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Penalty — Concealment of income — Penalty leviable even in a case where the concealed income reduces the returned loss and finally the assessed income is also a loss or minus figure — Also illustrative guidelines for Courts while writing orders/judgments.

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5 Penalty — Concealment of
income — Penalty leviable even in a case where the concealed income reduces the
returned loss and finally the assessed income is also a loss or minus figure —
Also illustrative guidelines for Courts while writing orders/judgments.


[JCIT v. Saheli Leasing
and Industries Ltd.,
(2010) 324 ITR 170 (SC)]

On return being filed by the
respondent-assessee, an order u/s.143(3) of the Act was passed on February 28,
1998, showing a total income of Rs. Nil for A.Y. 1995-96.

During the course of
assessment proceedings, it was noticed that the assessee had claimed
depreciation, which was held to be incorrect. Thus, an amount of Rs.24,22,531
was disallowed out of depreciation. Penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act
were initiated. In response to the show-cause notice issued by the Revenue, the
assessee filed its reply denying the allegations and contending that no penalty
can be imposed on it, when the returned income was nil.

The Deputy Commissioner of
Income-tax, Special Range-2, Surat on the basis of the discussion in the order
held that the assessee was liable to pay penalty, with reference to such
additions to income to be treated as its total income, with reference to
Explanation 4(a) to S. 271(1)(c) of the Act.

Accordingly, the penalty was
levied on concealed income of

`24,22,531 at the
minimum rate of 100 per cent of tax sought to be evaded. Thus, a penalty of
`11,14,364 was imposed on the assessee.

Feeling aggrieved thereby,
the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals). Considering various judgments of the Tribunal and the High Courts,
the appeal of the assessee came to be dismissed and the penalty levied on it
stood confirmed.

The assessee preferred
further appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad. The
Tribunal, on the strength of an earlier order passed by a Special Bench of the
Ahmedabad Tribunal in the case of Apsara Processors (P) Ltd. in ITA No. 284/Ahd./2004,
dated December 17, 2004, came to the conclusion that no penalty can be levied if
the returned income and the assessed income is loss. Accordingly, the orders
passed by the Assessing Officer as well as the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) were set aside and quashed and the penalty imposed on the assessee was
deleted. It was this order of the Tribunal which was carried further by filing
appeal u/s.260A of the Act in the High Court, which met the fate of dismissal by
the Division Bench.

However, the Division Bench
in its wisdom thought it fit to dispose of the appeal as under :

“Admitted facts are that the
appellant had filed return showing loss and the income is also assessed as ‘nil
income’. When the return was shown as loss as well as assessment of income is
also nil, no penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act is attracted. No case
is made out for admission of the appeal. The appeal stands dismissed at the
admission stage.

(Sd.)………………………….
Judge

(Sd.)………………………..
Judge”

On a further appeal, the
Supreme Court found that the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned
order had decided the question of law as projected before it in the appeal
preferred u/s.260A of the Act, in a most casual manner. The order was not only
cryptic, but did not even remotely deal with the arguments which were sought to
be projected by the Revenue before it.

The Supreme Court observed
that it had, time and again, reminded the Courts performing judicial functions,
the manner in which judgments/orders are to be written but, it was, indeed,
unfortunate that those guidelines issued from time to time were not being
adhered to.

The Supreme Court further
observed that no doubt it is true that brevity is an art, but brevity without
clarity is likely to enter into the realm of absurdity, which is impermissible.

The Supreme Court therefore,
before proceeding to decide the matter on the merits, reiterated few guidelines
for the Courts, while writing orders and judgments to follow the same,
clarifying that the guidelines were only illustrative in nature, not exhaustive
and could further be elaborated looking to the need and requirement of a given
case :

(a) It should always be
kept in mind that nothing should be written in the judgment/order, which may
not be germane to the facts of the case. The ratio decided should be clearly
spelt out from the judgment/order.

(b) After preparing the
draft, it is necessary to go through the same to find out, if anything,
essential to be mentioned, has escaped discussion.

(c) The ultimate finished
judgment/order should have sustained chronology, regard being given to the
concept that it has readable, continued interest and one does not feel like
parting or leaving it midway. To elaborate, it should have flow and perfect
sequence of events, which would continue to generate interest in the reader.

(d) Appropriate care
should be taken not to load it with all legal knowledge on the subject as
citation of too many judgments creates more confusion than clarity. The
foremost requirement is that leading judgments should be mentioned and the
evolution that has taken place ever since are pronounced and thereafter, the
latest judgment, in which all previous judgments have been considered, should
be mentioned. While writing judgment, psychology of the reader has also to be
borne in mind, for the perception on that score is imperative.

(e) Language should not be
rhetoric and should not reflect a contrived effort on the part of the author.

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Constitutional validity — National Tax Tribunal — Challenge not similar to the appeal relating to the constitutional validity or National Company Law Tribunal — Matter separated.

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4 Constitutional validity —
National Tax Tribunal — Challenge not similar to the appeal relating to the
constitutional validity or National Company Law Tribunal — Matter separated.


[Madras Bar Association
v. Union of India and Another,
(2010) 324 ITR 166 (SC)]

In the petitions before the
Supreme Court, the constitutional validity of the National Tax Tribunal Act,
2005 (‘the Act’ for short) was challenged. In T.C. No. 150 of 2006, additionally
there was challenge to S. 46 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act,
1976 and Article 323B of the Constitution of India. It was contended that S. 46
of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, is ultra vires the
basic structure of the Constitution as it enables proliferation of Tribunal
system and makes serious inroads into the independence of the judiciary by
providing a parallel system of administration of justice, in which the executive
has retained extensive control over matters such as appointment, jurisdiction,
procedure, etc. It is contended that Article 323B violates the basic structure
of the Constitution as it completely takes away the jurisdiction of the High
Courts and vests it in the National Tax Tribunal, including trial of offences
and adjudication of pure questions of law, which have always been in the
exclusive domain of the judiciary.

On January 21, 2009, when
arguments in C.A. No. 3067 of 2004 and C.A. No. 3717 of 2005, which related to
the challenge to Parts IB and IC of the Companies Act, 1956 were in progress
before the Constitution Bench, it was submitted that these matters involved a
similar issue and they could be tagged and disposed of in terms of the decision
in those appeals. Therefore the Constitution Bench directed these cases to be
listed with those appeals, even though there was no order of reference in these
matters.

C.A. No. 3067 of 2004 and
C.A. No. 3717 of 2005 were subsequently heard at length and were reserved for
judgment. The matters which were tagged were also reserved for judgment.

While disposing of C.A. No.
3067 of 2004 and C.A. No. 3717 of 2005, the Supreme Court observed that insofar
as the cases relating to the National Tax Tribunal were concerned, the T.C.
(Civil) No. 150 of 2006 involved the challenge to Article 323B of the
Constitution. The said Article enables appropriate Legislatures to provide by
law, for adjudication of trial by Tribunals of any disputes, complaints or
offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2)
thereof. Sub-clause (i) of the clause (2) of Article 323B enables such Tribunals
to try offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in
clauses (a) to (h) of clause (2) of the said Article.

One of the contentions urged
in support of the challenge to Article 323B related to the fact that the
Tribunals do not follow the normal rules of evidence contained in the Evidence
Act. In criminal trials, an accused is presumed to be innocent till proved
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and the Evidence Act plays an important role, as
appreciation of evidence and consequential finds of facts are crucial. The trial
would require experience and expertise in criminal law, which means that the
judge or the adjudicator to be legally trained. The Tribunals which follow their
own summary procedure, are not bound by the strict rules of evidence and the
members will not be legally trained. Therefore it may lead to convictions of
persons on evidence which is not sufficient in probative value or on the basis
of inadmissible evidence. It was submitted that it would thus be a retrograde
step for separation of executive from the judiciary.

The Supreme Court observed
that the appeals on issues on law are traditionally heard by the Courts. Article
323B enables the Constitution of Tribunals which will be hearing appeals on pure
questions of law which is the function of the Courts. In L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 it had considered the validity of only clause
(3)(d) of Article 323B, but did not consider the validity of other provisions of
Article 323B.

The Supreme Court noted that
the appeals relating to constitutional validity of the National Company Law
Tribunal under the Companies Act, 1956 did not involve the consideration of
Article 323B. The constitutional issues raised in T.C. (Civil) No. 150 of 2006
were not touched as the power to establish company Tribunals was not traceable
to Article 323B but to several entries of Lists I and III of the Seventh
Schedule and consequently there was a challenge to this article.

The Supreme Court observed
that the basis of attack in regard to Parts IB and IC of the Companies Act and
the provisions of the NTT Act were completely different. The challenge to Parts
IB and IC of the Companies Act, 1956 sought to derive support from Article 323B
by contending that Article 323B was a bar for constitution of any Tribunal in
respect of matters not enumerated therein. On the other hand the challenge to
the NTT Act was based on the challenge to Article 323B itself.

The Supreme Court therefore
was of the view that these petitions relating to the validity of the NTT Act and
the challenge to Article 323B raised issues which did not arise in the two civil
appeals. Therefore these cases could not be disposed of in terms of the decision
in the civil appeals, but were required to be heard separately. The Supreme
Court accordingly directed that these matters be delinked and listed separately
for hearing.

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which had read down Rule 3.

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2 which had read down Rule
3.


[Bhel Workers Union and
Another v. Union of India and Another,
(2010) 324 ITR 26 (SC)]

In the cases before the
Supreme Court, the appellants had challenged the validity of Rule 3 of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962, as amended by the Income-tax (Twenty-second Amendment)
Rules, 2001 which amended the method of computing valuation of perquisites
u/s.17(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. According to the appellants, the amended
Rule 3 was inconsistent with the parent Act and also ultra vires Article 14 of
the Constitution.

Writ petitions filed by the
appellants were dismissed by the High Court, aggrieved by which appeals were
filed before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed
that the amended Notification was the subject matter of appeals in the case of
Arun Kumar v. Union of India reported in (2007) 1 SCC 732. A three-Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court did not strike down Rule 3 of the Rules, but read
down the Rule to make it in line with S. 17(2)(ii) of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that
as the point involved in the present appeals had been concluded by the aforesaid
judgment, the same were disposed of in terms thereof.

The Supreme Court noted that
subsequent to the aforesaid judgment, the Legislature has added an Explanation 1
to S. 17(2) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2007, with effect from April 1, 2002,
taking away the effect of the judgment on or after April 1, 2002. According to
the appellant, however, the year 2001-02 which was also covered under Rule 3 had
not been affected by the amendment. Since, there was no challenge to the amended
provision before the Supreme Court, it declined to record any opinion on the
same and disposed of the appeals noticing the subsequent amendment brought out
by the Legislature.

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Income-tax return — Must be filed in the form prescribed by the statutory authority.

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3 Income-tax return — Must
be filed in the form prescribed by the statutory authority
.

[Union of India & Others
v. I.T. Bar Association, Lucknow,
(2010) 324 ITR 80 (SC)]

By the impugned order, the
High Court had permitted the assessees to file income-tax returns in Form Saral
2D instead of Form ITR-1 to ITR-8. It has been stated by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent that this order was passed by the High
Court because of paucity of time and non-availability of adequate number of
forms. The Supreme Court held that whether the return should be filed in a
particular Form was not the business of the Court. It is for the statutory
authority to decide the same. The Supreme Court however, noted that the original
time for filing the return had been already expired, but the learned Additional
Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, had stated that
the time for filing the return in the prescribed Form was being extended in
relation to all categories of assessees. The Supreme Court noted this position
and set aside the impugned order with a direction that all the assessees, who
had already filed return in Form Saral 2D, pursuant to the impugned order passed
by the Allahabad High Court or any other High Court in the country, should file
return in the prescribed Form by the extended date.

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Refund — Interest on amount to be refunded would partake the character of ‘amount due’ u/s.244A.

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1 Refund — Interest on
amount to be refunded would partake the character of ‘amount due’ u/s.244A.


[CIT v. H.E.G. Ltd.,
(2010) 324 ITR 331 (SC)]

For A.Y. 1993-94, the amount
paid by the assessee towards TDS was

`45,73,528. The tax
paid after original assessment was `1,71,00,320. The total of TDS amounting to
`45,73,528 plus tax paid after original assessment of `1,71,00,320 stood at
`2,16,73,848. In other words, the total tax paid had two components, viz. TDS +
tax paid after original assessment. The assessee was entitled to the refund of
`2,16,73,848 (consisting of `1,71,00,320 and `45,73, 528 which payment was made
after 57 months and which is the only item in dispute). The assessee claimed
statutory interest for delayed refund of `45,73,528 for 57 months between April
1, 1993 and December 31, 1997 in terms of S. 244A of the Income-tax Act. The
Supreme Court held that the assessee was entitled to interest for 57 months on
`45,73,528. The principal amount of `45,73,528 has been paid on December 31,
1997, but net of interest which, as stated above, partook of the character of
‘amount due’ u/s.244A. The Supreme Court further held that the interest
component would partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ u/s. 244A.

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Warehousing income : Whether business income or income from property : S. 22 and S. 28 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Income would be business income if dominant purpose was commercial activity and it would be income from property if dominant ob

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10 Warehousing income :
Whether business income or income from property : S. 22 and S. 28 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Income would be business income if dominant purpose
was commercial activity and it would be income from property if dominant object
was to lease property.


[Nutan Warehousing Co. P.
Ltd. v. Dy. CIT,
326 ITR 94 (Bom.)]

The assessee-company was
carrying out warehousing activities since 1972. For the A.Y. 2001-02, the
Assessing Officer assessed the warehousing charges as income from business and
the rental income as income from house property. In appeal, the Commissioner of
Income Tax (Appeals) treated even the warehousing charges as income from house
property. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the assessee,
the Bombay High Court remanded the matter and held as under :

“(i) The question whether
the income received by the assessee from a transaction entered into in respect
of immovable property should be treated as income from house property or as
income from business, would have to be resolved on the basis of the
well-settled tests laid down by the law in decided cases. What is material in
such cases is the primary object of the assessee while exploiting the
property. If the primary or the dominant object is to lease or let out
property, the income derived from the property would have to be regarded as
income from house property. Conversely, if the dominant intention of the
assessee is to exploit a commercial asset by carrying on a commercial
activity, the income would have to be treated as income from business. What
has to be deduced is as to whether the letting out of the property constitutes
a dominant aspect of the transaction or whether it was subservient to the main
business of the assessee.

(ii) The terms of the
warehousing agreements were not considered by the Tribunal. Merely styling an
agreement as a warehousing agreement would not be conclusive of the nature of
the transaction since it was for the Tribunal to determine as to whether the
transaction was a bare letting out of the asset or whether the assessee was
carrying on a commercial activity involving warehousing operations.“



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Presumptive tax : Civil construction business : S. 44AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Assessment of income at 8% u/s.44AD : Assessee is not under any obligation to explain individual entry of cash deposit in bank, unless such entry has no n

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8 Presumptive tax : Civil
construction business : S. 44AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 :
Assessment of income at 8% u/s.44AD : Assessee is not under any obligation to
explain individual entry of cash deposit in bank, unless such entry has no nexus
with gross receipts.


[CIT v. Surinder Pal
Anand,
192 Taxman 264 (P&H)]

The assessee is in the
business of civil construction. For the A.Y. 2005-06, the income of the assessee
from civil construction business was computed at the presumptive rate of 8% of
the gross receipts u/s.44AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO made an addition
in respect of the cash deposited in the bank account during the year. On appeal,
the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee was not required to maintain
regular books of account as the return had been filed u/s.44AD and the turnover
was below Rs.40 lakhs. It was also recorded that since the cash deposits in the
bank statement were lower than the business receipts shown by the assessee and
in the bank statement there were withdrawals as well as deposits, the addition
was unjustified. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under :

“(i) Ss.(1) of S. 44AD
clearly provides that where an assessee is engaged in the business of civil
construction or supply of labour for civil construction, income shall be
estimated at 8% of the gross amount paid or payable to the assessee in the
previous year on account of such business or a sum higher than the aforesaid
sum, as may be declared by the assessee in his return of income,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in S. 28 to S. 43C. This
income is to be deemed to be the profits and gains of the said business
chargeable to tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession’. However, the said provisions are applicable where the gross
amount paid or payable does not exceed Rs.40 lakhs.

(ii) Once under the
special provision, exemption from maintenance of books of account has been
provided and presumptive tax at the rate of 8% of the gross receipt itself is
the basis for determining the taxable income, the assessee is not under any
obligation to explain individual entry of cash deposit in the bank, unless
such entry has no nexus with the gross receipts.

(iii) In the instant case,
the stand of the assessee before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal
that the amount in question was on account of business receipts had been
accepted. The Revenue could not show with reference to any material on record
that the cash deposits were unexplained or undisclosed income of the assessee.

(iv) Therefore, no
question of law arose from the Tribunal’s order and the Revenue’s appeal was
to be dismissed.”

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Reassessment : S. 143(2), S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1994-95 and 1995-96 : Return filed in response to notice u/s.148 : Notice u/s.143(2) mandatory before proceeding to pass reassessment order.

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9 Reassessment : S. 143(2),
S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1994-95 and 1995-96 : Return
filed in response to notice u/s.148 : Notice u/s.143(2) mandatory before
proceeding to pass reassessment order.


[CIT v. Rajeev Sharma,
192 Taxman 197 (All.); 232 CTR 309 (All.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the
assessee had filed original return of income on 29-3-1996. On 26-12-2000, the
Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s.148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In
response to the said notice, the assessee informed that he had already filed
return of income on 29-3-1996 and requested the Assessing Officer to withdraw
the said notice u/s.148. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer issued notice
u/s.143(2) and u/s.142(1) informing the assessee that notice u/s.148 was pending
and had not been withdrawn as requested by him. Thereafter, the assessee filed
return on 7-2-2002. The AO thereafter completed the assessment u/s.147 of the
Act. In appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) the assessee contended that
since no notice was issued u/s.143(2) after filing of return in response to
notice u/s.148, reassessment was not valid. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected
the contention holding that when the assessee had filed return in response to
notice u/s. 148, non-issuance of notice u/s.143(2) after filing return would not
be fatal. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal holding that after filing
of return in response to notice u/s.148, a notice u/s.143(2) should have been
issued being mandatory in nature.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The provisions
contained in S. 143(2) are mandatory and the Legislature, in its wisdom by
using the word ‘reason to believe’, has cast a duty on the Assessing Officer
to apply his mind to the material on record and after being satisfied with
regard to escaped liability, to serve notice specifying particulars of such
claim. In view of the above, after receipt of return in response to notice
u/s.148, it shall be mandatory for the Assessing Officer to serve a notice
u/s.143(2) assigning reason therein.

(ii) In the absence of any
notice issued u/s.143(2) after receipt of fresh return submitted by the
assessee in response to notice u/s.148, the entire procedure adopted for
escaped assessment shall not be valid.

(iii) In the instant case,
in response to the notice issued u/s.148, the assessee sent a letter to drop
the proceedings. Therefore, vide letter dated 18-12-2001, the Deputy
Commissioner informed that proceeding would not be dropped and gave last
opportunity to file return. Along with letter dated 18-12-2001, notices
u/s.143(2) and u/s.142(1) were also sent. In consequence thereof, the assessee
filed return on 7-2-2002. After filing of return, the Assessing Officer should
have applied his mind and after considering the material on record on ‘reason
to believe’, notice u/s. 143(2) should have been issued afresh.

(iv) Since return was
filed on 7-2-2002 in response to notice u/s.148, earlier notice dated
29-3-2001 would not be treated as valid notice for the purpose of escaped
assessment. The Legislature, in its wisdom had categorically provided that
after receipt of notice u/s.148 a fresh return may be filed and in consequence
thereof, the Assessing Officer has to apply his mind to the contents of fresh
return and then issue a notice u/s.143(2). The satisfaction, under reason to
believe, must be recorded by the Assessing Officer after applying his mind to
the contents of fresh return before issuing a notice u/s.143(2).

(v) Therefore, the appeals
were to be dismissed and the judgments of the Tribunal were to be upheld.”

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Interest on borrowed capital : Deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1986-87 to 1988-89 : Amount borrowed at 16% interest and invested in 4% non-cumulative preference shares : No evidence that transaction not genuine : No part of intere

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7 Interest on borrowed
capital : Deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1986-87 to
1988-89 : Amount borrowed at 16% interest and invested in 4% non-cumulative
preference shares : No evidence that transaction not genuine : No part of
interest could be disallowed.


[CIT v. Pankaj Munjal
Family Trust,
326 ITR 286 (P&H)]

For the A.Ys. 1986-87 to
1988-89, the assessee had claimed deduction of interest at the rate of 16%
borrowed for purchase of 4% non-cumulative preference shares. The Assessing
Officer restricted the allowance to 4% and disallowed the balance interest. The
Tribunal allowed the full claim.

In reference at the instance
of the Revenue, the following question of law was raised :

“Whether, on the facts and
in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in
allowing interest as claimed by the assessee at a higher rate on borrowings to
the nominal fixed return on investments made in purchase of shares out of such
borrowings from family concerns ?”

The Punjab and Haryana High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) It is not the case of
the Revenue that the assessee had not paid interest to the lender. Merely
because the assessee had invested the borrowed amount for the purchase of 4%
non-cumulative preference shares, it could not be presumed that the
transaction was colourable. The Revenue had not brought on record any evidence
to show that the interest paid by the assessee on the borrowed amount was
highly exorbitant and no such interest rate was ever prevalent in the market.

(ii) Therefore, the
Tribunal was right in law in allowing interest as claimed by the assessee.”

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Search — Levy of surcharge on block assessment — Surcharge is leviable even to cases relating to assessment years prior to the insertion of S. 113.

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7. Search — Levy of surcharge on block assessment — Surcharge
is leviable even to cases relating to assessment years prior to the insertion of
S. 113.

[ CIT v. Rajiv Bhatara, (2009) 310 ITR 105 (SC)]

Search was conducted on April 6, 200. The Assessing Officer
in his order dated May 22, 2002, imposed surcharge and an application u/s.154
of the Act filed by the assessee for rectification was dismissed vide order
dated September 17, 2003, with the observation that the surcharge was levied
as per the provisions of Part I of the First Schedule appended to the Finance
Act, 2000. However, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Ludhiana, [for
brevity ‘the CIT(A)’] reversed the order passed by the Assessing Officer and
took the view that surcharge was not leviable in cases where the search had
taken place prior to June 1, 2002. In that regard, reliance was placed on a
Division Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of
CIT v. Ram Lal Babu Lal,
234 ITR 776. On further appeal by the Revenue the
Tribunal upheld the order dated September 12, 2005, passed by the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals) holding that the search in the present case took place
on April 6, 2000, which was much prior to the date of amendment made in S.
113. The amendment was incorporated on June 1, 2002, by inserting a proviso to
S. 113 by the Finance Act, 2002. It was by the amendment that the levy of
surcharge on the undisclosed income was specifically provided with effect from
June 1, 2002. The provision has not been given retrospective effect, and
therefore, the Tribunal held that it applied only to cases where searches were
carried out after June 1, 2002. The High Court dismissed the appeal relying on
its decision in the case of CIT v. Roshan Singh Makkar, (2006) 287 ITR
160 (P&H) and also referred to two other decisions of the Madras High Court in
CIT v. Neotech Company, (Firm) (2007) 291 ITR 27 and CIT v. S.
Palanivel,
(2007) 291 ITR 33.

On an appeal before the Supreme Court, the learned counsel
for the appellant (Revenue) submitted that the case at hand was squarely
covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta,
(2008) 297 ITR 322.

According to the appellant, prior to June 1, 2002, the
position was ambiguous as it was not clear even to the Department as to
whether surcharge was levied with reference to the rates provided for in the
Finance Act of the year in which the search was initiated or the year in which
the search was concluded or the year in which the block assessment proceedings
u/s.158C were initiated or the year in which block assessment order was
passed. The Supreme Court held that to clear that doubt precisely, the proviso
was inserted in S. 113 by which it is indicated that the Finance Act of the
year in which the search was initiated would apply. Therefore, the proviso to
S. 113 was clarificatory in nature. It only clarifies that out of the four
dates, Parliament has opted for the date, namely, the year in which the search
was initiated, which date would be relevant for applicability of a particular
Finance Act. The above position was highlighted in Suresh N. Gupta’s case. The
Supreme Court therefore allowed the appeal of the revenue.

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Substantial Question of Law — Cancellation of penalty on the ground that the benefit under the amnesty scheme was available to the assessee even though there was material to show that the return was not voluntary gives rise to a substantial question of la

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5. Substantial Question of Law — Cancellation of penalty on
the ground that the benefit under the amnesty scheme was available to the
assessee even though there was material to show that the return was not
voluntary gives rise to a substantial question of law.

[CIT v. C. A. Taktawala, (2009) 309 ITR 340 (SC)]

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in not
answering the following question, which in its opinion was a substantial
question of law.

“Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Tribunal was right in law and on facts in cancelling the penalty levied
u/s.271(1)(a) and u/s.273(2)(a) of the Income-tax-Act on the ground that the
benefit under the amnesty scheme was available to the assessee, particularly
when subsequent to search operation, the assessee itself had revised its
returns on a number of occasions, which would go to show that the return was
not voluntary”.

 

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Substantial Question of Law — Whether on conversion of a partnership firm into a company under Part IX of the Companies Act the revaluation of the depreciable assets prior to conversion would be liable to capital gain tax is a question of law.

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6. Substantial Question of Law — Whether on conversion of a
partnership firm into a company under Part IX of the Companies Act the
revaluation of the depreciable assets prior to conversion would be liable to
capital gain tax is a question of law.

[CIT v. Well Pack Packaging, (2009) 309
ITR 338 (SC)]

The respondent-assessee was a partnership firm.
On August 30, 1995, it filed its original return of income in respect of the
A.Y. 1995-96 declaring a total income of Rs.1,93,930. The said return was
processed u/s.143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act’), on
January 29, 1996. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer noticed that the
assessee had revalued the depreciable assets and enhanced the value at
Rs.1,28,13,831 on July 31, 1994. It was also noticed by him that the
partnership firm was converted into a company under Part IX of the Companies
Act, 1956, and was registered as such u/s.567 of the said Act on October 17,
1994. Therefore, proceedings u/s.148 of the Act for reassessment were
initiated. After considering the explanation of the respondent, the Assessing
Officer determined the total income of the respondent at Rs.1,30,07,761. The
Assessing Officer made an addition of capital gains of Rs.1,28,13,831 on
account of transfer of the depreciable assets at enhanced value on conversion
to company under Part IX of the Companies Act , which was a separate entity.
The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal allowed the
appeal and set aside the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the
Assessing Officer.

Before the High the following four questions of
law were said to be arising from the order of the Tribunal :

“(1) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
is right in law and on the facts of the case in holding that revaluation of
the assets of the assessee-firm and subsequent conversion of the firm into
limited company under Part IX of the Companies Act which has taken over such
assets at the enhanced value will not result into any capital gains
liability under the Income-tax Act ?

(2) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
is right in law and on the facts of the case in holding that there is no
transfer involved when the assessee gets itself registered under Part IX of
the Companies Act, 1956 ?

(3) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
is right in law and on facts of the case in holding that the assessee is not
liable to any capital gains tax either u/s.45(1) or u/s.45(4) of the
Income-tax Act ?

(4) Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
is right in law and on the facts of the case in directing to delete the
addition of Rs.1,28,13,831 ?”

The High Court, by the impugned order, dismissed
the appeal by passing a short order observing, that no question of law much
less a substantial question of law arose from the order of the Tribunal.

On an appeal, the Supreme Court held that it did
not agree with the view taken by the High Court. In its opinion, the questions
of law as raised by the Revenue before the High Court were substantial
questions of law which arose from the order of the Tribunal.

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Export business — Deduction u/s.80HHC — If the assessee is a supporting manufacturer, on producing disclaimer certificates from export house, he would be entitled to claim the benefit u/s.80HHC.

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3. Export business — Deduction u/s.80HHC — If the assessee is
a supporting manufacturer, on producing disclaimer certificates from export
house, he would be entitled to claim the benefit u/s.80HHC.

[Janatha Cashew Exporting Co. v. CIT, (2009) 309 ITR
440 (SC)]

The assessee, a cashew exporter, had made direct and
indirect exports for the A.Y. 1992-93 and had claimed total deduction of an
amount of Rs.97,54,515 u/s.80HHC(1) and S. 80HHC(1A) of the Income-tax Act.
The Assessing Officer granted deduction u/s.80HHC(1) and u/s.80HHC(1A) in
respect of direct and indirect exports in all amounting to Rs.91,10,306 as
against the claim of Rs.96,54,515. However, while granting deduction under the
proviso to S. 80HHC(3) the Assessing Officer excluded sales to export houses
from the export turnover and he re-worked the relief at Rs.12,63,532.
Aggrieved by the said order the assessee took up the matter before the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The order of the Assessing Officer was
upheld on the ground that export turnover included only direct exports since
S. 80HHC(3) dealt with quantification of deduction in case of direct exports
and the quantum of deduction had to be computed only on the basis of direct
export turnover. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) also took note of
the deduction separately granted on indirect exports u/s.80HHC(1A) of the Act.
However, when the assessee carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal it
took the view that, the Assessing Officer should compute the income of the
assessee and allow benefits admissible to the export house if such export
house had issued a disclaimer certificate. Aggrieved by the said decision the
Department moved the High Court by way of appeal u/s.260A of the Income-tax
Act. The decision of the Tribunal was, however, set aside by the High Court
which took the view that since S. 80HHC(1) read with S. 80HHC(3) provided for
computation and deduction of profit on direct exports only and the assessee
was not entitled to the benefit in that regard qua indirect exports made
through the export house. The High Court also proceeded on the basis that the
sales turnover from sales effected by the assessee to the export houses did
not answer the description of export turnover and, therefore, the assessee was
not entitled to take the indirect exports into account while calculating sales
turnover in the formula mentioned in S. 80HHC(3).

On an appeal, the Supreme Court held that the matter needed
to be remitted to the Assessing Officer. Firstly, because in this case, there
was no factual finding recorded by the High Court as to whether the sales made
through the export houses by the assessee were supported by a disclaimer
certificate from such export houses. According to the Supreme Court, under the
provisions of S. 80HHC(3), if the assessee is a supporting manufacturer, on
his producing such disclaimer certificate the assessee would be entitled to
claim the benefit of deduction under the said section. Secondly, fresh
computation was now required to be done in view of three subsequent judgments,
in the case of CIT v. K. Ravindranath Nair, (295 ITR 228) A. M. Mosa
v. CIT,
(294 ITR 1) and Lalsons v. Dy. CIT, (89 ITD 25).

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Appellate Tribunal — Scope of powers — The Tribunal is not authorised to take back the benefit granted to the assessee by the Assessing Officer — The Tribunal has no power to enhance the assessment.

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4. Appellate Tribunal — Scope of powers — The Tribunal is not
authorised to take back the benefit granted to the assessee by the Assessing
Officer — The Tribunal has no power to enhance the assessment.

Lease transaction if found to be sham, depreciation cannot
be allowed — Alternative argument that only interest component be treated as
income rejected.

[M. Corpn. Global P. Ltd. v. CIT, (2009) 309 ITR 434
(SC)]

During the relevant assessment year 1991-92, the assessee
carried on the business of trading in lamination machines and binding and
punching machines. In addition, it was engaged in the leasing business. During
the year in question, the assessee had bought 5,46,000 soft drink bottles from
M/s. Glass and Ceramic Decorators worth Rs.19,54,953. The bottles were
directly supplied to M/s. Coolade Beverages Pvt. Ltd. (‘M/s. Coolade’ for
short) in terms of lease dated February 15, 1991. Vide assessment order dated
March 28, 1994, the Assessing Officer found that M/s. Coolade had received
only 42,000 bottles out of the total of 5,46,000 bottles receivable by them
from the assessee and that the remaining bottles stood received after March
31, 1991, i.e., between the period April 3, 1991, and April 18, 1991,
and, consequently, the Assessing Officer restricted the depreciation only to
42,000 bottles and consequently disallowed the depreciation of Rs.18,04,572.
In appeal the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) after formulating the ‘user
test’ remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer who on remand held that all
5,46,000 bottles stood paid for and dispatched before March 31, 1991, and
therefore, the assessee was entitled to 100% depreciation on all 5,46,000
bottles. This finding was given when the appeal was pending before the Income
Tax Appellate Tribunal. The said finding of the Assessing Officer (on remand)
was not challenged. However, when the appeal came before the Tribunal, it was
held that since the lease was not renewed and since the bottles were not
returned on expiry the transaction in question was only a financial
arrangement and not a lease, hence, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
disallowed the depreciation claim of the assessee which finding stood
confirmed by the High Court.

On an appeal, the Supreme Court held that in the case of
Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. CIT,
reported in (1967) 63 ITR 232 it had held
that u/s.33(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (equivalent to S. 254(1) of the
1961 Act), the Tribunal was not authorised to take back the benefit granted to
the assessee by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal has no power to enhance
the assessment. Applying the ratio of the said judgment to the present case,
the Supreme Court was of the view that, in this case, the Assessing Officer
had granted depreciation in respect of 42,000 bottles out of the total number
of bottles (5,46,000). By reason of the impugned judgment of the High Court
that benefit was sought to be taken away by the Department, which was not
permissible in law. This was the infirmity in the impugned judgment of the
High Court and the Tribunal. There was one more aspect which attracted the
attention of the Supreme Court. It observed that, according to the impugned
judgment of the High Court and the Tribunal, the transaction dated February
15, 1991, was a financial transaction and not a lease. If depreciation is to
be granted for 42,000 bottles under the transaction dated February 15, 1991,
then it cannot be said that 42,000 bottles came within the lease dated
February 15, 1991, and the balance came within the so-called financial
arrangement. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the benefit of
depreciation given to the assessee by the Assessing Officer in respect of
42,000 bottles out of 5,46,000 bottles could not be withdrawn by the
Department and for that reason alone the assessee should succeed in the civil
appeal. The Supreme Court further observed that, in this case the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals) had remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer who
on remand came to the conclusion that all 5,46,000 bottles stood sold before
March 31, 1991. This finding of fact had become final. It had not been
challenged. Hence, the Department had erred in disallowing the depreciation of
Rs.18,04,572.

Another lease transaction was also the subject matter of
the appeal. On March 15, 1991, lease was executed between the assessee as
lessor and M/s. Aravali Leasing as lessee whereas there was a sub-lease
between M/s. Aravali Leasing and M/s. Unikol Bottles dated March 8, 1991. The
Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that the transaction dated March 15,
1991, was not proved. It was a sham. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer
disallowed the depreciation amounting to Rs.30,17,122. This finding has been
accepted by the Tribunal and the High Court. The Supreme Court found no
infirmity in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the authorities
below. The Supreme Court also rejected the alternative submission made on
behalf of the assessee that, if the said transaction was a financial
arrangement, as held by the Department even then the assessee could be taxed
only on interest embedded in the amount of lease rental received from the
lessee on the ground that the transaction was not proved by the assessee.


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Export business — Deduction u/s.80HHC (prior to 1989) — Deduction only to the extent it is covered by the reserve created for the said reserve.

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2. Export business — Deduction u/s.80HHC (prior to 1989) —
Deduction only to the extent it is covered by the reserve created for the said
reserve.

[Parekh Brothers v. CIT, (2009) 309 ITR 446 (SC)]

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the decision of
the Kerala High Court to the effect that, where the reserve created for the
purpose of the special deduction u/s.80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is of
a lesser amount then deduction would be allowed only of the lesser sum
supported by the creation of the reserve.

 

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Substantial Question of Law — Applicability of S. 35AB — For applicability of S. 35AB, the nature of expenditure is required to be decided at the threshold because if the expenditure is found to be revenue in nature, then S. 35AB may not apply — However,

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1. Substantial Question of Law — Applicability of S. 35AB —
For applicability of S. 35AB, the nature of expenditure is required to be
decided at the threshold because if the expenditure is found to be revenue in
nature, then S. 35AB may not apply — However, if it is found to be capital in
nature, the question of amortisation and spread over, as contemplated by S. 35AB
would come into play.

[CIT v. Swaraj Engines Ltd., (2009) 309 ITR 443
(SC)]

The High Court dismissed the Department’s appeal in limine
following its earlier judgment in the case of CIT v. JCT Electronics Ltd.,
(2008) 301 ITR 290 (P&H) on the following question of law :

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Hon’ble Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is right in upholding the
decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that the payments of
the royalty made by the assessee company to M/s. Kirloskar Oil Engine Ltd.
to acquire technology know how under the agreement dated October 19, 1989,
is a revenue expenditure and does not come within the ambit of the
provisions of S. 35AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, whereas the payment is a
capital expenditure in view of the following judgments.

(A) Fenner Woodroffe and Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1976)
102 ITR 665 (Mad.);

(B) Ram Kumar Pharmaceuticals Works v. CIT, (1979)
119 ITR 33 (All.);

(C) CIT v. Warner Hindusthan Ltd., (1986) 160 ITR
217 (AP); and

(D) CIT v. Southern Switchgear Ltd., (1984) 148
ITR 272 (Mad.).”

On an appeal the Supreme Court noted that, M/s. Swaraj
Engines Ltd. (respondent herein) entered into an agreement of transfer of
technology know-how and trade mark with Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. under which
royalty was payable by it. The claim for deduction in respect of the said
payment was made by the respondent. During the relevant A.Y. 1995-96, royalty
was paid by the assessee as a percentage of net selling price of the licensed
goods products.

According to the Supreme Court, two questions arose for its
determination. Firstly, whether the question regarding applicability of S.
35AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was ever raised by the Assessing Officer in
this case ? The second question which arose for determination in this case was
whether the expenditure incurred was revenue expenditure or whether it was an
expenditure which was capital in nature and depending on the answer to the
said question, the applicability of S. 35AB of the Income-tax Act needed to be
considered.

The Supreme Court observed that, on the first question,
there was considerable amount of confusion. It appeared that prior to the A.Y.
1995-96, the Department had been contending that the royalty expenditure came
within the ambit of S. 35AB. However, there was some doubt as to whether the
said contention regarding applicability of S. 35AB was at all raised. In this
regard, the order of the Assessing Officer was not clear principally because
it had focussed only on one point, viz., whether such expenditure is
revenue or capital in nature. The Supreme Court held that even for the
applicability of S. 35AB, the nature of expenditure is required to be decided
at the threshold because if the expenditure is found to be revenue in nature,
then S. 35AB may not apply. However if it is found to be capital in nature,
then the question of amortisation and spread over, as contemplated by S. 35AB,
would certainly come into play. Therefore in the view of the Supreme Court, it
was not correct to say that in this case, interpretation of S. 35AB was not in
issue and the above reasoning was further fortified by the question framed by
the High Court.

The Supreme Court therefore held that the said question
needed to be decided authoritatively by the High Court as it was an important
question of law, particularly, after insertion of S. 35AB and therefore,
remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance
with law.

The Supreme Court did not express any opinion on the second
question observing that it was for the High Court to decide, after construing
the agreement between the parties, whether the expenditure was revenue or
capital in nature and, depending on the answer to that question, the High
Court would have to decide the applicability of S. 35AB of the Income-tax Act.
The Supreme Court kept all contentions on both sides expressly open.

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Backdoor Taxation ?

Editorial

One often hears claims by tax
officials that India has one of the lowest tax rates in the world for
individuals, that the effective taxes paid by companies in India as a percentage
of their profits is very low as compared to that paid by companies in other
countries, etc. Are such claims really true ? Do such claims take into account
the real effects of our tax system on taxpayers ?

What one needs to keep in mind
is that the taxes as per the rates found in the Finance Act are not the only
taxes that a taxpayer ends up paying. MAT, wealth tax and FBT add to the tax
burden. The provisions of our tax laws ensure that a taxpayer ends up paying
taxes not only on his real income, but on various other items added to his
income for non-tax reasons. To illustrate, salaried employees pay taxes on
retirement compensation (which is really a capital receipt), on stock options
which may not fetch any return, etc. Businessmen pay taxes on delayed payments
of provident fund, taxes, duties and fees, on cash expenses exceeding certain
limits, on expenses on which tax is not deducted at source, and on penalties
incurred in course of business. Most people pay taxes on capital appreciation on
sale of assets, though at current prices they may be worse off, since cost
inflation index neutralises only 75% of consumer inflation. Over the years, one
has learnt to live with such unfair provisions, which result in more tax than
the fair tax on one’s income.

In recent years, one sees a new
dimension being added to such backdoor taxation. Let us look at some
developments :


  • Software used for processing of income tax
    returns is defective, computing wrong amounts of tax in respect of long term
    capital gains, giving rise to incorrect demands and lower refunds.




  • Online system of TDS is started, and the
    return-processing software gives credit only on the basis of the online tax
    credit as per the TIN system, which is normally less than half the amount of
    TDS claimed. Demands are raised and refunds refused on basis of such non-grant
    of tax credit (TDS). Applications for rectification remain unattended to, in
    spite of all relevant TDS certificates being filed. There is no provision for
    speedy redressal of such grievances.




  • Banks are asked to upload tax payment details
    online into the TIN system. Invariably, bank clerks make errors, on account of
    which the taxpayer does not get credit for taxes paid. The taxpayer has to
    approach the Assessing Officer a number of times to get credit for each such
    payment incorrectly entered by banks. Wrong demands are raised and refunds
    refused on account of credits not granted.




  • Even before the TIN system has stabilised, and
    while thousands of crores of taxes paid by way of TDS and advance taxes are
    lying unadjusted against the correct taxpayer PAN, TDS credit rules are
    amended to provide that credit shall be given not on the basis of TDS
    certificate, but on the basis of quarterly e-TDS statements filed by the tax
    deductor. No provision is made for any method for the deductee to ensure that
    his PAN is quoted correctly by the deductor. The deductee is now therefore
    left at the mercy of the TIN system and the tax deductor for getting credit of
    TDS.




  • E-filing and centralised processing of tax
    returns are introduced ostensibly to speed up the processing of tax returns.
    It is then realised that the e-filed returns cannot be processed by the
    software, which is not yet operational, and that the whole process of refunds
    will get held up.




  • No effort is made to ensure that rectifications
    and appellate effects are speeded up.



Taking each of these happenings
in isolation, one can understand that these could be due to teething problems.
However, when one sees that no efforts are being made to sort out past problems,
that existing problems are sought to be kept under wraps, and that new problems
are being created without a care for taxpayer difficulties, one wonders whether
there is more to this than meets the eye.

Computerisation of the tax
system was supposed to make the whole process of tax payment and recovery more
taxpayer-friendly. In reality, the system is being experimented with at the cost
of the taxpayer. Given India’s famed skills in software, the computerisation
efforts should not have caused so much difficulty to so many.

The least that the CBDT can do
to dispel taxpayer doubts is :


  • Admit the problems being faced and share with
    taxpayers the progress being made in resolving the problems on an ongoing
    basis;




  • Set up alternative mechanisms to deal with
    computerisation/software defects & failures, so that taxpayers do not suffer
    due to such defects; and


  • Ensure that in future, computerisation of processes by taxpayers is not made
    mandatory unless the software and systems are ready, tested, and found to be
    mistake-proof and reliable.





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Where is the Wealth of Commons?

Editorial

By the time this communication reaches you, the Commonwealth
Games would have commenced. Over the last three weeks, the Commonwealth Games
have hogged the headlines in the print media and have been the topic of debates
/ discussions on numerous prime-time shows. Much has been said about corruption,
the callous approach in which the Organising Committee, sections of the
bureaucracy, and other agencies have functioned. The object of this editorial is
not to debate upon the absolute chaos which one is witnessing, but to dwell upon
much larger issues which have emerged through debate and discussion on the
Games. The Commonwealth Games are supposed to promote the principles of the
Commonwealth Organisation. Most of us are unaware of the Singapore Declaration
of 1971, in which, promotion of the principles of human rights and good
governance is a significant aspect.

The debate that has been carried on in the media brings to my
mind four specific aspects which we as a nation must address if we are to become
a country that merits the attention of the world. The organisation of the games
reflects four ills which are unique not to the Games but pervade the national
scene. Lack of prioritisation, degeneration of national character, lack of
foresight or vision and finally, our love for the event rather than the object
behind it.

The first is lack of prioritisation. It is said that the
ultimate cost of the Games is going to be equal to the cost of agricultural debt
waiver. Assuming that there is some degree of exaggeration, the money disbursed
is going to reach some pockets, whether they are of corrupt politicians,
bureaucrats or the resident or foreign agencies. The real point is that even if
the money was spent more efficiently, it was not going to benefit the common
sportsman at all. In my view, the organisation of the Games was flawed right
from the conceptualisation stage. The whole objective of hosting the Games was
to create a sporting infrastructure, which would be available to sportsmen at
large. Creating world-class facilities at one location would never serve any
purpose since the access to them is limited to a few. The resources should have
been utilised to create different facilities across the country or at least, the
facilities should have been spread out much more than they are today. It is here
that there is a gross error in priorities.

