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VALUATION STANDARDS – AN ATTEMPT TO STANDARDISE SUBJECTIVITY

‘Valuation is the process of
determining the economic worth of a subject under certain assumptions and
limiting conditions for a particular purpose on a particular date.’

 

The above
description comes closest to defining ‘Valuation’ from a financial and economic
perspective. Such a process of valuation usually culminates into an ‘estimation
of value’, that is generally performed by a person with the desired skill-sets.
Since long, the valuation exercises have been the domain of various
subject-matter-experts, each claiming to be one in a specific category. The
nuances of such specific categories, e.g. real property, financial assets,
personal assets, intangibles, etc., ensured that the profession of valuation
remained scattered across various professional silos operating in a particular
domain area.

 

In the recent past, various
developments and factors in the Indian context have contributed to the
thought-process of creating a distinct class of professionals who would be
entrusted with the responsible need of performing valuations. The shift to the
fair-value based financial reporting, fragmented regulatory regime surrounding
valuations, advent of the insolvency and bankruptcy code and enhanced
stakeholder expectations, were the key contributors to the thought-process of
creating a distinct class of professionals to focus on performing valuations.
The Companies Act, 2013 (‘Act’), more specifically section 247 therein,
incarnated this distinct class of professionals as ‘Registered Valuers’.

 

The Act envisages an entire
framework under which the Registered Valuer is expected to function. Amongst
the many constituents of this framework, is an important obligation on the
Registered Valuer to ensure the conduct of the valuation exercise is in
accordance with the valuation standards as notified by the Central Government. Unlike
the other contemporaries, being Accounting Standards, Auditing Standards,
Standards of Internal Audit, etc., the Valuation Standards have, in a sense, a
self-defeating role in standardising the judgments, estimations,
subjectivities, presumptions and perceptions that are the inherent basis and
purpose of a valuation exercise.
Each of these attributes are a clear
antithesis to ‘standardisation’. Having said that, there is a real opportunity
to standardise the processes surrounding valuation and the broad contours of a
valuation exercise, basis of which a valuation professional can apply
his expertise.

 

Globally, there are different
valuation standards that are applicable to different jurisdictions. More
notable ones being (a) the International Valuation Standards (‘IVS’)
issued by the International Valuations Standards Council, applicable to various
countries, (b) the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (‘USPAP’)
issued by The Appraisal Foundation – USA (‘TAF’), predominantly
applied in the United States of America and (c) European Valuation Standards (‘EVS’)
as issued by The European Group of Valuers’ Association, applicable to certain
countries in the European region. These prominent sets of valuation standards
are more different than similar in their construct, approach, guidance and
application. Whilst attempts are being made to bridge the divergence between
these prominent valuation standards, significant differences remain between
these prominent international standards. Whilst the IVS tend to be highly
principle-based in their approach, the EVS and USPAP are fairly rule-based in
their approach. The EVS ecosystem particularly also provides detailed technical
guidance on nuances of the valuation process through guidance notes, codes and
technical documentation.

 

Indian Regulatory Position on Valuation
Standards


Rule 8 of Companies (Registered
Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2017 mandates every Registered Valuer to comply
with valuation standards as notified by the Central Government.

 

Till date, no valuation standards
have yet been notified under the Companies Act, 2013 and the duty has been
entrusted to a committee formed by the central government, i.e. ‘Committee to
advise on valuation matters’ to recommend the valuation standards to the
Central Government for an eventual notification on their applicability.

 

The Act envisages 3 (three)
different asset classes, being a) Land and Building, b) Plant and Machinery and
c) Securities or Financial Assets; and the Registered Valuer shall practice
only in the specific asset class for which the Registered Valuer is qualified
for. Intangible assets are a part of Securities or Financial Assets. One would
expect that the committee would recommend valuation standards separately for
each asset class. It will be interesting to observe the outcome of this process
and the road map set by the committee for promulgation of valuation standards
under the Act.

 

Until such time the Central
Government formulates and notifies the valuation standards, the Registered
Valuer shall perform valuation engagements in accordance with (a) internationally
accepted valuation standards or (b) valuation standards adopted by any
registered valuation organisation.

 

Meanwhile, the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India (‘ICAI’) recognising the need to
have consistent, uniform and transparent valuation policies and harmonise the
diverse practices in use in India, constituted the Valuation Standards Board (‘VSB’)
on 28th February, 2017. The composition of the VSB is broad-based
and ensures participation of all interest groups in the standard-setting process.
Amongst various other functions, the main function of the VSB is to formulate
Valuation Standards to be recommended by ICAI to Registered Valuers
Organisations in India, the Government and other regulatory bodies in India and
abroad for adoption and implementation. Based on the recommendation of the VSB,
the ICAI at its landmark 375th meeting issued a set of Valuation
Standards aka ICAI Valuation Standards’.

 

These ICAI Valuation Standards are
applicable to members of the ICAI for all valuation engagements on a mandatory
basis under the Companies Act, 2013.
In respect of valuation
engagements under other statutes like Income Tax, SEBI, FEMA, etc., it will be
on recommendatory basis for the members of the Institute. These Valuation
Standards are effective for the valuation reports issued on or after 1st
July, 2018. There are currently 8 (eight) valuation standards along with
Preface and Framework documents that have been made applicable by the ICAI.
They are as follows:

 

a.   Preface
to the ICAI Valuation Standards

b.   Framework
for the Preparation of Valuation Report

c.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 101
Definitions

d.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 102
Valuation Bases

e.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 103
Valuation Approaches    and Methods  

f.    ICAI
Valuation Standard 201
Scope of Work, Analyses and Evaluation 

g.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 202
Reporting and Documentation

h.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 301
Business Valuation

i.    ICAI
Valuation Standard 302
Intangible Assets

j.    ICAI
Valuation Standard 303
Financial Instruments

 

The standards have been neatly
grouped into three different number scalable series, with 1XX series dealing
with a set of standards that are fundamental common principles being applicable
to across asset classes, the 2XX series dealing with the specifics of
performing a valuation engagement and the 3XX series dealing with explicit
matters in relation to an asset class. The currently applicable ICAI Valuation
Standards cover only the asset class of Securities or Financial Assets under
the 3XX series. On the other hands, the IVS as issued by International
Valuation Standards Council are as below:

 

a.   International
Valuation Standards Framework

b.   International
Valuation Standards 101
Scope of work

c.   International
Valuation Standards 102
Investigations and Compliance

d.   International
Valuation Standards 103
Reporting

e.   International
Valuation Standards 104
Bases of Value

f.    International
Valuation Standards 105
Valuation Approaches and Methods

g.   International
Valuation Standards 200
Business and Business Interests

h.   International
Valuation Standards 210
Intangible Assets

i.    International
Valuation Standards 300
Plant and Equipment

j.    International
Valuation Standards 400
Real Property Interests

k.   International
Valuation Standards 410
Development Property

l.    International
Valuation Standards 500
Financial Instruments

 

Since the ICAI Valuation Standards
are mandatory for chartered accountants, we shall discuss in detail on those
standards. The ICAI Valuation Standards are drafted by a committee of experts
appointed by the VSB and are curated keeping in sight the nuances surrounding
the valuation ecosystem in India alongwith the peculiar conditions of the
Indian regulatory regime. A synopsis of the ICAI Valuation Standards and key
provisions in each of the above standards is covered below:

 

a.   Preface
to the ICAI Valuation Standards

The Preface acts a precursor
to understanding the backdrop to valuation standards. The preface delves
in detail into formation and functioning of the Valuation Standards Board, the
scope of valuation standards and the procedure to issue a valuation standard.
The mandatory nature of the standards is also an attribute being derived from
the Preface.

 

b.   Framework for the Preparation of Valuation Report

The Framework sets out the concepts
that underline the preparation of valuation reports in accordance with the ICAI
Valuation Standards. The Framework acknowledges the fact that the ICAI
Valuation Standards may not be able to cover every nuance of a valuation
engagement and accordingly a valuation professional is expected to apply his
judgment to the matter. The Framework further elaborates the factors on which
the judgment should be based including the regulatory guidance surrounding such
an application of judgment. The Framework prescribes
a) Understandability, b) Reliability and c) Reliance as the three principal
qualitative characteristics that make the information in the valuation report
useful to the users of the valuation report. The Framework also prescribes
fundamental ethical principles to be followed by the valuation professional,
being a) Integrity and fairness, b) Objectivity, c) Professional competence and due care, d) Confidentiality and
e) Professional behaviour.

 

In case of a conflict between the
ICAI Valuation Standards and Framework, the provisions of ICAI Valuation
Standards would prevail.

 

c.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 101 – Definitions

The objective of this valuation
standard is to prescribe specific definitions and principles which are
applicable to the ICAI Valuation Standards, dealt specifically in other
standards. The definitions enunciated in this standard shall guide and form the
basis for certain terms used in other ICAI Valuation Standards.

 

The standard prescribes 48
definitions that are used in other ICAI Valuation Standards. Various terms
which are more generally and colloquially used have been defined in this
standard, e.g. As-is-where-is Basis, Goodwill, Fair value, Forced Transaction,
Highest and best use, Observable inputs, etc.

 

It is evident from the drafting of
the standard that an attempt has been made to maintain parity of common
definitions that are also defined in the accounting standards.

 

As-is-where-is Basis: The term
as-is-where-is basis will consider the existing use of the asset which may or
may not be its highest and best use.

 

d.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 102 – Valuation Bases

This standard defines important
valuation bases, prescribes the measurement assumptions on which the value will
be based and explains the premises of values.

 

Valuation Base’ is as an
indication of the type of value being used in an assignment. Different
valuation bases may lead to different conclusions of value. Therefore, it is
important for the valuation professional to identify the bases of value
pertinent to the engagement. This standard defines the following valuation
bases:

 

(a) Fair value;

(b) Participant specific value; and

(c) Liquidation value

 

On the other hand, ‘Valuation
Premise
’ refers to the conditions and circumstances of how an asset is
deployed.

 

In a given set of circumstances, a
single premise of value may be adopted while in some situations multiple
premises of value may be adopted. Some common premises of value prescribed in
the standard are as follows:

 

(a) highest and best use;

(b) going concern value;

(c) as is where is value;

(d) orderly liquidation; or

(e) forced transaction.

 

A valuation professional shall
select an appropriate valuation base considering the terms and purpose of the
valuation engagement. The standard also recognises the multiplicity of
‘valuation premises’ based on the conditions and circumstances how an asset is
deployed.For instance, a ‘Liquidation Value’ being the ‘Valuation Base’ with
‘Forced Transaction’ being the ‘Valuation Premise’ can result in a completely
different valuation outcome for a same asset being valued on a ‘Fair Value’ as
‘Valuation Base’ with ‘Highest and Best Use’ as the ‘Valuation Premise’.

 

e.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 103 – Valuation Approaches and Methods 

The objective of this standard is
to provide guidance on different valuation approaches and methods that can be
adopted to determine the value of an asset. The standard lays down three main
valuation approaches:

 

(a)  Market
Approach

(b)  Income
Approach

(c)  Cost
Approach.

 

The appropriateness of a valuation
approach for determining the value of an asset would depend on valuation bases
and premises. The standard requires that valuation approaches and methods shall
be selected in a manner which would maximise the use of relevant observable
inputs and minimise the use of unobservable inputs. It is also possible to use
multiple methods to arrive at combination value or weighted value.

 

ICAI Valuation Standard 103 is one
of the lengthiest of the valuation standards and delves on various commonly
used methods that are adopted vis-à-vis the different approaches. Few of the
methods discussed under this standard include:

 

(a)  Market Approach Methods:

i.    Market
price method

ii.    Comparable
companies multiple method

iii.   Comparable transaction multiple method

 

(b)  Income
Approach

i.    Discounted
cash flow method

ii.    Relief
from royalty method

iii.   Multi-period excess earnings method

iv.   With
and without method

v.   Option
pricing method


(c)  Cost Approach

i.    Replacement
cost approach

ii.    Reproduction
cost method

 

f.    ICAI
Valuation Standard 201 – Scope of Work, Analyses and Evaluation
 

This standard prescribes the basis
for (a) determining and documenting the scope/terms of a valuation engagement,
responsibilities of the valuer and the client; (b) the extent of analyses and
evaluations to be carried out by the valuer; and (c) responsibilities of the valuer
while relying on the work of other experts.

 

The standard prescribes detailing
of certain key attributes that form a part of a valuation engagement and such
attributes must be documented by way of an engagement letter. The minimum
contents of an engagement letter are also prescribed in the standard.

 

The standard is an important
guiding factor for the extent of analyses and evaluation that should be
conducted by a valuation professional in conducting the valuation exercise,
including the level of review of non-financial information, ownership
information, general information, subsequent events, etc. The standard also
provides guidance on necessary evaluation to be conducted by the valuation
professional in placing reliance on the work of other experts.

 

In placing reliance on the work of
other experts, the valuer shall evaluate the skills, qualification, and
experience of the other expert in relation to the subject matter of his
valuation. It is for the valuer to evaluate whether the expert has sufficient
resources to perform the work in a specified time frame and also explore the
relationship which shall not give rise to a conflict of interest.

 

If the work of any third party
expert is to be relied upon in the valuation assignment, the description of
such services to be provided by the third party expert and the extent of
reliance placed by the valuer on the expert’s work shall be documented in the
engagement letter. The engagement letter should document that the third party
expert is solely responsible for their scope of work, assumptions and
conclusions.

 

g.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 202 – Reporting and Documentation

The objective
of this Standard is to prescribe the minimum contents of the valuation report
depending upon the nature of the engagement and specify the responsibility of a
valuer in preparing the relevant documentation for arriving at a value. The
standard also deals with the functionality of a management representation and
its limitations.

 

In relation to the documentation to
be maintained by a valuation professional, the standard provides adequate
direction in relation to maintenance of sufficient and appropriate evidence of
the valuation exercise. The minimum set of documentation that should be
preserved by the valuation professional is also prescribed by the standard.

 

h.   ICAI
Valuation Standard 301 – Business Valuation

This standard provides guidance for
valuation professionals who are performing business valuation or business
ownership interests valuation engagements. The standard acknowledges the fact
that such a business valuation may be carried out for various different
purposes including for financial transactions, dispute resolution, reporting
requirements, compliance requirements, internal planning, etc.

 

The standard lays down a
step-by-step methodology in performing business valuation as under:

 

(d)  define
the premise of the value

(e)  analyse
the asset to be valued and collect the necessary information;

(f)   identify
the adjustments to the financial and non-financial information for the
valuation;

(g)  consider
and apply appropriate valuation approaches and methods;

(h)  arrive
at a value or a range of values; and

(i)   identify
the subsequent events, if any.

 

The standard also provides guidance
on commonly used methods for business valuation across the different approaches
that are used in the valuation of a business.

 

i.    ICAI
Valuation Standard 302 – Intangible Assets

In an increasing knowledge-driven
new-age economy, the valuation of intangibles is of greater and heightened importance.
The objective of this standard is to prescribe specific guidelines and
principles which are applicable to the valuation of intangible assets that are
not dealt with specifically in another ICAI valuation standard. The standard
defined an intangible asset as an identifiable non-monetary asset without
physical substance. The interplay of goodwill with intangible assets and their
distinct natures is well enshrined in the standard.

 

The standard
elucidates on the various types of intangible assets and goes on to provide
detailed guidance on various methods that are commonly used in valuation of
intangible assets across the different valuation approaches. Apart from other
methods, the greenfield method and the distributor method are also guided for
in the standard.

 

j.    ICAI
Valuation Standard 303 – Financial Instruments

The term ‘financial instrument’ has
a common adaption across financial reporting and valuation. This standard
establishes principles, suggests methodology and considerations to be followed
by a valuation professional in performing valuation of financial instruments.
For the purposes of this Standard, financial instrument is any contract that
gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or
equity instrument of another entity. Equity instruments, derivatives, debt
instruments, fixed income and structured products, compound instruments, etc.,
are certain examples of financial instruments.

 

The principles laid down in this
standard are generally consistent with the broad principles of Ind AS, although
the Ind AS provide far more detailed guidance including specific
classifications of inputs (level 1, level 2 and level 3) and their preferred
usage in a valuation exercise.

 

Acknowledging the prevalence of
market, income and cost approach, the standard discourages the use of cost
approaches as it is more commonly used in non-financial asset valuation.
Amongst various other matters, the standard deals with certain special
considerations surrounding (a) the entity control environment, (b) the
determination of present value in a valuation technique, (c) adjustment to
credit risks in a valuation exercise.

 

Conclusion


As evident from the above synopsis,
the ICAI Valuation Standards set the right platform for a valuation professional
to perform his valuation exercise. These standards have put in place various
guard-rails to which the subjectivity and estimation element of a valuation
exercise, can be subjected to. One of the important enhancements to the quality
of valuation reporting under the ICAI Valuation Standards is the enhanced
disclosure requirements that are mandated by the ICAI Valuation Standards.

 

The minimum disclosure requirements
also enhance comparability and provide a sense of underlying assumptions that
are considered by the valuer in making his assessment.

 

Given this fact and the
cohesiveness of the ICAI Valuation Standards adequately capturing the Indian
nuances, it would not be surprising if the ‘Committee to advise on valuation
matters’ as set up by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs recommends the ICAI
Valuation Standards as notified valuation standards under the Act, especially
for the securities and financial assets class.

One will need
to wait and watch the adoption of ICAI Valuation Standards by other registered
valuation organisations and their applicability for other regulatory purposes.


The ICAI Valuation Standards pushes the practice of valuation into certain
required rigours of documentation, reporting, reliance on experts, evaluation
of a control environment, etc., that would only act as a catalyst to further
enhance the reliance on the report of the valuation professional. While the
domain does not and by its very nature cannot, remove the element of
‘subjectivity’, the robust nature of ICAI Valuation Standards alongwith the
enhanced disclosure requirements have the potential go a long way in setting
the right principles and providing the right directional clarity to the
professional valuer performing a valuation exercise. The needle of balance
between subjectivity and standardisation has certainly moved a fair bit towards
standardisation.

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

1.  Prelude

In the
hierarchy of tax, the Assessing Officer is the first authority to determine the
tax liability in accordance with law. One of the most important provisions of
the Constitution of India is Article 265, which provides “no tax
shall be levied or collected except by authority of law”.
CBDT vide
Circular No. 14 (XL-35 dt. 11-04-1955 dealing with refunds and reliefs
to the assessee, stated that it is the duty of the Assessing Officer to grant
relief if he is legally entitled though the assessee has not claimed it in the
return of income. First appeal lies u/s. 246A of the Income-tax Act before the
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who has been stated as a superior
assessing authority to correct and also to cure the assessment. Adversary
proceedings commence with appeal u/s. 253 to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal,
an independent body functioning under the Ministry of Law, which is the final
fact finding
authority and to whom second appeal lies by the assessee as
well as by the Revenue. Third appeal lies u/s. 260A before the State High Court
against order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal only on substantial question
of law. Final appeal lies to the Supreme Court of India u/s. 261 and Special
Leave Petition can be filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
before the Supreme Court, which is discretionary power, whereas all other
appeals are statutory. Relevant rules govern the procedure in first and second
appeal and third appeal is governed by the Civil Procedure Code and State High
Court rules. In the same order is the subordination and each is bound by the judicial
precedents
of the higher authorities, Tribunal, High Court and Supreme
Court. To maintain discipline, decorum and to avoid chaos and arbitrariness ‘Judicial
Discipline’ has been built-up by the judicial precedents, judge made
law.

 

2. 
Object, sanctity and effect

The basic object of judicial
discipline is to bring in consistency; to avoid unwanted litigation, which is costly
and full of uncertainties; to avoid harassment of tax-payers; to eliminate
denial of justice and to put an end to controversy. It has been rightly said
that if an appeal would have been provided against an order of the Supreme
Court, at least 10% of earlier judgments would have been reversed. Hence, a
four-tier scheme of appeal has been provided under the Income-tax Law.

 

3. 
Supreme Court   


3.1   The Supreme Court in Bhopal Sugar
Industries Ltd. vs. ITO (1960) 40 ITR 618 (SC)
observed that an assessing
authority is bound to carry out the directions given by the superior tribunal.
It stated as under: Refusal by a subordinate court is in effect a denial of
justice, and “is further more destructive of one of the basic principles in
the administration of justice based as it is in this country on a hierarchy of
courts”.

 

3.2   The Supreme Court in UOI vs. Kamlakshi
Finance Corporation Ltd. AIR 1992 SC 711
at 712 emphasised: The
principles of judicial discipline require that the orders of the higher
appellate authorities should be followed unreservedly by the subordinate
authorities. The mere fact that the order of the appellate authority is not
‘acceptable’ to the Department – in itself an objectionable phrase
– and is
the subject-matter of an appeal can furnish no ground for not following it
unless its operation has been suspended by a competent court.

 

3.3   The principle of judicial discipline as
expounded in the case of Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd.(supra) has
been followed in the case of Nicco Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT (2001) 251 ITR
791 (Cal.) (HC)
.

 

3.4   Judgment delivered by the Income-tax
Appellate Tribunal is binding on the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer
is bound to follow the judgment in its ‘letter and spirit’. This is
necessary for judicial unity and discipline as the Assessing Officer is an
inferior officer vis-à-vis the Tribunal. Hence, the Assessing Officer should
not attempt to distinguish the same on untenable grounds. In this context, it
will not be out of place to mention that “in the hierarchical system of courts”
which exists in our country, “it is necessary for each lower tier” including the
High Court, “to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers”.

 

3.5   Hence, I.T.O. cannot refuse to follow orders
of Tribunal and such order would be without jurisdiction as held in Voest-Apline
Ind. GmbH vs. ITO. (2000) 246 ITR 745 (Cal.) (HC)
.

 

3.6   In Assistant Collector of Central Excise
vs. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 154 ITR 172
at 173 (SC): “It is inevitable
in a hierarchical system of courts that there are decisions of the supreme
appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members
of the judiciary. But the judicial system works only if someone is allowed
to have the last word and that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted”
.
Also refer Bank of Baroda vs. H.C. Shrivastava (2002) 256 272 385 Bom H.C.

 

3.7   In Cassell and Co. Ltd. vs. Broome (1972)
AC 1027 (HL)
, the House of Lords observed we hope it will never be
necessary for us to say so again that : “in the hierarchical system of
courts” which exists in our country, it is necessary for each lower tier,
including the High Court “to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers”.
`The better wisdom of the court below must yield to the higher wisdom of the
court above’.
That is the strength of the hierarchical judicial system.

 

3.8   In Cassell vs. Broome (1972) AC 1027,
commenting on the Court of Appeal’s comment that Rookes vs. Barnard (1964)
AC 1129
, was rendered per incuriam, Lord
Diplock observed (p. 1131): “The Court of Appeal found themselves able to
disregard the decision of this House of Rookes v. Barnard by applying to it the
label per incuriam. That label is relevant only to the right of an appellate
court to decline to follow one of its own previous decisions, not to its right
to disregard a decision of a higher appellate court or to the right of a judge
of the High Court to disregard a decision of the Court of Appeal”.

 

3.9   In this connection reliance is also placed on
the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of East India Commercial
Co. Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs AIR 1962 SC 1893
at page 1905. “Where
there is a decision of a higher appellate authority, the subordinate authority
is bound to follow such decision. Hence, an order passed by the Income Tax
Officer following the decision of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be held to be
erroneous and such an order cannot be revised u/s. 263”. Russell Properties
Pvt. Ltd. vs. A. Chowdhury, Addl. CIT (1977) 109 ITR 229 (Cal.) (HC)

 

3.10 Ours is a unified judiciary. According to
Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law declared by the Supreme Court
shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The expression “all
courts means courts other than the Supreme Court”
. The decision of the
Supreme Court is binding on all the High Courts. In other words, the High
Courts cannot hold the law laid down by the Apex Court is not binding on the
ground that relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Supreme
Court, or the Supreme Court laid down the legal position without considering
all points. The decision of the Apex Court binds both the pending cases and the
future ones. Even the directions of the Apex Court in a decision constitute
binding law under Article 141
Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC
3011
.

 

3.11 It is pertinent to state that : the Supreme
Court is not bound by its own decisions and may also overrule its
previous decisions either by expressly saying so or impliedly by not following
them in a subsequent case. Dwarka Das Shrinivas vs. Sholapur Spinning and
Weaving Company Ltd.,- AIR 1954 SC 119)
and C N Rudramurthy vs. K
Barkathulla Khan (1998) 8 SCC 275
.

 

3.12 Thus, in view of Article 141 of the
Constitution of India, when there is a decision of the Apex Court directly
applicable with all the force to the case on hand, the learned Single Judge
could have decided the Writ Petitions following the decision of the Apex Court,
holding that the decision of the Division Bench is contrary to the law laid
down under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Sidramappa & Others
vs. State of Karnataka and others AIR 2014 (Karn.)100
, at 103 (Full Bench).

 

3.13 Two member bench not agreeing with opinion of
earlier three member bench, may refer to the President for a larger bench as
held in Union of India vs. Paras Laminates Pvt. Ltd. (1990) 186 ITR 722 (SC).
Judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two judges of the
Supreme Court should follow a decision of a Bench of three judges. If the Bench
of two judges concludes that an earlier judgment of a Bench of three judges is
so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper
course for the Bench of two judges to adopt is to refer the matter before it to
a Bench of three judges, setting out the reasons why it could not agree with
the earlier judgment. If, then, the Bench of three judges also comes to the
conclusion that the earlier judgment of a Bench of three judges is incorrect, a
reference to a Bench of five judges is justified
Pradip C. Parija vs.
Pramod C. Patnaik (2002) 254 ITR 99 (SC)
.

 

3.14 No co-ordinate Bench of Supreme Court can even
comment upon, let alone sit in judgment over the discretion exercised or judgment
rendered in a case or matter before another co-ordinate Bench. Sub-Committee
of Judicial Accountability vs. UOI (1992) 4 SCC 97
.

 

3.15 On 18.01.2018 a Division Bench of the Supreme
Court in National Travel Services vs. CIT (2018) 401 ITR 154 (SC), directed,
after giving detailed reasons to place the matter before the Hon’ble Chief
Justice for reconsideration of decision in CIT vs. Madhur Housing and
Development Co. (2018) 401 ITR 152 (SC)
. Incidentally it is noticed
that Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman is common in both the cases. Matter
stands referred to the larger bench.

 

3.16 Further if the order of an appellate authority
is the subject-matter of further appeal, that cannot be the ground for not
following it, unless its operation has been suspended by a competent court.
If this rule is not followed, the result will not only be undue harassment to
assessees but also chaos in the administration of tax laws. The State is bound
to be fair to those with whom it has to deal, and to the extent possible, it
must avoid any harassment to the assessee public without causing any loss to
the exchequer. Nokia Corporation vs. DIT (2007) 292 ITR 22 (Delhi) (HC).

 

3.17 In case for any reason the Executive /
Department does not agree with the decision of the Supreme Court it can seek
review of the decision. However, the experience has been that the executive has
sought to amend the law.

 

4. 
Precedent


It would be appropriate to consider
the doctrine of precedent. In Krishnakumar vs. UOI AIR 1990 SC 1782,
the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the doctrine of precedent i.e., being bound
by a previous decision was limited to the decision itself and not as to what
was necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that the Court was
bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they
contain proportions wider than the case required. In other words, the
enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a Court has
been decided alone is a precedent.
The ratio decidendi is the
underlying principle
, namely the general reasons or the general grounds
upon which the decision is given devoid of peculiarities of the particular case
which give rise to the decision. Hence, it is the principle laid down in the
judgement that becomes the law of the land
and not every word mentioned in
the judgement. Bharat Petroleum 117 Taxman 377 Sc.

 

5. 
Supreme Court & High Court decision


5.1   It is needless to add that in India under
Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be
binding on all courts within the territory of India and under Article 144 all
authorities, civil and judicial, in India shall act in aid of the Supreme
Court. It may be added under Article 226 of the Constitution all authorities
civil and judicial, in a State shall act according to the decision of the
relevant High Court.

 

5.2   The Tribunal has to follow decision of
jurisdictional High Court without making any comment upon the decision and/or
without ignoring it on any ground. National Textile Corporation Ltd. (M.P.)
vs. CIT. (2011) 338 ITR 371 (MP) (HC)
.

 

5.3   A view expressed by the High Court is of
binding nature on all the subjects and authorities functioning within its
territorial jurisdiction [Motor Industries Co. Ltd. vs. JCIT (2007) 292 ITR
70 (Karn.) (HC)
] Precedent law must be followed by all concerned; deviation
from the same should be only on a procedure known to law. A subordinate
court is bound by the law enunciated by the superior court.

 

5.4   A co-ordinate Bench of a court cannot
pronounce judgment contrary to law declared by another Bench. It can only refer
it to a larger Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement. [(CIT
vs. Travancore Titanium Products Ltd. (2004) 265 ITR 526 (Ker. HC)
]. The
same principle will apply to the decision of the Tribunal. Hence, we have
experienced the constitution of special benches of the Tribunal CIT vs.
Travancore Titanium Products Ltd (2004) 265 ITR 526 KER.H.C
.

 

5.5   The Supreme Court in Sub-Inspector Rooplal
and Anr. vs. Lt. Governor (2000) 1 SCC 644
considered the situation where a
co-ordinate Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal had in effect
overruled an earlier judgment of another co-ordinate Bench of the same
Tribunal. The Court observed: “If at all, the subsequent Bench of the
Tribunal was of the opinion that the earlier view taken by the co-ordinate
Bench of the same Tribunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter
to a larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the two co-ordinate
Benches on the same point could have been avoided. This Court has laid down
time and again that precedent law must be followed by all concerned; deviation
from the same should be only on a procedure known to law. It can only refer it
to a larger Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement”.

Also refer the following :

 

  •    District Manager,
    APSRTC, Vijayawada vs. K. Sivaji and Ors. (2001) 2 SCC 135
  •    Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho
    vs. Jagadish (2001) 2 SCC 247
  •    Gopabandhu Biswal vs.
    Krishna Chandramohanty and Ors. (1998) 4 SCC 447 para 16
  •    Usha Kumar vs. State of
    Bihar and Ors. (1998) 2 SCC 44 para 3 and
  •    State of A.P. vs. V.C.
    Subbarayudu (1998) 2 SCC 516 para 10.

 

5.6   Hence, it is well-settled that if a Bench of
co-ordinate jurisdiction disagrees with another Bench of coordinate
jurisdiction whether on the basis of “different arguments” or otherwise, on
a question of law,
it is appropriate that the matter be referred to a
larger Bench for resolution of the issue rather than leave two conflicting
judgments to operate, creating confusion”.

 

5.7   In a multi-judge court, it is essential the
judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion
only when there is no declared principle, no rule and no authority is found.
Judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a single judge or a
Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of co-ordinate
jurisdiction, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench.


It would be subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure.
Sundardas Kanyalal Bhatija and Others vs. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra and
Others (1990) 183 ITR 130 (SC)
.

 

5.8   If a division bench expresses a view without
noticing a contrary view of a concurrent bench the lower judicial /
administrative authorities face a dilemma. It has been held that the later
decision will prevail and the subordinate court / authority would follow the
later view. However, the division bench of the High Court would have to
refer the matter to the Chief Justice for constituting larger bench.


6. Mixed Question of law and fact

6.1   The final authority on facts is the Tribunal.
However, the High Court and Supreme Court can consider the facts of a case if
the decision of Tribunal is perverse. Hence, the Supreme Court or High Court
can go into facts on a mixed question of law and fact. The Supreme Court in CIT
vs. Bedi & Co. P. Ltd. (1998) 230 ITR 580
observed: “Where the High
Court has to deal with various facts on record to determine whether the amount
in question was a loan or income, if the discussion of the High Court leads to
the conclusion that the amount was a loan and not income, it cannot be urged
that the High Court disturbed the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal”.

 

The Supreme Court in Kailash
Devi Burman vs. CIT (1996) 219 ITR 214 (SC)
observed: “Even when the High
Court is required to decide whether the findings of fact reached by the
Tribunal are perverse, the High Court is confined to the evidence that was
before the Tribunal. The High Court cannot look at evidence that was not
before the Tribunal when it reached the impugned findings to hold that those
findings are perverse”.

 

7. Substantial Question of Law  


7.1        Appeal u/s. 260-A can be preferred only
on substantial question of law since 01.10.1998. The Supreme Court in Santosh
Hazari vs. Purshottam Tiwari (2001) 251 ITR 84
stated: “To be
“substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by
law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the
decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the
parties before the court are concerned. The substantial question of law need
not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance”.

 

7.2   In Premier Breweries Ltd. vs. CIT (2015)
372 ITR 180
it was held: “The legal inference that should be drawn from
the primary facts is eminently a question of law
”.

 

8. Tribunal
and sanctity of its decision(s)


8.1   Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is the final
fact finding authority. Facts found by the Tribunal are final, unless perverse.
Facts found, if proper, cannot be tinkered with and will govern the decision of
the High Court and Supreme Court. Order passed by the Tribunal is binding on
all Revenue authorities functioning under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

 

8.2   A single member of the Tribunal is bound by
the view of another single member. If the single member wants to differ the decision must have the support of a decision of a division bench.
The Gujarat High Court in Sayaji Iron and Engineering Co. vs. CIT (2002) 253
ITR 749
, dealing with an almost similar situation laid down guidelines for
resolution of such controversy as follows: the
Tribunal on facts had no right to come to a conclusion contrary to the one reached by another Bench of the Tribunal on the same facts. If the
Tribunal wanted to take a view different from the one taken by an earlier
Bench, it ought to place the matter before the President of the Tribunal so
that he can refer to a Bench consisting of three or more members under the
provision in the Income-tax Act itself”. In the instant case, the learned
Members of the Indore Bench of the Tribunal instead of reviewing their own
earlier judgment, ought to have referred the matter to the larger Bench. This
finds support in Agarwal Warehousing and Leasing Ltd. (2002) 257 ITR 235
(MP) (HC)
.

 

8.3   The requisite provision is sub-section (3) of
section 255 where the President of the Tribunal is authorised to constitute a
Special Bench of three or more members.

 

8.4   Constitution of benches is the prerogative of
the President. The President can constitute a Special Bench constituting of
three or more members, on any particular case. The Supreme Court in ITAT vs.
DCIT (1996) 218 ITR 275(SC)
stated: “The administrative decision of the
President that a case is of all-India importance and requires to be decided by
a larger Bench or a Special Bench of three members is an administrative order
and such an order is not open to scrutiny under article 226 of the Constitution
of India except in extraordinary cases wherein the order is shown to be mala
fide one”.

 

8.5   Status of decision of Tribunal on CIT(A) or AO

A decision of
Special Bench of the Tribunal is a binding precedent on all single and division
Benches of the Tribunal and if any, division or three member Bench has
different opinion, the matter must be referred to the President of the Tribunal
u/s. 255(4) and if the President is satisfied can constitute larger Bench to
resolve the controversy.

 

8.6   A decision of Special Bench is not binding on
the High Court, but it is permissible to refer and if convinced the High Court
may adopt the same reasoning.

 

8.7   The CIT(A) or AO being subordinate to the
Tribunal are bound to follow the decision of the Tribunal. K.N. Agarwal vs.
CIT (1991) 189 ITR 769 (All) (HC).
In case the AO or the CIT differ from
the decision it is the bounden duty of the CIT(A) or AO to refer the cited case
law and to distinguish on facts. One single non-similar fact may justify the
CIT(A) or AO’s decision not to follow.
But it cannot be laid aside at
the ipse-dixit of the subordinate authority. Ratio decidendi
has to be
followed and cannot be commented upon or legal lapse or fault found by the
subordinate authority.

 

8.8   On the same facts the A.O. and CIT (A) needs
to follow an earlier decision.

 

8.9   The ITO is bound by decision of a single
judge. K. Subramanian vs. Siemens India 156 ITR 11.

 

8.10 Full Bench decision is binding on the A.O. even
if an appeal is pending before the Supreme Court Koduru Venkata Reddy ITO
ITR 15 A.P.

 

8.11 In Eagle Flask Industries 72 ITD 455 Pune:
it is observed

The action on the part of the
authorities below was flagrant disregard and disrespect to the provisions of
law. It may be considered as settled law that the decision of higher
authorities is binding on the lower authorities in the judicial hierarchy. Accordingly,
it would stand to reason that the CIT Appeals and the A.O. would be bound by
the decision of the Tribunal because at the time of passing the order, they
were working within the jurisdiction of the Pune Tribunal’.

 

8.12 In DCWT vs. Ashwin C Shah 82 ITD 573 BOM: it
is observed

Judicial adventurism or originality
has its limitations and cannot be taken to such absurd lengths where each and
every judgement of a higher judicial forum is sought to be circumvented on some
slender or tenuous ground. Every discovery of argumentative novelty cannot
compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. This would lead to judicial
chaos and indiscipline.

 

9. Impact
of decision of non-jurisdictional High Court over appellate authorities and the
Tribunal


9.1   In CIT vs. Sarabhai Sons Ltd 147 ITR 473
the Gujarat High Court has observed that one High Court should follow the other
High Court with a view to maintain uniformity in tax matters.

 

9.2   The Bombay High Court in Godavari Das
Saraf 113 ITR 589
has held that decision of another High Court should have
more than persuasive value for another High Court and would generally be
binding on the Tribunal.

 

9.3   In Arvind Boards & Paper Products Ltd.
vs. CIT (1982) 137 ITR 635
the Gujarat High Court observed: “If one High
Court has interpreted the provision or section of a taxing statute, which is an
All India statute, and there is no other view in the field, another High Court
should ordinarily accept that view in the interest of comity of judicial
decisions and consistency in matters of application of a taxing statute”.

Also refer CIT vs. Virajlal Manilal 127 ITR 512 MP.

 

9.4   Hence as Income-tax Act is a Central
legislation and applies on all the tax payers and tax administration
alike, a decision of a non-jurisdictional High Court is of persuasive value and
must be followed unless and until any contrary decision is available of any
other High Court. In case of conflict between High Courts or debatable issue
between different High Courts, the appellate authority or the Tribunal would
be justified to follow one which convinces its conscience and ignore the other.

In C.I.T. vs. Alcock Ashdown & Co. Ltd. (1979) 119 ITR 164 (Bom.) (HC)
High court observed at 170: “if any High Court has construed any section or
rule and come to a particular interpretation thereof, that interpretation
should be followed by this court unless there are compelling reasons brought to
our notice for departing from the view taken by another High Court.”

       

9.5   If different High Courts have expressed
different view and it is a debatable issue, the view taken by the
jurisdictional High Court would prevail and need to be followed. Refer Taylor
Instrument Co. (India) Ltd. vs. CIT (1998) 232 ITR 771 (Delhi) (HC), CGT vs.
J.K. Jain (1998) 230 ITR 839 (P&H) (HC), CIT vs. Sunil Kumar (1995) 212 ITR
238 (Raj.) (HC), CIT vs. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd. (1994) 206 ITR 727
(Bom.) (HC), Indian Tube Company Ltd. vs. CIT (1993) 203 ITR 54 (Cal.) (HC),
CIT vs. P.C. Joshi and B.C. Joshi (1993) 202 ITR 1017 (Bom.)
(HC), and
CIT vs. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy (1957) 32 ITR 466 (SC). Same view expressed
in DCIT vs. Raghuvir Synthetics Ltd. (2017) 394 ITR 1 (SC).

 

9.6   It is pertinent to note that if a decision of
a particular High Court is cited and the other High Court does not agree with
the same – the differing High Court would issue what in legal parlance is
termed a ‘speaking order’.

 

10. 
Hope & Expectation


Judicial Discipline deserves to be
followed religiously and its sanctity must be understood. It is painful that
despite a plethora of decisions commencing with Bhopal Industries, the AO. and
CIT(A) and few of the members of the Tribunal are flouting judicial discipline
and committing contempt. It is high time that appellate authorities correct the
errant authorities with heavy hand. It is being noticed that the Supreme Court
and High Courts are taking indiscipline seriously. Recently the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in UOI. v. Prithwi Singh(SC) (www.itatonline.org) dismissed the appeal
with cost of Rs.1,00,000/-. It held that, Union of India has created a huge
financial liability by engaging so many lawyers for an appeal whose fate can be
easily decided on the basis of existing orders in similar cases. Yet the Union
of India is increasing its liability and asking the taxpayers to bear an
avoidable financial burden for the misadventures.
The Bombay High Court has
also levied cost and passed strictures against errant officers, and has
directed that even cost be realised from such officers. However, there remain
deafening ears. The subordinate authorities should remain within their bounds
and do justice to the harassed tax payers. It is suggested that the Central
Board of Direct Taxes must keep a watch and vigil and take disciplinary action
against the wrong doers. Malady must go. Law is Supreme – Not the Tax
Authorities.
I conclude by stating : Judicial discipline is the essence of
`rule of law’.
 

Article 7(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA – in absence of DTAA providing any restrictions on deduction of expenses, domestic law restrictions on deductibility cannot be imported into DTAA

9. DDIT vs. Unocol Bharat Ltd

ITA Nos.: 1388/Del/2012

Date of Order: 5th October, 2018

A.Y.: 1998-99

 

Article 7(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA – in absence of DTAA
providing any restrictions on deduction of expenses,  domestic law restrictions on deductibility
cannot be imported into DTAA

 

Facts

The Taxpayer was a company
incorporated in Mauritius. It was engaged in business of development and
promotion in the energy sector in India for its parent company. The Taxpayer
was pursuing certain projects in India. It had constituted a PE in India.
Accordingly, it was offering its income on net basis. During the relevant year,
the Taxpayer had incurred certain expenses relating to operating contract,
employee salaries and travel and entertainment but did not earn any income.
Thus, Taxpayer incurred losses in the relevant year. 

 

According to the AO, the Taxpayer
had not produced appropriate documentary evidences in respect of the said
expenses. Further, it had also not withheld any tax from such payments.
Accordingly, the AO, relying on Supreme Court decision in Transmission Corporation
vs. CIT, 239 ITR 587 (SC)
, concluded that the expenditure was not allowable
and further invoked the provisions of section 40 (a)(i) to disallow the
expenditure.

 

Before CIT(A), the Taxpayer
contended that having regard to the short stay exemption under Article 15 of
India-USA DTAA, employee salaries were not taxable in India. The Taxpayer also
furnished information relating to expenses incurred. Further, compared to DTAAs
with other countries, Article 7(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA is worded differently.
In other DTAAs not only there is restriction on deduction of expenses but
deduction is also subject to the limitation of domestic tax law. In support of
its contention, the Taxpayer relied on the decision in JCIT vs. State Bank
of Mauritius Limited 2009 TIOL 712
. The Taxpayer also contended that it had
furnished sufficient details to the AO to support its claim. Thereafter, to
disallow the expenses, the onus was on the AO to point out errors/omission. The
CIT(A) held in favour of the Taxpayer.


Held

The contention of the AO that the
Taxpayer has not furnished details of expenditure is untenable. Further, the
amount paid to employees was eligible for short stay exemption under the DTAA.
Further, relying on Mumbai Tribunal decision in JCIT vs. State Bank of
Mauritius Limited 2009 TIOL 712
, the Tribunal held that:

 

  •    Article 7(3) of
    India-Mauritius DTAA provides for determining profits of a PE after deduction
    of expenses (including executive and general administrative expenses) incurred
    for the business of the PE. Accordingly, all expenses, which were incurred for
    the purpose of the business of the PE were to be allowed.
  •    The language in Article
    7(3) of India-Mauritius DTAA is different from that in other treaties.
    Illustratively, Article 7(3) of India-US DTAA provides deduction subject to the
    limitation of domestic tax laws. After the Protocol, India-UAE DTAA also
    incorporates similar restriction.
  •    In absence of such
    restriction in DTAA, any limitation under the Act cannot be imported into DTAA.
    Accordingly, if the expenditure was incurred for the purpose of the business of
    PE, it had to be allowed fully without any restriction that may have been
    provided under the Act.
     

Sections 9, 195 of the Act – Fees paid to surveyors for assessing damage was not taxable in India since the surveyors had undertaken work outside India and had merely provided their report without imparting any knowledge to the Taxpayer

8. [2018] 97 taxmann.com 644 (Chennai – Trib.)

Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT

ITA Nos.: 1622 to 1630 (Chny) of 2011

Date of Order: 6th August, 2018

A.Ys.: 2002-03 TO 2010-11

 

Sections 9, 195 of the Act – Fees paid to surveyors for assessing
damage was not taxable in India since the surveyors had undertaken work outside
India and had merely provided their report without imparting any knowledge to
the Taxpayer 

 

Facts

The Taxpayer was engaged in the
business of general insurance in India. The Taxpayer had engaged surveyors to
assess loss or damage to goods insured by it in transit to foreign country.
During the relevant year, the Taxpayer paid fees to the surveyors for such
assessment. The surveyors had assessed the damages outside India using their
experience and knowledge and furnished their report to the Taxpayer. The
Taxpayer contended that such income is not taxable in India and hence, it did
not withhold tax from the fees paid to surveyors.

 

In the course of assessment, the AO
disallowed the payment.

 

Held

  •    The surveyors were
    non-residents. They had undertaken the assessment of damage outside India using
    their experience and knowledge.
  •    The surveyors had not
    imparted their knowledge to the Taxpayer and had merely provided a report of
    the extent of damage to the Taxpayer so as to enable it to compensate its
    customers.
  •    Accordingly, the payment
    made by the Taxpayer to the surveyors was not chargeable to tax in India.
    Consequently, the Taxpayer was not required to withhold tax from such payment.

Article 7(3), India-Japan DTAA – Having regard to Article 7(3), read with Protocol thereto, of India-Japan DTAA, interest paid by Indian branch of a foreign bank to HO was allowable as a deductible expenditure

7.  DCIT vs. Mizuho
Corporate Bank Ltd.

ITA No.: 4711/Mum/2016 & 4710/Mum/2016

Date of Order: 13th August, 2018

A.Ys. 2007-08 & 2008-09

 

Article 7(3), India-Japan DTAA – Having regard to Article 7(3),
read with Protocol thereto, of India-Japan DTAA, interest paid by Indian branch
of a foreign bank to HO was allowable as a deductible expenditure

 

Facts       

The Taxpayer
was a bank incorporated in Japan. It was carrying on banking operations in
India through its branches at Mumbai and Delhi. It had furnished its return of
income for the relevant year. Subsequently, it furnished a revised return and
reduced the income. During the relevant year, the branch had paid interest to
Head Office (HO) on the funds that the HO had advanced to the branches in the
normal course of banking business. The branch had also withheld tax from the
interest payment. The Taxpayer had claimed the interest paid as a deduction by
relying on the protocol to Article 7(3) of India-Japan DTAA. In terms of the
said Protocol, interest on moneys lent by a banking institution to its PE is
allowable as a deduction.

 

In the course of assessment proceedings,
the AO observed that the branch in India constituted PE of the Taxpayer in
India and concluded as follows.

 

  •    The AO noted the interest
    paid by branch to HO. According to the AO, the branch and HO were not separate
    entities for the tax purpose. Hence, payment made by branch to HO was payment
    to self. Therefore, AO disallowed the deduction of interest paid to the HO. In
    this respect, the AO relied on the decision in ABN Amro Bank NV vs. ADIT
    [2005] 97 ITD 89 (SB).
  •    The AO further concluded
    that the source of the interest earned by HO was the branch in India. Hence, in
    terms of section 9(1)(v)(c) of the Act, the interest was deemed to have accrued
    or arisen in India. Therefore, it was taxable in India as per the Act.
  •    Further, as the payer of the
    income to a non-resident, the AO treated the branch as a representative
    assessee/agent of the Taxpayer in terms of section 163(1)(c) of the Act.
  •    Finally, the AO concluded
    that the interest received by HO was taxable in India @10% in terms of Article
    11(2)(a) of India-Japan DTAA on gross basis.

 

In appeal, CIT(A) ruled in favour
of the Taxpayer. Hence, the tax authority preferred an appeal before the
Tribunal.

 

Held2

  •    The Special bench decision in ABN Amro Bank
    case was reversed by Kolkata High Court in ABN Amro Bank NV vs. CIT [2012]
    343 ITR 81 (Cal)
    . Further, in Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation vs.
    DDIT [2012] 136 ITD 66 (SB) (Mum)
    , Special Bench of Mumbai Tribunal had
    deviated from the view of Kolkata Tribunal. The tax authority has not brought
    on record any decision to the contrary.
  •    In case of the Taxpayer in
    earlier year, relying on the decision in Sumitomo Mitsui banking corporation
    case
    , the Tribunal had held that the interest paid by Indian branch of the
    Taxpayer to HO was not chargeable to tax in India.
  •    While reversing the
    Tribunal decision in ABN Amro bank case, the High Court had observed that
    though a branch and HO are same person under general law, Articles 5 and 7 of
    India-Netherlands DTAA provided for assessment of PE as a separate entity.
    Hence, the High Court allowed interest paid by the branch to HO as a deduction
    from income of PE.
  •    Since Article 7(3) of
    India-Japan DTAA, read with Protocol thereto, provides for deduction of interest
    on moneys lent by HO of a banking institution to its branch in India, interest
    paid by branch to HO was allowable as a deduction.

 

_______________________________________________

2   The
Tribunal had issued notice of hearing to the Taxpayer. The Taxpayer neither
sought adjournment nor did it represent before the Tribunal. Accordingly,
Tribunal delivered its decision ex parte.

Article 13 of India-UK DTAA; section 9 of the Act – As subscription income from provision of deal matching system for foreign exchange dealing was providing ‘information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific work’, income was royalty

6.  [2018] 96 taxmann.com
354 (Mumbai – Trib.)

DCIT vs. Reuters Transaction Services Ltd.

ITA Nos.: 1393 & 2219 (Mum.) of 2016

Date of Order: 3rd August, 2018

A.Ys.: 2012-13

 

Article 13 of India-UK DTAA; section 9 of the Act – As
subscription income from provision of deal matching system for foreign exchange
dealing was providing ‘information concerning industrial, commercial or
scientific work’, income was royalty

                       

Facts       

The Taxpayer was a company
incorporated in, and tax resident of the UK. It was providing access to its
electronic deal matching system for foreign exchange dealings. Its server was
located in Switzerland. The Taxpayer had entered into an agreement with its
group company in India for marketing of its system.

 

In the course of assessment
proceedings, the AO observed that: the income of the Taxpayer was not covered
under Article 13(6) of India-UK DTAA; the Taxpayer had a PE in India; and
therefore, the income of the Taxpayer was taxable as royalty. However, since
the Taxpayer had disputed the existence of the PE, Article 13(6) was held to be
inapplicable.

 

Following the Tribunal decision in
case of the Taxpayer in earlier years, the DRP upheld the draft order of the AO
to the effect that the payment received by the Taxpayer from its subscribers
was for use of its equipment and process and hence, it qualified as  royalty, both under the Act and India-UK
DTAA. The DRP further held that the server of the Taxpayer in Switzerland
extended to the equipment provided in India by the Taxpayer to the subscribers
constituted an equipment PE in India of the Taxpayer.

 

Held

u   In the earlier years, the
Tribunal had held that income received by the Taxpayer from subscribers in
India was royalty.

u   The Taxpayer had failed to
bring on record any evidence to counter the finding of facts by the Tribunal.

u   Hence, the subscription
income received by the Taxpayer was in the nature of royalty. Since the
subscription income was in the nature of royalty, there was no need to examine
whether the Taxpayer had PE in India. Article 13(6) can be invoked only if
existence of a PE is not in dispute. Since the Taxpayer has contended before
the lower authorities that it does not have a PE in India, Article 13(6) cannot
be applied.

Article 5, 13 of India-UK DTAA; section 9 of the Act – if the entire profits of a UK partnership are taxed in UK, the partnership would qualify for benefits under India-UK DTAA; as the expression “any twelve-month period” in Article 5(2)(k)(i) is not defined in India-UK DTAA, it should be read as ‘previous year’ as defined in section 3 of the Act

5.  [2018] 97 taxmann.com
464 (Mumbai – Trib.)

Linklaters LLP vs. DCIT

ITA No.: 1540 (Mum) of 2016

Date of Order: 29th August, 2018

A.Y.: 2012-13

 

Article 5, 13 of India-UK DTAA; section 9 of the Act – if the
entire profits of a UK partnership are taxed in UK, the partnership would
qualify for benefits under India-UK DTAA; as the expression “any twelve-month
period” in Article 5(2)(k)(i) is not defined in India-UK DTAA, it should be
read as ‘previous year’ as defined in section 3 of the Act

 

Facts

The Taxpayer was a UK LLP. The
Taxpayer provided legal consultancy globally to its clients, including clients
from India.

 

The Taxpayer contended that such
income was not taxable in India in absence of a Permanent establishment (PE) in
India.

 

The AO sought
further information from the Taxpayer and found that the Taxpayer had provided
legal services to several clients and the work relating to such services was
performed partly in India and partly outside India. Thus, AO held that Taxpayer
had a PE in India because its employees and other executives had stayed in
India for more than ninety days. The AO also held that the Taxpayer was not
liable to tax in UK and hence, it was not entitled to the benefits under
India-UK DTAA. Thus, the AO held that the income received by LLP was taxable as
FTS in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. Without prejudice, the AO also
held that such income also qualified as FTS under the DTAA.

 

The DRP rejected the objections of
the Taxpayer and directed the AO to finalise the assessment.

 

Held

  •   Following its ruling in
    the Taxpayer’s own case for the earlier years, the Tribunal held as follows.

 

    If
the entire profits of the partnership are taxed in UK, irrespective of whether
in the hands of the firm or in the hands of the partners, the LLP would be
entitled to benefits under India-UK DTAA.

    Income
of the Taxpayer from legal advisory services was not FTS as contemplated under
Article 13 of India-UK DTAA. Further, having regard to section 90(2), such
income cannot be brought to tax as FTS in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the
Act.

 

  •    Interpretation of the
    expression “any twelve-month period” in Article 5(2)(k)(i)

    Article
5(2)(k)(i) of India-UK DTAA uses the expression “any twelve-month period”1.  This expression has not been defined in
India-UK DTAA.

    Under
the Act, a twelve-month period would mean ‘previous year’ or financial year in
terms of section 3 of the Act. Harmonious reading of Article 5(2)(k)(i) with
the Act would lead to the conclusion that “any twelve-month period
would mean previous year or financial year in terms of section 3 of the Act.

    As
contended by the Taxpayer, during the relevant previous year or financial year,
the personnel of the Taxpayer had rendered services in India for a period
aggregating to seventy-seven days.

    This
factual aspect was not verified by AO as Taxpayer had not raised this issue
before the lower authorities. Hence, the Tribunal restored the issue to the AO
directing him to verify the facts.  

__________________________________________

1   In
terms of Article 5(2)(k)(i), a PE is constituted if: the enterprise furnishes
services (including managerial services) other than services taxable as
Royalties and FTS through its personnel; and if such activities continue for a
period or periods aggregating to more than 90 days within “any twelve-month
period’.

Section 254 – The ITAT is an adjudicator and not an investigator. It has to rely upon the investigation / enquiry conducted by the AO. The Department cannot fault the ITAT’s order and seek a recall on the ground that an order of SEBI, though available, was not produced before the ITAT at the hearing. The negligence or laches lies with the Department and for such negligence or laches, the order of the ITAT cannot be termed as erroneous u/s. 254(2). Section 254(2) of the Act is very limited in its scope and ambit and only applies to rectification of mistake apparent on the face of record, review of earlier decision of the Tribunal is not permissible under the provisions of section 254(2) of the Act

4.  ITO vs. Iraisaa Hotels Pvt. Ltd.

Members
: Saktijit Dey, JM and Rajesh Kumar, AM

MA No.
29/Mum/2017 arising out of ITA No.: 6165/Mum/2014

A. Y.:
2007-08  
Dated: 10th September, 2018.

Counsel
for revenue / assessee: Ram Tiwari / Pradeep Kapasi

 

Section 254 – The ITAT is an adjudicator and not an investigator.
It has to rely upon the investigation / enquiry conducted by the AO. The
Department cannot fault the ITAT’s order and seek a recall on the ground that
an order of SEBI, though available, was not produced before the ITAT at the
hearing. The negligence or laches lies with the Department and for such
negligence or laches, the order of the ITAT cannot be termed as erroneous u/s.
254(2). Section 254(2) of the Act is very limited in its scope and ambit and
only applies to rectification of mistake apparent on the face of record, review
of earlier decision of the Tribunal is not permissible under the provisions of
section 254(2) of the Act

 

FACTS

The Revenue filed an application
seeking recall of the order dated 29th April, 2016 passed in ITA No.
6165/Mum/2014.  It was contended that at
the time of disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal, though the final order
dated 31.3.2015, passed by SEBI was available it was not brought to the notice
of the Tribunal while deciding the issue relating to additions made u/s. 68 of
the Act by the Assessing Officer (AO) in respect of unsecured loan and share
capital amounting to Rs. 1,69,94,882.  It
was contended that had the observations of the SEBI in the final order been
considered, the issue relating to the disputed additions made by the AO could
have been decided in a different manner i.e., in favor of the Department.  It was submitted that the appeal order be
recalled and the appeal be heard and decided afresh after considering the final
report of the SEBI.

 

HELD

From the narration of facts in the
authorisation memo of the learned PCIT, the Tribunal noticed that he admits
that proper enquiry was not done by the learned CIT(A) and by the AO at the
stage of remand which resulted in not bringing certain facts to the notice of
the Tribunal.  It observed that it is
crystal clear that the Tribunal has proceeded on the basis of facts and
material on record and as were placed before it at the time of hearing by the
learned Counsels appearing for the parties. 
It observed that the role of the Tribunal as a second appellate
authority is of an adjudicator and not an investigator. 



The Tribunal under the provisions
of the Act has to decide the grounds raised in an appeal filed either by the
assessee or by the Department on the basis of the facts and materials available
on record or brought to its notice at the time of hearing of appeal.

 

The Tribunal observed that it is
after passing of the order of the Tribunal the Department has come forward with
the final order of the SEBI by stating that, though, it was available at the
time of hearing of appeal but it could not be brought to the notice of the
Tribunal.  It held that the negligence or
laches for not bringing the final order of SEBI to the notice of the Tribunal
lies with the Department and for such negligence or laches of the Department,
the appeal order passed by the Tribunal cannot be termed as erroneous to bring
it within the ambit of section 254(2) of the Act. 

 

After disposal of appeal by the
Tribunal, if the Department comes with fresh evidence certainly it cannot be
entertained, much less, by taking recourse to section 254(2) of the Act. 

 

The Tribunal observed that by
filing this application the Department wants a review of the earlier decision
of the Tribunal which is not permissible under provisions of section 254(2) of
the Act which is very limited in its scope and ambit and only applies to
rectification of mistake apparent on the face of record. 

 

The Tribunal held the application
filed by the Department to be not maintainable. 

Sections 143(2), 147 – A notice u/s. 143(2) issued by the AO before the assessee files a return of income has no meaning. If no fresh notice is issued after the assessee files a return, the AO has no jurisdiction to pass the reassessment order and the same has to be quashed

3.  Sudhir Menon vs. ACIT

Members
: Mahavir Singh, JM and N K
Pradhan, AM

ITA
No.: 1744/Mum/2016

A. Y.:
2010-11  
Dated: 3rd October, 2018.

Counsel for assessee / revenue: S E Dastur / R. Manjunatha Swamy

 

Sections 143(2), 147 – A notice u/s. 143(2)
issued by the AO before the assessee files a return of income has no meaning.
If no fresh notice is issued after the assessee files a return, the AO has no
jurisdiction to pass the reassessment order and the same has to be quashed

 

FACTS

The assessee filed his return of
income on 30.7.2010 declaring total income of Rs. 46,76,95,780 which return of
income was processed u/s. 143(1) of the Act on 21.3.2012.  Thereafter, the case was reopened by issuing
notice u/s. 148 of the Act dated 1.4.2013 which was served on the assessee on
8.4.2013. The ACIT, Central Circle – 45, Mumbai (AO) issued notice u/s. 143(2)
of the Act dated 3.5.2013 requiring assessee to attend his office on
13.5.2013.  The assessee in response to
notice issued u/s. 148 of the Act, filed a letter dated 23.5.2013 stating that
the return originally filed be treated as a return filed in response to notice
u/s. 148 of the Act.

