, the meticulously
detailed order at a preliminary stage is credit-worthy.

 

This order is in
the matter of certain dealers of Reliance Securities Limited in respect of
transactions by Reliance in their capacity as stockbrokers for Tata Absolute
Return Fund, a scheme of Tata AIF, a SEBI-registered Alternate Investment Fund
(‘Tata Fund’). The interim order finds these parties, along with various
associated persons, to have been involved in front-running and allegedly making
profits by trading ahead of the large orders of Tata Fund.

 

WHAT IS FRONT-RUNNING?

There have been
several cases of front-running in the past and in respect of which SEBI has
passed orders. However, earlier what amounted to front-running and even whether
it was a violation of securities laws, was in question. Indeed, the Securities
Appellate Tribunal had even held that front–running did not amount to violation
of the securities laws then existing [e.g., Dipak Patel (2012) 116 SCL
581 (SAT)], [Sujit Karkera (2013) 118 SCL 84 (SAT)].
However, the
Supreme Court decision in the case of SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldeobhai Patel
[(2018) 207 Comp Cas 416 (SC)]
laid the matter more or less to rest and
held that it was a violation of specified provisions of the securities laws.
Further, the relevant clause in the SEBI PFUTP Regulations has also been
amended to explicitly include front-running as it is generally understood.
Hence, today, it is more or less well settled that front-running is a violation
punishable under the securities laws.

 

However, there
is no specific definition in the Securities Laws of the term ‘front-running’. There
are clauses that do describe what is understood as front-running. There are
also several other dictionary definitions and also a fairly detailed
description in the decision of the Supreme Court. For guidance, although in a
different context, there is also a definition of front-running in a SEBI
Circular (dated 25th May, 2012).

 

Front-running is
also known as trading ahead. It essentially means that, armed with valuable
information of a proposed large transaction which would result in a change in
the price of a security, a person, in breach of trust, trades before such a
transaction takes place and makes personal illicit profits. To take an example,
a stockbroker has been given an order to buy a very large quantity of shares of
a particular company by his client. The experienced stockbroker knows that this
order will result in a rise in the price of that scrip in the market. He then
proceeds to first buy for himself these shares at the then prevailing price.
After doing this, he places the order of his client at the increased price.
Simultaneously, he sells the shares that he has just acquired, at this higher
price. The result is that his client ends up paying a higher price for the
shares – and the difference is pocketed by the stockbroker.

 

This is breach
of trust of the client. This also affects faith in the markets and its
integrity because, if permitted, there would be concerns that such malpractices
can happen on a regular basis and cause losses to the public. SEBI has alleged
in this case that front-running harms not just the client but the market and
the public in general.

 

Front-running is
thus similar to insider trading. In insider trading, a person in possession of
price-sensitive information which has been given to him in trust, abuses such
trust and trades and makes a profit for himself. So also in front-running.
However, interestingly, there are comprehensive regulations for insider trading
that define various terms, have several deeming provisions, etc. This, at least
in theory, should help inside traders to be caught and punished. It is another
thing that insider trading is still notoriously rampant and yet difficult to
catch. Front-running, in comparison, has just one specific provision under the
PFUTP Regulations. There are no definitions, no deeming provisions, no
explanations of how persons may be deemed to have been connected as insiders,
etc. In this context, the SEBI order in the present case is thus a good case
study for all on how the violation has been established, albeit by an
interim order.

 

WHAT ARE THE ALLEGED FINDINGS OF THIS
CASE?

As discussed
earlier, the Tata Fund used to carry out trades through its stockbrokers,
Reliance Securities Ltd. The orders were large and expectedly would result in a
change in the price of the ordered scrip. A large purchase order would thus be
expected to result in rise in prices, and vice versa in case of an order
of sale. The Fund also dealt heavily in derivatives where, again, the impact of
the orders would be similar.

 

Front-running in
such a circumstance, as the order also explains in detail, follows two
strategies. In case of a purchase order, it is the Buy-Buy-Sell (BBS) strategy.
In case of a sale transaction, it is the Sell-Sell-Buy (SSB) strategy. If the
Fund had placed a buy order, the front-runner would buy ahead, and then place
the order of purchase for the Fund. Against such purchase order of the Fund,
the front-runner would sell the shares bought by him earlier.

 

SEBI found
through its surveillance that transactions suspiciously of the nature of
front-running were taking place. An analysis of the data followed and the
various parties who allegedly did the front-running were investigated. Their
connections with the dealers of the stockbroker who had executed the
transactions of the Fund were looked into by checking the bank transactions,
inquiry with the brokers, their phone records and even their Facebook accounts.
Personal connections and relations were also looked into. It was established
that three such dealers had connections directly or indirectly with various
parties who had actually traded ahead of the orders of the Fund. This was seen
in the equity segment as well as the derivative segment. The timing of these
orders and how they matched with the orders of the Fund were analysed. Analysis
was also done of the volume of trading of such persons, particularly in the
derivatives segment before and during the period when such alleged
front-running took place. It was alleged that a significant proportion of the
transactions of such parties matched with those of the Fund and a large amount
of profit was made in a short time by these parties.

 

In view of these
findings, SEBI passed an interim order and prohibited the parties from dealing
in or being associated with the securities market.

 

SEBI also
ordered these parties to deposit the profits allegedly made from front-running
– of nearly Rs. 4.50 crores – pending further investigation, a hearing to the
parties and a final order. The parties have been required to deposit this
amount within 15 days of the order. Their assets have also been frozen.

 

SOME ISSUES IN THE ORDER

As stated
earlier, the order is credit-worthy on several grounds. It has detected, even
in an interim way and through an ex parte order, a difficult case of
front-running. Not only this, the speed of detection and investigation is indeed
very fast. It is expected to act as a warning to those who indulge in such
activities.

 

However, there
are some concerns, too. To begin with, the connections alleged are on
relatively flimsy basis. A few phone calls between the dealer and the alleged
front-runner have been held sufficient to establish a connection. Transfers of
funds of relatively small amounts between parties have also become the basis of
the connection. What is surprising is that even being a Facebook friend is seen
as a connection. While checking the Facebook profiles of persons is surely good
use of modern technology to go behind the scenes, it is also unrealistic. It is
very common for people active on social media to have hundreds or even
thousands of so-called Facebook friends. Facebook, Twitter and even LinkedIn
are generally used for exchange of information and ideas and do not necessarily
mean that there is also an off-line connection between the parties.

 

Interestingly,
this is not the first time SEBI has used online connections to allege
‘connections’. In another case of alleged front-running, SEBI had noticed a
‘connection’ through a matrimonial site and passed an interim order (dated 4th
December, 2019). There have been other cases, too, where a Facebook connection
has been relied upon to allege ‘connections’.

 

The connection
alleged on account of the calls made between parties may also not be sufficient
to uphold such serious allegations. Unless the calls are timed with the
transactions it may be difficult to say that this meant such a connection that
parties are engaged in front-running together. In this case, of course, SEBI
has also tabulated the data of transactions and alleged that the timing also
matched.

 

Then there is
the connection alleged on account of financial transactions. Being an interim
order, it appears that no further information has been collected as to the
reason for entering into such transactions. It may be possible that such
financial transactions may be for genuine reasons having no connection with
front-running and also not establishing any connection sufficient for
front-running.

 

Nevertheless,
all these parties have been debarred even in the interim by this order. They
have been made to deposit a very large sum of money being alleged profits of
front-running. Their assets are also barred from sale, etc.

 

There is another
angle here. As stated, at least on first impression, the basis for alleging
connections is shaky. What is possible is that in the future such parties may
ensure that even such connections are not there, or not evident. After all,
these are white-collar crimes committed by educated people having a level of
sophistication. Indeed, if such flimsy connections are relied on, it may mean
that many persons perpetrating front-running would not come under the radar.

 

To conclude,
being an interim order, it may happen that the explanation given by the parties
may result in it being set aside either wholly or in part. Nevertheless, this
order is a wake-up call and a warning to persons operating the markets that
SEBI by its market surveillance collects and analyses information that may
throw up white-collar frauds. The fact that such white-collar frauds have been
tackled in a timely manner should make one hope that other less sophisticated
orders would also be caught in larger numbers.

 

 

Do not wait; the time will never
be ‘just right.’
Start where you stand and work with whatever tools you may have at your
command, and better tools will be found as you go along

 
George Herbert

 

LAW OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO WITNESSES TO A WILL

INTRODUCTION

One of the most crucial ingredients for a valid Will is the fact of it
being witnessed by two attesting witnesses. Many a Will has been found wanting
for the fact of improper attestation. However, what would be the state of a
Will where both the attesting witnesses are also dead and when it is being
proved in Court (say in a probate petition)? Would the Will suffer for want of
attestation or could it yet be considered valid? The Supreme Court was faced
with this interesting issue in the case of V. Kalyanaswamy (D) by LRs vs.
L. Bakthavatsalam (D) by LRs, Civil Appeal Nos. 1021-1026/2013, order dated 17th
July, 2020.
Let us analyse this case and other related judgments on
this issue.

 

FACTS AND THE ISSUE

In the Kalyanaswamy case (Supra) in the Supreme Court, both
the attesting witnesses to the Will were not alive. One of them was an
Income-tax practitioner and the other a doctor. The questions framed by the
Supreme Court for its consideration were as follows:

(a) When both the attesting witnesses are dead, is it required that the
attestation has to be proved by the two witnesses? Or

(b) Is it sufficient to prove that the attestation of at least one of the
attesting witnesses is in his handwriting and proving the testator’s signature?

 

Before we analyse the Court’s findings it would be worthwhile to understand
the requirements of witnessing a Will and the manner of proving the same.

 

WITNESSING A WILL

The mode of making a Will in India is provided in section 63 of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925. This Act applies to Wills by all persons other than
Muslims. For a Will to be valid under this Act, its execution by a testator
must be attested by at least two witnesses. The manner of witnessing a Will is
as is provided in section 63 of the Indian Succession Act which requires that
it is attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has:

(a) seen the testator sign the Will; or

(b)   received from the testator a
personal acknowledgement of his signature.

 

It is trite that the witnesses need not know the contents of the Will. All
that they need to see is the testator and each other signing the Will ~ nothing
more and nothing less!

 

MANNER OF EVIDENCE

Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘the
Evidence Act’) explains how a document that is required to be attested must be
proved to be executed. In the case of a Will, if the attesting witness is alive
and capable of giving evidence, then the Will can be proved only if one of the
attesting witnesses is called for proving its execution. Thus, in the case of a
Will, the witness must be examined in Court and he must confirm that he indeed
attested the execution of that Will.

 

WHAT IF WITNESSES CANNOT BE FOUND?

However, section 69 of the Act provides that if no such attesting witness
can be found, it must be proved that the attestation by at least one of the
witnesses is in his own handwriting and that the signature of the person
executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. Thus, evidence
needs to be produced which can confirm the signature of at least one of the
attesting witnesses to the Will as well as that of the testator of the Will.

 

The Madras High Court in N. Durga Bai vs. Mrs. C.S. Pandari Bai,
Testamentary Original Suit No. 22 of 2010, order dated 27th
February, 2017,
has explained that u/s 69 of the Evidence Act, two
conditions are required to be proved for valid proof of the Will, i.e., the
person who has acquaintance with the signature of one of the attesting
witnesses and also the person executing the document should identify both such
signatures before the court. In that case, a person had identified the
signature of the testator. However, his evidence clearly showed that he was not
acquainted with the signature of both the attesting witnesses. Therefore, the
High Court held there was no compliance of section 69.

 

The Supreme Court in Kalyanaswamy (Supra)
explained that the attesting witness not being found refers to a variety of
situations ~ it would cover a case of an incapacity on account of any physical
illness; a case where the attesting witnesses are dead; the attesting witness
could be mentally incapable / insane. Thus, the word ‘found’ is capable of
comprehending a situation as one where the attesting witness, though physically
available, is incapable of performing the task of proving the attestation and,
therefore, it becomes a situation where he is not found.

 

In Master Chankaya vs. State and others, Testamentary Case No.
40/1999, order dated 12th September, 2019
the Delhi High
Court explained that it was not the case of the petitioner that the attesting
witnesses could not be found. In fact, the petitioner had throughout contended
that he was aware of their whereabouts and assured the Court that he would
produce them before the Court. Later, he dropped the said witnesses on the
ground that their whereabouts were not known and he was therefore unable to
produce them. The Court held that the petitioner did not exhaust all the
remedies for producing the witnesses before it. The petitioner could have
resorted to issuance of a summons to the witnesses under Order 16 Rule 10 of
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for the purpose of seeking their appearance. No
such assistance was taken from the Court and hence section 69 could not
automatically be invoked. Thus, all possible remedies must be exhausted before
resorting to this section.

 

The Calcutta High Court in Amal Sankar Sen vs. The Dacca Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. (in liquidation), AIR 1945 Cal 350,
observed:

 

‘…In order that Section 69, Evidence Act, may be applied, mere taking out
of the summons or the service of summons upon an attesting witness or the mere
taking out of warrant against him is not sufficient. It is only when the
witness does not appear even after all the processes under Order 16 Rule 10,
which the Court considered to be fit and proper had been exhausted, that the
foundation will be laid for the application of Section 69, Evidence Act………In
order that S.69, Evidence Act, may be applied ………….the plaintiff must move the
Court for process under Order 16 Rule 10 Civil P.C., when a witness summoned by
him has failed to obey the summons…’

 

Further, in Hare Krishna Panigrahi vs. Jogneswar Panda & Ors.,
AIR 1939 Cal 688,
the Calcutta High Court observed that the section
required that the witness was actually produced before the court and then if he
denied execution or his memory failed or if he refused to prove or turned
hostile, other evidence could be admitted to prove execution. If, however, the
witness was not before the court at all and the question of denying or failing
to recollect the execution of the document did at all arise… the plaintiff
simply took out a summons against the witness and nothing further was done
later on. The court held that in all such cases it was the duty of the
plaintiff to exhaust all the processes of the court in order to compel the
attendance of any one of the attesting witnesses, and when the production of
such witnesses was not possible either legally or physically, the plaintiff
could avail of the provisions of section 69 of the Evidence Act.

 

In this respect, the Supreme Court in Babu Singh and others vs. Ram
Sahai alias Ram Singh (2008) 14 SCC 754
has explained that section 69
of the Evidence Act would apply where the witness is either dead or out of the
jurisdiction of the court, or kept out of the way by the adverse party, or
cannot be traced despite diligent search. Only in that event the Will may be
proved in the manner indicated in section 69, i.e., by examining witnesses who
were able to prove the handwriting of the testator. The burden of proof then
may be shifted to others. The Court further propounded that while in ordinary
circumstances a Will must be proved keeping in view the provisions of section
63 of the Indian Succession Act and section 68 of the Evidence Act, in the
extraneous circumstances laid down in section 69 of the Evidence Act, the
strict proof of execution and attestation stands relaxed. However, in this case
the signature and handwriting, as contemplated in section 69, must be proved.

 

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court in the Kalyanaswamy
case (Supra) considered the question whether (despite the fact
that both the attesting witnesses were dead), the matter to be proved u/s 69 of
the Evidence Act was the same as a matter to be proved u/s 68 of the same Act?
In other words, section 68 of the Act mandatorily requires that in the case of
a Will at least one of the attesting witnesses must not only be examined to
prove attestation by him, but he must also prove the attestation by the other
attesting witness. The court held that while it was open to prove the Will and
the attestation by examining a single attesting witness, it was incumbent upon
him to prove attestation not only by himself but also the attestation by the
other attesting witness.

 

The Apex Court agreed with the principle that section 69 of the Evidence
Act manifests a departure from the requirement embodied in section 68. In the
case of a Will, when an attesting witness is available, the Will is to be
proved by examining him. He must not only prove that the attestation was done
by him, but he must also prove the attestation by the other attesting witness.
This is subject to the situation which is contemplated in section 71 of the Evidence
Act which allows other evidence to be adduced in proof of the Will among other
documents where the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the
execution of the Will.

 

Section 71 of the Evidence Act states that if the
attesting witness to a document denies or does not recollect the execution of
that document, its execution may be proved by other evidence. The Apex Court
held that the fate of the transferee or a legatee under a document (which is
required by law to be attested), is not placed at the mercy of the attesting
witness and the law enables corroborative evidence to be effected for the
document despite denial of the execution of the document by the attesting
witness.

 

One of the important rules laid down by the Supreme Court is that in a case
covered u/s 69 of the Evidence Act, the requirement pertinent to section 68 of
the same Act (that the attestation by both the witnesses is to be proved by
examining at least one attesting witness), is dispensed with. In a case covered
u/s 69 what was to be proved as far as the attesting witness was concerned was
that the attestation of one of the attesting witness was in his handwriting.
The language of the section was clear and unambiguous. Section 68 of the
Evidence Act contemplated attestation of both attesting witnesses to be proved
but that was not the requirement in section 69.

 

The Court also dealt with another aspect about section 69 of the Evidence
Act. Section 69 spoke about proving the Will in the manner provided therein.
The word ‘proved’ was defined in section 3 of the Evidence Act as follows:

 

‘Proved. – A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters
before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular
case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.’

 

According to the Supreme Court, the question to be asked was whether having
regard to the evidence before it, the Court could believe the fact as proved.
The Court held that in a case where there was evidence which appeared to
conform to the requirement u/s 69, the Court was not relieved of its burden to
apply its mind to the evidence and it had to find whether the requirements of
section 69 were proved. In other words, the reliability of the evidence or the
credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the Court to still ponder over.
In this case, one of the witnesses was an Income-tax practitioner and the other
was a doctor. Both of them were respectable professionals who were well known
to the testator and there was no reason to doubt their credibility. Applying
these principles, the Supreme Court found that based on external evidence
before it, the signature of one of the attesting witnesses and the testator
were proved.

 

The Court also considered the physical and mental
capacity of the testator to make a valid Will. It held that as far as his
health was concerned, it was well settled that the requirement of sound
disposing capacity was not to be confused with physical well-being. A person
who has had a physical ailment may not automatically be robbed of his sound
disposing capacity. The fact that a person was afflicted with a physical
illness or that he was in excruciating pain would not deprive him of his
capacity to make a Will. What was important was whether he was conscious of
what he was doing and whether the Will reflected what he had chosen to decide.
In this case, the testator was suffering from cancer of the throat but there
was nothing to indicate in the evidence that he was incapable of making up his
own mind in the matter of leaving a Will behind. The fact that he was being fed
by a tube could hardly have deprived him of his capacity to make a Will.

 

Accordingly, the Court opined that the requirements of section 69 were
fulfilled and, hence, the Will was a valid Will.

 

CONCLUSION

A Will is a very important, if not the most
important, document which a person may execute. Selecting an appropriate
witness to the Will is equally important. Some suggestions in this respect are
selecting a relatively younger witness. Further, one should consider having
respectable professionals, businessmen, etc., as witnesses so that their
credibility is not doubted. As far as possible, have people who know the
testator well enough. In the event that both the witnesses predecease the
testator, he must make a new Will with new witnesses. Always remember, that all
precautions should be taken to ensure that a Will should live longer than the
testator!

 

PRACTICAL GUIDANCE ON SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE

There
are numerous situations where, concluding whether an investor exercises
significant influence over the investee and consequently whether the investee
is an associate of the investor, requires considerable judgement to be
exercised. When there is no significant influence, and an entity incorrectly
interprets the relationship to be that of significant influence, it will end up
wrongly consolidating (using the equity method) the entity in the consolidated
financial statements, rather than measuring it in accordance with Ind AS 109 – Financial
Instruments
and vice versa.

 

In this
article, we discuss two examples. But before we do that, it is important to
understand the following key provisions in Ind AS 28 – Investments in
Associates and Joint Ventures
which is reproduced below.

 

Paragraph
3 defines the following terms:

 

‘An associate is an entity over which the investor has significant
influence.’

 

‘Significant influence is the power to participate in the financial and
operating policy decisions of the investee but is not control or joint control
of those policies.’

 

Paragraph
5:

 

‘If an entity holds, directly or indirectly (e.g.
through subsidiaries), 20 per cent or more of the voting power of the investee,
it is presumed that the entity has significant influence, unless it can be
clearly demonstrated that this is not the case. Conversely, if the entity
holds, directly or indirectly (e.g., through subsidiaries), less than 20 per
cent of the voting power of the investee, it is presumed that the entity does not
have significant influence, unless such influence can be clearly demonstrated.
A substantial or majority ownership by another investor does not necessarily
preclude an entity from having significant influence.’

 

Paragraph
6:

 

‘The existence of significant influence by an entity is usually evidenced
in one or more of the following ways:

a)  representation on the board of
directors or equivalent governing body of the investee;

b)  participation in policy-making
processes, including participation in decisions about dividends or other
distributions;

c)  material transactions between the
entity and its investee;

d)  interchange of managerial
personnel; or

e)  provision of essential technical
information.’

 

Example 1A – Significant influence in a group structure

 

Fact Pattern

 

The
parent has two subsidiaries, Sub 1 and Sub 2. Sub 1 has a 16% ownership
interest in Sub 2. The group structure is as follows:

 

 

 

 

The
parent has appointed two executives of Sub 1 as Directors to the Board of Sub
2. Thanks to the number of Directors on the Board, the two Directors are able
to have an impact on Sub 2’s Board. The parent has the right to remove the two
executives from the Board at any time. Sub 1 has also been directed to manage
Sub 2 in a way that maximises the return for the parent, rather than for Sub 1.
The parent can amend this directive at any time. Whether Sub 1 has significant
influence over Sub 2?

 

Response

 

Ind AS
28:5 indicates that ‘[a] substantial or majority ownership by another investor
does not necessarily preclude an entity from having significant influence’. In
this fact pattern, however, Sub 1 does not have significant influence over Sub
2, because although Sub 1 can participate in policy-making decisions, the
parent can remove Sub 1’s executives from Sub 2’s Board at any time. Therefore,
Sub 1’s apparent position of significant influence over Sub 2 can be removed by
the parent and Sub 1 does not have the power to exercise significant influence
over Sub 2. Since Sub 1 does not have significant influence over Sub 2, Sub 2
is not an associate of Sub 1. It is actually the parent that has 100% control
over Sub 2, directly and indirectly through Sub 1.

 

Example 1B – Board
participation alone does not provide significant influence

 

Fact pattern

 

Internet
Ltd.’s Board is the ultimate decision-making authority and has ten Directors.
The shareholder analysis of Internet Ltd. shows the following shareholders.
Other shares are widely held by the public.

 

Shareholding

Board
representation

Viz Ltd.

38%

4

Fiz Ltd.

36%

4

Ke Ltd.

9%

1

Individual M (Managing Director of Internet Ltd.)
appointed by Viz Ltd.

6%

1

Others – widely held

11%

none

 

100%

10

 

Board
decisions are passed by a 70% majority of voting Directors. Is a 9%
shareholding and representation of one Director on the Board enough to provide
Ke Ltd. with significant influence?

 

Response

 

Whether
Ke Ltd. has significant influence is a matter of judgement. Ke Ltd. has only
one Director out of the ten. The Board is dominated by Viz and Fiz who can make
decisions without the agreement of the other Board members. Under Ind AS 28,
the Board representation is an indicator of significant influence. However, it
does not provide any further guidance on


how to evaluate the representation in the context of the size of the Board,
voting patterns, significant transactions, exchange of managerial personnel and
the like. Ke Ltd. only has 10% of the Board seats and believes this is not
enough to exercise significant influence, given the presence of the two major
investors and the Managing Director on the Board. Although Ke Ltd. participates
in the policy-making processes and decisions, that alone does not enable it to significantly
influence those decisions as suggested under Ind AS 28.

 

Having a
representation on the Board of Directors is an indicator of significant
influence. It is not an automatic confirmation. Additional analysis would be
required and relevant facts and circumstances will need to be considered. Ke
Ltd., in this scenario, holds far less than 20% shareholding threshold
indicated in the standard. It therefore does not have significant influence
over Internet Ltd.

 

CONCLUSION

The
determination of significant influence is a matter of considerable judgement
and needs careful evaluation of all the details, the facts and circumstances of
the case.



UNEXPLAINED DEPOSITS IN FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTS

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

A few years back, around 2011, the Government of France shared certain
information with the Government of India concerning deposits in several bank
accounts with HSBC Bank, Geneva, Switzerland held in the names of Indian
nationals, or where such nationals had a beneficial interest. The information
was received in the form of a document known as ‘Base Note’ wherein various
personal details of account holders such as name, date of birth, place of
birth, sex / gender, residential address, profession, nationality, date of
opening of bank account in HSBC Bank, Geneva and balances in certain years, etc.,
were mentioned.

 

A number of cases
have since then been reopened on the basis of the ‘Base Note’, leading to
reassessments involving substantial additions and sizable consequential
additions which are being contested in numerous appeals across the country
mainly on the following grounds:

(i)   the assessee is a resident of a foreign
country and his income is not taxable in India,

(ii)  the source of income of the assessee in India
has no connection with the bank deposits concerned,

(iii)  the bank account was not opened or operated by
the assessee,

(iv) the bank account was not in the name of the
assessee,

(v)  the bank account was in the name of a private
trust which was a discretionary trust and the assessee had not received any
payment or income from the trust,

(vi) the reopening was bad in law.

 

In addition to the
above defences, the assessees have also contended that the additions were made
on the basis of unauthentic material (the ‘Base Note’), that copies of the
material relied upon were not provided, or that adequate opportunity of hearing
was not provided, or that the principles of natural justice were violated on
various grounds, and also that the A.O. had failed in establishing his case for
addition and in linking the deposits to an Indian source.

 

More than 20 cases
have been adjudicated by the Tribunal or the courts on the issue of the
additions, some in favour of the Revenue, some against the Revenue and in
favour of the assessee, either on application of the provisions of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 or on the grounds of natural justice. Most of these
decisions have been rendered on the facts of the case. In a few cases, the
issue involved was about the possibility of taxing an income in India for a
year during which the assessee was a non-resident and was the beneficiary of a
discretionary trust under the Income-tax Act, 1961. In one of the cases, one of
the Mumbai benches of the Tribunal held that no addition could be made on
account of such deposits in the assessment year in the hands of the assessee who
was a non-resident and had not received any money on distribution from the
trust in that year. As against this, recently in another case, another Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal held that the addition was sustainable even when the
assessee in question was not a resident for the purposes of the Act and claimed
to be a beneficiary of a discretionary trust.

 

THE DEEPAK B. SHAH CASE

The issue came up
for consideration in the case of Deepak B. Shah 174 ITD 237 (Mum).
The assessees in this case had filed income-tax returns which were processed
u/s 143(1). Subsequently, the Government of India received information from the
French Government under DTAA that some Indian nationals and residents had
foreign bank accounts in HSBC Bank, Geneva, Switzerland which were not
disclosed to the Indian Tax Department. This information was received in the
form of a document known as ‘Base Note’ wherein various personal details of
account holders, such as name, date of birth, place of birth, sex / gender,
residential address, profession, nationality, date of opening of bank account
in HSBC Bank, Geneva and balances in certain years, etc., were mentioned. After
receiving the ‘Base Note’ as a part of the Swiss leaks, the Investigation Wing
of the Income Tax Department conducted a survey u/s 133A at the premises of one
Kanu B. Shah & Co. During the course of the survey proceedings, the ‘Base
Note’ was shown to the assessees Deepak B. Shah and Kunal N. Shah and it was
indicated that the Revenue was of the view that both the assessees had a
foreign bank account. The said foreign bank account was opened in 1997 by an
overseas discretionary trust known as ‘B’ Trust, set up by a Settlor, an NRI
since 1979 and a non-resident u/s 6. Both the assessees with Indian residency
were named as discretionary beneficiaries of the said trust.

 

The A.O. added peak
balance in the hands of both the assessees at Rs. 6,13,09,845 and Rs.
5,99,75,370 for assessment years 2006-07 and 2007-08, respectively. The same
additions were also made in the case of Dipendu Bapalal Shah who created the
private discretionary trust known as Balsun Trust.

 

On appeal, the
CIT(A) affirmed the addition to the tune of half of the peak balance in the
hands of both the assessees to avoid double taxation. The CIT(A) confirmed the
addition to the tune of Rs. 3,06,54,922 and Rs. 2,74,007 (sic) in
A.Ys. 2006-07 and 2007-08 u/s 69A of the Act in both the cases.

 

In the appellate
proceedings of Dipendu Bapalal Shah, the CIT(A) set aside the addition on the
basis that as an NRI none of his business monies earned outside India could be
brought to tax in India, unless they were shown to have arisen or accrued in
India. He also held that there was no linkage of the amounts to India and the
Revenue had not discharged its duty on this issue. The said order of the CIT(A)
in the case of Dy. CIT vs. Dipendu Bapalal Shah 171 ITD 602 (Mum.-Trib.)
was upheld by the Tribunal on the ground that the contents of the affidavit
dated 13th October, 2011 were not denied or proved to be not true by
the A.O. Further, it was held that the bank account with HSBC Bank, Geneva was
outside the purview of the IT Act as Dipendu Bapalal Shah was a non-resident
Indian.

 

In the second
appeal, the assessees reiterated the undisputed facts about the ‘Base Note’ of
2011, denied knowledge of any such bank account and highlighted that no
incriminating material was found during the course of the survey; the Settlor
had created and constituted an overseas discretionary trust known as ‘Balsun
Trust’ by making a contribution to the said trust from his own funds / sources
with Deepak and Kunal as discretionary beneficiaries of the said trust; during
the years under consideration, they did not receive any distribution of income
from the said trust as no such distribution was done by the trust during those
years; the Settlor was a foreign resident since 1979 and was a non-resident u/s
6 of the Act; the Settlor and both the assessees in their respective assessment
proceedings had filed their sworn-in affidavits; the affidavit of the Settlor was
sworn before the UAE authority, stating on oath that he had settled an offshore
discretionary trust with his initial contribution, none of the discretionary
beneficiaries had contributed any funds to the trust, and none of the
beneficiaries had received any distribution from the trust.

 

The sworn
affidavits of the assessees stated that they were not aware of the existence of
any of the accounts in HSBC Bank, Geneva, that they never carried out any
transactions in relation to the said account, nor received any benefit from the
said account, and that they had not signed any documents nor operated the said
bank account. A clarificatory letter from HSBC Bank, Geneva was also filed
stating that they had neither visited nor opened or operated the bank accounts
and that no payments had been received from them or made to them in relation to
the said account; the addition was made in three hands but the Commissioner
(Appeals) deleted the addition in the hands of the Settlor, which order of
deletion was also upheld by the coordinate bench of the Tribunal, holding that
the contents of the affidavit of the Settlor were not declined or held to be
not true by the A.O.

 

It was explained
further that the bank account of HSBC Bank, Geneva was out of the purview of
the IT Act, as the Settlor was a non-resident Indian since 1979; looking to the
decision of the coordinate bench holding that the money belonged to the
Settlor, who was a non-resident, and the income of the non-resident held abroad
was not assessable in India unless it was shown to have arisen or accrued in
India; since it was held by the Tribunal that the amount in the HSBC account in
Geneva was owned by the Settlor who was a non-resident, there was no
justification or reason to sustain the order of the Commissioner (Appeals); the
Revenue had completely failed to show any linkage of the foreign bank account
with Indian money; addition had been made u/s 69A and it was a sine qua non
for invoking section 69A that the assessee must be found to be the owner of
money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles. The money was held in the
name of the Settlor, who claimed to be the owner of the said deposits from his
own funds / sources, and the Revenue had failed to bring any cogent and
convincing materials on record which proved that the assessees were owners of
the money in the HSBC account.

 

It was further
contended that the Settlor was the owner of the HSBC Bank account, Geneva and
the assessees were discretionary beneficiaries which led to the positive
inference that they were not the owners of the said account and hence the
additions u/s 69A could not be sustained; the assessees had not made any
contribution to, nor done any transaction with, the said trust at all; the
income of the trust could not be added in the hands of the beneficiaries and
the trustees, as the representative assessees, were liable to be taxed on the
income of the trust; if the discretionary trust had made some distribution of
income during the year in favour of the discretionary beneficiaries, only then
was the distributed income taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries; but
nothing of the sort had happened nor had the assessees received any money as
distribution of income by the discretionary trust; so long as the money was not
distributed by the discretionary trust, the same could not be taxed in the
hands of the beneficiaries.

 

It was explained
that as per the provisions of sections 5 and 9 read with sections 160-166 of
the IT Act, qua a trust, the statute clearly prescribed a liability to
tax in the hands of the trustee, and stipulated that a discretionary
beneficiary having received no distribution would not be liable to tax. As
such, the provisions required to be read strictly and no tax liability could be
imputed to the assessees as discretionary beneficiaries when the statute
specifically provided otherwise.

 

The Revenue
contended that the affidavits filed were self-serving documents without any
corroborative or evidentiary value; in the affidavit of Dipendu Bapalal Shah,
there was no detail of his family members, and, therefore, the said document
was self-serving without any evidentiary value; the confirmation submitted by
HSBC Bank had confirmed the names of Deepak B. Shah and Kunal N. Shah (the
assessees); the names of the assessees had been mentioned in the information
received by the Government of India as a part of Swiss Leaks in relation to
HSBC Bank, Geneva by way of the ‘Base Note’; the assessee had refused to sign
any consent paper, which clearly showed that the said transactions were proved
beyond doubt that these two assessees had a connection with the said bank
account; the assessees did not co-operate at any stage of the proceedings; in
such clandestine operations and transactions, it was impossible to have direct
evidence or demonstrative proof of every move of the assessee and that the
income tax liability was to be assessed on the basis of parameters gathered
from the inquiries, and that the A.O. had no choice but to take recourse to the
material available on record.

 

The Tribunal, on
due consideration of the contentions of both the parties, vide
paragraphs 14, 15, 17 and 18 of the order held as under:

 

‘14. Further, the bank account of HSBC Bank, Geneva is out of the
purview of the IT Act, as Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah is a non-resident Indian
since 1979. In the case of the two appellants before us, the same amount was
added in AYs 2006-07 and 2007-08 which was reduced by Ld. CIT(A) to one half of
the total additions to avoid any double taxation affirming the additions to
that extent. Looking to the decision of the coordinate bench holding that the
money belonged to Mr. Dipendu B. Shah who is non-resident and the income of the
non-resident held abroad is not assessable in India unless it is shown to have
arisen or accrued in India. Since it is held by the ITAT that the amount in
HSBC Account in Geneva is owned by Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah who is non-resident
we do not find any justification or reasons to sustain the order of Ld. CIT(A)
when the Revenue has completely failed to show any linkage with foreign bank
account with Indian money. We find that addition has been made by the A.O. u/s
69A of the Act to justify the addition on account of peak balance. We agree
with the contentions of the Ld. AR that it is
sine
qua non for invoking section 69A of the IT Act, the assessee must be found
to be the owner of money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles and
whereas in the present case the money is owned and held by Mr. Dipendu Bapalal
Shah a foreign resident in an account (with) HSBC, Geneva and also admitted
that he is the owner of the money in the HSBC Account Geneva.’

 

‘15. In the present case the money is held in the name of Mr. Dipendu
Bapalal Shah who vehemently claimed to be owner of the said deposits from his
own fund / sources and the Revenue has failed to bring any cogent and
convincing materials on record which proved that the two appellants are owners
of the money in HSBC Account.’

 

‘17. In the present case, undisputedly Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah is owner
of HSBC Bank account, Geneva and the appellants are discretionary beneficiaries
which leads to positive inference that the appellants are not the owners of the
said bank account and hence the additions under section 69A cannot be
sustained. In the present case before us, admittedly both the appellants,
namely Deepak B. Shah and Kunal N. Shah are discretionary beneficiaries of the
“Balsun Trust” created by Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah and the two
appellants have not made any contribution nor done any transaction with the
said trust at all. In our opinion in the case of discretionary trust, the
income of the trust could not only be added in the hand of beneficiary but the
trustees are the representative assessees who are liable to be taxed for the
income of the trust. If the discretionary trust has made some distribution of
income during the year in favour of the discretionary beneficiaries only then
the distributed income is taxable in the hands of the beneficiaries but nothing
of the sort has happened nor two appellants have received any money as
distribution of income by the discretionary trust. So long as the money is not
distributed by the discretionary trust, the same cannot be taxed in the hands
of the beneficiaries. Similarly, in the present case before us, the deposits held
in HSBC, Geneva account cannot be taxed in the hand of beneficiaries /
appellants at all.’

 

‘18. So applying the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
abovesaid two decisions, we are of the considered view that the additions
cannot be made and sustained in the hands of the appellants as the Balsun Trust
is a discretionary trust created by Mr. Dipendu Bapalal Shah and said trust has
neither made any distribution of income nor did the two beneficiaries /
appellants receive any money by way of distribution. While the Department has
failed to bring any conclusive evidence to establish nexus between these two
appellants and the bank account in HSBC, Geneva and more so when Mr. Dipendu
Bapalal Shah has owned the balance in the HSBC, Geneva bank account, we are not
in agreement with the conclusions of the CIT(A) in sustaining the additions
equal to fifty percent of the peak balance in the hands of both the appellants.
Considering the facts of the two appellants, in view of various decisions as
discussed hereinabove, we hold that the order of CIT(A) is wrong in assuming
that the said money may belong to these two appellants and such conclusion is
against the facts on record and based on surmises and presumptions.
Accordingly, we set aside the order of Ld. CIT(A) and direct the A.O. to delete
the additions made u/s 69A in respect of HSBC Bank account for assessment years
2006-07 and 2007-08 in the case of both the appellants before us.’

 

In the result, the
appeals of the assessees were allowed and the additions made in their hands
were deleted.

 

THE RENU T. THARANI CASE

Recently, the issue
arose in the case of Renu T. Tharani 107 taxmann.com 804 (Mum).
The assessee in the case was an elderly woman in her late eighties. On 29th
July, 2006 she had filed her income tax return for A.Y. 2006-07 disclosing a
returned income of Rs. 1,70,800 in Ward 9(1), Bangalore. Her case was
transferred to Mumbai under an order dated 20th December, 2013
passed u/s 127 of the Act. The return was not subjected to any scrutiny and the
assessment thus reached finality as such. The investigation wing of the Income
Tax Department received information that the assessee had a bank account with
HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva. Based on the information, this case was
reopened for fresh assessment on 30th October, 2014 by issuance of a
notice u/s 148.

 

She responded by
stating that she had neither been an account holder of HSBC nor a beneficial
owner of any assets deposited in the account with HSBC Private Bank (Suisse)
SA, Switzerland, during the last ten years. It was further stated that HSBC
Private Bank (Suisse) SA had also confirmed that GWU Investments Ltd. was the
holder of account number 1414771 and, according to their records, GWU
Investments Limited used to be an underlying company of Tharani Family Trust,
of which Mrs. Renu Tharani was a discretionary beneficiary, and that the
Tharani Family Trust was terminated and none of the assets deposited with them
were distributed to her. It was further stated that the ‘Base Note’ issued was
inaccurate, as she did not have any account with HSBC Bank Geneva bearing
number BUP_SIFIC_PER_ID_5090178411 or any other number.

 

It was explained
that the income of a discretionary trust could not be taxed in her hands as per
the decision in the case of Estate of HMM Vikramsinhji of Gondal, 45
taxmann.com 552(SC),
wherein it was held that in the hands of the
beneficiary of a discretionary trust income could only be taxed when the income
was actually received, but in her case she had not received any money in the
capacity of beneficiary. It was submitted that in the light of the abovesaid
facts, there was no reason why the A.O. should insist on asking the assessee to
provide the details of the account standing in the name of GWU Investments
Ltd., as she was in no position to provide the details for the reasons
mentioned to the A.O.

 

However, none of
the submissions impressed the A.O. He rejected the submissions made by the
assessee and proceeded to make an addition of Rs. 196,46,79,146, being an
amount equivalent to US $3,97,38,122 at the relevant point of time, by
observing as follows:

 

‘12. The
assessee has not provided the bank account statement in which she is the
discretionary beneficiary nor has explained the sources of deposits made in the
said account… not acceptable because of the following reasons:

(a)  It is surprising that she does not know about
the Settlor of the Trust as well as the sources of deposits made in the HSBC
account. No bank account statement has been provided nor the source of deposits
made in the account explained by the assessee even after specific queries were
raised on this.

(b)  It is also surprising that as a beneficiary
she did not receive any assets when the Tharani Family Trust was terminated and
if that be so, then where all the money went after termination of the Tharani
Family Trust is open to question and the same remains unexplained.

(c)  Even though the returned income were not
substantial, these facts show that she is having her interests in India.

Considering the
facts of this case, the decision of the Hon’ble ITAT, Mumbai in the case of
Mohan Manoj Dhupelia in ITA No. 3544/Mum/2011 etc. is
directly applicable to this case.

In absence of
anything contrary, the only logical conclusion that can be inferred is that the
amounts deposited are unaccounted deposits sourced from India and therefore
taxable in India. This presumption is as per the provisions of section 114 of
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Thus, as per the
provisions of section 114 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also, it needs to be
held at this stage that the information / details not furnished were
unfavourable to the assessee and that the source of the money deposited in the
HSBC account is undisclosed and sourced from India.’

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee carried the matter in appeal but without any success. The CIT(A)
confirmed the conclusions so arrived at by the A.O. He noted as under:

 

‘21. The focus
of the submission is shifting responsibility on Assessing Officer without
furnishing any supplementary and relevant details. Vital facts (at cost of
repetition) regarding the entities involved / persons are as under:

A.  Smt. Renu Tharani is the beneficiary of
Tharani Family Trust.

B.  Smt. Renu Tharani is the sole beneficiary.

C.  Tharani Family Trust is the sole beneficiary
of GWU Investments Ltd.

D.  Smt. Renu Tharani holds interest in GWU
Investments Ltd. through Tharani Family Trust.

E.  Income attributable directly or indirectly to
GWU Investments Ltd. or Tharani Family Trust pertains to Smt. Renu Tharani.

F.  GWU Investments Ltd. having address in Cayman
Islands has investment manager as Shri Haresh Tharani, son of the appellant.

The holding
pattern of entities concerned and the contents of the base note cement the
issue. The fact that the appellant is sole beneficiary implies that there is
never a case of distribution and all income concerning the asset only belongs
to her, i.e., will accrue or arise only to her from the moment beneficial
rights came to the appellant.’

 

Coming to the
quantum of additions, however, the CIT(A) upheld the stand of the assessee and
gave certain directions to the A.O.

 

On second appeal,
the assessee stated that she was admittedly a non-resident assessee, inasmuch
as the impugned assessment was framed on the assessee in her residential status
as ‘non-resident’, and it was thus not at all required of her to disclose her
foreign bank accounts, even if any. It was explained that unlike in the United
States, where global taxation of income of the assessee was on the basis of
citizenship, the basis of taxability of income outside India, in India, was on
the basis of the residential status of the assessee. The fundamental principles
of taxation of global income in India were explained in detail to highlight
that unless someone was resident in India, taxability of such a person was
confined to income accruing or arising in India, income deemed to accrue or
arise in India, income received in India and income deemed to have been
received in India. None of those categories covered the income, even if any, on
account of an unexplained credit outside India.

 

The assessee
pointed out that since 23rd March, 2004 she was regularly residing
in the United States of America, and that, post the financial year ended 31st
March, 2006 onwards, the assessee was a non-resident assessee. In this
backdrop, she was not required to disclose any bank account outside India or
report any income outside India unless it was covered by the specific deeming
fiction which was admittedly not the case for her. It was, therefore, contended
that any sums credited in the bank account in question could not be taxed in
her hands.

 

Attention was
invited to a coordinate bench decision in the case of Hemant Mansukhlal
Pandya 100 taxmann.com 280, 174 ITD 101 (Mum),
wherein it was inter
alia
held that where additions were made to the income of an assessee who
was a non-resident since 25 years, since no material was brought on record to
show that funds were diverted by the assessee from India to source deposits
found in a foreign bank account, the impugned additions were unjustified. It
was thus contended that she, too, being a non-resident, such an income in
foreign bank deposits, even if that were so, could not be taxed in the hands of
the assessee.

 

It was further
contended that when the account did not belong to the assessee, there was no
question of the assessee being in a position to furnish any evidence in respect
of the same; that she did not have information whatsoever about the source of
deposits in this account, and the assets held therein; that the account was
held with GWU Investments Limited with which the assessee had no relationship
whatsoever; she at best was a beneficiary of the discretionary trust, settled
by GWU Investments Limited, but then in such an eventuality the question of
taxability would arise only at the point of time when the assessee actually
received any money from the trust by relying on the judgment in the case of Estate
of HMM Vikramsinhji of Gondal (Supra),
in support of the proposition;
that the entire case of the A.O. was based on gross misconception of facts and
ignorance of the well-settled legal position.

 

It was reiterated
that the assessee did not have any account with the HSBC Private Bank (Suisse)
SA, and yet she was treated as the owner of the account. The account was of the
investments, but was treated as a bank account. The assessee was a
non-resident, taxable in India in respect of her income earned in India, and yet
the assessee was being taxed in respect of an account which undisputedly had no
connection with India. Denying the tax liability in respect of such an account
at all, it was submitted that if at all it had tax implications anywhere in the
world, the liability was in the jurisdiction of which the assessee was a
resident. The assessee was taxable only on disbursement of the benefits to the
beneficiary, but then the beneficiary was being taxed in respect of the corpus
of the trust. The impugned additions were, even on merits, wholly devoid of any
substance.

 

The Revenue in
response vehemently relied upon, and elaborately justified, the orders of the
authorities below by highlighting that it was a case in which a specific
information had come to the possession of the Government of India, through
official channels, and this information, amongst other things, categorically
indicated that the assessee was a beneficiary and beneficial owner of a
particular account which had peak assets worth US $3,97,38,122 and that the
genuineness of the account was not in doubt and had not even been challenged by
the assessee, which reality could not be wished away. It was contended that the
IT Department had discharged its burden of proof by bringing on record
authentic information received through government channels about the bank
relationships which were unaccounted in India and unaccounted abroad, and
whatever documents the assessee had given were self-serving documents and
hyper-technical explanations, which did not contradict the official information
received by the Government of India through official channels, and it did in
fact corroborate and evidence the existence of the account with the assessee as
beneficiary and, in any case, the documents submitted could not be considered
enough to discharge the burden of the assessee that the evidences produced by
the Department were not genuine or the inescapable conclusions flowing from the
same were not tenable in law.

 

It was highlighted
by the Revenue that all that the assessee said was that she had no idea as to
who did it, and passed on the blame to a Cayman Island-based company which was
operating the said account, but then the Cayman Island company could not be a
person unconnected with the assessee. It was inconceivable that a rank outsider
would be generous enough to put that kind of huge money at her disposal or for
her benefit but, as a beneficiary, she was expected to know the related facts
which she alone knew. The fact of the Swiss Bank accounts being operated
through conduit companies based in tax havens was common knowledge and, seen in
that light, if the assessee had an account for her benefit in a Swiss Bank,
whether she operated it directly or through a web of proxies, the natural
presumption was that the money was her money which she must account for.

 

It was also pointed
out that within months of her changing the residential status, the account was
opened and the credits were afforded. Where did this money come from?
Obviously, in such a short span of time that kind of huge wealth of several
millions of dollars could not be earned by her abroad, but then if she had
shown that kind of earning anywhere to any tax authorities, to that extent, the
balance in Swiss account could be treated as explained. The technicalities
sought to be raised were of no use and the judicial precedents, rendered in an
altogether different context, could not be used to defend the unaccounted
wealth stashed away in the assessee’s account with HSBC Private Bank, Geneva.

 

In a brief
rejoinder, the assessee submitted that the sweeping generalisations by the
Revenue had no relevance to the facts before the Tribunal. The hard reality was
that the account did not belong to the assessee and that there was no direct or
indirect evidence to support that inference. The assessee was only a
beneficiary of a trust but the taxability in her hands must, at best, be
confined to the monies actually received from the trust; that admittedly GWU
Investments Ltd. was owner of the account in which the assessee was neither a
director nor a shareholder; and that, in any case, nothing remained in the
account as the same stood closed now. It was then reiterated that the assessee
was a non-resident and she could not be taxed in respect of monies credited,
even if that be so, in her accounts outside India; that there was no evidence
whatsoever of the assessee having an account abroad, that whatever evidence had
been given to the assessee was successfully controverted by her, that she was a
non-resident and her taxability was confined to the incomes sourced in India,
and that, for the detailed reasons advanced by her, the impugned addition of
Rs. 196,46,79,146 in respect of her alleged and non-existent bank account in
HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva must be deleted.

 

The Tribunal deemed
it important to recall the backdrop in which the information about the
assessee’s account with the HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA was received by the
Government of India to also refresh memories, and certain undisputed facts,
about the ‘HSBC Private Bank Geneva scandal’ as it was often referred to. In
paragraph 23 of the judgment, it detailed the backdrop. In paragraph 24, it
also referred to one more BBC report, which could throw some light on the
backdrop of this case, and found the report worth a look at by reproducing
extensively from it. The Tribunal further noted that those actions of the HSBC
Private Bank (Suisse) SA had not gone unnoticed so far as law enforcement
agencies were concerned, and the bank had to face criminal investigations in
several parts of the globe, and had to pay millions of dollars in settlement
for its lapses. In paragraph 26, it explained that the above press reports were
referred to just to set the backdrop in which the case before them was set out,
and, as they explain the rationale of their decision, the relevance of the
backdrop would be appreciated.

 

The Tribunal took it upon itself to examine the trust structures
employed by HSBC Private Bank since a lot had been said about the assessee
being a discretionary beneficiary of a trust which was said to have the account
with HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva. The Tribunal found that it would be
of some use to understand the nature of trust services offered by HSBC Private
Bank, as stated on their website even on the date of the decision.

 

It noted that the
assessee had shifted to the USA just seven days before the beginning of the
relevant previous year, and it would be too unrealistic an assumption that
within those seven days plus the relevant financial year, the assessee could
have earned that huge an amount of around Rs. 200 crores which, at the rate at
which she did earn in India in the last year, would have taken her more than
11,500 years to earn. Even if one went by the basis, though the material on
record at the time of recording reasons did not at all indicate so, that the
assessee was a non-resident for the assessment year, which was, going by the
specific submissions of the assessee, admittedly the first year of her
‘non-resident’ status, it was wholly unrealistic to assume that the money at
her disposal in the Swiss Bank account reflected income earned outside India in
such a short period of one year.

 

The Tribunal took a
very critical note of the fact that the assessee had, in response to a specific
request from the A.O., declined to sign ‘consent waiver’ so as to enable the IT
Department to obtain all the necessary details from the HSBC Private Bank
(Suisse) SA, Geneva which aspect of the matter was clear from the extracts from
the assessee’s submissions dated 25th February, 2015 filed by the
A.O. as follows:

 

‘……..we would
like to submit that the letter from HSBC Private Bank dated 5th
January, 2015 categorically states that the assessee does not have any account
in HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA in Switzerland, hence question of providing
you with CD of HSBC Bank account statement does not arise. Also, the question
of signing the consent waiver does not arise as the assessee does not have any
account in HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA.’

 

The Tribunal
observed that the net effect of not signing the consent waiver form was that
the A.O. was deprived of the opportunity to seek relevant information from the
bank in respect of the assessee’s bank account; if she had nothing to hide,
there was no reason for not signing the consent waiver form; all that the
consent waiver form did was to waive any objection to the furnishing of
information relating to the assessee’s bank account, i.e. HSBC Private Bank
(Suisse) SA Geneva in her case. The Tribunal found it necessary to take note of
the above position so as to understand that the assessee had not come with
clean hands and, quite to the contrary, had made conscious efforts to scuttle
the Department’s endeavours to get at the truth.

 

Proceeding with the
consent letter aspect, the Tribunal further observed that clearly, therefore,
the consent waiver being furnished by the assessee did not put the assessee to
any disadvantage so far as getting at the actual truth was concerned. Of
course, when the monies so kept in such banks abroad were legal or the
allegations incorrect, the assessee could always, and in many a case assessees
did, co-operate with the investigations by giving the consent waivers. The case
before the Tribunal, however, was in the category of cases in which consent
waiver had been emphatically declined by the assessee, and thus a deeper probe
by the Department had been successfully scuttled.