In a country where resources are scarce, we must see that
they are spent with the right priorities. Despite all its promises, even the
current government has been unable to allocate enough resources for education.
Spending on the health sector is also meeting the same fate. Sixty-three years
after independence, our development is extremely skewed. While we may have made
substantial progress in the field of infrastructure, particularly in the field
of communications, unless we pay attention to the basic pillars of human
infrastructure that is education and health, we will fail miserably in achieving
the dream of a powerful Indian nation. Even when we spend on education and
health, we need to get our priorities in place. We tend to pay a lot of
attention to higher education like creation of better management and engineering
institutes while the real need is to improve the quality of primary and
secondary education. Even in the health sector, we tend to concentrate on super
speciality hospitals while the need is to create a vast network of primary
health centres that will cater to the needs of the common man.

The second problem is in regard to the steady degeneration of
national character. A Union Minister commenting on the collapse of a bridge said
that the bridge in question was not to be used by sportsmen but by members of
the public. The statement is shocking to say the least. Another bureaucrat has
gone on record to say that the standards of hygiene in other parts of the world
are different from ours. This has become a common phenomenon in public life. We
break with impunity the laws we make, and think nothing about the breach of
ethical standards. The problem is that we do not seem to feel aggrieved. It is
this silent acceptance that perpetrates the decay of moral standards. It is only
if we perceive that there is a problem, will we strive to rectify it, otherwise
we will simply lower the bar and that does not augur well for us as a nation.

The next characteristic which was displayed in the
organisation of the Games is a complete lack of foresight or vision. The Games
were allotted to us as early as 2005. Yet, for the first three years from that
date, we did nothing of note in that regard. It is reported that tenders for
work were floated as late as in 2008. Again this lack of foresight / vision is
not unique to the Games .The site of the new Mumbai airport was selected more
than a decade ago. If there are environmental issues today, they would have
existed even then. It is only now that we are looking at environmental
clearances. Further, the site at which the new airport is proposed is such that
experts state that it is not capable of expansion and it will suffer from
congestion in about 25 years. This reflects a complete lack of vision. Today,
the vision is limited to the next election.

The last aspect is our love for events rather than for the
objective behind those events. Out of the aggregate spending for the Games, a
significant quantum is supposedly to be spent on the opening and closing
ceremonies. The programmes planned are such that the limelight is on actors and
not on sportsmen. Success in the Games is to be measured by the creation of
sports persons who will dominate the world of sports and not a spectacle that
the world will see and quickly forget. This is true of many of our festivals and
programmes. The Ganapati festival is an illustration. While it was initiated all
those years ago with the object of ensuring social bonding, people seem to have
lost sight of this very objective.

Having highlighted all these problems and issues, I believe
there is still hope. This is for the reason that whatever ills the media may
suffer from, it has made people aware. The Right to Information Act has created
a virtual revolution. The youth of today give strength to this hope. In them, I
see the urge to act. The ‘meter jam’ agitation is a case in point. It reflects
the non acceptance of injustice. If the “educated” class can lend a helping hand
and contribute their might, things will gradually change. Young India has a vast
pool of talent. All we need to do is harness it to create quality in public
life!

Once the games are over, all the discussion will be forgotten
and the country will bask in the “glory” of the medals that we are likely to
garner in the absence of participation of top sportsmen and athletes. It is this
national apathy which the organisers are banking on and we, the educated class,
must strive to avoid. We must demand an inquiry. Into the shoddy organisation,
total lack of governance and gross wastage of national resources contributed by
the diligent citizens of this country.


Anil Sathe
Joint Editor

The Bursting of the Bubble

Editorial

The last few months have seen the eruption of a major crisis
in the financial services and banking sector, particularly in the USA. Entities
hitherto regarded as icons and pillars of Wall Street have bitten the dust. Even
entities regarded as too big to fail have succumbed to this financial crisis.
Giants such as Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch, AIG, Washington Mutual, have all either gone under or had to be bailed
out by the US Government or other entities. Giants such as Citibank, UBS, Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs have been shaken to seek financial assistance. This
crisis is already being compared to the great depression of the 1930s. It is
therefore evident that what we are witnessing is not just a minor storm which
will quickly blow over, but a full-fledged hurricane which will leave
devastation in its wake. Given the dominance of American financial services
entities and banks over the world economy, the repercussions are bound to be
felt all over the world.

What does this imply for us here in India ? The Government,
the Finance Minister and various other government functionaries have been rather
too quick to clarify that this will not affect India significantly, since Indian
banks and financial services companies have not over-extended themselves. While
the direct impact may not be as significant as in the US, even in these early
days after the eruption of the crisis in the US, one reads various reports
everyday about the indirect effects of this crisis in India.

One direct impact of course has been on the subsidiaries of
such companies in India, where bankruptcy/sale has created uncertainty about the
continuation of business by these entities. Employees of such subsidiaries are
suddenly left wondering whether they will have their jobs at the end of the
month or not. With job uncertainty looming, employees are hesitant to spend as
freely as before, impacting demand for goods and services.

Most infotech companies in India have had a high level of
exposure to the banking, financial services and insurance sector. The chaos and
turmoil in this sector will significantly impact their growth, and the frenzied
hiring by companies will definitely now be a thing of the past. Unrealistic
salary hikes may no longer be the norm for the next few years.

The second impact will certainly be on foreign direct
investment. Many of these entities had been investing directly themselves or had
been active in raising foreign funds for investment in India either through the
private equity route or through different types of funds. Such initiatives will
obviously now be significantly reduced, as these entities would focus their
energies on raising funds to ensure their own survival. Lending by these
entities would also be restricted, in order to limit their exposure.

Liquidity has almost dried up, particularly for risky
businesses and ventures. Banks and financial companies have become extremely
cautious in lending. Businesses which had based their expansion plans on the
basis of recent growth figures have started cutting back on their proposals to
expand. This is bound to affect growth of Indian industry and business — the
days of assured growth are over.

The real estate market, which had assumed the proportions of
a speculative bubble, has been particularly impacted in two ways. There are few
takers willing to splurge their liquidity on buying real estate, or renting real
estate at the prevailing unrealistic levels. Real estate developers have so far
been desperately holding on to their prices, hoping that the crisis will soon
tide over. However, the easy flow of money that fuelled the growth in real
estate prices has dried up, and not only that, money committed to certain
projects by some foreign investors is no longer forthcoming. Further, most of
the foreign capital in this sector which had been attracted on the back of
assured returns offered by Indian developers would soon start falling due for
payment, aggravating the liquidity crisis of Indian real estate developers.
There is bound to be a shakeout in this sector, with the highly leveraged
players forced to sell out to better capitalised developers. Hopefully, real
estate prices will now gravitate to more realistic and sane levels.

Our understanding of finance is undergoing a thorough
revision. Complex financial concepts such as value at risk, complex derivatives,
securitisation, which were once regarded as cutting tools of the financial
services business, are now shunned. Stand-alone investment-banking, so far
regarded as a money-spinner, is no longer regarded as a viable business.
Government intervention, which was sought to be minimised during good times, is
now welcomed.

All in all, the next couple of years at least should see
tightening of conditions on the economic front, with a natural fallout on all
services and businesses, including on our profession. Fortunately, the
Government still has scope for liberalisation of various sectors of the economy,
which can help improve efficiency and create opportunities for business, so that
we continue to see some growth, unlike the developed countries of the West,
which expect to see a decline.

As professionals, we also have the advantage of seeing newer
areas of practice emerging, which can help us grow in spite of the slowdown. We
need to prepare ourselves to meet this challenge, so that we are not caught
unawares by the slowdown. We also need to be extra careful in our audits, to
ensure that we are not blamed for business failures sought to be covered up by
managements.

There is however a silver lining. Major bankruptcies, such as
in the US, are unlikely in India. In the long run, new financial structures will
emerge. The US dominance may reduce with Asian countries emerging stronger. This
crisis may mark the beginning of a new phase in the world economy, with
opportunities for all of us in the long run.

Gautam Nayak

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IFRS implementation Û Auditors’ Training

Accountant Abroad

Earning your stripes as a certified public accountant is not
an easy job. This is about to get even more complicated as the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission is moving toward adoption of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

There is going to be a scramble to train people who are in or
headed for financial accounting careers. Plus, there will be a host of issues
that arise for the profession: Training institutes and firms will be stretched
to prepare auditors for the switch. Accounting firms may face new legal
liability. And, investors will have a new breed of financial statements to
study. There’s work ahead for all involved.


Principle-based v. rule-based :


One thing most accountants have probably learned is this :
U.S. GAAP largely is considered a rules-based set of standards, while IFRS is
considered more principles-based and, therefore, subject to more interpretation.
This requires that accountants know business, the economics behind transactions
and the accountant’s responsibility to society to report things that reflect
economic reality. Without this knowledge, data could be presented in ways that
could be misunderstood or misleading. If rules are going to be less specific,
then intent needs to be understood.

Will professors focus more on principles and the conceptual
framework for the rules rather than on the rules themselves ? But will there be
time to teach anything but regulations and the how-to mechanics of accounting ?
These questions remain un- answered.

There is a need to graduate students who know more ‘canon’
than context since partners and managers can do the interpretive work. There is
a requirement for entry-level people who know enough rules to be effective when
sent out on a job. Most agree that principles will be of increasing importance
in training the next generation of accountants as there is more judgment needed
in applying IFRS.

However, this does not take away the fact that focus needs to
be on the conceptual framework, which is more heavily relied upon in IFRS.
Professors can round out this knowledge by comparing IFRS specifics to those of
U.S. GAAP.

This brings in the issue of litigation. One can take a legal
stand when it comes to rules by saying that ‘These are the rules. We made sure
the company conformed to them.’ This is not the same with principles. They can
be interpreted differently, and the interpretation that seemed like a good idea
during audit might not look as good in front of a jury. In light of legal
issues, the shift to fewer rules and more principles will prompt accountants to
hone skills in documenting interpretations and procedures clearly and concisely,
resulting in the entry-level person turning into a critical thinker and a good
writer.

The other point to ponder is discussions between auditors and
corporate management over disclosures and unqualified financial statements. IFRS
may give managers more power in negotiating with auditors over rules’
interpretation and adverse opinions in statements. Issuing an audit opinion is
the auditor’s discretion including the type of opinion to issue. However, there
is a school of thought which opines that this could result in additional
disclosures in the financial statements whether by way of a footnote or
otherwise. If this takes place, then investors will need to work harder to
understand the financial health of companies they’re researching.

World-class catch-up :

Since 2005, companies in the European Union have been
adhering to IFRS, a circumstance that some feel puts U.S. markets at a
disadvantage. “Banks are interested in IFRS because U.S. regulations place a
significant cost on firms.”

GAAP compliance makes U.S. markets more expensive places to
raise capital and less competitive than foreign markets. That was particularly
true for foreign firms, as they had to reconcile statements to U.S. GAAP prior
to this past January, when the SEC dropped the GAAP-reconciliation requirement.
The fact that the SEC said it’s OK to file under IFRS is tantamount to saying
those standards are acceptable.

IFRS may soon be acceptable for U.S. securities issuers, too.
The SEC voted on August 27, 2007 to publish for public comment a proposed
roadmap that could lead to the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers beginning in 2014.
The proposed multi-year plan sets out several milestones that, if achieved,
could lead to the use of IFRS by U.S. issuers in their filings with the
commission. With market globalisation as a driver, the push to bring U.S.
accounting in line with international standards is definitely on. This is going
to result in a requirement for much more robust IFRS education. Academics expect
IFRS questions to first appear on the CPA exam this year. Convergence between
the two standards — U.S. GAAP and IFRS — already is under way.

(Source : knowledge.Wpcarey.com)

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Investor Protection – Shareholder Nominees As Directors

Accountant Abroad

A new rule in the US makes
it easier for minority investors to remove

profligate and ineffective board
members


We have witnessed in recent
times how SEBI has been introducing measures to regulate market players in its
quest to protect small investors. There has been some speculation that the
regulator may introduce provisions to force companies to appoint directors
representing small investors and employees. In this context the following report
on the fallout of a new SEC ruling allowing investor nominees for board
positions makes interesting reading.

The Securities and Exchange
Commission, the US securities market regulator, recently voted in favour of a
proposal that requires companies to put candidates nominated by investors on the
proxy statements sent to stockholders before director elections. Such candidates
can be put up by investors or groups that will be eligible to offer nominees.
The new regulations will let investors owning 3% of a company nominate directors
on corporate ballots, a step that may help shareholders oust board members
accused of non-performance and a failure to boost shareholder value.

The SEC acted in response to
investor complaints that company-selected directors failed to rein in
compensation and risk-taking that led to more than $ 1.79 trillion of writedowns
in the financial sector during the credit crisis. Business groups, including the
US Chamber of Commerce, have fought the change, arguing that labour unions and
pension funds will misuse the threat of proxy fights to seek concessions that
would harm companies.

SEC chairperson Mary
Schapiro said before the vote : “These rules reflect compromise and weighing
competing interests; as with all compromises, they do not reflect all the views
of any one person or group. They are rational, balanced and necessary to enhance
investor confidence in the integrity of our system of corporate governance.” The
SEC has considered permitting so-called proxy access since 2003, only to back
away in the face of opposition from corporations and concern that the agency
would lose a law suit.

The Chamber of Commerce, the
nation’s biggest business lobby, is weighing the possibility of filing a
lawsuit. The organisation had worked with Washington-based lawyer Eugene Scalia
about a year ago to analyse the SEC’s rule-making process on the matter.

“Using the proxy process to
give labour unions, pension funds and others greater leverage to try to ram
through their agenda makes no sense,” David Hirschmann, chief executive officer
of the Chamber’s capital markets unit, said in a statement. The business lobby
“will continue to fight this flawed approach using every method available.” he
said. Scalia, a partner at Gibson Dunn & Crutchei; has won suits against the SEC
over rules for mutual funds and fixed-indexed annuities on the grounds that the
agency made procedural missteps in writing regulations.

Under the SEC’s proxy access
rule, shareholders will be able to nominate at least one director and as much as
25% of a company’s board. Investors will be required to hold the minimum amount
of stock at least through the date of the election, and couldn’t use the rule if
they hold the shares for the purpose of changing control of the company.

“Smaller reporting
companies” with less than $ 75 million in market capitalisation will be exempt
from the rule for three years, the SEC said. Nominating dissident directors
previously required that shareholders mail a separate ballot with the names of
competing candidates and persuade other investors to vote along with them.
Activist investors such as Carl Icahn and Nelson Peltz have waged proxy fights
to get their candidates elected to boards of companies they said were
under-performing.

Various institutional
investors and the bodies representing pension and labour funds have opined to
the effect that the process was time-consuming and too expensive for all but the
wealthiest shareholders. One of the lessons of this current economic downturn is
to be mindful that governance is a significant risk factor and the new
regulation that affords greater accountability will go a long way towards
mitigating that risk. However, the rule won’t necessarily cut costs for
investors because of filing requirements the SEC has mandated. The legal costs
for meeting the process may ultimately be as much as the printing costs sought
to be avoided.

As for possibilities of
litigation arising out of the new rule, one view is that the SEC is susceptible
to litigation, because the rule doesn’t allow shareholders to reject proxy
access if they don’t want it or set “different parameters for ownership
thresholds and holding periods”. There is room for a very serious legal
challenge on the grounds that the rule is internally inconsistent. It will be
interesting to see how investors respond to the new opportunity handed out to
them.

(Source :Bloomberg/Financial Express, 30-8-2010—
excerpted & edited report)

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ADIT v. TII Team Telecom International Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 12 taxmann.com 502 (Mum.) Article 5, 7 and 12 of India-Israel DTAA; Section 9 of Income-tax Act A.Y.: 2006-07. Dated: 26-8-2011

i) In the absence of transfer of certain rights constituting ‘copyright right’, payment received by taxpayer was not ‘royalty’ under India-Israel DTAA.

  (ii)  ‘Process’ in the definition of ‘royalty’ should be understood as know-how and not product. Hence, treating payment for software as payment for ‘process’ is divorced from the ground realities of business.

Facts:
The taxpayer was a company incorporated in, and tax resident of, Israel. The taxpayer did not have any office or PE in India and it qualified to access India-Israel DTAA.

The taxpayer entered into an agreement with an Indian company (IndiaCo) for grant of a perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive, royalty-free, worldwide licence, to install, use, operate or copy the software and the documentation licensed under the agreement solely for implementation, operation, management and maintenance of IndiaCo’s wireless network in India.

In terms of the agreement, the taxpayer had received certain payment form IndiaCo. The taxpayer had furnished return of its income disclosing ‘nil’ income. The AO found that the taxpayer had raised invoice on IndiaCo.

The taxpayer contended that the amount received from IndiaCo was business profits and in absence of PE in India, it could not be taxed in India. The AO, however, held that the amount was ‘royalty’ and was liable to tax in India.

In appeal, the CIT(A) held that the payment was for ‘purchase of copyrighted material’ and not payment for ‘use of, or right to use, copyright’. Therefore, it was not ‘royalty’ under Article 12(3) of India-Israel DTAA.

Before the Tribunal, the taxpayer submitted that while the decision in Gracemac Corporation v. ADIT, (2010) 42 SOT 550 (Delhi) was a later decision, it was contrary to law laid down by the Special Bench decision in the case of Motorola Inc. v. DCIT, (2005) 95 ITD 269 (Delhi) (SB). Further, till a Larger Bench decision directly on the issue is not overruled, it has to be followed. On the other hand, the tax authority submitted that the later decision should be followed.

Held:
The Tribunal held as follows.
  (i)  In the context of India-Sweden DTAA, in Motorola case, the Special Bench considered the issue whether payment for software could be treated as payment for ‘use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary artistic or scientific work’ and held that the software supplied was a copyrighted article and not for providing use of a copyright and hence, it could not be considered as ‘royalty’ either under the Income-tax Act or under India-Sweden DTAA.

  (ii)  The language in India-Israel DTAA is the same as that in India-Sweden DTAA. In Motorola case, the Special Bench has identified four rights which would constitute ‘copyright right’. Since this is not so in case of the licence transferred by the taxpayer, the payment received by the taxpayer is not for use of copyright in the software. Hence, it was not ‘royalty’ under India-Israel DTAA.

 (iii)  When someone pays for the software, the payment is for product which gives certain results and not for the process of execution of embedded instructions. In fact, the software buyer cannot tinker with the process. Hence, to treat the payment for software as a payment for process would be a hyper-technical approach totally divorced from the ground realities of business. The ‘process’ in the definition of ‘royalty’ in the Article 12(3) of India-Israel DTAA should be understood in the nature of know-how and not a product.

Partition — Co-owner — Possession of vendee — Transfer of Property Act, S. 44 & Partition Act, S. 4.

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5 Partition — Co-owner —
Possession of vendee — Transfer of Property Act, S. 44 & Partition Act, S. 4.

[Ram & Ors. v. Ram Kishan
& Ors.,
AIR 2010 Allahabad 125.]

The plaintiffs and
defendants were co-owners of house. The defendants sold their share in the house
in favour of defendant No. 1, namely, Shri Ram Kishan who took possession
forcibly. Therefore
the plaintiff filed the suit for cancellation of the sale and prayed for
mandatory injunction against the defendant No. 1.

The Allahabad High Court
observed that when the stranger to the family acquires an interest in an
immovable property or dwelling house of an undivided family, he has the right to
seek partition. S. 4 of the Partition Act gives a right to a member of the
family, who has not transferred his share, to purchase the transferee’s share,
when the transferee files a suit for partition.

These are two valuable
rights of the members of the undivided family. Particularly when the right to
joint possession is denied to a transferee in order to prevent a transferee who
is an outsider from forcing his way into a dwelling house in which the other
members of the transferor’s family had a right to live. Without there being any
physical formal partition of an undivided immovable property, a co-sharer cannot
put his vendee in possession. It was a settled law that the purchaser of a co-parcener’s
undivided interest in the joint family property was not entitled to the
possession of what he had purchased. He can only claim a right to sue for
partition of the property and seek allotment of that which on partition might be
found to fall to the share of the co-parcener whose share he had purchased. It
was therefore obvious that even if the sale deed whereby the undivided share has
been alienated was legally permitted to be executed, the transferee cannot force
his way into the dwelling house of the co-owners until and unless he files a
suit for partition and obtains an order from the Court or makes a settlement
with the
co-owners who have not transferred their shares.

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Firm — Registration — Reconstitution of firm — No separate registration necessary — S. 60 and S. 63 of Partnership Act.

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3 Firm — Registration —
Reconstitution of firm — No separate registration necessary — S. 60 and S. 63 of
Partnership Act.


[Noble Kuries v.
Sebastian Antony & Ors.,
AIR 2010 Kerala 99.]

Whether a fresh registration
of the partnership firm is required consequent to its reconstitution to maintain
a suit in view of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act and whether
non-intimation of reconstitution of the partnership firm to the Registrar of
Firms would affect maintainability of the suit.

On account of some of the
partners retiring and another person coming in, the partnership firm was
reconstituted on 1-4-1986. S. 59 of the Act deals with registration of the
partnership. There is no provision in the Act which states that when there is
reconstitution of a firm which is already registered, a further registration is
required after such reconstitution. What is required is only intimation to the
Registrar of Firms about the reconstitution/change as provided u/s.60 to u/s.63
of the Act. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Bharat Sarvodaya
Mills v. Mohatta Bros.,
(AIR 1969 Gujarat 178) held that no separate
registration is necessary where there is reconstitution of a continuing firm. In
this case the firm had obtained registration from the Registrar of Firms. Hence
after reconstitution of that firm it was not necessary to have a fresh
registration of the reconstituted firm.

Then the question is what
are the consequences of not intimating the Registrar of Firms about
reconstitution even if it is assumed so, on the maintainability of the suits. S.
60 to S. 63 of the Act require any change in the constitution of a registered
partnership firm to be intimated to the Registrar of Firms. But neither the Act,
nor the Rules provide any time limit for that.

Thus, there could be no time
limit for intimation of the reconstitution or other change in a registered
partnership to the Registrar of Firms, though intimation has to be given within
a reasonable time.

Editor’s Note: The
Partnership Act 1932 as applicable in Maharashtra provides for time limit for
intimating changes in the constitution and other particulars of a registered
partnership firm to the Registrar of Firms.

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Limitation — Acknowledgement of debt — On each repayment of loan limitation get extended — Limitation Act, S. 18, S. 19.

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4 Limitation —
Acknowledgement of debt — On each repayment of loan limitation get extended —
Limitation Act, S. 18, S. 19.

[Dena Bank, Durg v. Smt.
Chameli Bai and Ors.,
AIR 2010 Chhattisgarh 49]

The Bank filed a civil suit
for recovery of loan advance to the defendant for purchase of tractor and
trolley. The loan was repayable in half-yearly instalments in seven years with
interest The Bank pleaded that the defendant kept depositing various amounts and
thus on each repayment of loan, the limitation period got extended by three
years.

The Court held that the
period of limitation for suits relating to accounts for the balance due on a
mutual, open and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands
between the parties, is three years and the time from which period begins to run
is to be computed from the close of the year, in which the last item admitted or
proved is entered in the account; such year is to be computed as in the account
as per Article 1 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.

In the present case also,
the account between the parties was at all times an open and current one. From
the transactions reflecting from the statement of account, it was clear that it
was mutual during the relevant period. As per S. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1891,
the plaintiff-Bank has submitted statement of account duly certified by the Bank
officer and the same is a prima facie evidence of the existence of such
entries, and the same may be treated as sufficient evidence to hold that the
defendant No. 1 deposited the sums towards repayment of loan on various
occasions. Thus, by virtue of S. 19 read with aforesaid Article 1 of the
schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, fresh extended period of limitation of
three years is to be computed from the close of the year in which the last item
is admitted or proved as entered in the account.

The Suit was not barred by
limitation.

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Appeal by Department — Measures to reduce litigation.

New Page 1

2 Appeal by Department —
Measures to reduce litigation.

[Commr. of Central Excise
v. Techno Economic Services P. Ltd.,
(2010) 255 ELT 526 (Bom.)]

While dismissing an appeal
filed by the Revenue wherein the amount in dispute was Rs.1,21,219 the Court
noted that number of appeals are being filed before the Court; wherein the
customs duty and/or central excise duty involved was negligible. It was noticed
that most of the times the duty impact ranges between

`2 to 3 lakh; wherein,
normally, senior advocates appear on behalf of the Revenue assisted by two
junior advocates. In spite of engaging multiple advocates, adjournments were
sought. The matters were allowed to remain pending in the Court for a
substantially long period of time. With the result, they come up for hearing on
more than two or three occasions. Adjournments were always taken and granted by
the Court considering the substantial cause shown for the adjournment. All this
results in payment of heavy professional charges to the advocates appearing for
the Department. Sometimes the expenses incurred by the Revenue were
disproportionate to the stakes involved in the appeal and/or petition filed by
the Department.

In the aforesaid scenario,
the Court took the judicial notice of the fact that the Centre and the States
had acquired the ‘government is the largest litigant’ tag, accounting for 70% of
the 3 crore cases — over 2.1 crore pending in various Courts.

The Court, observed that the
Central Government had formulated a National Litigation Policy (NLP) to shed the
tag ‘Largest Litigant’. Thus, keeping in view the policy of the Central
Government, it invited attention of the Chairman of the Central Board of Excise
and Revenue (‘the Board’) to consider the necessity of taking policy decision
not to file cases; wherein the duty/tax impact was negligible. The similar
policy was already in vogue so far as the Income-tax Department was concerned.
The Central Board of Direct Taxes vide its Circular dated 27th March, 2000
followed by other Circulars dated 24th October, 2005 and 15th May, 2008 had
taken a policy decision not to file appeals or references wherein the tax effect
is less than the amount prescribed in the instructions issued from time to time,
so as to reduce litigation before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The
said policy decision taken by the CBDT had reduced the volume of litigation,
with the result, their officers were in a position to concentrate on the cases
involving heavy stakes.

It has, therefore, become
necessary for the Board to impress upon the Departmental heads not to go for
appeals and litigation wherein tax or duty impact was not substantial, otherwise
it results in harassment to the assessees and creates unnecessary burden on the
infrastructure of the Revenue Department. The ‘let the Court decide’ attitude
needs to be given go-bye.

The Chairman of the Central
Board of Excise and Revenue shall consider the necessity of issuing a Circular,
on the lines of the Circulars issued by the CBDT, so as to reduce litigations
arising out of indirect tax legislations.

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Appeal — Merger of order — Once the Appellate Authority disposes a matter, the order passed by the subordinate authority gets merged in such order.

New Page 1

1 Appeal — Merger of order —
Once the Appellate Authority disposes a matter, the order passed by the
subordinate authority gets merged in such order.


[Box and Carton India P.
Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex. Delhi,
2010 (255) ELT 423 (Trib. Del.)]

The applicant had filed a
rectification application before CESTAT alleging various mistakes apparent on
the record in the order and pleaded that the order needs to be rectified.
Against the said order of the CESTAT the applicant had also approached the
Supreme Court and the appeal was dismissed by the Court. The applicant in the
rectification proceedings submitted that the issue raised in the rectification
application was not raised in the appeal before the Supreme Court and therefore
the principle of merger cannot be applied.

The CESTAT held that it was
a settled doctrine of merger that once the Appellate Authority is seized with
the matter, and particularly in relation to the merits of the case, whatever
order is passed in such proceedings by the Appellate Authority, becomes a final
order and becomes an executable order. In other words, once the proceedings in
appeal are disposed off by an order by the Appellate Authority, the order passed
by the subordinate authority, gets merged in such order.

Once the party takes the
step to take the matter at appellate stage on conclusion of the proceedings at
original stage and the Appellate Court, considering the matter on merits,
disposes the same either by way of reversal, modification or confirmation, the
operative order would be that of the Appellate Authority. It would all depend
upon exercise of powers by the Appellate Authority. Once the Appellate Authority
finds no case for interference in the order passed by the lower authority and
dismisses the appeal, the order of the original authority would get merged in
the order of the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the order which would be
executable will be that of the Appellate Authority.

The Tribunal considering the
law laid down by the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Kunhayammed v.
State of Kerala,
(2000) 6 SCC 359 held, that an order passed by the Apex
Court in its appellate jurisdiction either by reversing, modifying or confirming
the order of the lower court or lower authority would result in merger of order
of the lower Court or the lower authority in the order of the Apex Court,
irrespective of the fact as to whether such order of the Apex Court is a
speaking order or a non-speaking order.

It was further held that
once the applicant had approached the Supreme Court against such order and
having tried to get it set aside, it was not permissible for the applicant
thereafter to approach the Tribunal under the guise of rectification of the
order and to seek de novo hearing of the appeal. What in essence the
applicant was seeking in the matter was not the correction of the order, but
reassessment of the matter on the ground that the Tribunal failed to take note
of the fact that the documents which the Commissioner was expecting the parts to
produce were already in possession thereof. Undoubtedly, this could have been
the ground for the appellants before the Apex Court in the appeal field by the
appellants.

In any case, it is settled
law that the party is not entitled to raise the points in piecemeal by way of
different proceedings in that regard. If the party does not raise a point at an
appropriate stage and the matter stands concluded by final order, then the party
would be debarred from raising such point thereafter by reopening the matter.
That is principle embedded in Explanation 4 of S. 11 of the CPC. Considering the
same, it is not permissible to allow the applicant to raise issue under the
guise of filing rectification of application.

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Electricity tariff : Advocates running office from commercial place liable to be charged at Commercial basis : Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 : S. 49.

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  1. Electricity tariff : Advocates running office from
    commercial place liable to be charged at Commercial basis : Electricity
    (Supply) Act, 1948 : S. 49.

[ J.V.V.N. Ltd. & Ors. v. Smt. Parinitoo Jain & Anr.,
AIR 2009 Rajasthan 119]


The controversy involved is in regard to the electricity
tariff levied by the appellants on the offices of Advocates under category of
non domestic service.


The Single Judge relying on the judgement of Sajjan Raj
Surana v. JVVNL,
AIR 2002 Raj 109 held that categorisation and inclusion
of profession of a lawyer as a commercial establishment or non domestic
services for the purpose of payment of electricity consumption at commercial
rate was illegal.


On further appeal it was held that the decision of Sajjan
Raj Surana (supra) had been overruled by Larger Bench and the Advocates
running their office from their residences cannot be charged the additional
tariff on the commercial basis. However, in case advocates are running their
office at independent commercial place, then the advocate cannot be exempted
from the same. A distinction has been made between the office in a residence
and office in a commercial place.



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Choice of one reasonable course of treatment to other — Not medical negligence : Consumer Protection : S. 2(1)(g).

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  1. Choice of one reasonable course of treatment to other — Not
    medical negligence : Consumer Protection : S. 2(1)(g).

[ Martin F. D’souza v. Mohd. Ishfaq, AIR 2009 SC
2049]


The respondent who was suffering from chronic renal failure
was referred by the Director, Health Services to the Nanavati Hospital, Mumbai
for the purpose of a kidney transplant.


On or about 24-4-1991, the respondent reached Nanavati
Hospital, Bombay and was under the treatment of the appellant Doctor.
Investigations were underway to find a suitable donor. The respondent wanted
to be operated by Dr. Sonawala alone who was out of India.


The respondent approached the appellant Doctor. At the
time, the respondent, who was suffering from high fever, did not want to be
admitted to the Hospital despite the advice of the appellant. Hence, a broad
spectrum antibiotic was prescribed to him. The appellant constantly requested
the complainant to get admitted to hospital but the respondent refused. On
29-5-1991 the respondent who had high fever of 104 F finally agreed to get
admitted to hospital due to his serious condition.


The blood culture report of the respondent was received,
which showed a serious infection of the blood stream. The respondent insisted
on immediate kidney transplant even though the appellant had advised him that
in view of his blood and urine infection no transplant could take place for
six weeks. The respondent was administered Amikacin injection. On 8-6-1991,
the respondent, despite the appellants advice, got himself discharged from
Nanavati Hospital. The respondent received haemodialysis at Nanavati Hospital
and allegedly did not complain of deafness during this period. On 25-6-1991,
the respondent, on his own accord, was admitted to Prince Aly Khan Hospital,
where he was also treated with antibiotics. The complainant allegedly did not
complain of deafness during this period and conversed with doctors normally,
as was evident from their evidence. The respondent returned to Delhi on
14-8-1991. After discharge. The respondent filed a complaint before the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, claiming
compensation of an amount of Rs.12,00,000 as his hearing had been affected.
The appellant filed his reply stating, inter alia, that there was no material
brought on record by the respondent to show any correlation between the drugs
prescribed and the state of his health.


The case of the respondent, in brief, was that the
ap-pellant was negligent in prescribing Amikacin to the
respondent of 500 mg twice a day for 14 days as such dosage was excessive and
caused hearing impairment. It is also the case of the respondent that the
infection he was suffering from was not of a nature as to warrant
administration of Amikacin to him.


The Commission allowed the complaint of the respondent and
awarded Rs.4 lakhs with interest @ 12% as well as Rs.3 lakhs as compensation
as well as Rs.5000 as costs.


On appeal the Supreme Court observed that law, like
medicine, is an inexact science. One cannot predict with certainty an outcome
of many cases. It depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the
case, and also the personal notions of the Judge concerned who is hearing the
case. However, the broad and general legal principles relating to medical
negligence need to be understood.


A medical practitioner is not liable to be held negligent
simply because things went wrong from mischance or misadventure or through an
error of judgment in choosing one reasonable course of treatment in preference
to another. He would be liable only where his conduct fell below that of the
standards of a reasonably competent practitioner in his field. It is not
enough to show that there is a body of competent professional opinion which
considers that the decision of the accused professional was a wrong decision,
provided there also exists a body of professional opinion, equally competent,
which supports the decision as reasonable in the circumstances.


The standard of care has to be judged in the light of
knowledge available at the time of the incident and not at the date of the
trial. Also, where the charge of negligence is of failure to use some
particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally
available at that point of time.


As regard the impairment of hearing of the respondent is
concerned it was observed that there is no known antibiotic drug which has no
side effect. Hence merely because there was impairment in the hearing of the
respondent that does not mean that the appellant was negligent.


The Court further observed that some times despite best
efforts the treatment of a doctor fails. For instance, sometimes despite the
best effort of a surgeon, the patient dies. That does not mean that doctor or
the surgeon must be held guilty of medical negligence, unless there was some
strong evidence to that effect. The appellant was held not guilty of medical
negligence.

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Nomination by Member of Society empowers nominee to hold property in trust for real owner : Maharashtra Co-op. Societies Act, S. 30.

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  1. Nomination by Member of Society empowers nominee to hold
    property in trust for real owner : Maharashtra Co-op. Societies Act, S. 30.

[Ramdas Shivram Sattur v. Rameshchandra alias Ramchandra
Popatlal Shah & Ors.,
AIR 2009 (NOC) 2058 (Bom.)]


One Shri Shivram had purchased a plot of land in his own
name from co-op. hsg. Society. He nominated his wife Smt. Tarabai the original
defendant No. 1 as his nominee pursuant to S. 30 of the Mah. Co-op. Societies
Act, r/w. Rule 25 of the Rules framed thereunder.


They had 4 children namely Ramdas, Krishnadas, Vithaldas
and Sangita. After death of Shivram, Tarabai sold the property to Ramchandran
Popattlal Shah. The respondent No. 1 instituted suit against Tarabai for
specific performance and declaration. The society was also impleaded as party.


In the above litigation inter alia among other issue
one issue that came up for consideration was about the status of a nominee who
has been validly nominated as a member of Co-op. society u/s. 30 of
Maharashtra Co-op. Society Act.


The Court observed that by virtue of nomination of wife by
her deceased husband u/s.30 of the Maharashtra Co-op Societies Act, 1960, she
does not become absolute owner of the property, however, was only empowered to
hold the property in trust for the real owners that too for the purpose of
dealings with the society. Wife as such, had no power, authority and title to
alienate the property to the exclusion of the other legal heirs of her
deceased husband. Wife as such, was not competent to enter into an agreement
for sale of the suit plot as she along with her four children were class I
heirs of her deceased husband.


S. 30 of the Maharashtra Co-op. Societies Act does not
provide for a special rule of succession altering the rule of succession laid
down under the personal law.



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Liability of a surety or a guarantor to repay loan of principal debtor arises only when a default is made by the latter : State Financial Corporation Act 1951 : S. 29(1) and S. 31.

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  1. Liability of a surety or a guarantor to repay loan of
    principal debtor arises only when a default is made by the latter : State
    Financial Corporation Act 1951 : S. 29(1) and S. 31.

[ West Bengal Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. & Anr
v. Niccon Electronics Devices P. Ltd. & Ors.,
AIR 2009 Calcutta 193.]

The appellant had given financial assistance of Rs. 55 lacs
to the respondent No. 1 a Pvt. Ltd. Company @ interest 14% p.a. for setting up
of a plant. The respondent 2 to 7 executed a deed of their personal guarantee.


On the failure on part of respondent No. 1 to pay dues a
notice u/s.29(1) read with S. 30 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951
was issued, asking the respondent No. 1 to liquidate the dues within a
stipulated period, but as the respondent No. 1 failed to liquidate its dues in
accordance with the said notice, the appellant took over all secured assets of
the respondent No. 1.


The assets were auctioned and after adjusting the sale
proceeds of the fixed assets of respondent No. 1 amounting to Rs.12,00,000 in
the loan account of respondent No. 1, the appellant sent demand notices dated
7th June, 2005, invoking guarantee of respondent Nos. 2 to 7. By the said
notices, the appellant called upon the said respondents to pay the sum.


The Single Judge by an order appointed Jt. Receivers to
sell the properties and assets of respondents 2 to 7. The respondent submitted
that the auction by financial corporation in terms of S. 29 of the Act must be
exercised only on a defaulting party. Only when there was a default on the
part of the principal debtor that the separate provision could be invoked
against a surety or a guarantor for repayment of loan.


The Court observed that S. 29 of the Act nowhere states
that the corporation can proceed against the surety even if some properties
are mortgaged or hypothecated by it. The right of the financial corporation in
terms of S. 29 of the Act must be exercised only on a defaulting party. There
cannot be any default as is envisaged in S. 29 by a surety or a guarantor. The
liabilities of a surety or the guarantor to repay the loan of the principal
debtor arise only when a default is made by the latter.


The demand was, therefore, specifically made and default
had admittedly not occurred on the part of the ‘industrial concern’, as on
date of the said notice, so as to enable the appellant to invoke the provision
of S. 31 of the Act for enforcing the liability of any surety.

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Templates in Excel

Whether Concealment Penalty can be levied in case of reduction in loss ?

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 If the assessee has concealed particulars of his income
or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, a penalty u/s.271(1)(c)
(Concealment Penalty) can be imposed under the Income-tax Act (the Act). The
amount of such Concealment Penalty shall not be less than 100% (or more than
300%) of the amount of tax sought to be evaded (‘the tax on concealed income’).

1.2 The expression, ‘the amount of tax sought to be evaded’ (i.e.,
‘the tax on concealed income’) is defined in Explanation 4 to S. 271(1)(c),
which, inter alia, effectively provided (before amendment w.e.f. A.Y.
2003-2004) that the same represents the difference between the tax on assessed
income and the tax on returned income (assuming that the difference between the
returned income and the assessed income is treated as concealed income). This
explanation, inter alia, also provided that when concealed income exceeds
the total income, then the tax that would have been chargeable on concealed
income as if such concealed income is the total income of the assessee, is
treated as ‘tax on concealed income’. This explanation was inserted w.e.f.
1-4-1976 (hereinafter, the same is referred to as the said Explanation).

1.3 As there was difference of opinion amongst the High
Courts on the issue that if the income disclosed in the return as well as the
income assessed is in negative (even after making certain
additions/disallowances), whether Concealment Penalty can be imposed or not. An
appropriate amendment was made to take care of such situation u/s.271(1)(c) as
well as in the said Explanation by the Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. A.Y. 2003-2004
(hereinafter, such amended provisions are referred to as post-amendment
provisions and the earlier provisions are referred to as pre-amended
provisions). These amendments made by the Finance Act, 2002 are referred to as
Amendment of 2002. The post-amendment provisions made the position explicitly
clear that Concealment Penalty can be imposed even if income assessed is
negative and the assessee is not liable to pay any income-tax.

1.4 In the context of pre-amended provisions, the issue
referred to in para 1.3 above was decided by the Apex Court in the case of
Virtual Soft Systems Limited (289 ITR 83), wherein the Court took the view that
Concealment Penalty cannot be imposed in a case where the assessment has
resulted into loss where the assessee is not liable to pay any tax and the
Amendment of 2002 was applicable w.e.f. 1-4-2003 (i.e., A.Y. 2003-2004)
and the same is not clarificatory/declaratory in nature and hence the same is
prospective. This judgment has been considered in this column in the April, 2007
issue of the Journal.

1.5 The correctness of the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) was doubted by another Bench
of the Apex Court and hence the issue decided therein came up for
reconsideration before a larger Bench (three Judges) of the Apex Court in the
case of Gold Coin Health Food P. Limited, wherein the earlier judgment has been
overruled. Though this judgment will affect only the cases governed by the
pre-amended provisions (i.e., up to A.Y. 2002-03), considering its
importance and the fact that there may be many pending matters involving this
issue in respect of that period, it is thought fit to consider the same in this
column.


CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food P. Ltd.,


304 ITR 308 (SC) :

2.1 In the above case, the larger Bench of the Apex Court was
constituted to consider the correctness of the judgment of the Division Bench of
the Apex Court in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) and to
decide whether Concealment Penalty can be imposed in case of reduction in loss
under the pre-amended provisions. In that case, the Department had placed
reliance on Notes of Clauses relating to the Amendment of 2002 to contend that
the said amendment was clarificatory in nature and consequently it was
applicable retrospectively. This argument was rejected by the Court. Another
Division Bench, which doubted the correctness of the said judgment, noted that
the Division Bench in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra)
had rejected this argument, but it was of the view that the true effect of the
Amendment of 2002 was not considered in that case, as it was prima facie
of the view that merely because the amendment was stated to take effect from
1-4-2003, that cannot be the ground to hold that the same did not have a
retrospective effect.

2.2 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia,
contended that the purpose behind making the provisions relating to Concealment
Penalty is to penalise the assessee for (a) concealing particulars of income;
and/or (b) furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income, and hence, whether
the assessee’s income was a profit or loss was really of no consequence. It was
further contended that the word ‘any’ used in the expression in addition to ‘any
tax payable’ found in the provision makes the position clear that the penalty
was in addition to any tax and even if no tax was payable, the penalty was
leviable. The Amendment of 2002 was made to clarify this position as some High
Courts took a contrary view. This was not a substantive amendment which created
penalty for the first time. Even Notes on Clauses make the position clear that
the amendment was clarificatory in nature and would apply to all assessments
even prior to A.Y. 2003-04.

2.3 On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee, it was,
inter alia,
contended that the judgment in the case of Virtual Soft Systems
Limited (supra) lays down the correct principle in law and that position
was rightly noted by various High Courts, more particularly by the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in the case of Prithipal Singh and Co. (183 ITR 69) and the
Department’s appeal against this judgment was dismissed by the Apex Court (249
ITR 670). It was further contended that the Amendment of 2002 enlarged the scope
of levying Concealment Penalty and therefore, does not operate retrospectively
and is applicable only w.e.f. 1-4-2003. It was also pointed out that the
memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2002 also states that
this amendment will take effect from 1-4-2003.

2.4 After considering the arguments advanced on behalf of both the parties, the Court noted that in the judgment in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra), it was also observed that even if the statute does contain a statement to the effect that the amendment is clarificatory or declaratory, that is not the end of the matter. The Court has also to analyse the nature of the amendment to decide whether, in reality, it is clarificatory or declaratory. Hence, the date from which the amendment is made operative does not conclusively decide the issue. The Court also noted the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Reliance Jute and Industries Limited (120ITR 921) wherein, it was observed that the law to be applied in income-tax assessments is the law in force in the assessment year, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication.