 

Since no notice u/s. 143(2) was
issued after filing of return by the assessee, it was contended that the
assessment framed is invalid and bad in law. For this proposition, reliance was
placed on the following decisions –

 

i)    ACIT
vs. Geno Pharmaceuticals [(2013) 32 taxmann.com 162 (Bom.)]

ii)    CIT
vs. Ms. Malvika Arun Somaiya [(2010) 2 taxmann.com 144 (Bom)]

iii)   DIT vs. Society for Worldwide Inter Bank Financial,
Telecommunications [(2010) 323 ITR 249 (Delhi)]

iv)   Decision
of Delhi Tribunal in ITA Nos. 5163 & 5164/Del/2010, 5554/Del/2012 for AY
2004-05 and 2005-06 vide order dated 2.7.2018

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted the factual
position and observed that the question is can the AO issue notice u/s. 143(2)
of the Act in the absence of pending return of income.  It held that the provisions of section 143(2)
of the Act is clear that notice can be issued only when a valid return is
pending assessment.  It held that the
notice issued before 23.5.2013 had no meaning as the assessee filed return of
income u/s. 148 vide letter dated 23.5.2013 stating that the original return of
income can be treated as return filed in response to notice u/s. 148 of the
Act.  It observed that it means return
was filed only on 23.5.2013. 

 

The issue as to whether assessment
can be framed without issuing a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act when the return
was filed by the assessee in response to notice u/s. 148 of the Act has been
considered by the Bombay High Court in the case of Geno Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
(supra)
.   Having noted the
observations of the Bombay High Court in the case of Geno Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. (supra)
, the Tribunal observed that similar is the position in the
case of Malvika Arun Somaiya (supra). 
The Tribunal also noted the observations of the Delhi High Court in the
case of Society for Worldwide Inter Bank Financial, Telecommunications
(supra)
and held that in view of the consistent view of jurisdictional High
Court and Delhi High Court, in the absence of a pending return of income, the
provisions of section 143(2) of the Act is clear that notice can be issued only
when a valid return is pending for assessment. Accordingly, the notice issued
on 3.5.2013 has not meaning.  Since no
notice was issued by the Department after 23.5.2013 (date of filing of return
of income by the assessee) the Tribunal held that the assessment framed without
issuing a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act when the return was filed by the
assessee in response to notice u/s. 148 of the Act is bad in law. The Tribunal
quashed the assessment framed by the AO.

 

The issue raised by the assessee by
way of additional ground was allowed. 
The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Section 140A(3) and 221 – AO was not justified in levying penalty u/s. 140A(3) r.w.s. 221(1) for failure to pay self-assessment tax as per the provisions of section 140A(3) as amended w.e.f. 1st April, 1989 as the amended section 140A(3) does not envisage any penalty for non-payment of self-assessment tax

10.  [2018] 195 TTJ 536
(Mumbai – Trib.)

Heddle Knowledge P (Ltd) vs. ITO

ITA No.: 7509/Mum/2011

A. Y.: 2009-10.                                   

Dated: 19th January, 2018.

 

Section 140A(3) and 221 – AO was not justified in levying penalty
u/s. 140A(3) r.w.s. 221(1) for failure to pay self-assessment tax as per the
provisions of section 140A(3) as amended w.e.f. 1st April, 1989 as
the amended section 140A(3) does not envisage any penalty for non-payment of
self-assessment tax 

 

FACTS

The assessee filed its return for the relevant year which was not
accompanied by proof of payment of self-assessment tax. In response to
show-cause notice issued by AO, assessee raised a plea of financial stringency.
The AO did not find the reason advanced by the assessee to be satisfactory to
mitigate the levy of penalty.

He took a view that the assessee had defaulted in payment of self-assessment
tax within the stipulated period and was thus liable to be treated as
‘assessee-in-default’ as per the provisions of section 140A(3) r.w.s. 221(1) of
the Act. Accordingly, penalty order was passed for delayed payment of
self-assessment tax.

 

Aggrieved by the assessment order,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A). The CIT(A) confirmed the
penalty order.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that in terms of
the provisions of section 140A(3) as existing till 31-3-1989, the Assessing
Officer was empowered to levy penalty in cases where assessee had failed to pay
the self-assessment tax. The section was then amended by inserting Explanation
to it with effect from 1-4-1989. The amended section along with the explanatory
notes to the amendment conjointly made it clear that the earlier provision
prescribing for levy of penalty for default outlined in sub-section (1) of
section 140A(3) had yielded place to mandatory charging of interest for such
default. The aforesaid legislative intent also got strength by the fact that
simultaneously the legislature prescribed for mandatory charging of interest
u/s. 234B of the Act for default in payment of self-assessment tax with effect
from 01-04-1989 onwards.

 

However, a contrary position was
taken by the revenue to the effect that for having defaulted in payment of
self-assessment tax within the stipulated period, assessee qualified to be an
“assessee-in-default” as prescribed in the amended section 140A(3).
Section 221(1) of the Act prescribed for penalty when assessee was in default
in making the payment of tax. Once section 140A(3) had been amended with effect
from 01-04-1989, there was no amendment of section 221 and it continued to
remain the same. Furthermore, the intention of the legislature at the time of
insertion of the amended section 140A(3) made it clear that the old provisions
of section 140A(3) prescribing for levy of penalty for non-payment of
self-assessment tax was no longer found necessary because the said default
would henceforth invite mandatory charging of interest. Ostensibly, the
legislature did not envisage that consequent to the amendment, the default in
payment of self-assessment tax would hitherto be covered by the scope of
section 221(1).

 

The consequence of the aforesaid
two expressions contained in section 140A(3) were also not of the type sought
to be understood by the revenue, and rather the assessee was to be treated as
an “assessee-in-default” for the limited purpose of enabling the AO
to make recovery of the amount of tax and interest due and not for levy of
penalty, an aspect which had been specifically done away in the new provision.
Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the fact that the amended section
140A(3) with effect from 01-04-1989 did not envisage any penalty for
non-payment of self-assessment tax, the AO was not justified in levying the
penalty by making recourse to section 221(1) of the Act. It may again be
emphasised that section 221 remained unchanged, both during the pre and post
amended section 140A(3) of the Act and even in the pre-amended situation,
penalty u/s. 221 of the Act was not attracted for default in payment of
self-assessment tax, which was expressly covered in pre 01-04-1989 prevailing
section 140A(3). In the result, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the
penalty.

Section 54F – AO having accepted the returned income despite the fact that the assessee neither admitted capital gains on sale of property nor claimed exemption under any of the provisions and the CIT having given direction to the AO in his revisional order to verify the facts and to redo the assessment as per law, the claim for exemption u/s. 54F could not be denied in the fresh assessment

9.  [2018] 195 TTJ 630 (Hyd
– Trib.)

Manohar Reddy Basani vs. ITO

ITA No.: 1307/Hyd/2017

A. Y.: 2010-11.                                   

Dated: 30th May, 2018.

           

Section 54F – AO having accepted the returned
income despite the fact that the assessee neither admitted capital gains on
sale of property nor claimed exemption under any of the provisions and the CIT
having given direction to the AO in his revisional order to verify the facts
and to redo the assessment as per law, the claim for exemption u/s. 54F could
not be denied in the fresh assessment 

 

FACTS

The assessee filed its return
declaring certain taxable income. In course of scrutiny assessment, the AO
noticed that the assessee made transaction of sale of property. The assessee
had neither admitted capital gains on sale of property nor claimed exemption
under any of the provisions of the Act. In response to show-cause notice, the
assessee furnished the information called for and stated that he was entitled
to exemption u/s. 54F on the capital gains since his share of sale
consideration of the property was utilised for construction of a residential
property. Having considered the stand of the assessee, AO accepted the returned
income.

 

The Commissioner, however, opined
that in the absence of disclosure of capital gains in the return of income, the
assessee was not entitled to get any deduction u/s. 54F for investment in new
residential house. He thus passed a revisional order setting aside the
assessment.

 

Consequent to the directions of the
Revisional Authority, the AO passed an order u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 263 holding
that the assessee neither declared the transaction of sale of property nor made
any claim of deduction u/s. 54F of the Act in the return of income and, in the
absence of any claim the assessee was not entitled to get any deduction u/s.
54F of the Act.

 

HELD

The Tribunal held that even if it
was assumed that the assesse could not make any new claim at later stage but
the fact remained that the assessee had not even disclosed capital gains and in
the absence of offering the capital gains to tax, the AO should have strictly
confined to the return filed and would not have made any addition and if once
he took the issue of capital gains for the first time, the claim of the
assessee regarding deduction u/s. 54F of the Act should also be considered and
in fact, the AO had fairly considered the same in the original assessment and
completed the assessment without making any addition. Presumably, because of
this the Revisional Authority did not give much stress to this aspect but
limited his direction by stating that the AO should reconsider the matter in
accordance with law. Thus, there was a categorical direction of the
Commissioner, to verify the facts and to redo the assessment as per law, and in
such an event it was a duty of the AO to consider the issue afresh. As the
assessee neither disclosed the capital gains in the return of income nor
claimed any deduction u/s. 54F, the assessee was not entitled to get any
deduction u/s. 54F, in the same way the AO should not have added the capital
gains to the income of the assessee since there was no disclosure of the same
in the return of income.

 

The first appellate authority ought
to have considered the issue on merits since the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd., would not debar the first appellate
authority to consider the fresh claim, if any, so as to arrive at the correct
taxable income. The High Court, in the case of CIT vs. Indian Express
(Madurai) (P.) Ltd. [1983] 13 Taxman 441/140 ITR 705
, observed that unlike
a law suit in civil appeals, in tax litigation, it could not be treated as a
“lis”
between two rival parties but the job of the AO was to arrive at the correct
taxable income.

 

Therefore, merely on account of
fact that the assessee had not claimed exemption in return of income, the same
could not have been denied. In the result, the Tribunal directed AO to allow
the claim of deduction u/s. 54F of the Act.

Section 23 – Annual value of property of the assessee which property had remained let out for 36 months and thereafter could not be let out and had remained vacant during whole of the year under consideration, but had never remained under self-occupation of the assessee, has to be rightly computed at `nil’ by taking recourse to section 23(1)(c) of the Act

8.  [2018] 97 taxmann.com
534 (Mumbai-Trib.)

Sonu Realtors (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT

ITA No.: 2892/Mum/2016 & 66(MUM) OF 2017

A. Y.: 2011-12 and 2012-13.

Dated: 19th September, 2018.

 

Section 23 – Annual value of property of the
assessee which property had remained let out for 36 months and thereafter could
not be let out and had remained vacant during whole of the year under
consideration, but had never remained under self-occupation of the assessee,
has to be rightly computed at `nil’ by taking recourse to section 23(1)(c) of
the Act 

 

FACTS

The assessee, engaged in the
business of construction, filed its return of income for assessment year
2011-12, declaring therein a total income of Rs. Nil. In the course of
assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noted that immovable properties
were reflected in the balance sheet of the assessee but the deemed rental
income had not been offered for taxation. He called upon the assessee to show
cause why deemed rent of the properties owned by the assessee should not be
charged to tax under the head `Income from House Property’. The assessee, in
response to the show cause, submitted that the two flats owned by it were let
out to Sterling Construction P. Ltd. for a period of 36 months vide agreement
dated April 2007. Upon expiry of the license period, the licensee vacated the
flats. During the period when the properties were let out on leave and license,
the rental income was offered for taxation under the head `Income from House
Property’. Since during the entire year the property was vacant, the assessee
had considered the annual value to be nil. The assessee contended that its case
is covered by section 23(1)(c) of the Act. The AO, however, held that since the
properties under consideration were not let out at all during the previous
year, the provisions of section 23(1)(c) would not be applicable to its case.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the order passed by the AO. Aggrieved, the
assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the
assessee had vide agreement dated April, 2007 let out the Unit No. 401 &
425 of project Balaji Bhavan to Sterling Construction Pvt. Ltd. for a period of
36 months, and had offered the rental income received therefrom as its
“Income from house property” in the preceding years, but after the
expiry of the license period of 36 months the licensee had vacated the property
and conveyed its intention of not getting the license agreement renewed any
further. It observed that it is not the case of the department that after the
property was vacated, the same thereafter had remained under the self
occupation of the assessee.

 

In light of the aforesaid factual
position the Tribunal found itself to be in agreement with the submissions of
the Ld. A.R. that the issue raised before it is squarely covered by the orders
of the coordinate benches of the Tribunal in the case of (i) Vikas Keshav
Garud vs. ITO [(2016) 71 taxmann.com 214 (Mum.); (ii). ACIT vs. Dr. Prabha
Sanghi [(2012) 27 taxmann.com 317 (Delhi)]; (iii). Premsudha Exports (P) Ltd.
vs. ACIT [(2008) 110 ITD 158 (Mum.); and (iv) Informed Technologies India Ltd.
vs. DCIT [(2016) 75 taxmann.com 128 (Mum.)]
.

 

The Tribunal, observed that the
co-ordinate Bench in the case of Informed Technologies India Ltd. (supra)
had while analysing the scope and gamut of section 23(1)(c) of the ‘Act’,
concluded that in light of the words ‘Property is let’ used in clause (c) of
section 23(1) of the ‘Act’, unlike the term ‘house is actually let’ as stands
gathered from a conjoint reading of sub-section (2) to (4) of section 23, it
can safely and rather inescapably be gathered that the conscious, purposive and
intentional usage of the aforesaid term ‘Property is let’ in section 23(1)(c)
of the ‘Act’, cannot be substituted by the term ‘house is actually let’ as used
by the legislature in all its wisdom in sub-section (3) of section 23.

 

The Tribunal held that it can
safely be concluded that the requirement that the ‘house is actually let’
during the year is not to be taken as a prerequisite for bringing the case of
an assessee within the sweep of section 23(1)(c) of the ‘Act’, as long as the
property is let in the earlier period and is found vacant for the whole year
under consideration, subject to the condition that such vacancy of the property
is not for self occupation of the same by the assessee who continues to hold
the same for the purpose of letting out.

 

Though the
term ‘Property is let’ used in section 23(1)(c) is solely with the intent to
avoid misuse of determination of the ‘annual value’ of self occupied properties
by the assesses by taking recourse to section 23(1)(c), however, the same
cannot be stretched beyond that and the ‘annual value’ of a property which is
let, but thereafter remains vacant for the whole year under consideration,
though subject to the condition that the same is not put under self occupation
of the assessee and is held for the purpose of letting out of the same, would
continue to be determined u/s. 23(1)(c) of the ‘Act’. The Tribunal held that
the assessee had rightly determined the ‘annual value’ of the property at Nil
by taking recourse to section 23(1)(c) of the ‘Act’.

 

It observed that the CIT(A) had
misconceived the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the
case of Vivek Jain vs. Asstt. CIT [2011] 14 taxmann.com 146/202 Taxman
499/337 ITR 74
.  It observed that in
the said judgment the Hon’ble High Court in the concluding Para 14 & 15 had
observed that though the benefit of computing the ‘ALV u/s. 23(1)(c) could not
be extended to a case where the property was not let out at all, however the
same would duly encompass and take within its sweep cases where the property
had remained let out for two or more years, but had remained vacant for the
whole of the previous year.

 

The Tribunal was of the view that now
when in the case of the present case no infirmity emerges from the computation
of the ‘annual value’ of the said property u/s. 23(1)(c) of the ‘Act’ by the
assessee. The Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal filed by the assessee.

Section 271AAA – Penalty proceeding u/s. 271AAA can be initiated only if the person has been subjected to search u/s.132(1) If penalty proceedings u/s. 271AAA are initiated against a person who is not subjected to search action u/s. 132(1) of the Act, the provision itself becomes unworkable as no declaration u/s. 132(4) of the Act is possible from any person other than the person against whom search and seizure action u/s. 132(1) is carried out.

7.  [2018] 97 taxmann.com 460 (Mumbai-Trib.)

DCIT
vs. Velji Rupshi Faria

ITA
No.: 1849/Mum/2017

A. Y.:
2008-09
Dated: 31st August, 2018

 

Section 271AAA – Penalty proceeding u/s. 271AAA can be initiated
only if the person has been subjected to search u/s.132(1)

 

If penalty proceedings u/s. 271AAA are initiated against a person
who is not subjected to search action u/s. 132(1) of the Act, the provision
itself becomes unworkable as no declaration u/s. 132(4) of the Act is possible
from any person other than the person against whom search and seizure action
u/s. 132(1) is carried out.

 

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, was a
key person of certain firms and companies which were subjected to search and
seizure operation. The Assessing Officer (AO) initiated proceedings u/s. 153C
of the Act. In the course of proceedings for assessment u/s. 153C of the Act,
the AO referring to incriminating material found in the course of search and
seizure operation made a number of additions as a result of which total income
was assessed at Rs. 7,40,04,778. He also initiated proceedings for imposition
of penalty u/s. 271AAA of the Act. The AO, rejecting the explanation filed by
the assessee, levied penalty of Rs. 74,00,477 u/s. 271AAA of the Act.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the CIT(A) who having found that no search and seizure action was
carried out in the case of the assessee, followed the decision of the Ahmedabad
Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Dy. CIT vs. K. G. Developers, ITA No.
1139/Ahd./2012
, dated 13th September, 2013, and deleted the
penalty imposed.


Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

At the outset, the Tribunal noted
that the Department is not disputing that the penalty has been levied u/s.
271AAA of the Act. The Tribunal held that the primary condition for initiating
penalty proceeding is, a person concerned must have been subjected to a search
and seizure operation u/s. 132(1) of the Act. Undisputedly, in the facts of the
present case, no search and seizure operation u/s.132(1) of the Act was carried
out in case of the assessee. This fact is clearly evident from the initiation
and completion of proceedings u/s. 153C of the Act.

 

Thus, the primary condition of section 271AAA of the Act remains
unsatisfied. Even otherwise also, if penalty proceedings u/s. 271AAA of the Act
is initiated against a person who is not subjected to search action u/s. 132(1)
of the Act, the provision itself becomes unworkable as no declaration u/s.
132(4) of the Act is possible from any person other than the person against
whom the search and seizure u/s. 132(1) is carried out.

Thus, in such circumstances, sub-section (2) to section 271AAA of the Act
cannot be given effect to. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that initiation
of penalty proceedings u/s. 271AAA of the Act in the instant case is invalid.
The Tribunal observed that its decision gets support from the decision relied
upon by the Authorised Representative.

 

The Tribunal upheld the order
passed by the CIT(A). The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

 

Section 263: Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue – Scope of power – Subsequent amendement. [ Section 6(a)]

6.  CIT-26 vs. Mihir Doshi [ Income tax Appeal no
196 of 2016, Dated: 23rd August, 2018 (Bombay High Court)]. 

 

[Mihir Doshi vs. DCIT; dated
30/08/2013 ; ITA. No 4403/Mum/2010, Mum. 
ITAT Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Section 263: Commissioner – Revision of orders prejudicial to
revenue – Scope of power – Subsequent amendement. [ Section 6(a)]

 

The assessee has been serving in
‘Morgan Stanley International (Inc)’ of the USA. He was on deputation to India.
He filed return of income for Assessment Year 2003- 2004 on 19th
October, 2004, claiming the status of a ‘Resident’, but ‘not ordinarily
resident’ within the meaning of section 6 sub-section 6 clause (a) of the I.T
Act. He offered the salary earned in India to the extent of Rs.3,23,23,506/- to
tax. He offered further income under the head ‘Short Term Capital Gain’ and
‘Bank Interest’ on his own, which the A.O brought to tax by his Assessment
Order of 24th January, 2006. The said proceedings resulted from the
refund sought by this assessee and the A.O modified his order by invoking
section 154 of the Act. Admittedly the A.O was possessed of this power and he
modified or corrected his order to the extent of the amount of income which
could be brought to tax.

 

The Commissioner was of the view
that the A.O did not examine the legal status of the assessee in the course of
the assessment proceedings and, hence, initiated action u/s. 263 of the Act.
That is on the footing, namely, the unamended section 6 sub-section 6 clause
(a) of the Act. It is said that the A.O gave effect
to the order of the Commissioner, but when the assessee asked for rectification
of that order to exclude double addition, the A.O surprisingly passed another
order dated 24th February, 2009 deleting the entire amount. It is in
these circumstances that the records were again summoned by the Commissioner of
Income Tax and he returned the finding that the order of the A.O is erroneous
in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. Not only the salary,
but his perquisites also should be brought to tax was the view of the
Commissioner.

 

The aggrieved assessee approached
the Tribunal and the Tribunal considered both issues in the backdrop of the
peculiar facts and came to the conclusion that there could not be prejudice
caused to the Revenue as the A.O not only brought to tax the Indian component,
but the global component of the salary. That was a mistake and he, therefore,
made this correction so as to pass an Assessment Order in tune with the law. It
does not mean that the Commissioner was authorised by the same legal provision,
namely, section 263 of the Act to raise the issue of taxability. Firstly, all
proceeds of the entire tax deducted at source and secondly, that part of the
refund which was granted to the assessee on the basis that the sum refunded,
does not belong to the assessee, but to his employer. The main issue was
whether there was indeed any mistake in the Assessment Order and whether that
justified exercise of powers by the A.O conferred vide section 154 of the Act.
The Tribunal considered the factual and legal position and a judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradip J. Mehta vs. Commissioner of
Income Tax (300 ITR 231)
and arrived at the conclusion that the amendment
to section 6 sub-section 6 clause(a) has been brought into effect from 1st
April, 2004. That was not applicable to the Assessment Year under
consideration. The existing law was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the aforesaid judgment and the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment would bind the
A.O. That part of the income earned outside India would have to be excluded and
the assessee would have to be taxed to the extent of the income earned in
India. That has admittedly been done.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of the ITAT, the Revenue filed the
Appeal before High Court. The Court find that, in such circumstances, there was
no prejudice caused and this was not a fit case, therefore, to exercise the
powers u/s. 263 of the Act. Such a conclusion is imminently possible in the
peculiar facts of this case. The assessee’s status, the nature of his income
and the legal provision then prevailing having been correctly applied, the
order under Appeal does not suffer from perversity or any error of law apparent
on the face of the record. Accordingly, 
dept appeal was dismissed.

Section 153A: Assessment – Search or requisition-No addition can be made in respect of an unabated assessment which has become final if no incriminating material is found during the search. [Section 132, 143(3)]

5.  The Pr. CIT-4 vs. Jignesh P. Shah [Income tax
Appeal no 555 of 2016, Dated: 26th September, 2018 (Bombay High
Court)]. 

 

[Jignesh P. Shah vs. DCIT;
dated 13/02/2015 ; ITA. No 1553 & 3173/Mum/2010, Mum.  ITAT ]

 

Section 153A: Assessment – Search or requisition-No addition can
be made in respect of an unabated assessment which has become final if no
incriminating material is found during the search. [Section 132, 143(3)]

 

The assessee is an individual being
the member of Financial Technologies India Ltd., was covered under search and
seizure action. In pursuance of search action u/s. 132(1), notices u/s. 153A
was issued to the assessee on 25.10.2007 for the six assessment years
immediately preceding the assessment year of the year of the search, which
included the aforesaid assessment years. In response to the said notices the
assessee filed his return of income on 26.11.2007 on the same income which was
declared in the original return of income filed u/s. 139. In the assessment
order passed u/s. 153A, r.w.s 143(3), the addition on account of deemed
dividend of Rs.1,69,68,750/- for the A.Y. 2002-03 and Rs.4,65,76,000/- for the
A.Y. 2004-05 was made, vide separate order dated 31.03.2009.

 

The Ld. AO noted the facts about
receiving the payments by the assessee from Lotus investment, which was a
division of La-fin Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. in which the assessee held 50%
of share, from the balance sheets and records already filed along with the
return of income. However, an Assessment Order was made and this time, an
addition, on account of deemed dividend of Rs.1,69,68,750/for AY: 2002-03 and
Rs.4,65,76,000/- for AY:  2004-05, was
made. This came to be confirmed by the CIT (A).

 

The assessee submitted that during
the course of search and seizure action, no incriminating document, material or
unaccounted assets were found from the assessee. The A.O, without there being
any incriminating material found in the course of search relating to the deemed
dividend has made the addition on the basis of information already available in
the return of income. This is also evident from the copy of panchnama and
statement on oath of the assessee recorded at the time of search. The Ld. AO
has noted the facts about receiving of the payments by the assessee from Lotus
investment, which was a division of La-fin Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. in
which the assessee held 50% of share, from the balance sheets and records
already filed along with the return of income. Since the assessment for the
A.Ys. 2002-03 & 2004-05 had attained finality before the date of search and
does not get abated in view of second proviso to section 153A, therefore,
without there being any incriminating material found at the time of search, no
addition over and above the income which already stood assessed can be made.
This proposition he said, is squarely covered by the decision of All Cargo
Global Logistics Ltd. vs. DCIT reported in (2012) 137 ITD 287 (SB) (Mum).

 

Even the Hon’ble jurisdictional
(Bombay) High Court in the case of CIT vs. Murli Agro Products Ltd. ITA No.
36 of 2009 order dated 29.10.2010
, has clearly held that, once the
assessment has attained finality before the date of search and no material is found
in the course of proceedings u/s. 132(1), then no addition can be made in the
proceedings u/s. 153A. This proposition has been reiterated by Hon’ble
Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jai Steel (India) vs. ACIT reported in
(2013) 259 CTR (Raj) 281
. Thus, the addition of deemed dividend made by the
assessing officer is beyond the scope of assessment u/s 153A for the impugned
assessment years.

 

The Tribunal held that the
principle which was enunciated by the judgment of this Court rendered in the
case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/S Murli Agro Products Ltd. (Income
Tax Appeal No.36 of 2009 decided on 29th October 2010)
was
applied. That judgment held that, once the assessment has attained finality
before the date of search and no material is found in the course of proceedings
u/s. 132(1), then, no addition can be made in the proceedings u/s. 153A. After
setting out this principle in great details, the Tribunal rendered their
opinion that factually there was no incriminating material found during the
course of search relating to the addition made on account of deemed dividend.
The very fact that section 132 was resorted requiring the Assessing Officer to
record the necessary satisfaction, was lacking in this case. The assessment,
which had gained finality, in the absence of any material termed as
incriminating having thus been subjected to assessment/reassessment, the Tribunal
held in favour of the assessee.

 

Being aggrieved with the order of
the ITAT, the Revenue filed the Appeal before High Court. The Court upheld  the order of the Tribunal. Accordingly,
dismissed the departments appeal .

Sections 133A, 119(2)(a), 234A, 234B and 234C – Waiver of interest u/s. 234A, 234B and 234C – Delay in furnishing return and in paying advance tax – Discretion of Chief Commissioner to waive interest – Return submitted voluntarily – Assessee genuinely believing that he had no taxable income – Interest to be waived

20. R. Mani vs. CCIT; 406 ITR
450 (Mad):

Date of order: 4th
December, 2017

A. Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99


Sections 133A, 119(2)(a), 234A, 234B and 234C – Waiver of interest u/s. 234A,
234B and 234C – Delay in furnishing return and in paying advance tax –
Discretion of Chief Commissioner to waive interest – Return submitted
voluntarily – Assessee genuinely believing that he had no taxable income –
Interest to be waived

 

The assessee’s income was mainly
from property, sago commission income and income from a trust. For the A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99, the assessee filed his returns of income on
20/12/2000 which was processed and the assessee was assessed to tax and
interest was levied u/s. 234A, 234B and 234C of the Act. The assessee
approached the Chief Commissioner u/s. 119(2)(a) of the Act for waiver of
interest u/ss. 234A, 234B and 234C so levied. The Chief Commissioner rejected
the application on the ground that the assessee failed to voluntarily file his
returns and that the returns were filed consequent upon a survey conducted on
23/01/1999 u/s. 133A and issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act.

 

The Madras High Court allowed the
writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

“i)    An
income tax survey does not amount to detection of undisclosed income.

iii)    The Circular issued by the CBDT empowering the Chief Commissioner
to consider petitions for waiver of interest u/s. 234A as well as section 234B
would show that even in cases covered by section 234B, even though these
provisions are compensatory in nature, special orders for grant of relaxation
could be passed.

iv)   A
survey was conducted in the premises of the assessee on 22/01/1999. However,
the survey did not lead to any immediate issuance of notice u/s. 148. In the
interregnum, the assessee filed his return of income. Thereafter the Assessing
Officer had taken up the matter and completed the assessment u/s. 143 of the
Act and passed an order dated 30/03/2001 accepting the return filed by the
assessee with no further additions.

v)    The
assessee’s case was that he had no taxable income. This plea has not been
controverted by the Revenue and this was evident from the conduct of the
assessee in not filing returns for the earlier three years, i.e., A. Ys.
1994-95 to 1996-97. That apart, the assessee had been able to establish that
the property still remained undivided and no definite share in the property had
been allotted to any coparcener and the suit for partition was pending.

vi)   Apart
from that, the returns filed by the assessee had been accepted and assessment
had been completed with no further additions. The dispute with regard to the
division of property was a bonafide dispute which directly related to the
assessability of the assessee to tax. Therefore, if assessee were entitled to
waiver of interest u/s. 234A the question of payment of advance tax or a
portion thereof would not arise and therefore, the assessee was entitled to
waiver of interest u/s. 234B and 234C of the Act.

vii)   Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed, the impugned order is
set aside and it is held that the petitioner is entitled for waiver of interest
u/s. 234A, 234B and 234C of the Act.”

Sections 194L, 194J and 260A – TDS – Acquisition of capital asset – Compensation payment (Encroached land) – Section 194L – Where land belonging to State was encroached upon, and such encroachment was removed by assessee, and encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated, there was no question of land being acquired by assessee and, therefore, provisions of section 194L would not be applicable

19. CIT(TDS) vs. Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority; [2018] 97 taxmann.com 461 (Bom):

Date of the order: 6th
September, 2018

A. Ys. 2008-09 and 2009-10

 

Sections 194L, 194J and 260A – TDS – Acquisition of capital asset
– Compensation payment (Encroached land) – Section 194L – Where land belonging
to State was encroached upon, and such encroachment was removed by assessee,
and encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated, there was no
question of land being acquired by assessee and, therefore, provisions of
section 194L would not be applicable

 

TDS – Fees for professional or technical services (Maintenance
services) – Section 194J – Where assessee made payments in respect of
maintenance contracts which related to minor repairs, replacement of some spare
parts, greasing of machinery etc., since, these services did not required any
technical expertise, same could not be categorised as ‘technical services’ as
contemplated u/s. 194J

 

For the purpose of implementing
scheme of Government relating to road widening near railway track, assessee
evacuated illegal/unauthorised persons who were squatters/hutment dwellers –
Since, possession of these persons was unauthorised and illegal and they were
not owners of land on which they had squatted/built their illegal hutments the
Assessing Officer was of the firm opinion that there had been acquisition of
immovable property, for which the affected persons were compensated as per the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Since, the assessee had not deducted Tax at Source
as per the provisions of section 194L/194LA of the Act, the Assessing Officer
treated the assessee as an assessee in default and computed the payment of tax
u/s. 201(1) and that for interest u/s. 201(1A). Additionally, for A. Ys.
2008-09 and 2009-10 the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had made
payment towards Annual Maintenance Contracts (AMCs) for Air Conditioners and
Lifts on which TDS was deducted u/s. 194C when, according to the Assessing
Officer, the same ought to have been deducted u/s. 194J. Since, the assessee
had deducted TDS u/s. 194C, the Assessing Officer proceeded by levying the
liability u/s. 201(1) and also held the assessee liable to pay interest u/s.
201(1A). In relation to section 194L/194LA,
the Commissioner (Appeals) accepted that there was no payment of compensation
for acquisition of any land or immovable property, and therefore, the said
sections had no application to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, he
deleted the demand raised by the Assessing Officer u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A).
Similarly, the Commissioner (Appeals) observed that the Annual Maintenance
Contracts were contracts for periodical inspection and routine maintenance work
along with supply of several parts. He was, therefore, of the view that such
services did not constitute technical services, and therefore, section 194J had
no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In these
circumstances, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee had correctly
deducted the TDS u/s. 194C and was not required to deduct TDS as per the
provisions of section 194J thereof. He, therefore, deleted the demand of
tax/interest u/s. 201(1) and section 201(1A). The Tribunal upheld the order of
the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)    Section194LA inter alia deals with payment
of compensation on acquisition of certain immovable property. Section 194LA was
brought into force with effect from 01/10/2004. Section 194L, deals with
payment of compensation on acquisition of a capital asset and was omitted with
effect from 01/06/2016. Basically, what both these provisions provide is that
any person responsible for paying to a resident any sum in the nature of
compensation or enhanced compensation or consideration or enhanced
consideration on account of compulsory acquisition, under any law for the time
being in force of any capital asset, at the time of payment of such sum in cash
or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, is
liable to deduct an amount equal to 10 per cent of such sum as TDS on the
income comprised therein. The provisos to said sections are not really relevant
or germane for our purpose. What can be seen from the aforesaid provisions is
that TDS is to be deducted when compensation is paid on account of compulsory
acquisition under any law for the time being in force. In the facts of the
present case, as correctly recorded by the Tribunal, for the purpose of
implementing the scheme of the Government relating to road widening near the
railway track, the assessee evacuated the illegal/unauthorised persons who were
squatters/hutment dwellers.

ii)    The
fact of the matter was that the possession of these persons was unauthorised
and illegal and they were not the owners of the land on which they had
squatted/built their illegal hutments. In fact, they were trespassers. This
being the case, there was no question of the land being acquired by the
assessee. In fact the Tribunal, came to the conclusion that the land always
belonged to the State; it was encroached upon, which encroachment was removed
by the assessee; and the encroaching squatters/hutment dwellers were rehabilitated.
This being the case, section 194L or section 194LA had absolutely no
application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The revenue has
totally misunderstood the law when it assumes that the squatters/hutment
dwellers are deemed owners of the land on which they squat or encroach upon.
The squatters/hutment dwellers have absolutely no title in the land on which
they squat or build their illegal and unauthorised hutments. This being the
case, there is no question of there being any compulsory acquisition from them
under any law either under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or any other
enactments which permit compulsory acquisition of land. This being the case,
section 194L or section 194LA has absolutely no application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case.

iii)    In this regard the Tribunal correctly held that the assessee had
made payments only in respect of maintenance contracts which relate to minor
repairs, replacement of some spare parts, greasing of machinery etc. These
services do not require any technical expertise, and therefore, could not be
categorized as ‘technical services’ as contemplated u/s. 194J. Section 194J,
deals with fees for professional or technical services. In contrast, section
194C deals with payments to contractors. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the assessee had correctly deducted TDS under the provisions of
section 194C and not as per the provisions of section 194J thereof. This being
the case, even the additional question of law (for the A. Ys. 2008-09 and
2009-10 does not give rise to any substantial question of law which would
require to admit the present appeals.

iv)   They
are all, accordingly, dismissed.”

Sections 226(3), 276B and 276BB – Recovery of tax – Garnishee proceedings – Assessee holding lease for settlement of sand ghats – Surrender of lease accepted by Government – Attachment of bank account of assessee thereafter for failure by Mining Office to collect tax from other settlees – No determination that settlement amount to Mines Department due against assessee – Liability was that of Mines Department – Attachment of assessee’s bank account not sustainable and revoked

18. Sainik Food Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Principal CCIT; 406 ITR 596 (Patna);

Date of order: 8th
February, 2018

 

Sections 226(3), 276B and 276BB – Recovery of tax – Garnishee
proceedings – Assessee holding lease for settlement of sand ghats – Surrender
of lease accepted by Government – Attachment of bank account of assessee
thereafter for failure by Mining Office to collect tax from other settlees – No
determination that settlement amount to Mines Department due against assessee –
Liability was that of Mines Department – Attachment of assessee’s bank account
not sustainable and revoked

 

The assessee was the highest bidder
of the tender for settlement of sand ghats located in different districts in
the State of Bihar for the period of 2015-19. According to the notice inviting
tender the assessee was required to pay settlement amount in three instalments
with simultaneous payment of the required amount of tax to the Sales Tax
Department of the State, Income Tax Department and other statutory charges. The
assessee deposited the entire settlement amount with the Department of Mines
and Geology for the years 2015 and 2016. The assessee was required to deposit
the third and the last instalment of settlement amount in the month of
September, 2017.

 

In the mean while, the assessee
received a notice of demand dated 26/07/2017, issued by the ITO in purported
exercise of power u/s. 226(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 calling upon the
assessee to deposit the tax liability of the District Mining Office, Bhagalpur.
The assessee requested for grant of time so that the third instalment was paid
to the Department instead of to the District Mining Officer with settlement of
sand ghat. On 19/12/2017 the amount was deducted from the bank account of the
assessee by the Department which treated it to be an assesee u/s. 226(3)(x) and
dues payable by the District Mining Officer, Bhagalpur on account of default in
deducting tax collected at source from various brick kiln owners. The assessee
surrendered the lease on 14/10/2017 and was accepted by the State Government on
20/10/2017. The ITO (TDS) passed the order of recovery u/s. 226(3)(x) on
23/10/2017.

 

The assessee filed a writ petition
contending that the assessee was not a debtor of the Mines and Geology
Department after surrender of lease and its acceptance, that the action of the
Department in releasing the bank account of the Mining Department and
thereafter attaching the bank account of the assessee and recovery of tax
liability of the Mining Department from the bank account of the assessee was
not justified, and that not taking action against the Mining Department u/s.
276B and 276BB and attaching and recovering from the bank account of the
assessee was arbitrary exercise of power. The Patna High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

 

“i)    The
Department had not carried out any factual enquiry to examine whether or not
there was any liability to be paid by the assessee in connection with the
settlement of sand ghat. In the absence of factual enquiry, proceeding against
the assessee and treating it as debtor was not justified. The action of the
Department in treating the assesse as debtor and attaching its bank account and
recovering the tax liability of the Mines and the Geology Department from the
bank account of the assessee, without noticing the surrender of lease and its
acceptance by the State Government, was not proper.

ii)    For
the lapse of the Mines Department the assessee could not be fastened with any
liability if no tax was due to be payable by the assessee against any head to
the Mines Department. In the absence of exclusive determination that the
settlement amount to the Mines Department was only due against the assessee, it
could not have been declared exclusive debtor. The counter-affidavit filed by
the Mines Department acknowledged the lapse of its officers. There was no
statement that the settlement or tax liability was exclusively due against the assessee
and not other settlees which was noticed from the fact that the assessee kept
on requesting the authorities in the matter of payment of tax u/s. 226(3)(x).

iii)    The provisions of section 226(3)(x) did not confer such arbitrary
power to the Department to recover the amount from an innocent assessee after
surrender of settlement. The tax was the liability of the Mines and Geology
Department and instead of taking coercive action and adopting the means
available under the provisions of sections 276B and 276BB for recovery of the
liability from the Mines Department, attaching the bank account and directing
the tax due to be recovered from the account of the assessee was unreasonable
and unjustified. The attachment of the bank account was revoked.”

Sections 147, 148 and 151(2) – Reassessment – Notice u/s. 148 – Sanction for issuance of notice – Designated authority Additional Commissioner – Sanction by Commissioner – Notice not valid – Order of reassessment without jurisdiction and invalid

17. CIT vs. Aquatic Remedies
P. Ltd.; 406 ITR 545 (Bom):

Date of order: 25th
July, 2018

A. Y. 2004-05

 

Sections 147, 148 and 151(2) – Reassessment – Notice u/s. 148 –
Sanction for issuance of notice – Designated authority Additional Commissioner
– Sanction by Commissioner – Notice not valid – Order of reassessment without
jurisdiction and invalid

 

The assessee was in the business of
trading in pharmaceutical product. The Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s.
148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to reopen the assessment for the A. Y. 2004-05.
The assessee contended that the issuance of the notice for reopening of the
assessment was without jurisdiction since the sanction for issuing the notice
had to be obtained from the Additional Commissioner according to section 151(2)
but the sanction had been obtained from the Commissioner which was in breach of
the sanction and therefore without jurisdiction. The Assessing Officer rejected
the claim and passed the assessment order u/s. 147.

 

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and
quashed the reassessment order passed by the Assessing Officer.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)    U/s.
151(2) sanction to issue notice u/s. 148 has to be issued by the Additional
Commissioner. The Assessing Officer had not sought the approval of the
designated officer but the Commissioner which was evident from the form used to
obtain the sanction and the Additional Commissioner had not granted permission
to initiate reassessment proceedings against the assessee.

ii)    The
view of the Additional Commissioner was subject to the approval of his superior
– the Commissioner. Thus, there was no final sanction granted by the Additional
Commissioner for issuing the notice u/s. 148 to reopen assessment. Further, it
was the Commissioner who had directed the issuance of the notice u/s. 148 to
the Assessing Officer.

 

iii)    The order of the Tribunal in quashing the order u/s. 143(3)
r.w.s. 147 was correct. No question of law arose.”

Chapter X and Section 260A – International transactions – Determination of arm’s length price – Appeal to High Court – Power of High Court to interfere with such determination – Interference only if finding of Appellate Tribunal is perverse – Selection of comparables, short-listing them, applying of filters, fact finding exercises and final orders passed by the Tribunal binding on Department and High Court

16. Principal CIT vs.
Softbrands India P. Ltd.; 406 ITR 513 (Karn):

Date of order: 25th
June, 2018

A. Y. 2006-07

 

Chapter X and Section 260A – International transactions –
Determination of arm’s length price – Appeal to High Court – Power of High
Court to interfere with such determination – Interference only if finding of
Appellate Tribunal is perverse – Selection of comparables, short-listing them,
applying of filters, fact finding exercises and final orders passed by the
Tribunal binding on Department and High Court

 

In the appeal filed by the Revenue
before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal the following questions
were raised:

 

“i)    Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal is right in law
in rejecting the comparables, namely, Kals Information Systems Ltd., Tata Elxsi
Ltd., M/s. Accel Information Systems Ltd., M/s. Bodhtree Consulting by
following its earlier order and without appreciating that the reasonings of the
Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO)/Assessing Officer (AO) for adopting the said
comparables which have been brought out in the TPO’s order and without
appreciating that TPO has chosen the same after application of mind and
materials on record?

ii)    Whether
the Tribunal was justified in fixing the related party transaction (RPT) at 15
percent of total revenue and deleting Geomatric Software Ltd. (Seg) and
Megasoft Ltd. as comparables without going into specific facts in the case of
taxpayer and without adducing the basis for arriving at 15 percent cut off RPT
filter, in the case of taxpayer?”

 

The Karnataka High Court dismissed
the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

 

“i)    Income-tax
Act, 1961 contains special provisions relating to avoidance of tax in Chapter X
of the Act comprising sections 92 to 94B with regard to assessment to be done
for computation of income from international transactions on the principle of
“arm’s length price” and the relevant Rules for computation of such income
under the provisions of Chapter X are enacted in the form of rules 10A to 10E
in the Income-tax Rules 1962. The procedure for assessment under Chapter X
relating to international transactions is a lengthy one and involves multiple
authorities of the Department. A huge, cumbersome and tenacious exercise of
transfer pricing analysis has to be undertaken by corporate entities who have
to comply with the various provisions of the Act and Rules with huge data bank
and in the first instance they have to satisfy that the profits or the income
from transactions declared by them are at “arm’s length” which analysis is
invariably put to test and inquiry by the authorities of the Department through
the process of Transfer Pricing Officer and Dispute Resolution Penal and the
Tribunal at various stages, the assessee has a cumbersome task of compliance
and it has to satisfy the authorities that what has been declared by it is a
true and fair disclosure.

ii)    The
pick of comparables, short-listing of them, applying of filters, etc., are all
fact finding exercises and therefore the final orders passed by the Tribunal
are binding on the lower authorities of the Department as well as the High
Court.

iii)    The scheme of both section 260A in the Income-tax Act, 1961 and
section 100 read with section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are in
pari materia and in the same terms. The existence of a substantial question of
law is a sine qua non for maintaining an appeal before the High Court. The High
Court may determine any issue which (a) has not been determined by the Tribunal
or (b) has been wrongly determined by the Tribunal, only if the High Court
comes to the conclusion that “by reason of the decision on substantial question
of law rendered by it”, such a determination of an issue of fact also would be
necessary and incidental to the answer given by it to the substantial question
of law arising and formulated by it.

iv)   Sub-section
(6) of section 260A does not give any extended power, beyond the parameters of
the substantial question of law to the High Court to disturb the findings of
fact given by the Tribunal below. The insertion of sub-section (7) of section
260A does not give any new or extended powers to the High Court and the
pre-existing provisions from sub-section (1) to sub-section (6) in section 260A
of the Act already had all the trappings of section 100 and 103 of the Civil
Procedure Code.

v)    The
Tribunal is expected to act fairly, reasonably and rationally and should
scrupulously avoid perversity in its orders. It should reflect due application
of mind when it assigns reasons for returning particular findings. The very
word “comparable” means that the group of entities should be in a homogeneous
group. They should not be wildly dissimilar or unlike or poles apart.

 

ii)    From the perusal of the Tribunal’s order, it
was apparent that individual cases of such comparables had been considered,
analysed and discussed by the Tribunal and while some comparables were found to
be appropriate and really comparable to the facts of the assessee, some were
not. The Tribunal had given cogent reasons and detailed findings upon
discussing each case of comparable corporate properly. Whether or not the
comparables had been rightly picked up or filters for arriving at the correct
list of comparables had been rightly applied, did not give rise to any
substantial question of law.”

Sections 9 and 195 – Non-resident – Income deemed to accrue or arise in India – TDS – Effect of sections 9 and 195 – Non-resident liable to tax only on incomes attributable to operations in India – Commission paid for procuring abroad – Non-resident not liable to tax on commission – Tax not deductible at source on commission

15. Evolv Clothing Company Pvt.
Ltd. vs. ACIT; 407 ITR 72 (Mad):

Date of order: 14th
June, 2018

A. Y. 2009-10

 

Sections 9 and 195 – Non-resident – Income deemed to accrue or
arise in India – TDS – Effect of sections 9 and 195 – Non-resident liable to
tax only on incomes attributable to operations in India – Commission paid for
procuring abroad – Non-resident not liable to tax on commission – Tax not
deductible at source on commission

 

The assessee carried on business of
export of garments and claimed to have entered into agency agreements with a
non-resident Italian agent for procuring export orders for the assessee at a
commission. In the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee paid a sum of Rs. 3,74,09,773/-
as commission to the foreign agent. According to the assessee, since no amount
of agency commission was chargeable to tax in India, the assessee did not
deduct tax at source before payment of commission to the foreign agent.
According to the assessee, the foreign agent rendered service akin to the
service of a broker to the assessee, procuring orders upon market survey with
regard to demand for the products of the assessee in the foreign country. The
Assessing Officer passed the assessment order disallowing the entire commission
u/s. 40(a)(i), because tax had not been deducted at source. This was upheld by
the Tribunal.

 

On appeal by the assessee, the
Madras High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)    Explanation
1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would attract liability to
Indian tax for a non-resident with business connection in India, only in
respect of income attributable to his operations in India. The amendment with
retrospective effect from June 1, 1976, by insertion of Explanation to section
9(2) can only apply to income by way of interest, royalty and fees for
technical services and not to brokerage or job-wise commission on activities
incidental to procurement of orders.

ii)    Section
195 attracts tax only on chargeable income, if any, paid to non-residents.
Where there is no liability, the question of tax deduction does not arise.
Where no part of income is chargeable in India, even clearance u/s. 195(2) or
(3) of the Act is not necessary. In Toshoku’s case (1980) 125 ITR 525, the
Supreme Court held that payments to agents for performance of services outside
India are not liable to be taxed in India.

iii)    From the service agreements with the agents abroad, it was clear
that the service rendered was essentially brokerage service. The very first
clause of the agreement stated “to procure orders”. The reference to market
research abroad or co-ordination with the supplier or to ensure timely payment
or making available its office space for visit by the suppliers, were
ordinarily things which any agent or broker undertook incidental to brokerage
service. There was no finding that any of the commission agents had any place
of business in India.

iv)   The
Assessing officer had in the assessment order, accepted that the assessee had
paid commission charges to oversees agents. It was not the case of the
Assessing Officer that any lump sum consideration had been paid for any
specific managerial, technical or consultancy services. The commission was not
taxable in India. The assessee was liable to deduct tax on such payment.

v)    The
appeal is allowed and the questions framed are answered in favour of the
assessee and against the revenue”

Section 9 of the Act and Article 5 of DTAA–Income – Deemed to accrue or arise in India (Permanent establishment) – Where there were all relevant documentary evidence available on record to render finding whether assessee, a Netherland based company, had a permanent establishment in India and the Tribunal having referred to same in its order could not have remanded back matter to Assessing Officer for consideration afresh? – The Tribunal having referred to all factual details and crystallised issues could not have remanded back matter to Assessing officer for consideration afresh

14. Co-operative Centrale
Reiffeisen Boerenleenbank B. A. vs. Dy. DIT, (International Taxation);  [2018] 97 taxmann.com 24 (Bom);

Date of order: 29th
August, 2018:

A. Ys. 2002-03, 2003-04 and
2005-06

 

Section 9 of the Act and Article 5 of DTAA–Income – Deemed to
accrue or arise in India (Permanent establishment) – Where there were all
relevant documentary evidence available on record to render finding whether
assessee, a Netherland based company, had a permanent establishment in India
and the Tribunal having referred to same in its order could not have remanded
back matter to Assessing Officer for consideration afresh? – The Tribunal
having referred to all factual details and crystallised issues could not have
remanded back matter to Assessing officer for consideration afresh

 

The assessee was a tax resident of
Netherlands and was entitled to claim the benefit of the DTAA between India and
Netherlands. In fact the assessee was part and parcel of the Rabo bank group.
An Indian company, the Rabo India Finance Private Limited (RIFPL) was
registered as a non-banking financial company with the RBI. It provided wide
range of financial services such as credit facilities, investment banking,
strategic, financial and project advisory services. This company also belonged
to the Rabo group. It was claimed that both, the assessee and the said Indian
Company were independent entities but worked together on select assignments as
and when required. In the relevant years, the assessee claimed to have provided
assistance on principle to principle basis to the Indian company on a few
transactions and received fees and guarantee commission.

 

However, the amounts received under
the aforesaid category were not offered to tax in India on the ground that the
assessee did not have a permanent establishment in India within the meaning of
Article (5) of the DTAA. The Assessing Officer passed an order holding that the
Indian Company RIFPL was a permanent establishment of the assessee within the
meaning of Article 5 (5) of the DTAA. Hence, certain percentage of the sums
referred above were taken as profits attributable to the permanent
establishment. A further percentage from that was taken as profits chargeable
to tax in India. This resulted in the return depicting total income to Rs.
31.25 lakh.

 

On appeal, the
Commissioner(Appeals) came to the conclusion that the assessee neither had a
fixed place of business nor agency or any other form of permanent establishment
in India and consequently the income of the assessee was not taxable in India.
The Tribunal restored the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer to
determine the issue afresh.

 

Thereafter, an application was
filed seeking rectification of order initially passed by the Tribunal. However,
the Tribunal concluded that the issue was rightly remitted to the Assessing
Officer by inter alia observing that the quantum of work done, services
rendered, the contract undertaken for outsiders would have to be examined to
determine whether RIFPL was an agent having independent status or was merely
working on behalf of assessee.

 

On appeal, the Bombay High Court
held as under:

 

“i)    The
First Appellate Authority while deciding the Appeals of the assessee has passed
a fairly detailed order. The facts and the submissions have been noted in his
order. In fact, under separate heads, the details have been noted and
considered. The Appellate Authority concludes that all the agreements placed on
record would indicate that the RIFPL had procured the contract of provision of
services to the two parties.

 

However, with a view to meeting its
obligations, the RIFPL further entered into an agreement with the assessee
requiring the assessee to provide advisory services in Italy for a
consideration paid by the RIFPL. Based on these two contracts, the First
Appellate Authority concluded that it cannot be said that RIFPL is acting as an
agent of the assessee. On the contrary, the agreements point towards the said
Indian company obtaining independent contracts and subcontracting the part of
the work thereunder to the assessee. On each of the counts, namely, guarantee
commission and other services, the First Appellate Authority has held that the
Assessing Officer committed a mistake. The clear conclusion in this order is
that the business profits of the assessee are not taxable in India in absence
of any permanent establishment in India within the meaning of article 5 of the
DTAA.

ii)    These
very materials could have been examined by the Tribunal and it would have
arrived at the satisfaction whether the Assessing Officer was correct or
whether the First Appellate Authority was right in reversing the order of the
Assessing Officer and holding as above in favour of the assessee. One does not
see why, when the Tribunal refers to all the factual matters in its order and
has in earlier paragraphs crystallised the issues, then, what was the occasion
for a remand. In the order under Appeal, the Tribunal notes that the assessee
preferred an Appeal before the First Appellate Authority and argued that the
concept of fixed place, permanent establishment requires the enterprises to
have their business or a place of management/branch in India or office in India
and the assessee had neither.

iii)    The activities of the Indian company did not result in
constitution of any agency or permanent establishment of the assessee and that
the Indian company did not have any authority to conclude the contract on
behalf of the assesee, that it did not maintain any stock of any goods or
merchandise of the assessee nor did it secure any orders from the assessee that
it was economically and legally independent, that it was acting in ordinary
course of its business not dependent on the assessee. During the year under
Appeal, the Indian company had income from various sources amounting to Rs.
1386.70 Million. The assessee received professional income and guarantee
commission. There was also certain reimbursement of expenses by the Indian
company.

iv)   In
the backdrop of all this, and further facts noted, a cryptic order has been
passed by the Tribunal. In fact, in the order under challenge in reference to
the Income Tax Appeal No. 4632 of 2006 for Assessment year 2002-2003, the
Tribunal says that the Indian company had made payment to the assessee for
providing the advisory services to it and under the Head ‘Guarantee Commission’
and that the Indian company was paying the assesee more than 30 per cent of its
income. That the basic issues are, as to whether the assesee had permanent
establishment in India or not and as to whether the services rendered by the
Indian company could be treated as the activities carried out by the assessee.
Yet, it says that there is nothing on record to prove that the provisions of
article 5(1) of the Agreement are applicable. That stipulates that the
permanent establishment for the purpose of convention meant a fixed business
through which the business of the enterprise was wholly or partly carried on.
The conclusion is that the assessee was not having fixed place of business in
India. Hence, the First Appellate Authority rightly held that the provisions of
article 5 (1) were inapplicable. It is in these circumstances, it is surprising
that the Tribunal still deems it fit and proper to remand the case. If there
was indeed no material on record, then, the above conclusion was impossible to
be reached.

v)    Judicial
decisions have to be consistent and all the more there should be no confusion.
There ought to be some predictability and when given facts and circumstances
give rise to certain legal principles which parties assert are applicable,
then, as a last fact finding authority, the Tribunal could have summoned all
records and thereafter should have arrived at a categorical conclusion whether
the First Appellate Authority was right or the Assessing Officer. This having
admittedly not been done, it is opined that the Tribunal failed to act as a
last fact finding authority. It failed to discharge its duty and function
expected of it by the law.

vi)   Thus,
the order of the Tribunal is set aside and revenue’s appeal is restored to the
file of the Tribunal for a decision afresh on merits and in accordance with
law.”

Sections 45 and 54(1) – Capital gain – Exemption u/s. 54 – Construction of residential house within stipulated time – Exemption in respect of cost of new residential house – Scope of section 54 – Does not exclude cost of land from cost of residential house

13. C.
Aryama Sundaram vs. CIT; 407 ITR 1 (Mad) :

Date of order: 6th
August, 2018

A. Y. 2010-11

 

Sections 45 and 54(1) – Capital gain – Exemption u/s. 54   
Construction of residential house within stipulated time – Exemption in
respect of cost of new residential house – Scope of section 54 – Does not
exclude cost of land from cost of residential house

 

The assessee
had sold a residential house property on 15/01/2010 for a total consideration
of Rs. 12,50,00,000/- and the total long term capital gains was Rs.
10,47,95,925/. On 14/05/2007, the assessee had purchased a property with a
superstructure thereon for a total consideration of Rs. 15,96,46,446/- and
after demolishing the existing structure, the assessee constructed a
residential house at a cost of Rs. 18,73,85,491/-. For the A. Y. 2010-11, the
assessee had claimed the entire long term capital gains as exempt from tax u/s.
54 of Act. The Assessing Officer held that only that part of the construction
expenditure that was incurred after the sale of the original asset was eligible
for exemption u/s. 54 and based on records held that the cost of construction
incurred after the sale of the original asset was Rs. 1,14,81,067/- and
accordingly allowed exemption of the same amount.


The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the decision of the Assessing Officer. The
Tribunal held that section 54 was a beneficial provision and had to be
construed liberally on compliance with the conditions. It held that the
assessee had complied with the conditions of section 54 and remitted the matter
to the Assessing Officer to consider the deduction u/s. 54 for the construction
cost incurred by the assessee.

 

The Madras High Court allowed the
appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

“i)    Section
54(1) did not exclude the cost of land from the cost of the residential house.
According to the section the capital gains had to be adjusted against the cost
of the new residential house. What had to be adjusted or set off against the
capital gains was the cost of the residential house that was purchased or
constructed. Section 54(1) was specific and clear. It was the cost of the new
residential house and not just the cost of construction of the new residential
house, which was to be adjusted.

ii)    The
cost of the new residential house would necessarily include the cost of the
land, material used in the construction, labour and any other cost relatable to
the acquisition or construction of the residential house. The condition
precedent for such adjustment was that the new residential house should have
been purchased within one year before or two years after the transfer of the
residential house, which resulted in the capital gains or alternatively, a new
residential house had been constructed in India, within three years from the
date of the transfer, which resulted in the capital gains.

iii)    The new residential house had been
constructed within the time stipulated in section 54(1). It was not requisite
of section 54 that construction could not have been commenced prior to the date
of transfer of the asset that resulted in capital gains. If the amount of
capital gain is equal to or less than the cost of the new residential house,
including the land on which the residential house was constructed, the capital
gains were not to be charged u/s. 45.”

Sections 12A and 12AA(3)– Charitable purpose – Registration of trust – Cancellation of registration – Grounds for – Difference between objects of trust and management of trust – No change in objects of trust – Amendment in respect of appointment of chief trustee and manner of managing the trust – Not ground for cancelling registration of trust

12. CIT(Exemption) vs. Sadguru
Narendra Maharaj Sansthan; 407 ITR 12 (Bom):

Date of order: 28th
February, 2018

 

Sections 12A and 12AA(3)– Charitable purpose – Registration of
trust – Cancellation of registration – Grounds for – Difference between objects
of trust and management of trust – No change in objects of trust – Amendment in
respect of appointment of chief trustee and manner of managing the trust – Not
ground for cancelling registration of trust

 

The assessee-trust amended its
trust deed. The Commissioner recorded that the amendment to the trust deed
devised a system by which the chief trustee would alone define his heir for the
post of the chief trustee and “adhishtata” and that the heir could not
take part in the management of the trust during the lifetime of the chief
trustee. The Commissioner exercised his power u/s. 12AA(3) of the Income tax
Act, 1961 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as the
“Act”) and cancelled the registration of the assessee on the ground
that the amendment violated the provisions of section 13(1)(c).

 

The Tribunal held that the
Commissioner had not appreciated the difference between the objects of the
trust and the powers/management of the trust; the amendment of the trust deed
dealt with the powers of the management of the trust rather than the objects of
the trust. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Commissioner cancelling the
registration of the trust. 