 

On the aspect of
the consent, the Tribunal found it useful to refer to a judgment of the
jurisdictional Bombay High Court on materially similar facts, wherein the Court
had disapproved and deprecated the conduct of the assessee in not signing the
consent waiver form, in the judgment reported as Soignee R. Kothari’s
case
in 80 taxmann.com 240. The Tribunal noted that it
was also a case in which the assessee, originally a resident in India, had
migrated to the USA and in whose case the information by way of a ‘Base Note’
was received from the French Government under the DTAA mechanism (as in the
assessee’s case), about the existence of her bank account with the same bank,
i.e. HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva; it was a case in which the assessee
had declined to sign the consent waiver form outright, and taken a stand that
the question of signing the consent waiver form did not arise. Neither such a
conduct could be appreciated, nor anyone with such a conduct merited any
leniency, the Court had held in that case.

 

The Tribunal
observed that on the one hand the assessee had not co-operated with the IT
authorities in obtaining the relevant information from HSBC Private Bank (Suisse)
SA Geneva, or rather obstructed the flow of full, complete and correct
information from the said bank by not waiving her rights to protect privacy for
transactions with the bank, and, on the other hand, the assessee had complained
that the IT authorities had not been able to find relevant information.
Obviously, those two things could not go together.

 

The Tribunal found
that while the claim of the assessee was that she was a discretionary
beneficiary of the Tharani Family Trust, that fact did not find mention in the
‘Base Note’ which showed that the assessee was the beneficial owner or
beneficiary of GWU Investments Ltd.; that in the remand report filed by the
A.O., there was a reference to some unsigned draft copy of the trust deed
having been filed before him but neither the deed was authentic nor was it
placed before the Tribunal in the paper-book. The assessee had not submitted
the trust deed or any related papers but merely referred to a somewhat
tentative claim made in a letter between one Mahesh Tharani, apparently a
relative of the assessee, and the HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA, an
organisation with a globally established track record of hoodwinking tax
authorities worldwide. Nothing was clear, nor did the assessee throw any light
on the same. The letter did not deny, nor show any material to controvert, what
was stated in the ‘Base Note’ i.e. GWU Investments Ltd. and the assessee were
linked as beneficial owners. There was no dispute that the account was in the
nominal name of GSW Investments Ltd., but the question was who was the natural
person / beneficial owner thereof. As for the trust, there was no corroborative
evidence about the statement, but nothing turned thereon as well. The assessee
being the discretionary beneficiary owner of the trust, and beneficial owner of
the underlying company, was not mutually exclusive anyway; but the claim of the
assessee being a discretionary beneficiary of the trust was without even
minimal evidence.

 

As regards the
reference to the judgment in the case of the estate of HMM Vikramsinhji
of Gondal (Supra),
the Tribunal noted that it was important to
understand that it was a case in which a discretionary trust was settled by the
assessee and the limited question for adjudication was taxability of the income
of the trust, after the death of the Settlor and in the hands of the
beneficiary. The observations had no relevance in the context of the case of
the assessee; firstly, neither was there any trust deed before the Tribunal,
nor the question before it pertained to the taxability of the income of the
trust; secondly, beyond a mention in the ‘Base Note’ as a personnes légales
liées
(i.e. related legal persons), there was no evidence even about the
existence, leave aside the nature, of the trust; thirdly, the point of
taxability here was beneficial ownership of GWU Investments Ltd., a Cayman
Island-based company, by the assessee; finally, even if there was a dispute
about the alleged trust, the dispute was with respect to taxability of funds
found with the trust and the source thereof. Clearly, therefore, the issue
adjudicated upon in the said decision had no relevance in the present context.
The very reliance on the said decision presupposed that the assessee was
discretionary beneficiary simplicitor of a discretionary family trust,
and nothing more – an assumption which was far from established on the facts of
the case.

 

As regards the
question of income which could be brought to tax in the hands of the assessee,
being a non-resident, and certain errors in computation on account of duplicity
of entries, etc., the Tribunal had noted that the CIT(A) had given certain
directions which it had reproduced in paragraph 18 of the Order, and those
directions were neither challenged nor any infirmities were shown therein. Obviously,
therefore, there was no occasion, or even prayer, for interference in the same.

 

In the end, the
Tribunal while confirming the order of the A.O. read with the order of the
CIT(A), nonetheless recorded that their decision could not be an authority for
the proposition that wherever the name of the assessee figured in a ‘Base Note’
from HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva an addition would be justified in
each case. The mere fact of an account in HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA Geneva
by itself could not mean that the monies in the account were unaccounted,
illegitimate or illegal. The conduct of the assessee, the actual facts of each
case, and the surrounding circumstances were to be examined on merits, and then
a call was to be taken about whether or not the explanation of the assessee
merited acceptance. There could not be a short-cut and a one-size-fits-all
approach to the exercise.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The provisions of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 extend to the whole of India vide section 1 of
the Act. Section 4 of the Act provides for the charge of income tax in respect
of the total income of the previous year of a person. The total income so
liable to tax includes, vide section 5 of the Act, the income of a
person who is a non-resident, derived from whatever source which is received or
is deemed to be received in India or has accrued or arisen or is deemed to
accrue or arise to him in India. A receipt by any person on behalf of the
assessee is also subject to tax in India. The scope of the total income subject
to tax in case of a resident is a little wider inasmuch as, besides the income
referred to above, he is also liable to tax in respect of the income that
accrues or arises to him outside India, too, unless the person happens to be
Not Ordinarily Resident in India.

 

Section 9 expands
the scope of the income that is deemed to have accrued or arisen in India even
where not actually accrued or arisen in India and the income listed therein, in
the circumstances listed in section 9, such income would be ordinarily taxable
in India even where belonging to a non-resident, subject of course to the
provisions of sections 90, 90A and 91 of the Act.

 

The sum and
substance of the provisions is that the global income of a resident is taxable
in India, irrespective of its place of accrual. In contrast, income in the case
of a non-resident or Not Ordinarily Resident person is taxed in India only
where such an income is received in India or has accrued or arisen in India or
where it is deemed to be so received or accrued or arisen.

 

In both the cases
under consideration the assessees were non-residents and applying the
principles of taxation explained above, the income could be taxed in their
hands only where such income for the respective assessment years under
consideration was received in India or had accrued or arisen in India or where
it was deemed to be so. In both cases, the deposits were made during the
relevant financial year in the bank account with HSBC Geneva, Switzerland held
in the name of the discretionary trust or its nominee during the period when
the assessees in question were non-residents for the purposes of the Act. In
both the cases, the provisions of section 5 were highlighted before the
authorities to explain that the deposits in question did not represent any
income of the assessee that was received in India or had accrued or arisen in
India or where it was deemed to be so. In both cases, the assessees were the
beneficiaries of discretionary trusts and had not received any money or income
on distribution by the trust and it was explained to the authorities that the
additions could not have been made in the hands of the beneficiaries of such
trusts. In both the cases, the authorities had sought the consent of the
assessees for facilitating the investigation with the Swiss bank and collecting
information and documents from the bank – and in both the cases the consent was
refused.

 

In the first case
of Deepak B. Shah, the Tribunal found that the assessee was a non-resident for
many years, and the A.O. had failed to establish any connection between the
deposits in the impugned bank account and his Indian income. No addition was
held to be sustainable by the Tribunal in the hands of the non-resident
assessee on account of such deposits which could not be considered to be
received in India or had accrued or arisen in India or was deemed to be so. In
this case, the bank account was in the name of a discretionary trust of which
the assessee was a beneficiary and the Settlor of the trust had admitted the
ownership of the funds in the bank account and these facts weighed heavily with
the Tribunal in deleting the additions. It held that a beneficiary of the
discretionary trust could be taxed only when there was a receipt by him during
the year, on distribution by the trust.

 

And in the second
case, of Renu T. Tharani, the assessee, aged 83 years, a resident of the USA
for a few years, was a sole beneficiary of a discretionary trust who operated
the HSBC Geneva bank account. The addition was made in the hands of the
beneficiary assessee on account of deposits in a foreign bank account held in
the name of a company, whose shares were held by a discretionary trust, the
Tharani Beneficiary Trust; in the course of reopening and reassessment, and on
appeal to the Tribunal, the addition was sustained in spite of the fact that
not much material was available for linking the deposits to the Indian income
of the assessee for the year under consideration, and the fact that the
assessee was a beneficiary of the discretionary trust from which she had not
received any income on distribution during that year.

 

In the latter
decision, the assessee had brought to the attention of the Tribunal the
decision in the case of Hemant Mansukhlal Pandya, 100 taxmann.com 280
(Mum)
but that did not help her case. The fact that the assessee had
refused to grant the consent, as required under the treaties and agreements,
for facilitating the inquiry and investigation by permitting the authorities to
obtain documents from the foreign bank, had substantially influenced the
adjudication by the Tribunal. That the bank account was closed and the trust
was dissolved with no trail was also a factor that was not very helpful. The
fact that the trust was in a tax haven, Cayman Islands, and was managed by
‘professional trustees’ did not help the case of the assessee. The Tribunal
gave due importance to the international reports on the clandestine movement of
funds to go to the root of the source. It was also not very happy with the
genuineness of the evidences produced or their authenticity and also with the
withholding of information by the assessee, as also with the limited
co-operation extended by her.

 

The fact that the
assessee in the latter case had ceased to be a resident only a few years in the
past and had left India just a year before the year of deposit, and that the
quantum of deposits was very huge, might have influenced the outcome in the
case, though in our opinion these factors were not determinative of the
outcome. It is true that the deposits were made during the year under
consideration, but it is equally true that during the year under consideration
the assessee was a non-resident and therefore the addition to the income could
have been sustained only if it was found to have been received in India or was
linked to Indian operations. The fact that the assessee was a beneficiary of a
discretionary trust and the bank account was not in her name but in the name of
the company that belonged to the trust, coupled with the fact that the assessee
had not received any money on distribution from the trust during the year, are
the factors which weighed in favour of not taxing the assessee, but although
considered, these did not inspire the Tribunal to delete the addition.

 

The decisions of
the Apex Court relating to the taxation of a discretionary trust were held by
the Tribunal to be delivered in the context of the facts of the cases before
the Court and not applicable to the facts and the issue before it. In case of a
discretionary trust, the beneficiaries could be taxed only on receipt from the
trust on distribution of income by the trust. Please see Estate of HMM
Vikramsinhji of Gondal 45 taxamnn.com 552 (SC);
and Smt. Kamalini
Khatau 209 ITR 101 (SC).

 

The Tribunal in the
first case of Deepak B. Shah approved the contention of the assessee that the
addition in his hands was not sustainable in a case where the bank account was
in the name of the discretionary trust and the assessee was only the
beneficiary. It also upheld that the addition could not have been sustained
when no income of the trust was distributed amongst the beneficiaries. Its
decision was also influenced by the fact that the Settlor of the trust had
admitted the ownership of the account and the addition made in the Settlor’s
hands was deleted vide an order of the ITAT, reported in 171 ITD
602 (Mum)
in the name of Dipendu B. Shah on the ground that the
Settlor was a non-resident during the year under consideration.

 

As against that, in
the latter case of Renu T. Tharani, all the three facts that influenced the
Tribunal in the Deepak B. Shah case were claimed to be present. But those facts
did not deter the Tribunal from sustaining the addition, perhaps for the lack
of evidence acceptable to it to satisfy itself and delete the addition on the
basis of the evidence available on record. Had proper evidence in support of
the existence of a discretionary trust or in support of the non-resident source
of the funds been available, it could have strengthened the case of the
assessee.

 

There was no
finding of the A.O. to the effect that there was, nor had the A.O. established,
any Indian connection to the deposits. If the deposits were considered to be
made out of her income while she was in India, then such income should have
been taxed in that year alone, and not in the year of deposit.

 

A receipt in the
hands of a non-resident in a foreign country is not taxable under the Indian
tax laws unless such a receipt is found to be connected to an Indian activity
giving rise to accrual or arising of income in India. Please see Finlay
Corporation Ltd. 86 ITD 626 (Delhi); Suresh Nanda 352 ITR 611 (Delhi);

and Smt. Sushila Ramaswamy 37 SOT 146; Saraswati Holding Corporation 111
TTJ Delhi 334;
and Vodafone International Holding B.V. 17
taxmann.com 202 (SC).

 

Besides various
unreported case laws, the issue of addition based on the said ‘Base Note’
concerning the deposits in HSBC Bank account Geneva, Switzerland arose in the
following reported cases:

1.  Mohan M. Dhupelia, 67 SOT 12 (URO) (Mum)

2.  Ambrish Manoj Dhupelia, 87 taxmann.com 195
(Mum)

3.  Hemant Mansukhlal Pandya, 100 Taxmann.com 280
(Mum)

4.  Shravan Gupta, 81 taxmann.com 123 (Delhi)

5.  Shyam Sunder Jindal, 164 ITD 470 (Delhi)

6.  Soignee R. Kothari, 80 taxmann.com 240 (Bom).

 

The first two cases
were decided by the Tribunal against the assessees, while the later cases were
decided in favour of the assessee mainly on account of the failure of the A.O.
to establish the nexus of the bank deposits to an Indian source of income or to
adhere to the rules of natural justice or to obtain authentic documents.

 

A deposit in the
foreign bank account of a trust wherein the assessee was a beneficiary of a
trust was held to be taxable in the hands of the assessee for A.Y. 2002-03 for
the inability of the assessee to render satisfactory explanation in the course
of reopening and reassessment which were also held to be valid. Please see Mohan
M. Dhupelia, 67 SOT 12 (URO) (Mum).
Also see Ambrish Manoj
Dhupelia, 87 taxmann.com 195 (Mum).

 

The assessee, a
non-resident since 25 years, was found to have a foreign bank account in HSBC
Bank Geneva in his name for which no explanation was provided by the assessee,
staying in Japan for A.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08. The addition made by the A.O.
was deleted on the ground that the A.O. had not brought on record any material
to show that the income had accrued or arisen in India and the money was
diverted by the assessee from India. As against that, the assessee had proved
that he was a non-resident for 25 years. Please see Hemant Mansukhlal
Pandya, 100 Taxmann.com 280 (Mum).

 

In the absence of a
nexus between the deposits found in a foreign bank account and the source of
income derived from India, the addition made for A.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08 on
account of deposits in HSBC Account Geneva on the basis of a ‘Base Note’ in the
hands of the assessee who was a non-resident since 1990, was deleted. The
assessee was a Belgian resident. Please see Dipendu Bapalal Shah 171 ITD
602 (Mum).

 

For A.Y. 2006-07,
the A.O. had made additions to the total income on account of deposits in a
foreign bank account with HSBC Geneva. The assessee claimed complete ignorance
of the fact of the bank account. The addition was deleted on the ground that it
was made on the basis of unsubstantiated documents which were not signed by any
bank official and were without any adequate and reliable information. Please
see Shravan Gupta, 81 taxmann.com 123 (Delhi).

 

The addition was
made by the A.O. to the assessee’s income in respect of undisclosed amount kept
in a foreign bank account HSBC, Geneva, Switzerland. However, the same was set
aside due to non-availability of authentic documents and requisite information
to be relied upon by the A.O. to make the addition. Please see Shyam
Sunder Jindal, 164 ITD 470 (Delhi).

 

ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE REQUIREMENTS REGULATIONS – AN OVERVIEW

1.0 
Introduction

‘Substance
over Form’ is an evergreen debate now tilting in favour of the former. Can a
legal form justify weak substance, or can a strong substance without a legal form be relevant or
practical? Does one score over the other? Are they interdependent or independent
of each other? How does one determine substance in a given transaction or
arrangement? Is it necessary to lift the corporate veil each time to examine
substance? Can a perfectly legal structure within the four corners of the law
be challenged and ignored for want of (or say, apparent lack of) substance? Is
every case of double non-taxation or lower taxation attributable to lack of
substance? There are a host of questions in this arena, some with answers, many
with grey areas and some without an answer. The easiest answer, perhaps, could
be that each case is fact-specific. However, in this uniqueness we need to have
certain rules and regulations and / or patterns to determine substance and give
tax certainty to businesses.

Recently, many jurisdictions introduced
Economic Substance Requirements Regulations (or ESR Regulations) for
enterprises carrying on business activities in / from that jurisdiction in any
form.

In this Article, we shall attempt to
understand what are the provisions of a typical ESR Regulations regime, their
significance and how does one comply with them.

 

2.0 
Genesis of substance requirements

Way back in 1998, OECD published a Report
on ‘Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue’ expressing
concern about the preferential regimes that lack in transparency and that are
being used by Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) for artificial profit shifting.
OECD created the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) to review and monitor
compliances by preferential tax regimes with respect to transparency and other
aspects of tax structuring.

One of the twelve factors set out in the
1998 Report to determine whether a preferential regime is potentially harmful
or not was, ‘The regime encourages operations or arrangements that are purely
tax-driven and involve no substantial
activities’.

Fifteen Action Plans to prevent BEPS are
based on the following three main pillars:

(1) coherence of corporate tax at the
international level,

(2) realignment of taxation and substance,
and

(3) transparency, coupled with certainty
and predictability.

BEPS Action Plan 5 dealing with ‘Countering
Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and
Substance,’
intends to achieve the objectives of the second pillar of
realigning taxation with substance to ensure that taxable profits are not
artificially shifted away from countries where value is created.
 

FHTP identified many harmful preferential
tax regimes that were providing an ideal atmosphere for profit-shifting with no
or low effective tax rates, lack of transparency and no effective exchange of
information.

To counter such harmful regimes more
effectively, BEPS Action Plan 5 requires FHTP to revamp the work on harmful tax
practices, with priority and renewed focus on requiring substantial activity
for any preferential regime and on improving transparency, including compulsory
spontaneous exchange on rulings related to preferential regimes1.

_____________________________________________________________

1 Paragraph 23 of the BEPS Action Plan 5


3.0 
FHTP’s approaches

FHTP has provided three approaches to
address the issue of substance in an Intellectual Property (IP) regime. They
are as follows:

(i)   Value Creation:
This approach requires taxpayers to undertake a set number of significant
development activities in the jurisdiction to claim tax benefits;

(ii)  Transfer Pricing:
This approach would require a taxpayer to undertake a set level of important
functions in the jurisdiction concerned to take advantage of lower tax regime.
These functions could include legal ownership of assets or bearing economic
risks of the assets, giving rise to the tax benefits.

(iii) Nexus Approach:
This approach has been agreed to by FHTP and endorsed by G20. It looks at
whether an IP regime makes its benefits conditional on the extent of R&D
activities of taxpayers in its jurisdiction. The Nexus Approach not only
enables the IP regime to provide benefits directly to the expenditures incurred
to create the IP, but also permits jurisdictions to provide benefits to the
income arising out of that IP, so long as there is a direct nexus between the
income receiving benefits and the expenditures contributing to that income.

In other words, when the Nexus Approach is
applied to an IP regime, substantial activity requirements establish a link
between expenditures, IP assets and IP income. The expenditure criterion acts
as a proxy for activities and IP assets are used to ensure that the income that
receives benefits does, in fact, arise from the expenditures incurred by the
qualifying taxpayer. The effect of this approach is therefore to link income and
activities.

Based on the above approach for the IP
regime, the Action Plan suggests applying this method to non-IP regimes as
well. Thus, a preferential regime should provide the substance requirement with
a clear link between income qualifying for benefits and core activities
necessary to earn the income.

What constitutes a Core Activity depends
upon the type of regime. However, the Action Plan has given certain indicative
Core Income Generating Activities (CIGA) for different types of preferential regimes,
such as Headquarters regimes, Distribution and service centre regimes,
Financing or leasing regimes, Fund management regimes, Banking and Insurance
regimes, Shipping regimes and Holding company regimes. (Paragraphs 74 to 87
of the BEPS Action Plan 5.)
 

Under each of these regimes the Plan
identifies how preferential regimes give benefits and related concerns arising
from these regimes. Two common concerns under each regime are: (i)
‘Ring-fencing’, whereby foreign income is ring-fenced from domestic income to
provide tax exemption to the foreign-sourced income, and (ii) ‘Artificial
definition of the tax base’, whereby a certain fixed percentage or amount of
income is taxed, irrespective of the actual income of the taxpayer.

In order to address the above concerns, the
Action Plan provides CIGA in respect of each of the regimes mentioned above. A
taxpayer is expected to undertake CIGA commensurate with the nature and level
of activities. The idea underlying this is to tax income where value is
created. And value creation is determined by looking at the CIGA and also the
expenditure incurred to earn relevant income.
 

Another major concern about preferential
regimes is lack of transparency. This concern is addressed through Automatic
Exchange of Information through Common Reporting Standard (CRS)2.
Besides this, when information is sought on request, the international standard
on information exchange covers the provision not only of exchange of
information, but also availability of information, including ownership,
banking, and account information. The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange
of Information for Tax Purposes monitors implementation of international
standards on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes and
reviews the effectiveness of their implementation in practice.

________________________________________________________________________________________________

2 The Common Reporting Standard (CRS), developed in response to the
G20 request and approved by the OECD Council on 15
th July, 2014 calls
on jurisdictions to obtain information from their financial institutions and
automatically exchange that information with other jurisdictions on an annual
basis. It sets out the financial account information to be exchanged, the financial
institutions required to report, the different types of accounts and taxpayers
covered, as well as common due diligence procedures to be followed by
financial institutions. [Source: OECD (2017), Standard for Automatic Exchange
of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters]

 

4.0  Economic Substance Requirements Regulations
(ESR Regulations)

ESR Regulations require economic substance
in a jurisdiction where an entity reports relevant income. The underlying
objective of ESR Regulations is to ensure that entities report profits in a
jurisdiction where economic activities that generate them are carried out and
where value is created.

In December, 2017, the European Union Code
of Conduct Group (EU COCG) assessed preferential tax regimes with nil or only
nominal tax to identify harmful practices and enforce substance requirements.
The EU COCG also published a list of ‘non-co-operative jurisdictions for tax
purposes’ which were engaged in harmful tax practices such as ring-fencing
(through offshore tax regimes), artificial definition of tax base and lacked
transparency. Many countries promised to revamp their tax systems to curb
harmful tax practices and introduce substance requirements to avoid being
blacklisted. The work of EU COCG has been strengthened by BEPS Action Plan 5,
with similar objectives and wider applicability.

BEPS Action Plan 5 is also a Minimum
Standard which requires all G20 Nations and countries in the inclusive group
(over 135 countries) who are signatories of the BEPS Project to mandatorily
implement the same.
 

To comply with the above, the following
countries enacted legislation to introduce the Economic Substance Regulations
for tax purposes with effect from 1st January, 2019 or an accounting
period commencing thereafter:

(i)    Bahamas

(ii)   Bermuda

(iii)  British Virgin Islands (BVI)

(iv)  Cayman Islands

(v)   Guernsey

(vi)  Jersey

(vii)  Isle of Man

(viii) Mauritius

(ix)  Seychelles

(x)   United Arab Emirates (UAE) (implemented with
amendments effective from 10th August, 2020).

In this Article we shall look closely at
the ESR Regulations as implemented in the UAE. However, it may be noted that
ESR Regulations as introduced by the above-mentioned countries are by and large
similar as they are based on the guidance and requirements issued by the EU as
well as by the OECD; the requirements of CIGA for different regimes are almost
identical.
 

Broadly, ESR Regulations in every
jurisdiction would require resident entities to prove economic substance with
respect to the following criteria:

 

4.1 
Management test

The entity should be directed and managed
from the jurisdiction concerned. This can be proved by having physical board
meetings at regular frequency, maintaining minutes and accounts in the tax
jurisdiction concerned, directors having domain expertise of the activities of
the company, handling day-to-day operations and banking transactions, etc.

4.2 
CIGA test

The entity will have to clearly demonstrate
that Core Income Generating Activities are undertaken in the relevant
jurisdiction and such activities are commensurate with the level of income
generated therefrom. What is CIGA will depend upon the nature of income or the
regime. CIGA can be outsourced to a corporate service provider in the
jurisdiction, subject to oversight by the entity (e.g., monitoring and
control). In such cases, the relevant resources of the service providers will
be taken into account when determining whether the CIGA test is satisfied.

 

4.3 
Adequacy test

The entity will have to prove that it has
adequate number of qualified employees and infrastructure to carry out CIGA. It
has to also demonstrate that adequate expenditure is incurred to generate the
relevant income in that jurisdiction. ‘Adequacy’ of expenditure, employees or
infrastructure would depend upon the nature of the CIGA.

 

4.4  Summary of tests for Economic Substance
Requirements

1. The management and direction of the entity
should be located in the offshore jurisdiction concerned;

2. Core Income Generating Activities with respect to
the relevant activity must be undertaken in the offshore jurisdiction
concerned;

3. The entity should have a physical presence in
the offshore jurisdiction;

4. The entity should have full-time employees with
suitable qualifications in the jurisdiction concerned; and

5. The entity should have incurred operating
expenditure in the offshore jurisdiction concerned in relation to the relevant
activity.

 

5.0 
ESR Regulations in UAE

On 30th April, 2019, the Cabinet
of Ministers of the UAE issued Cabinet Resolution No. 31 of 2019 concerning
Economic Substance Requirements Regulations (Resolution 31). On 10th
August, 2020 amendments were introduced to Resolution 31 by the Cabinet of
Ministers by way of Resolution No. 57 of 2020 (ESR Regulations), which repealed
and replaced Resolution 31.

The UAE ESR Regulations contain 22
articles, a list of which is given below.

 

Article
No.

Description

1.

Definitions

2.

Objective of the Resolution

3.

Relevant Activity and Core Income Generating Activity

4.

Regulatory Authorities

5.

National Assessing Authority

6.

Requirement to meet Economic Substance Test

7.

Assessment of whether Economic Substance Test is met

8.

Requirement to provide Information

9.

Provision of Information by the Regulatory Authority

10.

Provision of Information by the National Assessing Authority

11.

Exchange of Information by Competent Authority

12.

Co-operation by other Governmental Authorities

13.

Offences and Penalties for failure to provide a Notification

14.

Offences and Penalties for failure to submit an Economic
Substance Report and for failure to meet the Economic Substance Test

15.

Offences and Penalties for providing inaccurate information

16.

Period for imposition of Administrative Penalty

17.

Right of Appeal against Administrative penalty

18.

Date of Payment of Administrative Penalties

19.

Power to enter Business Premises and Examine Business
Documents

20.

Executive Regulations

21.

Revocation

22.

Entry into Force

 

Ministerial Decision No. 100 for the year
2020 dated 19th August, 2020 is intended to provide further guidance
and direction to entities carrying out one or more Relevant Activities. An
entity subject to ESR Regulations shall have regard to this Decision for the
purposes of ensuring compliance with ESR Regulations.

           

5.1 
Basis of ESR Regulations

The basis of ESR Regulations in UAE as
stated in its ‘Ministerial Decision No. 100 for the year 2020 on the Issuance
of Directives for the implementation of the provisions of the Cabinet Decision
No. 57 of 2020 concerning Economic Substance Requirements’ (hereafter referred
to as ‘Ministerial Directives’) is as follows:

‘The ESR Regulations are issued pursuant
to the global standard set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, which requires entities
undertaking geographically mobile business activities to have substantial
activities in a jurisdiction. In addition to the work of the OECD, the European
Union Code of Conduct Group (“EU COCG”) also adopted a resolution on a code of
conduct for business taxation which aims to curb harmful tax practices. The
Cabinet of Ministers enacted the ESR Regulations taking into account the
relevant standards developed by the OECD and the EU COCG.’

 

5.2 
Applicability

Article 3 of the Ministerial Directives
deals with the Licensees required to meet the Economic Substance test and
provides that ESR Regulations are applicable to Licensees. The term ‘Licensee’
is defined in Article 1 of the ESR Regulations to mean any of the following two
entities:

 

‘i. a juridical person (incorporated inside
or outside the State, i.e., UAE); or

ii. an Unincorporated Partnership;

registered in the State, including a Free
Zone and a Financial Free Zone and carries on a Relevant Activity.’

A juridical person is defined to mean a
corporate legal entity with a separate legal personality from its owners.

An Unincorporated Partnership is defined
under ESR Regulations to include those forms of partnerships that may operate
in the UAE without having a separate legal personality and are thereby
identified separately under the ESR Regulations.
 

In other words, the regulations cover all
Licensees (natural and juridical person) having the commercial license,
certificate of incorporation, or any other form of permit necessarily taken
from the licensing authority to do business. Going by the spirit of the ESR
Regulations, it is interpreted that entities in Free Zone (including offshore
companies) would also be covered.

 

Branches

Branch of a foreign entity in the UAE

Since a licensee could be in the form of a
UAE branch of a foreign entity (juridical person incorporated outside UAE is
covered in the definition), Article 3 of the Ministerial Directives
specifically covers them for compliance of ESR Regulations.
 

Similarly, a branch of a foreign entity
registered in the UAE that carries out a Relevant Activity is required to
comply with the ESR Regulations, unless the Relevant Income of such branch is
subject to tax in a jurisdiction outside the UAE.

Branch of a UAE entity outside UAE

Where a UAE entity carries on a Relevant
Activity through a branch registered outside the UAE, the UAE entity is not
required to consolidate the activities and income of the branch for purposes of
ESR Regulations, provided that the Relevant Income of the branch is subject to
tax in the foreign jurisdiction where the branch is located. In this context, a
branch can include a permanent establishment, or any other form of taxable
presence for corporate income tax purposes which is not a separate legal
entity.

 

5.3 Licensees exempted from ESR Regulations

The following entities which are registered
in the UAE and carry out a Relevant Activity are exempt from ESR Regulations:

(a)  an Investment Fund,

(b)  an entity that is tax resident in a
jurisdiction other than the UAE,

(c)  an entity wholly owned by UAE residents and
which meets the following conditions:

      (i)    the
entity is not part of an MNE Group;

      (ii)   all
of the entity’s activities are only carried out in the UAE;

(d)  a Licensee that is a branch of a foreign
entity, the Relevant Income of which is subject to tax in a jurisdiction other
than the UAE.
 

 

(a) Investment Funds

The ESR Regulations define an Investment
Fund as ‘an entity whose principal business is the issuing of investment
interests to raise funds or pool investor funds with the aim of enabling a
holder of such an investment interest to benefit from the profits or gains from
the entity’s acquisition, holding, management or disposal of investments and
includes any entity through which an investment fund directly or indirectly
invests (but does not include an entity or entities in which the fund
invests).’

The above definition would include the
Investment Fund itself and any entity through which the Fund directly and indirectly
invests, but not the entity or entities in which the Fund ultimately invests.
It is clarified that the words ‘through which an investment fund directly or
indirectly invests’ refers to any UAE entity whose sole function is to
facilitate the investment made by the Investment Fund. The exemption for
Investment Funds is distinct from the Investment Fund Management Business as
regulated under ESR Regulations. The Investment Fund itself is not considered
an Investment Fund Management Business unless it is a self-managed fund (the
Investment Manager and the Investment Fund are part of the same entity).

 

(b) Tax resident in a jurisdiction other
than the State

An entity which is tax resident in a
jurisdiction outside the UAE need not comply with the ESR Regulations. However,
in order for such an entity to avail this exemption, the entity must be
subjected to corporate tax on all of its income from a Relevant Activity by
virtue of being a tax resident in a jurisdiction other than the UAE. It should
be noted that an entity that pays withholding tax in a foreign jurisdiction
will not be considered as tax resident in a foreign jurisdiction other than the
UAE solely on that basis.

 

(c) An entity wholly owned by UAE
residents

An entity that is ultimately wholly and
beneficially owned (directly or indirectly) by UAE residents is exempt from the
Economic Substance Test only where such entity is: (i) not part of an MNE
Group; (ii) all of its activities are exclusively carried out in the UAE; and
(iii) UAE resident owners of the entity reside in the UAE. The entity must
therefore not be engaged in any form of business outside the UAE. In this
context, ‘UAE residents’ means UAE citizens and individuals holding a valid UAE
residency permit, who reside in the UAE.
 

(d) A
UAE branch of a foreign entity the Relevant Income of which is subject to tax
in a jurisdiction other than the State

An entity is not required to meet the
Economic Substance Test if such entity is a branch of a foreign entity and its
Relevant Income is subject to corporate tax in the jurisdiction where such
foreign entity is a tax resident.
 

Evidence
to be submitted to claim exemption from ESR Regulations

A Licensee that claims to be exempt on the
basis of being a tax resident in a foreign jurisdiction is required to submit
one of the following documents along with its Notification in respect of each
relevant Financial Year:

(a)  Letter or certificate issued by the competent
authority of the foreign jurisdiction in which the entity claims to be a tax
resident stating that the entity is considered to be resident for corporate
income tax purposes in that jurisdiction; or

(b)  An assessment to corporate income tax on the
entity, a corporate income tax demand, evidence of payment of corporate income
tax, or any other document, issued by the competent authority of the foreign
jurisdiction in which the entity claims to be a tax resident.

It is further provided that where an entity
fails to provide sufficient evidence to substantiate its status as an Exempted
Licensee, the entity will be regarded as a Licensee for the purposes of ESR
Regulations and shall be subject to the requirements of ESR Regulations as
applicable to a Licensee, including the requirement to meet the Economic
Substance Test.

5.4 First reportable Financial Year

It is provided that all Licensees and
Exempted Licensees are subject to ESR Regulations from the earlier of (i) their
financial year commencing on 1st January, 2019, or (ii) the date on
which they commence carrying out a Relevant Activity (for a Financial Year
commencing after 1st January, 2019).

5.5 What are the Relevant Activities?

Article 3(1) of ESR Regulations identifies
any of the following activities to be a Relevant Activity: (i) Banking
Business, (ii) Insurance Business, (iii) Investment Fund Management Business,
(iv) Shipping Business, (v) Lease-Finance Business, (vi) Distribution and
Service Centre Business, (vii) Headquarters Business, (viii) Intellectual
Property Business, and (ix) Holding Company Business.

Entities are expected to use a ‘substance
over form’ approach to determine whether or not they undertake a Relevant
Activity and as a result will be considered Licensees for the purposes of ESR
Regulations, irrespective of whether such Relevant Activity is included in the
trade licence or permit of the entity. A Licensee may have undertaken more than
one Relevant Activity during the same financial period. In such a case, the
Licensee would be required to demonstrate economic substance in respect of each
Relevant Activity.
 

Any form of passive income from a Relevant
Activity can also bring the entity within the scope of the ESR Regulations.

 

5.6 Relevant Income

The Economic Substance Test has to be
satisfied by a Licensee having regard to the level of Relevant Income derived
from any Relevant Activity. For the purposes of the ESR Regulations, ‘Relevant
Income’ means entity’s gross income from a Relevant Activity as recorded in its
books and records under applicable accounting standards, whether earned in the
UAE or outside, and irrespective of whether the entity has derived a profit or
loss from its activities.
 

For the purposes of ‘Relevant Income’,
gross income means total income from all sources, including revenue from sales
of inventory and properties, services, royalties, interest, premiums, dividends
and any other amounts, and without deducting any type of costs or expenditure.
It appears that even capital gains are to be included while computing gross
income.
 

In the context of income from sales or
services, gross income means gross revenues from sales or services without
deducting the cost of goods sold or the cost of services. It is further
clarified that gross income does not mean taxable or accounting income or
profit.

 

5.7
Liquidation or otherwise ceasing to carry on Relevant Activities

A Licensee and an Exempted Licensee shall
be subject to ESR Regulations as long as such an entity continues to exist.

 

5.8
The Economic Substance Test – How to substantiate economic substance in the
UAE?

In order for a Licensee to demonstrate that
it has adequate substance in the UAE in a given financial year, an entity must
meet the following tests:


(a) Core Income Generating Activities
(CIGA) Test

The Licensee
should conduct Core Income Generating Activities in the UAE. The CIGAs are
those activities that are of central importance to the Licensee for the
generation of the gross income earned from its Relevant Activity.

 

The CIGAs
depend upon the nature of the Relevant Activity. The list given in Article 3(2)
of the ESR Regulations is an indicative list and not exhaustive3. A
Licensee is not required to perform all of the CIGAs listed in the ESR
Regulations for a particular Relevant Activity. However, it must perform any of
the CIGAs that generate Relevant Income in the UAE. It is clarified that
activities that are not CIGAs can be undertaken outside the UAE.

 

(b) Directed and Managed Test

The ‘directed and managed’ test aims to
ensure that a Relevant Activity is directed and managed in the UAE and requires
that, inter alia, there are an adequate number of board meetings held
and attended in the UAE. A determination as to whether an adequate number of
board meetings are held and attended in the UAE will depend on the level of
Relevant Activity being carried out by a Licensee.

 

Consideration must also be given to more
onerous requirements in respect of board meetings prescribed under the applicable
law regulating the Licensee or as may be stipulated in the constitutional
documents of the Licensee.

 

The ‘directed and managed’ test further
requires that:

(i)   meetings are recorded in written minutes and
that such minutes are kept in the UAE;

(ii)  quorum for such meetings is met and those
attendees are physically present in the UAE; and

(iii) directors have the necessary knowledge and
expertise to discharge their duties and are not merely giving effect to
decisions being taken outside the UAE.

 

The minutes of the board meetings must
record all the strategic decisions taken in relation to Relevant Activities and
must be signed by the directors physically present. The quorum shall be
determined in accordance with the law applicable to the Licensee setting out
quorum requirements, or as may be set out in the constitutional documents of
the Licensee (or both).

 

It is clarified that for the purposes of
ESR Regulations the ‘directed and managed’ requirement does not prescribe that
board members (or equivalent) be resident in the UAE. Rather, the board members
(or equivalent) are required to be physically present in the UAE when taking
strategic decisions. In the event that the Licensee is managed by its
shareholders / owners / partners, an individual manager (e.g., general manager
or CEO), or more than one manager, the above requirements will apply to such
persons to the fullest extent possible.

 

(c) Expenditure Test


Having regard to the level of Relevant
Income earned from a Relevant Activity, the Licensee should ensure that it (i)
has an adequate number of qualified full-time (or equivalent) employees in
relation to the activity who are physically present in the UAE (whether or not
employed by the Licensee or by another entity and whether on temporary or long-term
contracts), (ii) incurs adequate operating expenditure by it in the UAE, and
(iii) has adequate physical assets (e.g. premises) in the UAE.

 

What is adequate or appropriate for each
Licensee will depend on the nature and level of Relevant Activity being carried
out by such Licensee. A Licensee will have to ensure that it maintains
sufficient records to demonstrate the adequacy and appropriateness of the
resources and assets utilised and expenditure incurred.

 

It is provided that the National Assessing
Authority shall review such records and other supporting documentation
submitted in assessing whether a Licensee has demonstrated the adequacy and
appropriateness of resources and assets utilised and expenditures incurred.

 

The requirement for adequate employees is
aimed at ensuring that there are a sufficient number of suitably qualified
employees carrying out the Relevant Activity. The requirement for adequate
physical assets is intended to ensure that a Licensee has procured appropriate
physical assets to carry out a Relevant Activity in the UAE. Physical assets
can include offices or other forms of business premises (such as warehouses or
facilities from which the Relevant Activity is being conducted) depending on
the nature of the Relevant Activity. Such premises may be owned or leased by
the Licensee, provided that the Licensee is able to produce the lease
agreement, etc., to prove the right to use the premises for the purposes of
carrying out the Relevant Activity.

 


__________________________________________________________________________________

3 The indicative list of CIGAs is based on the recommendations of the BEPS
Action Plan 5 (paragraphs 74 to 87).


5.9 Outsourcing

Article 6(2)
of the ESR Regulations provides that a Licensee may conduct all or part of its
CIGAs for a Relevant Activity through an Outsourcing Provider. For the purposes
of ESR Regulations, an Outsourcing Provider may include third parties or
related parties. The substance (e.g., employees and physical assets) of the
Outsourcing Provider in the UAE will be taken into account when determining the
substance of the Licensee for the purpose of the Economic Substance Test,
subject to certain conditions.

 

5.10 Notification Filings


Every Licensee and Exempted Licensee is
required to submit a Notification to their respective Regulatory Authorities
setting out the following for each relevant financial year:

i.   the nature of the Relevant Activity being
carried out;

ii.  whether it generates Relevant Income;

iii.  the date of the end of its financial year;

iv. any other information as may be requested by
the Regulatory Authority.

 

A Notification submitted by an Exempted
Licensee must be accompanied by sufficient evidence to substantiate the
Exempted Licensee’s status for each category in which it claims to be exempt.
Failure to provide sufficient evidence to this effect will result in the
Exempted Licensee not being able to avail itself of the exemption and having to
comply with the full requirements of the ESR Regulations, including meeting the
Economic Substance Test.

 

The time frames for compliance with the
requirement to submit a Notification are different from the time frames to
submit an Economic Substance Report as discussed in paragraph 5.11 below.

 

The Notification must be submitted within
six months from the end of the financial year of the Licensee or Exempted
Licensee. The Notification must be submitted electronically on the Ministry of
Finance Portal.

 

 

5.11 Submission of Economic
Substance Report

Every Licensee shall be required to meet
the applicable Economic Substance Test requirements and submit an Economic
Substance Report containing the requisite information and documentation
prescribed under the ESR Regulations within 12 months from the end of the
relevant financial year.

 

The Economic
Substance Report of the
Licensee will be assessed by the National Assessing Authority within a
period of six years from the end of the relevant financial year. The
National
Assessing Authority will issue its decision as to whether a Licensee has
met
the Economic Substance Test. This six-year limitation period shall not
apply if
the National Assessing Authority is not able to make a determination
during
this period due to gross negligence, fraud, or deliberate
misrepresentation by
the Licensee or any other person representing the Licensee.

 

5.12
Exchange of information with foreign authorities


The Competent Authority will spontaneously
exchange information with relevant Foreign Competent Authorities under the ESR
Regulations pursuant to an international agreement, treaty or similar
arrangement to which the UAE is a party in the following circumstances:

i)   where a Licensee fails to satisfy the
Economic Substance Test;

ii)  where a Licensee is a high-risk IP Licensee;

iii)  where an entity claims to be tax resident in a
jurisdiction outside the UAE; and

iv) where a branch of a foreign entity claims to be
subject to tax in a jurisdiction outside the UAE.

 

Every Licensee that is carrying out a
Relevant Activity must identify the jurisdiction in which the Parent Company,
Ultimate Parent Company and Ultimate Beneficial Owner claim to be tax resident.
An Exempted Licensee that is either (i) tax resident in a jurisdiction other
than the UAE; or (ii) a UAE branch of a foreign company of which all the income
of the UAE branch is subject to tax in a jurisdiction other than the UAE must,
in addition to identifying the foregoing, also identify the jurisdiction in
which such Exempted Licensee claims to be (a) a tax resident or (b) the
jurisdiction of the foreign company of the UAE branch (as may be relevant).

 

5.13 Penalties


Stringent penalties are prescribed for
non-compliance with ESR Regulations, which are as follows:

 

Article No.

Nature of offence

Penalty

Remarks

13

Failure to provide Notification

AED 20,000

 

14

Failure to submit Economic Substance Report and any other
information or documents in accordance with ESR Regulations or Failure to
meet the Economic Substance Test

AED 50,000

AED 4,00,000 for a repeat offence in the subsequent year

15

Providing inaccurate information

AED 50,000

 

 

5.14
Summary of the Relevant Activities, related CIGAs and the Regulatory Authority4


One may refer to the Text of ‘Schedule 1 –
Relevant Activities Guide’, of the Ministerial Directives referred to in
Paragraph 5.1 infra, for detailed explanations and examples.


Relevant Activity
pursuant to Article 3.1 of Cabinet Resolution No. (57) of 2020

Core Income
Generating Activities (non-exhaustive) Article 3.2 of Cabinet Resolution No.
(57) of 2020

Regulatory Authority
pursuant to Article 4 of Cabinet Resolution No. (57) of 2020

Banking Business

(a) Raising funds, managing risk
including credit, currency and interest risk.

(b) Taking hedging positions.

(c) Providing loans, credit or other
financial services to customers.

1. UAE Central Bank

2. The competent authority in the
Financial Free Zone for the Banking Businesses

Insurance Business

(a) Predicting and calculating risk.

(b) Insuring or re-insuring against risk
and providing Insurance Business services to clients.

(c) Underwriting insurance and
reinsurance.

1. Securities and Commodities Authority

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Insurance Business

Investment Fund Management Business

(a) 
Taking decisions on the holding and selling of investments.

(b) Calculating risk and reserves.

(c) Taking decisions on currency or
interest fluctuations and hedging positions.

(d) Preparing reports to investors or
any government authority with functions relating to the supervision or
regulation of such business.

1. Securities and Commodities Authority

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Investment Fund Management Business

Lease-Finance Business

(a) Agreeing funding terms.

(b) Identifying and acquiring assets to
be leased (in the case of leasing).

(c) Setting the terms and duration of
any financing or leasing.

(d) Monitoring and revising any
agreements.

(e) Managing any risks.

1. UAE Central Bank

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Lease-Finance Business

 

Headquarter Business

(a) Taking relevant management
decisions.

(b) Incurring operating expenditures on
behalf of group entities.

(c) Coordinating group activities.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Headquarter Business

Shipping Business

(a) Managing crew (including hiring,
paying and overseeing crew members).

(b) Overhauling and maintaining ships.

(c) 
Overseeing and tracking shipping.

(d) Determining what goods to order and
when to deliver them,

(e) Organising and overseeing voyages.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Shipping Business

Holding Company Business

Activities related to a Holding Company Business.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial
Free Zone for the Holding Company Business

Intellectual Property Business

Where the Intellectual Property Asset is
a

(a) Patent or similar Intellectual
Property Asset: Research and development.

(b) Marketing intangible or a similar
Intellectual Property Asset: Branding, marketing and distribution.

In exceptional cases, except where the
Licensee is a High-Risk IP Licensee, the Core Income Generating Activities
may include:

(i) taking strategic decisions and
managing (as well as bearing) the principal risks related to development and
subsequent exploitation of the intangible asset generating income.

(ii) taking the strategic decisions and
managing
(as well as bearing) the principal risks relating to acquisition by third
parties and subsequent exploitation and protection of the intangible asset.

(iii) carrying on the ancillary trading
activities through which the intangible assets are exploited leading to the
generation of income from third parties.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Intellectual Property Business

Distribution and Service Centre Business

(a) Transporting and
storing component parts, materials or goods ready for sale.

(b) Managing inventories.

(c) Taking orders.

(d) Providing consulting or other
administrative services.

1. Ministry of Economy

2. The competent authority in the Free
Zone and Financial Free Zone for the Distribution and Service Centre Business

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

4 Source:https://www.mof.gov.ae/en/StrategicPartnerships/Document/Economic%20Substance%20Relevant%20Activities%20Summary.pdf

                      5.15  Flow-chart of the Applicability of ESR
Regulations5

 

 

 ________________________________________________________________________

5.Source: https://www.mof.gov.ae/en/StrategicPartnerships/Pages/ESR.aspx



6.0.
Relevance of ESR Regulations for Indian Entities


Many Indian companies have their
subsidiaries, branches, project offices or other forms of entities operating in
the UAE. Every such entity needs to strictly follow the ESR Regulations as
stringent penalties are prescribed. The provisions of the ESR Regulations are
stricter than Limitation of Benefits under a Tax Treaty. Therefore, each structure
would need a reassessment, review and restructuring if need be. As the
Regulations are applicable to each type of Licensee, including Free Trade
Zones, Proprietorships, etc., even individual investments need to be examined
and should comply with ESR Regulations.


7.0 Epilogue


There is a well-known saying, ‘Don’t judge
a book by its cover’. It means, a beautiful cover cannot determine the worth of
a book. It can enhance its visual appeal but not the underlying (inherent)
value. In a lighter vein, an old Bollywood song also gives us some guidance… Dil
ko dekho, chehera na dekho, chehere ne lakhon ko loota… Dil sachcha aur chehera
jhutha.

 

So, there is no doubt that one needs to
have a substance and purpose in whatever structure one enacts, whichever
jurisdiction one chooses or whatever business activities / transactions one
undertakes. One has to justify every action from the perspective of non-tax
evasion, while one can always take benefits and advantages of favourable tax
treaties / regimes with good business substance.

 

It is equally important for Indian
entrepreneurs to bear in mind the ESR Regulations in different jurisdictions,
their reporting requirements while structuring or undertaking any outbound
investments / activities. They may also need to revisit their existing
structures to fall in line with the stringent substance requirements of various
jurisdictions. It may be noted that genuine businesses need not worry, but they
will have to prove their bona fides.

 

Special deduction u/s 80-IA of ITA, 1961 – Telecommunications services – Computation of profits u/s 80-IA(1) – Change in shareholding of company – Effect of section 79 – Losses which have lapsed cannot be taken into account for purposes of section 80-IA

8. Vodafone Essar
Gujarat Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2020] 424 ITR 498
(Guj.) Date of order: 3rd
March, 2020
A.Ys.: 2005-06 and
2006-07

 

Special deduction u/s 80-IA of ITA, 1961 –
Telecommunications services – Computation of profits u/s 80-IA(1) – Change in
shareholding of company – Effect of section 79 – Losses which have lapsed
cannot be taken into account for purposes of section 80-IA

 

The assessee company, established in
1997-98, was in the business of providing cellular telecommunications services
in the State of Gujarat. During the previous year relevant to the A.Y. 2001-02,
there was a change in the shareholding of the assessee, as a result of which the provisions of section 79 of the IT Act, 1961 were made applicable and the accumulated losses from the A.Ys. 1997-98 to 2001-02 lapsed. The assessee made a claim for
deduction u/s 80IA for the first time for the A.Y. 2005-06. In the return of income, the assessee had shown total income of Rs. 191,59,84,008 and claimed the entire
amount as deduction u/s 80IA(4)(ii) of the Act. According to the A.O., the
quantum of deduction available to the assessee u/s 80IA(4)(ii) was to be
computed in accordance with the provisions of section 80IA(5), without the
application of the provisions of section 79.

 

This was upheld by the Commissioner
(Appeals) and the Tribunal.

 

On an appeal by the assessee, the Gujarat
High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)  The application of section 80IA(5) to deny the
effect of provisions of section 79 cannot be sustained. When the loss of
earlier years has already lapsed, it cannot be notionally carried forward and
set off against the profits and gains of the assessee’s business for the year
under consideration in computing the quantum of deduction u/s 80IA(1). The
provisions of section 80IA(5) cannot be invoked to ignore the provisions of
section 79.

 

ii)
The appeals are allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Tribunal in the
respective tax appeals are quashed and set aside. The substantial question is
answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.’

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961 – Validity – Officer recording reasons and issuing notice must be the jurisdictional A.O. – Reasons recorded by jurisdictional A.O. but notice issued by officer who did not have jurisdiction over assessee – Defect not curable u/s 292B – Notice and consequential proceedings and order invalid

7. Pankajbhai
Jaysukhlal Shah vs. ACIT
[2020] 425 ITR 70
(Guj.) Date of order: 9th
April, 2019
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961
– Validity – Officer recording reasons and issuing notice must be the
jurisdictional A.O. – Reasons recorded by jurisdictional A.O. but notice issued
by officer who did not have jurisdiction over assessee – Defect not curable u/s
292B – Notice and consequential proceedings and order invalid

 

For the A.Y.
2011-12 an order u/s 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed against the
assessee. Thereafter, a notice dated 29th March, 2018 u/s 148 was issued
to reopen the assessment u/s 147 of the Act. In response to the notice, the assessee submitted that the original return filed by him be
treated as the return filed in response to the notice u/s 148 and requested the
A.O. to supply a copy of the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment. The
assessee participated in the assessment proceedings and raised objections
against the initiation of proceedings u/s 147 on the ground that the assumption
of jurisdiction on the part of the A.O. by issuance of notice u/s 148 was
invalid, contending that the notice was issued by the Income-tax Officer, Ward
No. 2(2), whereas the reasons were recorded by the Deputy Commissioner of
Income-tax, Circle 2. The Department contended that issuance of the notice by
the Income-tax Officer was a procedural lapse which had happened on account of
the mandate of the E-assessment scheme and non-migration of the permanent
account number of the assessee in time and that such defect was covered under
the provisions of section 292B and therefore, the notice issued could not be
said to be invalid.

