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PART PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT

INTRODUCTION
It is said that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Taking a cue from this maxim, s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“the Act”) has enacted the concept of part performance of a contract. This concept is based upon the law of possession.

The Income-tax Act at several places makes references to any transaction allowing the possession of any immovable property in part performance of a contract. The concept of part performance of a contract is found in s. 2(47) relating to the definition of ‘transfer’ for capital gains, s. 27 relating to the definition of ‘owner’ under House Property Income and the erstwhile s. 269UA relating to ‘transfer’ for Form 37-I. Thus, it becomes important to understand the meaning of this concept.

DEFINITION
The Supreme Court in  Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi [2002] 3 SCC 676 has stated that certain conditions are required to be fulfilled if a transferee wants to defend or protect his possession under s. 53A of the Act. The necessary conditions are:

(1)    there must be a contract to transfer for consideration of any immovable property;

(2)    the contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf;

(3)    the writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained;

(4)    the transferee must in part-performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof;

(5)    the transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract; and

(6)    the transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract.

If the above mentioned elements are present, then the transferor is debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property in possession of the transferee other than a right expressly provided by the contract. Thus, this section protects certain types of transferees from any action by the transferor. The principle laid down has been explained by the Supreme Court in Sheth Maneklal Mansukhbhai vs. Messrs. Hormusji Jamshedji, AIR 1950 SC 1 as follows:

“The s. is a partial importation in the statute law of India of the English doctrine of part performance. It furnishes a statutory defence to a person who has no registered title deed in his favour to maintain his possession if he can prove a written and signed contract in his favour and some action on his part in part-performance of that contract.”

Let us examine each of the above key elements.

CONTRACT
The starting point of s. 53A is that there must be a contract that must relate to the transfer of specific immovable property. Without a contract, this section has no application. Since a contract is a must, it goes without saying that all the contract prerequisites also follow. Thus, if the contract has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, etc., then it is void ab initio, and the section would also fail – Ariff vs. Jadunath (1931) AIR PC 79.

WRITTEN CONTRACTS
Another important requirement is that the contract must be in writing. Oral contracts are valid under the Indian Contract Act but not for the purposes of s. 53A. The transfer must be by virtue of a written contract. If the contract merely refers to a previous oral understanding, then the same would not fall within the purview of s. 53A – Kathihar Jute Mills Ltd. vs. Calcutta Match Works, AIR 1958 Pat 133.

In Sardar Govindrao Mahadik vs. Devi Sahai, 1982 (1) SCC 237, it was held that to qualify for the protection of the doctrine of part performance it must be shown that there is an agreement to transfer immovable property for consideration and the contract is evidenced by a writing signed by the person sought to be bound by it and from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. In Mool Chand Bakhru vs. Rohan, CA 5920/1998 (SC), letters were written by a landowner offering to sell half his property in exchange for money which he needed. The Supreme Court letters denied the benefit of s. 53A to the transferee by observing that the letters written could not be termed as an agreement to sell, the terms of which had been reduced into writing. At the most, it was an admission of an oral agreement to sell and not a written agreement. Statutorily the emphasis was not only on a written agreement but also on the terms of the agreement as well which could be ascertained with reasonable certainty from the written document. There was no meeting of minds. The letters did not spell out the other essential terms of an agreement to sell, such as the time frame within which the sale deed was to be executed and who would pay the registration charges etc.

REGISTRATION

Earlier, s. 53A provided that the section would take effect even if the agreement for the transfer of the immovable property had not been registered. However, the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 modified this position. Now for s. 53A to operate, the agreement must be registered. Hence, registration has been made mandatory, and in its absence, the section would be inoperative. Since the agreement is to be in writing, stamp duty would also follow. Accordingly, if the agreement is inadequately stamped, it would not be admissible as evidence in a Court.

In a recent judgment of Joginder Tuli vs. State NCT of Delhi, W.P.(CRL) 1006/2020 & CRL.M.A. 8649/2020, the Delhi High Court has stated that it is well settled that in order to give benefits of s. 53A, the document relied upon must be a registered document. Any unregistered document cannot be looked into by the court and cannot be relied upon or taken into evidence in view of s. 17(1A) read with s. 49 of the Registration Act. Thus, the benefit of s. 53A would be given, if and only if the Agreement to Sell cum Receipt satisfied the provisions of s. 17(1) A of the Registration Act. It relied upon an earlier decision in the case of Arun Kumar Tandon vs. Akash Telecom Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. MANU/DE/0545/2010.

Another decision of the Delhi High Court, Earthtech Enterprises Ltd. vs. Kuljit Singh Butalia, 199 (2013) DLT 194, has observed that a person can protect his possession under s. 53A on the plea of part performance only if it is armed with a registered document. Even on the basis of a written agreement, he cannot protect his possession.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Balbir Singh Maini, (2017) 398 ITR 531 (SC) under the Income-tax Act has succinctly summed up the relationship between registration of the instrument and s. 53A. It held that the protection provided under s. 53A is only a shield and can only be resorted to as a right of defence. An agreement of sale which fulfilled the ingredients of s. 53A was not required to be executed through a registered instrument. This position was changed by the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001. Amendments were made simultaneously in s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and sections 17 and 49 of the Indian Registration Act. By the aforesaid amendment, the words ‘the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or’ in s. 53A of the 1882 Act have been omitted. Simultaneously, sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act have been amended, clarifying that unless the document containing the contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property (for the purpose of s. 53A) is registered, it shall not have any effect in law other than being received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument.

The effect of the aforesaid amendment was that, on and after the commencement of the Amendment Act of 2001, if an agreement, like the Joint Development Agreement in the impugned case, was not registered, then it had had no effect in law for the purposes of s. 53A. In short, there was no agreement in the eyes of the law which could be enforced under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, in order to qualify as a ‘transfer’ of a capital asset under s. 2(47)(v), there must be a ‘contract’ which could be enforced in law under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ONLY

The contract must pertain to the ‘transfer of an immovable property’. The Act defines this phrase as an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one more other living persons or to himself, and one or more other living persons. This is also known as transfer inter vivos. The Act then proceeds to deal with various types of transfer of immovable property – a sale, an exchange, a mortgage and a lease. All these transfers would be covered within the scope of s. 53A. A gift of an immovable property is also a transfer but is not covered within the purview of s. 53A as explained below. Anything which is not a transfer is not covered by s. 53A. For instance, a leave and licence is an easement / personal right and hence, would be outside the purview of this section. Similarly, various Supreme Court decisions have held that a family arrangement is not a transfer, and hence, a family arrangement would be outside the scope of this section.

A movable property would be out of the purview of this section – Bhabhi Dutt vs. Ramlalbyamal (1934) 152 IC 431. The Act defines the term immovable property in a negative manner by stating that it does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. The General Clauses Act defines it to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and any anything attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, defines the term to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The scope of this section even applies to agricultural properties – Nakul Chand Polley vs. Kalipada Ghosal, AIR 1939 Cal 163.

The Supreme Court has held in UOI vs. M/s. KC Sharma & Co., CA No. 9049-9053 /2011 that the defence under s. 53A was even available to a person who had an agreement of lease in his favour though no lease had been executed and registered. It also protected the possession of persons who have acted on a contract of sale but in whose favour no valid sale deed was executed or registered. The benefit was available, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed by the law for the time being in force. In all cases where the section was applicable, the transferor was debarred from enforcing against the transferee any right in respect of the property of which the transferee had taken or continued in possession.

CONSIDERATION
The transfer of immovable property must be for consideration. Hence, gratuitous transfers or gifts of immovable property would be outside the purview of s. 53A – Hiralal vs. Gaurishankar (1928) 30 Bom LR 451. As is the norm in India, adequacy of consideration is immaterial. For instance, in the USA, not only is consideration a must for a valid contract, it must also be adequate. In India, all that is necessary, both for a valid contract as well as for s. 53A, is that there must be consideration.

SIGNATURE
The contract must be signed by the transferor or any person on his behalf, say the power of attorney holder.

TERMS OF CONTRACT
The terms of the contract must be ascertainable with reasonable certainty. If they are ambiguous or cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty, then the contract cannot be enforced u/s. 53A – Bobba Suramma vs. P Chandramma 1959 AIR AP 568.

POSSESSION
The transferee must take possession of the property for this section to apply – Sanyasi Raju vs. Kamappadu (1960) AIR AP 83. Alternatively, if he is already in possession of the property, then he must continue with such possession. Possession of a part of the property is also enough – Durga Prasad vs. Kanhaiyalal (1979) AIR Raj 200. Further, the possession of the property must be pursuant to part performance of the agreement to sell the property. The onus of proof is on the defendant – Thakamma Mathew vs. Azamathulla Khan 1993 Suppl. (4) SCC 492.

In the case of Roop Singh (Dead) Through Lrs vs. Ram Singh (Dead) Through Lrs, JT 2000 (3) SC 474, the plaintiff pleaded that he owned certain agricultural land. As the land was in illegal possession of the defendant, he filed a suit. The defendant submitted that 14 years prior to the date of institution of the suit, he had purchased the suit land for consideration, had paid full sale consideration to the plaintiff, and since then, he was in possession of the suit land. He contended that his possession is protected under s. 53A. He also pleaded that he had acquired the title by adverse possession (adverse possession is a means of acquiring title to a property by physically occupying it for a long period of time. A person can acquire property if one possesses it long enough and meets the legal requirements). The Supreme Court held that the plea of adverse possession and retaining the possession by operation of s. 53A were inconsistent with each other. Once it was admitted by implication that the plaintiff came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till the date of the suit, then the plea of adverse possession would not be available to the defendant.     

WILLINGNESS OF TRANSFEREE
The transferee must be willing to complete his part of the contract. Failure on his part to complete his contract, e.g. payment of monthly instalments, would not entitle him to the defence of part performance – Jawaharlal Wadhwa vs. Chakraborthy 1989 (1) SCC 76.

In Ranchhoddas Chhaganlal vs. Devaji Supadu Dorik, 1977 SCC (3) 584, the purchaser paid a portion of the consideration and claimed shelter u/s.53A. Despite demands from the plaintiff, he failed to pay the balance sum. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was never ready and willing to perform the agreement as alleged by the appellant. One of the ingredients of part performance under s. 53A was that the transferee had taken possession in part performance of the contract. In the case on hand there was no performance in part by the respondent. The true principle of the operation of the acts of part performance required that the acts in question must be referred to some contract and must be referred to the alleged one; that they proved the existence of some contract and were consistent with the contract alleged. S. 53A was a right to protect his possession against any challenge to it by the transferor contrary to the terms of the contract.

Again in Ram Kumar Agarwal vs. Thawar Das, (1999) (1) SCC 76, it was held that a plea under s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act raised a mixed question of law and fact and therefore could not be permitted to be urged for the first time at the stage of an appeal. Further, performance or willingness to perform his part of the contract was one of the essential ingredients of the plea of part performance. The defendant, having failed in proving such willingness, protection to his possession could not have been claimed by reference to s. 53A.

The section does not create a title in the defendant. It only acts as a deterrent against a plaintiff asserting his title. It does not permit the defendant to maintain a suit on title – Ram Gopal vs. Custodian (1966) 2 SCR 214.

NULL AND VOID TRANSACTIONS

The section has no application to transactions which are null and void for any reason. The Supreme Court held in Biswabani (P.) Ltd vs. Santosh Kumar Dutta, 1980 SCR (1) 650 that if a lease was void for want of registration, neither party to the indenture could take advantage of any of the terms of the lease. No other terms of such an indenture inadmissible for want of registration can be the basis for a relief u/s. 53A.

Again in Ligy Paul vs. Mariyakutti, RSA No. 79/2020, the Kerala High Court has reiterated that s.53A is applicable only where a contract for transfer is valid in all respects. It must be an agreement enforceable by law under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

EXCEPTION

This section does not impact the rights of a buyer who has paid consideration and who has no notice of the contract or the part performance of the contract.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of part performance is a concept with several important cogs in the wheel. Each of them is vital for the doctrine to be applied correctly. Although it is one of the fundamental tenets in the field of conveyancing, its importance under the Income-tax Act also cannot be belittled!

NSE’S HIGH-TECH STOCK MARKET SCANDAL: WILL THE MASTERMINDS GO SCOT FREE?

NSE was hit by a co-location trading scandal sometime in 2015 when a whistle-blower first complained to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Author and Journalist Palak Shah has done a deep dive investigation into the NSE co-location scam. His book The Market Mafia, published in November 2020, is a full-scale exposé of the deep rot in India’s financial market ecosystem. As a journalist working with some of the leading Business newspapers in Mumbai, Palak has much insight into the working of markets, exchanges, SEBI and regulations. Considering certain constraints, BCAJ sent him questions and carried this e-interview to throw light on how the NSE scam has unfolded and the delay in investigating it. Hope you enjoy reading it!

Q.1. Can you briefly explain the matter relating to the Colo scam and corporate governance issues at NSE?
Co-location (Colo) is nothing but proximity hosting of broker servers with NSE’s master order matching engine in the exchange premises at Bandra-Kurla Complex (BKC). It gives a superior trading speed and advanced information on price moves and order books. As I have detailed in my book, The Market Mafia, the Colo scandal goes back to 2010. When NSE started co-location trading, it lacked the necessary study from the market regulator SEBI and hence safeguards. There were flaws in the system, which investigations post 2015 revealed were deliberate. The flaws gave a few an advantage in connecting first and hence faster data and so on. Had SEBI made a proper study of NSE trading systems in 2010 or carried out a thorough audit and then given its go-ahead after a public consultation, the scenario would have been different. The deliberate flaws in the system were a result of corporate governance lapses at NSE, for which the accountability has to be fixed.   

Q.2. How was the matter unearthed?

In January 2015, an unknown whistle-blower first informed SEBI about the co-location scandal and certain flaws in the system. The then SEBI whole time-member Rajeev Agarwal pushed his officials into action, and the probe started in the weeks following the whistle-blower complaints. But even after Agarwal set the ball rolling, SEBI was slow in its approach and investigations since NSE’s top bosses enjoyed high patronage in New Delhi, and the regulators were scared to take them head-on. Multiple forensic and system audits by IIT Mumbai were carried out under SEBI’s instructions. NSE’s top management was hostile towards these investigations since they would not share the data and other inputs with the investigators. Yet certain facts on governance lapses and flaws in the system emerged. CBI registered an FIR in 2018 on the basis of a complaint but for four years the Co-location file kept gathering dust since no major investigation was done by the agency. It was believed by many that key players in the scam were difficult to identify. In November 2020, I published my book The Market Mafia – Chronicle of India’s High Tech Stock Market Scandal & The Cabal That Went Scot Free. The book detailed the nuts and bolts of NSE’s trading system and, for the first time, gave an inside into the working of a Co-location scam and other aspects that most of the market investors were unaware about. The book also gave vital details of the key characters in the co-location scam and brought into the public domain several hidden communication between NSE officials and SEBI with regard to the ongoing probe. The book laid bare how NSE flouted norms with relative ease and impunity, and even senior SEBI officials looked the other way. The Market Mafia carries a detailed account of brokers, NSE officials, financial market experts and policymakers who benefited from the Co-location scam and the happening within NSE. For the first time in 30 years after the Harshad Mehta scam, a book has revealed true events to show how India’s stock markets are rigged by those very people who are supposed to protect the system.

In February 2022, SEBI released an order against former NSE MD and CEO Chitra Ramkrishna, who was among the key managerial persons when the co-location scam was taking place and was later in charge of NSE between 2013 and 2016. The SEBI order stated that Ramkrishna was taking instructions from an unknown person to run the exchange, whom she called a Yogi dwelling in the Himalayas. All this attracted public attention to the NSE scandal, which I say is several times bigger than the Harshad Mehta scam.

Q.3. As the first line of oversight, has NSE performed its obligation when the matter came to light?


From the beginning, NSE has been lax in diving deep into the scandal, which came to light in 2015. It has shielded and protected its officials who could have turned a blind eye to the various lapse or who could have engineered the flaws in the trading system. Simple instance of NSE shielding its officials can be gauged from the fact that Ramkrishna was allowed to exit NSE with dignity and was also paid Rs 44 crore in dues in 2016. Instead, the exchange was required to conduct investigations into her bad governance practices and slap some serious charges. Several other instances, like sharing data illegally with Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas, the two well-known market researchers by NSE, show that the officials within the exchange were complacent with the scamsters.

Q.4. Was SEBI aware of the irregularities at NSE, and for how long?

SEBI officials can be charged with ‘Omission and Commission of Duty’ which implies complacency in the scandal. It is one of the directions in which the CBI is now probing SEBI officials. The regulator is alleged to have hidden facts from the public, investigators and government about the scam. This is clear from the various arguments of CBI in the court.

Q.5. As a regulator, has SEBI been fair in investigating the matter and discharging its obligation in terms of timeliness of action, quality of investigation, quantum of punitive action taken and taking corrective action?

SEBI failed to conduct due diligence of NSE co-location trading systems from the day it started in January 2010. SEBI has been very slow in ordering proper investigations and even conducting its own probe. It left the probe to NSE to investigate itself. SEBI’s orders are childish and loosely knit. It has broken down the scam into various instances of small violations and not imposed charges of fraud and other stringent provisions laid down in the SEBI Act. The regulator has wide-ranging powers to probe such scandals, which it has not used at all. The list of SEBI’s inaction is long. All this points to SEBI’s lack of willingness in bringing the real culprits to book.

Q.6. Was a similar matter also detected at any other exchanges, and has SEBI dealt with other exchanges differently?

Yes, a forensic audit by TR Chaddha and Co. points out a scandal in sharing data by MCX with Susan Thomas and one New Delhi based algo trading Chirag Anand in an unauthorised manner. But SEBI and MCX have buried this scandal. NSE data, which was illegally obtained by Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas was going into algo trading work. Similarly, data obtained from MCX without following proper checks and balances were also going into algo trading work. SEBI has failed to take the MCX probe further and bring the actual culprits to book.

Q.7. How, in your view, will these irregularities impact the credibility of the Indian securities market, especially when one out of two exchanges and its regulator is found inactive or even complicit?

Both foreign investors and domestic institutions strongly believe that India follows the rule of law. Retail investors believe that Indian markets are most efficient and scam free. All the investors have placed their faith in SEBI and exchanges like NSE, BSE and MCX who are the larger players. They invest and trade billions of dollars at the blink of an eye. But the scandal at NSE and data sharing at MCX in a dubious manner, both of which show SEBI in poor light, can erode the trust of these investors. The credibility of the market has already been impacted but would be in ruins till the time the culprits are not found and brought to book by the government.

Q.8. You have been covering the colo and corporate governance matter at NSE in detail at various forums for quite a long time and have also covered these irregularities in detail in your book – ‘The Market Mafia’ – What is the whole idea behind this book?

You will find that The Market Mafia is a unique book since it gives all the real names of those behind the scandal at NSE and dubious happenings at MCX. The book exposes SEBI and the government’s lack of will for the past few years to investigate the scandal. It also reveals the conflict of interest that prevails in the governing structures of the stock markets and, above all, the bureaucratic rut that has exposed SEBI as a lame paper tiger.