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the
Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)    The
cancellation of registration u/s. 12AA(3) is only in two contingencies, one the
activities of the trust not being genuine or the activities of the trust not
being carried out in accordance with its objects.

ii)    Cancellation
of the registration of the assessee-trust was not justified. The cancellation
was not on above two grounds. Section 13 applied while applying section 11. It
was in the domain of the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings
and not a basis for cancellation of registration.

iii)    Besides, the amendment of the trust deed not being in the spirit
of charitable trust, could not be the basis of cancellation u/s. 12AA(3). The
term “spirit of a charitable trust” was not defined in the Act nor elaborated
in the order of the Commissioner. The amendment made in the trust deed did not
suggest any change or addition to the objects of the trust. It was only in
respect of the appointment of the chief trustee and the manner of managing the
trust. The Tribunal rightly held that the Commissioner had focused on change in
the future management of the trust rather than the objects of the trust to
cancel the registration. The appeal is dismissed.”

Section 37(1) – Business expenditure – Where assessee company had furnished names and PAN numbers of all vendors to whom it had paid repair and maintenance charges for their services, the Tribunal was justified in allowing expenditure on account of such repair and maintainence charges

11. Principal CIT vs. Rambagh
Palace Hotels (P.) Ltd.; [2018] 98 taxmann.com 167 (Delhi):

Date of order: 17th
September, 2018

A. Y. 2005-06

 

Section 37(1) – Business expenditure – Where assessee company had
furnished names and PAN numbers of all vendors to whom it had paid repair and
maintenance charges for their services, the Tribunal was justified in allowing
expenditure on account of such repair and maintainence charges

 

During the year, i.e. A. Y.
2005-06, the assessee had claimed expenditure on account of repair and
maintenance charges paid by it to several parties. The Assessing Officer had
allowed repair and maintenance charges paid to four parties, who had appeared
before him and whose statements were recorded on oath. However, the balance
repair and maintenance expenditure was disallowed to the extent of 50 per cent,
on the ground of absence of supporting documents.

 

On appeal, the Commissioner
(Appeals) reduced the disallowance to 5 per cent. The Tribunal recorded that
the assessee had produced details of all vendors, including their PAN numbers,
invoices raised by them, etc., and held that the Commissioner (Appeals) was not
right in making disallowance of 5 per cent on the ground of mere suspicion and
accordingly allowed the full claim.

 

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi
High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

 

“i)    The
finding of the Tribunal deleting disallowance of 50 per cent by the Assessing Officer
is primarily factual. One has quoted the reply filed by the respondent/assessee
before the first appellate authority. These documents and papers were relied
upon by the Tribunal and the Commissioner (Appeals). However, copies of the
said documents/papers have not been filed. There is nothing to show and
establish that the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal are
perverse and factually incorrect.

ii)    Given
the aforesaid facts, there is no any substantial question of law arises for consideration.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”

TAXABILITY OF PROPORTIONATE DEEMED DIVIDEND IN CASE OF LOANS TO CONCERNS

Issue
for Consideration

“Dividend” is inclusively defined
u/s. 2(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Clause (e) of that section provides for
taxation of of any payment by a company, not being a company in which public
are substantially interested, of any sum by way of advance or loan to a
shareholder, who is the beneficial owner of shares holding not less than 10% of
the voting power, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a
partner and in which he has a substantial interest, to the extent to which the
company possesses accumulated profits. As per Explanation 3(b) of section
2(22), a person shall be deemed to have a substantial interest in a concern,
other than a company, if he is at any time during the previous year
beneficially entitled to not less than twenty per cent of the income of such
concern while in the case of a company, a person carrying not less than twenty
per cent of the voting power shall, by virtue of section 2(32) be considered to
be the person holding a substantial interest in the company.    

 

In the case of loan or advance to a
concern in which a shareholder has a substantial interest, the Supreme Court in
the case of CIT vs. Madhur Housing & Development Co Ltd Ltd. 401 ITR 152,
has  recently held  that the taxation of deemed dividend would be
in the hands of the shareholder, and not in the hands of the recipient concern.
The ratio of this decision though has been doubted by the apex court in a later
decision in the case of National Travel Services vs. CIT, 401 ITR 154
and the issue therein has been referred to the larger bench of the court.

 

Whether in bringing to tax the
deemed dividend, in the hands of the shareholders, the amount of the loan
advanced to a concern, is to be apportioned in their hands or not is an issue
that requires consideration. If yes, what shall be the basis on which the
amount is to be apportioned is another issue that is open; in cases where more
than one shareholder holds more than 10% of the voting power in the lending
company, and also has a substantial interest in the recipient concern, in what
proportion would the amount of loan be taxed as deemed dividend amongst such
shareholders – in the proportion of their shareholding in the lending company
or in the proportion of their interest in the recipient concern.

 

While the Delhi bench of the
Tribunal has held that the taxation of deemed dividend would be in the
proportion of the interest in the recipient concern, the Hyderabad bench of the
Tribunal has taken a contrary view, that such taxation would be in the
proportion of the voting power in the lending company.   

 

Puneet Bhagat’s case

The issue came up for consideration
before the Delhi SMC bench of the Tribunal in the case of Puneet Bhagat vs.
ITO 157 ITD 353.

 

The facts in this case were that
the assessee held 50% of shares in a company, in which his wife held the
remaining 50%. This company advanced a loan of Rs 10 lakh to another company,
in which the assessee held 53.85% shares, and his wife held 46.11%. At the
relevant point of time, the accumulated profits of the lending company were Rs
14.51 crore.

 

The assessing officer, following
the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ankitech (P) Ltd
340 ITR 14
, held that the deemed dividend had to be taxed in the hands of
the shareholders of the loan recipient company. Since both the assessee and his
wife were equal shareholders in the lending company, he taxed an equal amount
of Rs 5 lakh in the hands of each of the two shareholders.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected
the assessee’s appeal, confirming the addition made by the assessing officer.

 

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of
the assessee, it was argued that though, on the facts of the case, the amount
of loan liable for addition u/s. 2(22)(e) could not be apportioned amongst the
shareholders, both of whom had substantial interest in the concerns, in as much
as no mechanism had been provided in the Act for apportioning the amount of the
deemed dividend in the respective shareholders hands. The fact that there was a
different shareholding pattern of shareholdings in the two companies made the
thing all the more unworkable. Therefore, the computation provisions failed,
and, following the Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT v s. B C
Srinivasa Setty 128 ITR 294
, the charging provisions would also fail.
Hence, it was argued that deemed dividend could not be taxed in the hands of
any or both the shareholders.

 

The Tribunal noted that there was
no dispute that the total amount of loan was taxable as deemed dividend in the
hands of the 2 shareholders, as the 2 shareholders held more than 20%
shareholding in both the lending company as well as the recipient company.
Referring to the argument that the charging sections would fail on account of
failure of the computation provisions, the Tribunal noted that for application
of section 2(22)(e), a loan to a ‘concern’ was also contemplated in the section
itself and therefore the charge could not have failed It also observed that it
would be too technical to hold that the legislature visualised only one
shareholder in the concern and therefore the better view would be to pin the
charge on all the qualified shareholders.

 

The Tribunal, having held so,
observed that the section clearly stated that the shareholder might be a member
of the concern or a partner thereof, which implied that the interest of the
shareholder in the concern was to be determined with reference to the
percentage of share in income or of the shareholding with the voting power in
the concern, of the qualified shareholder, that received the loan or advance.
According to the Tribunal, it was not necessary that in every case, the
detailed mechanism should be provided by the Act for computing the income. If by
reasonable construction of the section, the income could be deduced, then,
merely on the ground that a specific provision had not been provided, it could
not be held that the computation provisions failed. The Tribunal also observed
that it was well settled law that a construction which advanced the object of
legislation should be preferred to the one which defeated the same.

 

According to the Tribunal, the
percentage of shareholding in the concern to which the loan was given, was a
determining factor of the quantum of the deemed dividend to be taxed in case of
the shareholder. In the case before it, it noted that the assessee had 53.85%
shareholding with the voting power in the loan receiving company. Therefore,
according to the Tribunal, Rs. 5,38,500 should have been assessed as dividend
in his hands, and the balance Rs.4,61,100 should have been taxed as dividends
in the case of his wife. However, since in the assessee’s case, the AO had made
an addition of Rs. 5 lakh only, the Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 5 lakh.

 

G Indira Krishna Reddy’s case

Recently, the issue again came up
for consideration before the Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal in the cases of G
Indira Krishna Reddy vs. DyCIT (ITA Nos 1495-1497/Hyd/2014) and G V Krishna
Reddy vs. DyCIT (ITA Nos 1498-1500/Hyd/2014)
dated 24th May
2017.

 

In this case, the assessee and her
husband were both shareholders of a company, Caspian Capital & Finance P.
Ltd.holding more than 10% of the share capital of the company. This company
advanced amounts of Rs. 36.10 lakh and Rs. 15 lakh ostensibly by way of share
application money to 2 companies namely, Metro Architectures & Contractors
Pvt.Ltd. and Orbit Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd.  in which the assessee had shareholding of 20%
and 40% respectively, her husband also was holding more than 20% shareholding
in both the companies. The lending company Caspian Capital & Finance P.
Ltd. had accumulated profits exceeding the amounts of share application money
advanced at the relevant point of time.

 

The assessing officer, based on the
facts, held that such amounts advanced by Caspian Capital & Finance P. Ltd.
were unsecured loans, though termed as share application money. He therefore
added the entire share application  money
of Rs. 51.10 lakh as income of the assessee by way of deemed dividend.

 

Before the Commissioner (Appeals),
on behalf of the assessee it was argued that the entire share application money
had been taxed as deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee as well has her
husband, which had led to double taxation. It was argued that the amount of the
deemed dividend, to be taxed in the asessee’s hands, should be restricted to
the percentage of the assessee’s shareholding in the recipient companies.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals), while
upholding the taxation of deemed dividend, directed the assessing officer to
apportion the entire advanced amounts between the assessee and her spouse as
per their shareholding pattern in the lending company and not in the recipient
company as was claimed by the assessee subject to the fact that it was taxed in
both hands of the assesseee and her husband. In case there was no taxation in
both hands, the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the question of apportionment
did not arise.

 

Before the Tribunal, it was argued inter
alia
, that the share application money advanced to the recipient companies
should be taxed in proportion to the shareholding of the assessee and her
husband in the recipient company.

 

The Tribunal rejected the
assessee’s main contention that since the computation mechanism failed, no
addition of deemed dividend could be made. It observed that the entire advances
or loans, given to the concerns of the shareholders having substantial interest
were required to be taxed to the extent of accumulated profits. It observed
that dividend was always distributed to the shareholders of the company, and
the entire advances or loans given to such concerns of shareholders with
substantial interest should be brought to tax to prevent unauthorised
distribution of dividend to the controlling shareholders in the guise of loans
and advances.

 

On the issue under consideration
the Tribunal observed that there was no other shareholder who had substantial
interest in both the payer company and the recipient company, other than the
assessee and her husband. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the advances given
to the recipient companies were required to be taxed in the hands of both the
assessee and her husband. It however expressed its inability to follow the
decision of the Delhi tribunal in the case of Puneet Bhagat (supra),
wherein the Delhi Tribunal had held that the dividend would be assessable in
the hands of the shareholders in the proportion of the shareholding of the
shareholders in the recipient entity. The Hyderabad Tribunal observed that
dividend was always payable to the shareholders of the payer company, and
non-shareholders had no right in the dividend. Hence, according to the
Tribunal, the question of taxing the deemed dividend as per the proportion of
shareholding in the borrowing company did not arise.

 

The Hyderabad Tribunal, in holding
as above that the proportion should be in the ratio of the holding in the payer
company, relied upon the observations in the decision of the Mumbai bench of
the Tribunal in the case of ITO vs. Sahir Sami Khatib 57 taxmann.com 13,.
The Hyderabad Tribunal therefore expressed its inability to accept the
contention that the deemed dividend should be assessed in the hands of the
assessee in proportionto the assessee’s shareholding in the recipient company.

 

Observations

If one analyses the objective
behind section 2(22)(e), as noted by the Hyderabad Tribunal, it is to tax a
shareholder who is circumventing the taxation of dividend by taking the benefit
in a disguised form as a loan to another concern. That being the purpose, it is
no doubt true that the person who has got the benefit should be taxed to the
extent of the benefit that he has derived. However, when a loan is given to a
company or other concerns, one can perhaps say that the shareholders of the
borrowing company or the members of such concerns have received an indirect
benefit in the ratio of their shareholding in the borrowing company or in the
income sharing ratio of such concerns.

 

The argument on the other hand is
that normally, if the intention of shareholders of a company is to give a loan
to another entity instead of distributing dividend, they would have factored in
the shareholding of that other entity, to ensure that the shareholders of the
lending company get the benefit of the accumulated profits indirectly in the
ratio of their entitlements to such profits in the receiving company.

 

Given the fact that this is a
taxation of dividend, unless it can be demonstrated that the benefit has
actually flowed to the shareholders in a different ratio, the more appropriate
ratio to be adopted in such cases is the ratio of the shareholding of the
assessee in the lending company. The difference of opinion between
the Delhi and the Hyderabad benches of the Tribunal is limited to the adoption
of the proportion in which such loan is to be taxed; should the proportion be
determined w.r.t the shareholding pattern of the shareholders in a lending
company or should it be w.r.t such pattern in the receiving company or concern.

 

The decision of the Mumbai bench of
the Tribunal in the case of Sahir Sami Khatib vs. ITO(supra) relied upon
by the Hyderabad Tribunal has been upheld by the Bombay High Court, on the
facts of the case, in [ITA No 722 of 2015] vide its order dated 3rd
October 2018 for reasons not relevant in deciding the issue under
consideration. The Bombay High Court observed in this case:

 

“Equally, we find that the
reasoning given by the ITAT that there cannot be any proportionate addition of
deemed dividend taking into consideration the percentage of the shareholding in
the borrowing company, does not give rise to any substantial question of law.
In the factual matrix before the ITAT, it held that Section 2(22)(e) of the I.
T. Act, 1961 does not postulate any such situation. This is especially the case
before us as there is only one shareholder that has a shareholding in the
lending company as well as in the borrowing company. This being the case and
purely factual in nature, we do not think that the ITAT was in any event
incorrect in rejecting this argument of the assessee. We may hasten to add that
different considerations may arise if two or more shareholders are shareholders
of the same lending company and the same borrowing company. In such a factual
position it could possibly be argued that the addition ought to be made on a
proportionate basis. However, we are not examining this issue in the present
case as the facts before us are completely different.

 

The last decision relied upon by Ms
Jagtiani was a decision of the Delhi ITAT wherein it appears that the Delhi
ITAT has allowed the proportionate allocation of deemed dividend on the basis
of the shareholding of the borrowing company. We find this Judgment to be
wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case as in the facts of this
decision, both the shareholders were holding more than 10% in the lending
company and more than 46% in borrowing company. In fact, there were only two
shareholders of the lending company as well as of the borrowing company. It was
in these peculiar facts that the Delhi ITAT came to a conclusion that the
deemed dividend ought to be proportionately divided. In the facts before us,
and as mentioned earlier, the appellant – assessee is the only shareholder who
is the shareholder of the lending company as well as that of the borrowing
company. This being the case, the ratio of the Delhi ITAT is squarely not
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.”

 

From these observations of the
Bombay High Court, it is clear that the decision of the Mumbai bench of the
Tribunal in Sahir Sami Khatib’s case was based on entirely
different facts, where there was only one shareholder who fulfilled the
conditions of being the beneficial owner of more than 10% of voting power in
the lending company, and more than 20% of the shareholding in the recipient
company. It was on these facts that both the Mumbai Tribunal and the Bombay
High Court held that there was no question of proportional taxation of deemed
dividend. Therefore, to that extent, the reliance of the Hyderabad bench of the
Tribunal on the decision of the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal was not justified.

 

Useful reference may be made to the
decision of the Pune bench of the Tribunal in the case of Kewalkumar Jain
vs. ACIT 144 ITD 672,
though the issues in that case were slightly
different. In that case, loans were given directly to the four shareholders
holding more than 10% of the shares of the company (the total holding of such
shareholders being 100% of the company), and the aggregate value of such loans
amounting to Rs 3.81 crore exceeded the total accumulated profits of the
company, which amounted to Rs. 2 .61 crore. The assessee had a shareholding of
14%, and received a loan of 0.76 crore.

 

The assessing
officer had computed the assessee’s share of accumulated profits at 14% of 2.61
crore, amounting to Rs. 0.36 crore, added the assessee’s proportionate share of
the general reserve, and since such amount of Rs.0.42 crore was less than the
loan received by the assessee, had taxed such amount of Rs 0.42 crore as deemed
dividend in the hands of the assessee. In this case, the Commissioner exercised
his revisional powers u/s. 263, setting aside the assessment with a direction
to the assessing officer to arrive at the correct available accumulated profits
for considering the amount of deemed dividend assessable in the hands of the
assessee. According to the Commissioner, there was nothing in section 2(22)(e)
permitting or prescribing the restriction to the proportionate amount of
accumulated profits.

 

The Tribunal set aside the order of
the Commissioner u/s. 263, noting that the balance of the accumulated profits
had been taxed in the hands of the other shareholders, and hence there was no
error in taxing only the proportionate accumulated profits in the hands of the
assessee. This decision of the Pune Tribunal therefore does indicate that the
relevant ratio for the purpose of taxation of deemed dividend is the proportionate
shareholding in the lending company, where more than one shareholder is
chargeable to tax on the deemed dividend.

 

Fortunately or otherwise, with
effect from 1st April 2018, this issue would no longer be relevant,
except perhaps for the disclosure by the shareholders of exempt income in their
returns of income, since such deemed dividend would also now be subject to
payment of dividend distribution tax at the rate of 30% u/s. 115-O by the
lending company, and would be exempt in the hands of the shareholders.

ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

If there is
one institution that has been seen as a panacea for all ills in corporate
India, it is that of independent directors. The role of the independent
directors has come to mean different things to different people. Like the story
of the blind men and the elephant, it has come to mean different things
to different people. Some believe the independent director to be a strategic
guide; others want her to be a conscience-keeper; while yet others believe she
is a policewoman, who some believe is a watchdog and others believe must be a
bloodhound.

 

First, a word
on what exactly a director, or for that matter, the Board of Directors is meant
to do. Directors are those who direct the running of the company. The Board of
Directors comprises the individuals who direct the course of operations. The
management conducts the affairs of the company under the overall
superintendence, oversight and control by the Board of Directors. The
management of a company holds office at the pleasure of the Board of Directors.
Directors of a company hold office at the pleasure of the shareholders of the
company.

 

Once the Board
of Directors is appointed, the shareholders move out of the picture in relation
to the day-to-day oversight of the company. It is for the directors to govern
the company in terms of the Articles of Association. It is the directors who
are meant to provide strategic direction and guidance to the management of a
company. That is their main role. An attendant consequence is the role of being
policemen keeping vigil over the conduct of affairs by the management.  

 

In this
context, sits the office of independent directors, which is now firmly codified
into the law. Making its debut in the Listing Agreement – a statutory agreement
between listed companies and stock exchanges – the concept has moved firmly
into Parliament-made company law, and indeed in the SEBI (Listing Obligations
and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“LODR Regulations”)
governing listing obligations that has replaced the listing agreement. With
each move in this regulatory waltz, the expectation, role and scope of what is
expected from an independent director has kept changing. Add to this rulings by
courts that have at the least laid down what cannot be ruled out from the role
of these directors. 

 

Independence from?

Yet, to begin
with, one has to necessarily understand what the law expects from independent
directors in terms of independence – are they meant to be independent of
ownership or are they meant to be independent from management? As defined, the
independence is expected from both ownership and management. The definition
rules out independence of a director on both counts. An equity ownership
interest of two percent or more would result in a director being regarded as
non-independent. Likewise, senior executives of a company who become directors
would not be considered independent unless three years have passed since their
association with the company. 

 

However, the
facet that skews the picture in any case is that all independent directors
would in any case rely on the vote of all shareholders to be appointed to the
Board of Directors – just as any other director would have to be voted into
office. In other words, every director, including the independent director,
holds office at the pleasure of the majority vote of the shareholders. 

 

How
independent can the director therefore be, purely as a matter of political
science, from the shareholder? The answer perhaps does not lie in making the
majority owners, or controlling owners (under Indian law, “promoters”)
ineligible to vote for independent director appointments.  The answer in fact lies in recognising that
independent directors cannot be totally independent of ownership and can indeed
lose their office by being voted out for being unpopular. Therefore,
strengthening the institution of the independent director, granting an
independent director protection of tenure, and providing conceptual clarity on
real role expectations is the way to go.

 

The very
concept of independent director is one that has developed as a matter of best
practice elsewhere in the world, but has been codified into the law here. Best
practices that evolved with the aim of minimising the risk of litigation
against those involved in governance of companies as a shield against
litigation, have become swords that directors need to defend themselves
against.

 

Role of
Independent Directors

The question
of whether a director is meant to represent the interests of the shareholders
has been well settled in case law. 
Company law is quite clear that the role of every director on the Board
of Directors, whether independent or not, is to apply her mind to serving the
best interests of the company, and not of the shareholder who nominated her to
be appointed. Indian company law has been codified for long. However, what
standards a director must bring to bear, how she is supposed to conduct herself
in decision-making, and what is a realistic expectation from her was left
substantially to the sphere of judge-made law, laid down when dealing with
controversies and proceedings presented to them for resolution. India is a
common-law jurisdiction – gaps in the statute are filled in by judges,
providing meaning to ambiguities and inconsistencies based on the principles of
justice, equity and good conscience. 

 

Some of these
principles are now codified into the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”), with
section 1661 , which contains motherhood statements in the
expectations from directors in general, leaving the burden of establishing the
tests and standards to be applied when ruling on alleged violation of the
provision, to the courts – but more about that later. Once appointed, a
director has a fiduciary duty to discharge to the company and she is not a
servant of the shareholders who appoint her. The shareholders cannot impinge
upon the exercise of rights by a director in discharge of the fiduciary duties
of the director. Shareholders cannot dictate terms to directors except by
amendment of Articles of Association or by sacking the directors2. 

 

In the words
of the court, in the first-cited judgement in the footnote to the foregoing
paragraph:-

 

“The
shareholder….. is entitled to consider his own interests, without regard to
interests of other shareholders. However, Directors are fiduciaries of the
Company and the shareholders. It is their duty to do what they consider best in
the interests of the Company. They cannot abdicate their independent judgment
by entering into pooling agreements.”

_______________________________________________

1   References to Sections
by number are references to provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 while
references to Regulations by number are references to provisions of the SEBI
(Disclosure Obligations and Listing Requirements) Regulations, 2015.

2              All these principles are well
stated by a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of
Rolta India Ltd. & Another Vs. Venire Industries Ltd. & Others 2000
(100) Comp. Cas. 19 (Bom) and has been well analysed in other decisions
applying the principles found in this judgement, including Mrs. Madhu Ashok
Kapur & 3 Others Vs. Mr. Rana Kapoor & 8 Others – decision by Justice
Gautam Patel of the same court on June 4, 2015  
           

 

“In our view,
the curtailment of the powers of Director by enforcement of such a clause would
not be permissible. Clause 8 would result in curtailment of the fiduciary
rights and duties of the Directors. The shareholders cannot infringe upon
the Directors’ fiduciary rights and duties.
Even Directors cannot enter
into an agreement, thereby agreeing not to increase the number of Directors
when there is no such restriction in the Articles of Association. The shareholders
cannot dictate the terms to the Directors, except by amendment of Articles of
Association or by removal of Directors.”

[Emphasis
Supplied
]

 

In the second
judgement referred to in the footnote to the foregoing paragraph, the court
rejected the attempt to cite the aforesaid judgment to support arguments
relating to the facts of the case before the court, but well reiterated the
same principle thus: –

 

“Or take a
nominee director
, that is, a director of a company who is nominated by a
large shareholder to represent his interests.
There is nothing wrong
in it. It is done every day. Nothing wrong, that is, so long as the director
is left free to exercise his best judgment in the interests of the company
which he serves.
But if he is put upon terms that he is bound to act in
the affairs of the company in accordance with the directions of his patron, it
is beyond doubt unlawfu
l, or if he agrees to subordinate the interests of
the company to the interests of his patron, it is conduct oppressive to the
other shareholders
for which the patron can be brought to book .”

[Emphasis
Supplied
]

 

The
codification of directors’ responsibilities in section 166, is a game-changer
in what company law means for directors. 
For independent directors, the Code of Conduct stipulated u/s. 149 read
with Schedule IV, is another game changer. These are now explicit provisions of
the law that require directors to be mindful that their constituents are way
beyond shareholders alone. For all directors, the term used is “stakeholders”
u/s. 166 while for independent directors, there are specific obligations
imposed to be mindful of the interests of minority shareholders. 

Therefore,
many of the past practices and comfort zones reached by corporate Boards of
Directors, are up for disruption. The impunity that has been demonstrated in
the past is no longer a light matter – indeed, companies are now actively
considering becoming private limited companies so that they are not bound by
the statutory obligation of maintaining the institution of independent
directors. A case in point is Tata Sons Ltd., which is a “systemically
important core investment company” and has sought to convert itself into a
private limited company amidst litigation over governance standards applied in
that company4.

 

What is clear
is that independent directors can now be litigated against as a matter of
codified legal standard, with principles-based law that forms part of statutory
obligations set out in Schedule IV of the Act.

 

Limitation of
Liability

Now, one facet
of the law that is not fully appreciated among Indian corporate boards yet, is
that while the limitation of liability for shareholders is limited,
increasingly, the limitation of liability for directors seems to not be so. The
Act has codified the obligation to have independent directors4;  the qualifications of an independent director5;
the duties of independent directors6, with a specially stipulated
Code of Conduct for independent directors7. A fully codified robust
statutory framework for governance of companies in India is now formally in
place.

 

It is settled
law that every director of any company (including directors nominated by
specific shareholders) are meant to address and look after the interests of the
company and not the interests of the shareholders nominating them.



A director
indeed holds office at the pleasure of the shareholders, who can appoint,
remove or replace a director in compliance with other applicable law, by
passing an ordinary resolution. This is in fact the reason for the Takeover
Regulations to provide that a right to appoint a majority of the Board of
Directors constitutes “control” and it is the shareholder holding the majority
of a company who is deemed to be acquiring the voting rights in any listed
company, held by the company being acquired.

A ruling by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court just before the onset of the Act and the LODR
Regulations is instructive in appreciating this growing trend in this area of
jurisprudence.  Upholding monetary
penalty imposed against directors of a company for a finding of market abuse by
a company, in the case of N. Narayanan vs. Adjudicating Officer, SEBI8
the Court actually ruled that the role of directors in listed companies is
meant to be a “particularly onerous” one, stating that “the Board of Directors
makes itself accountable for the performance of the company to shareholders and
also for the production of its accounts and financial statements especially when
the company is a listed company.” 

_________________________________________________________________

3   Disclosure: The author is involved as an advocate
in the litigation and is interested in the intervention against Tata Sons Ltd.

4   Section 149(4)

5   Section 149(6)

6   Section 149(8) read with Schedule IV

7   Schedule IV to the Act

8 Civil
Appeals no. 4112 – 4113 of 2013 – available at:
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40338

 

In the court’s
own words (paraphrasing would not do justice to the content): –

 

Responsibility
is cast on the Directors to prepare the annual records and reports and those
accounts should reflect ‘a true and fair view’. The over-riding obligation of
the Directors is to approve the accounts only if they are satisfied that they
give true and fair view of the profits or loss for the relevant period and the
correct financial position of the company. Company though a legal entity cannot
act by itself, it can act only through its Directors. They are expected to
exercise their power on behalf of the company with utmost care, skill and
diligence.
This Court while describing what is the duty of a Director of a
company held in Official Liquidator vs. P.A. Tendolkar (1973) 1 SCC 602
that a Director may be shown to be placed and to have been so closely and so
long associated personally
with the management of the company that he
will be deemed to be not merely cognizant of but liable for fraud in the
conduct of business of the company even though no specific act of dishonesty is
proved against him personally.
He cannot shut his eyes to what must be
obvious to everyone who examines the affairs of the company even superficially.

 

The facts in
this case clearly reveal that the Directors of the company in question had
failed in their duty to exercise due care and diligence and allowed the company
to fabricate the figures and make false disclosures.
Facts indicate that they have overlooked the numerous red flags in the
revenues, profits, receivables, deposits etc. which should not have escaped the
attention of a prudent person. For instance, profit as on quarter ending June
2007 was three times more than the preceding quarter, it doubled in the quarter
ending December 2007 over the preceding quarter. Further, there was
disproportionate increase in the security deposits i.e. Rs. 36.05 crore in
September 2007 to Rs. 270.38 crore in December 2007 as compared to increase in
the number of theatres during the same period. They have participated in
the board meetings and were privy to those commissions and omissions.

[Emphasis
Supplied
]

 

 

All the
judgements and precedents cited above involved the law governing directors and
their role prior to the Act and the LODR Regulations coming into force. Now,
the codified law stipulates the standards to be followed and expectations from
directors.  To take just the role of
independent directors, summarising and paraphrasing just some of their
obligations under Schedule IV, such directors must: –

 

a)  act objectively, constructively and exercise
responsibilities in the interest of the company;

b) not allow extraneous considerations to vitiate
objective independent judgment in the paramount interest of the company as a
whole;

c)  bring independent judgment to bear on the
Board’s deliberations especially on issues of strategy, performance, risk
management and resources;

d) safeguard the interests of all stakeholders,
particularly the minority shareholders;

e)  balance conflicting interests of the
stakeholders;

f)  moderate and arbitrate in the interest of the
company as a whole;

g) seek appropriate clarification or amplification
of information and, where necessary, take and follow appropriate professional
advice and opinion of outside experts at the expense of the company;

h)  ensure that concerns about any proposed action
are addressed and, to the extent that they are not resolved, insist that their
concerns are recorded;

i)   ensure adequate deliberations before
approving related party transactions and assure themselves that the same are in
the interest of the company; and

j)   hold meetings of just the independent
directors at least once in a year, without the attendance of non-independent
directors and members of management.

 

Each of these
standards would necessarily entail mixed questions of fact and law in disputes
involving interpretation of Schedule IV. Section 166 is but a synopsis of these
tests and is made applicable to all directors, whether or not independent. The
LODR Regulations, which follow more of a check-the-box framework for
composition of the Board of Directors and of sub-committees of the Board of
Directors or listed companies, too have to be read with Section 166.  It must be remembered that the provisions of
the SEBI Act, in particular, sections 11 and 11B, entitle SEBI to issue
directions “in the interests of the securities market”. Such directions may be
issued by SEBI of its own accord without having to convince any independent
judicial mind about the appropriateness of its intervention.  The only check and balance is a post-facto
statutory appeal to the Securities Appellate Tribunal.

 

This poses
multiple nuanced threats to directors. Actions may be taken suo motu by
SEBI where it is convinced that a director must be taught a lesson. These may
take the form of restraint not to deal in securities or not to join the board
of directors of other listed companies or capital market intermediaries for
specified periods.  Action by SEBI could
be triggered by a complaint by other regulatory agencies and tax authorities.
There is precedent of regulatory action triggered in such a manner.  It is only a matter of time for the gravity
and creativity in the application of the law to reach the doorstep of
independent directors of companies that SEBI acts against.

 

Some independent directors are also prone to
getting carried away and get involved in the day-to-day functioning of the
company – at times with direct access to the employees whose line of reporting
is to the CEO.  Whether a director has
been truly in charge of day-to-day operations or only relied on Board processes
for oversight of the company, will always be a mixed question of fact and law,
requiring tedious evidence.



Given the
scope for intervention by the securities regulator and indeed other regulators
who may be regulating the company in question, one must be very clear and have
very specific and formal processes for an independent director’s engagement
with the company.

 

Whether every director has then acted in the interests
of the company would become the question to ask.  Derivative suits by shareholders in any civil
court present a serious threat to directors having to answer allegations about
their conduct. To summarise, if the general standard for directors of listed
companies as laid down by the Supreme Court in the Narayanan case (supra)
is to be followed under the newly-legislated framework set out in the Act and
the LODR Regulations, being a director, and more so, an independent director at
that, would not be an easy call.

INTERVIEW | ISHAAT HUSSAIN

In celebration of its 50th Volume, the BCAJ brings you a series of interviews with people of eminence, those whom we can look up to as outstanding professionals. These are persons who have reached the top of their chosen spheres, are leading lights of the profession and who have set high standards for others to emulate.

The fourth interview in this series features the indefatigable Mr. Ishaat Hussain. Originally from Patna, Bihar, he went to Delhi to study at St. Stephen’s College and then to England to pass Chartered Accountancy from ICAEW. He went through the rank and file at Tata Steel during one of the most fascinating times in the history of that company. He worked under four Chairmen at the Tata Sons, worked with stalwarts at the Tata Steel and played number of roles from financial management, tax, M&A, operations, banking, and so on. He served on Boards of several iconic and respected companies of India. Most notably, he served as Finance Director of Tata Steel, Board member at Tata Sons, chairman at Voltas and other group companies. 71 years old now, Mr. Hussain is a treasure trove. He tells his story, recalls anecdotes, shares his perspectives on life and work in this interview with BCAJ Editor Raman Jokhakar and Past Editor Gautam Nayak. Read on for his take on Fair Value Estimates, expectations from auditors, idea of success, conflicts of interest and what made him tick at the House of Tatas

Raman Jokhakar: Can you tell us a little about your childhood, your formative years, what made you choose the Chartered Accountancy course and, if I may ask, why from the ICAEW? After that, how did you find your way to the Tata group?

I am from Patna. My father was a doctor and my mother’s family hailed from Lucknow. In those days, it was quite rare for a Bihari to marry in UP. I am 71 years old now; I did my initial schooling in Patna and then went to Doon School. I spent 5 years there, did my senior Cambridge and then went to St. Stephen’s for my BA with Honours in Economics. St. Stephen’s has probably produced 50% of the bureaucrats (and Ambassadors of India). One career option was to attempt to get into the IAS. The other choice was to do Chartered Accountancy. In retrospect I think it was the right decision not to go for the IAS. I have many friends in the IAS. They were all very bright – but they were quite frustrated at the end of their tenures!

I had a friend whose father was the Finance Director of Glaxo. He was going to do Chartered Accountancy. He put the idea of doing Chartered Accountancy in my head. I had lost my father when I was 15, so there was also a heavy emphasis on security. One thing that I have learnt about the Chartered Accountancy profession is that as a CA you will never starve. It is a “safe” profession.However, I knew that the pass rates were very low and it was very difficult to clear the exams. An elder cousin was in business and he was my mentor. When I mentioned Chartered Accountancy to him, he said it was an excellent idea. Besides, I had the aptitude. In school, I was reasonably good in maths. I did higher maths and got good grades. I also studied economics, which in retrospect was a good decision.

For a CA if you have a good knowledge of economics it helps you enormously in understanding finance. My cousin’s auditors were A F Ferguson & Co and I got articleship with them at Allahabad Bank Building in Bombay (Fort) right after my BA results. I was there for a year from July 1967.

GOING TO ENGLAND

However, almost all my college mates had gone to England to do their CA. I was a bit late on the draw. I was pretty comfortable here. But my friends kept saying – come here, come on, come over. So I finally started looking around for articleship in the UK. It meant that I would lose a year – but that was not bad because at Ferguson’s I got excellent training as an articled clerk. Finally, when I went to England, although I had lost a year, I was up to speed in accounting matters. My firm (in the UK) was very happy because of the experience I had (from the previous articleship). I was just 20 years old then, the world was opening up and it was thrilling to experience what was happening. India was a bit moribund at that time, not as advanced as it is today.

In the UK I joined a medium-sized firm. Doing small audits in the UK was a very different experience and a great learning in those days. In small firms you learnt a lot about accounting. Some of the clients could not put their final accounts together and you had to handle ‘incomplete records’. You won’t believe this, but once I had to prepare the accounts of some Pub. The proprietor came with a sack and left it on the table – that sack contained cheques, stubs, vouchers and all that you needed to piece his accounts together! Putting a set of accounts together from incomplete records provided tremendous learning. Even today, unless I am satisfied on the debits and credits I find it difficult to move ahead.

To return to my Chartered Accountancy, I passed my Inter with flying colours. I was in the top 5%. I got to my part 1 and then to part 2 and passed that also at the first attempt. That gave me terrific confidence in myself, plus I gained good experience, too. I used to do the largest audits for the firm.

And then, for personal reasons, I decided to come back to India. Very few amongst my contemporaries came back, Deepak Parekh was one of them, although I didn’t know him there. Keki Dadiseth was also a very dear friend and was also at Ferguson for a year. He, too, came back. I can count on my fingertips the number of people who came back.

BACK IN BOMBAY

On my return to India, I joined the ICI Group and was posted as the Financial Accountant to CAFI (Chemicals and Fibres of India) which used to make Terylene under the brand Terene. I joined them in Vashi where Reliance (ADAG) stands today. It was a great experience for me because I looked after all accounting, banking and insurance matters. As a front line manager, I also got to handle a large body of unionised staff. In those days, unions were very strong. Everything was a negotiation. Industrial relations in Bombay were not good and in CAFI, it was definitely bad. In fact, CAFI were just recovering from a two month old strike prior to my joining. This exposure to managing a large body of unionised staff has held me in very good stead throughout my career. That is why whenever I recruited accountants, I used to tell them while by and large all C.A.s have the requisite technical skills, they need to sharpen their people and inter-personal skills.

I was with CAFI for a year and a half; in ICI they used to transfer people around very quickly. I was transferred to ACCI (Alkali and Chemical Corporation of India) which used to make Dulux and Duco paints which was a very hot commodity in those days. I was with them in Bombay as the Regional Accountant. The Regional Accountant had much more to do than accounting, and the accounting was very simple, involving just branch accounting. But the godowns also reported to the Regional Accountant. All the contracts of the transporters used to be negotiated by me. Thus, I got considerable commercial experience.

LIAISING WITH BANK AND LENDERS

Since ACCI was headquartered in Calcutta and all the Financial Institutions such as IDBI, ICICI, LIC, the banks and RBI had headquarters in Bombay, a part of my job as the Regional Accountant was to liaise with these institutions. This was a unique and great experience and I was really lucky to get this exposure. One of the long-standing benefits of which was that many of those whom I dealt with in the 1970s had risen to the highest levels in these organisations which was of considerable value to me when I returned to Bombay in the ‘90s.

When I had completed five years, I felt I needed to step out and learn more about financing capital evaluation, project evaluation and so on. I mentioned this to my Finance Director and he said “fine, you come and work as my assistant”. I was transferred to Calcutta as Assistant to the Finance Director. There was a Finance Director, there was a Head of Finance and there was the Assistant (me). The three of us were a sort of think tank and I used to do all the legwork. In those days, there were no Excel spreadsheets.

While working on the financial part of the project evaluation, one had to start getting involved with the engineers to understand how the project cost was developed, talk to the commercial people about how they looked at the markets and assess the demand. One might have read all this in textbooks but I was now doing all this in practice. ICI was a very process oriented company. Both at CAFI and ACCI, the systems and procedures were well developed, though computers, thanks to the unions, were few and far between. Charts of authority along with delegation of powers, checks and counter balances and so on were in place and governance was of a high standard. ICI was also very sound in financial analysis and techniques. If you remember, in the early ‘80s, inflation was running at a very high level. In fact, there were proposals to dump “Historic cost Accounting” and to adopt “Inflation Accounting”. In ICI I was involved in “inflation accounting” which had been mandated by the ICAEW – it was a fascinating intellectual exercise.

I strongly believe that after one qualifies, one’s first job must be with a good company where one can get hands-on experience and exposure to good systems, procedures, governance and management.

Gautam Nayak: From heading financial functioning at a flagship entity to Tata Sons, how did that happen? Any memorable stops along the way?

My ex-boss at CAFI left the ICI Group to join Indian Oxygen. The Chairman of Indian Oxygen was Mr. Russi Mody. Mr. Mody told him that he was trying to modernise Tata Steel, particularly the finance and accounts department, which he felt was very archaic in its approach. He wanted to rejuvenate Tata Steel. He asked him whether he knew of any young guys who would consider joining Tata Steel. To cut a long story short, I agreed to meet Mr. Mody. We had an interview. He offered me two jobs – one was the number 2 man in accounts in Jamshedpur and the other was Finance Director in Indian Tube Company, which at that time was among the top 100 companies in India. I chose the latter.

THE SKY IS THE LIMIT

Indian Tube Company was 40 % owned by Tata Steel, 40 % by British Steel (which Tata Steel later acquired) and 20 % was held by the Indian public. It was not a listed company. British Steel was in trouble at that time and wanted to sell their shares and Tata Steel wanted to buy them out. Mr Mody told me that they were looking for a Finance Director, and he added that some day it would merge with Tata Steel and I would be back with him in Tata Steel. If I did well, then the sky was the limit for me. I said I would take my chance. I was only 30 or 31 then. That’s how I came in to Tatas.

In 1983, Indian Tube merged with Tata Steel. The Board continued because the merger was a contested merger and that was another experience that I had – how to deal with contested mergers. One of my jobs was to see the merger through. It went up to the MRTP (there was a hearing at MRTP). I made a presentation before them. I learned about share valuations and got a good understanding of M & A. It was a terrific learning experience. I continued to be on the Board because the company was not dissolved till two and a half years later but I, as an executive, was transferred to Tata Steel and became the Joint Director of Accounts, the no. 2 man – something that Mr. Mody had originally offered me.

Mr. Mody gave me two tasks at Tata Steel – to complete the merger and to go and “smell” Jamshedpur because what he had in mind for me was the position of Finance Director of Tata Steel. But he told me that in order to become the Finance Director it was necessary to go and live in Jamshedpur, to see what steel is about, imbibe the culture of Tata Steel and the Tatas.

OVER TO JAMSHEDPUR

I went to Jamshedpur as no. 2 but very unfortunately, the Director of Accounts (DOA) got a heart attack and took retirement. So I became the Director of Accounts. At that time, Mr. Mody was acquiring companies – Kumardhinbi Fire Clay, Metal Box Bearings Division, Dairy Ashmore. I dealt with all these three acquisitions, in addition to the ITC merger.

As Director of Accounts, I was truly overawed by the enormity of the job. The diversity of Tata Steel’s operations is best captured by the famous by-line “We also make Steel”. Furthermore, the Director of Accounts was not only responsible for accounting for such a diversified company, he was also responsible for despatches of all the steel from Jamshedpur. In other words, all the weighbridges came under the DOA’s charge.

Furthermore, the maintenance of attendance records, the Time Offices, which meant keeping a tab on some 45,000 people also came under the DOA’s jurisdiction. And you have to keep in mind this was in the ‘80s when there was very little computerisation. The departments reporting to me had a strength of 2000 people!

I often reflect on how I came through this “Baptism by fire”. As I said earlier that by and large, C.A.s have a high level of technical skills, but to manage a large body of people, one must have competence in inter-personal skills. I didn’t manage by sitting in my room. I was young then and I had boundless energy. I made it a point to be in touch with the troops, visit them informally and have some tea and pakoras with them. I would slap their backs, joke with them, motivate them – and I actually brought the overtime level down.

I treated my fellow professionals, about 150 of them, as equals and empowered them fully. I concentrated on doing things that I believed I could do better than anyone else and left the experts and specialists alone. However, I did not abdicate my responsibility and told them to come to me if they had a problem.

I was also very lucky with my choice of people. About two years into my tenure as DOA, I began a search for my successor. With the help of Mr. Mody, we selected Mr. R. Sankaran, from SAIL as the Joint Director of Accounts. Mr. Sankaran was an outstanding professional, some 15 years my senior and vastly more experienced than I was. I credit him for much of my success, not only when I was in Jamshedpur but later on when I moved to Bombay as Finance Director.

I truly believe that you must get people who are the best, even better than you, and if you have to work under them, then so be it. The organisation is more important than individuals. However, I have also learnt that what people value most is recognition and respect and who reports to whom is irrelevant. It is the team that matters.

Amongst the more significant impacts that I made as DOA in Jamshedpur was rationalising the manpower and setting the scene for the digital transformation which Tata Steel subsequently undertook.

With Mr. Sankaran in position and after completing four years in Jamshedpur, I told Mr. Mody I was ready for my next assignment.

MOVING TO BOMBAY HOUSE

I moved to Bombay House and became Finance Director. It was very interesting to work with Mr. Yezdi Malegam who was the Tata Steel Auditor and for whom I have the greatest respect. I think he is the finest accountant this country has ever had. I relied very heavily on him and he on me. We shared a very good relationship.

There was also Mr. Soonawala who was the Finance Director of Tata Sons. He was an outstanding man, a mentor in many ways. We all worked together as a team. We had only one objective – the good of the organisation. There were no personal agendas. This is where organisations fail and the culture you have to build is that of trust, a culture of respect. I did not give a damn about whether I was a Finance Director of Tata Sons or not. The respect, the treatment that I received, and gave, is what I value.

At Tata Steel, we did interesting things. We invented the SPN (Secured Premium Note). The financing of the entire modernisation programme of Tata Steel was an interesting challenge. I had Mr Tata and Mr Soonawala to advise and guide me. We worked collectively. Don’t be individualistic to seek credit. These are small things, but very vital in any organisation.

I attended Tata Steel Board meetings from 1984 when I became the Director of Accounts. Mr. JRD Tata was there – I saw him in action for 7 years. Mr. Nani Palkhivala was there, Mr. Keshub Mahindra was there. When I interacted with these people in the same boardroom, I was struck by their sense of decency. Although I was only 37 years old, they would listen to me, show me the courtesies. I developed confidence interacting with people like them.

TATA SKY IS DEAR TO MY HEART

In 1997-98, Mr. Tata was setting up his Group Executive Office. I had a very good relationship with him and had worked very closely with him. He was my Chairman. I used to meet him almost on a daily basis to report to him. So when he formed the Group Executive Office, he asked me to come and work with him. He said you can oversee Tata Steel as you know it so well now, get another man. So we brought in another person and I moved to Tata Sons as Executive Director with a clutch of companies to look after. And when Mr. Soonawala retired, I became Finance Director. I became Chairman of Voltas. I had earlier joined the Board of Titan in 1989 and was on the Board for 25 years! That was a terrific experience, tremendous breadth of businesses to be involved with – from steel to watches to jewellery and airconditioners. And when Tata Sky was formed, Mr. Tata told me to look after it. There was, of course, the telecom war, which was not a good story. I was also on the insurance companies for some time and eventually became chairman of two of them. In the meantime, there was the meltdown of Tata Finance. I became Chairman of Tata Finance, revived it and saved it. Tata Sons provided the money and there were a lot of people involved.

Tata Sky is very dear to my heart because I started it from scratch. I am so happy that it is likely to have an EBIDTA of over Rs.2,000 crores and a turnover of over Rs.6,500 crores. Its market valuation would probably be about $3 billion – it is an unquoted company.

It has been a very rewarding career. If I were to sum up, I would say that you have to do the right thing. Companies fail when they don’t do the right thing. Don’t get obstinate, don’t get arrogant, do the right thing. Do the right thing by people, build teams because it’s the people who deliver. People talk about strategy, I ask, what is strategy? Strategy for me is setting course. Once you have set your goal, go for it. You can strategise and decide what you want to do and how you want to do it. Once you have done that, then just execute.

This is what I have attempted to do in Tata Sky, in Voltas. When I took over Voltas, it was a Rs. 300 crore company (market cap), it used to make a profit of Rs. 40 to Rs.50 crores. By the time I left, it had a market cap of Rs. 20,000 crores. I was Chairman for 17 years and when I left it had cash of about Rs.1,800 crores and a pre-tax profit of Rs. 700 crores. People ask me, how did you do that? I say, I really don’t know. I just did my job. You just go to office and plunge into your job. My job was to set things right, get the teams in place. Just do the right thing, do it honestly, transparently and be execution-focussed.

(R): The big pillars of the Tata Group have stepped in and out; yet the culture continues. What is the secret behind keeping purpose and profit woven together in such a fine blend? Have these values ever taken precedence over business interests?

There is a certain ‘Tataness’. Where does it come from? I don’t know if I have the answer. There is a certain glue which keeps the group together. My feeling is that this comes from what the group stands for and that is what comes from the people must go back to the people. That is what Jamshetji Tata had said. The ownership structure of the Tata Group is such that we actually practice it – because whatever we do, eventually a large part of it goes back to the Trust, which it spends on charity. This, in my humble opinion, is the essence of it. That is how I felt. At the end of the day, kuch bhalaa kaam kiyaa. In the Tata Group, money is not an end; money is purely a means to an end. There is a certain-self actualisation and everybody across the group feels the same. Either they have thought through it, or they feel it. The Tata Trusts own 66 % of us, we are working for the trusts. The company is just a vehicle.

And we are very proud of our heritage. Of Jamshetji, Dorabji, JRD, Ratan Tata. Mr. Ratan Tata is an iconic figure. We have produced the only Bharat Ratna from the business world in this country. So many Padma Vibhushans, Padma Bhushans and Padma Shris have come from the Tata stable. Which organisation has achieved that? We are truly proud of this heritage. We feel proud of what we have given to the country. There is the TIFR (Tata Institute of Fundamental Research). The TISS (Tata Institute of Social Sciences). The Indian Institute of Science, Jamshedpur; Mithapur; Tata Motors in Pune; in Lucknow we have a huge plant. Wherever we have gone, we have served the community. Some human beings are driven just by money (I am not saying it is a bad thing). But many of us, after we reach a level of comfort, we want to give back. And that sense is very strong in the Tata Group.

When I spoke at the TISS the other day, I met a young lady who said she is doing work with the Tata Trusts. She said when she goes to talk to Tata Companies about CSR, she does not have to sell the concept of CSR to them. The connect is straightway. They know what CSR is. When she goes elsewhere, first of all people are really not interested. Secondly, she has to explain things to them. Thirdly, she doesn’t even know where she stands with them. So it all comes down to the Tata culture, our rich heritage with a very noble objective. And that is what I think keeps us together. We have had mishaps, but people forgive us.

(G): You worked with four group Chairmen. Can you share some stories about them, especially about JRD Tata!

In their own ways, they were all very exemplary people, exuding humility. The gap between me and Mr. JRD was very great. He was extremely courteous and correct. To give you an example…This was just after liberalisation in 1991. He was on the Board of Tata Steel but not Chairman (Mr. Mody was Chairman). Mr JRD was Chairman of Tata Sons. I was sitting in my room, my phone rang, it is not very often that he rang me up. He said this is ‘Jeh’ here (he called himself Jeh and we used to call him Mr. JRD). He said, are you busy? I said, not for you, Sir. He asked, are you sure? I said, absolutely sure. He said can you come up and have a cup of tea with me. I was perplexed! I went up to his office, very simple but elegant and classy. In fact, they have reconstructed his office in Pune.

When Mr. JRD used to sit in the chair in Tata Steel, he had 7 % of the vote, and although he was in charge and in control, he behaved as a person who only had a 7 % control. He would go round the table, he would speak very little, he would introduce the agenda, he would listen to everybody, forge a consensus. So that gives you a measure of the man and his transparency.

All the Chairmen I worked with were wonderful human beings, with a genuine heart for the less privileged. I have not seen that in many people – genuineness. They were all Deshbhakts. For them, anything that the group did, the question always asked was – is it good for the country. You look at our vision statements. It is all about the country. So that is what is remarkable about these people I have worked with – The Deshbhakts.

(R): How do the best Boards that you have been on deal with conflict of interest, particularly when promoters/groups control the Board? Any challenge you have come across as a Finance Director such as shared services, cross-charging, questionable transactions that need more probing – how did you deal with it as a Finance Director?

This is very easy to answer. No, I didn’t come across any challenge on this score. The problem of related-party transactions arises when people start having personal agendas.

(R): How does a large group like the Tatas handle the challenge of Related-Party Transactions?

As I said, the issue of related-party transactions and suspicion around them arises when people start having personal agendas. For us in the Tata Group, the culture discourages personal agendas and requires a high-level of integrity. We treat the independent Boards as truly independent Boards and all related-party transactions are entered into transparently, with an emphasis on substance over form.

(G): Conflict of Interest in respect of auditors – several firms have business entities with business relationship with audit clients. What are the best practices that Boards should follow from a legal and especially from an ethical point of view?

This is definitely an issue and a contentious one. While the Institute has laid down guidelines in this regard, I believe the accounting firms, particularly the Big 4, have to make a case for providing other services along with providing audit services. If providing just audit services is not a viable proposition, then it would appear to me that we do have a serious problem. To treat the audit as a loss leader, if that is so, is not an acceptable argument.

(R): From your long career as a Board member, have you seen expectations from auditors change – over the 80s to 90s to now – do Boards expect something different from what they used to?

No – it hasn’t remained static. I think what has really changed is the formation of Audit Committees. The formation of Audit Committees is a great innovation and a great force for good. Auditors now have a forum where they can strongly put their point of view across and they have time. It is up to the auditors now to make use of this forum to be much more forceful.

I think auditors must ask themselves – what does the man on the street expect from an auditor? How does he read an audit report? Is it true and fair, is it an opinion, or is it a certificate? The second point that I want to make is that the man on the street does not buy that the auditor is a watchdog, he wants the auditor to be a bloodhound. We were taught that the auditor is a watchdog and not a bloodhound. But now the ordinary man wants him to be a bloodhound.

(G): But from a practical perspective, considering the time limitations for an auditor, is it possible for him to be a bloodhound?

Given the technology that we have today, I think it is possible to be a bloodhound. Today everything is on the computer. Plug in your software and you can do a hundred percent check in 5 minutes. I think we have the technology to be a bloodhound.

(G): You feel an auditor should adopt technology better and work differently?

Of course. You can use it for fraud prevention. If I was the auditor, I would look at what the internal audit is doing; it should be the internal auditor’s duty to do checks on every transaction in real time. If they were not doing it, I would make an observation in the Auditor’s Report.

The other issue is – what do people really expect their Auditors to be signing off on? They are only giving a true and fair view. They are not giving the company a clean bill of health, right? But it should not be that you sign the accounts today and the company collapses tomorrow.

And this is why I believe Auditors must question the “going concern” assumption very closely before they sign off. The “going concern” assumption is that the business will be viable for the next 12 months. I strongly urge that Auditors should examine de novo the “going concern” assumption every year.

That brings me to my favourite topic – “cash profit” vs. “accounting profit”. As Chairman, I would start all my monthly, quarterly and annual accounts presentations by first looking at the cash flow statement. You start there and look at the key ratio of how much of your operating profit, how much of your PAT, is getting converted into cash. The cash flow should be the principle statement of account. It should not be item no. 3. It should be item no. 1. I don’t know if you studied the Carillion case…

(R): Yes. I have.

While they were reporting accounting profits, if you looked at their cash flows, there was clearly no case for declaring dividends for the last few years. It is the Directors who are charged with recommending payment of dividends, and given the cash situation, I am amazed how they could declare dividends while borrowings were rising alarmingly. Incidentally, the Auditors have come in for heavy criticism including for allowing the payment of dividends. This is clearly being unfair to the Auditors, but just goes to show peoples’ expectations from Auditors.

(R): Any views on Fair Value, Estimates and Judgements that now are a legitimate part of most financial statements – the shift from historical cost and prudence to market-linked approach?

The accounting that I learnt sought primarily to preserve the entity’s capital. From this grew the conventions of historic cost, prudence, accruals and going concern. If in any situation there was a conflict between prudence and the other conventions, then prudence would prevail. The historic cost convention has the advantage of verifiability. It is imperative that all the numbers in the financial statements are verifiable. While the argument for fair market value and mark to market are theoretically compelling, but in practice are very difficult to implement with any degree of certainty and objectivity.

The classic example of this difficulty was when options given by AIG to Goldman Sachs were valued and each party ended up with claims against the other party!

As I mentioned earlier, in ICI under instructions from the holding company we attempted inflation accounting in the ‘80s which tended to modify the historic cost convention. The idea was abandoned after a few trials because of the highly subjective nature of the assumptions that required to be made.

Therefore, to sum up, while I am sympathetic to the idea of fair value accounting, for the reasons explained earlier, I wouldn’t vote for it. However, even though my vote doesn’t count and Accounting Standards have accepted Fair Valuation Accounting, I would still urge that all unrealised gains arising from Fair Value Accounting should only be booked through other comprehensive income.

While “intangibles” are inherently difficult to value, and in many cases constitute a significant part of the balance sheet, one intangible in particular I would like to touch upon is goodwill arising on acquisition. Under extant accounting standards, goodwill is subject only to impairment testing. I have earlier spoken of my reservations about fair value accounting, and in the case of goodwill arising on acquisition, I strongly believe it should be amortised over a period of time. I’d like to draw your attention to a very interesting case I came across recently concerning Adidas in Germany. Adidas was carrying a large value for goodwill arising from an acquisition it made some 12 years ago. In Germany, they have a super regulator for financial reporting who disagreed on the value of goodwill being carried by Adidas, and the regulator forced Adidas to write down the value of goodwill.

(G): We saw some auditor resignations recently and some last-minute resignations. How do you see the role of auditors; any shortcomings you notice as a Board member?

Very good. I am wholly supportive of it. If they are not satisfied, and if the auditors take a stand, managements and boards can do nothing about it. I am not saying that they should become unreasonable. Be professional. Be what you were trained for. Be what you are taught in the classroom. Practice it. Don’t be unreasonable. I tell my friends who always knock auditors: I say to them, the auditor is a bit like the Reserve Bank of India. If the Reserve Bank of India says this bank is in trouble, there will be a run on the bank. If the auditor says that this company is not a going concern, there will be a run on it and it will pack up. This is a huge dilemma and I would advise auditors to make use of the regulators when they face this dilemma.

(G): SEBI has some regulations that if the auditor is qualifying, then the company can be forced to restate the accounts.

I am not aware of the regulation, but I don’t see any harm in it. In any case, the accounting standards do cover such eventualities.

(R): But isn’t it a matter of judgement where there is an element of subjectivity?

There you have to take materiality. If this judgement goes wrong, does this company go bankrupt? It depends on materiality.

(R): Has the idea of success changed over the years and how?

Yes, it has certainly evolved. I was very designation conscious at one point of time and I thought that that would be the measure of success. But that changed completely. Designations became irrelevant. At one point, money was important. But as I got better paid and I built up some assets – money became less important – how could I be helpful and useful? That became a great source of encouragement for me to continue.

(R): Some takeaways for the present generation!

Work hard, continuously widen your horizons, go beyond finance and accounting, go beyond business, have hobbies and you must play the game beyond the prize. Do your best. I can assure you that if you do your best, the results will come. I have not seen anybody who has tried and the result has not come.

You must have noticed I have stressed a lot on leadership and behavioural issues. I have done this for two reasons.
Firstly, while there is a lot of talk around this issue, I haven’t seen people really walking the talk. Secondly, peoples’ expectations of good Corporate behaviour is continuously increasing.Corporate behaviour and a company’s culture are strongly co-related. Hence, leadership and behavioural attitudes assume considerable significance.

Riding The Reset Button Constantly

Twelve
full moons have passed, and so have 360 sunrises as I write this. Holidays and
observances have gone by! Chartered Accountants are known to keep burning the
mid night oil to meet deadlines after deadlines. The year is over, Sir! It is
already Diwali.

 

Time
has flown by, to never return. Time is invisible, touching all there is. Time
is a temptress – every day looks like another day – but it really isn’t! The
Sanskrit word for time is Kaala. The word Kaala shares its root
with the Sanskrit words for death and black. Perhaps they all – time, black and
death – represent that which absorbs everything to a point of no return to its
original state. This Editorial therefore focuses on something to ponder around
the New Year.