 

The assessee filed
a writ petition and challenged the validity of the notice. The Gujarat High
Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

“i)  While the reasons for reopening the assessment
had been recorded by the jurisdictional A.O., viz., the Deputy Commissioner,
Circle 2, the notice u/s 148(1) had been issued by the Income-tax Officer, Ward
2(2), who had no jurisdiction over the assessee and, hence, such a notice was
bad on the count of having been issued by an Officer who had no authority to
issue such notice.

 

ii)   It was the Officer recording the reasons who
had to issue the notice u/s 148(1), whereas the reasons had been recorded by
the jurisdictional A.O. and the notice had been issued by an Officer who did
not have jurisdiction over the assessee. The notice u/s 148 being a
jurisdictional notice, any inherent defect therein could not be cured u/s 292B.

iii)  It was not possible for the jurisdictional
A.O., viz., the Deputy Commissioner, to issue the notice u/s 148 on or before
31st March, 2018 as migration of the permanent account number was
not possible within that short period and therefore, the Income-tax Officer had
issued the notice instead of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. Thus there
was an admission on the part of the Department that the Deputy Commissioner,
Circle 2, who had jurisdiction over the assessee had not issued the notice u/s
148 but it was the Income-tax Officer, Ward 2(2) who did not have any
jurisdiction over the assessee who had issued such notice.

 

iv)  No proceedings could have
been taken u/s 147 in pursuance of such invalid notice. The notice u/s 148(1)
and all the proceedings taken pursuant thereto could not be sustained.’

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961 – Validity – Notice issued in name of dead person – Objection to notice by legal heir and representative – Department intimated about death of assessee in reply to summons issued u/s 131(1A) – Legal heir not submitting to jurisdiction of A.O. in response to notice of reassessment u/s 148 – Provisions of section 292A not attracted – Notice and proceedings invalid

6. Durlabhai
Kanubhai Rajpara vs. ITO
[2020] 424 ITR 428
(Guj.) Date of order: 26th
March, 2019
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961
– Validity – Notice issued in name of dead person – Objection to notice by
legal heir and representative – Department intimated about death of assessee in
reply to summons issued u/s 131(1A) – Legal heir not submitting to jurisdiction
of A.O. in response to notice of reassessment u/s 148 – Provisions of section
292A not attracted – Notice and proceedings invalid

 

For the A.Y.
2011-12, the A.O. issued a notice in the name of the assessee who was the
father of the petitioner u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 28th
March, 2018 to reopen the assessment u/s 147. Even prior to that, the Deputy
Director (Investigation) had issued a witness summons u/s 131(1A) in the name
of the assessee, the father of the petitioner, to personally attend the office
and the notice was served upon the petitioner. The petitioner furnished the
death certificate of his late father before the authority and submitted that he
had expired on 12th June, 2015, therefore, the notice was required
to be withdrawn. Thereafter, the notice in question dated 28th
March, 2018 was issued in the name of the late assessee. The petitioner also
received a notice dated 16th July, 2018 issued u/s 142(1) on 17th
July, 2018. The petitioner filed a reply and submitted that his father had
expired on 12th June, 2015 and a copy of the death certificate was
also annexed. The petitioner also contended in his reply that the fact of the
death of his father was disclosed pursuant to the summons issued by the Deputy
Director (Investigation) u/s 131(1A), that the notice issued u/s 148 was
without any jurisdiction as it was issued against a dead person and prayed that
the proceedings be dropped. The Department rejected the objections.

 

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

 

‘i)  The petitioner at the first point of time had
objected to the issuance of notice u/s 148 in the name of his deceased father
(assessee) and had not participated or filed any return pursuant to the notice.
Therefore, the legal representatives not having waived the requirement of
notice and not having submitted to the jurisdiction of the A.O. pursuant
thereto, the provisions of section 292A would not be attracted and hence the
notice had to be treated as invalid.

 

ii)  Even prior to the issuance of such notice, the
Department was aware about the death of the petitioner’s father (the assessee)
since in response to the summons issued u/s 131(1A) the petitioner had
intimated the Department about the death of the assessee. Therefore, the
Department could not say that it was not aware of the death of the petitioner’s
father (the assessee) and could have belatedly served the notice u/s 159 upon
the legal representatives of the deceased assessee.

 

iii)
The notice dated 28th March, 2018 issued in the name of the deceased
assessee by the A.O. u/s 148 as well as further proceedings thereto were to be
quashed and set aside.’

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961 – Validity – Amalgamation of companies – Notice issued against transferor-company – Amalgamating entity ceases to have its own existence and not amenable to reassessment proceedings – Notice and subsequent proceedings unsustainable

5. Gayatri Microns
Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2020] 424 ITR 288
(Guj.) Date of order: 24th
December, 2019
A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 of ITA, 1961
– Validity – Amalgamation of companies – Notice issued against
transferor-company – Amalgamating entity ceases to have its own existence and
not amenable to reassessment proceedings – Notice and subsequent proceedings
unsustainable

 

In the return for the A.Y. 2015-16, the
assessee company furnished information regarding amalgamation of three
companies GMCL, GISL and GFL with it. In the return, under the heading ‘holding
status’, further details were provided below the column ‘business
organisation’, that is, the status of those three companies which were
amalgamated with it.

 

For the A.Y. 2015-16, the A.O. called for
certain information, and the assessee submitted the details categorically
stating that by virtue of the order passed by the High Court dated 18th
June, 2015, the amalgamation had taken place amongst the three companies. The
Assistant Commissioner issued a notice dated 25th March, 2019 u/s
148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the A.Y. 2012-13 to GISL.

 

The assessee filed a writ petition and
challenged the notice. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and
held as under:

 

‘i)  The notice issued u/s 148 had been issued to
GISL which had been amalgamated with the assessee by order dated 18th
June, 2015 passed by the court and thus, it had ceased to have its own
existence so as to render it amenable to reassessment proceedings under the
provisions of section 147.

 

ii)  The amalgamation had taken place much prior to
the issuance of the notice dated 25th March, 2019 for reopening the
assessment. Thereafter, the assessee had informed the Assistant Commissioner
about the amalgamation of all the three companies with it with sufficient
details, viz., (i) the passing of the order dated 18th June, 2015 by
the court ; (ii) the communication dated 9th September, 2017
addressed by the assessee to the Income-tax Officer, during the assessment proceedings
for the A.Y. 2015-16 containing the information of amalgamation; and (iii) the
details of amalgamation in the return for the A.Y. 2015-16. Moreover, the
Assistant Commissioner and the Department were duly informed by the assessee
about the amalgamation and despite this a statutory notice u/s 148 (was sent).

 

iii)
The notice for reopening of the assessment being without jurisdiction, was not
sustainable. The notice and all the proceedings taken pursuant thereto were to
be quashed and set aside.’”

Income – Unexplained money – Section 69A of ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent for application of section 69A – There should be evidence that assessee was the owner of the money – Assessee acting as financial broker – Material on record showing amounts passing through his hands – No evidence that amounts belonged to him – Amounts not assessable in his hands u/s 69A

4. CIT vs.
Anoop Jain
[2020] 424 ITR 115
(Del.) Date of order: 22nd
August, 2019
A.Y.: 1992-93

 

Income – Unexplained money – Section 69A of
ITA, 1961 – Condition precedent for application of section 69A – There should
be evidence that assessee was the owner of the money – Assessee acting as
financial broker – Material on record showing amounts passing through his hands
– No evidence that amounts belonged to him – Amounts not assessable in his
hands u/s 69A

 

The assessee
was a financial broker. During the course of assessment for the A.Y. 1992-93,
the A.O. found that the assessee had received 13 pay orders aggregating to Rs.
5,17,45,958 from Standard Chartered Bank, Bombay during the financial years in
question, and mostly between December, 1991 and February, 1992. All these pay
orders were utilised by him for purchasing units and shares from different banks
and mutual funds. The explanation offered by the assessee was that all the pay
orders were received from C, a Bombay broker, and the purchase of units and
shares was done by him on behalf of C and these were then sold back to C after
earning normal brokerage. The A.O. found that all 13 pay orders were actually
tainted pay orders relating to the securities scam of 1992 and that they had
been issued by the Standard Chartered Bank under extraordinary circumstances.
The Standard Chartered Bank had informed the Assistant Commissioner, Circle
7(3) that it had been a victim of a massive fraud perpetrated in 1992 by
certain brokers in collusion with some ex-employees of the Bank to siphon out
funds. It was also conveyed that the Standard Chartered Bank had filed a first
information report with the C.B.I. in which ‘JP’, an ex-employee, was named as
one of the accused and the 13 pay orders were part of a total of 15 pay orders
fraudulently issued by ‘JP’. The A.O. did not accept the explanation and added
an amount of Rs. 5,17,45,958 to the income of the assessee u/s 69A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) noted that
certain assets were found by the C.B.I. in the possession of C, who then
surrendered them to the Bureau. The Commissioner (Appeals) also held that there
was no evidence to show that the money in question was utilised by the
assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) accordingly deleted the addition. This was
upheld by the Tribunal.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)  The very basis for making the additions was
the inference drawn by the A.O. that the assessee had received pay orders and
spent the monies for purchase of shares and units as a result of some “financial
quid pro quo”. There were certain facts that stood out which showed that
these amounts received by the assessee as pay orders did not belong to him. The
assessee was only a conduit through whom the amounts were floated.

 

ii)  One of the essential conditions in section 69A
of the Act is that the assessee should be the “owner of the money” and it
should not be recorded in his books of account. There was overwhelming evidence
to show the involvement of C acting on behalf of SP for SMI. The C.B.I. also did
not proceed against the assessee and that discounted the case of any collusion
between the assessee and C along with P.

 

iii)
The assessee was at the highest used as a conduit by the other parties and did
not himself substantially gain from these transactions. In that view of the
matter, the concurrent view of both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal
that the addition of the sum to the income of the assessee was not warranted
was justified.’

 


Income – Business income or income from house property – Sections 22 and 28 of ITA, 1961 – Company formed with object of developing commercial complexes – Setting up of commercial complex and rendering of services to occupants – Income earned assessable as business income

3. Principal CIT vs. City Centre Mall Nashik Pvt. Ltd. [2020] 424 ITR 85
(Bom.) Date of order: 13th
January, 2020
A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Income – Business income or income from
house property – Sections 22 and 28 of ITA, 1961 – Company formed with object
of developing commercial complexes – Setting up of commercial complex and
rendering of services to occupants – Income earned assessable as business
income

 

The assessee was a private limited company
incorporated with the object of construction and running of commercial and
shopping malls. The assessee set up a commercial complex-cum-shopping mall and
the operations commenced during F.Y. 2009-10. The assessee let out various
shops in this commercial complex dealing with various products.

 

Apart from letting out the premises, the
assessee also provided various services to the occupants such as security
services, housekeeping, maintenance, lighting, repairs to air conditioners,
marketing and promotional activities, advertisement and such other activities.
The premises were let out on leave and licence basis, and the compensation was
based on revenue-sharing basis. For the A.Y. 2010-11, the assessee declared its
income under the head ‘Income from business’. The A.O., however, treated it as
income from house property.

 

The Tribunal held that the income was
assessable as business income.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i) The object of
the assessee was clearly to acquire, develop, and let out the commercial
complex. The assessee provided even marketing and promotional activities. The
intention of the assessee was a material circumstance and the objects of
association, and the kind of services rendered, clearly pointed out that the
income was from business.

 

ii)
All the factors cumulatively taken demonstrated that the assessee had intended
to enter into a business of renting out commercial space to interested parties.
The findings rendered by the Tribunal on assessment of the factual position
before it that the income in question had to be treated as business income was
justified.’

Section 28(iv) – Waiver of loan

1. M/s Essar Shipping Limited vs. Commissioner of
Income-tax, City-III, Mumbai
[Income-tax Appeal (IT) No. 201 of 2002 Date of order: 5th March, 2020 [Order dated 16th August, 2001
passed by the ITAT ‘A’ Bench, Mumbai in Income-tax Appeal No. 144/Ban/91 for
the A.Y. 1984-85] (Bombay High Court)

 

Section 28(iv) – Waiver of loan

 

The appellant company earlier was known as
M/s Karnataka Shipping Corporation Limited and carrying on the business of
shipping. During the relevant previous year, because of certain developments it
was amalgamated with M/s Essar Bulk Carriers Limited, Madras, whereafter it
came to be known as M/s Essar Shipping Limited.

 

In the assessment proceedings for the A.Y.
1984-85 following amalgamation, it filed a revised return of income wherein an
amount of Rs. 2,52,00,000 was claimed as a deduction being the amount of loan
given by the Government of Karnataka which was subsequently waived. It was
claimed on behalf of the appellant that the Government of Karnataka had written
off the said loan advanced to the appellant as the said amount had become
irrecoverable. The A.O. did not accept the claim of the appellant and observed
that waiver of loan benefited the appellant in carrying on its business and in
terms of the provisions contained in section 28, the said benefit enjoyed by
the appellant should constitute income in its hand. Accordingly, the aforesaid
amount was added to the total income of the assessee.

 

Aggrieved
by this, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(Appeals)-III,
Bangalore. The first appellate authority considered the requirement of section
28(iv) of the Act and held that waiver of loan could not be treated as a
benefit or perquisite because it was clearly a cash item. The amount would be
includible u/s 28(iv) only if it was a non-cash item and that cash item cannot
be treated as a perquisite. It was further held that what can be assessed u/s
28 are only items of revenue nature and not items of capital nature. Therefore,
waiver of loan cannot partake the character of income to be includible for
assessment. Accordingly, the addition made by the A.O. was deleted.

 

On further appeal by Revenue, the Tribunal
took the view that writing off of the loan was inseparably connected with the
business of the assessee and therefore this benefit had arisen out of the
business of the assessee. The amount written off was nothing but an incentive
for its business. It was held that the benefit was received by the assessee in
the form of writing off of the liability to the extent of the loan. Therefore,
it could not be said that the assessee received cash benefit. The Tribunal
opined that the A.O. had correctly made the addition considering the waiver of
loan as revenue receipt of the assessee and, therefore, set aside the finding
of the first appellate authority, thereby restoring the order of the A.O.

 

The appellant contended that to be an income
chargeable to income tax under the head ‘profits and gains of business and
profession’, the value of any benefit or perquisite has to arise from business
or the exercise of a profession and it should not be in cash. He submitted that
this court in Mahindra & Mahindra vs. CIT, 261 ITR 501 has
held that the income which can be taxed u/s 28(iv) must not only be referable
to a benefit or perquisite, but it must be arising from business. Secondly,
section 28(iv) would not apply to benefits in cash or money. The Supreme Court
in CIT vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., 404 ITR 1 had affirmed
the finding of the Bombay High Court and declared that for applicability of
section 28(iv) of the Act, the income should arise from the business or
profession and that the benefit which is received has to be in some other form
rather than in the shape of money.

 

On the other hand, the Department contended
that after a loan is waived or written off, it partakes the character of a
subsidy, more particularly an operational subsidy. Emphasis was laid on the
expression ‘operational subsidy’ to contend that the action of the Government
of Karnataka in writing off of the loan provided was an act of providing
operational subsidy to the assessee, thus extending a helping hand to the
assessee to salvage its losses thereby benefiting the assessee to the extent of
the waived loan and it is in this context that he placed reliance on the
decision of Sahney Steel & Press Works Limited (Supra) and
Protos Engineering Company Private Limited vs. CIT, 211 ITR 919.

 

The Court observed that section 28 deals with profits and gains of
business or profession. It says that the incomes mentioned therein shall be
chargeable to income tax under the head ‘profits and gains of business or
profession’. Clause (iv) refers to the value of any benefit or perquisite
whether or not convertible into money arising from business or the exercise of
a profession. The Court relied on the decision in the case of  Mahindra & Mahindra Limited (Supra)
wherein the Supreme Court was examining whether the amount due by Mahindra
& Mahindra to Kaiser Jeep Corporation which was later on waived off by the
lender constituted taxable income of Mahindra & Mahindra or not. The
Supreme Court held as under:

 

‘On a plain reading of section 28(iv) of
the Income-tax Act,
prima facie, it appears that
for the applicability of the said provision, the income which can be taxed
shall arise from the business or profession. Also, in order to invoke the
provisions of section 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act, the benefit which is
received has to be in some other form rather than in the shape of money.’

 

In the above case, according to the Supreme
Court, for applicability of section 28(iv) of the Act the income which can be taxed has to arise from the business or profession. That apart,
the benefit which is received has to be in some other form rather than in the
shape of money. Therefore, it was held that section 28(iv) was not satisfied
inasmuch as the prime condition of section 28(iv) that any benefit or
perquisite arising from the business or profession shall be in the form of
benefit or perquisite other than in the shape of money, was absent. Therefore,
it was held that the said amount could not be taxed u/s 28(iv) in any circumstances.

 

The Court observed that the facts and issue
in the present case are identical to those in Mahindra & Mahindra
(Supra)
. Here also, a loan of Rs. 2.52 cores was given by the Karnataka
Government to the assessee which was subsequently waived off. Therefore, this
amount would be construed to be cash receipt in the hands of the assessee and
cannot be taxed u/s 28(iv). In view of the Supreme Court decision in Mahindra
& Mahindra
, the earlier decision of this court in Protos
Engineer Comp.
would no longer hold good.

 

The Court further observed that in the
decision in Sahney Steel & Press Works Limited (Supra) the
issue pertained to subsidy received by the assessee from the Andhra Pradesh
Government. The question was whether or not such subsidy received was taxable
as revenue receipt. In the facts of that case, it was held that such subsidies
were of revenue nature and not of capital nature.

 

Insofar as the argument of the Department,
that upon waiver of loan the amount covered by such loan would partake the
character of operational subsidy, the Court is unable to accept such a
contention. Conceptually, ‘loan’ and ‘subsidy’ are two different concepts.

 

In Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd.
(Supra)
, the Supreme Court held that the subsidy provided by the Andhra Pradesh Government was basically an endeavour of the state to extend
a helping hand to newly-set up industries to enable them to be viable and
competitive.

 

Thus, the Court held that there is a
fundamental difference between ‘loan’ and ‘subsidy’ and the two cannot be
equated. While ‘loan’ is a borrowing of money required to the repaid with
interest, ‘subsidy’ being a grant, is not required to be repaid. Such grant is
given as part of a public policy by the state in furtherance of the public
interest. Therefore, even if a ‘loan’ is written off or waived, which may be
for various reasons, it cannot partake the character of a ‘subsidy’.

 

The substantial question of law therefore is
answered in favour of the assessee by holding that waiver of loan cannot be
brought to tax u/s 28(iv) of the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

 

 

 

BCAJ:
Positive impact of COVID-19 on number of pages

 

Month

2019

2020

%  change

May

112

148

32%

June

124

132

6%

July

136

148

9%

August

116

124

7%

September

140

156

11%

Total

628

708

13%

 

 

Do not dwell in the past, do not
dream of the future, concentrate the
mind on the present moment

 
Buddha

 

 

God doesn’t dwell in the wooden,
stony or earthen idols.
His abode is in our feelings, our thoughts

  
Chanakya

Charitable institution – Exemption – Sections 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961 – Denial of exemption – Activity for profit – Effect of proviso to section 2(15) – Concurrent finding of appellate authorities that the assessee was charitable institution – Event organised to raise money – Amount earned entitled to exemption

2. CIT (Exemption)
vs. United Way of Baroda
[2020] 423 ITR 596
(Guj.) Date of order: 25th
February, 2020
A.Y.: 2014-15

 

Charitable institution – Exemption –
Sections 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961 – Denial of exemption – Activity for profit
– Effect of proviso to section 2(15) – Concurrent finding of appellate
authorities that the assessee was charitable institution – Event organised to
raise money – Amount earned entitled to exemption

 

The assessee is a
charitable institution registered u/s 12A of the Act. For the A.Y. 2014-15, the assessee filed its return of income declaring total income as Nil after claiming exemption u/s
11. But the A.O. assessed the total income at Rs. 4,53,97,808. He had found
that the assessee had received a total sum of Rs. 5,48,04,054 which included
Rs. 4,37,61,637 as income from organising the event of garba during the
Navratri festival. According to the A.O., the assessee sold passes and gave
food stalls on rent, etc., which constitutes 79.85% of its total income. The
assessee, during the year, had declared gross receipts of Rs. 5,27,40,432 and
showed surplus of Rs. 26,27,243. The assessee thereby claimed Rs. 4,42,59,665
as income from charitable event. The A.O. held that the activities of the
assessee as per the amended provision of section 2(15) could not be said to be
advancement of any other object of general public utility and, therefore, the
assessee was not eligible to claim the benefit under sections 11 and 12,
respectively, more particularly in view of section 13(8) of the Act. The A.O.,
having regard to the gross receipts of Rs. 5,48,04,054, made the addition of
Rs. 58,90,500 on account of the interest on FSF fund and Rs. 1,67,90,118 on
account of anonymous donation.

 

The Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals), allowed the appeal of the assessee, taking the view that
the activities of the assessee could be termed as charitable in nature and the
assessee would be eligible for the benefit under sections 11 and 12. The
Tribunal concurred with the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and
dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘i) Once the activity of the assessee falls within
the ambit of trade, commerce or business, it no longer remains a charitable
activity and the assessee is not entitled to claim any exemption under sections
11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The expression “trade”, “commerce” and
“business” as occurring in the first proviso to section 2(15) must be
read in the context of the intent and purport of section 2(15) and cannot be
interpreted to mean any activity which is carried on in an organised manner.
The purpose and the dominant object for which an institution carries on its
activities is material to determine whether or not it is business.

 

ii) The object of introducing the first proviso
is to exclude organisations which carry on regular business from the scope of
“charitable purpose”. An activity would be considered “business” if it is
undertaken with a profit motive, but in some cases, this may not be
determinative. Normally, the profit motive test should be satisfied, but in a
given case the activity may be regarded as a business even when the profit
motive cannot be established. In such cases, there should be evidence and
material to show that the activity has continued on sound and recognised
business principles and pursued with reasonable continuity. There should be
facts and other circumstances which justify and show that the activity
undertaken is in fact in the nature of business.

 

iii)  The main object of the
assessee could not be said to be organising the event of garba. The
assessee had been supporting 120 non-government organisations. The assessee was
into health and human services for the purpose of improving the quality of life
in society. All its objects were charitable. The activities like organising the
event of garba, including the sale of tickets and issue of passes, etc.,
cannot be termed as business. The two authorities had taken the view that
profit-making was not the driving force or the objective of the assessee. The
assessee was entitled to exemption under sections 11 and 12.’

 

 

 

Assessment: (i) Effect of electronic proceedings – Possibility of erroneous assessment if transactions and statement of account of assessee not properly understood – A.O. to call for assessee’s explanation in writing to conclude that cash deposits made by assessee post-demonetisation of currency was unusual; (ii) Unexplained money – Sections 69A and 115BBE of ITA, 1961 – Chit company – Tax on income included u/s 69A – Monthly subscriptions / dues – Cash deposits of collection made post-demonetisation of currency by Government – Cash deposits during period in question not in variance with same period during preceding year – Addition of amount as unexplained money – Provisions of section 115BBE cannot be invoked

1. Salem Sree Ramavilas Chit Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2020] 423 ITR 525
(Mad.) Date of order: 4th
February, 2020
A.Y.: 2017-18

 

Assessment: (i) Effect of electronic
proceedings – Possibility of erroneous assessment if transactions and statement
of account of assessee not properly understood – A.O. to call for assessee’s
explanation in writing to conclude that cash deposits made by assessee post-demonetisation
of currency was unusual;

(ii) Unexplained money – Sections 69A and
115BBE of ITA, 1961 – Chit company – Tax on income included u/s 69A – Monthly
subscriptions / dues – Cash deposits of collection made post-demonetisation of
currency by Government – Cash deposits during period in question not in
variance with same period during preceding year – Addition of amount as
unexplained money – Provisions of section 115BBE cannot be invoked

 

The assessee was in
the chit fund business. For the A.Y. 2017-18, the A.O. added the amounts
received and deposited by it during the period between 9th November,
2016 and 31st December, 2016, post-demonetisation of Rs. 500 and Rs.
1,000 notes by the Government on 8th November, 2016 to the income of
the assessee. The order stated that the assessee did not properly explain the
source and the purpose of cash along with party-wise break-up as required in
the notice issued u/s 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

 

The assessee filed
a writ petition and challenged the assessment order. The Madras High Court
allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i) The order making the assessee liable to tax at the maximum marginal
rate of tax by invoking section 115BBE was misplaced. The assessee had prima
facie
demonstrated that the assessment proceedings had resulted in
distorted conclusion on the facts that the amount collected by it during the
period was huge and remained unexplained and therefore the amount was liable to
be treated as unaccounted money in the hands of the assessee u/s 69A. The
closing cash on hand during the preceding months of the same year was not at
much variance with the closing cash on hand as on 31st October,
2016. The demonetisation of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000 notes by the Government was
on 8th November, 2016 and the collection of the assessee between 1st
November, 2016 and 8th November, 2016 was not unusual compared to
its collection during the month of November, 2015. The cash deposits made by
the assessee in the year 2016 were not at variance with the cash deposits made
by it in the preceding year. Collection of monthly subscription / dues by the
assessee during the period in question was reasonable as compared to the same
period in the year 2015.

 

ii) Since the
assessment proceedings no longer involved human interaction and were based on
records alone, such assessment proceedings could lead to erroneous assessment
if officers were not able to understand the transactions and statement of
accounts of the assessee or the nature of the assessee. The assessee was to
explain its stand in writing so that the A.O. could arrive at an objective
conclusion on the facts based on the record.

 

iii) Under these
circumstances, the impugned order is set aside and the case is remitted back to
the respondent to pass a fresh order within a period of sixty days from the
date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall file additional
representation if any by treating the impugned order as the show cause notice
within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order. Since the Government of India has done away with the human interaction
during the assessment proceedings, it is expected that the petitioner will
clearly explain its stand in writing so that the respondent-A.O. can come to an
objective conclusion on facts based on the records alone. It is made clear that
the respondent will have to come to an independent conclusion on facts
uninfluenced by any of the observations contained herein.’

Article 12 of India-USA and India-Netherlands DTAAs – Testing and certification charges paid to US and Netherlands entities did not qualify as FTS since they did not satisfy ‘make available’ requirement Article 12 of India-China and India-Germany DTAAs – Testing and certification charges were FTS and taxable in India

2. [2020] 117
taxmann.com 983 (Delhi-Trib.)
Havells India Ltd.
vs. ACIT ITA Nos.:
6072/Del./2010; 6073/Del./2010; 466/Del./2011
A.Ys.: 2004-05 and
2007-08 Date of order: 25th
August, 2020

 

Article 12 of
India-USA and India-Netherlands DTAAs – Testing and certification charges paid
to US and Netherlands entities did not qualify as FTS since they did not
satisfy ‘make available’ requirement

 

Article 12 of
India-China and India-Germany DTAAs – Testing and certification charges were
FTS and taxable in India

 

FACTS


The assessee was
engaged in the manufacture of electrical goods. It made payments to various
foreign entities in the USA, the Netherlands, China and Germany for testing and
certification of its products. The foreign entities had specialised knowledge
and facilities for undertaking testing and certification, which was required
for the manufacturing activity of the assessee. These were country-specific
certifications that were mandatory for sale in the respective countries.

 

The A.O. held that
the payments for testing fees were taxable u/s 9(1)(vii). As regards the
applicability of the DTAAs, the A.O. held that the services met the requirement
of ‘made available’ under the India-Netherlands and India-USA DTAAs. The A.O.
further held that the testing fees were in any case taxable under the
India-China and India-Germany DTAAs wherein the ‘make available’ clause was not
present.

 

The CIT(A) upheld
the order of the A.O.

 

Being aggrieved,
the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD


Payments to
US and Netherlands entities

Relying upon its
order in the assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2005-06 and A.Y. 2006-07 and
following orders for earlier years, the Tribunal held that the services
provided did not satisfy the ‘make available’ condition. Hence, the services
were not chargeable to tax in India.

 

Payment to
Chinese entity

(a) The assessee contended that in terms of Article
12 of the India-China DTAA, the meaning of FTS was restricted to only services
performed in India, based on ‘place of performance test’.

(b) Relying on the decision in Ashapura
Minichem Ltd.2
dealing with Article 12 of the India-China
DTAA, the Tribunal observed that: (i) FTS shall be deemed to accrue or arise in
the source country when the payer is resident of that country; (ii) it is the ‘provision
of services’
, and not necessarily the ‘performance of services’ in the
source country which triggers taxability. The Tribunal observed that the
expression ‘provision for services’ used in the India-China DTAA is much wider
in scope than the expression ‘provision for rendering of services’
used in other DTAAs. Hence, rendition of services in India is not necessary for
taxability of FTS in India. It is sufficient that services were utilised in
India. Accordingly, under India-China DTAA, FTS was taxable in India.

(c) Relying on the above decision, the Tribunal
upheld disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) for non-withholding of tax.

 

Payment to
German entity

In case of payments
made to the German entity, the Tribunal held that the services provided by it
were in the nature of technical services and hence were taxable under the
India-Germany DTAA.

 

Standard
services and machine-provided services

(i)  The assessee relied upon the Supreme Court
decision in Kotak Securities3 to contend that
technical services were standard services. However, the Tribunal held that
testing services were not standard services as they were for a specific
country, a specific product, and / or a specific manufactured lot of the
assessee, which was exported to that particular country and conformed to the
standards specified in that country.

(ii) The assessee also relied
on the decision of the Apex Court in Bharti Cellular Ltd.4
to contend that services were not FTS as they were provided by machines without
any human intervention. However, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Kotak
Securities (Supra)
, the Tribunal did not accept the contention of the
assessee. In the said decision, after taking note of the decision in Bharti
Cellular (Supra)
, the Court had observed that services could be
technical even in case of a fully-automated process which did not involve human
intervention.

_________________________________________________________________________________________________


2    (2010)
40 SOT 220 (Mum)

3    (2016)
383 ITR 1 (SC)

4    (2011)
330 ITR 239 (SC)

 

 

You can’t blame gravity for
falling in love

  
Albert Einstein

Article 5 of India-UK DTAA – Section 195 of the Act – Payment for production and delivery of film outside India is not taxable in India

1. [2020] 118
taxmann.com 314 (Mumbai-Trib.)
Next Gen Films (P)
Ltd. vs. ITO ITA Nos.: 3782,
3783/Mum./2016
A.Ys.: 2011-12 to
2012-13 Date of order: 11th
August, 2020

 

Article 5 of
India-UK DTAA – Section 195 of the Act – Payment for production and delivery of
film outside India is not taxable in India

 

FACTS


The assessee and another Indian Company (E1) were co-producers of a
feature film. They entered into a commission agreement with D, a UK-based
company which was to provide production services like pre-production,
production, post-production and delivery of the feature film. Key terms of the
agreement were as follows:

(a) Based on the story concept provided by the
assessee, development of storyboards and screenplay, selection of locations and
special and visual effects services. D was to consult and take consent of the
assessee over important aspects like the identity of all key cast members, budget,
production schedule, delivery materials, cash flow, screenplay, production
services companies to be engaged, etc., to ensure that the film was produced
and delivered in accordance with the material requirement.

(b) Ownership of the film was solely and
exclusively with the assessee.

(c) As a consideration for the
aforesaid services, D was paid 100% of the budget. This amount was to be
reduced by the amount of UK Tax Credit advance, any underspent amount, interest
accrued on monies held in the production account and any realisable value from
equipment / materials sale at the end of production of the film.

 

To execute the
Indian leg of the project, D entered into a production service agreement with
E2 (a subsidiary of the parent of E1). The services of E2 were subject to the
direction and control of D. The A.O. was of the view that D had a place of
management in India. He further held that the assessee, D and E2 were
associated enterprises in terms of Article 10. Accordingly, E2 had also created
a service PE of D in India. Since the assessee had not withheld tax on
remittance, the A.O. deemed it as ‘assessee in default’ and initiated
proceedings u/s 201/201(1A) of the Act.

 

In appeal, the
CIT(A) held against the assessee who, being aggrieved, appealed before the
Tribunal.

 

HELD


Associated
enterprise

+ The contract
between the assessee and D was on a principal-to-principal basis which required
D to produce the film in accordance with the specifications laid down by the
assessee.

+ D carried out its
activities in consultation with the assessee to ensure that the film was
produced as per specifications and in keeping with the storyline.

+ D acted
independently and was free to take decisions and also engage other service
providers.

+ D had borrowed
against expected UK tax credit1. Thus, it could not be said that D
was dependent upon the assessee for its financial requirement.

+ D also recorded
revenue received from the assessee and consequential loss in its books of
accounts.

 

Thus, it could not
be said that the assessee participated directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of D.

 

Permanent
Establishment

* The agreement
between D and E2 was that between a principal and an agent. E2 had provided
limited production services for a lump sum consideration of Rs. 3 crores.

* The gross
receipts of E2 were Rs. 133.55 crores (A.Y. 2011-12) and Rs. 76.27 crores (A.Y.
2012-13), respectively, as compared to the fees of Rs. 3 crores received from
D. Therefore, E2 was an agent of independent status. Consequently, D did not
create a PE in India.

 

Thus, D and E2 were
not associated enterprises in terms of Article 10 of the DTAA.


_________________________________________________________________________________________________

1    Decision
does not mention nature or conditions qualifying for tax credit in UK

 

Section 40(a)(ia) r/w section 195 – Payments to overseas group companies considered as reimbursement of expense incurred, not liable to deduction of tax at source

3. ACIT vs. APCO Worldwide (India) Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi) Members: Sushma Chowla (V.P.) and Anil Chaturvedi (A.M.) ITA No. 5614/Del./2017 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 9th September, 2020 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Rakhi Vimal / Ajay Vohra and Gaurav
Jain

 

Section
40(a)(ia) r/w section 195 – Payments to overseas group companies considered as
reimbursement of expense incurred, not liable to deduction of tax at source

 

FACTS


The issue was
with respect to disallowance of expenses u/s 40(a)(ia). The assessee had made
payments to its overseas group companies towards recoupment of actual cost
incurred by them on behalf of the assessee for corporate administration,
finance support, information technology support, etc., without deduction of tax
u/s 195. According to the assessee, the payments made cannot be considered as
income of the recipients, as no profit element was involved. However, according
to the A.O., the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) were attracted. He accordingly
disallowed the payment of Rs. 1.49 crores so made. On appeal, the CIT(A)
deleted the addition by holding that the assessee was not required to deduct
tax at source on the reimbursement of the expenses made to overseas entities.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
noted that the CIT(A) had found that the payments made were on cost-to-cost
basis. Further, the coordinate bench of the Tribunal while deciding an
identical issue in the assessee’s own case in A.Ys. 2010-11, 2011-12 and
2012-13, had held that the provisions of section 195 were not attracted on the
amounts paid by the assessee to its overseas group companies as it was mere
reimbursement. Accordingly, it was held that no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) was
required to be made.

 

Section 199(3) and Rule 37BA – Credit for TDS allowed in the year of deduction even when related revenue was booked in subsequent year(s)

2. HCL Comnet Limited vs. DCIT (Delhi) Members: O.P. Kant (A.M.) and Kuldip Singh (J.M.) ITA No. 1113/Del./2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 4th September, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Ajay Vohra, Aditya Vohra and Arpit
Goyal / S.N. Meena

 

Section
199(3) and Rule 37BA – Credit for TDS allowed in the year of deduction even
when related revenue was booked in subsequent year(s)

 

FACTS


The assessee
was in the business of selling networking equipment and installation and
provision of after-sales services. In respect of after-sales services, the
customers would make payment which covered 
a period of three to four years. The assessee would recognise revenue
from such services on a year-to-year basis. However, the customer would deduct
TDS on the entire amount at the time of payment as per the provisions of the
Act. Relying on the decision of the Visakhapatnam bench of the Tribunal in the
case of Asstt. CIT vs. Peddu Srinivasa Rao (ITA No. 324/Vizag./2009, CO
No. 68/Vizag./2009, dated 3rd March, 2011),
the assessee
claimed that it was eligible to claim the entire TDS in the year of deduction
(even when the related revenue was booked in subsequent financial years).
Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Toyo Engineering India Limited vs. JCIT (5 SOT 616)
and of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of HCL Comnet Systems and Services
Ltd. vs. DCIT (ITA No. 3221/Del./2017 order dated 31st December,
2019).
However, the A.O. rejected the claim of the assessee.

 

HELD


The Tribunal,
following the order passed by the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case
of HCL
Comnet Systems and Services Ltd.,
held that the TDS credit is to be
granted irrespective of the fact that related revenue is booked in subsequent financial years. Accordingly, the assessee’s
claim for credit of the TDS in the year of deduction was allowed.

Section 80IC – Income arising from scrap sales is part of business income eligible for deduction u/s 80IC

1. Isolloyd Engineering Technologies Limited vs. DCIT (Delhi) Members: O.P. Kant (A.M.) and Kuldip Singh (J.M.) ITA No. 3936/Del./2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 4th September, 2020 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: None / S.N. Meena and M. Barnwal

 

Section 80IC
– Income arising from scrap sales is part of business income eligible for
deduction u/s 80IC

 

FACTS


The assessee
had three manufacturing units. It was entitled to claim deduction u/s 80IC @30%
on the first two units and @100% on the third one. During the year under
appeal, the assessee’s claim for deduction u/s 80IC included the sum of Rs.
52.67 lakhs qua the amount of scrap sales aggregating to Rs. 80.13
lakhs. According to the A.O., the same was not related to manufacturing
activity, hence it was disallowed. On appeal, the CIT(A) restricted the
addition to Rs.7.08 lakhs by allowing the deduction to the extent of Rs. 45.59
lakhs claimed u/s 80IC.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
noted that the scrap consisted of empty drums, off-cuts, trims, coils,
leftovers, packing material, ‘gatta’, scrap rolls, etc., which were generated
in the course of the business. According to it, it was settled principle of law
that scrap generated in the business is part and parcel of the income derived
from the business and as such forms part of the business profit, as held by the
Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Sadu Forgings Ltd. (336 ITR 444).
It further noted that the CIT(A) had duly obtained and analysed unit-wise
details of scrap sold in the year under appeal and found the claim of the
assessee prima facie plausible. However, without giving any reason, the
sum of Rs. 7.08 lakhs was disallowed. According to the Tribunal, the CIT(A) had
erred in disallowing the amount of Rs. 7.08 lakhs out of the total claim of Rs.
52.67 lakhs made u/s 80IC. Accordingly, it allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Section 244A – Interest is payable on refund arising out of payment of self-assessment tax even though refund is less than ten per cent of tax determined

4. [2020] 119 taxmann.com 40 (Del.)(Trib.) Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. vs. CIT ITA Nos. 2553, 2641 (Delhi) of 2013 &
others
A.Ys.: 1999-00 to 1994-95 Date of order: 31st August, 2020

 

Section 244A – Interest is payable on
refund arising out of payment of self-assessment tax even though refund is less
than ten per cent of tax determined

 

FACTS


The assessee
claimed refund of Rs. 201,37,93,163 comprising of advance tax, TDS and
self-assessment tax of Rs. 14,59,79,228 and Rs. 186,78,13,935, the tax paid on
different dates. The A.O. did not allow interest u/s 244A(1)(a) on the amount
of Rs. 14.59 crores as the refund was less than 10% of the tax determined u/s
254 r/w/s 143(3).

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order on the
ground that to give effect to the provisions of section 244A(3), the assessee
had to mandatorily cross the limitations imposed u/s 244A(1)(a).

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) treated the entire amount of Rs.
14.60 crores as prepaid taxes for the purpose of section 244A(1)(a). This, according to the Tribunal, was where the
CIT(A) considered / read the provisions wrong. The Tribunal held that the
prepaid taxes consist of TDS and advance tax. The provisions of self-assessment
tax are governed by section 140A which is not covered by the provisions of
section 244A(1)(a). Self-assessment tax which is payable on the basis of return
does not constitute part of advance tax. For the purpose of embargo of 10% of
tax determined in accordance with the provisions of section 244A(1)(a), it is
clear from the provisions of the section that self-assessment tax does not form
part of the embargo as self-assessment tax falls under clause (b) of section
244A(1). The proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 244A is
applicable and has to be considered for the computational purpose of interest
computable for the refund payable u/s 244A(1)(a).

 

As regards the
question whether or not interest is payable on self-assessment tax paid, the
Tribunal observed that it is trite law that whenever the assessee is entitled
to refund, there is a statutory liability on the Revenue to pay the interest on
such refund on general principles to pay interest on sums wrongfully retained.

 

Section 244A does
not deny payment of interest in case of refund of amount paid u/s 140A. On the
contrary, clause (b) being a residuary clause, necessarily includes payment
made u/s 140A. Since there is no proviso attached to sub-clause (b), the
embargo of 10% is not applicable for calculation of interest for the refund
arising out of payment of self-assessment tax.

 

The Tribunal held
that with regard to the self-assessment tax paid, the assessee is eligible for
interest on the total amount of refund in accordance with the provisions of
section 244A(1)(b). This ground of appeal was allowed.

 

Sections 250 and 271AAA – Ex parte dismissal of appeal by CIT(A), without considering the material on record on the ground that the written submissions were not signed by the assessee, is contrary to the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 250

3. 118 taxmann.com 223 (Raj.)(Trib.) Keshavlal Devkaranbhai Patel vs. ACIT ITA No. 124 /Rajkot/2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 28th July, 2020

 

Sections 250 and 271AAA – Ex parte
dismissal of appeal by CIT(A), without considering the material on record on
the ground that the written submissions were not signed by the assessee, is
contrary to the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 250

 

FACTS


Aggrieved by the
order levying penalty u/s 271AAA, the assessee preferred an appeal to the
CIT(A). The assessee had filed his explanation before the A.O. and also before
the CIT(A). However, the submissions filed before the CIT(A) were not signed by
the assessee.

 

In view of this,
the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal by recording that the assessee was not
interested in pursuing the appeal.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal found
the order of the CIT(A) to be very cryptic and not having any discussion on the
material already available on record before him. The Tribunal observed that:

(i)   there is no valid and justifiable reason
given by the appellate authority in his order while dismissing the claim of the
assessee;

(ii)  the CIT(A) has recorded in his order that the
assessee has filed written submissions in the office on 29th August,
2017 but without signature, hence the same were not considered by the CIT(A);
and

(iii) the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution even when the written submission was on record which did not bear
the signature of the assessee.

 

The Tribunal held
that the CIT(A) ought to have adjourned the matter and passed a further
direction to file fresh written submissions, duly signed. It is a basic
principle that justice should not only be done, but it must also be seen to be
done. In the absence of that, the Tribunal held, the order impugned is not in
consonance with the spirit and object of sub-section (6) of section 250.

 

The Tribunal set
aside the issue to the file of the CIT(A) with a direction to adjudicate it
afresh after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and to pass a
speaking order thereon keeping in mind, inter alia, the mandate of the
provisions of section 250(6) in order to render true and effective justice.

Section 50C – Provisions of section 50C are not applicable to introduction of development rights as capital contribution in an AOP of which assessee is a member

2. 119 taxmann.com 186 (Mum.)(Trib.) Network Construction Company vs. ACIT ITA No. 2279/Mum./2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 11th August, 2020

 

Section 50C – Provisions of section 50C are
not applicable to introduction of development rights as capital contribution in
an AOP of which assessee is a member

 

FACTS


The assessee firm
acquired development rights in respect of seven buildings of which the assessee
firm developed and sold four on its own and disclosed the profit earned as
business profit in its return of income. The development rights in respect of
the remaining three buildings were shown as investments in the balance sheet as
at 31st March, 2010.

 

As per the joint
venture agreement dated 1st July, 2010, the assessee contributed
development rights in respect of three buildings as ‘capital contribution’ in
an AOP for an agreed consideration of Rs. 5 crores. The assessee contended that
the capital gains were to be computed in accordance with the provisions of
section 45(3).

 

The A.O. treated
the introduction of the development rights as a transfer and computed capital
gains by applying the provisions of section 50C by adopting Rs. 10,10,47,000,
being stamp duty value of these rights, as the full value of consideration.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

 

The assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD


The Tribunal
observed that section 45(3) is a charging provision having two limbs joined by
the conjunction ‘AND’. The first limb is a charging provision which levies
capital gains tax on gains arising from the contribution of a capital asset in the
AOP by a member, and the second limb is an essential deeming fiction for
determining the value of consideration without which the charging provision
would fail. The Tribunal also observed that the provisions of section 50C are
also a deeming fiction which deems only the value of consideration for the
purpose of calculating capital gains in the transfer of a capital asset from
one person to another. It held that the provisions of section 50C are not
applicable in the present case and that the provisions of section 45(3) will be
applied.

 

The Tribunal
reversed the orders of the A.O. and the CIT(A) and allowed this ground of
appeal filed by the assessee.

 

Section 44AD r/w sections 44AB and 144 – Assessing Officer can resort to estimation of income under the provisions of section 44AD only after rejecting the books of accounts of the assessee, by best judgment assessment u/s 144

1. [118 taxmann.com
347]
Saykul Islam vs.
ITO ITA No.
64/Ahd./2018
A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 31st
July, 2020

 

Section 44AD r/w sections
44AB and 144 – Assessing Officer can resort to estimation of income under the
provisions of section 44AD only after rejecting the books of accounts of the
assessee, by best judgment assessment u/s 144

 

FACTS


The assessee is an
individual trading in hardware goods. His business turnover was in excess of
Rs. 1 crore, but he had declared profit at 0.99% of the turnover in his tax
return. The information was provided by the assessee in his return of income
reflecting maintenance of books of accounts, but not audited as required under
the provisions of section 44AB. The A.O. was of the view that as per the
provisions of section 44AD, an assessee may claim lower profits and gains than
the profits and gains specified in sub-section (1) of section 44AD provided
that the assessee keeps and maintains such books of accounts and other
documents as required under sub-section (2) of section 44AA and gets his
accounts audited and furnishes a report of such audit as required u/s 44AB. The
assessee submitted that the net profit percentage was very low in his business
and requested the officer to take the net profit percentage @3% of the
turnover.

 

The A.O. rejected
this contention and estimated the net profit at 8% of the turnover. On appeal
to the CIT(A), he reduced the estimated profit on turnover from 8% to 5%.
Aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee filed an appeal with the
Tribunal.

 

HELD


The assessee had
produced all books of accounts, bills, vouchers and other documents; however, without
pointing out any mistake or error in the books of accounts, the A.O. made an
addition at 8%. Moreover, the books of accounts were not rejected. The Tribunal
observed that the A.O. could resort to estimation of net profits only after
rejecting the books of accounts u/s 145(3) and thereafter making best judgment
assessment u/s 144. Instead, he estimated net profits only on the basis of
suspicion that the assessee might be inflating expenses and showing a lower net
profit ratio. On the factual position of the case, the Tribunal directed the
A.O. to estimate the income at 2.5% of the turnover.

 

The appeal of the
assessee was partly allowed.

NEW TCS PROVISIONS – AN ANALYSIS

 

The Finance Act,
2020 has inserted a new sub-section (1H) in section 206C of the Income-tax Act,
1961 with effect from 1st October, 2020 to provide for collection of
tax at source (Tax Collected at Source or TCS) on consideration received on
sale of certain goods. In this article an effort is being made to set out
various issues that are likely to arise out of these newly-inserted provisions.

 

AMENDMENT IN BRIEF

Every seller whose
turnover in the immediately preceding F.Y. exceeds Rs. 10 crores and who
receives an amount exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs in aggregate from a buyer in any
previous year on the sale of goods, is required to collect a sum of 0.1%
(0.075% for F.Y. 2020-21) on the sale consideration exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs from
the buyer of such goods.

 

The rate is to be
increased to 1% if neither PAN nor the Aadhaar number are provided.

 

Receipts from sale
of scrap, alcohol, motor vehicles, remittances under Liberalised Remittance
Scheme (LRS) and overseas tour programme packages are excluded from this
sub-section since they are covered by other clauses of section 206C.

 

The provisions of
TCS shall not be applicable in cases where the buyer is liable to make a tax
deduction at source from the amount payable to the seller, and such tax has
been deducted. Besides, goods exported out of India have also been excluded
from the applicability of TCS.

 

Further, the
following have been excluded from the meaning of the term ‘buyer’, thus making
these provisions inapplicable to them:

    Central Government

    State Government

    Embassy

    High Commission

    Legation

    Commission

    Consulate

    Trade Representation of a foreign state

    Local Authority

    Person importing goods into India

    Other Notified Person

 

ISSUES

‘Goods’

The levy of TCS is
on the consideration received on the sale of goods. The Income-tax Act does not
define the term ‘goods’. But it can be interpreted widely since anything that
is marketable, i.e., capable of being sold in the market, can be classified as
goods. The other relevant legislation from which a definition can be drawn is
the Sale of Goods Act. As per section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, ‘goods’
are described as: ‘Every kind of movable property other than actionable claims
and money; and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass and things
attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before
sale or under the contract of sale.’

 

Under this
definition, shares and securities are included within the definition of goods.
Let us analyse this position in the following scenarios:

 

Shares &
securities held as stock in trade by a dealer trading in them

Listed shares and securities:

In case of listed
shares and securities, the dealer who regularly trades in them is required to
pay Securities Transaction Tax (STT) for transactions carried out through the
recognised stock exchanges. The identity of the buyer is not known to the
seller and, therefore, whether the sale consideration exceeds Rs. 50 lakhs for
each buyer cannot be determined. The machinery for implementation of TCS
provisions would not work in these cases. In view of these practical
difficulties, the CBDT vide its Circular No. 17 of 2020 dated 29th
September, 2020 (the Circular) has provided that the provisions of sub-section
(1H) of section 206C will not be applicable to transactions for sale of shares
/ securities and commodities which are carried out through recognised stock /
commodities exchanges. Though welcome, the Circular gives only limited clarity
and a few more issues with regard to ‘goods’ covered under this section are
discussed below.

 

Unlisted shares & securities:

In such a
scenario, there would be no STT payable on the sale of these shares. Since the
consideration would be received directly from the buyer, the seller will be in
a position to collect tax at source. Therefore, unless there is a specific
exclusion, unlisted shares and securities sold by a dealer may be covered under
these provisions. However, shares of private limited companies are not tradable
on account of restrictions on their transfer and may therefore not be regarded
as stock-in-trade. Sales proceeds of such shares may not be regarded as turnover
if they are held as capital assets. If the seller of such shares is otherwise a
dealer in goods having a turnover of more than Rs. 10 crores in the preceding
year, the question of applicability of TCS may arise. The question is whether
TCS provisions are attracted by sale of goods only in the course of business or
even otherwise in the case of a businessman. This is discussed further below.
Shares held as capital assets are taken up next.

 

Shares &
securities held as investments / Capital assets by an investor

Listed shares and securities:

In the case of
listed shares and securities, they would remain outside the scope of TCS for
the same reasons as discussed above.

 

Unlisted shares and securities:

In a case where unlisted shares and securities held as investments are
sold, whether they would constitute ‘goods’ would determine the applicability
of the TCS provisions. These shares and securities would usually be capital
assets and their sale would give rise to resultant capital gains / loss. Though
the definition of ‘goods’ under the Sale of Goods Act includes stocks and
shares, the fact that they would be considered as ‘goods’ in the context of
these provisions seems unlikely, and therefore may be excluded.

 

In order to
extrapolate this thought further, let us analyse the criteria to be fulfilled
for the applicability of TCS provisions. This sub-section has two-fold
criteria:

(i) the turnover from business of the preceding
financial year should be in excess of Rs. 10 crores, and

(ii) the aggregate consideration received from sale
of goods during the previous year should be in excess of Rs. 50 lakhs.

 

The consideration
received from the sale of such shares will not be included in the ‘turnover’
from business while determining the threshold of Rs. 10 crores. It would be
inappropriate to include such consideration while ascertaining the threshold
for aggregate consideration for the applicability of the TCS provisions. One
cannot apply an independent sense to interpret the words ‘turnover’ and
‘consideration’ on sale of goods which has been used in the same sub-section
(this reasoning has been elaborated further).

