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Allied Laws

23. Ashok Kumar Joshi vs. Achlaram Bhargava Joshi
AIR 2023 Rajasthan 97
27th March, 2023

Maintenance of parent — Father living on pension since 2008 — Father unable to maintain himself — Son bound to maintain. [Section 4, Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007].

FACTS

The Petitioner (Ashok Kumar Joshi – son) was the eldest son of the Respondent (Achlaram Bhargava Joshi – father). The Respondent was working in the department of B.S.N.L. until his retirement in 2008. Thereafter, the Respondent was living off of pension and other rental income. The Petitioner and Respondent were staying together till 2013. The Respondent was unable to maintain himself, and hence, he filed an application for maintenance from his eldest son (the Petitioner) in 2018. The lower court held that the Petitioner was bound to maintain the Respondent and directed the Petitioner to maintain the Respondent by paying a monthly sum.

The Petitioner – Son preferred a Writ Petition before the High Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Court observed that the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, was a special legislation enacted to safeguard the rights and interests of a vulnerable section of the society, i.e., senior citizens. It held that the eldest son was bound to pay monthly maintenance to his aged father (Respondent) for expenses towards his food, medical and other requirements. Thus, the order of the lower court was upheld.

The Petition was dismissed.

24. Public Works Department, Chennai vs. East Coast Constructions & Industries Ltd
AIR 2023 Madras 188
2nd February, 2023

Arbitration — Powers to award compensation and interest by the Arbitral Tribunal [Sections 7 & 34, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 74, The Indian Contract Act, 1972].

FACTS

The Petitioner and the Respondent agreed to the construction of a new complex for the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. The Respondent was unable to complete the construction in time due to the faults of the Petitioner. The Petitioner had granted an extension of time without any objections to the Respondent. Later on, the Petitioner denied a refund of liquidated damages and also consequential damages to the Respondent. The Petitioner denied payments towards consequential damages.

On Arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded compensation and interest. The Petitioner is aggrieved that the Arbitration Tribunal was not authorised to grant the same as there was no authorisation between the parties in the contract to decide any dispute ex aequo et bono (Section 28 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996).

HELD
The Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to award interest in the form of compensation if such has been agreed by the parties. However, in the absence of such agreements, the Arbitral Tribunal can award interest to the extent of delay in payment of money in the form of compensation. Thus, the Court upheld the order of the Arbitration Tribunal awarding consequential damages.

The Petition was dismissed.

25. Mohan Sundaram vs. Punjab National Bank
AIR 2023 Kerala 110
12th December, 2022

Tenancy — Tenanted Property is mortgaged — Unable to repay — Tenanted property is a secured asset- Bank entitled to evict a tenant — Bank held as a public institution. [Section 8, Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970; Sections 5, 6 & 9, Banking Regulation Act, 1949;
Section 13, Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Asset and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI)] .

FACTS
The tenants of five premises facing eviction petitions under section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, initiated by a single landlord (Respondent Bank) in a commercial complex, are the petitioners in the revision case. The Petitioners contested that the Respondent cannot be said to be a public institution within the scope of section 11(7) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The second contention of the Petitioner was whether the Bank had locus standi as a landlord to seek eviction of tenants from a secured asset taken over by the bank for sale for realising its dues.

HELD
The Hon’ble Kerala High Court held that the Bank (Respondent) was established under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. The statute was enacted in the parliament for serving the needs of the development of the economy in conformity with the national policy and objectives and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Thus, the Respondent Bank was a public institution within the scope of section 11(7) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The court held that according to section 17 of the SARFAESI, the Respondent Bank is empowered to take possession of the secured assets including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset. The Hon’ble Court upheld the decision of the lower court; thereby, evicting tenants from the property.

The revision petition was dismissed.

26. K N Ravindran and another vs. G Venkatesh Suresh and others
AIR 2023 Madras 222
27th January, 2023

Suit for partition — Property purchased jointly by relatives for conducting business — Business conducted by a Firm — Retirement from the firm does not amount to relinquishment of interest in the property. [Section 34, Specific Relief Act, 1962; Sections 17 & 49, Registration Act, 1908; Section 35, Stamps Act, 1899].

FACTS
The Original Plaintiff (Respondent 1), the Appellants and other Respondents had purchased the suit property to start a business. The parties are relatives of one another. After some time of running the business through a firm, issues cropped up, which led to Defendants 3–5 (Respondents) and the Original Plaintiff (Respondent 1) retiring from the partnership firm. Defendants 1 and 2 (appellants) were the remaining partners of the firm.

The Original Plaintiff and the Defendants 3–5, relinquished all their shares of the firm to the Defendants 1 and 2. Later, the Original Plaintiff, as the co-sharer of the suit property, filed for a partition suit of the property in the Trial Court.

The Trial Court held the partition in favour of the Plaintiff. The Original Defendants 1 and 2 filed an appeal.

HELD
The Plaintiff and the Defendants 3–5 relinquished all their rights concerning shares in a firm in the deed. However, the rights and title of the suit property were not relinquished by the deed. Furthermore, the family agreement (relied on by appellants) was not properly stamped and registered. Thus, the same was invalid in the eyes of the law. Thus, the decree of the Ld Trial Court declaring the partition of property in the favour of the Plaintiff was confirmed. No costs.  

ALLIED LAWS

1 Dr. A. Parthasarathy and Ors. vs. E Springs Avenues Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
SLP (C) Nos. 1805-1806 of 2022 (SC)
Date of order: 22nd February, 2022
Bench: M.R. Shah J. and B.V. Nagarathna J.
Arbitration – High Court has no jurisdiction to remand matter to same Arbitrator – Unless consented by both parties. [Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 S. 37]

FACTS

The Appellants challenged the judgment and order passed by the High Court in exercise of power u/s 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, wherein the High Court set aside the award passed by the Ld. Arbitrator and remanded the matter to the same Arbitrator for fresh decision.HELD

As per the law laid down in the case of Kinnari Mullick and Anr. vs. Ghanshyam Das Damani (2018) 11 SCC 328 and I-Pay Clearing Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. ICICI Bank Ltd. (2022) SCC OnLine SC 4, only two options are available to the Court considering the appeal u/s 37 of the Arbitration Act. The High Court either may relegate the parties for fresh arbitration or consider the appeal on merits on the basis of the material available on record within the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction u/s 37 of the Arbitration Act. However, the High Court has no jurisdiction to remand the matter to the same Arbitrator unless it is consented by both the parties that the matter be remanded to the same Arbitrator.The appeal was allowed.

2 Horticulture Experiment Station Gonikoppal, Coorg vs. The Regional Provident Fund Organization
Civil Appeal No. 2136 of 2012 (SC)
Date of order: 23rd February, 2022
Bench: Ajay Rastogi J. and Abhay S. Oka J.

Labour Laws – Compliance – Default or delay in payments – sine qua non for levy of penalty – mens rea or actus rea not essential. [Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (Act) S. 14B]

FACTS

The establishment of the Appellant(s) is covered under the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (Act). The Appellant(s) failed to comply with the provisions of Act from 1st January, 1975 to 31st October, 1988. For non-compliance of the mandate of the Act, proceedings were initiated u/s 7A of the Act and dues towards the contribution of EPF for the intervening period were assessed by the competent authority, and after adjudication, that was paid by the Appellant to the office of EPF. Thereafter, the authorities issued a notice u/s 14B of the Act to charge damages for the delayed payment of the provident fund amounts which were levied for the said period.The High Court, under the impugned judgment, held that once the default in payment of contribution is admitted, the damages as being envisaged u/s 14B of the Act are consequential, and the employer is under an obligation to pay the damages for delay in payment of the contribution of EPF u/s 14B of the Act, which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeals.

HELD

Taking note of three-Judge Bench judgment in the case of Union of India and Others vs. Dharmendra Textile Processors and others [2008] 306 ITR 277 (SC), the apex Court held that that any default or delay in the payment of EPF contribution by the employer under the Act is a sine qua non for imposition of levy of damages u/s 14B of the Act and mens rea or actus reus is not an essential element for imposing penalty/damages for breach of civil obligations/liabilities.The appeal was dismissed.

3 Arunachala Gounder (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Ponnusamy and Ors.
AIR 2022 Supreme Court 605
Date of order: 20th January, 2022
Bench: S. Abdul Nazeer J. and Krishna Murari J.

Succession – Intestate – Daughters of a Hindu male – Entitled to self-acquired and other properties obtained by their father in partition. [Hindu Succession Act, 1956, S. 14, S. 15]

FACTS

The property under consideration belonged to a person who had two sons, namely, Marappa and Ramasamy. Marappa had one daughter, namely, Kuppayee Ammal, who was issueless, and once she died, property devolved on legal heirs of Ramasamy, who predeceased his brother.The suit for partition was filed by one of the daughters of Ramasamy. Ramasamy had one son and four daughters, one of the daughters amongst these was deceased. The petitioner is the daughter claiming 1/5th share in the suit property on the basis that the plaintiff and defendants are sisters and brothers. All five of them being the children of Ramasamy Gounder, all the five are heirs in equal heirs and entitled to 1/5th share each.

HELD

The right of a widow or daughter to inherit the self-acquired property or share received in the partition of a coparcenary property of a Hindu male dying intestate is well recognized not only under the old customary Hindu Law but also by various judicial pronouncements.Thus, if a female Hindu dies intestate without leaving any issue, then the property inherited by her from her father or mother would go to the heirs of her father, whereas the property inherited from her husband or father-in-law would go to the heirs of the husband.

In the present case, since the succession of the suit properties opened in 1967 upon the death of Kupayee Ammal, the Hindu Succession Act,1956 shall apply, and thereby Ramasamy Gounder’s daughters being Class-I heirs of their father too shall be the heirs and shall be entitled to 1/5th share each in the suit properties.

The suit was decreed accordingly.

4 Bishnu Bhukta thru. Lrs. vs. Ananta Dehury and Anr.
AIR 2022 ORISSA 24
Date of order: 10th November, 2021
Bench: D. Dash J.

Gift – Donor having 1/5th interest in property – No partition of property – Interest of donor not covered under the definition of gift – Gift is invalid. [Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 122]

FACTS

Plaintiff’s case is that the land described in the schedule of the plaint belonged to one Barsana Bhukta who died, leaving his widow Sapura and four daughters, namely, Budhubari, Asha, Nirasa and Bilasa. Budhubari and Asha died issueless in 1970 and 1980 respectively. In 1983, Nirasa died, leaving as her heirs her two sons, the Plaintiffs. After the death of the daughters of Barsana, the Plaintiffs succeeded to the property.The Plaintiffs had filed Civil Suit for partition of the suit land, arraigning Bilasha as the Defendant. Defendant claimed exclusive right over the suit land on the strength of one registered deed of gift dated 2nd September, 1967 covering the entire property standing in favour of his wife, Bilasha, which he inherited upon Bilasha’s death.

The Appellant/Defendants filed the present Appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Ld. District Court while dismissing the Appeal filed by the present Appellant.

HELD

Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982 defines ‘gift’. It is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property, made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he/she is still capable of giving.

Sapura was only having 1/5th interest over the property, and there was no partition amongst the five. So, Sapura cannot be said to be having any definite property. Thus, here the interest of the donor over the property would not get covered under the definition of a gift. Further, here in such a case, the acceptance of the same by the donee cannot be found out being faced with uncertainty as to which portion of the property the donee would be accepting to be the property gifted to her.

The registered deed of gift executed by Sapura on 12th September, 1967 gifting away the property in suit in favour of one of her daughters, namely, Bilasha is neither valid in its entirety nor can it be said to be valid up to the extent of her share over the entire property belonging to her and her four daughters.

Under the given circumstance, Sapura was neither competent nor had the authority to make a gift of the property inherited by her and her four daughters either in whole or even to the extent of her interest.

The appeal is dismissed.

5 Somuri Ravali vs. Somuri P. Roa and Ors.
AIR 2022 (NOC) 30 (TEL)
Date of order: 8th June, 2021
Bench: A. Rajasheker Reddy J.

Partnership – Original Partnership Deed contains an arbitration clause for disputes amongst partners – Amended deed did not have such a clause – Since firm is not re-registered after amended deed – original deed is valid – Dispute can be referred to Arbitration. [Indian Partnership Act, 1932 S. 43]

FACTS

Petitioner and Respondents No. 1 to 3 have established a Partnership Firm by the name M/s. Reliance Developers vide Partnership Deed dated 27th October, 2011. In 2014, vide Amendment Deed dated 18th September, 2014 they intended to amend the original Partnership Deed with regard to sharing pattern, inter alia. However, a dispute arose amongst the partners who tried to resort to arbitration.

The question arose on the applicability of the arbitration clause in the Original Deed after the termination of the contract on dissolution of the firm.

HELD

The purpose of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to minimize the burden of the Courts so also to expedite the matters. Once the parties have intended to refer their disputes, if any, to the Arbitrator in the agreement, then any dispute pertaining to the contents of the agreement or touching the subject matter of the agreement is necessarily to be referred to the Arbitrator even though the agreement is mutually terminated by both the parties. Therefore, the arbitration clause in such a contract does not perish. Any dispute arising under the said contract is to be decided as stipulated in the arbitration clause.The arbitration agreement constitutes a “collateral term” in the contract, which relates to the resolution of disputes and not to the performance of the contract. Upon termination of the main contract, the arbitration agreement does not ipso facto come to an end. However, if the nature of the controversy is such that the main contract would itself be treated as non-est in the sense that it never came into existence or was void, the arbitration clause cannot operate, for along with the original contract, the arbitration agreement is also void.

Where a contract containing an arbitration clause is substituted by another contract, the arbitration clause perishes with the original contract unless there is anything in the new contract to show that the parties intended the arbitration clause in the original contract to survive. Even if a deed of transfer of immovable property is challenged as not valid or enforceable, the arbitration agreement would remain unaffected for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising with reference to the deed of transfer.

Corporate Law Corner – Part A | Company Law

13. Case Law No. 01/October/ 2023

M/s. VINAYAK BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED

No. ROC/ PAT/ Inquiry/13665/834

Office of the Registrar of Companies,

Bihar-Cum-Official Liquidator,

High Court, Patna Adjudication Order

Date of Order: 18th August, 2023

Order for penalty for violation of section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 for non-disclosure in the Auditor’s Report by the Statutory Auditor.

FACTS

As per the documents available on MCA Portal, Mr SK was the auditor of the company for the financial year ending 31st March, 2017.

Registrar of Companies, Bihar (“RoC”) on inspection of the financial statements of M/s VBDPL for the financial year ending 31st March, 2017 observed that, in the column of details of Specified Bank Notes (SBNs) held and transacted during the period from 8th November, 2016 to 30th December, 2016 was mentioned as zero. However, the directors of M/s VBDPL in their reply dated 17th January, 2019 had enclosed a letter dated 16th January, 2019 from ICICI Bank in which the details of the deposit amount had been mentioned as follows:

Date Amount Denominations
14th November, 2016 150,000 1000 x 150
15th November, 2016 50,000 1000 x 50
24th November, 2016 200,000 1000 x 200
02nd December, 2016 150,000 1000 x 150

As per Ministry’s Notification No. G.S R. 307(E) dated 30th March, 2017, the following clause was inserted in rule 11 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 after clause (c), namely:

“(d) Whether the company had provided requisite disclosure in its financial statements as to holdings as well as dealings in specified Bank Notes during the period from 8th November, 2016, to 30th December, 2016, and if so, whether these are in accordance with the books of accounts maintained by the company.”

Hence, it appeared that the provisions of Section 143(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 had been contravened by the Auditor for the financial year 31st March, 2017 for Non-disclosure of Specified Bank Notes (SBN) held and transacted during the period from 8th November, 2016 to 30th December, 2016 and therefore he was liable for penalty under section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Based on the above facts, RoC had issued a show cause notice for default under section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013. However, no reply was received to the show cause notice from Mr SK, Auditor.

Further, RoC had also issued a “Notice for Hearing” to M/s SK, Auditor in default to appear personally or through an authorised representative under Rule 3(3), Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014 on 11th August, 2023 and also to submit their response, if any, one working day prior to the date of hearing.

On the date of the hearing, Mr SK neither appeared nor any submission was made regarding the aforesaid non-compliance. Hence, it was concluded that the provisions of Section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 had been contravened by the auditor and therefore he was liable for penalty u/s 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 for the financial year ended 31st March, 2017.

HELD

Adjudication Officer (‘AO’) after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and after taking into account the provisions of Rule 11(d) of Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 (as amended), imposed a penalty on Mr SK, Chartered Accountants as per the below mentioned table:

Further, it was directed to pay the penalty within 90 days of the order.

#Final Penalty was imposed pursuant to the provision of section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 since M/s VBDPL satisfied the criteria of being a Small Company where Mr SK was an auditor.

Nature of
default
Relevant section under the Companies Act, 2013

 

Name of

persons on whom the penalty is imposed

 

No. of

days of default

 

Penalty

for defaults as per Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 (₹.)

 

Total

penalty

(₹)

 

Final penalty imposed as per Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 () #

 

Non-disclosure in Audit Report Section 143(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 11(d) of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 Mr SK, Chartered Accountants NA 10,000 10,000 5,000

SEBI Acts Tough against Market Manipulators

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) on 16th September, 2022, passed a stiff order of penalty, on a case involving, among others, allegedly synchronised trades. By the other order, it also debarred some of the parties from the securities markets. Soon thereafter, in June 2023, the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) rejected the appeals against the order in an almost dismissive way to the appeal. What is noteworthy is that SEBI has shown that it means serious business in such cases. The penalty levied is fairly large, considering the facts and figures involved, apart from the order to restrain persons from the markets. This should hopefully show that SEBI now means business in tackling this almost uniform feature in cases of market manipulation. If this approach continues, this should mean that the manipulators see a strong deterrent to engaging in such activities.

SYNCHRONISED MANIPULATIVE TRADING

Price manipulation is rarely carried out without involving synchronised trading. But, such cases have seemingly gotten away without strong deterrent penal measures. The use of synchronised trades has been a regular feature for decades.

The pattern is almost consistent in such cases. The manipulators, using blatant or camouflaged techniques, use this modus operandi with successful results. Small investors rarely carry out the most basic efforts and work to check up on the history of price and volume, or the fundamentals of the company. So while investors pile on by being attracted to the prospect of quick and handsome, the manipulators sell and exit.

COMMON PATTERNS OF SYNCHRONISED MANIPULATIVE TRADING

The method may vary in small details, but some features are common. There is a circular on trading amongst a group of persons who also steadily increase the quoted price. This artificial spurt in price and volume is meant to create an image that something good is about to happen which selected people know and anticipate.

Another common pattern has been to project that the company is engaged in a business that is the latest fad. At one time, for example, we had the dotcom boom, then internet-based services and apps, infrastructure, etc. The advantage of using such methods from the point of view of the manipulators was that past fundamentals become totally irrelevant. There may be occasional star performers and some genuine but failed attempts. But smart manipulators recognised that this front would attract investors. This included changing the name of the company, passing resolutions to start such a business, etc.

What allegedly happened in this particular case? (Till there is a finality in the form of a Supreme Court, one cannot consider the matter as closed for this particular case.) The price of the shares was hiked up by a slow increase with small synchronised trades at successively higher prices. SEBI has also stated that thereafter, even SMSes were circulated about the potential of the company. And hence, yet again, as public interest grew, those who held shares in the company sold them at a high price. And, yet again, the price slowly crashed to as low as almost 2 per cent of the highest price.

WHETHER THE LAW IS LACKING?

It is not as if the law is lacking in this regard. Multiple provisions in the SEBI PFUTP regulations deal with such manipulative practices. The transactions have been dissected into individual steps and portions and make each of them specifically an offence. This includes circular trading, artificially jacking up the price, the price, spreading false news, etc.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW

That is the law. Next comes the investigation which plays an important role. These days, SEBI carries out very meticulous analysis of the parties, the trades, the bank accounts, etc., of the parties. These days much of the data is available almost instantaneously thanks to electronic trading. SEBI then takes it to the next level by meticulously investigating the background of the parties, including their relations, personal or commercial, and study of their bank statement and internal transactions. The parties may not even realise that they are being investigated since such information is available from stock exchanges or other authorities directly. Of course, at a later stage, SEBI may summon some or all of the parties to question them independently. Often, the weakest persons in the group, including those who are mules, may break down and confess. But even otherwise, too, many of the facts, available from credible independent third parties like banks, brokers, etc., cannot be so easily countered or explained away.

LOW DETERRENT ACTION IN THE PAST

What was perhaps lacking was the final step of a strong deterrent step which would make the wrongdoers feel the loss and even realise that such acts are simply not profitable enough. Unfortunately, in too many cases, while the penalty has been levied, it has rarely been proportionate to the severity of the crime.

A recent example that can be taken is of the brazenness of false trading in illiquid options. It was found that thousands of persons engaged in circular trades in illiquid options. The objective did not seem to be enticing and cheating investors. Rather, it was very likely to pass on profits or loss for tax evasion. A person who had profits and did not want to pay tax traded in the options by buying high and then selling very low and that too with the same counterparty and also, often, within a gap of barely minutes. Though this may not harm investors directly, it violates multiple SEBI regulations and, worse, creates an impression of stock markets as being a lawless jungle. When SEBI initiated proceedings, it was prolonged by the need to serve notice, give hearings to each party, etc. Quite a few parties went in to appeal the clogging of the dockets of SAT, which requested SEBI to come with a scheme of settlement. SEBI did so but for various reasons including Covid, it did not get the required response. So the dockets of SAT clogged again, which yet again requested SEBI to make another attempt. The second scheme of 2022 got a better turnout. However, the moral here was that since the parties got away effectively with barely a rap on the knuckles, it did not have any real deterrent effect.

Hopefully, orders like this one, assuming they attain finality, will make parties think really hard before contemplating such acts. And even if there is some change in appeal, it will be a lesson in principle generally.

A SIMILAR FIRM APPROACH IS NEEDED IN OTHER OFFENCES

Going a step further, I think a similar firm hand is needed in other categories of market evils, including insider trading, front running, etc., where often there is no real deterrent action. Fortunately, here too, the data generated is quick and SEBI’s investigation is often thorough. Law is also helpful and empowers SEBI to disgorge the illicit profits, debar parties, etc. SEBI has powers to levy very stiff penalties. Here, too, if some examples are set, there can be a fear and also a sense of inevitability of getting caught. Granted that parties can be more sophisticated here using mules, underhand passing of profits, use of sophisticated technology, etc. So establishing guilt may not always be easy. But here again, SEBI often interviews the weakest links in the chain who may spill the beans. That said, perhaps some changes could help.

CLOSING NOTE: PROPOSAL OF SEBI TO DEEM CERTAIN SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS AS VIOLATIONS UNLESS REBUTTED

Although discussed in great detail earlier in this column, it is worth mentioning that a group of radical proposals to deal comprehensively with the menace of insider trading, front running, etc., have been made by SEBI in a consultation paper issued in March 2023.

This aspect is worth mentioning since SEBI has proposed to deal particularly with those sophisticated manipulators where there is multiple evidence of crime committed all over but it is difficult to pinpoint the parties and find them guilty. Very specific examples of what had transpired in certain actual cases (names withheld in paper but not difficult to guess).

SEBI noted that while several Supreme Court rulings have generally supported the stand of SEBI in using circumstantial evidence of a clear pattern of suspicious transactions, it was also noted that this was not sufficient enough, and a generic set of enabling provisions was needed. The Supreme Court ruling allowed SEBI to use the lower benchmark of circumstantial evidence to indicate guilt. But that too required crossing certain hurdles which sophisticated market manipulators and legal technicalities could make the process difficult and delayed.

Hence, SEBI has proposed a set of provisions which would deem the parties involved as guilty if a certain pattern of suspicious trading is observed. This does not mean that this one-sided judgement of SEBI would close the matter. The parties would still get a chance to present their case and rebut the finding and allegation. In short, the onus shifts to the parties to rebut the allegations or be deemed guilty.

These provisions, if implemented, could certainly make the task of SEBI easier. But there is also a flip side to this. Presently, SEBI carries out extensive investigations to establish guilt. It is possible that these efforts may be diluted if such deeming provisions are available.

Also, such provisions are like putting a genie out of the bottle, which cannot be put back in. SEBI may be perceived to be exercising arbitrariness. While good benchmarks are provided before the provisions are applied, one would not know how they are applied in actual cases. Here again, considering the rewards, large sophisticated abusers of the law may continue to escape. Smaller parties on the other hand may find it difficult to hire expensive legal advice to present a credible and effective defence to shift the onus back.

It is also doubtful how courts would view such provisions, which almost give a one-sided power to SEBI to a large extent. Whether such provisions are held arbitrary and unconstitutional? This aspect becomes even more important when we consider that it is SEBI, who would make Regulations to implement this proposal and not Parliament made law or amendments. In the nearly six months after its introduction, there does not seem to be any indication from SEBI of whether and how it is going to implement these proposals. But, to conclude, a fair re-haul of the law is certainly needed to counter the brazen cases of market abuse.

Hindu Law: Rights of an Illegitimate Child in Joint Property

INTRODUCTION

The codified and uncodified aspects of Hindu Law deal with several personal issues pertaining to a Hindu. One such issue relates to the rights of an illegitimate child, in relation to inheritance to ancestral property, self-acquired property of his parents, right to claim maintenance, etc. This feature has earlier (March 2021) examined the position of the rights of an illegitimate child. However, recently a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun, C.A. No. 2844/2011, Order dated:1st September, 2023, has examined the position of such a child’s rights in respect of joint family / HUF property.

VOID / VOIDABLE MARRIAGE

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, applies to and codifies the law relating to marriages between Hindus. It states that an illegitimate child is one who is born out of a marriage which is not valid. S.16(1) of this Act provides that even if a marriage is null and void, any child born out of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be considered to be a legitimate child. Hence, all children of void/voidable marriages under the Act are treated as legitimate. The Act also provides that such children would be entitled to rights in the property of their parents.

SUCCESSION TO PROPERTIES OF OTHER RELATIVES

However, while such a child born out of a void or voidable wedlock would be deemed to be legitimate, the Act does not confer any rights on the property of any person other than his parents. This is expressly provided in s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

In JiniaKeotin&Ors. vs. Kumar SitaramManjhi&Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 730, the Supreme Court held that s.16 of the Act, while engrafting a rule of fiction in ordaining the children, though illegitimate, to be treated as legitimate, notwithstanding that the marriage was void or voidable chose also to confine its application, so far as succession or inheritance by such children is concerned to the properties of the parents only. It held that conferring any further rights upon such children would be going against the express mandate of the legislature.

This view was once again endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bharatha Matha & Anr vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan, AIR 2010 SC 2685 where it held that a child born of void or voidable marriage is not entitled to claim inheritance in ancestral coparcenary property but is entitled only to claim share in self-acquired properties, if any.

CONTROVERSY IN THE ISSUE

The above issue of whether illegitimate children can succeed in ancestral properties or claim a share in the HUF was given a new twist by the Supreme Court in 2011 in the case of Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun (2011) 11 SCC 1. The question which was dealt with in that case was whether illegitimate children were entitled to a share in the coparcenary property or whether their share was limited only to the self-acquired property of their parents under s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act? It disagreed with the earlier views taken by the Supreme Court in JiniaKeotin (supra), BharathaMatha (supra) and in Neelamma&Ors. vs. Sarojamma&Ors (2006) 9 SCC 612, wherein the Court held that illegitimate children would only be entitled to a share of the self-acquired property of the parents and not to the joint Hindu family property.

The Court observed that the Act uses the word “property” and had not qualified it with either self-acquired property or ancestral property. It has been kept broad and general. It explained that if they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be discriminated against and they will be at par with other legitimate children, and be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The prohibition contained in s. 16(3) will apply to such children only with respect to the property of any person other than their parents. Qua their parents, they can succeed in all properties! The Court held that there was a need for a progressive and dynamic interpretation of Hindu Law since Society was changing. It stressed the need to recognise the status of such children which had been legislatively declared legitimate and simultaneously recognisethe rights of such children in the property of their parents. This was a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who were as innocent as any other children.

The Supreme Court also explained the modus operandi of succession to ancestral property. Such children will be entitled only to a share in their parents’ property but they cannot claim it in their own right. Logically, on the partition of an ancestral property, the property falling in the share of the parents of such children would be regarded as their self-acquired and absolute property. In view of the Amendment, such illegitimate children will have a share in such property since such children were equated under the amended law with legitimate offspring of a valid marriage. The only limitation even after the Amendment was that during the lifetime of their parents such children could not ask for partition but they could exercise this right only after the death of their parents.

Hence, the Court in Revanasiddappa (supra) concluded that it was constrained to take a view different from the one taken earlier by it in JiniaKeotin (supra), Neelamma (supra) and Bharatha Matha (supra) on s. 16(3) of the Act. Nevertheless, since all these decisions were of Two-Member Benches, it requested the Chief Justice of India that the matter should be reconsidered by a Larger Bench.

CURRENT STATUS

After a long wait of more than 12 years, the Supreme Court Larger Bench has finally resolved the matter in the case of Revanasiddappa vs. Mallikarjun, C.A. No. 2844/2011, Order dated: 1st September, 2023.The issue for determination, as framed by the Supreme Court, was “Whether such an illegitimate child, who has been deemed to be legitimate by virtue of s.16 of the Act, can succeed only to the self-acquired properties of his parents or even to their ancestral properties?” The Court was also examining whether such a child could become a coparcener in the HUF.

LEGITIMACY UNDER SECTION 16

The first issue settled by the Apex Court was that legitimacy bestowed by s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act was irrespective of whether (i) such a child was born before or after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1976 which introduced s.16; (ii) a decree of nullity was granted in respect of that marriage under the Act and the marriage was held to be void. Further, where a voidable marriage has been annulled by a decree of nullity, a child ‘begotten or conceived’ before the decree has been made, is deemed to be their legitimate child, notwithstanding the decree.

HUF AND HINDU SUCCESSION ACT

The Court examined the meaning of an HUF and its genesis under the Hindu Law. It also examined the rights of coparceners to succeed to the share of their father in the HUF in light of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This could be by way of a Will or by intestate succession. In the case of intestate succession, the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act provide for Class I heirs to succeed to the property of a Hindu male. In this situation, the Court noted that the Hindu Succession Act did not distinguish between legitimate Class I heirs and illegitimate heirs. The fact that legitimacy has been bestowed upon the children of a void marriage by virtue of s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act would mean that no distinction can be drawn between those children who were legitimate and those who are deemed to be legitimate.

INTESTATE PROPERTY INCLUDES SHARE IN HUF

All property of an intestate Hindu male was to be divided amongst his Class I heirs. The Apex Court observed that the phrase “all property” means all property belonging to the intestate and included the share in his HUF. The Hindu Succession Act also provided for a notional partition of the HUF to determine the share of the deceased in the HUF. The legislature had provided for the ascertainment of the share of the deceased on a notional basis. The expression ‘share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place’ indicated that this share represented the property of the deceased. Where a person died intestate, the property would devolve in terms of the Hindu Succession Act. The Court held that in the distribution of the property of the deceased who had died intestate, a child who was recognised as legitimate under the Hindu Marriage Act would be entitled to a share. Since this was the property that would fall to the share of the intestate after the national partition, it belonged to the intestate. Hence, where the deceased had died intestate, the devolution of this property must be among the children – legitimate as well as those conferred with legitimacy by the Legislature. The Court gave an illustration of a HUF with 4 coparceners. Of these, C2, one coparcener dies and is survived by his wife and two children. One of the two children is illegitimate but deemed to be legitimate as above. A notional partition of the HUF would take place, and C2’s share would be determined as 1/4th and this 1/4th would be split equally amongst his widow, his legitimate child and his illegitimate child. Each of them would get a 1/3rd share in C2’s 1/4th share, i.e., a 1/12th share in the HUF.

ENTITLED TO SHARE BUT NOT A COPARCENER

However, the Court held that the illegitimate child would not ipso facto become a coparcener in the HUF. He would get a share in his deceased father’s HUF share but not directly become a coparcener in the HUF. This is because the HUF property is not the exclusive property of his father. S.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act has an express carve out that a deemed legitimate child cannot succeed to properties of other relatives. To make him a coparcener would violate s.16(3). It noted several amendments during the year to the Hindu Succession Act to remove gender biases. But the legislature has not stipulated that a child whose legitimacy is protected by s.16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, would become a coparcener by birth.

The very concept of a coparcener postulated the acquisition of an interest by birth. If a person born from a void or voidable marriage to whom legitimacy was conferred by s.16 were to have an interest by birth in a HUF, this would affect the rights of others apart from the parents of the child. Holding that the consequence of legitimacy under s.16 was to place such an individual on an equal footing as a coparcener in the coparcenary would be contrary to the provisions of s.16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

CONCLUSION

The issue relating to HUF rights of illegitimate children has been quite contentious and litigation-prone. After a long wait, the issue has reached finality. The Court has aimed for a balancing approach by protecting the rights of the deemed legitimate child on the one hand and also preserving the rights of other HUF coparceners on the other hand!

Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) — Examining the Application of PARI-PASSU and PRO-RATA Concepts

Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) play a vital role in India’s economy. They provide risk capital in the form of equity/quasi-equity capital for pre-revenue stage companies, early and late-stage ventures, growth companies that wish to scale their operations, and even companies facing distress.

The size of AIFs has grown to a significant amount over the years. There are around 1,100 AIFs registered with SEBI with over 8.44 trillion INR in commitments (as of 30th June, 2023), witnessing an annual growth rate of over 30 per cent.

Considering the need of the economy for such funds, its growth and the huge amount committed, SEBI, aptly supported by its policy advisory committee, is continuously making sincere attempts to ensure transparency and good governance. Recently in May 2023 SEBI, in its consultation paper titled Consultation paper on proposal with respect to pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors in Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs)”, has empathetically asserted:

“Considering that fair treatment of investors is a core and inherent principle for a pooled investment vehicle, as also evident from global references given above it is essential to expressly provide that AIFs shall not provide any differential treatment to investors which affects economic rights of other investors. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly provide for fair treatment of all investors as a principle under the AIF Regulations, from the perspective of investor protection.” (para 31 — emphasis supplied)

The objective of this article is to critically examine the extant regulations on pari-passu and pro-rata rights of investors in AIF and the fair treatment of all investors as regards investors joining a fund at different points in time.

What is pari-passu?

Pari-passu is a Latin term that means “ranking equally and without preference.” Applied in the context of investments, pari-passu means that multiple parties to an investment joining an investment scheme at different points of time with varying amounts are treated the same, “ranking equally and without preference — in the sense that the assets or securities would be managed with equal preference or a preference weighted on the value or amount invested and when invested in either the asset or securities.”

Fundraising by an AIF scheme/ fund:

SEBI Regulations governing AIFs viz. SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012, contemplate that a fund approved by SEBI may be able to attract investors to such a fund at different points of time, committing varying amounts (subject to the minimum prescribed). The terms used for investors joining at different points of time are (i) investors joining at the time of First Closing, (ii) investors joining at Subsequent Closing(s), and (iii) investors joining at the time of Final Closing. The Private Placement Memorandum (PPM — explained later) (in section VII) requires each scheme to specify indicative timelines for Initial closing, Subsequent closing(s), Final closing, Commitment Period and Term of the Fund/Scheme.

Considering the above, there is a need to place all these investors joining at different points of time with varying amounts on equal footing.

In mutual fund equity schemes where daily NAV based on the market prices is readily available, all subsequent investors join based on this daily NAV at the time of joining.

However, the investments by most AIFs are in private equity/ quasi equity. These investments have certain time frame depending on the period of nurturing required and success and growth of the ventures. They are illiquid investments and can’t have daily market value. Considering this limitation, the best way to put these investors joining at different points of time with varying amounts is by ensuring equal IRR (Internal Rate of Return) or equal RoI (Return on Investment) for all investors. The implementation of this system may be practically cumbersome and, therefore, in order to simplify the process, in cases of AIFs, this is ensured by what is popularly known as equalization method. In this method, there are three different types of contributions which investors joining during subsequent closing(s) and final closing have to pay — Catch-up Contribution, Compensatory Contribution and Management Fees Additional Contribution. The first two viz. Catch-up Contribution and Compensatory Contributions are meant to place subsequent investors on equal footing vis-à-vis earlier investors and therefore, are distributed by the fund amongst earlier investors on pro-rata basis.

In this article, I am making an attempt to specifically focus on the following:

• The precise nature of Catch-up Contribution and Compensatory Contribution.

• How they are quantified, collected from subsequent contributors (investors) and distributed pro-rata amongst original/ prior contributors.

In Annexure 1, I have brought out the key concepts and the regulatory framework that guides the functioning of AIFs.

The subject of the economic rights of investors during fundraising by AIF — specifically in the context of Category II AIF is very significant.

MODEL CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENT:

Every investor investing in an AIF has to enter into an agreement which is called a Contribution / Subscription Agreement.

The format of PPM provided by SEBI in Part A in Section VII titled ‘Principal Terms of the Fund/Scheme’ requires the Investment Manager to specify the indicative timeline for various closings, the payments unitholders participating in subsequent closings have to make (like catch-up contribution, compensatory contribution).

SIDBI, which manages Fund of Funds, on its website, provides a model contribution agreement.

https://www.sidbivcf.in/files/new_announcement/Model per cent20Contrubution per cent20Agreement per cent20for per cent20AIFs.pdf

The relevant definitions for the present subject are:

• “Catch-up Contribution”

• “Compensatory Contribution”

• “Final Closing”

• “First Closing”

• “Subsequent Closing”

• “Subsequent Contributor”

Clause 3 of this model agreement deals with the “Induction of new contributors and the issue of Units.”

For brevity, the same are not reproduced here.

On reading the above definitions and clause 3 of the model agreement and requirements of PPM, it conveys:

1. At every subsequent closing up to the Final Closing, subsequent contributors shall pay Catch-up Contribution as well as Compensatory Contribution.

2. Both these amounts collected by the Fund shall be distributed amongst the contributors who were admitted prior to such subsequent closing pro rata in proportion to their respective capital contributions.

Considering the above-stated provisions usually contained in all contribution/ subscription agreements and similar provisions contained in PPMs, it is evident that AIFs have to collect catch-up and compensatory contributions from subsequent investors and distribute the same pro-rata amongst prior/ earlier investors.

The next step is to understand how these two contributions are quantified, collected and distributed.

The methodology of quantifying, collecting and distributing Catch-up Contributions and Compensatory Contributions are explained using case studies.

CATCH-UP CONTRIBUTION:

Before a private equity fund is launched, the IM solicits commitments to invest from potential investors. These soft commitments are not legally binding and do not represent future subscriptions. They, however, indicate as to how much capital might be raised.

Once the IM decides to launch the fund, the PPM is published and circulated amongst potential/prospective investors. Thereafter, hard commitments are made by investors with whom contribution/subscription agreements are signed.

The IM can seek to raise additional commitments and capital at any time between the First Closing and the Final Closing.

The above is illustrated below by a hypothetical case of Rahul Fund as at First Closing on 30th November, 2018 (Table no. 1):

 

Investor

COMMITMENT(INR)

OWNERSHIP

The IM 5,00,00,000 10 per cent
Investor1 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 30 per cent
TOTAL 50,00,00,000 100 per cent

The Fund issues a drawdown notice dated 1st December, 2018 calling upon the investors to contribute 10 per cent aggregating to Rs. 5,00,00,000 and all investors send their contributions by 31st December, 2018. Accordingly, the above data will appear as under (Table no. 2):

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1
The IM 5,00,00,000 10 per cent 50,00,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 30 per cent 1,50,00,000
TOTAL 50,00,00,000 100 per cent 5,00,00,000

One year after the Initial Closing, the IM decides to seek additional capital commitments and finds an investor (Investor 4 in the table below). Rahul Fund’s investor allocation will now be as under (Table no. 3):

 

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1
The IM 5,00,00,000 8.33 per cent 50,00,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 25 per cent 1,50,00,000
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 16.67 per cent NIL
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 100 per cent 5,00,00,000

 

With this additional investor’s commitment, the initial investors’ ownership has been diluted, yet the new investor hasn’t paid anything into the fund. Investor 4 could simply make the initial drawdown payment to balance things out, but this wouldn’t accurately compensate the initial investors and would eat into Fund’s IRRs.

Instead, an equalisation needs to be completed.

What is equalisation — catch-up contribution?

Equalisation is the process of truing up all investors as if they had all joined a fund on its initial closing date. The process of doing so is multi-pronged. This is called catch-up contribution.

First, Investor 4 pays in drawdown 1 on 31st December, 2019. But rather than making the payment to the fund, the payment is allocated across the initial investors, according to their percentage of ownership of the fund (Table no. 4).

 

INVESTOR COMMITMENT OWNERSHIP DRAWDOWN 1 Returned/called Adj.Drawdown1 Per cent drawdown
The IM 5,00,00,000 8.33% 50,00,000 (8,35,000) 41,65,000 8.33
Investor1 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 25% 1,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 25
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 16.67% NIL 83,35,000 83,35,000 16.67
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 100% 5,00,00,000 NIL 5,00,00,00 100

The magic of equalisation is putting Investor 4 as if Investor 4 had joined the Fund at the time of initial closing — at par with the IM and other three Investors 1, 2 & 3.
Clause 3.1.of the model agreement also states:

“The Investment Manager shall promptly distribute Catch-up Contributions amongst the Contributors who were admitted prior to such Subsequent Closing pro rata in proportion to their respective Capital Contributions and such amounts distributed to the Contributors shall be added back to their Unpaid Capital Commitments, ……….”

This provision is illustrated as under (Table no. 5):

INVESTOR COMMITMENT DRAWDOWN 1 Unpaid capital commitment Returned/called Adj.Drawdown1 Adjusted unpaid capital
The IM 5,00,00,000 50,00,000 4,50,00,000 (8,35,000) 41,65,000 4,58,35,000
Investor1 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 2 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 3 15,00,00,000 1,50,00,000 13,50,00,000 (25,00,000) 1,25,00,000 13,75,00,000
Investor 4 10,00,00,000 NIL nil 83,35,000 83,35,000 9,16,65,000
TOTAL 60,00,00,000 5,00,00,000 45,00,00,000 NIL 5,00,00,00 55,00,00,000

From this Table No. 5, it is evident that the share in catch-up contribution received by The IM and Investors 1, 2 and 3 adds up to unpaid capital commitment by all four of them. This, in essence, means that the share in the catch-up contribution received is part refund of the amount they had already paid. This is relevant in deciding the taxability, if any, of this share in catch-up contribution received by original/ prior investors.

The cardinal principle of an AIF is — All investors have to be treated at par — equally treated (barring a few issues like set-up fees, and management fee structure). This ‘catch-up contribution’ has the effect of putting all investors on an equal footing. The outcome should be that, having re-balanced contributed capital, the amount of uncalled capital for each partner is consistent with the percentage ownership of each partner after this subsequent closing.

A basic premise in the treatment of subsequent closings is that subsequent investors should be treated as if they had invested at the beginning.

Following this principle, the new/subsequent investors who join at a later date are put at par with original/ prior investors following this system of catch-up contribution and its pro rata distribution amongst prior/ original investors.

Note that, so far, it appears that the fund does not receive cash on 31st December, 2019; the net effect of the cash flows shown is zero as the flows simply re-balance the investor’s capital

COMPENSATORY CONTRIBUTION:

However, there is one more area where also, both these types of investors need to be put at par — time value of money.

In the given case, the original three investors and the IM had put their money by December, 2018. Whereas the new investor 4 puts his pro rata contribution in December, 2019 — after a lapse of a year. This issue is addressed by what is called Compensatory Contribution in India and Equalisation Interest abroad. The same is amplified as under.

What is Equalisation Interest — called Compensatory Contribution in India?

In the given case, the IM and 3 original investors paid their first drawdown on 31st December, 2018. Whereas, Investor 4 pays Rs. 83,35,000 only on 31st December, 2019 — after a time lapse of 1 year. To compensate for this, Investor 4 also pays compensatory contribution at a specified rate per annum. Normally, this rate is the Hurdle Rate provided in the Contribution/ Subscription Agreement. This compensatory contribution is also distributed amongst original/ prior investors pro-rata.

The collection of Compensatory Contribution from the new investor and distribution of the same amongst the IM and original three investors will put all investors at par vis-à-vis each other. Any drawdown(s) thereafter will be paid by all the 5 investors as per their respective shares of unpaid capital commitments.

The impact of Compensatory Contribution is illustrated on the following page:

INVESTORS DATE AMOUNT Per cent HOLDING Equalisation Interest
Original Investors:
Investment Manager 31-12-2018  2,00,00,000 7.41 per cent  1,95,09,000
Investor 1 31-12-2018  20,00,00,000 74.07 per cent  19,50,11,000
Investor 2 31-12-2018  5,00,00,000 18.52  per cent  4,87,60,000
Final Closing:
Investor 3 30-06-2021  94,00,00,000 -26,32,80,000

Investor 3 pays interest at 10 per cent p.a. (compounded quarterly), being hurdle rate, from 31st December, 2018 to 30th June, 2021.

The readers will notice the loss original investors would suffer (almost close to 100 per cent of the invested amount) if an investment manager decides to waive this equalisation interest.

These calculations look relatively easy and straightforward, but it is easy to imagine how they quickly become increasingly complex as factors multiply. Funds might have multiple capital calls that they need to track between the initial and subsequent closing, as well as multiple closings with different investors on-boarding at different times.

Whether Investment Manager has the right to waive Catch-up and/or Compensatory Contributions?

Clause 3 of the Model Contribution Agreement deals with the Induction of new contributors and issue of Units). This clause states — “The Investment Manager shall however, have the power to waive or increase/reduce, subject to the consent of the Advisory Committee, the Compensatory Contribution on Catch-up Contributions to be received and accepted at such Subsequent Closings.”

In this context, readers’ attention is invited to SEBI’s Consultation paper with respect to pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors issued in May 20231. In this paper, inter alia, it is stated, “While the above principle is not explicitly stated in AIF Regulations, maintaining pro-rata rights of investors in each investment of the scheme of AIF, including while making distribution of investment proceeds, is an essential characteristic of the AIF structure.”


1. https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/may-2023/consultation-paper-on-proposal-with-respect-to-pro-rata-and-pari-passu-rights-of-investors-of-alternative-investment-funds-aifs-_71540.html

Considering the above, the right, if any, of the investment manager to waive catch-up and/ or compensatory contribution has to be subject to conditions, and the fund and the trustee are responsible for ensuring pari-passu rights of all investors — initial as well as subsequent — at all times.

As mentioned earlier, accounts of each fund have to be audited each year and the auditor may consider examining, during the course of audit, whether the fund has collected and distributed catch-up as well as compensatory contributions from subsequent investors or not. And, if not, the auditor needs to examine whether such an act affects the pro-rata and pari-passu rights of investors or not. If the auditor finds that it affects this essential characteristic of the AIF structure, it may be his responsibility to suitably report the same.

Taxation of Catch-Up Contribution & Compensatory Contribution:

Also, considering that category II AIF enjoys pass-through status, it is important to understand the income-tax implications of the catch-up contribution and compensatory contribution collected from subsequent contributors and distributed by the Fund amongst prior/ original contributors.

No attempt is made here to analyse income tax implications of these two amounts either in the hands of the Fund or in the hands of contributors (both original as well as subsequent contributors).

However, the potential tax issues are listed as under:

1. The Fund:

• Whether it is a business income and therefore liable to be taxed in the hands of the Fund,

• If not, whether, while passing on both these amounts to original/ prior investors, whether the Fund is required to deduct tax at source? If yes, whether on both the amounts or only on equalisation interest (compensatory contribution)?

2. Subsequent contributors (new investors):

• Whether catch-up contribution as well as compensatory contribution will be treated as ‘cost’ while computing their taxable capital gain? If not, does it mean that same will not give any tax relief in respect thereof to such subsequent investors?

• Whether compensatory contribution which is in the nature of equalization interest (and not actual interest) can be claimed as deduction while computing gross taxable income of such a subsequent contributor in the year of payment?

3. Original / prior contributors:

• Whether these amounts are ‘capital receipts’ or ‘revenue receipts’?

• Whether catch-up contribution received can be adjusted against the amounts paid against earlier drawdown(s) to reduce that amount?

• If not, whether the catch-up contribution is liable to be taxed as capital gain or as income from other sources?

• Whether compensatory contribution (which is in the nature of equalisation interest) liable to be taxed as ‘interest income’? Or, whether the same too will go to reduce the cost already incurred? [NOTE: It is important to note that these so called ‘subsequent investors’ too will qualify to receive both ‘catch-up contribution’ as well as ‘compensatory contribution’ whenever there is any fresh round of fund-raising post their investment.]

CONCLUSION

Considering the above, I submit that it is the responsibility of the Investment Managers, PPM Auditors and Investors to assess if the true principles of catch up and compensatory contributions have been followed.

i. The investment managers have to decide whether to adopt equalisation method at the times of each subsequent closing(s) and final closing.

ii. The AIF PPM Auditors (who can be internal/external auditors or legal professionals), while conducing audits of PPM and annual accounts, have the responsibility to examine the actions and decisions of the IM and, if required, to report on the same.

iii. The investors too need to be vigilant as to their rights to receive catch-up and compensatory contributions whenever they notice that the fund in which they have invested has raised fresh commitments.

The writer has come across an instance where the IM, using its discretionary power, waived these contributions even though such a waiver negatively impacted the investor’s economic rights in his regard.

The annual audit of PPM compliance is mandated in the interests of investors. Considering this, SEBI regulations must provide that this annual audit report should also be shared with each investor along with corrective action(s) taken by AIFs. Considering the automation in back-office systems, the time allowed for conducting such an audit too needs to be reduced to maximum 90 days. SEBI also needs to take initiative to form an investors forum which can, on an on-going basis, disseminate information to investors in the matter of their economic rights and representatives of such a forum are included in alternative investment policy advisory committee.

ANNEXURE 1

The background on AIFs is briefly stated for readers’ quick references and understanding.

What is an Alternative Investment Fund (“AIF”)?

Alternative Investment Fund or AIF means any fund established or incorporated in India which is a privately pooled investment vehicle which collects funds from sophisticated investors, whether Indian or foreign, for investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy (stated in PPM) for the benefit of its investors.

AIF does not include funds covered under the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996, SEBI (Collective Investment Schemes) Regulations, 1999 or any other regulations of the Board to regulate fund management activities. Further, certain exemptions from registration are provided under the AIF Regulations to family trusts set up for the benefit of ‘relatives‘, employee welfare trusts or gratuity trusts set up for the benefit of employees, ‘holding companies‘ etc. [Ref. Regulation 2(1)(b)]

(source – SEBI FAQs)
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1471519155273.pdf

AIFs are regulated by the capital market regulator’s SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 as amended from time to time and circulars issued by SEBI.

https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/apr-2017/sebi-alternative-investment-funds-regulations-2012-last-amended-on-march-6-2017-_34694.html

SEBI’s Master Circular dated 31st July, 2023 on AIFs:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/master-circulars/jul-2023/master-circular-for-alternative-investment-funds-aifs-_74796.html

SEBI circulars on AIFs:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/home/HomeAction.do?doListingAll=yes&cid=25

SEBI also has formed Alternative Investment Policy Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Mr N R. Narayana Murthy. This committee has published three reports which are available on SEBI’s website.

Report dated 31st December, 2015:

https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1453278327759.pdf

Report dated 26th November, 2017:
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/jan-2018/1516356419898.pdf

In terms of SEBI AIF Regulations it is mandatory to obtain certificate of registration from SEBI for enabling AIFs to operate under one of the following 3 categories:

• Category I — AIFs which invest in start-up or early stage ventures or social ventures or SMEs or infrastructure. Includes venture capital funds, SME funds, social venture funds, infrastructure funds, angel funds, etc.

• Category II — AIFs, which do not fall in Category I or Category III and which do not undertake leverage or borrowing other than to meet day-to-day operational requirements. Includes private equity funds or debt funds for which no specific incentives or concessions are given by the government or any other regulator.

• Category III — AIFs, which employ diverse or complex trading strategies and may employ leverage including through investment in listed or unlisted derivatives. Includes hedge funds or funds, which trade for short term returns, or open-ended funds, for which no specific incentives or concessions are given by the government or any other regulator.

Private Placement Memorandum (PPM):

The PPM is a risk disclosure document (akin to a prospectus issued by a company making public issue) used for marketing a fund to its potential/ prospective investors.

In terms of Regulation 12, AIF has to, at least 30 days prior to the launch of a scheme, submit Placement Memorandum with the Board and the Board may communicate its comments which will have to be incorporated in the placement memorandum before it can be released to prospective investors. Circular dated 5th February, 2020 issued by SEBI has prescribed format for PPM.

The PPM is divided into two parts — Part A requiring minimum disclosures in respect of 15 sections listed in annexure I to the circular and Part B where any additional information in relation to the Fund/Scheme, Manager, investment team which does not form part of the standard disclosures and the section-wise supplementary section under the earlier sections, can be indicated. Considering a sizable amount invested by each investor and high risks associated with such investments, investors should read the PPM and understand the precise nature of the fund where the amount is being invested, particularly provisions which directly or indirectly affect investors’ economic and legal rights.

http://www.aibi.org.in/Circulars/Disclosure per cent20Standards per cent20for per cent20Alternative per cent20Investment per cent20Funds per cent20(AIFs).pdf

https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/commondocs/feb-2020/an_1_p.pdf

Economic rights:

The parity of economic rights between investors of AIFs is necessary as well as critical. It is observed that at times, the PPMs adopt different practices which provide differential benefits/rights to certain investors over others. Few such terms on which differential economic rights are provided by AIFs are Drawdown timeline, Hurdle rate of return/performance linked fee, Transfer rights, Information rights, Compensatory contribution for investors on-boarded in subsequent closings including catch-up contribution for maintaining pro-rata rights of investors, and Co-investment rights.

Even though PPMs may provide equal rights to investors in these matters, the IMs may, using their discretion, give such preferential rights to a select group of investors or waive catch-up as well as compensatory contributions. As the minimum investment amount prescribed is rupees one crore, general perception is that the investors are sophisticated and capable of taking decision to invest after properly studying PPM and understanding its contents. However, this perception in reality may not be correct.

AIFs and AUDIT REQUIREMENTS:

To complement the measures prescribed by SEBI, chartered accountants as auditors and consultants, also have an important role to play to ensure orderly growth of AIFs and protection of investors’ economic rights.

The accounts of each fund managed by a registered AIF have to be audited annually by a qualified auditor. Each AIF has to provide Annual Report to all its investors including financial information of investee companies and detailed risk profiles. The auditor’s report along with audited accounts are shared with the investors in each such fund along with the annual report. In order to further protect investors’ interests, SEBI circular has introduced a specific requirement that the terms of a contribution or subscription agreement (by any name it may be called) signed with each investor must be aligned with the terms of the Private Placement Memorandum (PPM — what is PPM is explained earlier) and contribution agreement cannot go beyond the terms of the PPM. The Investment Managers are required to ensure that they carry out all activities of the AIF in accordance with the PPM and that they should maintain fairness in ensuring that investors economic and legal rights are of paramount importance.
Also, with a view to ensure that the management team has complied with the terms of PPM, SEBI has introduced a requirement for annual audits of PPM. The results of the audit and any necessary corrective action must be shared with (i) the Trustee, Board, or Designated Partners of the AIF; (ii) the Board of the Manager; and (iii) SEBI within six months of the financial year’s end.

AIFs that have not received any funding from investors are exempt from the requirement of audit compliance. However, within six months of the end of the financial year, a Certificate from a Chartered Accountant declaring that no money has been raised must be provided to support this claim.

Considering SEBI’s persistent attempts to increase good governance and risks management in the management of AIFs through compliances and disclosures, management teams face number of challenges in their functioning and time is not far when large sized funds will need external audit firms to conduct internal audits to assist the management.
Considering the above, such high risk non-traditional investments present number of challenges to chartered accountants as auditors, tax experts & consultants to ensure that they discharge their expected obligations with due care and caution.

Considering the huge amount generated by AIFs, the responsibilities cast on auditors are enormous and, therefore, the auditors need to be familiar with various special features of AIFs, particularly economic rights of investors. One such important feature is — investors joining a fund at different points of time and ensuring they all stand in equal footing — paripassu.

In May 2023, SEBI had come out with several proposals for stricter regulations of AIFs. SEBI issued four consultation papers.

AIF Taxation:

Category I and Category II AIFs enjoy pass-through status. This subject is known to most tax practitioners.
Government’s role in AIF Funding:

Fund of Funds:

Government of India (GoI) created access to a large capital of funds for startups in India, through the scheme “Fund of Funds for Start-ups” to create a nation of job creators than job seekers. This Fund is operated by SIDBI. https://www.sidbivcf.in/en

Self-Reliant India (SRI) Fund — Mother-Daughters Fund:

MSME Sector is very important for the Indian economy in terms of contribution to GDP and employment generation. Considering that the GoI has set-up SRI Fund (Mother Fund) to assist MSME sector through Daughters Fund in the form of Category II Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) who are oriented towards providing funding support to MSMEs as growth capital, in the form of equity or quasi-equity. The details are available at https://dcmsme.gov.in/Final per cent20SRI per cent20Operating per cent20Guidelines per cent20 per cent20approved per cent20by per cent20Minister per cent20 per cent2017 per cent2008 per cent202021.pdf

The SRI Fund is managed by NSIC Venture Capital Fund. The details are available at http://www.nvcfl.co.in/AboutUs

Corporate Law Corner : Part A | Company Law

7 M/s Assam Company India Ltd & Ors
vs. Union of India & Ors
The Gauhati High Court
High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh
Case No. : WP(C) 2572/2018
Date of Order: 07th March, 2019The expression “Shell Company” had not been defined under any law in India. Therefore, before declaring any Company as a Shell Company, a notice or an opportunity of being heard shall be given having regard to its negative implications and serious consequences. FACTS

M/s ACIL was incorporated on 15th March, 1977 having its Registered Office at Assam, involved in the business of cultivation and manufacture of tea having several tea estates in the State of Assam.

M/s ACIL learned that respondent No.2, i.e., Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) had initiated proceedings against M/s ACIL by instructing the Bombay Stock Exchange, National Stock Exchange and Metropolitan Stock Exchange (collectively referred to as ‘Stock Exchanges’) to restrict and/or to suspend trading of shares of M/s ACIL. Further learned that, SEBI had initiated such proceedings on the basis of a letter dated 09th June, 2017 received from Government of India by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’) forwarding the database of 331 listed shell companies for initiating necessary action. In the said list of 331 shell companies, M/s ACIL was listed at Serial No.2 with the source indicated as Income Tax Department.

M/s ACIL represented before SEBI on 07th August, 2017 contending that it was an on-going company and could not be included in the list of shell companies. It was pointed out that M/s. ACIL produces 11 million KGS of tea and employs about 20 thousand workers across the Tea Estates.

According to M/s ACIL, no steps were taken by SEBI on the representation by M/s ACIL. Therefore, an appeal was filed before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’), Mumbai which was registered as Appeal No.196/2017. The appeal was disposed of vide order dated 21st August, 2017 by directing the stock exchanges to reverse their decision expeditiously, while granting liberty to M/s ACIL to make a representation to SEBI, which was directed to be disposed of by SEBI in accordance with the law. It was further observed that the aforesaid order of appeal would not come in the way of SEBI as well as the stock exchanges from investigating the case of M/s ACIL and to initiate proceedings if deemed fit.

In compliance with the order of the SAT, M/s ACIL submitted several representations before SEBI and also sought for copies of documents on the basis of which M/s ACIL was declared as a shell company, which were handed over by SEBI on 25th January, 2018.

According to M/s. ACIL, based on the documents handed over, it was found that the aforesaid letter dated 09th June, 2017 was received from the Serious Fraud Investigation Office of Government of India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (SFIO). The same included the database of 124 listed companies along with a Compact Disc received from the Income Tax Department, having been identified during various search/seizures.

From the database (Compact Disc) of the letter, it appeared that M/s ACIL was shown as a company controlled by Mr VKG against whom several Income Tax Proceedings were pending. A nexus was drawn between Mr VKG and M/s ACIL through Mr SK who was one of the Independent Directors of M/s ACIL and also a Director in one of such companies controlled by Mr VKG.

M/s. ACIL contended that the mere presence of Mr. SK as an Independent Director of M/s ACIL, who was also a Director in the companies controlled by Mr VKG, cannot be construed as there being any relationship between M/s ACIL and Mr VKG. Furthermore, Mr VKG had filed an affidavit before SEBI stating that he had no association with M/s ACIL in any manner.

In the meanwhile, SEBI passed an interim order dated 08th December, 2017. By the said order trading in securities of M/s ACIL was reverted to the status as it stood prior to issuance of the letter dated 07th August, 2017. It was ordered that Stock Exchanges would appoint Independent Auditors to verify misrepresentation of finance and business of M/s ACIL as well as misuse of funds/books of accounts. Also, the Promoters and Directors of M/s ACIL were permitted only to buy securities of M/s ACIL, prohibiting them from transferring the shares held by them.

Aggrieved by the order, present writ petition was been filed by M/s ACIL seeking the relief that passing of such order by SEBI was not justified and stated that M/s ACIL cannot be treated as a Shell Company.

The expression “Shell Company” had not been defined under any law in India. Therefore, there was no statutory definition of a Shell Company, be it in fiscal statutes or in penal statues. In addition, neither the Companies Act, 1956 nor the Companies Act, 2013 defines the expression shell company. In the interim order passed on 12th July, 2018, the Court observed that in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Revised Edition, a Shell Company had been defined as a non-trading company used as a vehicle for various financial manoeuvres.

In popular parlance, a Shell Company was understood as having only a nominal existence; it exists only on paper without having any office and employee. It may be used as a deliberate financial arrangement providing service as a tool or vehicle of others without itself having any significant assets or operations i.e., acting as a front. Popularly Shell Companies are identified as companies that are used for tax evasion or money laundering, i.e., channelising crime tainted money or proceeds of crime into the formal economy.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has prepared a glossary of foreign direct investment terms and definitions. In the said glossary, a Shell Company has been defined as a company which is formally registered, incorporated or otherwise legally organised in an economy, but which does not conduct any operations in that economy other than in a pass-through capacity. Shell companies tend to be conduits or holding companies and are generally included in the description of special purpose entities.

Mr AB, Assistant Professor in Law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad had carried out a study and published an article on the subject ‘Tackling the Menace of Shell Companies in India’. He had stated that there had been a spurt in economic crimes, such as, money laundering, benami transactions, tax evasion, generation of black money, round tripping of black money, etc. which not only causes revenue and foreign exchange loss to the Government, but also creates economic inequality in the society. It may compromise economic sovereignty of the State. According to him, such illegal activities are committed through the incorporation of companies which have neither any asset nor liability nor any operational businesses. These companies exist only on paper to facilitate illegal financial transactions, such as, money laundering and tax evasion. According to him, these kinds of companies are called shell companies.

However, it is no offence to be a shell company per se. A corporate entity may be set up in such a fashion with the objective of carrying out corporate activities in future. That would not make it an illegal entity. The Registrar of Companies can strike off the name of such a company from the register of companies. But, if such Shell Company is/was involved in money laundering or tax evasion or for other illegal purposes, then relevant provisions of laws under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, Prohibition of Benami Transactions Act, 2016, Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Companies Act, 2013 would be attracted.

As per the study, SEBI had proposed to the Government of India that there should be a legal definition of Shell Company as there was no law in India which defines a Shell Company. Such definition besides giving legal clarity, would also enable the investigative agencies to carry out investigation more swiftly and in a structured manner. The Committee was of the view that all Shell Companies may not have fraudulent intention. Therefore, the expression shell company needs to be defined as having fraudulent intent as one of the characteristic features of such a company.

HELD

The Honourable Judge based on the above, deduced that though Shell Company was defined in other jurisdictions, in India there was no statutory definition of the term. However, the general perception was that with presence of shell companies there can be a potential use for such Companies for illegal activities that threatens the very economic foundation of the country and severely compromises its economic foundation and ultimately sovereignty.Thus, there was a prima facie view that since declaration of M/s ACIL as a Shell Company by itself would entail adverse consequences, M/s. ACIL should have been at least served a notice before being branded as a Shell Company. It was recorded that M/s ACIL was an old and reputed company owning 14 tea estates in the State of Assam producing 11 million KGS of tea every year and having a labour force of 20 thousand of its own. Therefore, branding such a company as a Shell Company was not justified.

Principles of natural justice would require that before such branding, M/s ACIL should have been put on notice and being provided a reasonable opportunity of hearing as to why and on what grounds it was being suspected to be a Shell Company. Only if the response was found to be not satisfactory, then such a finding could have been recorded. Besides, initiating proceedings after branding M/s ACIL as a Shell Company virtually amounted to giving a finding first and thereafter initiating a proceeding to justify the finding like a post-decisional hearing. One cannot be declared guilty first and thereafter subjected to a trial to justify or uphold finding of such guilt. The letter dated 09th June, 2017 was very clear that M/s ACIL was a Shell company and not a suspected Shell company.

Therefore, upon thorough consideration of the matter, writ petition was not only maintainable but also deserved to be allowed.

Impugned letter dated 09th June, 2017 in respect of M/s ACIL was accordingly interfered with and was set aside.

8 M/s. Oscar FX Pvt Ltd
U72900TG2014PTC094237/Telangana/152 of 2013/2023/4139 to 4141
Adjudication Order
Registrar of Companies, Hyderabad
Date of Order: 24th January, 2023.

Order under section 454 read with Section 159 of the Companies Act, 2013 for the violation of section 152(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 i.e. in case of appointment of any person as director in the company who does not have a valid director identification number (DIN) at the time of his/her appointment.

FACTS

M/s OFPL (hereinafter referred as ‘Company’) is registered in the State of Telangana on 29th May, 2014, having its registered office in Telangana. M/s OFPL had filed an application in Form GNL-1 dated 16th January, 2023 along with its officers in default under section 159 for adjudication of violation of Section 152(3) read with Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) seeking necessary orders.It was submitted that erstwhile Board of Directors of the Company comprising Mr. KKP (Managing Director) and Mr. RPK (Director) at its Board Meeting held on 30th March, 2021 had appointed Ms. VBP as an Additional Director with effect from 30th March, 2021. However, Ms. VBP did not have a valid Director Identification Number (DIN) at the time of appointment to become the director on the Board of the company, which was a violation of the provisions of Section 152(3) of the Companies Act, 2013; and liable for penalty under Section 159 of the Companies Act, 2013.

It was further submitted that such appointment of Ms. VBP was unintentional and inadvertent due to lack of knowledge of provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.. Immediately upon realisation, Ms VBP, had applied to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) for allotment of DIN on 15th September, 2021 and was allotted DIN on the same day by MCA. Immediately upon allotment of DIN to Ms. VBP, M/s OFPL had filed e-form DIR-12 with the Registrar of Companies dated 28th September, 2021 to give effect to her appointment as additional director. Section 152(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 states the following:

(3) No person shall be appointed as a director of a company unless he has been allotted the Director Identification Number under section 154:”

Section 159 of the Companies Act, 2013 contemplates the following:

“If any individual or director of a company makes any default in complying with any of the provisions of section 152, section 155 and section 156 such individual or director of the company shall be liable to a penalty which may extend to fifty thousand rupees and where the default is a continuing one, with a further penalty which may extend to five hundred rupee for each day after the first during which such default continues “.

HELD

After considering the submissions made in the application made by M/s OFPL and the facts of the case it is proved beyond doubt that M/s OFPL and the officers of the company have defaulted in complying the provisions under Section 155(3) of the Act. In this regard, M/s OFPL being a small company, and its officers in default (within the meaning of section 2(60) of the Companies Act, 2013) are hereby directed to pay the following penalty from their own sources.

Name of the Company

Penalty under section 159 r/w s. 446B of the Act.

 

On default

On continuous
default, with a further penalty which may extend to
R 500 for 169 days
(date of allotment of DIN).

Total penalty

Oscar FX Private
Limited

Rs. 25,000/-

169 @ 100 = 16,900/-

Rs. 41,900/- (Rupees
Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred only)

Officer in Default

Penalty as per Act.

 

On default

On continuous
default, with a further penalty which may extend to five hundred rupees for
169 days (date of allotment of DIN).

Total penalty

Mr. KKP (MD)

Rs. 25,000/

Rs. 169 @ 100 =
Rs. 16,900/-

Rs. 41,900/- (Rupees
Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred only)

It was directed that the penalty be paid within 30 days from the date of issue of the order.

Updated FAQS on Insider Trading Throw Light on Many Complex Issues

BACKGROUND

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has recently issued (on 31st March, 2023) comprehensive Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on its regulations relating to insider trading – the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (the Regulations). It is good to see this practice continuing whereby, not just clarifications, even if not binding, are given on important and repetitive issues, but they are all updated and provided at one place. The Regulations are fairly complex with a series of deeming provisions. Insider trading violations are regularly caught through a fairly sophisticated data surveillance, coupled with good investigation and quick orders. Of course, some orders are found wanting on evidence or principles of law applied and do not stand up on appeal, but the fact that such Regulations exist and there is a close watch acts as a deterrent. Insider trading reduces the credibility of markets since investors would feel demoralised if, whether in purchase or in sale, the insiders are able to illegally profit from information they are entrusted with as fiduciaries.

The Regulations are also distinct, in the sense that many of the provisions have a note attached to them which explain the intention of the particular provision. The FAQs add further to this by explaining and clarifying many provisions.

BINDING NATURE OF FAQS

It would be axiomatic to say that the Act and the Regulations and even certain notifications/circulars have a binding effect but not the FAQs. Indeed, they bind not even the regulator, i.e., SEBI, as the FAQs themselves take pains to emphasise. Paragraph 4 of the FAQs, says that the FAQs “…are in the nature of providing guidance on the SEBI (PIT) Regulations, 2015 and any explanation/clarification provided herein should neither be regarded as an interpretation of law nor be treated as a binding opinion/decision of the Securities and Exchange Board of India”.

That said, the FAQs do reveal the mind of the regulator on certain provisions. They explain many concepts useful to the student, the compliance officer and practitioner. Often, the question may not be of technical interpretation but of understanding what a particular provision means to say. Importantly, the cautious compliance officer and companies may prefer to toe the line by following the interpretation given in the FAQs, since it is likely that SEBI may initiate proceedings. The appellate authorities, however, may not give more than a passing view to the FAQs, if at all.

There are 59 frequently raised questions that are answered in the FAQs. While it would not be possible to cover all of them, some of the important ones can be highlighted.

PLEDGE OF SHARES – THEIR CREATION, INVOCATION AND RELEASE

The concept of pledge of shares has to be seen, in context of the Regulations, from at least three perspectives. Firstly, what is pledge of shares and how it is created, invoked and released? Secondly, why is it relevant for these Regulations? Thirdly, who are the persons who have obligations when they pledge their shares or get the pledge released, etc?

Pledge of shares, as a concept is well understood. Shareholders may want to raise finance against the security of shares held by them. Such security may be in the form of hypothecation or pledge, with the latter being more preferred by lenders. Pledge is generally governed by the Indian Contract Act, 1872 but a detailed discussion on this would be beyond the scope of this article. Unlike earlier times when physical shares with duly executed transfer deeds were deposited with the lenders, the depository system requires a different method. The pledge has to be registered with the depository. Invocation of such pledge is easier. Some lenders may still want to go all the way and ask the borrower to actually transfer the shares to the lender’s DEMAT account. The implications of such a ‘pledge’ is a complex issue by itself and deserves a separate detailed discussion.

The Regulations deal with insider trading and the first reaction would be that pledge is not trading as commonly understood. However, the Regulations have learnt from history. A shareholder may pledge while being in possession of unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) and realise a higher value of shares. Thus, the scope of the terms has been widened to include pledge, and therefore also their invocation and release. Note though that the Regulations provide for this widened meaning by way of a note to the definition of ‘trading’.

Thus, the Regulations require specified insiders not to carry out a pledge while being in possession of UPSI. In other words, the restrictions on trading also apply to the creation of a pledge.

DEALING IN SECURITIES OTHER THAN SHARES/CONTRA TRADES

Do the Regulations apply only to dealings in shares or do they apply to dealings in futures and options too? Do they apply to exercise of ESOPs and also to sale of shares arising on exercise of ESOPs?

To begin with, the Regulations make it clear that they apply to ‘securities’, the definition of which is wide enough to include futures and options. Since ESOPs are a form of options, it is clear that the Regulations apply to ESOPs too. The FAQs specifically deal with this issue to put this issue beyond any doubt.

The question then comes of contra trades. As a matter of principle, the Regulations prohibit trading while in possession of UPSI. However, in case of close insiders (i.e., ‘Designated Persons’ as identified by the company), a stricter rule is adopted. Trading by them at a short intervals, called contra trades, is banned altogether since such trading would typically be done only on basis of UPSI. But several questions arise.

Firstly, futures and options get reversed within a short period. The Regulations do not provide how to deal with this. The FAQs have provided a view as follows. If a person buys futures/options and then sells them (or vice versa) within the maturity period of less than six months, then it would be deemed to be a contra trade and hence prohibited. However, if such trades mature by physical settlement, then they will not be deemed to be contra trades and hence not banned.

Even entitlements to rights shares are treated as securities and hence trading in them would attract the contra trade ban.

As far as ESOPs are concerned, the view expressed is as follows. The first part relates to grant of ESOPs. These are not treated as ‘trading’ and hence grants can be made even when the trading window is closed. Similarly, exercise of ESOPs is also not treated, the FAQs say, as trading. Hence, the acquisition of shares on exercise of ESOPs can be done even while in possession of UPSI. There is yet another concession regarding ESOPs. If shares are acquired on exercise of ESOPs, they do not invite the six-month ban of contra trades and hence such shares can be sold within six months of acquiring the shares.

CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS AND OTHER FIDUCIARIES AND THE REGULATIONS

Firms of Chartered Accountants render services to listed companies in many ways. They may act as auditors (statutory or internal or tax), they may act as advisors for many services. This is so also for other professionals such as company secretaries, lawyers, etc. They are very likely to have access to UPSI and hence would generally be deemed to be insiders.

However, they have a further and more elaborate role. They are required to frame a code of conduct which should contain at least the minimum requirements specified in the Model Code. This includes pre-clearance of trading in specified securities, ban on contra trades therein, etc.

Moreover, they are also required to maintain a structured database. Essentially, this is maintenance of prescribed details of persons to whom UPSI is shared with. And maintain such records for at least the minimum specified period. Such database “shall not be outsourced” and “shall be maintained internally”. On the question of keeping such a database on third party servers such as Amazon, Google, etc. which are also maintained outside India, the FAQs give a cryptic answer, instead of a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The answer given merely reiterates the responsibilities of the Board and the Compliance Officer to ensure that all Regulations, laws, etc. are complied with. However, on the question whether the company can use the software provided by third party vendors, the FAQs state that such software and services are provided on a login basis. The vendor may have access to the data and this would be contrary to the requirements of the Regulations.

Professionals rendering services to listed companies and having access to UPSI may range from small proprietorship to a large multi-partner firm, but the requirements are the same.

The FAQs confirm that these requirements are to be complied with by all professionals who have an access to the UPSI.

RELATIVES OF INSIDERS

There is often a confusion on the extent to which persons connected with the insider are also covered by the Regulations. The FAQs speak about this on some aspects.

The term ‘insider’ is broadly defined to cover several groups of persons who may have access to the UPSI. However, apart from persons directly connected to the company, there may be persons who have connection with them. For example, there may be a CFO of a company. The question is whether the family members of such a CFO would also be deemed to be insiders. The Regulations have sought to strike a fair balance but in the process has created confusion. Apart from relatives, several entities connected with such persons are also covered as insiders unless proven otherwise. But we could focus on one term that creates some confusion and practical difficulties too.

‘Immediate relatives’ of specified insiders are also deemed to be insiders, unless proven otherwise. The term ‘immediate relatives’ is defined in a curious manner. It includes not only the spouse, but also parents, siblings and children of such a person or their spouse, but they should be either financially dependent on such a person or should consult such persons in taking decisions relating to trading in securities. On first part, identifying such relatives should be easy enough. The question is applying the two alternate conditions.

Firstly, the question is whether the relative is financially dependent on such a person. This should be generally easy in many circumstances such as a minor child or a non-working spouse, etc. However, there may be grey areas such as a relative who earns and contributes to the household. Whether such persons can be said to be financially dependent?

The other condition is easier to explain but difficult to prove. Does such a relative consult the insider for their decisions on trading in securities? Financial discussions in families are very likely to happen and it would be difficult to prove otherwise. This makes things particularly difficult when the relatives actually take an independent decision. Let us say one person is a partner in a firm of Chartered Accountants acting as statutory auditor and also an advisor to several listed companies. The spouse works in another company and manages their own investments without consulting or even informing the other spouse. If by chance, trading is done by such a spouse in securities of a company where the spouse has access to UPSI, it will be difficult to prove that there was no violation of the Regulations. Now take the matter further where the spouse is a lawyer rendering services to various listed companies. Now the difficulty becomes compounded.

CONCLUSION

The FAQs are welcome generally as they not only clarify several concepts but give a good starting point for taking a view. Many of the difficulties expressed above arise in spite of these FAQs and not because of them. And the Regulations are also complicated because insider trading is not only common, but is often done by while collar educated persons who can use many sophisticated methods including technology to evade the law. Caution then becomes the rule and applying the interpretation given by the FAQs can give a higher level of assurance that one is within the law, even if the clear fact is that they are not binding, not even on SEBI itself.

What’s In a Name? Immovable or Movable Could Be the Same

INTRODUCTION
Immovable property is the most ancient form of an asset which mankind has ever known. Its law and practice are multi-faceted, both from a legal and tax perspective.Different laws have defined the term ‘immovable property’ differently. These definitions are very relevant in determining whether or not a particular asset can be classified as an immovable property. For example, there is a difference in the rates of stamp duty on conveyance of a movable property and an immovable property. Similarly, GST is payable only in respect of sale of goods which are movable property and not on a completed immovable property. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of the Sub Registrar, Amudalavalasa versus M/s Dankuni Steels Ltd., CA No. 3134-3135 of 2023, order dated 26th April, 2023 had an occasion to consider this issue in great detail. The Court analysed various definitions and propounded the settled principle that anything which is permanently affixed to land would also be immovable property. Let us examine this important proposition.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In the case of Dankuni (supra), under an auction, the assets of a company which consisted of land, building, civil works, plant and machinery and current assets, were declared to be sold to the highest bidder for a consideration of Rs. 8.35 cr. A sale deed was executed for this amount. Subsequent to the sale deed, a conveyance was executed for conveying the land, building and civil works. In the conveyance, the fact of the sale deed was mentioned and it was also stated that the market value of the land and building was Rs. 1.01 cr.Accordingly, the buyer tried to pay stamp duty on this amount of Rs.1.01 cr. and register the conveyance deed. The Sub-Registrar of Assurances did not agree with this value and held that the market value of the plant and machinery should also be included since it was immovable in nature. The matter reached the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which held that the when the conveyance was only for the land and building, the Sub-Registrar could not force the buyer to pay stamp duty on the value of the plant when he does not seek its registration. The Court directed the registration of the conveyance deed as it stood and for the value recorded therein. Aggrieved by this decision, the Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court.

DEFINITIONS

The Registration Act, 1908 defines the term in an inclusive manner to include land, buildings, hereditary allowances, rights of ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops and grass.The General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the term to include land, benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is the primary law dealing with immovable property. The Act merely defines immovable property as not including standing timber, growing crops and grass. However, it defines the phrase attached to the earth to mean-

“(i)      rooted in the earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs;

(ii)    imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or buildings; or

(iii)     attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it is attached”.

Section2(ja) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, defines the term immovable property as follows:

“Immovable property includes land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.”

The Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 does not contain any definition of the term immovable property or land. However, the definition of the crucial term “goods” states that it not only includes every kind of movable property other than money and securities but also actionable claims, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply.  Thus, in this case the definition under the Transfer of Property Act would come in useful.

From the above definitions, it would be evident that the main issue whether an asset is an immovable property or not would arise in respect of plant and machinery, power transmission towers, cellular towers, and similar assets.

JUDICIAL HISTORY

Various landmark decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts have dealt with what is an immovable property. Key decisions are discussed below.The Supreme Court in Sirpur Paper Mills (1998) 1 SCC 400 while examining whether or not a paper plant was an immovable property, held that the whole purpose behind attaching the machine to a concrete base was to prevent wobbling of the machine and to secure maximum operational efficiency and also for safety. It further held that paper-making machine was saleable as such by simply removing the machinery from its base. Hence, the machinery assembled and erected at its factory site was not an immovable property because it was not something attached to the earth like a building or a tree.  The test laid down was, whether the machine can be sold in the market. Just because the plant and machinery is fixed in the earth for better functioning, it would not automatically become an immovable property.

Further, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Duncan’s Industries Ltd vs. State Of U. P. (2000) 1 SCC 633, dealing with a fertiliser plant, is also relevant in determining what is movable and what is immovable. In this case, the Supreme Court distinguished Sirpur’s case and held that whether machinery which is embedded in the earth is a movable property or an immovable property, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Primarily, the court will have to take into consideration the intention of the party when it decided to embed the machinery: the key question is, whether such embedment was intended to be temporary or permanent?  If the machineries which have been embedded in the earth permanently with a view to utilising the same as a plant, e.g., to operate a fertiliser plant, and the same was not embedded to be dismantled and removed for the purpose of sale as a machinery at any point of time, then it should be treated as an immovable property.  In this case, a transfer took place on “as is where is” basis and “as a going concern” of a fertiliser business. This was preceded by an agreement which involved also expressly the transfer of plant and machinery. The Collector levied a stamp duty and penalty on the basis that since the transfer contemplated the sale of the unit as a going concern, the intention of the vendor was to transfer all properties in the fertiliser business in question.

Applying the above principles, the Apex Court agreed with the demand of the Collector. It was held that when the buyer contended that the possession of the plant and machinery were handed over separately to by the vendor, the machineries were not dismantled and given to the buyer, nor was it possible to visualise from the nature of the plant that such a possession de hors the land could be given by the buyer. Thus, it was an attempt to reduce the market value of the property the document by drafting it as a conveyance deed regarding the land only. The buyer had purported to transfer the possession of the plant and machinery separately and was contending now that this handing over possession of the machinery was de hors the conveyance deed. The Court relied on the conveyance deed itself to hold that what was conveyed was not only the land but the entire fertiliser business including plant and machinery.

In the case of Triveni Engineering & Indus. Ltd., 2000 (120) ELT 273 (SC), the Supreme Court held that generating sets consisting of the generator and its prime base mover are mounted together as one unit on a common base. Floors, concrete bases, walls, partitions, ceilings etc., even if specially fitted out to accommodate machines or appliances, cannot be regarded as a common base joining such machines or appliances to form a whole. The installation or erection of the turbo alternator on the concrete base specially constructed on the land could not be treated as a common base and, therefore, it followed that the installation or erection of turbo alternator on the platform constructed on the land would be immovable property.

The decision in the case of Mittal Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE Meerut, 1996(88) ELT622 (SC) was on similar lines where it held that a mono vertical crystalliser, which had to be assembled, erected and attached to the earth by a foundation at the site of the sugar factory was not capable of being sold as it is, without anything more. Hence, the plant was not a movable property.

In Quality Steel Tubes (P) Ltd vs Collector of Central Excise, 1995 SCC (2) 372 it was held that goods which were attached to the earth became immovable, and did not satisfy the test of being goods within the meaning of the Excise Act nor could be said to be capable of being brought to the market for being bought or sold, fall within the definition of immovable. Therefore, a plant of tube mill and welding head was regarded as immovable.

The Delhi High Court in Inox Air Products Ltd vs. Rathi Ispat Ltd (2007) 136 DLT 101 (DB) dealt with machineries which have been embedded in the earth, to constitute Cryogenic Air Separation Plants for the production of oxygen and nitrogen to be used in the production of steel. The machinery was erected with civil and structural works, viz., foundation, piling, structural support and pipe support, etc. for the installation of the plant, and the same could not be shifted without first dismantling it and then re-erecting it at another site. These were held to be immovable in nature. On erection, the machinery, ceased to be movable property. The Court held the machinery did not answer the description of “goods” or “movable property”, which by its very nature envisaged mobility and marketability on an “as it is, where it is basis”. Even though, the plant and machinery after dismantling could have been sold as scrap, but that was also the case with steel recovered from the rubble of an edifice.

The Karnataka High Court in Shree Arcee Steel P Ltd vs. Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd, AIR 2005 Kant 287, held that the meaning of the word “immovable” means permanent, fixed, not liable to be removed. In other words, for a chattel to become immovable property, it must be attached to the immovable property permanently as a building or as a tree attached to earth. Though a moveable property was attached to earth permanently for beneficial use and enjoyment, it remained a movable property. The Court gave an illustration that though a sugar cane machine/or an oil engine was attached to earth, it was moveable property. The degree, manner, extent and strength of attachment of the chattel to the earth or building were the main features to be recorded. Thus, the Court concluded that a centerless bar turning machine measuring 80’ in length and 10’ in width and 5’ height embedded to the earth by mounting the same on a cement base and fastened to it with bolts and nuts could not be called as immovable property.

The Central Board of Excise and Customs had, under the erstwhile, Central Excise Act 1944, after considering several Court decisions (including some of those mentioned above), clarified vide Order No. 58/1/2002 – CX that:

(A)    If items assembled or erected at site and attached by foundation to the earth cannot be dismantled without substantial damages to components and thus cannot be reassembled, then the items would not be considered as movables.

(B)    If any goods installed at site (e.g., paper-making machine) are capable of being sold or shifted as such after removal from the base and without dismantling into its components/parts, the goods would be considered to be movable. If the goods, though capable of being sold or shifted without dismantling, are actually dismantled into their components/parts for ease of transportation etc., they will not cease to be movable merely because they are transported in dismantled condition.

(C)    The intention of the party is also a factor to be taken into consideration to ascertain whether the embedment of machinery in the earth was to be temporary or permanent. This, in case of doubt, may help determine whether the goods are moveable or immovable.

The CBEC also issued clarifications for specific items:

(i)    Turn key projects like Steel Plants, Cement plants, Power plants, etc. involving supply of large number of components, machinery, equipments, pipes and tubes, etc. for their assembly/installation/erection/integration/inter-connectivity on foundation/civil structure etc. at site, will not be considered as excisable goods.

(ii)    Huge tanks made of metal for storage of petroleum products in oil refineries or installations: These tanks, though not embedded in the earth, are erected at site, stage by stage, and after completion they cannot be physically moved. On sale/disposal they have necessarily to be dismantled and sold as metal sheets/scrap. It is not possible to assemble the tank all over again. Such tanks are therefore not moveable.

(iii)    Refrigeration/Air conditioning plants: These are basically systems comprising of compressors, ducting, pipings, insulators and sometimes cooling towers, etc. They are in the nature of systems and not machines as a whole. They come into existence only by assembly and connection of various components and parts. The refrigeration/air conditioning system as a whole cannot be considered to be goods.

(iv)    Lifts and escalators: Lifts and escalators which are installed in buildings and permanently fitted into the civil structure cannot be considered to be goods.

DECISION IN DANKUNI’S CASE

The Supreme Court considered the various statutory definitions of the term immovable property as well as its own decision in Duncans (supra). It also considered the sale deed in the present case. Accordingly, it was clear from the sale deed itself, that the total sale consideration was Rs. 8.35 cr., for the land, building, civil works, plant and machinery and current assets, etc. However, what had been done was that an amount of Rs.1.01 cr. had been taken as the value of the land, building and civil works. The Court held that what was purported to be conveyed, was, the land as defined in the Sale Deed and land was immovable property. However, Immovable property was defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897 as ‘including land, benefits to arrive out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth’. When it came to the definition of ‘immovable property’ in the Transfer of Property Act, it is defined as ‘not including standing timber, growing crops or grass’. In the Registration Act, 1908, immovable property included, apart from land and buildings, things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth but not including standing timber, growing crops or grass. In this respect, the Supreme Court made a useful reference to section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act which declared that in the absence of an express or implied indication, a transfer of property passed to the transferee all the interests, which the transferor was capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. Such incidents included, inter alia, where the property was land, all things attached to the earth. Accordingly, the Apex Court laid down a very important principle, that when the property was machinery attached to the earth, the movable parts thereof also were comprehended in the transfer.A proper reading of the Sale Deed, indicated that what was conveyed was rights over the scheduled property, which, no doubt, was the land but it also included all the rights, easements, interests, etc., i.e., the rights which ordinarily passed on such sale over the land. The Court held that it was from a reading of this deed in conjunction with section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act that the intention of the parties become self-evident that the vendor intended to convey, all things, which inter alia stood attached to the earth. The mere fact that there was no express reference to plant and machinery in the Sale Deed did not mean that the interest in the plant and machinery which stood attached to the land was not conveyed. It held that the buyer had only considered value of the land, building and civil works and this was done to tide over the liability to stamp duty for what was actually, in law, conveyed. Thus, the Court concluded that it was clear that the sale deed operated to convey the rights over the plant and machinery as well, which were comprised in the land mentioned in the sale deed. However, it added that as far as plant and machinery was concerned, it would be only that which was permanently embedded to the earth and answering the description of the immovable property as defined above. Accordingly, the stamp duty valuation should be recomputed on that basis.

EPILOGUE

Apparently, the quote “What’s in a Name?” would hold true in this case. Even if an asset is called movable property, if it answers the description of immovable property, then instruments dealing with it would be subject to stamp duty accordingly. In this case, a “Rose by any other name would smell as sweet!” Although one may hasten to add that here, the smell would be far from sweet due to the higher stamp duty incidence.

Corporate Law Corner Part A : Company Law

5 M/s Herballife Healthcare Pvt Ltd
No. ROC/D/Adj/2023/defective/HerbalLife/1622-1624
Office of Registrar of Companies, Delhi & Haryana
Adjudication order
Date of Order: 21st April, 2023

Adjudication Order for penalty pursuant Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014

FACTS

M/s HHPL was incorporated at New Delhi. Registrar of Companies, Delhi & Haryana (“RoC”) received an application from Ms. SY, Director of M/s HHPL regarding adjudication of the defect in filing of E-form DIR-11. In this regard, it was observed that as per column 4 of the E-form, date of filing of resignation from M/s HHPL, was shown as 30th November, 2016 but in resignation letter attached therewith the date of submission of resignation to M/s. HHPL was mentioned as 9th September, 2020.

RoC on examination of the document/information submitted observed that a default /non-compliance of the provisions of Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 had been made and there was no specific penalty under relevant rule. Thus, provisions of section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 get attracted.

Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 provides that:

The authorised signatory and the professional, if any, who certify e-form shall be responsible for the correctness of the contents of e-form and correctness of the enclosures attached with the electronic form.

RoC issued a show cause notice to M/s. HHPL and Ms. SY in response to which, Ms. SY submitted a reply vide email wherein it was admitted that default has occurred due to some inadvertent typographical error.

It was noted that E-Form DIR-11 had been filed with wrong date of resignation. M/s. HHPL fulfils the requirements of a small company as defined under section 2(85) of the Companies Act, 2013. Thus, the penalty would be governed by Section 446B of the Act.

HELD

RoC, in exercise of the powers conferred vide Notification dated 24th March, 2015 and having considered the reply submitted imposed the penalty of Rs. 5,000 on the signatory for defect in e-form DIR-11 pursuant to Rule 8(3) of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014 read with relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

6 M/s Chaitanya India Fin Credit Pvt Ltd
9/23/ADJ/SEC.161/2013/KARNATAKA/RD(SER)/2022/5496
Office of the Regional Director (South East Region)
Appeal against Adjudication order
Date of Order: 29th December, 2022
Appeal against Adjudication order under section 454 passed by the Registrar of Companies, Karnataka for default in compliance with the requirements of Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013.

FACTS

M/s CIFCPL had appointed Mr. SB as the Managing Director and CEO of the Company (KMP) vide its Board Resolution dated 27th February, 2020 for a period of five years from 6th March, 2020. However, by inadvertence, the Board omitted to co-opt him as Additional Director before appointing as Managing Director.

As a consequence of the Board having so omitted to appoint Mr. SB as Additional Director, the approval for the appointment by the shareholders (regularisation) at the annual general meeting of the company held on 18th August, 2020 was omitted to be obtained. Consequently, Mr. SB was deemed to have vacated the office with effect from 18th August, 2020 in terms of Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013. However, M/s. CIFCPL did not notice this omission till 18th October, 2021 and took on record the cessation of the office of Mr. SB with effect from 18th August, 2020 in its Board Meeting held on 19th October, 2021. M/s. CIFCPL had thus violated the provisions of Section 161 of the Act from 06th March, 2020 to 18th October, 2021.

Registrar of Companies, Karnataka (‘RoC’) had levied a penalty on M/s CIFCPL of Rs. 3,00,000, Mr. AR, Managing Director, Mr. SB, CEO (KMP), Mr. SCV, CFO (KMP), Ms. DS, Company Secretary, Mr. AS, CFO (KMP), Mr. AA, Additional Director and Mr. AKG, Company Secretary of amounting to Rs.1,00,000 each. M/s CIFCPL filed an appeal under section 454(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 against the adjudication order passed by the Registrar of Companies, Karnataka for default in compliance with the requirements of Section 161 of the Companies Act, 2013.

An opportunity of being heard was given on 27th October, 2022. The authorised representative Mr. SR, Practicing Company Secretary appeared and reiterated the submissions made in the application and requested to reduce the quantum of penalty as levied by RoC.

HELD

The Regional Director, after considering the submissions made by Mr. SR, facts of the case and taking into consideration the Order of Adjudication of Penalty under section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 issued by RoC, deemed that it would meet the ends of justice if the penalty levied by the Registrar of Companies, be appropriately reduced, as a mitigation.

The order of the RoC was modified and penalty was reduced for violation of section 161 of the Companies Act 2013, as mentioned below:

Penalty imposed
on

Penalty imposed
by Registrar of Companies, Karnataka

Penalty imposed
by the Regional Director (South East Region)

M/s CIFCPL

Rs.
3,00,000

Rs.
1,00,000

Mr. AR, Managing Director, Mr. SB, CEO (KMP), Mr. SCV,
CFO (KMP), Mr. AA, Additional Director Ms. DS, Company Secretary

Rs.
1,00,000
each * 5 =
Rs. 5,00,000/-

Rs.
50,000
each * 5 =
Rs. 2,50,000

Mr. AS, CFO (KMP) of M/s CIFCPL

Rs.
1,00,000

Rs.
5,000

Mr. AKG, CS of M/s CIFCPL

Rs.
1,00,000

Rs.
20,000

Total Penalty

Rs.
10,00,000

Rs.
3,75,000

SAT Dumps SEBI’S Pump-and-Dump Order in Bollywood Celebrity’s Case

BACKGROUND

A Bollywood celebrity and his family/associate were widely in the news recently because of a judgment SEBI made against them. SEBI held, in an interim and ex parte order, that they were allegedly involved in a pump-and-dump stock scam and made illicit profits. While this celebrity, Arshad Warsi (AW) and family/associate (together ‘AWS’), were alleged to have made Rs. 76 lakhs, the total profits made by the whole ‘group’ were about Rs. 41 crores. The 21 parties including AWS were debarred from stock markets, directed to impound these allegedly illicit profits in an escrow account and their bank accounts, and assets frozen in the interim.

This case is an example of how good intentions, and quick and extraordinary efforts can still result in serious injustice. While SEBI’s order shows quick action on all fronts including pursuing internet giants like YouTube for information and meticulously collating all information, it also shows how conclusions in law and facts ended up being flawed. The Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) came down harshly on the order and even laid down several prerequisites for future orders. The parties, at least some of them, clearly suffered due to this order, for which SAT repeatedly said, it had no evidence whatsoever. However, hopefully, since SEBI will be required to follow the pre-requisites and prove the basic assertions, other parties may not suffer in the future and if they do, they have this precedent to cite and get quick justice (the order of SEBI is dated 2nd March, 2023 and the order of SAT is 27th March, 2023).

QUICK SUMMARY

At the outset, it may be stated that the whole matter is still under investigation. The SEBI order is interim in nature. Such interim and ex parte orders are passed to ensure that a wrong is not being continued and also parties are not able to take actions in the meantime to frustrate justice. Being ex parte, it also obviously means that the parties have not been given any prior opportunity to present their case. Thus, all the assertions and ‘facts’ and statements made here are provisional and need to be taken as allegations.

That said, this was one of the countless cases that, if the findings are true, are serious and daring, almost brash, scams. It is not as if they have started with the invention of the internet. But the internet has given more opportunities to reach a wider audience, to audio-visual techniques of psychological manipulation, and also use anonymity. On the other hand, using digital methods also means leaving digital footprints which can be speedily tracked, collected and collated. Instead of using laboured methods of investigation, making calls, going door to door, etc., SEBI too can use digital means to fight digital-based scams.

The findings/allegations of SEBI as per the order are as follows. There were two companies whose share prices were ‘pumped’ up by a barrage of false information and reports mainly through YouTube. Though the modus operandi and even some parties were common in both the cases, here, we are concerned with one of these companies – Sadhna Broadcast Ltd (SBL). The perpetrators uploaded several videos on YouTube in channels having a following of lakhs of people. Their reach was further widened by paying crores of rupees to Google Ad sense, which helped in reaching people interested in investing. This was also supplemented by creating artificial trading, leading to an impression that there are numerous people eagerly interested in buying the shares. Thus, the combination of targeted messaging of good prospects of the company accompanied by such false trades and rising prices created a rush amongst gullible investors looking for quick and easy profits, and who feared missing the proverbial bus.

The scam ended like all other scams. The perpetrators started selling their holding at the artificially raised prices, pocketed the profits of tens of crores of rupees, leaving investors holding the shares at the price which then crashed back.

ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF ARSHAD WARSI, FAMILY, ASSOCIATE (AWS)

SEBI found that, amongst others, AWS had also purchased shares at relatively low prices and sold them at higher prices, thus making, in all, net profits of about Rs. 76 lakhs (this was very likely an erroneous calculation by SEBI, as discussed later). SEBI held that AWS, like some others, was a party to the scam and thus the strictures were passed against them too. SEBI also pointed out that call data records showed that AW had telephonic contact with the person accused to be the primary perpetrator of the scam.

Accordingly, AWS were required to impound the profits so made in an escrow account with a lien in favor of SEBI. Till they did that, their bank accounts were frozen and they were barred from alienating any of their assets. Further, they were barred from dealing in securities markets and their demat accounts were also frozen.

SEBI NEGLECTING A FUNDAMENTAL ACCOUNTING CALCULATION OF PROFITS/LOSSES?

SEBI did show that AWS had purchased and sold shares of SBL. This made their profits, as alleged by SEBI, illegal. However, the SEBI order itself showed certain significant other information. While AWS did buy and sell these shares, they again purchased more shares. These purchases were made not only at a higher price but also of a larger quantity. These shares remained, it appears from SEBI’s order, with AWS. SEBI consciously ignored these shares in stock since it stated that it was concerned with the profits made.

To some extent, this approach by SEBI may be justified if other facts also pointed to intimate involvement in the scam. It is common for parties engaged in volume creation to buy and sell shares in a circular manner. Thereafter the group can sell most of the shares but some shares need to remain in their hands. For the purposes of the scam committed by the group as a whole, the fact that there were shares in hand in one or more of the parties, even out of their purchases, may not be material.

However, in case of AWS, no other factor was present showing intimate involvement. These shares that remained in hand were purchased at a high price, and if one considered the value of the shares at the post scam rates, AWS actually suffered a significant loss. The net loss even after adjusting the earlier profits was very likely at least Rs. 1 crore.

However, as stated earlier, SEBI ignored this aspect.

APPEAL TO SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL (SAT) AND REVERSAL OF ORDER BY SAT

AWS filed an appeal with SAT. SAT went through the order and also heard both the sides. It noted several intriguing aspects. AWS was not involved at all in creation of the YouTube videos. Also, they did not feature in them. Neither did they recommend the shares to anyone. They had no connection (except one, discussed later) with either the main perpetrators or the other parties in terms of such scam. SAT repeatedly pointed out that there was not even an iota of evidence of guilt against AWS.

It was noted though that AW had a professional connection with the main alleged perpetrator. Such person, MS, had retained AW for a professional assignment in a film.

SAT noted yet another interesting aspect. AWS had purchased shares not from the public but from parties named in the order as being allegedly involved in the scam. Further, their sales too had counter parties named in the SEBI order. In other words, their profits were not made at all from any of the public investors.

Taking all the above into account, SAT ordered that the directions against AW and family to be reversed substantially. SAT repeatedly pointed out said that there was no evidence whatsoever against AWS of any involvement. However, it noted that considering the professional relation, even if this did not amount to any guilt, the fact remained that it did not totally rule out the guilty. SEBI had yet to complete the investigation and therefore it could not be ruled out that SEBI may find and present some evidence that would stand up, unlike the present situation where there was none. Accordingly, SAT ordered that AW and family should deposit 50 per cent of the profits in escrow and provide an undertaking to deposit the remaining 50 per cent in case of finding of confirmed guilt. As far as the associate of AW was concerned, there was no order of impounding of any profits. In view of this, all directions against her were reversed by SAT.

LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In its order, SAT repeatedly pointed out the dangers of hastily placing restrictions such as freezing of bank accounts, demat accounts, debarring persons from trading, etc. in ad interim, ex parte orders. Even if such restrictions are provisional, there have to be a certain level of evidence which point out to guilt. In the present case, there was none against AWS. SAT cited copiously from the order of Supreme Court (in Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 6 SCC 771) which had made detailed observations on the preconditions of making provisional attachment of bank accounts. These were applied in this case too. These should help not only guide SEBI in making orders in the future but also would help parties who have faced such directions from SEBI.

Having said that, it is also notable that this case received wide publicity because of the celebrity name and hence this order received detailed attention and analysis which otherwise possibly may not have received. Also, the celebrities, possibly unlike ordinary persons, could afford competent legal advice and also file an urgent appeal. This obviously helped them get relief in barely a month. The fact is that SEBI often passes such orders and the parties find that much of the restrictions continue for a long time till SEBI finally completes the investigation, issues show cause notices, and final orders. Till that time, parties continue to suffer.

Further, freezing of bank accounts and directions to deposit in the escrow account, the alleged profits are often made on a group basis, imposing joint and several liability. Thus, each person suffers such restrictions unless the whole profit is deposited, even if the profit may not be with him.

All in all, the order of SAT is welcome and an important precedent for future application.

Cross-Border Succession : Foreign Assets Of An Indian Resident

INTRODUCTION

We continue with our theme of cross-border succession planning. Last month’s Feature, examined issues in the context of a foreign resident leaving behind Indian assets. This month we explore the reverse situation, i.e., succession issues of an Indian resident leaving behind foreign assets. In the age of the Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) of the RBI, this has become a very important factor to be considered.

APPLICABLE LAW OF SUCCESSION

The first question to be addressed is which law of succession applies to such an Indian resident? Here the Indian Succession Act, 1925 would not be applicable. The relevant law of succession of the country where the assets are located would apply. It would have to be seen whether that country has a law similar to the Indian Succession Act which provides that succession to movables is governed by the law where the deceased was domiciled and succession to an immovable property is governed by the law of the land where the property is located. For instance, England has a law similar to India.

There are two basic legal systems in International Law ~ Civil Law and Common Law. Certain Civil Law jurisdiction countries, such as, France, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, etc., have forced heirship rules. Forced heirship means that a person does not have full freedom in selecting his beneficiaries under his Will. Certain close relatives must get a fixed share. This is a feature which is not found in Common Law countries, such as, the UK and India. Thus, an Indian has full freedom to prepare his Will as per his wishes and bequeath to whomsoever he wishes. This issue has been elaborated eloquently by the Supreme Court in its decision in Krishna Kumar Birla vs RS Lodha, (2008) 4 SCC 300 where it has held:

“Why an owner of the property executes a Will in favour of another is a matter of his/her choice. One may by a Will deprive his close family members including his sons and daughters. She had a right to do so. The court is concerned with the genuineness of the Will. If it is found to be valid, no further question as to why did she do so would be completely out of its domain. A Will may be executed even for the benefit of others including animals.

Countries in the Middle East, such as, the UAE, follow the Sharia Law. According to the Sharia Law forced heirship rules apply, i.e., a person does not have complete freedom in bequeathing his assets under a Will. The Federal Law No. (28) of 2005 on Personal Status applies in the UAE for all inheritance issues. When a non-Muslim dies intestate, the Sharia Law as applicable in the UAE would apply to his assets located in the UAE. Sharia Law provides more rights to a son as opposed to a daughter. However, if the non-Muslim were to make a Will and follow the necessary procedure, such as, translation to Arabic, attestation by authorities, etc., then the Sharia Law would not apply. In addition, certain free trade zones e.g., the DIFC in Dubai, gives the option of getting the Will registered with Courts located within their zone. This registration also results in Sharia Law not applying to the UAE assets of the deceased.

Since January 2023, the forced heirship in Switzerland has reduced from 3/4th share in the estate to ½ share. Thus, a person can now make a Will according to his choice for ½ of his estate located in Switzerland and the rest must go according to the law to the spouse and parents of the deceased. Louisiana in the US is the only State which has forced heirship rules since it was at one time a French colony. Trusts could be a solution for avoiding forced heirship rules.

ONE INDIAN WILL OR SEPARATE WILLS?

Is it advisable to make one consolidated Indian Will for all assets, wherever they may be located or should a person make a separate Will for India and one for each country where the assets are situated? The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law or UNIDROIT has a Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will. Member signatories to this Convention would recognise an International Will if made as per this Format. Thus, a person can make one consolidated Will under this Convention which would be recognised in all its signatories. This would preclude the need for making separate Wills for different countries. However, only a handful of countries such as, Australia, Canada, Italy, France, Belgium, Cyrpus, Russia, etc., have accepted this Convention. Countries, which have a major Indian diaspora such as, UAE, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, etc., are not signatories. Further, in the US, only 20 states have ratified this Convention, with the major states being, California and Illinois. Conspicuous by their absence are key States such as, Texas, Florida, New York, New Jersey, etc. Considering the limited applicability of the UNIDROIT Convention, it is a better idea to have horses for courses approach, i.e., a distinct Will for each jurisdiction where assets are located. For example, an Indian with assets in Dubai, could get his Will prepared according to the format prescribed by the Dubai International Financial Centre and register it with the DIFC Courts to avoid the applicability of Sharia Law.

International Wills would require probates/succession certificates/inheritance certificates as per the laws of the country in which the assets are located. Some nations that require a Probate / Certificate of Inheritance ~ US, Singapore, UAE, France, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Malaysia, South Africa, etc. Further, states in the US have their own Probate Laws and Probate Fees. For instance, Probate Costs are very high in the states of California and Connecticut. Thus, if a person dies leaving behind assets in these states, he would have to consider the costs as per the State Law.

Indian residents should examine whether their foreign Wills for foreign assets need to follow forced heirship rules if that country is governed by such rules.

FEMA AND FOREIGN ASSETS OF A RESIDENT

The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 provides that a person residing in India may hold, own, transfer or invest in currency, security or any immovable property situated abroad, if such currency, security or property was acquired, held or owned by such person when he was a non-resident or inherited by him from a person who was a non-resident. Thus, a resident can own, hold and transfer such assets inherited by him.In addition, the Overseas Investment Rules, 2022 permit a person resident in India to acquire immovable property outside India by way of inheritance from a person resident in India who has acquired such property as per the foreign exchange provisions in force at the time of such acquisition. Hence, if a person has acquired a foreign property under LRS then his heirs can inherit the same from him. A person resident in India can also acquire foreign immovable property from a non-resident.

Further, a resident individual may, without any limit, acquire foreign securities by way of inheritance from a person resident in India who is holding such foreign securities in accordance with the provisions of the FEMA or from a person resident outside India. Again a person who has invested in shares under LRS can bequeath them to his legal heirs.

TAX PROVISIONS

Inheritance Tax / Estate Duty is applicable in several nations, such as, the US, UK, Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Thailand, South Africa, etc. These provisions apply to the global assets of a resident of these countries and should be carefully scrutinised to understand their implications. Belgium has the highest slab rate of estate duty with the peak duty touching 80 per cent! While there is no duty on movables located within Belgium, Belgian immovable property is subject to inheritance tax even for non-residents.Popular countries where Indians have assets and which do not levy estate duty include, UAE, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Mauritius, Australia, etc.

The US has the most complex and comprehensive Estate Duty Law. An Indian resident (who is neither a US citizen nor a Green Card holder) is subjected to estate duty on the US assets after a basic exemption limit of only US$60,000. On the other hand, a US citizen has a basic estate duty exemption limit of $12.92 million. However, the peak estate duty rate is the same for both at 40 per cent! Thus, consider an example of an Indian resident who has been regularly investing under the LRS in the shares of Apple Inc. His portfolio has now swelled up to a value of $3 million. On his demise, his estate would get an exemption of $60,000 and the balance sum of $2.94 million would be subject to US estate duty with the peak rate being 40 per cent. Add to this the US Probate costs and you could have a huge portion of the estate snipped off to taxes and duties.

Further, in the case of a US citizen who is living abroad, say, in India, while the basic exemption limit is $12.92 million, any inheritance to his estate by his non-US spouse is exempt only to the extent of $175,000. If it was a case of US citizen to US spouse estate transfer (even if both were residents of India), there would be no estate duty since marital transfers are exempt from duty.

The UK also levies Inheritance Tax @ 40 per cent after a basic exemption limit (known as the nil-rate band) of £325,000. In addition, one UK house up to £175,000 is also exempt. These limits apply also to foreigners owning assets in the UK. There are certain exemptions, such as, inter-spousal transfers. In addition, the UK and India have a Double Tax Avoidance Treaty in relation to Estate Duty. The UK also has look-back rules of up to 7 years and thus, in the case of certain gifts if the donor does not survive for 7 years after the gift, then the gift would also be subject to Inheritance Tax. Most countries, including the US, have a look back period of 3 years, the UK is quite unique in pegging this period at 7 years.

Switzerland has a unique system where the inheritance taxes are regulated by Cantons. Each Canton has the power to determine their own inheritance tax rate.

There is no Estate Duty/Inheritance tax in India on any inheritance/succession/transmission. Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act also exempts any receipt of an asset/money by Will/intestate succession. This exemption would also be available to receipt of foreign assets by Indian residents. There is no condition that the receipt under a Will/Succession/Inheritance must be from a relative. It could even be from a friend.

Residents who inherit any foreign assets must be careful and file Schedule FA in their income-tax Returns. They should also pay heed to whether the asset inherited by them consists of an undisclosed asset as per the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Shrivardhan Mohta vs UOI, [2019] 102 taxmann.com 273 (Calcutta) is relevant in this respect. Four undisclosed offshore bank accounts were found during a search on the assessee and action under the Black Money Act was initiated against him for non-disclosure of these accounts. The explanation given by the assesse was one of inheritance. The Court held that “Inheritance did not prevent him from disclosing. It is just an unacceptable excuse.” Thus, it would be the responsibility of the beneficiary to include foreign assets within his disclosure on receiving the same.

CONCLUSION

Estate planning, per se, is a complex exercise. Throw in a cross-border element and one is faced with a very dynamic, multi-faceted scenario which requires due consideration of both Indian and foreign tax and regulatory provisions.

Major Changes in the Functioning of Listed Companies Imminent

BACKGROUND

SEBI has recently, on 21st February, 2023, circulated a consultation paper (“the Paper”) proposing amendments relating to topics that fall under what is commonly understood as corporate governance. These have also been approved by SEBI at its Board meeting on 29th March, 2023. The actual amendments have not yet been notified, and hence the text of the new provisions is awaited.

The amendments are proposed to the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“the LODR Regulations”). These can be categorised into four broad areas:

a.    Agreements binding the listed entity, directly or indirectly.

b.    Special rights to certain shareholders.

c.    Sale, disposal or lease of assets outside the “scheme of arrangement route.”

d.    Certain directors having a tenure which does not require them to put themselves up for reappointment from time to time, which the Paper calls Board Permanency.

Other than (c), the remaining three effectively give some shareholders special rights, thus creating a category of shareholders that has more rights than others. This is against the principles of shareholder’s democracy where all the shareholders are equal in the sense of one share-one vote. The proposed amendments seek to correct this to some extent. The category in (c) is meant to place some checks on the transfer or lease of assets otherwise through the approval of NCLT under a scheme of arrangement.

It needs to be recollected and emphasised that these requirements will be over and above those contained in the Companies Act, 2013, for listed entities. Hence, the stricter of the two would apply in case of overlapping requirements.

As is generally the case, when SEBI decides to make amendments, it circulates a consultation paper for public comments, takes feedback, and then finalizes the amendment which SEBI has done this time too.

Some of the amendments proposed are far-reaching and have retrospective effect in the sense that they apply even to existing arrangements. These arrangements may end up being reversed if certain requirements are not complied with. Much also depends on the exact final wording of the new requirements in the law. In some cases, the wording proposed or otherwise used to describe changes, are capable of multiple interpretations. This could lead to confusion and possibly litigation.

Let us discuss each of the proposed amendments in detail as to their implications, if given effect to.

AGREEMENTS BINDING THE LISTED ENTITY, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY

Agreements that bind the company and are not in the ordinary course of business, if they have material implications, are something shareholders and the general investor public would want to know about. Under certain circumstances, where required in law, these may even require approval of the shareholders. The LODR Regulations do contain certain disclosure requirements relating to shareholder agreements and similar or other agreements.

However, SEBI has realized that there may be many more categories of such agreements where the company is not even a party but yet there may be material implications on the company. The promoters, management, etc., for example, may enter into such agreements. SEBI has now desired that certain agreements where, even if the company is not a party but if there are certain specified implications on it, there should be disclosure, approvals, etc. This is required where such an agreement, for example, “impacts management or control, whether or not entered into in the normal course of business” or if they “intend to restrict or create any liability” on the listed entity.

SEBI is of the view that such agreements require screening as to whether they are in the interests of the company. For this purpose, three requirements are now being proposed to be made.

Firstly, it is required that there should be disclosure to the company and the stock exchanges of such agreements.

Secondly, the Board of the company should examine such agreements and give its opinion “along with detailed rationale’ whether the agreement is “in the economic interest of the company.”

Thirdly, the agreement would be subject to the approval of the shareholders, by a “majority of the minority”, and that too by a special resolution. It is not specifically made clear what is ‘minority’ here but, taking a cue from other SEBI Regulations, it may mean shareholders other than the promoters.

Importantly, these requirements will also have an effect on existing agreements. Thus, even agreements that continue to be in force will have to undergo such disclosure and screening requirements.

The proposed new provisions would obviously have far-reaching effects. The fact that they apply to subsisting agreements made in the past can create difficulties for the company, for the parties, particularly for the counterparties. The company may have benefitted from such agreements which in many cases would have brought in issue proceeds to the company. This may enable the company/promoters/management to back out of commitments after having enjoyed the gains. But this could lead to litigation since the affected parties may seek recourse in law.

The terms used in the Paper such as “intend to create”, “economic interest”, “impact management or control”, etc. are not defined and in any case, are not precise. The term “control” has already been the subject of past controversy and grey areas still remain. These uncertainties may further compound the difficulties.

It remains to be seen whether the actual text of the amendments resolve these issues, or adds to them!

SPECIAL RIGHTS TO CERTAIN SHAREHOLDERS

Very often, agreements are entered into with investors whereby certain rights are given to them. This may include a right to nominate one or more directors on the Board, consent/veto rights on important matters, etc. To give fuller binding effect to such clauses, they are usually incorporated in the Articles of Association of the company.

SEBI has pointed out, and to this extent rightly so, that such rights put certain shareholders on a pedestal. Though all the shareholders of the same class are meant to be equal, particularly in the sense of one share-one vote, these shareholders are more equal than the others and get special treatment. They get a right, for example, to nominate a director on the Board which otherwise only shareholders having a majority of the voting shareholders would have. They can block certain decisions proposed by the company that ordinary shareholders, even those holding relatively substantial holdings, may not have.

SEBI has now proposed that such special rights shall be subject to review by way of approval of shareholders once every five years. This proposal applies even to existing agreements, and companies would be bound to take such approval within five years of the notification of the amendments.

This requirement too is well intended. But it suffers from the same issues as the preceding proposal. It enables the company to take benefits from an investor but the rights may lapse after five years if the shareholders do not approve at the time of such renewal. Considering that the proposals apply even to existing arrangements, the impact is wider and again, like the preceding proposal, may create difficulties for the investors as also the company, promoters, etc.

SALE, DISPOSAL OR LEASE OF ASSETS OUTSIDE THE “SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT” ROUTE

Disposal of substantial assets can be carried out either through the scheme of arrangement route through approval by the National Company Law Tribunal or by the shareholders, depending on the nature of the transaction. Certain disposal of assets may not attract either approval though, but in the present case, we are concerned with those that require such approval.

Where approval of the NCLT is required, SEBI has no further suggestions. However, in case of “slump sale” outside this NCLT route, SEBI has recommended that there should be a disclosure of “the objects and commercial rationale” for such transactions.

Moreover, it is required that there should be approval of the shareholders in the form of the majority of the minority. This is in addition to the requirement of special resolution under the Companies Act, 2013. SEBI believes that this would give a say to the minority shareholders and thus they would be able to reject a proposal that would affect their interests adversely.

END TO ‘PERMANENCY’ OF CERTAIN DIRECTORS

SEBI has noted that certain directors are not required by law, contractual arrangements, etc. to retire and hence, for all practical purposes, are ‘permanent’. What is effectively meant is that shareholders do not have an opportunity to consider from time to time whether they are giving worthwhile services on the Board and whether they should be continued. Other directors ‘retire by rotation’ and hence shareholders have a chance to deny them reappointment. The law itself permits part of the Board to be non-retiring. The articles may even provide that some directors are for ‘lifetime’. SEBI considers this position as not a desirable one. Hence, it has proposed that all directors should be required to present themselves for reappointment at least once in five years. This applies even to existing directors and those directors who would have completed tenure of five years as on 31st March, 2024 without having been subject to reappointment by shareholders, may be required to present themselves for reappointment at the first general meeting of the company after 1st April, 2024. However, since the amendments, as this article is being written, are still not notified, it is possible that this date may be extended.

Technically speaking and in law, no director is really ‘permanent’ and ordinarily any director can be removed by a simple/special majority. Hence, in this sense, the position may appear the same that if a majority of shareholders are required to approve the reappointment, the same majority can remove him or her.

However, this does not always solve the problem. Firstly, removal of the directors is not always easy since an attempt by shareholders to remove a director may be met with resistance and litigation and thus, at the very least, delays. Secondly, the articles may provide for a complex procedure including a supermajority to remove a particular director or directors. Whether such a provision is valid in law and also in due compliance with requirements, may become another point of litigation and hence yet another hurdle in the removal of a director. The new requirements of SEBI, if implemented, may effectively overcome such difficulties and thus every director may end up having to regularly present himself before shareholders for reappointment.

CONCLUSION

The recommendations are noteworthy, to say the least and could create difficulties for many listed companies, and may even be partly counterproductive. One also hopes that SEBI has received extensive feedback on this and that in the actual final amendments, there will be some relief.

Cross-Border Succession: Indian Assets Of A Foreign Resident

INTRODUCTION

We live in a global village and cross-border acquisition of assets has become an extremely common phenomenon. Cases of both, Indians acquiring assets abroad and foreign residents acquiring Indian assets, are increasing. With this come issues of cross-border succession and Wills. What happens when a person living abroad dies leaving behind Indian assets and when an Indian resident dies, leaving behind foreign assets? Which law should apply and which Wills would prevail? These are some of the myriad complex questions which one grapples with in such scenarios. Let us, in this month’s Feature, examine some such posers in the context of a foreign resident leaving behind Indian assets.

APPLICABLE LAW OF SUCCESSION

The first question to be addressed is which law of succession applies to such a foreign resident? The Indian Succession Act, 1925 (“the Act”) provides that succession to the immovable property in India, of a person deceased shall be regulated by the law of India, wherever such a person may have had his domicile at the time of his death. However, succession to his moveable property is regulated by the law of the country in which such person had his domicile at the time of his death. For example, A, having his domicile in England, dies in UK, leaving property, both moveable and immovable, in India. The succession to the immovable property would be regulated by the law of India but the succession to the moveable property is regulated by the English rules which govern the succession to the moveable property of an Englishman. The Act further provides that a person can have only one domicile for the purpose of the succession to his moveable property. If a person dies leaving the moveable property in India, then, in the absence of proof of any domicile elsewhere, succession to the property is regulated by the law of India.

The Act provides that the domicile of origin of every person of legitimate birth is in the country in which at the time of his birth his father was domiciled; or, if he was born after his father’s death, then in the country in which his father was domiciled at the time of the father’s death. However, the domicile of origin of an illegitimate child is in the country in which, at the time of his birth, his mother was domiciled. The domicile of a minor follows the domicile of the parent from whom he derived his domicile of origin. Except as provided by the Act, a person cannot, during minority, acquire a new domicile.

By marriage a woman acquires the domicile of her husband, if she had not the same domicile before. A wife’s domicile during her marriage follows the domicile of her husband.

The domicile of origin prevails until a new domicile has been acquired which can be done by taking up his fixed habitation in a country which is not that of his domicile of origin. The law further provides that a man is not to be deemed to have taken up his fixed habitation in India merely by reason of his residing in India or by carrying or the civil, military, naval or air force service of Government, or in the exercise of any profession or calling. Thus, a person who comes to India for business does not ipso facto acquire an Indian domicile. There must be intent to remain in India forever and for an uncertain period of time. The Act gives an example of A, whose domicile of origin is in England, comes to India, where he settles as a barrister or a merchant, intending to reside there during the remainder of his life. His domicile would now be in India.

However, if A, whose domicile is in England, goes to reside in India to wind up the affairs of a partnership which has been dissolved, and with the intention of returning to England as soon as that purpose is accomplished, then he does not by such residence acquire a domicile in India, however long the residence may last. But if in the same example, A, having gone to reside in India, afterwards alters his intention, and takes up his fixed habitation in India, then he has acquired a domicile in India.

The Act provides that any person may acquire a domicile in India by making and depositing before the State Government, a declaration of his desire to acquire such domicile; provided that he has been resident in India for one year immediately preceding the time of his making such declaration. A new domicile continues until the former has been resumed or another has been acquired.

The Act also provides that the above provisions pertaining to domicile would not apply to a Hindu / Buddhist / Sikh / Jain or to a Muslim since they are governed by their personal law of succession. Hence, the above provisions would apply mainly to Christians, Parsees, Jews, etc. However, even though the Act does not apply to these five communities, the Rules of Private International Law (on which the provisions of the Act are based) would apply to them.

ONE WILL OR SEPARATE INDIAN WILL?

Is it advisable to make one consolidated Will for all assets, wherever they may be located or should a person make a separate Will for each country where assets are situated? The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law or UNIDROIT has a Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will. Member signatories to this Convention would recognise an International Will if made as per this Format. Thus, a person can make one consolidated Will under this Convention which would be recognised in all its signatories. This would preclude the need for making separate Wills for different countries.

However, only a handful of countries such as, Australia, Canada, Italy, France, Belgium, Cyrpus, Russia, etc., have accepted this Convention. India is not a signatory to this Convention.

Considering the limited applicability of the UNIDROIT Convention, it is a better idea to have a ‘horses for courses’ approach, i.e., a distinct Will for each jurisdiction where assets are located. Thus, a foreign resident should make a separate Indian Will for his Indian assets.

PROBATE OF A FOREIGN WILL IN INDIA

International Wills

Consider a situation of a person who is domiciled in the UK but also has several immovable properties and assets in India. This individual dies in the UK and has prepared a Will for his UK estate. This also includes a bequest for his Indian properties. How would this Will be executed in India?

According to the Indian Succession Act, 1925, no right as an executor or a legatee of a Will can be established in any Court unless a Court has granted a probate of the Will under which the right is claimed.

A probate means the copy of the Will certified by the seal of a Court along with the list of assets. Probate of a Will establishes its authenticity and finality, and validates all the acts of the executors. It conclusively proves the validity of the Will and after a probate has been granted no claim can be raised about its genuineness.. This probate provision applies to all Christians and to those Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists who are / whose immovable properties are situated within the territory of West Bengal or the Presidency Towns of Madras and Bombay (i.e., West Bengal or Tamil Nadu or Maharashtra). Thus, for Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists who are / whose immovable properties are situated outside the territories of West Bengal or Tamil Nadu or Maharashtra, a probate is not required.

Section 228 of the Indian Succession Act deals with a case where the Will has been executed by a non-resident. It provides that where a Will has been proved in a foreign court and a properly authenticated copy of such Will is produced before a Court in India, then letters of administration may be granted by the Indian Court with a copy of such Will annexed to the same. A letters of administration is at par with a probate of a Will and it entitles the holder of the letters of administration to all rights belonging to the deceased as if the administration had been granted at the moment after his death. Basically, while a probate is granted for a testate succession (i.e., one where there is a will), a letters of administration is granted for an intestate succession (i.e., one where there is no will). However, in case of a foreign Will, instead of a probate, a letters of administration is granted.