JURISDICTION OF SEBI IN TAKING ACTION AGAINST PRACTISING CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

BACKGROUND
With the onset of the infamous Satyam scam of 2008-2009, where major accounting frauds were exposed, SEBI initiated a detailed investigation in the books of accounts of Satyam. Post investigation, SEBI issued a Show Cause Notice to the statutory auditor of Satyam, namely Price Waterhouse Co. (PWC). The power of SEBI to issue such a Show Cause Notice to a Chartered Accountant (firm) was challenged by PWC before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court (Writ Petition No. 5249 of 2010) under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court (vide its order of 13th August, 2010) put the controversy to rest by allowing SEBI to initiate action and bring Chartered Accountants within its fold – subject to not encroaching on the ICAI’s powers under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (CA Act).

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court emphasized the fact that only if the Chartered Accountant was involved in falsification and fabrication of books of a listed company, then SEBI could invoke its powers under Section 11(4) r.w.s. 11B of the SEBI Act, which reads as under:

Section 11B.

(1)    Save as otherwise provided in section 11, if after making or causing to be made an enquiry, the Board is satisfied that it is necessary:

(i)    in the interest of investors, or orderly development of securities market; or

(ii)    to prevent the affairs of any intermediary or other persons referred to in section 12 being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of investors or securities market; or to secure the proper management of any such intermediary or person

it may issue such directions:

(a)    to any person or class of persons referred to in section, or associated with the securities market; or

(b)    to any company in respect of matters specified in section 11A, as may be appropriate in the interests of investors in securities and the securities market.

An important facet of the aforesaid definition is whether an auditor of listed companies (and registered intermediaries) can be considered to be a ‘person associated with the securities market’ and thereby under the jurisdiction of SEBI. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court clarified that if SEBI concludes that there was no ‘mens rea or connivance’ to fabricate and fudge the books of accounts, then SEBI ought not to issue any direction(s) against the auditor.

Within the aforesaid contours, the proceedings (qua PWC) continued at the SEBI level and finally concluded with an Order against PWC (on 10th January, 2018), inter-alia, imposing a restraint on PWC on issuing a certificate to a listed company for two years, amongst other directions. PWC challenged the SEBI Order before the Hon’ble Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). In the said case (decided on 9th September, 2019), the Hon’ble SAT went into the question as to whether SEBI could have proceeded against an auditor in connection with the work which they have undertaken for a listed company in respect of maintaining its books of accounts. After deliberation, the Hon’ble SAT ruled that SEBI’s enquiry ought to be only restricted to the charge of conspiracy and involvement in ‘fraud’. SEBI cannot take action against the auditing firm on the charge of professional negligence – since the CA firm was under the jurisdiction of ICAI. The said SAT Order has been challenged by SEBI before the Hon’ble Supreme Court – in which the regulator obtained a limited stay in its favour (Supreme Court Order dated 18th November, 2019 in Civil Appeal No(s). 8567-8570/ 2019). Until the Hon’ble Supreme Court finally adjudicates the matter – the question of SEBI’s jurisdiction of taking action against the Chartered Accountant(s) remains an open-ended one.

However, in the recent past, SEBI has been penalizing auditors of listed companies and registered intermediaries in respect of their auditing functions by alleging that the concerned auditor had violated Sections 12A(a), 12A(b) and 12A(c) of the SEBI Act, which reads as under:

12A. No person shall directly or indirectly:

(a)    use or employ, in connection with the issue, purchase or sale of any securities listed or proposed to be listed on a recognized stock exchange, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder;

(b)    employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection with issue or dealing in securities which are listed or proposed to be listed on a recognised stock exchange;

(c)    engage in any act, practice, course of business which operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the issue, dealing in securities which are listed or proposed to be listed on a recognised stock exchange, in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder.

RECENT RULING BY HON’BLE SAT

Through recent decisions in the M. V. Damania case (Appeal No. 335 of 2020 decided on 17th January, 2022) and Mani Oommen case (Appeal No. 183 of 2020 decided on 18th February, 2022); the Hon’ble SAT has set aside the SEBI orders penalising the auditors:

I.    In the M. V. Damania case, the concerned auditor had certified the expenditure incurred by Paramount Printpackaging Ltd (PPL) towards Initial Public Offering (IPO) expenses out of the IPO proceeds. The crux of SEBI’s allegation was that auditor negligently certified that an amount of Rs. 36.60 crores was utilized towards objects of the IPO. SEBI had alleged that:

(i)    PPL made payment to the various vendors in crore of rupees without having any invoices;

(ii)    in some cases, bills from the vendors were issued at a later date, post remittance by PPL; and

(iii)    the auditor did not raise any red flag against doubtful payments made by PPL.

In view of the aforesaid, SEBI imposed a monetary penalty of Rs. 15 lakhs on the auditor firm (and its partner), jointly and severally, for alleged violation of provisions of Section 12A(a), 12A(b) and 12A(c) of the SEBI Act r.w. Regulations 3 and 4 of the SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP Regulations).

In Appeal, the concerned auditor contended the following, amongst other arguments:

(i)    audit of the financial statements of PPL was based on the information provided by the management;

(ii)    in the process of the audit, the endeavour was to obtain audit evidence that is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for forming an independent opinion;

(iii)    all the payments made by PPL were supported by bank statements; and

(iv)    in any case, SEBI had no jurisdiction to proceed against Chartered Accountants, who are members of the ICAI.

The Hon’ble SAT ruled that the provisions of Section 12A(a) and 12A(b) of the SEBI Act do not apply to Chartered Accountants since ‘they are not dealing in the securities’. Similarly, the provisions of Section 12A(c) cannot be made applicable because the concerned auditor has carried out no ‘fraud’. Most importantly, the Hon’ble SAT ruled that in the absence of connivance, deceit, or manipulation by the auditor, the provisions of Regulation 3 and 4 of the PFUTP Regulations cannot be made applicable. Consequently, the SEBI Order was set aside.

II.    In the Mani Oommen case, SEBI alleged that DCHL (a listed company) had understated its outstanding loans to the tune of Rs. 1,339.17 crores in 2008-09 and wrongly disclosed the difference between the actual and reported outstanding loans for 2009-10 and 2010-11. Also, its promoters, the owner of the Deccan Chronicle Marketers (DCM) had wrongly transferred loans on the last day of the financial year and reversed on the first day of the next financial year. SEBI had alleged that:

(i)    As per Sections 224 and 227 of the Companies Act, 1956, an auditor owes an obligation to the shareholders to report true and correct facts about the company’s financials, and the auditor was duty bound to report correct facts under Section 227 of the Companies Act.

(ii)    SEBI opined that the concerned auditor overlooked the reporting of the outstanding loans, and he was not diligent in his obligation to check outstanding loans details from the bank and other independent sources.

In view of the aforesaid, SEBI held that the auditor did not adhere to the Auditing and Assurance Standard – 5 (AAS) prescribed by ICAI. SEBI alleged that the concerned auditor had violated the provisions of Section 12A(a) and 12A(b) of the SEBI Act r.w. Regulations 3 and 4 of the PFUTP Regulations. Consequently, SEBI penalized the said auditor and prohibited him from issuing any certificate of audit and rendering any auditing services to any listed companies and registered intermediaries for one year. Additionally, SEBI directed listed companies and intermediaries registered with SEBI not to engage any audit firm associated with the said auditor in any capacity for issuing any certificate w.r.t compliance of statutory obligations, which SEBI is competent to administer and enforce.

In Appeal, the concerned auditor contended the following, amongst other arguments:

(i)    as a statutory auditor, the responsibility was to express an opinion on the financial statement based on the internal audit;

(ii)    the auditor was not involved in the preparation of the books of accounts of the company; and

(iii)    the accounting adjustment, namely non-disclosure of the loans by transferring the same to the another entity was brought to his notice for the first time during audit of the books of accounts of DCHL in October-2012 (at a later point in time).

The Hon’ble SAT ruled that,
in the entire SEBI Order, there is no finding that the concerned auditor was instrumental in preparing false and fabricated accounts or has connived in the falsification of the books of account. The only finding by SEBI was that due diligence was not carried out by the said auditor. There was no finding (by SEBI) that the auditor had manipulated the books of accounts with knowledge and intention, in the absence of which, there is no deceit or inducement by the auditor. In the absence of any inducement, the question of fraud committed by the auditor does not arise. Consequently, the SEBI Order was set aside.

FRAUD VIS-À-VIS NEGLIGENCE

It is clear from the aforesaid rulings of the Hon’ble SAT that lack of due diligence can only lead to professional negligence, which would amount to misconduct – which could be under the purview of other regulators (like ICAI / NFRA). While the much-needed clarity on the jurisdiction of the SEBI vis-à-vis auditors is being awaited from the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Chartered Accountant(s) must bear in mind that presently SEBI can act against them – if found that there was an element of ‘fraud’ while auditing listed companies and regulated intermediaries.

The Regulation 2 (c) of PFUTP Regulations define the term ‘fraud’ in two parts:

(i)    First part includes any act, expression, omission, or concealment committed whether in a deceitful manner or not by a person or by any other person with his connivance or by his agent while dealing in securities in order to induce another person or his agent to deal in securities, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or avoidance of any loss; and

(ii)    The second part includes specific instances which may tantamount to be fraudulent.

In the Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel case (2017 15 SCC 1 – decided on 20th September, 2017), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled that the term ‘fraud’ under the PFUTP Regulations is an act or an omission (even without deceit) if such an act or omission had the effect of ‘inducing’ another person to ‘deal in securities’.

The term ‘negligence’ as quoted in the PWC Order (SAT Appeal No. 6 of 2018) means the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances; it is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances or failure to do of a person of ordinary prudence would have done under similar circumstances (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th edition).

RISK OF REGULATORY OVERREACH

The regulatory overlaps between SEBI and other regulators in the financial service space has been an ongoing issue. With SEBI having powers under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act), there arises a situation where SEBI exercises jurisdiction against all persons on the ground that they are ‘associated with the securities market’. Consequently, the casualty is usually the regulated entities and professionals who advise them on lawfully navigating this complex regulatory space. In the past, there have been instances of such regulatory overlaps of SEBI with Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI), Competition Commission of India (CCI), Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), etc.

One cannot deny that the SEBI is an apex regulator when it comes to protecting the sanctity of the securities market and, in fact, has been armed with powers to protect the interest of investors. If the regulator demonstrates that an auditor was involved in fabricating and fudging the financial statements or had ‘colluded’ with the listed company / promoters, a charge of fraud can be fastened. However, the question is whether SEBI ought to adjudicate on issues pertaining to professional conduct of practising Chartered Accountant(s). At the end of the day, the bible for Chartered Accountants is the auditing standards – which are prepared and deliberated upon by the ICAI. The hazard of over-regulation may result in moving away from a solution-oriented regime and create a situation where every audit report will carry more caveats than it already carries. There being a thin line between a ‘fraudulent’ and ‘negligent’ act, to avoid anomaly, inter-agency coordination is desirable.

THE WAY FORWARD

In October 2010, the central government constituted Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) – an apex regulatory Council to resolve regulatory overlaps. FSDC’s role is to enhance inter-regulatory coordination and promote financial sector development. The Chairman of the Council is the Finance Minister, and its members include the heads of financial sector Regulators (RBI, SEBI, PFRDA, IRDA, etc.), Finance Secretary and/or Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Secretary, Department of Financial Services, and Chief Economic Adviser. The Council is empowered to invite experts to its meetings as and when required. FSDC may consider inviting representatives from the ICAI and NFRA for inter-regulatory coordination to resolve the regulatory overlap.

ASSET ACQUISITIONS AND DEFERRED TAXES

This article deals with a scenario concerning the creation of deferred taxes where the shares of a company are acquired, and the acquisition is classified as an asset acquisition.

BACKGROUND
•    A Ltd acquires 100% shares of B Ltd, having one Building (a PPE) and accumulated loss of INR 30 for a cash consideration of INR 100.

•    This transaction is not a business combination (i.e., the transaction is accounted for as an asset acquisition).

•    Tax rate applicable – 30%.

•    The carrying value and tax base of the Building in the standalone financial statement (SFS) of B Ltd is INR 80 and INR 70, respectively. The taxable temporary difference of INR 10 arose after the initial recognition of the Building by B Ltd, and accordingly, a deferred tax liability of INR 3 has been recognised.

•    B Ltd has accumulated a loss of INR 30, which it expects to be able to utilise and accordingly, a deferred tax asset of INR 9 has been recognised.

•    A Ltd also expects to be able to utilise all of the available losses of B Ltd, and it is probable that future taxable profit will be available against which the tax losses can be utilised.

•    The fair value of Building on the date of acquisition is INR 91.

ISSUE
Whether any deferred tax should be recognised in the consolidated financial statements (CFS) of A Ltd.?
RESPONSE

Ind AS References

Ind AS 103, Business Combinations

Paragraph 2 – This Ind AS does not apply to:
(a) ………..
(b) the acquisition of an asset or a group of assets that does not constitute a business. In such cases the acquirer shall identify and recognise the individual identifiable assets acquired (including those assets that meet the definition of, and recognition criteria for, intangible assets in Ind AS 38, Intangible Assets) and liabilities assumed. The cost of the group shall be allocated to the individual identifiable assets and liabilities on the basis of their relative fair values at the date of purchase. Such a transaction or event does not give rise to goodwill.


Ind AS 12,
Income Taxes

Definitions
Para 5 – The following terms are used in this Standard with the meanings specified:
Deferred tax assets are the amounts of income taxes recoverable in future periods in respect of:

(a) deductible temporary differences;

(b) the carry forward of unused tax losses; and

(c) the carry forward of unused tax credits.

Taxable temporary differences
Para 15 – A deferred tax liability shall be recognised for all taxable temporary differences, except to the extent that the deferred tax liability arises from:

(a) the initial recognition of goodwill; or

(b) the initial recognition of an asset or liability in a transaction which:

(i) is not a business combination; and

(ii) at the time of the transaction, affects neither accounting profit nor taxable profit (tax loss).

Deductible temporary differences

Para 24 – A deferred tax asset shall be recognised for all deductible temporary differences to the extent that it is probable that taxable profit will be available against which the deductible temporary difference can be utilised, unless the deferred tax asset arises from the initial recognition of an asset or liability in a transaction that:

(a) is not a business combination; and

(b) at the time of the transaction, affects neither accounting profit nor taxable profit (tax loss).

ANALYSIS
• An entity recognises a deferred tax asset for unused tax losses/credits
carried forward to the extent that it is probable that future taxable profits will be available against which the unused tax losses/credits can be utilised. In Author’s view, this principle should be applied to both:

• internally generated tax losses; and

• tax losses acquired in a transaction that is not a business combination.

• The initial recognition exception in paragraph 15 of Ind AS 12 applies only to deferred tax relating to temporary differences. It does not apply to tax assets, such as purchased tax losses that do not arise from deductible temporary differences. The definition of ‘deferred tax assets’ (see above) explicitly distinguishes between deductible temporary differences and unused losses and tax credits [Ind AS 12.5]. Therefore, the Author believes that on initial recognition, an entity should recognise a deferred tax asset for the acquired tax losses at the amount paid, provided that it is probable that future taxable profits will be available against which the acquired tax losses can be utilised. The deferred tax asset is then remeasured in accordance with the general measurement principles in Ind AS 12. Therefore, the Author believes that deferred tax assets of INR 9 on the accumulated loss of B Ltd is recognised by A Ltd in its CFS.

• The initial recognition exception applies
to the difference between the cost of the Building in the CFS of A Ltd of INR 91 and its tax base of INR 70, in exactly the same way as if the property had been legally acquired as a separate asset rather than through the acquisition of the shares of B Ltd [Ind AS 12.15(b)]. Therefore, no deferred tax is recognised by A Ltd in respect of the Building at the time of its acquisition. At this point, A Ltd has an unrecognised taxable temporary difference of INR 21 (INR 91 less INR 70).

CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the above example, deferred taxes are not created on initial recognition of an asset. It does not matter whether the acquisition was by way of underlying shares of a company which owns the asset, or the asset is acquired directly. The response would be the same in either scenarios.

MATERIALITY WITH REFERENCE TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

INTRODUCTION
Materiality is a widely used concept for the preparation and presentation of financial statements and reporting thereon. Management assesses the materiality with respect to the preparation and disclosures made in the financial statements, aiming at the information needs of the primary users of the financial statements (i.e., existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors) that can influence their decisions regarding investments, and providing their services or resources to the entity.

Auditors, on the other hand, assess the materiality while making judgements about the nature, timing and extent of the audit procedures to be performed and the implications of the misstatements observed during the audit to express an opinion as to whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework.

Further, from the auditor’s perspective, there could be other considerations like the type of audit opinion based on the pervasiveness of misstatements, reporting under CARO 2020, internal financial controls with reference to the financial statements, and the restatement of financial statements etc., wherein materiality plays a crucial role.

In this article, an attempt has been made to discuss the importance of materiality for the preparers and the auditors along with the key aspects of the guidance available for its assessment.

MATERIALITY FROM MANAGEMENT’S PERSPECTIVE
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (‘ICAI’) had issued SA 320 – Materiality in Planning and Performing an Audit, and Implementation Guide to Materiality in Planning and  Performing An Audit (‘Implementation Guide’) to define the auditor’s responsibility to apply the concept of materiality in planning and performing an audit of financial statements, and SA 450 – Evaluation of misstatements, to explain how materiality is applied in evaluating the effect of identified misstatements on the audit and of uncorrected misstatements, if any, on the financial statements. However, there is limited guidance for determining the materiality for the preparation and presentation of the financial statements from the management’s perspective.

Materiality, amongst others, is a fundamental qualitative characteristic to identify the types of information that are likely to be most useful for the primary users of the financial statements, as described in the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under Ind AS, as issued by ICAI. As per Ind AS 1 – Presentation of Financial Statements and Ind AS 8 – Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors, ‘Information is material if omitting, misstating or obscuring it could reasonably be expected to influence decisions that the primary users of general-purpose financial statements make on the basis of those financial statements, which provide financial information about a specific reporting entity. Materiality depends on the nature or magnitude of information, or both. An entity assesses whether information, either individually or in combination with other information, is material in the context of its financial statements taken as a whole’. The Guidance note on Ind AS Schedule III, also suggests the same guidance with exceptions for items of income or expenditure which exceeds 1% of revenue from operations or Rs. 10,00,000 whichever is higher, and continuing defaults in repayment of borrowings for consolidated financial statements.

In the above definition, the emphasis is placed on the below two statements, to define materiality:

Assessing whether an omission, misstatement or obscuring could influence economic decisions of users

The materiality assessment can be done by considering the characteristics of the potential users of the financial statements. Here it is worth noting that the users of the financial statements include present and potential investors, employees, lenders, suppliers and other trade creditors, customers, governments and their agencies and the public. Each of these users uses financial statements to satisfy some of their different needs for information. For example:

•    investors might be interested in the various disclosures related to revenue, profitability, dividend, credit risk, capital management, etc.;

•    customers might be interested in the disclosures related to going concern of the entity due to long term supply contract and service dependency;

•    lenders and suppliers might be interested in disclosers related to cash flows and assessment of the ratios to know the economic health of the entity; and

•    the public might be interested in knowing if the entity  has a significant contribution in its sector, or to the overall economy of the country.

Further, it is important to understand that information is said to be obscured if it is communicated in a way that would have a similar effect for primary users of financial statements to omitting or misstating that information. Some of such examples may include disclosure of material information by using vague or unclear language, disclosure of material information in scattered way, aggregating dissimilar information etc.