 

OTHER ASSETS


Next, would TCS
provisions be applicable in the case of other assets (other than the ones in
which the seller deals) that are sold? To illustrate the same, let us look at a
scenario: Say, Mr. A sells certain automobile parts (which constitute his
stock-in-trade) to Mr. B (buyer) during the year, the aggregate consideration
being Rs. 60 lakhs and the other relevant conditions have been fulfilled.
Assume that he further sells some machinery / furniture to Mr. B for a
consideration of Rs. 25 lakhs.

 

Will Mr. A collect
tax at source on the consideration received for the sale of machinery /
furniture as well?

 

A prima facie
view that one may be inclined to adopt is that TCS would be required to be
collected on the consideration received from the sale of machinery or
furniture, since the section does not carve out any specific exclusion. That
may be a conservative view, but it would be unfair to not evaluate the contrary
view. Before we analyse the same, it is pertinent to note that Mr. A in the
illustration above trades in or deals in automobile parts. In what is probably
an isolated transaction, he has sold certain machinery / furniture to one of
his buyers, Mr. B.

 

Before taking up
the contrary view, the following are certain important observations:

1. As discussed above, the term ‘goods’ has not
been defined in the Act. It is therefore capable of being applied to a wide
range of things. ‘Goods’ may also cover every movable asset except money and
actionable claims. However, when a particular word has not been defined in the
statute, it is important to understand its usage in the context of the
provision.

 

2.  The provisions related to TCS are covered
under Chapter VII-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which deals with Collection
& Recovery of Tax. The heading for section 206C containing the group of
sub-sections u/s 206C reads as ‘Profits & Gains from the business of
trading in alcoholic liquor, forest produce, scrap, etc.’

 

3. While the term ‘goods’ may mean a wide range of
items, the heading to the section in which the particular sub-section appears
clearly hints at receipts in the nature of profits / gains from the business of
‘trading’… In view of this, one may infer that the receipts intended to be
covered in this section are such receipts as arise to the seller from the sale
of such items that he trades in as part of his business.

 

4. Further, as per the Literal Rule of
Interpretation of Statutes, where a statute uses a word which is of everyday
use, such a word should be interpreted in its popular sense, i.e., construed as
it is understood in common language. Therefore, to interpret goods as
understood in common language, would ordinarily mean stock in trade or goods
that a person trades in regularly in the course of his business activities.

 

5. Explanation to this sub-section defines
‘seller’ as…

‘seller’ means
a person whose total sales, gross receipts or turnover from the business
carried on by him exceed ten crore rupees during the financial year immediately
preceding the financial year in which the sale of goods is carried out, not
being a person as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify for this purpose, subject to such conditions as may be
specified therein.

 

The seller in the context of this sub-section is a person whose sales /
gross receipts or turnover from ‘business’ carried on by him exceeds Rs. 10
crores in the preceding financial year. In determining the threshold for one of
the two criteria for applicability of these provisions, the sales / turnover
from ‘business activities’ of such seller has to be taken into account. It
would be inappropriate to include receipts on sale of such items which would
otherwise not form a part of
turnover or sales in determining the threshold for consideration of goods sold.
To put it simply, in the illustration above, when Mr. A sells machinery /
furniture to Mr. B, such amount will not be included in his ‘turnover from
business’ as clearly stated by the meaning of seller given in the explanation.
To include it in the aggregate consideration for goods sold, and
collect tax on such amount, would therefore not be appropriate.

 

Thus, a possible
contrary view is that other assets sold by the seller to the buyer which do not
represent goods or items that the seller trades in as a part of his business
would not be covered by these provisions.

 

APPLICABILITY OF
PROVISIONS

This sub-section
is effective from 1st October, 2020 and is prospective in
application. It is triggered if the consideration received for sale of goods of
the value, or aggregate of such value, is in excess of Rs. 50 lakhs in any
previous year (other than goods exported out of India). Therefore, the
threshold criterion of consideration in excess of Rs. 50 lakhs has to be
considered for the entire previous year.

 

This has been
clarified by paragraph 4.4.2(iii) of the Circular, which states that since
the threshold of fifty lakh rupees is with respect to the previous year,
calculation of receipt of sale consideration for triggering TCS under
sub-section (1H) of Section 206C shall be computed from 1st April,
2020.
Let us take up a few probable scenarios here:

 

(I)   Mr. A sells goods to Mr. B for Rs. 65 lakhs –
for Rs. 20 lakhs, both sale and receipt of consideration were pre-October,
2020; for Rs. 45 lakhs, both sale and receipt of consideration were
post-October, 2020. Though TCS provisions will be applicable on the receipt of
sale consideration of Rs. 45 lakhs post-October, for determining the threshold
criterion, receipt of sale consideration of Rs. 20 lakhs will be considered.

 

(II)  Mr. A sells goods to Mr. B and receives an
aggregate consideration of Rs. 75 lakhs. The sale and receipt of the entire
consideration take place post-1st October, 2020. Here, without any
doubt, the TCS provisions will be applicable and Mr. A will be under an
obligation to collect tax on Rs. 25 lakhs (Rs. 75 lakhs minus Rs. 50 lakhs).
Before we analyse further, it is important to take note of paragraph 4.4.2(ii)
of the Circular which states as under: Since sub-section (1H) of section
206C of the Act applies on receipt of sale consideration, the provision of this
sub-section shall not apply on any sale consideration received before 1st
October, 2020. Consequently, it would apply on all sale consideration
(including advance received for sale) received on or after 1st
October, 2020 even if the sale was carried out before 1st October,
2020.

 

(III) Mr. A had sold certain goods to Mr. B in F.Y.
2019-20 for a consideration of Rs. 80 lakhs. Of this, Rs. 10 lakhs was received
in F.Y. 2019-20. Of the balance Rs. 70 lakhs, further Rs. 5 lakhs was received
in July, 2020 and Rs. 65 lakhs was received post-October, 2020.

 

In view of the
above paragraph of the Circular, the seller would be required to make TCS on
the receipt of Rs. 15 lakhs of consideration received in the month of October,
2020 (Rs. 65 lakhs minus Rs. 50 lakhs), even though the sales were effected in
F.Y. 2019-20.

 

The Circular
categorically states that TCS would be applicable on all sale considerations,
even if the sale was carried out before 1st October, 2020. This is
not sufficiently asserted in the provisions of section 206C (1H) which states –
Every person, being a seller, who receives any amount as consideration for
sale of any goods of the value or aggregate value exceeding fifty lakh rupees
in any previous year…

 

In my humble view,
as mentioned above, this section is prospective in its application and takes
effect from 1st October, 2020. Though the trigger for applicability
of TCS provisions is ‘receipt of sale consideration’, it should not be made
applicable to such receipts for sales effected prior to 1st October,
2020.

 

Considering the
language used in the Circular, it will imply that all outstanding amounts due
to the seller for sales effected prior to 1st October, 2020 will now
be included in the ambit of the TCS provisions. This may span over a period of
the past one or two financial years, and the seller will be required to collect
TCS on receipts of such amounts. It may pose practical difficulties as the
buyers may be reluctant to remit additional amounts as they would not reflect
in the original invoices raised.

 

These practical
issues notwithstanding and referring to the arguments above, it will be unjust
to include receipts of consideration for sales affected prior to 1st
October, 2020 within the ambit of TCS.

 

There seems to be
an intention to apply the TCS provisions in respect of all sale considerations,
including advances, received on or after 1st October, 2020. However,
it’s ‘lost in translation’ as it further states advances received on or after 1st
October, 2020 including those for sales carried out before 1st
October, 2020. The only aspect clear from this paragraph is that the provisions
of TCS shall not apply on any sale consideration received before 1st
October, 2020.

 

Again, it is
important to note that the section does not use the word ‘advance’ and refers
to receipt of amount as ‘consideration for sale of goods’, or sale
consideration as used in common parlance. Further, neither has the term
‘consideration’ nor ‘sale consideration’ been defined in the sub-section, in
view of which the term will have to be understood in the context of its use in
common parlance. Any amount received as advance cannot partake the character of
‘sale consideration’ unless the corresponding sale against such sum of money
received is effected.

 

Thus, by merely
using a particular term in the Circular, which does not find place in the
section, its meaning cannot be imported in the section. Therefore, in my humble
view, TCS provisions will not be applicable on advances.

 

(IV) Mr. A,
dealing in a particular category of goods, sells them to Mr. B who uses them
further for his manufacturing / processing activity and is not the ultimate
consumer of such goods. Whether TCS would be collected by Mr. A in respect of
such goods?

 

To correlate,
section 206C(1A) excludes applicability of TCS on such sale transactions
covered u/s 206C(1) where the buyer uses the goods for further manufacturing or
production activities. At present, there is no such exclusion u/s 206C(1H).

 

The Circular makes
reference to transactions for sale of motor car, covering receipts from all
kinds of transactions of sale of motor car, under the TCS provisions, either
under sub-section (1H) or sub-section (1F), both sub-sections being mutually
exhaustive.

 

GOODS & SERVICES
TAX IMPLICATION


Another important
aspect that requires consideration is whether TCS is required to be collected
on the consideration inclusive of GST, or otherwise. The term sale
consideration has not been defined in the sub-section. It will mean the price
paid for purchase of goods. The question to be considered is whether it can be
said that GST is a part of the consideration? There are contrary views on this
issue as well. Based on certain judicial precedents, a view which prevails is
that GST is includible in the consideration and therefore TCS should be made on
the amount of consideration inclusive of GST.

 

Paragraph 4.6 of
the Circular clarifies that no adjustment on account of sale return or discount
or indirect taxes including GST is required to be made for collection of tax
under sub-section (1H) of section 206C of the Act since the collection is made
with reference to the receipt of the amount of sale consideration.

 

Let us evaluate
each of the items covered under this paragraph:

i. Sales
return:

a.  Sales
returns post receipt of amount of sale consideration by the seller:
In this case, the receipt will not
be net of sale return and the seller would have collected TCS on the same, as
it has been received. Assuming the sales return takes place in the subsequent
month, by when the seller has paid the amount of tax collected to the credit of
the government, the buyer will claim credit of the same while furnishing his
income tax return.

b.  Sales returns before receipt of amount of sale
consideration by the seller:
In this case, under
the terms of contract, the buyer will pay the amount net of sales return, and
thus the amount of consideration received will be subjected to TCS.

 

ii.  Discounts: The
discounts will be factored in the invoice, and / or the amount of sale
consideration received by the seller from the buyer will be net of such
discounts. As TCS is to be made on the amount received, no adjustment would be
required.

 

iii. GST: The Circular
states that no adjustment is required to be made on account of GST. It brings
little clarity on this aspect. In my view, GST should not be included for the
purpose of TCS though a conservative and practical approach adopted may be that
TCS is to be made inclusive of GST.

 

In case the
component of TCS is charged in the invoice, whether GST would be applicable on
the TCS component?

 

GST applies on the
consideration for supply of goods or services, whereas TCS is a collection of
the income tax component.

 

The Central Board
of Indirect Taxes (CBIC) Corrigendum to Circular No. 76/50/2018-GST dated 31st
December, 2018 issued vide F. No. CBEC-20/16/04/2018-GST has clarified
that for the purpose of determining value of supply under GST, TCS will not be
includible since it is in the nature of an interim levy. Therefore, if the TCS
component is reflected in the invoice, there will be no GST applicable on the
TCS component.

 

RESULTANT PRACTICAL
ASPECTS


The tax collected
by the seller shall be paid to the account of the Government by the 7th
of the month subsequent to the month in which the consideration was received.

 

No separate TAN is
required for TCS under this sub-section. The seller has to furnish TCS return
in Form 27EQ on a quarterly basis. The CBDT has amended the IT Rules in line
with the above changes to the TCS provisions.

 

The existing Rules
require the assessee to file quarterly TCS returns in Form 27EQ. Under the
amended Rules, the assessee (seller) is required to report the amount on which
TCS is not collected from the buyer. An annexure for party-wise break-up of TCS
is also provided in the form.

 

Due dates of
filing of Form 27EQ are:

Quarter

Due
date (normally)

April – June

15th July

July – September

15th October

October – December

15th January

January – March

15th May

 

 

CONCLUSION

As we cope with the implications of this newly-inserted sub-section, it
will be interesting to have a sneak peek into the history of these provisions.
The TCS provisions were first inserted by the Finance Act, 1988. The rationale
behind introducing these provisions was the fact that there was difficulty in
assessing the income of persons undertaking contracts for sale of liquor, etc.
Over the years, there have been several other sub-sections added to section
206C on the pretext of widening the tax base or to track high-value
transactions, the latest amendment being this insertion of sub-section 1H. From
1988 to 2020, both tax administration and tax compliance have undergone a sea
change. Considering the ‘E-mode’ of operations, several tests and checks are in
place to ensure minimal evasion of taxes and non-reporting of transactions.

 

Against this
backdrop, one wonders about the necessity of such provisions which are most
likely to increase the hassles of businessmen.

 

‘Lord Atkin once
said that an impartial administration of the law is like oxygen in the air:
people know and care little about it till it is withdrawn.’’

                                                                                         – Fali S. Nariman, Before Memory
Fades:
                                                                                                                              An Autobiography

BCAJ SURVEY ON DIGITAL GEARING OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT FIRMS

The BCAJ carried out a dipstick
survey in September 2020 to gauge the Digital awareness and adoption of
technology by CA firms.

 

Attributes of the
respondents:

 

A>  Location and Presence

32.5% respondents
had presence in Non-Metros and about 67.5% in both Metros and Non-Metros.

 

B>  Nature
of Respondents

45.5% respondents
were proprietors, 33.5% were firms having up to 4 partners, 11% were firms
having 5-9 partners and 10% were firms having more than 10 partners.

 

Survey Questions and Responses

 

1.  In the
present scenario, considering where the world is heading (WFH, extreme
digitisation, digital filings, client needs) and the role you perform at work,
how do you describe your personal digital skills?

 

 

 

2.  In the
role which you perform, how much time are you required to use digital skills?

 

 

3.  In terms
of awareness of where things are moving for accountants and digital
products/services available for CAs, how do you rate your DIGITAL AWARENESS?

 


 

4.  As part of
the digital journey, which of the following digital tools do you use?

     (Percentage
of participants using the tools)

 

 

5.  Considering
the present scenario, how effectively are your personnel operating under WFH in
the last several months?

 

 

6.  Keeping
the future in mind, what is the status of formal assessment of the current
state of digital maturity of your firm/practice?

 

 

 

 

 

7.  In order to gear up for the change, what
is/are you hindrance/s?
(Percentage of participants selecting each issue)

 

 

8.  Going
ahead, how important do you consider the digital skills and digital quotient in
GROWTH or even SURVIVAL of your practice?

 

 

9.  How often
do you consider upgrading digital capabilities and practices through SOFTWARE
and HARDWARE upgrades?

 

10. Going
ahead, at what capacity do you feel that your personnel can work from home?

 


EXECUTIVE PRESENCE

Executive
Presence
– we admire it in others and want it for
ourselves! Also called Personal Presence, Leadership Presence or The
‘It’ Factor,
this intangible, difficult to define yet must-have trait
is found in business and political leaders across the world.

 

In today’s
competitive world, technical and intellectual skills are not enough to
guarantee success as a business leader. While in-depth industry knowledge is
the foundation of your career, your ability to deliver and articulate a
confident message which engages your audience, and is consistent with your
corporation’s value system, and at times even a calibrated response in
stressful times, is a leadership skill which inspires trust.

 

Your executive
presence
is on display when you

(a) Meet with prominent clients and important
prospects,

(b) Communicate with your team,

(c) Work with stakeholders to get a buy-in for your
ideas,

(d) Increase your internal and external visibility
at public fora and networking events,

(e) Present your company to shareholders, investors
and media.

 

Leaders know about
this influential dimension and believe that communication is made up of both
verbal and non-verbal components and know how to use both effectively. Your
body movements, posture, facial expressions, gestures, eye contact and attire
influence the audience and inspire trust. By integrating their verbal and
non-verbal communication, they deliver a powerful signal saying ‘I am
capable and confident’
. It’s necessary for creating a powerful impact when
interacting with clients, board members, teams and shareholders. As defined by
Sheryl Sandberg, COO of Facebook, ‘Leadership is about making others better
as a result of your presence and making sure that impact lasts in your
absence’.

 

VISUAL RESUME


As per a research
study, people wearing branded clothes were ‘perceived’ as being richer and of a
higher status than those wearing non-designer clothes. But then Warren Buffet
once said, ‘I buy expensive suits. They just look cheap on me’. While
many argue that clothes are mere ‘packaging’ and it’s what’s inside that
matters, gurus of the advertising industry will convince you that brands spend
billions of dollars every year to enhance their packaging before marketing it
to their target customers. Similarly, when you meet people for business, your
appearance can inspire confidence, putting people at ease, or it can elicit
hesitation and create confusion in their minds.

 

Body
language:
Has body language taken a backseat in
today’s information age? Not really. Think about it – we continue to judge a
book by its cover, appreciate restaurants with nicely laid-out tables, enjoy
opening beautifully-wrapped gifts. And we also believe in Hollywood movies that
show love at first sight and vote for politicians who look trustworthy. Look
around you and observe the popular world leaders, from J.F. Kennedy, Winston
Churchill, Ronald Reagan, Barack Obama to Justin Trudeau, Vladimir Putin,
Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, they all display strong body language and
have used it to create an imposing presence. Physicality counts for a lot in
the business world, too. Body language is an integral component of Executive
Presence.
Defined as a non-verbal form of communication, when used
effectively it can be your key to greater success as it

(i)   Conveys interest, helping you build rapport
with stakeholders,

(ii)  Helps develop positive business relationships,

(iii) Influences and motivates your team members,

(iv) improves
productivity, and

(v)  helps
you present your ideas with more confidence and with greater impact.

 

Personal
branding:
In today’s day and age, and a highly
digitised and virtually connected world, personal branding and image management
have become ever so important. Chances are that you are working on your
personal branding – without even realising it. Every Facebook post or tweet on
Twitter is an opportunity to let others know who you are. Unlike traditional
meetings or conversations, our digital footprints are here to stay for a very
long time. They not only create a lasting impression on internal and external
stakeholders, but also help ensure better networking for the individual, which
is an important factor for success in today’s world. The word branding conjures
up an image of logos, advertising and models, which till today forms a large
chunk of how companies spend on a brand. Think IPL – look at the millions spent
by team-owners and their battery of consultants to ensure they look different
from the other teams and their fans recall their brand. For the past decade,
each IPL team has ‘invested’ millions on its logos, cricketers, sponsorships,
parties and cheerleaders.

 

(A) The leader as a statesman: There’s something about Mr. Deepak Parekh that inspires confidence.
Maybe it’s his serious demeanour or his succinct manner of communicating, but
when he makes a suggestion people listen and act on it. This explains why he is
invited on the boards of the best companies and by the government’s most
important policy-making committees. How has he managed to create this aura of
calm energy around himself? In his long career as a banker and head of HDFC,
the country’s premier housing finance company, he has built an impeccable
reputation for his integrity and decisiveness. Following in his footsteps is
the younger Mr. Uday Kotak, CEO, Kotak Bank. If he makes a comment in the
press, it is respected, if he is on a committee to define corporate governance,
investors believe he will steer it along the right path. Mr. Parekh and Mr.
Kotak are the most mature kind of leaders we call ‘statesman’ and it is
gravitas on display.

 

As per research
done at Princeton University, people decide on your trustworthiness within
one-tenth of a second. Whether it’s at an office meeting or a large social
gathering, successful leaders have an uncanny ability to command the room. They
get noticed when they walk into a room, and as they work their way through the
room, they make a connection with everyone they meet. They look people in the
eye, give them their full attention, listen to their story and say things that
make the other person feel good about the interaction. Interestingly, they
linger in your thoughts even after they have left. Clearly, leaders are in
complete agreement with American poet and civil rights activist Maya Angelou
who had famously remarked, ‘People will forget what you said, people will
forget what you did, but people will never forget how you made them feel.’

 

(B) In a virtual
world:
Today, managers and their teams are finding
it challenging to transition from high-contact, face-to-face meetings to remote
interactions. Despite the circumstances which have led to this sudden shift, it
may prove to be the new ‘normal’ for the next few months, maybe even forever.
Today, it has become a forced reality. The organisations of the future may not
need a physical location as their employees collaborate from remote locations,
creating new opportunities for both people and companies.

 

Leaders are
expected to add value by inspiring and motivating remote teams; the traditional
role of the leader as a supervisor is no longer relevant. As team members are
capable of solving their own problems, they need a leader who is both a coach
and a mentor. Simply put, leaders of remote teams have to make things smoother
for their teams to achieve their targets and stay engaged with the
organisation.

 

TEN WAYS TO ENHANCE YOUR EXECUTIVE PRESENCE

1. Embrace structure: As a leader, create a structure which allows smoother flow of
information. Spend time both at the individual level and at the group level
getting to know your team members better.

 

2. Focus on
enhanced communication:
We have to make changes in
our communication style to less distant and more accessible to our colleagues.
Communicating using technology requires a slightly more enthusiastic greeting,
speaking a tad bit louder, using a few extra gestures and spending a little
more time setting the context.

 

3. Encourage
participation:
A common complaint by all leaders is
that team members appear distracted during face-to-face meetings. With remote
teams, this problem has increased several fold. To encourage participation,
assign and allocate agenda items to team members. Ask specific questions to
individuals, e.g., ‘what was the highlight of your last week’s project?’ ‘what
more did you learn about this problem after speaking with the client?’

 

4. Redefine
trust:
When you can see team members sitting across
the corridor, you automatically assume that they are working. On the other
hand, if you see them once a month or twice a quarter, you might start doubting
their productivity. Managers will have to learn to trust their remote teams by
focusing on the deliverables, a major shift from the old order which gave
credit to the number of hours spent at the desk.

 

In the virtual
world, leaders tend to connect for task-based agendas, relying on technology.
However, humans need face-to-face interactions to trust and share their ideas.
Push for video calls – both at the individual level and at the group level.
Video calls are ideal for client meetings and internal reviews as they allow
screen-sharing and increased participation. Be quick to catch cues from members
who could be feeling lonely, appearing less motivated or possibly facing mental
health issues. Being clued-in enhances the leader’s ability to sense conflicts
and discontent at an early stage.

 

5. Micromanaging
is passé:
Check in frequently, but resist
micro-managing. Maintain clarity of communication, track the deliverables and
let your teams take ownership for their work.

 

6. Maintain
transparency:
Create a culture of being
non-judgmental and learn to manage biases. In the virtual world, it’s easier to
create sub-groups and alienate others. As a leader, you have to be sensitive to
this and nip it in the bud.

 

7. Enhance your
listening skills:
As a leader, an integral part of
your job is listening to your teams and clients. With remote working, leaders
are expected to further sharpen their ability to listen, offering support and
encouragement. Listen effectively, focus on vocal intonations, summarise and
repeat, ensuring you have a good grip on the ‘real’ problem.

 

8. Create a
sense of togetherness:
Like a traditional business
meeting, start remote interactions, too, with small talk. Ask pointed questions
to individual members, e.g., ‘How was your weekend?’ ‘What is the news from
your city?’ or ‘Give us a visual trip of your work zone.’ Small talk creates a
bridge, works as an ice-breaker and helps build relationships. Scheduling a
‘Zoom coffee’ for one-on-one interactions or a ‘Happy Hour’ for team drinks is
an excellent way to bond.

 

9. Civility
remains non-negotiable:
Some members will be
comfortable using technology while others may be awkward as they view it as a
physical barrier, leading to aggressiveness, rudeness and off-hand comments. As
a leader, be firm about acceptable behaviour and set the boundaries.

 

10. Promote a
culture of sharing:
Email, phone call, video call
or social media – what is the right communication tool for this query? Matching
the technology to your communication query requires planning. Plan the levels
of escalation and communicate them to your team.

 

CONCLUSION


It’s important to
note that Executive Presence can be developed through a combination of
self-awareness and coaching. In other words, you can learn to be a
leader who can influence and inspire and energise those around you. Is it
possible to build Executive Presence? Yes, it’s something you need to
focus on and you can develop it. Like any other skill, once you build awareness
on your strengths and weaknesses, you can get coached on your shortcomings. As
billionaire Warren Buffet said, his number one tip for success is: ‘Invest
in yourself.’

 

(Ms Shital
Kakkar Mehra is an executive coach, speaker and writer. She is the author of
‘Business Etiquette, A Guide for Indian Professional’ and has recently released
‘Executive Presence: The P.O.I.S.E. Formula for Leadership’, in July, 2020)

 

 

Life is a song – sing it

Life is a game – play it

Life is a challenge – meet it

Life is a dream – realise it

Life is a sacrifice – offer it

Life is love – enjoy it

                                                                        — 
Sai Baba

PROVISIONING FOR EXPECTED CREDIT LOSSES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NBFCs POST-COVID-19

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 outbreak which surfaced in
China towards the end of 2019 was declared a global pandemic by the WHO in
March, 2020. It has affected economic and financial markets, and virtually all
industries are facing challenges associated with the economic conditions
resulting from efforts to address it. As the pandemic increases both in magnitude
and duration, entities are experiencing conditions often associated with a
general economic downturn. The continuation of these circumstances could result
in an even broader economic downturn that could have a prolonged negative
impact on an entity’s financial results. In response thereto, the RBI announced
a series of regulatory measures and relief packages dealing with rescheduling
of loans and credit facilities, providing moratorium, asset classification and
provisioning for the entire financial services sector which comprises of banks,
financial institutions and NBFCs.

 

Since the purpose of this article is to
highlight some of the key issues that emanate from the Covid pandemic to be
considered by financial institutions and NBFCs, in particular, in applying the
expected credit loss model (ECL) for provisioning in their Ind AS financial
statements, the discussion of the regulatory aspects will only be limited to
the extent it impacts the ECL. Whilst the focus of this article is for lenders,
much of it would apply to measurement of ECL in industries other than financial
services.

 

For the purpose of this article, it is
assumed that the readers have reasonable working knowledge of the various
technical requirements and guidance under Ind AS on ECL and related matters.

 

OVERVIEW OF THE ECL
MODEL AND ITS INTERPLAY WITH OTHER TECHNICAL AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IN THE
COVID ENVIRONMENT

 

ECL model as per Ind AS 109

Ind AS 109 on
Financial Instruments sets out a framework for determining the amount of
ECL that should be recognised. It requires that lifetime ECLs be
recognised when there is a significant increase in credit risk (SICR) on a
financial instrument
. However, it does not set bright lines or a mechanical
approach to determining when lifetime losses are required to be recognised, nor
does it dictate the exact basis on which entities should determine
forward-looking scenarios to consider when estimating ECLs.

 

Ind AS 109 requires entities to measure
expected losses and consider forward-looking information by reflecting ‘an
unbiased and probability-weighted amount that is determined by evaluating a
range of possible outcomes’
and taking into account ‘reasonable
and supportable information that is available without undue cost or effort at
that date about past events, current conditions and forecasts of future
economic conditions’.
Whilst it always required entities to consider
multiple scenarios, entities may not have done so because it did not make a
material difference to the outcome in a benign / static economic environment.
However, such an approach may no longer be appropriate in the current Covid
scenario. Further, Ind AS 109 requires the application of judgement and
permits entities to adjust their approach to determining ECLs in different
circumstances. A number of assumptions and linkages underlying the way ECLs
have been implemented to date may no longer hold in the current Covid
environment and therefore entities will have to revisit the ECL approach /
methodology and should not continue to apply their existing ECL methodology
mechanically.

 

PRESENTATION AND
DISCLOSURES

In line with the requirements of Ind AS
107
on Financial Instruments – Disclosures and Ind AS 1 on Presentation
of Financial Statements
, entities would be required to provide more
additional information to enable users of financial statements to understand
the overall impact of Covid-19 on their financial position and performance.
This is particularly important for areas in which Ind AS requires that
significant judgement is applied, which might also include other areas of
financial reporting. Similarly, the auditors would also need to consider
whether reporting on Covid-related matters needs to be reported as a key audit
matter in terms of the Auditing Standards.

 

Finally, distinguishing between adjusting
and non-adjusting events requires significant judgement,
particularly in the current environment for those entities where the economic
severity of the pandemic became apparent very shortly after the end of their
reporting period. The Guidance issued by the ICAI in connection therewith
should be referred to.

 

Impact of regulatory measures

The government and the RBI have been
announcing various relief measures / packages to enable entities to tide over
the adverse impact of Covid on their operations and financial position.
However, it may be difficult to initially incorporate the specific effects of
Covid and government support measures on a reasonable and supportable basis. The
changes in economic conditions should be reflected in macro-economic scenarios
applied by entities and in their weightings. If the effects of Covid are
difficult to be reflected in models considering the timing of Covid and
implications on Internal Financial Controls over Financial Reporting (IFCoFR),
post-model overlays or adjustments duly considering the portfolio segmentation
having shared credit risk characteristics and staging criteria (Stages 1, 2 and
3) may need to be considered as a pragmatic approach.

 

Further, entities should carefully assess
the impact of the economic support and relief measures on recognised financial
instruments and their conditions. This includes the assessment of whether such
measures result in modification of the financial assets and whether
modifications lead to their de-recognition. If it is concluded that the
support measures provide temporary relief to borrowers affected by the Covid
outbreak and the net economic value of the loan is not significantly affected,
the modification would be unlikely to be considered as substantial.

 

Finally, measures taken in the context of
the Covid outbreak that permit, require or encourage suspension or delays in
payments, should not be regarded as automatically having a one-to-one impact on
the assessment of whether loans have suffered an SICR.
Therefore, a
moratorium under these circumstances should not in itself be considered as an
automatic trigger of SICR. Assessing whether there is an SICR is a holistic
assessment of a number of quantitative and qualitative indicators. Furthermore,
when relief (forbearance) measures are provided to borrowers by issuers, these
measures should be analysed taking into account all the facts and circumstances
in order to distinguish, for example, whether the credit risk on the financial
instrument has significantly increased or whether the borrower is only
experiencing a temporary liquidity constraint and there has not been a
significant increase in credit risk and consequential impact on the ECL to be considered.

 

These and some other specific considerations
arising out of Covid-19 on the assessment of ECL are examined later in this
article.

 

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS


The following are some of the specific
considerations which need to be kept in mind whilst determining the adequacy
and appropriateness of the ECL provisions in the post-Covid scenario.

 

Reassessing the business model

As per Ind AS 109, the classification and
measurement of financial assets is dependent on the contractual cash flows
of the asset and the business model within which the asset is held,
which
in turn determines the basis of valuation of the financial assets and
the provisioning thereof. An entity’s business model is determined at a
level that reflects how groups of financial assets are managed together
to achieve a particular business objective. Going forward, entities may need to
revisit their business model to determine whether it (the business model) has
changed due to the Covid implications, as the entity may decide to sell its
‘hold to collect’ portfolio as part of its revised strategy to manage liquidity
and credit risks.

 

Revisiting overall portfolio
segmentation

In accordance with Ind AS 109, financial
instruments
should be grouped on the basis of shared credit
risk characteristics.
Due to the disruptions in the business
operations, entities might witness an impact on the credit quality of their
portfolio across certain industries, geographies, customer segments, etc., that
may require them to revisit their portfolio segmentation and revise the ECL
assessment as appropriate. This may result in new portfolios being created or
assets moving to an existing portfolio that better reflects the similar credit
risk characteristics of that group of assets.

 

Further, forward-looking information might
need to be tailored for each portfolio. How much weight to give that
information depends on the specific credit risk drivers relevant to the
entities’ portfolios.

 

To illustrate, entities may lend across a
broad customer base resulting in concentration of risk exposure because of the
sectors and geographic areas in which customers are based or work. An entity’s
expectations over future unemployment in a particular sector may only be
relevant to borrowers who work in that sector.

 

At a broader level the portfolios can be
segregated between corporate and retail customer base which can be further
segregated based on the representative shared credit risk characteristics,

as considered relevant. Examples of shared credit risk characteristics may
include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a)   instrument type;

(b)   credit risk ratings;

(c)   collateral type;

(d)   date of initial recognition;

(e)   remaining term to maturity;

(f)    industry;

(g)   geographical location of the borrower; and

(h)   the value and liquidity of collateral
relative to the financial asset if it has an impact on the probability of a
default occurring (for example, loan-to-value ratios).

           

Assessment of SICR vis-à-vis
moratorium

When an entity grants an extension of terms
to a counter-party, the management should assess whether or not this indicates
that there has been a significant increase in credit risk. Measures taken in
the context of the Covid outbreak that permit, require or encourage suspension
or delays in payments should not be regarded as automatically having a
one-to-one impact on the assessment of whether loans have suffered an SICR.
Determining whether a change in the timing of contractual cash flows is an
SICR, or evidence of a credit-impaired financial asset, requires careful
consideration of the specific facts and circumstances.

 

Within the population of customers that
apply for a moratorium, separating those that are in financial difficulty
(borrowers with a solvency issue) from those that are not (borrowers with a
temporary liquidity issue), will be an operational challenge.
Consideration
will need to be given to the payment status and history of the borrower
on the date when he applies for a moratorium. Therefore, an assessment will be
needed as to whether the moratorium is providing a short-term liquidity benefit
or addressing a deterioration in the borrower’s ability to meet its obligation
when due which, if it is a significant increase in lifetime Probability of
Default (PD), is an SICR.

 

An illustrative list of factors which can be
considered in making the aforesaid evaluations is as under:

 

1.   ‘Days Past Due’ metrics could reflect
the impact of the payment moratorium where borrowers take advantage of a
payment holiday and so instalments due on or after 1st March, 2020 may
no longer be ‘past due’.

2.   Payment history: Has the customer made
regular payments over, say, the last year on the loan in question and its other
credit obligations?

3.   Collateral: Has the valuation of the
underlying collaterals been significantly depleted?

4.   Leverage: Has the customer seen a
recent increase in leverage or indebtedness?

5.   Repeat forbearance: Has the customer
been granted prior / subsequent (post-balance sheet) forbearance treatments?

6.   Changes to credit risk policy: Do the
previous qualitative indicators of SICR need a reconsideration?

7.   Breach of the covenants of a credit
contract is a possible indication of unlikeliness to pay under the definition
of default. However, a covenant breach does not automatically trigger a
default. Rather, it is important to assess covenant breaches on a case-by-case
basis and determine whether they indicate unwillingness to pay.

8.   Sector in which the customer is
employed or operates, including its representative income profiles.

9.   Reference may also be drawn from various credit
agency reports
which detail the sectors which have had a significant
impact, e.g., travel, aviation, tourism, etc.

10. In case of wholesale customers, factors
including current cash position, gearing status, future payments (including
loan repayments, expenses), future cash inflows and likely covenant breaches
can be evaluated.

 

Paragraph B5.5.17 of Ind AS 109 also provides a non-exhaustive list of information that may be
relevant and considered by entities in assessing and evaluating changes in
credit risk.

 

The entity should have a clearly defined
policy
based on its portfolio to detail its evaluation of SICR and
how it will be applied across various portfolios and it should be approved by
the Board. (Refer to discussion under Governance process for further
details).

 

Assessing management overlays

This is an important consideration in the
context of the current unprecedented situation. The speed and timing of the
economic impact of Covid would require entities to include Post-Model
Adjustments (PMAs)
to cater for the inadequacies of their ECL
models
that are not designed to cater for the extreme economic
circumstances and government support measures that currently exist and to
reflect risks and other uncertainties that are not included in the underlying
ECL measurement models. Some of the macro-economic factors which could
be considered for making the assessment include, but are not limited to, GDP
growth rates, bank credit growth, wholesale price index, consumer price index,
Index of Industrial Production, unemployment rate, crude oil price, exchange
rates
, etc., depending upon the nature of the portfolio. Considering the
timing, availability of information and uncertainties involved, a pragmatic
approach needs to be considered depending on the facts and circumstances in doing the overlay on Probability of Default (PD)
scenarios at the identified segmented portfolio levels.
This would result
in additional downside scenarios in their year-end results, which topped
up the amount of their ECL allowances to specifically address economic
uncertainty.

 

Such PMAs should be well-controlled,
authorised, documented and need to be disclosed in accordance with the
governance framework for ECL as laid down by the entity.
It is recommended
that entities disclose an explanation for each material post-model
adjustment or overlay made,
along with the reason for the adjustment,
how the amount is determined, the approach used for the estimation and the
amount of each material post-model adjustment.

 

Probability weightage of various
scenarios

Paragraph 5.5.17(a) of Ind AS 109 requires the estimate of ECL to reflect an unbiased and
probability-weighted amount that is determined by evaluating a range of
possible outcomes.
In practice, this may not need to be a complex analysis,
and relatively simple modelling may be sufficient without the need for a large
number of detailed simulations of scenarios.

 

However, currently there is little
visibility on how long the pandemic would last and the economic impact could
range from a mild downturn (where growth slows for a quarter or two, and the
economy bounces back immediately) to a severe slowdown (where growth slows for
more than a year followed by a tenuous recovery). Accordingly, ECL computation
needs to be done based on a range of possible scenarios, presenting a varying
degree of the economic and financial crisis and predict corresponding outcomes
such as:

 

(i)   an optimistic scenario, considering a
temporary impact of Covid-19 and a V-shaped recovery,

(ii)  a scenario, considering a severe and extended
impact of Covid-19 and a U-shaped recovery; and

(iii) a pessimistic scenario, with a prolonged severe
downturn, leading to a new low-level normal.

 

An unbiased estimate is one that is neither
overly optimistic nor overly pessimistic. For this purpose, entities will need
to develop an estimate based on the best available data about past events,
current conditions and forecasts of future economic conditions. Adjustments to
expected loss rates in provision matrices and overlays to formal models (where
used) will be needed. Updated facts and circumstances should continue to be
monitored for any new information relevant to assessing the conditions at the
reporting date. The probabilities assigned to these multiple economic scenarios
will often be a significant judgement warranting disclosure, which is a
critical component of ECL reporting, given the level of measurement uncertainty
resulting from Covid.

 

Forward-looking
information

The use of forward-looking information is a
key component of the ECL impairment approach. But this is not straight-forward
and involves judgement. No one can predict the future with certainty so the
incorporation of forward-looking information introduces considerable volatility
into entities’ results.

 

The economic forecasts that entities use to
estimate lifetime losses should not only be consistent with internal
managements’ forward-looking views, but also supportable with sound
quantitative data and methods. It is recommended that lenders consider official
economic forecasts issued by RBI and internal economists in assessing the
severity and duration of the macro-economic deterioration. Economic forecasts
generated by research agencies or professional forecasters could also be used.
However, over-reliance on these sources may become problematic as market prices
for debt and derivatives might reflect factors other than the borrower’s risk
of default (such as market liquidity) and the credit ratings could be a lagging
indicator of credit risk. But so long as the forecasts are defensible and
consistent with the institution’s own views, these could also be used where
relevant for the particular financial instrument or group of financial
instruments, and not at the entity level, to which the impairment requirements
are being applied. Different factors may be relevant to different financial instruments
and, accordingly, the relevance of particular items of information may vary
between financial instruments, depending on the specific drivers of credit
risk. Some examples in respect thereof are as under:

 

(A)  For corporate lending, forward-looking information
includes the future prospects of the industries in which the group’s
counter-parties operate, obtained from economic expert reports, financial
analysts, governmental bodies, relevant think-tanks and other similar
organisations, as well as consideration of various internal and external
sources of actual and forecast economic information.

(B)  For retail lending forward-looking information
includes the same economic forecasts as corporate lending with additional
forecasts of local economic indicators, particularly for regions with a
concentration of certain industries, as well as internally generated
information of customer payment behaviour.

 

As required by paragraph 35G (b) of Ind
AS 107
, financial statements should disclose how forward-looking information
has been incorporated into the determination of expected credit losses,
including the use of macro-economic information.
Further, paragraph
35G(c)
requires disclosure on changes in the estimation techniques or
significant assumptions made during the reporting period and the reasons for
those changes.

 

Events after the reporting period

Ind AS 10 on Events
after the Reporting Period
distinguishes between adjusting and non-adjusting
events, with adjusting events being those that provide further evidence of
conditions that existed at the end of the reporting period and therefore need
to be reflected in the measurement of balances in the reporting period. Non-adjusting
events are those that are indicative of
a condition that arose after the end of the reporting period.

 

Entities will need to update their forward-looking
information to reflect expectations at the reporting date. Entities will need
to distinguish between those events that arose after the end of the reporting
period that reflect new events, as opposed to those that were reasonably
expected at the reporting period end and so would have been reasonably assessed
as being included in the forward-looking assessment made at the end of the
reporting period. This assessment might include, for example, assessing the
status and extent of the Covid-19 pandemic in geographies relevant to the
entity’s credit risk exposures at the reporting period end and considering the
path and extent of the increase in infection rates in other areas that were affected
earlier.

 

An entity may consider it reasonable at the
reporting period end to forecast particular macro-economic inputs used in ECL
modelling. If those macro-economic inputs end up not occurring or changing
after the reporting date, this should not be used as evidence to adjust the
entity’s expectation at the period end. Doing so would represent inappropriate
use of hindsight and would not reflect the conditions that existed at the
reporting period end. Distinguishing between adjusting and non-adjusting events
requires significant judgement, particularly in the current environment for
those entities where the economic severity of the pandemic became apparent very
shortly after the end of their reporting period.

 

The severity of the economic impact of Covid
after the end of the reporting period will require consideration even if those
economic impacts are non-adjusting events. When non-adjusting events after the
reporting period are material, an entity is required to disclose the nature of
the event and an estimate of its financial effect, or a statement that such an
estimate cannot be made.

 

Governance process

An entity’s Board of Directors (or
equivalent) and senior management are responsible for ensuring that it has
appropriate credit risk practices, including an effective system of internal
control, to consistently determine adequate allowances in accordance with its
stated policies and procedures, the applicable accounting framework and
relevant supervisory guidance.

 

As per the RBI circular dated 13th
March, 2020
on Implementation of Indian Accounting Standards, for
Non-Banking Financial Companies and Asset Reconstruction Companies,
the
RBI expects the Board of Directors to approve sound methodologies for
computation of ECL that address policies, procedures and controls for assessing
and measuring credit risk on all lending exposures, commensurate with the size,
complexity and risk profile specific to the NBFC / ARC.
These matters
become more critical in the context of the Covid-19-induced environment.
It would not be out of place for entities to set up a separate sub-committee
of the Board to monitor the impact on various aspects of the business due to
Covid, which could also cover the above referred matters.

 

The following are some of the specific matters
which need to be documented and approved by the Board and / or the Audit
Committee of the Board (ACB):

 

(I)    The parameters and assumptions considered
as well as their sensitivity to the ECL output.

(II)   NBFCs / ARCs are advised to not make
changes in the parameters, assumptions and other aspects of their ECL model for
the purposes of profit smoothening.

(III)  The rationale and justification for any
change in the ECL model.

(IV)  Any adjustments to the model output (i.e.,
a management overlay)
which are necessitated due to Covid-19 should be approved
by the ACB
together with its rationale and basis.

(V)  ACB should also approve the
classification of accounts that are past due beyond 90 days but not treated as
impaired, together with the rationale for the same.

 

CONCLUSION

Covid-19 is likely to be the new normal and
will continue to pose several challenges which will require quick responses on
a real-time basis, which may make it difficult to incorporate the specific
effects of the regulatory support measures on a reasonable and supportable
basis. However, changes in economic conditions should be reflected in
macro-economic scenarios applied by entities and in their weightings. If the
effects of Covid-19 cannot be reflected in models, post-model overlays or adjustments
will need to be considered. Although the current circumstances are difficult
and create high levels of uncertainty, ECL estimates can still be made if
monitored under the appropriate supervision and governance framework laid down
by the entities, based on reasonable and supportable information supplemented
by adequate disclosures for transparency in the entity’s financial statements.

 

(The author
would like to acknowledge the contribution of CA Rukshad Daruvala and CA
Neville Daruwalla for their inputs in preparing this article.)

 

 

FRAUD ANALYTICS IN INTERNAL AUDIT

BACKGROUND

Even though some organisations are
disinclined to report fraud, it is still necessary to try to prevent and detect
it. There is, however, some confusion over who exactly is responsible for this
task, with many non-auditors having the misconception that it is the duty of
auditors, internal or external, to uncover fraud. From the external auditors’
perspective, their role is to say whether the financial statements fairly
represent the operations of the company. Internal auditors would argue that
revealing fraud is not their ultimate goal – they aim to test the effectiveness
of internal controls. In reality, it’s much more likely that errors rather than
frauds will be found during an audit.

 

Under the
Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 – CARO 2020 – the Statutory Auditor is
required to report on fraud and whistle-blower complaints as below:


(a) Has there
been any fraud by the company or any fraud done on the company? Has any such
fraud been noticed or reported at any time of the year? If yes, the nature and
amount involved have to be reported.

(b) Whether
the auditors of the company have filed a report in Form ADT-4 with the Central
Government as prescribed under the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014?

(c) In case of
receipt of whistle-blower complaints, whether the complaints have been
considered by the auditor.

 

While
uncovering fraud may not be an auditor’s main responsibility, there is
certainly a variety of tools, tests and processes that can be utilised to
detect it. And data analytics increases the chances of uncovering fraud.

 

WHAT IS FORENSIC
ACCOUNTING?

Forensic
accounting is a specialty practice area where accounting, auditing and
investigative skills are used to analyse information that is suitable for use
in a court of law.

 

Forensic
accountants are often engaged to quantify damages in instances related to fraud
and embezzlement, as well as on matters involving insurance, personal injury,
business disputes, business interruption, divorce and marital disputes,
construction, environmental damages, cyber-crime, products liability, business
valuation and more.

 

What is
fraud investigation?

Fraud investigation is the process of
resolving allegations of fraud from inception to disposition. Standard tasks
include obtaining evidence, reporting, testifying to findings and assisting in
fraud detection and prevention.

 

Developing an
investigation plan includes:


(i)    Review and gain a basic
understanding of key issues.

(ii)   Define the goals of the
investigation.

(iii)   Identify whom to keep
informed.

(iv)  Determine the terms of
reference and timeline for completion.

(v)   Address the need for law
enforcement assistance.

(vi)  Define team member roles and
assign tasks.

(vii)  Outline the course of
action.

(viii) Prepare the organisation
for the investigation.

 

What is
fraud analytics?

Fraud
analytics is an integral part of fraud investigation. Fraud analytics combines
analytic technology and techniques with human interaction to help detect
potential improper transactions, such as those based on fraud and / or bribery,
either before the transactions are completed or as they occur.

 

The process of
fraud analytics involves gathering and storing relevant data and mining it for
patterns, discrepancies and anomalies. The findings are then translated into
insights that can allow a company to manage potential threats before they occur
as well as develop a proactive fraud and bribery detection environment.

 

KEY REASONS FOR USING DATA ANALYTICS FOR FRAUD DETECTION

Forensic data
analysis tools help organisations to fully realise or realise to a credible
extent early fraud detection, increased business transparency and reduced costs
of their anti-fraud programme.

 

Some of the
key reasons for using forensic data analysis tools are:


(A)  Early fraud detection.

(B)  Ability to detect fraud that
could not be detected earlier.

(C)  Faster response in
investigations.

(D)  Increased business
transparency.

(E)  Getting the business to take
more responsibility for managing the company’s anti-fraud programme.

(F)  Reduced costs of the
anti-fraud programme.

 

Case
study on fraud analytics – ‘Procure to Pay’

‘Procure to
Pay’ is one of the major areas of success with fraud analytics. The main
objective is to check for the validity of items. This encompasses supplier
overpricing, invalid invoices, frauds of various types, accidental duplication
and simply picking up out-of-control expenses.

 

Some of the
illustrative fraud analytics tests for visualisation and / or red flag
detection are:


1.   Analyse purchases or payments
by value bands and identify unusual trends.

2.   Test for splitting,
particularly below threshold authority limits.

3.   Summarise by type of payment
– regular supplier, one-time supplier, etc.

4.   Analyse by period to
determine seasonal fluctuations.

5.   Analyse late shipments for
impact on jobs, projects, or sales orders due.

6.   Reconcile orders received
with the purchase orders to identify shipments not ordered.

7.   Report on purchasing
performance by location.

8.   Summarise item delivery and
quality and compare vendor performance.

9.   Compare accrued payables to
received items to reconcile to general ledger.

10. Check for continued purchases
despite high rate of returns, rejections, or credits.

11. Track scheduled receipt dates
versus actual receipt dates.

12. Identify price increases
higher than acceptable percentages.

13. Capture invoices without a
valid purchase order.

14. Find invoices for more than
one purchase order authorisation.

15. Isolate and extract pricing
and receipt quantity variations by vendor and purchase order.

16. Filter out multiple invoices
just under approval cut-off levels.

17. Detect invoice payments on
weekends or public holidays.

18. Find high value items being
bought from a single vendor.

19. Aging analysis of open orders
beyond a specified number of months.

20. Changes to orders in terms of
quantity and unit price after receipt of material.

21. Orders raised after receipt of
material and / or after receipt of supplier’s bills.

22. Sequential orders raised on
suspect vendors.

23. Backdating of orders.

24. Same material being bought
under different material codes.

25. Same material being bought
from the same vendor on different payment terms and / or delivery terms.

26. Payments to vendors initiated
and approved by the same user.

27. Same vendor having multiple
vendor codes of which one or more code/s have debit balances (on account of
advances) while other code/s are receiving bill-based payments without
adjusting the on-account advances.

28. Duplicate bill payments to a
vendor against the same invoice and order – exact match on invoice.

29. Duplicate bill payments to a
vendor against the same invoice and order – near match on invoice (fuzzy
pattern-based match).

30. Material bought at a higher
price from a vendor when there is an open order within the system for the same
material pending delivery at a lower price.

 

The examples
given in this article are based on use of IDEA Data Analysis Tool. However, a
reader can choose and use any Data Analytical Tool for conducting such fraud
analytics.

 

Case
Study 1 – Using Benford’s Law in IDEA Software to identify Vendor Payment
splitting and / or skimming

 

In this tool Benford’s Law has been
incorporated for easy detection of red flags. Any significant alteration to the
natural flow of numbers is identified in the form of a graph. The graph
containing many specialised views is designed to identify common forms of
fraud.

 

Benford’s Law
lets you compare your data under review for patterns predicted by Benford’s Law
of Digital Analysis. Spot irregularities by analysing digits in numerical data
sets to capture potential fraud (exploratory analytics). Apply the Benford’s
Law – Last 2 Digits Test, to detect skimming and circumvention of vendor
payments just below a threshold approval limit as seen in the ‘Highly
Suspicious’ red bars in the Benford’s screenshot below.

 

 

Case
Study 2 – Apply the Relative Size Factor (RSF) test to capture Vendor Payment
outliers

 

The purpose of
the Relative Size Factor (RSF) test is to identify anomalies where the largest
amount for subsets in a given key is outside the norm for those subsets. This
test compares the top two amounts for each subset and calculates the RSF for
each. The RSF test utilises the largest and the second largest amount to
calculate a ratio based on purchases that are grouped by vendors in order to
identify potential fraudulent activities in invoice payment data, as has often
been suggested in fraud examination literature.

 

 

Case Study 3 – Apply the Fuzzy Duplicate test to
capture duplicate pattern matches

 

The Fuzzy
Duplicate task identifies pattern-based matching (similar) records within
selected character field/s and then groups them based on their degree of
similarity. Identify multiple similar records within selected character fields
to detect data entry errors, multiple data conventions for recording
information and fraud. Generate a potential list of pattern matching duplicates
on the Inventory Description in an Inventory Master Dump.

 

Case
Study 4 – Apply Anti-Bribery and Corruption checks through Search on a General
Ledger narration field

 


A search
provides keyword searching capabilities to find text within fields in a database
without the need to write code / equations to execute the search criteria.
Anti-bribery and corruption checks can be applied through Search on a General
Ledger to look for the narration field containing key words like ‘gift’,
‘donation’, ‘suspense’ and other such text.

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

Incorporating
an anti-fraud programme for internal auditors (even for external / statutory
auditors) is extremely important, irrespective of the requirement of the law as
the top management and stakeholders are moving towards ‘zero tolerance’ of such
incidents. If a process / area has been reviewed / audited and later there are
incidents of fraud detected, then there is always a close scrutiny of the work
carried out by the internal auditor.