FEMA AND INDIAN ASSETS OF A FOREIGN RESIDENT

Section6 (5) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 provides that a person resident outside India may hold, own, transfer or invest in Indian currency, security or any immovable property situated in India if such currency, security or property was acquired, held or owned by such person when he was resident in India or inherited from a person who was resident in India. Thus, a non-resident (whether of Indian origin or not) has been given express permission to inherit such Indian assets from a resident Indian.

Further, Rule 24 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 provides that an NRI or an OCI may acquire any immovable property in India by way of inheritance from a person resident outside India who had acquired such property:

(i) in accordance with the provisions of the foreign exchange law in force at the time of acquisition by him; or

(ii) from a person resident in India.

When contrasted with Section 6(5), it would be evident that the general permission under Rule 24 is only for NRIs and Overseas Citizens of India, whereas Section 6(5) is for all persons resident outside India. Thus, a foreign citizen of Indian origin, who does is not an OCI, i.e., he is only a Person of Indian Origin, would not be eligible for automatic permission to inherit the property mentioned under Rule 24.

RBI’s Master Direction on Remittance of Assets provides that a Citizen of a foreign state may have inherited assets in India from a person resident outside India who acquired the assets (being immovable property, securities, cash, etc.) when he was an Indian resident or is a spouse of a deceased Indian national and has inherited assets from such Indian spouse. Such a Foreign Citizen can remit an amount not exceeding US$ 1 million per year if he produces documentary proof in support of the legacy, e.g., a Will. “Assets” for this purpose include, funds representing a deposit with a bank or a firm or a company, provident fund balance or superannuation benefits, amount of claim or maturity proceeds of insurance policies, sale proceeds of shares, securities, immovable properties or any other asset held in accordance with the FEMA Regulations.

Further, a Non-Resident Indian or a Person of Indian Origin, who has received a legacy under a Will, can remit from his Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) Account an amount not exceeding US$ 1 million per year if he produces documentary proof in support of the legacy, e.g., a Will. The meaning of the term “Assets” is the same as that above. In addition, a similar amount is also allowed to be repatriated in respect of assets acquired by the NRI / PIO under a deed of settlement made by either of his/ her parents or a relative as defined in Companies Act, 2013. The settlement should take effect on the death of the settler. Relative for this purpose means, spouse, siblings, children, daughter-in-law and son-in-law. Further, step-parents, step-children and step-siblings are also included within the definition. There is no express mention about adoptive parents. However, various Supreme Court decisions have held that once all formalities of adoption are validly completed, the adopted child becomes as good as the biological child of the adoptive parents. The term settlement is not defined under the FEMA Regulations and hence, one may refer to definitions under other laws. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 defines a settlement to mean any non-testamentary disposition (i.e., not by Will), in writing, of moveable or immovable property made–

(a) in consideration of marriage,

(b) for the purpose of distributing property of the settler among his family or those for whom he desires to provide, or for the purpose of providing for some person dependent on him, or

(c) for any religious or charitable purpose;

and includes an agreement in writing to make such a disposition.

The Specific Relief Act, 1963 defines a settlement to mean an instrument (other than a Will or codicil as defined by the Indian Succession Act, 1925), whereby the destination or devolution of successive interests in movable or immovable property is disposed of or is agreed to be disposed of.

A declaration of Trust has also been held to be a settlement in the case of Sita Ram vs. Board of Revenue, AIR 1979 All 301. In the case of Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs P.A. Muthukumar, AIR 1979 Mad 5, the Full Bench examined the question of whether a deed was a settlement or a trust? The Court held that the quintessence of the definition of the word ‘settlement’ in Section 2(24)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act was that the property should be distributed among the members of the family of the author of the trust or should be ordained to be given to those near and dear to him. In the absence of any such clause express or implied to be culled out by necessary implication from out of the instrument to conclude about distribution of property, either movable or immovable among the settlor’s heirs or relatives, it would be difficult to hold that an instrument should be treated as a settlement.

In case of a remittance exceeding the above limits, an application for prior permission can be made to the Reserve Bank of India.

TAX PROVISIONS

Inheritance Tax / Estate Duty is applicable in several nations, such as, the USA, UK, Germany, France, etc. These provisions apply to the global assets of a resident of these countries.

The USA has the most complex and comprehensive Estate Duty Law. A US Resident leaving behind Indian assets would be subject to US Estate Duty on the Indian Assets. Currently, the US has a Federal Estate Duty exemption of US$12.92 million which can be utilized by the estate of a person even for foreign assets. In addition, there is no estate duty on marital transfers, i.e., between US spouses. Hence, if a US person leaves his global assets to his Wife (who should also be a US person), then there is no estate duty. However, if the spouse is a non-US person, then the estate duty exemption is only US$175,000. US Federal Estate duty rates are as high as 40 per cent above the exemption limit.

Further, several US States, such as, NY, Illinois, Washington, etc., levy a State Estate Duty for its residents who die leaving behind estate. Key states which do not levy Estate Duty, include, Texas, Florida, etc.

In addition, six  states (Iowa, Kentucky,  Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) levy a State Inheritance Tax, i.e., a tax paid by the recipient on the assets received from a deceased. Thus, for recipients staying in these six states, the estate of the deceased would be subject to a Federal Estate Tax, may have to pay a State Estate Duty and then the recipients would also pay State Inheritance Tax.

There is no Estate Duty / Inheritance tax in India on any inheritance/succession/transmission. Section 56 (2) (x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 also exempts any receipt of an asset / money by Will / intestate succession. This exemption would also be available to receipt by non-residents in cases covered by Section 9 (1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, i.e., receipt of sum of money by a non-resident from a resident.

CONCLUSION

Estate planning, per se, is a complex exercise. In a cross-border element, one is faced with a very dynamic, multi-faceted scenario which requires due consideration of both Indian and foreign tax and regulatory provisions.

SEBI Acts against Pump-N-Dump Operations through Telegram Channels

BACKGROUND

SEBI, on 25th January, 2023, passed a detailed interim order (in the matter of Superior Finlease Ltd) against persons allegedly involved in market manipulation through the popular messaging app, Telegram. This followed several search and seizure operations conducted about a year ago at multiple locations where SEBI seized, amongst other things, mobiles, hard disks, etc. SEBI found that a well-organized scam using the age-old “pump and dump” method was being carried out with illicit gains of Rs. 3.89 crores generated. SEBI carried out an elaborate and methodical investigation to join the various dots together. This revealed several interesting facts and issues, legal and otherwise. While such scams are regularly seen and even predictable now in their pattern, this was perhaps one unique case where the bare bones of the modus operandi were exposed in detail. SEBI carried out searches that enabled it to get its hands on mobile devices which contained lurid and explicit details of the scam.

At the outset, though, it must be emphasised that this was an interim order. Interim orders are usually passed in cases where the regulator cannot wait for the investigation and further proceedings to be wholly completed and only final orders are passed. Waiting a long time may not only mean that the scam could go on, but the illicit profits may also be diverted and the evidence destroyed, etc. However, this also means that the order lays down findings of SEBI to which the parties may have had no opportunity of presenting their side. Thus, it would be a one-sided case at that stage. Often, such orders are appealed against particularly if it is found that they contain grave errors and charges, and would result in injustice and even besmirching of the names of innocent parties. Appellate authorities do give relief in case of obvious errors or if it is found that the losses caused to parties may be irreversible and more than the benefit obtained by such order. Hence, the findings and conclusions in this order (and the discussion here) should be treated as mere allegations at this point.

Nonetheless, SEBI deserves due credit not just for the elaborate investigation and detective work including of technical aspects, but also for expressing its findings well in the order with graphs, transcripts of conversations and even sharing their recordings.

WHAT IS PUMP-AND-DUMP?

Pump and dump operations are age-old. And, sadly, they work again and again. Even SEBI has recognized the human psychology involved, where, the public and particularly lay investors, get a Fear of Missing Out (FOMO, as how this has become part of today’s popular slang) and act. This is partly because of greed which blinds them to rational and skeptical analysis and partly because of the sense of urgency created by the operators.

Pump and dump involve, as is obvious from the term, two parts. One is the initial part of pumping up the price. This involves two aspects. One is, of course, the steady raising of the price of the shares of the concerned company. This is done by a group of operators trading amongst themselves at a successively higher price. The second is creating volumes, though this may not always be the case. Nevertheless, high volumes create an appearance of credibility that there are many buyers even at higher prices.

Usually, most of the shares of the company are in the hands of this group of persons since otherwise, the public shareholders who see the price rising may sell their holding which could not only result in a fall in prices but also increase the cost of the operations. Thus, such operations are often carried out in companies that have little operations. Having said that, such operations are also seen in fully functioning companies where the idea is to pump up the price to enable a further issue of shares/securities at a higher price or simply to offload holdings to raise funds.

The second part involves dumping the shares at the higher price to the unsuspecting and expectant public who are eager to acquire these shares since they are promised a much higher price later. At this stage, the operators are selling and the public is buying. Of course, as was actually seen in this case too, the operators may have to step in if the price falls due to reasons such as some sellers coming in. Shares are thus offloaded within a price range and then the operators pack their bags and leave the investors high and dry.

SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION AND FINDING IN THIS CASE INCLUDING INTERESTING ASPECTS

SEBI received complaints that certain telegram channels were giving out tips for dealings in shares through telegram channels. Telegram, as is well known, is a popular messaging application with others including WhatsApp, Signal, etc., and of course, the regular SMS services. Interestingly, action has already been taken in respect of stock manipulation scams through SMS messages by restricting messages with the use ‘buy’, ‘sell’, etc. However, acting against apps is more difficult as they are privately owned and also have secrecy features built in. Telegram has become more popular since it has many more features including anonymity, larger size of groups, etc.

SEBI followed such channels and noted that they did engage in giving out tips. Importantly, it was found that just the two channels put together had a subscriber base of more than 23 lakh persons. This was the ready audience the operators had and, as SEBI notes, even if a minuscule number of these people fell to the scam, it was enough for it to succeed and illicit gains of crores be made.

What is more, the channels also had paid subscribers. For getting periodic tips in various ranges, the subscribers paid periodic (weekly/fortnightly/monthly) subscriptions of Rs. 5000-10000. This by itself was a money-making operation. It may be noted that several SEBI regulations deal with such giving of tips, whether for money or otherwise, and if these are given by unregistered persons or against regulations, they are illegal. SEBI has, in recent times, passed numerous orders against such unregistered persons making recommendations.

SEBI found that there was an alleged mastermind who controlled a listed company and a broking firm. He approached certain intermediaries who in turn involved other persons including those who operated such telegram channels. SEBI found that the mobiles they seized had actual recordings of telephonic conversations between the parties where they summarized how broadly the scam would be managed and how they would share the profits. SEBI found that the parties had agreed that the portion of the price above Rs. 100 would be paid as a commission by the sellers to the other persons involved. There was discussion of even how a certain percentage of this commission would be retained for contingencies. The alleged mastermind was said to have even stated in this regard, justifying the retention, that “Mein beimaan aadmi nahi hu lekin…” (“I am not a cheat but…”). Considering that the whole operation was allegedly for making fraudulent profits from unsuspecting lay public investors, the irony cannot be missed.

Then there were messages of the actual working of the profits made and the amounts to be shared along with how they were paid or to be paid.

SEBI investigated methodically several things in this regard. It tracked the movement of the prices of the shares, their volumes and the persons who engaged in the trading leading to D-day when the offloading was to happen. It gave findings of a connection between these parties including how the trading was financed by the alleged mastermind. Thereafter, screenshots of the recommendations through messages in the telegram channel to buy such shares with the high target prices (and also the stop loss price) were found and given in the order. SEBI also not only tracked the number of calls between the parties including the total time of such calls, but it also traced the mobile locations to further support its case of connections between the parties. The bank account statements of some of the parties were analysed to show the flow of funds which were then linked with the agreed plan of financing and also sharing of the illicit profits.

Statements of parties were taken, and certain parties were said to have confessed and also explained the modus operandi and the role of various parties.

At the end, in this 93-page long order, SEBI concluded that multiple violations of law appeared to have taken place and also there was a need for immediate interim order giving directions. Accordingly, SEBI gave certain directions against 19 parties. It required that the total illicit profits of about Rs. 3.89 crores be impounded and incidental directions to banks, etc. not to permit debits to accounts till the money was paid, were given. It directed the parties not to buy or sell, such securities till further orders. Finally, the interim order was also to be treated as a show cause notice to parties asking them to give their responses as to why final adverse directions such as that of disgorgement, debarment, penalty, etc. not be passed.

SOME LEGAL ISSUES

As stated, the order is interim and comprises a set of allegations that do not give parties an opportunity to present their case. SEBI may also carry out further investigations and place them before the parties. It is thus possible that as the case progresses, perhaps also in appeals, there may be changes in the stated findings, conclusions, allegations, etc. Nonetheless, several legal questions can be considered at this stage itself that may be raised and ultimately resolved either by SEBI or by appellate authorities. Hence, the progress of this order would be worth tracking to see how such a case, perhaps the first of its kind in many aspects such as use of messaging apps, search and seizure, telephone recording, etc., progresses.

One issue is that the order is a combined one against 19 parties, who may be placed in unequal positions. Though SEBI has divided the roles of certain groups of parties, the law would require that each person’s guilt be individually established. An important aspect here is placing joint and several liabilities on a group of persons who are alleged to have jointly acted – and profited – from a part of the alleged scam. This has been questioned in the past and rightly so.

Then there are alleged confessions and statements. These may be retracted, possibly on grounds that they were made under duress, and the question of their validity would thus arise. In any case, other parties may seek cross-examination particularly if these statements are implicating them.

There are voice recordings taken from the mobile. There may be questions raised whether they are indeed of the persons that SEBI claims they were. And whether there would be a need under the law of expert voice analysis.

The transactions in the bank have been alleged to be for financing the trades, sharing illicit gains, etc. While there may be other corroborating evidences, the question in law would be whether other explanations may be plausible.

Also open to challenge are the reasons for mobile calls between the parties. Since, except for the recording found on the mobile itself, there are no details of what was discussed in the call, whether allegations that these show connections between parties would stand in law.

There are many other issues. Having said that, the Supreme Court (in Rakhi Trading ((2018) 143 CLA 15)) and Kishore R. Ajmera ((2016) 131 CLA 187) has created strong precedents to enable SEBI to apply lower benchmarks of proof in civil proceedings. However, if SEBI also initiates prosecution against these parties, the higher benchmark of proof may be applied, and hence the aforesaid issues may need stronger countering.

Finally, there is the issue of disgorgement of the illicit profits. These profits clearly correspond to the losses incurred by investors who fell prey to the scam. However, there are no explicit provisions in law to enable return of these profits to these investors.

CONCLUSION

While there is no solution to the greed amongst the public, which will regularly result in cases of cheating, it is also true that new technologies have made it even easier to reach a larger populace, anonymously and cheaply. Even right now, a simple search on telegram or even google, shows up multiple telegram channels, Twitter handles, etc. which claim to give ‘hot tips’ for stocks, futures and options. Close down one, and many more may crop up. However, SEBI’s making an example of a few may lead not only to a strong disincentive to others, but also awareness amongst the public. However, in practice, pursuing such cases could take longer and require evidence that stands up in law.

IBC & SC in Vidarbha Industries: NCLT May or Should Admit a Financial Creditor’s Application?

INTRODUCTION

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in payment of a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code, may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default in respect of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default in respect of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

An interesting question has arisen as to whether the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) is bound to admit a plea for a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) filed by a financial creditor against a corporate debtor or does it have the discretion to refuse to admit it, if the debtor is otherwise financially healthy? The Supreme Court in the case of Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd vs. Axis Bank Ltd, [2022] 140 taxmann.com 252 (SC) has given a very interesting reply to this very crucial question. A subsequent review petition has upheld the earlier decision of the Apex Court. Now, once again in an appeal filed before the Supreme Court, this decision has been questioned. This shows the importance of this decision to matters under the Code. Let us examine the issue at hand.

FINANCIAL CREDITOR’S APPLICATION

To refresh, the following terms are important under the Code:

a)    A corporate debtor is a corporate person (company, LLP, etc.,) who owes a debt to any person. Here it is interesting to note that defined financial service providers are not covered by the purview of the Code. Thus, insolvency and bankruptcy of NBFCs, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, etc., are not covered by this Code. However, if these financial service providers are creditors of any corporate debtor, they can seek recourse under the Code.

b)    A debt means a liability or an obligation in respect of a claim and could be a financial debt or an operational debt. Financial debt is defined as a debt along with an interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money. An operational debt is defined as a claim for the provision of goods or services or employment dues or Government dues.

c)    It is also relevant to note the meaning of the term default which is defined as non-payment of debt when the whole or any part has become due and payable and is not repaid by the debtor.

The process for a CIRP filed by a financial creditor is as follows:

(a)    Financial creditors can file an application before the NCLT once a default (for a financial debt) occurs for initiating a corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor.

(b)    The NCLT would decide within 14 days whether or not a default has occurred.

(c)    Section7 (5)(a) of the Code provides that -if the NCLT is satisfied that a default has occurred and the application filed by the financial creditor is complete, it may, by order, admit such an application.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT IN VIDARBHA

In the case of Vidarbha (supra), the corporate debtor was a power-generating company which due to a fund crunch defaulted in its dues to a bank. It had however, received an Order from the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity in its favour which when implemented would result in an inflow of Rs.1,730 crores and would take care of its liquidity position. The NCLT admitted the application of the bank and held that all that was required to check whether there was a default of debt and whether the application, was complete. This Order was upheld by the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). Both the forums held that they were not concerned with the abovementioned favourable order which the debtor had received.

A Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court observed that the objective of the Code was to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals, in a time-bound manner, inter alia, for maximization of the value of the assets of such persons, promoting entrepreneurship and availability of credit, balancing the interest of all the stakeholders and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

It held that both, the NCLT and the NCLAT proceeded on the premises that an application must necessarily be entertained under section7(5)(a) of the Code, if a debt existed and the corporate debtor was in default of payment of debt. In other words, the NCLT found section 7(5)(a) of the IBC to be mandatory.

Thus, the Supreme Court framed the question before it as whether section 7(5)(a) was a mandatory or a discretionary provision. In other words, could the expression ‘may’ be construed as ‘shall’?

It proceeded to answer the question by holding that there was no doubt that a corporate debtor who was in the red should be resolved expeditiously, following the timelines in the IBC. No extraneous matter should come in the way. However, the viability and overall financial health of the Corporate Debtor were not extraneous matters. When the corporate debtor had an Award of Rs. 1,730 crores in its favour, such a factor could not be ignored by the NCLT in considering its financial health. It laid down a principle that the existence of a financial debt and default in payment thereof only gave the financial creditor the right to apply for initiation of CIRP. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) was required to apply its mind to relevant factors and the overall financial health and viability of the Corporate Debtor under its existing management.

It strongly relied upon the fact that the Legislature had, in its wisdom, chosen to use the expression “may” in section 7(5)(a) of the IBC and had it been the legislative intent that section 7(5)(a) of the IBC should be a mandatory provision, the Legislature would have used the word ‘shall’ and not the word ‘may’.

It compared the position of a financial creditor with that of an operational creditor. Section 8 of the Code provided for the initiation of a resolution by an operational creditor. There were noticeable differences between the procedure by which a financial creditor could initiate resolution and the procedure by which an operational creditor could do so. The operational creditor, on occurrence of a default, was required to serve on the corporate debtor, a demand notice of the unpaid operational debt. If payment is not received within 10 days of this Notice, the operational creditor could file a petition before the NCLT. The Supreme Court observed the wordings of s.9(5)(i) of the Code in this respect

“9(5) The Adjudicating Authority shall, within fourteen days of the receipt of the application under sub-section (2), by an order

(i) admit the application……………..”

The Court concluded that the Legislature had used the word ‘may’ in section 7(5)(a) of the Code in respect of an application initiated by a financial creditor against a corporate debtor but had used the expression ‘shall’ in an otherwise almost identical provision of section 9(5) relating to the initiation of insolvency by an operational creditor. The Court gave an explanation on when the word “may” could be construed as “shall” and when it remained “may”.

The Legislature intended section 9(5)(a) to be mandatory but section 7(5)(a) to be discretionary. The rationale for this dichotomy was explained and it held that the law consciously differentiated between financial creditors and operational creditors, as there was an innate difference between financial creditors, in the business of investment and financing, and operational creditors in the business of supply of goods and services. Financial credit was usually secured and of much longer duration. Such credits, which were often long-term credits, on which the operation of the corporate debtor depends, could not be equated to operational debts which were usually unsecured, of shorter duration and of a lesser amount.

The financial strength and nature of business of a financial creditor were not comparable with that of an operational creditor, engaged in the supply of goods and services. The impact of the non-payment of admitted dues could be far more serious on an operational creditor than on a financial creditor.

In the case of financial debt, there was flexibility. The NCLT was conferred the discretion to admit the application of the financial creditor. If facts and circumstances so warranted, it could keep the admission in abeyance or even reject the application. A very telling statement was that it was certainly not the object of the Code to penalise solvent companies, temporarily defaulting in repayment of their financial debts, by the initiation of insolvency.

It however, concluded that the discretionary power of the NCLT could not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

REVIEW PETITION

A review petition was filed before the Supreme Court in the case of Axis Bank Ltd vs. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd, Review Petition (Civil) No. 1043 of 2022. It was contended that the above judgment was rendered per incuriam since it ignored an earlier Two-Judge Decision in E. S. Krishnamurthy vs. Bharath Hi-Tech Builders Pvt Ltd (2022) 3 SCC 161. In that case, the Court had held that NCLT must either admit or reject an application. These were the only two courses of action which were open to the NCLT in accordance with s. 7(5).

The NCLT could not compel a party to the proceedings before it to settle a dispute. Thus, it was contended that the NCLT had no discretionary power. The Supreme Court rejected the Review Application by holding that the question of whether section7(5)(a) was mandatory or discretionary was not an issue in the above judgment. The only issue was whether the NCLT could foist a settlement on unwilling parties. That issue was answered in the negative.

In the Review Application, the Solicitor General also contended that Vidarbha’s decision could be interpreted in a manner that might be contrary to the aims and objects of the Code and could render the law infructuous. The Apex Court held that such an apprehension appeared to be misconceived. Hence, the review petition was dismissed.

FOLLOWED BY NCLAT

Subsequently, Vidarbha’s decision was followed by the NCLAT in Jag Mohan Daga vs Bimal Kanti Chowdhary, CA (AT) (Insolvency) No. 848 of 2022. The NCLAT held that the dispute was a family dispute which was given the colour of a financial creditor’s dues.

The NCLAT set aside the admission of the plea by the NCLT on the grounds that the Supreme Court in Vidarbha has clearly laid down that it was not mandatory that s. 7 applications were to be admitted merely on proof of debt and default. Petitions should not be allowed to continue when the financial creditor proceeded under the Code not for the purposes of resolution of insolvency of the corporate debtor but for other purposes with some other agenda. The NCLAT held that the NCLT should not permit such an insolvency petition to go on which had been initiated to settle an internal family business dispute.

APPEAL AGAINST NCLAT / VIDARBHA AGAIN QUESTIONED

An appeal was filed before the Supreme Court (Maganlal Daga HUF vs. Jag Mohan Daga, CA 38798/2022) against the above-mentioned NCLAT decision. The matter was heard by a Three-Judge Bench and it noted that the NCLAT relied on Vidarbha’s decision against which the review petition was rejected. Once again the Petitioners contended that Vidarbha’s decision ran contrary to the settled position of law. The Solicitor General again pleaded that the principle which was enunciated in Vidarbha was liable to dilute the substratum of the Code. This appeal is still pending.

MCA’S DISCUSSION PAPER

Realising the gravity of the decision in Vidarbha’s case, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) issued a Discussion Paper on 18th January, 2023 highlighting the proposed changes to the Code. One of the key changes is a proposed amendment to s. 7(5)(a) making it mandatory to admit the application if other conditions are met. Thus, the disparity between section 7(5) and section 9(5) is sought to be removed.

The MCA has stated that Vidarbha’s decision has created confusion and hence, to alleviate any doubts, it was proposed that section 7 may be amended to clarify that while considering an application for initiation of the insolvency process by the financial creditors, the NCLT was only required to be satisfied about the occurrence of a default and fulfilment of procedural requirements for this specific purpose (and nothing more). Where a default was established, it would be mandatory for the NCLT to admit the application and initiate the insolvency process.

CRITIQUE

It is submitted that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Vidarbha’s case is spot on and cannot be faulted. The objective of the Code must be to create and enhance value for all stakeholders and not merely send an otherwise sound company to the gallows. A discretionary power to the NCLT would empower it to provide for other remedial measures in case of a default on a debt. Rather than making the powers mandatory under section7(5)(a), the MCA could provide for alternative remedies which the NCLT can suggest in case of a default. It is true that several unscrupulous promoters have hoodwinked the financial system under the earlier laws, but it is also true that an overzealous law may in fact harm otherwise good companies.

If the MCA proposals are implemented then this discretionary power would be taken away from the NCLT. Also, the outcome of the Supreme Court appeal would be interesting. It could impact several NCLT cases, including the recent insolvency plea of IndusInd Bank against Zee Entertainment Ltd.

In conclusion, the words of the Supreme Court sum up the situation aptly ~ “It is certainly not the object of the IBC to penalize solvent companies, temporarily defaulting in repayment of its financial debts, by initiation of CIRP.”

Corporate Law Corner Part B: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Law

9. NCLAT, Principal Bench

New Delhi

Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 241 of 2022

Arising out of order dated 10th February, 2021 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati in IA No. 32 of 2020 in C.P. (IB) No. 20/GB/2017.

1. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax,

2. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax,

…Appellants.

vs.

M/s Assam Company India Ltd              …Respondent.

FACTS

Corporate Insolvancy Resolution Process (CIRP) under Section 7 was admitted against the Assam Company/Corporate Debtor (“CD”) on 20th September, 2018. Appellants filed their claim under Form B and claimed the Income Tax for the A.Y. 2013-14 for Rs. 6,69,84,657 and A.Y. 2014-15 for Rs. 9,50,41,296 totalling Rs. 16,20,25,953 before the Resolution Professional (RP). RP via email informed that the NCLT, Guwahati Bench may consider payment of Rs. 1,97,92,084 being 15 per cent of the outstanding dues owed to the Appellants since the Respondent had filed petition for stay of demand before the AO. RP made a payment of Rs. 1,20,23,691 as a tranche payment to the Appellants and told that the rest of the amount would be contingent on the outcome of the appeal filed before the IT appellate authority.

The appellants filed an application for review of the order of the Hon’ble NCLT dated 20th September, 2018 with necessary directions to the Resolution Professional for submission of the revised resolution plan incorporating the entire amount alleged to be due to the Appellants. NCLT, in its order dated 22nd October, 2019 stated that since the RP intimated the Department that the demand after finalization of appeal by CIT(A) would be payable by the new promoter, such a written intimation of the RP is to be read with the new resolution plan and the demand of the Appellants is duly considered and they have a right to lay their claim before the new promoter of the Respondent Company. NCLT dismissed the claims of the Appellants vide its order dated 10th February, 2021.

QUESTION OF LAW

This appeal lies against the order dated 10th February, 2021 with respect to extinguishment of appellants claim. In that order, the Hon’ble NCLT, failed to take into consideration that vide its earlier order dated 22nd October, 2019 it had stated that since the RP intimated the Appellants that the demand after finalisation of appeal by CIT(A) would be payable by the new promoter, such written intimation of the RP is to be read with the new resolution plan; and the demand of the Appellants is duly considered and the Appellants have a right to lay their claim before the new promoter of the Respondent Company.

RULING IN CASE

NCLAT held that as per the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State Tax Officer (1) vs. Rainbow Papers Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 1661 of 2020 dated 06th September, 2022”, the dues of the Appellants are ‘Government dues’ and they are Secured Creditors.

HELD

That the impugned order dated 10th February, 2021 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati) in IA No. 32 of 2020 in C.P. (IB) No. 20/GB/2017 is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, Guwahati) with a request to hear the parties (Appellants and Respondent herein) considering the aforesaid facts and also judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Rainbow Papers Ltd Case (supra)’ and pass fresh orders as expeditiously as possible.

Of Mules and Securities Laws

BACKGROUND

Mules, in common parlance, are understood as beasts of burden. They mindlessly carry out severe labor work often for relatively small rewards. In the narcotic drug business, mules are those who carry/smuggle drugs from one place to another. In securities laws too, now, the term ‘mules’ has acquired a similar meaning. They refer to persons who do illegal work under the instructions of another mastermind. Theyget small rewards for doing such work or allowing their names to be used. The question is how they are treated in securities laws since the violations are carried out in their names?

USE OF MULES TO CARRY OUT NUMEROUS TYPES OF SECURITIES LAWS VIOLATIONS

The typical use of mules is to use their names to carry out certain acts, which if carried out in one’s own name, would be illegal or otherwise help links to be established whereby the acts would be held to be illegal. A corrupt person, for example, would take bribes and build wealth in the name of another person, and thus himself being free of scrutiny. Having wealth in one’s own name could be a presumption of having acquired it through corrupt means. In securities laws, there are similar reasons. An insider having Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI), for example, may use mules to carry out trades with benefit of such information and make illicit profits. Similarly, a front runner, who has information of impending large orders of clients/employers, may use these mules to carry out transactions in such scrips. Since it is expected that on account of the large orders of his client/employer, there would be significant movement in price, he would use these mules to enter into transactions first and then reverse these transactions when the orders of his employer/client are put through.

Then, there are those who engage in price manipulation. Often a group of persons are needed to carry out such acts. Such group of persons may engage in trades and counter trades, often in a circular manner whereby, at least initially, there may be no movement of shares outside such the group. If the intent is ‘pump and dump’, then, after the price is pumped up to higher levels, there would be off loading of the shares by the master mind to unsuspecting investors. At a later date, when there are complaints and investigations, the master mind may claim to have had no knowledge or connection with the various mules. The mules, assuming they are traceable or appear before SEBI against summons, too may claim having no connection.

Then there were the classic cases of share subscriptions in public issues to take the benefit of reservations for retail investors. It was alleged that share applications in large numbers were made in the names of thousands of such mules, and these were financed by a small group of people. These cases, which came to be popularly referred by one of the alleged persons, Roopalben Panchal, led to investigations and multiple proceedings that lasted for a long time. It was alleged that share applications were made in the name of such mules and shares allotted to such persons were sold and the profits/sale proceeds transferred back to the alleged financiers.

DETECTION/DEMONSTRATING VIOLATIONS OF SECURITIES LAWS USING MULES

The use of mules present a challenge to the regulator in proving and punishing violations of securities laws. The mules and their mastermind may claim no connection with each other and thus argue that there were no violations.

In case of insider trading, the work of SEBI is thus relatively easier as there are deeming provisions that hold several connected persons as insiders. Further, well settled principles of law (as laid down by the Supreme Court and as discussed later herein) help SEBI in using circumstantial evidence. Thus, several such orders are seen to be regularly passed from time to time.

That said, sophisticated capital market operators may use means that make detection and punishment difficult. Digital tools, messengers, etc. may also be used. In some cases, SEBI has meticulously traced mobile calls and established links between persons based on such connections. However, there are just too many ways to pass messages/make calls unless such messages remain on record. Here too, there are sporadic cases where SEBI has even used web archives to excavate deleted websites. But the technical challenges remain formidable.

SEBI does come to know of suspicious transactions through market surveillance. Financial transactions between the parties, introducing such mules in bank or broker accounts, etc. also help establish guilt. SEBI had, in one case, shown extraordinary initiative to track the movement of an alleged front runner through his mobile phone and found that the person used to withdraw cash through ATM from the account of such a mule. However, such cases are one off and do not help wider prevention, detection and punishment of securities laws violations.

SEBI’S ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST SUCH MULES – DIFFICULTIES AND INJUSTICE

Even if detected, the unresolved issue is what action should be treated against mules? The dilemma particularly here is this. The ‘mastermind’ may claim that he has done no wrong, the transactions are not done by him and the rewards of the misdeeds are also not with him. It is the other person, the alleged mule, who has done everything. The mule may claim a similar story of innocence, the counter part. He may say he is just an uneducated person, maybe in the employment of the mastermind at a lower hierarchy earning a small salary or otherwise in a similar job elsewhere and who is recruited. He may claim that the rewards of the misdeeds have been transmitted to the real culprit, either by the way of ‘loans’ or through cash. In some cases, he may admit to have signed various documents on the basis of some small remuneration. It may be difficult for SEBI to ascribe/allocate blame to the “real culprit”. This is more so if it is admitted, or otherwise easily demonstrated, that the mule was aware that wrongful transactions were being done in his name.

Typically, SEBI has been punishing all the persons equally. They may all be debarred from capital markets. A common penalty be levied on them, payable jointly and severally and this stance is particularly justified if the money may be lying with the mule or if SEBI is unable to find out where it has landed.

The difficulties in taking such a uniform stand are several. Firstly, the mule gets punished as an equal to the main person, despite his role being less, maybe a name-lender. Secondly, levying the penalty as fully recoverable from the mule (even if on a joint and several basis) creates far more difficulties on the mule. His bank account and his meagre savings and properties may get attached/recovered. Even if he bears guilt in this regard, such a punishment is clearly disproportionate and unjust. The mastermind may also have bigger resources to fight the matter.

Recently, however, SEBI has been changing its stand for the better. For one, if it is possible to trace how much of the ill-gotten gains went to whom, the recovery is made accordingly from such persons, instead of recovering on a joint basis. Further, in several cases, even if not on a consistent basis with general principles laid down, SEBI has levied penalty/punishment on the basis of demonstrated involvement in the violation. The backgrounds of the parties too have been considered for this purpose. Hence, while some punishment may still be meted out, it may be proportionate to the guilt and involvement.

Admittedly, if it is not easy to find the culprits, then, demonstrate the violations and then go even further and allocate blame. However, SEBI has the benefit of at least two Supreme Court decisions (SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 3 Comp. LJ 198 (SC) & SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P.) Ltd. ((2018) 207 Comp Cas 443 (SC)) which have made deciding of the guilty easier on the principles of “preponderance of probability.” This principle does not require a proof of beyond reasonable doubt but a lower one based on what is more probable than not. SEBI could see the facts of the case, see the level of sophistication and resources of the persons involved, the cooperation given, etc. and ascribe blame and punishment accordingly.

VISHWANATHAN COMMITTEE REPORT

The SEBI Committee chaired by T. K. Vishwanathan had in August 2018 made certain recommendations on this topic. A method of detecting mule accounts was suggested. For this purpose, a formula was provided that lays down the volumes of trades based on income/net worth of the investor. If the broker finds that the volumes are beyond an “affordability index”, then the broker should exercise special diligence for such client. If the volumes are beyond this and even beyond prescribed levels, the account could be suspected as a mule account. However, though amendments to the Regulations were suggested, they have not yet been made.

SOME CASES

An interesting investigation was carried out by SEBI which culminated in an interim order dated 1st October, 2020. While a detailed analysis of this order could be a separate subject, it is seen that SEBI traced the mobile records and even the location of parties as available from such records. Based on these investigations, it alleged that mule accounts were created for carrying out front running and the primary person withdrew the cash from the bank accounts of such mules. However, SEBI ordered that the profits made be deposited by all the parties including the alleged mules and this liability for deposit was made joint and several. Till this was done, the assets, bank accounts, etc. were required not to be disposed off. Effectively, this meant that the alleged mules too suffered such embargo.

In an order dated 24th December, 2020, in the matter of Viji Finance Ltd, SEBI alleged that 78 parties were ‘mules’ or ‘name lenders’. They were low income/unskilled/uneducated people whose occupations included being a vegetable vendor, house painter, auto drivers, etc. For alleged violation of the Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices (PFUTP) Regulations, a penalty of Rs. 15 lakhs was levied jointly and severally on them. The result is that the full amount could be recovered from even any one of them and there would be no mechanism for them to share it between them. It is possible that they may not even know each other.

In an order dated 13th January, 2021, SEBI elaborated the concept of “Family and Friends” mule accounts. It was stated, “Before proceeding to deal with the circumstances, it will be appropriate to elaborate on the concept of “Family and Friends” mule accounts. These are trading accounts which are “lent” by persons known to the person who is effectively controlling / placing the orders in the trading account. For example, family members, extended family members, friends, acquaintances, etc. The person who is controlling the account / placing the orders gets access to the trading accounts based on trust or on the strength of relationship between him and the registered owner of the trading account.” Using this principle, the family members were held equally responsible for the alleged violations. They all were required to deposit the impounded amount their banks.

CONCLUSION

While legal issues of proving and apportioning guilt are difficult enough, the unorganized economy in India where transactions in cash may be made, adds to the difficulties. It is quite possible that the SEBI’s attempt may be barely scratching the surface.

The Retroactive Application of Special Criminal Laws – Recent Supreme Court Decisions

“The entire Community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to books. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the Community. A disregard for the interest of the Community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the Community in the system to administer justice in an even handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the National Economy and National Interest.”

– State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 364

The above quote of the Supreme Court (SC) may seem general – but it puts the importance given to economic offenses in context. In the never-ending game of cat and mouse, it is always the law enforcement that seems to play catch up with the offenders. The last decade has seen an increased focus on special laws with the aim of curbing economic offenses. These laws are special – they have special agencies with special powers for investigation, special courts for prosecution and special procedures – for specific offenses, all justified to prevent economic offenders from escaping punishment. However, some of the amendments brought about to these Acts have raised a peculiar problem that gives the public a cause for concern. Can I be punished for an act that was not an offence at the time of its commission? Can criminal liability be fastened upon me by a retrospective amendment? What repercussions does this have for the concept of mens rea?

The SC has examined two different Acts in two different judgments, both in 2022. Both these judgments are considered a landmark in their own field and the legislations that they consider are of particular interest to Chartered Accountants – The Prohibition of Benami Transactions Act,  1988 (the Benami Act) and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (the PMLA). The issue, however, is still live – very recently, the Bombay High Court issued notice on a petition that challenges what it considers the retrospective application of the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 and contends that this Act should not penalize transactions that were entered into before it came into force.

The words “retrospective” and “retroactive” have different meanings in law. However, often these terms work in tandem like in the two SC judgments covered in this article. The SC in the case of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, 2020 (9) SCC 1, described the nature of prospective, retrospective, and retroactive laws as follows: “The prospective statute operates from the date of its enactment conferring new rights. The retrospective statute operates backwards and takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws. A retroactive statute is the one that does not operate retrospectively. It operates in futuro. However, its operation is based upon the character or status that arose earlier. Characteristic or event which happened in the past or requisites which had been drawn from antecedent events.”

Readers may read this article and interpret these terms accordingly.

A. THE PROHIBITION OF BENAMI TRANSACTIONS ACT, 1988

The Benami Act was one of those Acts that stood quietly on the sidelines waiting to fulfill its avowed objectives. In 2016, sweeping changes were made to the Act in line with the government’s objective to crack down on economic offences and undesirable practices. The Benami Act has been the subject of much debate and discussion especially as benami transactions in India are neither new nor rare. Traditional civil remedies were often exercised in those transactions that were benami in nature. The courts had dealt with various civil disputes with regard to benami properties. Though the Benami Act was brought out in order to prohibit benami transactions, it was widely considered toothless and was rarely invoked.

Post-2016 amendments, however, the Benami Act is looked upon as having the colour of being criminal legislation. This is primarily because though entering a benami transaction was prohibited even prior to 2016, the criminal provisions lacked teeth. In recent years a variety of legislations have been enacted for special purposes and these are an amalgam of both civil and criminal provisions. The name of the Benami Act is self-explanatory, it seeks prohibition of benami transactions. This is a clear indication that the Act does not exist merely to punish, its raison d’être is to prohibit them altogether. It cannot, however, be doubted that the amending Act brought in wide-ranging changes to the original Act.

The judgment of the SC in UOI v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. (2023) 3 SCC 315 is a watershed moment for many reasons. The judgment reaffirms the basic principle of the criminal law of not imposing criminality retroactively. How can it be that an act that is not an offence at the time of its commission be considered an offence subsequently? While this may seem like common sense, the manner in which the SC  arrives at this conclusion while considering Sections 3 and 5 of the Benami Act warrants consideration.

What is a Benami Transaction?

Post the 2016 amendment, the definition of ‘benami transaction’ given in section 2(9) of the Benami Act is as follows:

“benami transaction” means,—

(A)    a transaction or an arrangement—

(a)    where a property is transferred to, or is held by, a person, and the consideration for such property has been provided, or paid by, another person; and

(b)    the property is held for the immediate or future benefit, direct or indirect, of the person who has provided the consideration,

except when the property is held by—

(i)    a Karta, or a member of a Hindu undivided family, as the case may be, and the property is held for his benefit or benefit of other members in the family and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the Hindu undivided family;

(ii)    a person standing in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person towards whom he stands in such capacity and includes a trustee, executor, partner, director of a company, a depository or a participant as an agent of a depository under the Depositories Act, 1996 (22 of 1996) and any other person as may be notified by the Central Government for this purpose;

(iii)    any person being an individual in the name of his spouse or in the name of any child of such individual and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the individual;

(iv)    any person in the name of his brother or sister or lineal ascendant or descendant, where the names of brother or sister or lineal ascendant or descendent and the individual appear as joint-owners in any document, and the consideration for such property has been provided or paid out of the known sources of the individual; or

(B)    a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property carried out or made in a fictitious name; or

(C)    a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property where the owner of the property is not aware of, or, denies knowledge of, such ownership;

(D)    a transaction or an arrangement in respect of a property where the person providing the consideration is not traceable or is fictitious.

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that benami transaction shall not include any transaction involving the allowing of possession of any property to be taken or retained in part performance of a contract referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), if, under any law for the time being in force,—

(i)    consideration for such property has been provided by the person to whom possession of property has been allowed but the person who has granted possession thereof continues to hold ownership of such property;

(ii)    stamp duty on such transaction or arrangement has been paid; and

(iii)    the contract has been registered;”

What are the broad repercussions of entering into a Benami Transaction?

Chapter II of the Benami Act deals with the prohibitions of benami transactions. Section 3 and Section 5 deal with the repercussions of entering into a benami transaction as amended in 2016 while Sections 4 and 6 deal with certain consequences with regard to civil remedies. Section 5 is punitive in nature while Section 3(2) and 3(3) make entering into a benami transaction a criminal offense.

Sections 3 and 5 are reproduced below:

“Section 3 – Prohibition of benami transactions.

3. (1) No person shall enter into any benami transaction.

(2)    Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.

(3)    Whoever enters into any benami transaction on and after the date of commencement of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), be punishable in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter VII.

“Section 5 – Property held benami liable to confiscation.

5.    Any property, which is subject matter of benami transaction, shall be liable to be confiscated by the Central Government.”

The case for Retroactive Application

Though the amendments were carried out in 2016, the effect of the 2016 amendment Act to the Benami Act (amending Act) was that transactions that could be captured under the definition of ‘Benami Transaction’ entered into before the year 2016 were also liable for prosecution. The stand of the Union of India, in this case, was clear – the 2016 amendments, according to the Union of India, only clarified the unamended 1988 Act (unamended Act) and were made to give effect to the older Act. It was in a sense enacted to fill up certain lacunae in the unamended Act and therefore could be given a retroactive application. It was the case of the Union of India that the 1988 Act had already created substantial law for criminalising the offence of entering into a benami transaction and therefore the 2016 amendments were merely clarificatory and procedural.

The SC’s Judgement with regard to retroactive Application

As the basic argument advanced on behalf of the Union of India was that the amending Act was merely clarificatory in nature, the SC decided to first consider the provisions of Section 3 of the Benami Act as it stood prior to its amendment. It is reproduced for ready reference as hereunder –

“3. Prohibition of benami transactions.—

(1)    No person shall enter into any benami transaction.

(2)    Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to—

(a)    the purchase of property by any person in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter;

(b)    the securities held by a—

(i)    depository as registered owner under sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Depositories Act, 1996

(ii)    participant as an agent of a depository.

Explanation.—The expressions “depository” and “Participants shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (e) and (g) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Depositories Act, 1996.

(3)    Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.

(4)    Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an offence under this section shall be non-cognizable and bailable.”

The SC observed that the criminal provisions envisaged under the unamended Section 3(2)(a) along with Section 3(3) did not expressly contemplate mens rea and that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offense.

This observation is interesting because it was the cornerstone for the SC to strike down the retrospective criminality put in place by this act. The importance of the existence of the ‘mental intention’ to be convicted in criminal proceedings is the fundamental cornerstone of criminal law. An individual cannot be said to commit a crime without intent, and where the requirement of intent is whittled down, without knowledge (As in the cases of the second part of Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code – culpable homicide not amounting to murder).

The SC found that the absence of mens rea creates the harsh result of imposing strict liability. The Court further found that ignoring the essential ingredient of beneficial ownership exercised by the real owner also contributes to making the law stringent and disproportionate with respect to benami transactions that are tri-partite in nature and that Section 3 as it stood prior to the amendment was susceptible to arbitrariness. The Court alluded to Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India to emphasise that a law needs to be clear, not vague and should not have incurable gaps that were “yet to be legislated/ filled in by judicial process”. The SC also held that a reading of Section 3(1) with Section 2(a) of the unamended Act would have created overly broad laws susceptible to being challenged as manifestly arbitrary.

It was also considered by the Court that the Union of India fairly conceded that the criminal provision had never been utilised as there was a significant hiatus in enabling the function of the provision.

Having considered the above four broad factors – the SC concluded that Section 3 which contained the criminal proceedings with regard to the unamended benami Act was unconstitutional. The Court held that the criminal provisions in the unamended Act had serious lacunae which could not have been cured by judicial forums, even through harmonious forms of interpretation. Regarding Section 5 of the unamended Act, the Court observed that the acquisition proceedings contemplated therein were in rem against the property itself – and that such rem proceedings transfer the guilt from the person who utilised a property which is a general harm to the society on to the property itself.

The SC held that Section 3 (and Section 5) of the unamended Act did not suffer from gaps that were merely procedural but that the gaps were essential and substantive. In absence of such substantive positions, the omissions in the unamended Act created a law which was both fanciful and oppressive at the same time and that such an overly broad structure would be ‘manifestly arbitrary’ as it did not incorporate sufficient safeguards. The Court held that as the Sections were stillborn (never utilised) in the first place, the said Section 3 was unconstitutional right from the inception.

As a natural corollary to Section 3 (and 5) of the unamended Act being held to be unconstitutional, the SC held that the 2016 amendments are in effect, creating new provisions and offences. The Court held that the law cannot retroactively reinvigorate a still-born criminal offence and therefore, “There was no question of retroactive application of the 2016 Act.”

The Fundamental take away from Ganpati Dealcom

The fundamental takeaway from the judgment of the SC in the case of Ganpati Dealcom with regard to the retroactive application of criminal statutes is that the retroactive application of the amended Section 3 of the Act was struck down not merely on the broadly accepted principles that criminal statutes cannot operate retroactively, but the reasoning was deeper. The primary reason of why the statute could not operate retroactively was that the provisions of the Act prior to the 2016 amendments were held to be unconstitutional and void ab initio. This automatically meant that the 2016 amendment could not claim to be merely ‘procedural or clarificatory’ but gave rise to substantial new offences – for the first time. Given the peculiar nature of the factual matrix of this statute, the retroactive operation of the amended Section 3 was held to be bad in law.

However, the Ganpati Dealcom Judgement is significant for another important reason – the SC had just a few months earlier passed another landmark Judgement in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 92.

The Indian SC does not sit en banc – as a whole, but as a combination of various ‘divisions’ and benches of various strengths. That is the reason why it’s often been called ‘Many Supreme Courts in one.’ Within a few months of the Vijay Choudhary Judgment, some apprehensions were already being cast upon its veracity – one such apprehension has been explicitly mentioned in Ganpati Dealcom.

B. THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002

The PMLA also seemed to wait in the wings for fulfilling its objectives until post-2014, when it started being invoked in earnest to curb the menace of money laundering. The PMLA, its provisions and its applications have all been criticised in the recent past for their draconian nature. A preventive law rather than a prohibitive one like the Benami Act, it was not ‘still born’. It had been amended from time to time in line with India’s global commitments. The Scheme of the PMLA clearly shows that it does not seek only to punish the offence of money laundering but also to prevent it. A substantive part of the legislation is dedicated to compliance and preventive powers given to the authorities under the PMLA.

While benami transactions were primarily a problem in India (and perhaps in the Indian sub-continent), PMLA is global in its outreach.  Primarily set up to combat some of the greatest evils in the form of drug trade, arms trade and flesh trade, today the framework covers a very wide variety of subjects, each perhaps not as dire as the other. The  PMLA, however, has the most motley assortment of legislations included in its Schedule. Various offences under the Indian Penal Code, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Explosive Substances Act, Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, Arms Act, Companies Act, Wildlife Protection Act, Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, Explosives Act, Antiques and Art Treasures Act, Customs Act, Bonded Labour Law, Child Labour Law, Juvenile Justice Law, Emigration, Passports, Foreigners, Copyrights, Trademarks, Biological Diversity, Protection of plant varieties and farmer’s rights, Environment Protection Act, Water / Air Pollution Control law, Unlawful Acts against safety of Maritime Navigation and fixed platforms on Continental Shelf, etc.

What is Money Laundering according to the PMLA?

Section 3 of the PMLA defines the offence of money laundering –

“3.     Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,—

(i)    a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:—

(a)    concealment; or

(b)    possession; or

(c)    acquisition; or

(d)    use; or

(e)    projecting as untainted property; or

(f)    claiming as untainted property,
    in any manner whatsoever,

(ii)    the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.”

But this definition is incomplete without considering the definition of proceeds of crime as laid out in Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA:

Proceeds of crime is defined u/s 2(1)(u) of  PMLA as under:

“(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property [or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

Explanation. —For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;”

It would be incorrect to assume that the offence of money laundering would be triggered upon the laundering of money. In fact, Section 3 of the PMLA makes even the possession of proceeds of crime a part of the offence of money laundering. If the section as reproduced above are read, it can be observed that both of them contain ‘explanations’. The retrospective application of these explanations were some of the issues that were brought up before the SC.

What are the broad repercussions of the offence of money laundering?

The broad repercussions of money laundering activity are laid down in Section 4 of the PMLA.

What is the most troublesome though is that the maximum punishment for money laundering that may arise out of all the above-assorted activities is the same – up to seven years (not less than three years) and a fine of five lakh rupees, with a single exception of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act – the money laundering relating to which attracts a sentence of up to ten years (not less than three years) and a fine of up to five lakh rupees. This punishment is not graded based upon the severity of the scheduled offense.

The case for Retroactive/Retrospective Application

The landmark case on the PMLA is Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 92. In this, the case for retrospective/retroactive application of the amendments made in 2019 made to Sections 3 and 2(1)(u) was fairly simple – what was inserted were merely explanations as a part of the statute. It was contended, inter alia, that these explanations were clarificatory in nature and did not increase the width of the definition itself.

What is important is that the constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 3 prior to the insertion of the explanation was not in doubt. What contended was that this amendment was merely clarificatory. It is trite law that the parliament is empowered to make laws that operate retroactively and retrospectively, and such action cannot be challenged especially if the changes are merely clarificatory and/or procedural in nature.

The Supreme Court’s Judgement with regard to Retroactive Application

In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary the SC held that the Explanation as inserted in 2019 in Section 3 of the PMLA (making the offence of money laundering a continuous one) did not entail expanding its purport as it stood prior to 2019. It held that the amendment is only clarificatory in nature in as much as Section 3 is widely worded with a view to not only investigate the offence of money laundering but also to prevent and regulate that offence. This provision (even de hors explanation) plainly indicates that any (every) process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime results in offence of money laundering. The Court held that projecting or claiming the proceeds of crime as untainted property is in itself an attempt to indulge in or being involved in money laundering, just as knowingly concealing, possessing, acquiring, or using of proceeds of crime, directly or indirectly. The Court held the inclusion of Clause (ii) in the Explanation inserted in 2019 was of no consequence as it does not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all as the existing provisions of Section 3 of the PMLA  as amended until 2013 which were in force till 31.7.2019, have been merely explained and clarified by it.

Similarly, for the changes in the definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ and ‘property’ it was held that the Explanation added in 2019, did not travel beyond that intent of tracking and reaching upto the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. Therefore, the Explanation was in the nature of a clarification and not to increase the width of the main definition of “proceeds of crime”. The Court held that the Explanation inserted in 2019 was merely clarificatory and restatement of the position emerging from the principal provision i.e., Section 2(1)(u) of the PMLA.

There is a stark difference in the approach of the SC in both cases. However, it cannot be challenged that the statutory matrix and the circumstances of the application of both laws were also very different. The PMLA was hardly in a state of stasis before the 2019 amendment. The constitutional validity of the sections sought to be amended was not in doubt, the challenge was limited to the amendment itself. However, it would be curious to see if the ‘continuing nature’ of the offence of PMLA will stand up to judicial scrutiny if dissected in a manner similar to the way it has been done in Ganpati Dealcom.

The Fundamental take-away from Vijay Madanlal Choudhary

The key take-away from the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Judgment with regards to retrospective/retroactive application of criminal statutes is that the manner in which such amendments are brought about in the statute book does matter. Though the law as interpreted by the apex court now states that the explanations are merely clarificatory, the repercussion of making the offence of money laundering a continuing activity is far more sinister.

Though money laundering is an offence by itself, it is what can be termed as a predicate offence, it does not exist in the absence of a primary offence. That primary offence may be any of the offences that have been included in the schedule to the PMLA. By making the offence of money laundering a continuing one, however, the statute has empowered itself to virtually prosecute those accused of offences that may have been committed not only before their insertion into the schedule to the PMLA, but also before the PMLA ever came into force. It is possible that someone may be prosecuted for the offence of money laundering decades after the primary offence is committed, even though such an accused may not have been involved in the commission of the primary offence. This aspect of the retroactive application of the PMLA has been the subject of much litigation before various High Courts. The Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Judgment paves the way for such prosecutions at will, by upholding the explanation that states that the offence of money laundering never ends and also by upholding the explanation that makes proceeds of crime include any property ‘directly or indirectly’ obtained as a result of any criminal activity related to the scheduled offence.

It is not that the concept of manifest arbitrariness of various provisions of the PMLA has not been considered. Those claims however, have been dismissed.

C. CONCLUSION

The retrospective/retroactive application of criminal provisions of special laws cannot be countered by a broad sweeping observation that ‘Criminal legislation does not have retrospective application’. The approach of the Courts is always nuanced. Though certain amendments to the criminal provisions of the Benami Act were held to be prospective and certain amendments to the criminal provisions of the PMLA were considered retroactive/retrospective, this was done given due weightage to the type of amendment contemplated in the amending Act and the sort of lacunae that were sought to be filled by the amendments. The two judgments are harmonious in law, but a view can be taken that there is a difference in the approach and the jurisprudential philosophy between the both of them. It’s telling that just a few months after the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary judgment, in Ganpati Dealcom with regard to the principles regarding confiscation / forfeiture provisions the SC observed:

“In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, this Court dealt with confiscation proceedings under Section 8 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”) and limited the application of Section 8(4) of PMLA concerning interim possession by the authority before conclusion of final trial to exceptional cases. The Court distinguished the earlier cases in view of the unique scheme under the impugned legislation therein. Having perused the said judgment, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid ratio requires further expounding in an appropriate case, without which, much scope is left for arbitrary application”.

Justice YK Sabharwal (the then Chief Justice of India) is said to have said in 2006 “We are final not necessarily because we are always right – no institution is infallible – but because we are final.”

The Supreme Court may be final – but that may not hold necessarily true for its judgments. Both these Judgments have come out in 2022. Review Petitions by aggrieved parties were filed against them and the Apex Court has already agreed (albeit separately) to consider the review of both of them, though such a review may take place well into the future.

 

Liberalised Remittance Scheme – How Liberal It Is? (An Overview And The Recent Amendments)

This article looks at recent amendments in the
Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS) under Foreign Exchange Management
Act (FEMA) and in the provisions of Tax Collection at Source (TCS) on
remittances under LRS under the Income-tax Act. The changes are
significant and people should be aware of these issues. Along with the
recent amendments, we have dealt with some important & practical
issues also.

A. FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT ACT:

1. Background:

1.1 In February 2004, RBI introduced the LRS with a small limit (vide A.P.
Circular No. 64 dated 4.2.2004). Any Indian individual resident could
remit up to US$ 25,000 or its equivalent abroad per year from his own
funds. It was introduced to provide exposure to individuals to foreign
exchange markets. Dr. Y. V. Reddy, ex-Governor of RBI in his book titled
“Advice & Dissent” on Page 352 mentions that the funds could be
used for almost any purpose. It was supposed to be a “No questions asked” window and was in addition to all existing facilities. Late Finance Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh in a gathering said “Go conquer the world, we will be your supporters”. That was the underlying theme of the LRS.

1.2 There was a small negative list of purposes for which remittance could
not be made. The negative list included payments prescribed under
Schedule I and restricted under Schedule II of Current Account
Transaction Rules such as lotteries and sweepstakes; and payments to
persons engaged in acts of terrorism. Remittances also could not be made
to some countries. Later in 2007 remittance under LRS for margin
trading was also prohibited.

1.3 Over the years, the scheme has been modified. The limits have been increased periodically
(except for a brief period from 2013 to 2015). Today the limit is US$
2,50,000 per year per person. Thus, every individual Indian resident can
remit US$ 2,50,000 per year for any permitted purpose. At the same
time, restrictions have been introduced on current account transactions
and investments under LRS and such restrictions have kept on increasing.
The spirit of the original theme has been diluted to a significant extent. Let us see the current provisions of LRS including its main issues.

2. The present LRS:

2.1 The present LRS is dealt with by the following rules, regulations and circulars. FAQs provide some more clarifications.

i) Foreign Exchange Management (Permissible Capital Account Transactions) Regulations, 2000 (FEMA Notification no. 1).

ii) Foreign Exchange Management (Permissible Current Account Transactions) Rules, 2000.

iii) Foreign Exchange Management (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as “OI Rules”).

iv) Foreign Exchange Management (Overseas Investment) Directions, 2022
vide AP circular no. 12 dated 22.8.2022 (hereinafter referred to as “OI
Directions”).

v) Master Direction No. 7 on LRS updated up to 24.8.2022.

vi) FAQs updated up to 21.10.2021 (these have not been updated with the
rules and regulations of August 2022. However, these contain some
important clarifications.)

The statutory documents are the first
three documents – Rules and Regulations. The fourth and fifth documents
are essentially directions to Authorised Persons – i.e. Banks for
implementation of the rules and regulations. The sixth document – FAQs –
doesn’t have a binding effect. These are clarifications and wherever
helpful, these can be used.

However, if one reads only the
statutory documents, one does not get the full picture. One has to read
all the documents together to understand the entire scheme with its
nuances. At times, A.P. Circulars and Master Directions contain
additional provisions which are nowhere covered in the statutory
documents. Hence it is necessary to consider all the documents.

Also,
as is the case with several rules and regulations under FEMA, one
cannot get the entire picture merely by reading the documents. Some
things go by practice. Many such issues and practical problems will be
dealt with subsequently. Needless to say, it will not be possible to
deal with all issues. The focus is on important issues and issues arising out of amendments to LRS in August 2022 and TCS provisions in Finance Act 2023.

2.2 The present LRS in brief:

2.2.1
Under the present scheme, an Indian resident individual (including a
minor) can remit up to US$ 2,50,000 or its equivalent per financial
year. This limit has been there since May 2015. The remittance can be
made for any “permitted” Current Account Transaction or a “permitted”
Capital Account Transaction. The word “permitted” is a later addition.
As per the 2004 circular, the LRS was overriding all restrictions
(except those stated in the circular itself).

For remittance
under LRS, the simple compliance is the submission of Form A2 with some
basic details. [No form is required for making a rupee gift or a loan.
However, the person must keep a track to see that aggregate of such
rupee payments (discussed later) and foreign exchange remitted during a
year are within the LRS limit.]

Remittances during one year have to be made through one bank only.

2.2.2 Remittance has to be made out of person’s own funds.
In a family, one member can gift (not loan) the funds to another family
member and all the relatives can remit the funds under LRS. This has
been an accepted position.

Source of funds:

Loans: A person cannot borrow funds in India and remit them abroad for capital account transactions.
The restriction on taking loans continues right from the beginning
(i.e., February 2004). One can refer to these provisions in Paragraphs 8
and 10 in Section B of the present Master Direction on LRS.

A person also cannot borrow funds from a non-resident to invest. Thus,
buying a home abroad with a foreign loan is not permitted even if the
loan repayment is within the LRS limit. Foreign builders offer schemes
where the person can get a completed house, but payment can be made over
the next few years after completion. This will clearly be a violation
as the payment option over a few years is a loan.

Primarily a loan also cannot be taken for current account transactions. However, in the FAQs dated 21st October 2021, FAQ 16 clarifies that banks can provide loans or guarantees for current account transactions
only. Here, FAQ is being relied upon. Strictly, FAQs have no legal
authority. In practice, it goes on. Thus, a loan can be taken from a
bank for education and funds can be remitted abroad. However, no loans
can be taken from anyone else even for a current account transaction.

Other prohibited sources:

Remittances out of “lottery winnings, racing, riding or any other
hobby” are prohibited. These are stated in Schedule I of the Current
Account Rules. Hence even if the person has his own funds but earned
from these sources, he cannot remit the same under LRS. This is an issue
that is missed by many people. Further, ‘hobby’ is a broad term. What
seems to be prohibited is income from hobbies which involve gambling and
chance income.

LRS covers both Current and Capital Account Transactions.

2.2.3 Current Account Transactions –

Under clause 1 of Schedule III of Foreign Exchange Management (Current
Account Transactions) Rules, 2000, the following purposes are specified
for which remittance can be made:

i) Private visits to any country (except Nepal and Bhutan).
ii) Gift or donation.
iii) Going abroad for employment.
iv) Emigration.
v) Maintenance of close relatives abroad.
vi) Travel for business or attending a conference or specialised
training or for meeting medical expenses, or check-up abroad, or for accompanying
as an attendant to a patient going abroad for medical treatment/check-up.
vii) Expenses in connection with medical treatment abroad.
viii) Studies abroad.
ix) Any other current account transaction.

Prior to May 2015, there was no limit on remittance for
Current Account transaction. Since May 2015, the limit has been brought
in. Item (ix) above seems to be a misplacement in the Current Account
Transaction rules. This raises some difficulties. Import of goods is a
Current Account transaction. An individual who is doing trading business
in his individual name could import goods worth crores of rupees. Now
can he import above the LRS limit? The view is that for Import, there is
a separate Master Direction laying down procedures and compliances.
Under that Master Direction, there is no limit for imports. Hence
whatever is covered under the Master Direction on Imports, can be
undertaken freely. All other expenses are restricted by the LRS limit.
Thus, expenses for services, travel, etc. will be restricted by the LRS
limit. It would be helpful if Central Government could come out with a
clarification.

We would like to state that India has accepted
Article VIII of the IMF agreement. Under the agreement, a country cannot
impose restrictions on Current Account transactions. However, some
reasonable restrictions can be placed. This is the stand adopted by
India also (refer Section 5 of FEMA). Under this section, a person is
allowed to draw foreign exchange for a Current Account Transaction.
However, the Government can impose some “reasonable restrictions”. This
can mean restrictions on some kinds of transactions or imposition of
some conditions. However, a blanket ban above US$ 2,50,000 on all
current account transactions may not come within the purview of
“reasonable restrictions”. A business entity owned by an individual can
remit any amount for a Current Account Transaction. But the same
individual cannot, if he is doing business in his individual name
(except import of goods and services). In our view, this is not logical.

Specified current account transactions allowed without any limit:

i) Expenses for emigration are permitted without limit. However,
remittances for making an investment or for earning points for the
purpose of an emigration visa are not permitted beyond the LRS limit.

ii)
For medical expenses and studies abroad also, one can incur expenses
more than the LRS limit subject to an estimate given by the hospital/
doctor or the educational institution.

2.2.4 Capital Account Transactions

– The permitted Capital Account transactions can be referred to in
Clause 6 – Part A of the Master Direction on LRS dated 24th August 2022.
Earlier the list was a little more elaborate. Now the list is truncated
after the Overseas Investment Rules have been enacted. The permitted
transactions are:

i) opening of foreign currency account abroad with a bank.
ii) acquisition of immovable property abroad, Overseas Direct
Investment (ODI) and Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI), in accordance with
the provisions contained in OI Rules, 2022; OI Regulations, 2022 and OI
Directions, 2022.
iii) extending loans including loans in Indian Rupees to
Non-resident Indians (NRIs) who are relatives as defined in the Companies
Act, 2013.

The LRS is primarily used for opening bank accounts, portfolio
investment, acquiring immovable property and giving loans abroad. Prior
to 24th August 2022, the circular referred to specific kinds of
securities – listed and unlisted shares, debt instruments, etc. Now the
reference has been made to Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI)
and Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) under the New Overseas Investment
regime. This is discussed more in detail in para 2.2.5 below.

It may be noted that a foreign currency account cannot be opened in a bank
in India or an Offshore Banking Unit. The bank account should be outside
India.

2.2.5 Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI) – OPI has been defined in Rule 2(s) of OI Rules to mean “investment, other than ODI, in foreign securities, but not in any unlisted debt instruments or any security issued by a person resident in India who is not in an IFSC”.
(It has been clarified that even after the delisting of securities, the
investment in such securities shall continue to be treated as OPI until
any further investment is made in the entity.)

Basically, OPI
means investment in foreign securities. Then, there are exclusions to
the same – ODI, unlisted debt instruments and securities issued by a
resident [except by a person in the International Financial Services
Centre (IFSC)].

ODI includes investment in the unlisted equity capital
of a foreign entity. Equity Capital includes equity shares and other
fully convertible instruments as explained under Rule 2(e) of OI Rules.
Thus, now it is clear that investment even in a single unlisted share of
a foreign entity falls under ODI and it requires separate compliance.

Listed foreign securities have not been defined. However, “listed foreign
entity” has been defined in Rule 2(m) of OI Rules to mean “a foreign
entity whose equity shares or any other fully and compulsorily convertible instrument is listed on a recognised stock exchange outside India.”

Para
1(ix)(a) of OI Directions provides further prohibitions under OPI which
are not covered under the OI Rules. It provides that OPI is not
permitted in derivatives and commodities.

This brings out the following:

OPI means Investment in foreign securities. However, investment in the following are not covered under OPI:

i) Investments considered as ODI:

a) Investment in unlisted equity capital;

b) Subscription to Memorandum of Association;

c) Investment in 10% or more of listed equity capital;

d) Investment of less than 10% of listed equity capital but with control in the foreign entity.

ii) Unlisted debt instruments.

iii) Security issued by a person resident in India (excluding a person in an IFSC).

iv) Derivatives unless specifically permitted by RBI.

v) Commodities including Bullion Depository Receipts.

Debt instruments are defined in clause (A) of Rule 5 of OI Rules. These mean:

i) Government bonds.

ii) Corporate bonds.

iii) All tranches of securitisation structure which are not equity tranches.

iv) Borrowings by firms through loans.

v) Depository receipts whose underlying securities are debt securities.

Other investments:
Apart
from listed securities, investment is permitted in units of mutual
funds, venture funds and other funds which can be considered as “foreign
securities”.

Investment in Gold (precious metal) bonds is not permitted as it amounts to a corporate bond.

Buying physical gold or other precious metals outside India is also not permitted under LRS.
Also, see para 2.2.12 for more prohibitions under LRS.

2.2.6 Bank fixed deposits

– Is investment in fixed deposits of banks permitted? Can these be
considered as loans? Extending loans is specifically permitted under
LRS. What is prohibited is borrowing by firms. Banks are not firms.
These are companies.

Bank FDs are also not corporate bonds.
Bonds have a specific meaning. It means a security or an instrument
which can be transferred. A bank FD cannot be transferred.

However,
OPI means investment in foreign securities. A Bank Fixed Deposit is not
a “security”. Hence in our view, keeping funds in Bank FDs is not
considered as OPI.

One view is that bank fixed deposit is like a bank balance. Hence funds remitted under LRS may be kept in bank fixed deposits.
However, funds remitted abroad have to be used within 180 days. (See
para 3 for more discussion). Hence such FDs cannot be held beyond 180
days and should be used for some permitted purpose within 180 days.

2.2.7 Unlisted shares of a foreign company – A background:

From 2004 till 22nd August 2022, the Master Directions were abundantly clear that investment under LRS could be made in unlisted and listed equity shares. However, vide A.P. Circular 57 dated 8th May 2007, the RBI introduced the sentence – “All other transactions which are otherwise not permissible under FEMA …… are not allowed under the Scheme.”
Under this clause, RBI took a view that investment in unlisted shares
was not permitted. According to RBI, investment in unlisted shares was
permitted only as per ODI rules applicable at that time (Old ODI Regime
under FEMA Notification 120 which was in effect before 22nd August
2022). Under those rules, individuals were not permitted to make
business investments outside India. Hence, investments made by resident
individuals in unlisted foreign companies to undertake business were
considered as a violation. With due respect, the stand taken by RBI does
not go in line with the language of the Master Directions – right till
22nd August 2022. All penalties imposed for investment in unlisted
shares by resident individuals – are not in keeping with the law – FEMA.

The phrase “which are otherwise not permissible” applies
to all investments. For example, investment in immovable property
abroad is otherwise not permissible. But under LRS it is permissible.
Loans abroad are otherwise not permissible. But under LRS they are
permissible. The LRS was supposed to apply in addition to all existing facilities.
In Master Circular on Miscellaneous Remittances from India – Facilities
for Residents dated 1st July 2008, the phrase was amended to “The facility under the Scheme is in addition to those already included in Schedule III of Foreign Exchange Management (Current Account Transactions) Rules, 2000”. From May 2015, the Current Account Rules were changed and from Master Circular dated 1st July 2015 onwards, the phrase “in addition to”
has been dropped. However, the fact remains that till 22nd August 2022
investment in unlisted shares was permitted as per Master Direction.
From 23rd August 2022, the phrase “unlisted shares” was dropped in the
Master Direction.

On representation, RBI formally introduced the
scheme of ODI for resident individuals from August 2013 (generally
called “LRS-ODI”). It permitted individuals to invest in unlisted shares
of a foreign company having bonafide business subject to compliances
pertaining to ODI. However, RBI considered investments made prior to
August 2013 as a violation which required compounding. This did leave a
bad taste for Indian investors.

Thus, now the investment in
unlisted securities is covered under the ODI route and has a separate
set of rules and compliances. This was the position since August 2013
under the Old ODI regime as well as under the New OI regime notified on
22nd August 2022. It is not dealt with more in this article as that is a
subject by itself.

2.2.8 Listed securities abroad of Indian companies – Up to Master Circular dated 1st July 2015, the language was that investment could be made under “assets” outside India.
It did not specifically state that investment could be only in
securities of foreign entities. Hence investment made in say GDRs or
securities of Indian companies listed abroad was possible. Later, Master
Circulars were replaced with Master Directions. From Master Direction
dated 1st January 2016, it was provided that investment could be in “shares of overseas company”. Hence, it should be noted that under LRS, an individual can invest in listed securities of a foreign entity.
One cannot invest in securities of an Indian company which are listed
abroad. Some people have invested in bonds of Indian companies listed
abroad. Such investments are not permitted under LRS. One should sell
such investments and apply for compounding of offence. Under the OI
Rules as well, investment in securities issued by a person resident in
India is not permitted under OPI. There is only one exclusion to the
prohibition – investment in securities issued by an entity in IFSC is
allowed.

2.2.9 Investment in permissible security of an entity in IFSC is permitted under LRS. Under the Notification No. 339 dated 2.3.2015, any entity in an IFSC is treated as a non-resident.

OPI as discussed in para 2.2.5 above means investment …. in foreign securities, but not in any unlisted debt instruments or any security issued by a person resident in India who is not in an IFSC.
This language creates some confusion. Investment is not permitted in
any security issued by an Indian resident which is not in IFSC. Does it
mean that investment in any security such as “unlisted debt instrument”
issued by an entity in IFSC is permissible? We would not take such a
view. One has to equate an IFSC entity with a foreign entity. Whatever
security of a foreign entity one can invest in, similar security of an
IFSC entity can be invested in. Thus, investment should be in assets
discussed in paras 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.

2.2.10 Extending Loans:
Under LRS, extending loans to non-residents is allowed. However, this
is allowed in the case of outright loans to third parties. For instance,
Mr. A (an Indian resident) can give a loan to his friend Mr. B (a US
Resident) or to B Inc (a US company).

However, if Mr. A has made
ODI in the USA (whether in his individual capacity or through an Indian
Entity), then a loan by Mr. A to the investee entity in the USA is not
considered under LRS. Mr. A will have to comply with the ODI Rules in
such a case. Under ODI Rules, only equity investment can be made by
individuals. One cannot take a view that investment in equity of a
foreign entity will be under ODI and loan to that entity will be under
LRS. If there is any equity investment in a foreign entity as ODI, then
all conditions of the ODI route shall be fulfilled. Hence, no loan can
be given.

2.2.11 Transactions in Indian rupees – Indian
residents are allowed to give gifts and loans to NRI/ PIO relatives (as
defined under the Companies Act 2013) in rupees in their NRO account.

Para
6(iii) of the Master Direction initially refers to NRIs. Later, it has
been clarified that gifts and loans can be given to PIOs also (i.e.,
foreign citizens but Persons of Indian Origin).

It was represented to RBI that under LRS, foreign exchange can be remitted
outside India to anyone. However, if payment has to be made in rupees in
India, it is not permitted! RBI has since then permitted gifts and
loans in rupees in India but only to NRI/PIO relatives within the
overall LRS limit.

2.2.12 Prohibited transactions – Apart from restrictions discussed in para 2.2.5, the following transactions are prohibited:

i) Transactions specified in Schedule I and Schedule II of Current
Account Transactions Rules. This includes remittances for lottery
tickets, banned magazines, etc.

ii) Remittances to countries identified by FATF as non-co-operative countries.

iii) Remittance for margin trading. Thus, dealing in derivatives and options is not permitted.

iv) Trading in foreign exchange. (This is stated in FAQs updated up to 21.10.2021. No other document states this.)

3. Retaining funds abroad:

3.1 Background: This is the most important change in the LRS.

The individual who has remitted funds under LRS can primarily retain
the same abroad, reinvest the funds and retain the income earned from
such investments abroad. This has now undergone a change with effect
from 24th August 2022. The change has been carried out without any
specific announcement.

The Overseas Investment rules and
regulations were notified on 22nd August 2022. The Master Direction on
LRS was amended on 23rd August 2022 to factor in the changes in capital
account transactions as per the OI Rules as explained in paras 2.2.4 and
2.2.5 above. Paragraph 16 of the Master Direction amended on 23rd
August 2022 stated that – “Investor, who has remitted funds under LRS
can retain, reinvest the income earned on the investments. At present,
the resident individual is not required to repatriate the funds or
income generated out of investments made under the Scheme.” Till
23rd August 2022 funds remitted under LRS and income from the same could
be retained and used abroad without any restrictions.

The Master
Direction on LRS was amended again on 24th August 2022 (just one day
later). This amendment includes an important change in the scheme and
has been dealt with in the next para 3.2.

3.2 Main amendment: Under the LRS Master Direction amended on 24th August 2022, Paragraph 16 provides the following:

“Investor, who has remitted funds under LRS can retain, reinvest the income earned on the investments. The received/realised/unspent/unused foreign exchange, unless reinvested, shall be repatriated and surrendered to an authorised person within a period of 180 days
from the date of such receipt/ realisation/ purchase/ acquisition or
date of return to India, as the case may be, in accordance with
Regulation 7 of Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation, repatriation
and surrender of foreign exchange) Regulations, 2015 [Notification No.
FEMA 9(R)/2015-RB]”.

It is provided that the received or
realised or unspent or unused foreign exchange should be repatriated to
India, unless it is reinvested. The time limit of 180 days is provided.
This condition of repatriating the unused or uninvested funds back to
India within 180 days is a major change. No specific announcement was
made. It was simply brought in the Master Direction on 24th August 2022.

The language is broad. The terms “received” and “realised” can
refer to the amount received on sale of investment, or income on
investment. The terms “unspent” and “unused” can refer to amount
received on sale of investments, or income on investment, or amount remitted from India under the LRS. The amounts have to be reinvested within 180 days from the date of receipt, realisation, acquisition or purchase of foreign exchange.

While the word “reinvested” is used, it cannot be mandatory that the funds
should only be “reinvested”. The intention seems to be that funds should
not be parked idle. They should be “reinvested” or “used” within 180
days. Let us assume a person makes an investment under LRS, then sells
the same and receives the sale proceeds. These proceeds can be used for
any permitted Current Account Transaction (expenditure) or Capital
Account Transaction (investment) within 180 days. That is the purpose of
LRS. Here also it will be helpful if RBI could provide a clarification.

3.3 Retrospective amendment: The requirement to
repatriate the idle funds within 180 days applies not only to fresh
remittances but also to the existing funds lying abroad which were
remitted before 24th August 2022. It is effectively a retrospective amendment. Many people are not aware of this.

Let
us take a case where funds were remitted under LRS since 2018 and funds
were lying idle in the bank account since then. These are unspent funds
and the amendment made on 24th August 2022 applies to such funds as
well. Hence, the person will have 180 days to invest the funds from 24th
August 2022. If it is not done, the funds should be repatriated.

Thus, by 19th Feb 2023 the funds remitted prior to 24th Aug 2022 had to be
utilised, if they were lying unspent or unutilised. If the funds are not
used by then and are still lying abroad, it is a contravention of FEMA.

3.4 Issues: This will cause difficulties for several people. Let us consider some issues.

3.4.1 Small amounts to be tracked and invested: The
income earned on investments abroad should also be invested abroad
within 180 days, or these should be remitted back to India. The income
on LRS funds could be small. Let us take a case where funds are remitted
to a brokerage account in the USA and investment is made in listed
shares. A small amount of income is received and lying in the brokerage
account. Or some funds are kept in the brokerage account to pay an
annual fee. One will have to keep track of all these incomes and
reinvest them. Keeping such a track and investing small funds is
difficult. Further remittance of funds to India also costs money by way
of bank charges, etc.

3.4.2 Time-consuming investments: Let
us consider another case. Let us say the person has purchased a flat
and after few years, he sells the same. He would like to buy another
flat abroad. The sale proceeds of the first flat should be used within
180 days. Either he should buy the flat or invest the funds in permitted
investments. At times, to finalise the transaction for a flat takes lot
of time. Therefore, one will have to plan to invest within 180 days
from the sale of flat.

3.4.3 Consolidation of funds over multiple years for high-value investments:

Some people have sent funds over a few years to buy an immovable property
abroad as one year’s limit under LRS may not be sufficient. However,
with the 180 days’ time limit, the accumulation of funds is not
possible. In such cases, the funds remitted abroad should be invested in
portfolio investment. And when the funds are sufficient to buy the
property, the securities can be sold. This however means that the person
undertakes risks associated with the securities. A fall in prices of
the securities will jeopardise the purchase of property.

3.5 Can the person invest the funds in bank fixed deposits?

See
para 2.2.6 above where it is stated that Bank FDs do not fall within
the definition of OPI. Remitting funds under LRS and keeping them in
Bank FDs for up to 180 days is all right. However, bank fixed deposits
are not securities and can be considered equivalent to funds in a bank
account. Hence, in our view, placing funds in bank fixed deposits will
not be considered an “investment” of funds. It will be ideal if RBI
comes out with a clarification on the same.

3.6 Some cases where the 180-day limit will not apply:

As mentioned in para 2.2.4, Indian residents can give loans and gifts
to NRI relatives. Here, there is no question of utilising foreign
exchange. Hence there is no limit of 180 days or any other time period.
The limit of 180 days applies only for foreign exchange remitted abroad
or lying abroad.

Let us take another illustration. A student
remits funds under LRS for education purposes to his foreign bank
account. Before leaving India, he is an Indian resident. All funds may
not be utilised within 180 days. Some funds may be lying for ongoing and
future expenses. However, when the student leaves India for education
abroad, he becomes a non-resident. In such a case, the 180-day limit
will not apply. Once a person is a non-resident, the funds outside India
are not liable to FEMA restrictions. Hence, the condition of
repatriating the funds within 180 days will not apply.

3.7 Consequences of violation:

What are the consequences of a violation of not using the funds within
180 days? The person concerned has to apply for compounding. Compounding
is a process under which the person concerned admits to the violation.
RBI then levies a penalty for the violation. There is no option to pay
Late Submission Fee (LSF) and regularise the matter. LSF is for delays
in submitting the documents/forms.

There is however, a hitch. Before applying for compounding, the transactions have to be regularised. How does one regularise?

Regularising
means doing something now, which should have been done earlier. In our
view, the violation can be regularised in two manners – one is by
remitting the funds back to India. The other is to invest/use the funds
abroad as permitted – although with a delay. It is however doubtful
whether utilising the funds after the 180-days’ period will be
considered as regularisation. It will be better for the funds to be
repatriated to India. Once the funds are repatriated, a Compounding
Application should be filed with RBI.

3.8 Alternate views:

3.8.1
There is a view that the provision of use of funds within 180 days
applies to an “investor” only (see para 16 of Master Direction). Thus,
if funds are remitted by an investor for investment, one has to use the funds within 180 days. Whereas, if a person has remitted the funds for expenses
such as education, one can use the funds beyond 180 days also. However,
the language does not suggest such an intention. While the provision
starts with the term “investor”, the provision goes on further to add
that the funds have to be surrendered to the bank “in accordance with
Regulation 7 of Foreign Exchange Management (Realisation, repatriation
and surrender of foreign exchange) Regulations, 2015 [Notification No.
FEMA 9(R)/2015-RB]”. Regulation 7 of Notification 9(R) provides as under:

“A person being an individual resident in India shall surrender the
received/realised/unspent/unused foreign exchange whether in the form of
currency notes, coins and travellers cheques, etc. to an authorised
person within a period of 180 days from the date of such
receipt/realisation/purchase/acquisition or date of his return to India,
as the case may be.”

Regulation 7 applies to all individual
Indian residents and for all purposes. Hence even if the funds have been
remitted for expenses, they have to be utilised within 180 days.
Otherwise, the same should be remitted to India.

3.8.2 There is
another view as to when is the amount to be considered as unused/
unspent. The view is that once the amount is remitted abroad, it has to
be used on the first day. If it is not used on the first day, then it is
unused/unspent. If it unused/unspent, it has to be remitted back to
India. The time of 180 days is only to remit the funds back to India.

While
literal reading suggests this – in our view, this is neither the
correct interpretation, nor the intention. One cannot use the funds on
day one. It takes time for the funds to be used. If the funds are not
used within 180 days, then they have to be remitted back to India.

4. Some more issues:

4.1 Purpose Codes: At
the time of remittance, one has to state the purpose code in the form.
For example, one mentions the purpose code as S0023 (remittance for
opening a bank account abroad). After remittance, can the funds be used
for investment in shares? Or the purpose code stated is investment in
real estate (S0005) and one is not able to invest in real estate within
180 days, and hence invested in shares. Can it be done? Technically it
could be considered an incorrect purpose code. However, if one considers
the substance of LRS, remittance for any permitted purpose is allowed.
One may have the original intention for one purpose, but then the
purpose has changed, and it should be all right. After the remittance of
funds, change of use has always been permitted. Assume that a person
has remitted the funds to open a bank account abroad. Under the present
LRS scheme, funds have to be used within 180 days. To comply this
condition, funds are invested. This means the “use of funds” has changed
from keeping funds in bank account to investment. Or the funds are sent
for investment in shares, and then the shares are sold. Does it mean
the sale proceeds have to be reinvested only in shares? No. The funds
have to be used or reinvested for any permissible purpose.

It
will be better that after remitting the funds for the first time, if
there is a change in the use, one should write to the bank and inform
the change of use. This is however out of abundant caution. In substance
after sending the funds, the same can be used for any permitted
purpose. Also see para 3.2 of Part B on TCS provisions.

4.2 Joint holding:

There are people who open bank accounts and make investments in joint
names. Investment is made by one person (say the first holder). Funds
belong to the first holder. That is how it is declared in the income tax
returns. However, to take care of situations where the investor dies or
becomes incapacitated, the account or the investment is held in the
joint name. Otherwise, the funds may be blocked. The process of
producing a Will or succession document is a time-consuming process. So,
the second name is added for the sake of convenience. Hence in our
view, holding an investment or bank account in a joint name is all
right. It is a prudent step. There cannot be any objection to this.

5. Co-ownership and Consolidation of funds:

5.1 Co-ownership

– Assume that funds are sent by two or more relatives in one bank
account. From there investment has to be made. It is necessary that the
investment should be made in the proportion in which the funds are
remitted. Assume that Mr. A remits US$ 1,00,000 and Mrs. A remits US$
50,000, and together they invest US$ 1,50,000 in shares. The holding
ratio in the shares should be 2:1 between Mr. A and Mrs. A. If the
investment holding is 50:50, it means Mr. A has given a gift to Mrs. B.
Gift outside India from one resident to another resident is an
impermissible transaction. It will become a violation.

5.2 Consolidation of funds

– Master Direction prior to 23rd August 2022 permitted consolidation of
remittances by the family members. It further provided that clubbing is
not permitted by family members if they are not the co-owners of bank account/ investment/ immovable property. Here, the condition for co-ownership does not mean being just a co-owner. It means that ownership ratio in the asset should be commensurate with the ratio in which payment is made.
This is prima facie in line with the LRS that the owner should remit
the funds. If another person becomes the owner without remitting the
funds it is as good as a gift from the person who has remitted the
funds. This is different from being a joint holder (without remittance
or payment) for the sake of convenience discussed in para 4.2 above.

It may be noted that “family members” have not been explained. It should
be considered as a family comprising relatives under the Companies Act
2013.

5.3 Consolidation of funds for acquiring immovable property

– The amended Master Direction on LRS has retained the above-mentioned
condition of consolidation of funds and co-ownership. However, the
reference to the immovable property has been removed. The Master
Direction has stated that remittances for the immovable property should
be in accordance with OI rules.

Under the OI rules, an Indian
resident can acquire immovable property by remitting funds under LRS.
Further, an Indian resident can acquire property as a gift from another
resident also, subject to the condition that the donor should have
acquired such property in line with FEMA provisions applicable at the
time of acquisition.

Further, proviso to Rule 21(2)(ii)(c) of OI Rules states that “such
remittances under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme may be consolidated
in respect of relatives if such relatives, being persons resident in
India, comply with the terms and conditions of the Scheme”.

Does this mean that relatives can consolidate/ club the remittances, but
property can be owned by one person? As discussed above, an Indian
resident cannot gift funds to another Indian resident outside India.
When consolidated funds are remitted, purchase by one person actually
amounts to a gift of funds – which is not permitted. If the property is
acquired and then later the share in the property is gifted, it is
permissible.

However, if one considers the draft rules on Overseas investment published in 2021 for public consultation, it
provided that if funds were consolidated, the immovable property has to
be co-owned. In the final OI rules notified by Central Government and
the amended Master Direction, the language is different. The condition
of co-ownership is not present for the purchase of immovable property
abroad. While it seems like a specific amendment to relax the condition
for co-ownership, it does not come out clearly that funds can be
remitted by relatives but property can be purchased by one person.

At present, where remittances are consolidated amongst relatives, one
should avoid purchasing immovable property without complying with the
condition of co-ownership. It will be helpful if RBI can provide a
specific clarification.

5.4 In some cases, banks have permitted remittance under LRS from one account of an individual for say
4 different people by obtaining PAN of all 4 people. This is incorrect.
Remittance is not based on PAN. It is per person. One individual
can remit only up to the LRS limit and that too for himself/ herself.
If funds have to be remitted by other Indian resident family members,
then the account holder should first gift the funds to others and then
others may remit the funds from their account. Of course, if the bank
account is a joint account and funds in that account belong to all joint
holders, then each joint holder can remit up to the balance available
under his ownership. Consolidated funds can be remitted subject to what
has been discussed in para 5 above. In such cases, one should keep a
proper account of the funds, ownership and remittances.

Summary:

LRS was started in the year 2004 as the first step towards capital account
convertibility of the rupee. Subsequent amendments have imposed too many
conditions and restrictions. This clearly goes back from
liberalisation.

B. INCOME-TAX ACT – TAX COLLECTION AT SOURCE ON REMITTANCES UNDER LRS:

1. Provisions in force till 30th June 2023:

1.1 Basic provision:

Sub-section (1G) was introduced in Section 206C vide Finance Act, 2020
w.e.f. 1st October 2020. It provides for Tax Collection at Source (TCS)
at the rate of 5% on remittances out of India under LRS. There is
a threshold of INR 7,00,000 for the same, i.e., there is no TCS on
remittances up to INR 7,00,000. The rate of 5% is applicable for amount
in excess of Rs. 7,00,000. It should be noted that TCS is applicable per
person per financial year.

Thus, the bank which sells foreign exchange to the individual for remittance under LRS, will collect tax @
5% over and above the rupee amount required for sale of foreign
exchange. This TCS is like an advance tax. The individual can claim the
TCS as tax paid while filing his income-tax return. Many laymen are
under the impression that this is a straight loss. However, that is not
the case. The issue is that the funds of the person get blocked for some
time.

1.2 Non-applicability of TCS:

1.2.1 Remittance not covered under LRS: TCS applies only where remittance is made under the LRS. For instance – if
an NRI remits funds from his NRO/ NRE Account, TCS will not apply in
such case. It is because this is not a remittance under LRS. Similarly,
TCS is not applicable to remittances by persons other than individuals.

1.2.2 Remitter liable to TDS: It has been provided that if the remitter is liable to deduct tax at
source under any provisions of the Income-tax Act, and has deducted such
tax, then this TCS provision will not apply. The intention seems that
TCS is not applicable only if the remitter is liable to deduct tax at
source on the “concerned LRS remittance” and has deducted the same.

However, the language is not clear whether the remitter should be liable to
deduct tax at source on “the concerned remittance under LRS” or “any
transaction”. The literal reading suggests that it is not necessary that
TDS should be applicable on the concerned LRS remittance. The person
may be liable to deduct tax at source on any payment. Consider some
examples. Some individuals have to deduct tax at source where the
turnover or gross receipts from business/profession exceeds the
prescribed thresholds; or on purchase of immovable property u/s. 194-IA;
or on payment of rent u/s. 194-IB. These transactions on which TDS is
deductible are unrelated to the LRS remittance. The language suggests
that TCS is not applicable where the person has deducted tax at source
under any provisions. In our view, this is not the intention. It would
be better if the Government brings clarity in respect of the provision.

1.3. Concessional rate in case of loan taken for education:

A concessional rate of TCS @ 0.5% is applicable instead of 5% where:

the remittance is for the purpose of pursuing education; and
the amount being remitted is from loan funds obtained from a financial institution as defined u/s 80E.

In other words, if the remittance under LRS is made for the purpose of
education out of own funds then the concessional rate of TCS will not be
applicable and one needs to pay TCS @ 5 per cent.

1.4. Overseas Tour Program Package:

While the threshold of INR 7 Lakhs is prescribed for all purposes, such a
threshold is not applicable where the remittance is for the purpose of
an overseas tour program package. Hence, in such cases, TCS @ 5% is applicable without any threshold.

This is the position of TCS on remittances under LRS as of now. Let us take a look at the amendments proposed in Budget 2023.

2. Amendment vide Finance Act 2023 as passed by the Lok Sabha on 24.3.2023 – TCS rate to be increased to 20%:

2.1 Vide Finance Act 2023, the rate of TCS has been increased from the
existing 5% to 20% for remittances made under LRS w.e.f. 1st July 2023.

2.2 Further, the threshold of INR 7,00,000 has been restricted only to
cases where remittance is for the purpose of education or medical
treatment.

2.3 Consequently, the rate of TCS will now be 20% without any threshold for all purposes except education and medical treatment.

2.4 One more amendment is that the phrase “out of India” has been removed
for the purpose of TCS. Under the original provision, TCS was applicable
only where remittance was done “out of India” under LRS. As discussed
above in Para 2.2.11, LRS can be used for giving gift or loan in rupees
to NRI/ PIO relatives in their NRO account as well. In such case, TCS
was not applicable as per existing provision.

From 1st July 2023, TCS will be applicable on such rupee transfers as well. It is not
required that there is remittance out of India. It should be noted that
for rupee payments discussed in para 2.2.11 of Part A, there is no
mechanism to report to the bank. The remitter has to keep track of rupee
payments and see that all payments in rupees and foreign exchange
should be within the limits of LRS. For remittance abroad, formal
reporting must be made to the bank and thus bank will know that the
funds are being remitted under LRS. In the case of rupee payments, RBI
should work out a mechanism for reporting. Alternatively, the remitter
should himself provide the details to the bank and the bank should
collect TCS.

2.5 The concessional rate of 0.5% where remittance
is out of educational loan (discussed in Para 1.3 above) remains the
same after amendment.

The table below summarises the TCS rate for various transactions before and after the proposed amendment.

Particulars Vide
Finance Act 2020
1st
October 2020 to 30th June 2023
Vide
Finance Act 2023
1st
July 2023 onwards
Remittance out of educational loan taken from
financial institution defined u/s 80E
0.50% on amount exceeding INR
7,00,000
Education & medical treatment 5% on amount exceeding INR
7,00,000
Overseas tour program package 5% without any threshold 20% without any threshold
All other purposes 5% on amount exceeding INR 7,00,000 20% without any threshold

3. Other issues:

3.1 Payment through International Credit Cards:

It should also be noted that payments made by International Credit Card
(ICCs) for foreign tours or any other Current Account Transaction are
not captured within the purview of LRS. The limit of LRS, of course,
applies whether payment is made through bank transfer or through ICC.
There is however no mechanism to collect TCS when payment is made by
ICC.

Finance Minister – Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, while passing
the Finance Bill in Lok Sabha on 24th March 2023 has made a statement on
this. The Central Government has requested the RBI to develop a
mechanism to capture payment for foreign tours and TCS by ICC.

3.2 Change in use of funds – As mentioned in para 4.1 of Part A, the purpose can be changed after remitting the funds. This can have some issues.

Normally the TCS rate is 20%. If the purpose of remittance is changed to
education, the TCS should have been lower at 5%. As excess tax is
collected, there is no difficulty. In any case, TCS is like advance tax.
It will be claimed as such in the income tax return.

However, let us assume that funds are remitted for education and TCS is 5%. Later
the use is changed to investment, then there is a shortfall in the TCS.
Banks would of course have collected the tax based on declaration and
documents provided by the remitter. The change in use would not cause
any liability on the bank. Will it cause any liability on the remitter?
There should be no implication for a bonafide case. For example, The
original remittance was for education purpose but some funds could not
be used within 180 days. In order to comply with the condition of
investing the funds within 180 days, the funds were invested.
Subsequently the investments were sold and funds were used for
education. This should not be an issue. Even otherwise there is no
specific provision for change of use. Please note that we are discussing
bonafide change in use and not false declarations. Out of abundant
caution, the remitter may inform the bank on change of use and if
necessary, ask the bank to collect additional tax from him and pay the
same to the Government. It may even collect interest. The remitter will
in any case claim the additional TCS in his tax return.

Summary:

20% is a very high rate for TCS. There are no thresholds. The threshold of
INR 7 Lakhs has also been removed. Sometimes, remittances are made for
pure expenses or gift to relatives which do not lead to any potential
incomes. However, with the steep hike in its rate, it appears that the
government does not wish to encourage remittances under LRS. Hence it is
making remittances costlier.

Conclusion:

There are significant changes in the LRS in terms of inserting some
restrictions and disincentives. Before making remittances under the LRS,
one should carefully understand the implications and then go ahead with
the remittance.

(Authors acknowledge contributions from CA Rutvik Sanghvi, Ms. Ishita Sharma and CA Nidhi Shah.)

Conditional Gifts Vs. Senior Citizens Act

INTRODUCTION

A gift is a transfer of property, movable or immovable, made voluntarily and without any consideration from a donor to a donee. This feature, in the past, has examined whether a gift which has been made, can be taken back by the donor? In other words, can a gift be revoked? There have been several instances where parents have gifted their house to their children and then the children have either not taken care of their parents or ill-treated them. In such cases, the parents wonder whether they can take back the gift on grounds of ill-treatment? The position in this respect is not so simple and the law is clear on when a gift can be revoked. Recently, the Supreme Court faced an interesting issue of whether a gift made by a senior citizen can be revoked by having resort to the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (“Senior Citizens Act”)?

LAW ON GIFTS

The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (‘the Act’) deals with gifts of property, both immovable and movable. Section122 of the Act defines a gift as the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by a donor, to a donee. The gift must be accepted by or on behalf of the donee during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, then the gift is void. In Asokan vs. Lakshmikutty, CA 5942/2007 (SC), the Supreme Court held that in order to constitute a valid gift, acceptance thereof is essential. The Act does not prescribe any particular mode of acceptance. It is the circumstances of the transaction which would be relevant for determining the question. There may be various means to prove acceptance of a gift. The gift may be handed over to a donee, which in a given situation may also amount to a valid acceptance. The fact that possession had been given to the donee also raises a presumption of acceptance.

This section is also clear that it applies to gifts of movable properties also. A gift is also a transfer of property and hence, all the provisions pertaining to transfer of property under the Act are applicable to it. Further, the absence of consideration is the hall mark of a gift. What is consideration has not been defined under this Act, and hence, one would have to refer to the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 2(d) of that Act defines ‘consideration’ as follows: ~ “when, at the desire of one person, the other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.”

HOW ARE GIFTS TO BE MADE?

Section 123 of the Act answers this question in two parts. The first part deals with gifts of immovable property while the second part deals with gifts of movable property. Insofar as the gifts of immovable property are concerned, section 123 makes transfer by a registered instrument mandatory. This is evident from the use of word “transfer must be effected”. However, the second part of section 123 dealing with gifts of movable property, simply requires that gift of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”. The difference in the two provisions lies in the fact that in so far as the transfer of movable property by way of gift is concerned the same can be effected by a registered instrument or by delivery. Such transfer in the case of immovable property requires a registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective. This view has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Renikuntla Rajamma (D) By Lr vs. K.Sarwanamma (2014) 9 SCC 456.

CONDITIONAL GIFTS

In Narmadaben Maganlal Thakker vs. Pranjivandas Maganlal Thakker, (1997) 2 SCC 255 a conditional gift of an immovable property was made by the donor without delivering possession and there was no acceptance of the gift by the donee. There was no absolute transfer of ownership by the donor in favor of the donee. The gift deed conferred only limited right upon the donee and was to become operative after the death of the donor. The donor permanently reserved his rights to collect the mesne profit of the property throughout his lifetime. After the gift deed was executed, the donee violated certain conditions under the deed. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the donor had executed a conditional gift deed and retained the possession and enjoyment of the property during his lifetime. Since the donee did not satisfy the conditions of the gift deed, the gift was void.

In K. Balakrishnan vs. K Kamalam, (2004) 1 SCC 581 the donor gifted her share in land and a school building. However, the gift deed provided that the management of the school and income from the property remained with the donor during her lifetime and thereafter would be vested in the donee. The Supreme Court upheld the gift without possession and held that it was open to the donor to transfer by gift title and ownership in the property and at the same time reserve its possession and enjoyment to herself during her lifetime. There is no prohibition in law that ownership in a property cannot be gifted without its possession and right of enjoyment. It examined section 6(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which states that an interest in property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally cannot be transferred by him. However, the Supreme Court held that Clause (d) of section 6 was not attracted to the terms of the gift deed being considered by the Court because it was not merely an interest in a property, the enjoyment of which was restricted to the owner personally. The donor, in this case, was the absolute owner of the property gifted and the subject matter of the gift was not an interest restricted in its enjoyment to herself. The Court held that the gift deed was valid even though the donor had reserved to herself the possession and enjoyment of the property gifted.

However, the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court settled the above issue by the decision in the case of Renikuntla Rajamma vs. K. Sarwanamma, (2014) 9 SCC 445. In this case, the donor made a gift of an immovable property by way of a registered gift deed, which was duly attested. However, the donor retained the possession of the gifted property for enjoyment during her life time, and also the right to receive the rents of the property. The question before the Court was that since the donor had retained the right to use the property and receive rents during her life time, whether such a reservation or retention or absence of possession rendered the gift invalid?

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the gift. It held that a conjoint reading of sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property, 1882 Act made it abundantly clear that “transfer of possession” of the property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by the donor and attested as required, was not a sine qua non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 123 has overruled the erstwhile requirement under the Hindu Law/Buddhist Law of delivery of possession as a condition for making of a valid gift. Transfer by the way of gift of immovable property requires a registered instrument but the provision does not make delivery of possession of the immovable property gifted as an additional requirement for the gift to be valid and effective. Absence of any such requirement led the Court to conclude that the delivery of possession was not essential for a valid gift in the case of immovable property. The Court also distinguished on facts, its earlier decision in the case of Narmadaben Maganlal Thakker. It held that in that case, the issue was of a conditional gift whereas the current case dealt with an absolute gift. It accepted the ratio laid down in the latter case of K. Balakrishnan. Thus, the Supreme Court established an important principle of law that a donor can retain possession and enjoyment of a gifted property during his lifetime and provide that the donee would be in a position to enjoy the same after the donor’s lifetime.

REVOCATION OF GIFTS

Section 126 of the Act provides that a gift may be revoked in certain circumstances. The donor and the donee may agree that on the happening of certain specified event that does not depend on the will of the donor, the gift shall be revoked. Further, it is necessary that the condition should be expressed and specified at the time of making the gift. A condition cannot be imposed subsequent to giving the gift. In Asokan vs. Lakshmikutty, supra, the Supreme Court held that once a gift is complete, the same cannot be rescinded. For any reason whatsoever, the subsequent conduct of a donee cannot be a ground for rescission of a valid gift.

However, it is necessary that the event for revocation is not dependent upon the wishes of the donor. Thus, revocation cannot be on the mere whims and fancies of the donor. For instance, after gifting, the donor cannot say that he made a mistake, and now he has a change of mind and wants to revoke the gift. A gift is a completed contract and hence, unless there are specific conditions precedent which have been expressly specified there cannot be a revocation. It is quite interesting to note that while a gift is a completed contract, there cannot be a contract for making a gift since it would be void for absence of consideration. For instance, a donor cannot enter into an agreement with a donee under which he agrees to make a gift but he can execute a gift deed stating that he has made a gift. The distinction is indeed fine! It needs to be noted that a gift which has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, duress, etc., would not be a gift since it is not a contract at all. It is void ab initio.

DECISIONS ON THIS ISSUE

In Jagmeet Kaur Pannu, Jammu vs. Ranjit Kaur Pannu AIR 2016 P&H 210, the Punjab & Haryana High Court considered whether a mother could revoke a gift of her house in favor of her daughter on the grounds of misbehaviour and abusive language. The mother had filed a petition with the Tribunal under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 which had set aside the gift deed executed by the mother. It held that the deed was voidable at the mother’s instance. The daughter appealed to the High Court which set aside the Tribunal’s Order. The High Court considered the gift deed which stated that the gift was made voluntarily, without any pressure and out of natural love and affection which the mother bore towards the daughter. There were no preconditions attached to the gift. The High Court held that the provisions of s.126 of the Act would apply since this was an important provision which laid down a rule of public policy that a person who transferred a right to the property could not set down his own volition as a basis for his revocation. If there was any condition allowing for a document to be revoked or cancelled at the donor’s own will, then that condition would be treated as void. The Court held that there have been decisions of several courts which have held that if a gift deed was clear and operated to transfer the right of property to another but it also contained an expression of desire by the donor that the donee will maintain the donor, then such an expression in the gift deed must be treated as a pious wish of the donor and the sheer fact that the donee did not fulfil the condition could not vitiate the gift.

Again, in the case of Syamala Raja Kumari vs. Alla Seetharavamma 2017 AIR (Hyd) 86 a similar issue before the High Court was whether a gift which was made without any preconditions could be subsequently revoked? The donor executed a gift deed in favor of his daughters out of love and affection. He retained a life interest benefit and after him, his wife retained a life interest under the said document. However, there were no conditions imposed by the donor for gifting the property in favor of the donees. All it mentioned was that he and his wife would have a life-interest benefit. Subsequently, the donor executed a revocation deed stating that he wanted to cancel the gift since his daughters were not taking care of him and his wife, and were not even visiting them. The Court set aside the revocation of the gift. It held that once a valid unconditional gift was given by the donor and accepted by donees, the same could not be revoked for any reason. The Court held that the donees would get absolute rights in respect of the property. By executing the gift deed, the donor had divested his right in the property and now he could not unilaterally execute any revocation deed for revoking the gift deed executed by him in favor of the plaintiffs.

Similarly, in the case of Sheel Arora vs. Madan Mohan Bajaj, 2007 (6) BomCR 633, the donor executed a registered gift deed of a flat in favor of a donee. Subsequently, the donor unilaterally executed a revocation deed cancelling the gift. The Bombay High Court held that after lodging the duly executed gift deed for registration, there was an unilateral attempt on the part of the donor to revoke the said gift deed. Section 126 of the Act, provides that revocation of gift can be only in cases specified under the section and the same requires participation of the donee. In the case in hand, there was no participation of the donee in an effort on the part of the donor to revoke the said gift deed. On the contrary, an unilateral effort on the part of the donor by execution of a deed of revocation itself disclosed that the donor had clearly accepted the legal consequences which were to follow on account of execution of a valid gift deed, and presentation of the same for registration.

However, in the case of S. Sarojini Amma vs. Velayudhan Pillai Sreekumar 2018 (14) SCALE 339, the Supreme Court considered a gift, where in expectation that the donee would look after the donor and her husband, she executed a gift deed. The gift deed clearly stated that, gift would take effect after the death of the donor and her husband. Subsequently, the donor filed a Deed of Cancellation of the Gift Deed. The Supreme Court observed that a conditional gift became complete on the compliance of the conditions mentioned in the deed. Hence, it allowed the revocation.

CANCELLATION VS. SENIOR CITIZENS ACT

Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Sudesh Chhikara vs. Ramti Devi, Civil Appeal No. 174 of 2021; Order dated 6th December, 2022 was faced with a very interesting issue as to whether a senior citizen can cancel a gift of lands made to her children on grounds that their relationship was strained. Accordingly, she filed a petition under section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act for the cancellation of the gift. The Maintenance Tribunal constituted under the Act (which adjudicates all matters for maintenance, including provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment) upheld the cancellation on the grounds that her children were not taking care of her.

Section 23 of this Act contains an interesting provision. If any senior citizen has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, on the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, then the transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. This negates every conditional transfer if the conditions subsequent are not fulfilled by the transferee. Property has been defined under the Act to include any right or interest in any property, whether movable/immovable, ancestral/self-acquired, tangible/intangible.

The Supreme Court in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) held that the Senior Citizens Act was enacted for making effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution of India. The Maintenance Tribunal was established to exercise various powers under this Act. This Act provided that the Maintenance Tribunal, had to adopt such summary procedure while holding inquiry, as it deemed fit. The Court held that the Tribunal exercised important jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act and for attracting Section 23, the following two conditions must be fulfilled:

a)    The transfer must have been made subject to the condition that the donee / transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the senior citizen transferor; and

b)    the transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor.

The Apex Court concluded that if both the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, the transfer shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or undue influence. Such a transfer then became voidable at the instance of the transferor and the Maintenance Tribunal has the jurisdiction to declare the transfer as void.

The Court held that when a senior citizen parted with his property by executing a gift deed / release deed in favor of his relatives, the senior citizen does not make it conditional to taking care of him. On the contrary, very often, such transfers were made out of natural love and affection without any expectations in return. Therefore, the Court laid down an important proposition that when it was alleged that the conditions mentioned in section 23 were attached to a transfer, existence of a conditional gift deed must be clearly brought out before the Maintenance Tribunal. If a gift was to be set aside under section 23, it was essential that a conditional gift deed / release deed was executed, and in the absence of any such conditions, section 23 could not be attracted. A transfer subject to a condition of providing the basic amenities and basic physical needs of the senior citizen transferor was a sine qua non (essential condition) for applicability of section 23. Since in this case, there was no such conditional deed, the Apex Court did not set aside the release deed executed by the senior citizen.

CONCLUSION

Donor beware of how you gift, for gift once given cannot be easily revoked! If there are any doubts or concerns in the mind of the donor then he should refrain from making an absolute unconditional gift or consider whether to avoid the gift at all! This is all the more true in the case of old parents who gift away their family homes and then try to claim the same back since they are being ill-treated by their children. They should be forewarned that it would not be easy to revoke such a gift. Remember a non-conditional gift / release is like a bullet which once fired cannot be recalled!!

The Risks Posed to Chartered Accountants by the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

INTRODUCTION

The role of Chartered Accountants has increased exponentially in the modern-day business environment. Gone are the days when the question of whether a Chartered Accountant conducting an audit was expected to be a watchdog or a bloodhound. The enlarged scope of audit/ compliance and the multifaceted advisory services rendered in today’s complex business environment by Chartered Accountants have opened them up to numerous regulatory and compliance-related challenges. We can see that Chartered Accountants are being called in for questioning by investigating agencies when a client’s affairs are the subject matter of investigation. Much unlike a Lawyer, the communication between a client and a Chartered Accountant does not get covered within the ambit of ‘legal privilege/privileged communication’ even though modern-day Chartered Accountants render a raft of quasi-legal services. With mushrooming of various tribunals before which Chartered Accountants has the right to represent, the risks they are exposed to in dispensing quasi-legal services need to be looked into given the numerous statutory laws that can cause an individual or professional firm to land in hot waters.

The last decade has witnessed sea changes in the regulation of economic activities. A number of legislations have now granted mandates to specialized agencies to detect and prevent economic offences. Much water may have flown under the bridge since the judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitmalji Porwal (1987) 2 SCC 364 wherein economic offences were compared with even a crime as unforgivable as murder. However, the judiciary still considers economic offences very seriously. It has now been established without a doubt that economic offences are to be regarded as a class unto themselves. The Serious Fraud Investigations Office, the Directorate of Enforcement, and the Income Tax authorities as mandated by the Prohibition of Benami Transaction Law in addition to other investigating agencies including the local police all operate in the field of investigating economic offences. Economic offences do not exist in silos. There is always the possibility of an overlap or an interplay. Investigation of economic offences invariably involves, inter alia, following the trail of money. Consulting and accounting professionals thus suddenly may find themselves in the epicenter of these investigations. No matter what the final verdict is, the taint of being accused of an economic offence often leaves an indelible mark on a person.

While studying for Master’s degree in law, a curious question was posed by a professor: “What can be done about bad advice?” This question was raised over a decade ago, and much water has flown under the bridge since then. Advice no longer needs to be bad to land a professional in hot water. In the Indian context, we have seen auditors hauled onto the coals for mistakes and frauds perpetuated by clients. It may very well be that in some cases professionals are complicit in those crimes due to professional pressure, however, more often than not it is likely that an auditor or a consultant from this august profession has unwittingly and unfortunately been dragged into controversy for no fault of his. This begs the question, “What can be done if good advice has unintended consequences? What can be done if a client does not follow the advice? What is the extent of the advisor’s liability? Chartered Accountants being arrested under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) (“Act”) are no longer unheard of. Though much has already been discussed about this harsh law with a client-centric focus, today this article shifts the focus onto professionals.

THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

One of the most important sections in any Act is the section that contains definitions. More often than not these definitions are contained in section 2 of an Act. The PMLA is no exception and defines proceeds of crime in section 2(1)(u) of the Act while section 3 itself defines the offence of money laundering. Both are reproduced below for clarity.

Section 2(1)(u) – “proceeds of crime means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property [or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country [or abroad].

[Explanation – For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.]”

Section 3 reads as follows-

“Whoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.

Explanation- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that, –

(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely: –

(a) concealment; or

(b) possession; or

(c) acquisition; or

(d) use; or

(e) projecting as untainted property; or

(f) claiming as untainted property,

in any manner whatsoever,

(ii) the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time as a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.]”

ANALYSING THE RISK

A conjoint reading of both sections clearly shows that the Act casts an extremely wide net. This seems to be deliberate and by design. An immediate red flag for Chartered Accountants can be the term ‘knowingly assisted’ which can be easily imported to both, the act of commission as well as an omission by professionals. Some solace therefore can be sought from the inclusion of the word ‘knowingly’ before ‘assisted’, as it establishes the requirement of mens rea for an offence to be made out. The absence of mens rea will certainly be invoked as a defense if any accusations are made under the act, however, mens rea itself is not very easy to prove at the outset and often requires evidence to be lead which equates to one being subject to the rigors of an ignominious criminal trial. It is incredibly difficult to prove the absence of criminal intent before the trial commences unless it is apparent from the face of the record that the accused professional may indeed ex-facie have no criminal intent. A complication that one encounters is the fact that the Economic Case Information Report (ECIR) is not a public document and does not need to be handed over to the accused at the time of the arrest. It may be produced before the special court that shall conduct the trial if required as held in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India 2022 SCC Online SC 929; [2022] 140 Taxmann.com 610 (SC). The Court has held that the ECIR is an internal document of the Directorate and not equivalent to the First Information Report (FIR) which is provided for in the Criminal Procedure Code. This poses a significant increase in the challenge of drafting a bail application. Be that as it may, obtaining bail in PMLA prosecutions is whole together a different challenge by itself, even if the ECIR copy is supplied to the accused. The infamous twin conditions (of the court being satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail) fulfill the same role that the mythological Cerberus did when it comes to the grant of bail for those accused under the PMLA. The jurisprudence regarding bail under PMLA has been a roller coaster ride much akin to the plot of a gripping thriller novel, what with the Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India (2018) 11 SCC 1 striking down the twin conditions, just for Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (supra) to uphold their revival post the 2018 amendment to the Act. Just like any other movie as of today, the story ends on a cliffhanger with the Supreme Court agreeing to review aspects of the Vijay Madanlal Choudhary judgment. That being said, as of today, the twin conditions are good law.

The red flag is not merely knowingly assisted. The explanation to section 3 lists out the processes or activities which shall constitute the offence of money laundering in wide terms such as ‘concealment, possession, acquisition, use, projecting as untainted property, or claiming as untainted property in any manner whatsoever’. This gamut of activities, despite the standard caveat of mens rea, is enough to cause considerable headaches to Chartered Accountants who are regularly called upon to assist in structuring transactions, helping out in complex business decisions, or auditing books of accounts. To precipitate matters, the definition includes the phrase “actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.” It is incredibly easy for a Chartered Accountant to be accused of the crime of money laundering. The activity of money laundering, being a continuous activity, also leaves one susceptible to the wrath of the law long after one’s association with the clients concerned may have ceased. Yes, it is true that there are various defenses that may be available to a Chartered Accountant, but a defense is not the same as immunity. I’m sure many will agree that in this particular context, prevention is infinitely better than cure.

The definition of ‘proceeds of crime’ is also amorphous enough to cause sufficient headaches for a Chartered Accountant. Technically, a fee that is received from a client who is involved in the process of money laundering could easily fall within the four corners of the definition of proceeds of crime. This is due to the broad language employed by section 2(1)(u) where property derived even indirectly by a person as a result of criminal activity is to be considered as proceeds of crime, even though it may not by itself be derived or obtained from the scheduled offence. If a client is involved in the commission of a scheduled offence and he pays a fee to a Chartered Accountant, who is unaware of the occurrence of such a scheduled offence, arguably, the fee received could still be claimed to be proceeds of crime even though the offence of money laundering may not be made out. The Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (supra) has held that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence and that the involvement of a person in any one of the processes or activities provided for in section 3 would constitute the offence of money laundering which would otherwise have nothing to do with the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence except that the proceeds of crime may be derived or obtained as a result of that crime.

The Appellate Tribunal set up under the PMLA in the case of Vinod Kumar Gupta v. Joint Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2018 SCC On Line ATPMLA 27 has decided an appeal where the Appellant received consultation fees from a party accused of offences under the PMLA and the Appellant took up a defense that he had no way of knowing that he had received consultation fees which may be part of proceeds of crime. The Tribunal observed that all professionals such as Advocates, Solicitors, Consultants, Chartered Accountants, Doctors, and Surgeons receive their professional charges from their respective clients against the service provided. Neither can the presumption under section 5(1)(a) of the PMLA (section 5 deals with provisional attachment of proceeds of crime) be drawn ipso facto that they have the proceeds of crime received as professional charges in their possession nor on the basis of presumption can their movable and immovable properties be attached unless a link and nexus directly or indirectly towards the accused or the crime is established within the meaning of section 2(1)(u) of the Act. In the absence of such a link, the professionals are to be treated as innocent persons as unless a link and nexus of proceed of crime are established under section 2(1)(u), the proceeding under the Act cannot be initiated. A caveat here is advisable, the orders of the Adjudicating Authority and Appellate Tribunal are only with respect to Attachment – these orders are not binding upon the special court that actually tries the offence of money laundering. The Special Court is neither bound, governed nor influenced by any order passed by the Enforcement Authorities and has to act independently on the basis of evidence led before it. Various other High courts have held that the decisions of the Adjudicating Authorities are not binding upon the Special Court where the Special Court has independently applied its mind.

There are various ways in which a professional may be pulled into an investigation under the PMLA by the Directorate of Enforcement some examples that come to mind are:

(i)    Chartered Accountants are privy to sensitive information about their clients and therefore may find themselves receiving summons during an investigation.

Section 50 of the PMLA grants certain authorities of the Directorate the power to summon any person whose attendance they consider necessary to give evidence or to produce any records during the course of any investigation or proceeding under the PMLA. All the persons so summoned shall be bound to attend in person or through authorized agents, as such officer may direct, and shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements and produce such documents as may be required. This would not be a cause of concern for most Chartered Accountants as their role would be confined to assisting the Directorate with their investigation and as such, giving evidence. As mentioned earlier Chartered Accountants do not enjoy the protection of privilege as is enjoyed by lawyers under section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. That being said, in Nalini Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement 2018 SCC Online Mad 5924, the Madras High Court, where the concerned Senior Advocate had appeared through an authorized representative before the Directorate of Enforcement, permitted the Directorate to issue fresh summons to the Senior Advocate.

(ii)    Chartered Accountants may find themselves involved in strategizing/planning company structures etc. and may find themselves being entangled in the offence of money laundering.

It would considerably be riskier for a Chartered Accountant if a transaction that he has consulted upon attracts the offence of money laundering. A blanket stand that this was done unknowingly or without mens rea may not be sustainable at the outset, because both commissions and omissions of the Chartered Accountant would need to be considered and the Directorate can always take the stand that this would be a subject matter of evidence to be considered at trial. The directorate may also always take a stand that evidence would need to be led to establish the lack of mens rea or the innocence of the Chartered Accountant. Professionals may need to increase their due diligence with regard to the transactions that they consult upon with their client in order to avoid being unwittingly pulled into this web and ensure proper documentation.

(iii)    Chartered Accountants may find themselves certifying documents or statements and may find themselves being entangled in the offence of money laundering.

In Murali Krishna Chakrala v. The Deputy Director Criminal Revision Case No. 1354 of 2022 and Crl. M. P. No. 14972 of 2022, dated 23rd November 2022, the High Court of Madras held that when issuing certain certificates, a Chartered Accountant is not required to go into the genuineness or otherwise of the documents submitted by his clients and he cannot be prosecuted for granting the certificate based on the documents furnished by the clients.

However, the Madras High Court decision may not come to the aid of Chartered Accountants when they are required to exercise due care while issuing certificates without taking the same at face value. This judgment arguably may not aid auditors who are required to report whether the books of accounts reflect a true and fair view of the financial condition of the audited entity and to what extent an Auditor or a Chartered Accountant certifying a particular document is required to go into the accuracy of the data provided to them (which takes us back to the watchdog versus the bloodhound debate). The risk could always be higher for the internal auditors of an entity. There can be no clear-cut answers as to which commissions and the omissions of a certifying Chartered Accountant would entail scrutiny. It would be advisable to have an iron-fist adherence to the relevant auditing standards and checklists while also ensuring that the client similarly adheres to the relevant accounting standards. It may be tempting to make qualifications when undecided, if for no other reason than to cover one’s own risk. This may be an additional factor in the mind of an auditor or a Chartered Accountant issuing a certificate. It is always preferable to err on the side of caution when risk is involved. One may not need to be actually involved in any dubious activity to incur the wrath of this draconian law.

CONCLUSIONS

This article by itself cannot be considered to be exhaustive. It is meant to be indicative and to inform the Chartered Accountant fraternity that their roles are now under more scrutiny than ever before and so is the risk associated with it. As the business environment and transactions get increasingly complex while some of the scheduled offences remain by and large generic, it may prove impossible for a Chartered Accountant to mitigate all risks. The offences included in the schedule are wide-ranging, spanning from legislation regarding drug trade and human trafficking to offences under certain intellectual property legislations! The most dangerous are the generic offences under the India Penal Code for example -cheating – something that can be invoked easily and is generic enough to include a variety. This takes us back once again to the watchdog and bloodhound conundrum. In today’s modern world perhaps, the bloodhound side shall weigh heavily in the mind of a Chartered Accountant.

The diligence with regard to the documentation needs to start right at the start – from the engagement letter itself. A clearly defined scope of work can help mitigate risk as far as the question of the authorities as to why a specific issue has not been dealt with. Checklists can specify the depth of the scrutiny. An exhaustive and complete audit file for auditors is more important than ever. It may clearly need to be made out and disclaimers may be made out to the effect that the scope of the certification/audit or advice is limited to the commercials involved and that the client must ensure adherence to all relevant local and central laws. The scope of preventive documentation is not exhaustive. It is meant to ensure that the scope of engagement of Chartered Accountants as well as the actual work carried out by them are well defined in order to ensure that no aspersions can be cast upon the role of professionals in any manner. It is not possible for a Chartered Accountant to ensure that the client has not indulged in any of the scheduled offence, indeed, that is not their function unless they come across them while fulfilling the scope of their work. Increased diligence, erring on the side of caution, and extensive documentation are the key to mitigating risk. The margin of discretion in audit qualification has reduced drastically. Going through the schedule of the PMLA is highly recommended, you may be surprised at certain offences that are included therein!

CORPORATE LAW CORNER PART B : INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

8 Shekhar Resorts Ltd (Unit Hotel Orient Taj) vs. Union of India & Ors  (CIVIL APPEAL NO.8957 OF 2022)

FACTS

The corporate debtor was engaged in the business of proving hospitality services and therefore was registered with Service Tax Department. On evasion of taxes by the Corporate Debtor, show cause notices were issued by the Service Iax Department. In interregnum, one Financial Creditor had filed an application under section 7 of the Code and vide order dated 11th September, 2018 and therefore moratorium kicked in which got over on 24th July, 2020 when plan of a resolution applicant was approved by the Adjudicating Authority. The Corporate Debtor had filed an application through Form 1 under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 within the due date as prescribed and the application was accepted and necessary forms were issued for payment of the tax due by Designation Committee i.e. Rs. 1,24,28500. However, due to moratorium imposed under section 14 of the Code, the corporate debtor was unable to deposit the tax within the due date. When he approached the Joint Commissioner CGST, he was told that as the payment was not made within the due date, the benefit of scheme could not be availed. Aggrieved by the order, the corporate debtor approached the Allahabad High Court but the Court refused to entertain the writ as the Designation Committee was not in existence.

Question of law

a)    Whether it was impossible for the corporate debtor to deposit the settlement amount due to restrictions under the IB Code and whether the corporate debtor can be punished for no fault of his?

b)    Whether the High Court was right in quashing the petition on the basis of non-existence of the Designation Committee?

HELD

It was evident from the backdrop that the Corporate Debtor cannot e deposit the sum due to the operation of law in place. The Corporate Debtor was unable to make the payment due to the legal impediment and the bar to make the payment during the period of moratorium. Even if the Corporate Debtor wanted to deposit the sum before 30th June, 2020,, it would be against the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code because of the calm period in action. Once a moratorium is kicked in, any existing proceeding against the Corporate Debtor shall stand prohibited and it is a well-settled law that IBC shall have precedence over any inconsistent legislations. When the Form No.3 was issued under the Scheme 2019, the Corporate Debtor was subjected to the rigors of process of IBC by virtue of the moratorium. In such a scenario, the Corporate Debtor cannot be rendered remediless and should not be made to suffer due to a legal impediment which was the reason for it and/or not doing the act within the prescribed time. The Corporate Debtor could not make the payment due to legal disability and no one can be expected to do the impossible.

It was also held that the High Court shall grant relief to the Corporate Debtor when there are valid reasons or causes for his inability to make the payment. The High Court cannot extend the time period of the Scheme under section 226 of Constitution of India but it can consider extra ordinary circumstances where there is a legal disability on the part of the Corporate Debtor for the interest of justice. The Designated Committee under the Scheme had been constituted on a need basis to comply with the orders of the courts across the country and in many cases they have rejected the applications under the Scheme, 2019 erroneously.

The Apex Court is of the view that the corporate debtor cannot be remediless just because he is restrained by law. It is a pity if a person is accused wrongly when he is willing to not do that wrong thing. The orporate Debtor cannot make the payment due to legal disability and therefore, he is entitled to claim benefits under the Scheme.

Proposed Changes to Reporting Material Developments

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

SEBI has proposed changes to the provisions related to reporting of material events/developments by listed entities. These provisions are contained in the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“the Regulations” or “the LODR Regulations”).

