Category: Allied Laws

48. Rajani Manohar Kuntha & Ors vs. Parshuram Chunilal Kanojia & Ors

2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1253

December 02, 2025

Tenancy – Eviction – Tenant cannot dictate – Bona fide Requirement – Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction is narrow – The bona fide requirement has to be assessed from the landlord’s perspective and not from the tenant’s convenience.

FACTS

The Appellants (Landlords) instituted a suit seeking eviction of the Respondents (Tenants) from a commercial Premises. The eviction was sought on the grounds of bona fide requirement for commercial use. The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the pleadings and evidence, decreed the suit for eviction, holding that the requirement was genuine and bona fide. The First Appellate Court confirmed the findings and decree of the Trial Court. In revision, the Bombay High Court set aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The High Court undertook a detailed scrutiny of the pleadings and evidence and held that the landlord’s bona fide requirement was not established, inter alia, relying on the existence of other premises and the obtaining of a commercial electricity connection during the pendency of proceedings.

On an appeal to the Supreme Court:

HELD

The High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by re-appreciating evidence and conducting a microscopic scrutiny of facts, despite the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. Revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only when the findings of the courts below are ex facie perverse or without jurisdiction. Further, the Supreme Court observed that a tenant cannot dictate to the landlord as to the suitability of alternative accommodation or how the landlord should conduct his business. The bona fide requirement has to be assessed from the landlord’s perspective and not from the tenant’s convenience. Relying upon settled principles of law, the Court reaffirmed that the concurrent findings of fact should not be interfered with in revision, and the High Court’s interference was held to be without jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the judgement of the High Court was set aside, and the Trial Court and First Appellate Court decrees of eviction were restored.

49. Cement Corporation of India vs. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited

2025 INSC 1444

December 15, 2025

Insurance Law – Fire Insurance – Proximate Cause – Exclusion Clause – Theft preceding Fire – Interpretation of Fire and Special Perils Policy [Indian Contract Act, 1872]

FACTS

The Appellant, Cement Corporation of India, a Government company, obtained a Standard Fire and Special Perlis (Material Damage) Insurance Policy from the Respondent insurer covering its Cement Factory. An unknown miscreant entered the factory premises during the night and attempted theft of copper windings and transformer oil using blow torches and gas cutters. During the course of such attempted theft, a transformer caught fire, resulting in extensive damage to the insured property. An FIR was registered, and the Appellant lodged an insurance claim. The Surveyor appointed by the insurer opined that the fire resulted from the attempted theft and recommended repudiation of the claim by invoking the Riot, Strike, Malicious Damage (RSMD) exclusion clause, treating burglary as the proximate cause. Relying on the survey report, the Respondent repudiated the cause and the claim. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed a consumer complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC). The NCDRC dismissed the complaint, holding that burglary/theft was the proximate cause of loss and that theft was not a covered peril under the policy.

HELD

The Supreme Court held that a fire insurance policy is a contract of indemnity against the loss caused by fire, and once it is established that the damage occurred due to fire, the cause that ignited the fire becomes immaterial unless it is specifically excluded under the policy or is attributable to fraud or wilful misconduct of the insured. The Court observed that burglary/theft was not an exclusion under the specific peril of “Fire” in the policy. The RSMD exclusion could not be invoked to defeat a claim where the loss was directly attributable to fire, an insured peril with its own distinct exclusions. The Court further held that the doctrine of proximate cause had been wrongly applied by the NCDRC, as the immediate and effective cause of loss was fire, while theft merely preceded the incident.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the repudiation of the claim as well as the order passed by the NCDRC.

50. Apsara Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. vs. Vijay Shankar Singh

WP 3908 of 2025 (Bom)(HC)

January 05, 2026

Cooperative Housing Society – Housing Society formed for collective management is neither “industry” nor “establishment” – Proceedings not maintainable – Gratuity Act, 1971 is inapplicable – irrespective of earning income through installation of telecommunication towers/antennas. [S. 2(j), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; S. 1(3)(b), S. 2(4) Maharashtra Shops and Establishments (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 2017]

FACTS

The Petitioner is a Co-operative Housing Society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The Respondent was appointed as Building Manager in 2013, and his services were terminated in 2022.

The Respondent filed claim before the labour court for bonus, leave wages and gratuity before the Controlling Authority. The Petitioner opposed the maintainability by filing applications seeking dismissal of both proceedings, contending that it is neither an “industry” within Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act) nor an “establishment” within Section 2(4) of the Maharashtra Shops and Establishments (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 2017. (MSE Act)

The Labour Court/Controlling Authority dismissed applications, holding that the Respondent should be permitted to lead evidence. Aggrieved, the Petitioner filed writ petitions challenging the said orders.

HELD

The Bombay High Court held that for invoking provisions of the ID Act, the Respondent (Original Applicant) must establish that the employer is an “industry” within Section 2(j) of the ID Act. A co-operative housing society formed by flat owners only for collective management of the building does not carry on any systematic trade, business or commercial activity and therefore cannot be treated as an “industry”. The Court further held that the mere existence of facilities such as a clubhouse or earning income through the installation of telecommunication towers/antennas does not, by itself, convert the society’s activities into a systematic commercial activity. Such incidental income is aimed at reducing maintenance contributions and does not constitute trade/business. Thus, the Labour Court erred in rejecting the dismissal application and in posting the issue for evidence, since the Respondent would not be able to demonstrate any industrial activity even upon leading evidence.

On the gratuity claim, the Court held that the applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act (Section 1(3)(b) depends upon whether the entity is a shop/establishment within the meaning of the MSE Act. Under Section 2(4) of the Maharashtra Shops Act, an “establishment” contemplates an entity carrying on business/trade/profession or incidental or ancillary activities thereto. A cooperative housing society, managing residential premises for members’ personal use, does not carry on business/trade/profession and therefore is not an “establishment”.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Petitioner Society is neither an “industry” under the ID Act nor an “establishment” under the Maharashtra Shops Act and therefore both the proceedings were not maintainable.

51. Kanchana Rai vs. Geeta Sharma & Ors.

2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41

January 13, 2026

Hindu Law – Maintenance – Dependents –“Any widow of his son” – Widowhood after father-in-law’s death – Right to claim maintenance from estate of father-in-law. [S. 21(vii), Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956]

FACTS

The dispute arose inter se among heirs/family members of the late Dr. Mahendra Prasad, who died on December 27, 2021. He had three sons: (i) Ranjit Sharma (who later died on March 02, 2023), (ii) Devinder Rai (husband of Appellant Kanchana Rai, predeceased), and (iii) Rajeev Sharma.

Respondent No.1 Geeta Sharma, wife of Ranjit Sharma, filed proceedings before the Family Court seeking maintenance from the estate of her father-in-law under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.

The Family Court dismissed the petition as not maintainable, holding that Respondent No.1 was not a widow on the date of death of the father-in-law, since her husband was alive at that time.

In appeal, the High Court set aside the Family Court order and held that the petition was maintainable as Respondent No.1 was the widow of the son of the deceased and thus a dependant, and directed the Family Court to decide the matter on merits and quantum. On appeal to the Supreme Court.

HELD

The Court analysed Chapter III (Sections 18–28) of the Act and especially Section 21(vii), which defines “dependants” to include “any widow of his son” so long as she does not remarry, subject to inability to obtain maintenance from husband’s estate/children, etc. The Court held that the language is clear and unambiguous and does not permit reading the words as “widow of his predeceased son”. The legislature consciously used “any widow of his son”, and the time of becoming a widow is immaterial.

The Court reiterated the literal rule of interpretation, holding that courts cannot add or subtract words from statutes. The Court further observed that restricting maintenance only to widows whose husbands died during the lifetime of the father-in-law would create an arbitrary classification violating Article 14 and would also offend Article 21 by exposing widowed daughters-in-law to destitution.

The Appeal was dismissed.

52. UOI . vs. Paresh Chandra Mondal

2026 LiveLaw (SC) 42

January 07, 2026

Nomination – Provident Fund – Succession Certificate/Probate – Nominee’s primacy – Harmonious construction – Government should not insist on succession certificate where valid nomination exists – Nominee as trustee (not beneficial owner). [S. 4(1)(c)(i), S. 5(1), Provident Funds Act, 1925; R. 33(ii), GPF (Central Services) Rules, 1960]

FACTS

The Petitioners filed a Special Leave Petition challenging the judgment passed by the Calcutta High Court whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Union of India against an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal,

The Tribunal had allowed the application filed by the Respondent seeking release of amounts lying in the General Provident Fund (GPF) of his deceased brother, holding that the Respondent was the only valid nominee and entitled to receive the amount under Rule 33(ii) of the General Provident Fund (Central Services) Rules, 1960.

The Union of India contended that since objections were raised by nephews of the deceased, and as the amount exceeded Rs.5,000/-, Section 4(1)(c)(i) of the Provident Funds Act, 1925 required production of succession certificate/probate/letters of administration for release of such amount, and that Rule 33(ii) could not override the statutory mandate. It was also argued that, though the Respondent produced a succession certificate, the GPF amount was not mentioned in its schedule.

HELD

The Supreme Court declined to entertain the SLP and upheld the approach of the Tribunal and the High Court, holding that Rule 33(ii) of the GPF (Central Services) Rules, 1960 provides that where the subscriber leaves no family and a valid nomination subsists, the amount standing to his credit shall become payable to the nominee.

Further, if succession certificates/probates were insisted upon even in valid nomination cases, it would render nominations otiose and defeat their object. The Court relied upon Section 5(1) of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, which begins with a non-obstante clause and confers entitlement upon the nominee to the exclusion of all other persons, thereby giving primacy to a valid nomination. The Court further observed that the Government should avoid becoming party to private inheritance disputes, which would inevitably occur if succession certificates were insisted upon even in nomination cases.