 

With the
advent of technology and the data explosion, it is necessary for the internal
auditor to employ data analytics tools and techniques, or ‘Fraud Analytics’,
for:

*
comprehensive coverage of process / area under review,

* storing
evidence using the analytics tool on the steps taken for each test, full
coverage of the period under review or even sample selection,

* devising and
completing various tests for detecting any anomaly or red flags,

* focusing on
transactions / areas which show patterns which deviate from the norms.

BENEFITS FOR SMPs UNDER MSME ACT & OTHER STATUTES

The
Chartered Accountants in public practice spread across India are generally
categorised as Small and Medium Practitioners (SMP). As per ICAI statistics,
almost 97% of the CA firms in India are sole proprietorships or partnership
firms with up to five partners. This category forms the backbone of the
profession in India catering to a vast number of entities.

 

The
ICAI’s Ethical Standards Board in a recent decision has clarified that ‘A CA
firm may register itself on Udyog Aadhar, a web portal of the Ministry of
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises’. Accordingly, the SMP CA firms can avail
the various benefits available to the MSME units by registering themselves
under ‘UDYAM’ (earlier Udyog Aadhar).

 

The
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act was notified in
2006 to address policy and practical issues affecting MSMEs as well as the
coverage and investment ceiling of the sector.

 

Many CAs
do not register as MSMEs due to lack of familiarity with the various benefits
and support made available by the government for the sector. The authors have
attempted to summarise in this article the key benefits available to SMPs.

 

CLASSIFICATION OF MICRO, SMALL & MEDIUM ENTERPRISES

 

The
revised classification of MSME’s applicable w.e.f. 1st July, 2020
for Manufacturing and Service Enterprises is as follows:

 

Micro

Small

Medium

Investment in Plant & Machinery (for manufacturing entities) or
Equipment (for service entities) not more than

Rs. 1
crore

Rs. 10
crores

Rs. 50
crores

 

AND

Annual turnover not more than

Rs. 5 crores

Rs. 50 crores

Rs. 250 crores

 

REGISTRATION OF MSME (UDYAM)

 

Registration
under the MSME Act, 2006 will be called  Udyam
Registration w.e.f. 1st July, 2020 and a dedicated web portal has
been made available for registration at the following web address:
https://udyamregistration.gov.in.

 

The
following are important features of the new registration process:

 

* The
MSME registration process is fully online, paperless and based on
self-declaration.

* No
documents or proofs are required to be uploaded for registering as an MSME.

* No fees
are payable for registration.

* Aadhaar
number is mandatory for obtaining Udyam Registration (Aadhaar of
proprietor / partner / karta / authorised signatory).

* PAN and
GSTIN are mandatory for Udyam Registration from 1st April, 2021.

* PAN and
GST-linked details on investment and turnover of enterprises will be taken
automatically from government data bases.

*
Registration of entities not having either PAN or GSTIN will be cancelled
w.e.f. 1st April, 2021.

* A
registration certificate will be issued which will have a dynamic QR Code from
which the details about the enterprise can be accessed.

* All
existing enterprises registered under EM–Part-II or Udyog Aadhar shall register
again
on the Udyam Registration portal on or after 1st July,
2020. All enterprises registered till 30th June, 2020 shall be
reclassified in accordance with this Notification.

* The
existing enterprises registered prior to 30th June, 2020 and not
having registered under Udyam shall continue to be valid only for the
period up to 31st March, 2021.

 

KEY BENEFITS FOR SMPs UNDER THE MSMED ACT AND OTHER STATUTES

 

1.
Protection against delayed payments to Micro & Small Enterprises (MSEs)

 

The MSMED
Act, 2006 gives protection to MSME-registered entities against delay in
payments from buyers.
Further, the MSME’s have right of interest on delayed payment through
conciliation and arbitration and settlement of disputes to be done in minimum
time.

 

  • If any micro or small
    enterprise that has MSME registration supplies any goods or services, then
    the buyer is required to make payment on or before the date agreed upon
    between the buyer and the micro or small enterprise.
  •  In case there is
    no payment date on the agreement, then the buyer is required to make
    payment within 15 days of acceptance of goods or services.
  • Further, in any case,
    a payment due to a micro or small enterprise cannot exceed 45 days from
    the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance.
  • In case of failure by
    the buyer to make payment on time, the buyer is required to pay compound
    interest with monthly interest rests to the supplier on that amount from
    the agreed date of payment or 15 days of acceptance of goods or services.
  •  The penal
    interest
    chargeable for delayed payment to an MSME enterprise is three
    times the bank rate
    notified by the Reserve Bank of India. Such
    interest is also not a tax-deductible expense under the Income-tax Act.
  • Further, as mentioned
    in section 22 of the MSMED Act, 2006, where any buyer is required to get
    his annual accounts audited under any law for the time being in force,
    such buyer shall furnish additional information in his annual statement of
    accounts regarding the outstanding principal and interest payable to MSME
    enterprises.

 

MSME
units can access the MSME SAMADHAAN portal
(https://samadhaan.msme.gov.in/) for prompt settlement of any disputes relating
to delay in payment or interest.

 

2.  Credit Guarantee Scheme for Micro & Small
Enterprises (CGTMSE)

 

  • Credit guarantee for
    loans up to Rs. 2 crores, without collateral and third-party guarantee.
  • New and existing Micro
    and Small Enterprises engaged in manufacturing or service activity are
    eligible borrowers under this scheme.
  • Borrowers need to
    conduct a market analysis and prepare a business plan containing relevant
    information, such as business model, promoter profile, projected
    financials, etc. and submit the loan application which is sanctioned as
    per the bank’s policy. After the loan is sanctioned, the bank applies to
    the CGTMSE authority and obtains the guarantee cover.
  • Guarantee coverage
    ranges from 85% (Micro Enterprise up to Rs. 5 lakhs) to 75% (others).
  • 50% coverage is for
    retail activity.

Detailed
information and application
can be obtained from https://www.cgtmse.in/

 

3.
Interest Subvention Scheme for MSMEs – 2018

  • 2% interest subvention
    on fresh or incremental loans, maximum up to Rs. 1 crore, to MSMEs.
  • This interest relief
    will be calculated at two percentage points per annum (2% p.a.), on outstanding
    balance from time to time from the date of disbursal / drawl or the date
    of notification of this scheme, whichever is later, on the incremental or
    fresh amount of working capital sanctioned or incremental or new term loan
    disbursed by eligible institutions.
  • Incremental / fresh
    term loan or incremental / fresh working capital extended from 2nd
    November, 2018 by any scheduled commercial banks, NBFCs, RRBs, UCBs
    (scheduled and non-scheduled) and DCCBs would be covered under the scheme.
  • SIDBI shall act as a
    nodal agency for the purpose of channelling of interest subvention to the
    various lending institutions through their nodal office.
  • MSMEs already availing
    interest subvention under any of the schemes of the State / Central
    government are not eligible under the scheme.

 

Detailed
information about the scheme can be obtained from:
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/125ISCUR72A9B5ADE83345F9A47410967A83ED27.PDF

Detailed
information and application can be obtained from
https://sidbi.in/files/circulars/ISS-for-MSMEs,-2018—Circular-and FAQs.pdf

 

4.
Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme – Atmanirbhar Bharat Mission 2020

 

The
Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme, worth Rs. 3 lakh crores, was launched
as part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat Mission on 20th May, 2020. The
scheme provides credit relief to MSMEs facing hardships due to coronavirus
pandemic-triggered lockdowns.

 

In a
pragmatic mid-scheme assessment, the government on 1st August, 2020
has expanded the eligibility criteria for the Emergency Credit Line Guarantee
Scheme (ECLGS) beyond MSMEs to include ‘individuals who take loans for business
purpose’. With the eligibility expansion, Chartered Accountants, who
have taken loans for their professional needs, will be eligible for credit
under the special credit guarantee scheme which was earlier aimed to benefit
medium and small enterprises.

 

KEY FEATURES

 

  • All MSME borrower
    accounts with outstanding credit of up to Rs. 25 crores as on 29th
    February, 2020 which were less than or equal to 60 days past due as on
    that date, i.e., regular, SMA 0 and SMA 1 accounts, and with an annual
    turnover of up to Rs. 100 crores, would be eligible for Guaranteed
    Emergency Credit Line (GECL) funding under the scheme.
  • The amount of funding
    shall be either in the form of additional working capital term loans (in
    case of banks and FIs), or additional term loans (in case of NBFCs).
  • Funding would be up to
    20% of their entire outstanding credit up to Rs. 25 crores as on 29th
    February, 2020.
  • The entire funding
    shall be provided with a 100% credit guarantee.
  • Tenor of loan under
    the scheme shall be four years with moratorium period of one year on the
    principal amount.
  • No guarantee fee shall
    be charged.
  • Interest rates under
    the scheme shall be capped at 9.25% for banks and FIs, and at 14% for
    NBFCs.

 

5. Trade Receivables
Discounting System (TReDS)

 

  • TReDS is a digital
    platform for MSMEs to auction / discount their trade receivables at
    competitive rates through online bidding by financiers.
  • The system, which is
    accessible online through three exchanges, was launched to ensure that
    suppliers are credited their due receivables in a timely manner.
  • The system is
    initiated when a transaction is conducted between the supplier and buyer.
  • The receivable is
    logged into the system by the supplier.
  • Receivables are funded
    by financiers through a bidding process.
  • Only the supplier is
    able to view all the bids placed by different financiers. When the
    supplier selects the best bid, the amount is received within two to three
    business days from the financier.
  • On the regular due date,
    the due amount is debited from the buyer and transferred to the financier.
  • The objective is to
    address the critical needs of MSMEs:

(i)
Promptly finance trade receivables, and (ii) Financing trade receivables based
on buyers’ credit rating.

 

TReDS has
been licensed to three exchanges:

 

(1)
Receivables Exchange of India Ltd. (RXIL):
A joint venture between
Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and National Stock Exchange
of India Limited (NSE).

https://www.rxil.in/AboutTreds/Treds

(2)       Invoicemart: Promoted by A TReDS Ltd.
(a joint venture between Axis Bank and mjunction services).

https://www.invoicemart.com

(3)       M1Xchange: Promoted by Mynd Solutions
Private Limited

M1xchange:
https://www.m1xchange.com/treds.php

 

Detailed
information available at:
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Content/PDFs/TREDSG031214.pdf

 

6. Public
Procurement Policy from MSME

 

  • The Public Procurement
    Policy for Micro and Small Enterprises (MSME) Order, 2012 has mandated every
    Central Ministry / Department / PSU to procure minimum 25% of the annual
    value of goods or services and certain reserved items from Micro and Small
    Enterprises.
  • No fees for procuring
    tender document or furnishing earnest money; and, in certain cases, price
    adjustment also permissible for MSEs to the extent of 15% to match lowest
    bid in tender.
  • The MSME SAMBANDH is
    the Public Procurement Portal launched by the Central Government for the
    MSMEs to monitor the implementation of the public procurement from MSEs by
    Central Public Sector Enterprises (sambandh.msme.gov.in).

 

7.
Reimbursement of ISO Certification

 

  • All registered Micro
    and Small Industries can avail an exemption of all expenses incurred for
    obtaining ISO 9000, ISO 14001 and HACCP certifications.
  •  It includes 75%
    of the certification expenses up to a maximum of Rs. 75,000 to each unit
    as one-time reimbursement.
  • Scheme applicable only
    to those MSEs which have acquired Quality Management Systems (QMS) / ISO
    9001 and / or Environment Management Systems (EMS) / ISO14001 and / or
    Food Safety Systems (HACCP) Certification.

 

For more
information:

https://www.startupindia.gov.in/content/sih/en/government-schemes/reimbursement_iso_standards.html

 

  • 8. Service Exports
    from India Scheme (SEIS)

 

  • To facilitate growth
    in export of services so as to create a powerful and unique ‘Served from
    India Scheme’ brand, instantly recognised and respected the world over.
  • Under this scheme, all
    Indian Service Providers having free foreign exchange earning of at least
    US $15,000 in the preceding year can claim the Duty Credit Scrip.
  • For Individual Service
    Providers and sole proprietorships, such minimum net free foreign exchange
    earnings criterion would be US $10,000 in the preceding financial year.
  • This Duty Credit Scrip
    is equivalent to 3% – 7% of ‘NET’ free foreign exchange earned during the
    previous financial year.
  • The Duty Credit Scrips
    and goods imported against them shall be freely transferable.
  • The services of SMPs
    are covered under the category – Professional Services – Legal Services,
    Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping Services and Taxation Services.
  • Free foreign exchange
    earned through International Credit Cards and other instruments as
    permitted by RBI for rendering of service are also taken into account for
    computation of Duty Credit Scrip.
  • Import Export Code
    (IEC) is mandatory at the time of rendering service for claiming benefits.

 

For more
information:
https://dgft.gov.in/CP/

 

9.
Reduced IPR Filing Fee

  • The Department of
    Electronics and Information Technology (DeiTY) has launched a scheme
    entitled ‘Support for International Patent Protection in E&IT
    (SIP-EIT)’ to provide financial support to MSMEs and Technology Startup
    units for international patent filing.
  • The reimbursement
    limit has been set to the maximum of Rs. 15 lakhs per invention or 50% of
    the total charges incurred in filing and processing of a patent
    application, whichever is lesser.

 

For
details refer:
http://www.ict-ipr.in/sipeit/SIPEITForm

 

CONCLUSION

 

The
Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSME) is one of the top priority sectors
for the present Government of India and it is providing all the support and
assistance needed for the development of the sector. The Small and Medium
Chartered Accountant Practitioners (SMPs) are the most popular source of advice
and support to MSMEs.

 

Among
other MSMEs, the SMPs are also in need of credit and technical support for
growth and development. The delayed recovery of outstanding dues from clients
leads to working capital issues and a major roadblock for the growth of small
CA firms. The lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic has further reduced the
inflow of client funds and resulted in a cash crunch. The various schemes as
discussed above will come as a great guidance to the practising Chartered
Accountancy firms in these difficult times.

 

 

 

TAXPAYER SERVICES: MESSAGE, MEANING AND MEANS – 2/2

This Editorial covers the remainder of what the previous
one couldn’t due to limitations of space. In September we had covered tax
overreach, accountability, creating grounds for taxpayers
and stoppage of target-setting.
Here are more points on detailing the Taxpayer’s Charter (TC) to honour the
honest taxpayer:

 

Scrutiny: The time between notice, commencement of actual
proceedings and closure must be three to five months. Today, assessment happens
in the last few months before time-barring. This is as unfair to an ITO who has
to read, study, understand and form an opinion, as it is to a taxpayer /
professional.

 

Time as the essence: Outer time limit at the CIT(A) level is
specified as one year and six months for fact-based appeals. Non-response by an
ITO / assessee to a CIT(A)’s call for information and response time trails
should be mentioned in orders and non-response by the A.O. cannot be a reason
for stretching dispute resolution. At the ITAT level, the time limit
should generally be fixed up to three years, and two years for matters of fact.
Remand of cases should be monitored, statistics of the number of matters
remanded and the average time taken should be reported in public domain.

 

Structure of orders: Orders should carry the dates of submissions and
hearings, brief nature and number of submissions and questions raised from both
sides. Additions / SCNs should state clearly, where possible, whether the
issues are predominantly about law or fact so that further dispute resolution
can be placed in the right bucket. Just as the assessee makes a statement at
the end of an ITR, the ITO should declare that the assessment order, demand,
etc. are in accordance with the Taxpayer’s Charter and the provisions of law.

 

Data: A.Y.-wise statistics, including drill-down up to
Commissionerate level, is made available in the public domain. This should
include the number of orders passed at each level, the number and value of
demands raised, how many appealed, appealed by assessee or Department [in case
of CIT(A) onwards], did the matter contain an issue of law or fact or
indeterminate, ageing of each appeal at each level, determination in favour of
Department or assessee, and amount demanded vs. amount determined at each level
of dispute resolution. Such data must be published regularly. A periodic
jurisdiction-wise transparent reporting will show us what is happening.

 

Reservation in tax system: It is outrageous that
agricultural income without any limit goes ‘tax-free’. As reported by the CAG,
in A.Y. 2017-18, Rs. 500 crores of agricultural income went tax-free without
adequate verification based in 1527 / 6778 cases. This is inequitable,
unreasonable and disrespectful to honest taxpayers. Section 10(1) is a conduit
for evasion, misuse and laundering (refer TARC Report in 2014).

 

Data obesity: Today ITR seeks so many details of the assessee
which the assessee has already given elsewhere. When companies have filed data
on the MCA, GST or customs portals, why ask for it, then send mismatch notices,
and trigger some action based on incomparable data points? Recent example of
ISIN in ITR (A.Y. 2021): Can an honest taxpayer not share his DP ID, CAS ID,
etc., and ITD can thereafter fetch data from the Stock Exchanges to match it? Let’s
have one nation, one Government!

 

Other issues include: Sharpening selection of cases (1% of
taxpayers make up 50% of demands), consider cost incurred by the taxpayer in cost
of collection vs. collected, accounting of revenue
collected (disputed
amounts collected should be treated as an advance), rewriting ITA in plain
English
and giving due attention to what the taxpayer gets after a lifetime
of paying taxes when 98% others don’t. While an Honest Taxpayer is not
defined, if his rights and services are enumerated, it will be a stronger,
meaningful and praiseworthy start.

 

 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

BE THE CHANGE: REMEMBERING GANDHI

‘Be the
change you wish to see in the world,’
said Gandhiji as he invited us to become agents
of change. Today, as we face a severe environmental crisis, this teaching is
more relevant than ever. But what does it really mean to you and me?

 

Often people
ask me – what difference will it make if I make a small change in my life? Will
I be able to
save the Amazon forests that are burning down? Will I be able to save those
dolphins and whales that are dying on the shores with stomachs full of plastic?
What can I do?

 

The damage
that disposable plastic has had on our natural world and on other living beings
is unprecedented. The seas and oceans are now filled with microplastics that it
will be almost impossible to clean up. But who is using these products that end
up in the ocean?

 

Imagine if
one billion Indians took a pledge never to use a plastic carry bag in their
lives, to find creative alternatives to plastic water bottles and to never ask
for plastic spoons in a restaurant.

 

Gandhiji
reminds us that real change comes from an individual level and grows into
national and international change. He said, ‘What is true of the individual
will be tomorrow true of the whole nation if individuals will but refuse to
lose heart and hope.’

 

Making this
change is not as difficult as we make it out to be. When I was growing up, we did
not have
single-use disposables in our life. We carried our own cloth bags to the market
and we bought oils and milk in bottles. Drinking water was available at train
stations and restaurants for free. The idea of using plastic spoons and forks
emerged much later. So we have seen that it is possible to live a life without
disposable plastics.

 

You might
think – but this is so inconvenient! The one reason that people in the UK gave
for not carrying their own cloth bags was that they ‘forgot’. The cost we are
paying for this forgetfulness is so high that future generations will never
forgive us. Microplastics are entering the water we drink and the food we eat.
Cancers are being caused by these nano particles of plastic. Is this worth it?

 

As
individuals, if we find ways to reuse items in our own lives, we will be
saving money, saving our own health and our environment. As accountants and
auditors to businesses, if we can conduct waste audits, even as a complimentary
service, we enable huge savings by establishing systems of reuse.

 

Here are some
of the small things you can do at the corporate level:

1.  Can ball pens get refills
instead of being thrown out each time the ink gets over?

2.  Can plastic water bottles
be replaced by drinking water stations at each level?

3.  Can food be packaged in larger
steel containers instead of small individual plastic packets?

4.  Can conferences use ‘green’
kits – do nametags have to be in disposable plastics?

5.  Can cleaning supplies be
ordered in larger quantities and stored rather than in smaller plastic
containers?

6.  Can plastic packaging be
replaced by paper
and cloth packaging?

7.  Can waste be segregated
and wet waste composted at source?

8.  Can plastic wastes be recycled?

9.  Can the corporate campus be
declared a plastic-free zone
?

 

Such a waste
audit and its recommendations can be followed up with change of habit and new
norms.

 

Gandhiji
visited the UK wearing a khadi dhoti to make a point about
self-determination. How can we make a point and redesign our lifestyle and
working style as we celebrate the birth anniversary of Bapu?

 

You and I may
not be able to make grand and brave statements, but even the smallest change we
make in our choices can lead the world towards the change we wish to see. It is
because Gandhiji believed that one voice mattered, that the entire world
listened to them.

 

Be the change
you wish to see in the world.

Capital gains – Transfer – Sections 45(4) and 47 of ITA, 1961 – Conversion of firm to private limited company – Transaction not transfer giving rise to capital gains

4.      
Principal CIT vs. Ram Krishnan
Kulwant Rai Holdings P. Ltd.; [2019] 416 ITR 123 (Mad.)
Date of order: 16th July, 2019 A.Y.: 2009-10

 

Capital gains – Transfer – Sections 45(4)
and 47 of ITA, 1961 – Conversion of firm to private limited company –
Transaction not transfer giving rise to capital gains

 

The assessee was a
private limited company. Originally, the assessee was a partnership firm and it
was converted into a private limited company. The firm revalued its assets and
in the revaluation, the value of the assets was increased to Rs. 117,24,04,974,
but the book value of the assets on the date of revaluation was Rs. 52,16,526.
The AO held that the total value of the capital account of all the four
partners after being revalued stood at Rs. 117,32,87,069, that the shares were
allotted to the partners of the firm for a total amount of Rs. 10 lakhs and
that the balance of Rs. 117,22,87,070 was given as credit of loan to the
partners of the erstwhile firm in the same proportion as their share capital of
the firm, that this was a deviation stipulated u/s 47(xiii) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 for exemption from the capital gains and made an addition of Rs.
117,22,87,070 towards short-term capital gains and brought the amount to tax.

 

The Tribunal held
that the capital gains tax could not be levied in the hands of the
assessee-company, which succeeded to the assets and the liabilities of the firm
and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘(i)   The legal position having been well settled
that when vesting takes place, it vested in the company as it existed.
Therefore, unless and until the first condition of transfer by way of
distribution of assets is satisfied, section 45(4) of the Act would not be
attracted. In the facts and circumstances, there was no transfer by way of
distribution of assets.

 

(ii)   The Commissioner (Appeals) did not take into
consideration the legal issue involved, i.e., when a firm was succeeded by a
company with no change either in the number of members or in the value of
assets with no dissolution of the firm and no distribution of assets with
change in the legal status alone, whether there was a “transfer” as
contemplated u/s 2(47) and 45(4) of the Act. The Tribunal rightly decided the
issue.’

Business expenditure – Difference between setting up of business and starting commercial activities – Company formed to design, manufacture and sell commercial vehicles – Commencement of research and development and construction of factory – Business had been set up – Assessee entitled to deduction of operating expenses, financial expenses and depreciation

3.      
Daimler India Commercial
Vehicles P. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT.; [2019] 416 ITR 343 (Mad.)
Date of order: 5th July, 2019 A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Business expenditure – Difference between
setting up of business and starting commercial activities – Company formed to
design, manufacture and sell commercial vehicles – Commencement of research and
development and construction of factory – Business had been set up – Assessee
entitled to deduction of operating expenses, financial expenses and
depreciation

 

The assessee was a
company. In terms of its memorandum of association, it was incorporated for a
bundle of activities, viz., designing, manufacturing, distributing, selling,
after-sales engineering services and research and development of commercial
vehicles and related products and components for the domestic Indian and
overseas market. The AO disallowed the operating expenses, financial expenses
and depreciation. The reason given by him was that the commercial operation of
manufacture and sale of commercial vehicles had not commenced so far and,
therefore, the expenditure incurred by the assessee under the three heads could
not be allowed.

 

The Tribunal upheld
the order on the ground that the business of the assessee had not been set up.

 

On appeal by the
assessee, the Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under:

 

‘(i)   There is a clear distinction between a person
commencing a business and a person setting up a business. When a business is
established and ready to commence business, then it can be said of that
business that it is set up. The test is of common sense and what in the eye of
a business can be said to be the commencement of business. One business
activity may precede the other and what is required to be seen is whether one
of the essential activities for the carrying on of the business of the assessee
as a whole was or was not commenced. In the case of a composite business, a
variety of matters bearing on the unity of the business have to be
investigated, such as unity of control and management, conduct of the business
through the same agency, the interrelation of business, the employment of same
capital, the maintenance of common books of accounts, employment of same staff
to run the business, the nature of the different transactions, the possibility
of one being closed without affecting the texture of the other, etc.

 

(ii)   There was no dispute with regard to the date
on which the assessee had set up its business. The business of the assessee had
been set up in the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal erred in holding that
merely because the manufacturing and sale of the vehicle did not take place the
business of the assessee had not been set up. This was never an issue before
the AO and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to unsettle the finding of the date
on which the business of the assessee was set up. The order of the Tribunal had
necessarily to be set aside.

 

(iii)   The assessee had commenced and performed
activities relating to designing of commercial vehicles and related products
research and development, buying and selling of parts and in the process of construction
of factory building for manufacture of commercial vehicles. The unity of
control, management, etc., of the assessee in respect of each of its activity
had not been disputed by the Revenue. In such circumstances, the assessee on
showing that it had commenced several of its activities for which it was
incorporated would definitely qualify for deduction of the expenditure incurred
by it under the head operating expenses, financial expenses and depreciation.’

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s 43B of ITA, 1961 – Deduction only on actual payment – Service tax – Liability to pay service tax into treasury arises only upon receipt of consideration by assessee – Service tax debited to profit and loss account – Cannot be disallowed

2.     Principal CIT vs. Tops Security
Ltd.; [2019] 415 ITR 212 (Bom.)
Date of order: 10th September,
2018
A.Y.: 2006-07

 

Business expenditure – Disallowance u/s 43B
of ITA, 1961 – Deduction only on actual payment – Service tax – Liability to
pay service tax into treasury arises only upon receipt of consideration by
assessee – Service tax debited to profit and loss account – Cannot be
disallowed

 

The assessee
provided detection and security services to its clients. The AO found from the
balance sheet that the assessee had claimed the amount of unpaid service tax as
its liability. The AO held that according to section 43B of the Income-tax Act,
1961 the service tax could be allowed only when paid and that the amount was
not allowable as deduction. The assessee submitted that the gross receipts
included the service tax but whenever it was due and payable, namely, when the
amount for the services was realised, it would be remitted.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) held that the tax became payable only when it was collected from the
customer. The Tribunal found that though the service tax was included in the
bill raised on the customers, it was not actually collected from them and
confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘(i)   The Tribunal was justified in holding that
the service tax debited to the profit and loss account but not credited to the
Central Government by the assessee could not be disallowed u/s 43B.

 

(ii)   The liability to pay service tax into the
treasury arose only when the assessee had received the funds and not otherwise.
The consideration has to be actually received and thereupon the liability to
pay tax would arise. No question of law arose.’

Appeal to High Court – Territorial jurisdiction – Sections 116, 120, 124, 127, 260A and 269 of ITA, 1961 – Territorial jurisdiction of High Court is not governed by seat of the AO – Appeal would lie to High Court having jurisdiction over place where Tribunal which passed order is situated

1.      
Principal CIT vs. Sungard
Solutions (I) Pvt. Ltd.; [2019] 415 ITR 294 (Bom.)
Date of order: 26th February,
2019
A.Y.: 2008-09

 

Appeal to High Court – Territorial
jurisdiction – Sections 116, 120, 124, 127, 260A and 269 of ITA, 1961 –
Territorial jurisdiction of High Court is not governed by seat of the AO –
Appeal would lie to High Court having jurisdiction over place where Tribunal
which passed order is situated

 

In this case, the
Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal had passed an order on 30th July,
2015. On 8th September, 2015, an order was passed u/s 127 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 transferring the respondent-assessee’s case from an
Assessing Officer (AO) at Bangalore to an AO at Pune. On the basis of the place
of the new AO, the Revenue filed an appeal against the order of the Tribunal in
the Bombay High Court. The assessee’s advocate raised a preliminary objection
about the maintainability of the appeal before the Bombay High Court.

 

The Bombay High
Court accepted the assessee’s plea and held as under:

 

‘(i)   A bare reading of sections 116, 120, 124,
127, 260A and 269 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 establishes that Chapter XIII of
the Act would be applicable only to the income-tax authorities under the Act as
listed out in section 116 thereof. Thus, it follows that the provisions of
sections 120, 124 and 127 of the Act will also apply only to the authorities
listed in section 116 of the Act. The Tribunal and the High Court are not
listed in section 116 of the Act as income-tax authorities under the Act.

 

(ii)   The jurisdiction of the court which will hear
appeals from the orders passed by the Tribunal would be governed by the
provisions of Chapter XX of the Act which is a specific provision dealing with
appeals, amongst others to the High Court. In particular, sections 260A and 269
of the Act when read together would mean that the High Court referred to in
section 260A of the Act will be the High Court as defined in section 269, i.e.,
in relation to any State, the High Court of that State. Therefore, the seat of
the Tribunal (in which State) would decide jurisdiction of the High Court to
which the appeal would lie under the Act.

 

(iii)   The High Court to which the appeal would lie
is not governed by the seat of the Assessing Officer. The words “all
proceedings under this Act” in section 127 have to be harmoniously read with
the other provisions of the Act and have to be restricted only to the
proceedings under the Act before the authorities listed in section 116 of the
Act. Thus, a harmonious reading of the various provisions of law would require
that the appeal from the order of the Tribunal is to be filed to the Court
which exercises jurisdiction over the seat of the Tribunal.

 

(iv)  Accordingly, the Bombay High Court did not
have jurisdiction to entertain appeals u/s 260A of the Act in respect of orders
dated 30th July, 2015 passed by the Bangalore Bench of the
Tribunal.’

 

Commemorating the Mahatma

Gandhiji is the
most admired Indian of the last hundred years. In his lifetime and after his
death he inspired people across continents and cultures to act. Today he is
most noticeable on currency notes, in photos at schools and government offices,
in political speeches, in history books, political dressing, stamps, schemes,
slogans, museums and the like. He is vanishing or missing in places where his
ideals are needed the most – in behaviour and approach. Many of his ideas have
either vanished or have been totally adulterated. 


Gandhiji
propagated many ideas that are as relevant today as they were then in spite of
the change in external situation and their context. Swadeshi, Satyagraha,
ends do not justify the means, non violence as an epitome of all virtues, karo
ya maro
(do or die), civil resistance, Swaraj, cleanliness, social
service, Sarvodaya and more. Many of these values are the need of our
times more than ever before. Much of humanity has walked away from the trail he
blazed. Let us look at two of his ideals in today’s context: 

Truth: Satyagraha literally means insistence on truth.
This insistence arms the votary with matchless power1
. It means
that all worthwhile activities that can only be sustainable, and genuinely
profitable if they depend on the ability to answer a fundamental question – Is
this truthful
? Rather a first and last question! Today truth is perhaps the
first and the last casualty to justification, opinions, denials,
rationalisations, propaganda at all levels. Bapu carried an immaculate ability
for insistence on truth that carried no anger, no retaliation
and no submission
. As chartered accountants, we are in the job of what is
true (and fair). Do we ask this question with enough rigour – to ourselves and
to the government? Or do we just carry on and find ways to keep going?

Swadeshi: Swadeshi is that spirit in us which restricts
us to the use and service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the
more remote2.
  In today’s
times it could stand for several things. For one – how can we operate in a
global environment keeping a deep connection with our roots? As a country we
lack a narrative – the US, China has it! We haven’t articulated Indian approach
or we are mostly in a ‘follow’ and ‘tow’ mode?

Swadeshi can be seen from the perspectives of globalisation
and interdependence. Swadeshi is a form of deep interdependence. If
there is no local interdependence, what is the meaning of global
interdependence? By serving the immediate neighbourhood, we don’t harm anyone –
serving the family, neighbourhood, culture, ethos, fraternity, society and the
entire rashtra.

Much of India
remains colonised – not politically, but psychologically. Take the English
language – which is considered a bridge language (to the exclusion of all other
Indian languages) and the lack of which is still looked down upon. People are
made to believe that English is the ‘be all and end all’ of development. Japan,
Germany, Russia and many non English speaking nations didn’t take that route.
We often look at many Indian words that are ‘non translatable’ through their
dim English description. Some of the courts and government trainings are still
‘English only’. Indian laws are written in a fuzzy ‘Queen’s English’, which is
legally done away with even in England, when only 9% people understand English.
This obnoxious writing of laws remains the chief instigator of litigation.
Indian languages are not even considered business languages in the ‘corporate’
world. In a Board room full of Indians well versed in a common language,
discussions are generally not in any Indian language.

Have you
noticed how India often sees itself through the eyes of the ‘non Indian’?
Indian traditions are analysed, written and taught through the eyes of those
who are not steeped in the deeper and wider Indian civilizational ethos. We are
yet to have an indigenous validation mechanism for our products and services to
receive confirmation of ‘good enough’ or ‘fit for consumption’. Many imported
ideas, often violent, have spread across the country in disguise.

Swadeshi’
could effectively serve as an insurance against psychological, commercial and
economic colonisation.

Finally, the legacy and relevance of the Mahatma in a given context is
what each one of us makes of it. In the end and always – It’s up to us! 

 

 

_____________________________________________

1 Young India, 27.2.1930

2   Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, pp. 336-44


Raman Jokhakar

Editor

 

RECOVERING THE UNRECOVERABLE

Recovery
proceedings are initiated to realise the taxes dues. The proceedings are a
final step towards the realisation of any tax or amount which has been
confirmed as payable after following the due process of adjudication and has
remained unpaid beyond the statutory time limit. Government has set in place
three broad routes for collection of taxes – (a) self-assessment; (b)
adjudication; and (c) tax deduction at source / tax collection at source. Under
Article 265 of the Indian Constitution, not only should the levy of tax be
under authority of law, its collection should also be backed by a clear
authority of law. Recovery is the end stage of collection and any action beyond
statutory boundaries would be unconstitutional and rendered void. This article
aims at discussing the various circumstances under which recovery could be
initiated and their respective modes.

 

CIRCUMSTANCES
WARRANTING RECOVERY

Self-assessed
/ admitted taxes

The self-assessment
scheme requires taxpayers to compute the taxes and discharge the dues by
reporting in tax returns u/s 39 of the CGST / SGST Act. Self-assessed taxes are
considered as admitted taxes (though there is no estoppel in tax law)
and are recoverable without any adjudication u/s 73/74 (sec. 75[12]).
Self-assessed taxes are payable on or before the due date of filing the returns
and are to be discharged on FIFO basis (section 49[8]), i.e., any payment would
be first adjusted towards previous period tax liabilities and then towards
current period tax dues. The common portal maintains an indelible trail of tax
liabilities and its eventual adjustment.

 

Primary issues
arising here are: (a) GSTR3B does not appear to be a ‘return’ u/s 39 (refer
our previous article in BCAJ September, 2019)
and one may contend
that tax liabilities reported in 3B are not covered by the said section; (b)
GSTR-9 (annual return) may also involve admission of tax liabilities, but this
is a return u/s 44 and not u/s 39; (c) GSTR3B online module does not permit the
taxpayer to file its return without payment of the reported tax liabilities,
and hence reported tax cannot remain unpaid if returns are filed; and (d)
reporting of outward supplies in GSTR-1 statement u/s 37 does not constitute
filing of return u/s 39. In effect, though the taxes are ‘self-assessed’
(liability is determined by the taxpayer), such self-assessment is not through
the return specified u/s 39. Consequently, section 75(12) does not seem to
apply under the current return filing scheme. The Revenue may still want to
invoke recovery provisions on the ground that they are admitted taxes even
though the admission is not by way of a return u/s 39. A better alternative for
the Revenue would be to conduct full-fledged assessment proceedings and then
proceed for any recovery.

 

Taxes arising
from adjudication / assessments

Taxes assessed by
way of an order of adjudication u/s 73/74 are recoverable after three months
from the date of service of the order. Three months’ time enables the taxpayer
to prefer any appeal before the appellate forum on any aggrieved point of
assessment. Once an appeal is preferred, the tax demand continues unless it is
stayed by a higher forum (say, a High Court, etc.). Section 107(7) provides for
an automatic stay over recovery of demands on payment of 10% of the disputed
tax dues under first appeal (20% in case of second appeal u/s 112[8]). In cases
of multiple issues involved, taxes due on issues not disputed would be payable
on expiry of three months from service of order. The proper officer in such
cases is required to issue a demand notice in DRC-07 and proceed towards
recovery on its expiry. The proper officer can also seek special permission for
recovery in a shorter period in case he believes that the action of the
taxpayer (such as fleeing the country, disposal of assets, etc.) in the interim
may jeopardise the recovery.

 

Taxes
collected and unpaid

Taxpayers are
required to remit any amount collected as taxes forthwith to the government.
The taxpayer is not allowed to hold on to taxes which are collected,
irrespective of whether such amounts are duly collectible under law. This is
based on the fundamental tenet of indirect
taxation wherein taxpayers are made ‘agents’ of the government and such agents
are not permitted to engage in profiteering from taxes. A classic case would be
where taxable person collects taxes from the recipient prior to its time of
supply (such as advance, including taxes collected prior to sale of goods).
Such amounts are payable forthwith (implying on the immediate due date) and the
taxable person cannot claim that the time of supply of provisions is yet to be
triggered. The section provides for an issuance of a show cause notice and its
conclusion prior to proceeding on the recovery (one-year time limit). Where the
amount is held to be wrongly collected by the taxpayer, the section also
provides for a claim of refund by the person who has ‘borne’ the incidence of
taxes, failing which the same would be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund.

 

Recovery of legacy tax liabilities

Section 174(2) saves the rights, obligations or liabilities in respect
of anything done prior to the repeal of earlier laws. Under this provision, tax
demands pertaining to pre-GST periods can be enforced against the defaulter and
recovered under the respective laws. The erstwhile Central excise, VAT laws
contained similar provisions for recovery of tax dues. Simultaneously, section
142(8) of GST law also enables recovery of tax dues which are unrecovered under
the earlier tax laws.

 

While the recovery proceedings initiated prior to 30th June,
2017 are saved by the said provisions, a question arises whether Revenue should
initiate recovery (such as garnishee proceedings, etc.) after 30th
June, 2017 under the erstwhile law or u/s 142(8) of the GST law. One view would
be that section 174(2)(d) r/w/s 174(2)(e) permits any legal proceeding to be
instituted, continued or enforced in respect of tax dues of the earlier laws
despite their repeal w.e.f. 30th June, 2017. Such legal proceeding
(including recovery proceedings) can be instituted even after the repeal as
long as it pertains to tax dues pertaining to the period prior to the repeal.
The provisions of section 142(8) are in addition to the erstwhile recovery
provisions and the recovery officer can opt for either of these provisions.

 

The alternative view would be that section 174(2) in its entirety only
permits institution of proceedings qua the tax defaulter. A garnishee
proceeding, which is an independent proceeding, cannot be instituted after 30th
June, 2017 as there is no pre-existing liability on the defaulter’s debtor to
the government as on the said date. One of the arguments being canvassed in Sulabh
International Social Service Organization vs. UOI 2019 (4) TMI 523 (JH)

is that the term ‘instituted’ refers to proceedings already instituted before
30th June, 2017. It is on account of this deficiency in the repeals
/ saving provision that section 142(8) comes into operation for recovery
actions instituted after 30th June, 2017. Therefore, any recovery
proceeding should necessarily be initiated under the GST law. Rule 142A
provides for issuance of DRC-07A for creation and recovery of the legacy tax
liabilities on the GST portal.

 

Recovery of transitional credit

The transition scheme has been codified for enabling tax credits on
introduction of GST. Recovery of incorrect transition credit falls under two
variants: (a) recovery due to non-conformity with erstwhile provisions, say
Cenvat, availed on input services ineligible under Cenvat Rules. The recoveries
would be either covered under the repeals and savings provisions or u/s 142(8) (alternative
view discussed above)
; and (b) recovery due to non-conformity with GST
provisions, say ineligible cess carried forward or ineligible credits of stocks
u/s 140(3), etc. These recoveries arise due to violation of GST law and would
be recoverable through specific provisions under GST law rather than any
erstwhile law. However, GST law lacks a specific recovery provision for transitional
items such as these.

 

Overlooking the literal interpretation and giving a wide meaning to
‘input tax credit’1  u/s
73/74, transitional credit could at the most be recoverable under the said
sections, in which case it would form part of GST liabilities and hence covered
under the previous heading – Taxes arising from adjudication /
assessments.
The scope of section 73/74 in this context has been
discussed in an earlier article.

 

Recovery in case of clandestine removal /
non-accounted goods

Goods without appropriate documentation are considered as tax-evaded
goods and such goods are liable for seizure. Such evasive acts may be
identified as a result of inspection, search or interception. In case of
hazardous, perishable goods or any other relevant consideration, the proper
officer would dispose of the goods by following the process through DRC-16.
However, the said recovery is subject to the final outcome of the assessment
following the inspection, search or interception.

 

MODES OF RECOVERY

Recovery by
deduction / adjustments

The section
empowers the proper officer to adjust amounts held by the government (e.g.,
refunds) and due to the taxpayer against any dues to the government. Refund may
be either held by the proper officer himself or by any specified officer.
Amounts lying under the electronic cash ledger balance would also be subject to
such adjustments as being amounts held by the government. The proper officer
would issue DRC-09 intimating the specified officer to adjust the tax dues from
the amounts due to the taxable person. Rule 143 includes, amongst others,
officers of public sector undertakings / State-operated undertakings within its
coverage, implying that the proper officer can directly approach such creditors
for recovery.

 

Recovery by
detention and sale of goods

The proper officer
or any other specified officer/s is empowered to detain goods belonging to the
defaulter and under the control of the proper officer. The process of acquiring
control over goods has not been specified under the section. One would view
this section as being limited only to goods which are already under control of
the proper officer (say, confiscation of goods u/s 130 or seizure u/s 67). Rule
144 requires the officer to issue a notice in DRC-10 for public auction of
goods under its control and conclude the recovery through DRC-11 and DRC-12. An
issue would arise as to ascertainment of goods which are ‘belonging’ to the
taxpayer. The answer possibly lies in the underlying principle followed by all
the modes of recovery, i.e., recover amounts over which the taxpayer has
financial claim and not just possession / legal title.

 

Recovery by
garnishee

The proper officer
is empowered to issue a garnishee to a third-party debtor who holds sums to the
account of the taxpayer. A garnishee is an instruction to the third-party
debtor to pay the required sum forthwith or within the time specified, or pay
it on becoming due to the proper officer instead of the tax defaulter. The
proper officer would have to issue the notice in DRC-13 which would have
overriding claim against any other claims of the tax defaulter. The payment by
the third party to the government would constitute sufficient discharge of the
debt due to the tax defaulter (issued in DRC-14). Failure on the part of the
third party to comply with the notice would result in its treatment as a
defaulter under law and initiation of an independent recovery process on such
person. Recovery can also take place where any amounts are due under an
execution decree to the taxable person and the proper officer can request the
court to execute the decree in its favour for settlement of tax dues (DRC-15
and process of Civil Procedure Code, 1908).

 

Recovery by
distraint (seizure)

The proper officer
can also seize any movable / immovable property belonging to or under the
control of the taxable person and detain the same until the amount is paid.
Unlike detention, this provision extends to all property (such as fixed assets,
land, building, etc.) for recovery proceedings. If the said amount is not paid
within 30 days, the proper officer is empowered to sell the property for
realisation of the amounts due after deduction of the expenses of sale.

 

Recovery as
land revenue

Amounts due to the
government can be recovered as arrears of land revenue by applying to the
District Collector. The proper officer would issue a certificate to the
District Collector for recovery of the tax dues under the respective Revenue
Recovery Act under which all rents, incomes arising from the land would accrue to
the government account.

 

Government has
various options for recovery and though not explicit, the general practice has
been to recover amounts based on their ease of recovery without any specific
sequence. It is discretionary for the officer concerned that he may recover the
amount by attachment and if, in the opinion of the officer concerned, the goods
are of such nature that they are not saleable or would not fetch any price he
may not recover the amount by attachment and sale of such goods. The use of the
methods as provided is discretionary and even if the approach was slightly
indirect it need not be interfered with by the court (Prem Chandra Satish
Chandra vs. CCE (1980 6] E.L.T. 714 [All.]).

 

PROPER ADMINISTRATION AND OFFICER FOR
RECOVERY

Recovery
proceedings are to be conducted only by the ‘proper officer’ who may or may not
be the adjudicating officer. Section 2(91) of the CGST Act grants the Board the
power to assign the recovery functions to specified officers under its
administration. In view of the cross empowerment provisions, the challenge
would arise on the front of deciding the ‘proper officer’ for recovery
provisions. Does adjudication performed by the Centre permit the state tax
officer to proceed on recovery? The 16th Council meeting has provided exclusive
administrative powers to the state / Central administration based on the
allocation agreed between the governments. Moreover, section 6(2) provides that
where the proper officer has initiated a proceeding on a subject matter under
the CGST Act, the corresponding proper officer under the SGST Act is prohibited
from initiating any proceeding and vice versa. Recovery proceedings
would have to be initiated only by the proper officer from the administration
assigned for the taxpayer.

 

In the case of the
SGST Act, the Commissioner of the state would be empowered to perform the
assignment. Under the CGST law, the delegation is as follows:

 

Principal /
Commissioner

Reduce the 3-month
moratorium for recovery (proviso to s. 78)

Addl. / Joint
Commissioner

Permission for
transfer of property in case of pending tax dues

Asst. / Dy.
Commissioner

All other powers

Superintendent /
Inspector

Nil

 

 

State Commissioners
have also issued necessary instructions delegating their powers to Assistant
Commissioners for performing the recovery functions. Recently, the High Court
in Valerius Industries vs. UOI 2019 (9) TMI 618 (Guj.) held that
the State Commissioner being a delgatee himself, cannot further delegate the
recovery powers conferred by the State to its junior officers. The provision of
attachment of property on this ground was struck down by the court.

 

PROCEDURE FOR RECOVERY

The basic
requirement of recovery is that there should be a tax due either through self /
revenue assessment. Rule 142 prescribes the forms and the demand notice to be
issued along with the order of assessment directing the taxable person for
payment of tax dues. The notice is required to quantify the tax, interest and
penalty payable on account of assessment. This demand notice should be arrived
at after adjustments of amounts already paid to the government. Once the
pre-conditions for recovery are satisfied, the recipients to whom the
directions are being served would have to be issued a notice instructing them
to either exercise distraint or appropriate the amounts held with them to the
government. Revenue has in multiple cases attempted to recover taxes pending
adjudication or without any adjudication. This action has been clearly struck
down by courts from time to time and as recently as in Mono Steel India
Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat (2019-TIOL-422-HC-AHM-GST)
where bank
attachment immediately on issuance of a show cause notice was set aside.

 

PECULIARITIES UNDER GST

Though there is
standardisation of the legal framework, the current GST structure (CGST / IGST
and 29 states and 7 UTs; pre- 6th August, 2019) is still fettered
with tax segmentation and multiple state administrations. This poses definite
challenges over acquisition of jurisdiction for proceeding with recovery.
Section 25 has fragmented a single unified legal entity, based on its presence
across the states, into ‘distinct persons’ for purposes of implementation of the
Act, implying that each state registration is ring-fenced from the rest of the
entity. While the Act has placed this fiction from a legal perspective, most
organisations are unified from an operational perspective. The challenges are
explained by way of examples:

 

Q1 – ‘A’ a multi-locational entity having registration in all states
would still operate on a single bank account, unified debtor / creditor
relationships and directors / workforce. The proper officer in Maharashtra
having jurisdiction over AMH would like to proceed with a garnishee
order to a bank or a debtor of ADEL.

A1 – Explanation to section 79 prescribes that person would include
‘distinct persons’. The officer is within his powers to issue garnishee notice
to any bank / debtor and recover the sums due from the distinct person. In the
context of recovery, one may have to view the entire entity as one person even
though there is a bifurcation for the purpose of levy and collection of taxes.
Of course, this is an issue that would be subject to judicial scrutiny.

 

Q2 – Extending this example further to a scenario where distinct bank
accounts / debtor lists are maintained based on registrations… does the
officer have jurisdiction to recover sums due from a debtor of another distinct
person of the entity?

A2 – The proper officer can issue a garnishee to any debtor it chooses
to and is not limited by the geographical limits of the state. The proper
officer can issue a garnishee to all bank accounts / creditors for the purpose
of recovery.

 

Q3 – ADEL, a distinct person, has been sanctioned a
CGST/SGST/IGST amount. Would the proper officer of AMH be entitled
to adjust demands with the refunds sanctioned to ADEL?

A3 – Specified officer has been defined to include any officer of the
Central / state government. The proper officer may direct the officer of ADEL
to appropriate the refunds to the outstanding demands in Maharashtra.

 

SPECIAL PROVISIONS IN RECOVERY

Section 80 – Recovery in instalments: A Commissioner is empowered to permit payments of tax dues in
instalments subject to the condition that any default therefrom  would make the entire balance outstanding
without any further recovery notice. The officer in such cases directly
proceeds for recovery of the balance amount after the act of default.

 

Section 81 – Transfer of property void in certain cases: This
section repudiates any transfer of property by sale, mortgage, exchange, etc.,
which is in the possession of a taxpayer if such transfer has been conducted
with an intention to defraud the government. The proper officer in such cases
is permitted to recover its tax dues from the property notwithstanding the fact
that the property has been transferred by the taxable person. The proviso to
the said section carves out an exception for cases where the transfer is made
for adequate consideration in good faith, or with the prior permission of the
proper officer.

 

Section 82 – Tax to be first charge on property: This section overrides all laws, except the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, to state that any amount payable as taxes under the GST
law would be a first charge over the property. In Central Bank of India
vs. State Of Kerala [2009] 21 VST 505 (SC),
the three-judge Bench held
that in case of specific provisions in the statute, the sovereign State would
have primacy over secured debt for realisation of sovereign dues and
distinguished the decision in Union of India vs. SICOM Limited [2009] 2
SCC 121
, delivered in the context of Central excise, held the converse
in the absence of a specific provision in the statute.

 

Section 83 – Provisional attachment of property: This section empowers the proper officer to obtain the permission
of the Commissioner seeking provisional attachment of property during the
pendency of any proceeding in order to protect the interest of the Revenue.
Such provisional attachment is valid for a period of one year from the date of
attachment.

 

Section 84 – Continuation and validation of recovery proceedings: Where the demand notice is subject to appeal, revision, etc., any
subsequent enhancement at a higher forum would need to be followed up with an
additional demand notice. The recovery proceedings in respect of the original
demand can be continued without a fresh notice from the stage at which such
proceedings stood immediately before the disposal of such proceedings. For
example, in case a garnishee order has been issued to a debtor and the same has
been stayed by a court, the proper officer need not issue a fresh garnishee
notice after the passing of the order and can proceed for recovery to the
extent the original demand is confirmed. In case of any enhancement, a fresh
demand notice recovery process would have to be initiated.

 

LIABILITY IN SPECIAL CASES

The GST law
prescribes cases where the recovery provisions can extend beyond the taxable
person. The cases have been tabulated below:

 

Scenario

Relationship: Taxable person & other
person

Type of liability of the said person

Transfer of business by sale, gift,
lease, license, etc.

Transferee – Transferor

Joint and several liability on tax dues
up to date of transfer

Principal agency transactions

Agent – Principal

Joint and several liability of principal
on goods sold by agent

Amalgamation / merger

Amalgamating and amalgamated company

Tax dues would be assessed separately in
respective companies’ hands from appointed date to effective date of order

Directorship

Private company – Director

Joint and several liability on directors
who are responsible for gross neglect, misfeasance, etc.

Partnership / HUF

Firm – Partners / HUF – Member

Joint and several liability on partners
up to date of retirement (subject to intimation of retirement) or partition

Guardian / Trustee, court of wards, etc.

Minor – guardian / Trustee, etc.

Recovery from the guardian, etc., in the
same manner as recoverable from minor

Death of individual

Deceased – Legal representative

Legal representative liable entirely,
except where the business is discontinued, in which case the liability is
limited to the estates of the deceased

Dissolution

Firm – Partner

Joint and several liability on partners
up to dissolution

Discontinuation of business

Firm / AOP / HUF – Partner / Member

Joint and several liability on partner /
member

 

One must note that
there is no outer time limit for recovery of tax dues once the adjudication has
been completed within the specified time frame. Generally, one should expect
that the Revenue would proceed on recovery at the earliest for recovering its
arrears.