Nature and magnitude of information

At times the size and nature of the information itself determine its relevance. For example:

•    the reporting of a new segment may affect the assessment of the risks and opportunities facing the entity irrespective of the materiality of the results achieved by the new segment in the reporting period;

•    Mergers and acquisitions by the entity;

•    Change in the government policies for the sector in which the entity operates;

•    Exceptional or additional line items, headings and subtotals in the statement of profit and loss, when such presentation is relevant to an understanding of the entity’s financial performance;

•    Related party transactions; etc.

The Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements in accordance with Indian Accounting Standards issued by ICAI also states that the materiality assessment needs to take into account how users could reasonably be expected to be influenced in making economic decisions. Further, the information about complex matters like fair valuation assumptions and methodologies for the valuation of financial instruments, disclosures related to expected credit loss of financial assets, sensitivity analysis, ratio analysis, income tax reconciliation, etc. that should be included in the financial statements because of its relevance to the economic decision-making needs of users should not be excluded merely on the grounds that it may be too difficult for certain users to understand.

Based on the above guidance, the standard emphasizes the qualitative evaluation of information to be presented in the financial statements, including any misstatements, rather than restricting it to any quantitative threshold.

The above methodology will require management to do a detailed deliberation on all the disclosures required to be presented in the financial statements, including any omissions and misstatements, both individually and collectively with others, at the financial statements level to conclude if a required disclosure or misstatements is material, considering the primary users of the financial statements.

For example, as per Ind AS 8, an entity shall correct material prior period errors retrospectively in the first set of financial statements approved for issue after their discovery by:

(a) restating the comparative amounts for the prior period(s) presented in which the error occurred; or

(b) if the error occurred before the earliest prior period presented, restating the opening balances of assets, liabilities and equity for the earliest prior period presented.

In the above guidance, though the standard talks about correcting the material prior period errors, it does not give additional guidance on what is considered material in quantitative terms or any methodology to quantify it.

Here again, the emphasis is placed on the qualitative aspects of the misstatements. If management believes that the prior period errors are so material that it can adversely affect the true and fair presentation of the financial statements or influence the economic decision of the primary users of the financial statements, then such prior period errors are required to be corrected in accordance with the guidance given under Ind AS 8.

On the other hand, the audit team is required to evaluate any such prior period errors based on the materiality assessed for the audit of the financial statements.

A reference can also be drawn to ‘Practice Statement 2, Making Materiality Judgements’, which is a non-mandatory guidance published by the International Accounting Standards Board (‘IASB’).

The IASB, in the said practice statement, has introduced a four-step model illustrating the role of materiality in the preparation of financial statements and clarifies how a materiality judgement needs to be made. A brief overview of the model is as under:

Step
1 Identify

 

Identify
information that primary users might need to make decisions about providing
resources to the entity.

 

Step
2 Assess

 

Assess
whether information is material based on both quantitative and qualitative
considerations.

 

Step
3 Organise

 

Based
on the output of materiality judgement and different roles of the primary
financial statements and the notes, decide whether to present an item of
information separately in the primary financial statements, to aggregate it
with other information and/or to disclose the information in the notes.

 

Step
4 Review

 

Review
the information from an

aggregated
perspective, once the draft financial statements are prepared to see if
entity needs to revisit the assessment made in Step 2, to provide/reorganise/
remove information.

 

The materiality for the financial statements must also be discussed with management and Those Charged with Governance (TCWG) by the auditors as per the requirement of SA 260 (Revised) – Communication with Those Charged with Governance while planning the audit of the financial statements.

As during the said discussion, materiality for the financial statements is discussed in detail by both the parties, taking into account all the relevant quantitative and qualitative factors. Management may decide to follow the same quantitate threshold as materiality for the preparation of financial statements unless it chooses to follow a lower threshold by considering a different methodology that is more suitable for the entity.

MATERIALITY FOR THE AUDIT OF THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
SA 320 and the Implementation Guide provides detailed guidance for the identification of materiality for the audit of the financial statements. However, considering that the identification of materiality requires significant professional judgement, below are two case studies that can be helpful in exercising the professional judgement:

Case study 1

A Ltd is a public listed entity operating in the telecom sector. A is a well-established telecom service provider from the last decade and presently in the process of incurring significant capital expenditure, to upgrade its infrastructure with latest 5G technology. A is able to maintain a consistent revenue from operations. However, its profit before tax (‘PBT’) is at a lower end, with a declining trend, due to its product pricing to tackle competition.

The Engagement Partner of the audit firm XYZ & Associates LLP, the statutory auditor of the Company, has decided to consider PBT as a benchmark for materiality, considering the following reasons:

• The Company’s PBT margin is presently at par with the other market participants in the industry,

• Being an established listed entity, the retail investors are more focused on profitability and dividends,

• Lenders of the Company have imposed financial covenants for maintaining profitability in the lending arrangement, and

• A Ltd. is already an established player in the industry. Hence, capital expenditure for technological upgradation is to secure the future market presence and hence not the present primary focus of the users of the financial statements.

Here it is important to note that:

• if the Company’s profitability had been volatile, then revenue from operations or gross profits would be a more suitable benchmark, and

• if the Company had been a new entrant in the industry and in the process of creating the required infrastructure, then net assets or total assets would have been a suitable benchmark.

Case study 2

Continuing with the above example, post deciding on the benchmark, the audit team is now identifying a suitable percentage to be applied on the PBT to quantify the materiality for the financial statements as a whole and the performance materiality. Below are a few more facts that the audit team has considered in quantifying the materiality:

• PBT includes an exceptional expenditure of Rs 20 crores,

• There were no audit qualifications given in the previous year’s audit reports,

• The Company operates in a highly regulated environment,

• There are significant related party transactions, and

• The Company carries significant debt.

The Engagement Partner of the audit firm, has decided the materiality for the financial statements as a whole and the performance materiality, based on the following:

• PBT will be normalised by excluding the exceptional expenditure of Rs 20 crores. The said normalisation is done as the transactions that are exceptional, unusual or non-recurring in nature tend to distort the actual state of affairs of the business, if not excluded.

• 5% of the normalised PBT will be used to quantify the materiality for the financial statements as a whole. SA 320 and the Implementation Guide do not prescribe any specific percentage for any of the benchmarks of materiality, however one can use a range for gross and net benchmarks, for example, 5% to 10% for net benchmarks like profit before tax and 0.5% to 2% for gross benchmarks like revenue from operations or total assets.

• The engagement partner, in the above example, has followed the range of 5% to 10% for PBT and has decided to adopt a lower materiality of 5%, considering that A Ltd is a new audit client and operates in a highly regulated environment with significant related party transactions, and as such indicates higher audit risk.

• The engagement partner has decided performance materiality to be 70% of the materiality for the financial statements as a whole. Like materiality, SA 320 and the Implementation Guide do not prescribe any specific percentage for performance materiality. As per SA 320, performance materiality is set to reduce to an appropriately low level the probability that the aggregate of uncorrected and undetected misstatements in the financial statements exceeds materiality for the financial statements as a whole, and as such professional judgement is required to be exercised to determine how much reduction is required to the materiality at the financial statements as a whole. This can again be done by following a range which may be between 50% to 80% based on the risk assessment procedures and misstatements identified in earlier year’s audit.

• The engagement partner in the above case study has considered a moderate performance materiality of 70%, considering it a new audit engagement and moderate risk of material misstatement.

However, here it is important to note that the concept of materiality should not be applied while ensuring the compliances with laws and regulation, for example compliance of various sections of Companies Act like sections 185, 186, 188 etc., or where the law specifically require reporting without following the materiality like reporting under specific clauses of CARO 2020.

MATERIALITY FOR THE AUDIT OF INTERNAL FINANCIAL CONTROL WITH REFERENCE TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Though we discussed above that ICAI has issued SA 310 and SA 405 to provide guidance on the audit of the financial statements, there may be a question if the said guidance can also be applied to determine the materiality for the audit of internal financial control with reference to the financial statements. The said question was answered in the ‘Guidance Note on Audit of Internal Financial Controls Over Financial Reporting (‘Guidance Note’)’ issued by ICAI, which states that the auditor should apply the concept of materiality and professional judgment as provided in the Standards on Auditing and this Guidance Note while reporting under section 143(3)(i) on the matters relating to internal financial controls with reference to the financial statements for both standalone and consolidated financial statements. The Guidance note has further clarified that the audit team should use the same materiality consideration as they would use in the audit of the entity’s financial statements as provided in SA 320.

Similar guidance is also given in the Technical Guide on Audit of Internal Financial Controls in Case of Public Sector Banks issued by ICAI.

However, it is important to note that the for the purpose of internal financial control, the audit team should consider the misstatements at an aggregate level rather than netting them off.  For example, control deficiencies that lead to an overstatement of expenses and overstatements of income may have a net impact that is less than the materiality, but at an aggregate level, they may have a material financial implication on the financial statements that may lead to material weakness and modification in the audit report on internal financial control.

MATERIALITY CONSIDERATION FOR REPORTING UNDER COMPANIES (AUDITOR‘S REPORT) ORDER, 2020 (‘CARO’)
The Guidance Note on CARO 2020 issued by ICAI also requires auditors to use materiality while evaluating the reporting considerations and ensure adequate documentation wherein any unfavourable comments have not been reported in view of the materiality of the item. The Guidance Note further states that for the purpose of CARO reporting, the auditor should consider the materiality in accordance with the principles enunciated in SA 320.

For example, in the case of clause 3(iii) of the CARO, while reporting on the repayment schedule of various loans granted by the company, the auditor examines the loan documentation of all large loans and conducts a test check examination of the rest, having regard to the materiality.

However, for certain clauses reporting should be made, irrespective of the materiality, for instance:

• Any discrepancies of 10% or more in the aggregate for each class of inventory and, whether they have been properly dealt with in the books of account, is required to be reported irrespective of the materiality, considering the specific reporting requirement of clause 3(ii)(a) of CARO.

• In case of reporting for consolidated financial statements, if a qualification/adverse remark is given by any individual component, then there is a presumption that the item is material to the component and hence not required to be re-evaluated from the materiality at the consolidated financial statement level. Hence every qualification/adverse remark made by every individual component including the parent should be included while reporting under clause 3(xxi).

IN SUMMARY
Materiality with reference to the financial statements is subject to significant judgement both by the management and the audit team. While from the management’s perspective its determination depends on the qualitative aspects, except where specific quantitative threshold has been prescribed like in Schedule III, whereas from the auditor’s perspective its determination is driven from both qualitative and quantitative factors. However, for both parties, materiality plays a pivotal role in ensuring the preparation of financial statements that are free from material errors and contains all the required disclosures relevant to the primary users of the financial statements, including issuance of audit report thereon.

Article 5 of India-Japan DTAA – Presence of personnel of foreign parent in premises of Indian subsidiary to render services did not constitute, either fixed place PE, or Supervisory PE of foreign company

1 FCC Co. Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2022] 136 taxmann.com 137 (Delhi – Trib.)
ITA No: 54/Del/2019
A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 9th March, 2022                        

Article 5 of India-Japan DTAA – Presence of personnel of foreign parent in premises of Indian subsidiary to render services did not constitute, either fixed place PE, or Supervisory PE of foreign company

FACTS
Assessee, a tax resident of Japan (FCO), received the following income from its wholly owned-subsidiary (ICO) in India:

• Royalty and FTS income offered to tax at 10% under DTAA, and

• Income from the supply of raw material, components and capital goods treated as not taxable in India in the absence of PE.

AO considered that the premises of ICO was the office or branch of FCO in India. Accordingly, he taxed income from the supply of material by treating premises of ICO as fixed place PE of FCO in India. AO further held that FCO constituted supervisory PE as employees visited India to help ICO in setting up a new product line in India. DRP upheld AO’s order.

Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD
Fixed place PE

• To constitute a Fixed Place PE, it is a prerequisite that premises must be at the disposal of the enterprise.

• Access to ICO’s premises to provide services by FCO would not amount to the place being at its disposal. Such access was for the limited purposes of rendering services to ICO without FCO having any control over the said premises.

•    ICO was an independent legal entity carrying on its business with its own clients. FCO provided technical assistance to ICO from time to time as was required by ICO. FCO had not carried out its business from the alleged Fixed Place PE.

•    FCO had manufactured goods outside India; FCO had sold sale goods outside India; title in the goods had passed outside India; and FCO had also received consideration outside India. Thus, FCO had not carried out any operation in India in relation to the supply of raw material and capital goods.

Supervisory PE

•    FCO employees had visited India for assisting ICO in relation to supplies made by ICO to its customers; resolving problems relating to production; for fixing machines; maintenance of machines; checking safety status at the premises; suggesting ways for enhancing safety; support in quality control; IT-related services; and, support for the launch of new segment line. Said services were not supervisory in nature.

•    Further, as no assembly or installation work is going in ICO premises, services rendered by FCO were also not in connection with any construction, installation, or assembly project.

Where revenue had been duly informed about dissolution of trust and still chose to continue proceeding on dissolved entity which was no more in existence, such trust was a substantive illegality and not a procedural violation of nature adverted to in section 292B

5 Varnika RPG Trust vs. PCIT
[2021] 91 ITR(T) 1 (Delhi-Trib.)
ITA No.: 451 to 453 (Delhi) of 2021
A.Y.: 2016-17;
Date of order: 9th September, 2021  
                
Where revenue had been duly informed about dissolution of trust and still chose to continue proceeding on dissolved entity which was no more in existence, such trust was a substantive illegality and not a procedural violation of nature adverted to in section 292B

FACTS
Assessee trust was formed for the sole benefit of the settlor’s minor grand-daughter.

As per the trust deed, all the trust property including accumulation of yearly income along with the rights of ownership, use, possession and dispossession, were to vest with the granddaughter on attaining majority or on 31st March 2015, whichever was later and the term of the trust would expire on such date. The beneficiary attained majority on 3rd September, 2015 (i.e. A.Y. 2016-17).

Regular Assessment was completed u/s 143(3) in the year 2018 wherein it was brought on record that the trust stood dissolved from 3rd September, 2015 on account of granddaughter attaining majority. However, the PCIT on 15th March, 2021 initiated the revisionary proceedings u/s 263 against the assessee trust and revised the assessment order. The assessee contended that the order passed by the PCIT was invalid as the said trust was not in existence as on the date of initiating such revisionary proceedings.

HELD
The ITAT held that the trust was in existence only upto A.Y. 2016-17 and that the revenue had been duly informed about the dissolution of trust; but still the PCIT chose to continue the proceeding on the dissolved entity which was no more in existence. Hence, impugned order passed by the PCIT u/s 263 in the name of the dissolved trust was a substantive illegality and not a procedural violation of the nature adverted to in section 292B. It therefore held that the order passed on non-existent entity was a nullity.

In arriving at the conclusion, the ITAT applied the ratio of the judgment in Pr. CIT vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. [2019] 107 taxmann.com 375/265 Taxman 515/416 ITR 613 (SC).

Proviso to section 68 inserted vide Finance Act, 2012 requiring the Assessee to prove source in respect of share premium money; operates prospectively from A.Y. 2013-14. Merely because the lender parties did not respond to summons/notices of the Assessing Officer; that cannot be sole ground to make addition u/s 68 when otherwise the documentary evidences were duly produced by the Assessee

4 AdhoiVyapar (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO
[2021] 91 ITR(T) 582 (Mumbai-Trib.)
ITA No.: 7308 to 7311 (MUM.) of 2019
A.Ys.: 2009-10 to 2012-13;
Date of order: 1st October, 2021

Proviso to section 68 inserted vide Finance Act, 2012 requiring the Assessee to prove source in respect of share premium money; operates prospectively from A.Y. 2013-14. Merely because the lender parties did not respond to summons/notices of the Assessing Officer; that cannot be sole ground to make addition u/s 68 when otherwise the documentary evidences were duly produced by the Assessee

FACTS
Assessee-company received share application money from various parties. As evidence, the assessee furnished various documents like share application form, PAN Card, confirmation from share-applicants regarding investment, relevant pages of bank passbook/statement, income-tax acknowledgement for the year, statement of income, financials for the relevant year and letter of allotment. It also submitted copies of Board Resolution, Memorandum and Articles of Association in case of corporate applicants. The assessee summarized the net worth position of all the share-applicants which substantiated that all the entities had sufficient net worth to make the investment in the assessee-company and were filing their ITRs since past several years ranging from 5 to 15 years.

Because few of the applicants failed to respond to summons u/s 131, the Assessing Officer concluded that the receipts shown by the assessee were accommodation entry in the garb of share capital /share premium and made addition u/s 68. It also alleged that commission payments must have been made for the same and made some addition u/s 69C also. The CIT(A) upheld the said addition.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD

The ITAT allowed the assessee’s appeal on the following grounds:

The ITAT observed that the shareholder entities had sufficient net worth to invest in the assessee-company. It was also observed that there was no immediate cash deposits before making investment in the assessee company.

As regards attendance of summons u/s 131, the ITAT concluded that the assessee does not have any legal power to enforce the attendance of the share-applicants.

The ITAT also remarked that as the said year was the first year of operation, it was difficult to presume that the assessee generated unaccounted money in the first year itself and routed the same in the garb of share-application money.

Therefore, on the above grounds, the ITAT concluded that assessee had discharged the initial onus of proving these transactions in terms of the requirements of Section 68 and the onus had shifted on Assessing Officer to dislodge the assessee’s documentary evidences and bring on record cogent material to substantiate his adverse allegations. The additions made could not be sustained merely on the basis of suspicion, conjectures and surmises.

The proviso to Section 68 as inserted vide the Finance Act, 2012 requiring the assessee to substantiate the source of share application/premium money was applicable only from A.Y. 2013-14, and the same is not retrospective in nature. Therefore, the assessee was not even otherwise obligated to prove the source of share application money in the years under consideration which is A.Ys. 2009-10 to 2012-13.

Thus, the addition made u/s 68 was deleted. Consequently, the addition made u/s 69C was also deleted.

Where source of funds is clearly established, clubbing provisions do not apply

3 Abhay Kumar Mittal vs. DCIT
[TS-152-ITAT-2022 (Delhi)]
A.Y.: 2013-14; Date of order: 8th February, 2022
Sections: 10(13A), 64

Where source of funds is clearly established, clubbing provisions do not apply

FACTS
The assessee, an individual, in his return of income, claimed exemption of HRA in respect of rent of Rs. 5,34,000 paid by him to his wife. The Assessing Officer (AO), in the course of assessment proceedings, asked the assessee to explain the capacity of the assessee’s wife to purchase the property giving details of sources of funds for the same. The assessee explained that the property was worth Rs. 1.15 crore of which amount of Rs. 87.50 was funded by the assessee himself, and the balance was invested out of her own sources. The AO noticed that the assessee’s wife, in fact, had no independent source of income to make the investment in FDRs and a major share of Rs. 87.50 lakh was funded by the assessee. The AO held that rental income earned by the assessee’s wife is liable to be clubbed in the hands of the assessee since the investment to have purchased the property was made by her without having an independent source of income. The AO clubbed the rental income of Rs. 5,34,000 after allowing deduction u/s 24 and made an addition of Rs. 3,73,800 in the hands of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO by holding that the contention that the investment has been made by her out of her independent source is not acceptable. He relied on the income summary statement of the assessee’s wife for A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2003-04 wherein she had shown income from profession of Rs. 57,400 and Rs. 1,48,900 respectively. He also relied on total income shown in ITR filed from A.Ys. 2001-02 to 2012-13.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal found that the assessee’s wife, who has low returned income, had received a loan from the assessee, which has been repaid by her from the redemption of mutual funds and liquidation of fixed deposits. It held that there is no bar on the part of the assessee to extend a loan from his known sources to his wife. Similarly, there is no bar on the assessee’s wife to repay the loan from her own mutual funds and fixed deposits. The assessee has paid house rent and the recipient, wife of the assessee, declared the same under the head `income from house property’ in her returns which has been accepted by the revenue. It held that the observations of the CIT(A) that the assessee’s wife has got meagre income hence she cannot afford to purchase a house was found to be not acceptable as the source for the purchase of the house in her hands are proved and never doubted. It also held that the contention of the CIT(A) that the husband cannot pay rent to the wife is devoid of any legal implication supporting any such contention. The Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the assessee.