Timely reporting of material events and developments with regards to listed entities is important for several reasons. It puts an end to speculation and gossip due to leaks, guesswork (informed or otherwise) or even media reports. It informs the investors and public of important developments in a timely way to enable them to take their decisions factoring these into account. Hence, they do not have to wait for the financial statements released within about one and half months at the end of every quarter, which, while have much improved over previous annual reporting, are still considered late if major developments take place between two such reporting dates.

Further, reporting right from the proverbial horse’s mouth, is more reliable than market gossip. Indeed, as we will see, while there are already some provisions related to reporting by listed entities to reports/rumors in the market, the proposed provisions now require mandatory reporting by certain listed entities.

Reporting of material events also helps curb insider trading since  more delayed the reporting, more are the chances of insiders abusing knowledge of price sensitive information. However, what is considered ‘material’ for the purposes of LODR Regulations is different from the corresponding term – price-sensitive information – under the Regulations relating to insider trading, even if one may see overlap. Further, while there is a fairly elaborate definition of what is considered price-sensitive, there is no specific definition of ‘material’ under the LODR Regulations.

Instead, it is seen that the term material is defined as a mix of specific cases that are deemed to be material and for other cases, there is a blend of policy and discretion. The listed entity is required to lay down a policy related to not only determining the materiality of events, but also one that gives an element of discretion to the specified key managerial personnel in this regard.

Further, while the Regulations related to insider trading focus more on proper preservation of price sensitive information and prevention/prohibition of its abuse, the LODR Regulations are more concerned with prompt reporting.

The LODR Regulations have broadly divided material events into two categories. There are a set of items deemed to be material leaving no discretion to the company in this regard. Thus, these have to be reported, irrespective of the amounts involved or their nature. Then, there is a list of items in respect of which the top specified executives have to exercise discretion and report if found material.

To these provisions, SEBI has now proposed several changes vide its consultation paper on 12th November 2022. After taking feedback, SEBI will notify the final amendments. However, as has been often the practice, and a good one at that, the consultation paper gives the actual wording of the proposed amendments to the regulations. Hence, even the fine print as proposed is available making it easier to visualize the implications in more detail than otherwise when only the description of the proposed amendments is given.

Let us consider some of the important amendments as proposed.

QUANTIFIED PARAMETERS TO GIVE MINIMUM LIMITS TO DETERMINE MATERIALITY

At present, as discussed, there are two categories of criteria to determine whether a particular event or development is material or not. In the first category, are clearly specified events deemed to be material and where, thus, no discretion is available to management but to report. There is criticism, and in some cases rightly so there are areas in which these deemed material events are not really material at all in substance. Hence, there is a needless deluge of information which the public may actually misconceive as material on one hand and, on the other hand, substantially material events get lost in these.

The second category relates to matters where a principle-based guidance is given by SEBI to determine materiality but the company has the discretion to decide whether or not an event is material in context of this guidance. It is now proposed that one more principle, a quantified one, be laid down to provide a minimum lower limit which, if crossed, would make the event material. Three alternative parameters are provided and if the impact of the information in financial terms exceeds any of these three parameters, then the same would be deemed material. These three parameters, simplified for present purposes are 2 per cent of turnover, 2 per cent of net worth or 5 per cent of average net profits of last 3 years, whichever is lower.

Quantified limits are always welcome as they reduce ambiguity, and thus also avoid second guessing by the regulator, often based on hindsight wisdom. However, they may often be far from the substance, and may at times make non-material events material, material events non-material or, worse, may miss items not easy to quantify.

Secondly, the quantified limits are applied irrespective of whether the event may impact the turnover, net worth or profits. Thus, an event may have a significant impact on the turnover but not on profits (or vice versa). If, even one of the limits is crossed, the event is deemed to be material. Thus, not only more events would be reported because quantified parameters are provided but the number would also be more since the parameters provided are three, and not necessarily connected to the nature of the event and the impact it may have on a particular parameter.

It is also provided that while the company may continue to determine the policy of how it determines material events, this policy will not dilute the specified quantified parameters. Thus, these parameters would represent absolute lower limits which even the policy or discretion cannot exclude.

ESCALATION OF INFORMATION OF MATERIAL EVENTS UP THE LADDER OF MANAGEMENT

Typically, it is the man or woman in the field or on the ground level who becomes aware of a development that could have such material implications requiring reporting under the Regulations. For example, there may be a fire at a plant whose implications would have to be determined as material or not. It may take some time for the information to reach, with relevant data, to the KMPs. However, these requirements specify a short time limit (which is proposed to be shortened even further, as we will see herein) within which the information should be reported.

SEBI now proposes that a system be laid down in the policy whereby the information of material events would be escalated up to the KMPs for them to determine whether such an event is material or not. The details of how this would work would be up to the company to frame.

SHORTER TIMELINES FOR REPORTING OF MATERIAL EVENTS

The present provisions have a generic requirement of reporting of material developments within a maximum of 24 hours. It is now proposed to divide these requirements into three categories. In case of developments that emanate from outside the organization, the time limit would be maximum 24 hours. In case the information emanates from within the organization, a shorter period of 12 hours would be available. In case of events arising out of Board meetings, within 30 minutes of closure of such meeting.

Companies particularly have to plan well for this since this is the maximum time available for many things. Firstly, for the information to reach the management. Secondly, for deciding whether the event is material, whether deemed to be so under the Regulations or otherwise determined to be so taking into account the principles as well as the quantified parameters laid down. Thirdly, to compile the information in the format, if so prescribed. Finally, reporting the same. Too often, the compliance officer and even external legal advisors have to provide inputs in the process. The already short time limits are being proposed to be cut further. This may end up affecting the quality of information including its clarity and specificity.

REACTING TO MEDIA REPORTS

Under existing provisions, it is discretionary for management to react to media reports or rumors regarding developments related to the company. Exchanges, however, may ask in some cases a company to react to specific news.

It is now proposed to make companies proactively react to news in mainstream media. To begin with, top 250 companies (based on market capitalization) would be required to react to news reported in mainstream media that could, if true, have material implications. What is considered mainstream media (which may be print or digital), however, is not defined or described.

Companies thus will now have to keep track of reports in mainstream media and react to them. No time limit has been prescribed but, at least in spirit of the provisions, the 24 hour limit may be considered.

RATINGS, REVISIONS, RATING SHOPPING

Presently, companies need to report on ratings and revisions thereon. Now it is proposed that such reporting should be carried out even if the rating (or revision thereto) was not requested by the listed entity or, if requested, such request has been withdrawn by it. This may counter rating shopping that some entities may engage in.

WIDER COVERAGE OF DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO PERSONNEL

At present, resignations by independent director or auditor, frauds or defaults by promoter/key management personnel, etc, are required to be reported. Now, it is proposed that certain developments by other specified persons should also be reported on by the listed entity.

Such information, in situations like fraud, defaults, etc, would have to be informed first by the person concerned to the entity, for the latter to report. However, curiously, such persons themselves are not required to report to the company. SEBI may, however, take a view that the requirements implicitly require them to do such reporting and if they do not report, SEBI could take action against them. However, it would have been better if the provisions had contained a specific obligation on such persons to report to the listed entity and a time limit therefor. Even better, the person could report simultaneously also to the exchanges.

CONCLUSION

There are several other changes proposed. Curiously, there seems to be a distinct change in approach from a principle-based reporting to rule-based reporting. In other words, instead of laying down broad principles that would have wider effect but at the same time give discretion to the entity to decide for each event based on its substance, increasingly the discretion is being taken away. Instead, detailed rules are being specified for reporting giving quantified parameters, specific categories of events/persons, etc. Partly this may arguably be considered as a failure of the principle-based approach. However, rule based reporting may also end up being tick-the-box attitude where form has precedence over substance. Worse, particularly considering the wider coverage and also lower quantified limits, there may be a deluge of reporting in which the real material developments may be missed by most except the discerning few who have time and experience to monitor and screen the reports.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER PART A : COMPANY LAW

15 Hydro Prokav Pumps India Pvt Ltd ROC/CBE/A.O./10A/9881/2022 – Office of the Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu-Coimbatore Adjudication order Date of Order: 10th October, 2022

Adjudication order: Penalty for violation of not attaching notes to the financial statements which is the mandatory requirement as per section 134 (7) (a) of the Companies Act, 2013.

FACTS

HPPIPL was having its registered office at Coimbatore in the state of Tamil Nadu.

HPPIPL realised that the financial statements along with the Director’s report filed with the Office of the Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu-Coimbatore (‘RoC’) for the financial years ended as on 31st March, 2017, 31st March, 2018, 31st March, 2019, 31st March, 2020 and 31st March, 2021 did not contain the notes to the financial statements which is a mandatory requirement as per section 134 (7) (a) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Thereafter, HPPIPL and its directors filed a suo-moto application before the office of the Registrar of Companies, (‘RoC’) for Adjudication of the penalty for violation of provisions of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013.

Provisions of Sub-section (7) of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013; A signed copy of every financial statement, including consolidated financial statement, if any, shall be issued, circulated or published along with a copy each of:-

(a) Any notes annexed to or forming part of such financial statement;

(b) The auditor’s report and

(c) The board’s report referred to in sub-section (3);

Further, penal provision for any default/violation of Section 134 of the Companies Act, 2013 are provided under Sub-section (8) of section 134;

that if a company is in default in complying with the provisions of this section, the company shall be liable for a penalty of ₹3 lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of ₹50,000.

HELD

The Adjudication Officer was of the view that HPPIPL had defaulted in complying with provisions of Section 134 (7) (a) by not attaching/annexing the notes to the financial statements. Hence, he imposed penalty on HPPIPL and every officer of the company in default in a manner as provided under provisions of Section 134 (8) of the Companies Act, 2013 as mentioned below:

Sr. No. Penalty imposed on Maximum penalty imposed
1. HPPIPL Rs. 3,00,000
2. Officers in default (Total 3
Officers of Company i.e. 3 Directors)
Rs. 1,50,000

(Rs. 50,000
each)

TOTAL Rs. 4,50,000

It was further directed that the company and its director(s) rectify the defect immediately on receipt of copy of the order.

16 Kosher Realhome Pvt Ltd ROC/D/Adj Order /defective/2022 Office of the Registrar of Companies, NCLT of Delhi & Haryana Adjudication order Date of Order: 16th November, 2022

Adjudication order: Penalty for violation of Rule 8(3) of (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules 2014 under Section 450 and 446 B of the Companies Act, 2013 for filing incorrect attachments along with e-form AOC-4 with the Registrar of Companies.

FACTS

KRPL was having its registered office at Delhi.

The Registrar of Companies, Delhi & Haryana (‘RoC’) had issued a show cause notice to the Company and its Directors stating that the financial statements attached by KRPL in E-form AOC-4 with RoC were the financial statements of “IGCPL” i.e., Transferee Company instead of financial statements of “KRPL”.

Further KRPL and its officer in default submitted their reply to the RoC admitting the fact that financial statement of “IGCPL” were attached to e-form AOC-4 instead of “KRPL.”

The following provisions were violated by the KRPL and its officer/s in default;

  • Rule 8 (3) of Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014; The authorised signatory and the professional if any, who certify e-form shall be responsible for the correctness of its contents and the enclosures attached with the electronic form
  • Rule 8 (7) of Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014; It shall be the sole responsibility of the person who is signing the form and professional who is certifying it to ensure that all the required attachments relevant to the form have been attached completely and legibly as per provisions of the Act and rules made thereunder to the forms or application or returns filed.

Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013 for penal provision for any default / violation where no specific penalty is provided in the relevant section / rules;

If a company or any officer of a company or any other person contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, or any condition, limitation or restriction subject to which any approval, sanction, consent, confirmation, recognition, direction or exemption in relation to any matter has been accorded, given or granted, any for which no penalty or punishment is provided elsewhere in this Act, the company and every officer of the company who is in default or such other person shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing contravention, with a further penalty of Rs. 1,000 for each day after the first during which the contravention continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,00,000 in case of a company and Rs. 50,000 in case of an officer who is in default or any other person.

Further, KRPL being a Small Company, applicability of Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for lesser penalties for certain companies and the relevant provision is as given below:

Section 446B – Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, if a penalty is payable for non-compliance of any of the provisions of this Act by One Person Company, small company, start-up company or Producer Company, or by any of its officer in default, or any other person in respect of such company, then such company, its officer in default or any other person, as the case may be, shall be liable to a penalty which shall not be more than one half of the penalty specified in such provisions, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2,00,000.

HELD

The Adjudication Officer held that the concerned director i.e. Mr. VP was authorized by the board of directors for certifying the financial statements in e-form AOC 4 with complete and legible attachments and therefore he was liable under section 450 of the Companies Act 2013, for the in-correctness of the content of e-form AOC-4 and enclosures attached with the same pursuant to Rule 8 of the Companies (Registration Offices and Fees) Rules, 2014.

The Adjudication Officer also considered the provision of section 446 B of the Companies Act, 2013, r.w.s2(85) of the Companies Act, 2013, as the company fulfilled the requirements of the small company. Therefore, lesser penalty was levied as mentioned below:

Violation of section/rule Penalty imposed on Company / directors Penalty specified under section 450 of the
Companies Act 2013
Penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Officer
under section 454 r.w.s 446B of the Companies Act 2013
Rule 8 (3) of the Companies (Registration
Offices and Fees) Rules 2014
Mr. VP, Director Rs. 10,000 Rs. 5,000

Further it was held that Mr. VP, who was the authorized signatory shall have to make the payment of penalty individually out of his funds.

The AO order also directed Mr. VP to rectify the default immediately from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Hindu Gains of Learning Act

INTRODUCTION

Hindu Undivided Families (HUFs) often have a scenario wherein the family sponsors the education of one of the members and he goes on to become a successful professional/businessman. In such a case, the question that one comes across is whether the joint family, which has funded his education, can stake a claim to his earnings? In other words, can the other family members state that whatever income / wealth the member has on account of the investment made by the family in his education and hence, they should also share in the same? Let us examine this quite interesting facet of family law.

HINDU LAW AND HUF

Hindu Law is a unique statute since part of it is codified by the Parliament whereas part of it is governed by customs, traditions, and usages. The answer to the above questions could be dissected into two scenarios ~ the position before 1930 and the position post-1930.

POSITION BEFORE 1930

Before 1930, the position in this respect was dictated by the ancient uncodified Hindu Law which was explained by a Division Bench ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrakant Manilal Shah vs. CIT (1992) 193 ITR 1 (SC). It held that before 1930, it was settled law that income earned by a member of a joint family by the practice of a profession or occupation requiring special training was joint family property if such training was imparted at the expense of the joint family property.

Accordingly, till 1930 if a joint family had spent on a coparcener’s education, then whatever he earned by virtue of this degree/skill became joint family property in which all coparceners also had a right.

POSITION AFTER 1930

On 25th July, 1930, the Parliament passed the Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930 (“the 1930 Act”). The 1930 Act was passed to remove doubts as to the rights of a member of a Hindu Undivided Family in the property acquired by him by means of his learning.

Section 3 of the 1930 Act provides that notwithstanding any custom, rule, or interpretation of the Hindu Law, gains of learning of a member shall be held to be the exclusive and separate property of the acquirer even if —

(a) his learning having been, in whole or in part, imparted to him by any member, of his family, or with the aid of the joint funds of his family/ any family member, or

(b) himself or his family having, while he was acquiring his learning, been maintained or supported, wholly or in part, by the joint funds of his family, any member.

The Act further describes “gains of learning” in an inclusive manner to mean `all acquisitions of property made substantially through learning, whether such acquisitions be made before or after the commencement of this Act and whether such acquisitions be the ordinary or the extraordinary result of such learning’.

The important term “learning” has been defined to mean education, whether elementary, technical, scientific, special or general, and training of every kind which is usually intended to enable a person to pursue any trade, industry, profession or a vocation in life.

Thus, the net impact of the 1930 Act is that on and from the date of its enactment:

(a) All gains of learning of a coparcener of an HUF shall be held to be his exclusive and separate property even if his learning was funded by the joint family funds /HUF. Thus, all income earned by him by virtue of his skill / knowledge / learning would solely belong to him.

(b) Even acquisitions of properties made by him out of such gains of learning are treated as his exclusive and separate property and not that of the HUF.

(c) Hence, the HUF cannot claim any right, title or interest in such gains of learning of the coparcener.

RATIONALE

The Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji vs. CIT, [1970] 78 ITR 33 (SC) has explained the rationale behind the enactment of the 1930 Act. It held that in Gokul Chand vs. Hukum Chand Nath Mal AIR 1921 PC 35, the Judicial Committee ruled “that there could be no valid distinction between the direct use of the joint family funds and the use which qualified the members to make the gains on his efforts”. In making this observation, the Judicial Committee appeared to have been guided by certain ancient Hindu law texts. According to the Supreme Court that view of the law became a serious impediment to the progress of the Hindu society. It was well-known that the decision in Gokul Chand’s case (supra), gave rise to a great deal of public dissatisfaction and the Central Legislature was constrained to step in and enact the Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930, which nullified the effect of that decision.

JURISPRUDENCE

The Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Dineschandra Sumatilal, 1978 112 ITR 758 (Guj) has explained this Act. It held that the law now recognised the distinction between the earnings of a coparcener as a result of his learning, efforts, and advancement in life and the income which a coparcener received merely as a result of the investment of the family funds in the source which produced such income.

The Court held that with technological advancements in commerce and industry, a qualified coparcener might be employed in a business in which his family had contributed its funds, and by his skill, experience, and labor, all of which were his incorporeal property or intangible assets, might contribute to the growth of such a business. If any remuneration was received by him for the services so rendered, it could not, by any stretch of imagination, be related to the joint family investment in the business. The salary of such a coparcener was not an alias for the return of profits of the investment made by the family. It was a legitimate return for the human capital – sweat, skill, and toil, which were productive investments, which the coparcener made in such business. To treat his income as the income of the family was not only not in consonance with the true legal position, but would also lead to the denial to the family business of the human capital which the coparcener would contribute with greater sincerity than an outsider. Thus, the Gujarat High Court held that even in a case where the HUF funded the business, the remuneration earned by the coparcener would remain his personal property.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Chandrakant Manilal Shah vs. CIT (1992) 193 ITR 1 (SC) held that the definition of the term ‘learning’ was wide and encompassed every acquired capacity which enabled the acquirer of the capacity “to pursue any trade, industry, profession or avocation in life”. Skill and labor involved as well as generated mental and physical capacity. This capacity was in its very nature an individual achievement and normally varied from individual to individual. It was by utilisation of this capacity that an object or goal was achieved by the person possessing the capacity. Achievement of an object or goal was a benefit. This benefit accrued in favor of the individual possessing and utilising the capacity. Skill and labour were by themselves possessions. They were assets of that individual and there seemed to be no reason why they could not be contributed as a consideration for earning profit in the business of a partnership firm. They certainly were not the properties of the HUF but were the separate properties of the individual concerned.The Court held that where an undivided member of a family qualified in technical fields – may be at the expense of the family – he was free to employ his technical expertise elsewhere and the earnings were his absolute property; he will, therefore, not agree to utilise them in the family business, unless the latter is agreeable to remunerate him therefore immediately in the form of a salary or share of profits.

The Madras High Court in the case of Prof. G. S. Ramaswamy (2003) 259 ITR 442 (Mad) was dealing with the case of a Professor who was educated from funds belonging to his joint family. He published a book on a technical subject and threw the royalties from the book into the HUF hotchpot and claimed that the royalties would now belong to the HUF. The Tax department objected on the grounds that after the passage of the 1930 Act, all gains of learning of an individual cannot be treated as HUF property even if the education was funded by the HUF funds. The High Court said while the proposition of the Department was correct, the 1930 Act would not apply if the coparcener himself took steps to blend his self-acquired earnings / property with the joint family hotchpot.

In K Govindrajan vs. K Subramanian, 2013 AIR (Mad) 80, it was contended that if a member got educated from out of the joint family funds, and also acquired properties, the member should put all those properties into the common hotchpot, and also render accounts. The Madras High Court negated this claim and held, nothing had been demonstrated as on what basis the plaintiff should render accounts of his earnings and also put all the properties he earned out of such learning into the common hotchpot. Simply because, he admitted that he got his education, during the lifetime of his father that per se did not mean that it should be construed that what all he acquired out of his salary should be put into common hotchpot. The 1930 Act was relied upon by the Court to hold this conclusion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above discussion, the following position emerges:

(a)    If a coparcerner’s education was funded out of HUF property, even in that scenario, his earnings and investments would remain his separate property.

(b)    The 1930 Act would clearly apply in this case and all gains of learning of such a coparcener would be his separate self-acquired property.

(c)    Even investments made by the coparcener would be treated as his gains of learning.

(d)    As long as the coparcener has not taken any action of blending his gains of learning with the common family hotchpot and hence not converted his personal property into joint family property, the gains of learning would not be a part of the HUF property.

This very old piece of pre-independence legislation could help quell several family disputes. It is interesting to note that even though this Act has been around for over 80 years it has not got the recognition which it deserves!

SEBI’s Consultation Papers On Suspicious Trading

BACKGROUND
To make it easier to catch persons engaged in wrongdoings in securities markets such as front running, insider trading, etc., SEBI has circulated a consultation paper on 18th May, 2023. The paper proposes a special set of regulations (a draft of which is also provided) that would, under certain circumstances, presume a person or group of persons guilty of certain wrongdoing. This would be a rebuttable presumption, and the proposed law also gives a set of defenses that the accused can demonstrate. The proposed law is perhaps an expression of frustration by SEBI that persons have been able to use the latest technology and the unorganised sector to carry out wrongs but without leaving any trace or track whereby SEBI could prove the wrongdoing.

The net cast is wide, and persons engaged in regular trading in securities could face proceedings under this law if their trading has features listed in the proposed regulations, if they become law.

THE TRADITIONAL WAY OF CATCHING WRONGDOERS
Essentially, the proposed law says that transactions with a particular pattern shall be deemed to be suspicious, and if they remain unexplained, they will be deemed to be in violation of law and will attract various penal consequences.

The paper expresses concern at the growing use of digital tools and certain other practices and that many transactions which clearly seem to be that of front running, insider trading, etc., go unpunished. SEBI highlights the use of messaging apps that have in-built encryption for messages and calls. Further, some have the feature of disappearing messages, whereby the messages do not remain on record, whether on the mobile or on the cloud. The calls made using such apps too do not have any record of who called whom, when, how long the conversation lasted, etc.

It has been seen in numerous earlier SEBI investigations, which resulted in successful prosecution of the wrongdoers, that SEBI could collect call data records between the mobiles of the parties. Thus, evidence of contact and communication between them, particularly at a time when sensitive information was available, could be easily established. However, such tools ensure that there is no track or trail which SEBI could lay hands on.

Typically, in cases of front running, insider trading, etc., the violation is rarely done singularly. It is usually done in concert between at least two persons, but often in a group. Thus, in the case of insider trading, the insider, i.e., a person who has access to inside information in a company due to being in a position of trust, such as a director, CFO, auditor, etc., communicates unpublished price-sensitive information (UPSI) to another person. The other person, either singularly or with friends / relatives / associates, engages in trading in securities and makes profits (or avoids losses) in violation of the law. In case of front running, the person having knowledge of large orders, say a Chief Dealer of a mutual fund, communicates such information to his friend, relative, etc. Such person then carries out planned trading before and after such large orders and makes risk free and easy profits.

Then comes the matter of sharing of ill-gotten gains. The parties may have financial transactions between them in various forms, though often weakly disguised as of being of some other nature. Such transactions help SEBI further to establish a connection between the parties. Also, they may show how the profits have been shared.

In each of such cases, SEBI meticulously collects information about the communication between them. The relations / connections between the parties are also compiled. This may include being relatives, being a common director in some companies, etc. Even relations on social media have been used to help create the base for there being a connection.

The background of connected persons, also being in communication with each other, existence of price-sensitive information, and finally trading while such sensitive information is not public, helps SEBI create a sufficient case that would stand up in law. Rulings of the Supreme Court that require a lower benchmark of proof in case of civil proceedings have helped SEBI further in this regard.

Only when the parties are able to show that one or more of such grounds are not correct, then the case could fail.

RECENT DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING GUILT
However, recent times have shown that SEBI, on its own admission, is finding itself much behind the wrongdoers. Perhaps learning from SEBI’s past methods of investigations, the wrongdoers have used techniques that make it very difficult for SEBI to gather evidence and establish guilt. The messaging applications, as discussed earlier, have been used to create trail-free communication by way of calls and messages. Financial transactions are carried out in cash and even offshore through hawala, as SEBI pointed out, actually happened in a recent case. Persons who are unconnected on record and are just name-lenders (also called “mules”) are taken help of. Even apps such as AnyDesk, which helps one person control another person’s computer through the internet, have also been alleged to have been used.

The result is that there is ample evidence of wrongdoing and handsome profits of crores of rupees. There is evidence that certain price-sensitive information existed which was not public. There is evidence that trading was done during such time which stands out from other trading of those very parties. Further, abnormal profits are made through such transactions in such securities, which again stand out from other trading which carry normal risk. What is absent is communication between the party having the information and the party carrying out trading. What is also absent is the financial connection and transactions between these parties which show sharing of such profits. Both of these are done, as explained earlier, through digital and other means beyond the reach of SEBI.

SEBI has given several examples of such cases which have occurred and though names and dates are not given (or changed), anyone following media reports can easily identify the cases. This is particularly because the amounts involved are so large that most have received extensive media coverage.

SEBI noted that in numerous such cases, parties carried out transactions that were too coincidental to be accidental. SEBI pointed out that parties bought securities just before some good news was released (or sold before bad news). Transactions with the clear fingerprints of front running were carried out before and after large, market moving orders. SEBI frankly admitted that though it dug for connections between the parties, it failed to find any. Considering the recent experience of finding the use of such easily available apps that facilitate untraceable and untrackable communication, SEBI judged that these cases may also have seen similar modus operandi. Worse, even in the cases where it could have or did take action, the evidence could not hold up again due to lack of clearly incriminating evidence and also vagaries of law. While the test of ‘preponderance of probability’ does help SEBI, the differing test methods by different appellate rulings meant that many further cases went out of regulatory reach.

This has culminated in SEBI deciding to give the law a wholly different approach. That is provide for a presumption of guilt when basic facts are evident and in such cases, shift the onus on the party to prove their innocence.

THE NEW APPROACH OF PRESUMED GUILTY, WHICH ASSUMPTION IS REBUTTABLE BUT WITH ONUS ON PARTY ACCUSED
SEBI has proposed a new regulation — the SEBI (Prohibition of Unexplained Suspicious Trading Activities in the Securities Markets) Regulations, 2023. The draft regulations have been attached to the consultation paper. Let us analyse its components.

Regulation 3(1) of the proposed regulations prohibits the carrying on of any Unexplained Suspicious Trading Activity (USTA). So there has to be a trading activity that should be suspicious and which the accused has been unable to ‘explain’. Regulation 2(1)(k) defines USTA in a wide manner. It includes suspicious trading activity in securities executed in such a manner for which there is no reasonable explanation.

The definition of the term “trading” would be the same as under the regulations relating to insider trading. Thus, buying, selling, subscribing, etc., are all covered. Further, the term securities, being widely defined, includes shares, futures, options, etc.

The term “suspicious trading activity” has been defined with yet more component terms — Unusual Trading Pattern and Material Non-Public Information. Unusual Trading Pattern will be such trading which parts from the normal trading activity undertaken by a person or persons in the sense that it involves a substantial change in risks over a short period of time. Furthermore, it should result in abnormal profits or averted abnormal losses. The term “Material Non-Public Information (MNPI)” reminds one of the term “Unpublished Price Sensitive Information” used in the regulations relating to insider trading. However, MNPI has been defined differently, even if the essence intended may be similar. It can be information about a company / security which is not generally available but when so made available had a ‘reasonable’ impact on the price of the concerned security. It may also be an impending order on an exchange which when executed, also ‘reasonably’ impacted the price of the concerned security. Finally, it also covers recommendations by ‘influencers’. If the advice / recommendation of the influencer — for securities and related markets, they are also called fin-influencers — reasonably impacts the price of a security, that information too is MNPI.

The term “influencer” in turn is defined as a person who is reasonably in a position to influence the investment decision in securities of a reasonably large number of persons.

The term “reasonably” has been used repeatedly but not yet defined. An explanation says that the meaning shall be such as notified from time to time.

Piecing all the components together, the term “USTA” can be understood. Essentially, it is that trading that stands out from normal trading and is in the presence of MNPI and results in abnormal results (profits made / losses avoided).

Critical then is the term “unexplained”. While this term is not defined, the meaning can be gathered from two places. The first is in the definition of USTA, where it has been stated that the trading should have been executed in circumstances ‘for which no reasonable rebuttal or explanation is provided’. Regulation 5(2) thereafter guides as to how such reasonable rebuttal can be provided. Effectively, it is showing that the components of suspicious trading activity such as MNPI, or trading beyond the normal pattern or being non-repetitive, etc., can be countered as untrue by facts. The accused has to provide documentary evidence in rebuttal.

If the accused is not able to give a reasonable rebuttal, he would be held guilty. Action can then be taken by SEBI as provided under law.

CRITIQUE
SEBI has given several examples and even demonstrated by some actual cases for which even orders are passed that parties have engaged in trading resulting in abnormal profits which could not be explained otherwise than by the conclusion of wrongdoing. Since the digital world and unorganised sector have helped suppression / elimination of evidence, SEBI is unable to take action. Hence, the proposal of regulations that shift the onus to the accused.

However, it is seen that several terms are used that are wide, vague and subjective. The rebuttal of the presumption of guilt is, in comparison, possible in a narrow way and also has to be supported by documentation.

Trading in securities markets in large quantities is normal in these times of easy availability of trading apps and tools, and the cost of trading has also become significantly low or even near-free. Tools to help analyse markets, including technical analysis, and help analyse several parameters updated constantly are also readily available at low cost. It is possible that for various reasons, persons may end up engaging in trading that viewed with hindsight rationale, along with trades of other persons, may be perceived to be suspicious enough to fit the definition under the regulations. Recently, it was even seen that a Bollywood celebrity was alleged to have engaged in activity that might fit the definition of these regulations. In that case, discussed earlier in this column, SEBI passed an adverse order, which was substantially reversed in appeal. However, one wonders whether the case if proceeded against under the proposed regulations would have been more difficult to rebut. Traders in securities markets, who also perform the valuable function of providing market liquidity, may end up constantly looking behind their shoulders and worrying whether their trading could in hindsight be deemed to be suspicious.

It will have to be seen whether more safeguards are provided in the final regulations giving reasonable protection to bonafide traders, and in such cases, the onus to establish guilt remains on SEBI.

Guarantors, Beware!

INTRODUCTION
It is quite common for banks and lenders to insist upon the personal guarantees of the managing directors/promoters/partners, in case of loans extended by them to business entities. In addition, one generally also comes across requests from family members and friends to stand as a guarantor for business loans taken by them. Most people would sign on the dotted line. However, pause for a moment and consider the legal consequences of such a personal guarantee. In light of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”), the position has become quite different than what it was earlier. Also, some Supreme Court decisions in this respect have made the situation even more peculiar.

INDIAN CONTRACT ACT
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 deals with contracts of guarantee and lays the framework for all guarantees. A “contract of guarantee” is defined as a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the “surety”; the person in respect of whose default the guarantee is given is called the “principal debtor”, and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the “creditor”. A guarantee may be either oral or written. The liability of the surety is co- extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. The Contract Act gives an illustration in this respect ~

“A guarantees to B the payment of a bill of exchange by C, the acceptor. The bill is dishonoured by C. A is liable, not only for the amount of the bill, but also for any interest and charges which may have become due on it.”

Any variance, made without the surety’s consent, in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance. The surety is also discharged by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the principal debtor is released, or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor.

The Contract Act also provides that where a guaranteed debt has become due, or default of the principal debtor to perform a guaranteed duty has taken place, the surety upon payment or performance of all that he is liable for, is invested with all the rights which the creditor had against the principal debtor. A surety is also entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the principal debtor at the time when the contract of suretyship is entered into, whether the surety knows of the existence of such security or not; and if the creditor loses, or, without the consent of the surety, parts with such security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security.

The Supreme Court in a judgment under the Code has examined the Indian Contract Act. In the case of Maitreya Doshi vs. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd, [2022] 142 taxmann.com 484 (SC), it held that a contract of indemnity was a contract by which, one party promised to save the other from loss caused to him by the conduct of the promisor himself, or by the conduct of any other person. In a contract of indemnity, a promisee acting within the scope of his authority was entitled to recover from the promisor all damages and all costs which he may incur. A contract of guarantee, on the other hand, was a promise whereby the promisor promised to discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default. Anything done or any promise made for the benefit of the principal debtor may be a sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee.

IBC
As readers would recall, the Code is a one-stop shop for all matters relating to an insolvency of a corporate debtor. The trigger point of any action for corporate insolvency is the default by a corporate debtor in paying its debt, whether operational or financial. The expression ‘default’ is expounded in section 3(12) of the Code to mean non-payment of debt which had become due and payable and is not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be. This leads to an insolvency resolution process of the corporate debtor before the NCLT. A corporate debtor is a company or an LLP. A relevant definition under section 2 of the Code in the context of this discussion is the term ‘personal guarantor’. A personal guarantor is defined to mean an individual who is the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.

AMENDMENT IN 2018
The Code presently, only concerns itself with the insolvency resolution process of corporate persons. The provisions relating to the insolvency provisions of non-corporates have not yet been notified by the Central Government. Section 2 as originally enacted, did not contain a separate category of personal guarantors to corporate debtors. Instead, personal guarantors were a part of a category or group of individuals, to whom the Code applied (i.e. individuals, proprietorship and partnership firms). The Code envisioned that the insolvency process outlined in provisions of Part III was to apply to them. However, vide an Amendment in 2018, personal guarantors were added as a separate class to whom the Code applied. The rationale for the same was explained as follows:

“In the first phase, the provisions would be extended to personal guarantors of corporate debtors to further strengthen the corporate insolvency resolution process….”

Further, by the Amendment to the Code in 2018 and a Notification dated 15th November, 2019, the provisions pertaining to insolvency of personal guarantors to corporate debtors were notified and all such provisions were to be considered by the NCLT.  Thus, all matters that were likely to impact, or have a bearing on a corporate debtor’s insolvency process, were sought to be clubbed together and brought before the same forum.

SUPREME COURT’S APPROVAL
The rationale behind this Amendment was explained by the Supreme Court in its landmark decision of Lalit Kumar Jain vs. UOI, (2021) 127 taxmann.com, 368 (SC). It held that it was clear that the Parliamentary intent was to treat personal guarantors differently from other categories of individuals. The intimate connection between such individuals and corporate entities to whom they stood guarantee, as well as the possibility of separate processes being carried on in different forums, with its attendant uncertain outcomes, led to carving out personal guarantors as a separate species of individuals, for whom the NCLT was common with the corporate debtor to whom they had stood guarantee. The NCLT would be able to consider the whole picture, as it were, about the nature of the assets available, either during the corporate debtor’s insolvency process, or even later; this would facilitate framing of realistic insolvency resolution plans, keeping in mind the prospect of realising some part of the creditors’ dues from personal guarantors.

The Court concluded that when the Code alluded to insolvency resolution or bankruptcy, or liquidation of three categories, i.e. corporate debtors, corporate guarantors (to corporate debtors) and personal guarantors (to corporate debtors), it also covered the insolvency resolution, or liquidation processes applicable to corporate debtors and their corporate guarantors, whereas insolvency resolution and bankruptcy processes applied to personal guarantors (to corporate debtors).

CORPORATE DEBTOR OR NOT, CORPORATE GUARANTORS COVERED
An interesting reverse situation arose in the case of Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India, [2021] 125 taxmann.com 394 (SC), wherein the principal debtor was a sole proprietary firm. However, the debt was guaranteed by a company. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether since the guarantor was a corporate, could insolvency proceedings be brought against it even though the debtor was not a corporate debtor.

The Court held that a right or cause of action would be available to the lender (financial creditor) to proceed against the principal borrower, as well as the guarantor in equal measure in case they commit default in repayment of the amount of debt acting jointly and severally. It would still be a case of default committed by the guarantor itself, if and when the principal borrower failed to discharge his obligation in respect of amount of debt. For, the obligation of the guarantor was coextensive and coterminous with that of the principal borrower to defray the debt, as predicated in section 128 of the Contract Act. As a consequence of such default, the status of the guarantor metamorphoses into a debtor or a corporate debtor if it happened to be a corporate person. Thus, action under the Code could be legitimately invoked even against a (corporate) guarantor being a corporate debtor. The definition of ‘corporate guarantor’ in the Code needed to be understood accordingly.

The expression “default” had also been defined in section 3(12) of the Code to mean non-payment of debt when the whole or any part or instalment of the amount of debt had become due or payable, and was not paid by the debtor or the corporate debtor, as the case may be. The principal borrower may or may not be a corporate person, but if a corporate person extended guarantee for the loan transaction concerning a principal borrower not being a corporate person, it would still be covered within the meaning of expression ‘corporate debtor. The Apex Court negated the argument that as the principal borrower was not a corporate person, the financial creditor could not have invoked remedy against the corporate person who had merely offered guarantee for such loan account. That action can still proceed against the guarantor being a corporate debtor, consequent to the default committed by the principal borrower. There was no reason to limit the width of the Code, if and when default was committed by the principal borrower. For, the liability and obligation of the guarantor to pay the outstanding dues would get triggered coextensively.

The Court laid down the principle, if the guarantor was a corporate person (i.e., a company or an LLP), it would come within the purview of the expression ‘corporate debtor’, within the meaning of the Code.

GUARANTORS COVERED EVEN IF NO ACTION AGAINST DEBTORS
The Supreme Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar Jajodia vs. SBI, [2022] 172 SCL 665 (SC) has held that corporate insolvency resolution proceedings can be carried out against the personal guarantor even in a case where no insolvency/liquidation proceedings have been commenced against the corporate debtor itself. This is a very important principle since the creditor could pick and choose whom he would like to approach first.

In Axis Trustee Services Limited vs. Brij Bhushan Singal, [2022] 144 taxmann.com 139 (Delhi), the High Court held that in terms of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors), Rules, 2019, it has specifically been provided that the adjudicating authority for the purposes of personal guarantors to corporate debtors would be the NCLT. Accordingly, it held that the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the DRT would have no jurisdiction in such cases over the personal guarantors and all proceedings would stand transferred to the NCLT who has jurisdiction over the corporate debtor.

The rationale for this was explained by the Supreme Court in Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd vs. State of Karnataka, [2019] 112 taxmann.com 56 (SC). It explained that the objective behind making the NCLT the nodal authority was to group together, the insolvency/liquidation proceedings of a corporate debtor and the insolvency resolution or liquidation or bankruptcy of a corporate guarantor/personal guarantor of the very same corporate debtor, so that a single Forum may deal with both. This was to ensure that the insolvency resolution of a corporate debtor and the insolvency resolution of the individual guarantors of the very same corporate debtor did not proceed on different tracks, before different fora, leading to conflict of interests, situations or decisions. The Court further held that the DRT continued to remain the Adjudicating Authority in relation to insolvency matters of individuals and firms. This was in contrast to the NCLT being the Adjudicating Authority in relation to insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate persons including corporate debtors and personal guarantors. The expression “personal guarantor” meant an individual who was the surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor. Therefore, the object of the Code was to avoid any confusion that may arise and to ensure that whenever an insolvency resolution process was initiated against a corporate debtor, the NCLT would be the Adjudicating Authority not only in respect of such corporate debtor but also in respect of the individual who stood as surety to such corporate debtor, notwithstanding the naming of the DRT as the Adjudicating Authority for the insolvency resolution of individuals (who were not personal guarantors).

PERIOD OF LIMITATION
In Laxmi Pat’s case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the liability of the corporate debtor (corporate guarantor) also triggered when, the principal borrower acknowledged its liability in writing within the expiration of prescribed period of limitation, to pay such outstanding dues and fails to pay the acknowledged debt. Correspondingly, the right to initiate action within three years from such acknowledgment of debt accrued to the financial creditor. That, however, needed to be exercised within three years when the right to sue/apply accrued, as per Article 137 of the Limitation Act. A fresh period of limitation was required to be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed by the principal borrower or the corporate guarantor (corporate debtor), as the case may be, provided the acknowledgement was before expiration of the prescribed period of limitation. It concluded that the financial creditor had not only the right to recover the outstanding dues by filing a suit, but also had a right to initiate resolution process against the corporate person (being a corporate debtor) whose liability was coextensive with that of the principal borrower and more so when it activated from the written acknowledgment of liability and failure of both to discharge that liability.

DOES A RESOLUTION PLAN DISCHARGE THE GUARANTOR?
The Apex Court in Lalit Kumar’s case (Supra) also laid down an important proposition that the sanction of a resolution plan and finality imparted to it by the NCLT did not per se operate as a discharge of the guarantor’s liability. As to the nature and extent of the liability, much would depend on the terms of the guarantee itself. It reiterated its earlier verdict in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Board Bombay vs. Official Liquidator, High Court, Ernakulum [1982] 3 SCC 358 which held that a surety was discharged under the Indian Contract Act by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which the principal debtor was released or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which was the discharge of the principal debtor. However, this did not mean that a discharge which the principal debtor secured by operation of law in bankruptcy (or in liquidation proceedings in the case of a company) absolved the surety of his liability. The Court concluded that its approval of a resolution plan did not ipso facto discharge a personal guarantor (of a corporate debtor) of her or his liabilities under the contract of guarantee. The release or discharge of a principal borrower from the debt owed by it to its creditor, by an involuntary process, i.e. by operation of law, or due to liquidation or insolvency proceeding, did not absolve the surety/guarantor of his or her liability, which arose out of an independent contract.

CAN ARCS PROCEED AGAINST GUARANTORS?
A related issue has been that if the bank securitized its bad loan in favour of an Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC), can the ARC proceed against the guarantors to the corporate debtor. This was the issue before the NCLAT in Naresh Kumar Aggarwal vs. CFM Asset Reconstruction (P) Ltd [2023] 152 taxmann.com 264 (NCLAT- New Delhi). The NCLAT referred to the Supreme Court decision in Anuj Jain vs. Axis Bank Ltd [2020] 115 taxmann.com 1 (SC) wherein it was held that when acquisition of assets by an ARC is made, it shall be deemed to be the Lender for all purposes. As a Lender, the ARC was fully entitled to exercise its right to initiate proceedings under the Code. Hence, the NCLAT held that the ARC could also proceed against the guarantor.

CAN THE RESOLUTION PLAN INCLUDE THE GUARANTOR’S ASSETS?
One of the important decisions in this respect is that of the NCLAT in the case of Nitin Chandrakant Naik vs. Sanidhya Industries LLP [LSI-696-NCLAT-2021(NDEL)]. The NCLAT has held that in the Resolution Plan itself, there can be no provision to move against the personal guarantor. The NCLAT held that making a provision to this effect in the Resolution Plan, would be akin to a blank cheque given to proceed even with regard to any other property of the Personal Guarantors. It concluded that without resorting to appropriate proceedings against the Personal Guarantors of Corporate Debtor, this was an irregular exercise of powers.

In January 2023, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs released a Consultation Paper inviting public comments on changes being considered to the Code. One of the important changes being considered is the Intermingling of the assets of the corporate debtor and its guarantor. Under the Code, the resolution process is restricted to the assets of a corporate debtor. However, according to the Paper, in several cases, assets of the corporate debtor and its guarantor (whether, corporate or personal) are so closely or inseparably linked, that the meaningful resolution is not viable in a separate proceeding. For instance, while a building, plant, or machinery may belong to the corporate debtor, the land on which it is situated may belong to a guarantor. In such cases, restricting the resolution process of the debtor to its assets results in inefficient outcomes. Therefore, it is being proposed that a mechanism should be provided under the Code to include such assets of the guarantor in the general pool of assets available for the insolvency resolution process for efficient resolution of the corporate debtor.

EPILOGUE
Giving a guarantee has now become a very risky proposition. One could paraphrase Shakespeare’s famous quote from Hamlet which read, “Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender be” to now read “Neither a Borrower nor a Guarantor be!!”

SEBI Makes Significant Amendments to Corporate Governance Rules

BACKGROUND
SEBI has notified the amendments to the SEBI (Listing and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (LODR Regulations) vide notification dated 14th June, 2023. Except where specified, they will come into effect from the 30th day from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. Thus, a short period has been given so that the amendments are understood and digested and systems laid down for their implementation.

The amendments relate generally to what one would call corporate governance requirements. Some of the amendments made are substantial in nature with far reaching effects. Importantly, an effectively retrospective application has been given to some amendments since they will apply also to subsisting arrangements and situations. Listed companies, their key management personnel, directors and others concerned will need to study and examine which of them apply to their companies and lay down processes to implement them.

These amendments follow the Consultation Paper issued on 21st February, 2023 and considering the feedback received to this paper, SEBI has implemented the proposals in a manner that is different in some aspects of what the original proposals laid down.

The LODR Regulations apply to listed entities but, for simplification and using a familiar term, the words “listed companies” are used here.

EXTENDING AND MODIFYING THE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO REPORTING OF ‘MATERIAL’ DEVELOPMENTS

SEBI requires ‘material’ information to be dealt in a way that it is not misused while also shared with the public at the earliest possible stage so that investors and others concerned can keep track and take their decisions accordingly. The Regulations relating to insider trading provide for control of and prevention of misuse of price sensitive information by insiders. The LODR Regulations provide for disclosure of material information at an early stage.

Regulation 30 primarily deals with timely disclosure of material developments. SEBI has divided, broadly speaking, what constitutes material developments into two categories. In the first category are those developments that are deemed to be material and require reporting in the prescribed manner. There is no discretion to the management to decide whether or not a development is material, if it falls in this category. In the second category are listed certain events which and any other developments would be material if the management, following through a prescribed process and after considering a materiality policy laid down in advance by the Board, so decides. However, there are no objective/quantitative factors laid down to determine whether a development would be material.

Now, SEBI has prescribed three quantitative factors which would be also considered, in addition to the discretion of the management, as to what constitutes a material development. These are the following (simplified):

a. 2 per cent of the consolidated net worth of the company, if positive.
b. 2 per cent of its consolidated turnover.
c. 5 per cent of the average of absolute value of the consolidated net profits/loss.

If the value of impact of the development/event is more than the least of the above values, the development would be treated as a material one requiring reporting in the prescribed manner.

REACTING TO REPORTS IN ‘MAINSTREAM MEDIA’ ON ‘MATERIAL’ DEVELOPMENTS BY TOP 100/250 COMPANIES

Ordinarily, material developments in relation to a listed company emanate from within. Obviously, the company would be the first to know whether it has landed a major contract, whether a major disaster has occurred, whether a major acquisition has been agreed on, etc. The company would ordinarily share the information at a stage when only it could be called a ‘development’ and earlier than that. However, it is also common that the media, print and electronic, may come to know of it through leaks or otherwise and report on them. Usually, reputed media would give some time to the company to respond to such information but this is not always so and even otherwise, the company may not respond or not confirm. Such news then results in uncertainty.

SEBI has now amended the requirements of how companies should deal with such reports in ‘mainstream media’. For this purpose, it has defined what is ‘mainstream media’. The definition is exceedingly broad. It includes every newspaper registered with Registrar of Newspaper for India and news channel permitted by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Even newspapers, channels, etc. similarly registered, permitted or regulated outside India are covered.

If there is a report in any of such ‘mainstream media’, the company should respond to it within 24 hours by confirming, denying or clarify on it.

This requirement applies to top 100 companies in terms of market capitalization from 1st October, 2023 and to top 250 such companies from 1st April, 2024.

While there are some more detailed provisions, the sheer difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of complying with this requirement is apparent. There are numerous such ‘mainstream media’ and possibly beyond the physical capacity of a single company to keep track and respond as prescribed. Such media may be from any corner of India, indeed the world, and may be in English or a local language. It is submitted that SEBI should have a cut-off point in terms of size/reach of such media such as number of subscribers, etc., though it must be admitted that even making a definition of reach of such media also can be difficult.

Perhaps the status quo could be retained, for want of a better alternative. Since quite a few detailed criteria, including now quantitative ones, have been laid down, the company could be left to take a decision and SEBI could, in glaring cases where the company did not reveal the development in time, take action.

PROVISIONS GIVING SOME SHAREHOLDERS SPECIAL RIGHTS

There are two amendments that deal with agreements or provisions that put some shareholders on a higher or special position as compared to others. The first amendment deals with a situation where special rights are given to some shareholders. Broadly stated, SEBI has required that such special rights should be approved by a special resolution at a general meeting at least once in five years.

The new provision does not define what a ‘special right’ is and how it is given. It is possible that it may refer to a situation where some shareholders have exclusive or extra right as compared to other shareholders. Ordinarily, matters before a shareholders meeting are decided by “one equity share one vote”. It is another thing that the law itself may provide for a different manner and hence here, the intention may be to refer to a situation where the company itself has given special rights. Thus, a particular shareholder may have a right to veto some decision, even if agreed by the majority, or they may have a right to appoint a director, and so on.

It is now provided that such rights should be subject to approval of the shareholders by way of a special resolution once in every five years from the date of grant of such right. This provision applies to rights already granted before the date when this amendment comes into force. In such a case, such right should be approved by a special resolution within five years when this amendment comes into force.

There are certain exceptions provided to this general rule. They do not apply to rights given to:

a. A financial institution registered with or regulated by the Reserve Bank of India under a lending agreement in ordinary course of business.

b. A debenture trustee registered with SEBI under a subscription agreement for debentures issued by the listed entity.

These exceptions apply if such entities become shareholders as a consequence of such lending or subscription agreement.

SALE/LEASE/DISPOSAL OF UNDERTAKING OUTSIDE SCHEME OF ARRANGEMENT

Section 180(1)(a) requires the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution in case the company proposes to sell, lease or otherwise dispose the whole or substantially the whole of an undertaking of the company. The section defines undertaking and makes other provisions in this regard.

SEBI has amended the LODR Regulations to provide a higher and different level of approval of the shareholders.

Let us consider some important amendments made. SEBI requires a prior special resolution where the notice of the meeting would need to disclose the object and commercial rationale for the proposed transaction.

The approval would not only have to be by a special resolution of the shareholders, but can be acted on only if the votes cast by the public shareholders in favor are more than the votes cast against by such shareholders. In other words, a “majority of the minority” also have to approve the transaction. Further, of the shareholders, the public shareholders who are a party to such transaction are debarred from voting.

Transaction with a wholly owned subsidiary does not require such approval, but provision is made the intent of which appears to provide against avoidance of this requirement by a transaction using this route.

It is not clear why such a higher level of approval is required and, particularly, why the approval of a majority of the public shareholders is required. Perhaps the intention may be that when a business unit itself is being disposed off, the public shareholders should have a greater say.

ALL DIRECTORS (WITH SOME SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS) NOW NEED TO TAKE APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS FOR THEIR APPOINTMENT/REAPPOINTMENT

The Act permits some directors to be non-retiring, that is to say, they will continue as directors unless they are removed, they resign, etc. Often, the articles have provisions for indefinite continuation of some directors or even provide for permanency of sorts of their term. While the validity of such term in law is a separate topic for discussion, the result also is that some directors thus continue indefinitely. The law does provide for removal of a director by shareholders. But perhaps realising that this may be an uphill task for shareholders if the promoters/management may be against it, and also to ensure as a sound principle of corporate governance, a new provision now requires that every director should require appointment by shareholders once at least five years. This provision applies also to existing directors. Exceptions are provided for Managing Directors, Whole-time Directors, Independent directors and directors retiring by rotation, the obvious reasons seem to be that they in any case periodically require approval of shareholders. Exceptions are also for certain categories of nominee directors.

OTHER AMENDMENTS

There are several other amendments made.

Agreements by shareholders, promoters, directors, key managerial personnel, etc. which could have impact on the management of the company in the specified manner require to be disclosed to the company, which in turn will disclose this to the stock exchanges. This applies also to past agreements which are subsisting.

An amended provision now requires even more detailed requirements relating to Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report. Many aspects relating to this are yet to be specified by SEBI but when fully notified, it would need to be gone into in detail and require services of Chartered Accountants for ‘assurance’ and related matters.

Timelines for filling of vacancies in key managerial personnel and even independent directors have been tightened.

To conclude, SEBI continues to take a lead in updating and improving on corporate governance standards in listed entities as compared to the provisions under the Companies Act, 2013. The cost of compliance does rise but the expectations are that the payoff would be in terms of better image and lower costs of raising capital for listed entities.

SPES Successionis: Expectation of a Heir to Succeed to Property of Deceased

INTRODUCTION

Spes Successionis’ is a Latin phrase which means the hope / expectation of a legal heir to succeed to the property of the deceased. The Privy Council in the case of Lala Duni Chand vs. Mst. Anar Kali, 1946 AIR(PC) 173, explained this term in the context of Hindu Law. It held that a legal heir had no vested interest in the estate of a person (property owner) who was alive but he only has a mere ?Spes Successionis’ or a chance of succession, which was a purely contingent right which might or might not accrue. The succession would take place only once the property owner died, and hence, the right of the heir was contingent upon the same. It is founded on the principle that a living man has no heirs. They come into existence only once he dies. The Supreme Court in Elumalai @ Venkatesan vs. M. Kamala, CA No. 521-522/2023, order dated 25th January, 2023 had an occasion to consider this right when viewed against a release deed executed by a son in respect of his father’s self-acquired property. The decision examined the position under the Transfer of Property Act, the Hindu Succession Act, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, etc.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In Elumalai’s case (supra), a person who owned a self-acquired property, had two wives. The son from his first wife executed a Release Deed, in respect of this property of his father, in favor of his step-brother. The releaser son received consideration from his father for executing this Release Deed and he also stated in the Deed that he had no connection with his father other than that of blood relation. After the releaser son passed away, his children filed a suit that they too were eligible to succeed to the property of their deceased grandfather notwithstanding the Release Deed executed by their father. They contended that they were minors / not even born when their father executed the Release Deed. When the Release Deed was executed by their father, he had a mere ?Spes Successionis’ in the property of his father who was alive at that time. Hence, there was no way in which their father could transfer a contingent right. The mere expectation of succeeding to a property at a future date could not form the subject matter of a legitimate transfer. For this they relied upon section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. This section deals with property which could be validly transferred by a person. It states that the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate / any other mere possibility of a like nature cannot be transferred. In this respect the Gujarat High Court in CWT vs. Ashokkumar Ramnlal, [1967] 63 ITR 133 (Guj), has explained that a ?Spes Successionis’ is a bare or naked possibility such as the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or any other possibility of a like nature and it is non-transferable by reason of section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, it was contended that under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable for the benefit of / protection of the minor’s estate. However, this Act provides that a natural guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. Accordingly, they contended that the father could not execute a Release Deed.The Madras High Court in Elumalai’s case (supra) negated the claim of these grandchildren on the ground that their father had executed a Release Deed and had obtained consideration from his father. Accordingly, they (the grandchildren) would stand estopped from laying a claim to a share in their grandfather’s property.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT

The Court held that section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act enumerated property which could be transferred. It declared that property of any kind could be transferred except as otherwise provided by the Transfer of Property Act or by any other law for the time being in force. Section 6(a) declared that a chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or other mere possibility of a like nature could not be transferred. It held that a living man had no heir. Equally, a person who may become the heir and was entitled to succeed under the law upon the death of his relative would not have any right until succession to the estate is opened up. It held that when the grandfather was alive, his son, at best, had a ?Spes Successionis’. It compared the son to a co-parcener who acquired a right to joint family property by his mere birth, in regard to the separate property of a Hindu, no such right existed. The Madras High Court in Sri Kakarlapudi Lakshminarayana vs. Sri Rajah Kandukuri Veera Sarabha, (1915) 28 MLJ 650 has held that even before the enactment of the Transfer of Property Act, both in England and in India, a mere chance of succeeding to an estate was a bare possibility incapable of assignment (Jones vs. Roe (1789) 3 T.R. 88; In re: Parsons Stockley vs. Parsons (1890) 45 Ch. D. 51). The Apex Court held that the conduct of the son executing a Release Deed and receiving consideration resulted in the creation of an estoppel. The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevented the son from staking a claim if he had survived his father. An estoppel is an impediment to a right of action arising from a man’s own act.

The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in the case of Gulam Abbas vs. Haji Kayyam Ali, AIR 1973 SC 554, wherein the Supreme Court referred to the Latin maxim ‘nemo est heres viventis’ ~ a living person had no heir. An heir apparent had no reversionary interest which would enable him to object to any sale or gift made by the owner in possession. The converse was also true, a renunciation by an expectant heir in the lifetime of his ancestor was not valid, or enforceable against him after the vesting of the inheritance. The Court held that this was a correct statement of the law, because a bare renunciation of expectation to inherit would not bind the expectant heir’s conduct in future. However, if the expectant heir went further and received consideration and so conducted himself as to mislead an owner into not making dispositions of his property inter vivos, the expectant heir could be debarred from setting up his right when it vested in him. Thus, the Court held that the principle of estoppel remains untouched by this statement.

The Apex Court further observed that the property in question was not the ancestral property of the father. He would have acquired rights over the same only if the grandfather had died intestate. The father was, thus, only an heir apparent. Transfer by an heir apparent being mere spes successonis was ineffective to convey any right. By the mere execution of Release Deed, in other words, in the facts of this case, no transfer took place. This was for the simple reason that the transferor, namely, the father of the appellants did not have any right at all which he could transfer or relinquish.

The Court observed that the intention of the grandfather would have been to secure the interest of the son from his second marriage. For this, the son from his first marriage was given some valuable consideration, which persuaded him to release all his rights in respect of the property in question. The words in the ‘Release Deed’ that hereafter he did not have any other connection except blood relation appeared to signify that the intention of the grandfather was to deny any claim to his son in regard to the property. The father receiving consideration for the Release Deed was held to be a very important factor in deciding that the father (and hence, the grandchildren) was estopped from staking any claim to the estate of the grandfather. The fact that the grandfather had not executed a Will in favour of his son showed that he too intended to cut him from inheritance to the self-acquired property.The Court also considered the impact of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 on powers of a natural guardian. That Act provided that in case of a Hindu, the father and after him the mother would be the natural guardian. However, the powers of a natural guardian are limited by the Act. If, in regard to the property of the minor, the natural guardians were to enter into a covenant, then, it may be open to the minor to invoke the prohibition against the natural guardian, binding the minor by a personal covenant. The Court held that it was unable to discard the Release Deed executed by their father as a personal covenant within the meaning of this Act.

It also referred to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which deals with the succession rules for the property of a Hindu male. The grandchildren could not claim adefence against the principle of estoppel on the basis of the Hindu Succession Act. The estoppel applied both to the person executing his Release Deed as well as his children.

CONCLUSION

The principle of estoppel can prevent a person from claiming a right to a property. In this case, even though the Release Deed per se was not valid but since the father had received consideration under it, that fact created an estoppel against his heirs from claiming to their grandfather’s property.

SEBI Lays down Clearer Guidelines on What Constitutes ‘Misleading Information’

BACKGROUND

A recent SEBI Order on alleged misleading price-sensitive news by a journalist of a leading TV channel has wider ramifications. Not just news media but also companies, their senior executives, advisors of various forms and, more particularly in recent times, social media ‘influencers’ may need to consider the reasoning offered here. There is now even a word coined for this fast-growing group of social media influencers in investing – finfluencers (i.e. finance + influencers). While SEBI let off the journalist, and rightly so on the facts, the reasons provided for differentiating this case are noteworthy. Effectively, SEBI has laid down certain general principles on how communications to the public by various parties may be viewed. When would a person communicating to the public, in general, be said to have been misleading, acting fraudulently, acting recklessly, etc., to the point of becoming a violation of the law? The decision could help in answering these questions. And this would be relevant for persons including, say, the Chairman/CEO of a company (there is a case earlier where SEBI held him liable, only to find its Order reversed on appeal), the company secretary who communicates to the exchanges, various forms of advisors and ‘experts’ (registered with SEBI or not), etc.

The Order is also interesting since a core question raised was the constitutional guarantee of free speech, and it was claimed that the media had immunity from action. The Order considered several Court rulings in this regard.

Let us review this Order of SEBI and know what factors were deemed relevant to determine that the journalist concerned was not guilty. These factors should help determine how, another person could be found guilty on a different set of facts.

SEBI’S ORDER

SEBIs Order dated 31st October, 2022, bearing reference No. Order/NH/VS/2022-23/20979, is briefly summarized. A leading business TV channel’s journalist reported to it on a price sensitive matter. She reported that the merger of a leading listed company was approved by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT). She was personally present at the hearing of the NCLT. On receiving the report, the channel immediately interviewed the company’s Chairman on the implications of the ‘merger order’. The Chairman gave replies though he first qualified that he had not seen the merger order.

Now, mergers, takeovers, etc., are generally treated as material and price-sensitive information. This is particularly so because, depending on various factors such as the condition of the company being merged, the exchange ratio, etc., there could be significant demand – or offloading – of the company’s shares, thus impacting the market price. Thus, various SEBI Regulations provide for special treatment of such material/price-sensitive information. The SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, for example, require that it should not be leaked selectively or that insiders should not trade based on such information. The SEBI LODR Regulations require that material information should be disclosed forthwith in the specified manner. However, in this case, the question was the applicability of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (the PFUTP Regulations). The Regulations have multiple provisions prohibiting sharing of misleading information or other similar manipulative/fraudulent practices.

SEBI was of the view that the journalist misreported the development when, according to it, the merger was not approved, and the matter was still at an early stage. Hence, the reporting was premature and thus misleading and violated the PFUTP Regulations. SEBI initiated proceedings against the journalist (whilst also seeking inputs from the TV channel, the company, its Chairman, etc.).

There were several defences proffered by the journalist. Two were fundamental in law and special for journalists. First, she refused to share the source of her information, claiming this as a privilege of journalists. Secondly, she stated that any action against her for her report would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of freedom of expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

Then, there were some more specific defences in light of the PFUTP Regulations. There was a question on whether the order of the NCLT on that day really amounted to a final verdict on the merger. The order was said to be ‘reserved’ by NCLT. Whether, particularly in light of the other factors in the proceedings before NCLT, issuance of a final order was a matter of formality or whether there was anything substantial still pending. This was more so in light of the fact that the NCLT did issue a formal order approving the merger, albeit several weeks later.

The journalist also pointed out that in her email to the TV channel, she mentioned that the written order was yet to be issued.

SEBI’S REASONING IN DISPOSING OFF THE PROCEEDINGS

SEBI made several points while finding the journalist not guilty.

It noted that the journalist and her family members did not trade in the securities of the listed company in question. Hence, no benefit was obtained from the report, even if one were to assume that the report was substantially incorrect.

SEBI also drew on several Court rulings which had opined that while, as an advisory, Courts would want journalists and media to avoid sensationalizing, they would be “loathe to restrain media”. It cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajendran Chingaraveluv. R. K. Mishra, ((2010) 1 SCC 457), where the Hon’ble Court held, “Every journalist/reporter has an overriding duty to the society of educating the masses with fair, accurate, trustworthy and responsible reports relating to reportable events/incidents and above all to the standards of his/her profession. Thus, the temptation to sensationalize should be resisted.”

It was also considered that in the news flashed immediately later by the TV channel, it stated that NCLT was yet to publish the written order.

However, particularly for the purposes of this article, what was most significant was the point made by SEBI on whether there was any intentional misleading by the journalist concerned. Was there any intention to influence investors to trade in a direction that they would not have done but for such news?

SEBI relied on the oft-quoted decision of the Supreme Court in N. Narayanan vs. SEBI [(2013) 12 SCC 152] to reiterate the law on the duty of the print and electronic media in relation to the securities market. The apex Court has stated that – “Print and Electronic Media have also a solemn duty not to mislead the public, who are present and prospective investors, in their forecast on the securities market. Of course, a genuine and honest opinion on market position of a company has to be welcomed. But a media projection on company’s position in the security market with a view to derive a benefit from a position in the securities would amount to market abuse, creating artificiality. [emphasis supplied].

An earlier case of SAT was also cited where a company’s Chairman was alleged to have made a misleading statement, also on a price-sensitive matter of a possible takeover of another listed company. SEBI levied a significant penalty on the Chairman. SAT overturned the order on facts and reiterated the principle that “…in the absence of any motive or a scheme or any evidence a reported news item alone is not sufficient to prove a serious charge like fraud.

Thus, the litmus test appears to be the intention of the person making the communication. Emphasizing the wording of the Regulations, SEBI concluded in the present case that, to be held guilty of violating the provisions, it would need to be shown that “…that the (journalist) filed the impugned news report with (the channel) with a pre-determined intent to manipulate scrip prices or induce investors”. Thus, an intention had to be shown and that too of manipulating the scrip prices or inducing investors to act. Absent these, the charge of violating the relevant Regulations fails. The journalist was thus held not guilty of violating the provisions.

WIDE SCOPE OF THESE PROVISIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THESE DAYS OF SOCIAL MEDIA

The convenience of social media/internet has made it easy for individuals to present their views, informed or otherwise. For example, Youtube and Twitter have made it easy to share views economically and widely. A flourishing industry of social influencers has formed, including food reviewers, tech reviewers, plain entertainers and, for the purposes of this topic, influencers in the field of investing (finfluencers). Recently, Business Standard reported that SEBI is keeping a watchful eye on this group, and that they may end up being regulated. The concerns with this group are, however, different. Their intention primarily is not to maliciously induce investors to deal in some scrips. They intend to have a large following and ‘views’ (or eyeballs). The more the views, the more their earnings. And to increase the views, many use hyperbole and click-bait and the like or shallow tips for financial analysis that promise high and easy rewards but which often border on recklessness. The scheme of securities laws particularly expects professionally qualified people to be more responsible, and recklessness on their part may be viewed more strictly. SEBI closely regulates registered intermediaries, such as investment advisers, research analysts, etc., and requires them to follow a strict Code of Conduct. However, these groups appear to fall into a grey area in most cases.

There have also been cases where SEBI has found such persons allegedly engaging in acts that could fulfil all the prerequisites laid down earlier. SEBI has, for example, made findings that certain Telegram Channels are engaged in giving ‘tips’ of scrips to induce investors to buy the shares at inflated prices while they offloaded.

In another case, it was alleged that the anchor of a leading financial channel gave recommendations on television but illicitly made personal profits. Given the large viewership and following, his recommendations led to an immediate rise in purchases of such recommended scrips. SEBI alleged that the anchor/his family members had purchased these scrips just before such recommendations and sold them immediately after making the recommendations.

CONCLUSION

SEBI has laid down fairly clear criteria for determining whether or not communications to the public relating to securities violate the PFUTP Regulations, and then it would be a question of applying them in the facts of each case. Having said that, even this may not be the last word. In recent times, the settled rule is that even in cases of alleged fraud or manipulative practices, if the proceedings are civil (and not criminal), the proof required is not strict. The test is of ‘preponderance of probabilities’ and not ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ (Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Kishore Ajmera (2016) 196 Comp Cas 181 and SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P.) Ltd. (2018) 207 Comp Cas 443). Thus, while the media may still get some extra leeway, the rest may be judged with a more relaxed benchmark.

Maintenance under Criminal Procedure Code

INTRODUCTION

The duty to maintain certain relatives is a subject covered by different statutes. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 deals with the maintenance to be provided by a Hindu male for his wife, parents, children and certain other relations. Another Hindu Law statute which deals with this is the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Maintenance payable by a Hindu to his wife is also covered under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This Law applies to people of all religions.

However and interestingly, maintenance as an obligation is also covered under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The CrPC is a criminal procedure law, whilst maintenance is a civil obligation. Nevertheless, sections 125 to 128 of the CrPC deal with this important civil duty. The Bombay High Court in Zahid Ali Imdadali vs. Fahmida Begum 1988 (4) BomCR 366 has observed that the right of an aggrieved claiming maintenance u/s 125 of the CrPC was essentially a civil right. The remedies provided in the said sections were in the nature of civil rights. The proceedings u/s 125 were essentially civil in nature.

In Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188, the Supreme Court explained that the purpose of these sections of the CrPC was to achieve “social justice”, which was the constitutional vision enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.

APPLICABILITY

The provisions of the CrPC come into force where any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain:

(a)    His wife who is unable to maintain herself;

(b)    His minor child (even if illegitimate) unable to maintain itself;

(c)    His major child (even if illegitimate) who cannot maintain itself owing to any physical/mental abnormality/injury; or

(d)    His parent who is unable to maintain itself.

Thus, any of the above four categories could petition the Court, and if such proof of neglect/refusal exists, then the Court would order an interim/final maintenance order for the aggrieved on such terms as it deems fit. A First Class Judicial Magistrate (the starting point of Courts in the Criminal hierarchy) is empowered to pass such maintenance order.

The onus to prove neglect/refusal lies on the claimant. She/he must demonstrate willful default on the other person’s part.

The Supreme Court in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 4 SCC 479 explained that the dominant and primary object of the section was to provide social justice to women, children, infirm parents etc., and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling those who can support those who are unable to support themselves but have a moral claim for support. The provisions provide a speedy remedy to those women, children and destitute parents who are in distress. The provisions were intended to achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose behind the benevolent provisions was that the wife, child and parents should not be left in a helpless state of distress, destitution and starvation.

In Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya vs. State of Gujarat 2005 AIR(SC) 1809, it was held that the provisions of CrPC were applicable and enforceable whatever was the personal law by which the persons concerned were governed. Hence, even Muslims were covered by it (Mohd.Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 SCC (Cri) 245).

PERSON OF SUFFICIENT MEANS

In Anju Garg vs. Deepak Garg, Cr. Appeal 1693/2022 (SC) it was held that it is the sacrosanct duty of the husband to provide financial support to his wife and minor children. The husband is required to earn money even by physical labour if he is an able-bodied man. In this case, the husband contended that he had no source of income as his business had been closed. The Supreme Court held that it was neither impressed by nor ready to accept such submissions. The respondent being an able-bodied man, was obliged to earn by legitimate means and maintain his wife and the minor child.

Thus, if he has sufficient means at his disposal, either in the form of property, assets, employment or even physical capacity to be employed, then an order of maintenance would be passed against him for neglect of duty.

The Apex Court in Dr. Mrs. Vijaya Arbat vs. Kashirao Sawaui and another (AIR 1987 SC 1100) held that, under this section, even a daughter is liable to maintain her parents, without making any distinction between an unmarried daughter and a married daughter. It held that even though the section had used the expression “his father or mother”, the use of the word ‘his’ did not exclude the parents claiming maintenance from their daughter. The Court explained that if the contention of the daughter was accepted that she had no liability whatsoever to maintain her parents, in that case, parents having only daughters and unable to maintain themselves, would go destitute, if the daughters even though they had sufficient means refused to maintain their parents!

In an interesting recent decision, the Supreme Court in Kiran Tomar vs. State of UP, Cr. Appeal No. 1865/2022 dealt with a petition u/s 125 of the CrPC. The Family Court fixed a certain sum of maintenance based on the Income-tax returns of the husband, which was appealed against by the wife. The Supreme Court held that it was well-settled that income tax returns did not necessarily furnish an accurate guide of the real income! Particularly, when parties were engaged in a marital conflict, there was a tendency to underestimate income. Hence, it was for the Family Court to determine on a holistic assessment of the evidence what would be the real income of the husband to enable the wife and children to live in a condition commensurate with the status to which they were accustomed when they stayed together.

MAINTENANCE AND ITS QUANTUM

In Bhuwan Mohan Singh vs. Meena, 2014 AIR (SC) 2875, the Court held that the section was conceived to ameliorate the agony, anguish and financial sufferings of a woman so that the Court could make some suitable arrangements and she could sustain herself and also her children if they were with her. The concept of sustenance did not necessarily mean to lead an animal’s life, feel like an unperson to be thrown away from grace and roam for her basic maintenance somewhere else. She was entitled to lead a life in a similar manner as she would have lived at her husband’s house. That is where the status and strata came into play, and that is where the obligations of the husband, in the case of a wife, became prominent. In a proceeding of this nature, the husband could not take subterfuges to deprive her of the benefit of living with dignity. Regard being had to the solemn pledge at the time of marriage and, in consonance with the statutory law that governed the field, it was the obligation of the husband to see that the wife did not become a destitute, a beggar. A situation was not to be maladroitly created whereby she was compelled to resign to her fate and think of life “dust unto dust”. In fact, it was the husband’s sacrosanct duty to render financial support even if he was required to earn money with physical labour if he was able bodied. The object of the section was to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provided a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.

In Rajnesh vs. Neha 2021 AIR(SC) 569, it was held that the objective of granting interim/permanent alimony was to ensure that the wife was not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage and not as a punishment to the other spouse. There was no straitjacket formula to fix the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. The factors which would weigh with the Court included the status of the parties; reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children; whether the applicant was educated and professionally qualified; whether the applicant had any independent source of income; whether the income was sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home; whether the applicant was employed before her marriage; whether she was working during the subsistence of the marriage; whether the wife was required to sacrifice her employment opportunities for nurturing the family, child-rearing, and looking after adult members of the family; and reasonable costs of litigation for a non-working wife.

One of the inseparable conditions for claiming maintenance that also had to be satisfied was that the wife could not maintain herself – Chaturbhuj vs. Sita Bai, 2008 AIR(SC) 530. However, in Shailja & Anr. vs. Khobbanna, (2018) 12 SCC 199, the Supreme Court held that merely because the wife was capable of earning, it would not be sufficient ground to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court. The Court had to determine whether the wife’s income was sufficient to enable her to maintain herself in accordance with her husband’s lifestyle in the matrimonial home. Sustenance did not mean mere survival. Similarly, in Sunita Kachwaha vs. Anil Kachwaha, (2014) 16 SCC 715, it was held that merely because the wife was earning some income, it could not be a ground to reject her maintenance claim.

In the case of minor children, the Court, in Rajnesh’s case (supra), held that maintenance would include expenses for food, clothing, residence, medical expenses and children’s education. Extra coaching classes or other vocational training courses to complement the basic education must be factored in while awarding child support. However, it should be a reasonable amount awarded for extra-curricular/coaching classes and not an overly extravagant amount.

MAINTENANCE UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

In addition to maintenance under Hindu Law, it also becomes essential to understand maintenance payable to a wife under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights, guaranteed under the Constitution of India, of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, then such aggrieved woman can approach designated Protection Officers to protect her. The Supreme Court in Shome Danani vs. Tanya Danani 2019 (3) RLW 2124, held that a lady can approach both remedies under the CrPC as well as under the Domestic Violence Act. The object of both laws is different. This feature has earlier dealt in detail with the provisions of this law [refer BCAJ February 2021 and June 2022].

In Rajnesh vs. Neha 2021 AIR(SC) 569, the Apex Court held that maintenance might be claimed under one or more statutes (e.g., CrPC, Domestic Violence Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act), since each of these enactments provided an independent and distinct remedy framed with a specific object and purpose. The remedy provided by Section 125 was summary in nature, and the substantive disputes with respect to the dissolution of marriage could be determined by a Civil/Family Court in an appropriate proceeding, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. It further held that maintenance granted under the Domestic Violence Act to an aggrieved woman and children would be given effect to, in addition to an order of maintenance awarded under the CrPC or any other law in force.

The Court, however, held that while it was well settled that a wife could make a claim for maintenance under different statutes, it would be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. Accordingly, to overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, the Court directed that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant must disclose the previous maintenance proceeding and the orders passed therein so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded during the last proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding required any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned Court in the previous proceeding.

A compromise decree entered into by a husband and wife agreeing for a consolidated amount towards permanent alimony, thereby giving up any future claim for maintenance, accepted by the Court in a proceeding u/s 125 of the CrPC, would not preclude the wife from claiming maintenance in a suit filed under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 – Nagendrappa Natikar vs. Neelamma, 2013 AIR(SC) 1541.

In Bhagwan Dutt vs. Kamla Devi, (1975) 2 SCC 386, the Supreme Court held that under CrPC, only a wife who was “unable to maintain herself” was entitled to seek maintenance.

ENFORCEMENT

Section 125(3) of the CrPC provides that if the party against whom the order of maintenance is passed fails to comply with it, the same shall be recovered in the manner as provided for fines. The Magistrate may award a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or until payment, whichever is earlier. However, the imprisonment is resorted to only against non-payment under the order.

The Court in Chaturbhuj’s case (supra) explained that the object of maintenance proceedings was not to punish a person for his past neglect but to prevent vagrancy and destitution of a deserted wife by providing her food, clothing, and shelter by a speedy remedy.

In addition, the Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh (supra) directed that enforcement/execution of orders of maintenance, may be enforced as a money decree of a Civil Court as per the provisions of the CrPC, i.e., by attachment of property, arrest, detention, appointing a Court Receiver for his property, etc.

CONCLUSION

The right to claim maintenance has been provided to several persons under the Code. The Courts have been eager to uphold the claim of the aggrieved wife/others and have been very liberal in construing the provisions of these sections. As explained by the Supreme Court in Badshah’s case (supra), Courts would bridge the gap between Law and society using purposive interpretation to advance the cause of social justice!

MSME Act, 2006 – 12 Compliance Action Points for Entities Dealing with MSMEs

BACKGROUND OF THE MSME ACT, 2006

The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSME Act) provides for the registration of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) based on the specified criteria. It thereafter provides for a host of measures for the promotion, development and enhancement of the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises. It also casts various obligations on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises. This article explains the extent of obligations cast on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises and the consequences of non-compliance with such obligations.

MEANING OF ENTERPRISE AND APPLICABILITY OF MSME ACT

Section 7 of the MSME Act provides the criteria based on which an enterprise is classified as either a micro-enterprise, small enterprise, or medium enterprise. However, before venturing into the specific criteria for classifying an enterprise into micro, small or medium, it may be important to look at the definition of ‘enterprise’ as provided u/s 2(e) of the Act. The said definition is significant and reproduced below for ready reference:

“enterprise” means an industrial undertaking or a business concern or any other establishment, by whatever name called, engaged in the manufacture or production of goods, in any manner, pertaining to any industry specified in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (55 of 1951) or engaged in providing or rendering of any service or services.

On a perusal of the above definition, it is very clear that only establishments engaged in the manufacture of specified goods or rendering any service can be considered an ’enterprise’. Therefore, traders and works contractors are not covered under this definition, and the provisions of the MSME Act do not apply to such traders and works contractors. In fact, in its FAQ dated 24th October, 2016, the Ministry of MSME has clarified vide answer to Q. No. 18 that the policy is meant only for procurement of goods produced or services rendered by MSEs, and traders are excluded from the Policy.

Further, various Court rulings have held that works contractors are not covered under the MSME Act, 2006. Useful reference may be made to the decisions in the cases of Rahul Singh vs. Union of India C 42491 of 2016 (Allahabad High Court), Shreegee Enterprises vs. Union of India 2015 SCC Online Del 13169 (Delhi High Court), Samvit Buildcare Pvt Ltd vs. Ministry of Civil Aviation C/SCA/1094/2018 (Gujarat High Court) and Sterling and Wilson Pvt Ltd. vs. Union of India WP – L1261/2017 (Bombay High Court).

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

1. Check whether the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor involves  supply of goods, services or works contracts. If the nature of the contract awarded is that of a works contract, then MSME Compliances are not applicable.

2. If the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor is that of the supply of goods, further check whether the goods supplied by the vendor are manufactured or produced by him. If the goods are neither manufactured nor produced by him, but he is merely a trader, then the MSME Compliances are not applicable. For example, a trader of stationery items or supplier of printer consumables would not be eligible for the benefit of the MSME provisions since the said suppliers neither manufacture nor produce the products supplied by them.

3. If the nature of the contract awarded to the vendor is that of supply of services, further check whether the services supplied by the vendor are rendered by him or by some other person. If the services are rendered by some other person and the vendor is merely acting as an intermediary/aggregator, then MSME Compliances are not applicable. For example, an advertising agent might help an enterprise by placing an advertisement in a newspaper. Since the services of advertisement are rendered by the newspaper and not the agent, MSME compliances would not apply to the advertisement amount. However, if the advertising agent charges some amount to the enterprise for either the preparation or placement of the advertisement, then the MSME compliances would become applicable only to the extent of such preparation/placement charges. A similar situation would apply to air travel agents as well.

CLASSIFICATION OF ENTERPRISES

Section 7 of the MSME Act provides for the criteria based on which enterprises can be classified either as micro-enterprise, small enterprise, or medium enterprise. The following table summarises the latest criteria concerning the classification of enterprises as micro, small or medium enterprises:

Classification

Investment Criteria in Plant, Machinery and Equipment do
not exceed

Turnover Criteria do not exceed

Micro

Rs. 1 Crore

Rs. 5 Crore

Small

Rs. 10 Crore

Rs. 50 Crore

Medium

Rs. 50 Crore

Rs. 250 Crore

Further, Section 8 provides for the registration of such enterprises with the MSME and the issuance of a registration certificate. At the time of registration, it is important to mention the specific NIC Codes under which the enterprise intends to supply the goods or the services. The privileges under the law are available only to enterprises which are so registered and bear a Udyog Registration Certificate with the specific NIC Codes listed therein.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

4. Check whether the vendor has obtained registration under the MSME Act and if so, obtain a copy of his registration certificate. The correctness of the said certificate can be checked online. If no communication is received from the vendor, it can be presumed that he is not registered under the MSME Act. In case the vendor is not registered under the MSME Act, then MSME Compliances are not applicable even if, factually, he satisfies the conditions for classification as an MSME.

5. Similarly, mere registration under MSME does not automatically entitle the enterprise for blanket benefit of all the privileges under the Act. The privilege to MSME and the obligation cast on the entity dealing with such an enterprise will have to be examined qua each transaction.

MISUSE OF MSME CLASSIFICATION

MSMEs are entitled to various benefits. Some enterprises furnish false information for obtaining Udyam Adhar Memorandum even though they may not be eligible. One of the benefits to MSMEs is procurement preference by public sector enterprises. In this context, to curb fraudulent practices and protect the interests of genuine MSEs, the Ministry of MSME vide Office Memorandum – F.No.5/1(1)/2019-P&G/Policy dated 10th January, 2020 (OM) has provided powers to specified buyers to enquire upon the status of MSEs before awarding any contract. The relevant extract of the said OM is reproduced below“While awarding contract to MSEs under the Public Procurement Policy (PPP), the Government Departments/ CPSEs / Other Organizations shall satisfy themselves about the MSE status of the concerned enterprise. In case of any doubt/ lack of evidence in respect of the MSE status of any enterprise, they may go through due verification process with the help of supporting documents such as CA certificate, details available from the website of Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) etc.”

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

6. While the above notification may not apply strictly to entities other than the public sector, it may be important to insist on such CA Certificate before taking upon the onus of ensuring the onerous compliance obligations cast in relation to MSMEs.

OBLIGATIONS CAST ON ENTITIES DEALING WITH VARIOUS VENDORS

Section 15 of the MSME Act casts specific obligations on the buyer to make payments to specified suppliers within the prescribed timelines. The provisions are reproduced below for ready reference

Where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day:

Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance.

It may be noted that Section 15 uses the word ‘supplier’ and not ‘enterprise’. Therefore, it may be important to understand the definition of the supplier as provided under section 2(n) of the Act and the same is reproduced below:

“supplier” means a micro or small enterprise, which has filed a memorandum with the authority referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8, and includes … (not reproduced as very specific)

On a perusal of the above definition, it is evident that the term ‘supplier’ only covers micro or small enterprises. The MSME Act actually has three classifications – micro , small and medium. While medium-scale enterprises are eligible for various concessions and incentives provided under Chapter IV of the MSME Act, they are not included in the scope of suppliers for Section 15 compliances. Therefore, medium-scale enterprises are not eligible to enjoy the privilege of priority payment under section 15 of the Act.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

7. If the vendor is registered under the MSME Act, check the classification of the enterprise. If the enterprise is registered as ‘MEDIUM’, compliance with the provisions of Section 15 is not required. The classification is evident from the registration certificate.

UNDERSTANDING THE PAYMENT OBLIGATION

In cases where the vendors/transactions are eliminated from the purview of MSME Compliance in view of the earlier action points, there is no further cause for worry from the MSME perspective. However, in cases where the vendors/transactions are not eliminated from the purview, it may be important for the entity to examine and ensure compliance with the provisions of Section 15 referred to above. Basically, the said provision requires the entity to make the payment to the MSME vendor within prescribed timelines. Effectively, the provision requires that the payment be made within 15 days from the ‘day of acceptance’ (See detailed analysis later) of the goods or services by the buyer. This time limit can be extended up to a maximum of 45 days from the ‘day of acceptance’ if the date of payment is agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing.Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

8. In order to avail the maximum time limit of 45 days, it is important that the entity enters into written agreements with the vendors and those agreements provide for the credit period to be mentioned as 45 days. In the alternative, if there is no formal agreement entered into with the vendor, the purchase order issued by the entity can specify this term and if no objection is raised to the purchase order, the said purchase order can be considered as the written agreement between the parties.

At this juncture, it may also be important to understand what is meant by ‘day of acceptance’. Explanation (i) to Section 2(b) defines the term ‘day of acceptance’ as under:

‘the day of acceptance’ means,—

(a) the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; or

(b) where any objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier.

Further, Explanation (ii) to the said clause deems the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services as the day of deemed acceptance where no objection is made in  writing by the buyer regarding the acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services.

The above provisions cast a very important burden on the entities dealing with various vendors to raise commercial or technical objections, if any, in writing within 15 days of the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services. If such commercial or technical objections are raised in writing, the burden then shifts to the supplier to ensure that such objections are duly resolved and removed. Clause (b) above acts as a protection to the buyer in such cases and the time count does not start till the time of removal of the commercial or technical dispute by the supplier.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

9. Immediately after the receipt of goods or services, verify the qualitative and quantitative, and commercial parameters of the goods or services and if there is any variation from the parameters expected under the agreement or the purchase order, raise the objection in writing to the supplier within 15 days of the receipt of the goods or services.

Since the timelines prescribed under the law are anchored around “the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services“, it may be important to understand what exactly is meant by delivery of goods and rendering of services.

At this juncture, it may be relevant to stress once again the limited applicability of the MSME Act only to the supply of goods manufactured by the vendor or services rendered by the vendor. As stated earlier, the MSME Act does not apply to either traders or to works contractors (where there is a composite supply of goods as well as services).

The Sale of Goods Act, 1930, is an elaborate code dealing with transactions of sale of goods. Section 2(2) of the said Act defines the term “delivery“ to mean a voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another. Section 33 of the Act further specifies that the delivery of goods sold may be made by doing anything which the parties agree shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorised to hold them on his behalf.

The mere change in the place of location of goods from the suppliers’ warehouse to the buyers’ warehouse does not ipso facto mean that the goods have been delivered. Most of the agreements or purchase orders contain clauses which stipulate the timeline when the goods will be deemed to be delivered and the transfer of possession of the goods takes place. Further, it may be important to note the provisions of Section 41 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 which specifically mentions that where goods are delivered to the buyer which he has not previously examined, he is not deemed to have accepted them unless and until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract. Having said so, it is also important to bear in mind the provisions of Section 42 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 which specifies that the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them, or when the goods have been delivered to him and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent  with the ownership of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a  reasonable time, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them.

Though the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 does not apply to the rendering of services, in my view, in the absence of any authoritative guidance on what could constitute acceptance of the rendering of services, I believe that the above principles would apply in the case of services as well.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

10. It is important that the entity enters into a written agreement with the vendors that provides for the time when the delivery will be deemed to be accepted by the buyer. In the alternative, if there is no formal agreement entered into with the vendor, the purchase order issued by the entity can specify this term and if no objection is raised to the purchase order, the said purchase order can be considered as the written agreement between the parties.

IMPACT OF GST NON-COMPLIANCES BY THE VENDOR

The payment due to the vendor would not only include the value of the goods or services supplied but also the GST charged by the vendor for onward payment to the Government. Such GST charged is available as an input tax credit to the buyer enterprise under the GST Law subject to various vendor-specific conditions like payment of tax to the Government and uploading the transaction details on the GST Portal. Many enterprises would wish to withhold the GST component in case of non-compliance in this regard by the vendor. Whether such a withholding of the GST Component would amount to non-payment to the vendor resulting in the consequences under the MSME Act?

A strict reading of Explanation (i) to Section 2(b) defining the term ‘day of acceptance’ may suggest that a buyer can raise an objection regarding the acceptance of goods or services only. However, this would be a very restrictive interpretation of the said provision. One may argue that the acceptance of goods or services is not limited to merely the physical characteristics of the said goods or services but their other financial facets. Eligibility for an input tax credit is a substantial financial facet associated with the supply of the said goods or services and accordingly, if the agreement or the purchase order is suitably worded, the buyer may be entitled to withhold the GST component in case of non-compliance by the vendor.

CONSEQUENCES OF DELAY IN PAYMENT

Section 16 of the Act provides for payment of interest by the buyer to the enterprise in case of delay in payment. The said provision has an overriding effect to anything specifically mentioned in the agreement. The relevant provision is reproduced below for ready reference:

Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 15, the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay compound interest with monthly rests to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank.

It may be noted that the provision not only provides for the mandatory payment of interest but also mentions the way the interest is calculated. The same is explained below:

Issue

Provision

Illustration

When is interest payable?

If the buyer fails to make the payment of the
amount to the supplier within the credit period or before the appointed date.

If the goods are received on 15th
April and the agreement provides for a maximum credit period of 45 days, the
outer due date of payment will be 31st  May. If the payment is not made by that
date, the interest liability is triggered.

What is the type of interest?

Compounded interest with monthly rests.

The interest will be payable from 1st  June. The interest will be compounded each month.
So, the interest for the month of July will be calculated by taking the
outstanding principal as well as the interest of June.

What is the rate of interest?

Three times the bank rate notified by the
Reserve Bank

If the Bank Rate notified is 4.25 per cent,
the applicable interest rate will be 12.75 per cent.

 

An associated issue that usually arises is that the RBI keeps
amending the bank rate at various points. Therefore, what is the  bank rate to be taken into account for the
purposes of calculation? In my view, at the end of every month, the interest
needs to be calculated for compounding purposes. The bank rate on the said
date will be applied for the calculation of interest for that particular
month.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors11. Make sure that the payments to MSMEs are made within the time limits stipulated earlier. If, for any reason, the payments are delayed, also calculate, and provide for interest as per the provisions mentioned above. Make sure that the payments to the MSMEs are made with the applicable interest at the earliest possible opportunity.

HOW DOES ONE DEFINE DELAY IN PAYMENT IN CASE OF MULTIPLE SUPPLIES FROM THE SAME SUPPLIER?

The above provisions require the payment of interest in case of delayed payment. However, a very common issue which may arise includes situations in which the supplier makes multiple supplies and payments are also made on account or in some cases, advances are also given. In such a scenario, the provisions of Sections 59 to 61 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 become very important. Section 59 of the said Act provides that where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one person, makes a payment to him, either with express intimation or under circumstances implying, that the payment is to be applied to the discharge of some particular debt, the payment if accepted, must be applied accordingly. Section 60 then provides a similar discretion to the creditor in cases where the debtor has omitted to intimate, and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied. Further, Section 61 specifies that if neither parties make any appropriation, the debts will be discharged in order of time.

Action points for entities dealing with various vendors

12. Make sure that the payments to MSMEs are made with a specific instruction to appropriate the said payments against the outstanding amounts due from them.

FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF DELAY IN PAYMENT

Section 18 of the Act provides the buyer a mechanism to enforce the payments due under sections 16 and 17 through a reference to MSEFC. The MSEFC would then undertake a conciliation process to settle the dispute between the MSME and the buyer and expedite the payment to the MSME.

Section 22 of the Act also requires the disclosure of the following information in the audited accounts of the enterprise:

(i) the principal amount and the interest due thereon (to be shown separately) remaining unpaid to any supplier as at the end of each accounting year;(ii) the amount of interest paid by the buyer in terms of section 16, along with the amount of the payment made to the supplier beyond the appointed day during each accounting year;(iii)  the  amount  of  interest  due  and  payable  for  the  period  of  delay  in  making  payment  (which have  been  paid  but  beyond  the  appointed  day  during  the  year)  but  without  adding  the  interest specified under this Act;(iv) the amount of interest accrued and remaining unpaid at the end of each accounting year; and (v) the amount of further interest remaining due and payable  even in the succeeding years,  until such date when the interest dues as above are actually paid to the small enterprise, for the purpose of disallowance as a deductible expenditure under section 23.

Section 23 further provides that the interest under the MSME Act will not be allowable as a deduction while computing taxable income.

CONCLUSION

The MSME Act, 2016 casts various obligations on entities dealing with such MSME enterprises. Further, Section 22 requires certain disclosures in the statutory accounts in this regard. Therefore, it is important for a statutory auditor to ensure that the disclosures are correctly made. In determining the correctness of the disclosure, it would be useful for the statutory auditor to understand the scope of the applicability of the law. Further, professionals could also obtain MSME registration for the services rendered by them if they qualify within the turnover and capital criteria listed earlier and avail the benefits of timely payment obligation cast by the Act on the clients serviced by them.

Supreme Court Holds that Profit Motive Necessary for Charge of Insider Trading – But with Several Nuances and Riders

BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has recently held that for an insider trading charge to sustain, a profit motive should be established (SEBI vs. Abhijit Rajan, Order dated 19th September, 2022, ((2022) 142 taxmann.com 373)). If it was clear that the trades by an insider, even if in possession of inside information, were clearly to result in losses, at least considering the nature of the information, then the insider trading charge cannot sustain. This makes a material change in the approach to proceedings relating to insider trading. Till now, generally in the framing of the law as well as the approach of SEBI, it was taken for granted that trading by an insider in possession of (or access to) unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) was ipso facto insider trading, which should result in adverse action such as disgorgement of profits made (or losses avoided), debarment, penalty, etc.

However, as we will see, there are several nuances and riders to this decision as well as further questions that arise in the application of this decision in diverse situations. However, before we go into that, let us consider the broad framework of the regulations relating to insider trading, namely, the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading), Regulations, 2015 (“the Regulations”).

SEBI REGULATIONS RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING
There is a unique feature of these Regulations which makes them stand out as compared to other Regulations. And, that is the endless deeming provisions whereby certain situations are deemed to be true, if certain conditions are satisfied, irrespective of the actual ground reality. In some cases, the deeming fictions merely shifts the onus to the parties, and they can rebut the fiction by presenting the actual facts with evidence. But in other cases, the deeming fictions are carved in law, with no rebuttal possible.

For example, some persons are deemed to be insiders and generally cannot rebut that they are not. However, for example, in the case of relatives of an insider who also are deemed to be insiders, there is a rebuttal possible under certain circumstances. Certain categories of information are deemed to be price sensitive, irrespective of whether they are actually or not (though the decision of the Supreme Court makes certain interesting comments on this, as we will see later herein). Trading by an insider is deemed to be insider trading (again, Supreme Court makes some qualifications to this). Reverse trades by certain insiders are effectively deemed to be insider trading, so much so that they are wholly banned with very few exceptions possible. UPSI can be said to be published only if the dispersal of this information is in the prescribed mode – the fact that, say, it was already widely reported in media will be no defense. Moreover, there is a cooling or assimilation period from the time when the information is published to the time when trading is allowed. In other words, despite modern day instant notifications, etc., the information is deemed to be unpublished till this time passes. And so on.

This puts a person charged with insider trading trapped in a fortress out of which there are few escapes. An insider has to be very careful while trading so that he does not fall into any of these deeming traps of which he cannot come out, despite his best intentions.

Such a fortress of deeming fiction is said to be necessary mainly because insider trading is said to be difficult to detect and prove. The persons who are insiders may generally be at a senior level and often sophisticated white-collar educated persons. They may use many subterfuges, ‘mules’, advanced technologies to communicate the UPSI, etc. This may make the task of SEBI tougher, more so since SEBI has often argued of the inadequate powers it has for investigation. If such mechanisms are not available, every case of insider trading would be mired in litigation since every aspect would become subjective and prone to differing interpretations.

Certain of these deeming fictions came to be questioned in this decision and the Supreme Court appears to have parted ways from giving literal effect to them and has introduced that factors such as the intent of the parties should be considered.

SUMMARISED FACTS OF THE CASE
The person charged of insider trading (“the Insider”) was the Chairman and Managing Director of a listed company, that was engaged in the business of carrying out large construction/turnkey projects. It received a contract for a total cost of Rs. 1,648 crores. Another company received a similar contract but of a lesser size. The two companies formed SPVs and had holdings in each other’s SPVs. For some reason, the companies decided to terminate the SPVs and buy each other out. While this information was not published to the stock exchanges, the Insider sold a significant quantity of shares. The Insider was charged with violation of the Regulations. SEBI held that the information of termination of the agreements and the SPVs were price sensitive information, and thus the trading by the Insider while this information was not published amounted to insider trading. SEBI calculated the loss allegedly avoided due to such a sale and sought to forfeit (disgorge) such amount. There were disputes as to whether the date in respect of which the price was calculated for the determination of such loss was correctly ascertained. The Insider appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”), which set aside the order of SEBI. SEBI appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the decision of the SAT.

IMPORTANT ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
The Insider made several arguments before the Court, some of which helped in the decision going in his favour.

The Insider pointed out that he was in dire need of funds and that too for saving the company itself from insolvency. There were certain restructuring of the company’s debts going on with its lenders, one of the conditions of which was the infusion of funds by the Promoters. The Insider pointed out that he infused the sale proceeds of the sale of shares in the company to fulfil such obligations. Then he contended that the information was not price sensitive at all since the value of the contracts were miniscule with respect to the turnover of the company, particularly when taken on a net basis. He also questioned the basis of calculation of the losses avoided. SEBI contended that the closing price on the day after the information was released should be taken into account, and since it was lower, there were losses avoided. The Insider, however, stated that since the information was released well before closing on the first day, the closing price on that day should be taken into account, and since that was higher, there were no losses avoided.

Moreover, he pointed out that even if the information was deemed to be price sensitive, it was of a positive nature. Thus, it goes against the logic that he would sell shares on the basis of such information and be charged with insider trading. A person seeking to profit from such positive price sensitive information would buy shares since the price is likely to go up. SEBI contended that the intent of trades cannot matter, it is sufficient if an insider trades while in possession of UPSI.

The Supreme Court accepted that there are certain deeming provisions in the Regulations. However, it noted that while seven categories of information were deemed to be price sensitive, the particular information in question fell in the seventh category. This category specifically stated that the information should relate to “significant changes in policies, plans or operations of the company” (emphasis supplied). The Court noted that while the earlier categories of information (such as those relating to financial results, dividends, etc.) were ordinarily material, in this case, the information has to be significant enough. Hence, any changes are by themselves not necessarily price sensitive. The Supreme Court then analysed the transaction and noted that, on a net basis, the information was actually positive in nature. While other points were also analysed and discussed, the ruling turned on this point.

The Court held that it goes against human nature and logic that a person would sell shares to profit from insider trading when the information was positive in nature which would have resulted in price rise. The Court placed emphasis on the profit motive. A person cannot be charged with insider trading when the transaction was such that there was full absence of the profit motive. The Court factored into account, though clearly mentioning that this was not the deciding factor, that the Insider had carried out such trades to meet his obligations to the lenders to save the company. Thus, the Court ruled that the charge of insider trading failed and the amount disgorged by SEBI should be returned to the Insider.

NUANCES, RIDERS AND CONCERNS
There are several aspects of this case that need examination before a conclusion is drawn about the case. And these do not merely relate to the generic point that the decision should be seen on the facts of the case.

The Court held that this information related to the seventh category of information deemed to be price sensitive. Since this seventh category, as discussed earlier, specifically used the word “significant”, the information would be price sensitive only if significant. However, does it not mean that the earlier six categories of information are always deemed to be price sensitive? The Court made two observations. Firstly, it stated “nothing is required to show that the information listed in Items (i) to (vi)…is likely to materially affect the price of securities of a company”. However, it then said that “the likelihood of the price of securities getting materially affected, is inherent in Items (i) to (vi)..”. Can it be argued that, by the second set of words imply that even in respect of these first six items, the condition of their being price sensitive would have to be independently established? For example, if the financial results show no significant change or if the dividends have not changed materially from earlier periods, etc., can the information relating to such items be still held to be price sensitive?

The next question was when should the information be held to have been published? This is important because as in the present case, the amount of profits made/losses avoided are also determined on the basis of when the information can be held to be known. In the present case, the information was released at 1.05 pm and 2.40 pm respectively on the two exchanges. On that day, the price actually rose by 10 paise, while on the next day the price fell by 30 paise. The importance was obvious that in the first case, the argument was that the information was positive. The Court stated that it did not have to answer the question since it had already held that in the absence of profit motive, the charge of insider trading failed. Interestingly, at another place, the Regulations provide for a cooling period of 48 hours from the time when information was disseminated. Hence, arguably, both stands were incorrect. However, this question is sure to come in some later cases. Then, the fact that information, once released, spreads like wildfire in these days of social media, instant notifications, etc., may be considered by Courts, and perhaps such deemed cooling period of 48 hours may be questioned.

Then there is the question of determination of profits made or losses avoided. SEBI calculates, and this calculation is generally upheld, by taking into account the closing prices after disclosure of the UPSI. However, at the same time, the law provides and SEBI/Appellate Authorities contend that what matters is whether the information was price sensitive. The actual movement in price should not be relevant since the market may be subject to several influences. In view of this, is the calculation of profits with reference to the actual closing price correct? Take the present example. On the first day of disclosure, the price went up by 10 paise. This was found to be consistent with the stand of the Insider, endorsed also by the Court, that the information was positive in nature. However, on the second day, the price fell by 30 paise. This was consistent with SEBI’s stand that the information was negative in nature. In either case, this demonstrates that the use of the closing price is arbitrary and contradictory with the two stands taken. Again, in a future case, this question may be determined and the contradiction resolved.

CONCLUSION
While there are several other issues in this decision, it is fair to state that the Court has found several chinks in the fortress of deeming fiction in the Regulations. On one hand, this will help give justice, as in the present case, where the Insider was sought to be penalized despite his not attempting to profit from the UPSI. On the other hand, this will significantly reduce the relative certainty of such cases. SEBI will have more hoops to cross, and there will be more areas of litigation possible. Now it will be up to SEBI to pursue cases judiciously and not seek to enforce every deeming fiction and put the party – and SEBI itself – in much trouble and costs.

Debts and their Treatment

INTRODUCTION
The Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines a debt as a sum of money due by certain and express agreement; a specified sum of money owing to one person from another, including not only an obligation to pay but right of creditor to receive and enforce payment. The relation between a debtor and a creditor is the result of a debt. However, would the treatment of a debt in the books of account have any legal bearing? Would the treatment impact the tax position of the debtor or the creditor? Let us examine some of these facets.


MEANING UNDER IBC, 2016
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) deals with the insolvency resolution of debtors who are unable to pay their debts. The trigger point of the Code is a default by the debtor. A default is defined u/s 3 to mean non-payment of a debt when it has become payable and is not so paid by the debtor. Thus, the entire Code pivots on a debt and its default. If there is no default of a debt, then the Code does not come into play. The Supreme Court in Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy, [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC) has held that under the scheme of the Code, the Insolvency Resolution Process begins, when a default takes place, in the sense that a debt becomes due and is not paid.

Section 3 of the Code defines a debt to mean a liability or obligation in respect of a claim and could be a financial debt or an operational debt. A financial debt is defined to mean a debt along with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money. An operational debt is defined as a claim for provision of goods or services or employment dues or Government dues. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code, may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of a financial debt) u/s 7 or by an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) u/s 9 or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default) u/s 10 of the Code.

LIMITATION ACT AND IBC
Section 238A of the Code provides that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the proceedings or appeals before the NCLT, NCLAT, DRT, etc., under the Code. In this respect, Section 18 of the Limitation Act is relevant. It provides that where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability has been made in writing signed by the debtor, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Section18 was explained by the Supreme Court (Khan Bahadur Shapoor Fredoom Mazda vs. Durga Prasad, (1962) 1 SCR 140) to mean that the acknowledgement as prescribed merely renewed a debt; it did not create a new right of action. It was a mere acknowledgement of the liability in respect of the right in question; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication. The statement on which a plea of acknowledgement was based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability might not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgement must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement was made with the intention to admit such jural relationship.
In the case of Sesh Nath Singh vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. [2021] 125 taxmann.com 357, the Supreme Court held that u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgement of present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, has the effect of commencing of a fresh period of limitation, from the date on which the acknowledgement is signed. However, the acknowledgement must be made before the period of limitation expires.

In Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India [2021] 125 taxmann.com 394, the Supreme Court held that Section18 of the Limitation Act gets attracted the moment acknowledgement in writing signed by the party against whom such right to initiate resolution process u/s 7 of the Code ensues. Section 18 of the Limitation Act would come into play every time when the principal borrower and/or the corporate guarantor (corporate debtor), as the case may be, acknowledge their liability to pay the debt. Such acknowledgement, however, must be before the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation including the fresh period of limitation due to acknowledgement of the debt, from time to time, for institution of the proceedings under the Code.

One question that arises is whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act, which extends the period of limitation depending upon an acknowledgement of debt made in writing and signed by the corporate debtor, is also applicable u/s 238A of the Code to a debt entry appearing in the debtor’s Balance Sheet? In other words, if the debtor shows a debt as payable in its Balance Sheet would that accounting entry, give rise to a fresh period of limitation u/s 18 of the Limitation Act and thereby under the Code?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DEBT IN BALANCE SHEET BY DEBTOR
The Calcutta High Court in Bengal Silk Mills Co. vs. Ismail Golam Hossain Ariff AIR 1962 Cal 115, in an exhaustive decision held that an acknowledgement of liability that is made in a balance sheet can amount to an acknowledgement of debt. It held that each of the balance sheets contained an admission that balances had been struck at the end of the previous year, and that a definite sum was found to be the balance then due to the creditor. The natural inference to be drawn from the balance sheet was that the closing balance due to the creditor at the end of the previous year would be carried forward as the opening balance due to him at the beginning of the next year. In each balance sheet there was an admission of a subsisting liability to continue the relation of debtor and creditor and a definite representation of a present intention to keep the liability alive until it was lawfully determined by payment or otherwise. This judgment held that though the filing of a balance sheet was by compulsion of law, the acknowledgement of a debt was not necessarily so. In fact, it was not uncommon to have an entry in a balance sheet with Notes annexed to or forming part of such balance sheet, or in the auditor’s report, which were to be read along with the balance sheet, indicating that the impugned entry would not amount to an acknowledgement of debt for reasons given in the said Note.

The above decision of the Calcutta High Court has been approved by a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. vs. Bishal Jaiswal, [2021] 126 taxmann.com 200 (SC). It perused various decisions on this issue and various sections of the Companies Act 2013 and held that there was no doubt that the filing of a balance sheet in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act was mandatory, any transgression of the same being punishable by law. However, what was of importance was that the Notes annexed to or forming part of such financial statements were expressly recognised by Section 134(7).

Equally, the Auditor’s Report could also enter caveats with regard to acknowledgements made in the books of accounts including the balance sheet. A perusal of the aforesaid would show that the statement of law contained in the Calcutta High Court decision, that there was a compulsion in law to prepare a balance sheet but no compulsion to make any particular admission, was correct in law as it would depend on the facts of each case as to whether an entry made in a balance sheet regarding any particular creditor is unequivocal or has been entered into with caveats, which then had to be examined on a case by case basis to establish whether an acknowledgement of liability had, in fact, been made, thereby extending limitation u/s 18 of the Limitation Act.

The Supreme Court also referred to a Delhi High Court decision in CIT-III vs. Shri Vardhman Overseas Ltd. [2011] 343 ITR 408, which held that the assessee had not transferred the said amount from the creditors’ account to its profit and loss account. The liability was shown in the balance sheet. The assessee, being a limited company, this amounted to acknowledging the debts in favour of the creditors and Section 18 of the Limitation Act stood attracted.

It also referred to the decision in Al-Ameen Limited vs. K.P. Sethumadhavan, 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 11337, wherein the Kerala High Court held that, a balance sheet was a statement of assets and liabilities of the company as at the end of the financial year, approved by the Board of Directors and authenticated in the manner provided by law. The persons who authenticated the document did so in their capacity as agents of the company. The inclusion of a debt in a balance sheet duly prepared and authenticated would amount to admission of a liability and therefore satisfied the requirements of law for a valid acknowledgement u/s 18 of the Limitation Act, even though the directors by authenticating the balance sheet merely discharged a statutory duty and may not have intended to make an acknowledgement.

Ultimately, the Apex Court concluded that an entry made in a balance sheet of a corporate debtor would amount to an acknowledgement of liability u/s 18 of the Limitation Act.

Similarly, in Dena Bank (supra), the Supreme Court held that it was incorrect to state that there was nothing on record to suggest that the ‘Corporate Debtor’ acknowledged the debt within three years and agreed to pay debt, in view of its very own Statement of Accounts/Balance Sheets/Financial Statements which showed the debt as due.

Again, in State Bank of India vs. Krishidhan Seeds (P.) Ltd., [2022] 172 SCL 515 (SC), the Court held that an acknowledgement in a balance sheet without a qualification can furnish a legitimate basis for determining as to whether the period of limitation would stand extended, so long as the acknowledgement was
within a period of three years from the original date of default.

The Supreme Court once again had an occasion to consider this aspect in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. vs. Tulip Star Hotels Ltd, [2022] 141 taxmann.com 61 (SC). It held that there was no specific period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1963, for an application under the IBC, before the NCLT. An application for which no period of limitation was provided anywhere else in the Limitation Act, was governed by Article 137 of the Schedule to the said Act. Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for such an application was three years from the date of accrual of the right to apply. It further held that the period of limitation for making an application u/s 7 or 9 of the Code was three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue, that is, the date of default in payment of the financial or operational debt. Accordingly, it held that an application u/s 7 of the Code would not be barred by limitation, on the ground that it had been filed beyond a period of three years from the date of declaration of the loan account of the Corporate Debtor as NPA, if there were an acknowledgement of the debt by the Corporate Debtor before expiry of the period of limitation of three years, in which case the period of limitation would get extended by a further period of three years.

EFFECT OF WRITE-OFF OF DEBT BY CREDITOR ON RECOVERY MEASURES
Sometimes, the creditor writes-off the debt as a bad debt in its books of account. In this case, the question which arises is whether the creditor can yet pursue a legal remedy against the debtor for such a debt? Here, one must bear in mind the difference between a debt waiver and a debt write-off. A waiver is one where the creditor is forgoing the entire debt altogether, for example, under a one-time settlement, part of the loan may be waived by the bank. In this case, the debtor is no longer liable to repay the debt waived to the bank. However, in case of a write-off also known as a technical write-off, the creditor is only cleaning up its balance sheet. The loan yet remains payable, and the bank / creditor can yet pursue legal remedies for its recovery. Banks are required, by the RBI, to write-off all loans which have become NPAs. Nevertheless, they would yet continue all civil and criminal recovery methods for such an NPA. Banks and NBFCs must make provision as per the Prudential Norms of the RBI for all loans. A loan may have a 100 per cent provision, i.e., these assets represent little hope of immediate recovery. The Prudential Norms would require the lenders to remove these assets from their balance sheets. This technical writing off helps the bank present a true picture of its asset base and free up provisioning resources.

The Minister of State for Finance, in response to a question raised in the Rajya Sabha (August 2022) as to the magnitude of bank loans written-off has also explained this concept. He replied that as per the RBI guidelines and policies approved by Boards of banks, non-performing loans, including, inter-alia, those in respect of which full provisioning has been made on completion of four years, were removed from the balance-sheet of the bank by way of write-off. Banks evaluate/consider the impact of write-offs as part of their regular exercise to clean up their balance-sheet, avail of tax benefit and optimise capital, in accordance with RBI guidelines and policy approved by their Boards. As borrowers of written-off loans continue to be liable for repayment and the process of recovery of dues from the borrower in written-off loan accounts continues, write-off does not benefit the borrower. Banks continue to pursue recovery actions initiated in written-off accounts through various recovery mechanisms available, such as filing of a suit in civil courts or in the Debts Recovery Tribunals, action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, filing of cases in the National Company Law Tribunal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, through negotiated settlement/compromise, and through sale of non-performing assets. Having said that, in several cases, creditors have been advised by their lawyers that a write-off may impair their chances of recovery in Courts. Several times the Courts may ask the creditor for a copy of the Ledger Account of the debtor and if the debt has been written-off, it could be an issue. In addition, thought should be given as to whether the write-off would impair the position in case of a criminal complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for a cheque bouncing. Hence, this is a move which requires due consideration of all facts.

CLAIM OF BAD DEBT BY CREDITOR
In this respect, the Income-tax Act provides that when a creditor writes-off a debt, he can claim a bad debt u/s 36(1)(vii). The Supreme Court recently in Pr. CIT vs. Khyati Realtors (P.) Ltd., [2022] 447 ITR 167 (SC) held, that earlier the law was that even in cases where the assessee had made only a provision in its accounts for bad debts and interest thereon, without the amount actually being debited from the assessee’s profit and loss account, the assessee could still claim deduction u/s 36(1)(vii). However, w.e.f. 1989, with the insertion of the new Explanation u/s 36(1)(vii), any bad debt written-off as irrecoverable in the account of the assessee would not include any ‘provision’ for bad and doubtful debt made in the accounts of the assessee. In other words, before this date, even a provision could be treated as a write off. However, after this date, the Explanation to section 36(1)(vii) brought about a change. As a result, the Court held that merely stating a bad and doubtful debt as an irrecoverable write off without the appropriate treatment in the accounts would not entitle the assessee to a deduction u/s 36(1)(vii).

TAXATION – WRITE BACK OF DEBTS BY DEBTOR
When a loan is waived, the debtor writes-back the quantum so waived. In this case, the issue of taxation of the loan so waived in the hands of the debtor becomes an issue. The Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd (2018), 404 ITR 1 (SC) had an occasion to consider a case of taxability of the write-back of a loan which was used for capital expenditure / acquiring fixed assets. This ruling has held that the waiver of such a loan by the creditor was neither taxable as a business perquisite u/s 28(iv) of the Income-tax Act nor taxable as a remission of liability u/s 41(1) of the Act. However, waiver of a trading debt by a creditor would lead to income u/s 41(1) in the hands of the debtor.

EPILOGUE
If a debtor desires to dispute a debt, then he should be very careful about its accounting treatment. Similarly, creditors should bear in mind the distinction between a loan waiver and write-off in their books of account.

Social Stock Exchange – A Marketplace for Philanthropy finally in place with a few final touches remaining

BACKGROUND
Through a set of amendments to various SEBI Regulations made on 25th July, 2022 followed by a detailed circular dated 19th September, 2022 of SEBI laying down further details, the basic framework of the Social Stock Exchange (“SSE”) is finally in place. This will enable a whole ecosystem/marketplace where the donors and investors having an objective of social benefit will be able to find suitable organizations engaged in the type of social work they are interested in. On the other side, such social organizations (or ‘Social Enterprises’ or SEs, as the SEBI regulations term them) will also be able to find donors and investors.

There are several final touches still remaining, though. The stock exchanges hosting the SSE will need to lay down several requirements, such as information required in offer documents, etc. The framework for Social Auditors and accounting by SEs almost wholly remains to be set up. Then, there are other things, such as tax rebates, CSR-related amendments, etc., that are desirable and would give a boost to this exchange and will need to be considered by lawmakers and other regulators.

Let us, however, first review the concept of SSE, earlier discussed in this feature (July, 2020 BCAJ) when the initial developments took place. Now, that the formal amendments have taken place and the basic legal framework established, the subject is worth reviewing in more detail.


WHAT IS A SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE (SSE)?
To simplify a little, SSE is a marketplace for philanthropy regulated by SEBI and exchanges expected to keep a watchful eye on their functioning. It is a matchmaking place of investors/donors and organizations carrying on recognized socially beneficial activities. A framework for sharing information – one-time and regular – by SEs is laid down. A system to raise funds, particularly by innovative investment methods and even simple grants, has been set up.

Let us consider a basic example to understand this. There may be, say, a social organization, such as a school for mentally challenged students. In present times, such a school would have to struggle to seek donors through contacts of its trustees, past students, etc. The scope of raising funds, particularly for expansion, would thus be limited. However, it could register at the SSE and follow its guidelines and requirements. Then, the background, objects and achievements of the school can be shared with a wider audience through the exchange. Funds can be raised not only through social venture funds but also from the general public through an offer document, unlike a public issue of shares. Funds can also be raised through various instruments and modes suiting the differing requirements of SEs and donors/investors. There would be transparency and disclosure, ensuring regular information sharing. Such an information would be audited by the regular financial auditors as well as a new group of auditors called Social Auditors who would mainly check and confirm the correctness of information about social impact parameters disclosed.

Only SEs fulfilling certain qualifying requirements would be permitted to register themselves on SSEs and raise funds.

SSE is proposed to be a segment of stock exchanges with nationwide terminals. These stock exchanges need to lay down several supplementary and general requirements for the SEs, apart from requirements laid down by SEBI.

WORKING GROUP REPORTS OF SEBI
To study and recommend the formation of SSEs, SEBI set up expert working groups who, from time to time, have provided their reports. The Working Group, chaired by Ishaat Hussain, presented its report in June 2020 and made detailed recommendations on the structure and policies relating to SSEs. It also made recommendations on the legal changes required to enable the success of SSEs, which included changes to tax and company law (particularly those relating to corporate social responsibility).

The Technical Group then took the matter further and gave even more detailed recommendations on disclosure norms, setting up the other ecosystem components including Social Auditors, etc. Their report was submitted in May 2021.

These were considered and adopted by SEBI, and it was decided to go forward with amendments to the law under the purview of SEBI.


AMENDMENTS TO SEBI REGULATIONS
To set up the framework of SSEs, enable the SEs to register on the SSEs, and/or issue securities/raise funds, lay down various disclosure and other requirements, etc., SEBI made changes in relevant regulations on 25th July, 2022. The following regulations were amended:

a.    SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012.

b.    SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018.

c.    SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015.

The principal amendments made relate to the following areas in the respective regulations.

SEBI (AIF) REGULATIONS
These Regulations govern the registration of various investment funds other than mutual funds. The existing ‘social venture funds’ have been renamed ‘social impact funds’ (SIFs) to represent the revised objective of such funds having a social impact. Such SIFs can issue Social Units which shall carry only ‘social returns or benefits’ and no financial returns for their investments. The minimum amount of corpus of schemes of such SIFs has been kept at Rs. 5 crores. Further, if the SIF invests only in securities of not-for-profit organizations registered or listed on SSEs, the minimum amount of investment by an individual investor in such a SIF is kept at Rs. 2 lakhs.


SEBI (ICDR) REGULATIONS
Definitions of, and requirements for ‘For Profit’ and ‘Not-for-Profit Organizations’ have been laid down. These have to be Social Enterprises (SEs). Also, specific requirements have been laid down for the SEs to qualify as such. These SEs should establish the primacy of their intent that has to be one or more of various social activities as specified. The SEs should also target those underserved or less privileged popular segments or regions that record lower performance in the development priorities of central or state governments. Even more specifically, the importance of such social intent would be demonstrated when the SEs meet one or more of the minimum quantified levels in terms of revenues, expenditure and target population. The minimum percentage specified for this purpose is 67 per cent.

Corporate foundations, political or religious organizations or activities, professional or trade associations, and infrastructure and housing companies (except affordable housing) are disqualified explicitly from being identified as SEs.

NPOs that are SEs need to be registered with an SSE. For this, they need to comply with various disclosure and other requirements. Such a registered SSE may then raise funds by multiple means including Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments (ZCZP), donations, etc. For Profit SEs may issue equity, debt, etc. in a regular manner.

SEs whose promoters, trustees, etc. face certain disqualifications such as being debarred by SEBI from accessing the capital markets, are willful defaulters, etc. and ineligible to register on SSE.

The amendments also provide for the manner and details of offer documents for raising funds.

Importantly, Social Auditors have been defined as individuals registered with a self-regulatory organization under the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India or other agency as specified by SEBI, and those qualified under a certification program conducted by the National Institute of Securities Markets. Social Audit Firms are entities that employ duly qualified Social Auditors and have a track record of conducting social impact assessment for at least three years.


WHAT ARE ZCZPs?
Not-for-profit organizations that are SEs are permitted to raise funds through Zero Coupon Zero Principal Instruments (ZCZP). The primary feature of this instrument is that there will be zero returns and even the principal will not be repaid. Effectively, thus, this is akin to a donation. However, the additional feature of ZCZPs is that they can be potentially traded. ‘Investors’ can thus transfer the instrument to someone interested in taking over at some stage. There may be interest in the ZCZP if the SE has performed its obligations well, and hence there is assurance that the donation may be well utilized.

SEBI CIRCULAR LAYING DOWN FURTHER DETAILS OF THE FRAMEWORK OF SSEs

SEBI vide Circular dated 19th September, 2022 has laid down several requirements and details related to the working of the SSE and related matters.

It has laid down the conditions under which a Non-Profit Organization (NPOs) can qualify for registration with an SSE. The requirements include having registration under the Income-tax Act, 1961, a minimum annual spending and funding, minimum age of the NPO, etc.

Disclosure requirements in the offer document by NPOs for issuing ZCZPs have been laid down. SEBI has laid down the minimum requirements, while the SSEs can require additional information to be given in such a document.

Annual reporting by NPOs registered with SSEs, who may also have raised funds through the SSE, has been prescribed. Such NPOs are also required to provide duly audited Annual Impact Reports.

The Circular notes that the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India is publishing a uniform accounting and reporting framework for NGOs. Till this is done, certain minimum disclosures have been prescribed.

CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

While SEBI has largely completed its preliminary role in this regard, much of the remaining work is in progress. Stock Exchanges have much work to do, which SEBI has laid down for them in the Regulations/Circular. The profession of Social Auditors, too, will take time building up. ICAI has also its role cut out in terms of accounting and auditing requirements for SEs, particularly for Social Auditors. There are several more recommendations in the working group reports that have to be gradually implemented.

Apart from this, the government will also have to play a role in boosting this sector. Amendments to tax law would have to be made to provide tax rebates to investors and SEs in respect of several matters. Considering that corporates can play a significant role through the funds allocated for CSR purposes, amendments and clarifications would be needed, particularly with regards to investments/donations made to SEs.

While, as the reports of the working group note, other countries have also taken actions on these lines. However, the recommendations of the working group are far more holistic and ambitious. It is quite possible that in the near future, SSEs may become a vibrant and thriving marketplace for philanthropy. The result would only be more funds for socially valuable activities, better managed SEs and greater faith by donors in SEs, all of which can only spiral upwards in a virtuous cycle.

International Trade Settlement in Indian Rupees – New Mechanism

INTRODUCTION

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) constantly monitors, supervises and regulates the foreign exchange market in India by regulating currency, securing monetary stability, maintaining currency reserves, and overseeing India’s credit and currency system. Due to the recent global events of Russia-Ukrainian conflict resulting in sanctions on major Russian banks by USA, UK and the EU from accessing the SWIFT, the impact of availability of crude oil and fear of global recession, India has been increasingly facing pressure on maintaining the Rupee stability. Further, India’s over dependence on using the US Dollar for trade settlement has its own set of challenges. In fact, dollarization of global trade has given huge advantage to USA at the cost of rest of the world. It’s time for India and other countries to start looking for alternatives to the USD.

In this context, and with an intention to promote international trade, build a healthy forex reserve, support the increasing interest of global trading community in Indian Rupees (INR), and to combat the rupee depreciation, the RBI recently issued a Circular vide A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No.10 dated 11th    July, 2022. Through this circular, RBI has introduced a new mechanism and arrangement for invoicing, payment, and settlement of exports / imports in Indian Rupees (INR). Earlier, under this RBI regulation, international trade (except for those done with Nepal and Bhutan) is only   permitted   to   be   settled   in   specified foreign currencies which are freely convertible. This latest notification paves   the   way   for   international   trade settlement in   INR. The   circular   provides   a   broad framework for implementing the arrangement for cross border transactions in INR.


LEGAL FRAMEWORK

OPENING OF SPECIAL RUPEE VOSTRO ACCOUNTS

The bank of a partner country to approach an Authorised Dealers (AD) bank in India for opening of Special INR Vostro account (nostro and vostro are terms used to describe the same bank account. Nostro, from the Latin, means ours – as in our money that is in deposit in your bank. Vostro again from Latin means yours – as in your money that is in deposit in our bank). The AD bank will seek approval from the RBI for opening and maintaining the special Vostro Account. For example, SBI in India will hold Bank of Russia’s Vostro Account.


TRANSACTION AND SETTLEMENT
An Indian exporter will approach his regular bank, which will send the invoice to the Indian AD bank. The Indian AD Bank will debit the Rupee Vostro account and credit the money to the exporter’s regular bank, which in-turn will credit the money to the exporter’s bank account.

An   Indian   importer   will   transfer   the   payment   into his/her regular bank, which will then transfer that to the AD bank. The AD Bank will credit the Rupee Vostro Account, and the exporter from the other country will be paid through the authorised bank there and in its local currency.


DOCUMENTATION
The export / import undertaken and settled shall be subject to normal documentation process and reporting requirements   as   done   for   regular   export / import transaction namely; LC and related documents etc.