 

Recovery is a necessary tool for the
government to realise its taxes. Yet, this tool should be used cautiously and
wisely for effecting its end purpose rather than mere display of authority over
the taxpayer. The erstwhile law as well as GST Law has already experienced
hasty use of these provisions and leading to the closure of the enterprise
itself. The heads of administration should issue circulars limiting the
instances where such provisions should be invoked, in a way ensuring efficient
recovery of taxes rather than killing the golden goose itself.  

RIGHT TO INFORMATION CONSTRICTED

Gandhiji had said: ‘Real Swaraj will come,
not by the acquisition of authority by a few, but by the acquisition of the
capacity by all to resist authority when it is abused. In other words, Swaraj
is to be attained by educating the masses to a sense of their capacity to
regulate and control authority.’ (Young India, 29-1-1925, p. 41.)

 

This Swaraj eluded India all these years
despite a very well drafted Constitution and a reasonably fair system of
elections. The average Indian citizen owns the government but did not get the
respect due to him. His simple demand for information of how and why the
government which governed in his name took actions was denied to him despite it
being recognised as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. This was formally codified in the Right to Information Act, 2005
which is one of the progressive transparency laws in the world.

 

The biggest gain has been in empowering
individual citizens to translate the promise of ‘Democracy of the people, by
the people, for the people’ into a living reality. The law as framed by
Parliament has outstandingly codified this fundamental right of citizens. When
framing the law cognisance had been taken of various landmark decisions of the
Supreme Court on the subject. One of the objectives of this law mentioned in its
preamble is to contain corruption. It is a simple, easy to understand statute,
which common people can understand. However, there are some decisions of
information commissions and courts which are constricting this fundamental
right of citizens which is sanctioned neither by the Constitution nor by the
law. This article is an effort to highlight one such instance, the Girish
Ramchandra Deshpande
judgement, which is resulting in an effective
illegal amendment of the law without Parliamentary sanction. The denial of
information has been justified on the basis of section 8(1)(j) which allows
denial of information, when:

 

(j) information which relates to personal
information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity
or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the
individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public
Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may be, is
satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such
information:

 

Provided that the information, which cannot
be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any
person.

 

The RTI Act mandates that all citizens have
the right to information subject to the provisions of the Act. Section 7(1)
clearly states that information can only be refused for the reasons specified
in sections 8 and 9. Section 22 of the Act ensures that no prior laws or rules
can be used to deny information. I would also draw attention to the fact that
the reasonable restrictions which may be placed on the freedom of expression
under Article 19(1)(a) have been mentioned in Article 19(2) of the Constitution
as those affecting ‘the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India,
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence.’

 

It is worth remembering two judgements of
the Supreme Court. A five-judge bench has ruled in P. Ramachandra Rao vs.
State of Karnataka case No. [appeal] (crl.) 535
: ‘Courts can declare
the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious lacunae and fill
the gaps but they cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly
meant for the legislature’. In Rajiv Singh Dalal (Dr.) vs. Chaudhari Devilal
University, Sirsa and another (2008)
,
the Supreme Court, after
referring to its earlier decisions, has observed as follows: ‘The decision of a
Court is a precedent, if it lays down some principle of law supported by
reasons. Mere casual observations or directions without laying down any
principle of law and without giving reasons does not amount to a precedent.’

 

The Supreme Court’s judgement in the
Girish Ramchandra Deshpande1 case is being treated as the law
throughout the country and I will argue that this has the effect of amending
section 8(1)(j) without legitimacy
. This article
will seek to show that the impugned judgement does not lay down the law and is
being wrongly used to constrict the citizen’s fundamental right to information.

 

Girish Ramchandra Deshpande had sought
copies of memos, show cause notices and censure / punishment awarded to a
public servant. He had also demanded details of assets and gifts received by
him. Since the Central Information Commission gave an adverse ruling he finally
went to the Supreme Court. The main part of the judgement states:

 

‘12. The petitioner herein sought for
copies of all memos, show cause notices and censure / punishment awarded to the
third respondent from his employer and also details viz. movable and immovable properties
and also the details of his investments, lending and borrowing from banks and
other financial institutions. Further, he has also sought for the details of
gifts stated to have accepted by the third respondent, his family members and
friends and relatives at the marriage of his son. The information mostly sought
for finds a place in the income tax returns of the third respondent. The
question that has come up for consideration is whether the above-mentioned
information sought for qualifies to be “personal information” as defined in
clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act.

 

13. We are
in agreement with the CIC and the courts below that the details called for by
the petitioner i.e. copies of all memos issued to the third respondent, show
cause notices and orders of censure / punishment etc. are qualified to be
personal information as defined in clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act.
The performance of an employee / officer in an organisation is primarily a
matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are
governed by the service rules which fall under the expression “personal
information”, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public
activity or public interest. On the other hand, the disclosure of which would
cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of course, in a given
case, if the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information
Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest
justifies the disclosure of such information, appropriate orders could be
passed but the petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of right.

__________________________________

1   Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27734 of
2012; Girish Ramchandra Deshpande Versus Cen. Information Commr. & Ors;
K.S. Radhakrishnan & Dipak Misra; 3rd October, 2012; (2013) 1
SCC 212

 

 

 

14. The details disclosed by a person in
his income tax returns are “personal information” which stand exempted from
disclosure under clause (j) of section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless involves a
larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State
Public Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the
larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.’

 

A careful reading of the RTI Act shows that
personal information held by a public authority may be denied under section
8(1)(j) under the following two circumstances:

(i) Where the information requested is
personal information and the nature of the information requested is such that
it has apparently no relationship to any public activity or interest; or

(ii) Where the
information requested is personal information and the disclosure of the said
information would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual.

 

If the information is personal
information, it must be seen whether the information came to the public
authority as a consequence of a public activity
.
Generally, most of the information in public records arises from a public
activity. Applying for a job or ration card are examples of public activity.
However, there may be some personal information which may be with public
authorities which is not a consequence of a public activity, e.g., medical
records or transactions with a public sector bank. Similarly, a public
authority may come into possession of some information during a raid or seizure
which may have no relationship to any public activity.

 

Even if the information has arisen by a
public activity it could still be exempt if disclosing it would be an
unwarranted invasion on the privacy of an individual. Privacy is to do with
matters within a home, a person’s body, sexual preferences, etc., as mentioned
in the Apex Court’s earlier decisions in Kharak Singh and R. Rajagopal
cases. This is in line with Article 19(2) which mentions placing restrictions
on Article 19(1)(a) in the interest of ‘decency or morality’. If, however, it
is felt that the information is not the result of any public activity or
disclosing it would be an unwarranted invasion on the privacy of an individual,
it must be subjected to the acid test of the proviso: Provided that the
information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature
shall not be denied to any person.

 

The proviso is meant as a test which must be
applied before denying information claiming exemption under section 8(1)(j).
Public servants have been used to answering questions raised in Parliament and
the Legislature. It is difficult for them to develop the attitude of answering
demands for information from citizens. Hence, before denying personal
information, the law has given an acid test: Would they deny this information
to the elected representatives? If they come to the subjective assessment that
they would provide the information to MPs and MLAs they will have to provide it
to citizens, since the MPs and MLAs derive legitimacy from the citizens.

 

Another perspective is that personal
information is to be denied to citizens based on the presumption that disclosure
would cause harm to some interest of an individual.

If, however, the information can be given to the legislature it means the
likely harm is not very serious, since what is given to the legislature will be
in public domain. It is worth remembering that the first draft of the bill
which had been presented to the Parliament in December, 2004 had the provision
as section 8(2) and stated: (2) Information which cannot be denied to
Parliament or Legislature of a State, as the case may be, shall not be denied
to any person.
In the final draft passed by Parliament in May, 2005, this
section was put as a proviso only for section 8(1)(j). Thus, it was a conscious
choice of Parliament to have this as a proviso only for section 8(1)(j). It is
necessary that when information is denied based on the provision of section
8(1)(j), the person denying the information must give his subjective assessment
that he would deny it to Parliament or State Legislature if sought.

 

It is worth noting that in the Privacy Bill,
2014 it was proposed that sensitive personal data should be defined as personal
data relating to:

 

‘(a) physical and mental health, including
medical history, (b) biometric, bodily or genetic information, (c) criminal
convictions, (d) password, (e) banking credit and financial data, (f) narco
analysis or polygraph test data, (g) sexual orientation. Provided that any
information that is freely available or accessible in public domain or to be
furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for time being
in force shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data for the purposes of
this Act’.

 

Only if a reasoned conclusion is reached
that the information has no relationship to any public activity or that
disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion on the privacy of an individual, a
subjective assessment has to be made whether it would be given to Parliament or
State Legislature. If it is felt that it would not be given, then an assessment
has to be made under section 8(2) whether there is a larger public interest in
disclosure than the harm to the protected interest. If no exemption applies,
there is no requirement of showing a larger public interest.

 

In the impugned judgement, an RTI request
for copies of all memos, show cause notices, orders of censure / punishment,
assets, income tax returns, details of gifts received, etc. of a public servant
was denied. The Court has ruled without giving any legal arguments merely by
saying that this is personal information as defined in clause (j) of section
8(1) of the RTI Act and hence exempted. It must be noted that the law does not
exempt all personal information. The only reason ascribed in this decision is
that the Court agrees with the Central Information Commission’s decision. Such
a decision does not form a precedent which must be followed. It cannot be
justified by Article 19(2) of the Constitution or by the complete provision of
section 8(1)(j). As per the RTI Act denial of information can only be on the
basis of the exemptions in the law. The Court has denied information by reading
section 8(1)(j) as exempting:

 

‘information which relates to personal
information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public
activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy
of the individual
unless the Central Public Information Officer or the
State Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may
be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of
such information’.

Provided
that the information, which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State
Legislature shall not be denied to any person.”

 

There are no words in the judgement, or the
CIC decision which it has accepted, discussing whether the disclosure has any
relationship to a public activity, or if disclosure would be an unwarranted
invasion on the privacy. The words which have been struck above have not been
considered at all and information was denied merely on the basis that it was
personal information. Worse still, the proviso ‘Provided that the
information…..’ (underlined above) has not even been mentioned and while
quoting section 8(1)(j) the proviso has been missed. Effectively, only 40 of
the 87 words in this section were considered.

 

The Supreme Court judgement in the ADR
/ PUCL Civil Appeal 7178 of 2001 has laid down that
citizens have a right to know about the assets of those who want to be public
servants (stand for elections). It should be obvious that if citizens have a
right to know about the assets of those who want to become public servants,
their right to get information about those who are public servants
cannot be lesser. This would be tantamount to arguing that a prospective groom
must declare certain matters to his wife-to-be, but after marriage the same
information need not be disclosed!

 

The Girish Ramchandra Deshpande
judgement should not be treated as a precedent for the following reasons:

 

(i)    It is devoid of any detailed reasoning and
does not lay down a ratio;

(ii)    It does not analyse whether a public servant’s
work and assets is information which is a public activity or not. The judgement
when stating that certain matters are between the employee and the employer
misses the fact that the employer is the ‘people of India’;

(iii)   It has completely forgotten the proviso to
section 8(1)(j) which requires subjecting a proposed denial to this acid test;

(iv)   It has not considered the clear ratio of the Rajagopal
judgement or the ADR / PUCL judgement

(v)   This became the most commonly used exemption.
In R.K. Jain vs. Union of India JT 2013 (10) SC 430 this was
reiterated when denying information about the comments on the integrity of an
official by the Chairman of CESTAT. This referred to the Girish Deshpande
judgement enthusiastically and held it as a precedent. Subsequently, in Canara
Bank vs. C.S. Shyam
, civil appeal No. 22 of 2009 the
Supreme Court refused names and details of officials transferred holding this
as personal information and quoting the Girish Deshpande judgement.
Effectively, the law has been amended and most information which relates to a
natural person, and can be called personal, is being denied. This conceals
corruption, protects people who have submitted false bills or certificates. It
is also helpful to ensure that fictitious beneficiaries of various schemes
cannot be caught. The law’s objective of curbing corruption is being defeated;

(vi) Across the
country, information about MLA funds expenditure, officers’ leave, caste
certificates, file notings, educational degrees, beneficiaries of subsidies and
much more are being denied. Many PIOs are denying information which may have
the name of a person claiming it is personal information.

 

A major provision of the RTI Act has been
amended by a judicial pronouncement which appears to be flawed. It is also
violating Article 19(2) of the Constitution. A major tool of citizens to bring
the shenanigans, arbitrary and corrupt acts of public servants has been
affected adversely without a proper reasoning. Commissioners and the legal
profession must discuss this and it must be recognised that Girish
Ramchandra Deshpande
does not lay down the law on section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and is contrary to the ratio of the R. Rajagopal
and ADR judgements. However, the Girish Ramchandra
Deshpande
judgement has been treated as a precedent in two subsequent
Supreme Court judgements and is being used to deny most information which can
be related to a natural person. This has become the most commonly used
exemption.

 

PIOs and
Information Commissioners are using this widely to deny all information which
relates to any person and the Right To Information Act is being subverted and
illegally converted into Right to Denial of Information. Section 8(1)(j) is
being converted into an omnibus exemption which can be used to deny most
information.
This will
be a very unfortunate regression for citizens’ fundamental right and would
greatly curb their power to get accountability and curb corruption.

 

The nation must
discuss this illegal and unconstitutional curtailment of our fundamental right
and create a strong public opinion for its restoration.

GANDHIAN PRINCIPLES AND THE CA PROFESSION

The second of October, 2019 is the 150th
birth anniversary of the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi. By a
coincidence, it is also the birth anniversary of our beloved Ex-Prime Minister,
the Late Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri. Both were known to be highly principled
persons. That is why we still remember them with reverence even after so many
years. I felt honoured when I was asked to write an article on Gandhian
principles vis-à-vis our CA profession for our BCA Journal.

 

It is true that
quite a few decisions or stands taken by Gandhiji on certain points proved
highly controversial. Some of his views became the subject matter of severe
criticism; so much so that it eventually resulted in his unfortunate
assassination. After all, every coin has two sides. However, the fact remains
that no one questioned his integrity and honest intentions for the good of our
country.

 

In this article, I will attempt to enumerate
a few of his principles with reference to the conduct of our CA profession. I
compliment the Editor for choosing this very important topic and thank him for
giving me the opportunity to express my views on it.

 

We are in kaliyug and violating,
circumventing or crushing good principles has become the rule of the day. In
fact, that is the very essence of kaliyug.

 

God was particularly kind to this country
that he gave us so many towering personalities during our fight for freedom –
Lokmanya Tilak, Veer Savarkar, Mahatma Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel, Subhash
Chandra Bose, Lala Lajpatrai, Bhagat Singh, Rabindranath Tagore, Swami
Vivekananda and hundreds of others in different walks of life. Hardly any other
country would be so blessed. Despite this, unfortunately, we remained poor and
weak in almost every respect. The reason is that the level of the society or a
country depends on the level of the common citizen. These personalities
received not only praise and respect but they were literally revered and
worshipped. However, they were not followed in letter and spirit in day-to-day life. Mahatma Gandhi remained only on the walls of government
offices and courts; and also on currency notes! He was never given a place in
our hearts. The politicians merely used his name for their selfish motives.
Thus, he was physically assassinated only once, but he is now being killed
every day. We CAs are an integral part of the society and I proceed to examine
whether CAs were also a party to this every-day assassination, or they were an
exception to the general rule. I have selected only a few of Gandhiji’s
principles.

 

TRUTH

The two great values cherished and professed
by Mahatmaji were Truth and Non-violence. Truth was supreme. Even his
autobiography is titled My Experiments with Truth. Truth was dearest to
his heart. Not that he never deviated from the truth, but he had the courage to
confess whenever and wherever he felt that he had deviated. This is his real
greatness.

 

After all, no one is infallible.

 

We CAs, unlike lawyers, are intimately
connected with Truth. Our core function in the profession is to attest the
financial position as ‘True and Fair’. I leave it to the conscience (and
introspection) of every reader of this article as to how many times we have
deviated from this principle. It is not only an ethical principle, but it is
our statutory obligation.

 

Here, I would pause a little to discuss
briefly our Code of Ethics. The motto of our Institute, as recommended by Maharshi
Aurobindo
is ‘ya Esha Supteshu Jagarti’. It was adopted from the Kathopanishad.
A CA should be the one who is expected to be awake when the world around is
asleep. Symbolically, Truth is ‘light’ (day) and Untruth is ‘darkness’ (night).
Thus, our very motto and vision as well mission is to pursue the Truth.

 

In my opinion, the edifice of our entire
Code of Ethics is the three messages given by the ancient Gurus to their
disciples (shishyas). These are enshrined in the Taittireeya
Upanishad
.

Satyam Vada – Speak the Truth

Dharmam Chara. Pursue the eternal principles of righteousness
(religion means one’s duty; and not the worship)

Swadhyayan ma pramadah!

Never commit any default in studies or in
updating of knowledge.

 

This is nothing but our CPE.

 

Against this, what is commonly observed is
that we not only overlook the untrue things but often become a party to the
creation of false things and certify them to be true. Forget the big scams
where CAs’ active role was exposed, many of the scams were masterminded by the
CAs; but even on day-to-day basis we consciously sideline this principle.

 

All of us are so familiar with this that the
point hardly needs any elaboration.

 

NON-VIOLENCE

The second principle dearest to his heart
was non-violence. By non-violence I do not mean merely physical non-violence.
We may not beat or assault any one, or kill any one. We may not torture any
one, or cause injury to any one at the physical level. But indirectly, we may
either overlook or connive at such behaviour, or run away from it. There may be
a few CAs who may be indirectly helping or supporting such acts. Thus, there
are many underworld people, or criminals, or even ‘politicians’ with criminal
inclinations, or traders, or manufacturers engaged in or aiding violence.

 

I know a CA, a practicing Jain, refused to
do the work of a slaughter house. I don’t mean to suggest that no CA should
render service to such a business so long as it is a socially accepted and
lawful business. It was only an indicative observation. At the same time, a CA
should use discretion in selecting a client and have the courage to say ‘No’ to
certain types of clients.

 

SELF-RESPECT

Gandhiji’s struggle against humiliating
treatment in South Africa is well known. In fact, that was his debut in public
life. That made him a leader.

 

Today, CAs receive humiliating treatment
from government, bureaucrats and even clients. They are taken for granted by
all these people. Politicians make even public statements against the whole
profession. But we have no courage to raise our voice against such humiliation.
We are not assertive. We cannot put our foot down on the nonsensical things. We
have made our signature very cheap. Many of the CAs do not themselves keep the
respect of their own signature, then why and how will others respect it?

 

One of the reputed agencies had expressly
notified in one of their documents, ‘Please avoid bringing Chartered
Accountants’ certificates as the same are often found unreliable!’  No one pulled them into the court of law
for this.

 

The manner in which we go begging to the
Finance Minister every year for extension of due date is indeed very
humiliating. Government should understand that this is a chronic or systemic
problem and not the fault or inefficiency of CAs. We are not capable of making
strong and assertive representations but we merely beg mildly. Lawyers for
flimsy grounds have the audacity (or courage?) to boycott the proceedings of
the court.

 

Even transporters are so organised that they
make the government bend in their favour. We, as a profession, never show this
kind of strength of unity and collective action. The reason may be that we are
not perceived to be indispensable.

 

CHARACTER

By character I do not mean merely moral
character in a physical sense. Character is the result of honesty and
integrity. Courage comes out of this character. It is well said: ‘If one salutes
oneself, one need not salute anyone; but if one pollutes oneself, one has to
salute everyone!’

 

We blame bureaucrats and police personnel
for corruption. Unfortunately, we feel that corruption means only bribery.
Actually, the worst form of corruption is corruption of thoughts – our evil
thoughts. If we observe, when we come across any law or regulation many of us
first think of loopholes. We always think of ways and means to bypass it.
Often, our profession is perceived as the one that ‘manages’ everything.

 

Even our mandatory CPE hours many CAs try to
‘manage’ by hook or by crook. This is nothing but corruption. We CAs are
financial ‘police’. Had we performed our duty consciously, the extent of
financial scandals or debacles could have been minimised. But audit as a
function was never taken in its true spirit or with enough stringency by many.
It was seen either as mere compliance or even as a ‘tool’ to get loans from
banks. Accepting fees without doing justice to the audit is also corruption.

 

Gandhiji did propagate defiance of ‘black
law’ or unjust law. But that was an open and transparent movement against the
Britishers in the interest of the country. It was not meant for achieving
anybody’s selfish, vested interests. Unfortunately, even our judicial system
also never understood and performed its role meaningfully. Both the principles
of judicial system, viz., ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ and ‘justice
hurried is justice buried’, are violated conspicuously every day. CAs and the
legal profession are sister professions and both the ‘sisters’ have often
worked hand-in-hand in dismantling or crushing the very foundation and purpose
of the respective professions. This is the tragedy and we have no courage to
speak against it. We take pride in playing with words and crippling the system
by any means without any scruples.

 

PATRIOTISM AND NATIONAL
SPIRIT

Winston Churchill, who is responsible for
deaths of several million Indians, had observed, ‘India is not a nation, but
only a population!’ The question is — Do we represent our national character?
CAs are supposed to provide intellectual leadership to the society. Gandhiji
had the courage to swim against the flow. We are not only swimming with the
flow, but often remain in the forefront. Examples are plenty if we study all
the scams that have occurred so far. The intellectual class often ridicules the
concepts like patriotism. We have to ask ourselves how do we display a national
spirit?

 

When there was burning and communal violence
in Noakhali, Gandhiji had the courage to go there alone and observe a fast for
peace.

 

LEADERSHIP

CAs are rarely perceived as thought leaders.
You hardly come across any CA who is influencing opinion in society or of the
common man. Have we ever attempted to influence or mould the thinking of our
clients? We always ‘follow’ the clients’ thoughts. A leader has to be
‘proactive’. Why are we always reactive?

 

Thus, if any new regulation is proposed in
bill form – be it by government or by our Institute – we seldom study it from
the point of view of creating public opinion for or against it. Do we bother or
even push enough to give our suggestions and express our apprehensions
effectively at the right forum and at the right time?

 

 

I firmly believe that our country has the
real inherent expertise in the accounting field. Unfortunately, non-Indians are
dominating the scene. Many of the so-called accounting standards may lack
logic, purpose or consistency. They may not be relevant in the Indian context.
We only keep criticising them but accept them with a ‘slave’s mindset’. The few
firms who have vested interests in thrusting these regulations on us attract
our talented members by offering hefty packages. In our fight for freedom, many
intellectuals consciously remained away from the attractive jobs offered by the
British government. Today, our intelligent CAs are tolerating the stressful if
not torturous treatment in these so-called ‘professional firms’ who are doing
nothing but ‘business’ in an unscrupulous and unfair manner.

 

Gandhiji in his newspaper ‘Harijan’
influenced and moulded public opinion into the desired channel for the benefit
of the society and the country. How many CAs are into journalism doing such a
job? On TV channels, when there are discussions or debates on social or national
issues, the presence of CAs among expert panellists is conspicuous by its
absence – meaning, CAs are never perceived as social leaders! Are we not
concerned with social and national issues?

 

SIMPLICITY

Simplicity should not be merely a ‘style’,
it should be a way of life. One can be essentially simple. Simplicity is
expressed in thinking, writing, expressing and all aspects of living. Is there
real simplicity in drafting of our regulations or pronouncements? Is there
enough clarity? Is there enough truth and forthrightness? Are we either
offensive or defensive? We find that all such texts are full of ambiguity. It
is our duty to compel the concerned persons to make it simple.

 

We often see very pompous and showy offices
of CAs. For a professional a reasonably decent office set-up is sufficient. But
in the craze of showmanship, many professionals compromise on principles. In
the process they also move away from nature in their day-to-day life. Many CAs
work as ‘brokers’ quite contrary to the principles of Gandhiji.

 

LOVE FOR INDEPENDENCE

Gandhiji staked
his entire life for the freedom of the country. He fought for independence. Are
CAs really independent in their profession? If our client pays the fees for his
own audit, can we really afford to be independent? It is an obvious conflict of
interest. In our Code of Ethics there are items of misconduct based on the
‘conflict of interest’. When there is no effective independence in attest
function, the foundation of the profession itself gets crippled. All
complicated regulatory measures are of no use.

 

SENSE OF JUSTICE

Gandhiji fought injustice. When he started
practising as a lawyer, he was particular in accepting only those cases where
he believed that the truth was on his client’s side. He used to verify it
first. If at a later date his client turned out to be false, he used to give up
the brief. Do we have the courage to do such a thing? The business assessees
for whom we fight tooth and nail with the tax department – are they really on
the right side of the law? What are we shielding by using the best of our
professional skills?

 

CONCLUSION

Readers may wonder why I am so critical or
sceptical about the situation. Actually, the entire society is behaving more or
less in the same manner – that is, against the principles cherished and taught
by Gandhiji and other towering personalities. In fact, I see that there is a
lot of hypocrisy all around. In our motto, the CA profession has been equated
with the ultimate Truth – the Brahman or the Atman. But in
reality? The less said the better. For that matter, all the professions have
failed and succumbed to the pressure of kaliyug.

 

I have no particular grudge against the CA
profession as such. The observations made in this article would apply with
equal force more or less to all professions and occupations. In my humble
opinion, CAs have proved no exception to the general conditions of kaliyug.

 

However, CAs have the capability and
training to look through and see what is happening, the direction in which
things are headed and also future implications.

 

The only remedy is to remember the real
heroes this country had produced a few decades ago and follow their path
consciously and religiously. Even when the situation looks bleak, when we look
at Bapu’s life we see that he stood for what he believed to be true even
if it meant to stand alone. This reflection and marching towards finding what
is true should be our dandi march towards restoration of values
in each of our circles of influence.

 


GANDHI FOR US NOW

The author is former Vice-Chancellor of
Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad, a university founded by Gandhiji in 1920, and is
engaged in charitable works in rural areas.

 

Humanity in general has been optimistic and
so it should be. However, there have been times when all has not been well and
the business as usual approach can and has landed the humanity in deep crisis.
In the distant past, most crises have arisen due to natural calamities. In
recent times, however, many of the crises have been man-made. A seemingly major
crisis has hit the humanity today. It is the deepening environmental and
ecological crisis. The intense desire of human beings to control nature and
exponentially increase the materialistic living are said to have led to the
present crisis. In the context of our country the nature of the crisis is the
same. The impact is so hard that our socio-cultural values at society level and
ethical values at individual level have gradually been vanishing. In totality,
one can see the crisis arising due to the irresponsible and often irreversible
behaviour of most of us. In our cultural parlance there is serious disturbance
and discord between Vyakti (Individual), Samashti (Universe) and Prakruti
(Nature).

 

Gandhiji understood the problem and offered
a solution with potential to restore and perhaps build harmony among vyakti,
samashti and prakruti. In case of India, the immediate crisis is
related to character. Gandhiji’s life was his message and was about continuous
character-building, a process that was initiated from childhood. With his
departure his message was conveniently forgotten. The result is that people
with character and integrity are at a premium both in public and private lives.
Unethical means in business have become the norm rather than the exception. In
fact, the world over the business management schools are trying to introduce
ethics and spirituality courses in the curricula. Recently, a Bench headed by the
then Chief Justice of India gave a judgement with regard to the Vyapam case in
Madhya Pradesh where the students were admitted to medical college fraudulently
and had completed the course. Upon disqualification, they had filed a petition.
The judgement read, ‘If we desire to build (our) nation on the touchstone of
ethics and character, and if our determined goal is to build a nation where
only rule of law prevails, then we cannot accept the claim of appellants
(students) for suggested social gains (by allowing them to keep the degrees on
the condition of doing social service free of cost for some years)’. This is
just one illustration of many in the country.

 

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi transformed his
persona to a level that earned him the title of Mahatma. The process of
transformation began from a very early age. Mohan’s regard for service began
with service of his parents and later turned into service of humanity. Watching
a play of Harishchandra, he wrote, ‘To follow the truth and to go
through all the ordeals Harishchandra went through was the one ideal it
inspired in me”. Truth and honesty got engraved permanently on the young
Mohandas’s mind and changed his personality completely in the years to come. At
a young age he learned three aspects of improving the self: Sveekruti
acknowledgement, Pashchatap – repentance, and Prayashchit
willingness to accept punishment for wrong-doing. He also thought that it was
possible for others to do the same; he expected that every individual should,
indeed, do so. As a student in England he remained faithful to the oath he made
to his mother not to touch wine, woman and meat. His resolve to being truthful
and honest under the most trying circumstances helped him to acquire a strong
self-discipline.

 

By the age of twenty five years, young
Gandhi had accepted and had become a staunch practitioner of honesty, truth and
non-violence. Gandhi firmly internalised the value of firm resistance with
self-suffering in the situations of injustice and exploitation rather than inflicting
injury and violence to the perpetrator.
It was this Gandhi who went on to
lead the South Africa Satyagraha between 1896 and 1914 and after that
became the central figure in India’s fight for Independence. Gandhi fought for
his liberty and freedom and for the freedom of communities by using non-violent
protest – Satyagraha. Self-discipline is what is needed in order to be a
Satyagrahi for fighting for one’s own liberty and freedom, and for
serving the society and its causes. Once he practised being a truthful Satyagrahi,
he suggested others to try it.

 

He gave eleven vows or Mahavrats. 1. Satya – Truth, 2. Ahimsa or Love, 3. Brahmacharya
or Chastity / Control, 4. Aswada – Control of the Palate, 5. Asteya
– Non-Stealing, 6. Aparigraha – Non-Possession, 7. Abhaya
Fearlessness, 8. Sprushya bhavana – Removal of Untouchability, 9. Shareera
Shrama
– Bread Labour, 10. Sarvadharma Samabhava – Tolerance:
Respect of all Religions, 11. Swadeshi – Use of Products Made in India.
This is practical idealism as we shall see. (All these eleven vows can be
adopted by a Gruhastha.) This is the key for character-building and we
should take the core values and start the work at all ages with special
emphasis on education of children in the country.

 

The second point is about the environmental
and ecological crisis. Gandhiji had anticipated today’s problem in 1909 in his
small treatise Hind Swaraj. His criticism of the modern civilization was
the following:

 

‘Let us first consider what state of
things is described by the word “civilization”. Its true test lies in the fact
that people living in it make bodily welfare the object of life… The people of
Europe today live in better-built houses than they did a hundred years ago.
This is considered an emblem of civilization and this is also a matter to
promote bodily happiness. Formerly, they wore skins and used spears as their
weapons. Now, they wear long trousers, and, for embellishing their bodies, they
wear a variety of clothing and, instead of spears, they carry with them
revolvers containing five or more chambers. If people of a certain country, who
have hitherto not been in the habit of wearing much clothing, boots, etc.,
adopt European clothing, they are supposed to have become civilized out of
savagery… Men will not need the use of their hands and feet. They will press a
button, and they will have their clothing by their side. They will press
another button, and they will have their newspaper. A third and a motor-car
will be in waiting for them. They will have a variety of delicately dished up
food. Everything will be done by machinery. Formerly, when people wanted to
fight with one another, they measured between them their bodily strength; now
it is possible to take away thousands of lives by one man working behind a gun
from a hill. This is civilization.’

 

Indeed, it all applies to the India of
today. The industrial revolution is all about material production to meet
material needs. Science led to technologies and technologies largely produced
material comfort. Information technology in the beginning showed some potential
to be an equalizer, but soon went into the same control lines – in the hands of
few powerful people with money and power. Protestant Ethics had justified the
‘this worldly affairs’, especially creating material wealth for family and
society to live comfortably as divine. And free market was the best agency
which would provide equal opportunity to all, thus simultaneously optimising
individual and social welfare. It was presumed that the civil society that
would result out of such protestant values would be virtuous. The virtue of
civil society, if left to its own devices, were said to include good character,
honesty, duty, self-sacrifice, honour, service, self-discipline, tolerance,
respect, justice, civility, fortitude, courage, integrity, diligence,
patriotism, consideration for others, thrift and reverence.

 

 

But as capitalism flourished the Protestant
values gave way. Gluttony, pride, selfishness and greed became prominent. These
are precisely the Christian sins. Communist society could do no better than the
Orwellian phrase ‘some are more equal than others’! The modern economic
progress has increased the tension among the nations. Human footprint is
dangerously self-destroying. Conflicts within and between the countries and
military violence and killings are said to have been more than the total loss
that occurred during the Second World War.

 

Like the West celebrates individual liberty,
Gandhiji too upholds individual liberty but with responsibility to self, fellow
humans and nature. The individual and societal efforts have to be mended and
mentored in a way where vyakti’s interface with samashti is
harmonious; every vyakti is an essential part of the processes in samashti.
However, vyakti’s mind-set in interacting with samashti and prakruti
has to be the following:

 

Ishavasyam
idam sarvam Yatkinchit Jagatyam Jagat;

Ten
tyaktena bhunjitha maa grudha kasya swid dhanam

 

Whatever there
is changeful in this ephemeral world, all that must be enveloped by the Lord.
By this renunciation (of the world), support yourself. Do not covet the wealth
of any one.

 

With
advancements in science and technology as well as human achievements, nature
has to be treated with respect and humanity must not cancel tomorrow. Although
individual freedom is the ultimate goal, humanity needs to go on the Gandhian
way of education for freedom. Gandhiji himself was a learner till the last day
of his life. His kind of education that would inform / influence the
preferences and choices of individuals was not only confined to Indians, but
also to world citizens. The resultant position would not be that of pursuing
limitless wants. It is imperative that the desire to acquire more and more
should decline. The era of equality of rights and opportunities can then be
established. If people adopt the eleven vows listed earlier, harmony and
‘equality of rights and opportunities’ are possible globally. With practise of
the vows, the relationship between humans and nature would alter, averting the
ecological crisis. When vyakti (individual) changes and becomes
responsible and focuses on development of inner self, peace will evolve in samashti
(universe) and harmony with prakruti (nature) will return. Gandhi
beckons.

 

A ‘RESIDENTIAL HOUSE’ FOR SECTIONS 54 AND 54F

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

An assessee, whether an individual or an
HUF, is exempted u/s 54 of the Income-tax Act from capital gains arising from
the transfer of a long-term capital asset, being a residential house, on the
purchase or construction of a residential house within the specified period.
Similar exemption is granted u/s 54F of the Act for capital gains arising from
the transfer of any long-term capital asset, not being a residential house, on
the purchase or construction of a residential house, within the specified
period and subject to other conditions as provided therein. One of the
essential conditions for availing the exemption under both these provisions is
that the house purchased or constructed should be a ‘residential house’.

 

Quite often, an issue arises as to whether
the exemption can be availed when the new property purchased or constructed,
though approved and referred to as a residential house, has been used for
non-residential or commercial purposes. Such issues arise in implementation of
sections 54 and 54F, including for compliance with conditions that apply
post-exemption. The issue may arise even where one is required to determine the
nature of premises under transfer, for ascertaining the application of sections
54 or 54F, which are believed to be mutually exclusive, that call for
compliance with
different conditions.

 

The Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal has held
for the purposes of section 54F that the new house constructed for residential
use, consisting of all the required amenities, accordingly would not lose its
character of a residential house even if it was used for some commercial
purposes. As against this, the Delhi bench of the Tribunal has held that the
existing residential house which was used by the assessee as his office would
not be taken into consideration while determining whether the assessee owned
more than one residential house as on the date of transfer of the original
asset while applying the provisions of section 54F.


THE N. REVATHI CASE

The issue
first came up for consideration of the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal in the
case of N. Revathi vs. ITO 45 taxmann.com 30 (Hyderabad – Trib.).
In this case, the assessee claimed the exemption u/s 54F on transfer of a
long-term capital asset, not being a residential house, on utilisation of the
net consideration in constructing a residential building over the plot of land
owned by her jointly with her sister for assessment year 2007-08. The building
consisted of ten flats, five each belonging to the assessee and her sister.
Since the AO was of the view that the exemption could be claimed only for one
flat, he deputed the Inspector to make a spot inquiry for verifying the
assessee’s claim. Upon verification, it was also found that the said building
was used for running a school by the assessee and her friend and it had
classrooms, a big hall and a play area for children in the cellar of the
premises. The exemption u/s 54F was denied by the AO on the ground that the
building constructed was not a residential house. While passing an ex parte
order on account of non-appearance on the part of the assessee, the CIT (A)
concurred with the view of the AO by holding that the term ‘residential’
clearly implied usage as a ‘home’.

 

Before the Tribunal, it was argued on behalf
of the assessee that the Inspector, while submitting his report on 23rd
December, 2009, had categorically stated that the school had started
functioning six months earlier. Therefore, it implied that no school was
functioning in the said residential building during the relevant assessment
year.

 

The Tribunal held that only because the
building was used as a school could not change the nature and character of the
building from residential to commercial; even a residential building could be
used as a school or for any other commercial purpose; the relevant factor to
judge was whether the construction made was for residential purpose or for
commercial purpose; if the building had been constructed for residential use
with all amenities like kitchen, bathroom, etc., which were necessary for
residential accommodation, then even if it was used as a school or for any
other commercial purpose, it could not lose its character as a residential
building. However, it further held that if the construction was made in such a
way that it was not normally for residential use but for purely commercial use,
then it could not be considered to be a residential house; the primary fact
which was required to be examined was whether the building had been constructed
for residential use or not, a fact that could be verified from the approved
plan and architectural design of the building.

 

As the approved plan of the building
constructed by the assessee was not brought on record, the Tribunal remitted
the matter back to the file of the AO to conduct an inquiry to find out the
exact nature of construction, i.e., whether the said building was constructed
for residential use or for commercial use. The AO was directed to allow the
exemption if it was found that the building had been constructed for
residential use with all amenities which were necessary for a residential
accommodation. Insofar as the allowability of the exemption with respect to
more than one flat was concerned, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of
the assessee.

 

THE SANJEEV PURI CASE

The issue, thereafter, came up for
consideration of the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Sanjeev
Puri vs. DCIT 72 taxmann.com 147 (Delhi – Trib.).

 

In this case (assessment year 2010-11) the
assessee, who was a senior advocate, owned three different properties as
follows:

(i)   E-549A, which was used for residential
purposes;

(ii) E-575A, used
as office for conducting the legal profession; and

(iii)  Gurgaon flat which was still under
construction.

 

The assessee sold the rights in the
under-construction Gurgaon flat which resulted in long-term capital gains of
Rs. 1,48,23,645. Proceeds from the aforesaid sale were invested in purchase of
a new residential house for which the assessee claimed an exemption u/s 54F of
the Act. The exemption claimed u/s 54F was denied by the AO on the ground that
the assessee on the date of transfer of the rights held more than one
residential house, namely, E-549A and another at E-575A, holding that the
latter was also a residential property and, therefore, the assessee owned more
than one residential house at the time of transfer. He held that a residential
property could not be used as an office and that there was no distinction
between the ‘type’ of the property and its ‘actual use’. In other words, the
actual use of E-575A for commercial purposes did not make the premises
non-residential. The CIT (A) upheld the view of the AO and confirmed the
disallowance.

 

Before the Tribunal, it was argued by the
assessee that the house at E-575A was not used for residential purposes and was
put to use for the purposes of his profession being carried on by the assessee
from the said premises; holding the said property to be residential house
merely on the basis that the same was classified as residential property as per
municipal laws and in the registered sale deed executed at the time of purchase
of such property and disregarding the actual use thereof for professional
purposes, was not justified.

 

The Revenue argued before the Tribunal that
the manner of the construction would decide the nature of the house, as to
whether it was residential or commercial. The usage of the property was
immaterial if the property was shown as residential on the records of the
corporation. The capability of the premises for use as a residential house was
enough and it was not necessary to reside there. Therefore, it was claimed that
the exemption was rightly denied on the basis of the fact that the property was
classified as residential property as per municipal laws and in the registered
sale deed executed at the time of purchase of such property, disregarding the
actual use thereof for professional purposes.

 

The Tribunal
held that for availing deduction u/s 54F, the test to be applied would be that
of the actual use of the premises by the assessee during the relevant period.
In other words, it did not make a difference whether the property had been
shown as residential house on the records of the government authority but it
was actually used for non-residential purpose. The actual usage of the house by
the assessee would be considered while adjudicating upon the eligibility of exemption
u/s 54F. Accordingly, the AO was directed to allow the exemption u/s 54F as
claimed by the assessee for the reason that E-575A was used for commercial
purposes, i.e., non-residential purposes, and therefore the assessee could not
be held to have held more than one residential premises.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The primary issue under consideration is the
basis on which a particular house should be recognised as a residential house,
i.e., whether the premises by its plans and approval and its design should be a
residential house, or whether it should have been used as a residential house,
or whether both these conditions should have been satisfied. While the
Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal has considered the nature of the house, i.e.,
how it has been built and how it has been classified in the records of the
local authorities as the basis, the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal has considered
the actual usage of the premises as the basis for determination.

 

The provisions of sections 54 and 54F use
the term ‘residential house’, but without defining it. One possibility is to
apply a common parlance test to understand the meaning of such term, which has
not been defined expressly under the Act. It should be attributed a meaning
supplied to it by a common man, i.e., a meaning accorded to the term in the
popular sense. In that sense, a house is considered to be a residential house
when it has all the facilities which makes that house capable of residing in,
i.e., facilities for living, cooking and sanitary requirements, when its
location is in a residential area, when it has been recognised as a residential
house by the local authorities for the purpose of levying different types of
taxes. The house satisfying these conditions, not necessarily all of them, can
be regarded as a residential house irrespective of the purpose for which that
house has been put to use, unless it is found that it was always intended to be
used for non-residential purposes and it was shown to be a residential house
only for the purpose of availing the benefit of exemption.

 

A useful reference can be made to the
observations of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Purshottam
Dass 112 Taxman 122 (Delhi)
for understanding the meaning of the term
‘residential house’. In this case, the High Court was dealing with the issue of
eligibility of exemption granted under erstwhile provisions of section
23(1)(b)(ii), which was available only in respect of ‘residential unit’. The
relevant observations of the High Court in this regard are reproduced below:

 

Question whether a particular unit is
residential or not is to be determined by taking into account various factors,
like, the intention of the constructor at the time of construction, intended
user, actual user, potentiality for a different user and several other related
factual aspects. The provision only stresses on erection of a building
comprising of residence(s) during a particular period.

 

In a given case, the constructor may have
constructed a particular unit as the residential unit, but to avoid deterioration
on account of non-user, may have temporarily let out for office purposes. There
may be a case where for some period of a particular assessment year, the
building has been used for residential purposes and for the residual period for
office purposes. There may be another case when during the period of five years
referred to in the provision for three years building is used for residential
purposes and for balance period for office purposes. Can it be said in the
above three contingencies, the unit ceases to be a residential unit for some
periods? These factual aspects have great relevance while adjudicating the
question whether the exemption is to be allowed. We may state that user is one
of several relevant factors and not the conclusive or determinative one. The
intention of constructor at the time of erection is one of the relevant
factors, as stated above. If intention at the time of erection was use for
residential purposes, it is of great relevance and significance.

 

In view of these observations, the High
Court allowed the exemption as claimed u/s 23(1)(b)(ii), on the ground that the
construction of the house was made for residential purpose and in a residential
area though there was temporary non-use as residence and, consequently,
temporary use for office purposes. Thus, one of the important criteria which is
required to be considered is the intention of the assessee while purchasing or
constructing a house. If the intention was to use the house as a residential
house at that point in time, then the subsequent usage of that house for a
non-residential purpose for a temporary period should not disqualify that
assessee from claiming the exemption.

 

Reference can also be made to the definition
of a ‘residential unit’ as provided in section 80-IBA, though it has restricted
applicability only for that section. This definition is reproduced below:

 

‘residential unit’ means an independent
housing unit with separate facilities for living, cooking and sanitary
requirements, distinctly separated from other residential units within the
building, which is directly accessible from an outer door or through an
interior door in a shared hallway and not by walking through the living space
of another household.

 

In this definition also, importance has been
given to the structure of the unit, rather than the usage of the unit.

 

Further, a usage test may not help in
several cases, like in a case where the house has not been put to any use at
all, or a case where the house has been used for both residential as well as commercial
purposes, or a case where the house has been used for different purposes over
different periods. In such cases, it will be difficult to determine the nature
of the house for the purpose of allowing the exemption u/s 54 or 54F. However,
again, the intention may play an important role; commercial premises purchased
with the intention to use them for residential purposes may qualify to satisfy
the test of the provisions.

 

Importantly, the erstwhile provision of
section 54 as applicable prior to A.Y. 1983-84 was materially different from
its present provision. Under the erstwhile provision, the exemption was
available only when the house property was purchased or constructed by the
assessee for the purpose of his own residence or of the parents. This condition
was omitted by the Finance Act, 1982 with effect from A.Y. 1983-84. The
expression ‘the assessee has within a period of one year before or after
that date purchased, or has within a period of two years after that date
constructed, a house property for the purposes of his own residence’
was
substituted by the expression ‘the assessee has within a period of one year
before or after the date on which the transfer took place purchased or has
within a period of three years after that date constructed, a residential
house’.
Circular No. 346 dated 30th June, 1982 explained the
reason for this change as follows:

 

The conditions of self-occupation of the
property by the assessee or his parents before its transfer and the purchase or
construction of the new property to be used for the residence of the assessee
for the purposes of exemption of capital gains created hardships for assessees.
This was usually due to the fact of employment or business of the assessee at a
place different from the place where such property was situated.

 

Thus, the fact that the assessee cannot
always occupy the house for his own residential purpose has been recognised
while relaxing the condition for claiming the exemption. In such a case, the
exemption cannot be denied merely because the residential house has been let
out and the tenant has used it for non-residential purpose.

 

In the case of Dilip Kumar and Co.
(TS-421-SC-2018),
it has been held that the notification conferring an
exemption should be interpreted strictly and the assessee should not be given
the benefit of ambiguity. However, the Delhi High Court, in the case of Purshottam
Dass (Supra)
, has considered this aspect. In this case, the Revenue had
also argued that the exemption provisions or exception provisions have to be
construed strictly and it should be construed against the subject in case of
ambiguity. Reliance was placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
case of Novopan India Ltd. vs. CCE JT 1994 (6) SC 80; CCE vs. Parle
Exports (P) Ltd. 1989 (1) SCC 345;
and Union of India vs. Wood
Papers Ltd. 1990 (4) SCC 246.
With regard to this contention, the High
Court held that the language with which the case at hand was concerned was
clear and unambiguous and, therefore, there was no need for seeking the intention
and going into the question whether a strict or liberal interpretation was
called for.

 

The better view is that a house, which is
otherwise a residential house by its nature, cannot cease to be a residential
house merely on the ground that it has been used for non-residential purpose,
unless it is found that the intention of the assessee was never to put that
house for residential use. This principle should equally apply while
determining the number of houses owned by the assessee as on the date of transfer
of the original asset while applying the proviso to sub-section (1) of section
54F without any exception. Two diagonally opposite views may not be taken while
interpreting the same expression ‘residential house’ used at two different
places in the same section, unless warranted by the rule of beneficial
interpretation, where two views are possible.

 

It is
interesting to see that the assessee in both the cases, in either of the
situations, has been allowed the exemption by the Tribunal, perhaps indicating
that the benefit of the exemption should not be denied by laying undue emphasis
on the approval by the authorities and the use thereof. As long as the assessee
is seen to have complied with the other conditions, the benefit under the
beneficial provisions should be granted and not denied. Accepting this would
even be the best view.

 


THE FINANCE (No. 2) ACT, 2019

THE FINANCE ACT, 2019

Mr. Piyush Goyal, the eminent chartered accountant, in his capacity as
Finance Minister presented a very bold Interim Budget of the Narendra Modi
government on 1st February, 2019. He tried to give benefits to
farmers, the poor, the unorganised sector, salaried employees and the
middle-class families. The Interim Budget was unique as it gave relief to
certain deserving persons in respect of the income tax payable by them in the
financial year beginning from 1st April, 2019. No Finance Minister
in the past has given any concession in the direct tax provisions in an Interim
Budget. With this Interim Budget, the Finance Act, 2019 was passed in February,
2019 and received the assent of the President on 21st February,
2019.

 

BENEFITS TO SALARIED EMPLOYEES AND MIDDLE
CLASS FAMILIES

While delivering
the Interim Budget, the Finance Minister stated that as per convention the main
tax proposals would be presented in the regular budget. However, he pointed out
that small taxpayers, especially the middle class, salary earners, pensioners
and senior citizens, need certainty in their minds at the beginning of the year
about their taxes. He said that while the existing rates of income tax would
continue for the financial year 2019-20, the following amendments have been
made by the Finance Act, 2019 for giving benefits to salaried employees and
middle-class families; these benefits will be available in the computation of
income and in the taxes payable on income for the financial year commencing on
1st April, 2019.

 

Salary income: In the last Budget the provision for allowing
standard deduction of Rs. 40,000 was made in place of the earlier provision for
allowance for reimbursement of medical expenses and transport allowance. This
standard deduction is now increased to Rs. 50,000 w.e.f. 1st April,
2019. This will benefit all salaried employees and pensioners.

 

House
property income:
At present an individual is
entitled to claim exemption in respect of one self-occupied house property. But
from 1st April, 2019 he will be entitled to claim exemption in
respect of two residential houses. Therefore, if an individual owns two or more
houses, which are not let out, he can claim exemption in respect of two
residential houses of his choice. In respect of houses in excess of two which
are not let out, he will have to pay tax on the basis of notional income.

 

Properties
held as stock-in-trade:
In the case of
assessees holding house properties as stock-in-trade, i.e., builders,
developers and persons dealing in real estate, the Finance Act, 2017 had
provided that such assessees would have to pay tax on the basis of notional
income of the house property which is not let out after one year from the date
of completion of construction. By an amendment of section 23(5) of the Income
tax Act, it is now provided that no tax will be payable in respect of the house
properties which are not let out for the first two years after the date
of completion of the construction.

 

Interest on
housing loans:
Section 24 of the Income-tax Act
at present provides for deduction of interest (subject to a maximum of Rs. 2
lakhs) paid in respect of one house which is claimed to be self-occupied. This
provision is now amended to provide that this limit of Rs. 2 lakhs shall apply
in respect of two houses which are claimed to be for self-use and not
let out. Considering the present level of prices of real estate, when the
benefit of exemption to self-occupied houses is extended to two houses, the
above limit of Rs. 2 lakhs for deduction of housing loans for two such houses
should have been enhanced to
Rs. 5 lakhs.

 

Exemption of
capital gains:
Section 54 of the Act provides
for exemption in respect of long-term capital gains on sale of any residential
house by an individual or HUF. This exemption is available if the assessee
sells any residential house and reinvests the capital gain in the purchase of
another residential house within two years of sale, or constructs such residential
house within three years of the sale. This section is now amended, effective
from the financial year 2019-20, to provide that if the long-term capital gain
does not exceed Rs. 2 crores the individual or HUF can purchase or construct two
houses within the prescribed time limit to claim the exemption from tax. It is
also provided that if this benefit is claimed by the individual or HUF in any
assessment year, he cannot claim a similar benefit in any other year later on.
However, if the individual or HUF subsequently sells the residential house, the
benefit u/s 54 will be available if the capital gain is invested in the
purchase or construction of one residential house during the specified period.

 

Benefit for
affordable housing projects:
At present section
80IBA provides for exemption in respect of income of the assessee who is
developing and building affordable houses. This is available if such a housing
project is approved between 1st June, 2016 and 31st
March, 2019. To encourage this activity, it is now provided that the benefit of
this exemption u/s 80IBA can be claimed if such a housing project is approved
between 1st June, 2016 and 31st March, 2020.

 

Rebate in
computing income tax:
Section 87A of the
Income-tax Act provides that if the total income of a resident individual does
not exceed Rs. 3,50,000 he shall be entitled to a deduction from tax on his
total income of Rs. 2,500, or the actual tax payable on such income, whichever
is less. This section is now amended to provide that if the total income of an
individual does not exceed Rs. 5 lakhs, he shall be entitled to rebate of Rs.
12,500, or the actual tax payable on such income, whichever is less. This
amendment is effective from the financial year 2019-20. It may be noted that
the above benefit of tax rebate is available u/s 87A only to
individuals. An HUF or AOP will not get this benefit.