For the purpose of section 54, it is the date of possession which should be taken as the date of purchase and not the date of registration of agreement for sale

2 Raj Easow vs. ITO
[TS-155-ITAT-2022 (Mum.)]
A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 8th March, 2022
Section: 54

For the purpose of section 54, it is the date of possession which should be taken as the date of purchase and not the date of registration of agreement for sale

FACTS
In May 2011, the assessee, along with his wife booked a residential flat (Flat No 203) in an under construction building named `Bankston’ at Thane (a new house) for a consideration of Rs. 1,40,51,500. In December 2012, the assessee made majority payments to the builders by availing a mortgage/housing loan. Thereafter, on 21st May, 2014, the assessee and his wife, being co-owners holding 50% share, sold a residential house (original house) and utilised the sale proceeds for making repayment of housing loan taken for new house.

In the return of income for A.Y. 2015-16, the assessee claimed a long-term capital gain of Rs. 79,92,015 arising on transfer of original asset as a deduction u/s 54 of the Act. According to the Assessing Officer (AO), the new house was purchased on 15th February, 2012 being the date on which the agreement for sale dated 7th February, 2012 was registered. Since this date was 2 years and 3 months prior to the date of sale of the original house The AO denied the benefit of deduction u/s 54 on the ground that the assessee has not purchased a new residential house within a period specified in section 54, which is one year before or two years after the date of sale of the original asset.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who moving on the premise that the date of registration of agreement for sale is to be considered as the date of purchase of new residential house, decided the appeal against the assessee holding that purchase of the property was beyond the specified period of 2 years. The CIT(A) also rejected the alternative argument that since the property being purchased was under construction, the benefit of section 54 of the Act can be extended to the assessee by treating the transaction as a case of ‘construction’ and not ‘purchase’ and since the construction was completed and possession of new house taken on 2nd April, 2016, which date is within 3 years from the date of original asset.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal, having noted that the AO and CIT(A) have taken 15th February, 2011, the date of registration of agreement for sale as the date of purchase, proceeded to examine the nature of this agreement and its terms. It observed that the said agreement is not a sale / conveyance deed but only an agreement for sale entered into between the builders who have agreed to sell to the assessee a flat in a multi-storied building. It also observed that when the agreement for sale was registered, the multi-storied building was not yet constructed and the obligation of the assessee to make the payment is linked to construction. The agreement was required to be registered and was governed by provisions of MOFA. Having noted the provisions of section 4 of MOFA and clause 53 of the agreement for sale, held that the purchaser is put in possession only as a licensee and to that extent, the assessee acquired an interest in the premises on entering into possession. Since by that date the assessee has already paid entire/majority of consideration for purchase, it held that the assessee has on the date of taking possession purchased the property for the purposes of section 54 of the Act as has been held by the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. Smt Beena K. Jain 217 ITR 363. The Tribunal held that the date on which possession is taken by the assessee (i.e. 2nd April, 2016) should be taken as the date of purchase. The requirement of section 54 is that the assessee should purchase a residential house within the specified period, and the source of funds is quite irrelevant. Since the date of purchase falls within 2 years from the date of sale of original house it held that the assessee is entitled to benefit of deduction u/s 54. It observed that the alternate contention of the assessee that the benefit of section 54 be granted to the assessee by treating the transaction as a case of construction is now academic and does not require consideration.

BLOCKED CREDITS

The previous articles discussed the various restrictions imposed u/s 17 (5) on input tax credit claims. In this concluding article on blocked credits, we will discuss clauses (b) and (g) of Section 17 (5).

INTRODUCTION
The erstwhile CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 permitted the claim of credit of tax paid on inputs, input services or capital goods. An inward supply was required to fall within the purview of the said terms, as defined u/r 2 thereof. The definition of inputs and input services provided therein specifically excluded the following goods/ services from being classified as inputs/ input services:

Exclusion from scope of inputs:

Exclusion from scope of input services:

(E) any goods, such as
food items, goods used in a guesthouse, residential colony, club or a
recreation facility and clinical establishment, when such goods are used
primarily for personal use or consumption of any employee; and

(C) such as those
provided in relation to outdoor catering, beauty treatment, health services,
cosmetic and plastic surgery, membership of a club, health and fitness
centre, life insurance, health insurance and travel benefits extended to
employees on vacation such as Leave or Home Travel Concession, when such
services are used primarily for personal use or consumption of any employee.

The above indicates that the legislature’s intention has always been to deny CENVAT credit in respect of such goods or services which have an element of being used primarily for personal use or consumption of any employee. This approach has been inherited under GST as well with two specific clauses – (b) and (g) u/s 17 (5) with clause (b) specifically restricting credit on specified inward supplies, subject to exceptions provided therein (nexus with outward supplies/ obligatory for an employer to provide the facilities) while clause (g) is more in the nature of a use-based restriction, as it restricts input tax credit on goods or services or both, used for personal consumption.

One important distinction in the provisions under the CENVAT regime and GST regime is that under the CENVAT regime, clauses (b) & (g) were under a single entry and therefore, the restrictions complemented each other, i.e., the specified goods/services were not eligible for CENVAT credit when used for personal consumption of an employee. However, under GST, the restriction is split into two different entries. Therefore, items covered under clause (b) shall not be eligible for input tax credit (subject to exceptions), irrespective of whether the same are used for personal consumption or not. However, when it comes to clause (g), there will be a need to identify and demonstrate ‘personal consumption’ first. Once the item is classified as meant for ‘personal consumption’, the input tax credit shall not be allowed, even if is covered within the exceptions under clause (b) or other sub-clauses.

Another distinction that needs to be noted is that under the CENVAT regime, the ineligibility to claim credit was attracted when the goods/ services were used for the personal consumption of the employees. However, under GST, the restriction applies only for personal consumption, which gives rise to the question as to whether it intends to refer to the personal consumption of the taxpayer/ the employees of the taxpayer. In this article, we have analysed both clauses.

CLAUSE (b) – SPECIFIC ITEMS COVERED U/S 17 (5)
Clause (b) is reproduced below for reference:

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
of section 16 and sub- section (1) of section 18, input tax credit shall not be available in respect of the following, namely:—

(a) … …

(b) the following supply of goods or services or both—

(i) food and beverages, outdoor catering, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery except where an inward supply of goods or services or both of a particular category is used by a registered person for making an outward taxable supply of the same category of goods or services or both or as an element of a taxable composite or mixed supply;

(ii) membership of a club, health and fitness centre;

(iii) rent-a-cab, life insurance and health insurance except where–

(A) the Government notifies the services which are obligatory for an employer to provide to its employees under any law for the time being in force; or

(B) such inward supply of goods or services or both of a particular category is used by a registered person for making an outward taxable supply of the same category of goods or services or both or as part of a taxable composite or mixed supply; and

(iv) travel benefits extended to employees on vacation such as leave or home travel concession;

AMENDMENT W.E.F 1st FEBRUARY, 2019

The above was amended w.e.f 1st February, 2019 by way of substitution as under:

(b) the following supply of goods or services or both—

(i) food and beverages, outdoor catering, beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery, leasing, renting or hiring of motor vehicles, vessels or aircraft referred to in clause (a) or clause (aa) except when used for the purposes specified therein, life insurance and health insurance:

Provided that the input tax credit in respect of such goods or services or both shall be available
where an inward supply of such goods or services or both is used by a registered person for making an outward taxable supply of the same category of goods or services or both or as an element of a taxable composite or mixed supply;

(ii) membership of a club, health and fitness centre; and

(iii) travel benefits extended to employees on vacation such as leave or home travel concession:

Provided that the input tax credit in respect of such goods or services or both shall be available, where it is obligatory for an employer to provide the same to its employees under any law for the time being in force.

The effect of the above amendment is tabulated below for ease of reference:

Restriction for

Pre-amendment

Post-amendment

Sub-clause
(i)

Food & beverages

Restricted subject to condition that the
inward supply is used for making an outward supply of same category of goods
or services or both, or as a part of a composite or mixed supply

Restricted subject to two conditions:

• Inward supply is used for making an
outward supply of same category of goods or services or both, or as a part of
a composite or mixed supply

• Where it is obligatory for an employer to
provide such goods or services or both to its’ employees

Outdoor catering

Beauty treatment,
health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery

Leasing, renting or hiring of motor
vehicles, vessels or aircraft referred to in clause (a) or clause (aa)

Life insurance, health insurance

Sub-clause
(ii)

Membership of a club, health and fitness
centre

Blanket restriction

Restricted subject to two conditions:

• Inward supply is used for making an
outward supply of same category of goods or services or both, or as a part of
a composite or mixed supply

• Where it is obligatory for an employer to
provide such goods or services or both to its’ employees

Sub-clause
(iii)

Rent-a-cab

Restricted subject to condition that the
inward supply is used for making an outward supply of same category of goods
or services or both, or as a part of a composite or mixed supply,

OR

when obligatory for employer to provide
such service to employees

Deleted as shifted to sub-clause (i)

Life insurance and health insurance

Deleted as shifted to sub-clause (i)

Sub-clause
(iv)

Travel benefits extended to employees on
vacation such as leave or home travel concession

Blanket restriction

Renumbered as sub-clause (iii) and
exception provided when it is obligatory on the part of employer to provide
such goods or services or both to its’ employees

We now proceed to discuss each item covered under clause (b).

FOOD AND BEVERAGES
The first item under clause (b) on which input tax credit is blocked is ‘food and beverages’. In our view, the following points need analysis:

• Whether the restriction would apply on receipt of goods, being food and beverages or even services with an element of food and beverages would be covered?

• What shall be the scope of the terms – ‘food’ and ‘beverages’?

• Whether the ‘and’ need to be read as ‘or’ while interpreting the restriction?

Clause (b), as reproduced above, applies to the supply of goods or services or both, of food and beverages. The first question which needs analysis is whether this restriction has to be applied when the food and beverages are being supplied as standalone goods, or as part of service and therefore, deemed as service in view of entry 6(b) of Schedule II? This is relevant because if it is the former, when food and beverages would be supplied as part of a service, the same would be deemed to be a supply of service and therefore, unless such food or beverages are supplied as a part of a service and specifically mentioned under the restrictive clause, the same would not be an ineligible input tax credit. One reasoning to support this view is that after food and beverages, clause (b) refers to outdoor catering. If the supply of food and beverage as a part of service was supposed to be covered within the first item, i.e., food and beverage, there was perhaps no need to specifically cover outdoor catering under the restriction list.

Per contra, it may be contended that a restaurant also supplies food and beverages, with the only distinction being that the food and beverages are not sold as such but are supplied by way of service. One may rely on the decision in the case of Northern India Caterers’ case [1980 SCR (2) 650] wherein the Hon’ble SC has held as under:

The appellant prepared and served food both to residents in its hotel as well as to casual customers who came to eat in its restaurant, and throughout it maintained that having regard to the nature of the services rendered there was no real difference between the two kind of transactions. In both cases it remained a supply and service of food not amounting to a sale. … … (only relevant extracts).

In other words, even in the case of restaurant service, there is a supply of food and beverage, though the same may not be sold in the restaurant itself owing to it being consumed. Therefore, a strong view prevails that the restriction under food and beverages extends to restaurant services as well.

Food & Beverages – scope

This takes us to the second question, i.e., the scope of the terms – ‘food’ and ‘beverages’ for the purpose of this clause. The general meaning of both the terms is something which is consumed by a person. Generally, food refers to something which can either be in solid/ semi-solid/ liquid stage, while beverages refer to liquid items for consumption. What constitutes food has been dealt with by the Hon’ble SC in the case of Swastik Udyog vs. Commissioner [2006 (198) ELT 485 (SC)] wherein the Hon’ble SC held that food is a substance which is taken into the body to maintain life and growth. Similarly, in the context of beverages, in the case of Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories [1999 (113) ELT 20 (SC)], the SC has held as under:

5. Beverages, broadly speaking are liquids for drinking, other than water, which may be consumed neat or after dilution.

This takes us to the first issue, i.e., whether preparatory items used to cook such food and beverages can be treated as food/ beverages per se or not? For instance, whether coffee beans/powder used to make coffee can be treated as an item classifiable as ‘food’ or ‘beverage’ and therefore, input tax credit on the same is blocked? For instance, while dealing with the question of whether Rasna powder, which is used for preparing a beverage, can itself be treated as a beverage or is it a mere preparatory material to make the beverage? In the case of P. Sukumaran [(1989) 74 STC 185], the Delhi HC held that Rasna is only a concentrate and not a liquid. Therefore, it would not come within the ambit of the expression ‘beverage’. However, while dealing with the classification of Rooh Afza, the Hon’ble SC in the case of Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories held as under:

7. The Tribunal would also appear to have concluded that the said sharbat was not a beverage but a preparation for the same. The fact that three table spoonfuls of the said sharbat have to be added to a glass of water to make it drinkable does not, in our view, make the said sharbat not a beverage but a preparation for a beverage. Were that so, many beverages which are classified as such, as for example, tea, coffee, orange squash and lemon squash would not be beverages. (See, for example, paragraph 5 of this Court’s judgment in the case of Parle Exports P.Ltd. [1988 (38) E.L.T. 741 (S.C.) = 1989 (1) SCC 345] and paragraph 12 et seq of the Tribunal’s judgment in the case of Northland Industries [1988 (37) E.L.T. 229]. It seems to us that the phrase `preparations for lemonades or other beverages’ in clause (j) of Note 5 of Chapter 21 was intended to refer to the industrial concentrates from which aerated waters and similar drinks are mass produced and not to preparations for domestic use like the said sharbat.

Of course, both the products are different in nature. While Rasna powder cannot be consumed as such, Rooh Afza can be consumed, as held by the Hon’ble Court, without mixing with any other liquid. However, a prudent view would be to not only treat such items which can be consumed directly as ‘food’ or ‘beverage’, but also such items, which with minimal process would result in the ‘food’ or ‘beverage’ being prepared, for instance, ready to eat meals, such as Maggi, soups, etc., Infact, such items were also referred to under the Central Excise Tariff as ‘food preparations’. Not doing so may defeat the intention of the legislature, which is to deny input tax credit on items that are meant for personal consumption.

‘And’ vs. ‘Or’

This takes us to the next question as to whether while analysing the first item, i.e., ‘food and beverages’, the ‘and’ needs to be read ‘as is’ or as ‘or’. In this regard, one may refer to the decision in the case of Kamta Prasad Aggarwal vs. Executive Engineer, Ballabhgarh [1974 (4) SCC 440] wherein the Hon’ble SC held that depending upon the context, ‘or’ may be read as ‘and’ but the Court would not do it unless it is so obliged because ‘or’ does not generally mean ‘and’ and ‘and’ does not generally mean ‘or’. In other words, the context needs to be looked into while determining if ‘and’ can be read as ‘or’.

In this regard, let us look into the intention of the legislature to understand the context behind the entry. The purpose of this entry is to restrict credit, i.e., deny a benefit to the taxpayer. In such a scenario, reading ‘and’ as ‘and’ instead of ‘or’ would deny the purpose of the entry. This is because the ‘and’ would necessitate both ‘food’ and ‘beverages’ to be present in a supply. This would mean the existence of two different supplies, one of food and another of beverage. However, such a situation would be theoretically impossible since both the supplies would be taxed independently as GST is a transaction-based tax and therefore, there cannot be a scenario where food and beverage are being supplied under a single contract. On the other hand, if the ‘and’ is read as ‘or’, the scope of the restriction entry would drastically expand, as the likelihood of a person receiving only food or only beverages in a single supply is higher. One may also refer to the service tariff entry, which also refers to the tax rate on supply of food and beverage. If the ‘and’ is read as ‘and’, the rate notification itself would also fail.

Lastly, it is an industry practice to refer to any person dealing in the food or beverage industry as a part of Food & Beverage Industry.

OUTDOOR CATERING
This takes us to the next restriction for outdoor catering. The first question that comes into mind is the need for specifically referring to ‘outdoor catering’ under clause (b), especially when food & beverages are also restricted in the same clause. The only probable reason is that outdoor catering is a wider activity as compared to the mere supply of food and beverages. This aspect has been dealt with by the Hon’ble SC in the Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Associations vs. UOI [2006 (3) STR 260 (SC)] wherein the Hon’ble SC held as under:

55. … … …

Similarly the services rendered by out door caterers is clearly distinguishable from the service rendered in a restaurant or hotel inasmuch as, in the case of outdoor catering service the food/eatables/drinks are the choice of the person who partakes the services. He is free to choose the kind, quantum and manner in which the food is to be served. But in the case of restaurant, the customer’s choice of foods is limited to the menu card. Again in the case of outdoor catering, customer is at liberty to choose the time and place where the food is to be served. In the case of an outdoor caterer, the customer negotiates each element of the catering service, including the price to be paid to the caterer. Outdoor catering has an element of personalized service provided to the customer. Clearly the service element is more weighty, visible and predominant in the case of outdoor catering. It cannot be considered as a case of sale of food and drink as in restaurant. … …

BEAUTY TREATMENT, HEALTH SERVICES, COSMETIC AND PLASTIC SURGERY
This restriction is directly borrowed from the definition of input services u/r 2 (l) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. While what is meant by the above terms has not been defined under GST, the same were defined under the Finance Act, 1994, and it would therefore be appropriate to refer to the definitions provided therein to understand what may and may not get covered within it:

• ‘beauty treatment’ includes hair cutting, hair dyeing, hair dressing, face and beauty treatment, cosmetic treatment, manicure, pedicure or counselling services on beauty, face care or make-up or such other similar services.

• ‘health and fitness service’ means service for physical well-being such as, sauna and steam bath, Turkish bath, solarium, spa, reducing or slimming salons, gymnasiums, yoga, meditation, massage (excluding therapeutic massage) or any other like service.

• ‘any service provided or to be provided to any person, by any other person, in relation to cosmetic surgery or plastic surgery, but does not include any surgery undertaken to restore or reconstruct anatomy or functions of body affected due to congenital defects, developmental abnormalities, degenerative diseases, injury or trauma’.

As can be seen, the above terms actually refer to services that are personal in nature. However, clause (b) specifically does not restrict that the said services should only be used for personal consumption. Rather it imposes a general restriction with an exception where such supplies are used by a registered person for making an outward taxable supply of the same category of goods or services or both or as an element of a taxable composite or mixed supply. In other words, either there is a direct nexus where the registered person supplies the same class of service, or such registered person is engaged in making a composite or mixed supply, i.e., more than one supply with one of the supplies being either beauty treatment, health services or cosmetic and plastic surgery.