ADVANCE AGAINST EXPORTS
In case of advance payment against exports in INR, the AD Banks will ensure that available funds in these accounts are first used towards payment obligations arising out of already executed export orders / export payments in the pipeline.

SETTING-OFF OF EXPORT RECEIVABLES

‘Set-off’ of export receivables against import payables in respect of the same overseas buyer and supplier with facility to make/receive payment of the balance of export receivables/import payables may be allowed in INR, subject to the conditions as mentioned under the Master Direction on Export of Goods and Services 20161 (as amended from time to time).

BANK GUARANTEE
Issue of Bank Guarantee for trade transactions, undertaken through this arrangement, is permitted subject to adherence to provisions of FEMA Notification No. 82, as amended from time to time and the provisions of Master Circular on Guarantees & Co-acceptances3.


REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Reporting of cross-border transactions need to be done in terms of the extant guidelines under FEMA 19994.

FAQs

Whether New Mechanism of Settlement in INR is applicable to export / import of goods and services both?

As per the RBI Circular, the new mechanism is applicable to export / import of goods and services.

What is Special Rupee Vostro Account?

It is a bank account held by a foreign bank in India with an Indian bank in INR.

What are prohibited items under the New Mechanism?

As per RBI Circular, the new mechanism of settlement in INR is not available if the correspondent bank is from a country or jurisdiction in the updated FATF Public Statement on High Risk & Non-Co-operative Jurisdictions on which FATF has called for counter measures.

What additional documentation is required by exporters and Importers for settlement of transaction in INR?

As per RBI Notification, there are no additional documents and reports required for settlement of transaction in INR. The export / import undertaken and settled in this manner shall be subject to usual documentation and reporting requirements as per extant FEMA guidelines.

1. Master Direction – Export of Goods and Services (Updated as on 8th January, 2021) – RBI/FED/2015-16/11 FED Master Direction No. 16/2015-16 dated 1st January, 2016 (updated as on 8th January, 2021)
2. Notification No. FEMA 8/2000-RB dated 3rd May, 2000
3. Master Circular – Guarantees, Co-Acceptances & Letters of Credit – UCBs – RBI/2021-22/119 DoR.STR.REC.65/09.27.000/2021-22 dated 2nd November, 2021
4. Master Direction – Import of Goods and Services (Updated as on 31st May, 2022) and Master Direction – Export of Goods and Services (Updated as on 8th January, 2021)

Whether exporters are allowed to set-off export receivables against import payables?
As per RBI Circular, the ‘set-off’ of export receivables against import payables is allowed in respect of the same overseas buyer and supplier with facility to make/ receive payment through the Rupee Payment Mechanism subject to the conditions mentioned relating to set-off of export receivables against import payables under Master Direction on Export of Goods and Services 2016 (as amended from time to time).

Whether the issue of a Bank Guarantee for transaction through the Rupee Payment Mechanism is allowed?

Yes, issue of Bank Guarantee for transaction through the Rupee Payment Mechanism is allowed subject to compliance of provision of FEMA Notification No. 8 as amended from time to time and the provisions of Master Direction on Guarantees & Co-acceptances.


IMPLICATIONS UNDER VARIOUS OTHER LAWS
In case of a Company, to whom Ind-AS is not applicable, Division I of the Schedule III of Companies Act, 2013 requires disclosure and reporting of expenditure in foreign currency and earnings in foreign currency in the Notes to the Financial Statements. Thus, from the audit perspective, one should be careful in reporting and disclosure of expenditure in foreign currency and earnings in foreign currency since all export and imports may not be in foreign currency if the company has opted for trade settlement in INR for import and export in some cases.

Under the Income-tax Act, there are certain exemptions/ deductions relating to export business which are linked to sale proceeds realised in foreign exchange. One should be careful in claiming such exemptions/deductions if exports are settled in INR.

Under GST, the definition of “Export of Services” under clause (iv) states “payment to be received in convertible foreign exchange” whereas in definition of “Export of Goods” such condition is missing. So, one can presume that the benefits of GST can be availed if payment for export of goods is settled and received in INR. Further, in case of Import of Goods and Import of Services, the definition of import of goods and import of services, does not provide for payment in convertible foreign exchange. Thus, GST under reverse charge needs to be paid on import of goods and services settled in INR as provided.

CONCLUSION
The introduction of alternative payment mechanism in INR is not new for India. In the past, India had introduced a similar arrangement with Iran by allowing Rupee-Rial payment mechanism when economic sanctions were imposed on Iran. Further, a similar arrangement was made under Article VI of the 1953 Indo-Soviet trade agreement.

At present, the Indian Rupees (INR) is not considered as a freely convertible currency globally. However, with this effort of RBI, the new mechanism will focus on creating a recognition for the Indian rupee as an international currency by expanding external trade with the rupee- settlement mechanism which will bring down pressure on India’s forex reserves and assist in controlling the rupee depreciation to a certain extent. India’s total imports in F.Y. 2021-22 were $612,608 million5. It is estimated that this arrangement could potentially reduce outflows to the extent of $3 billion per month.

However, one needs to assess the provisions of GST to understand the impact of Rupee settlement on export of goods and services.


5. https://dashboard.commerce.gov.in/commercedashboard.aspx

Hierarchy of FEMA

INTRODUCTION

One of the common questions which a newly qualified CA / Lawyer often asks is “How does one Study FEMA?” The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) has been around since 1999 and before that it existed as the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA). In spite of such a long lineage, this question refuses to die down.

A
possible reason for this confusion could be the multiple sources of
legislations which one comes across when dealing with FEMA. In addition,
there are different agencies which one encounters under this law.
Through this article let us examine the hierarchy of FEMA and the
various types of legislations one encounters when dealing with foreign
exchange transactions in India!

CENTRAL ACT

The
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 is a Central Statute of the
Parliament and is the supreme statute when it comes to regulating all
foreign transactions in India. The Preamble to the Act states that it is
a law relating to foreign exchange with the objective of facilitating
external trade and payments and for promoting the orderly development
and maintenance of the foreign exchange market in India. It applies to
the whole of India and even to an office, branch or agency abroad which
is owned or controlled by a person resident in India.

Three important decisions  have  examined  the  fabric  of FEMA. A two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Dropti Devi vs. Union of India (2012) 7 SCC 499
held that FEMA was quite similar to its predecessor FERA. It held that
insofar as conservation and/or augmentation  of foreign exchange were
concerned, the restrictions in FEMA continued to be as rigorous as they
were in FERA. While its aim was to promote the orderly development and
maintenance of foreign exchange markets in India, the Government’s
control in matters of foreign exchange had not been diluted.

An
offence under FEMA is no longer a criminal offence as it was under FERA.
However, while no arrest can    be made under FEMA, the Supreme Court
in Union of India vs. Venkateshan S., 2002 AIR SCW 1978,
has held that a person who violates the provisions of the FEMA  to a
large extent can be detained under the Preventive Detention Act, namely,
the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974 (“COFEPOSA”). It held that the object
of FEMA was also promotion of orderly development and maintenance of
foreign exchange market in India. For violation of foreign exchange
regulations, a penalty can be levied and such activity is certainly an
illegal activity, which is prejudicial to conservation or augmentation
of foreign exchange. The COFEPOSA was enacted to prevent violation of
foreign exchange regulations or smuggling activities which were having
an increasingly deleterious effect on the national economy and thereby
serious effect on the security of the State. It observed that COFEPOSA
empowered the authority to exercise its power of detention with a view
to preventing any person inter alia from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange. If
the activity of any person was prejudicial to the conservation or
augmentation of foreign exchange, the Authority under COFEPOSA was
empowered to make a preventive detention order against such person.
Preventive detention law was for effectively keeping out of circulation
the detenu during a prescribed period as held in Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan and Others 1987 (3) SCC 347.

Subsequently, the Delhi High Court in Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings vs. Unitech Ltd [2017] 80 taxmann. com 188 (Delhi)
has explained the rationale of FEMA. It held that with the
liberalization of India’s economy, it was felt that FERA must be
repealed and a new legislation must be enacted. FEMA was enacted in view
of significant developments that had taken place ~ there was a
substantial increase in the foreign exchange reserves, growth in foreign
trade, rationalisation of tariffs, current account convertibility,
liberalisation of Indian investments abroad, increased access to
external commercial borrowings by Indian corporates and participation of
foreign institutional investors in India’s stock markets. The focus had
now shifted from prohibiting transactions to a more permissible
environment. The fundamental policy of FEMA no longer prohibited Indian
entities from expanding their business overseas and accepting  risks in
relation to transactions carried out outside India. The policy now was
to manage foreign exchange. Under FEMA, all foreign account transactions
were permissible subject to any reasonable restriction which the
Government may impose in consultation with the RBI.

Subsequently, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in VijayKaria vs. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL
[2020] 11 SCC 1, has approved the above Delhi High Court decision and
has again explained the legislative intent and the background behind the
replacement of FERA by FEMA. It held that FEMA, unlike FERA, referred
to the nation’s policy of managing foreign exchange instead of policing
foreign exchange, the policeman being the RBI under FERA. It was
important to remember that Section 47 of FERA no longer existed in FEMA
and hence, transactions that violated FEMA could not be held to be void
ab initio. Also, if a particular act violated any provision of FEMA or
the Rules framed thereunder, permission of the RBI could be obtained
post-facto if such violation could be condoned. The decision also
referred to the above-mentioned two member Bench decision in Dropti Devi (supra)
and held that the observations contained therein as to conservation
and/or augmentation of foreign exchange, so far as FEMA was concerned,
were made in the context of preventive detention of persons who violate
foreign exchange regulations. It concluded that to use those
observations in Dropti Devi to contend that any violation of any FEMA would make such violation an illegal activity did not follow.

The
FEMA consists of 49 sections. While section 2 contains definitions,
sections 3 to 9 are the substantive provisions of the FEMA which lay
down the permissions and prohibitions on a person for matters connected
with foreign exchange in India. All the remaining sections deal with
procedures, penalties, powers, etc.

U/s 46 of  the  FEMA,  the 
Central  Government  has  the power to make Rules to carry out the
provisions of the Act. Further, u/s 47, the RBI has powers to make
Regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act and the Rules.

The
Finance Act, 2015 made certain key amendments to FEMA. The Finance
Minister stated that Capital Account Controls was a policy, rather than a
regulatory matter. Therefore, the Finance Bill amended FEMA to clearly
provide that control on capital flows as equity will be exercised by the
Central Government, in consultation with the RBI. Controls on debt
capital flows continue to be exercised by the RBI. Further, even in the
equity flows, the matter of pricing, reporting and valuation continues
to be determined by the RBI. Moreover, the RBI administers the equity
flows as regulator under the aegis of the Rules enacted by the Central
Government.

RULES

As noted
above, the Central Government has power to frame rules under FEMA.
Accordingly, the Department  of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance,
exercises this power. The Government has framed various rules for
permitting Current Account Transactions, Adjudication Procedure under
FEMA, Compounding Procedure for violations under FEMA, etc.

In
2015, the power was shifted from the RBI to the Central Government to
frame laws pertaining to control of equity capital flows both into India
and from India. Pursuant to the same, the Central Government has
notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019
which deal with foreign investment (e.g., Foreign Direct Investment,
Foreign Portfolio Investment, Foreign Investment in LLPs, AIF/REITs, NRI
Investment, etc.,) in India by a person resident outside India and
acquisition of immovable property in India by a person resident outside
India. Thus, now the power to make Regulations in respect of these two
important matters vests with the Central Government. However, the RBI
continues to administer these rules.

Recently, the Central Government has notified the Foreign Exchange Management (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022
which deal with overseas investment (e.g., Overseas Direct Investment,
Overseas Portfolio Investment, Overseas Investment by an individual,
etc.,) by a person resident in India and acquisition of foreign
immovable property by a person resident in India. However, the RBI
continues to administer these rules.

REGULATIONS

The
RBI is the nodal regulatory authority for all matters connected with
foreign exchange transactions in India. It is the authority which has
powers to launch prosecution, levy penalties, allow compounding  of 
offences,  etc.,  as well as the agency which notifies regulations for
various vital foreign exchange transactions such as, borrowing and
lending in foreign exchange and rupees / realisation of foreign exchange
/ export and import provisions / foreign currency accounts / remittance
of assets / valuation / reporting requirements / cross border mergers,
etc.The RBI has been revising old regulations and hence, whenever it
issues a new regulation, it denotes the same with (R) as a suffix along
with the  year of publication. For example, the Foreign Exchange
Management (Remittance of Assets) Regulations, 2016 have superseded the
Foreign Exchange Management (Remittance of Assets) Regulations, 2000 and
the revised regulations are numbered FEMA13(R)/2016-RB dated 1-4-2016.
The regulations are notified by the Government in the Official Gazette.

DIRECTIONS / CIRCULARS

One
unique feature of the FEMA Regulations are the Authorised Person
Directions issued by the RBI u/s 10(4) and 11(1) of FEMA to various
Authorised Persons, popularly known as “A.P.(DIR Series) Circulars”.
Authorised Persons are Authorised Dealers, Money Changers, Banks, etc.,
who are authorised by the RBI  to deal in foreign exchange. These
directions lay down the modalities as to how the foreign exchange
business has to be conducted by the Authorised Persons with their
customers/constituents with a view to implementing the regulations
framed. Thus, these crculars are operational instructions from the RBI
to Banks, etc. The legal validity of these circulars has been upheld by
the Bombay High Court in the case of Prof. Krishnaraj Goswami vs. the RBI, 2007 (6) Bom CR 565.
The Court held the RBI issued the circulars by way of directions as
contemplated under Sections 10(4) and 11(1) of the Act. A bare reading
of these provisions clearly showed that  the  RBI  had the power to
issue directions to the authorised persons and this power was wide
enough to cover any kind of directions so far as it provided for the
regulation of FEMA. The RBI had jurisdiction to issue such circulars.
The Act clearly stipulated that an Authorised Person shall in all his
dealings be bound by these directions, general or special, issued by the
RBI.

MASTER DIRECTIONS
The
RBI has started the practice of issuing Master Directions on various
important subjects. For instance, all instructions issued by the RBI in
respect of External Commercial Borrowings and Trade Credits have been
compiled  in  the  Master  Direction  on  Master Direction – External Commercial Borrowings, Trade Credits and Structured Obligations.
The list of underlying Rules / Regulations /
Notifications/Instructions/  Circulars  on this subject are all compiled
and  consolidated  within this one direction. The Master Directions 
are  issued  u/s 10(4) and 11(1) of FEMA and have the same force  of law
as the AP DIR Circulars. As of date, the RBI has issued Master
Directions on different subjects such as, foreign investment in India,
LRS, import, export, deposits, remittance of assets, etc.

MASTER CIRCULARS
Earlier,
the RBI issued a Master Circular which consolidated all the existing AP
DIR Circulars at one place. Master Circulars were issued with a sunset
clause of one year. They were introduced in accordance with the
recommendations of the Tarapore Committee. This Committee recommended
that every year, the RBI should consolidate all the instructions and
regulations on each subject into a Master Circular for use by the
public. It also recommended that the Master Circulars should be prepared
in an unambiguous language without using jargons. The Master Circulars
did not have the same force of law which the Master Directions have.
However, now with the issuance of Master Directions on all subjects, the
Master Circulars have lost its significance. They could, however, yet
be referred to when there is some interpretation issue or if one wishes
to trace the history of changes to a provision.

FDI POLICY

When
it comes to foreign investment in India, one finds another important
legislation framed by another Ministry within the Government. The
Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT),
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, frames the Foreign Direct Investment Policy
in India which lays down the sectors in which FDI is allowed, the
conditions attached and the sectoral caps.  It also lays down the
sectors in which FDI is Automatic and those in which it requires
approval of the Government of India. The FDI Policy is prepared in the
form of the Consolidated FDI Policy (“CFDIP”).

The
DPIIT, Commerce Ministry makes policy pronouncements on FDI through the
Consolidated FDI Policy Circular/Press Notes/Press Releases which are
notified by the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance as
amendments to the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019
under FEMA. These notifications take effect from the date of issue of
press notes/ press releases, unless specified otherwise therein. The
policy also clearly states that in case of any conflict, the relevant
notification under the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt
Instruments) Rules, 2019 will prevail. The policy also explains that the
regulatory framework, thus, consists of FEMA and rules/ regulations
there under, consolidated FDI policy circular, press notes, press
releases, clarifications, etc.

The DPIIT issues a Consolidated
FDI Policy which subsumes all press notes / press releases / circulars
issued by DIPP till date. The latest CFDIP was issued in October
2020.Any amendments to this policy are by way of press notes issued by
the DPIIT.

The power of the Central Government to lay down economic policy has been the subject-matter of great judicial interest. In Balco Employees Union vs. UOI, (2002) 2 SCC 333,
the Supreme Court laid down the prerogative of the Government to frame
economic policy. It held that Courts have consistently refrained from
interfering with economic decisions. In Federation of Railway Officers Association vs. UOI (2003) 4 SCC 289,
the Apex Court laid down that on matters affecting policy and requiring
technical expertise Courts would leave the matter for decision of those
who are qualified to address the issues. Unless the policy or action is
inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws or arbitrary or
irrational or abuse of the power, the Court will not interfere with such
matters.

The validity of the FDI Policy laid down by the Government has come in for review by the Courts. In the decision of Radio House vs. UOI, 2008 (2) Kar. LJ 695 (Kar),
the Court while dealing with the FDI Policy, held, that no directions
can be given to the Government to accept a particular definition. It is
for the Government to evolve    a policy to safeguard the interest of
the retailers. It is  trite position in law that the Court should not
substitute its wisdom for the wisdom of the Government in policy
matters.

A decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Putzmeister India Pvt Ltd and others vs. UOI, W.P.(C) 5633-35/2006 Order dated 1st July, 2008 (Del)
is also relevant. This case examined the validity of the press notes
issued by the Commerce Ministry. It held that a large number of
decisions have ruled that the wisdom   of an executive policy does not
fall within the domain of judicial review; nor does Article 226 permit
High Courts to sit in appellate judgment over executive decisions, made
in legitimate bounds of exercise of power.

The Supreme Court had an occasion in Manohar Lal Sharma vs. UOI, (2013) 33 taxmann.com 33 (SC)
to examine the Government’s FDI Policy in respect of retail trading. It
held that if the Government of the day after due reflection,
consideration and deliberation felt that by allowing FDI in multi-brand
retail trading, the country’s economy would grow and it would facilitate
better access to the market for the producer of goods and enhance  the
employment potential, then it was not open for the Court to go into the
merits and demerits of such a policy. It further laid down that on
matters affecting policy, the Supreme Court did not interfere unless the
policy was unconstitutional or contrary to the statutory provisions or
arbitrary or irrational or in abuse of power.

Again, the Delhi High Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. UOI, [2014] 44 taxmann.com 281 (Delhi)
was faced with a Public Interest Litigation over whether the FDI Policy
permitted FDI in existing airlines only and not in proposed or new
airlines. It refused to grant any interim injunction against the policy
and held that a policy of   the Government of India was essentially an
executive function, and not a statute.

FAQs

The
RBI has been issuing FAQs on matters pertaining  to various foreign
exchange transactions, such as, LRS, compounding of contraventions, etc.
The FAQs attempt to put in place the common queries that users have on
the subject in an easy to understand language. The FAQs issued by the
RBI are at best, executive instructions which neither have the statutory
force nor can override the express provisions of the law. The issuance
of FAQs by the RBI is not in pursuance of any power conferred under FEMA
and do not have any statutory force.
PRESS RELEASES
When
the RBI issues some Regulations or Directions, it may also issue a
press release giving a brief idea about the same and annex the main
Notification / Circular. The press release is merely for information
purposes.

NODAL AUTHORITY

As
explained above, the RBI is the nodal authority for   all matters
pertaining to FEMA. The Foreign Exchange Department of the RBI deals
with all foreign exchange matters. The RBI also issues various forms /
returns to be filed by users / banks in respect of foreign exchange
transactions.

ENFORCEMENT OF FEMA

For
adjudicating any offence under FEMA, the Central Government has powers
to appoint Adjudication Officers. The Directorate of Enforcement or ED
has been appointed as the Adjudicating Authority under FEMA. It has also
been vested with powers of search and seizure of assets of an accused.
One of the important powers of the ED in this respect is found u/s 37A
of FEMA. This empowers the ED to seize assets of the accused in India of
a value equal to the offence under FEMA. It may be noted that even
though the agency i.e., ED is same under FEMA and the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), an offence under FEMA is not a
Scheduled Offence under PMLA. Thus, an offence under FEMA does not
automatically become an offence under PMLA and vice- versa. These two
Statutes are separate and independent. However, if an offence under FEMA
also falls under any of the scheduled offences under PMLA, then the
accused could be tried under both statutes. For instance, a person
resident in India, with a view to evading taxes, sets up an undisclosed
offshore structure which violates FEMA, and is also in violation of the
Black Money Act, 2015. This constitutes a scheduled offence under PMLA
and hence, could be tried under both FEMA and PMLA and not to mention
also under the Black Money Act! Similarly, a smuggling offence would
violate both the FEMA as well as the PMLA. Hence, whether or not PMLA is
attracted in addition to FEMA needs to be tested based on the facts of
each offence.

APPELLATE MECHANISM

Orders of the Adjudicating Authority can be appealed against before the Special Director (Appeals) constituted under FEMA.

An
appeal against an Order of the Special Director (Appeals) lies before
the Appellate Tribunal constituted under FEMA. The Appellate Tribunal
constituted under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA)
is empowered to act as the Appellate Tribunal under FEMA. Any person
aggrieved by an Order of the Appellate Tribunal can appeal to the High
Court on any question of law arising from such Order.

COMPOUNDING

As
a parallel route, section 15 of FEMA provides that any contravention
under the Act may, on an application made by the person committing such
contravention, be compounded within 180 days from the date of receipt of
application by the officers of the RBI. Certain compounding powers have
been delegated to the Regional Offices/ Sub- Offices of the RBI but
offences related to Liaison/ Branch/ Project office(LO/ BO/ PO)
division, Non Resident Foreign Account Division (NRFAD) and Immovable 
Property  (IP) Division are compounded out at New Delhi . For all other
contraventions, compounding is handled by the CEFA, Foreign Exchange
Department, RBI Mumbai. The Compounding Authority examines the
application based on the documents and submissions made in the
application and assesses whether contravention is quantifiable, the
amount of contravention and the compounding fee. The Authority
accordingly issues the Compounding Order. In Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd.vs. Special Director of Enforcement, [2022] 140 taxmann.com 615 (Bom),
the Court held that it was clear that no proceeding or further
proceeding could be continued once a Compounding Order is passed by the
RBI in a particular case. A very interesting judgment of the Bombay High
Court on the powers of the RBI to compound an offence as well as the
interplay between FEMA and PMLA is found in New Delhi Television Ltd vs. RBI(2018) 149 SCL 29 (Bom).

HIERARCHY

Thus,
the descending order of hierarchy amongst various pronouncements would
be as follows: FEMA, 1999 -> Rules -> Regulations -> AP Dir
Circulars / Master Directions -> FAQs. While dealing with matters
pertaining to Foreign Investment in India, the Foreign Direct Investment
Policy should also be considered.

Another universe would be the
judgments on FEMA of the Supreme Court and High Court,  the  decisions 
of the FEMA Appellate Tribunal and Compounding Orders issued by the
Compounding Authority, RBI.

ANCILLARY LAWS

Certain allied laws though not directly connected with FEMA could be treated as friends of FEMA! These are the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, the Smugglers
and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976,
the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, the Foreign Trade
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1992.
One or more of these allied
laws, may or may not be relevant   in a transaction under FEMA. It would
be worthwhile to examine their applicability also when dealing with a
foreign exchange transaction. While foreign investment by Foreign
Portfolio Investors is governed by FEMA, their registration and
operational guidelines are handled by SEBI. Similarly, investments /
operations in the GIFT City are regulated by the International Financial
Services Centres Authority, SEBI and to some extent by the RBI.

EPILOGUE

India’s
laws on foreign exchange management are myriad, complex and ambiguous
at times. Add to this the multiplicity of regulations and you have a
heady cocktail! All the best with practicing FEMA!!

Insider Trading Regulations for Mutual Funds – SEBI Issues Draft Consultation Paper

BACKGROUND
SEBI released, on 8th July 2022, a consultation paper (“the Paper”) for provision for prohibition of Insider Trading in mutual funds. It may be recollected that the current regulations related to Insider Trading, (the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015, or “Insider Trading Regulations”) specifically state that they do not apply to mutual fund units. SEBI pointed out in the paper recently, two serious cases of alleged abuse by insiders of unpublished price sensitive information. Both included cases of redemption of units by insiders while having access to unpublished material information which allegedly helped them gain while the general public investors suffered. While the said persons acted against the SEBI rules under other generic provisions, there was clearly a void in terms of having specific provisions for insider trading in mutual funds.

Mutual funds have, as per Association of Mutual Funds of India, assets under management of – over Rs. 35 trillion. The stakes are clearly high and abuse of price sensitive information by trusted insiders could be of large amounts, as shown by the orders referred to (though not named) in the paper. Having a comprehensive set of regulations on insider trading for mutual funds thus was clearly overdue. SEBI thus took a quick step by issuing this Paper, that suggests detailed provisions for insider trading in mutual fund units, besides giving the draft wording of the new provisions as proposed.

A review of the proposed provisions can be made at this stage. A more detailed analysis of the notified regulations can be carried out once they are released.

BROAD FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS

SEBI does not propose to introduce separate insider trading regulations for mutual funds. Instead, it proposes to incorporate separate chapters in the existing Insider Trading Regulations for mutual fund units. Certain existing provisions have also been modified for this purpose.

The scheme of the proposed regulations, however, is broadly the same. There are similar definitions of an insider, connected persons, unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI), Code of Conduct, etc. These have been adapted to a significant extent to the unique features of mutual fund units. The offence of insider trading is on similar lines. The Code of Conduct for dealing in securities would also be laid down for mutual fund units. Even the concept of Trading Plan would be adopted and applied to mutual fund units.

Thus, the time tested, repeatedly amended current regulations and their framework is sought to be applied for mutual fund units. That can be good but also, in some ways, a bad thing, as later discussed herein.

It may be added here that, insider trading regulations for mutual fund units are not entirely new. There have been circulars/guidelines covering the subject in different ways that have been frequently amended over the years. But, clearly, these circulars/guidelines have relatively lesser legal standing as compared to the Regulations. Further, they are not as comprehensive. Now, as a part of the Regulations, they are intended to be comprehensive and carry the full force of the Regulations, thus inviting punitive/adverse actions as the consequences of their violations.

IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR MUTUAL FUND UNITS

To begin with, the definition of ‘securities’ would be amended. Earlier, it specifically excluded mutual fund units. Now this exclusion would be omitted.

The definition of trading in securities would be amended to also include redeeming, switching, etc of securities. This would be in addition to the already existing activities of subscribing, buying, selling, etc. of securities. The new definition may sound like a hotch-potch since different concepts are mixed. Redemption and switching are unique features of mutual fund units, and hence sound out of place with other terms such as buying, etc. which are general for all types of securities.

The concept of ‘insider’, however, is defined separately for mutual fund units. It includes a connected person, and a person in possession of UPSI.

Similarly, the definition of ‘connected person’ is separately made for mutual fund units and rightly so. Apart from those who generally are accepted to have access to UPSI, a list of persons deemed to be connected has been provided that includes persons whose connection is unique to this industry.

The term UPSI is also separately defined to include several items of information. These items are considered unique to this industry. For example, it was found recently, that restrictions on redemption of securities created serious inconvenience and uncertainty amongst unit holders of a fund. It was also alleged and found that certain insiders had redeemed before such restrictions were announced. Information regarding restrictions on redemption or winding up of schemes is thus deemed to be UPSI.

Trading in securities (which now include mutual fund units) would be a contravention. So would be sharing or procuring of UPSI, except for specified ‘legitimate’ purposes.

Then, a unique feature related to sharing of UPSI is sought to be created for mutual fund units. A critical aspect of insider trading regulations is, when can unpublished price-sensitive information said to have become published? What are the acceptable modes of publishing UPSI to make this information available to the public. One acceptable means is to share information through the stock exchanges. However, this makes sense for listed entities. It is seen that almost 98% of the mutual fund units, as this Paper too emphasises, are unlisted. Hence, sharing of UPSI on exchanges would not help in achieving the objective of reaching the intended public. SEBI therefore proposes that a separate and independent platform be created under the aegis of AMFI or collectively owned by asset management companies, etc. The UPSI could be shared here, and since such an independent platform would be able to reach the mutual fund unit holders and prospective holders/public generally, it could prove to be a better mode and alternative.

The ‘Code of Conduct’ for trading in securities by designated persons is broadly in line with the existing Code for other securities. Similarly, the coverage of ‘fiduciaries’ for making a Code is also similar with audit firms, accountancy firms, valuers, law firms, etc. being specifically included under this category.

CONCERNS

The primary concern is that, using a time-tested existing framework for insider trading can also, unfortunately, be a disadvantage since the existing framework was tailored for a different form of security. Undoubtedly, SEBI also may have wanted to move speedily since not only have skeletons been tumbling out of the closet, but the further litigation against the orders have also showed, the existing framework was neither specific nor comprehensive. Also, abuse of price sensitive information as a concept has not changed, and continues to apply as much to mutual fund units. However, there are several reasons to argue that SEBI could have taken a wholly fresh look from the ground up. Mutual fund units have several fundamental differences. These units are held in investment vehicles, and not in businesses as generally known. The primary information of schemes such as NAVs, portfolios, etc. is already fairly transparent in view of existing requirements to share such information regularly. In comparison, traditional businesses that regularly generate material/price sensitive information, offer a different scope for abuse despite listed entities being bound to disclose several categories of material information promptly.

The existing insider trading regulations have been drafted and repeatedly amended on recommendations by Expert Committees. In comparison, the present draft regulations appear to have been prepared internally, thus missing out on the benefits of deliberations and close study carried out by an Expert Committee.

It is submitted that even otherwise, mutual fund units have a different structure and are subject to abuse in a different manner. As earlier SEBI circulars themselves state, investments that a fund makes for itself can be subject to abuse of at least two kinds. First includes, using such information for making one’s own investments. The second and far more serious is front running, which too has been repeatedly caught though a valid fear may be that it may be far more rampant than even the large number of cases caught. Sadly, the serious offence of front running is covered in a small sub-clause of a different regulation that aims to cover all forms of front running. Thus, a separate set of Regulations specifically for malpractices in mutual funds covering insider trading, front running, etc. could have been the better alternative.

One hopes then, that, while SEBI notifies, after taking due feedback, the amendments, it also sets up an Expert Committee to holistically look at this field and puts into place a comprehensive set of regulations separately for mutual funds which factor in the unique circumstances of this industry.

WHETHER INSIDER TRADING WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SIGNIFICANT PENALTY? – A MAJOR LACUNA?

This apparent lacuna deserves a separate part to highlight it in more detail. Presently, SEBI notifies Regulations (subject to, of course, review by Parliament), and hence can draft and cover the subject comprehensively as an expert and specialised body. However, a penalty is levied under the Act made by the Parliament. The SEBI Act was drafted 30 years back, albeit frequently amended. Notably, Section 15G which governs penalty for insider trading, has remained unchanged since its inception, as far as the present issue is concerned. It primarily governs insider trading only in “securities of body corporate listed on any stock exchange’’. This squarely excludes most, if not all, mutual fund units.

This special section levies a stiff penalty of a minimum of Rs. 10 lakhs and a maximum of Rs. 25 crores or three times the gains made, whichever is higher.

Prima facie, this section may not apply to unlisted mutual fund units. Would this mean that the penalty then would be leviable only under the residuary clause which is limited in nature?

Granted, it is the Parliament that has power to amend the Act. But without a parallel amendment, would the new regulations be largely toothless?

CONCLUSION

Better late than never and better something than nothing can be the two adages that one could apply to the proposed regulations. It is high time this mammoth industry is subjected to strict regulations. But at the same time, Mutual funds represent a different framework that deserve a tailor made approach. As readers know, they are used more by persons seeking relatively secure returns, and having a different frame of mind than investors in equity shares. Further, even the existing insider trading regulations have seen that adverse orders for violations have often been set aside in appeal. Hence, all the more, the regulations for mutual funds need to be framed with a fresh outlook and by an expert committee consisting of members knowing the industry well. One hopes, that these regulations will see this very soon. Nonetheless, it is good news that the evil of insider trading will soon be subject to regulation and punishment.

Gift of Foreign Securities

INTRODUCTION
Who does not like to get a gift? More so, when it  comes from abroad? However, there are a variety of laws that apply to a gift of foreign securities received by a resident from a non-resident or vice-versa. Let us consider some of the important provisions in this respect.

FEMA, 1999

The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the recently enacted FEM (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022 permit a person resident in India to receive a gift of foreign securities as follows:

(a)    Without any limit from a person resident in India by way of inheritance (i.e., by way of a Will or intestate succession on death) if the donor has been holding the foreign securities in accordance with the applicable FEMA provisions;

(b)    Without any limit from a person resident outside India by way of inheritance;

(c)    By way of a gift (different than a receipt under inheritance) from a person resident in India if the donor is a relative (as per the definition under the Companies Act, 2013) of the donee, and has been holding the foreign securities in accordance with the applicable FEMA provisions; and

(d)    By way of a gift from a person resident outside India on compliance with the applicable provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010.

An Indian resident is permitted to gift foreign securities to another Indian resident only if the donor is a relative of the donee. Relative for this purpose means the following:

• Members of a Hindu Undivided Family
• Spouse
• Father (including stepfather)
• Mother (including stepmother)
• Son (including stepson)
• Son’s wife
• Daughter (including stepdaughter)
• Daughter’s husband
• Brother (including stepbrother)
• Sister (including stepsister)

An overseas investment by way of receipt of gift, and inheritance is to be categorised as Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) or Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI) based on the nature of the investment. ODI means investment through acquisition of unlisted equity capital of a foreign entity or investment in 10 per cent  or more of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity, or investment with control where investment is less than 10 per cent of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity. Anything which is not ODI is OPI. The donee needs to accordingly file Form FC in respect of the gift / inheritance constituting an ODI with the RBI through its Authorised Dealer. If the gift /inheritance constitutes OPI then a resident individual does not need to file Form OPI.

Acquisition of foreign securities by way of inheritance or gift is not to be reckoned towards the Liberalised Remittance Scheme limit of $250,000 and hence, need not be reported under the LRS.

It may be noted that a person resident in India cannot gift foreign securities to a person resident outside India.

FCRA, 2010

The FEM (Overseas Investment) Rules, 2022 permit a person resident in India to receive a gift of foreign securities from a person resident outside India only if the applicable provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 have been complied with. Hence, it becomes important to understand the provisions of this Act also.

FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION

A person (individual / HUF/ company) resident in India who is a specified person u/s 3 of the FCRA cannot accept any foreign contribution, i.e., a gift from a foreign source of any security as defined under the Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956 or the FEMA. These specified persons include: election candidates, judges, civil servants, politicians, journalists, etc.

FOREIGN SECURITIES

The type of securities covered under these two Acts include:

•  shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock or other marketable securities of a company or other body corporate
•    derivatives
•    units or any other instrument issued by any collective investment scheme
•    security receipts
•    units under any mutual fund scheme
•    Government securities
•    rights or interest in securities
•    shares, stocks, bonds, debentures or any other instrument denominated or expressed in foreign currency
•    securities expressed in foreign currency, but where redemption or any form of return such as interest or dividends is payable in Indian currency

A gift, delivery or transfer of  foreign securities by a person receiving it from a foreign source, either directly or indirectly, is also deemed  as a foreign contribution.

FOREIGN SOURCE

The definition of foreign source includes a foreign citizen and an Indian company of which more than 50 per cent of the capital is held by a foreign Government/foreign citizens / foreign companies / foreign trusts, etc. Thus, a non-resident Indian (passport holder of India) residing abroad would not constitute a foreign source. However, a foreign citizen permanently resident in India would constitute a foreign source! This difference is very important and would determine whether or not the gift constitutes a foreign contribution.

The FAQs issued on the FCRA state that contributions made by a citizen of India living in another country (i.e., Non-Resident Indian), from his personal savings, through the normal banking channels, is not treated as foreign contribution. However, while accepting any donations from such NRI, it is advisable to obtain his passport details to ascertain that he/she is an Indian passport holder. Similarly, the FAQs state that a donation from an Indian who has acquired foreign citizenship is treated as foreign contribution.

An Overseas Citizen of India would also constitute a foreign source since an OCI cardholder is not an Indian citizen. An OCI card is granted by the Government of India to a person under the aegis of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Section7A of this Act provides for the registration of OCIs. An OCI cardholder is not a full-fledged India citizen under the Citizenship Act but he is only registered as an OCI.

Interestingly, under FEMA, citizenship has no relevance whereas under FCRA it is material. Hence, an NRI working abroad would be a person resident outside India under FEMA but he would not be a foreign source under FCRA. A gift of foreign securities from such a person would not trigger the FCRA since it would not constitute a foreign source.   

Exceptions: While specified person under Section 3 of the FCRA cannot accept any foreign contribution, Section 4 carves out an exception to this rule. Specified persons being an individual / HUF can accept a foreign contribution from his relative. Interestingly, the FCRA definition of the term relative refers to the extended list under the Companies Act 1956, and not the restrictive list under the Companies Act, 2013. Hence, a specified person can receive a gift of foreign securities from the following relatives who are foreign citizens:

• Members of a Hindu Undivided Family
• Spouse
• Father
• Mother (including stepmother)
• Son (including stepson)
• Son’s wife
• Daughter (including stepdaughter)
• Father’s father and mother
• Mother’s mother and father
• Son’s son
• Son’s son’s wife
• Son’s daughter
• Son’s or daughter’s husband
• Daughter’s husband
• Daughter’s son
• Daughter’s son’s wife
• Daughter’s daughter
• Daughter’s daughter’s husband
• Brother (including stepbrother)
• Brother’s wife
• Sister (including stepsister)
• Sister’s husband

It may be noted that the FEMA rules allow a gift of foreign securities from a person resident outside India provided the FCRA rules are complied with. Hence, as far as the FCRA is concerned, a person resident in India can receive a gift from a donor who is a relative under FCRA even if he is not a relative under FEMA.  

The FAQs have also clarified that individuals in general as well as those prescribed u/s 3 and an HUF are permitted to accept foreign contribution without permission from relatives.

Intimation: Any individual/HUF (whether or not covered u/s 3 of the FCRA), receiving foreign contribution in excess of R10 lakhs in a financial year from his relatives should inform the Central Government regarding the details of the foreign contribution received by him in Form FC-1 within 3 months from the date of gift. This provision applies to all persons and not just the persons specified u/s 3. This is an information provision and not a prohibitory section. The earlier threshold limit for intimation was Rs. 1 lakh but it has been enhanced to Rs. 10 lakhs from July 2022.  

INDIAN TAX TREATMENT

Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act taxes gifts received without / or for inadequate consideration. In such cases, the donee becomes liable to tax on the receipt of the gift. It also contains several exceptions under which this section does not apply. The relevant exceptions in this respect are:

• A gift from defined relatives
• A gift on the occasion of the marriage of the donee
• A gift under a Will / inheritance from any person (even a non-relative)
• Gifts made in contemplation of death of the donor

The tax position of the donee  needs to be examined keeping in mind the provisions of s.56(2)(x) and other provisions, such as, s.68 of the Income-tax Act.

Since the securities acquired would be foreign securities, necessary disclosures in Schedule FA of the Income-tax Return should be made. Failure to do so would entail a penalty under the Black Money Act, 2015.

FOREIGN TAX TREATMENT

In addition, if the country of the donor levies a gift tax then the same should be considered. For instance, the USA levies a gift tax on the donor on all gifts in excess of US$16,000 per donor per calendar year. Thus, a US couple can gift $32,000 per donor every year since US taxes a couples as one unit. Further, the donor can also utilise his lifetime estate duty-cum-gift tax credit to avoid paying the gift tax. Gifts in excess of $16,000 need to be reported by the donor in Form 709 in the USA. In the US, states are also empowered to levy a gift tax and hence, the same should also be examined. Connecticut is one such state which levies a state level gift tax.

The UK does not levy any gift tax but if the donor dies within 7 years of making the gift, then an inheritance tax on the gifts is  levied. However, certain gifts are exempt from this inheritance tax.

CONCLUSION

The law relating to gifts is myriad and one needs to consider various factors before contemplating a gift of foreign securities.

PMLA – Magna Carta – Part 2

Part – I of the article on PMLA – Magna Carta was published in the September 2022 issue of the BCAJ. In this concluding part, the author has answered some interesting and important questions arising from the Supreme Court decision in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India [2022] 140 taxmann.com 610 (SC). For a detailed analysis of the case, please refer to the September 2022 issue of the BCAJ.

1.    Whether investigation under PMLA can automatically be extended under other Statutes like the Black Money Act or the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act by the authorities under PMLA?
“Investigation” is a crucial term which has a bearing on the interpretation of all substantive aspects of PMLA. It is defined in section 2(1)(na) of PMLA, as under:

(na) “investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Act conducted by the Director or by an authority authorised by the Central Government under this Act for the collection of evidence.

The term “investigation” has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned decision. The Supreme Court has held that:

•    the term “proceedings” [section 2(1)(na) of PMLA] is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include the inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court.

•    the term “investigation” does not limit itself to the matter of investigation concerning the offence under PMLA, and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the authorities under PMLA.

It is apparent from the above mentioned interpretation of the term “investigation” by the Supreme Court that the word “proceedings” which is a part of the term “investigation” is contextual and must be given wider meaning to include the inquiry conducted by the Director or by an authority authorised by the Central Government under PMLA for collection of evidence. The “authority” referred to in section 2(1)(na) are all the authorities mentioned under sections 48 and 49 of PMLA.

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 49(1), the Central Government has notified the appointment of the following officers:

•    Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India under the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, to exercise the exclusive powers conferred under section 49.

•    Director of Enforcement holding office immediately before 1st July, 2005 under FEMA.

The scope of the powers of Director, Financial Intelligence Unit, India and the Director of Enforcement have been specified respectively, in Notification No. GSR 440(E) dated 1st July, 2005 and Notification No. GSR 441(E) dated 1st July, 2005. A review of the powers listed in the said two notifications suggests that the investigation under PMLA may be extended to other statutes.

•    This view is fortified by the powers of section 45 of PMLA authorising the Director of Enforcement or other authorised officer to file a complaint to the Special Court.

•    Reference may also be made to section 66 of PMLA which authorises the Director of Enforcement and other authorities specified by him to disclose information to authorities under “other laws”.

2. Whether fees received by a Chartered Accountant or a lawyer from an offender under PMLA be regarded as proceeds of crime?
The expression “proceeds of crime” is defined in section 2(1)(u), as under:

(u) “proceeds of crime” means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.

Explanation — For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.

A review of the above mentioned definition would show that it is very widely worded. However, with the passage of time, even such a widely worded definition was found inadequate to cover a number of situations faced by the authorities. Accordingly, the Explanation was added w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 to expand the parameters of “proceeds of crime”. The purpose of adding the Explanation was to bifurcate the definition into the following two types of properties on a stand-alone basis:

•    Property derived or obtained from a scheduled offence.

•    Property which is directly or indirectly derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity related to a scheduled offence.

The opening words of the Explanation suggest that the Explanation is intended to apply retrospectively.

Wordings of the Explanation leave open a possibility that the Enforcement Directorate may consider the fees received by the Chartered Accountant or lawyer from an offender under PMLA as “proceeds of crime”. In terms of section 24 of PMLA, the burden of proving that the fees received from the offender do not constitute “proceeds of crime” will be on the CA or the lawyer.

It may be noted that the constitutional validity of section 24, which mandates a reverse burden of proof, has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the recent decision.

[However, the matter has been sent by SC for review by a larger Bench].

3. Can a legitimate property acquired by a person be attached or appropriated by the authorities, if later it is found that the said property was acquired by the seller from the proceeds of crime? To what layers the officers can go to attach the property?

Section 8(5) of PMLA deals with confiscation of property on the conclusion of the trial of an offence under PMLA as a result of which the Special Court gives a finding that the offence of money-laundering has been committed. Consequently, the Special Court will pass an order that the following properties stand confiscated to the Central Government:

•    The property involved in money-laundering; or

•    The property which has been used for the commission of the offence of money-laundering.

Accordingly, the property legitimately acquired may be attached and confiscated under PMLA if the Special Court finds that such a property was acquired by the seller through the proceeds of crime. The categorical finding of the Special Court that the property is involved in money- laundering does not leave any doubt that the property described in the captioned issue is liable to confiscation. As regards the second part of the captioned issue, namely; up to what layers the officers can go, a reference may be made to the definition of “offence of money-laundering” in section 3 which is very comprehensive. This definition is clarified and strengthened by the Explanation added w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. Being clarificatory, the Explanation is retrospectively applicable.

Clause (ii) of the Explanation clarifies that the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime is a continuing activity which continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime.

In the Supreme Court decision, all nuances of the definition of money-laundering were examined and it was categorically held that the said definition has a wider reach so as to capture every process and activity, direct or indirect, connected with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy.

4. In the event it is found that the legitimate property acquired by an innocent person was out of the proceeds of crime what remedies does he have? How can a person or a consultant safeguard his interests from handling proceeds of crime?

Section 24 of PMLA which deals with the reverse burden of proof gives the right of defence to the person charged with the offence to prove to the contrary. In this connection, a similar situation was noticed by PMLA Appellate Tribunal.

In S. Ramesh Pothy vs. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 102 taxmann.com 314 (PMLA-AT), the appellant had purchased the property from one ‘D’ for business. Enforcement Directorate alleged that the appellant purchased the property out of proceeds of crime since the father of ‘D’ was facing criminal prosecution for offences committed under provisions of PMLA. On that ground, the provisional attachment of said property was confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. The appellant produced bank statements and individual tax returns to prove the source of funds for the purchase of property.

It was held by PMLA Tribunal that the appellant was the bonafide purchaser of the property and was not involved in any crime relating to money-laundering. The gist of the Tribunal’s decision is:

•    There was no cogent and clear material on record even prima facie that the appellant had any knowledge of any FIR against the accused vendor. There was no mechanism to know if any FIR was registered against any vendors, or their family members and other relatives.

•    While purchasing the property from any vendor, due diligence does not lead to knowledge about the registration of FIR against the vendor or his family members and other relatives.

•    Under the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act, there is no method or process to find out about the existence of any FIR nor is there any provision to mandatorily disclose the existence of any FIR against the vendor or his family members.

•    The “No Encumbrance Certificate,” issued in the State of Tamil Nadu, did not have any clause whereby the FIR against the relatives or family members of vendors is reflected.

The above mentioned decision gives sufficient clues to discharge the reverse burden of proof and the relevant remedies to discharge such burden.

Indeed, the person charged, or his consultant can safeguard his interest by proper study of section 3 and section 24 in light of the minutest facts of the case. Indeed, while presenting a reply to the show-cause notice, the facts have to be properly articulated and succinctly presented in defence.

[Section 24 has been under review by a larger Bench of SC.]

5. What are the beneficial provisions of section 436A of CrPC that can be invoked by the accused arrested for an offence punishable under PMLA?

Section 436A of CrPC deals with the maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained. To understand the substance of section 436A, it is necessary to refer to its following background.

Prior to June 2006, there were instances where undertrial prisoners were detained in jail for periods beyond the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the alleged offence. Therefore, section 436-A was inserted in the Code to release an undertrial prisoner [other than the one accused of an offence for which death has been prescribed as one of the punishments], who has been under detention for a period extending to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the alleged offence, on his personal bond, with or without sureties.

The intention was also to provide that in no case should an undertrial prisoner be detained beyond the maximum period of imprisonment for which he can be convicted for the alleged offence.

Accordingly, w.e.f. 23rd June 2006, section 436-A was inserted in CrPC. The benevolent provisions of section 436-A are clear and evident from its following language.

“436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained –


Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties.

Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties:

Provided further that no such person shall, in any case, be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law.

Explanation — In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail, the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded.”

Indeed, the language of section 436-A of CrPC is self-explanatory and does not require any interpretation. However, to ensure that the case of the accused falls within the parameters of section 436A of CrPC so as to qualify him for the benefit thereunder, it is advisable for the accused to take the help of a professional having expertise in CrPC.

6. After this SC decision, what defences are still available to the litigants? Are they totally defenceless?

Reference may be made to Question No. 4 which gives a broad guideline for defence that may be formulated after a study of the case laws relevant to sections 3, 5, 8,19 and 24.

It may be noted that the strategy for defence must be formulated in consultation with the Counsel who had dealt with the matter in the High Court or subordinate Court before it was carried to the Supreme Court in various civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, SLPs, etc. The order of the Supreme Court passed on 27th July, 2022 clarifies that the interim relief granted by the Supreme Court in the petitions/appeals will continue for a period of 4 weeks from 27th July, 2022, with the liberty to the parties to mention for an early listing of the case including for continuation/vacation of the interim relief.

7. What is the final take of this Supreme Court decision?

The final take of the decision may be summarised by a broad review of the following approach of the Supreme Court.

•    The Supreme Court was seized of 241 civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, special leave petitions, transferred petitions and transferred cases raising various questions of law.

The Government of India, too, had filed appeals and SLPs. There were also few transfer petitions filed before the Supreme Court under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India.

Questions in these petitions, appeals, etc. pertained to the constitutional validity and interpretation of certain provisions of PMLA and other statutes including the Customs Act, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

However, the Apex Court decided to confine to challenge to the validity of certain important provisions of PMLA and their interpretation.

•    In addition to challenges to Constitutional validity and interpretation of provisions of PMLA, there were also SLPs filed against various orders of High Courts and subordinate Courts all over the country with prayers for grant of bail or quashing or discharge.

All such SLPs were rejected by the Supreme Court.

•    Instead of dealing with facts and issues in each case on merits, the Supreme Court confined itself to examining the challenge to the relevant provisions of PMLA, being a question of law raised by parties.

• The question as to whether some of the amendments to the PMLA could not have been enacted by the Parliament by way of a Finance Act was not examined by the Supreme Court. The same was left open for being examined along with the decision of the Larger Bench (seven Judges) of the Supreme Court in Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Ltd (2020) 6 SCC 1.


Controversy on What is ‘Control’ Set at Rest

BACKGROUND
An oft-litigated issue has been – when can a person be said to be in ‘control’ of a company? This is relevant not just in securities laws but to several other laws including the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, the Companies Act, 2013, Insurance law, Competition law, etc. The definition of ‘control’ under the SEBI Takeover Regulations, the Companies Act, 2013 and the IBC is on the same lines. Acquiring control of a company or even being in control has significant consequences. However, the definition of ‘control’ is very widely worded and has left doubts on how it would apply to facts. Thus, there has been uncertainty and hence litigation. As we will see later, SEBI did propose to make the definition more specific but later backtracked. Indeed, though a 12-year-old decision of SAT (Subhkam Ventures (I) P. Ltd. vs. (2010) 99 SCL 159 (SAT) – ‘Subhkam’) gave fairly clear guidelines and principles on how this definition of ‘control’ should apply. The matter was appealed before the Supreme Court. But since the matter got resolved on other grounds, the Supreme Court consciously refrained from commenting on the merits and stated that its decision should not be taken as a precedent over the issue. This was interpreted particularly by SEBI as leaving the matter open putting even the SAT decision as without having any finality. The uncertainty then continued.

A recent decision of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) (Vishvapradhan Commercial (P.) Ltd. vs. SEBI (2022) 140 taxmann.com 498 (SAT) – ‘Vishvapradhan’) has finally given some semblance of finality. This has happened because the Supreme Court in 2018 approved the Subhkam decision which elaborated the matter even further. However, this ruling was under the IBC and thus a level of uncertainty continued. Now, the latest Vishvapradhan SAT ruling has affirmed that the Supreme Court decision indeed applies even to securities laws. This gives one strong reason to hope that this matter is finally settled for good. Let us go into more details about the issues involved.

DEFINITION OF ‘CONTROL’ UNDER THE SEBI TAKEOVER REGULATIONS

The controversy rages around the definition of ‘control’ under these Regulations, which, incidentally, is more or less identical to that under the Companies Act, 2013, and which definition also applies to IBC. It reads as under (Regulation 2(1)(e) excluding the proviso, which is not of concern here):

(e)  “control” includes the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner:

The definition is an inclusive one and widely framed. Control may arise through a majority holding of equity, where the holding of the whole group is counted. Or it may be through agreements or in any other manner. The parts which have faced difficulty in interpretation relate to what amounts to control of management or policy decisions. Particularly here, the question is what the border lines are, if at all such lines could be defined, which would separate a situation where there exists control from one where it does not. This is particularly so when certain rights are given to certain investors holding a significant quantity of shares. These rights so granted may include the right to appoint a director or two, the right to veto certain significant decisions proposed to be taken by the company, etc. The question is whether such rights to participate in the management amounts to ‘control’?

IMPLICATIONS OF ACQUIRING/HOLDING ‘CONTROL’

If a person acquires control, he would be required to make an open offer under the Takeover Regulations which would have significant financial implications for the acquirer and possibly the benefit of a higher offer price to the selling shareholders. Such a person may also be classified as a promoter with various resultant implications. If one has control over certain specified companies that have defaulted on their debts, eligibility to participate in resolutions of companies under insolvency would be lost.

It is not surprising then that SEBI and other regulators are also vigilant on whether control is acquired. Investors who desire to obtain participation rights are also wary of whether having such rights would result in their being held to have acquired control.

THE SUBHKAM DECISION

In this decision, the SAT examined the issue in detail. The issue in question was, as described earlier, about an investor in a listed company which acquired certain participation rights in it. The question was whether this amounted to an acquisition of control. SEBI held that it did so amount to acquisition of control and required the investor to make an open offer. SAT reversed the order and used the analogy and metaphor of driving a car. It said that the crucial question was who was in the driving seat? Taking the metaphor further, it asked whether this would mean determining whether such a person had control not just of the steering wheel, but also the accelerator, the gears and the brakes. Or to put it more succinctly, the test was whether the person had proactive rights or reactive rights.

Acquiring of participation at best amounted to the occasional use of the brakes and occasionally (to extend the metaphor even further) giving driving instructions. It found that, on the facts of that case, the investor was not at all in the driver’s seat. Importantly, he could not initiate and implement any of the major decisions where it had veto rights. The definition of ‘control’ itself refers to having a right to appoint the majority of the directors and, by implications, it is submitted, having a right to appoint one or two directors who would be in the minority would not by itself amount to having control.

APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT AGAINST THE SUBHKAM DECISION

SEBI appealed to the Supreme Court but in the intervening period, certain events took place whereby the issue was rendered more or less infructuous. Thus, the Supreme Court did not have to decide on the issue and hence the matter was disposed of with a clarification that its decision did not amount to a precedent on the matter. While it did not set aside the SAT order either, undue emphasis or perhaps even an incorrect interpretation was being taken that the order of SAT too should not have any standing.

SEBI’S PROPOSAL TO LAY DOWN CERTAIN BRIGHT-LINE TESTS OF CONTROL

On 14th March, 2016, SEBI released a ‘consultation paper’ on the issue and particularly referring to the Subhkam decision, which considered whether certain specific bright-line tests could be laid down to help decide whether a person can be said to have or not have ‘control’. This, SEBI felt, would result in the definition being more specific. However, on receiving responses, SEBI decided that the definition did not need any change and dropped the proposal. It is submitted that this should have closed the matter, at least as far as SEBI is concerned. It, as we will see below, did not.

SUPREME COURT DECISION IN ARCELORMITTAL’S CASE

This decision (ArcelorMittal India (P.) Ltd. vs. Satish Kumar Gupta ((2018) 150 SCL 354 (SC)) was under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The matter and issues thereunder were several and complex. But essentially, the question was the same – under what circumstances would a person (or group of persons) can be said to have control over a company? The implications, as mentioned earlier, of being held to have control were significant and serious – a person would be disqualified from offering a resolution plan.

The Supreme Court cited the Subhkam decision and held that the observations made therein on what amounts to having ‘control’ were apposite. The Court even went further and elaborated on the question but essentially, the principles laid down in Subhkam were approved.

THE SAT DECISION IN VISHVAPRADHAN

Most recently, in Vishvapradhan, SAT had the occasion to examine a similar question on whether such participative rights amount to control. Again, in this case, there were others too but the question that is relevant for this article was whether, on account of having certain participative rights, an investor can be said to have acquired control. SAT examined in great detail the exact rights that the investor had. It also considered the Subhkam decision and the Supreme Court decision in ArcelorMittal. SEBI clutched at several straws of arguments. It argued that the Subhkam decision did not, particularly in light of the Supreme Court observations on appeal, have any standing. It also argued that the ArcelorMittal case was under the IBC. It even argued that the Supreme Court decision in Subhkam was given by three judges while the ArcelorMittal ruling was by two judges.

The SAT rejected all these arguments. It affirmed that ArcelorMittal endorsed the Subhkam ruling, and the principles would need to be applied to the present case too. Accordingly, it held that acquisition of such participating rights did not amount to acquisition of control.

CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD

Arguably, then, it can be said that a level of certainty has finally prevailed on the control issue. And this extends to several laws where the definition is on similar lines. However, importantly, there is clarity on principles which then would have to be applied to the facts of an individual case. It is possible that in a given case, the rights may be such that the acquirer may be held to proactively have control. Thus, care would need to be taken in structuring such arrangements and it is likely that some cases may still see litigation. However, the clarity of the guidelines and the principles laid down to determine the issue should help SEBI and even the Appellate Authorities arrive at a conclusion.

It may not be out of place to mention that there are likely to be further developments on the matter. SEBI is actively exploring reforming the concept of ‘promoters’ and prefers to define and apply the term ‘person-in-control’. This is particularly in light of changing shareholding patterns. SEBI had issued a consultation paper on 11th May, 2021 on the subject and it is possible that it may implement the proposal at least in parts, though to implement the whole of it would require amendment of other statutes too falling under the purview of other regulators/Parliament. But it is submitted that the legal developments discussed here would actually help in the changed scenario too, perhaps even more so.

Bequests and Legacies Under Wills – Part 2

INTRODUCTION
In the last month’s feature (BCAJ, August 2022), we examined some of the important principles regarding a Will’s valid bequest, the time when it vests, etc. We continue with an examination of some more interesting and vital features in this respect.

TYPES OF LEGACIES

Specific Legacy

When a specific part of the testator’s property is bequeathed to any person and such property is distinguished from all other parts of his property, then the legacy is known as a specific legacy. E.g., A makes a bequest to C of the diamond ring which was gifted to A by his father. This is a specific legacy in favour of C. Thus, the essence of a specific legacy is that it is distinguishable from the other assets of the testator’s estate. A specific legacy is distinguishable from a general legacy, e.g., a bequest of all the residue estate is a general legacy.

What is a specific legacy and what is a general legacy is a question of fact and needs to be determined on a case-to-case basis. If the legacy exists at the time of the testator’s death and his estate is otherwise insufficient to pay off his debts, then the specific legacy must be given to the legatee. The following are the principles with respect to a specific legacy:

(i)    Usually, a bequest of money, stocks and shares are general legacies. In some cases, a sum of money is bequeathed and the stock or securities in which the money is to be invested is specified in the Will. Even in such cases, the legacy is not specific. E.g., A makes a bequest of Rs. 10 crores to his son and his Will specifies that the sum is to be invested in the shares of XYZ P. Ltd. The legacy is not specific.

(ii)    Even if a legacy is made out under which a bequest is made in general terms and the testator as on the date of the Will possesses stock of the same or greater amount, the legacy does not become specific. E.g., A bequeaths 8% RBI Bonds worth Rs. 10 lakhs to X. On the date of the Will, A has 8% RBI Bonds worth Rs. 10 lakhs. The legacy is not specific. However, if A were to state that “I bequeath to X all my 8% RBI Bonds”, then this would have been a specific legacy.

(iii)    A legacy of money does not become specific merely because its payment is postponed until some part of the testator’s estate has been reduced to a certain form or remitted to a certain place.

(iv)    A Will may make a specific bequest for some items and a residual bequest for the others. While making a residual bequest, the testator lists down some of the items comprised within the residue. Merely because such items are enlisted they do not become specific legacies.

(v)    In the case of a specific bequest to two or more persons in succession, the property must be retained in a form in which the testator left it even if it is a wasting or a reducing asset, e.g., a lease or an annuity.

(vi)    A property bequest is generally a specific legacy.

Demonstrative Legacy

A Demonstrative Legacy has the following characteristics:

(a)    It means a legacy which comprises a bequest of a certain sum of money or a certain quantity of a commodity but refers to a particular fund or stock which is to constitute the primary fund or stock out of which the payment is to be made. The difference between a specific and a demonstrative legacy is that while in the case of a specific legacy, a specific property is given to the legatee, in the case of a demonstrative legacy, it must be paid out of a specified property.

E.g., A bequeaths Rs. 50 lakhs to his wife and also directs under his Will that his property should be sold and out of the proceeds Rs. 50 lakhs should go to his daughter. The legacy to his wife is specific but the legacy to his daughter is demonstrative.

(b)    In case a portion of a fund is a specific legacy and a portion is to be used for a demonstrative legacy, then the specific legacy stands in priority to the demonstrative legacy. If there is a shortfall in paying the demonstrative legacy, then it is to be met from the residue of the estate of the testator.

(c)    Similarly, in case a portion of a fund is a specific legacy and a portion is to be used for a demonstrative legacy, and if the testator himself receives a portion of the fund with the result that funds are insufficient, then specific legacy stands in priority to the demonstrative legacy. If there is a shortfall in paying the demonstrative legacy, then it is to be met from the residue of the testator’s estate.

E.g., A bequeaths Rs. 20 lakhs, being part of an actionable claim of Rs. 50 lakhs which he has to receive from B to his wife and also directs under his Will that this claim should be used to pay Rs. 10 lakhs to his daughter. During A’s lifetime he receives Rs. 25 lakhs himself from B. The legacy to his wife is specific, but the legacy to his daughter is demonstrative. Hence, the wife will receive Rs. 20 lakhs in priority to the daughter. Since the balance in the claim is only Rs. 5 lakhs, whereas the daughter has to receive Rs. 10 lakhs, she would have to receive the balance from A’s general estate.

General Legacy

A legacy which is neither specific nor demonstrative is known as a general legacy. E.g., A bequeaths all the residue of his estate to B. This is called a general legacy.


ADEMPTION OF LEGACIES
Ademption of a legacy means that the legacy ceases to take effect, i.e., the legacy fails. Ademption of a legacy takes place when the thing which has been legated does not exist at the time of the testator’s death. The rules in respect of ademption of legacies are as follows:

(a)    In the case of a specific legacy, if the subject matter of the item bequeathed does not exist at the time of the testator’s death or it has been converted into some other form, then the legacy is adeemed. Thus, because the bequest is not in existence, the legacy fails. E.g., A makes a Will under which he leaves a gold ring to X. A in his lifetime, sells the ring. The legacy is adeemed. The position would be the same if a stock has been specifically bequeathed and the same is not in existence at the testator’s death.

However, in case the bequest undergoes a change between the date of Will and the death of the testator and the change occurs due to some legal provisions, then the legacy is not adeemed. E.g., A bequeaths 10,000 equity shares in Z Ltd. to B. Z Ltd. undergoes a demerger under a court-approved reconstruction scheme and the shares of A are split into 5,000 2% Preference Shares of Y Ltd. and 4,000 equity shares of Z Ltd. The legacy is not adeemed.

Another exception to the principle of ademption is if the subject matter undergoes a change between the date of the Will and the death of the testator without the testator’s knowledge. In such a case since the change is not with the testator’s knowledge, the legacy is not adeemed. One of the instances where such a change may occur is if the change is made by an agent of the testator without his consent.

(b)    Unlike a specific legacy, a demonstrative legacy is not adeemed merely because the property on which it is based does not exist at the time of the testator’s death or the property has been converted into some other form. In such a case the other general assets of the testator would be used to pay off the legacy.

(c)    In some specific bequests, debts, receivables, actionable claims, etc., which the testator has to receive from third parties may be bequeathed. In such cases, if the testator receives such dues himself, then the legacy adeems because there is nothing left to be received by the legatee.

However, where the bequest is money or some other commodity and the testator receives the same in his lifetime, then the same is not adeemed unless the testator mixes up the same along with his general property.

(d)    If a property has been specifically bequeathed to a person and he receives a part or a portion of the property, then the bequest adeems to the extent of the assets received by the legatee. However, it continues for the balance portion of the bequest.

As opposed to this, if only a portion of the entire fund or property has been specifically bequeathed to a legatee and the testator receives a part or a portion of this fund or property, then there is an ademption to the extent of the receipt. The balance fund or stock shall be used to discharge the legacy.

(e)    If a stock is specifically bequeathed to a person and it is lent to someone else and accordingly replaced, then the legacy is not adeemed. Similarly, if a stock which is specifically bequeathed is sold and afterwards before the testator’s death, an equal quantity is replaced, then the legacy is not adeemed.

CONCLUSION

It is important to bear in mind the above principles while drafting a Will so that the bequest does not become void and so that the beneficiaries can receive what the testator intended that they receive!

Revised Code of Ethics

INTRODUCTION AND OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE REVISED CODE OF ETHICS

ICAI recently issued the 12th edition of the Code of Ethics, in convergence with the changes to the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) Code of Ethics. In this article, we shall discuss certain significant changes in the revised Code of Ethics and their relevance in the contemporary professional world.

For the first time, the Code of Ethics has been segregated into different volumes, i.e. I, II and III. These volumes became applicable with effect from 1st July, 2020.

Volume–I of the Code of Ethics (12th edition) is the revised Counterpart of Part-A of Code of Ethics, 2009. It is based on International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) Code of Ethics, 2018 edition.

Volume–II of the Code of Ethics is the revised counterpart of Part-B of the Code of Ethics, 2009. It is based on domestic provisions.

Volume–III of the Code of Ethics contains Case Laws segregated and updated from the Clauses under Part-B of Code of Ethics, 2009.

The Code of Ethics, 2009, and the revised Code of Ethics are a convergence (and not an adoption) of the provisions of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) IESBA Code of Ethics.

It is a well-known maxim that “Ignorance of Law is No Excuse”. The revised Code of Ethics (Volume–I) has been issued as a Guideline of the Council. Further, there is change from “should” to “shall”, and requirements are clearly demarcated. As a result, the non-compliance with provisions of the Code will be deemed as a violation of Clause (1) of Part-II of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, 1949-

A member of the Institute, whether in practice or not, shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he-

(1) contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or the regulations made thereunder or any guidelines issued by the Council.

Thus, the revised Code of Ethics, 2019, is mandatory to be followed.


VOLUME-I – STRUCTURE

Volume-I of the Code of Ethics is based on the IESBA Code of Ethics and is structured as follows:

Part 1- which applies to all Professional Accountants, is Complying with the Code, Fundamental Principles and Conceptual Framework.

Part 2- pertains to provisions applicable to Professional Accountants in Service.

Part 3- pertains to provisions applicable to Professional Accountants in Public Practice.

The Code further contains International Independence Standards (Parts 4A and 4B):

• Part 4A- Independence for Audits & Reviews (Sections 400 to 899)

• Part 4B- Independence for Other Assurance Engagements (Sections 900 to 999).

The Code also contains a Glossary of terms used in the Code of Ethics applicable to all Professional Accountants, whether in practice or service.


DEFERRED PROVISIONS OF VOLUME I

There are certain provisions of Volume-I of the Code of Ethics deferred till further notification:

(a) The provision relating to Non-Compliance of Laws and Regulations, popularly called NOCLAR is the new provision in Volume-I. It was not there in the Code of Ethics, 2009. It has been made applicable to members in practice and service both.

(b)  Fees- Relative Size- These deal with the restriction of fees from any single client.

(c) Taxation Services to Audit Clients- the earlier edition of the Code had no prohibition on Taxation Services to Audit Clients. However, the revised Code has certain restrictions on taxation services provided to audit clients.


CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE REVISED CODE OF ETHICS

(a)  Independence Standards- While the 2009 edition of the Code has Section 290, i.e., “Independence – Assurance Engagements”, Volume–I of the Revised Code, based on the 2018 IESBA Code, has “Independence Standards” in the form of Parts- 4A and 4B as mentioned above.

All members are expected to comply with these Independence Standards while conducting various professional assignments.

The segregation of the existing Section 290 into Parts- 4A and 4B represents the bulkiest change. Most provisions/compliances are common to both Parts 4A and 4B but are given separately in the Code under both parts.

(b)  Breaches of the Code- This is regarding the Accountant’s duty in case of breach of Independence Standards, where nobody, except the member knows that there has been breach on his part. There was no such corresponding provision in the earlier Code of Ethics.

This may be said to be a mechanism of self-correction prescribed in the Code in case the Chartered Accountant on his own discovers an unintentional violation.

Examples

A Chartered Accountant who identifies a breach of any other provision of the Code shall evaluate the significance of the breach and its impact on the chartered accountant’s ability to comply with the fundamental principles. The chartered accountant shall also: (a) take whatever actions might be available, as soon as possible, to address the consequences of the breach satisfactorily; and (b) determine whether to report the breach to the relevant parties.

(c) Firm Rotation Requirements- The 2009 edition of the Code of Ethics contained requirements relating to partner rotation. It does not contain Firm rotation requirements.

However, in line with the Companies Act, 2013, the Code being the immediately subsequent edition after coming into force of Companies Act, 2013, Section 550 on Firm rotation has been incorporated in Volume-I over and above the provisions of partner rotation appearing in the IESBA Code.

Accordingly, it is clarified in the Code that partner rotation will co-exist along with Audit Firm rotation (wherever prescribed by a statute).

The 2019 Code (i.e., Volume-I) incorporates Firm rotation requirements to make the guidance comprehensive for members.

(d) Introduction of Key Audit Partner and changes in Rules of Partner Rotation- Key Audit Partner was not defined in the earlier Code of Ethics. In Volume-I of the revised Code of Ethics, Key Audit Partner has been defined as “The Engagement partner, the individual responsible for the engagement quality control review, and other audit partners, if any, on the engagement team who make key decisions or judgments on significant matters with respect to the audit of the financial statements on which the firm will express an opinion. Depending upon the circumstances and the role of the individuals on the audit, “other audit partners” might include, for example, audit partners responsible for significant subsidiaries or divisions.”

The time or period of partners in the Firm remains the same, i.e., 7 years.

However, there is a change with regard to the difference in cooling-off periods. As against the cooling-off period of 2 years, now there will be a cooling-off period of:

  • 5 years for Engagement Partners;

  • 3 years for Engagement Quality Control Review; and

  • 2 years for all other Key Audit Partners of the Firm.

This change is important, as it makes stricter rules on partner rotation.

Further, there are certain restrictions on Activities During Cooling-off w.r.t partner rotation as contained in Section 540 of Volume-I of the Code of Ethics.

The Chartered Accountant will have to maintain the relevant documentation regarding the Key Audit Partner, Cooling-off provisions etc.

(e) Changes in Professional Appointments- The Council of ICAI approved the KYC Norms, which are mandatory in nature and shall apply in all assignments pertaining to attest functions. These became mandatory with effect from 1st January, 2017.

In the revised Code, in paragraph R320.8, the incoming auditor shall request the retiring auditor to provide known information regarding any facts or other information of which, in the retiring auditor’s opinion, the incoming auditor needs to be aware before deciding whether to accept the engagement. There was no such corresponding duty in the earlier Code.

(f) Periodical Review with respect to Recurring Client Engagements-
As per Volume-I of the Code of Ethics, for a recurring client engagement, a professional accountant shall periodically review whether to continue with the engagement.

In view of the same, potential threats to compliance with the fundamental principles might be created after acceptance which, had they been known earlier, would have caused the professional accountant to decline the engagement.

(g) Introduction of the term “Public Interest Entity”-
The Revised Code 2019 edition contains a new term, “Public Interest Entity” (PIE). It had not been used in the Code of Ethics, 2009.

PIE is defined as-

(i) A listed entity; or

(ii) An entity-

  • Defined by regulation or legislation as a public interest entity; or

  • For which the audit is required by regulation or legislation to be conducted in compliance with the same independence requirements that apply to the audit of listed entities. Such regulation might be promulgated by any relevant regulator, including an audit regulator.

For the purpose of this definition, it may be noted that Banks and Insurance Companies are to be considered Public Interest Entities.

Other entities might also be considered by the Firms to be public interest entities, as set out in paragraph 400.8.

There are enhanced independence requirements for PIE clients in the new Code.

(h) Management Responsibilities- The provisions on Management Responsibilities occur for the first time in the ICAI Code of Ethics and appear in Sections 607 – 608.

The feature did not find mention in the Code of Ethics, 2009. In Volume-I, there is a new section dealing with ‘Management Responsibilities’. As per the same, the Firm shall not assume management responsibility for an audit client.

Determining whether an activity is a management responsibility depends on the circumstances and requires the exercise of professional judgment. Examples of activities that would be considered management responsibility include:

  • Setting policies and strategic direction.

  • Hiring or dismissing employees.

  • Directing and taking responsibility for the actions of employees in relation to the employees’ work for the entity.

However, providing advice and recommendations to assist the management of an audit client in discharging its responsibilities is not assuming a management responsibility.

  • Providing administrative services to an audit client does not usually create a threat. Examples of administrative services include:

  • Word processing services.

  • Preparing administrative or statutory forms for client approval.

  • Submitting such forms as instructed by the client.

  • Monitoring statutory filing dates and advising an audit client of those dates.

Members may note another term known as “Management Services” as appearing in Section 144 of Companies Act, 2013. These are not defined in the Companies Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Since these will be defined by Government, there is no finality of views on the Management Services being or not being at par with Management Responsibilities as appearing in Volume-I of the Code.

(i) Documentation Requirements- The 2009 Code required Firms to document their conclusions regarding compliance with independence requirements.

In the 2019 Code, the requirements of documentation have been given in greater detail. NOCLAR requires all steps in responding with NOCLAR to be documented.

The Chartered Accountant is encouraged to document:

  • The facts.

  • The accounting principles or other relevant professional standards involved.

  • The communications and parties with whom matters were discussed.

  • The courses of action considered.

  • How the accountant attempted to address the matter(s).

  • Requirements for NOCLAR have to be sufficient to enable an understanding of significant matters arising during the audit, the conclusions reached, and significant professional judgments made in reaching those conclusions. Thus, documentation is of critical importance in manifesting compliance with NOCLAR.

CONCLUSION
The Code of Ethics has been developed to ensure ethical behaviour for members while retaining the long-cherished ideals of ‘excellence, independence, integrity’, protecting the dignity and interests of members and leading our profession to newer heights.

Major Changes in Overseas Investment Regulations under FEMA

INTRODUCTION
A revamp of the Overseas Direct Investment regulations of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) was under process for quite some time. Draft Overseas Investment Rules and Overseas Investment Regulations were also in the public domain for consultation. The Finance Ministry, in consultation with RBI, has now finalised the Rules and Regulations, overhauling the outward investment provisions substantially. The new rules supersede the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004, and the Foreign Exchange Management (Acquisition and Transfer of Immovable Property Outside India) Regulations, 2015.

This article highlights the significant changes in Overseas Direct Investment provisions in a simplified manner. While there are open issues due to the language adopted in the rules and regulations, such analysis of issues is beyond the scope of this article.

1. WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE NEW PROVISIONS?

The new provisions have liberalised a few important areas concerning overseas investments and, more importantly, clarified quite a few aspects regarding the older provisions. Some of the significant changes brought about by the new rules and regulations are summarised below:

(i) The new provisions provide enhanced clarity to various terms, including:

  • Bonafide business activity
  • Foreign entity
  • Overseas Direct Investment (ODI)
  • Overseas Portfolio Investment (OPI)
  • Strategic Sector
  • Subsidiary or Step-down subsidiary (SDS),
  • Financial services activity
  • Revised pricing guidelines

(ii) The provisions also dispense with approval for:

  • Deferred payment of consideration.
  • Investment/disinvestment by a person resident in India under investigation by any investigative agency/regulatory body if conditions are met.
  • Issuance of corporate guarantees to or on behalf of Second or subsequent level Step Down Subsidiary (SDS).
  • Write-off on account of disinvestment.
  • Round-tripped investment if conditions are met, etc.

The provisions have also brought in revised set of compliances and ‘Late Submission Fee’ (LSF) for reporting delays.

2. HOW WOULD THE REVISED OVERSEAS INVESTMENT RULES OPERATE?

In line with amendment to Section 6 of FEMA in 2015, the changes are brought about both by the Government and RBI in the following manner on 22nd August, 2022:

Title

Content

Notified by

FEM (Overseas Investment) Rules,
2022

Dealing with Non-Debt
Instruments

Central Government [Notification
No. G.S.R. 646(E).
]

FEM (Overseas Investment) Regulations,
2022

Dealing with Debt
Instruments

RBI [Notification No.
FEMA 400/2022-RB.
]

FEM (Overseas Investment) Directions,
2022

Directions to be
followed by Authorised Dealer-Banks

RBI [Annexed to AP DIR
Circular No. 12.
]

Consequential amendments have also been made to the Master Direction on Reporting under FEMA and the Master Direction on Liberalised Remittance Scheme (LRS).

3. WHAT IS COVERED BY OVERSEAS INVESTMENT?

Overseas Investment (“OI”) means Financial Commitment (“FC”) and Overseas Portfolio Investment (“OPI”) by a person resident in India.

FC, in turn, means the aggregate amount of investment made by a person resident in India by way of:

– Overseas Direct Investment (“ODI”),

– Debt (other than OPI) in a foreign entity or entities in which ODI is made, and

 – Non-fund-based facilities to or on behalf of such foreign entity or entities.

The total FC made by an Indian entity in all the foreign entities taken together at the time of undertaking such commitment cannot exceed 400% of its net worth as on the date of the last audited balance sheet or as directed by RBI.

It should be noted that the erstwhile regulations allowed unexhausted limit of holding as well as subsidiary for reckoning the limit of 400% of the net worth of the ‘Indian Party’. Now, only the net worth of the investor entity (Indian Entity) is to be
considered.

Corporate guarantees by specified group companies are allowed. However, they will be counted towards the utilisation of such group companies’ financial commitment.

4. WHAT DOES ODI COVER?

Rule 2(1)(q) of the OI Rules defines ‘Overseas Direct Investment’. Accordingly, ODI means investment by way of:

a.    Acquisition of unlisted equity capital of a foreign entity, or

b.    Subscription as a part of the Memorandum of Association of a foreign entity, or

c.    Investment in 10% or more of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity, or

d.    Investment with control, where investment is less than 10% of the paid-up equity capital of a listed foreign entity.

Control and Equity Capital are important terms, explained later in this article.

Further, once an investment is classified as ODI, the investment shall continue to be treated as ODI even if the investment falls below 10% of the paid-up equity capital of the foreign entity or if the investor loses control of the foreign entity.

5. WHAT ARE THE CHANGES IN ODI RULES AS COMPARED TO EARLIER?

The erstwhile regulations referred to ODI as Direct investment outside India by an Indian Party in a Joint Venture (JV) and Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS). All these terms have undergone a change.

JV/WOS is substituted under the new regime with the concept of ‘foreign entity’, which means an entity formed or registered or incorporated outside India with limited liability. By implication, investment cannot be made in any foreign entity with unlimited liability. It includes an entity in an International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in India.

The concept of Indian Party (IP), where all the investors from India in a foreign entity were together considered as IP, has been substituted under the new regime with the concept of ‘Indian entity’, which shall mean a Company or a Limited Liability Partnership or a Partnership Firm or a Body Corporate incorporated under any law for the time being in force. Each investor entity shall be separately considered an Indian entity.

Further, there was lack of clarity between ODI and portfolio investment under the erstwhile regulations. ODI and OPI have now been demarcated into distinct baskets of investments which is explained below.

6. WHAT IS THE CRITERIA TO DETERMINE AN ODI INVESTMENT VIS-À-VIS LISTED AND UNLISTED ENTITIES?

One of the major clarifications emerging in the new rules is that any investment (even one share) in an unlisted entity would be considered as ODI. This was not clear in the erstwhile regime, and each AD Bank was applying different criteria for the same.

Further, an investment in a listed entity of over 10% will now be considered as ODI even if there is no control, while an investment of any limit in a listed entity which provides control would be considered as ODI.

The following flow-chart depicts the difference between ODI and OPI in the case of investment in equity capital:

Control has become a key factor in determining whether an investment is ODI. ‘Control’ has been defined to mean:

– the right to appoint a majority of the directors, or

– to control management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons, acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly,

– including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders’ agreements or voting agreements that entitle them to 10% or more of voting rights or in any other manner in the entity.

The above wording makes it clear that ‘Control’ should be looked at in substance and not on a technical basis.

As per the new rules, ODI covers investment in ‘Equity Capital’ which is defined to mean equity shares or perpetual capital; or instruments that are irredeemable; or contribution to non-debt capital of a foreign entity in the nature of fully and compulsorily convertible instruments. What is meant by perpetual capital is not clarified – but it seems to suggest that equity capital would be capital which is for the long term and not a specific period as it would be in the case of redeemable instruments.

7. WHAT ARE THE IMPORTANT CHANGES AS FAR AS STRUCTURING OF OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS GO?

One of the important changes brought about relates to subsidiary or step-down subsidiary (SDS) of the foreign entity. Subsidiary means a first-level subsidiary of a foreign entity. SDS means second and further level subsidiaries beneath the first level subsidiary. Subsidiary or SDS of a foreign entity is defined as an entity in which the foreign entity has ‘Control’. It should be noted that ‘Control’ is the only criterion for determining whether an entity is a subsidiary/ SDS of the foreign entity. Hence, where the foreign entity does not have ‘Control’, it will not be treated as SDS. The rules provide that in such a case, even no reporting is required.

However, it has been provided that the subsidiary and SDS shall comply with the structural requirements of the foreign entity, i.e., it should have limited liability. At the same time, it has been provided that only ‘subsidiaries and SDS’ are required to comply with the structural requirements of the foreign entity. Hence, it can be inferred that the foreign entity may invest in an entity with unlimited liability if the entity does not fall within the definition of subsidiary/ SDS, i.e., the foreign entity does not have control over such underlying entity.

Another important change is the introduction of ‘strategic sector’. The above requirement of limited liability for a subsidiary / SDS has been exempted for a foreign entity hiving its core activity in a ‘strategic sector’ which shall include energy and natural resources sectors such as Oil, Gas, Coal, Mineral Ores, submarine cable system and start-ups and any other sector or sub-sector as deemed fit by the Central Government. ODI in these sectors can also be made in unincorporated entities as well as part of consortiums (in the case of the submarine cable systems sector).

As can be noticed above, strategic sectors include startup sector. However, any ODI in startups shall not be made out of funds borrowed from others in accordance with Rule 19(2) of OI Rules.

8. WHAT DOES OPI MEAN?

OPI means investment in foreign securities other than ODI. It does not include investment in any unlisted debt instruments, or any security issued by a person resident in India (except for those in an IFSC).

More importantly, FC does not include OPI investment; hence the overall limit of 400% of net worth does not apply to OPI investments.

Thus, any investment less than 10% in a listed entity without control would be outside the ambit of FC and its limits. However, there are caps on OPI investments which are given below:

An Indian entity can invest only 50% of its net worth as on the date of its last audited balance sheet under the OPI route. A resident individual can invest up to the limit as per LRS, i.e., $ 250,000 per financial year.

OPI by a resident in India in the equity capital of a listed entity, even after its delisting, shall continue to be treated as OPI until any further investment is made in the entity.

Minimum qualifications shares, or shares or interest acquired by resident individuals by way of sweat equity shares or under Employee Stock Ownership Plan or Employee Benefits Scheme up to 10% of the equity capital of a foreign entity, whether listed or unlisted and without control shall be considered as OPI.

Any investment made overseas under Schedule IV of the OI Rules in securities as stipulated by SEBI, Mutual Funds (MFs), Venture Capital Funds (VCFs) and Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) registered with SEBI shall also be considered as OPI.

9. WHAT CHANGES HAVE COME IN FOR INVESTMENTS THAT CAN BE MADE IN FOREIGN ENTITIES UNDERTAKING FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTIVITIES?

For an Indian entity engaged in financial services activity in India, there are no significant changes. Such an entity can make ODI in a foreign entity which is directly or indirectly engaged in financial services activity subject to the erstwhile conditions of a) a 3-year profit track record; b) being registered or regulated by a financial services regulator in India and c) having obtained the required approval for the activity from the regulators both in India and the host country. However, as per the new rules, in the case of an ODI made in an IFSC, such approval would have to be provided within 45 days from the date of application; else, it would be considered that such approval has been granted. Banks and NBFIs regulated by RBI are not included in these regulations and would need to follow the conditions laid down by RBI in this regard.

Further, until now, only Indian entities in the financial services sector were allowed to invest in foreign entities engaged in financial services. As per new ODI Rules, Indian entities which are not involved in financial services activities are also permitted to invest in foreign entities engaged in financial services (except banking and insurance) subject to only one condition – that such entities have earned net profits during the last three financial years.

This single condition also has been removed for Indian entities that invest in an entity in an IFSC engaged in financial services activity.

Even Resident Individuals (RI) are allowed to make ODI in a foreign entity in an IFSC, including in an entity engaged in financial services activity (except for banking and insurance). However, in such a case, where the RI controls the foreign entity, such entity cannot have a subsidiary or SDS outside the IFSC.

Further, what activities would constitute ‘Financial services activity’ was not clear in the erstwhile regulations as the term was not defined. However, the new rules provide that a foreign entity shall be considered to be engaged in the business of financial services activity if it undertakes an activity which, if it were carried out by an entity in India, would require registration with or is regulated by a financial sector regulator in India.

10. CAN A GIFT OF OVERSEAS SHARES BE RECEIVED OR MADE BY A RESIDENT INDIVIDUAL?

Foreign securities can be acquired by a Resident Individual (RI) as a gift from another person resident in India who is a relative as per clause (77) of section 2 of the Companies Act. Gift of shares can also be received from a person resident outside India, but only in accordance with provisions of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (FCRA) and the rules and regulations made thereunder.

At the same time, RIs are not allowed to gift an overseas investment to a person resident outside India.

11. WHAT ARE THE CHANGES FOR OVERSEAS INVESTMENT BY A RESIDENT INDIVIDUAL?

Apart from changes in acquiring shares by way of gift and in a foreign entity in an IFSC as explained above, the following are the other main changes for overseas investment by a RI:

a. Step-down subsidiary (SDS) in case of ODI

Under FEMA 120, individuals investing under the ODI Route were not allowed to invest in a structure which would have a subsidiary or an SDS. Under the new regulations, a subsidiary or SDS of a foreign entity is allowed where RI does not have control of the foreign entity.

Moreover, in case of acquisition by way of inheritance or sweat equity shares or qualification shares or shares or interest under ESOP or Employee Benefits Scheme, ODI can be in a foreign entity engaged in financial services activity or can also have a subsidiary or SDS even if RI has control in such foreign entity.

b. Certain investments deemed to be OPI

Acquisition of sweat equity shares or qualification shares or shares or interest under ESOP or Employee Benefits Scheme, amounting to less than 10% of equity capital of a foreign entity without control, will be classified as OPI even if such entity is unlisted.

Similarly, a contribution by an RI to an investment fund or vehicle set up in an IFSC would be considered an OPI.

c. Inheritance of foreign securities under the ODI route is also now expressly provided.

12. IS ROUND TRIPPING ALLOWED UNDER THE NEW RULES?
Round tripping was not allowed earlier without prior approval of the RBI. It was not considered a bona fide business activity by RBI, which was the prerequisite for an ODI investment. While this condition continues, bona fide business activity has now been exhaustively defined under the new rules. It simply means an activity permissible under any law in force in India and in the host jurisdiction.

Rule 19(3) now prohibits investment back into India in cases where the resultant structure has more than two layers of subsidiaries.

The combined reading of the definition of bona fide business activity and limitation in restriction under Rule 19(3) above suggests that round tripping is now allowed. However, it has not been expressly provided for in the Rules.

13. ARE THERE ANY CHANGES IN THE ACQUISITION OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY OUTSIDE INDIA?

While the rules for the acquisition of Immovable Property (IP) outside India have remained largely the same, the following changes need to be noted as per Rule 21 of the OI Rules read along with amendments in the LRS Master Direction:

a.    IP can be purchased under the LRS Scheme as earlier. Further, funds can also be consolidated in respect of relatives as earlier. However, the requirement for such relatives to be co-owners has been removed now.

b.    A person resident in India can acquire IP now out of income or sale proceeds of assets (other than ODI) acquired overseas as per the provisions of the FEMA.

c.    Earlier only a company having an office outside India could acquire IP outside India for the business and residential purposes of its staff. This has now been allowed for an Indian Entity which has a wider meaning now, as explained earlier.

d.    In the erstwhile regulations for buying IP outside India, it was permitted to acquire property jointly with a relative who is a PROI, given that there should be no remittance from India. This condition (of no remittance) seems to have now been removed.

14. WHAT ABOUT INVESTMENTS MADE UNDER THE ERSTWHILE REGULATIONS?

Rule 6 prescribes that any investment or financial commitment outside India made in accordance with the Act or the Rules or Regulations made thereunder and held as on the date of publication of these new rules shall be deemed to have been made under the new Rules and Regulations.

Conversely, it has been provided that if any investment was in violation of the earlier regulations it will remain a violation and may attract consequences as if the old rules are still applicable.

15. WHAT ARE THE CHANGES MADE FOR INVESTMENT IN IFSC?

There are several relaxations made under the new OI Rules in respect of investment in an IFSC. Fundamentally a foreign entity is defined to include an entity set up in an IFSC. Thus, investment into an entity in an IFSC would be considered ODI. At the same time, overseas investment by a financial institution in an IFSC is outside the ambit of the OI Rules.

Specific relaxations have also been made for investment by an Indian entity and RI in an entity engaged in financial services activity in an IFSC, as explained in reply to query 9 above. Such an investment is now allowed by an Indian entity not engaged in financial services activity within India without any attendant conditions.

16. ARE THERE ANY CHANGES IN THE PRICING GUIDELINES?

Earlier the pricing guidelines stated that investment in a JV/WOS outside India could happen at the value arrived at as prescribed by FEMA 120 or even at a value lower than that. Also, the transfer of investment in a JV/WOS could happen at the fair valuation as per FEMA 120 or even at a value higher than that. However, the new OI Rules prescribe that the pricing for investment as well as transfer shall be subject to a price arrived at on an arm’s length basis, taking into consideration the valuation as per any internationally accepted pricing methodology. Further, AD Banks are required to put in a board-approved policy with respect to the documents that need to be taken by them with respect to the pricing and also provide for scenarios where such valuation may not be insisted upon.

17. WHAT ARE THE MODES AVAILABLE FOR FINANCIAL COMMITMENT BY AN INDIAN ENTITY OTHER THAN BY WAY OF EQUITY CAPITAL?

Separate Regulations have been issued by RBI (OI Regulations) for investment in Debt Instruments issued by a foreign entity or to extend non-fund-based commitment to or on behalf of a foreign entity, including the overseas step-down subsidiaries of such Indian entity, subject to the following conditions:

i) The Indian entity is eligible to make ODI,

ii) Such an entity has made ODI in the foreign entity,

iii) The Indian entity has acquired control in such a foreign entity at the time of making such FC.

FC by an Indian entity by way of debt, guarantee, pledge or charge and by way of enabling deferred payment are covered in Regulations 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the OI Regulations. Further, FC under all these regulations would be considered part of the overall limit for FC as stipulated by the OI Rules.

18. IS DEFERRED PAYMENT ALLOWED NOW? WILL IT ALSO COVER CONDITIONAL PAYMENT?

Regulation 7 of OI Regulations now allows acquisition or transfer through deferred payment. This was earlier under the approval route. The deferred consideration shall be treated as part of non-fund-based commitment till the final payment is made. It is provided that payment of consideration may be deferred provided:

i)    Deferment is for a definite period,

ii)    Deferment should be provided for in the agreement,

iii)    Equivalent amount of foreign securities shall be transferred or issued upfront, and

iv)    Full consideration shall be paid finally as per applicable pricing guidelines.

Under conditional payment, the amount of payment may vary, or payment may not be made at all. Whereas the above-mentioned conditions for deferred payment require upfront transfer/issue and valuation and also eventual payment of full consideration as per pricing guidelines. Hence, conditional payment may not be allowed as part of deferred payment.

19. OTHER CHANGES

Apart from the above changes, the new OI Rules have also brought in changes with respect to the following:

a. Requirement of a NOC as per Rule 10 of the OI Rules by an Indian entity under investigation or having an account termed as NPA or classified as a willful defaulter.

b. Restructuring of the Balance Sheet of the foreign entity has been allowed subject to conditions as provided in Rule 18 of the OI Rules.

c. Reporting for OI has been changed, and new forms have been issued – ODI has to be reported in Form FC, while OPI has to be reported in Form OPI by a person resident in India other than individuals.

One must keep in mind the above changes before entering into a Financial Commitment in respect of a foreign entity. As mentioned earlier, there are certain issues with regard to the new regulations and an analysis of all such issues is beyond the scope of this article.

PMLA – Magna Carta – Part 1

BACKGROUND
On 27th July, 2022, the Supreme Court of India gave a landmark ruling in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of India [2022] 140 taxmann.com 610 (SC) on various aspects and concepts involving dicey provisions of The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”). This decision put to rest raging controversies on various issues agitated in a huge batch of petitions, appeals and cases.

DICEY ISSUES
The issues agitated before and examined by the Supreme Court covered as many as twenty significant aspects of PMLA. Some of these had arisen from decisions of various High Courts rendered a long time ago and were pending the final decision of the Apex Court. Few crucial aspects related to parameters of the concept of money-laundering, punishment for money-laundering, confirmation of provisional attachment, search and seizure, arrest, the burden of proof, bail, powers of authorities regarding summons, production of evidence and Special Courts.

These aspects were agitated before the Supreme Court in as many as over 240 civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals and special leave petitions (SLPs) including transferred petitions and cases.

APPROACH OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court was seized of various civil and criminal writ petitions, appeals, SLPs, transferred petitions and transferred cases raising various questions of law. Such questions pertained to constitutional validity and interpretation of certain provisions of the other statutes, including the Customs Act, the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). However, the Apex Court decided to focus primarily on the challenge to the validity of certain important provisions of PMLA and their interpretation.

In addition to ‘challenge to constitutional validity’ and ‘interpretation of provisions of PMLA’, there were SLPs filed against various orders of High Courts and subordinate Courts all over the country. In all such SLPs, prayer for grant of bail or quashing or discharge was rejected by the Supreme Court. The government of India, too, had filed appeals and SLPs. There were also a few transfer petitions filed before the Supreme Court under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India.

Instead of dealing with facts and issues in each case, the Supreme Court confined itself to examining the challenge to the relevant provisions of PMLA, being a question of law raised by parties.

The question as to whether some of the amendments to the PMLA could not have been enacted by the Parliament by way of a Finance Act was not examined by the Supreme Court. The same was left open for being examined along with the decision of the Larger Bench (seven Judges) of the Supreme Court in Rojer Mathew (2020) 6 SCC 1.

Consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court, the author, too, has decided merely to give here the gist of the conclusions reached by the Supreme Court on crucial aspects, as follows.

DEFINITIONS
Certain substantive aspects of the following important definitions in PMLA were examined by the Supreme Court.

  • “investigation”
  • “proceeds of crime”

As regards the definition of “investigation”, it was concluded that the term “proceedings” [section 2(1)(na) of PMLA] is contextual and is required to be given expansive meaning to include the inquiry procedure followed by the Authorities of Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Adjudicating Authority, and the Special Court.

Likewise, it has been held that the term “investigation” does not limit itself to the matter of investigation concerning the offence under PMLA and is interchangeable with the function of “inquiry” to be undertaken by the Authorities under PMLA.

As regards the definition of “proceeds of crime”, it was held that the Explanation inserted w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 does not travel beyond the main provision predicating tracking and reaching up to the property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence.

OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING

The concept of “money-laundering” is pivotal to all other provisions of PMLA. This concept was rationalised by inserting an Explanation w.e.f. 1st August, 2019. The Supreme Court examined all nuances of “money-laundering” and held that “money-laundering” has a wider reach so as to capture every process and activity, direct or indirect, in dealing with the proceeds of crime and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy. The Supreme Court opined that the Explanation does not expand the purport of Section 3 (Offence of money-laundering) but is only clarificatory in nature.

The Supreme Court clarified that the word “and” preceding the expression “projecting or claiming” occurring in Section 3 must be construed as “or”, to give full play to the said provision so as to include “every” process or activity indulged into by anyone. According to the Supreme Court, “projecting or claiming the property as untainted property” would constitute an offence of money-laundering on a stand-alone basis, being an independent process or activity. Being a clarificatory amendment, it would make no difference even if the Explanation was introduced by Finance Act or otherwise.

The Supreme Court very aptly rejected the interpretation suggested by the petitioners, that only upon projecting or claiming the property in question as untainted property that the offence of money-laundering would be complete. According to the Supreme Court, after insertion of the Explanation to section 3, this suggestion was not tenable. Indeed, it was explained that the offence of money-laundering is dependent on the illegal gain of property as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. This proposition was elaborated by the Supreme Court with the observation that the Authorities under PMLA cannot prosecute any person on a notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before the competent forum. In view of the Supreme Court, if the person is finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or where the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-laundering against him or anyone claiming such property being the property linked to the stated scheduled offence through him.

CONFIRMATION OF PROVISIONAL ATTACHMENT
In various appeals and petitions, the constitutional validity of section 5 of PMLA authorising provisional attachment was challenged. After examining the relevant legal position, it was held by the Supreme Court that section 5 is constitutionally valid. According to the Supreme Court, provisional attachment provides for a balancing arrangement to secure the interests of the person and also ensures that the proceeds of crime remain available to be dealt with in the manner provided by PMLA. Elaborating this, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the procedural safeguards as envisaged by law are effective measures to protect the interests of the person concerned.

The challenge to the validity of section 8(4) of PMLA authorising seizure of property attachment which is confirmed, was also rejected by the Supreme Court subject to Section 8 being invoked and operated in accordance with the meaning assigned to it.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In several petitions, PMLA authorities’ powers of search and seizure were challenged as unconstitutional to the extent of deletion of the Proviso to section 17 which dispensed with report or complaint to the Magistrate. This challenge was also rejected by the Supreme Court on the ground that there are stringent safeguards provided in section 17 and the rules framed thereunder.

A similar challenge to the deletion of Proviso to section 18(1) dealing with the search of persons was also rejected on the ground that there are similar safeguards provided in section 18. Accordingly, it was held that the amended provision does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness.

ARREST
The challenge to the constitutional validity of section 19 providing powers to arrest was rejected on the ground that there are stringent safeguards provided in section 19. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that section 19 does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness.

BURDEN OF PROOF
Section 24 of PMLA mandates a reverse burden of proof. In respect to the challenge to the validity of this provision, the Supreme Court held that section 24 has reasonable nexus with the purposes and objects sought to be achieved by PMLA and cannot be regarded as manifestly arbitrary or unconstitutional.

SPECIAL COURTS TO TRY OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING
Section 44 of PMLA provides for trial of the offence of money-laundering and scheduled offence by Special Courts.

As regards the challenge to the validity of section 44, the Supreme Court did not find merit in such a challenge (that was based on the premise that section 44 was arbitrary or unconstitutional). However, it observed that the eventualities referred to in section 44 shall be dealt with by the Court concerned and by the Authority concerned in accordance with the interpretation given in this judgement.

OFFENCES TO BE COGNISABLE AND NON-BAILABLE
Section 45 of PMLA deals with this aspect. Earlier, in Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. UoI (2018) 11SCC 1, the Supreme Court had declared the twin conditions in section 45(1) of PMLA, as it stood at the relevant time, as unconstitutional. However, now the Supreme Court has held that the said decision did not obliterate section 45 from the statute book; and that it was open to the Parliament to cure the defect noted by the Supreme Court in the earlier decision to revive the same provision in the existing form.

To elaborate this, the Supreme Court observed that it does not agree with the observations in Nikesh Tarachand Shah distinguishing the ratio of the Constitution Bench decision in Kartar Singh, and other observations suggestive of doubting the perception of Parliament in regard to the seriousness of the offence of money-laundering including about it posing a serious threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the country. It was further elaborated by the Supreme Court that section 45, as applicable post-2019 amendment, is reasonable and has direct nexus with the purposes and objects to be achieved by PMLA and does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness.

As regards the prayer for grant of bail, it was explained by the Supreme Court that irrespective of the nature of proceedings, including those under section 438 of CrPC or even upon invoking the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts, the underlying principles and rigours of section 45 may apply.

It was also explained that the beneficial provision of section 436A of CrPC (which provides a maximum period for which an undertrial can be detained) could be invoked by the accused arrested for an offence punishable under PMLA.

POWERS OF AUTHORITIES REGARDING SUMMONS AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCE

Section 50 of PMLA deals with the powers of authorities regarding summons, compelling production of records, etc.

In this connection, the Supreme Court held that the process envisaged by section 50 is in the nature of an inquiry against the proceeds of crime and is not an “investigation” in the strict sense of the term for initiating prosecution; and the authorities under PMLA referred to in section 48 are not police officers as such.

It was explained by the Supreme Court that the statements recorded by the Authorities under PMLA are not hit by Article 20(3) (no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself) or Article 21 of the Constitution of India (Protection of life and personal liberty).

ENFORCEMENT CASE INFORMATION REPORT (ECIR)

In respect of the plea that a copy of ECIR should be supplied to the arrested person, the Supreme Court held that in view of the special mechanism envisaged by PMLA, ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under CrPC. It was explained that ECIR is an internal document of the ED and the fact that an FIR in respect of a a scheduled offence has not been recorded does not come in the way of the authorities referred to in section 48 to commence inquiry/investigation for initiating “civil action” of provisional attachment of property being proceeds of crime.

It was held that the supply of a copy of ECIR in every case to the arrested person is not mandatory and it is sufficient that at the time of arrest, ED discloses the grounds of such arrest.

Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that, when the arrested person is produced before the Special Court, it is open to the Special Court to look into the relevant records presented by the authorised representative of ED for answering the issue of the need for his/her continued detention in connection with the offence of money-laundering.

On this issue, it was suggested by the Supreme Court that even though the ED manual is not to be published, being an internal departmental document issued for the guidance of the ED officials, the department ought to explore the desirability of placing information on its website which may broadly outline the scope of the authority of the functionaries under the Act and measures to be adopted by them as also the options and remedies available to the person concerned before the Authority and the Special Court.

PUNISHMENT
As regards the plea about the proportionality of punishment with reference to the nature of the scheduled offence, it was held by the Supreme Court that such plea is wholly unfounded and stands rejected.

WAY FORWARD
What next after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court ruling?

Indeed, in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution, the propositions affirmed by the Supreme Court are now binding on all courts in India.

That calls for clear direction for the way forward. The way forward post 27th July, 2022 is outlined by the Supreme Court by way of following interim measures for four weeks from 27th July, 2022.

  • The private parties in the transferred petitions are at liberty to pursue the proceedings pending before the High Court. The contentions other than those dealt with in this judgement, regarding validity and interpretation of the concerned PMLA provision, are kept open, to be decided in those proceedings on their own merits.

  • Writ petitions which involve issues relating to Finance Bill/Money Bill are to be heard along with the Rojer Mathew case.

  • In the writ petitions in which further relief of bail, discharge or quashing was prayed, the private parties are at liberty to pursue further reliefs before the appropriate forums, leaving all contentions in that regard open, to be decided on its own merits.

  • The writ petitions in which validity and interpretation of other statutes (such as Indian Penal Code, CrPC, Customs Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, Companies Act, 2013, CGST Act) were challenged, were directed to be placed before appropriate Bench “group-wise or Act-wise”.

  • The parties are at liberty to mention for early listing of the concerned case including for continuation/vacation of the interim relief.

[Some of the interesting questions and answers arising from reading of this judgment will be dealt with by the Author in the next issue of the BCAJ]

References:

[Readers are advised to read the following two articles published in the BCAJ in 2021 written by Dr. Dilip K. Sheth about PMLA for more insight. The said articles can be accessed on bcajonline.org]

1.    OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING: FAR-EACHING IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT AMENDMENT – Published in January, 2021.

2. ‘PROCEEDS OF CRIME’ – PMLA DEFINITION UNDERGOES RETROSPECTIVE SEA CHANGE – Published in February, 2021.  

Editor’s Note: At the time of going to press, the Supreme Court, on 26th August 2022, stated that two aspects of its 27th July 2022 judgement required reconsideration (i.e. (i) the finding that ECIR is not FIR and hence no mandatory need to provide it to the accused; and (ii) the negation of the cardinal principle of “presumption of innocence”).

CORPORATE LAW CORNER PART B : INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

5 Vidarbha Industries Power Limited vs.
Axis Bank Limited
Supreme Court of India Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Civil Appeal No. 4633 of 2021

FACTS
This case is an appeal u/s 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, against a judgment and order dated 2nd March, 2021 passed by the NCLAT, New Delhi in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 117 of 2021, whereby the ld. Tribunal refused to stay the proceedings initiated by the Respondent, Axis Bank Limited, against the appellant for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) u/s 7 of the IBC as the Tribunal was of the opinion that the appellant has no justification in stalling the process and seeking a stay of CIRP, which in essence has manifested in blocking the passing of the order of admission of application of the respondent u/s 7 of I&B Code.

QUESTION OF LAW
Is section 7(5)(a) of IBC a mandatory or a discretionary provision?

RULING
In this case, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) proceeded on the premise that an application must necessarily be entertained u/s 7(5)(a) of the IBC if a debt existed and the Corporate Debtor was in default of payment of debt. In other words, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) found Section 7(5)(a) of the IBC to be mandatory, with which the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) agreed since the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) did not consider the merits of the contention of the Respondent Corporate Debtor. In other words, is the expression ‘may’ to be construed as ‘shall’, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case?

Even though Section 7(5)(a) of the IBC may confer discretionary power on the Adjudicating Authority, such discretionary power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. If the facts and circumstances warrant the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, discretion would have to be exercised in that manner.

The existence of financial debt and a default in payment thereof only gave the financial creditor the right to apply for initiation of CIRP. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) was required to apply its mind to the relevant factors, including the feasibility of initiation of CIRP against an electricity generating company that operated under statutory control, the impact of MERC’s appeal pending in this Court, the order of APTEL and the overall financial health and viability of the Corporate Debtor under its existing management.

HELD
In the present case, the Supreme Court has set aside the verdicts of NCLT and NCLAT, refusing to stay the insolvency proceedings sought to be initiated by Axis Bank. The Court held that the power of the NCLT to admit an application for initiation of the CIRP by a financial creditor u/s 7(5)(a) of IBC is discretionary and not mandatory.

THE WIDE NET CAST BY THE STRINGENT ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW – COVERS CORPORATE FRAUDS AND SECURITIES LAWS VIOLATIONS

BACKGROUND
Hardly a week (or less) goes by when we read/hear news about cases being launched under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (“the Act”) on company promoters/executives, politicians, celebrities, apart from various other groups. Arrests often accompany these. The dreaded Enforcement Directorate (ED) is seen as the lead organisation carrying out such action. This may rightly be seen as strange. It may appear that serious crimes that were seen to be covered by this Act may have been happening regularly, and this does not match with one’s understanding of events generally or even in the specific case if one reads the news report in detail.

More particularly, in the context of the topic of this feature, the situation sounds very surprising since action under this Act is taken for insider trading, stock market price manipulation, corporate frauds, etc. This is in parallel and in addition to the action that SEBI may have initiated.

As one would remember, and this is written right in the preamble of this Act, this law has been enacted pursuant to the fact that our country is part of the UN Political Declaration on this matter. Furthermore, the core focus of this declaration is use of anti-money laundering laws to tackle drug trafficking. This has been extended to money laundering relating to terrorism, armed action against the state and similar very serious and heinous acts. Considering the seriousness of the crime, the powers given to the authorities, as we will see in more detail later herein, are also wide and even peremptory. The punishment is also very severe. The question is whether such powers and punishment should be applied even to relatively far less severe crimes. And more so when there are already provisions in law to punish such crimes. More focus has been made herein on violations of securities laws and corporate laws.

SCHEME OF THE ACT
While a detailed analysis of this law and its background is beyond the scope of this feature, an overview of some relevant provisions is given herein to see the implications to violations of securities laws and corporate laws.

The preamble, as stated earlier, states that the law has been enacted pursuant to the Political Declarations of UN of 1990 and 1998 to the member states. There are several definitions, but the most relevant for this discussion are two. The definition of “scheduled offences” refers to the various offences listed in the Schedule to the Act. The Schedule consists of 3 Parts (A-C), and it is specified that in respect of offences listed in Part B, which consists only of certain offences under the Customs Act, the Act would apply only if the total value involved in such offence is Rs. 1 crore or more. By implication, all the remaining offences do not have any minimum amount for the law to apply.

Then comes the more substantial definition which is “proceeds of crime”. The definition is fairly elaborate but in substance, it covers those properties derived from the scheduled offences or the value of such property. Properties derived even from criminal activities relatable to the scheduled offences are also covered.
 
Section 3 defines what constitutes the offence of money laundering. The section is very widely worded. It covers any activity related to the proceeds of crime and includes its “concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property”. Every person involved in any such activity relating to the proceeds of crime is deemed to have committed the offence of money laundering. While we will not go into more details, suffice here to emphasise that it is very widely worded. To repeat, mere possession of proceeds of crime, is deemed to be money laundering.

Section 4 delves on punishment for money laundering, which is minimum of three years of rigorous imprisonment and can extend to seven/ten years. A fine is also leviable. Note that there are no provisions for the compounding of the offence. No minimum amount needs to be involved (except for the lone exception of specified offences under the Customs Act) for the punishment to be attracted.

There are detailed provisions for attachment, retention and confiscation of the property involved in money laundering.

Then there are provisions on how the guilt of money laundering is determined. There is certain presumption made with respect to records or property found during a survey or a search. There is a presumption that the proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering. The conditions of grant of bail after arrest are stricter than otherwise. It is clarified that “the officers authorised under this Act are empowered to arrest an accused without warrant” subject to the satisfaction of specified conditions.

Finally, the non-obstante provision in Section 71 says that the Act will have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law.

The above overview should be sufficient to indicate that wide powers are given to authorities, that the crimes are defined widely, that there is almost a ‘presumed guilty’ unless proven innocent stance in the law, and finally, the punishment is very stringent and unforgiving.

Now let us see what are the scheduled offences, i.e. the offences in respect of which properties are derived from are deemed to be “proceeds of crime” and the money laundering in respect of which is then punishable under law. While the Schedule is very long, the focus here is on offences under securities laws and certain corporate laws.

SCHEDULED OFFENCES
The Schedule to the Act lists down, in three parts, the offences that are deemed to be scheduled offences. To reiterate, the properties derived from such offences are deemed to be proceeds of crime. Money laundering, which includes mere possession apart from concealment and even use, would be in respect of such proceeds of crime. For example, paragraph 2 of Part A deals with various offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The property derived from such offences would be proceeds of crime, and their concealment, use, possession, etc., are treated as money laundering and punishable under the Act.

The Schedule contains many other offences. There are offences relating to terrorism and also under the Arms Act. Several offences under the Indian Penal Code are covered. But many relatively lesser serious crimes are covered, such as those under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, Trademarks Act, etc.

However, let us specifically reproduce those offences under the securities/corporate laws, which we can focus on in a little more detail. These are as follows:

1. Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 dealing with frauds.

2. Section 12A (r.w.s. 24) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, dealing with manipulative and deceptive devices, insider trading and substantial acquisition of securities and control.

While it may appear that only two offences are covered, a closer look at the provisions shows that the list of acts contained in these provisions may be much wider.

Section 447 deals with acts of various kinds in relation to a company that are deemed to be fraud and that, provided that the fraud is of at least a minimum amount, are severely punishable. This provision is wide enough. But it is also seen that several other provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 deem certain other acts to be fraud for the purposes of Section 447. Furnishing of false or incorrect particulars or suppression of material information in relation to the registration of a company is liable for action u/s 447. Misstatements of the specified kind in a prospectus, Section 34 states, is liable for action u/s 447. Then there are Section 448 false statements, etc. in returns, reports, certificates, etc., under the Act or rules made thereunder are liable for punishment u/s 447. There are several such other provisions. There could be two views on whether these other provisions which make respective acts/omissions liable u/s 447 can be deemed to be also offences u/s 447 and hence become a scheduled offence for the purposes of the Act on money laundering.

But Section 12A of the SEBI Act lists several acts in the section itself. Various forms of manipulative and fraudulent acts, insider trading, etc., are covered. Section 12A(a) states that the various manipulative and other acts that are in contravention of the Act or even the ‘rules or the regulations made there under’ are covered. The regulations contain offences of a very wide range. Similar is the case of insider trading. These regulations could apply not just to listed companies and intermediaries but practically every person associated with the capital market.

What is more interesting is that the acquisition of control or securities more than the specified percentage of equity share capital are also covered. The SEBI (SAST) Regulations specify various percentage which include 2%, 5%, 25%, etc.

Thus, a wide range of corporate and securities law violations are covered. Dealing with the proceeds of crime from such violations would amount to money laundering and would result in the heavy hand of the law coming down on them. Now let us consider how these provisions could apply to such offences under securities/corporate laws.

APPLICATION TO SECURITIES/CORPORATE LAWS AND CONCERNS
As discussed, a wide variety of violations under the SEBI Act and the Companies Act, 2013 have been included as scheduled offences. Some questions and concerns arise as to their application.

The punishment under the Act would be over and above the penal action under the respective SEBI Act and the Companies Act. For example, a fraud u/s 447 would be punished (and quite severely at that) under that section as also under the Act. This also applies to all the other violations.

A question may arise whether this amounts to punishing the same offence twice? As a matter of principle, it is not. For example, insider trading is a contravention under the SEBI Act read with the relevant SEBI Regulations. However, when it comes to money laundering, it is about the act of concealment of the property, projecting or claiming the property as untainted, etc. So, strictly viewed, these are two different offences. However, in reality, the line is very thin and perhaps non-existent under most circumstances.

Take an example of an inside trader. Mr. A, using unpublished price-sensitive information (UPSI), deals in securities and makes profits of, say, Rs. 10 lakhs. This makes him liable for penal and other actions under the SEBI Act, which action may include disgorgement of the profits made, penalty, debarment and even prosecution. However, the Rs. 10 lakhs profits are also the proceeds of crime. And owing to the wide wording of the offence of money laundering, mere fact of possessing such profits, without doing anything further would make him liable under the Act. Even its use is deemed to be money laundering.

The same concern arises in the case of, say, price manipulation and making profits therefrom. SEBI would act against such persons in various ways, but the mere fact of possessing or using such profits makes him liable under the Act too.

Curiously, acquisition of shares beyond specified limits and acquisition of control of a listed company is also a scheduled offence. It is often difficult to ascertain the gains, if any, on the acquisition of shares beyond specified limits. In case of acquisition of control or takeover, the person who violates the requirement of open offer avoids acquiring the specified percentage of shares at the specified price, and hence there is ostensible gain.

The question still remains. When the person is already punished for committing the original offence, should the same be also punished under the Act? This question indeed applies to the numerous other scheduled offences, which too are relatively of lesser seriousness than, say, drug trafficking and terrorism.

Arguably, the intention of the law against money laundering is to ‘follow the money’ and punish those who hide proceeds of crime or convert them into untainted money and those who help them in the process. But the fact the definition of money laundering is widely worded, the fact that the scheduled offences now cover a wide variety of violations and also the fact that the authorities are given very wide powers, and punishment is very serious, makes the law near draconian, it is submitted. Such a fear factor can only inhibit business activity. Also, the authority’s resources get diluted and spread over instead of focussing on very serious crimes. It is time that the law is taken a close second look and rewritten.

BEQUESTS AND LEGACIES UNDER WILLS – PART I

MEANING
A bequest may be defined as the property / benefits which flow under the Will from the testator’s estate to the beneficiary. A legacy also has the same meaning. Thus, they are a gift of a personal estate under a Will. Interestingly, while these terms are used extensively in the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (which governs the making of Wills in India), neither has been defined under this Act. Since making a Will is all about making a bequest or a legacy, it is important to understand the principles regarding a valid bequest, the time when it vests, etc.

VOID BEQUESTS

Although a testator can bequeath his property in any manner whatsoever, certain bequests are treated as void under the Indian Succession Act. This is to prevent an embargo upon the free circulation of property. These bequests are as follows:

(a) A bequest made to a person of a particular description who is not in existence at the time of the testator’s death. E.g., A bequeaths land to B’s eldest son. At A’s death, B has no son. The bequest is void subject to certain exceptions to this rule.

(b) A bequest made to a person not in existence at the time of the testator’s death subject to a prior bequest contained in the will. In such cases, the latter bequest would be void unless it comprises the whole of the remaining interest of the testator in the property bequeathed. E.g., X bequeaths property to B for life and after B’s death to B’s son for life. At the time of X’s death, B has no son. The bequest made to B’s son for life is not for the whole interest that remains with X. Hence, the bequest to B’s son is void.

It needs to be noted that a bequest would be void only if all the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) A prior life-interest bequest is created in favour of a person;

(ii) After the life-interest, another interest is created in favour of some other person;

(iii) That other person is not in existence at the time of the testator’s death; and

(iv) Such interest created in favour of the unborn person is not the entire remainder interest of the testator.

Thus, if any of the four conditions is not satisfied, then the bequest remains valid. For instance, if in the above illustration, B has a son at the time of X’s death, then the life-interest bequest in his favour is valid.

(c) One of the situations where a bequest is void is known as the rule against perpetuity which is almost similar to s.14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. A bequest made whereby the vesting of the property is delayed beyond the lifetime of one or more persons living at the testator’s death and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom if he attains full age, the thing bequeathed is to belong. E.g., a property is bequeathed to A for his life and after his death to B for his life; and after B’s death to such of B’s sons who shall first attain 25 years of age. A and B survive the testator. The son of B who attains 25 years may be a son born after the testator’s death, and he may not attain 25 years till more than 18 years have passed from the death of longer liver of A and B. Thus, the vesting is delayed beyond the lifetime of A and B and the minority of the sons of B. The bequest made after B’s death is void.     

(d) Where a bequest is made in favour of a class of persons and the bequest to some of the legatees is hit by the conditions specified in (b) and (c) above, then the remaining legatees would not be hit by such void conditions.

(e) If a bequest in favour of someone is void because of the conditions specified in (b) and (c) above, then any bequest contained in the same Will and which is intended to take effect upon the failure of such prior bequest would also be void. E.g., a property is bequeathed to X for his life and after his death to B for his life; and after B’s death to such of B’s sons for life who shall first attain 25 years of age and after that, to all the children of that son. Since the bequest in favour of B’s son is hit by the rule of perpetuity and hence, is void, the subsequent bequest in favour of his children is also void.

(f) A Will cannot give a direction for the accumulation of the income from a property of the testator for a period longer than eighteen years. If it contains any such direction, then at the end of eighteen years, it would be treated as if there is no such direction, and the property and the income would be disposed of. The exception to this rule is applicable for an accumulation made for the following purposes:

(i) The payment of the debts of the testator or any person who takes an interest under the Will; or

(ii) The provision of portions for the children of the testator or any person who takes an interest under the Will; or

(iii) The preservation or the maintenance of any property bequeathed.

(g) One of the interesting situations, when a bequest would be void, is a case of a bequest for charitable or religious uses. If any person, who is not a Parsi, has a nephew or a niece or any nearer relative, then he does not have any power to bequeath his property for religious or charitable uses, except under certain conditions. Thus, this provision seeks to prohibit people with close relations from bequeathing all their property to charity unless a prescribed procedure is followed.

VESTING OF LEGACIES
    
The Act also contains specific provisions in relation to the time of the vesting of the legacies. These are as under:

(a) Vested Interest: There may be situations where the possession of a legacy is postponed for certain time. In such cases, unless the Will demonstrates a contrary indication, the vesting of the bequest is immediate upon the testator’s death, although its possession or payment may be postponed. The consequence of this vesting is that even if the legatee dies without receiving the bequest, his estate would be entitled to receive the bequest. This is known as a vested interest in a legacy.

In the case of a bequest made to a class of people of a certain age, only those persons who have attained that age can claim a vested interest. E.g., if a will provides for a bequest to all persons above the age of 21, then only those persons who are above 21 have a vested interest.

(b) Contingent Interest: A contingent interest is the opposite of a vested interest. In the case of a vested interest, only the possession of the legacy is postponed, but in the case of a contingent interest, the legacy itself is in doubt, i.e., it may or may not come to the legatee. Thus, in a vested interest, the vesting is unconditional, while in a contingent interest, it is dependent upon the fulfilment of a future uncertain condition.

CONDITIONAL BEQUESTS

Conditional bequests are those bequests which take effect only if certain conditions are fulfilled. Conditional bequests should be distinguished from contingent bequests. While contingent bequests are dependent upon the happening of some events, conditional bequests require the doing or abstinence from doing certain acts.

Conditions may be of two types: conditions precedent and conditions subsequent. While conditions precedent must be fulfilled prior to the vesting of the estate, the conditions subsequent can be fulfilled even after the vesting of the estate. If the conditions are not satisfied, then the vested estate is divested. Thus, in the first case, the estate does not vest itself till compliance with the condition, while in the second case, the estate vests immediately till such time as the condition is broken, after which it is divested. The rules in relation to conditional bequests are as under:

(a) Condition Precedent

(i) A bequest conditional upon an impossible condition is void. E.g., A makes a bequest to P provided he marries his (A’s) daughter S. S is dead at the time of making the will. The bequest is void ab initio as the condition is impossible to be fulfilled. Thus, if a condition precedent is impossible to be fulfilled, then the bequest is void.

(ii) If the condition precedent is either illegal or immoral, then it results in a void bequest. E.g., A leaves Rs. 10 lakhs to C under a will if C robs a bank. The condition precedent is illegal, and hence, the bequest is void.

(iii) In the case of a condition precedent, if the condition is substantially complied with, then the condition is treated as complied with. E.g., S bequeaths Rs. 1 crore to W provided he marries with the prior consent of all his 4 uncles. At the time of W’s marriage, only 3 uncles are alive, whose consent W obtains. The condition is substantially complied. The bequest is valid.

However, if there is a condition precedent and if it is provided that in case the condition is not complied with, the property passes over to another beneficiary, then the condition must be complied with strictly.

(iv) If a bequest is made to a beneficiary only if a prior bequest fails, then the latter bequest takes effect upon failure of the prior bequest even if the failure was not in the manner contemplated by the will. E.g., A makes a bequest to C if she remains unmarried forever, and if she marries, then the bequest would go to X. If C dies unmarried, the bequest to X takes effect.

However, if the latter bequest is only made if the former bequest fails in a particular manner, then the latter bequest does not take effect unless the prior bequest fails in the manner specified.

(v) Where a particular time has been prescribed for the performance of the condition and the same cannot be fulfilled in time due to a fraud, then further time would be allowed to make up for the time lost due to the fraud.        

(b) Condition Subsequent

(i) A bequest may be made to any person with the condition superadded that in case of a specified uncertain event occurring or a specified uncertain event not occurring, the bequest shall go to another person. E.g., a sum of money is bequeathed to C with the condition that if he dies before he attains the age of 40 years, then B will get the estate. In this case, C takes a vested interest which may be divested and given to B in the event that he dies before 40 years. However, in such a case, the condition must be strictly fulfilled; it is not adequate if the condition is substantially complied with. Thus, unlike a condition precedent which is deemed to have been complied with if substantially complied with, a condition subsequent must be strictly complied with in the manner laid down. This is because it divests an already vested interest and hence, deprives a legatee of an estate that he was hitherto enjoying. E.g., a bequest is made to B with the condition superadded that if he does not marry with the consent of all his brothers, the legacy would go to X. B marries with the consent of 3 of his 4 brothers. The legacy to X does not take effect.

(ii) In the case of a condition precedent, if the condition is void on the grounds of illegality or immorality or impossibility, then the bequest itself fails. However, in the case of a condition subsequent, if the condition is void on any of these grounds, then the original bequest does not fail, and it continues. E.g., A gets a bequest with the condition that if he does not murder C, then the legacy would go to P. The condition is void, but the bequest continues.

(iii) One type of a condition subsequent could be a condition requiring a legatee to do something after receiving the bequest, failing which the bequest passes on to another person or the bequest ceases to have effect. However, in many cases, no specific time is specified for performing the act. In such cases, if the legatee takes any steps which either render the act impossible to be performed or indefinitely postpones the act, then the legacy would fail as if the legatee had died without performing the act in question. Thus, the act must be completed within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a matter of fact which needs to be ascertained on a case-to-case basis. E.g., A makes a bequest to his niece W with a proviso that her husband would look after his business or else the bequest would go to his nephew X. W becomes a nun and thereby takes a step which renders the act impossible. The bequest goes over to X.

(iv) Where a particular time has been prescribed for the performance of the condition and the same cannot be fulfilled in time due to a fraud, then further time would be allowed to make up for the time lost due to the fraud.
         
DIRECTIONS AS TO APPLICATION / ENJOYMENT

There may be bequests which lay down specific directions as to the application or the enjoyment of the fund bequeathed. Such conditions restrict the free usage of the estate bequeathed and thereby act as a clog on the property. Hence, the Act lays down certain prohibitions and certain exceptions relating to such restrictive directions in a Will. The provisions in respect of directions as to application and enjoyment of an estate are as follows:

(a) If assets are bequeathed for the absolute benefit of a person but it contains restrictions on the manner in which it can be applied or enjoyed, then the condition is void, and the legatee can enjoy the fund as if there was no such condition. However, for the restriction to be void, it is necessary that the legatee is absolutely entitled to enjoy the property. If the interest created is not absolute, then the condition is valid. For instance, a father bequeaths a large sum of money to his son, which is to be used only for his business. The son buys a house from the money. He is entitled to disregard the restrictive condition. However, if the bequest is not absolute, say, it is a life-interest, then the condition would be valid.

(b) If a testator leaves a bequest absolutely to the legatees but restricts the mode of enjoyment or application of the property in a certain manner which is for the specific benefit of the legatees, and if the legatee is not able to obtain such a benefit, then the estate belongs to the legatee as if the fund contained no such direction. E.g., A gives a fund to his son for life and after him to his son. The son dies without a child. His heirs are entitled to the fund.

(c) If a bequest has been made which is not absolute in nature and is for a specific purpose, but some of those purposes cannot be fulfilled, then such portion of the fund would remain a part of the testator’s estate. This provision applies only when the interest is not absolute but is, say, a life-interest.

[To be Continued Next Month]

Author’s Note: This month marks the 20th Year of this Feature, ‘Laws and Business’, that started in September, 2002 as an experiment to educate readers about certain laws impacting a business. I have thoroughly enjoyed exploring the labyrinth of Indian laws and regulations, and I hope the readers also have!

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA – GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

INTRODUCTION
Death or rather the fear of it makes people do things they might normally not have done. One such act is known as donatio mortis causa or the giving of gifts in contemplation of death. A person on his deathbed gives certain gifts because he does not want to leave to inheritance under his Will or succession. The law deals with such gifts and the Income-tax Act also deals with the taxation of these gifts.

LEGAL PROVISIONS
Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, defines the Latin maxim “donatio mortis causa” as a gift made in contemplation of the donor’s imminent death.

Section 191 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 deals with the requirements of gifts made in contemplation of death. It reads as follows:

“191. Property transferable by gift made in contemplation of death. — (1) A man may dispose, by gift made in contemplation of death, of any movable property which he could dispose of by will.

(2) A gift said to be made in contemplation of death where a man, who is ill and expects to die shortly of his illness, delivers, to another the possession of any movable property to keep as a gift in case the donor shall die of that illness.

(3) Such a gift may be resumed by the giver; and shall not take effect if he recovers from the illness during which it was made; nor if he survives the person to whom it was made.”

Thus, the requirements of a gift in contemplation of death as laid down by Section 191 are:

(i)    the gift must be of movable property ~ this is a matter of fact;

(ii)    it must be made in contemplation of death ~ the donor must be in contemplation of his death. He must be fearful that he is likely to die shortly;

(iii)     the donor must be ill and he expects to die shortly of the illness – an illness which is the cause of the fear is a must. A mere statement that the donor was old is not adequate. Medical evidence to prove that he was suffering from an ailment would be helpful in this respect;

(iv) the possession of the property should be delivered to the donee ~ possession should be physical/ actual. It should be clearly demonstrated that the donee has been put in possession of the asset/ money; and

(v)     the gift does not take effect if the donor recovers from the illness or if the donee predeceases the donor ~ this is the most important aspect. Such gifts are conditional upon the donor dying. If he survives, the gift is revoked and returns to him.

For instance, a person is suffering from terminal cancer and is not given much hope to live. He makes gifts to his friends/ relatives/ employees of his money, jewellery, precious watches, securities, etc. Such gifts of movables could be treated as gifts in contemplation of death. However, if he miraculously survives, then the gifts would revert back to him. Thus they are conditional gifts.

However, merely because the ‘gift’ is given at the time of illness, or ‘occasioned’ by the donor undergoing medical treatment, it would not by itself make it a gift in contemplation of death.

In CGT vs. Abdul Karim Mohd., [1991] 57 Taxman 238 (SC), the Supreme Court has held that for an effectual donatio mortis causa, three elements must combine:

(i)    firstly, the gift or donation must have been made in contemplation, though not necessarily in expectation of death, i.e., the person must have a reasonable apprehension that he would die soon;

(ii)    secondly, there must have been delivery to the donee of the subject matter of the gift; and

(iii) thirdly, the gift must be made under such circumstances as showed that the thing was to revert to the donor in case he should recover. The Court held that this last requirement was sometimes put somewhat differently and it was said that the gift must be made under circumstances which showed that it was to take effect only if the death of donor followed.

In the above mentioned case under the Gift-tax Act, a question arose whether the gift deed needed to contain an express clause that the gift would revert to the donor in case, he should recover from the illness? The Supreme Court negated this proposition. It held that the recitals in the deed of the gift were not conclusive to determine the nature and validity of the gift. The party may produce evidence to prove that the donor gifted the property when he was seriously ill and contemplating his death with no hope of recovery. These factors in conjunction with the factum of death of the donor, may be sufficient to infer that the gift was made in contemplation of death. It was implicit in such circumstances that the donee became the owner of the gifted property only if the donor died of the illness and if the donor recovered from the illness, the recovery itself operated as a revocation of the gift. It was not necessary to state in the gift deed that the donee became the owner of the property only upon the death of the donor. Nor it was necessary to specify that the gift was liable to be revoked upon the donor’s recovery from the illness. The law acknowledged these conditions from the circumstances under which the gift was made. The Apex Court cited with approval the following passage from Jerman on Wills (8th edn., Vol. 1, pp. 46-47):

“The conditional nature of the gift need not be expressed: It is implied in the absence of evidence to the contrary. And even if the transaction is such as would in the case of a gift inter vivos confers a complete legal title, if the circumstances authorise the supposition that the gift was made in contemplation of death, mortis causa is presumed. It is immaterial that the donor in that dies from some disorder not contemplated by him at the time he made the gift.”

It also referred to Williams on Executors and Administrators (14th edn., p. 315):

542. Conditional on death:

‘The gift must be conditioned to take effect only on the death of the donor.But it is not essential that the donor should expressly attach this condition to the gift; for if a gift is made during the donor’s last illness and in contemplation of death, the law infers the condition that the donee is to hold the donation only in case the donor dies’.”

In the case of CGT vs. Late C.V. Ct. Thevanai Achi (2006) 202 CTR 566 (Mad ) a lady was 90 years old and ill. Her great-grandson was taken to her and she placed in her hands the key to her safe. She died within seven days. The Gift-tax Department rejected the plea that it was a gift in contemplation of death as it was of the view that old age of 90 years and death within a week of the gift will not establish the ingredient of expectation to die shortly of her illness, which was so essentially an ingredient to establish a gift in contemplation of death. The Madras High Court negated this view. It held that a person of 90 years old would always be in the belief that he/ she will shortly die of illness caused by old age. There may be exceptional cases where persons of 90 years hoped to live long. But the generality was otherwise. In this case, the fact of 90 years of age led to the conclusion that the donor expected to die shortly. All the more so where the donor actually died a week later and it was a natural death caused by old age.

TAX TREATMENT
Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 taxes gifts received without/ or for inadequate consideration. In such cases, the donee becomes liable to tax on the receipt of the gift of money/ property. It also contains several exceptions under which this section does not apply. One such exception is a gift made in contemplation of death. There are no conditions attached to this exception. Hence, one possible view is that all gifts made in contemplation of death are exempt. The gift could also be of immovable property and the gift need not comply with the conditions laid down under the Indian Succession Act since there is no express reference to that section. Such gifts could even be made to non-relatives and yet remain exempt in the hands of the donees. The erstwhile Gift-tax Act, 1958 also contained a similar exemption from gift tax on the donor.

However, the Chennai ITAT in the case of F. Susai Raju vs. ITO [2017] 78 taxmann.com 81 (Chennai – Trib.), has taken a contrary view. It referred to the Apex Court’s decision in Abdul Karim (supra) and held that the conditions specified under Section 191 of the Indian Succession Act had to be complied with to claim exemption under Section 56(2)(x).

It further held that in the present case, the gift was made eight months in advance. Though it did raise some doubts as to whether it was indeed given in contemplation of death, the matter was to be considered in view of the attending circumstances; rather, the totality of the facts and circumstances. The ITAT held that if a person was, as claimed, sick, with little hope of recovery at the time of gift/s, it would matter little that he survived for eight months thereafter. Though there was no finding in the matter, nor any material on record (except the affidavit by the donor stating that he is being treated for the kidney failure), it was held to be inferable from the circumstances that he was ill at the relevant time.

The ITAT also considered the fact that the gift was not been made per a registered document; rather, not even per a deed of gift, but by an affidavit. This objection of the AO (assessing officer) was set aside as the gift, being of money, i.e., movable property, could be legally valid even if oral when accompanied by delivery of possession. The affidavit clearly reflected the alienation of the money in favour of the assessee and hence, operated as a valid gift. The transfer of movable property was only on its delivery. The fact of acceptance was borne out both by the assessee’s conduct (in utilizing the amount for his purposes) as well as of the money having been transferred to his bank account and, thus, in his possession. The ITAT held that it was not a gift simpliciter, but a gift in contemplation of death, which took place only in the event of the ‘donor’ predeceasing the ‘donee’ and, further, was liable to be revoked where the circumstances changed, as, for example, where the donor recovered from the illness, i.e., the condition under which the disposition was made. It was conditional and took place only on the death of the ‘donor’, so that it assumed the nature of a ‘Will’. A will, was not required to be registered.

CIVIL DEATH OR ACTUAL DEATH? An interesting question arose in the case of JCGT vs. Shreyans Shah, [2005] 95 ITD 179 (Mum.)(TM). A lady renounced the world and became a saint. Before taking up sainthood, she gifted all her movable assets to her relatives. The issue was whether such gifts could be treated as gifts in contemplation of death and hence, exempt from gift tax? It was contended that sainthood was akin to civil death and hence, the exemption was available.

The ITAT held that the law was clear that in order to be treated as a gift in contemplation of death, one of the important conditions was that the donor must be ill and should be expected to die shortly of the illness. The finding about the donor being ill was thus sine qua non for applicability of Gift-tax exemption. Sanyas being civil death will not, therefore, suffice. The ITAT held that one also had to proceed on the basis that planning to take up sanyas was to be treated as an illness, and perhaps terminal illness. That according to the bench, was too far-fetched a proposition to meet judicial approval. Gifts in contemplation of death implied reference to natural death alone. There was nothing to suggest that the gift-tax exemption also takes care of gifts in contemplation of a civil death. The very scheme of gifts in contemplation of death took into account only natural death, as was evident from the specific reference to ‘illness’. An illness was only relevant to natural death and not a civil death.

CONCLUSION
Deathbed gifts have gained popularity in the recent pandemic. Many people have resorted to them when they saw no hope of recovering from COVID. However, a word of caution of their potential misuse would not be out of place. That is probably why the Indian lawmakers did not extend such gifts to immovable properties.

CORPORATE LAW CORNER

ADJUDICATION MECHANISM UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013
Adjudication mechanism is covered under the Jurisdiction of Regulator to impose penalty on the defaulting Companies and its officers for non-compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

The reason for the introduction of the in-house Adjudication Mechanism is to promote ease of doing business, to reduce the burden of National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and Special Court. Since adjudication mechanism is handled by the bureaucrats, the Central Government (CG) has delegated its power to respective Registrar of Companies (RoC) who are acting as Adjudication Officers (AO).

The provisions of Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Amendment Rules, 2019 provide for adjudication mechanism.

Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 and 2020, has recategorized various sections/ provisions which were punishable with “Fines” with “Penalties”.

The  Difference between “Fine” and “Penalty” is as under:-

Fine

Penalty

As per the definition
provided in Oxford Dictionary: “Fine” is a sum of money exacted as a
penalty by a court of law or other authority.

As per the definition
provided in Oxford Dictionary “Penalty is “a punishment imposed for
breaking a law, rule, or contract.”

Fine is the amount of
the money that a court can order to pay for an offence after a successful
prosecution in a matter.

Penalties do not
require court proceedings and are imposed on failing to comply with a
provision/s of an Act.

Where any offence is punishable
with;

i. “Fine or imprisonment or both”
or

ii. “Fine or imprisonment”

iii. Only Fine

are compoundable offences under
Section 441
of the Companies Act, 2013 by
filing application before NCLT/ RD /any officer authorised by Central
Government.

Whereas offences
which are Non-Compoundable offences under the Companies Act, 2013, are
punishable with Penalties

Hence, Adjudication Order can be
issued/imposed by the Respective 
Registrar of Companies (RoC).

An appeal against such an order
can be preferred before office of the Respective Regional Director (RD).

Hence, for various non-compliances, a Company may need not go to NCLT with compounding applications and can settle such offences through an in-house mechanism, where a penalty could be levied on violations of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

If one has a look at the recent Adjudication Orders passed by various offices of Registrar of Companies (RoC), one will observe and experience that massive Penalties are levied even on Private Limited Companies. Hence, it is very useful to circulate such orders amongst our esteemed readers, especially amongst professionals and small and medium-sized firms who will be well equipped to advise their clients regarding such matters.   

Accordingly, we intend to cover Adjudication Orders on a regular basis henceforth.

PART A | COMPANY LAW


5 Central Cottage Industries Corporation of India Limited RoC Adjudication Order ROC/D/ADJ/92&137/Central Cottage/185 Date of Order: 13th January, 2022

RoC, Delhi order for violation of Section 92 (4) (Annual Return e-form MGT-7) & 137(3) (e-form AOC-4 XBRL) of Companies Act, 2013

FACTS
M/s CCICIL is a Government Company incorporated under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 ( The Act).

M/s CCICIL, along with its Managing Director (MD) and Company Secretary (CS) had suo-moto filed application vide e-form GNL-1 for adjudication of penalty under the provisions of Section 454 of the Act and rules thereunder and stated therein inter alia that:

a. M/s CCICIL could not file its e-form AOC-4 XBRL (Financial Statements) and e-form MGT-7 (Annual Return) for the Financial Year ended on 31st March, 2020 as its Annual General Meeting could not be held in time.

b. After holding the Annual General Meeting on 16th June, 2021, M/s CCICIL had filed e-form MGT-7 (Annual Return) for the Financial Year ended 31st March, 2020 on 28th June, 2021 and e-form AOC-4 XBRL (Financial Statement) for the Financial Year ended 31st March, 2020 on 20th July, 2021 and made good the default.

c. M/s CCICIL had prayed to pass an order for adjudicating the penalty for such violations of the provisions of the Sections 92 & 137 of the Act.

d. M/s CCICIL had complied with the provisions of Section 92(4) and 137(1) of the Act by filing its due annual return and financial statement for the Financial Year 2019-20 on 28th June, 2021 and 20th July, 2021 respectively as stated above.

e. Since the proviso in sub-section (3) of Section 454 of the Act had been inserted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 which had come into force w.e.f. 22nd January, 2021, the Authorized Representative contended that no penalty for such violation of Sections 92(4) & 137(1) of the Act should be imposed on the applicants and all proceedings under this section in respect of such default shall be deemed to be concluded.

HELD
Adjudicating Office took into consideration the insertion of proviso of sub-section (3) of Section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 which inter alia provides that no penalty shall be imposed in this regard and all proceedings under this section in respect of such default shall be deemed to be concluded in case the default relates to non-compliance of sub-section (4) of Section 92 and sub-section (1) of Section 137 of the Act and such default has already been rectified either prior to, or within thirty days of the issue of the notice by the adjudicating officer.

a) In this case, M/s CCICIL and its Director(s) had suo-moto filed an application for adjudication of penalties under section 454 of the Companies Act, 2013 on 23rd November, 2021. Accordingly, in the interest of natural justice, a reasonable opportunity of being heard under section 454(4) of the Companies Act had been given to the M/s CCICIL before passing the relevant order under section 454(5) of the Act taking into consideration the amendment by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 No. 29 of 2020 in Companies Act, 2013 which was inserted and, later on, came into force w.e.f. 22nd January, 2021 vide Notification No. 1/3/2020-CL.I dated 22nd January, 2021.

b) In exercise of the powers conferred on the Adjudication Officer vide Notification dated 24th March, 2015 and after considering the facts and circumstances of the case besides oral submissions made by the representative of applicants at the time of the hearing and after taking into account the factors mentioned in the relevant Rules followed by amendments in Section 454(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, Adjudication Officer was of the opinion that no penalty shall be imposed for the default which relates to non-compliance of Section 92(4) & 137 of the Act as the said default had been rectified by filing the annual return and financial statement for the financial year 2019-20 on 28nd June, 2021 and 20th July, 2021, repectively, i.e. prior to the issue of notice by adjudicating officer.

c) The order was passed in terms of the provisions of sub-rule (9) of Rule 3 of Companies (Adjudication of Penalties) Rules, 2014 as amended by Companies (Adjudication of Penalties), Amendment Rules, 2019.

6 Tangenttech Infosoft Private Limited RoC Adjudication Order No. RoC-GJ/ADJ. ORDER-2/ Tangenttech/ Section 12(3)(c)/ 201-22 Registrar of Companies, Gujarat, Dadra & Nagar Haveli Date of Order: 6th April, 2022

RoC, Gujarat, Dadra & Nagar Haveli order for violation of Section 12(3)(c) of Companies Act, 2013 – Not mentioning CIN and Registered Office Address on its Letterhead

FACTS
a) Company had filed a certified true copy of Board’s resolution dated 28th December, 2017 as well as letter dated 28th December, 2017 addressed to M/s Himanshu Patel and Company. The said documents were attached with ADT-1 filed on 1st January, 2018 on the MCA21 portal. It was further observed that the company has not mentioned CIN and Registered Office Address on its Letter Head as required under the provisions of Section 12(3)(c) of the companies Act, 2013, which is a violation attracting penal provisions of Section 12(8) of the Companies Act, 2013.

b) Similarly, it was also observed that CIN & Registered Office address of the company have been not mentioned on letter dated 23rd February, 2021, attached with ADT-2  filed on 24th February, 2021 on the MCA, 2l portal.

c) The Ld. Regional Director, NWR, Ahmedabad vide order dated 5th October, 2021 had issued direction to ROC, Ahmedabad to take necessary action and submit action taken report.

d) An adjudication notice was issued to the Company and its officers for aforementioned violations.   

e) In reply and at the time of personal hearing company submitted as under :

“Company is an abiding corporate body and has no motive to disregard any of the compliances. The absence of the CIN and Registered office Address was absolutely unintentional and due to the mistake done by one of employee of the company while scanning the document. ClN and Registered address of the company was mentioned on the letter head but while scanning the documents employee hastily did not take that part which created misinterpretation of that letter.”

The authorised representative further submitted that the “company has also filed various documents to Registrar of Companies (ROC) where company has also mentioned CIN and registered office address as required for Section 12(1) of the Companies Act, 2013.”

It was further requested that before passing any adjudication order, the authorities may take into consideration financial position etc. as the company had incurred heavy financial losses and also the Company’s business suffered due to Covid-19 outbreak and lockdown around the country during the financial year 2020-21.  

f) It was further observed that MGT-7 was filed on 23rd October, 2019, Company had mentioned CIN and Registered Office Address on the Shareholders’ List attached thereto. Thus, it revealed that the Company has failed to comply with the relevant provisions occasionally.   
 
HELD
a) It was observed from the Balance Sheet of the Company as at 31st March, 2021, that the paid-up capital of the Company was Rs 1 Lakh and Turnover was Rs 95.68 Lakhs. Hence, Company was a small Company. Therefore, the provisions of imposing lesser penalty as per the provisions of Section 446B of the Companies Act, 2013 apply to the company.

b) Considering the facts and circumstances, submissions made and further considering number of defaults, a Penalty of an amount of Rs 6000 was imposed on Company and its Directors. (Penalty of Rs 1000 on Company and Rs 1000 on each of 5 directors)

c) Company was directed to pay the penalty within 90 days of the receipt of the order.   

FEW NOTES:
1.  Appeal lies against the order and is required to be filed within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order.

2. If penalty is not paid within 90 days from the date of receipt of the order, Company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs 25000 but may extend to Rs 5,00,000.

3. If officer in default does not pay penalty within 90 days from the receipt of the order, such officer shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to 6 months or with a fine which shall not be less than Rs 25000 but may extend to Rs 1,00,000 or with both.

4. Non-Compliance of the order including non-payment of penalty entails prosecution under section454(8) of the Companies Act, 2013.

PART B |  INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

4 Vallal RCK vs. M/s Siva Industries and Holdings Ltd and others Civil Appeal Nos. 1811-1812 of 2022 Date of Order: 3rd June, 2022

FACTS
In relation to the Corporate Debtor, IDBI Bank Ltd submitted an application under section 7 of the IBC to initiate CIRP. The NCLT granted the application on 4th July, 2019. M/s Royal Partners Investment Fund Ltd had submitted a Resolution Plan to the RP, which was approved by the CoC. The stated plan, however, could not be accepted because it obtained just 60.90% of the CoC’s votes, falling short of the required 66%. On 8th May, 2020, the RP filed an application under Section 33(1)(a) of the IBC, requesting that the Corporate Debtor’s liquidation procedure be started. The promoter of the Corporate Debtor, the appellant, submitted a settlement application with the NCLT under Section 60(5) of the IBC, indicating his willingness to offer a onetime settlement plan. The RP filed an application before the learned NCLT seeking required directions based on the request of IARCL (one of the Financial Creditors, namely International Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (“IARCL”), which has a voting share of 23.60% and opted to adopt the aforementioned Settlement Plan). The NCLT rejected the application for withdrawal of CIRP and adoption of the Settlement Plan in an order dated 12th August, 2021, holding that the aforementioned Settlement Plan was not a settlement simpliciter under Section 12A of the IBC but a “Business Restructuring Plan.” The NCLT began the liquidation procedure of the Corporate Debtor as well, pursuant to another ruling dated the same day. As a result of this, the appellant filed two appeals with the learned NCLAT. The same was dismissed pursuant to the common impugned judgment dated 28th January, 2022.

ISSUE RAISED
Whether AA/Appellate Authority can sit in appeal over commercial wisdom of CoC? When 90% or more of the creditors, after careful consideration, determine that allowing settlement and withdrawing CIRP is in the best interests of all stakeholders, the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority cannot sit in an appeal over CoC’s commercial wisdom. This Court has consistently concluded that the CoC’s commercial judgment has been given precedence over any judicial involvement in ensuring that the stipulated processes are completed within the IBC’s timeframes. The premise that financial creditors are adequately informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and the feasibility of the proposed resolution plan has been upheld. They act based on a thorough review and assessment of the suggested settlement plan by their team of experts. Only where the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority judges the CoC’s judgement to be entirely capricious, arbitrary, irrational, and in violation of the statute or the Rules would interference be justified.

HELD
In this case, the CoC made its decision after deliberating over the benefits and drawbacks of the Settlement Plan and using their commercial judgment. The Court is of the considered opinion that neither the learned NCLT nor the learned NCLAT were justified in not assigning due weight to CoC’s commercial wisdom, according to the Court. The Court has often highlighted the importance of minimal judicial interference by the NCLAT and NCLT in the context of the IBC. The Court allowed the appeals, the NCLAT’s challenged judgment of 28th January, 2022, and the NCLT’s directives of 12th August, 2021, are quashed and set aside and the Resolution Professional’s application to withdraw CIRP before the learned NCLT was granted.

SUPREME COURT ON PLEDGE OF DEMATERIALIZED SHARES

BACKGROUND
Recently, on 12th May 2022, the Supreme Court of India, gave a detailed judgement on issues relating to the pledge of dematerialized shares and its invocation. Apart from minutely going into the process of the pledge of shares in such form, and making certain rulings on it, it also highlighted that dematerialized shares (“demat shares”) have raised several other issues which SEBI and other regulators will need to clarify or regulate. These include issues of accounting, taxation, Takeover Regulations, etc. Importantly, the Court has taken a harmonious view of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the Depositories Act/ Regulations and, for this purpose, overrules certain decisions of the High Court. This decision is in the case of PTC India Financial Services Limited vs. Venkateswarlu Kari & Another ((2022) 138 taxmann.com 248 (SC)).

PECULIARITIES OF PLEDGE OF DEMAT SHARES AND ISSUES THE NEW FORMAT AND PROCESS RAISE
Barring very few exceptions, shares (and even other securities) of listed companies (and even some unlisted companies) are held in dematerialized form. A pledge of such shares is quite common and carried out by many shareholders. In the simplest form of a pledge, a shareholder may want to borrow monies against such shares and would thus pledge them to the lender. Promoters typically pledge their shares for borrowings by the listed company they have promoted or even for their own borrowings. When shares were in paper form, the pledge could be carried out in different ways with each having their own implications. However, the process of pledge of dematerialized shares has its own benefits and challenges.

Briefly stated, the Depositories Act/Regulations provide for a specific procedure in which the pledge (or hypothecation) needs to be carried out. The shareholder intimates the depository participant (“the DP”) of his desire to create a pledge in favour of the pledgee. The depository participant then records the pledge and intimates the pledgor and the pledgee.

If the purpose for which the pledge was created is satisfied, the record of the pledge can be removed with the concurrence of the pledgee. If, however, the pledge is required to be invoked (say, due to default in repayment of the loan), the pledgee intimates the DP who then transfers the shares in the name of the pledgee after, of course, removing the record of the pledge. The pledgee is then free to sell the shares or transfer the shares back to the pledgor in case he complies with the purpose for which the pledge was carried out (e.g., typically by repaying the loan with interest and other charges as per the terms of the loan). However, as this case also illustrates, this is where the complications arise and this is why the matter went all the way to the Supreme Court.

The primary issue arises from the fact that on invocation of the pledge, the shares are transferred to the name of the pledgee. Does this mean that the pledgee has become the clear owner of the shares with its risks and rewards? Or does this mean that the pledgee continues to retain the same merely as security? Can the pledgor argue that the amount of loan should be reduced to the extent of the value of the shares on the day of such invocation/transfer? Should the pledgee account for the shares in its books as owned by it? Does such transfer (and the re-transfer) have tax implications? Would the transfer (or the re-transfer) amount to an acquisition under the SEBI Takeover Regulations (and other applicable Regulations of SEBI) and thus possibly result in an open offer and/or disclosures? The Supreme Court answered some questions but, on other issues, placed the issues on record and referred the matters to the appropriate regulators to deal with them.

BRIEF FACTS AND ISSUES
The facts of the case, simplified and summarized, were as follows. In respect of a loan taken by a group company, another group company pledged shares of an unlisted company, held in dematerialized form, with the lender. There was a default on the loan. After due notice, the lender invoked the pledge. The DP transferred the shares in the name of the lender.

The lender claimed that the full amount of the loan, interest, etc. remained unpaid and sought the payment of the amount while stating that the shares transferred to its name were being retained as security in accordance with the Indian Contract Act. The borrower, however, claimed that on account of the transfer of shares, the amount of loan got reduced to the extent of the value of the shares as on the date of invocation of the pledge/transfer. Further, it claimed to have stepped into the shoes of the lender and thus itself had claims to that extent from the original borrower. There were disputes also as to the value of the shares also and this was not unexpected since the shares were unlisted and thus not having regular quotes/transactions on a stock exchange.

The lender could not persuade any of the authorities up to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (the matter under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code) that its stand was correct. Hence, it appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court had several legal issues before it, the primary being whether the Depositories Act/Regulations effectively replaced the Indian Contract Act and thus the provisions of the latter Act did not apply to pledge of demat shares? Or could they be read in a harmonized manner with both the laws being applicable? Was the 150-year-old Contract Act obsolete to modern digital times or the principles so wisely drafted to be nearly timeless? Having decided on that, some other issues became redundant but then some other fresh issues cropped up.

SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT
The Indian Contract Act provides for, in great detail, the pledge of goods, invocation of pledge and related aspects. Pledge is considered a form of bailment. Simplified and summarized, the provisions are as follows. A person can pledge goods to another by delivering the same to the pawnee/pledgee. When the purpose of the pledge is satisfied, the pledgee returns the goods. Till that time, generally, the goods remain with the pledgee but at the risk and reward of the pledgor. To take examples, in the context of shares, this means that rise and fall in the value of the shares pledged is for the benefit/loss of the pledgor. So are usually accretions to it, say, in the form of bonus shares or dividends. The pledgee, however, has only certain specific and limited rights with regard to such pledged goods, unlike, say, a mortgage.

If the pledge has to be invoked, the goods continue to remain with the pledgee. However, after giving due notice, the pledgee can sell the goods and adjust the proceeds against the loan amount. If the proceeds are higher than the amount of loan, interest, etc., the excess is to be paid to the pledgor. If there is a deficit, he can claim the same from the pledgor. The pledgor is generally entitled, right till the time the goods are actually sold, to repay the loan and get the goods back.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
As discussed above, the primary issue arose about the implications of the transfer of the shares from the name of the pledgor to the pledgee. Did this amount to a purchase/acquisition of the shares by the pledgee whereby, firstly, the loan got reduced to the extent of the value of the shares? Secondly, the shares were then at the risk and reward of the pledgee? Furthermore, the pledgor could not thereafter repay the loan and claim back the shares?

The Hon’ble Court minutely analysed the provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the Depositories Act/Regulations and several rulings in this regard. It noted the peculiarities arising out of shares being held in demat form and also how provisions were made under the relevant law to deal with pledge of such shares. However, it held that this did not negate/override the general principles of the Depositories Act and the two laws need to be read in a harmonized manner. The Court also held as incorrect the view of the Bombay High Court (in JRY Investments (P.) Ltd vs. Deccan Leafine Services Ltd (2004) 56 SCL 339) that demat securities cannot be pledged under the Contract Act as it is not possible to transfer physical possession. However, the view in this decision that the pledge of demat shares requires compliance of the procedure laid down in Depositories Act/Regulations was endorsed as correct, though to be read in light of the present decision.

The Court further held that when the shares were transferred to the pledgee on invocation of the pledge, it continued to hold them as a pledgee and not as an owner. Indeed, it would be a violation of the law if the pledgee transferred the shares to himself as full owner. The loan thus did not get reduced on the day of such invocation/transfer to the extent of the value of the shares. The pledgee could continue to retain such shares and yet claim the full amount of its dues. If it desires to transfer the shares, the provisions requiring giving of due notice under the Indian Contract Act before the sale continue to apply. The right of the pledgor/borrower to pay the dues and seek transfer of the shares back to it continues till the shares are actually sold.

Thus, it ruled in favour of the pledgor/lender and set aside the order of NCLAT.

PECULIARITIES ARISING OUT OF PLEDGE OF DEMAT SHARES, PARTICULARLY AFTER INVOCATION
As discussed above, the Supreme Court noted that holding shares in demat form resulted in peculiarities that, while it did not rule on since these questions were not before the court for ruling, it asked the relevant regulators to consider and provide on.

The issues arise because of certain steps involved in the pledge process. First is the transfer of the shares in the name of the pledgee on invocation of the pledge. The second is when the shares are sold by it after due notice. The third situation is that before the sale, the pledgor pays the dues and this requires transfer of the shares from the pledgee to the pledgor.

Firstly, how should the pledgee account for such shares that were now in their name in its books? This perhaps is an easier question to answer but a little more difficult is the tax implications of the transfer and retransfer/sale. Even more difficult is the answer under the SEBI Takeover Regulations which though deal with pledge to an extent does not cover all situations and all pledgors/pledgees. The Hon’ble Court asked the relevant regulators to ponder and provide for these.

CONCLUSIONS
It is almost amusing to note that a 150-year-old law does not require any change or even any major crease to be ironed out but more recent laws such as the Takeover Regulations and other laws are found to be wanting.

The implications, or at least the issues raised and the approach of how they were solved, of this decision could possibly apply even to other forms of digital assets whose number and variety are fast growing. These could include cryptocurrency, non-fungible tokens, etc. many of which do not as of now even have basic laws specifically dealing with them. Laws governing them thus will have to be well thought out and comprehensive and deal with the issues that arose before the Court in the present matter.
 

SUPREME COURT ON INSIDER TRADING – PUTS GREATER ONUS OF PROOF ON SEBI, EFFECTIVELY READS DOWN PRECEDING DECISION

BACKGROUND
Recently, vide decision dated 19th April 2022, the Supreme Court reversed the order of disgorgement and penalty of about Rs. 8.30 crores and the parties’ debarment, in a case of alleged insider trading. In doing so, it laid down important principles of proof in insider trading cases. More importantly, it is submitted that it effectively read down its own decision in an earlier case that required lesser levels of proof in cases of civil actions (as against criminal actions). It is submitted that insider trading cases will now require not just greater levels of proof by SEBI for action, but it will be subjected to a greater level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court had earlier held (in SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368) that the standards with which to see civil proceedings were ‘preponderance of probability’ and not ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, which is so in criminal proceedings. By a curious observation, as we will see later herein, the Supreme Court in the present case distinguished Kishore Ajmera’s case as a case of fraud/price manipulation while the present case was of insider trading. The decision is in the case of Balram Garg vs. SEBI ((2022) 137 Taxmann.com 305 (SC)).

It is submitted that this decision will thus now require greater efforts of investigation and legal reasoning by SEBI to take penal action in cases of insider trading, such that these actions meet the test of law and hence are not reversed in appeals. This would be so even if the penal action being taken is of civil actions in the form of penalty, disgorgement or debarment and not prosecution.

INSIDER TRADING LAW GENERALLY – A SERIES OF DEEMING PROVISIONS
While the SEBI Act, 1992, provides for the extent of penal actions in the form of penalties, etc. that can be taken in cases of insider trading, the substantive and procedural details are laid down in the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (‘the Regulations’). The Regulations lay down what constitutes the offence of insider trading and also provide several incidental requirements to prevent insider trading, give disclosures of holdings/acquisitions, etc.

The core offence of insider trading is easy to understand as a concept. It is dealing in securities by an insider who is in possession of unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI). It also covers communication, otherwise than for permissible purposes, of such UPSI. A simple example can be taken to illustrate this offence. Say, the Chief Financial Officer, who sees the financial results being far better than expected, buys shares before such financial results are published. And then he sells them when the price of the shares predictably shoots up once the results are published. Or, instead of dealing himself, he may have communicated the results to his relative, who carried out similar dealings and made such illicit profits.

While this is a simple example that may not require elaborate investigation/proof, insider trading is generally seen to be carried out in far more devious ways with near-criminal sophistication. Too often, front persons (termed as ‘mules’ or ‘name lenders’) are found in whose names the trades are carried out. The profits are then funnelled back to the insider with great circumlocution, often using the parallel economy. Technical advancements in the internet, mobile telephony, cryptography in messaging, etc., are also available to the criminally minded. As the bestselling book Den of Thieves by James Stewart lays down in detail, even several decades ago, sophisticated methods were used, including offshore accounts, for insider trading. The investigation led to the fall of large financial firms, and some well-known names in the industry went behind bars. The cases of Raj Rajaratnam and Rajat Gupta have also been the subject of other best-selling books.

To make the job of SEBI easier, a series of deeming fictions have been introduced in the Regulations on insider trading. For example, the definition of UPSI itself has two deeming fictions. Information published otherwise than in the prescribed manner is deemed to be unpublished. Certain events, including even some ordinary occurrences, are deemed price sensitive – e.g., financial results, dividends, mergers and acquisitions, etc. The term ‘insider’ also contains multiple deeming fictions on who are deemed to be insiders. Evidence collection is also helped by the automated generation of information and reports of surveillance of trading on stock exchanges, particularly around the time when price-sensitive information is published. One would then expect that the job of SEBI would be quite easy. However, in reality, it is often seen that rulings of SEBI are reversed on appeal. The present case now holds that the benchmarks of proof are higher than what is presumed, and if the investigation and legal reasoning fall short of these benchmarks, the orders would be reversed.

SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT CASE
To provide a simplified summary of this case, SEBI found that certain persons allegedly close to a listed company/management sold shares while certain price-sensitive information was unpublished. The listed company had made an announcement about the decision of its Board to buy back shares at Rs. 350 per share. However, since this proposal was rejected by its bankers, the Board decided to withdraw the offer. Clearly, the information about the buyback of shares and thereafter its withdrawal was price sensitive and even specifically deemed to be so under the Regulations. If, for example, one knows that there would be a buyback at Rs. 350 while the ruling market price was much lower, such information could boost the price. Also, information that the buyback would be withdrawn would do the reverse, leading to a fall in price. And a person having knowledge of such information may be tempted to sell shares held by him and avoid loss. The temptation may even be to further deal in futures by selling now and reversing the trades once the information is published and making further profits. This, to summarise, is what was alleged by SEBI to have been carried out by relatives of those in the top management. Consequently, it ordered the parties to disgorge the amount of such gains (being notional losses avoided/profits made) with interest at 12% p.a., aggregating to about R8.30 crores. It also levied a penalty of Rs. 20 lakhs on the parties. Furthermore, it debarred the parties from the
securities markets in the specified manner and for a specified time.

It rejected the arguments of the parties that though they were near relatives, the family had undergone a partition both on a business and personal level, and hence there was no communication. SEBI laid emphasis on the fact that the sales were made during the time when there was UPSI. The transactions of sales thus avoided losses. SEBI also gave importance to the fact that the parties stayed on the same plot of land, even if in separate residences. Moreover, one of the parties was made a nominee for shares held by a person from the other family group. Based on these and other facts, SEBI took the view that these circumstances were sufficient to take a reasonable view that there was insider trading, and hence penal action was warranted. The parties appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), which confirmed SEBI’s order. The parties then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court held that the SEBI took an incorrect view of the events and made assumptions of foundational facts instead of establishing them by evidence. The deeming provisions did not apply to the present facts and that SEBI was required to show that there was communication between the parties in management and the parties that sold the shares, and SEBI could not presume it to be so, nor it could the mere fact that the two groups were near relatives could result in the assumption that there was a communication of the UPSI.

SEBI had held that though there was a commercial separation with one group leaving the business and management and even residing separately, this was an arrangement and not an estrangement. However, the Supreme Court considered the facts, including some facts that SEBI did not lay adequate emphasis on. It highlighted that though they stayed on the same plot of land, the plot was very large, and the parties had separate entrances. Importantly, the party was continuously selling the shares held well before the UPSI came into existence, having sold predominantly during this earlier period. Thus, the sales during the UPSI period had to be seen in the light of these earlier sales.

The important point that the Court made was that even between such near relatives, communication could not be assumed, and the onus was on SEBI to establish this foundational fact of there being communication. Even the definition of ‘immediate relatives’ had a condition that one party was financially dependent on the other or that it consulted the other in its investment conditions. That the parties were financially independent was seen from the record. As regards whether the parties had consulted the others in investment decisions, it was SEBI who had to prove this by cogent evidence. Further, the conclusions that SEBI draws from such foundational facts it proves have to logically follow leaving no other reasonable conclusion possible. SEBI had neither provided cogent evidence of communication nor did it give sound reasoning to come to its conclusion such that no other view could be reasonably possible.

The Court also observed that the SAT did not do what was expected of it as the first appellate authority and that is re-examining the facts and law. Instead, the Court observed that it did not apply its mind and merely repeated the alleged findings of SEBI.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the orders and directed that the amounts paid be refunded.

IS THE LOWER BENCHMARK OF ‘PREPONDERANCE OF PROBABILITY’ STILL VALID FOR INSIDER TRADING CASES?
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Kishore Ajmera’s case had laid down what is now referred to as the test of ‘preponderance of probability’ in civil cases in securities laws. Applying this test, it had held that the conclusion that a reasonable man would make from the available facts should be drawn. While not expressly dissenting with this ruling, the Supreme Court, in the present case, made a curious observation. It said, “Suffice it to hold that these cases are distinguishable on the facts of the present case, as the former is not a case of insider trading but that of Fraudulent/Manipulative Trade Practices; and the latter case relates to interests and penalty rather than the subject matter at hand.” (emphasis supplied). It can now become an interesting issue what weight in law this observation should be given. Should it mean that the test applies only to cases of fraudulent and manipulative trade practices and not others such as insider trading? Or should this remark be treated as obiter dicta or just as an observation on specific facts and in context? The author submits that since there is no express departure or dissent, the observation should be seen only in context and perhaps more to emphasise that SEBI has to establish some foundational facts. But what muddies the water further is that even the ‘latter case’ (Dushyant N. Dalal vs. SEBI (2017) 9 SCC 660) was also distinguished on the ground that it dealt with ‘Interests and Penalty’.

Insider trading cases, as discussed earlier, are difficult to catch due to the level of criminal sophistication adopted. This decision, it is respectfully submitted, will require SEBI to climb a steeper hill of detection, investigation, establishment of facts and punishment in such a way that these tests are met and the orders upheld.

SHARED HOUSEHOLD UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT

INTRODUCTION
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“the DV Act”) is a beneficial Act that asserts the rights of women who are subject to domestic violence. Various Supreme Court and High Court judgments have upheld the supremacy of this Act over other laws and asserted from time to time that this is a law which cannot be defenestrated.

In the words of the Supreme Court (in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja, CA No. 2483/2020), domestic violence in this country is rampant, and several women encounter violence in some form or the other almost every day. However, it is the least reported form of cruel behaviour. The enactment of this Act is a milestone for protecting women in this country. The purpose of the enactment of the DV Act, as explained in Kunapareddy Alias NookalaShanka Balaji vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr., (2016) 11 SCC 774 – to protect women against violence of any kind, especially that occurring within the family, as the civil law does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. In Manmohan Attavar vs. Neelam Manmohan Attavar, (2017) 8 SCC 550, the Supreme Court noticed that the DV Act had been enacted to create an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence.

Recently, the Supreme Court, in the case of Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi, Cr. Appeal No. 511/2022, Order dated 12th May 2022, has examined various important facets of this law.

WHO IS COVERED?
It is an Act to provide for more effective protection of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India of those women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family.

It provides that if any act of domestic violence has been committed against a woman, she can approach the designated Protection Officers to protect her. In V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183, it was held that this Act applied even to cases of domestic violence which had taken place before the Act came into force. The same view has been expressed in Saraswathy vs. Babu, (2014) 3 SCC 712.

Hence, it becomes essential who can claim shelter under this Act? An aggrieved woman under the DV Act is one who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with an adult male and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by him. A domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage or are family members living together as a joint family.

WHAT IS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE?
The concept of domestic violence is very important, and s.3 of the DV Act defines the same as an act committed against the lady, which:

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, or wellbeing, whether mental or physical, of the lady and includes causing abuse of any nature, physical, verbal, economic abuse, etc.; or

(b) harasses or endangers the lady with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.

Thus, economic abuse is also considered an act of domestic violence under the DV Act. This term is defined in a wide manner. It includes deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which she is entitled under any law or custom or which she requires out of necessity, including household necessities, stridhan property, etc.

Shared Household
Under this Act, the concept of a “shared household” is very important and means a household where the aggrieved lady lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship with the accused male and includes a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. S.17 of the DV Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Further, the Court can pass a relief order preventing her from being evicted from the shared household, against others entering / staying in it, against it being sold or alienated, etc. The Court can also pass a monetary relief order for the maintenance of the aggrieved person and her children. This relief shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with her accustomed standard of living.

 

The recent Supreme Court’s decision in Prabha Tyagi (supra) laid down various principles in relation to a shared household.

Facts: In this case, a lady became a widow within a month of her marriage. The widowed daughter-in-law stayed in her in-laws’ house only for 13 days. She left the house due to constant mental torture by her in-laws.

Issues before the Court: Two questions were posed to the Supreme Court: whether it was mandatory for the aggrieved lady to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the point of commission of domestic violence?; and whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved lady and the person against whom the relief was claimed?

In a very detailed and far-reaching judgment, the Court reviewed the entire law under this Act. The various findings of the Court were as follows:

Past relationships also covered: The parties’ conduct even prior to coming into force of the Act could also be considered while passing an order under the Act. The wife who had shared a household in the past but was no longer residing with her husband can file a petition if subjected to domestic violence. It was further observed that where an act of domestic violence is once committed, then a subsequent decree of divorce will not change the position. The judicial separation did not alter the remedy available to the lady. The Supreme Court judgments in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another (2014) 10 SCC 736, V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita Bhanot – (2012) 3 SCC 183, Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury (2016) 2 SCC 705 support this view.

In Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja (2021) 1 SCC 414, a Three-Judge Bench of the Court had to decide whether a flat belonging to the father-in-law could be restrained from alienation under a plea filed by the daughter-in-law under the DV Act? The question posed for determination was whether a shared household has to be read to mean that a shared household can only be that household which is a household of a joint family / one in which the husband of the aggrieved lady has a share? It held that a shared household is the shared household of the aggrieved person where she was living when the application was filed or in the recent past. The words “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” had to be given their normal and purposeful meaning. The living of a woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living in different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living, including the nature of household, have to be looked into to find out whether the parties intended to treat the premises as a shared household or not. It held that the definition of a shared household as noticed in s. 2(s) did not indicate that a shared household shall only be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. If the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom the woman has lived in a domestic relationship, then the conditions mentioned in the DV Act were satisfied, and the said house will become a shared household.

Right available to all women: The Supreme Court laid down a very vital tenet that a woman in a domestic relationship who is not aggrieved, i.e., even one who has not been subjected to an act of domestic violence, has a right to reside in a shared household. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister, wife, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, or such other categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right to reside in a shared household de hors a right, title or beneficial interest in the same. The right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women and such other categories of women in a domestic relationship was guaranteed under the Act and she could not be evicted, excluded or thrown out from such a household even in the absence of there being any form of domestic violence.

Women residing elsewhere: The Apex Court further laid down that even in the absence of actual residence in the shared household, a woman in a domestic relationship can enforce her right to reside therein. Due to professional, occupational or job commitments, or for other genuine reasons, the husband and wife may decide to reside at different locations. Even in such a case where the woman in a domestic relationship was residing elsewhere on account of a reasonable cause, she had the right to reside in a shared household.

It held that the expression ‘right to reside in the shared household’ was not restricted to only actual residence, as, irrespective of actual residence, a woman in a domestic relationship could enforce her right to reside in the shared household. Thus, a woman could not be excluded from the shared household even if she had not actually resided therein. It gave an example to buttress this point. A woman and her husband, after marriage, relocate abroad for work. She may not have had an opportunity to reside in the shared household after her marriage. If she becomes an aggrieved person and is forced to return from overseas, then she has the right to reside in the shared household of her husband irrespective of whether he or she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the shared household. In such circumstances, the parents-in-law of such a lady woman cannot exclude her from the shared household.

Another example given was where soon after marriage, the husband goes to another city due to a job commitment. His wife remains in her parental home and is a victim of domestic violence. It held that she also had the right to reside in the shared household of her husband, which could be the household of her in-laws. Further, if her husband resided in another location, then an aggrieved person had the right to reside with her husband in the location in which he resided which would then become the shared household or she could reside with his parents, as the case may be, in a different location.

Context of the Act: The Supreme Court explained that in the Indian societal context, the right of a woman to reside in the shared household was of unique importance. This was because, in India, most women were not educated nor were they earning; neither did they have financial independence to live singly. She could be dependent for residence in a domestic relationship not only for emotional support but also for the aforesaid reasons. A relationship could be by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage (live-ins), adoption or living together in a joint family. A majority of women in India did not have independent income or financial capacity and were totally dependent vis-à-vis their residence on other relations.

Religion agnostic: The Court laid down a very important principle that the Act applied to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship. Therefore, the expression ‘joint family’ did not mean as understood under Hindu Law. Even a girl child/children who were cared for as foster children had a right to live in a shared household if she became an aggrieved person, the protection under the Act applied.

CONCLUSION
Thus, in Prabha Tyagis’s case (supra), the Court answered the first question – the lady had the right to live in her matrimonial home and being a victim of domestic violence, she could enforce her right to live or reside in the shared household irrespective of whether she actually lived in the shared household.

In respect of the second question, the Court held that the question raised about a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed must be interpreted in a broad and expansive way, to encompass not only a subsisting domestic relationship in presentia but also a past domestic relationship. While there should be a subsisting domestic relationship at some point in time, it need not be so at the stage of filing the application for relief.

In respect of the case on hand, it held that the lady had a right to reside in the shared household as she was in a domestic relationship with her husband till he died and she had lived together with him. Therefore, she also had a right to reside in the shared household despite the death of her husband. The aggrieved lady continued to have a subsisting domestic relationship owing to her marriage and she being the daughter-in-law, had the right to reside in the shared household.

It is evident that the Act is a very important enactment and a step towards women empowerment. Time and again, the Supreme Court has upheld its supremacy to give relief to aggrieved women!  

GIFT BY HUF OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

INTRODUCTION
Can the Karta of a HUF make a gift of joint family immovable properties? – a question that keeps cropping up time and again. The answer to this is not a simple yes or a no. It is possible but subject to the facts of each case. There have been several important Supreme Court verdicts on this issue that have dealt with different facets of this question. Let us analyse the position on this topic.

BACKGROUND OF A HUF AND ITS KARTA

As is trite, a HUF is a creature of law. Traditionally speaking, a HUF was a joint family belonging to a male ancestor, e.g., a grandfather, father, etc., and consisted of male coparceners and other members. Thus, the sons and grandsons of the person who was the first head of the HUF automatically became coparceners by virtue of being born in that family. A unique feature of a HUF is that the share of a member is fluctuating and ambulatory, which increases on the death of a member and reduces on the birth of a member. A coparcener is a person who acquires an interest in the joint family property by virtue of being born in the family. Earlier, only men could be coparceners. A wife and a person’s mother also could not become a coparcener in a HUF. However, from 2005, all daughters are at par with sons, and they would now become a coparcener in their father’s HUF by virtue of being born in that family. Importantly, this position continues even after her marriage. Hence, alhough she can only be an ordinary member in her husband’s HUF, she can continue to remain a coparcener in her father’s HUF even after her marriage.

A Karta of a HUF is the manager of the HUF and its joint family property. Normally, the father and, in his absence, the senior-most coparcener acts as the Karta of the HUF. The Karta takes all decisions and actions on behalf of the family. He is vested with several powers for the operation and management of the HUF. After 2005, daughters are at par with sons in their father’s HUF and hence, the eldest child of the father, whether male or female, would become the Karta in the father’s HUF. The Delhi High Court’s verdict in Mrs. Sujata Sharma vs. Shri Manu Gupta, CS(OS) 2011/2006, Order dated 22nd December, 2015 is on the same lines.

SUBJECTIVE TEST
While the Karta has been clearly vested with powers of management of the HUF, the position is not so simple when it comes to making gifts of immovable properties belonging to the HUF. He could do so in certain cases, and that too up to a reasonable extent having regard to the wealth of the HUF. Thus, it is something that needs to be vetted on a case-by-case basis and based on the facts of each family.

In Ammathayee vs. Kumaresan, 1967 AIR(SC) 569, it was held that so far as movable ancestral property was concerned, a gift out of affection may be made to a wife, to a daughter and even to a son, provided the gift was within reasonable limits. A gift, for example, of the whole or almost the whole of the ancestral movable property cannot be upheld as a gift through affection.

Only by way of Gift and Not by Will
However, a Karta cannot make a will/testamentary disposition of HUF property even if it is for the benefit of a charity. There have been several instances where a Karta has included HUF property in his Will. HUF property does not belong to the Karta, even though he is the head. It belongs to the joint family. While he can will away his own share in the HUF, he cannot include the HUF property in his Will. The Karta can alienate that only inter vivos, i.e., by way of a gift. This view has been expressed in the cases of Gangi Reddi vs. Tammi Reddi 14 AIR. 1927 PC 80; Sardar Singh vs. Kunj Bihari Lal 9 AIR 1922 PC 261; Jawahar Lal vs. Sri Thakur Radha Gopaljee Maharaj AIR 1945 All 169.  This position has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in R.Kuppayee vs. Raja Gounder, 2004 AIR(SC) 1284.

Pious Purposes and Charity
Gifts of HUF immovable property made for family purposes and especially pious purposes are permissible. The Supreme Court in Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh vs. Mallappa Chanbasappa, 1964 AIR(SC) 510, has held that the expression pious purposes is wide enough, under certain circumstances, to take in charitable purposes though the scope of the latter purposes has nowhere been precisely drawn.

Gift to Daughters and Sisters
The Supreme Court, in the case of Guramma Bhratar (supra), has laid down the principle in relation to gifts by a HUF to daughters and sisters. It held that the Hindu law conferred a right upon a daughter or a sister, as the case may be, to have a share in the family property at the time of partition. That right was lost by efflux of time. But it became crystallized into a moral obligation. The father or his representative could make a valid gift, by way of reasonable provision for the daughter’s maintenance, regard being had to the financial and other relevant circumstances of the HUF. By custom or by convenience, such gifts were made at the time of marriage, but the right of the father or his representative to make such a gift was not confined to the marriage occasion. It was a moral obligation, and it continued to subsist till it was discharged. Marriage was only a customary occasion for such a gift. But the obligation could be discharged at any time, either during the lifetime of the father or thereafter. It was not possible to lay down a hard and fast rule, prescribing the quantitative limits of such a gift as that would depend on the facts of each case and it could only be decided by Courts, regard being had to the overall picture of the extent of the family estate, the number of daughters to be provided for and other paramount charges and other similar circumstances. The manager was within his rights to make a gift of a reasonable extent of the family property for the maintenance of a daughter. It could not be said that the said gift must be made only by one document or only at a single point of time. The validity or the reasonableness of a gift did not depend upon the plurality of documents but on the power of the father to make a gift and the reasonableness of the gift so made. If once the power was granted, and the reasonableness of the gift was not disputed, the fact that two gift deeds were executed instead of one, did not make the gift invalid. Accordingly, in that case, the Supreme Court concluded that where the HUF had many properties and the father gave the daughter only a life-estate in a small extent of land in addition to what had already been given for her maintenance, the gift made by the father was reasonable in the circumstances of that case.

Another important decision on this issue is Kamla Devi vs. Bachhulal Gupta, 1957 AIR(SC) 434, which laid down certain Hindu law principles. It held that it is the imperative, religious duty and a moral obligation of a father, mother or other guardian to give a girl in marriage to a suitable husband; it is a duty that must be fulfilled to prevent degradation and direct spiritual benefit is conferred upon the father by such a marriage. For pious acts, the family can alienate a reasonable portion of the property. If a promise was made of such a gift for or at the time of the marriage, that promise may be fulfilled afterwards and it was not essential to make a gift at the time of the marriage but it, may be made afterwards in fulfilment of the promise.

A corollary of the above decisions would be that the Karta of a HUF cannot make a gift to other members/coparceners. Of course, if all coparceners agree, then a partial partition of the HUF could be done, partial as regards members or properties. Do remember, that while the Income-tax Act may not recognise a partial partition, the Hindu Law yet recognises the same!   

Test of reasonableness
The Supreme Court in R. Kuppayee (supra) held that the question as to whether a particular gift was within reasonable limits or not had to be judged according to the status of the family at the time of making a gift, the extent of the immovable property owned by the family and the extent of property gifted. No hard and fast rule prescribing quantitative limits of such a gift could be laid down. The answer to such a question would vary from family to family. Further, the Apex Court laid down that the question of reasonableness or otherwise of the gift made had to be assessed vis-a-vis the total value of the property held by the HUF. Simply because the gifted property was a house, it could not be held that the gift made was not within reasonable limits.

Gift to the wife of Karta not allowed
In Ammathayee (supra), the Apex Court held that as far immovable ancestral property was concerned, the power of gift by the Karta was much more circumscribed than in the case of gift of movable ancestral property. A Hindu managing member had the power to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable limits for pious purposes, including, in fulfilment of an antenuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms of the daughter’s marriage. However, the Court held that it could not extend the scope of the words pious purposes beyond what had already been held in earlier decisions. It held that a gift in favour of a wife by her Karta husband of ancestral immovable property made out of affection must therefore fail, for no such gift was permitted under Hindu Law insofar as immovable ancestral property was concerned. Even the father-in-law, if he had desired to make a gift at the time of the marriage of his daughter-in-law, would not be competent to do so insofar as immovable ancestral property was concerned. A gift by the father-in-law to the daughter-in-law at the time of marriage could by no stretch of reasoning be called a pious purpose, whatever may be the position of a gift by a father to his daughter at the time of her marriage. After marriage, the daughter-in-law became a member of the family of her father-in-law and she would be entitled after marriage in her own right to the ancestral immovable property in certain circumstances, and clearly therefore her case stood on a very different footing from the case of a daughter who was being married and to whom a reasonable gift of ancestral immovable property could be made. A father-in-law would not be entitled to gift ancestral immovable property to a daughter-in-law so as to convert it into her stridhan.

Gift to Strangers not allowed
The Supreme Court, in the case of Guramma Bhratar (supra), held that a gift to a stranger of joint family property by the manager of the family was void.

TAX ON SUCH GIFTS
The recipient/donee of the gift would have to examine the applicability of section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act in her hands and whether the same would be taxed as a receipt of immovable property without adequate consideration. If the gift is received on occasion of the marriage of the donee then there is a statutory exemption under the Act. Further, as explained above, Courts have held that the right of the daughter/sister to receive a share in the family property was a moral obligation. Hence, a gift received towards the same could be said to be for adequate consideration. In addition, certain Tribunal decisions have held that if a HUF consists of such members who are relatives of the donee, then the HUF as a whole also could be treated as a relative u/s 56(2)(x) – Vineenitkumar Rahgavjibhai Bhalodia vs. ITO (2011) 12 ITR 616 (Rajkot); DCIT vs. Ateev V. Gala, ITA No. 1906/Mum/2014 dated 19th April, 2017. However, Gyanchand M. Bardia vs. ITO, ITA No. 1072/Ahm/2016 has taken a contrary view.     

Income earned on property gifted by a member to a HUF is subject to clubbing of income in the donor’s hands. However, no such clubbing exists under the Income-tax Act when a HUF gifts immovable property to a daughter/sister. Income earned on such property would be taxed in the hands of the donee only. However, it is also possible that the Department takes the view that this is a partial partition qua the HUF properties, and hence, income should continue to be taxed in the hands of the HUF only.

STAMP DUTY ON SUCH GIFTS
There is no concessional stamp duty when a HUF gifts property to a daughter/sister. Hence, full stamp duty on a gift of immovable property would be paid on such a gift, and the gift deed would have to be duly registered. For instance, under the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, the duty on such a gift would be 5% of the market value. This duty would be further increased by 1% metro cess levied from 1st April, 2022. The concessional duty of Rs. 500 in case of gift of a residential/agricultural property by a father to daughter would not be available since although the gift may be made by the Karta father, it is the HUF’s property and not that of the father which is being gifted. The position could be different if, instead of a gift, the partial partition route is considered. However, the same would depend upon various facts and circumstances.  

CONCLUSION
The law relating to HUFs as a whole is complex and often confusing. This is more to do with the fact that there is no codified statute dealing with HUFs, and there are several conflicting decisions on the same issue. The position is further complicated when it comes to ownership and disposal of property by HUFs. Joint families and buyers dealing with them would be well advised to fully consider the legal position particularly in relation to ancestral property. A slip up could prove fatal to the very title of the property!

RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO RECEIVE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS FROM SEBI – SUPREME COURT LAYS DOWN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES

The Supreme Court has, by a recent decision of 18th January, 2022 (T. Takano vs. SEBI (2022) 135 taxmann.com 252), gave a decision that has an important bearing on the information that SEBI is required to provide to persons accused of wrongdoing in securities markets. It has effectively held that, barring very specific exceptions, SEBI must provide the full investigation report to the person against whom proceedings for debarment, disgorgement, etc., are initiated. There can be only limited exceptions to this general rule, and even in respect of these exceptions, SEBI is required to provide reasons. Where information is not provided, the accused is entitled to demonstrate that the withholding of such information is not valid as they do not meet the criteria laid down by SEBI. In terms of upholding principles of natural justice, transparency and fairness, this decision can be said to be a landmark. Instead of limited disclosure being the rule and full disclosure being the exception, non-disclosure would now be the exception, and comprehensive disclosure would be the general rule. Moreover, the Court has made certain nuanced points on what information SEBI can be said to have relied on or even influenced by. A mere and bald denial that SEBI has not relied on certain documents as a ground for refusal to provide them is also not enough.

A classic bone of contention between SEBI and persons against whom it initiates penal proceedings is whether all the information relied on by SEBI or otherwise relevant to the proceedings has been duly provided to the person accused of violations or not. Principles of natural justice, which do not even have to necessarily be coded in the law in detail, require that all the information that is relied on by SEBI to make accusations needs to be disclosed so that the person can study it and give his response. On request that certain information be provided, while SEBI often does provide relevant information, the response is often that the information or document sought is not relevant or not relied on. At times, also depending on the efforts (and deep pockets!) of such person, this issue is pursued in appeal/writ petition. In some cases, it is seen that the appellate authority/Court requires SEBI to provide the requested information and then provide a reasonable opportunity for the person to respond and also a personal hearing. In some cases, the order is set aside totally or remanded back to SEBI. The important question is what are the guiding principles for deciding whether the information is relevant or relied on and what are exceptions to the rule of full disclosure. The Supreme Court has now comprehensively laid them in this decision, at least as far as most SEBI proceedings are concerned.

BRIEF AND SUMMARIZED FACTS OF THE CASE
This matter concerned Ricoh India Limited, a public listed company. The appellant was the Managing Director for the financial years 2012-13 to 2014-15. The Audit firm, appointed in 2016, expressed reservations over the veracity of the financial statements for the two quarters ending 30th June, 2015 and 30th September, 2015. The company’s Audit Committee appointed a firm to conduct a forensic audit, whose preliminary report was submitted on 20th April, 2016, which the company shared with SEBI with a request to carry out due investigation for fraud, etc. The forensic auditors submitted their final report on 29th November, 2016. SEBI initiated investigations and summoned the then senior management, whom the company also accused of wrongdoings. Thereafter, SEBI passed an interim order cum show cause notice making a finding that certain persons including the appellant were responsible for the misstatements in the financial statements. As far as the appellant was concerned, SEBI stated that the company had restricted the investigation only to the six months ended 30th September, 2015 and not for 2012-13 and later, when the fraud was started when the appellant was the MD. It was also stated that the forensic audit was limited to the half-year ending 30th September, 2015 to “ring-fence the earlier MD & CEO, T. Takano.”. Since SEBI recorded a finding that there was a fraud during this extended period, it passed adverse orders against the appellant and others, debarring them from the securities markets. An independent audit firm was appointed to conduct a detailed forensic audit. The interim order also served as a show cause notice (“SCN”) seeking a response as to why adverse directions, including debarment should not be passed in a final order. The interim order was later confirmed after considering the representations of the appellant. When the appellant appealed to SAT, the order was set aside on various grounds. However, liberty was given to SEBI to issue a fresh SCN on receipt of the final report of the forensic auditor.

SEBI then issued the fresh SCN, which was the cause of contention that finally resulted in the decision by the Supreme Court. To focus on the core issue, which was the subject matter of the decision, the question was whether SEBI was bound to provide a copy of the investigation report as sought by the appellant. SEBI replied that the investigation report could not be provided as it was an ‘internal document’. The appellant filed a writ before the Bombay High Court which held that such investigation report is solely for internal purposes, and relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Natwar Singh’s case ((2010) 13 SCC 255), concluded that the report does not form the basis of the SCN and hence need not be disclosed. The appellant filed a review petition before the Division Bench, which too was rejected. The appellant then filed a special leave petition before the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.

RULING BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court reviewed the law relating to how proceedings are to be conducted, particularly under the relevant SEBI PFUTP Regulations. It highlighted the core importance of the investigation report in these provisions and the proceedings thereunder. It also made some very important observations about the documents that would influence an authority’s mind in his decision, even though he may not specifically rely on them. All in all, it is submitted that the Court took a broader and more realistic view of the matter, particularly in the light of fairness, transparency and principles of natural justice.

First, the Court reviewed Regulations 9, 10 and 11 of the SEBI PFUTP Regulations. It noted that the core process laid down by law was fairly simple and clear. SEBI conducts an investigation in case of a suspected violation of securities laws by a person. If such an investigation reveals a violation, then SEBI initiates proceedings and issues an SCN. Regulation 10 specifically states that it is only “after consideration of the (investigation) report, if satisfied that there is a violation of these regulations, and after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the persons concerned, issue such directions or take such action as mentioned in regulation 11 and regulation 12.” (emphasis supplied).

The Court highlighted the importance of the investigation report as the sheer basis for deciding whether or not there is a violation of the Regulations. The penal/adverse directions also arise as the next step. These directions that can be issued under Regulations 11 and 12 are fairly wide and carry grave consequences. Trading of the concerned security can be suspended. Parties may be restrained from accessing the securities markets and dealing in securities. Proceeds of transactions or securities can be impounded/retained. And so on. Thus, as the Court noted, the sequence was as follows: an investigation is conducted; the authority reviews the report of such investigation based on which, if satisfied, it initiates proceedings, grants a hearing; and then issues directions that have serious consequences. It is evident, then, that the investigation report is the core basis for the proceedings and action, and denying the person a copy of it is unjust, unfair and against the principles of natural justice. It is hardly a mere internal document, as SEBI contended.

The Supreme Court highlights three other important points. The argument often put forth is that certain documents sought by the person have not been ‘relied on’ while issuing the SCN, which makes the allegations. Hence, there is no requirement or need to provide such documents. The Court noted a distinction between what documents are relied on and what is relevant to the proceedings, which is a broader term.

Further, the Court noted that there might be documents reviewed by the authority though not ‘relied on’ while issuing the SCN. The nuanced point made by the Supreme Court (for which several precedents were also cited) was that such documents do influence the mind of the authority. That being so, such documents are also relevant and hence need to be provided to the person accused so that he may defend himself.

Then the Court pointed out that a mere bald denial by the authority that it has not relied on the document sought is insufficient. The actual facts would have to be seen.

The Court pointed out that the principles of reliability of evidence, fairness of a trial, and transparency and accountability are relevant for such quasi-judicial proceedings so that such proceedings do not become opaque, without accountability and thus unjust and unfair.

Thus, the Court held that relevant parts of the investigation report need to be shared with the appellant, though bearing in mind certain exceptions as discussed below.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF PROVIDING ALL RELEVANT DOCUMENTS TO AN ACCUSED
As mentioned earlier, the decision in a way reverses the general practice often seen in such proceedings. Disclosure is almost an exception, and non-disclosure is the general rule. Selective disclosure is commonly seen with requests to provide documents sought for, often rejected. The Court has now said, of course, in the context of the SEBI proceedings under such Regulations, that disclosure ought to be the general rule and non-disclosure has to be only under certain specific exceptions. Even for the exceptions, reasons would have to be provided why those parts are not disclosed. And in such a case, the onus then shifts to the accused, who still can provide convincing reasons why such information said to fall under such exception should still be provided. The Court held that the accused could not seek a roving disclosure of even documents unconnected to the case. The right of third parties may be balanced with the requirements of disclosure. Information of a ‘sensitive nature bearing upon the orderly functioning of the securities markets’ is another exception.

Thus, the Court laid down certain specific exceptions but also kept the authority accountable.

CONCLUSION
This decision will have a significant bearing on how proceedings are conducted by SEBI and would obviously impact not just future proceedings but even presently ongoing proceedings. This decision would also guide appeals before appellate authorities. Accused have far better rights of justice. This decision is thus a boost for transparency and fairness making disclosure the general rule.  

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS – SEBI’S GUIDANCE ON CROSS-REFERRALS, NSE RULING AND AMENDMENT TO FUTP REGULATIONS

Securities laws continue to remain interesting by constant tweaking of the regulations by the SEBI to keep them with times, even if some of which may be ill-considered. Some SEBI orders too create good precedents and, at times, place on record happenings in companies which can be disturbing and even disillusioning. Then there are informal guidances handed out, which are akin to advance ruling in substance which, even if they do not have binding effect, usually reflect the view that SEBI is likely to take even in other cases. Let us discuss some of such developments in recent weeks briefly.

SEBI’S INFORMAL GUIDANCE – EARNINGS BY INTERMEDIARIES FROM REFERRALS OF CLIENTS TO OTHERS

Providing as many services as possible under one roof makes business sense and good customer service, helping common branding and savings in costs in the financial services industry. However, this also presents scope for conflicts of interest. For example, a merchant banker who manages an issue could face a conflict with other departments which recommend investments to clients. An investment adviser who must give an impartial recommendation to clients on their investment portfolio faces a potential conflict with other entities in the group, such as mutual funds. SEBI’s general approach to dealing with such conflicts has been multi-pronged. Firstly, full disclosure must be made of all conflicts by various intermediaries. Secondly, certain conflicts are wholly prohibited and cannot be cured even by disclosure. Yet another method is requiring that entities in the same group will not give the same client two types of conflicting services.

Introducing many such provisions initially resulted in resistance, but this was eventually accepted as good practice for all. A recent informal guidance by SEBI (in the case of HDFC Securities Limited, dated 14th February, 2022) presents an interesting way of how one organization proposed to deal with the issue in the interests of all. It proposed that it would recommend and refer selected external investment advisors to its clients. The advisor then would pay a referral fee to the organization. This would appear to be a win-win situation for all. The organization would earn from the referral of a client who otherwise would have consulted an investment advisor in their own group. The investment advisor would get a client. The client would be saved from hunting afresh for yet another intermediary for services he needs. In its informal guidance, SEBI allowed this, stating that this is a correct interpretation of the law and, hence, permissible.

However, this, in the author’s submission, creates an imbalance amongst intermediaries. An investment advisor, for example, faces far more and stricter restrictions under Regulation 15, 22 and other provisions of the Regulations governing investment advisors. He absolutely cannot earn directly or indirectly any fees, commissions, etc., from providing any distribution service to its clients. For example, if he advises his clients to invest in certain mutual funds, it cannot act as an agent of such fund and sell units of such fund to the client and earn commission thereon. Indeed, even a family member cannot provide such distribution services to that client. As stated above, while some restrictions can be cured by disclosures to client, the restrictions generally on investment advisors are far wider and more strict.

Indeed, this problem has wider ramifications, particularly since there are multiple intermediaries and even multiple regulators – SEBI, IRDA, PFRDA, etc. So there are even further potential areas of conflict that could be detrimental to investors. It is perhaps time that a holistic view is taken by individual regulators of their multiple regulations and even together as regulators so that cross-regulator arbitrage is eliminated.

SEBI’S RULING – NATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE AND OTHERS

SEBI passed a final order (Reference No. WTM/AB/MRD/DSA/21/2021-22 dated 11th February, 2022) in the case of Chitra Ramkrishna, National Stock Exchange (NSE) and others levying penalties on them for violations of various regulations governed by SEBI. While there are several perspectives from which the order can be seen, it is also the factual matrix asserted in the order which deserves attention. The order talks of events that have allegedly taken place in the Exchange which are bizarre on one hand but, on other hand, in the submission of the author, not uncommon. But they do present a disturbing state of affairs of management of large companies and question whether well-meaning practices of corporate governance which are mandated by law actually exist in practice or are flouted easily. It is possible that the order may be contested in appeal and that some of the factual assertions made or directions may be rejected/set aside. But taking at face value, let us discuss what the order asserts.

Firstly, the Order says that the Managing Director and CEO of NSE appointed a deputy of sorts and gave extremely wide powers to him and huge remuneration that was reviewed substantially upwards over his tenure. In the opinion of SEBI, this was not only unreasonable considering his background and qualifications but did not even pass through the regular performance appointment and review processes mandated for senior management (e.g., review and recommendation by the Nomination and Remuneration Committee). Further, though having such wide powers, which even resulted in several very senior executives reporting to him, he was not given the designation of Key Managerial Personnel (KMP). Appointment of a person as KMP involves certain approval and review processes and places him accountable in terms of being directly liable for defaults in areas falling within his purview. As asserted by SEBI, what was also disturbing is the alleged silence of the various persons who could have been aware of this and who would then be expected to play the role of checks and balances in such a large organization. It was asserted that the MD/CEO took these decisions single-handedly. Such revelations raise yet again questions whether the elaborate provisions in law (and at times voluntarily adopted) exist primarily on paper or can otherwise be easily flouted?

On the other hand, in the author’s submission, it is common not just in corporates but also in different fields, including politics, that an executive assistant is appointed to assist the top leader. Such executive assistant often has the total trust of the leader and is given wide powers to execute on behalf of the leader. Such executive assistants could individually become very powerful and command authority far beyond his status and accountability. The question then is how corporate governance and law requirements and their actual practice should ensure that they do not become power centers without the requisite supervision and accountability.

The second major and perhaps more disturbing aspect in the order is that the MD/CEO regularly consulted a ‘Spiritual Guru’ on important matters relating to the running of NSE. She even allegedly shared confidential corporate information with such a person. The said Guru not only had no official connection with NSE but was asserted by the MD not even to have physical coordinates and could manifest at will! But equally curiously, the Guru could still access emails sent to him and reply to them. Further, he gave detailed advice on important policy matters relating to the running of NSE and even used sophisticated corporate management jargon in such emails. Thus, instead of running NSE through modern corporate practices and teamwork, such a person appeared to have a decisive say on important matters. It is again surprising that the checks and balances in the organization and the corporate governance framework did not detect/prevent these alleged happenings.

Now, again, it is indeed a tradition in India to seek the guidance of spiritual Gurus. Perhaps a leader faces the proverbial loneliness at the top, which makes the compulsion to seek out advice even more. Such Gurus are also known to be approached to resolve family or business disputes. But it is one thing to seek advice and solace on personal life outlook and spiritual matters. It is totally different when blind reverence leads to them having a vital say in running a large organization. Saddeningly, this also places even corporates in the global stereotype of India being a place of snake charmers and superstitions. And, finally, yet again, the question arises whether the checks and balances of good corporate governance either do not exist beyond paper or whether they can be flouted and thus provide false assurance?

SEBI REGULATIONS AMENDMENT – FRAUD AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

SEBI has amended the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (“the Regulations”) with effect from 25th January, 2022 by replacing the existing clause (k) to Regulation 4(2). What is interesting is the wide wording and hence implications of this revised clause. The clause forms part of a list of those acts/omissions which are deemed to be manipulative, fraudulent or unfair trade practice. This short clause is worth reproducing verbatim here so that its implications as analysed can be appreciated:

“(k) disseminating information or advice through any media, whether physical or digital, which the disseminator knows to be false or misleading in a reckless or careless manner and which is designed to, or likely to influence the decision of investors dealing in securities;”

While the earlier clause in substance had a similar objective, certain additions/changes expand its scope and possibly overcome some legal hurdles faced in preventing such practices.

The clause intends to prevent the dissemination of false/misleading information that would influence investors in entering into dealing in securities. It has been found that persons spread rumours, tips, etc., to influence investors into transactions in securities. This could be done fraudulently, to earn profits at the cost of investors who may, sometimes, end up holding dud securities. A practice referred of this type, referred to as ‘pump and dump’ has been found in several cases by SEBI. Social media such as messaging services have also been found to be used for such fraudulent practices.

However, SEBI has now sought to expand the scope, particularly by adding “in a reckless or careless manner”. This apparently could lower the bar of proof and perhaps even shift the onus at least partly on the person who shares such information. Thus, he may have to demonstrate that he had shared such information after due diligence/care. He may even be required to show documentation to prove such care.

Sharing ‘tips’ casually with friends/relatives/colleagues, etc., is indeed quite common. Such tips/information may not necessarily be a product of documented analysis of the scrip. They can often be just a gut feeling based on the reading of some news or developments. Whatsapp and other social media/messaging services are replete with groups where investments are discussed and recommended. Recently, discussions on certain groups on Reddit were widely reported in media, particularly involving the scrip Gamestop.

While fraudulent practices certainly need a stop, the question is whether the new clause goes too far? The clause still retains an important pre-requisite for a person to be charged with violating it – that such a person should know that the information is false or misleading. But yet, the question is whether adding the words “in a reckless or careless manner” could cover even casual discussions. Price discovery in stock markets is the sum result not just of informed and expert analysis but also a continuous process of such analysis coupled with informed guesswork. The question is whether having such a widely worded clause would stifle otherwise healthy discussions.

PART PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT

INTRODUCTION
It is said that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Taking a cue from this maxim, s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“the Act”) has enacted the concept of part performance of a contract. This concept is based upon the law of possession.

The Income-tax Act at several places makes references to any transaction allowing the possession of any immovable property in part performance of a contract. The concept of part performance of a contract is found in s. 2(47) relating to the definition of ‘transfer’ for capital gains, s. 27 relating to the definition of ‘owner’ under House Property Income and the erstwhile s. 269UA relating to ‘transfer’ for Form 37-I. Thus, it becomes important to understand the meaning of this concept.

DEFINITION
The Supreme Court in  Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi [2002] 3 SCC 676 has stated that certain conditions are required to be fulfilled if a transferee wants to defend or protect his possession under s. 53A of the Act. The necessary conditions are:

(1)    there must be a contract to transfer for consideration of any immovable property;

(2)    the contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf;

(3)    the writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained;

(4)    the transferee must in part-performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof;

(5)    the transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract; and

(6)    the transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract.

If the above mentioned elements are present, then the transferor is debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property in possession of the transferee other than a right expressly provided by the contract. Thus, this section protects certain types of transferees from any action by the transferor. The principle laid down has been explained by the Supreme Court in Sheth Maneklal Mansukhbhai vs. Messrs. Hormusji Jamshedji, AIR 1950 SC 1 as follows:

“The s. is a partial importation in the statute law of India of the English doctrine of part performance. It furnishes a statutory defence to a person who has no registered title deed in his favour to maintain his possession if he can prove a written and signed contract in his favour and some action on his part in part-performance of that contract.”

Let us examine each of the above key elements.

CONTRACT
The starting point of s. 53A is that there must be a contract that must relate to the transfer of specific immovable property. Without a contract, this section has no application. Since a contract is a must, it goes without saying that all the contract prerequisites also follow. Thus, if the contract has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, etc., then it is void ab initio, and the section would also fail – Ariff vs. Jadunath (1931) AIR PC 79.

WRITTEN CONTRACTS
Another important requirement is that the contract must be in writing. Oral contracts are valid under the Indian Contract Act but not for the purposes of s. 53A. The transfer must be by virtue of a written contract. If the contract merely refers to a previous oral understanding, then the same would not fall within the purview of s. 53A – Kathihar Jute Mills Ltd. vs. Calcutta Match Works, AIR 1958 Pat 133.

In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik vs. Devi Sahai, 1982 (1) SCC 237, it was held that to qualify for the protection of the doctrine of part performance it must be shown that there is an agreement to transfer immovable property for consideration and the contract is evidenced by a writing signed by the person sought to be bound by it and from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. In Mool Chand Bakhru vs. Rohan, CA 5920/1998 (SC), letters were written by a landowner offering to sell half his property in exchange for money which he needed. The Supreme Court letters denied the benefit of s. 53A to the transferee by observing that the letters written could not be termed as an agreement to sell, the terms of which had been reduced into writing. At the most, it was an admission of an oral agreement to sell and not a written agreement. Statutorily the emphasis was not only on a written agreement but also on the terms of the agreement as well which could be ascertained with reasonable certainty from the written document. There was no meeting of minds. The letters did not spell out the other essential terms of an agreement to sell, such as the time frame within which the sale deed was to be executed and who would pay the registration charges etc.

REGISTRATION

Earlier, s. 53A provided that the section would take effect even if the agreement for the transfer of the immovable property had not been registered. However, the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 modified this position. Now for s. 53A to operate, the agreement must be registered. Hence, registration has been made mandatory, and in its absence, the section would be inoperative. Since the agreement is to be in writing, stamp duty would also follow. Accordingly, if the agreement is inadequately stamped, it would not be admissible as evidence in a Court.

In a recent judgment of Joginder Tuli vs. State NCT of Delhi, W.P.(CRL) 1006/2020 & CRL.M.A. 8649/2020, the Delhi High Court has stated that it is well settled that in order to give benefits of s. 53A, the document relied upon must be a registered document. Any unregistered document cannot be looked into by the court and cannot be relied upon or taken into evidence in view of s. 17(1A) read with s. 49 of the Registration Act. Thus, the benefit of s. 53A would be given, if and only if the Agreement to Sell cum Receipt satisfied the provisions of s. 17(1) A of the Registration Act. It relied upon an earlier decision in the case of Arun Kumar Tandon vs. Akash Telecom Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. MANU/DE/0545/2010.

Another decision of the Delhi High Court, Earthtech Enterprises Ltd. vs. Kuljit Singh Butalia, 199 (2013) DLT 194, has observed that a person can protect his possession under s. 53A on the plea of part performance only if it is armed with a registered document. Even on the basis of a written agreement, he cannot protect his possession.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Balbir Singh Maini, (2017) 398 ITR 531 (SC) under the Income-tax Act has succinctly summed up the relationship between registration of the instrument and s. 53A. It held that the protection provided under s. 53A is only a shield and can only be resorted to as a right of defence. An agreement of sale which fulfilled the ingredients of s. 53A was not required to be executed through a registered instrument. This position was changed by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001. Amendments were made simultaneously in s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and sections 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act. By the aforesaid amendment, the words ‘the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or’ in s. 53A of the 1882 Act have been omitted. Simultaneously, sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act have been amended, clarifying that unless the document containing the contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property (for the purpose of s. 53A) is registered, it shall not have any effect in law other than being received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument.

The effect of the aforesaid amendment was that, on and after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 2001, if an agreement, like the Joint Development Agreement in the impugned case, was not registered, then it had had no effect in law for the purposes of s. 53A. In short, there was no agreement in the eyes of the law which could be enforced under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, in order to qualify as a ‘transfer’ of a capital asset under s. 2(47)(v), there must be a ‘contract’ which could be enforced in law under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ONLY

The contract must pertain to the ‘transfer of an immovable property’. The Act defines this phrase as an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one more other living persons or to himself, and one or more other living persons. This is also known as transfer inter vivos. The Act then proceeds to deal with various types of transfer of immovable property – a sale, an exchange, a mortgage and a lease. All these transfers would be covered within the scope of s. 53A. A gift of an immovable property is also a transfer but is not covered within the purview of s. 53A as explained below. Anything which is not a transfer is not covered by s. 53A. For instance, a leave and licence is an easement / personal right and hence, would be outside the purview of this section. Similarly, various Supreme Court decisions have held that a family arrangement is not a transfer, and hence, a family arrangement would be outside the scope of this section.

A movable property would be out of the purview of this section – Bhabhi Dutt vs. Ramlalbyamal (1934) 152 IC 431. The Act defines the term immovable property in a negative manner by stating that it does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. The General Clauses Act defines it to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and any anything attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, defines the term to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The scope of this section even applies to agricultural properties – Nakul Chand Polley vs. Kalipada Ghosal, AIR 1939 Cal 163.

The Supreme Court has held in UOI vs. M/s. KC Sharma & Co., CA No. 9049-9053 /2011 that the defence under s. 53A was even available to a person who had an agreement of lease in his favour though no lease had been executed and registered. It also protected the possession of persons who have acted on a contract of sale but in whose favour no valid sale deed was executed or registered. The benefit was available, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed by the law for the time being in force. In all cases where the section was applicable, the transferor was debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property of which the transferee had taken or continued in possession.

CONSIDERATION
The transfer of immovable property must be for consideration. Hence, gratuitous transfers or gifts of immovable property would be outside the purview of s. 53A – Hiralal vs. Gaurishankar (1928) 30 Bom LR 451. As is the norm in India, adequacy of consideration is immaterial. For instance, in the USA, not only is consideration a must for a valid contract, it must also be adequate. In India, all that is necessary, both for a valid contract as well as for s. 53A, is that there must be consideration.

SIGNATURE
The contract must be signed by the transferor or any person on his behalf, say the power of attorney holder.

TERMS OF CONTRACT
The terms of the contract must be ascertainable with reasonable certainty. If they are ambiguous or cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty, then the contract cannot be enforced u/s. 53A – Bobba Suramma vs. P Chandramma 1959 AIR AP 568.

POSSESSION
The transferee must take possession of the property for this section to apply – Sanyasi Raju vs. Kamappadu (1960) AIR AP 83. Alternatively, if he is already in possession of the property, then he must continue with such possession. Possession of a part of the property is also enough – Durga Prasad vs. Kanhaiyalal (1979) AIR Raj 200. Further, the possession of the property must be pursuant to part performance of the agreement to sell the property. The onus of proof is on the defendant – Thakamma Mathew vs. Azamathulla Khan 1993 Suppl. (4) SCC 492.

In the case of Roop Singh (Dead) Through Lrs vs. Ram Singh (Dead) Through Lrs, JT 2000 (3) SC 474, the plaintiff pleaded that he owned certain agricultural land. As the land was in illegal possession of the defendant, he filed a suit. The defendant submitted that 14 years prior to the date of institution of the suit, he had purchased the suit land for consideration, had paid full sale consideration to the plaintiff, and since then, he was in possession of the suit land. He contended that his possession is protected under s. 53A. He also pleaded that he had acquired the title by adverse possession (adverse possession is a means of acquiring title to a property by physically occupying it for a long period of time. A person can acquire property if one possesses it long enough and meets the legal requirements). The Supreme Court held that the plea of adverse possession and retaining the possession by operation of s. 53A were inconsistent with each other. Once it was admitted by implication that the plaintiff came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till the date of the suit, then the plea of adverse possession would not be available to the defendant.     

WILLINGNESS OF TRANSFEREE
The transferee must be willing to complete his part of the contract. Failure on his part to complete his contract, e.g. payment of monthly instalments, would not entitle him to the defence of part performance – Jawaharlal Wadhwa vs. Chakraborthy 1989 (1) SCC 76.

In Ranchhoddas Chhaganlal vs. Devaji Supadu Dorik, 1977 SCC (3) 584, the purchaser paid a portion of the consideration and claimed shelter u/s.53A. Despite demands from the plaintiff, he failed to pay the balance sum. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was never ready and willing to perform the agreement as alleged by the appellant. One of the ingredients of part performance under s. 53A was that the transferee had taken possession in part performance of the contract. In the case on hand there was no performance in part by the respondent. The true principle of the operation of the acts of part performance required that the acts in question must be referred to some contract and must be referred to the alleged one; that they proved the existence of some contract and were consistent with the contract alleged. S. 53A was a right to protect his possession against any challenge to it by the transferor contrary to the terms of the contract.

Again in Ram Kumar Agarwal vs. Thawar Das, (1999) (1) SCC 76, it was held that a plea under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act raised a mixed question of law and fact and therefore could not be permitted to be urged for the first time at the stage of an appeal. Further, performance or willingness to perform his part of the contract was one of the essential ingredients of the plea of part performance. The defendant, having failed in proving such willingness, protection to his possession could not have been claimed by reference to s. 53A.

The section does not create a title in the defendant. It only acts as a deterrent against a plaintiff asserting his title. It does not permit the defendant to maintain a suit on title – Ram Gopal vs. Custodian (1966) 2 SCR 214.

NULL AND VOID TRANSACTIONS

The section has no application to transactions which are null and void for any reason. The Supreme Court held in Biswabani (P.) Ltd vs. Santosh Kumar Dutta, 1980 SCR (1) 650 that if a lease was void for want of registration, neither party to the indenture could take advantage of any of the terms of the lease. No other terms of such an indenture inadmissible for want of registration can be the basis for a relief u/s. 53A.

Again in Ligy Paul vs. Mariyakutti, RSA No. 79/2020, the Kerala High Court has reiterated that s.53A is applicable only where a contract for transfer is valid in all respects. It must be an agreement enforceable by law under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

EXCEPTION

This section does not impact the rights of a buyer who has paid consideration and who has no notice of the contract or the part performance of the contract.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of part performance is a concept with several important cogs in the wheel. Each of them is vital for the doctrine to be applied correctly. Although it is one of the fundamental tenets in the field of conveyancing, its importance under the Income-tax Act also cannot be belittled!

NSE’S HIGH-TECH STOCK MARKET SCANDAL: WILL THE MASTERMINDS GO SCOT FREE?

NSE was hit by a co-location trading scandal sometime in 2015 when a whistle-blower first complained to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Author and Journalist Palak Shah has done a deep dive investigation into the NSE co-location scam. His book The Market Mafia, published in November 2020, is a full-scale exposé of the deep rot in India’s financial market ecosystem. As a journalist working with some of the leading Business newspapers in Mumbai, Palak has much insight into the working of markets, exchanges, SEBI and regulations. Considering certain constraints, BCAJ sent him questions and carried this e-interview to throw light on how the NSE scam has unfolded and the delay in investigating it. Hope you enjoy reading it!

Q.1. Can you briefly explain the matter relating to the Colo scam and corporate governance issues at NSE?
Co-location (Colo) is nothing but proximity hosting of broker servers with NSE’s master order matching engine in the exchange premises at Bandra-Kurla Complex (BKC). It gives a superior trading speed and advanced information on price moves and order books. As I have detailed in my book, The Market Mafia, the Colo scandal goes back to 2010. When NSE started co-location trading, it lacked the necessary study from the market regulator SEBI and hence safeguards. There were flaws in the system, which investigations post 2015 revealed were deliberate. The flaws gave a few an advantage in connecting first and hence faster data and so on. Had SEBI made a proper study of NSE trading systems in 2010 or carried out a thorough audit and then given its go-ahead after a public consultation, the scenario would have been different. The deliberate flaws in the system were a result of corporate governance lapses at NSE, for which the accountability has to be fixed.   

Q.2. How was the matter unearthed?

In January 2015, an unknown whistle-blower first informed SEBI about the co-location scandal and certain flaws in the system. The then SEBI whole time-member Rajeev Agarwal pushed his officials into action, and the probe started in the weeks following the whistle-blower complaints. But even after Agarwal set the ball rolling, SEBI was slow in its approach and investigations since NSE’s top bosses enjoyed high patronage in New Delhi, and the regulators were scared to take them head-on. Multiple forensic and system audits by IIT Mumbai were carried out under SEBI’s instructions. NSE’s top management was hostile towards these investigations since they would not share the data and other inputs with the investigators. Yet certain facts on governance lapses and flaws in the system emerged. CBI registered an FIR in 2018 on the basis of a complaint but for four years the Co-location file kept gathering dust since no major investigation was done by the agency. It was believed by many that key players in the scam were difficult to identify. In November 2020, I published my book The Market Mafia – Chronicle of India’s High Tech Stock Market Scandal & The Cabal That Went Scot Free. The book detailed the nuts and bolts of NSE’s trading system and, for the first time, gave an inside into the working of a Co-location scam and other aspects that most of the market investors were unaware about. The book also gave vital details of the key characters in the co-location scam and brought into the public domain several hidden communication between NSE officials and SEBI with regard to the ongoing probe. The book laid bare how NSE flouted norms with relative ease and impunity, and even senior SEBI officials looked the other way. The Market Mafia carries a detailed account of brokers, NSE officials, financial market experts and policymakers who benefited from the Co-location scam and the happening within NSE. For the first time in 30 years after the Harshad Mehta scam, a book has revealed true events to show how India’s stock markets are rigged by those very people who are supposed to protect the system.

In February 2022, SEBI released an order against former NSE MD and CEO Chitra Ramkrishna, who was among the key managerial persons when the co-location scam was taking place and was later in charge of NSE between 2013 and 2016. The SEBI order stated that Ramkrishna was taking instructions from an unknown person to run the exchange, whom she called a Yogi dwelling in the Himalayas. All this attracted public attention to the NSE scandal, which I say is several times bigger than the Harshad Mehta scam.

Q.3. As the first line of oversight, has NSE performed its obligation when the matter came to light?


From the beginning, NSE has been lax in diving deep into the scandal, which came to light in 2015. It has shielded and protected its officials who could have turned a blind eye to the various lapse or who could have engineered the flaws in the trading system. Simple instance of NSE shielding its officials can be gauged from the fact that Ramkrishna was allowed to exit NSE with dignity and was also paid Rs 44 crore in dues in 2016. Instead, the exchange was required to conduct investigations into her bad governance practices and slap some serious charges. Several other instances, like sharing data illegally with Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas, the two well-known market researchers by NSE, show that the officials within the exchange were complacent with the scamsters.

Q.4. Was SEBI aware of the irregularities at NSE, and for how long?

SEBI officials can be charged with ‘Omission and Commission of Duty’ which implies complacency in the scandal. It is one of the directions in which the CBI is now probing SEBI officials. The regulator is alleged to have hidden facts from the public, investigators and government about the scam. This is clear from the various arguments of CBI in the court.

Q.5. As a regulator, has SEBI been fair in investigating the matter and discharging its obligation in terms of timeliness of action, quality of investigation, quantum of punitive action taken and taking corrective action?

SEBI failed to conduct due diligence of NSE co-location trading systems from the day it started in January 2010. SEBI has been very slow in ordering proper investigations and even conducting its own probe. It left the probe to NSE to investigate itself. SEBI’s orders are childish and loosely knit. It has broken down the scam into various instances of small violations and not imposed charges of fraud and other stringent provisions laid down in the SEBI Act. The regulator has wide-ranging powers to probe such scandals, which it has not used at all. The list of SEBI’s inaction is long. All this points to SEBI’s lack of willingness in bringing the real culprits to book.

Q.6. Was a similar matter also detected at any other exchanges, and has SEBI dealt with other exchanges differently?

Yes, a forensic audit by TR Chaddha and Co. points out a scandal in sharing data by MCX with Susan Thomas and one New Delhi based algo trading Chirag Anand in an unauthorised manner. But SEBI and MCX have buried this scandal. NSE data, which was illegally obtained by Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas was going into algo trading work. Similarly, data obtained from MCX without following proper checks and balances were also going into algo trading work. SEBI has failed to take the MCX probe further and bring the actual culprits to book.

Q.7. How, in your view, will these irregularities impact the credibility of the Indian securities market, especially when one out of two exchanges and its regulator is found inactive or even complicit?

Both foreign investors and domestic institutions strongly believe that India follows the rule of law. Retail investors believe that Indian markets are most efficient and scam free. All the investors have placed their faith in SEBI and exchanges like NSE, BSE and MCX who are the larger players. They invest and trade billions of dollars at the blink of an eye. But the scandal at NSE and data sharing at MCX in a dubious manner, both of which show SEBI in poor light, can erode the trust of these investors. The credibility of the market has already been impacted but would be in ruins till the time the culprits are not found and brought to book by the government.

Q.8. You have been covering the colo and corporate governance matter at NSE in detail at various forums for quite a long time and have also covered these irregularities in detail in your book – ‘The Market Mafia’ – What is the whole idea behind this book?

You will find that The Market Mafia is a unique book since it gives all the real names of those behind the scandal at NSE and dubious happenings at MCX. The book exposes SEBI and the government’s lack of will for the past few years to investigate the scandal. It also reveals the conflict of interest that prevails in the governing structures of the stock markets and, above all, the bureaucratic rut that has exposed SEBI as a lame paper tiger.

JURISDICTION OF SEBI IN TAKING ACTION AGAINST PRACTISING CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

BACKGROUND
With the onset of the infamous Satyam scam of 2008-2009, where major accounting frauds were exposed, SEBI initiated a detailed investigation in the books of accounts of Satyam. Post investigation, SEBI issued a Show Cause Notice to the statutory auditor of Satyam, namely Price Waterhouse Co. (PWC). The power of SEBI to issue such a Show Cause Notice to a Chartered Accountant (firm) was challenged by PWC before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court (Writ Petition No. 5249 of 2010) under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court (vide its order of 13th August, 2010) put the controversy to rest by allowing SEBI to initiate action and bring Chartered Accountants within its fold – subject to not encroaching on the ICAI’s powers under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (CA Act).

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court emphasized the fact that only if the Chartered Accountant was involved in falsification and fabrication of books of a listed company, then SEBI could invoke its powers under Section 11(4) r.w.s. 11B of the SEBI Act, which reads as under:

Section 11B.

(1)    Save as otherwise provided in section 11, if after making or causing to be made an enquiry, the Board is satisfied that it is necessary:

(i)    in the interest of investors, or orderly development of securities market; or

(ii)    to prevent the affairs of any intermediary or other persons referred to in section 12 being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of investors or securities market; or to secure the proper management of any such intermediary or person

it may issue such directions:

(a)    to any person or class of persons referred to in section, or associated with the securities market; or

(b)    to any company in respect of matters specified in section 11A, as may be appropriate in the interests of investors in securities and the securities market.

An important facet of the aforesaid definition is whether an auditor of listed companies (and registered intermediaries) can be considered to be a ‘person associated with the securities market’ and thereby under the jurisdiction of SEBI. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court clarified that if SEBI concludes that there was no ‘mens rea or connivance’ to fabricate and fudge the books of accounts, then SEBI ought not to issue any direction(s) against the auditor.

Within the aforesaid contours, the proceedings (qua PWC) continued at the SEBI level and finally concluded with an Order against PWC (on 10th January, 2018), inter-alia, imposing a restraint on PWC on issuing a certificate to a listed company for two years, amongst other directions. PWC challenged the SEBI Order before the Hon’ble Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). In the said case (decided on 9th September, 2019), the Hon’ble SAT went into the question as to whether SEBI could have proceeded against an auditor in connection with the work which they have undertaken for a listed company in respect of maintaining its books of accounts. After deliberation, the Hon’ble SAT ruled that SEBI’s enquiry ought to be only restricted to the charge of conspiracy and involvement in ‘fraud’. SEBI cannot take action against the auditing firm on the charge of professional negligence – since the CA firm was under the jurisdiction of ICAI. The said SAT Order has been challenged by SEBI before the Hon’ble Supreme Court – in which the regulator obtained a limited stay in its favour (Supreme Court Order dated 18th November, 2019 in Civil Appeal No(s). 8567-8570/ 2019). Until the Hon’ble Supreme Court finally adjudicates the matter – the question of SEBI’s jurisdiction of taking action against the Chartered Accountant(s) remains an open-ended one.

However, in the recent past, SEBI has been penalizing auditors of listed companies and registered intermediaries in respect of their auditing functions by alleging that the concerned auditor had violated Sections 12A(a), 12A(b) and 12A(c) of the SEBI Act, which reads as under:

12A. No person shall directly or indirectly:

(a)    use or employ, in connection with the issue, purchase or sale of any securities listed or proposed to be listed on a recognized stock exchange, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder;

(b)    employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with issue or dealing in securities which are listed or proposed to be listed on a recognised stock exchange;

(c)    engage in any act, practice, course of business which operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the issue, dealing in securities which are listed or proposed to be listed on a recognised stock exchange, in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder.

RECENT RULING BY HON’BLE SAT

Through recent decisions in the M. V. Damania case (Appeal No. 335 of 2020 decided on 17th January, 2022) and Mani Oommen case (Appeal No. 183 of 2020 decided on 18th February, 2022); the Hon’ble SAT has set aside the SEBI orders penalising the auditors:

I.    In the M. V. Damania case, the concerned auditor had certified the expenditure incurred by Paramount Printpackaging Ltd (PPL) towards Initial Public Offering (IPO) expenses out of the IPO proceeds. The crux of SEBI’s allegation was that auditor negligently certified that an amount of Rs. 36.60 crores was utilized towards objects of the IPO. SEBI had alleged that:

(i)    PPL made payment to the various vendors in crore of rupees without having any invoices;

(ii)    in some cases, bills from the vendors were issued at a later date, post remittance by PPL; and

(iii)    the auditor did not raise any red flag against doubtful payments made by PPL.

In view of the aforesaid, SEBI imposed a monetary penalty of Rs. 15 lakhs on the auditor firm (and its partner), jointly and severally, for alleged violation of provisions of Section 12A(a), 12A(b) and 12A(c) of the SEBI Act r.w. Regulations 3 and 4 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP Regulations).

In Appeal, the concerned auditor contended the following, amongst other arguments:

(i)    audit of the financial statements of PPL was based on the information provided by the management;

(ii)    in the process of the audit, the endeavour was to obtain audit evidence that is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for forming an independent opinion;

(iii)    all the payments made by PPL were supported by bank statements; and

(iv)    in any case, SEBI had no jurisdiction to proceed against Chartered Accountants, who are members of the ICAI.

The Hon’ble SAT ruled that the provisions of Section 12A(a) and 12A(b) of the SEBI Act do not apply to Chartered Accountants since ‘they are not dealing in the securities’. Similarly, the provisions of Section 12A(c) cannot be made applicable because the concerned auditor has carried out no ‘fraud’. Most importantly, the Hon’ble SAT ruled that in the absence of connivance, deceit, or manipulation by the auditor, the provisions of Regulation 3 and 4 of the PFUTP Regulations cannot be made applicable. Consequently, the SEBI Order was set aside.

II.    In the Mani Oommen case, SEBI alleged that DCHL (a listed company) had understated its outstanding loans to the tune of Rs. 1,339.17 crores in 2008-09 and wrongly disclosed the difference between the actual and reported outstanding loans for 2009-10 and 2010-11. Also, its promoters, the owner of the Deccan Chronicle Marketers (DCM) had wrongly transferred loans on the last day of the financial year and reversed on the first day of the next financial year. SEBI had alleged that:

(i)    As per Sections 224 and 227 of the Companies Act, 1956, an auditor owes an obligation to the shareholders to report true and correct facts about the company’s financials, and the auditor was duty bound to report correct facts under Section 227 of the Companies Act.

(ii)    SEBI opined that the concerned auditor overlooked the reporting of the outstanding loans, and he was not diligent in his obligation to check outstanding loans details from the bank and other independent sources.

In view of the aforesaid, SEBI held that the auditor did not adhere to the Auditing and Assurance Standard – 5 (AAS) prescribed by ICAI. SEBI alleged that the concerned auditor had violated the provisions of Section 12A(a) and 12A(b) of the SEBI Act r.w. Regulations 3 and 4 of the PFUTP Regulations. Consequently, SEBI penalized the said auditor and prohibited him from issuing any certificate of audit and rendering any auditing services to any listed companies and registered intermediaries for one year. Additionally, SEBI directed listed companies and intermediaries registered with SEBI not to engage any audit firm associated with the said auditor in any capacity for issuing any certificate w.r.t compliance of statutory obligations, which SEBI is competent to administer and enforce.

In Appeal, the concerned auditor contended the following, amongst other arguments:

(i)    as a statutory auditor, the responsibility was to express an opinion on the financial statement based on the internal audit;

(ii)    the auditor was not involved in the preparation of the books of accounts of the company; and

(iii)    the accounting adjustment, namely non-disclosure of the loans by transferring the same to the another entity was brought to his notice for the first time during audit of the books of accounts of DCHL in October-2012 (at a later point in time).

The Hon’ble SAT ruled that,
in the entire SEBI Order, there is no finding that the concerned auditor was instrumental in preparing false and fabricated accounts or has connived in the falsification of the books of account. The only finding by SEBI was that due diligence was not carried out by the said auditor. There was no finding (by SEBI) that the auditor had manipulated the books of accounts with knowledge and intention, in the absence of which, there is no deceit or inducement by the auditor. In the absence of any inducement, the question of fraud committed by the auditor does not arise. Consequently, the SEBI Order was set aside.

FRAUD VIS-À-VIS NEGLIGENCE

It is clear from the aforesaid rulings of the Hon’ble SAT that lack of due diligence can only lead to professional negligence, which would amount to misconduct – which could be under the purview of other regulators (like ICAI / NFRA). While the much-needed clarity on the jurisdiction of the SEBI vis-à-vis auditors is being awaited from the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Chartered Accountant(s) must bear in mind that presently SEBI can act against them – if found that there was an element of ‘fraud’ while auditing listed companies and regulated intermediaries.

The Regulation 2 (c) of PFUTP Regulations define the term ‘fraud’ in two parts:

(i)    First part includes any act, expression, omission, or concealment committed whether in a deceitful manner or not by a person or by any other person with his connivance or by his agent while dealing in securities in order to induce another person or his agent to deal in securities, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or avoidance of any loss; and

(ii)    The second part includes specific instances which may tantamount to be fraudulent.

In the Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel case (2017 15 SCC 1 – decided on 20th September, 2017), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled that the term ‘fraud’ under the PFUTP Regulations is an act or an omission (even without deceit) if such an act or omission had the effect of ‘inducing’ another person to ‘deal in securities’.

The term ‘negligence’ as quoted in the PWC Order (SAT Appeal No. 6 of 2018) means the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances; it is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances or failure to do of a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition).

RISK OF REGULATORY OVERREACH

The regulatory overlaps between SEBI and other regulators in the financial service space has been an ongoing issue. With SEBI having powers under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act), there arises a situation where SEBI exercises jurisdiction against all persons on the ground that they are ‘associated with the securities market’. Consequently, the casualty is usually the regulated entities and professionals who advise them on lawfully navigating this complex regulatory space. In the past, there have been instances of such regulatory overlaps of SEBI with Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI), Competition Commission of India (CCI), Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), etc.

One cannot deny that the SEBI is an apex regulator when it comes to protecting the sanctity of the securities market and, in fact, has been armed with powers to protect the interest of investors. If the regulator demonstrates that an auditor was involved in fabricating and fudging the financial statements or had ‘colluded’ with the listed company / promoters, a charge of fraud can be fastened. However, the question is whether SEBI ought to adjudicate on issues pertaining to professional conduct of practising Chartered Accountant(s). At the end of the day, the bible for Chartered Accountants is the auditing standards – which are prepared and deliberated upon by the ICAI. The hazard of over-regulation may result in moving away from a solution-oriented regime and create a situation where every audit report will carry more caveats than it already carries. There being a thin line between a ‘fraudulent’ and ‘negligent’ act, to avoid anomaly, inter-agency coordination is desirable.

THE WAY FORWARD

In October 2010, the central government constituted Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) – an apex regulatory Council to resolve regulatory overlaps. FSDC’s role is to enhance inter-regulatory coordination and promote financial sector development. The Chairman of the Council is the Finance Minister, and its members include the heads of financial sector Regulators (RBI, SEBI, PFRDA, IRDA, etc.), Finance Secretary and/or Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Secretary, Department of Financial Services, and Chief Economic Adviser. The Council is empowered to invite experts to its meetings as and when required. FSDC may consider inviting representatives from the ICAI and NFRA for inter-regulatory coordination to resolve the regulatory overlap.

IPO FINANCING – RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Initial Public Offers (IPO), as public issues of shares/securities are commonly known, have been in the news for several reasons. One is the handsome profits made by allottees in many cases due to the shares listing at a price far higher than the issue price (though some showed losses too). Then expectedly linked to this is that many IPOs have been oversubscribed many times. The other factor is the rapid rise of IPO financing, which also incidentally came to attention recently due to an alleged abusive call made by a prospective borrower to a bank officer who allegedly failed to provide the promised IPO finance. What became widely known was the enormous leverage being available through IPO financing to subscribers. SEBI has also decided to amend some IPO related provisions in the SEBI ICDR Regulations. Finally, the Reserve Bank of India has recently decided to place some very stringent restrictions on IPO financing by NBFCs, so much so that it is very likely that IPO financing could drop down to a miniscule level of what exists today. Further, the question repeatedly raised is whether there is an IPO bubble, that IPOs are priced too high and that the market boom is being taken advantage of by making IPOs. This subject generally also has a colourful history, and it is worth seeing some aspects of the past and the most recent developments.

EARLIER BOOMS IN IPOs
Many may remember the massive rise in IPOs during the Harshad Mehta times. The boom in the stock market also made new issues by companies attractive. Numerous IPOs were oversubscribed. There was actually a grey market for IPOs functioning, albeit with no legal backing, and the grey market quotes were often published in pamphlets and quoted elsewhere. To increase the odds of getting allotment in shares, it was commonly known that people resorted to multiple applications by using names of their family members and even staff and making applications in different combinations of names of such persons. The technology at that time was not advanced enough to weed out such multiple applications. Of course, those were also the times when many companies with dubious backgrounds made IPOs and then ‘vanished’.

DEMATERIALISATION OF SHARES
Dematerialisation of shares and other changes eliminated the earlier practice of multiple applications by the same person. However, a new abuse came to light, particularly surrounding the SEBI rules mandating allocation for retail investors. It was found that lakhs of Demat accounts were opened in Benami or even fake names. Amusingly, for this purpose, some names with photographs were reported to have been picked up from matrimonial sites! Applications were made in such names, financed by others. When shares were allotted, they were sold, and the sale proceeds with the profits paid to the financier. These cases became famous by one of the allegedly involved – Roopalben Panchal. Such persons whose name is ‘borrowed’ for carrying out transactions in shares by others now even have a term – ‘mules’. SEBI’s action in such cases, which saw prolonged litigation though, supplemented with other efforts such as know-your-client verification, stronger penal provisions for using fake names, etc., dealt with this abuse.

CURRENT BOOM IN IPOS AND RESPONSE OF SEBI
Very large amount of money is being raised through IPOs of several companies in recent times. New age web-based companies have finally come to roost, and some of them have offered shares to the public at a significant premium. Apart from this, several other companies have joined the party. What has been particularly notable has been the generally massive response to such issues from the public. Several public issues have seen applications that are many times the issue size.

SEBI has long moved from having a say in determining the pricing of issues. The emphasis is on due disclosure of information sufficient for the investor to make an informed decision, supported by due diligence by merchant bankers and others. Other safeguards include eligibility requirements, minimum holding and lock-in requirements, etc. But other than that, the issue price is generally not controlled.

However, this time, considering factors such as there being offers for sale by existing holders too and for other reasons, SEBI has decided to make certain amendments to the SEBI ICDR Regulations at its Board Meeting held on 28th December, 2021, followed up by formal amendments to the Regulations. The following are some of the important amendments:

a. If an object of the issue is for future inorganic growth, but specific acquisition or investment targets are not identified, in that case, the amount raised for such objects, including for ‘general corporate purposes’ shall not exceed 35% of the total amount being raised. Of this, the amount earmarked for such use for inorganic growth shall not exceed 25% of the issue size.

b. In the case of an offer for sale by companies without a track record, certain limits have been laid down for specific categories of existing shareholders. A shareholder (along with persons acting in concert) who holds more than 20% of the pre-issue shareholding (on a fully diluted basis) shall not offer more than 50% of his pre-issue shareholding. Other shareholders cannot offer more than 10% of their pre-issue shareholding.

c. Credit Rating Agencies will now act as Monitoring Agencies in place of presently recognized monitoring agencies. They will monitor the use of issue proceeds until 100% is utilized, compared to the present 95%.

d. For Anchor Investors, the lock-in now will be 30 days for 50% of shares allocated to them and 90 days for balance shares. This will apply for issues opening on or after 1st April 2022.

e. Modifications have been made to the allocations made regarding Non-Institutional Investors with effect from 1st April 2022.

The amendments thus appear to be intended to ensure only partial exit for existing shareholders in some instances or to anchor investors and generally make other fine-tuning.

HIGHLY LEVERAGED IPO FINANCING AND RESERVE BANK OF INDIA’S RECENT RESTRICTION
Earlier, we referred to financing persons who acted merely as front or were even fake to subscribe for IPOs, which is an abuse of the law. However, what is widely prevalent is also financing by lenders to subscribers to IPOs. The objective of obtaining such finance can be many. One is to acquire a higher quantity of shares of a company whose issue price is perceived by the subscriber/borrower as low, leaving scope for quick profits. However, considering that many issues are heavily oversubscribed, applying for a larger quantity of shares boosts the chances of getting a higher quantity of shares than otherwise. IPO financing thus has become quite common. Thanks to the ever-shortening gap between the date of application for shares and payment and allotment/refund, IPO financing is thus for a very short period – about a week or so. This increases the attractiveness of the finance since the attendant costs are also lower. Further, lenders have shown willingness to lend an amount that is many times the amount contributed by the borrower. Thus, there is enormous leverage. The consequence is that the profits would also be magnified, and so would the losses. The risk of losses is as much to the borrower as is to the lender since if there are huge losses (owing to, say, the price of the allotted shares being quoted far below the issue price), there could be concerns of recovery if there is not adequate other collateral.

The matter of borrowing and lending is under the purview of the Reserve Bank of India, which has taken a strong – and possibly drastic – action. It has issued guidelines dated 22nd October, 2021, stating that, from 1st April 2022, “There shall be a ceiling of Rs. 1 crore per borrower for financing subscription to Initial Public Offer (IPO). NBFCs can fix more conservative limits.”. Thus, non-banking financial companies (‘NBFCs’) shall lend a maximum of Rs. 1 crore per borrower for IPO. While Rs. 1 crore by itself does sound to be a significant sum, considering that IPO financing has been of massive amounts, this would significantly affect IPO financing. To take just one example, in the recent case referred to earlier, which came widely in the news because of an abusive call allegedly made, the amount of IPO financing said to be involved in just this one case was Rs. 500 crores that too for one single IPO. The absolute limit of Rs. 1 crore stated by the Reserve Bank of India thus sounds relatively puny in comparison. Of course, questions are raised about the interpretation of the guidelines. Whether the limit is per IPO and hence a borrower can raise Rs. 1 crore separately for each IPO? Whether the IPO is per NBFC and hence the borrower can borrow Rs. 1 crore each from different NBFCs? And so on. While clarity on this may hopefully come from RBI before the date when it will come into effect, the fact remains that the amount of IPO financing may go down substantially. The concerns of RBI are, of course, valid – that giving of huge financing may be risky for the sector itself, apart from allowing borrowers to take huge unhealthy risks. But whether the answer to this was to place such an absolute limit or whether other solutions were possible? For example, the limit could have been placed in the form of margin – say, 50% whereby the borrower would have to put in as much amount himself as he borrows. Alternatively, the borrower could provide adequate collateral of such nature that may not present difficulties in realizing if recovery has to be made. One will have to see whether RBI makes any changes before the rule comes into effect.

CONCLUSION
There are views that, retail investors are more involved in the stock market, particularly due to the pandemic with numerous people working from home. Apart from acquiring shares in the secondary market, acquisition through IPOs has also seen a rapid rise. Time only will tell us whether this is a bubble or not. But if the restriction on IPO finance comes into effect, that would also contribute to a reduction in amounts subscribed through IPOs.

IBC AND LIMITATION

INTRODUCTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors and connected persons, such as guarantors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in paying a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

One of the crucial aspects of the Code is whether a period of limitation applies for initiating proceedings against the corporate debtor that is very relevant since a time bar would scuttle claims against the company. This provision has seen a great deal of judicial development in recent times. Let us analyse this provision in greater detail.

THE LIMITATION ACT

Before we delve into whether a period of limitation applies to claims under the Code, it is essential to get an understanding of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“the Act”). This is a Central statute that provides for the law of the limitation for initiating suits and other proceedings.

The phrase ‘period of limitation’ is defined under the Act to mean the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule. The phrase ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed under the provisions of this Act.

S.3 of the Act states that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and the application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

APPLICABILITY TO THE CODE

A question that arises is whether the provisions of the Limitation Act can apply to the Code? An answer to this question is given under s.238A of the Code which was incorporated in the Code by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 with effect from 6th June, 2018. It states that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals under the Code filed before the National Company Law Tribunal / National Company Law Appellate Tribunal / the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be. Thus, it is very clear that the Act’s provisions apply to claims filed under the Code.

The decision of the Apex Court in Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. [LSI-179-SC-2021(NDEL)] has held that there is no specific period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1963 for an application under the Code before the NCLT. Accordingly, an application for which no period of limitation is expressly provided under the Act, is governed by Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for such an application is three years from the date of accrual of the right to apply. It held that the provisions of the Limitation Act applied mutatis mutandis to proceedings under the IBC in the NCLT/NCLAT. It also held that the words ‘as far as may be’ found in s.238A were to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonised with the subject matter of the legislation and the object which the Legislature had in view. The Courts would not give an interpretation to those words, which would frustrate the purposes of making the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings in the NCLT / NCLAT.

In Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave vs. Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 395 (SC), it was held:—

‘6. ……The present case being “an application” which is filed under Section 7, would fall only within the residuary Article 137.’

In Jignesh Shah vs. Union of India [2019] 156 SCL 542 (SC) the Court established the proposition that the period of limitation for making an application under Section 7 or 9 of the Code was three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue, i.e., the date of default.

In B.K. Educational Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Parag Gupta [2018] 98 taxmann.com 213 (SC), the Supreme Court held:—

‘……“The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application.’

Again in Sesh Nath Singh (supra), it was held that it was well settled that the NCLT/NCLAT has the discretion to entertain an application/appeal after the prescribed period of limitation. The condition precedent for exercise of such discretion was the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal and/or the application within the period prescribed by limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enables this extension. That section enables a Court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be, satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application and/or preferring the appeal within the time prescribed.

EXCLUDE TIME BEFORE WRONG FORUM
Part III of the Limitation Act lays down the manner of computation of the period of limitation. An important provision in this respect is laid down in s.14 of the Act. It states that in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has launched civil proceedings in another Court, then such time shall be excluded provided that those proceedings relate to the same matter have been launched in good faith in a Court which cannot entertain it since it has no jurisdiction to do so. In other words, if the first Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the plea and if such plea was filed by the plaintiff in good faith, then the time taken for such plea would be excluded in computing the period of limitation. In Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board vs. Mohanlal & Co. [2016] 14 SCC 199, it was held that s.14 of the Limitation Act had to be interpreted liberally to advance the cause of justice. S.14 would be applicable in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. The Supreme Court in Sesh Nath Singh (supra) has held that:

‘There can be little doubt that Section 14 applies to an application under Section 7 of the IBC. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the IBC does not exclude the operation of Section 14 ….’

Again in Dena Bank vs. C Shivakumar Reddy [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC) it was held that that default in payment of a debt triggered the right to initiate the Corporate Resolution Process. A Petition under Section 7 or 9 of the Code was required to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed by law, which would be three years from the date of default by virtue of Section 238A of the Code read with Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

EXCLUSION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER SARFAESI ACT
Another legislation with similar objectives as the Code is the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”). The SARFAESI Act also provides mechanisms for the recovery of debts by banks and financial institutions. This Act enables secured creditors to take possession of secured assets without going to Court.

In the case of Sesh Nath Singh (supra), the bank had resorted to action under the SARFAESI Act in respect of a loan default by a debtor. This debtor challenged this action by filing a Writ Petition before the Court and the Court granted an interim stay. While the Writ was pending, the bank filed a claim under the Code against the corporate debtor. This action was challenged by the corporate debtor contending that the NCLT should not have entertained the application filed by the financial creditor as the same was barred by the period of limitation. This issue reached the Supreme Court. Hence, the moot point before the Supreme Court was whether prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act qualified for the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act since they were not civil proceedings before a Court?

Upholding the exclusion of time spent under SARFAESI, the Supreme Court held that it was wrong to say that s.14 could never be invoked until and unless the earlier proceedings had actually been terminated for want of jurisdiction or other cause of such nature. It held that s.14 excluded the time spent in proceeding in a wrong forum, which was unable to entertain the proceedings for want of jurisdiction or other such cause. Where such proceedings had ended, the outer limit to claim exclusion under Section 14 would be the date on which the proceedings ended. The Court observed that in the case on hand, the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act had not been formally terminated. The High Court stayed the proceedings by an interim order. The writ petition was not disposed of even after almost four years. The carriage of proceedings was with the Corporate Debtor. The interim order was still in force, when proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC were initiated, as a result of which the Financial Creditor was unable to proceed further under the SARFAESI Act.

Accordingly, it concluded that since the proceedings in the High Court were still pending on the date of filing of the application under s.7 of the Code in the NCLT, the entire period after the initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act could be excluded. If the period from the date of institution of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act till the date of filing of the application under s.7 of the Code in the NCLT was excluded, the application in the NCLT was well within the limitation of three years. Even if the period between the date of the notice under SARFAESI and the date of the interim order of the High Court staying the proceedings was excluded, the proceedings under Section 7 of IBC were still within limitation of three years.

It also held that the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 were undoubtedly civil proceedings. There was no rationale for the view that the proceedings initiated by a secured creditor against a borrower under the SARFAESI Act for taking possession of its secured assets were intended to be excluded from the category of civil proceedings. Even though the SARFAESI Act enabled a secured creditor to enforce the security interest created in its favour, without the intervention of the Court, it did not exclude the intervention of Courts and/or Tribunals altogether. Hence, the Court held that keeping in mind the scope and ambit of proceedings under the Code before the NCLT / NCLAT, the expression ‘Court’ in s. 14 of the Limitation Act would be deemed to include any forum for a civil proceeding including any Tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act.

EXCLUSION OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY DEBTOR
Another important provision while computing the limitation period is s.18 of the Limitation Act. This states that if an acknowledgement of liability has been made in writing signed by the debtor against whom such property or right is claimed, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed.

In Dena Bank vs. C Shivakumar Reddy [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC), the Apex Court, while explaining the essence of this provision held that as per s.18 of Limitation Act, an acknowledgement of a present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, had the effect of commencing a fresh period of limitation from the date on which the acknowledgement is signed. Such an acknowledgement need not be accompanied by a promise to pay expressly or even by implication. However, the acknowledgement must be made before the relevant period of limitation has expired. It further held that even if the writing containing the acknowledgement was undated, evidence might be given of the time when it was signed. An acknowledgement may be sufficient even though it was accompanied by refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy or was coupled with claim to set off, or was addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right. The term ‘signed’ was to be construed to mean signed personally or by an authorised agent.

In Sesh Nath Singh (supra), the Court held that the Code did not exclude the application of s.18 or any other provision of the Limitation Act. Again, in Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India & Anr. [LSI-176-SC-2021(NDEL)], the Supreme Court held that there was no reason to exclude the effect of Section 18 of the Limitation Act to proceedings initiated under the IBC.

The issue before the Apex Court in Dena Bank (supra) was whether an offer for one-time settlement signed by the debtor would lead to an exclusion of time under s.18? The Court held that it saw no reason why an Offer of One-Time Settlement of a live claim, made within the period of limitation, should not also be construed as an acknowledgement to attract Section 18 of the Limitation Act. To sum up, an application under s.7 of the IBC would not be barred by limitation, on the ground that it had been filed beyond a period of 3 years from the date of declaration of the loan account of the Corporate Debtor as a Non Performing Asset, if there was an acknowledgement of the debt by the Corporate Debtor before expiry of the period of limitation of 3 years, in which case the period of limitation would get extended by a further period of 3 years.

CONCLUSION
Thus, it is clear that the Limitation Act applies with all its exclusions, even to the Code. Courts are very quick to support this principle and would be wary in holding otherwise.  

THE ESG AGENDA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR C-SUITE AND CORPORATE INDIA

INTRODUCTION
The topic of Environmental, Social and Governance (‘ESG’) aspects of a business has been extensively covered across the global media in the past couple of years. The focus on ESG has been particularly expedited by the Covid-19 pandemic. There is mounting pressure on businesses from all stakeholders – shareholders, investors, regulators, suppliers, customers and communities – to start thinking about their sustainability and wider ESG journey.

ESG – DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA

The business landscape in India is catching up on the ESG agenda. There is a significant growth in ESG-linked capital markets in India, with assets under management of the top 10 ESG mutual funds growing to INR 12,000 crore during 2019-2021 – representing almost a 5x increase in just two years1. From F.Y. 2022-23, SEBI has mandated the top 1,000 listed companies by market capitalisation to disclose ESG data through Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR). At the COP26 summit in November 2021, India announced its goal to be net-zero by 2070. It will be businesses – large and small – which will eventually have to work towards achieving the net-zero goal and key targets around the country’s energy mix and carbon emissions intensity.     

In addition to this business and regulatory imperative, environmental factors are also at play. According to Germanwatch, India is one of the top countries which will be impacted by climate change2. Chennai almost ran out of water in 2019. The year 2021 saw droughts, floods, and landslides in various states in India. The start of the year 2022 was one of the coldest winters in India. The frequency and scale of such events are predicted to only increase in the future. Combining the impacts of such natural disasters with India’s goal to be net-zero by 2070 means that businesses across industry sectors will have to start considering sustainability and ESG parameters to make their operations more resilient for a climate-informed landscape of the future.

 

1   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/mf/mf-news/esg-fund-assets-jump-4-7-times-in-2-years-may-grow-further/articleshow/88380627.cms

2   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-among-top-10-countries-most-affected-by-climate-change-germanwatch-121012500313_1.html

So, what does this ESG agenda mean for Indian companies?

I have identified three key themes and focus areas for the C-suite to consider while trying to embed ESG parameters into business operations: a) Sustainable/ESG financing, b) Operating model, and c) Stakeholder engagement.

SUSTAINABLE/ESG FINANCING

Sustainability is not an overnight success. Embarking on a sustainability journey involves potential changes to how businesses have operated historically. This requires long-term planning and resources, with capital often being the most important. Organisations that lack enough capital or need additional funds can look at Sustainable/ESG financing. There are growing sustainability-focused capital markets – in India and overseas – that Indian companies can tap into to finance their sustainable business transformations. Depending on the business needs, the funding can take the form of either of the following two mechanisms: 1) ‘Use of proceeds’ instruments (e.g., Green/sustainability bonds/loans), where funds are used to finance specific projects/initiatives with environmental or social benefits. The 2022 Finance Budget has laid out various policies, including launching Sovereign Green Bonds and other initiatives on a private-public partnership model, in order to boost the climate finance ecosystem in India. In September 2021, Adani Green Energy Limited issued green bonds worth $750 million to fund the Capex of its ongoing renewable projects3. 2) ‘ESG-linked’ instruments (e.g., ESG/sustainability-linked loans), where repayment terms are pegged to certain environmental or social performance indicators. Ultratech Cement is already linking its financial commitments with sustainable targets4.

 

3   https://www.adanigreenenergy.com/newsroom/media-releases/Adani-Green-Energy-Continues-to-Ramp-Up-Focus-On-ESG

4   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/glasgow-cop26-how-india-inc-plans-to-meet-net-zero-targets-by-2070-121110300058_1.html

Financial institutions are increasingly moving away from funding traditional environmentally damaging assets and industry sectors. Sustainable/ESG financing can help CFOs access necessary capital as well as a greater capital pool. Additionally, such funding can potentially be at a lower cost, in turn positively impacting the bottom line. ESG/sustainability-linked loans usually involve a reduced interest rate when underlying ESG goals are met. Similarly, organisations can issue Green/sustainability bonds at lower coupon rates to investors who are willing to accept lower returns alongside achieving positive environmental and social outcomes. For organisations, sourcing cheaper Sustainable/ESG financing can help reduce the cost of capital and improve margins whilst advancing their sustainability/ESG agenda. Additionally, through embedding ESG metrics within their strategic decision-making process, an organisation can ensure that funds are utilised in activities/initiatives which can generate maximum environmental and social impact.

OPERATING MODEL – VALUE CREATION FROM ESG
Secondly, from an operating model perspective, there are opportunities for value creation as well as risk mitigation from incorporating ESG parameters into business operations. Organisations can look at value creation by assessing their product/service mix. Companies can consider launching new sustainable products to take advantage of shifting consumer trends and preferences. E.g., the plant-based protein market in India is expected to grow to $650-700 million by 20255. Similarly, the market for vegan food, recycled raw materials, electric vehicles, alternative raw materials to single-use plastics, etc., is on the rise. A global BCG research suggests that within the consumer goods sector, 70% of consumers are willing to pay a 5% price premium for more sustainably manufactured products6. India’s net-zero goals and transition to zero-carbon economy present multiple business opportunities in the areas of green hydrogen, biofuels, electric vehicles and related infrastructure, waste management, etc. Organisations can therefore achieve top-line growth through a combination of ESG/sustainability-focused new product and service launches, entering into new markets, and premium pricing. For SMEs and start-ups, it is a great opportunity to be disruptors in the sustainability domain. Through sustainable products and services, SMEs/start-ups can achieve a competitive advantage vis-à-vis large corporates which lack ESG credentials.

 

5   https://www.cnbctv18.com/environment/global-surge-in-plant-based-cultivated-meat-indian-market-sees-substantial-growth-11012762.htm

6   https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/supply-chain-needs-sustainability-strategy

A strong focus on environmental parameters can help organisations achieve significant resource efficiencies. Through embedding circular economy principles, companies can look at reducing the usage of raw materials and resources, including reusing and recycling them, in turn driving cost savings. A global paper company managed to achieve a 10% increase in EBITDA margins through a combination of emissions costs reductions, resource efficiencies and revenue growth7. By 2030, Ambuja Cement is targeting to save 77 litres of water/tonne of cement produced8. While these ESG-focused efforts require initial investments and often involve a longer payback period, it is not always the case. A private Indian mining company that invested in a water treatment facility on their site was able to recover the investment in just under three years. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by shifting to renewable sources of energy and less carbon-intensive methods can also drive energy savings. Ultimately, such cost savings translate to higher business valuations. The BCG research cited earlier9 also suggests that by being leaders in the ESG domain, companies across industry sectors are able to achieve significant valuation premiums (between 11-14% across consumer goods, steel and chemical sectors) over peers. Businesses can therefore look at significant value creation through a combination of multiple ESG-focused initiatives across their end-to-end value chains.

OPERATING MODEL – RISK MITIGATION BY FOCUSING ON ESG

From a risk mitigation perspective, companies need to start assessing and adapting their supply chains to account for negative impacts from climate change. Almost 5 million hectares of crop in India was affected in 2021 due to climate crisis10.  A negative impact on the agricultural sector can have a knock-on implication on multiple other industry sectors that directly or indirectly rely on agricultural produce for their raw material needs. WWF research predicts that almost 30 cities in India will face acute water crises by 205011. In addition to traditional industry sectors like agriculture, manufacturing, mining, chemicals, this can be a cause of concern for the growing technology sector in India, whose demand for water to cool their data centres will continue to rise. There is a growing sense of urgency for businesses across industry sectors to look at sustainable options and plan for raw material shortages (in India and globally) to avoid potential supply chain disruptions.

Indian companies might also face risks from regulatory changes and/or increased scrutiny. While an earlier blanket ban imposed in 2019 on single-use plastics was held off by the central government, it is now going to come into force from 1st July, 2022. New EPR rules in relation to plastic recycling and use are also coming into effect from 1st July, 202212. Corporates will have to reassess their supply chains to comply with these upcoming regulations. In November 2021, a local municipal corporation in western India, imposed a crackdown on major textile companies discharging trade effluents into the city sewage network citing environmental concerns, leading to factory closures. Proactively implementing sustainable supply chain measures can help organisations mitigate any potential disruptions (and consequential financial loss) from such regulatory changes and/or scrutiny.

 

7   https://www.bain.com/client-results/a-paper-company-takes-bold-steps-to-become-a-sustainability-leader/

8   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/glasgow-cop26-how-india-inc-plans-to-meet-net-zero-targets-by-2070-121110300058_1.html

9   https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/supply-chain-needs-sustainability-strategy

10 https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/climate-change/climate-crisis-has-cost-india-5-million-hectares-of-crop-in-2021-80809

Focusing on social aspects like health and safety, employee wellbeing, impact on communities and indigenous populations is also becoming increasing important. Any instances of corruption, bribery, child-labour, human rights abuses, etc. can lead to a negative impact on brand reputation. This might also entail financial risk in the form of a decline in stock prices or reduced valuations, regulatory penalties and fines. Ensuring the right social and governance policies for increased transparency and accountability is becoming critical.

Leading Indian multinationals have already committed to various climate change and sustainability and ESG goals. The likes of the Tata group have put compliance with ESG standards as a top business priority, and more business will follow. For SMEs as well, it will be a business imperative to consider the ESG agenda – particularly where they are suppliers or customers of large Indian and global multinationals which have their own sustainability goals and targets to achieve.

 

11 https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/water/wwf-identifies-100-cities-including-30-in-india-facing-severe-water-risk-by-2050-74058

12           https://indianexpress.com/article/india/centre-notifies-epr-norms-for-plastic-packaging-waste-7780632/

ESG AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
Lastly, from a stakeholder engagement perspective, the C-suite can place high importance on ESG reporting and sustainability-related disclosures. For listed companies not within the remit of the current SEBI mandate, as well as for private companies, a voluntary disclosure can help achieve a competitive advantage through improved brand credentials. Such a voluntary disclosure can be based on existing domestic requirements in India (SEBI’s BRSR) or any global frameworks (like GRI, UN SDGs, etc.) or a customised basis depending on the commercial priorities. Voluntary disclosures can also help C-suite pre-empt any potential disclosure requests and/or pressure from customers, communities, activists and investors and build more transparent and better working relationship with these stakeholders. Mandatory or voluntary disclosures that show improved performance and results on ESG metrics can help enhance ESG ratings for organisations, which can in-turn enable them to access a larger capital pool and at more favourable terms. The government of India is also looking at obtaining an ESG ranking for the upcoming Initial Public Offering of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, with the aim of attracting a larger and responsible pool of capital13.

Impact investment has gained a lot of traction in India in the past couple of years. According to data from Impact Investors Council, almost $1.2 billion were invested just in the first five months of 202114. Private equity and venture capital groups in India are also increasingly focusing on ESG parameters as part of their investments as well as launching dedicated ESG funds15. Consequently, for SMEs and start-ups, focusing on ESG can be a great catalyst for raising funds to fuel their expansion and growth journey.

CONCLUSION

All of the above three themes – Sustainable/ESG financing, Value Creation and Risk Mitigation from ESG from an Operating Model perspective and Stakeholder Engagement – are in a way interrelated. In practice, it will be difficult to isolate one theme from the other. Progress in one aspect will have a compounding impact on others. Similarly, a negative outcome in one will also mean potential revisions across other ESG initiatives. Therefore, organisations will have to undertake a robust scenario-planning analysis in choosing ESG initiatives to be implemented and engage in continuous monitoring to maximise their ESG impact.

Irrespective of the industry sector, ownership status (public vs. private), the scale of operations (start-up vs. large multinational), it is becoming clear that there are multiple business reasons for organisations to look at ESG.

Climate change is already here (the latest evidence is the unseasonal rain on 6th January, 2022 in my home city of Ahmedabad – for a minute not considering its unintended consequences for the agricultural sector). The time for the C-suite of Indian organisations to act is now. The more proactive they are, the bigger will be the benefits and opportunities for future generations in India.

 

13             https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/ipos/fpos/govt-working-on-esg-ranking-for-lic-ahead-of-public-offer/articleshow/88744950.cms

14 https://www.freepressjournal.in/business/impact-investors-infused-around-12-bn-in-india-amid-the-second-wave-of-covid

15           https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/aavishkaar-capital-launches-250-mn-esg-first-fund-11643022266115.html

BOMBAY HIGH COURT ON RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS – A RULING RELEVANT TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

BACKGROUND
A recent decision of the Bombay High Court not only lays down and confirms important principles of law but also has implications for corporate governance and rights of shareholders (‘activists’ or otherwise). The decision has seen differing views and reactions. Some support it as laying down correctly the law. Others hold that a more purposeful view of the provisions could have been taken as they believe the conclusions drawn impact the spirit of good corporate governance. Be as it may be, these important legal conclusions of the court are valuable to review. This decision is in the matter of Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. vs. Invesco Developing Markets Fund ((2021) 131 Taxmann.com 321 (Bom.)).

This ruling is under appeal before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Interestingly, parallel proceedings are also pending before the National Company Law Tribunal/National Company Law Appellate Tribunal for the same matter. Indeed, the core question of whether the NCLT has sole jurisdiction over such matters to the exclusion of the High Court is itself being pursued. Thus, we are likely to see further developments, including possibly a different view of the facts and/or law, in the matter.

SUMMARY OF CORE FACTS AND ISSUES
The core issue is whether shareholders have the unfettered right to call a general meeting and place resolutions for consideration by shareholders? Does the Board of Directors have any discretion or power to review and reject any of such resolutions or they are bound to call (or, in default, the shareholder group would itself call) such general meeting? Is the only thing the Board is expected to check is whether the procedural requirements of calling such general meetings are complied with? Or can the Board consider the merits of such resolutions in terms of their legality, whether such resolutions could result in violations of law by the company, etc.?

The matter concerned Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. (ZEEL), a listed company. Two shareholders (‘the Shareholders’), holding, in the aggregate, 17.88% of the equity share capital of ZEEL, served a requisition under section 100 of the Companies Act, 2013 on ZEEL to convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) to consider primarily two categories of resolutions (aggregating to nine resolutions in all). The first three resolutions proposed the removal of three existing directors. The remaining six resolutions proposed the appointment of six specified individuals as independent directors. Two of the first three resolutions became redundant since two of the specified directors resigned voluntarily. Interestingly, the promoters of the company held only 3.99%.

The independent directors of ZEEL met and considered the matter. The Board of ZEEL considered various legal opinions and concluded that the notice of EGM was invalid and hence decided not to call the EGM. The reasons for holding that the notice was invalid were several and which were considered by the High Court. Since, under section 100, if the Board does not call the EGM, the Shareholders themselves could call it, ZEEL approached the High Court with three prayers. The first was to declare that the notice was illegal, ultra vires, invalid, bad in law and incapable of implementation. The second sought a declaration that the rejection by ZEEL to convene the EGM was valid in law. The third prayer sought an injunction against the Shareholders from holding the EGM themselves.

These prayers, including the grounds for rejection of such requisition, became the issues for consideration by the Court.

DOES THE HIGH COURT HAVE ANY JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN SUCH PETITIONS OR DOES THE NCLT HAVE SOLE JURISDICTION?
The Shareholders claimed that, in view of Section 430 of the Act, the High Court had no jurisdiction and the NCLT/NCLAT had sole jurisdiction over this matter. The Court rejected this contention stating that the relevant Rules that set out the provisions which NCLT has sole jurisdiction on does not include Section 100 and other relevant provisions. Thus, the Court concluded that it did have jurisdiction over such matters.

CAN SHAREHOLDERS PASS RESOLUTIONS WHICH HAVE LEGAL INFIRMITIES? CAN THE BOARD REJECT A REQUISITION ON SUCH GROUNDS?
This was the core and substantive issue before the Court. The Shareholders claimed that so long as the requirements of Section 100 are complied with, the Board was bound to call the EGM. Indeed, it was argued that Section 100 mandated the Board to do this by use of the word ‘shall’. The only principal substantive requirement the Board of Directors are required to check is whether the procedural requirements of Section 100 are complied with (e.g., the minimum percentage of shareholders specified (10%) have sought the holding of such EGM). This is the sole test that is relevant to decide whether the requisition is ‘valid’ (as specified in section 100(4)) or not. Effectively, the argument, as the Court highlighted, was that even if the resolutions could have resulted in ZEEL committing illegalities, the Board had no say and was bound to call the EGM.

ZEEL countered this by pointing several issues in the resolutions which made them illegal to be proceeded with and would also mean committing illegalities by ZEEL if such resolutions were passed. The appointment of six independent directors could possibly exceed the limit of 12 directors on the Board. ZEEL operated in areas that were regulated by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (‘MIB’). Any change in the Board required prior approval of the MIB. The resolutions, however, proposed the appointment first and made it subject to approval, meaning the approval, if received, would be a post-facto approval. Thus, the removal or appointment of directors would mean violation of the MIB rules for which the company would suffer.

Appointment of independent directors could be made, in law, only by following a specified procedure. The Nomination and Remuneration Committee is required to review the merits of the proposed independent directors and recommend them to the Board. The Board thereafter, at their discretion, appoints such directors and this appointment has to be then approved by the shareholders. Thus, it was a three-step process mandated by law. ZEEL contended that the requisition sought to bypass the first two steps and, thus, again, the company would be held to commit violation if it allowed the resolutions. Indeed, it was contended, the shareholders could only ‘approve’ an appointment already made and not directly appoint an independent director itself.

ZEEL even questioned whether the directors proposed for appointment by certain substantial shareholders could be held to be ‘independent’, despite their respective merits and qualifications. In the ordinary course, nominee directors are by definition, not independent directors.

Thus, ZEEL contended on these and other grounds that if the EGM was allowed to be proceeded with and the resolutions passed, ZEEL would be committing several violations of law.

The High Court, in the very eloquently written judgment, held that the Board could not proceed with a requisition that would, if implemented, result in the company committing violations of law. Citing early precedents from the UK (where the law had thereafter changed, but the rulings still had merit) and also elsewhere, as well as decisions of Indian courts, the Court held that the Board was not bound to convene an EGM if the resolutions resulted in the company committing illegalities. Particularly for listed companies (and ZEEL was a listed company), there were certain specified requirements to be followed for the appointment of independent directors, and these could not be bypassed. The prior approval of the MIB for changes in the Board was required while the resolutions proposed that it could be obtained later on.

An issue arose whether the Board of Directors could consider extreme situations and possibilities to decide whether the resolutions may end up in the company committing illegalities. The Court held that the Board could and cited the philosopher Karl Popper and held that the test of illegality was to be checked from every angle, even extreme ones. It observed, ‘Any hypothesis has to be tested, repeatedly, for failure; including testing at the margins or extremities. It is no use saying that a hypothesis fits a median situation. The question is whether the hypothesis survives a test or collision against a polarity? If it does, then it is sound; if not, it must fail throughout and considered unsound’. To demonstrate this, the Court asked the counsel for the Shareholders whether a resolution proposing that the company engage in gambling business (illegal in India) could be allowed? The counsel replied that this was an extreme or outlandish proposition. The Hon’ble Court held that even such extreme tests were necessary to test the proposition raised. If the argument of the Shareholders was accepted, even a ‘madcap resolution’ would end up being allowed.

The Court also made another important point. It observed that even the Board of Directors itself could not propose such resolutions in the manner in which they were proposed as there would be violations of law. The shareholders are not on any higher pedestal, and the same criteria are applied. Had the Board proposed such resolution, could a shareholder object before a court against such proposals and seek injunctions? The Court answered in the affirmative.

Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the Board of ZEEL to reject the requisition and granted the injunctions prayed. The EGM was directed not to be held by the Board or by the requisitioning shareholders.

IMPLICATIONS ON RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY
With due respect, some aspects are worthy of consideration and debate. Concerns have been raised whether the court ruling would disempower shareholders and put brakes on even healthy shareholder activism. It could, it is argued, excessively empower an existing board having support of a small minority of shareholders and exclude the majority shareholders from exercising their rights. In particular, the issue raised was whether the process of screening prospective directors through the Nomination and Remuneration Committee was for the benefit of shareholders or could be used to supplant and exclude them? Indeed, this would mean that the shareholders could not even appoint directly those board members who would form this Committee. These, it is respectfully submitted, are valid points but it is also respectfully submitted that the answer lies in an amendment of the law, which, perhaps in hindsight, does seem to have lacuna which the present decision has thrown up.

In any case, it is respectfully submitted, that the Hon’ble Court is right in holding that the Board could not allow resolutions to be passed and implemented resulting in the company violating legal requirements. As the Court pithily observed, ‘Sometimes, it happens that a company must be saved from its own shareholders, however well-intentioned’.

IBC AND MORATORIUMS

INTRODUCTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘the Code’) has become one of the most dynamic and fast-changing legislations. Not only has the Government been modifying it from time to time, but the Judiciary is also playing a very active role in ironing out creases and resolving controversies. The Code provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in payment of a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

One of the important facets of this resolution process is a moratorium on legal proceedings against the corporate debtor contained u/s 14 of the Code. This provision has seen a great deal of judicial development in recent times. Let us analyse this crucial section in greater detail.

MORATORIUM
Once the insolvency resolution petition against the corporate debtor is admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), and after the corporate insolvency resolution process commences, the NCLT declares a moratorium prohibiting institution or continuation of any suits against the debtor; execution of any judgment of a Court / authority; any transfer of assets by the debtor; and recovery of any property against the debtor. The moratorium continues till the resolution process is completed. Thus, total protection is offered to the debtor against any suits / proceedings. In Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. vs. Hotel Gaudavan (P.) Ltd. [2018] 145 SCL 428 (SC), it was held that even arbitration proceedings are stayed during this period.

An extract of the relevant provisions is given below:

Moratorium.
14. (1) Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, namely:—
(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority;
(b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the corporate debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein;
(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its property including any action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002);
(d) the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor.
…………………….
(2) The supply of essential goods or services3 to the corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be terminated or suspended or interrupted during the moratorium period.
…………………….
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to:—
(a) such transactions, agreements or other arrangements as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator or any other authority.
(b) a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.’

(4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date of such order till the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process:
Provided that where at any time during the corporate insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating Authority approves the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of the corporate debtor under section 33, the moratorium shall cease to have effect from the date of such approval or liquidation order, as the case may be.”

The Supreme Court in P. Mohanraj vs. Shah Brothers Ispat P Ltd. [2021] 125 taxmann.com 39 (SC) has explained that the object of a moratorium provision such as s.14 of the Code was to see that there was no depletion of a corporate debtor’s assets during the insolvency resolution process so that it could be kept running as a going concern during this time, thus maximising value for all stakeholders. The idea was that it facilitated the continued operation of the business of the corporate debtor to allow it breathing space to organise its affairs so that new management may ultimately take over and bring the corporate debtor out of financial sickness, thus benefitting all stakeholders, which would include workmen of the corporate debtor. The Apex Court further explained that while s.14(1)(a) referred to monetary liabilities of the corporate debtor, s.14(1)(b) referred to the corporate debtor’s assets. Together, these two clauses formed a scheme that shielded the corporate debtor from pecuniary attacks against it in the moratorium period so that the corporate debtor got breathing space to continue as a going concern in order to rehabilitate itself ultimately. Relying on this explanation, the Supreme Court did not allow cheque bouncing proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It held that a quasi-criminal proceeding that is contained in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act would, given the object and context of s.14 of IBC, amount to a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of s.14(1)(a) of the Code. Hence, the moratorium would attach to such a proceeding.

In the case of Sandeep Khaitan vs. JSVM Plywood Industries Ltd. [2021] 166 SCL 494 (SC) the Apex Court dealt with an issue of whether the High Court has inherent powers under s.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to make such orders against the corporate debtor to give effect to any order under that Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice? The Court held that the power under s.482 of the CrPC may not be available to the Court to allow the breach of a statutory provision. The words ‘to secure the ends of justice’ in s.482 cannot mean to overlook the undermining of a Statute, i.e., the provisions of s.14 of the Code.

Similarly, in Anand Rao Korada v Varsha Fabrics P Ltd. [2019] 111 taxmann.com 474 (SC), in order to recover labour dues, the High Court ordered the auction of the assets of the corporate debtor after issuance of the moratorium. The Supreme Court set aside this Order and held that if the assets of the company were alienated during the pendency of the proceedings under the IBC, it would seriously jeopardise the interest of all the stakeholders. The sale or liquidation of assets had to be in accordance with the IBC only.

RECOVERY OF PROPERTY
In Rajendra K Bhutta vs. MHADA [2020] 160 SCL 95 (SC), a society redevelopment project was blessed by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA). The developer went into insolvency, MHADA wanted to take over possession of the land given to the developer for demolition and redevelopment. The Supreme Court disallowed this owing to the moratorium u/s. 14(1)(d). It held that under s.14(1)(d) what was referred to was the ‘recovery of any property’ of the corporate debtor. It was clear that when recovery of property was to be made by an owner under s.14(1)(d), such recovery would be of property that was ‘occupied by’ a corporate debtor. The expression ‘occupied by’ would mean or be synonymous with being in actual physical possession of or being actually used by, in contra-distinction to the expression ‘possession’, which would connote possession being either constructive or actual and which, in turn, would include legally being in possession, though factually not being in physical possession. Since it was clear that the Joint Development Agreement had granted a license to the developer (i.e., the corporate debtor) to enter upon the property, with a view to do all the things that were mentioned in it, it is obvious that after such entry, the property would be ‘occupied by’ the developer. Section 14(1)(d) of the Code, when it speaks about recovery of property ‘occupied’ refers to actual physical occupation of the property. Hence, MHADA’s plea for repossession of the land was turned down.

NATURAL PERSONS NOT PROTECTED
In the above referred decision of P.Mohanraj (supra), the Supreme Court also held that it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in s.14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons, i.e., its Directors in charge of its affairs continued to be statutorily liable under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Accordingly, criminal proceedings could continue unabated against the Managing Director / Other Directors who have drawn the bounced cheque.

Similarly, in Anjali Rathi vs. Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. [2021] 130 taxmann.com 253 (SC), the Supreme Court allowed proceedings to be carried out against the promoters of a corporate debtor which was a developer for failing to honour the terms of settlement entered into with home buyers.

PERSONAL GUARANTOR NOT SHIELDED
Another novel issue arose in SBI vs. V. Ramakrishnan [2018] 96 taxmann.com 271 (SC) of whether the moratorium extended to the personal guarantor of a corporate debtor also? The Court held that the moratorium under s.14 cannot possibly apply to a personal guarantor. This decision has since been given the shape of law by inserting sub-section (3) in s.14 which expressly provides that the moratorium under s.14 will not apply to a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.

WILFUL DEFAULTER PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE
An interesting question arose before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Gouri Prasad Goenka vs. State Bank of India, LSI-473-HC-2021(CAL). Here the corporate debtor had gone into insolvency resolution. However, the question was whether wilful defaulter proceedings could be initiated against the promoter, in view of the moratorium imposed u/s 14? The Court held that whole-time directors and promoters who were in charge of the affairs of the defaulting company during the relevant period, when the default was committed, could not be said to be absolved of their act of wilful default committed prior to final approval and acceptance of a resolution plan. The moratorium in no way prevented this. The wilful defaulter declaration proceeding were to disseminate credit information for cautioning banks and financial institutions so as to ensure that further bank finance was not made available to them and not for recovery of debts or assets of the corporate debtor, which could hamper the corporate resolution process.

PMLA ATTACHMENT OF ASSETS
In Directorate of Enforcement vs. Manoj Kumar Agarwal [2021] 126 taxmann.com 210 (NCL-AT), the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was determining whether an attachment order passed by the Enforcement Directorate under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 before the start of the resolution process of the corporate debtor could survive in view of s.14?

The NCL-AT held that the aim and object of the PMLA for attaching the property alleged to be involved in money laundering was to avoid concealment, transfer or dealing in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to the confiscation of such proceeds of crime under PMLA. Thus, Provisional Attachment Order was issued for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of Order. Now if s.14(1)(b) of IBC relating to the moratorium was seen, the NCLT was required to pass an order declaring a moratorium, inter alia prohibiting ‘transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the Corporate Debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein? thus the moment an insolvency was initiated, the property of the corporate debtor was protected by such a moratorium. Thus, both the provisions sought to protect the property of corporate debtor from transfer etc. till further actions take place. It further held s.14 would be attracted in all such cases. Once the moratorium was ordered, even if the Enforcement Directorate moved the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA, further action before the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA must be said to have been prohibited. Section 14 of IBC will hit the institution and continuation of proceedings before Adjudicating Authority under PMLA.

CONCLUSION
The provisions relating to the moratorium are very important to protect the assets and going concern of the corporate debtor. However, Courts are quick to ensure that while it is a shield for the debtor it cannot be used as a shield by its promoters / directors.

AMENDMENTS TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

The Securities and Exchange Board of India has amended, vide Notification dated 9th November, 2021, certain provisions concerning related party transactions as contained in the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (the LODR Regulations). These amendments will come into force from 1st April, 2022, except for certain specific provisions which shall come into effect from 1st April 2023. These amendments are a follow-up to the decisions taken at SEBI’s Board Meeting held on 28th September, 2021. Those decisions, in turn, are partial / modified implementation of the recommendations made by the Working Group constituted by SEBI on related party transactions vide its report dated 22nd January, 2020 (released by SEBI on 27th January, 2020). Let us take a look at these amendments.

BACKGROUND
Related party transactions, generally stated, are specified transactions between a company and certain parties related to it in a manner defined under the relevant law. Related party transactions are a sensitive issue where there is scope of benefit to the company but which also carry serious potential of abuse. Hence, not just company law and securities laws, but even tax and other laws provide for safeguards against abuse in such transactions.

In the case of companies, the concerns are special. The scheme of management of a company is that shareholders appoint a Board of Directors to run the company. While the Board oversees the running of the company and meets regularly to review the progress, lays down strategy, etc., the actual day-to-day running is carried out by full-time employees. Hence, there are layers between the actual owners – the shareholders – and those who run the company. If transactions are carried out between the company and directors / senior management (or entities connected to them), there is obviously a conflict of interest. Steps and controls would have to be laid down in law to ensure that this conflict of interest does not prejudice the company / its shareholders. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, usually, in Indian companies, there is a dominant group of shareholders, referred to as the promoters, who have ownership and management control over the company. Transactions with such promoters (or entities connected to them) would also have a similar conflict of interest which needs to be resolved.

At the same time, considering the manner in which businesses are generally run, related party transactions are unavoidable. Arguably, related party transactions could actually result in more efficiency and other benefits. Hence, related party transactions do not deserve a total ban. Both the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) and the LODR Regulations have elaborate provisions to regulate related party transactions. As often pointed out earlier in this column, it is unfortunate that both the Act and the LODR Regulations regulate related party transactions in differently worded provisions. Thus, questions such as who are related parties, what is a related party transaction, how should they be regulated, etc., are answered differently by the Act and by the LODR Regulations.

What makes it worse is that SEBI keeps amending and reforming the LODR Regulations at a rapid pace – and thus the gap widens further. While there have been attempts earlier to narrow these differences, these are far from adequate. SEBI has now made some further amendments which we will discuss here. Note that the LODR Regulations apply to companies whose shares (and, in certain cases, debt securities) are listed on stock exchanges.

AMENDMENT TO THE DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTIES
The present definition, inter alia, deems only those members of the promoter group who hold 20% or more of the shares of the company as related parties. This part has been amended and now all members of the group shall be deemed to be related parties. The definition of promoter group itself is quite widely framed. Each of the members of the group, whether holding shares or not, will now be deemed to be a related party (as discussed earlier, with effect from 1st April, 2022).

The definition is amended even further whereby any person holding 20% or more of the equity share capital at any time during the immediately preceding financial year shall be deemed to be a related party. And with effect from 1st April, 2023 this limit will be lowered to 10% for a person to be deemed to be a related party. It appears that SEBI considers a higher, even if non-majority, shareholding a source of influence sufficient enough to consider a person as a related party and thus transactions with such persons requiring to be regulated!

The shareholding of 20% / 10% should be by a person and the concept of ‘group’ or ‘persons acting in concert’ is not made applicable. That said, it is also provided that the 20% equity shareholding (or 10% with effect from 1st April, 2023) may be held by such person directly or on a beneficial interest basis as provided in section 89 of the Act. Section 89, as amended a few years back, now has a more elaborate definition of what constitutes beneficial interest. A concern may arise here. It is stated that the holding may be direct or on a beneficial interest basis. While this results in clarity that transactions with such an entity shall be related party transactions, the question is whether the transactions should be with such beneficial owner or the company. Let’s take an example. In listed company L, a company A holds 25% shares. The beneficial owner in company A, as per section 89, is one Mr. P. Thus, Mr. P would be deemed to be a related party. The question is whether transactions with only Mr. P would be deemed to be a related party transaction and not transactions with the company A?

AMENDMENTS TO DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The present definition considers any transaction involving transfer of resources, services or obligations between a company and a related party as a related party transaction. It is now provided, to simplify things a little, that transactions between the holding company and related parties of its subsidiaries will be related party transactions for the holding company. Similarly, transactions between a subsidiary and the related party of the holding company would also be deemed to be related party transactions.

However, with effect from 1st April, 2023 a further twist is given to this to widen the scope even further. If the effect of any transaction is such that it is for the benefit of any related party as now defined (i.e., related parties of the holding company / subsidiaries), even then it will be deemed to be a related party transaction. While the intention seems to be clear, that is, to cover structuring whereby related parties get the benefits indirectly, the amendment does not give any further guidance as to how does one ascertain that a particular transaction is for the benefit of such newly-deemed related parties? This may create challenges for the Audit Committee and the Board.

The definition is further amended whereby certain transactions are now explicitly excluded. An issue of specified securities on a preferential basis that is in compliance with the SEBI ICDR Regulations will not be a related party transaction. Payment of dividends, bonus or rights issues, buybacks, etc., will not be related
party transactions if they are uniform across all shareholders in proportion to their shareholding. Acceptance of fixed deposits by banks or non-banking financial companies will not be related party transactions if the terms offered are the same as offered to all shareholders / public, provided that disclosure of such transactions is made to the exchanges every six months in the prescribed format.

AMENDMENTS TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO MATERIAL RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The scheme of the LODR Regulations is that related party transactions above the specified threshold are deemed to be material transactions requiring approval of shareholders. While such thresholds are laid down, the Board of Directors is also required to lay down a policy on materiality of related party transactions and how they should be dealt with, including clear thresholds. At present, a transaction with a related party would be considered as material if it, taken together with previous transactions in the financial year, exceeds 10% of the annual consolidated turnover as per the audited financial statements of the preceding financial year. It is now provided that if the transaction (taken along with earlier transactions in that financial year) exceeds Rs. 1,000 crores, then, too, the transaction will be deemed to be a material transaction. Thus, if the amount crosses 10% of such annual consolidated turnover or Rs. 1,000 crores, whichever is lower, it would be treated as material. This amendment will affect relatively large companies.

The present Regulations provide that related party transactions shall require prior approval of the Audit Committee. An amendment now requires that even ‘subsequent material modifications’ to related party transactions shall require such approval. The Regulations, however, do not define what constitute ‘material modifications’. Instead, the Regulations require the Audit Committee to define this term and make it a part of the policy on materiality of related party transactions.

It is now also provided that a related party transaction to which the subsidiary, and not the holding listed company, is a party and which transaction exceeds 10% of the consolidated turnover as per the preceding financial year’s audited financial statements, then the prior approval of the Audit Committee of the listed company would be required. With effect from 1st April, 2023, this clause will have effect if the value of such transaction exceeds 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary.

The purpose of making a separate category of material related party transactions is to make them subject to approval by shareholders. It is now provided that even material modifications to related party transactions shall require approval of shareholders. Moreover, all approvals of shareholders of related party transactions will now have to be prior approvals.

CONCLUSION
This latest series of amendments to related party transactions seems aimed more towards expanding the scope to ensure that transactions are not structured in a manner that in substance they benefit related parties but in form they do not get caught in the net. The broad structure and scheme, however, remains the same. That is to say, non-material transactions may be approved at the level of the company and material transactions would require approval of the shareholders. Thus, there continues to be no outright ban on related party transactions. Also, no approval of any authority such as the Government or SEBI is required. The approvals remain internal and there are also elaborate disclosure requirements. Thus, stakeholders have a say in and have knowledge of such transactions.  (Also refer detailed analysis on Page 26)

SALE DEED SANS CONSIDERATION IS VOID

INTRODUCTION
One of the first lessons learnt in Contract Law is that agreements without consideration are void ab initio. The Latin Maxim for the same is ‘ex nudo pacto non oritio action’. Of course, there are some statutory exceptions to the above under the Indian Contract Act, 1872; for example, one of the exceptions is a gift made for natural love and affection. However, by and large one cannot have an agreement for which there is no consideration. Recently, this issue was examined once again by the Supreme Court of India in the context of a sale deed without consideration. Let us examine this important proposition in the light of this recent decision.

WHAT IS CONSIDERATION?

Under the Indian Contract Act, consideration has been defined to mean any act or abstinence on the part of one party to the contract at the desire of the other. Such act or abstinence may be past, present or future. Thus, it is a valuable consideration, in the sense of the law and it may be in the form of some right, interest, profit, benefit, etc., which accrues to one of the parties to the contract or it may also be some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other party.

It is important to note that unlike in many other countries, e.g., the USA, adequacy of consideration is immaterial in India. If there exists a consideration for a contract and the parties to the contract have consented to the same, then the Courts would not examine whether the consideration is adequate for the contract or not. The Act does not require that the value of the consideration by one party must be equivalent to the value of the goods / services provided or promises made by the other party. Thus, if two parties contract to sell a horse for Rs. 1,000 and the seller has freely consented to the same, then there exists a valid consideration for the horse. Under the Contract Act, consideration must be something which the law can consider of value but it need not necessarily be money or money’s worth. Sir Pollock in his famous book on Contracts has opined that ‘It does not matter whether the party accepting the consideration has any apparent benefit thereby or not; it is enough that he accepts it and the party giving it does thereby undertake some burden, or lose something which in contemplation of law must be of some value’. Section 25 of the Act provides that an agreement to which the consent of the promisor is freely given is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate; but the inadequacy of the consideration may be taken into account by the Court in determining whether the consent was freely given. Of course, this position of adequacy of consideration has been altered to some extent by the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the introduction of deeming provisions such as sections 50C, 50CA, 56(2)(x), etc.

Under the Act, consideration may move from the party to the contract or even any other person who is a stranger to the contract. Based on this, the Madras High Court has held in the case of Chinnaya vs. Ramayya (1881) 4 Mad 137 that consideration in India can move from a person who need not be a party to the contract. In this case, a mother agreed to gift certain properties to her daughter in consideration for her daughter agreeing to maintain her uncle (mother’s brother). After the death of the mother, the daughter refused to maintain her uncle and in response to a suit filed by the uncle, she stated that the uncle was not privy to the contract as no consideration had flown from him to her. The Court upheld the maintenance suit of the uncle and held that under the Act consideration could flow from a third party, i.e., in this case the mother, and hence there was a valid consideration to the contract between the daughter and her uncle.

Similarly, under the Act the consideration need not flow directly to a party to the contract, it can also flow to a third party and that would be treated as a valid consideration. An important case in this respect is that of Keshub Mahindra & Other, 70 ITR 1 (Bom). In this case, three brothers were substantial shareholders and in the employment of a company. The brothers agreed to transfer some of their shares in the company to certain foreign entities in return for a good business relationship of the company with these foreign entities on favourable payment terms. The Gift Tax Officer held that since the brothers had not directly received any consideration for the sale of their shares, there was a gift by them to the foreign entities. Negating this argument, the Bombay High Court held that under the Indian Contract Act, consideration can not only flow from a third party but it can also flow to a third party. The Court held that the term consideration was defined in the Contract Act. Although the shareholders of the company were distinct from the company, as per the definition of the term consideration there was nothing to show that the benefit of the act or abstinence of the promisee must go directly to the other party only, i.e., the promisor. A contract can arise even though the promisee does an act or abstains from doing something for the benefit of a third party, i.e., the company in this case, and that was a good consideration for the three brothers to transfer their shares.

In this backdrop of consideration let us examine the ratio of the Supreme Court decision.

APEX COURT’S VERDICT
The Supreme Court’s verdict in Kewal Krishan vs. Rajesh Kumar & Ors., CA No. 6989-6992/2021, Order dated 22nd November, 2021 is relevant on the subject of consideration. In this case, the appellant had executed a power of attorney in favour of his brother. The Power of Attorney holder executed two sale deeds for selling immovable properties of the appellant. One was for selling to his wife and the other to his son. The appellant objected to these sales on various grounds. One of them was that the entire sale consideration for acquiring suit properties was not paid by the purchasers. Accordingly, it was prayed that the sale deeds should be set aside.

The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence adduced to show that the purchasers had indeed paid the consideration as shown in the sale deeds. It examined section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in this respect. This section deals with the definition of sale of immovable property. It defines a sale (in respect of immovable property) to mean a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. In Samaratmal vs. Govind, (1901) ILB 25 Bom 696, the word ‘price’ as used in the sections relating to sales in the Transfer of Property Act was held to be in the sense of money.

The Apex Court in Kewal’s case (Supra) went on to hold that a sale of an immovable property had to be for a price. The price may be payable in future. It may be partly paid and the remaining part can be made payable in future. The payment of price was an essential part of a sale covered by section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. If a sale deed in respect of an immovable property was executed without payment of price and if it did not provide for the payment of price at a future date, it was not a sale at all in the eyes of law. It was of no legal effect. Therefore, such a sale would be void. It would not impact the transfer of an immovable property.

The Court deduced that since no evidence was provided to show payment of sale consideration, the sale deeds would have to be held as void being executed without consideration. Hence, the sale deeds did not affect in any manner the share of the appellant in the suit properties. In fact, such a transaction made by the Power of Attorney holder of selling the suit properties on the basis of the power of attorney of the appellant to his own wife and minor sons was nothing but a sham transaction! Thus, the sale deeds did not confer any right, title and interest on his wife and children as the sale deeds were to be ignored being void. It further held that a document which was void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea could be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings. As no title was transferred under the said sale deeds, the appellant continued to have undivided share in the suit properties.

Thus, it is clear that for a sale transaction presence of consideration in the form of money would be a must. If the consideration is anything other than money, i.e., in kind, then it would be an exchange and not a sale. However, a sale can also take place where instead of the buyer paying the seller, some debt owed by the seller to the buyer is set off. For instance, in Panchanan Mondal vs. Tarapada Mondal, 1961 (1) I.L.R. (Cal) 619, the seller agreed to sell a property to the buyer for a certain price by one document and by a second document he also agreed to buy another property of the buyer for the same amount. Instead of the buyer paying the seller and vice versa, they agreed to set-off the two amounts. It was held that the transactions were for execution of two sale agreements.

INCOME-TAX CONSEQUENCES
One related issue would be could section 56(2)(x) of the IT Act be invoked by the Department against the purchaser? Since the agreements were without consideration could it be held that the buyer received the immovable property without payment of adequate consideration, and conversely could section 50C be invoked on the seller as being a transfer less than the stamp duty ready reckoner value? One would have to go back to the decision of the Supreme Court for the answer.

The Court has clearly held that the sale deeds did not affect in any manner the share of the appellant in the properties. It was nothing but a sham transaction. The sale deeds did not confer any right, title and interest on the buyers and the seller’s share remained intact. Hence, in such a scenario there is no receipt of immovable property by the buyer and there is no transfer by the seller. Accordingly, it stands to reason that neither section 50C could be invoked on the seller nor could section 56(2)(x) be invoked on the buyer.

STAMP DUTY CONSEQUENCES
A sale deed is liable to be stamped with duty as on a conveyance. However, what happens when the sale deed is held to be a sham as in the above case? The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 provides for the refund of stamp duty paid in case it has been used on an instrument which is afterwards found to be absolutely void in law from the beginning. An application for refund must be made to the Collector, normally within a period of six months from the date of the sale deed. Some amount is deducted while making refund of Stamp Duty, which is as follows – for stamps falling in the category of e-payment (simple receipt / e-challan and e-SBTR), 1% of the duty amount is deducted with a minimum of Rs. 200- and a maximum of Rs. 1,000. For stamp categories other than mentioned above a deduction of 10% of the duty is made.

CONCLUSION
This Supreme Court decision has once again highlighted the importance of consideration in the context of any agreement. Due care and caution should be exercised as to the manner and mode of consideration. Failure to do so could invalidate the entire transaction as seen above.  

SAT SETS ASIDE INSIDER TRADING ORDERS

As discussed several times earlier in this column, SEBI has been investigating stock market frauds, insider trading, etc., by tracking the use of social media / messaging applications. About a year back, we also discussed certain SEBI orders where it was held that some persons shared unpublished price-sensitive information through the popular chat application WhatsApp. Stiff penalties were levied on such persons under the Insider Trading Regulations. Those who were penalised appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) which has now reversed those orders. SAT has held that, on the facts, there was no violation of the SEBI Regulations on insider trading.

This decision of SAT has several interesting aspects. Has SAT made any significant interpretation of the law that has far-reaching implications as suggested by some reports? When can a person, who shares unpublished price-sensitive information (‘UPSI’), be held to have violated the Regulations? Is it necessary that a link be established between the person having the UPSI and the source within a company who had leaked such information? There are also lessons generally for persons using social media applications. Let us consider this decision (Shruti Vora vs. SEBI, dated 22nd March, 2021) in greater detail.

BROAD SCHEME OF SEBI (PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING) REGULATIONS, 2015 AS RELEVANT HERE
The Regulations seek to prohibit and punish insider trading. They prohibit what is commonly understood as insider trading – that is, trading by an insider who is in possession of, or has access to, UPSI. However, they also prohibit several other things like communication of UPSI except where permitted under the Regulations. The Regulations also have further requirements of disclosure of holdings and dealings by certain insiders, prohibition of trading during periods when the trading window is required to be closed, etc.

In the present case, the relevant provision is related to the sharing of UPSI. Insiders are prohibited from sharing UPSI. The reason for this prohibition is obvious. Sharing such information may result in the recipient dealing and profiting out of it. However, such recipient may also further pass on such information to others. Such sharing is also covered by the offence of ‘insider trading’.

However, as this case shows, three interesting questions arise: Is it required to show that a person who shared UPSI had received it from a particular person within the company? Is it required that he should know that such information was UPSI? Would the offence of insider trading also cover sharing of UPSI by a person who is not aware that it is UPSI?

The first question has been answered by a deeming provision in the Regulations itself. It is provided that a person would be deemed to be an insider even if he is in mere possession of UPSI. Thus, it is not required that his source of such information be traced within the company (a little more on this later). He is deemed to be an insider. If he then deals in the securities, or shares such UPSI, he would be deemed to have committed the offence of insider trading.

The second question is interesting and indeed became, as we will see, the core issue in this case. Should a person know that the information in his possession is UPSI? The Regulations have not made an express provision on this. SAT has held that a person should be aware that such information is UPSI and it is only in such a case that the person would be deemed to be an insider. However, the equally critical question is how does one establish whether a person knows that the information he possesses is UPSI? This can be tricky as this would be something in the person’s mind. This aspect will be discussed further while analysing the decision.

The third question would be answered by implication from the answer to the second question although, again, the Regulations have no express provision about it. If a person does not know that the information he possesses is UPSI, then sharing of such information would not make him guilty of the offence of insider trading.

With this brief background, let us consider the case and then discuss what SAT has held.

FACTS OF THE CASE AND SEBI’S ORDER
It appears that SEBI was alerted especially by media reports that financial results of reputed companies were being leaked and shared in advance on social media through chat applications like WhatsApp. It conducted investigations and amongst its findings was some data relating to two appellants in the present case. It was found that they worked in the industry and had forwarded financial results through WhatsApp to many persons, including clients. The financial results forwarded were eerily accurate and very closely matched the actual results published soon after. However, SEBI could not trace who had sent this information to such persons. Even the companies concerned could not find any leak that could have happened internally from within the companies themselves.

SEBI, however, held that the law was clear. Possession of UPSI made the person an insider. The law also prohibited insiders from sharing UPSI with others. Since these persons did share the UPSI, they committed the offence of insider trading. It levied stiff penalties on such persons. Since similar orders were passed separately for sharing of results for each company, the penalties cumulatively rose to an even larger amount.

The parties had argued that not only these messages but several others were also forwarded in the same manner. And these messages were forwarded to groups of numerous persons. The messages were sent almost as soon as they were received. The other messages had information which was not UPSI and in any case often did not even match with the actual financial results in those other cases. However, SEBI stuck to its position and held that they had indulged in insider trading and levied penalties.

APPEAL BEFORE SAT
In the appeal before SAT, the appellants made several arguments. It was pointed out that they were not aware that what they had was UPSI. They had received numerous such messages and those were also forwarded along with the ones under question. They had no means to verify the authenticity of any of the information. The messages / information so received could be compared to ‘heard in the street’ columns common in media and while such pieces are read by many, it was accepted that their authenticity was not assured. Indeed, some could be just rumours or informed guesses. The appellants also pointed out that the specific messages that were of concern were not differently coded while being forwarded. So the recipients could not distinguish those messages from the others.

DECISION OF SAT
SAT accepted the arguments of the appellants and set aside the orders of SEBI levying penalties. It also made some important points about the interpretation of the law.

At the outset, SAT confirmed that possession of UPSI did make a person an insider under law and sharing of such UPSI by such person would be an offence under the Regulations. SEBI did show that the person was in possession of the UPSI and hence it may appear that one part was fulfilled. The information was shared, too.

However, and this was the crucial point, did such person know the information received and shared was UPSI? And, if not, would the information still be UPSI qua such person? The law is silent on this point. However, this did matter because it is from the perspective of the person accused of insider trading. If such person did not know it was UPSI, then that person cannot be held to be in possession of UPSI and hence is not an insider. And if this was so, his sharing of the information was not insider trading.

It was apparent from the record itself that the persons had received numerous bits of information and had forwarded the same to many other persons. Neither the persons sending them nor the persons receiving them could have had any way of knowing that the information was authentic and hence UPSI. SAT observed, ‘The above definitions of the “unpublished price sensitive information” and “insider” would show that a generally available information would not be an unpublished price sensitive information… The information can be branded as an unpublished price sensitive information only when the person getting the information had a knowledge that it was unpublished price sensitive information’. Thus, the information was not UPSI. One could take the example of the numerous WhatsApp forwards many of us receive. We have become used to examine them with so much scepticism that we generally have stopped even reading most of them.

While it is true that possession of UPSI was sufficient to make a person an insider, there were sufficient circumstances to doubt that it was UPSI and thus the onus shifted back to SEBI. It was now up to SEBI to prove, even with a reasonably low benchmark of proof or of the preponderance of probability, that the persons knew it was UPSI. SEBI could not and it did not so prove.

SAT also noted that SEBI has not connected the information to any source within the companies and even the companies did not have any such findings of leakage.

The order was thus set aside.

CONCLUSION
The important legal point thus is that UPSI is from the perspective of the person who is in possession of the same. If I have a pile of stones with me and I do not know that a couple of the ‘stones’ are really diamonds, I may give the same to someone else for a low value. And even he may do the same with them.

That said, this does not mean one should be lax with the law. The law provides for serious consequences for insider traders and the benchmark of proof remains relatively low. In this particular case, the facts were peculiar and hence did not allow any wider generalisation. One should remain ever vigilant while forwarding information. The law has sufficient deeming provisions. Chartered Accountants are typically and even otherwise deemed to be insiders as auditors, advisers, CFOs, etc. They are also expected to know the importance of figures and it is even possible that information shared by them may be given more weightage by the recipient, and thereby also by SEBI while deciding guilt. Thus, this case should induce even more caution.

OCI: A FEW CHANGES, BUT LOTS OF CONFUSION

INTRODUCTION
The Overseas Citizen of India or OCI was a modified form of dual citizenship introduced by the Indian Government in 2005 for the benefit of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origins (PIOs) resident abroad. India currently does not permit dual citizenship, i.e., a person cannot be the citizen of both India and a foreign country, say the USA. He must select any one. An OCI cardholder is not a full-fledged citizen but he has certain benefits at par with a citizen. As of 2020, there were over six million OCIs abroad.

This scheme has seen certain regulatory and legal developments which have caused a great deal of confusion and anxiety amongst the OCI cardholders resident abroad. The University of WhatsApp (sic!) has played a stellar role in fuelling this fire. The intent of this article is to discuss those forwards and dispel some myths.

WHAT IS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK?
An OCI card is granted by the Government of India to a person under the aegis of the Citizenship Act, 1955. Section 7A of this Act provides for the registration of OCIs. At the cost of repetition, an OCI is not a full-fledged Indian citizen under the Citizenship Act but he is only registered as an OCI. Section 7A allows the Government to register the following individuals as OCIs on an application made by them:

(a) Any person who currently is a foreign citizen but was an Indian citizen at the time of commencement of the Constitution of India, i.e., in 1950;
(b) Any person who currently is a foreign citizen but was eligible to be an Indian citizen at the time of commencement of the Constitution of India, i.e., in 1950;
(c) Any person who currently is a foreign citizen but belonged to a territory that became part of India after Independence;
(d) Any person who is a child or a grandchild of the above persons;
(e) A minor child of a person mentioned in the clause above;
(f) A minor child both of whose parents are citizens of India or one of whose parents is a citizen of India;
(g) Spouse of a citizen of India or spouse of an Overseas Citizen of India cardholder;
(h) Spouse of a person of Indian origin who is a citizen of another country and whose marriage has been registered and subsisted for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the application under this section.

Thus, all of the above persons are eligible to be registered as OCIs. Interestingly, even a person of non-Indian origin can be registered as an OCI if he marries a citizen / an OCI cardholder. For example, a Caucasian American man marries an Indian OCI woman residing in the USA. He, too, would be eligible to be registered as an OCI along with their children. The Act further provides that the OCI card granted u/s 7A to a spouse is liable to be cancelled upon dissolution of marriage by the competent court. The special privileges can then be withdrawn.

The Bombay High Court in Lee Anne Arunoday Singh vs. Ministry of Home Affairs, WP 3443/2020 has held that the provisions of section 7 of the Act cast a duty on the Government to take necessary steps regarding cancellation of the OCI card issued on spouse basis, if the marriage is dissolved by a competent court of law.

The Government of India has recently made a submission in a similar case before the Delhi High Court that a foreigner registered as an OCI on the strength of marriage to an Indian citizen loses that status when the marriage is dissolved. Such foreigners are no longer eligible to be registered as OCIs under the Citizenship Act. Such a person could, however, continue to visit India by applying for an ordinary / long-term visa. A PIL (public interest litigation) has also been filed before the Delhi High Court in Jerome Nicholas Georges Cousin vs. Union of India, W.P. (C) 8398/2018 by a French national against this provision. In his plea he states that he would have to close down his business and go back to France since he would now not have permission to run a business in India.

WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO AN OCI?
The OCI card is a life-long visa granted to these foreign citizens. While their passport is the primary document to enter India, the OCI card is an additional document that they receive. They can visit India as many times as they want and stay as long as they wish. They can even permanently reside in India and work and study here. Non-OCI cardholders need to get registered with the Foreigners Regional Registration Office if they want to stay for more than six months in India. These procedures are not applicable to OCIs.

Earlier, there was a concept of a Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card which was also a long-term visa. However, issuance of new PIO cards has been discontinued and all PIO cardholders are being encouraged to migrate to the OCI card.

The Government has made some changes in the benefits available to OCIs by a Notification issued in March, 2021. This Notification has caused a lot of confusion amongst the Indian diaspora. The revised list of benefits available to OCIs is as follows:

(1) It grants a multiple entry life-long visa for visiting India for any purpose. The revised Notification has added that for undertaking the following activities, the OCI cardholder shall be required to obtain a special permission or a Special Permit, as the case may be, from the competent authority or the Foreigners Regional Registration Officer or the Indian Mission concerned, namely:
(i)  to undertake research;
(ii) to undertake any missionary or tabligh or mountaineering or journalistic activities. This amendment is to overrule the Delhi High Court’s decision in the case of Dr. Christo Thomas Philip vs. Union of India, W.P. (C) 1775/2018 where an OCI card was cancelled on the ground that the person was involved in missionary activities in India. The Court held that there is no law which prevents missionary activities by an OCI and hence the cancellation was invalid. The Court had held that prima facie the rights under Article 14 (equality before law) and 19 (freedom of speech and expression) of the Constitution of India which are guaranteed to the citizen of India, also appear to be extended to an OCI card-holder;
(iii) to undertake internship in any foreign Diplomatic Missions or foreign Government organisations in India or to take up employment in any foreign Diplomatic Missions in India;
(iv) to visit any place which falls within the Protected or Restricted or prohibited areas as notified by the Central Government or competent authority.
    
(2) Exemption from registration with the Foreigners Regional Registration Officer or Foreigners Registration Officer for any length of stay in India. The revised Notification has added that the OCI cardholders who are normally resident in India shall intimate the jurisdictional Foreigners Regional Registration Officer or the Foreigners Registration Officer by email whenever there is a change in permanent residential address and in their occupation.

(3) It provides parity with NRIs in the matter of
(i)  inter-country adoption of Indian;
(ii) appearing for the all-India entrance tests to make them eligible for admission against any NRI seat. However, the OCI cardholder shall not be eligible for admission against any seat reserved exclusively for Indian citizens. This overrules the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Pranav Bajpe vs. The State of Karnataka, WP 27761/2019 which held that when the parity between the OCI cardholder and Non-Resident Indians is removed, the concept of OCI cardholder cannot be given a restricted meaning as Non-Resident Indian so as to restrict such admission only to Non-Resident Indian quota in the State quota of seats and not in the institutional quota or Government quota of seats under the NEET Scheme. It had concluded that the minor children of Indian citizens born overseas must have the same status, rights and duties as Indian citizens, who are minors;
(iii) purchase or sale of immovable properties other than agricultural land or farmhouse or plantation property; and
(iv) pursuing the following professions in India as per the provisions contained in the applicable relevant statutes or Acts as the case may be, namely, doctors, dentists, nurses and pharmacists; advocates; architects; chartered accountants.

(4) In respect of all other economic, financial and educational fields not specified in this Notification or the rights and privileges not covered by the Notifications made by the Reserve Bank of India under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, the OCI cardholder shall have the same rights and privileges as a foreigner. This is a new addition by the March, 2021 Notification. Thus, if any benefit is not specifically conferred either under the Citizenship Act or under the FEMA, 1999, then the OCI would only be entitled to such privileges as are available to a foreigner.

An OCI is not entitled to vote in India, whether for a Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council, or for Parliament, and cannot hold Constitutional posts such as those of President, Vice-President, Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts, etc., and he / she cannot normally hold employment in the Government.

CAN AN OCI BUY PROPERTY IN INDIA?
One of the benefits of being an OCI is that such a person can buy immovable property in India other than agricultural land. The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 deal with this aspect. Rule 21 permits an OCI to purchase any immovable property in India other than agricultural land or farmhouse or plantation property. An OCI is also allowed to get a gift of such a property from an Indian resident / NRI / OCI who is a relative as per the definition under the Companies Act, 2013. Citizens of certain countries, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Nepal, Bhutan, Hong Kong or Macau, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), cannot purchase immovable property in India without permission from the RBI but even this prohibition is not applicable to OCI cardholders. It may be noted that the above relaxations under the FEMA Rules are only for OCI cardholders and not for all persons of Indian origin. If a foreign citizen of Indian origin does not have an OCI card, then he cannot buy immovable property in India without prior permission of the RBI. This is one of the biggest benefits of having an OCI card.

In this respect, misunderstanding of a Supreme Court decision in Asha John Divianathan vs. Vikram Malhotra, CA 9546/2010 Order dated 26th February, 2021 has created great heartburn amongst the OCI community. This was a decision rendered under the erstwhile Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (which has been superseded by the FEMA in 1999). Section 31 of the erstwhile law provided that any foreign citizen desirous of buying immovable property in India required the prior approval of the RBI. The Court held that entering into any such transaction without RBI approval was treated as an unenforceable act and prohibited by law. It further held that when penalty was imposed by law for the purpose of preventing something on the ground of public policy, the thing prohibited, if done, would be treated as void, even though the penalty if imposed was not enforceable. It is important to note that this decision is not applicable in the light of the current provisions of the FEMA Regulations. As explained above, the law now, by virtue of Rule 21 of the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 expressly provides that an OCI can purchase any immovable property in India other than agricultural land or farmhouse or plantation property.

WHAT DOES FEMA PROVIDE IN RESPECT OF OCIs?
The provisions relating to OCIs have been dealt with in great detail under the FEMA Regulations and it would be difficult to elaborate on all of them here. However, a few examples are explained here. At most places under the FEMA Regulations, the provisions available to persons of Indian origin have been replaced with OCIs. Thus, it is mandatory for the PIOs to have an OCI card. For instance, the facility of investment on a non-repatriable basis under Schedule IV of the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 is allowed only to Non-Resident Indians and OCI cardholders. Persons of Indian origin who do not have OCI cards cannot avail of this facility.

Similarly, under the Foreign Exchange Management (Borrowing and Lending) Regulations, 2018 an Indian bank is allowed to lend in Indian rupees only to an NRI or an OCI cardholder.

However, in a few Regulations under FEMA, it is not mandatory to have an OCI card. For example, a Non-Resident External (NRE) Bank Account or a Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) Bank Account can be opened by any Person of Indian origin. It is not necessary that such a person has an OCI card. Similarly, the Foreign Exchange Management (Remittance of Assets) Regulations, 2016 allows a PIO to remit up to US $1 million every year out of balances held in the NRO account and from the sales proceeds of assets.

IS THE DEEMED RESIDENCY PROVISION APPLICABLE?
Under section 6 of the Income-tax Act, any Indian citizen having total Indian income exceeding Rs. 15 lakhs during the previous year is deemed to be an Indian tax resident in that year, if he is not liable to tax in any other country or territory by reason of his domicile or residence or any other criteria of similar nature. This provision is applicable only to an Indian citizen, i.e., a person holding an Indian passport. An OCI does not have an Indian passport and so he would be out of the deemed taxation net.

CONCLUSION
The law relating to OCIs is dynamic in nature. In respect of all other economic fields not expressly specified or not covered by the Notifications under the FEMA, 1999, the OCI cardholder is equated with the same rights and privileges as a foreigner. Thus, it becomes very important to understand what are the benefits and provisions for an OCI cardholder.

A LEG-UP FOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS – WILL SEBI’S PROPOSALS IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?

SEBI has proposed several changes to the rules relating to corporate governance, mainly to strengthen the status of Independent Directors. The major changes include giving a bigger role to minority shareholders in the appointment / removal of such directors, proposing higher remuneration to them, strengthening the Audit Committee / Nomination and Remuneration Committee (‘NRC’) even further, etc. Views have been sought from the public at large through the release of a Consultation Paper.

The Consultation Paper notes how the requirements relating to corporate governance, introduced formally for the first time in 1999, have, over the years, seen several expert reviews and amendments in law to successively upgrade the requirements. As the paper notes, the Companies Act, 2013 / Rules made thereunder too have corporate governance requirements generally for specified listed and unlisted companies, many of them overlapping with the SEBI requirements. Hence, the fresh proposals are yet another step in that direction, though this time more focused on Independent Directors.

Independent Directors are seen as a pillar that balances the interests of all stakeholders with the primary focus on those of the minority shareholders vis-à-vis promoters. The worry is that promoters with their controlling stake should not be able to usurp the interests of others. This requires that they should not be able to influence the watchdog group – the Independent Directors.

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
The first of these important proposals looks at how Independent Directors are appointed and removed. At present, they are usually recommended by the NRC. The next step is appointment by the Board and the validity of their tenure is till the next annual general meeting. At such annual general meeting, the appointment is placed and confirmed by approval of the majority of shareholders who vote. Their removal is also by majority shareholder approval.

It is seen that the promoters who usually have a controlling stake can influence – perhaps decisively – the process at every step. This would mean that at every step they have a direct say and even decision-making ability. Thus, there are fair concerns that their independence may be influenced by the promoters. Hence, adopting the UK model almost wholly, it is proposed that this be corrected and that the appointment at shareholder level should pass two tests; first, approval by a majority of all shareholders including the promoters, and second, approval by the majority of the minority shareholders. Minority shareholders for this purpose would mean shareholders other than the promoters.

Let us understand this better through an example. Say, the promoters of a company hold 60% equity shares. The first test would be achieved when 50.01% of all shareholders approve (the percentage in each case is of shareholders who actually vote). Since promoters hold 60%, they would control this outcome. The second test is majority of the public (40%) shareholding and thus more than half of these – say 20.01% of the total – would also have to approve. If either of these tests fails, the appointment is rejected. There are then two ways out for the management. The first is that it can propose a new person as Independent Director and put him through these tests. Or, it can put the same candidate through a slightly different agni pariksha of sorts after a cooling period of 90 days, but before 120 days. If at least 75% of shareholders (including the promoters) approve, the appointment would be through. A similar process is proposed for the removal of Independent Directors. This ensures a significant role for the public shareholders and the strong influence of the promoters is mitigated to an extent.

SHORTLISTING OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS TO BE MORE TRANSPARENT
Even the shortlisting of Independent Directors is given a fillip by requiring more disclosures on how they came to be shortlisted. The process and requirements have to be laid down first and thereafter it is to be seen how each candidate fits these requirements. There have to be extensive disclosures to the shareholders, too.

Higher proportion of Independent Directors in the NRC
Moreover, the NRC that recommends Independent Directors will now have a higher proportion (two-thirds) of Independent Directors instead of just a majority as at present. A higher 67% ratio of Independent Directors would mean even more say to them in the NRC.

Appointment of new Independent Directors only by shareholders
At present the appointment of Independent Directors is made first by the Board and it is only at the later annual general meeting that shareholders get a chance to approve. During this period – which could be as long as a year – the Independent Director functions in office. To avoid this even interim say of the promoters on such appointments, it is now proposed that the appointment of Independent Directors shall only be by shareholders. If an Independent Director resigns / dies, his replacement too has to be made by shareholders, now within three months.

Resignation of Independent Directors to be more transparent and subject to restrictions
Concerns are often expressed that some Independent Directors having issues with the company may prefer to exit quietly without creating a fuss. To tackle this, several proposals have been made. Firstly, the complete resignation letter is required to be published by the company.

Further, if an Independent Director resigns stating ‘personal reasons’, ‘other commitments’ or ‘preoccupation’, he won’t be able to join any other Board for a year. This obviously makes sense since one cannot claim being busy, resign and then promptly join elsewhere. This may encourage them to be more forthright, if that was the real issue.

There is another concern. The management may have offered full-time employment to an Independent Director. This may be for bona fide reasons such as the management being impressed with his work. But obviously there are also concerns that this would affect his independence. A new proposal now states that if an Independent Director desires to join the company as a Wholetime Director, he will have to wait for one year after his resignation. Interestingly, as we will see later, the cooling period to become an Independent Director after having been an employee or KMP is three years, while in this case only one year’s cooling period is given.

Audit Committee to have no promoter / nominee directors or executive directors
The Audit Committee has an important role in approving related party transactions, accounts, etc. At present it is required that two-thirds of the committee should be Independent Directors and the rest can be any director, including promoter directors. Now, several categories are excluded even for the balance one-third of the committee. These may be non-independent directors but cannot be executive directors, nominee directors or those related to the promoters. The influence of both promoters and management is thus sought to be removed.

Excluding further categories of Key Managerial Persons
Persons who may have, in the immediate past, been employees / Key Managerial Persons (or their relatives) of the company and its holding / associate / subsidiary companies, or having material pecuniary relationships with them, may still have loose ties and may be subject to influence, and hence there may be concerns about their independence. Therefore, cooling periods are prescribed whereby they can join as Independent Directors only after specified periods. Two changes are now proposed. Firstly, now, past employees / KMPs of even promoter group companies will have to be subject to the cooling period. Secondly, the cooling period for all categories would now be uniform at three years.

ENHANCED REMUNERATION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
Finally, there is the proposal to enhance the remuneration of Independent Directors. The dilemma here is that if you pay too little, the Independent Director does not have the incentive to devote sufficient time to the affairs of the company. And if you pay too much, the concern is about him being influenced by the remuneration which may affect his independence. At present, a maximum Rs. 1 lakh per meeting is permitted as sitting fees. Commission based on profits is allowed but this has issues for loss-making companies. Besides, commission linked to profits has obvious concerns of conflict in approving accounts since there is a link between higher profits and higher commission.

A compromise of sorts is now proposed in two ways. One is by increasing the sitting fees, but this would have to be decided by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Hence, this proposal would be forwarded to them for their consideration.

The second is by permitting grant of employees stock options (‘ESOPs’) with at least five years vesting period. Thus, those who stay on for five years can possibly be rewarded through appreciation in the value of shares. However, this solution may not resolve the issue well. ESOPs are generally not very common in companies. Apart from this, a waiting period of five years could be too long and many may not benefit.

CONCLUSION
All in all, the changes are positive. However, much more is needed to be done. The powers and liabilities of Independent Directors have not been touched upon. Individually, Independent Directors have very little power. But the liability, on the other hand, is significant and the enhanced status may raise it even more. The remuneration of Independent Directors is still not resolved satisfactorily on at least two counts. First, the amount would still be decided by the Board and thus the promoters would still have a significant, often decisive, say. Second, the amount and manner may still be found to be insufficient to attract the best of talent. The proposal of dual approval tests giving minority shareholders a bigger role could also be applied for appointment of auditors who represent another pillar of safeguards.

It will also have to be seen how companies are required to transition to the new requirements. Will the provisions be effective immediately? Whether only large companies will be required first to change, with later dates being given for successive categories of smaller companies? Will the existing directors be allowed to complete their terms or will they have to be subject to this test immediately?

It is also seen that two laws – the SEBI LODR Regulations and the Companies Act, 2013 – have simultaneous requirements of corporate governance which overlap and even conflict. Perhaps the first step could be to require that listed companies would be regulated in this regard only by SEBI.

There is also another thought. Many principles of corporate governance are borrowed from the West, including a few significant ones from the UK, even in these proposals. India is different in a very vital way. Promoters typically hold a very significant stake, often more than 50%. Investors traditionally invest on the faith of the reputation and entrepreneurship of the promoters, though there would be cases where this trust is broken. While a check on them is always advisable, it should not happen that adopting a relatively alien concept tilts the balance so much that it actually becomes a hindrance.

GIFTS FROM ‘GIFT CITY’

INTRODUCTION

The Gujarat International Financial Tec-City (‘GIFT City’) in Gujarat is India’s first International Financial Service Centre (‘IFSC’). Many nations such as Singapore, the UAE, etc., have successfully developed IFSCs which have become financial service hubs and have attracted foreign investments. India aims to do so through the GIFT City. Several sops have been provided for setting up financial service intermediaries in the GIFT City both by the RBI and by SEBI. While GIFT City is a subject which merits a publication to itself, this article only looks at some of the key features and benefits available to financial service intermediaries for setting up an entity in the GIFT City.

REGULATORY REGIME
Instead of multiple financial services regulators such as SEBI, RBI and IRDA, the GIFT City is regulated by only one body – the International Financial Services Centres Authority set up under the Finance Ministry. The IFSC Authority is based in Gujarat. The unified IFSC Authority aims to ease the business environment for the intermediaries. However, multiple legislations continue to impact the GIFT City.

Units set up in the IFSC are treated as SEZ Units set up under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005. Accordingly, units set up in an IFSC must conform to the provisions of the SEZ Act and its regulations.

Some of the key regulations pertaining to the setting up of financial institutions in the GIFT City are:

  •  Special Economic Zones Act, 2005
  •  Foreign Exchange Management (International Financial Services Centre) Regulations, 2015
  •  International Financial Services Centres Authority Act, 2019
  •  International Financial Services Centres Authority (Banking) Regulations, 2020
  •  Securities and Exchange Board of India (International Financial Services Centre) Guidelines, 2015
  •  SEBI’s Operating Guidelines for Alternative Investment Funds in International Financial Services Centres of 2018
  •  IFSCA’s Guidelines of 2020 for AIFs in IFSCs.

PERSON RESIDENT OUTSIDE INDIA
One of the most salient features of the GIFT City is that any entity set up here would be treated as a Person Resident Outside India under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. Thus, even though the unit is physically incorporated in India, it would be treated as if it is a non-resident under the FEMA. A financial institution is an entity engaged in rendering financial services or carrying out financial transactions and includes banks, NBFCs, insurance companies, brokerages, merchant bankers, securities exchanges, mutual funds, etc. On the other hand, a financial service is defined to mean any activity allowed to be carried out by SEBI / RBI / IRDA or any authority empowered to regulate the financial institution.

Consequently, a financial institution set up in the GIFT City must conduct business only in foreign currency and not in Indian Rupees. This feature has certain unique consequences which are explained below.

Any SEBI-registered intermediary may provide financial services relating to the securities market in the IFSC without forming a separate company.

FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTORS
SEBI has liberalised the regime for foreign investors operating in the GIFT City as well as for FPIs to operate in it. Any applicant incorporated in the GIFT City shall be deemed to be appropriately regulated for the purposes of being registered as an FPI with SEBI. Hence, such an entity can apply for registration as a Category-I FPI.

Eligible Foreign Investors (EFIs) operating in IFSCs / GIFT City shall not be treated as entities regulated by SEBI. Further, SEBI-registered FPIs shall be permitted, without undergoing any additional documentation and / or prior approval process, to operate in the IFSC. The following are eligibility and KYC norms for EFIs:

Eligibility norms: EFIs are those foreign investors who are eligible to invest in IFSCs by satisfying the following conditions:
a) the investor is not resident in India,
b) the investor is not resident in a country identified in the public statement of the Financial Action Task Force as a deficient jurisdiction, and
c) the investor is not prohibited from dealing in the securities market in India.

KYC norms: An intermediary operating in an IFSC needs to ensure that the records of its clients are maintained as per the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and the rules made thereunder. The following KYC norms may be made applicable to EFIs:

  •  In case of participation of an EFI, not registered with SEBI as an FPI but desirous of operating in the IFSC, a trading member of the recognised stock exchange in the IFSC may rely upon the due diligence carried out by a bank which is permitted by RBI to operate in the IFSC during the account opening process of the EFI.
  •  In case of EFIs that are not registered with SEBI as FPIs and also not having bank accounts in the IFSC, KYC as applicable to Category-II FPI as per the new FPI categorisation shall be made applicable. However, PAN shall not be applicable for KYC of EFIs in the IFSC.
  •  In case of participation of FPIs in the IFSC, due diligence carried out by a SEBI-registered intermediary during the time of account opening and registration shall be considered.

Segregation of accounts: FPIs who operate in the Indian securities market and also propose to operate in the IFSC shall be required to ensure clear segregation of funds and securities. The custodians shall, in turn, monitor compliance of this provision for their respective FPI clients. Such FPIs shall keep their respective custodians informed about their participation in the IFSC.

AIFs IN THE GIFT CITY
Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) are investment vehicles set up in India which privately pool funds / monies from domestic as well as foreign investors and invest such funds / monies in securities as per a defined investment policy. In India, an AIF along with its constituents is regulated by SEBI under the SEBI (AIF) Regulations, 2012 (SEBI AIF Regulations). SEBI has provided several incentives for setting up an AIF in the GIFT City / IFSCs. The IFSC Authority has further liberalised the framework for setting up AIFs in the GIFT City. The combined regulations for setting up an AIF are explained below.

Incorporation of the AIF
Any trust / LLP / company set up in the IFSC can be registered with SEBI as an AIF. If the sponsor / manager of an Indian AIF wishes to set up an AIF in the IFSC, it must first set up a branch / company in the IFSC which will act as the sponsor / manager of the AIF. Thus, the Indian sponsor cannot directly sponsor the IFSC AIF. It must first set up a foreign branch / foreign company in the IFSC. The investment in the IFSC sponsor would be treated as an overseas direct investment in a Joint Venture / Wholly-Owned Subsidiary under the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 (FEMA No. 120/RB-2004). Since this would be an investment in the Financial Services Sector, the provisions of Regulations 6 and 7 of these Regulations would need to be adhered to.

The SEBI IFSC guidelines along with the SEBI AIF Regulations recognise the following types of AIFs:
(a) Category-I AIF: Funds which invest in startups, early-stage ventures, social ventures, small and medium enterprises, infrastructure sector, etc. These include Venture Capital Funds.
(b) Category-II AIF: Residual category, i.e., other than Category I and III AIFs and which do not undertake leverage other than to meet day-to-day operational requirements as per SEBI AIF Regulations. These include Private Equity Funds / Debt Funds.
(c) Category-III AIF: Funds which employ diverse or complex trading strategies and leverage including through investments in listed or unlisted securities / derivatives. These would include Hedge Funds.

Each scheme of the AIF shall have a corpus of at least US $3 million. The manager or sponsor shall have a continuing interest in the AIF of not less than 2.5% of the corpus or US $750,000, whichever is lower, in the form of investment in the AIF and such interest shall not be through the waiver of management fees. Further, for Category-III AIFs the continuing interest shall be not less than 5% of the corpus or US $1.5 million, whichever is lower. The AIF must raise money only in foreign currency and not in Indian Rupees.

Investments permissible by the AIF
SEBI has harmonised the provisions governing investments by AIFs incorporated in IFSCs with the provisions regarding investments applicable for domestic AIFs. Accordingly, AIFs set up in the IFSC can invest in

  •  Securities which are listed in the IFSC
  •  Securities issued by companies incorporated in the IFSC
  •  Securities issued by companies in India or belonging to foreign jurisdictions
  •  Units of other AIFs located in India as well as in the IFSC
  •  Any company, Special Purpose Vehicle or Limited Liability Partnership or body corporate or Real Estate Investment Trust or Infrastructure Investment Trust in which a domestic AIF can make an investment
  •  It can also co-invest in a portfolio company through a segregated portfolio by issuing a separate class of units. However, the investments by such segregated portfolios shall, in no circumstances, be on terms more favourable than those offered to the common portfolio of the AIF and appropriate disclosures must be made in the placement memorandum regarding creation of the segregated portfolio.

AIFs operating in India are subject to leverage restrictions under the SEBI Regulations. Accordingly, AIF Category-I cannot borrow, while Category-II can only borrow for meeting daily expenses. However, these restrictions have been removed for AIFs set up in the GIFT City. An AIF in an IFSC may borrow funds or engage in leveraging activities without any regulatory limit, subject only to the following conditions:
(a) The maximum leverage by the AIF, along with the methodology for calculation of leverage, shall be disclosed in the placement memorandum;
(b) The leverage shall be exercised subject to consent of the investors;
(c) The AIF employing leverage shall have a comprehensive risk management framework appropriate to the size, complexity and risk profile of the fund.

Further, AIFs operating in India have a maximum investment diversification rule. Thus, under the SEBI Regulations a Category-I AIF can invest a maximum of  25% of its investible funds in one investee company. Similarly, a Category-II AIF can invest a maximum of 10% of its investible funds in one investee company. The guidelines for AIFs in the IFSC have removed these diversification rules. Accordingly, they shall not apply to AIFs in IFSCs, subject to the conditions that appropriate disclosures have been made in the placement memorandum and the investments by the AIFs are in line with the risk appetite of the investors.

Most offshore financial centres do not have restrictions on leveraging or diversification guidelines. This is a very welcome move since now AIFs in IFSCs can set up tailor-made schemes for investing in a very select pool of companies. These guidelines should encourage more foreign institutions to set up AIFs in India.

Lastly, Indian AIFs are subject to a monetary limit when they want to invest abroad. AIFs set up in the IFSC are exempt from this limit since they are treated as set up in an offshore jurisdiction.

Nature of Indian investments by the AIF
Under the FEM (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 an AIF is treated as an Investment Vehicle. If the control and management of the sponsor and manager of the AIF are ultimately with resident Indian citizens, then the entire investment made in India by such an AIF is treated as a domestic investment. It does not then matter whether the corpus of the scheme is foreign or Indian. Thus, if the AIF in the GIFT City is set up by and managed by another Indian entity which in turn is ultimately controlled and managed by resident Indian citizens, then the downstream investment by such an AIF in Indian entities would be treated as domestic investment. Such investment would then be outside the purview of the FEMA Regulations and would not be subject to pricing / sectoral conditions / sectoral caps under the FEM (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 even if the entire corpus is raised from non-residents.

Eligible investors in the AIF
The following persons can make investments in an AIF operating in the IFSC:

  •  A person resident outside India;
  •  A non-resident Indian;
  •  Institutional investor resident in India who is eligible under FEMA to invest funds offshore, to the extent of outward investment permitted;
  •  A person resident in India having a net worth of at least US $1 million during the preceding financial year who is eligible under FEMA to invest funds offshore, to the extent  allowed in the LRS (US $250,000) of RBI. The minimum investment by an investor in an AIF is US $40,000 for employees or directors of the AIF or its manager and US $150,000 for all other investors.

The RBI has recently expressly allowed resident individuals to make remittances under LRS to IFSCs set up in India. Resident individuals may also open non-interest-bearing Foreign Currency Accounts (FCAs) in IFSCs for making the above permissible investments under LRS. Any funds lying idle in the account for a period up to 15 days from the date of receipt into the account shall be immediately repatriated to the domestic Rupee account of the investor in India. This is an example of express round-tripping being permissible by the RBI ~ Indian money under LRS would go abroad to an offshore AIF (although physically the AIF is in India) and could be routed back into India since such an AIF can invest in Indian companies!

Under the International Financial Services Centres Authority (Banking) Regulations, 2020 Qualified Resident Individuals (meaning an individual who is a person resident in India having net worth not less than US $1 million or equivalent in the preceding financial year) are permitted to open, hold and maintain accounts in a freely convertible foreign currency, with a banking unit, for undertaking transactions connected with or arising from any permissible transaction specified in the Liberalised Remittance Scheme of the Reserve Bank of India. The IFSCA has clarified that the net worth criteria shall not be applicable for an individual, being a person resident in India who opens an account with the bank for the purpose of investing in securities under the LRS. This is because of the fact that the purpose of such remittance under the LRS is investment in securities and the opening of a bank account with a banking unit is incidental to the same.

Triple role of the AIF
The AIF set up in the IFSC can also invest in India under the FDI Route, the FPI Route or the Foreign Venture Capital Investor (FVCI) Route. If it desires to come under the FPI or the FVCI Route, then it must get a separate registration for the same with SEBI. All such investments would be subject to the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019 administered by the RBI and the relevant SEBI Regulations.

CONCLUSION
The GIFT City at Gujarat is an excellent idea to attract foreign investment and foreign financial institutions to set up shop in India. Along with the regulatory concessions provided to AIFs, there are several income-tax benefits which are also afforded to AIFs established in the IFSC. While the Government has given a strong impetus to the GIFT City, it remains to be seen whether financial institutions actually set up shop.

 

UNDERSTANDING PREPACK RESOLUTION

BACKGROUND OF IBC AND NECESSITY OF PREPACKING THE RESOLUTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was passed four years ago with the objective ‘to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution in a time-bound manner for maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interests of all the stakeholders including alteration in the order of priority of payment of Government dues and to establish an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.’ The NCLAT in Binani Industries Limited vs. Bank of Baroda & Anr. laid down the objective of the code as ‘reorganisation and insolvency resolution of Corporate Debtor (CD), maximising value of assets of the company and promoting entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balancing the interests of all stakeholders’.

Since then, the IBC has moved on and benefited with the help of the rich source of knowledge as provided by jurisprudence. After all, it was time for Government to take steps that would further improve the ease of doing business. Especially with the impact of the pandemic, there is every possibility that businesses will suffer from greater stress due to external reasons beyond their control. This could also put many businesses into greater trouble, making them go through the stress of insolvency through the Courts.

The IMF, through its ‘Special Series on Covid’, identifies three potential phases of the crisis, viz., a first phase where there is a need for interim measures to halt insolvency and debt enforcement activity; a second phase, in cases of severe crisis, where transitional measures may be required to respond to the wave of insolvency cases, including special out-of-court restructuring mechanisms; and a third phase in which countries strengthen their regular debt resolution tools to address the remaining debt overhang and support economic growth.

While the harsh truth of such turmoil is flailing and failing businesses, the pressing need is to allow genuine businesses to sustain themselves and provide options for them to recoup and bounce back. Legislative options may create a lucrative, conducive environment to rescue those affected in these challenging times. ‘Prepack’ emerges in the midst of all this as a decoction which combines the formal and informal option to lessen the burden. Addressing this necessity, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs constituted a sub-committee on 24th June, 2020 to propose a detailed scheme for implementation of prepacked and prearranged resolution processes.

As of today a company in stress in India has four options: the Compromise and Arrangement scheme under the Companies Act, 2013; the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the IBC; RBI’s prudential framework for early recognition, reporting and time-bound resolution of stressed assets; and fourth, the out-of-court settlement framework. The then Finance and Corporate Affairs Minister, the Late Mr. Arun Jaitley, once said, ‘I think today may not be the right time to go in for this discussion (informal option) because of the huge rush of companies coming to the insolvency process, but once this rush is over over the next couple of years, and business comes back to usual, honest creditor-debtor relationship is restored on account of IBC, a situation may arise when we may then have to consider a need to marry the two processes together so they may well exist simultaneously’. Thus, the necessity to introduce an ecosystem of informal options was foreseen at the time of legislation of the IBC and prepack has emerged as an innovative corporate rescue method that incorporates the virtues of both informal (out-of-court) and formal (judicial) insolvency proceedings1.

GETTING TO KNOW ABOUT PREPACK
Prepack is a process to conclude in advance an agreement by a company which is stressed before moving for statutory administration of the same. This provides it an opportunity to continue its business as a going concern and enables the promoter to rationally decide the options, and to save the time and money cost, along with erosion of goodwill, had this been routed through the CIRP channel.

The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in its ‘Legislative Guide on Insolvency’ uses the word ‘Expedited reorganisation proceedings’ and Paragraph 76 defines prepack as ‘to involve all creditors of the debtor and a reorganisation plan formulated and approved by creditors and other parties in interest after commencement of the proceedings. Reorganisation may also include, however, proceedings commenced to give effect to a plan negotiated and agreed by affected creditors in voluntary restructuring negotiations that take place prior to commencement, where the insolvency law permits the court to expedite the conduct of those proceedings’.

The USA was the first to introduce prepack in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. It soon gained momentum with more than 20% of the bankruptcies going through prepack2.The plan ‘is negotiated, circulated to creditors and voted on before the case is filed’3.

With a slight variation, the United Kingdom requires an administrator to conclude the sale. The Insolvency Practitioners Association issued a Statement of Insolvency Practice which defines prepack sale as ‘an arrangement under which the sale of all or part of a company’s business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the appointment of an Administrator and the Administrator effects the sale immediately on, or shortly after, appointment.’

In Singapore, the Insolvency, Restructuring, and Dissolution (Amendment) Bill, 2020 proposes to introduce a new prepack scheme for micro and small companies in the Covid-19 environment. An automatic moratorium would come into play when a company is accepted into the scheme. There would be no requirement to convene a meeting of the company’s creditors. Instead, the Court can approve the scheme, provided that the company can satisfy it that if a meeting had been called a majority representing at least two-thirds in value of the creditors would have approved the proposed scheme.

BENEFITS OF PREPACK

Faster resolution and cost effective: The greatest advantage of prepack lies in early disposal of the case. A majority of the terms are negotiated at the stage before the same are administered by the courts, which allows sufficient time for the debtor to fructify the negotiations. The time taken in courts reduces substantially, together with an increase in the possibility of a resolution. This eventually reduces the cost of administrator / Insolvent Professional (IP) consultant. On the other hand, increase in the time involved in the process of resolution would mean that the CD may have to sustain the stress until the resolution, which in turn reduces the value of the business and also the overall chances of resolution. After introduction of the IBC, the time for resolving insolvency also came down significantly from 4.3 years to 1.6 years. Now, prepack intends to bring it down even further. In countries which are in advanced stages of implementation of the insolvency law, such as the UK and the USA, the time of resolution in prepack can be as low as a few hours!

Goodwill retention and value maximisation: The threat to any business during the resolution process is the disruption that it causes on its normal business, which eventually threatens and hampers its goodwill. Even the Act tries to resolve this concern by introducing a moratorium on admission of CIRP, but the concern is that of loss of goodwill which would otherwise impact the right resolution options. Prepack as an option would enable the CD to safeguard the goodwill which otherwise would be impacted in the formal process.

Increases the possibility of resolution: Once a debtor opts for CIRP, he loses control of the decision-making process which goes to the creditors. It is believed that the defaulting debtor must not be in control of the decision-making process, but then this reduces the possibility of resolution and leads to liquidation. The incidental option for a defaulting debtor in CIRP is that of liquidation, but the statistics reveal that debtors that stay long at CIRP are more prone to end in liquidation. Liquidation is a consequence of failed resolution and a non-desirable situation for the debtor, the creditors, the employees, etc. With prepack invoking informal methods, the chances of resolution increase with intent to move with commercial wisdom, which the debtor can assist and resolve.

Less reliance on courts: The report of the sub-committee of the Insolvency Law Committee on prepacked Insolvency Resolution process mentions withdrawal of applications filed for initiation of CIRP in respect of 14,510 Corporate Debtors at pre-admission stage, closure of CIRPs of 218 CDs u/s 12A of the Code, 27 terminations of CIRPs by the Adjudicating Authority (AA), closure of CIRPs on taking note of settlement recorded by the mediator, and even settlements at the level of the Apex Court. The volume of cases is testimony to the success of out-of-court settlements which if nurtured and guided can enable courts to decide and resolve.

CONCERNS IN PREPACK
Transparency: In the existing CIRP, section 29A of the IBC, 2016 imbibes the importance of transparency and concern of involvement of the related party in the process. Over the concerns of serial prepacking or phoenix companies hangs the fear of failure of prepack. This may also necessitate the Government to work the whole process in a controlled environment to ensure that any unscrupulous elements do not fail the process.

Defaulting debtor in decision-making: The process of CIRP shifts the decision-making power from the CD to professionals who are independent and work for the common commercial good of all. This ensures that the CD is not in control of but only a part of the decision-making process. The RP and the COC decide the course of action which is further supervised by the Courts. Prepack in contract empowers the defaulting corporate to decide on the course of resolution, whereas administrator / RP / IP have a limited role in the resolution process, that of overseeing and approval. This ensures that the CD does not hijack the resolution in his favour if left unchecked.

Framework on prepackaged Insolvency Resolution Process as suggested by the sub-committee
Different jurisdictions have legislated prepack under insolvency with various options; but it is necessary to make a law which is country-specific because one size may not fit all. The three principles that the sub-committee suggested to guide the design of the prepack framework are,
(i)    the basic structure of the Code should be retained;
(ii)  there should be no compromise of the rights of any party; and
(iii) the framework should have adequate checks and balances to prevent any abuse.

The report mentions the following as the main features of prepack:

  •  Prepack as an option must be part of the same law which governs IBC and also part of the same legislation.
  •  Prepack as an option must be available to all CDs for any stress, pre-default and post-default.
  •  The CD shall initiate prepack with consent of simple majority of (a) unrelated FCs and (b) its shareholders. No two proceedings – prepack and CIRP – shall run in parallel.
  •  Promoters and management of the CD to be in control of the decision-making process, except for decisions on matters enumerated u/s 28 of the Code, including interim finance, which shall be taken by the CD with the approval of the CoC.
  •  List of documents and reports like outstanding claims, including contingent and future claims, and a draft Information Memorandum, etc., shall be prepared by the CD and certified by the MD.
  •  The moratorium u/s 14 shall be available from the Prepack Commencement Date (PCD) till closure or termination of the process.
  •  IP shall be appointed by unrelated FC’s who shall not run the business like in CIRP but only administer / conduct the process of prepack.
  •  Similar to CIRP, RP shall make public announcements but on electronic platform, he shall verify the claim, constitute CoC (Committee of Creditors), get valuation report, conduct due diligence, make application to AA (Adjudication Authority) in case of avoidance transaction, etc.
  •  As in CIRP, the CoC shall take decisions with regard to approval by majority of votes except that of liquidation which requires 75% vote.
  • ? Section 29A related to persons not eligible to be resolution applicants to remain sacrosanct even in the prepack process.
  •  Prepack to have the Swiss challenge method to counter the first offer to ensure better proposals. Two-option approach: (i) without Swiss challenge but no impairment to Operational Creditors (OCs), and (ii) with Swiss challenge with rights of OCs and dissenting FCs subject to minimum provided u/s 30(2)(b). Prepack should allow 90 days for market participants to submit the resolution plan to the AA and 30 days thereafter for the AA to approve or reject it.

BRIEF ABOUT THE PREPACK INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROCESS (PIRP) PASSED BY ORDINANCE DATED 4TH APRIL, 2021


The Government, aware of the urgent need for prepack, has inserted a Prepackaged Insolvency Resolution Process (PIRP) under Chapter III-A in Part II of the IBC through the ordinance route. The following is a brief, along with some highlights, about the process:

  •  An application for initiating a PIRP may be made in respect of a CD classified as a micro, small or medium enterprise under sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.
  •  Restrictions have been placed on the CDs who have recently concluded CIRP / PIRP within three years or are undergoing CIRP, or those against whom liquidation order is passed u/s 33.
  •  An FC, not being a related party of more than 66% in value, has to propose an IP to be appointed as the Resolution Professional (RP). The CD shall also obtain approval for filing the PIRP from its FC not being its related parties representing not less than 66% in value of the financial debt due to such creditors.
  •  The majority of directors / partners have to declare that the CD shall file an application for PIRP within the timeframe not exceeding 90 days along with other declarations as required u/s 54A(2)(f).
  •   The special resolution in case of companies should have three-fourths of the total number of partners approving for filing the PIRP.
  •  The IP to be appointed as RP in PIRP is duty-bound to confirm whether the CD confirms the eligibility requirement for application under PIRP.
  •  Fees paid to the IP to perform his duties shall form part of the PIRP costs.
  •  The AA shall, within a period of 14 days of the receipt of the application under PIRP, either accept or reject it after providing seven days’ time to rectify the defects, if any.
  •  The PIRP shall commence from the date of admission of the application by the AA. The PIRP shall be completed within 120 days from its commencement and the RP shall submit the resolution plan within 90 days from the prepackaged insolvency commencement date. If the resolution plan is not approved by the CoC within the stipulated time, then the RP shall file for termination of the PIRP.
  •  Moratorium as provided in sub-section (1) read with sub-section (3) of section 14 shall be applicable and shall cease to exist upon termination of PIRP.
  •  CD shall submit within two days of commencement of PIRP a list of claims and preliminary information memorandum relevant to formulate the Resolution Plan.
  •  Unlike in CIRP, the management of affairs shall vest with the Board of Directors. However, the management may be handed over to the RP if the Committee by a vote of not less than 66% of the voting share in value decides to do so, or the AA is of the opinion that the affairs had been conducted in a fraudulent manner or there has been gross mismanagement.
  •  The CoC shall be constituted within seven days of the prepackaged insolvency commencement date and its first meeting shall be held within seven days of its constitution.
  •  The CD shall submit the base resolution plan, referred to in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 54A, to the RP within two days of the prepackaged insolvency commencement date and the RP shall present it to the CoC.
  •  The CoC may approve the base resolution plan for submission to the AA if it does not impair any claims owed by the CD to the operational creditors.
  •  The RP shall invite prospective resolution applicants to submit a resolution plan or plans, to compete with the base resolution plan, in such manner as may be specified.
  •  Sub-section (2) section 14, sub-section 2A of 14, section 14(3(c), section 17, section 19(3), section 18 clause g to e, section 19(2), section 21, section 25(1), clauses (a) to (c) and clause (k) of sub-section (2) of section 25, section 28, section 29, sub-sections (1), (2) and (5) of section 30, sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of section 31, sections 24, 25A, 26, 27, 28, 29A, 32A, 43 to 51, provisions of Chapters VI and VII of Part II have been applied mutatis mutandis to the PIRP.
  •  If the AA is satisfied that the resolution plan as approved by the CoC under sub-section (4) or sub-section (12) of section 54K, as the case may be, subject to the conditions provided therein, meets the requirements as referred to in sub-section (2) of section 30, it shall, within 30 days of the receipt of such resolution plan, by order approve the resolution plan.

Prepack is a great way if India can take a leaf out of the book of countries which have legislated, administered and have learnt from experience. It may also be necessary to implement the law in a controlled environment but with the caution of not excessively restricting the eco-system which the law would promulgate. This law would stretch to the fullest strength when it is allowed to resolve the stress, provided that it is allowed to be experimented with within the framework, with little interference from courts. Excess legislation and restrictions may dilute the intent of faster resolution; this requires that those involved in the process of prepack are sensitive to the consensus-building mechanism of debtors and creditors. This also means that creditor-debtor must also act maturely during this process as they must realise that the success of this process depends on its negotiation and approval of the same. On the point of restriction, such as the one in section 29A, views are divided on transparency and genuine related-party buyer.

References
1 Bo Xie (2016), Comparative Insolvency Law: The Prepack Approach in Corporate Rescue, Edward Elgar Publishing
2 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law Perspectives and Principles (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2009) 454
3 John D. Ayer et al, ‘Out-of-court Workouts Prepacks and Pre-arranged Cases, a Primer’, (April, 2005), ABI Journal <https://www.abi.org/abijournal/out-of-court-workouts-prepacks-and-pre-arranged-cases-a-primer> [2] (2020) 8 Supreme Court Cases 531

COGNIZANCE OF THE OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING

INTRODUCTION
.
Newspaper reports show that, on an average, every week in two to three cases a businessman, politician, banker or bureaucrat is booked under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act (PMLA). Apart from attachment of property and freezing of bank accounts, another action started simultaneously against such a person is initiation of criminal proceedings. On a complaint made u/s 44 of the PMLA, investigation commences and the Special Court may take cognizance of the offence of money-laundering.

However, the terms ‘cognizance of offence’ and ‘cognizable offence’ are not defined in the PMLA. Indeed, section 65 provides that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA for arrest, search and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all other proceedings under the PMLA.

Accordingly, in the absence of any provision in the PMLA, one may refer to the provisions of the CrPC on a given aspect such as the definition of ‘cognizable offence’. This
term is defined in section 2(c) of the CrPC as follows:

‘Cognizable offence’ means an offence for which, and ‘cognizable case’ means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant.

From a review of the above-mentioned definition one can see that where the offence is covered under the First Schedule of the CrPC or under any other law for the time being in force, the police officer may arrest without a warrant.

A reference to the First Schedule shows that it provides the following classification of offences:
• cognizable or non-cognizable,
• bailable or non-bailable, and
• the court which will try the offence.

Part II of the First Schedule refers to ‘classification of offences under other laws’. It provides that offences punishable with imprisonment for more than three years would be cognizable and non-bailable.

A reference to section 4 of the PMLA shows that the offence of money-laundering is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for more than three years which may extend up to seven years (ten years in the case of NDPS offences).

Accordingly, on the basis of the criteria specified in the First Schedule of the CrPC, the offence of money-laundering is cognizable.

WHETHER THE OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING IS COGNIZABLE?
The issue whether the offence of money-laundering is cognizable had come up for consideration before the Courts in the following cases:
•  Jignesh Kishorebhai Bhajiawala vs. State of Gujarat [2018] 90 taxmann.com 320 (Guj);
• Rakesh Manekchand Kothari vs. UoI (Manu/Guj/0008/2015);

Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal vs. UoI [2017] 78 taxmann.com 143 (Bom);
• Vakamulla Chandrashekhar vs. ED [2019] 356 ELT 395 (Del);
• Virbhadra Singh vs. ED (Manu/Del/1813/2015);
• Moin Akhtar Qureshi vs. Union of India [2017] 88 taxmann.com 66 (Del);
• Rajbhushan Omprakash Dixit vs. Union of India [2018] 91 taxmann.com 324 (Del).

The Courts gave views which were divergent and in many cases the matter was carried to the Supreme Court by way of SLPs which are pending.

However, an Explanation to section 45 has now settled the issue. The Explanation was added to section 45 w.e.f. 1st August, 2019 to clarify the meaning of ‘offence to be cognizable and non-bailable’. It reads as follows:

‘Explanation. – For the removal of doubts, it is clarified that the expression “Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable” shall mean and shall be deemed to have always meant that all offences under this Act shall be cognizable offences and non-bailable offences notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and accordingly the officers authorised under this Act are empowered to arrest an accused without warrant, subject to the fulfilment of conditions under section 19 and subject to the conditions enshrined under this section’.

Thanks to this clarification, the controversies faced by the Courts in the above-mentioned decisions have been put to rest.

COGNIZANCE OF THE OFFENCE OF MONEY-LAUNDERING – PRECONDITION

There are two provisions which refer to the precondition to take cognizance of the offence of money-laundering.

Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in the CrPC, a Special Court may take cognizance of the offence of money-laundering upon a complaint made by an authority authorised in this behalf under the Act, without the accused being committed to it for trial.

The second Proviso to section 45(1) lays down the basic precondition for taking cognizance of an offence punishable u/s 4. It categorically provides that the Special Court cannot take such cognizance except upon a written complaint by the Director or any officer of the Central or State Government authorised by a general or special order.

‘Taking cognizance of’ – connotation of
The expression ‘taking cognizance of’ is not defined or explained in the PMLA. In section 44, too, there is no clarification as regards the meaning of this expression. However, its meaning has been examined by the Supreme Court and the High Courts in various decisions. The propositions laid down by the Courts may be reviewed as follows:

• Whether a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down on this issue1.
• Taking cognizance means cognizance of an offence and not of an offender. ‘Cognizance’ indicates the point of time when a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence. It is different from initiating a proceeding. Rather, it is a condition for initiating a proceeding2.
• Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence and takes first judicial notice of an offence on a complaint or police report or on his own information.3
• The Magistrate takes cognizance once he makes himself fully conscious and aware of the allegations made in the complaint and decides to examine or test the validity of the said allegation4.
• At the stage of taking cognizance, only the prima facie case is to be seen. It is not open to the Court to appreciate the evidence at this stage with reference to the material5.
• For taking cognizance of an offence, the Court has to merely see whether prima facie there are reasons for issuing process and whether the ingredients of an offence are on record6.
• ‘Taking cognizance of offence’ means taking notice of an offence which would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings. It is not the same thing as issuance of process. It is entirely different from initiation of judicial proceedings; rather, it is a condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate7.

Private complainant has no locus standi
Having regard to the provisions of section 44(1)(b) and section 45 of the PMLA dealing with a complaint to the Special Court to take cognizance of an offence punishable under the PMLA, an important question that frequently arises is whether a complaint filed by a private complainant can be entertained by the Special Court.

This question was addressed by the Delhi High Court in the Raman Sharma case8. While answering it in the negative, the High Court made the following observations:

‘The question before the learned Trial Court was whether the Trial Court can entertain a complaint filed by a private party for the offence committed under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act. On this issue, section 44(b) of the Act clearly stipulates that the Special Court may, upon a complaint made by an authorised person in this behalf under this Act, take cognizance of an offence under section 3. Further, the second Proviso to section 45 makes it clear that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of offence except upon a complaint in writing made by the Director, or any officer of the Central Government or State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government.

_________________________________________________________________________________

1   Nupur Talwar vs. CBI [2012] 1 SCC (Cr) 711

2   Ajit Kumar vs. State of WB; AIR 1963 SC 765

3   Anil Sawant vs. State of Bihar (1995) 6 SCC 142; R.R. Chari vs.
State of
UP 1951 CrLJ 775(SC); Darshan Singh Ram Kishan vs. State of Maharashtra 1971
CrLJ 1697 (SC)

4   Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas vs. State of WB; 1959 CrLJ
1368(SC)

5   Kishan Singh vs. State of Bihar 1993 CrLJ 1700 SC

6   Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon International Ltd.
[2008] 2 SCC 492

7   State of Karnataka vs. Pastor P. Raju: AIR 2006 SC 2825; State
of WB vs. Mohd Khalid AIR 1995 SC 785

8   Raman Sharma vs. Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2020)
113
taxmann.com 114 (Del)

Accordingly, the learned Trial Court opined that the aforesaid two provisions make it clear that the Court cannot entertain a complaint filed by a private complainant for the offence committed under the Act’.

Cognizance of supplementary complaint
In the context of a supplementary complaint, a question arises whether cognizance is required to be taken again on the filing of a supplementary complaint? This question has been addressed by the Delhi High Court in Yogesh Mittal vs. Enforcement Directorate (2019) 105 taxmann.com 336 (Del). While answering it in the negative, the Delhi High Court made the following observations:

‘It is thus trite law that cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender. It is also well settled that cognizance of an offence / offences once taken cannot be taken again for the second time. Since this Court has already taken a view that a supplementary complaint on additional evidence qua the same accused or additional accused who are part of same larger transactions / conspiracy is maintainable, however, with the leave of the Court and cognizance is taken of the offence / offences, not the offender and in case no new offence is made out from the additional material collected during further investigation, supporting an earlier offence on which cognizance has already been taken or additional accused are arrayed, no further cognizance is required to be taken’.

Procedural aspect of the cognizance of the offence of money-laundering
Apart from the above-mentioned substantive aspects of cognizance of the offence of money-laundering, it is equally necessary to be aware of procedural aspects relating to the same. Such procedural aspects are not specified in the PMLA.

Section 65 of the PMLA provides that the provisions of the CrPC shall apply, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA, for search and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all other proceedings under the PMLA.

Hence, a reference may be made to Chapter XII of the CrPC [Information to the Police and their Powers to Investigate]. This Chapter lays down the procedure to be followed for investigation of cognizable or non-cognizable offences.

A reference may be made to the following provisions relating to a cognizable offence:
• Section 154 – Information in case of cognizable offence,
• Section 157 – Procedure for investigation of cognizable offence,
• Section 158 – Report to Magistrate, how submitted,
• Section 159 – Power to hold investigation or preliminary inquiry,
• Section 160 – Police officer’s power to require attendance of witnesses,
• Section 161 – Examination of witnesses by Police,
• Section 167 – Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours,
• Section 172 – Diary of proceedings in investigation,
• Section 173 – Report of police officer on completion of investigation.

A review of the above-mentioned provisions of the CrPC in the context of certain provisions of the PMLA would show that the PMLA does contain the following provisions which are analogous to corresponding provisions of the CrPC:
• Section 19 of the PMLA empowers the ED to arrest a person u/s 19 if, on the basis of material in its possession, it has reason to believe that a person is guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA.
• Proviso to section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA (inserted w.e.f. 1st August, 2019) requires that upon completion of investigation where it is found that no offence of money-laundering was committed, just like section 173 of the CrPC, the ED is required to submit a closure report to the Special Court.
• However, in respect of the other provisions of Chapter XII of the CrPC, such as filing of FIR, maintaining a case diary, etc., the PMLA does not contain analogous provisions.

CONCLUSION

Often, clients approach their chartered accountants with the show cause notice received by them from an Enforcement Officer alleging that an offence under the PMLA has been committed. The clients seek advice on the manner of giving a reply. That apart, a number of questions are raised by clients in respect of the consequences of various actions under the PMLA, such as provisional attachment of property, arrest, search and seizure, etc.

To advise clients on the proper course of action it is necessary for us to familiarise ourselves with basic knowledge of the main provisions of the PMLA. This will facilitate proper steps to be taken by the client during adjudication and other proceedings under the PMLA and briefing the arguing Counsel engaged by the client for representation before the Special Court.

CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN COMPANIES ACT AND SECURITIES LAWS: COMPOUNDED BY ERRANT DRAFTING

BACKGROUND
A listed company is subject to dual regulation. First, by the Companies Act, 2013 which is the parent act under which it is incorporated and which lays down the basic rules about how companies should be governed. And second, the multiple regulations notified under the SEBI Act. The regulator under each of these sets of laws is also different.

It is not as if the objectives of the two laws are clearly distinct and non-overlapping. Unfortunately, however, neither regulator would like to cede to the other and agree that some areas are best regulated exclusively by the other. Thus, several areas are regulated by both the regulators. And these areas actually keep increasing. Whether the concept and requirements relating to Independent Directors, whether the issue of shares and debentures, whether the setting up of various committees, their constitution and scope, etc., each regulator makes its own set of provisions.

This article attempts to look at this overlap and the resultant consequences. It also highlights the attempts made periodically to harmonise and even cede control. It also differentiates the nature of enforcement by the two regulators.

But this article arises primarily out of a recent informal guidance issued by SEBI. In this case, not only is there dual regulation, but owing to what appears to be poor drafting, certain harsh consequences have arisen which SEBI has merely reinforced without accepting.

AREAS OF DUAL GOVERNANCE

The objectives of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘the Act’) / Rules notified therein and the Securities Laws (consisting of the SEBI Act and several regulations notified by it) do have common areas. Both have as one of their objectives the governance of companies, even if SEBI primarily regulates companies that have listed, or propose to list, their securities. Both regulate the issue of securities, even if SEBI basically regulates the issue of securities to the public.

Thus, for example, the whole area of corporate governance is regulated minutely by both the laws. The definition of ‘Independent Directors’ is enunciated elaborately and separately by each of the two regulators. The constitution of committees such as the Audit Committee and the Nomination and Remuneration Committee is similarly laid down independently by the two laws. And the manner of issue of securities is also regulated independently by each of the two sets of laws.

Both sets of laws also regulate related party transactions. However, the definition of related parties, the nature of related party transactions governed, the manner of their approval, the quantum limits beyond which special approvals are required, etc., are all framed with differences, some major and some minor.

The result obviously is many differences, big and small, which companies have to carefully navigate through.

CONSEQUENCES OF DIFFERENT PROVISIONS

What happens when the same issue has differently-worded provisions under the Act / Rules and the Securities Laws? For example, the minimum number of Independent Directors required. The Act has made a simple rule which may result in a lower number of minimum Independent Directors, while the Securities Laws (the LODR Regulations) would require more. Or, say, the definition of related party transactions. The definition of related parties under the SEBI LODR Regulations is wider and covers groups of persons who are not covered as related parties under the Act. Similarly, the definition of related party transactions under the SEBI LODR Regulations is wider. So, again, the question is how will the differences be reconciled?

Primarily, the answer is that (i) both the sets of provisions have to be complied with, and (ii) in case of overlap / difference, the narrower or stricter provision will apply. If the LODR Regulations require more Independent Directors while the Act prescribes a lower number, the LODR Regulations will apply. Similarly, the wider definition of related party transactions under the SEBI LODR Regulations will apply.

But while this may be a good basic principle, the provisions of each set of laws should be carefully examined.

ATTEMPTS TO HARMONISE AND CEDE CONTROL

It is not as if the two regulators are always deliberately confrontational and engaged in a turf war. There is actually a tendency to carefully review what the other regulator has already provided in its corresponding provisions. Indeed, from time to time reviews are carried out and attempts are made to harmonise wherever possible. However, often a fresh set of amendments is made which widens the gap further. Since the provisions governed by SEBI are generally in the Regulations which can be easily amended, SEBI is able to update the provisions to current requirements and also take care of the difficulties faced. The amendments to the Act require approval of Parliament, although, interestingly, we have also seen a series of amending acts over the years.

DUAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Each of the two sets of laws has differing consequences in case of violation. Even the process of enforcement can be different. A violation of the provisions in the Act may result in fine and / or prosecution and, at times, other action. SEBI, however, generally has a wider arsenal of actions. It may be in the form of levying a penalty, directing persons not to deal in securities, barring persons from accessing securities markets, disgorgement, etc.

Companies and other persons in default alleged to have violated the provisions may face dual proceedings, one by each regulator, even for substantially the same violation!

Interestingly, under section 24 of the Act, certain specified provisions of the Act relating to listed / to be listed companies are to be ‘administered’ by SEBI. Ideally, such a provision would have ensured not only that dual provisions are either eliminated or harmonised, but even the action is by a single regulator. However, the provisions of this section have a narrow scope.

MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION – DUAL PROVISIONS AND CONSEQUENCE OF POOR DRAFTING

Let us take up a specific case that provides a good example of overlapping provisions with certain anomalous results owing to poor drafting. This case relates to payment of ‘managerial remuneration’, i.e., remuneration paid to directors. Traditionally, the Act has regulated payment of managerial remuneration in fair detail. The persons who can be appointed as Managing / Wholetime Directors, the manner of their appointment, the upper limits of their remuneration, etc., are all regulated in detail. Earlier, payment of remuneration beyond the specified limits required approval of the Central Government. However, now the Act requires approval of the shareholders instead. But even the shareholders cannot grant approval for remuneration that exceeds certain limits. The Act places limits on managerial remuneration in terms of percentage of net profits (as calculated in a prescribed manner) and, in case where profits are inadequate, or there are losses, in absolute terms.

SEBI had, till recently, not provided for limits on managerial remuneration but dealt with the subject by requiring the Nomination and Remuneration Committee to recommend managerial remuneration. However, with effect from 1st April, 2019 it made several requirements relating to certain managerial remuneration. One such requirement related to Promoter Executive Directors and became an area of confusion and a company approached SEBI for an ‘informal guidance’. It may be recalled that SEBI grants ‘informal guidance’ on provisions (for a relatively small charge) which, although it has limited binding effect, often helps know the view that SEBI may generally take.

The relevant provision is Regulation 17(6)(e) of the SEBI LODR Regulations which reads as under:

(e) The fees or compensation payable to executive directors who are promoters or members of the promoter group, shall be subject to the approval of the shareholders by special resolution in general meeting, if –
(i)    the annual remuneration payable to such executive director exceeds rupees 5 crore or 2.5 per cent of the net profits of the listed entity, whichever is higher; or
(ii)    where there is more than one such director, the aggregate annual remuneration to such directors exceeds 5 per cent of the net profits of the listed entity:

Provided that the approval of the shareholders under this provision shall be valid only till the expiry of the term of such director.

Explanation. – For the purposes of this clause, net profits shall be calculated as per section 198 of the Companies Act, 2013.

As can be seen, the provision states that the upper limit on annual remuneration in case of one such Promoter Executive Director is Rs. 5 crores or 2.50% of the net profits, whichever is higher. In case there is more than one such director, the corresponding limit on the aggregate remuneration to all such directors is 5% of the net profits.

The anomaly is apparent. The limit on remuneration in case of one director is given in an absolute amount as well as in a percentage. However, in case of more than one such director, the limit is given only in percentage terms. To take an example, if the net profit is Rs. 50 crores, then the company may pay Rs. 5 crores as managerial remuneration to one such director, being the higher of Rs. 5 crores and Rs. 1.25 crores (2.50% of Rs. 50 crores). If there are two or more such directors, however, the company can pay only Rs. 2.50 crores, since in such a case the company cannot pay more than 5% of its net profits as aggregate remuneration to all such directors. Thus, even the single director, who could have otherwise received up to Rs. 5 crores, would now get a far lesser remuneration since the aggregate limit for all the directors put together is Rs. 2.50 crores! Of course, if the net profits are very large (say, beyond Rs. 100 crores), the difficulty arising out of such an anomaly would be diluted. But if the profits are less, the anomaly becomes even more glaring.

For a company that needs more than one such director, the provision creates difficulties. When SEBI was approached for an informal guidance on this, it confirmed the above view and said that the remuneration would be limited to 5% of net profits (see informal guidance dated 18th November, 2020 to Manaksia Aluminium Company Limited). Thus, the company would be required to approach the shareholders for a special resolution.

To be fair, SEBI could not have resolved a drafting anomaly through an informal guidance since this would generally require an amendment.

CONCLUSION


A careful consideration is needed whether at all there is a need for dual sets of provisions on the same subject which result in overlap, conflict and even confusion, apart from double proceedings and double punishment. A fleet-footed SEBI could be given exclusive jurisdiction over listed / to be listed companies in several areas. This will ensure that companies have a single set of provisions to apply and that there is a single regulator who will take action in case of violation and the regulator is one who has several different enforcement actions that it can take that are suited to the violation/s.

HINDU LAW: THE RIGHTS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD

INTRODUCTION
The codified and uncodified aspects of Hindu Law deal with several personal issues pertaining to a Hindu. One such issue is the rights of an illegitimate child in relation to inheritance of ancestral property, self-acquired property of his parents, right to claim maintenance, etc.

 

VOID / VOIDABLE MARRIAGE

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 applies to and codifies the law relating to marriages between Hindus. It states that an illegitimate child is one who is born out of a marriage which is not valid. A valid marriage is one which does not suffer from the disabilities mentioned in this Act, viz., neither partner has another spouse living at the time of the marriage; neither of them is of unsound mind / has a mental disorder / is insane; they are not under the marriageable age; the parties are not within prohibited degrees of relationship as laid down in Hindu law; the parties are not sapindas (defined common relationships) of each other. For all void marriages, the Act provides that a decree of nullity can be obtained from a court of law. Hence, the marriage is treated as null and void. Thus, if there is a marriage which suffered from any of these defects then the same would be void. Certain marriages under the Act are voidable at the option of the party who is aggrieved.

 

ILLEGITIMATE CHILD – MEANING

A child born out of such a void or voidable wedlock would have been treated as an illegitimate child prior to the amendment of the Hindu Marriage Act in 1976. From 1976, the Hindu Marriage Act has been amended to expressly deal with an illegitimate child. Section 16(1) provides that even if a marriage is null and void, any child born out of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be considered to be a legitimate child. This is true whether or not such child is born before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. This would also be the case whether or not a decree of nullity is granted in respect of that void marriage under this Act.

 

It also provides that if a decree of nullity is granted in respect of a voidable marriage, any child begotten or conceived before the decree is made, who would have been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if at the date of the decree it had been dissolved instead of being annulled, shall be deemed to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the decree of nullity.

 

Hence, now all children of void / voidable marriages under the Act are treated as legitimate. The Act also provides that such children would be entitled to rights in the property of their parents.

 

The Supreme Court in Bharatha Matha & Anr. vs. R. Vijaya Renganathan, AIR 2010 SC 2685 has held that ‘it is evident that Section 16 of the Act intends to bring about social reforms, conferment of social status of legitimacy on a group of children, otherwise treated as illegitimate, as its prime object.’

 

In Jinia Keotin & Ors. vs. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 730, the Apex Court explained the meaning behind the Amendment as follows:

‘4 … Under the ordinary law, a child for being treated as legitimate must be born in lawful wedlock. … The legitimate status of the children which depended very much upon the marriage between their parents being valid or void, thus turned on the act of parents over which the innocent child had no hold or control. But for no fault of it, the innocent baby had to suffer a permanent setback in life and in the eyes of society by being treated as illegitimate. A laudable and noble act of the legislature indeed in enacting section 16 to put an end to a great social evil.’

 

In S.P.S. Balasubramanyam vs. Suruttayan @ Andali Padayachi & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 756 the Supreme Court held that if man and woman are living under the same roof and cohabiting for a number of years, there will be a presumption u/s 114 of the Evidence Act that they live as husband and wife and the children born to them will not be illegitimate. Thus, even children born out of a live-in relationship were accorded legitimacy.

 

In Rameshwari Devi vs. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 735 the Supreme Court dealt with a case wherein after the death of a government employee, the children born illegitimately to the woman who had been living with the said employee, claimed a share in the pension / gratuity and other death-cum-retirement benefits along with children born out of a legal wedlock. The Court held that u/s 16 of the Act, children of a void marriage are legitimate. As the employee, a Hindu, died intestate, the children of the deceased employee born out of the void marriage were entitled to a share in the family pension, death-cum-retirement benefits and gratuity.

 

SUCCESSION TO PROPERTIES OF OTHER RELATIVES

However, the Amendment Act has also introduced an interesting caveat, that while such a child born out a void or voidable wedlock would be deemed to be legitimate, the Amendment would not be treated as conferring any rights in the property of any person other than its parents.

 

In Smt. P.E.K. Kalliani Amma & Ors. vs. K. Devi & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1963 the Apex Court held that section 16 of the Act was not ultra vires of the Constitution of India. In view of the legal fiction contained in section 16, the illegitimate children, for all practical purposes, including succession to the properties of their parents, had to be treated as legitimate. They could not, however, succeed to the properties of any other relation on the basis of this rule which in its operation was limited to the properties of the parents.

 

Again, in Jinia Keotin & Ors. vs. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi & Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 730 the Supreme Court held that section 16 of the Act, while engrafting a rule of fiction in ordaining the children, though illegitimate, to be treated as legitimate, notwithstanding that the marriage was void or voidable, chose also to confine its application, so far as succession or inheritance by such children is concerned, to the properties of the parents only. It held that conferring any further rights upon such children would be going against the express mandate of the Legislature.

 

This view was once again endorsed by the Supreme Court in Bharatha Matha (Supra) where it held that a child born of a void or voidable marriage is not entitled to claim inheritance in ancestral coparcenary property but is entitled only to claim share in self-acquired properties, if any.

 

CONTROVERSY IN THE ISSUE

The above issue of whether illegitimate children can succeed to ancestral properties or claim a share in the HUF was given a new twist by the Supreme Court in 2011 in the case of Revanasiddappa and Anr. vs. Mallikarjun and Ors. (2011) 11 SCC 1. The question which was dealt with in that case was whether illegitimate children were entitled to a share in the coparcenary property or whether their share was limited only to the self-acquired property of their parents u/s 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act? It disagreed with the earlier views taken by the Supreme Court in Jinia Keotin (Supra), Bharatha Matha (Supra) and in Neelamma & Ors. vs. Sarojamma & Ors. (2006) 9 SCC 612, wherein the Court had held that illegitimate children would only be entitled to a share of the self-acquired property of the parents and not to the joint Hindu family property.

 

The Court observed that the Amendment had used the word ‘property’ and had not qualified it with either self-acquired property or ancestral property. It has been kept broad and general. It explained that if they have been declared legitimate, then they cannot be discriminated against and they will be at par with other legitimate children and be entitled to all the rights in the property of their parents, both self-acquired and ancestral. The prohibition contained in section 16(3) will apply to such children only with respect to property of any person other than their parents. Qua their parents, they can succeed to all properties. The Court held that there was a need for a progressive and dynamic interpretation of Hindu Law since the society was changing. It stressed the need to recognise the status of such children who had been legislatively declared legitimate and simultaneously recognise the rights of such children in the property of their parents. This was a law to advance the socially beneficial purpose of removing the stigma of illegitimacy on such children who were as innocent as any other children.

 

The Supreme Court also explained the modus operandi of succession to ancestral property. Such children will be entitled only to a share in their parents’ property, but they could not claim it in their own right. Logically, on the partition of an ancestral property the property falling in the share of the parents of such children would be regarded as their self-acquired and absolute property. In view of the Amendment, such illegitimate children will have a share in such property since such children were equated under the amended law with the legitimate offspring of a valid marriage. The only limitation even after the Amendment was that during the lifetime of their parents such children could not ask for partition, but they could exercise this right only after the death of their parents.

 

Hence, the Court in Revanasiddappa (Supra) concluded that it was constrained to take a view different from the one taken earlier by it in Jinia Keotin (Supra), Neelamma (Supra) and Bharatha Matha (Supra) on section 16(3) of the Act. Nevertheless, since all these decisions were of two-member Benches, it requested the Chief Justice of India that the matter should be reconsidered by a larger Bench.

 

CURRENT STATUS

It has been close to ten years since the above request for a larger Bench, but the matter has not yet been resolved. This issue once again cropped up in the Supreme Court in the case of Jitender Kumar vs. Jasbir Singh CA 18858/2019 order dated 21st October, 2019. The Supreme Court observed that since this issue has been referred to a larger Bench, the current case would be decided only after its hearing.

 

MAINTENANCE

Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 also needs to be noted; it provides for maintenance of children by a Hindu. A Hindu is bound, during his or her lifetime, to maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate children during their minority. In addition, an unmarried Hindu daughter (even if illegitimate) can claim maintenance from her father till she is married relying on section 20(3) of this Act, provided that she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain herself from her own earnings. This is also the view expressed by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Abhilasha vs. Parkash, Cr. Appeal No. 615/2020, order dated 15th September, 2020.

 

GUARDIANSHIP

Who would be the natural guardian of such an illegitimate child is another interesting question. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 states that a natural guardian of a Hindu minor (if he is a boy or an unmarried girl) and / or his property, is the father and after him the mother. In case the minor is below the age of five years, the child’s custody ordinarily vests with the mother. However, the Act provides an exception to this Rule that in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl, the mother would be the natural guardian and only after her can the father be the natural guardian. Recently, the Bombay High Court in Dharmesh Vasantrai Shah vs. Renuka Prakash Tiwari, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 697, reiterated that in case of an illegitimate child it is only the mother who can be the natural guardian under Hindu Law. The only exception is if the mother has renounced the world by becoming a hermit or has ceased to be a Hindu. The Court held that since it was the father’s own case that the child was an illegitimate child, it was difficult to see how he could claim the custody of the child over the biological mother. The Supreme Court has taken a similar view in the case of the guardianship of an illegitimate Christian child in the case of ABC vs. State of Delhi (NCT) (2015) 10 SCC 1.

 

CONCLUSION

The issue relating to various rights of illegitimate children has been quite contentious and litigation prone. One eagerly awaits the constitution of the larger Supreme Court Bench. Clearly, it is high time for a comprehensive legislation dealing with all issues pertaining to such children. In the words of the Apex Court, ‘they are as innocent as any other children!’  

 

FIT AND PROPER PERSON (A widely worded test to refuse entry in the securities market)

BACKGROUND
Persons desiring to do business in the securities markets are usually required to obtain a license of sorts – a registration – from the Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’). This is especially so for those who are known as ‘intermediaries’ and who render various forms of services. They may be stock-brokers, portfolio managers, those handling mutual funds, etc. Each category has a different set of requirements for being eligible to be registered which may include qualifications, net worth requirements, etc. Once registered, they also have to follow prescribed rules and usually a Code of Conduct. Failure to follow such rules / Code may result in action which may include penalties, suspension or even cancellation of certificates.

However, there is one overriding requirement and test common across almost all intermediaries. And that is the ‘Fit and Proper Person’ test. A person needs to be ‘fit and proper’ to obtain registration. Unlike other requirements which are well defined and strictly applied, the ‘fit and proper’ requirement may appear at first glance as vague, broadly defined and subjectively applied. In several cases, entities have been debarred or refused entry in the securities market on the ground that they failed this ‘fit and proper’ test.

So what is this test and requirement? Is it as arbitrary as it appears to be? There have been several rulings of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (‘SAT’) and orders of SEBI over the years in this regard. This article describes the legal provisions and discusses, in the light of several precedents, how this test has been applied. While some areas of doubt and concern still remain, the rulings have been generally on similar lines applied consistently.

THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF ‘FIT AND PROPER’ UNDER SECURITIES LAWS

This term has different connotations and definitions under different laws. The Reserve Bank of India, for example, has a different connotation of this test for appointment of directors in public sector banks. Further, without using this term, other laws, too, apply similar principles while granting or rejecting licenses / registration. However, we shall focus here on the definition under Securities Laws.

The definition has seen significant change over the years and the current definition and criteria are given in Schedule II to the SEBI (Intermediaries) Regulations, 2008 (‘the Regulations’) which reads as under:

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING A ‘FIT AND PROPER PERSON’

For the purpose of determining as to whether an applicant or the intermediary is a ‘fit and proper person’ the Board may take account of any consideration as it deems fit, including but not limited to the following criteria in relation to the applicant or the intermediary, the principal officer, the director, the promoter and the key management persons by whatever name called –

(a) integrity, reputation and character;
(b) absence of convictions and restraint orders;
(c) competence, including financial solvency and net
        worth;
(d) absence of categorisation as a wilful defaulter.

Earlier, there were full-fledged and separate Regulations focused on this aspect – the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Criteria for Fit and Proper Person) Regulations, 2004. The wordings in the earlier Regulations were similar but lengthier. The general pattern and essence remain the same in the new criteria and, hence, the rulings thereon can be generally relied on and are indeed followed for the Intermediaries Regulations.

BROAD AND VAGUE WORDING OF THE CRITERIA

The test applies not just to the applicant / intermediary but also to its director, promoter, key managerial person, etc. The criteria are striking in their wideness and even vagueness in wording. The ‘integrity, reputation and character’ of the person is examined, but no specific benchmark has been provided as to how it would be measured or judged. And whether it would be limited to the person’s work or even his personal life can be considered.