2.5 The Court then stated that it will be necessary to focus on the definition of the term ‘income’, which is inclusively defined in S. 2(24) and includes losses, i.e., negative profits. Having stated so, the Court drew support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Harprasad & Co. P. Ltd. (99 ITR 118) and  observed as under    (page 313) :

“…. This Court held with reference to the charging provisions of the statute that the expression ‘income’ should be understood to include losses. The expression ‘profits and gains’ refers to positive income, whereas losses represent negative profit or in other words minus income. This aspect does not appear to have been noticed by the Bench in Virtual’s case (2007) 9 SCC 665. Reference to the order by this Court dismissing the Revenue’s Civil Appeal No. 7961 of 1996 in CIT v. Prithipal Singh and Co. is also not very important because that was in relation to the A.Y. 1970-71 when Explanation 4 to S. 271(1)(c) was not in existence. The view of this Court in Harprasad’s case leads to the irresistible conclusion that income also includes losses. Explanation 4(a) as it stood during the period April 1, 1976 to April 1, 2003 has to be considered in the background.”

2.6 The Court then stated that it appears that what the Amendment of 2002 intended was to make the position explicit, which otherwise was implied. For this, the Court noted the following recommendation of Wanchoo Committee pursuant to which a relevant portion of the said explanation was inserted w.e.f. 1-4-1976 (page 313) :

“We are not unaware that linking concealment penalty to tax sought to be evaded can, at times, lead to some anomalies. We would recommend that in cases where the concealed income is to be set off against losses incurred by an assessee under other heads of income or against losses brought forward from earlier years, and the total income thus gets reduced to a figure smaller than the concealed income or even to a minus figure, the tax sought to be evaded should be calculated as if the concealed income were the total income.”

2.7 Referring to the Circular No. 204, dated 24-7-1976, issued by the CBDT explaining the provisions along with which the said Explanation was introduced, the Court noted that in the said Circular also it is stated that even if the total income is reduced to the minus figure, ‘the tax on concealed income’ still means the tax chargeable on the concealed income as if it were the total income. The Court, then, observed as under (page 314) :

“A combined reading of the Committee’s recommendation and the Circular makes the position clear that Explanation 4(a) to S. 271(I)(c) intended to levy the penalty not only in a case where after addition of concealed income, a loss returned, after assessment becomes positive income, but also in a case where addition of concealed income reduces the returned loss and finally the assessed income is also a loss or minus figure. Therefore, even during the period between April 1, 1976 and April 1, 2003, the position was that the penalty was leviable even in a case where addition of concealed income reduces the returned loss.”

2.8 Considering the relevance of the Notes on Clauses, while interpreting the provisions on such issues, the Court stated that the same are relevant and for that drew support from the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Yuvraj Amarinder Singh (156 ITR 525). The Court also noted the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Poddar Cement P. Ltd. (226 ITR 625), wherein it was stated that the circumstances under which the amendment was brought in existence and consequences of the amendment will have to be taken care of while deciding the issue as to whether the amendment was clarificatory or substantive in nature and, whether it will have retrospective effect or not. The Court then referred to various judgments of the Apex Court, in which the Court has considered cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. In these judgments, it was also made clear that the presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.

2.9 Having referred to the principles and tests to be applied to determine whether a particular amendment is to be regarded as clarificatory or substantive in nature or whether it will have retrospective effect or not, the Court finally overruled the view of the Division Bench in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra) and held as under (page 318) :
“The above being the position, the inevitable conclusion is that Explanation 4 to S. 271(I)(c) is clarificatory and not substantive. The view expressed to the contrary in Virtual’s case (2007) 9 SCC 665 is not correct.”

Conclusion:

3.1 In view of the above judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, reversing the judgment of the division bench of the Apex Court in the case of Virtual Soft Systems Limited (supra), the position now emerges is that, under the pre-amended provisions also, the Concealment Penalty can be imposed even in a case where the assessment has resulted into reduction in loss and there is no tax payable by the assessee.

3.2 From the above judgment, it also appears that for the purpose of determining the nature of amendment (i.e., whether the same is clarificatory or substantive in nature), the position as existed before the amendment and the purpose for which the amendment is made is very relevant.

Allowability of Broken Period Interest

Controversies

1.
Issue for consideration :


1.1 Interest on government
securities is normally payable half-yearly. When government securities are
traded, the purchaser has to pay the seller not only the purchase price of the
securities but also the interest accrued on the government securities from the
last due date of the interest till the date of purchase of the securities. This
interest from the last due date till the date of purchase/sale is referred to as
broken period interest. While the purchaser of the government securities would
pay the broken period interest, the seller would receive the broken period
interest. For a trader in government securities, including a bank, the net
position of broken period interest for the year would either be an income or an
expenditure, depending upon the quantum of government securities bought and sold
and the dates on which such transactions were effected.

1.2 In a situation where the
net broken period interest for the year is an expenditure, the issue has arisen
before the courts as to whether such broken period interest is deductible as
business expenditure. While the Bombay High Court has held that such amount of
broken period interest is an allowable deduction, the Rajasthan High Court has
taken a contrary view and held that such broken period interest cannot be
allowed as a deduction.

2.
American Express Bank’s case :


2.1 The issue first came up
before the Bombay High Court in the case of American Express International
Banking Corporation v. CIT,
258 ITR 601.

2.2 In this case, the
assessee, which was a bank, was required to maintain statutory liquidity ratio
in relation to its business in the form of government securities. It also traded
in government securities. During the year, the assessee paid Rs.7,13,627 to
sellers towards broken period interest accrued on securities till the date of
purchase by the assessee, and received Rs.4,07,288 from buyers towards broken
period interest on securities sold by it. The assessee claimed the net amount of
Rs.3,06,399 as business expenditure u/s.37.

2.3 The Assessing Officer
taxed the amount of Rs.4,07,288 received by the assessee towards broken period
interest, but denied deduction of Rs.7,13,627 broken period interest paid by the
assessee. The denial was on the ground that the expenditure was for purchase of
income-bearing assets, and was therefore a capital expenditure, which could not
be set off as expenditure against the income from such assets. The Commissioner
(Appeals) held that the amount was allowable as a deduction u/s.28. The Tribunal
upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), holding that the broken period
interest of Rs.7,13,627 was allowable as a deduction.

2.4 On behalf of the
Revenue, it was argued that the government securities purchased were income
bearing assets, and that the amount spent on such purchase was capital outlay.
It was therefore argued that capital outlay on purchase of the assets could not
be set off as expenditure against income accruing from the assets purchased.
Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Vijaya Bank v. Additional CIT,
187 ITR 541. It was also argued that a
composite price had been paid for the purchase, consisting of interest accrued
as well as the price, and that there was no provision under the Income-tax Act
which authorised bifurcation of such a price. It was also argued that the
interest income was chargeable to tax under the head ‘Interest on Securities’,
and that therefore S. 28 could not be invoked for claiming the net interest as a
deduction.

2.5 On behalf of the
assessee, it was argued that the assessee was computing its profit from trading
in securities, which had to be computed u/s.28. To compute the correct profits,
the interest income for the period that the securities were held by the assessee
had to be recorded as its income, and it was on this basis that the net broken
period interest was claimed as a deduction. It was further argued that the
interest income in respect of such trading activity had not been taxed under the
head ‘Interest on Securities’ but under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business
or Profession’. It was argued that the method of accounting followed by the
assessee was consistently followed by it, as well as by all other banks. It was
further argued that when the income of such broken period interest was taxed,
the payment of such broken period interest could not be disallowed.

2.6 The Bombay High Court
observed that Vijaya Bank’s case (supra) was a case where the interest on
government securities was taxable under the head ‘Interest on Securities’,
whereas the case before it was a case where the interest was taxed under the
head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’. The Bombay High Court noted
that there was no loss of revenue under the method of accounting followed by the
bank. The Bombay High Court therefore held that the broken period interest paid
by the bank was an allowable deduction in computing its business profits.

2.7 In CIT v. Citibank
NA,
264 ITR 18, the Bombay High Court has followed the view taken by it
earlier in American Express’ case.

3.
Bank of Rajasthan’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently
came up before the Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT v. Bank of
Rajasthan Ltd.,
316 ITR 391.

3.2 In this case, pertaining
to a year subsequent to deletion of the head of income ‘Interest on Securities’,
an order had been passed u/s.263 making an addition to the income returned by
the assessee-bank, representing the broken period interest paid by the bank.
This order was on the basis that such interest was not allowable as a deduction
in view of the Supreme Court decision in Vijaya Bank’s case (supra). The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal, holding that Vijaya Bank’s case did not
apply after the deletion of the head of income ‘Interest on Securities’. The
Tribunal followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in American Express
International Banking Corpo-ration’s case (supra), and quashed the order
u/s. 263.

3.3 The Rajasthan High Court considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijaya Bank’s case (supra), and observed that even if that decision related to deduction of interest under the head ‘Interest on Securities’, it had relied upon the English decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of CIR v. Pilcher, 31 TC 314, for the well-settled principle that outlay on the purchase of an income-bearing asset is in the nature of capital outlay and no part of the capital for laid out can be set off as expenditure against income accruing from the asset in question. It was on that reasoning that the deduction had not been allowed in that case. According to the Rajasthan High Court, the ratio of Vijaya Bank’s decision still held good even after the deletion of the head of income ‘Interest on Securities’.

3.4 The Rajasthan High Court expressed its dissent with the decision of the Bombay High Court in American Express International Banking Corporation’s case on the ground that if carried to the logical conclusion, it permitted a post-mortem of the purchase component of the asset and permitted deduction of interest element paid as business expenditure. According to the Rajasthan High Court, the Supreme Court judgment proceeded on an established legal principle deduced from previous English judgments, and could not therefore be brushed aside.

3.5 The Rajasthan High Court therefore held that the ratio of Vijaya Bank’s decision (supra) applied to the case before it, and held that the broken period interest was not deductible in computing the income of the bank.

    Observations:
4.1 The whole controversy seems to revolve around the validity and continued applicability of the Supreme Court decision in Vijaya Bank’s case (supra). It would therefore be worthwhile to consider the facts and the ratio of that decision, and the circumstances in which it was rendered.

4.2 Unfortunately, the decision of the Supreme Court is a brief one-page judgment. The decision of the Karnataka High Court from which this matter came up to the Supreme Court is however reported in Tax LR (1976) 524, from which the facts can be deduced. Also, the Bombay High Court has drawn out certain facts from the deci-sion of the Karnataka High Court as well as the Supreme Court. From the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that though the issue before it was with reference to taxation of interest under the head of income ‘Interest on Securities’ as well as deduction u/s.28 in computation of income under the head of income ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’, the Supreme Court seems to have answered the issue only from the perspective of ‘Interest on Securities’. One significant factor that needs to be understood is that under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’, all expenditure incurred for the purpose of the business or profession is allowable, unless specifically prohibited, as also all losses incurred during the course of carrying on of the business or profession, unlike in the case of ‘Interest on Securities’ where only expenditure incurred for purpose of realising the interest on securities is deductible as expenditure. It was therefore perhaps on account of the restricted allowability that the Supreme Court took the view that it did in Vijaya Bank’s case.

4.3 The other aspect of Vijaya Bank’s decision, as analysed by the Bombay High Court, is that Vijaya Bank had taken over the assets and liabilities of Jayalakshmi Bank Ltd., which included the government securities and interest accrued thereon. It was such interest which was claimed as a deduction by Vijaya Bank, which had accrued to Jayalakshmi Bank prior to takeover of assets and liabilities by Vijaya Bank. On the facts, it appears therefore that such government securities were investments of Vijaya Bank, and not its stock in trade. It may however be noted that the second question raised before the Supreme Court pertained to broken period interest in case of securities purchased from the open market. The Bombay High Court does not seem to have looked at this aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision.

4.4 Where the government securities form part of a trading business, it certainly cannot be said that the amount paid for the acquisition of stock in trade is a capital outlay, as such purchases and stock form part of the circulating capital of the business. The entire purchase is on revenue account, and is an allowable expenditure of the business. Therefore, even if a view is taken that the broken period interest forms part of the purchase cost of the government securities and cannot be broken up, it would still be allowable as a revenue expenditure.

4.5 Further, as anybody familiar with the government securities market in India would be aware, the purchase price of government securities quoted on the markets does not include the interest component for the broken period. Such interest component for the broken period has to be invariably computed separately and is payable over and above and in addition to the negotiated purchase price. Given this commercial reality, to say that the broken period interest is a part of the purchase price would be incorrect. In reality, what is being paid for over and above the purchase price is the right to receive the interest accrued up to the date of the transaction. Therefore, irrespective of whether the securities are held as stock in trade or as investments, such interest paid for would have to be reduced from the total interest received subsequently on the due date, since the interest received includes the interest for which payment is made.

4.6 It is also important to note that business profits have to be computed in accordance with the method of accounting followed by the assessee. In preparing its accounts, the assessee would have to follow accounting standards applicable to it. The accounting standards applicable to in-vestments (e.g., AS-13) require that when unpaid interest has accrued before the acquisition of an interest -bearing investment and is therefore included in the price paid for the investment, the subsequent receipt of interest is allocated between pre-acquisition and post-acquisition periods; the pre-acquisition portion is deducted from cost. This supports the view that the subsequent interest receipt on the due date has to be partly adjusted against the broken period interest paid, and it is only the net amount which is really the income.

4.7 Even under the Income-tax Act, all business losses and revenue expenditure are allowable as deduction in computing business income. The payment of broken period interest on purchase of government securities held as trading assets is certainly a business expenditure, if not a busi-ness loss, and is therefore clearly an allowable deduction.

4.8 Lastly, the CBDT had clarified vide its Circular No. 599, dated 24 April 1991 [189 ITR (St) 126], that securities held by banks must be regarded as stock in trade, and that interest payments and receipts for broken period on purchase of securities must be regarded as revenue payments/receipts, and only the net interest on securities should be brought to tax as business income. Though the Circular was issued subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijaya Bank’s case, it had not considered the ratio of that decision which was rendered on 19 September 1990. This Circular was therefore withdrawn on 31 July 1991 vide CBDT Circular No. 610 [191 ITR (St) 2]. By a subsequent Circular No. 665, dated 5 October 1993 [204 ITR (St.) 39], the CBDT clarified that the Supreme Court, in Vijaya Bank’s case, was not directly concerned with the issue whether securities form part of stock in trade or capital assets. The CBDT has clarified that whether a particular item of investment in securities constitute stock in trade or capital asset is a question of fact, and that banks are generally governed by the instructions of the Reserve Bank of India from time to time with regard to the classification of assets and also the accounting standards for investments. Assessing Officers have therefore been directed to determine the facts and circumstances of each case whether a particular security constitutes stock in trade or investment after taking into account the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India. In a sense, the CBDT has also therefore indirectly accepted the fact that where the government securities are held as trading assets (stock in trade), the allowability of broken period interest as a deduction should not really be an issue.

4.9 The view taken by the Rajasthan High Court therefore does not seem to be justified, given the fact that government securities are generally held as stock in trade by banks. Therefore, the view taken by the Bombay High Court is the better view of the matter, and broken period interest should be allowed as a deduction where the securities are held as stock in trade. Even if the securities are held as investments, logically the interest income actually received includes the broken period interest paid for, and to that extent the amount received on the due date does not constitute income of the recipient.

‘Literary work’ and ‘dramatic work’ Copyright Act. S. 2(o), (h).

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‘Literary work’ and ‘dramatic work’ Copyright Act. S. 2(o),
(h).

[Academy of General Education, Manipal & Anr. v. B.
Malini Mallya,
AIR 2009 SC 1982]

One Dr. Karanth, a Jnanapeeth awardee had developed a new
form of ‘Yakshagana’ (a form of ballet dance). He was a director of the
appellant institute. Before he expired, he had executed a will in favour of
the respondent.

The said Yakshagana ballet dance was performed in New
Delhi. Respondent filed a suit for declaration, injunction and damages
alleging violation of the copyright in respect of the said dance vested in her
in terms of the said will and thus the appellants infringed the copyright
thereof by performing the same at New Delhi without her prior permission. The
respondent had claimed copyright in respect of literary and artistic works in
her favour in terms of the said will. The appellant denied and disputed any
copyright of the said dance in Dr. Karanth alleging that whatever work he had
done was in a capacity of a director of the Kendra and assistance of finance
and staff of the organisation.

S. 2(c) of the Act defines ‘artistic work’ to mean (i) a
painting, a sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan), an
engraving or a photograph, whether or not any such work possesses artistic
quality; (ii) a work of architecture; and (iii) any other work of artistic
craftsmanship.

The word ‘author’ is defined in S. 2(d) to mean, (i) in
relation to a literary or dramatic work, the author of the work; (ii) in
relation to a musical work, the composer; (iii) in relation to an artistic
work other than a photograph, the artist; (iv) in relation to a photograph,
the person taking the photograph; (v) in relation to a cinematograph film or
sound recording, the producer; and (vi) in relation to any literary, dramatic,
musical or artistic work which is computer generated, the person who causes
the work to be created.

S. 2(o) defines ‘literary work’ to include computer
programmes, tables and compilations including computer databases. S. 2(qq)
defines ‘performer’ to include an actor, singer, musician, dancer, acrobat,
juggler, conjurer, snake charmer, a person delivering a lecture or any other
person who makes a performance.

The Court observed that a dramatic work may also come
within the purview of literary work being a part of dramatic literature.
However, provisions of the Act make a distinction between the ‘literary work’
and ‘dramatic work’. Keeping in view the statutory provisions, there cannot be
any doubt whatsoever that copyright in respect of performance of ‘dance’ would
not come within the purview of the literary work but would come within the
purview of the definition of ‘dramatic work’.

The Court dismissed the appeal by modification of the
injunction order granted by High Court.

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Addition to value of closing stock and MAT

1.0 Facts of the case :

    1.1 The following is the Profit and Loss account of ABC Ltd. for the year ended 31st March, 2006.

The company values its stock at lower of the cost or the net realisable value (NRV). The NRV in this case was lower than the cost.

1.2 The company filed the return of income for A.Y. 2006-07 as under:

1.3 The Profit and Loss account of the company for EY, 2006-07 relevant to A.Y. 2007-08 was as under:
1.4 The company declared income in its return for A.Y. 2007-08 as under:
1.5 Since there was no tax payable under the normal computation of income and since there was book profit as worked out u/s.115JB of the Act, the company paid MAT for A.Y. 2007-08 on the book profit of Rs.0.25 cr.

1.6 Thereafter, the AO completed assessment for A.Y. 2006-07 by adding Rs.0.25 cr. to the value of the closing stock on the ground that the company should have valued its stock at cost instead of at an amount being the lower of the cost or the NRV. Since the final tax still was nil the company did not opt to file an appeal. The assessed loss stood at Rs.0.25 cr. in place of the returned loss of Rs.0.50 cr.

1.7 The AO accepted the return for A.Y. 2007-08. Believing that the adjustment to the value of the closing stock would have a bearing on the taxable income of the succeeding year, the assessee contended in an application made u/ s.154 of the Act for A.Y. 2007-08 that the value of the opening stock should be adjusted by the amount of the adjustment made to the value of the closing of stock of the preceding year. It also contended that a similar adjustment should also be made to the book profit worked out u/s.115JB. According to the company, the revised book profit for A.Y. 2007-08 should appear as under:

It claimed  refund  of MAT paid.

1.8 The Aa rejected the application in so far as it concerned adjustment to the book profit, on the grounds that:

    i) the accounts of the assessee for the year relevant to AY. 2007-08 were prepared in accordance with the provisions of parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956; and

    ii) therefore, he had no power to make any adjustment to the book profit, as was held by the Honourable Supreme Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. v. ClT, (2002) 255 ITR 273 and ClT v. Comnet Systems & Services Ltd., (2008) 305 ITR 409.

1.9 The company seeks your advice on whether an appeal should be filed against the stand of the AO.

2.0  Advice:

2.1 The company is advised to prefer an appeal for the reasons to be stated hereafter.

2.2 It is true that in the cases referred to by the AO, the SC held that the AO does not have power to make adjustment to the book profit other than the adjustments permitted in the provisions relating to MAT. The SC, however, did not say that no adjustment can ever be made by the AO to the book profit. The AO is empowered to make the permitted adjustments. Let us, therefore see the nature of the adjustment made by the AO in the form of addition to the value of closing stock for AY. 2006-07, and whether the adjustment sought by the assessee is a permitted one.

2.2.1 The assessee valued the closing stock at the lower of the cost or the NRV. Therefore, when the assessee found the NRV of the stock to be lower than the cost for AY. 2006-07, it scaled down the value of stock as at 31st March, 2006 in the books. Thus, the assessee effectively created a provision for eventual loss that might be incurred at the time of realisation of stock. When the AO did not allow the reduction in the value of stock for AY. 2006-07, what he was effectively doing was that he was disallowing the provision for loss, and he was permitted to make such adjustment to the ‘book profit’ for AY. 2006-07. (I leave aside for the present the ratio of decisions that hold that a provision in recognition of reduction in value of an asset is not it was not challenged in appeal). However, since the total book loss for A.Y. 2006-07 at Rs.0.50 cr. exceeded the disallowance of Rs.O.25cr., there was a negative ‘book profit’ after the said adjustment and there was no liability for AY. 2006-07 u/s.115JB of the Act.

2.2.2 It must be noted that though the Aa disallowed the hidden provision for loss in A.Y. 2006-07, the assessee had not made any corresponding changes in its books in the succeeding year. As a result, the assessee continued to carry the hidden provision in the books. In the next year relevant to AY. 2007-08, the profit and loss account of the assessee can be restated as under:

Based on the above, the assessee has the right to exclude the credit of Rs.0.25 cr. from the book profit since that figure represents provision recalled which was not allowed while computing the book profit for AY. 2006-07. S. 115JB, in clause (i) of Explanation (1) to S. 115JB, read with Proviso thereto, permits exclusion from the book profit of the amount withdrawn from reserve or provision (excluding a reserve created before 1-4-1997, otherwise than by way of a debit to the profit and loss account), if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss ac-count. The only issue that can survive is: whether the provision recalled at Rs.0.25 cr. as shown in the restated profit and loss account is an amount credited to the profit and loss account and thereby forming part of the book profit and therefore meriting exclusion from the book profit, for one may remember that this amount was not originally credited in the account and it appeared only in the rested profit and loss account. The author is of the view that though this amount did not appear in credit in the original profit and loss account, it was nevertheless de facto credited in the profit and loss account as is shown in the restated profit and loss account which is the same as the original profit and loss account except that it differs in presentation. It is submitted that the substance of a transaction rather than its presentation should decide taxability or otherwise.

2.2.3.1 There is one more aspect to be considered also. The assessee has prepared accounts for both the years following accounting standards in general and AS-2 relating to valuation of inventory in particular. Therefore, a question can arise whether there was any mistake committed by the AO in the next year as far as the working u/s.115JB is concerned. If there was no mistake, no rectification will lie u/s.154 of the Act.

2.2.3.2 In my view, it is true that AS-2 has been followed by the assessee for valuing inventory and therefore there is no mistake in the accounts which could be the subject matter of rectification u/s.154 of the Act. However, the AO, in my view, cannot take two different stands in two years in respect of one and the same issue. The AO holds the view for AY. 2006-07 that there is an uncalled for provision for loss in respect of closing stock, which should not be allowed. Here, for AY. 2006-07, I concede to the AO the right to make adjustment to the book profit of that year without providing justification to his right. However, as shown above, the book profit still would be a negative figure after such addition and the addition would have had no effect on the final tax. Now, when the AO comes to A.Y. 2007-08, he cannot hold the’ view that the addition to the closing stock for AY. 2006-07,which is also the opening stock for AY. 2007-08, did not represent addition on account of an uncalled for provision. If he could have made adjustment to the book profit for AY. 2006-07 on account of the addition, he should make adjustment to the book profit for AY. 2007-08. In other words, it is expected that the AO keeps his stand consistent for both the years.

3.0 Thus, in view of the above, the assessee is not liable to MAT for AY. 2007-08. MAT paid by it should be refunded.

Author’s Note:
There can be other angles to the issue. For example, it is a question whether the booking of reduction in value of stock in this case was a provision for a loss or was recognition of an actual loss. If it is a provision, the amended S. 115JB now may not permit reduction of the book profit by such amount, whereas if it is recognition of an actual loss, the provisions may permit reduction of the book profit. The issue discussed here also shows that it is advisable, in case the NRV of an inventory is less than the cost, that a separate provision is made by debiting the profit and loss account instead of reducing the closing value of the inventory in the trading account and recall such provision to the trading account in the next year and repeat the process every year. Thus, in case such a provision is disallowed u/s.115JB, its recall next year cannot form part of the book profit.

Buildings in city of Mumbai are entitled to extra Floor Space Index : Development Control Regulation Act, 1991.

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5. Buildings in city of Mumbai are entitled
to extra Floor Space Index : Development Control Regulation Act, 1991.


In an appeal before the Supreme Court, there was challenge to
the judgment of the Bombay High Court which, while holding that Regulation 33(7)
of the Development Control Regulations, 1991 (in short the ‘Regulations’) for
the city of Mumbai as amended in the year 1999 does not suffer from any
illegality, further observed that the same applies only to dilapidated buildings
of ‘A’ category which satisfy the requirement and those declared prior to the
monsoon of 1997 under 3rd proviso are covered under Regulation 33(7) and are
entitled to extra ‘Floor Space Index’ (‘FSI’). It also directed that certain
side space has also to be provided.

 

The Supreme Court allowing the appeals held :

1. The Scheme under Regulation 33(7) involves landlords
with the consent of 70% of the occupiers. There is no acquisition for
redevelopment under this Scheme. Therefore to bring in ‘old and dilapidated
buildings’, which is a
prerequisite for acquisition and reconstruction under the other Scheme,
namely, under Chapter VIII of the MHADA Act cannot be included in the
provisions of Regulation 33(7) read with Appendix III.

2. The provisions relating to buildings which have been
declared unsafe are specifically covered by Regulation 33(6) and
reconstruction by MHADA is covered by Regulation 33(9). When the situation has
been differently expressed in different Sections, the Legislature must be
taken to have
intended to express a different intention if this building belongs to ‘A’
category.

3. Hence landlord of buildings of ‘A’ category need not
wait for the building to get dilapidated as he is entitled to reconstruct.

4. Under Regulation 33(10) the open space is 5 feet and to
insist on 12 feet as per the High Court judgment would make the same
unreasonable and prevent even buildings which are on the verge of collapse
from being redeveloped.

5. The above being the position, the inevitable conclusion
is that the High Court was not justified in reading additional requirements
into Regulation 33(7) after holding the same to be valid.

[Jayant Achyut Sathe v. Joseph Bain D’Souza and Ors.,
Civil Appeal Nos. 2970 to 2979 of 2006 & others, dated 4-9-2008
(unreported)]

 


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Deficiency in service by Development Authority : Consumer Protection Act, S. 2(1)(g)]

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6. Deficiency in service by Development
Authority : Consumer Protection Act, S. 2(1)(g)]


 

The Development Authority was not able to allot the
commercial flat under the second Self-Financing Scheme 1985. Even after expiry
of 20 years the Scheme failed to take off. The petitioner opted out of the
Scheme. The Hon’ble Commission held that the Scheme was not earnest act on part
of DDA and it cannot be allowed to thrive on money of registrants. Petitioner
entitled to refund along with 12% interest and DDA cannot deduct cancellation
charges.

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Firm : Personal liability and liability of partnership firm to repay debts : SARFAESI Act. S. 35.

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3. Firm : Personal liability and liability of
partnership firm to repay debts : SARFAESI Act. S. 35.


The appellants and the respondents were partners in
partnership business. The respondents allegedly took a loan from a bank by
forging documents. Thereafter, the bank initiated recovery proceedings against
partnership assets. Meanwhile, the appellants and the respondents became parties
to arbitration proceedings as per partnership clause and the appellants opposed
proceedings by the bank. However, the Trial Court rejected the appellants’
application and allowed the bank to continue with recovery proceedings.

 

The bank had instituted proceedings under the SARFAESI Act.
There is a specific provision in S. 35 of the said Act, which lays down that the
provisions of the Act would have overriding effect over other laws.

 

It is open for the appellants to oppose the application and
proceedings which are initiated by the bank under the SARFAESI Act and seek
discharge of their personal liability, as also the liability of the firm to
repay the said bank loan. The subject matter of the arbitration proceedings,
essentially, is the statement of accounts between the partners, whereas the
subject matter of the proceedings which are initiated by the bank are in respect
of recovery of loan which was taken by the partnership firm from the bank. These
proceedings being distinct and separate, the subject matter of both these
proceedings, therefore, is different and, therefore, is was justified in
rejecting the application filed by the appellants for impleading the bank as
party.

[Ravindra Vithal Prabhu and Laxmibai Ramchandra Pai v.
Umesh Martappa Prabhu, Deepak Rajaapa Prabhu, Annasaheb Sambhaji Patil and
Kolhapur Janta Sahakari,
(2008) Vol. 110 (7) Bom. L.R. 2401]

 


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Recovery agents cannot resort to activities of using criminal force against card holders for recovery of dues : Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

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1. Recovery agents cannot resort to
activities of using criminal force against card holders for recovery of dues :
Banking Regulation Act, 1949.


The Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court received a
telegram from the president of All India Credit Card Members Association,
Hyderabad complaining that the recovery agents of HDFC Bank have illegally
detained one Prof. Murthy and the officer of Police Station has illegally acted
in that regard. Acting on the telegram, the Court observed that harassment by
the recovery agents of banks for recovery of amount due under the credit cards
is not the solitary instance.

 

The Court further held that recovery of any amounts due from
customers of banks should be by method known to law or a fair practice of debit
collection, which has approval of Reserve Bank of India, which enjoins the
overall supervisory and monitoring power over all banks in the country. Taking
notice of the criticism about the illegal methods being adopted by certain banks
issuing credit cards for recovery of debts due under credit cards, Reserve Bank
of India issued certain guidelines to be adopted by all commercial banks issuing
credit cards and which are employing recovery agents for collection of dues. It
was categorically observed in guidelines that banks or recovery agents should
not resort to intimidation or harassment of any kind, either verbal or physical,
against any person in their debt collection efforts, including acts intended to
humiliate publicly or intrude the privacy of credit card holders’ family
members, referees and friends, making threatening and anonymous calls or making
false and misleading representations. Therefore, banks or recovery agents
employed by them have to scrupulously follow the guidelines issued by Reserve
Bank of India in the matter from time to time and they cannot resort to
activities of using criminal force against the cardholders for recovery of the
amounts due. If any such criminal force or harassment is made by the banks or
the recovery agents employed by them for recovery of amounts due under credit
cards, the affected card holders will have a right to take recourse to law by
lodging a complaint with police or can move competent Criminal Court having
jurisdiction by filing a complaint as required u/s.190 and u/s.200 of the
Criminal P.C. Whenever such complaints are lodged by credit card holders
suffered at hands of gundas/recovery agents employed by banks for recovery of
amounts due to banks under credit cards, the concerned police shall register
complaint and after due investigation file necessary reports before competent
Court having jurisdiction over matter.

[B. V. S. P. Choudary v. The Station House Officer
Mahankali Police Station, Secunderabad & Ors.,
AIR 2008 A.P. 147]

 


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Consolidation – redefining control and reflecting true net worth Part-2

In the previous article, we discussed the principles of control defined in the IFRS consolidation standards, the impact of rights available with non controlling interests, accounting for step-up acquisitions, accounting for dilution of stake with or without losing control and consolidation of special purpose entities.

Continuing with the topic of consolidation, in this article we will cover certain implementation issues and other differences which will have a significant impact on Indian companies.

Key differences and  implications:

Concept  of de facto  control:

In the earlier article we discussed that control is defined as the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an entity so as to obtain benefits from its activities. This definition of control under IFRS gives rise to another perspective, which is the’ defacto’ control model. De facto control arises when an entity holding a significant minority interest can control another entity without legal arrangements that would give it majority voting power. De facto control exists if the balance of holdings in an entity with other shareholders is dispersed and the other shareholders have not organised their interests in such a way that they commonly exercise more votes than the significant minority shareholder.

Under a de facto control model the power to govern an entity through a majority of the voting rights or other legal means is not essential for consolidation. Rather, the ability in practice to control (e.g., by casting a majority of the votes actually cast) in the absence of legal control may be sufficient if no other party has the power to govern. Under this approach, de facto control is evaluated based on all evidence available. Presence of de facto control can result in consolidation by the significant minority shareholder.

Both the ‘power to govern’ and ‘de facto’ control models meet the principles of control under IAS 27 – Consolidated financial statements. Accordingly, an entity has an accounting policy choice on assessing control and consolidation i.e. whether to assess as per the power to govern model or the de facto control model. This policy choice needs to be followed consistently and disclosed in the financial statements.

Accounting for joint ventures:

Currently,  accounting for joint ventures under  IFRS is not very different from accounting under Indian GAAP i.e. AS 27 – ‘Financial reporting of interests in joint ventures’. However, IAS 31- ‘Reporting interests in joint ventures’ gives the venturer a choice to account for a jointly controlled entity using either the proportionate consolidation method or the equity method in its consolidated financial statements. Interestingly, as part of the IASB/FASB convergence project, the exposure draft ED-9 on ‘Joint Arrangements’ issued by the IASB in September 2007 proposes to prohibit the proportionate consolidation method. Hence, once this ED becomes an effective IFRS, venturers would account for jointly controlled entities only as per the equity method of accounting in their consolidated financial statements.

The basis for such a change has been stated by the IASB as follows – ‘When a party to an arrangement has joint control of an entity, it shares control of the activities of the entity. It does not, however, control each asset nor does it have a present obligation for each liability of the jointly controlled entity. Rather, each party has control over its investment in the entity. Recognising a proportionate share of each asset and liability of an entity is not consistent with the Framework, which defines assets in terms of exclusive control and liabilities in terms of present obligations.’ Hence the equity method of accounting is more representative of the interests of a venturer in the joint venture. Going forward, this change would most impact the reported consolidated revenue of such venturers.

Accounting for  associates:

The principles of accounting for associate entities in the consolidated financial statements of an investor under IFRS are the same as under Indian CAAP. Unlike Indian CAAP, IFRS considers potential voting rights that currently are exercisable in assessing significant influence, for example convertible debentures held by the investor.

Deferred taxes on consolidation:

Under Indian CAAP, deferred taxes in the consolidated financial statements are quite simply the summation of deferred taxes in each of the individual group companies. Unlike IFRS, the Indian CAAP accounting framework does not require any adjustments to be made to deferred taxes on consolidation. Under IFRS, the important adjustments that are required to be made to arrive at the consolidated deferred taxes and resultant profit after tax are as below:

Elimination of deferred taxes on inter company transactions/stock reserves:

In determining tax expense in consolidated financial statements, temporary differences arising from elimination of unrealised profits and losses resulting from intra-group transactions should be considered. Consider an example: Parent company sells goods to its subsidiary company worth Rs. 1000. Parent company’s profit on this transaction is Rs. 100. At the year end, these goods remain unsold by the subsidiary and are hence lying in its inventory. On consolidation an adjustment to eliminate the unrealised profit of Rs. 100 is made in the consolidated financial statements of the Parent company. Hence the accounting base of the inventory in the consolidated books has now become Rs.900 whereas the tax base of the same inventory still remains Rs. 1000. This gives rise to deductible temporary difference which should be recognised as a deferred tax asset in the consolidated financial statements.

Now the question that arises is at what tax rate should this deferred tax asset be recognised – at the seller’s (parent company’s tax rate) or the buyer’s (subsidiary company’s tax rate). IAS 12 states that an entity recognises deferred tax assets only when it is probable that taxable profits will be available against which the deductible temporary differences can be utilised/Since the reversal of the difference would result in lower current taxes in the buyer’s books, the recognition of this deferred tax asset is made on the buyer’s rate keeping into consideration whether the buyer would have sufficient taxable profits in the future to utilise this deferred tax asset.

Recognition of deferred taxes on undistributed profits of joint ventures and associates:

Currently under Indian CAAP, profits of subsidiaries, branches, associates and joint ventures (‘investee companies’) are included in consolidated profits of the Parent company. The consolidated performance results and net worth are accordingly reported to the shareholders of the Parent under Indian CAAP. However one important aspect that is not reported is the impact of tax leakage when the profit earned by the investee companies will be transferred to the Parent. Accordingly the consolidated profit and the net worth reported under Indian CAAP is over-stated to that extent, since the overall tax impact on the consolidated profit available to the Parent company is not completely recorded in the books of account. Such deferred tax impact is accounted for in the consolidated financial statements under IFRS.

For example: Parent Company P consolidates undistributed profits of Rs. 100 crores of Subsidiary company S in its consolidated financial statements of which Rs 15 crores is post acquisition profits. P plans to draw dividends of Rs.20 crores from S in 18 months’ time; P estimates that Rs.15 crores of that amount will relate to post-acquisition earnings already recognised in the financial statements. The dividend distribution tax rate in S’s jurisdiction is 15%. In this case, P should recognise a deferred tax liability of Rs.2.25 crores (at a rate of 15% on Rs.15 crores) in its consolidated financial statements.

Thus as explained above, undistributed profits of certain investee companies result in a taxable temporary difference in the consolidated books of accounts. However, as per Para 39 of IAS 12, taxable temporary differences in respect of investments in subsidiaries, branches, associates and joint ventures are not recognised if :

  •     the investor is able to control the timing of the reversal of the temporary difference; and

  •     it is probable that the temporary difference will not reverse in the foreseeable future.

Since an entity controls an investment in a subsidiary or branch, the entity may be exempt for recognising deferred tax liability on undistributed profits, if it can demonstrate that it controls the timing of the reversal of a taxable temporary difference and the temporary difference will reverse in the foreseeable future. The term ‘foreseeable future’ is not defined in the standard; generally it is necessary to consider in detail a period of 12 months from the reporting date, and also to take into account any transactions that are planned for a reasonable period after that date.

Since deferred tax assets and liabilities are measured based on the expected manner of recovery (asset) or settlement (liability); deferred taxes on undistributed profits of subsidiaries, joint ventures or associates could be recognised either based on the applicable dividend distribution tax or the capital gains tax rate depending on the expected manner of recovery of such profits.

In case where the difference is assumed to be reversed though capital gains i.e. on sale of investments deferred tax liability is created on the effective capital gain tax rate on the difference between the net assets attributable to the Parent’s share less the indexed cost of acquisition.

In the above example, consider that P plans to dispose of the investment in 15 months and the capital gains tax rate applicable to it is 30%. The excess of the net assets of S over the cost of acquisition is Rs.15 crores and the indexation benefit is assumed to be 3 crores. In this case, P would recognise a deferred tax liability of Rs.3.6 crores [(15-3)*30%]in its current consolidated financial statements.

In situations where the entity does not account for the aforesaid deferred tax liability in accordance with Para 39, a disclosure to that extent is required in the financial statements reporting the amount of deferred tax liability not accounted for in the books.

An investor does not control an associate or a joint venture and therefore is not in a position to control the associate/joint venture’s dividend policy. Therefore a deferred tax liability must be recognised unless the associate/joint venture has agreed that profits will not be distributed in the foreseeable future or the Parent company’s approval is mandatory for dividend distribution (as a protective right).

Uniform accounting policies:

Para 24 of IAS 27 states that ‘consolidated financial statements shall be prepared using uniform accounting policies for like transactions and other events in similar circumstances.’ Therefore, if a subsidiary, associate or joint venture uses different accounting policies from those applied in the consolidated financial statements, then appropriate consolidation adjustments to align accounting policies should be made when preparing those consolidated financial statements. In practice, this can often pose challenges, particularly in case of associates and joint ventures, where the parent entity has no control over the accounting policies considered by the investee companies for their separate financial statements.

Impact of business combination ‘fair value’ accounting on ongoing consolidation:

In the earlier article on IFRS 3 – Business Combinations (refer BCA Journal, June 2009 edition), we discussed the purchase method of accounting for all business combinations and in particular, acquisition of a subsidiary, which results in accounting for all assets and liabilities acquired at fair values. Since there is no option of push down accounting under IFRS, the subsidiary continues to carry the same assets and liabilities at their book values (or as per the IFRS accounting policy adopted by it for each asset and liability) in its stand alone books of ac-count. Whereas in the consolidated books of accounts, the assets and liabilities at acquisition date are continued to be carried at fair values as on that date. This results in the following additional adjust-ments that are required to be carried out as part of the consolidation procedure at every reporting period:

  • Restate the recognised assets and liabilities in the subsidiary’s books as on acquisition date to their fair values and accordingly make adjustments for depreciation or amortisation

  • Recognise intangibles identified as on the acquisition date at their fair values and accordingly make adjustments for amortisation or impairment

  • Recognise deferred taxes as on the acquisition date and accordingly make adjustments for reversals in the future periods.

Effectively, the acquired subsidiary would have to maintain two sets of financial statements:

  • Separate financial statements as per IFRS book values or the accounting policies applied

  • Financial statements for consolidation purposes as per the fair values on acquisition date with appropriate adjustments.

IAS 28 –    ‘Investment in associates’  requires that on acquisition of the investment the excess between the cost of the investment and the investor’s share of the net fair value of the associate’s identifiable assets and liabilities should be accounted for as goodwill and included in the carrying amount of investments or any deficit arising on the same basis should be included as income in the period in which the investment is acquired. In either case, initial accounting requires the identification of the fair value of net assets of the investee as on the acquisition date. Consequently, appropriate adjustments the investor’s share of the associate’s profits or losses after acquisition are also made to account for the subsequent measurement of these initial fair values. For example, depreciation of the assets would be based on their fair values at the acquisition date. Hence, separate set of accounts of associates would also have to be maintained for consolidation purposes.

Conclusion:

Consolidated financial statements are considered as the primary set of accounts under IFRS. The differences highlighted in the earlier and the present article have far reaching effects on the procedures of consolidation and the resultant impact on various performance matrices. The goal under IFRS is to move towards more transparent and consistent reporting that reflects the true net worth of the group.

Business Valuations – An Important Part of M&A

Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) is a buzz word in current business environment. It refers to that area of corporate strategy which deals with buying, selling, combining, splitting, restructuring, etc. of an enterprise to enhance shareholder value.

In India, the liberalisation process which started in early nineties provided the impetus for M&A transactions involving large businesses. In the initial years, the transactions were domestic but in last couple of years cross border transaction activity has increased. One of the first such large transactions was acquisition of Tetley by Tata Group. Barring last one year, M&A activity has shown constant growth over last many years. It is observed that M&A activities are at a peak in boom period. In the down-turn, such activities take back seat though it is probable that M&A in a downturn may yield higher returns to shareholders. At the same time, one cannot forget that risk attached to M&A activities is also very high during downturn.

M&A activity may be carried out through mergers, demergers, acquisitions, sale of business, spin offs, etc. Any transaction to get finally consummated needs to be settled by flow of consideration from the acquirer to the seller. The consideration may be discharged by actual payment or through any other financial instrument. The determination of consideration carries more weight as stakeholders would like to ensure that the transaction is done in most fair and transparent manner.

In any M&A transaction, valuation of the business being transferred becomes very critical from all angles. In view of this, the current article covers certain basic features of financial valuations along with practical issues connected thereto.

The importance and purpose  of valuation:

The stakeholders will always ask following questions on valuation when a business or an asset is transacted:

What  is the value  at which it is sold?

Is it a fair value?

What are the principles applied to determine the fair value?

The professional who is carrying out the valuation needs to keep purpose of valuation constantly in mind. The methodology of valuation may differ according to the purpose. For example, in case of valuation for merger, relative valuation of the companies involved is more relevant than the absolute valuation. As against this, in case of valuation for sale of business, absolute value of the company / business is more relevant.

The date of the valuation is also very relevant. A valuation done today may not be valid after passage of time as underlying factors such as price earning multiple, market price of the share, the return expectation, etc. may change from time to time. It is always advisable that the valuation is finalised near to the date of the transaction; otherwise the conclusions may undergo a material change.

Business Value would also differ from the point of view of the Buyer and that of the Seller, depending on one’s own perception, vision, strategy and future projections made by each of them independently.

Some of the purposes for which valuation may be required are as follows:

Determining the Portfolio Value of Investments  by Venture Funds or Private Equity Funds:

In the current environment, when funds are deployed in investee company through private equity or venture capital funds, it becomes important that at regular interval the basket of investments held by such funds is valued and reported to the concerned forum (investment committee or trustees) so that performance of the fund managers as well as return generated for the investors can be determined.

Determining the consideration for Acquisition/Sale of Business or for Purchase/Sale of Equity stake:

When a business or shares are proposed to be divested, valuation becomes very relevant as the consideration has to change hands between buyer and seller based on agreed valuation. It is general practice that both buyer as well seller undertakes the valuation exercise which becomes base for the negotiation process. Only in very few instances it is observed that a common valuer is appointed by both the parties to arrive at the fair value.

Determining the swap ratio for Merger:

In case of merger of two companies the role of valuer is to recommend fair exchange ratio (number of shares of Transferee Company to be issued to the shareholders of the transferor company). If the companies involved are listed on the stock exchanges, it is required that the valuation is also followed by a fairness opinion by a category I merchant banker. It is required that valuation of both the companies involved is carried out on a like to like basis to the extent applicable. It may be inappropriate to use asset-based valuation for company A and earnings-based valuation for company B, unless there are justifiable reasons to follow such different methodologies.

Determining  the swap ratio for Demerger :

There is misconception that every demerger requires valuation of the division being demerged. In case of vanilla demerger where beneficial ownership of the two entities post-demerger remains with the same set of shareholders, valuation may not be required as both the companies will be held by the same shareholders in the same inter se proportion as they were owning the company prior to the demerger. (Example: Demerger of Reliance Industries Limited.) As against this, when a division is demerged from a company into an operating company with a different set of shareholders, valuation of the division as well as the company to which the division is being transferred are required to be carried out. (Example: Demerger of farm input division of E.I.D.-Parry (India) Limited into Coromandel Fertilisers Limited. Demerger of scheduled airlines business of Kingfisher Airlines Limited into Deccan
Aviation  Limited)

Determining the Fair value of ESOPs as per the ESOP guidelines:

Generally  such valuation is carried  out using Black Scholes model  for ‘option  Valuation.

Determining the value offamily owned business and assets in case of Family Separation:

This is generally required when family  members decide to part ways. Here the valuation exercise becomes sensitive as one of the parties involved will always feel that fair treatment is not given. There are instances where valuers are dragged to court of law in case of valuation for family separation.

Sale/purchase of Intangible assets including brands, patents, copyrights, trademarks, rights:

In case of acquisition of a business for a lumpsum price, the identification and valuation of intangible assets becomes a requirement. In recent times, many transactions of intangibles are carried out. (Example sale of certain brands by Pfizer to Jhonson and Jhonson)

Liquidation  of company:

When a company is liquidated valuation of each and every asset and liability is carried out and cost required to be incurred for closure is reduced from such values.

Determining the fair value of shares for Listing on the Stock Exchange:

when a company decides to offer its security for public participation, an estimation of the fair valuation of the security is required to guide the promoters and merchant bankers to decide the offer price. There are instances where shares are issued at a discount to the fair value to encourage public at large to invest.

Other reasons:

Many times valuations are required for litigation, buyback of shares, raising of funds, open offer in case of takeover, approval under the FEMA regulations, etc.

The above list is not exhaustive but only indicative of the purposes for which valuation is attempted.

Methods of valuation:

As discussed earlier that the value changes with the change in the purpose holds true also for the use of methodologies of Valuation. A valuer may use different methods to value the Shares of a Company / Business. In practice, however, the valuer normally uses different methodologies of valuation and arrives at a fair value for the entire business by combining the values arrived, using various methods and giving appropriate weights to the values so arrived to opine on fair value.

Each method proceeds on different fundamental assumptions, which have greater or less relevance, and at times even no relevance to a given situation. Thus, the methods to be adopted for a particular valuation must be judiciously chosen.

Commonly  used methods  of valuation  are as under:

A. Asset Based Approach:

i. Net Assets  Method:

Valuation of net assets is calculated with reference to the historical cost of the assets owned by the company. Such value usually represents the minimum value or a support value. of a going concern. It is also necessary to make adjustments for market value of non operating assets, contingent liabilities likely to materialise, outstanding warrants, appreciation/ diminution in the value of investments, etc. This method is mainly applicable for investment companies or companies which are yet to commence their operations. For a manufacturing concern the value under this method is a floor value below which a transaction may not be carried out.

ii.  Net Realisable Value Method:

Where the business of the company is being liquidated, its assets have to be valued as if they were individually sold and not on a going concern basis. This method is generally used in case of liquidation. One has to take a note of liabilities that would arise on account of closure, tax implications, and dividend distribution tax, etc.

iii. Remainder Replacement Value Method:

Under this method, the replacement value of assets and not the book value is captured. Net replacement value of the assets indicates the value of an asset similar to the original asset whose life is equal to the residual life of the existing asset. The term replacement cost refers to the amount that a company would have to pay, at the present time, to replace anyone of its existing assets.

B.  Earnings-based    Approach:

i. Profit Earning Capitalisation Value Method (PECV) :

Earnings-based methods are generally regarded as more appropriate in case of ‘going concern’ valuation. Capitalisation of future maintainable earnings on a post tax basis is carried out under Earnings Approach. For this purpose past profitability generally gives the indication. However, for a company where past profits are not representative of future maintainable earnings then, future expected profitability may be used after taking into account present value of future expected profits. Any extraordinary item of income/ expenditure is adjusted for arriving at future maintainable profit. The most common example of such adjustments are profit/loss on sale of assets/investments, impact of VRS, one time write off of stocks / debtors, loss on account of natu-ral calamities, etc. The price earning multiple is to be carefully chosen taking into account multiples enjoyed by similar quoted companies.

ii.  Discounted  Cash flow Method  (DCF) :

DCF method considers cash flow and not the profits of the business. The DCF method values the business by discounting its free cash flows for the explicit forecast period and the perpetuity value thereafter. The free cash flows represent the cash available for distribution to both the owners and the creditors of the business. The cash flows are considered keeping in mind the projections, horizon period, growth rate, and the residual value. Discounting is done taking into account the weighted average cost of capital which is based on the cost of equity and cost of capital and after taking into account the proportion of debt and equity used to fund the business.

iii. EBITDA  Multiple  Method:

The EBITDA multiple is the ratio of Enterprise value to EBITDA. It involves determination of maintainable EBITDA.

This method ensures that the valuation is not affected by the pattern of funding adopted by the company or comparable companies. One has to keep in mind that value of debt is reduced from the enterprise value to arrive at the equity value.

iv. Sales Multiple  Method:

Sales multiple may be used to arrive at the enterprise value particularly if the business is not making profits. The information needed is annual sales and an industry multiplier, which will depend on industry. The industry multiplier can be obtained from public sources including data relating to listed comparables. This method is easy to understand and use. However, this method is generally used to cross check the values arrived at under other methods of valuation.

C.  Market-based Approach:

Market Price Method :

The Market Price Method takes into consideration prices quoted on the stock exchange. Average of quoted price is considered as indicative of the value perception of the company by investors operating under free market conditions. Adjustments have to be made for issue of bonus shares or right shares during the period. Regulatory bodies often consider market value as important basis – Preferential allotment, Buyback, Open offer price calculation under the Takeover Code. Market Price Method is not relevant where the shares are not listed or are thinly traded etc.

Market  comparables :

This method is generally applied in case of unlisted entities. This method estimates value by relating the same to underlying elements of similar companies. It is based on market multiples of ‘comparable companies’. e.g.

  • Earnings/Revenue Multiples (Valuation of Pharmaceutical Brands)

  • Book Value Multiples (Valuation of Financial Institution or Banks)

  • Industry-Specific Multiples (Valuation of cement companies based on Production capacities, Valuation of BPO companies based on number of seats)

  • Multiples  from Recent M&A Transactions.

Though this method is easy to understand and quick to compute, it may not capture the intrinsic value and may give a distorted picture in case of short term volatility in the markets. There may often be difficulty in identifying the comparable companies or comparable transactions.

Data used  to carry out valuations :

Valuation starts with collection of relevant and optimal information required for valuing Share or Business of a company. Such information can be obtained from one or more of the following sources:

Historical    results:

Annual Reports for atleast 3 years of the Company are required for valuation exercise. Apart from review of detailed financials, it is necessary to

carefully consider the Directors Report, Management Discussions, Corporate Governance Reports, Auditors’ Report and Notes to accounts. A detailed analysis of the past performance is starting point in any valuation exercise. From the past results various important aspects can be worked out such as one time non-recurring income, expenditure, change in Government/Tax regulations affecting business, tax benefits enjoyed, etc.

Projections:

Future expected Profitability, Balance Sheet and Cash Flows along with detailed assumptions underlying the projections are required. The projections considered for valuation should not be at variance with the outlook discussed in the Annual Report. It is important to cover the period which will comprise the entire cycle of the business. In certain industry even 3 year period will cover the cycle whereas in certain industries like heavy engineering or cement, a longer period of 5 to 7 years may capture the cycle. It is impossible to predict the future in a precise way particularly considering the dynamic nature of the economy. One should ensure that the assumption behind the future projections is reasonable at a point of time when they are prepared. A few common mistakes which are found in the projections are: assuming production much higher than the capacities without capturing additional capital cost, showing unreasonable changes in selling price of the final products or of raw materials, showing unreasonable change in the working capital movements, capturing tax benefits even after sunset clause under the Tax laws, unreasonable changes in manpower cost, etc.

Discussions with the Management:

Discussions with management may sometimes reveal issues that may drive the valuation. It is very important that open, fair and detailed discussions are carried out between the valuer and the management. The discussions should not be restricted to only representatives of Finance Department but involve other key functional heads.

It is advisable to obtain written confirmation of the inputs provided by the Management. This helps the valuer in defending the valuation in the eventuality of its being challenged by any Authority.

Market surveys, other publicly available data:

A valuer carries out market surveys and obtains publicly available information. It may pertain to the industry as well as the Company being valued. Due to technology advancement, most 6£ these data are available on the net. Various newspaper reports are also available on the subject. It is advisable to double check the accuracy of these data before relying on such data. Various software packages that have the relevant data are available. It should be ensured that updated version of such data is used.

Data on comparable companies:

Review of data on comparable companies is an important feature in any valuation exercise. Area of operations and the extent of the market share also play an important role in considering the comparable companies. It is possible that geographically the companies are located in different areas because of which there are substantial differences in the operational cost. For example cement companies located near to limestone reserve and those which are located far off are not strictly comparable. Further, different funding pattern of two companies and investment also makes them non-comparable.

Steps in valuation:

Obtaining information:
It is always experienced that the time available to carry out the valuation is short as the parties want to complete the transaction as fast as possible. In view of this, it is very critical that one seeks relevant information. Obtaining and processing unrelated data may take away precious time without obtaining desired result. For example if the transaction is only for an intangible asset, processing the data for working capital of the business may not be required. At the same time there should not be compromise on obtaining critical data on the ground of shortage of time. It goes without saying that this stage comes only after appropriate Engagement letter setting out scope of work, time lines and fees is in place.

Reviewing data provided:

Having obtained the relevant information, next step is to process the same. Some of the items on which extra emphasis should be given are analysis of various ratios, comparison with comparable companies, current Regulatory environment, future plans, contingent liabilities, surplus assets, outstanding warrants, etc. Use of technologies and other software will be maximum during this stage of valuation.

Review of underlying assumptions of projections:
Depending on the facts of the case, one can decide whether projections should be used or not. If one is using the future projections, review of underlying assumption for various critical items such as growth in turnover, raw material consumption, inflation rate, foreign exchange rate, working capital movement, capital expenditure needs, etc. will be important. One should always keep in mind the requirement of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India while dealing with future projections.

Selecting method(s) :
Having obtained and processed the data, the valuer will have to decide on methods to be used for valuation. There is no fixed rule or principle regarding methods to be used for valuation. It is more dependent on valuer as to which method is relevant in a particular case. The selection of method(s) may differ from valuer to valuer as it a very subjective issue. The valuer should be in a position to justify the method(s) used as well as factors considered in case the valuation is challenged by any Authority. If multiple methods are used for a particular valuation, it is a common practice to assign weights to different methods to arrive at the fair value. Guidance may be taken from past decided case laws as to the selection of methods and weights.

Reporting:
Once the valuer concludes on his opinion as to the fair value, the next step will be Report of valuation. The typical contents of the report should be purpose of valuation, date of valuation, background of the Company, sources of information, methods of valuation used alongwith major adjustments, conclusions and disclaimers. There are some valuers who attach entire workings with the report where as some valuers just mention the final value.

Conclusion:
It may be relevant to mention that valuation is not at all a rocket science. It is always seen as a very specialised field. However it is more an application of common sense. The more you practise a particular work, more conversant and proficient you become. It is always seen that the easiest target in any transaction to get challenged is valuation. The reason is that valuation is very subjective. The discount rate, the price earnings multiple, the selection of methods, determination of maintainable profits, etc. will differ from one individual to other. There is no single correct answer to any valuation. That is why it is considered more an art and not an exact science.

Fictione Legis

‘Fictio’ in old Roman Law was a term of pleading and signified a false averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse e.g. an averment that the plaintiff was a Roman citizen, when he was a foreigner, if the object was to give jurisdiction over him [Maine’s Anc. Law Ch. II]. The term, meaning ‘fiction’, therefore, came to be used for those things that have no real essence in their own body but are so accepted in law for a special purpose. In the words of Viscount Dunedin in CfT v. Bombay Trust Corporation, AIR 1930 PC 54, “Where a person is deemed to be something, the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something, the Act of Parliament requires him to be treated as if he were”.

2. Fictions in law are created for definite purposes to result in a situation which would not otherwise have resulted and to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real. It is introduced for necessity, generally to avoid inequity caused by mischief made possible under general provisions and concepts of law. In tax laws the object is mainly ‘to prevent mischief arising out of circumvention of normal legal provisions resulting in tax avoidance while remaining within the confines of the law, as also to remove unintended consequences. The introduction of legal fictions thus introduces equity in legislation which is expressed in the maxim, “In fictione legis acquitas exist it” i.e. the legal fiction is consistent with equity. Beyond the purpose for which they are created legal fictions must injure no one as expressed in the maxim ‘fictio legis neminem ladit’.

3. The English law has always abounded in fictions, so are taxation laws in India. The unrestricted operation of treating the imaginary as real has the potentiality of upsetting the whole scheme of legislation and the basic fundamentals of law causing injury to untargeted subjects and areas and thus violating equity. Courts have, therefore, in keeping with the maxim, been cautioning against extending them beyond their legitimate field. The Apex court has repeatedly observed that legal fictions are created only for a definite purpose. They are limited to the purposes for which they are created and should not be extended beyond their legitimate field. [CfT v. Elphinstone Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd., 40 ITR 124].

4. In CfT v. Amarchand N. Shroff, 48 ITR 59, the court was to interpret the fiction contained in S. 24B(1) of 1922 Act making a legal representative an assessee in respect of the income which the deceased would have earned had he not died. Attempt was made to extend the fiction to post-death income as well. The court disapproved extending the fiction, the legitimates purpose of which was to tax income earned upto the year in which death took place. As a result, the 1961 Act made a specific provision in S. 168 to cover income upto the date of complete distribution of assets.

5. Commenting on Rule 8 of the Income-tax Rules which apportions the business income of the growers and manufacturers of tea, between agricultural and business income in the context of deduction u/s.80 HHC, the Calcutta High Court in Warren Tea Ltd v. UOf, 236 ITR 492 held that the applicability of the fiction is limited to computation of taxable income from business by apportioning the total business income computed after all deductions and, accordingly, held that since the stage of grant of deduction u/s.80HHC would be at the time before applying Rule 8 and not after apportionment is made, the Rule cannot be extended to computation of deduction u/s.80HHC. On that basis it struck down the CBDT Circular No. 600 dated May 23, 1991.

6. Fictions are suppositions and, unless it is clearly and expressly provided, it is not permissible to impose a supposition on a supposition of law. In Executors and Trustees of Sir Cawasji Jehangir v. CFT, 35 ITR 537, the Bombay High Court was to consider the scope of the jictio juris’ in S. 23A of the 1922 Act under which the undistributed income of the company, as computed in accordance with that provision, was deemed to have been distributed as dividend amongst the shareholders and included in their total income as such. The issue arose that if such income of the company constituted partly of capital gains, should the dividend which is deemed as distributed also be apportioned between capital gains and dividend in the hands of the shareholder. While accepting  that  full effect has to ‘fictio juris’ the court ruled out sub-joining or tacking a fiction upon fiction and observed that there is nothing even remotely suggesting the assessee to identify himself with the company or to assert an equivalence between his income and the income of the company. The argument, if accepted, would amount to imposing supposition upon the supposition of law.

7. Within its legitimate area of application, the fictione legis has to have its full effect. The question of chargeability of interest u/s.234B and u/s.234C came for consideration before the Gauhati High Court in Assam Bengal Carriers Ltd v. CIT, 239 ITR 862. Brushing aside all the arguments based on the impracticability of estimation of income before the book profit is arrived at, the Court directed full effect to be given to the fiction contained in the provision with its obvious fall out. Observing that, where fall out of the fiction leads to an obvious inference, there can be no half way house, the court held S. 234B & S. 234C applicable even in case where income is determined u/s.115JB. They quoted with approval the following observations of Lord Asquith in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2 All ER 587 (HL) which was also relied upon by the Bombay High Court in the case of Executors and Trustees of Sir Cawasji Jehangir (supra).

“If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real, the conse-quences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it”.

The Supreme Court, however, in CIT v. Kwality Biscuits Ltd., 284 ITR 434 disapproved the judgment of the Gauhati High Court on a different ground of the impracticability of arriving at the total income before arriving at the ‘book profit’.

8. In a recent judgement delivered by the Special Bench of the Ahmedabad Tribunal in Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax v. Goldmine Shares and Finance P. Ldt 302 ITR (AT) 208, the Tribunal  considered the fiction contained in S. 80IA(5) which bids one to treat the eligible business as the only source of income of an undertaking. Applying the observations of Lord Asquith (supra), the Tribunal took note of the consequences and incidents flowing from it and held that the profit from the eligible business for the purpose of deduction u/s.80IA has to be computed after deduction of the notional brought forward losses and depreciation of eligible business even though they have been allowed set off against other income in earlier years.

9. Fictions are generally by way of deeming provisions where imaginary or unreal state of affairs is deemed to exist in the presence of certain facts. Income-tax Act abounds in deemed provisions in which, all are not restricted to imaginary state only. Deemed provisions are sometimes used to give an artificial construction to a word or phrase that would otherwise not prevail. A clear example is to be found in the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) of the Act deeming advances to specified persons as dividend to shareholders. The Act defines ‘Income’ in an inclusive manner including receipts of the nature which would not otherwise be taken as such. They are also used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be capable of different interpretation. One may refer to the provisions of S. 9 which deems certain income as accruing or arising in India to keep them outside the pale of uncertainly. We have fiction in S. 45(3) and S. 45(4) to avoid unintended situation legalised by courts decisions and S. 115 JB to partly neutralise the impact of various tax incentives and thus introduce horizontal equity. All these provisions involve some digression from the normal provisions and the concepts in tax law. The peculiar sense in which the provision is employed has to be judged in the light of the scheme of the section and the context in which deeming is made.

10. Fictions in law, therefore, give completeness to the scheme of law and the intention of the legislature.

Rewriting and Revising Securities Laws – Highlights of some recent amendments

This series of articles introducing securities laws for listed companies to the lay reader continues …

1) SEBI has been busy in recent times and several revisions/amendments have been made, some of which are highlighted here.

2) SEBI rewrites  and replaces  the DIP Guidelines 2000 with  ICDR Regulations  2009

a. While not comparable to the Direct Taxes Code which seeks to rewrite the direct taxes laws into what is hoped to be an easy to understand law, SEBI too has undertaken a comparable exercise and has replaced the almost one-decade old DIP Guidelines with a re-written (though not overhauled) Regulations – the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009 or ‘the Regulations’.

b. Readers may recollect that the DIP Guidelines mainly regulate issue of securities to the public, shareholders and others. They regulate initial pubic offers, rights issues, preferential issues, etc. They provide for very detailed provisions which border on micro-regulation of every aspect of the process of such issues. These Guidelines are very frequently amended. For listed companies, their promoters and merchant bankers, these guidelines are literally like a Bible which they need to keep handy for regular reference.

c. As can be expected, frequent changes have made the Guidelines unwieldy and complex. Further, when one writes a set of clauses, one may have a central theme in mind. However, as new clauses and provisos and explanations are inserted and amended, the new set of clauses represent neither the original harmo-nious theme nor a new one but represent a hotch potch of ideas.

d. Another aspect of these Guidelines was that they were not, in my opinion and also as held in decisions, law in the strictest sense of the word. These guidelines were obviously not Parliament-made law nor could they be compared to Regulations and Rules which the Act provides for and which are also laid before Parliament later. Rather, they represented the provisions made by SEBI from time to time. While there is nothing wrong in SEBI prescribing such Guidelines – indeed this manner is inevitable and required in dealing with the dynamics of the capital market, a question often arises as to what their legal status is and what could be the penal consequences of their violations.

e. Thus, the replacement of the Guidelines with Regulations at least removes this concern over their legal status. Incidentally, though, the SEBI Act will now need to be amended to provide for specific punishment for violation of these Regulations since otherwise, the violation of these newly notified Regulations will fall under the residuary provisions and this mayor may not achieve the object that SEBI may have in mind. In fact, it may make sense if different provisions of these new Regulations are treated differently and thus separate punishment is provided for violations having differing intensity or seriousness. However, that would require a Bill to amend the SEBI Act itself.

f. In any case, to reiterate, the Guidelines are now replaced by Regulations whose violations can be punished with significant penalty and/or prosecution.

g. While it would be a mammoth exercise to compare the old Guidelines and the new Regulations and even to highlight the changes, suffice it to say that the intention has not been to completely rehaul the provisions. Future articles here may highlight some interesting implications particularly arising out of change in wording.

h. Further, the Regulations represent the DIP Guidelines rewritten but in most cases without any intention of changing the law. However, how well this intention of keeping the substantive law intact will be successful will be shown by time and experience in varying situation since the wording would often show up differently when one tries to apply and interpret them.

i. On first appearances, the substantive provisions and clauses have been trimmed and made more compact. However, part of the reason for the substantive clauses appearing more compact is also because the Regulations are now divided into substantive clauses and drafts of various precedents, forms, agreements, etc.

j. Consequential changes have been made in the SEBI ESOPs Guidelines and the Listing Agreement.

3) Ban on issue of shares with superior voting rights:

a. SEBI has issued a circular dated July 21, 2009, to make amendments to prohibit issue of shares with superior voting rights by listed companies. Earlier to this, SEBI had a Press Release announcing the decision to make such changes. Incidentally, the actual amendment covers all superior rights as to voting as well as dividends. The original decision as per the Press Release read that “No listed company can issue shares with superior voting rights.”.

b. The amendment is by way of insertion of a new clause 28A to the Listing Agreement. The amendment is to come into immediate effect though because of the peculiar status of Listing Agreement, one will also have to wait for amendment of the Listing Agreement by the respective stock exchanges.

4) The new clause is brief and is reproduced for ready reference:

“28A. The company agrees that it shall not issue shares in any manner which may confer on any person, superior rights as to voting or dividend vis-a-vis the rights on equity shares that are already listed.”

5) The following are some quick comments and concerns :

a) The prohibition is on issue of shares with ‘superior’ rights and not on ‘inferior’ rights.

b) A corollary from the earlier point, if a company issues shares with ‘inferior’ rights, those shares will then become the new benchmark. If one takes this further logically, then, thereafter, even ‘normal’ equity shares cannot be issued since these normal shares would have ‘superior’ rights as compared to the existing shares with ‘inferior rights’ assuming such latter shares are also listed !

c) Can the amendment affect issue of preference shares which have priority of dividends and at times even rights of sharing further dividends? Or can one say that the intention is to cover issue of equity shares only since the comparison is made to existing equity shares?

d) To bring the change into effect, the Listing Agreement is amended. This is curious. One would have thought the SEBIDIP Guidelines/ ICDR Regulations could have been a better place.

e) Would special rights given to certain investors/ promoters under the Articles of Association such as veto rights, special rights, etc. be deemed to be ‘superior rights as to voting’ ? Can it be said that the ban applies only where the superior rights are given to the ‘shares’ and not to the ‘persons’ holding such shares?

6) SEBI issues circular to formalise clarifications on 5% additional creeping acquisition

a) It may be recollected that late last year, SEBI had amended the Takeover Regulations to provide for a creeping acquisition window between 55-75%. These amendments permitted acquisition of further shares upto 5% for persons who held shares between 55-75%. A circular has been issued recently to clarify on some of the concerns expressed.

b) The circular is fairly self explanatory. A few quick comments though.

i) The clarifying circular is issued under Regulation 5 which permits SEBI to, inter alia, issue directions to remove difficulties in interpretation. S. 11 of SEBI Act is also relied on.

ii) It is seen that some of the interpretations so given go clearly beyond the plain wording and meaning. It is possible that in the future, a legal issue may come up whether such ‘clarification’ can go beyond the express and unambiguous wording of the Regulations.

iii) It is clarified that the 5% acquisition may be made in one or more tranches and also without any time limit.

iv) For calculating the 5% acquisitions, sales cannot be netted off. Thus, only gross purchases would be counted. For example, the acquirer cannot purchase 4%, then sell 3% and then acquire another 4% and claim that the net purchases are within the 5% limit.

v) The cumulative holding of the acquirer cannot exceed 75%. Thus, a person holding, say, 73% can acquire only a further 2%.

vi) The cumulative holding limit of 75% is irrespective of the minimum public share-holding that is required to be maintained under the Listing Agreement. Thus, e.g., in respect of a company having a 10% minimum public shareholding, the upper limit for this Regulation will still be 75% and not 90%.

7) SEBI clarifies on Insider Trading Regulations amendments of November 2008.

a) SEBI had amended the Insider Trading Regulations 1992 vide a Notification dated November 19, 2008. SEBI has now released a set of ‘Clarifications’ on 24th July 2009 on certain issues arising out of the amendments made.

b) Curiously, the ‘clarifications’ have no formal standing or reference. It is neither a circular, nor a notification, nor even a press release. It is neither signed nor dated. But it seeks to ‘clarify’ and give meaning to the Regulations that have legal standing and where such ‘meaning’ is quite contrary – as we will see to the plain reading of the text. Having said that, the ‘clarifications’ mostly relax the requirements and hence, being gift horses, one should not examine them in the mouth too closely!

C) Let us consider  the clarifications  given.

i. lt may be recollected that specified persons were banned from carrying out opposite transactions’ (banned transactions’) for six months of original buy/sale (‘original transactions’). The question was whether acquisition of shares under ESOP scheme and sale of such shares would be considered as transactions that trigger off such ban and whether these themselves are banned. It is clarified that exercise of ESOPs will neither be deemed to be ‘original transaction’ nor ‘banned transaction’. Thus, by acquiring shares under ESOPs, you don’t trigger a ban and if you are banned for six months, you can still exercise ESOPs. The reasoning given is that the ban is only on transactions in secondary market.

ii. Sale of shares acquired through ESOPs is covered but it will only be deemed to be an ‘original transaction’ and not a ‘banned transaction’. In other words, even if you are under a ban, you can still sell shares acquired under ESOPs but once you sell such shares, you have triggered a ban of six months. On this aspect, I do not understand the basis of clarifying that the sale of shares acquired under ESOPs scheme will not be an ‘original transaction’ – the logic of covering secondary market transactions should apply here also.

iii. Then, it is clarified that every later transaction triggers a fresh six month ban. A purchase on 1st February results in ban till 1st August. However, if there is a fresh purchase on 15th March, there is a ban now till 15th September. Effectively, this means that the ban period is from 2nd February till 15th September.

iv. What about transactions before this amendment – will the amendment create ban in respect of them too – this is an academic issue now at least as the six month period is now complete. It is clarified though that the transactions before the amendment are not to be considered. On a similar note, unwinding of positions in derivatives held on the date of this amendment is possible.

v. A crucial clarification is that the ban on ‘sale’ of shares for personal emergencies is permissible by waiver by the Compliance Officer. This is not evident from a plain reading of the provision. But SEBI thinks it is so evident and hence let us accept this gift without creating legal niceties! Note that this clarification applies only to sales and there can be no purchases within these six month ban period – obviously there cannot be any personal emergency to purchase shares !

vi. It is also clarified that tile ban on derivatives does not apply to NIFTY/SENSEX futures.

Limited Liability Partnerships Part-III

1. Winding-up of an LLP:

1.1 There are two ways in which an LLP can be wound-up, by an order of the Court or voluntarily.

1.2 An LLP can be wound-up by an order of the High Court under any of the fall owing circumstances:

    a) If the LLP decides that it should be wound-up by a Court Order.

(b) If the minimum number of partners reduces to less than two and remains sa far mare than 6 months,

    c) If it is unable to pay its debts. The Act does not prescribe any minimum amount of debts or any conditions under which an LLP is deemed to be unable to pay its debts. All these are contained in the draft Concept LLP (Winding-up and Dissolution) Rules.

    d) If it has acted against the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State or public order.

    e) If it has made a default in filing the Statement of Account and Solvency or the Annual Return far any 5 consecutive years.

    f) If the Court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to wind-up the LLP.

1.3 The above section is similar in its operation to S. 433 of the Companies Act. However, unlike the Companies Act, the LLP Act does not contain any provisions far the compulsory or voluntary winding-up of an LLP. All these provisions are contained in the draft Concept LLP (Winding-up and Dissolution) Rules. The final Rules have yet not been notified. It is interesting to note that while normally Rules only contain the procedures and the substantive portion is contained in the Act, the Winding-up Rules, even deal with the substantive portion of winding-up of LLPs. One would expect that such an important provision is passed by the Parliament rather than notified by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs.

1.4 S. 51 of the Act also provides that if an LLP’s affairs are under investigation if, based an an inves-tigatian report made u/s.49, the Central Covernment is of the view that it is expedient to do sa, then the Gavernment may present a winding-up petition to the High Court, The petition may be presented an the ground that it is just and equitable to wind-up the LLP.

2. Investigation of an LLP:

2.1 S. 43 of the Act empawers the Central Government to appoint an inspector to investigate the affairs of an LLP in any of the following circumstances:

    a) If partners having at least 20% voting pawer apply to the Tribunal far an investigation and the Tribunal passes an order to that effect. An application should be accompanied with a security of an amount calculated based an the turnover. The amount of security ranges from Rs.2 to 25 lakhs.

    b) If the Tribunal sua moto passes an order far an investigation into the affairs of an LLP.

    c) Any Court passes an Order that the affairs of an LLP should be investigated.

    d) If in the opinion of the Central Gavernment, there are circumstances suggesting that the business of the LLP is being conducted :

  •     with an intent to defraud  creditors, partners
  •     otherwise far a fraudulent/unlawful purpase
  •     in a manner .oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to its partners

    e) If in the opinion of the Central Gavernment, there are circumstances suggesting that the LLP was farmed far any fraudulent or unlawful purpase.

    f) If in the opinion of the Central Gavernment, there are circumstances suggesting that the LLP’s affairs are not being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

    g) If in the opinion .of the Central Gavernment, there are circumstances suggesting that, based an a rep art of the RaC, there are sufficient reasons that the affairs of the LLP should be investigated.

2.2 The inspector may make interim reports and on conclusion of the investigation make a final report.

2.3 If based on this report, the Central Government is of the view that any person named in the report is guilty of any offence, then it may launch crimi-nal prosecution against him. The Government may also initiate proceedings:

a) for the recovery  of damages;  or

b) for the recovery of any property of the LLP/ any entity which has been misappropriated or wrongfully retained.

3. Defunct  LLPs :

3.1 The RoC may strike off the name of an LLP from its register. It can do so, where an LLP is not carrying on any business or operation:

    a) For a period of 2 years or more and the RoC has reasonable cause to believe the same, for taking suo moto action for striking off the LLP’s name; or

    b) For a period of 1 year or more and it has made an application to the RoC in Form 24 with the consent of all the partners for striking off its name from the register.

3.2 The RoC shall in all cases of suo moto action provide an opportunity of being heard to the LLP. After that if the RoC is satisfied that the name should be struck off then it will publish a notice in the Gazette and from that date, the LLP shall stand dissolved.

4. Offences  and penalties:

4.1 The LLP Act lays down various penalties and prosecutions for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. It also lays down penalties for various procedural offences such as not filing forms on time. Further, where any document or return is required to be filed and if it is not so done on time, then it may be filed within 300 days from the original date of filing along with a daily fine of Rs. 100 for every day of delay.

4.2 In offences where no penalty has been pre-scribed, the punishment shall be a fine ranging from Rs.50,000 to Rs.5 lakhs along with a further fine which may extend to Rs.50 per day for every day after which the default continues.

4.3 A petition for compounding of offences can be made in From 31 to the RoC. Only those offences can be compounded for which the punishment is only a fine. Thus, offences which are punishable with imprisonment are not compoundable. This is different from the provisions of S. 621A of the Companies Act. Under this Act, offences for which the punishment is a fine or imprisonment are compoundable. One reason for the same is that there are no offences under the LLP Act for which the punishment is a fine or an imprisonment. The punishments under the Act are in the form of fines and imprisonment. Where any offence by an LLP is compounded no prosecution would be launched against the offender.

4.4 Offences in relation to the Incorporation Document, carrying on of a fraudulent business, making of false statements under the Act, matters arising out an Inspection Report and non-compliance of any Order of the Tribunal, are offences under the Act which also attract imprisonment as a punishment.
Thus, these offences would not be compoundable.

4.5 Where any offence by an LLP is proved to be because of the consent or connivance of a partner or attributable to the neglect of any partner, then such person shall be proceeded against and punished under the Act.

5. Whistle blowers:

5.1 A Court or Tribunal is empowered to reduce or waive any penalty leviable against any partner or employee of an LLP who is a whistle blower, if :

  •     he provided useful information during the investigation of the LLP; or

  •     he provided some information which lead to the LLP or its partner / employee being convicted under any Act.

5.2 The Act also contains a safeguard against harassment of such a whistle blower by providing that he would not be discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed or discriminated against merely because he provided the above information.

RBI/FEMA

4. Press Note No. 6 (2009) dated September 4, 2009 – Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Small Scale Industrial Under-taking (SSI)/Micro & Small Enterprises (MSE) and in industrial undertaking manufacturing items reserved for SSI/MSE – clarification

This Press Note relaxed the limit for FDI in SSI/MSE and clarified issues relating to FDI in industrial undertaking manufacturing items reserved for SSI/MSE.

1. FDI in SSI/MSE :


The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act, 2006, has removed the ceiling for equity participation (both domestic and foreign) in the micro and small enterprises, by other enterprises. Under this Act Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE) (earlier small scale industries) are defined solely on the basis of investment in plant & machinery (for micro and small enterprise engaged in manufacturing) and equipment (for micro and small enterprise engaged in providing or rendering of services).

The Press Note amends Press Note 18 (1997 Series) but stating that FDI in MSE is subject only to the sectoral equity caps, entry routes and other relevant sectoral regulations.

2. FDI in an Industrial Undertaking manufacturing items reserved for SSI/MSE

This Press Note clarifies the position, as stated at Part III (ii) of Annex to Press Note 7 (2008), in respect of FDI in an industrial undertaking manufacturing items reserved for SSI/MSE. Accordingly, any industrial undertaking, with or without FDI, which is not an MSE, manufacturing items reserved for manufacture in the MSE sector (presently 21 items) as per the Industrial Policy, would:

a) Require an Industrial License under the Indus-tries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951, for manufacture of the reserved items.
 
b) Apart from fulfillment of certain general conditions, the undertaking will have to export a minimum of 50% of the new or additional annual production of the MSE reserved items to be achieved within a maximum period of three years.

c) The export obligation will be applicable from the date of commencement of commercial production.

d) Such an industrial undertaking would also require prior approval of the Government (FIPB) where foreign investment is more than 24% in the equity capital.

5. A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 8 dated September 14, 2009 — Foreign Currency Account by diplomatic missions — Credit of Visa Fees.

Notification No. FEMA 193/2009-RB dated June 2, 2009 — Foreign Exchange Management (Deposit) (Amendment) Regulations, 2009.

Presently, Diplomatic Missions are permitted to credit proceeds of inward remittances received from outside India through normal banking channels to their foreign currency accounts.

This circular, in addition to the existing permission, permits Diplomatic Missions to transfer visa fees collected in India in Indian rupees from their rupee accounts to their foreign currency accounts.

Part D : Miscellaneous

The Government of India has signed a Social Security Agreement with the Government of Switzerland on 3rd September, 2009. The said agreement is intended to benefit cross-border operations in the two countries by avoiding the hardship of double payment of the social security (by employer and employee) in India and Switzerland. The same will come into effect after the fulfillment of the necessary requirements in both  the countries.

Tribunal News: PART B

Bomi  S. Billimoria    v. ACIT ITAT ‘F’ Bench, Mumbai Before  D. Manmohan (VP) and J. Sudhakar Reddy (AM)
ITA No. 2120/Mum./1998 A.Y. : 1993-94. Decided on:  30-6-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue: Prakash Jotwani/ J. V. D. Langstieh

S. 48 – Amount received on transfer of shares under cashless option not liable to tax under the head ‘Income from Capital Gains’ since such option does not have cost of acquisition.

Per D. Manmohan :

Facts:

The assessee was an employee of Johnson & Johnson, Bombay which was a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, USA. Under stock option plan, the USA company granted to the assessee, on 7-12-1989, a cashless option to purchase 2500 shares of Johnson & Johnson, USA at a price of USD 57.88 per share which price was the fair market value of the stock on the day of granting the option. The Reserve Bank of India had approved the stock option scheme on the condition that there should not be any payment, either in India or abroad, for acquiring the shares.

During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 1993-94, on 13-8-1992, the assessee exercised his option to realise the value of the options under the scheme and accordingly sold 1000 shares in USA and received a sum of Rs.4,59,405 in Indian currency. After considering the amount retained in USD in EEFC Account and also the bank charges the net gain was computed at Rs.5,44,925. The assessee regarded this amount as a capital  receipt  not chargeable    to tax.

The Assessing Officer (AO) held the profit on sale of option to be chargeable either as salary or short term capital gains or as speculation profit.

The CIT(A) held that the shares obtained under the ESOP were a capital asset and as they were held for less than 3 years, the gain was assessable as short term capital gain. He rejected the argument that as there was no ‘cost of acquisition’, ‘the capital gains were not assessable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The issue before the Tribunal was whether the amount received by the assessee was liable to tax under the head’ capital gains’ and if so whether there was any cost of acquisition so as to bring to tax the net receipts.

Held:

    1) As the CIT(A) had held that the shares acquired under ESOP amounted to acquisition of a capital asset one had to proceed on that premise;

    2) Since on the date of exercising the option there was no cost of acquisition of shares, in accordance with the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B. C. Srinivasa Shetty (128 ITR 294) the gains could not be taxed;

    3) Even if it is assumed that the market value of the shares is the benefit given to the assessee, such benefit can be said to accrue to the assessee only on the date of exercise of the option. As the date of exercise of option as well as the date of sale is the same, there was no difference between the ‘deemed cost of acquisition’ and the actual price realised by assessee and thus there is no capital gain chargeable to tax.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

2. Shree Capital Services Ltd. v. ACIT ITAT Special Bench Kolkata Before G. D. Agrawal (VP) and B. R. Mittal (JM) and C. D. Rao (AM) ITA No. 1294 (Kol.) of 2008

AY.  : 2004-05. Decided on: 31-7-2009

Counsel for assessee/revenue: Manish Sheth/ Sushil Kumar s. 43(5) – For a period prior to A. Y. 2006-07 transactions in futures and options are speculative transactions u/s.43(5) – S. 43 (5) (d) is not retrospective.

Per G. D. Agrawal :

Facts:

During the previous year relevant to A.Y. 2004-05 the assessee company, which was engaged in the business of financing and investment in shares and securities, suffered a loss of Rs.9,25,065 on account of futures and options. The Assessing Officer (Aa) treated the same as speculation loss as per S. 43(5) of the Act.

The CIT(A) confirmed the order of the Aa. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. The Special Bench (SB) of the Tribunal adjudicated two questions viz. (i) whether a transaction in derivatives falls within the meaning of ‘speculative transaction’ as provided u/s.43(5); and if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether clause (d) of S. 43(5), introduced by the Finance Act, 2005 w.e.f. 1-4-2006, is clarificatory in nature and therefore retrospective in operation.

Held:

    1. Derivative is a security which derives its value from the underlying assets. When the underlying asset of any derivative is share and stock, for all practical purposes, the treatment given to such derivative should be similar to stock and securities.

    2. S. 43(5) uses the term ‘commodity’ in a very wide sense and covers ‘derivatives’.

    3. The fact that S. 43(5)(d) exempts certain derivatives from the ambit of the definition of ‘speculative transaction’ itself shows that they would otherwise have come within the term. If ‘derivatives’ are held to be not covered by the definition of ‘speculative transaction’ the amendment would be redundant.

    4. Since clause (d) of S. 43(5) does not exempt all transactions in derivatives but only the ‘eligible transactions’ on ‘recognised stock exchanges’ this clause cannot be held to be clarificatory. Further, Rules 6DDA and 6DDB which deal with ‘recognised stock exchanges’ were inserted w.e.f. 1-7-2005. Consequently, clause (d) of S. 43(5) applies to AY. 2006-07 and onwards.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

3. Western Coalfields Ltd. v. ACIT  ITAT Nagpur Bench
Before N. L. Dash (JM) and V. K. Gupta (AM)
IT A No. 289 and  290/N ag.l2006

AYs.  : 2002-03 and  2003-04. Decided on:  30-6-2009 Counsel for assessee/revenue: Nani Daruwala/ A K. Singh

Explanation to S. 37(1) – Penalty which is not of the nature of illegal! unlawful expenditure is not covered by the Explanation to S. 37(1).

Per V. K. Gupta :

Facts:

The assessee company was a colliery which trans-ported coal to Electricity Boards in railway wagons. Freight paid to the railways depended upon the carrying capacity of the wagons. In case the wagons were overloaded as compared to their carrying capacity, the railways charged ‘overloading charges’ at a rate which was generally six times the normal freight. The assessee’ claimed these overloading charges as a deduction on the ground that they have been incurred for a commercial purpose and were not for infraction of any law. The Assessing Officer (Aa), however, held these to be penal in nature and did not allow the same.

The CIT(A)  confirmed the  action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred-an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that had the amounts been paid to a private carrier the same would have been allowable. The fact that the same are paid to Railways which is an institution owned by the Government, working under an Act of Parliament, the nature of overloading charges which are essentially of commercial nature cannot be characterised as of penal nature irrespective of the nomenclature given to such charges by the Railways. It held that:

    i. the substance of the matter has to be looked into and given preference over the form;

    ii. the amount was essentially of a commercial nature and incurred in the normal course of the business and was consequently allowable;

    iii. the object of Explanation 1 also supports the claim of the assessee as these expenses are not of the nature of any illegal/unlawful expenditure;

    iv. the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Hero Cycles Ltd. is squarely applicable.

This ground was decided in favor  of the assessee.

4. ACIT v. RPG Life Sciences Ltd. ITAT ‘C’ Bench, Mumbai Before P. M. Jagtap (AM) and V. D. Rao OM) ITA No. 1579/Mum.l2006

A.Y. : 2002-2003. Decided on:  31-8-2009
Counsel  for revenue/assessee:
Yashwant  V. Chavan/B. V. Jhaveri

S. SOB read with S. 2 (42 C) – Slump sale – Sale of one of the manufacturing divisions of the assessee
– Whether the transaction could be considered as slump sale – On the facts, Held: No.

Per P. M. Jagtap  :

Facts:

The assessee was engaged in the business of manufacturing pharmaceutical and agrochemical prod-ucts. During the year under consideration, its agro-chemical division was sold for an agreed consider-ation of Rs.72.70 crares. During the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee was asked to explain as to why the said sale be not treated as a slump sale and capital gain arising therefrom be not computed u/ s.50B. In reply, the assessee explained that it had sold the assets and liabilities of its agrochemical division by identifying the value of each and every item. In support, the break up of the agreed consideration of Rs.72.7 crore was given. The attention of the AO was drawn to the various schedules of the agreement where the fixed assets were valued item-wise by ascertaining the value of land, building, plant and machinery, furniture and fixtures and capital work-in-progress separately.

However, the assessee’s submissions were not found acceptable by the AO for reasons, amongst others, as under:

Assessee had transferred the entire undertaking as a going concern along with all existing employees.

The intention of the contracting parties was to sell the agrochemical undertaking and not the land, building, plant and machinery and furniture and fixtures and other intangible and current assets, all of which comprised the agro-chemical division separately.

The individual assets of agrochemical division I.were not separately valued but only group of assets were valued.

The valuation report valuing individual assets and/or schedules to the agreement listing out individual assets and value thereof have no relevance unless the consideration is determined on the basis of itemised value.

All the licences, old records of account books, vouchers pertaining to agrochemical business were also transferred by the assesses.

Accordingly, it was held that that the sale of the agrochemical division by the assessee was slump sale and the capital gain arising there from was chargeable to tax in its hand as per the provisions of S. SOB.