This necessitates the need to understand the meaning of the terms ‘composite supply’ or “mixed supply”. The relevant definitions are reproduced below for reference:

(30) ‘Composite supply’ means a supply made by a taxable person to a
recipient consisting of two or more
taxable supplies of goods or services or both, or any combination thereof,
which
are naturally bundled and supplied in conjunction with each other in the
ordinary course of business, one of which is a principal supply;

(74) ‘Mixed supply’ means two or more
individual supplies of goods or services, or any combination thereof,

made in conjunction with each other by a taxable person for a single price
where such supply does not constitute a composite supply.

Both the above terms indicate that there must exist more than one supply of goods or services or both being made in conjunction with each other. Therefore, it becomes necessary to understand what is meant by the phrase “two or more taxable supply of goods or services or both, supplied in conjunction with each other” for the purpose of this entry. Let us understand this with the help of an example. A company organizes a 4-day residential training course in a 5-star hotel charging a lump sum fee of Rs. 1,00,000 plus GST per participant. The same includes, apart from training charges, charges towards participants stay, food & beverage, travel arrangements (including hiring vehicles for airport/ railway station pick-up/ drop), one-time spa coupon, etc.,

There are more than two supplies involved in this case, such as training service, F&B, rent-a-cab services, health and fitness centre, etc. In this case, it can be said that there are two or more taxable supplies involved as the recipient of supply actually receives/consumes the said supplies. Therefore, the supplier will be eligible to claim input tax credit even of such specified items, as they are used for making a taxable supply of goods or services or both. It is imperative to note that each of the activities undertaken for the recipient is taxable in nature, and the same is undertaken in conjunction with each other while providing the main service of training.

However, even the above example can have some twists. If out of 100 participants, 70 participants have paid for the course, 20 are free participants, and 10 are employees of the organizer who also attend the seminar, the eligibility to claim input tax credit gets a bit changed. Free participants would imply no taxable supply as there is no consideration, and therefore, tax is not leviable. Since there is no taxable supply involved, the question of the inward supplies being used to make a composite or mixed supply does not arise and therefore, eligibility to claim input tax credit to the extent of 20 participants would be an issue. The same treatment would apply even when own employees are attending the course or organizing team members avail the same service. To the extent own employees are attending the course for free/employees of the team organizing the course are also using the said facilities, it cannot be said that the same is used for making an outward taxable supply and therefore, the input tax credit to that extent would not be eligible.

Similarly, there can be instances where though there are various activities undertaken by the supplier, the question of composite/mixed supply does not arise. For instance,

• A film producer undertaking production of a film has entered into an agreement for a lock-stock-barrel transfer of all rights in the movie, once the shooting is completed. GST is paid at the applicable rates on the outward supply, i.e., transfer of copyrights. In the course of shooting, the film producer incurs the expense of beauticians for the acting crew. The beauticians’ levy GST on their service charges. Can it be said that the film producer has actually further supplied the said service of beauticians to the distributor along with the main supply, i.e., transfer of copyrights or there is a single supply only, and therefore the question of mixed and composite supply does not arise?

• Similar example applies in the context of news channel/entertainment channel where the service provided is the sale of advertising slots. However, in order to create the content/ news broadcasting, expenses of beauty parlour are incurred, and GST is paid on the same. The same would also be covered under the blocked credit list,
and input tax credit would not be eligible on the same as well.

• Another example would be of an actor/ actress who has undergone  cosmetic surgery with the intention of getting a new assignment and paid GST on the charges levied by the Doctor. Can the actor/actress claim input tax credit on the grounds that the services are used as a part of a composite / mixed supply? The answer to this is apparently negative.

We may also need to look into a scenario where the service recipient arranges for the material used in the delivery of the above service, and the supplier of service merely performs the said service. The question then remains whether the recipient can claim the input tax credit of GST paid on materials. Is a view possible that the restriction of beauty treatment, health services, cosmetic and plastic surgery is to be read in the context of the supply of services only? Such a view is possible for the simple reason that all the three terms refer to an activity done on another person, i.e., a service. However, such a view is likely to be litigative since the Revenue is going to interpret it strictly, and any expense which has a distant relation to the above items would be treated as blocked credits only.

MEMBERSHIP OF A CLUB, HEALTH AND FITNESS CENTRE
A plain reading of the entry would indicate that the restriction applies to membership of a club or membership of a health and fitness centre. This would mean that the restriction applies when there is an inward supply of service and not goods. This implies that if a taxable person has set up a health and fitness centre within his Place of Business and procures various equipment, the same would not get covered within the purview of health and fitness centre service and therefore, restriction might not apply. One may refer to the decision in the case of ITC Ltd. vs. Commissioner [2018 (12) GSTL 182 (Tri. – Kol.)] wherein the Hon’ble Tribunal had allowed the credit in respect of health and fitness centre opened in the premises of the taxpayer for the benefit of the employees. Similarly, if certain services are received with respect to such a centre, the restriction would not apply as the same applies only for membership services of a club or a health and fitness centre.

Let us first analyse the restriction w.r.t membership of a club. The term ‘club’ has not been defined under GST. However, the term ‘club or association’ was defined under service tax vide section 65 (25aa) as under:

“club or association” means any person or body of persons providing services, facilities or advantages, primarily to its members, for a subscription or any other amount, but does not include —

(i) any body established or constituted by or under any law for the time being in force; or

(ii) any person or body of persons engaged in the activities of trade unions, promotion of agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry; or

(iii) any person or body of persons engaged in any activity having objectives which are in the nature of public service and are of a charitable, religious or political nature; or

(iv) any person or body of persons associated with press or media;

From the above, it is apparent that under the service tax regime also, the levy of service tax was on club or association service, but the claim of credit was restricted only to the extent of membership of a club. It, therefore, becomes necessary to understand the distinguishing factor between clubs and associations.

In layman’s terms, a club may be a for-profit/non-profit organization established with the end objective to provide various facilities to its’ members. A club can be in the form of a members’ club, such as CCI, Bombay Gymkhana, etc., or even non-member clubs, such as Club Mahindra, Country Club, etc. Such clubs offer services which are purely personal in nature and meant for consumption of the member. In the context of membership clubs providing services that are personal in nature/ meant for personal consumption, there has been substantial litigation on the same under the CENVAT regime before the amendment of the definition of input services, specifically excluding the same from its’ scope. In Racold Thermo Ltd. vs. Commissioner [2016 (42) STR 332 (Tri. – Mum.)], the Hon’ble Tribunal had allowed the CENVAT credit on annual club membership, concluding that the same was used to promote sales and purchase activity by attending to clients and holding conferences. On the contrary, for periods after 1st April, 2011, the Tribunal has consistently denied the CENVAT credit on club membership services [Cenza Technologies Pvt. Ltd. – 2017 (4) GSTL 150 (Tri. – Che.) and Marathon Electric India Pvt. Ltd. – 2016 (45) STR 253 (Tri. – Hyd.)].

On the other hand, an association is an organization, generally non-profit, established with the end objective of the collective benefit of members. Some examples of an association can be:

• a co-operative housing society which is an association of members/ owners of houses who have come together with the objective of benefiting the members by maintaining the building/ complex and its’ facilities.

• Trade associations, such as CII, NASSCOM, etc., are associations where industry participants join hands with a stated objective of representing the industry before various forums, working towards the welfare of the members, etc.

• Recently, a new organization called BNI has started its’ Chapters across various cities. It is nothing but a networking organization where different businesses can take annual memberships and get a chance to showcase their business offerings at the periodic meetings organized by the Chapter. The members can also transact between them through the BNI network, which is advertised as one of the key benefits of joining the BNI network.

As such, it can be said that a club is an organization that provides services personal in nature/ meant for personal consumption and not for the general welfare of all members. On the other hand, an association works towards the general cause for the benefit of all members with no element of personal nature/ personal consumption being involved. This aspect has also been recognized under the CENVAT regime wherein in the case of BCH Electric Ltd. vs. Commissioner [2013 (31) STR 68 (Tri. – Del.)], the Tribunal had allowed the CENVAT credit of service tax paid on membership fees of IEEMA, an association of engineering products manufacturers. Even after the amendment in 2011, in Commissioner vs. Zensar Technologies Ltd. [2016 (42) STR 570 (Tri. – Mum.)], the Tribunal had allowed the CENVAT credit on service tax paid on membership fees of CII. In essence, though there is no specific exclusion for membership services provided by professional associations, the same should not be covered under the blocked credit entry.

It should also be kept in mind that while under the pre-amendment regime, there was no exception provided for claiming input tax credit on such supplies, post-amendment, exception is provided when it is obligatory on the part of the employer under any law, for the time being in force, to arrange for such facilities for his employees.

RENT-A-CAB
This restriction has been discussed in detail in the previous article [BCAJ, March 2022], dealing with the restriction under clauses (a), (aa) & (ab) of Section 17 (5). Readers may kindly refer to the same.

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE
The terms ‘life insurance’/ ‘health insurance’ has not been defined under the GST law. The general interpretation would be that policy instruments titled  life insurance/health insurance shall be covered by the restriction provided u/s 17 (5) (b). However, when a business takes a life insurance/health insurance, it is generally for their employees, and at times because it is mandatory on such business to extend the insurance cover to the employees.

However, there are different types of policies that an employer takes for his employees. For instance, the Workmen Compensation Insurance Policy taken for construction workers to meet mandatory labour laws. In such policies, it is actually the employer who gets insured and not the employees, as it safeguards the employer in case of any untoward accident resulting in injury to the employee. It is an insurance policy where the risks of the employer are subsumed by the insurance company. In the context of such policies, the Hon’ble Karnataka HC in the case of Ganesan Builders Ltd. vs. CST, Chennai [2019 (20) GSTL 39 (Mad.)] had held that the CENVAT credit was allowable as the insurance policy was employer-specific and not employee-specific. This was despite the fact that the definition of input service did not provide any exception to cases where it was obligatory to provide insurance facilities to their employees. Also, under the CCR, 2004, the exclusion applied only when the said services were used for personal consumption of the employee, w.r.t which the HC has held to the contrary.

Of course, the restriction applies only to specific insurance policies and not for other policies such as travel insurance, fire insurance, etc., on which the input tax credit will be allowed.

TRAVEL BENEFITS EXTENDED TO EMPLOYEES ON VACATION
At times, employers themselves arrange for vacation travel of employees and their family members by booking them for a travel package or reimbursing the cost of travel. In such cases, the benefit of the input tax credit is specifically restricted subject to the exception that it is obligatory on the employer’s part to provide such facilities to the employee.

However, there are also other instances where an employer extends travel benefits to the employees, such as:

•    Relocation – An employee working in one location may be transferred to another location, and the employer might arrange for travel of the employee/ his family members as well as transportation of their belongings.

•    Joining – This is similar to relocation, with the only difference being that this occurs when a company hires an employee belonging to another city. As a joining incentive, the company arranges/bears the cost of relocation.

•    Training – An employer might arrange for the employee to undergo certain training which necessitates the employee to travel to a different city/ country, and the cost incurred during such travel for training is borne by the employer.

•    Marketing – In the course of employment, an employee might be required to travel extensively, especially when involved in a sales/ marketing role. The entire travel expenses are borne by the employer. In Ramco Cements Ltd. vs. Commissioner [2017 (5) GSTL 105 (Tri. – Che.)], the Tribunal has allowed the CENVAT credit of tax paid on air travel agency services /tour operator services used to book tickets for travel of employees for marketing/business promotion. In Netcracker Technologies Solutions India Private Limited vs. Chief Commissioner [2017 (4) GSTL 10 (Tri. – Hyd.)], the Tribunal had held that travel insurance of employees for business travel was eligible for CENVAT credit.

Though the above are in the nature of travel benefits, they cannot be categorized as being extended to employees on vacation. Therefore, the restriction to claim input tax credit cannot be extended to the above.

CLAUSE (g) – GOODS OR SERVICES OR BOTH USED FOR PERSONAL CONSUMPTION
This takes us to clause (g), which restricts the claim of an input tax credit on goods or services or both used for personal consumption. For the purpose of this clause, the scope of the term ‘personal consumption’ needs to be analysed.

Neither the term ‘personal consumption’ nor ‘personal’ has been defined under GST. Therefore, we need to refer to the dictionary meaning to understand the scope of the term ‘personal’. The Oxford Dictionary refers to ‘personal’ as “your own; not belonging to or connected with anyone else”.

At this juncture, we should also refer to section 37 (1) of the Income-tax Act, which specifically prohibits the claim of expenses that are personal in nature. While analysing the scope of section 37 (1), in the case of Galgotia Publications Private Limited vs. ACIT [ITA No. 1857/Del/2015], the Hon’ble Tribunal has held that there cannot be a nature of personal expenses when the assessee is a company, an entity recognized by law as a legal person and existing independently with its’ own rights & liabilities. Therefore, no element of personal expenses by Directors/ Office bearers can be attributed unless there is sufficient documentary evidence in support.

The above indicates that while interpreting the term ‘personal consumption’, it has to be referred to as the consumption of the taxable person in the context of whom the eligibility to claim input tax credit needs to be looked into. Owing to the decision of the ITAT, even expenses incurred for Key Managerial Personnel, i.e., directors, office bearers, etc., may be covered within the scope of personal expenses/ consumption. The question that therefore remains is if any expenses are incurred for the welfare of the employees and not covered under any other clauses of section 17 (5), whether the same would be hit by clause (g) or not?

For instance, a Mumbai based company has hired a new employee who will be relocating to Mumbai along with his family. As a facilitation measure, the company arranges for the travel of the employee and his family members and the transportation of their belongings to Mumbai. The company also arranges for  temporary accommodation in a hotel for ten days to assist the employee in settling. The company also pays brokerage to a real estate agent for helping the employee find permanent accommodation. None of the expenses incurred by the employer in the above activities is specifically covered under any of the clauses of section 17 (5) – except perhaps the F&B expenses incurred during hotel stay for ten days.

The question that remains is whether this can be treated as a personal expense of the employer as it is consumed by the employee? It is important to note that such expense is allowable u/s 37 (1) as business expenses as this is nothing but personnel expenses, i.e., the expense incurred for the staff. However, the Bombay HC has, in the case of Commissioner vs. Manikgarh Cement [2010 (20) STR 456 (Bom.)] held that mere allowability of expense under income tax cannot be a yardstick to determine eligibility to claim the  credit. A nexus between the input/input service has to be established with the business activity of the taxpayer in order to demonstrate eligibility to claim the credit.

While a strong view to suggest that such expenses are not covered u/s 17 (5) (g) would prevail, it is also important to note that the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) has held to the contrary. For instance, in Chennai Port Trust’s case [2019 (28) GSTL 600 (AAR-GST)], the Authority has held that input tax credit on expenses incurred (procurement of inputs/ capital goods/ services) for in-house hospital is for personal consumption of the employees and therefore covered u/s 17 (5) (g).

The entry can also be analysed from a different perspective, especially in the context of goods. Let us take an example of a company having constructed a housing colony for its’ employees. The company also acquires various household equipment, which are installed at each of the houses in the colony. As per entry 4 (b) of Schedule II, where, by or under the direction of a person carrying on a business, goods held or used for the purposes of the business are put to any private use or are used, or made available to any person for use, for any purpose other than a purpose of the business, the usage or making available of such goods is a supply of services. In other words, a view can be taken that the act of making available the goods at the houses in the housing colony for the personal use of employees is actually a supply of service, and therefore, the corresponding input tax credit cannot be denied. Of course, there would be implications on the same from an output liability perspective, in view of entry 2 of Schedule I.

The scope of clause (g), therefore, appears to be controversial, especially till the term ‘personal consumption’ is not defined/ analysed by the Judiciary to provide more clarity.

CONCLUSION

Be it Direct Taxes or Indirect Taxes, when it comes to allowing the benefit of expenses/tax paid on expenses where there is an element of personal nature, the legislature’s intention has always been to deny the same. The same is further implemented by overzealous tax officers who do not miss any opportunity to label a particular expense as being personal in nature and deny the benefit. Therefore, taxpayers always need to be very careful when claiming input tax credit in respect of goods or services where there is an element of ‘personal’ consumption prevailing. Clauses (b) and (g), both revolve around this mindset of the legislature, and therefore, the taxpayers need to tread cautiously when analysing the same.

On maturity of life insurance policy, where section 10(10D) does not apply, it is only net income which is chargeable to tax

1 Sandeep Modi vs. DCIT
[TS-184-ITAT-2022 (Kol.)]
A.Y.: 2017-18; Date of order: 4th March, 2022
Sections: 10(10D), 56

On maturity of life insurance policy, where section 10(10D) does not apply, it is only net income which is chargeable to tax

FACTS
The assessee, an individual, took a single premium life insurance policy from SBI Life Insurance Co. Ltd., paying a premium of Rs. 10,00,000. The policy was to mature after three years. No deduction was claimed u/s 80C. During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, on the maturity of the policy, the assessee received a sum of Rs. 13,09,000 and included a sum of Rs. 3,09,000 in his total income under the head `Income from Other Sources’.

When the return of income was processed by CPC, a sum of Rs. 10,00,000 was added to the total income under the head Income from Other Sources. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an application for rectification u/s 154 of the Act. The assessee’s application was rejected without giving any specific reason for rejection.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who confirmed the action of the CPC in enhancing the total income by Rs. 10,00,000, which according to the assessee, was premium paid by the assessee to SBI Life Insurance Co. Ltd.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that since SBI deducted 1% TDS on the entire receipt of Rs. 13,09,000, the CPC, while processing the return of income found that out of Rs. 13,09,000 received by the assessee, only Rs. 3,09,000 has been offered for taxation and, therefore, the balance of Rs. 10,00,000 was added as income of the assessee. It also noted that vide the Finance Bill, 2019, while increasing the TDS rate from 1% to 5% the problem has been taken note of. “…… Several concerns have been expressed that deducting tax on gross amount creates difficulties to an assessee who otherwise has to pay tax on net income (i.e. after deducting the amount of insurance premium paid by him from the total sum received). From the point of view of tax administration as well, it is preferable to deduct tax on net income so that income as per TDS return of the deductor can be matched automatically with the return of the income filed by the assessee. The person who is paying a sum to a resident under a life insurance policy is aware of the amount of insurance premium paid by the assessee.”

The Tribunal, upon noting the above-stated observations as well as taking note of the contention of the assessee that the addition of Rs. 10,00,000 tantamounts to double taxation and also the fact that the assessee had neither availed any deduction u/s 80C of the Act in respect of premium paid to SBI nor claimed any deduction u/s 10(10D) of the Act and offered Rs. 3,09,000 for tax in his return of income held that the addition made by the AO is not warranted.

S. 264 – Revision – Maintainability – Error / Mistake committed by assessee – Application maintainable

2 Hapag Lloyd India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Mumbai – 5;
[W.P. No. 2322 of 2021;
Date of order: 9th February, 2022
(Bombay High Court)]

S. 264 – Revision – Maintainability – Error / Mistake committed by assessee – Application maintainable

The Petitioner is a private limited company. It is a successor of United Arab Shipping Agency India Company Pvt. Limited (‘UASAC’), which amalgamated with the Petitioner with effect from 1st April, 2019, pursuant to an order by National Company Law Tribunal. The UASAC, the predecessor company, had distributed a dividend of Rs. 10,16,75,641 to its holding company, United Arab Shipping Company Limited, a company incorporated under the laws of Kuwait. The UASAC paid Dividend Distributed Tax (‘DDT’) at 16.91% (including surcharge and cess), aggregating to Rs. 2,06,99,127. A return of income for A.Y. 2016 – 2017 was filed by UASAC on 30th November, 2016. A revised return of income was filed on 23rd December, 2016.