 

Tax deduction
at source:
Tax is deducted at source (TDS) at
10% if the interest receivable on bank / post office deposits exceeds Rs.
10,000 in a financial year. By an amendment of section 194A of the Act, the
threshold limit for TDS on such interest is increased from Rs. 10,000 to Rs.
40,000, effective from 1st April, 2019. This will benefit small
depositors and the non-working spouse who will not suffer TDS in respect of
interest from bank / post office deposits if such interest is less than Rs.
40,000.

 

Similarly, u/s
194-I, tax is required to be deducted from rent paid by the tenant to the
specified assessee at the rate of 10% if the total rent for a financial year is
more than Rs. 1,80,000. This threshold limit has been increased to Rs. 2,40,000 from 1st April, 2019. Thus, no tax will deductible if
the yearly rent is less than Rs. 2,40,000 from 1st April, 2019.

 

THE FINANCE (No. 2) ACT, 2019

After the recent
General Elections, Ms Nirmala Sitharaman took charge as the first lady Finance
Minister of the country and presented her Budget to Parliament on 5th
July, 2019. The Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2019 was presented with the Budget and
was passed in July, 2019. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 received the assent of
the President on 1st August, 2019. Some of the important provisions
of this Act are discussed in this article. After the above Act was passed, the
President promulgated ‘The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019’ on 20th
September, 2019 to further amend the Income-tax Act and the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2019. Some of the important provisions of this Act and the Ordinance are
discussed in this article.

 

Rates of
taxes

The slab rates of
taxes for A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) for an individual, HUF, AOP, etc., are
the same as in A.Y. 2019-20. Similarly, the rates of taxes for firms,
co-operative societies and local authority for A.Y. 2020-21 are the same as in A.Y.
2019-20. However, in the case of a domestic company the rate of tax will be 25%
if the total turnover or gross receipts of the company in F.Y. 2017-18 was less
than Rs. 400 crores. In A.Y. 2019-20 the limit for total turnover or gross
receipts for this rate was Rs. 250 crores for F.Y. 2016-17. Thus, about 99% of
domestic companies will now pay tax at the rate of 25%. Other larger companies
will pay tax at the rate of 30%.

 

The existing rates of surcharge on income tax will continue to be levied
on companies, firms, co-operative societies and local authorities. However, the
rates of surcharge (S.C.) in cases of individuals, AOPs, HUFs, BOIs, trusts,
etc. (residents and non-residents) have been revised as under:

 

 

Total income

Existing rate of S.C.

Rate of S.C. for A.Y. 2020-21
(F.Y.2019-20)

1

Up to Rs. 50 lakhs

Nil

Nil

2

Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore

10%

10%

3

Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 2 crores

15%

15%

4

Rs. 2 crores to Rs. 5 crores

15%

25%

5

Rs. 5 crores and above

15%

37%

 

Thus, the
super-rich individuals, HUFs, AOPs, BOIs, Trusts, etc., will now pay more tax
if their income exceeds Rs. 2 crores. While proposing to levy this additional
surcharge on super-rich individuals and others, the Finance Minister stated in
para 127 of her Budget speech:

 

‘In view of
rising income levels, those in the highest income brackets need to contribute
more to the nation’s development. I, therefore, propose to enhance surcharge on
individuals having taxable income of Rs. 2 crores to Rs. 5 crores and Rs. 5
crores and above so that the effective tax rates for these two categories will
increase by around 3% and 7%, respectively.’

 

The impact of the above enhanced super surcharge was felt by many of the
Foreign Institutional Investors (FPI) who are assessed in the status of AOPs.
There was large-scale protest by them. In order to alleviate the tax burden in
such cases and for others who pay tax at special rates u/s 111A and 112A, the
Central government issued a press note on 24th August, 2019 announcing
that this additional super surcharge will not be payable in the following
cases… in order to give effect to this announcement, the ordinance dated 20th
September, 2019 has made the required amendments in the First Schedule to
the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019:

 

(i)    Capital gains on transfer of equity shares
in a company, redemption of units of an equity-oriented M.F. and units of a
business trust as referred to in section 111A and 112A.;

(ii)    Capital gains tax payable on derivatives
(futures and options) in the case of Foreign Institutional Investors (FPI)
which are taxable at special rates u/s 115AD;

(iii)   In the case of foreign companies there is no
change in the rates of taxes and surcharge. In the cases to which sections
92CE(2A), 115O, 115QA, 115R, 115TA or 115TD apply, the rate of S.C. will
continue to be 12%.

(iv)   The rate of health and education cess at 4%
of total tax will continue as at present.

 

Corporate
taxation

The ordinance dated
20th September, 2019 has amended certain provisions of the Income-tax
Act effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20). It is clarified in the press
note dated 20th September, 2019 that these amendments are made in
order to promote growth and investment. These amendments are as under:

 

Section 115BA This section provides for tax on income of
certain domestic companies. The taxation at the rate of 25% is at the option of
the company – if specified tax incentives are not claimed. Now, section 115BAB
has been inserted from A.Y. 2020-21 giving similar tax concession to certain
manufacturing companies. Therefore, it is now provided that where the company
exercises the option u/s 115BAB, the option exercised u/s 115BA will be
withdrawn.

 

Section
115BAA
This is a new section inserted effective
from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20). It provides that the tax payable by a
domestic company, at its option, shall be 22% plus applicable surcharge and
cess if such company satisfies the following conditions:

(a)   The Company does not claim any deduction u/s
10AA, 32(1)(iia), 32AD, 33AB, 33ABA, 35(1)(ii), (iia),(iii), 35(2AA), 35(2AB),
35AD, 35CCC, 35CCD or any of the provisions of chapter VIA under the heading ‘C
– deductions in respect of certain incomes’ excluding section 80JJAA;

(b)   The company does not claim deduction for
set-off of any carried forward loss which is attributable to deductions under
the above sections;

(c)   The company will be able to claim
depreciation u/s 32, excluding 32(1)(iia), which is determined in the
prescribed manner;

(d)   The company has to exercise the option for
the lower rate of 22% in the prescribed manner before the due date for filing
return of income u/s 139(1) relevant to A.Y. 2020-21. The option once exercised
will be valid for subsequent years. Further, the company cannot withdraw the
option once exercised in any subsequent year.

 

It may be noted
that section 115JB is also amended, effective A.Y. 2020-21, to provide that
section 115JB will not apply to a company which exercised the option under the
new section 115BAA.

 

The companies which
are engaged in trading activities, letting out of properties, rendering
services and other similar activities may find this concession in rate of tax
attractive if they are not claiming deductions under the sections stated in (a)
above.

 

Section
115BAB
This is also a new section inserted from
A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20). It provides that the tax payable by a
manufacturing domestic company, at the option of such company, shall be at the
rate of 15% plus applicable surcharge and cess if the company satisfies the
following conditions:

 

(i) The company
should be set up and registered on or after 1st October, 2019 and
should commence manufacturing on or before 31st March, 2023 and

– is not formed by
splitting up, or reconstruction, of a business already in existence. However,
this condition will not apply to reconstruction or revival of a company u/s
33B;

– it does not use
any machinery or plant previously used for any purpose.

However, this
condition will not apply to machinery or plant previously used outside India if
the conditions stated in Explanation – 1 in the section are satisfied. Further,
by Explanation 2, concession is given if the value of the old plant and
machinery used by the company does not exceed 20% of the total value of the
plant and machinery;

– The company
should not use any building previously used as a hotel or convention centre;

(ii)    The company should not be engaged in any
business other than the business of manufacture or production of any article or
thing. Further, the company has to ensure that the transactions of purchase,
sales, etc., are entered into at arm’s length prices;

(iii)   The total income of the company should be
computed without any deduction u/s 10AA, 32(1)(iia), 32AD, 33AB, 33ABA,
35(1)(2AA)(2AB)(iia)/(iii), 35AD, 35CCC, 35CCD, or under any provisions of
chapter VI A other than the provisions of section 80JJA;

(iv)   The option u/s 115BAB for concessional rate
is to be exercised in the first return to be submitted after 1st
April, 2020 before the due date u/s 139(1). This option once exercised cannot
be withdrawn.

 

It may be noted
that the provisions of section 115JB will not apply to a company which
exercises the option under this new section 115BAB. This new section will
encourage investment in new companies engaged in manufacture of goods and
articles in India.

 

TAX DEDUCTION AT SOURCE

The existing
provisions for TDS will continue. However, there are some modifications in
sections 194-A and 194-I made by the Finance Act, 2019 as discussed earlier.
Further, the following modifications and additions are made by the Finance (No.
2) Act, 2019:

 

Section 194
I-A
It provides for TDS at the rate of 1% when
payment of consideration is made at the time of purchase of immovable property.
The term ‘consideration for immovable property’ is not defined at present. This
section is now amended w.e.f. 1st September, 2019 to provide that
the consideration for immovable property will include charges in the nature of
club membership fees, car parking fees, electricity and water facility fees,
maintenance fees, advance fees or any other charges of similar nature, which
are incidental to the transfer of the immovable property. This deduction of 1%
tax will have to be made for payment made on or after 1st September, 2019.

 

Section 194M: A new section 194M has been inserted in the Income-tax Act with
effect from 1st September, 2019. At present, any individual or HUF,
not liable to tax audit, is not required to deduct tax from payments made to a
contractor, commission agent or a professional u/s 194C, 194H or 194J. It is
now provided in section 194M that if any individual or HUF makes payment for a
contract to a contractor, commission or brokerage or fees to a professional of
a sum exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs, in the aggregate in any financial year, tax at
the rate of 5% shall be deducted at source. This provision will apply even if
the payment is for personal work. The individual / HUF governed by section 194M
will not be required to obtain TAN for this purpose. The individual / HUF can
use his PAN for this purpose. This provision for TDS will come into force from
1st September, 2019 and will cover all payments made in F.Y.
2019-20.

 

Section 194N: A new section 194 N has been inserted w.e.f. 1st
September, 2019 which provides that a banking company, co-operative bank or a
post office shall deduct tax at source at 2% in respect of cash withdrawn by
any account holder from one or more accounts with the bank / post office in
excess of Rs. 1 crore in a financial year. This section does not apply to
withdrawal by any government, bank, co-operative bank, post office, banking correspondent,
white label ATM operators and such other persons as may be notified by the
Central government. This limit of Rs. 1 crore will apply to all accounts of a
person in any bank, co-operative bank or post office. Hence, if a person has
accounts in different branches of the same bank, total cash withdrawals in all
these accounts will be considered for this purpose. This TDS provision will
apply to all persons, i.e., individuals, HUFs, firms, companies, etc., engaged
in business or profession, as also to all persons maintaining bank accounts for
personal purposes. Thus, there will be no deduction of tax up to Rs. 1 crore.
This TDS provision applies on amounts drawn in excess of Rs. 1 crore in a
financial year. The provision is effective from 1st September, 2019.
Therefore, if a person has withdrawn cash of more Rs. 1 crore in the F.Y.
2019-20, tax of 2% will be deductible on or after 1st September,
2019. This provision has been made in order to discourage cash withdrawals and
promote digital economy.

 

It may be noted
that u/s 198 it is now provided that the tax deducted u/s 194N will not be
treated as income of the assessee. If the amount of this TDS is not treated as
income of the assessee, credit for this TDS amount will not be available to the
assessee u/s 199 read with Rule 37BA. If credit is not given, this will be an
additional tax burden on the assessee. It may be noted that by a press release
dated 30th August, 2019 the CBDT has clarified that if the total
cash withdrawal from one or more accounts with a bank / post office is more
than Rs. 1 crore up to 31st August, 2019, TDS will be deducted from
cash withdrawn on or after 1st September, 2019 only.

 

Section
194DA:
Section 194DA, providing for TDS in
respect of payment for life insurance policy has been amended w.e.f. 1st
September, 2019. At present the insurance company is required to deduct tax at
1% of the payment to a resident on maturity of life insurance policy if such
payment is not exempt u/s 10(10D). The present provision for TDS at 1% applies
to gross payment made by the insurance company although the assessee is
required to pay tax on the net amount after deduction of premium actually paid.
In order to mitigate the hardship, this section now provides that tax at the
rate of 5% shall be deducted at source w.e.f. 1st September, 2019,
from the net amount, i.e., actual amount paid by the insurance company on
maturity of policy after deduction of actual premium paid on the policy.

 

EXEMPTIONS AND DEDUCTIONS

Section
10(4C):
A new section 10(4C) is inserted in the
Income-tax Act after the press release dated 17th September, 2018.
Under this announcement the Central government had given exemption from tax in
respect of interest paid to a non-resident or a foreign company by an Indian
company or a business trust on Rupee-denominated bonds. Under the new section
10(4C), such interest received by the non-resident or foreign company during
the period 17th September, 2018 to 31st March, 2019 will
be exempt from tax.

 

Section
10(12A):
At present, payment from the National
Pension System Trust to an assessee on closure of his account or on opting out
of the pension scheme u/s 80CCD to the extent of 40% of the total amount
payable to him is exempt u/s 10(12A). This limit for exemption is now increased
to 60% of the amount so payable to the assessee by amendment of section 10(12A)
effective from F.Y. 2019-20.

 

Section 80C: In order to enable Central government employees to have more
options of tax savings investments u/s 80C, this section has been amended to
provide that such employees can now contribute to a specified account of the
pension scheme referred to in section 80CCD – (a) for a fixed period of not
less than three years, and (b) the contribution is in accordance with the
scheme as may be notified. For this purpose, the specified account means an
additional account referred to in section 20(3) of the Pension Fund Regulatory
and Development Authority Act, 2013.

 

Section
80CCD:
Section 80CCD(2) has been amended. The
Central government has enhanced its contribution to the account of its
employees in the National Pension Scheme (NPS) from 10% to 14% by a
notification dated 31st January, 2019. To ensure that such employees
get full deduction of this contribution, the limit of 10% in section 80CCD(2)
has been increased from F.Y. 2019-20 to 14%. For other employees the old limits
of 10% will continue.

 

Section
80EEA:
This is a new section that provides that
an individual shall be allowed deduction of interest payable up to Rs. 1,50,000
on loan taken by him from any financial institution for the purpose of
acquiring any residential house property. This deduction is subject to the
following conditions:

 

(a)   The individual is not eligible for deduction
u/s 80EE;

(b)   The loan has been sanctioned during the F.Y.
1st April, 2019 to 31st March, 2020;

(c)   The Stamp Duty Value of the residential house
does not exceed Rs. 45 lakhs;

(d)   The assessee does not own any other
residential house as on the date of sanction of the loan.

 

Once deduction of
interest is allowed under this section, deduction of the same interest shall
not be allowed under any other provisions of the Act for the same or any other
assessment year. It may be noted that the assessee will have the option to
claim deduction for interest up to Rs. 2 lakhs u/s 24(b) if he does not desire
to avail of the
above deduction.

 

Section
80EEB:
This is also a new section inserted to
encourage purchase of electric vehicles (EV) and preserve the environment. This
section provides that an individual can claim deduction for interest up to Rs.
1,50,000 payable on loan taken by him from a financial institution for purchase
of an EV. For this purpose the loan should have been sanctioned between 1st
April, 2019 and 31st March, 2023. Once a deduction of interest is
allowed under this section, no deduction for this interest will be allowable
under any other section for the same or any other assessment year. The terms
‘Electric Vehicle’ and ‘Financial Institution’ are defined in the section. It
may be noted that this deduction is allowable to an individual only and not to
any other assessee. From the wording of this section it is evident that an
individual can claim this deduction for interest even if the electric vehicle
is purchased for his personal use.

Section 80 –
IBA:
This section deals with deduction from
profits and gains from housing projects. The Finance Act, 2019 has extended the
date for approval of the project by the competent authority from 31st
March, 2019 to 31st March, 2020. However, in respect of the projects
approved on or after 1st September, 2019, some of the conditions
about the size of the project have been modified by amendment of the section as
under:

(i)    The restriction of plot area for the project
of 1,000 sq. metres which applied to only four metropolitan cities will now
apply to the cities of Bengaluru, Chennai, Delhi National Capital Region
(limited to Delhi, Noida, Greater Noida, Ghaziabad, Gurugram, Faridabad),
Hyderabad, Kolkata and the whole of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (specified
cities);

(ii)    The carpet area of a residential unit in the
housing project should not exceed…

– In specified
cities 60 sq. metres (as against 30 sq. metres at present);

– In other cities
90 sq. metres (as against 60 sq. metres at present).

(iii)   The Stamp Duty Valuation of a residential unit
in the housing project should not exceed Rs. 45 lakhs.

 

The above
amendments will benefit some affordable housing projects.

 

CHARITABLE TRUSTS

The provisions of
section 12AA deal with the procedure for granting registration and cancellation
of registration in the case of a public trust or institution claiming exemption
u/s 11. This section is now amended, effective from 1st September,
2019, to give the following additional powers to the Commissioner (CIT):

(i)    At the time of granting registration, the
CIT can call for necessary information or documents in order to satisfy himself
about the compliance of such requirements of any other law for the time being
in force by the trust or institution as are material for the purpose of
achieving its objects;

(ii)    Where a trust or institution has been
granted registration u/s 12A or 12AA, and subsequently it is noticed that the
trust or institution has violated the requirements of any other law which is
material for the purpose of achieving its objects and the order, direction or
decree, holding that such violation under the other law has become final, the
CIT can cancel the registration granted to the trust or institution.

 

It may be noted
this is a very wide power given to the CIT. To give an example, if a trust
governed by the Bombay Public Trust Act takes a loan from a trustee or a third
party, or sells its immovable property without obtaining the permission of the
Charity Commissioner as provided in the BPT Act, and the non-compliance or
delay in compliance with the provisions of the BPT Act is not condoned by the
Charity Commissioner and his order becomes final, the CIT can cancel the
registration u/s 12A/12AA. The consequence of such cancellation of registration
will be that the trust or the institution will be denied exemption u/s 11. In
addition, tax on accreted income u/s 115TD will be payable at the maximum
marginal rate.

 

It may be noted
that similar amendment is made in section 10(23C) effective from 1st
September, 2019. Therefore, all hospitals, universities, educational
institutions claiming exemption u/s 10(23C) will have to ensure that they
comply with any other law which is material for the purpose of achieving their
objects.

 

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES CENTRE

Section
47(viia b):
This section provides that any
transfer of a capital asset such as bonds, global depository receipts,
Rupee-denominated bonds of an Indian company or derivatives, made by a
non-resident through a recognised stock exchange located in the International
Financial Services Centre (IFSC) will not be treated as a transfer. In other
words no tax will be payable on
such transfer.

 

By amendment of
this section, the Central government is given power to notify similar other
securities in respect of which this exemption can be claimed. The consequential
amendment is made in section 10(4D).

 

Section 80LA: At present any unit located in an IFSC is eligible for deduction
u/s 80LA in respect of the specified business. Under the existing provision 100%
of the income of the unit from the specified business is exempt for the first
five consecutive assessment years and 50% of such income is exempt for the
subsequent five years. By amendment of this section, effective from A.Y.
2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20), it is now provided that 100% of such income will be
exempt for ten consecutive assessment years, at the option of the assessee, out
of fifteen years beginning with the assessment year in which permission or
registration is obtained under the applicable law.

 

Section 115A: This section provides for special rate of tax for a non-resident or
a foreign company having income from dividend, interest, royalty, fees for
technical services, etc. In computing total income in such cases, deduction
under chapter VIA is not allowed from the gross total income. To give benefit
of section 80LA to the eligible unit set up in the IFSC, this section is
amended to the effect that in the case of such an eligible unit, deduction u/s
80LA will be allowed against the income referred to in section 115A. This
amendment is effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20).

 

Section 115-O: Under this section dividend distribution tax
(DDT) is not applicable on dividend distributed out of current income by a unit
in the IFSC deriving income solely in convertible foreign exchange on or after
1st April, 2017. By amendment of this section, effective from 1st
September, 2019, it is now provided that DDT will not be payable even if the
dividend is distributed out of the income accumulated after 1st
April, 2017 by such a unit in the IFSC.

 

Section 115R: This section provides for levy of additional
income tax (income distribution tax) by a Mutual Fund (MF). This section is now
amended, effective from 1st September, 2019 to provide that the
above income distribution tax will not be payable if such distribution is out
of income derived from transactions made on a recognised stock exchange located
in any IFSC. For this exemption, the following conditions will have to be
satisfied:

(a)   The M.F. specified u/s 10(23D) should be
located in an IFSC;

(b)   The M.F. should derive its income solely in
convertible foreign exchange;

(c)   All units in the M.F. should be beneficially
held by non-residents.

 

Section
10(15):
This section provides for exemption of
interest income from specified sources. A new clause (ix) has been inserted,
effective from 1st September, 2019 to provide for exemption in
respect of interest received by a non-resident from a unit located in an IFSC
on monies borrowed by such unit on or after 1st September, 2019.

 

From the above
amendments it is evident that the government wants to encourage units to be set
up in IFSCs (e.g., Gifts City).

 

INCOME
FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

Section 32: At a press conference on 23rd August, 2019 the Finance
Minister announced that on vehicles purchased during the F.Y. 2019-20
depreciation will be allowed at the rate of 30% instead of 15%. For this
purpose the I.T. Rules will be amended. It is not clear from this announcement
whether this benefit will be given for only motor cars or all other vehicles
and whether it will apply to purchase of new vehicles or to purchase of second
hand vehicles also.

 

Section 43B: This section provides that deduction for certain expenditure will
be allowed in the year in which actual payment is made. This is irrespective of
the fact that liability for the expenditure is incurred in an earlier year.
This section is amended with effect from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide
that interest on any loan or borrowing taken from a deposit-taking NBFC or
systemically important non-deposit-taking NBFC will be allowable only in the
year in which the interest is actually paid. It is also provided that in
respect of F.Y. 2018-19 or any earlier year, if the deduction for such interest
is actually allowed on accrual basis, no deduction will be allowed for the same
amount in the year in which actual payment is made.

 

Section 43D: This section provides that in the case of a scheduled bank,
co-operative bank and other specified financial institutions interest on
specified bad and doubtful debts is not taxable on accrued basis but is taxable
in the year in which the same is credited to the profit and loss account. By
amendment of this section this benefit is now extended, effective from A.Y.
2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20), to deposit-taking NBFCs and systemically important non-
deposit-taking NBFCs.

 

CAPITAL GAINS

Section 50CA: At present the difference between the fair market value and actual
consideration is taxed in the hands of the assessee who transfers unquoted
shares, held as a capital asset, for inadequate consideration. The section 50CA
is now amended, effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide that this
section will not apply to any consideration received or accruing as a result of
transfer of such shares by such class of persons and subject to such conditions
as may be prescribed. The intention behind this amendment is that if the prices
of the shares are fixed by certain authority (e.g., RBI) and the assessee has
no control over fixing the price, the assessee should not suffer.

 

Section 54GB:
This section grants exemption in respect of
long-term capital gain arising from transfer of residential property if the net
consideration is invested in shares of an eligible startup company. The said
startup company has to utilise the amount so invested for purchase of certain
specified assets, subject to certain conditions. By amendment of section 54GB,
effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) some of the above conditions have
been relaxed as under:

(a)   Lock-in period of holding the new asset
(computer or computer software) by the company is now reduced from five to
three years;

(b)   Benefit of section 54GB is now extended to
transfer of residential property from 31st March, 2019 to 31st
March, 2021;

(c)   The minimum shareholding and voting power
requirement in the startup company is now reduced from 50% to 25%.

 

The wording of the
amended section suggests that the above relaxations will also apply to
investments made by an assessee in a startup company prior to 31st March,
2019.

 

Section 111A: At present short-term capital gain on transfer of Units of Fund of
Funds is not eligible for concessional rate of 15% under this section. The
section is now amended, from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide that
short-term capital gain on transfer of units of Fund of Funds will be taxable
at the concessional rate of 15% plus applicable surcharge and cess.

 

INCOME FROM OTHER SOURCES

Section
56(2)(viib):
Under this section, share premium
received from a resident by a closely-held company from issue of shares at a
consideration in excess of the fair market value is taxable in the hands of the
company as income from other sources. This is popularly referred to as ‘Angel
Tax’. At present this provision does not apply to investments by a venture
capital fund under the ‘Category I Alternative Investment Funds’. By amendment
of this provision, it is now provided, effective from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y.
2019-20) that this section will not apply to investments by Category II
Alternative Investment Funds.

 

This section
provides that the Central government can declare that the provisions of this
section shall not apply to investment by specified class or classes of persons.
By amendment of this provision it is now provided that if there is failure on
the part of the company to comply with the conditions specified in the above
notification, the company will be liable to pay the ‘Angel Tax’ as provided in
the section in the year in which there is such default. Further, the difference
between the fair market value of shares and the actual consideration received
on issue of shares will be considered as under-reported income and penalty u/s
270A will be levied on such amount.

It may be noted
that by a press release dated 22nd August, 2019 the CBDT has
clarified that the provisions of this section will not apply to startup
companies recognised by the DPIIT. CBDT has also issued a comprehensive
circular on 30th August, 2019 to clarify the assessment procedure for
such startup companies and also clarifying the circumstances when the
provisions for levy of ‘Angel Tax’ will not apply to such companies. This
indicates that the government is keen to encourage startups and may amend the
Income-tax Act to give effect to the assurances given by the Finance Minister
at the press conference on 23rd August, 2019 and at various meetings
with stakeholders.

 

Section
56(2)(x):
This section provides that any sum of
money, immovable property or specified movable assets received by an assessee
for inadequate consideration, the difference between the fair market value and
the actual consideration will be taxable in the hands of the assessee. There
are certain exceptions to this provision as listed in the fourth proviso to the
section. An amendment has been made in this proviso and item XI is added to
provide that receipt from such class of persons, and subject to such conditions
as may be prescribed, will not be taxable under this section.

 

It may be noted
that the provisions of this section are now made applicable to a non-resident.
This has been provided by amendment of section 9(1)(viii). Therefore, if a
non-resident receives any money, immovable property or specified movable
property outside India on or after 5th July, 2019 for inadequate
consideration, tax u/s 56(2)(x) will be payable by the non-resident.

 

INCOME OF A NON-RESIDENT

Section 9: Section 9 of the Act deals with income deemed to accrue or arise in
India. Under the Act, non-residents are taxable in India in respect of income
that accrues or arises (including income deemed to accrue or arise) or received
in India. At present, a gift of money or property (movable or immovable)
received by a resident is taxed in the hands of the donee, subject to certain
exceptions as provided in section 56(2)(x) of the Act. However, in the case of
a non-resident (including a foreign company) who is outside India a view is
taken that such gift is not taxable as it does not accrue or arise or is
received in India and is a capital receipt. To ensure that such gifts by a
resident to a non-resident are subject to tax u/s 56(2)(x) of the Act, section
9 has been amended w.e.f. 5th July, 2019. The amendment provides in
new clause (viii), added in section 9(1), that such income is taxable u/s
56(2)(x) under the head ‘Income from Other Sources’. Thus, any sum of money
paid or transfer of any movable or immovable property situated in India on or
after 5th July, 2019 by a resident to a person outside India shall
now be taxable. In other words, section 56(2)(x) which provides for taxation of
a gift or a deemed gift where the value of the gift exceeds Rs. 50,000 will now
apply to such gift given by a resident to a non-resident. If there is a treaty
with any country, the relevant article of the applicable DTAA shall continue to
apply for such gifts as well.

 

Some of the cases
in which the above amendment will apply are considered below:

(a)   If Mr. ‘A’ (resident) who is not a relative
of Mr. ‘B’ (non-resident), as defined in section 56(2)(vii), remits more than
Rs. 50,000 as a gift to Mr. ‘B’ in a financial year, Mr. ‘B’ will be liable to
tax on this amount.;

(b)   In the above case, if Mr. ‘A’ has sold some
shares of an Indian company to Mr. ‘B’ at a price below its market value as
provided in section 56(2)(x), Mr. ‘B’ will have to pay tax on the difference
between the market value and the sale price, if such difference is more than
Rs. 50,000;

(c)   In the above case, if Mr. ‘A’ sells any
immovable property situated in India to Mr. ‘B’ at a price which is below the
Stamp Duty Valuation and the difference between the Stamp Duty Valuation and
the sale price is more than Rs. 50,000, the said difference will be deemed to
be the income of Mr. ‘B’;

(d)   It may be noted that the above amendment is
applicable to all transfers of property made on or after 5th July,
2019. Further, the amended provisions apply in all cases of transfers of
property situated in India by a resident (including an individual, HUF, AOP,
firm, company, etc.) to a non-resident person (including individual, firm, AOP,
company, etc.). In all such cases the resident will have to deduct tax at
source u/s 195 at applicable rates.

 

BUY-BACK OF SHARES

Section
115QA:
This section provides for levy of
additional income tax at the rate of 20% plus applicable surcharge and cess of
the distributed income on account of buy-back of shares by an unlisted domestic
company. As a result of this, the consequential income in the hands of the
shareholder is exempt u/s 10(34A). This provision does not apply to buy-back of
shares by a listed company. This section as well as section 10(34A) are now
amended. The amendment provides that even in the case of buy-back of shares by
a listed company on or after 5th July, 2019, the above additional
income tax will be payable by the company. So far as the shareholder is
concerned, exemption u/s 10(34A) will be allowed. It may be noted that the
ordinance dated 20th September, 2019 provides that this provision
will not apply to a listed company which has made a public announcement for
buy-back of shares before 5th July, 2019 in accordance with SEBI
regulations.

 

CARRY FORWARD OF LOSSES

Section 79: The existing section 79 which restricts carry-forward and set-off
of losses in the case of companies where there is change in shareholding of
more than 51%, has been substituted by a new section 79. This new section is
more or less on the same lines as the existing one. The only change made by the
new section is that this section will not apply from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y.
2019-20) to a company and its subsidiary and the subsidiary of such subsidiary
in the case where the National Company Law Tribunal (NELT), on an application
by the Central government, has suspended the Board of Directors of such a
company and has appointed new directors nominated by the Central government u/s
242 of the Companies Act, 2013 and a change in shareholding has taken place in
the previous year pursuant to a resolution plan approved by NCLT u/s 242 of the
Companies Act, 2013 after affording an opportunity of hearing to the Principal
C.I.T. concerned.

 

Section
115UB:
This section provides for pass-through
of income earned by Category I and II Alternate Investment Funds (AIF), except
for business income which is taxed at AIF level. Pass-through of income (other
than profit and gains from business) has been allowed to individual investors
so as to give them the benefit of lower rate of tax, if applicable.
Pass-through of losses is not permitted and these are retained at AIF level to
be carried forward and set off in accordance with chapter VI.

 

Sections
115UB(2)(i) and (ii) have been substituted and sub-section (2A) has been
inserted from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide that the business loss of
the investment fund, if any, shall be allowed to be carried forward and it
shall be set off by it in accordance with the provisions of chapter VI and it
shall not be passed on to the unit holder. The loss other than business loss,
if any, shall be regarded as loss of the unit holders. It shall, however, be
ignored for the purposes of pass-through to its unit holders, if such loss has
arisen in respect of a unit which has not been held by the unit holder for a
period of at least 12 months.

 

The loss other than
business loss, if any, accumulated at the level of investment fund as on 31st
March, 2019 shall be deemed to be the loss of a unit holder who held the unit
on 31st March, 2019 and be allowed to be carried forward for the
remaining period calculated from the year in which the loss had occurred for
the first time, taking that year as the first year and shall be set off in
accordance with the provisions of chapter VI. The loss so deemed in the hands
of unit holders shall not be available to the investment fund.

 

FILING OF INCOME TAX RETURNS

Section 139: At present, section 139(1) provides that an individual, HUF, AOP,
BOI or Artificial Juridical Person has to file the return of income if their
total income exceeds the threshold limit without giving effect to exemptions /
deductions provided u/s 10(38), 10A, 10B, 10BA and chapter VIA. By amendment of
this section from the current financial year, in case of such assessees the
return of income will have to be filed if the total income exceeds the
threshold limit before claiming the benefit of sections 10(38), 10A, 10B, 10BA,
54, 54B, 54D, 54EC, 54F, 54G, 54GA, 54GB and chapter VIA.

 

Further, from the
A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) it will be necessary for an individual, HUF, AOP,
BOI, etc., to file the return of income although their income is below the
threshold limit in the following cases:

(i)    If the person has deposited an aggregate
amount exceeding Rs. 1 crore in one or more current accounts, with one or more
banks or co-operative banks during the year. It may be noted that this
requirement includes deposits in cash or by way of cheques, drafts, transfers
by electronic means, etc.;

(ii)    If the person has incurred expenditure
exceeding Rs. 2 lakhs on foreign travel for himself or any other person during
the year;

(iii)   If the person has incurred expenditure
exceeding Rs. 1 lakh on electricity consumption during the year; or

(iv)   If the person fulfils any
other conditions that may be prescribed.

 

Section 139A:
This section provides for allotment of PAN and
has been amended effective from 1st September, 2019 to provide as
under:

(a)   It is now provided that every person
intending to enter into any transaction, as may be prescribed, shall apply for
PAN;

(b)   Every person possessing Aadhaar number who is
required to furnish or quote his PAN which has not been allotted can furnish or
quote his Aadhaar number in lieu of PAN. He shall then be allotted a PAN in the
prescribed manner;

(c)   Every person who has been allotted PAN and
who has intimated his Aadhaar number u/s 139AA(2) can furnish or quote his
Aadhaar number in lieu of his PAN;

(d)   If a person is required to quote his PAN in
any document or transaction, as may be prescribed, he has to ensure that his
PAN or Aadhaar number is duly quoted in the document pertaining to such
transaction and authenticated in the prescribed manner;

(e)   It may be noted that in section 272, which
deals with levy of penalty for non-compliance of section 139A, consequential
amendment has been made effective from 1st September, 2019.

 

The above
amendments are made for ease of compliance and inter-changeability of PAN with
Aadhaar number effective from 1st September, 2019.

 

Section
139AA:
This section provides for linking of
Aadhaar number with PAN. The amendment in this section, effective from 1st
September, 2019, provides that if a person fails to intimate the Aadhaar
number, the PAN allotted to such person shall be made inoperative after the
date so notified in such manner as may be prescribed.

 

Section 140A: This section provides for payment of tax by way of self-assessment.
It has been amended effective from 1st April, 2007 to provide that
while calculating the amount of tax payable on self-assessment basis, any
relief of tax claimed u/s 89 can be deducted from the tax liability. Section 89
grants relief in tax payable when salary or allowances are paid to an employee
in advance. The consequential amendment is made in sections 143(1)(c), 234A,
234B and 234C. This amendment is only clarificatory.

 

Section 239: This section provides for a time limit for a person claiming refund
of tax. It has been amended with effect from 1st September, 2019.
Before the amendment, the provision was that, (a) the assessee claiming refund
of tax was required to file Form 30 prescribed by the I.T. Rules; and (b) such claim
for refund of tax could be made within one year from the last day of the
assessment year. Thus, claim for refund of tax could be made in respect of the
F.Y. ending 31st March, 2019 on or before 31st March,
2021. This time limit has now been reduced by one year and the requirement of
filing the prescribed Form No. 30 has been done away with by this amendment
from 1st September, 2019. Therefore, claim for refund of tax u/s 239
can be made by the assessee only within the time limit provided u/s 139. In other
words, claim for refund in respect of F.Y. 2018-19 will have to be made before
31st March, 2020.


MINIMUM ALTERNATE TAX (MAT)

At present, clause
(iih) of Explanation 1 below section 115JB(2) provides for book profits to be
reduced by the aggregate amount of unabsorbed depreciation and loss brought
forward in case of a company in respect of which an application for corporate
insolvency resolution process has been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority
u/s 7, 9 or 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

 

By amendment of
this section, this benefit is extended to a company and its subsidiary and the
subsidiary of such subsidiary, where the NCLT, on an application moved by the
Central government u/s 241 of the Companies Act, 2013 has suspended the Board
of Directors of such company and has appointed new directors who are nominated
by the Central government u/s 242 of the said Act. This amendment is effective
from the A.Y. 2020-2021 (F.Y. 2019-20).

 

The ordinance dated 20th September, 2019 has amended section
115JB(1) to provide that from A.Y. 2020-21, the rate of tax on book profits
will be reduced from 18.5% to 15%.

 

Section 115JB(5A)
is also amended to provide that this section will not apply to companies opting
to be taxed u/s 115BAA and 115BAB from A.Y. 2020-21.

 

TRANSFER PRICING PROVISIONS

Section 92CD: Section 92CD(3) provides that where the assessment or re-assessment
has already been completed and modified return of income has been filed by the
assessee pursuant to an Advance Pricing Agreement (APA), then the AO has to
pass the order of assessment, re-assessment or computation of total income.
This section is now amended, effective from 1st September, 2019, to
provide that the AO can pass such revised order only to the extent of modifying
the total income of the relevant assessment year in accordance with the APA.
The consequential amendment is also made in section 246A dealing with
appealable orders before CIT (Appeals).

 

Section
92CE(a):
Section 92CE(1) provides that the
assessee shall make secondary adjustment in a case where primary adjustment to
transfer price takes place as specified therein. Further, it is provided that
the said section shall not apply in cases fulfilling cumulative conditions, i.e.,
(a) where the amount of primary adjustment
made in any previous year does not exceed Rs. 1 crore; and (b) the primary
adjustment is made in respect of an assessment year commencing on or before 1st
April, 2016. Now this proviso is amended to make these two conditions
alternative. This amendment is effective from A.Y. 2018-19.

 

Section
92CE(1)(iii):
This section provides that
secondary adjustment shall be applicable where primary adjustment to transfer
price is determined by an advance pricing agreement. Now, section 92CE(1)(iii)
is amended to provide that the secondary adjustment will be applicable only
where the primary adjustment to transfer price is determined by an advance
pricing agreement entered into by the assessee u/s 92CC on or after 1st
April, 2017. Further, a new proviso after section 92CE(1) has been inserted
with effect from A.Y. 2018-19 to provide that no refund of the taxes already
paid till date under the pre-amended section shall be claimed and allowed.

 

Section
92CE(2):
This section
provides that the excess money available to the associated enterprise shall be
repatriated to India from such associated enterprise within the prescribed time
and, in case of non-repatriation, interest thereon is to be computed deeming
the excess money as advance to such associated enterprise. Now the said section
is amended to provide that the assessee shall be required to calculate interest
on the money that has not been repatriated. Further, an explanation has been
inserted to clarify that the excess money may be repatriated from any of the
associated enterprises of the assessee which is not resident in India in lieu
of the associated enterprise with which the excess money is available. This
amendment is effective from A.Y. 2018-19.

 

This section has
also been amended by insertion of new sub-sections (2A), (2B), (2C) and (2D) to
provide that where the excess money or part thereof has not been repatriated in
time, the assessee will have the option to pay additional income tax at the
rate of 18% on such excess money or part thereof. Such tax shall be in addition
to the computation of interest till the date of payment of this additional tax.
Further, if the assessee pays additional income tax, such assessee will not be
required to make secondary adjustment or compute interest from the date of
payment of such tax. Also, the deduction in respect of the amount on which
additional tax has been paid shall not be allowed under any other provision of
the Act and no credit of additional tax paid shall be allowed under any other
provision of the Act. This amendment is effective from 1st
September, 2019.

 

Section 286: This section provides for a specific reporting regime containing
revised standards for transfer pricing documentation and a template for
country-by-country reporting. Section 286(9)(a)(i) defines ‘accounting year’ to
mean a previous year in a case where the parent entity or alternate reporting
entity is resident in India. This definition is now amended effective from A.Y.
2017-18 and ‘accounting year’ in such a case will be the annual accounting
period with respect to which the parent entity of the international group
prepares its financial statements under any law of the country or territory of
which such parent entity is resident.

 

PENALTIES AND PROSECUTION

Section 270A:
This section provides for levy of penalty in a
case where a person has under-reported his income. The several cases of
under-reporting of income have been provided in section (2) of this section
which includes a case where no return of income has been furnished. In a case
where the person files his return of income for the first time in response to a
notice u/s 148, the mechanism for determining under-reporting of income and
quantum of penalty to be levied are not provided in this section. By amendment
of the section, effective from A.Y. 2017-18, it is now provided that where a
return of income has been filed for the first time in response to a notice u/s
148, if the income assessed is greater than the maximum amount which is not
chargeable to tax, then it will be considered that the assessee has
under-reported his income.

 

In such a case, the
amount of under-reported income shall be computed in the following manner:
(a)   In case of a company, firm or local
authority, the assessed income itself will be considered as under-reported
income;

(b)   In other cases, the excess of assessed income
over the maximum amount not chargeable to tax will be considered as
under-reported income.

 

Section
271DB:
This is a new section added with effect
from 1st November, 2019 which provides that if a person who is
required to provide facility for accepting payment through the prescribed
electronic modes of payment as referred to in new section 269SU, fails to
provide such facility, a penalty of Rs. 5,000 for each day of default will be
levied. This penalty can be levied only by the Joint Commissioner. No penalty
under this section will be levied if the person concerned proves that there
were good and sufficient reasons for such failure.

 

It may be noted
that new section 269SU has been added with effect from 1st November, 2019 to
provide that every person whose turnover or gross receipts in a business
exceeds Rs. 50 crores in the immediately preceding previous year shall provide
facility for accepting payment through prescribed electronic modes.

 

Section
271FAA:
This section provides for levy of a
penalty of Rs. 50,000 for default in compliance with clause (k) of section
285BA(1). Clause (K) referred to only reporting of prescribed particulars. By
amendment of this section, effective from 1st September, 2019, this
section has been made applicable to defaults in complying with reporting
requirements u/s 285BA(1)(a) to (k).

 

Section
276CC:
This section empowers prosecution in the
case of wilful default to furnish return of income within the prescribed time
limit. At present, in the case of a non-corporate assessee, prosecution cannot
be initiated if the tax payable on total income, as reduced by advance tax and
TDS, does not exceed Rs. 3,000. The amendment in this section from A.Y. 2020-21
(F.Y. 2019-20) provides that such prosecution cannot be initiated if the tax
payable on the total income assessed in a regular assessment, as reduced by
advance tax and self-assessment tax paid before the end of the assessment year
and TDS, does not exceed Rs. 10,000.

      

It appears that
raising of limit from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 10,000 is inadequate when the government
is trying to reduce litigation. This limit should have been raised to Rs. 25
lakhs.

      

It may further be
noted that by CBDT circular No. 24/2019 dated 9th September, 2019 it
has now been clarified that no prosecution u/s 276B to 276CC should ordinarily
be initiated if the amount of tax is less than Rs. 25 lakhs. In cases where the
amount of tax is less than Rs. 25 lakhs, the prosecution should be initiated
only with the prior approval of the Collegium of two CCIT / DGIT. This is a
welcome move and will result in reduction of litigation.

 

It may further be
noted that by another circular No. 25/2019 dated 9th September,
2019, the CBDT has granted further time up to 31st December, 2019
for making an application for compounding of offences under Direct Tax Laws as
a one-time measure. Normally, an application for compounding of offences can be
filed within 12 months as per the guidelines issued by CBDT. In some cases, the
assessees have not been able to make such an application. In order to reduce
litigation the CBDT, by the above circular, has granted time up to 31st December,
2019 as a one-time concession. Therefore, assessees who have not been able to
make such compounding applications till now will be able to make such
applications up to 31st December, 2019.

 

Section 201: At present section 201 provides for treating certain persons as
assessees in default for failure to deduct tax and also provides for charging
interest in such cases. From this, relaxation is provided in cases of failure
of such deduction in respect of payments, etc. made to a resident subject to
the condition that such resident payee (a) has furnished his return of income
u/s 139; (b) has taken into account such sum for computing income in such
return of income; and (c) has paid the tax due on the income declared by him in
such return of income. In such cases, it is provided that the person shall not
be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of such non-deduction of tax.

 

The above benefit
is now extended, by amendment of sections 201 and 40(a)(i), for payments made
to non-residents effective from 1st September, 2019.

 

Section
201(3):
This section provides that an order deeming
a person to be an assessee in default for failure to deduct whole or part of
the tax from a payment made to a resident shall not be made after expiry of
seven years from the end of the financial year in which payment is made or
credit is given.

 

Section 201(3) is
now amended, effective from 1st September, 2019, to provide that
such an order can be made up to:

(i)    expiry of seven years from the end of the
financial year in which payment is made or credit is given; or

(ii)    two years from the end of the financial year
in which the correction statement is delivered under proviso to section 200(3),
whichever is later.

 

OTHER AMENDMENTS

Section
2(19AA):
This section gives the definition of
‘demerger’. Section 2(19AA)(iii) provides that for such demerger, the property
and liabilities of the undertaking transferred by the demerged company to the
resulting company should be at book value. The applicable Indian Accounting
Standards (Ind AS) provides that in the case of demerger, the property and
liabilities of the demerged company should be transferred at a value different
from its book value.

 

This section has
been amended from A.Y. 2020-21 (F.Y. 2019-20) to provide that in a case where
Ind AS is applicable, the property and liabilities of the demerged company can
be recorded by the resulting company at values different from the book value.

 

Rule 68B of
Second Schedule:
At present the Rule provides
that sale of immovable property attached towards recovery shall not be made
after expiry of three  years from the end
of the financial year in which the order in consequence of which any tax,
interest, fine, penalty or any other sum becomes final.

 

The following
amendments have been made affective from 1st September, 2019 to
protect the interest of Revenue, especially to include those cases where demand
has been crystallised on conclusion of the proceedings:

(a)   Sub-rule 1 is amended to increase the time
limit for sale of attached property from a period of three years to seven
years; and

(b)   A new proviso has been inserted in the said
sub-rule so as to give powers to CBDT to extend the above period of limitation
by a further period of three years after recording the reasons in writing.

 

Section 206A: The existing section 206A dealing with submission of statement, in
the prescribed form to the prescribed authority, about Tax Deducted at Source
from payment of any income to a resident has been replaced by a new section
effective from 1st September, 2019. The new section is more or less
on the same lines as the old one with a few major modifications as under:

 

(i)  In the case of a bank or a co-operative bank
the threshold limit for submission of this statement for interest payment to
the resident will now be Rs. 40,000 instead of Rs. 10,000;

(ii) Earlier, the Central
government was authorised to issue a notification to require any other person
to submit a statement for TDS from other payments. This power is now given to
CBDT which will frame Rules for this purpose;

(iii) The persons required to submit these statements
can make corrections in the statement in the prescribed form.

 

Section
285BA:
This section provides for furnishing of statement
of financial transactions or reportable accounts by the specified persons. This
section is amended effective from 1st September, 2019, as under:

(a) At present, CBDT has power to prescribe different values for
different specified transactions. This is subject to the minimum limit of Rs.
50,000. This limit is now removed;

(b) If there is any
defect in the statement, at present it can be rectified within the specified
time provided in section 285BA(4). If this defect is not rectified by the
person concerned, it is now provided that such person has furnished inaccurate
information in the statement. This will invite penalty of Rs. 50,000 u/s
271FAA.

 

Promotion of
digital economy:
At present various sections of
the Income-tax Act encourage payment / receipts through account payee cheques,
drafts, electronic clearing systems, etc. From the current year sections 13A,
35AD, 40A, 43(1), 43CA, 44AD, 50C, 56(2) (X), 80JJA, 269SS, 269ST, 269T, etc.,
are amended to provide that in addition to the existing modes of payment /
receipt, any other electronic mode, as may be prescribed, will also be
considered permissible.

 

AMENDMENTS IN OTHER LAWS

Along with the
Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019, some of the sections of the following Acts are also
amended:

(a) The Reserve Bank
of India Act, 1934; (b) The Insurance Act, 1938; (c) The Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956; (d) The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of
Undertakings) Act, 1970 and 1980; (e) The General Insurance Business
(Nationalisation) Act, 1972; (f) The National Housing Bank Act, 1987; (g) The
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988; (h) The Securities and
Exchange Board of India Act, 1992; (i) The Central Road and Infrastructure Fund
Act, 2000; (j) The Finance Act, 2002, 2016, 2018 and The Finance (No. 2) Act,
2004; (k) The Unit Trust of India (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act,
2002; (m) The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; (n) The Payment and
Settlement System Act, 2007; and (o) The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income
and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015.

 

Finance Act,
2016:
The Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 –
Sections 187 and 191 of the Finance Act, 2016, have been amended effective from
1st June, 2016 as under:

(i) At present,
under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 there is no provision for delayed
payment of the tax, surcharge and penalty payable in respect of undisclosed
income. Further, section 191 of the Finance Act, 2016 states that any tax,
surcharge and penalty paid shall not be refunded. A proviso is now inserted in
section 187 of the Finance Act, 2016 to provide that where the tax, surcharge
and penalty has not been paid within the due date for the same, the government
may notify a class of persons who may make payment of the same within the notified
date along with interest at the rate of 1% for every month or part thereof from
the due date of payment till the date of actual payment.

(ii) Further, a proviso has been inserted to section 191 to enable the
government to notify a class of persons to whom excess tax, surcharge and
penalty paid shall be refunded.

 

TO SUM UP

From the above
analysis it is evident that Mr. Piyush Goyal, the then Finance Minister,
provided some relief to all deserving sections of the society in the Finance
Act, 2019 which was passed with the Interim Budget in February, 2019. In that
Interim Budget he had placed the vision document of the government covering ten
areas, such as building physical as well as social infrastructure, creating
digital India, making India a pollution-free nation, expanding rural
industrialisation, making our rivers and water bodies our life-supporting
assets, developing our coastlines, developing our space programmes, making
India self-sufficient in food, making India a healthy society and transforming
India into a ‘Minimum Government-Maximum Governance’ nation. He had also stated
that this would be the India of 2030. Further, there would be a proactive and
responsible bureaucracy which will be viewed as friendly to the people. If this
can be achieved, we can create an India where poverty, malnutrition and
illiteracy would be things of the past. He further stated that it is the vision
of the present government that by the year 2030 India will be a modern,
technology-driven, high growth, equitable, transparent society and a ‘Ten
Trillion Dollar Economy’. Let us hope that our present government is able to
achieve its vision.

 

The present Finance
Minister, Ms Nirmala Sitharaman, in her Budget speech has repeated the above
ten points of the vision of the government for the next decade. She has further
stated in para 10 of her Budget speech that ‘Today, we are nearing the three
trillion dollar level. So when we aspire to reach the five trillion dollar
level, many wonder if it is possible. If we can appreciate our citizens’
“purusharth” or their “goals of human pursuit” filled with their inherent
desire to progress, led by the dedicated leadership present in this House, the
target is eminently achievable’.

 

In the Finance Act,
2019 which was passed in February, 2019, some benefit was given to small
taxpayers, especially the middle class, salary earners, pensioners and senior
citizens. In the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019, several amendments have been made
in the Income-tax Act. The major amendment is in the field of surcharge on
income above Rs. 2 crores earned by all Individuals, HUFs, AOPs, Trusts, etc.
There was a lot of resistance from Foreign Institutional Investors. Considering
the issues raised by them, the Finance Minister has now announced that this super
surcharge will not be payable on capital
gains on sale of quoted shares by residents and non-residents. Further, as
promised by the government, the rate of tax for domestic companies is now
reduced to 25% where the turnover or gross receipts is less than Rs. 400
crores. This year’s Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 passed in July, 2019 is unique as
it has been amended by an Ordinance within two months – on 20th
September, 2019. It is explained that this has been done to resolve several
issues raised and opposing some of the tax proposals. Further, some of the
amendments have been made by the ordinance to encourage the corporate sector to
invest in new manufacturing activities and thus boost the economy.

 

Another important
amendment relates to TDS provisions. Now tax is required to be deducted at 5%
by an individual or HUF, who has paid more than Rs. 50 lakhs in a financial
year to a contractor, commission agent or a professional even for personal
work. Further, TDS at 2% will now be deducted by a bank if an assessee
withdraws more than Rs. 1 crore in cash in a financial year. Since this tax is
not to be deducted from any income chargeable to tax, the assessee will not get
credit for the TDS amount. This will amount to an additional tax burden on the
assessee.