 

Yuval
Noah Harai in his latest book – 21 Lessons for the 21st Century
– writes about three threats staring at humans – Technology, Nuclear War and
Climate Change. A compelling new vision is not coming through in our fragmented
world order – from political, business or spiritual sides. How connected and
how evolved we are and yet how fragmented and shallow are some of our actions.
Take the recent Living Planet Report 2018. It tells a tale of what
humans have done so far to life around them. Homo sapiens have destroyed 95% of
all species that have ever come to this planet; since 1970, 60% of all wildlife
that existed then is extinct by manmade causes. Yet we are going on as if it is
business as usual. While we are focused on a $80 trillion world economy (or
whatever that number is), Nature gives us services worth $125 trillion per
year. Some of what humans do is not just cruel, but outright stupid too. No
other creature goes on a binge to destroy itself like humans.
The word
Amazon brings an image of the online retail store these days, but 20% of the
real Amazon (forest) got wiped out in the last 20 years! Guess what –
consumption has played a big part in it. In other words: Amazons kill Amazon.
By Amazons, I mean the entire economic chain that entices us to consume. All
that we got and all that we need has its source in Nature. Just imagine the
pressure humans put on the planet – since circa 1800 the global population has
grown 7 times and Economic growth has been 444 times. Reading the report made
me wonder how misplaced our tools of measurement and epistemology of growth
are. We are moving fast but in the reverse gear!

 

On
the other hand there is good news. A new generation is re-shaping a messed up
planet – it does not want to own, does not need more and so it does not consume
like a maniac. This generation gets free news from the internet, sources free
books online1, believes in solar and wind energy2, they
are creating a sharing economy3. While the last generation bought
toys for their kids, this generation borrows toys from an online platform and
tells their children to take care of them, so that other children after them
will be able to play with them. This promise of change from ownership and
possession to sharing and circular economy – is a change in human thinking that
challenges present economic laws, legal structures, ideas of nations and rancid
belief systems. As one author writes, Geopolitics will be replaced with a
biosphere consciousness4. This silent transition will replace
consumerism by sustainability, capital by social capital, and being rich by
being valuable.

___________________________________

1    Even
the E Book share has nearly doubled in last 5 years to 25% of total book sales.

2  Germany’s
share of solar power is 7.5% of total consumption and India 2.2%. China has
added solar assets like never before – 43,530 MW in 2015 to 131,000 MW in
2017. 

3  Statistics
say that sharing economy can eliminate 80% vehicles. Additionally, they will be
replaced by EV and perhaps driverless cars.

4   Refer ‘The Third Industrial Revolution’ by
Jeremy Rifkin.

 



Exclusivity
is substituted by inclusivity; a pyramid structure is giving way to open
source. People are realising that forest fires, floods, landslides have a
connection with hamburger and the beef5  in it. Simply speaking, many are finding out
that everything is interconnected and all that we do intimately affects someone
else and will boomerang back to us. 

 

End
of 2016, I decided that through 2017 I won’t buy anything for myself (except
food) – like fasting on most forms of consumption. I could manage. As we march
into the New Year: let us consider to Refuse. Reduce. Reuse. Recycle. As
we begin the New Year let us consider offering back to the planet because if it
is not YOU then who and if is not NOW, then when?

New
Year means new beginnings – a cut-off to draw up a balance sheet of life and
revisit the reset button and stay at the beginning. As Jim Carrey puts it: “…Now
I am always at the beginning. I have a reset button. And I ride that button
constantly”.
This festive season BCAJ wishes you and your family the very
best to ride that reset button whenever you need it all through a wonderful New
Year!

 

_________________________________________________________

5   The second biggest cause of climate change
supposedly is methane emissions from animals. Popular beef requires 28 times
more land than chicken and pork, 11 times more water, and results in 5 times
more climate warming emissions. Compared to potatoes, wheat and rice: impact of
beef per calorie is 160 times more land and 11 times more green house gases.

 

 Raman Jokhakar

Editor

BCAS – E-Learning Platform
(https://bcasonline.courseplay.co/)

Sr. No.

Course Name E-Learning Platform

Name of the BCAS
Committee

Date, Time and Venue

Course Fees (INR)**

Members

Non – Members

1

Three Days Workshop On Advanced
Transfer Pricing

International Taxation
Committee

As
per your
convenience

5550/-

6350/-

2

Four
Day Orientation Course on Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA)

International
Taxation
Committee

As
per your
convenience

7080/-

8260/-

3

Workshop
on Provisions & Issues – Export/ Import / Deemed Export/ SEZ Supplies

Indirect
Taxation Committee

As
per your
convenience

1180/-

1475/-

4

7th
Residential Study Course On Ind As

Accounting
& Auditing
Committee

As
per your
convenience

2360/-

2360/-

5

Full
Day Seminar On Estate Planning, Wills and Family Settlements

Corporate
& Allied Laws Committee

As
per your
convenience

1180/-

1180/-

6

Workshop
on “Foreign Tax Credit”

International
Taxation
Committee

As
per your
convenience

1180/-

1475/-

7

Panel
Discussion on Analysis of PE
Constitution – “Recent Judicial
Pronouncements including MasterCard, Nokia Networks and Formula One.”

International
Taxation
Committee

As
per your
convenience

472/-

708/-

8

12th
Residential Study Course on GST

Indirect
Taxation Committee

As
per your
convenience

5900/-

N. A

9

Seminar
on Tax Audit

Taxation
Committee

As
per your
convenience

2065/

2596/-

10

Full
day Seminar on Charitable
Trusts – Critical Aspects

Corporate
& Allied Laws Committee

As
per your
convinience

2301/-

2773/-

11

BCAS
Initiative – Educational Series
on GST

Indirect
Taxation Committee

As
per your
convinience

Free

Free

12

GST
Training program for Trade, Industry and Profession

Indirect
Taxation Committee

As
per your
convinience

Free

Free

 

**Course Fee is
inclusive of 18% GST.

For more details, please contact Javed Siddique at 022
– 61377607 or email to events@bcasonline.org



Desire a Defeat

India can boast of a very rich tradition of
‘Guru-Shishya-Parampara’ i.e. mentor-disciple relationship. In ancient India,
there was a Gurukul  system where
the sages (gurus) stayed in their Ashrama (hermitage) in jungles.  Pupils used to go to the Ashramas to stay
there for 12 long years to acquire knowledge. The Guru and his wife were
virtually the parents of the pupils. This helped to develop a strong bonding
between the Guru and Shishya. In today’s era of mass-education, this tradition
is practically extinct.

 

However, the remnants of this system can be found in present
times only in a few fields like art (music, dance) and our profession of CAs in
the form of mandatory articleship. Usually, when we come across a good singer,
we immediately ask – who is his Guru. Similarly, in the case of a bright CA, he
is asked about his principal during articleship.

 

There are certain principles which were observed in this
tradition in olden days.

 

First is ‘Acharya devo bhava’.  People wrongly take the meaning of this
saying as ‘Guru is God’. Actually, it is not such a plain statement; but
it is in the imperative sense – meaning ‘you become the believer that Guru
is God’
.

 

Secondly, there was a ban on Gurus not to impart the
knowledge to an ‘ashishya’ i.e. undeserving pupil. Only an ‘Adhikari’,
one who is endowed with the prerequisite virtues could be considered worthy of
receiving knowledge. If anybody undeserving receives knowledge, he is
considered as a sinner.

 

Thirdly, there is a popular shloka (verse):

  

People mistake it to be a mantra to be recited before meals (Bhojana-mantra).
They are under an impression that the mantra means ‘Let’s come together and
have meals’.  Actually, it is a mantra –
which carries the essence of the relationship between teacher and student. Its
recitation is meant to remind the Guru and Shishya of this sacred bond in the
endeavour of learning. Its meaning is:

 

May both of us (Guru and Shishya) be protected by the
Divine,

May the Divine nourish both of us. 

Let both of us together perform great tasks with great
energy and vigour,


May our study bring us purity and light;

May there never be any hostility Let us not hate or be
jealous of each other! Let us not act as rivals.

 

(Today we find strange relationships of jealousy or cheating
between a Ph.D guide and his student!)

 

Finally, the ultimate thought is –



One should always expect to win in all situations; but should
desire to get defeated (surpassed) by one’s son and pupil. Such principle was
implemented by many – the prominent examples being Guru Dronacharya and Arjun;
Shree Ramkrishna Paramahansa and Swami Vivekananda.

 

So, let us all CAs try to uphold this rich
tradition while dealing with our articled students!

MVAT updates

Extension  of  due  date 
for  filling  of 
refund application for F.Y. 2014-15

Trade Circular 30T of 2016 dated 1.10.2016

Due  to technical problem in the system of MSTD,
due date of filing refund application in Form 501 for the financial year
2014-15  is extended for 7 days that is
from 30.9.2016 to 8.10.2016.

Extension of time limit under
Settlement act, 2016 and clarification on certain issues Trade Circular 31T of
2016 dated 1.10.2016

By this Circular, time limit in
maharashtra Settlement of arrears in dispute act, 2016 is extended from
30-9-2016 to 15-11-2016 and some issues have been clarified..

First Phase Go Live of e-payment under SAP – TRM new automation process

Trade Circular 32T of 2016 dated 27.10.2016

Many tax payers are having their
accounts in private banks and co op banks and as such they are unable to make
tax payments through e banking. Therefore, 
department has developed and expanded facility so that tax payments can
be done through more number of banks. System has been explained in this
Circular.

e-Returns w.r.t.Maharashtra Tax on the Entry of Goods into Local Areas
Act, 2002

Trade Circular 33T of 2016 dated 27.10.2016

e Service facility to file
electronic returns to the importers registered under the maharashtra tax on the
entry of Goods into local  area act.2002
has started and step by step procedure is explained in this Circular.

Service Tax updates

Exemption on payment to State Government Industrial    Development    Undertakings    reg.
lease of plots

Notification No.41/2016-ST dated 22. 09. 2016

Central Government has exempted
Service tax on one time upfront amount paid to State Government industrial
development Corporations/ undertakings for granting of long term lease of industrial
plots to industrial units.

Exemption to advancement of Yoga

Notification No. 42/2016-ST dated 26. 09. 2016

CBEC through this notification
exempts the Service Tax on the services by way of advancement of yoga provided
by an entity registered under section 12AA of the income tax act
retrospectively to services rendered during the period 01.07.2012 to
20.10.2015.

Return Form ST 3 amended

Notification No. 43/2016-ST dated
28. 09. 2016

The CBEC has amended half
yearly Service Tax Return Form ST 3 by issuing notification namely ‘Service Tax
(Third   amendment)  rules, 2016’ to  facilitate 
changes in tables relating to the details of CENVAT, payment and
liability of Krishi Kalyan Cess & detailed disclosure of reversal under CENVAT
Credit Rule 6(3A) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. this amended ST-3 form shall be
applicable from the date of publication of this notification in the official
gazette.

Issue of Notice by Department- revision of monetary limits

Notification No. 44/2016-ST dated 28. 09. 2016

Central Government has, vide this
notification, amended the adjudication powers of the officers.

Under the revised limits, the
Superintendent can issue notice provided that for the amount of service tax or CENVAT
credit specified in the notice should not exceed Rs. 10 lakhs (excluding the
cases relating to taxability of services or valuation of services and cases
involving extended period of limitation). Similarly in case of notice by
assistant Commissioner or deputy Commissioner such amount should not exceed Rs.
50 lakhs (except cases where Superintendents are empowered to adjudicate). For
the joint  Commissioner or additional
Commissioner such amount is Rs. 50 lakhs and above but not exceeding Rs. 2
crores. While for the Commissioner there is no such monetary limit.

Exemption on transportation to Educational Institutions

Notification No. 45/2016-ST dated 30. 09. 2016

By this notification, Government
has exempted Service tax on transportation facility by educational institutions
to students, faculty and staff for the period commencing on and from the first
day of April, 2013 and ending with the tenth day of July, 2014 which was not
being collected by the educational institutions in view of the generally
prevalent practice.

M/S. J. K. Lakshmi Cement Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Civil Appeal No.102 of 2010, 16th Sep- tember, 2016 , SC.

Central Sales Tax – Exemption From Payment of Tax Or Concessional Rate
of Tax – Notification u/S. 8(5) – under Two Separate Notifications – Not
allowed, Section 8(5) of The Central Sales tax, act, 1956.

Facts

The   appellant, 
a  Public  limited  
Company  incorporated under the
Companies act, 1956, is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
Grey Portland Cement. in exercise of powers conferred by section 8(5) of the
Central Sales tax act, 1956 (for short, “CST act”), the Government of Rajasthan
had issued a Notification No. F4(72)FD/Gr. IV/81- 18 dated 06.05.1986 allowing
partial exemptions from the sales tax payable in respect of inter-state sales
in the manner and subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Partial
exemption was granted under the said notification at the rate of 50%/75% on the
basis of increase in the percentage of the entire inter-state sales and
decrease in percentage of stock transfers but the benefit under the said
notification was not available on levy cement. from the assessment year 1989-90
to 1997-98 the appellant had been granted benefit of partial exemption under
the notification dated 06.05.1986 except for the assessment year 1995-96 and
1996-97 as no claims were made by the appellants being not eligible. By
Notification no. 97-122 dated 12.03.1997 issued u/s. 8(5) of the CST act, the
State Government rescinded the Notification No. 94-70 dated 07.03.1994 and
directed that CST  on inter-State sales
of cement shall be calculated at the rate of 4%, inter alia, subject to
fulfillment of the condition that the dealer making inter-State sales under
this notification shall not be eligible to claim benefit provided by partial
exemption notification dated 06.05.1986. further, in exercise of power u/s.
8(5) of the CST act, the State Government vide Notification No. 97-266 dated 21.1.2000
directed that tax payable under sub-sections (1) and (2) of the said Section on
the inter-state sales of cement shall be calculated at the rate of 6%, inter
alia, subject to the condition that the dealer making inter-state sales under
this notification shall not be eligible to claim benefit provided under partial
exemption notification dated 06.05.1986. After a lapse of seven years from the
previous circular dated 15.04.1994, the CCT issued another Circular no.
94-95/119 dated 16.04.2001 purporting to clarify the applicability of partial
exemption notification  dated  06.05.1986  vis-a-vis 
notification  dated 07.03.1994 and
subsequent notifications dated 12.03.1997 and 21.01.2000. By the said circular,
the competent authority purported to state that the dealer can avail the
benefit of either of these two notifications in any financial year meaning
thereby that if he opts for the benefit under notification dated 06.05.1986 for
the year 2000-2001, he would not be entitled to claim simultaneous benefit in
respect of the same year under the notification dated 21.01.2000. The
Department Held that as per circular dated 16.04.2001 the benefit could not be
claimed under notification dated 06.05.1986 if the unit had made sales under
notification dated 21.01.2000. It was Held that benefit of both the
notifications could not be availed of in the same financial year.

The High Court in appeal, filed
by the appellant, confirmed the order of Rajasthan Board allowing the appeal
filed by the Department. The appellant company filed appeal before the SC.

Held

The circular dated 15.04.1994,
when in force, had referred to the notifications dated 07.03.1994 as well as
06.05.1986. Under the notification dated 07.03.1994, the rate of central sales
tax on inter-State sale of cement was unconditionally fixed at 4%, even when
there was no declaration in form  C and
form  d. The notification dated
06.05.1986 relating to inter-State sale required Form C and Form D, for
availing the benefit. The circular did not in clear and categorical terms lay
down that dual or multiple benefits under the two notifications could be
availed of by the same dealer. it, however, appears that both the assessee as
well as the revenue had understood the circular dated 15.04.1994 to mean that
inter-state transactions would qualify and would be entitled to partial
exemption under the notification dated 06.05.1986, when accompanied with
form  C and d and for inter-state sale
transactions without Form C and D, benefit of notification dated 07.03.1994
would apply. The understanding by the assessee and the revenue, in obtaining
factual matrix, has its own limitation. it is because the principle of res-
judicata would have no application in spite of the understanding by the
assessee and the revenue, for the circular dated 15.04.1994, is not to the specific
effect as suggested and, further notification dated 07.03.1994 was valid
between 1st  april, 1994 up to 31st  march, 1997 (upto 31st march, 1997 vide
notification dated 12.03.1997) and not thereafter. The Commercial tax
department, by a circular, could have extended the benefit under a notification
and, therefore, principle of estoppel would apply, though there are authorities
which opine that a circular could not have altered and restricted the
notification to the detriment of the assessee. Circulars issued under tax
enactments can tone down the rigour of law, for an authority which wields power
for its own advantage is given right to forego advantage when required and
considered necessary. This power to issue circulars is for just, proper and
efficient management of the work and in public interest. It is a beneficial
power for proper administration of fiscal law, so that undue hardship may not
be caused. Circulars are binding on the authorities administering the enactment
but cannot alter the provision of the enactment, etc. to the detriment of the
assessee.

The controversy herein centres
round the period from 1st april, 2001 to 31st 
march, 2002. The period in question is mostly post the circular dated
16.04.2001. The appellant­ assessee has pleaded to take benefit of the circular
dated 15.04.1994, which stands withdrawn and was only applicable to the
notification dated 07.03.1994. It was not specifically applicable to the
notification dated 21.01.2000. The fact that the third paragraph of the notification
dated 21.01.2000 is identically worded to the third paragraph of the
notification dated 07.03.1994 but that would not by itself justify the
applicability of circular dated 15.04.1994.

Accordingly, the SC dismissed the
appeal, filed by the appellant, and Held that due to language of notifications
the appellant cannot take benefit of concession under both notifications in
same financial year.

M/S. Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. State of Karna- taka, Civil Appeal No. 4003 of 2007, dated 2nd September, 2016, SC.

Entry Tax – Exemption – Packing material is used For Packing of Tea
-Not Raw material – Not Exempt When Only Raw material is Exempt – Section 11a
of The Karnataka Tax on Entry of goods act, 1979.

Facts

The appellant is a public limited
company, having a tea manufacturing unit at dharwad (Karnataka) and various
other units which also manufacture tea. The tea manufactured by the appellant
is of three types, namely, packet tea, tea in tea bags, and quick brewing black
tea. The appellant claimed that its dharwad unit, as opposed to the other units
manufacturing tea, is a new unit and is, therefore, exempt altogether from
payment of entry tax on packing material of tea under a notification dated
31.3.1993 issued u/s. 11A of the Karnataka tax on entry of Goods act, 1979. Insofar
as the other units are concerned, it is the case of the appellant they are
covered by Explanation II to a Notification dated 23.9.1998 issued u/s.3 of the
said act, and “packing material” being covered by the said explanation would
entitle them to pay entry tax at the rate of 1% and not 2%. all the authorities
under the entry tax act i.e. the assessing authority, the first appellate
authority and the Karnataka appellate tribunal have Held that packing material
cannot be regarded as raw material, component parts or inputs used in the
manufacture of finished goods and, therefore, in the context of the Entry tax
act, read with Schedule i, such packing material is neither exempt nor
chargeable at the rate of 1% on a true construction of the notifications of
1993 and 1998. The High Court in turn also dismissed the revision petitions
filed under the statute by the assessee. the question that arises for decision
in appeal before SC was whether “packing materials” which enter the local, area
for consumption therein, that is for packing tea that is manufactured by the appellant,
can be said to be raw material, components, or inputs used in the manufacture
of tea for the purpose of either of exemption or liable to lower rate of tax of
1% instead of 2%.

Held

In the context of the entry tax
act, the difference between “goods” used in the manufacture of goods and
“packing material” is also brought out by Schedule i. Packing materials are
separately defined in Entry 66. On the other hand, raw material, component
parts and inputs, which are used in the 
manufacture  of  an 
intermediate  or  finished 
product, are separately and distinctively given in entry 80 thereof. The
context of the entry tax act therefore is clear. When raw material, component
parts and inputs are spoken of, obviously they refer to material, components
and things which go into the finished product, namely, tea in the present case,
and cannot be extended to cover packing material of the said tea which is
separately provided for by the aforesaid entry 66. The notification dated
23.9.1998 issued u/s. 3 uses identical language as that contained in entries 66
and 80 of Schedule I to the Entry Tax Act. Equally, notification dated
31.3.1993 is an exemption notification issued u/s. 11A which also uses the
identical language of Entry 8 of Schedule I. Thus, notification cannot be read
to include “packing material” as “raw material, component parts  or 
inputs  used in the manufacture”
of tea. Accordingly, the SC dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant and
judgment of High Court was affirmed.

2016 (44) STR 258 (Tri-Ahmd.) Newlight Hotels 25 & Resorts Ltd. vs. CCE & ST, Vadodara

Classification of service cannot be changed at service recipient’s end.

Facts

The appellant received management
consultancy services. However, department intended to classify it as Business
auxiliary Services. Relying on numerous judicial pronouncements, it was
contested that classification by service provider cannot be changed at
recipient’s end. It was argued that service provider had paid service tax under
management consultancy category at the behest of revenue and therefore,
classification cannot be altered.

Held

Relying on CCE Pondicherry vs.
Mohan Breweries & Distilleries Limited 2010 (259) ELT 176 (Mad.) and also
on Sarvesh Refractories Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE & C 2007 (218) ELT 488 (SC), it
was Held that classification cannot be changed at service recipient’s end.
Credit of service tax paid cannot be denied or reduced on the grounds that
classification was wrongly done by service provider. Accordingly, appeal was
allowed.

2016 (44) STR 97 (Tri-All.) LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C.Ex. &S.T., Noida

Whether CENVAT credit on employees shifting expenses are admissible.
(Period of dispute – prior to 2011)

Facts

The appellant had incurred
expenses including freight charges on shifting and relocation of its employees
in accordance with transfer policy of its business and availed CENVAT credit of
service tax paid on the said services. The said credit was disallowed on the
contention that the said services have no nexus with the business, shifting of
employee was not an activity of the business.

Held

Relying on ruling, in the case of
“CCE vs. Ultratech Cement Ltd. – 2010 (20) S.T.R. 577 (Bom.), where the hon’ble
High Court Held that the definition of “input service” is not restricted to
services used in or in relation to the business of manufacturing the final
product, input service is defined illustratively and not
restrictively/exhaustively. And restriction if any is imposed post year 2011,
only if such travel expenses are of primarily of personal use and consumption.
Prior to 2011, such expenses are allowable if the same are provided to
employees in general expenditure in relation to the business of the assesse.

Appeal was allowed with
consequential relief to appellant.

2016 (44) STR 65 (Tri-Mumbai) Kolland Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of C.Ex., Nagpur

Whether refund claim of SEZ developer can be rejected on the ground
that input services on which refund sought were not pre-approved from approval
Committee before its availment?

Facts

The Appellant was a developer of
SEZ and had filed a refund claim in respect of input services availed in terms
of the notification 12/2013-S.T. dated 01/07/2013. The refund claim was
rejected by the lower authorities on the ground that the specified input
services were not approved at the time of its availment.

Before the tribunal, the
appellant, relying on the decision of 
“mahindra  engineering  Services 
ltd –  2015  (38) S.t.r. 841 (tri.-mum)”, argued that
erstwhile exemption notification (09/2009-ST) did not mandate pre-approval of
services before its availment.

Held

The tribunal observed that, in
case of “Mahindra Engineering Services Ltd.”, the said notification was an
exemption notification and at the time of availment, the conditions of
exemption have to be fulfilled. However, the Notification No. 12/2013 (which is
under dispute) provides for refund of tax paid on specified input services
which are approved by approval committee and to avail the exemption the
assessee must fulfill the conditions of the said notifications at the time of
availing the services. Accordingly, appeal was dismissed and refund claim
rejection was Held to be appropriate.

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 4 (Hyderabad-CESTAT) – Spandana Spoorthy Financial Ltd. vs. Com- missioner, Hyderabad

fiogf49gjkf0d

Tribunal affirmed appellant’s entitlement to CENVAT credit for period
prior to registration and utilisation thereof for discharging service tax
demanded for such period.

Facts

The appellant, engaged in micro
finance  Business, was not registered
with service tax department from April 2004 till june  2009. In June 
2009, when statutory auditors pointed 
out  this  fact, appellant obtained  opinion 
from their consultants and applied for service tax registration. Part of
the liability for the period prior to June 
2009 was discharged by adjustment of CENVAT credit pertaining to that
period and balance liability was paid in cash along with interest. on scrutiny
of records in august 2009, department issued SCN to appellant by invoking
extended period of limitation by alleging suppression of Facts by appellant
with intention to evade service tax liability and also proposed to deny
availment of CENVAT credit on the ground that rule 3(4) of CCR, 2004 permits
utilisation of CENVAT credit only to the extent such credit is available on the
last day of the month or quarter for which tax liability is being discharged. The
appellant challenged invocation of extended period and also submitted that the
case is covered by provision of section 73(3) of the finance  act, 1994 as entire liability was discharged
prior to scrutiny by department.

Held

As regards eligibility for CENVAT
credit, the hon’ble CeStat opined that if and when the department demands
service tax liability for taxable services rendered during a particular period,
a corresponding right shall accrue to the assessee entitling him to avail of CENVAT
credit on CENVATable documents evidencing inputs or capital goods or input
services received by such assessee during the same period, subject to the
conditionalities envisaged in CCr, 2004. as regards rule 3(4) of CCr, 2004 the
tribunal  Held that it merely puts cap on
the credit that can be ‘utilised’ for payment of duty or tax and not on the
quantum that be ‘availed’. The tribunal relied upon decisions in cases of
mPortal India Wireless Solutions (P.) Ltd vs. CST [2011] 16 taxmann.com 353
(Kar.), Nitesh residency Hotels (P.) Ltd. vs. CST [Misc. Order No. 27030/2013,
dated 27-8-2013], Amar Remedies vs. CCE 2010 (257) ELT 552 (Tri-Ahd.) and C.
Metric Solution (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE [2013] 31 taxmann.com 344,to hold that
appellant was entitled to availment and utilisation of CENVAT credit on the
basis of documentary evidences for the period prior to obtaining registration.

As regards applicability of
proviso to section 73(3) the hon’ble tribunal Held that since major part of
duty which was adjusted by CENVAT credit was in dispute, issuance of SCn is
legal and the said proviso is not applicable.

As regards invocation of extended
period, the tribunal affirmed allegations of suppression on the ground that
appellant neither filed returns nor approached department for clarifying
taxability of services rendered by them. however, penalties imposed u/s. 78
were dropped on the basis of finding that as appellant was not aware of tax
liability ab initio, non-payment thereof cannot be said to be done knowingly
and even adjudicating authority took note of the fact that appellant become
aware of its liability only after obtaining opinion from consultants.

{Note: readers may note that, although the tribunal  on one hand has Held that invocation of
extended period is justified and on other hand has deleted the penalty u/s. 78,
hon’ble Bombay high  Court in the case of
Saswad Mali Sugar Factory Ltd vs. CCE, Pune [2014] 44 taxmann.com 149 has Held
that conditions for invocation of extended period of limitation u/s. 73(1) and
the conditions for imposing penalty u/s. 78 are identical. therefore both the
provisions go hand-in-hand, and if one did not survive, the other also cannot
be invoked.}

[2016] 72 taxmann.com 5 (Mumbai-CESTAT) – Dhanshree Ispat vs. Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Aurangabad

fiogf49gjkf0d

If, commission agent, who arranges for transportation of goods, pays
tax on gTa services and claims reimbursement thereof from its customer, input
tax credit of tax paid on gTa services is not allowable in terms of CCR, 2004.

Facts

The appellant, a commission agent,
handled receipt of goods from principal and transportation to the buyers. The
appellant discharged service tax liability as a provider of “goods transport
agency” and also recovered the said tax paid towards Gta services from the
buyers of goods who were contractually required to reimburse freight charges
along with taxes paid thereon to the appellant. While discharging service tax
liability on his commission income, the appellant claimed CENVAT credit of tax
paid on Gta services. Revenue denied availment of CENVAT credit on the ground
that for Gta services, the appellant was acting only as agent of the buyers and
hence, he cannot be said to be discharging tax on Gta services on its own
account and accordingly, is not eligible for CENVAT claim.

Held

The Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal
affirmed the denial of CENVAT credit by holding that the activity of
“transportation of goods” as undertaken by the appellant is same as other
agency functions rendered by the appellant on reimbursement basis and hence, it
does not constitute performance of taxable service by appellant, so as to
entitle the appellant to claim CENVAT credit thereof.

As regards imposition of penalty
u/s. 78 of the finance act, 1994 for period covered by second show cause
notice, the hon’ble tribunal Held that when second show cause notice (SCN) is
issued within few months after first SCN is issued, it is not open for revenue
to contend suppression of Facts and resultantly, in absence of clear evidence
of suppression with intention to evade service tax payment, levy of penalty
u/s.78 in relation to second period of demand is not proper.

[2016-TIOL-2576-CESTAT-DEL] M/s. Marud- han Motors vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Jaipur-II

fiogf49gjkf0d

Trading cannot be considered as an exempted service prior to April 2011

Facts

The   appellant, 
a  service  provider, 
was  also  engaged in trading activities. CENVAT credit
on common input services was disallowed under rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit
rules, 2004 on the ground that trading activity should be considered as
exempted service in terms of rule 2(e) of the said rules. Since separate
accounts were not maintained, reversal was demanded in accordance with  rule 6(3a) 
of  the  said 
rules  and  the 
demand was confirmed.

 Held

The  tribunal noted that the term exempted service
is defined in Rule 2(e) of the said rules during the relevant period  as 
taxable  services  which 
are  exempt  from the whole of the service tax leviable
thereon. The said definition was amended vide notification 3/2011-CE(NT) dated
01/03/2011 and an explanation was added clarifying that exempted service
includes trading. On perusal of both un-amended and amended provisions of
exempted service, it reveals that the activity of trading was not included
within the ambit of the definition prior to 01/04/2011. Since the period in the
present case is prior to April 2011, the amended definition would not be
applicable and thus rule 6(3) of the CENVAT Credit rules 2004 does not have any
application and therefore credit is allowable.

{Note: readers may note a similar decision in the case of Kundan
Cars Pvt. ltd.  [2016 (43) STR 630
(tri.-mumbai)] wherein the tribunal relying on the decision of Shariff motors
[2010] 18 Str 64(tr.-Bang)  upheld by the
andhra Pradesh high Court [2015 (38) St j53(a.P)] and Badrika motors [2014 (34)
STR349] Held that reversal of CENVAT credit attributable to trading activity is
not required.}

[2016-TIOL-2520-CESTAT-DEL] Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur vs. M/s Hira Ferro Alloys Ltd, Unit-II

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Allegation of suppression is not sustainable when the information is
declared in balance sheet which is publicly available documents.

Facts

The appellant acted as an
intermediary between two companies 
and  received  brokerage 
for  such  services on which no service tax was
discharged. The lower authorities confirmed the demand under business auxiliary
service and the Commissioner (appeals) set aside the demands as being
timebarred, considering the fact that the departmental authorities were in
knowledge of the activity undertaken at the time of their departmental audit in
the earlier years. Accordingly, the revenue was in appeal.

Held

The tribunal noted that the
appellant acted as a commission  
agent   and   therefore  
service   tax   was payable under the category of business
auxiliary service. However, it was observed that the same issue of non­ payment
was not raised earlier during the departmental audit. Moreover, it was not in
dispute that receipt of brokerage was declared in the published balance sheet
of the company. Thus,  once the information
was declared in balance sheets which are publicly available documents, the
allegation of suppression is not sustainable and accordingly, the revenue’s
appeal was dismissed.

[2016-TIOL-2571-CESTAT-CHD] M/s Fermanta Biotech Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh

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Suppression  cannot  be alleged when there is a failure to pay
service tax under reverse charge mechanism as there is a scope of
interpretation in such cases.

Facts

The appellant received services
from foreign based commission agents and failed to pay service tax under
reverse charge mechanism. on this being pointed out by the audit team, service
tax liability was discharged and a show cause notice was issued demanding equal
penalty u/s. 78 of the finance  act,
1994. The lower authorities confirmed the demand.

Held

The tribunal  noted that in this case, the services were
received from outside india and the tax was payable under reverse charge
mechanism. It was not a case where the services were provided and the service
tax is payable thereon. Accordingly, the benefit of doubt goes in favor of the
appellant and therefore the charges of suppression cannot be alleged. Thus
provisions of section 73(3) of the finance 
act are attracted and therefore, no show cause notice was required to be
issued and accordingly the penalty was set aside.

2016-TIOL-709-CESTAT-MUM] Milind Kul- karni vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-I

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ii.   Tribunal

Reimbursements made to Overseas Branch Office by head Office in india
are not liable to service tax.

Facts

The appellant viz. the Head
Office had established network of branches at different locations outside the
country. The branches acted as salary disbursers of the staff deputed from
india to client locations and carried out other assigned activities. The
salaries and other expenses of running the branch are borne by the head office.
Payments made by the customers are also received in the branches and
transmitted to the head office after netting the expenses incurred by the
branch. Show Cause notice was issued demanding service tax under reverse charge
mechanism on the payments made to the branches considering it business
auxiliary services rendered by them to their head office along with interest
and penalties thereon. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand
primarily on the basis that head office and its branches were different
persons. Accordingly, the present appeal was filed.

Held

The tribunal noted that there was no dispute
that the appellant   had   entered  
into   contractual   agreements with overseas customers for
supply of services which also involved onsite activity undertaken by deputing
employees at the site. Section 66a(2)  of
the finance act, 1994 provided that “a person carrying on a business through a
permanent establishment in India and through another permanent establishment in
a country other than India, such permanent establishments shall be treated as
separate persons for the purpose of this section”. The explanation 1 in s/s.(2)
has designated branches as business establishment overseas. It was observed
that the section is not elastic enough to govern the corporate intercourse and
commercial indivisibility of headquarters and its branches. Accordingly,  any service rendered to the other contracting
party by the branch as branch of the service provider would not be within the
scope of section 66A. Such a legal fiction in relation to overseas activities
is undertaken to prevent escapement from tax by resort to branches to take
advantage of principles of mutuality. A branch by its very nature cannot
survive without resources assigned by the head office. Its employees are the
employees of the organisation itself. There was no independent existence of the
overseas branch as a business. The transfer of funds by gross outflow or by netted
flow is, therefore, nothing but reimbursements and taxing of such reimbursement
would amount to taxing of transfer of funds which was not contemplated by the
act whether before 2012 or after. Accordingly the appeals were allowed.

2016 (44) STR 236 (Mad.) Sree Daksha Property 16 Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Coimbatore

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Non-consideration of submissions made by assessee while
passing adjudication order, is an error apparent from record.

Facts

During
adjudication, petitioner asked for deduction of land value for determining
value of services and provided relevant information for calculation.
Adjudication got completed without considering such information and it was
stated that no corroborating and convincing evidences were produced.
Consequently, application for rectification of mistake apparent from record was
filed. The same was rejected by the department on the ground that this was not
an error apparent from record and it was Held that there cannot be a long drawn
process of reasoning on points if there are two opinions, relying on the
hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Sant
Lal Gupta vs. Modern Co-op. Group Housing Society 2010 (262) ELT 6 (SC).

Held

It
was Held that the power to rectify a mistake u/s. 74 of Finance  Act, 1994 cannot be put under a straight
jacket formula and each case has to be tested on its own Facts. Adjudication
order did not discuss the relevance or irrelevance of records produced by
petitioner and did not examine records. This was undoubtedly an error apparent
from records. Further,  opportunity of
being heard was not granted to the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition
was allowed.

2016 (44) STR 207 (M.P.) Indore Municipal 15 corporation vs. CCE (A), Indore (MP)

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No  time  limit  is 
prescribed  under  Central Excise act, 1944 for filing
cross-objection
.

Facts

Department filed an appeal and sent
relevant documents to  the  appellants 
with  directions  to 
file  memorandum of cross
objections within 45 days. Due to non-receipt of order, one week’s time was
requested to file cross objections during personal hearing. Cross objections
and one appeal was filed thereafter. However, the same were rejected as
time-barred since department had dispatched the orders through speed post. However,
despite follow up with speed post department, the appellants could not gather
information as to whether the orders were delivered to them. Revenue argued
that in view of section 37C of Central excise act, 1944 read with section 27 of
General Clauses act, 1897, the burden of proof was on assessee to rebut the
presumption of service of speed post.

Held

The hon’ble high Court observed
that section 27 of General Clauses act, 1897 provides presumption for
registered post. However, having regard to section 114 of evidence act, burden
of proof was on assessee to prove that speed post was not delivered. In the
absence of any evidences, the issue was decided against the appellants.

Cross objections should be filed
within 30 days from receipt of notice of appeal vide order  41, rule 22 of CPC. Though direction was made
to file cross objection within 45 days, no time limit is prescribed under Central
Excise Act, 1944. Accordingly, cross objection filed within extended time
period allowed by the appellate authority and taken on record cannot be said to
be time-barred.

2016 (44) STR 31 (Mad.) Hitech Manpower 14 Consultant Pvt. Ltd. vs. CESTAT Chennai

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Is condonation of a delay in filing an appeal beyond statutory
prescribed period possible?

Facts

An appeal was filed by Appellant
before the Tribunal after a lapse of statutory period of filing of appeal along
with application for condonation of delay. Appellant prayed that delay occurred
due to misplacement of order by security guard who received the order on
account of closure of company for the last four years. The tribunal dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the reason stated for the delay was not
acceptable.

Held:

On appeal before the high  Court, the Court observed that normally, fault
of employees cannot be a reason for condoning delay. But, considering the fact
of closure of company in this case, the Court agreed to condone the delay and
accordingly, set aside the order of the tribunal rejecting the appeal and
directed the tribunal to take up the appeal for hearing.

Guthka, Whether Tobacco?

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Introduction

Under
Sales Tax  Laws,  the rate of tax depends upon classification
of the given product under a particular entry. There are certain entries which
are with reference to classification under Central Excise Tariff act etc. in
other words, the entry may provide that if the item is covered by a particular Excise
Tariff, then the said item may be liable at nil rate or concessional rate.

under  the 
MVAT  Act,  there 
are  several  such 
items which are classified in different entries with reference to
classification under Central Excise Tariff.

Recent controversy about classification of Guthka:

After
coming into effect of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002, new
classification came into effect. Amongst others, exempted goods are covered by
entries in Schedule A and other taxable items are classified under Schedule B,
C, D and E. there is also an entry for tobacco (modified from time to time).
The controversy about classification of ‘guthka’ prevailed for initial two
years i.e. 2005-06 & 2006-07.

The
Hon. Bombay High Court had an occasion to decide such dispute in case of Ghodawat Energy Pvt. Ltd. Writ Petition No.
8572 of 2015 dt. 4.10.2016.

In
the above case, the dealer, m/s. Ghodawat energy india Pvt. ltd.  Was classifying its item ‘guthka’ under above
entry as tobacco. However, the department, based on explanation, held the item
as not covered by Schedule A and therefore levied tax under residuary entry E-1
at 12.5%.

To
challenge the Constitutional validity of levy of tax as well as to contend that
explanation is not retrospective and can apply only from 1.2.2006, the above
Writ Petition was filed before the Hon. Bombay High Court.

The
facts noted by the Hon. High Court in the judgment are as under:

“3.
The writ petition is filed by contending that the petitioner in this writ
petition is a private limited company, incorporated and registered under the indian
Companies act, 1956, having its registered office at the address mentioned
herein above.

4.
Respondents nos.1 to 4 are the authorities exercising powers together with the
State itself under the Maharashtra Value Added 
Tax Act,  2002 (for short “MVAT”).

5.
The petitioner, inter-alia, engages itself in the business of manufacturing pan
masala. During the period under dispute, namely, financial  year 2005-2006, the petitioner has
manufactured and sold pan masala with or without tobacco. The petitioner claims
that it has discharged its vat liability under the MVAT act. The petitioner
manufactures pan masala not containing tobacco under the brand name “Star Pan
masala” classifiable under tariff heading 21069020 of the Central Excise Tariff
act, 1985. The petitioner claims that it has discharged its vat liability of
12.5% on the sale of such pan masala not containing tobacco. At annexure-a
collectively are copies of invoices for sale of such pan masala.

6.
The petitioner also manufactured and sold pan masala containing tobacco,
commonly known as “Guthka” / “mawa” under various brand names. That is
classifiable under tariff heading 24939990 of the Central Excise Tariff act,
1985 during the relevant period. The petitioner has claimed exemption on
payment of vat on sale of such pan masala containing tobacco under Schedule
entry A-45 of the MVAT act, 2002. The relevant period is 1st April, 2005 to
31st march, 2007.

7.
The  said pan masala containing tobacco
is described in column (2) of the first 
Schedule to the additional duties of excise (Goods of Special
importance) act,1957 (for short “ADE act, 1957”). during the period 1st April,
2005 to 28th  February,  2006, the petitioners have discharged ade at
18% on the sale of such pan masala containing tobacco.

8.For
the period 1st  April,  2005 to 28th 
February, 2006, therefore, the petitioners have claimed exemption from
payment of vat on sale of such pan masala containing tobacco under Schedule
entry  A-45  of the MVAT act, 2002.

9.
Entry 45 of the Schedule a to the MVAT 
Act, 2002, as introduced, reads as under:

Sr. no.

name  of the

Commodity

Conditions
and ex- ceptions

Rate of tax  (%)

date
 of
effect

45

Sugar, fabrics

 

Nil %

1-4-2005

 

and tobacco as

 

 

to 31-1-

 

described from

time to time in column 3 of the First schedule

to the additional duties  of excise
[Goods of Spe- cial Importance) act,  1957.

 

 

2006

 

10.
However,  in exercise of the powers
conferred u/s. 9(1) of the MVAT act, 2002, the State Government of Maharashtra,
vide notification no. VAT/1505/Cr-382/

Taxation-1   dated 
21st    January,   2006, 
amended  the Schedule a and
Schedule C with effect from 1st February, 2006, by inserting explanation to
Schedule entry A-45 as under :­

“Explanation-
for removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that tobacco shall not include Pan
masala, that is to say, any preparation containing betel nuts and tobacco and
any one or more of the following ingredients, namely :­

(i)    Lime, 
and

(ii)   Kattha (Catechu)

Whether
or not containing any other ingredient such as cardamom, copra and menthol.”

 11. With effect from 1st march, 2006, pan
masala containing tobacco falling under 24039990 of the first Schedule to ade
act, 1957, was liable to additional duty of excise @ 18% under the said
Schedule. However, the said tobacco product was exempt from payment of
additional duty of excise in view of exemption notification no.11/2006-C.E. dated
1st March, 2006.

12.
Simultaneously,  the  rate 
of  basic  excise 
duty leviable on such tobacco products under Chapter 24 of the Central Excise
Tariff act, 1985, was suitably increased with no change in total excise duty.
In other words, practically there was no exemption from ADE Act, 1957.

13.  Consequently, with effect from 1st march,
2006, on sale of pan masala containing tobacco, petitioners paid increased
amount of central excise duty. It continued to avail exemption from payment of
vat vide entry A-45 of the MVAT for the period from 1st March, 2006 till 31st
march, 2007.

14.
Since the said pan masala containing tobacco is 
described  in  column 
(3)  of  the 
first   Schedule  to the additional duties of excise (Goods of
Special importance) act, 1957, during the relevant period of time, the
petitioners have discharged ade at 18% on the sale of such pan masala
containing tobacco. Illustrative copies of the invoices for sale of such pan
masala containing tobacco are annexed collectively as annexure-B of the paper
book.”

In
the  judgment,  arguments 
of  both  the 
sides  have been elaborately
noted. on  behalf of the petitioner, the
argument  was  that 
since  additional  duties 
of  excise are applicable, no tax
can be levied as per entry a-45. It was also argued that since State Government
shares additional duties of excise, there is a Constitutional bar on levy of
sales tax. Judgment of hon. Supreme Court in case of Godfrey Phillips (India)
Limited & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 515 was
relied upon.

In
respect of retrospective effect of explanation, it was submitted that it is issued
under a delegated power and under such circumstances, there cannot be power to
issue notification with retrospective effect.

On
behalf of department,  it was submitted
that sharing of additional duties is a matter between State and Centre and it
cannot affect the Constitutional right of a State to levy tax.

The
explanation was only for clarification of doubt and hence it was submitted that
it had retrospective effect.

The
Hon. High Court observed as under:

“63.  The 
constitutional provisions,so far referred to, our mind do not indicate
that the State is denuded, much less divested of its power to levy and impose a
tax on sale or purchase of goods. Therefore, 
Schedule VII list II entry 54 authorises the State legislature  to impose taxes on sale or purchase of goods
other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92A of list I.

64.
We  have 
no  hesitation  in 
agreeing  with  Mrs. Jeejeebhoy when she submits that these
constitutional provisions  create  no 
embargo  on  the 
State’s  power to impose tax on
the sale or purchase of pan masala containing tobacco.

68.
A bare perusal of this would indicate that the doubts were sought to be
removed. The doubts whether tobacco would include pan masala. That has been
clarified by declaring that tobacco shall not include pan masala i.e. to say
any preparation containing betel-nuts and tobacco and any one or more of the
ingredients in sub- clause (1) to clause (10). to be precise, the Government of
Maharashtra amended by the notification with effect from 1st  February, 
2006, Schedules a and C appended to the Maharashtra value added tax act
in terms of the powers conferred by section 9(1) of the MVAT act. That power is
of adding or modifying or deleting any entry in the schedule. The power is of amendment
of the Schedule as above and equally to reduce or enhance the rates of tax or
for specifying the rates of tax or for specifying the rates of tax, where nil
rates are specified.”

Conclusion

Thus,
the Hon’ble High Court rejected both the grounds and upheld levy from
retrospective effect. The classification of product under fiscal entries is a
complicated process. It appears that in respect of additional duties, the law
is still not settled and a clarification on such issues at the beginning of
classification will be more appreciated.

Taxability of Discounts/incentives

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Preliminary

It
is widely known that, post introduction of negative List based taxation of
Services, the ambit of taxation of services has expanded manifold. the  scope of ‘service’ and in particular as to
what constitutes “activity carried out for a consideration” and scope of
“declared services”, has been a subject of extensive deliberations. In this
write up, an attempt is made to discuss this aspect, with a recent ruling of
authority for advance ruling (Central excise, Customs & Service tax) [AAR
(CEST)]

Relevant statutory Provisions

Section
65B  (44) of the Finance act,   1994
as amended (Act):

“Service”
means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and
includes a declared service, but shall not include: –

(a)
An activity which constitutes merely, –

i)   A transfer 
of  title  in 
goods  or  immovable property, by way of sale, gift or
in any other manner; or

ii)  Such transfer, delivery or supply of any
goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of clause (29A) of
article 366 of the Constitution; or

iii)
A transaction in money or actionable claim;

(b)
A provision  of  service 
by  an  employee 
to  the employer in the course of
or in relation to his employment;

(c)
Fees taken in any Court or tribunal 
established under any law for the time being in force.

 Section 66E of the
act – Declared Services:

The
following shall constitute declared services, namely –

(e)
Agreeing to the obligation to refrain from an act, or to tolerate an act or a
situation, or to do an act.

Ruling of AAR (CEST) in AKQA media India (P) ltd. (2016) 55
GST 720 (AAR  – New Delhi) (2016) 69
taxman.com. 390:

Facts in Brief

In
this case, applicant intended to carry out the activity of an advertising
agency (‘AA’), whereby it would provide professional services to its clients
(i.e. advertisers) in relation to placement of advertisements on various media.
Further, the applicant intended to charge commission from such clients as a
consideration for provision  of its
services. While the applicant is to provide services only to advertisers,
depending on the quantum of its advertisements placed by the applicant on
various media, the applicant could be entitled to an incentive / volume
discount from the media owners (MO). The applicants propose to undertake two
business models, which are described hereafter briefly:

Proposed business model 1
– Placement of advertisement in traditional media on behalf of the advertiser
(Steps involved) [“BM 1”]:

Client
Contract

Preparation
of media Plan

Approval
of the media Plan

Issuance
of estimate by advertising agency

Issuance
of release order by advertising agency

Monitoring
of Campaign

Receipt
of invoice from media vendor

Raising
of invoice by advertising agency

Receipt
of volume discount

Proposed business model 2
– Buying and Selling of advertisement Inventory in non – traditional media, on
its own account (steps involved) [“BM 2”]

More
or less on similar lines as BM 1

under
proposed BM 1, while the applicant shall be appointed by its clients (i.e. the
advertiser) to provide services, will incidental receipt of incentives / volume
discounts from MO shall be considered to be providing a service, as defined
under the Act, to the MO and shall the same be liable to Service tax ?

under  proposed 
BM 2,  while  the 
applicant  shall  buy and sell the media inventory on its own
account to the advertiser, will incidental receipt of incentives / volume
discounts from MO shall be considered to be providing a services as defined
under the Act, to the MO and shall the same be liable to service tax?

In
case, it is considered that the applicant is providing any service to the MO,
in the course of providing advertisement placement services to its client, then
on what value should the Service tax be applicable under the Act?

Submissions of Applicants

The
incidental receipt of incentives / volume discounts by the applicant from MO are
gratuitous payment not for providing services. No service tax is payable on
such incentives in as much as the applicant does not enter into any contract
for provision of service with the MO;

The
applicant places the order on behalf of the advertiser and the advertiser is
liable to pay the cost of the advertisement to the MO and the agency commission
to the applicant. The applicant pays service tax on the said agency commission;

No
‘service’ is provided or agreed to be provided by the applicant to the MO and
that the incentives / volume discounts are paid at the sole discretion of the MO
and there is no obligation, either contractual or otherwise, on the MO to pay
incentives / volume discounts to the applicant;

The
concerned issue has been examined by the CEST at in the case of Grey Worldwide
India (P.) Ltd. vs. CST [2015] 52 GST 1020 / (Mum. – CESTAT) wherein it was
held that no service tax is payable on such amount (i.e. incentives / volume
discounts) received by the AA  from the
MO;

In
any event, once MO discharges service tax on the gross amount charged by them
to the advertisers and the applicant having discharged service tax on such
agency  commission  received, 
no  further  service 
tax is  payable  as 
consideration  for  services 
charged  by the MO  and the applicant has already suffered service
tax in full;

In
regard to the proposed BM 2, the applicant would be paying service tax on the
gross amount charged to the advertiser for the media inventory (except non –
taxable media such as print media) and the MO would charge the applicant
service tax on the gross amount charged to the applicant. any incentives /
volume discount received by the applicant from the MO post issuance of the
taxable invoice on the applicant for the gross amount charged to the applicant,
no service tax will be payable on the gross amount charged to the applicant on
the said incentive volume discount, as the service tax, at the first instance
will be paid on the gross amount charged to the applicant. The applicant, in
turn, will pay service tax on the gross amount charged by the applicant to the
advertiser.

Submissions of Revenue

As
far as proposed BM 1 is concerned, the volume discount received by the
applicant for the services provided to the MO is liable to service tax in as
much as the invoices from MO only mentions the name of the applicant, thus
there is contractual relationship for provision of service between the
applicant and mo. the  entire amount
payable to MO in respect of media is to be paid by the applicant and the
applicant is to receive separate amount as consideration for the services
provided to the advertiser.

As
far as BM 2 is concerned, applicant is to sell media inventory on his own
account to the advertiser and in such a case, applicant needs to discharge
service tax liability on the total sale price invoiced to the advertiser. In
this BM 2 also, applicant is required to pay service tax on the amount received
from the MO treating the said amount as consideration for the services
provided.

Observations of AAR (CEST)

As
far as BM 1 is concerned, it is contended by the revenue that, the amount
received by the applicant from the MO is in the nature of consideration
received for the services provided and liable to service tax for following
reasons:

(i)
Invoices pertaining to transaction from MO only mention the name of the
applicant. Consequently, contractual relationship for provision of service
exists only between these two parties.

(ii)
Entire amount payable to MO in respect of space and time for media is payable
by the applicant.

(iii)
Applicant     receives     separate     amount    
as consideration for the service provided to the advertiser.

It  is 
noticed  that  “Step 
7  (receipt  of 
invoice  from media vendor”) of BM
1, clearly mentions that the MO raises its invoices for the cost of the media
inventory sold to the advertiser. Further, invoice will mention the name of
advertiser and also the name of the applicant, besides other details,
therefore,  it is evident that the media
inventory is sold to the advertiser and not to the applicant. Also, Revenue is incorrect in stating that
invoice will only mention the name of the applicant
. The submission of
revenue that the entire amount is payable to MO in respect of space and time
for media by the applicant is also incorrect. In Step 7 of BM 1, it has been
made amply clear that AA makes the payment for the media inventory to the mo,
on behalf of the advertiser after retaining its commission. It is further alleged
by the revenue that applicant receives separate amount as consideration for the
services provided to the advertiser. Step 8 of BM 1 mentions that the amount
received by the applicant from the advertiser is its fees / agency commission
plus service tax. It is to be observed
that the question raised by Revenue relating to BM 1 is based on incorrect
appreciation of facts
.

In
respect of BM 2, it is contended by the revenue that the applicant sells media
inventory on his own account to the advertiser. In such case, applicant needs
to discharge service tax liability on the total sale price invoiced to the
advertiser. Applicant has confirmed that they would be paying service tax (if
any) on the gross amount charged to the advertiser for the media inventory (except
non – taxable media such as print media). Based on the above assumptions which
are factually incorrect, revenue has concluded that applicant is required to
pay service tax on the amount received from MO treating said amount as
consideration for services provided. The
question raised by the Revenue are based on incorrect appreciation of facts,
the subject question does not survive
.

Revenue
further contended that as per section 65B of the act, ‘service’ has following
ingredients;


any activity


by one person for another


for consideration

And
in the present case, all 3 ingredients are satisfied, thus service provided to MO
by the applicant will be liable to service tax. Applicant submitted that they
will not carry out any activity for consideration. It is to be observed that in
the definition of ‘service’, there has to be nexus between activity and
consideration. In case, there is no nexus between the activity and
consideration, such an activity  shall  not 
fall  under  the 
definition  of  “service”, as the concept “activity for
consideration” involves an element of contractual relationship. This
relationship could be express or implied, for which the burden of proof would
be on the revenue. In the subject case,
no iota of the evidence has been produced before us by the Revenue to indicate
that there is an activity undertaken by the applicant, which resulted in MO giving
volume discount to the applicant, especially when  the 
choice  of  selecting 
MO   is  reportedly with the advertiser and not with
the aa (applicant). Therefore, volume discount that could be received from the MO
by the applicant is not in relation to any activity undertaken by the
applicant. Therefore, it is not service.

Revenue
also argued that the applicant provides “declared   service”  
in   terms   of  
section   66E(e)   of the act,

It
is observed that there is no agreement or contractual obligation between the
applicant and the MO to give volume discount to the applicant by the mo. volume
discount is not fixed and is to be given at the discretion of mo. Further,
volume discount is gratuitous. Applicant /AA cannot claim it as a matter of
right. Therefore, applicant is not providing declared services to the MO.

Revenue
has raised another issue that applicant provides promotion or marketing
services to the MO by giving preferential treatment to the them, which provide
volume discounts / incentives. It is noticed that MO are not under any legal
obligation to pay volume discounts and it is purely discretionary on the part
of mo.  Applicant is not carrying out any
activity to promote any mo’s  business.
Further, which MO is to be engaged is the decision of the advertiser and not of
the applicant. Therefore,  applicant
cannot be said to provide promotion or marketing services to MO.

Further,
in Grey Worldwide India (P.) Ltd. vs. CST [Order No. A /1337 – 1338 /
14/CSTB/C-1, dated 30-7-2014], tribunal 
held  that  media 
giving  certain  incentives 
by way of volume discounts cannot be levied to service tax. Relevant extracts
from the Judgment are reproduced hereafter:

“Thereafter,  at the end of the year, depending upon the
volume of business given by the advertising agency, the media gives certain
incentives by way of volume discounts / rate difference. There is no agreement
or understanding or any contract between the advertising agency and the media
for promotion of the media’s business activities. There is also no obligation
on the part of the media to Give these incentives.

These payments are made only as a gratuitous payment   for  
the   advertisements   placed  
on the media. There is no contractual obligation between the advertising
agency and the media for provision of any services. In the absence of such a
contractual obligation, it is difficult to accept the Revenue’s contention that
on the incentives received, the appellant is liable to service tax under
“business  auxiliary  Services”. This was the view taken by this
Tribunal consistently in a series of decisions starting from Euro RSCG
advertising Ltd.”

Ruling:

In
view of the above, AAR (CEST) ruled as under:

In
proposed BM 1, while the applicant shall be appointed by its clients i.e. the
advertiser to provide services, incidental receipt of incentives / volume
discounts from MO shall not be considered to be providing a service, as defined
under the Finance Act, 1994, to the MO and shall not be liable to service tax.

In
proposed BM 2, while the applicant shall buy and sell the media inventory on
its own account to the advertiser, incidental receipt of incentives / volume
discounts from MO shall not be considered to be providing a service, as defined
under the Act, to the MO and shall not be liable to Service tax.

In
view of rulings 1 and 2 above, Question 3 becomes infructuous

Conclusion:

Despite
categorical ruling by AAR (CEST) based on examination of facts placed before
them, it is a common knowledge that at a practical level advertising agencies
are authorized by media owners. Hence, they could be regarded implied agents of
media owners who book advertisements on their behalf.

Further, acting as an agent itself, may
constitute activity for consideration inasmuch as the same could tantamount to
providing representational services. In light of the foregoing, it is felt that
conclusion arrived at by AAR (CEST) may have to be tested before a Court of
law.

Welcome GST Input Tax Credit Under GST Regime – Model GST Law

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Invoice-to-invoice Matching

“An
important item in our agenda for 1986-87 is to initiate reform in the system of
indirect taxes. … In excise taxation a vexatious question which has been often
encountered is the taxation of inputs and the cascading effect of this
on the value of the final product. … . This scheme, which has been referred as
Modified Value Added Tax (MODVAT) scheme … allows the manufacturer to
obtain instant and complete reimbursement
of the excise duty paid on
the components and raw materials. … Introduction of MODVAT will decrease the
cost of the final product considerably through the availability of instant
credit of the duties paid on the inputs and consequential reduction of interest
costs. The MODVAT scheme will be in force from 1st March, 1986.”

  Shri V. P. Singh, union minister of finance,
on introducing the union Budget for 1986-87

Instant
credit was the cardinal principle when MODVAT scheme was first introduced in
1986.   Under the Central excise law, the
credit has been available instantly on receipt of goods in the premises of the
manufacturer.  Under the State-vat laws
also, credit is available to the dealer on the purchase of goods. under the
service tax law, this cardinal principle is followed currently, subject to
specified condition viz. payment of invoice is made within specified period.
However, under the proposed GST  regime,
input tax credit would not be instant; it would be subject to
‘invoice-to-invoice matching’. The 
invoice-to-invoice matching requires the details of the inward supply of
the recipient to be matched with that of corresponding details of the outward
supply of the supplier; so as to claim input tax credit in respect of invoices
relating to inward supply.

Global
leader for indirect taxes of a large accounting firm was recently quoted
saying, “Invoice-to-invoice matching under the proposed goods and services tax
in India will make it harder for the cash economy and other parts of the world
will soon like to emulate this feature. India is the only country that is doing
it (invoice-to-invoice matching). This is unique ….people will to comply or
they will fall out of the GST chain. 
Only those who play in the cash economy will feel the pressure as they
will lose credit. Is it the right time to do as it’s a new tax.”

Missing
trader fraud (also known as missing trader intra- Community fraud) within the
european union (eu), abusing the vat rules on cross-border transactions within
the eu or the ‘missing trader’ fraud as seen in the case of Mahalaxmi Cotton
Ginning Pressing and Oil Industries vs. The State of Maharashtra & Others
51 VST 1 (Bom.) could also be the added reasons for this proposed change.

The
recommendations in the report of the technology advisory Group for unique
Projects, january 2011, included that the Common GST Portal would also act as a
tax booster, matching the input tax credits in the returns to detect tax
evasion. Hence, this change is being considered and designed since 2011. The businesses in India, however, are still
not in a position to assimilate the proposed change and the change is perceived
as inconceivable; possibly in view of the current practice and mind frame to
take credit instantly.

The
Common GST  Portal created and managed by
GSTn is suppose to do this matching on the basis of invoice level data filed as
part of return by all taxpayers, including for inter-state supplies.

Detailed
provisions are there in the model CGST / SGST law  to deal with situations –

 -Where
the input tax credit claimed by the recipient in respect of an inward supply is
in excess of the tax declared by the supplier for the same supply (Section 29);


Where the input tax credit claimed by the recipient in  respect 
of  an  inward 
supply  is  not 
declared  by the  supplier 
as  outward  supply 
in  his  valid 
returns (Section 29);


For duplication of claims of input tax credit (Section 29);


Reduction of input tax credit by the recipient where the output tax is reduced
by output supplier by issuing a credit note (Section 29A).

Manner of Taking input Tax credit

(Section 16 of the model CGST / SGST law)

“Input
tax credit” is defined in Model CGST / SGST Law to mean credit of ‘input tax’.

“input
tax” in relation to a taxable person, means the {iGST and CGST}/{iGST and
SGST}   charged on any supply of goods and/or services to him which are used, or
are intended to be used, in the course or furtherance of his business and
includes the tax payable under reverse charge mechanism.

It
is key to note that though the law has defined the terms‘ input’, ‘input
service’ and ‘capital goods’, these terms have not been used in the definition
of ‘input tax’ / ‘input tax credit’. “input tax” is the tax charged on any
supply of goods and/ or services and it is not a tax charged on ‘input’ /
‘input services’ / ‘capital goods’. 
Hence, wherever the provision, in model GST law,  deals with input tax credit, it would have to
be read currently in the context of supply of goods and/ or services.  Wherever the model GST  law 
has referred to input / input service / capital goods with reference to ‘input
tax credit’, either that should get rectified in the final law in favour of
goods and/or services or the definition of ‘input’, ‘input service’ and
‘capital goods’ should be revisited considering one of the objects of GST  to remove cascading effect of taxes.

Every
registered taxable person is entitled to take credit of input tax admissible to
him, subject to the followings:

-He
is in possession of a tax invoice, debit note, supplementary invoiceor such
other taxpaying document as may be prescribed, issued by a supplier registered
under the GST law;


He has received the goods and/or services (where the goods are received in lots
or instalments, upon receipt of the last lot or instalment) – for this purpose,
it shall be deemed that the taxable person has received the goods where the
goods are delivered by the supplier to a recipient or any other person on the
direction of such taxable person, whether acting as an agent or otherwise,
before or during movement of goods, either by way of transfer of documents of
title to goods or otherwise;


The tax charged in respect of such supply has been actually paid to the credit
of the appropriate Government, either in cash or through utilisation of input
tax credit admissible in respect of the said supply; and


He has furnished valid returns, as required

In
case the goods and/or services are used partly for business purposes / taxable
supplies and zero-rated supplies and partly for other purposes / non-taxable
supplies and exempted supplies, input tax shall be restricted to so much as it
is attributable to business purposes / taxable supplies and zero-rated
supplies. The manner of attribution for such purposes would be prescribed.

The
input tax credit in respect of any invoice needs to be taken before

-Filing
of the return u/s. 27 for the month of September following the end of financial
year to which such invoice pertains or

-Filing
of the relevant annual return whichever is earlier.

Negative list for input Tax credit

Input
tax credit will not be available in respect of the following (Section 16(9) of
the model CGS / SGST law):

-Motor
vehicles, except when they are supplied in the usual course of business or are
used for providing the following taxable services

 (i) Transportation of passengers, or

 (ii) Transportation of goods, or

 (iii) Imparting training on motor driving
skills;

-Goods
and / or services provided in relation to food and beverages, outdoor catering,
beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery, membership of
a club, health and fitness centre, life insurance, health insurance and travel
benefits extended to employees on vacation such as leave or home travel
concession, when such goods and/or services are used primarily for personal use
or consumption of any employee;

  Goods and/or services acquired by the
principal in the execution of works contract when such contract results in
construction of immovable property, other than plant and machinery;


Goods acquired by a principal, the property in which is not transferred
(whether as goods or in some other form) to any other person, which are used in
the construction of immovable property, other than plant and machinery;


Goods and/or services on which composition tax has been paid; and


Goods and/or services used for private or personal consumption, to the extent
they are so consumed


Capital goods, where depreciation is claimed under the income tax act, 1961 on
the tax component of the cost of such capital goods[the restriction specified
herein is not on all goods but only on ‘capital goods’; capital assets and
capital goods, both are defined separately and have different meaning]

Supply (Removal) of capital Goods on Which input Tax credit
Was Taken

On
supply of capital goods on which input tax credit has been taken, higher of the
following is required to be paid:

  An amount equal to the input tax credit taken
on the said capital goods reduced by the percentage points as may be specified
in this behalf; or

  Tax on the transaction value of such capital
goods

Transfer of input Tax credit

in
case there is change in the constitution of a registered taxable person on
account of sale, merger, demerger, amalgamation, lease or transfer of the
business with the specific provision for transfer of liabilities, the input tax
credit that remains unutilised in its books of accountsof the registered
taxable person (transferor) would be allowed to be transferred such sold,
merged, demerged, amalgamated, leased or transferred business.

Utilisation of input Tax credit

Every
taxable person would be entitled to take input tax credit; however, till he
discharges his self-assessed tax liability vide valid tax returns he will not
be allowed to utilize such input tax credit (Section 28 of model CGST/SGST law).   Such restriction on utilisation of input tax
credit is not prevalent in the current indirect tax regime.

The
input tax credit is to be utilised as follows (Section 35(5)

Input tax credit on
account of

Utilization, towards
payment of

IGST

First, IGST, remaining for CGST

and
SGST in that order

CGST

First, CGST, remaining
for IGST

SGST

First, SGST, remaining
for IGST

Input
tax credit on account of CGST cannot be utilised for payment of SGST and
vice-versa.

Unutilised
input tax credit at the end of the tax period can be claimed as refund (Section
38(2) of model CGST  / SGST law)  in cases of:

  Exports (other than the goods exported which
are subject to export duty)

  Credit accumulation is on account of rate of
tax on inputs being higher than the rate of tax on outputs. [‘input’ has been
defined to mean goods other than capital goods. ‘Output’ has not been defined.]

Input Tax credit on stock, When registration is applied for

The
following persons are entitled to take credit of input tax within one year from
the date of issue of the tax invoice in respect of inputs held in stock and
inputs contained in semi- finished or finished goods held in stock, to be
calculated as per Generally accepted accounting Principles:

Person

Stock held on

A person applying for registra- tion
within 30 days from the date he becomes liable to reg- istration and has been
granted such registration

On
the day immediately preceding the date from which he becomes liable to pay
tax

A person taking voluntary registration

On
the day immediately preceding the date of registration

A person who ceases to pay composition tax

On
the day immediately preceding the date from which he becomes liable to pay
tax under regular mechanism

The
provisions currently are silent in respect of capital goods held on the date of
registration / date he becomes liable to pay tax under regular scheme and in
respect of credit of input tax on services received before the date of
registration / date he becomes liable to pay tax.

Switching To composition levy / Goods or services become
exempt

On
switching over from the regular mechanism to composition levy, or the goods and
/or services become exempt, the registered taxable person is required to pay an
amount equal to the input tax credit in respect of inputs held in stock and
inputs contained in semi-finished or finished goods held in stock on the day
immediately preceding the date of such switch over or, as the case may be, the
date of such exemption, to be calculated as per Generally accepted accounting
Principles.  Balance of input tax credit,
if any, would lapse.

Input Tax credit of Goods sent for Job Work (section 16a of
The Model CGS / SGST law)

The
principal is entitled to take input tax credit on inputs / capital goods sent
to job worker, including sent directly without being first brought to the
premises of the principal, if the said inputs / capital goods are received back
by the principal within the specified period.

Input service Distributor (section 17 of The Model CGS /
SGST law)

“Input
Service Distributor”(ISD) means an office of the supplier of goods and / or
services which receives tax invoices issued u/s. 23 towards receipt of input
services and issues tax invoice or such other document as prescribed for the
purposes of distributing the credit of CGST 
(SGST in State acts) and / or IGST paid on the said services to a
supplier of taxable goods and / or services having same PAN as that of the
office referred to above.

Explanation. – for the purposes of distributing the
credit of CGST  (SGST  in State acts) and / or IGST, input Service
distributor shall be deemed to be a supplier of services.

An
ISD is allowed to distribute the credits as follows

Credit of

Credit
distributed as

ISD and the recipient of credit

IGST

IGST

are
in different State

CGST

SGST

IGST

CGST

are in same State (different business vertical)

CGST

IGST

SGST

SGST

 The
manner for computing the credit to be distributed is not yet prescribed.

Account and records for input Tax credit

Every
registered person is required to keep and maintain a true and correct account
of input tax credit availed (Section 42 of model CGST / SGST law).

An
input tax credit ledger in electronic form would be maintained at the common
portal for each registered taxable person, to be called as “electronic credit
ledger”. The amount of input tax credit will be credited to electronic credit
ledger of the registered taxable person.

Transition provisions

A
registered taxable person is entitled to take credit of the amount of Cenvat
credit / vat credit carried forward in the return furnished under the earlier
law.  A registered taxable person is also
entitled to take credit of the unavailed Cenvat credit / vat credit in respect
of capital goods, not carried forward in the return furnished under the earlier
law. Such credits can be taken only if the amount was admissible as Cenvat
credit / vat credit under the earlier law and is also admissible as input tax
credit under the GST law.

Transition
provisions have been provided for situations:

         –Where the goods manufactured / traded were exempted under
earlier law and are liable to tax under GST law

       
Where the person is going to be
taxable person under the regular mechanism under GST law, however, was under
the composition scheme under the earlier law

Transition
provisions have not been provided for situations:

       –Cenvat
credit was taken on input services, however the invoice was not paid within
three months, hence Cenvat credit taken was reversed; the invoice would be paid
after the appointed date or the invoice would be paid after the filing of
return u/s. 27 for the month of September following the end of first financial
year under GST Law andafter filing of the relevant annual return

      
Unavailed Cenvat credit in respect
of natural resources (where Cenvat credit is currently availed over the period
of three years)

Disputes under earlier law for claim / recovery of Cenvat
credit / VAT credit

The
proceedings relating to claim / recovery of Cenvat credit / vat credit under
the earlier law shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of earlier
law. Any amount of credit found to be admissible to the claimant shall be
refunded to him in cash and any amount of credit becomes recoverable shall be
recovered as an arrear of tax under GST law. The said amount admissible /
recovered would not be admissible as input tax credit under the GST law.

[2016] 73 taxmann.com 363 (Pune – Trib.) Quality Industries vs. ACIT A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 9th September, 2016

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Section 14A   – interest paid on
partners’ capital does not qualify as `expenditure’ for the purpose of section
14A.

Facts

The assessee firm, engaged in the
business of manufacturing of chemicals etc., filed return of income for  assessment 
year  2010-11  declaring 
total  income of Rs.95,65,090/-.
in the course of assessment proceedings, 
the Assessing  Officer  (AO) 
noticed  that the assessee has,
inter-alia, earned tax free dividend income amounting to Rs.24,63,700/- from
investment in mutual funds which was claimed as exempt income under section
10(35) of the Act. The  AO also noted
that the assessee’s investments in mutual funds as on 31.3.2010 was Rs.4,41,88,955/- and the corresponding amount
as on 31.03.2009 was Rs.3,18,39,548/-. He observed that the partners of the
assessee firm were charging interest on capital introduced by them into the
firm. Total interest claimed as deduction against taxable income was Rs. 75,63,615
which comprised of interest on bank loans Rs.75,615/- and interest on partner’s
capital to the tune of Rs.74,88,000/-.

The  assessee contended that interest on partners
capital is not an `expenditure’ per se, as specified u/s.14A of the act and
that even income-tax law understands it this way as such interest in partners’
hand is taxable as “profits from business” and not as “income from other
sources”. It was also contended that expenditure needs presence of two parties
i.e. spender and earner. The firm has no separate existence from its partners.
The assessee firm is a separate entity under income-tax act only for taxation
purposes.  This   is the very reason that deduction  of interest and salary to partners is allowed
as a separate deduction and not as an expenditure under separate section from
sections 30 to 43 of the act. These interest and  salaries 
to  partners  are 
for this  very  reason 
not liable to TDS provisions under the act. The AO,  however, Held that assessee has incurred
expenditure including interest expenses which are attributable to earning
dividend income from investment in mutual funds which is exempt and not
includible in total income.  he invoked
the provisions of section 14a of the act read with rule 8D of the income-tax
rules, 1962 (“rules”) and disallowed the a sum Rs. 29,25,362 being estimated
expenditure incurred in relation to dividend income so earned in terms of the
formula provided under rule 8D of the rules.

Aggrieved, the  assessee 
preferred  an  appeal 
to  the CIT(A) who confirmed the
action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred
an appeal to the tribunal.

Held

The tribunal noted that interest
and salary received by the partners are treated on a different footing by the
act and not in its ordinary sense of term. Section 28(v) treats the passive
income accrued by way of interest as also salary received by a partner of the
firm as a ‘business receipt’ unlike different treatments given to similar
receipts in the hands of entities other than partners. The tribunal  observed that under proviso to section 28(v),
the disallowance of such interest is only in reference to section 40(b) and not
section 36 or section 37. This also gives a clue that deduction towards
interest is regulated only under section 40(b) and the deduction of such interest
to partners is out of the purview of section 36 or 37 of the act.

Firm and partners of the firm are
not separate person under Partnership act although separate unit of assessment
for tax purposes. There cannot therefore be a relationship inferred between
partner and firm as that of lender of funds (capital) and borrower, hence,
section 36(1)(iii) is not applicable at all. 
Section 40(b) is the only section governing deduction towards interest
to partners. In view of section 40(b) of the Act, the Assessing Officer
purportedly has no jurisdiction to apply the test laid down u/s. 36 of the Act
to find out whether the capital was borrowed for the purposes of business or
not. Thus,  the question of allowability
or otherwise of deduction does not arise except for section 40(b) of the act.

The interest paid to partners and
simultaneously getting subjected to tax in the hands of its partners is merely
in the nature of contra items in the hands of the firms and partners.
Consequently interest paid to its partners cannot be treated at par with the
other interest payable to outside parties. Thus, in substance, the revenue is
not adversely affected at all by the claim of interest on capital employed with
the firm by the partnership firm and partners put together. Thus, capital
diverted in the mutual funds to generate alleged tax free income does not lead
to any loss in revenue by this action of the assessee. In view of the inherent
mutuality, when the partnership firm and its partners are seen holistically and
in a combined manner with costs towards interest eliminated in contra, the
investment in mutual funds generating tax free income bears the characteristic
of and attributable to its own capital where no disallowance u/s.14A read with
rule 8D is warranted.  The tribunal Held
that it found merit in the plea of the assessee in so far as interest
attributable to partners.

The Tribunal allowed the ground
of appeal filed by the assessee to the extent of interest on partners capital.

[2016] 74 taxmann.com 90 (Kolkata – Trib.) Soma Rani Ghosh vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of Order: 9th September,2016

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Sections 40(a)(ia), 194C – Since the assessee had, in the
course of assessment proceedings, submitted to the AO PAN and addresses of the transporters,
in respect of whose payments tax was not deducted at source, disallowance u/s.
40(a)(ia) is not called for.

Facts

The   assessee, 
an  individual,  carried 
on  proprietary export business in
export of Chemical, Surgical and Clinical 
Goods.  During the  previous 
year  relevant  to the assessment year under consideration
the assessee incurred transport charges by way of lorry  hire Charges, both in relation to Purchases,
referred to as Carriage inward, and exports to Bangladesh referred to as
Carriage outward.

The
Assessing Officer (AO) on the premise that the assessee was required to deduct
tax at source under the provisions of section 194C of the act disallowed the
expenses of rs.1,63,78,648/- claimed towards Carriage inward  and rs.1,13,00,980/- claimed as Carriage
outward  by invoking the provisions of
section 40(a)(ia) of the act,  since the
assessee had not deducted tax at source.

Aggrieved,  the 
assessee  preferred  an 
appeal  to  the CIT(A) and  contended 
that  because  of 
the  provision of section 194C(6),
she was not liable to deduct tax at source on payments to transporters who had
submitted their Pan,  and those details
of Pan  and addressees of the transporters
were filed during the course of scrutiny assessment before the AO.

Aggrieved,
the  assessee  preferred 
an  appeal  to  the
CIT(A), who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved,  the 
assessee  preferred  an 
appeal  to  the Tribunal.

Held

The
Tribunal  noted that the CIT(A) had
dismissed the appeal of the assessee on the ground that the assessee is a
contractor making payments to the transporter for carrying of goods and was
thus liable to deduct TDS on such payment. According to the CIT(A), section
194C(6) will not apply to payments made by a person who himself is not a transporter,
to another sub-contractor for plying, hiring or leasing goods carriage.
Further,  the CIT(A) Held that provisions
of section 194C(6) and 194C(7) have to be read together and the benefit u/s.
194C (6) is available only when the assessee fulfils the conditions laid down
in s/s. 194C(7) of the act.

The
Tribunal Held that –

(a)   in the context of section 194C (1), person
undertaking to do the work is the contractor and the person so engaging the
contractor is the contractee;

(b)   by 
virtue  of  the 
amendment  introduced  by  the
finance  (no.2) act 2009, the distinction
between a contractor and a sub-contractor has been done away with and
clause(iii) of explanation u/s. 194C(7) now clarifies that contract shall
include sub-contract;

(c)   subject to compliance with the provisions of
section 194C (6), immunity from TDS u/s. 194C (1) in relation to payments to
transporters applies transporter and non-transporter contractees alike;

(d)   u/s. 194C (6), as it stood prior to the
amendment in 2015, in order to get immunity from the obligation of TDS, filing
of PAN of the payee transporter alone is sufficient and no confirmation letter
is required;

(e)   Section 194C (6) and section 194C (7) are
independent of each other and cannot be read together to attract disallowance
u/s. 40(a) (ia) read with section 194C; and

(f)    if 
the  assessee  complies 
with  the  provisions 
of section 194C(6), no disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) is permissible, even
there is violation of the provisions of section 194C(7).

Therefore,
the payments made by the assessee to the transporters for carriage inward and
carriage outward were not disallowable u/s. 40(a)(ia).

The
Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Asst. CIT vs. Majmudar & Co. ITAT “B” Bench, Mumbai Before Mahavir Singh (J. M.) and Rajesh Kumar (A. M.) ITA No. 3063 to 3067 and 6604 /Mum/2012 A.Ys.: 2004-05 to 2009-10. Date of order: 19th August, 2016 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: N.P. Singh / Arvind Sonde

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Section 10B – Export  of legal data base eligible for deduction.

Facts

The assessee, a firm of  Advocate & Solicitors, is engaged in production and export of customised electronic data or legal database.  The unit of the firm was recognised as a 100% EOU by the development Commissioner SEZ, SEEPZ and its entire sale proceeds from export of such legal services was brought in india in convertible foreign exchange. according to the assessee, it has transferred the customised electronic data to its client therefore it forms part of computer software as per explanation 2 to section 10B of the act. accordingly, it claimed deduction u/s 10B of the act. However, the claim of the assessee was rejected by the AO on the grounds amongst others that, the assessee was engaged in providing legal services to its foreign clients and not engaged in exporting legal database which was one of the items notified by the CBDT for the purpose of “Computer Software” on which deduction u/s. 10B was admissible. Rendering of legal services by the assessee firm to the foreign clients cannot be termed as export of legal database from india.

Held

The tribunal noted that the services provided by the assessee i.e. legal services, are recognised by the Government of India for the various benefits under the scheme of EOU as per EXIM Policy 2002-2007.  Section 10B of the Act was introduced to give benefit to such EOU under the Income-tax Act, reflecting the intention of law to provide encouragement to the exporters of services to enhance their capacity for provision of services and in turn earn valuable foreign exchange for our country. According to the Tribunal, the assessee has fulfilled the specific requirements of Section 10B by providing legal  Services using  legal   database.  legal database  is  recognised by the Board vide its notification No. S.O.890(E) dated September 26, 2000 as one of the eligible information technology enabled services. Explanation 2(i) (b) defines computer software to include, inter alia, a “Customised Electronic Service as notified by the Board”. As legal database is notified by the Board for this purpose and the assessee has provided services by using such legal database via electronic media i.e. via emails and internet facilities, the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s. 10B of the Act in the light of Explanation 2(i) (b) is fully justified.

[2016] 74 taxmann.com 99 (Mumbai – Trib.) Voltas Ltd. vs. ITO A.Y.: 2005-06 Date of Order: 16th September, 2016

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Section 50C – Provisions of section 50C are not applicable
to transfer of development rights in land.

Facts

The
assessee company owned a plot of land at Panchpakdi, thane,  in respect of which it entered into a
development agreement with m/s. Sheth developers Pvt.  Ltd., 
on  8.6.2004.  In 
the  return  of 
income  filed by the assessee,
long term capital gains arising as a result of entering into the development
agreement were computed with reference to consideration mentioned in the
agreement.

During
the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (AO) asked the
assessee to show cause why sales consideration should not be substituted with
the value adopted by the stamp valuation authority in view of section 50C of
the act. In response, the assessee objected to the value adopted by the stamp
valuation authority and also objected to the very invoking of section 50C of
the act upon the impugned transaction of sale of development rights.

The
AO referred the matter to District Valuation Officer for valuation of the sales
consideration as well as cost of acquisition of the property.  But, 
valuation  report of the dvo was
not received by the ao till conclusion of  
the   assessment   proceedings  
and   therefore   the ao adopted value of stamp valuation
authority and substituted it with actual sales consideration shown by the assessee
and computed the long term capital gains on sale of development rights of the
land accordingly. Subsequently, upon receiving the valuation from the DVO, the
AO rectified the assessment order by passing an order u/s.154 of the Act.

Aggrieved,
the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT (A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it, interalia, contended
that the transaction of sale of development rights is not covered u/s 50C.

Held

The
Tribunal Held that the scope of term ‘capital asset’ mentioned in the section
50C specifically refers and confines its meaning to ‘land or building or both’.
The scope of section 50C is restricted by the legislature itself to these two
types of capital assets only.

It
noted that the capital asset transferred by the assessee was ‘development   rights in the  land’ 
and  not  the ‘land’ 
itself.

The  Tribunal having noted a few other similar
provisions of the act found that in section 269a and section 269UA ‘rights’ in
`land & building’ have been specifically included as per requirement of
these sections. It concluded that term ‘land & building’ and ‘rights
therein’ have been clearly understood and treated as independent from each
other. A perusal of the definitions given in these sections when compared with
section 50C shows that legislature was conscious about the proper expression to
be used as per its intention, scope, object and purpose of the section 50C,
wherein it has been expressly mentioned that capital asset should be ‘land or
building or both’. It has not been mentioned that any type of ‘rights’ shall
also be included in the definition of capital assets to be transferred by an
assessee.

Since
the provisions of section 50C are deeming provisions, the settled law and well
accepted rule of interpretation is that deeming provisions are to be construed
strictly. While interpreting deeming provisions neither any words can be added
nor deleted from language used expressly. The Tribunal Held that the ‘rule of
Strict interpretation’ as well as ‘rule of literal Construction’ should be
applied while understanding the meaning and scope of deeming provisions. it
Held that the provisions of section 50C have been wrongly applied to the
impugned transaction since the capital asset transferred by the assessee, upon
which long term capital gain has been computed by the ao, is development rights
in the land of the assessee. The land itself has not been transferred by the
assessee. The Tribunal reversed the action of lower authorities in applying the
provisions of section 50C and in substituting any value other than the amount
of actual sales consideration received by the assessee.

This
ground of the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Rajeev B. Shah vs. ITO ITAT “SMC” Bench, Mumbai Before Mahavir Singh, Judicial Member ITA No.: 262/Mum/2015. A.Y.: 2010-11. Date of Order: 8th July, 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Subhash Shetty & R. N. Vasani / Somanath S. Ukkali

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Section 54F – due to fault of the builder project not
completed on time. assessee  entitled to relief.

Facts
The assessee sold a plot of land for a consideration of Rs.19.35 lakh and
earned long term  Capital Gains of Rs.14.81 lakh. The assessee invested a
sum of Rs. 18.60 lakhs for buying a residential flat under construction. The
Developer allotted flat no.602 in the project for a sum of Rs.143.96 lakh on
the terms and conditions given in the letter of allotment issued to him by the
Builder dated 16­03-2010. The AO rejected the claim of deduction u/s. 54F of
the act on the ground that the property is incomplete and registered document
was not filed by the assessee to claim deduction u/s. 54F of the act.

Before the Tribunal, the assessee explained that the builder was avoiding the
customers due to disputes and the project was also stalled and there was no
further progress in construction of the project. the  assessee also
filed civil suit before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court for an order and direction
calling upon the developer to commence construction of the project as per the
agreement evidenced by the allotment letter.

Held
According to the Tribunal,  it was not in the assessee’s hands to get the
flat completed or to get the flat registered in his name. The intention of the
assessee was very clear and he has invested almost the entire sale
consideration of land in purchase of this residential flat. It was impossible
for the assessee to complete the formalities i.e. taking over possession for
getting the flat registered in his name and this cannot be the reason for
denying the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s. 54 of the act. in view of
the above, the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled for deduction u/s.
54F  of the Act.

Penalty- When amount received from affiliated companies was not chargeable to tax – interpretation placed upon the DTAA – Not liable: Section 271(1)(c)

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DCIT vs. Koninklijke-DSM-NV. [Income tax Appeal no: 432 of
2014 dt : 07/09/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[DCIT vs. Koninklijke-DSM-NV. [ITA No.  978/PN/2011 
; Bench : B ; dated 15/07/2013 ; A Y: 2006- 2007. PUNE. ITAT ]

The  assessee was a company incorporated and based
in Netherlands. The assessee qualified as a tax resident of netherlands as per
dtaa between india and netherlands. The assessee had  affiliated companies operating in India and
received income from them. This income was in respect of Corporate Services and
CICT Charges (cost incurred on share of email, network and internet charges).
however, the assessee being of the view that 
the above income was not chargeable to tax, in its return of income
filed electronically for A.Y. 2006-07 
declared total income at nil. During assessment proceedings, the
assessing Officer on examination of the DTAA, held that the fees received in
respect of CICT Services and for Corporate Services from its affiliated
companies was in fact in  the nature of
fees for technical services. This was on the basis of article  12 of the dtaa between india and netherlands
and therefore   chargeable to tax in
india. Consequently, the income of Rs.2.34 
crores received from its indian affiliates on the above two counts was
brought to tax by an assessment order.

The   assessee 
tried  to justify its claim of
non-taxability of those incomes in india. according to the information given by
the assessee, C-ICT charges represented cost incurred  by 
the  assessee  on 
share  of  e-mail, 
network and  internet  charges. 
The  assessing  Officer 
examined the  agreement  between 
the  assessee  and 
its  affiliates more particularly
between
DEPIPL. after  examining the
agreement between the assessee and its affiliates, the Assessing  Officer 
concluded  that  the 
assessee  was not only providing
the basic it services such as e-mail, network 
and  internet  charges 
but  much  more 
than that which was the it infrastructure to have access to those
facilities.

The
assessee did not contest the assessment order. The Assessing Officer issued the
show cause notice to the assessee why the penalty should not be levied u/s.
271(1) (c) of the Act.

The
assessee while responding pointed out that all the relevant facts and details
with regard to the nature of receipt on account of CICT Service and Corporate
Services along with the basis of its non-taxability was mentioned in the notes
to its accounts. The above amount of Rs. 2.34 crore on the above two counts was
not offered to tax on the basis of its interpretation of the DTAA and judicial
decisions. This led to a bonafide belief that the receipt of amounts from its
affiliated companies was not chargeable to tax. Thus, it was submitted that it
was not a case of filing inaccurate particulars of income or concealment of
income which would warrant imposition of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. The
Assessing Officer did not accept the aforesaid contention and imposed a penalty
of rs.25 lakh u/s. 271(1) (c) of the Act.

Being
aggrieved, the assessee carried the issue in appeal to the CIT(A). the   CIT(A) noted that identical services were
being rendered by the assessee to its Indian affiliated companies from the
assessment  year 2002-03 onwards and in
the earlier returns also the receipt from the affiliated companies were not
shown as income. On the contrary, the tax which was deducted at source by the
affiliated companies while making payments to the assessee, was refunded by the
revenue. It was further noted that for several assessment years before the
filing of returns by Corporates in electronic form was made mandatory in the
subject AY, the notes to accounts filed along with the returns of income
completely disclosed not only the facts of receipt of amounts from affiliated
companies but the nature of the receipts. The filing of return in Electronic
media did not provide for filing notes to Accounts along with the Return. Thus
the non offering of Income to tax was bonafide. This was based upon past practice
and grant of refund of the tax deducted by the affiliated companies on the
payments made to it. Moreover, the entire basis of holding that the amount
received from affiliated companies was not chargeable to tax was the
interpretation placed upon the dtaa by the assessee. On the aforesaid facts,
the CIT(A) held that there was no concealing of particulars of income or
furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. Accordingly, the penalty was
deleted.

Being
aggrieved, the revenue carried the issue in appeal to  the 
tribunal.  The   tribunal, 
by  the  impugned 
order, upheld the finding of the CIT(A). In particular, the impugned
order records the fact that the compulsory filing of e-return by Corporates had
started for the first time only from the subject assessment year. This new
system had no provision for attaching the computation or notes while filing the
return in the prescribed form. The impugned order of the tribunal also records
the fact that the balance sheet and books of accounts also duly reflected that
the Assessee had received payments from its Indian affiliates for providing
services. Thus,   mere non-acceptance of
the claim made by the assessee,  would
not by itself lead to an imposition of penalty, when the claim made was
bonafide. Further, the impugned order holds that even the Assessing Officer had
on an interpretation of article 12 of the dtaa came to a conclusion that the
amounts received from the affiliated companies are chargeable to tax as they
were in the nature of fees for technical services. The impugned order also
placed reliance upon the decision of the apex Court in CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. to conclude that a
bonafide claim not accepted by the Assessing Officer would not by itself
warrant imposition of penalty.

Being
aggrieved, the revenue carried the issue in appeal to the high Court. High
Court held  assessee’s  claim that amount received from its
affiliated companies on account of CICT and Corporate Services is not taxable
was based on an interpretation of DTAA. It is a settled position of law that
where the issue is debatable then mere making of a claim on the basis of a
particular interpretation would not lead to an imposition of penalty. Bearing
in mind that for the earlier assessment years, the assessee had claimed and
been granted refund of taxes deducted at source by the affiliated companies in
respect of the payment received by it for Corporate Services and CICT Services
would also establish that the claim made by the assessee that the income
received is not chargeable to tax was a bonafide claim.

In
view of the above concurrent finding of fact by CIT(A) and the tribunal the appeal
of revenue was dismissed.

Service tax – no deduction claimed on account of service tax which is payable to the Government – Section 43B of the Act would have no application – Section 145A(a)(ii) deals with goods and not services- Section 43B rws 145A(a)(ii) of the Act.

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CIT -2 vs. Knight Frank (India) Pvt. Ltd. [Income tax Appeal
no. 247 of 2014 with 255 of 2014, dt : 16/08/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[Knight Frank (India) Pvt. Ltd..   vs. Asst. CIT ,. [ITA No. 2021/MUM/2011,
6286/MUM/2010, 123/MUM/2011, 178/ MUM/2012 ; 
Bench : A ; dated 10/07/2013 ; 
AYs : 2007- 2008 & 2008-2009. Mum. ITAT ]

The
assessee was engaged in the business of real estate consultancy / agency and
property management services. during the course of the assessment proceedings,
the assessing Officer sought to include the service tax billed by it for
rendering services to the service receivers as trading receipts on invocation
of section 145A(ii) of the act. Besides, the assessing Officer also sought to
invoke section 43B of the act on the ground that the billed amount of service
tax had not been paid over to the Government till the due date of filing the
return of income. The assessing Officer also sought to recast the assessee
profit and loss account so as to reflect the receivable service tax as a part
of the consideration for the services rendered. The assessee contended that
section 145A(a)(ii) of the act would have no application to the present facts
as service tax is not mentioned therein. Further,  it was submitted that as the assessee has
claimed no deduction on account of service tax which is payable to the
Government, and therefore, section 43B of the act would have no application.
However, the same was not accepted by the Assessing Officer and he added the
service tax billed by the assessee to its service receivers as a part of its
turnover / consideration received for services rendered. Further,  section 43B of the act was invoked to add the
service tax billed, which has not been paid over to the Government.

In
appeal, the CIT(A) held that section 145A(a)(ii) of the act would apply as it
is not restricted only to manufacturing and trading companies. It was concluded
that the service tax stands on the same footing as excise duties, sales tax and
other taxes, which are collected to be paid over to the Government. Similarly,
the order of the Assessing Officer with regard to section 43B of the act was
also upheld.

On
further appeal, the tribunal by the impugned order held that section 145A(a)(ii)
of the act would have no application in respect of the service tax billed on
rendering of services. This for the reason the section 145A(a)(ii) deals with
goods and not services. It also held that section 43B of the act would have no
application in the present facts as no liability to pay the same to the
Government arose before the last date of filing of the Returns. Besides, it
held that no deduction had been claimed on the aforesaid amounts while
determining its  income.  Accordingly, 
the  appeal  of 
the  assessee was allowed.

On
further appeal to the high Court, it was held that it is very clear from the
reading of section 145A(a)(ii) of the act that it only covers cases where the
amount of tax, duty, cess or fee is actually paid or incurred by the assessee
to bring the goods to the place of its location and condition as on the date of
valuation. In this case, the assessee has admittedly not paid or incurred any
liability for the purposes of bringing any goods to the place of its location.
In this case, the assessee is rendering services. Thus,  on the plain reading of section145A(a)(ii) of
the act, it is self evident that the same would not apply to the service tax
billed on rendering of services. This is so as the service tax billed has no
relation to any goods, nor does it have anything to do with bringing the goods
to a particular location. The explanation to section 145A(a) of the act does
not expand its scope. An explanation normally does not widen the scope of the
main section. It merely helps clarifying an ambiguity. (relied on : Zakiyr
Begam v/s. Shanaz Ali & Ors., 2010 (9) SCC 280). The main part of the
section specifically restricts its ambit only to valuation of purchase and sale
of goods and inventory. Rendering of service is not goods or inventory. The
Explanation in this case clarifies/explains that any tax, duty, cess or fee paid
or incurred will have to be taken into account for valuation of goods even if
such payment results in any benefit/right to the person making the payment. It
does not even remotely deal with the issue of service tax. Thus, it is clear
that the legislature never intended to restrict the applicability of section 145A
of the act only to goods and not extend it to Services. as observed by the apex
Court In State of Bihar vs. S. K. Roy
AIR 1966 (SC) 1995:
“ It is well recognised principle in dealing with
construction that a subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see
what is the proper interpretation to be put upon an earlier Act where the
earlier Act is obscure or capable of more then one interpretation.”

Therefore,
section 145A of the act would have no application in cases where service is
provided by the assessee. The assessee had not claimed any deduction on account
of the service tax payable in order to determine its taxable income. In the
above view, there can be no occasion to invoke section 43B of the act.
Accordingly, both the appeals were dismissed.

TDS – Fees for technical services- Section 194J – Assessee purchasing and selling electricity – Transmission of electricity by State Power Transmission Corporation – Not technical services – Tax not deductible u/s. 194J on amount paid for such transmission –

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ACIT vs. Gulbarga Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.- 387 ITR 484
(Karn):

The
assessee was in the business of buying and selling of electricity. The assessee
purchased electricity from the generators of the Karnataka Power Corporation
etc. and sold it to different categories of consumers in its jurisdiction. The
power from the generation point to the customers was  transmitted 
through  the  transmission 
network  of the Corporation. The
Assessing Officer found that the assessee had made payment of transmission charges
to the Corporation, without deducting tax at source thereon. He held that the
assessee was an assessee in default u/s. 201(1) of the income-tax act, 1961 in
respect of payment of transmission charges u/s. 194J. The Commissioner
(appeals) and the tribunal set aside the order.

On
appeal by the revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal
and held as under:

“i)
 The 
provisions of section 194J  of the
act, was not attracted in the present case and the assessee was not liable to
deduct the tax at source from the payment of transmission charges made to the
Corporation and the order of the Assessing Officer was rightly set aside by the
tribunal.

ii)  Accordingly, appeal of the revenue is
dismissed.”

TDS – Commission- Sections 194H and 201(1) – A. Ys. 2008-09 to 2010-11- Assessee paying incentive under trade discount scheme to retail dealers through del creder agents – Transactions between assessee and retail dealers on principal to principal basis- No principal agent relationship – No services rendered by retail dealers to assesse – Incentive given only to promote sales – not commission – Tax not deductible

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CIT vs. United Breweries Ltd.; 387 ITR 150 (T&AP):

The
assessee was engaged in the manufacture and sale of beer to the andhra Pradesh
Beverage Corporation. The Corporation, in turn, sold beer purchased from the
assessee, to retail dealers. The assessee paid incentives under the trade
discount scheme to the retail dealers through del creder agents. The Assessing
Officer held that for the payment made to the retail dealers, section 194H of
the income-tax act, 1961 was applicable and the assessee had committed default
in terms of section 201(1) in not having deducted tax at source on the payments
and levied interest u/s. 201(1A) of the act in respect of the amounts paid
under the trade scheme and discounts. The tribunal held the payments
constituted sales promotion expenses and did not fall in the category of
“commission” attracting 194H of the act.

On
appeal by the Revenue, the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the
decision of the tribunal and held as under:

“i)  It was evident that beer was sold by the
assessee to the Corporation, and the Corporation, in turn, sold the beer
purchased from the assessee, to retail dealers. The two transactions were
independent of each other, and were on a principal to principal basis. No
services rendered by the retail dealers to the assessee, and the incentive
given by the assessee to the retailers as trade discount was only to promote
their sales.

ii)
The tribunal rightly held that in the absence of a relationship of principal
and agent, and as there was no direct relationship between the assessee and the
retailer, the discount offered by the assessee to the retailers could only be
treated as sales promotion expenses, and not as commission, as no services were
rendered by the retailers to the assessee.”

Search and seizure – Block assessment – Notice u/s158BC – Where condition precedent to issue notice u/s. 158BC, viz. undisclosed income found during search proceedings was not satisfied, no notice u/s. 158BC could have been be issued to petitioner

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Dr. Gautam Sen vs. CCIT; [2016] 74 taxmann.com 128 (Bom):

Revenue carried out the search on
16th january, 1999 u/s. 132 of the income-tax act, 1961 on the Petitioner and
his premises. During the course of the search, an amount of Rs.20,000/- in cash
was found in his house which was explained to the satisfaction of the revenue. Nothing
incriminating was found during the course of search.  However, a notice dated 16th May 2000 was
issued u/s. 158BC of the Act to the Petitioner to file his return of income for
the block period covered by the search.

The petitioner filed a writ
petition before the Bombay High Court challenging the validity of the notice on
the ground that during course of search, nothing was found with the Petitioner,
so as to infer that he was in possession of any undisclosed income either at
the time of search or at any time prior thereto. Consequently, in the absence
of there being undisclosed income, the Assessing Officer would not have any
justification to issue the impugned notice u/s. 158BC of the act.

The Bombay high Court allowed the
writ petition and held as under:

“i) Action of the revenue in
issuing section 158BC notice despite the appraisal report clearly stating that
no incriminating material was found against petitioner was highly deplorable as
it amounted to harassment of the taxpayer. The Officers of the income tax
department  are obliged to proceed
in   accordance   with  
the   statutory   provisions and cannot act on their whim and
fancy. The department should adopt a standard operating procedure to provide
adequate safeguards before issuing notices under Chapter XVIB.

ii)  In the above facts, the impugned notice is
quashed and set aside.

iii) This is the fit case where
costs should be awarded to the Petitioner. The Respondents-revenue i.e. the jurisdictional Chief Commissioner of income
tax (respondent no.1) is directed to pay the costs of Rs.20,000/- to the
Petitioner within four weeks from today.”

Search and seizure- Assessment of third person- Section 153C – A. Ys. 2003-04 to 2008-09- Condition precedent – Cheque book pertaining to assessee reflecting issue of cheques only document seized during search – No other evidence of undisclosed income – Proceedings u/s. 153C not valid

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CIT vs. Refam Management Services P. Ltd.; 386 ITR 693 (Del)

Pursuant to a search and seizure
operation undertaken u/s. 132 of the income-tax act, 1961 in the case of a
third party, cheque books of the assessee reflecting issue of cheques were
found. Assessments were made for the assessment years 2003-04 to 2008-09 u/s.
153C of the act. Certain additions u/s. 69C and certain disallowances were
made. The CIT(a) and the tribunal deleted the additions and disallowances. In
view of such deletion assesee’s ground that assessments were illegal and
invalid were not decided.

On appeal by the revenue, the
assessee raised the ground that the assessments u/s. 153C were illegal and
invalid.

The Delhi High Court held as
under:

“The  only document seized during the search was a
cheque book pertaining to the assessee which reflected the  issue 
of  cheques  during 
the  period august  2008 to october  2008, relevant to the A. Y. 2009-10. Since there was no other evidence
of undisclosed income, the proceedings u/s. 153C were not valid.”

Reassessment – Validity – Section 147 – A. Y. 1993 -94 – Non-supply by the AO of reasons recorded for reopening the assessment (even where the 14 reopening is prior to GKN Driveshafts 259 ITR 19 (SC)) renders the reassessment order bad as being without jurisdiction

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CIT vs. IDBI (Bom); ITA No. 494 of 2014 dated 19/09/2016; www.itatonline.org:

For the A. Y. 1993-94, the
assessment of the assessee was reopened by issuing notice u/s. 148 of the
income­ tax Act, 1961. The assessee filed return in response to the notice and
requested the reasons for reopening. In spite of the repeated request the
reasons were not furnished but the reassessment was completed. The assesee
challenged the reassessment order on the ground that the reassessment made
without furnishing the reasons for reopening is invalid. The tribunal accepted
the assessee’s claim and held that the reassessment order is invalid.

On appeal by the revenue, the
Bombay high Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held as under:

“i) The   question as framed proceeds on the basis
that the respondent assessee was aware of the reasons for reassessment.
the  only basis for the aforesaid
submission is the submission made by the revenue before the tribunal that the
respondent assessee is a public sector institution who was aware that search
action has been initiated on certain lessees in respect of transactions with
idBi i.e. assessee. On the basis of the above, it is to be inferred that the
reason for reassessment was known to the respondent assessee.

ii) The supply of reason in
support of the notice for reopening of an assessment is a jurisdictional
requirement. The reasons recorded form the basis to examine whether the
Assessing Officer had at all applied his mind to the facts and had reasons to
believe that taxable income has escaped reassessment. It is these reasons,
which have to be made available to the assessee and it could give rise to a
challenge to the reopening notice. It is undisputed that the reasons recorded
for issuing reopening notice were never communicated to the respondent assessee
in spite of its repeated requests. Thus, the grievance of the revenue on the
above count is unsustainable.

iii) An  alternative submission is made on behalf of
the revenue that the obligation to supply reasons on the Assessing Officer was
consequent to the decision of the apex Court that GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd.
vs. Income-tax Officer (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC) rendered in 2003 while, in the
present case, the reopening notice is dated 9th 
December 1996. Thus it submitted at the time when the notice u/s. 148 of
the act was issued and the time when assessment was completed, there was no
such requirement to furnish  to the  assessee 
a  copy of the reasons recorded. This
submission is not correct. We find that the impugned order relies upon the
decision of this Court in Seista Steel Construction (P.) ltd.  [1984] 17 taxman 122(Bom.) when it is held
that in the absence of supply of reasons recorded for issue of reopening notice
the assessment order would be without jurisdiction and needs to be quashed. The
above view as taken by the tribunal has also been taken by this Court in CIT
vs. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. [2012] 21 Taxmann 53 (Bombay) viz. non-supply of
reasons recorded to issue a reopening notice would make the order of assessment
passed thereon bad as being without jurisdiction.

iv) In view of the above, the
appeal is dismissed”

Business loss/speculation loss – 37(1)/43(5) – A. Y. 2009-10 – Loss suffered in foreign exchange transactions entered into for hedging business transactions cannot be disallowed as being “notional” or “speculative” in nature. S. Vinodkumar Diamonds is not good law as it lost sight of Badridas Gauridas 261 ITR 256 (Bom)

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CIT vs. M/s. D. Chetan & Co. (Bom); ITA No. 278 of 2014 dated 01/10/2016:
www.itatonline.org:

The assessee is engaged in the
business of import and export of diamonds. during the assessment proceedings,
the Officer found that Respondent assessee explained that the amount of
rs.78.10 lakhs claimed as loss was on account of having entered into hedging
transactions to safeguard variation in exchange rates affecting its
transactions of import and export by entering into forward contracts. The
Assessing Officer by order of assessment dated 27th december 2011 disallowed the
claim on the ground that it is a notional loss of a contingent liability debited
to Profit and Loss Account.  Resultantly,
the same was added to the assessee’s total income. The Cit (appeals) allowed
the assessee’s appeal inter alia relying upon the decisions of tribunal in
Bhavani Gems vs. ACIT (ITA No.2855/Mum/2010 dt.30.3.2011) and the Special Bench
decision in the case of DCIT vs. Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait ((2010) 132 TTJ
(Mumbai) (SB) 505). The Cit (appeals) on facts found that the transaction of forward
contract was entered into during the course of its business. It held that it
was not speculative in nature nor was it the case of the Assessing Officer that
it was so. Thus the loss incurred as forward contract was allowed as a business
loss. The Tribunal upheld the finding of the Cit (appeals). The tribunal found
that the transaction of forward contract had been entered into for the purpose
of hedging in the course of its normal business activities of import and export
of diamonds.

On appeal by the revenue, the
high Bombay Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal has, while
upholding the finding of the Cit (appeals), independently come to the
conclusion  that  the 
transaction  entered  into 
by the assessee is not in the nature of speculative activities. Further,  the hedging transactions were entered into so
as to cover variation in foreign exchange rate which would impact its business
of import and export of diamonds. These concurrent finding of facts are not
shown to be perverse in any manner. In fact, the Assessing Officer also in the
Assessment Order does not find that the transaction entered into by the
assessee was speculative in nature.

 ii) The reliance placed on the decision in S.
Vinodkumar Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. vs. Addl.CIT ITA 506/MUM/2013 rendered on 3rd may
2013 in the revenue’s favour would not by itself govern the issues arising
herein. This is so as every decision is rendered in the context of the facts
which arise before the authority for adjudication. Mere conclusion in favour of
the revenue in another case by itself would not entitle a party to have an
identical relief in this case. In fact, if the revenue was of the view that the
facts in S. vinodkumar are identical/similar to the present facts, then
reliance would have been placed by the revenue upon it at the hearing before
the tribunal. The impugned order does not indicate any such reliance. It
appears that in S. vinodkumar, the tribunal held the forward contract on facts
before it to be speculative in nature in view of section 43(5) of the act. However,
it appears that the decision of this court in CIT vs. Badridas Gauridas (P) Ltd.
261 ITR 256 (Bom) was not brought to the notice of the tribunal when it
rendered its decision in S. vinodkumar (supra). in the above case, this court
has held that forward contract in foreign exchange when incidental to carrying
on business of cotton exporter and done to cover up losses on account of
differences in foreign exchange valuations, would not be speculative activity
but a business activity.”

Business expenditure – TDS – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – A. Y. 2006-07 – Professional services- Subscription to e-magazines – No rendering of professional services – Tax not deductible at source on subscription – Disallowance of subscription not justified

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CIT vs. India Capital Markets P. Ltd.; 387 ITR 510 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the
Assessing Officer disallowed the payment made to Bloomberg being data services
charges of Rs. 4.74 lakh on account of non-deduction of tax at source u/s
40(a)(ia) of the income-tax act, 1961. The Assessing Officer was of the view
that the payment made by the assessee to Bloomberg was in the nature of
consultative services and so the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source. The
Commissioner (appeals) found that the payment made to Bloomberg was essentially
a subscription for a financial e-magazine and was not liable to deduction of
tax at source and accordingly there would be no occasion to invoke section
40(a)(ia) of the act. He therefore deleted the addition. The tribunal upheld
the decision of the Commissioner (appeals).

On appeal by the revenue, the
Bombay high Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The 
Commissioner (appeals) and the tribunal had reached a concurrent finding
of fact that payments made  to  Bloomberg 
were  for  subscription 
to e-magazines and therefore, there was no occasion to deduct tax under
the act. Thus,  section 40(a)(ia) could
not have been invoked.

ii)  The  
submission on behalf of the revenue that B’s magazines/information was
backed by solid research carried out by its employees and made available on the
website would not by itself result in B rendering any consultative services. It
was not the case of the Revenue that specific queries raised by the asessee
were answered by B as part of the consideration of rs. 4.34 lakh. The
information was made available to all subscribers to e-magazines/journal of B.
therefore, in no way could the payments made to B be considered to be in the
nature of any consultative/professional services rendered by B to the assessee.

iii) The Tribunal was justified
in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer u/s. 40(a)(ia) of
the act.”

Business expenditure – A. Y. 1985-86 – Accrued or contingent liability – Mercantile system of accounting- Customs duty – Seller challenging increase in payment of customs duty before Supreme Court – Mere challenge to demand would not by itself lead to cessation of liability- Assessee cannot be denied deduction of amounts paid for purchase of goods

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CIT vs. Monica India (No. 1); 386 ITR 608 (Bom):

The assessee was following
mercantile system of accounting. For the A. Y. 1985-86, the assessee had
claimed expenditure on accrual basis which included customs duty of Rs. 1.78
crore. The same was allowed by the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner in
exercise of his powers u/s. 263 of the income-tax act, 1961 held that the
amount of rs. 1.78 crore was a contingent liability as the assessee had
challenged it in the Supreme Court and the payment of it to the customs
department was postponed and thus could not be allowed as an expenditure for the  subject 
assessment  year.  The   tribunal
held that the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting and
therefore, the liability was to be allowed as deduction on accrual basis and
further held that the liability to pay the customs duty by the assesee was a
part of the sale price to the two sellers, and consequently, ought to be
allowed as an expenditure for purchase of goods.

On appeal by the revenue, the
Bombay high Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The  
agreements  between  the 
parties  provided that the consideration
payable for the purchase of goods included within it, the duty of customspayable
on the imported goods as a part of the cost incurred by  the 
seller. Therefore,   the cost of
purchase of goods was not only the expenses incurred by the seller from the
opening of the letter of credit but continued to run till the execution of the
contract. The mere fact that the seller of the goods had obtained a stay, would
not by itself result in an unascertained or unqualified liability.

ii) Moreover, since the assessee was following
the mercantile system of accounting mere challenge to the demand by the seller
might not by itself lead to the liability ceasing. Although the seller of the
goods might not be able to claim deduction since it was paid in terms of
section 43B of the act, this would not deprive the assessee of the deduction of
amounts paid by it for purchase of goods. Thus, the assessee would be entitled
to deduct the amount of rs 1.78 crore 
as  consideration paid  for the goods in the assessment year.”

Appellate Tribunal – Power to admit additional grounds/evidence – Section 254, read with Rules 11 and 29 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 – A. Y. 2007-08 – In terms of section 254(1), Tribunal while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, has discretion to allow to be raised before it new or additional questions of law arising out of record after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to other party

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VMT Spinning Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT; [2016] 74 taxmann.com 33
(P&H):

For
the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee challenged assessment order before the
Commissioner (appeals) which was partly allowed. This led to filing of cross-
appeals before the tribunal i.e., one by the revenue and the other by the
assessee. In the memorandum of appeal filed before the Tribunal, the assessee
raised an additional ground with regard to calculation of minimum alternate tax
to be carried forward to the subsequent year. According to the assessee, in the
assessment order, the same had not been correctly calculated. As said ground
had not been raised before the Commissioner, the tribunal refused to adjudicate
upon the same as according to the tribunal prior leave of the tribunal through
an application in writing should have been obtained before raising the
additional ground. An oral request made by the assessee to raise said
additional ground was not considered enough.

On
appeal by the assessee, the Punjab and Harayana High Court held as under:

“i)
Appeals to the tribunal are preferred u/s. 254(1) which provides that after hearing
the contesting parties, the tribunal  may
pass such orders that it thinks fit. In section 254(1) the usage of the words
‘pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit’ gives very wide powers to the
tribunal and such powers are not limited to adjudicate upon only the issues
arising from the order appealed from. Any interpretation to the contrary would
go against the basic purpose for which the appellate powers are given to the
tribunal u/s. 254 which is to determine the correct tax liability of the assessee.

 ii)
Rules 11 and 29 of the income-tax (appellate tribunal) rules, 1963 are  also 
indicative  that the powers of the
tribunal,  while considering an appeal
u/s. 254(1) are not restricted only to the issues raised before it. Rule 11 of
the 1963 rules provides that the appellant, with the leave of the tribunal can
urge before it any ground not taken in the memorandum of appeal and that the
tribunal while deciding the appeal is not confined only to the grounds taken in
the memorandum of appeal or taken by leave of the tribunal under rule 11.

iii)
Rule 29, is to the effect that though parties to the appeal before the
tribunal  shall not be entitled to
produce additional evidence but if the tribunal desires the production of any
document or examination of any witness or any affidavit to be filed, it can,
for reasons to be recorded, do so.

iv)
A harmonious reading of section 254(1) of the act and rules 11 and 29 of the
rules coupled with basic purpose underlying the appellate powers of the
tribunal which is to ascertain the correct tax liability of the assessee leaves
no manner of doubt that the tribunal while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction, has discretion to allow to be raised before it knew or additional
questions of law arising out of the record before it. What cannot be done, is
examination of new sources of income for which separate remedies are provided
to the revenue under the act.

v)
Rule 11 in fact confers wide powers on the tribunal, although it requires a
party to seek the leave of the tribunal. It does not require the same to be in
writing. It merely states that the appellant shall not, except by leave of the
tribunal, urge or be heard in support of any ground not set forth in the
memorandum of appeal. In a fit case it is always open to the tribunal to permit
an appellant to raise an additional ground not set forth in the memorandum  of 
appeal.  The   safeguard 
is  in the proviso to rule 11
itself. The proviso states that the tribunal 
shall not rest its decision on any other ground unless the party who may
be affected thereby has had a sufficient opportunity of being heard on that
ground. Thus,  even if it is a pure
question of law, the tribunal cannot consider an additional ground without
affording the other side an opportunity of being heard. even in the absence of
the proviso, it would be incumbent upon the tribunal to afford a party an
opportunity of meeting an additional point raised before it.

vi)
Moreover,  even  though 
rule  11  requires 
an appellant to seek the leave of the tribunal,  it does not confine the Tribunal to a
consideration of the grounds set forth in the memorandum of appeal or even the
grounds taken by the leave of the tribunal. In other words, the tribunal can
decide the appeal on a ground neither taken in the  memorandum 
of  appeal  nor 
by  its  leave. The only requirement is that the
tribunal cannot rest its decision on any other ground unless the party who may
be affected has had sufficient opportunity of being heard on that ground.

vii) in the present case, the tribunal ought to have exercised its
discretion especially in view of the fact 
that  the  assessee 
intends  raising  only  a
legal argument without reference to any disputed questions  of 
fact. The   matter is  remanded 
to the tribunal for adjudicating upon the additional ground on merits.”

Appellate Tribunal – Power to grant stay – Section 254(2A) – A. Y. 2009-10- Tribunal has power to grant stay for a period exceeding three hundred and sixty five days

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Principal CIT vs. Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration
Ltd.; 387 ITR 441 (P&H):

In
the appeal filed by the Revenue before the Punjab and haryana high Court, the
following questions were raised:

“i)  Whether the hon’ble income-tax appellate
tribunal has acted in contravention of the second proviso to section 254(2a) of
the income-tax act, 1961 as the combined period of stay has exceeded 365 days?

ii)  Whether the order of the income-tax tribunal
be treated as void ab initio in the light of the third proviso to section
254(2a) of the income-tax act, 1961, which provides that stay of demand stands
vacated after expiry of 365 days even if delay in disposal of appeal is not
attributable to the assessee?”

The
high Court held as under:

“Where the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the
assessee, the tribunal has the power to grant extension of stay beyond 365 days
in deserving cases.”

Shipping Companies – Computation of income – Tonnage Tax Scheme – Income generated from slot charter could be computed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter-XII-G and requirement of producing certificate referred to in section 115 VX would not apply.

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CIT vs. Trans Asian Shipping Services (P) Ltd. (2016) 385
ITR 637 (SC)

The  question that arose before the Supreme Court
for consideration pertained to “slot charter”, i.e. should the “slot charter”
operations of “tonnage tax company” be carried on only in “qualifying ships” to
include the income from such operations to determine the “tonnage income” under
“tonnage tax scheme” in terms of the provisions of Chapter XII-G of the act? in
other words, is the income derived from “slot charter” operations of a “tonnage
tax company” liable to be excluded while determining the “tonnage income”
under  the  “tonnage 
tax  scheme”  if such operations are carried on in ships
which are not “qualifying ships” in terms of the provisions of that Chapter of
the act and the relevant provisions of the income-tax rules, 1962?

The
Supreme Court noted the tonnage tax Scheme, namely, Chapter XII-G of the
income-tax act, 1961 (the “act”) which contains special provisions for assessments
relating to income of shipping companies. under this Chapter, shipping
companies are  given  a 
choice  to either get income from
the shipping business computed in accordance with the provisions contained in
the act meant for computation of income in respect of business or profession or
opt for methodology of computing income as per the special formula provided in
that Chapter which accords a different treatment and different manner of
computation of income for the shipping business.

U/s.115VA
option is given to  the  shipping 
company, which is operating “qualifying ships”, as defined in certain
115 VD,  to get its income computed in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII-G, irrespective of those
stipulations otherwise contained in sections 28 to 43C for computation of
business income. once such an option is exercised and income is computed in
accordance with the provisions of the said Chapter, a fiction is created by
deeming the said income to be the profits and gains of such business chargeable
to tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”.

For
a shipping company to be eligible to exercise such an option, there are certain
conditions to be fulfilled, which are as under:

(i)
In the first place, the assessee has to be a “company”. The word “company” is
defined in section 2(17) of the act. 
Such a company may have various business and one such business may be
the business of operating qualifying ships. However, it is only that income which
is generated from “the business of operating qualifying ships” that will be
computed as per the special provisions in Chapter XII-G. Income from other
business will be computed in the same manner as provided in sections 28 to 43C.
In case the business of the company is to operate qualifying ships only, then
the income from that sole business will be under this Chapter.

 (ii) 
Income from the business  of  operating 
qualifying ships shall be computed under Chapter XII-G  only if such an option is specifically
exercised by the assessee-company. This requirements is particularly mentioned
in section 115VP of the act. Such an option, when given, is to remain in force
for a period of ten years from the date on which the said option is exercised,
and this period is prescribed in section 115VQ
of the act. However, it can be renewed within one year from the end of the
previous year in which the option ceases to have effect (section 115VR). in
certain circumstances stipulated in section 115VS of the act, there is a
prohibition to opt for the scheme.

The
scheme that is to be opted for computation of income under this Chapter is
known as “tonnage tax scheme” (for short “TTS”) as defined in clause (m) of
section 115V of the act.

(iii)
Though these special provisions relate to income of shipping companies, it is
only that income which is received from business of “operating qualifying
ships” that is eligible for computation under this Chapter.