SLP of the Petitioner was dismissed.

BCAJ Admin

47. Leela and Ors. vs. Murugananthan and Ors.

Civil Appeal No. 7578 of 2023

2025 LiveLaw (SC) 8

2^nd January, 2025

Will — Validity — Necessary to prove execution — Mere registration does not guarantee validity. [S. 68, Indian Succession Act, 1925; S. 68, Indian Evidence Act, 1872].

FACTS

The Respondents (first wife and children of one late Mr. Balasubramaniya) instituted a suit for partition. The Appellants (second wife and her children) contested the said partition, claiming that the deceased had already executed an unregistered Will in their favour in 1989. The Respondents — first wife and children of the deceased — contended that the suit property should be partitioned among themselves and the children of the Appellant (children of the second wife), but excluding the Appellant herself (second wife), on the ground that she is an illegitimate wife. The learned Trial Court accepted the contention of the Respondent — the first wife and declined to accept the unregistered Will propounded by the Appellant-second wife on the ground that the same was non-genuine. The same was confirmed by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras.

Aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed several inconsistencies in the Will propounded by the Appellant-second wife. Further, the Appellants failed to establish the execution of the Will as per section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying on its decision in the case of MoturuNalini Shah vs. Gainedi Kaliprasad (dead through legal heirs) (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1488) reiterated that mere registration of a Will (let alone an unregistered Will, as in this case) does not confer validity unless its execution is duly proved.

The appeal was therefore, dismissed.

48. Vidyasagar Prasad vs. UCO Bank and Anr.

AIR 2024 Supreme Court 5464

22^nd October, 2024

Insolvency Proceedings — Recovery — Limitation period of three years — Acknowledgement of debt in Balance Sheet and Audit Report — Limitation period extended from last acknowledgement made. [S.7, 238A, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; S. 18, Limitation Act, 1963].

FACTS

The Appellant is a suspended Director of a Corporate Debtor (Respondent No. 2). The Corporate Debtor had availed a loan from UCO Bank (Respondent No. 1) and other consortium banks in 2012. The said loan was defaulted by the Corporate Debtor and was declared a Non-Performing Asset. Subsequently, in 2019, Respondent No. 1 – UCO Bank had filed an application under section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to initiate a corporate insolvency resolution process against the Corporate Debtor. It was contended by the Appellant-Director that the application was barred by limitation, as it was filed after the expiration of the three year limitation period, leaving no remedy available. However, the argument was rejected by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal as well as Hon’ble National Law Company Appellate Tribunal. It was held by both the authorities that the debt had been duly acknowledged by the Corporate Debtor in its financial statements and Auditor’s report, thereby extending the limitation period in accordance with Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act).

Aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the balance sheet of the Corporate Debtor as of 31^st March, 2017 and found a clear acknowledgement of the default in loan repayments. Further, the Court noted entries indicating the balance loan payable by the Corporate Debtor. The Court dismissed the argument that the balance sheet did not specifically name the creditor bank to whom the loan was owed, stating that such specificity was not required. Relying on a series of precedents, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that entries in the balance sheet constituted an acknowledgement of debt as per Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby extending the limitation period for initiating recovery actions.

The Appeal was therefore dismissed.

49. Central Warehousing Corporation and Anr vs. Sidhartha Tiles & Sanitary Pvt Ltd.

SLP(c) No. 4940 of 2022 (SC)

21^st October, 2024

Arbitration and Conciliation- Lease agreement —Dispute — To be resolved by arbitration mechanism only. [S. 11, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants, 1971].

FACTS

A lease agreement was entered into between the Appellant — a statutory body incorporated under the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962 and operating under the administrative control of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and the Respondent — a company engaged in the business of trading. As per the lease agreement, the Appellants were to provide warehouse space to the Respondent-Company for a period of three years at a mutually agreed rate. The agreement included an arbitration clause for resolving disputes arising during the lease term. Subsequently, the Appellant unilaterally increased the lease rent and informed the Respondent that non-payment of the revised rate would result in eviction, and the Respondent’s occupancy being deemed illegal. In response, the Respondent approached the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act), seeking the appointment of an arbitrator to resolve the dispute. The Appellant however, contended that the Respondent-Company was illegally occupying the storage premises and that the matter fell under the ambit of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Public Premises Act). The High Court declined to accept the contention of the Appellant and proceeded to appoint an arbitrator.

Aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the dispute arose between the parties during the existence of a lease agreement. Further, all the disputes emerging out of the said agreement must strictly be resolved through an Arbitration mechanism as per the said agreement. Rejecting the Appellant’s contention, the Court relied on its decision in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd vs. KrishSpinning [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754] and held that the provisions of the Public Premises Act cannot override the provisions of the Arbitration Act.

The appeal was therefore dismissed along with a cost of ₹50,000/- to the Appellant.

50. Purnima BhanuprasadGohil vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

AIR 2024 Bombay 370

3^rd October, 2024

Registration — Settlement deed — Registration within four months from execution — Period for determination of stamp duty value by the stamp authority to be excluded. [S. 23, Registration Act, 1908; S. 34, Maharashtra Stamps Act, 1958].