In the original as well as revised return, the benefit of Article 10 of India – Kuwait DTAA was, however, not claimed. Under the said article, the dividend distributed during F.Y. 2015–2016, was taxable at 10%. The Petitioner was, thus, entitled to a refund of Rs. 84,61,650, being the excess tax paid. The Petitioner thus preferred an application u/s 264 of the Act before Pr.CIT / Respondent no. 1.

By the impugned order, Pr. CIT rejected the application as untenable primarily on the ground that the UASAC had not made a claim for the return of excess DDT at the time of filing original return of income as well as the revised return of income. Consequently, the assessment order u/s 143(3) was passed on 18th December, 2018. Thus, there was no apparent error on the record in the said assessment order which warranted exercise of jurisdiction u/s 264 of the Act.

The Petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction on the ground that Pr.CIT has completely misconstrued the scope of jurisdiction u/s 264. This incorrect approach of Pr.CIT has resulted in an unjustified refusal to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by Section 264 of the Act.

The Petitioner submitted that Pr.CIT committed a grave error in law in holding that an application u/s 264 was not maintainable when the assessee had not made a claim for refund of excess tax paid in the original return. The Petitioner submitted that the view of Pr.CIT that, for the exercise of jurisdiction u/s 264 of the Act, the order impugned ought to be apparently erroneous, is completely misconceived. Under Section 264 of the Act, the Commissioner is empowered to call for the record of any proceeding and make an inquiry or cause an inquiry to be made and thereafter pass such order, as he thinks fit, but not being one prejudicial to the assessee. The scope is thus not restricted to correction of error apparent on the face of the record.

In opposition to this, the Respondent sought to justify the impugned order on the premise that the refund was not claimed in the original as well as revised return and thus the order passed u/s 143(3) by the Assessing Officer, which was sought to be revised cannot be said to be prejudicial to the assessee and, therefore, Respondent was well within his rights in refusing to exercise the revisional jurisdiction.

The Hon. Court observed that on the perusal of the aforesaid reasons, it becomes evident that two factors weighed with Respondent no. 1. First, the assessee had not claimed a refund in the original and revised return and, thus, there was no error in the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) on 18th December, 2018. Second, Respondent no. 1 was of the view that the jurisdiction u/s 264 was confined to correct the order, which is found to be apparently erroneous.

The Court observed that the Respondent no. 1 was justified in recording that the assessee had not claimed a refund of excess tax paid by it in the original and revised return. However, Respondent no. 1 committed an error in constricting the scope of revisional jurisdiction in the backdrop of the said undisputed factual position. In fact, the very foundation of the application u/s 264 was that the assessee had inadvertently failed to claim the benefit of Article 10 of the India – Kuwait DTAA, under which the dividend distribution was taxed at a lower rate. The Court held that the approach of Respondent no. 1 in refusing to exercise the jurisdiction u/s 264, on the premise that it can be lawfully exercised only where such a refund was claimed and considered by the Assessing Officer is neither borne out by the text of Section 264 nor the construction put thereon by the precedents.

The aforesaid reasoning indicates that Respondent no. 1 failed to appreciate the distinction between revisional and review jurisdiction. The principles which govern the exercise of review were sought to be unjustifiably imported to the exercise of power u/s 264 and thereby imposing limitations which do not exist on exercise of such power. Undoubtedly, revisional jurisdiction is not as wide as an appellate jurisdiction. At the same time, revisional jurisdiction cannot be confused with the power of review, which by its very nature is limited. The Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Geekay Security Services (P) Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle – 3(1)(2) [2019] 101 taxmann.com 192 (Bombay) wherein the Court considered an identical question as to whether the revisional authority was justified in rejecting the revision application solely on the ground that the applicant had not claimed the benefit in the original return. Section 264 does not limit the power to correct errors committed by the sub-ordinate authorities and could even be exercised where errors are committed by the assessee and there is nothing in Section 264 which places any restriction on the Commissioner’s revisional power to give relief to the assessee in a case where assessee detects mistakes after the assessment is completed.

The Court held that since Pr.CIT / Respondent no. 1 has not considered the revision application on merits, matter was remitted back to Pr.CIT for de novo consideration on merits.

S. 80IB (10) – Housing Project – commencement of development of residential project – Date of approval/ sanction – Developer – Eligibility

1 Commissioner of Income Tax-24 vs. Abode Builders;
[Income Tax Appeal No. 2020 of 2017;
Date of order : 16th February, 2022
(Bombay High Court)]

S. 80IB (10) – Housing Project – commencement of development of residential project – Date of approval/ sanction – Developer – Eligibility

Assessee Firm is a developer and builder who developed a residential project called ‘Trans Residency’ on a piece of land admeasuring 12,540 sq. metres in the Andheri Area of Mumbai. The assessee firm entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with another concern M/s. Vaman Estate to develop the property vide agreement dated 28th August, 2001. The residential project ‘Trans Residency’ has 7 wings in Building No. I (A to G) and 3 wings in building No. III (A to C). The construction activity was undertaken for Wings E & F first, and residential units were sold before 31st March, 2005. The project for E & F Wing was completed in 2005 and profits were offered for tax (deduction u/s 80IB was claimed on the same) in the return of income filed for A.Y. 2005-06, while the rest of the project was completed in March, 2007, and proceeds on sale of residential units was shown in the return of income filed for A.Y. 2007-08. The return of income was filed on 19th October, 2007, declaring a total income of Rs. 18,16,656. The only addition was made on account of disallowance of claim u/s 80IB(10) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, amounting to Rs. 17,94,05,681.

The Assessing Officer (AO) scrutinized the assessee’s claim keeping in view two major criteria having a direct bearing on the legitimacy of the claim. The AO observed that the land on which the Trans Residency Project had been built was not owned by the assessee but by Malad Satguru Sadan CHS Ltd. and that the Conveyance Deed for the said land had been executed in the name of the society in pursuance to the directions of the High Court vide Consent Decree passed on 18th July, 1995. The AO also noted that the assessee had been engaged as a ‘developer’ by the Malad Sadguru Sadan CHS and has made payment on behalf of the society. Based on this, the AO concluded that the assessee was not the owner of the said land. Then the AO proceeded to examine whether the assessee could be considered as a developer. The AO observed that the assessee entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with M/s. Vaman Estate on 28th August, 2001 and observed that as per the agreement, the development and construction of the building was to be done by M/s. Vaman Estate at its own cost, and both the parties were to share the gross sale proceeds in the ratio of 50:50. The AO concluded that the assessee did not incur any expenditure on the project, nor did he do any construction activity, and the proceeds from the project were its net profit. The AO observed that once the Joint Venture Agreement was entered into, the status of the assessee changed from that of a ‘developer’ to that of a ‘facilitator’. The AO, thus, observed that the assessee was neither ‘the owner’ nor ‘the Developer’ of the property, and accordingly, the assessee was not eligible for claiming deduction u/s 80IB(10).

A supplementary agreement had been executed between the assessee and M/s. Vaman Estate on 14th March, 2005. Based on various clauses of both the above-mentioned agreements, the AO concluded that the BMC had given sanction to the Plan submitted by the assessee through letter dated 21st September, 1996. He observed that the Explanation to section 80IB(10) of the Act stipulated that where the approval for the concerned project was given more than once, the date of initial approval would be the operative date of approval. Thus, the assessee was not eligible to claim deduction u/s 80IB(10). Accordingly, the AO rejected the assessee’s claim of deduction u/s 80IB(10) of the Act amounting to Rs. 17,94,05,681. The assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act on 24th December, 2009, assessing the total income at Rs. 18,12,22,340.

The Respondent-Assessee firm challenged this order before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The CIT (Appeals) allowed the claim of deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act. Aggrieved by this order of CIT (Appeals), Revenue preferred an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai (‘ITAT’). The ITAT dismissed the appeal by an order dated 26th August, 2016.

The Hon. Court observed that the Revenue had originally raised three points, namely, (a) lack of ownership of land on which the project was constructed; (b) Assessee not having invested in the construction activity or done construction, could not be considered as a developer; and (c) Project was approved and commenced before the stipulated date of 1st October,1998. On these three grounds, the claim of the assessee under section 80IB(10) of the Act was denied by the Assessing Officer.

The Court observed that as regards the first issue regarding the ownership of the land, though it was raised before the ITAT, has not been raised in this present appeal. The ITAT has given a finding of fact which is not disputed inasmuch as the ITAT has observed that Respondent through, its partner one Liaq Ahmed, has been involved in the project right from the beginning with the signing of the Principal Agreement and primary acquisition of the development rights for the land in question. The AO has not even disputed that Intimation of Disapproval (‘IOD’) issued by the Municipal Corporation was in the name of assessee. So also the Commencement Certificate (CC). It is also noted that all tax related to the land in question were paid by the assessee from 1998 onwards. It is also noted that assessee has even made payment for the development rights. What the AO has missed out is unless the Respondent had any role in the development of the project, the joint venture partner would not agree to share 50% profit in the project with the assessee. Therefore, on this issue, the Court agreed with the findings of ITAT.

As regards the other objection that the project was commenced much before the stipulated date of 1st October, 1998, it was argued that the assessee had submitted the original Plan to the concerned authorities on 7th November, 1996 for which the IOD was granted in 1997, and therefore, even if a subsequent IOD has been obtained, as per the Explanation to section 80IB(10), where the approval for the concerned project was given more than once, the date of final approval would be the operative date of approval.

The Court further observed that the ITAT has once again come to a finding of fact that the project, as completed, was different from the project for which initial approval had been obtained. It is true that the original plan which was submitted and for which IOD was granted was in 1997. The life of the IOD once granted as per the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 is four years. This finding has not been disputed by the Revenue. The original Lay-out Plan became invalid after 7th January, 2001. The assessee applied for IOD for the second time on 22nd November, 2001 and was granted permission on 21st July, 2002. The ITAT has come to a conclusion on facts, which is also not disputed, that the second project proposal was for only three buildings as against the four for which the permission was sought earlier, and IOD for different buildings was granted on different dates. The ITAT has concluded that, therefore the project for which permission was granted on 24th July, 2002 was not the same as that, for which the IOD lapsed in 2001.

The Court held that Tribunal has not committed any perversity or applied incorrect principles to the given facts and when the facts and circumstances are properly analysed, and correct test is applied to decide the issue at hand, then, no substantial question of law arises in the matter. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

Settlement of cases — Interest u/s 220(2) — Order of Commissioner (Appeals) directing AO to withdraw investment allowance granted u/s 32A set aside by Tribunal — Order passed by Settlement Commission reducing interest u/s 220(2) — Need not be interfered with

8 UOI vs. Dodsal Ltd.
[2022] 441 ITR 47 (Bom)
A.Y.: 1989-90; Date of order: 9th December, 2021
Ss. 32A, 156, 220(2), 245D(4) of ITA, 1961

Settlement of cases — Interest u/s 220(2) — Order of Commissioner (Appeals) directing AO to withdraw investment allowance granted u/s 32A set aside by Tribunal — Order passed by Settlement Commission reducing interest u/s 220(2) — Need not be interfered with

For the A. Y. 1989-90, the Assessing Officer passed an order u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessment order was rectified u/s 154 on 27th July, 1992 revising the total income after allowance of set-off of unabsorbed investment allowance brought forward from the A.Ys. 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1988-89. The assessee made an application u/s 245C before the Settlement Commission, which passed an order u/s 245D(4). The Assessing Officer gave effect to the order u/s 245D(4) and also calculated the interest payable u/s 220(2). The quantum of interest was rectified, and a revised order was passed. The assessee sought rectification of the order passed by the Settlement Commission on the ground that since the order u/s 245D(4) was silent on the point of charging interest u/s 220(2), it should be considered to have been waived. The Settlement Commission held that it did not consider it to be a good case for waiver of interest chargeable u/s 220(2). However, regarding the method of charging of interest, the Settlement Commission directed the Assessing Officer to take the income as determined by him in his order dated 27th July, 1992, adjust it in accordance with its order u/s 245D(4), but without withdrawing the benefit of set-off of brought forward investment allowance u/s 32A. The Department filed an application contending that the Settlement Commission could not have granted the assessee the benefit of set-off of brought forward investment allowance. The Settlement Commission rejected the application filed by the Department.

The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Department and held as under:

“i) The language used in sub-section (2) of section 220 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is that the interest on demand is payable by the assessee for every month or part of a month comprised in the period commencing from the day immediately following the end of the period mentioned in sub-section (1) and ending with the day on which the amount is paid. Accordingly, the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 220 provides that where as a result of an appellate order, the amount on which interest was payable under this section is reduced, the interest shall be reduced accordingly. Therefore, the effect of the first proviso to sub-section (2) of section 220 will be that the amount on which the interest is payable under sub-section (2) of section 220 will get modified according to the appellate order. There can be variation in charging interest if ultimately due to the result of the appellate order, the liability to pay the original amount on which interest is levied u/s. 220 ceases, and accordingly, the assessee needs to be given the benefit of reduction in interest resulting in reduced payment of interest.

ii) According to the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 220, once the amount on which interest was charged got extinguished the liability of the assessee to pay interest on such amount would also be extinguished. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) directing the Assessing Officer to withdraw the investment allowance granted u/s. 32A was set aside by the Tribunal. Therefore, interference with the orders passed by the Settlement Commission reducing the liability of the assessee to pay interest u/s. 220(2) would result in directing the assessee to pay interest on an amount which had been extinguished and consequently would result in miscarriage of justice.

iii) The power under article 226 of the Constitution of India needs to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interest of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point.

iv) Therefore, we refuse to interfere in the exercise of power under article 226 of the Constitution of India in its extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction. The petition stands dismissed.”

Return of income — Revised return — Delay in filing revised return since sanction from National Company Law Board for demerger was received after expiry of time limit for filing revised return — Rejection of revised return not valid

7 Deep Industries Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT
[2022] 441 ITR 307 (Guj)
A.Y.: 2018-19;
Date of order: 29th September, 2021
S. 139(5) of ITA, 1961

Return of income — Revised return — Delay in filing revised return since sanction from National Company Law Board for demerger was received after expiry of time limit for filing revised return — Rejection of revised return not valid

The company DIL had its business of oil and gas exploration and production and oil and gas services. It decided to demerge its oil and gas services business, and a scheme of arrangement was formulated and a company application was moved before the National Company Law Tribunal. The scheme of arrangement was sanctioned on 17th March, 2020, and the appointed date was 1st April, 2017. The certified copy of the scheme was received on 20th May, 2020, and it was filed with the Registrar of Companies on 20th June, 2020.

DIL had filed the original return of income for the A.Y. 2018-19 on 30th March, 2019. On the sanction of the scheme being effective from 1st April, 2017 the erstwhile DIL’s assets, liabilities, incomes, etc., were deemed to be that of the resulting company, the assessee. However, the time for filing the revised return for the A.Y. 2018-19 had lapsed, and there was no mechanism to file it online. The assessee raised a grievance on the income tax portal on 26th June, 2020 through the e-Nivaran facility. Thereafter, it physically filed the revised return along with the letter dated 28th July, 2020, explaining the cause of revision. The Deputy Commissioner rejected the revised return of income filed by the assessee and passed an assessment order on a protective basis making an addition.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Once there was no response to the grievance raised on the Income-tax portal, the assessee had physically filed the revised return on 28th July, 2020. The Department therefore ought to have considered the physical filing of the revised return.

ii) Resultantly, the assessment which has been finalized shall need to be quashed permitting the respondent to process considering the revised return which has been filed by the petitioner. If it is not filed in an electronic manner as has been reflected in the affidavit-in-reply, he should be permitted to do that by a specific order and granting him reasonable time of minimum one week to so do it. Otherwise, his physical copy which he has dispatched shall be taken into consideration.

iii) As a parting note the court needs to make a mention that the matter has travelled to this court only because the revised return was not permitted beyond the prescribed time limit as set under section 139(5) of the Act. Thus, the apex court in the case of Dalmia Power Ltd. vs. Asst. CIT [2020] 420 ITR 339 (SC) has categorically held and observed that section 119 of the Income-tax Act in such matters also would not be applicable and therefore, when the respondents are desirous of operating in the regimes of electronic mode and faceless assessment, it shall need to improvise the software and allow the revised return more particularly, when the law has been made quite clear by virtue of the direction of the apex court. Let care be taken in improvising the software wherever necessary since its limitations have tendency to swell the court litigation. The petitioner could have been saved from this ordeal, had such a care taken to permit the revised return in an electronic mode once the direction of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) was communicated along with the decision of the apex court.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 after four years — Condition precedent — Failure by assessee to disclose material facts necessary for assessment — Notice not stating which fact had not been disclosed — Mere statement that there had been failure to disclose material facts is not sufficient — All documents and details submitted by assessee during original assessment and examined by TPO and original order passed by AO thereafter — No failure on part of assessee to disclose material facts fully and truly — Notice and reassessment on change of opinion — Impermissible

6 Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2022] 441 ITR 74 (Bom)
A.Y.: 2004-05; Date of order: 4th December, 2021
Ss. 92CA(3), 143(3), 147, 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 after four years — Condition precedent — Failure by assessee to disclose material facts necessary for assessment — Notice not stating which fact had not been disclosed — Mere statement that there had been failure to disclose material facts is not sufficient — All documents and details submitted by assessee during original assessment and examined by TPO and original order passed by AO thereafter — No failure on part of assessee to disclose material facts fully and truly — Notice and reassessment on change of opinion — Impermissible

For the A.Y. 2004-05, the Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 after four years for reopening the assessment u/s 147. The reasons recorded stated that on verification of the records it was found that the assessee had capitalized an amount paid towards lump sum payment of technical know-how fees and claimed depreciation but had calculated the operating loss considering the actual payment of technical know-how fees instead of only the depreciation as claimed by the assessee, that therefore, the working profit calculated by the assessee was not correct and that the arm’s length price calculated was short by Rs. 116.20 crores and hence such amount had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147. The assessee filed objections to the reopening. Before the objections were disposed of, various further notices were issued.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the reopening. An ad interim stay was granted till the next date of hearing. However, when the stay did not get extended, reassessment was completed, and an order was passed pursuant to the order passed by the Transfer Pricing Officer on a reference made u/s 92CA(1). The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The reasons recorded for reopening were based on a change of opinion which was not permissible. The proviso to section 147 applied and the Assessing Officer had to make out a case that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its assessment. The reasons recorded did not indicate which were those material facts that the assessee had failed to truly and fully disclose.

ii) The assessee had in its annual report mentioned the technical know-how fee, royalty and technical assistance fee that it had paid and had also filed form 3CEB in which it had disclosed the details and description of the international transactions in respect of technical know-how and patents and regarding the royalty paid and lump-sum fees paid for the technical services. Before the original order was passed u/s. 92CA(3), the Transfer Pricing Officer also had raised all these queries and had considered the royalty, technical know-how fees paid. The assessee had not only filed its account books and other evidence but those had been considered by the Transfer Pricing Officer whose order also had been considered by the Assessing Officer while passing the original order u/s. 143(3). Therefore, there could be nothing which had not been truly and fully disclosed.

iii) The contention of the Department that Explanation 1 to section 147 provided that production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence should have been discovered by the Assessing Officer was no defence, was not tenable. The notice issued u/s. 148 and the reassessment order were quashed and set aside.”