The
Supreme Court observed that it is only income from the business of operating
qualifying ship that has to be computed in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter XII-G. as per section 115VB of the act, 
a company is regarded as operating a ship if it operates any ship which
is owned by it or a ship which is chartered by it and it also includes a case
where even a part of the ship has been chartered by it in an arrangement such
as slot charter, space charter joint charter, etc.

The
Supreme Court further noted that the respondent­ assessee owned a qualifying
ship and fulfilled all other conditions as well as to make it a qualifying
company u/s. 115VC.  The income that was
generated from the said qualifying ship was exigible to tax as per the special
provisions contained in Chapter XII-G, as the assessee had exercised the
requisite option in this behalf. However, in addition to operating its
qualifying ship, in the relevant assessment years, i.e., 2005-06 and 2008-09 it
had also “slot charter” arrangements in other ships. In the relevant income-tax
return filed by the assessee, the assessee- had also included the income earned
from such slot charter arrangements for the purpose of computation thereof
under Chapter XII-G. it was in this context the question had arisen as to
whether the assessee was eligible to include the income derived from activities
through “slot charter” arrangements as relevant shipping income to determine
the deemed tonnage in terms of rule 11Q of the Income-tax Rules.

The
Assessing Officer was of the view that the income earned under slot charter
arrangement did not qualify for coverage to be given special treatment in
Chapter XII-G as this income was not generated by the assessee from its own
ship, i.e, it is neither from the ship owned by the assessee nor from the
entire ship chartered by the assessee. he took the view that in order to avail
of the benefit of Chapter XII-G, the assessee was supposed to show that the
ship operated by it was qualifying ship and for this purpose it was incumbent
upon the assessee to produce a “valid certificate indicating its net tonnage”
as provided in section 115VX(1)(b) of the act. However, the assessee had
submitted such valid certificate only in respect of its own ship and did not
submit the same in respect of ship chartered by the assessee under the slot
charter arrangement. The contention of the assessee was that the requirement of
producing “valid certificate” is to be insisted only for assessee’s own ships
and for the ships hired fully. This contention was not accepted by the
Assessing Officer. The assessee had also argued that as per the method of
computation provided u/s. 115VG of the act read with rule 11Q of the rules,
income for full ship is to be computed on the basis of “net tonnage” shown in
the valid certificate, whereas income of part of the ship is computed as
“deemed tonnage”. This argument was also rejected by the Assessing Officer on
the ground that there was a requirement of producing valid certificate even for
part of the ship and in the absence thereof income from slot charter
arrangement could not be included for the purpose of computation of tonnage
income under the tonnage tax scheme.

The
order of the Assessing Officer was upheld by the Commissioner of income-tax
(appeals) resulting into dismissal of appeal filed by the assessee. Even the
income-tax appellate tribunal  accepted
the view taken by the Assessing Officer and dismissed the appeal filed before
it by the assessee thereby upholding the order of the Assessing Officer.
However, in further appeal that was preferred by the assessee to the high  Court u/s. 260a of the act, the assessee has
succeeded in getting its way through as the high Court has found merit in its
contention. thus,  the high Court had
allowed the appeal of the assessee holding that the income earned by the
assessee under slot charter arrangement comes under the definition of “deemed
tonnage tax” as per Explanation to 
sub-section  (4)  of 
section  115VG  of  the
act,  and, therefore, exclusion of this
while assessing the same under the said special provisions was not appropriate.
in other words, the high Court held that the assessee was eligible for tonnage
on slot charter related income also.

On
appeal by the revenue, the Supreme Court noted that the assessee was a company
as defined u/s. 2(17) of the act and was also in the business of operating
qualifying ship(s). it was also not in dispute that it owned a qualifying ship
and fulfillment of this condition permitted the assessee to exercise its option
for computation of income from the business of operating qualifying ships under
Chapter XII-G of the act. The assessee exercised the option in this behalf, as
per section 115VP of the act in respect of assessment years in question.
Therefore,  the assessee was a qualifying
company u/s. 115VC of the act. In fact, the income that was generated from the
qualifying ship owned by the assessee was also assessed under the special
provisions contained in Chapter XII-G of the act. The dispute, however,
pertained to the income from the slot charter arrangements which the assessee
had made in other ships during the concerned assessment years. The ships where
slot charter were arranged were obviously not owned by the assessee.
Further,  as only some slots were
chartered, full ships were not chartered.

According
to  the 
Supreme  Court,  in 
this  context, the first question
would be as to whether such a slot charter could be treated as “operating
ships” within the meaning of section 115VB of the Act? This provision
specifically provides that for the purpose of Charter XII-G, a company would be
regarded as operating a ship “if it operates any ship whether owned or
chartered by it and includes a case where even a part of the ship has been
chartered by it in an arrangement such as slot charter, space charter or joint
charter”. The Supreme Court held that it was clear from the above that slot
charter was specifically included as an instance of a ship chartered by the
company.

Further,    the Supreme Court observed  that 
section 115VG(4)  was in two parts
in so far as computation of tonnage was concerned. When it came to tonnage of a
ship, a certificate as mentioned in 115VX was to be produced. The second part
of this provision talks about “deemed tonnage” in contradistinction to the
“actual tonnage” mentioned  in  the 
certificate.  The Supreme Court
held that thus, it was not only the actual tonnage that was mentioned in the
certificate referred to in 115VX of the act which this provision dealt with. In
addition, deemed tonnage was also to be included if there was such a deemed
tonnage, and that deemed tonnage was to be added to the actual tonnage which is
indicated in the certificate. Explanation to s/s. (4), inter alia, mentions
that in so far as slot charter arrangements are concerned, purchase of such
slot charter should be treated as deemed tonnage. according to the Supreme
Court the legislature  had, thus, clearly
visualied that in so far as deemed tonnage was concerned, there would not be
any possibility of producing a certificate referred to in section 115VX of the
act. When the provision is read in this manner, it becomes amply clear that section
115Vd of the act which talks of a qualifying ship, contemplates the situation
in which the entire ship is either owned or chartered. Similar is the position
which inheres in section 115VX of the act as it refers to “the tonnage of a
ship”. Therefore, whenever the question of a tonnage of a ship crops up and the
said tonnage is to be determined, it has to be in accordance with the valid
certificate indicating its tonnage and it is a compulsory obligation of the
assessee to produce such a certificate. However, this requirement of producing
a certificate would not apply when entire ship is not chartered and the
arrangement pertains only to purchase of slots, slot charter and an arrangement
of sharing of break-bulk vessel.

The
Supreme Court further held that calculation of income arising from carriage of
goods on slot basis has, in the wisdom of the legislature, been disconnected
from the capacity of a ship, on account of impossibility of getting such
information in relation to ships on which slot charter is undertaken. This
aspect has due recognition in note 3 of the form 66. Thus, the act and the
rules for computation on tonnage tax specifically and categorically
differentiate the requirement of the certificate with regard to owned ship and
slot charter. In law, the said rule also recognises that identification of the
vessel for slot charter cannot be done. Also, note 3 below form no.66, in terms
of rule 11T, recognises the reason for prescribing a separate formula for slot
charter.

The
Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the high Court and dismissed the
appeal of the revenue.

Business Loss – A licensee/assessee may be entitled to claim the forfeited amount of licence fees paid on cancellation of license by Excise Department as business loss but in a case where the licensee/ assessee transfers his licence and forfeiture of licence take place thereafter the loss cannot be allowed.

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CIT vs. Preetam Singh Luthra (2016) 386 ITR 408 (SC)

The Assessing Officer (AO) denied
to set off the loss on account of forfeiture of licence fee of Rs.3,93,67,000,
against income as claimed by the assessee and added the said amount of Rs.3,93,67,000
as unexplained investment.

In appeal preferred by the assessee,
the Commissioner (appeals) held that the addition made by the assessing Officer
at Rs.3,93,67,000, which was actually Rs.2,32,33,500 was not sustainable on
account of later confiscation of the amount so deposited and accordingly, the
entire addition was directed to be deleted.

Dissatisfied with the order of
the Commissioner (Appeals), the Revenue filed appeal before the Tribunal. The
Tribunal, after considering the arguments of for the parties, placing reliance
on the judgment passed by the madras high Court in the case of CIT vs. Chensing
Ventures [2007] 291 ITR 258 (Mad) held that since the assessee was allotted the
licence by the excise department, which was later on transferred to one Shankar
lal Patidar but the said licence was cancelled by the excise department and the
amount of licence fees deposited by the petitioner was forfeited by the excise
department, the assessee was entitled to set off on account of such forfeiture.

The High Court dismissed the
appeal filed by the Revenue holding that no question of law arose in the
matter.

On  further appeal by the revenue, the Supreme
Court held that if the licence fee stood forfeited, the licensee/ assessee may
be entitled to claim the forfeited amount as a business loss. However in the
present case, from the grounds urged before the high Court which facts had not
been controverterd by the assessee, it appeared that the respondent had transferred
the licence on 25th june, 2005 to one Shankarlal Patidar and the forfeiture of
the said licence took place thereafter on 1st august, 2005. According to the
Supreme Court, if that be so, the loss, if any, on account of forfeiture was
sustained not by the respondent-assessee but by the transferee-Shankarlal
Patidar.

The Supreme Court therefore
concluded that the tribunal and the high Court had overlooked the aforesaid
vital fact, and therefore the orders passed by the learned tribunal and the
high Court were required to be reversed. Consequently, the Supreme Court set
aside the order of the High Court affirming the order of the Tribunal and the
Commissioner of income-tax (appeals) passed in favour of the assessee and
affirmed the order of the Assessing Officer disallowing the aforesaid claims of
the assessee.

Business Income or Income from House Property – Assessee having one business of leasing its property and earning rent therefrom – Rent received from property should be treated as business income-

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Rayala Corporation Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2016] 386 ITR 500 (SC)

The appellant-assessee, a private
limited company, was having house property, which had been rented.  The issue that arose before the Supreme Court
was whether the income so received should be taxed under the head “Income from
house property” or “Profit and gains of business or profession”. the  reason for which the aforestated issue had
arisen was that though the assessee was having the house property and was
receiving income by way of rent, the case of the assessee was that the assessee
company was in business of renting its properties and was receiving rent as its
business income, the said income should be taxed under the head “Profits and
gains of business or profession” whereas the case of the revenue was that as
the income was arising from house property, the said income should be taxed
under the head “income from house property”.

According to the Supreme Court,
the law laid down by it in the case of Chennai Properties and Investments Ltd.
vs. CIT (2015) 373 ITR 673 (SC) showed the correct position of law and looking
at the facts of the case in question, the case on hand was squarely covered by
the said judgment.

The Supreme Court noted the
submissions made by the counsel appearing for the revenue which were to the
effect that the rent should be the main source of income or the purpose for
which the company was incorporated should be to earn income from rent, so as to
make the rental income to be the income taxable under the head “Profits and gains
of business or profession”.

The Supreme Court observed that
it was an admitted fact in the instant case that the assessee company had only
one business and that was of leasing its property and earning rent therefrom. Thus,
even on the factual aspect, the Supreme Court did not find any substance in
what had been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the revenue.

The  Supreme Court held that the business
of the company was to lease its property and to earn rent and
therefore, the income so earned should be treated as its business income
and that the high Court was not correct while deciding that the income
of the assessee should be treated as income from house property,

Rate of Taxation and Deemed Short-term Capital Gains

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Issue for consideration

Any
profits or gains arising from the transfer of a property, held as a capital
asset, is liable to be taxed under the head “capital gains”. Such gains are
classified into short term capital gains and long term capital gains, where the
former is subjected to tax at the ordinary rates, while the later qualifies for
concessional rate of taxation, besides being eligible for the benefit of
reinvestment related exemptions from tax.

Ordinarily,
a short term capital gains arises on transfer of a short term capital asset and
long term capital gain arises on transfer of a long term capital asset. An
asset held for a period exceeding 36 months is usually treated as a long term
capital asset. Under a fiction of section 50 however, the act provides for a
separate treatment for an asset on which depreciation has been claimed, even
where such an asset is otherwise held for a period exceeding 36 months.

Section
50 has been the subject matter of two important controversies; one relating to
the eligibility of the deemed short term capital gains to the benefit of
sections 54E, 54f, 54EC, etc. and the other relating to the eligibility of such
gains for the concessional rate of taxation. While the former has now been
settled with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs.
V.S. Dempo Co. Ltd. 387 ITR 354, the later continues to be debatable as is
confirmed by conflicting decisions of the courts on the subject. While the Pune
and the Kolkata Tribunal are against conferring the benefit of concessional
rate on the deemed short term capital gains, a series of decisions of the
Mumbai Tribunal favour the grant of the benefit of concessional rate of
taxation for such gains.

Reckitt Benckiser (India)
Ltd.’s case

The  issue recently arose in the case of Reckitt
Benckiser (India) Ltd. vs. ACIT, 181 TTJ 384(Kol.) before the Kolkata Tribunal
involving the determination of rate of tax payable by the assessee on capital
gains arising from the sale of flats on which depreciation was claimed. In the
year under consideration, flats owned by the assessee were sold and since the
sold flats were held by the assessee for more than 36 months, the capital gains
arising from the sale thereof was offered to tax by the assessee at the
concessional rate applicable to long-term capital gains. Since the flats sold
by assessee were depreciable assets, the AO invoked the provisions of section
50 and brought to tax the capital gains arising from the sale thereof at normal
rate applicable to short-term capital gains.

On
appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO on the issue, by observing that
the provisions of section 50 were clearly applicable to the capital gains
arising on account of sale of depreciable assets not only for computation but
also for the rate of tax.

The
Tribunal, on hearing the arguments from both the sides on the issue and perusal
of the relevant material available on record, held that the relevant provisions
of section 50 as applicable in the context were very clear and specific, as
rightly held by the learned CIT (A). As per the said provisions, which were
overriding in nature, the capital gains arising from the sale of depreciable
assets was chargeable to tax at the rate applicable to short-term capital
gains, irrespective of the holding period. Certain judicial pronouncements,
relied upon by the appellant, were found to be not applicable in the context,
involving the issue relating to rate of tax applicable to the capital gains
arising from sale of depreciable assets. The Tribunal did not find merit in
ground raised by the assessee and dismissed the same.

Smita Conductors Ltd.’s case, 152 ITD 417 (Mum.)

The  issue arose before the Tribunal in the case
of Smita Conductors Ltd. vs. DCIT, 152 ITD 417(Mum.) wherein the assessee had
filed an additional ground for contesting the tax rate applied in case of
capital gains computed u/s 50 r.w.s 50C of the income-tax act. In that case,
the assessee had sold a flat after holding the same for more than 36 months. It
had claimed depreciation on the flat and had claimed that the gains arising
thereon be taxed at the concessional rate u/s. 112.

In
the appeal to the Tribunal,  it was
submitted that the flat sold by the assessee had been held for a long time
exceeding more than three years and, therefore, the capital gains, though
required to be computed u/s. 50 of the it act, had to be treated as long term
capital gain in view of the judgment of the high Court of Bombay in case of Ace
Builders Ltd.,281 ITR 410, in which it had been held that the factum of deemed
short term capital gains u/s. 50 of the it act was applicable only to
computation of capital gains, and for the purpose of other provisions of the
act, such as section 54EC, the capital gains had to be treated as long term
capital gains, if the asset was held for more than three years. it was
contended that section 50(1) made it quite clear that the capital gains in
respect of depreciable asset was deemed as short term capital gains for the
purposes of sections 48 and 49 of the it act, which related to computation  of capital gains. Therefore, the deeming
provision was only limited to the provisions for computation of capital gains.

Reference
was made to the decision of the mumbai bench of the Tribunal in case of
Mahindra Freight Carriers vs. DCIT, 139 TTJ 422, in which it had been held that
prescriptions of section 50 were to be extended only to stage of computation of
capital gains and, therefore, capital gain resulting from transfer of depreciable
asset which was held for more than period of three years would retain the
character of long term capital gains for all other provisions of the act and
consequently qualify for set off against brought forward loss of long term
capital gains. reference was also made to another decision of mumbai bench of
the Tribunal in case of Prabodh Investment & Trading Company Vs. ITO in
(ITA No. 6557/Mum/2008), in which following the judgment of the high Court of
Bombay in case of Ace Builders P. Ltd. (Supra), the Tribunal held that section
50 created a legal fiction only for a limited purpose i.e. for the purpose of
sections 48 and 49 and for the purposes of section 54E, the gains had to be
treated as long term capital gains. the Tribunal in that case also accepted the
arguments of the assessee that in case capital gains was assessed as long term
capital gain the rate of tax as provided in section 112 of the it act would
apply.

It
was explained that provisions of section 50, deeming the capital gains as short
term capital gains was only for the purposes of section 48 and 49, which
related to computation of capital gains. The deeming provisions therefore was
to be restricted only to computation of capital gain and for the purpose of
other provisions of the act, the capital gain has to be treated as long term
capital gain. it was, therefore, argued that in the case of the assessee, rate
of tax applicable to long term capital gain had to be applied as per the
provisions of section 112 of the IT act.

The
same view had been taken by the mumbai bench of Tribunal in case of Manali
Investments vs. Assistant CIT, 139 TTJ 411, in which it had been held that the
prescriptions of section 50 were to be extended only to the stage of
computation of capital gain and, therefore, capital gain resulting from
transfer of depreciable asset, which was held for more than three years would
retain the character of long term capital gain for the purpose of all other
provisions of the act.

It
was highlighted that the flat had been held for 15 to 20 years, which was
supported by the fact that cost of the flat as shown in the balance sheet was
only Rs.1, 30,000/-, and if the flat was held for more than three years, the
tax rate as provided in section 112 of the it act applicable in respect of capital
gains arising from transfer of long term capital asset, had to be applied.

The  Tribunal held that, for the purpose of
computation of capital gains, the flat had to be treated as short term capital
gains u/s. 50 of the it act, but for the purpose of applicability of tax rate,
it had to be treated as long term capital gains if held for more than three
years. It accordingly directed the AO to compute the capital gains from the
sale of flat and apply the appropriate tax rate, after necessary verification
in the light of observations made in the order.

Observations

The
basis of the claim for the benefit of concessional rate of taxation for the
deemed gains, besides being founded in law, has largely been founded on the
decisions of the high Courts delivered in the context of the eligibility of
such deemed gains for the benefit of exemption u/s. 54E, 54EC, etc. the   high Courts have consistently held that such
gains are eligible for the benefit of exemption u/s. 54E, 54EC, etc. CIT vs.
Assam Petroleum 263 ITR 587 (Gau), CIT vs. Ace Builders 281 ITR 240 (Bom), CIT
vs. Pole Star Industries, 41taxmann.com 237 (Guj), Aditya Media Sales Ltd.,
38taxmann 244 (Guj), Rajiv Shukla 334 ITR 0138 (Del) and CIT vs. Delite Tin
Industries in ITA no. 118 of 2008 dated 26/09/2008. The Bombay high Court is
deciding the case of delite tin industries (supra), had followed its own
decision in the case of ace Builders (supra). The Special leave Petition of the
income tax department against the said decision has been rejected by the Supreme
Court vide order dated 20/10/2009 in SlP. (c) no. 21450 of 2009, 322 itr (st)
8. The delhi high Court in the case of rajiv Shukla (supra) has taken note of
the said dismissal of SLP by the apex court. The issue has recently been
settled in favour of allowability of the benefit in the case of CIT vs. V.
S.Dempo Co. Ltd. (supra).

The   issue under consideration had also arisen
before the Pune bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rathi Bros. Madras Ltd.
vs. ACIT in ITA No. 787/PN/2813. In a decision dated 30/10/2014, the Tribunal
decided the issue against the assesssee, interestingly, by holding that the
issue on hand has been decided by the decision of the Bombay high Court in the
case of ace Builders (supra). the Tribunal noted that the Bombay high Court in
para 23 of the order while confirming the grant of benefit of exemption u/s.54,
had observed that the deemed short term capital gains, though taxable at the
ordinary rates would nonetheless be eligible for the tax exemption. It is
respectfully submitted that such observations, not made in the context of the
case, should not have been the guiding force in adjudicating an issue that was
otherwise decided by the co-ordinate bench in favour of the assessee. The issue
before the high Court was about the eligibility of an assessee for the benefit
of section 54E and not for the concessional rate of taxation u/s. 112 of the
Act. In any case, the final findings of the Court on the issue before it are
clearly placed in para 25 of the order, which has no observations on the
subject of rate of taxation.

In
Rathi Bros.’ case (supra), the Tribunal, under an error, did not follow the
decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of  P.D. Kunte and Co., by observing that in the
said case the issue though raised, had remained to be adjudicated by the Tribunal.
The fact of the matter, as was noted by the AO, is that the said assessee had
filed an MA on the ground that the issue had remained to be adjudicated by the Tribunal
and the Tribunal had rectified the error by adjudicating the issue and deciding
the issue in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal had followed the decision of
the Bombay high Court in the case of Ace Builders (supra). Accordingly, it was
the decision in the case of Rathi Bros. that requires rectification. It seems
that the order in the MA was lost sight of while adjudicating the issue.

On
a comprehensive reading of the various provisions of the income-tax act,
namely, sections 2(14), 2(29A), 2(42A), 45, 48, 49, 50 and section 112, all of
which are relevant to the issue under consideration, the following things
emerge:

  • A distinction is made in the scheme of taxation of
    capital gains by classifying such gains into short term capital gains and
    long term capital gains. Such a classification is primarily based on the
    nature of capital asset, namely short-term capital asset and long-term
    capital asset which distinction is founded on the period of holding of a
    capital asset.
  • An exception has been made, where under the deeming
    fiction of section 50 treats even a long-term capital asset as a
    short-term capital asset.
  • The deeming fiction of section 50 however has a limited
    application in as much as the fiction created there under has the effect
    of qualifying the application of only sections 48 and 49 and no other provisions
    of the act.
  • The  said  deeming 
    fiction  of  section 
    50  has  been introduced  as 
    a  special  provision  with 
    effect  from 01/04/1988 by
    the taxation  laws   (A&MP)  act,1986 with the objective of providing
    a working solution to the problems of identifying the cost of acquisition
    and indexing such cost in cases of depreciable assets whose cost kept on
    varying year after year.
  • No parallel amendments have been carried out in any of
    the other provisions of the act, clearly conveying the legislative intent
    that the other provisions continued to operate with full force.
  • Even otherwise there is nothing in section 50 which has
    the effect of overriding the other provisions of the act, including
    section112, but for the provisions of section 2(42A), which override has a
    very limited application. The said override cannot convert a long-term
    capital asset into a short-term capital asset, as has been now recently
    confirmed by the Supreme Court. In our considered opinion, section 50 will
    apply and operate even without the said override.
  • Section 50 is a special provision for computation of
    capital gains in case of depreciable assets and it is incorrect to apply
    the same fiction in deciding the rate of tax at which the income so
    computed is to be taxed.
  • There is no provision, implied or express, in
    section112, to indicate that the benefit of the concessional rate of tax
    thereunder would be denied to the gains computed under the deeming fiction
    of section 50 of the Act.
  • The logic and the rationale applied by the Supreme
    Court for granting the benefit of sections 54E, 54EC, etc. shall equally
    apply in conferring the benefit u/s.112 of the concessional rate of
    taxation.

Principles of Corporate Governance put to test!

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In the past few days, there have
been two events which have caused sadness to professionals. The first event was
the will of God, whose wishes one has simply to accept. This was the untimely
demise of Rajesh Kapadia, an eminent Chartered accountant and a past president
of the Society. He was a man with sterling qualities, thoroughly professional
and yet humble to the core. I have had the good fortune of having worked with
him and have greatly benefited from the interactions. With his departure, the
profession has suffered a loss which cannot be made good.

The second event was the will of
men, the removal of Cyrus Mistry, as the chairman of Tata Sons, an entity which
virtually controls the Tata group. The name Tata has a special place in the
heart of nearly all Indians. The name, the brand may have been valued, but to
me, it was invaluable, and I hope it remains so. This was a group that carried
on business, with the object of creating wealth for all stakeholders and the
public. The concept that a businessman was a trustee was a principle that the
group followed in letter and spirit. This was because nearly 2/3rd of the
group’s wealth, belonged to various Tata Trusts which are public charitable
trusts. Philosophers, business commentators, and management gurus have lauded
the ethical standards of this group.

In this context, the removal of
Cyrus Mistry as the chairman of Tata Sons, caused shock and surprise, and the
manner in which it took place left a tinge of sadness in the mind. One would
like to believe that the wise gentlemen, who took this step, must have had
compelling reasons for taking the drastic action that they did. They would have
had interests of all stakeholders at heart. A change of guard, even a sudden one
is not unknown in industrial groups, but that it should happen in the Tata
Group is bound to create waves.

Firstly, the incumbent Cyrus
Mistry was not a hurried choice, but had been appointed after a long search and
deliberations. He had plenty of experience, was echnically sound and also had
to some extent a lineage. It is true that, in his four-year tenure the fortunes
of the group were not exactly ascendant. But that was the position with many
industrial groups. It was known that there were differences of opinion in
regard to various business decisions like divesting of assets, ownsizing of
businesses that were taken during his tenure.

There is very little in the
public domain which would lead one to believe that, change of chairman was
being considered much less imminent. Therefore, the manner in which Cyrus
Mistry was removed and the speed of the actions thereafter left one really
surprised. From what has been reported in the media, the action does not appear
to be fair, even if it may have been legally right and necessary. These
observations are from what has appeared in the press, and one is conscious that
these reports are not necessarily accurate.

In the action that was taken, it
appears that at least two principles of governance were not fully adhered to.
Firstly, in an action of this magnitude, it is imperative that all the
stakeholders are informed to the extent possible. These would be shareholders,
lenders, business affiliates, associates and in the case of the Tata Group the
public at large. This is because a majority stake in the Group’s fortunes is
held by public charitable trusts. By their very definition, every member of the
public is interested in those trusts. One is aware that if information as
sensitive as this is placed in the public domain, there would be some fallout
articularly in the form of an effect on share prices. But I am sure that a
group as strong as the Tata Group would not be unduly concerned with these
short-term effects.

Secondly, one has to be fair in
regard to the person against whom action is taken and also appear to be fair.
From what is reported in the media, Cyrus Mistry was not aware of the proposed
action and the notice, if at all it was given, appears to be very short. At the
cost of repetition, there is anguish, not for the removal of an individual,
because that must have been necessary for safeguarding the interest of the
Group, at least in the minds of those men who took the decision, but in taking
that action, some principles of governance appear to have been compromised.

I hope that the action does not
lead to litigation, and the public is quickly and fully informed as to the
rationale behind the decision, and the speculation is put to an end.

The Rhythm of Pain and Pleasure

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As human beings, we tend to
realise happiness only through experiences of pleasure. Happiness is a
psychological state of mind that portrays enthusiasm and exuberance in all that
we do. But as soon as pain sets in, we tend to shrink and shrug seeking
providential help and support to live through that phase. It has not been
possible to understand as to why there are imbalances in times of pain and
pleasure.

If one carefully observes and
becomes sensitive to the whole process of living, the reasons for going through
these phases of pain and pleasure can be identified. But then, each one of us
is caught up in myriad ways and methods of living that we fail to understand,
or, fathom the depths in the rhythm of experiencing pain and pleasure.

Why do we need to understand this
rhythm? Is it because we have to shorten the phase of pain or eliminate it
altogether? If so, let us accept that it is an artificial method that goes
against the natural ways of living. It is a fact of life that all living
creatures have to go through these phases whether they want it or not. It is
healthy to accept that our lives are ordained with both pleasure and pain.

While having accepted that pain
and pleasure are part of life, we need to delve into the details of it so that
our awareness builds, to go through the process with equanimity. This then
provides the required space not just for ourselves but also builds standards for
a moral and robust society.

Phases of pleasure and pain are
incidental to the actions of the past. Call it the cause and effect of karma
theory or the Newton’s third law of motion, the pattern of the inevitable
cannot be brushed aside. Any attempt to artificially ward off evil will have
its repercussion of disturbing the rhythm with further consequences flowing
from it. In the alternative, it provides us a great sense of responsibility and
maturity to accept pain gracefully as a necessary part of our life. It brings in the required
humbleness to balance arrogance and pride that we experience in phases of pleasure.

We have the parable of Kisa
Gotami and Buddha where Kisa returns without the mustard seeds from a household
untouched by death. Let us accept that pleasure and pain with all its rhythm
are part of life and accept this fact
with grace. Let us not have the choice but let us go through `pain and pleasure’ with absolute
awareness. This helps us in building psychological strength to go through any
crisis and act with humility in benevolent situations without any trace of
arrogance or pride.

The rhythm of pain and pleasure,
when accepted with absolute awareness, has a great deal of impact on our day to
day living, which has a positive influence on our health. A matured
psychological thought process sets in, resulting in preventing us from over
indulgence. Apart from having a benign influence on our health, we can also
realise our full potential and inner creativity by accepting the rhythm of
`pain and pleasure’.

There is so much to fathom from
what people have said of pain and pleasure:

“The end is the beginning of all
things, suppressed and hidden, awaiting to be released through the rhythm of
pain and pleasure…Pain itself destroys pain. Suffering itself frees man from
suffering.”- Jiddu Krishnamurthy

“On attaining the state of
non-attachment and nonaversion, the soul becomes indifferent to worldly pleasure
and pain. ” – Jain wisdom

It is often seen that people
appreciate listening to what others have said and what others have got to say.
But to digest and put these into practice, requires tremendous energy and
conviction. One must be willing to let go. This state of mind brings equanimity
in both pleasure and pain, and this will pave the way for understanding the
essence of life.

While all through our life we are
taught to gain, to accumulate and have comfort,
we fail to understand that there are several natural ethical ways of making a living. We are more secure in natural
actions and surroundings, but every artificial and conditioned behaviour
carries with it the attachment, and hence the aspiration for pleasure with a
sense of exclusion to pain. It is a forgone conclusion that life has to be
lived with all its travails and triumphs and the detached mind alone
understands the rhythm of life in its whole perspective.

When something is done naturally
and acted upon with conviction, it does not create `fear’. This allows one to
accept any outcome whether it ends in pain or pleasure. Everything is important
and significant, absolute attention on the process means it brings in no fear of the outcome. This develops an attitude of resilience and one remains calm in
every situation of adversity and stress. Equally so, every achievement or
progress is looked upon as a team effort or a support from providence.

If we want to be ethical and
bring balance into our lives, let us all try to provide equal space for both
pleasure and pain, by understanding its rhythm.

Article 5 of India-Denmark DTAA – Where master and crew on a vessel charter hired by a Denmark company to an Indian company were not employees of the Taxpayer but procured from a group company, and were under control and direction of the Indian company, the Taxpayer could not be said to have ‘Service PE’ in India in terms of article 5; where decisions relating to business were taken in Denmark, no PE in India in terms of article 5(2)(a) was constituted on account of ‘Place of management’.

8. 
[2017] 86 taxmann.com 77 (Delhi – Trib.)

Maersk A/s vs. ACIT

A.Ys.: 1998-99 to 2003-04

Date of Order: 08th June,
2017


FACTS

The Taxpayer was a company
incorporated in Denmark. It qualified for benefits under India-Denmark DTAA. It
was in the business of providing charter hire services for ‘Anchor Handling Tug
cum Supply Ship’ (“the vessel”). The Taxpayer owned the vessel and had procured
the master and the crew from its group company. During the relevant assessment
year, the Taxpayer entered into agreement with an Indian company (“ICo”) for
charter hire of the vessel for exploration and exploitation of oil and natural
gas in Indian off-shore area. In its return of income, the Taxpayer disclosed
‘nil’ taxable income on the ground that no part of the receipts from ICo were
taxable in India since it did not have any Permanent Establishment (“PE”) in
India in terms of Article 5 of India- Denmark DTAA.

During the course of the
assessment proceedings, the Taxpayer submitted that:

 

   it did not have any fixed place in the form
of ‘place of management’, branch, office, factory, workshop, etc.;

 

  it did not have any installation or structure
used for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources since the
vessel could not be said to be an installation or structure;

 

   in terms of any of the clauses (a) to (j) of
paragraph 2 of Article 5 of India- Denmark DTAA, it did not have any PE in
India.

 

Hence, no income could be
taxed in India in terms of Article 7.

According to the Assessing
Officer (“AO”), the commentary on ‘UN model’ mentions that a ‘place of
management’ may also exist where no premises is available or required for
carrying on business and it is sufficient if the enterprise has certain amount
of space at its disposal and it uses such space to carry out its business
wholly or partly through it, which the Taxpayer had done from the vessel. He
further referred to commentary by Phillip Baker, which mentions that where
enterprise lets out or leases facilities, equipment, and tangible properties
and also supplies the personnel to operate the equipment with wider
responsibilities, then the activities of such enterprise constitute a PE.
Accordingly, he held that the vessel of the Taxpayer, being a ‘place of
management’, constituted a PE under Article 5(2)(a) of Indo-Denmark DTAA and
therefore, receipts of the Taxpayer from ICo were taxable in India.

HELD

  Perusal of the agreement showed that the
arrangement was for hire of vessel for exploitation and exploration of oil and
natural gas by ICo. Not only the vessel but also the master and the crew were
under the direction and control of ICo. In another decision in case of the
Taxpayer, the High Court had accepted that the master and the crew were not the
employees of the Taxpayer, but were procured from a group company.

 

   When the personnel manning the vessel were
not the employees of the Taxpayer; and nor were they within the direction and
control of the Taxpayer, it cannot be said that these personnel constituted a
PE in terms of either ‘Service PE’ or that the Taxpayer was rendering its
activities through its employees in India for a period of 183 days or more.

 

   The revenue had contended that the vessel was
a “place of management” in terms of Article 5(2)(a) of India- Denmark
DTAA. However, it cannot be disputed that the management of the Taxpayer is in
Denmark where the decisions relating to the business are taken. The concept of
control and management of the business alludes to a concept of a place where
controlling and directive power (i.e., the head and brains) of the enterprise
is situated and where the decisions are taken. The AO and the CIT(A) have
misinterpreted the UN commentary. In his commentary, Arvid A. Skaar has
emphasised that the place must have power to make significant decisions.

 

  To conclude, the following three aspects need
to be considered. Firstly, the hiring of the vessel by ICo does not make
the vessel a place of management for the Taxpayer in India; secondly, as
accepted by the High Court in the Taxpayer’s own case, the crew and the master
of the vessel were not the employees of the Taxpayer; and lastly, in any
case master and crew did not have power to make significant decisions for the
Taxpayer because they were under control and direction of ICo.


–  The vessel of the Taxpayer cannot be reckoned as installation or structure used for exploration and exploitation of natural resources as such activity was being done by ICo. ICo had merely hired the vessel from the Taxpayer. Therefore, even under this clause it could not be held that the vessel of the Taxpayer constituted a PE in India.

 

   Thus, no PE of the Taxpayer in India was
constituted. Hence, payments received from ICo could not be taxed in India in
terms of Article 7 of DTAA.

Article 5 and 22 of India-Saudi Arabia DTAA – Only solar days of services rendered in India should be considered to examine constitution of service PE; question of virtual PE does not arise in the absence of services rendered virtually.

7. 
TS-451-ITAT-2017(Bang)

Electrical Material Center Co. Ltd. vs.
DDIT

A.Y.: 2010-11      Date of Order: 28th September, 2017


FACTS       

The Taxpayer was a company resident of Saudi
Arabia. It received income from an Indian company for rendering certain
services through four engineers who were sent to India. All the engineers in
aggregate spent more than 360 individual man days in India. However, their
collective stay in India was 90 days. The Indian company paid the Taxpayer for
services provided by the engineers in India.

 

  While filing the return of income in India,
relying on the Madras High Court ruling in the case of Bangkok Glass
Industry Co. Ltd. vs. ACIT
1, the Taxpayer claimed that income
from services to the Indian company were in the nature of FTS, and since
India-Saudi Arabia DTAA did not have any specific Article dealing with FTS,
such income was not taxable in India. The Taxpayer further relied on the
decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Clifford Chance2 and
contended that only solar days should be considered for the purpose of
determining the existence of a service PE. Accordingly, as the presence of
engineers in India was less than 182 solar days, no service PE was created.

 

According to the Assessing Officer (“AO”),
the income of the Taxpayer was taxable in India as “royalty” under the Act as
well as the DTAA; and a PE is created if the aggregate man days of stay of the
engineers in India (i.e., 360 individual man days) exceed the threshold period
in the DTAA. He relied on the decision of the Bangalore Tribunal in ABB FZ –
LLC vs. DCIT
3 to contend that the physical presence of the
employee was not essential since services could be rendered through various
virtual modes. The DRP confirmed the order of the AO.

________________________________________________

1   [2015
(4) TMI 503]

2   76
TTJ 0725

3     IT (TP) A No. 1103/bang/2013

 

HELD

Service PE

  In Clifford Chance (supra), the Mumbai
Tribunal has held that only solar days are to be considered, and not man days.
As the presence of the Taxpayer in India, through its engineers, was only 90
solar days (i.e., less than 182 days), there was no service PE.

 

  The decision of the Bangalore Tribunal (supra)
on virtual PE was distinguishable on facts because, in the present case,
payment was made only for the services rendered through the engineers in India
and no service was rendered through virtual modes like e-mail, internet, video
conferencing, etc.

 

Taxability
of income under other provisions of DTAA

 

   In the absence of the FTS Article, income
should be considered as “other income” under Article 22 of India-Saudi Arabia
DTAA, which will be taxable only in the country of residence of the Taxpayer,
i.e., Saudi Arabia.

Section 9 of I T Act, Article 12 of India-USA DTAA – Payment received by an American company for grant of non-exclusive, non-transferable software license to Indian customer for a specific time period was not liable to tax in India as royalty since copyright was retained by the taxpayer.

6. 
[2017] 86 taxmann.com 62 (Delhi – Trib.)

Black Duck Software Inc vs. DCIT

A.Y.: 2012-13  Date of Order: 11th September, 2017


FACTS

The Taxpayer was an
American company. It provided software products and services at enterprise
scale. During the year under consideration, the Taxpayer entered into a ‘Master
License and Subscription Agreement’ with two entities in India for sale of
software. According to the Taxpayer, it received the payment for copyrighted
product and not for use of copyright. The Taxpayer further submitted that it
did not have any Permanent Establishment (“PE”) in India. Therefore, receipts
from sale of software were not taxable as business income in terms of Article 7
of India-USA DTAA.

The Assessing Officer
(“AO”) concluded that receipts of the Taxpayer from licensing of software were
taxable as royalty u/s. 9(1)(vi) of the Act. He further held that even in terms
of Article 12(3) of India-USA DTAA, the payment received was in the nature of
royalty.

 

HELD

  The Taxpayer had contended that since it did
not have any PE in India, receipts from sale of software will not be taxed as
business income in terms of article 7 of India-USA DTAA. However, the Revenue
had not rebutted this.

 

   From perusal of the terms of ‘Master License
and Subscription Agreement’, it was apparent that:

    the
Taxpayer had granted a non-exclusive, non-transferable, non-perpetual license
for the specified subscription period;

    the
customer did not have right to retain or use the programme after termination of
applicable subscription period;

    the
customer was not permitted any access or use of the programme for any user
other than the user licenses paid by the customer;

    while
the customer was permitted to make reasonable number of copies of the programme
for inactive back up, disaster recovery, failover or archival purposes, it was
not permitted to rent, lease, assign, transfer, sub-license, display or
otherwise distribute or make the programme available to any third party;

    the
customer was prohibited to modify, disassemble, decompile or otherwise reverse
engineer the programme or to permit any third party to do so.

 

   Thus, the Taxpayer had retained all the
rights in the software which comprised copyright and the customer did not have
any right to exploit the copyright in the software.

 

  The payment received by the Taxpayer was for
copyrighted software product and not for grant of right to use any copyright in
the software.

 

  Definition of ‘copyright’ in section 14 is an
exhaustive definition and refers to bundle of rights. In respect of computer
programming, copyright mainly consists of rights as given in clause (b). If any
of the said rights are not given, there is no copyright in the computer
programme or software. None of the rights granted under ‘Master License and
Subscription Agreement’ are in the nature of the aforementioned rights,

 

  Since the software was to be run at an
enterprise level, in the Supplement Agreement, there was a stipulation of unlimited
number of users, but all the users were to be only from within the
organisation. Further, since the software was to be used only on one server in
India, the contention of the revenue that access was granted to all servers was
not correct.

 

   Accordingly, the payment received by the
Taxpayer was not in the nature of ‘royalty’ under Article 12(3) of India-USA
DTAA. Therefore, question of taxability did not arise. Indeed, if the receipts
cannot be taxed under India – USA   
DTAA    as  royalty, they cannot be taxed u/s. 9(1)(vi).

 

6 Section 54B – Deduction u/s. 54B cannot be denied on the ground that entering into agreement to sell does not amount to `purchase’.

6 
[2017] 86 taxmann.com 217 (Chandigarh- Trib.)

     Anil Bishnoi vs. ACIT

      ITA No. : 1459 (Chd.) of 2016

      A.Y.: 2014-15    Date of Order:  27th September, 2017


The word `purchase’ cannot
be interpreted and detached from the definition of word `transfer’ as given
u/s. 2(47) of the Act.

 

FACTS       

The assessee, during the
year under consideration, sold land for a consideration of Rs. 1,29,00,000 and
claimed deduction u/s. 54B claiming purchase of following agricultural lands –

 

(i)  Agricultural  land 
at  Kiratpur  Rotwara, 
Jaipur, of Rs. 28,84,500 through a registered sale deed dated 6.5.2013;

 

(ii) Agricultural   land  
at   Village   Dudu, 
Jaipur  for Rs. 1,00,00,000 through an agreement to sell dated 16.4.2014.

The Assessing Officer,
allowed deduction for purchase of land mentioned at S. No. (i) above but in
respect of land mentioned at (ii) above he asked the assessee to show cause why
deduction claimed should not be disallowed on the ground that the sale deed is
not registered, but only an agreement to sell is entered into. 

The assessee submitted that
the entire payment for purchase of land was made through cheques and the
possession was handed over to the assessee by the seller with all the rights to
use the said land or to sell it further. The name of the assessee had also been
entered in Khasra Girdawari, a document showing the possession and cultivation
of the land. The assessee also submitted that at the time of execution of the
agreement to sell, the assessee was not aware of the Stay Order to the sale of
land issued by ADM and hence, the sale deed could not be registered.

The AO held that the word
used in section 54B is `purchase’ and not `transfer’ as defined in S. 2(47).
The purchase, according to the AO, could be only through a registered sale
deed. He disallowed the claim for deduction u/s. 54B with reference to the land
for which only an agreement to sell was entered into.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the
assessee paid consideration through cheques and also obtained possession of the
property in question. The claim of deduction was denied on the ground that the
deed of purchase / sale had not been registered with the competent authority.

The Tribunal having noted
the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Lal
vs. CIT (2014) 269 CTR 1 (SC); CIT vs. T. R. Arvinda Reddy (1979) 12 CTR 423
(SC)
and the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs.
Dr. Laxmichand Narpal Nagda (1995) 211 ITR 804 (Bom.)
, held as follows –

If capital gains are deemed
to have been earned by the assessee on transfer of land as per the provisions
of section 2(47) of the Act, as per which registration of the sale deed is not
necessary, the consequences are that the seller of the assessee is said to have
transferred his right in property and consequently, those rights are acquired
by the transferee; if in the case of transferor, the same is to be treated as
sale, then, we do not find any reason to give a different meaning to the word
`purchase’. If someone has sold a property, consequently the other person has
purchased the said property.

If the transfer of property
is complete as per the definition of transfer u/s. 2(47) of the Act, the
assessee is made liable to pay tax on the capital gains earned by him, on the
same analogy, the transfer is also complete in favour of the purchaser also.
The provisions cannot be interpreted in a manner to say that transfer vis-à-vis
selling is complete, but vis-à-vis purchase is not complete in respect
of same transaction. In view of this, the word `purchase’ cannot be interpreted
and detached from the definition of word `transfer’ as given u/s. 2(47) of the
Act.

When the transfer takes
effect as per the provisions of section 2(47) of the Act, if a liability to pay
tax arises in the case of the seller, the consequent right to get deduction on
the purchase of property accrues in favour of the purchaser, if he otherwise is
so eligible to claim it as per the relevant provisions of the Act. The Tribunal
directed the AO to give the benefit of deduction u/s. 54B of the Act in respect
of the purchase of property at Village Dadu.

The Tribunal allowed the
appeal filed by the assessee.

5 Section 54 – Investment made upto due date of filing return u/s. 139(4) of the Act qualifies for deduction u/s. 54 provided the investment is made upto date of filing of return of income.

5   TS-443-ITAT-2017 (Ahmedabad- Trib.)

      Anita Ajay Shad vs. ITO

       ITA No. 3154 (Ahd.) of 2015

       A.Y.: 2011-12      Date
of Order: 18th September, 2017


FACTS

During the previous year
relevant to assessment year 2011-12, a long term capital gain of Rs. 35,23,326
arose to the assessee, an individual, on transfer of an immovable property
jointly owned by her. The assessee claimed that a sum of Rs. 35 lakh was exempt
u/s. 54 on the ground that the assessee has deployed the consideration for
purchase of a new residential house. The assessee made the following
investments towards purchase of a new residential property –

 

#    Rs.
15 lakh before 31.7.2011 (being due date for
filing ROI u/s. 139(1)

 

#    Rs.
5 lakh before actual date of filing ROI (being 25.8.2011); and

 

#    Rs.
15 lakh between Sept. 2011 to Dec. 2011  (which
is within the time limit available under section
139(4) of the Act).


While assessing the total
income of the assessee, the Assessing Officer (AO) denied the claim for
deduction u/s. 54 on the ground that the assessee has not invested capital gain
before filing return of income and the tax payer has not acquired the new
property before filing return of income.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who observed that the assessee has invested the
gains after furnishing the return of income. He, held that the assessee is
entitled to claim partial exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the assessee, it was
contended that the investment made is within the due date stipulated u/s.
139(4) of the Act and that the property was acquired and put to use within a period
of two years from the date of transfer of original asset and therefore,
qualifies for exemption u/s. 54 of the Act.

HELD

Section 54(2) enjoins that
the capital gain is required to be appropriated by the assessee towards
purchase of a new asset before furnishing of return of income u/s. 139 of the
Act. Alternatively, in the event of non-utilisation of capital gains towards
purchase of new asset, the assessee is required to deposit the capital gains in
specified bank account before the due date of filing of return of income u/s.
139(1) of the Act. Any payment towards purchase subsequent to the furnishing of
return of income (25.8.2011 in the instant case) but before the last date
available to file the return of income u/s. 139(4) of the Act is irrelevant.
Such subsequent payments after filing of return are required to be routed out
of deposits made in capital gain account scheme. Thus, the plea of the assessee
that utilisation of capital gain can be made before   the  
extended   date for filing of
return of income  u/s. 139(4) of the Act
even after filing of return do not coincide with the plain language employed in
section 54(2) of the Act. Nonetheless, the capital gain employed towards
purchase of new asset before the actual date of furnishing return of income
either u/s. 139(1) or  u/s. 139(4) of the
Act will be deemed to be sufficient compliance of section 54(2) of the Act.

The Tribunal observed that
the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression section 139 for purchase,
etc. of new asset while on the other hand, time limit u/s. 139(1) has
been specified for deposit in the capital gain account scheme. When viewed
liberally, the distinction between the two different forms of expression of
time limit can yield different results. A beneficial view may be taken to say
that section 139 being omnibus would also cover extended time limit provided
u/s. 139(4) of the Act. Thus, when an assessee furnishes return subsequent to
due date of filing return u/s.139(1), but within the extended time limit u/s.
139(4), the benefit of investment made upto the date of furnishing return of
income u/s. 139(4) cannot be denied on such beneficial construction. However,
any investment  made after   the 
furnishing of return of income but before extended date available u/s.
139(4) would not receive beneficial construction in view of unambiguous and
express provision of section 54(2) of the Act. The suggestion on behalf of the
assessee on eligibility of payments subsequent to furnishing of return of
income is not aligned with and militates against the plain provision of law as
stated in section 54(2) of the Act.

Since there was ambiguity
on record as to whether the other joint owner of the property purchased by the
assessee has also availed exemption in respect of investment made from joint
account and if yes, to what extent, the Tribunal set aside and remanded back to
the file of AO for the limited purpose of verification of the extent of claim
made by the other joint owner.

The appeal filed by the
assessee was allowed.

4 Section 68 – Addition u/s. 68 cannot be sustained in respect of share application money received from shareholder who is a daughter of a director and is therefore, not a stranger. Also, shareholder was a resident of USA, earnings statement of her husband were on record, the payments were made through banking channels and receipts in bank account of the shareholder were also through banking channels.

4    TS-432-ITAT-2017 (Ahd.)

Namision Powertech Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT

 ITA No. : 218/AHD/2015

A.Y.: 2010-11      Date of Order:  21st
September, 2017

FACTS 

During the financial year
2009-10, the assessee company received a sum of Rs. 19,00,000 towards share
application money from Smt. Pammi Sandesara, daughter of one of the directors
of the assessee company. The Assessing Officer (AO) held that the source of
funds in the hands of Smt. Pammi Sandesara and her creditworthiness are not
proved.  He rejected the explanation
furnished by the assessee viz. that she was a resident of USA, money was
received in US dollars through her ICICI Bank account in India.

Aggrieved, the assessee
preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD 

The Tribunal observed that
Smt. Pammi Sandesara was a resident of USA as was evident from her passport. It
also noted that the earnings statement of her husband issued by NetApp Inc USA
was filed. The payments were made through banking channels and receipts in her
bank account were also through banking channels.

The relationship between
the assessee-company and the shareholder is well established in the sense that
the shareholder is the daughter of one of the directors of the company. It is,
therefore, not a transaction between two strangers and her bank accounts show prima
facie
evidence of the means of the shareholder. The amounts have been
received through the banking channels. The Tribunal held that bearing in mind
all these factors, the receipts from Smt. Pammi Sandesara cannot be treated as
unexplained cash credit. The Tribunal deleted the addition made by the AO.

The Tribunal allowed the
appeal filed by the assessee.

Supreme Court Widens Powers of SEBI – Penalties Now Even More Easier to Levy

Background

The Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal B
Patel (2017) 85 taxmann.com 267
has held that `front running’ by any person
(and not merely intermediaries as provided by a specific provision) is in
violation of the SEBI Regulations relating to fraud and unfair trade practices.
By holding that SEBI is right in taking penal action against a person who is
`front running’, the Supreme Court has increased the penal powers of SEBI even
where the letter of the law is found wanting. However, the reasons given by the
Court have created a precedent that will have far reaching implications. It extends
the scope of `front running’ to almost every case of tipping. It makes it easy
to levy penalties with a lesser level of proof. It also broadens the definition
of ‘fraud’ to include even cases where there is no deceit. It would allow SEBI
to act even when there is a private
wrong between two parties and even if public/securities markets are not
affected. Finally, the Supreme Court holds that proving mens rea is
not required
for levy of penalty in case of fraud.

Some parts of this ruling make it easier for
SEBI to take action against persons who indulge in fraudulent acts which are
not covered by the strict letter of the law. The decision makes the law
dynamic. Some parts of the judgement cover acts that shouldn’t at all be the
business of SEBI even if the actions were wrong. Finally, some parts of the
ruling overly broaden the scope of the law to convert some actions which are
neither wrong nor irregular into an offence. Instead of actually reading down
certain overly broad wordings of the Regulations, the ruling takes them
literally, it is respectfully submitted, that this creates absurd results.
Hence, this decision has far reaching effect beyond the specific offence of
`front running.’

What is front running?

`Front running’ is recently being found to be
a common practice in the securities market, considering that several cases have
been detected. Essentially, it is abusing of trust/confidence placed usually in
a market intermediary by a client, but it can happen in another context too.
`Front running’ is not only not defined – but the term is not even used in the
Regulations/Act. The Supreme Court has cited several definitions. Taking the
example of a stock broker, the gist of the definition is :

 

  A client may place an order for a large
quantity of shares with a stock broker. The stock broker knows that as soon as
he places this large order, the market price will move up. To profit from this,
at the cost of his client and hence unethically, he would place the order of an
identical or lesser quantity of shares for himself (or he may tip some
friend/relative to do so). The price of the share would rise. He then would
place the order in the name of his client and simultaneously offer for sale at
the higher price the shares he had earlier bought. The result would be that he
would make a profit from the difference and his client would end up paying a
higher price. He may act similarly in case of a large order of sale.

 

–    There can be variants as was seen in the
cases in appeal before the Supreme Court. There may be a mutual fund
intermediary who seeks to buy a large quantity of shares and the employee who
is authorised to place such an order, tips off a friend/relative. A portfolio
manager may seek to buy and the manager/employee may do the same. Indeed, even
an employee of the client who is planning to buy such number of shares may do a
similar act.

In each of such cases, it is seen that the
person goes in front of such order and places his orders first. Hence the term
?front running.’


It is easy to see that such acts done by
registered market intermediaries result in the investing public losing trust in
the securities markets. SEBI obviously would be right in acting against such
intermediaries. However, should SEBI act even in cases where such acts are
committed by persons not registered with it? For example, should SEBI take
action against the employee of a private investor   who  
uses  the  information 
about  a  large 
planned
order by his employer and commits `front
running’? Such a matter does not affect the securities markets. Is it similar
to any other fraud/breach of trust committed by an employee against his
employer! The issue becomes relevant because the Regulations relating to
frauds/unfair trade practices of SEBI provide specifically for front running by
intermediaries.

Background of the decision – front
running – law, SEBI and SAT decisions and amendments

The decision of the Supreme Court is in
appeal against five decisions of the Hon’ble Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”)
in relation to `front running.’ In each of these cases, certain persons got
tipped off of large orders in shares. They thus bought ahead of such orders
(hence the term ‘front running’) and sold when these large orders actually
materialised, making a handsome profit. In each of these cases, SEBI had taken
penal action against persons found guilty of `front running.’ In the earlier
two of these cases, SAT held the SEBI Regulations applied only when an
intermediary did such front running ahead of its client’s large orders, not
when a person tipped off by an intermediary’s employee and did front running
ahead of the intermediary & its client’s large orders. The reasoning
offered was that the relevant regulation – 4(2)(q) of the SEBI (Prohibition of
Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market)
Regulations, 2003 (“the Regulations”) – applied only to intermediaries and not
to others. The principle applied was “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius”,
i.e., when something specific is expressly mentioned, others in
the same class are excluded.

In later decisions, however, the SAT took a
different view. It held that the general provisions in the Regulations relating
to fraud were wide enough to cover front running even by non-intermediaries.

In the meantime, SEBI amended Regulation 4.
As noted earlier, Regulation 4(2)(q) treated front running by intermediaries as
a specific case of fraud prohibited by the Regulations. Some other clauses in
this Regulation too applied only to intermediaries. Apparently, to overcome
this, an explanation was introduced in 2013 to this Regulation which was stated
to be clarificatory and which, for this context, effectively said that the
clauses were not restricted to acts of intermediaries. The intention of the
amendment also appears to give it a retrospective effect and thus would apply
even to past cases including the ones decided by SAT.

Apart from the technical issue of whether the
specific provision that prohibits `front running’ only by intermediaries, there
was another issue involved.  The tipping
by an unregistered intermediary (and other parties) or its employee to an
outsider which results in front running does not necessarily mean that the
capital markets or the public are thereby harmed. The harm is caused to the
intermediary privately and/or its clients. To take an example, say a closely
held company seeks to place a large order of purchase  of 
shares  in  a particular company. An employee of the
buyer company tips a friend who then buys the shares and then sells the shares
to the buyer company at a higher price. Now in this case, the company ends up
paying a higher price, but the public who sells shares to the friend do not
lose since they would have otherwise sold the shares directly to the company at
the same price. Hence the loss is caused only to the company, by paying a
higher price, then it is arguable that the interests of the public/capital
markets are not affected. Indeed, it is also arguable that even if the orders
were placed on behalf of a client, the harm is caused by the intermediary to
the client and thus, the intermediary may need to compensate the client and
also otherwise face action for allowing such things to happen. The question
thus is whether wrongs that are private between parties and not affecting the
public/capital markets should be dealt with by SEBI?

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court thus essentially had to
face certain basic questions. First question is, whether the specific
provisions relating to front running by intermediaries meant that front running
by others were not prohibited by the Regulations? Or were the general
provisions relating to fraud were wide enough to cover all types of front
running. The Court held that the rule that specific excludes the general does
not apply here. Several other issues were raised which were answered and also
certain reasoning and ruling of law/interpretation were provided which need
consideration.

The Court (reading together the separate
judgement of each of the two Hon’ble Judges) effectively held as follows:-

 

1. The definition of fraud is very wide. It includes every act
that induces another person to deal in shares.
Importantly, it is not necessary that such inducement should be with a
malafide intention of deceit or the like
.

 

2. The act whereby the
tippee engages in front running is in breach of the understanding and law
relating to confidentiality of information and thus is an act that is violative
of the Regulations.

 

3. The general provisions of
Regulation 3 are wide enough to cover front running. Effectively, it is thus
not necessary to refer to Regulation 4 that refers to front running by
intermediaries.

 

Note: In
the author’s view, taking the ruling to its logical end, the specific
provisions relating to front running by intermediaries become redundant!

 

4. The Court held that
proving mens rea – guilty mind – is not necessary. It is sufficient if
the violation is proved by preponderance of probabilities and not beyond
reasonable doubt.

Note: This observation
lowers the bar of proof required to find a person guilty and subject to penal
action.

 

5. Any tipping by a
person to another is in violation of the Regulations. Effectively, this would
thus include
insider trading where insiders share unpublished price sensitive information
with third parties. `Front running’ thus is one of the types of such irregular
tipping.

 

Note:
This again may result in many provisions of the SEBI Regulations relating to
Insider Trading being redundant. This would extend the provisions of the
Regulations beyond what is expressly provided in the regulations.

 

Implications

As stated earlier,  we 
now  have a  broad and 
widely interpreted definition of fraud by the Supreme Court that gives
SEBI wider powers to catch and punish persons who directly or indirectly take
advantage of the securities markets. However, we have an earlier decision of
the Supreme Court in Shriram Mutual Fund ((2006) 131 Comp Cas 591 (SC)) that
has resulted in SEBI taking a view that penalty has to automatically follow
every violation. This decision goes many steps ahead and even effectively
endorses poorly drafted law, albeit mentioning in passing that current law
needs an overhaul. While one can hope that SEBI will not apply in practice the
definition of fraud which says deceit is not required. One also hopes that SEBI
exercises restraint whilst despite the wider powers provided by the Court.
However, it still remains an area of concern since parties will find it
difficult to meet allegations, which are not serious and will suffer larger
amounts of penalty, etc. whether before SEBI or even in appeal before
SAT. It is humbly submitted that this decision needs reconsideration. _

Insolvency and Bankuptcy Code: Pill for all Ills – Part II

3
Consequences of the Process

After the corporate
insolvency resolution process commences, i.e., once the application is admitted
by the NCLT, the following three consequences immediately take place in respect
of the corporate debtor:

 

(i)     The
NCLT would declare a moratorium prohibiting any suits against the
debtor; execution of any judgement of a Court / authority; any transfer of
assets by the debtor; recovery of any property against the debtor. The
moratorium continues till the resolution process is completed. Thus, total
protection is offered to the debtor against any suits / proceedings. Even
proceedings for enforcement of security against the debtor under the SARFAESI
Act would be put on hold. In Indus Financial Ltd. vs. Quantum Ltd., 147
SCL 332 (NCLT-Mum)
, it was held that two parallel proceedings, one
under the SARFAESI and the other under the Code could run side-by-side against
the same debtor. Since the life of the insolvency proceedings is only for 180
days, it does not eclipse the SARFAESI Act proceedings for an unlimited period.
An interesting Order has been given by the NCLAT in Schweitzer Systemetek
India P. Ltd.,CA (AT) (Insolvency) 129/2007,
wherein it held that the
moratorium only operated against assets of the corporate debtor. If an action
was bought for enforcing the personal guarantee provided by the promoters of
the corporate
debtor, then the same would survive and can be proceeded against.