FACTS

The Appellant and her ex-husband had executed a settlement deed on 20^th December, 2011, following a long-drawn legal battle in the family court.

The said deed was deposited with the family court until both parties fulfilled their respective obligations. Subsequently, the family court issued a decree on 17^th February, 2012. Subsequently, on 6^th June, 2012, the Appellant filed an application before the Superintendent of Stamps for determination of stamp duty payable on the settlement deed for registration. The said application was processed by the authority on 28^th August, 2012, and the stamp duty that was determined was paid within two days. Upon compliance with the settlement deed, the Appellant requested the family court to return the original deed on 12^th September, 2012, for affixing the requisite stamps under the Bombay Stamp Act. It was received the following day. The Appellant then lodged the deed for registration on 16^th November, 2012. However, the stamp authority refused to register the settlement deed on the ground that the deed was executed on 20^th December, 2011, and as per Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908, documents must be presented for registration within four months of execution.

Aggrieved, a petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court held that from 20th December, 2011 (date of execution) till 17th February, 2012 (i.e. till the date of passing of decree), the period must be excluded as per the proviso to section 23 of the Registration Act. Further, relying on its earlier decision in the case of KritiJagdish vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors [Writ Petition No. 2662 of 2012], the Hon’ble Court held that for the purpose of calculating the period of four months, the period from 6^th June, 2012 (date of application for determination of stamp duty) till 13^th September, 2012 (receipt of settlement deed from the family court) must also be excluded. This was because such a period cannot be attributable to the Applicant. Therefore, after such period was excluded, it was observed that the Petitioner had lodged the settlement deed for registration within four months of execution.

The petition was therefore allowed.

51. KumudMahendra Parekh vs. National Insurance Company., Kochi and Ors.

AIR 2024 KERALA 189

17^th July, 2024

Insurance — Medical insurance for travel —Hospitalisation — Claim of insurance — Mention of pre-existing disease in discharge papers —Non-disclosure of disease at the time of issuance of policy — Rejection of claim — Disease during childhood, 30 years ago and cured thereafter — No existing disease since last 30 years — Claim allowed. [S. 45, Overseas Medical Insurance for Trip].

FACTS

The Petitioner, a septuagenarian had availed medical insurance for her overseas travel after undergoing a detailed medical examination. During her trip, she fell ill with fever and shortness of breath, requiring hospitalisation for three days. Upon returning to India, she submitted an insurance claim, which the Respondent (insurance company) initially approved, and requested for hospitalisation documents for the claim processing. However, during the review, it was discovered that the discharge summary mentioned a history of bronchial asthma, which had not been disclosed at the time of availing medical insurance. Since the form specifically required the disclosure of any pre-existing diseases, the Respondent rejected the claim on the grounds that the Petitioner had withheld vital information regarding her medical history.

The Petitioner, however, maintained that she did not suffer from any existing disease. Further, discharge papers cannot be held as conclusive proof of any pre-existing disease. Furthermore, it was stated that the Petitioner suffered from bronchial asthma in her childhood and was cured almost 30 years ago therefore, the same was not needed to be disclosed. However, the Respondent, Grievance Cell of the Respondent as well as the Insurance Ombudsman, rejected the claim of the Petitioner.

Aggrieved, a petition was filed before the Hon’ble Kerala High Court (Eranakulam).

HELD

The Hon’ble Kerala High Court observed that, under the Overseas Mediclaim Insurance Policy for Business & Holiday Travel, a ‘pre-existing disease’ is defined as any ailment the insured had within 48 months prior to the issuance of the policy. It was undisputed that the Petitioner had bronchial asthma 30 years ago, well beyond the 48 month limit prescribed. Further, the condition had been cured, and therefore, there was no question of disclosure of any existing disease. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Court held that the insurance company was liable to accept the Petitioner’s claim.

The Petition was thus allowed.

BCAJ Admin

45 IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd vs. Geeta Devi and others

AIR 2023 Supreme Court 5545

Date of Order: 30th October, 2023

Compensation — Right of recovery — Death due to negligent driving of employee — Fake driver’s license — Failure on the part of the insurance company to plea — Failure on the part of the insurance company to prove wilful breach of insurance policy by the insured — Insurance policy did not mandate to confirm every license with RTO authorities — Liable to compensate for damages. [S. 149, 168, Motor Vehicle Act, 1988].

FACTS

In 2010, Mr. Dharambir died in a road accident, when his motorcycle was hit by a truck driver who was driving negligently. Dependents (Respondents) of the deceased sought compensation from the insurance company of the truck (Petitioner). The Tribunal held that the insurance company was liable but later discovered that the driving license of the truck driver was fake. Thus, the Tribunal directed the Petitioner to deposit the awarded amount with the liberty to recover the same from the present owners of the truck. Aggrieved, the Petitioner approached the Hon’ble Delhi High Court. The Hon’ble High Court ruled that the insurance company couldn’t recover compensation from the current truck owner as the Petitioner neither pleaded nor proved that the insured (vehicle owner) did not take adequate steps to verify the genuineness of the driving licence and in the absence of such a plea on its part, it cannot be said that there was a breach of contract.

The Petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that employers relying on a driver’s license from a seemingly competent authority cannot be expected to independently verify every license with the RTO authority. Further, the court observed that such a condition was not mandated in an insurance policy. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that Petitioner failed to prove that there was a wilful breach of insurance policy on the part of the insured. The Court concluded that the insurance company lacked the right to recover compensation, given the absence of pleading and proof for a willful breach.

Thus, the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court was upheld.

46 Prataap Snacks Ltd vs. Royal Marketing

AIR 2023 Madhya Pradesh 173

Date of Order: 28th July, 2023

Arbitration and Conciliation — Super-Stockiest agreement with provision for arbitration — Application for appointment of arbitrator -Instrument neither registered nor stamped — Cannot be considered as a contract — Application dismissed. [S. 7, 11(6), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; S. 35, Indian Stamps Act, 1899].

FACTS

The Petitioner, a registered company entered into a super-stockist agreement with the Respondent, a Telangana-based proprietor firm, appointing the proprietor firm as a non-exclusive distributor. The Petitioner alleged that despite purchasing materials from the Petitioner, the Respondent failed to pay the outstanding amount. The agreement included a provision for dispute resolution through discussion and subsequently through formal arbitration proceedings. The Petitioner proposed a retired High Court Judge as the sole arbitrator. With no response from the Respondent, the Petitioner filed an application before the court to seek a resolution.

HELD

The Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that the Petitioner had not submitted the original or certified copy of the agreement. Furthermore, the photocopy of the agreement which was provided was unregistered and unstamped. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited vs. Indo Unique Flame Ltd [(2023) SCC Online SC 495], the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the instrument which attracts the stamp duty may contain an arbitration clause and if it is not stamped or insufficiently stamped, the same cannot be said to be a contract which could be enforced. It is further held that the arbitration agreement which attracts the stamp duty, if not stamped or insufficiently stamped cannot be acted upon given Section 35 of the Indian Stamps Act.

Thus, the Arbitration application was dismissed.

47 Sri Basavegowda vs. The State of Karnataka

Writ Petition No. 10872 of 2023 (Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru)

Date of Order: 20th December, 2023

Gratuity — Appointed as daily wage employee — Services regularised subsequently — Retirement after 42 years — Denied gratuity for the time spent as a non-regularised employee — Daily wage employee same as Regular employee – Entitled to full gratuity for services of 42 years. [S. 2(e), 14, Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972].

FACTS

The Petitioner, a septuagenarian, joined the services of a Government High School on 18th November, 1971, as a Group-D employee. The Petitioner had joined as a daily wage employee until his services were regularised on 1st January, 1990. He retired on 31st May, 2013, after serving for 42 years in the Government school. However, the gratuity entitlement during the period when the petitioner served as a daily wage worker was denied, with gratuity being granted only from the date of service regularization. Thus, he filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court.

HELD

The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court after interpreting section 2(e) and 14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 held that a daily wage employee is within the definition of an employee. Thus, there is no distinction between a regular employee and a daily wage employee. The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nagar Ayukt Nagar Nigam, Kanpur vs. Mujib Ullah Khan [(2019) 6 SCC 103] and Netram Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh [(2018) 5 SCC 430) and directed the Respondent to pay gratuity to the Petitioner for his entire period of service i.e. for 42 years along with interest.

The Petition was allowed.

48 Nitin Shambhukumar Kasliwal vs. Debt Recovery Tribunal

Writ Petition No. 26333 of 2023 (Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru)

Date of Order: 6th December, 2023

Impounding of Passport — Power is available only to Passport Authority or Constitutional Courts – Impounding by Debt Recovery Tribunal — No authority — Passport impounded to be immediately released. [S. 10, The Passport Act, 1967].

FACTS

On 16th April, 2015, the Hon’ble Debt Recovery Tribunal ordered impounding of the passport of the Petitioner following the initiation of a case against him by lender banks. The petitioner was granted temporary access to his passport whenever he travelled abroad for business purposes, subject to the submission of a duly filed application and appropriate travel itineraries. On 2nd December, 2016, the Petitioner sought the release of his passport as he had to renew it before its validity expired. However, his application was rejected. The Petitioner, thus, filed an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court (Bengaluru Bench) seeking an order instructing the Hon’ble Debt Recovery Tribunal (Respondent) to release the petitioner’s passport for passport renewal.

HELD

The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court after referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Nanda vs. CBI [(2008) 3 SCC 674] held that as per section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967, only the Passport Authority of India has the powers to impound or seize a passport of a citizen. The Debt Recovery Tribunal had no power to order the impounding of the passport. The Hon’ble Karnataka High Court also observed that neither the police nor the courts (other than constitutional courts) have the power to seize or impound the passports of citizens. Thus, the Hon’ble Court ordered the release of the passport by the Respondent.

The Petition was allowed.

49 Amol Vaman Tilve vs. Goa State Information Commission and others

AIR 2023 Bombay 382

Date of Order: 21st September, 2023

Right to Information — Failure to provide information within statutory timeline — First Appeal – Directed to provide information — Failure to provide information — Second Appeal — Directed to provide information and awarded cost — Petition before High Court — Consistently failed to provide information — Penalty justified. [S. 4, 20, Right to Information Act, 2005].

FACTS

Respondent had filed an application seeking information under provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005. However, the Petitioner failed to provide the relevant information within the prescribed timeline. The Respondent instituted the first appeal after her application was deemed to have been rejected. In the first appeal, the Petitioner was directed to give the information as per the said application. However, despite directions, the Petitioner did not bother to provide the information. The Respondent, thus, filed a second appeal to the Global State Information Commission (GSIC). The Ld. GSIC allowed the appeal in favour of Respondent and imposed a penalty on the Petitioner. The Petitioner challenged this order before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court (Goa Bench) by invoking provisions of articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

HELD

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court held that the Petitioner had consistently failed to perform its statutory duties. The Hon’ble court further held that various allegations put forth by the Petitioner such as Respondent acting under mala-fide intentions were vague and baseless. Furthermore, the Court observed that the Petitioner was seeking excuses of the corona virus and nationwide lockdown in March 2020, which were not acceptable. Thus, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court upheld the order of the GSIC and directed the Petitioner to pay the penalty ordered by the Ld. GSIC.

The Petition was dismissed.

BCAJ Admin

21. Condonation of Delay – Delay of 3671 days – No reason to decline
benefit merely due to delay in filing of appeal when in similar cases benefit
was derived by similar concerns [Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Sections 4, 5, 18,
54]

K.
Subbarayudu and Ors. vs. The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) (2017)
12 Supreme Court Cases 840

The issue was
whether the lower authority could decline the benefit available to the
appellant only due to the reason of delay of 3,671 days in filing an appeal.

It was observed
by the Court that, when the concerned court has exercised its discretion either
condoning or declining to condone the delay, normally the superior court will
not interfere in exercise of such discretion. The true guide is whether the
litigant has acted with due diligence. Since the Appellants/claimants are the
agriculturists whose lands were acquired and when similarly situated
agriculturists were given a higher rate of compensation, there is no reason to
decline the same to the Appellants. Merely on the ground of delay, such benefit
cannot be denied to the Appellants. Accordingly, the delay was condoned.

22. Family Settlement Limitation – Suit challenging the deed of family
settlement after period of 9 years of deed of family settlement was held to be
barred by limitation. [Limitation Act (36 of 1963, Art. 157)]

Jose
Floriano Cristovam Pinto and Ors. vs. Michelle N. Pinto Souza and Ors. AIR 2017
BOMBAY 263

One of the
issues to be decided was whether a suit filed for repudiation of the deed of
family settlement after a gap of 9 years be allowed?

It was held
that there was substantial delay and laches on part of Respondents to
approach Court in seeking the repudiation of the Deed of Family Settlement of
2005 in a suit of 2014 and on that premise, could not have secured the
plaintiffs with the relief of injunction and also that the appellants could
well have disposed off other properties between this period of filing the suit
and the deed of settlement and in that context of apathy and inaction of the
plaintiffs did not entitle them to the relief of injunction, hence deed of
family arrangement cannot be held to be invalid.

23. Interpretation – Deed and documents – The terms of the contract will
have to be understood in the way the parties wanted and intended them to be.
[Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34]

Bharat
Aluminium Company vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2016) 4 Supreme
Court Cases 126

The only issue
was whether the parties, by agreement, express or implied, have excluded wholly
or partly, Part I of the Arbitration Act, where Art. 17 mentions that English
law would be applicable and Art. 20 mentions that Indian Law would be
applicable.

In the facts of
the present case, disputes arose out of an agreement which was executed. The
same were referred to arbitration in England where the arbitral Tribunal made
two awards in favour of the Respondent. The Appellant filed applications, u/s.
34 of the Arbitration Act before the District Judge, Bilaspur, which were
dismissed. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed appeal before the High Court of
Chhattisgarh. The High Court dismissed the appeal.

It was observed
by the Supreme Court that the parties have agreed in expressed terms that the
law of arbitration would be English Arbitration Law. In the case before us,
being a contract executed between the two parties, the court cannot adopt an
approach for interpreting a statute. The terms of the contract will have to be
understood in the way the parties wanted and intended them to be. In that
context, particularly in agreements of arbitration, where party autonomy is the
grundnorm, how the parties worked out the agreement, is one of the
indicators to decipher the intention, apart from the plain or grammatical
meaning of the expressions and the use of the expressions at the proper places
in the agreement. Contextually, it may be noted that in the present case, the
Respondent had invoked the provisions of English law for the purpose of the
initiation of the unsettled disputes. In view of the above, the Supreme Court
held that the arbitration agreement was not governed by the Indian Law.

24. Jurisdiction – on jurisdiction is mandatory – At any stage of the
proceeding, issue of jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter has to
be tried once it is brought to the notice of the court– Remanded. [CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908; ORDER I, RULE 8]

S.N.D.P.
Sakhayogam vs. Kerala Atmavidya Sangham (2017) 8 Supreme Court Cases 830

One of the
issues were whether the Plaintiff, who is a juristic person, i.e.,
“Society” is entitled to invoke the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of
the Code for filing a suit in a “representative capacity” i.e.
whether the Lower authority had the jurisdiction to try such a suit.

The facts of
the present case deal with the fact that the Plaintiff treated their suit to be
in the nature of a “representative suit” within the meaning of Order
1 Rule 8 and, therefore, applied to the Trial Court under Rule 8 of the Code
seeking permission to prosecute the suit in the representative capacity. This
permission appears to have been granted to the Plaintiff by the Trial Court
without any objection from the side of the Defendants and, therefore, Issue No.
1 was answered in Plaintiff’s favour.

The Court held
that the Trial Court was expected to decide several material questions, namely,
whether the Plaintiff, who is a juristic person, i.e., “Society” is
entitled to invoke the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code for filing a
suit in a “representative capacity”. In other words, the Trial Court
should have examined the question as to whether the expression
“person” occurring in Rule 8 also includes “juristic
person”. Secondly, if the Plaintiff is held entitled to file such suit,
whether the facts pleaded and the reliefs claimed in the plaint can be said to
be in the nature of representative character so as to satisfy the ingredients
of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code which are meant essentially for the benefit of public
at large for grant of any relief and lastly, if the facts pleaded and the
reliefs claimed in the plaint do not satisfy the requirements of Order 1 Rule 8
of the Code for grant of relief to the public at large then whether such suit
is capable of being tried as a regular suit on behalf of the Plaintiff for
granting reliefs in their personal capacity, because the suit relates to
ownership of land, namely, who is the owner of the suit land. Since there was
neither any discussion much less finding on any of the aforesaid issues by any
of the Courts below, though these questions directly and substantially arose in
the case, we are of the considered opinion that it would be just and proper and
in the interest of justice to remand the case to the Trial Court to answer
these issues and then decide the suit depending upon the answer in accordance
with law.

The Hon’ble
Court observed that the issue of jurisdiction which goes to the root of the
case if found involved has to be tried at any stage if the proceedings once
brought to the notice of the Court.

25. Nominee – Not entitled to withdraw from bank especially when dispute
raised by another legal heir [Banking Regulation Act, 1949, Section 45ZA]

Vishwanath
Yadav and Ors. vs. Kashinath Yadav and Ors. AIR 2017 BOMBAY 258

The questions
for consideration was whether a nominee can recover the amounts from the Bank
on behalf of all the legal representatives when the legal representatives
themselves have put up a claim to recover such amount from the concerned Bank and
whether such amounts can be claimed only after the Inventory Proceedings are
initiated.

It was observed
by the Court that it is clear that whenever a depositor appoints his nominee
and the depositor dies before the maturity of the fixed deposit for release,
the nominee so appointed would certainly be entitled to collect the amount
payable on such fixed deposit amount on its maturity for release. However, that
would not take away the right of the legal heirs of the deceased depositor from
claiming right to the amount standing to the credit of the deceased depositor
in accordance with the provisions of law of succession in force. This is so
because a nominee is merely a representative of the lawful successor of the
deceased depositor to receive the payment on the maturity of the deposit for
release. The nominee does not step in the shoes of the legal heirs merely on
account of nomination by a depositor.

BCAJ Admin

19. 
Appellate Tribunal – Reasoned Order – Order should refer to all factual
aspects, rival contentions and legal provisions – Reasons to be assigned for
the basis of any conclusion reached. [Section 254(1)]

Gandhar Oil Refinery vs. Commissioner of Customs (Import)
2016 (342) E.L.T. 31 (Bom.) (HC)

The Tribunal, in the present case had, not beyond one
paragraph, adverted to factual exercise and no details had been mentioned.

The High Court held that the Tribunal should focus on the
core issue, must refer to all factual matters, including any findings by the
laboratories after a test of the samples, the rival contentions and whether the
legal provisions, including, the Rules having a bearing or impact on the same
should be clearly indicated. The Tribunal must assign reasons for the
conclusion it reaches either way.       

20. 
Contempt of Court – Serious and unsubstantiated allegations of
corruption and bias against Judiciary – Cannot be termed as Fair Criticism –
Affidavits filed for apology not deemed bonafide – Imprisonment upto 6 months
and upto Rs. 2,000 fine for contempt. [Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Sections
2(c), 5, 12]

Het Ram Beniwal And Others vs. Raghuveer Singh And Others
Air 2016 Supreme Court 4940

The 4 appellants, of whom 2 were advocates, addressed a huge
gathering of their party workers in front of the Collectorate, when some of the
accused were granted anticipatory bail, who were allegedly involved in the
murder of a prominent trade union activist.