On appeal the CIT(A) accepted the stand of the assessee that sale of its agrochemical division was not a slump sale.

Held:

The Tribunal noted that as confirmed by the CIT(A) in his order – all the fixed assets as well as the current assets of agrochemical division were valued. The fixed assets were valued itemised by ascertaining the value of each and every asset separately and after adding non-compete fee of Rs.4 crores to the said value, the value of the fixed assets was worked out at Rs.54.33 crores. In a similar manner, net current assets were valued at Rs.58.38 crores and after deducting the value of net current liabilities therefrom, the total value was arrived at Rs.88.68 crores. As against the said value, the consideration finally agreed was Rs.72.70 crores and the reconciliation to explain the difference between the same was also furnished. The Revenue was not able to controvert or rebut the findings recorded by the CIT(A). Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

Tribunal News: PART A

1. (2009) 119 ITD 1 (Pune) Bhagwandas Associates v. ITO, Ward 5(4), Pune A.Y.: 1988-89. Dated:  28-9-2007

The mistake which is otherwise rectifiable u/s.154 cannot be adjusted at the time of giving effect to appellate order u/s.250/254 particularly when that mistake is absolutely out of context and purview of appellate order.

Facts:

The assessee claimed deduction u/s.32AB in his return for A.Y. 1988-89 based on audit report. The AO wrongly allowed deduction of higher amount and also made addition on account of sales tax refund. The Tribunal deleted the addition of sales tax refund. While giving effect to Tribunal’s order AO rectified deduction u/s.32AB to the correct figure. The CIT(A) also held that ‘rectification was consequential of giving effect to the Tribunal’s order’ and upheld the addition in favour of AO. On an appeal to Tribunal, it was held that:

    There are 2 types of orders of appellate authority. One is specific relief pertaining to specific ad-dition and the other is de novo assessment i.e. setting aside assessment and making a fresh assessment. In second case, AO has same powers as at the time of making fresh assessment.

    ‘When Tribunal sets aside the assessment and remands the case for making fresh assessment, the power of AO is confined to the subject matter of the appeal before Tribunal. He can not take up the questions which were not subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal even though no specific direction has been given by the Tribunal.’

    The contention of CIT(A) is not correct because thetquaritum of deduction u/s.32AB is not linked with the assessed income. Rather it is based on the quantum of investment. Giving effect to the Tribunal’s order can not be equated with the regular assessment order.

    Even though AO can make rectification of order u/s.154, he has exceeded his limits while giving effect to the order of the Tribunal.

    Hence, it was held that even though a mistake is rectifiable u/ s.154, it can not be adjusted while giving effect to the order of Tribunal particularly when that mistake is absolutely out of context and purview of appellate order.

2. (2009) 119 ITD 13 (Mumbai) Smarttalk (P.) Ltd. v. ITO, Ward 8(3)(2), Mumbai A.Y. : 2001-02. Dated: 31-3-2008

Assessee co., a joint venture, took bank loan guaranteed by co-venturers – Payment by one of the venturers to discharge his obligation credited by company to capital reserve. Repayment taxed u/s. 10(3) – CIT(A) upheld addition u/s.28(iv)/41(1) – Since assessee has not claimed deduction of the amount originally, repayment of loan not taxable u/s.28(iv)/41(1). Also can not be taxed u/s.10(3) as S. 10 deals with income which does not form part of total income – Additions, therefore to be deleted.

Facts:

The assessee company was a joint venture between ‘M’ (holding 49%) and ‘B’ (holding 51% of shareholding). The company took a loan of Rs.7 crores from Bank of America which was guaranteed by eo-venturers in proportion to their shareholding. The agreement also restricted the right of the asses-see to enter into any merger, acquisition or sale without prior permission of bank. In A.y. 2002-03~ ‘ASC’ took over 51% shareholding of ‘B’ and’ AW’ took over 49% shareholding of ‘M’. The company had repaid the loan to the extent of Rs.2 crores. 49% of the balance loan was repaid by ‘M’ (i.e. Rs.2.45 crores) along with outstanding interest which was credited by assessee to capital reserve. The AO taxed the same u/s.l0(3). On appeal to CIT (A), it upheld the addition u/s.28(iv)/41(1). On appeal to Tribu-nal, it applied the ratio laid down by the Bombay High Court in Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. CIT, and followed by the Third Member Bench in ITO v. Ahuja Graphic Machinery Ltd., holding that waiver of loan is neither covered u/s.28(iv) nor u/s.4l(l). As the assessee has not claimed deduction of loan taken, repayment of the same by eo-venturer cannot be taxed as cessation of liability u/s.4l(l). Further, the said sum can also not be taxed u/s.lO(3) as S. 10 deals with only such incomes, which are not to be included in the total incomes of the assessee. Hence, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

3. (2009) 199 ITD 15 (Agra) (Third  Member) ITO,  Range  3(1), Gwalior  v. Laxmi Narain Ramswaroop Shivhare A.Y.: 2001-02. Dated: 26-12-2008

S. 145 – A.Y. 2001-02 was the first year of business of the assessee – Aa rejected books of accounts on the ground that there were no support-ing vouchers for sales and all sales made in cash
– Applied different G.P. ratio on comparative basis – Since due to the nature of business of the assessee it is not possible to maintain proper sales bills, it cannot be said that books of accounts were defective – Therefore, books cannot be rejected and actual G.P. ratio to be considered.

Facts:

The assessee firm was engaged in the business of trading in country liquor and IMFL. The supplies of country liquor to the assessee were made through the Government warehouse on payment of duty and purchase of IMFL was made from other private parties in accordance with the permit given by the Government. The assessee got his accounts audited and furnished audit report in Form 3CD. However, he could not produce supporting vouchers in respect of sale of country liquor as the sales were recorded on the basis of daily sales records given by employees of the shops. AO rejected books of accounts on the ground that the sales were not subject to any independent evidence and applied G.P. ratio of 5% against actual G.P. ratio of 3.11%. On an appeal to CIT(A), he reduced G.P. ratio to 4%. On appeal before Tribunal, the Third Member held that:

    The AO rejected books of accounts for want of sales bills and accepted sales value declared by the assessee. Hence, he has no reason to reject books of accounts.

    The CIT(A) has reduced  G.P. ratio and has given a finding  that there was no significant defect in the books.    

    The nature of business of the assessee is such that it is not possible to maintain proper bills.

    Hence, the books of accounts can not be rejected and actual results declared by the assessee be accepted.

4. (2009) 119 ITD 49 (Ahd.) ITO, Ward-4(2),  Ahmedabad v. Krishnonics Ltd. A.Y. : 1996-97. Dated: 19-12-2007

Held  1:

Provisions of S. 2(22)(e) are not applicable when loan is advanced in the course of normal money lending business – Further, in determining ‘sub-stantial part of business’, income criteria is not relevant but objects and deployment of funds are relevant factors.

Held  2:

Foreign travelling expenses incurred for the purpose of business are allowable expenditure especially when they are proved to be incurred for the purposes of business.

Facts 1 :

The assessee company took loan of Rs.37,77,475 from ‘I’ Ltd. which was claimed to be engaged in the business of money lending. ‘I’ Ltd. also advanced the loan of Rs.1,08,099 to G Ltd. a third party not connected with any of the above parties. It was found that one of the directors of assessee was holding more than 10% of share-capital in ‘I’ Ltd. and more than 20% capital in assessee company. The AO invoked the provisions of S. 2(22)(e) on the ground that ‘I’ Ltd. derived more income from dividend than from interest income. On appeal to CIT(A), it deleted the addition. However, Revenue preferred an appeal to Tribunal. The Tribunal held that as per S. 2(22)(e)(ii) ‘substantial income’ is not the relevant criteria for determining substantial part of business but objects and deployment of funds are relevant. As money lending business was one of the six objects of assessee company and it carried on that object in preference to others it was engaged in the business of money lending and hence provisions of S. 2(22)(e) are not attracted.

Facts 2:

The assessee company claimed expenses on account of travelling of managing director to Taiwan. It was claimed that the expenditure was incurred to find out the possibility of expanding export sales and to acquaint company regarding latest automation machinery concept. The AO disallowed the expenditure on the ground that assessee did not prove it to have been incurred for the purposes of business.

The CIT(A) allowed the claim of assessee. However, department preferred an appeal to Tribunal. It was shown that as a result of the visit to Taiwan, assessee was able to make exports to Taiwan which was not contested by AO. Hence, Tribunal allowed the appeal in favour of assessee and upheld the decision of CIT(A).

5. (2009) 119 ITD 62 (Kolkata) (TM) Shanti Ram Mehta v. ACIT, Circle-3, Asansol A.Ys.: 2000-01 and 2003-04 Dated: 11-11-2008

Additions u/s.69C for unexplained expenditure cannot be made on ad hoc basis or on presumptions.

Facts:

The assessee mainly dealt in two products namely Kerosene Oil and Fertilizers. During A.Ys. 2000-01 and 2003-04, assessee made purchases from different parties. He was to bear some expenses relating to transportation charges. However, he submitted to AO that the purchases were made in bulk. Regard-ing kerosene oil it was submitted that supplying dealers redirect the Tankers to assessee’s business place hence no charges were incurred towards trans-portation. However, AO accepted the contention of assessee only in respect of Kerosene oil and added transportation charges of Rs.50,OOOon estimated basis in respect of purchase of fertilizers as they were purchased in small quantities in a day which was revealed from books of accounts. On an appeal to C!T(A), he upheld the addition. On appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that 5. 69C is applied when assessee is unable to explain the source of any expenditure however ‘the AO has to first find the evidence of incurring the expenditure. S. 69C cannot be applied on mere presumption or suspicion’. In the present case, the’ AO didn’t bring on record any evidence of incurring transportation charges. Consequently, the Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs.50,OOOalleged to have been incurred towards transportation charges.

6. 2009 TIOL 526 ITAT Mum. Livingstones Jewellery (P) Ltd. v. DCIT ITA No. 187/Mum./2007 A.Y. : 2003-04. Dated:   12-5-2009

S. 10A –  All the profits  which  have  nexus  with the  business   of  the  undertakingqualify   for deduction u/s.10A – Interest income on FDRs given by the assessee to the Bank for obtaining credit facilities has nexus with the business of the undertaking and qualifies for deduction u/s.10A.

Facts:

The assessee having its business of manufacturing and export of studded and plain jewellery of gold and platinum filed its return of income for A.Y. 2003-04 declaring total income after claiming deduction u/s.10A. Interest of Rs.9,OO,961 received on fixed deposits was netted against the interest payment of Rs.1,04,37,835 and net interest of Rs.95,36,873 was debited to its P&L account. The AO held that interest income on FDs with bank cannot be said to be derived from export of goods and merchandise. He, denied the deduction u/s.10A of this amount of interest on FDs.

The CIT(A) did not allow any relief to the assessee.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The expression ‘profits derived from export of articles or things or computer software’ as employed in 5s.(1) or 5s.(lA) has been given a specific meaning in 5s.(4). 5s.(4) states that the ‘profits derived from export of articles or things or computer software’ shall be the amount which bears to the ‘profits of the business of the undertaking’, the same proportion as the export turnover in respect of such articles or things or computer software bears to the total turnover of the business carried on by the undertaking. By providing for considering the ‘profits of the business of the undertaking’, the position has been made clear that the restricted general meaning given to eligible profi ts as derived from the export of articles in 5s.(1) ha; been given a go by in 5s.(4) and the scope of the benefit has been expanded by extending to all the profits of the business carried on by the undertaking. The Tribunal noted that the wording of 5s.(4) as amended w.e.f. 1-4-2000 is on the pattern of 5. 80lA prior to its substitution w.e.f. 1-4-2000. It also noted that in the context of 5. 80IA the Arnritsar Bench of the Tribunal had in the case of Dy. CIT v. Chaman Lal & Sons, 3 50T 333 held that the benefit of deduction was available in respect of purchase and sale which was part and parcel of the business of the industrial undertaking. All the profits which have nexus with the business of the undertaking will qualify for deduction. The Tribunal noted since that the FDRs were given to obtain credit facility, interest income had nexus with the business of the undertaking and falls under the head ‘Income from Business’. It allowed the claim of deduction u/s.lOA in respect of interest income.

The appeal  filed by the assessee  was allowed.

7. 2009 TIOL 559 ITAT Mum. ITO v. P & R Automation Products Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 2119/Mum./2007 A.Y.: 2003-04. Dated:   25-3-2009

32 – Machinery purchased and given to sister concern for manufacturing goods for the assessee, which in turn exports them, is utilised by the assessee for business – No part of depreciation can be disallowed on such machinery on the ground that spare capacity was utilised by the sister concern for manufacturing its own goods which were sold locally.

Facts:

As per the agreement entered into between the assessee and PAL (its sister concern) a CMG machine was purchased by the assessee and was installed at the factory premises of the sister concern. The sister concern was to use the machine at its premises for manufacturing goods by utilising its power, labour and other facilities and sell the goods so manufactured to the assessee at fair market price to meet the assessee’s export obligation. PAL was authorised to develop indigenous market for said products by using spare capacity. The total sales declared by PAL were Rs.2.28 crores out of which sales to the assessee were Rs.1.50 crores. 93% of the capacity of the machine had been utilised for goods sold to the assessee and spare capacity to the tune of 7% had been utilised for others. The assessee had not charged any rent or hire charges from the sister concern.

The assessee claimed depreciation on the machine on the ground that it was utilised by it for the purposes of its business. While assessing the total income of the assessee the Aa disallowed the claim of depreciation on this machine on the ground that the sister concern had also utilised the machine for manufacturing its own goods which were sold locally.
 
The CIT(A) relying upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Express Pvt. Ltd. 255 ITR 68 held that the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s.32 of the Act.

Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal observed that u/s.32 an assessee is entitled to deduction by way of depreciation on machinery, if it is owned by the assessee and is used for the purpose of its business. The Tribunal noted the undisputed facts viz. that the assessee had purchased the machinery and the same was provided to the sister concern essentially to manufacture goods for the assessee and supplying the same at fair market price. The Tribunal held the conditions required to be satisfied for deduction u/s.32 as having been satisfied. It stated that its view is supported by the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Express Pvt. Ltd.

The appeal  filed by the Revenue  was dismissed.

8. 2009 TIOL 550 ITAT Mum. Popatlal Fulchand v. ACIT ITA No. 358/Mum./2008 A.Y. : 2004-05. Dated:  6-5-2009

s. 22. – Property owned by individuals and used by a firm, without paying any rent, whose partners are HUFs of the individuals owning the property can be said to be used for the purposes of business by such individuals and consequently its notional income is not chargeable.

Facts:

The assessee alongwith other individuals were owners of a property which was being used by M/s. F C International, a partnership firm, whose partners were HUFs of the assessee and other individual owning the property. The HUFs were partners through the individuals owning the property. The firm did not pay any rent for the property.

The assessee was of the view that annual value of this property is not chargeable to tax since the same is being used for the purposes of his business. The Assessing Officer (Aa) was of the view that the firm is a distinct entity than its individual partners and since the property has been utilised for the purpose of the business of the firm, the benefit of S. 22 cannot be given to individual partners.

The CIT(A) upheld    the view  of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

Held:

The Tribunal held that the assessee was not liable to tax in respect of the notional income of the house property used by the firm for its business without paying any rent to the owners of the property. It also observed that the issue under consideration is squarely covered by the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Cl’T v. H. S. Singhat & Sons, 253 ITR 653 (Del.). The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Is it fair to insist on e-compliance without adequate machinery

1. Computerisation is the need of the day in all walks of life. Even various government departments are gradually (in fact, in some sectors, rapidly) thrusting e-compliance on citizens. In the context of income-tax, it all started with e-filing of Quarterly TDS Statements, then e-filing of Returns, followed bye-payment of Taxes, e-filing of remittance certificate (S. 195) and now forthcoming is e-credit of Taxes (Form 26AS). This article examines certain grievances faced by tax practitioners and taxpayers at large in the context of e-compliance under Income-tax Act, 1961.

2. E-payment  of taxes:

E-payment has been made mandatory for all corporate assessees (and those non-corporate assessees who are liable for audit u/s.44AB) w.e.f. 1-4-2008. The general difficulties faced in e-payment are:

2.1 On the NSDL website, once we click the relevant link for e-payment, a web-page appears where we have to fill up the basic information like PAN I TAN, Assessment Year, Name, Address etc. After filling all these details, we have to click to the relevant link, submit to the bank and then proceed with the e-payment gateway.

If at all in this whole process, there is any interruption due to whatever problem like power failure, internet connection failure, bank password mis-match etc., then the whole process is to be restarted from filling of the Basic data. Even otherwise, when multiple payments for different sections (TDS) are to be made; for all the challans, one has to fill up the basic data like name, address, etc. over and again. There should be a facility that once PAN I TAN is entered all the Basic data should automatically appear because it is already in the database of the department.

2.2 At present, there are only 30 banks which are authorised to accept e-payment of taxes ..This creates practical difficulties for taxpayers who are not maintaining account with these Banks. Though, in practice, certain other Banks are also accepting e-payment of taxes but since they are not authorised, ultimately they also have to route it through one of the authorised Banks. This, at times, results in de-lay in credit of tax-payments, with consequential loss of interest u/s.234A, u/s.234B, u/s.234C, u/s. 201 etc. and at times may become a cause of 40a(ia) disallowance.

3. e-filing    of quarterly TDS  statements:

3.1 Once a quarterly TDS statement is uploadedl filed with NSDL, if any corrections are to be done, deductor has to upload/file a correction statement. For this, first of all he has to give the link of fvu file of original statement. Once this is done, the original statement appears on the screen, which can be corrected and new fvu file is generated. There are instances, where the deductor has lost the original fvu file due to computer problem etc. There is no procedure to get the lost fvu file back either from NSDL web site or income tax department’s website. In such a scenario, as the correction statement can never be filed, the deductee will lose the credit for taxes?

3.2 There was a suggestion from NSDL official that, if 95% PAN compliance is not possible, the deductor should submit only those deductee records where PAN is available. As and when other PANs are obtained, correction statement should be filed. This may create 3 difficulties. Firstly, the Challan Details and Deductee Details amount will not match. Secondly, it may amount to a default on the part of deductor of not submitting the details of all tax deducted. Thirdly, filing correction statements repeatedly, is a cumbersome process, as explained in para 3.1 and also it comes at a cost every time.

4.  Form 26AS :

It is proposed that in the near future, even credit for tax deducted will be based on Form 26AS which is electronically generated by NSDL, based on data submitted by deductor. If PAN is wrongly given by deductee, it will not be reflected in his Form 26AS. The deductee will, therefore, have to request the deductor to file a correction statement. In case of large deductors, especially government departments or public sector banks, the feasibility of filing such correction statement, at the instance of a large number of deductees, is really a question mark. Admittedly, there is a facility on the NSDL website to verify PAN, but it comes at a huge cost of Rs.12,OOO. Should there be such a huge charge for statutory compliance?

5. Conclusion:
It is rightly said that change is the only constant in life and generally, change is for the better. Admittedly, even if e-compliance is for the better, the transition should be pain-free and at least in the transitional period, the system should not be faceless. There has to be a sort of ombudsman for handling these technical grievances of the taxpayer.

Inter-State sales vis-a-vis Branch Transfer

A debatable issue arises about nature of transaction of dispatch of goods from one branch to another branch in other state. If the dispatch amounts to Branch transfer, the sale by branch to customer will be local sale.

On the other hand if the dispatch is not considered as branch transfer it will amount to inter-State sale from the moving state. To decide the nature of movement, whether inter-State sale or branch transfer, reference is required to be made to CST Act, 1956.

Under CST Act the nature of inter-State sale transaction is defined. Therefore, if the transaction falls into said definition, it will be inter-State and if not covered by the said definition, it will be a local sale. The definition of the inter-State sale is given in S. 3 of the CST Act, 1956. The said section is reproduced below for ready reference:

“A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of interstate trade or commerce if the sale or purchase –

    a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another; or

    b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another.”

It can be seen that if there is movement of goods from one state to another state because of sale, such sale will be inter-State sale. There is no condition that the clause for movement from one state to another state should be expressly provided in the sale agreement. In other words, even if the implied link between the movement and sale is established, it will be inter-State sale.

On the other hand, if the movement of goods from one state to another state is without reference to any pre-existing sale, it will not be an inter-State sale.

The cases of inter-State sales vis-a-vis branch transfers are required to be seen in light of above legal position. The branch and the head office or other branch in other State, are one and the same entity. Therefore, when a branch in one State transfers goods to branch in other State, there can be two situations: First, the branch in one State may be
transferring goods to branch in other State without reference to any particular sale agreement etc. in the transferee State. In other situation, the branch in transferee State may have pre-committed sale agreement and the branch in transferring State may be sending the goods to the branch in pursuance of said agreement. The receiving branch may thereafter deliver the goods to the customer. In this case also, though the delivery is to a branch, the transaction will be considered as an inter-State sale. In short, if there is nexus between dispatch from one State and sale in other State, such sale will be in the category of inter-State sale.

There are number of judicial pronouncements deciding nature of transactions. Reference can be made to following few important judgments:

Nivea  Time  (108 STC 6) (Born.)

The observations of the Bombay High Court on nature of interstate sale are as under:

“8. S. 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 lays down when a sale or purchase of goods is said to take place in the course of interstate trade or commerce. It says:

‘A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of interstate trade or commerce if the sale or purchase –

c) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another; or

d) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another.’

In this case, we are concerned with sale or purchase falling under clause (a).

9. It is well-settled by now by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that a sale can be said to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade under clause (a) of S. 3, if it can be shown that the sale has occasioned the movement of goods from one State to another. A sale in the course of inter-State trade has three essentials: (i) there must be a sale; (ii) the goods must actually be moved from one State to another; and (iii) the sale and movement of the goods must be part the same transaction. The words ‘occasions’ is used as a verb and means to cause to be the immediate cause of. There must exist a direct nexus between the sale and the movement of the goods from one State to another. In other words, the movement should be an incident of and necessitated by the contract of sale and be inter-linked with the sale of goods. [See Kelvinator of India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1973) 32 STC 629 (SC)]. It is not necessary for a sale to be an interstate sale that the covenant regarding inter-State movement must be specified in the contract itself. It would be enough if the movement was ‘in pursuance of’ or ‘incidental to’ the contract of sale. Similarly, if the movement of goods is the result of contract and is an incident to the agreement between the parties, the transaction will remain an inter-State one no matter in which State the delivery of goods is taken by the purchaser. In other words, the question whether it is an inter-State sale or intra state sale, does not depend upon the circumstances as to in which state the property in the goods passes. It may pass in either State and yet the sale can be an inter-State sale. What is decisive is whether the sale is one which occasions the movement of goods from one State to another.”

English Electric Company of India Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, (1976) (38 STC 475) (SC)

In this case, it was observed by Supreme Court as under:

“When the movement of goods from one State to another is an incident of the contract it is a sale in the course of inter-State sale. It does not matter in which State the property in the goods passes. What is decisive is whether the sale is one which occasions the movement of goods from one State to another. The interstate movement must be the result of a covenant, express or implied, in the contract of sale or an incident of the contract. It is not necessary that the sale must precede the interstate movement in order that the sale may be deemed to have occasioned such movement. It is also not necessary for a sale to be deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, that the covenant regarding inter-State movement must be specified in the contract itself. It will be enough if the movement is in pursuance of and incidental to the contract of sale.”

It was further observed:

…… If there  is a conceivable link between  the movement of the goods and the buyer’s contract, and if in the course of inter-State movement the goods move only to reach the buyer in satisfaction of his contract of purchase and such a nexus is otherwise inexplicable, then the sale or purchase of the specific or ascertained goods ought to be deemed to have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce as such a sale or purchase occasioned the movement of the goods from one State to another . . . .

Cheeseborough Pond’s Inc. v. State of Tamil Nadu (52 STC 164)

The short  gist of the judgment is as under:

The assessee was a manufacturer and dealer in face powder, having its head office and manufacturing unit at Madras and branches at Bombay and other places. A department of the Government of India, known as Canteen Stores Department which was part of the Defence Ministry, placed orders for the purchase of the goods manufactured by the assessee with the Bombay branch of the assessee. The orders, when received by the Bombay branch, were forwarded by that branch to the head office at Madras. The head office then consigned the goods by lorry to the Bombay branch warehouse, mentioning in the lorry way-bill that the goods had been dispatched against orders passed by the Canteen Stores Department. When the goods reached Bombay, these were cleared by the Bombay branch and immediately supplied to the Canteen Stores Department, after raising invoices in terms of the orders already placed. The assessing authorities as well as the Tribunal rejected the assessee’s contention that the transactions could not be regarded as sales in the course of inter-State trade, chargeable to tax u/s.3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. On revision, the assessee contended that the goods moved from Madras to Bombay in what was described as stock transfers and that the Canteen Stores Department placed the orders not with the head office at Madras direct, but only with the Bombay branch:

Madras  High  Court  held,

i) that if all that the stock transfers evidenced was displacement of goods from a head office to a branch, then there would be no difficulty at all in accepting the contention that there was no inter-State sale for the simple reason that the transfers from Madras to Bombay involved no sale at all; but as found by the Tribunal, the stock transfer notes relied on by the assessee themselves clearly referred to the particular orders placed by the Canteen Stores Department with the Bombay branch of the assessee against which the goods were sent in the particular consignment or consignments, by lorry. It was, therefore, not accurate to describe the movements of the goods as inter-office, or non-sale, consignments from the head office to a branch;

ii) that the fact that the head office at Madras did not dispatch the goods direct to the Canteen Sores Department which placed the orders, but sent the goods to the Bombay branch from where the goods ultimately found their way to the purchaser did not make any difference to the application of S. 3(a) of the Act. It did not matter how many stop-overs were there in the delivery State before the goods reached the purchaser’s hands. All that mattered was that the movement of the goods was in pursuance of the contract of sale or as a necessary incident to the sale itself; and

iii) that, therefore, the transaction between the assessee and the Canteen Stores Department, Bombay, was an inter-State sale liable to tax.

M/s. Tan India Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (133 STC 311) (Mad.)

The brief gist of the judgment is as under:

Identifiable ultimate buyers in Kerala State placed specific orders at the dealer’s branch office at Palghat in Kerala. The branch office at

Pal ghat informed the head office at Kumarapalayam in Tamil Nadu about the specific requirements of the ultimate customers in Kerala. It is only on the information so furnished by the branch office, the head office either effected dispatches directly to the ultimate buyers in some transactions or to its branch office in other transactions and thereafter effected delivery to those ultimate buyers. The assessing officer treated the transactions as inter-State sales and also imposed penalty at 150% of the tax due upon the dealer. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the same. The Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal found some transactions as inter-State sales and other transactions as stock transfer to dealer’s branch. It reduced the penalty to fifty per cent of the tax due. On revision petition both by the dealer and the Revenue:

Madras High Court held, (i) that whether the dispatches were effected from the head office to the ultimate buyers directly at Kerala or whether the deliveries were effected to the ultimate buyers outside the State through the branch make no difference in the eyes of law. The goods moved from the State of Tamil Nadu to the State of Kerala, pursuant to or incident of a contract of sale entered into by the dealer with the identifiable ultimate buyers. Further from the orders placed at the branch located at a different State and the order subsequently having been communicated to the head office in the State of Tamil Nadu, no legal consequence was likely to flow for the simple reason that the head office and the branch office were offices of the same company and they did not possess separate juridical personalities. The movement of goods from the head office was occasioned by the order placed by the customers and was an incident of the contract and therefore from the very beginning from Kumarapalayam in the State of Tamil Nadu, all the way until delivery to customers in Kerala State, it was an inter-State movement. Therefore, the transactions were inter-State sales u/ s.3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. [Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (1985) 60 STC 301 (SC) followed.]

Thus, the legal position is very clear. If the move-ment from transferring branch is without reference to any pre-existing sale, it will be a case of branch transfer. The sale by transferee branch to customer will be a local sale. On the other hand, if the en-marked (ascertained) goods are sent to branch for a particular customer, it will be an inter-State sale from the transferring branch, whether delivery is given through the transferee branch or directly given by the transferor branch. On the other hand, movement without reference to pre existing sale agree-ment, will amount to branch transfer.

Part C – TRIBUNAL & AAR INTERNATIONAL TAX DECISIONS

1. M/s. Invensys Systems Inc 183 Taxman 81 (AAR)
S. 5, S. 9(1), S. 195, Income-tax Act; Articles 7(1), 12(1), 12(2) 12(4)(b)
India-USA    DTAA
Dated:    6-8-2009

Issues:

    i) Under Article 12(4)(b) of India-USA DTAA, ‘managerial’ services are not chargeable to tax in India.

    ii) In absence of PE in India, payments for stew-ardship/shareholder activities are not charge-able in India.

Facts:

The applicant was an American company (‘US Co’) engaged in the business of process control instruments, engineering and research and technology based services, cooperative or consortium services, etc. US Co had a group company in India (‘I Co’). US Co was incurring expenditure in relation to various functions for the benefit of Group as a whole. US Co and I Co had executed a Cost Allocation Agreement dated 1-4-2007. In terms of the Agreement, US Co raised invoices on I Co for the amounts computed as per the formula in the Agreement. No personnel of US Co visited India nor were they to visit India in future for providing centralised assistance to I’Co. The amount of invoice of US Co was to be determined: the entire cost of centralised assistance directly provided to I Co was charged to I Co; and where such direct cost could not be specifically identified, it was allocated prorate, based on turnover or headcount of I Co.

US Co raised the following two questions for ruling by the AAR.

1 Whether payment made by I Co towards cost allocation was taxable in terms of India-USA DTAA?
2 Whether I Co is liable to withhold tax u/s.195 of the Act on cost allocation payments made to US Co?

Before the AAR, US Co contended that:

  • Various services provided by it to I Co were managerial in nature and cannot be considered technical or consultancy services.

  • Even assuming they were technical or consultancy services, they did not ‘make avail-able’ technical knowledge, skill, know-how, etc. which was an essential requirement under Article 12(4)(b) ofIndia-USA DTAA.

  • As the entire services/ assistance was rendered from outside India, in terms of Supreme Court’s decision in Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. DIT, (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC), amount received by US Co would not be taxable u/s.9(1) or u/ s.5 of the Act because, according to the Supreme Court, it is not sufficient that the ser-vices are utilised in India but they should also be rendered in India.

US Co furnished a list of the functions divided in five broad categories. It also drew attention of the AAR to the meaning of the word ‘manage’ as inter-preted in Intertek Testing Services India P Ltd., in re (2008) 307ITR 418 (AAR).

The tax authorities contended that the payments made under the Agreement were in the nature of service fee and not entirely on cost-to-cost basis and hence, profit element cannot be ruled out. The AAR noted that the underlying question was: whether the receipts under the Agreement were mere reim-bursement of expenses or in the nature of income.

According to AAR, although this question was not raised in the application, it did need to be answered. Hence, AAR considered the question: assuming that it is a fee received for rendering certain services, can it be subjected to tax under the provisions of the Act or India-USA DTAA ?

The AAR then referred to Article 7(1) and Article 12(1) and (2) of India-USA DTAA. The AAR analysed the nature of the functions stated in the Agreement and commented that most of them were managerial in nature and unlike some DTAAs, where apart from the terms ‘technical’ and ‘consultancy’, the term ‘managerial’ was also included within the Fees for Technical Services clause, it was not so included in case of India-USA DTAA. To examine the scope of the expression ‘technical services’, the AAR discussed the decisions in Intertek Testing Services India P Ltd., in re (2008)307 ITR 418 (AAR), G. V. K. Industries Limited v. ITO, (1997) 228 ITR 564 (AP) and J. K. (Bombay) Ltd. v. CBDT, (1979) 118 ITR 312 (Del.).

The AAR then mentioned the specific requirement of ‘make available’ in Article 12(4)(b) of India-USA DTAA and observed that even if it was to be assumed that some of the services/functions of US Co could be brought within the definition of technical or consultancy services, still they did not satisfy the requirement of ‘make available’. It then referred to Intertek Testing Services India P. Ltd., in re (2008) 307 ITR 418 (AAR), WorIey Parsons Services Pty Ltd., in re (2009) 313 ITR 74 (AAR) and Anapharm Inc, in re (2008) 305 ITR 394 (AAR) wherein the expression ‘make available’ was discussed and construed. The AAR observed that applying the test given in these decisions, one could hardly find any service of US Co which ‘makes available’ the technical knowledge, experience or skills to I Co and concluded that even if the services are ‘technical’, they do not ‘make available’ the technical knowledge, etc. within the meaning of Article 12(4)(b) of India-USA DTAA. It further noted that in view of the foregoing conclusion, it was not necessary to deal with the contention of US Co that even if the services were to be covered within the definition in Article 12(4), the income cannot be taxed in India in view of the fact that the services are rendered from abroad.

As regards certain specific services, the AAR considered the aspect whether any of these services was really rendered to I Co or they were merely in the nature of stewardship or shareholder activities.

Held:

The AAR held  that:

  • on facts, services rendered by US Co to I Co were ‘managerial’ in nature;

  • even if these were assumed to be technical, they did not ‘make available’ the technical knowledge, etc. within the meaning of Article 12(4)(b); and

  • assuming that some of these activities were not really services but were in the nature of stew-ardship or shareholder activities, in the absence of PE of US Co in India, the payments cannot be taxed in India.

2. Fujitsu Services  Limited  (unreported) AAR No. 800/2009 S. 48 (Ist proviso, S. 112(1) (Proviso), Income-tax Act

Dated: 23-7-2009

Issue:

Capital gain on sale of ‘listed securities’, by non-resident investor chargeable @10%.

Facts:

The applicant was a company incorporated in United Kingdom (‘UK Co’). It was a non-resident as per the Act. It was engaged in the business of information technology services. During the years 1963 to 1994, UK Co had acquired shares of an Indian company. The funds for investment were remitted in foreign currency after obtaining RBI’s approval. The shares of the Indian company were listed on the Stock Exchanges in India. UK Co held 26.55% of the share capital of the Indian company.

UK Co executed a Share Purchase Agreement dated 1-3-2007 with another Indian company (‘Purchaser’). Pursuant to the Agreement, on 4 July, 2007, UK Co sold its entire shareholding to the purchaser and a Cyprus company, which was an affiliate of the Purchaser. As per UK Co, the Cyprus company was an affiliate of the Purchaser and therefore, eligible to purchase the shares. The Purchaser and its affiliate both deducted tax @20% from the sale consideration. However, as per UK Co the correct applicable rate was 10%.

Before the AAR, UK Co sought ruling on the following two issues:

(1) Whether on facts and in law, tax applicable on long term capital gains arising on sale of shares of an Indian company would be 10% as per the proviso to S. 112(1) of the Act?

(2) Whether the beneficial rate of 10% can be applied where the long term capital gains arising to UK Co are computed in terms of S. 48 of the Act by applying the first Proviso to S. 48, read with Rule 115A ?

UK Co contended that even if the benefit under the first Proviso to S. 48 was availed of by the non-resident, the non-resident was not disentitled to invoke the Proviso to S. 112(1). As the shares of the Indian company were listed on the Stock Ex-changes, the long term capital gains were chargeable to tax @ 10% as benefit of indexation was not claimed by the assessee.

The AAR observed that the shares of the Indian company which were sold by UK Co were ‘listed securities’ in terms of S. 112(1) of the Act. In the context of the expression ‘before giving effect to the second proviso to S. 48’ (i.e. giving benefit of indexation), the AAR had consistently ruled that the said expression pre-supposes the existence of a case where the computation of long term capital gains could be made in accordance with the formula contained in the second proviso to S. 481. The AAR had also referred to Mumbai Tribunal’s decision in BASF Aktiengesellschaft v. DOlT, (2007) 293 ITR (AT) 1 (Mum.) and had expressed its disagreement with the view of Tribunal.

Held:
Following its earlier rulings, the AAR held that UK co was liable to pay tax @ 10% as per the proviso to S. 112(1) of the Act.

Regulatory Risk – Case Study

Overview:

It is the duty of every government of a civilised society to regulate economic activity. The function of regulation is to encourage economic activity with ethics which benefits society. However, our (Indian) experience has been that of having ‘over-regulation’ leading to corruption and unethical practices. Reversal of ‘over-regulation’ in the past two decades has changed the environment to an extent, but over regulation and desire to increase the same continues to manifest itself. Let us not forget that too many and that too, complex laws convert ordinary honest citizens into criminals – e.g. – everyone who drinks in areas where prohibition prevails becomes converted from an ordinary citizen into a criminal in the eyes of law. Today there exist many laws which impact normal economic activity. In addition to laws which are common to all businesses – there are industry-specific laws, e.g. – pharma, food, health, chemicals, refineries etc. Compliance with the applicable laws, rules and regulation is an integral part of running a business.

Hence, business runs the risk of non-compliance with laws, rules and regulations resulting at times even in the suspension or closure of business in addition to the levy of penalties, legal action by customers, bureaucratic hassles and corruption.

Non-compliance also at times entails prosecution and imprisonment.

Regulatory Risk is the risk that a change in laws and regulations will materially impact a business, industry and activity, an organisation or an entity. However there is another dimension to regulatory risk. This is the risk of government agencies exercising control over the functioning of commercial and other activities of various entities.

Thus on the one hand a change in laws and regulations can disturb a level playing field; it can give skewed advantage to certain entities, organisations and companies. These regulations can be those pertaining to taxes, duties, licences, other regulations and procedures or relating to human operations.

On the other hand regulatory authorities at the behest of the government, the public or even on its own may step in to regulate, control and guide business or other activity by way of certain norms, rules and regulations which have to be followed and involve a cost, compliance load, and impact the operations, returns and profitability of enterprises. e.g. Drug price control order and the rules there-under is a case in point. The website – ‘Investopedia’ has given the well known example of utility companies like electricity companies to explain regulatory risk. The government through legislation and administrative orders introduces a significant amount of regulation in the way they operate, set their tariffs and even the quality of infra-structure and the controls on the system. Regulations also affect investment market and investment activity which means that any change in these (for example margin requirements) can affect prices, returns and valuations.

The first significant characteristic of regulatory risk is that it is an additional source of risk due to the wide variation in regulations across countries, regions, industries and even regulators. The second significant characteristic is that due to the diversity of cause and effect, the nature of regulatory risks is difficult to understand, perceive, capture and communicate. As a result such risk is not well understood and consequently at times difficult to quantify, estimate, measure and manage.

Also many times this type of risk materialises without any warning or indication and takes most of us by surprise. Thus on the one hand a change in laws and regulations can disturb a level playing field; it can give skewed advantage to certain entities, organisations and companies. These regulations can be those pertaining to taxes, duties, licences, other regulations and procedures or relating to human operations.

The first step for mitigating the risk of violation is to identify applicable laws and put in place, compliance procedures. To ensure compliance there should also exist means of ensuring that the pre-scribed procedures are followed. This is normally achieved by having an effective internal audit or periodic review of functioning of ‘internal controls’.

The regulatory risk can be captured as under:

Regulatory risk

  •     Risk of changes  in legislation  and its impact.

  •     Risk of changes in rules and regulations and its impact

  •     Risk emanating from government agencies exercising controls by way of regulations and compliances on business.

  •     Risk of corrective controls and palliative measures that can affect businesses and organisations.

A formal analysis of this risk is difficult because it is an external risk that is affected by the frequency of changes in the several laws applicable to a business. The risk also depends directly on the duration of regulation, nature of regulation, whether involving strategy, operations or procedures and finally the extent of discretion exercised by the regulatory agencies. In fact business and industry would do well to study and understand regulatory preferences, styles, policies and trends. To summarise, regulatory risk even in the least regulated free environment is inevitable. The magnitude of risk is inversely proportional to the credibility, accountability and- stability, of the regulators.

The example for this month is the case study of a company engaged in conducting coaching classes for students in the context of regulatory risk. Expert Coaching Classes Ltd is one of the leading coach-ing classes for the 10th SSC and ICSE examinations, the 11th & 12th HSC, CBSE and for entrance exami-nations of lIT like JEE and Engineering and Medi-cal CET and others.

Expert Coaching Classes began as a small venture in the living room of Sri Prakash – a retired senior teacher from Vidya Mandir School about twenty years back with three students. Today it has over 50 in house faculty, 25 visiting faculty, 5000 + students and over 10 branches in two metro cities. In the good old days students were charged Rs.SO per month, today the fees for a year is in lakhs. The business model comprises holding awareness and introductory lectures that are attended by students and their parents. This is followed by a rigorous program for students using in-house well developed material and question bank. The course is inter-spersed with tests, the results of which are periodically communicated to the parents directly apart from communicating the same to the students. Intensive coaching takes place and students’ doubts are cleared. Expert coaching classes thus imparts quality education by limiting the number of students in a batch. Discussions are also held with parents of non-performing students.

There is some turnover in staff and faculty, and at times the advent of new classes means losing a few existing and potential students. Of late on the heels of the use of ‘Right to Information Act’ to uncover overcharging of fees by schools and the ever increasing pressure on the education system following issues have emerged:

    i) There is a growing awareness of the need for quality education with adequate facilities, infrastructure and good faculty at school among students and their parents.

    ii) After regulating functioning of schools, their admission procedures and fees, there is now a demand to regulate coaching classes.

    iii) There is a move to mandate registration for coaching classes which is fast gaining ground.

At present ‘coaching classes’ are fairly independent of the regulatory system except obtaining some municipal licenses. Hence, coaching classes do not face any serious regulation. The risk is that some serious regulation is likely to be put in place. If this happens it is bound to affect the infrastructure needs, working, and functioning of the classes substantially in as much as the fees charged per student are likely to be also regulated. This change will affect both the top and bottom line. Further with conflicting reports emerging about scrapping of CETs, it is not clear if students would continue to patronise these coaching classes. It is in this context that the CEO of the classes has invited you, as the risk manager, to prepare a note identifying, estimating and measuring risks likely to be faced and advise the possible course of action to prevent, protect and mitigate the identified risks and come up with an action plan.

Regulatory Risk Analysis & Solution:

An analysis of the case reveals the following issues:

Well drafted regulations when fairly implemented help in the smooth functioning of business. Hence fair monitoring of certain sets of activities is necessary for implementation of law. However experience tells us clear language is rare and the absence of clear language leads to chaos and corruption. This has a bad impact on both the business and the organisation. It is because of this aspect that business advocates free market with minimum regulation and giving a free hand to the market forces. The following challenges and their impact have been identified:

  •     changes in law and regulations will impact size, fees and profitability.

  •     cost of compliance  will increase.

  •     possible increase in unhealthy practice by unregistered, flyby night, small operators.

  •     possible increase in working school teachers conducting private tuitions.

  •     lower profitability.

  •     lower profitability  could lead to lower standards

  •     cost cutting measures could lead to increase in faculty turnover – impacting quality.

  •     reduction in visiting faculty to reduce cost – impacting quality.

  •     reduction in investment in infrastructure – impacting quality.

  •     reduction in the number of students because of the above and proposed abolition of Std. X exams – impacting profitability.

Solutions    for Expert  Coaching    Classes (ECC) :

The possible solution to deal with this risk is out-lined in the steps given below:

    1. Preparing a sensitivity analysis and assessing its impact on revenue and faculty related concerns.
    
2. Channelise existing cash flow into higher savings to meet unforeseen contingencies.

    3. Centralise  operations  to reduce  costs.

    4. Preparing online version of coaching sessions whereby it gives flexibility of time to students, reduces dependence on faculty and investment in infrastructure and reduces operating costs. – encourage e-learning.

    5. Identifying areas of diversification – e.g. – corporate training, starting hobby classes, starting health education classes.

    6. Initiate a network of coaching classes and form a trade association to take on unfair regulations.

Anticipating risk and taking planned and persistent steps are today essential elements of running a successful business. Suggestions made by the risk adviser have been appreciated by the management. The management has initiated steps in line with the suggestions made.

Fraud by illusion and trickery

The Professional

Title:    The Professional
Author:    Subroto Bagchi, Gardener and Vice-Chairperson, MindTree Limited
Price:    Rs.399
Publisher: 
Penguin (Portfolio)
Author’s official website : http://www.mindtree.com/subrotobagchi

The Satyam episode led to some uncomfortable situations for us CA-professionals. The general public did tend to paint us all with the same brush. It may have led to some uncomfortable encounters at networking events when people came up to us during the tea-break and questioned us about ‘our profession’. Hopefully we will never have to face such a scenario again.

This incident brought to the forefront the moot question. Does having a professional qualification (say: the much coveted CA tag), make one a professional?

The answer is no. Anyone can with the right amount of hard work (and luck, as most of us CAs would like to add) can acquire a professional degree. However, it is the ability to stay true to ourselves and our vocation that makes us a true professional.