 

There are several
provisions in the Act to give incentives to units situated in International
Financial Services Centres (IFSC). Incentives are also provided to attract new
units to be established in IFSCs. Similarly, incentives are also given to
startups. It is proposed that the ‘Angel Tax’ shall not be charged on startups
registered with the DPIIT. Incentives are also provided for those engaged in
construction of affordable houses.

 

Last year, section
143 of the Income-tax Act was amended authorising the government to notify a
new scheme for ‘e-assessment’ to impart greater efficiency, transparency and
accountability. Under this scheme it is proposed to eliminate the interface
between the assessing officer and the assessee, optimise utilisation of resources
and introduce a team-based assessment procedure. The Finance Minister has
stated in her Budget speech that it is proposed to launch this scheme of
‘e-assessment’ in a phased manner this year. To start with, such ‘e-assessment’
will be carried out in cases requiring verification of certain specified
transactions or discrepancies. Cases selected for scrutiny shall be allocated
to assessment units in a random manner and notices will be issued
electronically by a central cell, without disclosing the name, designation or
location of the AO. The central cell will be the single point of contact
between the taxpayer and the Department. It is stated that this new scheme of
assessment will represent a paradigm shift in the functioning of the Income tax
Department. It may be noted that the CBDT has issued a notification dated 12th
September, 2019 notifying a detailed scheme called the ‘E-Assessment Scheme,
2019’ which provides for the procedure for e-assessment u/s 143(3A). The Scheme
will come into force on a date to be notified hereafter. There is going to be
some confusion in the initial years when the new scheme is introduced. Let us
hope that this new scheme is successful.

 

With the amendments
made in several sections of the Income-tax Act by this year’s Budget, the
Income-tax Act has become more complex. The committee appointed by the
government has submitted its report to simplify the Income-tax Act. The
proposal is to replace the present six-decade-old Act by a new Direct Tax Code.
This report is not yet in the public domain. Let us hope that we get a new
simplified law during the tenure of the present government.

 

 

 

THE LATEST AMENDMENTS TO THE INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2016

ONE STEP FORWARD
AND TWO STEPS BACKWARD?

 

INTRODUCTION

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has been
one of the present government’s landmark legislations and continues to be
pursued as a mechanism to improve India’s standing in the rankings for ‘ease of
doing business’. The government has been keenly following the judicial
developments and has also been very proactive in amending the law in an attempt
to iron out any difficulties.

Recently, by a Gazette Notification dated 16th
August, 2019 bearing No. S.O. 2953(E), the provisions of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Amendment Act) were brought into force.
This Amendment Act, in principle, is touted to be an outcome of the decision
passed on 4th July, 2019 by the National Company Law Appellate
Tribunal (NCLAT) in the case of Standard Chartered Bank vs. Satish Kumar
Gupta, R.P. of Essar Steel Ltd.
1
and amends the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) on certain vital issues.

 

THE ESSAR STEEL CASE

The Essar Steel case related to the
insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings of Essar Steel India Limited (ESIL) which
were initiated on the basis of an application filed by the State Bank of India
and Standard Chartered Bank under the provisions of section 7 of the IBC before
the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Ahmedabad. These proceedings were
amongst the first few insolvency proceedings initiated pursuant to the RBI
press release2  directing
banks to take action against 12 large companies that had defaulted on their
repayment obligations. The matter has had a chequered history and has been heavily
contested by various parties.

Initially, the litigation before the NCLT
was related to two resolution applicants, ArcelorMittal India Pvt. Ltd. (AMIPL)
and Numetal Limited (Numetal) submitting their respective resolution plans.

The Resolution Professional, however, found
both AMIPL and Numetal ineligible to be resolution applicants in view of the
amendments brought about by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act,
2017 and in particular the enactment of section 29A to the IBC which deals with
disqualification of applicants.

____________________________________

1   Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 242 of 2019

2   
https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=40743

 

While considering the challenge, the NCLT
remanded the matter back to the Committee of Creditors (COC) of ESIL, with
directions that the comments of the Resolution Professional on the eligibility
of the resolution applicants be placed before the COC and the COC should
consider the resolution plans submitted by the resolution applicants.


This decision of the NCLT was challenged
before the NCLAT. However, while the appeals were pending, the COC rejected the
proposals of both the resolution applicants, i.e., Numetal and AMIPL.
Eventually, when the appeals were finally heard by NCLAT, it found Numetal to
be an eligible resolution applicant as Numetal’s shareholder, Aurora
Enterprises Limited (which was a related party and hence violative of section
29A) had divested from Numetal. The NCLAT directed the COC to consider the
resolution plan of Numetal. However, insofar as the eligibility of AMIPL was
concerned, the NCLAT permitted its resolution plan to be considered by the COC
subject to it paying the outstanding dues and interest of KSS Petron Pvt. Ltd.
and Uttam Galva Steels Limited (both of which were alleged to be related
parties of AIMPL and hence affected by the provisions of section 29A). Both
Numetal and AMIPL approached the Supreme Court of India challenging the order
passed by the NCLAT.

 

The Supreme Court, vide its judgement of 4th
October, 20183 , while dealing with the challenges to section 29A of
the IBC, held that both the resolution applicants, AMIPL and Numetal, were in
breach of provisions of section 29A; however, exercising its powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, it agreed to once again permit the
resolution applicants to pay the debts of their respective related corporate
debtors and submit the resolution plans for consideration by the COC.
Subsequently, only AMIPL paid the debts of its related corporate debtors and
the resolution plan submitted by it was considered and ultimately approved by
the COC.

______________________________________

3   Civil Appeal Nos. 9402-9405 of 2018 in
ArcelorMittal India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and others

 

The second phase of litigation started
subsequent to approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority
where the plan submitted by AMIPL was approved with certain modifications. The
order passed by the Adjudicating Authority was challenged before the NCLAT4
by various stakeholders, including the promoter, secured creditors as well as
the operational creditors and the COC. The NCLAT dismissed the challenge to the
resolution plan but in the process laid down principles which are arguably
against well-settled banking principles and distribution of assets.

 

The NCLAT held that the COC is not empowered
to decide the manner in which the distribution of the resolution proceeds is
required to be made between one or other creditors as the same is within the
exclusive domain of the resolution applicant and, if found discriminatory by
the NCLT, the resolution plan could be rejected. It further laid down that the
COC is merely required to see the viability and feasibility of the resolution
plan apart from the other requirements and ineligibility of the resolution
applicant but not the distribution of the proceeds.

 

It also held that that under the IBC there
was no distinction between secured and unsecured financial creditors and the
IBC only had a homogenous class of financial creditors. Further, it also stated
that the provisions of section 53 of the IBC will not apply to distribution of
amounts amongst stakeholders as proposed by the resolution applicant in the
resolution plan. Finally, NCLAT observed that in cases where the NCLT is unable
to decide the claim on merit, the parties can raise the issue before the
appropriate forum in terms of section 60(6) of the IBC, whereas financial and
operational creditors whose claims have been decided by the Adjudicating
Authority or by NCLAT, such decision being final, is binding on such financial
and operational creditors. Their total claims will be considered to have been
satisfied.

 

In addition to the above, NCLAT also held
that the claims of financial creditors who were beneficiaries of a guarantee
will stand satisfied to the extent of the guarantee and the comparative amount
of the guarantee cannot be claimed from the principal borrower.

______________

4   Supra at 3

 

CONCERNS
ARISING SUBSEQUENT TO THE NCLAT DECISION IN STANDARD CHARTERED BANK VS. SATISH
KUMAR GUPTA, R.P. OF ESSAR STEEL LTD.5

By laying down that the COC was not required
to look into the distribution of the proceeds but merely the viability and
feasibility of the resolution plan, the NCLAT has ruled contrary to the report
of the Banking Law Reforms Committee of November, 2015 wherein primacy has been
given to the COC to evaluate the various possibilities and take a decision. In
the words of the Banking Law Reforms Committee, ‘the appropriate disposition
of a defaulting firm is a business decision, and only the creditors should make
it’.

 

Fittingly, the Supreme Court in K.
Shashidhar vs. Indian Overseas Bank
6 held that the
commercial and business decisions of the financial creditors are not open to
any judicial review by the Adjudicating Authority or the appellate authority.
Largely, prior to the NCLAT decision in Essar Steel’s case, it was settled that
COC will be the imprimatur (meaning authoritative approval) that will
guide the resolution process. This, perhaps, also explains the purposive
distinction between financial and operational creditors and the consequential
waterfall mechanism under the IBC. However, by significantly taking away the
power to decide the distribution of the proceeds, the NCLAT had left the door
wide open for more companies seeing liquidation proceedings as opposed to
insolvency and resolution.

 

Another fundamental distinction made by the
NCLAT in Essar Steel’s case was where it has refused to recognise the
difference between secured and unsecured financial creditors and decided to
treat both at par. This has created grave difficulties for secured creditors
where insolvency proceedings are pending and which are yet to commence. As a
result, this would also cause the cost of borrowing to go up significantly. An
equally important point to note would be that on the kicking in of the
moratorium period, the rights of secured creditors would get immediately
impacted, and now, with this ruling, secured creditors would expect little in
the resolution process. It would, therefore, not be completely incorrect to
conclude that more secured creditors may prefer to opt for liquidation as opposed
to resolution, as under liquidation at least the sanctity of those secured
creditors that chose to realise the security would be maintained.
Interestingly, even u/s 31B of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993, primacy has been given to provisions of the IBC while
recognising the supremacy of secured creditors.

__________________________________

5   Supra at 3

6 
Civil Appeal No. 10673 of 2018 decided on 5th February, 2019

 

Another can of worms had also been opened
when the NCLAT held that provisions of section 53 of IBC do not apply to the
distribution of amounts received under a resolution plan but only apply in the
event of actual liquidation. This not only does violence to the language of the
statute, but is also a far cry from the well-established principles of law.
Even otherwise, operationally, this would lead to most COCs voting in favour of
liquidation as opposed to resolution, given that liquidation would recognise their
rights to realise security. Effectively, ‘maximisation of value’ through
resolution would arguably have become ‘liquidation’ value.

 

Given the flutter created by the judgement
in Essar Steel’s case, the government took prompt steps by amending the IBC.
Just how quick the reaction was is borne out from the fact that the judgement
in Essar Steel was passed on 4th July, 2019 and the Amendment Act
was passed on 24th July, 2019 and after receiving the President’s
Assent on 5th August, 2019 it was brought into force with effect
from 16th August, 2019.

 

Significantly, the NCLAT decision in the
Essar Steel matter has been challenged by the COC forthwith before the Supreme
Court7 and the same is pending further adjudication. It is yet to be
seen exactly how the same will play out, given that the Amendment Act is now in
force.

 

KEY
AMENDMENTS UNDER THE AMENDMENT ACT

Some of the key amendments brought about by
the Amendment Act are discussed below:

 

Amendment to section 7(4) of IBC

The Amendment Act has amended section 7(4)
of the IBC to make it necessary for the Adjudicating Authority to record
reasons if, in the case of a financial creditor application, it has not
ascertained the existence of default and passed the order within a period of 14
days. This amendment effectively recognises
the principle set out in the NCLAT decision in JK Jute Mills Company
Limited vs. Surendra Trading Company
8
where the NCLAT, while considering
whether the timelines under the IBC were mandatory for rectifying the defects
in an insolvency application, held that the timeline of seven days was
mandatory but the timeline of 14 days to decide on admission of the application
was directory. The NCLAT stated that reasons may be recorded where the
insolvency application is not disposed of within the time specified under the
IBC. Whilst the NCLAT made it discretionary to record reasons, the Amendment
Act makes it mandatory to record reasons.

____________________________

7   Civil Appeal (Diary Nos.) 24417 of 2019

 

 

 

Amendment to section 12 of IBC

A significant change brought about by the
Amendment Act is the mandatory timeline introduced for the completion of the
corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) by inserting a proviso to
section 12(3) of the IBC. The Amendment Act states that the CIRP shall
mandatorily be completed within a period of 330 days from the insolvency
commencement date, i.e., the date of admission, and shall be inclusive of
extensions granted and the time taken in legal proceedings in relation to the
resolution process of the corporate debtor. Where CIRP is at present pending,
the Amendment Act has made it mandatory for the CIRP to be completed within a
period of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, i.e., 16th
August, 2019.

__________________________________________

8   Company Appeal (AT) No. 09 of 2017 decided on
1st May, 2017. The NCLAT decision was challenged in the Supreme
Court in Civil Appeal No. 8400 of 2017 where the Supreme Court held that the
time to remove the defects from an insolvency application was not mandatory but
directory, but sufficient cause is required to be shown for the delay in
removing the defects

 

 

From the
changes made in the Amendment Act, this amendment seems to be the most
noteworthy and will have an immediate impact on all CIRPs, pending as well as
those admitted to insolvency. The timeline of 330 days, at first blush, seems
salutary, but given the mandatory nature of the amendment, appears difficult to
achieve in practice.

 

First, the 330-day period is inclusive of
all time taken in litigation in relation to the resolution process, which seems
difficult to achieve given the pendency of cases as well as delays in the
judicial system. Moreover, judicial primacy has already been bestowed to
exclude the time during which applications and appeals are pending before the
Adjudicating Authority and the appellate authority, keeping firmly in mind the
established principle, Actus curiae neminemgravabit – the act of the Court
shall harm no man
and, to quote the Supreme Court9 , ‘This is
only to say that in the event of the NCLT, or the NCLAT, or this Court taking
time to decide an application beyond the period of 270days, the time taken in
legal proceedings to decide the matter cannot possibly be excluded, as
otherwise a good resolution plan may have to be shelved, resulting in corporate
death and the consequent displacement of employees and workers.’

 

The NCLAT in the case of Quinn
Logistics India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Mack Soft Tech Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
10
has enumerated several other instances beyond the control of the parties, other
than pending litigation, which could also delay the CIRP. Instances are also
seen where the suspended board of directors and personnel of the corporate
debtor have not co-operated with the interim resolution professional leading to
delay in formal commencement of the insolvency resolution process. Second, this
amendment makes the extension period granted for the CIRP exclusive. This,
along with the mandatory language of the amendment, would suggest that in the
event the CIRP is not completed within the period of 330 days, there would be
no other option before the Adjudicating Authority but to remit the corporate
debtor to liquidation under the provisions of section 33 of the IBC.
Threateningly, this has been the outcome in the case of S.N. Plumbing
Limited
11 where the resolution plan was not
approved within the period of 270 days under the then prevailing provisions of
the IBC, and the NCLAT held that the COC ceased to have any authority after 270
days, resulting in the Adjudicating Authority being mandatorily required to
pass an order for liquidation. Needless to say, this would be against the
spirit of the IBC which has fostered the idea to maximise valuation and save the
debtor from corporate death. Additionally, a one-size-fits-all approach may not
work where a CIRP for companies as large as Essar Steel India Limited having a
resolution plan worth more than Rs. 40,000 crores is being deliberated upon.

________________________________________

9   Supra at 5 – This decision was prior to the
Amendment Act, where the time period allowed under the IB Code was 270 days
inclusive of extension of 90 days

10  Decision
dated 8th May, 2018 in Company Appeal (AT) Insolvency No. 185 of 2018

 

Amendment to section 30 of IBC

Another key change has been made by amending
the provisions of section 30 of the IBC. This change has primarily been brought
about in view of the NCLAT decision in Essar Steel’s case. Essar Steel’s case
stated that it would be impermissible for a resolution applicant to
discriminate between various classes of creditors, such as secured and
unsecured creditors. This led to a position where, even though certain
creditors had security, they would recover only such amounts as would an
unsecured creditor. This was widely criticised.

 

The amendment to section 30 now provides
that a resolution plan should at the very least provide for payments to
operational creditors, which shall be the higher of the amount that would be
paid to the operational creditor u/s 53 of the IBC on liquidation of the
corporate debtor, or the amount that would be paid to the operational creditor,
if the corporate debtor was wound up and the resolution proceeds were
distributed in accordance with the waterfall set out in section 53(1). The
amendment further provides that the resolution plan should provide for the
payment to financial creditors who do not vote in favour of the resolution plan
and that such payment shall not be less than the amount such creditor would
receive u/s 53 if the corporate debtor was being liquidated. As would be
apparent, this change has been brought about to emphasise that the distribution
of resolution proceeds shall only be in accordance with the statutory waterfall
provided u/s 53 of the IBC and to negate the anomaly created in view of the
NCLAT’s decision in the Essar Steel case. This, therefore, clarifies that
different classes of creditors may continue to be treated differently and the
interest of a secured creditor would take priority over that of an unsecured
one.

____________________________________________

11  NCLAT decision in Sanjay Kumar Ruia vs.
Catholic Syrian Bank Limited
decided on 3rd January, 2019

 

 

Under section 53, the priority of claims
would be for claims of insolvency resolution professional costs, workmen’s
dues, claims of secured creditor where such secured creditor has relinquished
his security and is standing in line with the other creditors, wages of
employees, financial debts of unsecured creditors, government dues, unsecured
debts of secured creditors after adjusting the security value that they have
realised on enforcing the security. This means that only after the above claims
have been satisfied, the claims of operational creditors are given their due.
This is also the reason why operational creditors are normally given a nil
value or only Re. 1 as the resolution applicants are uncertain whether any
value will remain subsequent to settling the prior claims.

 

Section 30 has also been amended with an explanation
to state that the distribution of the resolution proceeds in accordance with
section 30 shall be fair and equitable. This change, in the view of the
authors, has been brought about in order to cease and desist operational
creditors or unsecured financial creditors from claiming that the resolution
plan is unfair, inequitable and discriminatory.

 

As an example, if a corporate debtor has
overall creditors of say Rs. 1,000 crores (Rs. 500 crores secured and remaining
unsecured), is undergoing insolvency and has a liquidation value of about Rs.
300 crores, the code mandates that a resolution applicant pay the creditors a
minimum of Rs. 300 crores. Further, the distribution of the Rs. 300 crores must
be in a manner so that they pay each class of creditors more money than they
would have got if the corporate debtor is wound up and money received is
distributed as per the waterfall set out in section 53 of the Code. Based on
Essar Steel’s judgement, distribution of amounts received from a resolution
applicant (Rs. 300 crores) would have to be paid proportionately to all
creditors for it to be approved (irrespective of their place in the waterfall
set out in section 53). Interestingly, in a recent judgement12, the
NCLAT has considered the amended provisions of section 30 of the IBC and has
held that creditors falling under the same class cannot be treated differently,
even if they have a dissenting vote. The basis of the judgement seems to be
that even though provisions of section 30 have been amended, the provisions of
regulation 38 of the CIRP regulations have not been amended. Thus, the CIRP
regulations do not permit a successful resolution applicant to discriminate
between similarly situated ‘secured financial creditors’ on the ground of
dissenting vote.

__________________________________

12  Company Appeal (AT) Insolvency No. 745 of 2018
decided on 17th September, 2019 – Hero Fincorp Ltd. vs. Rave
Scans Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

 

 

Another explanation added to section 30
clarifies that on and from the commencement date of the Amendment Act, i.e., on
and from 16th August, 2019, the amended provisions of section 30
will also apply (a) where the resolution plan is pending approval or has not
been rejected by the Adjudicating Authority, (b) where an appeal has been preferred
either before the NCLAT or the Supreme Court, or (c) where a legal proceeding
has been initiated in any court against the decision of the Adjudicating
Authority in respect of the resolution plan.

 

Yet another amendment that has been brought
to section 30 in view of the NCLAT’s decision in Essar Steel’s case is that the
COC is required to consider not just the ‘feasibility and viability’ of the
resolution plan but also ‘the manner of distribution proposed, which may take
into account the order of priority amongst creditors as laid down in section
53(1) of the IBC including the priority and value of the security interest of a
secured creditor’. A bare reading of this change will make it abundantly clear
that this has been brought about only to address the Essar Steel case.

 

By virtue of these changes and the
applicability of the amendments to section 30 even to those resolution plans
where appeals are pending before the NCLAT and the Supreme Court, it is clear
that these amendments may change the eventual distribution of the resolution
proceeds in the Essar Steel case.

 

OTHER
AMENDMENTS UNDER THE AMENDMENT ACT

Amendment to section 5(26) of IBC

Section 5(26) of the IBC has been amended to
clarify that the resolution plan may include provisions for restructuring,
including by way of merger, amalgamation and demerger. By permitting
restructuring under a resolution plan, the IBC has provided for greater
flexibility in the potential revival of a corporate debtor which is in
furtherance of the objective of the IBC. By providing even for merger,
amalgamation and demerger as potential options in a resolution plan, the
Amendment Act has effectively borrowed the principle as laid out in the NCLAT
decision in S.C. Sekaran vs. Amit Gupta & Ors.13
wherein it directed the liquidator to take steps u/s 230 of the
Companies Act, 2013 and only if there is a failure of revival, should the
liquidator then proceed with the sale of the company’s assets wholly, and if
that is not possible, then to sell the company in part and in accordance with
law.

_______________________________

13  Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 495 &
496 of 2018 decided on 29th January, 2019

 

 

Amendment to section 25A(3) of IBC

The Amendment Act has substituted the
provisions of section 25A(3) with the addition of section 3A which provides
that the authorised representative under 21(6A), i.e., the authorised
representative for security and deposit holders (viz., debenture / bond holders
and fixed deposit holders) as well as real estate allottees shall vote at COC
meetings in accordance with a majority decision, i.e., 50.01% or more of the
financial creditors he represents. Additionally, the amendment also states that
where the decision is in respect of section 12A, i.e., withdrawal of the
insolvency application, the authorised representative shall vote in accordance
with section 25(3) only, i.e., in accordance with the instructions received
from each financial creditor, to the extent of such financial creditor’s voting
share.

 

This amendment will further enhance the
objective to complete the insolvency resolution process in 330 days where large
insolvencies involving home buyers and investors holding security receipts are
concerned.

 

Amendment to section 31(1) of IBC

Amendment to section 31(1) has crystallised
that once the resolution plan has been approved by the Adjudicating Authority,
the same shall be binding on all and sundry. The Amendment Act has specifically
included Central government, state government and local authority to whom
statutory dues are pending in the list of stakeholders on whom the resolution
plan shall be binding.

 

As much as this is a much-celebrated
amendment as it will lead to increased resolution applicant interest and
confidence to bid by staving regulatory litigation, it could also lead to
situations where companies being in significant statutory debt could avoid
prosecution by simply knocking on the doors of the NCLT.

 

Amendment to section 33(2) of IBC

Provisions for initiation of liquidation as
provided u/s 33 have been amended to statutorily recognise the supremacy of the
COC to decide on the insolvency process of the corporate debtor. The amendment
provides that the COC may take a decision to liquidate the corporate debtor at any
time after the constitution of the COC but before confirmation of the
resolution plan, including before preparation of the information memorandum.

 

As argued earlier, this again recognises
that, after all, it is the COC which is the best judge on taking commercial
decisions, including as to whether or not revival of the corporate debtor is
possible. If the COC views that resolution is unlikely or not possible, it can
now kick-start the process of liquidation immediately and save time. Even
before the principle of COC supremacy was recognised by the Supreme Court in K.
Shashidhar
14, the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai in
the case of Gupta Coal India Private Limited15
recognised the supremacy of the COC and permitted liquidation of the corporate
debtor where it rejected the resolution plan and decided to go for liquidation.
The National Company Law Tribunal held that it could not go against the
decision of the COC.

 

CONCLUSION

The Amendment Act, in part, is a step in the
right direction where it has recast the efficacy of the resolution process by
recognising the COC’s supremacy and commercial wisdom in deciding not only on
the feasibility and viability of the resolution plan but also the distribution
of the resolution proceeds. Another laurel of the Amendment Act is that it has
statutorily recognised the applicability of the waterfall mechanism u/s 53 of
the IBC regarding liquidation proceedings to even insolvency proceedings. However,
despite these advantages the amendment to section 12 where the 330-day deadline
has been introduced as a hard stop may be impractical and risks more companies
undergoing liquidation rather than resolution. The government must naturally
look to augment the number of NCLT benches and improve the infrastructure.
There is also a need for improved training being given to stakeholders like
resolution professionals and COC members who play a crucial role in the
process.

 

Much like amendments to various economic
legislations being tested on constitutional principles, even the provisions of
the Amendment Act are now subject to the constitutional challenge in the case
of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar
Gupta & Anr.
16. It now remains to be seen whether the
changes proposed would have the necessary effect on the corporate insolvency
resolution process and yield the desired results.

_________________________________

14
Supra at 8

15
Decisionin MA 524 in Company Petition No.
31 of 2017 rendered on 1st January, 2018

16 Order dated 7th August, 2019
passed in Civil Appeal (Diary Nos.) 24417 of 2019

 

 

 

ADDITIONAL GROUND IN APPEAL: WHEN PERMISSIBLE?

INTRODUCTION

Under tax
laws, remedies are provided against orders passed by lower authorities.
Normally, the remedy is either rectification or appeal. While rectification has
a limited scope because it is restricted to correction of apparent mistakes,
appeal has a very wide scope and is a useful right with the assessee. An
aggrieved assessee can file an appeal to the designated higher authority
against unfavourable order/s. Normally, there is also a scheme for filing a
second appeal before the Tribunal or such higher authorities as may be
prescribed.

 

However,
it may be noted that the rights to appeal are subject to certain conditions.
Generally, there are appeal forms which are to be filled up and in the same the
grounds about the issues raised in appeal are required to be mentioned. It is
expected that the assessee will take proper care while raising the grounds of
appeal. Under fiscal laws, the grounds can be amended or new grounds can be
added in the course of an appeal. If the matter is in first appeal, then the modification
/ addition of the grounds is normally not objected to. However, if the appeal
is before the Tribunal and if any new ground is to be raised, then the issue is
not that simple. The power of the Tribunal to allow the additional ground is
discretionary and it may allow it subject to its satisfaction.

 

RECENT CASE LAW

Recently, the Hon. Bombay High Court had occasion to deal with such an
issue in the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. the
Commissioner of Sales Tax (68 GSTR 58) (Bom.)
under the BST Act. The
factual position involved is narrated by the High Court in the following words:

 

…..

‘7.   When all the aforementioned four second
appeals were fixed for hearing, the applicant sought permission to raise an
additional ground relating to levy of sales tax on the surrender of Exim
Scrips. This additional ground was with reference to the second appeals that
were filed pertaining to the F.Y. 1995-96. The additional ground sought to be
raised was thus:

 

“That the
lower authorities have erred in levying sales tax on surrender of Exim Scrip
and therefore such levy be set aside in view of the judgement of the Hon’ble
Tribunal in the case of M/s Agra Engineering Works (Second Appeal No. 185
of 1997, dated 30/4/2002).

 

8.    It was submitted on behalf of the applicant
that since this is a pure question of law, it could be raised at any time in
the appeal proceedings and therefore the said additional ground be allowed to
be raised before the MSTT.

 

9.    This was however vehemently opposed by the Revenue.
It was pointed out that this ground was never taken up either in the first
appellate proceedings or even in the grounds before the MSTT.

 

According
to the Revenue, the adjudication on this ground involved verification of the
relevant documents and therefore the said ground could not be allowed at such a
late stage of the proceedings.

 

10. Hearing the parties on this preliminary issue,
the MSTT opined that the applicant had not given any details of the particular
transactions, the levy in respect of which was now disputed through the
additional ground. It recorded that the assessment order for the period 1995-96
was also silent as regards whether any such transactions had been assessed to
tax. It was also not clear as to whether the transaction, if any, in respect of
the Exim Scrips constituted any surrender or sale. Having regard to these
facts, the MSTT agreed with the Revenue that adjudication in the context of
this ground would involve verification of relevant evidence so as to ascertain
the true nature of the transactions and therefore there was no case made out to
allow this additional ground to be raised at such a late stage. The MSTT
therefore declined to entertain the additional ground. Question (I) reproduced
by us earlier arises from this additional ground.’

…..

 

The above
matter came before the High Court by way of Sales Tax Reference. Long-drawn
arguments were made before the Court from both the sides. So far as the
assessee was concerned, it was submitted that the Tribunal is the last fact-finding
authority, and therefore it should have allowed the additional ground. It was
further submitted that the appellate powers under the BST Act are wide enough
to allow additional ground and even if additional evidence was required, still,
it could have been allowed.

 

Per contra,
on behalf of Revenue it was submitted that the additional ground sought to be
raised was not purely a question of law but was a mixed question of fact and
law and accordingly it was submitted that the rejection is justified.

 

The High
Court thereafter referred to the discussion by the Tribunal on the above ground
and came to a conclusion as follows:

 

…..

‘19.       As
can be seen from the aforesaid paragraphs, the MSTT (third Bench) on a
consideration of all the relevant facts had taken a conscious decision not to
entertain the additional ground relating to levy of tax on the transactions of
Exim Scrips. Thereafter, the fourth Bench of the MSTT itself examined the files
for the relevant financial years. It perused the files submitted by the
applicant in the assessment proceedings which contain statements of sales /
purchase, declarations and other relevant documents like transport receipts,
sales bills, etc. On going through all these files, the fourth Bench of the
MSTT opined that they did not contain any documents to conclusively show that
the Exim Scrips were surrendered to the Government of India or the designated
bank. On the contrary, in the statements of sales, the said transactions of
Exim Scrips have been specifically shown to be “Exim Scrips sold.”

 

Even in
the assessment order, the transactions were categorically mentioned to be
“sale” of Exim Scrips. After examining all this material, the MSTT opined (in
the referral order) that it was beyond any doubt that the assessment records
did not contain any document to conclusively show that the impugned
transactions constituted surrender of Exim Scrips and which was the additional
ground that was sought to be raised by the applicant. In this view of the
matter, it was absolutely clear that the adjudication on the said point before
the MSTT would have certainly involved perusal, verification and appreciation
of additional evidence and that is why the MSTT declined to adjudicate the said
issue. This was for the simple reason that no material on this additional
ground was ever produced. Over and above this, the MSTT in paragraph 21
(reproduced above) also examined certain documents which the applicant had
claimed to have submitted in the assessment proceedings. On examining the documents
mentioned in paragraph 21, the MSTT found that, in fact, at least part of the
Exim Scrips were admittedly sold by the applicant to one M/s Agrawal Traders of
Bombay.

 

As far as
the contention of the applicant regarding surrender of Exim Scrips is concerned,
the MSTT opined that the documents submitted by the applicant in relation to
certain cheque receipt entries in support of the receipt of cheques from the
Joint DGFT, the MSTT was of the opinion that merely on the basis of these
documents, the claim of the applicant that the Exim Scrips were surrendered to
the Government could not have been legally allowable unless the other
supporting documents relating to the particular transactions were produced,
verified and appreciated. To put it in a nutshell, the MSTT was of the view
that the relevant documents available on record were not sufficient for
adjudication of the additional ground that was sought to be canvassed by the
applicant. It would have certainly required leading of additional evidence.

 

20. We find that the applicant never made any
application for leading any additional evidence to substantiate its claim that
the Exim Scrips were in fact surrendered to the Government and were not sold.
In fact, in the order of MSTT dated 8th December, 2006 it was
specifically contended by the applicant that since the additional ground is a
pure question of law it could be raised at any time in the appeal proceedings
and therefore the MSTT ought to have entertained the additional ground. Having
found that the additional ground was not a pure question of law but required
additional documents and evidence which needed to be verified, produced and
appreciated, we do not think that the MSTT was unjustified in not entertaining
the additional ground regarding surrender of Exim Scrips. If the applicant did
not bring any material before the MSTT to substantiate its claim that it had
surrendered the Exim Scrips to the Government and therefore was not exigible to
tax, the MSTT necessarily could not have entertained the aforesaid ground as
there was no material brought on record to render a finding thereon.

 

In these
circumstances and peculiar to the facts of this case, we find that the MSTT was
legally justified in not adjudicating on the point regarding levy of tax on Exim
Scrips. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in answering Question (I)
in the affirmative and against the applicant and in favour of the Revenue.’

…..

 

Thus, the rejection is justified by the High Court. From the above
observation it can be seen that if the additional ground is about a law point,
then allowability of the same is normal. However, if the issue involves factual
position, then it becomes discretionary and may require more persuasion.

 

CONCLUSION

Though the
above judgement is under the BST Act, the ratio will apply to other fiscal laws
also where the assessee wants to raise additional grounds before the appellate
authority. Amongst others, while trying to raise additional grounds it is
expected that the assessee will give all relevant material that is ready to
convince the appellate authority to allow the additional ground. Normally, care
should be taken to take the grounds with the appeal itself, but if at all a
situation arises for raising additional ground, then the assessee should take
more care to submit the relevant supporting ground along with the application.
The above judgement will be a useful guidance for future.
 

Non-resident shareholder liable to capital gains tax on transfer of Indian company shares pursuant to conversion of the Indian company into an LLP under the LLP Act – The value of partnership interest as represented by capital as well as reserves and surplus is the full value of consideration for computation of capital gains on transfer of shares — Value of partnership interest is not same as cost of investment in shares

4. Domino
Printing Science Plc.
AAR No.: 1290
of 2012
A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order:
23rd August, 2019

 

Non-resident shareholder liable to capital gains tax on transfer of
Indian company shares pursuant to conversion of the Indian company into an LLP
under the LLP Act – The value of partnership interest as represented by capital
as well as reserves and surplus is the full value of consideration for
computation of capital gains on transfer of shares — Value of partnership
interest is not same as cost of investment in shares

 

FACTS

The applicant, a tax resident of the UK, was 100% shareholder of an
Indian company ICo. During the relevant year and in accordance with the LLP
Act, ICo was converted into an LLP. Consequently, the shareholding of the
applicant in ICo was transformed into a partnership interest in the LLP.

 

The Applicant filed an application before the Authority for Advance
Ruling (AAR) with respect to the aforesaid conversion and raised the following
questions:

(i) Whether conversion of equity shares held by the applicant in ICo
into partnership interest in the LLP, consequent to the conversion of the ICo
into an LLP, would be regarded as a ‘transfer’ under the Act?

(ii) Whether the computation provisions of the Act are capable of being
applied to such transfer?

(iii) Whether the transaction can give rise to any taxable capital gains
in the hands of the applicant when the value for the partnership interest in
the LLP was the same as the value of the applicant’s interest in ICo?

 

HELD

On whether conversion would be regarded as a ‘transfer’ of a capital
asset:

 

(a) The definition of transfer u/s 2(47) of the Act is inclusive and,
therefore, extends to events and transactions which may not otherwise be
‘transfer’ according to the ordinary, popular and natural sense of the term. The
Act also clarifies that transfer includes parting of any asset or any interest
therein;

(b) As per the LLP Act, conversion results in dissolution and vesting of
all the assets of the company into the LLP. On such vesting, the share capital
of the company along with the interest of shareholders in the shares of the
company gets extinguished. Alternatively, conversion involves exchange of
shares in the company with partnership interest;

(c) The argument that charge of capital gains triggers only when there
is a transfer between two existing parties at a time is not correct. This is
evident by the fact that even conversion of capital asset into stock-in-trade
is considered as transfer under the Act;

(d) The Supreme Court in the case of Grace Collis2  concluded that the extinguishment of a
right includes extinguishment of a right in a capital asset independent of and
otherwise than on account of transfer. This also supports that extinguishment
of rights in the shares on conversion results in transfer;

____________________________________________________________

2. ITAT seems to be of the view
that since the income qualifies as a business income u/s 28(va), the assessee
creates a business connection in India

 

(e) Existence of a specific provision under the Act which exempts the
transaction of conversion of company into LLP from capital gains tax also
indicates that such transaction results in transfer, such conversion will be
subject to capital gains tax under the Act.

 

On computation mechanism of capital gains arising on transfer as a
result of conversion:

 

(f) On conversion, shareholders
relinquish their shareholding in the company to acquire capital in the LLP in
the same proportion in which shares were held in the company. Thus, the value
of the partnership interest in the LLP is to be considered as the Full Value of
Consideration (FVC) received / accrued to each shareholder for computation of
capital gains;

(g) FVC can be computed on the
basis of the accounts of the LLP considering the reserves and surplus
transferred. If such FVC is not ascertainable, the deeming provision u/s 50D of
the Act can be adopted to deem the fair market value as the FVC.

(h)        The
assessee’s contention that the value of partnership interest was the same as
the cost of acquisition of the shares in the company, is incorrect for the
following reasons:

(I)  Cost of shares is the price at
which shares are acquired. Such cost of acquisition varies from one shareholder
to another shareholder;

(II)       The value of partnership
interest is inclusive of the share capital as well as the reserves and surplus
(i.e., shareholders fund) which is different from the cost of acquisition of
shares;

(III)      Thus,
the value of partnership interest as reduced by cost of acquisition of shares
is subject to capital
gains tax.

 

Article 11 of India-Cyprus DTAA – Interest earned by Cyprian company from investment in CCDs which were funded by parent company qualified for lower rate under Article 11 of India-Cyprus DTAA since, on facts, the Cyprian company had indicia (marks or signs) of beneficial owner of interest income

3. TS-523-ITAT-2019
(Mum.)
Golden Bella
Holdings Ltd. vs. DCIT
ITA No.:
6958/Mum/2017
A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order:
28th August, 2019

 

Article 11 of
India-Cyprus DTAA – Interest earned by Cyprian company from investment in CCDs
which were funded by parent company qualified for lower rate under Article 11
of India-Cyprus DTAA since, on facts, the Cyprian company had indicia
(marks or signs) of beneficial owner of interest income

 

FACTS

The assessee, a limited liability company resident in Cyprus, was an
investment holding company. During the year under consideration, the assessee
earned interest income from investment in CCDs of an Indian company (ICo),
which was offered to tax in India @ 10% in terms of Article 11 of the
India-Cyprus DTAA. The source of funds for investment in CCDs was equity
capital and interest-free funds from the Mauritian parent (MauCo) of the
assessee.

 

 

 

The AO held that the investment in CCDs was made by
the assessee out of a back-to-back loan taken from MauCo and hence the Assessee
did not qualify as the beneficial owner of the interest income. Hence, the
Assessee was not eligible to avail the lower tax rate under Article 11 of the
DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the DRP which affirmed the order
of the AO and held that the assessee’s role was limited to merely routing the
funds from MauCo and acting as a conduit for passage of funds of MauCo, as an
agent / nominee of MauCo. Hence, the assessee was not the beneficial owner of
interest income.

 

The Assessee went in appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

(i) The assessee had invested in CCDs and received interest for its own
exclusive benefit and not for or on behalf of MauCo;

(ii) As per the OECD Commentary on the Model Convention 2017 on Article
11, beneficial owner is an entity having right to use and enjoy the interest
income unconstrained by contractual / legal obligation to pass it on;

(iii) The mere fact that the investment was funded
using certain interest-free loans and share capital infused by MauCo did not
affect the assessee’s status as the beneficial owner of the interest income,
since the entire interest income was the sole property of the assessee who had
absolute control over the funds received from MauCo;

(iv) Further, the assessee also wholly assumed and maintained the
foreign exchange risk and the counter-party risk on interest payments arising
on the CCDs. Thus, there was no back-to-back transaction lacking economic
substance;

(v) Besides, the AO had failed to prove that:

(a) The assessee did not have exclusive possession and control over the
interest income received;

(b) The assessee was required to seek the approval or obtain consent
from any entity to invest in ICo or to utilise the interest income received;

(c) The assessee was not free to utilise the interest income received at
its sole and absolute discretion, unconstrained by any contractual, legal or
economic arrangements with any other third party;

(vi) Thus, interest income from investment in CCDs qualified to be taxed
@ 10% under Article 11 of the DTAA .

 

 

 

Section 9(1)(i) read with section 28(va) of the Act, Article 5(2)(1) of the India-US DTAA – Consideration received for granting the right to render BPO services to group entities qualified as business income u/s 28(va) of the Act – Such income was not taxable in India under the Act as well as the DTAA in absence of any business activity and PE in India

2. TS-458-ITAT-2019
(Pune)
Cummins Inc.
vs. DDIT
ITA No.:
2506/Pune/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09 Date of order:
7th August, 2019

 

Section 9(1)(i)
read with section 28(va) of the Act, Article 5(2)(1) of the India-US DTAA –
Consideration received for granting the right to render BPO services to group
entities qualified as business income u/s 28(va) of the Act – Such income was
not taxable in India under the Act as well
as the DTAA in absence of any business activity and PE in India

 

FACTS

The assessee, a resident of USA, was part of a multi-national group
called the ‘Cummins’ group  and rendered
certain BPO services to the group entities as well as to its internal
divisions. During the relevant year, the assessee entered into an agreement
(assignment agreement) with an Indian company (ICo) to transfer the right to
render these BPO services for a lump sum consideration.

 

Pursuant to the assignment agreement, ICo was entitled to render BPO
services to all the Cummins group entities including the assessee. The assessee
contended that the lump sum consideration received was in the nature of
business income and such income was not taxable in India in the absence of a PE
in India.

 

The AO contended that by virtue of the assignment agreement, the
assessee mandated ICo to secure orders and render BPO services to the Cummins
group entities on his behalf. Therefore, the AO was of the view that this
resulted in continuing business activity for the assessee and hence it
established a business connection in India. For the same reason, the AO held
that ICo triggered a dependent agency PE for the assessee in India under the India-US
DTAA and, hence, the lump sum consideration was chargeable to tax in India both
under the Act as well as Article 7 of the DTAA.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee approached the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP).

 

The DRP did not concur with the AO that an agency PE was constituted in
India. However, on the basis of the assignment agreement, the DRP held that the
employees of the assessee were actively involved in rendering BPO services,
which triggered Service PE in India of the assessee under the India-USA DTAA.
Further, the DRP held that the amount received by the assessee would amount to
an income arising from a ‘source of income’ in India and hence chargeable u/s
9(1)(i) of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(i) Prior to the assignment agreement
between the assessee and ICo, the BPO services were rendered by one of the
units of the assessee to other Cummins entities as well as to other units of
the assessee. Pursuant to the assignment agreement, ICo was required to render
services to the assessee as well as other Cummins group entities;

(ii) The assessee obtaining BPO services from ICo could not be equated
to granting of a right to ICo to render BPO services. This was evident from the
fact that a portion of the lump sum consideration was returned to ICo in the
form of higher outgo in the form of payment for receipt of services;

 

(iii) The lump sum compensation received in respect of granting right to
render BPO services to other Cummins group entities would be governed by
section 28(va) of the Act, under which any sum received for not carrying out
any activity in relation to any business or profession should be treated as
business income. This indicated that the assessee had a business connection in
India1. However, in the absence of any business operations in India,
such income was not taxable in India;

(iv) DRP misinterpreted the assignment agreement to
conclude that employees of the assessee were involved in rendering BPO services
in India. In fact, no material was brought on record to demonstrate that the
employees of the assessee were involved in rendition of the BPO services;

 

(v) In the present case, there were no services which were rendered by
the assessee in India through its employees or other personnel. Hence, there
was no service PE of the assessee in India.

(vi) In the absence of a PE of the assessee in India under the DTAA, the
lump sum consideration was not taxable in India under the DTAA.

___________________________________

1. ITAT seems to be of the view
that since the income qualifies as a business income u/s 28(va), the assessee
creates a business connection in India

 

 

Section 90(1)(a)(i) read with Article 25(2) of India-US DTAA — Foreign tax credit is available only in respect of taxes paid on the double-taxed income – Foreign tax credit is allowable against the taxes paid under the Act, which would include surcharge and cess

1. TS-499-ITAT-2019
(Pune)
DCIT vs. iGate
Global Solutions Ltd.
IT(TP)A. No.:
10/Bang/2014
A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order:
26th August, 2019

 

Section 90(1)(a)(i) read with Article 25(2) of India-US DTAA — Foreign
tax credit is available only in respect of taxes paid on the double-taxed
income – Foreign tax credit is allowable against the taxes paid under the Act,
which would include surcharge and cess

 

FACTS

The assessee, an Indian company, had branches outside India. The
assessee paid foreign taxes on income earned by its branches outside India.
During the year under consideration, the assessee was assessed to minimum
alternate tax (MAT) u/s 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). The total
income earned during the year, consisted of certain export income which was
eligible for exemption u/s 10A of the Act under normal computation of tax.
However, as the assessee was assessed to tax under MAT, such export income was
also subjected to MAT in India.

 

However, the assessee claimed credit of the entire
amount of taxes paid outside India against the taxes payable under MAT,
including by way of surcharge and cess. However, the AO allowed credit only to
the extent of the taxes paid on the double-taxed income and such credit was
limited only against the base taxes paid under the base MAT rate of 10%, i.e.,
excluding the surcharge and cess.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the CIT(A) who upheld the view
of the AO. The assessee then appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(i) Section 90(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires India to grant
credit of taxes in respect of income which is doubly taxed. In other words,
credit is allowed on taxes paid outside India only if such income has been
included in the total income under the Act as well as under the laws of the
foreign country. Similar provisions are also contained in India’s DTAAs.
Accordingly, the assessee is entitled to credit only for the taxes which are
paid on the double-taxed income;

(ii) Though the assessee is eligible
for deduction u/s 10A of the Act in respect of some portion of its total
income, such deduction was only for normal tax purposes and not for MAT. Since
the entire income was subjected to tax under MAT, the assessee was entitled to
claim credit of taxes paid on such income against taxes payable under MAT;

(iii) The language of section 90 of the Act as well as foreign tax credit
article under the DTAA provides for relief in respect of double-taxed income.
This requires that income tax is to be charged only on the balance amount of
income. As a result, whatever is the amount of tax and surcharge on the
double-taxed income should be automatically excluded from the total tax
liability computed under the Act;

(iv) Perusal of section 90 of the Act and foreign tax credit Article 25
of the DTAA suggests that foreign tax credit should be allowed at the rate at
which the double-taxed income is subjected to tax under the Act (i.e.,
inclusive of surcharge and cess).

 

Section 54F – Expenditure incurred by the assessee on remodelling, painting of the flat so that the same could be made habitable according to the standard of living of the assessee, forms part of cost of purchase and is admissible u/s 54F

3. Nayana Kirit
Parikh vs. ACIT (Mumbai)
Members:
Sandeep Gosain (J.M.) and Rajesh Kumar (A.M.)
ITA No.:
2832/Mum/2013
A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order:
25th June, 2019
Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: Rajen Damani / R.A. Dhyani

 

Section 54F –
Expenditure incurred by the assessee on remodelling, painting of the flat so
that the same could be made habitable according to the standard of living of
the assessee, forms part of cost of purchase and is admissible u/s 54F

 

FACTS

In the course
of assessment proceedings, the AO observed that the assessee had shown
long-term capital gain of Rs. 1,25,10,645 after claiming deduction of Rs.
1,54,50,250 u/s 54F of the Act. The assessee was asked to substantiate its
claim for deduction u/s 54F. The assessee submitted that she had acquired a new
residential property for Rs. 2,25,00,000 vide agreement dated 18th
March, 2009 jointly with her husband and incurred incidental expenditure of Rs.
15,00,500 thereon. Thus, the aggregate cost worked out to Rs. 2,40,00,500 of
which the assessee’s share was one–half, i.e., Rs. 1,20,00,250. The assessee
had also incurred an expenditure of Rs. 34,50,000 on the same flat to make it
habitable as per her standard of living and claimed deduction thereof u/s 54F
of the Act.

 

According to
the assessee, this sum of Rs. 34,50,000 formed part of the cost of the house as
it was incurred on electrification of the house, civil work, design planning,
plumbing, flooring, etc. According to the AO, the said expenditure was not
incurred on construction / improvement of the flat but on furniture,
fabrication and painting, etc. The AO held that the expenditure of Rs. 34,50,000
falls under the category of expenditure by way of renovation to make the flat
more comfortable and therefore is not liable to be allowable as part of the
cost of the flat. The AO denied benefit of section 54F to the extent of this
sum of Rs. 34,50,000.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that u/s 54F only amount
relating to agreement value, stamp duty, registration charges and professional
charges related to the purchase of the new flat could be claimed. The cost of
improvement and renovation are subsequent to the purchase and therefore cannot
be allowed as deduction u/s 54F of the Act. He upheld
the order of the AO on the ground that the expenditure of Rs. 34,50,000 has
been incurred to make the house more lavish.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that the assessee incurred expenditure of Rs. 34,50,000 for
remodelling the flat, its painting and so on so that the same could be made
habitable according to her standard of living. The Tribunal held that the said
cost forms part of the cost of purchase and is admissible expenditure u/s 54F
of the Act. It noted that the case of the assessee is supported by various
judicial pronouncements and in particular the case of G. Siva Rama
Krishna, Hyderabad vs. ITO (ITA No. 755/Hyd./2013) A.Y. 2007-08; Ruskom Home
Vakil vs. ITO (ITA No. 4450/M/2014);
and Mrs. Gulshabanoo R.
Mukhi vs. JCIT (2002) 83 ITR 649 (Mum.)
. The Hyderabad Bench in the
case of G. Siva Rama Krishna (Supra) has held that expenditure
incurred on remodelling the flat in the normal course after purchasing the
readymade flat is allowable u/s 54F of the Act. The Tribunal, following the decisions of the Co-ordinate Benches, set
aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to allow deduction of Rs.
34,50,000, being expenditure incurred by the assessee, also u/s 54F of the Act.

 

The appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed.

 

 

Section 234A – Interest u/s 234A can be charged only till the time tax is unpaid

2. Gulick Network Distribution vs. ITO (Mumbai) Members: Pawan Singh (J.M.) and M. Balaganesh (A.M.) ITA No. 2210/Mum/2019 A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 21st June, 2019 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Gautam R. Mota / Satish Rajore

 

Section 234A –
Interest u/s 234A can be charged only till the time tax is unpaid

 

FACTS

The assessee, a
private limited company, engaged in the business of multi-level marketing, did
not file its return of income within the time prescribed u/s 139 or 139(5). The
assessee filed its return of income manually on 7th May, 2014
declaring total income of Rs. 16,49,960 under normal provisions and Rs.
1,39,326 u/s 115JB of the Act. The AO received information in Individual
Transaction Statement (ITS) that the assessee company was in receipt of credit
of Rs. 16,49,960 and that the assessee failed to disclose the said income for
the relevant assessment year.

 

The AO issued
and served notice u/s 148 dated 30th March, 2017 and selected the
case for scrutiny. In response to the notice u/s 148, the assessee filed return
on 23rd June, 2017. The assessment was completed on 13th
October, 2017 u/s 143(3) r/w/s 147 and no addition was made to the returned
income. The AO, while passing assessment order, raised a demand of Rs. 5,81,470
on account of interest u/s 234A and 234B.

 

The due date of
filing return of income for the assessment year under consideration, i.e., A.Y.
2010-11, was 15th October, 2010. From the calculation of interest
levied by the AO, the assessee noted that since the assessee paid tax on 24th
March, 2014 he was liable to pay interest for 42 months (from 15th
October, 2010 to 24th March, 2014) and not for the period of 81
months (from 15th October, 2010 to 30th June, 2017) as
charged by the AO.

 

On 22nd
December, 2017 the assessee applied for rectification u/s 154 seeking
rectification of the working of the interest. The AO partially rectified the
mistake vide order dated 9th January, 2018.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the order passed by
the AO on an application u/s 154 of the Act.

 

Still
aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where he relied
upon the decision of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ms
Priti Prithwala vs. ITO [(2003) 129 Taxman 79 (Mum.)].
It was also
submitted that in the subsequent assessment year, on similar facts, no such
interest was charged from the assessee.

 

HELD

At the outset,
the Tribunal observed that, in principle, it is in agreement with the
calculation of interest as furnished by the assessee. It observed that in the
subsequent year, on similar facts, no such interest was charged by the Revenue.
It noted that the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal had in the case of Priti
Prithwala (Supra)
held that the words ‘regular assessment’ are used in
the context of computation. It does not show that the order passed u/s 143(3) /
144 shall be substituted by section 147. Considering the finding of the
Co-ordinate Bench and the fact that the assessee submitted that the assessee
could not be made liable to pay interest for the period during which it was not
possible on their part to file the return of income, the Tribunal directed the
AO to re-compute the interest up to the date of filing of the return.

 

The appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed.