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MICROSOFT WORD TRICKS

Microsoft Word is one of the most overused and probably underutilised softwares across the board. There is so much to explore and discover to make our day-to-day working more productive. Let us see some of the daily-used tricks which make working on Word faster and more effective.

Inserting horizontal lines in Word is super simple, just enter a – (dash) 3 times and press enter and you will immediately get a horizontal line across the screen. If you want a different type of line, you can experiment with = or ~ or * or # and play around till you get what you want.

Inserting a symbol of copyright? Just use (c) and magically it will change to a copyright symbol like this ©. The same holds true for the Trade Mark symbol – enter ™ and watch it change to ™ instantly.

Para numbering in Word is something which all users MUST use. Here again, you start the first para with 1. and automatically it will start para numbering. This is most useful since it numbers all paragraphs serially and, most importantly, if you wish to rearrange your paragraphs, the numbering will change automatically. In cases where you have a large document and need to rearrange the paragraphs in multiple edits, it takes the load off renumbering the paras over and over again.

Writing fractions is very intuitive in Word. Just type it as you would want it – like 1 1/2 and it will transform into 1 ½ as you move ahead!

In all the above cases, be sure to press a space after each word to make it work seamlessly.

All accountants use Excel for Tables – we can’t live without Tables. But what if we need to insert a Table in a Word Document? There are several ways of doing this:

1. You could make a Table in Excel and Copy Paste it into Word directly. This is the easiest and most obvious. Moreover, you could make the pasted Table live in Word, meaning, if you make changes in your original Excel Sheet, the same changes would be reflected in your Word Document, live. This applies not only to Tables, but also to Graphs and Charts which are copy-pasted from Excel.
2. Creating a new Table in Word is also simple – just go to the Insert Menu and click on Table – it will show you a dummy table and you can move your mouse around and insert a Table with as many rows and columns as you like. The other option is to click on Insert Table and specify the rows and columns you want in the Table. In both cases, the Table will be inserted at the point where your cursor is currently located.
3. The next option under Insert Table is to Draw a Table manually. Just click and drag your mouse wherever you want the Table lines to be drawn, and automatically, Word will draw the Table for you.
4. Another way of inserting a Table in your document is to enter the following:
+———+————+———+ Press Enter
Here, the number of dashes that you insert will determine the width of each column. You may enter your data in the cells and move to each next cell with a Tab. When you reach the last column and press the Tab, automatically another row will be inserted and you may continue filling the cells. This way, you are not limited by the number of rows that you declare in the beginning, under the earlier methods.

Did you know that Word also allows you to sort a list of values or text or dates, one below the other? Just select the list and in the Paragraph Tab on the top, click on A?Z and voila! – Your list is sorted instantly.

In the Office 365 ecosystem, in Word Excel or PowerPoint, there is an inbuilt Clipboard which you can use across all the apps during each session and also across devices. On the Home Tab, under Clipboard in the right bottom corner, there is an arrow pointing diagonally downwards – just click on that arrow and you will get the entire clipboard history for your session.

Word and Windows also have the option to insert emojis in your documents in any text area. Just press the Windows Key + ; together and the possible emojis will pop up for you to select.

It is interesting to know that you can open most open PDFs directly in Word, and even edit them. This will work only if the PDF document is not password-protected or encrypted. However, it’s worth a try.

And if you want to share your document with others, just head to File-Transform and you will be able to publish your document on the web and share it with friends / colleagues / clients and the world at large. This could be very useful for quickly making an FAQs page or for collaboration and sharing large documents.

Now that you know what all Word can do, try these simple tricks and enhance your computing experience with Microsoft Word. Happy Wording!

FEMA FOCUS

(A) Amendment in Foreign Direct Investment Limits
The Government of India has liberalised its extant FDI policy and made a few changes in the sectoral caps for FDI in the insurance, petroleum and telecom sectors. These changes are explained as under:

Sr. No.

Sector / Activity

% of Equity / FDI Cap

Entry route

Erstwhile limit

New limit

1

Insurance1 (Refer Note 1)

49%

74%

Automatic

2

Petroleum
refining by the Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), without any disinvestment
or dilution of domestic equity in the existing PSUs2

49%

49%
(100% allowed under automatic route where in-principle approval for strategic
disinvestment of a PSU has been granted by the Government)

Automatic

3

Telecom3

Automatic route up to 49% and beyond that under approval route

100% under Automatic route

Automatic

Note 1: The increase in the sectoral cap for insurance companies from 49% to 74% under the automatic route is subject to several conditions mentioned in the Press Note No. 2 (2021 Series) dated 14th June, 2021. Most of the conditions are the same as mentioned in the FDI Policy, 2020; one major change is with respect to constitution of the Board of Directors for insurance companies due to increase in their limit to 74%. Under the new condition, the Indian insurance company that has received foreign direct investment would need to ensure that the following persons are resident Indian citizens:
• Majority of Directors of such insurance companies;
• Majority of its Key Management Persons; and
• at least one among the Chairperson of the Board, the Managing Director and the Chief Executive Officer

______________________________________________________________________________________________

1   Press Note No. 2 (2021
Series), dated 14-6-2021

2   Press Note No. 3 (2021
Series), dated 29-7-2021

3   Press Note No. 4 (2021
Series), dated 06-10-2021

Further, the definition of Key Management Persons is the same as that defined in the guidelines issued by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (‘IRDAI’) on corporate governance for insurers in India.

(B) Amendment in Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations4
Under the existing Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations, 2015 (‘Export Regulations’), the rate of interest payable on advance payment received by the exporter from the buyer was capped at 100 basis points over the LIBOR rate. However, due to impending cessation of LIBOR as a benchmark rate, RBI has now permitted the use of any other applicable benchmark as directed by the RBI instead of the earlier specified only LIBOR rate.

(C) Review of FDI policy on downstream investment made by NRIs on non-repatriation basis5
The Government has now clarified that investments made by NRIs on non-repatriation basis would be deemed to be domestic investments at par with investments made by residents. Accordingly, investments made by an Indian entity which is owned and controlled by an NRI on non-repatriation basis shall not be considered for calculation of indirect foreign investment.

(D) ECB – Relaxation in period for parking of unutilised ECB proceeds in term deposits6
Under the existing ECB Regulations, ECB borrowers are permitted to park unutilised ECB proceeds in term deposits with AD Banks for a maximum period of 12 months cumulatively. However, in view of the Covid situation, RBI has now relaxed this provision and accordingly unutilised ECB proceeds drawn on or before 1st March, 2020 can be parked in term deposits with AD Banks prospectively for an additional period up to 1st March, 2022.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

4   A.P. (Dir. Series 2021-22)
Circular No.13, Dated 28-9-2021

5   Press Note No. 1 (2021
Series), Dated 19-03-2021

6   A.P. (Dir Series) Circular No.
01, Dated 17-6-2021

(E) Appointment of Special Director (Appeals) and his jurisdiction7
The Central Government has changed the jurisdiction of the Regional Special Director (Appeals) for hearing appeals filed against the order passed by the adjudicating authority under FEMA. The Table below prescribes the authority and its jurisdiction for hearing appeals:

Sr. No.

Special Director
(Appeals)

Station

Zone

Sub-zone

Jurisdiction

1.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-23, Delhi

Delhi

Delhi, Chandigarh Jaipur, Jalandhar and Srinagar

Dehradun and Shimla

States of Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal
Pradesh and Union Territory of Chandigarh, Union Territory of Jammu and
Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh, National Capital Territory of Delhi

2.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-20, Kolkata

Kolkata

Kolkata, Guwahati Lucknow and Patna

Bhubaneswar, Allahabad and Ranchi

States of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh,
Sikkim, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Odisha, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar
Pradesh and Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar

3.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-47, Mumbai

Mumbai

Mumbai, Ahmedabad and Panaji

Surat, Nagpur, Indore and Raipur

States of Maharashtra, Goa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Gujarat, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu

4.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-18, Chennai

Chennai

Chennai, Kochi Bengaluru and Hyderabad

Madurai and Kozhikode

States of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana, Union Territory of Puducherry and Union Territory of Lakshadweep

    
(F) Amendment in Master Direction on Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly-Owned Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad8
RBI has clarified that sponsor contribution by an Indian Party (‘IP’) to an Alternative Investment Fund (‘AIF’) set up in Overseas Jurisdictions, including International Financial Services Centres (‘IFSCs’) as per the laws of the host jurisdiction, will be treated as Overseas Direct Investment (ODI). Accordingly, an IP can set up an AIF in overseas jurisdictions, including IFSCs, under the automatic route, provided it complies with relevant regulations of FEMA 120/2004-RB (‘FEMA 120’).

Further, RBI, in consultation with SEBI, has enhanced the limit of overseas investment by Domestic Venture Capital Funds / Alternative Investment Funds registered with SEBI in equity and equity-linked instruments of off-shore Venture Capital Undertakings from the existing USD 750 million to USD 1,500 million.

Also, for investment by way of swap of shares, it is clarified that an Indian company can issue capital instruments to a person resident outside India under the automatic route if the Indian investee company is engaged in a sector which is under automatic route or with prior Government approval, if the Indian investee company is engaged in a sector under Government route as per Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 dated 17th October, 2019, as amended from time to time.

Additionally, RBI has also issued a clarification in para B.22 of the Master Direction on ODI which pertains to opening of a foreign currency account abroad by an Indian Party. RBI has now clarified that in addition to existing conditions, such account can be opened only if the Indian Party is eligible to make ODI under the provisions of FEMA, 120.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
7    Notification S.O. 3958(E) [F. No. K-11022/15/2021-AD.ED], Dated 24-9-2021
8    A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No. 04 dated 12th May, 2021 and SEBI/HO/IMD/DF6

(G) Clarification for the purpose of computation of late submission fee (‘LSF’)
Under the existing FDI provisions, if there is any delay in filing of any specified reports, such delay can be regularised by payment of LSF instead of going through the compounding process. For the purpose of computing LSF, the earlier Master Direction on Reporting specified that the period of delay would be counted from the day after the 30th day from receipt of funds / allotment or transfer of shares and end on the day preceding the day on which the transaction report is received by the RBI. RBI has now made an amendment in the Master Direction on Reporting and clarified that
the period of delay will now be counted beginning from the day after completion of the prescribed time period and end on the day preceding the day on which the transaction report is received by the RBI. The prescribed time period means the time period mentioned in the relevant regulations from the date of receipt of funds / allotment or transfer of shares, as the case may be.

Accordingly, where FDI regulations provide for a period of 60 days for filing of specified forms, such as filing of Form FC-TRS and Form FDI-LLP(II), the delay period for computing LSF will now start from the end of the stipulated time period, i.e., the 60th day.

(H) Liberalised remittance scheme (‘LRS’) for resident individuals – Change in reporting requirement for AD Banks9
AD Banks are required to submit yearly details of applications received and remittances made by resident individual account holders under the LRS route to RBI. This reporting was required to be made on the Online Return Filing System (ORFS) but now the same is required to be made through the XBRL system by accessing the URL https://xbrl.rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl. Further, in case no data is required to be furnished, AD Banks are required to file Nil figures.

(I) Introduction of Foreign Exchange Transactions Electronic Reporting System (FETERS)10
RBI, in order to collect more information on international transactions using credit card / debit card / unified payment interface (UPI), has introduced FETERS with effect from 1st April, 2021. AD Banks are required to submit details of transactions through credit card / debit card / UPI (including sale and purchase of Forex towards international transactions) along with their economic classification (merchant category code – MCC). The reporting needs to be done through a new
return, namely, ‘FETERS-Cards’ on https://bop.rbi.org.in. The frequency of submission is monthly and the same needs to be done within seven working days from the last date of the month for which reporting is to be made.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
9    A.P. (Dir Series 2021-22) Circular No. 7, Dated 7-4-2021
10    A.P. (Dir Series) Circular No.13, dated 25-3-2021

 

INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND QUALIFYING TEST

BACKGROUND
Independent Directors are meant to be the pillar of corporate governance many of whose tenets are now mandatory in specified large / listed companies. In principle, every Director is expected to exercise a level of independence and even act akin to a trustee while discharging his duties. This is expected even from a Promoter or a Working Director. However, there are conflicts of interest, the reality of which cannot be denied. A Promoter Director or a Working Director cannot, in all fairness, be expected to be able to exercise the level of independence than one who is not so. Hence, a category of Directors was needed who had no connection or conflict that could impinge on their independence. Independent Directors, thus, have to pass through a series of negative conditions to ensure that there is no conflict of interest.

However, merely being independent is not sufficient for a person to discharge the onerous responsibility of acting as a Director when the Board of which he is a member has to oversee at a very senior level. Hence, apart from prescribing a series of disqualifications, the law also lays down that he should have certain knowledge that would enable him to discharge his responsibilities. To be precise, it is passing a certain online self-assessment Test in certain areas that are relevant to his functioning as an Independent Director. He is also required to register his details with a databank in a prescribed manner. The provisions relating to such a Test and for the databank have undergone amendments, including one most recently on 19th August, 2021 which gives exemption from the Test for professionals, including Chartered Accountants of certain standing. We discuss this subject in detail in this article.

OVERVIEW OF QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR
There are more disqualifications that make a person ineligible to become an Independent Director than there are qualifications that make him eligible! Being connected with the company or the Promoters in a variety of specified ways makes a person disqualified to be an Independent Director. However, the qualifications / qualities laid down are largely generic and even vague, thus making most people eligible and qualified. Rule 5 of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014 (‘the Rules’) provide that an Independent Director ‘shall possess appropriate skills, experience and knowledge in one or more fields of finance, law, management, sales, marketing, administration, research, corporate governance, technical operations or other disciplines related to the company’s business.’ However, it is up to the Board to assess whether the proposed Independent Director has the required expertise / knowledge. Section 149(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 requires that the Board should assess whether in its opinion he ‘is a person of integrity and possesses relevant expertise and experience.’

However, there is also a specific requirement whereby the Independent Director has to pass an online Test which tests his knowledge on a variety of regulatory and related areas which are relevant for him to perform his functions as a Director.

BROAD SCHEME OF THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO MAINTENANCE OF DATABANK AND PASSING OF ONLINE TEST
There are two sets of requirements linked to each other that an Independent Director has to comply with. Firstly, he has to ensure that his name is entered into a databank maintained in the prescribed manner by the specified Institute. Secondly, he has to pass the specified online self-assessment Test.

Some of these requirements came into force when the provisions relating to Independent Directors were already on the statute. Hence, these provisions had to be introduced giving a transition period for Independent Directors already existing in office. Those aside, the broad scheme is as follows: A person desiring to be appointed as an Independent Director shall, before such appointment, apply to the Institute for inclusion of his name in the databank maintained by it. He may apply even if there is no immediate proposal of his being appointed as such. He also needs to pass the specified online Test within two years of inclusion of his name in such databank. If he does not pass, his name would be removed from the databank. There are categories of persons who are exempted from passing such a Test. Recently, by an amendment made to the Rules on 19th August, 2021, more categories of exempted persons have been added. The overall scheme for this purpose, partly by non-application of mind and partly by a series of amendments, is a little clumsy and also leaves several ambiguous areas.

Note that the requirement of appointment of an Independent Director under the Act applies not only to listed companies but also other categories of public companies, such as those with paid-up capital of at least Rs. 10 crores, turnover of at least Rs. 100 crores, etc.

Requirement of passing Test for being eligible to be appointed as an Independent Director
Rule 6(4) of the Rules requires an Independent Director to pass the specified ‘online proficiency self-assessment Test’ (‘the Test’). This Test has to be passed within two years of inclusion of his name in the databank maintained by the specified Institute. If he does not pass, his name will be removed from the databank.

The Institute in this case is the ‘Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs at Manesar’ as notified under section 150 of the Act.

He has to obtain a score of at least 50% in the aggregate in the Test. He can appear as many times as he wants for the Test, though he should pass it within the time limit of two years from the date on which his name is included in the databank.

Requirement of passing the Test applicable only to Independent Directors
Curiously, the requirement of passing such a Test and even of entering the name in the databank is required only for an Independent Director. Other Directors, who may form half or more of the Board, are not required to pass such Test.

Categories of Independent Directors who are exempt from passing the online Test
While the Test is not exceptionally difficult to pass, it still means that many otherwise highly qualified and / or experienced people would need to take this Test. There may be persons who may be specialists for years or even decades in their respective fields and yet would have to pass the Test. Recognising this, the Rules have been progressively amended and several categories of persons are now exempt from passing it. However, no exemption has been provided from the requirement of entering the name and details in the databank.

The categories that are exempt from passing the Test are described below.

Persons who have been Directors or key managerial personnel of certain types of entities for at least three years are exempted. These entities include listed companies, unlisted public companies with a paid-up capital of at least Rs. 10 crores, bodies corporate incorporated outside India with a paid-up capital of at least US$ 2 million, etc. This exemption will be particularly helpful for Promoters, Working Directors and even key managerial personnel, etc., who have already been associated with listed companies and who would otherwise have been required to take the Test.

Then there are persons who have worked at a senior level with the Government. Those persons who have acted at such a senior level for a period of three years in the pay scale of Director or equivalent or above in any Ministry or Department of the Central or State Government and having experience in specified areas such as commerce, corporate affairs, etc., are exempted from passing the Test.

Similarly exempted are persons who have acted for three years in the payscale of Chief General Manager or above with regulators like SEBI, Reserve Bank of India, the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority, etc., and having experience in handling matters relating to corporate laws, securities laws or economic laws.

Further, persons who have been, for at least ten years, advocates of a high court or in practice as a Chartered Accountant / Company Secretary / Cost Accountant, do not need to pass the Test. This will be helpful to professionals who by virtue of their long standing have adequate knowledge and experience in fields that would be relevant entities requiring the appointment of Independent Directors.

WHAT IF THE DIRECTOR DOES NOT PASS SUCH TEST WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME?
The law requires a person to appear for and pass the Test within the specified time. However, what would happen if he does not bother to appear or he appears and does not pass within the prescribed time? Rule 4 says that ‘his name shall stand removed from the databank of the institute’. The intention of the law seems to be that only those persons who have passed such Test or who pass the Test in the specified time should be appointed as Independent Directors.

However, the clauses are not happily worded. There are no clear answers to questions such as (i) Will it make such person ineligible to be appointed as an Independent Director? (ii) Will he immediately vacate his office as Independent Director? (iii) Will he have to pay any penalty for continuing to act as an Independent Director despite not passing the Test? (iv) What is the role of the company in this regard and whether it is required to remove such Director?

CONCLUSION
By these recent amendments, the law now rightly exempts more categories of persons who have long experience and good knowledge of their respective fields but would still be required to pass the online Test. However, it must be said that the governance of the Board and the regulatory requirements relating to them have over the years become quite complex and elaborate. The exempted categories are generally those having experience / knowledge of specialised areas while governance of the Board can require different skills, knowledge and exposure. Thus, knowledge of various laws and procedures would be helpful and it would be advisable to study the relevant laws. Further, it is necessary to appear for the Test and to pass it to confirm his knowledge. Clearly, the Test is one-time and at present there is no requirement to periodically re-appear for it or undergo some refresher course. But here, too, it may be advisable that even those who have passed the Test earlier may keep updating themselves and even voluntarily appear for it again.

    

PARTNERSHIP FIRM – STAMP DUTY ISSUES

INTRODUCTION
Partnerships are probably one of the oldest forms of doing business. Even today, a majority of the businesses in India are organised as ‘partnerships’. And stamp duty is an important source of revenue for the Maharashtra Government. This article deals with some issues relating to stamp duty which are peculiar to partnerships.

CHARGE OF STAMP DUTY

The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (‘the Act’), which is applicable to the State of Maharashtra, levies stamp duty u/s 3 of the Act which reads as follows:

‘3. Instrument chargeable with duty
Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in Schedule I as the proper duty therefor respectively, that is to say –
(a) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I, which is executed in the State … …
(b) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I, which is executed out of the State, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done in this State and is received in this State:’

From an analysis of section 3, the following points emerge:
(a) The stamp duty is leviable on an instrument and not on a transaction;
(b) The stamp duty is leviable only on those instruments which are mentioned in Schedule I to the Act;
(c) The stamp duty is leviable on the instrument if it is executed in the State of Maharashtra or on the instrument which, though executed outside the State of Maharashtra, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done in the State and is received in the State. Hence, for example, even if the instrument of partnership is executed outside the State of Maharashtra but if the partnership is located in Maharashtra, and the instrument of partnership is received in Maharashtra, then it would be subject to stamp duty under the Act.
(d) The charge of stamp duty is subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I.

INSTRUMENT
The term ‘instrument’ is defined in section 2(1) of the Act to include every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. However, it does not include a bill of exchange, cheque, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt. Stamp duty is leviable only on a written document which falls within the definition of instrument. If there is no instrument, then there is no duty.

Schedule I
Since stamp duty is levied only on the instruments specified in Schedule I, let us look at Schedule I. Only Article 47 of Schedule I specifically provides for levy of stamp duty on a partnership.

The term ‘instrument of partnership’ and the term ‘partnership’ have not been defined in the Act. Hence, the term ‘partnership’ would have to be understood as defined in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Stamp duty on formation of partnership
Stamp duty on formation of partnership is levied under Article 47(1). According to this Article, the stamp duty on the instrument of partnership or the deed of partnership depends upon the capital contribution made by the partners as explained below:
(a) If the capital contribution is made only by way of cash, then the minimum amount of stamp duty is Rs. 500. Where the contribution brought in in cash is in excess of Rs. 50,000, the stamp duty is Rs. 500 for every Rs. 50,000 or part thereof. However, the maximum amount of stamp duty payable is Rs. 5,000. In other words, if the capital ranges from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 5,00,000, the stamp duty would range from Rs. 500 to Rs. 5,000. If the capital contributed in cash is in excess of Rs. 5,00,000, then the stamp duty payable would be the maximum amount of Rs. 5,000.
(b) Where capital contributed by the partners is by way of property other than cash, then the stamp duty payable is that leviable on a conveyance under Article 25.

Article 25 on Conveyance
Since Article 25 is made applicable to an instrument of partnership, the relevant provisions of Article 25 are summarised below:
* It levies a stamp duty on movable property @ 3% of the value of the property;
* It levies a stamp duty on immovable property. The stamp duty depends upon the location of the property, that is, whether it is in a rural area or in an urban area and also upon the class of municipality. The stamp duty for the city of Mumbai is 5%. Further, this duty is based on the stamp duty ready reckoner value of the property.

ADMISSION OF PARTNER OR ADDITIONAL CAPITAL BY PARTNERS
Since admission of a partner requires a fresh instrument of partnership, the question of payment of stamp duty under Article 47 would arise. However, it would be restricted only to the share of contribution brought in by the incoming partner or additional contribution brought in by the existing partners. If the incoming partner does not bring in any capital, stamp duty payable would be the minimum sum of Rs. 500.

If in an existing partnership additional capital is brought in by one or more partners, would it attract stamp duty under Article 47(1)? It is submitted that if a fresh partnership deed is not executed, then stamp duty is not payable, otherwise it would be payable only on the additional capital. The following decisions under the Income-tax Act have held that a registered document is not required when a partner introduces his immovable property into a partnership firm as his capital contribution but a registered document is required when a partner wants to withdraw an immovable property from the firm:

(a)    Abdul Kareemia & Bros. vs. CIT [1984] 145 ITR 442
    (AP)
(b)    CIT vs. S.R. Uppal [1989] 180 ITR 285 (Punj & Har)
(c)    Ram Narain & Bros. vs. CIT [1969] 73 ITR 423 (All)
(d)    Janson vs. CIT [1985] 154 ITR 432 (Kar)
(e)    CIT vs. Palaniappa Enterprises [1984] 150 ITR 237
    (Mad)

RETIREMENT OF A PARTNER OR DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP
Earlier, there was no express provision for levy of stamp duty in the case of retirement of a partner. Now, it is expressly provided for and the stamp duty payable is the same as in the case of dissolution as discussed below.

Where on dissolution of a partnership (or on retirement of a partner), any property is taken as his share by a partner other than a partner who brought in that property as his share of contribution in the partnership, stamp duty is payable as on a conveyance under Article 25, clauses (a) to (d), on the market value of the property so taken by a partner. In any other case, stamp duty of only Rs. 500 is payable.

The implications of these provisions are as follows:
(a) If a partner has introduced certain property in a partnership and on dissolution of the partnership or on his retirement from that partnership he takes that property, then the stamp duty of only Rs. 500 would be payable.
(b) If a partner has introduced certain property in partnership and on dissolution of the partnership or on retirement of another partner from that partnership that partner takes the property, then the stamp duty as is leviable on a conveyance under Article 25 would be payable. Hence, if the property is an immovable property, then the stamp duty would be 5% as explained above. If the property is a movable property, then stamp duty would be payable at the rate of 3%.
(c) If the property acquired by the firm itself has been given to a partner on retirement or dissolution, then stamp duty of only Rs. 500 is payable.

An issue arises in the case of simultaneous admission-cum-retirement of partners done by the same deed: would the stamp duty be payable on the amount brought in by the incoming partner (gross amount) or this amount should be net of the withdrawals? Section 5 of the Act states that if an instrument relates to several distinct matters, it shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of duties with which separate instruments each relating to separate matters would have been chargeable under the Act. Hence, the stamp duty on the instrument of partnership should be payable with reference to the gross amount brought in by the incoming partner and should not be with reference to the net amount. In addition, the stamp duty would be payable also as on a deed of retirement, under Article 47(2).

ARRANGEMENTS RESEMBLING
A PARTNERSHIP
In several cases, the owner and the builder enter into a profit-sharing arrangement, which is quite similar to that under a partnership. An issue in such a case would be whether the arrangement is one of a Development Rights Agreement or a partnership. The stamp duty consequences on the owner and the developer would vary depending on the nature of the arrangement.
    
Section 4 of the Partnership Act defines a partnership as ‘the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all’. Thus, a partnership must contain three elements:
(a) there must be an agreement entered into by all the persons concerned;
(b) the agreement must be to share the profits of a business; and
(c) the business must be carried on by all or any of the persons concerned acting for all.

ELEMENT OF PROFIT-SHARING
Sharing of profits is an essential element of a partnership. The instrument must demonstrate that what is happening in effect is that it is the net profits that are being shared and not the gross returns. Various English decisions such as Lyons vs. Knowles, 1863 3 B&S, 556 have held that a mere agreement to share gross returns of any property would be very little evidence of a partnership between them and there is much less possibility of there being a partnership between them. In certain English cases such as Cox vs. Coulson (1916) 2 KB 177 (lessee of a theatre and manager of a theatrical company), French vs. Styring [1857] Eng R 509 (joint owners of a race horse – expenses jointly borne), it was held that the mere circumstance of their sharing gross returns would be very little evidence of the existence of a partnership.

In Sutton & Co. vs. Gray (1894) 1 QB 285, S, a share broker, entered into an agreement with G, a sub-broker, that G should introduce his clients to S, receive half the brokerage in respect of the transactions of such clients put through on the Exchange by S and should bear the losses in respect thereof; it was held that this did not create a partnership between S and G as no partnership was intended and that the agreement was merely to divide gross returns and not the profits of a common business.

Further, section 6 of the Partnership Act is also relevant. It provides that the sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in the property does not of itself make such persons partners.

The relevant extracts are given below :

‘6. Mode of determining existence of partnership – In determining whether a group of persons is or is not a firm, or whether a person is or is not a partner in a firm, regard shall be had to the real relation between the parties, as shown by all relevant facts taken together.
Explanation I – The sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in that property does not of itself make such persons partners.
Explanation II – the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business, or of a payment contingent upon the earning of profits or varying with the profits earned by a business, does not of itself make him a partner with the persons carrying on the business; and, in particular, the receipt of such share or payment
(a) by lender or money to person engaged or about to engage in any business,
(b) by a servant or agent as remuneration,
(c) by the widow or child of a deceased partner, as annuity, or
(d) by a previous owner or part-owner of the business, as consideration for the sale of the goodwill or share thereof,
does not of itself make the receiver a partner with the persons carrying on the business.’

A relevant case in this respect is the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Vijaya Traders, 218 ITR 83 (Mad). In this case, a construction partnership was entered into between two persons, wherein one partner S contributed land while the other was solely responsible for construction and finance. S was immune to all losses and was given a guaranteed return as her share of profits. The other partner who was the managing partner was to bear all losses. The Court held that the relationship is similar to the Explanation 1 to section 6 and there were good reasons to think that the property assigned to the firm was accepted on the terms of the guaranteed return out of the profits of the firm and she was immune to all losses. The relationship between them was close to that of lessee and lessor and almost constituted a relationship of licensee and licensor and was not a valid partnership.

MUTUAL AGENCY CONCEPT
Mutual agency is also a key condition of a partnership. Each partner is an agent of the firm and of the other partners. The business must be carried on by all or any partner on behalf of all.

What would constitute a mutual agency is a question of fact. For instance, in the case of K.D. Kamath & Co., 82 ITR 680 (SC), the Court held that control and management of the business of the firm can be left by agreement between the parties in the hands of one partner to be exercised on behalf of all the partners.

Consequently, in the case of M.P. Davis, 35 ITR 803 (SC), it was held that the provisions of the deed taken along with the conduct of the parties clearly indicated that it was not the intention of the parties to bring about the relationship of partners but they only intended to continue under the cloak of a partnership the pre-existing and real relationship of master and servant. The sharing of profits or the provision for payment of remuneration contingent upon the making of profits or varying with the profits did not itself create a partnership.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Sanjay Kanubhai Patel, 2004 (6) Bom C.R. 94 had an occasion to directly deal with this issue. The Court after reviewing the Development Rights Agreement held that it is settled law that in order to constitute a valid partnership, three ingredients are essential. There must be a valid agreement between the parties, it must be to share profits of the business and the business must be carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The third ingredient relates to the existence of mutual agency between the parties concerned inter se. The Court held that merely because an agreement provided for profit-sharing it would not constitute a partnership in the absence of mutual agency.

LLP
To incorporate a Limited Liability Partnership, the partners need to execute an LLP agreement. This agreement would lay down the respective capital contributions, whether they would be in the form of cash or property, etc. This Act has now been amended for an express provision of levying stamp duty on an LLP agreement. Article 47 of Schedule I to the Act now even applies to an instrument of an LLP.

AOP Deed
If, instead of a partnership, an association of persons is selected as an entity for the development business, then the above discussion would apply to the same. The law now contains an express provision that stamp duty on joint venture agreements would be also governed by Article 47.

Conversion of firm into company
The conversion of a firm into a company under Chapter XXI of the Companies Act, 2013 / Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956 should not attract any incidence of stamp duty, as there is a statutory vesting of the assets of the firm in the company and there is no transfer. This view is supported by the decision in the cases of Vali Pattabhirama Rao 60 Comp Cases 568 (AP) and Rama Sundari Ray vs. Syamendra Lal Ray, ILR (1947) 2 Cal 1 which state that under Part IX of the Companies Act there is a statutory vesting of the assets of the firm in the company and there is no transfer. Therefore, there is no conveyance and hence there should not be any incidence of stamp duty.

CONCLUSION
From the above discussions it would be clear that a proper structuring of the transaction and a proper drafting of the relevant documents is essential to achieve the desired results.


 

CONCEPT OF ‘PERSON’ UNDER GST

GST, as an indirect tax, is collected by a person from another person for onward payment to the Government. Though it is a destination-based consumption tax on businesses, the charge and legal liability to pay tax has to be vested onto a specific person (the subject). In case such subject is missing, the taxing statute would lose its purpose as the implementation of the same would become impossible. The word ‘person’ encompasses within its fold not only natural persons like individuals but also artificial persons like firms, AOPs, trusts, companies, etc.

The term ‘person’ has been defined u/s 2(84) of the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 as under:

(84) ‘person’ includes —
(a) an individual;
(b) a Hindu Undivided Family;
(c) a company;
(d) a firm;
(e) a Limited Liability Partnership;
(f) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, in India or outside India;
(g) any corporation established by or under any Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act or a Government company as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013);
(h) any body corporate incorporated by or under the laws of a country outside India;
(i) a co-operative society registered under any law relating to co-operative societies;
(j) a local authority;
(k) Central Government or a State Government;
(l) society as defined under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860);
(m) trust; and
(n) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the above.

As can be seen from the above, the term ‘person’ has been very widely defined to cover, apart from individuals, different types of entities / associations / societies, etc., as well as Government at different levels, i.e., Central, State as well as local authorities. However, mere inclusion in the definition of person would not result in liability of GST unless such person gets covered within the charging provision u/s 9 of the CGST Act, 2017.

CHARGING SECTION & LIABILITY TO PAY TAX
Section 9(1) imposes a levy of GST on all intra-state supplies of goods or services, or both. Having so imposed the tax, the said provision also defines that the tax shall be paid by ‘the’ taxable person. The definition of the term taxable person u/s 2(107) read with the provisions of section 22 would suggest that the taxable person shall generally be the supplier. The exceptions to this general rule are provided in subsequent provisions as under:

• Section 9(3) provides that in notified cases, the tax on supply shall be paid on reverse charge basis by the recipient;
• Section 9(4) provides that in notified cases, the tax on supply received from unregistered persons shall be paid by the registered person on reverse charge basis; and
• Section 9(5) provides that in case of notified services, the tax shall be paid by the Electronic Commerce Operator (ECO) through which the said services are supplied, by treating such ECO as the supplier.

Thus, the important terms emanating from the charging section are taxable person, registered person, supplier and recipient, and in order to enforce levy of tax on a person, a person needs to be classified under any of the said baskets. If a person is not a taxable person, or a registered person or a supplier or a recipient, the liability to pay tax cannot be fastened on him. In other words, the person needs to be specified as ‘a person liable to pay tax’ in one of the persons mentioned above for
the liability to be fastened on him. The above position was laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of service tax while dealing with Rule 2(d)(xii) and (xvii) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 which cast responsibility on the service receiver to pay service tax. The levy was struck down in the case of Laghu Udyog Bharati vs. UoI [1999 (112) ELT 356 (SC)] as well as in UoI vs. Indian National Shipowners Association [2010 (017) STR 0J57 (SC)].

In the context of GST also, this aspect has been dealt with by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Mohit Minerals Private Limited vs. UoI [2020 (33) GSTL 321 (Guj)]. The issue before the Court was the validity of Entry 10 of Notification 10/2017-IT (Rate) which casts liability on the importer to pay tax on the freight component of goods imported on CIF basis. The liability to pay tax was cast on a notional value, being 10% of the CIF value of the goods imported. One of the contentions raised before the Court challenging the validity of the rate entry was that the privity of contract was between a foreign shipping line as a supplier and the foreign exporter of goods as a recipient and the Indian importer was not a privy to the transaction. As such, the importer could not be treated as a recipient of service and, therefore, the liability to pay tax u/s 9(3) was not triggered. This was accepted by the Gujarat High Court which held as under:

148. In our opinion, the writ-applicant cannot be made liable to pay tax on some supposed theory that the importer is directly or indirectly recipient of the service. The term ‘recipient’ has to be read in the sense in which it has been defined under the Act. There is no room for any interference or logic in the tax laws.
149. If the definition of the term ‘recipient’ is overlooked or ignored, then the writ-applicant would become the recipient of all the goods which goes into the manufacture / production of goods and all the services which have been availed by the foreign exporter for such purposes. Such reasoning which leads to a harsh and arbitrary result has to be avoided, particularly when the term has been expressly defined by the Legislature. Thus, the writ-applicant cannot be said to be the recipient of the supply of the ocean freight service and no tax can be collected from the writ-applicant.

The principle emanating from the above decision is that a person has to be either a supplier or a recipient in order to be held liable to pay tax. In view of the specific deeming fiction in the law itself treating an E-Commerce Operator as a deemed supplier in some cases, even such ECO may be held liable for payment of tax.

PERSON: CONCEPT OF DISTINCTNESS
GST is a transaction tax driven by contract, whether oral or written. This necessitates that all the elements essential for a valid contract need to be present before the levy can be triggered. Keeping this aspect in mind and to achieve the concept of consumption-based tax, i.e., tax revenue should flow to the State where the consumption takes place, section 25 provides that a person who has obtained / is required to obtain registration in one or more State / Union Territory shall, in respect of each such registration, be treated as a distinct person. Further, Schedule I, Entry 2 deems supply of goods or services between such distinct persons as supply, even if made without consideration.

At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the service tax provisions wherein establishment of a person in a taxable territory and any of his other establishments in a non-taxable territory were treated as distinct establishments of the same person. The implication of this provision was that the Indian HO and its foreign branch were treated as separate entities, though their accounts were ultimately consolidated and for all legal purposes they were treated as one entity.

The above provision had resulted in certain litigation. In 3I Infotech Limited vs. Commissioner [2017 (51) STR 305 (Tri-Mum)], the issue before the Tribunal was liability to pay tax on expenditure incurred by the foreign branches of an Indian company but disclosed in the financial statements which were prepared on a consolidated basis. In this case, a show cause notice proposed recovery of service tax under reverse charge on expenses of such foreign branches. The Tribunal, however, set aside the demand and held as under:

12. We note that Rule 3(iii) of Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India), Rules, 2006 includes ‘business auxiliary services’ but is restricted to such as are received by a recipient located in India for use in relation to business or commerce. The thrust of the Rules is to identify the manner of receipt of service in India in the three categories, viz., in relation to the object of the service, the place of performance and the location of the recipient. We are concerned with the residuary aspect of location of recipient. The Adjudicating Commissioner has not rendered a finding that the appellant is the recipient of service, indeed, he could have done so only by examining the relationship between the appellant and branch in the context of the payments effected to the foreign service provider which he, probably, did not feel obliged to do in the absence of any allegation to that effect in the show cause notice. Unless the recipient is located in India, section 66A cannot be invoked.

Similarly, in the context of airlines, the Tribunal was seized with the question of determining whether or not service tax was payable under reverse charge on payment made to foreign service providers for the centralised reservation system. The challenge was primarily because the payments were made by the Head Office of the airlines. Therefore, in case of international airlines, the entire payment was made by the airlines from their base country, including for bookings done from India from where the said airlines operated. A show cause notice was issued to the foreign airlines to recover service tax under reverse charge mechanism to the extent payments were made pertaining to India bookings. The matter was ultimately decided by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of British Airways vs. Commissioner [2014 (36) STR 598 (Tri-Del)] wherein the Court set aside the demand and held as under:

46. In view of the foregoing discussions, M/s British Airways, India, has to be treated as a separate person. If that be so, in view of the admitted position that the contract between CRS / GDS companies is not with M/s British Airways, India and is only (sic) that M/s British Airways, UK, the present appellant cannot be held to be the recipient of the services so as to make him liable to pay service tax, on reverse charge basis, in terms of the provisions of section 66A. The said issue stands discussed by the Learned Member (Technical) in his impugned order, by giving an example with which I am in full agreement.

The above decisions indicate that while determining who is the recipient of service the one who is entering into the contract becomes more relevant, even if it is the same legal entity. The challenges would be more especially when this deeming fiction becomes applicable in the context of domestic branches. Let us try to understand the challenges with the help of a few examples:

1. A company incurs marketing expenses for its products which are sold through its regional branches. For accounting and MIS purposes, the company distributes the expenses to the regional branches and the expenses (along with the corresponding ITC) appears in the trial balance of each such branch, though there is only one corresponding invoice. The issue that would arise is who is the recipient of service, who is eligible to claim the input tax credit, and what will be the implications of the Schedule I Entry 2.

2. Similarly, issues may arise in the context of cases where the liability to pay tax is under reverse charge. For instance, a company having a centralised transport department books freight from its Head Office in State A for movement of goods from State B to State C. The company is registered in all the three States. The issue that would remain is whether the RCM liability is to be paid in State A from where the expense has been incurred or State B / C where the services are consumed?

3. The branch office situated in Gujarat has incurred certain expenses towards marketing and promotion. However, the vendor has raised the invoice to the Head Office and disclosed it accordingly in its GST returns, while the expense has been booked by the Gujarat office as it had raised the PO. Who can claim the input tax credit in such cases?

4. Even in case of revenue, while the main revenue would be tagged to the respective locations from where the supply has been made, there can be instances for other income where such identification is not available, or the identification is done erroneously. Let’s take the example of canteen charges which are collected by the company from the employees’ salary on a monthly basis. It is possible that the charges for all employees may be accounted for in one State only. Will there be any implications if the company pays the tax on such recoveries in the State where the recovery is accounted, or the company would be mandatorily required to make payment in the State to which the revenue pertains?

Each of the above situations needs changes at the organisational level, with a need to incorporate branch level accounting, sensitising the personnel with the importance of synchronisation of the invoicing location vis-à-vis the PO location vis-à-vis the accounting location (be it for income / expenditure). A lapse on any one aspect would have substantial impact on the organisation, including financial costs, as claiming of credit in wrong location would not only result in denial of input tax credit at the wrong location and recovery along with interest / penalty, but the correct location may lose out on such credits if not identified within the appropriate timelines. Similarly, even in case of revenue, if the tax is paid from the wrong location, it is likely that the tax authorities might still demand tax from the branch which was actually liable to pay the tax as a supplier of service, resulting in duplicate tax as well as bearing the same, along with interest / penalties as applicable.

Further, the deeming fiction is also inserted to associations where mutuality applies w.r.e.f. 1st July, 2017 wherein activities or transactions between such associations and their members are deemed to be supply. This is to negate the applicability of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Club Ltd. [2019 (29) GSTL 545 (SC)] wherein it was held that in the case of mutual associations, no VAT / Service Tax was leviable. However, the amendment has not been notified till date and in most likelihood will also be subjected to judicial scrutiny from the GST perspective.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN TAXABLE PERSON AND REGISTERED PERSON
The term ‘taxable person’ has been defined u/s 2(107) as under:

(107) ‘taxable person’ means a person who is registered or liable to be registered u/s 22 or u/s 24;

On a plain reading, it is apparent that any person who is liable to be registered or has voluntarily obtained registration is treated as a taxable person. A person is liable to be registered u/s 22 in the following cases:
• Turnover crossing the prescribed limit,
• Liability of successor in case of succession by way of transfer of business, or
• Liability of transferee on transfer of business / part thereof by way of merger, de-merger, etc.

Similarly, section 24 lays down the situation in which a person shall be liable to obtain registration notwithstanding the turnover limit prescribed u/s 22. However, section 22/24 merely determines the point when a person becomes liable to registration and treats such person as a taxable person. Once the registration is obtained by such person, either in view of section 22/24 or voluntarily, such person becomes a registered person. A ‘registered person’ has been defined u/s 2(94) to mean a person registered u/s 25 but does not include a person holding a Unique Identity Number.

The fundamental difference between a taxable person and a registered person forthcoming from the above is that the concept of taxable person is meant to determine a person who is liable to comply with the GST provisions, including obtaining registration, collecting and paying taxes. Such a person, when he complies with the provisions by obtaining registration, becomes a registered person and the procedural aspects of the GST law, such as input tax credit, filing of returns, assessments, etc., become applicable to such registered persons. For instance, the levy provision u/s 9(1) provides that the tax shall be paid by the taxable person. There can be instances where a person liable to obtain registration has failed to do so. Such a person cannot shirk away from his liability to pay tax on supplies made merely because he is not registered, as long as such person continues to be a taxable person, i.e., there is a liability on him to obtain registration. Similarly, liability to pay is cast on a taxable person in the following cases:

• In case of interest u/s 50, for cases where there is a failure to pay, the liability to pay interest is cast on ‘person’, i.e., both, a person already registered, as well as a person liable to registration but not registered.

However, the term ‘registered person’ is referred primarily in provisions relating to claiming of any benefit / procedural aspects. For example, the provisions relating to claim of input tax credit (section 16), exercising option to pay tax under composition scheme (section 10) or filing of returns / refund claims, etc., (Chapter IX) refer to a registered person. This is because the said provisions deal with the procedural aspects which a person cannot comply with unless such person has obtained registration and becomes a registered person.

Therefore, if it is ultimately held that a person was required to obtain registration but failed to do so, he is likely to lose out on claim of input tax credit as section 16(1), the enabling section, entitles only a registered person to take input tax credit. In view of the decision in the case of Spenta International Limited vs. Commissioner [2007 (216) ELT 133 (Tri-LB)], it is a settled position of law that eligibility of credit has to be decided at the time of receipt of inputs.

Therefore, it is apparent that unless a person obtains registration he shall not be entitled to take input tax credit on inward supplies received prior to grant of registration. However, the exception granted u/s 18(1)(a) in case of registration u/s 22/24 and voluntary registration u/s 25(3) will be available, though the same is restricted only to the extent of inputs held in stock. This is a departure from the position under the CENVAT regime where the Karnataka High Court has, in the case of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Private Limited [2012 (27) STR 134 (Kar)] held that registration is not a prerequisite for claim of CENVAT Credit.

LIABILITY TO PAY TAX UNDER ‘REVERSE CHARGE’
While section 9(1), which is the general section, imposes a liability to pay tax on the taxable person supplying the goods, sections 9(3) and 9(4) provide for cases where the liability to pay tax has been shifted to the recipient of the goods or services, or both. However, there is a difference in both the provisions.

Section 9(3) notifies the category of goods or services or both where the tax is payable by the recipient of such goods or services, or both. However, section 9(4) notifies the class of registered persons who shall on receipt of notified supply of goods or services or both, be liable to pay tax under reverse charge. The primary distinction in case of reverse charge u/s 9(3) and 9(4) is that section 9(3) applies to a recipient receiving the notified goods or services or both, as defined u/s 2(93), while section 9(4) applies to notified class of registered person receiving the notified goods or services or both. Therefore, for applicability of reverse charge u/s 9(3), a person needs to be classified as ‘recipient’,” while in the case of the latter, the person needs to be both, recipient as well as registered person.

It therefore becomes essential to analyse who is the recipient in the context of GST. The same is defined u/s 2(93) as under:

(93) ‘recipient’ of supply of goods or services or both, means —
(a) where a consideration is payable for the supply of goods or services or both, the person who is liable to pay that consideration;
(b) where no consideration is payable for the supply of goods, the person to whom the goods are delivered or made available, or to whom possession or use of the goods is given or made available; and
(c) where no consideration is payable for the supply of a service, the person to whom the service is rendered,
and any reference to a person to whom a supply is made shall be construed as a reference to the recipient of the supply and shall include an agent acting as such on behalf of the recipient in relation to the goods or services or both supplied;

It is evident that the definition merely refers to ‘the person’. The person may or may not be a taxable person / registered person. In such a situation, the liability to pay tax in case of supplies notified u/s 9(3) shall be on the recipient. This, coupled with the provisions of section 24(iii) which provides for compulsory registration in case of persons liable to pay tax under reverse charge, would trigger the need for registration even if such person is otherwise not liable to registration.

Therefore, in cases where the supply is notified u/s 9(3), the recipient (if not a registered person) would need to analyse whether or not an exemption has been granted for such supply. For instance, in case of reverse charge on security services / rent-a-cab services, there is no exemption provided under the exemption notification. Therefore, even if there is a single instance of such payments, the liability to obtain registration and pay the tax would get triggered.

This would apply even in cases where there is an exemption from obtaining registration. For instance, a supplier exclusively engaged in making exempt supplies is not required to obtain registration u/s 22(1) even if his aggregate turnover exceeds Rs. 20 lakhs as the same applies only to taxable supplies. However, if such a person receives security services / rent-a-cab services which are notified u/s 9(3), such person would be required to obtain registration in view of section 24(iii) and pay the tax (with no corresponding credits) and comply with the prescribed provisions.

It is also important to note that in quite a few cases exemption has also been granted. For instance, a charitable trust carrying out charitable activities and not liable to pay GST u/s 9(1) would not be liable to obtain registration u/s 22. However, if the same trust purchases software from outside India, the same will be taxable as import of service (which does not require to be in the course or furtherance of business) and in such cases the liability to obtain GST registration and comply with the provisions gets triggered. However, in view of Entry 10 of Notification 9/2017-IT (Rate), such services and certain other cases are exempted from the levy of tax and, therefore, the need to obtain registration does not get triggered in such cases.

However, when it comes to section 9(4), the liability to pay tax triggers only when the person is a registered person, i.e., he has obtained registration u/s 25 and is covered within the class of registered persons notified therein. Currently, the notified class of registered persons liable to pay tax u/s 9(4) on supplies received from unregistered suppliers is a promoter as defined u/s 2(zk) of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF TAXABLE PERSONS
Under the GST law, a person also has an option to obtain registration as a Casual Taxable Person (‘CTP’) / Non-resident taxable person (’NRTP’). The terms ‘casual taxable person’ and ‘non-resident taxable person’ have been defined u/s 2 as under:

(20) ‘casual taxable person’ means a person who occasionally undertakes transactions involving supply of goods or services or both in the course or furtherance of business, whether as principal, agent or in any other capacity, in a State or a Union Territory where he has no fixed place of business.
(77) ‘non-resident taxable person’ means any person who occasionally undertakes transactions involving supply of goods or services or both whether as principal or agent or in any other capacity, but who has no fixed place of business or residence in India;

As can be seen from the above, registration as NRTP / CTP is applicable in case of a supplier intending to make a taxable supply of goods or services or both from a State / Union Territory where such supplier, being a taxable person, has no permanent fixed place of business in the said State / Union Territory. The only distinction between NRTP and CTP is that while the concept of NRTP applies to a person who has no fixed place of business / residence in India, the concept of CTP applies to a person who has a fixed place of business / residence in India, but not in the State / UT from where such person occasionally makes the taxable supply.

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court in Commercial Tax Officer, Bharatpur vs. Bhagat Singh [2021 (46) GSTL 3 (SC)] held that a person can be treated as casual taxable person even if he carries out a single transaction. There is no need for multiple transactions in order to obtain registration as a Casual Taxable Person.

The need to opt for CTP / NRTP would generally apply in cases where goods are sent for exhibition in a different State and sold at the exhibition itself. Similarly, even Event Management Companies can opt for this concept to optimise credits (especially on inward supplies falling under the property basket). However, in case of handicraft goods, an exemption has been granted from obtaining registration.

It is, however, important to note that CTP / NRTP is compulsorily required to obtain registration u/s 24(ii) and 24(v), respectively. Therefore, a person who has a fixed place of business in Maharashtra and is not liable to be registered u/s 22(1) or 24 and intends to make a taxable supply in Gujarat where he has no fixed place of business, will be required to obtain registration even if his turnover from Gujarat or aggregate turnover is not likely to cross the threshold limit prescribed u/s 22(1). Secondly, the need to register as CTP / NRTP will be triggered only in a case where taxable supply of goods or services or both is intended to be made. This was recently held by the AAR in the case of Ascen Hyveg Pvt. Ltd. [2021 (48) GSTL 386 (AAR–GST–Har)].

E-COMMERCE OPERATOR
In these modern times, online service providers through their online portals have started providing the service of connecting the supplier and the recipient for a charge. The transaction is between the supplier and the recipient but is facilitated by the online portals (such as OLA, Uber, Zomato, etc.). The online portals charge a fee from the supplier or recipient or both. At times, what happens is that both supplier as well as recipient are not registered and, therefore, the transaction escapes the tax net.

Keeping this aspect in mind, the liability to pay tax on such transactions was cast on such online portals, i.e., E-Commerce Operators, through which the services are being supplied. The relevant definitions are:

(45) ‘electronic commerce operator’ means any person who owns, operates or manages digital or electronic facility or platform for electronic commerce;
(44) ‘electronic commerce’ means the supply of goods or services or both, including digital products over digital or electronic network;

Currently, the notified class of services where the liability to pay tax is cast on the ECO are:
• Service by way of transportation of passengers by radio-taxi, motor-cab, maxi-cab and motorcycle;
• Service by way of providing hotel accommodations except where the person actually supplying the service is liable for registration u/s 22(1), i.e., his turnover exceeds the threshold limit;
• Services by way of housekeeping, such as plumbing, carpentering, etc., except where the person actually supplying the service is liable for registration u/s 22(1), i.e., his turnover exceeds the threshold limit;
• Restaurant services supplied through ECO (Swiggy, Zomato, etc.) are also likely to be covered u/s 9(5) w.e.f. 1st January, 2022.

It is imperative to note that in the above cases the liability to pay tax is shifted to the ECO. This is not a case of reverse charge. Therefore, from suppliers’ perspective, especially unregistered suppliers, no tax can be demanded from such suppliers where the ECO has already paid the tax. Further, such unregistered suppliers, supplying exclusively through E-commerce operators are also exempted from obtaining registration if their turnover exceeds Rs. 20 lakhs.

The ECO is also required to collect tax at source @ 1% on the net value of taxable supplies (other than notified supplies) made through it by the registered suppliers.

PERSON – PRINCIPAL – AGENT RELATIONSHIPS UNDER GST
The transactions of principal / agency are governed by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the terms of the arrangement between such parties. Under GST, the supply of goods by a principal to his agent or by an agent to his principal is deemed to be a supply for the purpose of section 7, even if made without a consideration. However, the same does not extend to services. Therefore, any movement of goods by a principal to his agent or otherwise, be it intra-state or interstate, has to be under the cover of a tax invoice.

It is also important to note that the liability of the principal and his agent in respect of goods supplied / received by the agent shall be joint and several, and in case the agent fails to make payment of the due tax, the same can be recovered from the principal.

However, the deeming fiction has not been extended to services. This can lead to certain issues. Let’s take the example of an agent paying the GTA for transport services. The agent is also a registered person and the GTA recognises the agent as the recipient of service. In such cases, the question arises as to who shall pay GST under reverse charge? And if the agent has discharged the liability under reverse charge, can the same be demanded again from the principal?

Even under the pre-GST regime, there have been disputes on taxability in case of P2A transactions. The primary dispute has been determining whether the relationship of principal – agency exists between the two parties or not, be it travel agents, advertising agencies, freight forwarders, etc. For instance, in case of discounts / incentives given by vehicle manufacturers to the dealers where the Department had alleged Business Auxiliary Services, the Tribunal had stuck down the demand, concluding that such discounts were nothing but a reduction in purchase price (Refer Commissioner vs. Sai Service Station Ltd. [2014 (35) STR 625 (Tri-Mum)].

Even in case of freight forwarders, where the freight forwarders traded in cargo space and the Department had demanded service tax on the trading profits, the demand was set aside in the case of Greenwich Meridian Logistics (I) Pvt. Ltd. [2016 (43) STR 215 (Tri-Mum)]. Similarly, in case of advertising agencies, the Tribunal had in the case of Euro RSCG Advertising Ltd. [2007 (7) STR 277 (Tri-Bang)] held that the agency was liable to pay tax only on the amounts collected from the advertiser / client and not the publisher. It is, however, important to note that the basis for this dispute was that the freight charges / print advertising charges were exempt from service tax, which is not so in the context of GST. It is therefore unlikely that the disputes will continue under GST.

As can be seen from the above, even though the tax was discharged on the transaction complying with the principles of destination-based taxation (as the POS was correctly disclosed), the authorities still issued demand notice without appreciating the fact that the tax liability was exhausted. This demonstrates that while dealing with service transactions taxpayers will have to be very careful in taking positions, as any position is likely to be scrutinised by tax authorities and any instances involving non-payment of tax are likely to be looked at adversely.

Of course, on the issue of discharge of liability / person liable to pay tax, in the context of Service Tax, the Tribunal has, in the case of Reliance Securities Ltd. vs. Commissioner [2019 (20) GSTL 265 (Tri-Mum)], held that if the agent has paid the service tax liability, the principal would not be liable to pay tax on the same again on his share. It remains to be seen whether the said principle will be followed in the context of GST also.

PERSONS – WAREHOUSE / GODOWN OWNER / OPERATOR AND TRANSPORTERS
Apart from the above, there are various instances where a person, though not being a taxable person (i.e., registered or not liable to be registered), is required to comply with various requirements under the law. For instance, a warehouse / godown owner / operator and transporter who is not registered is required to maintain records of the consignor, consignee and other relevant details of the goods in the manner prescribed u/r 58. Such person is required to obtain a unique enrolment number by making an application in Form GST ENR-01 / ENR-02, respectively.

In addition, the following details are required to be maintained by such persons:
• In case of warehouse / godown owner / operator, period for which particulars of goods remain in the warehouse along with particulars relating to receipt, dispatch, movement and disposal of such goods;
• In case of transporter, record of goods transported, delivered and stored in transit along with the GSTIN of the consignor and the consignee.

The Proper Officer has the powers to carry out inspection, search and seizure at the premises of the above suppliers, i.e., transporter or warehouse / godown owner / operator u/s 67. Such officer also has powers to issue directions to the custodian of the goods to not remove, part with or deal with such goods without prior approval.

Similarly, when the goods are in movement, it is the responsibility of the transporter to ensure that the prescribed documents are in possession for verification during the movement. If the vehicle is intercepted during movement and the prescribed documents are not available with the transporter in support of the goods being transported, they are liable to confiscation.

PROCEEDINGS A PERSON MAY BE SUBJECTED TO
On the basis of the classification of a person, either as a taxable person, a registered person or otherwise, a distinction exists in the provisions relating to assessment, audit, recovery and penalties. While the concept of self-assessment u/s 59 refers to the registered person requiring such person to self-assess his liability, the option of provisional assessment u/s 60 is made available to a taxable person. Therefore, if a person has doubts over whether he is liable to be registered, he has an option to opt for provisional assessment.

Similarly, separate provisions have been prescribed u/s 63 for a taxable person who fails to obtain registration or has obtained registration but the same has been cancelled u/s 29(2). The reason for the assessment u/s 63 not being applicable to a taxable person registered under GST is that the taxable person who is registered is to be subjected to scrutiny u/s 61, assessment u/s 62 in case of non-filing of returns, audit by tax authorities u/s 65, and special audit u/s 66.

However, in case of recovery proceedings u/s 73 or u/s 74, the provisions refer to ‘the person’, implying that the provisions shall apply to both, a taxable person (thus including a registered person) and a person who is not liable to be registered and opts to be an unregistered person. The appeal provisions have also been similarly drafted.

However, depending on the nature of the contravention, the person on whom penalty can be imposed is based on the nature of contravention. For instance, penalty for specific offences listed u/s 122 is applicable only on a taxable person, while penalty for failure to furnish information return u/s 150 or statistics is leviable on any person. Similarly, the general penalty prescribed u/s 125, which deals with levy of penalty for any offence not covered above, is leviable on any person, irrespective of whether such a person is a registered person or not.

CONCLUSION
The GST law recognises different classes of persons and classification of a person would make such person liable to either pay tax, claim credit or be subject to various proceedings, or even require such person to comply with other provisions of the law. Therefore, it is always important that it is determined which particular provisions are applicable to a person, and whenever any proceedings are being commenced on such a person, it is ensured that such person can be subjected to the said proceedings else the very basis of the proceedings can be challenged before the courts.  

KEY AUDIT MATTERS IN AUDIT REPORT – RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

Compilers’ Note: Since the last few years, transactions between related parties have been in the limelight. Investors and regulators have been questioning these ‘Related Party Transactions (RPT)’, especially the determination of the ‘Arm’s Length Pricing’ for the same. Audit Committee members and Auditors also need to verify and confirm RPT and whether the same are at ‘arm’s length’. Given below are a few illustrations of audit reports for the year ended 31st March, 2021 where the auditors have included RPT as ‘Key Audit Matters’ in their reports and the procedures followed by them to verify the same.

SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LTD.

3

Related Party Transactions

Principal Audit Procedures

 

Refer Note No. 39 to the Standalone Financial Statements.

 

We identified the accuracy and completeness of disclosure of
related party transactions as set out in respective notes to the Standalone
Financial Statements as a key audit matter due to:

 

• the significance of transactions with related parties during
the year ended 31st March, 2021

 

• compliance with applicable laws and Regulatory Directives

 

• the fact that related party transactions are subject to the
compliance requirements under the Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI (LODR), 2015

Obtaining an understanding of the Company’s policies and
procedures in respect of the capturing of related party transactions and how
management ensures all transactions and balances with related parties have
been disclosed in the Standalone Financial Statements

 

• Obtaining an understanding of the Company’s policies and
procedures in respect of evaluating arm’s length pricing and approval process
by the audit committee and the Board of Directors

 

• Designing and performing audit procedures in accordance with
the guidelines laid down by ICAI in the Standard on Auditing (SA 550) to
identify, assess and respond to the risks of material misstatement arising
from the entity’s failure to appropriately account for or disclose material
related party transactions, which includes obtaining necessary approvals at
appropriate stages of such

 

 

(continued)

transactions as mandated by applicable laws and regulations

 

• Assessing management evaluation of compliance with the
provisions of section 177 and section 188 of the Act and SEBI (LODR), 2015

 

• Evaluating the disclosures through reading of statutory
information, books and records and other documents obtained during the course
of our audit

 

• Our examination has showed that the related party transactions
have been evaluated and disclosed appropriately

DLF LTD.

Related Party Transactions (as described in Note 44 to
the standalone Ind AS financial statements)

The Company has undertaken transactions with its related parties
in the ordinary course of business at arm’s length. These include making new
or additional investments in its subsidiaries; lending loans to related
parties; sales and purchases to and from related parties, etc., as disclosed
in Note 44 to the standalone Ind AS financial statements

 

We identified the accuracy and completeness of the related party
transactions and its disclosure as set out in respective Notes to the
financial statements as a key audit matter due to the significance of
transactions with related parties and regulatory compliances thereon, during
the year ended 31st March, 2021

Our procedures / testing included the following:

 

• Obtained and read the Company’s policies, processes and
procedures in respect of identifying related parties, obtaining approval,
recording and disclosure of related party transactions;

 

• Read minutes of shareholder meetings, Board meetings and
minutes of meetings of those charged with governance in connection with
Company’s assessment of related party transactions being in the ordinary
course of business at arm’s length;

 

• Tested related party transactions

 

(continued)

with the underlying contracts, confirmation letters and other
supporting documents;

 

• Agreed with the related party information disclosed in the
financial statements with the underlying supporting documents, on a sample
basis.

SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LTD.

Identification and disclosures of Related Parties (as described in Note 50 of
the standalone Ind AS financial statements)

The Company has related party transactions which include,
amongst others, sale and purchase of goods / services to its subsidiaries,
associates, joint ventures and other related parties and lending and
borrowing to its subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures

 

Identification and disclosure of related parties was a
significant area of focus and hence considered as a Key Audit Matter

Our audit procedures amongst others included the following:

 

• Evaluated the design and tested the operating effectiveness of
controls over identification and disclosure of related party transactions

 

• Obtained a list of related parties from the Company’s
management and traced the related parties to declarations given by Directors,
where applicable, and to Note 50 of the standalone Ind AS financial
statements

 

• Read minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors and
Audit Committee to trace related party transactions with limits approved by
Audit Committee / Board

 

• Tested material creditors / debtors, loan given / loans taken
to evaluate existence of any related party relationships; tested transactions
based on declarations of related party transactions given to the Board of
Directors and Audit Committee

 

• Verified the disclosures in the standalone Ind AS financial
statements for compliance with Ind AS 24

COFFEE DAY ENTERPRISES LTD.

Identification and compliance of related party transactions
(RPTs)

In view of the significance of the matter, the auditor of the
subsidiary has reported that the

(continued)

The Group has numerous transactions with related parties during
the year. The related party balances as at 31st March, 2021 and
related party transactions are disclosed in Note 31 to the consolidated
financial statements

 

Transactions with related parties mainly comprise transactions
between the Group and other entities which are directly / indirectly
controlled by the shareholders with significant influence of the Group

 

We identified related party transactions as a key audit matter
because of risks with respect to completeness of disclosures made in the
consolidated financial statements; compliance with statutory regulations
governing related party relationships such as the Companies Act, 2013 and
SEBI Regulations and the judgment involved in assessing whether transactions
with related parties are undertaken at arm’s length

(continued)

following audit procedures were applied in this area, among
others, to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence:

 

• We tested key controls to identify and disclose related party
relationships and transactions in accordance with the relevant accounting
standard and also tested controls on the required approval process of such
related party transactions

 

• We carried out an assessment of compliance with the listing
regulations and the regulations under the Companies Act, 2013, including
checking of approvals as specified in sections 177 and 188 of the Companies
Act, 2013 with respect to the related party transactions. In cases where the
matter was subject to varied interpretations, we have relied on opinions
obtained by management from independent legal practitioners

 

• We considered the adequacy and appropriateness of the
disclosures in the consolidated financial statements, relating to the related
party transactions

 

• For transactions with related parties, we inspected relevant
ledgers, agreements and other information that may indicate the existence of
related party relationships or transactions. We also tested completeness of
related parties with reference to the various registers maintained by the
Company statutorily

 

• We have tested on a sample basis, Management’s assessment of related
party transactions for arm’s length pricing

EROS INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LTD.

Related Party Transactions (Refer Note 44)

The Company has undertaken transactions with its related parties
in the ordinary course of business at arm’s length. These include
transactions in the nature of investments, loans, sales, etc.,

Our procedures / testing included the following:

 

• Obtained and read the Company’s policies, processes and
procedures in  respect of

(continued)

as disclosed in Note 44 to the standalone Ind AS financial
statements.

 

Considering the significance of transactions with related
parties and regulatory compliances thereon, related party transactions and
their disclosure as set out in respective notes to the financial statements
have been identified as key audit matters

(continued)

related parties, obtaining approval, recording and disclosure of
related party transactions;

 

• Read minutes of shareholder meetings, Board meetings and
minutes of meetings of those charged with governance in connection with
Company’s assessment of related party transactions being in the ordinary
course of business at arm’s length;

 

• Tested related party

 

(continued)

transactions with the
underlying contracts, confirmation letters and other supporting documents;

 

• Agreed the related party information disclosed in the
financial statements with the underlying supporting documents, on a sample
basis;

 

• Also reviewed the assessment of the recoverability from the
related parties based on group’s cash flow plan prepared by the Management.

TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY – AN OVERVIEW

1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND BACKGROUND
Digitalisation and globalisation have had a profound impact not only on the world economy, but also on the lifestyles of people. Digitalisation and the advent of Artificial Intelligence have further accelerated the impact in the 21st century. These changes have brought with them challenges to the age-old taxing rules of international business income which have resulted in multinational enterprises (MNEs) not paying their fair share of tax despite their huge profits.

In 2013, the OECD ramped up efforts to address the challenges in response to growing public and political concerns about tax avoidance by large multinationals. Implementation of the 15 Action Plans of the BEPS package, agreed to 2015, is well underway, but gaps remain. Globalisation has aggravated unhealthy tax competition.

In March, 2018, the OECD released the document Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation — Interim Report, 2018 as a follow-up to the 2015 final report on Action 1 of the project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. The 2018 Interim Report did not include any specific recommendations, indicating instead that further work would be carried out to understand the various business models in existence in the digital economy.

In January, 2019, the OECD released a Policy Note for renewed international discussions to focus on two ‘pillars’: one pillar addressing the broader challenges of the digitalization of the economy and the allocation of taxing rights, and a second pillar addressing remaining BEPS concerns. Following the Policy Note in February, 2019, the OECD released a Public Consultation Document describing the two-pillar proposals at a high level. The OECD received extensive comments from stakeholders and held a public consultation in March, 2019.

At the end of January, 2020, the OECD released a Statement by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach. With respect to both pillars, the documents included new details on the proposed approaches and identified key issues under consideration and areas where more work was to be undertaken.

In October, 2020, the OECD released detailed reports on the Blueprints on Pillar One and Pillar Two; an Economic Impact Assessment of the Pillar One and Pillar Two proposals; a Cover Statement by the Inclusive Framework on the work to date; future steps and a Public Consultation Document requesting comments on the Blueprints on both pillars.

On 1st July, 2021, the OECD released a Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising From the Digitalisation of the Economy (July Statement), reflecting the agreement of 130 of the member jurisdictions of the Inclusive Framework on some key parameters with respect to both pillars.

On 8th October, 2021, the OECD published an updated Statement (October Statement) regarding the conceptual agreement on the Two-Pillar Solution and the framework for the implementation of the same. And 136 out of 140 jurisdictions of the Inclusive Framework have agreed to the October Statement. The four jurisdictions which did not join the October Statement are Pakistan, Kenya, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka.

The 136 jurisdictions which have joined the Two-Pillar Solution represent more than 90% of the world’s GDP. An agreement is reached on a Detailed Implementation Plan that envisages implementation of the new rules by 2023.

The Two-Pillar Solution will ensure reallocation of excess profits of the large and profitable companies based on ‘nexus approach’ and that the MNEs will pay a minimum tax rate of 15%. This solution also aims to address concerns of the developing countries of having a fair share of tax revenue from MNEs who have a large customer base in these countries.

2. ISSUES UNDER THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TAXATION RULES
A key part of the OECD / G20 BEPS Project is addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy which has undermined the basic rules that have governed the taxation of international business profits for the last one century.

The existing international tax rules are based on agreements made in the 1920s and are enshrined in the global network of bilateral tax treaties.

There are two main issues:
(1) The old rules provide that the profits of a foreign company can only be taxed in another country where the foreign company has a physical presence. One hundred years ago, when digital technologies were non-existent and business revolved around factories, warehouses and movement of physical goods, this made perfect sense. However, in today’s digitalised world, MNEs often conduct large-scale business in a jurisdiction with little or no physical presence in that jurisdiction.
(2) Secondly, most countries only tax the domestic business income of their MNEs but not foreign income on the assumption that foreign business profits will be taxed where they are earned.

The growth of importance of intangibles like brands, copyrights and patents, and companies’ ability to shift profits to jurisdictions that impose little or no tax, means that MNE profits often escape taxation. This is further complicated by the fact that many jurisdictions are engaged in unfair tax competition by offering reduced taxation, and even zero taxation, to attract foreign direct investment and its attendant economic benefits.

OECD estimates that corporate tax avoidance costs anywhere from USD 100 to 240 billion annually, or from four to ten percent of global corporate income tax revenues. Developing countries are disproportionately affected because they tend to rely more heavily on corporate income taxes than advanced economies. Lack of global consensus on taxing MNE profits has given rise to unilateral measures at the national level, such as Digital Services Taxes (DST) and the prospect of retaliatory tariffs.

Such an outcome could cost the global economy up to 1% of its GDP. Again, this would hit developing countries harder than more advanced economies. The implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution aims to avoid trade wars, provide certainty and prevent unilateral domestic tax measures that would adversely impact trade and investment.

3. EVOLVING TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION
3.1 Pillar One
Pillar One aims to ensure a fairer distribution of profits and taxing rights among countries with respect to the largest MNEs which are the beneficiaries of globalisation. Tax certainty is a key aspect of the new rules, which include a mandatory and binding dispute resolution process for Pillar One, but with the caveat that developing countries will be able to benefit from an elective mechanism in certain cases, ensuring that the rules are not too onerous for low-capacity countries. The agreement to re-allocate profit under Pillar One includes the removal and standstill of DST and other relevant, similar measures, bringing an end to trade tensions resulting from the instability of the international tax system. It will also provide a simplified and streamlined approach to the application of the arm’s length principle in specific circumstances, with particular focus on the needs of low-capacity countries.

Pillar One would bring dated international tax rules into the 21st century, by offering market jurisdictions new taxing rights over MNEs, whether or not there is a physical presence.

a) Under Pillar One, 25% of profits of the largest and most profitable MNEs above a set profit margin (residual profits) would be reallocated to the market jurisdictions where the MNE’s users and customers are located; this is referred to as Amount A.
b) Pillar One also provides for a simplified and streamlined approach to the application of the arm’s length principle to in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities, referred to as Amount B.
c) Pillar One includes features to ensure dispute prevention and dispute resolution in order to address any risk of double taxation, but with an elective mechanism for some low-capacity countries.
d) Pillar One also entails the removal and standstill of DST and similar relevant measures to prevent harmful trade disputes.

3.2 Certain aspects of Amount A and Amount B
a) Computation of Amount A

Amount A would be computed for in-scope MNEs (i.e., ‘covered entities’ to which Pillar One applies), as 25% of residual profit (residual profit is defined as profit in excess of 10% of revenue) will be allocated to market jurisdictions with nexus using a revenue-based allocation key.

Revenue will be sourced to the end jurisdiction where the goods or services are ultimately used or consumed.

The base profit or loss of the in-scope MNE to be used for computation of Amount A will be determined by reference to the financial accounting income, with a few adjustments. (These rules are yet to be prescribed.)

b) Computation of Amount A in a case where marketing and distribution activities are undertaken in the relevant jurisdiction
In case the relevant market jurisdiction is already allocated a portion of the residual profit, a safe harbour will apply to cap the total residual profits allocated to such marketing jurisdiction under Amount A. Further work is expected to be undertaken to determine this safe harbour.

c) How would tax certainty be achieved for Amount A?
A dispute prevention and resolution mechanism will be introduced to avoid double taxation of Amount A. Such dispute resolution mechanism is expected to be mandatory and binding on jurisdictions. An elective binding dispute resolution mechanism will be made available on issues related to Amount A for developing economies which are eligible for deferral of their BEPS Action 14 review and have no or low levels of dispute. Interestingly, India has agreed to this Clause in the context of Pillar One, despite its consistent resistance to mandatory arbitration.

d) Computation of Amount B
Amount B would be based on the arm’s length return for in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities. The work on simplifying the computation of Amount B and streamlining the same is expected to be completed by the end of 2022. A safe harbour rate or other guidance may be provided for determining arm’s length return to compute Amount B. However, till such time one needs to follow the general principles enshrined in the Transfer Pricing Regulations.

e) How would Pillar One be implemented?
Amount A will be implemented through a Multilateral Convention (MLC) which will be developed and opened for signature in 2022, and Amount A is expected to come into effect in 2023. Unlike the MLI, which although multilateral, amends bilateral tax treaties, the MLC will operate multilaterally and along with the MLI.

3.3 Important elements of Pillar One
i) The scope of Amount A is restated without change as MNEs with a global turnover above €20 billion and profitability above 10% of profit before tax. These thresholds will be calculated using an average mechanism (yet to be described in detail).
ii) Amount A will allocate 25% of ‘residual profits’, which is defined as profit before tax in excess of 10% of revenue, to market jurisdictions with nexus using a revenue-based allocation key.
iii) A mandatory and binding dispute resolution mechanism will be available for all issues related to Amount A. For certain developing countries, an elective binding dispute resolution mechanism will be available. The eligibility of a jurisdiction for the elective binding dispute resolution mechanism will be regularly reviewed. If a jurisdiction is found to be ineligible, it will remain ineligible in all subsequent years.
iv) The removal of all DSTs and other relevant similar measures with respect to all companies will be required by the Multilateral Convention (MLC) through which Amount A is to be implemented. No newly-enacted DSTs or other relevant similar measures will be imposed on any company from 8th October, 2021 and until the earlier date of 31st December, 2023 or the coming into force of the MLC.
v) The October Statement reiterates that the MLC through which Amount A is implemented will be developed and opened for signature in 2022, with Amount A coming into effect in 2023.

3.4 Pillar Two
Pillar Two aims to discourage tax competition on corporate income tax through the introduction of a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15% that countries can use to protect their tax bases (the GloBE rules). Pillar Two does not eliminate tax competition, but it does set multilaterally agreed limitations on it. Tax incentives provided to spur substantial economic activity will be accommodated through a carve-out. Pillar Two also protects the right of developing countries to tax certain base-eroding payments (like interest and royalties) when they are not taxed up to the minimum rate of 9%, through a ‘subject to tax rule’ (STTR).

Governments worldwide agree to allow additional taxes on the foreign profits of MNEs headquartered in their jurisdictions at least to the agreed minimum rate. This means that tax competition will now be supported by a minimum level of taxation wherever an MNE operates.

A carve-out allows countries to continue to offer tax incentives to promote business activity with real substance, like building a hotel or investing in a factory.

3.5 Pillar Two seeks to reduce tax competition and protect tax base by introducing a minimum global corporate tax. It consists of the following:
i) An Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) which imposes a top-up tax on a parent entity in respect of the low-taxed income of a constituent entity;
ii) An Undertaxed Payment Rule (UTPR) which denies deduction or requires an adjustment to the extent the low-taxed income of a constituent entity is not subject to tax under the IIR. IIR and UTPR together are called the Global anti-Base Erosion Rules (GloBE);
iii) A treaty-based STTR that allows jurisdictions to impose limited source taxation on certain related party payments subject to tax below a minimum rate.

The IIR is to be applied in the country in which the parent is situated, whereas the UTPR and the STTR apply in the case of the subsidiary.

3.6 Which entities are covered?
MNEs that meet the €750 million revenue threshold under BEPS Action 13 (Country-by-Country Reporting) would be subject to the GloBE rules. However, even if the above thresholds are not met, countries are free to apply the IIR to MNEs headquartered in their States.

The exclusion from the GloBE rules also includes Government entities, international organisations, pension funds or investment funds that are Ultimate Parent Entities (UPE) of an MNE Group or any holding vehicles used by such entities.

UTPR will not apply to MNEs in the initial phase of their international activity, i.e., those MNEs whose tangible assets abroad do not exceed €50 million and who do not operate in more than five jurisdictions. Such exclusion is limited for a period of five years after the MNE comes within the scope of the GloBE rules for the first time. For MNEs which are covered by the GloBE rules when they come into effect, UTPR will not apply for five years and the period of five years shall commence at the time the UTPR Rules come into effect.

3.7 Income Inclusion Rule
The IIR will operate to impose a top-up tax using an Effective Tax Rate (ETR) test that is calculated on a jurisdictional basis. The minimum tax rate specified is 15%. Accordingly, in a situation where the constituent entity has not been subjected to tax of at least 15%, the jurisdiction of the parent entity will collect top-up tax.

3.8 Undertaxed Payment Rule
The UTPR applies in a situation where the transaction is not subject to IIR. It allocates top-up tax from low-tax constituent entities. The minimum ETR for the UTPR is 15%.

3.9 Subject To Tax Rule
The members have agreed on a minimum rate of 9% for the STTR and therefore covered payments, which are subjected to tax in the residence jurisdiction at a rate lower than 9%, will be subject to STTR in the payer jurisdictions. [This is a bilateral solution applicable in case of Interest, Royalties and other specified payments. Where a treaty partner country taxes such income below the STTR rate of 9% in its jurisdiction, then the other partner may tax the differential rate so as to ensure that such payments are taxed minimum at the STTR rate.]

3.10 Implementation
As the GloBE rules relate to amendments in domestic tax laws, model rules will be developed by the end of November, 2021 defining the scope and setting out the mechanics of the rules. It is expected that Pillar Two will be brought into law in 2022, to be effective in 2023 and UTPR to apply from 2024. Implementation of the GloBE rules is not mandatory on jurisdictions. However, if such rules are implemented, a common approach is to be followed and the rules and implementation are to be undertaken in the manner provided in Pillar Two.

A model treaty provision will be developed by the end of November, 2021 incorporating the STTR.

3.11 Important Elements of Pillar Two
i) It is restated that Inclusive Framework members are not required to adopt the GloBE rules but if they choose to do so, they should implement and administer the rules in a way that is consistent with the outcomes provided for under Pillar Two, including the model rules and guidance agreed to by the Inclusive Framework. It is also restated that Inclusive Framework members accept the application of the GloBE rules applied by other Inclusive Framework members.
ii) The design of Pillar Two is restated, including the GloBE rules, consisting of the IIR and the UTPR, and the STTR. Exclusion from the UTPR will be available for MNEs in the initial phase of their international activity (i.e., MNEs with a maximum of €50 million tangible assets abroad that operate in no more than five other jurisdictions). This exclusion is limited to five years after the MNE comes into the scope of the GloBE rules for the first time. In respect of existing distribution tax systems, there will be no top-up tax liability if earnings are distributed within four years and taxed at or above the minimum level.
iii) The minimum tax rate for purposes of the IIR and UTPR will be 15%.
iv) The substance-based carve-out is modified from the July Statement, with a transition period of ten years. (Detailed guidelines are provided for the same.)
v) A de minimis exclusion is provided for those jurisdictions where the MNE has revenues of less than €10 million and profits of less than €1 million.
vi) The nominal tax rate used for the application of the STTR will be 9%.
vii) Pillar Two will apply a minimum rate on a jurisdictional basis. Consideration will be given to the conditions under which the United States Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) regime will co-exist with the GloBE rules, to ensure a level playing field.
viii) The October Statement reiterates that Pillar Two generally should be brought into law in 2022, to be effective in 2023. However, the entry into effect of the UTPR has been deferred to 2024.

4. LIKELY IMPACT OF TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION
Under Pillar One, taxing rights on more than USD 125 billion of profit are expected to be reallocated to market jurisdictions each year. With respect to Pillar Two, with a minimum rate of 15%, the global minimum tax is estimated to generate around USD 150 billion in additional global tax revenues per year. The precise revenue impact will depend on the extent of the implementation of Pillar One and Pillar Two, the nature and scale of reactions by MNEs and Governments and future economic developments.

In terms of the investment impact, the Two-Pillar Solution is expected to provide a favourable environment for investment and growth. The absence of an agreement may have led to a proliferation of uncoordinated and unilateral tax measures (e.g., Digital Services Taxes and Equalisation Levy) and an increase in tax and trade disputes which would have undermined tax certainty and investment and resulted in additional compliance and administration burdens. It is estimated that these disputes could reduce global GDP by more than 1%.

5. FURTHER COURSE OF ACTION
Model rules to implement Pillar Two will be developed in 2021 with an MLC to implement Pillar One finalised by February, 2022. Inclusive Framework members have set an ambitious deadline of 2023 to bring the new international tax rules into effect.

6. IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION
6.1 Impact of the Two-Pillar Solution on tax payments by MNEs
Each Pillar addresses a different gap in the existing rules that allows MNEs to avoid paying taxes. First, Pillar One applies to about 100 of the biggest and most profitable MNEs and reallocates part of their profit to the countries where they sell their products and provide their services, where their consumers are located. Without this rule, these companies can earn significant profits in a market jurisdiction without paying much tax there.

Under Pillar Two, a much larger group of MNEs (any company with over €750 million of annual revenue) would now be subject to a global minimum corporate tax of 15%.

6.2 Coverage of MNEs in Two-Pillar Solution
The BEPS Project aims to ensure that all taxpayers pay their fair share of tax. While it is true that the reallocation of profit under Pillar One would apply to only about 100 companies now, these are the largest and most profitable ones.

There is also a provision to expand the scope after seven years once there is experience with implementation. Pillar One also includes a commitment to develop simplified, streamlined approaches to the application of transfer pricing rules to certain arrangements, with particular focus on the needs of low-capacity countries which are very often the subject of tax disputes.

The objective of Pillar Two is to ensure that a much broader range of MNEs (those with a turnover of at least €750 million, which will be several companies) pay a minimum level of tax, while preserving the ability of all companies to innovate and be competitive.

For other smaller companies, the existing rules continue to apply and the Inclusive Framework has a number of other international tax standards like the BEPS actions to reduce the risks of tax avoidance and ensure that they pay their fair share.

6.3 Developing Countries – Beneficial Impact
Developing countries make up a large part of the Inclusive Framework’s membership and their voices have been active and effective throughout the negotiations. The OECD estimates that on average, low-, middle- and high-income countries would all experience revenue gains as a result of Pillar One, but these gains would be expected to be larger (as a share of current corporate income tax revenues) among low-income jurisdictions. Overall, the GloBE rules will relieve pressure on developing countries to provide excessively generous tax incentives to attract foreign investment; at the same time, there will be carve-outs for activities with real substance. Specific benefits aimed at developing countries include:

i) Protecting their tax base by implementing the Subject to Tax Rule in their bilateral tax treaties ensuring minimum overall 9% tax on income from interest and royalties to MNEs (refer para 3.9 for further details).
ii) The simplified and streamlined approach to the application of the arm’s length principle to in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities, as low-capacity countries often struggle to administer transfer-pricing rules and will benefit from a formulaic approach in those cases.
iii) A lower threshold for determining the reallocation of profit under Pillar One to smaller economies.

The Two-Pillar Solution acknowledges the calls from developing countries for more mechanical, predictable rules and generally provides a redistribution of taxing rights to market jurisdictions based on where sales and users are located, often in developing countries. It also provides for a global minimum tax which will help put an end to tax havens and lessen the incentive for MNEs to shift profits out of developing countries. Developing countries can still offer effective incentives that attract genuine, substantive foreign direct investments. Importantly, this multilaterally agreed solution avoids the risk of retaliatory trade sanctions that could result from unilateral approaches such as digital services taxes.

6.4 Impact on profit-shifting by MNEs via tax havens, etc.
Harmful tax competition and aggressive tax planning have done great harm to the world economy. Tax havens have thrived over the years by offering secrecy (like bank secrecy) and shell companies (where the company doesn’t need to have any employees or activity in the jurisdiction) and no or low tax on profits booked there. The work of the G20 and the OECD-hosted Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes has ended bank secrecy (including leading to the automatic exchange of bank information), and the OECD BEPS Project requires companies to have a minimum level of substance to put an end to shell companies along with important transparency rules so that tax administrations can apply their tax rules effectively. Pillar Two will now ensure that those companies pay a minimum effective tax rate of 15% on their profits booked there (subject to carve-outs for real, substantial activities). Many countries including the UAE have introduced Economic Substance Regulations and related reporting each year to avoid shell companies.

6.5 Exclusions for certain business activities
There are four exclusions from the Two-Pillar solutions; these are, mining companies, regulated financial services, shipping companies and pension funds. The OECD Document clarifies that the exclusions that are provided for ‘relate to types of profit and activities that are not part of this problem either because the profit is already tied to the place where it is earned (for example, regulated financial services and mining companies will have to have their operations in the place where they earn their income), or the activity benefits from different taxation regimes due to their specific nature (such as shipping companies and pension funds).’ In any case, these types of businesses are still subject to all the other international tax standards on transparency and BEPS to ensure that tax authorities can tax them effectively.

7. IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINES
A detailed Implementation Plan has also been agreed upon. It contains ambitious deadlines to complete work on the rules and instruments to bring the Two-Pillar Solution into effect by 2023.

PROPOSED TIMELINES
A. Pillar One
a) Early 2022 – Text of a Multilateral Convention and Explanatory Statement to implement Amount A of Pillar One;
b) Early 2022 – Model rules for domestic legislation necessary for the implementation of Pillar One;
c) Mid-2022 – High-level signing ceremony for the Multilateral Convention;
d) End 2022 – Finalisation of work on Amount B for Pillar One;
e) 2023 – Implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution.

B. Pillar Two
a) November, 2021 – Model rules to define scope and mechanics for the GloBE rules;
b) November, 2021 – Model treaty provision to give effect to the subject to tax rule;
c) Mid-2022 – Multilateral Instrument for implementation of the STTR in relevant bilateral treaties;
d) End 2022 – Implementation framework to facilitate coordinated implementation of the GloBE rules;
e) 2023 – Implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution.

The detailed Implementation Plan provides for a clear and ambitious timeline to ensure effective implementation from 2023 onwards. On Pillar One, model rules for domestic legislation will be developed by early 2022 and the new taxing right in respect of re-allocated profit (Amount A) will be implemented through a multilateral convention with a view to allowing it to come into effect in 2023. India and many other countries may see changes in their domestic tax laws to include provisions of Pillar One. Similarly, one may see the end of unilateral measures such as the Equalisation Levy once the agreement is finalised, as stated by our Finance Minister recently. Meanwhile, work will be developed on Amount B and the in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities in scope, by the end of 2022. As for Pillar Two, model rules to give effect to the minimum corporate tax will be developed by November, 2021, as well as the model treaty provision to implement the subject to tax rule. A multilateral instrument will then be released by mid-2022 to facilitate the implementation of this rule in bilateral treaties.

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The October Statement marks an important milestone in the BEPS 2.0 project on fundamental changes to the global tax rules, with all OECD and G20 countries (including the European Union) now supporting the agreement on key parameters. However, more work will be required to reach agreement on some key design elements of the two Pillars. In addition, there is significant work to be done to fill in the substantive and technical details in the development of the planned model rules, treaty provisions and explanatory material. That work will need to be completed quickly in order to meet the timelines reflected in the implementation plan. It should be noted that while the October Statement provides that the work will continue to progress in consultation with stakeholders, the implementation plan provides limited time to policymakers to engage with businesses and other stakeholders.

It is said that technology has made our life simple in many respects but extremely complicated when it comes to determination of source rules for taxation. The Two-Pillar Solution is anything but a simplified, zero-defect multi-prong solution. The OECD Document admits that even the minimum corporate tax rate of 15% is a compromise, as a majority of jurisdictions have a higher corporate tax rate. But then it is said that we all live in an imperfect world, striving towards perfection which is nothing but a mirage.

Acknowledgement: The authors have relied upon various OECD publications and statements, etc., in July and October 2021 for this write-up.)

 

Vivad Se Vishwas – Pending appeal – Application for condonation of delay pending before CIT(A) – Notice of hearing issued – Application under VSV rejected by Pr. CIT on the ground that appeal was not admitted – Held not justified

4 Stride Multitrade Pvt. Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT Circle – 13(2)(2) [Writ Petition (L) No. 12932 of 2021; Date of order: 21st September, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Vivad Se Vishwas – Pending appeal – Application for condonation of delay pending before CIT(A) – Notice of hearing issued – Application under VSV rejected by Pr. CIT on the ground that appeal was not admitted – Held not justified

The petitioner challenged the order of rejection passed by the Pr. CIT under the provisions of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 (‘VSV’ Act).

The petitioner had filed its original return of income tax for A.Y. 2017-18 on 30th October, 2017 declaring total income at loss of Rs. 23,92,61,385. The case was selected for scrutiny and respondent No. 1 passed an assessment order dated 19th December, 2019 u/s 144. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed an appeal before respondent No. 3 u/s 246A on 6th February, 2020. The time limit for filing the appeal u/s 246A expired on 18th January, 2020 but the appeal was filed on 6th February, 2020 along with an application for condonation of delay. The delay was of 19 days. On 24th January, 2020 the petitioner had paid the filing fees for the appeal.

On 20th January, 2021, the petitioner received a communication from the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre, inquiring with it whether it would wish to opt for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2020, or would like to contest the appeal. The petitioner was told to furnish the ground-wise written submission in support of the grounds of appeal along with supporting documents and evidences if it was not opting for the VSV Scheme, 2020.

The Court observed that since this communication has come from the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is asking the petitioner to furnish a ground-wise written submission on the grounds of appeal, it would mean that the condonation of delay application had been allowed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Therefore, for respondent No. 2 to say that there is no order condoning the delay and, hence, the application / declaration of the petitioner under the VSV Act is rejected, is incorrect.

Moreover, section 2(1)(a)(i) of the VSV Act provides for a person in whose case an appeal or a writ petition or special leave petition has been filed either by himself or by the Income Tax Authority, or by both, before an appellate forum and such appeal or petition is pending as on the specified date, is entitled to make a declaration under the Act. The petitioner has admittedly made its declaration in Form 1 on 21st January, 2021, i.e., within the prescribed period.

The Central Board of Direct Taxes issued a Circular dated 4th December, 2020 in which question 59 and the answer thereto reads as under:

‘Q.59. Whether the taxpayer in whose case the time limit for filing of appeal has expired before 31st January, 2020 but an application for condonation of delay has been filed is eligible?

Answer: If the time limit for filing appeal expired during the period from 1st April, 2019 to 31st January, 2020 (both dates included in the period), and the application for condonation is filed before the date of issue of this Circular, and appeal is admitted by the appellate authority before the date of filing of the declaration, such appeal will be deemed to be pending as on 31st January, 2020.’

Therefore, where the time limit for filing of appeal has expired before 31st January, 2020 but an appeal with an application for condonation is filed before the date of the Circular, i.e., 4th December, 2020, such appeal will be deemed to be pending as on 31st January, 2020. In the answer to question 59 the expression used is ‘an appeal is admitted by the appellate authority before the date of filing of the declaration’. This has been dealt with by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Sethi vs. Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-10 and Ors. in Writ Petition (C) 2291/2021 and CM APPL. 6677/2021 dated 3rd March, 2021 wherein it is held that an appeal would be ‘pending’ in the context of section 2(1)(a) of the VSV Act when it is first filed till its disposal and the Act does not stipulate that the appeal should be admitted before the specified date, it only adverts to its pendency. The Court opined that the respondent could not have wrongly equated admission of the appeal with pendency. The Court, therefore, held that the appeal would be pending as soon as it is filed and until such time that it is adjudicated upon and a decision is taken qua the same. The Court agreed with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Shyam Sunder Sethi (Supra).

The Court held that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) himself has addressed a letter dated 20th January, 2021 asking the petitioner to furnish ground-wise submissions on the grounds of appeal if he was not opting for the VSV Scheme, 2020. This itself would also mean that the delay has been condoned. The order of rejection dated 26th February, 2021 is bad in law and is accordingly set aside. The respondent is directed to process the forms filed by the petitioner under the provisions of the VSV Act.

Reopening of assessment – Beyond four years – Precondition – Failure on part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary – No power to review

3 Ananta Landmark Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT Central Circle 5(3)
[Writ Petition No. 2814 of 2019; Date of order: 14th September, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Reopening of assessment – Beyond four years – Precondition – Failure on part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary – No power to review

The petitioner had filed its return for A.Y. 2012-13 u/s 139 along with its audited profit and loss account, balance sheet and auditor’s report. It received a notice u/s 143(2) and also u/s 142(1) calling upon it to furnish the documents mentioned as per the annexure to the notice. There were four relevant items mentioned in the annexure… By its letter dated 14th August, 2014, the petitioner submitted all the documents asked for and also clarified that the tax audit report in Form 3CD for the A.Y. 2012-13 was not applicable.

Thereafter, the petitioner received another notice calling upon it to provide certain details, one of which was ‘details of interest expenses claimed u/s 57’. These details were provided vide a letter dated 3rd December, 2014. A personal hearing was granted at which even further details were sought. The petitioner provided even more documents and details by its letter of 17th December, 2014.

After considering all the details supplied, an assessment order dated 20th February, 2015 was passed accepting the petitioner’s explanations and computation of income. But more than four years after this assessment order, the petitioner received yet another notice dated 26th March, 2019 u/s 148 stating as under:

‘I have reasons to believe that your income chargeable to tax for the A.Y. 2012-13 has escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961’.

In response, the petitioner, without prejudice to its rights and contentions, sought the reasons for this belief. The respondent by its letter dated 28th May, 2019 provided the reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment. In short, the issue raised in the reopening was in regard to deduction claimed u/s 57.

The petitioner responded by its letter dated 19th June, 2019 filing its objections to the reopening of the assessment. According to it, there was no failure to truly and fully disclose material facts and, in any case, it was a mere change of opinion and there was no fresh tangible material for initiating reassessment proceedings. Respondent No. 1 then passed an order dated 30th September, 2019 with reference to the objections raised by the petitioner to the issuance of notice u/s 148.

It was stated by the Department that subsequent to the assessment proceedings it was noticed that the assessee had wrongly claimed deduction u/s 57. Accordingly, the A.O. found reasons to decide on reopening the assessment. This issue had gone unnoticed by the A.O. during the course of the original assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2012-13 and therefore the jurisdictional requirement u/s 147 was fulfilled and reopening u/s 147 cannot be challenged. Further, the A.O. has not had any discussion in respect of the points on which assessment has been reopened, thus it can be hardly stated that the A.O. had formed an opinion on such points during the original assessment proceedings.

The High Court held that the A.O. had no jurisdiction to issue the notice u/s 148. It further observed as follows:

A) It is settled law that where the assessment is sought to be reopened after the expiry of a period of four years from the end of the relevant year, the proviso to section 147 stipulates a requirement that there must be a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all necessary material facts. Since in the present case the assessment is sought to be reopened after a period of four years, the proviso to section 147 is applicable.

B) It is also settled law that the A.O. has no power to review an assessment which has been concluded. If a period of four years has lapsed from the end of the relevant year, the A.O. has to mention what is the tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment and that there has been a failure to fully and truly disclose material facts.

C) After a period of four years even if the A.O. has some tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment, he cannot exercise the power to reopen unless he discloses what was the material fact which was not truly and fully disclosed by the assessee. Considering the reasons for reopening, the Court noticed that except stating that a sum of Rs. 7,66,66,663 which was chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary, there is nothing else in the reasons. The Court held that a general statement that the escapement of income is by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment is not enough. The A.O. should indicate what is the material fact that was not truly and fully disclosed to him. In the affidavit in reply, it is stated that the reassessment proceedings was based on audit objections.

D) The Court held that the reason for reopening an assessment should be that of the A.O. alone and he cannot act merely on the dictates of any another person in issuing the notice. The Court said that in every case the Income Tax Officer must determine for himself what is the effect and consequence of the law mentioned in the audit note and whether in consequence of the law which has come to his notice he can reasonably believe that income has escaped assessment. The basis of his belief must be the law of which he has now become aware. The opinion rendered by the audit party in regard to the law cannot, for the purpose of such belief, add to or colour the significance of such law. Therefore, the true evaluation of the law in its bearing on the assessment must be made directly and solely by the Income Tax Officer.

E) In the present case, the reasons which have been recorded by the A.O. for reopening of the assessment do not state that the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. The reasons for reopening an assessment have to be tested / examined only on the basis of the reasons recorded at the time of issuing a notice u/s 148 seeking to reopen an assessment. These reasons cannot be improved upon and / or supplemented, much less substituted by affidavit and / or oral submissions.

F) As regards the ground that the A.O. had not held any discussion in respect of those points on which assessment was reopened and hence he had not formed any opinion and thus the window of reopening of assessment would remain open for the A.O. on those points, these were not the grounds in the reasons for reopening. The entire case of the respondent while issuing the reason for reopening was ‘failure to disclose truly and fully material facts’.

G) As regards the ground that the disclosure of material facts with respect to the setting off of the interest expenses u/s 57 might be full but it cannot be considered as true, and hence it is failure on the part of the assessee, the mere production of books of accounts or other documents are not enough in view of Explanation 1 to section 147, etc., the words used are ‘omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year’. It postulates a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. What facts are material, and necessary for assessment, will differ from case to case. In every assessment proceeding, the assessing authority will, for the purpose of computing or determining the proper tax due from an assessee, require to know all the facts which help him in coming to the correct conclusion. From the primary facts in his possession, whether on disclosure by the assessee or discovered by him on the basis of the facts disclosed, or otherwise, the assessing authority has to draw inferences as regards certain other facts; and ultimately, from the primary facts and the further facts inferred from them, the authority has to draw the proper legal inferences and ascertain the proper tax leviable on a correct interpretation of the taxing enactment..

Thus, when a question arises whether certain income received by an assessee is capital receipt or revenue receipt, the assessing authority has to find out what primary facts have been proved, what other facts can be inferred from them, and taking all these together to decide what should be the legal inference. There can be no doubt that the duty of disclosing all the primary facts relevant to the decision of the question before the assessing authority lies on the assessee.

H) Whether it is a disclosure or not within the meaning of section 147 would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature of the document and circumstances in which it is produced. The duty of the assessee is to fully and truly disclose all primary facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. It is not part of his duty to point out what legal inference should be drawn from the facts disclosed. It is for the Income Tax Officer to draw a proper reference. In the case at hand, the petitioner had filed its annual return along with computation of taxable income along with MAT (minimum alternate tax) calculation as per provisions of section 115JB, audited annual financials including auditor’s report, balance sheet, profit and loss account and notes to accounts, annual tax statement in Form 26AS u/s 203AA in response to the notices received u/s 142(1) and 143(2). The petitioner also explained how the borrowing costs that are attributable to the acquisition or construction of assets have been provided for, what are the short-term borrowings and from whom have they been received. It also gave details of interest expenses claimed u/s 57 in response to the further notice of 10th October, 2014 u/s 142 (1), attended personal hearings and explained and gave further details as called for in the personal hearing vide its letter dated 17th December, 2014 – and after considering all this, the assessment order dated 20th February, 2015 was passed accepting the return of income filed by the assessee.

The A.O. had in his possession all primary facts and it was for him to make necessary inquiries and draw a proper inference as to whether from the interest paid of Rs. 75,79,35,292 an amount of Rs. 7,66,66,663 has to be allowed as deduction u/s 57 or the entire interest expenses of Rs. 75,79,35,292 should have been capitalised to the work in progress against claiming just Rs. 7,66,66,663 as deduction u/s 57.

The A.O. had had all the material facts before him when he made the original assessment. When the primary facts necessary for assessment are fully and truly disclosed, he is not entitled to change of opinion to commence proceedings for reassessment. Even if the A.O. who passed the assessment order may have raised too many legal inferences from the facts disclosed, on that account the A.O. who has decided to reopen the assessment is not competent to reopen assessment proceedings. Where on consideration of the material on record one view is conclusively taken by the A.O., it would not be open to him to reopen the assessment based on the very same material in order to take another view. As noted earlier, the petitioner has filed the annual returns with the required documents as provided for u/s 139. There was nothing more to disclose and a person cannot be said to have omitted or failed to disclose something when he had no knowledge of such a thing. One cannot be expected to disclose a thing or said to have failed to disclose it, unless it is a matter which he knows or knows about. In this case, except for a general statement in the reasons for reopening, the A.O. has not disclosed what was the material fact that the petitioner had failed to disclose.

The Court observed that the petitioner had truly and fully disclosed all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. Not only material facts were disclosed truly and fully, but they were carefully scrutinised and figures of income as well as deduction were reworked carefully by the A.O. In the reasons for reopening, the A.O. has, in fact, relied on the audited accounts to say that the claim of deduction u/s 57 was not correct, and the figures mentioned in the reason for reopening of assessment are also found in the audited accounts of the petitioner. In the reasons for reopening, there is not even a whisper as to what was not disclosed. In the order rejecting the objections, the A.O. admits that all details were fully disclosed. Thus, this is not a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened on the reasonable belief that income had escaped assessment on account of failure of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts that were necessary for computation of income, but this is a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened on account of change of opinion of the A.O. about the manner of computation of the deduction u/s 57.

Consequently, the petition is allowed. The notice dated 26th March, 2019 issued by respondent No. 1 u/s 148 seeking to reopen the assessment for the A.Y. 2012-13 and the order dated 30th September, 2019 are quashed and set aside.

Refund – Withholding of refund – Condition precedent – A.O. must apply his mind before withholding refund – Reasons for withholding must be recorded in writing and approval of Commissioner or Principal Commissioner obtained – Discretion to withhold refund must be exercised in judicious manner – Withholding of refund without recording reasons – Not sustainable

16 Mcnally Bharat Engineering Company Ltd. vs. CIT [2021] 437 ITR 265 (Cal) A.Y.: 2017-18; Date of order: 6th August, 2021 Ss. 143(1), 241A and 244A of ITA, 1961

Refund – Withholding of refund – Condition precedent – A.O. must apply his mind before withholding refund – Reasons for withholding must be recorded in writing and approval of Commissioner or Principal Commissioner obtained – Discretion to withhold refund must be exercised in judicious manner – Withholding of refund without recording reasons – Not sustainable

For the A.Y. 2017-18, the assessee declared loss in its return of income and claimed refund of the entire tax deducted at source. The assessee received a notice u/s 143(2) and an intimation u/s 143(1) regarding the refund payable thereunder with interest for the A.Y. 2017-18 u/s 244A. Subsequently, the refund was withheld u/s 241A by the A.O. without assigning any reasons.

The Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) The very essence of passing of the order u/s 241A was application of mind by the A.O. to the issues which were germane for withholding the refund on the basis of statutory prescription contained in section 241A. The power of the A.O. under the provisions of section 241A could be exercised only after he had formed an opinion that the refund was likely to adversely affect the Revenue and with the prior approval of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as an order for refund after the assessment u/s 143(3) pursuant to a notice u/s 143(2) was subject to appeal or further proceedings.

ii) Having not done so, the officer had acted arbitrarily. At the point of time when the refund was notified, there was no other demand pending against the assesse either for a prior or a subsequent period. The procedure followed by the A.O. did not also show proper application of two independent provisions as in section 241A and section 143 wherein once a refund was declared after scrutiny proceedings and such refund was withheld, a reasoned order had to follow because the assessment in such a case was done after production of materials and evidence required by the A.O. No reasons were assigned by him by referring to any materials that the refund declared would adversely affect the Revenue.

iii) That apart, the assessee was a public limited company whose accounts were stringently scrutinised at the internal level. It was, therefore, more important to apply the provisions more cautiously while withholding the refund after it had been declared on completion of assessment on scrutiny. The assessee became entitled to the refund immediately on the completion of the assessment and the refund having been notified. The A.O. could not have withheld the refund to link such refund with any demand against the assessee for a subsequent period when such demand was not in existence on the date when the refund was notified.

iv) The competent officer being authorised under the statute to withhold the refund if he had reasons to believe that it would adversely affect the Revenue, could or could have withheld the refund after the refund had been declared only after assigning reasons and not otherwise. The A.O. had withheld the refund without assigning any reason though the statute mandated the recording of reasons. Having not done so, the A.O. had acted arbitrarily. The withholding of the refund for the A.Y. 2017-18 was not sustainable and therefore was set aside and quashed. The assessee was entitled to refund with interest till the actual date of refund.’

Penalty – Penalty u/s 271AAB in search cases – Income-tax survey – Survey of assessee firm pursuant to search and seizure of another group – No assessment u/s 153A – Where search u/s 132 has not been conducted penalty cannot be levied u/s 271AAB

15 Principal CIT vs. Silemankhan and Mahaboobkhan [2021] 437 ITR 260 (AP) A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 12th July, 2021 Ss. 132, 133A, 153C, 271AAB and 260A of ITA, 1961

Penalty – Penalty u/s 271AAB in search cases – Income-tax survey – Survey of assessee firm pursuant to search and seizure of another group – No assessment u/s 153A – Where search u/s 132 has not been conducted penalty cannot be levied u/s 271AAB

In the course of a search conducted u/s 132A against an entity, the statements of its partners were recorded u/s 132(4). Pursuant thereto, a survey u/s 133A was conducted in the assessee firm and a notice was issued u/s 153C, whereupon the assessee filed a return admitting additional income. The Tribunal, referring to the proposition of law that no penalty u/s 271AAB could be imposed when search u/s 132 was not conducted against the assessee and the consistent view taken by the Tribunal, held that the imposition of penalty u/s 271AAB was illegal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) When the return of income is filed in response to a notice u/s 153C by an assessee in whose case search has not been conducted u/s 132, penalty u/s 271AAB cannot be imposed. Penalty under the provision can be imposed only when a search has been initiated against the assessee.

ii) No penalty u/s 271AAB could be imposed when admittedly a search u/s 132 had not been conducted in the assessee’s premises. The notice issued u/s 153C was incidental to the search proceedings of the searched party and could not be a foundation to impose penalty against the assessee u/s 271AAB. The legal position was based on the clear and unequivocal meaning transpiring from the words used in the section and cannot yield to any other interpretation. The view had been consistently followed by the Tribunal and was binding on the Department in such cases. No contrary view either of any High Court or the Supreme Court had been placed.

iii) In the light of the settled proposition of law, the provisions of section 271AAB could not be invoked to impose penalty on the assessee on whom search was not conducted. There was no perversity or illegality in the finding of the Tribunal. No question of law arose.’

Housing project – Special deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Open terrace of building not to be included for computation of built-up area – Time limit for completion of project – Date of approval of building plan and not date of lay-out – Completion certificate issued by local panchayat would satisfy requirement of section – Assessee entitled to deduction

14 CIT vs. Shanmugham Muthu Palaniappan [2021] 437 ITR 276 (Mad) A.Y.: 2010-11; Date of order: 15th June, 2021 S. 80-IB(10) of ITA, 1961

Housing project – Special deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Open terrace of building not to be included for computation of built-up area – Time limit for completion of project – Date of approval of building plan and not date of lay-out – Completion certificate issued by local panchayat would satisfy requirement of section – Assessee entitled to deduction

The assessee developed housing projects and claimed deduction u/s 80-IB(10) for the A.Y. 2010-11. The Tribunal held that (a) the open terrace area of the building should not be included while computing the built-up area for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s 80-IB(10), (b) the time limit for completion of the eligible project should not be computed from the date on which the lay-out was approved for the first time but only from the date on which the building plan approval was obtained for the last time, and (c) the completion certificate issued by the local panchayat would satisfy the requirements of the section instead of the completion certificate issued by Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority which had originally approved the plan.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘The Tribunal was right in holding that, (i) the open terrace area should not be included while computing the built-up area for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s 80-IB(10), (ii) the time limit for completion of the eligible project should not be computed from the date on which the lay-out was approved for the first time, but only from the date on which the building plan approval was obtained for the last time, and (iii) the completion certificate issued by the local panchayat would satisfy the requirements of the section instead of the completion certificate issued by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority which had originally approved the plan.’

EQUIPMENT INSTALLED AT CUSTOMER PREMISES – WHETHER LEASE OR NOT?

To determine whether a contractual arrangement contains a lease under Ind AS 116 Leases, can be very tricky and complex. This is particularly true for equipment installed at the customer’s premises such as a solar panel or a set-top box. This article includes an example of a set-top box to explain the concept in a simple and lucid manner.

The provisions in Ind AS 116 Leases relevant to analysing whether an arrangement contains a lease are given below:

9 At inception of a contract, an entity shall assess whether the contract is, or contains, a lease. A contract is, or contains, a lease if the contract conveys the right to control the use of an identified asset for a period of time in exchange for consideration.

B9 To assess whether a contract conveys the right to control the use of an identified asset for a period of time, an entity shall assess whether, throughout the period of use, the customer has both of the following:
(a) the right to obtain substantially all of the economic benefits from use of the identified asset; and
(b) the right to direct the use of the identified asset.

B14 Even if an asset is specified, a customer does not have the right to use an identified asset if the supplier has the substantive right to substitute the asset throughout the period of use. A supplier’s right to substitute an asset is substantive only if both of the following conditions exist:
(a) the supplier has the practical ability to substitute alternative assets throughout the period of use (for example, the customer cannot prevent the supplier from substituting the asset and alternative assets are readily available to the supplier or could be sourced by the supplier within a reasonable period of time); and
(b) the supplier would benefit economically from the exercise of its right to substitute the asset (i.e., the economic benefits associated with substituting the asset are expected to exceed the costs associated with substituting the asset).

B17 If the asset is located at the customer’s premises or elsewhere, the costs associated with substitution are generally higher than when located at the supplier’s premises and, therefore, are more likely to exceed the benefits associated with substituting the asset.

B24 A customer has the right to direct the use of an identified asset throughout the period of use only if either:
a. the customer has the right to direct how and for what purpose the asset is used throughout the period of use; or
b. the relevant decisions about how and for what purpose the asset is used are predetermined and:

i. the customer has the right to operate the asset (or to direct others to operate the asset in a manner that it determines) throughout the period of use, without the supplier having the right to change those operating instructions; or
ii. the customer designed the asset (or specific aspects of the asset) in a way that predetermines how and for what purpose the asset will be used throughout the period of use.

B25 A customer has the right to direct how and for what purpose the asset is used if, within the scope of its right of use defined in the contract, it can change how and for what purpose the asset is used throughout the period of use. In making this assessment, an entity considers the decision-making rights that are most relevant to changing how and for what purpose the asset is used throughout the period of use. Decision-making rights are relevant when they affect the economic benefits to be derived from use. The decision-making rights that are most relevant are likely to be different for different contracts, depending on the nature of the asset and the terms and conditions of the contract.

B26 Examples of decision-making rights that, depending on the circumstances, grant the right to change how and for what purpose the asset is used, within the defined scope of the customer’s right of use, include:
a. rights to change the type of output that is produced by the asset (for example, to decide whether to use a shipping container to transport goods or for storage, or to decide upon the mix of products sold from retail space);
b. rights to change when the output is produced (for example, to decide when an item of machinery or a power plant will be used);
c. rights to change where the output is produced (for example, to decide upon the destination of a truck or a ship, or to decide where an item of equipment is used); and
d. rights to change whether the output is produced, and the quantity of that output (for example, to decide whether to produce energy from a power plant and how much energy to produce from that power plant).

B 30 A contract may include terms and conditions designed to protect the supplier’s interest in the asset or other assets, to protect its personnel, or to ensure the supplier’s compliance with laws or regulations. These are examples of protective rights. For example, a contract may (i) specify the maximum amount of use of an asset or limit where or when the customer can use the asset, (ii) require a customer to follow particular operating practices, or (iii) require a customer to inform the supplier of changes in how an asset will be used. Protective rights typically define the scope of the customer’s right of use but do not, in isolation, prevent the customer from having the right to direct the use of an asset.

EXAMPLE – SET-TOP BOX
In the telecom industry, assets such as mobile phones and set-top boxes would generally be considered as low value and therefore the telecom entities can avail the recognition exemption under Ind AS 116. This example is used to merely illustrate the concept of ‘how and for what purpose’ with regard to equipment installed at customer premises. Additionally, it is also relevant to entities where it is determined that the assets are not low in value, for example, a solar panel or where the entity chooses not to avail the low value exemption.

FACT PATTERN
Telco, a well-integrated internet, telephony and content services provider, installs a set-top box to be placed in the customer’s premises. Telco offers two kinds of set-top boxes which in turn are dependent on the services required by the customer:
(a) The set-top box has no use to the customer other than to receive the requested television, internet, or telephony services. Telco has pre-programmed the set-top box to deliver the specified services and controls what content or internet speed is delivered. The set-top box has no additional functionality and the customer cannot use it to receive any other services from any other service provider.
(b) Other set-top boxes have multiple features. The most sophisticated ones offer a wide range of functionality, including the ability to record and replay, reminders for programmes or to access content and services provided by third parties.

The asset is an identified asset as per paragraph 9 of Ind AS 116. The customer obtains substantially all of the economic benefits from the use of the set-top box as per paragraph B9 of Ind AS 116. Assume that either the set-top is not low value, or the customer does not avail the low value exemption. In such a case, whether the arrangement above contains a lease as defined under Ind AS 116?

ANALYSIS
Firstly, the asset is an identified asset in accordance with Ind AS 116.9. Secondly, the supplier does not have a substantial substitution right in accordance with paragraph B14 and B17, because it would not be economically beneficial for the supplier to replace the equipment located in the premises of the customer. Lastly, the customer obtains substantially all of the economic benefits from the use of the set-top box as per paragraph B9.

We now proceed to consider whether or not the customer directs how and for what purpose the equipment is used.

Whether or not the customer directs how and for what purpose the equipment is used in accordance with Ind AS 116.B24(a) depends on its functionality. For simple set-top boxes, with no functionality for the customer other than to receive the requested services, it can be argued that the customer does not direct how and for what purpose they are used. The customer has no more control over the set-top box than he would over similar equipment located elsewhere, including at the operator’s premises. Can it be argued that the customer has the right to direct the use of the equipment because its use is predetermined, and the customer has a right to operate the asset, because the customer can switch it on or off and can choose which programmes to watch [see Ind AS 116.B24(b)]? The author believes that merely being able to switch on or switch off the set-top box does not mean that the customer is operating the identified asset. Therefore, he believes that there is no lease in the extant case.

The more functionality the set-top box has for the customer, the more likely it is that the customer has the right to direct its use, and therefore the arrangement contains a lease. However, there is no ‘bright-line’ test and judgement will need to be applied in determining the point at which the customer is considered to direct how and for what purpose the equipment is used, and therefore whether the arrangement contains a lease.

CONCLUSION
The author believes that the arrangements involving set-top boxes with limited functionality will not constitute a lease. On the other hand, an arrangement where the underlying asset is a set-top box with multiple functionalities may constitute a lease. Each entity will need to apply judgement to make that determination.

ALLOWABILITY OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT FEES IN COMPUTING CAPITAL GAINS

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Many investors in the stock market, especially high net-worth individuals or investors who have no investing experience, use the services of portfolio managers to manage their share and / or debt portfolios. Such services of expert portfolio managers are used to maximise the returns on investments. The portfolio managers charge the investors an annual fee for their services. Such fee is normally charged as a percentage of the value of the portfolio and may also include a fee linked to the performance of the portfolio. For instance, if the likely returns at the end of the year exceed a particular threshold percentage, the portfolio manager may get a percentage of the excess return over the threshold rate of return by way of a fee. Often, particularly for high net-worth individuals, such fees may constitute a substantial amount. Such fees include STT, stamp duty and other charges and are apart from the brokerage on purchase and sale of shares.

Investors have sought to claim deduction of such portfolio management fees in the computation of capital gains. There have been several conflicting decisions of the Tribunal on the deductibility of portfolio management fees while computing the capital gains. While the Mumbai Bench has held in several cases that such portfolio management fees are not deductible, the Pune, Delhi and Kolkata Benches, and even some Mumbai Benches of the Tribunal, have held that such fees are an allowable deduction in the computation of capital gains.

DEVENDRA MOTILAL KOTHARI’S CASE
The issue first came up before the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Devendra Motilal Kothari vs. DCIT 132 ITD 173, a case relating to A.Y. 2004-05.

In this case, the assessee declared certain long-term capital gains (LTCG) and short-term capital gains (STCG) after setting off the long-term capital losses and short-term capital losses. In the course of assessment, the A.O. noticed that the assessee had added portfolio management fees of Rs. 85,63,233 to the purchase cost of the shares while computing the capital gains. According to the A.O., the fees paid by the assessee for portfolio management services were not a part of the purchase cost of the shares. He, therefore, asked the assessee to explain why these fees should not be disallowed while computing the capital gains. The assessee submitted that the fees and other charges formed part of the cost of purchase and / or expenditure incurred by him and therefore must be taken into account whilst determining the chargeable capital gain. The assessee claimed that such fees and other expenses incurred by him as an investor, including fees for managing the investments, constituted the cost of purchase and were allowable for the purpose of computing the STCG or LTCG.

The A.O. disallowed the claim of the assessee while computing the STCG and LTCG, holding that these did not form part of the cost of acquisition of the shares.

In the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), it was contended by the assessee that the portfolio management fees constituted the cost of purchase of shares and securities and therefore was allowable as deduction while computing the capital gains. It was also submitted that without payment of these fees, no investments could have been made by the assessee and the question of realisation of capital gains would not have arisen. Alternatively, it was also contended that the portfolio management fees paid could be allocated between the purchase and sale of shares for the purpose of computing capital gains.

The Commissioner (Appeals) requested the assessee to submit a working, allocating the portfolio management fees paid in connection with the purchase and sale of shares, and also in relation to the opening and closing stock of shares during the year under consideration. The assessee submitted that the management fees paid was an allowable expenditure for the purpose of computing capital gains. Alternatively, it was also submitted that these fees could be allocated on the basis of the values of opening stock, long-term purchases, short-term purchases, long-term capital sale, short-term capital sale and closing stock, and based on such allocation, deduction may be allowed while computing LTCG and STCG.

The Commissioner (Appeals) found, on the basis of two portfolio management agreements filed with him, that the quantification of the fees was based on either the market value of the assets or the net value of the assets of the assessee as held by him either at the beginning or at the end of each quarter. He held that the assessee could not explain as to how the fees paid to the portfolio managers on such explicit basis could be considered differently so as to constitute either the cost of acquisition of the assets or expenditure incurred for selling such assets. He noted in this context that nothing was furnished by the assessee to establish any such nexus.

He held that the quarterly payment of fees by the assessee to the portfolio manager had no nexus either with the acquisition of the assets or the transfer of specific assets. He also held that it was just not possible to break up the fees paid by the assessee to the portfolio manager so as to hold that the same was relatable to the expenditure incurred solely for the purchase or transfer of assets. The assessee was paying these fees to the portfolio managers even on the interest accrued to him and the dividend received and it was therefore not acceptable that these fees were exclusively paid for acquiring or selling of shares as claimed by the assessee. The disallowance made by the A.O. of the assessee’s claim for deduction of portfolio management fees while computing the capital gains was therefore confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Before the Tribunal, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that he had entered into an Investment Management Agreement with four concerns for managing his investments and fees was paid to them for these services. These fees were paid for the advice given by the Investment Management Consultants for purchase and sale of particular shares and securities as well as for the advice given by them not to sell particular shares and securities. Thus, it was contended that the expenditure incurred on the payment of these fees was in connection with the acquisition / improvement of assets as well as in connection with the sale of assets. Therefore, the fees were deductible in computing the capital gains arising to the assessee from the sale of assets, i.e., shares and securities, as per the provisions of section 48.

Without prejudice to the contention that the portfolio management fees was deductible u/s 48 in computing capital gains and as an alternative, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that this expenditure was deductible even on the basis of Real Income Theory and the Rule of Diversion of Income by Overriding Title. It was contended that these fees were in the nature of a charge against the consideration received by the assessee on the sale of shares and securities, and therefore were deductible from the sale consideration, being Diversion of Income by Overriding Title.

It was argued on behalf of the Revenue that the relevant provisions in respect of computation of income from capital gains were very specific and the Real Income Theory could not be applied while computing the income from capital gains. It was submitted that portfolio management services were generally not required in the case of investment in shares and that was the reason why there was no provision for allowing deduction for portfolio management fees in the computation of capital gains. It was contended that the income can be taxed in generic terms applying the Real Income Theory, but this theory was not relevant for allowance of any deduction.

The Revenue further argued that the basis on which the portfolio management fees was paid by the assessee was such that there was no relationship with the purchase or sale of shares. Even without making any purchase or sale of shares and securities, the assessee was liable to pay a substantial sum as portfolio management fees.

The Tribunal noted that u/s 48 expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with transfer and the cost of acquisition of the asset and cost of any improvement thereto, were deductible from the full value of the consideration received or accruing to the assessee as a result of transfer of the capital assets. While the assessee had claimed a deduction in computing the capital gains, he had, however, failed to explain as to how the fees could be considered as cost of acquisition of the shares and securities or the cost of any improvement thereto. According to the Tribunal, the assessee had also failed to explain as to how the fees could be treated as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the sale of shares and securities.

On the other hand, the basis on which the fees were paid by the assessee showed that the fees had no direct nexus with the purchase and sale of shares, and the fees was payable by the assessee, going by the basis thereof, even without there being any purchase or sale of shares in a particular period. Also, when the Commissioner (Appeals) required the assessee to allocate the fees in relation to purchase and sale of shares as well as in relation to the shares held as investment on the last date of the previous year, the assessee could not furnish such details nor could he give any definite basis on which such allocation was possible.

The Tribunal concluded, therefore, that the fees paid by the assessee for portfolio management was not inextricably linked with the particular instance of purchase and sale of shares and securities so as to treat the same as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such sale, or the cost of acquisition / improvement of the shares and securities, so as to be eligible for deduction in computing capital gains u/s 48.

Even though the assessee was under an obligation to pay the fees for portfolio management, the mere existence of such an obligation to pay was not enough for the application of the Rule of Diversion of Income by an Overriding Title. The true test for applicability of the said rule was whether such obligation was in the nature of a charge on source, i.e., the profit-earning apparatus itself, and only in such cases where the source of earning income was charged by an overriding title it could be considered as Diversion of Income by an Overriding Title. The Tribunal noted that the profit arising from the sale of shares was received by the assessee directly, which constituted its income at the point when it reached or accrued to the assessee. The fee for portfolio management, on the other hand, was paid separately by the assessee to discharge his contractual liability. In the Tribunal’s view, it was thus a case of an obligation to apply income which had accrued or arisen to the assessee and it amounted to a mere application of income.

The Tribunal further held, following the Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Udayan Chinubhai 222 ITR 456, that the Theory of Real Income could not be applied to allow deduction to the assessee which was otherwise not permissible under the Income-tax Act. What was not permissible in law as deduction under any of the heads could not be allowed as a deduction on the principle of the Real Income Theory.

The Tribunal therefore dismissed the assessee’s appeal, holding that the portfolio management fees was not deductible in computing the capital gains.

This view of the Tribunal was followed in subsequent decisions of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the cases of Pradeep Kumar Harlalka vs. ACIT 143 TTJ 446 (Mum), Homi K. Bhabha vs. ITO 48 SOT 102 (Mum), Capt. Avinash Chander Batra vs. DCIT 158 ITD 604 (Mum), ACIT vs. Apurva Mahesh Shah 172 ITD 127 (Mum) and Mateen Pyarali Dholkia vs. DCIT (2018) 171 ITD 294 (Mum).

KRA HOLDING & TRADING (P) LTD.’S CASE
The issue again came up before the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of KRA Holding & Trading (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT 46 SOT 19, in cases pertaining to A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2004-05 to 2006-07.

For A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee paid fees of Rs. 69,22,396 to a portfolio manager, consisting of termination fee of Rs. 59,15,574 and annual maintenance fee of Rs. 10,06,823. The capital gains on the sale of shares were disclosed net of such fees.

The A.O. disallowed such fees on the ground that the payment constituted ‘profit sharing fee’ paid to the portfolio manager and that the same was not authorised by or borne out of any agreement between the assessee and the portfolio manager or the SEBI (Portfolio Managers) Rules & Regulations, 1993.

Before the Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee submitted that the expenditure was incurred in connection with the acquisition of shares. Therefore, the expenditure was required to be capitalised as done by the assessee in the books of accounts. As per the assessee, this expenditure was part of the cost of acquisition of shares as there was a direct and proximate nexus between the fees paid to the portfolio manager and the process of acquisition of the securities and the sale of securities.

Without prejudice, the assessee argued that part of the fee was attributable to the act of selling of securities and, therefore, part of the fees could be said to be expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer. Further, it was argued that the fee was paid wholly and exclusively for acquiring and selling securities during the year under review. Therefore, the fees so paid should be loaded on the shares / securities purchased and sold during the year in the value proportion. In respect of the shares purchased during the year, the fees loaded would be the cost of acquisition and in respect of shares sold during the year the fees loaded would represent expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer.

The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

It was argued on behalf of the assessee before the Tribunal, that section 48 allowed deduction of any expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with transfer and this expenditure being an outflow to the assessee, should be loaded to the cost of the investments. It was claimed that what was taxable in the hands of the assessee was the actual income that reached the assessee and, therefore, the fees paid to the portfolio manager had to be deducted from the capital gains earned by the assessee.

Reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee on the jurisdictional High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Shakuntala Kantilal 190 ITR 56 (Bom) for the proposition that when the genuineness and certainty and necessity of the payments was beyond doubt, and if it was only a case of absence of the enabling provisions in section 48, ‘such type of payments were deductible in two ways, one, by taking full value of consideration, i.e., net of such payments, or deducting the same as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer.’ As per the High Court, the Legislature, while using the expression ‘full value of consideration’, has contemplated both additions as well as deductions from the apparent value. What it means is the real and effective consideration. The effective consideration is that after allowing the deductible expenditure. The expression ‘in connection with such transfer’ was certainly wider than the expression ‘for the transfer’. As per the High Court, any amount, the payment of which is absolutely necessary to effect the transfer, will be an expenditure covered by this clause.

On behalf of the Revenue it was contended that (i) the expenditure in question was directly unconnected with the securities in question and the same cannot be loaded to the cost of the acquisition; (ii) securities is a plural word, whereas the capital gains is calculated considering each capital asset on standalone basis, and for this there is need for identification of the asset-specific expenditure, be it for arriving at the cost of acquisition or for transfer-specific expenditure. Reliance was placed on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in Devendra Motilal Kothari (Supra).

In counter arguments, it was stated on behalf of the assessee that the Tribunal decision was distinguishable on facts. In that case, the assessee claimed the deduction which was calculated based on the global turnover reported by the portfolio manager, and where such turnover also included the dividend income, the basis was unscientific and unspecific, etc. Further, it was pointed out that the assessee in that case failed to discharge the onus of establishing the nexus that the fee paid to the portfolio manager was incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer of the assets; whereas, in the case being considered by the Pune Tribunal, the assessee not only demonstrated the direct nexus of the expenditure to the acquisition and sale / transfer of the securities successfully but also the fee in question was strictly on the NAV of the securities and not on the dividends or other miscellaneous income. It was claimed that the basis was totally and exclusively capital-value-oriented, consistently followed by the assessee and it constituted an acceptable basis. It was argued that when the expenditure of fee paid to the portfolio manager was genuine and an allowable claim, the claim must be allowed under the provisions of section 48.

The Tribunal observed that the scope of section 48 as per the binding judgment of the High Court in Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra) was that the claim of bona fide or genuine expenditure should be allowable in favour of the assessee so long as the incurring of the expenditure was a matter of fact and the necessity of making such a payment was the imminent requirement for the transfer of the asset. According to the Tribunal, it was now binding on its part to take the view that the expression ‘in connection with’ had wider meaning than the expression ‘for the transfer’.

The Tribunal observed that for allowing the claim of deduction in the computation of the capital gains, the expenditure had to be distinctly and intricately linked to the asset and its transfer. The onus was on the assessee to demonstrate the said linkage between the expenditure and the asset’s transfer. It was evident and binding that if the expenditure was undisputedly, necessarily and genuinely spent for the asset’s transfer within the scope of the provisions of section 48, the claim could not be disallowed for want of an express provision in section 48.

The Tribunal noted the following facts:
(i) the assessee made the payment of fee to the portfolio manager and the genuineness of the said payment was undisputed;
(ii) the Revenue authorities had also not disputed the requirement or necessity of the said payments;
(iii) quantitatively speaking, in view of the adverbial expression ‘wholly’ used in section 48(i), the payment of fee @ 5% was only restricted to the NAV of the securities and not the global turnover, including the other income;
(iv) regarding the purpose of payment in view of the adverbial expression, ‘exclusively’ used in section 48(i), the same was intended only for the twin purposes of the acquisition of the securities and for the sale of the same;
(v) the NAV was defined as the ‘net asset value of the securities of the client’ and the assessee calculated the fee linked to the securities’ value only and not including other income, such as interest or dividend, etc.

The Tribunal was of the opinion that:
(i) the expenditure was directly connected to the asset and its transfer;
(ii) it was genuinely incurred as accepted by the Revenue;
(iii) it was a bona fide payment made as per the norms of the ‘arm’s length principle’ since the portfolio manager and the assessee were unrelated;
(iv) the necessity of incurring of expenditure was imminent and it was in the normal course of the investment activity;
(v) the provisions of section 48 had to be read down in view of the ratio in the case of Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra) to accommodate the claim of such expenditure legally.

According to the Tribunal, the expression ‘in connection with such transfer’ enjoyed much wider meaning and, therefore, the fee paid to the portfolio manager had to be construed to have been expended for the purposes of acquisition and transfer of the investment of the securities. The Tribunal was of the view that the expression ‘transfer’ involved various sub-components and the first sub-component must be of purchase and possession of the securities. Unless the assessee was in possession of the asset, he could not transfer the same. Therefore, the expression ‘expenditure’ incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with ‘such transfer’ read with ‘as a result of the transfer of the capital asset’ mentioned in section 48 and 48(i) must necessarily encompass the transfer involved at the stage of acquisition of the securities till the stage of transfer involved in the step of sale of the impugned securities. Such an interpretation of section 48 of the Act was a necessity to avoid the likely absurdity.

The Tribunal therefore held that the expenditure was allowable u/s 48.

The view taken by the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in this case has been followed by the Pune and other Benches of the Tribunal in the cases of DCIT vs. KRA Holding & Trading (P) Ltd. 54 SOT 493 (Pune), Serum International Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [IT Appeal No. 1576/PN/2012 and 1617/PN/2012, dated 18th February, 2015], RDA Holding & Trading (P) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [IT Appeal No. 2166/PN/2013 dated 29th October, 2014], Hero Motocorp Ltd. vs. DCIT [ITA No. 6282/Del/2015 dated 13th January, 2021], Amrit Diamond Trade Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA No. 2642/Mum/2013 dated 15th January, 2016], Shyam Sunder Duggal HUF vs. ACIT [ITA No. 2998/Mum/2011 dated 22nd February, 2019] and Joy Beauty Care (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [ITA No. 856/Kol/2017 dated 5th September, 2018].

OBSERVATIONS
A portfolio manager’s services, his fees and many related aspects are governed by the SEBI (Portfolio Managers) Regulations, 2000. Services include taking investment decisions on behalf of the client that can largely be classified into three parts:
a. identifying the scrip and the time and value of purchase,
b. decision as to retention of an investment, and
c. identifying the scrip and the time and price for exit.

The services do not include brokerage. Fees, though composite, are payable for performing the above-listed functions. The Regulations require the portfolio manager to share the manner of charging the fees and, importantly, for each service rendered to the client in the agreement. These fees are annually charged on the basis of the value of the portfolio or any other agreeable basis. In addition, though not always, fees are charged by sharing a part of the profit that accrues to the client.

In the context of section 48 of the Income-tax Act, the part of the fees attributable to the advisory services leading to the purchase should qualify to be included in the cost of acquisition and the other part of the fees attributable to the advisory services leading to the sale of the scrip should qualify to be included in the expenses incurred for the transfer. Unless otherwise stated in section 48, deduction of these parts of the fees should not be resisted. At the most, there could be a need to scientifically identify the parts of the fees attributable to these activities and allocate the parts rationally. Paying a lump sum or a composite fee should not be a ground for its blanket disallowance, nor should the manner of such payment take away the fact that the major part of the fees is paid for advising or deciding on various components of the purchase and sale of the scrip. No one pays the fees to a portfolio manager only for advice to retain the investment, though that part is relevant, but it is not a deciding factor for seeking the services of the portfolio manager. Besides, the advice to continue to retain a scrip is intended to fetch a better price realisation for the scrip and such advice should therefore also be construed as advice in relation to the sale of the investment.

Even otherwise, this should not discourage the claim for its allowance once it is accepted that the fees are paid mainly for advice on purchase and sales of investment; in the absence of a provision similar to section 14A, no part of an indivisible expenditure can be disallowed.

The issue in case of composite charges should not be whether it is allowable or not, at the most it could be how much out of the total is allowable. Even the answer here should be that no part of it could be disallowable where no provision for its segregation exists in the Act. [Maharashtra Sugars Ltd. 82 ITR 452(SC) and Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. 242 ITR 450(SC).]

As regards the fees representing the sharing of profit, we are of the considered opinion that such part is diverted at source under a contract which is not an agreement for partnership and surely is for payment for services offered.

The lead dissenting decision in the case of Devendra Motilal Kothari (Supra) was delivered against the claim for allowance, largely on account of the inability of the assessee to provide the basis for allocation of expenses on rational basis. This part is made clear by the Tribunal in its decision, making it clear that the expenditure could have been allowed in cases where the allocation was made available.

The other reason for dissenting with the decision of the Pune Bench in the KRA Investment case (Supra) was that the Bench had followed the Bombay High Court decision in Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra ) which, as noted in Pradeep Harlalka’s case (Supra), was overruled by the same Court in its later decision in Roshanbanu’s case (Supra). With great respect, without appreciating the facts in both the cases and, importantly, the part that had been overruled, it was incorrect on the part of the Mumbai Bench to proceed to disallow a legitimate claim simply because the decision referred to or even relied on was overruled. The reasons and rationale provided by the Court and borrowed by the Pune Bench for allowance of the expenditure could not have been ignored simply by stating that the decision relied upon by the Bench was overruled.

The Pune Bench of the Tribunal in KRA Holding & Trading’s case (Supra), placed substantial reliance on the Bombay High Court decision in the case of Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra) while deciding the matter. In Pradeep Kumar Harlalka’s case (Supra), the Tribunal noted that in the case of CIT vs. Roshanbanu Mohammed Hussein Merchant 275 ITR 231 (Bom), the Bombay High Court had observed that the decision in the case of Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra) was no longer good law in the light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions in the cases of R.M. Arunachalam vs. CIT 227 ITR 222, VSMT Jagdishchandran vs. CIT 227 ITR 240 and CIT vs. Attili N. Rao 252 ITR 880. All these decisions were rendered in the context of deductibility of mortgage debt and estate duty u/s 48 as expenditure incurred for transfer of the property.

Had the Bench looked into the facts of both the court cases and the conclusions arrived at therein, it could have appreciated that it was only a part of the decision, unrelated to the allowance of the expenditure of the PMS kind that was overruled.

It’s important to note that the following relevant part of the Shakuntala Kantilal decision continues to be valid:
‘The Legislature while using the expression “full value of consideration”, in our view, has contemplated both additions to as well as deductions from the apparent value. What it means is the real and effective consideration. That apart, so far as (i) of section 48 is concerned, we find that the expression used by the Legislature in its wisdom is wider than the expression “for the transfer”. The expression used is “the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer”. The expression “in connection with such transfer” is, in our view, certainly wider than the expression “for the transfer”. Here again, we are of the view that any amount the payment of which is absolutely necessary to effect the transfer will be an expenditure covered by this clause. In other words, if without removing any encumbrance including the encumbrance of the type involved in this case, sale or transfer could not be effected, the amount paid for removing that encumbrance will fall under clause (i). Accordingly, we agree with the Tribunal that the sale consideration requires to be reduced by the amount of compensation.’

These parts of the decision are not overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court. With due respect to the Bench of the Tribunal that held that the expenditure on fees was not allowable simply because the decision of one court was found, in the context of the facts, to be not laying down the good law, requires reconsideration. The fact that the many parts of the decision continued to be relevant could not have been ignored. It is these parts that should have been examined by the Tribunal to decide the case for allowance or, in the alternative, it should have independently adjudicated the issue without being influenced by the observation of the Apex Court made in the context of the facts in the case before it.

In Shakuntala Kantilal, the Bombay High Court examined the meaning of the terms ‘full value of consideration’ (to mean the real and effective consideration, including both additions to and deductions from the apparent value), and ‘expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer’ (to mean any amount the payment of which is absolutely necessary to effect the transfer), in deciding the matter regarding deductibility of compensation paid to previous intending buyer of the property.

In R.M. Arunachalam’s case (Supra), the Supreme Court examined the deductibility of estate duty paid as cost of improvement of the inherited asset. In this decision, the Supreme Court did not examine any issue relating to full value of consideration, cost of acquisition or expenses in connection with transfer at all. The Court specifically refused to answer the question regarding diversion of income by overriding title, which involved the question whether apart from the deductions permissible under the express provision contained in section 48, deduction on account of diversion was permissible, since the issue had not been raised before the Tribunal or the High Court.

In V.S.M.R. Jagdishchandran’s case (Supra), the Supreme Court considered whether the discharge of a mortgage debt created by the owner himself amounted to cost of acquisition of the property deductible u/s 48. The Court in this case did not examine the issue regarding full value of consideration or expenditure in connection with transfer. In Attili N. Rao’s case (Supra), the assessee’s property had been mortgaged with the Excise Department for payment of kist dues, the property was auctioned by the Government and the proceeds, net of the kist dues, was paid to the assessee. In this case, two of the questions before the Supreme Court were whether the charge was to be deducted in computing the full value of consideration, or could it be regarded as an expenditure incurred towards the cost of acquisition of the capital asset. The Supreme Court did not answer these questions while holding that the gross realisation was to be considered for computation of capital gains.

The Supreme Court, therefore, does not seem to have specifically overruled the Bombay High Court decision in the case of Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra), specifically those aspects dealing with the expenses in connection with the transfer.

On the other hand, in a subsequent decision in Kaushalya Devi vs. CIT 404 ITR 536, the Delhi High Court had an occasion to examine a situation identical to that prevailing in the Shakuntala Kantilal case. While holding that the payment of liquidated damages to the previous intending purchaser was an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer, the Delhi High Court observed that,

…the words ‘wholly and exclusively’ used in section 48 are also to be found in section 37 of the Act and relate to the nature and character of the expenditure, which in the case of section 48 must have connection, i.e., proximate and perceptible nexus and link with the transfer resulting in income by way of capital gain. The word ‘wholly’ refers to the quantum of expenditure and the word ‘exclusively’ refers to the motive, objective and purpose of the expenditure. These two words give jurisdiction to the taxing authority to decide whether the expenditure was incurred in connection with the transfer. The expression ‘wholly and exclusively’, however, does not mean and indicate that there must exist a necessity or compulsion to incur an expense before an expenditure is to be allowed. The word ‘connection’ in section 48(i) reflects that there should be a causal connect and the expenditure incurred to be allowed as a deduction must be united, or in the state of being united with the transfer, resulting in income by way of capital gains on which tax has to be paid. The expenditure, therefore, should have direct concern and should not be remote or have an indirect result or connect with the transfer. A practical and pragmatic view in the circumstances should be taken to tax the real income, i.e., the gain.

The Delhi High Court further observed that: ‘the words “wholly and exclusively” require and mandate that the expenditure should be genuine and the expression “in connection with the transfer” require and mandate that the expenditure should be connected and for the purpose of transfer. Expenditure, which is not genuine or sham, is not to be allowed as a deduction. This, however, does not mean that the authorities, Tribunal or the Court can go into the question of subjective commercial expediency or apply subjective standard of reasonableness to disallow the expenditure on the ground that it should not have been incurred or was unreasonably large. In the absence of any statutory provision on these aspects, discretion exercised by the assessee who has incurred the said expenditure must be respected, for interference on subjective basis will lead to unpalatable and absurd results. As in the case of section 37 of the Act, jurisdiction of the authorities, Tribunal or Court is confined to investigate and decide as to whether the expenditure was actually incurred, i.e., the expenditure was genuine and was factually expended and paid to the third party’.

If one applies this ratio to the deductibility of portfolio management charges in computing capital gains, the portfolio manager is paid for the services of advising on what shares to buy and when to buy and sell the shares, and of carrying out the transactions. To the extent that the services are rendered in connection with the purchase of the shares, the fees constitute part of the cost of acquisition of the shares, and to the extent that the fees relate to the sale of shares, the fees are expenses incurred wholly and exclusively for the transfer of the shares. In either situation, the fees should clearly be deductible in computing the capital gains, as held by the Pune Bench of the Tribunal.

If one analyses the facts of the cases as well, it can be clearly observed that the decision in Devendra Motilal Kothari’s case was to a great extent influenced by the fact that the assessee was unable to apportion the fee between the purchases, sales and the closing stock on a rational basis, whereas in KRA Holding & Trading’s case, the assessee was able to demonstrate such bifurcation on a reasonable basis. Therefore, if a rational allocation of the fees is carried out, there is no reason as to why such fees should not be allowed as a deduction, either as cost of acquisition or as expenses in connection with the transfer.

It may also be noted that as observed by the Tribunal in Joy Beauty Centre’s case (Supra), the Department had filed an appeal in the Bombay High Court against the Pune Tribunal’s decision in the case of KRA Holding & Trading (Supra). The appeal has been admitted by the Bombay High Court only on the question of whether the income was in the nature of business income or capital gains. Therefore, the Pune Tribunal’s decision in respect of allowability of portfolio management fees has attained finality.

There is no dispute that the objective behind the hiring of the portfolio manager’s services is to seek advice on purchase and sale of scrips, which expenses, without much suspicion, are allowable in computing the capital gains.

It would be inequitable to disallow a genuine expenditure incurred for earning a taxable income on the pretext that no express and specific provision for its allowance exists in the Act. In our opinion, the existing provisions of section 48 are wide enough to support the deduction of the fees.

Any attempt to isolate a part of the expenditure for disallowance should be avoided on the grounds of the composite expenditure and the expense in any case representing either the cost of acquisition or an expense in connection with the transfer.

As clarified by the Tribunal in the KRA Holding’s case, where the assessee demonstrated the direct nexus of the expenditure to the acquisition and sale / transfer of the securities successfully, and also the fee in question was strictly on the NAV of the securities and not on the dividends or other miscellaneous income, such fee should be allowable in computing the capital gains.

The better view of the matter, therefore, seems to be that portfolio management fees are deductible in computing the capital gains, as held by the Pune, Delhi, Kolkata and some Mumbai Benches of the Tribunal.

Exemption u/s 10(10C) – Amount received under early retirement option scheme of bank – Exemption not claimed in return but later in representation to Principal Commissioner on basis of Supreme Court ruling in case of another employee – That exemption not claimed in return of income not material – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption

13 Gopalbhai Babubhai Parikh vs. Principal CIT [2021] 436 ITR 262 (Guj) A.Y.: 2004-05; Date of order: 20th January, 2021 Ss. 10(10C) and 264 of ITA, 1961

Exemption u/s 10(10C) – Amount received under early retirement option scheme of bank – Exemption not claimed in return but later in representation to Principal Commissioner on basis of Supreme Court ruling in case of another employee – That exemption not claimed in return of income not material – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption

The assessee was a bank employee and opted for the scheme of early retirement declared by the bank. In his return of income for the A.Y. 2004-05, he did not claim the benefit of exemption u/s 10(10C) on the amount received under the early retirement option scheme. Thereafter, relying on the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of a similarly situated employee of the same bank, to the effect that the employee was entitled to the exemption u/s 10(10C), the assessee filed applications before the Principal Commissioner and claimed exemption u/s 10(10C) under the scheme. The Principal Commissioner was of the view that the assessee, unlike in the case before the Supreme Court, had not claimed such deduction in his return, and secondly, the assessee was expected to file a revision application u/s 264 and not file a representation in that regard. Therefore, he rejected the claim of the assessee.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) On the facts, the assessee was entitled to the exemption u/s 10(10C) for the amount received from his employer bank at the time of his voluntary retirement under the early retirement option scheme. Even if the assessee had not claimed the exemption in his return of income for the A.Y. 2004-05, he could claim it at a later point of time. The orders passed by the Principal Commissioner rejecting the benefit of exemption u/s 10(10C) are set aside.

ii) It is declared that the writ applicant is entitled to claim exemption u/s 10(10C) for the amount of Rs. 5,00,000 received from the ICICI Bank Ltd. at the time of his voluntary retirement under the scheme in accordance with the law. It is clarified that this order has been passed in the peculiar facts of the case and shall not be cited as a precedent.’

Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Resolution of disputes – Sum payable by declarant – Difference between appeal by assessee and that by Revenue – Lower rate of deposit of disputed tax where appeal is preferred by Revenue – Appeal to Tribunal by Revenue – Tribunal remanding matter to A.O. – Appeal from order by assessee before High Court – High Court restoring Revenue’s appeal to Tribunal – Appeal was by Revenue – Assessee entitled to lower rate of deposit of disputed tax

12 Cooperative Rabobank U.A. vs. CIT [2021] 436 ITR 459 (Bom) A.Y.: 2002-03; Date of order: 7th July, 2021 Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Resolution of disputes – Sum payable by declarant – Difference between appeal by assessee and that by Revenue – Lower rate of deposit of disputed tax where appeal is preferred by Revenue – Appeal to Tribunal by Revenue – Tribunal remanding matter to A.O. – Appeal from order by assessee before High Court – High Court restoring Revenue’s appeal to Tribunal – Appeal was by Revenue – Assessee entitled to lower rate of deposit of disputed tax

The assessee was a bank established in the Netherlands. It filed its return for the A.Y. 2002-03 declaring Nil income. The assessment order was passed assessing the business profits attributable to its permanent establishment at Rs. 31,25,060. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition. The Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal which remanded the issue to the A.O. Against the order, the assessee filed an appeal before the High Court on 23rd September, 2015 u/s 260A. The assessee also filed a Miscellaneous Application before the Tribunal which was rejected by an order dated 21st August, 2018. Thereafter, on 29th August, 2018, the High Court passed an order setting aside both the orders of the Tribunal, viz., the order dated 1st April, 2015 restoring the issue to the file of the A.O., as well as the order dated 21st August, 2018 dismissing the Miscellaneous Application filed by the assessee. The High Court directed the Tribunal to decide the matter afresh.

Meanwhile, the assessee made a declaration in Form 1 along with an undertaking in Form 2 according to the provisions of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. The assessee indicated an amount payable under the 2020 Act as Rs. 7,50,014 which was 50% of the disputed tax. On 28th January, 2021, Form 3 was issued by the designated authority indicating the amount payable as Rs. 15,00,029 which was 100% of the disputed tax.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) A plain reading of the Table in section 3 of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 suggests that in the case of an eligible appellant, if it is a non-search case, the amount that is payable would be 100% of the disputed tax, and if it is a search case it would be 125% of the disputed tax. However, in a case where the appeal is filed by the Income-tax authority, the amount payable shall be one-half of the amount calculated for payment of 50% of disputed tax or 100%.

ii) The Court had sent back the matter to the Tribunal and what was before the Tribunal was a matter by the Revenue. Factually as well as in law, it was the Revenue’s matter which stood revived. It was also not the Revenue’s case that it had not accepted the decision of the Court. The whole process resurrected under the orders of the High Court was not the proceedings in the Tribunal by the assessee but of the Revenue preferred u/s 253 of the 1961 Act where the Revenue was the appellant. Maybe the appeal by the Revenue is revived at the instance of the assessee because of its proceedings in the High Court, but that would by no stretch of imagination make the appeal before the Tribunal an appeal by the assessee u/s 253. Hence, the first proviso to section 3 of the 2020 Act would become applicable and, accordingly, the amount payable by the assessee would be 50% of the amount, viz., 50% of the disputed tax.’

Charitable purpose – Exemption u/s 11 – Conditional exemption where trust is carrying on business – Meaning of ‘business’ – Trust running residential college – Maintenance of hostel in accordance with statutory requirement – Maintenance of hostel did not amount to business – Trust entitled to exemption

Dayanand Pushpadevi Charitable Trust vs. Addl. CIT 11 [2021] 436 ITR 406 (All) A.Y.: 2010-11; Date of order: 23rd June, 2021 Ss. 2(13), 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961

Charitable purpose – Exemption u/s 11 – Conditional exemption where trust is carrying on business – Meaning of ‘business’ – Trust running residential college – Maintenance of hostel in accordance with statutory requirement – Maintenance of hostel did not amount to business – Trust entitled to exemption

The assessee was registered as a charitable trust. The trust was also recognised and registered u/s 12A as an institution whose objects were charitable in nature. The trust ran a dental college which was a residential institution. In pursuance of the statutory obligation imposed by the Dental Council of India requiring all students to reside in the halls of residence or hostel built by the institute within its campus, the assessee ran a hostel for residence of the students (both boys and girls) admitted in the institute. The hostel fees charged from the students included a mess fee. The A.O. concluded that the hostel activities of the trust were separable from its educational activities and would fall within the meaning of ‘business’ u/s 2(13) and could not be treated as ‘charitable purposes’ u/s 2(15). The benefit of section 11 was denied to the assessee.

The assessment order was affirmed in appeals both by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal.

But the Allahabad High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) Under sub-section (4A) of section 11, income of any business of a trust in the nature of profit and gains of such business can be exempted under sub-section (1) of section 11 only if two preconditions mentioned in the sub-section are fulfilled. The first condition is that the business must be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust. The crucial word in sub-section (4A) is “business” which has to be understood according to the meaning provided u/s 2(13). Any interpretation or meaning given to the word “business” in the literal parlance cannot be read into the Act as the word “business” has been defined in the Act itself.

ii) The applicability of sub-section (4A) of section 11 presupposes income from a business, being profits and gains of the business, and hence the test applied is whether the activity which is pursued is integral or subservient to the dominant object or is independent of or ancillary or incidental to the main object or forms a separate activity in itself. The issue whether the institution is hit by sub-section (4A) of section 11 will essentially depend upon the individual facts of the case where considering the nature of the individual activity, it will have to be tested whether it forms an incidental, ancillary or connected activity and whether it was carried out predominantly with the profit motive in the nature of trade or commerce.

iii) Having regard to the object and purpose for which the institution in question had been established by the trust and the mandate of the Dental Council of India in the Gazette Notification of the year 2007, its activity in maintaining the hostel by charging hostel fee (for its maintenance and providing mess facility) was an integral part of the main activity of “education” of the assessee. The hostel and mess facility sub-served the main object and purpose of the trust and were an inseparable part of its academic activity. The hostel fee could not be said to be income derived from the “business” of the trust. The activity being directly linked to the attainment of the main objectives of the trust, the requirement of maintaining separate books of accounts with regard to such activity for seeking benefit of exemption u/s 11(1) was, therefore, not attracted.

iv) There was no material on record with the Revenue to hold that the hostel activity was a separate business. From any angle, it could not be proved by the Revenue that the income from the hostel fee could be treated as profits and gains of the separate business or commercial activity. The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s 11.’

Assessment – Faceless assessment – Variation in income to assessee’s prejudice – Personal hearing not given before passing assessment order and consequential notices though requested – Assessment order and subsequent notices of demand and penalty set aside

10 Satia Industries Limited vs. NFAC [2021] 437 ITR 126 (Del) Date of order: 31st May, 2021 Ss. 144B(7)(vii), 156 and 270A of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Faceless assessment – Variation in income to assessee’s prejudice – Personal hearing not given before passing assessment order and consequential notices though requested – Assessment order and subsequent notices of demand and penalty set aside

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the assessment order and the consequential notice, issued u/s 156, towards tax demand and u/s 270A for initiation of penalty proceedings on the ground that no personal hearing was granted despite a request being made.

The High Court set aside the assessment order and the consequential notices issued u/s 156 towards tax demand and u/s 270A for initiation of penalty proceedings and gave liberty to the Department to proceed from the stage of issuing a notice-cum-draft assessment order with directions to afford an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

Assessment – Faceless assessment – Writ – Request by assessee for personal hearing – Orders passed and consequential notices of demand and penalty without affording personal hearing – No information on whether steps enumerated in provision taken – Proceedings under assessment order and subsequent notices stayed while notice on writ petition issued

9 Lemon Tree Hotels Limited vs. NFAC [2021] 437 ITR 111 (Del) A.Y.: 2018-19; Date of order: 21st May, 2021 Ss. 143(3), 144B, 144B(7), 156, 270A and 274 of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Faceless assessment – Writ – Request by assessee for personal hearing – Orders passed and consequential notices of demand and penalty without affording personal hearing – No information on whether steps enumerated in provision taken – Proceedings under assessment order and subsequent notices stayed while notice on writ petition issued

For the A.Y. 2018-19, a notice-cum-draft assessment order was issued to the assessee calling upon it to file its objections. Since the matter was complex both on the facts and on law, the assessee made a request for a personal hearing to the A.O. But orders were passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144B and consequential notices of demand were issued u/s 156 and for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 274 r.w.s. 270A.

The assessee filed a writ petition contending that the order and notices were passed in breach of the principles of natural justice. The Delhi High Court, while issuing notice on the writ petition, stayed the operation of the order passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144B and the consequential notices of demand issued u/s 156 and for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 274 r.w.s. 270A, on the grounds that the Department did not inform whether steps under sub-clause (h) of section 144B(7)(xii) had been taken.

The High Court observed that in faceless assessment, prima facie, once an assessee requests for a personal hearing the officer in charge, under the provisions of clause (viii) of section 144B(7) would, ordinarily, have to grant a personal hearing. According to the provisions of section 144B(7)(viii), the discretion of the officer in charge of the Regional Faceless Assessment Centre is tied in with the circumstances covered in sub-clause (h) of section 144B(7)(xii).

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Powers of Tribunal – Tribunal cannot transfer case from Bench falling within jurisdiction of a particular High Court to Bench under jurisdiction of different High Court Appeal to High Court – Writ – Competency of appeal – Competency of writ petition – Meaning of ‘every order’ of section 260A – Order must relate to subject matter of appeal – Order transferring case – Appeal not maintainable against order – Writ petition maintainable

8 MSPL Ltd. vs. Principal CIT [2021] 436 ITR 199 (Bom) A.Ys.: 2005-06 to 2008-09; Date of order: 21st May, 2021 Ss. ss. 255 and 260A of ITA, 1961 r.w.r. 4 of ITAT Rules, 1963; and Article 226 of Constitution of India

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Powers of Tribunal – Tribunal cannot transfer case from Bench falling within jurisdiction of a particular High Court to Bench under jurisdiction of different High Court

Appeal to High Court – Writ – Competency of appeal – Competency of writ petition – Meaning of ‘every order’ of section 260A – Order must relate to subject matter of appeal – Order transferring case – Appeal not maintainable against order – Writ petition maintainable

The assessee was engaged in the business of mining, running a gas unit and generating power through windmills. The relevant period is the A.Ys. 2005-06 to 2008-09. Following centralisation of the cases at Bangalore, the assessments were carried out at Bangalore and in all the assessment orders the A.O. was the Assistant Commissioner. The first appeals against the assessment orders were preferred before the Commissioner (Appeals) at Bangalore, after which the appeals were filed before the Tribunal at Bangalore. On 20th August, 2020, the President of the Tribunal passed an order u/r 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 directing that the appeals be transferred from the Bangalore Bench to be heard and determined by the Mumbai Benches of the Tribunal.

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the order. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ and held as under:

‘i) Section 255 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 deals with the procedure of the Appellate Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of section 255 says that the powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal may be exercised and discharged by Benches constituted by the President of the Appellate Tribunal from among the Members thereof. Sub-section (5) says that the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure and that of its various Benches while exercising its powers or in the discharge of its functions. This includes notifying the places at which Benches shall hold their sittings. This provision cannot be interpreted in such a broad manner as to clothe the President of the Tribunal with jurisdiction to transfer a pending appeal from one Bench to another Bench outside the headquarters in another State.

ii) The Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of section 255 of the Act to regulate the procedure of the Appellate Tribunal and the procedure of the Benches of the Tribunal. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 empowers the President to direct hearing of appeals by a Bench by a general or special order, and sub-rule (2) deals with a situation where there are more than two Benches of the Tribunal at any headquarters and provides for a transfer of an appeal or an application from one Bench to another within the same headquarters. Thus, this provision cannot be invoked to transfer a pending appeal from one Bench under one headquarters to another Bench in different headquarters.

iii) Section 127 of the Act deals with transfer of any case from one A.O. to another A.O. In other words, it deals with transfer of assessment jurisdiction from one A.O. to another. While certainly the appropriate authority u/s 127 has the power and jurisdiction to transfer a case from one A.O. to another subject to compliance with the conditions mentioned therein, the principles governing the section cannot be read into transfer of appeals from one Bench to another Bench that, too, in a different State or Zone for the simple reason that it is not a case before any A.O.

iv) A careful reading of section 260A(1) would go to show that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from “every order” passed in appeal by the Tribunal if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. The expression “every order” in the context of section 260A would mean an order passed by the Tribunal in the appeal. In other words, the order must arise out of the appeal, it must relate to the subject matter of the appeal. An order related to transfer of the appeal would be beyond the scope and ambit of sub-section (1) of section 260A.

v) Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the power to issue directions, orders or writs by any High Court within its territorial jurisdiction would extend to a cause of action or even a part thereof which arises within the territorial limits of the High Court, notwithstanding the fact that the seat of the authority is not within the territorial limits of the High Court.

vi) The writ petition was maintainable because the petitioner had no other statutory remedy. Having regard to the mandate of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the Bombay High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petitions.

vii) The fact that the assessee may have expressed no objection to the transfer of the assessment jurisdiction from the A.O. at Bangalore to the A.O. at Mumbai after assessment for the assessment years covered by the search period, could not be used to non-suit the petitioner in his challenge to the transfer of the appeals from one Bench to another Bench in a different State and in a different Zone. The two were altogether different and had no nexus with each other.

viii) The orders dated 19th March, 2020 and 20th August, 2020 were wholly unsustainable in law.’

Section 92C of the Act and CUP method – Arm’s length price of interest-free debt funding of an overseas Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), with a corresponding obligation on the SPV to use it for the purpose of acquisition of a target company abroad, under CUP method is Nil

Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT [(2021) 129 taxmann.com 398 (Mum-Trib)] [ITA No.: 298/Mum/2014] A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 30th August, 2021

Section 92C of the Act and CUP method – Arm’s length price of interest-free debt funding of an overseas Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), with a corresponding obligation on the SPV to use it for the purpose of acquisition of a target company abroad, under CUP method is Nil

FACTS
The assessee (an Indian resident entity – TIML) was, inter alia, engaged in the radio broadcasting business and wanted to acquire shares of a UK operating company (Virgin Radio, referred as Target Company below) to expand its radio business and thereby provide horizontal synergy. Acquisition of the target company was pursuant to a bid process and in the final bid proposal submitted for acquisition of the target company, TIML stated as under:

i) An SPV will be formed specifically for the purpose of acquiring the target company and such SPV will be wholly owned by TIML;
ii) The transaction will be financed wholly from internal resources of the group.

As part of implementation of a successful bid acquisition, TIML acquired two UK entities from third parties, viz., TIML Global and TIML Golden (UK SPV). These UK entities were typical £1 companies without substance and were used by TIML as SPVs for acquiring shares of the target company.

Further, as mentioned in the bid proposal, the financing of the acquisition was implemented through internal resources of the group. The taxpayer (TIML) was financed by its own Indian parent and these funds were used by TIML to grant interest-free loan to its UK SPV to acquire the target company.

The structure below depicts the underlying subsidiaries of the taxpayer and the mode in which the target company got acquired by TIML’s subsidiary:

As regards benchmarking of the loan, the assessee contended that the acquisition of the target company was to expand its own radio business and hence the activity of issuing interest-free loan to its subsidiary was in the nature of stewardship and the loan was in the nature of quasi capital. Accordingly, it had not charged any interest. The TPO held that benchmarking of this loan transaction was required to be done on the footing as if an independent entity would have charged interest on such a transaction. The TPO adopted the CUP method and imputed interest at 13% treating the transaction as an unsecured loan.

DRP confirmed the addition of imputed interest but reduced interest rate to 12.25%. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the ITAT.

HELD
Nature of transaction
• The transaction was not a loan simpliciter to the UK SPV but an advance with a corresponding obligation that the funds were to be used in the manner specified by the lender TIML.
• The entire amount of funds remitted to the UK SPV was to be, and in fact was, spent on the acquisition of the target company and this specific end-use of funds was an integral part of the entire transaction.
• Accordingly, the transaction of remittance to the UK SPV cannot be considered on a standalone basis but in conjunction with the restricted use of these funds.

Benchmarking of loan under CUP
• The transaction between TIML and its UK SPV should be compared with such transactions where remittance is made to an independent enterprise with the corresponding obligation to use the funds remitted for acquiring a target company already selected by, and on the terms already finalised by, the entity remitting the funds.
• Funding transactions between the owner of the SPV and the SPV belong to a genus different from transactions between lenders and borrowers.
• The moment funding is done by the owner to the SPV, it will render parties as associated enterprises. Since the comparable transaction will be between AEs, such transaction cannot be used in CUP.
• Even if it is assumed that such transaction is hypothetically possible, since borrower has no discretion to use the funds, the concept of commercial interest rates does not apply.
• If there must be an arm’s length consideration under the CUP method, other than interest for such funding, it must be net effective gains – direct and indirect – attributable to the risks assumed by the sponsor of the SPV. In other words, in an arm’s length situation when an SPV is created and such SPV is a mere conduit, the net gains of that project or purpose must go to the person(s) sponsoring the SPV. In this regard, support was drawn from Rule 8(1) of the Nigerian Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations, 2018, which states that ‘A capital-rich, low-function company that does not control the financial risks associated with its funding activities, for tax purposes, shall not be allocated the profits associated with those risks and will be entitled to no more than a risk-free return. The profits or losses associated with the financial risks would be allocated to the entity (or entities) that manage those risks and have the capacity to bear them.’
• However, in the present case this aspect of whether net gains of the UK SPV can be attributed to TIML was considered as academic because the financial statement of the UK SPV reflected a loss figure.

ITAT gave a caveat in its ruling by stating that it has adjudicated on the limited issue of arm’s length price adjustment of interest-free loan to the SPV under the CUP method and not under any other method. Also, that ruling cannot be an authority for the proposition that ALP adjustment cannot be made under any other TP method in respect of interest-free debt funding to the overseas SPV.

If an assessee admits certain undisclosed income of the company in which he is a Director, on the basis of incriminating material found and seized during search, since income / entries in such seized material belonged to company, impugned additions made in hands of assessee on account of such undisclosed income of company was unjustified and liable to be deleted

12 JCIT vs. Narayana Reddy Vakati [2021-88-ITR(T) 128 taxmann.com 377 (Hyd-Trib)] ITA No.: 1226 to 1230 (Hyd) of 2018 A.Ys.: 2010-11 to 2014-15; Date of order:
21st April, 2021

If an assessee admits certain undisclosed income of the company in which he is a Director, on the basis of incriminating material found and seized during search, since income / entries in such seized material belonged to company, impugned additions made in hands of assessee on account of such undisclosed income of company was unjustified and liable to be deleted

FACTS
During survey, a loose sheet bundle was impounded containing details of certain receipts and payments. The assessee admitted the same to be income from undisclosed sources. The same was assessed as additional income in the hands of the assessee. However, the assessee did not offer the said income to tax in his return of income. Hence, a show cause notice was issued as to why undisclosed income admitted during the search / post-search proceedings should not be added to his total income. The assessee stated that the income was inappropriately admitted in his hands instead of the company. He also furnished year-wise statements stating that these amounts do not belong to him.

However, the A.O. concluded that the assessee’s reply could not be accepted. The assessee had not retracted from his disclosure of income till filing of return. There was an almost 16-month gap from the search. In this period, he never brought his version before the DDIT (Inv.) or before the A.O. that the amounts disclosed pertained to the company.

Therefore, the A.O. concluded that the assessee adopted this device to evade taxes on admitted income by offering the same in the hands of the company and never furnished the required information such as books of accounts, receipts and payments account, etc., and submitted a reply to the show cause notice at the last minute deliberately to avoid verification of the transactions. Hence, the assessee’s reply was not considered.

On further appeal to the CIT(A), the assessee submitted that though he had admitted certain amount in his hands in the course of his statement u/s 132(4), the seized material forming the basis of the additions belonged to the company. Hence, while filing return of income he had reconciled the material and submitted a letter to the A.O. to the effect and pleaded with him to assess the said admitted income in the hands of the company. He also contended that the A.O. neither accepted his plea nor made any attempt to verify the facts set out by him in the letter. Therefore, in the absence of any seized material found during the course of search belonging to the assessee, no addition can be made.

The CBDT in its Circular in letter F.No.286/98/20l3-lT (Inv-II), dated 18th December, 2014, instructed the A.O. not to obtain disclosures and rather focus on gathering evidences during the search. Thus, the additions in the hands of the assessee were made only on the basis of the statement made uls. 132(4) which was given by the assessee in a state of confusion and without thinking of the consequences and its impact in the future. The CIT(A) observed that the claim of the assessee was not contradicted by the A.O. The income had to be taxed in the right hands irrespective of the admission made during the search, on the basis of evidences found or gathered during the assessment proceedings. The A.O. assessed the income on substantive basis in the hands of the assessee and on protective basis in the hands of the company. As the material and the entries in the statements related to the business of the company, the CIT(A) held that income was not taxable in the individual’s hands and accordingly deleted the addition made by the A.O. Aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that there is not even an indication in the Revenue’s grounds that the impugned additions pertain to the assessee himself rather than his company. The Apex Court’s landmark decision in ITO vs. C.H. Atchaiah [1996] 84 Taxman 630/218 ITR 239 (SC) had held long back that the A.O. can and must tax the right person and the right person alone. The Tribunal also relied on another landmark decision in the case of Saloman vs. Saloman and Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22, that in corporate parlance a company is very much a body corporate and a distinct entity apart from its Director.

Therefore, it upheld the action of the CIT(A) in deleting the additions made by the A.O.

Provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) will not apply to a case where there was an allotment prior to A.Y. 2014-15 – The amended provisions cannot apply merely because the agreement was registered after the provision came into force

11 Naina Saraf vs. PCIT [TS-897-ITAT-2021 (Jpr)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 14th September, 2021 Sections: 56(2)(vii), 263


Provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) will not apply to a case where there was an allotment prior to A.Y. 2014-15 – The amended provisions cannot apply merely because the agreement was registered after the provision came into force

FACTS

The assessee, a practising advocate of Rajasthan High Court, e-filed the return of income declaring therein a total income of Rs. 27,38,450. In the course of assessment proceedings before the A.O., the assessee filed a registered purchase deed in respect of purchase of immovable property and various other details required by the A.O. The A.O. completed the assessment accepting the returned income.
 

Subsequently, the PCIT observed that the assessee had purchased an immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 70,26,233 as co-owner with 50% share in the said property and the stamp duty value thereof was determined at Rs. 1,03,12,220; therefore, the difference of Rs. 32,85,987 was to be treated as income from other sources. The PCIT held that the A.O. having failed to invoke section 56(2)(vii)(b) during assessment proceedings, the order he had passed was erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. He invoked the jurisdiction u/s 263 and issued a show cause notice, and after considering the submissions of the assessee, passed an order u/s 263 on the ground that there was no agreement and therefore the assessee cannot be given benefit of the first proviso to section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii). The PCIT set aside the assessment order passed by the A.O. and directed him to complete the assessment afresh after giving an opportunity to the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that on 23rd September, 2006, the assessee applied for allotment of Flat No. 201 at Somdatt’s Landmark, Jaipur. The flat was allotted vide allotment letter dated 6th March, 2009 on certain terms and conditions mentioned in the allotment letter. The assessee agreed to the allotment by signing the letter of allotment on 11th November, 2009 as a token of acceptance. Prior to the registration of the transaction on 9th December, 2014, the assessee had paid Rs. 45,26,233 against the total sale consideration of Rs. 65,57,500. The allotment letter contained all substantive terms and conditions which created the respective rights and obligations of the parties and bound the respective parties. The allotment letter provided detailed specifications of the property, its identification and terms of the payment, providing possession of the subject property in the stipulated period and so on. The seller had agreed to sell and the assessee agreed to purchase the flat for an agreed price mentioned in the allotment letter.

 
The Tribunal held that,

i) What is important is to gather the intention of the parties and not to go by the nomenclature. There being an offer and acceptance by the competent parties for a lawful purpose with their free consent, the Tribunal held that all the attributes of a lawful agreement are available as per the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Such agreement was acted upon by the parties and pursuant to the allotment letter the assessee paid a substantial amount of consideration of Rs. 45,26,233 as early as in the year 2008 itself. For all intents and purposes, such an allotment letter constituted a complete agreement between the parties. Relying on the decisions in the cases of Hasmukh N. Gala vs. ITO [(2015) 173 TTJ 537] and CIT vs. Kuldeep Singh [(2014) 270 CTR 561 (Delhi HC)] rendered in the context of the provisions of section 54, the Tribunal was convinced that the assessee had already entered into an agreement by way of allotment letter on 11th November, 2009 in A.Y. 2010-11;

ii) the pre-amended law which was applicable up to A.Y. 2013-14 never contemplated a situation where immovable property was received for inadequate consideration. It was only in the amended law specifically made applicable from A.Y. 2014-15 that any receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration has been subjected to the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b), but not before that. Therefore, the applicability of the said provisions could not be insisted upon in the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2014-15;

iii) in the present case, since there was a valid and lawful agreement entered into by the parties long back in A.Y. 2010-11 when the subject property was transferred and substantial obligations discharged, the law contained in section 56(2)(vii)(b) as it stood at that point of time did not contemplate a situation of receipt of property by the buyer for inadequate consideration. The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in applying the said provision;

iv) the Tribunal did not find itself in agreement with the contention of the DR that allotment was provisional as it was subject to further changes because of some unexpected happening which may be instructed by the approving authority, resulting in increase or decrease in the area and so on because, according to the Tribunal, it is a standard practice to save the seller (builder) from unintended consequences;

v) the Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Ranchi Bench in the case of Bajranglal Naredi vs. ITO [(2020) 203 TTJ 925], held that the mere fact that the flat was registered in the year 2014, falling in A.Y. 2015-16, the amended provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) could not be applied;

vi) the assessment order subjected to revision is not erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Non-compliance with section 194C(7) will not lead to disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)

10 Mohmed Shakil Mohmed Shafi Mutawalli vs. ITO [TS-889-ITAT-2021 (Ahd)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 16th September, 2021 Sections: 40(a)(ia), 194C

Non-compliance with section 194C(7) will not lead to disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)

FACTS
The original assessment u/s 143(3) was finalised on 26th March, 2014 determining total income of Rs. 9,15,737. Subsequently, the CIT passed an order u/s 263 directing the A.O. to make a fresh assessment after granting an opportunity to the assessee on the issue of non-deduction of tax on freight payment of Rs. 10,63,995. Subsequently, assessment u/s 143(3) was finalised on 16th February, 2015 wherein the A.O. held that only submission of the PAN of the transporter was not sufficient with respect to payment to the transporter. Consequently, the claim of transport expenses of Rs. 10,63,995 was disallowed.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who dismissed it, holding that the assesse had not complied with the provisions of section 194C(7).

The assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and submitted copies of the documents submitted before the lower authorities, which included copies of invoices, transportation bills, along with particulars of truck number, PAN, phone numbers and complete addresses of the transporters.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that,
i) The A.O. has neither disproved the genuineness of the evidences furnished before him nor made any further verification / examination related to claim of such expenditure debited to the P&L Account;
ii) The CIT(A) has sustained the disallowance merely on technical basis that the assessee has failed to comply with the provisions of section 194C(7);
iii) The Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal has, in the case of Soma Ghosh vs. DCIT 74 taxmann.com 90 held that if the assessee complies with the provisions of section 194C(6), no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) is permissible even though there is a violation of provisions of section 194C(7). The Karnataka High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Marikamba Transport Co. 57 taxman.com 273 held that in the case of payment made to a sub-contractor, non-filing of Form No. 15I/J is only a technical defect and the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) should not be attracted in such a case.

The Tribunal held that since the assessee has furnished copies of PAN along with copies of invoices of the transportation bill comprising the complete address of the transporter, phone number and complete particulars of the goods loaded through the transporter and the A.O. has not taken any steps to disprove the genuineness of the transportation expenses, it is not appropriate to disallow the claim of transportation expenses simply for a technical lapse u/s 194(7). This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Assessee not liable to deduct tax at source from asset valuer’s fees paid by the lender bank and later recovered from the assessee

9 Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. vs. DCIT [TS-955-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2011-12; Date of order: 30th September, 2021 Sections: 40(a)(ia), 194J

Assessee not liable to deduct tax at source from asset valuer’s fees paid by the lender bank and later recovered from the assessee

FACTS
In the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. observed from Form No. 3CD that the assessee had paid a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs to Sigma Engineering (Rasayani Unit) from which tax had not been deducted at source. The A.O. disallowed the sum of Rs. 3,00,000 u/s 40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and submitted that it had availed credit facilities from State Bank of India (SBI) by mortgaging assets. The SBI had appointed Sigma Engineering Consultant for submitting a valuation report of the assets to secure their advances. Sigma raised a bill of Rs. 3,30,900 which included service tax. SBI made payment of the said amount and debited the sum from the assessee’s account. The assessee submitted that since it was a payment made to a banking company, it was not liable to deduct TDS. The CIT(A) upheld the action of the A.O.

Still aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that the services of the consultant were utilised for the purpose of SBI in order to secure the assets mortgaged to it. The consultant was appointed by SBI and after submission of the report, the bank settled the fee and recovered it from the assessee. Although the charges were ultimately collected from the assessee, but the services were provided exclusively for the purpose of securing mortgaged assets assigned to the bank. TDS provisions would be applicable only when the services are utilised and respective payments are made directly to the service provider. In this case the assessee neither appointed the consultant nor paid the consultancy charges but was only the observer and, therefore, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act do not apply.

PERSON IN CONTROL (PIC): NEW MODIFICATION IN THE ENTITY

Cementing the path for a notable modification in the manner that the promoters and more than 5,000 publicly-listed corporate entities operate in India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), in a consultation paper has suggested doing away with the concept of promoters and shifting to ‘person in control.’ It has proposed the change to put an end to the present definition of promoter group with an idea to streamline the disclosure encumbrance. Apart from this, SEBI has announced a few other proposals that include (a) decreasing the minimum lock-in period (tenure an investor can hold on to the securities) after an initial public offer (IPO) for promoters’ portion of a minimum 20% from the current three years to one year, and the lock-in period for holding more than 20% from one year to six months; and (b) decreasing the lock-in period for pre-IPO shareholders (those who invest in the entity even before the public issue) from the current one year to six months.

The notion of the promoter is a heritage from history when a corporate body or a group of companies (say, a business house like Tata, Birla and so on) would establish a business unit; for example, a power or steel or fertilizer plant, by pledging some funds of their own and financing the remainder of the project cost by borrowings from banks or financial institutions, on top of raising funds from the capital market. This business unit would remain linked with the establishment – virtually all through the life-span of the project – having a fundamental interest in safeguarding its constant profitability and progress and consistently work for achieving this goal, thereby obtaining the position of what one may label as ‘once a promoter, always a promoter’.

FIRST LESSONS IN INTERPRETATION OF CONTROL
In order to move with the times, SEBI in its Board meeting on 6th August, 2021 gave in-principle assent to move from the concept of promoter to ‘controlling shareholders’ as was recommended in the Consultation Paper dated 11th May, 2021 which dealt with the evaluation of the structure relating to promoters and the promoter group. Although the Consultation Paper has mentioned many other viewpoints and aspects, restructuring the definition of the promoter group rationalising the disclosure needs for group entities is one of the key changes proposed. This seems to be a branding modification in the configuration of the company law.

The Companies Act, 2013 along with the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018 has defined the term promoter ‘as a person who has been named as such in a prospectus or is identified by the company in the annual return in section 92; or a person who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly, as a shareholder, director or otherwise; or a person with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act.’ A person or group of people to be categorised as a ‘promoter group’ should have at least 20% equity share capital.

As per the Consultation Paper issued by SEBI, a controlling shareholder is to be defined as ‘A person who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly whether as a shareholder, Director or otherwise.’ The concept of controlling shareholders would restructure the tactic followed by controllers while levying any compulsions and transferring the responsibility of obeying statutory compulsions over to the controlling shareholders.

According to Regulation 2(1)(e) of the Takeover Regulations, 2011, the term ‘control’ has been defined as the right to appoint the majority of the Directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner. In an identical manner, the term control has been defined u/s 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013 as well.

Though the clarification of the term control given by the SEBI has been swinging, in the case of Subhkam Ventures vs. SEBI, the SEBI pronounced that defensive agreements, namely, positive votes extended to the nominee Director of the investor on issues such as amendment of the articles of association, alterations in share capital, consent of the annual business plan, reorganisation of the investee entity, the nomination of significant officers of the entity, etc., all these qualify as gaining of control by the investor.

However, on appeal the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) opined that control is a power by which, on the one hand, an investor can instruct an entity to do what it wants to do. It was also explained by the SAT that the power by which an investor can prohibit an entity from doing what the latter wants to do cannot by itself qualify as ‘control’. SEBI appealed against the SAT order before the Supreme Court. However, the Court could not pronounce its verdict due to the removal of the case owing to the departure of the investor.

The interpretation of the term ‘control’ came up before the Whole-Time Member (WTM) of SEBI for judgment in the case of Kamat Hotels vs. SEBI. The WTM had to resolve, inter alia, whether there had been a takeover of control by the Noticees just by virtue of entering into a contract under which they were allowed a number of privileges that would activate an open offer under the Takeover Code, 1997. The WTM judged that the determination of ‘control’ because of the existence of positive voting rights in light of the realities of the case was inappropriate. The WTM, with regard to the privileges accessible to the Noticees as per the contract specified as above, made an obiter pronouncement in its order: ‘It is apparent that the scope of the covenants, in general, is to enable the Noticees to exercise certain checks and controls on the existing management for the purpose of protecting their interest as investors rather than formulating policies to run the target company.’

However, since the contract ended on 31st July, 2014 and the terms and clauses that allegedly bestowed ‘control’ on the Noticees under the contract were no longer compulsory on the promoters of Kamat Hotels, therefore, the WTM opted that the determination of ‘control’ was no longer appropriate.

On the basis of earlier precedents, it looks like determination of ‘control’ shoots from several ideologies which when applied to a given group of particulars and situations offers scope for various interpretations. In this background, SEBI had proposed a Consultation Paper in March, 2016 in which the definition of ‘control’ under the Takeover Regulations was considered to be
amended as: ‘(a) the right or entitlement to exercise at least 25% of voting rights of a company irrespective of whether such holdings give de facto control, and / or (b) the right to appoint the majority of the non-Independent Directors of a company’. However, the same has not yet been executed.

IS IT THE RIGHT TIME TO MOVE FROM THE WORD ‘PROMOTER’?
Many will give a quick answer to the above question by saying ‘yes’ since the concept of ‘promoter’ has become stagnant. The concept of promoter embraces all types of casual people, blood relatives who have been suing are also treated as promoters. In short, persons who have no control whatsoever of the organisation are treated as promoters. This gives an incorrect feeling to the investors of the organisation.

SEBI should make the concept smarter, fluid and accurate rather than completely abolishing the responsibility of the leading shareholder. This can be done by employing global yardsticks. Expressions like a person acting in concert or persons in control are understood throughout the world and these will surely describe who is overseeing the entity. The minority shareholder will be better off if this modification is implemented. But it is clear that the concept of promoter has not gone away and the only change is in the terminology which has moved on from ‘promoter’ to ‘person in control’. This is a step forward because once a Promoter need not always be a Promoter.

SEBI CHASING CHANGING SCENARIO
During the previous decade, the investor scene in India experienced a radical deviation whereby a new class of shareholders has arisen as leading investors, namely, private equity funds (PEF), alternate investment funds (AIFs), mutual funds, etc. Due to this the shareholding of the promoters has come down and total promoters’ holdings in the prominent 500 listed entities by market value is on a downhill journey since 2009 when it had topped at 58%.

The new class of shareholders invests in new-age and tech businesses (although unlisted) by means of what is termed as ‘control deals’ even prior to these going in for an initial public offer (IPO) and continue to retain shares post-listing, many times being the biggest public shareholders, holding special privileges such as the right to appoint Directors.

Although the actual ‘ownership’ and ‘controlling rights’ of a company have transferred to PEFs or AIFs, the establishment that introduced the business firm continues to possess power (notwithstanding its shareholding having been reduced to a minority) as the current regulation lists it as a promoter. The market watchdog needs to fix this glitch by changing the emphasis from promoters to controlling shareholders, or the so-called ‘person in control’ (PIC). Nonetheless, it also needs to be asked whether the new class is indeed keen to take control?

These organisations signify a collection of tens of thousands of investors. However, in the case of mutual funds these run into lakhs of investors. They gather money from individual investors and many of them are high net-worth individuals and invest in companies with the prime aim of producing handsome returns. In a basic way they are financial investors, would stay invested in an entity as long as the target is achieved, otherwise they will depart; on the other hand, the role of a PIC necessitates that he stay invested over the long term. The question is, does SEBI really expect promoters to play the role of PICs.

From its suggestions on minimum lock-in period, it does not seem to be so. Post an IPO, the SEBI allows the promoter to discard his or her portion of a minimum of 20% within one year against the existing three years. Besides, holding of more than 20% can be discarded in six months instead of one year.

It is even contemplating to entirely get rid of the condition of minimum shareholding for a person to qualify as a promoter. If a unit, for instance, PEF, can dispose of its shareholding obtained before its IPO (even though big enough to give it the position of a promoter) within one year of the public issue or the condition of minimum shareholding itself is relinquished, how can it be imagined to be fair to the role of a ‘person in control’?

Irrationally, the watchdog does not even want the public to recognise the individuality of investors behind the issuer. As per the relaxed disclosure obligations, the issuer need not furnish financial statements of group entities associated with the one being listed; it need not name financial investors as promoters in IPOs; and it need not specify precise corporate entities which are part and parcel of the promoter group. How can an entity whose basis of funding is masked in privacy infuse confidence?

Today, many of the listed companies are professionally administered and much of the activity is positioned around the Board of Directors, including several Independent Directors. It also includes the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) supported by numerous teams, including the audit committee, remuneration committee, etc., for crystal-clear operations. Could the PIC role be delegated to the CEO or the BoD? The answer to this is not in the affirmative.

The members of the Board, including the CEO, are professionals. They are nominated and obtain their power from the shareholders even though by majority vote or any other method approved by them. If the majority shareholders vacate, then it is doubtful that the current CEO or BoD will continue. Further, if the former leaves within a short period, which is highly possible as per the new regulations suggested by the market regulator, then the case for the CEO or BoD serving as PIC becomes less likely. When the person who established the entity is reduced to a minority and the new group of shareholders who have majority share are reluctant to sneak into the former’s shoes, it will be tantamount to impelling the listed entity into a position of a ‘ship without a commander’.

The market watchdog should re-look at its suggestions keeping two essential principles in mind. These are, (i) the voting or controlling power of an investor must be proportional to his investment or the shares held by him, and (ii) solidity of the management. In the present situation, where the majority of shareholding is entrusted in PEFs or AIFs, they should be made accountable to accept the role of a PIC and remain invested in the entity over a reasonably long period. The market regulator must not decrease the lock-in period. It should also not abandon the prerequisite of minimum shareholding for an entity to remain in control of the firm and demand complete clarity on funding bases. Amazingly, the complete workout of the transition from promoters to controlling shareholders will prove to be pointless unless the SEBI effectively tackles the elephant in the room, viz., the definition of ‘control’.

NEW MODIFICATION IN A NUTSHELL

SEBI has recommended decreasing the minimum lock-in periods post a public issue for promoters and pre-IPO shareholders.

The consultation paper suggested a three-year transition period for moving from the promoter to the person in control concept.

If the object of the issue involves an offer for sale or financing other than for capital expenditure for a project, then the minimum promoters’ contribution of 20% should be locked in for one year from the date of allotment in the IPO.

The promoters’ holding in excess of minimum promoters’ contribution shall be locked in for a period of six months as opposed to the existing requirement of one year from the date of allotment in the IPO.

Control Person means any person that holds a sufficient number of any of the securities of an issuer so as to affect materially the control of that issuer, or that holds more than 20% of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer.

Control Person means any individual who has a Control relationship with the Fund or is an investment adviser of the Fund.

Control Person means a Director or executive officer of a licensee or a person who has the authority to participate in the direction, directly or indirectly, through one or more other persons, of the management or policies of a licensee.

The changes in the nature of ownership could lead to situations where the persons with no controlling rights and minority shareholding continue to be classified as promoters.

It will lighten the disclosure burden for firms.

The regulator has proposed to eliminate the present definition of promoter group because it would rationalise the disclosure burden.

It is necessitated by the changing investor landscape in India where concentration of ownership and controlling rights do not vest completely in the hands of the promoters or the promoter group.

This is because of the emergence of new shareholders such as private equity and institutional investors.

The investor focus on the quality of board and management has increased, thereby reducing the relevance of the concept of promoter.

It also suggested doing away with the current definition of promoter group since it focuses on capturing holdings by a common group of individuals.

It often results in capturing unrelated companies with common financial investors.

AUDITOR’S EVALUATION OF GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT

(This is the second article of the two-part series on Going Concern.
The first part appeared in the BCAJ edition of October, 2021.)

The first part of this article on Going Concern had touched upon the various aspects of going concern assessment by management; this part will attempt to highlight the various factors that an auditor should consider while evaluating the going concern assessment performed by the management, disclosure in the financial statements based on the outcome of the evaluation, and reporting considerations under various scenarios in the auditors’ report.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the on-going economic developments have changed the traditional way of doing business and have created significant challenges for some of the industries to save their existence and to survive in the present economic environment.

Our regulators have also acknowledged the criticality of the situation and, to save the interest of investors and users of the financial statements, have increased their focus on the disclosures and reporting requirements related to going concern assumption used in the preparation of financial statements, and introduced new provisions in the reporting requirement wherever needed.

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has also introduced guidance with respect to the assessment and evaluation of the going concern assumption in the present economic environment and also an implementation guide to assist auditors to comply with the additional reporting requirements.

Although the above amendments and additional guidance were introduced to assist auditors in discharging their responsibilities and to save the interest of the users of the financial statements, they have significantly increased the responsibilities of the auditors and the criticality of their role in the true and fair reporting of the financial statements.

SA 570 (Revised) states that the auditor’s responsibilities are to obtain sufficient audit evidence on the appropriateness of management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting in the preparation of the financial statements and to conclude, based on the audit evidence obtained, whether a material uncertainty exists about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

The auditor needs to be cognizant of this responsibility to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence on the appropriateness of the going concern assumption throughout the audit, and should start this evaluation from the audit planning stage, while understanding the entity’s business and assessing the risks of material misstatement in accordance with SA 315 Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement Through Understanding the Entity and its Environment, by considering whether there are any conditions or events that, individually or in aggregate, raise significant doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time and, if so, whether any preliminary assessment has been done by the management for those identified events and conditions.

If any such events or conditions are identified by the auditor at the audit planning stage or at any time thereafter, for instance, defaults on repayment of borrowings, legal action taken by creditors due to long outstanding, penalty imposed by regulators due to non-compliance that have a significant effect on the cash flows of the company, etc., then the auditor should also consider the possible effect of it on the identified Risks of Material Misstatements for other account captions and, accordingly, needs to plan and perform additional audit procedures to address them. For instance, the auditor may need to increase the risk of material misstatements for related account captions like creditors, borrowings, contingent liabilities, earlier cash flow projections, impairment of inventory or intangibles, etc., and perform extended audit procedures either by increasing the sample size or additional audit steps to address the risk identified from the development.

In the case of events and conditions that are identified and for which going concern assessment is performed by the management, the auditor is required to perform adequate audit procedures, if the other audit procedures performed as part of the audit are not sufficient to enable the auditor to conclude whether management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting is appropriate in the circumstances.

AUDIT PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATION OF GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT
Given below are examples of some of the audit steps that can be considered for evaluating the appropriateness of management’s assessment of going concern:
– Understanding the specific conditions and events considered by the management and their possible financial implications,
– Indicators or events that may be identified by the auditors during the audit and their possible financial implications on the cash flow projections,
– Ensuring that the possible cash inflows and outflows from business, during the projection period, are reasonable and are in line with the management’s future business projections that were approved by the Board earlier,
– Whether Covid consideration has been taken into account by the management while taking the critical assumptions like revenue growth rate, discount rate, timing of cash inflows and outflows, and if yes, the evidence considered by the management to support them,
– Sensitivity analysis on the assumptions made by the management,
– One-off cash inflows should be supported by adequate documentation to substantiate that realisation is certain,
– Adequate provisions have been made towards any future contingencies and events,
– Guarantees and commitments to related and non-related parties and to their creditors or lenders,
– Any subsequent events that may have an impact on the going concern assessment made by the management,
– Inquire with the management as to its knowledge of events or conditions beyond the period of management’s assessment that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern,
– Where an auditor relies on a ‘support letter’ as evidence, the auditor should also evaluate the financial strength and capability of the parent or group company issuing the support letter to evaluate whether the parent or group company has the financial ability to discharge the obligations of the company. Further, the support letter should cover at least twelve months from the date of the financial statements and should be executed in a way so as to create a legal binding on the parent or group company to provide financial support when needed,
– Written representations from management regarding their plans for future action and the feasibility of these plans

Going concern evaluation considerations for small and medium enterprises
In case of small and medium enterprises, there can be a situation where the management has not performed a detailed, documented going concern assessment; in such cases the auditor should discuss with management the basis for the intended use of the going concern basis of accounting and whether events or conditions exist that, individually or collectively, may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. The auditor should also remain alert throughout the audit for audit evidence of events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

GOING CONCERN EVALUATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
In case of consolidated financial statements, the auditor of the parent entity is also required to report on the going concern assumption used by the management for the preparation of consolidated financial statements. In this case, the auditor of the parent entity needs to perform the evaluation of going concern assumption of the entities that are getting consolidated, by placing reliance on the audit report issued and work performed by the component auditors (if the parent auditor is not the auditor for all components).

However, the auditor needs to perform adequate audit procedures, in accordance with the guidance given in SA 600 Using the Work of Another Auditor, on the work performed by the component auditors such as review of work papers of going concern evaluation, minutes of meetings with management and component auditors, subsequent events, etc., before concluding the evaluation of going concern assumption for the consolidated financial statements.

Period covered for going concern assessment
Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements requires management to consider at least twelve months from the end of the reporting period for the going concern assessment; similar guidance is given in SA 570 (Revised) as well.

Here it is important to highlight that twelve months is the minimum period prescribed both by Ind AS 1 and SA 570 (Revised), and if the auditor, based on the audit evidence obtained, believes that the period of assessment should be extended beyond twelve months from the date of the financial statements, then the auditor should request management to do so.

However, if management is unwilling to make or extend its assessment, a qualified opinion, or a disclaimer of opinion in the auditor’s report may be appropriate, because it may not be possible for the auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting in the preparation of the financial statements.

One example for the above scenario could be an entity whose license to do business is expiring in the thirteenth month from the end of the financial year and the cost of renewing the license is substantially high; in this case, the auditor may need to request management to extend its going concern assessment beyond twelve months to assess the certainty to renew the license and the source of finance to fund its renewal fees.

Reporting considerations
Based on the audit evidence obtained, the auditor needs to conclude whether in his judgement a material uncertainty exists related to events or conditions that, individually or collectively, may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, and accordingly needs to ensure the compliances with respect to the disclosures in the financial statements and reporting in the auditors’ report.

The Table below lists the scenarios and the related disclosure and reporting requirements as per Ind AS 1 and SA 570 (Revised) that the auditor needs to ensure:

Scenarios*

Events or conditions
have been identified and a material uncertainty exists

Events or conditions
have been identified but no material uncertainty exists

Financial statements

Disclosure in the financial statements

• Principal events or conditions and management’s evaluation of
the significance of those events or conditions

• Principal events or conditions and management’s evaluation of
the significance of those events or conditions

 

(continued)

• Management’s plans to deal with these events or conditions

• Fact that there is a material uncertainty related to these
events or conditions that cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to
continue as a going concern

(continued)

• Management’s plans that mitigate the effect of these events or
conditions

• Significant judgements made by management as part of its
assessment

*Reference can be made to the Annual Reports referred to in the first part of the Going Concern article to gain a practical understanding of the disclosures required to be made in the financial statements under various scenarios.

Like the Ind AS 1, AS 1 also does not provide any specific disclosure guidance on the material uncertainty and requires specific disclosures only when the entity has intentions or requirement to liquidate or curtail materially the scale of its operation, and as a result of which the financial statement needs to be prepared on an alternate basis.

(b) Scenarios for reporting in the auditor’s report:

Scenarios*

Events or conditions
have been identified and a material uncertainty exists*

Auditors’ report

Management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting in the
financial statements is inappropriate

Auditor to express an adverse opinion regardless of whether or
not the financial statements include disclosure of the inappropriateness of
management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting, and reporting of
it under u/s 143(3)(f);

Reference can be drawn to the Annual Report of Mercator Limited
for the year ended 31st March, 2020

Going concern basis of accounting is
appropriate, but a material uncertainty relating to going concern exists

Separate section in the auditors’
report
with a heading that includes reference to the fact that a material
uncertainty related to going concern exists, and reporting of it u/s
143(3)(f);

Reference can be made to the Annual
Reports of:

• Vodafone Idea Limited for the year
ended 31st March, 2021

• SpiceJet Limited for the year ended
31st March, 2020

Scenarios*

Events or conditions
have been identified and a material uncertainty exists*

Going concern basis of accounting is appropriate but adequate
disclosure of material uncertainty is not made in the financial statements

Qualified or adverse opinion, based on the pervasiveness of the
inadequacy of disclosure, and reporting of it u/s 143(3)(f) when sufficient
appropriate audit evidence regarding the appropriateness of the management’s
use of the going concern is obtained, but adequate disclosure of a material
uncertainty is not made in the financial statements

Management concluded going concern
basis of accounting is not appropriate and considered alternate basis of
accounting

Emphasis of Matter paragraph, to draw
the user’s attention, when the alternate basis of accounting is acceptable to
auditor

*As per the requirement of CARO 2020 clause (xix), the auditor is also required to comment on the material uncertainties, with respect to the company’s ability to honour its obligation existing at the balance sheet date and that are due for payment within a period of one year.

It is worth mentioning here that the auditor should not consider communicating key audit matters as a substitute for reporting in accordance with SA 570 (Revised) when a material uncertainty exists. Accordingly, a separate heading that includes reference to the material uncertainty related to going concern needs to be included before key audit matters as per the Appendix of SA 570 (Revised).

PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT
Just as going concern assessment requires significant judgement by management, the evaluation of going concern assessment also requires significant professional judgement by the auditors. The example below demonstrates one such scenario:

Illustration
Company A is into the business of providing e-learning solutions and had started its operations two years back with a share capital of Rs. 50 lakhs. The company received the first round of funding of Rs. 50 crores from a PE investor in the first year of its operations; however, due to significant spend on advertising and e-learning content development, the company is running into significant losses.

The company is in the third year of its operations and expected to start generating positive cash flows by the end of the fifth year. The historical year-on-year revenue growth is 100% and the promoter is in discussion with the PE investors for the second round of funding. The company is not able to borrow from bankers due to unavailability of asset base and adequate guarantee.

The management strongly believes that the second round of funding is going to happen within the next few months considering past revenue growth and positive future outlook in the e-learning sector.

Analysis
In the present scenario, there are events and conditions that cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern; however, the management based on evidence like growth potential in the industry, past revenue trends and current negotiations with PE investors, has concluded that the going concern assumption holds good.

Based on the above conclusion of management, the auditor may consider the following points for evaluating the management’s assessment:
(a) Industry analysts’ research reports on the growth potential of the industry,
(b) Evidence of negotiations with potential investors to assess the progress of the next round of funding, like non-binding term sheets, email communications, etc.,
(c) Normal gestation period in similar industries to generate positive cash flows,
(d) Evidence to support future projections and cash flows that may include sales orders, inquiries from present and prospective customers, reasonability of assumptions like growth rate, estimated expenditure to run operations, etc.,
(e) Sensitivity analysis on the assumptions to see the implications in case there is a deviation,
(f) Present litigations against the company, if any, specifically on account of non-payment of dues,
(g) Alternate plan with management, in case the funding does not take place.

Considering the above facts, the auditor needs to conclude whether a material uncertainty exists regarding the going concern assumption for the preparation of financial statements and accordingly should exercise his professional judgement on the basis of the available evidence to conclude whether the going concern basis of accounting is appropriate.

Based on the above evaluation, the auditor needs to ensure the adequacy of relevant disclosures made by the management in the financial statements and appropriate reporting of going concern in the auditors’ report.

Documentation
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the evaluation of going concern assessment requires significant professional judgement and involves various critical factors that require detailed evaluation and discussion with management before drawing a conclusion, and as such it becomes very critical for the auditor to ensure adequate audit documentation demonstrating the audit procedures performed and evidence obtained by the audit team, to conclude the going concern assumption.

Given below are the main points that the auditor should consider while documenting the going concern evaluation:
– Events and conditions identified during the audit that the auditor believes may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue on a going concern basis;
– Minutes of meetings with management, discussing all such identified events and conditions and management responses addressing those events and conditions. Here it is important to highlight that the audit team while documenting these minutes of meetings should also ensure that such documentation should also cover the date and place of the meeting, the names of the participants and their designations, and acknowledgment from the participants of the matters discussed therein;
– Details of the business plan and other factors considered by the management to support the going concern assumption;
– Audit procedures performed and evidence obtained by the audit team to validate the management plan and assumptions;
– Minutes of meetings of any discussion / consultation held by the audit team with the senior audit partners or industry experts within the firm;
– Adequate documentation demonstrating the reliance placed on the Subject Matter Experts and audit procedures performed in accordance with the guidance given in SA 260 Using the Work of an Expert;
– Conclusion drawn by the auditor based on the audit procedures performed and evidence obtained;
– Disclosure implications in the financial statements, based on the conclusion drawn and whether it has been complied by the management while preparing the financial statements;
– Reporting implications in the auditors’ report based on the above evaluation and disclosures made in the financial statements;
– In cases where the auditor concludes that an emphasis of matter or a modified opinion is required to be issued, evidences of communication with Those Charged With Governance should also be documented as part of audit documentation.

TO SUMMARISE
The above discussion highlights that the evaluation of going concern assessment has become more critical and complex in the present economic environment and the auditor needs to adopt a more vigilant approach to address it effectively. The auditor, along with the various guidances that have been issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to assist the auditors to address the challenges in going concern, should also draw reference from other audits, of events and conditions that have raised significant doubts on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern with their possible outcome, while concluding the evaluation of going concern assessment.

 

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS DEPOSITS, LOANS AND BORROWINGS

BACKGROUND
Companies need funds on a regular basis and tap various sources for the same, from retail / small depositors (commonly referred to as public deposits) to large lenders. In respect of public deposits there are stringent guidelines laid down by the RBI and the MCA which need to be complied with, including for amounts which are deemed to be in the nature of deposits. Further, the lenders and depositors also need an assurance that the companies are using the same for the stated purposes and not as a funding tool within group entities and would be able to repay the same as per the stipulated terms as well as an assurance about the future stability and liquidity of the company. The Companies Act, 2013 (‘the Act’) has also laid down stringent provisions to regulate the same, especially in respect of non-financial companies. CARO 2020 has also accordingly enhanced the reporting requirements substantially.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

Clause No.

Particulars

Nature of change, if any

Clause 3(v)

Deemed Deposits:

Enhanced Reporting

In respect of deposits accepted by the company or amounts which are deemed to be deposits:

• Whether the directives issued by the Reserve
Bank of India and the provisions of sections 73 to 76 or any other relevant
provisions of the Companies Act and the rules made thereunder, where
applicable, have been complied with;

• In case of any contraventions

 

in respect of the above, the nature of such
contraventions be stated;

• If an order has been passed by the Company Law
Board or the National Company Law Tribunal or the Reserve Bank of India or
any court or any other tribunal, whether the same has been complied with or
not;

 

Clause 3(ix)(a)

Default in repayment of loans / other borrowings
and interest:

Enhanced Reporting

• Whether the company has defaulted in repayment
of loans or other borrowings or in
the payment of interest thereon to any lender;

• If yes, the period and the amount of default to
be reported as per the format below:

• Nature of borrowing including debt securities

• Name of lender*

• Amount not paid on due date
• Whether principal or interest

• No. of days delay or unpaid
• Remarks, if any

* lender-wise details to be provided in case of
defaults to banks, financial institutions and Government
           

Clause 3(ix)(b)

Wilful defaulter:

New Clause

Whether the company is
declared a wilful defaulter by any bank or financial institution or other
lender.

Clause 3(ix)(c)

Application of term loans for prescribed
purposes:

New Clause

• Whether term loans were applied
for the purpose for which the loans were obtained;

• If not, the amount of
loan so

 

(continued)

diverted and the purpose
for which it is used may be reported.

 

Clause 3(ix)(d)

Short-term funds utilised for long-term purposes:

New Clause

• Whether funds raised on
short-term basis have been utilised for long-term purposes;

• If yes, the nature and
amount to be indicated.

Clause 3(ix)(e)

Funds borrowed for meeting obligations of group
companies:

New Clause

• Whether the company has
taken any funds from any entity or person on account of or to meet the
obligations of its subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures;

• If so, details thereof
with nature of such transactions and the amount in each case.

Clause 3(ix)(f)

Loans raised against pledge of securities of
group companies:

New Clause

• Whether the company has
raised loans during the year on the pledge of securities held in its
subsidiaries, joint ventures or associate companies;

• If so, give details
thereof; and

• Report if the company has
defaulted in repayment of such loans raised.

 

CLAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Deemed Deposits [Clause 3(v)]:
• The scope has been enhanced to cover amounts which are deemed to be in the nature of deposits as per the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014.
Default in repayment of loans / other borrowings and interest [Clause 3 (ix)(a)]:
• The scope of this clause has been extended to cover all borrowings other than loans and hence would include debentures, commercial paper, subordinated debt and inter-corporate deposits.
• The scope of the clause has been expanded to all borrowings from any lender and not just restricted to borrowings from financial institutions, banks, Government or dues to debenture holders, as was the case earlier.
• The scope of reporting has been extended to interest on the borrowings in addition to repayment of principal amount.
• If there is a default in the repayment of borrowings, the format for reporting, the period and amount of default has now been prescribed.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges, which are discussed below, in respect of the clauses where there are enhanced reporting requirements as well as new clauses:

Deemed Deposits [Clause 3(v)]:
a) Inclusive nature of the definition: The Act vide section 2(31) provides an inclusive definition of deposits by stating that deposits include:
• any receipt of money by way of deposit or loan or in any other form by a company; but
• does not include such categories of amounts as may be prescribed in consultation with the RBI (no such amounts have been prescribed till date).

In spite of the inclusive nature of the definition, Rule 2(1)(c) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014, makes certain exclusions from the definition of deposits. These are broadly indicated hereunder:
• Amounts received from the Central or State Government or guaranteed by them, as also from any other statutory or local authorities constituted under an Act of Parliament or any State Legislature;
• Amounts received from foreign Governments or other prescribed foreign sources / entities, subject to the provisions of FEMA and the regulations framed thereunder;
• Amounts received from banks, public financial institutions, insurance companies and regional financial institutions;
• Amounts received against issue of commercial paper or similar instruments in accordance with the RBI guidelines;
• Amount received by one company from another company (inter-corporate deposits);
• Amounts received towards subscription of securities, including share application money, in pursuance of an offer made in accordance with the provisions of the Act. However, such amounts need to be allotted or adjusted within 60 days. If the same are not refunded within 15 days from the completion of 60 days the same would be treated as deposits. Also, no adjustment of such amounts for any other purpose would be permissible;
• Any amounts received from a person who at the time of receipt was a Director of the company, provided that he has submitted a declaration that the amount is not given out of funds acquired by him by borrowings from others;
• Amount raised through issue of bonds or debentures which are secured by a first or ranking pari passu with the first charge on the assets of the Company (other than intangible assets) referred to in Schedule III and which are compulsorily convertible into shares within a period of five years;
• Any amount received from an employee subject to the following conditions:

(i) It does not exceed his annual salary under a contract of employment; and
(ii) It is in the nature of a non-interest-bearing security deposit;
• The following amounts received in the course of or for the purposes of business:
(i) Advances for supply of goods or provision of services provided they are appropriated / adjusted against the supply of goods or provision of services within 365 days from the date of receipt of the advance, unless they are the subject matter of dispute;
(ii) Advance received in connection with the consideration for immovable property under an agreement or arrangement, provided the same is adjusted against the property in terms of the agreement or arrangement;
(iii) Security deposit for the performance of a contract for the supply of goods or provision of services;
(iv) Advances received under a long-term contract for supply of capital goods, other than those under (ii) above.
Accordingly, deposits which are technically not in the nature of deposits by virtue of the definition but substantially having the character of deposits are also required to be reported upon.

b) Higher risk of non-compliance: The risk of non-compliance would be even higher in case of deemed deposits. The auditor should obtain the list of amounts received in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business of the company (e.g., advances, security deposits, credit balances, etc.) and assess whether these amounts comply with the above requirements to determine whether such amounts would constitute deemed deposits. He should also review the internal control systems and processes of the client to ensure that there are adequate checks and balances in place to ensure that there is no non-compliance with the requirements. For example, for any advance / deposits / amount received by a company from a vendor, there would be internal checks to ensure that the balance is appropriated against supply or goods / services
provided by the vendor within the stipulated time limit of 365 days.

Default in repayment of loans / other borrowings and interest [Clause 3 (ix)(a)]:
a. Companies adopting Ind AS: Such companies are likely to face certain specific challenges which need to be kept in mind whilst considering the various reporting requirements which are as under:
• The borrowings need to be considered on the basis of the legal form rather than on the basis of the substance of the arrangements as is required in terms of Ind AS 32 and 109. Accordingly, redeemable preference shares though considered as financial liabilities / borrowings under Ind AS, will not be considered for reporting under this clause since legally they are in the nature of share capital. Similarly, optionally or fully convertible debentures though considered as compound financial instruments or equity under Ind AS, will not be considered for reporting.
• The interest charged to the P&L Account is computed on the basis of the Effective Interest Rate (EIR) method which would include certain other charges. However, for identifying the unpaid interest the contractual payments need to be considered.
• Ind AS 107 requires disclosure of the maturity analysis of the financial liabilities showing the contractual repayments under different liquidity buckets. The auditors shall cross-check the work papers for reporting under this clause with the Ind AS disclosures. Similar considerations would apply to the disclosures with respect to the defaults in loan repayments under paragraphs 18 and 19 of Ind AS 107 as well as under Schedule III.

b. Reschedulement proposals: If the company has submitted an application for reschedulement to the lenders, which is under different stages of processing, the same would also be considered as a default and need to be reported. However, if the application for reschedulement of loan has been approved by the bank or financial institution concerned during the year covered by the auditor’s report, the auditor should state in his audit report the fact of reschedulement of loan. The Guidance Note issued by ICAI has clarified that where reschedulement of loan has been approved subsequent to the balance sheet date, the auditor should report the defaults during the year. However, he may mention this fact in the remarks column.

c. Covid-19 restructuring proposals: In case a company which has availed of the concessions in terms of the Covid regulatory package notified by the RBI, the compliance with the same would not be considered as a default. In such cases, the auditor may consider making an appropriate reference in the report.

d. Challenges for NBFCs and highly leveraged companies: Such companies are likely to face certain specific challenges which need to be kept in mind whilst considering the various reporting requirements which are as under:
• The auditor shall review the company’s internal control systems and test the design and operating effectiveness of the company’s treasury activities and liquidity management to identify defaults on a timely basis since it would not be practical to verify each individual case of default due to the volume of transactions. The auditors shall also verify the procedures that the company has in place to avoid any defaults in repayment of loan or payment of interest. Further, in such cases the auditor can also consider obtaining and reviewing the latest credit rating report and whether there is a mention about any defaults. Similarly, any decline in credit rating should trigger an element of professional scepticism about whether there is a default by the company. Finally, an appropriate representation should be obtained from the management.
• In respect of NBFCs which have issued subordinated debt and perpetual instruments (PDI) in terms of the RBI guidelines, care would need to be taken to check whether any events / triggers have taken place in terms of the RBI guidelines to make repayments, especially of the principal amounts and whether the same have been complied with. The key RBI guidelines which need to be kept in mind are as under:
(i) Subordinated debt is not redeemable at the instance of the holder or without the consent of the supervisory authority of the NBFC;
(ii) Non-deposit-taking NBFCs with asset size of Rs. 500 crores and above shall issue PDI as plain vanilla instruments only. However, they may issue PDI with a ‘call option’ for a minimum period of ten years from the date of issue and the call option shall be exercised only with the prior approval of RBI.

Wilful defaulter [Clause 3 (ix)(b)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this clause, the auditor will have to keep in mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:
Where a company is a declared wilful defaulter by any bank or financial institution or other lender, the following details shall be given:
a. Date of declaration as wilful defaulter,
b. Details of defaults (amount and nature of defaults),
* ‘wilful defaulter’ here means a person or an issuer who or which is categorised as a wilful defaulter by any bank or financial institution (as defined under the Act) or consortium thereof, in accordance with the guidelines on wilful defaulters issued by the Reserve Bank of India.

Whilst reporting, the auditor should make a cross-reference to the above disclosures made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Before proceeding further, it is important to analyse the key requirements as per the RBI guidelines for identification and classification of wilful defaulters, since that acts as the trigger-point.

Key requirements as per the RBI Guidelines (RBI Circular RBI/2014-15/73DBR.No.CID.BC.57/20.16.003/2014-15 dated 1st July, 2014):
Wilful default: A ‘wilful default’ would be deemed to have occurred if any of the following events is noted:
• The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender even when it has the capacity to honour the said obligations;
• The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has not utilised the finance from the lender for the specific purposes for which finance was availed but has diverted the funds for other purposes;
• The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has siphoned off the funds so that the funds have not been utilised for the specific purpose for which finance was availed, nor are the funds available with the unit in the form of other assets;
• The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has also disposed of or removed the movable fixed assets or immovable property given for the purpose of securing a term loan without the knowledge of the bank / lender.

The identification of the wilful default should be made keeping in view the track record of the borrowers and should not be decided on the basis of isolated transactions / incidents. The default to be classified as wilful should be intentional, deliberate and calculated. The key trigger-points for identification of wilful default indicated by RBI are:
• Diversion of funds
• Siphoning of funds

Diversion of funds:
This would be construed to include any one of the undernoted occurrences:
a) Utilisation of short-term working capital funds for long-term purposes not in conformity with the terms of sanction;
b) Deploying borrowed funds for purposes / activities or creation of assets other than those for which the loan was sanctioned;
c) Transferring borrowed funds to the subsidiaries / group companies or other corporates by whatever modalities;
d) Routing of funds through any bank other than the lender bank or members of the consortium without prior permission of the lender;
e) Investment in other companies by way of acquiring equities / debt instruments without approval of lenders;
f) Shortfall in deployment of funds vis-à-vis the amounts disbursed / drawn and the difference not being accounted for.

Siphoning of funds:
The term ‘siphoning of funds’ should be construed to occur if any funds borrowed from banks / FIs are utilised for purposes unrelated to the operations of the borrower, to the detriment of the financial health of the entity or of the lender. The decision as to whether a particular instance amounts to siphoning of funds or diversion of funds would have to be a judgement of the lenders based on objective facts and circumstances of the case. Generally, siphoning of funds would occur when the funds are diverted to group companies without proper approvals.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) If the company has not been declared a wilful defaulter but has received a show cause notice in accordance with the RBI Circular, the auditor may consider disclosing this fact under this Clause. In case a show cause notice is not received by the company, the auditor should also obtain a representation letter from the management that the company has neither been declared as a wilful defaulter nor has it received any show cause notice. This would normally be the case when the company has defaulted and the same has been reported under Clause 3(ix)(a) earlier.

b) It is possible that the company is legally disputing the bank’s / financial institution’s declaration of the company as wilful defaulter. In that case, the auditor shall consider performing the audit procedures under Standard on Auditing SA 501 Audit Evidence – Specific Considerations for Selected Items that requires the auditors to perform certain procedures, as indicated hereunder, as also make appropriate disclosures whilst reporting under this Clause as well as in the financial statements under the amended Schedule III.
• Obtain a list of litigation and claims;
• Where available, review the management’s assessment of the outcome of each of the identified litigation and claims and its estimate of the financial implications, including costs involved;
• Seek confirmation from the entity’s external legal counsel about the reasonableness of management’s assessments and provide the auditor with further information if the list is considered by the entity’s external legal counsel to be incomplete or incorrect;
• If the entity’s external legal counsel does not respond appropriately to a letter of general inquiry, the auditor may seek direct communication through a letter of specific inquiry;
• Consider meeting the entity’s external legal counsel to discuss the likely outcome of the litigation or claims, for example, where the matter is a significant risk.

c) It is possible that the company may not have been declared as wilful defaulter as at the date of the balance sheet but has been so declared before the audit report is issued. As per paragraph 6 of SA 560 Subsequent Events, the auditor shall perform audit procedures designed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that all events occurring between the date of the financial statements and the date of the auditor’s report that require adjustment of, or disclosure in, the financial statements have been identified. It is, therefore, clarified that the auditor should also consider whether the company has been declared as wilful defaulter as on the date of the audit report. The declaration of the company as a wilful defaulter will be published on the RBI website after the lender has followed the due process in terms of the above-referred RBI Circular.

Application of term loans for prescribed purposes [Clause 3 (ix)(c)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this Clause, the auditor will have to keep in mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:
Where the company has not used the borrowings from banks and financial institutions for the specific purpose for which these had been taken at the balance sheet date, the company shall disclose the details of where they have been used.

‘Utilisation of borrowed funds and share premium’
This Clause is applicable in case where the company has advanced or loaned or invested funds (either borrowed funds or share premium or from any other source) to any other person(s) or entity(ies) (Intermediaries) with the understanding that the Intermediary shall, inter alia, directly or indirectly lend or invest in the other persons or entities identified in any manner whatsoever by or on behalf of the company (Ultimate Beneficiaries). In such a case, the company shall provide in the financial statements certain details such as: date and amount of funds advanced or loaned or invested in Intermediaries with complete details of each Intermediary; date and amount of fund further advanced or loaned or invested by such Intermediaries to other Intermediaries or Ultimate Beneficiaries along with complete details of the Ultimate Beneficiaries; and, declaration that relevant provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the Companies Act have been complied with for such transactions and the transactions are not violative of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Whilst reporting, the auditor should make a cross-reference to the above disclosures made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) In case of any loans / advances / payments to related parties or promoters / promoter group entities or any investments made in other companies, auditors need to exercise greater professional scepticism to ensure that the payments are genuine and for the purposes as per the sanctioned terms.

b) Reference should be made to the RBI Circular on wilful defaulters referred to earlier to identify possible instances of diversion of funds, since the purpose for which the funds are used / diverted are required to be reported / disclosed. Some instances of diversion of funds are:
• Payment to capital goods vendors from CC limits when there was shortfall in term loan sanctioned;
• Meeting company’s margin money from CC limits for expansion / modernisation / technical upgradation of existing project;
• Investment in subsidiary / Group companies;
• Investment in capital market or payment of long-term debt from the existing CC limits;
• Purchase of immovable properties / assets for personal use of the promoters / directors / KMPs;
• Current ratio of less than one may indicate that the company has diverted working capital loans for long-term purposes.

c) Under Ind AS, certain loans may be treated as compound financial instruments (part debt, part equity). The auditor shall cover the entire proceeds of the loans from the bank / FI for the purpose of reporting under the Clause.

Short-term funds utilised for long-term purposes [Clause 3 (ix)(d)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:

Refer to Clause 3(ix)(c) earlier.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) The auditor is required to state the nature of application of funds if the company has financed long-term assets out of short-term funds. The auditor can determine the nature of application of funds only if there is a direct linkage between the funds raised and the asset. The determination of direct relationship between the particular funds and an asset from the balance sheet may not always be feasible. The auditor shall obtain adequate audit evidence supporting the movement in funds. If the quantum of long-term funds raised is less than the funds used for long-term assets, this may imply that some of the long-term assets have been financed through short-term funds.

b) Often, it may not be possible to establish a direct link between the funds and the assets / utilisation, since money is fungible. The auditor shall determine the overall deployment of the source and application of funds of the company. The auditor may also review the cash flow statement to determine whether short-term funds have been used for long-term purposes. Instances where short-term funds would have been utilised for long-term purposes would include, for example, where the company has utilised funds from bank overdraft facilities in long-term investments or long-term projects or fixed assets. Similarly, there may be cases where the company raises monies from public deposits due for repayment within two to three years for the purpose of acquiring long-term investments, unless the company is able to demonstrate that a bulk of these deposits are renewed.

c) In case of NBFCs and Ind AS companies the ALM / Maturity Analysis disclosures need to be referred to for the purposes of identifying any maturity mismatches. Further, in such cases the auditor should also check whether the company’s treasury / finance department uses any liquidity / working capital management tools and if so to check the design and operating effectiveness of the internal controls around the same. If the quantum of long-term funds raised is less than the funds used for long-term assets, this may imply that some of the long-term assets have been financed through short-term funds. These considerations would equally apply to all entities where the volume of borrowings is significant.

Funds borrowed for meeting obligations of group companies [Clause 3 (ix)(e)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:
Refer to Clause 3(ix)(c) earlier.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) Identifying subsidiaries and associates: Since this Clause requires to separately report on funds borrowed for meeting the obligations of subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates, the identification thereof is of paramount importance. The Guidance Note has clarified that these terms should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Act which could be different, in certain cases, from what is defined in the Accounting Standards in the case of subsidiaries which is examined as under:
Section 2(87) of the Act defines ‘subsidiary company’ or ‘subsidiary’ in relation to any other company, means a company in which the holding company – (i) controls the composition of the Board of Directors; or (ii) exercises or controls more than one-half of the total voting power either at its own or together with one or more of its subsidiary companies. Thus, the Act emphasises on legal control which is similar to what is considered for the purpose of Accounting Standard 21 (AS 21) – Consolidated Financial Statements for companies adopting Indian GAAP. The concept of control and, therefore, subsidiary relationship under Ind AS 110 is much broader. Existence of factors such as, de facto control, potential voting rights, control through de facto agents, power to enforce certain decisions, etc., have to be considered, which are not considered for the purpose of section 2(87). Hence, for companies adopting Ind AS there could be differences between what is disclosed in the accounts and what is required for reporting under this Clause, which would need to be reconciled to ensure completeness of reporting. The auditors of Ind AS companies will need to take utmost care about this distinction while dealing with this Clause.

The definition of ‘associate’ under the Act extends to an entity that is significantly influenced by the investor company. Significant influence may be achieved in cases where the company is accustomed to act as per the directions of the investor company. Such a significant influence may be as a result of shareholders’ agreements, too. Therefore, the definition of ‘associate’ can be quite broad vis-a-vis the Accounting Standards.

b) Determining the reporting boundaries: This presents several challenges and raises certain issues which are discussed below:
• The Clause refers to any funds taken from any entity. However, both these terms have not been defined;
• Whilst the Guidance Note has specified that the word entity would include banks, FIs, companies, LLPs, Trusts, Government or others irrespective of the legal form, normally in case of trusts and others the purpose for which the funds have been given may not be clearly specified in the absence of any statutory requirements and lack of proper documentation. This would make it difficult for the auditor to establish a proper audit trail for the utilisation of funds, and hence he needs to exercise a heightened degree of professional scepticism. He should also consider obtaining a suitable management representation in this regard;
• Further, whilst the funds would include both short-term and long-term funds as clarified in the Guidance Note, there is no clarity as to whether it would cover both borrowed funds and share capital. A plain reading seems to suggest that even funds raised by issue of shares should be considered. In such cases, the auditor should refer to the Offer Letter / Prospectus to identify whether the funds are to be utilised for granting loans and advances to or making investments in or meeting other obligations of group companies. The same should also be corroborated with the reporting under Clause 3(x)(a) and (b).
• Finally, the auditor should consider the procedures performed for reporting under Clause 3(ix)(c) earlier wherein he would have identified diversion of funds, and if required he should cross-reference the same for reporting purposes.

c) Challenges for NBFCs, highly leveraged companies and companies with a large number of group companies: Such companies are likely to face certain specific challenges which need to be kept in mind whilst considering the various reporting requirements which are as under:
• The auditor shall review the company’s internal control systems and test the design and operating effectiveness to identify whether there is proper monitoring of the usage of funds as per the sanctioned terms or approved purposes;
• The auditor shall review the company’s internal control systems and test the design and operating effectiveness to identify whether related parties and the transactions with them are identified and appropriately recorded. He should also perform adequate and appropriate procedures under SA 500 on Related Parties. In particular, the auditor shall inspect or inquire about the following for indications of the existence of related party transactions or transactions that the management has not previously identified or disclosed to the auditor:
a) Bank, legal and third-party confirmations obtained as part of the auditor’s procedures;
b) Minutes of meetings of shareholders and of those charged with governance;
c) Such other records or documents as the auditor considers necessary in the circumstances of the entity;
d) The entity’s ownership and governance structures;
e) The types of investments that the entity is making and plans to make; and
f) The way the entity is structured and how it is financed.

Loans raised against pledge of securities of group companies [Clause 3 (ix)(f)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:

Registration of charges or satisfaction with Registrar of Companies
Where any charges or satisfaction are yet to be registered with the Registrar of Companies beyond the statutory period, details and reasons thereof shall be disclosed.
Whilst reporting, the auditor should make a cross-reference to the above disclosures made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) Identifying subsidiaries and associates: Similar considerations as discussed under Clause 3(ix)(e) earlier would apply.

b) Negative lien / residual / floating charge: There may be cases where the company has a negative lien on its investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures and associate companies. It may be noted that such negative lien is not a pledge. Sometimes, loan agreements have a general or residual or floating charge on all securities without specific pledge of any security. Reporting under this Clause will be applicable only when the securities held in the subsidiaries, etc., are pledged for obtaining such loan by the company.

c) Validity / legality of pledge: In case of any doubts on the validity or legality of the pledge, the auditor may consider obtaining confirmation from the company’s lawyers by performing the procedures as per SA 501 referred to earlier. For this purpose the auditor should be aware of the requirements as under:
• Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013 dealing with registration of charges;
• Section 12 of the Depositories Act, 1996 read with Regulation 58, SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996.
In case the auditor based on his inquiries and / or discussion with the legal personnel observes any non-compliance with respect to the above, he should consider inviting attention to the same in his report so that the lender / pledgee is aware of the same.

d) The auditor may consider giving a reference to the reporting of defaults under Clause 3(ix)(a) earlier in case of any defaults without specifying the extent of default.

Impact on the audit opinion:
Whilst reporting on these Clauses, the auditors may come across several situations wherein they may need to report exceptions / deviations. In each of these cases, they would need to carefully evaluate the impact of the same on the audit opinion by exercising their professional judgement to determine the materiality and relevance of the same to the users of the financial statements. These are broadly examined hereunder:

Nature
of exception / deviation

Possible
impact on the audit report / opinion

The company has not complied with the RBI
directives or sections 73 to 76 or other applicable provisions of the Act or
relevant Rules or orders of any statutory authority which may have
implications on the main audit

• Modified opinion under SA 706

• Key audit matter under SA 701

 

(continued)

report due to non-compliance with the
following SAs:

• Consideration of laws and regulations (SA
250)

• Fraud (SA 240).

[Clause 3(v)]

 

• In extreme cases, where there are
continuing defaults in repayment of loans / borrowings by the company, there
may be uncertainties around the appropriateness of Going Concern assumption
in the financial statements. The auditor shall follow the requirements of SA
570 (Revised) Going Concern in such cases.

• Restructuring of loan subsequent to the
balance sheet date but before the date of auditor’s report.

[Clause 3(ix)(a)]

• Modified opinion under SA
706

• Emphasis of matter under
SA 705

• Key audit matter under SA
701 (in case of restructuring subsequent to the Balance Sheet date)

 

Where the company has been declared a
wilful defaulter, there may be uncertainties around the appropriateness of
Going Concern assumption in the financial statements. The auditor shall
follow the requirements of SA 570 (Revised) Going Concern in such
cases

[Clause 3(ix)(b)]

• Modified opinion under SA 706

• Key audit matter under SA 701 (where the
Company is disputing the same)

Where the company has not applied term
loans for the purpose for which the loans were obtained, there may be
uncertainties around the appropriateness of Going Concern assumption in the
financial statements. The auditor shall follow the requirements of auditing
standards, in particular SA 240 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to
Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements

[Clause 3(ix)(c)]

Modified opinion under SA 706

Where the company has taken any funds from
any entity or person on account of or to meet the obligations of its
subsidiaries,  associates or joint
ventures, the

Modified opinion under SA 706

(continued)

auditor may have to consider   the impact of impairment or provisioning
and whether the same is consistent with the purpose of loans taken by the
company and whether there is a breach in the loan covenants. The auditor
shall consider requirements of the auditing standards, in particular SA 240 The
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial
Statements

[Clause 3(ix)(e)]

 

Where the company has raised loans during
the year on the pledge of securities held in its subsidiaries, joint ventures
or associate companies and if the company has defaulted in repayment of such
loans, the auditor may have to consider audit issues such as requirements of
the auditing standards, in particular SA 570 Going Concern and SA 240 The
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial
Statements

[Clause 3(ix)(f)]

Modified opinion under SA 706

In such cases, it is imperative that the Board’s Report contains explanations / comments on every reservation / adverse comment in the audit report as per section 134(3)(f) of the Companies Act, 2013 and that there is no factual inconsistency between the two.

CONCLUSION
The above changes have cast onerous reporting responsibilities on the auditor, especially towards the lenders for various critical aspects as under:
• Identifying defaults on timely basis.
• Monitoring the end use of funds.
• Providing red flags towards Going Concern and fraud-related issues.

Accordingly, the auditors would need to exercise greater degree of professional scepticism during the course of their audits.

Statutory Audit – BCAJ Survey on Perspectives on NFRA Consultation Paper

STATUTORY AUDIT – BCAJ SURVEY ON PERSPECTIVES ON NFRA CONSULTATION PAPER

The BCAJ carried out a dipstick survey in October 2021 considering the National Financial Reporting Authority’s (NFRA) Consultation Paper [September 2021.] that brings out ideas to suggest that Statutory Audit fees are a burden, that only public interest entities require audit and that entities having Rs. 250 crores net-worth should be subjected to audit. The survey sought the views of Companies (Clients of Auditors) who avail the services of CA firms to carry out Statutory Audits.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE RESPONDENTS

64.9% of respondents represented Private Limited Companies, 16.2.% Group Companies (comprising of several companies of all sizes), 10.8% Listed/ Public Limited Companies, 4.1% One Person Companies and 4.0% regulated companies (such as NBFCs).

 

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

Survey Questions and Responses

 

  1. VALUE PROPOSITION: In your view, which of the following areas does a Statutory Audit add VALUE in your business? [Select one or more options]

Other Comments by Survey Participants: Statutory Audit: eases Foreign Operations; Facilitates in quoting for tenders.

  1. COST vs VALUE: In the growth cycle of your company do you feel Statutory Audit is not a compliance burden / a ‘cost’ and adds value as mentioned in Q1 above to management / owners ? [Select one option]

  1. FEES: Do you feel that the Statutory Audit Fees in your experience are generally commensurate to the scope, time, effort, and risk involved for the Auditor? [Select the most appropriate option]

  1. PUBLIC INTEREST: Do you feel requirement of statutory audit should be SOLELY based on Public Interest criteria OR statutory audit serves multiple purposes especially for companies which are not Public Interest Entities such as for MSME companies? [Select one option]

  1. OPTION: If audit was not mandatory or was optional would you still get your accounts audited for reasons other than “Compliance with the Act” since audited accounts give strength, sanctity, and dependability to financials? [Select one option]

  1. CONSEQUENCES: If you chose not to opt for statutory audit and later require loans, or get notices, or require certificates under various laws – would you be willing to go through “Audit” of those areas for above purposes later on for more than one year? [Select one option]

  1. CEASE TO BE A COMPANY – Hypothetically, if some categories of companies were to be exempted from Statutory Audits and other heavy compliances, would you rather wish to carry the business in a non-corporate format and therefore should be given an opportunity to change over to LLP or other modes for ease of operating without any questions / hassles from tax departments or MCA? [Select one option]

  1. BURDENSOME COMPLIANCES – In your view, which are the TOP THREE most burdensome compliances thrust upon small and medium companies from a financial reporting point of view?

DO TAXPAYERS UNDERTAKE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES TO PAY TAXES?

Hope you all had a beautiful Deepavali and a great start to the Samvat year 2078!

We have been seeing a much larger tax base in the last few years but we don’t see any specific ‘return on taxes paid’. There is no differentiation between a taxpayer and a non-taxpayer. When so few people pay taxes, I think tax cannot be an obligation but must be treated as an investment and taxpayers as investors in India.

On the other hand, taxpayer money is used to appease voters with freebees to the extent that taxpayers are thrown out of the system entirely. For example, if your child aspires to study medicine in Maharashtra, then you will be shocked to know that 74% seats are ‘reserved’, or rather awarded without merit. Reservation is a Government racket to strangulate a child to struggle excessively, or to get ejected out of the system for which his parents have paid, or the child goes out of the country, never to return. But it becomes vicious and ridiculous, once a student has done MBBS, then all pass-outs should be equal. But, even for MD, there is reservation. Government gives free seats to compensate its failure to give adequate education facilities to those who cannot afford it. So it gives out-of-turn seats directly. If Government gave money and extra classes for those who need it, so that they could compete, then one can build a meritocratic system that will give self-respect and not false entitlement. Reservation in most forms is racism and discrimination when it continues forever.

On the financial front, there are examples where Government extracts excessive taxes from taxpayers. Take the cost of buying a car as reported a while back. If a taxpayer wants to buy a vehicle worth Rs. 15 lakhs, she would have to earn about Rs. 21.42 lakhs because income tax takes away Rs. 6.42 lakhs. Out of Rs. 15 lakhs, the car dealer gets Rs. 9.8 lakhs only and Government ‘siphons’ off as taxes Rs. 5.2 lakhs. Add to it the taxes on fuel. On a retail price of Rs. 105.5, taxes amount to Rs. 57.2 (54%) and the dealer cost of petrol is Rs. 44.4 (42%). A sum of Rs. 3.9 is the commission per litre. Going back to earning this Rs. 105.5, a taxpayer needs to earn much more pre-tax. For other than ‘sin goods’, how can taxes be more than the transaction value?

Plus, let’s not forget that for Government nothing is enough – as per the MOS for Petroleum, the Union Government’s tax collection jumped 88% to Rs. 3.35 lakh crores for F.Y. 2020-21 from Rs. 1.78 lakh crores. This is also detrimental to encouraging consumption which is often the missing link in the virtuous cycle. Does Government take back as taxes what it spends? Imagine if taxes were reduced to 10-15% of the base value of cars for taxpayers. That would be some incentive or solace for paying direct taxes. And for those who believe Government can offer the best social services and taxes go towards that, one knows that Government is more often than not a benchmark of inefficiency and wastage, if you ignore corruption.

Facilities to taxpayers: They don’t exist. Most public services are paid for use by taxpayers: tolls, water, airport charges, train tickets or infra costs when you buy a home. Costs like defence must come from the massive natural resources that Government controls and not from the small income tax paying base. We should have reservations for taxpayers in top colleges in every segment, medical insurance top-up at any age for taxpayers who have paid taxes for 30 years or more, stamp duty set-off based on value add only for property purchase, fast track judicial service, and so on. Then we can even start to talk about honouring taxpayers. Till then, its harrowing taxpayers!

 
 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor

FATE IS THE FIFTH FACTOR

Readers will be aware that in the Bhagawad Geeta there is no mention or promotion of any religious community. The word religion – is used in the Geeta to mean ‘duty’, just as there is a religion (duty) of a king, of a teacher, a student, or of Brahmans and of Kshatriyas (warriors). It is a practical guide for day-to-day life and not necessarily a treatise with high level ‘philosophy’. Shrikrishna gives very practical tips in His message to Arjun.

In the 18th chapter, 14th stanza, Shrikrishna describes five factors responsible for performing a task,

Adhishthaan means ‘body’. It is believed that the soul (Atman) stays in our body and gets all the tasks performed. Thus, if there is no body then nothing can be done. We can achieve all things only through our body. Therefore, it is also said – Which means that the body is the first medium of achieving all religions – or discharging all duties.

Karta – The doer. In philosophical or spiritual terms, the soul gets everything done. Karta also refers to or ego. Everybody feels that he/she is doing the work. In reality, however, everybody is merely an instrument in the hands of the Supreme Power (or God). It is a false belief – ego – if one feels that one is doing the task oneself; it is the Supreme Power that gets it done through him/her.

Karanam – is resources or equipment or tools. In spiritual terms, it is our mind and various organs (indriyas). All our organs are the instruments in the hands of the soul – which is the real doer.

Cheshta – is ‘efforts’. Different types of efforts or actions.

Thus, the body, the doer, the equipment and actual efforts are the first four factors.

Daivam – The fifth factor is ‘Fate’ or ‘Destiny’ or even the unknown that is beyond our control. It is the power that controls the organs. Thus, despite the presence of all four factors, sometimes the task is not performed or completed successfully. Destiny is the fifth but equally important factor.

This is the beauty of Indian philosophy. Even the Gods cannot escape Destiny. Ram, Krishna and all other Gods also suffered in their lives in some way or other. They also tasted failures. They committed mistakes and even received ‘curses’. They also got ‘punished’ at times. That was their Destiny.

Therefore, the message is, we need to be down-to-earth. We should never boast about our physical power, wealth, resources, intellect and so on. We should always take into consideration the Destiny factor while planning anything. That is why we have Plan A, Plan B and so on.

At the same time, Destiny is not the sole factor. We should not be fatalists. Destiny helps only those who help themselves; or who have the first four factors in place. God favours the brave.

We experience this in every walk of life. In examinations, sports, wars, artistic performances, court proceedings, and even routine tasks like travelling, cooking, etc. Success can never be guaranteed. In cricket, it is often described as ‘glorious uncertainty’.

We professionals always need to bear this in mind. We experience this very often.

Let us offer our ‘Namaskaar’ to this very realistic philosophy.

USEFUL APPS AND EXTENSIONS WHILE WORKING FROM HOME

These days when we are
working from home and / or working with a reduced workforce, it is a good idea
to be digitally enabled with the latest Apps and Extensions which make our life
easier and our efforts more productive. Here are some Apps which are designed
to make a difference on a day-to-day basis.

 

Zoom
Scheduler:
This nifty Chrome extension helps you schedule and join meetings
instantly. Once installed, just click on its icon on the top right and you can
either join a meeting or schedule a meeting right away.

 

It also allows you to
schedule Zoom meetings directly from your Google Calendar. Once you have set up
a Zoom meeting from Google Calendar and invited others, the invitees can join
the Zoom meeting with a single click. Makes life super simple!

 

StretchClock:
This simple extension reminds you to stretch from time to time. The timer runs
in your browser and is configurable. When the countdown timer reaches zero,
StretchClock shows easy, no-sweat exercises that you can do at your desk in
business attire. It includes some easy Office Yoga poses also.

 

You can change the settings
to match your working style. Easy to pause when you don’t need it and easy to
unpause so that the hurt doesn’t come back. You can browse through the
different exercises during your break and use the ones you need.

 

It’s a professional break reminder
for desk warriors. Take a break and follow the simple no-sweat exercises to
avoid pain and stay fit. The easy way to feel better and be more productive!

 

Free
Video Email by CloudHQ:
This is a unique extension which
allows you to record and send videos directly from Gmail. If you want to stand
out in your emails or you’re just too busy to type an email, you can send a
Video Email by using this extension.

 

Video Email is 100% free
and allows you to record your video, overlay multiple filters on it and send it
directly through Gmail – all with just three taps: record, upload, and send.

 

You can also upload your
video privately to YouTube, Google Drive, or create video file (which you can
then send as an attachment).

 

This is ideal for
salespeople, realtors, lawyers, marketers, and anyone who’s looking to cut
through the noise of boring text emails.

 

Grammarly:
This free Chrome Extension is a marvellous free tool which makes a huge
difference to the quality of your communication.

 

Whatever you type in Gmail
or on Messenger or in Google Doc, or Social Media, on Chrome, Grammarly will
automatically check your Grammar, point out mistakes and offer suggestions for
the correct grammatical syntax. You may accept what is suggested or just ignore
it and move ahead. It will even suggest reframing of sentences based on the
context and what you wish to convey. Grammarly is totally AI-based.

 

From grammar and spelling
to style and tone, Grammarly helps you eliminate errors and find the perfect
words to express yourself.

 

Recommended for anyone and
everyone regardless of where they work or what they do.

 

Export
Emails to Google Sheets by CloudHQ:
This is an
excellent tool for all workplaces. The data sitting in your Gmail emails can be
a goldmine. With this extension you can parse and export your Gmail messages
and labels to Google Sheets, CSV or Excel.

 

All
you have to do is to install the extension. Then on the left, select the label
to export and select ‘Save Label to Google Sheets’ in the Label menu. Once the options dialog box opens,
you can just tick the columns you wish to export, such as Subject, Sender, etc.
In options, you could select continuous export, name of a spreadsheet, etc.
Then start the export – and you would have exported all your data in Spreadsheet
/ CSV format and use the goldmine to further your analysis, tracking, etc.

 

A very neat tool to analyse
your emails.

 

Mercury
Reader:
The Mercury Reader extension for Chrome removes ads and
distractions, leaving only text and images for a clean and consistent reading
view on every site. It just clears the clutter instantly.

 

Once installed and enabled,
with just one click you can read text on your webpages in a clear, uncluttered,
ad-free environment. You can eliminate all the ads and the noise surrounding
the text on your webpage. You can even adjust typeface and text size and toggle
between light or dark themes for ease of reading. Options to optimise printing
are also available to print a webpage without ads and unnecessary clutter.

 

An interesting add-on to
browse the web comfortably.

 

Now that you have so many extensions to ease
your job, you can breathe easy and enjoy working from home. Best Wishes!

THE FORTUNE-TELLER

Every human
being is ever anxious to know about his future. Chartered Accountants are still
considered as ‘human beings’, although they work like donkeys.

 

Man is all the
more worried about the future, especially when he has to make some crucial
decisions. Covid-19 has put the future of everyone in the dark.

 

In a small
town, a
Sadhu Maharaj arrived one fine day. He stayed in a temple at a
little distance from the town. But soon the news spread that he has great
spiritual powers. People started flocking to the place where he had put up his
tent. It soon became very crowded as people from nearby places also started
coming in.

 

There was a
lot of talk among the people…

 

‘How does the sadhubaba look like? What does he wear?’

 

‘Does he talk
to everyone? Is there privacy while you are talking to him?’

 

‘How much does
he charge?’

 

‘Which
language does he speak?’

 

‘Is there any
separate queue for “special
darshan”?’

 

Some sceptics
said they never believed in such
sadhus. They said that fortune-tellers are
bogus people; and astrology is humbug. However, secretly almost everyone wanted
to visit him and meet him. His presence had mesmerised the people.

 

Suddenly, the
news came in that the
sadhubaba actually does not talk with anyone. You have to simply go and enter
your name in a register. You have to utter a short question in your mind. Then
you get a token. You then go to another room where many chits are kept. You
have to pick up the chit bearing your token number. On that chit there is a
short message. It will be a boon or a curse depending upon your past
karma. ‘Boons’ will be in blue letters and
‘curses’ in red.

 

A group of
friends went to the
sadhu. CA Chandrakant was one of them. Many of them uttered a question in
their minds about their children’s future.

 

They then
picked up their chits in great anxiety and eagerness.

 

On reading
their respective chits, the faces of many glowed with happiness. Most of them
had got a ‘boon’.

 

Somebody’s son
would become a minister; someone else’s daughter would get married to a
millionaire. Some people’s children would get a US visa smoothly and quickly
although Mr. Trump was still there. A few were delighted to know that their
wives would leave them alone for a long time! Likewise, many of them got some
good message or other and they felt that the
sadhu was like an angel.

 

But
Chandrakant’s face turned pale. His mood changed quickly. His friends asked,
‘What’s there in your chit?’

 

‘It says my
son will join the CA course.’

 

The friends
said, ‘Very good! Then why are you so sad? You should be happy! It’s a boon.’

 

‘No,’ said
Chandrakant, ‘the letters are in
red.

 

Grief must be shared to be
endured

 
Kalidasa, AbhiGyaanShakuntalam

INFORMAL GUIDANCE – A REFRESHER USING A RECENT CASE STUDY

BACKGROUND

Informal guidance has not been discussed in this column recently. A
recent informal guidance by SEBI gives an opportunity to refresh this useful
method of obtaining guidance of the regulator and in a fairly interesting
manner.

 

Informal guidance is a speedy way to know the mind of SEBI – or at least
of the relevant department – on a regulatory issue one is facing in an actual
case. One may be proposing to enter into a transaction or may be facing an
issue on interpretation of legal provisions. One then approaches SEBI with an
application giving the facts and the regulatory issues involved / queries and
SEBI gives its informal guidance. One could compare this with the advance
rulings as available under other laws, but the analogy should not be taken too
far. Informal guidance has a limited binding effect. In law, it can even be
reversed / ignored by SEBI itself, as will be seen in some detail later in this
article. Nevertheless, it has been useful in several cases.

 

WHAT IS INFORMAL GUIDANCE AND WHAT IS THE REGULATORY
BACKING?

SEBI introduced the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Informal
Guidance) Scheme, 2003 (the Scheme) in June, 2003. It is issued u/s 11(1) of
the SEBI Act and is thus a kind of measure in relation to securities markets
that SEBI has implemented. It does not have the status of a formal regulation
or rule and thus its legal status is limited. As we shall see, the Scheme
itself repeatedly mentions that the guidance given under it has limited binding
effect.

 

Nevertheless, it is a useful form of seeking guidance or ruling from
SEBI on how the relevant department of SEBI would view a particular situation
in the context of the relevant provisions of the securities laws. The person
desiring it approaches SEBI giving all relevant facts and the precise issue on
which he desires clarification. A fairly time-bound reply is generally given.

 

Who can approach SEBI for informal guidance?

Specified persons associated with capital markets can approach SEBI for
informal guidance. Those eligible include registered intermediaries (i.e.,
stock brokers, portfolio managers, etc.), listed companies (and also companies
proposing to get their securities listed and that have filed their offer
document / listing application), an acquirer / prospective acquirer under the
SEBI Takeover Regulations, etc.

 

What are the types of informal guidance that may be applied for?

There are two types of informal guidance that can be applied for. One is
a ‘no-action letter’. A person lays down the detailed proposed transaction he
desires to undertake and seeks guidance from SEBI on how it would view it. The
department concerned at SEBI may provide a ‘no-action letter’ whereby it would
not recommend any action to be taken under the applicable securities laws if
such a transaction is undertaken.

 

The second type is an ‘interpretive letter’ where again the SEBI
department concerned provides an interpretation and answer on an issue of law
under any of the securities laws in the context of the specified facts /
proposed transaction.

 

What are the fees?

A sum of Rs. 25,000 is to be paid as application fees. If the
application is rejected because it pertains to a matter where informal guidance
cannot be given, the fees are refunded after deducting Rs. 5,000 as processing
fee. If the application is rejected because the request for confidentiality
(discussed later herein) is not accepted, the fee will be refunded.

 

What is the time period for issue of informal guidance by SEBI?

The application has to be disposed of as early as possible, but not
later than 60 days of its receipt.

 

What are the situations under which informal guidance will not be
granted?

Applications have to be based on factual situations, even if proposed.
Thus, applications with hypothetical situations or in which the applicant has
no direct / proximate interests are rejected. If the matter is already covered
by an earlier informal guidance, the application may be rejected giving a
reference to the earlier one. In particular, if enforcement action is already
taken on the matter (investigation, inquiry, etc.) or any connected matter is sub
judice
, then the application would be rejected.

 

However, the grant of informal guidance is not a right and SEBI may not
respond at all and also does not have to answer why it has not responded.

 

Confidentiality of application / informal guidance

The application and response thereto is published for public viewing by
SEBI. A party may have reasons to keep the application confidential and may
make such a request in its application. SEBI may consider this request and
either accept it or reject it and refund the application fees. If it accepts
the request for confidentiality, the response of SEBI would be kept
confidential for a period of up to 90 days.

 

WHAT IS THE BINDING NATURE OF AN INFORMAL GUIDANCE?

The informal guidance, while comparable in concept, is not an advance
ruling by SEBI and hence does not have an element of finality. It is issued by
the particular department of SEBI and although SEBI may act generally in
accordance with it, the view is not binding on SEBI. It is not conclusive and
cannot be appealed against. It is also on the facts provided, and if the
proposed transaction deviates from such facts, the informal guidance may not
cover it.

 

As we shall see later, there has been a case where SEBI issued a
different guidance in a later case. SAT has also had occasion to examine the
nature of an informal guidance and the extent to which it is final, appealable,
etc.

 

These factors are surely to be noted. However, despite this, the utility
of informal guidance cannot be understated. It can be quite helpful and even
the limited assurance that the department / SEBI will generally act according
to the guidance would be helpful in most cases.

 

Case study of a recent informal guidance in the matter of Takeover
Regulations and Insider Trading

The case shows how relatively simple transactions can have several implications
under detailed and complex laws. This is in the matter of proposed transactions
by the promoters of HEG Limited (SEBI informal guidance dated 4th
June, 2020).

 

The core issues were relatively simple. Some of the promoters of a
listed company had dealt in the shares of such company in the market. Now, they
desired to transfer some shares among themselves. Such inter se transfer
would mean that the overall holding of the Promoter Group would remain the
same, even if the holdings of individual promoters could rise / fall.

 

However, this
proposal of inter se transfer raised several issues. The first related
to certain provisions in the SEBI insider trading regulations which prohibit
‘contra’ trades on specified insiders for six months. Thus, if such a person
has bought shares, he cannot sell the same for six months. And vice versa.
As stated earlier, some promoters had dealt in the shares and hence concern
arose whether there would be a bar on further transactions. The question thus
was whether such prohibition would apply to the whole Promoter Group or
only to those persons who had earlier traded in the shares. SEBI replied that
it would apply only to those who had traded in the shares and not to the whole
Promoter Group.

 

An incidental question was whether transactions inter se the
Promoters would attract the ‘trading window’ restrictions. Insiders are
prohibited from trading during the time when the ‘trading window’ is closed.
This is usually so when there is unpublished price sensitive information which
is very likely to be accessed by the insiders. SEBI replied that since the
transfer was within the Promoter Group where both parties could be said to be
aware and thus would make a conscious and informed decision, the transaction
was covered by a specific exception in the Regulations. Hence, such transfer
would not attract the prohibition.

 

The third and final question was whether the inter se transfer
would be exempt from open offer requirements? A person / group holding more
than 25% shares can acquire up to 5% shares in a financial year. If the
acquisitions are more than this limit, an open offer is required. Inter se
transfers are exempted, but subject to certain conditions. However, in the
present case it was stated that the proposed inter se transfer was less
than 5%. Subject to compliance with the other conditions, the reply was that
the proposed transfer would not attract the open offer requirements.

 

Thus, a simple proposed transaction that could have serious consequences
was resolved by clear guidance from SEBI. If the transactions are completed in
the manner described in the application, there is a reasonable, even if not
conclusive, assurance that SEBI will not take a different view and initiate
proceedings having serious repercussions.

 

SAT DECISIONS WHERE INFORMAL GUIDANCE HAS BEEN
EXAMINED

In Deepak Mehra vs. SEBI [2010] 98 SCL 126 (SAT-Mum.), a
question arose that in the context of a takeover transaction involving a
complex restructuring / issue of securities, would the requirements of open
offer be attracted? SEBI was approached for informal guidance and the relevant
department opined that, on the facts, the open offer requirement would be
attracted only at a later stage on conversion of securities. A shareholder
filed an appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) against such
informal guidance. SAT answered some basic questions on informal guidance.
Firstly, it described the nature of informal guidance and whether it can be
appealed against. It observed, ‘Clause 13 thereof also makes it clear that a
letter giving an informal guidance by way of interpretation of any provision of
law or fact should not be construed as a conclusive decision or determination
of those questions and that such an interpretation cannot be construed as an
order of the Board under section 15T of the Act… The informal guidance given by
the general manager is not an “order” which could entitle anyone to
file an appeal.’

 

Thus, the informal guidance is not a conclusive decision on the issues,
nor is it an order of SEBI.

 

There is also the case of Arbutus Consultancy LLP vs. SEBI [2017]
81 taxmann.com 30 (SAT–Mum.)
where an interesting point arose. SEBI had
given an informal guidance earlier and in the appeal before SAT, the appellant
sought to rely on it and claimed that SEBI could not depart from it. Several
questions arose. How much weightage should be given to an informal guidance by
SEBI in another case and also by SAT? Secondly, can SEBI give a different informal
guidance in another matter? And if so, can an appellant still claim that the
first informal guidance should be relied upon in his case? SAT held that an
informal guidance that is erroneous can be rejected by SEBI itself and, of
course, also by SAT. A mistake by an officer of SEBI cannot be taken advantage
of. And the fact that another informal guidance with a different view was
available should have been noted by the appellant.

 

CONCLUSION

Carefully used, and in the spirit in which the Scheme has been conceived,
informal guidance can be a useful method to resolve legal issues in a fairly
speedy manner and with a reasonable degree of assurance. Informal guidance
given in the past in other cases also provides a window to the mind of SEBI in
respect of certain issues. The possible pitfalls should, however, be noted.

 

It’s almost always possible
to be honest and positive

  
Naval Ravikant

 

Be willing to be a beginner every single morning

  Meister Eckhart

  

 

PENAL PROVISIONS OF FEMA AS ANALYSED BY COURTS

INTRODUCTION

The
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) is a law dealing with foreign
exchange in India with the objective of promoting the orderly development and
maintenance of the country’s foreign exchange market. FEMA, a civil law,
replaced the erstwhile Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 which provided for
criminal prosecution. While this very important law celebrated its 20th
anniversary this year, in the recent past several Court decisions have analysed
FEMA Regulations and laid down certain important propositions. Through this
article, an attempt has been made to look at some such important decisions and
the principles laid down by them when it comes to imposition of a penalty under
FEMA.

 

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR LEVY OF PENALTY

Section
13(1) of FEMA levies a penalty for offences. It states that when any person
contravenes the Act or any regulation, notification, direction or order issued
in exercise of the powers under this Act, or contravenes any condition subject
to which an authorisation is issued by the RBI, he shall, upon adjudication, be
liable to a
penalty up to thrice the sum involved in such
contravention
where such amount is
quantifiable, or up to Rs. 2 lakhs where the amount is not quantifiable. Where
such contravention is a continuing one, a further penalty may be levied which
may extend to Rs. 5,000 for every day after the first day during which the
contravention continues.

 

Section
14 further provides that if any person fails to make full payment of the
penalty imposed on him u/s 13 within a period of 90 days from the date on which
the notice for payment of such penalty is served on him, he shall be liable to
civil imprisonment under this section. If the penalty is above Rs. 1 crore, the
detention period can extend up to three years and in all other cases up to six
months.

 

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT

In the
case of
Shailendra Swarup vs. ED, CA No. 2463/2014
(SC) dated 27th July, 2020
a penalty was levied on the company and its directors for import
violations under the erstwhile Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA).
One of the directors contested this penalty stating that he was a professional
and a non-executive director on the Board who was not in charge of day-to-day
affairs. The Supreme Court upheld his contention and held that for any action
under FERA the person charged must be responsible for the affairs of the
company. Merely because a person is a director he does not automatically become
liable. While this decision was under the FERA regime, it would be equally
useful under the FEMA. Section 42(1) of FEMA in relation to contraventions by
companies also states that every person who is in charge of and responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed to be guilty. Hence,
a blanket penalty notice by the Enforcement Directorate to all and sundry,
including independent directors, should be avoided.

 

Similarly,
in
M/s National Fertilisers Ltd. vs. ED, CRL.
M.C. 3003/2002 (Del.) dated 9th March 2016
, the Delhi High Court dealt with the issue (under the
erstwhile FERA) of a Government company making full advance payment for import
of certain chemicals without obtaining any prior permission of the Reserve Bank
of India. The Court held that to charge an officer for a default committed by a
company evidence must be brought on record to show that all the petitioners
were in charge and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the
time when the offence was committed. It held that the Memorandum and Articles
of Association of the company would have pinpointed as to who were the officers
in charge and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the time
of commission of the said offence. Only the Managing Director or the Executive
Director / Functional Directors are responsible for the conduct and management
of the business of the company. At best, persons having domain over funds or
those who instructed the authorised dealers could be construed to be guilty of
foreign exchange violations.

 

Again,
in
Narendra Singh vs. ED [2019] 111 taxmann.com
360 (Delhi)
it was held that while
as a broad proposition the Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution would not readily interfere with a show cause notice at the
stage of adjudication, this was not an inflexible rule, particularly in a case
where the foundational facts necessary for proceeding with such adjudication
were shown not to exist. In the case of each of the accused, it was shown that
they were only Non-Executive Directors of the accused company and, therefore,
not a person ‘in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its business’.
Hence, the adjudication proceedings under FEMA were quashed.

 

However,
in
Suborno Bose vs. ED, CA No. 6267/2020 (SC)
dated 5th March, 2020
, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of penalty on an M.D. for a
continuing offence by a company. In this case, a penalty was levied on a
company and its M.D. for an offence u/s 10(6) of the FEMA, i.e., not
surrendering foreign exchange to the authorised person / bank within the time
permissible under the Act. In this case, it was alleged that the import of
goods for which the foreign exchange was procured and remitted was not
completed as the Bill of Entry remained to be submitted and the goods were kept
in the bonded warehouse and the company took no steps to clear the same. As a
result, the Court held that section 10(6) of the FEMA was clearly attracted
being a case of not using the procured foreign exchange for completing the
import procedure. Further, the company should have taken steps to surrender the
foreign exchange within the time specified in Regulation 6 of the
Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation,
Repatriation and Surrender of Foreign Exchange) Regulations, 2000.
The Supreme Court concluded that an offence u/s 10(6) was
a continuing offence as long as the imported goods remained uncleared and the
obligation provided under the Regulations was not discharged. Thus, the
contravention would continue to operate until corrective steps were taken.
Accordingly, the person in charge of managing the affairs of the company would
be liable to corrective steps.

 

The
observations made by the Bombay High Court in
Shashank Vyankatesh Manohar vs. Union of India, 2014 (1)
Mh. L.J 838
are also very relevant.
Here, it was held that due caution and care must be taken before adjudicating a
penalty under FEMA, otherwise the noticee on failure to pay the penalty would
be presented with dire penal consequences of being imprisoned for six months,
apart from other liabilities and adverse consequences. Merely because the
imprisonment would be in a civil prison and not in a criminal prison would be
no consolation to the person who was not responsible for contravention of FEMA.
The Court held that since the provisions of section 42 of the Act were
in pari materia with the provisions of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla
and another (2005) 8 SCC 89,
were
required to be applied to FEMA cases also. That is why even in the case of a
person holding the position of M.D., he was not liable if he had no knowledge
of the contravention when the contravention took place, or if he had exercised
all due diligence to prevent the contravention of the Act. The liability was
thus cast on those persons who had something to do with the transactions
complained of. The conclusion was inevitable that the liability arises on
account of conduct, act or omission on the part of a person and not merely on
account of holding an office or a position in a company.

 

An
interesting penalty matter was considered by the Appellate Tribunal for SAFEMA,
FEMA, NDPS, PMLA and PBPT Act in the case of
M/s Jaipur IPL Cricket Pvt. Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED,
FPA-FE-9/Mum./2013 (AT-PMLA), dated 11th July, 2019.
In this case, the Enforcement Directorate had levied a
penalty u/s 13 of Rs. 98 crores (being thrice the sum involved of Rs. 33
crores) for violation of various FEMA Regulations in relation to Foreign Direct
Investment in the Rajasthan Royals IPL Franchisee.

 

The
Appellate Tribunal (AT) held that it was a settled principle of law that even
though proceedings initiated u/s 13 of FEMA did not result in criminal
conviction or sentence, the consequences were equally penal and disastrous.
Further, section 14 clearly provided that in case the penalty imposed was not
paid within the time period provided, it would result in civil imprisonment. It
held that a bare perusal of FEMA established that its provisions were onerous
in nature and wide in scope and statutes which imposed onerous obligations,
were wide in scope and ambit and envisaged penal consequences must be construed
strictly. It also considered section 42 of FEMA which governs the imposition of
penalty upon persons in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the
conduct of the business of the company. In order to invoke the said provision,
two conditions were required to be satisfied cumulatively; firstly, it must be
established that the company has violated FEMA, and secondly, it must be
established that the person sought to be made liable to penalty was in charge
of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the
company at the time the contravention was committed and not conducted its
diligence in relation to the transaction. The burden of proof to establish and
substantiate both the above requirements for imposition of penalty u/s 42(1) of
FEMA was upon the Enforcement Directorate in the first instant. Thereafter, it
shifted to the private party who was liable to discharge the same.

 

The
proceedings under FEMA in which a penalty was sought to be imposed for
contravention of a statutory obligation were ‘
quasi criminal
proceedings’. Section 13 of FEMA was couched in discretionary terms and vested
the regulatory authorities with discretion to impose a penalty up to three
times the sum involved in the contravention. It noted that the imposition of
penalty in quasi criminal proceedings must be guided by the well-established principles of proportionality. Imposition of a penalty of Rs. 98.35 crores as against
the total value of remittances of Rs. 33.22 crores in respect of alleged
contraventions which could at best be treated as technical and venial was untenable
and unsustainable. The factors which weighed with the AT in imposition of
penalty were that ~ no loss has been caused to the exchequer; the remittances
had come into India and continued to remain in India; this was not a case where
foreign exchange has gone out of India; the remittances were utilised for the
purposes for which they were intended; no allegation of misutilisation of the
monies for extraneous purposes; entities which made the said remittances had
not gained any benefit whatsoever and instead had suffered considerable
financial detriment as shares having beneficial interest were not issued
against the inward remittances to the foreign investors for 11 years; the
country has not lost any revenue. Hence, considering all factors, the AT held
that imposition of an exorbitant penalty of Rs. 98.35 crores should be reduced
to Rs. 15 crores.

 

Conversely,
in
Tips Industries Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED
[2020] 113 taxmann.com 318 [(PMLA-AT), New Delhi]
the AT was faced with the issue of penalty on the M.D. of
a company for FEMA violations in relation to overseas direct investment in
foreign subsidiaries. It was the argument of the accused M.D. that he was not
responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company and that the adjudicating
authority had not been able to substantiate why he should be penalised. The AT
observed that Form ODA (seeking approval of the RBI for the overseas direct
investment) had been filed before the RBI along with a declaration and the same
was signed by the accused as Managing Director of the foreign company and the
Indian investing company. This was held to be evidence that he was indeed
responsible for the activities of the appellant company. Besides, neither the
company nor the MD was able to show any other document to prove that somebody
else was the person responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company.

 

The AT also dealt with the
issue of pre-deposit of the penalty amount in the case of
Google India (P) Ltd. vs. Special Director, ED [2020] 116
taxmann.com 622 (ATFFE – New Delhi).
In this
case, Google India entered into an agreement with Google Ireland and Google USA
under which, for a distributor fee, Google Ireland granted a right to it to
distribute / sell online advertisement space under the ‘Ad Words Program’ to
advertisers in India. The dues to Google Ireland and Google USA were
outstanding beyond a period of six months and hence permission of the AD Bank
was sought explaining the reasons for delay. The AD Bank, out of abundant
caution, sought permission of RBI for allowing the remittances in question. The
RBI permitted the AD Bank to allow the remittances. The said permissions were
granted from ‘the foreign exchange angle under the provisions of FEMA’.

 

The ED
held that this was tantamount to borrowing by the Indian company and it levied
a penalty of Rs. 5 crores on the Indian company and Rs. 20 lakhs on each of its
foreign directors. It opposed the delay and stated that RBI could not condone
it and the appellant would be guilty of breach of provisions of FEMA as the
same were not paid within the prescribed period of time.

 

It was
contended on behalf of the appellant that there were no FEMA violations as the
permissions were granted by the RBI only after considering the following
aspects ~ expressly requiring the AD Bank to verify the genuineness of the
reasons for delay and whether there was any pecuniary gain to the appellant; a
specific confirmation by the appellant that there was no pecuniary gain to it
and a confirmation by the appellant that the amounts to be paid were not
utilised for any other purpose and that there was no interest paid on the same.
It was further submitted that the RBI has not treated the two transactions as
ECB / deferred payment arrangements. It is also submitted that nothing contrary
has been discovered by the respondent after independent investigation. Thus,
the decision taken by the RBI was as per law and the question of violations of
any provisions does not arise.

 

The AT
relying on
LIC vs. Escorts Ltd.
[1986] 1 SCC 264
held that it
is a settled law that FEMA being a special act no authority has the
jurisdiction to reinterpret and / or restrict the permissions granted by the
RBI in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 3 read with section 11 of FEMA.
Further, the ED had no jurisdiction to reinterpret the terms of the agreement
between Google Ireland and Google India. It was settled law that the Court
should proceed on the basis that the apparent tenor of the agreement reflects
the real state of affairs –
UOI
vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.
[1995] 76 ELT 481 (SC). Its prima
facie
view was that once the permission has been
granted by the RBI, the delay stood regularised and there were no violations of
the provisions of FEMA. The presumption was in favour of the appellant that RBI
must have been satisfied while condoning the delay. It held that the contention
by the ED that amounts due for more than six months automatically makes the
same a deferred payment arrangement / ECB was incorrect. A stringent law could
only be applied in the Master Circular on Imports where there was no such
condition mandated. Further, the circular expressly provided for settlement of
dues by the AD banks beyond a period of six months.

 

Hence,
it held that the appellants had
prima
facie
demonstrated that there was no violation of
the provisions of the FEMA / the Master Circular on Imports. Even if there was
a violation, then the RBI had regularised the same by granting the permissions
to settle the dues specifically from a ‘FEMA angle’. The RBI permission expressly
stated that the permission was issued from a foreign exchange angle under FEMA.
The limitation of the permission was only in respect of any other applicable
laws other than FEMA. The ED was not seeking to impose a penalty for violation
of any other laws. It concluded that in the light of the
prima facie case made out by the appellant, it would suffer hardship if asked to
deposit the penalty amount. The AT was of the opinion that the chances of
success of the appeal were more than of the failure of the appeal. Accordingly,
it stayed the payment of the penalty.

 

CONCLUSION

In
spite of being a 20-year-old law, FEMA is an evolving law since the
jurisprudence on it is taking shape only now. One reason for this is that often
cases under FEMA drag on, reaching finality after a long duration. It is
heartening to note that the judiciary has been taking a very balanced approach
towards cases under FEMA.

 

 

You may have a fresh start any moment you choose, for
this thing that we call ‘failure’ is not the falling down, but the staying down

  Mary Pickford

 

 

A man can only attain knowledge with the help of those
who possess it. This must be understood from the very beginning. One must learn
from him who knows

   George
Gurdjieff

Revision – Limited scrutiny case – CIT cannot exercise the power of revision u/s 263 to look into any other issue which the A.O. himself could not look at

2. CIT vs. Smt. Padmavathi
[dated 6th October, 2020; TCA/350/2020]
[Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras
‘C’ Bench, Chennai in ITA No. 1306/Chny/2019; Date of order: 2nd
December, 2019 for A.Y.: 2014-2015]
(Madras
High Court)

 

Revision
– Limited scrutiny case – CIT cannot exercise the power of revision u/s 263 to
look into any other issue which the A.O. himself could not look at

 

The assessee is an
individual and a partner in a firm under the name and style of Sri Ram
Associates. She filed her return of income declaring a total income of Rs.
2,58,110. The return was processed u/s 143(1). Subsequently, the case was
selected under Computer Aided Scrutiny Selection for ‘Limited Scrutiny’ with
regard to purchase of a property by the assessee. The A.O., after hearing the
assessee, verifying the source of funds, completed the assessment by an order
dated 28th December, 2016 u/s 143(3) and made an addition of Rs.
8,00,000.

 

The PCIT issued a show
cause notice u/s 263 dated 26th October, 2018 to the assessee for
the reason that the assessee had purchased the immovable property by a sale
deed registered for a consideration of Rs. 41,50,000, whereas the guideline
value fixed by the State Government was Rs. 77,19,000 and there was a
difference of Rs. 35,69,000 which was not properly inquired into by the A.O.
and also not considered during the course of assessment. For this reason, the
PCIT proposed to invoke his powers u/s 263.

 

The assessee submitted her
reply dated 11th January, 2019. The PCIT considered the explanation
and held that in the first place a request has to be made by the assessee for
valuation of the property and nothing is discernible from the records that the
assessee made any request, which leads to an inference that the A.O. did not
apply his mind to the fair market value and the consequential taxability of the
investment as ‘unexplained investment’ u/s 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii). The PCIT further
held that though the A.O. verified the source of funds, he failed to apply the
said provision, namely, section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii). Thus, the PCIT rejected the
explanation given by the assessee and set aside the assessment and referred
back the same to the A.O. to re-do the assessment.

 

The assessee challenged the
revision order dated 18th March, 2019 passed u/s 263 by filing an
appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the value adopted for stamp
duty purposes is taken as ‘deemed consideration’ u/s 56(2)(vii)(b) and this is
only a deeming provision and there is no occasion for the assessee to explain
the source for deemed consideration. Further, the Tribunal held that since the
assessment was under limited scrutiny, it would be beyond the powers of the
A.O. to look into any other issue which has come to his notice during the
course of assessment and also faulted the PCIT for invoking his power u/s 263.
The Revenue filed an appeal before the High Court.

 

The High Court considered
the issue as regards the power of the PCIT u/s 263 and whether he could have
set aside the assessment on the ground that the A.O. did not invoke section
56(2)(vii)(b).

 

Further, the Court observed
that the assessment order shows that the case was selected for limited scrutiny
only on the aspect regarding the sale consideration paid by the assessee for
purchase of the immovable property and the source of funds. The A.O. has noted
that the sale consideration paid by the assessee was Rs. 41,50,000 and she has
paid stamp duty and incurred other expenses of Rs. 5,75,000. The source of
funds was verified and the A.O. was satisfied with the same. The PCIT, while
invoking his power u/s 263, faults the A.O. on the ground that he did not make
proper inquiry. It is not clear as to what in the opinion of the PCIT is
‘proper inquiry’. By using such an expression, it presupposes that the A.O. did
conduct an inquiry. However, in the opinion of the PCIT, the inquiry was not
proper. In the absence of not clearly stating as to why, in the opinion of the
PCIT, the inquiry was not proper, the Court held that the invocation of the
power u/s 263 was not justified.

 

The Court further observed
that the only reason for setting aside the scrutiny assessment was on the
ground that the guideline value of the property, at the relevant time, was
higher than the sale consideration reflected in the registered document. The
question would be as to what is the effect of the guideline value fixed by the
State Government. There is a long list of decisions of the Supreme Court
holding that guideline value is only an indicator and the same is fixed by the
State Government for the purposes of calculating stamp duty on a deal of
conveyance. Therefore, merely because the guideline value was higher than the
sale consideration shown in the deed of conveyance, cannot be the sole reason
for holding that the assessment is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of
Revenue.

 

The A.O. in his limited
scrutiny has verified the source of funds, noted the sale consideration paid
and the expenses incurred for stamp duty and other charges. Furthermore, the
assessee in her reply dated 11th January, 2019 to the show cause
notice dated 26th October, 2018 issued by the PCIT, has specifically
stated that the assessment was getting time-barred; the A.O. took upon himself
the role of a valuation officer u/s 50(C)(2) and found that the guideline value
was not the actual fair market value of the property and the actual
consideration paid was the fair market value and therefore, he did not choose to
make any addition u/s 50(C). The PCIT has not dealt with this specific
objection, but would fault the A.O. for not invoking section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii)
merely on the ground that the guideline value was higher. The guideline value
is only an indicator and will not always represent the fair market value of the
property and, therefore, the invocation of power u/s 263 by the PCIT was not
sustainable in law.

 

In the result, the Revenue appeal was
dismissed.

 

 

In the morning when thou risest
unwillingly, let this thought be present – I am rising to the work of a human
being

 

Why then am I dissatisfied if I
am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into
the world?

   Marcus Aurelius

 

 

The sage acts without taking
credit.

She accomplishes without
dwelling on it.

She does not want to display her
worth

   Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, Ch.
77

 

Settlement Commission – Section 245C – Settlement of cases – Condition precedent – Full and true disclosure of undisclosed income – Income offered in application for settlement – Additional income offered during proceedings before Settlement Commission – No new source of income – Offer in order to avoid controversy – Acceptance of offer and passing of order by Settlement Commission – Justified

15. Principal CIT vs.
Shankarlal Nebhumal Uttamchandani
[2020] 425 ITR 235 (Guj) Date of order: 7th January,
2020
A.Ys.: 2012-13 to 2016-17

 

Settlement
Commission – Section 245C – Settlement of cases – Condition precedent – Full
and true disclosure of undisclosed income – Income offered in application for
settlement – Additional income offered during proceedings before Settlement
Commission – No new source of income – Offer in order to avoid controversy –
Acceptance of offer and passing of order by Settlement Commission – Justified

 

The
assessee was carrying on the business of purchase and sale of land and trading
in textile items of art silk clothes. A survey u/s 133A was carried out on 3rd
July, 2015 at the office premises of the assessee. During the course of the
survey operation, various loose documents were found and impounded by the
Department. While assessment proceedings were pending, the assessee filed a
settlement application u/s 245(1) before the Settlement Commission offering
additional income for the A.Ys. 2012-13 to 2016-17. The assessee filed its
statement of facts before the Commission, preparing a statement of sources and
application of unaccounted income to demonstrate that investment, application
and rotation of unaccounted funds was covered by the overall source of
unaccounted funds generated and offered to tax. The assessee disclosed
additional income during the course of the hearing u/s 245D(4) aggregating to
Rs. 12 crores for the five years. The Commission accepted the disclosures made
by the assessee after considering the detailed item-wise explanation submitted
by the assessee and accordingly the case of the assessee was settled on the
terms and conditions stated in the order.

 

The
Department filed a writ petition and challenged the order on the ground that
there was no full and true disclosure of undisclosed income. The Gujarat High
Court dismissed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘i)  The disclosure made during the course of the
proceedings before the Commission was not a new disclosure. The Settlement
Commission was right in considering the revised offer made by the assessee
during the course of the proceedings in the spirit of settlement.

 

ii)  On a perusal of the order passed by the
Commission, it was apparent that the application submitted by the assessee had
been dealt with in accordance with the provisions of sections 245C and 245D of
the Act. The Commission had observed the procedure while exercising powers u/s
245D(4) by examining thoroughly the report submitted by the Department under
rule 9 of the Income-tax Settlement Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1997. The
Commission had also provided proper opportunity of hearing to the respective
parties and therefore the amount which had been determined by the Commission
was just and proper.

 

iii)         The Commission was right in considering the revised offer
made by the respondent during the course of the proceedings in the nature of
spirit of settlement. We are therefore of the opinion that the order passed by
the Commission does not call for any interference.’

Securities Transaction Tax Act, 2004 – Stock exchange – Duty only to ensure tax collected, determined in accordance with Act and Rules and that amount collected deposited with Central Government – Stock exchange cannot collect securities transaction tax beyond client code – Addition to income of stock exchange on the ground that higher securities transaction tax ought to have been collected – Not justified

14. Principal CIT vs. National Stock Exchange [2020]
425 ITR 588 (Bom) Date
of order: 3rd February, 2020
A.Ys.: 2006-07

 

Securities
Transaction Tax Act, 2004 – Stock exchange – Duty only to ensure tax collected,
determined in accordance with Act and Rules and that amount collected deposited
with Central Government – Stock exchange cannot collect securities transaction
tax beyond client code – Addition to income of stock exchange on the ground
that higher securities transaction tax ought to have been collected – Not
justified

 

The
assessee is the National Stock Exchange of India Limited. For the A.Y. 2006-07,
the A.O. was of the view that there was a discrepancy between the total amount
of securities transaction tax collected by at least nine brokers from their foreign institutional investors and the amount of securities
transaction tax collected by the assessee. After considering the response of
the assessee, the A.O. passed an assessment order raising securities
transaction tax collectible by the assessee by an additional amount of Rs. 5 crores
over and above the securities transaction tax collected and deposited by the
assessee during the year under consideration. Penalty proceedings were also
initiated.

 

The
Tribunal deleted the addition made on this count as modified by the first
appellate authority, holding that the assessee had not committed any default
and that under the statute the assessee was not liable for any alleged short
deduction of securities transaction tax. Consequently, the levy of interest and
penalty were also deleted.

 

On appeal
by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

 

‘i)  Chapter VII of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004
deals with securities transaction tax. Securities transaction tax is charged at
a specified rate in accordance with section 98. Securities transaction tax is
payable either by the purchaser or by the seller and not by the stock exchange.
The value of taxable securities transaction has to be determined in accordance
with section 99 and the
proviso
thereto. Rule 3 of the Securities Transaction Tax Rules, 2004, including the
Explanation thereto, have been notified prescribing how the value of the
securities transaction tax is to be determined.

 

ii)  The responsibility of the stock exchange is to
ensure firstly that securities transaction tax is collected as per section 98;
secondly, that it has been determined in accordance with section 99 read with
rule 3 and Explanation thereto; and lastly, such securities transaction tax
collected from the purchaser or seller is credited to the Central Government as
provided u/s 100. The stock exchange can only ensure determination of the value
of the taxable securities transaction of purchase and sale through a client
code at the prescribed rate. However, there is no mechanism provided enabling
the stock exchange to collect securities transaction tax beyond the client
code.

 

iii)  The Securities and Exchange Board of India
issued a circular to the stock exchanges for using two client codes, one for
sale and the other for purchase in respect of investors such as foreign
institutional investors whose transactions are to be settled through delivery
mode pursuant to which the stock exchange had issued a circular dated 30th
September, 2004 to its member brokers to use the two client codes. If a broker
had not taken any separate client code the stock exchange cannot be held
responsible. Such failure cannot be ascribed to the stock exchange because the
client codes are not provided by the stock exchange but by the member brokers.

 

iv) The Tribunal had returned a finding of fact
that the securities transaction tax collected by the assessee was through and
under the client codes of the member brokers and the collected securities
transaction tax had been credited into the account of the Central Government.
Hence the deletion of the addition and the consequent interest and penalty were
justified.’

Recovery of tax – Section 179 – Attachment and sale of property – Properties settled on trust for grandchildren by ‘S’ – Recovery proceedings against son of ‘S’ u/s 179 – Properties settled on trust cannot be attached

13. Rajesh T. Shah vs. TRO [2020]
425 ITR 443 (Bom) Date
of order: 13th March, 2020
A.Ys.: 1988-89 to 1990-91

 

Recovery
of tax – Section 179 – Attachment and sale of property – Properties settled on
trust for grandchildren by ‘S’ – Recovery proceedings against son of ‘S’ u/s
179 – Properties settled on trust cannot be attached

 

One ‘S’
during her lifetime settled a private family trust under a trust deed dated 10th
April, 1978 for the benefit of her grandchildren. By a deed of will dated 5th
March, 1985, ‘S’ bequeathed all her properties in favour of the trust. ‘S’
expired on 26th August, 1991. The petitioner ‘H’, who was one of the
trustees, in the year 1986 joined the assessee company as a Managing Director
and resigned from the company in the year 1993. In 1990, the Department carried
out a survey action in the case of the company. Orders of assessment were
passed for the A.Ys. 1988-89, 1989-90 and 1990-91. The liability of the M.D.
was quantified. For realisation of the liability, by separate attachment
orders, the Tax Recovery Officer attached three properties belonging to the
trust on the premise that the three properties belonged to the petitioner in
his individual capacity.

 

The Bombay
High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the petitioner and held as under:

 

‘i) The
properties belonged to the trust which was settled by will by ‘S’ before
initiation of recovery proceedings by the Revenue against the petitioner. The
properties did not belong to the petitioner in his individual capacity or his
legal heirs or representatives. The trust had been formed in the year 1978 and
the will of ‘S’ was made in 1985, much before initiation of recovery proceedings.
There was no question of the properties being diverted to the trust to evade
payment of due tax.

 

ii) That being the
position, we set aside and quash the attachment orders.’

Non-resident – Taxability in India – Article 5(1) of DTAA between Mauritius and India – Meaning of ‘permanent establishment’ – Company in Mauritius engaged in telecasting sports events – Agreement with Indian company for exhibition of telecasts in India – Finding that agreement was on principal-to-principal basis – Indian company did not constitute permanent establishment of foreign company – Income earned not assessable in India

12. CIT (International Taxation) vs. Taj TV Ltd. [2020]
425 ITR 141 (Bom) Date
of order: 6th February, 2020
A.Ys.: 2004-05 and 2005-06

 

Non-resident
– Taxability in India – Article 5(1) of DTAA between Mauritius and India –
Meaning of ‘permanent establishment’ – Company in Mauritius engaged in telecasting
sports events – Agreement with Indian company for exhibition of telecasts in
India – Finding that agreement was on principal-to-principal basis – Indian
company did not constitute permanent establishment of foreign company – Income
earned not assessable in India

 

The assessee was a company
registered in Mauritius and was a tax resident of that country. The assessee
was engaged in telecasting a sports channel. The assessee had appointed ‘T’ as
its distributor to distribute the channel to cable systems for exhibition to
subscribers in India. In this connection, an agreement dated 1st
March, 2002 was entered into between the assessee and ‘T’. The A.O. held that
the income earned in terms of the agreement was assessable in India.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals)
found that ‘T’ was not acting as an agent of the assessee but had obtained the
right of distribution of the channel for itself and, subsequently, had entered
into contracts with other parties in its own name in which the assessee was not
a party, that the distribution of the revenue between the assessee and ‘T’ was
in the ratio of 60:40 and the entire relationship was on principal–to-principal
basis. The Commissioner (Appeals) reversed the order of the A.O. The Tribunal
noted that this finding of the first appellate authority was corroborated by
the terms and conditions of the distribution agreement as well as the
sub-distributor agreement. The Tribunal held that none of the conditions as
stipulated in article 5(4) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement was
applicable to constitute agency permanent establishment, because ‘T’ was acting
independently
qua its
distribution rights and the entire agreement was on principal-to-principal
basis. Therefore, it held that the distribution income earned by the assessee
could not be taxed in India because ‘T’ did not constitute an agency permanent
establishment under the terms of article 5(4) of the DTAA.

 

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘i)  Article 5 of the Double Taxation Avoidance
Agreement  entered into between India and
Mauritius defines “permanent establishment”. The sum and substance of paragraph
(4) of Article 5 is that a person acting in a Contracting State on behalf of an
enterprise of the other Contracting State shall be deemed to be a permanent
establishment of that enterprise in the first-mentioned Contracting State if he
habitually exercises in the first Contracting State an authority to conclude
contracts in the name of the enterprise and habitually maintains in the first
Contracting State a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise
from which he regularly fulfils orders on behalf of the enterprise.

 

ii)  There was a concurrent finding of fact by the
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. There was no evidence that the finding
of fact was perverse. Hence the income from distribution earned by the assessee
was not taxable in India.’

 

Cash credits – Section 68 – Assessee entry provider to customers making deposits in cash in lieu of cheques for lower amounts – Cash deposits accounted for in assessment orders of beneficiaries – Restriction of addition to difference between amounts deposited and cheques issued only as commission income as disclosed by assessee – Provisions of section 68 not attracted

11. Principal CIT vs. Alag Securities Pvt. Ltd. [2020]
425 ITR 658 (Bom) Date
of order: 12th June, 2020
A.Y.:
2003-04

 

Cash credits – Section 68 – Assessee entry
provider to customers making deposits in cash
in lieu of cheques for lower amounts – Cash deposits accounted for in
assessment orders of beneficiaries – Restriction of addition to difference
between amounts deposited and cheques issued only as commission income as
disclosed by assessee – Provisions of section 68 not attracted

 

The assessee
provided accommodation entries to entry seekers. For the A.Y. 2003-04, the A.O.
held that the identity of the parties involved and the genuineness of the
transactions were not proved by the assessee and added the amount of cash
deposits to the income u/s 68.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals) held that only 0.15% of the total deposits were to be treated as
income and restricted the addition to 0.15% of the total deposits as commission
in the hands of the assessee. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by the
Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeal of the Department.

 

On appeal by the
Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as
under:

 

‘i)  The provisions of section 68 would not be
attracted. The assessee had admitted that its business was to provide
accommodation entries. In return for the cash credits it issued cheques to its
customers and beneficiaries for smaller amounts, the balance being its
commission. Moreover, the cash credits had been accounted for in the respective
assessment of the beneficiaries.

 

ii)  Section 68 would be attracted only when any
sum was found credited in the books of the assessee and no explanation was
offered about the nature and source thereof or the explanation offered was not
in the opinion of the A.O. satisfactory. But it had been the consistent stand
of the assessee which had been accepted by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the
Tribunal that the business of the assessee centred around the customers and
beneficiaries who made the deposits in cash amounts and
in lieu thereof took cheques from the assessee for amounts slightly lower
than the quantum of deposits, the difference representing the commission
realised by the assessee.

 

iii)  The assessee had never claimed the cash
credits as its income. The cash amounts deposited by the customers, i.e., the
beneficiaries, had been accounted for in the assessment orders of those
beneficiaries. Therefore, the question of adding such cash credits to the
income of the assessee, especially when the assessee was only concerned with
the commission earned on providing accommodation entries, did not arise.

 

iv) On the issue of the percentage of commission,
the Tribunal had already held 0.1% commission in similar types of transactions to be a reasonable percentage of commission and
therefore had accepted the percentage of commission at 0.15% disclosed by the
assessee itself. This finding was a plausible one and the rate of commission
was not arrived at in an arbitrary manner.

 

v)  The order of the Tribunal did not suffer from
any error or infirmity to warrant interference u/s 260A. No question of law
arose.’

Capital gains or business income – Sections 4 and 45 – Non-banking financial institution – Conversion of shares and securities held as stock-in-trade into investment – Sale of shares – No provision at time of transaction for treating income from sale of shares as business income – Income could not be taxed as business income

10. Kemfin Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2020]
425 ITR 684 (Kar.) Date
of order: 11th June, 2020
A.Y.: 2005-06

 

Capital gains or business income – Sections
4 and 45 – Non-banking financial institution – Conversion of shares and
securities held as stock-in-trade into investment – Sale of shares – No
provision at time of transaction for treating income from sale of shares as
business income – Income could not be taxed as business income

 

The assessee was a
non-banking financial corporation engaged in the activity of investment in
shares. The board of the assessee passed a resolution to stop its trading
activities in shares and securities under the portfolio management scheme and
to convert the stock-in-trade into investment on 1st April, 2004.
For the A.Y. 2005-06, the A.O. passed an order u/s 143(3) wherein,
inter alia, he held that mere interchange of heads in books of account as
investment or stock-in-trade did not alter the nature of transaction, that the
transactions of the assessee fell within the ambit of business income and not
short-term capital gains and treated the transactions as business income.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals),
inter
alia
, held that the shares had to be considered as
stock-in-trade and the income from the sale of shares was to be treated as
business income. The Tribunal,
inter alia, held that the
assessee acquired certain shares under the portfolio management scheme and
those shares were treated by the assessee and accepted by the Department as
stock-in-trade for the A.Ys. 2003-04 and 2004-05, that the assessee changed the
character of its asset from stock-in-trade to investments, that a surplus arose
in the course of conversion of those shares and therefore, stock-in-trade was a
business asset and any income that arose on account of stock-in-trade was
business income. It also held that income always arose from an existing source
and not from a potential source and dismissed the appeals filed by the
assessee.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i) The assessee had converted stock-in-trade into
investments. Prior to introduction of the Finance Bill, 2018 by which
provisions of the Act had been amended to provide for taxability in cases where
stock-in-trade was converted into capital asset, there was no provision to tax
the transaction. In the absence of any provision in the Act, the transaction in
question could not have been subjected to tax.

 

ii) That statutory
interpretation of a taxing statute has to be strictly construed. The assessee
was not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose and every Act of
Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words.

 

iii)  In view of the preceding analysis, the
Tribunal erred in treating the income arising on sale of shares held as capital
asset after conversion from stock-in-trade as business income. The substantial
question of law framed in the appeals is answered in favour of the assessee and
against the Revenue.’

AGENCY IN GST

The concept of Agency has been engrafted in
the GST law on multiple fronts. Common law attributes representative powers to
the concept of agency but this traditional essence of agency has been altered
under GST. With the deviation from common law concepts of agency, we would have
to examine the contextual understanding of agency and test the fitment in
various practice areas of GST.

 

AGENCY UNDER CONTRACT ACT

Agency is a
special contract recognised under the Contract law. Section 182 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 defines an ‘agent’ as a person employed to do any act for
another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for
whom such act is done or who is so represented is called the ‘principal’.
Agency can be established either by an express oral / written agreement or even
from surrounding circumstances (section 187).

 

Thus, the test
of establishment of a contract of agency is a mixed question of law and facts.
An express contract is not an essential ingredient of agency but, on the other
hand, agency should not be concluded by the mere use of a terminology in an
arrangement. It is more behavioural rather than contractual in the sense that
mere terms do not automatically form the basis of agency. The Supreme Court in Assam
Small Scale Ind. Dev. Corp. vs. JD Pharmaceuticals 2005 (10) TMI 494

observed:

 

‘The
expressions “principal” and “agent” used in a document are not decisive. The
nature of transaction is required to be determined on the basis of the
substance there and not by the nomenclature used. Documents are to be construed
having regard to the contexts thereof wherefor “labels” may not be of much
relevance.’

 

The principles
of agency are to be examined with reference to the authorities exercised by a
person while engaging with a third party. An agent functioning within the
authority granted to it would be in a position to bind its principal by its
acts as against a third party (section 226). This forms the core of an agency
relationship under general law. To the extent that an agent surpasses its
authority, the third party would have to exercise its right against the agent,
in its personal capacity, without any recourse to the principal (section 227).
In fact, if the excessive authority is not separable from the original
authority, the whole contract can be repudiated by the principal (section 228)
and the remedy available to the third party is limited only against the agent.

 

A principal can
disown any acts beyond the agent’s authority in which case all implications
would fall upon the agent in its personal capacity (section 196).
Alternatively, the principal with knowledge of material facts can either
expressly or impliedly ratify the acts of the agent and all consequences of
agency would follow on such ratification (section 199). These are the critical
provisions which govern principal-agent contracts in general.

 

AGENCY UNDER SALE OF GOODS ACT

The Sale of Goods Act governs the principal-agency relationship on
matters involving sale or purchase of goods. The Act defines a ‘mercantile
agent’ as having in the customary course of business such authority either to
sell goods, or to consign goods for the purpose of sale, or to buy goods, or to
raise money on the security of goods. In contradistinction to the Contract Act,
the Sale of Goods Act narrowed down the authority under the agency
transactions, for its purpose, as those which have a reference to sale or
purchase of goods. A mercantile agent under the Sale of Goods Act is one who
has control and / or possession over the goods and the authority from the
owner-principal to pass the property in goods to a third party.

 

Section 27 of
the Sale of Goods Act acknowledges transfer of valid title on sales performed
by a mercantile agent even though such agent may not himself possess the title
over the goods. This comes with the obvious rider that such agent should act
within its authority and the buyer of such goods acquires the title in good
faith with knowledge about this authority. Section 45 grants rights to the
agent to step into the shoes of its principal as an unpaid seller and enforce
such rights as against the buyer for recovery of the price of the goods due to
it and accountable to its principal.

 

AGENCY ERSTWHILE VAT / CST LAW

Sale under the
VAT / CST laws was nomen juris, i.e. understood as per the prevailing
Sale of Goods Act, 1932 – involving transfer of title in goods. Accordingly,
transfer of goods by the principal to its agent was normally considered as a
delivery / stock transfer and not a transaction of sale. The Supreme Court in Sri
Tirumala Venkateswara Timber and Bamboo Firm vs. Commercial Tax Officer,
Rajahmundry [(1968) 2 SCR 476]
explained the distinction between a
contract of sale and agency as follows:

 

‘As a matter of
law there is a distinction between a contract of sale and a contract of agency
by which the agent is authorised to sell or buy on behalf of the principal and
make over either the sale proceeds or the goods to the principal. The essence
of a contract of sale is the transfer of title to the goods for a price paid or
promised to be paid. The transferee in such a case is liable to the transferor
as a debtor for the price to be paid and not as agent for the proceeds of the
sale. The essence of agency to sell is the
delivery of the goods to a person who is to sell them,
not as his own
property but as the property of the principal who continues to be the owner of
the goods and will therefore be liable to account for the sale proceeds. The
true relationship of the parties in each case has to be gathered from the
nature of the contract, its terms and conditions, and the terminology used by
the parties is not decisive of the legal relationship.’

 

Under Sales
Tax, the transaction through the medium of agents takes into account two
phases, (a) that which takes place between the agent and principal on one part,
and (b) that which takes place between the agent (on behalf of the principal)
on one part and the third person (a seller or purchaser) on the other part.
Therefore, the true test of whether two persons were under a
principal-to-principal relationship or under a principal-agent relationship was
to ascertain whether there was any inter se transfer of property in
goods between such persons. If after the transfer the risks of loss or injury
over goods would be that of the buyer to the exclusion of the seller, such
relationships would not be a principal-agency relationship.

 

Yet, in VAT
laws the definition of ‘sale’ included transfer of goods by the principal to
its selling agent or by the purchasing agent to its principal in cases of (a)
difference in the sale price being accounted back to the principal; (b)
non-accountal of all collections to its principal; (c) acting on behalf of
fictitious or non-existent principal. This was perhaps only done to address the
cases of tax frauds or sham transactions where terms of agency were used to
camouflage the transaction of sale.

 

Sales tax laws
also made reference to the relationship of agency while setting the scope of
the phrase ‘dealer’. This was done in order to acquire powers to make
assessments over mercantile agents dealing in respect of non-resident dealers
and enforce joint or several liability over transactions of the agent on behalf
of its principal.

 

AGENCY UNDER ERSTWHILE SERVICE TAX

The Service Tax
law had adopted a different understanding of agency. Until the negative list
regime, agency was identified as a service to its principal, say advertising
agent, insurance agent, air travel agent, custom house agent, real estate
agent, etc. The objective was to tax the inter se services rendered by
the agent (on its own account) to its principal. The general law prevailed on
services rendered by the principal through its agent and all consequences of
agent’s action would flow back to the principal in entirety without any
fictional element.

 

Even after the
introduction of the negative list scheme, the definition of ‘assessee’ included
an agent. With this as the basis, taxes discharged by agencies were considered
as sufficient compliance in the hands of the principal [Zaheer R. Khan
vs. CST 2014 33 STR 75 (Tri-Mum) and Reliance Securities Ltd. vs. CST 2018 (4)
TMI 1335 (Tri-Mum)].
The Tribunal also held that once the entire value
in a transaction chain has been taxed, additional tax on the principal would
amount to double taxation of the same amount which is impermissible.

 

AGENCY UNDER THE GST LAW

Schedule 1 to
section 7 of the GST law deems a supply of goods by a principal to its agent
for subsequent sale and a purchase of goods by an agent to its principal even
though without consideration, as a supply liable to tax. Effectively, Schedule
I treats the principal and agent as different persons for the purposes of the
Act. It treats a mere movement by the principal to its agent or vice versa
as a supply – equivalent to a buy-sell transaction. It is in this context that
section 2(5) defines an agent as follows:

 

‘(5) “agent”
means a person, including a factor, broker, commission agent,
arhatia, del credere agent, an auctioneer or any other mercantile
agent, by whatever name called, who carries on the business of supply or
receipt of goods or services or both on
behalf of another;’

 

The definition
u/s 2(5) triggered off a controversy initially over the inclusion of factors,
brokers, commission agents, etc., which are specifically mentioned in the
definition of agent but do not have authoritative scope on representing and
concluding contracts on behalf of their principals. For example, a broker is
one who has limited authority to identify buyers / sellers of goods and a
commission agent is one whose only interest is to receive a commission for
fixing a supply contract between its principal and a third party; both these
persons would not possess the authority of concluding supply contracts with a
third party and binding the principal with their actions.

 

On a careful
reading of the definition one would observe that the necessary ingredient of
agency under GST is the authority to effect
a supply / receipt on behalf
of its principal. This is because under
general law the scope of functions of the agent could take various forms such
as logistics, liaising, negotiations, etc., but the GST law has narrowed the
scope of agency u/s 2(5) to only functions w.r.t. effecting a supply or receipt
of goods on behalf of the principal. Section 2(5) also uses the phrase ‘or any
other mercantile agent’, implying that the preceding categories of agent are of
the type who have satisfied the condition of being a mercantile agent (as
understood under the Sale of Goods Act) though they are called by different
names. The phrase ‘whatever name called’ only reinforces the accepted practice
of looking into the substance of the relationship and not just the form.
Therefore, a person may be termed as a ‘factor’ or ‘a commission agent’ in
trade / general law parlance but would acquire agency u/s 2(5) only if he
possesses the power to enter into binding supply arrangements on behalf of his
principal. It is also possible to interpret that only those cases of agency
would be applicable to Schedule I which involve a delivery of goods to / from
the selling / buying agent and such agent possesses the authority to effect the
supply on behalf of its principal.

 

This
interpretation was also acknowledged by the CBEC Circular No. 57/31/2018-GST
which read as follows:

 

‘7. It may be
noted that the crucial factor is how to determine whether the agent is wearing
the representative hat and is supplying or receiving goods on behalf of the
principal. Since in the commercial world, there are various factors that might
influence this relationship, it would be more prudent that an objective
criteria
(sic) is used to determine whether a particular
principal-agent relationship falls within the ambit of the said entry or not.
Thus, the key ingredient for determining relationship under GST would be
whether the invoice for the further supply of goods on behalf of the principal
is being issued by the agent or not. Where the invoice for further supply is
being issued by the agent in his name then, any provision of goods from the
principal to the agent would fall within the fold of the said entry. However,
it may be noted that in cases where the invoice is issued by the agent to the
customer in the name of the principal, such agent shall not fall within the
ambit of Schedule I of the CGST Act. Similarly, where the goods being procured
by the agent on behalf of the principal are invoiced in the name of the agent
then further provision of the said goods by the agent to the principal would be
covered by the said entry. In other words, the crucial point is whether or not
the agent has the authority to pass or receive the title of the goods on behalf
of the principal.’

 

Though the
aspect of representative authority has been affirmed by the CBEC, it has
questionably used the manner of raising the invoice as the ‘objective criteria’
for ascertaining the representative authority. From the perspective of substance
over form, a mere mention of a name in the invoice cannot decide the presence
or absence of agency. Nevertheless, this appears to have been done from a
practical standpoint to overcome possible procedural challenges with place of
supply, credit flow and inter-government settlements.

 

While this is
the contextual understanding of agency under Schedule I, there is another type
of agency which has been subtly recognised under the GST law. The phrase
‘agent’ has also been used in the definition of supplier, principal, place of
business, output tax, etc. The consequence of this is that all activities of an
agent would merge into the assessment of the principal and treated as being
concluded by the principal for the purposes of GST. For example, output tax and
supplier have been defined as follows:

 

‘(82) “output
tax” in relation to a taxable person, means the tax chargeable under this Act
on taxable supply of goods or services or both made by him or by his agent but
excludes tax payable by him on reverse charge basis’.

 

‘(105)
“supplier” in relation to any goods or services or both, shall mean the person
supplying the said goods or services or both and shall include an agent acting
as such on behalf of such supplier in relation to the goods or services or both
supplied;’

 

The above
definition implies all taxes charged in agency capacity would be included in
the assessment of the principal. Moreover, a person would be considered to be a
supplier even though the goods are in fact being supplied by its agent.

 

This leads to a
head-on collision with the Schedule I situation discussed above. Ordinarily
speaking, after applying Schedule I and treating the principal and agent as
different persons under the law, one would have expected that all supplies of
the agent would be delinked from the principal’s activities for all purposes of
the Act. One would have expected that the deemed supply by the principal to the
agent would terminate all responsibilities of the principal over the subject
goods for the limited purpose under GST. All assessments of tax would be
conducted in the hands of the agent in its fictional capacity of a buyer of
goods. The inclusion of the agent’s turnover in the hands of the principal u/s
2(82) / 2(105) apparently conflicts with the consequence of agency under
Schedule 1. It would result in a turnover being taxed twice, (a) once in the
hands of the agent (by virtue of Schedule I), and (b) again in the hands of the
principal (by virtue of the definitions such as output tax, supplier, etc.).

 

This deadlock can be resolved through two theories: (A) The phrase ‘on
behalf of’ has been commonly used only in section 2(5) and Schedule I.
Moreover, Schedule I is only limited to supply of goods and not services.
Therefore, one could view section 2(5) as directly applicable to Schedule I
transactions and not beyond. All other references to agent in the Act are only
for supply of services and not for supply of goods, in which case their
turnover would continue to still be included in the hands of the principal.
This school of thought suffers from a very critical deficiency that the
definition of agency has been used with reference to goods and / or services
and it would not be correct to ignore the specific mention of services while
interpreting the definitions in the context of the agent’s activities; (B) An
agent could acquire representative capacity for various purposes such as making
/ receiving supply, making / receiving payments, etc. Of the various
authorities which an agent can acquire from its principal, section 2(5) read
with Schedule I is limited to agency exercising the authority to effect supplies on behalf of the principal w.r.t. supply
of goods.
Where the agent has other representative authorities (such as
carrying, forwarding, consignment agents, ancillary activities to enable a
supply of goods, etc.), the activities would be considered to have been made by
the principal itself and all consequences would follow therefrom. For services,
in the absence of a parallel Schedule I situation, all agents’ actions would be
assessed in the hands of the principal directly.

 

The consequence
of the latter interpretation may be as follows: For example, Steel Authority of
India appoints an agent for receiving supplies, storing them, procuring orders
and selling these goods to third parties, giving the principal a true account
of the sale proceeds for a commission. Here, the agent has the authority to
negotiate the price, bind SAIL with the price negotiated (of course within
authority) and effect the sale on behalf of SAIL. SAIL would be considered to
have made a Schedule I supply to its agent at the time of dispatch of the goods
and the agent will be considered to have received the goods and making a
subsequent supply to third parties. In effect, there are two supplies in this
arrangement and the agent, though only a medium, will be treated as a buyer for
all purposes of the Act. In such a scenario, the consequence of pricing,
assessment, input tax credit at the principal and agent’s end would have to be
viewed independently.

 

In contrast to
this, another case could be of Indian Oil Corporation appointing ‘carrying and
forwarding agents’ for receiving, storing and dispatching the goods on behalf of
IOCL. Here the carrying and forwarding agent would not have the authority to
negotiate and / or conclude contracts on behalf of IOCL. The instruction for
movement is also given by IOCL and the agent merely arranges for logistics and
ancillary functions associated with the main supply. In such a scenario, the
law states that even if the tax invoice is raised in the name of the agent on
behalf of IOCL, the supply having taken place by IOCL, the output tax,
turnover, etc., would have to be included in the assessment of IOCL. In such a
scenario there is only one supply, i.e., by the C&F agent under the IOCL’s
authority to the third party which would be assessed in the hands of IOCL
directly. The crucial difference is that the SAIL agent has the authority to bind
its principal under general law with the transactions of supply, while the IOCL
agent was not granted the authority to bind IOCL with its sale transaction and
had limited authority of possession and / or dispatch of the goods.

 

While these are
simplistic models, real-life transactions pose considerable challenges. One
would have to appreciate the true purport of commonly-used terms such as
factor, del credere agent, commission agent, consignment agent, etc.

 

(a)        Commission agent – is a mercantile agent who sells or disposes goods by exercising
authority to conclude contracts on behalf of its principal.

(b)        Factor – is generally
a mercantile agent who sells or disposes goods by taking possession or control
over the goods which are entrusted to him by the principal.

(c)        Del credere agent / Pukka arhatia – is one who guarantees that the price of the goods sold would be
recovered and indemnifies against any loss caused on account of non-recovery of
sale price.

(d)        Broker / Kutcha arhatia – is one who mediates a transaction between two principals but does not
acquire or transfer any title over the goods on anyone’s behalf. The broker
acts as a negotiator for each end of the transaction but cannot bind anyone to
the transaction. It is famously stated that all agents are brokers but all
brokers may not be agents.

(e)        Auctioneer – is one who
exercises authority to conclude the price of the goods under sale on the drop
of the hammer.

 

One may refer
to the principle outlined by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales
Tax vs. Bishamber Singh Layaq Ram [1981] 47 STC 80
while
differentiating an authoritative agent and a general agent as follows:

 

‘The crucial
test is whether the agent has any personal interest of his own when he enters
into the transaction or whether that interest is limited to his commission
agency charges and certain out of pocket expenses, and in the event of any loss
his right to be indemnified by the principal. This principle was applied in the
case of pakki arhat by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., in
Bhagwandas Narottamdas vs. Kanji Deoji [1906] ILR 30 Bom. 205 and approved of by the Judicial Committee in Bhagwandas Parasram vs. Burjorji Ruttonji Bomanji (1917-18) LR 45 IA 29 and by this Court in Shivnarayan Kabra vs. State
of Madras [1967] 1 SCR 138.’

 

The other
relevant decision is the case of Kalyanji Kuwarji vs. Tirkaram Sheolal
AIR 1938 Nag. 254
:

 

‘The test to my
mind is this: does the commission agent when he sells have authority to sell in
his own name? Has he authority in his own right to pass a valid title? If he
has then he is acting as a principal
vis-a-vis
the purchasers and not merely as an agent and therefore from that point on he
is a debtor of his erstwhile principal and not merely an agent. Whether this is
so or not must of course depend upon the facts in each particular case.’

 

The above
variants of mercantile agents u/s 2(5) of the GST law should be contextually
understood as those which have the authority to conclude the supply on behalf
of the principal supplier. Any other arrangement which as termed in the manner
specified above would not be considered as agency under GST law, and the latter
school of thought would accordingly apply.

 

CHALLENGES UNDER AGENCY RELATIONSHIP

Whether secretly
accounted profits / collections liable to GST as an independent activity?

A critical
dimension to the aspect of agency is that the agent is obligated to account for
all the collections to the principal. The agent is permitted to retain the
commissions, expenses and service fee due to it under the agency contract but
cannot secretly profit from the agency. The secreted profits of agency are held
without the knowledge of both the third party as well as the principal. Going
by the previous discussion, agency would take two forms under GST – (a)
Schedule I scenario where agents are treated on par with a principal, (b) the
other scenario where the agent’s functions are assessed in the hands of the
principal in entirety without any fiction.

 

In the former
scenario, if an agent procures the product at a deemed value of Rs. 85 and
supplies the product at a final price of Rs. 100 and accounts only Rs. 95 as
the collection to the principal, the secreted profit of Rs. 5 may not be a
discernible supply to anyone. It is a profit which has been retained by the
agent from its gross collections and not as a consideration for the agency
services. While the agent may have committed a breach under general law (which
is subject to ratification by the principal himself), tax laws would have to
implement this in its narrow sense. The secreted profit cannot be termed as a
consideration for any identifiable supply and hence may not be taxed at all.
Viewed from another angle, when the entire Rs. 100 has already been taxed as a
consideration of the sale price of goods to the third party, there is nothing
left to tax and Revenue cannot contend that Rs. 5 has escaped the tax net
altogether.

 

In the latter
scenario, where assessments are made in the hands of the principal, the secreted
profit of Rs. 5 would not be disclosed to the principal, resulting in short
reporting of the tax liability in the hands of the principal to this extent.
But even in such a scenario, the Rs. 5 cannot be taxed in the hands of the
agent as an identifiable supply activity. In contrast to the former scenario,
though there is a net shortfall in payment, the shortfall in payment cannot be
fixed as the liability of the agent for its agency function. At the principal’s
end, the said amount does not accrue to the principal, cannot be termed as a
consideration due to the principal and hence may not form part of the taxable
value of the supply.

 

The important
principle emerging from this example is that any surplus does not automatically
acquire the character of a supply unless there is a consensus over the activity
between both parties and such parties identify the consideration for such
consensual activity.

 

Whether
e-commerce activity makes the market place website ‘an agent’?

E-commerce
market place models have multiple variants. In today’s e-commerce business
models where a substantial part of the transaction is concluded by the
e-commerce company on behalf of the seller, there is a challenge in identifying
the relevant basket of agency, i.e. mere C&F agent or a mercantile agent.
Websites such as Amazon, Flipkart, etc., provide multiple facilities to sellers
such as (a) product hosting services, (b) fulfilment centres offering
warehousing, logistics, packing, etc., (c) direction over promotional schemes
for products, (d) incentives and price support to portal sellers, and (e)
collection of payments, etc. The web portal clearly depicts the name of the
seller and the prices offered by the seller which are accepted by the buyer at
the click of a button on the portal. The final invoice is raised in the name of
the seller of goods with the branding, logo and packaging of the web portal but
the payments are made to the web portal. The portal also hosts product
descriptions, customer reviews, seller rating, etc., of the product.

 

One may contend
that the web portal has portrayed itself as an agent of the seller and the
seller having accepted such a portrayal has impliedly accepted this
principal-agency relationship. By such implicit actions, the marketplace web
portal may be treated as an agent of the principal and effecting supplies on
their behalf. Hence, the transaction would be covered under Schedule I. The
other view may be that these are a host of services provided by a marketplace
web portal and the web portal does not hold out to make warranties /
representations over the product pricing, quality, description, etc. Moreover,
the GST law has imposed TCS provisions for e-commerce operators and treating
them as a separate class of persons who effect collections on behalf of
sellers. Hence, the web portals are not agents as defined in section 2(5) read
with Schedule I. At the most they may be termed as brokers who merely connect
the buyer and the supplier over an e-commerce platform but are not effecting a supply on behalf of the
seller. The issue is wide open and one would have to await clarity on this
front in the years to come.

 

Intermediary
services under place of supply for goods / services

Agency has also
been used in a different form in the IGST Act. Section 2(13) defines
‘intermediary’ to mean a broker, an agent or any other person, by whatever name
called, who arranges or facilitates the supply of goods or services or both, or
securities, between two or more persons, but does not include a person who
supplies such goods or services or both or securities on his own account. This
phrase is a legacy from the service tax era and has been used in the context of
determining the interstate character of supplies in overseas trade or commerce.

 

The said
definition includes similar terms such as broker, agent, etc. The important
distinctions between the definition of agent and intermediary are as follows:

1.         Intermediary definition is applicable
for the limited context of ascertaining the place of supply of services being
rendered by the intermediary as a principal and not for;

2.         Agent u/s 2(5) enlists categories of
‘mercantile agents’ while intermediary u/s 2(13) enlists categories of ‘agents’
in general. This is critical as one can contend that where one acquires the
status of a mercantile agent the element of intermediary does not arise in view
of the deeming fiction in Schedule I.

3.         The definition of intermediary excludes
supply of goods / services ‘on own account’. This probably implies that goods
which are supplied on own accounts, including those deemed as a supply by the
agent under Schedule I, would stand excluded from the scope of this definition.

4.         Therefore, the concept of intermediary
has to be distinguished from the concept of agency u/s 2(5) and the obscure
line of difference is the extent of authority granted to the person concerned.

 

As it appears, the principles of agency under GST
are multi-faceted with the same term having contextual meanings. This makes the
job of tax advisers a precarious walk over a tight rope. Apart from the concept
of agency, one may also need to address certain other relationships (such as
master-servant, bailee-bailor, brokers, consignment agents, etc.) which fall on
the peripheries of an agency relationship and draw a line of distinction while
interpreting these terms. This can be taken up in a separate article.

 

Advance tax – Interest for default in payment of advance tax – Sections 132, 132B, 234B and 234C – Computation of interest – Assessee paying four instalments of advance tax prior to search and seizure and communication sent to adjust advance tax against cash seized during search – Date of communication to be taken as date of payment of advance tax

9. Marble Centre International P. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2020]
425 ITR 654 (Kar.) Date
of order: 11th June, 2020
A.Y.:
2007-08

 

Advance tax – Interest for default in
payment of advance tax – Sections 132, 132B, 234B and 234C – Computation of
interest – Assessee paying four instalments of advance tax prior to search and
seizure and communication sent to adjust advance tax against cash seized during
search – Date of communication to be taken as date of payment of advance tax

 

The assessee was in
the business of trading. A search and seizure action was conducted u/s 132 in
the business premises of the assessee and residential premises of its director
and accountant. During the course of the search, Rs. 4.77 crores in cash was
seized by the Department. Prior to the seizure of the cash, the assessee had
paid advance tax in four instalments on 15th June, 2006, 14th
September, 2006, 14th December, 2006 and 8th March, 2007. The
assessee agreed to disclose Rs. 50 lakhs and stock of Rs. 1.40 crores as
additional income for the A.Y. 2007-08 and sent a communication dated 15th
March, 2007 in which a request was made to treat Rs. 50 lakhs out of the cash
seized as advance tax payable by the assessee for the A.Y. 2007-08. Notices
under sections 142(1) and 143(2) were issued and the assessee furnished the
details called for. An order dated 31st December, 2008 was passed
u/s 143(3). The assessee claimed that the date of the request letter, 15th
March, 2007, should be taken as the date of payment of advance tax of Rs. 50
lakhs out of the seized amount. The claim was not accepted.

 

The Commissioner
(Appeals),
inter
alia
, held that the assessee was entitled to relief
in respect of the interest from the date of filing of the return till the date
of the order of assessment and partly allowed the appeal. The Tribunal
dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

 

The Karnataka High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i)   The date of payment of tax by the assessee
was 15th March, 2007, i.e., the date on which the request was made
by the assessee to adjust the cash seized against the advance tax payable
towards the tax for the A.Y. 2007-08. The assessee had offered a sum of Rs. 50
lakhs on 15th March, 2007 towards the advance tax payable for the
A.Y. 2007-08. According to the statement of income prior to the seizure of
cash, the assessee had also paid advance tax in four instalments. However, the
Department did not adjust these amounts even though the cash was available with
it. The date of payment of tax shall be taken as 15th March, 2007,
i.e., the date on which the request was made by the assessee to adjust the cash
seized against the advance tax payable for the A.Y. 2007- 08.

 

ii)   In view of the preceding analysis, we hold
that the Tribunal ought to have held the date of payment of tax by the assessee
as 15th March, 2007, i.e., the date on which the request was made by
the assessee to adjust the cash seized against the advance tax payable towards
the tax for the A.Y. 2007-08.’

 

Sections 195 and 201(1)/(1A) – Demurrage charges payable to non-resident shipping company were not liable to TDS u/s 195

4. TS-527-ITAT-2020-Ahd. Gokul Refoils &
Solvent Ltd. vs. DCIT ITA No:
2049/Ahd/2018
A.Y.: 2016-17 Date of order: 11th
September, 2020

 

Sections 195 and
201(1)/(1A) – Demurrage charges payable to non-resident shipping company were
not liable to TDS u/s 195

 

FACTS

The assessee paid
demurrage charges to a non-resident Singaporean company without deduction of
tax. The A.O. was of the view that the assessee was required to withhold tax
u/s 195 from the said payment. Since the assessee had not done so, the A.O.
held the Assessee in Default (AID) u/s 201 and levied interest u/s 201(1A).

 

On appeal, the
CIT(A) upheld this order. The aggrieved assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

i)   In the course of the assessment, the assessee
had submitted documentary evidence (comprising demurrage contract, letter to
bank for remittance, debit note, Form No. 15CA, Form No. 15CB, remittance
voucher, details of remittance, Form A2 under FEMA, and no PE declaration)
pertaining to reimbursement of expenses5.

ii)   The Tribunal relied on Circular No. 723 in
terms of which section 195 cannot be invoked if freight payment was made in
respect of a ship which was owned or chartered by a non-resident to which
section 172 (i.e., voyage-based special assessment scheme of the Act) applied.

iii) Accordingly, section 195
was not applicable in respect of demurrage charges paid to the non-resident
shipping company.

 

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

 

1   Other
grounds related to transfer pricing and disallowance of expenditure

2   328
ITR 81

3   Finance
Bill which respectively introduced and reintroduced DDT

4     382
ITR 114

5   Assessee
represented demurrage charges as reimbursement during
assessment proceedings. There is no independent finding of the Tribunal to the
effect that demurrage represents reimbursement

Article 10 of India-Germany DTAA – Section 115-O of the Act – Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) payable by Indian company on dividend distributed to non-resident shareholder to be restricted to tax rate specified in DTAA

3. TS-522-ITAT-2020-Delhi Giesecke &
Devrient [India] Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT ITA No:
7075/Del/2017
A.Y: 2013-14 Date of order: 13th
October, 2020

 

Article 10 of
India-Germany DTAA – Section 115-O of the Act – Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT)
payable by Indian company on dividend distributed to non-resident shareholder
to be restricted to tax rate specified in DTAA

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a German company (GCo). It paid dividend to GCo and
also paid DDT u/s 115-O.

 

During the appeal
proceedings before the Tribunal1, the assessee raised additional
grounds and contended that dividend was paid to a non-resident shareholder who
was qualified for benefit under the provisions of the India-Germany DTAA.
Accordingly, the DDT rate under the Act was to be restricted to the rate
specified under the India-Germany DTAA and the excess DDT refunded.

 

HELD

Interplay of DDT
with DTAA

(i)    For administrative convenience, while DDT is
collected from the company paying dividends, effectively, DDT is a tax on
dividend.

(ii)   In Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing
Company Ltd.
2, the Bombay High Court held that DDT is a tax
on the company paying dividends and not on the shareholder.

(iii) The liability to pay DDT is on the Indian
company; DDT is a tax on income and income includes dividend.

(iv) The Tribunal perused the Memoranda to Finance
Bill, 1997 and the Finance Bill, 20033 and observed that
administrative convenience was the reason for the introduction of DDT. For all
intents and purposes, DDT was a charge on dividends. The burden of DDT falls on
shareholders rather than the company as the amount of dividend available for
distribution to shareholders stands reduced.

(v)   The income of a non-resident is to be
determined having regard to the provisions of the DTAA. The fact that liability
to pay DDT is on the Indian company was irrelevant for considering the rate for
tax on dividend under DTAA.

(vi) The India-Germany DTAA was notified in 1996,
i.e., prior to the introduction of DDT in 1997. In New Skies Satellite4
the Delhi High Court held that Parliament cannot amend DTAA by unilaterally
amending domestic law. Accordingly, the DDT rate cannot exceed the rate
prescribed on dividend under the India-Germany DTAA (namely, 10%).

(vii)       The Tribunal remitted the issue back to
the A.O. for limited verification of beneficial ownership and existence of PE
of GCO.

 

Note:

The Tribunal
admitted additional ground relying upon the jurisdictional Delhi High Court
decision in Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. WP(C) 1324/2019.

As per provisions of section 194C(6), the only requirement for non-deduction of tax at source is that the transport contractors have to furnish their PAN details – The Tribunal restored the issue to the file of the A.O. for de novo adjudication

7. M.S. Hipack v. ACIT (Mumbai) C.N. Prasad (J.M.) and Rajesh Kumar
(A.M.) ITA No.: 1032/Mum/2019
A.Y.: 2011-12 Date of order: 29th
September, 2020
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: D.J.
Shukla /
R. Bhoopathi

 

As per provisions
of section 194C(6), the only requirement for non-deduction of tax at source is
that the transport contractors have to furnish their PAN details – The Tribunal
restored the issue to the file of the A.O. for de novo adjudication

 

FACTS

The A.O. while completing the assessment noticed
that the assessee had incurred transportation charges and had not deducted tax
at source. The assessee having not complied with the requirement of filing
Form–26Q, accordingly, disallowance was made by the A.O.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who sustained the disallowance
as he was not convinced with the submissions made by the assessee.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended that
the assessee has complied with the provisions of section 194C(6) as it has
filed revised and corrected Form-26Q giving the details of PAN of transport
contractors and not deducted TDS complying with the provisions of section 194C(6).
It was submitted that as per the provisions of section 194C(6) the only
requirement for non-deduction of tax at source is that the transport
contractors have to furnish their PAN details. The assessee has duly obtained
PAN details of the contractors and incorporated the same in corrected Form-26Q.

 

HELD

In view of
the submissions of the assessee that it had corrected Form-26Q by furnishing
the PAN details of the transport contractors and complied with the provisions
of section 196C(6), the Tribunal held that this matter has to be examined by
the A.O. in the light of the submissions of the assessee and in the interest of
justice, it restored the issue to the file of the A.O. for de novo
adjudication with a direction that the A.O. shall take note of the fact of the
assessee filing the corrected Form-26Q and also that the assessee is at liberty
to file all necessary information before the A.O.

 

 

Section 153C – The date of initiation of search u/s 132 or requisition u/s 132A in the case of other person shall be the date of receiving the books of accounts or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the A.O. having jurisdiction over such other person. Where the A.O. of the searched person and the other person (the assessee) was the same, the date on which satisfaction is recorded by the A.O. for invoking the provisions of section 153C would be deemed to be the date of receiving documents by the A.O. of the other person

6. Diwakar N. Shetty vs. DCIT (Mumbai) Vikas Awasthy (J.M.) and Rajesh Kumar
(A.M.) ITA No.: 5618/Mum/2016
A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 30th
September, 2020
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Vasudev Ginde / Purushottam Tripure

 

Section 153C – The date of initiation of search
u/s 132 or requisition u/s 132A in the case of other person shall be the date
of receiving the books of accounts or documents or assets seized or
requisitioned by the A.O. having jurisdiction over such other person. Where the
A.O. of the searched person and the other person (the assessee) was the same,
the date on which satisfaction is recorded by the A.O. for invoking the
provisions of section 153C would be deemed to be the date of receiving documents by the A.O.
of the other person

 

FACTS

A search and
seizure action u/s 132 was carried out in the case of M/s Om Sai Motors Pvt.
Ltd., a company belonging to the Gangadhar Shetty group on 20th
August, 2009. In the search action certain documents pertaining to the assessee
were also seized.

 

The A.O. of
the person searched and the assessee was the same. The satisfaction for
initiating proceedings u/s 153C was recorded on 21st December, 2010,
i.e., in the financial year 2010-11, relevant to the assessment year 2011-12.

 

Notice u/s
153C was issued to the assessee on 21st December, 2010. The A.O.
made block assessment for A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2009-10 and for the impugned A.Y.,
i.e., 2010-11, the A.O. considered it as the year of search and made the assessment
under regular provisions.

 

The A.O.
completed the assessment of the impugned assessment year as a regular
assessment u/s 144.

 

Aggrieved by
the assessment made, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A).

 

Further
aggrieved by the order passed by the CIT(A), the assessee preferred an appeal
to the Tribunal where it raised an additional ground challenging the validity
of the assessment order passed u/s 144 by contending that the ‘relevant date’
for assuming jurisdiction u/s 153A r/w/s 153C in case of the person other than
the searched person (in this case the appellant / assessee) would not be the
date of search, but the date of handing over of the material, etc., belonging
to that other person to his A.O. by the A.O. having jurisdiction over the searched person.

 

In the
present case, the A.O. of the searched person and the other person (i.e., the
assessee) is the same. Since satisfaction for initiating proceedings u/s 153C
was recorded on 21st December, 2010, i.e., in financial year
2010-11, relevant to assessment year 2011-12, the year of search would be
assessment year 2011-12 and not 2010-11. Accordingly, the A.Y. 2010-11 under
consideration falls within the block of six assessment years referred to in
section 153C of the Act, therefore, assessment ought to have been made only u/s
153C and not as regular assessment u/s 143(3)/144.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed that the only issue for its consideration is whether the assessment
for A.Y. 2010-11 was required to be framed u/s 153C being part of block
assessment period or the assessment has been rightly made under regular
provisions considering impugned assessment year relevant to the year of search.
The assessment order for the aforesaid block period of six years was passed u/s
144 r/w/s 153C on 30th December, 2011.

 

The Tribunal
noted that the assessee challenged the invoking of section 153C jurisdiction
for A.Y. 2004-05 before the Tribunal in ITA No. 7309/Mum/2014 (Supra).
After examining the facts, the Tribunal held that A.Y. 2004-05 is outside the
purview of the block assessment period as the documents relatable to the
assessee found at the place of the searched person were handed over to the A.O.
of the assessee in financial year 2010-11 relevant to A.Y. 2011-12. If that be
so, the A.O. would have no jurisdiction for issuing notice u/s 153A r/w/s 153C
for A.Y. 2004-05. However, for the limited purpose of verification of facts,
the Tribunal restored the issue back to the A.O. Thereafter, the A.O. passed an
order giving effect to the order of the Tribunal wherein the A.O. admitted that
A.Y. 2004-05 does not fall within the block assessment period as the relevant
material was handed over in the period relevant to A.Y. 2011-12.

 

The Tribunal
observed that since the Revenue has itself admitted the fact that the year of
search would be financial year 2010-11 relevant to A.Y. 2011-12, the block
period of six years for search assessment u/s153C would comprise of assessment
years 2005-06 to 2010-11. Under these facts, the assessment for A.Y. 2010-11
being part of block assessment period should have been u/s 153A r/w/s 153C.

 

The Tribunal
having noted the ratio of the decision of the Delhi High Court in the
case of CIT vs. Jasjit Singh, Income Tax Appeal No. 337 of 2015 for A.Y.
2009-10, decided on 2nd January, 2018
by the Delhi High
Court has held that the date of initiation of search u/s 132 or requisition
u/s132A in the case of other person shall be the date of receiving the books of
accounts or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the A.O. having
jurisdiction over such other person. In the instant case, although the A.O. of
the searched person and the other person (the assessee) was the same,
satisfaction was recorded by the A.O. for invoking the provisions of section
153C on 21st December, 2010, the said date would be deemed to be the
date of receiving documents by the A.O. Thus, the year of search would be F.Y.
2010-11 relevant to A.Y. 2011-12.

 

Taking note
of the decision of the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of EON
Auto Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT, ITA No. 3179/Del/2013, A.Y. 2008-09
, decided on 28th
November, 2017, the Tribunal held that for the purpose of determining six
assessment years prior to the date of search, the relevant date for the purpose
of invoking provisions of section 153C in the case of a person other than the
person searched would be the date of recording satisfaction u/s 153C.

 

The Tribunal
held that since the impugned assessment year forms part of the block of six
assessment years prior to the date of search, the assessment should have been
made u/s 153C and not under the regular provisions as has been done by the A.O.
Therefore, the assessment order for the impugned year suffers from legal
infirmity and hence is liable to be quashed.

 

The Tribunal
quashed the assessment order and allowed the additional ground of appeal filed
by the assessee.

 

Sections 14A, 253 – In cross-objections, assessee can raise a ground for the first time, which was not taken up by him even in an appeal before the CIT(A)

5. ITO vs. Centrum Capital Limited
(Mumbai)
Shamim Yahya (A.M.) and Pavan Kumar
Gadale (J.M.) ITA No. 497/Mum/2019 and CO arising
out of ITA No. 497/Mum/2019
A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 5th October,
2020
Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: Lalit Dehiya / Jitendra Jain

 

Sections
14A, 253 – In cross-objections, assessee can raise a ground for the first time,
which was not taken up by him even in an appeal before the CIT(A)

 

FACTS

The assessee
in his return of income considered a sum of Rs. 22,82,187 to be disallowable
u/s 14A. The amount of exempt income earned by the assessee was Rs. 44,250. The
A.O., while assessing the total income of the assessee, disallowed a sum of Rs.
10,91,61,614 u/s 14A.

 

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who referred to the decision of
the Delhi High Court in the case of Joint Investment P. Ltd. vs. CIT (59
taxmann.com 295)
for the proposition that disallowance u/s 14A cannot
exceed the exempt income. He held that the disallowance in this case will not
exceed the suo motu disallowance done by the assessee which was more
than the exempt income. He held that since the total exempt income earned by
the appellant was only Rs. 44,250, therefore, respectfully following the
judgment of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in
the case of Future Corporate Resources Ltd. (Supra), the
disallowance u/s 14A r/w/r 8D is restricted to Rs. 44,250 only. He, however, held that because while filing the return of
income the appellant had itself disallowed a sum of Rs. 22,82,187 which is more
than the tax-free income earned by the appellant, therefore no further
disallowance can be made. Hence, disallowance of Rs. 10,91,61,614 made by the
A.O. u/s 14A r/w/r 8D is deleted and the appeal of the assessee on this ground
is allowed.

 

Aggrieved by
the decision of the CIT(A), Revenue preferred an appeal contending that the
CIT(A) erred in restricting the disallowance u/s 14A to Rs. 22,82,187 being the
amount suo motu disallowed by the assessee.

 

The assessee
filed a cross-objection contending that the CIT(A) ought to have restricted the
disallowance to the exempt income of Rs. 44,250 instead of observing that the
disallowance should be restricted to Rs. 22,82,187 being the suo motu
disallowance done by the assessee.

 

 

HELD

The Tribunal held
that there is no infirmity in the order of the CIT appeals which is duly
supported by the order of the Delhi High Court referred above. It observed that
the jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Delight Enterprises
(in ITA No. 110/2009)
has expounded a similar proposition. The Tribunal
dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

 

As regards
the CO filed by the assessee, the DR by referring to order 9 rule 13 of the CPC
objected to the ground being taken in the cross-objection which was not even
before the CIT appeals. The Tribunal noted that order 9 rule 13 of the CPC
deals with setting aside decree ex parte and held that such a reference
does not help the case of the Revenue.

 

The Tribunal
noted that as rightly observed by the ITAT bench in the aforesaid case of Tata
Industries Ltd. vs. ITO (2016) 181 TTJ 600 (Mum.),
no tax can be
collected except as per the mandate of the law. If the assessee has erroneously
offered more income for taxation, the same cannot be a bar to the assessee in
seeking remedy before the appellate forum.

 

The Tribunal
observed that the Supreme Court in the case of

i)    Goetze (India) Ltd. vs. CIT (2006) 284
ITR 323 (SC)
has held that nothing in that order would prevent the ITAT
in admitting an additional claim which was raised for the first time without a
revised return;

ii)   CIT vs. V. MR. P. Firm [1965] 56 ITR
67(SC)
has held that if a particular income is not taxable under the
Act, it cannot be taxed on the basis of estoppel or any other equitable
doctrine;

iii)  Shelly Products 129 taxman 271 (SC)
supports the proposition that if the assessee has erroneously paid more tax
than he was legally required to do, he is entitled to claim the refund, as
otherwise it would be violative of Article 265 of the Constitution.

 

The Tribunal
mentioned that the CBDT Circular 14 (XL-35) of 1953 dated 11th
April, 1955 states that officers of the Department must not take advantage of
the ignorance of the assessee as to his rights.

 

The Tribunal
held that

i)    in the background of the aforesaid Supreme
Court decisions, it does not find any merit whatsoever in the objection of CIT DR in accepting and adjudicating the ground raised by a
cross-objection by the assessee.

ii)   as regards the merits of the issue raised in
the cross-objection, the Tribunal held that the same stands covered by the very
decisions relied upon by the CIT (Appeals) himself as referred above, that the
disallowance u/s 14A cannot exceed the exempt income;

iii)  the disallowance in this case should not
exceed the exempt income earned as referred above;

iv)  in view of the CBDT Circular No. 14 as
referred above, the ground raised by the assessee is cogent.

 

The Tribunal
directed the A.O. to grant the necessary relief to the assessee and the
cross-objections filed by the assessee were allowed.

 

Section 144C inserted in the statute by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2009 is prospective in nature and would not apply to A.Y. 2009-10 or earlier assessment years

4. Truetzschler India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
DCIT (Mumbai)
Members: Vikas Awasthy (J.M.) and
Manoj Kumar Aggarwal (A.M.) ITA No. 1949/Mum/2015
A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 30th
September, 2020
Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Nitesh Joshi / A. Mohan

 

Section 144C
inserted in the statute by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 with retrospective
effect from 1st April, 2009 is prospective in nature and would not apply to
A.Y. 2009-10 or earlier assessment years

 

FACTS

In the
present appeal preferred against the order of the CIT(A), the assessee raised
an additional ground challenging the validity of the assessment order dated 13th
May, 2013 passed u/s 143(3) r/w/s 144C(13). In the additional ground, the assessee
contended that the assessment order ought to be quashed as it has been passed
after the expiry of the time limit prescribed u/s 153.

 

The Tribunal
noted that the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) passed the order u/s 92CA(3) on 9th
January, 2013. The A.O. passed the draft assessment order on 27th
March, 2013. Thereafter, the A.O. was required to pass the final assessment
order within the limitation period provided u/s 153(1), i.e., by 31st
March, 2013, whereas, actually the final assessment order was passed on 13th
May, 2013, i.e., after the expiry of the limitation period.

 

On behalf of
the assessee, and relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case
of Vedanta Limited vs. ACIT in Writ Petition No. 1729 of 2011 decided on
22nd October, 2019,
it was contended that the time limit for
passing the assessment order in the impugned assessment year does not get
extended by application of section 144C mandating reference to the dispute
resolution panel as the provisions of the said section do not apply to the
impugned assessment year. On the other hand, the Departmental Representative placed reliance on CBDT Circular
No. 5 of 2010 dated 3rd June, 2010 to counter the argument made on
behalf of the assessee.

 

HELD

The
additional ground being purely legal in nature and requiring no fresh evidence
was admitted by the Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal
noted that the Madras High Court has held that where there is a change in the
form of assessment itself, such change is not a mere deviation in procedure but
a substantive shift in the manner of framing an assessment. A substantive right
has enured to the parties by virtue of the introduction of section 144C.
Bearing in mind the settled position that the law applicable on the first day
of the assessment year be reckoned as the applicable law for assessment for
that year, leads one to the inescapable conclusion that the provisions of
section 144C can be held to be applicable only prospectively, that is, from
A.Y. 2011-12. The High Court also made it clear that the Circular issued in
2013 to bring the assessment year 2009-10 in the fold of the newly-inserted
provisions of section 144C would have no application.

 

The Tribunal
held that

i)    the provisions of section 144C would not
apply in the impugned assessment year, and hence the time period for passing
the assessment order would not get enlarged;

ii)   the A.O. was under obligation to pass the
assessment order within the time specified under the third proviso to
section 153(1), i.e., on or before 31st March, 2013;

iii)  since the order has been passed beyond the
period of limitation, the same is null and void. The assessee succeeds on the
legal ground raised as additional ground of appeal;

iv)  the assessment order is quashed and the appeal
of the assessee is allowed.

Section 37 – Expenditure incurred on cost of adhesive stamps for obtaining conveyance deed for assignment of receivables is allowable as the same is in connection with facilitating recovery of receivables which is a part of current asset and has been incurred for facilitating the business of the assessee

9. [2020] 120 taxmann.com 33 (Mum.)(Trib.) Demag
Delaval Industries Turbomachinery
(P) Ltd. A.Y.: 2004-05 Date of order: 16th September,
2020

 

Section 37 – Expenditure incurred on cost
of adhesive stamps for obtaining conveyance deed for assignment of receivables
is allowable as the same is in connection with facilitating recovery of
receivables which is a part of current asset and has been incurred for
facilitating the business of the assessee

 

FACTS

The assessee
acquired an industrial turbine unit of Alstom Project India Limited for a lump
sum consideration. The assessee incurred expenditure of Rs. 59,17,000 being
cost of adhesive stamp affixed on the conveyance deed for assignment of
receivables and claimed it as a deduction on the ground that it was an
expenditure in connection with the acquisition of business and is a revenue
expenditure.

 

The A.O. and the
CIT(A) denied the claim of the assessee on the ground that it is for
acquisition of industrial turbine unit from Alstom Project India Limited. He
held that the stamp duty is nothing but an expenditure incurred in order to
cure or complete the title to capital. Hence, it is capital expenditure.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and contended that the expenditure
in this regard has been incurred in connection with the conveyance deed of
receivables which are part of the current assets, therefore the expenditure
cannot be treated as expenditure for the purpose of acquisition of capital
assets. Expenditure was very much incurred for the purpose of the business of
the assessee and the same should be allowed as such. In this regard, reliance
was placed on the case of CIT vs. Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co.
(219 ITR 521)
and India Cement Ltd. vs. CIT (60 ITR 52).

 

HELD

The Tribunal, after going through the conveyance deed, held that the
deed involving duty of Rs. 59,17,000 was for the purpose of assignment of
receivables and that the CIT(A)’s conclusion that the expenditure is to cure
and complete the title to capital is without appreciating the facts of the
case.

 

The Tribunal held that this assignment is admittedly for facilitating
the business of the assessee by assigning receivables. The expenditure is in
connection with facilitating recovery of receivables which is a part of the
current assets. Hence, the expenditure in this regard cannot be said to be in
the capital field of acquiring the business. It is in fact for facilitating the
business of the assessee and in this view of the matter expenditure is
allowable as business expenditure. The ratio of the decisions in the
case of Bombay Dyeing Mfg. (Supra) and India Cements Ltd.
(Supra)
, relied upon on behalf of the assessee, are accordingly germane
and support the case of the assessee. The CIT(A) has been in error in holding
that the case laws are not applicable here.

 

The Tribunal decided this ground of appeal in favour of the assessee.

Section 115JB – When income which is exempt u/s 10 is credited to Profit & Loss Account, the Book Profit u/s 115JB is to be computed by reducing the amount of such income to which section 10 applies

8. [2020] 120 taxmann.com 31 (Del.)(Trib.) ITO vs. Buniyad Developers (P) Ltd. A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 21st September,
2020

 

Section 115JB – When income which is exempt
u/s 10 is credited to Profit & Loss Account, the  Book Profit u/s 115JB is to be computed by
reducing the amount of such income to which section 10 applies

 

FACTS

For the assessment
year 2009-10, the assessee company filed its return of income on 30th
September, 2009 declaring Nil income but paid tax on book profits u/s 115JB at
Rs. 5,73,70,009. The return was processed u/s 143(1). The A.O., in the course
of assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2010-11, having noticed that the lands were
sold in part and that there has been no income declared in respect of its profits
of Rs. 5,58,61,180 earned on sale of land, issued notice u/s 148 and, after
hearing the assessee, made an addition of Rs. 5,41,38,217 with interest income
of Rs. 21,90,212.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who, taking note of the remand
assessment in A.Y. 2010-11, found that since the village where the land sold
was located was eight km. away from the municipal limits, the very basis of the
A.O. reopening the assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2009-10 has no locus
standi
as the A.O. has himself in the remand assessment for A.Y. 2010-11
admitted the said fact. He, therefore, allowed the contention of the assessee
on that ground. He also accepted the contention of the assessee that under the
provisions of section 115JB(2)(k)(ii), the profits derived from sale of
agricultural land, which is exempt u/s 10, has to be reduced from the book
profits and, therefore, the assessee is entitled to relief even in respect of
the amount that was offered to tax. He directed the A.O. to compute the tax in
accordance with law by reducing the amount of income to which provisions of
section 10 of the Act apply, if the said amount is credited to the profit and
loss account.

 

Aggrieved, the
Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal observed that it is an admitted fact that the land that
was sold was located in village Kishora, which is more than eight km. away from
the municipal limits and the profits earned on the sale of such land are exempt
u/s 10. It noted that in view of the provisions of section 115JB(2)(k)(ii),
the assessee committed a mistake when it computed the book profits including
the sale consideration of agricultural land, which was credited to the profit
and loss account and offered the same to tax.

 

The Tribunal held that

i)   in view of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Shelly Products (2003) 129
Taxman 271,
such a mistake has to be rectified by the Revenue
authorities when it is brought to their notice and they are satisfied with the
genuineness of the claim;

ii)   when the CIT(A) is satisfied
that the income which is exempt u/s 10 is included in the book profit u/s
115JB, which should not be done, the CIT(A) is justified in directing the A.O.
to follow the law and to compute the tax in accordance with the provisions of
section 115JB by reducing the amount of income to which section 10 applies, if
such amount is credited to the profit and loss account.

iii)  the action of the CIT(A) is
perfectly legal and does not suffer any infirmity.

 

The Tribunal declined to interfere with the findings of the CIT(A) and
found the appeal of the Revenue to be devoid of merit.

I. Section 194H r/w/s 201(1) – Discount on sale of set-top boxes and recharge coupons including festival discount and bonus points to customers cannot be considered as commission and therefore not liable for deduction of tax II. Section 36(1)(iii) – Assessee had filed necessary evidence to prove availability of owned funds to cover investment made in capital WIP. Thus, interest paid on borrowed funds was to be allowed u/s 36(1)(iii)

7. [2020] 119 taxmann.com 424 (Mum.)(Trib.) Tata Sky Ltd. vs. ACIT, Circle 7(3) A.Ys.: 2009-10 and 2010-11 Date of order: 10th September,
2020

 

I. Section 194H
r/w/s 201(1) – Discount on sale of set-top boxes and recharge coupons including
festival discount and bonus points to customers cannot be considered as
commission and therefore not liable for deduction of tax

II. Section 36(1)(iii) – Assessee had filed
necessary evidence to prove availability of owned funds to cover investment
made in capital WIP. Thus, interest paid on borrowed funds was to be allowed
u/s 36(1)(iii)

 

FACTS

I.   The assessee was engaged in the business of
providing Direct to Home (DTH) services. The set-top box (STB) installed at the
premises of the subscribers receives television signals through the
broadcasters which are uplinked to the satellite. The main source of income for
the assessee was from the sale of STB’s and sale of recharge coupons to
subscribers. The assessee claimed deduction of discounts offered on sale of
STB’s and recharge coupons. The A.O. contended that the very nature of discount
given by the assessee to distributors is in the nature of commission and
disallowed the expenditure as no tax deduction was made by the assessee. The
CIT(A) upheld the decision of the A.O.

 

Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal with the Tribunal.

 

II.   The assessee had certain capital WIP and the
A.O. had observed that no interest expenditure was allocated against it. The
assessee had incurred huge interest expenditure on various loans and the A.O.
disallowed proportionate interest expenditure u/s 36(1)(iii). The CIT(A)
confirmed the disallowance. The assessee preferred an appeal with the Tribunal..

 

HELD

I. The transactions
between the assessee and its distributors were on principal-to-principal basis
and all the risk, loss and damages are transferred to the distributor on
delivery. Further, the distributors were free to sell the STB’s at any price below
the maximum retail price. The assessee had filed the sample copy of invoices
for sale of STB’s and other recharge coupons to prove that it was a sale and
not services to be covered u/s 194H. Therefore, the assessee was not required
to deduct TDS on discount allowed on the sale of STB’s and hardware, recharge
coupon vouchers and disallowance of bonus or credit provided to subscribers,
including sales promotion expenses. The A.O. was directed to delete the
addition made on account of the disallowances.

 

II.   Based on the facts in the case, it was clear
that the assessee had not borrowed specific loan for acquiring capital assets.
The A.O. had disallowed proportionate interest paid on other loans including
loans borrowed for working capital purpose on the ground that the assessee had
used interest-bearing funds for acquisition of capital asset. The A.O. did not
bring on record any evidence to prove that borrowed funds were used for
acquisition of capital work in progress. The assessee filed evidence to the
effect that capital work in progress had been acquired out of the share capital
raised which was sufficient to cover investment in the capital work in
progress. Therefore, the A.O. erred in disallowing proportionate interest
expenses u/s 36(1)(iii).

 

Section 54F: Where the genuineness of the transactions is established, to avail exemption u/s 54F it is not mandatory that the agreement must be registered or possession must be obtained

6. [2020] 77 ITR (Trib.) 394 (Pune)(Trib.) Lalitkumar Kesarimal Jain vs. DCIT ITA No. 1345-1347/Pune/2017 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 24th September,
2019

 

Section 54F: Where the genuineness of the
transactions is established, to avail exemption u/s 54F it is not mandatory
that the agreement must be registered or possession must be obtained

 

FACTS

The assessee earned
long-term capital gains on sale of certain assets and in his return of income
claimed exemption u/s 54F to the tune of Rs. 18.96 crores for purchase of new
residential property. The A.O. rejected the said claim citing the following
reasons: (1) The agreements for purchase were unregistered; (2) The seller had
not given possession of the property; and (3) The assessee was an interested party
in the seller’s concern. The assessee substantiated that he had already paid
Rs. 22.10 crores to the seller before the due date of filing return of income
for the relevant assessment year and the same was not returned. In an
affidavit, the assessee explained the reason for not getting possession from
the seller. However, the CIT(A) upheld the order of the A.O., rejecting the
exemption u/s 54F.

 

The assessee
therefore filed an appeal before the ITAT.

 

HELD

(i)  Section 54F is incorporated to promote housing
projects and development activities and according to it once a person sells
some assets and earns capital gains, that money should be utilised for
procuring some new assets. The assessee should part with that money or a
substantial amount of it, for procuring a new residential house. What
essentially is looked into in this regard is the bona fide nature of the
assessee and the genuineness of the transaction/s.

 

(ii)  It was an undisputed fact that the assessee
had paid a sum of Rs. 22.10 crores to the seller and the Department had not
brought on record any evidence to prove that the said money came back to the
assessee.

 

(iii) The entire ambit of the Income-tax Act is based
within the larger framework of welfare legislation. The object of each
provision is ultimately the development of the society as well as the
individual and at the same time taking care of the interests of taxpayers.

 

(iv) Merely because the assessee had an interest in
the seller concern by itself cannot be reason to deny the benefit of deduction
when the genuineness of the transactions was established and there were several
other persons who were purchasing flats from the same seller and who had
already paid advance amounts.

 

(v) It was further found that the delay in
completion of the project was absolutely circumstantial and neither the
assessee nor the seller had any mala fide intention for delay of the
project.

 

(vi) Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [2015] 376 ITR 596 (SC)
and several other decisions of Tribunals, it was held that it is not mandatory
that the agreement must be registered or possession must be obtained. If it is
substantiated that the transaction is genuine, then benefit of deduction u/s
54F should be given to the assessee.

 

Accordingly, the
assessee was granted the benefit of deduction u/s 54F.

 

DEEMED GRANT OF REGISTRATION U/S 12A

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

In order
for the income of a charitable or religious institution to be eligible for
exemption u/s 11 of the Income-tax Act, the institution has to be registered
with the Commissioner of Income Tax u/s 12A read with section 12AA. For this
purpose, the institution has to file an application for registration u/s
12A(1)(aa) and the Commissioner on receipt of the application is required to
then follow the procedure laid down in section 12AA by passing an appropriate
order. Section 12AA(2) provides that every such order of the Commissioner
granting or refusing registration has to be passed before the expiry of six months
from the end of the month in which the application was received by him.

 

But often
it is seen that the Commissioner fails to act on the application within the
prescribed time, leaving the institution without registration. An issue arises
in such cases before the Courts about the status of the institution where the
Commissioner does not pass any order u/s 12AA within the time limit. Is the
institution to be treated as unregistered, which it is, or is it to be deemed
to be registered on failure of the Commissioner to act within the prescribed
time? While the Kerala and the Rajasthan High Courts, following an earlier
decision of the Allahabad High Court upheld on an appeal decided by the Supreme
Court, have held that in such a situation the registration u/s 12AA is deemed
to have been granted on the expiry of the period of six months, the Gujarat
High Court, following a subsequent Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High
Court, has held that the expiry of the period of six months does not result in
a deemed registration of the institution. In deciding the issue, the Gujarat
High Court held that the Supreme Court in the above referred appeal had left
the issue of deemed registration open while the other High Courts followed the
decision of the Apex Court on the understanding that it had held that the
institution was deemed to be registered once the time for rejecting the
application and refusing the registration was over. The added controversy,
therefore, moves in a narrow compass whereunder it is to be examined whether
the Supreme Court really adjudicated the issue as understood by the Kerala and
Rajasthan High Courts or whether the Court had kept the same open as held by
the Gujarat High Court.

 

TWO INTRICATELY LINKED CASES

The issue
had first come up before the Allahabad High Court in the case of
Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport &
Conservation of Environment vs. CIT 372 ITR 222
and a
little later before the Full Bench of the same High Court in the case of
CIT vs. Muzafar Nagar Development Authority 372 ITR 209.
Both these cases are intricately linked and therefore it is thought fit to
consider them at one place.

 

In the
Society’s case, the assessee was running a school. Till A.Y. 1998-99 it was
claiming exemption u/s 10(22). It had, therefore, not registered itself u/s 12A
to claim exemption u/s 11. Since section 10(22) was omitted by the Finance Act,
1998, the Society applied for registration u/s 12A with retrospective effect,
since the inception of the Society. But because the application was not made
within one year from the date of its establishment as required by the law at
that point of time, the Society sought for condonation of delay in making an
application.

 

No
decision was taken by the Commissioner on the Society’s application within the
time of six months prescribed u/s 12AA(2) and, in fact, the decision was
pending even after almost five years. Therefore, the Society was treated by the
A.O. as unregistered and was not allowed exemption from tax and was assessed on
its income that resulted in large tax demands. The Society filed a writ
petition before the Allahabad High Court seeking relief, including on the
ground that it was deemed to be registered u/s 12AA and was eligible for
exemption u/s 11.

 

The
Allahabad High Court observed that what was to be examined in the petition was
the consequence of such a long delay on the part of the Commissioner in not
deciding the Society’s application for registration. It noted that admittedly,
after the statutory limitation, the Commissioner would become
functus officio, and could not thereafter pass
any order either allowing or rejecting the registration; it was obvious that
the application could not be allowed to be treated as perpetually undecided,
and under the circumstances, the key question was whether, upon lapse of the
six-month period without any decision, the application for registration should
be treated as rejected or to be treated as allowed.

 

It was
vehemently argued on behalf of the Society before the High Court that
registration shall be deemed to have been granted after the expiry of the
period prescribed u/s 12AA(2) if no decision had been taken on the application
for registration. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Bangalore bench of
the Tribunal in the case of
Karnataka Golf
Association vs. DIT 91 ITD 1
, where such a view had
been taken. Reliance was also placed on the decisions of the Allahabad High
Court in the cases of
Jan Daood & Co. vs. ITO
113 ITR 772
and CIT
vs. Rohit Organics (P) Ltd. 281 ITR 194
, both of
which laid down that when an application for extension of time was moved and
was not decided, it would be deemed to have been allowed. Further reliance was
placed on the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in the case of
K.N. Agarwal vs. CIT 189 ITR 769 and of
the Bombay High Court in the case of
Bank
of Baroda vs. H.C. Shrivastava 256 ITR 385
for the
proposition that the discipline of
quasi-judicial functioning
demanded that the decision of the Tribunal or the High Court must be followed
by all Departmental authorities because not following the same could lead to a
chaotic situation.

 

The
Society further argued that the absence of any order of the Commissioner should
be taken to mean that he has not found any reason for refusing registration,
notice of which could have been given to the Society by way of an opportunity
of hearing. It was also argued that latches and lapses on the part of the
Department could not be to its own advantage by treating the application for
registration as rejected.

 

On behalf
of the Revenue reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of
Chet Ram Vashisht vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1981 SC 653.
In that case, the Supreme Court, while examining the effect of the failure on
the part of the Delhi Municipal Corporation to decide an application u/s 313(3)
of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 for sanctioning a layout plan
within the specified period, had held that non-consideration of the application
would not amount to a deemed sanction.

 

The
Allahabad High Court, in the context of the
Chet
Ram
decision (Supra),
observed that the Supreme Court decision dealt with a different statute. It
further noted that one of the important aspects pointed out by the Supreme
Court for taking the view was the purpose of the provision requiring sanction
to layout plans. There was an element of public interest involved, namely, to
prevent unplanned and haphazard development of construction to the detriment of
the public. Besides, sanction or deemed sanction to a layout plan would entail
constructions being carried out, thereby creating an irreversible situation.
According to the Allahabad High Court, in the case before it there was no such
public element or public interest. Taking a view that non-consideration of the
registration application within the stipulated time would result in a deemed
registration might, at the worst, cause loss of some revenue or income tax
payable by that particular assessee, similar to a situation where an assessment
or reassessment was not completed within the prescribed limitation and the
inaction of the authorities resulted in deemed acceptance of the returned
income.

 

On the
other hand, according to the Allahabad High Court, taking the contrary view and
holding that not taking a decision within the time fixed by the law was of no
consequence, would leave the assessee totally at the mercy of the income tax
authorities, inasmuch as the assessee had not been provided any remedy under
the Act against such non-decision. Besides, according to the Court, their view
did not create any irreversible situation because the Commissioner had the
power to cancel registration u/s 12AA(3) if he was satisfied that the objects
of such trust were not genuine or the activities were not being carried out in
accordance with its objects. The only adverse consequence likely to flow from
the Court’s view would be that the cancellation would operate only
prospectively, resulting in some loss of revenue from the date of expiry of the
limitation u/s 12AA(3) till the date of cancellation of the registration. In
the view of the Allahabad High Court, the purposive construction adopted by the
Court furthered the object and purpose of the statutory provisions.

 

By far the
better interpretation according to the Court was to hold that the effect of
non-consideration of the registration application within the stipulated time
was a deemed grant of registration. It accordingly held that the institution
was a registered one and was eligible for the benefit of exemption u/s 11.

 

The
Income-tax Department challenged the decision of the Allahabad High Court
before the Supreme Court and in a decision reported as
CIT vs. Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sports
& Conservation of Environment, 382 ITR 6
, the
Supreme Court, confirming the deemed registration,
inter
alia
addressed the apprehension raised on behalf of the Revenue by
holding that the deemed registration would, however, operate only after six
months from the date of the application, stating that this was the only logical
sense in which the judgment could be understood. In other words, the deemed
registration would not operate from the date of application or before the date
of application, but would operate on and from the date of expiry of six months
from the date of application. The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal by
noting that all other questions of law were kept open. It is not possible to
gather what those other questions of law were before the Court in the appeal as
the order did not record such questions. It is best to believe that the
observations of the Court were for the limited purpose of restricting the
decision to the issue expressly decided by it, which was to confirm the deemed
registration as was held by the Allahabad High Court and,
inter alia, clarify that what the Allahabad
High Court meant was that the registration was to be effective from the date of
expiry of six months from the date of application.

 

The above ratio of the Allahabad High Court’s
decision in the case of the
Society for the
Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport & Conservation of Environment vs.
CIT 372 ITR 222
was doubted by another Division
Bench in the case of
CIT vs. Muzafar Nagar
Development Authority
and the Bench referred the case
before it to a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in
CIT vs. Muzafar Nagar Development Authority 372 ITR 209.
The doubts expressed by the Division Bench were as follows:

 

1.  There was nothing in section 12AA(2) which
provided for a deemed grant of registration if the application was not decided
within six months;

2.  In the absence of a statutory provision
stipulating that the consequence of non-consideration would be a deemed grant
of permission, the Court could not hold that the application would be deemed to
be granted after the expiry of the period; and

3. The Legislature had not contemplated that the
authority would not be entitled to pass an order beyond the period of six
months.

4. The decision of the Court in the case of the Society for the Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport &
Conservation of Environment (Supra)
did not
lay down a good law.

 

On behalf
of the assessee, it was argued before the Full Bench of the Allahabad High
Court that the intention of the Legislature was that the decision of the
Commissioner within the period of six months was mandatory and must be strictly
observed. The Legislature had used both expressions ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in
section 12AA(1), which was indicative of the fact that the expression ‘shall’
was regarded as mandatory wherever it had been used. Therefore, the period
prescribed in section 12AA(2) must be regarded as mandatory. If it was not
treated as mandatory, the assessee would be subjected to great prejudice by an
inordinate delay on the part of the Commissioner in disposing of his
application and the period, which had been prescribed otherwise, would be
rendered redundant.

 

It was
submitted on behalf of the Revenue that the period of six months was clearly
directory and the Legislature had not provided any consequence, such as a
deeming fiction that the application would be treated as being granted if it
was not disposed of within six months. Even if this was regarded as a
casus omissis,
it was a well-settled principle of law that the Court had no jurisdiction to supplant
it and it must adopt a plain and literal meaning of the statute.

 

The Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court examined the provisions of sections 12A and
12AA. It noted that the Legislature had not imposed a stipulation to the effect
that after the expiry of the period of six months the Commissioner would be
rendered
functus officio or that he would be disabled
from exercising his powers. It had also not made any provision to the effect
that the application for registration should be deemed to have been granted if
it was not disposed of within a period of six months with an order either
allowing registration or refusing to grant it. According to the Full Bench,
providing that the application should be disposed of within a period of six
months was distinct from stipulating the consequence of a failure to do so.

 

The Court
observed that laying down the consequence that the application would be deemed
to be granted upon the expiry of six months could only be by way of reading a
legislative fiction or a deeming definition into the law which the Court, in
its interpretive capacity, could not create. That would amount to rewriting the
law and introduction of a provision which, advisedly, the Legislature had not
adopted. The Full Bench also held that a legislative provision could not be
rewritten by referring to the notes on clauses which, at the highest, would
constitute background material to amplify the meaning and purport of a
legislative provision.

 

The Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court placed reliance on two decisions of the
Madras High Court in the cases of
CIT
vs. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust 354 ITR 478

and
CIT vs. Karimangalam Omriya Pangal Semipur Amaipur Ltd. 354 ITR
483
where it had held that failure to pass an order on an application
u/s 12AA within the stipulated period of six months would not automatically
result in granting registration to the trust.

 

According
to the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, the assessee was not without a
remedy on expiry of the period of six months, as this could be remedied by
recourse to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore,
the Court held that the judgment of the Division Bench in
Society for the Promotion of Education (Supra)
did not lay down the correct position of law and that non-disposal of an
application for registration within the period of six months would not result
in a deemed grant of registration.

 

THE TBI EDUCATION TRUST CASE

The issue
came up again before the Kerala High Court in the case of
CIT vs. TBI Education Trust 257 Taxman 355.

 

In this
case the assessee trust was constituted on 27th May, 2002 and filed
an application for registration u/s 12A on 10th October, 2006. The
Commissioner called for a report from the Income-tax Officer (ITO) on 12th
January, 2007 and this report was submitted only on 24th July, 2007.
Vide this report, the ITO recommended
registration u/s 12AA(2). However, the Joint Commissioner of Income-tax sent an
adverse report dated 31st July, 2007 to the Commissioner. There were
some adjournments later, and finally the Commissioner passed an order dated 29th
November, 2007 rejecting the application for registration.

 

The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal, relying on the decision of the Special
Bench of the Tribunal in the case of
Bhagwad
Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust vs. CIT
111 ITD 175 (Del.)(SB)
, holding that since the
application was not disposed of within the period of six months, registration
would be deemed to have been granted.

 

In the appeal filed by the Commissioner against the Tribunal order
before the Kerala High Court, on behalf of the Revenue, attention of the Court
was drawn to the detailed consideration by the Commissioner of the assessee not
being a charitable trust, especially with reference to the clause in the trust
deed which enabled collection of free deposits, contributions, etc., from
students and their parents. It was argued that there was a specific finding
that though the trust was essentially for setting up of an educational institution,
there was no charity involved. There was also considerable delay in filing the
application for registration by the assessee, and sufficient reasons were not
stated for condoning such delay.

 

It was
further argued that though a period of six months was provided under the
statute, there was no deeming provision as such and under such circumstances
there could not be a deemed registration u/s 12AA. Reliance was also placed by
the Revenue on the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
the
Muzafar Nagar Development Authority case (Supra), for the proposition that there
could be no deemed registration. It was argued that there was no declaration of
law in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Society for the Promotion of Education (Supra),
as it was only a concession made by the counsel appearing for the Department.
It was urged that the High Court should be concerned with the interpretation of
the provision to advance the course of law and not a concession by a counsel before
the Supreme Court in a solitary instance.

 

On behalf
of the assessee, it was submitted that the same Commissioner who had filed the
appeal before the Court had given effect to the order of the Tribunal, and
therefore the appeal was infructuous. Reliance was also placed on the decision
of the special bench of the Tribunal in the case of
Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth
Dham Trust (Supra)
which held the limitation to be
a mandatory provision, failure to comply with which would result in deemed
registration. Attention of the Court was drawn to the CBDT Instruction No.
16/2015 (F No 197/38/2015-ITA-1) dated 6th November, 2015 which
mandated that the application should be considered and either allowed or
rejected within the period of six months as provided under the section.
Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Society for the Promotion of Education (Supra).

 

The Kerala
High Court initially observed that the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad
High Court had a persuasive power and they were inclined to follow the
decision, holding that without a specific deeming provision there could be no
grant of deemed registration u/s 12AA. According to the Kerala High Court,
there could be no fiction created by mere inference in the absence of a specific
exclusion deeming something to be other than what it actually was. The Kerala
High Court therefore observed that the fact assumed significance as to the view
of the Department insofar as the mandatory provision of consideration of
application and an order being issued within a period of six months.

 

Further,
the Kerala High Court noticed that there was unreasonable delay in complying
with the mandatory provision u/s 12AA(2). It also took note of the CBDT
Instruction Number 16/2015 (F No 197/38/2015-ITA-1) dated 6th
November, 2015 where the CBDT had noted that the time limit of six months was
not being observed in some cases by the Commissioner. Instructions were
therefore issued that the time limit of six months was to be strictly followed
by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions) while passing orders u/s 12AA
and the Chief Commissioner (Exemptions) was instructed to monitor adherence to
the prescribed time limit and initiate suitable administrative action in case
any laxity in such adherence was noticed.

 

The Kerala
High Court observed that the CBDT had thought it fit, obviously from experience
of dealing with delayed applications, that the mandatory provision had to be
complied with in letter and spirit. These directions were binding on the officers
of the Department and were a reiteration of the statutorily prescribed mandate.
According to the Kerala High Court, the CBDT instruction gave a clear picture
of how the CBDT expected the officers to treat the mandatory provision as being
scrupulously relevant and significant.

 

The Kerala
High Court then considered the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Society for the Promotion of Education (Supra).
It stated that it was not convinced with the contention of the Revenue that
there was any concession made by the Additional Solicitor-General who appeared
in the matter for the Income-tax Department. It noted that the appeal before
the Supreme Court arose from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. When the
matter was considered by the Supreme Court, the Full Bench decision of the
Allahabad High Court had already been passed and the said decision had not been
placed before the Supreme Court. According to the Kerala High Court, rather
than a concession, the Additional Solicitor-General specifically informed the
Supreme Court that the only apprehension of the Department was regarding the
date on which the deemed registration would be effected; whether it was on the
date of application or on the expiry of six months.

 

The Civil
Appeal before the Supreme Court was disposed of expressing the apprehension to
be unfounded, but all the same, clarifying that the registration of the
application u/s 12AA would only take effect from the date of expiry of six
months from the date of application. Considering the effect of disposal of a
Civil Appeal as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of
Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala 245 ITR 360,
the Kerala High Court was of the view that the judgment of the High Court
merged in the judgment of the Supreme Court, since the Supreme Court approved
the judgment of the Allahabad High Court allowing deemed registration u/s 12AA,
though applicable only from the date of expiry of the six-month period as
mandated in section 12AA(2). According to the Kerala High Court, since the
verdict delivered by the Allahabad High Court regarding deemed registration u/s
12AA for reason of non-consideration of the application within a period of six
months from the date of filing was not differed from by the Supreme Court in
the Civil Appeal, the declaration by the High Court assumed the authority of a
precedent by the Supreme Court on the principles of the doctrine of merger.

 

Therefore,
the Kerala High Court rejected the appeal of the Department, following the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Society
for the Promotion of Education (Supra)
holding
that the failure of the Commissioner to deal with the application within the
prescribed time led to the deemed registration.

 

A similar
view was also taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of
CIT vs. Sahitya Sadawart Samiti Jaipur 396 ITR 46.

 

ADDOR FOUNDATION CASE

The issue
again came up before the Gujarat High Court in the case of
CIT vs. Addor Foundation 425 ITR 516.

 

In this
case, the assessee trust made an online application for registration u/s 12AA
on 23rd January, 2017. The Commissioner called for details of the
various activities actually carried out by the trust
vide his letter dated 5th February,
2018. After considering the details submitted by the trust, the Commissioner rejected
the application for registration.

 

In the
appeal, the Tribunal noted the fact that while passing the order rejecting the
registration application, the Commissioner wrongly mentioned the date of
receipt of the application for registration as 23rd January, 2018,
instead of 23rd January, 2017. Placing reliance on the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of
Society
for the Promotion of Education (Supra)
, the
Tribunal held the registration as deemed to have been granted and allowed the
appeal of the assessee.

 

On behalf
of the Revenue it was submitted before the Gujarat High Court that the
dictum of law as laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of
Society for the
Promotion of Education (Supra)
was of no avail to the
assessee in the facts and circumstances of the case before the Gujarat High
Court. Though the issues were quite similar, the Supreme Court had decided the
issue in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue only on the basis of the
statement made by the Additional Solicitor-General, keeping all the questions
of law open. It was submitted that on a plain reading of the section it could
not be said that merely by the Commissioner not deciding the application within
the stipulated period of six months, deemed registration was to be granted.

 

On behalf
of the assessee, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Kerala High Court
in the case of
TBI Education Trust (Supra)
and of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of
Sahitya
Sadawart Samiti Jaipur (Supra)
. It was argued that
although the Legislature had thought fit not to incorporate the word ‘deemed’
in section 12AA(2), yet, having regard to the language and the intention, it
could be said that a legal fiction had been created.

 

The Gujarat
High Court observed that the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in the case of
Society for the Promotion of
Education (Supra)
was of no avail as the
correctness of that decision had been questioned before the Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in the case of
Muzafar
Nagar Development Authority (Supra)
to hold
that there was no automatic deemed registration on failure of the Commissioner
to deal with the application within the stipulated six months. The Gujarat High
Court was not inclined to accept the line of reasoning which had found favour
with the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of
Society for the Promotion of Education (Supra).

 

The
Gujarat High Court reproduced with approval extracts from the Full Bench
decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of
Muzafar Nagar Development Authority (Supra).
The Court analysed various decisions of the Supreme Court, which had examined
the issue whether a legal fiction had been created by use of the word ‘deemed’,
and observed that the principle discernible was that it was the bounden duty of
the Court to ascertain for what purpose the legal fiction had been created. It
was also the duty of the Court to imagine the fiction with all real
consequences and instances unless prohibited from doing so.

 

The
Gujarat High Court did not agree with the views expressed by the Kerala High
Court in the case of
TBI Education Trust (Supra),
stating that the Supreme Court decision in the case of
Society for the Promotion of Education (Supra)
did not lay down any principle of law and, on the contrary, kept the questions
of law open to be considered. The Gujarat High Court therefore expressed its
complete agreement with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High
Court in the
Muzafar Nagar Development Authority
case and held that deemed registration could not be granted on the ground that
the application filed for registration u/s 12AA was not decided within a period
of six months from the date of filing.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The issue
of deemed registration u/s 12AA in the event of failure to dispose of the
application within the specified time limit of six months has continued to
remain a highly debatable issue, even after the matter had reached the Supreme
Court. The additional and avoidable debate on the issue could have been avoided
had the attention of the Supreme Court been drawn by the Revenue to the fact
that the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a later decision had
disapproved of the Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which
was being considered in appeal by the Supreme Court. It could have also been
avoided had the Apex Court not stated in the order that the other issues were
kept open, where perhaps there were none that were involved in the appeal.

 

The issue
which arises now is whether the issue has been concluded by the Supreme Court
or whether it has been left open! While the Kerala High Court has taken the
view that the issue has been concluded, the Gujarat High Court is of the view
that the issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court.

 

If one
examines the decision of the Supreme Court, it clearly states that the short
issue was with regard to the deemed registration of an application u/s 12AA and
that the High Court had taken the view that once an application was made under
the said provision and in case the same was not responded to within six months,
it would be taken that the application was registered under the provision. This
was the only issue before the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Supreme Court
clarified the apprehension raised by the Additional Solicitor-General, which
was addressed by the Supreme Court by holding that the deemed registration
would take effect from the expiry of the six-month period. Then, the Supreme
Court stated that subject to the clarification and leaving all other questions
of law open, the appeal was disposed of.

 

From this
it is evident that the appeal has been disposed of and not returned unanswered
or sent back to the lower court or appellate authorities. The appeal was on
only one ground – whether registration would be deemed to have taken place when
there was no disposal of the application within six months. The very fact that
the Supreme Court held that deemed registration would take effect on the expiry
of the six-month period clearly showed that it approved the concept of deemed
registration under such circumstances. Had the Supreme Court not approved the
concept of deemed registration, there was no question of clarifying that deemed
registration would take effect on the expiry of the six-month period.
Therefore, in our view, the Supreme Court approved of the decision of the
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.

 

The Kerala
High Court rightly appreciated this aspect of disposal of a Civil Appeal, which
implies approval of the judgment against which the appeal was preferred. In
Kunhayammed vs. State of Kerala 245 ITR 360,
the Supreme Court considered the effect of disposal of a Civil Appeal as under:

 

‘If
leave to appeal is granted, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court stands
invoked; the gate for entry in appellate arena is opened. The petitioner is in
and the respondent may also be called upon to face him, though in an
appropriate case, in spite of having granted leave to appeal, the Court may
dismiss the appeal without noticing the respondent.

……..

The
doctrine of merger and the right of review are concepts which are closely
inter-linked. If the judgment of the High Court has come up to the Supreme
Court by way of a special leave, and special leave is granted and the appeal is
disposed of with or without reasons, by affirmance or otherwise, the judgment
of the High Court merges with that of the Supreme Court. In that event, it is
not permissible to move the High Court for review because the judgment of the
High Court has merged with the judgment of the Supreme Court.

……………………

Once a
special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court have been let open. The order
impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order
passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the
applicability of the doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether
the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the
order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a
speaking or non-speaking one. Whenever the Supreme Court has felt inclined to
apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it, though it may
be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with the Supreme Court to grant
leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the
petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal
and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the
orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected
to judicial scrutiny of the Supreme Court.

……..

Once
leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court has been invoked, the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine
of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation’.

 

In case
one accepts that the Supreme Court in the case of
Society for the Promotion of Education (Supra)
had comprehensively decided the main issue of deemed registration, then in that
case no debate survives on that issue at least. It is only where one holds that
the Court had left the issue open and had delivered the decision on the basis
of a concession by the Revenue that an issue arises. In our considered opinion,
the Court had clearly concluded, though it had not expressed it in so many written
words, that the non-decision by the Commissioner within the stipulated time led
to the deemed registration of the society. It seems that this fact of law and
the finding of the Court were rather accepted by the Revenue which had raised
an apprehension for the first time about the effective date of deemed
registration inasmuch as the order of the High Court was silent on the aspect
of the effective date. In meeting this apprehension of the Revenue, the Court
clarified that there was no case for such an apprehension as in the Court’s
view the effective date was the date of expiry of six months, and again in the
Court’s view such a view was in concurrence with the High Court’s view on such
date. The Kerala and Rajasthan High Courts are right in holding that the Court
had concluded the issue of registration in favour of the deemed registration
and had not left the said issue open and were right in interpreting the
decision of the Apex Court in a manner that confirmed the view expressed.

 

There was
no concession by the Revenue in the said case before the Apex Court as made out
by the Revenue. The fact is that an apprehension was independently raised for
the first time by the Revenue about the effective date of registration, which
was dismissed by the Court by holding that there was every reason to hold that
the High Court in the decision had held that the registration was effective
only from the date of expiry of six months from the date of the application and
not before the said date. It is this part which has been expressly recorded in
the judgment. What requires to be appreciated is that the clarification was
sought because once the main issue of deemed registration was settled by the
Court, there could not have been a clarification on an effective date of the deemed
registration had the issue of deemed registration been decided against the
assessee or was undecided and, as claimed, kept open.

 

The issue
in appeal before the Supreme Court was never about the effective date of
registration but was about the registration itself; it could not have been for
the date of registration for the simple reason that the Allahabad High Court
had nowhere in its decision dealt with the issue of the effective date of
registration.

 

In the
case of the
Society for the Promotion of Education
(Supra),
the Supreme Court had therefore modified the
order of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, which order had merged
in the order of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the subsequent order of the Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court would no longer hold good since the Supreme
Court had taken a view contrary to that taken by the Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court. This aspect does not seem to have been appreciated by the
Gujarat High Court.

 

The better
view, therefore, is the view taken by the Kerala and Rajasthan High Courts –
that failure to dispose of an application u/s 12A within the period of six
months results in a deemed registration u/s 12AA.

 

At the
same time note should be taken of the decisions of the Madras High Court in the
cases of
CIT vs. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust 354 ITR 478
and
CIT vs. Karimangalam Omriya Pangal Semipur Amaipur Ltd. 354 ITR
483.
In the said cases the Court held that the non-decision by the
Commissioner within the prescribed time did not result in deemed registration
of the institution. These decisions should be held to be no longer good law in
view of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court.

 

The law is now amended with effect from 1st
April, 2021, with registration now required u/s 12AB. Section 12AB(3) also
requires disposal of the application within a period of three months, six
months or one month, depending upon the type of application, from the end of
the month in which the application is filed. The issue would therefore continue
to be
relevant even under the amended law.

 

Explanation 1 to section 37(1): Deduction made by the buyers from the price, on account of damage / variance in the product quality does not attract Explanation 1 to section 37 (1) and same is an allowable deduction even when the assessee classified it as ‘penalty on account of non-fulfilment of contractual requirements’

5. [2020] 77 ITR
(Trib.) 165 (Del.)(Trib.)
DCIT vs. Mahavir
Multitrade (P) Ltd. ITA No.:
1139/Del/2017
A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 27th
November, 2019

 

Explanation 1 to
section 37(1): Deduction made by the buyers from the price, on account of
damage / variance in the product quality does not attract Explanation 1 to
section 37 (1) and same is an allowable deduction even when the assessee
classified it as ‘penalty on account of non-fulfilment of contractual
requirements’

 

FACTS

The assessee was
engaged in trading of imported coal. It sold coal as per the specifications and
requirements of the buyer and in the event of failure to comply with the
requirements, the buyer used to make deduction while releasing the payment on
account of variation in quantity and quality; the amount of deduction for A.Y.
2012-13 was Rs. 3,66,68,504 which was claimed as a deduction while computing
the business income. During the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee
categorised such deduction as penalty levied for not complying with the terms
of the contract. But the A.O. made an addition on the ground that such penalty
cannot be regarded as a deductible expenditure as per the Explanation to
section 37(1). It was explained to the A.O. that the nature of the product was
such that there was high possibility of degradation or variance and the
deduction made by the buyers represented compensatory levy for not meeting the
specifications / agreed parameters of coal.

 

On an appeal before
the CIT(A), considering various judicial precedents it was held that
exigibility of an item to tax or tax deduction cannot be based merely on the
label (nomenclature) given to it by the assessee. It was held that deduction by
buyers represented the expenditure for the damages caused, which is
compensatory payment made by the assessee and it entitled him to claim the
deduction from the income. It could not be equated with infraction of law as
provided in the Explanation to section 37(1). Accordingly, the additions made
by the A.O. were directed to be deleted.

 

Thereafter, the
Department filed an appeal before the ITAT against the order of the CIT(A).

 

HELD

1.  It was accepted by the A.O. that the assessee
received less payment from the buyers because of the variance in the quality of
coal. The allegation of the A.O. only revealed that there was failure on the
part of the assessee to meet the contractual obligation but it was nowhere
specified as to which provision of law was violated so as to invite the penal
consequences.

 

2. The A.O. had failed to consider the explanation
given by the assessee wherein it was clearly stated that the contract with the
buyers stipulated the consequence of price reduction / adjustment when there
was variation in the quality or quantity of the coal.

 

3. The inability to meet the contractual
obligation by the assessee could not be termed as an offence or infraction of
law so as to deny the claim of the assessee by invoking Explanation 1 to
section 37(1) and exigibility of an item to tax or tax deduction cannot be made
merely on the label given to it by the parties. The penalty was levied on the
assessee for not complying with the terms of the contract, which is a civil
consequence for not complying with certain terms of the contract, and has
nothing to do with any offence.

 

4. The CIT(A) had rightly relied upon the
decisions in Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [1993] 201 ITR 684
(SC), Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT [1980] 125 ITR 33 (All.),
Continental Constructions Ltd. vs. CIT [1992] 195 ITR 81 (SC)
and also
the decisions of the Kerala and the Andhra Pradesh High Courts in CIT vs.
Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. [2004] 265 ITR 177 (Ker.)
and CIT vs.
Bharat Television (P) Ltd. [1996] 218 ITR 173 (AP).

 

Accordingly, the
order of the CIT(A) was upheld.

PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION

BACKGROUND

Privacy as a
fundamental right is recognised by all the democratic countries. This right
stems from recognition of a need to uphold individual dignity in a free world. Right to privacy flows from right to life and personal liberty given to every
citizen by our Constitution. The first law in the world about privacy data
protection was enacted in Sweden in 1973. Subsequently, the European nations
adopted Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) in 1995 about protection of
processing of personal data which later became known as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in April,
2016 and has become enforceable on 25th May, 2018. Similarly, in the
US, the federal law of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPPA) was passed in 1996 which mandated strict protection of personally
identifiable information processed by the healthcare and healthcare insurance
industry. A similar law in Canada called Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (PIPEDA) was made effective from April, 2020.

 

India has awakened
to the fact that in view of the fast-paced growth in every field, be it
technology, trade, medical science or sport, the interaction with the world has
impacted our eco-systems and the way we do business and adopt technology. Since
technology will form part of everything we do, we will need to formally protect
the personal information of citizens from abuse and manipulation. A new law
through the Personal Data Protection Bill of 2019 is likely to be enacted soon.

 

In the wake of the
recognition of the need to protect personal data by law, business enterprises
in many Western and Far Eastern countries are looking for solutions to
implement the regulations and save on huge penalties that are levied for
non-compliance.

 

This has opened
up new avenues of opportunity for the professionals in India to expand into
providing valuable solutions to these enterprises.

 

An attempt has
been made here to provide broad guidelines and a roadmap to implement the
regulations on personal data protection which will help our professionals and
IT service industries to provide value-added service to their customers.

 

WHAT DATA
IS SUBJECT TO PROTECTION?

It is important to
understand what is ‘data’ and what are the activities that are subjected to
protection. With little variations, most of the prevailing laws define
‘Personal Data’ as ‘data about or relating to a natural person who is
directly or indirectly identifiable, having regard to any characteristic,
trait, attribute or any other feature of the identity of such natural person,
whether online or offline, or any combination of such features with any other
information, and shall include any inference drawn from such data for the
purpose of profiling.’

 

Thus, all the
information like birth date, name, address, contact number, email address,
personal image, ID card No., payment card Nos., health details, financial
information, political and religious affiliation, biometric data and data about
the individual on the basis of which inference can be drawn is also subject of
the regulations, e.g., membership of clubs, religious, political or social
groups.

 

After considering
the scope of the privacy regulations in developed countries, it is found that
in general the scope of the activities and entities to which the privacy
regulations apply is as follows:

 

(a) the processing of personal data where such data
has been collected, disclosed, shared or otherwise processed within the
jurisdiction,

 

(b) the processing of personal data by any
enterprise, company, body of persons operating within the jurisdiction,

 

(c) to entities outside the territory of the
regulations but processing personal data of the citizens residing in the
jurisdiction; e.g., GDPR applies to the enterprises outside the European Union
but processing and collecting data of the citizens of the European Union.

 

DRIVERS
FOR IMPLEMENTING DATA PRIVACY REGULATIONS

(A)  Legal obligation:
Business enterprises take the initiative to implement the regulations about
protection of personal data primarily as a legal compliance requirement.
However, few organisations have taken proactive decisions as a good governance
practice.

 

(B)  Risk arising out of Data breach: Damage to reputation and uncalled publicity due to incidents like
data breach is a single good reason for management to take up data protection with
priority. One can refer to the incidents of data theft at the Marriott group,
the Target group, the SBI Card data breach which left
these companies struggling to answer the media and regulators.

 

(C)  Governance: It is
now widely accepted in the capital market that the companies which have good
practices in governance and have implemented data security framework, are
valued more than the enterprises which do not have such practices. The
companies with good governance practices will be less likely to be victim of
data breaches.

 

(D)  Punishment:
Punitive provisions of the law are a great driver for a majority of the
enterprises. In case of Personal Data Protection provisions, the penalty for
violations of the provisions could result in penalty up to Rs. 5 crores or 2%
of global turnover, whichever is higher. In case of more grave violations like
transfer of personal data outside India or children’s data in violation, may
attract penalty of Rs. 15 crores or 4% of global turnover, whichever may be
higher. This is in tune with European regulations (GDPR) where the penalty is
Euro 20 million or 4% of the global turnover of the enterprise.

 

(E) Customer: Another
important driver for adoption of early implementation of personal data
protection by the enterprise is the customer. Where the customer obliges (or
insists on) the vendor enterprise that there should be policies and procedures
about personal data protection, the enterprise in a move to win over the
customer resorts to quick compliance.

 

It becomes
imperative, therefore, and has become an important agenda for boards to take up
implementation of personal data protection as a strategy. Chartered Accountants
with IT security skills are often roped into audit committee discussions for
ways to comply with and implement the personal data protection policies. If one
has adequate knowledge and plans for implementation one may add great value to
the governance and provide leadership in data protection.

    

IMPLEMENTATION
ROAD MAP

1.  Board level initiative

A move to implement
PDP (personal data protection) should flow from the governing body. It is seen
that PDP is more effectively implemented where the board drives the
implementation and monitors its progress.

 

2.  Set up framework for the PDP

Framework for PDP
would include:

(a) Identification of Personal Data

Personal data
qualifying for protection as per the regulations may be part of databases
e-residing on owned database or data may be uploaded in cloud environment which
may be outside the territory of India but subject to control from India. The
Procedure needs to be defined as to how to obtain inventory of database
instances and identify personal data qualifying within the definition of
personal data.

 

(b) Governance policies and procedures

For effective
implementation of compliance, policies and SOPs for acquiring, identifying,
classifying and storing for processing need to be defined and documented.
Policies for personal data protection should be based on the following
principles:

(i)  Objective of adopting organisational, business
practices, processes and technical system to anticipate, identify and prevent
harm to the privacy data principal. ‘Data principal’ means an individual whose
data is processed by the data fiduciary;

(ii)  Policy to include the declaration that
processing of personal data shall adopt the commercially accepted, or
certified, standards;

(iii) Processing of data should be in transparent
manner and capable of easy identification;

(iv) Protection shall be offered throughout the data
life cycle, from collection, processing, storage, to deletion or disposal;

(v) Policy should demonstrate that the manner of
collecting, processing and disposing personal data shall be transparent, fair
and lawful.

 

(c) Data fiduciary and Data protection officer

Data fiduciary
means any person, including the State, a company, any

– juristic entity
or any individual who alone or in conjunction with others determines the

– purpose and means
of processing of personal data who is also known as Data Controller.

 

Thus, an entity
like a company, firm, association, or proprietary firm which acquires the data
and is responsible for protecting it is termed as data fiduciary.

 

A Data protection
officer needs to be appointed and be responsible for

* providing
information and advice to the data fiduciary on matters relating to fulfilling
obligations under the regulations;

* monitoring
personal data processing activities of the data fiduciary to ensure that such
processing does not violate the provisions of the regulations;

* providing advice
to the data fiduciary on carrying out the data protection impact assessments,
and carry out its review;

* providing advice
to the data fiduciary on carrying out the data protection activities;

* act as the point
of contact for the data principal for the purpose of grievance redressal.

    

(d) Set up mechanism for data breach or incident
response management

A procedure needs
to be documented for reporting responsibility, escalation of data breach and
prompt reporting of incident of data breach should be defined. This would also
include notifying the authority within reasonable time about data breach.

 

(e) Maintenance of records

The backbone of the
framework for privacy data protection is maintenance and organisation of
records or electronic data sets. As most of the information is collected,
stored and processed through IT systems, it is inevitable that how the data is
organised and retrievable is of great importance. The primary object of the
management should be that the format and manner in which data records are
maintained would demonstrate beyond doubt that due diligence is exercised by it
in protecting the personal data in case of litigation.

 

(f)  Monitoring

The framework for
the implementation would be incomplete without providing for supervising the
efforts taken for the personal data management. From the beginning an
independent authority be established in the form of internal audit or
supervisory in nature to see that the processes and compliances are well
integrated and the exceptions are reported and corrected in time

 

Personal Data
Protection implementation plan can be graphically represented in the following Fig.
1
which shows the key components. These can be viewed and considered from
top to bottom order.

 

 

 

 

 

Fig. 1, Personal Data Protection Implementation Plan

 

 

3. Identification of processes and Data sets

As a first step to
comply with the provisions of privacy law it is important to identify the
processes through which this personal data comes into the possession of the
company. There are business processes and supporting IT processes which need to
be identified and documented. For example, to generate customer inquiry about a
product or service you may have an application (API) where the customer enters
his / her name, email-id, or in case of on-boarding of new employee the
organisation may have a process to obtain personal details like address,
qualification, health details, etc. Such processes then become the focus for
identification and need to be documented. A register can be prepared containing
process identifier, purpose, input data, output data, geographical
jurisdiction, responsibility, third party interface and so on.

 

Similarly,
supporting IT processes to the above business processes need to be documented
containing relevant information like database, data sets (tables), input and
output interfaces. A register for data collected from these processes should be
maintained which would serve as the basis for demonstration of privacy law
compliance. The data register can be maintained as spreadsheet or database
containing details like source, type of information (personal attributes),
purpose, owner of the data, storage destination, jurisdiction, type of storage,
retention period, consent obtained and data whether exported to other
applications,

 

4.  Communication with Data Principal

The person who owns
his / her personal information is called as Data Principal who has prime right
to share his / her privacy data. Hence, communication with the data principal
is of great importance. The communication procedure also recommends a
structured approach and should have the following features:

 

NOTICE

Notice to the data
principal contains the company’s privacy policy and procedure description and
should be communicated at or before the time the personal information is
collected or immediately on collection, or if the personal information is sought
to be used for a new purpose (other than the purpose for which it was
originally collected). The language of the notice should be unambiguous and
conspicuous. It should state clearly the purpose of collecting the personal
information and intended use. Notice can be in multiple languages and contain
the identity and contact details of the data fiduciary (company) and contact
details of the data processing officer.

 

CONSENT

Communication with
the data principal should state the choice available with the individual
whether or not to share his / her personal information. The proposed bill makes
it obligatory for the data fiduciary to obtain consent. The provisions state
that ‘Personal data shall not be processed except on the consent given at the
commencement of its processing.’ The language of the consent should have
features like free, informed, specific, clear and capable of being withdrawn.
It should be noted that the provision of the goods or services or the
performance of any contract shall not be made conditional on giving consent to
the processing of personal data not necessary for that purpose. The burden of
proof is on the data fiduciary to prove that consent has been given by the data
principal for processing personal data.

 

EXCEPTIONS

In the following
cases, however, personal data can be processed without consent of data
principal:

    In connection with performance of any
function authorised by law for providing any benefit or service or issuance of
license or permit to the data principal,

    In compliance with an order or judgment by a
court or tribunal in India,

    As a response to medical emergency or threat
to life of data principal or any other person,

    To undertake any measure to provide medical
treatment or health service to any individual during outbreak of disease,
epidemic or threat to public health,

    Any non-sensitive data can be processed if
and when necessary for recruitment or termination of employment of data
principal by data fiduciary,

    In connection with providing any benefit to
employee data principal,

    In connection with reasonable purpose as
prescribed by the regulations. Reasonable purpose would include
whistle-blowing, network or information security, credit scoring, recovery of
debt and operation of search engine.

 

5. Collection

Once the purpose of
collection of personal data is communicated to the data principal, the process
of collection is to be standardised to satisfy two conditions: the collection
should be by lawful and fair means.

 

The information to
be collected should be necessary and which fulfils the purpose of collection.
It should be collected without intimidation, without deceptive means. The rules
of collection by law or by customary method must be complied with. The
management needs to ensure that information gathered from third parties like
intermediaries, e.g., social media site should also follow fairness and lawful
means.

 

6. Data retention and disposal

The international
laws provide that the data collected of personal nature should not be retained
by the data fiduciary beyond the intended purpose of collection. For the
purpose of demonstrating that the company does not retain the personal data
beyond required limit, a ‘Data Retention Policy’ be documented. Employee data
may be retained longer, till in employment, but marketing data of customer
inquiry needs to be retained only up to order fulfilment. Data beyond retention
limit can be retained only if required by any other law or with explicit
consent of the data principal. Responsibility of complying with the retention
policy should be assigned to the data processing officer. Options for disposal
of the data no longer required are anonymisation, i.e. data is cleansed of
personal identification fields, deletion or disposal in a manner that prevents
loss, theft, misuse or unauthorised access.

 

7. Data security

As a part of
personal data protection compliance, the sole accountability of protection of
the data is placed with the data fiduciary. The company should therefore have
data protection as part of its general information security policy. Personal
data needs to be protected after collection, during processing and while in
store. Data security standards prescribe for encryption of the data so that in
case of breach of theft it is very difficult to decipher the vital data stored.
Data security implies that the data should be accessible only to authorised
users. Therefore, strong access control like user authentication and multiple
authentication techniques be implemented. Internal audit can perform reviews and
monitor the controls over data security. Any lapses in the security policy
operations may be reported to the governing body. Many of the data breaches in
recent years have been possible for want of adequate data protection policies
and poor implementation. Data breaches have ruined reputations of big companies
and ended in huge penalties and risk of survival.

 

To give a few
instances in 2020, Roblox gaming company saw its 100 million accounts with
passwords exposed by a hacker who bribed an insider and badly ruined its brand.
Popular Zoom video conference service data of nearly 500,000 users was stolen
and was available for sale on the dark web. British airline Easyjet suffered
from their nine million customer account email addresses, travel details and 2,000
credit card credentials being stolen. Now the victims are subjected to
e-phishing attacks. In 2017, the Equifax (credit reporting and data analytics
company) data breach of 147 million people ended with the company settling for
425 million dollars with the US Fed Trade Commission. In 2019, Capital One, a
reputed bank, got its 106 million records compromised with precious data of
social security numbers, social insurance numbers and financial history of
customers. Similarly, in India SBI credit card data was breached in 2019.

 

8.  Risk Management

It is evident from
the above examples that risk of personal data being exposed is very high and
sensitive for any organisation. The best way to approach this is by resorting
to risk management seriously. Risk management includes three factors: Risk
identification, Risk assessment and Risk treatment. The starting point is that
all the events and threats be listed and discussed with the tech team and
operations. The more exhaustive the identification of events and threats, means
the more robust will be the risk mitigating plan. Equally important is the
assessment, i.e., likely loss from each event. It is no doubt difficult to quantify
the impact of the likely event in monetary terms but the magnitude can be
estimated by assigning values on a 1 to 10 scale. Risk treatment should include
the description of controls considering available resources and technology. The
risk assessment and treatment for mitigating the risks need to be addressed at
the highest level of management. A documented risk treatment plan can be a
guiding tool for internal audit, the executive management and should be updated
from time to time.

 

Many organisations
document this as a one-time exercise (and shelve it or remove it) only to show
to the auditors or regulatory authority. In case of sensitive data, the law
provides for ‘Data Protection Impact Assessment’ to be undertaken. Sensitive
data means such information about data principal which may cause harm if
disclosed. The assessment in such a case should contain a detailed description
of the proposed processing operation, purpose and nature of data to be
processed and so on. It would also indicate how the data fiduciary intends to
protect the sensitive data. This information will then be reviewed by the
statutory authority before giving approval. Sensitive information may include
credit, health related, financial or banking related information.

 

9.  Personal Data Access Management

The primary defence
against attack on personal data is strong access control. Having access
(logical and physical) procedures which have the following controls embedded in
it will go a long way in building a defence framework. Some of the controls
could be authorising limited internal users to limited access; managing the
change of access due to addition or separation of internal users effectively;
restricting access to offline storage; backup data; systems and media;
monitoring access activities of privilege users (system administrators) through
log reviews; restricting system configurations; super-user functionality;
remote access utilities and security devices like firewalls.

 

The most vulnerable
segment in personal data is transmission over email or public networks and
wireless networks. Companies dealing with collection of personal data often
resort to industry standard encryption methods. Importantly, testing of the
above safeguard controls should be carried out periodically and reported.

    

10.   Incident management and breach reporting

As a part of the
personal data management, every legislation provides for immediate response
communication to the authority. The incident-reporting provision states that
information about the breach should be communicated without undue delay. A
similar provision in the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulations) in the
European Union prescribes the time limit as 72 hours. A baseline reporting
mechanism needs to be developed about reporting of a data breach incident from
internal or external source by designing reporting templates. The reporting
mechanism should mainly include information-gathering and investigation
procedure about interaction between parts of the organisation and the data
processor. An important part of the incident management process is notification
to the data principals, i.e., individuals or groups whose data is subjected to
the breach. The notification should be proactive and should provide several
channels of communication like press, media and website notification at large.
The process should include legal advisory involvement, organisational
responsibility about formulating an appropriate message. Formal incident and
crisis management should be brought in in case of significant data breach.

 

The above stages in
strengthening data protection at any business enterprise would go a long way in
cultivating good governance practices. To adopt the best practices of personal
data protection, the International Standard Organization has released ISO 27701
which would help the organisations to provide the required assurance to
customers and authorities.

 

The above roadmap
and stages on this road to data protection compliance are no doubt initially
cumbersome but one should note that these are also steps towards good corporate
governance. The processes once set, if periodically reviewed for gaps and
improved, would certainly demonstrate due diligence and form a good defence in
data breach litigations.

 

References:

1.    The
Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, India

2.    The
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of European
       Parliament, and Directive 95/46/EC
(aka General
       Data Protection Regulations, GDPR)

3.    www.capitalone.com

4.   
PIPEDA (Personal Information Protection and
       Electronic Documents Act), Canada.

WHETHER PRACTISING CAs CAN DEAL IN DERIVATIVES ON STOCK EXCHANGES

Chartered
Accountants who are in practice are not supposed to carry on any business
activity other than accounting professional activity. Reference must be made in
this regard to Part-I of the First Schedule of the Chartered Accountants Act,
1949 which deals with professional misconduct by CAs in practice; clause (11)
of the Act reads as follows:

 

The Chartered
Accountants Act, 1949

‘THE FIRST
SCHEDULE

[See Sections
21(3), 21A(3) and 22]

PART-I:
Professional misconduct in relation to chartered accountants in practice.

A Chartered
Accountant in practice shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct,
if he –

(1) to (10)
……………

(11) engages in
any business or occupation other than the profession of chartered accountants
unless permitted by the Council so to engage;

Provided that nothing contained herein shall disentitle a chartered
accountant from being a director of a company (not being a managing director or
a whole time director) unless he or any of his partners is interested in such
company as an auditor.’

 

Given this
background, an attempt will be made here to understand ‘Whether chartered
accountants in practice can have dealings in Derivatives listed on stock
exchanges.’

 

Let us first look
at section 43(5) of the Income Tax Act; sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the same
read as under:

‘Sec. 43(5) –

(a) to (c)
……………..

(d) an eligible transaction in respect of trading
in derivatives referred to in clause [(ac)] of section 2 of the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956) carried out in a recognized stock
exchange; or

(e) an eligible transaction in respect of trading
in commodity derivatives carried out in a [recognized stock exchange] which is
chargeable to commodities transaction tax under Chapter VII of the Finance Act,
2013 (17 of 2013),

shall not be
deemed to be a speculative transaction.’

 

WHAT ARE
DERIVATIVES?

The term
‘Derivative’ indicates that it has no independent value, i.e., its value is
entirely ‘derived’ from the value of the underlying asset. The underlying asset
can be securities, commodities, bullion, currency, livestock or anything else.
In other words, Derivative means a forward, future, option or any other hybrid
contract of pre-determined fixed duration, linked for the purpose of contract
fulfilment to the value of a specified real or financial asset or to an index
of securities.

 

The definition of
Derivatives is specified u/s 2(ac) of the Securities Contracts
(Regulation) Act, 1956
and reads as under:

‘(ac)
“Derivative” includes –

 (A) a security derived from a debt instrument,
share, loan, whether secured or unsecured, risk instrument or contract for
difference or any other form of security;

 (B) a contract which derives its value from
the prices, or index of prices, of underlying securities.’

 

Whether
income / loss on dealings in Derivatives results in Income from Business

Since the issue of
Derivatives is laid down in section 43(5) of the Income Tax Act which falls
within the provisions of sections 28 to 44 which deal with ‘Income from
Business or Profession’, it seems implied that income / loss from dealing in
Derivatives shall form part of the ‘Income from Business’ and not any Other
Head of Income such as Income from Other Sources.

 

Reference is made to the ‘Guidance Note’ of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India on Tax Audit u/s 44AB of the Income Tax Act (Revised 2014
Edition), which contains a chapter dealing with determining the turnover or
gross receipt in respect of transactions in Derivatives / Future & Option. The
relevant paragraph 5.14 clause (b) of the said ‘Guidance Note’ u/s 44AB reads
as under:

 

‘5.14 –

(a)………….

(b) Derivatives,
futures and options: Such transactions are completed without the delivery of
shares or securities. These are also squared up by payment of differences. The
contract notes are issued for the full value of the asset purchased or sold but
entries in the books of accounts are made only for the differences. The
transactions may be squared up any time on or before the striking date. The
buyer of the option pays the premia. The turnover in such types of transactions
is to be determined as follows:

(i) The total of
favourable and unfavourable differences shall be taken as turnover.

(ii) Premium
received on sale of options is also to be included in turnover.

(iii) In respect
of any reverse trades entered, the difference thereon should also form part of
the turnover.’

 

This also added to
the understanding that income / loss from transactions of Derivatives, Futures
and Options shall likely be treated as Income from Business since the same is
considered in the ‘Guidance Note’ for the purpose of section 44AB which relates
to Income from Business or Profession only and not any other heads of income
under the Act.

 

In view of the
above, the following points emerge for consideration:

1.  Whether the income from the activity of a
chartered accountant in practice in respect of his investment dealing in
Derivatives listed on the stock exchange shall be treated as Income from
Business, in case there are multiple transactions of Derivatives undertaken by
a chartered accountant in a year.

2.  Whether a chartered accountant in practice can
otherwise invest in Derivatives listed on the stock exchange as part of his
investment activity.

3.  Although such income / loss on account of
dealings in Derivatives may be treated as Income from Business for the purpose
of Income Tax, but whether such income / loss can escape being treated as
Income from Business or Profession as per the guidelines of the Institute on
the subject, if any.

4.  Whether a chartered accountant in practice is
under obligation to seek permission of the Council of the Institute before
dealing in Derivatives.

 

To attain clarity
on the issue, the necessary clarification was sought from the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India and the Secretary, Ethical Standards Board of
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, clarified the position as
under:

 

‘In this regard,
please note that the Ethical Standards Board at its 148th Meeting
held on 13.06.2019 was of the view that “Derivative transaction on stock exchange is not any kind of
investment but it’s more likely a business prohibited under Clause (11) of Part
1 of the First Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. Such kind of
practice is not permissible to members in practice.”’

 

In view of this, it
is submitted that the above clarification may be kept in mind by the chartered
accountants in practice in case they undertake transactions in Derivatives and
they should do so with the prior permission of the Council of the Institute so
as to protect them from any possible (charge of) professional misconduct under
the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

 

Practising chartered accountant as ‘Karta’ of Hindu Undivided Family

In case a chartered
accountant in practice undertakes dealings in Derivatives as the karta
of his HUF, such activity shall also not be permissible in view of the above
guidelines of the Ethical Board of  the
Institute.

 

In this regard
reference may be made to Part-1 of the First Schedule – Clause 11 of the Code
of Ethics
, Volume-III (Case Law Referencer) published by the Institute
which reads as under:

 

Practising CA as karta of Hindu Undivided Family

1.1.11(191) – A
member as a karta of his Hindu Undivided Family entered into a
partnership business for a short period with non-chartered accountants for
engaging in business other than the profession of chartered accountants without
prior permission of the Council.

Therefore, he was
found guilty in terms of clauses (4) and (11).

[R.D. Bhatt
vs. K.B. Parikh – Page 191 of Vol. VI (2) of Disciplinary Cases – Decided on 15th,
16th and 17th December, 1988].

 

1.1.11(192) – Where
a chartered accountant was karta of the HUF and was engaged in the
business of a firm without permission of the Council.

He was held guilty
of professional misconduct.

[V. Krishnamoorthy vs. T.T.
Krishnaswami – Page 192 of Vol. VII (2) of Disciplinary Cases – Council’s
decisions
dated 27th to 29th September, 1992].

 

1.1.11(193) – Where
a chartered accountant acted as karta of a Hindu Undivided Family
without taking prior permission of the Council.

It was held that he
was inter alia guilty of professional misconduct.

[B.L. Asawa,
Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank, Delhi vs. P.K. Garg – Page 728 of Vol. IX
– 2A – 21(4) of Disciplinary Cases – Council’s decisions dated 16th
to 18th September, 2003].

 

Clause (4) be read with Authority of the Council as contained in
Clause (11)

These guidelines of
the Ethical Board of the Institute are self-explanatory and may be kept in mind
by chartered accountants in practice who carry on dealings in Derivatives as karta
of and on behalf of their HUF.

 

Applicability to other professionals and Government servants

In case the same
analogy is extended to other professionals, such as doctors in practice or
advocates in practice, these categories of professionals may also need to be
vigilant about it. It may not be out of place to point out that even Government
servants who are not otherwise eligible to carry on any business need to be
cautious about dealings in Derivatives in view of the above clarification by
the Institute.

 

CONCLUSION

This article has
been written with the intention of bringing this issue to the notice of the
fraternity of chartered accountants so that while undertaking any transactions
/ dealings in Derivatives either in their individual capacity or as the karta of their Hindu Undivided Family, they may not be caught
on the wrong foot vis-à-vis the Ethical Rules of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India; they should seek the prior permission of the
Council of the Institute as laid down in Part-1 of the First Schedule of the
Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 before carrying out dealings in Derivatives.

 

The Idea of Dharma and Adharma

 

Dharma is both that which we hold to and that which
holds together our inner and outer activities. In its primary sense it means a
fundamental law of our nature which secretly conditions all our activities, and
in this sense each being, type, species, individual, group has its own dharma.
Secondly, there is the divine nature which has to develop and manifest in us,
and in this sense dharma is the law of the inner workings by which that grows
in our being. Thirdly, there is the law by which we govern our outgoing thought
and action and our relations with each other so as to help best both our own
growth and that of the human race towards the divine ideal.…Dharma is all that
helps us to grow into the divine purity, largeness, light, freedom, power,
strength, joy, love, good, unity, beauty, and against it stands its shadow and
denial, all that resists its growth and has not undergone its law, all that has
not yielded up and does not will to yield up its secret of divine values, but
presents a front of perversion and contradiction, of impurity, narrowness,
bondage, darkness, weakness, vileness, discord and suffering and division, and
the hideous and the crude, all that man has to leave behind in his progress.
This is the adharma, not-dharma, which strives with and seeks to overcome the
dharma, to draw backward and downward, the reactionary force which makes for
evil, ignorance and darkness

   Sri
Aurobindo

(Essays on the Gita, CWSA, Vol. 19, p.172)

 

 

TRANSFER PRICING DATABASES – REQUIREMENT, USAGE AND REVIEW

This article is an attempt to understand
the purpose of transfer pricing software and to review the existing databases
based on certain parameters. But first a basic introduction to transfer pricing
will help us to appreciate the importance of these databases.

 

WHAT IS TRANSFER PRICING?

Transfer pricing (TP) refers to the pricing
of cross-border transactions between two related entities, referred to as
associated enterprises (AEs). When two AEs enter into any cross-border
transaction, the price at which they undertake the transaction is called
transfer price. Due to the special relationship between related companies, the
transfer price may be different from the price that would have been agreed to
between two unrelated companies. Thanks to their control over prices,
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have the flexibility to influence –

 

i)   Tax liabilities of individuals or a group of
persons / entities

ii)  Government tax targets

iii)  Cash flow requirements of the MNE group.

 

Every Government wants to prevent erosion
of its tax base and plug potential tax leakages, and hence there are TP regulations all over the world. In India, section 92 of the IT Act
was substituted by the Finance Act, 2001 with a set of new sections, 92 to 92F,
providing a detailed statutory framework for the determination of arm’s length
price (ALP) and maintenance of documentation.

 

TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION

As per Rule 10D(2) of the Income Tax Rules,
1962, when transactions with related parties cross the threshold of Rs. 1
crore, it is mandatory to keep and maintain information and documents as per
Rule 10D(1). TP Documentation also includes maintenance of proper records and
the process of how the ALP has been determined. The relevant extracts of Rule
10D which require proper documentation of process are reproduced below:

 

Rule

Description of the Rule 10D

10D(1)(h)

A record of the analysis performed to evaluate comparability
of uncontrolled transactions with the relevant international transaction

10D(1)(i)

A description of the methods considered for determining the
arm’s length price in relation to each international transaction or class of
transactions, the method selected as the most appropriate one along with
explanations as to why such method was selected and how such method was
applied in each case

10D(1)(j)

A record of the actual working carried out for determining
the ALP, including details of the comparable data and financial information
used in applying the most appropriate method and adjustments, if any, which
were made to account for the difference between international transactions,
or between the enterprises entering into such transactions

 

As per the rules, the entire analysis /
search process needs to be documented including the procedure being followed
and financial information of comparables. In such a case, the transfer pricing
database helps in the entire analysis and the working of documentation to a
great extent. This depends on which database is used and the features of each
database.

 

WHY A DATABASE IS REQUIRED

A TP database for determination of ALP can
be employed when the following methods are used:

(a)   Cost plus method (CPM)

(b)   Transactional net margin method (TNMM)

(c)   Resale price method (RPM) sometimes to
ascertain the gross margin earned by traders.

 

The above methods require a comparison of
the assessee’s gross / net margin with that of the industry.

 

A question that arises here is, how to
calculate the industry-wide margin. Can the assessee choose to pick companies
having similar transactions or competitors in their industry; ferret out their
financial information from the Ministry of Company Affairs (MCA) site; the BSE
/ NSE website; other private websites and then work out the industry margin?
Tribunals have generally held that the search process should be systematic and
consistent year on year. They have also held that cherry-picking of comparables
is not allowed. This approach will not only enable officers to only cherry-pick
companies having higher profitability but they can also reject the search
process and hence prove that the assessee’s transactions are not at ALP.
However, the ALP determined based on a detailed search process cannot be
rejected without any cogent reasons. Therefore, Transfer Pricing Databases are
used to remove the ambiguity involved and to bring standardisation in the
search process.

 

Apart from comparison margins, there are
some transaction-specific databases also available, such as Royalty Stat, Loan
Connector, OneSource, etc., which are used to benchmark specific transactions
like royalty and loan transactions and where the gross / net margins of
companies are not required.

 

GENERAL
SEARCH PROCEDURES IN A DATABASE

In general, a comparable search begins with
the identification of all companies appearing in the database in a particular
period in the relevant industry. Whenever the potential comparable is believed
to be spread over more than one industry, searches are supplemented by text
searches for business descriptions / products containing appropriate keywords.
Various filters (quantitative) are then applied in the database to arrive at a
set of reasonably comparable companies. Textual descriptions including the
background report and directors’ report identified by the database in the
initial screens are reviewed, along with the website details of certain
relevant companies (qualitative filters), first to eliminate companies that are
misclassified and then to narrow down the search to a reasonable number of the
most potentially comparable companies which can be selected.

 

A list of common filters (quantitative)
applied in the database is as follows:

1. Select companies in the same / similar industry
according to business activity and finished products produced / services
rendered. The first step is like creating a basket of similar companies.

2. Data Availability Filter to select companies
having data availability for the past three years. Companies for which the
latest financials are not available for the last three years are excluded
because their margin will not reflect the current trends.

3. Turnover Filter depending on the turnover of
your company as these companies would not be comparable to assess due to
differences in their scale of operations.

4. Net Worth Filter to select companies having net
worth > 0 because companies having negative net worth have a bankruptcy risk
and therefore margins may not be comparable to a normal company.

5. Select companies having manufacturing / sales
or services / sales ratio > X% depending on the industry in which the
company operates to restrict the list of selected companies with comparable
size and operations.

6. Select companies with related party transactions
< X% as a company having significant related party transactions would itself
be prone to incorrect transfer prices among related parties.

7. Other specific filters can be applied depending
on the facts of each case and the industry in which the company operates.

 

After applying all these filters, finally,
companies are accepted by applying Qualitative Filters. Qualitative Filters
include reviewing short business descriptions / directors’ report / annual
reports / generated from the database to ensure that their primary line of
business activities is matched with the assessee by excluding companies that

(a) were misclassified

(b) performed activities which involved
significantly different functions, assets and risks (FAR Analysis) as compared
to the assessee.

 

Having identified the comparable companies,
it is necessary to analyse the nature of these companies by performing a FAR
Analysis. A FAR Analysis identifies the functions undertaken by each party, the
risks each party assumes and the assets used by each party to the transaction.
It also assists in determining the economic value added by each relevant party.

 

Further, this analysis can help in
identifying specialised and critical business assets and activities that are
fundamental to the business. The CBDT emphasises the importance of the
functional analysis in determining the arm’s length price and identifying
suitable entities for comparison purposes.

 

Once the final companies are selected after
applying Qualitative Filters, the next step is to remove margins of companies
selected from the database / annual reports and compare the same with our
margin.

 

Adjustments, if any, can be made to the
margin of companies depending upon the difference, if any, in the FAR Analysis
of comparable companies. For example, Working Capital Adjustment, Risk
Adjustment, Idle Capacity Adjustment, etc.

 

DIFFERENT
TRANSFER PRICING DATABASES CHOSEN FOR DISCUSSION

We have analysed the three databases
mentioned below from the software available in India for transfer pricing
purposes. We have also identified certain objective parameters based on which
these databases can be evaluated.

 

(I)  Prowess1

  •   Developed by the Centre for Monitoring
    Indian Economy (CMIE) Private Limited.
  •   The service is only available for desktop version
    but the application can be downloaded on any number of desktops.

*    Number of Companies – Over 50,000

*    Unique Data fields – Over 3,500

*    Data Availability – from 1989

  •  Prowess as a software is extensively used
    in research projects and its usage is not restricted to only transfer pricing.
    Since it is not created specifically for transfer pricing, data collation and
    maintenance in the way that is required by Transfer Pricing Reports is a more
    cumbersome process. However, it also has an advantage over other databases
    based on the numbers of companies analysed and the years of experience in the
    statistical field.

 

(II) Ace-TP2

  •   Developed by Accord Fitch Private Limited.
  •    It is a web database-based browser
    application for comparing company financial information of Indian business
    entities. The service is available for both web-based and desktop versions.

*    Number of Companies – Over 38,000

*    Unique Data fields – Over 1,750

*    Data Availability – Past 15 years of
historical data

  •    Ace-TP was the first software which was
    specifically designed for TP and therefore has a very easy User Interface. It
    directly saves stepwise information and speeds up the documentation process.
    However, it is a relatively newer setup compared to the other software.

 

(III) Capitoline TP3

  •     Developed by Capital Markets Publishers
    India Pvt. Ltd.
  •  It is an
    internet web portal related to transfer pricing issues. The service is
    available for both web-based and desktop versions.

*    Number of Companies – Over 35,000

*    Unique Data fields – 1,250

Capitoline TP
Database has entered into an arrangement4 with ICAI wherein CA firms
would be charged a discounted rate.

 

  •    Capitoline TP is an extension of Capitoline
    Software which is extensively used for the stock market. Thanks to its arrangement
    with ICAI, its web version is one of the most used TP software by SME firms.

 

COMMON
FEATURES OF ABOVE DATABASES

#   Categorisation of companies based on industry,
sub-industry, NIC 2008 classification, business activities, products sold, raw
material consumed and various other factors. (Helpful in Search Procedure
Common Filter – Step 1 as mentioned above.)

#   Historical Data of Financials of company for
many years in easy-to-download Excel format. (Helpful in Search Procedure
Common Filter – Step 2 as mentioned above.)

#   Query Triggers and Formula Filters depending
on requirement of turnover, net worth, net profit and other parameters. Various
formulae can be clubbed together to derive more complex parameters. (Helpful
in Search Procedure Common Filter – Steps 3, 4, 5 and 6 as mentioned above.)

#   Data of both listed and unlisted companies.
Plus brief description / profile of companies and their business. (Helpful
in Search Procedure qualitative filters.)

#   Annual Report and financials of various companies
available in database. (Helpful in finding margins of comparable companies.)

#   Automation of filters applied for future use
by saving the process which is defined once.

  •    Database does not cover Proprietorship,
    Partnership and LLP.

 

Data is also compiled from notes of
accounts and aspects such as related party transactions, capacity utilisation,
export and import figures, etc.

 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

1
As per website https://prowessiq.cmie.com/ and brochure shared by the company’s
representatives with the authors

*
Kindly review prices from vendors before taking a decision

2
http://www.acetp.com/

3
https://www.capitaline.com/Demo/tp.aspx and brochure shared by the company’s
representatives with the authors

4
https://www.icai.org/post/16361

* Kindly review
prices from vendors before taking decision


SELECTION
PARAMETER FOR ANY DATABASE

Many professionals use two databases for
getting a higher number of companies in the search process. However, the same
could also create duplication. With the above three options available, the
following major parameters can be kept in mind to select any one TP Database.

    Number of companies available,

    Pricing of the software,

    User interface,

    Training and customer support provided.

 

TP
DATABASE – CAN IT ONLY BE USED FOR TP?

TP Database contains various data points
for various companies for several years. These can also be used for various
other functions such as the following:

  •    Industry Peer and Trend Comparison
    Some clients are interested in comparing their own companies’ financial health
    and growth with their competitors / industry leaders. These databases are a
    very effective tool to do the same.
  •   Due Diligence – If any of the
    companies on which due diligence needs to be conducted is presented in the
    database, it is easy to collate all the information and work upon it in a
    readily available manner. Even if the company is not available, these databases
    are an excellent tool to understand the industry dynamics.
  •    Stock Market – While investing in
    shares of a particular company / sector, a deep-dive analysis of a company /
    industry and its comparative peer set can be done in the database.
  •    Analysis of Business Ratios – Various
    ratios based on specific industry and specific companies can be collated
    instantly from these databases, thereby making them a very effective research
    tool.

 

Authors’ suggestions to database
companies based on our survey:

+ Instead of a yearly subscription, the
database should also be made available for short tenures. This will enable more
users to subscribe to them.

+ High pricing is the general concern of
respondents. They should target an increase in the number of users rather than
frequent increases in prices.

+ Users should be educated about the usage
of the database over and above transfer pricing. This will enable more
subscribers to join.

+ Companies can consider having a tie-up
with professional bodies for increasing awareness amongst users.

 

CONCLUSION

India is one of the fastest-growing
economies. A lot of businesses are being set up abroad by Indian MNC’s and many medium-sized companies are also expanding their footprints
globally. Besides, many foreign companies are setting up businesses in India. This
will lead to further increase in cross-border transactions between AEs.
Transfer Pricing Practice in India is about to step out of its teens. It’s
young, bubbling with energy and still shaping up. A more complex, granular and
widely covered yet affordable database will take this practice from the Metros
to Tier-II cities and can be a good practice area for budding chartered
accountants.

 

This article was an attempt to touch
base on the usage of the various databases available and to evaluate them in the
backdrop of various parameters. The user should assess or evaluate all the
databases before making any subscription decision.

 

 

Disclaimer: None of the authors is associated with / interested in any of the
databases and any relationship with them is purely restricted to the usage /
subscription of database licenses. All the information that is part of this
article has been gathered from the respective websites and brochures shared by
the databases with the authors.

 

 

TAXABILITY OF FORFEITURE OF SECURITY DEPOSIT

As we enter the seventh month living with
the coronavirus in India, with each passing day we come across new issues and
manage to find ways to skip / survive them. The virus has not only affected
one’s physical well-being, it has also had an impact on one’s mental, social
and economic health!

 

Talking of the impact on economic health,
every individual, whether in business or employed, is grappling with liquidity
issues. With the entire payment chain affected, no one in the cycle is left
untouched. Needless to say, the domino effect of salary cuts and layoffs has
only multiplied people’s woes.

 

This article deals with the consequences
under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) arising out of one of the many
issues which most people will come across or are already experiencing. It is
now common to hear about people defaulting on their monthly rental payments.
Apart from this, a lot of people are seeking reduction in rent or are prematurely
terminating their existing agreements in order to obtain the benefit of
competitive market rates. Whatever may be the reason, what could ensue, inter
alia
, is the forfeiture of the security deposit placed by the licensee with
the licensor.

 

An attempt will be made in this article to
explain the nature of security deposits and the taxability on their forfeiture
by the licensor and / or waiver by the licensee.

 

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF SECURITY DEPOSITS

In general terms, a security deposit is

(a) a sum of money

(b) taken from the licensee

(c) to secure performance of contract, and

(d) to protect the licensor from the damage, if
any, caused to the property.

 

In a typical leave and license agreement,
the licensor takes a security deposit from the licensee. This is done to ensure
due performance by the licensee of his obligations under the contract and, more
particularly, as the name suggests, the deposit acts as a security to make sure
about the safe return of the property at the end of the license period. It is
usually refundable by the licensor to the licensee upon termination of the
license period. The amount of security deposit is not fixed and is mutually
agreed upon by the parties involved. The amount of security deposit is held in
trust for the licensee and is repayable to him. Therefore, the security deposit
represents the liability of the licensor / owner of the premises which has to
be repaid to the licensee at the end of the license period, provided no damage
is caused to the property.

 

The Supreme Court in Lakshmainer and
Sons vs. CIT (23 ITR 202) (SC)
held that a security deposit is in the
nature of a loan and observed as follows:

 

‘The fact that one of the conditions is
that it is to be adjusted against a claim arising out of a possible default of
the depositor cannot alter the character of the transaction. Nor can the fact
that the purpose for which the deposit is made is to provide a security for the
due performance of a collateral contract invest the deposit with a different
character. It remains a loan of which the repayment in full is conditioned
by the due fulfilment of the obligations under the collateral contract.’

 

Generally, in
most leave and license agreements security deposit is refundable upon
termination of the agreement. The question being considered is whether
forfeiture / waiver of security deposit constitutes ‘income’ chargeable to tax
or whether it is a capital receipt not chargeable to tax.

 

SECURITY DEPOSIT AND ITS FORFEITURE – WHETHER ‘INCOME’
UNDER THE ACT?

Section 4 of the Act deals with the charge
of income tax. As per this section, income tax shall be charged in respect of
the total income of every person.

 

‘Income’ is defined u/s 2(24). A security
deposit is not specifically covered within any of the specific sub-clauses under
this section. However, since the definition of income is an inclusive
definition, a particular item could still be treated as the income of the
assessee if it partakes the character of income even though it is not expressly
included in the definition of income.
The scope of income is therefore not
restricted to the receipts mentioned in the specific sub-clauses of the
definition, but also includes the receipts which could generally be understood
as income.

 

The term ‘income’ has been judicially
interpreted in the case of Shaw Wallace 6 ITC 178 by the Privy
Council to mean:

 

‘Income… in this Act connotes a
periodical monetary return “coming in” with some sort of regularity, or
expected regularity from definite sources. The source is not necessarily one which
is expected to be continuously productive but must be one whose object is the
production of a definite return, excluding anything in the nature of a mere
windfall.’

 

Further, receipts which are generally
capital in nature are not chargeable to tax unless there is a specific
provision in the Act which requires taxing such an item.

 

There are specific provisions under the Act
to bring certain capital receipts to tax, for example, capital gains u/s 45 and
gifts u/s 56(2); subsidy received from the Central or State Government, though
generally capital in nature, is specifically included in the definition of
income u/s 2(24) and hence chargeable to tax. However, there is no such
specific provision which treats a security deposit or its forfeiture as income in
the hands of the assessee.

 

Security deposit is a liability and cannot,
therefore, be regarded as income.

 

However, a question arises as to whether the
security deposit becomes taxable if the same is no longer required to be repaid
to the licensee and is forfeited for breach of the agreed terms of contract
between the licensor and the licensee, or if the licensee defaults in the
payment of rent to the licensor.

 

Like security deposit, forfeiture of
security deposit is also not specifically covered within the definition of
income. Further, forfeiture of security deposit also cannot be construed as
being a regular activity, nor is it expected to have any regularity and hence
is also out of the scope of income as judicially interpreted by the Privy
Council.

 

Besides, since security deposit itself does
not constitute income and is not chargeable to tax, its forfeiture also cannot
be brought to tax as income.

 

BURDEN OF PROOF

If the Department seeks to tax the same as
income, then the burden lies on it to prove that it falls within the taxing
provisions. The Supreme Court in Parimisetti Seetharamamma vs. CIT [1965]
57 ITR 532 (SC)
has observed as follows:

 

‘By
sections 3 and 4 the Act imposes a general liability to tax upon all income.
But the Act does not provide that whatever is received by a person must be
regarded as income liable to tax. In all cases in which a receipt is sought to
be taxed as income, the burden lies upon the Department to prove that it is
within the taxing provision.
Where however a
receipt is of the nature of income, the burden of proving that it is not
taxable because it falls within an exemption provided by the Act lies upon the
assessee.’

 

A similar view has been taken by the Courts
in the following cases:

i)   Udhavdas vs. CIT
[1965] 66 ITR 462 (SC);

ii)  Dr. K. George Thomas
vs. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 412 (SC);

iii) Amartaara Ltd. vs. CIT
[2003] 262 ITR 598 (Bom.);

iv) CIT vs. Rajkumar Ashok
Pal Singh Ji [1977] 109 ITR 581 (Bom.).

 

Therefore, if the Revenue authorities seek
to tax the security deposit, the onus will be on them to establish that the
same is covered within the taxing provisions and hence chargeable to tax. The
Department may also, inter alia, look into the terms of the agreement
and the conduct between the parties so as to determine the taxability of the
forfeiture of security deposit.

 

The following paragraphs deal with the
taxability or otherwise of forfeiture of security deposit under different
scenarios. For the sake of clarity and ease of understanding, the scenarios are
broadly classified depending upon whether the rental income is offered by the
assessee / licensor under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or
Profession’, or under the head ‘Income from House Property’.

 

 

IF THE ASSESSEE OFFERS RENTAL INCOME UNDER THE HEAD PROFITS
AND GAINS FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

In this case, the licensor would primarily
be regarded as engaged in the business of renting of properties and would,
therefore, be offering the rental income under the head Profits and Gains from
Business or Profession.

 

Termination of agreement and consequent
forfeiture is a rare exception and can never be contemplated as a method of
profit-making by the assessee. Premature termination of a long-term contract
is not, by any means, a feature of business activity.
Upon forfeiture of
security deposit, the amount received by the assessee in the past which
undisputedly was capital in nature at the time of receipt, is now partly not
payable or is waived by the creditor, i.e., the licensee, and the amount
forfeited / waived continues to retain the same character as it held at the
time of receipt.

 

However, the same may not hold true in a
case where the security deposit is adjusted against dues. Where a person
defaults on payment of rent, the dues are adjusted against the security deposit
placed with the licensor. In such cases, the taxability will differ and the
same is dealt with in later paragraphs.

 

If the forfeiture of security deposit is
considered to be a revenue receipt chargeable to tax, the same would have to be
taxed u/s 28 which provides for items chargeable to tax under the head ‘Profits
and Gains of Business or Profession’, or u/s 41 which deals with taxing of
expenditure or trading liability upon its remission or cessation.

 

In CIT vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.
[2018] 404 ITR 1 (SC)
, the Apex Court considered the question whether
waiver of loan and interest thereon is a benefit or a perquisite arising from
the business of the assessee so as to be chargeable to tax under clause (iv) of
section 28. On this issue, the Court remarked that for applicability of section
28(iv), the income which can be taxed shall arise from the business or
profession. It also observed that the benefit which is received has to be in
‘some form other than money’. In the said case, the assessee procured equipment
from a US company. The supplier provided the said equipment on loan bearing
interest which was repayable after a period of ten years. Subsequently, another
US entity acquired the supplier company from whom equipment was purchased and
the loan was waived. In these facts, the Supreme Court held that the assessee
had received an amount due to waiver of loan and therefore the very first
condition of section 28(iv) which requires benefit or perquisite in the shape
of any form other than money, was not satisfied and in no circumstances could
it be said that the amount so received could be taxed u/s 28(iv). The Court therefore categorically laid down that waiver of loan is not income.

 

The ratio laid down by the Court in Mahindra
& Mahindra (Supra)
will also apply to a case of forfeiture of
security deposit since it is similar to that of loan and forfeiture of security
deposit, not being a benefit in any form other than money, section 28(iv)
cannot apply.

 

It is worthwhile to note that in the Mahindra
& Mahindra
case, the loan was taken for acquiring a capital asset
and the waiver was considered to be a capital receipt. Therefore, one may argue
that the ratio laid down in this case will apply only in cases where the
licensor holds the property as a capital asset and not where it is held as
stock-in-trade. However, for the purposes of section 28(iv) what is relevant is
that the benefit must be in some form other than money. Now, whether the
property is held as capital asset or stock-in-trade, the condition of section
28(iv) of benefit being in some form other than money still does not get
satisfied and therefore, even if the property is held as stock-in-trade, the
decision of the Supreme Court in this case (Mahindra & Mahindra)
will still apply and the forfeiture of security deposit will not be chargeable
to tax.

 

In continuation to the question of
taxability of forfeiture of security deposit u/s 28, a question arises as to
whether the same can be brought to tax as a normal business receipt. The
Department may tax forfeiture of security deposit u/s 28(i) rather than u/s
28(iv). For this, reliance may be placed by the Department on the decision of
the Bombay High Court in the case of Solid Containers Ltd. vs. DCIT
[2009] 308 ITR 417 (Bom.)
wherein it has been held that loan taken for
business purposes and subsequently waived is ultimately retained in business by
the assessee and since the same is directly arising out of the business
activity, it is liable to be taxed. With utmost respect, this ruling of the
Bombay High Court may not be correct in light of the following decisions
wherein it has been held that the character of the receipt is determined
initially at the time of receipt and if the receipt is not a trading receipt
initially, then subsequent events cannot turn it into a trading receipt. The
Courts, therefore, held that if a loan / security deposit is not repaid, then
it cannot be treated as income.

 

i)   Morely vs. Tattersall
7 IR 316 (CA);

ii)  British Mexican
Petroleum Company Ltd. vs. Jackson 16 TC 570 (HL);

iii) CIT vs. P. Ganesh
Chettiar 133 ITR 103 (Madras);

vi) CIT vs. Sesashayee Bros.
(P) Ltd. 222 ITR 818 (Madras).

 

To contest the abovementioned decisions, the
Department generally resorts to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd. [1996] 222 ITR 112 (SC).
In this case, the assessee received deposits from its customers in the course
of carrying on its business and these were treated as capital receipts. Since
the balances remained to be claimed by the customers, the assessee transferred
the amounts credited in the accounts of the customers to the Profit & Loss
Account. The Court held that though the amounts were not in the nature of
income when they were received, they subsequently became income and the
assessee’s own money since the claim of the customers became barred by
limitation. However, the Supreme Court categorically held that it was not a
case of security deposit and held as follows:

 

‘We are unable to uphold the decision of
the Tribunal. The amounts were not in the
nature of security deposits held by the assessee for performance of contract by
its constituents…

…The
amounts were not given and retained as security to be retained till the
fulfilment of the contract. There is no finding to that effect. The deposits
were taken in course of the trade and adjustments were made against these
deposits in course of trade. The unclaimed surplus retained by the assessee
will be its trade receipt. The assessee itself treated the amount as its trade
receipt by bringing it to its profit and loss account’
(paras 18 & 19).

 

In fact, after considering the decision of
the Supreme Court in T.V. Sundaram Iyengar & Sons (Supra),
the Mumbai Tribunal in ACIT vs. Das & Co. [2010] 133 TTJ 542 (Mum.)
held that forfeiture of security deposit on premature termination of agreement
is a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee. The question to be decided
by the Tribunal was regarding the taxability of forfeiture of security deposit.
The relevant facts in the said case were as follows:

 

i)   The assessee was engaged in the business of
leasing of properties, warehouses, etc., and offered the income from leasing of property as its business income;

 

ii) The assessee had entered into a leave and
license agreement to sub-lease its property. However, the licensee terminated
the agreement prematurely and upon termination of the lease, the assessee
forfeited the security deposit of Rs. 1.5 crores and received an amount towards
compensation. The assessee treated the said forfeiture of security deposit as a
capital receipt.

 

iii) The A.O. as well as the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] held that the receipts were revenue receipts and
were taxable as income;

 

iv)         The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the
assessee and held as follows:

 

*    Perusal of the terms of agreement showed that
security deposit was capital receipt and was treated as such by the assessee
and the same was accepted by the Department. The deposit was neither in the
nature of advance for goods nor could it be treated as part of the rental
component;

 

*    From the clauses of the termination agreement
it was clear that the forfeiture of security deposit was not in lieu of
the rental payments;

 

*    The quality and nature of receipt is fixed
once and for all when the same is received and its character cannot be changed
subsequently.

 

In the aforesaid case, the assessee was
engaged in the business of leasing of properties, warehouses, etc., and offered
the income from leasing of property as its business income.

 

A similar view has been taken by the Mumbai
Tribunal in the case of Samir N. Bhojwani vs. DCIT ITA No. 4212/Mum./2006
which has been relied upon and considered in the aforementioned decision of the
Mumbai Tribunal in the Das & Co. case (Supra).
Even in this case, the assessee was engaged, inter alia, in the business
of renting of its properties and offered rental income from leasing of flats
under the head business income.

 

However, the Mumbai Tribunal, in Anand
Automotive Systems Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT (ITA No. 1343/Mum./2012)(Mum) order dated
3rd June, 2013
, after considering the decision of the
coordinate bench in Das & Co. (Supra) has, in a subsequent
decision, held that forfeiture of security deposit on termination of lease
agreement was a receipt in lieu of the rents and hence liable to
be taxed as revenue receipt. The facts in the said case were as follows:

 

(a) The assessee had given premises on rent to one
of its group concerns and received a security deposit of Rs. 10.58 crores for
the same;

(b) Pursuant to sealing of the assessee’s premises,
the lessee requested the assessee to discontinue the agreement;

(c) The matter went into arbitration and the
Arbitrator, inter alia, ordered the lessee to forego the security
deposit to the extent of Rs. 5.8 crores and directed the assessee to refund the
balance security deposit to the assessee;

(d) The assessee regarded the said forfeiture of
security deposit as a capital receipt not chargeable to tax.

(e) The A.O. as well as the CIT(A) held the receipt
to be in the nature of revenue.

(f)  The Tribunal held that it was evident from the
order of the Arbitrator that the amount of Rs. 5.8 crores was nothing but
compensation received for loss of rent as a result of early termination of the
agreement. The amount so received by the assessee was on revenue account and
not capital account which constituted the business income of the assessee as
the rental income received from the property earlier was offered to tax as
business income by the assessee.

 

In the Das & Co. case (Supra),
the assessee had not forfeited the security deposit but was directed to adjust
it against the compensation due to it for loss of rent. The Tribunal
categorically observed that compensation received by the assessee from the
licensor was nothing but a payment in lieu of rent and since the
assessee offered rental income as its business income, the Tribunal held that
the compensation received was also chargeable to tax as business income of the
assessee.

 

However, the Mumbai Tribunal, in the Anand
Automotive Systems Ltd.
case (Supra), while dealing with
the case of the coordinate bench in Das & Co. (Supra), has
relied on the part of the judgment which deals with the taxability of
compensation to hold that the amount of security deposit forfeited was
chargeable to tax in the hands of the assessee. In this case, the security
deposit was forfeited by the assessee pursuant to an order of the Arbitrator
which also required the assessee to adjust the same towards the compensation
for early termination of the license agreement. In the peculiar facts of the
case, it was held by the Tribunal that the forfeiture of deposit was nothing
but compensation for loss of rent and therefore chargeable to tax as business
income of the assessee.

 

This decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the
case of Anand Automotive Systems Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT (ITA No.
1343/Mum./2012)(Mum)
has been challenged by way of an appeal before the
Bombay High Court which has been admitted and the same is pending till date.
The matter has, therefore, not attained finality.

 

Insofar as taxability u/s 41(1) is
concerned, it provides for taxing of loss, expenditure or trading liability in
respect of which allowance or deduction has been made in the past and,
subsequently, the assessee obtains any benefit in respect thereof by way of
remission or cessation. Therefore, what is necessary is that loss, expenditure
or trading liability in respect of which the assessee obtains benefit must have
been allowed as a deduction in the past.

 

When the licensor takes a security deposit,
there is no deduction whatsoever claimed by the licensor in respect thereof and
therefore there is no question of obtaining any benefit by the remission or
cessation and hence the provisions of section 41(1) cannot apply irrespective
of the fact whether the property is held by the licensor as a capital asset or
as a stock-in-trade.

 

This view also draws support from the
following decisions:

 

i)   CIT vs. Compaq
Electric Ltd. [2019] 261 Taxman 71 (SC)
, SLP dismissed by the Supreme
Court against the decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in CIT
vs. Compaq Electric Ltd. [2012] 204 Taxman 58 (Kar.);

ii)  CIT vs. Gujarat State
Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd. [2013] 217 ITR 343 (Guj.);

iii) Pr. CIT vs. Gujarat
State Co-op. Bank Ltd. [2017] 85 taxmann.com 259 (Guj.).

 

The views expressed in the above
paragraphs apply to cases where the security deposit is forfeited.

 

Where the forfeiture is treated as
compensation for damages or adjusted towards the rent, it no longer remains a
security deposit and its colour changes to rent and will therefore be a revenue
receipt chargeable to tax in the hands of the licensor.

 

It is, therefore, necessary to determine
from the fine print of the agreement between the licensor and the licensee as
to whether the deposit is compensatory or in lieu of rent
and if that be the case, then the same will be chargeable to tax.

 

IF THE LICENSOR OFFERS RENTAL INCOME UNDER THE HEAD
INCOME FROM HOUSE PROPERTY

In this scenario, the licensor offers rental
income under the head Income from House Property, i.e., the income of the
licensor is charged u/s 22. As per section 22, the annual value of the property
consisting of any buildings or land appurtenant thereto of which the assessee
is the owner is chargeable to tax. Section 23 provides how the annual value of
any property is determined.

 

Now, in a case where the licensor offers
income under the head House Property and the licensee makes a default in
payment of rent or prematurely terminates the agreement, the licensor may either:

(a) Adjust the dues from the security deposit and
return the balance to the licensee:

In this situation,
the colour of deposit changes to rent to the extent it is adjusted. It is
nothing but an amount received by the licensor as rent and therefore taxable
under the head Income from House Property. The charge u/s 22 is on the annual
value and for the purpose of computing annual value the rent receivable has to
be considered.

OR

(b) Adjust the dues from the security deposit and
forfeit the balance security deposit:

In this case, the
taxability of the adjusted security deposit remains the same as mentioned at
point (1.) above. However, so far as the forfeited deposit is concerned,
the same cannot be brought to tax. This is based on the reasoning that what is
taxed u/s 22 is the annual value and any receipt other than annual value cannot
be brought to tax under the head Income from House Property.

OR

(c)        Entire
security deposit is forfeited:

In such a scenario as well, nothing will be
chargeable to tax in the hands of the licensor since it is only the annual
value which is chargeable to tax.

 

The Pune Tribunal in Datar & Co.
vs. ITO [2000] 67 TTJ 546 (Pune)
held that compensation received by the
owner from the lessee for premature termination of tenancy agreement was a
revenue receipt. However, such compensation was held not taxable as property
income. This was held so on the basis that it is only the annual value which is
assessable under the head Income from House Property and any other receipt
other than annual value cannot be computed as income under this head.

 

The Tribunal observed that the agreement was
terminated with effect from September, 1988 and there was a loss of future
rents for 20 months which amounted to Rs. 1,50,000. The compensation of Rs.
1,00,000 received by the assessee was nothing but the discounted present value
of the future rent for the unexpired period of the agreement. Plus, the
assessee was free to let out the bungalow to any party. Based on these facts,
the Tribunal held the compensation to be revenue receipt. However, as regards
the taxability of the compensation, the Tribunal held that it is only the
annual value which is assessable under the head Income from House Property as
follows:

 

‘In the present case, the compensation arises out of the agreement of
letting out immovable property and therefore, assumes the nature of the income
from house property. Therefore, in our opinion, such receipt would fall under
the head “income from house property”. However, it is only annual
value which can be assessed under the head “income from house
property”. Any other receipt other than the annual value cannot be
computed as income under this head. Therefore, following the decision of the
Bombay High Court in the case of
T.P. Sidhwa (Supra) and the decision of Supreme
Court in the case of
N.A. Mody (Supra), it is held that the compensation received by the assessee cannot
be taxed.’

 

Further, the Mumbai Tribunal in Addl.
CIT vs. Rama Leasing Co. (P) Ltd. [2008] 20 SOT 505 (Mum.),
following
the decision of the Pune Tribunal in the Datar & Co. case
(Supra)
held that compensation received by the assessee on premature
termination of the lease agreement is not chargeable to tax though it is a
revenue receipt.

 

A similar view has also been taken in one
more decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in ITO vs. Nikhil S. Goklaney in ITA
No. 2542/Mum/2017 order dated 6th September. 2019.

 

Though the aforementioned decisions of the
Pune and Mumbai Benches of the Tribunal deal with the receipt of compensation
due to premature termination of tenancy agreement and not forfeiture / waiver
of security deposit, the principle laid down by the Tribunal that it is only
the annual value which can be taxed under the head Income from House Property
still applies. In fact, a case of forfeiture of security deposit stands on a
better footing than receipt of compensation.

 

CONCLUSION

To conclude, forfeiture of security deposit,
to the extent the forfeited amount is adjusted towards rent, in my view, will
be chargeable to tax irrespective of the fact whether rental income is offered
as business income or income under the head House Property. Therefore, it is
essential to determine from the terms of the agreement whether or not the
deposit forfeited is compensatory. To the extent that the forfeited amount is
not adjusted or is not compensatory in nature, forfeiture will not be
chargeable to tax u/s 28(iv) or section 41(1) even if the assessee offers
rental income as business income. If rental income is offered as business income
and the property is held as stock-in-trade, the same could be taxed as regular
business income of the assessee u/s 28(i). If, however, the assessee offers
rental income under the head House Property, forfeiture of security deposit
will be a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. However, even if the same is
held to be a revenue receipt, nothing will be charged to tax as annual value
under sections 22 and 23. In my view, one must first determine from the terms
of the agreement between the parties the exact nature of deposit and then
determine the taxability in view of the provisions contained as well as the
decisions laid down by the Courts.

 

 

 

Twitter is like a Public Sector Bank. Its losses mount
year on year; the organisation is run by pompous individuals; the rules &
regulations are confounding & absurd; the complaints are seldom heard; the
decisions go mostly against your wishes; but everyone who hates it uses it

  
Anand Ranganathan, Author

 

 

THE NEW EDGE BANKING

TAXABILITY OF TRANSFER FEE RECEIVED BY A CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY1

INTRODUCTION

In this article
would be discussed the taxability of transfer fee received by a
co-operative
housing society under the principles and provisions of the Income-tax
Act, 1961
(‘the Act’). A co-operative housing society (hereinafter also referred
to as ‘Society’) here would include all Societies – residential,
commercial and industrial. Apart from transfer fee simpliciter, the
taxability of its many variants such as voluntary contribution on transfer,
premium on transfer, etc. would also be examined.

 

NATURE OF TRANSFER FEE

At the outset, it
is most pertinent to understand the nature of a co-operative housing society
and the nature and purpose of the transfer fee collected by a Society. A
Society is generally formed and registered with the following objects in its
bye-laws:

 

(a) To obtain conveyance from the owner / promoter
builder, in accordance with the provisions of the Ownership Flats Act and the Rules
made thereunder, of the right, title and interest, in the land with building /
buildings thereon, the details of which are as hereunder:

 

The building /
buildings known / numbered as…….. constructed on the plot / plot Nos. …… /
Survey No……… / CTS No…….. of ……….. (village / taluka) admeasuring……. sq.
metres, more particularly described in the application for the registration of
the Society;

 

(b) To manage, maintain and administer the property
of the Society;

 

(c) To raise funds for achieving the objects of the
Society;

 

(d) To undertake and provide for, on its own
account or jointly with a co-operative or other institution social, cultural or
recreative activities;

 

(e) To provide
co-operative education and training to develop co-operative skills to….. …..its………
Members, Committee Members, officers and employees of the Society; and

 

(f) To do all
things, necessary or expedient for the attainment of the objects of the
Society, specified in these Bye-laws.

 

(Refer clause 5 of
the Model Bye-laws as approved by the Commissioner for Co-operation and
Registrar, C.S., M.S., Pune, which are generally adopted by the Societies in
Maharashtra.)

 

From the above, one
can decipher that a Society is nothing but a pool of people residing in /
occupying a building, and having as its common object managing and maintaining
the building / property for the common benefit of all in a spirit of camaraderie.
Thus, there is no taint of commerciality, nor any intention of carrying on any
trade or any activity for the purpose of profits in the objects of a Society.

 

For this management
and maintenance of the building / property for the common benefit of all the
members, the Society has to pay various outgoings like property tax to the local
authorities, water charges, common electricity charges, salaries to security
and other staff members, repair, maintenance and proper upkeep of the building,
lift, etc. To defray all these common expenses, the Society collects from all
the members contribution by way of monthly maintenance charges, specific
collection against the outgoings mentioned above, transfer fee,
donation, etc. The authority for the collection for and payment of the common
expenses is embodied in the bye-laws of the Society to which every member is a
party. So, the modus operandi of the entire scheme is such that the
Society is the convenient instrument or medium or conduit through which the
building / property is maintained and managed by the members, for the common
benefit of all the members, from the contributions received from all the
members in different ways and on different occasions.


__________________________________________________________________­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­________________________________

1 An article on this subject was written by
the same author in the July 1990 issue of
The BCA Journal. After over 30 years, at the suggestion of The BCA Journal, the author discusses in this article the
current position on this evergreen or ever-grey subject of great importance. –
Editor.


Transfer fee is one
such mode of collecting contribution towards common expenses by a Society on
the occasion or the event of the transfer of a flat / office / unit by the
member of the Society, credited to a separate account called ‘Reserve Fund’ by
the Society. (See clause 12 of the Model Bye-laws.) The ‘Reserve Fund’ is
utilised by the Society for the ‘expenditure on repairs, maintenance and
renewals of the Society’s property’. [See clause 14(a) of the Model Bye-laws.]

 

Thus, by nature,
character or quality, transfer fee is only a form of collection or contribution
from the members which is utilised for the common benefit of all the members
only.

 

DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY

Another concept
which has a material bearing while analysing the taxability of transfer fee is
the concept or doctrine of mutuality. The doctrine of mutuality is the
foundation on which the entire edifice of the non-taxability of transfer fee is
built. It is submitted that this is a simple but often misunderstood concept,
especially by the tax authorities.

 

The concept of
mutuality is extensively discussed and relied upon in a large number of
judicial cases which are commonly called ‘club cases’2, and which
concern the taxation of sports or other creative clubs, because the
non-taxability of the income of the clubs is also based on the doctrine of
mutuality.

 

Let us try to
understand this doctrine by turning to some decided cases. In CIT vs.
Madras Race Club [1976] 105 ITR 433, 443 (Mad)
, this doctrine was
elucidated thus: ‘To take a common instance, supposing a dozen persons gather
together and agree to purchase certain commodities in bulk and distribute them
among themselves in accordance with their individual requirements, they may
collect a certain amount provisionally based on the anticipated price of the
commodities to be purchased. If it ultimately happens that the commodities are
available at a cheaper price so that at the end of the distribution of the
commodities among themselves, a part of the original amount provisionally
collected is repaid, then what is repaid cannot by any test be classified as
income. This would represent savings and not income. The Income-tax Act seeks
to tax income and not savings….’

 

The fundamental
test of mutuality was explained succinctly by Lord Macmillan in Municipal
Mutual Insurance Ltd. vs. Hills [1932] 16 TC 430, 448 (HL):
‘The
cardinal requirement is that all the contributors to the common fund must be
entitled to participate in the surplus and that all the participators in the
surplus must be contributors to the common fund; in other words, there must
be complete identity between the contributors and the participators.
If
this requirement is satisfied the particular form which the association takes
is immaterial.’ (Emphasis supplied)

 

In the often-quoted
case of Styles vs. New York Life Insurance Company [1889] 2 TC 460 (HL)
the doctrine of mutuality was discussed as follows by Lord Watson: ‘When a
number of individuals agree to contribute funds for a common purpose, such as
the payment of annuities or of capital sums, to some or all of them, on the
occurrence of events certain or uncertain, and stipulate that their
contributions, so far as not required for that purpose, shall be repaid to
them, I cannot conceive why they should be regarded as traders, or why
contributions returned to them should be regarded as profits.’

 

The Supreme Court
in a recent decision in ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises Co-operative Society
Ltd. [2018] 402 ITR 670 (SC),
after referring to numerous weighty
authorities – both Indian and English – narrated the concept of mutuality in
the following crystal clear words (see head notes):

‘The doctrine of mutuality, based on common law principles, is
premised on the theory that a person cannot make a profit from himself. An
amount received from oneself, therefore, cannot be regarded as income and
taxable. The essence of the principle of mutuality lies in the commonality of
the contributors and the participants who are also the beneficiaries. The
contributors to the common fund must be entitled to participate in the surplus
and the participators in the surplus are contributors to the common fund. The
law envisages a complete identity between the contributors and the participants
in this sense.
The principle postulates that what is returned is
contributed by a member. Any surplus in the common fund shall therefore not
constitute income but will only be an increase in the common fund meant to meet
sudden eventualities.’ (Emphasis supplied)

 

________________________________________________________________________________________________

2 For instance, see CIT vs. Royal Western India Turf
Club Ltd. [1953] 24 ITR 551 (SC); CIT vs. Bankipur Club [1997] 226 ITR 97 (SC);
Chelmsford Club vs. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 89 (SC); Bangalore Club vs. CIT [2013]
350 ITR 509 (SC); IRC vs. Eccentric Club Ltd. [1925] 12 TC 657 (HL); CIT vs.
Merchant Navy Club [1974] 96 ITR 261 (AP); The Presidency Club Ltd. vs. CIT
[1981] 127 ITR 264 (Mad); CIT vs. Cawnpore Club Ltd. [1984] 146 ITR 181 (All); CIT
vs. Darjeeling Club Ltd. [1985] 153 ITR 676 (Cal) and CIT vs. Willingdon Sports
Club [2008] 302 ITR 279 (Bom)
. The principle of mutuality is also explained in CIT vs. Common Effluent Treatment
Plant (Thane Belapur) Association [2010] 328 ITR 362 (Bom); CIT vs. Kumbakonam
Mutual Benefit Fund Ltd. [1964] 53 ITR 241 (SC)
and CIT vs. Shree Jari Merchants Association
[1977] 106 ITR 542 (Guj).


The concept of
mutuality is based on the principle that no man can make profit out of himself.
So, when more than one person combine themselves for some common purpose or
mutual benefit and contribute for the common purpose or benefit and if afterwards
some surplus is left over and is returned to those contributors in their
capacity as contributors, the same does not amount to income in the hands of
the contributor-recipient, nor does the contribution as such amount to income
in the hands of the mutual benefit association of such persons.

 

BASIC PROPOSITION: TRANSFER FEE IS GOVERNED BY THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY

Based on the nature
of the transfer fee received by a Society, discussed hereinabove, and based on
the principle of mutuality, discussed above, it is submitted that the transfer
fee received by a Society on the transfer of a flat / office / shop / unit by a
member of the Society is completely governed by the principle of mutuality and
hence not liable to any tax under the Act. Transfer fee is nothing but a
contribution to the common fund of a mutual benefit association, i.e., the
Society, by its member on the occasion of the transfer of a flat, etc. which is
going to be utilised, either immediately or at a later date, for the common
benefit of all the members of the Society.

 

There is no express
statutory provision in the Act contrary to the above proposition. Whenever the
legislature intends to tax an item, it specifically provides for the same. For
example, section 2(24)(vii) of the Act specifically includes within the
definition of the term ‘Income’, ‘the profits and gains of any business of
insurance carried on by a mutual insurance company or by a co-operative
society, computed in accordance with section 44 or any surplus taken to be such
profits and gains by virtue of provisions contained in the First Schedule’.
Such income is, obviously, excluded from the principle of mutuality.3

 

Another example of
an express statutory provision creating an exception to the principle of
mutuality is section 2(24)(viia) which includes within the definition of
‘Income’, ‘the profits and gains of any business of banking (including
providing credit facilities) carried on by a co-operative society with its
members’.

________________________________________________________________________________________

3 See the observations at p. 679 in ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises
Co-operative Society Ltd. [2019] 402 ITR 670 (SC).
See also the observations at pp. 40-41 in State of West Bengal vs. Calcutta
Club Ltd. 2019-VIL-34-SC-ST.


JUMPING SOME HURDLES

As stated above,
the transfer fee received by a Society is non-taxable on the principle of
mutuality. But there are some hurdles in the way of this theory, which are
jumped over in the succeeding paragraphs.

 

Hurdle 1:
Incorporation

 

The principle of mutuality requires that there must be complete identity
between the contributors to the common fund and the participators in the
surplus, but a Society is always formed and registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 or under the relevant State law concerning the
incorporation and registration of a Society, e.g., The Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter also referred to as
the Societies Act), which is a legal entity, separate and distinct from its members.
Then, how does the principle of mutuality apply to a Society?

 

It is well settled
now that once the identity between the contributors to the common fund and the
participators in the benefits and surplus is established completely, the fact
of incorporation of the mutual benefit association does not damage the
applicability of the principle of mutuality to it. As Lord Macmillan observed
in a passage reproduced above from Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd. vs.
Hills [1932] 16 TC 430, 448 (HL):
‘… in other words, there must be
complete identity between the contributors and the participators. If this
requirement is satisfied the particular form which the association takes is
immaterial.
’ (Emphasis supplied)

 

Likewise, the House
of Lords held in Styles vs. New York Life Insurance Co. [1889] 2 TC 460
(HL):
…. Incorporation does not destroy or even impair the complete
identity
between the contributors and the participators.’ (Emphasis
supplied)

 

The Supreme Court in an early case in CIT vs. Royal Western India
Turf Club Ltd. [1953] 24 ITR 551, 560 (SC)
explained convincingly:
In such cases where there is
identity in the character of those who contribute and of those who participate
in the surplus, the fact of incorporation may be immaterial and the
incorporated company may well be regarded as a mere instrument, a convenient
agent for carrying out what the members might more laboriously do for
themselves.’
(Emphasis supplied)

 

Later, in yet
another decision in CIT vs. Chelmsford Club [2000] 243 ITR 89 (SC),
it was observed (see head notes at p. 90): ‘There must be complete identity
between the contributors and the participators. If these requirements are
fulfilled, it is immaterial what particular form the association takes. (Emphasis supplied)

 

When one surveys
all the club cases, one notices that in most of the cases, the club was an
incorporated company, still, the Courts have upheld the applicability of the
principle of mutuality to the club. The incorporation of the club as a company
did not pose a hurdle in the way of applying the principle of mutuality to the
club.

 

In view of the
above, one can safely conclude that it is settled law that incorporation of
members into a registered society under the Societies Act would not adversely
impact the applicability of the principle of mutuality to the transfer fee
received by a Society.

 

Hurdle 2:
Members as a class

 

As discussed above,
the cardinal requirement of mutuality is that all the contributors to the
common fund must be participators in the surplus and that all the participators
in the surplus must be contributors to the common fund. In the case of transfer
fee received by a Society, the beneficiaries are all the members of the
Society, but the contributors are only those members who have transferred their
flat / shop / office / unit and not all the members. Then, how does it
satisfy the requirement of mutuality?

 

In terms of the
bye-laws of every Society, every member who transfers the flat / office,
etc. is liable to pay to the Society transfer fee. So, the basic or primary
liability to contribute to the Society in the form of transfer fee is on every
member
, meaning thereby that all the members are liable to pay the transfer
fee and not a particular member or a particular section of the members is
liable to pay the transfer fee – only the occasion to pay, i.e., transfer of
the flat / office, should arise. The person paying the transfer fee is paying
in his capacity or character as ‘a member’ of the Society and not in any
other capacity. Further, the participators in or beneficiaries of the transfer
fee received by the Society are also enjoying the same in their capacity or character as ‘members’. Thus, the identity between the
contributors and the participators is perfectly established.

 

While comparing the
contributors and the participators, they should be compared as ‘a class’ and no
individual contributor or participator is to be compared. For the purpose of
applicability of the principle of mutuality to the transfer fee received by a
Society it is not necessary that all the members should contribute or pay the
transfer fee at the same time which is an impossible event. It is sufficient if
all the members are liable by terms of the agreement to the bye-laws to
pay the transfer fee at the time of ‘transfer’.

 

The above reasoning
of comparing the members as ‘a class’ is well settled by numerous judicial
precedents. In CIT vs. Merchant Navy Club [1974] 96 ITR 261, 273 (AP) the
Court articulated with precision: ‘The contributors to the common fund and the
participators in the surplus must be an identical body. That does not mean
that each member should contribute to the common fund or that each member
should participate in the surplus or get back from the surplus precisely what
he has paid.
What is required is that the members as a class should
contribute to the common fund and participators as a class must be able
to participate in the surplus….’ (Emphasis supplied)

 

On this topic, a
learned author, Wheatcroft enlightens in his authoritative treatise ‘The Law
of Income-tax, Sur-tax and Profits Tax’
in paragraph 1-417 at pp. 1200-01:
‘For this doctrine to apply it is essential that all the contributors to the
common fund are entitled to participate in the surplus and that all the
participators in the surplus are contributors, so that there is complete
identity between contributors and participators. This means identity as a
class, so that at any given moment of time the persons who are contributing are
identical with the persons entitled to participate: it does not matter that the
class may be diminished by persons going out of the scheme or increased by
others coming in.’
(Emphasis supplied) This paragraph was noted and followed
by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT vs. Merchant Navy Club (Supra)
while making the above observations.

 

Likewise, in CIT
vs. Shree Jari Merchants Association [1977] 106 ITR 542, 550-551 (Guj)

it was commented: ‘…. the main test of mutuality is complete identity of the
contributors with the recipients. This identity need not necessarily be of
individuals, because it is the identity of status or capacity which matters
more. Thus, individual members of an association may be different at different
times; but so long as the contributors and recipients are both holding the
membership status in the association, their identity would be clearly
established, and the principle of mutuality would be available to them.’

(Emphasis supplied)

 

Thus, if the
character or capacity of the persons paying the transfer fee, i.e., members, is
compared with the character or capacity of the persons enjoying the benefits or
participating in the surplus, i.e., members, the identity between the two is
established beyond the slightest shadow of doubt.

 

As rightly observed
in many cases4, in a Society the members are a class and that class
may be diminished by the members going out or increased by the members coming
in – but the class remains the same.

 

The Department
often argues that the member contributing the transfer fee is an outgoing
member, whereas the members enjoying the benefits of the transfer fee are the
existing members and the incoming members and therefore the contributors and
the participators are not identical. This argument stands answered by the class
theory discussed above.

 

Practically
speaking, it should be ensured that when the transfer fee is received by the
Society, the contributor is technically a ‘member’ registered in the records of
the Society. The occasion to take care arises more when the transfer fee or a
part thereof is received from an incoming member (‘transferee’) and on the date
when he pays the transfer fee he is not yet technically admitted as a member in
the records of the Society. The Department, in such a situation, often contends
that the transfer fee is paid by a person who is not a member and hence the
identity between the contributors and the participators is not established and the transfer fee is therefore taxable.5
Fortunately, however, the Supreme Court has adopted a very liberal and
pragmatic view even in such situations by granting the exemption even though
the admission of the transferee was pending when he paid the transfer fee. The
Supreme Court6 has unequivocally held that the transfer fee received
by a Society from a transferee member would not partake of the nature of profit
or commerciality as the amount is appropriated by the Society only after the
transferee is inducted as a member and the moment the transferee is inducted as
member the principle of mutuality applies, and in the event of non-admission,
the amount is refunded.7

 

Hurdle 3:
Participation in the surplus

 

In order to satisfy
the test of mutuality it is not necessary that the transfer fee received by a
Society should be utilised for the repairs and renewals of the Society’s
property in the year of receipt of the transfer fee. It may happen that the
transfer fee received may remain unutilised in the year of receipt and may have
to be carried forward to the future years under ‘Reserve Fund’ to be utilised
for ‘expenditure on repairs, maintenance and renewals of the Society’s
property’. Practically, one day or the other the amount is going to be utilised
for the repairs, renewals, etc. of the Society’s property, and there would be
no damage to the applicability of the principle of mutuality to the transfer
fee received by the Society. But, theoretically, technically or legally, what
happens if the surplus remains unutilised and the Society is to be wound up?

 

As per section 110
of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, in the event of winding up
of the Society, the following are the options available for the disposal of the
surplus:

 

(a) The same may be divided by the Registrar, with
the previous sanction of the State Government, amongst its members in such
manner as may be prescribed; or

 

(b) The same may be devoted to any object or
objects provided in the bye-laws of the Society; or

 

(c) If the same is not divided amongst the members
and the Society has no such bye-laws for its utilisation for its objects, the
surplus shall vest in the Registrar, who shall hold it in trust and shall
transfer the same to the reserve fund of any other Society having similar
objects and serving more or less an area which the Society, to which the
surplus belonged, was serving. It is further provided that if no such Society
is available, the Registrar may use it for some public purpose or charitable
purpose.

 

If the surplus is
utilised as per (a) and (b) above, there is certainly no damage to the
applicability of the principle of mutuality to the transfer fee since, in those
cases, it is the members who are the ultimate beneficiaries of or the
participators in the surplus and that would be perfectly in keeping with the
requirement of the principle of mutuality. But, in the event the surplus vests
in the Registrar in terms of (c) above, and is not utilised by or for the
members, would it militate against the applicability of the principle of
mutuality to the transfer fee received by the Society, because the
participators in the surplus would not be the members who have contributed to
it?

 

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

4 See, for example, Sind Co-operative Housing Society
vs. ITO [2009] 317 ITR 47, 60-61 (Bom).

5 This was the view expressed in Walkeshwar Triveni Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. vs. ITO [2004] 267 ITR (AT) 86 (Mum)(SB).

6 ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises Co-operative
Society Ltd. [2018] 402 ITR 670, 681 (SC).

7 See the similar views expressed in Sind Co-operative Housing Society
vs. ITO [2009] 317 ITR 47, 60 (Bom)
[after considering the decision in Walkeshwar Triveni Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. vs. ITO [2004] 267 ITR (AT) 86  (Mumbai) (SB)],
followed in Mittal Court Premises Co-operative
Society Ltd. vs. ITO [2010] 320 ITR 414, 419 (Bom)
(later affirmed by the Supreme

First of all,
looking at the provisions of the Model Bye-laws adopted by all the Societies,
the possibility of a situation arising under (c) is practically almost none.
But theoretically, technically or legally, what happens if the situation in (c)
arises and there is a possibility of the surplus falling into the hands of
persons other than members? Would it militate against the applicability of the
principle of mutuality? Let us go through some decided cases in search of
judicial guidance.

 

In IRC vs.
Eccentric Club [1925] 12 TC 657 (HL),
there was a club incorporated as
a company with the object to promote social relations amongst gentlemen connected
with literature, art, music, drama, etc., which conducted a club of
non-political character. Clause 6 of its memorandum of association prohibited
distribution of dividend and also provided that on winding up of the club, the
surplus, if any, was not to be distributed amongst the members, but was to be
given or transferred as the committee of management may determine. In spite of
these features, it was held by the House of Lords that the principle of
mutuality was applicable to the club and the income of the club was
non-taxable.

 

This decision was
followed in India by the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Madras Race Club
[1976] 105 ITR 433 (Mad).
In this case the memorandum of association of
the club provided that in the event of winding up, the surplus was not
divisible amongst the members, but had to be made over to the entities having
similar objects. Despite this feature, the Madras High Court held that the
principle of mutuality was applicable, following the above referred decision in
IRC vs. Eccentric Club (Supra). The Court made very interesting
observations (p. 443): It is well settled that the memorandum and
articles of a company represent the contract between the company and the
members. It is only by virtue of their ownership of the surplus assets, if any,
that the members had agreed to the clause that they would not take back the
surplus, but allow it to be transferred to any similar entity. As they
themselves are to deal with the surplus, if any, at the time of winding up, it
cannot be said that they are not participators in the surplus.
The clause
is only a fetter in the manner of disposal. The participation envisaged in
the principle of mutuality is not that the members should willy-nilly take the
surplus to themselves. It is enough if they held a right of disposal over the
surplus to show that they were the participators.’
(Emphasis supplied)

 

However, the
Gujarat High Court adopted a contrary view in CIT vs. Shree Jari
Merchants Association [1977] 106 ITR 542 (Guj)
. In this case a rule of
the constitution of the association provided that at the time of its
dissolution the surplus assets of the association shall be used in the manner
proposed in the resolution passed by the association. The Court observed (p.
551-552): It is apparent that any resolution which may come up for
consideration in future would not necessarily provide for the distribution of
the surplus assets only amongst the members of the association. If, therefore,
the assets of the association are not liable to be returned to the members, the
identity between the contributors and recipients would be lost. This would
militate against the very basic principle of mutuality. The Court
concluded (p. 553): In the result, we conclude that the assessee is not
a mutual concern and cannot claim exemption on that ground.

 

Thus, in this case,
it is the fear or possibility of distribution of surplus amongst non-members
which influenced the decision of the Court against the assessee.

 

But, in a
subsequent case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT vs. West Godavari
Dist. Rice Millers Association [1984] 150 ITR 394 (AP)
held the
principle of mutuality applicable to the association despite the provision that
the surplus remaining with the association should not, at the time of
dissolution, go to the members but it should be made over to an
association with similar objects.
The Court followed the
above decisions in IRC vs. Eccentric Club (Supra) and CIT
vs. Madras Race Club (Supra)
and dissented from the above
decision in CIT vs. Shree Jari Merchants Association (Supra).8

 

It would be
worthwhile to note that every Society is subject to rigid discipline of the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 or any other relevant law under
which it is registered and therefore the apprehension expressed by the Gujarat
High Court in CIT vs. Shree Jari Merchants Association (Supra) of
the possibility of the surplus being distributed among non-members is not
present in the case of a Society.

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

8 For identical views, see CIT vs. Cochin Oil Merchants’
Association [1987] 168 ITR 240 (Ker);
CIT vs. Northern India Motion Pictures
Association [1989] 180 ITR 160 (P & H)
and CIT vs. Indian Paper Mills
Association [1994] 209 ITR 28 (Cal).


Later, in CIT vs. Adarsh Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd.

[1995] 213 ITR 677 (Guj), the Gujarat High Court has taken a
favourable view by distinguishing the earlier adverse decision in
CIT vs. Shree Jari Merchants Association (Supra). This case was concerned with
determining the taxability of the premium amounts received by a Society on the
transfer of lease of plots by its members. Despite the fact that the bye-laws
of the Society provided that the surplus could be dealt with in accordance with
the resolution of the committee of the Society, the Court held that the premium
amounts were exempt on the principle of mutuality. The Court raised a pertinent
question (p. 692): ‘… the question which arises is: what is meant by ‘‘return’’
of what has been contributed to a common fund? Does it mean the return of the
corpus of the fund or does it include retention of control over the
corpus to be used in consonance with the statute regulating the association,
company or society, as the case may be?
(Emphasis supplied)

 

Dispelling the fear of the surplus going into the
hands of non-members,
the Court, taking into consideration the scheme and provisions of the
Gujarat
Co-operative Societies Act, observed that it is only on the failure of
the
members to exercise such power that the surplus vests in the Registrar
and not
otherwise. The Court observed that the phrase ‘return of the surplus to
contributors’ in the context of regulatory provisions as opposed to
voluntary act of parties, cannot be construed in the narrow sense of
division
of the corpus, where the body of the members as a whole retains the
power and
control over utilisation of surplus left at the time of dissolution or
winding
up, though division of the corpus is prohibited; it is return of the
corpus to
the members for their use. The Court elaborated the concept by stating
that it
is not the requirement that return of the corpus to the members must be
only
for the purpose of division; the fact that the members may in future
abandon
their power and may allow the surplus to be vested in the Registrar
cannot be a
decisive factor in determining the present status of mutuality. The
Court made
very significant comments (p. 693):

What is of the
essence is: what are the ordinary consequences envisaged by members within the
framework of the statute to deal with the surplus? The right of the members to
deal with the surplus is not destroyed but is only restricted to the extent
that instead of dividing the corpus pro rata, it has been confined to
utilisation or expending of the surplus for the objectives as per their own
decision. This does not detract from the concept of return of the surplus to
members which they have contributed in making that fund.’

 

After referring to
the facts of the adverse decision in Shree Jari Merchants Association
(Supra),
strongly relied upon by the Department, the Court observed
that in that case the question as to what is the meaning of ‘return of surplus’
was neither raised nor decided by the Court, but it proceeded on the assumption
that ‘return of surplus’ relates to ‘return of corpus’ to be shared by the
members pro rata. The Court finally stated: We find that the facts of the present case do not attract the ratio
of the decision in the case of Shree Jari Merchants Association [1977]
106 ITR 542 (Guj).

 

On this point, in Kanga
& Palkhivala’s The Law & Practice of Income Tax,
ninth edition (pp.
193-194), after referring to several judicial pronouncements discussed
hereinabove, the principle is summarised with precision: ‘….The contributors to
the common fund and the participators in the surplus must be an identical body.
That does not mean that each member should contribute to the common fund or
each member should participate in the surplus or get back from the surplus
precisely what he has paid.…..the test of mutuality does not require that
the contributors to the common fund should distribute the surplus amongst
themselves; it is enough if they have a right of disposal over the surplus,

and in exercise of that right they may agree that on winding-up the surplus
will be transferred to a similar association or used for some charitable
objects.’9 (Emphasis supplied)

 

In view of the
foregoing discussion, it is submitted that the applicability of the principle
of mutuality to the transfer fee received by a Society is not impaired on the
ground that the surplus might be distributed amongst non-members and
consequently the identity between the contributors and the participators may be
lost.

 

Hurdle 4:
Presence of other income

 

The fourth hurdle
could be the presence of some incidental receipts by the Society which may not
be governed by the principle of mutuality and hence may be taxable, e.g.,
interest received by a Society on excess funds deposited with a co-operative
bank. But would the presence of such taxable items jeopardise the applicability
of the principle of mutuality to the Society as a whole and qua the
transfer fee?

 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

9
These observations are noted and followed in many judicial rulings. See, for example,
Sind Co-operative Housing Society vs. ITO [2009] 317
ITR 47,
57-58 (Bom). See also the
observations at p. 63 in this case.


It is submitted
that mere presence of certain incidental items of taxable income should not
adversely affect the claim of the Society to the principle of mutuality in
respect of its main activities and in respect of the transfer fee.

 

In CIT vs.
Madras Race Club [1976] 105 ITR 433 (Mad),
where there were
transactions of the same nature with members as well as non-members resulting
in surplus, the Court applied the principle of mutuality to the transactions
with members, and observed (p. 442): ….
the application of the principle of mutuality is not destroyed by the
presence of transactions with or profits derived from non-members.
The said
principle could apply to transactions with members.’10 (Emphasis
supplied)

 

SOME DIRECT JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ANALYSED

In a plethora of
judicial decisions on the subject rendered by the Tribunal as well as several
High Courts over the last three decades, the issue of taxability of transfer
fee received by a Society came to be examined. Some decisions earlier had gone
against the assessee and the transfer fee was held taxable. But the recent
trend of the judicial decisions has been of upholding the applicability of the
principle of mutuality to the transfer fee received by a Society from its
members and treat it as non-taxable. To avoid overcrowding of citations, only a
few selected recent decisions and that, too, of the High Courts are discussed
here.

 

In CIT vs.
Apsara Co-operative Housing Society  Ltd.
[1993] 204 ITR 662 (Cal)
the assessee was a  co-operative housing society which provided residential premises to its members
and received transfer fee for transfer of flats. The question arose about the
taxability of the transfer fee received by the assessee-society. Applying the
principle of mutuality the Court held that the transfer fee was not taxable.

 

In Sind
Co-operative Housing Society vs. ITO [2009] 317 ITR 47 (Bom)
11,
the Court categorically held (at p. 63) that the principle of mutuality will
apply to a co-operative housing society which has as its predominant activity,
the maintenance of the property of the Society which includes its building or
buildings and as long as there is no taint of commerciality, trade or business.
This decision was followed in Mittal Court Premises Co-operative Society
Ltd. vs. ITO [2010] 320 ITR 414 (Bom).
12

 

Earlier there were
several Tribunal and High Court13 decisions where the taxability or
otherwise of the transfer fee was examined with reference to whether the
transfer fee is a capital receipt or revenue receipt, and not on the principle
of mutuality. Those decisions are not discussed here, since now they have no
relevance, especially when there are umpteen judicial rulings upholding the
applicability of the principle of mutuality to the transfer fee received by a
Society.

 

SUPREME COURT’S VIEW

In a recent
decision, several issues concerning the taxability of transfer fees,
non-occupancy charges, contribution to common amenities fund, etc. came up for
the consideration of the Apex Court in ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises
Co-operative Society Ltd. [2018] 402 ITR 670 (SC).
14 Based
on a careful reading of this decision, it is submitted that the Supreme Court
is of the clear-cut view that the transfer fee received by a co-operative
housing society gets the shelter of the principle of mutuality and is not taxable.
Fortunately, after a long battle, the issue has been finally set at rest by
this decision of the Supreme Court in favour of the assessee.

 

PREMIUM COLLECTED BY SOCIETIES

Some Societies have
a provision in their bye-laws, or in their lease agreements in case of plot
holder Societies, providing that at the time of transfer of the plot, the
transferor will pay to the Society a certain amount of premium calculated
either as a percentage of the sale price realised by the transferor or at a
rate per square foot of the plot. The question has arisen many times whether
such premium received by such Society is taxable or it gets the shelter of the
principle of mutuality.

 

It is submitted
that such premium collected by the Society from members is ultimately going to
be utilised for the common benefit of all the members only and hence such
premium is also governed by the principle of mutuality and is non-taxable. No
doubt, earlier there were some adverse Tribunal decisions, but now most of the
judicial decisions are in favour of the view that such premium is not taxable
being covered by the principle of mutuality.

 

___________________________________________________________________________________________________

10 For reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied upon
Carlisle
& Silloth Golf Club vs. Smith [1912] 6 TC 48, 54, 55 (KB).

11 This decision has been consistently
followed in countless judicial decisions (of the Tribunal and of the High
Courts) in favour of the assessee (which are not discussed here for brevity’s
sake).

12 Later affirmed in ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises
Co-operative Society Ltd. [2018] 402 ITR 670 (SC).

13 For example, see CIT vs. Presidency Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. [1995] 216 ITR 321 (Bom).
See the comments on this decision in Sind Cooperative Housing Society
vs. ITO [2009] 317 ITR 47 (Bom) at p. 57.

14 By the way, the Supreme Court considered
several judicial pronouncements in this case and affirmed
Mittal Court Premises Co-operative
Society Ltd. vs.

ITO
[2010] 320 ITR 414 (Bom)
and CIT vs. Shree Parleshwar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. [2017] 10
ITR-OL 202 (Bom)
.


In CIT vs.
Adarsh Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. [1995] 213 ITR 677 (Guj)
the
assessee was a co-operative society registered under the Bombay Societies Act,
1925. The Society acquired land and leased out the same to its members for a
period of 998 years. The Society permitted disposition or devolution of the
lease of any plot with any building thereon from an existing member to another
who registered himself as a member of the Society. On such transfer of lease
the existing member to whom the plot was leased had to pay to the Society half
of the premium amount received by him from the purchaser. The Court held that
the amounts contributed by the outgoing members were utilised by the Society
for extending common amenities to the members and hence the premium so
collected was non-taxable on the principle of mutuality.

 

In CIT vs.
Jai Hind Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. [2012] 349 ITR 541 (Bom)
15
the assessee was a co-operative housing society formed of plot owners, who had
obtained land on lease from the Maharashtra Housing Board. The assessee in turn
entered into sub-lease agreements with its members. The assessee looked after
the maintenance and infrastructure. In terms of a resolution passed by the
assessee-society a member who desired to avail of the benefit of transferable
development rights and carry out construction or additional construction on his
plot, had to pay a premium of Rs. 250 per square foot to the assessee-society.
The assessee collected a premium of Rs. 18.75 lakhs in the previous year
relevant to the assessment year 2005-06. The A.O. was of the view that by
allowing the member to commercially exploit the plot and charging the premium
for that, the assessee-society was sharing the profit which was of commercial
nature. When the dispute regarding its taxability reached the High Court, it
held that such premium received by the Society is non-taxable on the principle
of mutuality as the premium flowed from a member.16

 

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION OVER AND ABOVE TRANSFER FEE

As per the
notification17 issued, in the State of Maharashtra, the maximum
transfer fee which a Society can collect is Rs. 25,000. With increasing costs
of repairs and maintenance of buildings, the Societies are finding it difficult
to garner resources to maintain their buildings. As a result, many Societies,
especially in South Mumbai, are, in terms of resolutions passed in their
general body meetings, collecting voluntary contributions on transfer of flats
/ offices over and above the transfer fee of Rs. 25,000 as per the Government
notification. This voluntary contribution is fixed either at a particular rate
per square foot of the flat / office or sometimes even as a percentage of the
sale price of the flat / office. The Department has been contending that
collecting from the members any amount over and above the limit fixed by the
Government notification is illegal and amounts to profiteering and therefore
taxable.

 

But, fortunately,
even this controversy is now settled in favour of the assessee by the Supreme
Court decision in ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises Co-operative Society Ltd.
[2018] 402 ITR 670 (SC).
The Department relied upon (at p. 677) the
decision in New India Co-operative Housing Society vs. State of
Maharashtra [2013] 2 MHLJ 666 (Bom)
and contended that any receipt by the
Society beyond the permissible limit was not only illegal but also amounted to
rendering of services for profit attracting an element of commerciality and
thus was taxable. In response, the Supreme Court held (at p. 683) that in New
India Co-operative Housing Society (Supra),
the challenge by the
aggrieved was to the transfer fee levied by the Society in excess of that
specified in the notification, which is a completely different cause of action
having no relevance to the present controversy; that it is not the case of the
Revenue that such receipts have not been utilised for the common benefit of
those who have contributed to the funds. From these observations of the Supreme
Court it is clear that the Supreme Court is of the unequivocal view that so long
as the amount contributed over and above the limit specified in the Government
notification is utilised for the common benefit of all the members, it
satisfies the test of mutuality and is non-taxable. There is another pointer to
support this in the Supreme Court decision. At p. 676, the Supreme Court notes:
‘The assessee in Civil Appeal No. 1180 of 2015 assails the finding that such
receipts, to the extent they were beyond the limits specified in the Government
notification dated August 9, 2001 issued under section 79A of the Maharashtra
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960…was exigible to tax falling beyond the
mutuality doctrine.’ In this regard, the Supreme Court held (p. 684): ‘Civil
Appeal No. 1180 of 2015 preferred by the assessee-society is allowed.’

 

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

15 On identical facts, earlier same view was
expressed by the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in
The Friends Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd. vs. ITO (ITA No.
962/Mum/2010)(Order dated October 22, 2010). For identical views, see ITO vs. Presidency Co-operative
Housing Society Ltd. (ITA No. 6076/M/2017)
(Order dated December 5, 2017). See also Hatkesh Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT [2017]
10 ITR-OL 263 (Bom).

16 The Court followed Mittal Court Premises Co-operative
Society Ltd. vs. ITO [2010] 320 ITR 414 (Bom)
(later affirmed by the Supreme Court).

17 Circular No. CHS-2001/M. No. 188/14-C
dated August 9, 2001 issued under section 79A of the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960, by the Cooperation & Textile Department, Government of
Maharashtra. The validity of this circular was upheld in
New India Co-operative Housing
Society vs. State

of
Maharashtra [2013] 2 MHLJ 666 (Bom).


Earlier, in CIT
vs. Darbhanga Mansion Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (ITXA No. 1474 of 2012)
(Order dated December 18, 2014)
18 the Bombay High Court held
that even if the amount of transfer fee collected exceeds the limit of Rs.
25,000 it is non-taxable on the principle of mutuality, because the
applicability of the principle of mutuality is not dependent upon the amount.

 

In view of the
above, it is submitted that the voluntary contribution collected by a Society
over and above the limit specified in the Government notification gets the
shelter of the doctrine of mutuality and hence is non-taxable. It is noteworthy
that this will not be affected even if it is found that the contribution is not
voluntary but involuntary.19

 

SECTION 56(2)(x): APPLICABLE TO TRANSFER FEE?

Section 56(2)(x)20
of the Act contains a legal fiction to the effect that where any person
receives any benefit in terms of money or money’s worth, without consideration
or for inadequate consideration, such benefit is taxable as income in his hands
under the head ‘Income from other sources’. In effect, a gift or deemed gift is
subjected to tax as income in the hands of the recipient.21 This
provision encompasses within its fold three types of gifts: (i) sum of money
(b) immovable property and (iii) property22 other than an immovable
property. There is a threshold exemption of Rs. 50,000 of such gift from this
tax. There are of course some exemptions from this charge, contained in the proviso
to section 56(2)(x), such as gift received from any relative, gift received on
the occasion of marriage, etc.

 

Can the Department
contend that the Society has ‘received’ the transfer fee from a member without
consideration and therefore is taxable as income under section 56(2)(x)?

 

As discussed above,
a Society is a mutual benefit association governed by the doctrine of
mutuality, and the principle of mutuality is premised on the theory that a
person cannot make a profit from himself and an amount received from
oneself, therefore, cannot be regarded as income and taxable.23
Thus, the Society and the members constitute ‘one person’ and not two persons.
Incorporation as a Society is only a convenient mode. It is held that the word
‘received’  implies two persons, namely,
the person who receives and the person from whom he receives; a person cannot
receive a thing from himself. [Rai Bahadur Sundar Das vs. The Collector
of Gujarat (1922) ITC 189, 192 (Lahore).]
Since the Society and the
members constitute one person, the Society cannot be said to have ‘received’
the sum of money from another person (member) and hence the transaction does
not fall within the purview of section 56(2)(x) at all.24 Thus,
section 56(2)(x) does not override, or carve an exception to, the principle of mutuality. It is pertinent to note that
even in the contexts of sales tax25 and service tax26, it
is settled that in the case of a mutual concern, there is only one person and
there are no two persons involved and therefore there cannot be any ‘sale’ by
one person to another to be subjected to sales tax and that there is no
‘service provided’ by one person to another and therefore there is no question
of charging service tax.

 

It can be argued
alternatively that the transfer fee is paid by a member to the Society for
discharging the obligation cast upon him by the bye-laws of the Society and
hence it is not ‘without consideration’ and hence it does not fall within the
purview of section 56(2)(x).

 

It can also be further contended that the member paying the transfer
fee to the Society receives the consideration  in the form of all amenities and facilities of
the Society, including particularly good maintenance of the building in which
such member lives; and, therefore, there is a consideration for payment of
transfer fee. As such, the Society does not receive it
‘without
consideration’ and hence it does not fall
within the purview of section 56(2)(x).

 

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

18 For identical views, see The Friends Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd. vs. ITO (ITA No. 962/Mum/2010)(Order dated October 22, 2010); ITO
vs. Damodar Bhuvan Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (ITA No. 1610/ Mum/2010)
(Order dated September 16, 2011); ITO vs. The Presidency Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd. (ITA No. 6076/M/2017) (Order dated December 5, 2017)
and ITO vs. The Casa Grande
Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (ITA No. 4598/Mum/2014) (Order dated January
29, 2016).
19 See
Sind
Co-operative Housing Society vs. ITO [2009] 317 ITR 47, 61 (Bom).

20 Read with section 2(24)(xviia).

21 As is known, gift-tax, hitherto levied
under the Gift-tax Act, 1958, has been abolished from October 1, 1998.

22 The term ‘property’ is defined to mean
nine specific items enumerated therein (which includes an immovable property).
See the
Explanation
below
clause (x) of sub-section (2) of section 56 with clause (d) of the
Explanation to clause (vii) of sub-section (2) of section
56.

23 See ITO vs. Venkatesh Premises
Co-operative Society Ltd. [2018] 402 ITR 670, 679 (SC).

24 Whenever the legislature intended to tax a
transaction with self, it has provided so by an express statutory provision.
For example, see section 45(2) (conversion of a capital asset into
stock-in-trade) and section 28(via) (conversion of stockin- trade into a
capital assert). (See the observations at p. 41 in
State of West Bengal vs. Calcutta Club Ltd.
2019-VIL-34-SC-ST.)
Section
56(2)(x) is not a provision which would encompass transfer fee within its fold.

25 See CTO vs. Young Men’s Indian
Association (1970) 1 SCC 462.

26 See State of West Bengal vs. Calcutta
Club Ltd. 2019-VIL-34-SC-ST.

It is further
arguable that section 56(2)(x) contains a legal fiction. As is settled, a legal
fiction is created for a specific purpose and it has to be construed strictly27,
and its application has to be confined to the purpose for which it is
created and should not be extended beyond its legitimate field. Section
56(2)(x) (as well as its predecessors) was enacted to
fill the void created by the abolition of the Gift-tax Act, 1958 and to
tax
gifts by one person to another. Going by this principle, it is submitted
that
the transfer fee received by a Society (which is non-taxable on the
principle
of mutuality) cannot be accommodated within the scope and ambit of the
legal
fiction of section 56(2)(x).

 

GST IMPACT

As stated above, in
the contexts of sales tax and service tax, it is settled by the Supreme Court
that in the case of a mutual concern, where the doctrine of mutuality is
applicable, there cannot be sales tax and service tax. A view is maintained
that this judicial position holds good even for the purpose of tax under the
Goods and Services Tax Laws (‘GST Laws’), but there are a few recent rulings to
the contrary. Be that as it may, the position of income-tax on transfer fee
stands concluded in favour of the assessee as discussed above and it will
remain intact and unaffected by some adverse rulings under the GST Laws.

 

TO SUM UP

In conclusion, it
is submitted that all the following amounts received by a Society –
residential, commercial and industrial – on the transfer of a flat / office /
shop / unit are non-taxable on the principle of mutuality:

(i)  the normal transfer fee up to Rs. 25,000;

(ii)  the voluntary contribution / donation by a
member, over and above the normal transfer fee of Rs. 25,000; and

(iii) the premium on transfer
of plots or leasehold rights in plots.

 

27  See Principles
of Statutory Interpretation
by G. P. Singh, ninth edition, page 328.
See also CIT vs. Vadilal Lallubhai [1972]
86 ITR 2 (SC);
CIT vs. Amarchand B. Doshi [1992]
194 ITR 56, 59 (Bom)
and CIT vs. Khimji
Nenshi [1992] 194 ITR 192, 196 (Bom).

 


 

SPOTLIGHT ON MEDIA

Journalists cannot serve two masters. To the extent
that they take on the task of suppressing information or biting their tongue
for the sake of some political agenda, they are betraying the trust of the
public and corrupting their own profession
– Thomas Sowell

 

Media in a democracy is the sole agency for
citizens to get a factual, impartial, multi-dimensional and unbiased glimpse of
the facts as they unfold. It was this responsibility to inform
people that gave it the salutary title of the fourth pillar of democracy.
It was an enabler for citizens to separate fact from fiction, news
from nonsense, and get details not spin.

 

Cushrow Irani, who ran The Statesman, once
said that the press in India is as free as it chooses to be. The
credibility, continuity and need of the media will depend on this choice.

Everyone has preferences and political ones, too, but when one puts on the hat
of a journalist one has to leave those preferences at the door and seek facts.

 

Watching the quality of discourse, bias and even
fear pelted on screen (remember someone predicted millions of deaths within
months), many friends have told me that they have stopped watching the
televised news.

 

Considering the recent events involving media, US
elections and the pandemic, we are faced with more questions: Do
we get news or views? Are views objective and clearly demarcated
from news? Do we see multiple dimensions or a preferred perspective?
What level of responsibility should accompany freedom? Is the
media still a watchdog or are they lapdogs? Is a news anchor /
owner seeking to be a celebrity or a medium? Are the questions
posed on channels meant to find facts or are they traps? Do questions
come from a curious mind or are they leading to prove the anchor right? Is
there expected intellectual honesty and depth in presenting facts and
analysis? Is it a truth-seeking game or a spectator sport?

 

There are practical issues too. High costs for one.
A story could cost a few lakhs for two to three minutes of screen time, whereas
running a panel with screaming guests (even if they are paid) is cheaper
to get eyeballs and TRPs. As per reports, 45% of all revenue of television
channels comes from advertisements. So perhaps it is the sales team that
decides rather than the editorial team.

 

Then there are other issues – Can media be a
business which gives the market what it wants? Should media have an ideology?

(CNN as anti-Trump and Fox as pro-Trump, and the Facebook CEO saying that most
people in Silicon Valley who screen social media are left-leaning!)

 

The greatest outcome of free speech is a free
press.
But often that freedom is taken as a license to drive and control public
discourse. Amidst all this, one looks out for the calm, well-reasoned,
calibrated voice of a reporter.
Remember JRD’s interview on DD? Contrast
that with a ‘senior journalist’ reprimanded by the late President Mukherjee for
interrupting him.

 

Social media felt like the ultimate democratisation
of media for millions. But there is increasing discrimination there in the form
of ‘violating policies’, ‘fact checks’ and ‘labelling’. Twitter put ‘fact
checks’ on Trump but not on the Ayatollah of Iran. A US Senator said last week
that the three Internet companies pose the biggest threat to free speech and to
free and fair elections.

 

We need a level format of accountability and
regulation on the media. Perhaps an internal ombudsman to handle
complaints and an independent commission to hold media responsible so that Imaandaari
is mainstreamed and Yakin is restored. With the business of catching
attention, misinformation and 24×7 discourses becoming the norm, it seems less Mumkin
to achieve that goal. As long as the guardian of truth refrains from being the
butcher of facts, we will see through an ever fuzzy world!

 

 

Raman
Jokhakar

Editor

DO YOU HAVE A KRISHNA IN YOUR LIFE?

For many of us, the answer to the question
may be an obvious yes. But first a story which needs retelling only to put
things in perspective.

 

Arjuna was the third of the Pandavas in the
epic Mahabharat. He was a great archer, a mighty warrior and a key
player in the Kurukshetra war of the Pandavas against their cousins, the
Kauravas.

 

When they entered the battlefield of
Kurukshetra to ultimately fight a bloody battle for 18 days, the Pandavas,
including Arjuna, knew against whom they were fighting. However, on the day
when the opposing armies assembled facing each other, Arjuna developed cold
feet when he saw the line-up of his own elders and cousins on the other side.

 

He expressed his predicament to Krishna who
was his charioteer. Gita, the holy book, begins with what is variously
called as Arjuna’s dilemma, anguish, despair or confusion. The conversation
that follows is what we understand as the Gita. At the end of the
conversation, Arjuna decides to go ahead with the battle. And the rest is
history.

 

We, in the profession, acquire our
qualifications, groom ourselves as professionals, gather expertise, gain
experience and command the profession. It is likely that we come to believe
that what is required to continue as professionals is accumulating some CPE
hours of updating knowledge and participating in some seminars and conferences
to keep abreast of professional updates.

 

But here is the point that I wish to make. Do
we as professionals never get caught up in situations where we need to seek
help or guidance? I am not talking of knowledge and skill sets. Kindly recall
that Arjuna did not require to be guided in the skills of archery.

 

There are enough occasions when we, as
professionals, are caught up in predicaments where it is not our knowledge of
the subject which is put to the test. But the dilemma is to be or not to be,
or to do or not to do, or to act or not to act, or to be
inert,
or to say a yes or to say a no – to give a nod of approval
or raise an eyebrow of negation.

 

Whom do we turn to? Saints and seers down
the ages have stressed on the importance of a Guru. Explaining the significance
of a Guru, Kabir had this to say, among the various thoughts that he expressed
in connection with Gurus:

 

‘Guru kumhaar shish kumbha hai

Gadih gadih kaadhe khot

Antar haath sahaar dai

Baahar baahai chot’

 

Likening the Guru to a potter and the
disciple to a pitcher, Kabir says that the Guru hits at the defects of the
disciple with the aim of removing them while supporting and loving him from
within.

 

Unfortunately, we have largely relegated a
Guru to a teacher whom we abandon after acquiring our qualifications. However,
that is not the idea of a Guru handed down to us by the sages. For the purposes
of this write-up, I have therefore changed the metaphor. Do you have a Krishna
in your life who guides you on such occasions? He does not take decisions for
you but does definitely enlighten you enough to take decisions.

 

At the end of
his conversation, Krishna tells Arjuna – ‘Yatha icchasey, tatha kuru’  [As you desire (wish), do thus.]

 

Finally, the choice is yours. However, it is
an informed and a well-thought-out choice. As the poet Robert Frost famously
stated:

 

‘Two roads diverged in a wood

And I – I took the one less travelled by

And that has made all the difference’

 

That brings me back to the question – Do you
have a Krishna in your life?

INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS IN VAT / GST

In this, the second in the series, the compiler shares cases developing
throughout the world on VAT / GST as an aid in grasping the finer propositions
of the GST law in India. After each decision, the compiler has put in a note –
‘Principles applicable to Indian law’. This note is meant to draw the readers’
attention to particular propositions which are relevant. Readers are, however,
advised that provisions in India and abroad may not be similar and the
decisions should not be treated as automatically applicable to Indian law

 

EU
VAT / UK VAT

 

(1)   Composite / mixed supply –
(a) Post-supply activities – Whether changes nature of supply; (b) Inter-linked
contracts – Supply of land subject to condition that the land be further
supplied to an identified third party – Whether both contracts are composite

 

Skatterministeriet vs. KPC Herning [Judgement dated 4th
September, 2019 in Case C-71/18]

 

European Court of Justice

 

KPC Herning
purchased from the port of Odense the land known as ‘Finlandkaj 12’ with a
warehouse built on it. The sale contract was subject to a number of conditions,
including that KPC Herning was to conclude a contract with Boligforeningen
Kristiansda for the purpose of carrying out, on the land in question, a
building project composed of social housing for young persons.

 

Neither KPC
Herning under the first contract, nor Boligforeningen Kristiansda under the
second contract, was formally tasked with the duty to demolish the existing
warehouse on the land under the second contract, though the overall intention
and purpose of both contracts necessarily required demolition of the warehouse
at some stage. In fact, Boligforeningen Kristiansda engaged a third party to
undertake the demolition after the second sale was completed. A question arose
during the VAT classification proceedings as to whether the covenant to
demolish in the second contract formed part of the first and / or the second
contract?

 

HELD

It was held
that both the contracts did not require the demolition of the warehouse which
was existing at the time the two contracts were performed. Demolition was
carried out after the second sale was completed and was an independent contract
between Boligforeningen Kristiansda and a third party. This fact of demolition
could not colour the nature of supply under either the first or the second
supply.

 

Furthermore,
the first and the second contracts were held to be independent of each other.
The mere fact that one contract required the conclusion of another contract
with a third party was held not to make the two contracts a single, indivisible
transaction.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

This
decision is relevant for similar controversies which may arise u/s 8 of the
CGST Act wherein a determination is required as to whether two transactions are
composite transactions and must be classified as a single transaction or
independent of each other.

 

(2)   Whether making and reselling
hay is a ‘business’

 

Babylon Farm Limited vs. HMRC [2019] UKFTT 562 (TC)

 

UK First Tier Tribunal

 

The taxpayer
in this case was doing no activity except making hay for resale, sale of
outbuildings on the farm and undertaking preparatory steps for new ventures
which he wanted to launch. As such, the only income during the year under
question was from resale of hay. The question was whether making and reselling
hay can be said to be a ‘business’ under the UK VAT Act, since the Revenue had
denied input tax credit to the taxpayer on the basis that he was not engaged in
‘business’.

 

HELD

The
definition of ‘business’ is contained in section 94 of the UK VAT Act:

‘(1) In this
Act “business” includes any trade, profession or vocation.

(2) Without
prejudice to the generality of anything else in this Act, the following are
deemed to be the carrying on of a business:

(a) the provision by a club, association or organisation
(for a subscription or other consideration) of the facilities or advantages
available to its members; and

(b) the admission, for a consideration, of persons to any
premises.…

……

(4) Where a
person in the course or furtherance of a trade, profession or vocation, accepts
any office, (the) services supplied by him as the holder of that office are
treated as supplied in the course or furtherance of the trade, profession or
vocation;

(5) Anything
done in connection with the termination or intended termination of a business
is treated as being done in the course or furtherance of that business;

(6) The
disposition of a business, or part of a business, as a going concern, or of the
assets or liabilities of the business or part of the business (whether or not
in connection with its reorganisation or winding up), is a supply made in the
course or furtherance of the business.’

 

The Tribunal
recognised that there is no comprehensive definition of ‘business’ exhaustively
explaining its meaning under the UK VAT law. It therefore relied on the seminal
judgement in the case of Commissioners of Customs and Excise vs. Lord
Fisher [1981] STC 238
to derive the principles of what constitutes
‘business’ in ordinary parlance:

 

(a) a
serious undertaking earnestly pursued;

(b) has a
certain measure of substance;

(c) is an
occupation or function actively pursued with reasonable or recognisable
continuity;

(d) is
conducted in a regular manner and on sound and recognised business principles;

(e) is
predominantly concerned with the making of taxable supplies for consideration;
and

(f) the
supplies are of a kind that, subject to differences in detail, are commonly made
by those who seek to profit from them.

 

The Tribunal
reviewed all the evidence and the submissions in the appeal against these six
criteria and concluded that:

 

(i) The
hay-making activity was being seriously and earnestly pursued by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer organised this activity using the equipment and machinery that had
been in use for many years when he had a larger active farming business. The
taxpayer explained that he and his wife had wanted a farm and had carried on
farming for many years and remained committed to it. Hay-making was the last
part of that activity. There was a single customer of the business who was the
end-user for the hay and there was a clear purpose in producing
the hay.

(ii)   For the same reasons the hay-making activity
had some substance. The supply of hay was zero-rated but was not VAT-exempt.
However, it was a very modest activity carried out on a casual basis.

(iii)  The hay-making activity had been continuous
even though it was seasonal. The taxpayer undertook this activity regularly and
had done so for many years.

(iv) The
supply of hay for consideration was a common activity that was frequently
carried on for profit in agricultural businesses.

(v)    The activity of hay-making was not being
conducted in a regular manner and on sound and recognised principles. The hay
was grown on land belonging to the taxpayer. There was no evidence of the
commercial basis on which the taxpayer was able to carry out the cutting of hay
or any other activity on the land. The hay was cut and baled by the taxpayer on
the machinery he owned and operated. The bales were then sold to a single
customer for his livery business. He fixed the price that he paid for the hay
and decided what costs were borne by the taxpayer and which he or another of
his businesses bore. The activities of the taxpayer did not appear to give rise
to any staff or other costs. It was only the taxpayer’s ownership of the baling
equipment and machinery that was used in the hay-making activity. The single
customer also had a significant say in the manner in which costs were accrued
and the profitability of the taxpayer’s hay-making activities was entirely
dependent on the single customer’s subjective judgement as to where costs and
revenue should be allocated between his various activities.

(vi) The
hay-making activity was not predominantly concerned with making taxable
supplies for consideration. The activity led to little revenue, under £500 per
year. No invoices had been raised by the taxpayer for payment by its only customer
and no payment had been made for the bales of hay for a number of years. The
taxpayer’s activity was not predominantly concerned with making a profit.

 

On this
basis, the activity of making and reselling hay was held not to be a
‘business’.

 

Principles applicable to Indian law:

The UK VAT
Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the stand-alone hay-making activity on
its own cannot be said to be ‘business’. This decision repays study inasmuch as
it carefully dissects the various elements of the ordinary meaning of
‘business’. Lord Fisher’s (Supra) judgement is a decision
rendered under the UK VAT Act and hence is relevant in the Indian context –
except that the UK Tribunal seems to give some weightage to the profit motive
element. In India, the definition of ‘business’ in the Indian GST law makes the
profit motive irrelevant.

 

However, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained in the case of a similar definition in
sales tax statutes in CST vs. Sai Publication Fund (2002) 126 STC 288 (SC) that even if
the profit motive is irrelevant under the statute, the activity must still have an underlying commercial nature. The UK
VAT Tribunal’s observations as to lack of commercial nature are therefore
relevant in the Indian context.

 

NEW ZEALAND GST

 

(3)   Collection of GST and
non-payment – Penalties – New GST regime – Principles

 

Hannigan vs. Inland Revenue Department [(1988) 10 NZTC 5162]

 

High Court, New Zealand

 

The taxpayer
had collected tax but not paid the same. Regarding the penalty levied on him,
the High Court of New Zealand held that the principle of proportionality will
apply and certain mitigating factors must be taken into account. In particular,
the observations on the GST law being a new law (at that time in New Zealand)
are relevant to our Indian circumstances today:

‘…I am
reluctant at this stage and on this particular appeal to lay down general
guidelines as to the quantum of fines.

 

In the first place,
I imagine that the circumstances will vary enormously. There will be single
traders who, simply from inability to cope with the requirements of present-day
society, have not complied with the law. There may not be substantial sums of
money involved. There may be larger organisations who appear wilfully to have
ignored their legal obligations. There may even, indeed, be offenders who
prefer to face the fine rather than make the payment which is a necessary
consequence of making the return on the due date. Obviously, the fine must be
tempered to the circumstance and in particular must be tempered to the fact
that there are advantages to traders in delaying paying over the GST which they
have recovered. On the other hand, this is new legislation. The stage may not
yet have been reached where it is appropriate to lay down an indication that
offences of this kind will always be treated seriously and by way of the
imposition of a substantial fine. I do not doubt that that day will be
appropriate (sic), but it may be that the Act should be given two or
three years of operation before such a step is taken.’
 

RETROSPECTIVE IMPACT OF BENEFICIAL PROVISO – SECTION 40(a)(ia) & (i)

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

In computing the income under the head ‘Profit and
Gains from Business and Profession’, several expenditures specified under
sections 30 to 37 are allowed as deductions. The deductions, however, are
subject to the provisions of sections 38 to 43B of the Act. These provisions of
law stipulate that an expenditure, otherwise allowable, would not be allowed to
be deducted or fully deducted in computing the business income. One such
provision is contained in sub clause (ia) of clause (a) of section 40 of the
Act. The said provision at present provides that 30% of an expenditure shall
not be deducted in computing the business income, involving payments to the
residents on which tax was deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and, such
tax has not been deducted or, after deduction, has not been paid by the due
date for filing the return of income specified u/s 139(1) of the Act. This
provision introduced by the Finance Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1st April, 2005
has been amended from time to time. A similar provision, in the form of section
40(a)(i), exists for disallowance of expenditure on payments made to
non-residents.

 

A proviso was introduced by the Finance Act, 2008 with
retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005 to relax the rigors of
disallowance in cases where the assessee has otherwise paid the tax deducted,
after the end of the year, at any time before the due date of filing return of
income. Since then, the benefit of this proviso is now conferred under the main
provision itself. The said proviso is substituted by the Finance Act, 2010
w.e.f. 1st April, 2010 to provide for deduction in any other year,
other than the year of expenditure, in which the tax has been paid.

 

The Finance Act, 2012 has introduced the second
proviso w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 to deactivate the disallowance
provision in the case of an assessee who is not deemed to be an assessee in
default under the first proviso to section 201(1); in such a case it shall be
deemed that the assessee has deducted and paid the tax on the date of
furnishing the return of income by the payee in question.

 

Section 201 provides for the consequences of failure
to deduct tax at source or to pay as per the provisions of Chapter XVII-B by
treating the person as an assessee in default. The proviso to section 201(1),
introduced by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f. 1st July, 2012, relaxes
the rigors of the consequences of failure in cases where the payee of the
expenditure has paid the tax due on his income, including the sum of
expenditure, has furnished the return of income u/s 139 and has issued a
certificate to this effect in the prescribed form.

 

It is seen that the provisions of disallowance are
being relaxed by amendments from time to time to alleviate the harsh consequences
of disallowance. All of these amendments are introduced with prospective effect
and apparently do not help cases of assessees with defaults prior to the date
of introduction of the relief. Naturally, attempts are regularly made by the
assessees to seek retrospective application of the amendments for obtaining
relief otherwise made available prospectively, which attempts are resisted by
the Revenue authorities. The conflict about the date of application of the
second proviso to section 40(a)(ia), introduced by the Finance Act, 2012 w.e.f.
1st April, 2013 has reached the courts and conflicting decisions are
available on the subject. The Kerala High Court has consistently held that the
amendment is prospective in its application, while the Delhi, Allahabad,
Bombay, Karnataka, Punjab and Haryana High Courts have held that the benefit of
the second proviso is available retrospectively.

 

THE CASE OF THOMAS GEORGE MUTHOOT & ORS.

The issue came up for consideration before the Kerala
High Court in the case of Thomas George Muthoot & Ors. vs. CIT, 287
CTR 101
. During the relevant assessment years, the assessees had paid
interest on amounts drawn by them from partnership firms of which they were
partners, without deduction of tax at source as was provided under Chapter
XVII-B of the IT Act, 1961. For that reason, the interest paid was disallowed
by the AO in terms of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. The order passed by the AO
was confirmed by the CIT(A) and further appeals filed before the Tribunal were
dismissed by a common order dated 28th August, 2014. Aggrieved by
the orders passed by the Tribunal, the assessees filed appeals before the High
Court, formulating the following questions of law (the relevant ones):

 

‘(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of
the case, did not the Tribunal err in law in sustaining the addition of Rs.
6,28,28,000 by invoking section 40(a)(ia) for the A.Y. 2006-07?

(ii) Did not the statutory authorities and the
Tribunal err in law in making addition under s. 40(a)(ia) when the payee has
included the entire interest paid by the appellant in its total income and
filed return of income accordingly?

(iii) Should not the statutory authorities and the
Tribunal have accepted the contention that the second proviso inserted w.e.f. 1st
April, 2013 was intended to remove the unintended consequences and was a
beneficial provision for removal of hardship and therefore, retrospective in
operation and applicable to the appellant’s case?

 

On hearing the parties, the Court noted that section
194A(1) of the Act provided that any person, not being an individual or an HUF,
who is responsible for paying to a resident any income by way of interest,
other than income by way of interest on securities, shall at the time of credit
of such income to the account of the payee, or at the time of payment thereof
in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever was
earlier, deduct income tax thereon at the rate in force. As per the proviso to
the said section, an individual or HUF, whose total sales, gross receipts or
turnover from business or profession carried on by him exceeded the monetary
limits specified u/s 44AB(a) or (b) during the financial year immediately
preceding the financial year in which such interest was credited or paid, was
liable to deduct income tax u/s 194A.

 

One of the consequences of the non-compliance of
section 194A, as noted by the Court, was contained in section 40 of the Act,
whereunder, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections  30 to 38, the amounts specified in the
section was not to be deducted in computing the income chargeable under the
head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’. It further observed that
among the various amounts that were specified for deduction of tax, clause
(a)(ia) of section 40, insofar as it was relevant, provided for disallowance of
interest payable to a resident, where tax had not been deducted at source.

 

The Court also observed that the assessees were
partners of the firms and during the assessment years in question they had paid
interest to the firms without deducting tax as required u/s 194A. It was in
such circumstances that the interest paid by them to the firms was disallowed
u/s 40(a)(ia), which order of the AO had been concurrently upheld by the CIT(A)
and the Tribunal.

 

The Court took note of the contention raised by the
assessees that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, introduced
by the Finance Act, 2012, was retrospective in operation and as such, disallowance
could not have been ordered invoking section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, relying on
the judgements in Allied Motors (P) Ltd. vs. CIT-2 24 ITR 677 (SC) and
Alom Extrusions Ltd. 319 ITR 06 (SC).

 

It was noticed by the Court that the proviso was
inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 and came into force w.e.f. 1st April,
2013. The fact that the second proviso was introduced w.e.f. 1st
April, 2013 was expressly made clear by the provisions of the Finance Act, 2012
itself and the said legal position was clarified by the Court in Prudential
Logistics & Transports, 364 ITR 89 (Ker.).

 

The Court observed that the judgement in Allied
Motors (P) Ltd. (Supra)
was a case where the Apex Court was considering
the scope and applicability of the first proviso to section 43B inserted by the
Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1st April, 1988. On examination of the
legislative history, the Apex Court found that the language of section 43B was
causing undue hardship to the taxpayers and the first proviso was designed to
eliminate the unintended consequences which caused undue hardship to the
assessees and which made the provision unworkable or unjust in a specific
situation. Accordingly, the Apex Court held that the proviso was remedial and
curative in nature and on that basis held the proviso to be retrospective in
operation. Similarly, the Court noted that the Apex Court in Alom
Extrusions Ltd. (Supra)
following the judgement in the Allied
Motors (Supra)
case, held that the provisions of the Finance Act, 2003
by which the second proviso to section 43B was deleted and the first proviso
was amended, were curative in nature and therefore retrospective.

 

In conclusion, the Court held that a statutory
provision, unless otherwise expressly stated to be retrospective or by
intention shown to be retrospective, was always prospective in operation. The
Finance Act, 2012 clearly stated that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia)
had been introduced w.e.f. 1st April, 2013. A reading of the second
proviso did not show that it was meant or intended to be curative or remedial
in nature and even the assessees did not have such a case. Instead, by the
proviso, an additional benefit was conferred on the assessees. Such a provision
could only be prospective as was held by the Court in Prudential
Logistics & Transports (Supra).
Therefore, the contention raised
could not be accepted.

 

As a result, the Court did not find any merit in the
contention that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) inserted by the Finance
Act, 2012 w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 was prospective in nature. The
relevant questions of law were answered against the assessees and the appeals
were dismissed by the Court.

 

In a subsequent decision in the case of Academy
of Medical Sciences, 403 ITR 74 (Ker.)
, the Court reiterated the
proposition propounded in the cases of Prudential Logistics &
Transports, 364 ITR 689 (Ker.)
and Thomas George Muthoot 287 CTR
(Ker.).

 

SHIVPAL SINGH CHAUDHARY’S CASE

The issue again arose recently in the case of CIT
vs. Shivpal Singh Chaudhary, 409 ITR 87 (P&H).
The assessee in this
case had filed his return of income for the assessment year 2012-13 on 30th
September, 2012 declaring the total income of Rs. 1,25,96,920. The assessment
was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act on 27th February, 2015 on an
income of Rs. 2,45,41,840 by making the following additions / disallowances:
(i) Rs. 1,90,626 u/s 43B; (ii) Rs. 95,31,276 u/s 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of
TDS on payment made for job work; (iii) Rs. 54,045 u/s 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction
of TDS on professional charges; (iv) Rs. 3,47,743 and Rs. 21,313 u/s 40(a)(ia)
for non-deduction of TDS on interest paid; (v) Rs. 17,98,420 out of interest on
the ground that the assessee had paid interest-free loans; and (vi) Rs. 1,500
being charity and donation expenses.

 

In the context of the issue under consideration, the
focused facts are that the assessee during the year in question had debited Rs.
98,99,141 on account of job work, out of which Rs. 95,31,276 was paid to M/s
Jhandu Construction Company without deduction of tax. The AO took the view that
the said payment should have been made only after deduction of tax at source
and, in view of the assessee’s failure to deduct tax at source, the AO
disallowed the payment in question u/s 
40(a)(ia) of the Act. The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A)
pleading that, in view of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act,
payment should not have been disallowed. The CIT(A), after considering the
submissions of the assessee and going through the evidence on record, found
that the assessee had filed confirmation from the party that the payment made
by him to Jhandu Construction Co. had been reflected in its return of income.
Thus, the CIT(A) vide order dated 10th November, 2016 decided the
issue in favour of the assessee, which was upheld by the Tribunal vide order
dated 26th May, 2017.

 

The Revenue, aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal
for the assessment year 2012-13, had filed an appeal before the Punjab and
Haryana High Court u/s 260A of the Act raising the following substantial
question of law:

 

‘Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal has erred in deleting the addition of Rs.
95,31,276 made under s. 40(1)(ia) for non-deduction of TDS on payment made for
job works by holding that the second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) has a
retrospective effect and is applicable to the applicant for the relevant
assessment year whereas the said provisions of s. 40(a)(ia) are prospective in
operation w.e.f. 1st April,2013 as was held by the Hon’ble Kerala
High Court in the case of Thomas George Muthoot vs. CIT (IT Appeal No. 278
of 2014), [reported as (2016) 287 CTR (Ker.) 101: (2016) 137 DTR (Ker.)
76—Ed.]?’

 

On hearing the parties, the Court noted that:

(a) the issue
raised by the Revenue before the Tribunal pertained to the retrospectivity of
the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. Sub-clauses (i), (ia) and
(ib) in section 40(a) were substituted for clause (i) by the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1st April, 2005;

(b) the second
proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was inserted by the Finance Act, 2012
w.e.f. 1st April, 2013;

(c) according to
the aforesaid proviso, a fiction has been introduced where an assessee, who had
failed to deduct tax in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVII-B of the
Act, is not deemed to be an assessee in default in terms of the first proviso
to sub-section (1) of section 201 of the Act, then in such event it shall be
deemed that the assessee has deducted and paid the tax on such sum on the date
of furnishing of return of income by the resident / payee referred to in the
said proviso;

(d)       the
purpose of insertion of the first proviso to section 201(1) of the Act was to
benefit the assessee. It stipulated that a person who had failed to deduct tax
at source on the sum paid to a resident or on the sum credited to the account
of the resident, should not be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect
of such tax, provided the resident had furnished the return of income u/s 139
of the Act, had taken into account such sum for computing income in the return
of income, and paid tax due on the income declared by him in such return of
income;

(e) a mandatory
requirement existed under Chapter XVII-B of the Act to deduct tax at source
under certain eventualities;

(f) the
consequences for failure to deduct or pay tax deducted at source within the
time permissible under the statute were spelt out in section 201 of the Act.
However, under the first proviso to section 201(1) of the Act, inserted w.e.f.
1st July, 2012, an exception had been carved out which showed the
intention of the legislature to not treat the assessee as a person in default,
subject to fulfilment of the conditions as stipulated thereunder;

(g) no different
view could be taken regarding introduction of the second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) of the Act w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 which proviso was also
intended to benefit the assessee by creating a legal fiction in his favour, not
to treat him in default of deducting tax at source under certain contingencies
and that it should be presumed that the assessee had deducted and paid tax on
such sum on the date of furnishing of the return of income by the resident /
payee.

 

From the legal analysis of the first proviso to
section 201(1) and of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, it
was discernible to the Court that according to both the provisos, where the
payee / resident had filed its return of income disclosing the payment received
by it or receivable by it, and had also paid tax on such income, the assessee
would not be treated to be a person in default and presumption would arise in
his favour as noted above.

 

The question that would require an answer from the
Court was whether the insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of
the Act w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 would apply to assessment year
2012-13, being retrospective. In that context, the Court observed that a
similar issue of whether the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was
prospective or retrospective in nature came up for consideration before the
Delhi High Court in Ansal Land Mark Township (P) Ltd. 377 ITR 635 (Del.).
The High Court in that case approved the ratio of the decision of the Agra
Bench of the Tribunal in ITA No. 337/Agra/2013 (Rajiv Kumar Aggarwal vs.
Asstt. CIT)
wherein it was held that the second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) of the Act was declaratory and curative in nature and should be given
retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005.

 

The Court expressed its agreement with the view of the
Delhi High Court in Ansal Land Mark Township (P) Ltd. (Supra),
approving the reasoning of the Agra Bench of the Tribunal upholding the
rationale behind the insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of
the Act, and held that it was merely declaratory and curative and thus was
applicable retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April, 2005.

 

The Court noticed that the Revenue had relied upon two
decisions of the Kerala High Court in the cases of Prudential Logistics
& Transports (Supra)
and Thomas George Muthoot (Supra),
wherein it had been held that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the
Act w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 was prospective and not retrospective.
The Court noted with respect that it was unable to subscribe to the aforesaid
contrary view of the Kerala High Court in the aforesaid two decisions.

 

The substantial question of law was answered against
the Revenue and in favour of the assessee and the appeal was dismissed by the
Punjab & Haryana High Court.

 

The Allahabad High Court in the case of Pr. CIT
vs. Manoj Singh, 402 ITR 238
, concurring with Ansal Land Mark
Township (P) Ltd. (Supra)
and dissenting with Thomas George
Muthoot & Ors.
(Supra) also has held that the second
proviso to section 40(a)(ia) was retrospective in nature. The recent decisions
of the High Courts in CIT vs. S.M. Anand, 3 NYPCTR 383; Principal CIT vs.
Mobisoft Telesolutions (P) Ltd., 411 ITR 607 (P&H); Soma Trg. Joint Venture
vs. CIT, 398 ITR 425 (J&K); Principal CIT vs. Perfect Circle India (P) Ltd.
IT Appeal No. 707 of 2016 (Bom.)
and Smt. Deeva Devi vs.
Principal CIT & Anr. WP No. 3928 of 2018 (Karn.)
, are on similar
lines.

 

OBSERVATIONS

The issue under consideration moves in a narrow range.
There is no dispute about the prospective application of the second proviso to
section 40(a)(ia), for allowance of deduction in cases where the assessee is
not deemed to be in default on payment by the payee of an expenditure, subject
to satisfaction of the prescribed conditions. There is also no dispute that the
said proviso, in express language, is made applicable w.e.f. 1st April,
2013. The dispute is limited to reading the said proviso in a manner that
permits the retrospective application of the said proviso to assessment year
2012-13 and the earlier years.

 

The second proviso to section
40(a)(ia) of the Act reads thus:

 

‘Provided further that where an assessee fails to
deduct the whole or any part of the tax in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter XVI-IB on any such sum but is not deemed to be an assessee in default
under the first proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 201, then, for the purpose of this
sub-clause, it shall be deemed that the assessee has deducted and paid the tax
on such sum on the date of furnishing of return of income by the resident payee
referred to in the said proviso.’

 

Admittedly, this proviso was inserted by the Finance
Act, 2012 and came into force w.e.f. 1st April, 2013. The fact that
the second proviso was introduced w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 is
expressly made clear by the provisions of the Finance Act, 2012 itself. A
statutory provision, unless otherwise expressly stated to be retrospective or
by intendment shown to be retrospective, is always prospective in operation.
The Finance Act, 2012 shows that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) has
been introduced w.e.f. 1st April, 2013. A reading of the second
proviso does not show that it was meant or intended to be curative or remedial
in nature. Instead, by this proviso an additional benefit was conferred on the
assessees. Such a provision can only be prospective.

 

Ordinarily, a law, unless otherwise provided for, is
applicable from the date when it is introduced. This principle holds good even
in a case where the legislature has not expressly provided for the date of its
application. In cases where the date of the application of the law has been
expressly provided for, not much difficulty should arise in holding its
application to be prospective. Further, in cases where the law seeks to cast an
obligation on the subject, it will be fair to hold that such law is applied
prospectively, unless it has been in express terms retrospectively applied by
the legislature.

 

These understandings, so derived, may be materially
altered in cases where the law seeks to grant a relief or where it seeks to
undo an injustice or unfair practice or a prevailing hardship or remedy a wrong.
This is even in respect of the procedural amendments. Looking at the general
principles governing the date of application of the law or an amendment, it was
not very difficult for the five high courts to hold that the second proviso had
a retrospective application, the reason being that it, in essence, sought to
remove a hardship which was unintended and its application in this manner would
not harm the interest of the other party, namely, Revenue, in any manner in
this case.

 

Where a law is enacted to benefit a large section of
the public, the benefit may be applied retrospectively, even where it has not
been expressly so provided. The effect of the second proviso is to simply
remedy a wrong. In the circumstances, it was fair for the courts to have applied
the amendment retrospectively, though it was expressly made applicable
prospectively, by reading the retrospectivity into the law. Such a reading, in
our opinion, cannot be viewed to be doing violence to the law.

 

It is worth noting that most of the high courts have
quoted with approval and appreciation the ratio of the decision of the Agra
Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rajeev Kumar Agarwal vs. Addl. CIT
165 TTJ (Agra) 228.
The relevant part reads thus:

 

‘On a conceptual note, primary justification for such
a disallowance is that such a denial of deduction is to compensate for the loss
of revenue by corresponding income not being taken into account in computation
of taxable income in the hands of the recipients of the payments. Such a policy
motivated deduction; restrictions should, therefore, not come into play when an
assessee is able to establish that there is no actual loss of revenue. This
disallowance does de-incentivise not deducting tax at source when such tax deductions
are due, but so far as the legal framework is concerned, this provision is not
for the purpose of penalising for the tax deduction at source lapses. There are
separate penal provisions to that effect. Deincentivising a lapse and punishing
a lapse are two different things and have distinctly different, and sometimes
mutually exclusive, connotations. When one appreciates the object of the scheme
of section 40(a)(ia), as on the statute, and to examine whether or not, on a
“fair, just and equitable” interpretation of law as is the guidance
from the Delhi High Court on interpretation of this legal provision, it could
not be an “intended consequence” to disallow the expenditure, due to
non-deduction of tax at source, even in a situation in which corresponding
income is brought to tax in the hands of the recipient.

 

The scheme of section 40(a)(ia) is aimed at ensuring
that an expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an
assessee in a situation in which income embedded in such expenditure has
remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee. It is not a
penalty for tax withholding lapse but it is a sort of compensatory deduction
restriction for an income going untaxed due to tax withholding lapse. The
penalty for tax withholding lapse
per se is separately provided for
in section 271C and section 40(a)(ia) does not add to the same. The provisions
of section 40(a)(ia), as they existed prior to insertion of second proviso
thereto, went much beyond the obvious intentions of the law-makers and created
undue hardships even in cases in which the assessee’s tax withholding lapses
did not result in any loss to the exchequer. Now that the legislature has been
compassionate enough to cure these shortcomings of the provision and, thus, obviate
the unintended hardships, such an amendment in law, in view of the well-settled
legal position to the effect that a curative amendment to avoid unintended
consequences is to be treated as retrospective in nature even though it may not
state so specifically… the insertion of second proviso must be given
retrospective effect from the point of time when the related legal provision
was introduced.

 

In view of these discussions, as also for the detailed
reasons set out earlier, the view cannot be subscribed that it could have been
an “intended consequence” to punish the assessees for non-deduction
of tax at source by declining the deduction in respect of related payments,
even when the corresponding income is duly brought to tax. That will be going
much beyond the obvious intention of the section. Accordingly, the insertion of
second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and
it has retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005, being the date
from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2004.’

 

The retrospective operation is substantiated by
relying on the judgement in Allied Motors (P) Ltd. 224 ITR 677 (SC).
That was a case where the Apex Court was considering the scope and
applicability of the first proviso to section 43B inserted by the Finance Act,
1987 w.e.f. 1st April, 1988. On examination of the legislative
history, the Court found that the language of section 43B was causing undue
hardship to the taxpayers and the first proviso was designed to eliminate
unintended consequences which caused undue hardship to the assessees and which
made the provision unworkable or unjust in a specific situation. Accordingly,
the Court held that the proviso was remedial and curative in nature, and on that
basis held the proviso to be retrospective in operation.

In Alom Extrusions Ltd. 319 ITR 306 (SC) also
following the judgement in Allied Motors (Supra), the Apex Court
held that provisions of the Finance Act, 2003 by which the second proviso to
section 43B was deleted and the first proviso was amended, were curative in
nature and therefore retrospective.

 

The issue has been considered by five High Courts to
hold that the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act is declaratory and
curative in nature and should be given retrospective effect from 1st
April, 2005. The finding of the judgement in the case of Ansal Land Mark
Township (P) Ltd. (Supra)
was considered by the Apex Court in the case
of CIT vs. Calcutta Export Co. 404 ITR 654 (SC), in the context
of the first proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, which proviso was held to
be retrospective in nature. It is, however, noted that a Special Leave Petition
is granted by the Apex Court against the judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT
vs. Ansal Land Mark Township (P) Ltd. (Supra) 242 Taxman 5(SC) (St.).

 

The Apex Court in the case of Hindustan
Coca-Cola Beverage (P) Ltd. vs. CIT, 293 ITR 226 (SC)
held that even in
the absence of second proviso to section 40(a)(ia), once the payee has been
found to have already paid the tax, the payer / deductor can at best be asked
to pay the interest on delay in depositing tax.

 

The Kerala High Court, while deciding the cases of Thomas
George Muthoot (Supra)
and Prudential Logistics & Transports
(Supra)
, did not have the benefit of authority of the Constitution
Bench in Vatika Township (P) Ltd. (Supra). In both these
judgements, as observed by the Allahabad High Court in Manoj Kumar Singh’s
case, the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Vatika Township (P)
Ltd. (Supra)
was not considered.

 

The Apex Court in CIT vs. Vatika Township (P)
Ltd., 367 ITR 466 (SC)
while holding that, unless otherwise provided,
an amendment should be held to be prospective and should apply from the date
expressly specified for its application, nonetheless held as under:

 

‘31. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation
has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention
appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective
operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current
activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If
we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force
and not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the
law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his
affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have
been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as
lex prospicit non respicit: law looks forward not backward. As
was observed in
Phillips vs. Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1, a
retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation
by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the
first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past
transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.

 

32. The obvious basis of the principle against
retrospectivity is the principle of “fairness” which must be the basis of every
legal rule as was observed in the decision reported in L’Office Cherifien
des Phosphates vs. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. (1994) 1 AC 486 (HL).
Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose
obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated
as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a
retrospective effect
, unless the legislation is for the purpose of
supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former
legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the
subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various
decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties.
In any case, we shall refer to few judgements containing this
dicta a little later.

 

33. We would also like to point out, for the sake of
completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a legislation, the rule
against a retrospective construction is different.
If a legislation confers
a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on
some other person or on the public generally, and where to confer such benefit
appears to have been the legislators’ object, then the presumption would be
that such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would warrant it
to be given a retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat
procedural provisions as retrospective. In
Government
of India & Ors. vs. Indian Tobacco Association [(2005) 7 SCC 396], the
doctrine of fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute
conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective
operation.
The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a statute
was retrospective in nature, was applied in the case of
Vijay vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 289. It was held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as
a whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be held to be
retrospective in nature. However, we are (not) confronted with any such
situation here.

 

34. In such cases, retrospectively(ity) is attached to
benefit the persons in contradistinction to the provision imposing some burden
or liability where the presumption attaches towards prospectivity. In the
instant case, the proviso added to s. 113 of the Act (surcharge on special tax
in search cases) is not beneficial to the assessee. On the contrary, it is a
provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this, we
have to proceed with the normal rule of presumption against retrospective
operation. Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule
of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation
unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or
arises by necessary and distinct implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is
no more than a presumption and thus could be displaced by outweighing factors.’

 

It is not always necessary that an express provision
is made to make a statute retrospective. In fact, where a prohibition has been
deleted by a subsequent amendment, it is possible to presume that the same was
never in existence. It may be true, as noted by the Kerala High Court, that law
in general has to be applied prospectively, but such a presumption against the
retrospective operation may be rebutted by necessary implication, especially in
a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit
of the community as a whole (Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana, 8 SCC 1,
page 9).
The material to show that the Legislature intended to cure the
acknowledged evil or to remove any such hardship is available in the form of
the Explanatory memorandum explaining the need to introduce the second proviso.
The language used, the object intended, the nature of rights affected and the
circumstances under which the amendment is passed, support that the same is
retrospective in nature.

 

The test to be applied for deciding as to whether a
later amendment should be given a retrospective effect, despite a legislative
declaration specifying a prospective date as the date from which the amendment
is to come into force, is as to whether without the aid of the subsequent
amendment, the unamended provision is capable of being so construed as to take
within its ambit the subsequent amendment [CWT vs. B.R. Theatres and
Industrial Concerns (P) Ltd., 272 ITR 177 (Mad.)].
The Kerala High
Court did not, in our respectful opinion, provide adequate reasons as to how
this test was not met in the case of the second proviso under consideration
here, inasmuch as the amendment made provided an important guideline in interpretation
of the law prevailing before the amendment. This is all the more so where the
Apex Court (in the Hindustan Coca-Cola case) had taken a view
that even before the insertion of the proviso to section 201(1), the payer
could not be treated to be an assessee in default if the payee had paid tax on
such income, implying that the failure to deduct tax had been made good on
payment of tax by the payee. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Act,
2012 in the context of this amendment reads as under:

 

‘In order to rationalise the provisions of
disallowance on account of non-deduction of tax from the payments made to a
resident payee, it is proposed to amend section 40(a)(ia) to provide that where
an assessee makes payment of the nature specified in the said section to a
resident payee without deduction of tax and is not deemed to be an assessee in
default under section 201(1) on account of payment of taxes by the payee, then,
for the purpose of allowing deduction of such sum, it shall be deemed that the assessee
has deducted and paid the tax on such sum on the date of furnishing of return
of income by the resident payee.

 

These beneficial provisions are proposed to be
applicable only in the case of resident payee.

 

These amendments will take effect from 1st April,
2013 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2013-14
and subsequent assessment years.’

 

The Explanatory Memorandum therefore does indicate
that this was a measure of rationalisation – in other words, to correct
something which was irrational. This amounts to correction of a wrong.

 

An amendment is best considered to be curative in
nature if it is introduced to remove the hardship, more so where the amendment
takes care of ensuring that there is no leakage of revenue.

 

In the context of section 43B itself, the Supreme
Court in Allied Motors (P) Ltd. (Supra), held that the amendment
made in section 43B by the Finance Act, 1987 by way of insertion of the first
proviso is of curative nature and thereby retrospective in application. The
said first proviso was introduced to provide that the payment of taxes, duties,
fees, cess, etc., made by the due date of filing return of income was eligible
for deduction. No express provision was made to provide that the said proviso
had a retrospective effect. In spite of the absence of the express provision,
the Court held that the same was retrospective in nature and should be so
applied in conferring the relief to the assessees.

 

The better view on the subject is to apply the benefit
of the second proviso retrospectively to assessment year 2012-13 and earlier
years by holding that retrospectivity is called for by necessary and distinct
implication and its express application w.e.f. 1st April, 2013
should be displaced by outweighing factors.

 

 

 

COMPOSITION SCHEME – A PUZZLE UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION

Indirect tax is generally perceived as a
transaction level tax, i.e., each transaction is taxed and assessed separately.
It is possible that a person may be liable to pay tax on certain transactions,
while other transactions may be exempted from tax or excluded from the levy
itself. Therefore, in order to ensure that the taxes are discharged properly,
the businessman needs to review each transaction and check for taxability
thereof. Once the taxability is looked into, the next step is reporting the
transaction, claiming input tax credits, making payment of taxes, etc.

 

The above process in the context of the Goods
and Services Tax (GST) has been perceived in the form of filing GSTR 1 (details
of outward supplies), GSTR 2 (details of inward supplies), GSTR 3 (monthly
return and payment of taxes) and GSTR3B (which was introduced as a stop-gap
measure in place of GSTR 2 and 3 but is a statement for claiming input tax
credit and making payment of taxes for a particular month).

 

Even without going into the specifics of the
above process, it is apparent that the same is rigorous and exhaustive in
nature and, most importantly, unyielding for a small businessman having small
value transactions in huge volume (typically the unorganised sector).

 

Considering the time and resources involved in
the above process, GST has been perceived as a hindrance to ease of doing
business because at times it is possible that the time spent on complying with
the law is more than the time spent on doing business itself, which would
perhaps render the entire activity redundant.

 

It is for this reason that like the VAT regime,
even the GST law provides an option to small taxpayers to opt for the
composition scheme and pay a lump sum tax on supplies made based on turnover
without claiming input tax credit and minimum compliances. In this article, we
shall discuss the salient features of the composition scheme and the various
amendments since the introduction of the law. Before proceeding further,
readers may note that the provisions relating to taxation under the composition
scheme have undergone multiple amendments and we have tried to cover the same
in this article.

 

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1.         The
levy of GST is u/s 9 of the CGST Act, 2017 which applies to all suppliers
making taxable supplies. However, an exception is carved out for specific cases
u/s 10 which provides that any registered person, whose aggregate turnover in
the preceding financial year did not exceed Rs. 50 lakhs (which can be
increased up to Rs. 1.50 crores vide notification) may, instead of paying tax
u/s 9, i.e., under the normal scheme, opt to pay tax at such rate as may be
prescribed.

 

2.         The
turnover limit for opting for composition scheme, as notified from time to
time, is tabulated below for reference:

 

Notification
No.

Turnover
limit for
non-specified states

Turnover
limit for specified states

08/2017
– CT dated 27.06.2017

Rs.
75 lakhs

Rs.
50 lakhs

46/2017
– CT dated 13.10.2017

Rs.
1 crore

Rs.
75 lakhs

14/2019
– CT dated 07.03.2019

Rs.
1.5 crores

Rs.
75 lakhs

 

 

However, if multiple registrations are obtained
for a single PAN, the option to pay tax u/s 10 will have to be exercised for
all such registrations. It cannot be exercised only for selective
registrations. Further, the following class of registered persons are not
eligible to opt for paying tax u/s 10:

 

(i) A registered person engaged in the supply of
services other than those referred to in entry 6(b) of Schedule II, i.e.,
supply by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever of
goods being food or any other article for human consumption;

(ii) The registered person should not be engaged
in making supply of goods which are not liable to tax under this Act;

(iii) The registered person should not be
engaged in making inter-state supply of goods or services;

(iv)       The
registered person should not be engaged in supplying goods through e-commerce
operators required to collect tax at source u/s 54;

(v)        The
registered person should not be a manufacturer of notified goods;

(vi)       The
registered person should not be a casual taxable person or a non-resident
taxable person (condition inserted by Finance Act, 2019).

 

From the above it is apparent that the
composition option was introduced only for a supplier of goods. However, this
resulted in specific difficulties where a supplier was pre-dominantly engaged
in supply of goods, but occasionally undertook supply of services as well. For
instance, a trader in goods received commission for a one-off transaction.
Under the above conditions, since this would result in the registered person being
engaged in supply of services, he would become ineligible to continue under the
composition scheme requiring him to withdraw and pay tax under the normal
scheme. To overcome such difficulties, a second proviso to section 10(1) was
inserted w.e.f. 1st February, 2019. The proviso provided that a
supplier of goods, opting for the composition scheme, may supply services
provided that the value of supply of service does not exceed 10% of turnover in
a state / UT in the preceding financial year, or Rs. 5 lakhs, whichever is
higher.

 

Further, vide Finance Act, 1994, the option to
pay tax under composition has been extended to suppliers of services vide
insertion of sub-section (2A). The said section provides an option to
suppliers, whose aggregate turnover was less than Rs. 50 lakhs in the preceding
financial year to pay tax under composition, provided they satisfy the
conditions prescribed therein. The conditions are similar to (b) to (f) as
stated above, with the only change being that the conditions apply for services
also.

 

The scope of ‘aggregate turnover’ referred to in
section 10 is to be derived from its definition u/s 2(6) which is defined to
mean aggregate value of all taxable supplies, exempt supplies, export of goods
or services or both, and inter-state supplies of a person having the same PAN
to be computed on an all-India basis, but excluding GST and cess. This resulted
in a lot of confusion because all small businesses which had opted for the
composition scheme would have interest income, which is treated as exempt
service under GST in view of entry 27 of notification 12/2017 – CT (rate) dated
28th June, 2017, resulting in apparent non-satisfaction of the
condition prescribed u/s 10. To resolve this conflict, CBIC clarified vide
Removal of Difficulty Order No. 01/2017 – CT dated 13th October,
2017 that while determining aggregate turnover, the value of supplies shall not
include exempt supply of services provided by way of extending deposits, loans
or advances insofar as the consideration is represented by way of interest /
discount. Further, the Finance Act, 2019 also amended section 10 by inserting
an Explanation to that effect.

 

The rates notified u/s 10 since the introduction
of GST are tabulated for reference:

 

Activity
of Supplier

Not.
8/2017 – CT dated 27.06.2017

Not.
1/2018 – CT dated 01.01.2018

Not.
3/2019 – CT dated 01.02.2019

In
the case of manufacturer

2%
of turnover in a state

1%
of turnover in a state

1%
of turnover in a state

In
the case of a supplier, making supply by way of or as part of any service or
in any other manner whatsoever of goods being food or any other article for
human consumption

5%
of turnover in a state

5%
of turnover in a state

5%
of turnover in a state

In
case of other suppliers

1%
of turnover in a state

1%
of turnover of taxable supplies of goods in a state

1%
of turnover of taxable supplies of goods and services in a state

 

It is not mandatory for a registered person
satisfying the above conditions to pay tax under composition. For this reason,
it has been provided that any person, including a registered person opting to
pay tax u/s 10, shall need to give intimation in the prescribed format
regarding the exercise of the said option. The same is tabulated as follows:

 

 

A person opting to pay tax under the composition scheme in form GST
CMP-01 shall also be required to declare the stock on the date of opting for
composition levy in form GST CMP-03, while a person opting to pay tax in form
GST CMP-02 shall make a declaration in form ITC-03 within 180 days from the
date on which such person commences to pay tax u/s 10.

 

The purpose behind GST CMP-03 as well as GST ITC-03 is to ensure that a
person opting to pay tax u/s 10 of this Act should not have claimed the benefit
of taxes paid on inputs / capital goods lying in stock on the date of opting
for the composition scheme, and for this reason such person is required under
the Act to pay back the benefit taken under the earlier regime / existing
regime either from the balance in the credit ledger or by making a deposit in
the cash ledger. It is also provided u/s 18 that the balance lying in the
credit ledger after making the above reversal shall lapse. Further, Rule 5 also
imposes additional conditions, namely:

 

(a) In case of registered person opting to pay tax u/r 10(3), the goods
held in stock on the appointed day should not have been purchased in the course
of inter-state trade or commerce / imported / received from branch outside the
state or from an agent / principal outside the state;

(b) The goods held in stock should not have been purchased from
unregistered persons, and if purchased from unregistered persons, the
applicable tax u/s 9(4) should have been paid;

(c) The person opting to pay tax u/s 10 shall have to comply with the
provisions of section 9(3) and 9(4), i.e., the provisions relating to payment
of tax under reverse charge shall continue to apply on them;

(d) He should not have been engaged in the manufacture of notified goods
during the preceding financial year;

(e) He shall mention the words ‘composition taxable person, not eligible
to collect tax on supplies’ at the top of the bill of supply issued by him;

(f) He shall mention the words ‘composition taxable person’ on every
notice / signboard displayed at a prominent place at his principal place of
business and every additional place or places of business.

 

Once the option to pay tax u/s 10 has been
exercised, the same shall remain valid as long as the registered person
satisfies all the conditions mentioned in section 10 and the corresponding
Rules. Similarly, once the option is exercised, the registered person shall
continue to pay the tax under this scheme and there shall be no need to file
fresh intimation every financial year.

The important conditions to be satisfied are
that a person opting to pay tax u/s 10 cannot collect tax from the customer and
cannot claim input tax credit, including credit of tax paid u/s 9(3) and 9(4),
i.e., RCM. Further, for all supplies made by a person paying tax u/s 10, a bill
of supply needs to be issued containing the particulars prescribed in Rule 49
of the CGST Rules, 2017.

 

However, once the registered person ceases to
satisfy the conditions prescribed in section 10, he shall start discharging tax
u/s 9 from the day he ceases to satisfy the condition and issues tax invoices
for all supplies made after that
day. In addition, he shall also give intimation in GST CMP-04 for withdrawal
from the scheme within seven days. A person paying tax u/s 10 also has an
option to voluntarily withdraw from the composition scheme even if all the
conditions continue to be satisfied by giving prior intimation in GST CMP-04.

 

Similarly, even the Proper Officer can deny the
option to pay tax u/s 10 if he has reasons to believe that the registered
person is not eligible to opt for the scheme. However, before denying the
benefit, a notice has to be issued in GST CMP-05 asking such taxable person to
show cause within 15 days as to why the option should not be denied. In such
cases, the registered person shall be required to reply in GST CMP-06, post
which the Proper Officer shall issue an order in GST CMP-07 within a period of
30 days of receipt of such reply, either accepting or denying the option to pay
tax u/s 10 from the date of option or from date of occurrence of event of
contravention, as the case may be.

 

Any person who opts out of the composition
scheme, either voluntarily or on account of order passed in GST CMP-07, shall
file a declaration in GST ITC-01 to claim the benefit of tax paid on inputs and
capital goods held on the date when such person switched out of the composition
scheme. However, credit of such inputs / capital goods shall not be eligible
after the expiry of one year from the date of issue of tax invoice relating to
such supply. Further, in case of credit in respect of capital goods, the same
shall be allowed after reducing the tax paid by 5% per quarter of a year or
part thereof from the date of invoice / such other documents on which the
capital goods were received by the taxable person. The declaration in GST
ITC-01 has to be filed within 30 days from the date of cessation of payment of
tax u/s 10.

 

COMPLIANCES

At the time of introduction of GST, a person
paying tax u/s 10 was required to file quarterly returns in GSTR 4 which
contained the details of inward and outward supplies received by such
composition dealers. However, w.e.f. 23rd April, 2019 a person
paying tax u/s 10 is required to file two returns:

(I)        Quarterly
statement in GST CMP-08 containing details of payment of self-assessment tax by
the 18th day of the month succeeding such quarter; and

(II)       Return
for financial year in GSTR-4 by the 30th day of April following the
end of such financial year.

 

A person paying tax u/s 10 has to compulsorily
discharge his tax by debiting balance from cash ledger only.

 

FAQs

Is a taxable person opting to pay tax u/s 10
required to discharge tax under any one of the three options or all the three
options can be opted for simultaneously?

There are different rates prescribed for payment
of tax by a person opting for composition on the basis of whether the supplier
is a manufacturer, or supplier of service covered under schedule II, entry
6(b), or any other supplier. The issue remains that there can be instances
where a supplier eligible and exercising the option to opt for composition is
getting covered under multiple rate entries. The question therefore arises
whether the person will have to opt for residuary entry or opt for specific
entry for each transaction.

 

One possible view is to say that GST, being a
transaction tax, each transaction needs to be analysed separately and tax has
to be paid depending on the nature of the transaction. Therefore, for a
supplier who is engaged in trading as well as manufacturing activity, for
supplies made as manufacturer he should pay tax at the rate prescribed for
manufacturer, and for other supplies (pure trading) he should pay tax under the
residuary entry.

 

Are there notified goods for which option to pay
tax u/s 10 is not available?

The option to pay tax u/s 10 is not applicable
for the  manufacturer of specified
products, such as ice-cream and other edible ice whether or not containing
cocoa falling under entry 2105 00 00, pan masala falling under entry
2106 90 20 and tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes falling under
chapter 24.

 

What will be the implications if a person,
though not eligible to pay tax u/s 10, does so?

There can be instances where a person not
eligible to opt for payment of tax u/s 10 opts to do so. For such cases it has
been provided that in case a person wrongly opts to pay tax u/s 10, the amount
of tax which would have been payable u/s 9 would be liable to be recovered from
such person notwithstanding the fact that the tax has already been paid u/s 10.
In addition, such person shall be also liable for penalty and the provisions of
sections 73 and
74 shall apply mutatis mutandis for determination of tax and penalty.

 

 

VISION VS. EXECUTION

None of us would have
missed seeing, reading, hearing about the economic slowdown. Empirical evidence
sans the media noise does show most economic parameters looking weak if
not bleak. That’s an outcome rather than a problem. Things don’t remain static
or unidirectional and slowing is a part of growing.

 

Governments generally
respond to such problems in short-sighted ways – giving freebies, waivers, tax
reductions, feel-good signals and the like. A common approach often is a mix of
deny, shove it under the carpet, dodge issues, deflect, give a
counter-narrative opposed to facts, blame extraneous factors or past
governments. Washing your hands off and not owning up causes a blind spot for
governments which won’t help address the root causes.

 

The worrying element
is the nature and quality of government response these days. Many issues need a
healthy inclusive debate rather than denial; critical analysis rather than
cherry-picking data; and action rather than justifications.

 

Impact analysis of DeMo: The first major upheaval that jolted the growth
trajectory was DeMo. While it is only fair to give time before analysing
outcomes, after three years there is no action on the data gathered from
deposits made in those few months. There is no report, analysis or action about
a sovereign decision that invalidated 86% of the currency overnight. Aren’t
people entitled to a report on the outcome of such drastic and pervasive
action? So far no one has been punished – as if no one had stacks of
unaccounted cash! And currency in circulation is much higher now, including
higher denomination currency notes. While people were willing and ready to take
the pain of one of the most mismanaged economic operations, the government
seems to have forgotten the sacrifices of people and its own promises.

 

Numbers speak: Several sectors look pale and
sloppy. Consider textiles. In 2018 Bangladesh had a share in world exports of
6.4% (up from 2.6% in 2000) while India had only 3.3% (up from 3.0% in 2000)1
. Investment in Indian economy has been shrinking (from 15% to 5% YOY comparing
2005-11 and 2012-19 under the new series). Add to that the chaos created by sudden,
drastic and constant policy changes. Take the example of automotive sector
  emission standard change; GST credit
issues during the introduction phase of GST holding customers back from taking
decisions.

 

GST: A grand, much awaited and
transformational idea. Equally shallow has been its drafting and
implementation. The FM recently said that GST shouldn’t be damned. At the same
time GST can’t damn taxpayers. How many returns have we got these days? Most
changes made were to correct the flaws of a simple Kanoon! That itself
shows that Kanoon was flawed. During the formulation stage the then FM
did not listen enough. Now the FM wants to welcome delegations with suggestions
to continue endless tweaking of a new law that looks like a pair of trousers
with 700 stitches! Looks like a landmine of notices and reconciliations is
waiting to burst like a strip of firecrackers after GST audit of 2017-18!

 

Informal sector: Shameful to call it so when 80%
find employment in informal sector. Further shame is inflicted on it by
targeting it for running on unaccounted money. It is the only sector that gives
livelihood and dignity to so many. Last month, my carpenter who had deposited
advance in his bank came back saying drawings were blocked. Well, when common
people were asked to bank cash, whose job was it to secure those banked
amounts? Since the PMC bank debacle, the RBI hasn’t had a press conference and
no administrator has been questioned for lack of oversight. It is now following
a path that has failed in the past.

 

NPA: Capitalisation seems more like
taxpayer funding banks to protect their deposits. We all have read reports of a
25 years old private sector bank’s market cap being more than that of 20 odd
PSBs. That says it all.

 

This is not about
blame – it’s about responsibility. FM recently said we all must own up GST; the
question is what should government own up? Who makes the law and who runs it?
Who makes appointments in banks?

 

I wish such a list
gets shorter. I hope all this is temporary and doesn’t last long. Indian
experience tells us that we are yet to recognise that the bridge to grand vision is built by immaculate
execution.

 

 

____________________________________

1  
WTO, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

 

 

 

 

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

 

M/s Reliance Fresh Ltd. vs. ACIT-7(2); date of order: 13th July, 2016; [ITA. No. 1661/Mum/2013; A.Y.: 2008-09; Mum. ITAT] Section 37(1) – Business expenditure – Capital or revenue – Assessee wrongly entered the amount as capital in nature in the books – But in its return of income, rightly claimed it as revenue expenditure – Merely because a different treatment was given in books of accounts could not be a factor which would deprive the assessee from claiming entire expenditure as a revenue expenditure

5.  The Pr. CIT-8 vs. M/s Reliance Fresh Ltd.
[Income tax Appeal No. 985 of 2017]
Date of order: 17th
September, 2019
(Bombay High Court)

 

M/s Reliance Fresh Ltd.
vs. ACIT-7(2); date of order: 13th July, 2016; [ITA. No.
1661/Mum/2013; A.Y.: 2008-09; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 37(1) – Business
expenditure – Capital or revenue – Assessee wrongly entered the amount as
capital in nature in the books – But in its return of income, rightly claimed
it as revenue expenditure – Merely because a different treatment was given in
books of accounts could not be a factor which would deprive the assessee from
claiming entire expenditure as a revenue expenditure

The assessee company was
engaged in the business of organised retail. Its main business was sourcing and
selling fruits, vegetables, food articles, groceries, fast-moving goods and
other goods of daily use and provisions of various related services as a
neighbourhood convenience store. However, in order to expand business, the assessee
was setting up new stores. In its return of income, the expenditure incurred
for setting up new stores had been claimed as revenue expenditure to the extent
the expenditure was revenue in nature and where capital expenditure was
incurred, the same was not claimed as revenue expenditure. However, the
assessee in its books of accounts showed the entire expenditure, i.e., even the
expenditure which was claimed in the income tax return as revenue expenditure,
as capital expenditure. The AO disallowed the same on the ground that the
assessee had itself capitalised the same under the head ‘Project Development
Expenditure’.

 

The CIT(A) held that
since the assessee himself had claimed that these expenses pertained to a
project which had not been implemented, therefore, it could not be allowed as
revenue expenditure and confirmed the order of the AO.

 

Being aggrieved with
this order, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held
that all the expenses were purely revenue in nature. None of the expenses
pertained to acquisition of any capital asset. It was also well settled law
that ‘normally’, the manner of accounting shall not determine the taxability of
income or allowability of any expenditure. The taxability of income and
allowability of an expense shall be determined on the basis of the provisions
of the income-tax law as contained in the Income-tax Act, 1961 and as explained
by various courts from time to time. It was further noticed that nothing had
been brought out by the lower authorities to show that any of these expenses
were capital in nature, except the fact that the assessee had debited the same
under the head ‘Project Development Expenditure’. The assessment of the return
had to be made on the basis of the return filed by the assessee supported with
accounts. While examining the accounts, the return could not be ignored. The
return had to take precedence over the accounts in respect of legal claims. The
accounts had to be seen only to verify the facts. The admissibility of a claim
or otherwise should be primarily and predominantly on the basis of claims made
by the assessee in the return of income, unless the assessee claimed otherwise
subsequently during the course of assessment proceedings.

These expenses were
revenue in nature and should be allowed as such. There was no estoppel
against the statute and the Act enabled and entitled the assessee to claim the
entire expenditure in the manner it could be claimed under the law.

 

Being
aggrieved with the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed an appeal before High
Court. The High court relied on the case of Reliance Footprint Ltd.
being Income tax Appeal No. 948/2014. The Court had, vide order dated 5th
July, 2017, dismissed the above appeal filed by the Revenue on an identical question
as framed herein. Revenue agreed with the position that the decision of the
Court in Reliance Footprint Ltd. (Supra) would cover the issue
arising herein. In the above view, the appeal was, therefore, dismissed.
 

 

KPMG vs. ACIT; date of order: 18th March, 2016; [ITA No. 1918 & 1480/M/2013; A.Y.: 2008-09; Mum. ITAT]

4.  The Commissioner
of Income Tax-16 vs. KPMG [Income tax Appeal No. 690 of 2017]
Date of order: 24th September, 2019 (Bombay High Court)

 

KPMG vs. ACIT; date of order: 18th
March, 2016; [ITA No. 1918 & 1480/M/2013; A.Y.: 2008-09; Mum. ITAT]

 

Section 40(a)(ia) – Deduction at source – Fee for
professional services in nature of audit and advisory outside India without
deduction of tax at source – Payment made outside India was not sum chargeable
to tax in India – Hence, provisions of section 195 were not applicable

 

The assessee is engaged in providing taxation services,
advisory, audit-related and other consultancy services. During the previous
year relevant to the subject assessment year, the assessee had paid fees for
professional services outside India without TDS deduction.

 

During the course of assessment proceedings for the subject
assessment year, the AO disallowed the professional fees paid u/s 40(a)(i) of
the Act to the service providers outside India. This was on account of the fact
that no tax had been deducted at source. The assessee contended that no tax was
liable to be deducted in view of the fact that the payments made to service
providers for service outside India were governed by the Double Taxation
Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) entered into between India and the countries in
which the service providers rendered service.

 

The CIT(A) held that the amounts paid to the service
providers in various countries (except China) were governed by the DTAA. Thus,
the disallowance for not deducting tax was not justified. Thus, the entire amount of Rs. 7 crores which was disallowed was deleted, except the payment of
Rs. 33. 54 lakhs made to KPMG, China.

 

Being aggrieved, both the Revenue and the assessee filed
appeals before the Tribunal. The Revenue was aggrieved with the deletion of
disallowance for non-deduction of tax at source to service providers in all
countries (save China); and the assessee was aggrieved with the extent of the
disallowance for non-deduction of tax at source in respect of payment made to
service providers in China.

 

In the Revenue’s appeal it was found that services received
by the assessee outside India were audit and advisory in nature. It was held
that none of the services had attributes of making available any technical
knowledge to the assessee in India. It was further held that none of the
service providers had a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India. Therefore, the
payment made to the service providers outside India was covered by the DTAA.
Consequently, the same would be outside the scope of taxation in India.

 

So far as the assessee’s appeal in respect of China was
concerned, the Tribunal found that the nature of services was professional and
the service providers had no PE in India. Thus, it was covered by the
Indo-China DTAA and hence not taxable in India.

At the relevant time there was no obligation to deduct tax
at source in respect of fees paid to service providers on the basis of its
deemed income u/s 9(1)(vii) of the Act. It was only by the amendment made by
the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect by adding an Explanation to
section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, that the requirement of the service providers
providing the same in India was done away with for its application; thus making
it deemed income subject to tax in India and required tax deduction at source
by the assessee. However, the Tribunal held that the obligation to deduct tax
cannot be created with the aid of an amendment made with retrospective effect
when such obligation was absent at the time of making payment to the service
providers.

 

Being aggrieved with the Tribunal order the Revenue filed
an appeal to the High Court. The Court held that in terms of section 90(2) of
the Act it was open to an assessee to adopt either the DTAA or the Act as may
be beneficial to it. The Revenue having accepted that the service providers
during the relevant period did not receive any income in view of the DTAA, the
occasion to deduct tax at source would not arise. Therefore, disallowance u/s
40(a)(i) of the Act would also not arise. In the above view, the Revenue was
academic in these facts as the application of DTAA which resulted in no income
arising for the service providers in India was a concluded issue. Thus, the
occasion to examine section 195 of the Act in these facts would not arise. In
view of the above, the questions proposed by the Revenue were academic, as the
basis of the Tribunal’s order was that the amounts paid to the service
providers was not income taxable in India in terms of the DTAA. Accordingly,
the appeal was dismissed.

 

 

Search and seizure – Survey converted into – Sections 131, 132 and 133A of ITA, 1961 – Scope of power u/s 132 – Income-tax survey not showing concealment of income – Proceedings cannot be converted into search u/s 132

15. Pawan Kumar Goel vs.
UOI;
[2019] 417 ITR 82
(P&H)
Date of order: 22nd
May, 2019

 

Search and seizure –
Survey converted into – Sections 131, 132 and 133A of ITA, 1961 – Scope of
power u/s 132 – Income-tax survey not showing concealment of income –
Proceedings cannot be converted into search u/s 132

 

In the case of the assessee petitioner, survey operation u/s 133A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 was carried out which was then converted into search
action u/s 132 of the Act. The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the
validity of the search action with a prayer that the process of search and
seizure be quashed.

 

The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the writ petition and held as
under:

 

‘(i)  A search which is conducted
u/s 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is a serious invasion into the privacy of a
citizen. Section 132(1) has to be strictly construed and the formation of the
opinion or reason to believe by the authorising officer must be apparent from
the note recorded by him. The opinion or the belief so recorded must clearly
show whether the belief falls under clause (a), (b) or (c) of section 132(1).
No search can be ordered except for any of the reasons contained in clause (a),
(b) or (c). The satisfaction note should itself show the application of mind
and the formation of the opinion by the officer ordering the search. If the
reasons which are recorded do not fall under clause (a), (b) or (c) then the
authorisation u/s 132(1) will have to be quashed.

 

(ii)   The summons issued to the
assessee was of a survey and as stated by him he voluntarily disclosed the
retention of cash in his premises. In this situation, it was imperative upon
the officials to have recorded their suspicion to initiate further action if
they wanted to convert the survey into seizure. Besides, the summons issued to
the assessee was totally vague. No documents were mentioned which were required
of the assessee, nor was any other thing stated.

 

(iii)  The income-tax authority
violated the procedure completely. Nowhere was any satisfaction recorded either
of non-co-operation of the assessee or a suspicion that income had been
concealed by the assessee warranting recourse to the process of search and
seizure. The proceedings were not valid. The impugned action of the respondents
is quashed.’

 

Reassessment – Validity of notice – Sections 115A, 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Non-filing of return in respect of alleged taxable income – Notice not automatic – Filing of return not an admission that notice is valid – Assessee exempted from filing return u/s 115A – Investment of shares in subsidiary did not give rise to taxable income – Notice not valid

14. Nestle SA vs. ACIT;
[2019] 417 ITR 213 (Del.)
Date of order: 7th
August, 2019
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment – Validity
of notice – Sections 115A, 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Non-filing of return in
respect of alleged taxable income – Notice not automatic – Filing of return not
an admission that notice is valid – Assessee exempted from filing return u/s
115A – Investment of shares in subsidiary did not give rise to taxable income –
Notice not valid

 

The assessee was a company incorporated in Switzerland. A notice of
reassessment u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was issued to it for the A.Y.
2011-12 for the reason that it had entered into a share transaction. The
assessee filed the return and raised the following objections: (i) that the
assessee’s income from India consisted only of dividend and interest on which
tax had been deducted at source in accordance with the Act or the DTAA; and
(ii) that the share transaction was with its subsidiary and no taxable income
had been generated. The objections were rejected.

 

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice. The Delhi
High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘(i)  Under Explanation (2) to
section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 a notice of reassessment can be issued
in case of non-filing of return of taxable income. The Income-tax Department
has set up a non-filers monitoring system. The CBDT instruction sets down the
standard operating procedure that is required to be adopted in this regard. A
system-generated notice detecting the assessee as a non-filer does not
automatically mean that the assessee has to be issued a notice u/s 148 of the
Act. Even assuming that at the time the notice was issued the AO was perhaps
not fully aware of all the relevant facts, once the assessee submits its
objections, it is obligatory for the AO to apply his mind to those points.

 

(ii)   The averment of the assessee
that during the A.Y. 2011-12 its receipts from its Indian subsidiary was
comprising only of dividend and interest on which tax was deductible at source
and had been deducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act, had not
been disputed by the Revenue. It was also not disputed that the assessee was
specifically exempted from filing the return u/s 115A(5).

 

(iii)  The principal objection of
the assessee that its investment in the shares of its subsidiary could not be
treated as income was well founded. Therefore, the fundamental premise that the
investment by the assessee in the shares of its subsidiary amounted to “income”
which had escaped assessment was flawed. The question of such a transaction
forming a live link for reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment
was entirely without basis. The notice was not valid.’

 

Reassessment – Survey – Sections 133A, 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Notice of reassessment based only on statement recorded during income-tax survey – No material to show escapement of income – Notice not valid

13. A. Thangavel Nadar
Stores vs. ITO;
[2019] 417 ITR 50 (Mad.) Date of order: 25th
February, 2019
A.Ys.: 2013-14 to
2015-16

 

Reassessment – Survey –
Sections 133A, 147 and 148 of ITA, 1961 – Notice of reassessment based only on
statement recorded during income-tax survey – No material to show escapement of
income – Notice not valid

 

For the A.Ys. 2013-14 to 2015-16 the assessee, a partnership firm, filed
returns of income and the returns were processed u/s 143(1) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. Subsequently, survey u/s 133A of the Act was conducted at the
premises of the assessee and a statement of a partner was recorded. On the
basis of the statement, and without any corroborating material, the AO issued
notices u/s 148 of the Act for reopening the assessments for the three years.

 

The assessee filed writ petitions and challenged the validity of the
notices. The Madras High Court allowed the writ petitions and held as under:

 

‘(i)  A statement recorded u/s 133A
of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the course of survey is different and distinct
from a statement recorded u/s 132(4) in the course of search and seizure and
the evidentiary value ascribed to the two is not the same. Whereas u/s 132(4) a
statement recorded by a searching officer is specifically permitted to be used
as evidence in any proceedings under either the 1922 or the present Act, there
is no such sanctity conferred on a statement recorded u/s 133A(3)(iii).

 

(ii)   The utility of a statement
recorded in the course of survey is limited to the extent to which it is useful
or relevant to any proceedings under the Act. Thus, a statement recorded in the
course of survey can, at best, support a proceeding for reassessment. It cannot
be a sole basis for reassessment.

 

(iii)  There was no dispute that
the survey initiated by the Department had yielded no tangibly incriminating
material. In fact, the Mahazarnama of even date revealed as much.
Notwithstanding this, the Department had gone ahead with the proceedings for
reassessment based solely upon the sworn statement recorded u/s 133A from one
of the partners which he had retracted later. The notices of reassessment were
not valid.’

 

 

Reassessment – Settlement of cases – Sections 147, 148, 245C, 245D(4) and 245-I of ITA, 1961 – Order passed by Settlement Commission u/s 245D(4) – Notice for reassessment u/s 148 in respect of issues covered by such order – Not valid

12. Komalkant Fakirchand
Sharma vs. Dy. CIT; [2019] 417 ITR 11 (Guj.)
Date of order: 6th
May, 2019
A.Y.: 2011-12

 

Reassessment –
Settlement of cases – Sections 147, 148, 245C, 245D(4) and 245-I of ITA, 1961 –
Order passed by Settlement Commission u/s 245D(4) – Notice for reassessment u/s
148 in respect of issues covered by such order – Not valid

 

The assessee, an individual, had filed his return of income for the A.Y.
2011-12. A search took place at the premises of the assessee on 17th
February, 2012. Thereafter, the assessee filed an application u/s 245C of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 before the Settlement Commission. The application was
admitted and the Settlement Commission passed an order u/s 245D(4) of the Act
on 12th January, 2015. Subsequently, the AO issued a notice u/s 148
of the Act for reopening the assessment for the A.Y. 2011-12.

 

The assessee challenged the validity of the notice by filing a writ
petition. The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

 

‘(i)  There is a difference between
assessment in law [regular assessment or assessment u/s 143(1)] and assessment
by settlement under Chapter XIX-A. The order u/s 245D(4) of the Income-tax Act,
1961 is not an order of regular assessment. An application u/s 245C is akin to
a return of income, wherein the assessee is required to make a full and true
disclosure of his income, and the order u/s 245D(4) of the Act is in the nature
of an assessment order. Therefore, the assessment of the total income of the
assessee for the assessment year in relation to which the Settlement Commission
has passed the order u/s 245D(4) of the Act stands concluded and in terms of
section 245-I of the Act, such order shall be conclusive as to the matters
stated therein and no matter covered by such order shall, save as otherwise provided
in Chapter XIX-A, be reopened in any proceedings under the Act or under any
other law for the time being in force.

 

(ii)   Therefore, once an order is
passed by the Settlement Commission u/s 245D(4), it is conclusive insofar as
the assessment year involved is concerned. The only ground on which an order of
settlement made u/s 245D of the Act can be reopened is, if it is subsequently
found by the Settlement Commission that the order u/s 245D(4) of the Act had
been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation of facts. Therefore, once an order
has been passed u/s 245D of the Act by the Settlement Commission, the
assessment for the year stands concluded and the AO thereafter has no
jurisdiction to reopen the assessment.

 

(iii)  The petition succeeds and
is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned notice u/s 148 of the Act is hereby
quashed and set aside.’

 

 

International transactions – Arm’s length price – Section 92B of ITA, 1961 – Acquisition of shares of 100% subsidiary at premium – Alleged shortfall between fair market price of shares and issue price – That assessee would sell shares at a loss in future thereby reducing tax liability, a mere surmise – Cannot be basis for taxation – Difference cannot be treated as income of assessee

11. Principal CIT vs.
PMP Auto Components Pvt. Ltd.; [2019] 416 ITR 435 (Bom.)
Date of order: 20th
February, 2019
A.Y.: 2010-11

 

International
transactions – Arm’s length price – Section 92B of ITA, 1961 – Acquisition of
shares of 100% subsidiary at premium – Alleged shortfall between fair market
price of shares and issue price – That assessee would sell shares at a loss in future
thereby reducing tax liability, a mere surmise – Cannot be basis for taxation –
Difference cannot be treated as income of assessee

 

For the A.Y. 2010-11, in respect of the
international transactions made by the assessee, the Transfer Pricing Officer
(TPO) made transfer pricing adjustments on account of premium money paid to its
associated enterprise for acquiring its shares and the interest chargeable on
the purported loan transaction. The AO passed a draft assessment order u/s
143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Dispute
Resolution Panel (DRP) held that the premium paid on account of acquiring the
shares by the associated enterprise was taxable as held by the AO and deleted
the interest chargeable on the additional capital investment made to purchase
such shares on the ground that this adjustment done by the TPO was a secondary
transfer pricing adjustment. Accordingly, the AO passed the final order.

 

Both the assessee and the Department filed appeals before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held that no income
arose to the assessee on account of purchase of shares from its associated
enterprise as it was on capital account.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘(i)  Section 92 of the Act
requires income to arise from an international transaction while determining
the arm’s length price. Therefore, the sine qua non is that income must
first arise on account of the international transaction.

 

(ii)   The amount paid by the
assessee to acquire equity shares of its associated enterprise could not be
considered to be a loan to the associated enterprise. The shares which had been
purchased by the assessee were on capital account. The Department had brought
the difference between the actual investment and the fair market value of the
shares (investment) to tax without being able to specify under which
substantive provision such income arose. The distinction which was sought to be
made by the Department on the basis of this being an inbound investment and not
an outbound investment was a distinction of no significance. The Legislature
had made no distinction while it provided for determination of any income on
adjustments to arrive at an arm’s length price that arose from an international
transaction.

 

(iii)  The submission of the
Department that the assessee might sell those shares at a loss as it had
purchased them at a much higher price than their fair market value, which would
give rise to a reduction of its tax liability in future, was in the realm of
speculation and hypothetical. The Department had not shown any provision of the
Act which allowed it to tax a potential income in the present facts.

 

(iv)  The Tribunal was correct in
deleting the transfer pricing adjustment made on account of excess money paid
by the assessee to its associated enterprise for acquisition of shares. No
question of law arose.’

 

Industrial undertaking – Special deduction u/s 80-IA of ITA, 1961 – Computation – Assessee having two manufacturing units – Deduction to be at 30% of profits of eligible business and not of total income

10. CIT vs. Apollo Tyres
Ltd. (No. 5);
[2019] 416 ITR 571
(Ker.)
Date of order: 14th
March, 2019
A.Y.: 1995-96

 

Industrial undertaking –
Special deduction u/s 80-IA of ITA, 1961 – Computation – Assessee having two
manufacturing units – Deduction to be at 30% of profits of eligible business
and not of total income

 

The assessee manufactured and sold automobile tyres and tubes. It had
two manufacturing units. The profit from the eligible business was Rs.
7,16,68,439 and the total income was Rs. 6,46,55,496. For the A.Y. 1995-96, the
AO restricted the deduction u/s 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to 30% of
total income, instead of 30% of the profits of the Baroda unit as claimed by
the assessee.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim. The Tribunal held that according to section 80-IA, for the purpose of
allowing deduction the profits of the eligible unit alone should be considered
as if it was the only business of the assessee.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Kerala High Court upheld the decision of
the Tribunal and held as under:

 

‘(i)  The understanding of the
Department with regard to the scope of section 80AB to enable them to reckon
the deduction at 30%, confining it to the lower extent of the total income from
all sources, instead of reckoning it as 30% of the business profits from the
eligible business, was wrong and misconceived.

 

(ii)   The assessee was eligible to
have the deduction as allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and upheld by the
Tribunal.’

 

Income or capital – Subsidies – Book profit – Computation – Sections 2(24) and 115JB of ITA, 1961 – Receipts and power subsidies granted as incentives by State Government under schemes for setting up units in specified backward areas in State – Capital in nature – Not income – Cannot be included for purpose of computation of book profit u/s 115JB

9. Principal CIT vs. Ankit
Metal and Power Ltd.; [2019] 416 ITR 591 (Cal.)
Date of order: 9th
July, 2019 A.Y.: 2010-11

 

Income
or capital – Subsidies – Book profit – Computation – Sections 2(24) and 115JB
of ITA, 1961 – Receipts and power subsidies granted as incentives by State
Government under schemes for setting up units in specified backward areas in
State – Capital in nature – Not income – Cannot be included for purpose of computation
of book profit u/s 115JB

 

The assessee was a
manufacturer who invested in a sponge iron plant and mega project that made him
eligible for subsidy under the West Bengal Incentive Scheme, 2000 and the West
Bengal Incentive to Power Intensive Industries Scheme, 2005. For the A.Y.
2010-11 the assessee disclosed Nil income under the normal computation and an
amount as book profits u/s 115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the course of
the assessment proceedings, he filed a revised computation of income under the
normal provisions and section 115JB in order to claim deduction of the sums of
interest subsidy and power subsidy amounts received by him under those schemes
as capital receipts which he had treated as revenue receipts in the original
return. The AO treated the subsidies as revenue receipts and brought them to
tax.

 

The Tribunal held that the
‘interest subsidy’ and ‘power subsidies’ were capital receipts and would be
excluded while computing the book profits u/s 115JB.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Calcutta High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and stated as under:

 

‘(i)  According to the West Bengal Incentive Scheme, 2000 and the West
Bengal Incentive to Power Intensive Industries Scheme, 2005 the subsidies were
granted with the sole intention of setting up new industry and attracting
private investment in the State of West Bengal in the specified areas which
were industrially backward, and hence the subsidies were of the nature of
non-taxable capital receipts. Thus, according to the “purpose test” laid out by
the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the subsidy should be treated as a
capital receipt in spite of the fact that the computation of “power subsidy”
was based on the power consumed by the assessee.

 

(ii)   Once the purpose of the subsidy was established, the mode of
computation was not relevant. The mode of giving incentive was reimbursement of
energy charges. The nature of subsidy depended on the purpose for which it was
given. The entire reason behind receiving the subsidies was for setting up of a
plant in the backward region. Therefore, the incentive subsidies of interest
subsidy and power subsidy received by the assessee were “capital receipts” and
not “income” liable to be taxed in the A.Y. 2010-11.

 

(iii)  The amendment to the definition of income u/s 2(24) wherein
sub-clause (xviii) has been inserted including “subsidy” for the first time by
Finance Act, 2015, w.e.f. 1st April, 2016, i.e., A.Y. 2016-17 has
prospective effect and has no effect on the law on the subject applicable to
the year in question.

 

(iv)  Where a receipt was not in the nature of income it could not be
included in the book profits for the purpose of computation u/s 115JB.
Therefore, the interest and the power subsidies received by the assessee under
the government schemes would have to be excluded while computing the book
profits u/s 115JB, when they were capital receipts and did not fall within the
definition of income u/s 2(24).’

 

Section 271AAB – Mere disclosure and surrender of income in statement recorded u/s 132(4) would not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the amount surrendered by the assessee was undisclosed income in terms of section 271AAB of the Act, when the entry and the income were duly recorded in the books of accounts

4.  [2019] 71 ITR 518 (Trib.) (Jai.) DCIT vs. Rajendra
Agrawal ITA No.: 1375
(Jaipur) of 2018
A.Y.: 2015-16 Date of order: 22nd
March, 2019

 

Section 271AAB –
Mere disclosure and surrender of income in statement recorded u/s 132(4) would
not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the amount surrendered by the
assessee was undisclosed income in terms of section 271AAB of the Act, when the
entry and the income were duly recorded in the books of accounts

 

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, filed his return of income declaring total
income at Rs. 12,01,09,200 which included, inter alia, surrendered
income of Rs. 10,87,68,470 on account of long-term capital gain. The assessment
was completed u/s 143(3) read with section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 at
the total income of Rs. 12,24,18,200. The AO also initiated proceedings for
levy of penalty u/s 271AAB.

 

The AO passed the
order imposing penalty u/s 271AAB(1) @ 30% of the undisclosed income. But the
CIT(A) reduced the penalty from 30% to 10%. Aggrieved, the Revenue filed an
appeal to the Tribunal. The assessee also filed a cross appeal.

 

HELD

The question before the Tribunal was whether the surrender made by the
assessee in the statement recorded u/s 132(4) will be regarded as undisclosed
income without testing the same against the definition as provided under clause
(c) of the Explanation to section 271AAB of the Act.

 

It observed that the
term ‘undisclosed income’ has been defined in the Explanation to section 271AAB
and, therefore, the penalty under the said provision has to be levied only when
the income surrendered by the assessee constitutes ‘undisclosed income’ in
terms of the said definition. It observed that in various decisions the
Tribunal has taken a consistent view that the penalty u/s 271AAB is not
automatic but the AO has to decide whether a disclosure constitutes
‘undisclosed income’ as defined in the Explanation to section 271AAB of the
Act.

 

The Tribunal
observed that the assessee had established that the transactions were recorded
in the books and had also proved their genuineness with documentary evidence.
In such a scenario, mere disclosure and surrender of income would not ipso
facto
lead to the conclusion that the amount surrendered by the assessee
was undisclosed income in terms of section 271AAB of the Act. The Tribunal
observed that the document found during search was not an incriminating
material when the entry and the income were duly recorded in the books of
accounts. The Tribunal also held that the statement of the assessee recorded
u/s 132(4) would not constitute incriminating material and said the income
disclosed by the assessee could not be considered as undisclosed income in
terms of section 271AAB of the Act.

 

The penalty levied
u/s 271AAB of the Act was deleted. The appeal filed by the assessee was
allowed.

Tribute


KAHAN CHAND NARANG

(4th September, 1930 – 21st October, 2019)

With the demise
of Mr K C Narang, BCAS has lost a person who has contributed immensely to the
Society, and in particular, been a guiding light for the BCA Journal. I had the
privilege of working closely with him as Co-Chairman of the Journal Committee
and Joint Editor of the BCA Journal, when he was the Chairman of the Journal
Committee and the Editor of the BCA Journal.

As Editor, he
was completely dedicated to the Journal –always brimming with thoughts and new
ideas,with many new features conceptualised and implemented by him. Every
couple of days, I would receive a couple of press clippings from him, on some
topic which he felt was of importance for the Journal. Keeping up with him and
implementing some, out of his plethora of thoughts and ideas, was indeed a
tough job! However, he was extremely considerate towards us juniors, and never
got upset, even when we could not fully implement some of his ideas, or where
we disagreed with him. It was indeed a great learning experience working under
his guidance!

Even at an
advanced age, his dedication to the Journal was such that he continued to read
every month’s journal completely, and give his feedback and thoughts on various
articles and features, besides even vetting some features every month, in spite
of his ill health. He kept himself constantly updated on various professional
as well as other developments, even after having retired from professional
practice many decadesago. We were fortunate to have been associated with such a
true and dedicated professional, who remained so to the very end!

Mr Narang, we
all owe you a huge debt of gratitude. We will certainly miss your insightful
comments starting with “I would turn around and say…..” at our Journal
Committee and Editorial Board Meetings. May you enjoy your well deserved rest
and peace in the arms of the Almighty!

– Gautam S Nayak, Editorial Board

 

In the demise
of Mr. K. C. Narang the profession has lost an eminent member, the BCAS family
a father figure, and the BCA Journal its source of strength and encouragement.
To the members of the journal committee and the editorial board he was a sage
and we always had the benefit of his words of wisdom. His departure is a great
loss to the feature “Namaskar”. He mentored many members of the BCAS family and
honed the skills of several contributors to the Journal. My association with
him increased during my tenure as BCAS President, which was the diamond jubilee
year of the Society. He was instrumental in making the diamond jubilee
conference a success. It is with a heavy heart that one must accept the fact
that his fatherly advice and the affectionate call “beta “are now history!

– Anil Sathe, Editorial Board

 

Great
volunteers are precious – those who serve for decades with passion, commitment,
dedication, concern and detachment. Narang Saheb was such a person. He was
always loaded with ideas for the Journal. Often he would call me over to his
Nariman Point office to discuss thoughts which he would have written down
meticulously. They were not just rough ideas, but ripened and chiseled by deep
thought. At the end of such meetings, he would say – although I have shared
these ideas, but I am detached from whether you take it ahead or not.

He was particular
about time. Always came to 18.15 meetings before time and left at 19.00. In
Journal committee, he was one of those decreasing number of people, who would
bring his own copy which was marked with comments and suggestions. He would
challenge written material, appreciate Editorials and Articles that he liked,
and participated in committee debates on issues that arose during the review.
In spite of age, he was clear and strong. He was particularly concerned about
corporate governance issues and incidents.

The best was he
considered Journal to be part of himself. Often he would ask prospective
authors and obtained articles for emerging current issues and work with them
closely. Till his last days he vetted features on a monthly basis. His WhatsApp
messages ended with God Bless, KCN. As I look at the void created by his
departure, I can respectfully bid him goodbye with the same words!

– Raman Jokhakar, Editor

 

CALCUTTA CLUB CASE: PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY AND ITS RELEVANCE UNDER GST REGIME

INTRODUCTION

‘No man, in my
opinion, can trade with himself; he cannot, in my opinion, make, in what is its
true sense or meaning, taxable profit by dealing with himself
’.1

 

The principle of
mutuality is a concept borrowed from the ‘English decisions’ and has been adopted
and refined over a long period of time by the courts in India. The principle of
mutuality has been mainly held to be applicable in the context of levy of
income tax as well as the erstwhile sales tax regimes.

 

In a landmark
decision by the larger bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of
West Bengal & Ors. vs. Calcutta Club Limited, Civil Appeal No. 4184 of 2009
[reported in 2019-TIOL-449-SC-ST-LB],
it was held that the supply /
sale of goods or rendering of services by incorporated / unincorporated
associations or clubs to their members are not liable to sales tax / service
tax by application of the principle of mutuality even after the 46th
Amendment to the Constitution. Further, the Supreme Court also held that the
judgement in C.T.O. vs. Young Men’s Indian Association (1970) 1 SCC 462
which applied the doctrine of mutuality continues to hold the field even after
the 46th Amendment.

 

BACKGROUND: West Bengal & Ors. vs. Calcutta Club Limited (Supra)

The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes issued a notice to the
respondent club (assessee) proposing to demand sales tax on the sale of food
and drinks to the permanent members during the quarter ending 30th June,
2002. The demand was contested on the ground of principles of mutuality. The matter
was carried to the Tribunal which held that there is no supply or sale of goods
by the club to its members as members and the club are the same persons and
there is no exchange of consideration. The issue was contested before the High
Court by the Revenue. The High Court held that no sales tax could be imposed on
the supplies by clubs to their members.

 

On appeal, the
Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the State of West Bengal vs.
Calcutta Club Ltd. (2017) 5 SCC 356, considering the decision in C.T.O. vs.
Young Men’s Indian Association (1970) 1 SCC 462 and Fateh Maidan Club vs. CTO
(2017) 5 SCC 638
and Article 366(29A) of the Constitution, referred the
matter to a larger bench with the following questions:

 

(i)   Whether the doctrine of mutuality is still
applicable to incorporated clubs or any club after the 46th
amendment to Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India?

(ii)   Whether the judgement of this Court in
Young Men’s Indian Association (Supra)
still holds the field even after
the 46th Amendment; and whether the decisions in Cosmopolitan
Club (Supra)
and Fateh Maidan Club (Supra) which remitted
the matter applying the doctrine of mutuality after the Constitutional
amendment can be treated to be stating the correct principle of law?

(iii) Whether the 46th Amendment by
deeming fiction provides that provision of food and beverages by incorporated
clubs to their permanent members constitutes sale, thereby holding the same to
be liable to sales tax?

 

Levy of
service tax on clubs or associations

In the meanwhile,
the High Court of Jharkhand in Ranchi Club Ltd. vs. Chief
Commissioner of Central Excise & ST, Ranchi Zone [2012 (26) STR 401
(Jhar.)]
and the High Court of Gujarat in Sports Club of Gujarat
Ltd. vs. Union of India [2013 (31) STR 645 (Guj.)]
held that no service
tax could be demanded on the services provided by clubs or associations to
their members by applying the doctrine of mutuality and by relying upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in Young Men’s Indian
Association (Supra).

 

Consequently,
departmental appeals were filed before the Supreme Court against the aforesaid
High Court decisions. In the light of reference to the larger bench of the
Supreme Court in State of West Bengal vs. Calcutta Club Ltd. (Supra),
the service tax matters were also placed before this bench.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE
PARTIES

The submissions
before the larger bench of the Supreme Court by the Revenue and the assessees
could be summarised as below:

 

Revenue:

(a) After the 46th amendment to the
Constitution which inserted Article 366(29A), more specifically clause (e), the
earlier decision holding that there cannot be levy of sales tax on supply of
goods by clubs or associations to their members would no more be applicable;

(b) The supply of food or drink by the clubs or
associations to their members could either be taxed under clause (e) of Article
366(9A) or under clause (f) thereof;

(c) The decisions of the Constitution Bench in the
case of Young Men’s Indian Association (Supra) is prior to the
amendment of the Constitution referred above and the amendment is to do away
the effect of the said decision;

(d) The phrase ‘unincorporated association or body
of persons’ in sub-clause (e) must be read disjunctively, and so read would
include incorporated persons such as companies, co-operative societies, etc.;

(e) The doctrine of mutuality has no application
when a members’ club is in the corporate form. Reliance was placed on the
decision in the case of Bacha F. Guzdar vs. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Bombay (1955)
1 SCR 876,
wherein it was held that a shareholder is not the owner of
the assets of a company and, therefore, the aforesaid principle cannot possibly
apply to members’ clubs in corporate form.

 

Assessees:

(1) The 46th Amendment, which inserted
clause (29-A) into Article 366 of the Constitution, has not done away with the Young
Men’s Indian Association (Supra)
as there cannot possibly be a supply
of goods by a person to himself; and that, therefore, the doctrine of agency /
trust / mutuality continues as before;

(2) Referring to the definition of consideration,
it was contended that the consideration should move from one person to another
and as there are no two persons involved in a transaction between a club and
its members, no consideration is involved and hence no sale is involved;

(3) Clauses (e) and (f) of Article 366(29A) are for
different purposes and the clause (f) cannot be used to tax the supply of food
or drink by the clubs or associations to their members;

(4) On the issue of levy of service tax on clubs or
associations it was submitted that:

(i)   The concept of mutuality as applicable to
supply of goods would equally be applicable to the provision of service by a
club to its members;

(ii)   The definition under ‘club and association
services’ specifically excludes incorporated entities;

(iii)  Similar to Article 366(29A)(e) of the
Constitution, there is no deeming fiction to treat services by clubs to their
members as service liable to tax; deemed fiction in respect of goods cannot be
applied to services, and reliance is placed on the decision in the case of Geo
Miller & Co. vs. State of M.P., (2004) 5 SCC 209;

(iv)  Where supply of food or drinks by clubs or
associations falls under clause (e) of Article 366(29A) in its entirety, there
cannot be any levy of service tax on such transactions as the Supreme Court in
the BSNL case (2006) 3 SCC 1 held that in Article
366(29A) only clause (b) relating to works contract and clause (f) relating to
catering contract can be vivisected into services
and goods;

(v)  Even if it is assumed that the decision of the
Supreme Court in Joint Commercial Tax Officer vs. The Young Men’s Indian
Association (Regd.), Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 462
has been overcome, that
would relate only to sale or purchase of goods and not to services. Therefore,
there is no deeming provision in the Constitution relating to entry 97 of List
I, where a deeming clause is present in respect of service.

 

ANALYSIS OF DECISION

Levy of sales
tax on the goods supplied by clubs or associations to members

The larger bench of
the Supreme Court on the issue of sale of goods by an incorporated or
unincorporated club or association to its members held as under:

 

  •   The doctrine of
    mutuality continues to be applicable to incorporated and unincorporated
    members’ clubs after the 46th Amendment adding Article 366(29A) to
    the Constitution of India;
  •   Young Men’s Indian
    Association
    and other judgements which applied this doctrine continue to
    hold the field even after the 46th Amendment;
  •    Sub-clause (f) of
    Article 366(29-A) has no application to members’ clubs.

 

The reasoning for
the above view is summarised below:

(A) The 61st Law Commission Report,
which recommended the 46th Constitutional Amendment, was of the view
that the Constitution ought not to be amended so as to bring within the tax net
members’ clubs for the following reasons:

(1) The number of
such clubs and associations would not be very large;

(2) Taxation of
such transactions might discourage the co-operative movement;

(3) No serious
question of evasion of tax arises as a member of such clubs really takes his
own goods.

 

(B) Article 366(29A) was introduced by way of the
46th Amendment with a view to expand the scope of tax on sale in
respect of certain specified activities involving supply of goods or supply of
goods and services, which hitherto was held by the Supreme Court in various
decisions as not amounting to sale of goods. However, as regards clause (e) of Article
366(29A), relating to supply of goods by unincorporated associations to their
members, the Court ruled that the 46th Amendment did not overcome
the decision in the Young Men’s Indian Association case and the
doctrine of mutuality remains applicable even after the amendment.

 

It is interesting
to note that the Supreme Court placed reliance mainly on the decision in the
case of C.T.O. vs. Young Men’s Indian Association (1970) 1 SCC 462,
wherein the Association which is a society registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and the issue was whether supply of refreshments by the
society to its members would attract levy of sales tax. It should be noted that
in the said decision, members’ clubs were also a party. The Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court in this connection, referring to the decisions of English
judgements in the cases Graff vs. Evans (1882) 8 Q.B. 373 and Trebanog
Working Men’s Club and Institute Ltd. vs. MacDonald (1940) 1 K.B. 576,

held that there cannot be sale between a club or association and its members
when refreshments are supplied. The Court further observed that the club, even
though a distinct entity, is acting as an agent in supplying various
preparations and the concept of transfer is completely absent.

 

Further, the Court
followed the principle laid out in Young Men’s Indian Association, in
Fateh Maidan Club [Fateh Maidan Club vs. CTO, (2008) 12 VST 598 (SC)]
and
Cosmopolitan Club [Cosmopolitan Club vs. State of T.N., (2009) 19 VST 456
(SC)].

 

(C) The Supreme Court observed that the Statement
of Objects and Reasons for the 46th Amendment states that while sale
by a registered club or other association of persons (the club or association
of persons having corporate status) to its members is taxable, sales by an
unincorporated club or association of persons to its members is not taxable as
such club or association, in law, has no separate existence from that of the
members.

(D) The Supreme Court held that the Statement of
Objects and Reasons did not properly understand the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Young Men’s Indian Association and assumed
that sale of goods by members’ clubs in the corporate form were taxable. The
Court observed that in the Young Men’s Indian Association case,
it had held that sale of goods by an incorporated entity to its members is sale
to self and hence, does not amount to sale of goods for levy of sales tax. The
Court clearly stated that the Constitution Bench in Young Men’s Indian
Association
placed reliance on two English decisions (Graff vs.
Evans & Trebanog Working Men’s Club and Institute Ltd. vs. MacDonald)
which
pertained to incorporated clubs and hence the concept of mutuality would be
applicable to incorporated clubs or associations also.

 

(E) The Supreme Court further held that even in
case of sale / supply of goods by unincorporated associations or body of
persons to members, the requirement of consideration is not fulfilled since in
case of sale of goods to self, there exists no consideration as per the
provisions of the Contract Act, 1872.

 

(F) The Supreme Court also ruled out the contention
of the Revenue that the supply of food by clubs would fall under clause (f) of
Article 366(29A), if not under clause (e), and observed that clause (f) was
specifically brought in to tax supply of food by restaurants and that the
subject matter of sub-clause (f) is entirely different and distinct from that
of sub-clause (e) and it cannot be made applicable to members’ clubs.

 

(G) Unlike the specific provisions under the
Income-tax Act, 1961 such as section 2(24)(vii) or section 45, the absence of
such language in clause (e) to Article 366(29A) is also a pointer to the fact
that the doctrine of mutuality cannot be said to have been done away with by
the 46th Amendment.

 

Levy of service
tax on clubs or associations

The Supreme Court
held that the judgements of the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club Ltd.
(Supra)
and the Gujarat High Court in Sports Club of Gujarat
(Supra)
are correct in their view of the law in Young Men’s
Indian Association (Supra).
It was also held that with effect from 2005
no service tax could be levied on the services by clubs or associations to
their members in the incorporated form. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held
that show-cause notices, demand notices and other action taken to levy and
collect service tax from incorporated members’ clubs are declared to be void
and of no effect in law.

 

The judgement of
the Supreme Court is analysed as under:

(i)   The Court held that for the period prior to 1st
July, 2012, i.e.,  before the Negative
List regime, the definition of club or association as per section 65(2a)
of the Finance Act, 1994 specifically excluded incorporated entities. Thus, the
Court held that incorporated entities providing services to their members would
be outside the service tax net prior to 1st July, 2012.

 

(ii)   The Supreme Court held that companies and
co-operative societies registered under the respective Acts can certainly be
said to be constituted under those Acts.

 

(iii) For the period post-1st July, 2012, the Court,
referring to the definition of ‘services’ as per section 65B(44) of the Finance
Act, 1994 observed that to qualify as service the definition requires the
existence of two persons and the doctrine of mutuality, the doctrine of agency,
trust, as applicable to sales tax cases, would equally be applicable to the
definition of services. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that services by an
incorporated club / association to its members would amount to service to self
and hence would not qualify as service as defined above. [Note: However, the
Supreme Court has not dealt with exclusion of deemed sale under Article
366(29A) from the definition of ‘service’ in section 65B(44) of the Finance
Act, 1994.]

 

(iv)  As regards the Explanation 3 to section
65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, the Court held that the said explanation
deeming associations and their members as distinct persons would not be
applicable to incorporated associations or clubs. Relying on the decision in the
case of I.C.T., Bombay North, Kutch and Saurashtra, Ahmedabad vs. Indira
Balkrishna (1960) 3 SCR 513
, the Court further observed that the
expression ‘unincorporated associations’ would include persons who join
together in some common purpose or common action.

 

SUMMARY AND COMMENTS

In summary, the
supply of goods or services by incorporated / unincorporated clubs or
associations to their members would not be exigible to sales tax or service tax
on the basis of principles of mutuality. The larger bench of the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgement of Young Men’s Indian Association (Supra)
as regards the applicability of the doctrine of mutuality and held that it
continues to apply even after the 46th Amendment.

 

As regards the levy
of service tax on the services provided by the club to its members, the Supreme
Court held that the judgements of the Jharkhand High Court in Ranchi Club
Ltd. (Supra)
and the High Court of Gujarat in Sports Club of
Gujarat (Supra)
are correct.

 

Additional
points to be noted

In the context of
service tax levy on the services provided by clubs to their members, the larger
bench of the Supreme Court did not consider its categorical decision in Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. UOI 2006 (2) STR 161 (SC)
wherein it was held
that the 46th Amendment chose three specific situations: a works
contract, a hire- purchase contract and a catering contract, to bring the
services within the fiction of a deemed sale. Of these three, the first and the
third involve a kind of service and sale at the same time, hence apart from
these two cases where splitting of the service and supply has been
constitutionally permitted in clauses (b) and (f) of clause 29A of Article 366,
there is no other service which has been permitted to be so split.

 

Accordingly, under Article
366(29A) only ‘works contract’ in clause (b) and ‘catering contract’ in clause
(f) are divisible and split between services and goods and, therefore, there is
no question of splitting the deemed sale entry relating to sale or services
provided by the club to its members under clause (e) of Article 366(29A). This
aspect would have categorically ruled out any service tax levy for the period
up to 30th June, 2017. Even Explanation 3 found in the definition of
services u/s 65B(44) would have been restricted only to declared services u/s
66E(h) and (i) corresponding to clauses (b) and (f) of Article 366(29A) of the
Constitution as only those can be vivisected, and as clubs fall under Article
366(29A)(e), the said explanation would not apply as the transaction cannot be
vivisected.

 

Another aspect
which is to be noted from the above decision is that the concept of mutuality
would not be applicable to proprietary clubs. The Supreme Court in the case of Cosmopolitan
Club vs. State of T.N. (2009) 19 VST 456 (SC)
, referring to the English
decisions, brought in the distinction between members’ clubs and the
proprietary clubs as below:

 

7. The law in
England has always been that members’ clubs to which category the clubs in the
present case belong cannot be made subject to the provisions of the Licensing
Acts concerning sale because the members are joint owners of all the club
property including the excisable liquor. The supply of liquor to a member at a
fixed price by the club cannot be regarded to be a sale. If, however, liquor is
supplied to and paid for by a person who is not a
bona
fide member of the club or his duly authorised agent, there would be a sale.
With regard to incorporated clubs a distinction has been drawn. Where such a
club has all the characteristics of a members’ club consistent with its
incorporation, that is to say, where every member is a shareholder and every
shareholder is a member, no licence need be taken out if liquor is supplied
only to the members. If some of the shareholders are not members or some of the
members are not shareholders that would be the case of a proprietary club and
would involve sale. Proprietary clubs stand on a different footing. The members
are not owners of or interested in the property of the club. The supply to them
of food or liquor though at a fixed tariff is a sale.

 

Therefore, in case
of proprietary clubs, the doctrine of mutuality would not be applicable
inasmuch as some of the shareholders may not be members of the club and vice
versa
and outsiders could well use the club. In other words, the clear
mandate would be that the persons participating and persons enjoying should be
the same. If not, mutuality does not exist.

 

One other aspect to
be remembered is that although in the end portion of the judgement relating to
service tax the judgement seems to be confined to incorporated members’ club,
in our opinion it would apply to unincorporated members’ club also for three
specific reasons:

 

(1) The portion of
the judgement which answers the sales tax questions raised clearly covers both
type of members’ clubs and the Supreme Court refers to it when it discusses
service tax;

(2) If incorporated
members’ clubs or associations, where identity can be distinct, can still come
within the mutuality clause, there is no reason why unincorporated clubs or
associations cannot;

(3) Our observations relating to the BSNL case as to why the
transactions of clubs cannot be vivisected would rule out service tax
applicability. Further, the definition of services post-1st July,
2012 specifically excluded these transactions.

 

Whether above
decision is applicable in GST regime

With effect from 1st
July, 2012, GST is levied on the supply of goods or services or both in
terms of section 9 of the CGST Act, 2017. The term ‘supply’ is defined
elaborately in section 7 of the Act to include all forms of supply of goods or
services or both, such as sale, transfer, barter, exchange, licence, rental,
lease or disposal made or agreed to be made for a consideration by a
person
in the course or furtherance of business.

 

 

It shall be noted
that the term ‘business’ that has been defined in section 2(17) of the CGST
Act, 2017 inter alia includes ‘provision by a club, association,
society, or any such body (for a subscription or any other consideration) of
the facilities or benefits to its members’.

 

Further, entry 7 of
Schedule II to CGST Act, 2017 reads as below:

 

‘7. Supply of
Goods

The following
shall be treated as supply of goods, namely:

 

Supply of goods
by any unincorporated association or body of persons to a member thereof for
cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration.’

As per serial No. 7 of Schedule II, the supply of goods by any
unincorporated association or body of persons to its members shall be deemed to
be supply of goods. However, there is no such deeming fiction for ‘supply of
services’.

 

In terms of the
above referred provisions under the GST law, we are of the view that the
decision of the larger bench of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Club
(Supra)
is applicable even under the GST regime for members’ clubs on
the basis of the following points:

 

(a) The doctrine of mutuality continues to apply
under GST law. In terms of section 7, the term ‘supply’ includes sale or
transfer or barter, etc., which requires two persons; further, the said supply
must be for consideration which necessarily involves two or more persons. As
there are no two persons involved in the provision of supply of goods or
services by the club or association to its members, there cannot be any
‘supply’ of goods or services. This is specifically so for members’ clubs.

 

(b) Though the definition of the term ‘business’
includes the provision of facilities or benefits by the club or association to
its members, there is no deeming fiction under the provisions of section 7
which defines the term ‘supply’ to include such transactions. As the supply of
goods or services by the club or association does not get covered under the
definition of supply u/s 7, there is no question of levying GST by referring to
the clause (e) of definition of ‘business’.

 

(c) In terms of section 7(1A) of the CGST Act, 2017
entries in schedule II are only for the purposes of classification and cannot
be read independently. Therefore, no tax could be levied on supply of goods or
services by incorporated or unincorporated associations to their members as the
main section does not cover it.

 

(d) Alternatively, as per serial No. 7 of Schedule
II, the supply of goods by an unincorporated association or body of persons
could be termed as ‘supply of goods’, hence incorporated clubs or associations
cannot be brought under this entry. Further, serial No. 7 of Schedule II only
covers ‘supply of goods’, hence the provision of service by the club or
association to its members remains outside the purview of GST.

 

(e) The ratio of the decision laid out in Young
Men’s Association (Supra)
continues to hold the field that in a
members’ club, the club acts as merely an agent for the principal and would be
covered by the principle of mutuality.

 

In view of the above, the authors are sure
that the dispute would continue under the GST regime but are of the view that
the decision of the larger bench would apply to the GST regime also so as to
exclude members’ clubs from the purview of taxation.

RENEWED FOCUS ON ‘SUBSTANCE OVER FORM’ IN THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TAX

At first instance,
the term ‘Double Irish Dutch Sandwich’ would appear to be an appetising snack.
However, in the world of international tax this has become an unappetising
proposition for multinational corporations (MNCs). This is because ‘Double
Irish Dutch Sandwich’ refers to the use of a combination of Irish and Dutch
companies by MNCs to shift profits to low or no tax jurisdictions.

 

This and other
similar aggressive tax strategies not only help MNCs reduce their effective tax
outgo, but also highlight the shift in mind-set of tax being a cost against
profit, rather than a duty towards society. Many countries have started
frowning upon such investment and operating ‘structures’ and are implementing
various measures both nationally and internationally to address the issue. The
general consensus amongst them is that MNCs should pay their fair share of
taxes in the countries where they actually operate and earn income. In this
context, the two important aspects identified by the world at large are that

(a) certain countries provide aggressive and preferential tax regimes to
MNCs to enable them to adopt aggressive tax strategies (including access to
favourable tax treaties); and
(b) the operations of
MNCs in such countries do not have adequate economic or commercial substance to
justify the income allocated to them.

 

At the heart of
this fairly recent initiative is an age-old concept in tax laws, ‘substance
over form’ – whether the substance of the transaction is in fact different from
what its form is legally made out to be. This article aims to touch upon some
of the recent updates in the world of international tax which have a renewed
focus on ‘substance over form’ and the impact of some of the common structures
involving India.

 

(I)     Meaning of the terms ‘substance’ and ‘form’

‘Substance is
enduring, form is ephemeral’.
These are the words
of Mr. Dee Hock (founder of VISA) which imply that while ‘substance’ is
long-lasting, ‘form’ is transitory. The term ‘substance over form’ is a
well-known,
age-old concept under accounting and tax laws not only in India but even
globally. In essence, the concept requires looking at the real purpose /
intention of the transaction rather than simply relying on the way the
transaction is presented legally and on paper (e.g. accounting entries, legal
agreements, etc.). Black’s Law Dictionary defines the terms ‘substance’ and
‘form’ as under:

(i)    Substance: ‘The essence of
something; the essential quality of something as opposed to its mere form’;

(ii)    Form: ‘The outer shape or structure
of something, as distinguished from its substance or matter’.

 

(II)   Landmark
judgements on substance over form

One of the earliest
landmark judgements in the world in the context of ‘substance over form’ is the
English Court judgement in the case of IRC vs. Duke of Westminster (1936)
AC 1 (HL).
This judgement laid down certain important observations
which have subsequently been applied even by Indian courts. In this case, based
on professional advice, the Duke of Westminster paid his gardener an annuity
instead of wages and the same was claimed as tax-deductible expenditure. The argument
of the tax authorities was that the substance of the annuity payment was to in
fact pay wages, which were household expenses and not tax-deductible. The said
argument was, however, rejected by the House of Lords and Lord Tomlin observed
as under:

 

‘Every man is
entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering
them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the
Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his
ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax. This so-called
doctrine of “the substance” seems to me to be nothing more than an attempt to
make a man pay notwithstanding that he has so ordered his affairs that the
amount of tax sought from him is not legally claimable.’

 

The concept of ‘substance over form’ has also been discussed in Indian
judicial precedents since many years – for instance, the Supreme Court
judgement in the case of Mugneeram Bangur & Co.1  on facts of the case held that the sale of
the business of land development as a whole concern was a slump sale not liable
to tax, even though the Tribunal had factually held that the goodwill component
in the sale was the excess value / profit from stock in trade transferred with
the other assets. In a way, the Supreme Court had upheld the principle of form
over substance.

_____________________________________________________

1   [1965] 57 ITR 299 (SC)

2        [2012] 341 ITR 1 (SC)

 

However, in the
context of cross-border / international tax issues arising from ‘structures’,
the concept of ‘substance over form’ has recently gained more significance from
the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Vodafone International
Holdings B.V.
2  The
judgement underlined the difference between adopting a ‘look-through’ approach
(substance) at the transaction, versus adopting a ‘look-at’ approach (form).
The Supreme Court observed that the following principles emerged from the
Westminster judgement:

1. A legislation is
to receive a strict or literal interpretation;

2. An arrangement
is to be looked at not by its economic or commercial substance but by its legal
form; and

3. An arrangement
is effective for tax purposes even if it has no business purpose and has been
entered into to avoid tax.

 

However, the
Supreme Court also noted that during the 1980s, the House of Lords began to
attach a ‘purposive interpretation approach’ and gradually began to place
emphasis on ‘economic substance doctrine’ as a question of statutory
interpretation. For example, in Inland Revenue Commissioner vs.
McCruckian (1997) BTC 346
the House of Lords held that the substance of
a transaction may be considered if it is a tax avoidance scheme. Lord Steyn
observed as follows:

 

‘While Lord
Tomlin’s observations in the
Duke of Westminster
case [1936] A.C. 1
still point to a material
consideration, namely, the general liberty of the citizen to arrange his
financial affairs as he thinks fit, they have ceased to be canonical as to the
consequence of a tax avoidance scheme.’

 

In the light of
various judgements, the Supreme Court laid down the following rationale in the
context of substance over form:

(i)    The principle of the Westminster judgement is
that if a document or transaction is genuine, the court cannot go behind it to
some supposed underlying substance. Subsequent judgements of the English Court
have termed this as ‘the cardinal principle’.

(ii)    Courts have evolved doctrines like ‘substance
over form’ to enable taxation of underlying assets in cases of fraud, sham,
etc. However, genuine strategic tax planning is not ruled out.

(iii)   Tax authorities can invoke the ‘substance over
form’ principle (or ‘piercing the corporate veil’ test) only after establishing
on the basis of facts and circumstances that the transaction is a sham or tax
avoidant.

(iv)   For instance, in a case where the tax
authorities find that in an investment holding structure, an entity which has
no commercial / business substance has been interposed only to avoid tax, then
applying the test of fiscal nullity it would be open to the tax authorities to
discard such inter-positioning of that entity.

 

It is well-known
that the Supreme Court judgement in the Vodafone case was
significantly overridden through retrospective amendments made in the Indian
tax law in 2012. However, the retrospective amendments did not alter the
rationale that, unless there is conclusive evidence to suggest otherwise, once
a non-resident furnishes a tax residency certificate (TRC) from its home
country, benefits under the applicable tax treaty with India should not be
denied3 .

__________________________________________

3   This was also in line with an earlier Supreme
Court judgement in the case of Azadi Bachao Andolan and Another [2003] 263 ITR
706 (SC)

 

 

To address the
issue of ‘substance over form’, the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) was
introduced in 2012 itself, although it became effective in India only from 1st
April, 2017. Subject to conditions, GAAR now permits tax authorities to deny
tax treaty benefit in India if the main purpose of undertaking the transaction
was to obtain a tax benefit under an impermissible avoidance arrangement in
India. GAAR also permits disregarding or re-characterising any step in the
impressible avoidance arrangement, including deeming connected persons to be
one person, relocating the situs of any asset or place of residence,
disregarding corporate structure or treating equity as debt or revenue item as
capital or vice versa, as deemed fit. Accordingly, the concept of
‘substance over form’ has now been codified under the Indian law with effect
from 1st April, 2017 through GAAR.

 

Further, with India
adopting the Place of Effective Management (PoEM) criteria from 1st
April, 2016 for determination of tax residency of foreign companies in India,
it can be said that Indian tax laws now have greater focus on the concept of
‘substance over form’. This is also the case under the Income Computation and
Disclosure Standard I relating to accounting policies which categorically
states that the treatment and presentation of transactions and events shall be
governed by their substance and not merely by the legal form.

 

(III)  Renewed international focus on substance over
form, i.e., tax planning vs. tax avoidance

In the past few
years, certain large MNCs were found to implement aggressive business /
investment structures (such as the ‘Double Irish Dutch Sandwich’) which shifted
profits to jurisdictions with low / NIL taxes. At times, while the structures
were legally valid, it was found that the economic activities in the
jurisdictions with lower / NIL taxes were not commensurate with the profits
allocated to such jurisdictions. With courts upholding the legal validity of
the structures in light of tax treaties and international tax law principles,
countries realised that tax treaties along with aggressive tax regimes in
certain countries were in fact the thin line that separated fair tax planning
from aggressive tax mitigation / planning.

 

To tackle this
issue, the OECD and G20 countries adopted a 15-point action plan in September,
2013 to address Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). The BEPS Action Plan
identified 15 actions on the basis of three key pillars:

 

(a)   introducing coherence in the domestic rules
that affect cross-border activities;

(b)   reinforcing substance requirements in the
existing international standards; and

(c)   improving transparency as well as certainty.

 

While the concept
of ‘substance’ is one of the three key pillars of the overall BEPS project, it
is discussed in detail in BEPS Action 5: Countering Harmful
Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance.

Further, the concept of ‘substance over form’ has been specifically discussed
in BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits
in Inappropriate Circumstances.

 

The above-mentioned
15 actions have culminated in the formalisation and signing of the Multilateral
Instrument (MLI) which is a landmark development in the context of tax treaties
across the globe. The MLI seeks to modify thousands of existing bilateral tax
treaties through one instrument. It does not replace these bilateral tax
treaties but acts as an extended text to be read along with the covered
bilateral tax treaties for implementing specific BEPS measures.

 

India has deposited
the ratified MLI with the OECD on 25th June, 2019 and notified the
date of entry into force of the same as 1st October, 2019.
Accordingly, covered Indian tax treaties will be impacted from 1st
April, 2020 onwards. Hence, going forward it is imperative that any Indian
inbound or outbound cross-border structuring of investment / business
operations will have to factor BEPS and MLI aspects, if the structuring
involves availing tax treaty benefits.

 

(IV) Concept of ‘substance over from’ embedded in MLI

Part III of the
MLI, which deals with Treaty Abuse, includes two minimum standards / articles
which are sought to be introduced in the covered bilateral tax treaties. These
articles in essence require testing the substance of a transaction /
arrangement before granting tax treaty benefit. A summary of these articles is
as under:

 

1.    Article 6: Purpose of a Covered Tax
Agreement:
This article seeks to act as a preamble to the covered bilateral
tax treaty and clarify that while the purpose of such treaty is to eliminate
double taxation of income, the same should not be used for creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance. Specifically, it clarifies that cases of treaty-shopping for the
indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions would not be eligible for
tax treaty benefits.

 

2.    Article 7: Prevention of Treaty Abuse: This
article seeks to introduce the Principal Purpose Test (PPT) as a minimum
standard in the covered bilateral tax treaty. There is an option to supplement
the PPT with a Simplified Limitation of Benefits (SLOB) clause4.
Further, the PPT can be replaced altogether with a Detailed Limitation of
Benefits (DLOB) clause, if the same incorporates requisite BEPS standards. The
PPT mainly states that tax treaty benefit shall not be granted if it is
reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances,
that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any
arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that
benefit. The benefit would, however, be granted if the same is in accordance
with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the tax treaty.

From the above
articles it can be observed that wherever applicable, a transaction or
structure will need to have adequate economic substance in order to pass the
test laid down by the preamble or PPT article of the MLI.

_________________________________________________

4   India has adopted PPT along with SLOB with an
option to adopt an LOB in addition or replacement of PPT through bilateral
negotiation. However, various important tax treaty partners have only adopted
PPT which means that SLOB will not apply to those tax treaties

 

 

(V)    OECD’s focus on substance to tackle cases of
tax treaty abuse

BEPS Action 6 recognises that courts of some countries have developed various
interpretative tools such as economic substance, substance over form, etc.,
that effectively address various forms of domestic law and treaty abuses. There
is, however, an agreement that member countries should carefully observe the
specific obligations enshrined in the tax treaties to relieve double taxation
in the absence of clear evidence that the tax treaties are being abused.

 

BEPS Action 5 explains that the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) was
committed to improving transparency and requiring substantial activity for any
preferential tax regime in any country. FHTP was to take a holistic approach to
evaluate preferential tax regimes in the BEPS context and engage with non-OECD
members for modification to the existing framework, if required.

 

It has been
categorically explained that the work on harmful tax practices is not intended
to promote harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures generally within or
outside the OECD, nor to dictate to any country what should be the appropriate
level of tax rates. The intention mainly is to encourage an environment in
which free and fair tax competition can take place, i.e., a ‘level playing
field’ through agreement of common criteria that promote a co-operative
framework. The broad steps recognised by BEPS Action 5 are:

 

(i)    Enhanced requirement of having substantial
activity in jurisdictions with preferential tax regimes;

(ii)    Suitably checking the ‘nexus’ of actual
activity in such jurisdictions with the nature of income earned there;

(iii)   Improved transparency and addressing of BEPS
concerns through an agreed framework to exchange information pertaining to tax
provisions and rulings amongst countries;

(iv)   Need for amendments to preferential tax
regimes of countries in line with BEPS;

(v)   Ongoing engagement between FHTP and OECD and
non-OECD members to address BEPS.

The nature of core
income-generating activities, other than for IP activities, specifically
discussed in the BEPS Action 5 in the context of substantial
activity is as follows:

 

Nature of
activity

Illustrative core income-generating
activities

a. Headquarters regimes

Taking relevant management decisions;
incurring expenditures on behalf of group entities; and coordinating group
activities

b. Distribution and service centre
regimes

Transporting and storing goods; managing
the stocks and taking orders; and providing consulting or other administrative
services

c. Financing or leasing regimes

Agreeing on funding terms; identifying
and acquiring assets to be leased (in the case of leasing); setting the terms
and duration of any financing or leasing; monitoring and revising any
agreements; and managing any risks

d. Fund management regimes

Taking decisions on the holding and
selling of investments; calculating risks and reserves; taking decisions on
currency or interest fluctuations and hedging positions; and preparing
relevant regulatory or other reports for government authorities and investors

e. Banking and insurance regimes

Banking: Raising funds; managing risk, including credit, currency and
interest risk; taking hedging positions; providing loans, credit or other
financial services to customers; managing regulatory capital; and preparing
regulatory reports and returns

Insurance: Predicting and calculating risk; insuring or re-insuring
against risk; and providing client services

f. Shipping regimes

Managing the crew (including hiring,
paying and overseeing crew members); hauling and maintaining ships;
overseeing and tracking deliveries; determining what goods to order and when
to deliver them; and organising and overseeing voyages

g. Holding company regimes

Regimes providing benefits to companies
only holding equity in other companies should at a minimum require such
companies to adhere to all applicable corporate law filings and have the
substance necessary to engage in holding and managing equity participation.
For example, having both the people and premises necessary for these
activities to mitigate possibility of letterbox and brass plate companies
benefiting from such regimes

 

Subsequent to the Action
Report 5
, the FHTP published its 2018 report on preferential regimes in
the context of harmful tax practices. An update to the same has been published
on 19th July, 2019. The report explains in detail the activity-wise
review of tax regimes in various jurisdictions and the FHTP’s view on the same.
Some of the key observations arising from the said report for the purpose of
this article are:

(a)   In the context of the first time review of the
substantial activities factor in ‘no or only nominal tax jurisdictions’, the
status of United Arab Emirates (UAE) was ‘in the process of being amended’,
while the status of others, including Bahrain, Bahamas, Bermuda, BVI, Cayman
Islands, Isle of Man, Jersey, etc., was held to be ‘not harmful’. The report
states that while economic substance requirements were introduced in all these
jurisdictions (in case of UAE from 30th April, 2019 onwards) and
domestic legal framework meets all aspects of the standard, there was ‘one
technical point’ in UAE that is outstanding. However, the UAE has committed to
addressing this issue as soon as possible. The technical point has, however,
not been discussed in the report.

(b)   Tax regimes in Mauritius such as ‘innovation
box’, ‘Global headquarters administration regime’, ‘Global treasury
activities’, ‘Captive insurance’, ‘investment banking’, ‘shipping regime’ and
the recently introduced ‘partial exemption system’ are all compliant and not
harmful. The report also recognised the abolition of the tax regime for Global
Business License 1 and 2 holders
in Mauritius.

 

(VI) Steps regarding
economic substance taken by UAE and Mauritius in light of the BEPS Project

It is well known
that UAE and Mauritius have favourable tax regimes (such as non-levy of
income-tax in UAE, non-levy of income-tax on foreign capital gains in
Mauritius, etc.) and tax treaties which allocate right of taxation of certain
income to these countries. This effectively results in double non-taxation.
Accordingly, to address BEPS concerns both UAE and Mauritius have recently
introduced substance norms. A summary of the substance regulations is provided
below:

 

UAE

With effect from 30th April,
2019 all persons licensed by authorities of UAE (including free zones) are
required to meet the economic substance criteria notified. Only commercial
companies with direct or indirect ownership by the government of UAE / its
emirate or a body under its ownership have been excluded from the
applicability of these provisions. The nature of businesses identified is
similar to the businesses explained above in the context of BEPS Action
5

 

It is important to note that all the
covered persons need to file a report on the economic substance requirements
with the regulatory authority (that has issued trade license to it) for each
financial year. Failure to meet the criteria entails administrative penalties
ranging from AED 10,000 to AED 300,000 depending on nature of default

 

It is crucial to understand that the
regulation grants

power to authorised personnel of the
regulatory

authority to enter the covered person’s
business premises and examine and take copies of business documents. The
regulation also permits exchange of

information from Regulatory Authority to
Ministry of Finance in UAE and further with designated foreign

 

authority in cases where either economic
substance test is not met, or in all cases of persons involved in high-risk
IP activities

 

UAE has also published a guidance
document on 12th September, 2019 to further explain the criteria
for meeting substance regulations

Mauritius

Earlier, Mauritius provided deemed
foreign tax credit of up to 80% for taxable foreign income, where creditable
foreign taxes were lower. This reduced the effective corporate tax on such
income from 15% to 3%. Further, a company incorporated in Mauritius was
considered as resident if its central management and control was exercised in
Mauritius, i.e., the test of residency was earlier not based on PoEM criteria

 

However, the Mauritius tax law has moved
from the deemed foreign tax credit regime to granting 80% exemption to
taxable foreign income from 1st January, 2019. No foreign tax credit would be
granted in Mauritius against the balance 20% taxable foreign income

 

Further, a company incorporated in
Mauritius shall be considered to be a non-resident if its PoEM is outside
Mauritius. The guidance provided by the Mauritius authorities states that in
order for a Mauritius company to be held to have its PoEM in Mauritius, its
strategic decisions relating to its core income-generating activities should
be taken in or from Mauritius. Further, majority of meetings of the Board of
Directors should be held in Mauritius or the executive management of the
company should be regularly exercised in Mauritius. The determination of PoEM
would be based on all relevant facts and circumstances considering the
business activities of the company

 

Detailed circulars have been issued by
the Mauritius tax authorities explaining the various criteria to be met by
different types of companies operating in Mauritius under the Global Business
License (GBL) regime (which permits obtaining TRC in Mauritius). Broadly
speaking, a Mauritius company operating under the GBL regime will now be
required to ensure that at all times it carries out core income-generating
activities in or from Mauritius by employing suitably qualified persons and
has minimum expenditure in line with its level of activities / operations

 

From the above table it can be observed that entities / businesses based
out of UAE and Mauritius are now required to meet the enhanced criteria of
economic substance in those jurisdictions to be considered as tax resident in
that jurisdiction and benefit from their tax regimes.

 

(VII)      Impact on
Indian inbound and outbound business / investment structures

In terms of Indian inbound and outbound structures, Mauritius and UAE
have been popular choices for businesses. Some of the common structures are
discussed below along with their impact on account of BEPS.

 

Structure 1: Indian outbound – use of UAE trading company

Facts: XYZ India has incorporated a
trading company, DUB, in one of the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) of UAE. XYZ India
undertakes import from, and export to, third parties through DUB. DUB maintains
a fairly good margin while dealing with XYZ India.

 

Tax advantage: Subject to Indian transfer pricing
regulations, profits earned by DUB are not liable to any tax in India provided
DUB is non-resident in India under the PoEM regulations and does not have a PE
in India. Since UAE does not levy tax on income of companies incorporated in
FTZs, the effective tax rate on profits of such UAE companies is NIL, unless
repatriated to India as dividend.

 

Impact of BEPS: As a distribution /
service centre company, under the UAE substance regulations DUB will be
expected to undertake the following activities in UAE:

1. Transporting and
storing goods;

2. Managing the
stocks;

3. Taking orders;

4. Providing
consulting or other administrative services.

 

Accordingly,
businesses adopting the above structure will now need to factor the substance requirements
in UAE.

 

Structure 2: Indian inbound – use of Mauritius as holding company

Facts: XYZ USA has incorporated a
company in Mauritius, MAU, as a holding company for investment in XYZ India
(made prior to 1st April, 2017). Income of MAU is either dividend
from XYZ India or capital gains from sale of shares of XYZ India.

 

Tax advantage: MAU will not be liable to pay any tax on capital gains earned from
sale of XYZ India since the same are not taxable in Mauritius and are also
grandfathered from taxation in India under the amended India-Mauritius tax
treaty. The dividend income of MAU, which is exempt from tax in India, will be
subject to an effective tax rate of 3%, which is low. Also, Mauritius has
various favourable tax treaties (especially with African countries) making it
an ideal jurisdiction for holding investments.

 

Impact of BEPS: Mauritius has not notified the tax treaty with India under MLI and
hence, the treaty is not currently impacted by MLI. However, the same is
expected to be bilaterally amended on the lines of BEPS and hence the
requirement of substance in the form of the preamble and PPT (or DLOB) is
expected in the future.

 

In the context of
inbound investment structures through Mauritius, past litigation with Indian
tax authorities has been mainly on the ground that the structures lack
commercial / economic substance and are artificially interposed to avail tax
treaty benefits in India. Now, under Mauritius law, MAU will be required to
have PoEM in Mauritius to be eligible for TRC. Further, as an investment
holding company, in compliance with circular letter CL1-121018 dated 12th
October, 2018 issued by the Financial Services Commission (FSC) of Mauritius,
the minimum expenditure to be incurred by MAU is USD 12,000 p.a. (although no
minimum employees are specified). The same will, however, be tested on a
case-to-case basis, as per facts. For instance, BEPS Action 5
states that in addition to undertaking all applicable corporate law filings,
holding companies are expected to have both the people and premises necessary
to ensure that letterbox and brass plate companies do not benefit from
preferable tax regimes. Whether this will impact the substance evaluation in
Mauritius needs to be seen in the future.

 

It may be noted
that the minimum expenditure in Mauritius will be required even though the
India-Mauritius tax treaty does not provide for any such expenditure under its
LOB clause for availing grandfathering benefit for capital gains.

 

Structures 3-6: Indian inbound structures involving UAE or Mauritius
(others)

 

Structure

Nature of income

from India

UAE

(India-UAE tax treaty is

amended by MLI)

Mauritius

(India-Mauritius tax treaty
is not amended by MLI as yet)

Foreign Direct Investment

Capital gains from sale of
partnership interest in an Indian LLP

Not taxable in India under
Article 13(5) of the India-UAE tax treaty. No tax in UAE as well

Not taxable in India under
Article 13(4) of the India-Mauritius tax treaty. No tax in Mauritius as well

Foreign Portfolio Investment

Capital gains from sale of Indian derivatives /
bonds / debentures

Not taxable in India under Article 13(5) of the
India-UAE tax treaty. No tax in UAE as well

Not taxable in India under Article 13(4) of the
India-Mauritius tax treaty. No tax in Mauritius as well

Structure

Nature of income

from India

UAE

(India-UAE tax treaty is

amended by MLI)

Mauritius

(India-Mauritius tax treaty is not amended by MLI
as yet)

Foreign Service companies providing onshore
services in India

Service income not in nature of fees for technical
services

No PE or tax in India unless presence in India of
9 months within any 12-month period. No tax in UAE
as well

No PE or tax in India unless presence in India of
90 days within any 12-month period. Low tax in Mauritius

Foreign Service companies mainly providing
offshore services

Service income in nature of fees for technical
services

FTS is not taxable in India under the India-UAE
tax treaty. No tax in UAE as well

Although FTS is now taxable in India under the
India-Mauritius tax treaty, the same is subject to a low tax rate
in Mauritius

 

Impact of
BEPS:
The above structures seek to obtain tax
treaty benefits in India which may otherwise not be available under India’s tax
treaty with the country of headquarters of the business (say, USA or UK). Any
adverse impact on meeting substance requirements in the UAE or Mauritius could
adversely impact grant of tax treaty benefits in India – especially if TRC is
not granted to entities non-compliant with substance regulations.

 

Accordingly, businesses adopting the above
structures or any other structures involving use of an entity in a preferential
tax regime, in addition to PPT, should factor in the impact of substance
regulations in that country to ensure that the structure is compliant under
BEPS.

 

(VIII)     Parting
note

Considering the intention of the BEPS
project to tackle cases of tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning, it is not
surprising that India has been at the forefront of this landmark global
initiative. In addition to GAAR and PoEM, India has actively also incorporated
BEPS Actions into its domestic tax laws such as:

 

(i)    Country by country reporting (CbCR)

(ii)   Equalisation levy

(iii)
Commissionaire arrangements resulting in taxable presence

(iv) Significant
economic presence (SEP) constituting taxable presence for certain digital
businesses

(v) Limitation on
interest deduction for payments to associated enterprises

 

In fact, as a sign of things to come, the
recently-concluded protocol to the India-China tax treaty incorporated various
MLI provisions within the text of the tax treaty, including PPT (as a
result, India-China tax treaty is outside the purview of the MLI)
.

 

Accordingly, it is expected that BEPS
Actions and MLI will influence the approach of Indian tax authorities in the
future while granting tax treaty benefits in India. One of the key expected
areas of focus is to probe the economic substance of non-resident entities
under BEPS Action 5.

 

In light of the above, reference may be
made to another set of wise words from Mr. Dee Hock, which may be relevant in
the context of the future of international tax – ‘Preserve substance; modify
form; know the difference
’.  

IMPORTANCE OF CYBER SECURITY FOR MID-SIZED ACCOUNTING FIRMS

INTRODUCTION

We live in a
world that is networked together; and network protection is no longer an option
but a prime necessity for small and mid-sized accounting firms that deal with
sensitive client data. It should be seamless and thorough, regardless of
business or organisational standing. We have our own set of measures in terms
of practices and policies (that we have enlisted here) which are essential for
the right amount of preparation vital for optimised security, damage control
and recovery from the consequences of any possible cyber breach episodes.

 

IMPORTANCE OF CYBER
SECURITY FOR SMALL AND MID-SIZED ACCOUNTING FIRMS

Cyber
security is among the top issues currently on the minds of managements and
boards in just about every company, large or small, public or private,
including the small and mid-sized accounting firms. It becomes especially
challenging because while dealing with clients’ sensitive data, there is no
scope for taking things leniently.

 

Cyber
attacks may result in:

(i)    regulatory actions;

(ii)   negligence claims;

(iii) inability to meet contractual obligations; and

(iv) a damaging loss of trust among clients and
stakeholders.

 

Consequently,
it may bring commercial losses, as also loss of reputation, disruption of
operations and sometimes even business closures. Small breaches, if not
addressed adequately, could lead to insurmountable problems. Therefore, it is
better to take preventive measures at the organisational level.

 

By
definition, accounting firms are trusted with some of the most intimate
personal and financial information of their clients. And hackers are
continually trying to get their hands on such critical, private information.
This is a challenge for them but not really too difficult; in fact, it is
extremely simple for them to hack into firms that don’t have appropriate cyber
security measures at the core level. This is the reason that accountants need
to be motivated even more and to be cautious about protecting their client
data.

 

Understanding
the basics of cyber security ensures not only the safety of client information,
but also the longevity of the firm. Accounting companies thrive on their
reputation for privacy, just as much as their ability to crunch numbers, and
cyber security is a vital part of this reputation.

 

As the owner
/ manager of a small accounting, bookkeeping or finance firm, you’ve probably
faced questions about your cyber security and whether your firm could get
hacked in the same way that any larger financial institution might have been
hacked. The short answer is, yes!

 

THE CHALLENGE FOR ACCOUNTING FIRMS

Cyber-criminals
usually target small and medium-sized accounting firms because such
organisations place relatively less emphasis on data security, controls and
risk evaluations; they are, therefore, more vulnerable than the big firms. In
many cases, such firms don’t have sufficient staff in the IT function and not
all staff has the ability to spot these issues, which can prompt further risks.
The senior partners are especially at risk since they are both effortlessly
identifiable on the web and are most likely to conduct online banking
transactions for their practices. Any savvy cyber-criminal knows the steps for
hijacking access to accounts, as well as the security features associated with
online banking.

 

WHY ACCOUNTING FIRMS ARE AT HIGH RISK FOR
CYBER ATTACKS

(a) They hold massive private data

Cyber
attackers understand that accounting firms have total information as privileged
data from HNI clients or organisations. In addition to tax documents, financial
records, PAN and direct-store data, accountants may also serve as sources for
years of private data. Actually, some accounting firms hold virtually the
complete individual accounts of their customers, transforming these practices
into important targets.

 

(b) They have productive corporate information

While
numerous accounting firms deal exclusively with tax documents and related
personal and business documents, different practices handle high-stake
corporate issues. Accounting firms that frequently deal with mergers,
acquisitions and corporate rebuilding hold data that might be of considerable
‘interest’ to cyber-criminals.

 

(c) Firms do not assess security risk

Unlike large
accounting businesses, small and medium accounting firms often do not implement
robust security measures. However, they are all vulnerable to a variety of
targeted security attacks regardless of size and location. Many cyber-criminals
today execute malware attacks by targeting small and medium accounting firms by
taking advantage of inadequate data security.

 

No
accounting firm can combat and prevent emerging security threats without
assessing its security risk on a regular basis. The security risk assessment in
the accounting firms will help them to check the nature of client data being
accessed by each employee and assess the effectiveness of the employee’s device
to prevent targeted security attacks. Besides, the risk assessment will help
the firm to evaluate and improve its security strategy according to the
security vulnerabilities.

 

(d) Small firms tend to have insufficient security

While one
may expect that big accounting firms have far more resources and also face the
maximum risk of cyber attacks, small and mid-sized firms are far more
vulnerable to cyber threats. Indeed, a few criminals target small accounting
firms since they would have installed far fewer security systems than needed.
Some hackers launch strong, sustained attacks on small, poorly secured firms to
the point that they breach the company’s restricted protections. When they get
access to an organisation’s system, cyber-criminals can regularly steal
virtually any type of documents, from financial records to emails.

 

(e) Small accounting firms may not recover from hacks

For small
accounting practices, recovery may prove fairly tough if not impossible to
achieve. Clients pay accountants for their skills; however, in return they
expect trust and tact. Once a firm has demonstrated that it can’t give
satisfactory information data security or guarantee customers’ protection, the
organisation may never have the capacity to return to its earlier level of
business.

 

ACTION PLAN TO PROTECT YOUR FIRM FROM CYBER
ATTACKS

1.       Know The
Applicable Laws

Any effort
to strengthen cyber security for accounting firms starts with an understanding
of the applicable laws. Every accounting firm is expected to protect its
clients’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII) or details which, if
disclosed, ‘could result in harm to the individual whose name or identity is
linked with this information.’ In such a case, the data can be stolen for
financial fraud and in some cases can cost you three times the damages.

 

The following is a list of your
clients’ PII that your firm could be in custody of: PAN; Aadhaar number / data;
digital signatures; bank account numbers; residential address; residential or
mobile phone numbers; date of birth; place of birth; mother’s maiden name;
financial records; and so on.

 

2.       Perform
Regular Risk Assessments

Prevention
is indeed better than cure. New threats emerge every day and you need to
re-adjust your safeguards to adapt to these new threats. For your firm an
annual risk assessment should be sufficient.

 

And at the
minimum your risk assessment should include the following:

(a)   A review of the client information your firm
is currently collecting, categorising which are regulated PII and sensitive
data;

(b)   Identification of new laws and the applicable
commitments and requirements that your firm needs to fulfil for compliance;

(c)   Partner with a Managed Services Provider to
make sure your risk is limited and make sure your systems are protected and
secure;

(d)  Any change in your firm’s practices concerning
the acquisition, storage and sharing of client data that could open new
loopholes for financial identity theft;

(e)   New developments in the regulatory and
business environment; and

(f)   New technologies that your firm could be
maximising.

 

3.       Create A Written Financial
Identity Protection Policy

It’s easier for your accountants
to follow cyber security protocols if it’s a formal memo, part of your
employees’ handbook, or clearly outlined in your standard operating procedures.
A written cyber security policy can also serve as your springboard in training
employees to be more cyber security savvy.

 

4.       Update The
Operating System

Whether you
run on Microsoft Windows or Apple Mac OS, the operating system requires
frequent or continuous updates for strengthened security. System updates are
especially significant for server operating systems where all patches and
updates require to be looked at and refreshed repeatedly. Regular updates of
OS, upgraded firewalls and anti-virus in your workstations can provide for more
reliable protection against threats.

 

5.       Email
Security

Many
accounting firms rely on email to communicate with clients, even to send tax
documents or personal data. As email hacks have become increasingly common, it
is crucial to secure professional email accounts, especially when transmitting
important documents. This has also raised the requirement for efficient
encryption software, which is hard to decrypt by an untrusted third party.

 

More than
90% of cyber attacks begin with a phishing email. A vast majority of people
open an email from an unknown individual’s name without browsing or verifying
the actual sender’s email address. Having your email shielded from unauthorised
access is of prime importance.

 

6.       Anti-Virus
Updates

Accounting
firms need to ensure that anti-malware applications are set to check for
updates frequently, scan the devices on a set schedule in a mechanised manner,
along with any media
that is inserted
into any user computing terminal. In bigger firms, workstations must be
designed for reporting the status of the anti-virus updates to a unified
server, which can push out updates when released subsequently.

 

7.       Internet
Security

Browser downloads are another
leading method of cyber attacks. Internet searches can lead you to compromised
websites which infect your network with viruses and malware. To prevent this
type of attack, install all the latest security patches into your computers and
servers. Install a hardware firewall router with gateway anti-virus, gateway
anti-malware and intrusion protection system to stop the virus before it gets
into your private network. Routers provided by your Internet Service Provider
do not have this type of security. While these might be adequate for your home,
they are not designed for installation and application in any business
organisation.

 

8.       Protection
For Mobile Devices

As commerce
moves into the mobile space, so do hackers. Make sure that any employee that
uses mobile devices is encrypting data, password protecting the device (with a password
that is different from any other being used) and using the latest security apps
on the phone to ward off malicious third-party users.

 

9.       Protection
For Usb Devices

USB drives,
also known as pen drives, have become a popular form for storing and transporting
files from one computer to another. Their appeal lies in the fact that they are
small, readily available, inexpensive and extremely portable. However, these
same characteristics also make them attractive to attackers. And it’s not just
pen drives that are the culprits, any device that plugs into a USB port,
including electronic picture frames, iPods and cameras, can be used to spread
malware.

 

There are
numerous ways for attackers to use USB drives to infect computers. The most
common method is to install malicious code, or malware, on the device that can
detect when it is plugged into a computer. When the USB drive is plugged into a
computer, the malware infects that computer. Often, an organisation’s biggest
weakness might not be a malicious insider but rather an employee who simply
doesn’t understand the potential security risks of his / her actions.

 

There are
steps you can take to protect the data on your USB drive and on any computer
into which you might plug the drive:

 

(i)    Take advantage of security
features

Use
passwords and encryption on your USB drive to protect your data and make sure
that you have the information backed up in case your drive is lost.

(ii)   Keep personal and business
USB drives separate

Do not use
personal USB drives on company computers and do not plug USB drives containing
corporate information into your personal computer.

(iii) Use security software and
keep all software up to date

Use a
firewall, anti-virus software and anti-spyware software to make your computer less
vulnerable to attacks and make sure to keep the virus definitions current. It’s
also important to keep both the operating system and other software on your
computer up to date by applying any necessary patches.

(iv) Do not plug an unknown USB
drive into your computer

If you find
a USB drive, do not plug it into your computer to view the contents or to try
to identify the owner.

(v)   Disable Autorun

The Autorun
feature in Windows causes removable media such as CDs, DVDs and USB drives to
open automatically when they are inserted into a drive. By disabling Autorun,
you can prevent malicious code on an infected USB drive from opening
automatically.

(vi) Develop and enforce USB
drive-related policies

Make sure
employees are aware of the inherent dangers associated with USB drives and what
is your organisation policy on their proper use.

 

10.     Backing Up
Data Religiously

If all your
data is in one place, it is nowhere. Back up all of your most important data on
a regular basis. This may seem counter-intuitive to the concept of security as
you’re creating another copy of data that could be hacked. However, if the
backup is also stored securely over a proprietary or public network to an
off-site server, it drastically minimises chances of a breach or data loss.
There are additional fees associated with this type of backing up, but it’s
currently one of the best methods of security.

 

11.     Encrypt
Backup Data

Firms should
encrypt any backup media that leaves the workplace and also validate that the
backup is complete and usable. They should frequently review backup logs for
completion and restore files randomly to ensure that they will actually work
when required. Hiring an IT specialist is advisable to set up your firm’s
network and ensure your data is encrypted and secured. As a professional, your
responsibility is to ensure that data is secure when it’s in your custody.
Moreover, a backup is a definite must for any business.

 

12.     Educate
Employees

Most
breaches into accounting companies occur because of a backdoor innocuously left
open by an employee. Although hacking systems are becoming more sophisticated,
the majority of these systems are not able to force their way into a properly
managed security perimeter.

 

Security
education is a must and should be conducted once a year. In addition to looking
into the firm’s approaches, employees should be regularly instructed on current
cyber security attack techniques such as phishing and dangerous threats
including ransomware and social engineering used by hackers to gain access to a
user’s PC. Note: NEVER share your login, password or confidential
information over the phone with people whom you don’t know. Firms should review
IT / computer usage policies and provide reminder training to employees at
least once a year for all the new and updated policies.

 

13.     Wireless
Security

Secured
remote / wireless access into your network system should be planned, tested and
then implemented. Obviously, deploy a strong password policy, along with having
a guest network which should be set up for visitors (to your office network)
that need internet access via your wireless network system. This prevents any
guest user access to the system and resources on your network. This is
particularly required (to protect) in case one of the workstations or gadgets
used by the visitor is infected.

 

14.     Move Your
Data To The Cloud

Transporting
data using a USB drive is not secure. Data stored on the cloud has greater
protection than data stored on company servers. The move to such cloud services
can change business habits that help ensure a more secure accounting firm. For
example, if all company data is stored on the cloud, then there’s less need for
workers to email attachments to one another. When team members become less
reliant on email, it helps minimise the risk of falling victim to phishing
emails. Cloud accounting can make your business more efficient. It lets you
provide basic accounting services more easily – and in a cost-effective manner.

 

If you
haven’t moved your accounting practice to the cloud, you most likely believe it
is a complicated thing to do. But it’s not that hard to migrate your practice
to the cloud; it will improve your efficiency, save money and make your clients
feel safer than what they are feeling right now.

 

15.     Test
Security Measures

Hire security specialists for
proper configuration when implementing firewalls and security-related features
such as remote access and wireless routers. Chances are, your internal IT
people have not been exposed to ideal security training, or have no experience
with setting up a new device. External resources can likewise be called upon to
do penetration testing to recognise and lock down any system vulnerabilities.

 

16.     Byod Policies

The bring
your own device (BYOD) trend has seen rapid growth in offices throughout the
country. Since many accountants do get to access company and client data on
their personal devices, it is essential for firms to have policies with regard to
cyber security for such individual devices. Some accounting firms have decided
to completely prohibit the use of personal gadgets for organisation matters,
while others have imposed limitations to the data that can be accessed on them.
Furthermore, such devices can be easily targeted or exposed to cyber attacks by
hackers seeking confidential client data. Thus, it is in the best interest of
the accounting firms not to allow BYOD so that the data never leaves the
office.

 

17.     Remote
Working And Cyber Security

Large accounting firms deploy
resources for management of threats related to cyber security. They are well
equipped with infrastructure as well as manpower to keep such threats at bay.
But small and mid-sized firms may not enjoy similar privileges and could be
relatively more vulnerable to cyber threats.

 

Many firms
leverage cloud-based computing to enable employees to access accounting
software and client data remotely over the internet. The cloud-based services
and solutions even help accounting businesses to operate in distributed
environments. However, remote data access makes it easier for hackers to steal
and misuse sensitive financial data of clients.

 

Firms must
require employees to access the computers and business solutions over a secure
Virtual Private Network (VPN). A secure VPN will help the business to protect
data by avoiding the security risks.

 

Along with
that, it is recommended to use genuine and trusted software solutions, such as
Microsoft Remote Desktop, remote access. Apart from this, the firm must
implement multi-factor authentication to ensure that any unauthorised user does
not access the data stored in the cloud.

 

Recently, a
huge number of accounting firms have turned to remote staffing and hired such
staff to work for them. This could increase their anxiety about client data
even more as they won’t be able to monitor all the setups personally. In such
cases, the role of the remote staffing agency becomes all the more important.
Since the remote staff is actually working from their remote offices, these
need to be secured in terms of both policies as well as practices.

 

CONCLUSION

Isn’t
technology a crucial factor in cyber security for accounting firms? Some may
even go so far as to say that technology is at fault for all the modern-day
data espionage. However, you need to understand that it’s not technology per
se
, but the poor implementation of the technology that is responsible.

 

One way that
accounting firms are jeopardising their own cyber security is by burdening
their employees with overseeing the implementation, management and maintenance
of these technologies. Between servicing your clients and fulfilling internal
administrative tasks, adding cyber security to your accountants’ long to-do
list is hitting a nail into your data-protection coffin. Something is bound to
fall through the cracks. It would be best to partner with a managed services
provider to take care of your cyber security and tech management needs.

 

All
professionals owe a duty to their clients, managers and other employees to
address digital security. Active contribution is the key to addressing the
risks of illegal cyber activities. Understand your data and focus efforts on
the most critical information, implement encryption, become compliant with
cyber security regulations, educate employees about mobile devices and devise a
basic set of desktop security policies. These steps are a good initial move,
but they do not completely cover the gamut of standards and protocols seen in a
high-quality Cyber Security Risk Management System.

 

Accounting firms
that also have teams working from remote locations need to select their vendors
after due research and assurance that the data shared would be as secure as
demanded by their clients.
 

 



IMPACT OF ORDINANCE DATED 20th SEPTEMBER, 2019

The tax ordinance of
September, 2019 has made significant changes in the income-tax provisions and
the income-tax rates.

 

Prior to
this, existing domestic companies were liable to tax at the basic rate of
either 25% or 30%. The effective tax rate ranged from 26% to 34.94% after
considering surcharge of 7% / 12% and health and education cess of 4%.

 

The tax rate of 25% was
applicable to two types of domestic companies, viz., (a) those having turnover
or gross receipts not exceeding Rs. 400 crores in tax year 2017-18; and (b) new
domestic manufacturing companies set up and registered on or after 1st
March, 2016 fulfilling specified conditions.

 

With
effect from the tax year 2019-20, domestic companies shall have an option to
pay income tax at the rate of 22% plus 10% surcharge and 4% cess, taking the
effective tax rate (ETR) to 25.17%, subject to the condition that they will not
avail specified tax exemptions or incentives under the ITA. Such an option,
once exercised, cannot be subsequently withdrawn. Companies exercising such option will not be required to pay Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT).

 

Domestic companies claiming
any tax exemptions or incentives shall also be eligible to exercise such an
option after the expiry of the tax incentive period.

 

Subsequently, the CBDT has
clarified that domestic companies opting for the 22% concessional tax rate
(CTR) will not be allowed to set off the following while computing the total
income and their tax liability:

 

(i) Brought forward ‘losses’
on account of additional depreciation arising in any tax year prior to opting
for the 22% CTR;

(ii) Brought forward credit of
taxes paid under MAT provisions of the Indian Tax Law (ITL) in any tax years
prior to opting for the 22% CTR in view of inapplicability of MAT provisions to
a domestic company which opts for the 22% CTR.

 

Further, the CBDT clarified
that in the absence of any time-line for exercising of option to claim 22% CTR,
the domestic company, if it so desires may opt for the 22% CTR after it has
exhausted the accumulated MAT credit and unabsorbed additional depreciation by
being governed by the regular taxation regime existing under the ITL prior to
the ordinance.

 

The comparative effective tax
rates before and after exercise of the option are as follows:

 

Sr

Nature of domestic
company

Current ETR (%)

ETR on Exercise of
Option (%)

Reduction in tax
liability

1

Total
turnover or gross receipts = INR4b during FY 2017-18 or new manufacturing
companies incorporated between 1st March, 2016 and 30th
September, 2019

 

Income < INR
10m

Income > INR
10m, but < INR 100m

Income > INR
100m

26%

27.82%

29.12%

25.17%

25.17%

25.17%

0.83%

2.65%

3.95%

2

Optional
tax rate for new manufacturing companies incorporated on or after
1st October, 2019

 

Income < INR
10m

Income > INR
10m, but < INR 100m

Income > INR
100m

26%

27.82%

29.12%

17.16%

17.16%

17.16%

8.84%

10.66%

11.96%

3

Other
domestic companies

 

 

Income < INR
10m

Income > INR
10m, but < INR 100m

Income > INR
100m

31.2%

33.38%

34.94%

25.17%

25.17%

25.17%

6.03%

8.21%

9.77%

 

There are numerous tax issues
relating to the recent ordinance. From an accounting perspective, it converges
to a few important questions. These are discussed below and are equally
applicable to AS (Indian GAAP) as well as Ind AS.

 

Question

Does the ordinance have any
effect on the 31st March, 2019 financial statements (which were yet
to be issued at the time the ordinance was announced)?

 

Response

The ordinance was not an
enactment / substantive enactment at the balance sheet date, i.e. 31st
March, 2019. Consequently, the tax charge and deferred taxes are based on the
pre-ordinance rates / income tax provisions. However, it is a subsequent event
which needs the disclosure below in the notes to accounts. This disclosure may
need suitable modification to the fact pattern. For example, the impact
quantification may not be appropriate / required where the impact cannot be
estimated with reasonable certainty or is not material.

 

Pursuant to the Taxation Laws
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 (Ordinance) issued subsequent to the balance sheet
date, the tax rates have changed with effect from 1st April, 2019
and the company plans to pay tax at the revised rates. If those changes were
announced on or before reporting date, deferred tax asset (or / and deferred
tax liability) would have been reduced by xxxx. The tax charge or (credit) for
the year would have been increased / (decreased) by xxxx.

 

Question

The company currently has MAT
credit and unabsorbed depreciation. It is currently evaluating the tax position
and has not decided whether it should adopt new rates now or later. How should
the matter be dealt with in the quarter ended September, 2019 interim results?

 

Response

The ordinance is an abiding
law that came into force in September, 2019. Accordingly, the impact on tax
expenses based on the option elected by the company needs to be considered in
the September quarter financial results. Merely stating that the company is in
the process of evaluating the impact will not comply with Ind AS / AS
requirements. It is also possible that a decision made in the September, 2019
quarter may change at the year-end. The impact of change on the tax expense
will constitute a change in the accounting estimate which will have to be
properly explained both under Ind AS and AS.

 

Question

On transition to Ind AS 115 /
Ind AS 116, the transition adjustment along with deferred tax impact was
recognised in equity. Where should the subsequent changes in deferred taxes due
to the ordinance be recognised?

 

Response

The subsequent changes to
deferred tax impact is taken to P&L and not to equity even if the earlier
deferred tax was charged or credited to equity; for example, deferred tax
impact taken to equity on transitioning to Ind AS 115 / 116 or transitioning to
Ind AS under Ind AS 101. In the author’s view, the fact that deferred tax was
charged / credited to opening equity does not mean that subsequent changes in
the deferred tax asset or liability (for example, as a result of change in tax
rates) will also be recognised in equity. Rather, management needs to determine
(using the entity’s new accounting policy) where the items on which the
deferred tax arose would have been recognised if the new policy had applied in
the earlier periods (backward tracing). Therefore, if Ind AS 115 / 116 was
always applicable, the adjustment made to equity on transition would have ended
up in the P&L. Consequently, the subsequent changes in deferred tax due to
change in tax rates should also be taken to the P&L account.

 

Question

With
respect to 31st March, 2020 accounts, whether the full tax impact is
considered in the September, 2019 quarter or spread over the three remaining
quarters, namely, September, 2019; December, 2019; and March, 2020?

 

Response

Due to the change in tax rates
/ provisions, there may be a substantial adjustment to the DTA / DTL balance.
For example, a company may be availing tax incentives due to which huge amounts
of DTA / DTL may have got accumulated. If the company decides to fall in the
new regime of taxation, a significant amount of DTA / DTL will need to be
adjusted. The impact of the adjustment has to be taken to the P&L and
cannot be deferred beyond the financial year in which the change occurs. There
are two acceptable approaches, viz., considering the full impact in the
September quarter, and the alternative approach of spreading it over the three
quarters. The reason for two acceptable approaches is as follows:

 

In determining the effective
average annual tax rate as required by Ind AS 34, it is necessary to estimate closing
deferred-tax balances at the end of the year because deferred tax is a
component of the estimated total tax charge for the year. This conflicts with
Ind AS 12 which requires deferred tax to be measured at enacted or
substantially enacted tax rates. It is therefore not clear as to when in the
annual period the impact of remeasuring closing deferred tax balances for a
change in tax rate is recognised. Consequently, two practices have emerged to
determine the tax charge for the interim period:

(a)   The estimated tax rate does not include the impact of remeasuring
closing deferred tax balances at the end of the year. It is not included in the
estimated ‘effective’ average annual tax rate. Consistent with the treatment of
tax credit granted in a one-off event, an entity may recognise the effect of
the change immediately in the interim period in which the change occurs
(Approach 1).

(b)   The estimated rate includes the impact of
remeasuring closing deferred tax balances at the end of the year. In this
approach the effect of a change in the tax rate is spread over the remaining
interim periods via an adjustment to the estimated annual effective income tax
rate (Approach 2).

 

It’s an accounting policy
choice to be followed consistently. The example below explains the two
approaches:

 

Example: Impact of change
in tax rate on tax charge / (credit) in the interim period

 

Company X’s applicable tax
rate in first quarter (June, 2019) was 40%. In the second quarter (September,
2019) the tax rate was changed retrospectively from 1st April, 2019
to 25%. Opening temporary difference on which deferred tax asset was created is
Rs. 40,000, which is expected to reverse after three years.

 

Approach
1 – Adjust the impact of change in tax rate in the quarter in which change occurs

Quarter profit

Profit for the
quarter as per statutory

books (A)

 

Incremental
depreciation in tax books (B)

Tax (loss) / profit
for the quarter as per tax return

C = A-B

 

Tax rate (D)

Tax charge in books
(excluding effect of change in tax rate)
E = A*D

Impact of change in
tax rate (F)1

Total tax charge in
books (including deferred tax) G = E + F

ETR (G/A)

June

50,000

50,000

40%

20,000

 

20,000

40%

Sep

40,000

35,000

5,000

25%

10,000

(1,500)

8,500

21%

Dec

40,000

25,000

15,000

25%

10,000

 

10,000

25%

March

30,000

(10,000)

40,000

25%

7,500

 

7,500

25%

 

1,60,000

1,00,000

60,000

 

 

 

46,000

 

 

Approach
2 – Adjust the impact of change in tax rate over the period of remaining
quarters (the impact cannot be carried forward beyond the end of the financial year)

 

Quarter profit

Profit for the quarter as per

statutory books (A)

 

Incremental depreciation in tax books
(B)

Tax (loss) / profit for the quarter as
per tax return

C = A-B

 

Tax rate (D)

Tax charge in books (excluding effect of
change in tax rate)

E = A*D

Impact of change in tax rate (F)2

Total tax charge in books (including
deferred tax)

G = E+F

ETR (G/A)

June

50,000

50,000

40%

20,000

20,000

40%

Sep

40,000

35,000

5,000

25%

10,000

(545)

9,455

24%

Dec

40,000

25,000

15,000

25%

10,000

(545)

9,455

24%

March

30,000

(10,000)

40,000

25%

7,500

(410)

7,090

24%

 

1,60,000

1,00,000

60,000

 

 

 

46,000

 

 

2Reversal of excess provision made in 1st
quarter, i.e., 50,000*15% = 7,500 and reversal of opening deferred tax asset
created at higher rate, i.e., 40,000*15% = 6,000, i.e., 1,500 over the next
three quarters in the ratio of book profits (40000:40000:30000) minus
non-deductible temporary difference (zero in this fact pattern).

 

CONCLUSION

The author believes that both
views discussed above are based on sound arguments and are equally acceptable.

 

 

UNDUE INFLUENCE AND FREE CONSENT

Introduction

One of the biggest
issues with a Will is whether it has been obtained by fraud or undue influence.
If yes, then it is invalid. Section 61 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
states that any Will which has been caused by such importunity which takes away
the free agency of the testator is void. The Law Lexicon, 4th
Edition, Lexis
Nexis, states that importunity (insistence
or cajolery) must be such which the testator is too weak to resist; which would
render the act no longer the act of the deceased, not the free act of a capable
testator.

 

Similarly, in the
context of a contract, the Indian Contract Act, 1872 states that all
agreements are contracts only if they are made by the free consent of the
parties. Free consent is that which is not caused by undue influence. Section
16 of this Act defines ‘undue influence’ as follows:

 

‘(1)      A contract is said to be
induced by undue influence where the relations subsisting between the parties
are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the
other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other;

(2)        In particular and
without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is
deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another:

(a)    where he holds a real or
apparent authority over the other or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to
the other; or

(b)    where he makes a contract
with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by
reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress

(3)        Where
a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a
contract with him, and the transaction appears on the face of it or on the evidence
adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not
induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate
the will of the other.’

 

Hence, both in the
context of a Will and a contract, ‘undue influence’ is a major factor. While it
would render a Will void, it makes a contract voidable at the option of the
party whose consent was so caused.

 

Let us examine this very
vital concept in a bit more detail, especially in the light of a Supreme Court
decision rendered in the case of Raja Ram vs. Jai Prakash Singh, CA No.
2896/2009, order dated 11th September, 2019 (SC).
What makes
this decision even more important is that the facts are such that they could be
relevant even in a host of cases. The key questions considered in this decision
were whether mere old age and infirmity of the executor of an agreement could
be considered as grounds for undue influence? Further, whether the fact that
the agreement was executed by the executor in favour of those with whom he was
living was also grounds for undue influence? While the Supreme Court examined
these questions in the context of a non-testamentary instrument, i.e., a sale
deed, they would be equally relevant in the case of a Will.

 

FACTS
OF THE CASE

The decision in the case
of Raja Ram (Supra) would be better appreciated in the light of
its facts. The opposite parties to the case were two brothers and their
respective families. The parents of the brothers were living with one of the
brothers. The father was 80 years old. He executed a registered sale deed of a
parcel of land in favour of the son with whom he was living. The father died
within ten months of executing the sale deed.

 

The other brother
alleged that the deed was obtained by his brother fraudulently, by deceit and
undue influence because of old age and infirmity of the father who was living
with him. It was alleged that the father was old, infirm and bedridden and sick
for the last eight years; his mental faculties were impaired and he was
entirely dependent upon the defendants who were in a position to exercise undue
influence over him. It was pleaded that the father by reason of age and
sickness was unable to move and walk and had a deteriorated eyesight due to cataract.
It was also pleaded that he was deaf.

The Supreme Court stated
that there were two main questions which it had to consider:

(a)   The physical condition of the
father and his capacity to execute the sale deed; and

(b)  Whether the defendants could exercise
undue influence over the father.

 

DECISION
OF THE COURT

The Court considered the
definition of undue influence as appearing in section 16 of The Indian
Contract Act (Supra).
It also noted that under the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 the onus of proving good faith in a transaction is on the party who is in
a position of active confidence to another. It noted the following facts and
gave important verdicts on each of them:

 

(a)   Except for a mere statement,
no evidence was produced to show that the father’s mental capacity was
impaired. Mere old age cannot be a presumption of total loss of mental
faculties, such as in the case of senility or dementia. The father had executed
another sale deed in favour of a third party and the same was not challenged.
There was no evidence of rapid deterioration in condition after the same.

(b)   Merely being old, infirm and
having a cataract cannot be equated with being bedridden. The fact that the
father went to the Sub-Registrar’s office for registration demolishes the
theory of him being bedridden. Hardness of hearing could not be equated with
deafness.

(c)   The Court referred to its
earlier decision in the case of Subhas Chandra Das Mushib vs. Ganga
Prosad Das Mushib and Ors., 1967 (1) SCR 331
wherein it was held that
there was no presumption of imposition or fraud merely because a donor was old
or of weak character.

 

Thus, as regards the
first question, the Court concluded that the physical condition of the father
and his capacity to execute the sale deed was not in doubt.

 

It next turned to the
important question of undue influence. The allegations of the same were
completely bereft of any details or circumstances with regard to the nature,
manner or kind of undue influence exercised by the defendants over the father.
A mere bald statement was made attributed to the infirmity of the deceased. The
Court held that the defendants were in a fiduciary relationship with the
deceased and their conduct in looking after him and his wife in old age may have
influenced the thinking of the deceased. However, that, per se, could
not lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the defendants were therefore
in a position to dominate the will of the deceased, or that the sale deed
executed was unconscionable. The Court held that the onus of proving there was
no undue influence would come on the defendants only once the plaintiffs
established a prima facie case.

 

The Supreme Court
referred to its earlier decision in the case of Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh
Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558
where it had held that under the Indian
Evidence Act if the plaintiff fails to prove the existence of the fiduciary
relationship or the position of active confidence held by the
defendant-appellant, the burden would lie on him as he had alleged fraud. Next,
it proceeded to lay down certain important principles in the context of whether
undue influence could be presumed merely because a relative is taking care of
his / her elders:

 

(i)    In every caste, creed,
religion and civilized society, looking after the elders of the family was a
sacred and pious duty;

(ii)   If one were to straightway
infer undue influence merely because a sibling was looking after the family
elder, it would result in an extreme proposition which could not be allowed
without sufficient and adequate evidence. The Court held that any other
interpretation by inferring a reverse burden of proof straightway, on those who
were taking care of the elders, as having exercised undue influence, could lead
to very undesirable consequences;

(iii)  While such a contrary view
might not lead to neglect of the elders, it would certainly create doubts and
apprehensions leading to lack of full and proper care under the fear of
allegations with regard to exercise of undue influence;

(iv)  If certain members of the
family were looking after the elders (either by choice or out of compulsion)
there was bound to be more affinity between them and the elders. This is a very
crucial principle established by
the Court.

 

The Court reiterated the
principles laid down by it in its earlier decision of Subhas Chandra Das
(Supra)
wherein it was held that merely because two parties were
closely related to each other no presumption of undue influence could arise.
Even if one party naturally relied upon the other for advice, and the other was
in a position to dominate the will of the first, it only proved ‘influence’.
Such influence might have been used wisely, judiciously and helpfully. However,
the law required that more than mere influence, there was undue influence. In
that decision the Supreme Court observed that Halsbury’s Laws of England,
Third Edition, Vol. 17
, states that there was no presumption of fraud
merely because a donor was old or of weak character and there was no
presumption of undue influence in the case of a gift to a son, grandson, or
son-in-law, although made during the donor’s illness and a few days before his
death. In Poosathurai vs. Kappanna Chettiar, (1920) 22 BomLR 538, the Bombay High Court
held that where the relation of influence has been established, and it is also
made clear that the bargain is with the ‘influencer’ and is in itself
unconscionable, then the person in a position to use his dominating power has
the burden thrown upon him of establishing affirmatively that no domination was
practised so as to bring about the transaction.

 

The Apex Court also
distinguished its earlier decision rendered in the case of Krishna Mohan
Kul vs. Patima Maity, (2004) 9 SCC 468.
In that case, it was established
that the executor of a deed was more than 100 years of age. He was paralytic
and his mental and physical conditions were not in order. He was practically
bedridden with paralysis and though his left thumb impression was stated to be
affixed on the document, there was no witness who could substantiate that he
had in fact put his thumb impression. Hence, based on such specific facts, it
held that the executant was an illiterate person, was not in proper physical
and mental state and, therefore, the deed of settlement and trust was void and
invalid. Hence, the Apex Court concluded that Raja Ram’s case
could be distinguished on facts from this decision.

 

APPLICABILITY
TO WILLS

As
discussed above, the applicability of the ratio descendi of the case of Raja
Ram
is pari passu applicable to Wills. A similar decision was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Surendra Pal vs. Saraswati
AIR 1974 SC 1999.
In that case, a testator under his Will bequeathed
his entire estate to his second wife, excluding his first wife and her
children. The excluded relatives alleged undue influence on the part of the
second wife. The Supreme Court set aside such allegations. It held that if
undue influence, fraud and coercion is alleged, the onus is on the person
making the allegations to prove the same. If he does not discharge this burden,
the probate of the Will must necessarily be granted if it is established that
the testator had full testamentary capacity and had, in fact, executed it
validly with a free will and mind. In order to understand what the testator
intended and why he intended so, one had to sit in his armchair to ascertain
his frame of mind and the circumstances in which he executed the Will. The
Court observed that the testator was at complete loggerheads with the children
from his first marriage. Hence, with a family so hostile towards him, it was
but natural for the testator to provide for his second wife even without her
asking him or importuning him to do so. There was no suggestion that the
testator was feeble-minded or completely deprived of his power of independent
thought and judgement.

 

In
the case of Bur Singh vs. Uttam Singh (1911) 13 BOMLR 59, it was
held that in order to set aside a Will there must be clear evidence that the
undue influence was in fact exercised, or that the illness of the testator so
affected his mental faculties as to make them unequal to the task of disposing
of his property.

 

In
several cases, the testator excludes a close relative from his Will. In such
cases, the question of undue influence of the beneficiaries inevitably crops
up. Various Supreme Court decisions have time and again held that such
circumstances alone cannot lead to an inference of the Will being void due to
undue influence. In the cases of Uma Devi Nambiar vs. TC Sidhan (2004) 2
SCC 321 and Rabindra Nath Mukherjee vs. Panchanan Banerjee, 1995 SCC (4) 459
,
the Supreme Court held that deprivation of the natural heirs by the testator
should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution of a
Will was to interfere with the normal line of succession. So natural heirs
would be debarred in every case of a Will; it may be that in some cases they
are fully debarred and in others only partially. Again, in Pentakota
Satyanarayana vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam (2005) 8 SCC 67
, this view was
held when the testator’s wife was given a smaller share than others.

 

Similarly,
in Mahesh Kumar (D) By Lrs vs. Vinod Kumar, (2012) 4 SCC 387, the
Supreme Court was dealing with a case where a testator bequeathed all his
wealth to one son in preference to the others since he was living with that son
and the attitude of the other sons was extremely hostile towards their parents.
The Court held that the fact that one son took care of the parents in their old
age showed that there was nothing unnatural or unusual in the decision of the
testator to give his property only to him. Any person of ordinary prudence
would have adopted the same course and would not have given anything to the
ungrateful children from his / her share in the property. Thus, the Court held
that there was nothing invalid in the Will.

 

In the case of Narayanamma
vs. Mayamma, 1999 (5) KarLJ 694
, the Karnataka High Court held that no
cogent reason was given in the Will as to why one daughter of the testator was
preferred over the other two daughters and hence the Will appeared circumspect.
While one may not entirely agree with the reasoning of this decision, it is
always advisable that in all such cases an explanation is given in the Will as
to the reason why the natural heirs are excluded. It is better to play safe and
avoid protracted litigation for the beneficiaries.

 

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the question
of free consent in the case of a Will / contract would always be one which
would be decided on the basis of surrounding facts and circumstances. Those
deprived, in most cases, might raise an objection of undue influence. However,
as the above decisions have very clearly established, mere old age or closeness
of relations or taking care of the executor is no ground for undue influence.
 

 

 

WISE OR OTHERWISE

‘Bachcha, kabil bano, kabil… kamyabi
toh jhak maarke peeche bhagegi’
(become capable, my
son, become capable… success will follow you no matter what).

 

Even after ten years this line still strikes
a chord in my heart. It got me thinking that our minds from an early age are
conditioned to believe that completing the task at hand quickly leads to
success. As professionals, do we strive to build our capabilities, or do we
just aim to be successful at the task at hand?

 

In these past ten years I have transitioned
from being a student to becoming a professional. As students, we must get the
best scores to get admissions in good colleges. As professionals, we should
perform and deliver results in order to be ahead of others. As students we work
towards building our capabilities so that we would be successful in our chosen
area of work and in our chosen profession. However, as professionals do we
constantly keep challenging ourselves? With easy access to opportunities, the
world today has become far more competitive and everyone is in a hurry to climb
the ladder of success. We are concerned only with achieving the outcome – that
is, success.

 

Students want
to score good marks and are not keen to understand concepts; so they end up
mugging up from textbooks. Many of us are comfortable submitting work which is
80% good quality work instead of 100%. Striving towards completion of the work
rather than striving for excelling at the work often decides the quality of
work. In both these scenarios we choose quantity over quality. But would it be
wise to choose quantity over quality? An 80% good quality work might come back
for a re-work; however, a 100% good quality work would not require re-work and
thus would give us more time to take up more work. So, wouldn’t it be wise to
work towards building our skills to do error-free or 100% work in one go rather
than otherwise?

 

One of the topics in modern management
training programmes is, ‘Do it right the first time’ – meaning, it will save a
lot of the time and energy required in setting wrong things right. Or, as a
previous generation believed, ‘A stitch in time saves nine’. One can achieve
this by proper planning and focused execution.

 

As
professionals or as students, we should not become complacent by just
completing the work at hand, we should constantly strive at completing and
excelling at the work at hand. One of the quotes sums it up very well, ‘Success
is a journey, not a destination’. And in this journey of success we must
constantly keep working on our capabilities and skills (kabiliyat) to
achieve success (kamyabi).

 

For each one of us it is an individual
choice – whether we want to be wise or otherwise!

RULING OF SAT IN PRICE WATERHOUSE / SATYAM CASE: SUMMARY AND SOME LESSONS FOR AUDITORS

BACKGROUND

Recently, on 9th September, 2019,
the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) overturned the SEBI order banning 11
firms of chartered accountants of the ‘Price Waterhouse group’ (PW) for two
years. The ban was on carrying out audits, certification, etc. of listed
companies / intermediaries associated with the capital markets. It was in
connection with the audit by one such firm in the Satyam Computer Services
Limited (Satyam) case where massive frauds were found consequent to a
confession by Satyam’s Chairman. The SEBI order disgorging the fees earned by
PW from the audit of Satyam of about Rs. 13 crores plus interest was, however,
upheld. Essentially, what SAT held was that PW did not participate knowingly in
the fraud though there was negligence involved to an extent. Several other
conclusions were drawn. Whether, when and to what extent are auditors subject
to the jurisdiction of SEBI was something analysed in great detail. Two
important aspects were particularly discussed. Whether SEBI can ban auditors if
they are negligent in their professional duties, or whether this is the domain
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India? In case of alleged fraud /
connivance in fraud by auditors, does SEBI have to provide direct evidence or
will it be enough to show this by ‘preponderance of probabilities’, as the
Supreme Court has held in certain cases?

 

Needless to say, this decision will have
far-reaching implications for auditors of listed companies / intermediaries /
entities associated with the capital markets. Many auditors have been banned in
the past and this decision creates a path-breaking precedent for a modified
viewpoint over future cases. It is also possible that SEBI may, apart from
possibly appealing to the Supreme Court against this SAT order, seek amendments
to the law to seek wider jurisdiction over auditors.

 

Some major conclusions and observations by
SAT are discussed in this article.

Quick summary and background of matter
leading to this decision

Readers may recollect that the Chairman of
Satyam, Mr. B. Ramalinga Raju, had, in January, 2009, sent a ‘confession email’
to SEBI of massive frauds in Satyam. This had resulted in its bank balances /
fixed deposits with banks, revenues, debtors, profits, etc. being overstated.
The amount involved was in thousands of crores of rupees. Several criminal and
other proceedings were initiated against the Chairman, directors and certain
officers, the signing partners of the auditors and the Price Waterhouse group.
However, for purposes of this article, the focus is on the proceedings against
the PW group by SEBI. Against these proceedings, PW petitioned the Bombay High
Court claiming, inter alia, that SEBI did not have any jurisdiction over
auditors who are chartered accountants and over whom only the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has jurisdiction. The High Court rejected
this contention and upheld SEBI’s jurisdiction over auditors albeit with
certain conditions. Thereafter, SEBI issued an order on 10th
January, 2018 banning the PW group of 11 firms for two years from performing
certain audit / certification work in relation to listed companies, etc. It
made a finding that PW had committed / connived in fraud and was negligent. It
also ordered that the fees earned by it be disgorged – with interest @ 12% pa.
Now, SAT has partially overturned this order.

 

BOMBAY HIGH COURT’S DECISION

PW had filed a petition before the Bombay
High Court claiming that SEBI had no jurisdiction over auditors who, being
chartered accountants, were subject to action only by the ICAI. The Court (Price
Waterhouse & Co. vs. SEBI [2010] 103 SCL 96 [Bom.])
rejected this
contention but with certain riders which can be summarised as follows: It said
that auditors in general were primarily subject to ICAI. If the auditors were
negligent in their duties, it is the ICAI that can take action against them.
However, SEBI is a body that has been formed for the protection of investors
and safeguarding the integrity of capital markets. Auditors perform an
important role of attestation of financial statements that are relied on by
shareholders. If they themselves carry out a fraud or participate / connive in
fraud in the entity they audit, SEBI does have a role – to take action.
However, this has to be established by evidence by SEBI. If the auditor has
been negligent in performance of his duties but it cannot be shown that he has
committed or connived in fraud, SEBI does not have jurisdiction. It is these
comments by the Court that became the core point on which SAT rendered its
decision.

 

What are the tests by which SEBI can
prove a person is guilty of fraud in securities markets?

This was an important aspect discussed in
the decision and indeed was the turning point. SEBI had charged PW with fraud
under multiple provisions of the SEBI Act and Regulations. But what were the
valid criteria that were sufficient to establish fraud under these provisions?
SEBI applied the more liberal criterion of ‘preponderance of probabilities’. It
stated that PW was negligent on so many counts and over so many years, that it
was far more likely than not that it had connived in the fraud.

 

However, the SAT made an important
distinction. It analysed the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court on frauds
under the securities laws. It held that the criteria were different for persons
who dealt in securities and those who did not. In respect of persons who dealt
in securities, the test of preponderance of probabilities applied. However, PW
could not be said to have dealt in securities and hence this test could not be
used to prove fraud. Hence, for such persons direct evidence was needed that
they connived in fraud and that such fraud induced others to deal in
securities. SAT held that SEBI had not provided any such evidence. Negligence,
even if on repeated counts, did not become fraud once this test and standard
was applied.

 

Thus, the SAT held that SEBI had not
provided evidence that PW had committed fraud. The order of banning the PW
group failed on this ground.

 

Whether SEBI can ban 11 firms en masse in the PW group?

 

SEBI had banned 11 firms which according to
it were operating under the Price Waterhouse banner. SEBI also showed several
direct and indirect associations amongst the firms operating under this banner.
There was, for example, sharing of resources, there were common partners
amongst some firms and so on.

 

The SAT
analysed the relations in context of the law relating to partnerships and LLPs,
the relevant guidelines of ICAI, the fact that there were several partners
among those who joined as such much after this event / audit, etc. It also
noted that it was a ‘signing partner’ who certified the audit of companies. SAT
held that in these circumstances, it could not hold the whole group liable for
fraud in Satyam. A blanket ban on the group was thus not warranted.