 

(ii)    An
Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) would be appointed by NCLT to
manage the affairs of the corporate debtor within 14 days of the commencement
of the resolution process. The IRP is vested with all powers to manage the
corporate and the powers of the board of directors / designated partners stand
suspended and these powers would be exercised by the IRP. It may be noted that
there is no provision under the Companies Act, 2013 to provide for this
vacation of powers by the Board in case of appointment of an IRP. However,
section 238 of the Code provides that it would override anything inconsistent
contained in any other law. One question which arises is that, should the
Directors resign on the appointment of the IRP or should they continue but with
no powers? A Company cannot function without directors, for that would be a
violation of section149(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013. The Supreme Court in Innoventive
Industries Ltd. vs. ICICI Bank, CA 8337/2017
has held that once an
insolvency professional is appointed to manage the company, the erstwhile
directors who are no longer in management, cannot even maintain an appeal on
behalf of the corporate debtor. Accordingly, any appeal filed by the erstwhile
Directors challenging an order of the NCLAT is not maintainable.

 

        The
IRP is empowered to take all actions as are necessary to manage the corporate
as a going concern and continue its operations as a going concern. An IRP is an
Insolvency Professional (IP) who has passed the examination in this
respect and is authorised to conduct the corporate insolvency proceedings. CAs
can appear for this examination and become IPs.

 

        An
interesting order has been passed by the NCLAT in Bhash Software Ltd. vs.
Mobme Wireless Solutions Ltd., CA(AT) (Insolvency) 79/2017,
where it
set aside the order of the NCLT admitting the insolvency application on grounds
of natural justice not being followed. Accordingly, it held that all actions of
the IRP were illegal and were set aside. The corporate debtor was freed from
the rigours of the Code and the powers of its Board of Directors were
reinstated. It even asked the operational creditor to bear the fee of the IRP.

(iii)   A
Public Announcement would be issued by the IRP giving details of the
commencement of the process, asking all creditors to submit their claims. All
creditors must submit their claims in the prescribed form along with proof of
their claims.

 

Further Steps

The further steps in the corporate
insolvency resolution process are as follows:

 

(a)   Within
30 days of his appointment, the IRP has to collate all claims of creditors and
determine the financial position of the corporate debtor and constitute a
Committee of Creditors. This shall comprise of all financial creditors.

 

(b)   Within
7 days of its constitution, the Committee of Creditors has to meet and appoint
a Resolution Professional. It may either continue with the IRP or appoint a new
IP. The decision must be taken by a majority of at least 75% votes of the
Committee. However, in a case where the Committee could not take a decision
with 75% majority on whether the IRP should continue, the NCLT held that a
viable solution was to give a preference to the decision taken by that Financial
Creditor which had the largest percentage in the voting rights. Thus, the
wishes of the creditor having 61% vote share was preferred over the other
creditors – Raj Oil Mills Ltd., MA 362/2017 (NCLT Mum).

 

(c)    The
Resolution Professional so appointed would act as the Chairperson of the
Committee, conduct the entire corporate insolvency resolution process and
manage the operations of the corporate debtor. He would conduct the meetings of
the Committee of Creditors. He can even raise interim finance for the corporate
debtor, appoint professionals as may be necessary, etc.

 

(d)    Operational
Creditors may attend the meetings of the Committee of Creditors but cannot
vote.

 

(e)    Any
creditor who is a member of the Committee of Creditors can appoint an IP as his
representative on such Committee.

 

(f)    The
Resolution Professional can carry out certain functions only with the prior
approval of 75% of the Committee of Creditors, such as, creating any security
interest, changing the capital structure of the corporate debtor, appointing
auditors / internal auditors, etc.

 

(g)    The
most important task for the Resolution Professional is to prepare an
Information Memorandum and a Resolution Plan. The Memorandum must contain all
financial and other details of the corporate debtor along with the liquidation
value of the assets, i.e., their realisable value if the corporate were to be
liquidated. This must be worked out by two registered valuers after physical
verification of the stock and fixed assets of the debtor.

 

        The
resolution plan must provide for the payment of all costs associated with the
insolvency resolution, repayment of debts of operational creditors, management
of affairs, implementation and supervision of the plan, etc. It may
provide for measures such as, transfer of assets, reduction in amount payable,
issuing securities of the corporate debtor, modifying any security interest, etc.
It must provide for the specific sources of funds which would be used to pay
all costs of the insolvency resolution process, liquidation value to
operational creditors and liquidation value due to financial creditors who
dissented to the plan.

 

        The
SEBI Regulations and the Takeover Code have been amended to permit issue of
shares and takeover of listed companies under a resolution plan. The provisions
relating to preferential allotment of listed shares and an open offer process
do not apply to a resolution plan formulated under the Code.

 

        The
resolution plan may be likened to the Scheme prepared by an Operating Agency
before the erstwhile BIFR in relation to a sick industrial company.

 

(h)    The
resolution plan must also be approved by a 75% vote of the financial creditors.

 

(i)   Once
approved by the Committee, the plan must be submitted to the NCLT for its final
approval. If so approved, it becomes binding on the corporate debtor, the
creditors, the employees, etc. Further, the moratorium order shall come
to an end. However, if the plan is rejected by the NCLT, then a liquidation
process is triggered.   

 

       The
Hyderabad Bench of the NCLT pronounced the very first insolvency resolution
order under the Code in the case of Synergies-Dooray Automotive Ltd., CP(IB)
No. 01/HDB/2017
within the 180 day period provided under the Code.The
Scheme involves merging Synergies-Dooray with Synergies Casting, a creditor and
also a related party. The Order also provides for financial restructuring of
the dues of financial and operational creditors, government dues as well as
capital infusion from the promoters. The payments of creditors’ dues and
government dues would be made in instalments over 3 years and at a discount.
The Scheme also envisaged relief from the Andhra Pradesh Government in the form
of waiver of stamp duty on the merger scheme. Further, it sought that the sales
tax and service tax department waive all interest charged on the Company for
deferred payment. An interesting waiver was sought from the CBDT to exempt the
transferor sick company from the applicability of sec. 79 and sec. 72A of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, i.e., the transferee company be allowed to carry forward
and set off the accumulated losses and depreciation of the transferee company.
It even asked CBDT to exempt the transferee from the applicability of and
payment of MAT. The NCLT has approved the resolution plan as submitted with
some minor modifications. One of the creditors aggrieved by this Order has
appealed against it to the NCLAT.

 

Non-Obstante Clause

The Code contains a non-obstante
provision in section 238 which states that it would override all other laws.
The Supreme Court had an occasion to test this provision in Innoventive
Industries Ltd. vs. ICICI Bank, CA 8337/2017
,
where the issue was
whether the Maharashtra Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions Act), 1958
(‘the Maharashtra Act’), which suspended all liabilities of the corporate
debtor would impede any action under the Code? The Apex Court held that the
earlier State law was repugnant to the later Parliamentary enactment as under
the said State law, the State Government could take over the management of a
relief undertaking, after which a temporary moratorium similar to that under
the Code took place. Giving effect to the State law would directly impede or
come in the way of the taking over of the management of the corporate body by
the interim resolution professional. Also, any moratorium imposed under the
Maharashtra Act would directly clash with the moratorium to be issued under the
Code. Therefore, unless the Maharashtra Act was out of the way, the
Parliamentary enactment would be hindered and obstructed in such a manner that
it will not be possible to go ahead with the insolvency resolution process
outlined in the Code. Further, the non-obstante clause contained in the
Maharashtra Act could not possibly be held to apply to the Central enactment,
inasmuch as a matter of constitutional law, the later Central enactment being
repugnant to the earlier State enactment by virtue of Article 254 (1) of the
Constitution. It was clear that the later non-obstante clause of the
Parliamentary enactment would also prevail over the limited non-obstante clause
contained the Maharashtra Act. Accordingly, it held that the Maharashtra Act
could not stand in the way of the corporate insolvency resolution process under
the Code.

A similar question arises
as to whether the provisions and procedures specified under the Companies Act,
2013 need to be followed while implementing any plan under the Code? For
instance, would actions such as, sale of assets, preferential issue of shares, etc.,
need special resolutions? If yes, could not the promoters of the corporate
debtors defeat such resolutions? Section 30 of the Code provides that the
resolution plan must not contravene any of the provisions of the law in force.
Does that mean that the provisions of the Companies Act need to be adhered to?
However, at the same time one must also give due weightage to the non-obstante
clause u/s. 238 of the Code and the above-mentioned Supreme Court decision. It
would be a very strong argument to state that the Code overrides all other laws
including the Companies Act. Clearly, this is one area which needs to be tested
at a higher judicial forum.

Liquidation Process

If the NCLT rejects the
resolution plan or if a resolution plan has not been submitted to the NCLT
within the maximum period of 180 days + any extension, then it must order the
liquidation of the corporate debtor. Alternatively, if the Committee of
Creditors decides to liquidate the debtor, then also the NCLT must pass a
liquidation order. Once such an order is passed, the resolution professional
becomes the liquidator for the liquidation purposes provided the NCLT does not
replace him.

The liquidator has various
powers and duties under the Code and he can appoint professionals to assist him
in the discharge of his duties. He must verify all the claims of the creditor
and take custody of all assets of the debtor. He would carry on the debtor’s
business for its beneficial liquidation. He would also defend and institute all
legal proceedings for / on behalf of the debtor. He can also investigate the
affairs of the corporate debtor to determine whether there have been any
undervalued or preferential transactions which have led to one creditor being
preferred over the other. He also has the power to disclaim any onerous
property by applying to the NCLT.

He must form a liquidation
estate comprising of all assets owned by the corporate debtor and hold them in
a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of all the creditors. However, assets of a
third party possessed by the corporate, assets of any subsidiary of the
corporate, etc., would not form a part of the liquidation estate.


He must collect all
creditor claims within 30 days of the commencement of the liquidation process
and verify the same within 30 days from the last date for the receipt of
claims. He must then determine the value of the claims admitted. If the
liquidator is of the opinion that a corporate debtor has given a preference to
a particular creditor, then he must apply to the NCLT for avoiding the same.
The window of determining preferential treatment is two years before the
insolvency commencement date for related parties and one year for other
persons. Similarly, if he is of the opinion that during this window certain
transactions were undervalued, then the liquidator can apply to the NCLT for
having them set aside. He can also apply to the NCLT for setting aside any
extortionate credit transactions entered into by the corporate debtor within
two years preceding the insolvency commencement date.

The liquidator may make an
itemised sale of the assets of the liquidation estate or make a slump sale or
in parcels. The usual mode of sale of the assets is an auction, but in certain
cases he may even resort to a private sale. The Code lays down the priority for
distribution of proceeds from the sale of assets of a corporate debtor in
liquidation. It states that this priority would apply notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in any other Central / State law as well as any
contract to the contrary between the debtor and the recipients. The priority
schedule under the Code is as follows:

 

(a)    the insolvency resolution process costs and
the liquidation costs in full;

 

(b)    the following debts which shall amongst
themselves rank equally;

 

(i) workmen’s dues (i.e., wages / salary + accrued
holiday remuneration + compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Act +
Provident Fund, Gratuity, Pension due to the workmen) for 24 months preceding
the liquidation commencement date; and

 

(ii)  debts owed to a secured creditor if
he has relinquished his security;

 

(c)    wages and any unpaid dues owed to employees
other than workmen for the period of 12 months preceding the liquidation
commencement date;

 

(d)    financial debts owed to unsecured creditors;

 

(e)    the following dues shall rank equally between
themselves:

 

(i) any amount due to the Central Government and
the State Government for a period of 2 years preceding the liquidation
commencement date;

 

(ii) debts owed to a
secured creditor for any amount unpaid following the enforcement of security
interest;

 

(f)    any remaining debts and dues;

 

(g)    preference shareholders, if any; and

 

(h)    equity shareholders or partners, as the case
may be.

 

The distribution should be
made within 6 months from the receipt of the proceeds after deducting the
associated costs. If certain assets cannot be sold, the liquidator may, with
the approval of the NCLT, distribute them to the stakeholders.

The liquidator is required
to submit Progress Reports to the NCLT starting from within 15 days from the
end of the quarter of his appointment and thereafter within 15 days from the
end of every quarter of his tenure. This report shall also contain an Asset
Sale Report when any assets are sold.

The NCLT Mumbai bench has
passed an order in VIP Finvest Consultancy P. Ltd. vs. Bhupen Electronic,
CP No. 03/I&BP/2017,
ordering liquidation of Bhupen Electronic.
This decision was taken by the Committee of Creditors, since the company was
not a going concern and had land and building as its only valuable asset.

Completion of Liquidation

The
liquidator shall liquidate the corporate debtor within 2 years, failing which
he must apply to the NCLT to continue the process. He must submit reasons why
the additional time would be required. At the end, he must submit a Final
Report to the NCLT explaining how the liquidation was conducted and how the
assets have been liquidated.

When
the assets have been completely liquidated, the liquidator must apply to the NCLT
for dissolution of the corporate debtor. Once the NCLT passes an order, the
body corporate would be dissolved from that date.

Transfer of Winding up Pro-ceedings under
Companies Act, 1956

Earlier,
all winding up petitions against a company were heard u/s. 433 of the Companies
Act, 1956. Since the Companies Act, 1956 was superseded by the Companies Act,
2013, section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 provided that all
proceedings under the Companies Act, 1956, including proceedings of winding up
shall stand transferred to the NCLT. However, with the enactment and
notification of the Code, section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013 was also
amended. The amended section 434(1)(c) now provides that all proceedings under
the Companies Act, 1956 including those relating to winding up shall stand
transferred to the NCLT.

However,
it also adds a Proviso to section 434(1)(c), which states that only such
proceedings relating to winding up of companies shall be transferred to the
NCLT that are at a stage as may be prescribed by the Central Government. Thus,
if they have crossed the stage notified by the Central Government, then they
cannot be transferred to the NCLT under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016. They would then continue to remain with the High Court and be governed by
the provisions of section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Central
Government notified the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules,
2016, which provided that in order that proceedings of winding up are
transferred to the NCLT from the High Court, two conditions were a must ~ the
petition must be pending before a High Court and the petition must not have
been served on the respondent under Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules,
1959.

The
above view has also been endorsed by the Bombay High Court in Ashok
Commercial Enterprises vs. Parekh Aluminex Ltd., CP No. 136/2014.
It held
that it was clear that all winding up proceedings did not stand transferred to
the NCLT. If the service of the notice of the Company   Petition  
under   Rule   26 
of  the Companies(Court)   Rules, 
1959      was      not    
complied    before 15th December
2016, such Petitions stood transferred to NCLT, whereas all other Company
Petitions would continue to be heard and adjudicated upon only by the High
Court. The Legislative intent was thus clear that two sets of winding up
proceedings would be heard by two different forums, i.e., one by NCLT and
another by the High Court, depending upon the date of service of Petition on or
before or after 15th December 2016. There was no embargo on a High
Court to hear a Petition if the notice under Rule 26 of the Companies (Court)
Rules, 1959 was served on the respondent prior to 15th December
2016.

Conclusion

It
would be evident from this brief discussion that the Code has plenty of issues
and already in its short span it has seen several unique decisions from various
forums. While there are bound to be creases which need ironing, it is
definitely a step in the right direction. One booster shot to the Code could be
in the form of increasing the NCLT benches so that more applications can be
heard. Once the provisions relating to individuals and firms are made
operational, it is expected that industrial sickness resolution would have a
greater coverage.

However,
at the same time, the Code must be looked upon as the last frontier and not the
first form of attack by a creditor. Whether resolution professionals can
successfully run a sick company (which its promoters have not been able to) is
a matter which only time would tell? That is the reason why one of the largest
private sector banks in India looks upon the Code as the least preferred
solution unless the debtor was a wilful defaulter. Clearly, not all bankers view
the Code as the panacea for all ills!

Is it Fair to thrust the avoidable burden of compliance under the GST?

Background:
On 1st of July 2017, the Goods and Services Tax legislation (‘GST’)
was ushered in with pomp and fanfare. Enamoured by the hue created around the
switchover, businesses and tax consultants eagerly welcomed the ‘Good and
Simple Tax’.

In the run up to the
switchover, the Government maintained, confirmed and reiterated that the
Government and the GSTN was ready. That life (compliance) under GST will be
simple and that the GSTN is well equipped and ready to handle the loads of data
that was sought to be uploaded by taxpayers every month through the GSTR-1, 2
and 3 return forms.

Unfairness@Groundzero: Within
weeks from the switchover, grim reality of the preparedness of the Government
and the GSTN began to emerge and the simplicity of the ‘Good and Simple tax’
started to unfold. The   Government  announced 
that the date for filing GSTR-1 (return for outward supplies made) for
the months of July and August 2017 was being extended and in the interim tax
payers would be expected to file a ‘summary’ return in form GSTR-3B. In effect,
the assessee was required to file a return for the aforesaid period twice i.e.
first in summary Form3B and subsequently in Form GSTR1/2/3 giving full details.
Assurances were given that this was a one-time measure and will not extend
beyond August 2017.

When the assessee started
uploading the GSTR 3Bs for the month of July, the Government and the GSTN had
to face harsh reality that: they had underestimated the issue, but the assessee
had to bear the brunt of outages and the snags in data upload, even for
uploading summary data. In a knee jerk reaction, the Government extended the
time limit for filing the return by a ‘few days’. History was repeated while
filing the GSTR-3B for the month of August and the GSTR-1 for the month of
July.

By mid-September, the
Government realised that the patchy solutions approach was adding to the
assessees woes. Faced with the possibility of non-compliance en masse,
the Government announced that a Committee would be formed to address the issues
and in the meanwhile, filing of GSTR-3B would be extended upto the month of
December.

Is it fair?

Is it Fair to thrust upon
Taxpayers a huge new compliance regime? In spite of being aware of the lack of
preparedness, can the Government throw caution to wind in implementation of
GST? Is it fair to be unrelenting on the issue of extending the due dates for a
reasonable period or waiving the fee for filing returns late and hold the tax
payer at a gun point, threatening to penalise for defaults which were not
entirely due to their inaction?

Ergo, desperate tax payers
and tax professionals (who help to facilitate compliance) have had to
thanklessly and fruitlessly expend time and resources to ensure that the
returns are uploaded. In doing so, they have had to forsake personal life not
to mention peace of mind, among other things.

Is it fair for our
Government to adopt such an unrelenting approach, completely belying its own
assurances that in the initial period the Government will adopt a soft approach
and give time to the taxpayers! In addition, is it fair to drain the taxpayers
with a half-baked and untested compliance system?

Last but not the least, is it
fair of the Government to fix the due dates of an untested new law, without
pondering about clash of other due dates where there is no time for the
assessee /tax consultants to effectively comply with anything but a simple tax
law?

Way forward

The Government needs to look at the whole
process with open eyes. To ensure that the system and processes on the GSTN are
truly ready and functional for various types of taxpayers / filings for
which thorough testing of the modules has to be done. Post this, announce due
dates to ensure that compliances can be done realistically.

Also, the Government should build an
interface between the GSTN and the tax payers, which is systematic and time
bound. This will ensure that small and recurring issues are dealt with
efficiently and in early stages, the larger, and more burning issues get
escalated to the relevant persons for early resolution.

The Government needs to understand that the
GST implementation will be effective only if all the stakeholders, instead of
adopting the current ‘silo’ approach, adopt an ‘eco-system’ approach and they
appreciate that their relationship inter se is symbiotic.
_

Can there be Two Kings of the Jungle? The Delineation of ‘Dominance’ under the competition Act, 2002

Until the advent of competition law in
India, many large corporate entities functioned on the principle that “might is
right”. The stronger and more influential would set the norms, which others
would have to follow. This practice took various shapes and forms, by which
companies which had a substantial market share would dictate the terms on which
a particular market / industry would function, and all the others were expected
to fall in line.

Substantive provisions of the Competition
Act, 2002 (the “Act”) were notified in 2009. A regulator, namely the
Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) was established with the avowed
objective of promoting and sustaining competition in the market and for
striking down and preventing activities found to be having an appreciable
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.

The thrust of the competition policy is directed
to preventing cartel-like anti-competitive arrangements (section 3 of the Act)
and preventing parties from abusing their dominant position (section 4 of the
Act) so as to adversely affect consumers as well as competitors in a relevant
market. The Act also provides for regulation of mergers and acquisitions which
exceed certain prescribed thresholds of assets and turnover where the prior
approval of the CCI will be required before giving effect to such transactions
(sections 5 and 6 of the Act).

The Regulator – Role and Powers

Since its inception, the CCI has set about
its role investigating into anti-competitive conduct of various companies
across various sectors, and taking appropriate remedial measures with alacrity.
Over the years, the CCI has investigated the activities of various corporate
entities, trade associations and PSUs, and has passed various orders with the
object of restoring the balance in the relevant market. The various sectors
investigated include the cement manufacturers, real estate developers,
automobile part manufacturers, explosive manufacturers and the practices of
stock exchanges.

The CCI is a quasi-judicial body which has
the power to frame regulations, to investigate into offences through its
investigative wing, namely the office of the Director–General, and also to hear
and decide complaints in connection with anti-competitive conduct and to pass
appropriate, reasoned orders in respect of the same. Under the Act, the CCI has
been bestowed the powers to initiate investigations suo motu or upon
receipt of complaints / information from parties aggrieved by anti-competitive
conduct of other entities.

Further, the CCI has been granted extensive
powers to issue appropriate orders against entities found to be in violation of
the provisions of the Act. For instance, the CCI may impose penalties not
exceeding 10% of the average turnover of an offender for the preceding three
financial years. In case of a cartel, the penalty may be up to three times the
profits for each year of the continuance of the agreement, or 10% of turnover
for each year of continuance of the agreement, whichever is higher. The CCI
also has the power to direct enterprises to terminate an agreement which is
found to be anti-competitive; to direct them not to re-enter into such an
agreement, and even to modify an agreement which is perceived to have an
anti-competitive effect. An order passed by the CCI may be appealed before the
Competition Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. Any appeal against an
order of the Appellate Tribunal will lie directly before the Supreme Court.

Abuse of Dominance

Many sectors in the Indian market had
companies which held a substantial market share and huge asset base, and which
were in a position to abuse their dominance in the market by indulging in
discriminatory pricing policies and prescribing unfair terms and conditions for
purchase / sale of products dealt with by these entities.

Such conduct is caught by section 4 of the
Act, which states that no enterprise shall abuse its dominant position. The
types of ‘abuses’ of a dominant position caught by the Act are enumerated in
section 4(2) of the Act, and includes the imposition of an unfair or
discriminatory condition or price in the purchase / sale of goods, limiting or restricting
production of goods or services, practices resulting in denial of market
access, and also using a dominant position in one market to enter into or
protect another market. As such, abuse of dominance under the Act would cover
scenarios where a dominant entity imposes unfair conditions on consumers
directly (such as by excessive pricing). It also covers behaviour where a
dominant entity engages in conduct which would preclude competitors from
entering into or expanding in a particular market (such as by tying – i.e.
making the sale of one product conditional upon purchase of another product).
Such conduct reduces competition in the market, which ultimately harms
consumers. It is pertinent to note that abuse of dominance can also occur
across markets, for instance, where a supplier holding a dominant position in
an upstream market (e.g. for raw materials / input products) refuses to supply
its competitor in a downstream market, and thereby forecloses competition in
the downstream market.

One of the widely recognised forms of abuse
of dominance is by indulging in predatory pricing policies, where goods are
sold below the cost of production by a dominant undertaking with a view to
eliminate competition and capture the market. The concept is in the nature of
undertaking short-term pain for long-term gain, where an undertaking would, on
the basis of its vast resources, willingly undertake losses in the short-run
with the expectation of recouping these losses in the future when competition
would be eliminated. Smaller players and market participants would not be able
to match such a conduct of dropping prices below the cost and consequently
would be driven out of the market, leaving the dominant entity free to raise
prices and recover its losses.

A recent case which saw this kind of a
conduct was in MCX-SX vs. NSE, where NSE, a leading stock exchange, used its
dominant position in the market to implement a zero transaction fee structure
for trading on its currency derivatives segment, thereby making it unviable for
others who did not have a similar asset and resource base to match the NSE’s
transaction-fee waiver. MCX-SX, a relatively newer and smaller market player,
brought this conduct to the attention of the CCI, alleging that NSE had abused
its dominant position in violation of section 4 of the Act. A full-fledged
inquiry was conducted by the CCI, and a detailed order was passed holding that
NSE was in a dominant position in the relevant market, that it had used its
dominant position in one market to abuse its position in another market, and
huge penalties were consequently imposed on NSE for such a conduct in addition
to directions to refrain from such a conduct which had an anti-competitive
effect on the market1.

In another case, huge penalties were imposed
on DLF, a real-estate major, in connection with anti-competitive practices
whereby onerous terms and conditions were imposed on consumers looking for
residential accommodation in real estate projects. It was observed by the CCI
that DLF was holding a substantial market share in the relevant market, which
was defined as the market for high-end residential accommodation in Gurgaon2.

Factors that determine violation

As can be seen, there have been a number of
cases where the CCI has stepped in where a dominant undertaking was found to be
abusing its market position to the detriment of consumers and/or other
competitors. However, the determination of whether each such company has, by a
particular practice, abused its dominant position in a particular market, is
not a cut-and-dried formula. Each industry exhibits different complexities in
the factors that influence the development of competition in that market, and
therefore each type of market practice alleged to be abusive and violative of
the Act may impact different markets differently. Therefore, in each of the
cases that the CCI is faced with, a detailed analysis is conducted to arrive at
a conclusion as to (i) the relevant product market and geographic market in
which the entity which was subject to scrutiny, operated, (ii) whether the
entity in question was a dominant undertaking in the relevant market, so
defined, and (iii) whether the conduct complained of amounted to an abuse of
the dominant position, contrary to section 4 of the Act.

A pre-condition to a finding of abuse of
dominance in terms of section 4 of the Act, therefore, is that the entity in
question holds a dominant position in the relevant market. The assessment of
dominance includes an analysis of various factors including the market share of
the entity in the relevant market, its assets and resource base, barriers to
entry and expansion of competitors in the market, the relative size, importance
and resources of competitors, etc.

__________________________________________________________________________

1   Case
No. 13/2009,MCX-SX vs. NSE, decided on 23 June 2011

2 
Case No. 19/2010, Belaire Owner’s Association vs. DLF Limited

 

Can more than one entity be dominant?

While there have been a number of cases
where a single undertaking is found to be abusing its dominant position in a
particular market, it remains to be seen whether the concept of ‘dominance’
under Indian competition law will embrace possibility of there being more than
one undertaking exercising substantial market power in a particular market,
where either or all of such companies can be said to be in a dominant position.

For example, there may be instances where
the market can be potentially carved out between two companies, both exercising
substantial market power without them indulging in any concerted arrangement inter
se
. It may be possible for these two dominant undertakings to mirror each
other’s anti-competitive practices to the exclusion of other smaller players
who do not have the resources to compete in such anti-competitive conduct. The
situation which could result would be one where the market is carved out
between two undertakings exercising market power and being in a position to
abuse such power. Also, the possibility of two players trying to carve out markets
by indulging in similar practices and eventually aligning their forces,
directly or indirectly, cannot be ruled out.

While there is nothing in the Act which
prevents the possibility of more than one dominant undertaking in a relevant
market, the jurisprudence on this aspect is yet at a nascent stage. In a recent
decision, the CCI has taken the view that the Act does not allow for more than
one dominant player. According to the CCI, the concept of ‘dominance’ is meant
to be ascribed to only one entity.

By contrast, antitrust laws of other
jurisdictions have recognised the concept of “collective dominance”. European
competition law, for instance, prohibits abuse of a dominant position “by
one or more undertakings”
, thereby expressly accounting for the possibility
of two or more economically independent undertakings together holding a
dominant position vis-à-vis the other operators in the same market.

Other jurisdictions have also embraced the
possibility of more than one dominant undertaking operating in a particular
market in circumstances that merit such a finding. One such instance was the
case of Visa and Mastercard which was decided by the District Court of New
York, where it was alleged that both Visa and Mastercard had both violated
antitrust law by implementing rules prohibiting their member banks from issuing
cards of their competitors, American Express and Discover. Pursuant to a
detailed analysis of the market and the impugned market practices, the Court
came to the conclusion that both Visa and Mastercard had market power, whether
considered jointly or separately. This finding of the District Court was upheld
by the US Court of Appeals3. In a similar case before the Canadian
Competition Appellate Tribunal, the Canadian authorities too, accepted the
proposition that both Mastercard and Visa each possess market power in the same
relevant market4.

Even under the Indian Competition Act, if an
enterprise enjoys a position of strength and the potential to operate
independently of competitive forces in the market or affect its competitors /
consumers / the market in its favour, it will be an enterprise having a “dominant
position”
5. Such a position would not change even if there
is another enterprise which also meets the above criteria.

Evolution and Way Forward

Competition law in India is a dynamic law
which must constantly adapt to meet with the requirements of the time and the
changed circumstances of different markets. Competition jurisprudence and
policy must evolve to meet the challenges which new facts and situations may
present. The legislation ought to be given effect to further the object of the
law-makers; the approach must be to identify a wrong-doing and prevent mischief
from bearing fruition. Any constraint on the law or to the ability of a
regulator to act in such a case may result in a situation which may defeat the
avowed objects with which the law was enacted. As Lord Denning famously said6:

 

“What is the
argument on the other side? Only this, that no case has been found in which it
has been done before. That argument does not appeal to me in the least. If we
never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere.
The law will stand whilst the rest of the world goes on; and that will be bad
for both.”
_

__________________________________________________________________________________

 3   United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States of America vs.
Visa & Mastercard, Decision dated 17 September 2003

4   CT-2010-010
Commissioner of Competition vs. Visa Canada Corporation & Ors., Decision
dated 23 July 2013

5   Explanation
(a) to section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002

6  Packer vs. Packer
[1953] 2 All ER 127

Ind AS – Learings from Phase 1 Implementation – Tips for a Smooth implementation (Part 1)

Introduction

In accordance with the road map, phase 2
entities have started providing quarterly results under Ind AS starting from
the first quarter of 2017-18 with comparative Ind AS numbers for 2016-17. Under
Ind AS 101, the first time adoption choices are open and can be changed till
the preparation of the first annual financial statements for 2017-18.
Also,
quarterly results do not include the disclosures required in the Ind AS annual
financial statements. It is therefore worthwhile for Phase 2 entities to learn
from Phase 1 Ind AS implementation. Below are some important tips.


Use the right people in the Ind  AS conversion process

The existing accounting staff may not be Ind
AS literate, and therefore will need to be trained under Ind AS. However,
expertise does not come from mere training. Expertise comes from several years
of engagement in working on IFRS/Ind AS. Therefore, it will be worthwhile to
consider external help or recruit someone with Ind AS knowledge, expertise and
implementation experience.

 

Align all stake holders

Phase 1 entities have experienced that Ind
AS is not a mere accounting change, but has significant business impact.
Therefore, the CFO should be significantly involved in the Ind AS conversion
process, and also keep the CEO in the loop. The conversion process entails
taking numerous business decisions, which only the CFO or the CEO can take.

Other stakeholders that may need to be
aligned are regulators, investors and analysts, audit committee, board of
directors and various business heads of the organisation. In one particular
instance which the author is aware of, the Ind AS financial statements were
quite delayed, because the independent directors did not want to identify
themselves as key management personnel (KMP) in the financial
statements. It may be noted that independent directors are not KMPs under
Indian GAAP, but under Ind AS they would be disclosed as KMPs.
It took the
CFO and the auditors quite some time to convince the Independent directors that
they were indeed KMPs for Ind AS disclosure purposes.

Consider impact on debt/equity ratio

Many
instruments that are classified as equity under Indian GAAP could be a
liability under Ind AS. Consider a simple scenario, where a PE firm has made
investments in the preference shares of a company, and has a put option of
those shares on the Company, if exit is not achieved within the specified
period through a successful IPO. This instrument would be classified by the
Company within the shareholder’s fund under Indian GAAP. However, under Ind AS
such an instrument is classified as financial liability, because the issuer
Company has no unconditional right to avoid payment of cash, if the IPO is not
successful. Further, a successful IPO is beyond the control of the issuer
Company as it is dependent on numerous factors, which the issuer Company cannot
change, for example, the stock market condition. This is a case where equity
under Indian GAAP is reclassified as loan under Ind AS
.

In this
scenario, some Phase 1 companies have changed the arrangements with the PE,
such that the put option is not on the Company, but on the promoters of the Company.
In such a case, the financial liability is that of the promoter and not of the
Company. However, this change could be a very time consuming process as the PE
investor would need to be convinced. Therefore, it is important for Phase 2
companies to start early, in order to avoid last minute hiccups.


Consider income tax implications

One of the biggest impact areas of Ind AS
conversion is income-tax, which could be either positive or negative. Consider
a company that is restructuring its debts with the bank, wherein the bank takes
a hair-cut. The sacrifice the bank makes, is a gain for the borrower company,
and will be credited to the profit and loss account. A huge credit to the
P&L account, may result in a MAT liability even for a company that was otherwise
making book losses.

Besides the impact of Ind AS on income tax
on an ongoing basis, the Company also needs to consider the impact of first
time adoption adjustments. Phase 2 entities have a clear advantage over phase 1
companies in this regard. Phase 2 entities have a clear visibility on the
various requirements, which were available to phase 1 entities only at the last
minute. This is elaborated in the following paragraph. Phase 2 entities should
therefore have a clear plan and not waste any time in making the right first
time adoption choices.

Finding the sweet spot was not easy for
phase 1 entities. Consider a company which wants to reflect a better net worth
and therefore, used the Ind AS deemed cost option of fair valuing the fixed
assets. As MAT provisions were not clear at that point in time, these companies
were afraid of what the MAT implications would be, and hence the choice of fair
valuation was only tentative. Eventually, fair valuation of fixed assets on
first time adoption was made MAT neutral in the budget, which led to the
tentative decision becoming a final decision. Next, phase 1 Companies wanted to
fairvalue only land, since it does not entail any depreciation, and avoid higher
depreciation due to fair value uplift on plant and machinery. However, as per
Ind AS 101 selective fair valuation was not allowed, though there is a proposed
amendment to allow selective fair valuation which may help phase 2 companies.
Phase 2 companies should take benefit of the same. However, it is important
that all these choices are made in time and after careful consideration and
planning.

 

Presentation AND Disclosures can be a big
hurdle

Ind AS presentation and disclosures are
numerous running into several more pages than Indian GAAP. Many phase 1
companies were more focused on the Ind AS adjustments, and left presentation
and disclosures towards the end. These companies struggled to publish their Ind
AS financial statements on time.

The presentation and disclosure requirements
under Ind AS are highly onerous and time consuming, particularly the fair value
and various risk disclosures under Ind AS 107 Financial Instruments:
Disclosures
. Consider, for example, the liquidity risk disclosures. Companies
have to provide a maturity analysis of their financial liability based on a
worse-case scenario. To provide these disclosures on a worse-case basis,
companies will have to consider potential debt covenant violation, treat demand
liabilities as immediately payable, etc.

Companies have to disclose sensitivity
analysis for each significant risk (for e.g. foreign exchange) applicable to
them. In providing these disclosures, entities operating in multiple currency
environment, will have more difficulty because of the correlation between the
various foreign currencies. Companies will also have to ensure that an
appropriate control process is in place to prepare and review such information,
including a formal process for audit committee review.

Phase 2 companies should therefore prepare
in advance and not delay their effort on presentation and disclosures till the
eleventh hour.

 

Conclusion

Phase 2 entities should use the benefit of
lessons learnt in Phase 1 implementation and avoid any pitfalls. Part 2 of this
article, will be included in the next edition. _

 

Goods and Services Tax (GST)

1.      
2017-TIOL-15-HC-DEL-GST]
Union of India and ORS. vs. Narendra Plastics Pvt. Ltd. 

Facts

The petitioner herein, an
exporter had received export orders of the date prior to 1st July,
2017 for the fulfillment of which, it had to undertake imports of inputs. Under
an Advance Authorization Scheme (AAS) of the Government, entitles duty
exemption to the exporter manufacturers such as the petitioner and therefore
the person importing such inputs/goods would not be required to pay basic
customs duty, additional customs duty, education cess, anti-dumping duty
safeguard duty and transition product specific safeguard duty, wherever
applicable.


The petitioner was agitated
that on account of change brought about by GST regime, it would have to pay
IGST out of its own sources on the export order accepted prior to 01/07/2017
and thus faced blockage of working capital until refund thereof, would be
granted by the Government at a future date. It had exhausted its overdraft
limits with the banks and therefore faced a liquidity crunch. The prayer of the
Petitioner therefore was not to be asked to pay the additional IGST on such
imports as that was arbitrary and unreasonable. The petitioner did not question
the legislative competence to levy the additional IGST but only questioned its
applicability for fulfillment of export orders placed and accepted prior to
July 01, 2017 and sought to avail the credit outstanding in respect of
authorisations issued to it prior to 01/07/2017.

Held

Considering prima facie
case for grant of the prayer, the Court issued interim directions to the
Government to allow the petitioner to avail credit against advance
authorisation license issued prior to 01/07/2017, subject to terms as regards
quantity and value of such credit and also subject to other conditions such as
verification by the Customs department as to the export of credit availability vis-à-vis
advance authorisation license, furnishing undertaking by way of affidavit,
fulfillment of export obligation etc. Further,  the interim relief was limited to the export
orders placed prior to 01/07/2017 only and not thereafter. 


2.      
 [2017-TIOL-01-HC-Mum-GST] Union of India  vs. Dr. Kanaga Sabapathy Sundaram Pillai,
Founder, My Integrating Society India Net NGGO

Facts

A PIL in this case was made
challenging implementation of the Goods and Services Tax chiefly on the grounds
that: (a) there was lack of awareness and preparedness both   by  
the   states/UT   as  
well   as   public  
at large (b)implementation in the
midst of financial year was not valid (c) Acts in their current form were
doubtful to be effective in reducing regulatory and administrative
hurdles.  In the scenario, it was
required to defer the implementation till legal hurdles are removed and the
rates for all items are finalised and taken up in  February, 2018 in the Budget session of the
parliament for initiation of the proposals from April 1, 2018. During this
time, awareness programmes be conducted to make the traders familiar and they
can be given facilities of software interfaced with the trade account as per
the Tax registration.  As against this,
it was argued for the Government that in addition to 30 state legislatures
having passed state GST Acts & necessary rules being notified, over 65 lakh
taxpayers had already migrated to GST network and rates of taxes were
notified.  Further, GST Seva Kendra were
set up at every Commissionerate, division and range to answer questions of tax
payers & will continue to do so. 
States also followed the same procedure & everything was put in
public domain and 60,000 offices in Central and State Governments were trained
in GST law.

Held

Petition was not
entertained with the observation that since the entire government machinery was
geared up, the petitioner could not urge or seek directions to postpone the
decision of implementation from 01-07-2017.

3.      
 [2017-83-taxman.com-281-Delhi] Union of India
vs. J. K. Mittal & Co.

Facts

Legal services under
service tax law were taxable under reverse charge mechanism. When GST was to be
implemented  from July 1, 2017, among
others, Notification No.   13/2017 –  Central 
Tax    (Rule)   dated 28-06-2017 was issued
specifying services wherefore reverse charge mechanism is applicable. Entry
No.2 therein referring to services of advocates gave rise to interpretational
issues. The drafting of this entry created ambiguity as to whether all legal
services and not only representational services provided by legal practitioners
would be governed by reverse charge mechanism. The Finance Ministry therefore
issued a clarification by way of a press release dated 15th July,
2017. In this background, the petition was filed in Delhi High Court by the
petitioner. During the hearing, the questions that arose interalia included
whether the press release issued had a legal sanctity and whether
recommendations of the GST council could be modified, clarified or amended etc.
by a notification, notice or a circular of ‘press release’ and by whom. The
court expected the Respondents to provide para-wise reply to the petition and
answer various queries raised therein.

Held

Considering
that Respondents desired time to address various legal and constitutional
issues, the Hon. Court directed till further orders, not to take any coercive
action again law firms of advocates including limited liability partnerships of
advocates providing legal services for non-compliance of requirements under the
GST law. The court also stated that if any of such persons already registered
under GST law also would not be denied benefit of this interim order.

Works Contract Under GSTvis-a-vis Plant and Machinery

Introduction

Under earlier regime, the
term ‘works contact’ had a wide meaning. Whether the contract related to
immovable property or movable property, any contract, if involved in both
supply of goods as well as supply of services, it used to be referred to as
works contract.

But, under GST, there is
defined meaning of ‘works contract’ and the scope of the term ‘works contract’
is narrowed down. The definition of ‘works contract’, as given in section
2(119) of the CGST Act, is reproduced below for reference.

“(119) “works contract”
means a contract for building, construction, fabrication, completion, erection,
installation, fitting out, improvement, modification, repair, maintenance,
renovation, alteration or commissioning of any immovable property wherein
transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) is
involved in the execution of such contract;”

It can be seen, from the
above definition, that now only those contracts (for supply of goods and
services as specified) will be treated as ‘works contract’ which are relating
to immovable property.

In other words, if the
transaction of supply of goods and services is relating to movable property, it
will not be a ‘works contract’.


Situation of Plant and
machinery
  

Plant and machinery, which
is installed in a factory, can also be covered in the scope of works contract,
if the upcoming plant and machinery is in the nature of immovable property.
Whether upcoming plant and machinery is movable property or immovable property
may be a debatable issue and it will depend upon the facts of each case.

There are different
judgments laying down criteria for deciding the nature of plant and machinery.


Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Collector of
Central Excise, Hyderabad (1998 (1) SCC 400).   

In this case, the issue
arose whether Paper Mill is movable property or immovable property. Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under; 

“In view of this finding of
fact, it is not possible to hold that the machinery assembled and erected by
the appellant at its factory site was immovable property as something attached
to earth like a building or a tree. The tribunal has pointed out that it was
for the operational efficiency of the machine that it was attached to earth. If
the appellant wanted to sell the paper making machine it could always remove it
from its base and sell it. Apart from this finding of fact made by the
Tribunal, the point advanced on behalf of the appellant, that whatever is
embedded in earth must be treated as immovable property is basically not sound.
For example, a factory owner or a house-holder may purchase a water pump and
fix it on a cement base for operational efficiency and also for security. That
will not make the water pump an item of immovable property. Some of the
component of water pump may even be assembled on site. That too will not make
any difference to the principle. The test is whether the paper making machine
can be sold in the market. The Tribunal has found as a fact that it can be
sold. In view of that finding, we are unable to uphold the contention of the
appellant that the machine must be treated as a part of the immovable property
of the company. Just because a plant and machinery are fixed in the earth for
better functioning, it does not automatically become an immovable property. A
further argument was made that the entire machinery as it is cannot be bought
and sold because the machinery will have to be dismantled before being sold.
The Tribunal has pointed out that the appellant had himself bought several
items and completed the machinery. It had purchased a large number of
components and fabricated a few and manufactured the paper making machine at
site. If it is sold it has to be dismantled and reassembled at another site. We
do not find any fault with the reasoning of the Tribunal on this aspect of the
matter.”


Thus, on the given facts,
Hon. Supreme Court has held the plant and machinery of the mill is movable
property.

Duncans Industries
Ltd. vs. State Of U.P. & O
rs JT 1999 
9  SC 421 on 3 December, 1999

This is a subsequent case,
wherein again Hon. Supreme Court had an occasion to decide the nature of plant
and machinery installed in the factory. The relevant observations are as under:

“Therefore, it came to the
conclusion that these machineries were immovable property which were
permanently attached to the land in question. While coming to this conclusion
the learned Judge relied upon the observations found in the case of Reynolds
vs. Ashby & Son (1904 AC 466)
and Official Liquidator vs. Sri
Krishna Deo & Ors. (AIR 1959 All. 247)
. We are inclined to agree with
the above finding of the High Court that the plant and machinery in the instant
case are immovable properties. The question whether a machinery which is
embedded in the earth is movable property or an immovable property, depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Primarily, the court will have
to take into consideration the intention of the parties when it decided to
embed the machinery, whether such embedment was intended to be temporary or
permanent. A careful perusal of the agreement of sale and the conveyance deed
along with the attendant circumstances and taking into consideration the nature
of machineries involved clearly shows that the machineries which have been embedded
in the earth to constitute a fertiliser plant in the instant case, are
definitely embedded permanently with a view to utilise the same as a fertiliser
plant. The description of the machines as seen in the Schedule attached to the
deed of conveyance also shows without any doubt that they were set up
permanently in the land in question with a view to operate a fertiliser plant
and the same was not embedded to dismantle and remove the same for the purpose
of sale as machinery at any point of time. The facts as could be found also
show that the purpose for which these machines were embedded was to use the
plant as a factory for the manufacture of fertiliser at various stages of its
production. Hence, the contention that these machines should be treated as movables
cannot be accepted.”

Thus, in this case the Hon.
Supreme Court has considered the installed plant and machinery as immovable
property.

Conclusion     

If the transaction of
installation of plant and machinery is considered to be immovable property, the
transaction will be ‘works contract’ and therefore it will be treated as a
transaction of supply of service under GST Act.

Thus, being a service
transaction, the tax will be attracted as one transaction of supply of service.

However, if the transaction
is considered to be for movable property, it will be a transaction of ‘mixed
supply’ or ‘composite supply’ and tax rate will be decided accordingly.

Thus, determination of
nature of transition of installation of plant and machinery is very much
relevant for deciding the correct rate applicable under GST. _

 

Principles of Classification

1.   Indirect Taxes in India
have always witnessed substantial litigation arising out of classification, be
it for determining the nature of transaction (goods vs. service) or taxability
(interpretation of exemption notification to determine eligibility) or the rate
applicable on a transaction (depending on the nature of goods sold or service
provided). Some issues also arose from the fact that the taxing authorities
were different under the earlier laws, with Service Tax, Central Excise &
Customs duty being levied and administered by the Central Government while
Sales Tax & State Excise on specific products being levied and administered
by the respective State Governments.

2.   With the introduction
of Goods & Services Tax, it was felt that the issue of classification shall
be laid to rest with a single taxing event of supply becoming applicable for
goods as well as services. However, the charging section of the three primary
GST Acts, i.e., CGST, SGST/ UTGST and IGST Act clearly demonstrate the
continuance of distinct tax treatment for transactions involving supply of
goods, services as well as both, i.e., supplies where an element of goods, as well
as service are involved.

3.    In the context of goods,
rate Notifications under CGST and IGST have been issued wherein different rates
have been prescribed for different kinds of goods classified based upon the
HSN. Similarly, rate notifications for services have also been issued. An
Annexure with HSN wise classification of services has been issued and against
each such classification of services, a rate has been prescribed. Further, a
transaction which involves supply of both, goods or services has to be
classified as either composite / mixed supply and different tax treatment has
been prescribed depending on the classification adopted for such composite
supplies.

4.    Owing to this fact,
before making any supply, there are two specific steps that need to be
undertaken:

a. Identifying the nature of
supply, i.e., whether the supply is of goods or services or both. In both the
cases,one has to identify whether the supply is a composite supply or mixed
supply?

b. Identifying the HSN
classification of the product or service to determine the rate applicable
thereof.

 5.  Failure to take the
above steps can have its’ own repercussions. 
For  example,   under   
Notification

     11-2017, Entry 10 (ii)
provides that rental services of transport vehicles with / without operator
shall attract tax at 9% under heading 9966. However, Entry 17 provides that
leasing or rental services, with / without operator shall attract same rate of
central tax as would have been applicable on supply of like goods involving
transfer of title in goods. This clearly demonstrates the apparent conflict in
the notification as well as, it demands a proper interpretation of both the
entries to determine the correct classification.

 Identifying the nature of supply

 6.   As stated above, the charging
section provides for the levy of GST on supply of goods, services or both.
Further, different tax rates have been prescribed for different kinds of goods
and services. This can result in disputes to decide whether a transaction is
for provision of service or sale simpliciter.

7.    For instance, it has
always been a subject matter of dispute as to whether software is a transaction
for sale of goods or provision of service. At the outset, it is important to
note that incorporeal property is also treated as goods. It was further held
that a software, whether customised or not, shall be classified as goods if
they satisfy specific attributes, namely utility, capability of being bought
and sold and capable of transmission, transfer, delivery, storage and possession.
In this context, the Hon’ble SC held that a software embedded in a device shall
be classified as goods1.

Composite Supplies

8.    Even in the context of
works contract, there have been a plethora of cases where the Supreme Court had
a chance to determine whether a contract was divisible or not and how to
determine the taxability of the same. The aspect of divisibility vs. indivisibility
further gave rise to the theory of dominant intention, which is laid down in
the following judicial precedents:

 a. The need to determine
whether a transaction is a transaction for sale of goods or not arose with the
decision of the Hon’ble SC in the case of Gannon Dunkerley2, wherein
the Supreme Court held that the States had no authority to levy tax on a
transaction supply of goods as well as service when the contract was an
indivisible works contract.

 b. Relying on the decision of
Gannon Dunkerley, it was held in Hindustan Shipyard Limited vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh
3 that a contract for construction of a vessel
under the instruction of client would amount to sale of goods (as claimed by
the State of Andhra Pradesh) and not works contract (as claimed by the
Appellants).

     The Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that in a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods,
the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to
the contract intend it to be transferred. When something remains to be done on
the date of the contract to bring the specific goods in a deliverable state,
the property does not pass until such thing is done and brought to the notice
of the buyer. The risk in such case remains with the seller so long as the property
therein is not transferred to the buyer though the delivery may be delayed. On
the basis of these observations, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the
transaction was for sale of vessel and not a works contract. Hence, the
contract had to be classified as contract for sale of goods and not works
contract relying on the dominant intention of the transaction.

c. The theory of dominant
intention was again confirmed by the Hon’ble SC in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited4  wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held
that in a transaction of mobile connection, the predominant intention is to
receive the telecommunication service and not electro-magnetic waves, as
claimed by the Government.

 d. However, in Larsen &
Toubro Limited vs. State of Karnataka
in 2014 (034) STR 0481 SC, it was
held that the dominant nature test need not be applied to find out the true
nature of transaction as to whether there is a contract for sale of goods or
the contract of service in a composite transaction covered by the clauses of Article
366(29A). The above decision of Larsen & Toubro Limited was approved by the
Constitutional Bench in the case of Kone Elevators India Private Limited vs.
State of Tamil Nadu
in 2014 (304) ELT 161 (SC).

 9.   Despite the subsumation
of taxes on goods and services under a single legislation, the aspect of
composite supply vs. mixed supply under GST has resulted in the principle of
dominant intention being still relevant.

 10.   The  term 
composite  supply  has been defined u/s. 2 (30) to mean
a supply made by a taxable person to a recipient consisting of two or more
taxable supplies of goods or services or both, or any combination thereof,
which are naturally bundled and supplied in conjunction with each other in the
ordinary course of business, one of which is a principal supply.

11.   Further, the term
“principal supply” has been defined u/s. 2 (90) of the CGST Act, 2017 to mean supply
of goods or services
which constitutes the predominant element
of a composite supply and to which any other supply forming part of that
composite supply is ancillary.

12.   These two terms, namely
composite supply and principal supply shall clearly result in the revival of
dispute as to whether the supply is of goods or services or both? However, the
task shall be cut short in case of works contract services relating to
immovable property, as Schedule II clearly provides that a composite supply of
works contract service shall always be treated as supply of service and shall
be taxed accordingly.

13.   Let us analyse the impact
of GST on the transaction which was the subject matter of dispute in the case
of Kone Elevators referred above. Under the earlier regime, the position was
that the contract was a divisible contract for sale of goods (being elevator)
and provision of services (being commissioning and installation services). It
needs to be decided as to whether the supply can be classified as works
contract or not? For the same, reference to the definition of works contract
becomes necessary. Section 2 (119) of the CGST Act defines the term works
contract as a contract for building, construction, fabrication,
completion, erection, installation, fitting out, improvement, modification,
repair, maintenance, renovation, alteration or commissioning of any immovable
property wherein transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some
other form) is involved in the execution of such contract;

14.   The first aspect
therefore that needs to be checked is whether the elevator can be considered as
immovable property or not? In this context, the Supreme Court has in the
decision of Kone Elevators already held that once assembled, the elevator
becomes a permanent fixture. This in turn leads toward the conclusion that a
contract for supply and installation of elevator would be for creation of a
permanent fixture in an immovable property and hence, the supply would be
classified as works contract.

15.   However, the position
would not be so clear when the supply is in relation to a movable property or
pertains to two or more distinct goods supplied together or two or more
distinct services supplied together. In this context, it becomes more important
to analyse the definition of composite supply which provides that for multiple
supplies to be classified as a single composite supply, following conditions
need to be satisfied, namely:

a. There should be two or more
taxable supplies

b. The supplies should be
naturally bundled

c. The supplies should be in
conjunction with each other

d. One of the supplies should
be a principal supply

16.   Since what is meant by
“naturally bundled” has not been dealt with under the GST law, some specific
principles will have to be laid down for determining the same, such as:

a. There is a single price or
the customer pays the same amount, no matter how much of the package they
actually receive or use.

b. The elements are normally
advertised as a package.

c. The different elements are
not available separately.

d. The different elements are
integral to one overall supply – if one or more is removed, the nature of the
supply would be affected.

       Of course, the above
are mere examples and whether supplies are naturally bundled or not will have
to be decided on a case to case basis.

17. An example of composite
supply, in the context of movable property can be supplies made by vehicle
workshops. When a person takes his vehicle for repairs, there are certain parts
which are required to be replaced. At times, there are Annual Maintenance
Contracts undertaken by the workshops wherein they undertake to provide
periodic service for the vehicle along with replacement of specific parts,
whenever required. In this case, the question that arises is whether the supply
can be classified as a composite supply or not?

18. To decide the same, one
needs to go back to the conditions laid down in the definition of composite
supply to decide whether the same are fulfilled or not? The same is analysed in
the subsequent table:

There should be two or more taxable supplies

There are two supplies involved, namely supply of services
(being repair / maintenance services) and supply of goods (being replacement
parts)

The supplies should be naturally bundled

The indicators for “naturally bundled” discussed in
para 16 are getting satisfied

The supplies should be in conjunction with each other

This condition is also getting satisfied as only if there is
a repair activity undertaken will there be a need known for replacement part
and only when replacement part is supplied will the replacement activity also
be undertaken.

One of the supplies should be a principal supply

The predominant element of this transaction is to provide
maintenance service to the vehicle owner and the supply of replacement parts
is only ancillary to the service to be supplied.

 

 

19.  Thus, it can be concluded
that the contract is a composite contract with the principal supply being
supply of service and hence, the transaction would be taxed as service.

20. However, the situation
could have been different where the customer had approached the workstation for
replacement of tool-box, which the workshop agreed to undertake for a single
consideration. In this scenario also, there would have been two distinct
supplies, namely, supply of tool-kit as well as providing service of replacement
of tool-kit. In such a case, a stand can be taken that the pre-dominant supply
is the supply of tool-kit and hence, the entire supply will have to be taxed as
supply of goods.

21.  It
is important to note that whether a supply is a composite or not is a subjective
matter and no hardcore rule can be set for deciding the same. The same will
have to be decided on a case to case basis.

Mixed Supplies

22.  If any supply consisting
of multiple sub-supplies fail to satisfy the conditions discussed for composite
supply, the next question that arises is whether the supply is a mixed supply
or not. Section 2 (74) of the CGST Act defines the term “mixed supply” as two
or more individual supplies of goods or services, or any combination thereof,
made in conjunction with each other by a taxable person for a single price
where such supply does not constitute a composite supply.

23.   The definition is further
explained by the following example:

        A supply of a
package consisting of canned foods, sweets, chocolates, cakes, dry fruits,
aerated drinks and fruit juices when supplied for a singleprice is a mixed
supply. Each of these items can be supplied separately and is not dependent on
any other. It shall not be a mixed supply if these items are supplied
separately.

24.   In other words, when two
or more supplies are made in conjunction with each other, but are not naturally
bundled and there is a single consideration for all the supplies, such supplies
shall be made liable to GST at the rate applicable to supply, attracting the
highest GST Rate. For example, a person taking a residential property for rent
for both commercial as well as residential use. While the former is taxable
service, the latter is exempt from tax. Therefore, the entire transaction would
be subjected to tax, unless separate consideration is fixed for commercial and
non-commercial use.

Classification of Some Specific Transactions

25.  Having discussed the
Rules for Interpretation of classification, there are certain specific
transactions where there is an ongoing issue w.r.t classification, such as:

a. Takeaways vs. Restaurant
Dining

b. Alcohol – Separate Invoicing
vs. Consolidated invoicing

c. Sale of Publications vs.
Job-work of Printing of Publications

d. International Job-work –
Job-work vs. export

26.   Each of the above
transactions are discussed in detail in the subsequent paragraphs.

Takeaways vs. Restaurant Dining

27.   Schedule II, Entry 6 of
the CGST Act provides that a composite supply by way of or as part of any
service or in any other manner whatsoever of goods, being food or any other
article for human consumption or any drink (other than alcoholic liquor for
human consumption) where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment
or other valuable consideration, shall be treated as supply of service.

28.   The above entry intends
to cover only transaction where there is supply of food / beverages which is
part of a larger supply, i.e., supplies made in restaurant or as caterer. The
same has been made liable for GST at the rate of 12% / 18% on case to case
basis. This rate will apply irrespective of the products used in providing the
said service. For example, non-alcoholic beverages attract GST at 28% plus
compensation cess while food items such as namkeens, bhujia, mixture, etc.
attract 12%. Since this food / beverage items are supplied as a part of
restaurant service, the same is supposed to attract tax at the rate of 18%.

29.   However, the treatment as
composite supply of service is only applicable where the food / beverage is
supplied by way of or as part of a service. Therefore, the question that arises
is whether in case of takeaways, where the customer does not receive any
service, but merely buys the food / beverages from the restaurants, the supply
shall be treated as supply of food and beverages or as composite supply of
restaurants?

30.   In essence, the question
that arises in case of takeaways is whether the same is supply of goods or
supply of services? This is where the rules of interpretation discussed in the
preceding paras will come into play.

31.   The first thing that
needs to be decided in this transaction is whether the supply is of goods,
i.e., food and beverages or of services? In this transaction, it would be safe
to say that in case of takeaways, the predominant intention is to buy the food
/ beverages and there is no service element involved in the supply. Hence, both
the supplies, i.e., namkeen as well as beverage will have to be treated as
supply of goods and GST will have to be discharged as per the rates applicable on those products.

32.  In fact, under the
Service Tax regime also, initially it was clarified that the dominant intention
in the case of takeaways was to sell goods and not provide any service.
However, this clarification was subsequently withdrawn.

Supplies involving alcohol – GST vs. VAT

 33. Alcoholic liquor meant
for human consumption has been kept outside the purview of GST. The levy of tax
on the same continues to be governed by the provisions of State Excise and
Value Added Tax. In other words, there cannot be any GST implications on the
sale of alcoholic liquor.

34.   Keeping the said aspect
in mind, even the Schedule II entry which provides that supply of food /
beverages by way of or as part of service shall be considered to be as
composite supply of service excludes the supply of alcoholic liquor from its’
ambit. Therefore, the intention of the GST law to ensure that no tax is levied
on the alcohol component is very evident.

35.   While legally, the law
has clearly laid down its intention, practical issues  arise in the case of cocktails (with
alcoholic content) served in restaurant, which contain both, alcoholic as well
as non-alcoholic beverages? What happens to cakes which may also include
alcoholic content? The question that arises is whether the dominant intention
theory will have to be applied for such transaction and if yes, whether the
transaction will attract VAT or GST?