While addressing the gathering, the appellants made
scandalous and derogatory statements against the High Court and its Judges
stating how the system of Judiciary failed in rendering justice and people have
lost their faith and confidence in the Judiciary, the rule was of the Rich
People in the Judiciary and that there was the influence of money behind the
anticipatory bail of the accused.

The appellants, when questioned in Court by filing a
petition, contented that the statements only attributed to ‘Fair Criticism’
which would not amount to Contempt of Court as mentioned in section 5 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which states that Fair Criticism of Judicial act
was not contempt. It was also contended that Criticism of class bias and
improper administration of justice cannot be considered to be contempt.

The Ld. Amicus Curiae, assisting the Court, submitted
that vituperative comments undermining the Judiciary would amount to contempt
and that, an apology through an Affidavit was made only for the purpose of
avoiding punishment and was not bonafide.

The Supreme Court in the current case held that Judges need
not be protected and that they can protect themselves but it is the right and
interest of public in the due administration of justice that have to be
protected. Vilification of Judges would lead to the destruction of the system
of administration of justice. The statements of the appellants are not only
derogatory but also have the propensity of lowering the authority of the Court.
Accusing Judges of corruption results in denigration of the institution which
has an effect of lowering the confidence of the public in the system of
administration of justice. Hence, the appellants are not entitled to take
shelter u/s. 5.

The Court also states that every citizen has a fundamental
right to speech, guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
Contempt of Court is one of the restrictions of such right.

Dismissing the appeal, the court subjected the appellants to
an amount of Rs.2,000/- only as fine without any imprisonment.

21. 
Family – The term ‘family’ includes a married daughter for her to have a
right to evict the tenant from the building [Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Regulation Act, 1972; Section 3(g)].

Gulshera Khanam vs. Aftab Ahmad Air 2016 9 Supreme Court
414

Dr. Ahsan Ahmad was the
original owner of the building who died intestate. On his death, the entire
estate devolved upon his wife(appellant), 2 sons and 4 daughters as per the
shares defined in the Hanafi Law of Inheritance. Dr. Naheed Parveen being the
daughter, received her share accordingly and became the co-owner along with
other co-sharers.

Section 3(g) of the Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Regulation Act, 1972 clearly states in sub-section(iii) that “family includes
any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or
daughter of a male lineal descendent as may have been normally residing with
him or her” which clearly shows the intention of the legislation to exclude a
married daughter from the purview of the definition of ‘Family’ as defined under
the Act.

However, the Supreme Court took a different view by
interpreting the lines included in section 3(g) which are stated in the end as,
“and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of
residence in that building”. It was held that since the daughter got a legal
right in the building in the form of a share devolved on her as per the
Mohamedan law i.e. the Hanafi Law of Inheritance, the term ‘Family’ includes a
Married daughter.

22.  Interpretation-Binding precedents – If two
decisions of Supreme Court, being contrary to each other, are passed – The
later decision will be binding. [Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
Act, 1985; Section 22]

A.K. Mohta vs. Karnataka State Financial Corpn. [2016] 198
Comp Cas 286 (Karn.)(HC)

The issue was w.r.t. whether guarantors can be protected from
legal ‘proceedings’ whereas the section clearly mentions the word ‘suit’
against which the guarantors could claim protection u/s. 22 and not against
‘proceedings’.

Relevant portion of the section states, “and no suit for the recovery of money or for the
enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee
in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company”.

The court had placed reliance on one Supreme Court case law
(2003) where it stated that Legislature appeared to have knowingly used two
differently expressions in section 22(1) w.r.t. ‘proceeding’ and ‘suit
wherein the expression ‘proceeding’ would not include the expression ‘suit’ and
vice versa w.r.t to protection of Guarantors under the said Act.

The counsel however,
relied upon one Supreme Court Judgment (2007) which held that section 22(1)
would have to be interpreted to include the expression ‘proceeding’ also in
view of the legislature’s intention to protect the sick industries.

A peculiar fact was that, the earlier decision had not been
taken into consideration for the purpose of arriving at the judgment passed by
the Supreme Court in the later year (2007) and a larger bench did not have an
occasion to lay down the correct position of law.

The High Court in the current case held that if two decisions
of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and if both
Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the later of
the two decisions should be followed by the lower Courts/Authorities.

23. Interpretation – Binding
precedents – Binding  effect of order –
Order even if void, would continue to be in force until set aside by court of
competent jurisdiction.

Anita International vs. Tungabadra Sugar Works Mazdoor
Sangh and Ors. (2016) 9 Supreme Court Cases 44

It was held that parties to lis(a suit pending) or any
third party cannot themselves determine the voidness of any order without
approaching a competent court for setting it aside since not following the same
would amount to disobedience of court’s order which would entail punishment.

BCAJ Admin