Non-resident — Income deemed to accrue or arise in India — Royalty — Meaning of “royalty” — Transfer authorising transferee to use licensed software — No transfer of copyright — Amount received cannot be termed royalty

5 EY Global Services Ltd. vs. ACIT
[2022] 441 ITR 54 (Del)
Date of order: 9th December, 2021
S. 9 of ITA, 1961

Non-resident — Income deemed to accrue or arise in India — Royalty — Meaning of “royalty” — Transfer authorising transferee to use licensed software — No transfer of copyright — Amount received cannot be termed royalty

EYGBS was an Indian company that provided back-office support and data processing services. It entered into an agreement with the EYGSL (UK) whereby it received ‘right to benefit from the deliverables and/or services’ from the UK company. The Authority for Advance Rulings held that the amount received was assessable as royalty in India.

The assessee company filed a writ petition and challenged the ruling. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“a) In Engg. Analysis Centre of Excellence P. Ltd. vs. CIT [2021] 432 ITR 471 (SC), the Supreme Court observed that the definition of royalty that is contained in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 would make it clear that there has to be a transfer of “all or any rights” which includes the grant of a licence in respect of any copyright in a literary work. The expression “including the granting of a licence” in clause (v) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Act, would necessarily mean a licence in which transfer is made of an interest in rights “in respect of” copyright, namely, that there is a parting with of an interest in any of the rights mentioned in section 14(b) read with section 14(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957.

(i) Copyright is an exclusive right, which is negative in nature, being a right to restrict others from doing certain acts.

(ii) Copyright is an intangible, incorporeal right, in the nature of a privilege, which is quite independent of any material substance. Ownership of copyright in a work is different from the ownership of the physical material in which the copyrighted work may happen to be embodied. An obvious example is the purchaser of a book or a CD/DVD, who becomes the owner of the physical article, but does not become the owner of the copyright inherent in the work, such copyright remaining exclusively with the owner.

(iii) Parting with copyright entails parting with the right to do any of the acts mentioned in section 14 of the Copyright Act. The transfer of the material substance does not, of itself, serve to transfer the copyright therein. The transfer of the ownership of the physical substance, in which copyright subsists, gives the purchaser the right to do with it whatever he pleases, except the right to reproduce the same and issue it to the public, unless such copies are already in circulation, and the other acts mentioned in section 14 of the Copyright Act.

(iv) A licence from a copyright owner, conferring no proprietary interest on the licensee, does not entail parting with any copyright, and is different from a licence issued under section 30 of the Copyright Act, which is a licence which grants the licensee an interest in the rights mentioned in section 14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act. Where the core of a transaction is to authorize the end-user to have access to and make use of the “licensed” computer software product over which the licensee has no exclusive rights, no copyright is parted with and consequently, no infringement takes place, as is recognized by section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act. It makes no difference whether the end-user is enabled to use computer software that is customised to its specifications or otherwise.

(v) A non-exclusive, non-transferable licence, merely enabling the use of a copyrighted product, is in the nature of restrictive conditions which are ancillary to such use, and cannot be construed as a licence to enjoy all or any of the enumerated rights mentioned in section 14 of the Copyright Act, or create any interest in any such rights so as to attract section 30 of the Copyright Act.

(vi) The right to reproduce and the right to use computer software are distinct and separate rights.

b) For the payment received by the UK company from EYGBS to be taxed as “royalty”, it is essential to show a transfer of copyright in the software to do any of the acts mentioned in section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957. A licence conferring no proprietary interest on the licensee, does not entail parting with the copyright. Where the core of a transaction is to authorise the end-user to have access to and make use of the licenced software over which the licensee has no exclusive rights, no copyright is parted with and therefore, the payment received cannot be termed as “royalty”.

c) EYGBS, in terms of the service agreement and the memorandum of understanding, merely received the right to use the software procured by the UK company from third-party vendors. The consideration paid for the use thereof therefore, could not be termed “royalty”. The rights acquired by the UK company from the third-party software vendors were not relevant. What was relevant was the agreement between the UK company and EYGBS. As the agreement did not create any right to transfer the copyright in the software, the payment would not fall within the ambit of the term “royalty”.

Income — Income or capital — Investment of funds before commencement of operation in fixed deposits and mutual funds as per directive of Government — Income generated to be utilised for purposes of business of company — Income not revenue receipt

4 ClT vs. Bangalore Metro Rail Corporation Ltd.
[2022] 441 ITR 113 (Kar)
A.Ys: 2007-08 and 2008-09;
Date of order: 23rd November, 2021
S. 4 of ITA, 1961

Income — Income or capital — Investment of funds before commencement of operation in fixed deposits and mutual funds as per directive of Government — Income generated to be utilised for purposes of business of company — Income not revenue receipt

The assessee was a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and was a wholly-owned undertaking of the Government of Karnataka. It was established with the approval of Government of India to implement a rail-based mass rapid transit system in five years in five stages. The project’s cost was to be financed by both the Union and the State Governments. The assessee had received funds during the A.Y. 2007-08 which were not immediately required for execution of the project and these were invested in fixed deposits and mutual funds. As a result, interest and dividends were received. The assessee contended that the dividend income on mutual funds received from State Bank of India and Unit Trust of India was exempt u/s 10(35) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Apart from this, the assessee also claimed a short-term loss of Rs. 5,02,05,005 arising out of redemption of units with a mutual fund. The Assessing Officer rejecting the contention of the assessee and brought the income of Rs. 10,30,48,755 that was earned by the company through deposits to tax.

The Tribunal held that the amount was not taxable.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“It was apparent that the unutilized funds of the project, before the commencement of the functional operation of the project, was invested by the assessee in fixed deposits and mutual funds as per the directions of the Government. A perusal of the Government order dated 25th March, 2008, it was clear that the income generated out of earlier release of State Government for its project would have to be converted into State’s equity towards the project and could not be counted as income of the assessee. Thus, there was no profit motive as the entire funds entrusted and the interest accrued therefrom had to be utilized only for the purpose of the scheme. Thus, it had to be capitalized and could not be considered as revenue receipts.”

Charitable purpose — Exemption u/s 11:- (i) Charitable institution engaged in imparting education — Effect of proviso to s. 2(15) and CBDT circular No. 11 of 2008 [1] — Surplus income generated by educational activities — Would not affect entitlement to exemption u/s 11; (ii) Effect of s. 13 — Disqualification for exemption — Charitable institution running educational institution — Alleged excess of remuneration to employees — Revenue has no power to interfere — Exemption could not be denied

3 CIT(Exemption) vs. Krupanidhi Education Trust
[2022] 441 ITR 154 (Kar)
A.Ys.: 2009-10 and 2010-11;
Date of order: 20th September, 2021
Ss. 2(15), 11 & 13 of ITA, 1961

Charitable purpose — Exemption u/s 11:- (i) Charitable institution engaged in imparting education — Effect of proviso to s. 2(15) and CBDT circular No. 11 of 2008 [1] — Surplus income generated by educational activities — Would not affect entitlement to exemption u/s 11; (ii) Effect of s. 13 — Disqualification for exemption — Charitable institution running educational institution — Alleged excess of remuneration to employees — Revenue has no power to interfere — Exemption could not be denied

The assessee-trust ran various institutions in Bangalore offering degrees and training in various academic courses and was granted registration u/s 12A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer held that the assessee had violated the provisions of section 13(1)(c) of the Act and therefore, the assessee was not entitled to claim exemption u/s 11, 12 and 13 of the Act. The two trustees were being paid remuneration or salary not proportionate to the pay scales of a professor and administrative officer, respectively. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment for the A.Ys. 2009-10 and 2010-11 u/s 143(3) of the Act by order dated 30th December, 2011 denying the exemption u/s 11 of the Act and making certain additions.

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to exemption.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Under Circular No. 11 of 2008 dated 19th December, 2008 ([2009] 308 ITR (St.) 5) issued by the CBDT having regard to the proviso inserted to section 2(15) amended by the Finance Act, 2008 wherein, it has been clarified that the newly inserted proviso to section 2(15) will not apply in respect of the first three limbs of section 2(15), i. e., relief of the poor, education and medical relief. Consequently, where the object of trust or institution is relief to the poor, education or medical relief, it will constitute “charitable purpose” even if it incidentally involves in carrying of commercial activities.

ii) The Revenue cannot sit in the armchair of an assessee and decide the pattern of working, methodology to be adopted for administration of an educational trust including the payment structure of salary or remuneration to be paid to the professors or administrative staff. In other words, the Department cannot manage or control the managerial affairs of the educational trust. These aspects would not come within the purview of the authorities to decide the Income-tax liability merely on suspicion that the assessee is claiming huge expenditure to get the corresponding benefits of allowable deductions.

iii) The Assessing Officer merely on surmises and conjectures had come to the conclusion that the salary and remuneration paid to the two trustees was highly excessive and not proportionate to the services rendered by them. The Department cannot regulate the management of the assessee-trust. Indeed, the salary or remuneration paid to the trustees were duly accounted and reflected in their returns as income. Merely on imagination, exemption u/s. 11 of the Act could not be denied.

iv) Hence, the substantial question of law deserves to be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.”

Business expenditure — Disallowance — Expenses prohibited in law — CBDT Circular No. 5 dated 1st August, 2012 disallowing expenses in providing free gifts or facilities to medical practitioners by pharmaceutical and allied health sector industry — Circular not applicable retrospectively — Expenses deductible for earlier years

2 Principal CIT vs. Goldline Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.
[2022] 441 ITR 543 (Bom)
A.Y.: 2010-11; Date of order: 14th January, 2022
S. 37(1) of ITA, 196
1

Business expenditure — Disallowance — Expenses prohibited in law — CBDT Circular No. 5 dated 1st August, 2012 disallowing expenses in providing free gifts or facilities to medical practitioners by pharmaceutical and allied health sector industry — Circular not applicable retrospectively — Expenses deductible for earlier years

The assessee manufactured and traded in medicines. For the A.Y. 2010-11, the assessee claimed deduction u/s 37 of the Income-tax Act of expenditure incurred towards tour and travel expenses of medical practitioners to enable them to attend conferences held in different parts of the world. The Assessing Officer applied CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2012 and disallowed proportionate expenditure.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim and held that the disallowance of expenditure on the basis of Board’s Circular No. 5 of 2012, dated 1st August, 2012 was without merit.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) Under the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 as amended on 10th December, 2009 the Medical Council of India imposed a prohibition on medical practitioners and their professional associations from taking any gift, travel facility, hospitality, cash or monetary grant from pharmaceutical and allied health sector industries. According to Circular No. 5 of 2012, dated 1st August, 2012 ([2012] 346 ITR (St.) 95) issued by the CBDT claim of any expense incurred in providing the aforesaid or similar freebees in violation of the provisions of the said regulations were held inadmissible u/s. 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 being an expense prohibited in law. It was further stated that such disallowance would be made in the hands of such pharmaceutical or allied health sector industries or other assessee which had provided such freebees.

ii) The Board’s Circular No. 5 of 2012, dated 1st August, 2012 could not have been applied retrospectively to the A.Y. 2010-11. The circular imposed a new kind of imparity and therefore, the Tribunal had consistently held that the Board’s Circular No. 5 of 2012 would not have any retrospective effect but would operate prospectively from 1st August, 2012. These decisions of the Tribunal were not assailed before the High Court. The Tribunal was justified in deleting the disallowance and its order need not be interfered with.”

Business expenditure — Capital or revenue expenditure — Capital work-in-progress written off — Salary and professional fees expenditure incurred in respect of projects abandoned to conserve cash flow — Revenue expenditure

1 Principal CIT vs. Rediff.Com India Ltd.

[2022] 441 ITR 195 (Bom)
Date of order: 29th September, 2021
S. 37 of ITA, 1961

Business expenditure — Capital or revenue expenditure — Capital work-in-progress written off — Salary and professional fees expenditure incurred in respect of projects abandoned to conserve cash flow — Revenue expenditure

The assessee abandoned some of its incomplete website projects, which were not expected to pay back. The assessee wrote off expenses on account of capital work-in-progress pertaining to such abandoned projects and claimed deduction thereof as revenue expenditure u/s 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer held that the expenditure was incurred for creating new projects and represented capital assets of its business that were to yield enduring benefit and that by claiming such expenditure under the head ‘capital work-in-progress’, the assessee itself had admitted that those expenses were capital in nature and disallowed the assessee’s claim of writing off ‘capital work-in-progress’.

The Tribunal held that the expenses incurred were in connection with the existing business and were of routine nature, such as salary and professional fees, and that the expenses were revenue in nature and allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal’s view that if an expenditure was incurred for doing the business in a more convenient and profitable manner and had not resulted in bringing any new asset into existence, such expenditure was allowable business expenditure u/s. 37 was correct. The expenditure incurred was on salary and professional fees which was revenue in nature and did not bring into existence any new asset. There was no perversity or application of incorrect principles in its order. No question of law arose.”

THE CANTEEN BILL

Here is a story of a raid by Excise authorities. I am told this is a true incident that occurred in Pune.

Mr. Joshi was a hardcore technocrat but an accomplished businessman, very disciplined and upright, and uncompromising on his principles. His business of manufacturing certain engineering goods was very prosperous. Mr. Joshi believed in clean and transparent financial records. Therefore, his company’s Chartered Accountant never had any difficulty completing his audit, submitting all documents and other forms under any law, tax payments, and other compliances. The CA’s fees also used to be paid regularly and in time, within seven days from receiving his invoice.

All the workers and staff members of Mr. Joshi’s company were well trained, satisfied with the working conditions, happy with the remuneration and naturally, loyal to the company. In short, it was a dream situation for all concerned – a role model. The assessments of income and all other revenue laws were very smooth.

The Revenue authorities were rather unhappy with this type of an assessee. They had no ‘incentive’ in this case. Mr. Joshi did not mind fighting up to the highest forum for justice. If there was anything unfair in any law, he had the courage to raise his voice against it and approach the Government for necessary amendments. The Revenue authorities used to think twice before raising any objection on his records or his stand.

In short, Mr. Joshi’s position in his business and his performance on all fronts was too nice to be true! But fortunately, it was a reality. Naturally, some people were jealous due to rivalry. They used to file mischievous complaints against him.

One day, there was a raid on his factory on the pretext of some ‘information’. The Authorities came with the police force. Mr. Joshi coolly received them and asked them to go to any place and check anything, but warned them that they should not harass any employee or disturb the production process. He told them that they could meet him after they finished. The employees also were calm and undisturbed.

The authorities resorted to all types of tricks and intimidating tactics. They checked everything very thoroughly and interrogated the staff. Mr. Joshi was in his cabin throughout the day, entertaining his visitors. At the end of the day, the authorities were tired. They could not find any flaw. They virtually surrendered and wound up the raid. They came to meet Mr. Joshi who smilingly inquired whether they found anything and said that if anything were even slightly wrong, he would close his business! He maintained his cool despite some over smartness of the authorities. He apologised that he could not spare time for them since he had important visitors from abroad.

The authorities finally said, “we would get nothing out of the raid, especially when we saw that during lunchtime, your tiffin came from your residence, and you and your two sons had your lunch without even offering anything to us!” They admitted that it was an unprecedented experience for them!

“OK, Mr. Joshi, we have finished our job. Congratulations on your excellent, disciplined and transparent record keeping. We take your leave”.

“Oh! How can you leave like that? You had lunch and snacks in our canteen; and this is the bill of our canteen – Rs. 24,370. I will appreciate it if you clear it before leaving, as the canteen-man is accountable for this!’ said Mr. Joshi.

Is any of us having such a client?

EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF REASSESSMENT

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 147, applicable up to 31st March, 2021, empowers an Assessing Officer (AO) to assess or reassesses the income in respect of any issue which has escaped assessment and which has come to his notice subsequent to the recording of reasons and the issue of a notice u/s 148, in the course of reassessment proceedings. The relevant part of the said section reads as under:

‘If the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, or re-compute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned.’

Section 147, effective from 1st April, 2021, has dispensed with the condition of ‘reason to believe’. Instead, a new provision in the form of section 148A has been introduced to provide for compliance of a set of four conditions by an AO before issuing any notice u/s 148. The Explanation thereto empowers the AO to reassess an income in respect of an issue for which the four conditions of s. 148A has not been complied with.

This Explanation is materially the same as Explanation 3 of s. 147 applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2021, with a change that reference to ‘reasons recorded’ is substituted by ‘compliance of s.148A of the Act’.

Explanation 3 to s. 147 was added w.r.e.f. 1st April, 1989 by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 for providing that the reassessment would be valid even where the reasons recorded did not include an issue that has escaped assessment. The said Explanation reads as under:

‘For the purpose of assessment or reassessment under this section, the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue, which has escaped assessment, and such issue comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, notwithstanding that the reasons for such issue have not been included in the reasons recorded under sub-section (2) of section 148.’

On the insertion of Explanation 3 to s. 147 by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009, the then-existing conflict between various decisions of the Courts regarding the expansion of the subject matter of reassessment beyond the reasons recorded, had been rested in cases where some addition or disallowance or variation was made in respect of the subject matter for which the reasons were recorded. Apparently, the provisions, old or new, permit an AO to expand or extend the proceedings to a subject not covered either by notice u/s 148A or the reasons recorded for reopening an assessment.

An interesting issue, however arisen in cases where no addition or disallowance or variation is made in the order of reassessment in respect of the subject matter of the notice u/s 148A or the reasons recorded but all the same the addition or disallowance or variation is made in respect of a subject matter not covered by such notice or the reasons. At the same time, even after insertion of Explanation 3, the issue that remained open was about the power of the AO to travel beyond the reasons recorded, where no addition or disallowance or variation was made in respect of the subject matter recorded in the reasons for reopening.

Conflicting decisions of the courts are available on the subject. The Bombay and the Delhi High Courts have held that where no addition or disallowance or variation was made in respect of the subject matter of the reasons recorded, then, in such a case, the AO could not have extended the scope of reassessment beyond the reasons recorded. The Punjab & Haryana and Karnataka High Courts have, as against the above, held that it was possible for the AO to travel beyond the subject matter of the reasons recorded while reassessing the income.

It is felt that the conflict would apply to the old as well as the new provisions, requiring us to take notice of the conflict.

JET AIRWAYS (I) LTD.’S CASE
The issue arose in the case of CIT vs. Jet Airways (I) Ltd., 195 Taxman 117 (Bom.). In the said case, pertaining to A.Ys. 1994-1995 and 1995-1996, the revenue had raised the following substantial question of law in appeal u/s. 260A for consideration of the Bombay High Court.

“Where upon the issuance of a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with section 147, the Assessing Officer does not assess or, as the case may be reassess the income which he has reason to believe had escaped assessment and which formed the basis of a notice under section 148, is it open to the Assessing Officer to assess or reassess independently any other income, which does not form the subject-matter of the notice?”