36.   The answer to the above
question will have to be determined on case to case basis. For example, in the
first case involving cocktails, it can be said that the dominant intention was
to consume alcohol while in the second case of cake containing alcoholic
liquor, the dominant intention is to consume the cake and not the alcohol and
hence, the supply will have to be subjected to GST.

 Publications – Sale vs. Job-work

37.   The term “job-work” has
been defined u/s. 2 (68) of the CGST Act to mean any treatment or process
undertaken by a person on goods belonging to another registered person and the
expression “job worker” shall be construed accordingly.

38.   Schedule II, entry 3 also
provides that any treatment or process which is applied to another persons’
goods shall be treated as supply of service.

39.   There are multiple
scenarios possible, which are as under:

a. A person prints and
publishes books on his own account, which is sold to consumers.

b. A person in possession of
content gives a contract to a job-worker for printing the books, where the
material for printing the books is given by the principal.

c. A person in possession of
content gives a contract to a contractor for printing the books by using the
principal’s content but using own material.

40.   In (a) above, it is more
than evident that the transaction shall be that of supply of books and hence,
the same shall be liable for NIL rate of tax. Similarly, in case of (b) above,
the job-work transaction shall be considered as service owing to the specific
entry in Schedule II treating the activity as supply of service. The actual
issue arises in (c) above, where the content is of the principal, but the
entire activity of printing (including materials) is arranged for by the
contractor. The question that arises is whether the supply has to be treated as
supply of goods or supply of services?

41.   Drawing analogies from
the decision of the SC in the case of Hindustan Shipyard, it can be contended
that the supply should be characterised as supply of goods in the nature of
books and therefore, liable for NIL Rate of tax. However, a rate of 12% has
been prescribed for services in the nature of printing of books where the
content is provided by the principal and the paper and ink is used by the printer.
Whether mere supply of content by the principal can result in the
categorisation of the transaction as a service? If so, certain entries
prescribed under the schedule of goods like brochures, letterheads, etc.
may loose relevance.

International Job Work – Goods vs. Service

42.   This relates to a
transaction where a foreign principal has supplied certain material for
job-work to the Indian contractor who is required to undertake certain
treatment / process on the said material and send it back to the principal. As
already discussed in the previous case, job-work is treated as service under
GST. Therefore, in terms of the provision of section 13 (3) (a) of the IGST
Act, the place of supply becomes the location where the treatment/ process is
undertaken, i.e., the location of supplier and hence, the transaction cannot be
classified as export of services as well as, it becomes subject to tax.

43.   However, another
important point to be kept in mind is that in case of such transactions, the
movement of goods takes place from the principal to job-worker and from the
job-worker to the principal upon completion of the process. The process of
import of goods is governed by the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and
hence, when the movement of material takes place from the foreign principal to
the Indian Job-worker, the goods are required to be cleared at the Customs with
payment of appropriate custom duty and IGST by disclosing the same as import of
goods.

44.   Subsequently, when the
process is completed and the goods are sent back to the principal, the goods
are again subjected to Custom Assessment as Shipping Bill for export of goods
outside India is prepared. This activity of sending the goods outside India
also falls within the ambit of definition of export of goods, which is defined
to mean taking goods out of India to a place outside India. Further, Section 11
of the IGST Act clearly provides that the place of supply of goods exported
from India shall be the location outside India.

45. One can therefore say
that in transactions of international job-work, the same transaction can be
classified as supply of goods as well as supply of service, which appears to be
incorrect. Therefore, what needs to be decided is whether there is a supply of
goods or supply of services?

46.  In such situations,
whether dominant intention will play a role in determining the nature of supply
or the altered facts will also have to be considered in determining as to
whether the supply is of goods or services? In this context, reference to the
decision of the SC in the case of Moped India Limited vs. Assistant
Collector of Central Excise
in 1986 (23) ELT 8 (SC), wherein the SC had
held that while interpreting the terms of an agreement, it is the substance of
the transaction which shall prevail over the form of the transaction. That is
to say, while the transaction might have been structured as a Job-work, it
might not necessarily be classified as such depending on the actual conduct of
the parties.

47.   The situation becomes
even more evident from the fact that the levy of IGST on imports is under the
IGST Act unlike the earlier proposition of countervailing duty being levied
under the Customs Act only. It may therefore be argued that the activity of job
work gets subsumed in the transaction of import and export of goods and
therefore, no tax should be separately payable on the said labour charges.

Services of advertising agents – P2P vs. P2A

48.  There are two types of
agents, namely one, who deal on their own account, i.e., buy advertising space
from publishers and sell it to various advertisers and second, where they act
as agents of either advertisers / publishers and facilitate the transaction for
the sale of advertising space. In the first case, the revenue for the agents is
the net difference between the sale rate and the buying rate, while in the
second case, the agents specifically issue an invoice to their client, being
the advertiser / publisher for the agency services provided.

49.  There has been
substantial confusion with respect to the first case as to whether the agency
has to pay GST at the rate applicable on the media or they have to pay GST at
the rate applicable for commission agents? In this context, vide press release,
it has been clarified that in case of agency working on a Principal to Principal
basis, GST shall be applicable on the rate applicable on the media (5% in case
of print media). However, in case the agency is operating on a Principal to
Agency basis, GST will be applicable at the rate applicable on commission
services, i.e., 18%.

50.  However, it is imperative
to note that under the pre-GST regime, even when the advertising agencies were
operating on a Principal to Principal basis, there was substantial litigation
on the grounds that they were operating as an agent and hence liable to pay GST
on the net commission income. Similar issue had also plagued the freight
forwarders as well. It remains to be seen how far the Tax Authorities receive
this circular and how it will impact the litigation under the earlier tax
regime.

 Harmonised System of Nomenclature

51.   Section 9 of the CGST
Act, 2017 provides that tax shall be levied on all goods and / or services at
such rates as may be notified by the Government. Subsequently, the CBEC has
vide general rate notifications 01/2017 and 02/2017 for goods and 11/2017 and
12/2017 for services notified the rates respectively. The notifications have
classified the goods on the basis of HSN which is segregated into Chapter/
Heading/ Sub-heading/ Tariff item. Further, it has been provided that the rules
for the interpretation as provided for under Customs Tariff Act, 1975 shall
apply for the interpretation of headings covered under the said notification.

52.   HSN in the context of
goods is a multi-purpose international product nomenclature developed/ identified
by 6-digit code arranged in a legal and logical structure globally. India has
added two more digits to the 6-digit code for further precision, thus making it
an 8-digit HSN. The various components of an 8-digit HSN are as under:

 

1              2

3              4

5              6

7                    8

Chapter

Heading

Sub-

Heading

Tariff Item

 

53.  
In  addition  to 
HSN  for  goods, 
under  GST,  even    

       
services   have   been  
given   an   HSN  
code   for

       
identification by way of an Annexure in Notofication

       
11/2017 under Chapter 99. The components of HSN 

       
for services are as under:

 

1              2

3

4

5

6                 7

Chapter

Section

Heading

Group

Service Code

 

 Rules for Interpretation of Tariff

 54. It is always possible
that the same product / service can be classified under multiple HSN. In order
to assist in deciding the correct classification for such instances, the
notifications have provided that the Rules for interpretation as prescribed
under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 shall be followed for the purpose of
classification under GST.

55.  There are six rules
prescribed, which need to be applied in chronological order. The Rules deal
with different scenarios which can arise at the time of classifying a product /
service and lays down the method in which the classification is to be done.
Each of the above six rules are discussed in detail in the subsequent
paragraphs.

Rule 1 – General Rule

56.   This is the general rule
for interpretation of tariff. This rule provides that the words in the Section
and Chapter titles are to be used as guidelines only to point the way to the
area of the Tariff in which the product to be classified is likely to be found.
Classification is to be determined by the terms in the Headings and the Section
and Chapter Notes that apply to them, unless the terms of the heading and the
notes say otherwise.

       For example, Heading
9505 deals with articles for Christmas activities. Therefore, Christmas tree
candles would logically get covered under the said heading. However, notes to
the said heading specifically provide that Christmas tree candles will not get
covered under heading 9505 and hence, they will have to be classified under
heading 3406 which specifically deals with candles, tapers & the likes.

Rule 2 (a) – Classification of unfinished,
incomplete, unassembled or disassembled products

57. This rule deals with
classification of unfinished, incomplete, unassembled or disassembled products.
This rule provides that unfinished and incomplete goods can be classified under
the same Heading as the same goods in a finished state, provided that they have
the essential character of the complete or finished article, unless the Heading
/Note specifically exclude unfinished / unassembled products.

       Judicial Precedents: Collector
of Customs, Bangalore vs. Maestro Motors Limited
[2004(174) ELT 289 (SC)]

      Components of car in a
completely knocked down condition shall also be considered as cars for the
purpose of levy of customs duty.

 Rule 2 (b) – Classification of products not
classifiable u/r 1 or 2 (a)

58.   This rule provides that
any reference in a heading to a material / substance / goods of a given
material / substance shall also include reference to a mixture / combination of
that material / substance / goods consisting wholly or partly of such
substance.

       Example: Di-calcium
citrate is a calcium acid salt of citric acid. There is no specific
classification for this product. However, classification 2918 15 deals with “salts
and esters of citric acid”. Therefore, it would be apt to classify di-calcium
citrate under 2918 15.

 Rule 3 – Multiple probable classifications

59.   This rule is a
continuation of Rule 2 (b) and deals with situations wherein a product is
classifiable under more than one heading. The rule lays down three criteria for
determining the appropriate heading as under:

–    Rule
3 (a): Heading with most specific description shall be preferred over a more
general description.

     Judicial Precedents: Superintendent
of Central Excise & Others vs. Vac Met Corporation Private Limited

[1985 (22) ELT 330 (SC)]

       Metallic yarn (also
known as metallized yarn) manufactured in the form of Silver white or Golden
thin flat, narrow and continuous strip made of metallised polyester from
metallised laminated plastic sheets or foils which are spitted by them by
electrically operated machines, fall within the purview of Tariff Entry 15A(2)
which is a specific entry related to articles made of plastic of all kinds and
not under Tariff Item 18 of the Central Excise Tariff which is of general
nature.

Rule
3 (b): If 3 (a) is not applicable, the classification of the material /
substances which gives the final product its essential character should be
applied.

       Judicial Precedent: Sprint
RPG India Limited vs. Commissioner of Customs, Delhi
[2000 (116) ELT 6
(SC)]

     Computer Software
loaded on a hard disk drive is assessable on the basis of computer software at
the rate of 10% as per Heading 85.24 of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 read with
Notification No. 59/95-Cus. and not under Heading 84.71 ibid as a ‘hard
disk’ simpliciter, since what was imported was software on a hard disk and not
hard disk in the garb of software.

Rule
3 (c): If classification as per (a) or (b) is not possible, goods should be
classified under heading which occurs last in numerological order amongst those
classifications which equally merit consideration.

       Judicial Precedent: Commissioner
of Central Excise, Goa vs. Waterways Shipyard Private Limited
[2013 (297)
ELT 0077 Tribunal Mumbai]

      Vessel for use as
casino is classifiable under two entries, namely Heading 8903 which covers all
vessels for pleasure or sport, as well as classifiable under Heading 8901 which
covers cruise ships. Since there were two entries under which goods were
classifiable, vessel to be classified under Heading occurring last in numerical
order among those equally meriting consideration.

 Rule 4 – Classification for goods not
classifiable as per Rule 1-3

 60.   This Rule provides that
goods which cannot be classified as per Rule 1-3 shall be classified under the
heading appropriate to the goods to which they are most similar. This is also
known as “last resort rule” often used with new products.

      Judicial Precedent: Collector
of Central Excise, Bombay vs. KWH Heliplastics Limited
[1998 (97) ELT 385
(SC)]

     Plastic tanks would be
classifiable under Heading 39.25 which also applies to reservoir, tanks,
including septic tank, vats and similar containers to hold liquids or something
in liquid form in the process of manufacture as in tanning and dyeing etc.,
and thus can be used and are capable of being used for water storage in
connection with raising of construction or mixing construction materials and
not under the residuary entry of 3926 as held by the Tribunal.

 Rule 5– Classification of containers

61.   There are two sub-rules.
Sub-rule (a) provides that containers shall be classified as per the heading of
the article which it is meant to contain if all the conditions, viz.,
specifically shaped / fitted for the article, suitable for long term use,
protect the article, normally sold with such article and presented with article
designed to contain are satisfied, except in cases where the container gives
the article its essential character, in which case classification should be as
per the heading applicable for container and not article.

      Example: CD cases
are specifically meant for containing CD and are sold along with CD and hence
they shall be classifiable as CD and not separately.

 62. Sub-rule (2) provides
that all other types of containers / packing materials, other than those
covered u/r 5 (a) should be classified with the goods they contain, except in
cases where the container / packing material are meant for repetitive use.

        Example: Styrofoam
used in packaging of electronic materials, is not reusable as the same is
handed over to customer and hence, the same will have to be classified as per
classification applicable for electronic material and not Styrofoam.

Rule 6 – Manner of Application of Rules

63.  Once goods have been
classified to the Heading level as per Rule 1 – 5, then classification to the
Subheading level can now take place by repeating the said rules and taking into
account any related Legal Notes.

 Conclusion

 64. It would be sufficient to
say that classification plays a pivotal role in not only determining the rate
of tax, but also other aspects such as place of supply, time of supply,
procedural compliances, etc. and hence, any incorrect classification can
have severe consequences on the business. _

5 Sections 2(24), 28 – Subsidy in the nature of entertainment tax / duty collected, but not to be paid, constitutes capital receipt as it is meant for promotion of new industries by way of multiplex theatres.

  DCIT vs. Cinemax Properties Ltd. (Mumbai)

   Members : P. K.
Bansal (VP) and Pawan Singh (JM)

    ITA No.
5227/Mum/2015

     A.Y.: 2011-12. 
    
Date of Order: 09th August, 2017

     Counsel for revenue
/ assessee: Saurabh Deshpande / None

FACTS 

The
Assessing Officer, while assessing the total income of the assessee, disallowed
the claim of entertainment tax of Rs. 6,45,79,148 collected and claimed as
capital subsidy.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who allowed the appeal filed by
the assessee.

Aggrieved,
the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD 

The
Tribunal noted that the similar issue arose in the case of the assessee in the
assessment years 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10 and 2010-11.

The
Tribunal in ITA No. 394/Mum/2012 dated 24.01.2014 for AY 2008-09 while dealing
with the same issue held the amount under consideration to be capital in
nature. The Tribunal had while deciding the appeal noted that the Bombay High
Court has in the case of CIT vs. Chaphalkar Brothers (ITA Nos. 1342
& 1443 of 2006), order dated 08.06.2011, held that the subsidy of this kind
constitutes capital receipt as it is meant for promotion of new industries by
way of multiplex theatres. The Tribunal also noted that in the case of
assessee’s sister concern namely Vista Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No.
8402/Mum/2011) for AY 2008-09, it has been held that similar additions are not
sustainable, since the same amount is capital in nature. Following these
decisions, the Tribunal had dismissed the revenue’s appeal for AY 2008-09 and
had decided the issue in favour of the assessee. This order for AY 2008-09 was
followed while deciding appeals for AY 2009-10 and AY 2010-11.

Facts
being the same, the Tribunal did not find any illegality or infirmity in the
order of the CIT(A) deleting the addition of Rs. 6,45,79,148.

The
appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

4 Section 37 – Expenditure incurred by the assessee in connection with the issue of FCCB is revenue in nature.

 DCIT vs. Reliance
Natural Resources Ltd.
(Mumbai)

Members : B. R. Baskaran (AM) and Ravish Sood (JM)

ITA No. 6712/Mum/2012

A.Y.: 2009-10.         Date
of Order: 11th August, 2017

Counsel for revenue / assessee: Darse S. / Jitendra Sanghavi


FACTS 

The
assessee was engaged in the business of providing fuel and facilitation
services in various forms to power plants and also engaged in the joint venture
operations for exploration and production of coal based Methane blocks.  The assessee incurred expenses aggregating to
Rs. 13,85,96,004 in connection with the issue of foreign currency convertible
bonds (FCCB). These expenses comprised of – Agency Fees (Barclays Bank) : Rs.
10,58,188; Commission & Fronting Fees (Paid to Barclays Bank) : Rs.
13,73,38,456; and   Trustee   Maintenance  
Fees    (Deutsche Bank) :Rs.
1,99,360.

The
Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the expenses on the ground that identical
expenses incurred in earlier years were treated as capital expenses by the AO.
He held that the expenses have been incurred in connection with increasing the
capital base of the company and not for carrying on day-to-day business
activities. He treated the expenditure of Rs. 13,85,96,004 so incurred by the
assessee as capital expenditure.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who, following the orders passed
in earlier years, allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

Aggrieved,
the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD 

The
Tribunal noted that the co-ordinate Bench had considered identical issue in ITA
No. 1425/Mum/2011 dated 08.07.2016 relating to AY 2007-08 and also in ITA No.
6711/Mum/2012 dated 24.08.2016 relating to AY 2008-09. It observed that while
deciding the appeal filed by the revenue for AY 2007-08, the co-ordinate bench
has followed the decision rendered by the Tribunal in the case of Prime
Focus Ltd. vs. DCIT
(ITA No. 836/Mum/2011 dated 04.02.2016). In the case of
Prime Focus Ltd., the Tribunal observed that the FCCB is akin to borrowings
made by issuing debentures and both of them are different types of debt
instruments only.

Accordingly,
in the case of Prime Focus Ltd, the Tribunal held that the expenses incurred in
connection with FCCB are revenue in nature. Further, in the instant case, the
FCCB holders never had any voting rights as the same were not converted into
equity shares during that year.

Since
there was no change in facts as regards claim of the assessee and also
considering that none of the FCCB has been converted into shares during this
year also, the Tribunal, following the view taken in earlier years, held that
the CIT(A) was justified in holding that the expenditure incurred in connection
with the issue of FCCB is deductible as revenue expenditure.

As
regards the second ground of the revenue that the assessee had issued FCCB for
the purpose of meeting its working capital requirement, but the same has been
issued in a manner contrary to the permitted use, the Tribunal held that since
it has already held that the expenses incurred in connection with the issue of
FCCB is revenue in nature, it is not necessary to adjudicate the alternative
contention of the revenue.

This
ground of appeal filed by the revenue was allowed.

3 Section 263 – Revision – two possible views – the issue is debatable –Revision is not permissible

CIT vs. Yes Bank Ltd. [ Income tax Appeal
no. 599 of 2015 dated : 01/08/2017 (Bombay High Court)].

 [Yes Bank Ltd. vs. CIT [A.Y-2007-08  Mum. ITAT ]

During the FY:2005-06, the assessee had
incurred an aggregate expenditure of Rs.16,39,10,000/- on Initial Public
Offering (“IPO”) of equity shares made. The Issue closed on June 12, 2005. It
has claimed a deduction u/s. 35D for Rs.3,27,82,000/- being one-fifth of the
total expenses incurred. This is the second year of claim for deduction.

The assessee submits that section 35D grants
a deduction / amortisation in respect of expenses incurred by a company in
connection with the issue, for public subscription, of shares or debentures of
a company over a period of five years. Since the foregoing expenses on IPO are
in connection with the issue of shares for public subscription, one fifth of
the total amount thereof is eligible for deduction u/s. 35D.

The A.O had made an inquiry while passing
the assessment order. In return of income, the assessee had made the following
note. Deduction of Rs.3,27,82,000/- claimed u/s. 35D of the Act.

The Assessee submits that the A.O had before
passing the assessment order, called for explanation from the assessee. The
explanation was given for claiming deduction u/s. 35D of the Act, in respect of
expenses incurred by the company in connection with the issue of public
subscription of the shares and debentures of the company for a period of 5
years.

According to the Revenue, the order passed
by the A.O granting benefit u/s. 35D of the Act was erroneous and the same was
prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. As such, ingredients of section 263
of the Act were attracted.

The assessee submitted that it is an
industrial undertaking for the purpose of section 35D of the Act and relied
upon the judgement of this Court in a case of the CIT vs. Emirates
Commercial Bank Ltd. 262 ITR 55,
wherein this Court has held that the
banks are industrial undertakings and eligible for deductions u/s. 32A.

Also in HSBC Securities and Capital
Markets (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1384/M/2000),
where the Hon’ble Mumbai ITAT has
held that even a share broking entity is an “industrial undertaking” for the
purpose of section 35D.

Therefore, the claim of assessee for
deduction u/s. 35D is in accordance with law and is allowable. The Tribunal set
aside the order of the Commissioner passed u/s. 263 of the Act.

The Hon. High Court find that the Tribunal
has considered the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Malabar
Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra)
and held that when two possible views are
available and the issue is debatable, then, initiation of revision is not
permissible u/s. 263 of the Act.

It appears that the A.O sought clarification
from the assessee about the correctness of the amount of one fifth of the total
expenses incurred u/s. 35D of the Act. The assessee under letter dated
26.10.2004, gave specific explanation on the issue raised by the A.O and
thereafter, the assessment order was passed. Only because the Commissioner
thought that other view is a better view, would not enable CIT to exercise
power u/s. 263 of the Act. In the light of the above, the appeal was dismissed.
_

2 Section 153A – Search and seizure – Assessment would be limited to the incriminating evidence found during the search

CIT vs. SKS Ispat & Power Limited.
[Income tax Appeal no. 1874 of 2014 dated: 12/07/2017 (Bombay High Court)].

[Affirmed SKS Ispat & Power Limited
vs. DCIT . [ITA No. 8746 & 8747/MUM/2010 ; Bench : E ; dated 07/05/2014 ;
A.Y-2002-03 & 2003-04.Mum. ITAT ]

The Assessee raised a legal issue before
ITAT relating to the sustainability of additions which are not supported by the
seized or incriminating material u/s. 153A of the Act.

There was a search and seizure action on the
assessee in the case of SKS Ispat Ltd. Group, which is engaged in the business
of manufacturing and trading of steel products. The assessee filed the return
of income as per the provisions of the section 139(1) of the Act and the
assessments were completed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Act. Thus, the
assessments for the said AYs have reached finality. In all these four
assessments, AO made a common addition under the heads (i) unexplained sundry
creditors and (ii) share application money. Before the Tribunal, it is the
claim of the assessee that the said additions were made without the assistance
of any incriminating material gathered during the search and seizure operation.

In this regard, the Assessee submitted that
on para 7 of the assessment order and mentioned that the basis for the addition
is the financial statements annexed with the return of income. Otherwise, there
is no seized material in possession of the AO which is incriminating
information that suggests the necessity of making the said additions validly.
Similarly, para 8 of the said order of the AO, Assessee demonstrated that no
seized material is available in support of making the said additions.

The Tribunal observed that, undisputedly,
the impugned quantum additions are made merely based on the entries in the
accounted books and certainly not based on either the unaccounted books of
accounts of the assessee or books not produced to the AO earlier or the
incriminating material gathered by the investigation wing of the revenue.

The Tribunal held that the AO was not justified
in making the addition on account of unaccounted sundry creditors (purchases)
and unexplained share of the money u/s. 153A of the Act, as there was no
incriminating material discovered in the search.

Before the High Court the Revenue contented,
the judgements relied by the Tribunal while limiting the scope of inquiry u/s.
153A of the Act to the extent of discovery of incriminating material during
search only is improper. The said judgements were in respect of assessments
which had taken place u/s. 143(3) of the Act. In the present case, the
assessment has taken place u/s. 143(1) of the Act. The distinguishing feature
in sections 143(1) and 143(3) has not been considered by the Tribunal in an
assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act a long drawn inquiry is contemplated. It
would also amount to examination of evidence. However, inquiry u/s. 143 (1) of
the Act is limited on the basis of return filed. In view of that, the
judgements  relied on would not be
applicable.

The Assessee submits that this Court has time
and again held that assessment u/s. 153A of the Act would be limited to the
extent of any incriminating articles, incriminating evidence found during the
search. Even in case of The Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Gurinder Singh
Bawa
decided by this Court, the assessment was u/s. 143(1) of the Act.
The Assessee relied on the judgment of this Court in The Commissioner of
Income Tax vs. Gurinder Singh Bawa
reported in [2016] 386 ITR 483
(Bom)
and another Judgment of this Court in the case of The
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Warehousing Corporation & Anr.
reported
in [2016] 374 ITR 645 (Bom).

The Hon. High Court observed that on perusal
of Section 153A of the Act, it is manifest that it does not make any
distinction between assessment conducted u/s. 143(1) and 143(3). This Court had
occasion to consider the scope of section 153A of the Act in case of The
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Gurinder Singh Bawa [2016] 386 ITR 483 (Bom)
and
in the case of The Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Continental Warehousing
Corporation & Anr.
reported in [2016] 374 ITR 645 (Bom)
. It
has been observed that section 153A cannot be a tool to have a second inning of
assessment either to the Revenue or the Assessee. Even in case of The
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Gurinder Singh Bawa
(referred to supra)
the assessment was u/s. 143(1) of the Act and the Court held that the scope of
assessment after search u/s. 153A would be limited to the incriminating
evidence found during the search and no further. In the said Judgment, the
Judgement of this Court in The Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Continental
Warehousing Corporation & Anr.
(referred to supra) has been
followed. Considering the authoritative pronouncements of this Court in above
referred cases, one of which is also with regard to assessment u/s. 143(1), the
issue is no longer res integral and stands concluded in the above
referred Judgements. In the above view, the Appeals was dismissed.

1 Section 45 – Capital Gain – assessee not engaged in the business of dealing in land – the profit arising on its sale is assessable as Capital gain only

[Affirmed The Sonawala Company Pvt. Ltd.
vs. ACIT. [ITA No. 4004/MUM/2010 ; Bench : F ; dated 27/08/2014; A Y: 2007-
2008. Mum. ITAT]

CIT vs.The Sonawala Company Pvt. Ltd.
[Income tax Appeal no. 385 of 2015 dated : 11/07/2017 (Bombay High Court)].

The assessee had gross income received as
hoarding charges/compensation consisted of hoarding charges, lease rent,
parking charges etc.

The assessee had sold a plot located in Pune
for a consideration of Rs.2.23 crore. The assessee had acquired the lease hold
rights on it through an agreement dated 11.12.1941. The assessee declared the
profit arising on sale of above said plot as long term capital gain and claimed
deduction u/s. 54EC of the Act. The AO noticed that the assessee had proposed
to construct flat on the above said land about 20 years back and had also
obtained advances from the parties.

The assessee had also prepared plans for construction
of residential premises and also obtained sanction from Pune Municipal
Corporation. However, the project was abandoned and the advances received from
parties excepting a sum of Rs.73,200/- were returned back.

The AO took the view that the assessee had
converted the above said plot as “Business asset” and accordingly
assessed the gain arising on sale of land as business income. Consequently, he
rejected the claim for deduction u/s. 54EC of the Act.  

The Revenue submits that though the open
space was acquired in the year 1941 by the Assessee, it was only in the year
2004, the construction permission was obtained for developing the said flat and
the same was assigned along with construction rights. As such the same will
have to be constituted as business income and not long term capital gain.

The assessee submitted that even a solitary
transaction can amount to business transaction. The attending circumstances are
writ large to come to the conclusion that the sale of a flat along with
construction permission of the project is a business income. The Hon’ble Punjab
& Haryana High Court had considered an identical issue in the case of CIT
vs. Raj Bricks Industry (2010)(322 ITR 625).

The Tribunal observed that in the instant
case, the assessee has been holding the leasehold right in the land since 1941.
It has sold the same after holding it for about 65 years.

About 20 years back, the assessee had
attempted to develop the same, but it was prevented by the order of the Hon’ble
Bombay High Court. Hence, the assessee could not develop the same.
Subsequently, the assessee has obtained permission to construct a residential
premises. All these sequences would show that the assessee has continued to
hold the land as its capital asset. Under these circumstances, the Tribunal
held that the CIT(A) was justified in holding that the gain arising on sale of
land should be assessed as “Long term Capital gain” only.

Consequently it was held that the assessee
can claim deduction u/s. 54EC of the Act, subject to the fulfilment of
conditions prescribed in that section.

The Hon. High Court held that totality of
the facts as were discussed by the CIT (A) and the Tribunal would show that no
error has been committed in treating the income from the sale of land as long term
capital gain.

 In view of that, no substantial questions of
law arise. The appeal as such is dismissed.

 

18 TDS – Karta – HUF – A. Y. 2012-2013 – Erroneous of PAN of Karta – HUF is entitled to benefit of TDS – Revenue has discretion to grant benefit to family

Naresh Bhavani Shah (HUF) vs. CIT; 396 ITR
589 (Guj):

The assessee was a HUF regularly assessed to
tax under the provisions of Income-tax Act, 1961. The funds belonging to the
assessee were invested in RBI taxable bonds. This was, however, done in the
name of N, the karta of the family. Inadvertently, such investment was made in
his individual name and he was not described as the karta of the family. The
PAN given to the RBI also was that of N in his personal capacity and not that
of the family. Therefore, the RBI while deducting tax at source on the interest
income of such bonds issued certificates of tax deducted at source in the name
of N carrying his permanent account number. In the return of income for the A.
Y. 2012-13, the assessee included the interest from the said RBI bonds and also
claimed Rs. 5,42,800/- TDS on such interest. N, in his individual capacity, had
not included the said interest income and also had not claimed the TDS on the
same. The assessee wrote to the Assessing Officer and pointed out that the
amount of Rs. 5,42,800/- represented tax deducted at source on the income
offered by the assessee and that the benefit of such TDS should be granted to
the assessee, particularly when the karta had no claim on such benefit. The
Assessing Officer assessed the interest income, but refused to give credit of
the TDS. The assessee’s revision petition was rejected.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)   There
was no dearth of power with the Department to grant credit of tax deducted at
source in a genuine case. In the present case, many years had passed since the
event. The facts were not seriously in dispute. The assessee had offered the
entire income to tax. The Depatrment had also accepted such declaration and
taxed the assessee.

ii)   In view of such special facts and circumstances,
the Department    had   to 
give  credit   of 
the  sum     of
Rs. 5,42,800/- to the assessee, deducted
by way of tax at source, upon N filing an affidavit before the Department that
the sum invested by the RBI did not belong to him, the income was also not his
and that he had not claimed any credit of the tax deducted at source on such
income for the said assessment year.”

17 Section 245D – Settlement Commission – Settlement of cases – Section 245D – A. Y. 2000-01 to 2006-07 – Order of Settlement Commission after considering facts – Writ by Revenue – No evidence that conclusions of Settlement Commission were perverse – Order valid

CIT vs. Radico Khaitan Ltd.; 396 ITR 644
(Del):

The assessee company R was engaged in the
business of manufacturing and marketing of Indian made foreign liquor, country
liquor, etc. It also generated power for its manufacturing and bottling
plants. R was subjected to a search and seizure operation u/s. 132(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, in its business premises. Search was resorted to also in
the residential premises of its directors, UPDA and at the residence of M,
Secretary General of UPDA. Also, a survey u/s. 133A was conducted at the
business premises of S, one of the core members of the “managing committee” of
UPDA. Many incriminating documents pertaining to the assessee were found and
seized from these premises. Statements of various persons including M were
recorded u/s. 132(4) and 133A of the Act. After collecting all material, the
Assessing Officer issued notices u/s. 153A for A. Ys. 2000-01 to 2006-07
requiring the assessee to file returns. R filed its returns on September 29,
2007 offering an amount of Rs. 4.5 crore for taxation. Thereafter, R filed an
application u/s. 245C of the Act before the Settlement Commission covering all
assessment years and declared additional income for the relevant period to the
extent of Rs. 23 crore. Revenue filed its report under rule 9 of the Income-tax
Settlement Commission Rules, 1987, alleging that concealment of income by the
assessee was Rs. 159,82,92,966/- under various heads. This figure was revised
to Rs. 177,84,16,966/- by a supplementary report dated February 13, 2008. After
hearing the parties and considering the material, the Commission settled the
concealed income of the assessee for all the block years at Rs. 30 crore.

Revenue filed a writ petition and challenged
the order of the Settlement Commission. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ
petition and held as under:

“i)   The
main thrust of the Revenue’s grievance in these proceedings was with respect to
the amounts said to have been clandestinely given to UPDA as the assessee’s
contribution towards “slush fund” to be used as pay offs to politicians and
public officers in return for favourable treatment. The linkage between the
material seized from the assessee’s premises and those from UPDA’s premises as
well as the statement of M was not established through any objective material.

ii)   It
was now a settled law that block assessments were concerned with fresh material
and fresh documents, which emerged in the course of search and seizure
proceedings; the Revenue had no authority to delve into material that was
already before it and the regular assessments were made having the deposition.
That the assessee’s expenditure claim was bogus, or it had under-reported
income and that it resorted to over invoicing and diversion of funds into the
funds allegedly maintained by UPDA, was not established.

iii)   The
findings of the Commission therefore could not be faulted as contrary to law.
As far as suppression of profits for various financial years, alleged by the
Revenue, the Commission was of the opinion that the documents relied upon were
work estimates and projections that revealed tentative profitability in respect
of the assessee’s activities towards sale of country liquor i.e., that the documents
did not reflect the actual figures. The alleged bogus expenditure to the tune
of Rs. 9,11,41,457/- was claimed in the original assessments as payments made
to F and R. The Revenue alleged that F was involved in entry operations and
that the expenditure claimed by the assessee was bogus and entirely fictitious.
While the expenditure claimed by itself might be suspect, the Revenue had a
further obligation to investigate further having regard to the fact that the
agreement between the assessee and R was disclosed earlier.

The  mere statement  of 
one  employee  of  R
would not have discredited the agreement itself. The
lack of  any particulars to discredit the
services and expenditure claimed by the assessee, justified the
Commission’s   conclusion    that  
the   addition    of  Rs. 9.11 crore demanded by the Revenue or arguments on the basis that the
assessee did not disclose such amount, was not warranted.

iv)  The
Commission’s findings were not contrary to law or unreasonable. The order of the
Settlement Commission was valid.”

16 Section 9(1)(vii) and art 12 of DTAA between India and US – Non-resident – Income deemed to accrue and arise in India – A. Y. 2004-05 – (i) Agreement between resident and non-resident – Non-resident to procure designs and drawings from another non-resident – Designs and drawings supplied and payment received – Transaction one of sale – No royalty accrued to non-resident – tax not deductible at source; (ii) Indian company subsidiary of American company – Expenses incurred on behalf of Indian company by American company – Reimbursement of expenses – No payment for technical services – Amount not assessable u/s. 9 – Tax not deductible at source

CIT vs. Creative Infocity Ltd.; 397 ITR
165(Guj):

The assessee company, a subsidiary company
of C of the USA entered into joint venture undertaking with the Government of
Gujarat for developing and construction of an information technology park at
Gandhinagar, a project awarded to it by the Government of Gujarat. While
carrying out the construction of the project, the assessee entered into a
contract agreement with two non-resident companies, viz., N, and C, for
providing designs and drawings and for marketing and selling services
respectively. During the course of verification of the foreign remittances to
these entities, the Assessing Officer observed from the agreement entered into
between the assessee and N that the services provided by the non-resident
company were rendered towards providing of architectural, structural
engineering designs and drawings services, as mentioned in clause 9 of the
contract. As regards the payments made to C, the Assessing Officer observed
that the payments were made for providing services related to marketing and
selling, projects office administration expenses and promotional expenses and
to design charges which were paid to the employees of C, towards their salary,
travel expenses, etc. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was of the
opinion that since the payments made towards the services rendered by the
foreign companies were taxable as defined in section 9(1)(vii) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, as well as article 12 of the DTAA between India and US,
the assessee was required to deduct tax at source u/s. 195 of the Act.
Therefore, since the assessee made the payment to the foreign companies without
deducting tax at source, the Assessing Officer passed an order u/s. 201(1) and
(1A) read with section 195 of the Act raising demands. The Commissioner
(Appeals) and the Tribunal deleted the additions/demands.

The Gujarat High Court dismissed the appeal
filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i)   The
agreement with N was to procure the designs and drawings from architects. In
the agreement, only the assessee and N were the signatories and not the
architects. Thus, N first procured the plans and designs from the architects on
making payment of full consideration and thereafter supplied it to the assessee
as an outright sale. There were concurrent findings by both the Commissioner
(Appeals) as well as the Tribunal holding that (a) the assessee had purchased
drawings from N and not from the architects; (b) that the payment made by the
assessee towards supply of designs and drawings to N was for an outright
purchase and therefore, not taxable as royalty. The payment made towards supply
of designs and drawings to a non-resident was outright purchase and therefore,
not taxable as royalty u/s. 9(1) of the Act.

ii)   The
agreement was for reimbursement of expenses incurred by C for marketing. The
expenses incurred by C were fully supported by the vouchers and certified by
the certified public accountant of the USA as well as the chartered accountant
of India certifying that the expenses were in fact reimbursement. There were
concurrent findings by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal that
the amount was reimbursed and could not be said to be any amount paid to C for
rendering any service to the assessee. The findings of fact recorded by both
the lower appellate authorities were on appreciation of facts and considering
the material on record, more particularly the agreement entered into between
the assessee and C. It was not alleged that the findings of fact recorded by
lower authorities were perverse or contrary to the evidence on record. C had no
business activity or permanent establishment in India. It was neither working
through any agent nor had any branch in India. Therefore, the provisions of
section 9(1)(vi)(vii) would not have any application as the amount paid was
neither royalty nor fees for technical services.“

15 Section 271(1)(c) – Penalty – Concealment of income – A. Y. 2006-07 – Notice for levy of penalty – Notice should state specific grounds for levy of penalty – Printed form not sufficient

Muninga Reddy vs. ACIT; 396 ITR 398
(Karn)

 For the A. Y. 2006-07, after completing the
assessment, the Assessing Officer imposed penalty of Rs. 1,78,35,511/- for
concealment of income u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal
confirmed the penalty.

On appeal by the assessee, the Karnataka
High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   In
order to levy penalty, the notice would have to specifically state the ground
mentioned in section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, namely whether it
is for concealment of income or furnishing incorrect particulars of income that
the penalty proceedings are being initiated. Sending a printed form with the
grounds mentioned in section 271(1)(c) of the Act would not satisfy the
requirement of law. The assessee should know the ground which he has to meet
specifically, otherwise the principles of natural justice would be violated and
consequently, no penalty could be imposed on the assessee if there is no
specific ground mentioned in the notice.

ii)   There
was a printed notice and no specific ground was mentioned, which may show that
the penalty could be imposed on the particular ground for which the notice was
issued. Hence, the notice and the consequent levy of penalty were not valid.”

14 Sections 194A, 194H, 201(1A), 276B and 279(1), and section 482 of Cr PC 1973 – TDS – Failure to deposit – Assessee depositing tax with interest once mistake of its accountant revealed during audit – Reasonable cause – Prosecution initiated three years after such payment – Not permissible

Sonali Auto Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar
(Patna); 396 ITR 636 (Patna):

A prosecution u/s. 276B of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 was initiated against the assessee on the basis of a complaint filed
by the Deputy Commissioner in accordance with the sanction granted by the
Commissioner u/s. 279(1) of the Act, for failure to deposit the tax at source
for the financial year 2009-10. The complaint also stated that there was a
delay of 481 days without any reasonable cause. The Special Judge, Economic
Offences, took cognisance against the assessee company and its three directors
for the offence u/s. 276B.

The assessee filed writ petition u/s. 482 of
Cr PC 1973 and challenged the prosecution proceedings. The assessee submitted
that due to oversight on the part of its accountant, it could not deposit the
tax deducted at source within the specified time limit, that once the mistake
was found during the audit, the amount had been deposited along with the
interest due u/s. 201(1A) for the delayed payment of tax deducted at source and
that the complaint had been filed after a lapse of three years from the date of
payment of dues. The Patna High Court allowed the petition and held as under:

 “i)   Reasonable
cause would mean a cause which prevents a reasonable person of ordinary
prudence acting under normal circumstances, without negligence or inaction or
want of bonafides. The assessee had been able to prove reasonable cause for not
depositing the amount of tax deducted at source within the prescribed time
limit. Oversight on the part of the accountant, who was appointed to deal with
accounts and tax matters, could be presumed to be a reasonable cause for not
depositing the amount of tax deducted at source within the prescribed time
limit. The assessee immediately after noticing the defects by its auditors had
deposited the amount along with interest as required u/s. 201(1A) for the
delayed payment in 2010 itself.

ii)   Prosecution
had been launched against the assessee after a lapse of about three years from
the date of deposit of the due amount of tax deducted at source along with
interest and that was contrary to the instruction, F. No. 255/339/79-IT(Inv),
dated May 28, 1980 issued by CBDT in that regard. Moreover, according to the
provisions of section 278AA, no person for any failure referred to u/s. 278B
should be punished under the provisions if he had proved that there was a
reasonable cause for such failure.

iii)   Continuance
of criminal proceedings u/s. 276B of the Act, against the assessee was mere
harassment and abuse of process of court. Accordingly, the order passed by the
special judge, Economic Offences, taking cognisance of the offence u/s. 276B of
the Act, along with the entire criminal proceedings against the assessee were
quashed.”

13 Section 206C(1C) – A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2007-08 – Scope of section 206C(1C) – Collection of tax at source from agents who collect toll etc. – No obligation to collect tax at source from agent who collected octroi

CIT(TDS) vs. Commissioner, Akola
Municipal Corporation; 397 ITR 226 (Bom):

The respondent assessee is the Municipal
Corporation for the town Akola. For the A. Ys. 2005-06 to 2007-08, the
assesssee had entered into a contract called agency agreement, by virtue of
which the assessee appointed an agent to provide services of collecting octroi
on its behalf. This octroi was collected at the rates fixed by the assessee,
for which the necessary receipts are also issued in the name of the assessee.
The entire amount collected by the agent is remitted to the assessee and the
agent is entitled to a commission depending upon the quantum of octroi
collected during the year. The ITO(TCS) was of the view that that the assessee
was obliged to collect tax at source u/s. 206C(1C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
in respect of octroi collection received from the agent. Since the assessee had
not collected and deposited such tax, the ITO(TCS) passed order u/s. 206C and
raised a demand of Rs. 1.09 crore for failure to collect tax at source and
interest of Rs. 15.96 lakh on the same. The Tribunal cancelled the demand.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)   It
is a settled position of law that fiscal statutes are strictly construed.
Section 206C(1C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provides that a person who grants
an agency or licence, or in any other manner transfers his right in respect of
a parking lot, toll plaza or a mine and quarry to another person, while
receiving the amount so collected from the agent or licensee (the transferee of
its right), should also collect tax at source. The above obligation is only
restricted to parking lots, toll plazas or mine or quarry. This obligation does
not extend to octroi.

 ii)   The
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India empowers the state to levy octroi
as found in entry 52 of List II thereof, while entry 59 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empowers the State to collect tolls. Thus,
there is a basic constitutional difference between the two levies. A “toll” is
normally collected on account of use of the roads by animals and humans. As
against which, “octroi” is normally collected on account of goods entering the
corporation limits (area) for use, consumption or sale.

iii)   Section
206C(1C) cannot be extended to collection of octroi. The Legislature when it
brought in section 206C(1C) of the Act, has not authorised the collection of
tax at source in respect of octroi. It specifically restricted its obligation
to only three categories namely parking, toll plaza, mining and quarrying. No
fault can be found with the impugned order of the Tribunal.”

12 Section 41(1) – Business income – Deemed income – A. Y. 2000-01 – Remission or cessation of trading liability – Condition precedent for treating sum as deemed profits – Sum should have been claimed as allowance or deduction in earlier year – Advance received from parent company for business purposes to be adjusted against future supplies – Transfer of advances to capital reserve – Capital receipt not liable to tax

Transworld Garnet India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
CIT; 397 ITR 233 (Mad):

The shareholding in the assessee-company was
held to the extent of 74 percent, by a company T which in turn was wholly held
by W, Canada. The assessee was set up completely with the investment from the
parent company W.  Advances were also
received from W towards business needs and the advances were to be adjusted against
future supplies of garnet to W. Due to various logistic and administrative
reasons, the assessee incurred losses. The private sources that were approached
for their participation in the equity insisted upon equal investment to be made
by the foreign company W in order to dilute the losses incurred, as a
pre-condition to their investment. Accordingly, W directed the assessee to
convert the advances made by it into capital, which was complied with by the
assessee. It transferred the amount to general reserve.

The Assessing Officer was of the view that
the amount ought to have been taken to the profit and loss account instead of
the general reserve. He held that the provisions of section 41(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 relating to cessation of liability were attracted and that
the amount was liable to be brought to tax. Accordingly, he passed an order
u/s. 143(3) r.w.s.147 assessing that as income. The Commissioner (Appeals)
accepted the assessee’s submission that the amount constituted a capital
receipt. He recorded a finding to the effect that the conversion of the
advances resulted in wiping out of the losses and paved the way for the entry
of the resident participant. He also held that the provisions of section 41(1)
were attracted only in a situation where the amount in question, in respect of
which liability had ceased, had been claimed as an allowance or a deduction in
any previous year, which fact had not been established in the assessee’s case.

He further held that there was no nexus
between the allowance/deduction in the previous years and the amount in
question to invoke section 41(1). The Appellate Tribunal held that the amounts
were originally received as advances against the supply of garnet and
subsequently, the claim over the amount partook of the character of a revenue
receipt. It further held that the subsequent transfer of the amounts to general
reserve constituted only an application, that would not change the nature of the taxability of the amounts at a stage anterior thereto.

On appeal by the assessee, the Madras High
Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  In order for the
provisions of section 41(1) to be attracted, the benefit obtained by the
assessee in the relevant year should have a direct nexus with an allowance or
deduction for any previous year as a claim of loss, expenditure or trading
liability which has not been established in the assessee’s case.

ii)  The findings of the
Commissioner (Appeals) were based upon the financials as well as all the
relevant documents. He also found that there was nothing on record to lead to
the conclusion that the advances from W had been claimed as an allowance or
deduction in any previous year. The circumstances in which the infusion of
capital was made and the findings that related thereto were undisputed. The
amount though received as advances for the supply of garnet had remained static
without depletion of any sort.

iii)  The entire amount had
been converted to shareholding and consequently, benefit could be said to have
accrued to the assessee only in the capital field. The substantial questions of
law are answered in favour of the assessee and the appeal allowed.”

DeMo: The Incomplete Agenda

Demonetisation (DeMo), the overnight
invalidation of 86 percent of total value of currency, completes one year in
November 2017. After one year many remain unconvinced about the necessity
and efficacy of DeMo towards its principal stated objective: the annihilation
of black money.
Although an assault was made on black money1,
the empirical data on its whereabouts, form and probable effect of such action,
is not reported formally. We can only hope that, what is forcefully lauded as a
goal and even an achievement is not measured through empirical means (even with
limitations). We all know that only what gets measured gets changed2.
This editorial seeks to present the impact of DeMo action on that lofty goal
from three different perspectives that are underplayed.

1. Role of Banks

Here is a real life situation I witnessed.
An income tax survey was carried out on an assessee. The tax officer sought day
wise cash deposit details and also sought direct certificates from assessee’s
bankers about those cash deposits. The certificate given by bankers was
disputed by the assessee as they showed large SBN deposits in second and third
week of the period. The assessee wrote to the higher ups in the bank and
banking regulatory system, giving evidence that SBN deposits as claimed by the
bank was not made by the assessee. The branch immediately issued a ‘corrected’
certificate to the tax office to show that such SBN deposits were not made by
the assessee.

A well reasoned reader can draw the meaning!
While fingers were pointed at a certain profession, there was hardly any
reference to the potential or even actual breach of banking system that could
have diluted the very purpose of DeMo. Reports and photographs of people
with loads of new currency notes (obtainable by few hundred man years of
standing in a line during those times), could be possible only through a breach
of the banking system. This aspect is played down instead of being investigated
at a systemic level.

2. Risk of selective approach to assessing deposits

The second question, rather a risk, is
what if those who have the information of bank deposit decide to selectively
turn a blind eye to some of them.
For example, the
data of deposits could be selectively assessed to ignore some while punishing
others. I am unaware of legal and other precautions in place to ensure that
such ‘favourable assessments’ are not done to favour those who are high and
mighty, and friendly to the powerful.
This could defeat the entire purpose
and actually be so counterproductive that it could result in legitimising
‘illicit’.

3. The Impending kept pending: Action against corruption

Corruption is pervasive, collusive and
multi-dimensional. Corruption and black money are connected by an umbilical
cord, except that we cannot tell who the mother is and who the child is.

The self proclaimed ‘super specialists’ in eradication of disease of corruption
and black money haven’t done the surgery to sever it. The roots of tree of
corruption are made of political economy, the substance that also influences
the strongest pillars of our constitutional system. Consider the sluggish pace
of war against black money and corruption when the big weapons are in the
garage while the war is supposedly on:

a)  Lokpal and Lokayukta Act, 2013: Was notified in January 2014 and is
gathering dust since then. Reason given to Supreme Court in November 2016 was
that Selection Committee for appointment of Lokpal could not be constituted
because of unavailability of leader of opposition in Lok Sabha and therefore
amending bill was pending in parliament. In war, can there be so much waiting?

b) The Whistleblower Protection Act: Passed in 2014, but not notified
for 3 years.

c) RTI and Political Parties: The biggest parties, who talk at high
decibels about transparency in politics, oppose applicability of RTI to them.
Here, ‘No comments’ should suffice as the best comment.

d) Enforcement capability: Poor legislative, administrative and
political will and mechanism to deal with corruption cases. India is yet to
live up to the obligations under the UN Convention Against Corruption.

e) Finance Act 2017: The Finance Bill 2017 / budget speech, under the guise
of ‘transparency in electoral funding’ proposed a change that was exactly
opposite. A layer of opaqueness was sought to be added by removal of cap on
political funding (presently 7.5 percent3) and removal of disclosure
requirements of the beneficiary.

f)  Electoral Bonds: Bond with the Best, goes an advertisement
tag line. While we all wish to bond with the best, if the minister has his way,
these electoral bonds could be out soon. The reason: donors to political
parties had expressed their reluctance to ‘contribute by cheque or other
transparent means as it would disclose their identity and entail adverse
consequence’
. The present form of ‘electoral bonds’ could well be like
an IPO (Intimate Private Offering) for political parties – an easy way to
legitimise corruption.
Why would the Finance Minister want to help the
‘few’ at the cost of transparency in political funding? Electoral Bonds
(which rather appear to be Political Bonds) representing underlying incognito
money should then be given to EC to improve elections. If these bonds come out
on the lines declared so far, could turn out to be BONDING of BIG BUSINESS with
BIG POLITICOS.
I believe that Sunlight still remains the best
disinfectant
4, and every citizen would rather seek sharper sunlight
on political funding over a veil of darkness!

g) Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill 2013: Diluting the
existing spineless law and making it bedridden (if not dead). “The Bill has
deleted the provision that protects a bribe giver from prosecution, for any
statement made by him during a corruption trial. This may deter bribe givers
from appearing as witnesses in court.”5 
There are other diluting provisions too.6  The key principals of bribery in private
sector and compensation for those affected by corruption are not even there. I
hope that, that is the reason why it is in cold storage and the anomaly will be
removed soon.

In conclusion,
an independent objective assessment of DeMo would be a welcome step instead of
another bash to celebrate 8th November. Before celebrating success,
it would be reasonable to empirically demonstrate the success to be so. While
rhetoric, promises and self praise are the visible #trends7; a
realistic and humble approach would evoke more trust and truly benefit the 1.3
Crore people who stood in lines (and some died too). All that we know so far is
that RBI took 9 months to count notes and gave the data but an emphatic
report to show the real effect of DeMo action on black money and corruption
remains wanting. That leaves Indians in the dark, the very shade of money DeMo
sought to eradicate
. While one does not doubt the intent, intent without
execution means little. Sun Tzu points out in his Art of War: “Strategy without
tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise
before defeat.”

The government
deserves a special appreciation for one pointedly pursuing Ease of Doing
Business
(EoDB). Considering that we remained in lower ranges since the
inception of EoDB index, jumping from 130th to the 100th rank
is indeed remarkable, although the stated aim was to be in top 50 by 2017. The
results are based on samples from Mumbai and Delhi, the effort in right
direction and at a good pace deserves acknowledgement. We should now aim to
reach in top 30 of Transparency International ranking on corruption. Then
investment will not have to be sought, it will come calling. Ram Rajya
will then come out of the manifesto and actually begin to manifest. While Acche
Din
is a worthy aim, Acche Din would only be Acche for few if
they are not Sachhe Din. Jai Hind!

Raman Jokhakar

Editor

________________________________________________________________________

1 Black Money economy is estimated to be Rs. 93 Lakh crore ($1.4Trillion) or 62 percent of GDP as per Arun Kumar, author of The Black Economy in India
2 Quote attributed to legendary Peter Drucker
3 Section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013. Compare this to Managerial Remuneration which is limited to 11 percent on a comparable base of profit.
4 Quote by Louis D. Brandeis, an American SC Justice
5 PRS Legislative Research – Highlights of the Bill – http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-prevention-of-corruption-amendment-bill-2013-2865/
6 Refer Report No. 254th of Law Commission by Justice A P Shah
7 # supplied on purpose

Representation in Respect of Draft Rules 10DA & 10DB

16th
October, 2017

 Mr.
Sushil Chandra, Chairman

Central
Board of Direct Taxes,

North
Block,

New Delhi

 

 Representation
in respect of Draft Rules 10DA & 10DB

 

1. Deferment of the implementation of the Proposed Rules by 1 year

 

     There
are many tax jurisdictions (e.g. USA) which are yet to notify regulatory
provisions to compile the documents i.e. Master file, Country by Country Report
[CbCR] etc., as suggested in the BEPS Action Plan 13.

 

Suggestion:

In view of
this, it would be difficult to obtain required information and documents for
the Constituent Entity [CE] resident in India. Therefore, the implementation of
the rules 10DA and 10DB should be deferred by at least one year.

Alternatively, CEs resident
in India whose parent entity is situated in a jurisdiction where CbCR is
presently not applicable, be exempted from the onerous responsibility of
compiling and submitting global data pertaining to international group. In such
cases, the submission of the report may be restricted to only Indian
operations.

 

2. Applicability of the Rule 10DA and Form 3CEBA (Master File) only to
CE Resident in India

 

     Section
286(1) refers to ‘every constituent entity resident in India’, whereas draft
rule 10DA (1) refers to ‘every person being constituent entity of an
international group’. In the draft rule there is no reference to CE resident in
India. This is likely to create unwarranted and avoidable confusion and issues.

 

Suggestion:

It is
therefore suggested that it should be clearly provided in Rule 10DA that the
provisions relating to Master file are applicable only to resident CE in the
scheme of the notification.

 

3. Exclusion of the Capital Account Transactions

 

    For
the purposes applicability of the Master file, rule 10DA(1)(ii) provides that
‘the aggregate value of international transaction’ during the reporting year,
as per the books of accounts, exceeds fifty crore rupees, or in respect of
purchase, sale, transfer, lease or use of intangible property during the
reporting year, as per the books of accounts, exceeds ten crore rupees.

 

     For
the purpose of calculating the threshold of “aggregate value of international
transaction”, the notification does not exclude capital account transactions
(such as issue of shares, advances, trade receivables, etc.).

 

     It
is important to note that Rule 10DA(1)(i) as well as rule 10DB(6), both for the
purposes of calculation of threshold limits, consider consolidated group
revenue whereas the definition of the ‘international transaction’ in section
92B includes capital account transaction such as issue of shares, loans, trade
receivable etc. The intention of the BEPS Action Plan 13 seems to set the
threshold limit based on the gross revenue i.e. current account transactions
only
(i.e. transactions which have impact on statement of profit and loss).

 

Suggestion:

It is
therefore suggested that the Capital Account Transactions should be excluded
while calculating the threshold of “aggregate value of international
transaction” for the purposes of applicability of master file provisions.

 

4. Threshold limit on the applicability of the master file provisions

 

Rule 10DA(1)(i) for the
purposes of master file provisions provides a limit of Rs. 500 crores of the
consolidated revenue of the international group. For the purposes of country by
country reporting, rule 10DB(6) provides threshold of total consolidated group
revenue of the international group of Rs. 5,500 crore.

Suggestion:

Considering
the onerous requirement for maintaining master file and other documents, the
threshold limit for the first five years should be kept at a higher level i.e.
say 50% of the threshold of CbC Reporting amounting to Rs. 2,750 crore. The
limit can further be reviewed and reduced, if necessary, based on the
experience gained.

 

Consequently,
the threshold prescribed in Rule 10DA(1)(ii) pertaining to the aggregate value
of international transactions (other than intangible properties) should be
increased to Rs. 500 crore from the proposed limit of Rs. 50 crore. The
threshold for transactions pertaining to intangible property should be
increased to 100 crore from the proposed limit of Rs. 10 crore.

 

5. Due date for furnishing CbC Report

The Form 3CEBC requires to
compile data from multiple tax jurisdictions in which the CEs of the MNEs are
operating. This would require considerable amount of time and efforts.

 

Suggestion:

Therefore,
it is suggested that the due date for furnishing CbC Report (Form 3CEBC) should
be extended from 30th November 2017 to 31st March 2018,
in line with due date for furnishing Master file.

 

6. Definition of MNE group

 

In the Indian Income-tax
Act, there is no definition of ‘MNE group’ as stated in Form 3CEBC and thus,
the same needs to be changed in line with the Act i.e. the definition of
‘international group’ provided in section 286(9).

 

7. Amendment in the headings of Forms 3CEBB and 3CEBE

 

The heading in both Forms
3CEBB and 3CEBE states the term “non-resident international group” which words
are absent in the Act, and thus, heading in both Forms requires to be amended.

 

8. Methodology to be adopted for preserving the sanctity and
confidentiality of the information

 

Both the Master File and
CbC Report and the relevant Forms mandates submission of many confidential data, information and documents which, if leaked, can create havoc with the
business operations of the relevant international group.

The notification is
completely silent on the methodology to be adopted for preserving the sanctity
and confidentiality of the information shared by the international group.

Suggestion:

Therefore, it is suggested
that in line with best international practices, proper systems and procedures
should be adopted by the CBDT and the responsibility for such practices should
be properly assigned (including strictest access control with higher
authorities with accountability) and penalty be prescribed for non-adherence to
the strict protocol of confidentiality.

 

9. Additional requirements for Master File

 

Action 13 report of the
OECD provides the requirements for Master File. While the Indian Government has
largely adopted the format provided by OECD, the draft Indian Rules contain
certain additional requirements as mentioned below:

 

  List of all the operating entities of the
international group along with their addresses
– This information does not
form part of Action 13 report.

 

   The functions, assets and risks
analysis of the constituent entities of the international group that contribute
at least ten per cent of the revenues, assets and profits of the group
; –
The Action 13 report requires a brief functional analysis describing the
principal contributions to value creation by individual entities within a
group.

    

 

  List of all the entities of the
international group engaged in development of intangibles and in management of
intangibles along with their addresses
. The Action 13 report requires a
general description of the location of principal research and development
facilities and location of management.

 

  Detailed description of the financing
arrangements of the international group, including the names and addresses of
the top ten unrelated lenders
. Action 13 report requires a general
description of the group financing activities.

 

In a number of instances, the draft
rules require a “detailed description” instead of a “general description” as
mentioned in Action 13 report.

 

Suggestion:

Most countries have adopted
the format as provided by the OECD. It is requested that the format of Master
File be in sync with the format as provided by OECD. The additional
requirements will create certain inconsistencies for the MNC group since the
group will have to prepare different versions of the Master File for different
countries.

For Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society,

                                                                               

Narayan R. Pasari                                                             Mayur Nayak                 

President                                                     Chairman,
International Taxation Committee