‘Absence of convictions and restraint orders’ may sound clear at first glance but becomes complicated when looked at closely. If there is a conviction for which punishment or a restraint order is continuing, it would be obvious that he cannot be registered in violation of such orders. However, does the conviction / restraint have to be on acting as such intermediary? Or is it, and which is more likely, that the conviction / restraint may be on any area that may reflect adversely on the character of the person? In any case, it is not clear whether the conviction or restraint needs to be subsisting in the sense that it is being undergone or is a past one. If a past one, whether even a conviction / restraint from the distant past is also to be considered?

Competence, including financial solvency and net worth, is to be considered. But, again, no benchmarks are given – whether any specific qualification or area of experience would be considered. The term ‘financial solvency’ is easy to understand in a negative way as not being insolvent. But considering that it is used with the term ‘net worth’, perhaps the intention, to judge from context, may be that the net worth may be commensurate with the nature of registration sought.

As we will see later, there is a reason why the criteria are broadly worded with lack of specific, measurable parameters. The intention seems to be to judge the person in a subjective manner on such parameters. However, subjectivity is compensated in a different manner by ensuring that only those adverse aspects that are serious are considered.

PRECEDENTS

This subject has again come to the fore due to a recent Supreme Court ruling (reported in the media) on certain on-going appeals before SAT on decisions of SEBI on brokers in the NSEL matter. However, there is a longer history of precedents and generally there has been consistency in them following the principles laid down in an early SAT ruling of 2006.

Jermyn LLC vs. SEBI [2007] 74 SCL 246 (SAT – Mum.)
This was one of the earliest rulings (affirmed by the Supreme Court in the second appeal) that laid down the basic principles for application of the criteria. The matter related to the alleged Ketan Parekh scams. Simplified a little bit, the broad issue was whether persons who have been subjected to bans and investigations of serious violations could re-enter the market through a different name. The question was about determining whether a non-resident entity registered with SEBI was indeed associated with the KP group that faced serious allegations. It was alleged that there was commonality / association with persons allegedly connected with the KP group and several factors were placed on record. The entity contended that the allegations against the KP group were not finally proved, that many investigations were still going on, and so on. SAT took a broader view of the requirements relating to ‘fit and proper person’. It held that it was fair to consider serious allegations as relevant even if the proceedings do not yet have a final outcome. It also held that subjective judgment was acceptable. The following words can be usefully referred to since they have been applied in later cases (emphasis supplied):

‘9. A reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Regulations makes it abundantly clear that the concept of a fit and proper person has a very wide amplitude as the name “fit and proper person” itself suggests. The Board can take into account “any consideration as it deems fit” for the purpose of determining whether an applicant or an intermediary seeking registration is a fit and proper person or not. The framers of the Regulations have consciously given such wide powers because of their concern to keep the market clean and free from undesirable elements… In other words, it is the subjective opinion or impression of others about a person and that, according to the Regulations, has to be good. This impression or opinion is generally formed on the basis of the association he has with others and / or on the basis of his past conduct. A person is known by the company he keeps. In the very nature of things, there cannot be any direct evidence in regard to the reputation of a person whether he be an individual or a body corporate. In the case of a body corporate or a firm, the reputation of its whole-time director(s) or managing partner(s) would come into focus.

The Board as a regulator has been assigned a statutory duty to protect the integrity of the securities market and also interest of investors in securities apart from promoting the development of and regulating the market by such measures as it may think fit. It is in the discharge of this statutory obligation that the Board has framed the Regulations with a view to keep the marketplace safe for the investors to invest by keeping the undesirable elements out… One bad element can not only pollute the market but can play havoc with it which could be detrimental to the interests of the innocent investors. In this background, the Board may, in a given case, be justified in keeping a doubtful character or an undesirable element out from the market rather than running the risk of allowing the market to be polluted.

We may hasten to add here that when the Board decides to debar an entity from accessing the capital market on the ground that he / it is not a fit and proper person it must have some reasonable basis for saying so. The Board cannot give the entity a bad name and debar it. When such an action of the Board is brought to challenge, it (the Board) will have to show the material on the basis of which it concluded that the entity concerned was not a fit and proper person or that it did not enjoy a good reputation in the securities market. The basis of the action will have to be judged from the point of view of a reasonable and prudent man. In other words, the test would be what a prudent man concerned with the securities market thinks of the entity.’

This ruling and the principles it laid down were followed in many later cases such as:
1. Mukesh Babu Securities Limited vs. SEBI (Appeal No. 53 of 2007, dated 10th December, 2007, SAT);
2. SEBI’s order in case of Motilal Oswal Commodities Broker Private Limited dated 22nd February, 2019;
3. SEBI’s order in case of Anand Rathi Commodities Limited dated 25th February, 2019;
4. SEBI’s order in case of Phillip Commodities India Pvt. Ltd. dated 27th February. 2019.

ISSUES AND CONCLUSION


The series of decisions shows that the application of the criteria to determine whether a person is a fit and proper person is seen from a different perspective. The core objective is that persons with dubious reputation and image should not be allowed entry in the capital market. A person may have several cases against him about alleged scams, serious wrongdoing, etc. The final outcome of these cases may take years, even decades. Can such person enter or continue in the securities markets? Would it be sufficient that he discloses on-going cases? The governing principles as laid down suggest that SEBI can take into account such allegations even if there is no final outcome. In its subjective view, it can refuse entry to such persons. For this purpose, SEBI may take into account developments which may occur at various intermediary stages – observations of courts, reports of investigative agencies, etc. Many of the principles of natural justice such as right of cross-examination, providing of all underlying information / documents, etc., may not be strictly applied. The material SEBI has relied on is seen in a more substantive manner.

That said, this does not mean that SEBI has indiscriminate and unquestionable powers. Each of the cases has shown that the allegations on record have been fairly serious and multifarious. Such serious allegations are enough to put a person in a bad enough light to be refused entry in securities markets at least in the interim. SEBI as a gatekeeper thus has broader powers.

The test of ‘fit and proper person’ at present has application to intermediaries under the Regulations. However, it may not be surprising if such test, or at least the principles thereof, may get wider application to other persons associated with the capital markets and who play a key role. One example that can be thought of is Independent Directors.

FAMILY SETTLEMENTS: OPENING UP NEW VISTAS

INTRODUCTION
As families grow, new generations join the business, new lines of thinking emerge and disputes originate between family members regarding assets, properties, businesses, etc. Finally, these lead to a family settlement. Such a family arrangement is one of the oldest alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The scope of a family arrangement is extremely wide and is recognised even in ancient English Law. This is because the world over, courts lean in favour of peace and amity within the family rather than on disputes. In the last 60 years or so, a good part of the law in India relating to family settlements is well settled through numerous court decisions. In recent years, both the Supreme Court and the High Courts have delivered some important judgments on this very vital issue. The key tenets from these decisions have been culled out and analysed in this month’s feature.

PRINCIPLES SETTLED SO FAR

From an analysis of the earlier judgments, such as Maturi Pullaiah vs. Maturi Narasimham, AIR 1966 SC 1836; Sahu Madho Das vs. Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481; Kale vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1976) AIR SC 807; Hiran Bibi vs. Sohan Bibi, AIR 1914 PC 44; Hari Shankar Singhania vs. Gaur Hari Singhania, (2006) 4 SCC 658, etc., the settled principles that have emerged are summarised below:

(a) A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights, or by preserving the family property, or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation and saving its honour.

(b) An oral family settlement involving immovable property needs no registration. Registration (where immovable property is involved) is necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced to writing. Here, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement has already been made either for the purpose of the record, or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and it is, therefore, not compulsory to register it.

(c) A compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allotted to them respectively. That explains why no conveyance is required in these cases to pass the title from one in whom it resides to the person receiving it under the family arrangement. It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary.

(d) By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement, the members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family.

(e) A family settlement is different from an HUF partition. While an HUF partition must involve a joint Hindu family which has been partitioned in accordance with the Hindu Law, a family arrangement is a dispute resolution mechanism involving personal property of the members of a family who are parties to the arrangement. A partition does not require the existence of disputes which is the substratum for a valid family arrangement. An HUF partition must always be a full partition unlike in a family settlement.
    
DOCUMENT WHICH BRINGS ABOUT A FAMILY SETTLEMENT MUST BE REGISTERED AND STAMPED

The decision in the case of Sita Ram Bhama vs. Ramvatar Bhama, (2018) 15 SCC 130 is different from the scores of decisions which have held that family settlements do not require registration. However, this difference is on account of the facts of this case. Here, a father agreed to divide his self-acquired properties between his two sons. He died without doing so and also did not make a Will. Consequently, the two brothers, their two sisters and mother all became entitled to the properties under the Hindu Succession Act. The brothers executed a document titled ‘Memorandum of Family Settlement’ dividing the properties between the two of them as per their late father’s wishes. This document was also signed by their sisters and mother. The question was whether the instrument was to be registered or whether stamp duty was to be paid on the same? Distinguishing (on facts), the catena of decisions on the issue, the Supreme Court held that the document was to be registered and duly stamped. This was because it was not a memorandum of family settlement. The properties in question were the self-acquired properties of the father in which all his legal heirs had a right. The instrument took away the rights of the sisters and the mothers. It was a relinquishment of rights by them in favour of the brothers. It did not merely record the pre-existing rights of the brothers. Hence, it was held that the properties could not be transferred on the basis of such an instrument.

When on this subject, one must also consider the three-judge bench decision in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma, CA 32601/2018, order dated 11th August, 2020. Though not directly on the issue, it is equally relevant. It held that a daughter would not have a coparcenary right in her father’s HUF which was partitioned before 20th December, 2004. For this purpose, the partition should be by way of a registered partition deed / a partition brought about by a Court Decree. The Supreme Court held that the requirement of a registered deed was mandatory. The intent of the provisions was not to jeopardise the interest of the daughter but to take care of sham or frivolous transactions set up in defence unjustly to deprive the daughter of her right as coparcener. In view of the clear provisions of section 6(5), the intent of the Legislature was clear and a plea of oral partition was not to be readily accepted. However, in exceptional cases where the plea of oral partition was supported by public documents and partition was finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been effected by a decree of a Court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone could not be accepted and had to be rejected outright.

Another relevant decision is that of the Delhi High Court in the case of Tripta Kaushik vs. Sub-Registrar, Delhi, WP(C) 9139/2019, order dated 20th May, 2020. In that case, a Hindu male died intestate and his wife and son inherited his property. The son renounced his share in favour of his mother by executing an instrument. The issue was one of stamp duty on such instrument. It was contended that the son had inherited half share in the property on the death of his father under the Will left by his father and, therefore, the Relinquishment Deed be considered as a family settlement not chargeable to Stamp Duty. It was held that the Relinquishment Deed did not make any reference to the Will of the late father of the petitioner, or to any purported family settlement. Accordingly, it was held that the instrument was a Release Deed liable to stamp duty and registration.

MEMORANDUM OF FAMILY SETTLEMENT NEEDS NO REGISTRATION

As opposed to the above case, the decision of the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal vs. Manjit Kaur, CA 7764/2014, order dated 31st July, 2020 is diametrically opposite. In this case, a family settlement was executed in relation to a dispute between three brothers and their families. There was a specific recital in the memorandum that the appellant was accepted as the owner in possession of the suit property. He had constructed 16 shops and service stations on the same. In other words, it proved that he was being considered as the owner in possession of the suit property. Prior to execution of the memorandum on that day the family compromised not to raise any dispute regarding his ownership. Accordingly, the Court held that the document in question was a writing with regard to a fact which was already being considered and admitted by the parties. Hence, it could not be said that the document itself created rights in immovable property for the first time. Further, the parties to the document were closely related and hence the instrument did not require any registration. It was only a memorandum of family settlement and not a document containing the terms and recitals of a family settlement. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the document was valid and all parties were bound to act in accordance with the same. This decision reiterates the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kale’s case (Supra). Further, the case held that once the memorandum is acted upon, the same is binding upon the parties even though it is unregistered.

VALIDITY OF UNSTAMPED, UNREGISTERED DOCUMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

In the above case of Sita Ram (Supra), the Supreme Court also examined whether such an instrument which was required to be registered and stamped could be used for any collateral purpose. It held that it was not possible to admit such an instrument even for any collateral purpose till such time as the defect in the instrument was cured. It relied on Yellapu Uma Maheswari and another vs. Buddha Jagadheeswararao and others, (2015) 16 SCC 787 for this purpose. The documents could be looked into for collateral purpose provided the parties paid the stamp duty together with penalty and got the document impounded.

However, the Supreme Court in the recent case of Thulasidhara vs. Narayanappa, (2019) 6 SCC 409 and also in the earlier case of Subraya M.N. vs. Vittala M.N. and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 705 has held that even without registration, a written document of family settlement / family arrangement can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and the conduct of the parties.

PARTIES WITH WHOM A HINDU WOMAN CAN ENTER INTO A FAMILY SETTLEMENT

The decision in Khushi Ram vs. Nawal Singh, CA 5167/2010, order dated 22nd February, 2021 is a landmark decision. It has examined the scope of the term family when it comes to a Hindu woman. The issue here was whether a married woman could execute a valid family settlement with the heirs from her father’s side. The woman had executed a memorandum of family settlement with the sons of her late brother, i.e., her nephews. The Court referred to an old three-judge bench decision in Ram Charan Das vs. Girjanandini Devi, 1965 (3) SCR 841 which had analysed the concept of family with regard to which a family settlement could be entered. It was held that every party taking benefit under a family settlement must be related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property, or a claim, or even a semblance of a claim. In Kale’s case (Supra) it was held that ‘family’ has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs, but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title. In the Kale case, a settlement between a person and the two sisters of his mother was upheld.

The Court looked at the heirs who could succeed to Hindu women. It held that the heirs of the father are covered in the heirs who could succeed. When the heirs of the father of a woman were included as persons who can possibly succeed, it could not be held that they were strangers and not members of the family qua the woman. Hence, the settlement between the aunt and her nephews was upheld.

This decision, along with the vital three-judge bench decision in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma, CA 32601/2018, order dated 11th August, 2020, has upheld the rights of Hindu daughters in their father’s family. While this case reiterates her right to enter into settlements with the heirs from her father’s side, the latter decision has explicitly laid down that a Hindu daughter, whenever born, has a right as a coparcener in her father’s HUF.

As an aside, a settlement from an aunt in favour of her nephews is covered by the exemption for relatives u/s 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act but a reverse case is not covered since a nephew is not a relative for an aunt. In such a case, reliance would have to be placed on the family settlement itself to show that the receipt of property is not without adequate consideration.

BENAMI LAW AND FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS

In the case of Narendra Prasad Singh vs. Ram Ashish Singh, SA No. 229/2002, order dated 4th July, 2018, the Patna High Court was faced with the question whether a property purchased in the name of one family member out of joint family funds would be hit by the provisions of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The Court held that this proposition could not at all be accepted since acquisition of the land in the name of a member of a family from the joint family property was not regarded as a benami transaction within the meaning of section 2 of that Act. A benami transaction had been defined u/s 2(a) of the Act as any transaction in which property is transferred to one person and a consideration is paid or provided by another person. In the present case, the consideration had been found to have been provided by the joint family fund which could not be treated as the fund of another person. In any event, the owner claimed his title purely on the basis of a family arrangement and not as a benamidar and, therefore, the case was not said to be hit by the Act.

In this respect it should be noted that the Act requires that the property should be purchased out of ‘known sources of funds’. Earlier, the Bill contained the words ‘known sources of income’ which were replaced with the present wordings. The Finance Minister explained the reason for this change as follows:

‘…. The earlier phrase was that you have purchased this property so you must show money out of your known sources of income. So, the income had to be personal. Members of the Standing Committee felt that the family can contribute to it, ……which is not your income. Therefore, the word “income” has been deleted and now the word is only “known sources”. So, if a brother or sister or a son contributed to this, this itself would not make it benami, because we know that is how the structure of the family itself is….’

CAN MUSLIMS ENTER INTO A FAMILY SETTLEMENT?


This issue was dealt with by the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Chamanbi and Others vs. Batulabi and Others, RSA No. 100004/2015, order dated 15th March, 2018. An oral family settlement was executed between a Muslim family and pursuant to the same a Memorandum of Family Settlement was executed for mutation of rights in the land records. The plea was that the document was unenforceable since Muslims could not execute a family settlement. The Court held that it was true that there was no joint family under Mohammedan Law but family arrangement was not prohibited. The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shehammal vs. Hasan Khani Rawther, (2011) 9 SCC 223 which had held that a family arrangement would necessarily mean a decision arrived at jointly by the members of a family. Accordingly, the memorandum was upheld.

CONCLUSION


From the above discussion it would be obvious that our present laws relating to family settlement, be it stamp duty, registration, income-tax, etc., are woefully inadequate. Rather than making possible a family settlement, they do all they can to hamper it! India is a land of joint families and family-owned assets and yet we have to run to the courts every time a family settlement is to be acted upon. Consider the precious time and money lost in litigations on this count. It is high time amendments are made to various laws to facilitate family settlements.

SEBI TIGHTENS REGULATIONS FOR RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS – KEY AMENDMENTS AND AUDITOR’s RESPONSIBILITIES

Corporate Governance standards are being continuously strengthened with the focus on improving the quality of governance norms and disclosures by listed entities. Related party transactions have always been a key focus area for the regulators. Significant amendments have been made in the Companies Act, 2013 (2013 Act) as well as in the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (Listing Regulations) to regulate such transactions and their disclosure in financial statements. The regulators made various amendments in the 2013 Act and Listing Regulations to align the requirements prescribed under the two, for example, omnibus approval by Audit Committee for repetitive related party transactions; however, SEBI regulations continue to be more stringent, for instance, the definition of related party under the Listing Regulations will result in the identification of significantly higher number of related parties vis-à-vis those under the 2013 Act.

The three important aspects of related party transactions which merit consideration are (a) Identification [who are considered related parties (RP) and when], thresholds (values or %), approvals (depending on the former who will approve – Audit Committee / Shareholders / Government) and disclosure (and their timelines) in financial statements and to be filed with the regulators. For minority shareholders such steps are of great importance to protect their interests and allow them to take decisions…Information on RPs also give better insight into performance and monitoring of movement of funds.

Section 188 of the Companies Act, 2013 deals with ‘related party transactions’, i.e., transactions specified in the section with any person who falls within the definition of ‘related party’ as per section 2(76) of the Act. Apart from section 188, there are several other provisions in the 2013 Act that deal with specific types of transactions with specific types of parties which may be covered within the definition of ‘related party’, for example, section 185 deals with loans to Directors and to certain other parties in which the Directors are interested; section 192 places restrictions in respect of non-cash transactions with Directors and certain other specified persons; and a number of sections that deal with managerial remuneration.

Further, the Listing Regulations also prescribe specific regulations which govern RPTs for the listed entities. While some provisions are common, however, with the recent amendment to the regulations, the Listing Regulations have been made much more stringent as discussed in this article.

With the aim to review and strengthen the regulatory norms pertaining to RPTs, undertaken by listed entities in India, SEBI constituted a Working Group in November, 2019 comprising members from the Primary Market Advisory Committee (PMAC)1, including persons from the industry, intermediaries, proxy advisers, stock exchanges, lawyers, professional bodies, etc.

On the basis of the recommendations of the working group, SEBI as per Notification dated 9th November, 2021 has further amended provisions relating to RPTs under the SEBI Listing Regulations.

____________________________________________________________
1 Reference may be made to SEBI Meeting – Review of Regulatory Provisions
 
 
EFFECTIVE DATE
The SEBI LODR Amendment Regulations are applicable in a phased manner; certain amendments will be effective from 1st April, 2022, while the remaining amendments will be effective from 1st April, 2023 (as specified in the regulations).SEBI LODR has been amended, inter alia, in respect of the following:
* Definition of ‘related party’ (RP) and ‘related party transactions’ (RPT),
* Change in monetary limits for classification of material RPTs,
* Disclosure requirements for RPTs,
* Process to be followed by Audit Committee for approval of RPTs.

The objective of this article is to provide an overview of the recent amendments made by SEBI and the auditor’s role in the audit of RPTs.

OVERVIEW OF THE AMENDMENTS
Definition of related party
The working group constituted by SEBI felt that the promoter or the promoter group may exercise control over and influence the decision-making of the listed entity. Accordingly, the recommendation was made to consider every person or entity forming part of the promoter or promoter group, irrespective of their shareholding in the listed entity, as a related party.

Existing regulations consider any person or entity to be a related party if he / she or it belongs to the promoter or promoter group of the listed entity holding 20% or more of shareholding in the listed entity.

The amended regulations consider any person or entity to be a related party if
* he / she / it is belonging to the promoter or promoter group of the listed entity (i.e., irrespective of shareholding) or
* if any person or entity is holding 20% or more equity shares either directly or on a beneficial interest basis as per section 89 of the 2013 Act at any time during the preceding financial year and effective from 1st April, 2023 if any person or entity is holding 10% or more of equity shares at any time during the immediately preceding financial year. This amendment will cover persons or entities holding shares as above even if he / it does not form part of the promoter or promoter group of the listed entity.

The rationale behind lowering of these amendments has been explained in the SEBI agenda2 which states that a significant percentage of Indian businesses are structured as intrinsically linked group entities that operate as a single economic unit, with the promoters exercising influence over the entire group. Thus, the promoter or promoter group may exercise control over a company irrespective of the extent of shareholding. There is also the possibility of a shareholder not being classified as a promoter but who may be exercising influence over the decisions of the listed entity by virtue of shareholding.

With the revised definition of related party and the changes in threshold to 10% w.e.f. from 1st April, 2023 it may pose a practical challenge for companies in identification of related parties, in conducting their day-to-day business since companies will need to keep track of such entities at any time during the past financial year, and transactions with such entities will require Audit Committee approval. Companies need to evaluate whether such a shareholder may have ceased to hold any shares in the listed entity in the year of applicability of the amended regulations or in a subsequent year.

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2 Reference may be made to the SEBI meeting – Review of Regulatory Provisions
DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The scope of the term has been made significantly wider, principally with a view to bring transactions with subsidiaries (listed or unlisted, Indian or foreign) within its ambit.As per existing regulations, the definition covers transfer of resources, services or obligations between a listed entity and an RP, regardless of whether a price is charged, whether there is a single or a group of transactions.

Some of the corporate actions such as issue of securities on preferential basis, rights issue, buy-backs, payment of dividend, sub-division or consolidation, etc., where these provisions are uniformly applicable / offered to all shareholders in proportion to their shareholding, have been excluded from the ambit of the definition.

SEBI has also revised thresholds for determining ‘materiality’ of an RPT. A transaction with a related party shall be considered material if the transaction(s) to be entered into individually or taken together with previous transactions during a financial year, exceed Rs. 1,000 crores or 10% of the annual consolidated turnover of the listed entity as per its last audited financial statements, whichever is lower (as per existing regulations, the threshold was only 10% of the annual consolidated annual turnover of the listed entity).

It is noteworthy that the scope of RPTs has been extended to include transactions that not only have a direct nexus with an RP but eventually also those which would indirectly benefit the RP. This will entail significant efforts from companies, and they will be required to scrutinise individual transactions with a third party and may also require listed entities to demonstrate that the RP is not benefited from a third-party transaction.

The meaning of purpose and effect’ has not been defined in the SEBI Regulations. In common parlance, purpose would mean to have an intent to benefit the RP and effect is that it actually happens indirectly; it is more of substance-based assessment and management will require to undertake critical evaluation of documentation and the commercial intention of the transaction.

PRIOR APPROVAL FROM AUDIT COMMITTEE AND SHAREHOLDERS
The amended regulations require prior approval of the Audit Committee and shareholders of the listed entity for all related party transactions and subsequent material modifications thereto… Provided that only those members of the Audit Committee, who are Independent Directors, shall approve related party transactions.

There is no need to have prior approval of the Audit Committee and shareholders of a listed entity for a related party transaction where the listed entity is not a party and its listed subsidiary is a party if Regulations 23 and 15(2) of SEBI Listing Regulations are applicable to such listed subsidiary.

1. The definition of the term ‘material modifications’
will be required to be defined by the Audit Committee and disclosed as part
of the policy on materiality.

An RPT to which a subsidiary of a listed entity
is a party (even if the listed entity by itself is not a party) shall require
prior approval from the Audit Committee of the listed entity, if the value of
such transaction (individually or together with previous transaction during
the F.Y.) exceeds

I. 10% of the annual consolidated turnover, as
per the last audited financials of the listed entity (with effect from 1st
April, 2022)

II. 10% of the annual consolidated turnover, as
per the last audited financials of the subsidiary (with effect from 1st
April, 2023)

The scope of an RPT which requires prior shareholders’ and Audit Committee approval has been expanded. Depending on the type of approval, prior approval may be taken, for example, for omnibus approval it may be before the next financial year, while for contract or transaction-based approval, it may be immediately before entering into an RPT. It is not clear whether the regulations will apply to RPTs which were entered into before 1st April 2022. While SEBI may issue a clarification in this regard, one may take a view that the regulations will be applicable prospectively considering there are no specific transitional provisions specified in the amended regulations.

DISCLOSURES
Schedule V to the Listing Regulations specifies the additional disclosures required to be provided by listed entities in their annual report. This, inter alia, includes related party disclosures and disclosures pertaining to the corporate governance report.

Existing timeline is as under:

For equity listed entities – disclosure for the
half year to be submitted within 30 days from the date of publication of its
standalone and consolidated financial results for the half year.

For high value debt listed entities – disclosures
for the half year at the time of submission of their standalone financial
results (on a comply or explain basis up to 31st March, 2023) and
on a mandatory basis from 1st April, 2023.

Revised timeline is as under:

For equity listed entities – within 15 days from
the date of publication of standalone and consolidated financial results for
the half year.

With effect from 1st April, 2023 – on
the date of publication of its standalone and consolidated financial results.

For high value debt listed entities – along with
its standalone results for the half year.

SEBI has issued another Circular dated 22nd November, 2021 which provides detailed disclosure formats of RPTs and information to be placed before the Audit Committee and the shareholders for consideration of the same.

AUDITORS’ ROLE IN AUDIT OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The corporate scandals over a period of time have indicated that related parties are often involved in cases of fraudulent financial reporting. The RPTs may provide scope for distorting financial information in financial statements and not presenting accurate information to the decision-makers and stakeholders. The audit of RPTs and transactions presents a particular challenge to auditors due to many reasons, including the following:
(1) Related party relationships and transactions are not always easy to identify due to complex structures
and arrangements;
(2) Management is responsible for identifying all related parties yet may not fully understand the definition of a related party under various regulations or may not want to provide information on the grounds of sensitivity;
(3) Many companies may not have effective internal controls in place for authorising, recording and tracking related party transactions.
(4) Auditors of smaller companies may find it difficult to identify related party relationships and transactions because management may not understand the related party disclosure requirements or their significance. It is therefore important for auditors to be clear about what needs to be disclosed so that they can advise management on the responsibility to prepare financial statements that comply with the relevant accounting framework.

ICAI issued SA 550 Related Parties which deals with the auditor’s responsibilities regarding related party relationships and transactions. Under the current auditing framework, auditors are required to focus on three areas:
1) identification of previously unidentified or undisclosed related parties or transactions.
2) significant related party transactions outside the normal course of business. Related parties may operate through an extensive and complex range of relationships and structures, with a corresponding increase in the complexity of related party transactions.
3) assertions that related party transactions are at arm’s length.

Auditors are required to evaluate whether the effects of RPTs are such that they prevent the financial statements from achieving a true and fair presentation.

With the given plethora of amendments in SEBI regulations, the responsibilities of auditors have been enhanced even further. The auditors need to understand the implications of the amendments on the company’s systems and processes of identification and disclosure of RPTs. The auditor may consider the following illustrative work-steps while conducting an audit of related party relationships and transactions to enhance the quality of the audit.

(i) Plan the audit of related party relationships and transactions by updating existing information, and by obtaining a list of related parties from clients, or compile a list based on discussions with clients. Needless to say, the auditor should consider the amendments to related party regulations for listed entities and their subsidiaries while obtaining such information.

(ii) Make inquiries from the management about changes from the prior period, the nature of the relationships, whether any transactions have been entered into and the type and purpose of the transactions.

(iii) Understand the nature, size and complexity of the businesses and use family trees or document group structures under various laws / statutes and regulations (e.g., income-tax – transfer pricing and indirect tax – GST) to help identify related parties and relationships between the client and related parties.

(iv) Consider the impact of undisclosed related party relationships and transactions as a potential fraud risk.

(v) Understand the controls, if any, that management has put in place to identify, account for, and disclose related party transactions and to approve significant transactions with related parties, and significant transactions outside the normal course of business. Also understand management’s plan to update such controls for change in related party regulations.

(vi) Perform procedures to confirm identified related party relationships and transactions and identify others including:
a. inspecting bank and legal confirmations obtained as part of other audit procedures.
b. inspecting minutes of shareholder and management meetings and any other records or documents considered necessary, such as:
*    Other third-party confirmations (i.e., in addition to bank and legal confirmations)
*    Entity income-tax returns, tax filings and related correspondence
*    Information supplied by the entity to regulatory authorities
*    Records of the entity’s investments and those of its pension plans
*    Contracts or other agreements (including, for example, partnership agreements and side agreements or other arrangements) with key management or those charged with governance
*    Significant contracts renegotiated by the entity during the period
c. Ensure compliance with all the requirements of sections 179, 180, 185, 186, 187 of the Companies Act, 2013 and rules thereunder.
d. When there are other components of the company that are not audited by the parent auditor, coordinate audit procedures with the component auditors to obtain necessary information relating to intercompany transactions and balances.
e. Review minutes and other agreements for support for loans or advances and for evidence of liens, pledges or security interests related to receivables from, or loans and advances to, subsidiaries.
f. Examine the agreements entered between the company and the related parties.

(vii) Consider any fraud risk factors in the context of the requirements of SA 240 Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements.
(viii) Establish the nature of significant transactions outside the company’s normal course of business and whether related parties could be involved, by inquiring of management.
(ix) Consider any arm’s length assertions and obtain supporting evidence from third parties.
(x) Document the identity of related parties and the nature of related party relationships.
(xi) Obtain a representation that management has disclosed the identity of related parties, relationships and transactions of which they are aware, and that related parties and transactions have been appropriately accounted for and disclosed.
(xii) Communicate significant related party matters arising during the audit to those charged with governance unless all of those charged with governance are involved in its management.
(xiii) Ensure that the accounting for and disclosure of related parties and related party transactions are appropriate and in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework.
(xiv) Reporting of Key Audit Matter (KAM) and determining whether identification of related parties and transactions with related parties is a KAM. SA 701 states that events or transactions that had a significant effect on the financial statements or the audit, may include significant transactions with related parties, significant transactions outside the normal course of business, unusual transactions. The auditor should assess whether a KAM on RPT is required and which require significant auditors’ attention.

Amendments in Corporate Governance Report
The companies as well as auditors should take note of additional disclosures in the corporate governance report by the listed entity and its subsidiaries of ‘Loans and advances’ in the nature of loans to firms / companies in which the Directors are interested by name and amount. A compliance certificate from either the auditors or practising company secretaries regarding compliance of conditions of corporate governance is required to be annexed with the Directors’ report.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The SEBI LODR Amendment Regulations on RPTs will ensure greater transparency and better corporate governance which will safeguard the interests of all stakeholders and strengthen the regulatory framework. These amendments also enhance the responsibilities of the Audit Committees and the Independent Directors with respect to RPT approvals; Audit Committees will need to define ‘material modifications’ to RPTs, require amendment to the RPT policy, revise data base of RPTs with RPTs of subsidiaries and their value. In the light of the amended provisions, listed entities would need to revisit their list of related parties, RPTs, identify material RPTs which need Audit Committee / shareholder approval and comply with the additional disclosure and documentation requirements. The listed entities will be required to identify new related party transactions based on a review of the present arrangements, update the related party policy to capture amendments and recommend updating of processes, controls for capturing additional data requirement.

The auditors have an important role to play in reporting on related party transactions given the existing responsibilities under Standards on Auditing and amendments made in the Companies (Audit and Auditor’s Reporting) Rules applicable for the financial year ending March, 2022 onwards which requires auditors to obtain representations from management that (other than those disclosed in the financial statements) no funds have been provided to intermediaries with an understanding that the intermediaries would lend or invest or provide guarantee, etc., on behalf of the ultimate beneficiaries. A similar reporting requirement has also been prescribed for receipt of funds from funding parties.

DO CONGLOMERATE STRUCTURES FACILITATE BUSINESS EFFICIENCY?

A very common business structure used across the world for business control and management is that of Holding Companies. Business Promoter Groups hold shareholding interest in entities through the process of intercompany shareholding, everything finally rising to the top into a company which is called the ultimate Holding Company of that Business Group.

The purpose of this article is not financial analysis but to attempt to understand the reasons for variations and what could be the takeaways for corporate businesses.

These Holding Companies could have reporting entities (mainly subsidiaries) on a geographical basis (subsidiaries overseas) or on different business basis (national or international).

The writer analysed ten entities which have standalone businesses and investments in subsidiaries / joint ventures / associates. For the purpose of further discussion, two entities were dropped – one had losses and the other had negative working capital. The remaining eight entities are:

1. Infosys Ltd.;
2. Hindustan Unilever Ltd.;
3. Tata Chemicals Ltd.;
4. WIPRO Ltd.;
5. Tata Consumer Products Ltd.;
6. Maruti Suzuki Ltd.;
7. Godrej Consumer Products Ltd.;
8. Dr. Reddy’s Labs Ltd.

These entities were analysed for six Key High-Level Ratios at Standalone Business and Consolidated Financials basis:
a) Net Profit Before Tax to Total Revenue – as %;
b) Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) to Total Revenue – as %;
c) Earnings before Interest, Depreciation, Amortisation and Tax (EBITDA) to Total Revenue – as %;
d) Return on Capital Employed – as % of EBIT divided by Capital Employed;
e) Turnover of Capital Employed – Number of Times Capital Employed is turned to get Total Revenue on annualised basis;
f) Working Capital Turnover – Number of times Working Capital is turned to get Total Revenue on annualised basis.

In ratios (a) to (d) above, the higher percentage is better and in the last two turnover ratios, a higher number of times indicates improved efficiency. For all eight companies, a comparison of the ratios at standalone and consolidated entity were done and the following were the results.

Findings from the ratios:
1) In two specific companies all six ratios at the Consolidated Financials stage were lower than at standalone stage;
2) In four companies, five ratios at CFS were lower than standalone entities;
3) In one company, four ratios at CFS were lower than standalone entity;
4) In one company, two ratios at CFS were lower than standalone entity – it was the only case where consolidated financials could be said to be stronger than standalone financials.

Clearly, the performance of the satellite units is NOT adding value to the standalone Holding Company.

The questions that one needs to ask are:
(a) Through the process of creating multiple subsidiaries, are we losing supervision of performance and management control on the business? This is a serious issue at the stage that India is – since inefficiency of Financial / HR / Management resources results in less than optimum performance;
(b) The Holding Company for whatever reasons – emotional on retaining / nurturing businesses or improper analysis of business study – thereby holding on to companies / businesses that it should legitimately divest;
(c) Is the financial reporting of business performance of a good quality so the right red flags are raised, or do matters suddenly blow up and management is left wondering what could have gone amiss;
(d) Are subsidiaries allowed a free run, with inadequate supervision or manned by a management cadre which is not up to the task? Are there no demands of performance on them since the subsidiaries are small businesses, not paid much attention to;
(e) Is there excessive management focus on holding company standalone businesses and the focus on other related entities is much less, resulting in great surprises when things go wrong.

Whatever may be the reasons, the recent IL&FS and DHFL cases have shown the need for much superior monitoring of conglomerate structures. Often, many skeletons start coming out of the closet on a trigger event occurring and they impact the ultimate Holding Company. There is no doubt that Boards of Directors, Auditors, Rating agencies, Capital markets (mainly minority shareholders) have been stung by these two cases. The need to focus on Consolidated Financials Statements is being felt stronger than ever before. CFS is no longer an accounting exercise devoid of practical applications.

One way of improving Indian corporate efficiency is ensuring that the variation in performance parameters in standalone and consolidated financials is not too significant to create cause for concern. In the eight companies forming part of this study, the variations were quite significant, reflecting the need for tighter management review and control.

It is my opinion that all companies which are listed Holding Companies and entities which are not listed but have a certain large size on Total Revenues and / or Net Worth, must have the following done for their fulfilment of legal requirements:

1) Look at the possibility of Holding Company dividends being considered not at standalone entity level but at consolidated financials level so that there is proper emphasis on performance and linking the same with dividends payouts;
2) Managerial remuneration under the Companies Act MUST BE guided not by standalone entity performance but by Holding Company (CFS) level performance.

There is reason to believe that both the above actions will force Promoter Groups to focus on overall performance rather than on standalone performance.

Note – The author wishes to thank the professionals that he has connected with for the purpose of clarifications on the subject of this Article.

TRADING ON SELF-GENERATED RESEARCH – SEBI’S ORDERS MAKE IT ILLEGAL UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES

BACKGROUND
One would think that trading in shares based on one’s own research based on publicly available information is the commonest and the most logical thing to do and cannot imaginably be held to be illegal. Of course, many also trade on the advice of others such as professionals or even friends; equally obvious now is that trading on the basis of inside information is self-evidently illegal. And so is front-running illegal. But it would seem absurd to say that if one does meticulous research from publicly available information and then trades on it, it could be held to be illegal – and invite serious consequences! But, curiously, that is precisely one of the legal conclusions that the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has drawn in at least two recent orders. To be clear, the facts as found by SEBI are peculiar. But, as a ruling in law, it does sound to be flawed. There are a couple of other similar issues in these orders which are also of concern.

The cases relate to recommendations for trading in scrips by persons (‘Hosts’) on a financial news channel and dealings by persons alleged to be closely associated with such hosts. The primary questions are three: Whether dealing by such persons (the host / persons closely associated with such host) themselves with advance knowledge of such recommendations is illegal under securities laws and hence punishable? Whether creation of momentum in the market by dealing in advance of such recommendations is illegal? The third question, which partly overlaps with the earlier two, is whether such dealings and practices are so unethical and unfair that they amount to violation of securities laws?

THE SEBI ORDERS
There are primarily two orders that SEBI has issued in this matter. The first order, an interim one, is in the case of Hemant Ghai (the host) and his relatives (order dated 13th January, 2021). This interim order and directions issued thereunder were confirmed by an order dated 2nd September, 2021.

The second order (dated 4th October, 2021), also an interim one, is in the case of Pradeep Pandya and certain members / HUFs of the Furiya family.

It may be added that these orders are / may be further contested and in any case be under further investigation / response from parties, being interim orders. Hence, the alleged findings of SEBI as discussed here are as per the SEBI orders. The focus here is to highlight the important and interesting legal issues involved and the possible ramifications of such cases.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES AND ORDER PASSED
Television channels (and even social media / streaming services) commonly have programmes where a host discusses and often makes recommendations to buy / sell a particular security. The recommendation is usually accompanied by a detailed presentation / graphics, etc., giving the justification for such recommendations. This recommendation may be made in an exclusive show by such a host who is associated with such channel or in general news where an ‘external expert’ is interviewed and who gives his recommendation.

As stated, there were two orders. In the first case, Hemant Ghai hosted / co-hosted various shows on news channel CNBC Awaaz. Recommendations about buying or selling a particular scrip were made on one such show. It was observed that as soon as the recommendation was made, the price of the scrip moved sharply in the direction recommended. That is to say, for example, if the recommendation was to buy a particular scrip, the price of that scrip immediately rose sharply in the market, obviously, as SEBI pointed out, because of such recommendation. Even the volumes rose very significantly on that day. The rise in price was far higher than the comparative movement in the stock index and there was no specific news from the company whose shares were recommended justifying such a rise. SEBI compared the price before and after the recommendation and noted that the rise in price (and volumes, too) was highest on the day of such recommendation. Similar findings were made by SEBI in the second order in the case of Pradeep Pandya’s show.

What was, however, found was that certain persons alleged to be associated with such hosts (‘associates’) repeatedly carried out trading to profit from such recommendation. Such persons bought (in the case of a buy recommendation) on the day before (or earlier on the same day) of the recommendation. When the price of the shares rose sharply after the recommendations, the associates sold the shares and made handsome profits.

Furthermore, such trades were carried out under the Buy-Today-Sell-Tomorrow (BTST) mechanism. This ensured that there was no need to even make payment for the purchase and take delivery.

SEBI made detailed inquiries on how the hosts and the respective associates were linked by taking into account family relations, call data records, addresses, etc. Accordingly, it held that the associates were aware in advance what recommendation was going to be made and hence traded in advance of such recommendation. When the price moved in the desired direction after the recommendations were released, the trades were reversed and profits made.

In the order in the matter of Hemant Ghai, calculations were made alleging that aggregate profits of about Rs. 2.95 crores were generated. In the case of Pradeep Pandya, similar calculations were made alleging profits of Rs. 8.39 crores.

The parties concerned were directed to impound these profits and deposit them in an escrow account. The hosts were also debarred from continuing to make any such recommendations till further orders. The parties were also debarred from dealing in securities till further orders. As stated earlier, the interim order in the matter of Hemant Ghai was confirmed after giving the parties a hearing.

INTERESTING POINTS ARISING OUT OF THE ORDERS
SEBI held, under the interim order, the parties (the hosts / associates) prima facie guilty of violation of multiple provisions of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Markets) Regulations, 2003 (‘the Regulations’). It was held that they traded on the basis of advance information that was not public. It was further held that trading in such manner, particularly without intimating the public that they have carried out such trades, was an unethical / unfair practice which in the light of several rulings amounted to violation of the Regulations. It was also held, in the Pradeep Pandya case, that by trading in advance, a momentum was created which contributed to price movement which, too, was in violation of the Regulations.

SEBI held, on the basis of the preponderance of probability, that the parties were guilty. For this purpose it relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the following cases: SEBI vs. Rakhi Trading (P) Ltd. [(2018) 143 CLA 15 (SC)]; and SEBI vs. Kishore R. Ajmera [134 SCL 481 (SC)].

SEBI also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in SEBI vs. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel [(2017) 141 CLA 254 (SC)] for taking a broader and contextual view of what constitute unfair trade practices under the Regulations. Accordingly, it held that the practices alleged to have been carried out by the parties were in violation of the Regulations.

A few interesting points arise. The primary issue is whether trading on material self-generated information / analysis can be a violation of the Regulations? Can it be said that to have such advance information and trading on it amounts to such violation?

It is respectfully submitted that such ruling is absurd. Persons trading in markets, particularly informed and expert persons, often collate information of a wide nature and arrive at their own conclusion. There is no duty in law to publish such self-generated analysis and conclusions in advance to the public before carrying out trading on their own account. Investing and speculation in the market would, it is submitted, come to a standstill if this was held to be a requirement. Let us compare this aspect with two other types of dealings which are now well settled to be violations – insider dealing and front-running. In case of insider dealing, a person has access to unpublished price-sensitive information about a company and he deals on the basis of such information. It does not need elaborate explanation as to why this is illegal and indeed specific regulations make such dealings illegal. In the case of front-running, persons entrusted with price-sensitive information carry out trades on their own account first and then carry out the trades of the persons who have entrusted them with such information. They, too, thus profit and now such dealings are well settled to be violations of the Regulations.

In the case of self-generated information, there can hardly be a case of having advance information illegitimately obtained on the basis of which trades were carried out and that this is violation of the Regulations. It is submitted that this finding of SEBI has no basis in law or logic and the order needs to be reconsidered on this point.

Let us take the next issue which is a bit more contentious. The parties did not disclose to the public that they had already carried out the trades in advance of the time when they made the recommendations. To begin with, SEBI has not pointed out any specific provision in law which requires them to make such declaration. Interestingly, in most of the transactions, it was not even as if the parties made trades opposite to what they recommended. In other words, it was not as if the parties were, for example, selling while recommending to the public to buy. They did sell but after having bought first and after the price rose.

It was not even the case of SEBI that the price fell sharply after the parties sold the shares. Indeed, SEBI gave data in several cases which did not show any fall and the only point which was made was that the price did not rise as much in the days after the day of the recommendations. So it was not even a case of what is commonly known as ‘pump-and-dump’, which is a well-known fraudulent practice where unscrupulous persons by various means make the price rise to artificially high levels and then offload the shares, leaving the buyers in the lurch as the price falls soon thereafter.

Moreover, SEBI has not even claimed that the recommendation was deliberately manipulative and there was no informed basis for the recommendation. Indeed, as the SEBI orders point out, often the scrips recommended were large, well-known companies.

The allegation that in the Pradeep Pandya order the parties carried out heavy trades with an intention to thereby (even without the recommendation) result in an artificial momentum in one direction and this is thus a violation of the Regulations, of course does make sense. It would indeed be a case of pump-and-dump.

CONCLUSION
It would indeed be disturbing for the public to know that hosts of TV shows buy (or sell, as the case may be) first for themselves the scrips they recommend and sell when the price rises when there is a heavy rush to buy following the recommendation. Cynics would, of course, argue that there is no free lunch and indeed their own buying the very scrips they recommend to buy is actually having faith in their own recommendations. But holding that this is illegal and hence punishable is, it is submitted, a flawed view.

The matters are under further investigation. There could be prolonged proceedings resulting in a final order which could then be appealed against at various levels. It would be interesting to see how SEBI and appellate authorities deal with the issues. A wide range of persons, formally and informally, make recommendations about scrips. The final ruling could make such persons change the manner in which they make recommendations, what disclosures they make and perhaps debar certain types of trades.

LIABILITY OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR BOUNCED CHEQUES

INTRODUCTION
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘the Act’) is one of the few provisions which is equally well known both by lawmen and laymen. The section imposes a criminal liability in case of a dishonoured or bounced cheque. In cases where the defendant is a company, there is a tendency on the part of the plaintiff to implicate all the Directors of the company, irrespective of whether they are professional Directors / Independent / Non-Executive Directors. There have been numerous representations from chambers of commerce and professional / trade bodies to the Government that this section should be amended to exempt Independent and Non-Executive Directors who are not connected with the day-to-day management of the company. However, there has been no action on this front. Interestingly, the Act was amended in 2002 to provide that the provisions of section 138 would not apply to a Nominee Director appointed by the Central / State Government or by a financial corporation owned / controlled by the Central / State Government. One wonders why a similar exemption was not provided to other professional Directors.

SECTION 138 OF THE ACT
Let us pause for a moment and examine the impugned section. Section 138 provides that if any cheque is drawn by a person to another person and if the cheque is dishonoured because of insufficient funds in the drawer’s bank account, then such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and / or with a fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque. Earlier, the maximum imprisonment was for one year; however, it was extended to two years by the Amendment Act of 2002.
    
In order to invoke the provisions of section 138, the following three steps are necessary:
(i) the cheque must be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(ii) once the payee is informed by the bank about the dishonour of the cheque, he (the payee) must, within 30 days of such information, make a demand for the payment of the amount of the cheque by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque; and
(iii) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of the said notice. Earlier, the time given to the drawer for responding to the notice was 15 days; but this was extended to 30 days by the Amendment Act of 2002.

A fourth step is specified under section 142 which provides that a complaint must be made to the Court within one month of the date from which the cause of action arises (i.e., the notice period). A rebuttable presumption is drawn by the Act that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
    
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PERSONS IN CHARGE
Section 141 provides that in case the drawer of the cheque is a company then every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible for the company’s conduct of business, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished. However, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, then he would not be liable to the punishment. The section also exempts Government Nominee Directors. Although the section speaks about a company, the explanation to the section extends the same position to a firm, any other body corporate or association of individuals.
    
In almost all cases of cheque-bouncing involving companies, firms, etc., the complainant files a case and implicates all the Directors of the company, including the Independent and Non-Executive Directors. Thus, professionals such as Chartered Accountants, lawyers, etc., who are only involved in broader policy and strategic decisions of the company, or with the Audit Committee or Shareholders’ Grievance Committee and are in no way connected with the day-to-day management of the company, are also made a party to the criminal proceedings.
    
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENTS
The Supreme Court has passed a landmark decision in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89. This decision is by a three-Member Larger Bench in response to a reference application made to it by a two-Member Bench of the Supreme Court. Three very important issues were placed before the Court for its consideration:
(a)  Whether while making a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act must the complaint specifically state that the persons accused were in charge of, or responsible for, the conduct of the business of the company?
(b) Whether merely because a person is a Director of a company would he be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and, therefore, deemed to be guilty of the offence unless he proves to the contrary?
(c) Would the signatory of the cheque and / or the Managing Directors / Joint Managing Director always be responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and hence could be proceeded against?
    
The Court held that since the provision fastens criminal liability, the conditions have to be strictly complied with. The conditions are intended to ensure that a person who is sought to be made vicariously liable for an offence of which the principal accused is the company, had a role to play in relation to the incriminating act and further that such a person should know what is attributed to him to make him liable. Persons who had nothing to do with the matter need not be roped in. A complaint must contain material to enable the Magistrate to make up his mind for issuing the process. A ground should be made out in the complaint for proceeding against the respondent. At the time of issuing of the process the Magistrate is required to see only the allegations in the complaint, and where the allegations in the complaint or the chargesheet do not constitute an offence against a person, the complaint is liable to be dismissed.

The Supreme Court observed that there is nothing in the Act to suggest that simply by being a Director in a company, one is supposed to discharge particular functions on its behalf. It may happen that a Director may not know anything about the day-to-day functioning of the company. He may only attend Board meetings, decide policy matters and guide the course of business of a company. The role of a Director in a company is a question of fact depending on the peculiar facts in each case. There is no universal rule that a Director of a company is in charge of its everyday affairs.

A very fitting comment made by the Court was that ‘…there is no magic as such in a particular word, be it Director, Manager or Secretary.’ What is relevant is the roles assigned to the officers in a company and not the mere use of a particular designation of an officer. Thus, merely mentioning all Directors in a compliant without anything more may not be enough. The accused should be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and a person cannot be subjected to liability of criminal prosecution without it being averred in the complaint that he satisfies those requirements. It is not that all and sundry connected with a company are made liable u/s 141. A person who is in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company would naturally know why the cheque in question was issued and why it was dishonoured. Specific allegations in the complaint would also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know what is the case that is alleged against him. This will enable him to meet the case at the trial.

When it came to the position of a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, the Court took a different view since these are persons in charge of a company and are responsible for the conduct of its business. In respect of such persons, the onus is on them to prove their innocence, i.e., when the offence was committed they had no knowledge of the offence or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

The Supreme Court laid down another important principle, that the liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely, a person not holding any office or designation in a company may also be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company at the relevant time. It once again reiterates that liability depends on the role he plays in the affairs of a company and not on the designation or status. If being a Director or Manager or Secretary was enough to cast criminal liability, the section would have said so. Instead of ‘every person’ the section would have said ‘every Director, Manager or Secretary in a Company is liable’ …etc. The Court held that the Legislature was aware that a case of criminal liability has serious consequences for the accused. Therefore, only persons who can be said to be connected with the commission of a crime at the relevant time have been subjected to action. Thus, even a non-Director can be liable u/s 141.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court answered the queries posed to it as under:

(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint u/s 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of section 141 and has to be made in the complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) Merely being a Director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable u/s 141. A Director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a Director in such cases.
(c) The Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Holders of such positions in a company become liable u/s 141. Merely by virtue of being a Managing Director or Joint Managing Director these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Therefore, they get covered u/s 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the dishonour and will be covered u/s 141.

This very vital decision has been followed by the Supreme Court in cases such as S.K. Alagh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 (5) SCC 662; Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. vs. Datar Switchgear Ltd., 2010 (10) SCC 479; GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust vs. India Infoline Limited, 2013 (4) SCC 505, etc.
    
RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION
This issue was again examined recently by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya vs. M/s Gharrkul Industries Pvt. Ltd., Cr. A, No. 1206/2021, order dated 27th September, 2021. In this case, the respondent filed a complaint u/s 138 with specific averments in the complaint that all the Directors (including those who were not signatories to the bounced cheque) were involved in the day-to-day management / business affairs of the company whose cheque had bounced.

Accordingly, the trial court issued summonses against all the Directors. The Directors contended that they were only Non-Executive Directors and, hence, no complaint could lie against them. Against this argument, the respondent proved that the Form filed with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs showed the Directors as Executive Directors. Hence, the matter was a fit case for a trial which needed to be decided by the Court and the entire process needed to be gone through without quashing the summons at source.

The Court held that the settled principle was that for Directors who were not signatories / not MDs, it was clear that it was necessary to aver in the complaint filed u/s 138 that at the relevant time when the offence was committed the Directors were in charge and were actually responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

The Court further held that this averment assumed more importance because it was the basic and essential averment which persuaded the Magistrate to issue a process against the Director. If this basic averment was missing, the Magistrate was legally justified in not issuing a process. In the case on hand, the Court observed that the complainant had specifically averred that all the Directors were in charge. Further, the MCA Forms also demonstrated the same. Hence, this was an issue on which a trial is appropriate and the complaint cannot be quashed at source.

EPILOGUE
Although this is a judgment under the Negotiable Instruments Act, it has several far-reaching consequences and its ratio descendi can be applied under various other statutes which affix a vicarious criminal liability on Directors in respect of offences committed by a company.
    
One can only hope that taking a cue from this epoch-making Supreme Court judgment, the Government would amend the Negotiable Instruments Act to exempt Independent and Non-Executive Directors. In fact, such an amendment is also welcome in other similar statutes prescribing a criminal liability on the Directors.

FEMA FOCUS

(A) Amendment in Foreign Direct Investment Limits
The Government of India has liberalised its extant FDI policy and made a few changes in the sectoral caps for FDI in the insurance, petroleum and telecom sectors. These changes are explained as under:

Sr. No.

Sector / Activity

% of Equity / FDI Cap

Entry route

Erstwhile limit

New limit

1

Insurance1 (Refer Note 1)

49%

74%

Automatic

2

Petroleum
refining by the Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), without any disinvestment
or dilution of domestic equity in the existing PSUs2

49%

49%
(100% allowed under automatic route where in-principle approval for strategic
disinvestment of a PSU has been granted by the Government)

Automatic

3

Telecom3

Automatic route up to 49% and beyond that under approval route

100% under Automatic route

Automatic

Note 1: The increase in the sectoral cap for insurance companies from 49% to 74% under the automatic route is subject to several conditions mentioned in the Press Note No. 2 (2021 Series) dated 14th June, 2021. Most of the conditions are the same as mentioned in the FDI Policy, 2020; one major change is with respect to constitution of the Board of Directors for insurance companies due to increase in their limit to 74%. Under the new condition, the Indian insurance company that has received foreign direct investment would need to ensure that the following persons are resident Indian citizens:
• Majority of Directors of such insurance companies;
• Majority of its Key Management Persons; and
• at least one among the Chairperson of the Board, the Managing Director and the Chief Executive Officer

______________________________________________________________________________________________

1   Press Note No. 2 (2021
Series), dated 14-6-2021

2   Press Note No. 3 (2021
Series), dated 29-7-2021

3   Press Note No. 4 (2021
Series), dated 06-10-2021

Further, the definition of Key Management Persons is the same as that defined in the guidelines issued by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (‘IRDAI’) on corporate governance for insurers in India.

(B) Amendment in Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations4
Under the existing Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations, 2015 (‘Export Regulations’), the rate of interest payable on advance payment received by the exporter from the buyer was capped at 100 basis points over the LIBOR rate. However, due to impending cessation of LIBOR as a benchmark rate, RBI has now permitted the use of any other applicable benchmark as directed by the RBI instead of the earlier specified only LIBOR rate.

(C) Review of FDI policy on downstream investment made by NRIs on non-repatriation basis5
The Government has now clarified that investments made by NRIs on non-repatriation basis would be deemed to be domestic investments at par with investments made by residents. Accordingly, investments made by an Indian entity which is owned and controlled by an NRI on non-repatriation basis shall not be considered for calculation of indirect foreign investment.

(D) ECB – Relaxation in period for parking of unutilised ECB proceeds in term deposits6
Under the existing ECB Regulations, ECB borrowers are permitted to park unutilised ECB proceeds in term deposits with AD Banks for a maximum period of 12 months cumulatively. However, in view of the Covid situation, RBI has now relaxed this provision and accordingly unutilised ECB proceeds drawn on or before 1st March, 2020 can be parked in term deposits with AD Banks prospectively for an additional period up to 1st March, 2022.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

4   A.P. (Dir. Series 2021-22)
Circular No.13, Dated 28-9-2021

5   Press Note No. 1 (2021
Series), Dated 19-03-2021

6   A.P. (Dir Series) Circular No.
01, Dated 17-6-2021

(E) Appointment of Special Director (Appeals) and his jurisdiction7
The Central Government has changed the jurisdiction of the Regional Special Director (Appeals) for hearing appeals filed against the order passed by the adjudicating authority under FEMA. The Table below prescribes the authority and its jurisdiction for hearing appeals:

Sr. No.

Special Director
(Appeals)

Station

Zone

Sub-zone

Jurisdiction

1.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-23, Delhi

Delhi

Delhi, Chandigarh Jaipur, Jalandhar and Srinagar

Dehradun and Shimla

States of Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal
Pradesh and Union Territory of Chandigarh, Union Territory of Jammu and
Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh, National Capital Territory of Delhi

2.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-20, Kolkata

Kolkata

Kolkata, Guwahati Lucknow and Patna

Bhubaneswar, Allahabad and Ranchi

States of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh,
Sikkim, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Odisha, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar
Pradesh and Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar

3.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-47, Mumbai

Mumbai

Mumbai, Ahmedabad and Panaji

Surat, Nagpur, Indore and Raipur

States of Maharashtra, Goa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Gujarat, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu

4.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-18, Chennai

Chennai

Chennai, Kochi Bengaluru and Hyderabad

Madurai and Kozhikode

States of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana, Union Territory of Puducherry and Union Territory of Lakshadweep

    
(F) Amendment in Master Direction on Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly-Owned Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad8
RBI has clarified that sponsor contribution by an Indian Party (‘IP’) to an Alternative Investment Fund (‘AIF’) set up in Overseas Jurisdictions, including International Financial Services Centres (‘IFSCs’) as per the laws of the host jurisdiction, will be treated as Overseas Direct Investment (ODI). Accordingly, an IP can set up an AIF in overseas jurisdictions, including IFSCs, under the automatic route, provided it complies with relevant regulations of FEMA 120/2004-RB (‘FEMA 120’).

Further, RBI, in consultation with SEBI, has enhanced the limit of overseas investment by Domestic Venture Capital Funds / Alternative Investment Funds registered with SEBI in equity and equity-linked instruments of off-shore Venture Capital Undertakings from the existing USD 750 million to USD 1,500 million.

Also, for investment by way of swap of shares, it is clarified that an Indian company can issue capital instruments to a person resident outside India under the automatic route if the Indian investee company is engaged in a sector which is under automatic route or with prior Government approval, if the Indian investee company is engaged in a sector under Government route as per Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 dated 17th October, 2019, as amended from time to time.

Additionally, RBI has also issued a clarification in para B.22 of the Master Direction on ODI which pertains to opening of a foreign currency account abroad by an Indian Party. RBI has now clarified that in addition to existing conditions, such account can be opened only if the Indian Party is eligible to make ODI under the provisions of FEMA, 120.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
7    Notification S.O. 3958(E) [F. No. K-11022/15/2021-AD.ED], Dated 24-9-2021
8    A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No. 04 dated 12th May, 2021 and SEBI/HO/IMD/DF6

(G) Clarification for the purpose of computation of late submission fee (‘LSF’)
Under the existing FDI provisions, if there is any delay in filing of any specified reports, such delay can be regularised by payment of LSF instead of going through the compounding process. For the purpose of computing LSF, the earlier Master Direction on Reporting specified that the period of delay would be counted from the day after the 30th day from receipt of funds / allotment or transfer of shares and end on the day preceding the day on which the transaction report is received by the RBI. RBI has now made an amendment in the Master Direction on Reporting and clarified that
the period of delay will now be counted beginning from the day after completion of the prescribed time period and end on the day preceding the day on which the transaction report is received by the RBI. The prescribed time period means the time period mentioned in the relevant regulations from the date of receipt of funds / allotment or transfer of shares, as the case may be.

Accordingly, where FDI regulations provide for a period of 60 days for filing of specified forms, such as filing of Form FC-TRS and Form FDI-LLP(II), the delay period for computing LSF will now start from the end of the stipulated time period, i.e., the 60th day.

(H) Liberalised remittance scheme (‘LRS’) for resident individuals – Change in reporting requirement for AD Banks9
AD Banks are required to submit yearly details of applications received and remittances made by resident individual account holders under the LRS route to RBI. This reporting was required to be made on the Online Return Filing System (ORFS) but now the same is required to be made through the XBRL system by accessing the URL https://xbrl.rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl. Further, in case no data is required to be furnished, AD Banks are required to file Nil figures.

(I) Introduction of Foreign Exchange Transactions Electronic Reporting System (FETERS)10
RBI, in order to collect more information on international transactions using credit card / debit card / unified payment interface (UPI), has introduced FETERS with effect from 1st April, 2021. AD Banks are required to submit details of transactions through credit card / debit card / UPI (including sale and purchase of Forex towards international transactions) along with their economic classification (merchant category code – MCC). The reporting needs to be done through a new
return, namely, ‘FETERS-Cards’ on https://bop.rbi.org.in. The frequency of submission is monthly and the same needs to be done within seven working days from the last date of the month for which reporting is to be made.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
9    A.P. (Dir Series 2021-22) Circular No. 7, Dated 7-4-2021
10    A.P. (Dir Series) Circular No.13, dated 25-3-2021

 

INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND QUALIFYING TEST

BACKGROUND
Independent Directors are meant to be the pillar of corporate governance many of whose tenets are now mandatory in specified large / listed companies. In principle, every Director is expected to exercise a level of independence and even act akin to a trustee while discharging his duties. This is expected even from a Promoter or a Working Director. However, there are conflicts of interest, the reality of which cannot be denied. A Promoter Director or a Working Director cannot, in all fairness, be expected to be able to exercise the level of independence than one who is not so. Hence, a category of Directors was needed who had no connection or conflict that could impinge on their independence. Independent Directors, thus, have to pass through a series of negative conditions to ensure that there is no conflict of interest.

However, merely being independent is not sufficient for a person to discharge the onerous responsibility of acting as a Director when the Board of which he is a member has to oversee at a very senior level. Hence, apart from prescribing a series of disqualifications, the law also lays down that he should have certain knowledge that would enable him to discharge his responsibilities. To be precise, it is passing a certain online self-assessment Test in certain areas that are relevant to his functioning as an Independent Director. He is also required to register his details with a databank in a prescribed manner. The provisions relating to such a Test and for the databank have undergone amendments, including one most recently on 19th August, 2021 which gives exemption from the Test for professionals, including Chartered Accountants of certain standing. We discuss this subject in detail in this article.

OVERVIEW OF QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR
There are more disqualifications that make a person ineligible to become an Independent Director than there are qualifications that make him eligible! Being connected with the company or the Promoters in a variety of specified ways makes a person disqualified to be an Independent Director. However, the qualifications / qualities laid down are largely generic and even vague, thus making most people eligible and qualified. Rule 5 of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014 (‘the Rules’) provide that an Independent Director ‘shall possess appropriate skills, experience and knowledge in one or more fields of finance, law, management, sales, marketing, administration, research, corporate governance, technical operations or other disciplines related to the company’s business.’ However, it is up to the Board to assess whether the proposed Independent Director has the required expertise / knowledge. Section 149(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 requires that the Board should assess whether in its opinion he ‘is a person of integrity and possesses relevant expertise and experience.’

However, there is also a specific requirement whereby the Independent Director has to pass an online Test which tests his knowledge on a variety of regulatory and related areas which are relevant for him to perform his functions as a Director.

BROAD SCHEME OF THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO MAINTENANCE OF DATABANK AND PASSING OF ONLINE TEST
There are two sets of requirements linked to each other that an Independent Director has to comply with. Firstly, he has to ensure that his name is entered into a databank maintained in the prescribed manner by the specified Institute. Secondly, he has to pass the specified online self-assessment Test.

Some of these requirements came into force when the provisions relating to Independent Directors were already on the statute. Hence, these provisions had to be introduced giving a transition period for Independent Directors already existing in office. Those aside, the broad scheme is as follows: A person desiring to be appointed as an Independent Director shall, before such appointment, apply to the Institute for inclusion of his name in the databank maintained by it. He may apply even if there is no immediate proposal of his being appointed as such. He also needs to pass the specified online Test within two years of inclusion of his name in such databank. If he does not pass, his name would be removed from the databank. There are categories of persons who are exempted from passing such a Test. Recently, by an amendment made to the Rules on 19th August, 2021, more categories of exempted persons have been added. The overall scheme for this purpose, partly by non-application of mind and partly by a series of amendments, is a little clumsy and also leaves several ambiguous areas.

Note that the requirement of appointment of an Independent Director under the Act applies not only to listed companies but also other categories of public companies, such as those with paid-up capital of at least Rs. 10 crores, turnover of at least Rs. 100 crores, etc.

Requirement of passing Test for being eligible to be appointed as an Independent Director
Rule 6(4) of the Rules requires an Independent Director to pass the specified ‘online proficiency self-assessment Test’ (‘the Test’). This Test has to be passed within two years of inclusion of his name in the databank maintained by the specified Institute. If he does not pass, his name will be removed from the databank.

The Institute in this case is the ‘Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs at Manesar’ as notified under section 150 of the Act.

He has to obtain a score of at least 50% in the aggregate in the Test. He can appear as many times as he wants for the Test, though he should pass it within the time limit of two years from the date on which his name is included in the databank.

Requirement of passing the Test applicable only to Independent Directors
Curiously, the requirement of passing such a Test and even of entering the name in the databank is required only for an Independent Director. Other Directors, who may form half or more of the Board, are not required to pass such Test.

Categories of Independent Directors who are exempt from passing the online Test
While the Test is not exceptionally difficult to pass, it still means that many otherwise highly qualified and / or experienced people would need to take this Test. There may be persons who may be specialists for years or even decades in their respective fields and yet would have to pass the Test. Recognising this, the Rules have been progressively amended and several categories of persons are now exempt from passing it. However, no exemption has been provided from the requirement of entering the name and details in the databank.

The categories that are exempt from passing the Test are described below.

Persons who have been Directors or key managerial personnel of certain types of entities for at least three years are exempted. These entities include listed companies, unlisted public companies with a paid-up capital of at least Rs. 10 crores, bodies corporate incorporated outside India with a paid-up capital of at least US$ 2 million, etc. This exemption will be particularly helpful for Promoters, Working Directors and even key managerial personnel, etc., who have already been associated with listed companies and who would otherwise have been required to take the Test.

Then there are persons who have worked at a senior level with the Government. Those persons who have acted at such a senior level for a period of three years in the pay scale of Director or equivalent or above in any Ministry or Department of the Central or State Government and having experience in specified areas such as commerce, corporate affairs, etc., are exempted from passing the Test.

Similarly exempted are persons who have acted for three years in the payscale of Chief General Manager or above with regulators like SEBI, Reserve Bank of India, the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority, etc., and having experience in handling matters relating to corporate laws, securities laws or economic laws.

Further, persons who have been, for at least ten years, advocates of a high court or in practice as a Chartered Accountant / Company Secretary / Cost Accountant, do not need to pass the Test. This will be helpful to professionals who by virtue of their long standing have adequate knowledge and experience in fields that would be relevant entities requiring the appointment of Independent Directors.

WHAT IF THE DIRECTOR DOES NOT PASS SUCH TEST WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME?
The law requires a person to appear for and pass the Test within the specified time. However, what would happen if he does not bother to appear or he appears and does not pass within the prescribed time? Rule 4 says that ‘his name shall stand removed from the databank of the institute’. The intention of the law seems to be that only those persons who have passed such Test or who pass the Test in the specified time should be appointed as Independent Directors.

However, the clauses are not happily worded. There are no clear answers to questions such as (i) Will it make such person ineligible to be appointed as an Independent Director? (ii) Will he immediately vacate his office as Independent Director? (iii) Will he have to pay any penalty for continuing to act as an Independent Director despite not passing the Test? (iv) What is the role of the company in this regard and whether it is required to remove such Director?

CONCLUSION
By these recent amendments, the law now rightly exempts more categories of persons who have long experience and good knowledge of their respective fields but would still be required to pass the online Test. However, it must be said that the governance of the Board and the regulatory requirements relating to them have over the years become quite complex and elaborate. The exempted categories are generally those having experience / knowledge of specialised areas while governance of the Board can require different skills, knowledge and exposure. Thus, knowledge of various laws and procedures would be helpful and it would be advisable to study the relevant laws. Further, it is necessary to appear for the Test and to pass it to confirm his knowledge. Clearly, the Test is one-time and at present there is no requirement to periodically re-appear for it or undergo some refresher course. But here, too, it may be advisable that even those who have passed the Test earlier may keep updating themselves and even voluntarily appear for it again.

    

PARTNERSHIP FIRM – STAMP DUTY ISSUES

INTRODUCTION
Partnerships are probably one of the oldest forms of doing business. Even today, a majority of the businesses in India are organised as ‘partnerships’. And stamp duty is an important source of revenue for the Maharashtra Government. This article deals with some issues relating to stamp duty which are peculiar to partnerships.

CHARGE OF STAMP DUTY

The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (‘the Act’), which is applicable to the State of Maharashtra, levies stamp duty u/s 3 of the Act which reads as follows:

‘3. Instrument chargeable with duty
Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in Schedule I as the proper duty therefor respectively, that is to say –
(a) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I, which is executed in the State … …
(b) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I, which is executed out of the State, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done in this State and is received in this State:’

From an analysis of section 3, the following points emerge:
(a) The stamp duty is leviable on an instrument and not on a transaction;
(b) The stamp duty is leviable only on those instruments which are mentioned in Schedule I to the Act;
(c) The stamp duty is leviable on the instrument if it is executed in the State of Maharashtra or on the instrument which, though executed outside the State of Maharashtra, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done in the State and is received in the State. Hence, for example, even if the instrument of partnership is executed outside the State of Maharashtra but if the partnership is located in Maharashtra, and the instrument of partnership is received in Maharashtra, then it would be subject to stamp duty under the Act.
(d) The charge of stamp duty is subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I.

INSTRUMENT
The term ‘instrument’ is defined in section 2(1) of the Act to include every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. However, it does not include a bill of exchange, cheque, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt. Stamp duty is leviable only on a written document which falls within the definition of instrument. If there is no instrument, then there is no duty.

Schedule I
Since stamp duty is levied only on the instruments specified in Schedule I, let us look at Schedule I. Only Article 47 of Schedule I specifically provides for levy of stamp duty on a partnership.

The term ‘instrument of partnership’ and the term ‘partnership’ have not been defined in the Act. Hence, the term ‘partnership’ would have to be understood as defined in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Stamp duty on formation of partnership
Stamp duty on formation of partnership is levied under Article 47(1). According to this Article, the stamp duty on the instrument of partnership or the deed of partnership depends upon the capital contribution made by the partners as explained below:
(a) If the capital contribution is made only by way of cash, then the minimum amount of stamp duty is Rs. 500. Where the contribution brought in in cash is in excess of Rs. 50,000, the stamp duty is Rs. 500 for every Rs. 50,000 or part thereof. However, the maximum amount of stamp duty payable is Rs. 5,000. In other words, if the capital ranges from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 5,00,000, the stamp duty would range from Rs. 500 to Rs. 5,000. If the capital contributed in cash is in excess of Rs. 5,00,000, then the stamp duty payable would be the maximum amount of Rs. 5,000.
(b) Where capital contributed by the partners is by way of property other than cash, then the stamp duty payable is that leviable on a conveyance under Article 25.

Article 25 on Conveyance
Since Article 25 is made applicable to an instrument of partnership, the relevant provisions of Article 25 are summarised below:
* It levies a stamp duty on movable property @ 3% of the value of the property;
* It levies a stamp duty on immovable property. The stamp duty depends upon the location of the property, that is, whether it is in a rural area or in an urban area and also upon the class of municipality. The stamp duty for the city of Mumbai is 5%. Further, this duty is based on the stamp duty ready reckoner value of the property.

ADMISSION OF PARTNER OR ADDITIONAL CAPITAL BY PARTNERS
Since admission of a partner requires a fresh instrument of partnership, the question of payment of stamp duty under Article 47 would arise. However, it would be restricted only to the share of contribution brought in by the incoming partner or additional contribution brought in by the existing partners. If the incoming partner does not bring in any capital, stamp duty payable would be the minimum sum of Rs. 500.

If in an existing partnership additional capital is brought in by one or more partners, would it attract stamp duty under Article 47(1)? It is submitted that if a fresh partnership deed is not executed, then stamp duty is not payable, otherwise it would be payable only on the additional capital. The following decisions under the Income-tax Act have held that a registered document is not required when a partner introduces his immovable property into a partnership firm as his capital contribution but a registered document is required when a partner wants to withdraw an immovable property from the firm:

(a)    Abdul Kareemia & Bros. vs. CIT [1984] 145 ITR 442
    (AP)
(b)    CIT vs. S.R. Uppal [1989] 180 ITR 285 (Punj & Har)
(c)    Ram Narain & Bros. vs. CIT [1969] 73 ITR 423 (All)
(d)    Janson vs. CIT [1985] 154 ITR 432 (Kar)
(e)    CIT vs. Palaniappa Enterprises [1984] 150 ITR 237
    (Mad)

RETIREMENT OF A PARTNER OR DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP
Earlier, there was no express provision for levy of stamp duty in the case of retirement of a partner. Now, it is expressly provided for and the stamp duty payable is the same as in the case of dissolution as discussed below.

Where on dissolution of a partnership (or on retirement of a partner), any property is taken as his share by a partner other than a partner who brought in that property as his share of contribution in the partnership, stamp duty is payable as on a conveyance under Article 25, clauses (a) to (d), on the market value of the property so taken by a partner. In any other case, stamp duty of only Rs. 500 is payable.

The implications of these provisions are as follows:
(a) If a partner has introduced certain property in a partnership and on dissolution of the partnership or on his retirement from that partnership he takes that property, then the stamp duty of only Rs. 500 would be payable.
(b) If a partner has introduced certain property in partnership and on dissolution of the partnership or on retirement of another partner from that partnership that partner takes the property, then the stamp duty as is leviable on a conveyance under Article 25 would be payable. Hence, if the property is an immovable property, then the stamp duty would be 5% as explained above. If the property is a movable property, then stamp duty would be payable at the rate of 3%.
(c) If the property acquired by the firm itself has been given to a partner on retirement or dissolution, then stamp duty of only Rs. 500 is payable.

An issue arises in the case of simultaneous admission-cum-retirement of partners done by the same deed: would the stamp duty be payable on the amount brought in by the incoming partner (gross amount) or this amount should be net of the withdrawals? Section 5 of the Act states that if an instrument relates to several distinct matters, it shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of duties with which separate instruments each relating to separate matters would have been chargeable under the Act. Hence, the stamp duty on the instrument of partnership should be payable with reference to the gross amount brought in by the incoming partner and should not be with reference to the net amount. In addition, the stamp duty would be payable also as on a deed of retirement, under Article 47(2).

ARRANGEMENTS RESEMBLING
A PARTNERSHIP
In several cases, the owner and the builder enter into a profit-sharing arrangement, which is quite similar to that under a partnership. An issue in such a case would be whether the arrangement is one of a Development Rights Agreement or a partnership. The stamp duty consequences on the owner and the developer would vary depending on the nature of the arrangement.
    
Section 4 of the Partnership Act defines a partnership as ‘the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all’. Thus, a partnership must contain three elements:
(a) there must be an agreement entered into by all the persons concerned;
(b) the agreement must be to share the profits of a business; and
(c) the business must be carried on by all or any of the persons concerned acting for all.

ELEMENT OF PROFIT-SHARING
Sharing of profits is an essential element of a partnership. The instrument must demonstrate that what is happening in effect is that it is the net profits that are being shared and not the gross returns. Various English decisions such as Lyons vs. Knowles, 1863 3 B&S, 556 have held that a mere agreement to share gross returns of any property would be very little evidence of a partnership between them and there is much less possibility of there being a partnership between them. In certain English cases such as Cox vs. Coulson (1916) 2 KB 177 (lessee of a theatre and manager of a theatrical company), French vs. Styring [1857] Eng R 509 (joint owners of a race horse – expenses jointly borne), it was held that the mere circumstance of their sharing gross returns would be very little evidence of the existence of a partnership.

In Sutton & Co. vs. Gray (1894) 1 QB 285, S, a share broker, entered into an agreement with G, a sub-broker, that G should introduce his clients to S, receive half the brokerage in respect of the transactions of such clients put through on the Exchange by S and should bear the losses in respect thereof; it was held that this did not create a partnership between S and G as no partnership was intended and that the agreement was merely to divide gross returns and not the profits of a common business.

Further, section 6 of the Partnership Act is also relevant. It provides that the sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in the property does not of itself make such persons partners.

The relevant extracts are given below :

‘6. Mode of determining existence of partnership – In determining whether a group of persons is or is not a firm, or whether a person is or is not a partner in a firm, regard shall be had to the real relation between the parties, as shown by all relevant facts taken together.
Explanation I – The sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in that property does not of itself make such persons partners.
Explanation II – the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business, or of a payment contingent upon the earning of profits or varying with the profits earned by a business, does not of itself make him a partner with the persons carrying on the business; and, in particular, the receipt of such share or payment
(a) by lender or money to person engaged or about to engage in any business,
(b) by a servant or agent as remuneration,
(c) by the widow or child of a deceased partner, as annuity, or
(d) by a previous owner or part-owner of the business, as consideration for the sale of the goodwill or share thereof,
does not of itself make the receiver a partner with the persons carrying on the business.’

A relevant case in this respect is the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Vijaya Traders, 218 ITR 83 (Mad). In this case, a construction partnership was entered into between two persons, wherein one partner S contributed land while the other was solely responsible for construction and finance. S was immune to all losses and was given a guaranteed return as her share of profits. The other partner who was the managing partner was to bear all losses. The Court held that the relationship is similar to the Explanation 1 to section 6 and there were good reasons to think that the property assigned to the firm was accepted on the terms of the guaranteed return out of the profits of the firm and she was immune to all losses. The relationship between them was close to that of lessee and lessor and almost constituted a relationship of licensee and licensor and was not a valid partnership.

MUTUAL AGENCY CONCEPT
Mutual agency is also a key condition of a partnership. Each partner is an agent of the firm and of the other partners. The business must be carried on by all or any partner on behalf of all.

What would constitute a mutual agency is a question of fact. For instance, in the case of K.D. Kamath & Co., 82 ITR 680 (SC), the Court held that control and management of the business of the firm can be left by agreement between the parties in the hands of one partner to be exercised on behalf of all the partners.

Consequently, in the case of M.P. Davis, 35 ITR 803 (SC), it was held that the provisions of the deed taken along with the conduct of the parties clearly indicated that it was not the intention of the parties to bring about the relationship of partners but they only intended to continue under the cloak of a partnership the pre-existing and real relationship of master and servant. The sharing of profits or the provision for payment of remuneration contingent upon the making of profits or varying with the profits did not itself create a partnership.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Sanjay Kanubhai Patel, 2004 (6) Bom C.R. 94 had an occasion to directly deal with this issue. The Court after reviewing the Development Rights Agreement held that it is settled law that in order to constitute a valid partnership, three ingredients are essential. There must be a valid agreement between the parties, it must be to share profits of the business and the business must be carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The third ingredient relates to the existence of mutual agency between the parties concerned inter se. The Court held that merely because an agreement provided for profit-sharing it would not constitute a partnership in the absence of mutual agency.

LLP
To incorporate a Limited Liability Partnership, the partners need to execute an LLP agreement. This agreement would lay down the respective capital contributions, whether they would be in the form of cash or property, etc. This Act has now been amended for an express provision of levying stamp duty on an LLP agreement. Article 47 of Schedule I to the Act now even applies to an instrument of an LLP.

AOP Deed
If, instead of a partnership, an association of persons is selected as an entity for the development business, then the above discussion would apply to the same. The law now contains an express provision that stamp duty on joint venture agreements would be also governed by Article 47.

Conversion of firm into company
The conversion of a firm into a company under Chapter XXI of the Companies Act, 2013 / Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956 should not attract any incidence of stamp duty, as there is a statutory vesting of the assets of the firm in the company and there is no transfer. This view is supported by the decision in the cases of Vali Pattabhirama Rao 60 Comp Cases 568 (AP) and Rama Sundari Ray vs. Syamendra Lal Ray, ILR (1947) 2 Cal 1 which state that under Part IX of the Companies Act there is a statutory vesting of the assets of the firm in the company and there is no transfer. Therefore, there is no conveyance and hence there should not be any incidence of stamp duty.

CONCLUSION
From the above discussions it would be clear that a proper structuring of the transaction and a proper drafting of the relevant documents is essential to achieve the desired results.


 

PERSON IN CONTROL (PIC): NEW MODIFICATION IN THE ENTITY

Cementing the path for a notable modification in the manner that the promoters and more than 5,000 publicly-listed corporate entities operate in India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), in a consultation paper has suggested doing away with the concept of promoters and shifting to ‘person in control.’ It has proposed the change to put an end to the present definition of promoter group with an idea to streamline the disclosure encumbrance. Apart from this, SEBI has announced a few other proposals that include (a) decreasing the minimum lock-in period (tenure an investor can hold on to the securities) after an initial public offer (IPO) for promoters’ portion of a minimum 20% from the current three years to one year, and the lock-in period for holding more than 20% from one year to six months; and (b) decreasing the lock-in period for pre-IPO shareholders (those who invest in the entity even before the public issue) from the current one year to six months.

The notion of the promoter is a heritage from history when a corporate body or a group of companies (say, a business house like Tata, Birla and so on) would establish a business unit; for example, a power or steel or fertilizer plant, by pledging some funds of their own and financing the remainder of the project cost by borrowings from banks or financial institutions, on top of raising funds from the capital market. This business unit would remain linked with the establishment – virtually all through the life-span of the project – having a fundamental interest in safeguarding its constant profitability and progress and consistently work for achieving this goal, thereby obtaining the position of what one may label as ‘once a promoter, always a promoter’.

FIRST LESSONS IN INTERPRETATION OF CONTROL
In order to move with the times, SEBI in its Board meeting on 6th August, 2021 gave in-principle assent to move from the concept of promoter to ‘controlling shareholders’ as was recommended in the Consultation Paper dated 11th May, 2021 which dealt with the evaluation of the structure relating to promoters and the promoter group. Although the Consultation Paper has mentioned many other viewpoints and aspects, restructuring the definition of the promoter group rationalising the disclosure needs for group entities is one of the key changes proposed. This seems to be a branding modification in the configuration of the company law.

The Companies Act, 2013 along with the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018 has defined the term promoter ‘as a person who has been named as such in a prospectus or is identified by the company in the annual return in section 92; or a person who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly, as a shareholder, director or otherwise; or a person with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act.’ A person or group of people to be categorised as a ‘promoter group’ should have at least 20% equity share capital.

As per the Consultation Paper issued by SEBI, a controlling shareholder is to be defined as ‘A person who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly whether as a shareholder, Director or otherwise.’ The concept of controlling shareholders would restructure the tactic followed by controllers while levying any compulsions and transferring the responsibility of obeying statutory compulsions over to the controlling shareholders.

According to Regulation 2(1)(e) of the Takeover Regulations, 2011, the term ‘control’ has been defined as the right to appoint the majority of the Directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner. In an identical manner, the term control has been defined u/s 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013 as well.

Though the clarification of the term control given by the SEBI has been swinging, in the case of Subhkam Ventures vs. SEBI, the SEBI pronounced that defensive agreements, namely, positive votes extended to the nominee Director of the investor on issues such as amendment of the articles of association, alterations in share capital, consent of the annual business plan, reorganisation of the investee entity, the nomination of significant officers of the entity, etc., all these qualify as gaining of control by the investor.

However, on appeal the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) opined that control is a power by which, on the one hand, an investor can instruct an entity to do what it wants to do. It was also explained by the SAT that the power by which an investor can prohibit an entity from doing what the latter wants to do cannot by itself qualify as ‘control’. SEBI appealed against the SAT order before the Supreme Court. However, the Court could not pronounce its verdict due to the removal of the case owing to the departure of the investor.

The interpretation of the term ‘control’ came up before the Whole-Time Member (WTM) of SEBI for judgment in the case of Kamat Hotels vs. SEBI. The WTM had to resolve, inter alia, whether there had been a takeover of control by the Noticees just by virtue of entering into a contract under which they were allowed a number of privileges that would activate an open offer under the Takeover Code, 1997. The WTM judged that the determination of ‘control’ because of the existence of positive voting rights in light of the realities of the case was inappropriate. The WTM, with regard to the privileges accessible to the Noticees as per the contract specified as above, made an obiter pronouncement in its order: ‘It is apparent that the scope of the covenants, in general, is to enable the Noticees to exercise certain checks and controls on the existing management for the purpose of protecting their interest as investors rather than formulating policies to run the target company.’

However, since the contract ended on 31st July, 2014 and the terms and clauses that allegedly bestowed ‘control’ on the Noticees under the contract were no longer compulsory on the promoters of Kamat Hotels, therefore, the WTM opted that the determination of ‘control’ was no longer appropriate.

On the basis of earlier precedents, it looks like determination of ‘control’ shoots from several ideologies which when applied to a given group of particulars and situations offers scope for various interpretations. In this background, SEBI had proposed a Consultation Paper in March, 2016 in which the definition of ‘control’ under the Takeover Regulations was considered to be
amended as: ‘(a) the right or entitlement to exercise at least 25% of voting rights of a company irrespective of whether such holdings give de facto control, and / or (b) the right to appoint the majority of the non-Independent Directors of a company’. However, the same has not yet been executed.

IS IT THE RIGHT TIME TO MOVE FROM THE WORD ‘PROMOTER’?
Many will give a quick answer to the above question by saying ‘yes’ since the concept of ‘promoter’ has become stagnant. The concept of promoter embraces all types of casual people, blood relatives who have been suing are also treated as promoters. In short, persons who have no control whatsoever of the organisation are treated as promoters. This gives an incorrect feeling to the investors of the organisation.

SEBI should make the concept smarter, fluid and accurate rather than completely abolishing the responsibility of the leading shareholder. This can be done by employing global yardsticks. Expressions like a person acting in concert or persons in control are understood throughout the world and these will surely describe who is overseeing the entity. The minority shareholder will be better off if this modification is implemented. But it is clear that the concept of promoter has not gone away and the only change is in the terminology which has moved on from ‘promoter’ to ‘person in control’. This is a step forward because once a Promoter need not always be a Promoter.

SEBI CHASING CHANGING SCENARIO
During the previous decade, the investor scene in India experienced a radical deviation whereby a new class of shareholders has arisen as leading investors, namely, private equity funds (PEF), alternate investment funds (AIFs), mutual funds, etc. Due to this the shareholding of the promoters has come down and total promoters’ holdings in the prominent 500 listed entities by market value is on a downhill journey since 2009 when it had topped at 58%.

The new class of shareholders invests in new-age and tech businesses (although unlisted) by means of what is termed as ‘control deals’ even prior to these going in for an initial public offer (IPO) and continue to retain shares post-listing, many times being the biggest public shareholders, holding special privileges such as the right to appoint Directors.

Although the actual ‘ownership’ and ‘controlling rights’ of a company have transferred to PEFs or AIFs, the establishment that introduced the business firm continues to possess power (notwithstanding its shareholding having been reduced to a minority) as the current regulation lists it as a promoter. The market watchdog needs to fix this glitch by changing the emphasis from promoters to controlling shareholders, or the so-called ‘person in control’ (PIC). Nonetheless, it also needs to be asked whether the new class is indeed keen to take control?

These organisations signify a collection of tens of thousands of investors. However, in the case of mutual funds these run into lakhs of investors. They gather money from individual investors and many of them are high net-worth individuals and invest in companies with the prime aim of producing handsome returns. In a basic way they are financial investors, would stay invested in an entity as long as the target is achieved, otherwise they will depart; on the other hand, the role of a PIC necessitates that he stay invested over the long term. The question is, does SEBI really expect promoters to play the role of PICs.

From its suggestions on minimum lock-in period, it does not seem to be so. Post an IPO, the SEBI allows the promoter to discard his or her portion of a minimum of 20% within one year against the existing three years. Besides, holding of more than 20% can be discarded in six months instead of one year.

It is even contemplating to entirely get rid of the condition of minimum shareholding for a person to qualify as a promoter. If a unit, for instance, PEF, can dispose of its shareholding obtained before its IPO (even though big enough to give it the position of a promoter) within one year of the public issue or the condition of minimum shareholding itself is relinquished, how can it be imagined to be fair to the role of a ‘person in control’?

Irrationally, the watchdog does not even want the public to recognise the individuality of investors behind the issuer. As per the relaxed disclosure obligations, the issuer need not furnish financial statements of group entities associated with the one being listed; it need not name financial investors as promoters in IPOs; and it need not specify precise corporate entities which are part and parcel of the promoter group. How can an entity whose basis of funding is masked in privacy infuse confidence?

Today, many of the listed companies are professionally administered and much of the activity is positioned around the Board of Directors, including several Independent Directors. It also includes the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) supported by numerous teams, including the audit committee, remuneration committee, etc., for crystal-clear operations. Could the PIC role be delegated to the CEO or the BoD? The answer to this is not in the affirmative.

The members of the Board, including the CEO, are professionals. They are nominated and obtain their power from the shareholders even though by majority vote or any other method approved by them. If the majority shareholders vacate, then it is doubtful that the current CEO or BoD will continue. Further, if the former leaves within a short period, which is highly possible as per the new regulations suggested by the market regulator, then the case for the CEO or BoD serving as PIC becomes less likely. When the person who established the entity is reduced to a minority and the new group of shareholders who have majority share are reluctant to sneak into the former’s shoes, it will be tantamount to impelling the listed entity into a position of a ‘ship without a commander’.

The market watchdog should re-look at its suggestions keeping two essential principles in mind. These are, (i) the voting or controlling power of an investor must be proportional to his investment or the shares held by him, and (ii) solidity of the management. In the present situation, where the majority of shareholding is entrusted in PEFs or AIFs, they should be made accountable to accept the role of a PIC and remain invested in the entity over a reasonably long period. The market regulator must not decrease the lock-in period. It should also not abandon the prerequisite of minimum shareholding for an entity to remain in control of the firm and demand complete clarity on funding bases. Amazingly, the complete workout of the transition from promoters to controlling shareholders will prove to be pointless unless the SEBI effectively tackles the elephant in the room, viz., the definition of ‘control’.

NEW MODIFICATION IN A NUTSHELL

SEBI has recommended decreasing the minimum lock-in periods post a public issue for promoters and pre-IPO shareholders.

The consultation paper suggested a three-year transition period for moving from the promoter to the person in control concept.

If the object of the issue involves an offer for sale or financing other than for capital expenditure for a project, then the minimum promoters’ contribution of 20% should be locked in for one year from the date of allotment in the IPO.

The promoters’ holding in excess of minimum promoters’ contribution shall be locked in for a period of six months as opposed to the existing requirement of one year from the date of allotment in the IPO.

Control Person means any person that holds a sufficient number of any of the securities of an issuer so as to affect materially the control of that issuer, or that holds more than 20% of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer.

Control Person means any individual who has a Control relationship with the Fund or is an investment adviser of the Fund.

Control Person means a Director or executive officer of a licensee or a person who has the authority to participate in the direction, directly or indirectly, through one or more other persons, of the management or policies of a licensee.

The changes in the nature of ownership could lead to situations where the persons with no controlling rights and minority shareholding continue to be classified as promoters.

It will lighten the disclosure burden for firms.

The regulator has proposed to eliminate the present definition of promoter group because it would rationalise the disclosure burden.

It is necessitated by the changing investor landscape in India where concentration of ownership and controlling rights do not vest completely in the hands of the promoters or the promoter group.

This is because of the emergence of new shareholders such as private equity and institutional investors.

The investor focus on the quality of board and management has increased, thereby reducing the relevance of the concept of promoter.

It also suggested doing away with the current definition of promoter group since it focuses on capturing holdings by a common group of individuals.

It often results in capturing unrelated companies with common financial investors.

SUPREME COURT FORMULATES GUIDELINES FOR COMPOUNDING; HOLDS THAT CONSENT OF SEBI NOT REQUIRED

BACKGROUND
An interesting feature of the SEBI Act, 1992 is that one can potentially be prosecuted u/s 24 for violating any provision of the Act and even any of the rules and regulations made thereunder. Further, the punishment can be in the form of imprisonment for as long as ten years, or a fine of up to Rs. 25 crores. Non-payment of the penalty imposed is also punished stringently, with a minimum prison term of one month and a maximum of ten years; or with a fine of Rs. 25 crores. This is quite unlike other laws under which only specified serious violations can be prosecuted as offences. In a sense, the provisions of the SEBI Act, at least on paper, sound more stringent than even the Indian Penal Code that has varying punishments for different offences.

Fortunately, prosecution is not generally initiated indiscriminately under the SEBI Act. However, the fear of being prosecuted remains. The question that arises is how does a person, who is willing to make amends for the wrong he has committed get relief from prosecution? For this purpose, the SEBI Act has enabling provisions for compounding of offences. Section 24A provides that offences, other than those punishable with imprisonment only or with both imprisonment and fine, can be compounded by the Securities Appellate Tribunal or the court before which the proceedings are pending.

Considering that there is no violation in the Act that is punishable by imprisonment only or by both imprisonment and fine, the conclusion is that all offences are compoundable and thus any prosecution proceeding can be compounded (see later herein for certain remarks of the Supreme Court). This is because there is a common provision for prosecution u/s 24, unlike other laws that have separate punishments prescribed for different violations.

The question that came up before the Supreme Court in Prakash Gupta vs. SEBI (order dated 23rd July, 2021, [2021] 128 taxmann.com 362 [SC]) was whether, for compounding an offence by a Court / SAT, the consent of SEBI is a prerequisite? In other words, if SEBI vetoes the application for compounding and does not grant consent, can the offence still be compounded? The Supreme Court, while dealing with this question, ruled on several aspects and thereafter even laid down guidelines for compounding. These were made, the Court said, in the absence of explicit provisions in the law which gap it attempted to fill. Thus, the ruling has relevance on several aspects of the subject.

PROVISIONS OF LAW
As stated earlier, section 24A of the SEBI Act enables compounding of offences and the authority for this purpose is the SAT or the court before which the proceedings are pending. SEBI has notified settlement regulations which deal with settlement of civil proceedings and compounding of offences. The Regulations provide that the principles as applicable for settlement of civil proceedings would also apply for compounding. General principles have been laid down for three categories of proceedings. In respect of the offence of non-payment of penalty, such amount of penalty with interest and legal charges as deemed appropriate by SEBI would be proposed before the court. Generally, the amount for compounding the offence would be as per the guidelines laid down in the Schedule to the Regulations. If the application for compounding is made after framing of charges by the court, then this amount would be increased by 25%, apart from legal charges and other terms as approved by the whole-time panel of SEBI as set up under the Regulations.

However, there are many areas where there is silence or lack of clarity. Is there an inherent right to compounding? Can all offences be compounded as a matter of right? If there are some offences which cannot be compounded, which are those and who decides this? Whether such a decision can be questioned and, if so, on what grounds?

If the person rights the wrong, compensates the party that is wronged, etc., does compounding become a matter of right? In this context, is compounding of offences under the SEBI Act at par with compounding with, say, under the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonouring of cheques?

Finally, is the consent of SEBI necessary for compounding or is it solely at the discretion of the court to compound the offence? What is the relevance and weight of the views of SEBI in the matter?

These are some of the issues discussed in the decision.

IS THE OFFENCE OF NON-PAYMENT OF PENALTY COMPOUNDABLE?
Section 24(2) treats non-payment of penalty levied under the Act as an offence over and above the violation in respect of which the penalty is levied. The question is whether this offence is compoundable. In principle, considering that the offences of violation of the provisions of the Act / Regulations / Rules are compoundable, the answer should have been yes. However, the Court dwelt on what seem to be ambiguous words used in the provision. It appeared to the Court that since there was a minimum prison term of one month provided, one view could be that imprisonment is mandatory. Section 24 says that an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine cannot be compounded. In which case, as per this view, the offence of non-payment of penalty cannot be compounded. However, since this specific issue was not before the Court, it did not give a final ruling on it and kept it for consideration at a future date. In the author’s opinion, considering the framework not only of the section but also of the settlement regulations, the better view should be that non-payment of penalty should also be compoundable.

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES
In passing, and as a matter of academic interest, it is interesting to note that originally compounding itself was an offence and continues to be so to a certain extent. Compounding generally meant a person accepts consideration for not prosecuting an offence. This could be even by a police officer, or others in authority, and could thus be a bribe. However, the position has changed over time. There were less grave situations where it may not be worth the effort to prosecute a person. For offences such as under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the intention may be to make dishonouring of cheque an offence a means to make such a person honour the cheque. Hence, if the party is willing to pay off its dues, the court may generally be inclined to allow compounding. There may also be situations where the offence is not very grave, the offender may have realised his wrong and regretted it, and even the injured person may be willing to let the matter go (perhaps also on receipt of some compensation). Hence, compounding of offences could be lawfully done if the law provided for it. Different laws have provided for compounding in different ways and hence the question was how should the provisions of the SEBI Act be interpreted.

Serious wrongs that cannot be compounded
The Court noted that there may be offences that are not cured merely by compensating the injured person or even if the injured person is not interested in pursuing the proceedings. There are wrongs that are public in nature and have wider implications. The yardstick applied cannot be a single and uniform one.

WHETHER CONSENT OF SEBI IS NECESSARY FOR COMPOUNDING
In the matter before the Court, the appellant had applied for compounding before a lower court. When the views of SEBI were sought, SEBI refused to grant consent to such compounding and the Additional Sessions Judge before whom the proceedings were initiated thus rejected the application. The appellant approached the High Court which, citing earlier precedents, affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court held that the wording of section 24A is clear. There is no mandatory requirement of consent of SEBI for the Court to allow compounding. The Court would consider the views of SEBI but the decision of whether or not to compound the offence would rest with the Court. The important question, however, is what weight should the Court assign to the views of SEBI.

VIEWS OF SEBI ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW COMPOUNDING
The Court elaborately discussed the object of the SEBI Act and the role of SEBI as an expert body in the securities markets. It noted that SEBI has a duty to protect the interests of investors and generally the capital market. It also reviewed the mechanism laid down by SEBI for consideration of applications for compounding and also the independent High-Powered Advisory Committee (‘HPAC’) set up to provide advice on the matter. The Court held that the views of SEBI on whether or not compounding should be allowed should be respected and followed unless the view taken can be shown to be arbitrary or mala fide.

The Court also considered the aspects that SEBI takes into account and as laid down in the guidelines issued by SEBI. In particular, the matters in respect of which compounding / settlement would ordinarily not be allowed were noted.
All in all, the Court held that while the consent of SEBI is not a prerequisite, the views / recommendations of SEBI would ordinarily be followed.
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE COURT FOR CONSIDERING COMPOUNDING APPLICATIONS
As if to not only give the last word but provide a comprehensive framework for compounding, the Court laid down specific guidelines that would effectively fill the gap existing today. The Supreme Court laid down four guidelines that the Court / SAT should consider while disposing of applications for compounding:
a. The factors enumerated by SEBI in its Circular of 20th April, 2007 and accompanying FAQs should be considered, though not as exhaustive.
b. The application for compounding has to be made to SEBI which places the same before the HPAC. The recommendation of HPAC should be placed before the Court / SAT which should give due deference to such opinion. It should differ if it has cogent reasons and only if the reasons provided by SEBI / HPAC are mala fide or manifestly arbitrary.
c. The offences under the SEBI Act are not comparable with other laws where restitution of the injured party is a strong ground for allowing compounding. Most offences under the SEBI Act are of a public character and restitution may not always be enough. In any case, for this purpose the opinion of SEBI should be relied upon.
d. Finally, and this point is an extension of the third one, the Court / SAT should consider whether the offence is private or public in nature. If of a public nature, it would affect the public at large. Such offences should not be compounded even if restitution has taken place.
CONCLUSION

Not only has the Supreme Court given a categorical ruling on the role of SEBI and its views on compounding, it has also given a detailed framework on how compounding applications should be considered and what principles and considerations ought to be followed in the matter. The Court applied these principles also to the case before it and held that the matter did not deserve to be compounded, considering the facts and also the views of SEBI. With a fairly comprehensive framework laid down including the weight to be assigned to the opinion of SEBI, one can trust now that applications for compounding will be more transparent and reason-based.

GAMING NOT GAMBLING

INTRODUCTION
While the difference in the spelling of gaming and gambling is only of two letters, there is a world of difference between the two in reality. India’s online gaming market is growing by leaps and bounds and there is keen interest in setting up gaming ventures and investing in / acquiring Indian gaming companies. In India, gaming is a permissible activity, but gambling is either prohibited or heavily regulated. Some recent court decisions have helped clear the regulatory shroud covering gaming activities.

LEGAL ECOSYSTEM


Let us first understand the various laws which deal with this subject:
(a) Under the Constitution of India, the Union Government is empowered to make laws regulating the conduct of lotteries.
(b) Under the Constitution, the State Governments have been given the responsibility of authorising / conducting lotteries and making laws on betting and gambling.
(c) Hence, we must look at the Acts of each of the 28 States and seven Union Territories regarding gambling / gaming.
(d) The following are the various laws which regulate / restrict / prohibit gambling in India:

Public Gambling Act, 1867: This Central Legislation provides for the punishment of public gambling in certain parts of India. It is not applicable in Maharashtra and other States which have repealed its application.
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887: It applies in Maharashtra and regulates gaming in the State.
Other State legislations: Acts of other States, such as the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955, the Madras Gambling Act, etc., are more or less similar to the Public Gaming Act, 1867 as the object of these Acts is to ban / restrict gambling. The State Acts repeal the applicability of the Public Gambling Act in their respective States.

* Section 294-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section provides for punishment for keeping a lottery office without the authorisation of the State Government. Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: This Section prevents any person from bringing a suit for recovery of any winnings won by way of a ‘wager.’
* The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998: This Central Legislation lays down guidelines and restrictions on conducting lotteries.

* The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: It requires maintenance of certain records by entities engaged in gambling.

Some States which expressly permit gambling are

* Sikkim: The Sikkim Casino Games (Control and Tax Rules), 2002 permits setting up of casinos in Sikkim.

* The Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Act, 2008, along with the Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Rules, 2009 provides for licences to set up online gaming websites (for gambling and also betting on games like cricket, football, tennis, etc.) with the servers based in Sikkim. Other than this law, India does not have any specific laws targeting online gambling or gaming.

* Goa: An amendment to the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976 provides for casinos to be set up only at five star hotels or offshore vessels with permission. This is the reason Goa has floating casinos or casinos in five star hotels.

* West Bengal: The West Bengal Prize Competition and Gambling Act, 1957 excludes ‘skill-based’ card games like poker, bridge, rummy and nap from its operation. Thus, in West Bengal a game of poker is expressly excluded from the definition of gambling.

* Nagaland: The Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 regulates online games of skill in the State of Nagaland.

PUBLIC GAMBLING ACT
Since this is a Central Act on which several State Acts have been based, we may examine this Act. Section 1 of this Act has laid down three conditions all of which must be fulfilled in order that a place is treated as a common gaming house:
(a) It must be a house, walled enclosure, room or place;
(b) cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are kept in such place; and
(c) these instruments are used for profit or gain of the occupier whether by way of charging for the instruments or for the place.

It is a moot point whether these definitions can even be extended to online gaming ventures.

Section 3 of the Act levies a penalty for owning or keeping or having charge of a common gaming house. The penalty is a fine not exceeding Rs. 200 or imprisonment for any term up to three months. It may be noted that the public gaming house concept can even be extended to a private residence of a person if gambling activities are carried on in such a place. Thus, casual gambling at a house party may be treated, if all the conditions are fulfilled, as gambling and the owner of the house may be prosecuted.

Exception u/s 12: Even if all the above-mentioned three conditions are fulfilled, if it is a game of mere skill, the penal provisions do not apply. What is a game of skill is a question of fact and has been the subject matter of great debate. In Chamarbaugwalla vs. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, it was held that competitions which involve substantial skill are not gambling activities.

In State of AP vs. K. Satyanarayana, 1968 AIR 825 (SC), the Court analysed whether a game of rummy was a game of skill and held as follows:
• Rummy is not a game of mere chance like three cards;
• It requires considerable skill as fall of cards (is) to be memorised;
• The skill lies in holding and discarding cards;
• It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill;
• Chance is a factor but not the major factor.

The Court held that rummy is not a game of chance but a game of skill.

In Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs. State of TN, 1996 2 SCC 226, the Court analysed whether betting on horses is a game of chance or mere skill:
• Gambling is payment of a price for a chance to win. Gaming may be of skill alone or both skill and chance;
• In a game of skill chance cannot be entirely eliminated but it depends upon the superior knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of the players;
• A game of chance is one in which chance predominates over the element of skill, and a game of skill is one in which the element of skill dominates over the chance element;
• It is the dominant element which determines the game’s character;
• In horse-racing, the person betting is supposed to have full knowledge of the horse, jockey, trainer, owner, turf, race system, etc.;
• Horses are given specialised training;
• Books are printed giving details of the above, which are studied.

Hence, betting on horse-racing is a game of skill since skill dominates over chance.

In Bimalendu De vs. UOI, AIR 2001 Cal 30, it was held that Kaun Banega Carodpati, which was aired on TV channels, was not a game of chance but a game of skill. Elements of gambling, i.e., wagering and betting, were missing from this game. Only a player’s skill was tested. He did not have to pay or put any stake in the hope of a prize.

In M.J. Sivani vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770, video games parlours were held to be common gaming houses. Video games are associated with stakes of money or money’s worth on the result of a game, be it a game of pure chance or of mixed skill or chance. For a commoner it is difficult to play a video game with skill. Hence, they are not a game of mere skill.

In this respect, the Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 defines games of skill to include all such games where there is preponderance of skill over chance, including where the skill relates to strategising the manner of placing wagers or placing bets or where the skill lies in team selection or selection of virtual stocks based on analyses or where the skill relates to the manner in which the moves are made, whether through deployment of physical or mental skill and acumen. It further states that games of skill may be (a) card-based, (b) action / virtual sports / adventure / mystery, and (c) calculation / strategy / quiz-based. This is one of the first examples of a statutory definition of what constitutes a game of skill. ‘Gambling’, on the other hand, has been defined by this Act to mean and include wagering or betting on games of chance (meaning all such games where there is a preponderance of chance over skill) but does not include betting or wagering on games of skill.

Thus, the facts and circumstances of each game would have to be examined as to whether it falls within the domain of mere skill and hence is a game, or is it more a game of chance and hence gambling.

MAHARASHTRA PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT, 1887
This Act is similar in operation to the Public Gambling Act but has some differences. It defines the term ‘gaming’ to include wagering or betting except betting or wagering on horse races and dog races in certain cases.

‘Instruments of gaming’ are defined to include any article used as a subject matter of gaming or any document used as a register or record for evidence of gaming / proceeds of gaming / winnings or prizes of gaming.

The definition of common gaming house includes places where the following activities take place:
• Betting on rainfall;
• Betting on prices of cotton, opium or other commodities;
• Betting on stock market prices;
• Betting on cards.

The imprisonment under this Act extends up to two years and the fine is also higher. Police officers have been given substantial powers to search and seize and arrest under this Act.

INDIAN PENAL CODE
Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever keeps any office or place for drawing any lottery not authorised by the Government is punishable with a fine of up to Rs. 1,000. What is a lottery has not been defined. Courts have held that it includes competitions in which prizes are decided by mere chance. However, if the game requires skill then it is not a lottery. A newspaper contained an advertisement of a coupon competition which included coupons to be filled by the newspaper buyers with names of horses selected by them as likely to finish 1st, 2nd or 3rd in a race. The Court held that the game was one of skill since filling up the names of the horses required specialised knowledge about the horses and some element of skill – Stoddart vs. Sagar (1895) 2 QB 474.

Further, it must verify and maintain the records of the identity of all its clients / customers.

RECENT MADRAS HIGH COURT DECISION ON ONLINE RUMMY / POKER
In the recent case of Junglee Games India vs. State of Tamil Nadu, WP No. 18022/2020, the Madras High Court had occasion to consider whether an amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 which ended up banning online rummy / poker was unconstitutional. The amended statute prohibited all forms of games being conducted in cyberspace, irrespective of whether the game involved being a game of mere skill, whether such game was played for a wager, bet, money or other stakes. The High Court held that gambling is often equated with gaming and the activity involved chance to such a predominant extent that the element of skill that may also have been involved could not control the outcome. A game of skill, on the other hand, might not necessarily be such an activity where skill must always prevail; however, it would suffice for an activity to be regarded as a game of skill if, ordinarily, the exercise of skill could control the chance element involved in the activity such that the better skilled would prevail more often than not. It held that the wording of the amending Act was so crass and overbearing that it smacked of unreasonableness in its every clause and could be seen to be manifestly arbitrary.

Whatever may have been the pious intention of the Legislature, the reading of the impugned statute and how it might operate amounted to the baby being thrown out with the bath. It even held that broadly speaking, games and sporting activities in the physical form could not be equated with games conducted in virtual mode or in cyberspace. However, when it came to card games or board games such as chess or scrabble, there was no distinction between the skill involved in the physical form of the activity or in the virtual form. The Court held that such distinction was completely lost in the amending Act as all games were outlawed if played for a stake or for any prize.

It came out with a very interesting take on the difference – ‘Seen from the betting perspective, if the odds favouring an outcome are guided more by skill than by chance, it would be a game of skill. The chance element can never be completely eliminated for it is the chance component that makes gambling exciting and it is the possibility of the perchance result that fuels gambling.’

The Bench categorically held that there appeared to be a little doubt that both rummy and poker were games of skill as they involved considerable memory, working out of percentages, the ability to follow the cards on the table and constantly adjust to the changing possibilities of the unseen cards. The Madras High Court laid down the principle that the betting that a State can legislate on has to be the betting pertaining to gambling; ergo, betting only on games of chance. At any rate, even otherwise, the judgments in the cases of Chamarbaugwalla (Supra) and K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra) also instruct that the concept of betting in the Constitution cannot cover games of skill. It concluded that the amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 was capricious, irrational and without an adequate determining principle such that it was excessive and disproportionate.

RECENT DECISION ON FANTASY SPORTS LEAGUES
One of the biggest revolutions in the gaming industry has been that of Online Fantasy Sports Leagues, be it in cricket, football, hockey, etc. Time and again there have been writs filed before the High Courts to decree these as games of chance.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Varun Gumber vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2017 Cri LJ 3827 and the Order dated 15th September, 2017 passed by the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid judgment, have held that the fantasy games of Dream 11 were games of mere skill and their business has protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, i.e., freedom to carry out trade / vocation / business of one’s choice.

In Gurdeep Singh Sachar vs. Union of India, Cr. PIL Stamp No. 22/2019, the Bombay High Court held that success in Dream 11’s fantasy sports depended upon a user’s exercise of skill based on superior knowledge, judgement and attention, and the result thereof was not dependent on the winning or losing of a particular team in the real world game on any particular day. It was undoubtedly a game of skill and not a game of chance. The attempt to reopen the issues decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in respect of the same online gaming activities, which are backed by a judgment of the three-judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra), that, too, after dismissal of the SLP by the Apex Court, was wholly misconceived. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP [SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 43346 of 2019] against this decision inasmuch as it related to whether or not it involved gambling. Again, on 31st January, 2020, the Supreme Court reiterated on an application seeking clarification of its earlier Order, that it does not want to revisit the issue as to whether gambling is or is not involved.

In the cases of Ravindra Singh Chaudhary vs. Union of India, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20779/2019 and Chandresh Sankhla vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2020 SCC Online Raj 264, the Rajasthan High Court dismissed a petition against Dream11. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in D. Siluvai Venance vs. State, Criminal O.P. (MD) No.6568/2020 has passed a similar order. Recently, the Supreme Court in Avinash Mehrotra vs. State of Rajasthan, SLP (Civil) Diary No(s). 18478/2020, dismissed an SLP against the Rajasthan High Court Order in the Ravindra Singh case (Supra). It held that the matter was no longer res integra as SLPs have come up from the Punjab & Haryana and the Bombay High Courts and have been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

All of the above judgments analysed what was a fantasy league. They held that any fantasy sports game was a game which occurred over a pre-determined number of rounds (which may extend from a single match / sporting event to an entire league or series) in which participating users selected, built and acted as managers / selectors of their virtual team. The drafting of a virtual team involved the exercise of considerable skill as the user had to first assess the relative worth of each athlete / sportsperson as against all athletes / sportspersons available for selection. The user had to study the rules and make evaluations of the athlete’s strengths and weaknesses based on these rules. Users engaged in participating in fantasy sports read and understood the rules of the game and made their assessment of athletes and the selection of athletes in their virtual team on the basis of the anticipated statistics of their selection.

It was held that the element of skill and the predominant influence on the outcome of the fantasy league was more than any other incidents and, therefore, they were games of ‘mere skill’ and not falling within the activity of gambling. It did not involve risking money or playing stakes on the result of a game or an event, hence, the same did not amount to gambling / betting. It was even held that the fantasy sports formats were globally recognised as a great tool for fan engagement as they provided a platform to sports lovers to engage in their favourite sport along with their friends and family. This legitimate business activity having protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution contributed to Government Revenue not only vide GST and income tax payments, but also by contributing to increased viewership and higher sports fan engagement, thereby simultaneously promoting even the real world games.

FEMA
The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 and the Consolidated FDI Policy state that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of any sort is prohibited in gambling and betting, including casinos. Thus, no FDI is allowed in any gambling ventures, whether online or offline. However, if the ventures are gaming ventures, then there are no sectoral caps or conditions for the FDI and there are no restrictions for foreign technology collaboration agreements. And, 100% FDI is allowable in gaming ventures, online and offline. Thus, one comes back to the million-dollar question – is the venture one of gambling or gaming? The tests explained above would be applicable even to determine whether FDI is permissible in the venture.

Similar tests may also be used under the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 for overseas direct investments in a foreign company. If it is an online gaming company, then it would constitute a bona fide business activity and foreign investment should be permissible.

CONCLUSION
Recent judicial thinking seems to be changing along with the times. When one looks at the Court decisions delivered on new topics such as cryptocurrencies, fantasy sports, online poker, etc., it is clear that the trend is to allow businesses in these sunrise areas. If the Legislature also moves at the same speed and in the same direction, we would have a wonderful environment which could spawn exciting businesses!

 

TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PROMOTER

BACKGROUND
As the securities laws increasingly seek to lay down sound principles of corporate governance and also push towards greater professionalisation of company management, a question has arisen whether the unique concept of promoters in securities and corporate laws needs a close relook. So much so, that even SEBI has realised this and is considering whether this concept should be dropped or re-conceptualised.

In India, promoters have been given a central role, focus and obligations in listed companies owing to historical and other reasons. While on their own they have hardly any special rights, they have multiple and even onerous responsibilities and it is increasingly felt that they need to be reconsidered considering the changing reality. The present law is so stringent that even reclassification of a person from promoter to non-promoter is a lengthy, difficult and complicated affair. It is almost as if being a promoter is a one-way street, i.e., till death do you part!

In a recent major proposed public issue, the question came up yet again about who should be classified as a promoter and why would this status be so keenly shunned. It was reported that certain top investors / management did not desire to be termed as ‘promoters’. The question is when and how is a person deemed to be a promoter and when can he claim that he is no longer a promoter.

HOW DID THE CONCEPT OF PROMOTER COME INTO BEING?

To appreciate this, we need to understand the term and then consider how various laws define and treat promoters. Promoters, traditionally, are those enterprising persons who conceive a business idea, set up a company and seek investors to finance the business. They would run the business and later even hand it over to another management. The investors would participate in the ownership / profits / appreciation. Thus, they could be seen as persons with ideas but without the financial means to implement them. They need investors who are willing to share the risk for what they expect to be substantial rewards, without usually participating in the day-to-day management of the company.

In western countries, promoters / management typically hold a small share in the capital. Their returns would come as appreciation of such holding and remuneration for running the company. In India, traditionally, promoters are families who typically own a substantial part, usually 50% or more, of the equity. Thus, they have very substantial control in the company by virtue of their own investment. As we will see, even the law expects them to have a significant own stake, or what is termed nowadays as ‘skin in the game’. Their control over the company would usually continue through succeeding generations. Since the promoter family would have dominant control, the challenge for the regulator is more of balancing the interests of these family promoters with those of the public / minority shareholders.

Thus, a multitude of provisions under the Companies Act, 2013 and various SEBI regulations have focused on identifying these promoters and placing various responsibilities and liabilities on them.

THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF PROMOTERS AND OBLIGATIONS ON THEM

To begin with, the term is defined very widely. Persons who are in ‘control’ of the company are deemed to be promoters. The term ‘control’ is also given a very wide definition. While majority shareholding is usually enough to give them ‘control’, even certain special rights under agreements are deemed to be ‘control’. Once such promoters are identified by these criteria, specified relatives and entities connected with them in the specified manner are also deemed by law to be part of the promoter group. The list of such persons is usually quite long.

The promoters are required to have a minimum significant percentage of capital after a public issue. Thus, the public issue cannot be a means of their exit. Further, their shareholding is subject to a lock-in for one to three years. Extensive disclosures are required about the history and background of each of the promoters. They have to make regular disclosures of their shareholding and changes or charges (such as pledge, etc.) made thereon.

Interestingly, they are also the fulcrum around which the independence of directors is tested. Any person who is connected with them in any of the specified ways is deemed to be not independent. This is again an extension of the presumption that the promoters are in control and hence if one is connected with them, one loses one’s independence.

Importantly, if anything goes wrong in the company, they could be very likely seen as the primary suspects for blame and punishment. This, again, is linked with their being presumed to be in control. Of course, in many situations those who are not directly involved in the day-to-day management may not be presumed to be liable.

Deeming as promoters starts with a public issue
One facet of this subject, the complications of which we will discuss later, is that the deeming of persons / group(s) as promoters begins with a public issue under securities laws. This category becomes defined and even frozen at this stage and the persons who form part of this group are identified. Unlike being in active management, being a promoter is not necessarily a choice. Being a relative or connected in one of the many specified ways is sufficient for a person to be deemed a promoter.

EXITING FROM THE PROMOTER GROUP

While it is easy to become a promoter, often even without a choice, the difficulty is in exiting. One cannot just ‘resign’ as a promoter or exit the group through a mere declaration. Even severing of financial or other ties may not always help one to get out of the category.

It is not as if a promoter is trying to escape responsibility. There may be members of the family who have no connection with the company. There may even be separations / divisions in the family. The promoters themselves could have so low a shareholding that they have literally no say, whether as directors or shareholders. Yet they continue to be promoters and remain subject to multiple restrictions, obligations and liabilities.

Regulation 31A of the SEBI LODR Regulations lays down the procedure for declassification from promoter to non-promoter. It requires, to begin with, the fulfilling of several conditions demonstrating that the person is no more connected with the promoter or even the company. The next step is obtaining the approval of the Board of Directors of the company. Then the approval of the shareholders is required. Finally, the stock exchange has to approve the reclassification. This process may easily take months and its outcome is quite uncertain. The process becomes even more difficult if the promoters seeking exit have disputes with the other promoters, which is something that is often seen in families.

Of course, it can be argued that in cases where some of the qualifications or connections that made a person a promoter no longer exist and so the person ought to thereby become a non-promoter. However, one wished there were specific and clear provisions regarding this.

COMPANIES WITHOUT PROMOTERS

Fortunately, there are provisions in the SEBI Regulations for companies with ‘no identifiable promoters’. This is particularly so in case of companies with professional managements. However, to qualify for this one would have to escape the wide net cast by the very broad definition of ‘promoter’ and ‘promoter group’.

SEBI’S ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE LAW


SEBI has been making attempts to address some of these issues. Indeed, two consultation papers have been recently issued by SEBI to discuss how to simplify the reclassification and how to narrow down the definition. These, however, at best scratch the surface. So the only way out is to squarely avoid becoming a promoter. And the best way is to do this, as stated earlier, at the time of the public issue.

But even that is not easy! The definition of promoters is very wide and even persons having a significant say in management, whether by way of shareholding or by agreements or otherwise, could be classified as promoters. Litigation on this issue (e.g., the decision of SAT in the Subhkam Ventures case, dated 15th January, 2010, read with the ruling of the Supreme Court on appeal) has been inconclusive. SEBI had attempted to specify some bright line tests in this regard to lay down specific criteria / clauses in an agreement which could make a person a promoter. But nothing real came out of this either.

The problem is further complicated because multiple laws have placed requirements on promoters. These include the Companies Act, SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, SEBI Takeover Regulations, SEBI Listing Regulations, the SEBI ICDR Regulations, certain laws made by the RBI, etc. Thus, there are multiple regulators involved. All this makes a change difficult and complex.

However, such changes are now the need of the hour. As SEBI has rightly pointed out in its recent consultation paper dated 11th May, 2021 on redefining the term ‘promoter’, the holding of promoters has decreased steadily from 58% in 2009 to 50% in 2018 in the top 500 companies. More importantly, the holding of institutional investors has substantially increased from 25% in 2009 to 34% in 2018. Many companies capitalising on new technology are professionally managed companies with no identifiable promoters. Hence, now the responsibilities and obligations are increasingly sought to be placed on the Board of a company rather than on the promoters.

Robust corporate governance with active involvement of institutional investors would be a better long-term objective rather than focusing on family-centred promoters. However, considering that these consultation papers propose small changes rather than a proper overhaul, the concerns remain. Hence, for now, even if not easy, prevention would be a better strategy for management / investors of new companies than the very difficult cure.  

CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TRAPPED IN A LEGAL LABYRINTH (Part – 2)

In the last issue, BCAJ, July, 2021, we looked at the legal background of cryptocurrencies and various issues relating to them. We continue examining the legal problems associated with Virtual Currencies (VCs) in India.
This month, we take up the FEMA provisions in relation to VCs

RBI PUTS TO REST 2018 CIRCULAR

In May, 2021, the RBI issued a Circular to all banks asking them not to refer to its own Circular of April, 2018 cautioning customers against VCs. This was in light of the fact that the Supreme Court in Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India, WP(C) No. 528/2018, order dated 4th March, 2020 (SC) had held that the RBI Circular of April, 2018 was liable to be set aside on the ground of being ultra vires the Constitution (explained in detail in last month’s feature). Therefore, the RBI directed banks that in view of the order of the Supreme Court, the April, 2018 Circular was no longer valid and hence could not be cited or quoted from. It, however, added that banks may continue to carry out customer due diligence processes in line with regulations governing standards for Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and obligations of regulated entities under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, in addition to ensuring compliance with relevant provisions under the Foreign Exchange Management Act.

CAN LRS BE USED FOR INVESTING IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES?

The Liberalised Remittance Scheme or LRS is a Scheme of the RBI under which any individual resident in India can remit abroad up to US $250,000 per financial year for permissible capital and current account transactions.

The million-dollar question is can the LRS be used for buying foreign crypto assets such as Bitcoins, Dogecoins? Alternatively, can a resident carry out a crypto arbitrage, i.e., buy cryptocurrencies from abroad and sell them in India? This is an issue on which there is no express prohibition under the LRS and there is more confusion than clarity.

When the LRS was introduced in February, 2004, the RBI stated that it could be used for any current or capital account transactions, or a combination of both. In May, 2007, the RBI clarified that remittances under the LRS were allowed only in respect of permissible current or capital account transactions. However, in June, 2015 the RBI introduced a novel concept of defining the permissible capital account transactions for an individual under the LRS. It defined them as follows:

(i) Opening of foreign currency account abroad with a bank;
(ii)    Purchase of property abroad;
(iii)    Making investments abroad;
(iv)    Setting up wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures abroad;
(v)    Extending loans, including loans in Indian Rupees, to Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) who are relatives as defined in the Companies Act, 2013.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India (Supra) examined various facets of cryptocurrencies. The ratio of this decision is relevant even for determining the issue under LRS. Various important issues were examined in this case and one of the most important of these was ‘Are Virtual Currencies (VCs) “currency” under Indian laws?’ After examining various provisions of law, the Apex Court concluded that it was not possible to accept the contention that VCs were just goods / commodities and could never be regarded as real money! This decision has been analysed in great detail in last month’s feature.

One may consider whether VCs can be considered to be securities and, hence, permissible under the LRS as an investment in securities. FEMA defines a security to mean shares, stocks, bonds and debentures, Government securities as defined in the Public Debt Act, 1944, savings certificates to which the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 applies, deposit receipts in respect of deposits of securities and units of the Unit Trust of India established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 or of any mutual fund, and includes certificates of title to securities, but does not include bills of exchange or promissory notes other than Government promissory notes or any other instruments which may be notified by the Reserve Bank as security for the purposes of this Act. VCs are not shares, stocks, bonds, debentures, Government securities, savings certificates, deposit receipts in respect of deposits of securities or units of any mutual fund. Hence, it is not possible to contend that purchase of VCs from abroad tantamounts to an investment in securities.