Subroto Bagchi, Gardener and Vice-Chairperson to the Board, MindTree Limited in his latest book ‘The Professional’ answers this important question: What does it take to be considered a true professional in any field?

‘The Professional’ comprises of seven distinct parts and the author does tell us to read each part sequentially in the order it is presented in the book, so as to get the maximum benefit from it. Each part comprises of short narratives drawn from real-life – both positive and negative examples – covering various professions and work-life scenarios. These narratives comprise situations which you and I have encountered/witnessed or are most likely to encounter or witness as we move up in our professional careers.

Part 1, explains the concept of integrity and how and why it is the key stone of professionalism, In fact, during the c.ourse of writing this book, Subroto Bagchi reached out to a group of people whom he admired for their professionalism and asked them to share the qualities of a professional. Integrity was a quality that topped. Little wonder then, that integrity is also the key stone of this book.

In Part 2, we move on to read about self-awareness and learn some valuable lessons, which include the power to say NO, which can be daunting when we have not yet risen in our career and the need to be generous, gracious and courteous to others when we are at the pinnacle of our professional career. Part 3 deals with basic qualities that make one a well rounded professional. Subroto Bagchi calls the first three parts, the foundational pillars.

As people become more experienced they have to deal with a larger volume of work, responsibilities and complexity. Yes, Part 4 and 5 provide us tools to cope with this. Integrity also makes good business sense and Subroto Bagchi describes this with ample illustrations, those of his own and those which he witnessed. The Abilene Paradox, where people agree to do strange things, when they suppress their own voice and simply go along with what everyone else is saying has been well described in the back drop of the Satyam episode. Yes, the voice of dissent plays a very important role and this is not the same as unconstructive criticism or plain whining.

All of us increasingly have to operate in global market-place. Part 6 guides us on how best to do so. Based on his experiences, Subroto Bagchi touches upon important facets of : Inclusion and Gender, Cross Cultural Sensitivity, Governance, Intellectual Property and Sustainability. Towards the end of the book is a chapter titled ‘The Unprofessional,’ with a list of ten markers of unprofessional conduct, such as: Missing a deadline, Non-escalation of issues on time, Non-disclosure, Not respecting privacy of information, Not respecting ‘need to know’, Plagiarism, Passing on the blame, Overstating qualifica-tions and experience, Mindless job-hopping and Unsuitable appearance.

There is no beginning or end in being a professional it is a life-long learning curve. Yet, this book provides a handy, well illustrated, tool-kit to be a better professional. Ultimately Professionalism boils down to individual choice, and indeed it is for you and me to continue on the path towards becoming a better professional.

A paragraph in the book aptly states this: ‘A doctor becomes part of an insurance fraud. A policeman colludes with a criminal. A lawyer bribes a judge. In each instance, the professional breach is justified as the price to be paid to be part of a system. The truth is, it is an individual choice”.

Subroto Bagchi in his book adds : ” … Society on the while may not always put a premium on the practice of professional values and hence most people do not incorporate it into their lives. But practising professional values is about who you are and what you want to be known as – a professional or merely professionally qualified. And, in the end, even the most corrupt society hails the ones that choose to be different.”

This itself, gives me hope.  Amen.

Subroto Bagchi speaks to BCAS members:

No one can become a professional just by acquiring a so-called professional degree or diploma. Some practising individuals who have a professional education behind them and a few years of experience, think that they are professionals. Neither qualification nor just the skill makes you worthy of being called ‘a professional’. In reality, it requires much more than that. That capacity, to build a professional reputation, which only a few can, comes from building ‘affective regard’ for your profession, it comes from conscious practice of unique tenets of a profession, it is about sustained self-regulation.

In the end, professionalism is about personal choices we must make, prices we have to be willing to pay and sometimes, choosing the right over the convenient is a difficult thing, even a risky thing. But it is that quality which separates the legends from the ordinary mortals.

Integrity is one of the key attributes of a good professional. It is here that organisations such as the Bombay Chartered Accountants Society (BCAS) have a huge role to play. Integrity can be taught. It is because the idea is based on the principles of natural justice. It is our natural state. Most people, most of the times are reasonable, they want to live in harmony and that means they have a natural affinity for fairness. When people are given an understanding of the concept of integrity and the power of self-regulation, most people can lead a life without contradictions. I have also seen people change for the better when they are given the right environment and the knowledge. The seeds of integrity can be sown in the minds of young CA students and CAs through collective efforts, such as by the BCAS.

GAPs in GAAP – Accounting for amalgamation

Accounting Standards

AS-14 — ‘Accounting for
Amalgamations’ defines amalgamations in the nature of merger and in the nature
of purchase (acquisition). The classification is important because in the case
of amalgamation in the nature of merger, the difference between the equity of
the transferor company and the equity issued to the shareholders of the
transferor company is adjusted against reserves of the amalgamated (transferee)
company. This accounting is usually known as the pooling method. In the case of
amalgamation in the nature of acquisition, the difference is reflected as
goodwill, which is then amortised in the income statement of the amalgamated
company over a period of 3-5 years. This method is usually known as acquisition
accounting.

Under AS-14 for an
amalgamation to qualify as being in the nature of merger it should satisfy all
the following conditions :


(a) All the assets and
liabilities of the transferor company become, after amalgamation, the assets
and liabilities of the transferee company.

(b) Shareholders holding
not less than 90% of the face value of the equity shares of the transferor
company (other than the equity shares already held therein, immediately
before the amalgamation, by the transferee company or its subsidiaries or
their nominees) become equity shareholders of the transferee company by
virtue of the amalgamation.

(c) The consideration
for the amalgamation receivable by those equity shareholders of the
transferor company who agree to become equity shareholders of the transferee
company is discharged by the transferee company wholly by the issue of
equity shares in the transferee company, except that cash may be paid in
respect of any fractional shares.

(d) The business of the
transferor company is intended to be carried on, after the amalgamation, by
the transferee company.

(e) No adjustment is
intended to be made to the book values of the assets and liabilities of the
transferor company when they are incorporated in the financial statements of
the transferee company, except to ensure uniformity of accounting policies.


Amalgamation in the nature
of purchase is an amalgamation which does not satisfy any one or more of the
conditions specified above.

Assuming conditions (a), (d)
and (e) are fulfilled, a question arises that in the case of an amalgamation of
a wholly-owned subsidiary into the parent company, whether the same would
qualify as being in the nature of merger and would require to apply pooling
method or in the nature of purchase and hence would need to apply acquisition
accounting.

The question arises because
it is not clear whether conditions (b) and (c) are fulfilled. For example,
condition (c) requires the parent company to discharge its obligation by issuing
shares to the shareholders of the wholly-owned subsidiary. In the given case,
that is not possible since the amalgamation would involve cancellation of the
existing shares (100%) of the parent company in the subsidiary, rather than the
parent issuing new shares to the shareholders (own self) of the subsidiary.

In the author’s view, in the
case of an amalgamation with a 100% subsidiary, conditions (b) and (c) are not
applicable at all, rather than unfulfilled. Therefore it is possible to apply
pooling method in the case of an amalgamation with a 100% subsidiary. This is
also in line with IFRS which requires the pooling method to be applied in the
case of common control transactions, i.e., restructuring or amalgamation
transactions within the group.

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Gaps in GAAP – Reverse acquisitions

Accounting Standards

In some business combinations, commonly referred to as
reverse acquisitions, the acquirer is the entity whose equity interests have
been acquired and the issuing entity is the acquiree. This might be the case
when, for example, a private entity arranges to have itself ‘acquired’ by a
smaller public entity as a means of obtaining a stock exchange listing. Although
legally the issuing public entity is regarded as the parent and the private
entity is regarded as the subsidiary, the legal subsidiary is the acquirer if it
has the power to govern the financial and operating policies of the legal parent
so as to obtain benefits from its activities. Commonly the acquirer is the
larger entity.


Example :

A Ltd. a big private company wants to become a public entity,
but does not want to register its equity shares. In order to accomplish that, A
Ltd. gets itself acquired by B Ltd., a smaller public entity.

A
Ltd.  

B
Ltd.

Private company Legal
subsidiary Accounting acquirer
Public company Legal
holding Accounting acquiree

Under International Financial Reporting Standard-3, in a
reverse acquisition, the cost of the business combination is deemed to have been
incurred by the legal subsidiary (i.e., the acquirer for accounting
purposes) in the form of equity instruments issued to the owners of the legal
parent (i.e., the acquiree for accounting purposes). If the published
price of the equity instruments of the legal subsidiary is used to determine the
cost of the combination, a calculation shall be made to determine the number of
equity instruments the legal subsidiary would have had to issue to provide the
same percentage ownership interest of the combined entity to the owners of the
legal parent as they have in the combined entity as a result of the reverse
acquisition. The fair value of the number of equity instruments so calculated
shall be used as the cost of the combination.

Example


Balance sheet before business combination

  C (CU) D (CU)
Net
Assets
1,100 2,000

Total
1,100 2,000

Equity
100 shares 300
  60 Shares 600

Retained Earning
800 1,400

Total
1,100 2,000

C issues 2.5 shares in exchange for each ordinary share of D.
Therefore C issues 150 shares in exchange of all 60 shares of D. Therefore,
legally C is the acquirer. However, C is in substance an accounting acquiree
(assume). Fair value of one equity share of D at date of acquisition is Currency
Units (CU) 50. Fair value of C’s identifiable net assets as at date of
acquisition is CU1,300.

Response :



  •  In the exchange, D’s shareholders own 60% of the combined entity (150/250).
  • If the business combination would have taken place in the form of D issuing equity to shareholders of C, in the same exchange ratio, it would have issued 40 shares (i.e., 100/2.5).
  • Thus, cost of business combination would be CU2000 (40 X CU50).
  • Goodwill = CU2000 — CU1300, i.e., CU700.
  • Consolidated Balance sheet of C Limited & Group after the acquisition:
Consolidated financial statements prepared following a reverse acquisition shall be issued under the name of the legal parent, but described in the notes as a continuation of the financial statements of the legal subsidiary (i.e., the acquirer for accounting purposes). Because such consolidated financial statements represent a continuation of the financial statements of the legal subsidiary:

(a)    the assets and liabilities of the legal subsidiary shall be recognised and measured in those consolidated financial statements at their pre-combination carrying amounts.

(b)    the retained earnings and other equity balances recognised in those consolidated financial statements shall be the retained earnings and other equity balances of the legal subsidiary immediately before the business combination.

(c)    the amount recognised as issued equity instruments in those consolidated financial statements shall be determined by adding to the issued equity of the legal subsidiary immediately before the business combination the cost of the combination. However, the equity structure appearing in those consolidated financial statements (i.e., the number and type of equity instruments issued) shall reflect the equity structure of the legal parent, including the equity instruments issued by the legal parent to effect the combination.

(d)    comparative information presented in those consolidated financial statements shall be that of the legal subsidiary.

As can be seen from the above, the accounting for reverse acquisition under IFRS is based on identifying the true acquirer. Goodwill is determined on the basis that the accounting acquiree is fair valued, considering the accounting acquirer has paid the consideration. Indian GAAP does not recognise the concept of reverse acquisition at all, and hence it is high time that Indian GAAP adopts IFRS-3 standard on business combination.

GAPs in GAAP – Accounting for SMEs

Accounting Standards

The publication of a simplified form of IFRS for private
entities has been long awaited by national standard setters and small and
medium-sized entities, which have been required to apply full IFRS in the past.
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has issued its International
Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium-sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs).

The standard consists of 230 pages of text, arranged into 35
chapters that cover all of the recognition, measurement, presentation and
disclosure requirements for SMEs. There is no cross reference to other IFRS
(with one exception relating to financial instruments discussed below). This
underscores the fact that IFRS for SMEs is viewed by the standard setter as
independent from the full IFRS.

The standard is intended for use by SMEs. SMEs are defined in
the standard as small and medium-sized entities that do not have public
accountability and which also publish general-purpose financial statements for
external users. An entity has public accountability if its debt or equity
instruments are traded in a public market, or it holds assets in a fiduciary
capacity for a broad group of outsiders.

While this definition is necessary for an understanding of
the entities to which IFRS for SMEs is applicable, the preface to the standard
indicates that the decision as to which entities are required or permitted to
apply the standard will lie with the regulatory and legislative authorities in
each jurisdiction. However, if a publicly accountable entity uses the standard,
it may not claim that the financial statements conform to IFRS for SMEs even if
its application is permitted or required in that jurisdiction, as the entity
would not meet the definition of an SME.

In India, various regulatory authorities such as the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs, RBI, IRDA, SEBI, etc will have to define the term SME.
Considering the manner in which the term SME is defined in the standard, these
would include entities other than listed companies, banks, financial
institutions, insurance companies, etc.

IFRS for SMEs is based on the fundamental principles of full
IFRS, but in many cases, it has been simplified to make the accounting
requirements less complex and to reduce the cost and effort required to produce
the financial statements. To achieve this, IASB has removed a number of
accounting options available under full IFRS and attempted to simplify
accounting for SMEs in certain areas.

For example in the case of share based payments, the fair
value of shares in equity-settled share-based payment transactions can be
measured using the directors’ best estimate of fair value if observable market
prices are not available. Another example of simplification is investment
property which can be accounted as fixed assets, if fair valuing them involves
undue cost or effort or does not provide a reliable measure.

The IFRS for SMEs includes a set of illustrative financial
statements and a presentation and disclosure checklist to assist entities with
preparing their financial statements. The application of this standard is
expected to reduce the compliance costs for many smaller entities and help make
the financial statements of such entities less complex.

As the standard is very much principles-based, interpretation
issues are likely to arise, which will require a globally consistent resolution.
In order to ensure this standard achieves international consistency and
comparability of financial reporting, it is important that interpretations are
not developed by each jurisdiction. It would appear logical that the
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) could be
approached to provide any interpretative guidance that users may require.

In India, one major criticism against the full implementation
of IFRS was that they would impose an unnecessary burden and hardship on SMEs.
With the issuance of the SME standard, one of the major hurdles for the
implementation of IFRS in India has been removed. The ICAI and the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs (MCA) should now take appropriate and swift measures to
legalize the adoption of full IFRS by public interest entities and IFRS for SMEs
by SMEs from 2011. As a first step, the ICAI and other regulatory bodies should
define an SME. Also, it is desirable that all regulatory agencies define SME in
a consistent manner to the extent practicable.

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Relevance of Dharma in Corporate Governance

Article

The increase in the size and proportion of organisational
activities over the last century, should have actually led to a proportional
increase in the organisations’ responsibility towards the various constituents
who contribute towards the survival, success and growth of the organisation.
However this has not happened. As seen from the corporate debacles that have
occurred across the globe in the last decade and more, the focus of the top
management became skewed as they started focussing only on one of their
constituents i.e., the shareholders. As a result of this skewed focus,
organisations neglected other constituents of the organisation such as
customers, employees, suppliers, local community and society, government,
environment and the like who are integral to society and hence critical for the
organisation’s survival, growth and success. In other words importance of Dharma
is not realised in Corporate Governance.


The human body — An ideal example :

The best example to illustrate the need for a holistic
approach to business is the human body. Just as the hands, legs, head, face,
stomach and other external and internal organs are all parts of human body, the
various stakeholders of an organisation are parts of the society. Just as these
organs are all equally responsible for the effective functioning and good health
of the body, the well-being of all the stakeholders appropriately is necessary
for a successful organisation and a good society. If we focus only on and take
care of the face alone because it is most visible and neglect the other body
parts, it would be no good and rather damaging.

The human body itself is an example of perfect integration in
this regard. When a thorn pricks the foot, the eye waters, though they are so
distant. This is because the whole body is one whole and each part reacts to the
pain and joy of the other. Similarly the whole corporate organisation should be
treated as an integrated whole and the welfare of all the organisational
constituencies should be taken care of for the effective functioning and growth
of the organisation.

In a social setting, this can be considered as the Dharma
of the organisation.

Dharma and Dharmic Management :

The word ‘Dharma’ is a Sanskrit word and has no exact
equivalent in the English language. It defies a simple translation into English.
Though sometimes it is used as an equivalent for the word ‘religion’, it is not
only that. A number of words come very close to explaining its meaning. These
include — right action, truth in action, righteousness, morality,
virtue, duty, the dictates of God, code of conduct and others.

Hawley (1993) defines Dharma, Dharmic and
Dharmic Management
in his landmark work ‘Dharmic Management’. He states,
‘The concept of Dharma is affixed to integrity, drawing to it the
energies of goodness, spirit, and fearlessness, creating a sort of super
integrity. The word Dharmic is Sanskrit for deep, deep integrity — living
by your inner truth. Dharmic Management means bringing that truth with
you when you go to work every day. It’s the fusing of the spirit, character,
human values and decency in the workplace and in life as a whole.’

Dharma is not the same for all. It differs based on one’s age
and stage in life. The ancient Indian scriptures highlight a large variety of
differences in the nuances of Dharma based on Desha-Kala-Paristhiti
(place, time and circumstance). These various types of Dharma are :


? Vyakti Dharma — Related to the individual



? Grihastha Dharma — Related to the family life



? Samajika Dharma — Related to the society



? Rajya Dharma — Related to the nation



? Ashrama Dharma — Related to the stage in life viz. student,
householder or renunciant



? Varna Dharma — Related to one’s profession



? Kula Dharma — Related to one’s lineage



? Mata Dharma — Related to one’s religion



? Aapat Dharma — To be followed in times of danger/crisis



? Manava Dharma — One’s duty as a true human being


Hawley in the same seminal work makes his observations in
this context. He states, “Dharma is personal. It is not a one-size-fits-all
set of ethical standards. It’s an inner formula for only the individual. We each
have our own law, or Dharma, peculiar to ourselves. It’s as much a part of us as
our body is, probably more. As with any law, we have to comply with it or suffer
the consequences
.”

Again, one’s Dharma is determined by one’s stature and status
in one’s organisation and in society and one is expected to act in accordance
with that for efficient functioning of the society as a whole. In this regard
Hawley states that one’s present status and level of achievement, or role in
life, also affect one’s Dharma. An individual’s Dharma differs according to
where he or she is in life. The Dharma of the CFO, for example, is different
from the Dharma of the accountant. It’s not that the accountant is inferior and
the CFO superior. It’s just that they are in different places in life at this
moment. This will change with time. For now, the differing responsibilities and
leverage that each brings to the table of life earn each of them a distinct
Dharma.

Whatever may be one’s stature or status, position or
situation in life, true perfection is excellence in action. The Bhagavad Gita,
one of the most revered spiritual texts of India also highlights this. It states
— ‘Yogaha Karmasu Koushalam’, which means ‘True Yoga is Perfection in
Action’.

No matter what one’s duty in life, one must do it and do it well. Whether one is a minister or a clerk, no matter what one’s particular role, one must carry it out to the absolute limit of one’s capacity for excellence.

Individual Dharma and Organisation Dharma:

This Individual Dharma can be extended to the organisation as a whole and be termed as Organisational Dharma. This is because an organisation is nothing but a collection of individuals working together towards achieving certain common goals and objectives. Each of these are bound by certain rules and regulations based on the roles and responsibilities allocated to them and they have to achieve the commonly chalked out goals which are in the larger interest of the organisation keeping these in mind. In this light the organisation can collectively be said to have a Dharma.

The collective traits/virtues of an organisation, which are its unique features and characteristics are in recent times represented as the organisation’s vision, mission and core values statements. They are the essential fabric of the organisation and form the core of its culture. Many organisations have a credo or an organisation charter which they adhere to and follow at all times and under all circumstances. One such example is of the Johnson & Johnson credo which the company follows and sticks to even in times of the famous Tylenol crisis.

Management Dharma:

Just as the organisation has its own Dharma, so do the managers working within it have theirs. Their Dharma as individuals differs from their Dharma as managers working in the organisation. As managers, they are the representatives of the collective value system of the organisation and they are trustees of the organisational wealth. Hence, they too have a Dharma.

Hawley expresses a similar opinion. He highlights the fact, “There is a particular Dharma for managers because they are in the responsibility seat. Their actions impact other humans and affect the economic and physical well-being of the organisation and, beyond that, the well-being of the environment and even the planet. With that power comes a greater measure of accountability. Management Dharma, like individual Dharma, matches one’s life station. Managers can’t expect to take the bigger jobs and not take on a broader Dharma. The manager’s Dharma is more demanding, more obligated to rightness, more careful (i.e., more full of care).”

The recent concept of Servant-Leadership coined and defined by Robert Greenleaf highlights the same fundamental. It emphasises the role of a leader as a steward of the organisations’ resources (human, financial and others). It encourages leaders to serve others while staying focussed on achieving results in line with the organisation’s values and integrity.

A Dharmic Organisation and Trikaranashuddhi:

An organisation which can be called Dharmic or a truly ethical organisation or the one pursuing business ethics in its day-to-day practice is the one which tries to ensure to the extent possible, the welfare of all its stakeholders. The true purpose of an organisation as highlighted by a number of studies is to Pareto optimise the welfare of the organisational stakeholders, as they are the ones, who in reality contribute towards the long-term growth and sustenance of the organisation.

‘To ensure the welfare of all concerned’ has been the endeavour and a part of the Indian culture and tradition right from the very beginning. The Indian scriptures have always hailed the ideal of Sarvajana Hitaya, Sarvajana Sukhaya (for the benefit and welfare of all). The excerpt from the Kaivalya Upanishad given below gives an insight into the all-encompassing approach of the Indian culture which has enabled the Indian civilisation (the longest and the only surviving ancient civilisation) to survive the last 5000 years and more.

Swasti Prajabhya Paripalayantaam,
Nyayena Margena Mahim Mahisham
Gou Brahmanebhya Shubhamastu Nityam,
Loka Samasta Sukhino Bhavantu

[May all the Subjects and their Rulers be prosperous; May the Rulers rule on the Righteous Path; May the cows (resources) and the Brahmins (individuals desirous of right living) be safe always; May all the beings in all the worlds be happy.]

The great leaders who got freedom to India and laid down their lives for such a glorious cause and the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution, believed in such noble approach to existence. The following scriptural injunction has been engraved on the entrance wall of the Indian Parliament:

Ayam Nijah Parovaiti Ganana Laghu Chetasam,

Udara Charitaanaam Tu Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam.

(It is only petty-minded individuals who fail to rise above selfishness and keep counting that this is mine and that is yours; on the other hand the large-hearted ones treat the entire humanity as members of their own family.)

In the light of the above it can be said that the complete accord in the corporation’s thought, word and deed — ‘Trikaranashuddhi1’ i.e., its intention of ensuring stakeholders’ welfare, framing policies commensurate with the aforementioned and communicate the same across the organisation, and ultimately undertake activities for realising this intention, is the righteous conduct of the organisation — the Dharma of the company. The Vedic scriptures declare: ‘Manasyekam, Vachasyekam, Karmanyekam Mahatmanaam’ which means, ‘A great individual is the one whose thought, word and deed are in complete unity.’ The same can be extended to a great corporate entity. An organisation whose intentions, communication and actions are in complete unison can truly be called a Dharmic Organisation. It is such scriptural injunctions which inspire and prompt one and all to set high standards of righteous conduct and put into practice these exaltations in day-to-day lives, thereby ensuring the welfare of all concerned — whether at home or at work.

To sum it up, I quote Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba, Revered Chancellor, Sri Sathya Sai University, Prashanti Nilayam, Andhra Pradesh, “Business should not be swayed by excess profits and wealth maximisation for a few, but should realise the significance of social responsiveness. Therefore, corporate philosophy should be guided by Dharma (Righteousness). A business organisation is to be treated as a place of worship, wherein the entire workforce, by means of sincere work, offers worship to God.” (Source: Man Management: A Values-Based Management Perspective — Based on the Discourses of Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba)

References:

    Hawley, Jack (1993) Reawakening The Spirit In Work — The Power Of Dharmic Management, San Francisco?: Berett Koehler Publishers.

    Shashank Shah and A. Sudhir Bhaskar (2009) Corporate Stakeholders Management?: Why, What and How — A Dharmic Approach, Unpublished Book, School of Busi-ness Management, Sri Sathya Sai University, Prashanti Nilayam, Andhra Pradesh.

    Sri Sathya Sai Baba (2009) Man Management?: A Values-Based Management Perspective — Based on the Discourses of Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba, Sri Sathya Sai Students and Staff Welfare Society (Publications Division), Prashanti Nilayam, Andhra Pradesh.

Provident Fund contribution for International Workers

The Government of India has recently made fundamental changes in the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 and the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995 (collectively referred to as Indian Provident Fund schemes) which will impact the expatriates and the employers with whom they work in India.

Background :

    Before we discuss the details, it is important to understand the context in which these changes have been introduced. Indian employees are often deputed by their employers to different countries. These international assignments could be for a few months to a few years. The Indian assignees and their employers are generally required to contribute to the Social Security schemes of the host country. These contributions only add to the cost of the assignment without any corresponding benefit, as neither the employee nor the employer is generally able to withdraw the contributions on completion of assignment. Further, the employee is also generally not entitled to any benefits under the scheme on return to India due to the period for which contributions were made to the overseas schemes, not meeting the minimum required as per the social security law of the host country. Correspondingly, the expatriates working in India are generally not required to contribute to the Indian Employee Provident Fund and the Pension Scheme as their salaries exceed the threshold limit of INR 6,500 (USD 145) per month.

    These changes impact employers who have expatriates working for them in India, except for expatriates from the countries with which India has signed a Social Security Agreement (‘SSA’) and hence, these changes are likely to put pressure on other countries to sign SSAs with India.

    On the other hand, Indian companies and their employees working in countries with which SSAs have been signed are likely to benefit, as employees’ and employer’s contributions would be required to be made only under the Indian Provident Fund scheme and not under the host country schemes. This will reduce assignment cost for the Indian entities and enable them to be more cost effective in the competitive global environment.

Recent amendments in Indian Provident Fund Schemes :

International Workers (covers expatriates) :

    A new concept of ‘International Workers’ (‘IWs’) has been introduced which includes expatriates (foreign citizens) working for an employer in India and Indian employees working overseas.

    As per the Notification dated 1 October 2008 ‘International Worker’ means :

    “(a) an Indian employee having worked or going to work in a foreign country with which India has entered into social security agreement and being eligible to avail benefits under a social security programme of that country, by virtue of the eligibility gained or going to gain, under the said agreement;

    (b) an employee other than an Indian employee, holding other than an Indian passport, working for an establishment in India to which the Act applies;”

    The IWs are required to join the scheme from 1st November 2008. Relief has been provided in case of an ‘Excluded Employee’ which primarily refers to an IW coming from a country with which India has entered into an SSA.

    In this article, we have discussed the implications only with respect to the second category of IWs i.e. foreign nationals working in India.

    As per the Notification dated 1st October 2008 ‘Excluded Employee’ means

    “an International Worker, who is contributing to a social security programme of his/her country of origin, either as a citizen or resident, with whom India has entered into social security agreement on reciprocity basis and enjoying the status of detached worker for the period and terms, as specified in such an agreement.”

Amount of contribution :

    The IWs (other than excluded employees) are required to contribute 12% of their salary to the Indian Provident Fund scheme. Further, the employers are also required to match an equal amount i.e. 12% of salary as their contribution to the scheme.

Compliance requirements :

    Every employer is required to file a return in the specified form, giving details of the IWs including their nationality, basic wage, etc. within 15 days of the commencement of the scheme (i.e. 15th October 2008). The employers are also required to file a ‘NIL’ return in case they do not have any IW working with them.

    Employers are also required to file monthly returns (within 15 days of the close of the month) in the specified forms furnishing necessary details.

Social Security Agreements :

    India had earlier signed an SSA with Belgium and France and has recently signed Social Insurance Agreement with Germany. It is understood that India is in the process of signing SSAs with the US, Australia, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and other countries.

    Key features of the SSAs :

  •      Employees on an assignment upto specified periods (Belgium and France — 60 months; Germany — 48 months with an extension of 12 months) are exempt from making social security contributions in the host country provided they continue to make social security contributions in their home countries.

  •      Employees on assignment for more than the specified period and making social security contributions under the host country laws will be entitled to export the benefits under the SSA to the home country on completion of their assignment or on retirement. However this is not provided under the Social Insurance Agreement with Germany.

    The Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner (‘ACPFC’) has also issued certain clarifications with respect to these amendments and the Ministry of Labour has posted responses to Frequently Asked Questions (‘FAQs’) on their website clarifying the position relating to the IWs.

Key clarifications as per the ACPFC letter :

Payment of benefits: The payment of benefits in case of an IW holding other than an Indian passport and coming  from a country with which India has signed an SSA, shall be as per the provisions of the SSA.

Contributions required to be made in India:
All expatriates, except expatriates from Belgium (as the SSA with Belgium is effective from 1st September 2009) but including expatriates coming from France and Germany and holding foreign passports are required to contribute to the Indian Provident Fund schemes as the SSAs with these countries are not yet effective.

Withdrawal of Pension benefits under Employee Pension Scheme:
For the IW (holding other than an Indian passport) coming from a country with which India has no SSA, the withdrawal of benefit under Employee Pension Scheme shall be based on the principle of reciprocity.

Other key clarifications as per the FAQ:

  • An Indian employee shall be an employee, holding or entitled to hold an Indian passport and employed by a covered establishment.

  • The Provident Fund rules will apply irrespective of whether the salary is paid in India or outside India.

  • In case of a split payroll, the contribution is required to be made on the total salary earned by the employee.

  • Even where an IW has multiple country responsibilities and spends some part of his time out-side India, his total salary will be considered for Provident Fund contribution.

  • There is no minimum period of stay in India for triggering the Provident Fund compliances. Every eligible IW has to be enrolled from the first date of his employment in India.

  • The purpose of the visit would determine the Provident Fund compliance requirements for an individual. The type of visa may help in determining the purpose of visit to India e.g. a foreign national coming to India on an employment visa would be considered as working in India.

  • The cap on the salary for the purpose of Employee Pension Scheme and Employees Deposit Linked Insurance Scheme remains unchanged at Rs.6,500 as against no cap on salary for Provident Fund purposes.


Key issues:

Any change in legislation would generally lead to open issues which require further clarification. This notification leaves many questions in the minds of the employers and expatriates coming and working in India. Some of the issues which need to be addressed are:

Applicability to the establishment:

An issue that comes to mind  is whether PF would be payable by a foreign employee of an employer, who is otherwise not liable to PF for any reason, e.g. if the number of employees are less than 20. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that applicability of the PF Act is qua the ‘establishment’, i.e. only if the establishment is covered under the scope, will the Act apply. Typically, factories and establishments employing 20 or more employees are covered (as per recent press reports, this threshold may be reduced to 10 employees to enhance the coverage of the PF Act). As such, PF would not be payable by a foreign employee of an employer, who is otherwise not liable to PF under the Act on account of any reason, e.g. if the number of employees is less than 20.

Employer-employee relationship:

In most cases, expatriates are seconded to the Indian entity while continuing as legal employees of the home country employer entity. For the PF Act to apply, an Employee of an Establishment should be deputed to work ‘in’ or ‘in connection with’ the work of such an Indian ‘Establishment’ to which the provisions of this Act applies. In such cases, it may need to be further examined whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the expatriate and the Indian establishment. There is no formula for determining the existence of a master-servant relationship and courts in India have laid down various tests such as accountability, right to recruit, right to decide leave, right to terminate, to ascertain whether an employer-employee relationship exists.

‘Salary’ to  be considered:

Further, the quantum and manner of computing salary on which the contributions are to be based is also contentious. For example, in cross-border movement of employees, there could be different employment arrangements and services could be rendered in different jurisdictions, salary could be paid in different countries and also at times, by more than one employer. A question arises in all such arrangements on whether salary paid by the overseas entity would need to be taken into account for this purpose. If the IW is employed by the Indian establishment to which the PF Act applies and is rendering services in connection with the establishment in India, then a point that may need further examination is whether only the Indian salary which is covered by the Indian employment contract is to be considered. While, the FAQ has confirmed that total salary will have to be considered for PF, the legal position would need to be examined.

Contrary positions for income-tax purposes:

In certain cases, the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements between countries provide exemptions to employees from double taxation of salary income in both countries, if the prescribed conditions are satisfied. Typically, these would be – duration of stay in India should be less than 183 days during the relevant period and the remuneration is paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of India i.e. implying that the overseas entity should be the employer.

Accordingly, in cases where the above-mentioned short-stay exemption is claimed, the overseas entity is considered as the employer for Income-tax purposes. As per the FAQ, PF would be payable by the Indian entity in its capacity of ’employer’ irrespective of the duration of stay in India. This would imply that the Indian entity is the employer for PF purposes. As a result, different positions would be adopted for the same individual under the Income-tax law and Provident Fund regulations and this may give rise to disputes and litigation.

Withdrawal of pension:

There are also issues around withdrawal of the balance at the end of the assignment. When an IW completes his assignment in India and leaves India to continue his employment abroad, he would be permitted to withdraw the accumulated PF balance.

However, the employer’s contribution to the Pension Scheme (i.e. 8.33 per cent of INR 6,500) can be withdrawn only subject to satisfying certain prescribed conditions such as:

  • Eligible service of 10 years or more and retirement on attaining the age of 58 years;

  • Early pension if rendered eligible service of 10 years or more and retirement or otherwise cessation of employment before attaining 58 years.

The withdrawal also depends on the principles of reciprocity with the home country of the IW where there is no SSA in place. Therefore, if the IW comes from the US, as an example, it would depend on whether the US would allow to freely repatriate such balance for Indians on completion of the assignments in the US.

Therefore practically, the withdrawal of the pension amount appears to be difficult.

Recovery by employer:

Another important point that arises is that, most expatriates are generally equalised on income tax and social security benefits, i.e. they would be guaranteed atleast the same net salary (after tax and social security deductions) while on assignment in India as they earned in their home country, prior to coming on assignment. On completion of the India assignment, the IW would receive the refund which consists of the employer and employee PF contributions and the interest thereon. As part of the equalization policy, the PF contributions may have been borne by the employer and hence, the expatriate may now be obligated to repay the employer this amount.

The PF Act protects the amount standing to the credit of any member in the Fund and states that this amount shall not be capable of being assigned or charged and shall not be liable to attachment under any decree or order of any Court for any debt or liability. Further, neither the official assignee appointed under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act 1909 nor any receiver appointed under the Provincial Insolvency Act 1920 shall be entitled to or have any claim on any such amount even though the employer may have funded the employee’s PF contribution (in addition to the employer’s contributions). This poses problems of recoverability for the employer especially since the amount involved may .be significant considering it is nearly 24% of salary.

Tax  impact:

As most assignments are typically for less than five years, the withdrawal of the PF amount before completion of the five years may give rise to additional income tax implications.

In conclusion:

The laws in this regard are still evolving and there are a lot of open questions which need to be answered. Realistically, the SSAs may take a long time before they are effective and until then the cost of the assignment of the expatriates in India, along with the compliance requirements is likely to increase.

Transactions with Associated Enterprises — A new category of service tax payers ?

Article

Service tax law is amended from 10-5-2008 for casting
liability on transactions of taxable services with associated enterprises to pay
service tax even before the actual payment is received by the service provider.
For this purpose, Explanation (c) to S. 67 of Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994
is amended and an Explanation is inserted in Rule 6(1) of the Service Tax Rules,
1994.

An attempt is made in this article to highlight the effect of
these provisions and the onerous responsibility cast on the taxpayers to
identify the transactions of taxable services between the Associated
Enterprises, a new category of taxpayers being introduced under service tax.

Service tax was hitherto payable on receipt of the value of
taxable service by the service provider. Even in case when the liability to pay
service tax is cast on the recipient of service, the amount actually paid by
such recipient triggered the liability. This means that so far, the liability of
service tax crystallised on what is known as ‘cash basis’ as distinguished from
‘accrual basis’ in accounting parlance.

Now, from the day the Finance Bill received assent of the
President i.e., from 10-5-2008, the liability is cast on the associated
enterprises to pay service tax even if the actual payment of value of taxable
service is not received/paid, as the case may be. ‘Associate Enterprises’ are
defined to take meaning from the Income-tax Act, 1961. This is a major deviation
in case of transactions between specified persons called as ‘Associated
Enterprises’ (AE) under the law. This amendment is introduced as anti-avoidance
measure, as the Government thought that tax avoidance takes place in case of
transactions of taxable services between the associated enterprises as service
tax is not paid, though it is recognised in the books of account as revenue or
expenditure by the concerned parties. This is clear from the clarification
issued by the Tax Research Unit (TRU) of the Government of India, dated 29th
February 2008. For better understanding the relevant portion of the said TRU
Letter is reproduced as follows :

“6. Transactions between Associated Enterprises


6.1 Service tax is levied at the rate of 12% of the
value of taxable services (S. 66). S. 67 pertaining to valuation of taxable
service for charging service tax states that value shall be the gross amount
charged for the service provided or to be provided and includes book
adjustment. As per Rule 6 of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, service tax is
required to be paid only after receipt of the payment.


6.2 It has been brought to the notice that the
provision requiring payment of service tax after receipt of payment are used
for tax avoidance especially when the transaction is between associated
enterprises.
There have been instances wherein service tax has not been
paid on the ground of non-receipt of payment even though the transaction has
been recognised as revenue/expenditure in the statement of profit and loss
account for the purpose of determining corporate tax liability.


6.3 As an anti-avoidance measure, it is proposed to
clarify that
service tax is leviable on taxable services provided by the
person liable to pay service tax even if the amount is not actually received,
but the amount is credited or debited in the books of account of the service
provider. In other words, service tax is required to be paid after receipt
of payment or crediting/debiting of the amount in the books of accounts,
whichever is earlier.
However, this provision is restricted to transaction
between associated enterprises. This provision shall also apply to service tax
payable under reverse charge method (S. 66A) as taxable services received from
associated enterprises. For this purpose, S. 67 and Rule 6(1) are being
amended.
(emphasis supplied)

In this context, let us examine the actual amendments :

Explanation to S. 67 (as amended) :

‘Gross amount charged’ includes payment by cheque, credit
card, deduction from account and any form of payment by issue of credit notes or
debit notes and book adjustment and any amount credited or debited, as
the case may be, to any account, whether called suspense account
or by any other name in the books of account of person liable to pay
service tax, where the transaction of service is with any associated
enterprise.”
(emphasis supplied).

Prior to the amendment, the explanation read as follows :

‘Gross amount charged’ includes payment by cheque, credit
card, deduction from account and any form of payment by issue of credit notes or
debit notes and book adjustment.”

Further, an Explanation to Rule 6(1) is introduced to bring
in line with S. 67, as a machinery provision :


Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that where the transaction of taxable service is with any associated
enterprise, any payment received towards the value of taxable service, in such
case shall include any amount credited or debited, as the case may be, to any
account, whether called ‘Suspense Account’ or by any other name, in the books of
account of a person liable to pay service tax.”


It can be seen from above that the definition of ,gross amount charged’ u/ s.67 is expanded in case of transactions with AE to include debit or credit to any account including a suspense account, in the books of the person liable to pay service tax. Under the erstwhile provisions as amended by the Finance Act, 2006, the liability to service tax was attracted upon issue of debit note or credit note in the context of payment of consideration in relation to provision of taxable service. For example, if there already existed a deposit in the books of A in favour of B, and A renders a taxable service to B, the liability of payment of service tax would arise when a book entry of adjustment of deposit is passed to-wards the value of taxable services provided. However, if A and B are associated enterprises, then the liability to service tax arises the moment a bill is issued, irrespective of the fact that whether there existed any deposit or not. This is because issue of a bill would result into credit to an income head and the liability would trigger on accrual basis of accounting. Thus the concept of book adjustment in relation to transactions between AE is of much larger import than in case of unrelated parties. Thus an onerous responsibility is cast on an enterprise providing service to its associated enterprise. Further illustrations of such onerous responsibility of this amendment are given elsewhere in this article.

Let us now examine whether such amendment was absolutely necessary to curb the incidence of avoidance of tax as made out by the Government. Firstly, the Service Tax Law is designed to cast liability on receipt of payment. This only means that the liability not necessarily arises even as transaction is recognised as revenue/expenditure in the books of account. Secondly, the purported avoidance is already taken care of by introduction of Explanation to S. 67 and valuation rules by the Finance Act, 2006. As can be seen from the Explanation before the amendment, the gross amount charged included payment by way of issue of credit/debit note or accounting adjustments. Further, even supposing that someone tries to avoid the tax (not actually avoid but delay) by raising debit note to a sister concern’s account instead of the recipient of service (assuming that all three are AE), it will not only raise questions from audit and other compliances, but also service tax and penalty from 100% to 200% can be levied u/ s.78 for fraud, collusion, etc. with intent to evade payment of service tax and the limitation period extends to five years. Thus, enough provisions exist under service tax to take care of the situations envisaged by the Government to deal with tax avoidance.

The effect of the amendment is that in case of a transaction of taxable service with AE, all debits or credits or adjustments in the account shall be regarded as the payment received towards the value of taxable service. This means that the liability to service tax triggers immediately upon issue of a bill for taxable service in case of AE. The payability of service tax on such transaction then falls due on the immediately following due date. It can thus be said that the amendment results only into preponement of liability. The amendments can therefore be said to be not addressing the issue of tax avoidance, but effectively preponing the liability in case of transactions between the AE.

Issue  of identification of AE :

The taxpayer community in this country has heard of the concept of associated enterprises under Income Tax from 1-4-2002 when the special provisions relating to avoidance of tax were introduced to levy tax on international transactions on Arm’s-Length Price (ALP), in line with international practice by the Finance Act, 2001. Under Income Tax, the umbrella of coverage is confined to international transactions involving one or more non-resident parties amongst the parties to the transaction. However, in case of service tax, even the domestic transactions are covered and also there is no need of any non-resident person to be a party to the transaction of taxable service.

AE is very widely defined under S. 92A of the Income-tax Act. and takes into its ambit an enterprise which participates through one or more persons, directly or indirectly, or through one or more intermediatary in the management or control or capital of other enterprise and also one or a set of persons who commonly participate directly or indirectly or through one or more intermediaries in the management or control or capital of the other AE. In the following cases, one enterprise is deemed as Associated Enterprise in relation to other enterprise as it appears from S. 92A(2)

  • One enterprise holds directly or indirectly 26% or more percentage of voting power in other enterprise.

  •  One person or enterprise holds directly or indirectly 26% or more percentage of voting power in each of such enterprises.

  • When loan from one enterprise to the other enterprise constitutes not less than 50% of the book value of such other enterprise.

  • One enterprise  guarantees  not less than  10% of the total borrowings  of the other  enterprise.

  • When one enterprise or one or a set of persons appoints more than half of the board of the directors or the members of the governing board or one or more executive directors or executive members of the governing board of the other enterprise.

  • When manufacturing or processing or any business carried out by one enterprise is wholly dependent on the other enterprise on use of know-how, patent, copyright, trademark, licence, fran-chise or any other business or commercial right of similar nature or any data, documentation, drawing or specification relating to any patent, invention, model, design, secret formula or process belonging to the other enterprise or within the exclusive right of the other enterprise.

  •  90%  or  more  of  the  raw  material   or  the consumables  required  for the manufacture   or processing of the goods or articles carried out by one enterprise are supplied by the other enterprise or by such persons as specified by the other enterprise and the prices and the other conditions relating to the supply are influenced by such other enterprise.

  • Where the goods or articles manufactured or processed by one enterprise are sold exclusively to the other enterprise or to such persons as specified by the other enterprise and the prices and conditions related thereto are influenced by such other enterprise.

  • Where one enterprise is controlled by an indi-vidual and the other enterprise is also controlled by such individual or his relative or jointly by such individual and his relative.

  • Where one enterprise is controlled by HUF, the other enterprise is controlled by a member of such HUF or a relative of the member of such HUF or by such a member and his relative.

  • Where one enterprise is a firm, AOP or BOI, not less than 10% of interest in such firm or AOP or BOI is held by the other enterprise.

  • Where there exists between the two enterprises, any relationship of mutual interest as may be prescribed 1.

The word, ‘enterprise’ is defined under the Income-tax Act as a person including a permanent establishment of such person.

The word, ‘permanent establishment’ is defined u/s. 92F which includes a fixed place of business through which business of enterprise is wholly or partly carried out.

The term ‘relative’ is not defined under Service Tax or under Central Excise Act. However, the Income-tax Act defines ‘relative’ as ‘in relation to an individual, means the husband, wife, brother, or sister or any lineal ascendant or descendant of the individual’ [5. 2(41)].

From the above definition, it is clear that the coverage under these provisions is wide. However, under income-tax, only international transactions are relevant to capture the transactions between the AE and it is not difficult to establish such a relationship in the context of international transactions. Applying this principle in the context of domestic transactions, is a Herculean task. Had such transactions been confined to import or export of services, it would have been simpler to take recourse to transfer pricing regulations to determine who should be regarded as an AE in relation to the transactions of taxable service.