 

Important concepts like negligence, role of
management / auditors, etc. discussed

SAT discussed extensively on what
constituted negligence and also discussed the role of management and the
auditors. In particular, it highlighted the role of the auditor to display
professional scepticism, to act as watchdog and not a bloodhound, to not be
aggressively looking for fraud all the time which is really the role of a
forensic auditor. It also emphasised that an audit cannot guarantee absence of
all fraud as long as the auditor utilises a process that demonstrates a
reasonable professional skill and approach to the audit. SAT also discussed
various applicable auditing standards. Finally, and above all, it stated that
cleverly designed and implemented fraud cannot necessarily be uncovered by an
auditor. The audit cannot be so extensive and detailed, considering the time
and cost constraints, to uncover all frauds; and the scope for such
sophisticated frauds by persons high in management has to be considered.

 

Remedial orders vs. preventive orders
vs. orders to ban amounting to penalising a person

An order
banning a person from being associated with the securities markets can be for
one or more reasons. The SEBI Act permits directions by SEBI to debar a person
from being associated with the capital markets for preventive or remedial
reasons. Banning a person to punish him for wrongs done by him is, however, a
punitive action.

 

SAT held that debarring a person can, of
course, be for remedial / preventive reasons. If a person has committed such a
wrong that has harmed investors it may be better to keep him away from the
stock markets for a time (or even permanently in appropriate cases) so that
others (more people) are not harmed.

 

On the facts of
the case, SAT held that debarring PW served neither a preventive nor a remedial
purpose. It was seen that more than a decade had passed since the uncovering of
the fraud. PW had continued to serve other entities in the securities market
without any complaints. It had, to the satisfaction of even US authorities who
had initiated proceedings against it, taken necessary corrective actions to
prevent such things from happening again. To prohibit PW now from being
associated with the capital markets did not serve any preventive or remedial
purpose.

 

This is again a relevant test which would
apply to proceedings in other cases against auditors where there may be similar
facts.

 

Disgorgement of fees

As noted earlier, negligence in performance
of professional work by auditors does not by itself amount to fraud under
securities laws. For holding an auditor guilty of having committed such fraud
direct evidence has to be provided. However, SAT affirmed that the auditors
were negligent in performance of their duties as auditors on certain counts. It
thus upheld the direction of SEBI to disgorge the fees earned by PW from the
performance of the audit of Satyam.

 

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the order has far-reaching effects
on auditors and even other persons associated with the capital markets. The
order is of course on the facts of the case which SAT took pains to mention and
repeat. But the circumstances and criteria under which auditors can be
proceeded against are now far clearer than before. The decision of the Bombay
High Court which upheld the jurisdiction of SEBI against auditors was
reconciled with decisions of the Supreme Court and it was shown that SEBI had
power and jurisdiction which was narrower. In these times, when auditors face
multiple regulators, it is a relief that there is clarity on who plays what
role and of what nature.

 

This order will also be relevant for others
who are not directly associated with the capital markets and who do not deal in
securities. These may include independent directors and directors in general,
company secretaries, lawyers, etc. While each group will have to examine how
this decision is relevant for them, there is still some guidance available. For
example, for holding them liable for fraud, direct evidence has to be shown.

 

Partners of firms of auditors will also have
less cause for worry if, despite reasonable efforts and systems, their partners
are negligent and / or commit fraud. The other partners of such firms will not
be held liable and acted against merely for the faults of one partner.
 

 

Article 13(4) and (5) of India-UAE DTAA – As Article 13(4) covered only gains from ‘share’, gains from ‘unit’ of mutual fund were subject to Article 13(5) under India-UAE DTAA

8. DCIT vs. K.E. Faizal ITA No.: 423/Coch/2018 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 8th July, 2019

 

Article 13(4) and (5) of India-UAE DTAA –
As Article 13(4) covered only gains from ‘share’, gains from ‘unit’ of mutual
fund were subject to Article 13(5) under India-UAE DTAA

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
non-resident under the Act. He was located in UAE and qualified for benefit
under the India-UAE DTAA. During the relevant year he sold units of
equity-oriented mutual funds and derived short-term capital gain (STCG). The
assessee claimed that the STCG derived by him was not chargeable to tax in
India in terms of Article 13(5) of the India-UAE DTAA.

 

The AO noted that the underlying instrument of an equity-oriented mutual
fund was nothing but a ‘share’. Accordingly, the AO held that in terms of
Article 13(4) of the India-UAE DTAA, STCG was chargeable to tax in India.

 

The CIT(A) held
that the units were not ‘shares’. Hence, in terms of Article 13(5) of the
India-UAE DTAA, STCG from units was not chargeable to tax in India.

____________________________________________

3.  CIT vs. Tata Autocomp Systems Ltd. [2015] 56
taxmann.com 206/230 taxman 649/374 ITR 516; CIT vs. Great Eastern Shipping Co
Ltd. [2018] 301 CTR 642

 

 

HELD


(a)         Article 13(4) of the
India-UAE DTAA provides that income arising to a resident of the UAE from the
transfer of shares in an Indian company other than those specifically covered
within the ambit of other paragraphs of Article 13, may be taxed in India.
Article 13(5) provides that income arising to such a resident from transfer of
property, other than shares in an Indian company, is liable to tax only in the
UAE.

(b)   Article 13(4) covers within
its purview capital gains arising from transfer of ‘shares’ and not any other
property. Therefore, units of a mutual fund could be covered under Article
13(4) only if they could be considered as shares.

(c)   Since the DTAA does not define
‘share’ in terms of Article 3(2), the definition under the Companies Act, 2013
should be referred. Further, as per SEBI regulations, a mutual fund can be
established only as a ‘trust’. Therefore, the units issued by an Indian mutual
fund could not be considered a ‘share’.

(d)   Under the Securities Contract
(Regulation) Act, 1956 a ‘security’ is defined to include inter alia
shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock or other body
corporate and units or any other such instrument issued to the investors under
any mutual fund scheme.

(e)   From the definition of
‘securities’, it is clear that ‘share’ and ‘unit of a mutual fund’ are two
separate types of securities. Hence, gains arising from transfer of units of a
mutual fund would not be covered within the ambit of Article 13(4).
Consequently, it would be covered under Article 13(5).

(f)    Therefore, the assessee was
not liable to tax in India in respect of STCG arising from the sale of units.
 

 

 

ERRATA: In BCAJ September, 2019
issue in the feature TRIBUNAL AND AAR INTERNATIONAL TAX DECISIONS, on page 58
in the 2nd paragraph under ‘HELD – PAYMENT FOR SIMULATOR’, the last
line should read as ‘Hence, the charges paid by the assessee for use of
simulator were not “royalty”. It may be noted that while the catch notes (page
57) correctly mentioned ‘not’, inadvertently the word ‘not’ was omitted in the
gist.

 

 

 

 

Section 92C of the Act, Article 11 of India-Germany DTAA – In respect of loans advanced to AE, arm’s length rate of interest should be determined on the basis of the rate prevalent in the country where loan is given – EURIBOR / LIBOR is not average interest rate at which loans are advanced and hence, they cannot be considered comparable uncontrolled rate of interest

7. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 48 (Trib.) Pune DCIT vs. iGate Global Solutions Ltd. ITA No.: 286 (Bang.) of 2013 A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order: 5th August, 2019

 

Section 92C of the Act, Article 11 of
India-Germany DTAA – In respect of loans advanced to AE, arm’s length rate of
interest should be determined on the basis of the rate prevalent in the country
where loan is given – EURIBOR / LIBOR is not average interest rate at which
loans are advanced and hence, they cannot be considered comparable uncontrolled
rate of interest

 

FACTS

The assessee, an
Indian company, was a subsidiary of an American company. It acted as a single
source of a broad range of information technology applications, solutions and
services that included client / server position and development. The assessee
advanced loans to its German AE in Euro and to its American AE in USD. The
assessee had charged interest @ 1.50% to its German AE and @ 6% to its American
AE.

 

 

The TPO observed
that the arm’s length interest rate on such loans should be the rate which the
assessee would have earned if it had advanced loan to an unrelated party in
India. Applying the Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method as the Most
Appropriate Method (MAM), the TPO determined the arm’s length rate interest as
per BBB bonds in India and accordingly recommended transfer pricing adjustment.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee
appealed before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) held that the domestic Prime Lending
Rate would have no application and the interest rate prevalent in the country
in which the loan is received should be considered for determining arm’s length
rate of interest. Since the loan was given
in Germany and in the USA, international rates like LIBOR or EURIBOR should be
considered.

________________________________

2.  Functional and risk analysis was recorded in
the transfer pricing study report. The report was accepted by the Transfer
Pricing Officer both, in case of I Co and in case of the assessee

 

 

HELD

1. There is almost
judicial3  consensus ad
idem
at the higher appellate forums that the arm’s length rate of interest
on loans advanced to the AEs should be considered with reference to the country
(in this case, Germany / USA) in which the loan was received and not from where
it was paid. Since India was the lender country, it was not correct to
determine the rate of interest in India as arm’s length rate of interest.

2. EURIBOR was
merely a reference rate calculated on the basis of the average rate at which
Euro Zone banks offer lending in the inter-bank market. Similar was the case
with the LIBOR, Thus EURIBOR / LIBOR could not per se be considered as
comparable uncontrolled rate of interest at which loans were advanced in
Germany.

3. Thus, the
impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the AO for
considering EURIBOR plus 2% as arm’s length rate of interest.

 

Section 9 of the Act, Article 5 of the India-USA DTAA – Though Indian company was controlled by foreign company, since all economic risks were borne by Indian company no fixed place PE was constituted – Since services were rendered outside India and no personnel had visited India, no service PE was constituted – Indian company neither had authority to conclude, nor had it concluded, contracts and since it had also not secured orders for foreign company, no agency PE was constituted

6. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 99 (Trib.) Mum. Gemmological Institute of America, Inc. vs.
ACIT ITA No.: 1138 (Mum.) of 2015
A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 21st June, 2019

 

Section 9 of
the Act, Article 5 of the India-USA DTAA – Though Indian company was controlled
by foreign company, since all economic risks were borne by Indian company no
fixed place PE was constituted – Since services were rendered outside India and
no personnel had visited India, no service PE was constituted – Indian company
neither had authority to conclude, nor had it concluded, contracts and since it
had also not secured orders for foreign company, no agency PE was constituted

 

______________________________________________

1.  (2012) 52 SOT 93 (Mum.)(Trib.) – In Daimler
Chrysler (DC), it was held that: the subsidiary of a company cannot be regarded
as PE; since sales of completely knocked down (CKD) kits were made by DC to the
Indian company on principal-to-principal basis, they became property of the
Indian company and did not constitute the Indian company as sales outlet or
warehouse of DC; as the Indian company had not carried out any operation in
India in respect of sales of CKD kits on behalf of DC, it could not be
considered as PE of DC in India

 

 

FACTS

The assessee was an
American company and a tax resident of USA. It was engaged in the business of
diamond grading and preparation of diamond dossiers. The assessee also owned
100% shares in an Indian company (I Co) which was also engaged in similar
services. Whenever I Co faced capacity and / or technical constraints, it would
send precious stones to the assessee for grading.

 

During the relevant
year, the assessee earned ‘Instructor Fee’ from I Co for rendering diamond
grading services. The AO contended that the assessee and I Co had established a
JV business in which both operated as partners. Consequently, he held that I Co
constituted a PE of the taxpayer in India.

 

The assessee
claimed that the impugned receipts were in the nature of business profits and,
in the absence of any PE in India, the said income was not chargeable to tax in
India in terms of the DTAA.

 

HELD

As regards
fixed place PE

In a joint venture,
each party contributes its share to undertake an economic activity under joint
control. The arrangement between I Co and the taxpayer could not be considered
a joint venture for the following reasons:

(a)   I Co had independent
expertise. It used the services of the assessee only when it faced technical or
capacity constraints. Thus, this was a sub-contracting arrangement;

(b)   I Co entered into agreement with the clients.
All the economic risks in relation to the agreement, viz., credit risk, risk of
loss or damage to articles while in transit, etc., were borne by I Co.

 

Merely because a
company has controlling interest in the other company would not by itself
constitute the other company’s (its) PE in terms of Article 5(6) of the
India-USA DTAA. Accordingly, the assessee did not have a ‘’fixed place’ PE in
India.

 

As regards
service PR

(i)    The assessee rendered services to I Co only
when I Co was facing capacity or technical constraints and requested the
assessee for providing services. The assessee rendered these services outside
India. None of the employees / personnel of the assessee had visited India for rendering
services;

(ii)    Two graders who were earlier employed with
the assessee were employed with I Co and were on the payroll of I Co. They were
working under the control and supervision of I Co.

 

Therefore, no
service PE was constituted in India in terms of the India-USA DTAA.

 

As regards
agency PE

Considering the
functions and the risks assumed2 
by I Co vis-à-vis its business activities in India, I Co was an
independent and separate legal entity incorporated in India. I Co had also
borne all the economic risks. Further, I Co did not have any authority to
conclude contracts and had not concluded any contracts on behalf of the
assessee. It had also not secured any orders for the assessee in India. Thus, I
Co could not be said to have constituted agency PE of the assessee in India.

 

Section 5 of the Act – Article 9 of India-Germany DTAA – Foreign car manufacturing company sold completely built-up cars to Indian company on principal-to-principal basis – Indian company sold such cars to dealers on principal-to-principal basis, each transaction constituted a separate and independent activity, and since Indian company was not acting on behalf of the foreign company, the foreign company could not be said to have PE in India, either u/s 9 of the Act or under article 5 of India-Germany DTAA

5. TS-548-ITAT-2019
(Mum.)
Audi AG vs. ADIT ITA No.:
1781/Mum/2014
A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of order: 3rd
September, 2019

Section 5 of the
Act – Article 9 of India-Germany DTAA – Foreign car manufacturing company sold
completely built-up cars to Indian company on principal-to-principal basis –
Indian company sold such cars to dealers on principal-to-principal basis, each
transaction constituted a separate and independent activity, and since Indian
company was not acting on behalf of the foreign company, the foreign company
could not be said to have PE in India, either u/s 9 of the Act or under article
5 of India-Germany DTAA

 

FACTS

The assessee was a
car manufacturer based in Germany (F Co). It was a tax resident of Germany. F
Co was inter alia engaged in the business of selling its cars globally
under its own brand name (F Co Brand).

 

It had appointed an
Indian company (I Co 1), which was its associated enterprise (AE) as its
exclusive distributor for sale of F Co Brand cars in India. During the relevant
year, the assessee had sold completely built-up cars (CBU cars) and accessories
to I Co 1. The assessee also had another AE (I Co 2) in India. The assessee
sold parts and accessories to I Co 2 from which I Co 2 manufactured F Co Brand
cars in India. I Co 2 sold these cars to I Co 1 who, in turn, distributed them
to the dealers / distributors.

 

 

The assessee
offered only fees for technical services for tax under the India-Germany DTAA.
However, on the basis of the following observations, the AO held that the
assessee had a business connection and a PE in India in terms of Article 5(1)
and 5(5) of the India-Germany DTAA.

 

(i)    I Co 1 was an exclusive distributor and its
only business activity and source of income was from the sale of F Co Brand
cars;

(ii)    Activities of the assessee and I Co 1
complemented each other and I Co 1 was functioning as an extended arm of, and
replaced, the assessee in India;

(iii)   The assessee and I Co 1 jointly established
sales targets;

(iv)   Most of the senior officials working with I Co
1 had come from F Co group; and

(v)   The activities of storage, marketing,
soliciting with clients and potential customers, after-sales services and
support services, supply of spare parts and accessories, taking part in Auto
Expo were undertaken in India by I Co 1 on behalf of the assessee.

 

The DRP upheld the
order of the AO. Aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

(a)   The manufacture of cars was completed by the
assessee outside India. Hence, it constituted a separate and independent
activity;

(b)   The sale of cars was also completed outside
India. Hence, income arising from sales could not be taxed in India;

(c)   The assessee had contended
that the cars were sold to I Co 1 on principal-to-principal basis outside India
and I Co 1 had sold these on principal-to-principal basis to dealers. I Co 1
was not acting on behalf of the assessee and the assessee was not selling cars
through I Co 1. Income from sale of such cars in India was taxed separately in
the hands of I Co 1 in India. The AO did not bring any material to counter
this. Thus, I Co 1 did not constitute a PE of the assessee in India and income
from sale of cars is not taxable in India. The Tribunal relied on the decision
in the case of ACIT vs. Daimler Chrysler AG1 .

 

Section 74 – Long-term capital loss on sale of listed equity shares is allowed to be carried forward

5.  United Investments vs. ACIT (Kol.) Members: A.T.
Varkey (J.M.) and M. Balaganesh (A.M.) ITA No.:
511/Kol/2017
A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order:
1st July, 2019

Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: S. Jhajharia / Sankar Halder

 

Section 74 –
Long-term capital loss on sale of listed equity shares is allowed to be carried
forward

 

FACTS

The assessee
was engaged in the business of horse-racing and also as a commission agent. It
had deployed its surplus funds by way of investments in listed shares and
securities. During the year it had derived long-term capital gain of Rs. 0.77
lakh and suffered long-term capital loss of Rs. 6.05 lakhs on the sales of
listed shares. In the return of income, the assessee carried forward the
long-term capital loss. However, the CIT(A) rejected the same since, according
to him, the gain derived from the sales of listed shares was exempt.

 

Being
aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the Tribunal where the Revenue
supported the orders of the lower authorities and submitted that the term
‘income’ included negative income, i.e., loss as well. Thus, when the profit
from transfer of shares of listed companies was exempt u/s 10(38), then as a
corollary the loss arising from such source also cannot be set off against any
other income which is chargeable to tax.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that the judicial authorities, including the Apex Court in the case of CIT
vs. J.H. Gotla (156 ITR 323)
, have held that the expression ‘income’
includes loss. The Tribunal further noted that the decision of the Apex Court
was in the context of clubbing of a minor’s income with that of the parents u/s
64, when the Court held that the loss legally assessable in the hands of the
minor was also required to be clubbed in the hands of the parent. In the said
case, according to the Tribunal, the Revenue had not proved that the source
from which the minor earned income or incurred loss was outside the purview of
the tax provisions. Although, admittedly, the source of income in the hands of
the minor was such that it was liable to tax and if there had been any income,
then the same would have been included in the hands of the parent. In the light
of this factual and legal position, the Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court
held that if the income was liable for clubbing in the hands of the parent,
then equally the same principle will apply with respect to loss which was negative
income.

 

According to
the Tribunal, the judicial concept that the term ‘income’ includes loss can be
applied only when the entire source of such income falls within the charging
provisions of the Act. Accordingly, in a case where the source of income is otherwise
chargeable to tax, but only a specific specie of income derived from such
source is granted exemption, then in such a case the proposition that the term
‘income’ includes loss will not be applicable. It is only when the source which
produces ‘income’ is outside the ambit of the taxing provisions of the Act, in
such a case alone the ‘income’ including negative income can be said to be
outside the ambit of taxing provisions, and therefore the negative income is
also required to be ignored for taxation purposes. Therefore, where only one of
the streams of income from the ‘source’ is granted exemption by the Legislature
upon fulfilment of specified conditions, then the concept of ‘income’ includes
‘loss’ will not apply.

 

According to
the Tribunal, on conjoint reading of the provisions of section 2(14) which
defines the term capital assets; section 45 which lays down the charge of tax
on gain arising on transfer of ‘capital asset’; section 48 which provides for
the manner and mode of computation of long-term capital gain; and section 74
providing for manner for claiming set-off of long-term capital loss / its carry
forward, nowhere had any exception been made with regard to long-term capital
gain / loss arising on sale of equity shares. The Tribunal further noted that
the same is liable to income tax like any other item of capital asset.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the source, viz., transfer of long-term
capital asset being equity shares, by itself is exempt from tax so as to say
that any ‘income’ from such source shall include ‘loss’ as well.

 

Therefore, relying on the decisions of the
Calcutta High Court in the case of Royal Calcutta Turf Club vs. CIT
[1983] 144 ITR 709/12 Taxman 133
and the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of
Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT (69 SOT 383), the Tribunal
held that the claim of the assessee for carry forward of long-term capital loss
be allowed.

Section 154 – Denial of deduction u/s 80HHC on sale proceeds of DEPB license, which was contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, can be termed as a ‘mistake’ apparent from record and can be rectified u/s 154

4. Anandkumar
Jain vs. ITO (Mum.)
Members: G.S.
Pannu (V.P.) and Ravish Sood (J.M.) ITA No.:
4192/Mum/2012
A.Y.: 2003-04 Date of order:
20th August, 2019

Counsel for
Assessee / Revenue: Jitendra Sanghavi and Amit Khatiwala / Rajesh Kumar Yadav

 

Section 154 –
Denial of deduction u/s 80HHC on sale proceeds of DEPB license, which was
contrary to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, can be termed as a
‘mistake’ apparent from record and can be rectified u/s 154

 

FACTS

The assessee is
an individual engaged in the business of manufacturing and export of garments.
In his return of income for assessment year 2003-04 he had claimed deduction
u/s 80HHC. During the course of the assessment, the AO, amongst other
adjustments made, re-computed the deduction u/s 80HHC by reducing 90% of the
duty drawback, excise duty refund and sale proceeds of DEPB license from the
profits of the business of the assessee. On further appeals, both the CIT(A) as
well as the Tribunal upheld the order of the AO.

 

Thereafter, the
Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Topman Exports vs. ITO (OSD)
(33 SOT 337 dated 11th August, 2009)
decided a similar issue
in favour of the appellant. In view thereof, the assessee filed a rectification
application u/s 154. The AO rejected the application holding that the issue was
debatable and the Department was in appeal against the order in the Topman
Exports
case. According to the CIT(A) this cannot be termed as a
mistake apparent from record and hence the same cannot be rectified u/s 154. He
also agreed with the AO that the issue was debatable. On merits, the CIT(A)
held that the issue of allowance of deduction u/s 80HHC had been decided
against the assessee by the Bombay High Court in the case of Kalpataru
Colours, 192 taxman 435.
Accordingly, the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal
of the assessee vide order dated 24th January, 2011. The assessee
did not prefer further appeal against the order of the CIT(A).

 

Subsequently,
the Supreme Court in the case of Topman Exports vs. CIT (342 ITR 49)
reversed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Kalpataru Colours
case vide its order dated 8th February, 2012. Thereafter, the
assessee filed the instant appeal before the Tribunal against the order of the
CIT(A) on 15th June, 2012 which was after a delay of 420 days, with
a request for condonation of delay.

 

Before the
Tribunal, the Revenue objected to the assessee’s application for condonation of
delay and relied upon the decision in the case of Kunal Surana vs. ITO in
ITA No. 3297/Mum/2012
wherein the application filed by the assessee for
condonation of delay of four months was rejected. Further, it was contended
that since the issue was debatable at the relevant point of time, it cannot be
said to be a mistake apparent from record and hence cannot be rectified u/s
154.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
noted that the delay in filing the appeal was solely on the ground that the
CIT(A) had decided the issue against the assessee following the decision of the
jurisdictional High Court in the case of Kalpataru Colours; and,
as such, based on the advice of the consultant, the assessee did not prefer
further appeal before the Tribunal. Subsequently, when the Supreme Court passed
a favourable order in the case of Topman Exports, based on the
advice from his consultant the assessee filed the present appeal which was
after a delay of 420 days. According to the Tribunal, the assessee had a valid
reason for the delay and hence, relying on the decisions in the cases of Magnum
Exports vs. ACIT (ITA No. 1111/Kol/2012)
and Pahilajal Jaikishan
vs. JCIT (ITA No. 1392/Mum/2012)
, it condoned the delay.

 

As regards the
issue whether it was a ‘mistake’ apparent from record in terms of section 154,
the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ACIT
vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. (173 Taxman 322)
relied on by
the assessee. As per the said decision, according to the Tribunal, the Hon’ble
Courts do not make any new law when the order is pronounced; the Courts only
clarify the legal position, which was not correctly understood. Therefore, the
legal position so clarified by the Courts has an effect which is retrospective
in nature. Therefore, the Tribunal observed, any order passed in contravention
of such legal position would be considered as a mistake apparent from record
which can be rectified u/s 154. Accordingly, the contention of the assessee was
accepted and it held that the order passed by the AO and CIT(A) can be
rectified u/s 154.

 

On merit, the Tribunal relied on the Supreme
Court decision in the case of Topman Exports (Supra) and directed
the AO to re-compute the deduction u/s 80HHC on the sale proceeds of the DEPB
license in light of the said decision of the Supreme Court and allowed the
appeal filed by the assessee.

Sections 28(ii), 45 – Amount of Rs. 1.75 crores received by assessee towards professional goodwill was not chargeable u/s 28(ii)(a) as no case was made out by AO to establish that the assessee was the person who was managing the whole or substantially the whole of the affairs of the company Section 55(2) does not specify cost of acquisition of management right. There is no deemed cost of acquisition in the statute. Therefore, the charge u/s 45 never intended to levy a tax on transfer of management rights

6. [2019] 201 TTJ (Rai.) 683 DCIT vs. Dr. Sandeep Dave ITA No.: 175/Rpr/2013 A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 1st July, 2019

 

Sections 28(ii), 45 – Amount of Rs. 1.75
crores received by assessee towards professional goodwill was not chargeable
u/s 28(ii)(a) as no case was made out by AO to establish that the assessee was
the person who was managing the whole or substantially the whole of the affairs
of the company

 

Section 55(2) does not specify cost of
acquisition of management right. There is no deemed cost of acquisition in the
statute. Therefore, the charge u/s 45 never intended to levy a tax on transfer
of management rights

 

FACTS

The assessee received a certain amount from company CARE. According to
it, the amount was received as professional goodwill and was liable to be
treated as capital receipt not liable to capital gain. The AO observed that the
amount was received by the assessee on account of relinquishment of his rights
in the management of a company in favour of CARE, and not on account of
relinquishment of any right relating to professional expertise or acumen as
surgeon. The AO, accordingly, brought the amount to tax holding that it was
covered under the provision of section 28(ii)(a). On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) deleted the addition made by the AO. Aggrieved by this order, the
Revenue filed an appeal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held
that the work of management was entrusted to different committees and such
committees had other members / doctors apart from the assessee. Therefore, it
was incumbent on the Revenue to establish that in spite of there being other
members on various managerial committees, it was the assessee alone who was
actually managing the affairs of different committees. In such a case, it is
the board of directors collectively who can be said to be managing the business
affairs of the company.

 

Management right
has now been included in the definition of ‘property’ and, therefore, is a
‘capital asset’ u/s 2(14). This being so, the taxability of any amount received
against relinquishment of ‘management right’ has to be tested on the touchstone
of provisions relating to computation of capital gain. The assessee argued that
since management right is a capital asset, provisions relating to capital gain
will apply and when such computation provisions are applied, they are
unworkable. It is true that under the scheme of taxation of capital gain it is
not the entire sale consideration of an asset which is chargeable to tax but it
is the ‘profit or gain’ arising on transfer thereof which is taxable. This
observation is subject to the specific provisions of law which prescribe that
in case of some category of capital assets, cost of acquisition is considered
to be nil and, in those cases, full consideration accruing on transfer will
become taxable. In the instant case, it is the stand of the assessee that cost
of acquisition of management right being indeterminate, no capital gain can be
worked out and so the provisions are not workable.

 

Section 55(2) does
not specify the cost of acquisition of ‘management right’. There is no deemed
cost of acquisition provided in the statute. No case has been made out by the
AO to show as to what was the cost of management right in the hands of the
assessee. Therefore, what has been brought to tax is the entire consideration
for relinquishment of management right which runs contrary to the settled
proposition of law, which was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT
vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 5 Taxman 1/128 ITR 294.
In this
decision, the Supreme Court has laid down the proposition that machinery and
charging provisions constitute an integrated code and in the situation where
the computation provision fails, it has to be assumed that such a transaction
was not intended to be falling within the charging section and, therefore, the
charge on account of capital gain must fail.

 

It is evident that
the Revenue has not established that the assessee was managing the whole or
substantially the whole of the affairs of the company as no case has been made
out by the Revenue that the amount received by the assessee from CARE was on
account of relinquishment of any managerial rights. Even assuming that the
amount received by the assessee is relatable to relinquishment of any
managerial right, in view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the
case of B.C. Srinivasa Setty (Supra), the cost of any such
managerial right being indeterminate, provisions relating to computation of
capital gain are not workable and, consequently, it has to be held that the
charge u/s 45 never intended to levy a tax on such a transaction. Therefore,
the amount received by the assessee is neither chargeable u/s 28(ii)(a) nor
under the head capital gain.

Section 12AA – At the time of granting of registration u/s 12A, the only requirement is examining the objects of the trust / society and genuineness of its activities

5. [2019] 72 ITR 14
(Trib.) (Amrit.)
Acharya Shri Tulsi
Kalyan Kendra vs. CIT(E) ITA No.: 335
(Amritsar) of 2017
A.Y.: 2017-18 Date of order: 28th
January, 2019

 

Section 12AA – At
the time of granting of registration u/s 12A, the only requirement is examining
the objects of the trust / society and genuineness of its activities

 

FACTS

The assessee is a
trust. It had applied for registration u/s 12A of the Act. However, the CIT(E)
denied the said registration citing the following reasons:

(i)    The assessee had carried out certain
activities which were not covered under charitable purposes u/s 2(15) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961;

(ii)    Complete inactivity since inception in 1979
till the sale of land in 2007 reflects that the activities were not in sync
with the stated objects;

(iii)   The registration was sought to be obtained
after a gap of ten years after the sale of land in 2007, indicating
unwillingness to carry out charitable activities;

(iv)   Amendment of the trust deed incorporating the
dissolution clause and at the same time introduction of new trustees indicated
that the motive of the applicant to seek registration under this section was
merely to save on taxes on interest income;

(v)   Changes in the trust deed do not have proper
legal sanction and though a supplementary deed was submitted to the
sub-registrar, his jurisdiction to accept the same was questionable.

 

Aggrieved by the
rejection order passed by the Commissioner, the assessee preferred an appeal to
the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal
observed the following in relation to the reasoning given by the Commissioner:

 

It is trite to say
that at the time of registration u/s 12AA, the CIT(E) has to consider the twin
requirements of (a) objects of the assessee society, and (b) genuineness of its
activity. Nowhere in the order had the CIT(E) either pointed out any defect in
the objects of the society and / or the activities of the applicant assessee
society, or doubted the genuineness of the activities specifically. Therefore,
the Tribunal concluded that the assessee is carrying out its activities in
accordance with its objects specified in the trust deed and for charitable
purposes. As a matter of fact, the Tribunal found that the trust also carried
out other charitable activities as per its objects.

 

The trust was in
operation since 1979. However, much activity was not carried out until 2007 due
to paucity of funds. When the trust had accumulated a good amount of funds from
rollover of investments after sale of land in 2007, it constructed certain
halls / rooms which were used in the course of its charitable activities. This
fact was clearly demonstrated by the assessee and the same was considered to be
a logical reason for not carrying out any activity previously. The main reason
for rejection of registration was that amendment of the trust deed
incorporating the dissolution clause and at the same time introduction of new
trustees indicated the motive of the applicant to seek registration under this
section was merely to save on taxes on interest income. This reasoning given by
the CIT(E) was merely a general remark without considering the intricacies of
the law and therefore the reason was illogical.

 

Considering the
above, the Tribunal directed the CIT(E) to grant registration to the trust. It
further clarified that the CIT(E) while granting the registration shall be at
liberty to endorse the condition, if any, he finds to be reasonable in accordance
with law.

 

JOB WORK : OLD WINE IN BETTER BOTTLE? (PART 2)

In the previous article, we
concluded that the GST law has widened the scope of job work from its
predecessor law by considering ‘any’ treatment or process undertaken on goods
belonging to another registered person as a ‘job work’. Job work under GST law
could be viewed from two vintage points – (a) job worker’s view point with
respect of determination of his output tax liability; and (b) recipient/
principals’ view point with respect to movement of goods and retention of input
tax credit. The said article aims at discussing Job Work under various sub
topics from these viewpoints.

 

A) Supply – whether deemed Supply between distinct persons?

Movement of goods for job work
reduces the cash flow cost (to the extent of tax component) of an organisation.
GST law has innovated with the concept of distinct persons wherein distinct
registration numbers having the same PAN is deemed as independent persons (even
though they may be in the same state). Does this fiction extend even to job
work arrangements? Whether factory A can operate as a job worker for factory B
as distinct persons even-though they are holding the same PAN?

 

Section 25(4) of the CGST Act
states that a person having registration in multiple states would be treated as
distinct persons in each of the State for the purpose of the CGST/IGST/SGST
Act. This deeming fiction seemingly applies to all provisions of the GST law.
Schedule I deems transactions without consideration between distinct persons as
taxable only when there is a ‘identified supply’ between such distinct persons.
Since job work arrangements do not entail a supply (in the nature of sale,
barter, exchange, etc) between factory A to B, it would be permissible to move
goods between states without any GST implications. The goods can undergo
processing and cleared therefrom on payment of GST. While there may be
practically challenges to prove the aspect of a principal-job worker
relationship without a written contract between factory A to B, the self
generated delivery challan and ITC-04 should ideally serve as an expression of
the job work arrangement.

 

B) Classification – Supply of Goods/ Services

Job work as a Supply of Service – Job work
transactions have been deemed to be a ‘supply of service’ under Entry 3 of
Schedule II. The scope of the entry is wider in comparison to the definition of
job work in as much as it does not require the owner of the goods to be a
registered person. This entry would certainly put to rest any litigation over
the classification of such transactions on the grounds of percentage of
material involved, dominant intention, end deliverable, etc. In its Circular
No. 52/26/2018-GST, CBEC has stated that body building activity involving
supply of the entire body over the chassis owned by the principal is taxable as
supply of services @ 18% and not at the rate applicable to the goods (28%).
Therefore, in job work arrangements one would necessarily have to examine the
tax rate and exemption as applicable to services irrespective of the rate
applicable to the goods involved in such contract. The modelling of contracts
as job work or sale and purchase would become significant where the applicable
tax rate for the goods is substantially lower say exempt/ 5-12% in comparison
to the standard job work rate of 18%.

 

Job work vs.Works contract – Is there
an overlap between job work (section 2(68)) and works contract (section 2(119))
where an immovable property is involved in the arrangement? For eg. fabrication
services at site during construction of building/ storage tank for the
principal/ contractee could have two aspects:

 

  •    Process of fabrication as
    a treatment / process on goods. SAC classification under job work (99887)
    states that such fabrication manufacturing services of metal structures, steam
    generators, etc., is classifiable as job work and taxable at 18%.
  •    Process also involves
    erection of movable property as an immovable property. SAC classification (99544)
    covers assembly and erection of prefabricated constructions under the works
    contract / construction service category and taxable at 18%.

 

Explanatory notes to the SAC
classification codes provide that specific description would prevail over
general description. Going by this principle, it appears that classification as
a works contract prevails over job work (on the basis of the specific
definition of work contract w.r.t. immovable properties) and the tax rates as
applicable to work contract would apply. The end deliverable under the
contractual arrangement is the erection of the civil structure and job work
should be considered as only the means and not the end.

 

The important
point to note here is that the classification of service under Schedule II is
relevant only with reference to the job worker’s view point (i.e. his output
tax liability). This classification at the job worker’s end should not bar the
principal from availing the benefits of job work procedures. The principal
should still be permitted to send the goods to the job workers premises for any
specific activity (such as twisting, bending, etc.) under job work procedure
even-though the job worker may ultimately raise a works contract invoice on its
output activity. While this view is subject to debate, the author believes that
understanding of job work from the principal’s perspective does not necessarily
have to translate into the classification as a job work on the job worker’s
output invoice.

 

Job work vs. Manpower Supply
Contracts
– Job work has been specifically defined unlike manpower service
contracts. In certain instances where a person outsources specific processing
functions of a product to third party either on man-day/man-hour basis, the
dividing line between it being classified as a job work contract or a manpower
contract is blurred. In cases where the supplier takes responsibility over the
assignment of personnel to a particular entity for a specified job but does not
undertake the obligation over the quantum / quality of output from such
assigned personnel, the contracts would typically be in the nature of manpower
supply contracts (SAC 998513/4). Where the supplier takes over the obligation
of ensuring the quality / quantum of the product processed by the personnel so
assigned under its supervision and direction, the supplier would be
classifiable as a job worker. Decisions under both excise/ service on whether a
person is a ‘manufacturer/ service provider’ or mere supplier of hired labour
would provide some guidance on this aspect.

 

C)     Place of
Supply – Inter-State / Intra-State

Job work transactions being
classified as ‘supply of service’ would be governed by the place of supply
provisions as applicable to services u/s. 12/ 13 of the IGST Act. Some unique
instances have been provided below:

 

Job work for SEZ units/ developers – Supply of
job work service would be an inter-state supply, irrespective of the location
of the supplier of service or the place of supply u/s. 12 of the IGST Act, as
long as they are carried out for authorised operations of the SEZ unit/
developer. For the SEZ unit/ developers where physical movement of goods takes
place across the SEZ area, one will have to follow procedures of procurement of
‘goods’ under the SEZ rules (Rule 41/ 50 of SEZ rules which are discussed
later) even though the transaction may be classified as a supply of ‘service’
under the GST law. The deeming fiction of treating job work as a service
transaction under Entry 3 of Schedule II has limited operation under the GST
law and does not extend to the SEZ law.

 

Export of goods outside India for
Job Work
– Export of goods under job work arrangements outside India would
be governed by section 13 of the IGST Act. Section 13(3) read as follows:

 

“(3) The place of supply of the
following services shall be the location where the services are actually
performed, namely :-

 

(a)    Services
supplied in respect of goods which are required to be made physically available
by the recipient of services to the supplier of services, or to a person acting
on behalf of the supplier of service in order to provide the services:… ”

 

Generally, job work would be
regarded as performing a treatment/ process on goods under physical possession
(as a bailee). The definition of job work indicates the activity would be
clearly governed by section 13(3) – performance based activity and the place of
supply in case of exported goods would be location where the services are
actually performed i.e. outside India. Since the place of supply is outside
India, the transaction would not be taxable in the hands of the job worker
supplier.

 

The transaction would also not
qualify as an import of service in terms of section 2(11) of the IGST Act.
Though the RCM notification issued u/s. 5(3) of the IGST seeks to impose tax on
reverse charge basis on the basis of location of the recipient and not on the
basis of place of supply rules, in view of the author, this is a transaction
outside India and not taxable under the provisions of section 5(1) of the IGST
Act itself. No RCM liability can be attached on a non-taxable transaction.

 

From a customs perspective, export
movement is generally duty free except for some export duty goods. For Import
movement Notification 45/2017-Cus dt. 30-06-2017 grants customs duty exemption
(incl. IGST) to goods originally exported, at the time of reimport within 3
years, provided the goods are ‘same’ as those exported. Explanation to the
notification states that the goods would not be same if they are subjected to
re-manufacturing, reprocessing through melting, recycling or recasting abroad.
In such arrangements, challenge would arise on whether the job worked goods
constitute ‘same’ goods. In case the goods do not get the customs duty
exemption, it would be regarded as a fresh import and subjected to customs duty
incl. IGST on the enhanced value of the product.

 

 



Be that as it may, one can
certainly take a view based on the celebrated decision of Hyderabad
Industries vs. UOI 1999 (108) E.L.T. 321 (S.C.)
that IGST component u/s.
3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act is counter-veiling in nature and hence cannot be
imposed on imports under job work in the absence of a transaction of ‘supply’
between the parties involved1. The transaction is deemed to be a
supply only in limited cases when the conditions of job work are breached by
the principal and not otherwise.

___________________________________

1 There is a slight variation in the way section 3(1), (3) and
(5) are worded in comparison to 3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

 

Import of goods into India for Job
work
– Goods are imported into India for job work. While the job work
is performed in India, the location of the recipient of such job work (i.e.
principal) is outside India. Strictly speaking this arrangement does not fall
within the ambit of the definition of job work since the owner of the goods is
not a ‘registered person’. Nevertheless we will analyse this job work
transaction as understood in commercial sense.

 

Under the GST law, by application
of section 13(3), the place of supply would be held to be in India. By way of a
proviso2 to section 13(3) (extracted below), the place of supply in
such transactions has been fixed to the location of the recipient of job work
services rather than the place of performance of the job work.

 

“Provided further that nothing
contained in this clause shall apply in the case of services supplied in
respect of goods which are temporarily imported into India for repairs or for
any other treatment or process and are exported after such repairs or treatment
or process without being put to any use in India, other than that which is
required for such repairs or treatment or process;”

 

In view of this proviso, the
transaction would be considered as an export of service and zero-rated in terms
of section 16 of the IGST Act. The Customs law vide Notification 32/1997 dt.
1-4-1997 permits temporary imports into India for the purpose of job work,
etc., subject to certain conditions over time limit, use etc. Therefore, import
of goods for job work should not have any implications in India.

 

Inter-state job work – Job work
transactions would be inter-state or intra-state and largely dependent on the
location of the supplier and recipient of the service in terms of section 12(1)
of the IGST Act. Where the location of the supplier and recipient is in the
same state, it would be an intra-state transaction and vice-versa. Except in
cases involving an immovable property, the location of supplier of service and
recipient of service would be the only determinants in deciding the inter-state
character of the transaction. Provisions of CGST Act would apply to inter-state
transactions as well (section 20 of IGST Act) and hence all benefits extended
to intra-state arrangements would equally apply even to inter-state movements.

 

From a principals perspective for
intra-state job work movement, further supply of goods after job work either
from the principal location or job workers location would not pose any
particular challenge since the registered location of the supplier and the
physical location of the goods is in the same state. The further supply would
be treated as inter-state or intra-state depending on the movement of the
goods.

 

In certain inter-state job work
movement where the principal does not receive the goods back but decides to
supply the processed/ job worked goods directly from the job worker’s location
to its customer, there is a challenge in deciding the location of the supplier.
This is primarily because the registered location of the supplier is different
from the physical location of goods. It is depicted below:

________________________________________________

2   Broadened
by the IGST amendment Act, 2018 and yet to be notified.

 

 

 

 

 

 

In such transactions, the initial
movement of goods takes place from KA-MH under a delivery challan for the
purpose of job work. The supplier may or may not have a confirmed order for
supply of the said goods to a customer in MH. Assuming there is no confirmed
order, after job work, the principal supplies the goods directly to its
customer in MH. A question arises on the type of tax to be charged on the sale
invoice (i.e. IGST/ CGST+SGST).

 

The IGST Act states that where the
supply involves movement of goods within a state, the transaction would be
intra-state, else it would be classified as an inter-state transaction. In this
case, the first movement of goods by the supplier is under an arrangement of
job work and not under a binding contract of supply with the customer. It is
only when the order is received from the customer in MH that the second
movement commences, which then terminates in MH. Going by the fabric of the
entire GST law and also the fact that job work is merely facilitation provision
and does not materially alter other obligations under GST, one can take a stand
that this is an inter-state transaction despite the fact that the movement
commences and terminates in the same state3. This reconciles with
the overall scheme of source and consumption principle of value-added scheme of
taxation.

_________________________________________________

3   It
must be noted that this is not a Bill to Ship to case as is envisaged in
section 10(1)(b) but a case where the billing location and dispatch location
are in different states.

 

D)     Valuation
under job work

Job work transactions are liable to
tax on its transaction value i.e. price paid or payable by the principal to the
job worker for the job work service. There is a clear departure from the excise
principle of notionally re-valuing the goods after job work and subjecting the
same to excise duty. Under job work, valuation is only restricted to the
service rendered by the job worker. The price charged for the job work service
would then be subject to all the additions/ exclusions as provided u/s. 15(2)
and (3) of the Act. Certain important points have been stated below:

 

Recoveries on disposal of
scrap/ waste from Job Work

The erstwhile Cenvat rules was
silent on the treatment of waste and scrap arising during the course of
manufacturing final products at the premises of job worker. This resulted in
litigation on the person liable to excise duty on such waste/ scrap. Section
143(5) of the GST law now provides that the waste and scrap generated during
the job work may be supplied by the registered job worker directly from
his place of business or by the principal in case the job worker is not
registered. A question arises on whether the liability of recoveries on waste/
scrap generated from job work arises on the job worker in all cases?

 

In this context, job work contracts
can be classified into two categories: (a) Contracts where the responsibility
of utilisation and/ or disposals of scraps or waste emerging from the goods is
on the job worker. In such cases by virtue of the contract, the scraps and
waste are to the account of the job work and any recoveries from waste/ scraps
would be retained by the job worker. Accordingly, such recoveries should be
taxable in the hands of the job worker and not the principal.  (b) In other contracts waste and scraps are
to the account of the principal and the job worker has to report the generation
of such items to the principal. The principal may either receive the goods back
or direct the job worker to dispose them under its authorisation to a third
party. Generally, two sub-scenarios arise in this category (b-i) principal
sells the goods under its invoice and directs the job worker to collect the net
proceeds (as a collection agent). The principal should report this turnover and
discharge the tax liability on such transaction; (b-ii) job worker sells the
goods in its possession under its own invoice effectively operating as a
‘selling agent’ of goods belonging to the principal – in such case the
recoveries would be taxed in the hands of the principal (as a deemed supply
between principal and agent under Schedule I) as well as in the hands of the
job worker (as a selling agent).

 

Is there a conflict that may
possibly arise by virtue of a contract and the statute? In view of the author,
the provisions of section 143(5) should not be given a strict application in
all cases in view of the use of the term ‘may’. The contract should be given
prominence before determining the person liable to pay tax on such recoveries.
Section 143(5) should be understood as giving an option to the principal to
decide the more economical and viable options viz., to bring back the wastes
and scraps or to clear the same from job worker premises on payment of taxes by
himself or by the job worker, as the case may be.

 

The following judgements General
Engineering Works vs. CCE 2007 (212) ELT 295 (SC)
clearly explains the
position of earlier law and the importance of contractual terms in order to
ascertain the appropriate value:

 

“4. It is an admitted position that
to manufacture 100 Kgs. of points and crossings, 105 Kgs. of raw material has
to be used. Therefore, in working out the value of points and crossings the
cost of 105 Kgs. of raw material would have to be taken into account.
Undoubtedly, when points and crossings are manufactured a small quantity of raw
material become scrap/waste. But that does not detract from fact that to
manufacture 100 kg. of points and crossings 105 kg. of raw material has to be
used. This element i.e. the cost of raw material would remain the same
irrespective of whether scrap/waste is returned to the Railways or kept by the
Appellants. The Appellants charge what are known as conversion charges. This
includes their labour charges. Such conversion charges would have to be added
to the cost of raw material. To this would have to be added profits, if any,
earned by the processor (Appellant). Thus suppose the conversion charges are
Rs. 450/-, the cost of 105 Kgs. of raw material is Rs. 1,000/-, and Rs. 50/- is
earned from sale of scrap the value of the points and crossings would be Rs.
1,500/-

5. It must be clarified that the value of scrap would be included in the value
of the points and crossings only in case where it is shown that the conversion
charges get depressed by the fact that the processor is allowed to keep and
sell the scrap. Thus in the example given above, it would have to be shown that
the conversion charges are Rs. 450/- because Rs. 50/- is earned from the sale
of scrap. If the conversion charges are not depressed or if the scrap/waste is
returned then, their value will not get added.

 

6. The burden of proving that the
price is so depressed would be on the Revenue. But one of the methods of
proving it would be through the contract between the parties itself. In this
case the contract is on record. The contract provides as follows : –

 

“The prices quoted are based on the
free supply of Rails by you at our works, Bharatpur, Western Railway,
Rajasthan. The tonnage for Rails will be 5% more than the net requirement of
Rails required for different items of Switches, 5% being the manufacturing
wastage…………

The total requirement of Rails for
different items would be forwarded to you within ten days of receipt of your
formal order. Manufacturing wastage of 5% has been considered and therefore
this wastage will not be separately accounted for and shall not be returned. Any
surplus materials received from you against the contract, will be returned to
you and dispatched to the destination as advised by you, F.O.R.”

 

7. Thus, the contract clearly
indicates that the price (conversion charges) have been worked out on the basis
that 5% wastage would be available to the Appellants. This indicates that the
price has been affected by the sale of scrap. In this view, we are in agreement
with the view of the Tribunal that in computing the value of points and
crossings the value of scrap sold has to be taken into account.”

 

Includibility of Value of FOC items
(such as inputs, moulds, dies, etc.)

 

Job workers in many instances are
supplied with moulds, dies, etc., for rendering the service. The Central excise
and GST law both use the phrase that ‘price should be sole consideration’.
Under excise provisions, explanation to Rule 6 of the Central Excise
(Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000 required the
manufacturer to include the amortised value of moulds, etc., in the value the
final product manufactured by the job worker. This practice under excise law
would certainly pose challenges during the GST period. The issue is whether a
notional value is to be attributed to the value of job work service on account
of (a) price not being the sole consideration in view of the FOC item; or (b)
in view of section 15(2)(b) of the GST law requiring the supplier to notionally
add value of all expenses incurred by the principal. Both are in some sense
correlated and section 15(2)(b) is an elaboration of the adjustment where price
is not the sole consideration.

 

Section 15(2)(b) has the following
cumulative conditions:

 

  •    Supplier (job worker) is
    making a supply (job work service) to its recipient (principal), typically
    under a contract;
  •    An amount is liable to
    be paid
    by the supplier (job worker);
  •    Such amount has been incurred
    by the recipient (principal)
  •    And accordingly this is
    not included in the price payable for supply (job work service)

 

In job work arrangements, the
moulds are purchased by the principal for multiple commercial reasons such as
high costs, IPR protection, etc. This is done in its own interest. One of the
primary conditions of section 15(2)(b) is that there has to be a primary
liability on the job worker to incur an expense, either under a contract or as
part the scope of work assigned to the job worker, which is subsequently taken
up by the principal, thereby reducing the net price as originally agreed in the
contract, for eg. a textile manufacturer agrees to outsource the dyeing of x
mtrs of textile with dyes/inks/ impressions as part of the responsibility on
the job worker and fixes a price of y/mtr. Subsequently, the manufacturer
procures the ink of specified type and supplies the same to the job worker and
reduces the price payable to y-1/mtr. In such cases, the dye could be
notionally added onto the value of supply in the hands of the job worker. In a
contrasting case, if the price was originally agreed at y 1/mtr with the supply
of dye being part of responsibility of principal, there is no liability on the
job worker to use his own dye for the process. The important driver for trigger
of this provision is that the liability of job worker should precede
the act of incurring the expense by the recipient. Fulfilment of one’s own
obligation is distinct from fulfilment of another person’s obligation and
15(2)(b) is addressing only the later obligation. In a transaction based law,
price agreed for a set of obligations (as a counter promise) should be the only
basis for valuation under GST.

 

E)     Compliance of Job work
provisions

Outsourcing
by job worker himself
– The law permits the principal to send the goods for job work to
multiple job workers. Outsourcing by job workers as a principal himself may be
permitted contractually but the law does not contain specific provisions for
job workers to send the goods at their own behest (in capacity of a principal).
One may view this from two perspectives.

 

The definition
of job work suggests that the law does not mandate that the goods should belong
to the principal i.e. the goods can be belong to any registered person. The
term principal is understood only u/s. 143 as being the person who ‘sends’ the
goods for job work.  Therefore, this
suggests that the job worker can function as a principal while sending the
goods for a second level job work. All provisions of the law as applicable to
principals would equally apply to the job worker when operating as a principal.

 

The other aspect is from the point
of view of section 143(2) which states that the accountability of the goods
under job work always lies with the principal. The accountability on the
principal u/s. 143(2) has been placed as a consequence of the fact that he has
availed input tax credit on such goods. This responsibility over the goods
under law cannot be shifted from the primary principal to the job worker.  Even if there is a clandestine removal of
goods without authorisation/ knowledge of the principal at any point of time,
the recovery of the tax on such goods would only be made by the person availing
the benefit of input tax credit i.e. principal. Since the job worker has not
availed the benefit of input tax credit on such goods, the onus is always on
the principal who has availed this facility to ensure that the goods are within
its supervision until all the conditions of job work are satisfied. While
outsourcing by a job worker to a sub-job worker is not barred, the
accountability over the goods under law still rests on the primary principal
only.

 

In-house job
work activity
– There are instances where a job worker performs the job work
activity in the premises of the principal for commercial reasons. In such
cases, the place of supply provisions would operate on similar lines and the
location of the principal and the job worker would decide the inter-state
character of the transaction (unless the job worker constitutes a fixed
establishment in the premises of the principal). Under these arrangements, the job
worker may have to move certain tools, equipments etc to the principal’s
premises and return those back to the original location. Section 19 and 143 is
applicable only cases where principal moves goods to the job worker’s premises
and not the other way round. However, in cases of in-house job work activity,
the principal does not need the facility of these sections since the entire
activity is occurring in-house. The job worker on the other hand is moving the
goods without an intent of supply but self-use. In view of the author, in the
absence of a transaction of supply between the job worker and the principal,
the job worker can still move the goods to the principal’s location and retain
the input tax credit by use of a delivery challan.

 

Possible consequence of violation
of Job work provisions

Violation of job work provisions
can be clubbed under two baskets (a) violation of substantial requirements
(such as arrangement not falling under the scope of job work, non-return of
goods within prescribed time etc) (b) violation of procedural requirements
(such as non-filing of ITC-04, etc).

 

(a)    Violation
of substantial provisions:
Conceptually any violation should be rectified
by restoring the benefit originally granted to the tax payer. In a job work transaction,
the principal avails the benefit of input tax credit on inputs/ capital goods
(i.e. skips the stage of reversal and reclaim) even-though the goods are not in
its possession. Section 143(3) & (4) deems the inputs/ capital goods as
being supplied by the principal to the job worker if they are not returned
within the time limit. Valuation rules do not provide any mechanism for
valuation of goods violating the job work provisions. In the absence of a
contractual consideration for the deemed supply of goods, does this mean that
the principal would have to pay tax on a notional value in terms of open market
value of the goods under job work? In the view of the author this may not be
so. The deeming fiction is to be understood in the context of the original
benefit extended to the supplier which is limited to recover the input tax
credit availed on the goods which have violated the job work provisions. It
would be legally in appropriate to assume this transaction as an independent
supply and subject it to tax in the hands of the principal at a notional value.

(b)    Violation
of procedural provisions:
Any procedural violation which is curable and
condonable should not have any adverse implication. Where the principal has
failed to make the necessary intimations of goods sent for job work, it can be
cured by producing books of accounts/ records evidencing the outward and inward
movement which conclusively establish the use of the goods under job work. In
cases where goods are duly accounted, it would be incorrect to saddle the
principal with an additional tax liability by invoking provisions of section
143(3) / (4). The penal provisions for non-filing of the relevant forms would
continue to apply.

 

F)     Procedural matters

Documentation requirements

Movement of goods between the
principal and job work is required to be covered under a delivery challan (DC)
in terms of Rule 45 r/w 55(1)(b) of CGST/ SGST Rules. This is also required to
be accompanied by a e-way bill in terms of Rule 138(1)(ii) of the said Rules.
Certain specific provisions have been provided under the e-way bill rules for
job work arrangements (CBEC Circular No. 38/12/2018):

 

  •    Where goods are sent by
    principal to only one job worker: The principal shall prepare a DC for sending
    the goods to a job worker. Two copies of the DC may be sent to the job worker
    along with the goods. The job worker should send one copy of the said challan
    along with the goods, while returning them to the principal. The FORM GST
    ITC-04 will serve as the intimation as envisaged u/s. 143 of the CGST Act,
    2017.
  •    Where goods are sent from
    one job worker to another job worker: In such cases, the goods may move under a
    DC issued either by the principal or the job worker. In the alternative, the DC
    issued by the principal may be endorsed by the job worker sending the goods to
    another job worker, indicating therein the quantity and description of goods
    being sent. The same process may be repeated for subsequent movement of the
    goods to other job workers.
  •    Where the goods are
    returned to the principal by the job worker: The job worker should send one
    copy of the DC received by him from the principal while returning the goods to
    the principal after carrying out the job work.
  •    Where the goods are sent
    directly by the supplier to the job worker: In this case, the goods may move
    from the place of business of the supplier to the place of business/premises of
    the job worker with a copy of the invoice issued by the supplier in the name of
    the buyer (i.e. the principal) wherein the job worker’s name and address should
    also be mentioned as the consignee, in terms of Rule 46(o) of the CGST Rules.
    The buyer (i.e., the principal) shall issue the challan under Rule 45 of the
    CGST Rules and send the same to the job worker directly in terms of para (i)
    above. In case of import of goods by the principal which are then supplied
    directly from the customs station of import, the goods may move from the
    customs station of import to the place of business/premises of the job worker
    with a copy of the Bill of Entry and the principal shall issue the challan
    under Rule 45 of the CGST Rules and send the same to the job worker directly.
  •    Where goods are returned
    in piecemeal by the job worker: In case the goods after carrying out the job
    work, are sent in piecemeal quantities by a job worker to another job worker or
    to the principal, the challan issued originally by the principal cannot be
    endorsed and a fresh challan is required to be issued by the job worker.

 

E-way Bill requirements

  •    E-way bill is required to
    be issued for movement of goods under a DC. The e-way bill is generally
    required to be generated by the person causing movement of goods. In case of
    job work, the provisions permit the either the principal or the job worker to
    raise the e-way bill for movement.

 

Quarterly
reporting of movement in Form ITC-04

  •    Rule 45(3) of the CGST
    Rules provides that the principal is required to furnish the details of DCs in
    respect of goods sent to a job worker or received from a job worker or sent
    from one job worker to another job worker during a quarter in FORM GST ITC-04
    by the 25th day of the month succeeding the quarter or within such period as
    may be extended by the Commissioner. FORM GST ITC-04 will serve as the
    intimation as envisaged u/s. 143 of the CGST Act.

 

G)     Challenges in
Compliance

Difference in unit of measurement
(UOM)/ quantity

Many a times, difference arises in
the UOM between goods sent and received under job work. Form ITC-04 originally
required that goods sent and received should be strictly correlated in terms of
the original UOM. The law also required the original delivery challan should be
enclosed with the delivery challan raised on return of goods. While in practice
there many reasons due which it is impossible to make a one-to-one correlation with
each outward and inward movement (eg. raw materials sent in batches, raw
materials losing their original identified, etc). The form has now been
recently rationalised wherein one-to-one correlation between outward challan
and inward challan is not mandatory if it is impossible for the principal to
ascertain. Therefore, as long as the principal can establish the conversion
ratio and account of the goods under job work, it may not be mandatory for the
principal to report each outward movement with the inward movement.
Whether job work provisions are applicable where raw material is exempt and
job worked product is taxable?

Section 143/ 19 are applicable only
on inputs/ capital goods i.e. goods used in business and on which tax is
leviable under the GST law. In cases where the raw material is exempt (such as
sugar to sugar cane), one may take a stand that since input tax credit has not
be availed on such goods, job work provisions need not be strictly followed.

 

Whether procedural provisions (such
as e-way bill) applicable when raw material is taxable and job worked product
is exempt?

Job work provisions are applicable
when the inputs under consideration are tax suffered goods and irrespective of
the taxability of goods on their return after job work provisions. Reporting
such movement is mandatory in ITC-04. However, e-way bill requirements are
waived for exempted goods. Therefore such goods may be returned under the cover
of a delivery challan and need not be accompanied with an e-way bill.

 

What is the value to be declared by
the job worker in the e-way bill on its return?

Certain challenges have been raised
on the value to be declared on the delivery challan on outward and inward
movement of goods under job work. One view suggests that the approx. market
value at the time the movement of goods should be adopted i.e. the return of
goods should be enhanced by the job work charges.  The other view may be to adopt the value of
cost of the input/ capital goods under job work for both outward and inward
movement. A third view may be to adopt the value on which input tax credit has
been availed on such inputs/ capital goods for both outward and inward
movement. The author is inclined to believe that the third view conceptually
aligns with the objective of the job work provisions under GST.


Special provisions for SEZ unit/ developer.

A
SEZ unit/ developer is permitted to sub-contract a portion of their processing
activity to other SEZ / EOU or DTA units (in terms of Rule 41 of SEZ Rules).
SEZ unit are also permitted to temporarily remove their capital goods/ inputs
to DTA without payment of duty for job work, testing, repair, refining,
calibration and return thereof (in terms of Rule 50 of SEZ Rules). Rule 40/51
both provide for strict procedures to be followed for outsourced processing
activities to a DTA including the time limit for return, account  of the goods cleared, wastage, quantum of
outsourcing, return of moulds, jigs, tools, etc. There could be variances
between the GST law and the SEZ requirements and the SEZ unit as a principal of
the transaction would have to necessarily comply with the more stringent
requirement in order to retain its SEZ benefits.

 

H)     Conclusion

Job work provisions should be
understood as a provision of convenience. Accordingly any misuse/
non-compliance should be viewed as a recovery of the benefit granted and not
beyond that.
 

ACCOUNTING OF FINANCIAL GUARANTEES

Query

Subsidiary has provided a financial
guarantee to a bank for loan taken by Parent. Subsidiary does not charge Parent
any guarantee commission. How is the guarantee accounted in the separate
financial statements of the Parent and Subsidiary assuming the guarantee is an
integral part of the arrangement for the loan?

 

Response

Subsidiary recognises the financial
guarantee liability (unearned financial guarantee commission) at fair value, in
its books at the date of issuance to the bank. Since the subsidiary does not
receive any consideration from the Parent, it has effectively paid dividends to
Parent.  Consequently, the corresponding
debit should be made to an appropriate head under ‘equity’. It would not be
appropriate to debit the fair value of the guarantee to profit or loss as if it
were a non-reciprocal distribution to a third party as it would fail to
properly reflect the existence of the parent-subsidiary relationship that may
have caused Subsidiary not to charge the guarantee commission. Under Ind AS
115, the unearned financial guarantee commission recognised initially will be
amortised over the period of the guarantee as revenue and consequently, the
balance of the unearned financial guarantee commission would decline
progressively over the period of the guarantee. However, in addition to
amortising the unearned financial guarantee commission to revenue, at each
reporting date, Subsidiary is required to compare the unamortised amount of the
deferred income with the amount of loss allowance determined in respect of the
guarantee as at that date in accordance with the requirements Ind AS 109. As
long as the amount of loss allowance so determined is lower than the
unamortised amount of the deferred income, the liability of Subsidiary in
respect of the guarantee will be represented by the unamortised amount of the
financial guarantee commission. However, if at a reporting date, the amount of
the loss allowance determined above is higher than the unamortised amount of
the financial guarantee commission as at that date, the liability in respect of
the financial guarantee will have to be measured at an amount equal to the
amount of the loss allowance. Accordingly, in such a case, Subsidiary will be
required to recognise a further liability equal to the excess of the amount of
the loss allowance over the amount of the unamortised unearned financial
guarantee commission.

 

As regards the Parent, in the fact
pattern, financial guarantee provided by Subsidiary is an integral part of the
arrangement for the loan taken by Parent from the bank. Therefore, in
accordance with the principles of Ind AS 109, separate accounting of such
financial guarantee is not required. However, the ITFG (Bulletin 16) felt that
as per Ind AS 109, fees associated with the guarantees that are an integral
part of generating an involvement with a financial asset or a financial
liability are taken into account in determining the effective interest rate for
the financial asset/financial liability. Therefore, the provision of guarantee
by Subsidiary without charging guarantee commission is analogous to a distribution/
repayment of capital by Subsidiary to Parent. To reflect this substance, Parent
should credit the fair value of the guarantee to its investment in Subsidiary
and debit the same to the carrying amount of the loan (which would have the
effect of such fair value being included in determination of effective interest
rate on the loan). Subsequently, ITFG revised Bulletin 16. As per the revised
requirement, Parent will debit the fair value of the guarantee to the carrying
amount of the loan. If the investment in subsidiary is accounted at cost or
FVTPL, the corresponding credit will be recognised in the P&L account. If
the investment in subsidiary is accounted at FVTOCI, the credit will be
recognised in the P&L account as dividend received, unless the distribution
clearly represents recovery of part of the cost of the investment.

 

The
author believes that the accounting of the financial guarantee by the grantor
is inevitable because financial guarantee is a financial liability in
accordance with the definition contained in Ind AS 32. However, there is no
requirement for the beneficiary to record a financial guarantee provided by a
grantor for which no commission is charged, in the way suggested by the ITFG.
This is also the global practice.
The implication of the ITFG view is that
in all cases, where any transaction between group companies are subsidised, the
transaction will be recorded at its fair value rather than at the transaction
price. This is certainly not required by Ind AS and could have unintended consequences,
particularly in the case of merger and amalgamation transactions. Furthermore,
it will create opportunities for group companies to create unnecessary credit
going to the P&L account of the separate financial statements. The only
requirement under Ind AS for such transactions would be appropriate disclosures
in accordance with the requirements of Ind AS 24 Related Party Disclosures.

TRAVEL APPS MADE EASY

We all travel a lot these days – be
it social or professional commitments. And travel has become so complicated –
multiple modes, multifarious options and unlimited variety. Sometimes, it could
get a bit overwhelming. Here are some apps which make travel easy and at times
enjoyable!

 

PackPoint travel packing list

PackPoint is a free travel packing list organizer and packing planner
for serious travel pros. PackPoint will help you organise what you need to pack
in your luggage and suitcase based on length of travel, weather at your
destination, and any activities planned during your trip.

 

Once your packing list is built and
organised, PackPoint will save it for you, and then you can choose to share it
with your friends and family in case they need help packing too.

 

Punch in the city you’re going to
travel to, the departure date, and the number of nights you’ll be staying
there. That’s it!

 

Different lists can be saved and
customised for different types of travel – business, leisure, activities you
plan to do, etc.

 

Use it often and never forget your
_____ Again!

 

Android : https://goo.gl/kA10CP

       

 iOS : https://goo.gl/Ji8AUd


 

Moovit: Bus Time & Train Time Live
Info

Moovit is your personal assistant for Public
Transport.  It guides more than 150
million users in over 2200 cities throughout the world. Commuters will find
updated bus time and train time, transit maps, and, where available, real-time
line arrivals based on GPS devices on-board buses, subways, and trains.

 

You can locate nearby stations,
travel with on-the-go live navigation guidance and receive get-off alerts at
your destination to ensure a smooth ride. This is why Moovit has been named one
of the best apps of the year in 2016 and 2017 by the Google Play and App
Stores, respectively.

 

You have offline maps, rate charts
and an interesting option to become a local guide for your city. You only need
one app to navigate – just MOOVIT!

 

Android : http://bit.ly/2KdWn5r  

 

iOS : https://apple.co/2Mcz5xi

 


Airbnb

If you are
travelling to a far away place, in a foreign country, or even within your own
country or city, and you are looking for some pleasant experiences on a
reasonable budget, Airbnb is for you.

 

Airbnb allows you to choose from
over 2.5 million homes in over 191 countries. Search by price, neighbourhood,
amenities, and more. Go through the reviews before you book. You may search for
last minute accommodation or even look for long term stays.

 

What is on offer, is home stays
where anyone having a spare room with decent surroundings can put up their
room(s) for rent.  You get the benefit of
meeting wonderful people, getting local guidance and a reasonable rate.  For the hosts, they can realise a decent
earning on their unused accommodation, communicate with the guests and make new
friends. A wonderful concept of matchmaking for guests and hosts effectively.

 

Android : https://goo.gl/Y3GUDu 

         
 iPhone : https://goo.gl/WdHJ7i

 


Google Trips

Google Trips
makes it easy to plan and organise your travel. Under beta testing for several
months, it is now available on the Play Store (https://goo.gl/hnBejO)

 

Once installed, it scans your GMail
account automatically to look for past and 
future trips. You can now find your travel reservations and
confirmations all in one place. Besides, it also downloads nearby interesting
places to see, hotels and restaurants, recreation activities – indoor and
outdoor and such interesting stuff automatically. These are curated by experts
and also by other fellow travellers. The best part is that you will be able to
access all of this even without an internet connection when you are in that
place!

 

Thus you can get
activity suggestions based on what’s nearby, customiseable day plans, and your
travel reservations from Gmail all in one place. And every trip you plan is
also available as a Card on your Google Home Page.
A must have
for frequent travellers.


 

Guides by Lonely Planet

Lonely
Planet is world famous for its travel guides – each of them curated by travel
writers who have visited each city and presents it in its true flavour. The
guides are bulky and costly too.

 

Now with this new app – Guides by
Lonely Planet – you get the city guides for free – yes you read it right –
FREE. Each city guide gives you details of what you can see (with friendly maps
and directions and wonderful pics), where and what you can eat, where you can
stay, shop, drink and play! You can save each city for offline use and pull it
out when you are there.

 

Currently, they have more than 20
cities listed and more are being added continuously.

With real life experiences and
essential tips, Guides by Lonely Planet are a boon to first time travellers to
any city – a must have when you travel to an unknown place.


https://goo.gl/daI5Eh


 

FlightAware

FlightAware.com
is a free flight tracker which tracks both commercial and private aircrafts
across the world. Founded in 2005, FlightAware has become the leading source of
flight information across the world.

 

Once you visit the site, all you
have to do is to enter the Airline Name and Flight No. and the site will
magically show you the current status of the aircraft – even if it is mid-air.
You may browse flight data by Operator, Aircraft Type and Airport.  The interface is quite simple and easy to
understand for the lay person while advanced options are available for the
geeks.

 

FlightAware also has an Android App
with the same name, which is very convenient to use. You can even receive
real-time push notification flight alerts, view airport delays, see nearby
flights (in the air!) and more.Remember to look up FlightAware if you are
travelling or assisting someone who travels by air.

 

 

TripIt: Travel Organiser

Tripit is
one of my favorite Travel Organisers for air travel.  As soon as you book a flight, hotel, car or
other reservation, simply forward it to plans@tripit.com and your plans will be
instantly added to your master itinerary.

 

All your important details like
flight timings, confirmation no., seat no. are in one place. No more
frantically searching through your inbox for them.  Important details like when your flight gets
in, or your confirmation number will all be in one place.  You can get to them instantly in TripIt, even
when you’re offline. Plus, it is very easy to send travel plans to your
calendar, or to anyone you choose. You can even update your meetings, hotel
bookings and local conveyance bookings, to give you a complete picture of your
visit in one place.

Manage all your plans for free with
TripIt, or, for about the price of checking your bags, upgrade to Tripit Pro to
get stress-free travel all year long. When you upgrade, you get additional
features like choosing the best seat, receive real-time flight alerts, get
terminal and gate reminders, track your frequent-flyer miles and much more.

An essential for Air Travel –
undoubtedly!

Android : http://bit.ly/2MxJfIS

              

iOS : https://apple.co/2MwOicp

 

HAPPY
TRAVELLING
!

RAINMAKING – ISSUES WITHIN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES FIRMS

A firm’s success or failure truly
boils down to three things: Finders, Minders and Grinders. For any firm to be
successful at all, it needs these three speci?c types of professionals.

 

1.     Finders-
Rainmakers who provide the work

2.     Minders-
Mid-level supervisory employees who manage the Grinders and are accountable for
their output

3.     Grinders-
junior level employees who are required to run assignments and matters

 

The Finders,
being an integral requirement in today’s hypercompetitive service landscape, pose
a special challenge to the otherwise collegiate culture that prevails in
professional services firms. More often than not there is a misplaced sense of
indispensability experienced by Finders who see themselves as the primary
generator of clients, and consider themselves extremely important to the
survival and success of the business. This attitude can generate some conflict
between the Finders and the Minders.

 

Role of Finder

Finders provide business and work
that keeps a firm running. They are extroverted by nature, enjoy networking and
making new connections and are able to generate business through new avenues.
Finders are not just salespeople or marketers but ‘people’s people’ who know
how to ?nd clients and what to say to them. Although primarily business
generators, they are also sometimes involved in executing the work since
clients have a high degree of comfort with them and repose more faith in their
abilities and competence.

 

Role of Minder

Finders cannot carry the firm on
their shoulders alone; a crucial element for success is being able to inspire
people to go through the journey with them. Minders are those employees who are
technically sound and expected to know every detail of their practice area.
They are focused on details of matters and are excellent at supervising
engagement teams. Finders need to be the captain of their Minders, steering the
vessel straight on course, adapting where necessary, and enabling them to
succeed.

 

A poor concept Finders have of
Minders is the stereotype of a micro-manager ruling over others with a task
list. However, it is the job of the Finders to enable their Minders to succeed
and intervene only at strategic points.

 

Role of Grinder

If the Finders are the Queen Bees
of the service industry, Grinders are the Worker Bees. They are responsible for
the heavy lifting of the workload, executing finer details of transactions and
are a very important cog in the wheel of the service industry.

 

Fees and revenue generated by a
firm are a combination of the talent and effort of all the above three
stakeholders. It is a well known fact that compensation increases with age and
competition. However, in many firms compensation can be disproportionate and
not entirely commensurate with the effort involved in the work.

 

This often causes feelings of
jealousy and insecurity among co-workers. Since people are the only asset of a
professional services organisation, it is imperative for the Finder to create
an environment of trust and fairness so there is a just and equal distribution
of work and compensation, which is commensurate with the skill and abilities of
the Minders and Grinders.

 

Compensation structures should
involve a proportion of fees to be distributed among the pool of employees in
addition to their salaries. There should also be incentives given to employees
who introduce clients and bring work to the firm. Some employees however, may
not have the contacts to generate revenue for the firm; they may have other
skills that would help them contribute to the growth of the firm such as
practice knowledge management, conducting training and learning programmes for
professionals and clients or contributing in other ways such as writing
articles for professional publications and journals. The management will also
need to find alternate ways of compensation for such skills.

 

The expectation of a Rainmaker is
to have a disproportionate share in the fees generated by his/her efforts to
bring in clients. Firms need to adopt best practices of profit sharing amongst
their partners to create a sense of fairness. This could include a number of
parameters such as rainmaking ability, execution capability, client
relationship management, promotion and marketing of the firm and contribution
by way of knowledge management.

While there is no “one size fits
all” approach to arrive at partner compensation, a balance of all these
indicative parameters may be the right approach towards achieving some
semblance of equity which would result in greater satisfaction and motivation
amongst the partnership.

 

At the end of the day, Finders, Minders and
Grinders need each other. One cannot exist without the other and all are
co-dependent on the others for their existence. In order to make a success of a
firm, Finders, Minders and Grinders must work together in a cooperative and
collaborative manner, each one knowing their place and purpose in the larger
scheme of things. As Henry Ford said, “Coming together is a beginning, staying
together is progress, and working together is success.”
  

MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION SHACKLES FINALLY REMOVED

Background


Finally, the requirement of
obtaining approval from the Central Government for paying managerial
remuneration by public companies has been removed. The amount of managerial
remuneration that can be paid is now an internal matter with the Board and,
where applicable, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee and the
shareholders. Shareholders consent by a special resolution is also needed wherever
the remuneration is in excess of limits prescribed in section 197 (1) of the
Companies Act, 2013.

 

For over last several decades,
though the laws relating to companies have been progressively reformed and made
liberal, managerial remuneration remained an area where sanction of the Central
Government was required to pay remuneration in excess of the limits prescribed
in section 197 read with Schedule V of the Act.

 

The limits on managerial
remuneration are mainly in the form of percentage of net profits and which
continues except that the approval of the Central Government is now not
required. There are overall limits for total managerial remuneration and then
sub-limits are provided for specified categories of directors. In case of loss
or inadequacy of profits absolute amounts are prescribed upto which a company
could pay remuneration. These are discussed in detail later herein. Paying
managerial remuneration beyond these limits required approval of the Central
Government. This requirement of taking government approval has been dropped
with effect from 12th September 2018. The new rules require
shareholders approval – special resolution. Hence, self governance has replaced
approval of the Central Government.

 

However, for listed companies SEBI
has prescribed additional requirements to ensure that promoters do not over pay
themselves without approval of the shareholders.

 

Summary
of existing provisions


The existing
provisions on limits on managerial remuneration are contained in section 197
read with Schedule V of the Companies Act, 2013. An overall limit for
managerial remuneration is provided at 11% of net profits. In other words,
executive and non-executive directors can be paid in the aggregate not more
than 11% of the net profits, calculated in the manner prescribed in section 198
of the Act. Payment of managerial remuneration beyond these limits required
approval of the Central Government. Within this limit, a single working
director (i.e., managing/whole-time director / executive director / manager)
could be paid remuneration upto 5% of the net profits, and all working
directors together could be paid 10% of the
net profits.

 

All non-executive directors could
be paid commission upto 1% of net profits and, if there was no working
director, then upto 3% of the net profits. The term manager and managing
director and whole-time director are defined in sub-section (53), (54) and (94)
of section 2 of the Act.

 

It is reiterated that sanction of
shareholders and central government was required to pay remuneration in excess
of the prescribed limits.

 

Needless to emphasise, obtaining
approval of the Central Government was a time consuming and possibly an
arbitrary affair. Even if shareholders agreed and approved, they could not take
such decisions. The limits on remuneration in case of inadequate profits were
arbitrary too, based on what the government perceived as fair remuneration.
Companies in need of talent at times were not able to hire the right person.
Moreover, the possibility of existing talent moving to other companies or even
migrating abroad loomed large generally for India and particularly during the
period when a company was going through a rough patch or even when the company
was expanding its activities and / or there existed circumstances beyond the
control of the management – for example – recession, market conditions and
period of restructuring operations.

 

As mentioned earlier, substantial
changes have been made which will ensure that the decisions of managerial
remuneration would be in accordance with good corporate governance practices
rather than government approval. The only approval required is of the
shareholders through a special resolution. This affirms the principle of
shareholders democracy. There have been several recent cases where shareholders
have showed growing disapproval by voting against remuneration they perceived
high. In many cases, this may be represented by substantial negative votes and
in some cases, actual rejection of the resolution itself by sufficient number
of negative votes.

 

Before we go into the specifics of
the changes, let us consider certain basics:

 

To which companies do the limits on managerial
remuneration apply?


The limits on managerial
remuneration apply to public companies, whether listed or not. They do not
apply to private companies, even if large in size.

 

What
is managerial emuneration?


Managerial remuneration is the
remuneration paid to directors, including those who are employees – such as
managing or whole time directors – that is –working directors and those who are
not employees of the company – i.e., the non-executive directors.  Managerial remuneration could be in the form
of salary, perquisites and / or commission. However, sitting fee for attending
board or committee meetings is not managerial remuneration.

 

Further, fees paid to professional
directors for professional services under certain circumstances is not
managerial remuneration.

 

Period
of appointment

The appointment of working director
could be made for a term of upto 5 years.

 

Changes
now made


The limits on managerial
remuneration remain largely as they are. Thus, the limits on managerial
remuneration as a percentage of net profits (including sub-limits for
individual directors) continue. Similarly, the minimum remuneration that can be
paid in case of inadequacy of profits also continues more or less as they
existed previously. However, if remuneration is desired to be paid beyond these
limits, the approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution is
required. Approval of the Central Government is no more required. Hence,
shareholders now have the final say on managerial remuneration. The management
and the Board will thus have to present a good case to the shareholders for
payment of such higher managerial remuneration.

 

Approval
of lenders, etc.


Section 197 also provides for a
situation where the company has defaulted on payment of dues to banks/public
financial institutions or non-convertible debenture holders or any other
secured creditors. Their prior approval would be required before seeking
approval of the shareholders for paying remuneration higher than the prescribed
limits. Such approval is also required waiving the recovery of remuneration
paid in excess of prescribed limits. This requirement ushers in the concept of
involving consent of other stakeholders whose interests are affected in the
event of loss or inadequate results of operation.

 

SEBI
places further restrictions


SEBI in the meantime has separately
made amendments to Regulation 17 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and
Disclosure Requirements), 2009, though with effect from 1st April
2019.
These are:

 

1.   It
is now required that in a year where the annual remuneration of a single non-executive
director exceeds 50%
of the total annual remuneration payable to all non-executive
directors
, approval of members by special resolution shall be obtained.

 

2.   Amendments
are made with regard to managerial remuneration to promoters or members of the
promoter group. The amended provisions require that if the managerial
remuneration to a single promoter is Rs. 5 crores or 2.50% of net profits, whichever is higher, then the approval of
the shareholders by way of special resolution shall be obtained.

 

3.   Where
the proposed managerial remuneration to all promoters put together exceeds 5%
of the net profits, then too approval by way of special resolution is required
to be obtained.

 

The above requirements apply to
companies who have listed their specified securities on recognised stock
exchanges. Regulation 15(2) details the applicability giving exceptions.

 

Limits
on remuneration to independent directors


There is no change in the limit of
remuneration of independent directors – the cumulative limit is 1% or 3% of net
profits depending on whether the company has managing / executive / whole time
director or not.

 

Shareholders’ democracy is becoming
visible as in some instances re-appointment of independent directors has been
objected to, even if unsuccessfully. This is the beginning of shareholder
activism.


Approval
of Central Government continues to be required in certain other matters


The approval of the Central
Government will continue to be required in cases of appointment of such
managerial persons where the requirements relating to
qualifications/disqualifications are not complied with.

 

Conclusion

Companies will thus have much
greater freedom and flexibility in paying their top executives. In particular,
companies with lesser profits (for whatever reasons) will find relief. The
requirements of recommendation and review by Nomination and Remuneration
Committee (where applicable) and approval of the shareholders by
ordinary/special resolution will help in providing the required balance.

 

The timing of the amendments,
though, is a little awkward for companies desiring to take benefit of these
relaxations. Most companies may have already convened their annual general
meetings for 2018 and these matters may have not been proposed or proposed as
per earlier law. Thus, companies may need to approach the shareholders again to
seek their approval to take advantage of these relaxations.
  

OVERVIEW OF SECTION 138 OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT

Introduction


Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881
(“the Act”) is one of the few
provisions which is equally well known both by lawmen and laymen. The section
imposes a criminal liability in case of a dishonoured or bounced cheque.
According to a 2008 Report of the Law Commission of India, over 38 lakh cheque
bouncing cases were pending at the Magistrate level as of October 2008. Over 10
years have passed since that Report and this figure is expected to have
leapfrogged!! The Magistrate Court is the first Court in the hierarchy of
criminal justice in India and if this entry level forum itself is clogged one
can very well understand why justice in India often takes so long. This Article
looks at some of the important facets of this Act including key recent changes
which have been introduced in the Act.  

 

When
does the section get triggered?


Let us briefly examine the impugned
section. Section 138 of the Act provides that if any cheque is drawn by a
person (drawer) in favour of another person (payee)
and if that cheque is dishonoured because of insufficient funds in the drawer’s
bank account, then such drawer is deemed to have committed an offence. The
penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a term which may be extended to 2
years and / or with a fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque.

 

In order to invoke the provisions
of section 138, the following three steps are necessary:

 

(i)    the
cheque must be presented to the bank within a period of 3 months from the date
on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is
earlier;

 

(ii)    once the payee is informed by the bank about the dishonour of the
cheque, then he must within 30 days of such information make a demand for the
payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the
drawer of the cheque; and

(iii)   the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said
amount of money to the payee of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of
the said notice.

 

A fourth step is specified u/s.142
of the Act which provides that a complaint must be made to the Court within one
month of the date from which the cause of action arises (i.e., the notice
period). A rebuttable presumption is drawn by the Act that the holder of the
cheque received it for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability.

 

It is presumed, unless the contrary
is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature
referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt
or other liability.

 

Thus, in order to prosecute a
person for an offence u/s. 138, It is manifest that the following ingredients
are required to be fulfilled:

 

(a)   a
drawer must have drawn a cheque on his bank account for paying a sum to the
payee;

(b)   the
cheque should have been issued for the discharge of any legally enforceable
debt / liability;

(c)   the
payee must present such cheque within 3 months from the date on which it is
drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier;

(d)   such
cheque is returned by the drawer’s bank as unpaid, because of insufficient
funds;

(e)   on
such cheque getting bounced, the payee demands repayment in writing and sends
such notice within 30 days of the dishonour intimation from the bank; and

(f)    even
after receipt of such written notice, the drawer fails to make payment of the
said amount of money to the payee of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt
of the said notice.

 

To illustrate, suppose a cheque is
deposited in a bank and the intimation of dishonour is received by the payee on

1st November 2018, then he has time till 30th November
2018 to send a demand Notice to the drawer. Assuming that the Notice is
received by the drawer on 30th November 2018, then he has time till
15th December 2018 to make good the payment. If not done, then the
payee can file a complaint starting 16th December 2018. The
complaint must be made by the payee within a period of 1 month from the date on
which the cause of action arises u/s. 138. It may be noted that a month is
defined under the General Clauses Act, to mean a month reckoned according to
the British Calendar. Thus, in this example, the last date for filing the
complaint would be 15th January 2019. This definition is relevant
since in several cases, it is presumed that a month means a period of 30 days
for filing a complaint. This becomes all the more relevant with a cause of
action which arises in the month of February. Thus, the maximum period is 1
month and not 30 / 31 days.

 

Who
can be Prosecuted in the cases u/s 138?


Various decisions have established
who can be prosecuted u/s. 138 in the case of dishonouring of a cheque. These
can be briefly summarised as follows:

 

(a)   The
drawer of the cheque himself in case of an individual drawer;

(b)   In
a case where the drawer is a company/firm / LLP – the Partners / the Directors
and the persons concerned for running of the company / firm / LLP including the
Managing Director, Designated Partner or any other officer of the entity with
whose consent or connivance the offence has been committed. Section 141 of the
Act regulates offences by companies and makes the directors, manager, secretary
and other officer of the company liable if the offence is attributable to any
neglect on their part.

The following Table indicates the
persons who can be implicated in case of a company / LLP:

 

Category

Degree of Averment

Reason

Managing Director or Designated Partner

No need to make an averment that he is in-charge of and
responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It
is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing
Director / Joint Managing Director or Designated Partner at the relevant
time.

The prefix ‘Managing’ to the word ‘Director’ makes it clear that
he was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the
business wof the company. The same would be the case with a Designated
Partner.

A director or an officer of the company who signed the cheque on
behalf of the company

No need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and
was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the
company or make any specific allegation about consent, connivance or
negligence.

The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on
behalf of the company, would give rise to responsibility.

Any other Director or officer of the company.

A specific averment is required in the complaint that such
person was in charge of, and was responsible to the company, for the conduct
of the business of the company is necessary. (Such officers can also be made
liable u/s. 141(2) by making necessary averments relating to consent and
connivance or negligence).

 

 

 

The Supreme Court has made it clear
in a catena of judgments that the complainant has to make out specific
averments to rope in directors u/s. 141 of the Act. Further, the Supreme Court
in the following Judgments have laid down the principle that the complainant
needs to demonstrate how and in what manner the director was responsible and
was in charge of affairs of the company:

 

a)    National Small Industries Corp. Ltd vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal and
Anr., 2010 All MR Cri 921

b)    Saroj Kumar Poddar vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., 2007 ALL MR
Cri. 560

c)    N. K. Wahi vs. Shekar Singh and Ors., 2007 (9) SCC 481


A company functions through its directors and officers who are responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company. A criminal liability on account of
dishonour of cheque primarily falls on the drawer company and is extended to
officers of the company. The normal rule in the cases involving criminal
liability is against vicarious liability, that is, no one is to be held
criminally liable for an act of another.

 

The legal position concerning the
vicarious liability of a director in a company which is being prosecuted for
the offence u/s. 138 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court on more
than one occasion. In a landmark decision in the case of National Small
Industries Corporation Limited vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Anr, 2010 ALL MR
CRI 921
the Supreme Court has laid down the following principles:

 

(a) The primary responsibility is
on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under law in the
complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the
criminal liability, there is no presumption that the director knows about the
transaction.

(b) Section 141 does not make all
the directors liable for the offence. The criminal liability can be fastened
only on those who, at the time of commission of the offence, were in charge of
and were responsible for the conduct of business of the company.

(c) Vicarious liability can be
inferred against a company only if the requisite statements, which are required
to be averred in the complaint, are made so as to make the accused therein
vicariously liable for offence committed by the company along with averments in
the complaint containing that the accused were in charge of and responsible for
the business of the company and by virtue of their position they are liable to
be proceeded with.

(d)   Vicarious liability on the part of a person must be pleaded and
proved and not inferred. (There is no presumption u/s. 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act of vicarious liability)

(e) The person sought to be made
liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business
of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there
is no deemed liability of a director in such cases. The Court has reiterated
the position taken by it in its earlier decisions including the landmark
judgment delivered by it in the case of SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs.
Neeta Bhalla,2005 (4) Mh.L.J. 731
.

 

In the case of Central Bank
of India vs. Asian Global Limited 2010 AIR(SC) 2835
, the Supreme Court
has laid down that the allegations have to be clear and unambiguous showing
that the directors were in charge of and responsible for the business of the
company.

In this respect, the Act has taken
due care of Government nominated Directors and they shall not be liable for
prosecution under u/s. 138 r.w.s 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Sadly,
such an exemption does not exist for Independent Directors!

 

Where
should a cheque bouncing complaint be filed?


One of the most litigious issues in
relation to a bounced cheque has been which Court has jurisdiction over a case?
Say, a debtor which has its registered office in Ranchi, Jharkhand issued a
cheque drawn on a Ranchi bank to a creditor based in Mumbai and the cheque once
deposited in the Mumbai bank bounces. Now, should the complaint be filed in
Mumbai or in Ranchi?

 

This answer could make a big
difference since the ease of filing a case in one’s own city or State is
manifold as compared to a remote location. This issue saw several Supreme Court
and High Court decisions leading to a see-saw one way and the other. A slew of
decisions came out strongly in favour of the accused unlike the earlier
decisions which were pro-complainant. Let us look at the history and the
current position on this very important aspect which made several creditors and
banks jittery.

 

A two-member bench of the Supreme
Court in K Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510
laid down five important components for filing a complaint u/s. 138 of the Act:

 

(a)   Drawing of the cheque,

(b)   Presentation of the cheque to the bank,

(c)   Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank,

(d)   Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding
payment of the cheque amount, and

(e)   Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt
of the notice

 

The Apex Court finally concluded
that since an offence could pertain to any of the above five acts there could be
five offences which could be committed at five different locations and hence,
the suit could be filed in any Court having jurisdiction over these locations.

 

 Thus, the complainant can select any of the
five Courts for filing his complaint within whose jurisdiction the five acts were
done.

 

However, a subsequent Supreme Court
decision in the case of Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of
Maharashtra, Cr. A. No. 2287 /2009 Order dated 1st August 2014

led to debtors across the Country celebrating and creditors panicking. It
overruled all the earlier decisions on this subject and held that the case u/s.
138 had to be filed only where bank of the accused was located. This was
because of the fact that the offence of cheque dishonour has occurred where the
bank of the accused was located. Hence, in the above example, the creditor
would have had to file his case before the Magistrate Court of Ranchi! Imagine
the sheer harassment it would cause the creditor and that too to recover his
own money.

 

This decision caused a great deal
of inconvenience to litigants and finally the Parliament amended the Act with
effect from 15th June 2015 by inserting sub-section (2) in section
142 of the Act to define the jurisdiction for filing the case. It states that
if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, then the
complaint would be filed at a place where the bank branch of the payee is
situated. Continuing with our above example, since the Mumbai-based creditor
deposited his Ranchi debtor’s cheque in his Mumbai Bank Account, the complaint
would be filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate of Mumbai. Indeed, a welcome
relief! The Constitutional Validity of this provision was challenged in the
case of Vikas Bafna & Ors vs. UOI, WP (C) 1351/2016 (Cha). It
was contended that the amendment took away a valuable right of the accused to
defend himself properly and that since the amendment nullified a Supreme Court
decision it was Constitutionally invalid. The Chattisgarh High Court negated
this plea and held that all laws which cause some hardship cannot be treated as
being constitutionally invalid.

 

Process
of Complaint


The process of filing a complaint
u/s. 138 of the Act is as follows:

 

(a)   A
complaint under the Act is filed by the payee before a Magistrate or JMFC (Judicial
Magistrate First Class) or Metropolitan Magistrate (only for the 4 Metros).

(b)   The
complainant is examined u/s. 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) where
his verification statement is filed. For the complainants verification can be
filed by way of an Affidavit also.

(c)   The
Magistrate then issues a Process u/s. 204 of the CrPC. or dismisses the
complaint u/s. 203 of the Code.

 

(d)   Once
the process is issued, summons are sent to the accused.

(e)   After
the summons are issued, if the accused does not appear before the Court, then a
Warrant of Arrest is issued.

(f)    Once
the accused appears before the Court, he has to secure bail and the plea of the
accused is recorded.

 

In this respect, there has been an important
amendment
with effect from 1st September 2018
to the Negotiable Instruments Act vide the insertion of section 143A. This
section states that if the accused pleads not guilty to the accusation made in
the complaint, then the Magistrate may direct the Accused to pay to the
complainant an interim compensation of up to 20% of the amount of the
cheque
. The interim compensation has to be paid within 60 days from the
date of the order. If the accused does not pay the same the same can be
recovered as if a fine was levied as per section 421 of the CrPC.

 

Two salient features of this
important amendment which are worth noting are as follows:

 

(i)    The
power to ask an accused to pay interim compensation is discretionary with the
Magistrate and is not mandatory. The words used are “may order
and not “shall order”. Hence, it is not that in each and every
case, the Court would order interim compensation, it may decide to avoid it
altogether in a case.

(ii)    Further, the interim compensation is not a fixed sum of 20% of
the cheque amount. It is an amount of up to 20% and hence, it could be any sum
even lower than 20% of the cheque amount. Thus, for instance, the Court may
order the accused to pay 5% as interim compensation.

 

(g)   Once
plea is recorded, the complainant has to file his evidence.

(h)   After
the evidence of the complainant /prosecution is recorded, the Magistrate
records the statement of the accused where questions are put to the accused
based on the evidence filed by the complainant. After the statement is recorded,
the accused has a choice to lead his evidence or has the right to remain
silent.

(i)    Once
the evidence of the accused is closed the matter proceeds for arguments and
judgment.

(j)    The
Court would then pass a judgment either of conviction of the accused or of his
acquittal. A judgment of conviction is appealable by the drawer in the Court of
Sessions. If an acquittal is given, then a leave has to be sought by the payee
from the High Court to file an Appeal in the High Court within 60 days of the
acquittal order.

 

Conclusion


One can only hope that given the
gravity of the violations and the consequences, the Government amends the
Negotiable Instruments Act to exempt Independent and Non-executive Directors.
In fact, such an amendment is also welcome in other similar statutes
prescribing a criminal liability on the directors. SEBI which has been the
driving force behind the corporate governance movement in India should take up
this matter with the Government. If we want more independent directors on our
companies, then we must make laws to facilitate the same!