The truth of the matter is that the RBI is not comfortable with the LRS being used to buy VCs. RBI’s view is that VCs are not currencies. Hence, bankers are shy to allow the LRS to buy VCs. However, what would be the position if a resident were to use the balance standing in his foreign bank account to buy VCs? How would the bankers then restrict the usage? The moot point is can the RBI have jurisdiction in such a case? Can one use credit cards and buy VCs on the ground that they are goods / intangibles and hence the transaction is a current account transaction and credit cards can be used on the internet for any permissible current account transaction? Some Indian banks have started asking their customers remitting money abroad for investment purposes to provide a declaration that such funds will not be used for buying cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins.

In fact, some private banks have gone a step forward and added a clause in the LRS declaration which doesn’t stop at cryptocurrencies but also wants customers to declare that funds would not be used to buy units of mutual funds or any other capital instrument of a company dealing in Bitcoins / cryptocurrencies / virtual currencies. Further, the LRS declaration even stipulates that the source of funds for LRS remittances should not come from investments in Bitcoins or cryptocurrencies. Clearly, a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater!

One point to be considered when dealing with this issue is that under FEMA one cannot do indirectly what one cannot do directly. Thus, if the RBI considers that VCs cannot be bought under the LRS, then one cannot buy them indirectly.

Another issue to be considered is that when remitting money under the LRS one needs to file Form A2 and fill in the Purpose Code. What Purpose Code would the bank show for cryptocurrencies – would it be Capital Account / Foreign Portfolio Investment? Without this clarity, a bank would not allow remittance for buying VCs.

ARE VCs GOODS?

In the aforesaid case of Internet and Mobile Association of India (Supra), the RBI contended that Virtual Currencies are not legal tender but tradable commodities / digital goods. If this proposition is upheld then the question which arises is whether the buying and selling of VCs would attract the provisions under FEMA relating to export and import of goods?

The Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015 defines ‘software’ to mean any computer programme, database, drawing, design, audio / video signals, any information by whatever name called in or on any medium other than in or on any physical medium. VCs are also computer programmes stored in a virtual medium and, hence, the question arises whether they can be considered goods.

If a resident buys VCs from abroad would it be treated as import of goods? In this case, the provisions of the Master Direction on Import of Goods and Services amended up to 1st April, 2019 would be applicable.

Similarly, if a resident pays for foreign services / goods availed of by him by way of VCs, then would the payment by VCs be treated as an export of goods and the receipt of the foreign services / goods as an import? In this case, the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015 read with the Master Direction on Export of Goods and Services amended up to 12th January, 2018 would be applicable. If one considers the payment by VCs to be an export and the receipt of goods from abroad to be an import, then this would constitute a set-off of export receivables against import payables. The FEMA Regulations permit a set-off of exports against imports only if it is in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. A payment by VCs is not prescribed under the FEMA Regulations, and hence it is a moot point whether the same would be permissible.

(To be
concluded)
 

CSR RULES AMENDMENT – AN ANALYSIS

1. BACKGROUND
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be defined as a company’s sense of responsibility towards the community and environment (both ecological and social) in which it operates. Companies can fulfil this responsibility through waste and pollution reduction processes, by contributing educational and social programmes, by being environmentally friendly and by undertaking activities of similar nature. CSR is not charity or mere donations. CSR is a way of conducting business by which corporate entities visibly contribute to the social good.

The Companies Act, 2013 has formulated section 135, Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility) Rules, 2014 and Schedule VII which prescribe mandatory provisions for companies to fulfil their CSR. This article aims to analyse these provisions (including all the amendments therein).

Applicability of CSR provisions
o On every company including its holding or subsidiary having:
* Net worth of Rs. 500 crores or more, or
* Turnover of Rs. 1,000 crores or more, or
* Net profit of Rs. 5 crores or more
o during the immediately preceding financial year, and
* A foreign company having its branch office or project office in India, which fulfils the criteria specified above.

However, if a company ceases to meet the above criteria for three consecutive financial years then it is not required to comply with CSR provisions till such time as it meets the specified criteria.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs, vide Notification dated 22nd January, 2021 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 135 and sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 469 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), notified rules to further amend the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014. These rules are to be called the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021.

They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. As per the Notification, section 21 of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 has come into force with effect from 22nd January, 2021.

2. The top ten points relating to changes in CSR rules are as follows
CSR expenditure
(i) Surplus from CSR activities to be ploughed back in same project or transferred to Unspent CSR Account and spent as per policy and annual action plan, or transferred to Fund within 6 months of the end of the financial year.
(ii) Excess amount spent shall be set off within three succeeding financial years subject to conditions (i.e., surplus arising out of CSR activities shall not be considered and the Board of the company shall pass a resolution to that effect).
(iii) CSR amount may be spent for creation / acquisition of capital asset to be held in the manner prescribed.
(iv) Specific exclusion of sponsorship activities for deriving market benefits from the scope of CSR activities.

Governance
(v) Eligible implementing entities through which a company shall undertake CSR activities will be required to register themselves with the Central Government w.e.f. 1st April, 2021.
(vi) Responsibility of the Board to ensure that the funds so disbursed have been utilised for the purposes and in the manner as approved by it and the CFO or the person responsible for financial management shall certify to the effect.
(vii) CSR Committee to formulate Annual Action Plan for CSR activities.
(viii) Companies with average CSR obligation of Rs. 10 crores or more in three preceding years to undertake impact assessment through an independent agency for projects of Rs. 1 crore or more which have been completed not less than one year before the impact study and the report to be placed before the Board and in the Annual Report of CSR.

Reporting
(ix) Earlier, only the contents of the CSR policy were required to be disclosed on the company’s website. Now, composition of CSR Committee, CSR Policy and projects approved by the Board are required to be disclosed.
(x) New format inserted for disclosure to be included in the Board’s Report.

3. The provisions relating to amendment of the Companies Act are tabulated below:

Section

Description

Amendment

Earlier
provision

Implication

135(5)

CSR spending

If the company has not completed 3
years
since incorporation, then 2% of average net profit during such
immediately preceding financial year

The Board to ensure that the company
spends at least 2% of the average net profit made during 3 immediately
preceding financial years

This provision is to rationalise the
method of computation of net profit for the purpose of CSR

In case of newly-incorporated entities,
the amount of CSR expenditure will be increased

135(5)

2nd proviso

Unspent amount not relating to an
ongoing project

The unspent amount not relating to an
ongoing project shall be transferred to a Fund specified in Schedule
VII within 6 months of the end of the financial year

If the company fails to spend the
amount, the Board is required to specify the reasons for not spending

This is a welcome step and the
corporates will be benefited

In case the amount cannot be spent, it
can be transferred to a Fund, avoiding non-compliance

135(6)

Unspent amount relating to an ongoing
project

The company is required to transfer the
amount to a special ‘Unspent CSR Account’ within 30 days from
end of financial year and spend it within 3 financial years from date
of such transfer

No corresponding provision

This is a welcome step and the corporates
will be benefited

This will enable corporates to plan
their cash flows and park the excess amount in ‘Unspent CSR Account’ to be
utilised within next 3 F.Y.s

135(7)

Contravention w.r.t. sections 135(5) and
135(6)

Fine equal to:

In case of company – 2X of the amount required to be
transferred, or Rs. 1 crore, whichever is less

In case of officers – 1/10th of the amount
required to be transferred, or Rs. 2 lakhs, whichever is less

No corresponding provision

Provision for fine introduced

4. The provisions relating to amended CSR Rules as per the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021 are tabulated below:

Rule

Description

Amendment

Earlier
provision

Implication

4

CSR implementation

Eligible implementing entities through
which a company shall undertake CSR will require to register themselves
with Central Government w.e.f. 1st April, 2021

No corresponding provision

Welcome step from the point of view of
governance

Responsibility of the Board to ensure that the funds so disbursed
have been utilised for the purposes and in the manner as approved by
it and the CFO or the person responsible for financial management shall certify
to the effect

5(2)

CSR Committee

Committee to formulate annual action
plan
for CSR activities

Institute transparent monitoring
mechanism for implementation of projects

This is a new provision

Shall help in formulation of
Board-governed annual plan. This would lead to good governance

Board may alter such plan based
on recommendation of CSR Committee

7

CSR expenditure

Board to ensure administrative overheads
not to exceed 5% of total CSR expenditure for financial year

Contribution to corpus, expenditure on
CSR projects approved by Board on recommendation of CSR Committee, excluding
items not falling under Schedule VII

New provisions and welcome ones

This was required as corporates
necessarily need to incur some administrative expenses

Surplus from CSR activities not to be treated as business profit and
be ploughed back in same project or transferred to Unspent CSR
Account
and spent as per policy and annual action plan or transfer to
Fund
within 6 months from the end of financial year

New provision

Shall benefit the corporates in
smoothening their cash flow and also compliance of the CSR provision

Excess amount spent shall be set off within 3
succeeding financial years subject to conditions (i.e., surplus
arising out of CSR activities shall not be considered and Board of the
company shall pass a resolution to that effect)

New provision

Shall benefit the corporates in
smoothening their cash flow and also compliance of the CSR provision

CSR amount may be spent for creation
/ acquisition of capital asset to be held in the manner prescribed

 

8

CSR reporting

Companies with average CSR
obligation of Rs. 10 crores or more in 3 preceding years to undertake impact
assessment
through an independent agency for projects of Rs. 1 crore or
more which have been completed not less than 1 year before the impact study

No corresponding provision

New provision

Will lead to good governance

The report to be placed before the
Board
and in the Annual Report of CSR

Company may book the expenditure
towards CSR which shall not exceed 5% of total CSR expenditure or Rs. 50
lakhs, whichever is less

9

Display of CSR activities on website

Company to disclose composition of CSR Committee,
CSR Policy and projects approved by the Board

Company to disclose the contents of the
CSR policy

 

10

Format for Annual Report on CSR

New format inserted for disclosure to be included in the Board’s
Report

No corresponding provision

Procedural, to clarify the definitions
and meanings

2(b)

Meaning of administrative overheads

General management and administrative
expenditure, excluding direct expenses towards a particular project

No corresponding provision

2(d)

Meaning of CSR activities

Excludes sponsorship activities for deriving market benefits for its
products

As per Schedule VII

2(f)

Meaning of CSR Policy

Definition amended to widen the scope
of Committee to recommend formulation of annual action plan

2(g)

Meaning of international Org.

As defined u/s 3 of UN (Privileges and
Immunities) Act

No corresponding provision

2(i)

Meaning of ongoing project

Project already commenced, multi-year
project, i.e., not less than 1 year but not exceeding 3 years

No corresponding provision

2(j)

Meaning of public authority

As defined under the RTI Act

No corresponding provision

6

CSR Policy

Omitted

List of CSR projects which a company
plans to undertake and monitoring process

This provision was omitted as the
provision relating to annual plan has been introduced

5. Impact Analysis
(I) The new rules will give the corporates thenecessary flexibility in spending in case of ongoing projects.
(II) Those corporates that are unable to spend for any reason will be able to comply with the rules if they transfer the amount to a special Fund
(III) The new rules will bring in more transparency and will involve experts in impact analysis.
(IV) The quality of governance through the Board will be a notch higher
(V) The reporting and disclosure will improve.

ERRATA
We regret that in the BCAJ issue dated January, 2021 (Vol. 52-B, Part 4), certain inadvertent errors have crept in on three different pages. In all cases, lines / cross-headings that should have been deleted have appeared with a ruling line across them. On Page 5, the lines ‘Since we all try to avoid… feel negative emotions’, have a ruling line across them. Similarly, one line on Page 30 and six lines on Page 31 also have ruling lines across them.
The errors are sincerely regretted

DAUGHTER’S RIGHT IN COPARCENARY – PART VI

I am overwhelmed that my articles on the subject have evinced considerable interest. The amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 (‘the Amendment Act’) and the issue of daughters’ right in coparcenary property have now been the subject matter of substantial litigation all over the country. Through my articles published in the BCAJ in January, 2009; May, 2010; November, 2011; February, 2016; and May, 2018, I made an attempt to analyse and explain the legal position as per the various cases decided by several High Courts and by the Supreme Court of India.

It cannot be disputed that the amendments were beneficial to society and a step towards ensuring equality between males and females in an HUF. However, in view of the imprecise language of the Amendment Act and lack of clarity about what exactly was intended by the Legislature, the amendment was the subject matter of a plethora of court cases all over the country and ultimately some cases went up to the Supreme Court.

In view of the cases decided by the Supreme Court till then, my article published in February, 2016 expressed a hope that the legal position then explained was final. Unfortunately, further decisions came from the Supreme Court. I say unfortunately because as explained in my last article published in May, 2018, confusion was created by two different decisions of the Supreme Court and I had to end the article with the fervent hope that the Apex Court would review its decisions to resolve the conflict.

I am glad to note that the Supreme Court has now tried to resolve the conflict in its recent decision in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma and others, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 1.

The confusion created by the Supreme Court can be explained in brief as under:

‘The Supreme Court in the case of Sheela Devi vs. Lal Chand [(2006), 8 SCC 581] held that the Amendment Act would have no application in a case where succession was opened in 1989, when the father had passed away. In the case of Eramma vs. Veerupana (AIR 1966 SC 1880), the Supreme Court held that the succession is considered to have opened on the death of a person. Following that principle in the case of Sheela Devi (Supra), the father passed away in 1989 and it was held that the Amendment Act which came into force in September, 2005 would have no application’.

Based on this, the Madras High Court applied the decision to other cases.

Even in the case of Prakash vs. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36 which was decided in 2016, the Supreme Court held that ‘the rights under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born’.

Thus, there is a plethora of cases deciding that the father of the claiming daughter should be alive if the daughter makes a claim in the coparcenary property. Moreover, it is necessary that the male Hindu should have been alive on the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act. Thus, at that stage the legal position was that the rights of a daughter under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Consequently, I closed my February, 2016 article with the hope that this final legal position would prevail without any further complications.

Unfortunately, this did not happen and in the case of Danamma vs. Amar (2018) 3 SCC 342 the Supreme Court held differently. The principle laid down in earlier cases was not followed and (without considering its own decision in the case of Sheela Devi) it was held that a daughter would have a share even if her father was not alive on the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act. This decision caused confusion. In my June, 2018 article I could end only by expressing the fervent hope that the Apex Court would review its decision in the Danamma case so that the apparent conflict is resolved without resulting in further litigation. Both these decisions were re-ordered by a Bench of two judges. Later, it was decided to refer the issue to a larger Bench.

Therefore, it is heartening to note that the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, after considering all previous decisions, including some High Court cases, has now taken a view which possibly settles all the confusion created earlier and lays down the law which is now final and binding on all. In the recent case of Vineeta Sharma (Supra), the Supreme Court has overruled its earlier decision in the cases of Prakash vs. Phulavati and partly overruled the Danamma decision of interpretation of the Amendment Act.

The final legal position as emerging from this decision can be summarised as follows:
(i) A daughter of a coparcener who is living as on9th September, 2005 shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as a son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she would have been a son;
(ii) This position applies regardless of when such daughter is born;
(iii) It is not necessary that the father on account of whom a daughter gets a right should be alive.

Hopefully, this closes the chapter of controversies regarding the interpretation of the Amendment Act. I can only express the wish that the legal ingenuity of lawyers does not extend to raising any new issues and allows the final legal position to stand.

VALUATION OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

The billion-dollar acquisitions that we read about, especially of early-stage companies, raise the question, how do deal makers arrive at the deal price? There is seldom a transaction wherein the buyer and the seller would agree on the future outcome of certain critical parameters which could be a point of negotiation, or even the cause of some potential deals falling through with the two parties unable to reconcile on the deal price. It is contingent consideration that helps in breaking this deadlock between two parties because it enables the buyer to pay a part of the deal price to the seller only on the achievement of certain pre-agreed critical milestones. While such contingent consideration is commonly observed in M&A deals, there are several complexities when it comes to the valuation aspects of such consideration.

1. INTRODUCTION TO CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

Ind AS 103, Para 37 requires the consideration transferred in a business combination to be measured at fair value which is to be calculated as the sum of the acquisition-date fair value of assets transferred by the acquirer, the liabilities incurred by the acquirer to the former owners of the said business, and the equity interests issued by the acquirer. In fact, contingent consideration is one of the forms of consideration as described in Ind AS 103 and it has to be recorded at the acquisition-date fair value as a part of the total consideration. Contingent considerations are typically employed in transactions to bridge the valuation gap between the buyers’ and the sellers’ differences of opinion regarding the target entity’s future economic prospects. It helps to get the buyer and the seller on the same page when it comes to the valuation of the target entity. Let us examine this basic concept by way of an example:

Company A intends to acquire Company B. Company B has just introduced a new product line that is expected to generate significant sales. Company B’s owners have projected a significant amount of sales from the proposed product line and are considering the same to influence the deal size. Company A, on the other hand, believes that there is a risk of uncertainty in the achievement of targets contemplated by the seller and hence there is a disagreement on the deal valuation. By incorporating a contingent consideration clause in the purchase agreement, the seller accepts part of the business risk along with the buyer and also participates in any upside post-transaction.

Contingent consideration may be contingent on different events, for example, on the launch of a product, on receiving regulatory approval, or reaching a certain revenue or income milestone. The achievement of such events often spans over more than a year. Thus, it is necessary to understand the acquisition date as well as the post-acquisition treatment of such contingent consideration.

2. CLASSIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

2.1 Liability vs. equity classification
The classification of consideration is essentially driven by the mode of settlement of such consideration. Consideration settled in cash is always classified as a liability. In a scenario where the consideration is to be settled by issue of certain instruments of the buyer, one needs to determine whether the number of instruments to be issued are fixed and determined at the acquisition date. In a scenario where the number of instruments is fixed, then such consideration is classified as equity, and where the number of instruments to be issued is not fixed, then such consideration is to be recognised as a liability. Refer to Figure 2.1.1 for a simplified approach to determining equity vs. liability.

Figure 2.1.1: Classification of contingent consideration

Example: A fixed monetary amount to be settled in a variable number of shares would be classified as a liability.

Contingent consideration classified as a liability is required to be re-measured at its fair value at each reporting period. For example, a consideration depending on revenue achieved over the next three years from acquisition will need to be fair-valued at the end of each year / quarter. Whereas, a consideration classified as equity is not required to be fair-valued post the initial recognition since the consideration has already been determined and locked as at the acquisition date.

3. VALUATION OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION / EARN-OUTS

The methods to be followed and the approach will be driven by the way the payment of such contingent consideration or earn-outs is structured. The pay-outs are structured based on a single or more than one metric. The Table below illustrates the various metrics which are commonly observed for contingent consideration:

Financial matrices

Non-financial matrices

Revenue

Gross profits

EBITDA

Profit before tax

Cash flows targets

Stock price

Result of clinical trials

Software development / R&D milestones

Employee retention targets

Customer retention targets

Closing of a future transaction

Number of units sold

Mostly, contingent consideration is paid on achievement of certain revenue or profit targets. Additionally, such payments may be spread over more than just one year. The pay-outs can either be linear pay-outs or non-linear pay-outs.

3.1 Linear pay-outs
Pay-outs which are dependent on a single metric and are expressed in terms of a fixed percentage or the product of a financial or some non-financial parameters, are referred to as linear pay-outs. Considerations that vary based on different levels of revenue or other parameters are non-linear pay-outs. For example:

Target will receive a payment at some future date as follows:

  •  If EBIT < $1 million, the payoff is zero;
  •  If EBIT = $1 million, the payoff is a 10x multiple of EBIT.

The valuation method will be driven by the structure of the contingent consideration pay-outs. There are two broad valuation approaches used to value a contingent consideration.
i) Probably weighted expected return method, more commonly referred to as ‘PWERM’, or scenario-based method (‘SBM’); and
ii) Option pricing method, also referred to as the ‘OPM’.

3.1.1 Probably weighted expected return method (PWERM)
The PWERM assesses the distribution of the underlying matrices based on estimates of the forecasts, scenarios and probabilities. The pay-out computed is then discounted to present value using a discount rate corresponding to the risk inherent in the inputs considered while computing the compensation. The following are the steps followed:
i) Estimate scenarios of outcomes and associated probabilities.
ii) Compute the expected payoffs using the scenario probabilities.
iii) Discount expected payoffs to present value using risk-adjusted discount rates.

Illustration 3.1.1.1

• INR 100 crores payment contingent upon obtaining FDA approval.
• Approval expected in one year.

Solution:

Particulars

Payment

Probability

Prob.-weighted payment

Approval
obtained

Approval
obtained

INR
100

INR
0

75%

25%

INR
75

INR
0

Total

Discount
rate

Present
value factor

 

100%

10%

INR
75 crores

 

0.91

Fair
value of contingent consideration

INR
68 crores

Advantages:
i)    Management controls scenarios and probabilities: The scenarios and probabilities are generally prepared by the management because they would be the best source for such data points.
ii)    Understandable: The computation and the flow are understandable to a reader with basic financial knowledge.
iii)    Flexible: The model can be structured to fit most pay-out scenarios.

Disadvantages:
i)    Management controls scenarios and probabilities: While this has been discussed under advantages, management control over these inputs is also counter-intuitive since management tends to be overly optimistic or pessimistic in its assumptions.
ii)    Lots of subjective assumptions: Most of the methods / inputs are subjective and involve judgement, which at times is not the most ideal approach to value such pay-outs.
iii)    Discount rate: Since the methods involve multiple scenarios, it is challenging to estimate the appropriate discount rate.
iv)    Path dependencies: Pay-out scenarios which are path dependent, i.e., the result of one scenario is related to one or more dependent scenarios, are difficult to model in the PWERM. It can lead to multiple nodes and is prone to errors.

3.2 Non-linear pay-outs
Non-linear contingent considerations are either not strictly linear, or they pay a fixed amount based on a milestone correlated with the broader economy; thus, they require an OPM as their complexity and discounting cannot be adequately captured in a PWERM; for example, if the buyer pays INR 50 crores if EBITDA is at least INR 75 crores in the first three years, or if the buyer pays 40% of revenues above INR 50 crores in year two, subject to a maximum of INR 40 crores. Another, more complicated, example: The buyer pays 40% of revenues in years one to three, subject to a minimum of INR 10 crores and a cap of INR 40 crores. In such an arrangement, a PWERM will not work since it’s impossible to adjust the discount rate to align with the risk of such a complex pay-out structure. An option-pricing model is generally used to value such arrangements.

3.2.1 Option-pricing methods
The payoff structures for contingent consideration arrangements that have a non-linear structure are similar to those of options in that payments are triggered when certain thresholds are met. Accordingly, some option-pricing methods may be appropriate for valuing contingent consideration that have a non-linear payoff structure and are based on metrics that are financial in nature (or, more generally, for which the underlying risk is systematic or non-diversifiable). The OPM is implemented by modelling the underlying metrics based on a log-normal distribution that requires two parameters:

* The expected value: The management expectation of the matrices over the term of the arrangement. This is generally provided by the management.

* The volatility (standard deviation) of the metric: The volatility of the metric measures the potential variability from the expected value. This is generally determined by using market-based data. However, volatility for financial metrics like revenue and EBITDA cannot simply be computed using the movement in stock prices of the comparable companies. It needs to be appropriately levered and unlevered to capture the variability in achievement of the metrics.

There are two widely used option-pricing methods, viz., the Black-Scholes Model (‘BSM’) and the Monte Carlo simulation model.

3.2.1.1 Option-pricing method – Black-Scholes Model
BSM treats a pay-out arrangement just like an ordinary option which enables use of the standardised Black Scholes – Merton formula. This approach can work for simpler pay-out structures, for example, if the selling shareholder earns the pay-out only if the target metric hits a threshold, or for linear pay-outs with caps or floors. The consideration is assumed to represent a call option on the future performance of the seller.

Illustration for BSM
Earn-outs are contingent upon the target of achieving a benchmark EBIT of INR 11,25,000 within three years. The EBIT is currently INR 10,00,000. At the end, the acquirer will pay additional consideration equal to the excess EBIT over the benchmark.

The discount rate is 10% and the risk-free rate is 3%. Volatility of earnings is 14% based on historical EBIT.

The inputs to the Black-Scholes Model for this example are:

i)    The current INR 10,00,000 level of earnings is the value of the underlying,
ii)    the benchmark of INR 11,25,000 serves as the exercise price,
iii)    the term is three years,
iv)    the volatility is 14%,
v)    the risk-free rate is 3%, and
vi)    the dividend rate is 0%.

Based on the above inputs, calculations for the Black-Scholes Model can be incorporated into an Excel spreadsheet. The resulting call option value of INR 84,413 will be the value of the contingent consideration.

3.2.1.2 Option-pricing method – Monte Carlo Simulation Model
For more complex structures, a Monte Carlo simulation is preferred. Arrangements that pay over multiple periods or multiple metrics are subject to combined caps or a floor. A Monte Carlo simulation considers the correlation between matrices and pay-outs over multiple periods. The Monte Carlo simulation repeats a process many times attempting to predict all the possible future outcomes. At the end of the simulation, several random trials produce a distribution of outcomes that can be analysed. Random numbers are used to measure possible outcomes and the likelihood of their occurrence. Generally, simulation software are used to generate random numbers. These random numbers are generated based on the applicable distribution driven by the metric triggering the pay-outs.

The following are the important considerations of key inputs for valuing contingent considerations using an option-pricing model:

Discount rate applied based on risk of target metric
For earn-outs that require this kind of discount rate, either the top-down or bottom-up approach may be used to develop the rate. These approaches are well known in the valuation field. They rely on the concept of beta (ß), which reflects the level of market risk reflected in an instrument.

In the top-down approach, ß is based on the deal’s rate of return adjusted for the difference in market risk between the target metric and the overall enterprise value. Adjustments can reflect many relevant factors, such as the general risk in the target metric, leverage, term, size premium and entity-specific risk. In the bottom-up approach, ß is the target metric adjusted for term, size, entity-specific risk and other relevant valuation factors. The bottom-up approach may rely on statistical analysis of the target metric from the entity or its peers.

Volatility
Valuation techniques that rely on options modelling or Monte Carlo simulation require a volatility of the target metric. There are four ways in which such volatility can be computed:

i)    Historical changes in the target metric for the acquired entity and public comparable companies,
ii)    Entity volatility based on the relationship between the target metric and the enterprise value,
iii)    The difference between analyst forecasts and actual results for peer companies, and
iv)    Fitting a distribution to management’s estimates.

With any of these methods, a discussion with management is recommended since a derived volatility may fail to accurately incorporate the economics of the entity’s situation.

Both option-pricing models can get complex and difficult to comprehend for a lot of professionals and they have their share of advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages:
i)    Manage complex payoff structures: Can accommodate a wide range of complex payoff structures.
ii)    Objective assumptions: Most inputs are governed by market-related inputs making it less subjective than the PWERM.
iii)    Discount rate: Since the computations are made using random numbers and volatility, generally risk-adjusted discount rates are used, reducing the need of subjectivity inherent in building discount rates for financial matrices.

Disadvantages:


i)    Perceived to be complex and time-consuming.
ii)    Rigid: OPMs are based on a prescribed formula and are perceived as rigid relative to the PWERM.
iii)    Difficulty in converting real-world cash flows into risk-free cash flows: It is challenging at times to convert the pay-out structure into models to be used with the OPMs.

Valuation of contingent consideration and selection of the appropriate methods for doing so can be quite challenging. Such valuations are continuously evolving as new literature on methods and approaches is published around the world. The selection of methods to value these arrangements is driven by the complexity of the pay-outs and the experience and the qualifications of the valuer to be able to appropriately apply these methods.

The complexity of contingent consideration is not limited to its valuation but has several accounting and taxation implications which need to be considered and analysed. The accounting and tax aspects vary, based on the accounting standard being followed as well as the structure of the transactions. A discussion on these aspects would warrant an independent article, which we intend to cover over the next few issues.

INTRODUCTION TO ACCREDITED INVESTORS – THE NEW INVESTOR DIASPORA

Investors and investments have, over the decades, evolved with respect to form, structure, taxation and compliances involved. The constant need to test and re-invent has led to newer market participants exploring the investment universe.

However, one of the foremost principles of investment and investing, that is, investors should invest in financial products after knowing the risks and returns associated with them, and therefore take an informed decision regarding their investments in line with their risk-return profile, continues to prevail.

SEBI Consultation Paper: On 24th February, 2021, SEBI introduced a ‘Consultation Paper on the Introduction of the Concept of Accredited Investors’ (‘Consultation Paper’) in the Indian securities market.

The Consultation Paper made a case for introduction of the concept of Accredited Investors (AI) in the Indian securities market and covered the following aspects:

  •  Benefits to the Indian Securities Market
  •  Proposed AI eligibility criteria for various categories of investors, namely, Individuals, HUFs, Family Trusts, Bodies Corporate and Non-Resident Investors
  •  Process and validity of accreditation
  •  Procedure for implementation

SEBI Press Release (SEBI PR): Subsequently, on 29th June, 2021, SEBI via PR No. 22/2021, inter alia proposed a formal introduction of the framework for AI in the Indian securities markets.

This article covers the following aspects:

(A) CONCEPT OF AI

The AI framework as proposed by SEBI in India and prevalent framework across different economies; impact on the Indian securities markets vis-à-vis Private Equity, Venture Capital, Portfolio Management Services (PMS) and the Startup ecosystem.

AI, or as they are colloquially called Professional or Qualified Investors, amongst others are a class of investors who possess expert understanding of various financial products, the risks and returns associated with them, coupled with the financial capacity to absorb losses, enabling them to take relatively higher risk in their investing endeavours.

Hence, they are classified as a distinct group to recognise their ability to take informed decisions regarding investments and to selectively eliminate the need for extensive regulatory protection. Such investors may also enjoy relaxations with respect to disclosure requirements, filings of offer documents / prospectus, etc., and enhanced flexibility in respect of investor reporting.

Across the globe, other jurisdictions have also similarly demarcated this investor class considering their distinct knowledge and investment experience, alongside financial capacity.

(B) WHY HAVE ACCREDITED INVESTORS

The investment ecosystem in India today restricts investments in various asset classes based on the capacity of the investor to digest risks associated with that investment. This ability to digest risks is determined by minimum investment thresholds and high net worth requirements.

However, over time, investors have gained requisite knowledge to demonstrate an understanding of the asset class along with the ability to take on the risks associated with such investments.

Therefore, identifying this new investor diaspora as an ‘Accredited Investor’ enables achieving the premise of risk-reward balance coupled with the opportunity to allow investors to invest in asset classes that they understand and follow which would fill in the gap in the current investment and securities regulations. This model has also been successfully implemented globally (see ‘Accredited Investor Ecosystem Globally’ below) and has resulted in the creation of this new investor diaspora.

Overall economic boost in the investment universe and promotion of asset classes which hitherto were inaccessible to a large set of investors would be visible.

(C) THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR FRAMEWORK AS PROPOSED BY SEBI IN INDIA1 AND ACROSS DIFFERENT ECONOMIES:

(I) The eligibility criteria for Resident Investors, Non-Resident Indians and Foreign Entities as proposed by SEBI are as detailed below:

Category of investor

Eligibility criteria for Indian
investor to be an Accredited Investor

Eligibility Criteria for Non-Resident
Indians and Foreign Entities to be Accredited Investors

Individuals, HUFs and Family Trusts

Annual income >= INR 2 crores; or

Net worth >= INR 7.5 crores with not
less than INR 3.75 crores of financial assets; or

Annual Income >= INR 1 crore + Net
worth >= INR 5 crores; with not less than INR 2.5 crores of financial
assets;

Annual income >= USD 300,000; or

Net worth >= USD 1,000,000; with not
less than USD 500,000 of financial assets; or

Annual income >= USD 150,000 + Net
worth >= USD 750,000; with not less than USD 375,000 of financial assets

Trusts (other than Family Trusts)

Assets Under Management >= INR 50
crores

Assets Under Management >= USD 7.5
million

Bodies Corporate

Net worth >= INR 50 crores

Net worth >= USD 7,500,000

Others

Central and State Governments,
Developmental agencies such as SIDBI, NABARD, etc., set up under the aegis of
Government(s), funds set up by Government(s) and QIB’s as defined under SEBI
(ICDR) Regulations, 2018

Multilateral agencies, Sovereign Wealth
Funds, International Financial Institutions and Category – I FPIs

 

1   SEBI Consultation Paper dated 24th
February, 2021

Manner of determination of annual income, net worth and value of real estate assets
(i) The income and asset details which need to be considered for assessment of eligibility criteria shall be as per the data furnished in the Income-tax Returns filed for the immediately preceding financial year and the financial year in which assessment is being made.

(ii) For calculation of net worth, the value of the primary residence of the investor shall not be included.

(iii) In case the assets of the investor accounted for the assessment of eligibility criteria are in the form of real estate, a ‘ready reckoner rate’ as published by the respective local bodies shall be considered.

Manner of determination of annual income and net worth in case of joint accounts

In case of joint accounts held by individuals, the account shall be considered as an AI account only in the following scenarios:

(i) The First holder of the account is an AI;

(ii) The Joint holders are parent(s) and child(ren), where at least one person is independently an AI;

(iii) The Joint holders are spouses and their combined income / net worth meets eligibility criteria.

Manner of determination of financial capacity in case of bodies corporate

For bodies corporate, the latest statutorily audited information as on the date of application shall be considered for assessment of eligibility.

For trusts, the calculation of Assets Under Management shall be based on the valuation data as included in the Statutory Audit Report of the preceding financial year or as on the date of application.

(II) Accredited Investor Ecosystem Globally

Country

Accredited Investor criteria

Regulation

United States of America

Earned income exceeding USD 200,000 (or
USD 300,000 together with a spouse) in each of the prior two years and
reasonable expectation of a similar earning for the current year, or

SEC Reg 501(d)

United States of America




(continued)

has a net worth over USD 1,000,000,
either alone or together with a spouse (excluding the value of the primary
residence

SEC Reg 501(d)

Singapore

Net personal assets exceeding SGD 2
million (or equivalent in foreign currency), or in case of Corporates – Net
Assets exceeding SGD 10 million (or equivalent foreign currency) or

Income in preceding 12 months should be
not less than SGD 300,000 (or equivalent in foreign currency)

Section

4A(1)(a) of the Securities and Futures
Act (SFA)

Australia

Net assets of at least AUD 2.5 million, or

A gross income for each of the last 2
financial years of at least AUD 250,000

Section 708(8) of the Corporations Act,
2001

United Kingdom

‘Experienced Investor’ definition in the
UK:

A body corporate which has net assets in
excess of
€ 1,000,000 or which is part of a group which has net assets in excess of €
1,000,000;

Trustee of a trust where the aggregate
value of the cash and investments which form part of the trust’s assets is in
excess of € 1,000,000;

An individual whose net worth, or joint
net worth with that person’s spouse, is greater than € 1,000,000, excluding
that person’s principal place of residence

Section 3 of Financial Services
(Experienced Investor Funds) Regulations, 2012

When compared to global benchmarks, the financial parameters (vis-à-vis income and net worth) laid down by SEBI are on the higher side and may indicate a sense of conservative caution which is understandably needed in the advent of the sensitivity and adaptability concerns that surround this critical regulation. However, over time SEBI may consider re-evaluating these parameters as soon as AI investment becomes mainstream and with the imminent need to reduce entry barriers (income and net worth) for a seamless functioning of these crucial market participants.

(D) IMPACT ON THE INDIAN SECURITIES MARKETS VIS-À-VIS PRIVATE EQUITY, VENTURE CAPITAL, PMS AND STARTUP ECOSYSTEM

The Indian financial and securities market ecosystem is evolving with the Startups and the alternative investment space is fast maturing.

The proposed regulations as detailed below create a base for a thriving market and a soft regulatory regime. While the market for customised products for elite investors may not be readily available in the Indian securities market at this juncture, putting in place the required enabling framework will propel innovation in and development of the securities market in time to come.

Category of market participant

Associated effects under proposed
regulations2

Impact (Author’s view) and SEBI PR

Investors

Recognition as AI will help in availing
intended benefits

Portfolio diversification through access
to customised investment products or structured products;

more investment products due to lower
entry barriers such as minimum investment size

Alternative Investment Funds (AIF)

(Venture Capital, Private Equity and
Startups)

 

and

 

PMS players

Flexible participation for AI under the
AIF and PMS regulations

This is a welcome step and a much-needed
initiative opening up the investment ecosystem to AIs who were hitherto
restricted from such investments owing to prevalent minimum investment norms

 

AIFs3 and PMS4
would be able to attract capital from AIs for this fast-growing asset class
helping Startup and Venture Capital investments get the much-needed push
without the minimum investment norm requirements.

Alternative
Investment Funds

 

and

 

Portfolio
Management Services players

Beneficial interrelationship of AI with
AIF and PMS

for AI’s with minimum investment of INR
10 crores (PMS) or INR 70 crores (AIF)

Accredited Investors with minimum
investment of

INR 70 crores with AIF may avail
relaxation from regulatory requirements such as portfolio diversification
norms, conditions for launch of schemes and extension of tenure of the AIF

OR
INR 10 crores with registered

Alternative
Investment Funds

 

and

 

Portfolio
Management Services players

 

 

 





 

(continued)

PMS provider may avail relaxation from
regulatory requirements with respect to investments in unlisted securities
and shall be able to enter into bilaterally negotiated agreements with the
PMS provider

 

The above benefits shall be instrumental
for availing better means for investment structuring, pooling of capital,
co-investments, etc.

 

However, the threshold of INR 70 / 10
crores seems to be on the higher side and may merit reconsideration

Investment Advisers (IA)

Optimal engagement with IA

The terms of the agreement may be determined
mutually between the IA and the AI client, without diluting the fiduciary
responsibility cast on IAs under the SEBI Investment Advisors Regulations.

AI shall be in a better
position to bargain since the limits and modes of fees
can be governed through bilaterally negotiated contractual terms

 

2   SEBI PR
dated 29th June, 2021

3   As an illustration, the minimum capital
commitment required to participate in AIFs is INR 1 crore. In case of an
Accredited Investor, the manager may accept a capital commitment less than INR
1 crore

4   As an illustration, any entity may enter into
an agreement with a Portfolio Manager to avail customised asset management,
i.e., portfolio management service with a minimum capital of INR 50 lakhs. Such
capital may be made available to the Portfolio Manager in the form of cash or securities.
In case of a client who is an Accredited Investor, the Portfolio Manager may
accept capital and manage a portfolio of less than INR 50 lakhs

Accreditation Agencies
Accreditation Agencies (AA) can be Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs), i.e., Stock Exchanges, Depositories and / or subsidiaries of such MIIs. The modalities of accreditation, including documentation, fees, etc., will be specified by the AA separately.

Accreditation, once granted, shall be valid for a maximum period of one year from the date of accreditation.

The investor shall submit the necessary data and documents to the AA for ascertaining its eligibility to be an Accredited Investor. If eligible as per the approved criteria, the Accreditation Agency shall provide a certificate to this effect, clearly indicating the period of validity. Each certificate of accreditation shall have a unique certificate number.

The AI shall provide a copy of the Accreditation Certificate to the financial product / service provider along with a declaration to the effect that:

(i) The Investor is aware that being an AI, it is expected to have the necessary knowledge or means to understand the features of the investment product / service, including the risks associated with the investment and also has the ability to bear the financial risk associated with the investment.

(ii) The Investor is aware that the investment product / service in which it is proposing to participate may have a relaxed and flexible regulatory framework and may not be subject to the same regulatory oversight as retail products / services.

(E) WELCOME TO THE AI IN INVESTING AND ITS BALANCE
SEBI continues to pursue its ambitious attempts to harmonise the Indian securities market with the staggered introduction of global best practices in investments while giving due recognition to sophisticated market participants for better regulation.

While from a risk minimisation and mitigation perspective for market participants SEBI will need to ensure a robust recognition process and monitor the impact on the asset classes, short-term liquidity boost and transparency of information by parties looking to on-board AI’s with investor protection and interest would remain the paramount factor.

We hope that the accreditation, and acceptance, of specialist investors further propels the quantum of investments into new asset classes and helps drive the Indian economy to greater heights.

NEW FAQs ON INSIDER TRADING

SEBI has released in April, 2021 a comprehensive set of Frequently Asked Questions (‘FAQs’) on the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (‘the Insider Trading Regulations’). Several aspects of the subject have been clarified. A few important ones are discussed here.

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS

Insider trading is an evil of stock markets that is unacceptable across the globe and stringent laws are made against such acts. The concept of insider trading is simple enough. A person close to a company is entrusted with material information about the company and he is duty-bound not to abuse it for profit. It may be information about, say, substantial growth in profits of the company. Yet he goes ahead and buys shares of the company while the information is not yet public. When the information is released, the share price expectedly rises and he thus profits. Insider trading is condemned on several grounds. It reduces faith in the markets as there arises a feeling that the market is rigged against ‘outsiders’. It also amounts to a moral wrong by such a person against the company itself which also loses. The persons who actually invest in the company and thus put their money at risk may be at a loss. Therefore, there are comprehensive regulations against insider trading.

This evil is tackled in various ways under the law. The primary policy of course is to ban trading on the basis of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (‘UPSI’). Communication of UPSI is also prohibited. Detailed rules are laid down for control over it. A comprehensive and very wide definition of an ‘insider’ is laid down. Several categories of persons who are connected with the company or even connected with connected persons are deemed to be insiders. Further, apart from the ban in law, the company itself is required to self-regulate trading by certain insiders by a code of conduct.

It is not surprising that many areas exist where the law does not appear to be clear. SEBI has now released a comprehensive set of FAQs on the Regulations.

MULTIPLE SOURCES OF GUIDANCE – NOTES, INFORMAL GUIDANCE AND FAQs

Before we proceed to some specific and important FAQs, it is interesting to note the several attempts made to give guidance in various forms to the admittedly complex set of Regulations. The Regulations have this fairly interesting feature of ‘Notes’ to some of them. The notes attempt to explain the nature of that particular regulation. The legal status of such notes is not wholly clear.

Then we have Informal Guidance issued by SEBI in reply to specific queries raised by market participants from time to time. Coincidentally, SEBI has compiled important Informal Guidances on insider trading and released them almost simultaneously with the FAQs. But the legal status of Informal Guidances, too, is ambiguous at best.

And now we have the FAQs which again are specifically stated to be not law and not binding!

Yet, the Notes, Informal Guidances and FAQs do throw light on the complex and loosely worded Regulations and also show the mind of SEBI on how it views the Regulations. The Regulations will, of course, always rule as law but in the field of Securities Laws such supporting material has always been relevant and indeed they enrich the law.

Let us now consider some important FAQs.

DO THE REGULATIONS APPLY ALSO TO DEALINGS IN DERIVATIVES, DEBENTURES, ETC.?

The common understanding of insider trading may be that the Regulations cover dealings in equity shares. This also makes general sense since it is typically equity shares that are affected by release of material information. For example, a jump in the performance of the company affects the price of its equity shares.

However, the Regulations refer to ‘securities’ and not merely to ‘equity shares’. The term ‘securities’ is very widely defined and includes shares of all types, derivatives, debt securities, etc. Thus, the FAQs clarify that such other types of securities (except units of mutual funds) are also covered by the Regulations. Dealings in ADRs / GDRs are also clarified to be covered.

CREATION / INVOCATION / REVOCATION OF PLEDGE AND OTHER FORM OF CHARGE ON SECURITIES

It is common for shareholders to raise loans against their securities or otherwise offer such securities as security for various obligations. The securities are thus subjected to a charge which may be a pledge, a hypothecation, etc. The question is whether the creation (as also the invocation / revocation) of such a charge would amount to ‘dealing’ which is regulated?

On first impression, it would appear counter-intuitive that such acts should be regulated. Pledging of the shares does not result in transfer of risk and reward. If the price of the shares rises or falls, it would be on account of the shareholder; unlike a sale where the risks and rewards get transferred. However, an insider in possession of UPSI may, for example, pledge his shares and obtain a loan. Once the UPSI is released, which, say, is seriously negative news, the price of the shares may fall sharply. The lender thus may suffer as he will not be able to recover his loan even if he had kept a margin.

A ‘Note’ to the definition of ‘trading’ clarifies that this would include pledging, etc., while in possession of UPSI. The FAQs make this clear even further. Thus, creation, etc., of such a charge while in possession of UPSI would amount to dealing that is prohibited. However, the FAQs clarify that under certain specified circumstances such acts are permitted but it would be up to the pledger / pledgee to demonstrate that they were bona fide and prove their innocence.

CONTRA TRADES

As explained earlier, the Regulations attack the evil on several fronts. One of them is by way of ban on short-term trading by insiders which is also known as entering into contra trades within a specified period.

The basic rule is that an insider should not deal in the securities of the company on the basis of UPSI. However, to find him guilty of such an act, SEBI would have to prove several aspects. To avoid this, certain designated insiders have been banned from entering into contra trades within six months. To put this a little simply, if he purchases shares today, he cannot sell shares for six months. And vice versa. This places a brake on insiders doing quick trading which can expectedly be on the basis of UPSI.

However, some aspects are not clear and the FAQs have been released to clarify them.

Can such an insider buy a derivative and then reverse it within six months? The FAQs say he cannot, unless the closure of the derivative is by physical delivery. In other words, if he buys a future for, say, X number of shares, he can close the future by taking delivery and making the payment. However, he cannot close the future by selling it. This again makes sense because buying and selling futures / options may expectedly be on the basis of UPSI.

Can such an insider acquire shares by exercise of ESOPs and then sell them within six months? The FAQs says he can. The FAQs make some further clarifications. If he buys equity shares from the market on, say, 1st January and then acquires further equity shares by exercise of ESOPs, he can sell the shares acquired through ESOPs any time but he cannot sell the shares acquired from the market till 1st July. This would appear a little strange since usually both the categories of shares may be in the same demat account and hence not capable of being distinguished.

Then, the question is would the acquisition of shares through rights issues or public issue also amount to acquisition whereby one cannot sell the shares for the following six months? The FAQs clarify that you cannot sell the shares for such period.

Further, it is clarified that the ban on contra trades would apply not just to the designated insiders but also to their immediate relatives collectively.

IMMEDIATE RELATIVES

It is common, particularly in India, that family investment decisions are made by one person or at least jointly. One person may thus take decisions for himself / herself and other family members such as spouse, parents, children and even further. It would also be very easy for an insider to avoid the ban on trading on himself by trading in the name of a family member. Thus, the definition of insider for specified categories includes trading by ‘immediate relatives’ and they, too, are subject to certain similar regulations.
The question then is, who is an ‘immediate relative’? The definition under the Regulations creates two categories. One is the spouse, the other category is of the parent, sibling and child of such person or his / her spouse who is financially dependent on such person or consults such person while making an investment decision. The ‘Note’ to this definition clarifies this is a deeming fiction and hence rebuttable. The FAQs further emphasise this.
This clarification is important because often, being a mere relative does not necessarily mean that their dealings are in consultation with or even known to other members. A parent may not even know what are the dealings in securities of the child, particularly when the child is an adult, maybe with his own family. The same principle extends to siblings. Even spouses may want to carry out their own dealings. Hence, it would not be fair to extend an inflexible rule covering dealings of all relatives. Nevertheless, it would be more reasonable to expect, particularly in circumstances in India, that dealings of relatives are more likely based on information accessed by the insider. However, the insider can rebut this deeming fiction and establish that such persons do not consult him for their investment decisions and are not financially dependent on him.
CONCLUSION

Insider trading is not only an evil in the securities markets, but being held guilty of insider trading carries its own stigma. A person with such a track record may not get a job again in a reputed company. Investors, particularly those who are close to listed companies, would have to be familiar with the intricacies of these widely-framed Regulations so that they are not held liable under them. A Chartered Accountant in his professional dealings is very often an insider or deemed to be so by legal fiction. He may be a statutory or internal auditor, Independent Director, Adviser, Chief Financial Officer, financial adviser, merchant banker, etc., of listed companies. With his financial expertise, he would also typically deal in securities. Or he may simply park his savings in securities for his retirement. He would have to be even more careful in his dealings. The FAQs issued by SEBI thus help particularly the conservative investor who would educate himself and wade through the minefield of these Regulations safely.
 

EMPOWERING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS

BACKGROUND
The concept of Independent Directors (IDs) had emerged from the need to have a certain number of Directors on the Board who would think and act independently and to bring a healthy balance between the interests of the promoters and those of other stakeholders, including minority and small shareholders. IDs are an important component in the overall framework of corporate governance.

SEBI has, over the years, strengthened the institution of IDs through the recommendations of various committees. But despite several measures, concerns about the efficacy of IDs have continued. To further strengthen the overall framework of IDs for equity listed entities, the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (‘Listing Regulations’) have been amended with effect from 1st January, 2022. The Listing Regulations have further been amended to specifically empower the IDs of ‘high value debt listed entity1’ which would apply on a ‘comply or explain’ basis until 31st March, 2023, and on a mandatory basis thereafter. This article seeks to provide an overview of the key aspects emanating from these amendments and the key considerations for the companies and the governance professionals.

DEFINITION OF AN ID

Regulation 16 of the Listing Regulations sets out certain objective conditions for determination of the independence of an ID. These conditions include areas of pecuniary relationship of self and of relatives with the listed entity, its promoter, or directors, etc. SEBI observed that scope exits to further strengthen the criteria for independence of IDs and harmonisation of certain requirements under the Listing Regulations, e.g., a cooling-off period while assessing the eligibility conditions for an ID. Further, an ID is also defined u/s 149 of the 2013 Act which provides that relatives of a proposed ID cannot have any pecuniary relationship including the pecuniary relationships as prescribed therein. The existing Listing Regulations do not provide a list of such pecuniary relationships. Hence, the definition of an ID under the 2013 Act and under the Listing Regulations is different.

To address the above concerns, especially harmonisation of requirements, SEBI has amended the Listing Regulations and has also inserted additional criteria as follows:

  •  Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID, apart from receiving Director’s remuneration, should not have / had any material pecuniary relationship with the prescribed entities, including the listed entity, its holding and subsidiaries during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Listing Regulations has been amended to extend the cooling-off period to three immediately preceding financial years. Let us consider the following example to better understand the amendment:

Ms Z is proposed to be appointed as an ID in Company XYZ in F.Y. 2021-2022. She noticed that in January, 2019 she had had a material pecuniary relationship (other than remuneration) with Company XYZ. As per the existing provisions, Ms Z could have been appointed as an ID as the relationship existed prior to the cooling-off period of two years. However, since the cooling-off has been extended to three years, she cannot be appointed as an ID.

  • Section 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act provides that a person cannot be appointed as an ID whose relatives have pecuniary relationships / transactions with the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or their promoters, or directors including holding any security of or interest and being indebted (in excess of the prescribed amount) during the immediately preceding two financial years or during the current financial year. Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations does not prescribe a list of the pecuniary relationships similar to that provided under the 2013 Act but simply states that the relatives of such proposed ID should not have / had pecuniary relationship during the two immediately preceding financial years or during the current financial year in excess of the prescribed amount.

The list of pecuniary relationships as provided u/s 149(6)(d) of the 2013 Act has been incorporated in Regulation 16(1)(b)(v) of the Listing Regulations – with certain modifications; e.g., the period for determining pecuniary relationship is stated as three immediately preceding financial years (under the 2013 Act – two immediately preceding financial years), and the lower threshold (as per existing norms) for determining pecuniary relationship of relatives has been retained. Let’s understand these key differences with the help of the following examples:

– While assessing his eligibility conditions, Mr. Y noticed that one of his relative owes Rs. 60 lakhs to the Holding Company of the Company ABC. Company ABC is proposing to appoint Mr. Y as an ID in F.Y. 2021-2022. Mr. Y considered that the pecuniary relationships are permitted to the extent of the following:

Under the 2013 Act

Rs.

 

Under the Listing
Regulations (lower of following)

Rs.

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

2% or more of gross turnover / income

90 lakhs

 

Another threshold

50 lakhs

In the above situation the balance outstanding from the relatives is within the permissible limits under the 2013 Act. However, the outstanding is in excess of the limit prescribed under the Listing Regulations. Hence, Mr. Y cannot be appointed as an ID.

– Mr. X is assessing the eligibility conditions for his proposed appointment as an ID in Company DEF in March, 2022. He noticed that during F.Y. 2018-2019 one of his relatives held equity shares of the Company whose face value exceeded the permissible limit prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. A cooling-off period of two years and three years, respectively, has been prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Listing Regulations. Accordingly, in this case even though the requirement of the two-year cooling period under the 2013 Act is met, Mr. X cannot be appointed as an ID because his relative had held securities during the three-year cooling period prescribed under the Listing Regulations.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations provides that a proposed ID is a person who (neither himself nor whose relatives) holds or has held the position of a key managerial personnel or is or has been an employee of the listed entity or its holding, subsidiary or associate company in any of the three financial years immediately preceding the financial year in which he is proposed to be appointed. The amended Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) of the Listing Regulations extends the restriction to employment in any promoter group company. However, the proviso to the Regulation further provides that the cooling-off period will not apply to relatives in employment of the stated entities, provided that they do not hold the position of a key managerial personnel. Accordingly, where relatives of a person holds employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) in the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary, or associate company or any company belonging to the promoter group of the listed entity in the preceding three financial years, such person can be appointed as an ID. The following example illustrates the amendment for better understanding:

While assessing her eligibility conditions, Ms Q noticed that her spouse is the Managing Director in a promoter group company of Company LMQ which is proposing her appointment as an ID in February, 2022. Since a relative of the proposed ID holds the position of a key managerial personnel in a promoter group company, Ms Q cannot be appointed as an ID in Company LMQ. If her spouse held an employment (other than the position of a key managerial personnel) such as Sales Executive, she can be appointed as an ID pursuant to the relaxation as per the proviso to Regulation 16(1)(b)(vi) stated above.

  • Regulation 16(1)(b)(viii) of the Listing Regulations provides that ID is a person who is not a non-independent director of another company on the Board of which any non-independent director of the listed entity is an ID. An explanation has now been inserted to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a body corporate that has been mandated to constitute its board of directors in a specific manner as per the law under which it is established, the non-executive directors on its Board would be treated as IDs. Similar requirement has also been prescribed for ‘high value debt listed entity’ which is a Trust.

• Pursuant to the amendment, the
Listing Regulation now provides a uniform cooling period of three years
across all eligibility conditions. Such a uniform cooling-off period strikes
a healthy balance of having a reasonable cooling-off period while also
upholding the independence of the proposed ID.

 

• It might be also noted that the
above amendments would require the listed entity to obtain revised
declaration of independence from the IDs since Regulation 25(8) of the
Listing Regulations requires IDs to provide such declaration whenever there
is any change in the circumstances which may affect the status as an ID.
Consequently, as required by Regulation 25(9), the Board of Directors would
be required to take on record such a declaration after undertaking due
assessment.

ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY IN THE ROLE OF THE NRC

At present, Regulation 19(1)(c) of the Listing Regulations provides that the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) should comprise of at least 50% of IDs and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares 2/3rd of the NRC should comprise of IDs. SEBI felt that there is a need to strengthen the composition of IDs in the NRC in order to reduce dependence on the promoters. Accordingly, Regulation 19(1)(c) was amended to provide that ‘at least 2/3rd’ of the Directors in the NRC of all listed companies (including listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise of IDs. Let’s understand this amendment though the following example:

The NRC of Company DEF comprises six members – with equal representation by IDs and other Directors. Company DEF does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. Hence the representation of IDs should be increased from the existing three to four IDs – so that 2/3rd of the NRC comprises IDs pursuant to the revised norms as stated above.

Clause A to Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations provides that the role of the NRC includes formulation of the criteria for determining qualifications and positive attributes of a Director. Notwithstanding such requirements, SEBI was of the view that there is a lack of transparency in the process followed by NRCs. Therefore, a need exists to prescribe disclosures for selection of candidates for the post of an ID. These disclosures are expected to increase the transparency in the functioning of NRCs and would also be good from the governance perspective. SEBI accordingly introduced Clause 1A in Part D to Schedule II of the Listing Regulations to provide that:

  •     For every appointment of an ID, the NRC should evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience on the Board of Directors;
  •     On the basis of such evaluation, the NRC should prepare a description of the role and capabilities of an ID. The person recommended to the Board for appointment should have the capabilities identified in such description;
  •     The NRC has the option of using the services of external agencies to consider candidates from a wide range of backgrounds (having due regard to diversity) and consider the time commitments of the candidates.

SEBI also introduced Regulation 36(f) in the Listing Regulations to provide that the shareholders’ notice should include the disclosures regarding the skills and capabilities required for the role and the manner in which the proposed person meets such requirements.

Further, amendments were made to Regulation 36(d) to provide that the shareholders’ notice for appointment of a new Director or reappointment of a Director should include the names of listed entities from which the person has resigned in the past three years.

• The Listing Regulations has
increased the number of IDs required in the NRC. Therefore, in case the NRC
of a listed entity does not meet the revised requirement, the NRC should be
reconstituted.

 

• The revised role of the NRC establishes
additional processes for appointment of an ID. As per the amended Schedule II
the NRC will be required to consider candidates from a wide range of
backgrounds. The databank of IDs as established under the 2013 Act might act
as a good reference point for selecting potential candidates.

COMPOSITION OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

The Listing Regulations cast specific responsibilities on the Audit Committee to review financial information, scrutinise inter-corporate loans and investments and the valuation of undertakings and assets of the listed entity, etc. At present, Regulation 18(1)(b) of the Listing Regulations provides that 2/3rd of the members of the Audit Committee should comprise of IDs, and for listed companies having outstanding superior rights equity shares the Audit Committee should comprise only of IDs. SEBI has amended this Regulation to provide that the Audit Committee of listed companies (which do not have outstanding superior rights equity shares) should comprise ‘at least 2/3rd of IDs’ instead of the existing composition of ‘2/3rd of IDs’. The amendment in the provision
relating to the constitution of the Audit Committee prescribes for a ‘minimum requirement’ of 2/3rd of the Committee to be comprised of IDs, thus allowing companies to appoint more IDs as members of the Committee. This amendment may not necessitate reconstitution of the Audit Committee.

For example, the Audit Committee of Company PQR comprises six members – four IDs and two other Directors. Company PQR does not have outstanding superior rights equity shares. So it can continue with the present composition of the Audit Committee as it has the minimum number of IDs in the Audit Committee as per the revised Regulations. Since the revised Regulations prescribe the minimum composition, Company PQR may choose to appoint a higher number of IDs on the Audit Committee.

Regulation 23(2) of the Listing Regulations provides that all related party transactions require prior approval of the Audit Committee. SEBI felt a need to further enhance the scrutiny around related party transactions. Accordingly, a proviso was added to Regulation 23(2) which provides that only those members of the Audit Committee who are IDs should approve related party transactions.

As per the revised norms, only those
members of the Audit Committee who are IDs can approve related party
transactions. There may be transactions which have either been approved prior
to the effective date of the amendment, or there might be modifications to
the terms and conditions of existing related party transactions, thereby
requiring approval of the Audit Committee. Listed entities would need to
assess whether these transactions would require
approval of the Audit Committee as per the
amended provisions.

APPOINTMENT, REAPPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF IDS

Appointment of an ID is made through an ordinary resolution in a general meeting of a company as provided u/s 152(2) of the 2013 Act. However, reappointment of an ID requires the passing of a special resolution by the company. SEBI felt that the present framework of appointment of IDs may be influenced by the promoters – in recommending the name of IDs and in the approval process by virtue of their shareholding. This may hinder the independence of IDs and undermine their ability to differ from the promoter, especially in cases where the interests of the promoter and of the minority shareholders are not aligned. Additionally, considering that the role of IDs includes protecting the interests of minority shareholders, there is a need for minority shareholders to have a greater say in the appointment / reappointment process of IDs.

Accordingly, to give more say to the minority shareholders in the simplest manner possible, SEBI introduced Regulation 25(2A) in the Listing Regulations to extend the requirement to obtain shareholders’ approval through a special resolution for appointment and removal of an ID. Thus, as per the revised requirements, the appointment, reappointment or removal of an ID should be subject to the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution.

APPROVAL OF SHAREHOLDERS WITHIN A STIPULATED TIMEFRAME

As per the current practice, companies appoint IDs as additional directors, subject to approval of the shareholders at the next general meeting. It is, therefore, possible that a person gets appointed as an additional ID just after an Annual General Meeting and then serves on the Board of Directors, without shareholder approval, till the next Annual General Meeting. SEBI also observed that there have been cases in the past where the shareholders have rejected the appointment of IDs even while these IDs had served on the Board for a few months. Hence, SEBI felt that reduction / elimination of the time gap may give more say to the shareholders in the appointment process. Further, in order to bring consistency and ease of compliance, SEBI felt that such a time frame may also be applied to approval of appointment of all Directors including IDs, Executive Directors, Non-Executive Directors, etc.

Accordingly, Regulation 17(1C) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that approval of shareholders for appointment of any person (including that arising due to casual vacancy) on the Board of Directors should be taken at the next general meeting or within three months from the date of appointment, whichever is earlier.

The revised norms require a listed
company to obtain shareholders’ approval at the next general meeting or
within three months from the date of appointment of the ID, whichever is
earlier. An issue arises where a person has been appointed as an ID (say in
November, 2021) but the shareholder approval is pending. The next general
meeting is expected to be held in September, 2022. One might argue that in
this case the shareholders’ approval should be obtained within three months
from the effective date of the amendments, i.e., by 31st March,
2022. However, under this approach the time gap between approval by the Board
and shareholders’ approval would exceed the time period prescribed under the
Listing Regulations. An authoritative clarification would be required from
SEBI to address these situations.

INSURANCE FOR IDS

The top 500 listed entities by market capitalisation are required under Regulation 25(10) of the Listing Regulations to undertake Directors and Officers insurance (‘D and O insurance’) for all IDs of such quantum and for such risks as may be determined by their Board of Directors. SEBI considered that due to increased expectation from IDs and the heightened regulatory scrutiny, adequate protection under a proper D and O insurance policy will help IDs perform their duties more effectively. Thus, the requirement of mandatory D and O insurance should be extended to a wider group of listed entities. Accordingly, SEBI has decided that with effect from 1st January, 2022 the requirement of undertaking D and O Insurance would be extended to the top 1,000 companies by market capitalisation.

The Listing Regulations were further amended to provide that a ‘high value debt listed entity’ should undertake D and O insurance for all its IDs for such sum assured and for such risks as may be determined by its Board of Directors.

COOLING OFF PERIOD – TRANSITION OF AN ID TO AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The current provisions as prescribed under Schedule III (Part A)(A)(7B)(i) require the resigning ID (within seven days of resignation) to disclose to the stock exchanges detailed reasons for the resignation along with a confirmation that there are no other material reasons for resignation other than those already provided. SEBI observed that IDs often resign for reasons such as preoccupation, other commitments or personal reasons, and then join the Boards of other companies. There is, therefore, a need to further strengthen the regulations around the resignation of IDs.

Hence, Schedule III was amended to provide for disclosure of the resignation letter of an ID along with the names of listed entities in which the resigning Director holds Directorships, indicating the category of Directorship and membership of Board committees, if any. It may be noted that the new requirement to disclose the entire resignation letter is only an extension of the existing requirements which require disclosure of detailed reasons for resignation along with a confirmation as aforesaid.

SEBI also observed cases where IDs have resigned and have then joined the same company as Executive Directors. While there may be valid reasons for transition from an ID to an Executive Director, such instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in the company in the near future may practically lead to a compromise in independence. SEBI felt that a cooling-off period should be prescribed to reduce potential impairments to an ID’s impartiality in decision-making in instances where an ID knows that he / she may move to a larger role in certain companies in the near future.

Thus, Regulation 25(11) was introduced in the Listing Regulations to provide that an ID who has resigned from a listed entity cannot be appointed as an Executive / Whole-time Director on the Board of the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company or on the Board of a company belonging to its promoter group, unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of resignation as an ID.

The amended Regulation provides a
cooling-off period of one year in case of resignation by an ID. However, such
cooling-off period has not been prescribed where the ID is appointed as an
Executive
Director post expiry of his
term as an ID.

TIME-PERIOD FOR FILLING UP CASUAL VACANCY OF IDS

As per Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations, an ID who resigns or is removed should be replaced by a new ID at the earliest but not later than the immediate next meeting of the Board of Directors, or three months from the date of such vacancy, whichever is later. However, the time limit for filling of a casual vacancy prescribed under the 2013 Act [Schedule IV (VI)(2)] is different, i.e., three months from the date of resignation / removal. In order to avoid inconsistency, SEBI has modified Regulation 25(6) of the Listing Regulations to align the time limits prescribed under the 2013 Act.

THE WAY FORWARD

 

• Listed companies might encounter
implementation challenges emanating from these amendments – some of them have
been highlighted above. Hence it is important that the listed companies
should engage with governance professionals, including auditors, to iron out
these challenges.

 

• Apart from the above amendments, SEBI
in its Board Meeting held on 29th June, 2021 had also decided to
make a reference to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for giving greater
flexibility to companies while deciding the remuneration for all Directors
(including IDs), which may include profit-linked commissions, sitting fees,
ESOPs, etc., within the overall prescribed limit specified under the 2013
Act. At present, ESOPs to IDs are prohibited under the Listing Regulations
and the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the implementation of the SEBI decision would
require modifications to the Listing Regulations and also to the 2013 Act.
Any positive development on this aspect would enable listed companies to
attract and / or retain talented IDs.
 

ACCREDITED INVESTORS – A NEW AVENUE FOR RAISING FINANCE

SEBI has, at its Board meeting of 29th June, 2021, taken some baby steps to introduce and recognise a new category of investors – the Accredited Investors (‘AIs’) who are persons of high net worth / income. This has been followed up by amendments to the respective SEBI regulations on 3rd August, 2021. These changes should open up a new and wide channel of raising finance from informed and capable investors, particularly in areas where the present regulations are too restrictive.

This is not a new concept internationally. Many countries such as the USA, Canada, Singapore and even China have provisions for such a category of persons who are deemed to be well aware, if not sophisticated, and also having sufficient net worth so as to be able to bear losses in risky investments. Many rules are relaxed for such persons and issuers / intermediaries are able to issue complex, high risk / high return products to such persons at terms that are mutually agreed rather than statutorily prescribed. Thus, on the one hand, entities that cannot otherwise raise finance without crossing many hurdles can now raise finance more easily from such persons, on the other hand, such persons have wider avenues of investments to aim for higher returns at risks which they understand and can even manage.

In other words, AIs are expected to be sophisticated high net worth investors who do not need elaborate hand-holding by the regulator. They can evaluate complex, high risk / high return products / services and negotiate terms flexibly to protect their interests.

COMPLEX SEBI REGULATIONS AIMED AT THE NAÏVE AND UNSOPHISTICATED INVESTOR

SEBI’s regulations generally are models of micro-management. Having seen small investors repeatedly suffering in their investments, and perhaps also considering the reality of Indian markets, the rules in capital markets tend to bend towards elaborate controls. Parties generally cannot, even by mutual agreement, waive the many requirements of law enacted for the protection of investors.

A portfolio manager, for example, cannot accept a client with less than Rs. 50 lakhs of investment even if the client is well informed / capable. He also cannot invest more than 25% of the portfolio in unlisted securities under discretionary management, even if the client is agreeable to this. Similarly, Alternative Investment Funds have restrictions which cannot be avoided. Investment Advisers, too, face a very elaborate set of rules which govern almost every aspect of their business, including even the fees that they can charge. Thus, even if an informed client is willing to pay higher fees to get expert advice, the investment adviser is limited by the regulations.

The result of all this is that needy issuers are starved of funds and well-informed investors deprived of avenues with the potential of higher returns.

CONSULTATION PAPER ISSUED IN FEBRUARY, 2021

SEBI had initiated this process in February, 2021 by issuing a consultation paper proposing a framework for AIs and seeking public comments. This has now been finalised and amendments accordingly made to the regulations relating to Alternative Investment Funds, Portfolio Managers and Investment Advisers.

Who would be recognised as Accredited Investors?
As per the new framework, a person can obtain a certificate as an AI on the basis of net worth / assets or income, or a combination of the two. For example, an individual / HUF / family trust can be an AI if its annual income is at least Rs. 2 crores or net worth is at least Rs. 7.50 crores, with at least half of it in financial assets. Or it can be a combination of at least Rs. 1 crore annual income and net worth of Rs. 5 crores (with at least half in financial assets).

For other trusts, a net asset worth of at least Rs. 50 crores can qualify them as AIs. For corporates, too, a net worth of Rs. 50 crores is necessary. A partnership firm would be eligible if each partner is individually eligible. Similar parameters are provided for non-residents such as non-resident Indians, family trusts / other trusts, corporates, etc. Government departments, development agencies and Qualified Institutional Buyers, etc., would be AIs without any such minimum requirements.

Interestingly, a further category of AIs has been specified, viz., Large Value Accredited Investors. This would apply in case of Portfolio Managers and would be persons who have agreed to invest at least Rs. 10 crores.

A strange aspect is that, unlike some countries in the West, SEBI has not permitted educated / experienced investors to qualify as AIs. Indeed, having qualification or experience is not deemed to be even relevant! Thus, for example, Chartered Accountants or even CFAs, though trained to be well-versed with finance, cannot only by virtue of the fact of being qualified and competent, be recognised as AIs. They can act as advisers to AIs, but not be AIs themselves, unless they have the minimum size of assets / income.

Further, again unlike many western countries, merely having a minimum income / net worth is not enough. A formal certification as an AI is needed from certain bodies recognised for this purpose. A fee would have to be paid to them for grant of such a certificate. Curiously, although the details have not been notified, it appears from the Consultation Paper that the certificate is likely to be valid only for one year at a time and will have to be renewed annually.

The Consultation Paper had proposed yet another strange condition. Persons who desire to provide financial products / advice to AIs would not only need to obtain a copy of such a certificate from the AIs, but will also need to additionally approach the certifying agency and reconfirm with them. This would be a needless additional hurdle. Hopefully, the process may actually end up being simpler with such confirmation being quickly provided online on an automated basis after due verification by the certifying agency. However, it would be best that this requirement is not mandated when the further details are notified.

Nature of relaxations from regulations available for transactions with AIs
While ideally, an informed and capable investor should not face any hurdles in his decision-making power for making investments, even if the provisions are meant for protection, there will not be total relaxation. Instead, perhaps with the intention of testing the waters and going in gradually, SEBI has given partial relaxation from the regulations. In fact, the relaxations as proposed are few and far between. The minimum investment required, the terms on which contracts of providing services can be made, the fees that can be charged, the extent to which investments in unlisted securities can be made, etc., are some relaxations proposed.

The amendments are primarily made in the SEBI regulations governing Alternative Investment Funds, Portfolio Managers and Investment Advisers. The Consultation Paper / SEBI Board meeting has talked of amendments to other regulations, too, and it is possible that more changes may be made in the near future.

BENEFITS OF THE NEW CONCEPT
The new scheme can be expected to benefit intermediaries, investors and indeed the market. They would have more freedom to enter into arrangements and investments with risks and complexities that they are comfortable with. It should also result in availability of far more funds, from many more persons and by many more issuers. Today, many such investments simply cannot take place because of protective legal requirements. There would also be more flexibility for the parties involved. The amendments also create a sub-category of AIs called Large Value Accredited Investors, as also a separate category of fund called Large Value Fund for Accredited Investors. These would enable further flexibility to larger investors who expectedly can undertake more informed risks.

Can an AI opt out of the scheme either generally or on a case-to-case basis?
There are a few other concerns. Even if a person is an AI, he may not always want to waive the regulatory protection. He may have more than the prescribed size of net worth, etc. However, in certain cases, he may prefer not to invest as an AI. It seems that there is no bar on him from opting out.

However, care would have to be taken in the paperwork / agreements to ensure that there is no inadvertent waiver. It is common, however, that investors end up signing on the dotted line on long documents containing fine print. This is even more important considering that the benchmark for being an AI is only financial and not knowledge / qualifications.

An interesting issue would still remain as to whether, in case of disputes, his being an AI could be used against him and he be assumed to be an informed and sophisticated investor.
Whether SEBI would be available as arbiter in case of disputes / malpractices?

The intention clearly is that parties should be able to negotiate their own terms and formulate such structures, even if complex and high risk, as they are comfortable with. The regulations that otherwise provide for mandatory detailed terms would not apply. The question then would be what would be the role of SEBI in case of disputes between AIs and issuers / intermediaries? In particular, whether SEBI would still be available as arbiter in case of malpractices? Or will the parties have to approach civil courts which are expensive and time-consuming? One hopes that at least in case of frauds, manipulations, gross negligence and the like, recourse to SEBI would still be available as SEBI continues to be an expert and generally swift-footed regulator.

CONCLUSION


Despite some concerns, the amendments are still a major reform in the capital markets. Considering that the relaxations are generally partial, the level of complexity may actually increase. One can now only wait and see how the experience turns out to be over the years and how SEBI deals with the issues that would arise.
(You can also refer to the Article on Accredited Investors on Page 31 of BCAJ,  August, 2021) 

CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TRAPPED IN A LEGAL LABYRINTH (Part – 3)

Over the last two months, this Feature has examined the legal background surrounding cryptocurrencies and FEMA provisions in relation to Virtual Currencies (VCs). In this, the concluding part, we take up the tax issues pertaining to this exciting new asset class

LEGALITY STILL IN DOUBT
The legality of VCs in India continues to be a question mark. As recently as on 10th August, 2021, the Minister of State for Finance gave a written reply in the Rajya Sabha stating that the Government does not consider cryptocurrencies legal tender or coin and will take all measures to eliminate use of these crypto-assets in financing illegitimate activities or as part of the payment system. The Government will also explore the use of blockchain technology proactively for ushering in a digital economy. He added that a high-level Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) constituted under the Chairmanship of the Secretary (Economic Affairs) to study the issues related to VCs and propose specific actions to be taken, had recommended in its report that all private cryptocurrencies, except any cryptocurrency issued by the State, be prohibited in India. The Government would take a decision on the recommendations of the IMC and the legislative proposal, if any, would be introduced in the Parliament.

Coupled with this is the action taken by the Enforcement Directorate against a crypto exchange in India on the grounds of money-laundering. The accusation was that the exchange was facilitating some Chinese betting apps which converted their Indian earnings into VCs and then transferred the same to digital wallets based in the Cayman Islands.

In spite of the above regulatory heat, the popularity of VCs and crypto exchanges is growing by the day and a crypto exchange has now even entered the Unicorn club!

However, in the midst of the regulatory hullabaloo and the hype over VCs, one must not lose sight of the fact that at the end of the day tax must be paid on all earnings from VCs. The Income-tax Act is not concerned with the legality of a trade. In CIT vs. S.C. Kothari [1972] 4 SCC 402 it was observed that: ‘…If the business is illegal, neither the profits earned nor the losses incurred would be enforceable in law. But that does not take the profits out of the taxing statute.’

Again, in CIT vs. K. Thangamani [2009] 309 ITR 15 (Mad), the Madras High Court held that the income-tax authorities are not concerned about the manner or means of acquiring income. The income might have been earned illegally or by resorting to unlawful means. But any illegality associated with the earning has no bearing on its taxability. The assessee, having acquired income by unethical means or by resorting to acts forbidden by law, cannot be heard to say that the State cannot be a party to such sharing of ill-gotten wealth. Allowing such income to escape the tax net would be nothing but a premium or reward to a person for doing an illegal trade. In the event of taxing the income of only those who had acquired the same in a legal manner, the tendency of those who acquire income by illegal means would increase. It is not possible for the Income-tax authorities to act like the police to prevent the commission of unlawful acts, but it is possible for the tax machinery to tax such income.

The Finance Ministry in reply to a question raised in the Rajya Sabha has stated that irrespective of the nature of business, the extant statutory provisions on the scope of total income for taxation as per section 5 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 envisage that total income shall include all income from whatever source derived, the legality of income thus being of no consequence. The gains arising from the transfer of cryptocurrencies / assets is liable to tax under a head of income, depending upon the nature of holding of the same. It further stated that no data is maintained on cryptocurrency earnings of Indians as there is no provision in the Income-tax return to capture data on earnings arising from cryptocurrencies / assets.

Accordingly, irrespective of whether a crypto trade is legal or illegal, we need to examine its taxability. Let us briefly analyse the same. At the outset, it may be noted that since this is an evolving subject, there is no settled view and hence an attempt has been made to present all the possible views.

TAXABILITY OF TRADERS IN VCs
Whether a particular asset is a capital asset or a stock-in-trade has been one of the burning issues under the Income-tax Act. Section 2(14) defines the term ‘capital asset’ to mean property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession, but it does not include any stock-in-trade. Hence, a stock-in-trade of any nature, whether securities, land or VCs, would be outside the purview of a capital asset.

People who trade in VCs, i.e., frequently buy and sell cryptos, are as much traders in VCs as a person dealing in shares and securities. The usual tests laid down to distinguish a trader from an investor would apply even in the case of VCs. Hence, tests such as intention at the time of purchase, frequency of trades, quantum, regularity, accounting treatment, amount of stock held on hand, whether purchase and sale take place in quick succession, whether borrowed funds have been used for the purchase, etc., are all relevant tests to help determine whether a person is a dealer / trader in VCs or an investor. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Associated Industrial Development Company (P) Ltd. 82 ITR 586 (SC) in the context of securities would be equally relevant even in the case of VCs. The Court held that whether a particular holding is by way of investment or forms part of the stock-in-trade is a matter which is within the knowledge of the assessee who holds the asset and it should, in normal circumstances, be in a position to produce evidence from its records as to whether it has maintained any distinction between those shares which are its stock-in-trade and those which are held by way of investment.

The CBDT Circular No. 4/2007, dated 15th June, 2007 and Circular No. 6/2016 dated 29th February, 2016, issued in the context of taxability of gains on sale of securities would assist in determining the issue even for VCs.

If a person is a trader in VCs, then any gain made by him would be taxable as business income. The purchase price of the VCs would be allowed as a deduction even if the Government / RBI takes a stand that trading in VCs is illegal.

One school of thought also suggests that since there is no actual delivery involved in the case of VCs, transactions in VCs should be treated as a speculative transaction u/s 43(5). But it would be incorrect to say that delivery is not given in case of VCs because they are credited to a digital wallet. Delivery need not always be physical and could even be constructive or symbolic and should be seen in the context of the goods in question. However, this could become a litigious issue. For example, shares in dematerialised format are credited to a demat account and not physically delivered. Similarly, mutual fund units only appear in a statement.

Section 43(5) states that any commodity in which a contract for the purchase / sale is settled otherwise than by an actual delivery or transfer of the commodity, would be treated as a speculative transaction. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India, WP(C) No. 528/2018, order dated 4th March, 2020 (SC) has held that it was not possible to accept the contention that VCs were just goods / commodities and could never be regarded as real money! Thus, while the Court has not come to a definite conclusion, the fact that VCs are commodities has been upheld by the Apex Court. In such a scenario, could the trading in VCs be treated as a speculative business? If so, then the losses from this business can only be set off against speculative gains u/s 73 of the Act, and the losses to the extent not set off can be carried forward only for four assessment years. Yet another school of thought suggests that the profits from trading in VCs should be taxed as Income from Other Sources.

TAXABILITY OF INVESTORS IN VCs
For investors in VCs, the gains would be taxable as capital gains. Depending upon whether the VC in question has been held for a period of more than or less than three years, the VCs would be treated as long-term capital assets or short-term capital assets. Long-term capital gains would be eligible for indexation and would be taxed @ 20% + surcharge + cess. Short-term capital gains, on the other hand, would be taxed as per the regular slab rate applicable to the investor. It must be pointed out that the special concessional tax rates of 10% with grandfathering of the cost for long-term gains in case of listed shares and 15% in the case of short-term gains on listed shares, do not apply to gains on VCs. Any long-term capital gain made on the sale of VCs can be saved by an Individual / HUF by reinvesting the net sale consideration in the purchase / construction of a new house property u/s 54F.

Receiving VCs as payment for goods / services
If a business receives payment for the goods / services sold by it in the form of VCs, then it would be treated as a barter exchange and the fair market value of the VCs received would be treated as the consideration received for the sale / supply. The cost of goods sold / services rendered would be deducted from this consideration and the gains would be taxable as business income.

Payment for mining
One buzzword associated with VCs is ‘mining’. A ‘VC miner’ is like the miner in the coal / gold / ore mine who, through his arduous labour, comes up with a prized catch. A Bitcoin miner is one who solves complex, cryptic math puzzles on the Bitcoin network and makes the network secure by validating the transactions which take place on it. While it is difficult to explain this concept, suffice it to say that miners help in improving the transaction network of VCs. And a miner receives payment in the form of VCs! Now how would this transaction be taxed is the question.

A good way to look at this would be that the miner is actually providing a service by carrying out the mining. Hence, the income from the same should be taxed as his business income. The cost of power, depreciation on IT equipment, maintenance, etc., would all be deductible expenses incurred to earn this income. The fair market value of the VCs received by the miner would be treated as the consideration for the service and the difference would be taxed as his business income. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs is also considering levying GST on mining activities on the ground that these constitute a service. Alternatively, if it is not a business income, it may be taxed as Income from Other Sources.

A more aggressive view is that income from mining consists of capital gains arising from a self-generated asset. This could be used for amateurs who are into VC mining as opposed to miners who carry on the activity as an occupation. Here, applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. B.C. Srinivasa Shetty [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC), a view is taken that since the cost of acquisition of such a self-generated capital asset cannot be determined and that since section 55(2) has not prescribed the cost of acquisition / improvement of the same to be Nil, the income cannot be taxed. It is likely that the Tax Department would contest this view.

Gift of VCs
What would be the tax treatment if a person gifts VCs to another person? A gift of specified property is taxable u/s 56(2)(x) in the hands of the recipient except in the exempt cases. However, the gift must be of property as defined in the Explanation to section 56(2)(x). Property is defined to mean any sum of money, immovable property, shares and securities, jewellery / bullion, art / sculptures and archaeological collections. The Government of India has constantly taken a stand (as explained above) that VCs are not money / legal currency in India. And that VCs are not shares and securities. Thus, VCs are not property as understood u/s 56(2)(x). Accordingly, it stands to reason that the provisions of section 56(2)(x) cannot apply in the hands of a donee who gets a gift of VCs.

Disclosure in Income-tax returns
Any individual / HUF who has annual total income exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs needs to file Schedule AL on Assets and Liabilities in his Income-tax return.

The assets required to be reported in this Schedule include immovable assets (land and building), financial assets, viz., bank deposits, shares and securities, insurance policies, loans and advances given, cash in hand, movable assets, viz., jewellery, bullion, vehicles, yachts, boats, aircraft, etc. Hence, it is an inclusive definition of the term assets. If a person owns VCs, it stands to reason that the same should also be included in the asset disclosures under Schedule AL. The cost price of the VC needs to be disclosed under this Schedule. For a resident who holds VCs credited to an overseas digital wallet / held with a foreign crypto exchange during the previous year, even if he has duly reported them in Schedule FA (foreign assets), he is required to report such foreign assets again in Schedule AL, if applicable.

However, for a non-resident or ‘resident but not ordinarily resident’, only the details of VCs located in India are to be mentioned. It would be interesting to note in the case of VCs how the situs of the asset would be determined.

Another Schedule to be considered is Schedule FA on foreign assets. A resident in India is required to furnish details of any foreign asset held by him in Schedule FA. This Schedule need not be filled up by a ‘not ordinarily resident’ or a ‘non-resident’. The details of all foreign assets or accounts in respect of which a resident is a beneficial owner, a beneficiary or the legal owner, is required to be mandatorily disclosed in the Schedule FA. Tables A1 to G of Schedule FA deal with the disclosures of various foreign assets and comprise of foreign depository accounts – foreign custodian accounts, foreign equity and debt interest, foreign cash value insurance contract or annuity contract, financial interest in any entity outside India, any immovable property outside India, any other capital assets outside India, any other account located outside India in which the resident is a signing authority, etc. The CBDT has not offered any guidance on how foreign VCs should be disclosed. However, in the absence of any clarity the same may be disclosed under either of the following two Tables of Schedule FA:

• Table D – Any other capital assets outside India
• Table E – Any other account located outside India in which the resident assessee is a signing authority (which is not reported in Tables A1 to D).

In Table D, the value of total investment at cost of any other capital asset held at any time during the accounting period and the nature and amount of income derived from the capital asset during the accounting period is required to be disclosed after converting the same into Indian currency. Further, the amount of income which is chargeable to tax in India, out of the foreign source income, should also be specified at column (9). The relevant Schedule of the ITR where income has been offered to tax should be mentioned at columns (10) and (11). The instructions state that for the purposes of disclosure in Table D, capital assets include any other financial asset which is not reported in Table B, but shall not include stock-in-trade and business assets which are included in the balance sheet. Hence, VCs held as stock-in-trade by traders would not be included in this Table.

In Table E, the value of peak balance or total investment at cost, in respect of the accounts in which the assessee has a signing authority, during the accounting period is required to be disclosed after converting the same into Indian currency. Only those foreign accounts which have not been reported in Table A1 to Table D of the Schedule should be reported in Table E.

One school of thought tends to suggest that in the absence of any specific guidance on disclosure under Schedule FA, VCs need not be disclosed. This would be playing with fire. The Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) Act, 2015 levies a penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs for non- / improper disclosures in Schedule FA. Hence, it would be better to err on the safe side and disclose the foreign VCs held.

It should be remembered that even though there is a question mark under FEMA over whether the Liberalised Remittance Scheme can be used for buying foreign VCs, disclosures under Schedule FA should nevertheless be made. Income-tax disclosures and taxation are not dependent upon the permissibility or otherwise of a transaction!

CONCLUSION
The world of cryptocurrencies is of high reward but carries high regulatory risk. This is due to the fact that there are a lot of uncertainties and unknown factors coupled with the apparently hostile attitude of the RBI and the Government towards VCs. People transacting in them should do so with full knowledge of the underlying issues that could arise. The famous Latin maxim ‘Caveat Emptor’ or ‘Buyer Beware’ squarely applies to all transactions involving virtual currencies!

(Concluded)  

INDIA’S MACRO-ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOME MACRO-LEVEL SOLUTIONS

India’s leadership wishes that India be recognised as an economic superpower.

But there is one catch in fulfilling this intent. Can we become an economy that comes in the first five in GDP rankings (although due to our large population, per capita we may still be very low) if we do not really ‘own’ our businesses in financial structures and do not supposedly pay our due share of taxes?

How can there be an entrepreneurial push to an economy when so much of quality time is spent not on expanding business and exploiting opportunities, but on creating ‘suitable business, financial and tax structures’?

Why are Indians considered a model minority culturally overseas when within the country we see examples of businesses defaulting on loans and interest payments with the term ‘wilful defaulter’ being specially coined for them and being accused of ‘tax evasion’?

[Please refer link (as example) – https://wap.business-standard.com/article/companies/around-rs-10-52-trn-corporate-debt-may-default-over-3-years-india-ratings-120030200388_1.html.]

‘Wilful defaulter’ is someone who has the ability to pay but is organising his business with the intent not to pay.

There are two macro-economic and financial problems that India is facing today:
(I) High debt capital gearing, and
(II) Intent of tax evasion (direct and indirect).

(I) High debt capital gearing

A classic case of high capital gearing and borrowings to fund business outcome comes from a major
telecom service provider (source – ‘moneycontrol.com’, standalone financials).

Between the years 2016-17 and 2020-21, this telecom company had these important events:
i)    Increase in equity capital – Rs. 25,130.07 crores;
ii)    Increase in tangible & intangible assets – Rs. 86,637.52 crores;
iii)    Increase in long-term borrowings – Rs. 105,777.67 crores;
iv)    Increase in short-term borrowings – Rs. 39.35 crores;
v)    Losses incurred in this period – Rs. 86,561.43 crores.

One can see that the increase in share capital to fund losses and increase in tangible and intangible assets is much lower than the increase in borrowings. The company has also used operating creditors to fund its business.

In the case of a large Indian entity whose major business is in oil and gas, between the years 2016-17 and 2020-21, the increase in reserves and surplus due to undistributed profits is Rs. 182,980 crores, while the increase in long-term and short-term borrowings is Rs. 92,447 crores. Clearly, there is a good match between increased borrowings and increased profits after tax for the period under review.

‘High Capital Gearing’ in Indian corporates is resulting in a skewed debt to equity ratio. This high debt when not serviced by payments on due dates of interest and principal instalment due, results in the corporate being ultimately called a ‘Non-Performing Asset’ (by bankers as lenders) and the process of recovery of dues starts.

NPAs pose a serious problem for the financial viability of India’s financial lending sector.

(Please see link – https://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/banks-gross-npas-may-rise-to-13-5-by-sept-financial-stability-report-121011200076_1.html.)

NPAs are unfair to the savings class of citizens because they destroy the net worth of banks – very unfairly, the insurance for the individual saving and keeping money in banks is restricted to Rs. 5 lakhs per bank. How this figure of Rs. 5 lakhs has come about is not known. Anybody who has studied Indian middle class savings patterns knows that a very large part of their savings corpus is in bank deposits. More than the borrower being impacted by action against him, the bank customer is hit hard, again very unfairly. Why has the RBI as regulator not thought of protecting the bank depositor by insisting that all deposits should be fully insured for bank default is not known. If the DICGC (Credit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation) which is a 100% subsidiary of RBI does not have the financial muscle to carry the entire risk liability, one can always bring in Indian and overseas insurers for providing the default risk cover.

The issue that needs attention is why do corporates accumulate such high debt (mainly from the banking sector)? The reality is that once the banking sector was opened to private players and long-term funding got opened in foreign exchanges, both the then Development Finance Institutions, ICICI Ltd. and IDBI Ltd., chose to become commercial / retail banks.

As the push for infrastructure came from the Government of India, commercial bankers became financiers of long-term debt (instead of just working capital funding). Bankers who were working capital funding entities started moving into long-term capital funding without truly understanding the implications. The intent of this article is not to comment on fraudulent behaviour or political intervention in sanctioning of loans. That is a different matter and proving of criminal conduct and punishment thereof is outside the scope of this article.

Corporate promoter groups in multiple business types saw an opportunity to draw large debt (facilitated by the financial markets meltdown in 2008 and 2009) and exploited the situation. The absence of the ‘skin in the game’ philosophy resulted in debt being incurred on unmerited and unviable business expansion / extension or new business proposals. In the hope of keeping the engines of growth firing, the banking sector funding went into undependable and unviable projects. Why did banks and financial institutions continue their funding despite ‘High Capital Gearing’ being visible is the question to be asked. The ease of getting borrowings has compounded the problem. Ultimately, the borrower is facilitated and the depositor is ruined!

To be fair, there is no doubt that in many over-leveraged business segments like the realty sector during Covid-19, the business entities have worked towards reducing debt by sale of business, liquidation of assets, etc.

SOLUTION
One part of the solution to avoid ‘High Capital Gearing’ and funding thereof is to have a much better overview of lending proposals and their appraisal at the lenders’ end (banks and financial institutions).

The other part which is systemic in nature is to remove the Income tax shield advantage of interest cost. Any entity has two sources of funds:
1) Shareholders capital – This funding is less popular because returns to shareholders come after corporate or business Income tax.
2) Borrowings – This funding is more popular because interest paid on debt funds is an eligible item of deductible expense, thereby reducing their cost impact for the business.

If a business wishes to give a shareholder dividend of Rs. 1,000 at a corporate income tax rate of 30%, it needs to earn Rs. 1,400+. However, Rs. 1,000 paid as interest on borrowings being eligible for income tax deduction as expense, actually costs Rs. 700 to the business (tax shield Rs. 300).

This business structuring and Income tax differential treatment of interest payment and returns to shareholders post tax, has moved the pendulum unswervingly towards debt from shareholders’ funds. Also, Indian corporate and business management is still very much dependent on family-based promoter groups who clearly would like to keep their exposure to risk at the lowest level. The principle of ‘as little skin in the game’ is followed.

Owing to this family / promoter development in Indian corporates, and maybe because the law is not facilitative enough, we do not have aggressive ‘business control’ wars and that has closed off the option of takeover by a rival if the business is languishing or going down. The IBC comes in much later at the point where insolvency is declared.

This is why in India the promoters’ exposure when business goes down is very low, thanks further to low capital invested. The high risk exposure is taken by the unsecured creditors and debt holders who are the ones taking the ‘haircut’. Hence, we are seeing the way the existing promoter is fighting to retain control of the entity in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy proceedings. Companies languish but don’t die.

(Please see link – https://m.economictimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/view-india-is-no-country-for-dying-companies/articleshow/85552085.cms.)

Our laws and our infrastructure to ensure timely implementation of laws are often not in sync with one another. This is fully exploited by a defaulting promoter. As the late Mr. Arun Jaitley said, ‘There are sick defaulting companies, but no poor promoters’!

Business Income tax should be based on profit before interest and tax, thereby removing the tax shield that is provided by interest. To compensate for this additional tax outgo, the rate on business income tax should be brought down by about 300 to 500 basis points (3 to 5%). By putting both sources of funds, at the same tax treatment level, the incentive to move towards debt and reduce equity contribution should diminish.

(II) Intent of tax evasion (direct and indirect)
There is no point in repeating ad nauseam that as per Finance Ministry Officials Indians evade both direct and indirect tax. Of course, nobody talks of the fact that agricultural income does not come under Income tax and therefore all international comparisons of percentage of direct taxpayers and percentage of total direct tax collection to total tax collected from individual assessees gets terribly vitiated.

GST has tightened indirect tax compliance to a great extent, but it could still do better on compliance matters. It is one thing to keep saying that Indians are tax-evaders and another to create an environment where tax evasion is not contemplated because it gives very marginal advantage.

SOLUTION
The solution is evident from the problem. There is a need to break the Chinese wall separating the Direct Tax Administration from the Indirect Tax Administration. GST has an issue because it is borne by the end customer who gets no credit on tax and it becomes a cost to him. That is why we have the sales without invoice, the unverified composition dealer sales, etc. Where the income tax payer can take GST credit (CGST, SGST, IGST) totally, he will be quite pleased.

The author is not aware whether fungibility between direct and indirect tax is available in other economies. All economies do have direct and indirect tax payment by the ultimate consumer. However, the Indian situation is different. We need to incentivise the ultimate taxpayer so that tax revenues are buoyant.

Amend the tax laws such that a direct tax payer is permitted GST paid on his personal purchases funded by income (taxable) as a credit. The moment this is done, the customer will insist on getting a proper ‘GST Invoice’. Of course, this GST invoice must have the assessee’s name and PAN #or Aadhaar #. Once the GST invoice is made, the details of a GST dealer will be available. A direct tax payer for the sake of taking GST credits on direct tax liability payable, will file his income tax return, thereby increasing the numbers of income tax returns filers.

Increased GST Returns filings will benefit state governments also in SGST and share of IGST.

It is preferred that agriculture income also comes within the income tax net, although this may have serious political consequences and may need to wait for implementation. Farmers buying agriculture equipment, seeds, fertilisers will be benefited.

In fact, if after full GST deduction the income tax assessee has a tax refund, 40% of that should be given / paid to him as incentive and the other 60% stand cancelled.

Our tax authorities (both direct and indirect) will need to do some original tax thinking. Just stating that Indians evade tax is insulting and does not improve tax compliance. Let them think of a solution that is not very convoluted and cumbersome.

The taxpayer must feel advantaged in filing the direct tax return, The authorities have to integrate direct and indirect tax, since the end customer is paying for the same and is the same person.

The answer to both the above serious problems lies in making the final individual taxpayer the centre of Government and regulatory authorities’ policies. The solution is available, it has to be accepted and implemented.

Of course, there will be serious resistance to the above proposals from the Revenue Ministry and from businesses, for being ‘impractical and unviable’. However, both proposals are of benefit to the individual – whether as bank depositor, shareholder of over-leveraged entities or as taxpayer (direct and indirect tax). The time has come to be different in thinking and implementing policies.

(The author is grateful for the usage of news links which have collaborated his point of view)

IMPLICATIONS OF KEY AMENDMENTS TO COMPANIES ACT, 2013 ON MANAGEMENT AND AUDITORS

The effect of laws and regulations on financial statements varies considerably. Non-compliance with the same may result in fines, litigation or other consequences for the entity that may have a material effect on the financial statements. It is the responsibility of management, with the oversight of those charged with governance, to ensure that operations are conducted in accordance with the provisions of various laws and regulations, including those that determine the reported amounts and disclosures in an entity’s financial statements.

Standards on Auditing (SA) 250, Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements, deals with the auditor’s responsibility to consider laws and regulations when performing an audit of financial statements. The provisions of some laws or regulations have a direct effect on the financial statements in that they determine the reported amounts and disclosures in an entity’s financial statements, e.g., the Companies Act, 2013 (‘2013 Act’). Other laws and regulations that do not have a direct effect on the determination of the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements, but compliance with which may be fundamental to the operating aspects of the business, to an entity’s ability to continue its business, or to avoid material penalties (e.g., compliance with the terms of an operating license, compliance with regulatory solvency requirements, or compliance with environmental regulations), non-compliance with such laws and regulations may therefore have a material effect on the financial statements. The Code of Ethics issued by the ICAI also includes specific sections on Responding to Non-Compliance of Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR)1 for listed companies. However, the auditor is not responsible for preventing non-compliance and cannot be expected to detect non-compliance with all laws and regulations.

The MCA has issued various amendments to the Companies Act, 2013, including an amendment to Schedule III of the Companies Act, 2013 to increase transparency and to provide additional disclosures in the financial statements, and CARO 2020 to enhance the reporting requirements for auditors. The MCA has also amended the provisions of Rule 11 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 to include additional matters in the Auditor’s Report w.e.f. 1st April, 2021 (except the requirement related to audit trail which is applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2022).

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1 The ICAI issued an announcement dated 26th July, 2021 and deferred the applicability date of these provisions to 1st April, 2022

This article attempts to provide an overview of the key amendments relating to the definition of listed company, Corporate Social Responsibility and managerial remuneration and related challenges emanating from these amendments and the enhanced role of management and auditors.

I. AMENDMENT TO DEFINITION OF LISTED COMPANY
Section 2(52) of the 2013 Act provides the definition of a listed company. Listed companies under this Act are required to adhere to stricter compliance norms when it comes to filing of annual returns, maintenance of records, appointment of auditors, appointment of independent directors and woman directors, constitution of board committees, etc. This may dis-incentivise (or demotivate) private companies / unlisted public companies from seeking listing of their debt securities even though doing so might be in the interest of the company. Effective 1st April, 20212, the MCA amended section 2(52) of the 2013 Act and Companies (Specification of Definitions Details) Rules, 2014 to exclude the following class of companies from the definition of a listed company:

  •  Public companies which have not listed their equity shares on a recognised stock exchange but have listed:

– Non-convertible debt securities, or
– Non-convertible redeemable preference shares, or
– Both the above categories
issued on private placement basis in terms of the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008 / SEBI (Issue and Listing of Non-Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares) Regulations, 2013, respectively.

__________________________________________________________
2 The MCA issued Notification No. G.S.R. 123(E) dated 19th February, 2021 on the
Companies (Specification of Definitions, Details) Second Amendment Rules, 2021
.
  • Private companies which have listed their non-convertible debt securities on private placement basis on a recognised stock exchange in terms of the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008.

 

  • Public companies which have not listed their equity shares on a recognised stock exchange but whose equity shares are listed on a stock exchange in a permissible foreign jurisdiction as specified in the sub-section of section 23(3)3 of the 2013 Act.

It may be noted that SEBI has not modified the definition of a listed company. Accordingly, the implications are limited to the provisions prescribed under the 2013 Act. Some of these considerations are discussed below:

Relaxation for companies from compliances under 2013 Act

Listed companies are required to comply with additional stringent requirements under the 2013 Act, e.g., at least 1/3rd of the total number of directors to be independent directors, appointment of one woman director on the board, appointment of an internal auditor and compliance with auditor’s rotation norms. Companies which no longer qualify as listed companies pursuant to the above amendment would not be required to comply with such stringent requirements.

Besides, it is interesting to note that though the intent of the amendment is to provide relaxations for private / public companies, there might be some unintended consequences as well. One such unintended consequence is the debenture redemption norms. Section 71(4) of the 2013 Act read with Rule 18 of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 prescribes the quantum of debenture redemption reserve and the investment or deposit of sum in respect of debentures maturing during the year ending on the 31st day of March of the next year, unless specifically exempted. It may be noted that in accordance with Rule 18(7)(b)(iii)(B), debenture redemption reserve is not required to be created by listed companies having privately-placed debentures. Pursuant to the amendment, these exemptions may no longer be available; creation of the debenture redemption reserve and investment of sums in respect of debentures might become applicable for listed companies having privately-placed debentures. However, this will be subject to clarification by the MCA or the ICAI.

_____________________________________________________________
3 Such class of public companies may issue such class of securities for the purposes of listing on permitted stock exchanges in permissible foreign jurisdictions or such other jurisdictions, as may be prescribed
Preparation of financial statements under Ind AS by the company
One of the criteria for applicability of Ind AS prescribed under the Companies (Indian Accounting Standards) Rules, 2015 is that companies whose ‘equity or debt securities are listed’ or are in the process of being listed on any stock exchange in India (except for listing on the SME exchange or Innovators Growth Platform), or outside India would be required to prepare financial statements as per Ind AS. Further, these Rules provide that once a company starts following Ind AS, it would be required to follow these for all the subsequent financial statements even if any of the prescribed criteria do not subsequently apply to it. Accordingly, companies which no longer qualify as listed companies but have prepared financial statements under Ind AS, would continue to prepare financial statements in accordance with Ind AS.

Private / public companies listing non-convertible debt securities and / or non-convertible redeemable preference shares on a private placement basis are excluded from the definition of ‘Listed company’ as per the amended definition. One may argue that Ind AS applies to all listed companies. Since these companies are not listed companies as defined under the 2013 Act, such companies would not be required to comply with Ind AS (unless other thresholds are met). A closer look at the aforesaid Rules indicates that Ind AS applies to companies whose ‘equity or debt securities are listed’ – instead of ‘listed company’. Hence, strictly speaking, the other possible view is that private / public companies having listed non-convertible debt securities / non-convertible redeemable preference shares on a private placement basis would need to comply with Ind AS. These companies need to consider GAAP applicable to them and their auditors, while issuing an opinion on true and fair view and compliance with accounting standards u/s 133 of the Act, will need to consider this amendment.

Auditors reporting on Key Audit Matters (KAM)
Auditors are required to report Key Audit Matters in the audit report of a listed entity which has prepared a complete set of general purpose financial statements as required by SA 701, Communicating Key Audit Matters in the Independent Auditor’s Report. KAMs are those matters that, in the auditor’s professional judgement, were of most significance in the audit of the financial statements of the current period. The Standard on Quality Control – 1 and SA 220, Quality Control for an Audit of Financial Statements, define a listed entity as an entity whose shares, stock or debt are quoted or listed on a recognised stock exchange, or are traded under the regulations of a recognised stock exchange or other equivalent body.

Different definitions of ‘Listed company’ under the 2013 Act and SA 220 may raise an applicability issue. One may argue that auditing standards are prescribed u/s 143(10) of the 2013 Act. Accordingly, the question is whether a listed company should be understood uniformly for all purposes under the 2013 Act, including while reporting on KAMs, or the definition of SA 220 be applied while auditing and reporting on the company’s financial statements. The definitions under the 2013 Act are for compliance with the legal requirements under the 2013 Act and do not apply to accounting and auditing matters. Since auditors are responsible to conduct audit in accordance with the SA, the auditor should follow the definition of a listed entity as envisaged in the SAs while reporting on KAMs. Hence, one may argue that auditors of all listed companies (even those not considered as listed companies under the 2013 Act) would continue to report on KAMs as required by SA 701. The MCA and the ICAI may consider clarifying this aspect.

Auditor’s reporting on CARO 2020
The Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on it under sub-section (11) of section 143 of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), issued the Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 on 25th February, 2020. Called CARO 2020 for short, it is applicable for the financial years commencing on or after 1st April, 2021 to a prescribed class of entities including listed companies, public companies and private companies meeting the prescribed thresholds.

One may take a view that CARO 2020 does not prescribe the listing of securities by any company (including a private company) as a criterion for applicability. Hence the change in definition of a listed company may not impact the applicability of CARO. The MCA and the ICAI may consider clarifying this issue. However, reporting on CARO 2020 would continue to apply to all public companies (listed or unlisted).

II. AMENDMENT TO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) PROVISIONS
Section 135 of the 2013 Act and the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014 (‘CSR Rules’) prescribe the norms relating to CSR. The MCA has recently overhauled the norms and brought significant changes in implementation of CSR initiatives, introduced new concepts like mandatory impact assessment, and prescribed the manner of dealing with unspent CSR amounts. These amendments were notified on 22nd January, 2021. CARO 2020 has also introduced specific additional reporting requirements for the auditors related to unspent amount under sections 135(5) and 135(6) of the 2013 Act. The revised Schedule III under the 2013 Act has added specific disclosures to be made by companies in respect of CSR spend.

The requirement of audit of CSR activities has not been made mandatory under the 2013 Act. However, various provisions of the Companies (Company Social Responsibilities Policy) Rules, 2014 require the monitoring and reporting mechanism for CSR activities.

Auditor’s responsibilities
Wherever an eligible company undertakes CSR activity itself, the key responsibilities of the auditor are summarised below:
• Auditors should check compliance with section 135 of the 2013 Act and check whether the expenditure has been incurred as per the CSR policy formulated by the company;
• The auditor is also required to check whether the activity / project undertaken is within the purview of Schedule VII of the Act;
• If mere contribution / donation is given for a specified purpose, then whether it is specifically allowed as per Schedule VII of the Act;
• The auditor, while opining on the financial statements, will also be required to check whether separate
disclosure of expenditure on CSR activities has been made as per Schedule III applicable for the financial
year ending 31st March, 2021 and additional disclosures as per revised Schedule III have been made by the company for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April 2021;
• The auditor to check whether the company has recorded a provision as at the balance sheet date to the extent considered necessary in accordance with the provisions of AS 29 / Ind AS 37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, in respect of the unspent amount;
• To check compliance with relevant Standards on Auditing for audit of CSR spend including:
– SA 250 – Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an Audit of Financial Statements;
– SA 720 (Revised) – The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information.

Eligible CSR activities in the context of Covid-19
The MCA has issued a Circular dated 30th July, 2021 clarifying that spending of CSR funds for Covid-19 vaccination for persons other than the employees and their families is an eligible CSR activity under Schedule VII of the Companies Act, 2013. Management would need to establish necessary internal controls to track that the spend is made to benefit persons other than employees and their families.

Increased focus on impact creation
The amendments require every company with an average CSR obligation of INR 10 crores or more (in the three immediately preceding F.Y.s) to undertake an impact assessment of their CSR projects having an outlay of INR 1 crore or more and has been completed not less than one year before undertaking the impact study. The assessment should be carried out through an independent agency and the impact assessment reports should be placed before the board and should be annexed to the annual report on CSR.

Enhanced monitoring mechanism
The amendments significantly enhance the monitoring mechanism and require the CSR committee to formulate and recommend an annual action plan in pursuance of its CSR policy to the board of directors. The action plan should include the prescribed matters such as the manner of execution of such projects or programmes, modalities of utilisation of funds and implementation schedules, and the monitoring and reporting mechanism for the projects or programmes.

The board of the company is required to satisfy itself that the funds disbursed have been utilised for the CSR purposes and in the manner as approved by it. It should be certified by the Chief Financial Officer or the person responsible for the financial management of the company.

The amendments have introduced a new format for the annual report on CSR activities to be included in the board’s report of a company for the F.Y. commencing on or after 1st April, 2020. Some of the new disclosures to be made by companies in the annual report include details of impact assessment of CSR projects (if applicable) along with the report and amount spent on impact assessment, details of the amount available for set-off and details of unspent CSR amount for the preceding three F.Y.s, including amount transferred to unspent CSR account and fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act. In case of creation or acquisition of a capital asset, additional disclosures are prescribed.

The auditor will also be required to read the information included in the annual report as required by SA 720, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information.

Unspent CSR amount – Reporting in CARO 2020
Section 135 prescribes a mandatory spending of 2% of the average net profits made by the company during the three immediately preceding financial years on CSR activities. Earlier, section 135 followed a ‘comply or explain approach’, i.e., the board of directors was required to explain in the Board Report the reason for not spending the minimum CSR amount. Accordingly, no provision for unspent amount was required to be made before the amendment.

The MCA observed that a tenable reason does not expel or extinguish the obligation to spend the stipulated CSR amount4. With this objective in mind, section 135 and the CSR Rules were amended and the ‘comply or explain’ approach was replaced with a ‘comply or pay penalty’ approach. The amended provisions now require the following in respect of ‘unspent amounts’:

• On-going CSR projects [Section 135(6)]: In this case, the company should transfer the unspent amount to a special bank account within a period of 30 days from the end of the financial year. The company should spend such amount within a period of three F.Y.s from the date of such transfer as per its obligation towards the CSR policy. In case it fails to do so, it would be required to transfer the same to a fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act within a period of 30 days from the date of completion of the third financial year.

Other than on-going projects [Section 135(5)]: When there is no on-going project, the unspent amount should be transferred to a fund specified in Schedule VII of the 2013 Act within a period of six months from the end of the financial year.

Additional reporting requirements for CSR have been introduced in CARO 2020 which require the auditor to report on the above two aspects.

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4 Report of the High-Level Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2018
Subsequent to the amendment, the revised Technical Guide on CSR issued by the ICAI provides that an obligation to transfer the unspent amount to a separate bank account within 30 days of the end of the financial year and eventually any unspent amount out of that to a specified fund, indicates that a provision for liability for the amount representing the extent to which the amount is to be transferred within 30 days of the end of the financial year needs to be recognised in the financial statements.

Implementation challenges
The following implementation challenges will need to be considered and evaluated by both the company and the auditor in this regard:

• The CSR amendments do not link the applicability of the amendments to any financial year. It may be noted that the applicability of this amendment is prospective and therefore provision may be required for shortfall for the F.Y. 2020-21 and onwards.

• Assessment of presentation of unspent amount in the CSR bank account in the financial statements may be critical as such amounts would not be available for any other purpose. Ind AS 7 / AS 3 on Cash Flow Statement requires companies to disclose, together with a commentary by management, the amount of significant cash and cash equivalent balances held by the entity that are not available for use by the entity. Thus, the amounts in the unspent CSR bank account should be disclosed as restricted cash with adequate commentary by the management in the financial statements.

• While preparing quarterly financial information, an issue may arise whether provision for CSR obligation for the entire year should be recognised in the first quarter or the provision for unspent amount should be made at the end of the year. In this regard, the ICAI has clarified that for the unspent amount a legal obligation arises to transfer to specified accounts depending upon the fact whether or not such unspent amount relates to on-going projects. Therefore, liability needs to be recognised for such unspent amount as at the end of the financial year. However, the amount spent during the interim period needs to be charged as expense for the same interim period. It cannot be deferred to the remaining interim periods of the financial year.

The amendments have also prescribed significant penalties, e.g., in case of non-compliance with provisions relating to unspent amount a penalty twice the default amount would be imposed on the company subject to a maximum of INR 1 crore. The auditor will need to evaluate the implications on the audit report in case of non-compliance with the mandatory and stringent CSR provisions.

III. MANAGERIAL REMUNERATION
Section 149(9) of the 2013 Act provides that an independent director may receive remuneration by way of profit-related commission as may be approved by the members. In case of no / inadequate profit, section 197 of the 2013 Act permitted payment of remuneration only to its executive directors or managers.

The MCA has extended the model followed for remuneration to executive directors to non-executive directors (including independent directors) by amending section 149 and section 197, and Schedule V to the 2013 Act. Schedule V now prescribes the following limits for payment of remuneration to each non-executive director (including independent directors):

Where the effective capital
is

Limit of yearly
remuneration payable shall not exceed (INR) in case of other director (i.e.,
other than managerial person)

Negative or less than INR 5 crores

12 lakhs

INR 5 crores and above but less than INR 100 crores

17 lakhs

INR 100 crores and above but less than INR 250 crores

24 lakhs

INR 250 crores and above

24 lakhs plus 0.01% of the
effective capital in excess of INR 250 crores

Remuneration in excess of the above limits may be paid if the resolution passed by the shareholders is a special resolution.

While Schedule V has been amended to include the limits for non-executive directors, Explanation II which provides for computation of effective capital for a managerial person has not been amended. It provides as below:
• Where the appointment of the managerial person is made in the year in which the company has been incorporated, the effective capital shall be calculated as on the date of such appointment;

• In any other case the effective capital shall be calculated as on the last date of the financial year preceding the financial year in which the appointment of the managerial person is made.

In the absence of a specific amendment, one may take the view that similar provisions should be applied for other directors also, i.e., for a non-executive director. The MCA may issue a clarification in this regard.

The above amendment is effective from 18th March, 2021. This means that companies would need to comply with the amended provisions in F.Y. 2020-21 and onwards.

Amendment to remuneration policy
The earlier remuneration policies of the company would not have the flexibility of payment of remuneration in case of no / inadequate profits as payment of remuneration to non-executive directors (including independent directors). Since the amendments now permit payment of remuneration in case of loss / inadequate profits, the remuneration policy of the company would need to be updated so as to comply with these requirements.

Auditor’s reporting
Auditor’s reporting on director’s remuneration in its audit report (under ‘Report on Other Legal and Regulatory Requirement’) will encompass remuneration paid to non-executive directors as well. Since remuneration would be paid to non-executive directors (including independent directors) in case of no / inadequate profits, the auditors would need to verify compliance in this regard.

BOTTOMLINE
The overhaul of the CSR provisions, amendments to the definition of listed company and managerial remuneration highlights the intent of the MCA aimed towards developing a robust and coherent regulatory and policy framework and underlying ecosystem. The primary responsibility of effective implementation of these amendments lies with the management by ensuring their compliance in a timely manner. However, the reporting responsibilities and issuing a true and fair view on the financial statements of the company lies with the auditor. The auditor should keep track of these fast-changing regulations and their consequential implications on the audit report, especially in case there is any non-compliance.

Love what you have. Need what you want. Accept

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES – ACCOUNTING AND TAX ISSUES

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) have become a rage in the United States and some other countries over the past few months. SPACs have a number of unique features – they have a limited shelf-life as they are in business only for a few years, they have no object other than acquiring a target company and they do not have too much in common with other corporates in terms of assets, liabilities, employees, etc. SEBI is considering issuing guidelines on how SPACs should operate in India. This article summarises the accounting and tax issues that SPACs could encounter here.

INTRODUCTION
SPACs. The word does not sound very exciting but it is a phenomenon that is taking stock markets (at least in the USA) by storm. The abbreviation expands as Special Purpose Acquisition Companies but a more street-sounding name is ‘blank cheque companies’. These are companies that are set up with next to nothing and list on the stock exchanges only for the purpose of raising capital for acquisitions. In India, SEBI is planning to come out with a framework on SPACs ostensibly to facilitate Startups to list on the exchanges. SPACs are usually formed by private equity funds or financial institutions, with expertise in a particular industry or business sector, with investment for initial working capital and issue-related expenses.

Private companies would benefit from SPACs as they go on to become listed entities without going through the rigours of an Initial Public Offering (IPO). It is not that SPACs is a new phenomenon – the concept of reverse mergers resembles a SPAC in many respects. SPACs are different from normal companies in that they have only one object – to list on the exchanges with the sole intention of acquiring a target company. One of the main advantages of a SPAC is the fact that it can use forward-looking information in the prospectus – this may not be permitted in a usual IPO.

In case the SPAC is not able to identify and acquire a target company within the set time frame it winds up and the funds are returned to the investors. In case the SPAC identifies a target company and enters into a Business Combination, the shareholders of the SPAC will have the opportunity to redeem their shares and, in many cases, vote on the initial Business Combination transaction. Each SPAC shareholder can either remain a shareholder of the company after the initial Business Combination or redeem and receive its pro rata amount of the funds held in the escrow account.

Investors in a SPAC put in a small amount of money for a stake in the company (usually around 20%). They get allotted shares with a lock-in period of up to a year. They have the option of exiting once the lock-in period is over. SPACs would also have similarities with Cat-1 alternate investment funds (AIF’s) – an angel fund listing on the SME platform.

THREE STAGES
Usually, a SPAC will have three phases with different time frames:

Stage

Activity

Indicative time frame

1

IPO

3 months

2

Search for target company

18 months

3

Close transaction

3 months

Ind AS accounting standards
Since all SPACs have to list on some stock exchange, they would have to follow Ind AS accounting standards as it is mandatory for all listed entities.

Stage 1
In Stage 1, SPACs normally issue different types of financial instruments to the founders / investors such as equity shares, convertible shares or share warrants. Investors would be keen to invest in these instruments since the warrants give them an opportunity to get some more shares in case a target company has been identified. Usually, the IPO price is fixed at par (say Rs. 10) while the exercise price of the warrants is fixed about 15% higher. SPACs are forced to invest at least 85% of their IPO proceeds in an escrow account. Accounting for these instruments would be driven by Ind AS 32 / Ind AS 109. Since the SPAC would not be undertaking any commercial activities at this stage, very few Ind AS standards other than Ind AS 32/109 would need to be applied. Typically, at this stage SPACs do not own too many assets. The nature of the financial instruments issued to the investors would determine the accounting. These instruments could be equity instruments, share warrants that are exercisable, convertible shares or bonds and other instruments that are entirely equity in nature. The type of the instrument would determine whether it would be accounted for as equity share capital, under other equity, or as a separate line item ‘instruments that are entirely equity in nature’.

Stage 2
Once a target company has been identified and the acquisition is formalised, Ind AS 103 Business Combinations would have to be applied. There are seven steps in Business Combination accounting:

1.    Is it an acquisition
2.    Identify the acquirer
3.    Ascertain acquisition date
4.    Recognising and measuring assets acquired, liabilities assumed, and NCI
5.    Measuring consideration
6.    Recognising and measuring Intangible Assets
7.    Post-acquisition measurement and accounting

First step – Is it an acquisition?
An amendment to Ind AS 103 has made the distinction between an asset acquisition and a Business Combination clearer. The main pointers are:

1.    Business must include inputs and substantive processes applied to those inputs which have ability to create output / contribute to ability to create output.
2.    Change in definition of ‘output’ – it now focuses on goods and services provided to customers.
3.    Omission of ability to substitute the missing inputs and processes by the market participants.
4.    Addition of ‘Optional Concentration Test’.

Remaining steps
Once the transaction meets the definition of a Business Combination, the other six steps would need to be followed. These would invariably be: identifying the acquirer, determining the acquisition date, measuring acquisition date fair values, measuring the consideration to be paid, recognising goodwill and deciding on post-combination accounting. Business Combination Accounting permits the recognition of previously unrecognised Intangible Assets – this clause would be important for SPACs since they would invariably look at technology companies that have some Intangible Assets for an acquisition.

GOING CONCERN?
Most SPACS have a limited shelf-life of about two to three years. One of the fundamental principles on which the Framework to Ind AS Standards has been formulated is the principle of Going Concern. An interesting question that arises is whether the management will need to comment on the going concern concept since it is clear that the SPAC will not be a going concern in a few years from the date of listing. Usually, SPACs provide a disclosure on their status in the financial statements. The disclosure given below is from the Form 10K (annual report) of Churchill Capital Corp IV for the year ended 31st December, 2020:

‘Our amended and restated certificate of incorporation provides that we will have until 3rd August, 2022, the date that is 24 months from the closing of the IPO, to complete our initial business combination (the period from the closing of the IPO until 3rd August, 2022, the “completion window”). If we are unable to complete our initial business combination within such period, we will: (1) cease all operations except for the purpose of winding up; (2) as promptly as reasonably possible, but not more than ten business days thereafter, redeem the public shares at a per share price, payable in cash, equal to the aggregate amount then on deposit in the trust account, including interest (net of permitted withdrawals and up to $100,000 of interest to pay dissolution expenses), divided by the number of then outstanding public shares, which redemption will completely extinguish public stockholders’ rights as stockholders (including the right to receive further liquidating distributions, if any), subject to applicable law; and (3) as promptly as reasonably possible following such redemption, subject to the approval of our remaining stockholders and our board of directors, dissolve and liquidate, subject in each case to our obligations under Delaware law to provide for claims of creditors and the requirements of other applicable law. There will be no redemption rights or liquidating distributions with respect to our warrants, which will expire worthless if we fail to complete our initial business combination within the completion window.’

It would appear that a disclosure on the above lines would suffice to satisfy the ability of the entity to continue as a going concern during the limited period of its existence.

CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION
A SPAC merger agreement may include a provision for additional consideration to be transferred to the shareholders of the target company in the future if certain events occur or conditions arise. This additional consideration, commonly referred to as an ‘earn-out’ payment, may be in the form of additional equity interests in the combined company, cash or other assets. If the SPAC is identified as the accounting acquirer and the target company is a business, the earn-out payment may represent contingent consideration in connection with a Business Combination. While such payments may be negotiated as part of the merger, the terms of the arrangement need to be evaluated to determine whether the payment is part of or separate from the Business Combination. In making this evaluation, the SPAC should consider the nature of the arrangement, the reasons for entering into the arrangement and which party receives the primary benefits from the transaction.

If the arrangement is entered into primarily for the benefit of the SPAC or the combined company rather than primarily for the benefit of the target or its former shareholders, the arrangement is likely a separate transaction that should be accounted for separately from the Business Combination. For example, payments are sometimes made to shareholders of the target company who will remain as employees of the combined company after the merger. In this case, the SPAC must carefully evaluate whether the substance of the arrangement is to compensate the former shareholders for future services rather than to provide additional consideration in exchange for the acquired business. If the SPAC determines that an earn-out provision represents consideration transferred for the acquired business, the contingent consideration is recognised at acquisition-date fair value under Ind AS 103. However, earn-out arrangements that represent separate transactions are accounted for under other applicable Ind AS. For example, payments made to former shareholders of the target company that are determined to be compensatory are accounted for as compensation expense for services provided in the post-merger period.

TAX IMPACT
Shareholders
At the time of the Business Combination, shares are usually issued. For shareholders under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961, issue of shares in any form results in a ‘transfer’ of shares held by the existing shareholders of the Indian target entity. The consideration is received in the form of SPAC shares. Capital gains tax may emerge on the sale / swap of shares of the Indian target company against the shares of SPAC. The taxable capital gains would be the excess of the fair market value over the cost of acquisition in the hands of the selling shareholders. Tax rates vary from 10% to 40% under the Indian tax laws, plus applicable surcharge and cess. Tax rates shall primarily depend upon various factors – inter alia, the mode of transfer, i.e., share swap vs. merger, residential status of shareholders, availability of treaty benefits and the period of holding of the shares.

SPAC
A SPAC is required to comply with the applicable withholding tax obligation at the time of discharge of consideration to non-residents, i.e., whether on account of a merger or swap of shares.

If an Indian target company has unabsorbed tax losses and its shareholder voting rights change by more than 49%, then the unabsorbed tax losses would lapse and it shall not be eligible to carry forward its past tax losses.

Once the shares of the SPAC are listed, it is possible that the tax implications of the indirect transfer rules outlined in section 9(1)(i) would need to be considered. However, this would apply only if the SPAC is a foreign company. [Will SPAC be an Indian or a foreign company?] If it is an Indian company, then its shares are actually located in India only. Where is the question of applying indirect transfer rules? For example, a tax liability would arise if a SPAC derives its substantial value from India (more than 50%) under the Indian indirect transfer rules. Shareholders who hold less than 5% of the voting power or the SPAC’s capital are not subject to Indian indirect transfer implications, provided certain conditions are met. For other shareholders, any transfer of SPAC shares results in Indian indirect transfer implications.

SPONSORS
Typically, a SPAC sponsor converts its Class B shares into Class A shares upon successfully acquiring a target company. Depending upon the date and timing of the Business Combination and the conversion of Class B shares into Class A shares, tax implications under the Indian indirect transfer rules need to be evaluated for the SPAC sponsor.

SPACs would also need to consider the implications of Notification No. 77/2021 dated 7th July, 2021 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes which clarifies that where the value of net goodwill removed from the block is in excess of the opening written down value as on 1st April, 2020, such excess will now be offered to tax as short-term capital gain.

WOULD SPACs BE A SUCCESS IN INDIA?
The answer to this question would obviously depend on the guidance that SEBI comes up with on SPACs. The Primary Market Advisory Committee of SEBI is deliberating on whether a framework for SPACs should be introduced. The Committee is also looking into any safeguards that should be built into the framework being proposed. From the information available now, SPACs are being set up by hedge funds and private equity investors who plan for a quick exit from their investments in a couple of years. The success of SPACs depends on the existence of companies that are available for a Business Combination. Traditional Indian companies may not be interested in the SPAC route as many would feel that it is too short-term in nature – they are in for the long term. Startups could provide a good source of companies that are SPAC-eligible. India has a large number of Startups but how many of them are worthy of listing remains to be seen. In addition, Indian companies do not have a history of issuing complicated financial instruments which is one of the basic requirements of a SPAC. As things stand today, it would be reasonable to conclude that there will be a few SPAC transactions in India but the concept of SPAC is not going to overly excite everyone at Dalal Street!