It therefore follows that the first issue would be to identify any enterprise being regarded as AE in relation to transaction of taxable service. In the context of domestic coverage, it may lead to absurd results, for example, a loan advanced by a bank, the amount of which exceeds 51% of the book value of the total assets of the borrower, such bank becomes AE of the borrower. We are all aware that normally the borrower’s margin is 30% while the bank borrowing can be to the extent of 70%. It is equally difficult to come out of the criteria under many other clauses and one is unknowingly and unintentionally roped in as AE of the other enterprise.

The provisions pertaining to AE are applicable to all kinds of entities i.e., not only companies but also to non-companies like individuals, HUF, partnership firms, AOP, Ba I, etc. In case of a partnership firm, BOI or AOP, in most of cases an individual or more than one individual holds more than 10% each. In case of an HUF, one or more individuals having control is very common. In such cases, all such entities will be covered as AE in relation to the other and will require payment of service tax on ‘accrual’ basis.

Let us take a case of a private or a public company, in which case also it is equally difficult to identify associated enterprise. Accounting Standard AS-IS issued by K’Al, requires every company to disclose their transactions with related parties. However, here we find that the persons covered under AS-IS are much more restricted than S. 92A of the Income-tax Act. This can be seen from the ‘relationship’ covered under AS-IS, a relevant portion of the Standard is given below:

“2. This Statement applies only to related-party relationships described in paragraph 3.

3.    This Statement deals only with related-party relationships described in (a) to (e) below:

(a)    enterprises that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, control, or are controlled by, or are under common control with, the reporting enterprise (this includes holding companies, subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries);

(b)    associates and joint ventures of the reporting enterprise and the investing party or venturer in respect of which the reporting enterprise is an associate or a joint venture;

(c)    individuals owning, directly or indirectly, an interest in the voting power of the reporting enterprise that gives them control or significant influence over the enterprise, and relatives of any such individual;

(d)    key management personnel and relatives of such personnel; and

(e)    enterprises over which any person described in (c) or (d) is able to exercise significant influence. This includes enterprises owned by directors or major shareholders of the reporting enterprise and enterprises that have a member of key management in common with the reporting enterprise.

4.    In the context of this Statement, the following are deemed not to be related parties:

(a)    two companies simply because they have a director in common, not with standing paragraph 3(d) or (e) above (unless the director is able to affect the policies of both companies in their mutual dealings);

(b)    a single customer, supplier, franchiser, distributor, or general agent with whom an enterprise transacts a significant volume of business merely by virtue of the resulting economic dependence; and

(c)    the parties listed below, in the course of their normal dealings with an enterprise by virtue only of those dealings (although they may circumscribe the freedom of action of the enterprise or participate in its decision-making process) :

(i)    providers  of finance;

(ii)    trade  unions;

(iii)    public  utilities;

(iv)    government departments and government agencies including government-sponsored bodies.”

The Accounting Standard defines control as a related party controlling more than half of the voting power in the other party. Significant influence is defined as one individual owning, directly or indirectly, 20% or more in voting power of any enterprise. It thus appears that the coverage is much more limited under the Accounting Standard than what is envisaged u/s.92A of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, the companies will have to devise a separate set of modalities to identify an AE for the purpose of payment of service tax.

Similarly, since the liability of service tax arises once the receipt of provision of taxable service crosses Rs.I0 lakhs, even small and medium enterprises shall have to formulate modalities to identify the AE in relation to the transactions of taxable services with them. Further, persons other than provider of output service, who are liable to pay service tax, like GTA service, also will have to formulate suitable modalities for identification of the AB.

As per one estimate, about 50% of the service tax payers have transactions of taxable service with AE. Such assessee may also have transaction of taxable services with other than AE. These assessees will have to make two kinds of computation in the same month or quarter, as the case may be, (i) for service tax payments in case of transactions of taxable service with AE, and (ii) in case of transactions of taxable service with other than AE.

The new provisions for carving out associated enterprises for such differential and harsh treatment have thrown up certain interesting questions for which no clarification is offered and no solution is in sight. Such issues are listed hereinbelow as brain-stormers.

(a) Export  of Service:

For the purpose of exemption under the Export of Service Rules, one of the conditions required to be satisfied is of receipt of the value of taxable service in convertible foreign exchange. In case of AE, the liability arises at the time of raising the bill and debit or credit to any account. In a case when the payment is received subsequently, though in convertible foreign exchange, it will be difficult for the person providing otherwise exempt service as export of service, to satisfy this condition. Urgent clarification for mitigating this genuine hardship is required.

(b) Cenvat    credit :
(i) In case of international  transactions:

A person liable to pay service tax on taxable service provided from outside India and received in India (import of service) from overseas AE, is required to pay service tax once he passes debit or credit or adjustment entry in the books of account. Such an assessee may not be required to pay for the value of import of service to his AE immediately upon provision of service (based on the terms of contract). However, mere payment of service tax without payment of value of service, may not entitle him claim of credit of input service tax paid, even though it is used for providing taxable output service or in manufacture of excisable goods, as the condition laid down in Rule 4(7) of the Cenvat Credit Rules 2004 is not satisfied.

(ii) In case of domestic  transactions:

ABC is having transaction of taxable  service with XYZ (AE) in July 2008 and pays service tax on that transaction. The amount of invoice issued to XYZ was adjusted in the running account of XYZ, as payment was not required to be made in view of credit balance lying in the account of XYZ.

In such circumstance, it will be difficult to claim Cenvat credit for XYZ in view of the fact that payment of taxable service is not made. For this purpose, ABC and XYZ may have to take extra precautions as follows:

(a)    ABC to inform XYZ about book adjustment in their account

(b)    XYZ to show corresponding adjustment in their books

(c)    XYZ will have to convince the CEO about this constructive payment.

May be for this purpose, it has to obtain ‘receipt’ from ABC or even a certificate of his Chartered Accountant.

(c) Memorandum entries for monthly closing of accounts:

In this fast-moving era, not only Indian subsidiaries of foreign companies but also internally related Indian companies are required to report their monthly results of profit or loss. In case of listed companies, quarterly results are required to be disclosed. In the process, such entities have to pass book entries of income/expenditure, whether called memorandum entries, suspense entries, etc. on the last day of the month. Such entries are reversed on the first day of the immediately following month. Whether such entries would also trigger the liability to pay service tax is a moot question.

(d) Invoices cancelled/amended on re-appraisal before payment:

An assessee provides taxable service to AE and issues an invoice for the value of taxable service. However, subsequently the value is re-appraised or negotiated and finally a lower amount bill is issued by the service provider. The whole exercise is over before making the payment of consideration. However, the payment of service tax is already made on the basis of invoice issued. Whether there is any recourse to adjust such excess payment of service tax in case of reduction in bill amount. It is a moot question, whether Rule 6(3) of the Service Tax Rules can be of any help in this regards.

(e) Amendment to the amount charged on the basis of change in Arm’s-Length Price (ALP) under the Transfer Pricing Regulations:

It may so happen that the amount charged for service provided is not accepted by the Transfer Pricing Officer for a similar service rendered in earlier year. On this account, it becomes necessary to change the current year’s pricing, and the invoice amount is altered (e.g., cost plus 15% model from cost plus 10% adopted earlier). Whether this kind of change will trigger service tax liability on additional amount charged and when service tax becomes payable on such additional amount.

Conclusion:

From the detailed analysis of the new provisions pertaining to the transactions between associated enterprises, it can be seen that they will add more complexities to the already controversial provisions of service tax. It will result in undue hardship for the taxpayers, particularly small companies, individuals, HUF, partnership firms, BOIs, AOPs, etc. On the other hand, the Department is ill-equipped to track such transactions, which is so difficult for even an honest taxpayer to do, so much so that a taxpayer may not mind paying service tax under the new provisions (on accrual basis), but may find it difficult to identify AEs in relation to the transactions of taxable service. So far, under the service tax, there were two types of assessees, one the provider of service and two, the recipient of service. Now, these provisions have introduced one more kind of person liable to pay tax, on what we call accrual basis.

Above all, the intended benefits appear to be far lesser as compared to the exercise the assessee and the Department have to undertake.

It appears that without realising the implications, the Government has in its overenthusiasm, imported the provisions from the Income-tax Act, which are of widest import and essentially framed for different purpose altogether. This only adds to the woes of the taxpayers under already overcomplicated service tax. Had the provisions been applied for international transactions, it would not have raised much dust. But by applying the same analogy to the domestic transactions, the Government has gone much overboard.

Co-op. Housing Society : BMC cannot sanction the modified plan without fresh NOC from society : Appellate Court, must pass reasoned order : Bombay Municipal Corporation Act S. 354A.

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4. Co-op. Housing Society : BMC cannot
sanction the modified plan without fresh NOC from society : Appellate Court,
must pass reasoned order : Bombay Municipal Corporation Act S. 354A.


The appellant is a co-op. hsg. society. A building plan was
submitted by the respondent No. 2 to the appellant society for approval and the
approval was granted by the appellant. Earlier a lease was granted by the
appellant society (the lessor) with respect to the plan in question in favour of
one Shri J. C. Patel and it has been provided therein that any structural
alternatives and additions by the lessee in the building required consent in
writing of the appellant. The condition to be complied with before the starting
of the work of building on the plot, the respondent No. 1 has mentioned that NOC
from the society along with resolution of general body for development will be
submitted before commencement certificate.

Thus the terms of the lease deed have been approved by the
respondent No. 1. The lessee made substantial changes in the original plan
without getting NOC from the appellant society. It was alleged by the appellant
that the respondent No. 2 suppressed the subsequent plan and was wilfully
deceiving the appellant by giving false representation.

The appellant expelled respondent No. 2 and Patel from the
membership of the appellant society. The appellant society terminated the lease
deed and initiated eviction proceeding against the respondents. The appellant
society represented to respondent No. 1 that the unamended plan was illegal. On
receiving the representation, the respondent No. 1 BMC issued a ‘stop-work
notice’ u/s. 354 A of the BMC Act.

Subsequently the respondent No. 1 withdrew the stop-work
notice against which the writ-petition was filed in the High Court by the
appellant society which was dismissed by the Single Judge and was upheld by the
Division Bench on appeal.

The Supreme Court held that respondent No. 2 had violated the
conditions of lease deed and the construction as the amended plan was wholly
illegal. There was a specific stipulation in the lease deed that NOC from the
lessor has to be obtained for the purpose of obtaining sanction of the building
plan from the BMC. The BMC cannot sanction/modify the plan unless a fresh NOC
had been obtained by the lessee from the appellant society. The order of the
High Court is set aside and the order of the BMC withdrawing the ‘stop-work
notice’ was quashed.

The Court also observed that when a judgment is written, the
learned Judge should at least briefly mention the facts of the case, the
controversy and then give his reasoning. Even in a judgment of affirmance, he
must show that it has properly applied his mind to the case and not acted as a
rubber stamp. There must be own independent reasoning.


[The New India Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Anr.
(unreported) Civil Appeal
No. 5426 of 2008 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20670 of
2006) order dated 2-9-2008]

 


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Claim for compensation for Fatal Accident can be made only for benefit of spouse, parent and child of deceased and not for benefit of brother or other relations of deceased. Expression ‘Legal Representative’ : Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988) : S. 68.

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2. Claim for compensation for Fatal Accident
can be made only for benefit of spouse, parent and child of deceased and not for
benefit of brother or other relations of deceased. Expression ‘Legal
Representative’ : Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988) : S. 68.


The appellants were the father, mother and brother of
deceased. The claimants challenged the quantum of compensation. The deceased had
died in a motor vehicle accident. The deceased was aged 21 years at the time of
her death and was a famous cine artist and dancer. According to the appellants
the compensation claimed was about Rs.60,00,000. The question which arose for
consideration was whether a brother of a person killed in a motor vehicle
accident can claim compensation.

 

S. 166(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act states the different set
of persons who can file applications for compensation arising out of an accident
of the nature specified in S. 165(1) of the M.V. Act.

 

The expression ‘legal representative’ has not been defined in
the M.V. Act. Definition of the expression ‘legal representative’ has been
incorporated in S. 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The said
definition, no doubt, in terms does not apply to a case before the Claims
Tribunal, but it has to be stated that even in ordinary parlance the said
expression is understood almost in the same way in which it is defined in the
Code of Civil Procedure. The definition reflects the sense in which the
expression is understood ordinarily and, therefore, must govern cases before the
Tribunal. Ordinarily, heirs of the deceased are the persons who represent the
estate of the deceased and must be taken to be his legal representatives. A
legal representative in a given case need not necessarily be the wife, husband,
parent and child. Thus in case of death of a person in a motor vehicle accident,
compensation can be claimed only by the legal representatives. They may claim
besides special damages, etc. compensation for economic loss and loss to the
estate. A brother of the deceased may be a legal representative of the deceased
in the absence of preferential heirs under the personal law governing the
parties and if so, he can claim compensation. But he cannot do so, if he is not
a legal representative entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased. This
is so even if as a matter of fact they were dependent on the deceased for
financial help.

[ P. N. Unni & Ors. v. Baby John & ors., AIR 2008
Kerala 157]

 


levitra

Sue the accountant

Introduction :

    The role of modern day accounting professionals has come a long way, from a core accounting function to that of being viewed as a corporate gatekeeper. Today’s professionals are not just auditors, certifying routine book of accounts, but also on the boards of companies as directors. This multi disciplinary role puts emphasis on “always taking the correct decisions and doing everything right”. While accountants look to successfully achieve the set standards, they are increasingly exposed to being targets for easy lawsuits, bought against them by third parties. A series of lawsuits filed against some of the reputed accounting firms and professionals is a beginning of the trend.

    These third parties could be regulators, customers, shareholders and creditors, to name a few. Own employees cannot be excluded from the list. The list of reputed professionals, who have developed skill in what they do, over the years, but are yet, in the midst of proving their innocence in the court of law, will get longer. This will be fuelled by the arrival of the specialised litigation firms, who have been trained to gather claimants and win lawsuits in more litigious territories like Europe and US.

    The Government is drafting regulations to ease Foreign Direct Investment and opening up of the Indian legal sector to overseas law firms. The local shops of the foreign firms will derive encouragement for local claimants to sue for miniscule failure by professionals to carry out diligence and care.

    In most courts, the lawsuit may drag for long, cutting into the pockets and personal assets of professionals. The professionals may have acted in good faith and will have the best of the counsel defending them in the court of law, yet, the process may not only be expensive, but, time consuming, complex and lengthy. This adds to the agony.

    A dent to reputation and financial condition with this situation is inevitable.

Recent cases in highlight involving accountants :

    In the recent times, India has been a witness to a few incidents, where accounting professionals have been in the face of legal action.

Depositors in Nagarjuna Finance v. Mr. Nimesh Kampani & others

    Source : Rediff business desk, 13-4-2009

    The Supreme Court on Monday quashed a petition filed by financial industry magnate Nimesh Kampani to stop proceeding initiated against him in the Nagarjuna Finance Corp case, thus clearing the way for his arrest.

    Nagarjuna Finance, the Hyderabad-based non-banking finance company has been charged with defaulting on repayment of deposits worth Rs.100 crore (Rs.1 billion).

    Kampani was a director of Nagarjuna Finance when the alleged default took place. He had resigned as a non-executive director in 1999. He was, however, on the board when the NBFC raised deposits from the public.

    Kampani, however, had earlier told APO police that he was in no way involved with the matter, having resigned as a non-executive director in 1999. The apex court had on April 2 stayed the arrest of investment banker Kampani.

Satyam ADR purchasers v. M/s. Pricewaterhouse Coopers

    Source : Financial Express, 8-1-2009

    The ADR purchasers of the Satyam Computers stock, represented by law firm Pomerantz Haudek Block Grossman & Gross LLP, have filed a lawsuit against the multinational audit firm Pricewater-house Coopers (PWC). The lawsuit alleges that PWC breached the duty towards shareholders, causing undue losses, by committing grossly negligent audits, overlooked internal control mechanisms. The lawsuit further alleges that PwC ignored red flags that should have alerted it to the fraud and that PWC failed to perform its audits in accordance with the requisite accounting principles.

    The Indian unit of the global audit major, has been maintaining that it followed all the standard accounting principles while auditing the books of Satyam Computers. While two partners of the firm have been arrested for abetting the fraud, PWC also said that its auditing on Satyam could be construed invalid, if the statements made by promoter Raju, in his admission letter about the fraud were correct.

    In the Satyam case, the audit firm is defending the allegations filed against it and incurring substantial legal expenses, while independent probe is under way by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO).

Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Auditors of Global Trust Bank

    Source : livemint.com

    ICAI disciplinary committee has held two Global Trust Bank (GTB) auditors guilty of professional misconduct. In 2003, Global Trust Bank had collapsed. It was alleged that the GTB auditors had failed to adequately point out in its audit report about the high levels of NPA. Four partners at the firm had been made respondents in this case for their audit work spanning over three years. Reserve Bank of India had stepped in at that time and speedily restored normalcy for the bank’s customers, by approving its merger with Oriental Bank of Commerce.

    As per the latest media reports, ICAI has conducted disciplinary proceedings and the case has been referred to the high level committee of the monitoring body. The partners of the audit firm have been hauled up and had to present themselves in front of the monitoring body to explain the alleged professional misconduct.

Liability under Indian Law :

    In India, a civil liability for negligence can be attached when it is proved that an auditor’s client suffered a financial loss due to the auditor’s professional negligence. The basis of pointing the finger and establishment of the liability would be through two simple steps :

    1. There was a professional negligence by the auditor in the performance of his duty

    2. This professional negligence resulted in a loss or damage to the client

    This process is simple and easy to allege. Professional negligence is generally held to imply “any action by an auditor that is careless or is not in consonance with the performance of his duty”.

Most accounting professionals are also directors on the boards of various listed and non listed companies. Error, omission or negligence on their part, can impact the performance of the company and erode its value. They could be sued for breach of their duty towards shareholders, even while the breach may not be willful. They would still have to defend themselves, in case a lawsuit is filed.

Once in court, the legal expense, may mount and end up being quite Significant. Subsequently, huge settlements may follow out of a court verdict or even a settlement may be negotiated out of court. All these are definitely likely to dent the bottom line of the audit firm held negligent, while there will also be a loss of reputation and goodwill of the firm, built over several years of hard work.

Risk mitigation through Insurance for Accountants:

Apart from relying on their own pocket to churn out expenses towards legal costs and litigation settlements, there are two specialised insurance policies which becomes a pertinent and reliable mechanism, for risk mitigation:

    1. Accountants  Professional  Liability Insurance

    2. Directors  and Officers Liability Insurance

The insurance policies are carved to pay for defence expenses and settlements, broadly.

Accountants Professional Liability Insurance:

Sample policy coverage:

An Accountants Professional Liability insurance policy covers legal liability arising out of professional negligence and error or omission of the accounting/ audit firms. The key highlights of a typical insurance policy are:

  • Provides protection against wrongful acts arising out of negligence, error or omission, of the insured firm, partners, employees.

  • Responds towards defense costs and settlements, within the policy terms and conditions.

  • Responds to acts taking place after the appended retroactive date in the policy. A retroactive date stands incorporated when a firm buys the insurance policy for the first time and usually remains constant over many years, thus giving continuity in the coverage of acts occurring after that date.

  • Claims on the policy have to be made and reported within the policy period and covered within the retroactive date in the insurance policy.

  • Every policy has a deductible, which is the minimum amount the insured has to bear on each claim. Depending on the firm, the deductible varies between 10% to 12% of the limit of liability opted for.

  • Can be taken by firms into multiple professions like accounts preparation, book keeping, audit, tax compliance, liquidation, valuation, mergers and acquisition work etc. Usually, the insurance company would request for exhaustive information on the activities of the firm and extend policy coverage.

  • Can be extended to include retroactive acts, provided they are unknown, when the policy is procured.

  • Can be extended to include coverage for costs incurred towards documents destroyed, damaged, lost or mislaid, as a small portion of the liability limit of the insurance policy.

Directors  and Officers Liability Insurance:

Sample policy coverage:

A Directors and Officers Liability insurance policy covers legal liability arising out of wrongful acts of the Directors and Officers of the company. The key highlights of a typical insurance policy are:

  • Provides  coverage  for liability  of :

  •     Directors and Officers who cannot be indemnified by the company
  •     Directors and Officers who can be indemnified by the company

  • Responds towards defense costs and settlements, within the policy terms and conditions

  • Responds to acts taking place after the appended retroactive date in the policy.

  • Claims on the policy have to be made and reported within the policy period and covered within the retroactive date in the insurance policy.

  • Every policy has a deductible, which is the minimum amount the insured has to bear on each claim. The deductible is smaller as compared to the Accountants Professional Liability insurance and usually has a fixed value.

 

  • Coverage territory and jurisdiction is incorporated in the policy. Can be issued on a world-wide basis or only for India.

  • Defense costs include attorney’s fees, reasonable expenses towards court attendance, administrative expenses, legal representation expenses and investigative costs.

  • Policy has advancements on current basis, towards defense costs.

Premium computation and  limits of liability :

The underwriters of this specialised nature of insurance policy, can structure and design coverage which could respond to individual firm’s business requirement. This involves an exchange of information with the underwriter, like profile of the firm, nature of services, partners’ profile. The size of the firm in terms of employees and revenue, financials, type of clients, contracts, geographical area of operation, incidents reported previously etc. are also studied.

This dialogue and information is processed to provide premium estimation to the firm seeking insurance. Depending on these parameters and the coverages opted for; the premium varies from firm to firm. Option is available with the insured, for volunteering for higher deductibles, which helps in bringing down the premium for the policies.

In conclusion:

In light of the increased emphasis on certifications to firms, whether it is in an audit or as a director on the board of listed and unlisted companies, it is recommended that all small, medium and large firms, purchase adequate level of insurance protection. In a dynamic economic and legal environment, the insurance policy will come handy as a risk mitigation tool.

Most of the leading underwriters of liability insurance offer these insurance policies. To get the best underwriter to be a part of one’s valued insurance program, the firm should ideally seek the assistance of an insurance broker. The insurance broker is licensed by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), to structure policy coverage, give informed advice and seek quotes from various insurers towards the finalisation of the best cover for their client.

Carry forward and set off of MAT credit u/s.115JAA — Allowability in the hands of amalgamated company — A case study

Facts :

    As on 31-3-2009 X Ltd. is entitled to carry forward MAT credit u/s.115JAA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 amounting to Rs. one million. X Ltd. is amalgamated with Y Ltd. with effect from 1-4-2009.

Issue :

    In the light of the above facts the question for consideration is whether Y Ltd. is entitled to carry forward and set off MAT credit of X Ltd. ?

Analysis of S. 115JAA:

    S. 115JAA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 allows credit in respect of tax paid u/s.115JA or u/s.115JB. Credit in respect of tax paid u/s.115JB is allowed only if such tax is paid for the A.Y. 2006-07 or any subsequent assessment year. The difference between the amount of tax paid u/s.115JA or u/s.115JB, as the case may be, and the amount of tax payable on total income, computed in accordance with the regular provisions of the Act, would be the amount of tax credit allowable u/s.115JAA. The credit in relation to tax paid u/s.115JA can be carried forward for a period of 5 assessment years succeeding the assessment year in which such tax credit becomes allowable. On the other hand, the credit in relation to tax paid u/s.115JB can be carried forward for a period of 10 assessment years succeeding the assessment year in which such tax credit becomes allowable. The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009, by amending S. 115JAA(3A), has increased the period of carry forward of MAT credit from 7 assessment years to 10 assessment years.

    The tax credit determined u/s.115JAA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowed as a set off in a year in which tax is payable on the total income computed in accordance with the normal provisions of the Act. Set off of MAT credit brought forward is allowed to the extent of the difference between tax on total income and tax which would have been payable u/s.115JA or u/s.115JB as the case may be.

    S. 115JAA does not expressly provide for set off of MAT credit of the transferor Company by the transferee Company. In other words, the said section does not specifically state that the MAT credit of the amalgamating Company can be carried forward and set off by the amalgamated Company. The said section also does not contain any express or specific prohibition with regard to carry forward and set off of the MAT credit of amalgamating or transferor Company by the amalgamated or transferee Company. In such a situation, the issue as to whether MAT credit of amalgamating or transferor Company can be carried forward and set off by the amalgamated or transferee company could be discussed under two alternatives.

Alternative 1 — Adverse view :

    The proposition under this view is that the amalgamated or transferee company is not entitled to carry forward and set off the MAT credit of the amalgamating or transferor Company. The reasons for the same are as follows :

    1. S. 115JAA does not specifically provide for the carry forward and set off of MAT credit of amalgamating company in the hands of the amalgamated company.

    (a) The legislature has enacted specific provisions allowing the amalgamated company to continue to claim exemption/deduction to which the amalgamating company was entitled. For ex :

  •      u/s.10A(7A), u/s.10B(7A) and u/s.10AA(5) where the eligible unit is transferred in a scheme of amalgamation, the amalgamated company is entitled to claim deduction for the unexpired period of tax holiday under the respective sections;

  •      as per 5th proviso to S. 32(1), the deduction in respect of depreciation allowance is apportioned between amalgamating and amalgamated company based on the number of days for which the assets were used by them;

  •      amalgamated company was entitled to claim the ‘investment allowance’/‘development rebate’/‘development allowance’ of the amalgamating company as per S. 32A(6), S. 33(3) and S. 33A(5) respectively;

  •      u/s.35AB(3), the amalgamated company is entitled to claim deduction in respect of expenditure on know how for the residual period;

  •      the amalgamated company is entitled to claim deduction u/s.35ABB(6) in respect of the expenditure incurred to obtain licence to operate telecommunication service for the unexpired period of the license;

  •      the deduction allowable u/s.35D in respect of amortisation of certain preliminary expenses over a period of 5 years can be claimed by an amalgamated company for the unexpired period;

  •      as per S. 35DDA(2) the amalgamated company is entitled to claim deduction in respect of the expenditure incurred under voluntary retirement scheme and eligible for amortisation for the remaining number of years;

  •      u/s.35E(7), the amalgamated company is eligible to claim deduction in respect of expenditure on prospecting for, or extraction or production of, any mineral for the unexpired period;

  •      S. 44DB allows amalgamating co-operative bank and amalgamated co-operative bank to claim proportionate deduction u/s.32, u/s.35D, u/s.35DD and u/s.35DDA based on the periods comprised in the financial year before and after the date of amalgamation.

  •      As per S. 72A, the amalgamated company is eligible to carry forward and set off brought forward business loss and unabsorbed depreciation allowance of amalgamating company on fulfillment of the conditions/requirements of the said section;   

  • U / s.72AA, the amalgamated banking company is eligible to carry forward and set off the accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation allowance of amalgamating banking company on fulfillment of the requirements/ conditions of the said section. Regarding S. 72AA, the Memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Bill 2005 [273 ITR (St.) 60] stated that the said section is being introduced with a view to provide for carry forward and set off of accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation allowance of a banking company against the profits of a banking institution under a scheme of amalgamation sanctioned by the Central  Government.

  •     S. 72AB allows an amalgamated co-operative bank to carry forward and set off accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation allowance of amalgamating co-operative bank if the conditions/requirements of the said section are satisfied.

  • 11,.. S. 80lA(12) allows the amalgamated company to claim deduction under the said section for the unexpired period. However, as per Ss.12A of S. 80IA the amalgamated company would not be entitled to claim deduction under the said section for the unexpired period of tax holiday if amalgamation or demerger happens on or after 1-4-2007.

  •     By virtue of Ss.3 of S. 80IAB, Ss.7 of S. 80lC and Ss.6 of S. 80lE, the amalgamated company is entitled to claim deduction under the above sections for the unexpired period of tax holiday.

  •     As per S. 80IB(12)where an undertaking which is entitled to claim deduction under the said section is transferred before the expiry of the tax holiday period in a scheme of amalgamation, the amalgamated company is entitled to claim deduction under the said section for the unexpired period of tax holiday.

As may be seen from the above, there are specific provisions in the Act allowing the amalgamated company to claim deduction or to carry forward and set off the accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation allowance of the amalgamating company.

As already noticed, there is a specific provision [80lA(12A)] denying the deduction under the said section to the amalgamated company. Further, S. 80lD allowing deduction in respect of profits and gains from business of hotels and convention centres in specified areas is silent as to whether amal-gamated company could claim deduction under the said section for the unexpired period of tax holiday.

S. 115JAA does not contain specific provision as to whether the amalgamated company can carry forward and set off the MAT credit of amalgamating company. One may contend that if the legislature had thought of permitting carry forward and set off of MAT credit to the amalgamated company it would have inserted specific provision to that effect in S. 115JAA. In the absence of a specific provision allowing the amalgamated company to carry forward and set off MAT credit of amalgamating company, Y Ltd. may not be eligible to carry forward and claim MAT credit of X Ltd.

2. Ss.lA  of S. 115JAA reads  as under:

“(lA) Where any amount of tax is paid U/ss.(l) of S. 115JBby an assessee, being a company for the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 2006 and any subsequent assessment year, then, credit in respect of tax so paid shall be allowed to him in accordance with the provisions of this section.”

On a literal reading of the above provision, one could argue that only the company which has paid tax u/s.115JB is entitled to carry forward and set off the MAT credit.

S. 115JAA was inserted by the Finance Act 1997. Para 99 of the Budget speech of the Finance Minister [224 ITR (St.) 9] for the year 1997 and the memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Bill 1997 [224 ITR (St.) 26] do not specifically state that the amalgamated company can set off the MAT credit of the amalgamating company.

3. Where the language of a provision is clear and unambiguous, the plain and natural meaning of the words should be supplied to the language used and no word should be ignored while interpreting a provision of a statute. [Keshavji Ravji and Co. v. CIT, [1990] 183 ITR 1 (SC)]. As stated earlier, the language of S. 115JAA(lA) allows carry forward and set off of MAT credit only to the company which has paid tax u/s.115JB. As a result, MAT credit of X Ltd. may not be available for carry forward and set off in the hands of Y Ltd.

4. The Finance Act, 2006 extended the period of carry forward and set off of MAT credit from 5 years to 7 years. The memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Bill 2006 [2006] 281 ITR (St.) 61 and Para 26.2 of the CBDT Circular No. 14/2006 dated 28-12-2006 [2007] 288 ITR (St.) 9 stated  as follows:

“To provide relief to assessees, being companies, who are required to pay MAT u/s.115JB for any assessment year commencing on or after 1st April, 2006, the provisions of S. 115JAA have been amended to provide that the amount’ of tax credit determined shall be allowed to be carried forward and set off for seven assessment years immediately succeeding the assessment year in which the tax credit becomes allowable under the said section.”

As stated earlier, Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 [314 ITR (St.) 57] has extended the period of carry forward and set off of MAT credit from 7 years to 10 years. In this connection, the memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance (No. 2) Bill 2009 [314 ITR (St.) 183] also states that the above amendment is proposed with a view to provide relief to the asses sees being companies who pay MAT u/s.115JB for any assessment year beginning on or after the 1st day of April 2006.

From a plain reading of the above, it would be manifest that carry forward and set off of MAT credit is intended to provide relief to companies who have paid MAT. Thus, the benefit of MAT credit could be claimed only by a company which has paid MAT for AY 2006-07 or subsequent years and not by any other company. As a result, the amalgamated company may not be able to carry forward and set off MAT credit earlier belonging to amalgamating company.

In the year in which a company is liable to pay tax under regular provisions of the Act, MAT credit is allowed as a set off against the tax payable. The provisions of S. 140A, S. 234A, S. 234B and S. 234C allow reduction of MAT credit in the process of determining the tax/interest payable under the said sections. In other words, the amount of MAT credit is adjusted/reduced in the process of determining the tax payable u/s.140A and interest payable u/ s.234A, u/ s.234B, u/ s.234C. Finance Act 2006 amended the provisions of S. 140A, S. 234A, S. 234B and S. 234C so as to allow the adjustment/reduction of MAT credit while determining the tax/interest payable under these sections.

The memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Bill 2006 [281 ITR (St.) 61] and para 38.2 of CBDT Circular No. 14/2006 dated 28-12-2006 explaining the provisions of Finance Act, 2006 state that tax credit allowed u/s.115JAA is no different from the tax paid in advance and credit for having paid the MAT should be allowed against the tax liability determined on assessment.

Similar is the view taken in CIT v. Jindal Exports Ltd., [2009] 314 ITR 137 (Del.) wherein it was held as follows:

“Minimum alternate tax credit represents that portion of minimum alternate tax which was not actually payable by the company but has all the same been collected by the government. It represents the tax paid before it is due. Minimum alternate tax credit which is available for set off in a year falls within the meaning of “advance tax” because the context requires it be given such a purposive meaning.”

S. 219 of the Act deals with credit for advance tax. As per the said section, advance tax paid by an assessee shall be treated as a payment of tax in respect of the income of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which advance tax was payable and credit therefor shall be given to the assessee in the regular assessment.

On a reading of the above section, one may argue that credit for advance tax payment is given to the person who has paid such tax.

When MAT credit and advance tax are treated equally or when MAT credit is considered as advance tax, the principle underlying S. 219 could be held applicable even to MAT credit. As credit for advance tax is allowed to the person who makes payment of such tax, similarly, set off of MAT credit should be allowed only to that company which pays MAT.

6. Rule 37BA read with S. 199 generally provides for allowing credit for tax deducted at source to the deductee. However, in certain cases, it also provides for allowing credit of TDS to a different person (other than the deductee) if the income on which tax is deducted at source is assessable in the hands of a person other than the deductee.

In the absence of guidelines or circumstances under which a company can set off MAT credit of other company u/s.115JAA or under any rule, the amalgamated company may not be eligible to carry forward and set off MAT credit of the amalgamating company.

7. As per the maxim ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ which is a rule of prohibition by necessary implication, mention of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as silently excluding all other members of the class; ‘expressum facit cessare tacitum’. Further, where a statute uses two words or expressions, one of which generally includes the other, the more general term is taken in a sense excluding the less general one; otherwise there would have been little point in using the latter as well as the former.

As detailed above, various provisions of the Act allow the amalgamated company to continue to claim deduction or to carry forward and set off the accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation of the amalgamating company. S. 115JAA does not specifically provide for carry forward and set off of MAT credit of amalgamating company by amalgamated company.

Applying the above rule of interpretation one could argue that in the absence of a specific provision, the amalgamated company would not be entitled to carry forward and set off MAT credit of the amal-gamating company.

Alternative II- Favourable view:
The proposition under this view is that the amal-gamated company is entitled to carry forward and set off the MAT credit of the amalgamating Company. The reasons for the same are as follows:

1. Amalgamation is a process wherein one or more companies merge into another company or two or more companies merge together to form a new company. All the property of the amalgamating company before amalgamation becomes the property of the amalgamated company by virtue of the amalgamation. Similarly, all liabilities of the amalgamating company before amalgamation become the liabilities of the amalgamated company by virtue of the amalgamation. The definition of the term ‘amalgamation’ ul s.2(1B) of the Act also envisages the above requirement. It is a settled law that the term ‘property’ as employed in S. 2(lB) is a term of the widest import and, subject to any limitation which the context may require, signifies every possible interest which a person can clearly hold and enjoy. MAT credit which can be carried forward and set off has the potential of reducing the tax liability during subsequent years and therefore it possesses the characteristics of being considered as a ‘property’. Guidance note on accounting of MAT credit issued by lCAl also recognises that MAT credit has expected future economic benefits in the form of its adjustment against the discharge of the normal tax liability in future years and therefore is an ‘asset’. The said Guidance note also permits the accounting and recognition of MAT credit as an ‘asset’ in the financial statements. Thus, MAT credit of the amalgamating company, which would be considered as a property, becomes  the property of the amalgamated company by virtue of the amalgamation.

AS-14 – Accounting for amalgamation in the books of amalgamated company issued by ICAI and notified by Central Government in the form of Companies (Accounting Standard) Rules 2006 envisages two types of amalgamation viz., amalgamation in the nature of merger (pooling of interest method) and amalgamation in the nature of purchase (purchase method).

If the amalgamation is that of type one i.e., amal-gamation in the nature of merger, all the assets and liabilities of amalgamating company are recognised in the books of amalgamated company at their book value. Under this method, if MAT credit is recog-nised as an asset in the balance sheet of the amal-gamating company, the amalgamated company is also required to recognise the same in its balance sheet.

Under type two amalgamation i.e., the purchase method, the amalgamated company accounts for the amalgamation either by incorporating the assets and liabilities at their existing carrying amounts or by allocating the consideration to individual identifi-able assets and liabilities of the amalgamating company on the basis of their fair values at the date of amalgamation. The identifiable assets and liabilities may include assets and liabilities not recorded in the financial statements of the amalgamating company. [para 12 of AS-14]

Under this method, if MAT credit of amalgamating company (irrespective of whether such credit is recognised as an asset in the balance sheet of amalgamating company or not) is taken over by the amalgamated company or if the consideration in respect of amalgamation includes consideration for taking over MAT credit in the scheme of amalgamation, the latter company recognises the same in its balance sheet.

Thus, under both the types of amalgamation, the MAT credit of amalgamating company could be recognised  as an asset  in the balance  sheet  of the amalgamated  company.  MAT credit  is thus  an accounting  derivative.  It could be regarded  as a ‘capital asset’  u/s.2(14).  On transfer  of such  capital  asset in a scheme  of amalgamation,   it could  be said that the amalgamated  company  becomes the owner, enabling  it to carry forward  and set off MAT credit. The principle underlying some of the provisions wherein deduction is attached to the undertaking and not to the owner thereof could also be extended to MAT credit. Therefore, it could be said that on amalgamation the amalgamated company gets the right to carry forward and set off the MAT credit.

2. Various amendments were made to the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act 1999 concerning tax implications of business reorganisations by way of amalgamation and demerger. The Finance Minister’s speech in Budget 1999 [236 ITR (St.) 1] stated that a comprehensive set of amendments is being proposed to make business re-organisations fully tax neutral. In the speech the following was stated “it is proposed that all fiscal concessions will survive for the unexpired period in the case of amal-gamation and de-mergers.” It may be noted that MAT credit in respect of tax paid u/s.115JA was already on the statute books when the provisions of Finance Act 1999 were introduced. The intention of the legislature appears to be that the benefits/reliefs available to the amalgamating company should vest in the amalgamated company so that the latter company can claim such benefits/reliefs for the unexpired period, on a premise that the amalgam-ation had not been effected.

3. There is no prohibition or restriction in S. 115JAA with regard to carry forward and set off of MAT credit belonging to the amalgamating company by the amalgamated company. The memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Bill, 2005 [273 ITR (St.) 60] and Circular no. 3 of 2006, dated 27-2-2006 [(2006) 281 ITR (St.) 222] explaining the provisions of Finance Act 2005 also do not state that carry forward and set off of MAT credit is allowable only to the company which has paid tax u/s.115JB. In an amalgamation, one company is subsumed into another. The amalgamated company becomes the ‘alter ego’ of the amalgamating company. Tax provisions desire that the benefits available to the amal-gamating company survive and continue to be effective in the amalgamated company. The benefits are to remain unhindered despite the assumption of new legal garb. As a result, the amalgamated company may carry forward and set off MAT credit belonging to the amalgamating company.

4. In DCIT v. Beck India Ltd., (2008) 26 SOT 141 (Mum.) the High Court vide order dated 20-9-2001 approved the merger of a company with the respondent company with effect from the appointed date of amalgamation being 1-1-2001. The financial statements presented in the annual general meeting did not consider the unabsorbed losses of the amalgamating company since the said meeting was conducted before the date of the order of the High Court approving the merger. For the same reason, the original return filed by the respondent on 30-10-2001 did not consider the unabsorbed losses of amalgamating company in the process of computation of book profits u/s.115JB. After the approval of merger by the High Court, the respondent assessee revised its financial statements so as to consider the effect of amalgamation. The respondent assessee also filed a revised return wherein the unabsorbed losses of amalgamating company remaining after setting off the same with the surplus of the assessee company was reduced in the process of computation of book profits u/s.115JB. The Tribunal held that the assessee is eligible for set off based on the revised accounts.

Considering the above decision wherein losses of amalgamating company were allowed to be set off by the amalgamated company in computing book profits u/s.115JB, one could contend that MAT credit of amalgamating company could also be carry forward and set off by the amalgamated company u/s.115JAA.

In VST Tillers and Tractors Ltd. v. CIT, ITA No. 588/Bang./2008, a decision of the Bangalore ITAT, VST Precision Components Ltd. (‘VPCL or the amal-gamating company’), a subsidiary of VST Tillers & Tractors Ltd. (‘the assessee’) amalgamated with the assessee under a scheme of amalgamation sanctioned by the Karnataka High Court. As per the sanctioned scheme, pursuant to the amalgamation, all assets and liabilities of VPCL would vest with the assessee. The sanctioned scheme inter alia provided that the unabsorbed .losses and depreciation of VPCL shall be deemed to be losses and depreciation of the assessee as provided u/ s.72 of the Act. The assessee in computing the MAT liability u/s.115JB reduced unabsorbed losses of VPCL (which was less than the unabsorbed depreciation of VPCL) from book profits. The CIT passed order u/ s.263 holding that unabsorbed losses reduced were not as per books of account of the assessee but were as per books of accounts of VPCL and therefore the same cannot be reduced from the book profits of the assessee. On appeal, the Tribunal apart from relying on S. 72 also relied on S. 72A of the Act. It was observed that the sanctioned scheme also provided that the unabsorbed losses and depreciation of VPCL shall be deemed to be losses and depreciation of the assessee as provided u/ s.72 of the Act. It was therefore held that the assessee has rightly reduced the unabsorbed losses of VPCL from its book prof-its in computing MAT liability u/s.115JB.

6. In ITO v. Mahyco Vegetable Seeds Ltd., (2009)314 ITR (AT) 37 ITAT (Mum.) it was held that the resulting company is entitled to carry forward unabsorbed scientific research expenditure allocated to it in the process of demerger by the demerged company. The Tribunal held that the amount representing the unabsorbed capital expenditure on scientific research u/s.35(4) was not different from the unabsorbed depreciation for the purposes of S. 72A(7). The respondent company was therefore allowed to carry forward unabsorbed scientific research expenditure of the demerged company even though there is no specific provision in S. 72A allowing amalgamated or resulting company to carry forward and set off unabsorbed scientific research expenditure of amalgamating or demerged company.

7. In SKOL Breweries Ltd. v. ACIT, 28 ITAT India 998 (Mum.) ITA No. 313/Mum./07 A.Y. 2003-04 decision dated 15-5-2008 the Tribunal allowed set off of MAT credit of amalgamating company in the hands of the appellant assessee being the amalgamated company. The Tribunal observed:

“We have duly considered the rival contentions and gone through the record carefully. The Ld. CIT(A) while denying the benefit of taxes paid by M/s .. Charrninar Breweries Ltd. (CBL) u/s.115JA has observed that M/ s.. CBL was amalgamated with erstwhile SKOL and ceased to exist. Once the company ceases to exist then any benefit available to the company would not devolve upon the transferee company. For the above view CIT(A) has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble SC in the case of Sarawati Industries Syndicate 186 ITR 278. In our opinion Ld. first appellate authority has referred to this decision without context. The facts of that case are quite different. In that case, an assessee ‘A’ has paid certain amount to ‘B’ towards sales tax liability. ‘B’ who collected the sales tax from’ A’ disputed the liability before the Sales tax Tribunal. During the pendency of the litigation’ A’ ceased to exist and its business was taken over by ‘C’. The Sales tax Tribunal decided the issue in favour of ‘B’ and held that no sales tax is payable. Accordingly ‘B’ returned the money to ‘C’. This amount was sought to be taxed u/s.41(1) of the Act according to the provision as it existed in AY 1965 – 66. In the context the Hon’ble Supreme court has held that this amount is not taxable in the hands of ‘C’. The ingredients provided in the definition of amal-gamation is altogether different from the condition provided in S. 41(1) in A.Y. 1965-66. The assets and liabilities on the date of amalgamation of the amalgamating company would become assets and liabilities of the amalgamated company. If M/ s. Charminar Breweries has paid tax u/s.115JA of the Act in earlier assessment years and that benefit is permissible u/s.115JA of the Act then that cannot be denied to the assessee simply for the reason that M/s. Charminar Breweries is not in existence. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in placing his implicit reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court. In principle we allow this ground of appeal of the assessee, set aside the issue to the file of A.O for verification of the taxes paid by M/ s. Charminar Breweries and how that benefit would devolve upon the assessee. The AO shall verify the details and then grant the benefit to the assessee.”

8. The rationale for allowing credit in respect of taxes paid under MAT, as per the memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Bill, 1997 [224 ITR (St.) 26] and as per Para 45.4 of CBDT Circular No. 763, dated 18-2-1998 [230 ITR (St.) 54] is that a company should always pay a minimum tax even while offsetting the MAT credit against regular tax. The objective of the said provision is to allow relief in respect of tax paid under MAT regime. It is a settled law that provisions granting exemptions and relief should be interpreted liberally so as to advance the objective and not to frustrate it. [Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. cit, [199] 196 ITR 188 (SC)]. Thus, MAT credit of X Ltd., on amalgamation with Y Ltd., should be available for carry forward and set off in the hands of the fatter company.

9. It is also a settled law that when there is any genuine doubt about the interpretation of a fiscal statute or where two opinions are capable of being formed then, that rule of interpretation which is favourable to the assessee is to be preferred. [CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd., [1973] 88 ITR 192 (SC)]

10. Going by the rationale of S. 115 JAA, one could contend that the MAT credit of amalgamating company can be set off by the amalgamated company. One could contend that in the process of amalgamation, one company loses its identity and would be merged with the other company. It could be contended that MAT credit, if utilised by the amalgamated company, would not result in any excessive relief.

11. Denial of carry forward and set off of MAT credit of an amalgamating company to an amalgamated company would be against the legislative intention and reasonable or purposive interpretation of S. 115JB and S. 115JAA. There would be no excessive relief or double deduction if amalgamated company is allowed to carry forward and set off MAT credit of amalgamating company. As explained earlier, MAT credit represents that portion of tax which was not actually payable by the company but has all the same been collected by the Government. [CIT v. [indal Exports Ltd., [2009] 314 ITR 137 (Del.)] If amalgamated company is denied the benefit of carry forward and set off of MAT credit of amalgamating company, it could be termed unauthorised collection of taxes by the Government. Reliance may be placed on the decision in Escorts Ltd. v. DCIT, (2007) 15 SOT 368 (Del.) wherein it was observed that if no credit of TDS is to be given to the payee/ deductee, the Government would have no authority to treat the same as tax and Article 265 does not empower the Government to make any levy or collection of tax not authorised by law.

It is settled law that where strict literal construction leads to injustice or a result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation, then an equitable construction should be preferred over the strict literal construction. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the court might modify the language used by the legislature so as to achieve the intention of the legislature and produce a rational result.

The task of interpretation of a statutory provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the legislature from the language used. Language is an imper-fect instrument for the expression of human intention. Statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish and a sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.

Though equity and taxation are often strangers, attempts should be made that these do not remain always so and if a construction results in equity rather than in injustice, then such construction should be preferred to the literal construction. [CIT v. Gotla, (J.H) [1985] 156 ITR 323 (SC); K. P. Varghese v. ITO, [1981] 131 ITR 597 (SC)]

12. In the process of interpretation of statutes, the maxim ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ is a valuable servant but a dangerous master. [Smith’s Judicial review of Administrative Action, Fourth edition page 187; Colquhoun v. Brooks, [1888] 21 QBD 52 (CA); Devidas v. UOI, (1993) 200 ITR 697 (Born.); Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. v. CIT(A), (1994) 210 ITR 0485 (Born.); CWT v. Dungarmal Tainwala, (1991) 191 ITR 0445 (PAT); Nathuram Weljibhai Vyas v. Mrs. Laxmibai Lunkaranji Chandak, (1983) 139 ITR 0948 (Born);ACCE v. National TobaccoCo. of India Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563.] The exclusion (in a legislature) is often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied, when its application, having regard to the subject-matter to which it is to be applied, leads to inconsistency or injustice. [Devidas v. UOI, (1993) 200 ITR 697 (Born.)] In ACCE v. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2563 [decision referred to in 139 ITR 0948 (supra)] it was observed that the rule of ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ is subservient to the basic principle that courts must endeavour to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose, and then adopt a rule of construction which effectuates rather than one that defeats these principles.

In view of the above, the maxim ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ should not be considered for denying the benefit of carry forward and set off of MAT credit of amalgamating company to amalgamated company.

Conclusion:

The reasons in support of and also against the issue under consideration have been set out above. The reasons in support of the argument that, amal-gamated company can claim MAT credit of amal-gamating company after merger, appears to be reasonable. Such conclusion would also be in accord with the purposive interpretation of the relevant provision. However, the tax authorities may be reluctant to allow MAT credit of the amalgamating company to amalgamated company. This may entail a tax demand and other consequences such as levy of interest and penalty on the amalgamated company. To avoid the levy of interest, one may take a pro-revenue stand while paying taxes, but adopt the liberal view while filing returns.

It may be noted that Para 13.10 of the discussion paper on Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2009 states that under the proposed code, MAT will be a final tax and therefore it will not be allowed to be carried forward for claiming tax credit in subsequent years.

Windmills — Stormy issues

Article

Introduction :


In recent times, companies have been installing windmills
mainly for two reasons (a) to garner green electrical energy from
non-conventional sources availing various incentives offered by the government,
and (b) as a tax planning measure due to availability of higher depreciation and
tax-free income for ten years u/s.80-IA. Many issues arise while availing tax
benefits u/s.80-IA. This article attempts to highlight the main issue of
notional carry forward and set-off of loss from eligible undertaking. Though
‘windmill’ is taken as the ‘eligible undertaking’ as an example, the discussion
is applicable for all other undertakings u/s.80-IA. The discussion is based on
the recent order of the Madras High Court in the case of

Velayudhaswamy
Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. v. ACIT,
(2010) 38 DTR 57.

Notional brought forward of loss of the earlier years
u/s.80-IA(5) :

This is an important issue in determining the eligible profit
of the windmill and the available period of deduction u/s.80-IA. The provisions
of S. 80-IA(5) are analysed accepting that the notional loss is to be set off
and that the provisions of S. 80-IA (5) are not redundant.

The Income-tax Act provides for deduction of 100% of income
of a windmill u/s.80-IA for a period of ten consecutive years out of fifteen
years. One possible interpretation is that the loss of the undertaking of the
windmill from the year in which it starts generating electricity is to be
notionally carried forward for setting off against the profits from windmill in
the subsequent years and only after the entire loss is absorbed by the income
from windmill, deduction u/s.80IA is available. The other interpretation is that
only the loss incurred in any year after first time deduction is claimed is
required to be set off before deduction can be claimed in any subsequent year.

Analysis of S. 80-IA(5) :

S. 80-IA(5) reads as under :

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision
of this Act, the profits and gains of an eligible business to which the
provisions of Ss.(1) apply shall for the purpose of determining the quantum of
deduction under that sub-section for the assessment year immediately
succeeding the initial assessment year
or any subsequent assessment year,
be computed as if such eligible business were the only source of income of
the assessee during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year
and to every subsequent assessment year up to and including the assessment
year for which the determination is to be made.” (Emphasis supplied)

The provision is analysed with the following example :



  •  The assessee has a spinning mill division.



  •  It has installed windmill (windmill division) which is eligible for deduction
    u/s.80-IA in A.Y. 2002-03 (first year of generation of power).



  • The loss from windmill division has been set off against the profit of the
    spinning mill division for the first three years.



  •  As there was loss from the windmill division, no deduction has been claimed
    u/s.80-IA for these three years i.e., till A.Y. 2004-05.



  • When the operations of the windmill division resulted in profit after setting
    of its loss against the profit of the spinning mill division, the assessee
    claimed deduction u/s.80-IA from the fourth year i.e. A.Y. 2005-06
    (first year of claim).



Method I :

One method of working would be to treat the windmill division
as the only source of income from the first year, notionally carry forward the
loss including the unabsorbed depreciation and set off against the income from
windmill division till that entire loss is fully set off and then start claiming
deduction u/s.80-IA. Working of the total income of the assessee in that case is
given in Table 1
.

Method II :

Other alternative would be to set off the loss of windmill
division against the income from the spinning mill division and once the loss of
windmill is fully set off against either income from the windmill or the
spinning mill division, then start claiming deduction u/s.80-IA. By this method,
the assessee would be in an advantageous position since he can claim the
deduction in respect of windmill from an earlier point of time and also for the
entire period of ten consecutive years within the span of 15 years. Working
under this method is given in Table 2.

Particulars

31-3-2004

 

 

31-3-2005

31-3-2006

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Windmill

Spinning
mill

Windmill

Spinning mill

Windmill

Spinning mill

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Taxable income before depreciation

25

350

 

60

400

70

450

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Depreciation on windmill

(220)

—

(48)

 

(10)

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Less
: Loss
adjusted (+)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Earlier loss of 20/-

(195+20)

(215)

 

 

(12)

—

(60)

—

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Net income

Nil

135

 

 

Nil

400+60

Nil

450+70

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Less
:
Deduction u/s.80-IA

Nil

Nil

 

Nil

0

Nil

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total income

 

135

 

0

460

0

520

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TAble
2
(Refer
Method II)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Particulars

31-3-2004

 

 

31-3-2005

31-3-2006

 

 

 

 

 

(First year of 80-IA claim)

(Second year of claim)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Windmill

Spinning
mill

Windmill

Spinning mill

Windmill

Spinning mill

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Taxable income before depreciation

25

350

 

60

400

70

450

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Depreciation on windmill

(220)

—

(48)

 

(10)

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Less
: Loss +
Earlier loss 20/-

(195+20)

(215)

 

 

Nil

—

Nil

—

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Net income

Nil

135

 

12

400

60

450

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Less
:
Deduction u/s.80-IA

Nil

Nil

(12)

0

(60)

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total income

 

135

 

0

400

0

 

450

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Issues :

The question here is which method is the correct one for
claiming deduction u/s.80-IA in respect of income from the windmill. In order to
analyse this further, we may consider the following issues :

1. Whether the ‘initial assessment year’ referred in S.
80-IA(5) is the first year of commencement of production or the first year
claim of deduction u/s.80-IA ?

2. Whether the fiction, namely, ‘eligible business was the
only source of income’ u/s.80-IA(5) is to be applied only from the second year
of the claim or from the second year of the commencement of operation of the
windmill?


Issue 1 : Initial Assessment Year :

S. 80-IA as it stands presently does not define the term
‘initial assessment year’. However, S. 80-IA as it stood prior to
31-3-2000, defined the term ‘initial assessment year’ basically in two ways
depending on the type of deduction available. Erstwhile S. 80-IA provided for
the following two types of deductions :



(i) Ten or fixed consecutive years starting from the first
year of commencement — like an undertaking engaged in cold storage plant, ship
or hotel;

    ii) Ten years out of twelve/fifteen years starting from the first year of commencement — like an undertaking engaged in the business of developing, maintaining and operating any infrastructure facility;

For undertakings falling under (i) above, the initial assessment year was defined as the first year of commencement of production or operation pursuant to the definition under erstwhile S. 80IA(12)(c)(1), (3), (4) and (5). For undertakings falling under above, the initial assessment year was defined to be the first year of claim under erstwhile S. 80-IA(12)(c)(2) which reads as under:

“Initial assessment year, in the case of an enterprise carrying on the business of developing infrastructure facility means the assessment year specified by the assessee at his option to be the initial assessment year not falling beyond twelfth assessment year starting from the previous year in which the enterprise begins operating and maintaining the infrastructure facility.” (Emphasis supplied)

Relevant contents of erstwhile S. 80-IA (12) are tabulated in Table 3.

Power-generating undertakings, namely, windmills are similar to category (2) of the above viz. infrastructure facilities and accordingly the initial assessment year in the case of windmills should be the first year of claim.

New S. 80-IA w.e.f. 1-4-2000:

The Finance Act, 1999, w.e.f 1-4-2000 substituted the erstwhile section S. 80-IA with two sections, namely, 80-IA and 80-IB. While doing so, the undertakings originally eligible for deduction for a fixed block of years like the one stated in clause (i) above, namely, the cold storage plant, ships, etc. are covered by S. 80-IB and undertakings which have the option to claim deduction for ten consecutive years within a block of twelve or fifteen years, like the infrastructure undertakings, are retained under the new S. 80-IA. A brief comparison is given in Table 4.

Contents of Form 10CCB:

 

Sub-cl.

Nature of undertaking — Ss.(4)

Period of deduction — Ss.(6)

Initial Asst. Year — Ss.(12)(c)

 

(12)(c)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(1)

Cold storage plant, ship or hotel

Ten years

Year in which it begins to

 

 

 

 

manufacture

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2)

Infrastructure facility

Ten out of Twelve years

Year specified by the as–

 

 

 

 

sessee at his option

 

 

 

 

 

 

(3)

Scientific research

Five years

Year of approval by the

 

 

 

 

prescribed authority

 

 

 

 

 

 

(4)

Telecommunication service

Ten years

Year in which service

 

 

 

 

begins

 

 

 

 

 

 

(5)

Industrial park

Ten years

Year of starting of the

 

 

 

 

park

 

 

 

 

 

 

(6)

Production of mineral oil

Seven years

Year of commencement of

 

 

 

 

commercial production

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table
4

 

 

 

 

Erstwhile
S. 80-IA effective up to

Present
S. 80-IA

New
80-IB (Similar to old 80-IA)

31.3.2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Eligible period of
deduction  var-

Deduction is available for ten

Eligible period of deduction

ied from undertaking to
under-

years in a block of
fifteen years

varies from undertaking
to un-

taking, industry to industry.

for all undertakings
(Ss.2).

dertaking.

 

 

 

Initial assessment year varied

Not defined.

Initial assessment year is de-

from
undertaking to undertaking

 

fined for each type
of undertak
–

as defined in
Ss.(12)(c).

 

ing separately.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Whenever a confusion of this kind arises, a reference to the form prescribed may at times throw more light to clarify the confusion. In the present case also, the contents and language of Form 10CCB are relevant. Relevant extracts from Form 10CCB, under the Rule 18BBB are reproduced below:

    Clause 8 — “Date of commencement of operation/activity by the undertaking”

    Clause 9 — “initial assessment year from when the deduction is being claimed”.

From the above clauses it is clear that the term the ‘initial assessment year’ under the present S. 80-IA is the first year of claim and not the first year of operation/commencement of production.

Issue 2: Applicability of the fiction u/s.80-IA(5):

There is no dispute that Ss.(5) creates a fiction. The fiction mandates a notional carry forward of loss from eligible business presuming that the eligible business is the only source of income. The moot issue is the year of applicability of the fiction.

For easy analysis, Ss.(5) is divided into phrases as below:

    a) for the purpose of determining the quantum of deduction;

    b) for the assessment year immediately succeeding the initial assessment year;

    c) eligible business was the only source of income;

    d) during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year;
    e) and to every subsequent assessment year up to and including the assessment year for which the determination is to be made;

Phrase (c) introduces the fiction ‘eligible business was the only source of income’ and phrase (d) provides for its applicability ‘during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year’. Phrases (c) and (d) collectively mean that the loss of the years commencing from the initial assessment year (i.e., the first year of claim) alone is to be notionally carried forward and not losses of the years prior to the initial assessment year.

Phrases (a) and (b) provide that when the determination of quantum of deduction is to be made for any year from the second year of the claim (year after the initial assessment year), it is only the loss of that year and subsequent years that is required to be set off against the profit of the eligible business and not the loss for any earlier year including the initial assessment year.

Therefore, loss from the eligible business in the years prior to the initial assessment year absorbed against the profits of other businesses need not be notionally brought forward and has no effect on the deduction claimed.

Accordingly, the fiction u/s.80-IA(5) is applicable only from the second year of claim and not prior to it. The true intention of Ss.(5) can be easily understood by imagining the absence of it. For example, where the assessee has claimed deduction u/s.80-IA for three years and there is a loss in the 4th year of claim in a block of ten years, in the absence of Ss.(5), the assessee can continue to claim full deduction on the profit from the 5th year ignoring loss incurred in the 4th year if it has been set off against any other income. By virtue of the fiction in Ss.(5), the loss of the 4th year is to be set off against the income before claiming deduction for the 5th year. Therefore, Ss.(5) will operate only during the period of ten years of claim and only from the second year of the claim. Ss.(5) is thus not rendered redundant.

Further grounds to support the above view are:

    i) In the example above, the year in which the eligible undertaking u/s.80-IA began generation of power is the year A.Y. 2002-03. But the assessee exercised the option to claim deduction u/s. 80-IA(2) in the A.Y. 2005-06. This is the year from which the assessee is governed by S. 80-IA. Prior to that, the provisions of the Section had no applicability in the assessee’s case.

    ii) The expression ‘initial assessment year’ is not defined in the present S. 80-IA. Even so, logically it has to be the previous year in which the assessee is first governed by S. 80-IA i.e., the year in which the option is exercised u/s.80-IA(2). As a corollary, it will be illogical to state that the year of commencement of operation or set up of infrastructure, or generation of power, as the case may be, referred to in Ss.(2) is the ‘initial assessment year’.

    iii) The Legislature has consciously used different and contrasting expressions in the different sub-sections of S. 80-IA. Ss.(2) inter alia, speaks of any ‘ten consecutive assessment years’ out of fifteen years beginning from the year in which the undertaking or the enterprise develops and begins to operate any infrastructure facility or starts providing telecommunication service or develops or generates power.

S. 80-IA(5) refers to the year of exercise of option. It is referred to as ‘the initial assessment year’. It uses the words ‘during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year’. U/ss.(5), the eligible business has to be one “to which the provisions of Ss.(1) apply”. Further, the words are “for the purposes of determining the quantum of deduction under that sub-section for the assessment year immediately succeeding the initial assessment year”. When words of import are used in the provisions of the statute, they are intended to convey different senses. (AIR 1956 SC 35 AIR 1989 SC 836)

iv) U/ss.(5), there is no ‘initial assessment year’ unless the provisions of Ss.(1) apply, i.e., unless the option has been exercised U/ss.(2). The determination of quantum of deduction U/ss.(1) is for the assessment year immediately succeeding the initial assessment year or any subsequent assessment year and every sub-sequent year. Therefore, ‘initial assessment year’ employed in Ss.(5) is different from the year ‘beginning from the year’ referred to in Ss.(2).

v) The fiction u/s.80-IA(5) to the effect that “as if such eligible business was the only source of income of the assessee during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year and every subsequent year” is to be confined to ten consecutive years beginning from the initial assessment year and to every subsequent year. The word ‘during’ connotes a period of time. Fiction U/ss.(5) operates in the ‘initial assessment year’ i.e., the year of option and runs for ten consecutive years. Without the option, there is no initial assessment year for S. 80-IA.

vi) To support the other interpretation of Ss.(5), the sub-section should have read as under: [blending Ss.(5) and Ss.(2)]

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, the profits and gains of an eligible business to which the provisions of Ss.(1) apply shall, for the purposes of determining the quantum of deduction under that sub-section for the assessment year immediately succeeding the initial assessment year or any subsequent assessment year, be computed as if such eligible business was the only source of income of the assessee for ten consecutive assessment years out of fifteen years beginning from the year in which the undertaking or the enterprise develops and begins to operate any infrastructure facility or starts providing telecommunication service or develops an industrial park or develops a special economic zone referred to in clause (iii) of Ss.(4) or generates power or commences transmission or distribution of power or under-takes substantial renovation and modernisation of the existing transmission or distribution lines” [Adopting the lines in Ss.(2)].

    vii) The fiction in Ss.(5) is limited to assuming that, during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year, the eligible business is the only source of income. The provision looks forward to a period of ten years from the initial assessment year (year of option). The fiction does not look backwards to the year beginning, referred to in Ss.(2). In construing a fiction, it is impermissible to invoke a further fiction or enlarge the same.

[AIR 1966 SC 870; AIR 1963 SC 448 1996 (2) SCC 449]

Judicial precedents:

Mohan Breweries v. ACIT, 116 ITTD 241 (Chennai) — This case pertains to A.Y. 2004-05 (i.e., after the amendment of S. 80-IA by the Finance Act 1999), In this case, the Madras Tribunal has held that the initial assessment year is the first year of claim and 80-IA itself becomes applicable only when the assessee makes the claim for the first time and not before that.

ACIT v. Goldmine Shares and Finance P Ltd., 113 ITD 209 (Ahd.) (SB) — In this case, the undertaking had been set up prior to 31-3- 2000. The Special Bench held that before claiming deduction, the losses of the earlier years (i.e., the first year of commencement of business being the initial assessment year) are to be brought forward notionally and set off against the income of the current year. It placed reliance on the Circular 281, dated 22-9-1980. How-ever, the ratio of this decision and the said Circular are relevant for undertakings set up till 31-3-2000 and not for those set up on or after 1-4-2000. When the Mohan Breweries case was referred before the Special Bench, the Tribunal distinguished it on facts. It pointed out that the assessee, Goldmine Shares had claimed deduction in the year of setting up of undertaking itself and whereas in Mohan Breweries case, the year of claim was after the year of setting up of the undertaking.

Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. Vs. ACIT (2010 38 DTR (Mad) 57)

The Madras High Court considered both the above decisions. It held that provision of S. 80-IA(5), treating eligible undertaking as a separate sole source of income, is applicable only when the assessee chooses to claim deduction under S. 80-IA and same cannot be applied to a year prior to the year in which assessee opted to claim relief under S. 80-IA for the first time. As initial year is not defined in S. 80-IA, the year of option has to be treated as the initial assessment year for the purpose of S. 80-IA.

To sum up:

    1. The initial assessment year in the case of an eligible undertaking is the first year of claim of deduction u/s.80-IA and not the first year of operation of the undertaking.

    2. The fiction of notional carry forward of loss u/s.80-IA(5) does exist, but operates only from the initial assessment year, i.e., from the first year of claim and thereafter and is not applicable in the earlier years.

    3. The Special Bench decision in the case of Goldmine Shares is clearly distinguishable given the fact that it was rendered in the context of erstwhile 80-IA which ceased to be effective from 1-4-2000.

European Holding Company — Choosing the right jurisdiction

Article

Investing abroad through a holding company is necessary as
the tax laws of India do not provide any relief on investment income.
Repatriation of dividends to India is not efficient from a tax point of view as
dividends from overseas subsidiaries are generally taxed in India on a net basis
without any credit for underlying foreign taxes paid on the profits of the
paying company. Indian taxes can be deferred on the profits from the investments
abroad through the use of a holding company located in an appropriate
jurisdiction. There are several factors which need to be considered while
determining the holding company jurisdiction.


At a broad level, the key factors to be considered while
selecting an appropriate holding company jurisdiction are :

1. Tax regime — Generally, the source of income for
a holding company is dividend and capital gains. Preferred holding company
jurisdictions either follow a participation exemption regime or a tax credit
regime; which eliminates/reduces taxes on dividend and capital gains. Further,
transaction costs like stamp duty on issue or transfer of shares, thin
capitalisation norms which govern interest deductibility, ability to carry
forward interest costs for set-off against future taxable income, etc. are
also important while selecting an appropriate holding company jurisdiction.

2. Tax treaty network — It is imperative that the
holding company jurisdiction has a good tax treaty network, especially with
respect to the target company jurisdiction. A good tax treaty network is
essential to optimise on withholding tax incidence on dividend and capital
gains tax originating from the target company jurisdiction.

3. Economic and political stability — Investments
are generally made with a long-term vision. Thus, political and economic
stability of the country is very critical for deciding on the holding company
jurisdiction. In addition to political and economic stability, a stable tax
regime is also very important. Frequent changes in the tax law
do not ensure confidence in the mind of investor.

4. Regulatory environment — Considering the role of
a holding company i.e., to make and manage overseas investments, a
liberal regulatory environment in the holding company jurisdiction is also
essential.

5. Financial environment — Flexibility in raising
funds is of importance for the taxpayer. The financial environment in the
holding company jurisdiction should be sound so as to enable fund raising in
that jurisdiction.


In the following paragraphs we shall discuss some of the
popular holding jurisdictions in Europe in greater detail.

The Netherlands :

General :

The Netherlands is increasingly being used as a holding
company jurisdiction in view of favorable tax regime. A company which is
considered to be tax resident in the Netherlands is subject to tax on its
worldwide income. Non-resident companies are liable to tax on specific source of
income in the Netherlands.

The Netherlands has an extensive tax treaty network. It has
entered into tax treaties with more than 75 countries covering most of the
developed countries. To name a few, it has tax treaties in force with the USA,
the UK, Russia, Germany, India, China, Singapore, etc.

The standard corporate tax rate in the Netherlands varies,
based on the income slab as under :

Income slab
Tax rate
Up to Euro
40,000
20%
Euro 40,000 to
Euro 200,000
23%
Above Euro
200,000
25.5%

Taxation of holding companies :

Dividend and capital gains :

The Netherlands has participation exemption which exempts
dividend and capital gains on qualifying participation. Participation Exemption
covers not only cash dividends, but also stock dividends, bonus shares,
dividends in kind, and hidden profit distributions, as well as foreign exchange
gains and capital gains realised on the disposal of a qualifying shareholding.
The participation exemption is not only limited to resident shareholders but
may, in principle, also apply to a Dutch permanent establishment to which the
shareholding can be attributed.

There are certain qualifying conditions which need to be
fulfilled so as to avail the participation exemption benefit. The following
tests need to be satisfied in this regard :


  • Ownership test, and



  • Asset test



Ownership test :

The ownership test essentially requires a participation of at
least 5% in the nominal paid-up share capital of an active investee company. A
participation of less than 5% may also be considered as a qualifying
participation, provided another group entity owns a stake of at least 5% in the
active investee company.

Asset test:

The asset test provides that the participation exemption does not apply to low-taxed investment participations. A low-taxed investment participation is a participation which fulfils the following conditions :

  • more than 50% of the assets of the participation, directly or indirectly, consist of free portfolio investments; and
  • the participation is not subject to tax on profits at an effective rate of at least 10%, determined in accordance with the Netherlands standards.


While determining whether more than 50% of the assets consist of portfolio investment, the fair market value of such assets is taken into consideration.

Portfolio investments are generally considered free if the investments are not used in the course of the business of the company.

It is, therefore, essential to evaluate that both the aforesaid tests are satisfied so as to avail the benefit of participation exemption in the Netherlands.

Withholding tax:

Dividend:

Dividend  paid by a Netherlands resident  company to a non-resident shareholder is subject to withholding tax in the Netherlands. The standard rate of withholding tax on outgoing dividend is 15%, unless a lower rate is prescribed under the relevant tax treaty. The aforesaid withholding tax rate could be reduced to 0% under the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive.

This Directive is aimed at eliminating tax obstacles in the area of profit distributions between groups of companies in the EU by :

  •  abolishing withholding taxes on payments of dividends between associated companies of different Member States; and
  •  preventing double taxation of parent companies on the profits of their subsidiaries.


With this Directive, dividend can flow from one EU member state to another EU member state without any withholding tax incidence. However, there are certain conditions regarding the form of entity and minimum participation for availing the benefit of the aforesaid Directive. In addition to the above, the member countries may mutually agree on certain other conditions/ obligations to be fulfilled for grant-ing the benefit of the said Directive.

The Netherlands, being an EU member state, is eligible to avail the benefit of the aforesaid Directive. This, effectively, means that dividend received by a Netherlands holding company from its EU subsidiary may not be subject to any withholding tax in the source country. However, as mentioned herein-above, it is essential that all conditions as agreed between the Netherlands and the respective country for granting benefit of the Directive are fulfilled.

Interest:

There is no withholding tax on interest in the Netherlands. However, it is essential to evaluate the features of the loan instrument so as to ensure that it does not qualify as equity. In case, it is considered as equity, interest payment could be considered as deemed dividend liable to withholding tax, if applicable.

Thin capitalisation  rules:

There are thin capitalisation rules in the Netherlands. Thin capitalisation rules effectively restrict the deductibility of interest paid to related entities if the company is excessively debt financed. The safe-harbour debt: equity ratio in the Netherlands is around 3 : 1. The net interest attributable to the debt that is more than this ratio is treated as non-deductible, up to a maximum of the interest paid to related entities.

Alternatively, the company can elect to apply for the group ratio. Under this alternative, the company can look at the consolidated debt to equity ratio of the group of which it is a member. If the company’ debt to equity ratio does not exceed the consolidated ratio, the interest paid to related party is not disallowed.

Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) :

CFC regulations are aimed at eliminating the benefits of deferral, by currently taxing income in the parent country even when the income has not been repatriated or remitted to that country. The Netherlands does not currently have specific CFC regulations.

Capital duty:

Capital duty is a duty levied on capital contribution. Currently, there is no capital duty in the Netherlands.

Cyprus:

General:

As a former British colony, Cyprus follows the common law system and is, in many ways, influenced by the legal system of the United Kingdom. Resident companies are taxed on worldwide income. Cyprus has tax treaty with around 35 countries. Among others, it has tax treaties in force with Canada, Germany, India, Mauritius, Russia, the US and the UK.

The standard rate of (Corporate) income-tax on taxable income realised by Cypriot corporate taxpayers is 10%. In addition to income-tax, there is also a. levy of Special Contribution for the Defence of the Republic (‘Defence Tax’) on certain types of income. The rate of Defence Tax varies from 3% to 15% de-pending on the nature of income. Defence Tax is a tax -levied on income rather than on profits and as such (business) expenses incurred for the production of the income are not deductible for Defence Tax purposes.

Capital Gains Tax at a rate of 20% is levied on profits from disposal of immovable property situated in Cyprus or of shares in companies which have immovable property situated in Cyprus (unless the shares  are listed  on a recognised stock exchange).

Taxation of holding companies:

Dividend    income:

Cypriot (Corporate) Income Tax law provides for an exemption of dividends received by Cyprus resident corporate taxpayers, irrespective of the holding period. Thus, dividend income is not liable to tax in Cyprus corporate tax.

In addition, Defence Tax is levied at a rate of 15% on dividends received by resident companies from foreign companies. However, there is a participation exemption from levy of Defence Tax on fulfilment of the following conditions:

  • Dividends are exempt from the levy of this Defence Tax if the recipient holds at least 1% of the share capital of the dividend paying company (‘participation exemption threshold’);


and

  • Dividend paying company does not derive 50% or more of its income directly or indirectly from activities which lead to investment income (‘active versus passive income test’);


or

  • the foreign tax burden on the profit to be distributed as dividend is not substantially lower than the Cypriot corporate income tax rate (i.e., lower than 5%) at the level of the dividend paying company (‘effective minimum foreign tax test’).


Only one of the two tests as mentioned above need to be met in order for the (participation) exemption to apply.

Investment income mentioned hereinabove normally includes (portfolio) dividend income, licensing income, interest income (unless the dividend paying company is a financial institution or a group financing company), rental income from immovable property (unless a real estate portfolio is actively and professionally managed) and certain capital gains.

Capital  gains:

There is no capital gains tax in Cyprus except on gains derived from sale of immovable property or sale of shares, which derives underlying value from immovable property in Cyprus (unless such shares are listed). This exemption applies irrespective of the holding period, number of shares held or trading nature of the gain. Capital losses resulting from the sale of securities are not tax deductible.

Withholding tax:

Dividend  and  interest:

Cyprus does not levy any withholding taxes on dividend or interest payments from Cypriot tax resident companies to non-tax residents.

Thin capitalisation    rules:

There are no thin capitalisation rules in Cyprus. Thus, there is no safe-harbour rule which prescribes the permissible debt: equity ratio of the Cypriot company.

Controlled Foreign Company  (CFC):

Cyprus does not have CFC regulations. This means that the earnings of the passive subsidiary of Cypriot holding company need not be included in the income of Cypriot holding company, unless such earnings are actually distributed.

Capital  duty:

There is a capital duty (registration fee) payable upon incorporation of a Cypriot company. The registration fee payable is calculated at around 0.6% of the registered authorised share capital. It is possible to optimise the capital duty incidence through appropriate structuring of the capital structure.

Switzerland:

General:

Switzerland is located in the heart of Europe. It has become an attractive destination for holding company due to its favourable tax regime. Switzerland has extensive tax treaty with around 70 countries. It has concluded tax treaties with most of the European and developed countries. It has concluded tax treaties with the US, the UK, Russia, India, Canada, etc.

Switzerland is a confederation of 26 cantons. Swiss corporations are generally taxed on their income at federal level as well as at cantonal level. As a result of this multilayer tax’ rates, no standard cantonal tax rates exist. The tax rate could vary from 12.5% to 24.5% depending on the canton. This rate includes the effective federal tax rate of 7.8%.

Taxation  of holding companies:

Dividend  and capital gains:

In Switzerland, companies of which  assets consist mostly of participations can benefit from lower income taxes on federal as well as on cantonal! communal level if certain requirements are met.

Cantonal level:

The tax laws of all Swiss cantons have a special privileged tax regime (holding privilege) for companies whose main objective is to hold substantial investments in the capital of other corporations.

Hence, their income essentially comprises dividend income and their main assets are participations.

The following conditions need to be fulfilled to qualify as a holding company for cantonal income tax purposes:

  • The statutes of the corporation should mention that the main activity of the company is the long-term management of equity investments in different companies. The corporation has no business activity in Switzerland.
  • In the long term, the participations should cover two-thirds of the assets or the derived income (dividends) should represent at least two-thirds of the total income.


There is no income tax at the cantonal level if a company meets the requirements of a holding company. In effect, dividend and capital gains earned by such company are not liable to cantonal tax.

Federal  level:

At a federal level, no holding privilege is available. All income is subject to an effective federal income tax rate of 7.8%. However, income derived from qualifying participations is subject to the participation deduction. The participation income is not exempt, but the income tax is decreased according to a certain percentage. The participation exemption is not a special tax status, but has the aim to avoid economical double taxation.

The following conditions need to be satisfied to avail the participation deduction:

  • Participation  deduction  company  must own at least 20% of the capital of another  company; or
  • Participations must have a fair market value of CHF 2 million.

If one of these requirements is met, the profit tax is reduced in proportion to the net income from these participations and the total income. Net income is computed in the prescribed manner.

For dividend income purposes there is no minimum holding period requirement. However, the following additional conditions need to be satisfied for participation deduction on capital gains:

  • Capital gains should arise from sale of participation of at least 20% of the equity (capital stock) of the company; and


  • such shares must have been held for a minimum period of 1 year.

 
Withholding tax:

Dividend:

Dividend paid by a Swiss resident company to a non-resident shareholder is subject to withholding tax in Switzerland. The standard rate of withholding tax on outgoing dividend is 35% unless a lower rate is prescribed under the relevant tax treaty. Most of the tax treaties entered into by Switzerland provide for 5% or 10% tax rate on dividend income.

The aforesaid withholding tax rate could be reduced to 0% under the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive benefit. Though Switzerland is not a member of EU, certain EU member countries have extended the benefit of the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive to Swiss resident companies. On remitting dividend to another EU member state, it is essential to evaluate if the aforesaid Directive is in force with respect to that country and the conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled.

Interest:

Swiss law differentiates between ordinary loans of a Swiss borrower and bonds (for example, cash bonds or money market instruments) issued by Swiss residents or accounts/client deposits at a Swiss bank. Interest payments on ordinary loans are not subject to withholding tax, whereas interest payments on Swiss bonds and on accounts/deposits at Swiss banks are subject to withholding tax. The standard rate of withholding tax on interest is 35% unless the tax treaty provides for a lesser rate.

Further, the aforesaid withholding tax rate could be reduced to 0% under the EU Interest & Royalties Directive. As mentioned hereinabove, though Switzerland is not a member of EU, certain EU member countries have extended the benefit of the EU Interest & Royalties Directive to Swiss resident companies. On remitting interest to another EU member state, it is essential to evaluate if the aforesaid Directive is in force with respect to that country and the conditions prescribed therein  are fulfilled.

Thin capitalisation rules:

There are no specific thin capitalisation rules in Switzerland. However, the tax authorities have issued a circular specifying the maximum allowable debt. The circular defines the maximum permitted amount of debt financing per asset evaluated at market value. For example, 85% on participations, 70% on intangibles, etc.

Exceeding debts are reclassified as so-called hidden equity if and to the extent that they are granted by related parties. Interest on debt reclassified as hidden equity is not tax deductible for income tax purposes and qualifies as deemed dividend distribution, subject to Swiss withholding tax.

Controlled  Foreign Company  (CFC):

Switzerland does not have any CFC legislation. Thus, income from foreign subsidiaries is not subject to tax in Switzerland before actual distribution. Participation deduction on dividend income and on capital gain does not require any minimum taxation of the subsidiaries’ profits.

Capital  duty:

Switzerland levies capital duty on infusion of capital. Capital duty is assessed at an ordinary rate of 1% on the fair market value of any capital in excess of CHF 1 million. There are ways to optimise the capital duty incidence in Switzerland e.g., re-organisation exemption mechanism, etc.

Luxembourg:

General:

Luxembourg is the smallest of all BENELUX countries. In fact, Luxembourg was one of the first to introduce ‘holding’ companies back in 1929. Although the 1929 holding companies can no longer be incorporated due to pressure from the EU, Luxembourg continues to be an attractive jurisdiction for holding companies. Luxembourg has concluded tax treaties with almost 50 countries. Among the prominent countries, Luxembourg has concluded tax treaties with the US, the UK, Canada, Russia, and Germany. Luxembourg has recently signed tax treaty with India.

The corporate tax rate varies from 20% to 22% depending on the income level. In addition, a surcharge of 4% is payable to the unemployment fund.

A local income tax i.e., Municipal Business Tax (MBT)is also levied by different municipalities. MBT rate varies from municipality to municipality.

Taxation  of holding  companies:

Dividend  & Capital gains:

Dividends and capital gains received by a Luxembourg tax resident company are in principle subject to Corporate Income Tax (hereafter ‘CIT’) and MBT at an aggregate rate of approximately 30%. However, such income could be exempt from crr and MBT under the participation exemption regime in Luxembourg.

The conditions to be met for availing of participation exemption are as follows:

(i)    The recipient  is one of the following:

1.    A resident capital company or a qualifying entity fully subject to tax in Luxembourg;

2.    A Luxembourg branch (permanent establishment) of a company which is a resident of another EU state that is covered under Article 2 of the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive;

3.    A Luxembourg branch of a capital company which is a resident of a tax treaty country.

(ii)    The recipient owns at least 10% of the share capital of the distributing company or the cost of acquisition of the shareholding is Euro 1.2 million (for capital gains participation exemption, the requirement is Euro 6 million);

(iii)    Shares have been held for 12 months. If this period has not been completed as on the date of dividend distribution, the recipient should commit to fulfilling the holding period.

As regards international participation exemption, i.e., dividends/ capital gains received/ arising from non-resident companies, participation exemption is available, if in addition to the above conditions, either of the following two conditions is met:

(i)    The distributing capital company must be subject to a tax comparable to Luxembourg corporate tax in its home country. This condition should be met if the foreign company is subject to tax at an effective rate which is at least equal to half of the CIT (excluding unemployment surcharge); or

(ii)    The distributing entity is a resident of another EU country and is covered by Article 2 of the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive.
 

Withholding tax:

Dividend:

Dividends distributed by a Luxembourg company are in principle subject to withholding tax at a rate of 15%, unless the relevant tax treaty provides for a lesser rate.

The aforesaid rate could be reduced to 0% under the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive, subject to fulfilment of prescribed conditions.

Interest:

There is no withholding tax on ordinary interest paid to non-resident companies. The feature of the loan instrument needs to be evaluated to ensure that it is in the nature of debt and is not an equity or quasi-equity instrument. In that event, there could be withholding tax implications in Luxembourg.

Accessibility to EU Directives:

Luxembourg is a member of EU and is therefore eligible for the benefit of the EU Parent Subsidiary Directive and EU Interest & Royalties Directive on incoming dividend and interest income, respectively. However, the Luxembourg resident company must fulfil the conditions prescribed under the respective directive so as to avail the benefit.

Thin capitalisation rules:

There are no specific thin capitalisation rules in Luxembourg.

Controlled  Foreign Company  (CFC):

There are no CFC rules in Luxembourg.

Capital  duty:

Contribution of cash to the capital of a company in exchange for shares is subject to capital duty at the rate of 0.5%. The taxable base is the amount of cash contributed.

Summary  :

The summary of analysis of aforesaid holding company jurisdictions is given in Table 1 on the next page:

Conclusion:

The selection of European holding company jurisdiction is a function of multiple variables. Although all the countries discussed above provide for exemption from dividend and capital gain taxation, the conditions to be fulfilled under each jurisdiction differ.

For example, there is a minimum holding period requirement of one year and a higher threshold of participation for availing the capital gains tax participation exemption in case of Switzerland. In case of
 
Luxembourg and Cyprus there could be a possible capital duty incidence.

With the outbound investment activity increasing from India, there is a need for India to introduce a tax regime which facilitates the use of India as a holding jurisdiction.


4. CBDT notifies norms for procedure and criteria for compulsory manual selection of cases for scrutiny during Financial Year 2014-2015 – Instruction No. 6 dated 2nd September, 2014

4. CBDT notifies norms for procedure and criteria for compulsory manual selection of cases for scrutiny during Financial Year 2014-2015 – Instruction No. 6 dated 2nd September, 2014

CBDT    extends    the    due    date    for    filing    income    tax    returns    for  assessees who are liable to tax audit u/s. 44aB of the act  –    Order    u/s.    119    of    the    Act    –    File    no:    F.No.153/53/2014-TPL    (Pt.I)    dated    26th    September    2014

 The    Board    has    extended    the    due    date    for    filing    return    of income for assessees who are subject to tax audit from 30th     September     2014     to     30th     November     2014     in     line    with the extension of obtaining the tax audit report. it has been    clarified    in    the    order    that    interest    u/s.    234A    would    be leviable.  in all other cases the due date would remain   at 30-09-14

RBI governor issues warning on loan waivers

Reserve Bank of  India governor  Raghuram  Rajan has cautioned finance secretaries of state governments against debt waiver schemes as banks are already starved of capital. the warning came during a conference of the    state finance secretaries.

In the meeting, Rajan said that the debt waiver schemes announced by state governments have an adverse impact     on the financial health of banks. He added     that the banking sector’s capital needs have gone up due to enhanced prudential requirements and rise in bad loans due to the slowdown in the economy.

The RBI governor highlighted the challenges faced by the country last year in tackling the serious issues relating to    current    account    deficit    (CAD),    growth    slowdown, fiscal consolidation    and inflation management and steps taken to restore confidence in the macro economy of the country.    

He referred to the decline in financial savings and consequential challenges to debt management when growth and private sector credit would pick up.

Earlier,  RBI deputy governor  harun Khan focused on channelising financial savings with the formal financial    system — like bank deposits,     equity, fixed income    securities    and insurance products — for    efficient    financial    intermediation.  he stressed that more concerted and coordinated measures would be needed by the state government along with the national regulators to prevent flow     of  peoples’ savings     into unauthorized,     illegal     and unviable schemes by dubious entities.

Besides     Rajan, SEBI Chairman U. K. Sinha also addressed the conference. Sinha said that  recent changes in the SEBI Act enable it to control unauthorised deposit schemes.  he sought cooperation of the state governments in this initiative by conducting concerted investor awareness programmes and imparting training  to the officials. He suggested that States should enact depositors’ investor protection act and strengthen  the enforcement mechanism. he further sought co-operation of the State Governments in curbing “dabba trading.”

(Source: Times of India dated 26-08-2014)

2. Extension of due date of filing of the return of income – Order F. No. 225-268-2014-ITA.II dated 16th September, 2014

2. Extension of due date of filing of the return of income – Order F. No. 225-268-2014-ITA.II dated 16th September, 2014

Considering     the     large     scale     devastation     in     the     State    of     Jammu     and    Kashmir     due     to     heavy     rains     and     floods,    CBDT     has     extended     the     due-date     of     filing     Returns     of      Income     from     30th    September,     2014     to     30th    November, 2014,     in    cases    of     Income-tax    assessees     in     the    State    of Jammu and Kashmir.

3. Agreement for Avoidance of double taxation and Prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income between Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan enters into force on 17th July, 2014 – Notification No. 42 dated 5th September, 2014

3. Agreement for Avoidance of double taxation and Prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income between Government of the Republic of India and the Royal Government of Bhutan enters into force on 17th July, 2014 – Notification No. 42 dated 5th September, 2014

1. Agreement for Avoidance of double taxation and Prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income between Government of the Re-public of India and the Government of Republic of Fiji enters into force on 12th August 2014 – Notification No. 35/2014/F.No.503/11/2005/-FTD-11 dated 12th August, 2014

1. Agreement for Avoidance of double taxation and Prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to  taxes on income between Government of the Re-public of India and the Government of Republic of Fiji enters into force on 12th August 2014 – Notification No. 35/2014/F.No.503/11/2005/-FTD-11 dated 12th August, 2014