The revenue in appeal urged that even if, during the course of assessment or, as the case might be a reassessment, the AO did not assess or reassess the income which he had reason to believe had escaped assessment and which formed the subject matter of a notice u/s 148(2), it was nonetheless open to him to assess any other income which, during the course of the proceedings was brought to his notice as having escaped assessment. It contended that the use of the words ‘and also’ clearly permitted an AO to make addition on an issue, even where no addition was made in respect of the issues for which the reasons were recorded and on the basis of which the assessment was reopened. It submitted that the language of the section was clear to reach such a conclusion. The words were non-conjunctive, and the two parts could operate independently of each other.

The assessee in response contended that the words “and also” in s. 147 postulated that the AO might assess or reassess the income for which he had reason to believe had escaped assessment together with any other income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment and which came to his notice during the course of the proceedings; unless the AO assessed the income with reference to which he had formed a reason to believe, it was not open to him to assess or reassess any other income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment and which came to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings.

It was clear to the Court, applying the first principle of interpretation for interpreting the section as it stood, and on the basis of precedents on the subject, without adding or deducting from the words used by Parliament, that upon the formation of a reason to believe u/s 147 and following the issuance of a notice u/s 148, the AO had the power to assess or reassess the income, that he had reason to believe had escaped assessment and also any other income chargeable to tax; that the words “and also” could not be ignored; the interpretation which the Court placed on the provision should not result in diluting the effect of those words or rendering any part of the language used by Parliament otiose; Parliament having used the words “assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment”, the words “and also” could not be read as being in the alternative. On the contrary, the correct interpretation would be to regard those words as being conjunctive and cumulative; that Parliament had not used the word “or” and that it did not rest content by merely using the word “and” it followed it with the word “also” clearly suggesting that the words had been used together and in conjunction.

The Court, after hearing the rival contentions, upheld the decision of the Tribunal in favour of assessee for the reasons recorded in Para 16 and 17 of its order as under:

‘This interpretation will no longer hold the field after the insertion of Explanation 3 by the Finance Act (No. 2) of 2009. However, Explanation 3 does not and cannot override the necessity of fulfilling the conditions set out in the substantive part of section 147. An Explanation to a statutory provision is intended to explain its contents and cannot be construed to override it or render the substance and core nugatory. Section 147 has this effect that the Assessing Officer has to assess or reassess the income (“such income”) which escaped assessment and which was the basis of the formation of belief and if he does so, he can also assess or reassess any other income which has escaped assessment and which, comes to his notice during the course of the proceedings. However, if after issuing a notice under section 148, he accepted the contention of the assessee and holds that the income which he has initially formed a reason to believe had escaped assessment, has as a matter of fact not escaped assessment, it is not open to him independently to assess some other income. If he intends to do so, a fresh notice under section 148 would be necessary, the legality of which would be tested in the event of a challenge by the assessee.

We have………. The words “and also” are used in a cumulative and conjunctive sense. To read these words as being in the alternative would be to rewrite the language used by Parliament. Our view has been supported by the background which led to the insertion of Explanation 3 to section 147. Parliament must be regarded as being aware of the interpretation that was placed on the words “and also” by the Rajasthan High Court in Shri Ram Singh’s case (supra). Parliament has not taken away the basis of that decision. While it is open to Parliament, having regard to the plenitude of its legislative powers to do so, the provisions of section 147(1) as they stood after the amendment of 1-4-1989 continue to hold the field.’

The AO, the Court noted, upon the formation of a reason to believe u/s 147 and the issuance of a notice u/s 148(2), must assess or reassess: (i) ‘such income’; and also (ii) any other income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment and which came to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under the section. The words ‘such income’ refers to the income chargeable to tax which had escaped assessment, and in respect of which the AO had formed a reason to believe that it had escaped assessment. The language used by the Parliament was indicative of the position that the assessment or reassessment must be in respect of the income in respect of which he had formed a reason to believe that it had escaped assessment and also in respect of any other income which came to his notice subsequently during the course of the proceedings as having escaped assessment. If the income, the escapement of which was the basis of the formation of the reason to believe, was not assessed or reassessed, it would not be open to the AO to independently assess only that income which came to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under the section as having escaped assessment.

The Court observed that the Parliament when it enacted the provisions of s. 147 w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, clearly stipulated that the AO had to assess or reassess the income that he had reason to believe had escaped assessment and any other income chargeable to tax that came to his notice during the proceedings. In the absence of the assessment or reassessment of the former, he could not independently assess the latter.

The Court in deciding the issue, in favour of the contentions of the assessee that it was not possible to make an addition in respect of an issue that was not recorded in the reasons for reopening, in cases where no addition was made in respect of the subject matter of reasons recorded, referred to the decisions in the cases of Vipan Khanna vs. CIT, 255 ITR 220 (Punj. & Har.); Travancore Cements Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT 305 ITR 170 (Ker.); CIT vs. Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd., 198 ITR 297 (SC); V. Jaganmohan Rao vs. CIT, 75 ITR 373 (SC); CIT vs. Shri Ram Singh, 306 ITR 343 (Raj.); and CIT vs. Atlas Cycle Industries, 180 ITR 319 (Punj. & Har.).

N. GOVINDARAJU’S CASE
The issue again arose before the Karnataka High Court in the case of N. Govindaraju vs. ITO, 60 taxmann.com 333 (Karn.). In the said case for A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee, in its appeal against the order of Tribunal, approached the Court with the following substantial questions of law:

Whether the Tribunal was correct in upholding reassessment proceedings, when the reason recorded for re-opening of assessment under S. 147 of Act itself does not survive.

• Whether the Tribunal was correct in upholding levy of tax on a different issue, which was not a subject matter for re-opening the assessment and moreover the reason recorded for the re-opening of the assessment itself does not survive.

• Whether the Tribunal was justified in law in passing an order without application of mind as to the determination of the fair market value as on 1.4.1981 by not taking into consideration the material on record and the valuation report filed by the appellant and consequently passed a perverse order on the facts and circumstance of the case.

• Whether the Tribunal was justified in law in not allowing a sum of Rs. 3,75,000/- being expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer more so when the payments are through banking channels, and consequently passed a perverse order on the facts and circumstance of the case.

On behalf of the assessee, in the appeal, it was contended before the Court that an order u/s 147 of the Act had to be in consonance with the reasons given for which notice u/s 148 had been issued, and once it was found that no tax could be levied for the reasons given in the notice for reopening the assessment, independent assessment or reassessment on other issues would not be permissible, even if subsequently, in the course of such proceedings, some other income chargeable to tax had been found to have escaped assessment. It was further submitted that the reason for which notice was given had to survive. It was only thereafter that ‘any other income’ which was found to have escaped assessment could be assessed or reassessed in such proceeding. Hence, the reopening of assessment should first be valid (which could be only when reason for reopening survived) and once the reopening was valid, then the entire case could be reassessed on all grounds or issues. That was to say, if reopening was valid and reassessment could be made for such reason, then only the AO could proceed further; if the AO could proceed further even without the reason for reopening surviving, it could lead to fishing and roving enquiry and would give unfettered powers to him.

On behalf of the revenue, it was contended that under the old s. 147 (as it stood prior to 1989), grounds or items for which no reasons had been recorded could not be opened, and because of conflicting decisions of the High Courts, the provisions of the said section had been clarified to include or cover any other income chargeable to tax which might have escaped assessment, and for which reasons might not have been recorded before giving the notice. That the said s. 147 was in two parts, which had to be read independently, and the phrase “such income” in the first part was with regard to which reasons had been recorded, and the phrase “any other income” in the second part was with regard to where no reasons were recorded in the notice and had come to notice of the AO during the course of the proceedings. Accordingly, both being independent, once the satisfaction in the notice was found sufficient, the addition could be made on all grounds, i.e., for which reason had been recorded and also for which no reason had been recorded, and all that was necessary was that during the course of the proceedings u/s 147, income chargeable to tax must be found to have escaped assessment relying on Explanation 3 to s. 147 which was inserted by Finance Act, 2009 w.e.f. 1st April, 1989.

The Karnataka High Court on hearing rival contentions observed and held as under:

• From a plain reading of s. 147 of the Act, it was clear that its latter part provides that ‘any other income’ chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which had come to the notice of the AO subsequently in the course of the proceedings, could also be taxed.

• The two parts of the section have been joined by the words ‘and also’ and the Court has to consider whether ‘and also’ would be conjunctive, or the second part has to be treated as independent of the first part. If the words were held to be conjunctive, then certainly the assessment or reassessment of ‘any other income’ which was chargeable to tax and had escaped assessment, could not be made where the original issue did not survive.

• The purpose of the provisions of Chapter XV was to bring to tax the entire taxable income of the assessee, and in doing so, where the AO had reason to believe that some income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment, he might assess or reassess such income. Since the purpose was to tax all such income which had escaped assessment, besides ‘such income’ for which he had reason to believe to have escaped assessment, it would be open to him to also independently assess or reassess any other income which did not form the subject matter of notice.

• While interpreting the provisions of s. 147, different High Courts have held differently, i.e., some have held that the second part of s. 147 was to be read in conjunction with the first part, and some have held that the second part was to be read independently. To clarify the same, in 1989, the legislature brought in suitable amendments in sections 147 and 148 of the Act, which was with the object to enhance the power of the AO, and not to help the assessee.

• Explanation 3 was inserted in s. 147 by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 w.e.f 1st April, 1989. By the said Explanation, which was merely clarificatory in nature, it had been clearly provided that the AO might assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue, which had escaped assessment, and where such issue came to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings, notwithstanding that the reasons for such issue had not been included in the reasons recorded under sub-section (2) of s. 148. Insertion of this Explanation could not be but for the benefit of the Revenue, and not the assessee.

• It was clear that in the phrase ‘and also’ which joined the first and second parts of the section, ‘and’ was conjunctive which was to join the first part with the second part, but ‘also’ was for the second part and was disjunctive; it segregated the first part from the second. Thus, on a comprehensive reading of the entire section, the phrase ‘and also’ could not be said to be conjunctive.

• It was thus clear that once the satisfaction of reasons for the notice was found sufficient, i.e., if the notice u/s 148(2) was found to be valid, then addition could be made on all grounds or issues (with regard to ‘any other income’ also) which might come to the notice of the AO subsequently during the course of proceedings u/s 147, even though the reason for notice for ‘such income’ which might have escaped assessment, did not survive.

• If there was ambiguity in the main provision of the enactment, it could be clarified by inserting an Explanation to the section of the Act which had been done in the case. Section 147 of the Act was interpreted differently by different High Courts, i.e., whether the second part of the section was independent of the first part, or not. To clarify the same, Explanation 3 was inserted by which it had been clarified that the AO could assess the income in respect of any issue which had escaped assessment and also ‘any other income’ (of the second part of s. 147) which came to his notice subsequently during the course of the proceedings under the section.

• After the insertion of Explanation 3 to s. 147, it was clear that the use of the phrase “and also” between the first and the second parts of the section was not conjunctive and assessment of ‘any other income’ (of the second part) could be made independent of the first part (relating to ‘such income’ for which reasons were given in notice u/s 148), notwithstanding that the reasons for such issue (‘any other income’) had not been given in the reasons recorded u/s 148(2).

• The view of the Court was in agreement with the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the cases of Majinder Singh Kang 344 ITR 348 and Mehak Finvest 52 taxmann.com 51.

• Considering the provision of s. 147 as well as its Explanation 3, and also keeping in view that s. 147 was for the benefit of the Revenue and not the assessee and was aimed at garnering the escaped income of the assessee (namely Sun Engineering) and also keeping in view that it was the constitutional obligation of every assessee to disclose his total income on which it was to pay tax, the two parts of s. 147 (one relating to ‘such income’ and the other to ‘any other income’) were to be read independently. The phrase ‘such income’ used in the first part of s. 147 was with regard to which reasons have been recorded u/s 148(2) of the Act, and the phrase ‘any other income’ used in the second part of the section was with regard to income where no reasons have been recorded before issuing notice and which has come to the notice of the AO subsequently during the course of the proceedings, which could be assessed independent of the first part, even when no addition could be made with regard to ‘such income’, but the notice on the basis of which proceedings had commenced was found to be valid.

• It was true that where the foundation did not survive, then the structure could not remain. Meaning thereby, if notice had no sufficient reason or was invalid, no proceedings could be initiated. But the same could be checked at the initial stage by challenging the notice. If the notice was challenged and found to be valid, or where the notice was not at all challenged, then, in either case, it could not be said that the notice was invalid. As such, if the notice was valid, then the foundation remains and, the proceedings on the basis of such notice could go on. We might only reiterate here that once the proceedings had been initiated on a valid notice, it became the duty of the AO to levy tax on the entire income (including ‘any other income’) which might have escaped assessment and came to his notice during the course of the proceedings initiated u/s 147 of the Act.

The Karnataka High Court found it unable to persuade itself, with due respect, to follow the decisions in the cases of Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. CIT, 336 ITR 136 (Bom.), CIT vs. Adhunik Niryat Ispat Ltd., 63 DTR 212 (Del.) and CIT vs. Mohmed Juned Dadani, 355 ITR 172 (Guj.), and proceeded to hold that it was permissible for an AO to make addition in respect of an issue noticed during the course of assessment even where no addition was made in respect of the issues for which the assessment was reopened by recording the reasons at the time of issue of notice u/s 148 of the Act.

OBSERVATIONS
One of the controversies about expanding the scope of reopened assessment, about the permission to travel beyond the subject matter of reasons recorded for reopening or otherwise, has been sought to be set to rest by insertion of Explanation 3 w.r.e.f 1st April, 1989. The other controversy, relating to AO’s power to make addition or disallowance or variation in cases where no addition or disallowance or variation is made on the subjects recorded in the reasons, continues to be relevant and live. This unresolved issue involves an appreciation of different schools of interpretation of the language used in the section and also of the legislative intent behind it. Very forceful, intense and valid contentions are made by both the schools of interpretation, which are backed by the decisions of the different High Courts. Even an amendment, that too with retrospective effect, has not been able to resolve the conflict. The best solution is to await the final word of wisdom from the Supreme Court.

The issue, in our considered opinion, would continue to be relevant even under the new scheme of reopening and reassessment made effective from 1st April, 2021. The new scheme retains an Explanation that empowers an AO to travel beyond the subject matter of ‘information’ received by an AO, and also the need for compliance of the four conditions of s. 148A of the Act. The Explanation to s. 147 might permit an AO to cover an issue even where ‘no information’ is received by him as per s. 148 of the Act.

The ‘reason to believe’ that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, was one aspect of the matter. If such reason existed, the AO could undoubtedly assess or reassess such income, for which there was such ‘reason to believe’ that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. This is the first part of the section, and up to this extent, there is no dispute. The issues as noted however were in respect of two aspects; one was whether the AO was permitted to rope in an issue for which reasons were not recorded. There were conflicting decisions of the Courts on this aspect which conflict was set at rest by the insertion of Explanation 3. The other issue was and is about the power of the AO to make an addition in respect of an additional issue, not recorded in the reasons, even where no addition is made in respect of the main issue recorded in the reasons. It is this second issue that has remained open and unresolved, even after insertion of Explanation in s. 147 and on which conflicting decisions of the Courts are noted.

It is the latter part of the s. 147 and not the Explanation 3 that is to be interpreted, which is as to whether the second part relating to ‘any other income’ is to be read in conjunction with the first part (relating to ‘such income’) or not. If it is to be read in conjunction, then without there being any addition made with regard to ‘such income’ (for which reason had been given in the notice for reopening the assessment), the second part cannot be invoked. But if it is not to be read in conjunction, the second part can be invoked independently, even without reason for the first part surviving, permitting an AO to make addition even where no addition is made in respect of the main issue for which reasons are recorded.

The effect of Explanation 3, inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 as is understood by one school of interpretation is that even though the notice issued u/s 148 containing the reasons for reopening the assessment does not contain a reference to a particular issue with reference to which income has escaped assessment, yet the AO may assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue which has escaped assessment, when such issue comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings. The reasons for the insertion of Explanation 3 are to be found in the memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2009.

The memorandum states that some of the Courts have held that the AO has to restrict the reassessment proceedings only to issues in respect of which reasons have been recorded for reopening the assessment, and that it is not open to him to touch upon any other issue for which no reasons have been recorded. This interpretation was regarded by the Parliament as being contrary to the legislative intent. Hence, Explanation 3 came to be inserted to provide that the AO may assess or reassess income in respect of any issue which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of proceedings u/s 147, though the reasons for such issue have not been included in the reasons recorded in the notice u/s 148(2).

The effect of s. 147, as it now stands, after the amendment of 2009, can, therefore, be summarised as follows : (i) the Assessing Officer must have reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year; (ii) upon the formation of that belief and before he proceeds to make an assessment, reassessment or recomputation, the AO has to serve a notice on the assessee under sub-section (1) of s. 148; (iii) the AO may assess or reassess such income, which he has reason to believe, has escaped assessment and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under the section; and (iv) though the notice u/s 148(2) does not include a particular issue with respect to which income has escaped assessment, yet he may nonetheless, assess or reassess the income in respect of any issue which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under the section.

Insertion of ‘Explanation’ in a section of an Act is for a different purpose than the insertion of a ‘Proviso’. ‘Explanation’ gives a reason or justification and explains the contents of the main section, whereas ‘Proviso’ puts a condition on the contents of the main section or qualifies the same. ‘Proviso’ is generally intended to restrain the enacting clause, whereas ‘Explanation’ explains or clarifies the main section. Meaning thereby, ‘Proviso’ limits the scope of the enactment as it puts a condition, whereas ‘Explanation’ clarifies the enactment as it explains and is useful for settling a matter of controversy.

Having noted that the issue on hand needs to be resolved by a decision of the Supreme Court at the earliest, in our opinion, the decisions of the High Courts in favour of the assessee represent a better view and the decisions of the High Courts holding a contrary view are based on considerations, the following of which require rethinking, for the reasons noted in italics:

• One of the grounds on which the Courts rested their decisions was that the assessee was given an opportunity to challenge the notice along with the reasons for reopening, both of which were held to be valid and the reopening proceedings were therefore validly initiated and with such initiation there would be no question of assessment of either ‘such income’ of the first part of s. 147 or ‘any other income’ of its second part. The courts, with respect, did not appreciate the fact that on the lapse of the reasons recorded, once no addition was made on such reasons, the notice and the proceedings were rendered invalid. The courts also ignored that the assessee had no opportunity to contest the validity of the notice on the reason subsequently added by the AO, and importantly, the proceedings might lead to fishing and roving inquiry.

• The Courts further held that as long as the proceedings had been initiated on the basis of a valid notice, it became the duty of the AO to levy tax on the entire income, which may have escaped assessment during the assessment year. With great respect, if this were to be true, there was no need for having amended the law to expressly provide the AO with the power to expand the scope of reassessment to add an issue or issues beyond the issues covered by the recorded reasons. The scope of the reassessment is limited to the issues recorded in reasons, and a special power was needed to rope in an additional issue without which the AO is not empowered to travel beyond the recorded reasons.

• The Courts admitted that where the words ‘and also’ was to be treated as conjunctive, then certainly, if the reason to believe was there for a particular ground or issue with regard to escaped income which had to be assessed or reassessed, and such ground was not found or did not survive, then the assessment or reassessment of ‘any other income’ which was chargeable to tax and has escaped assessment, could not be made. However, after having done so, for some not very comprehensive reasons, they proceeded to hold that the words were not to be read in conjunction and therefore, the second part could be invoked independently even without reason for the first part surviving.

• The Courts held that the purpose of the scheme was to tax all such income which had escaped assessment, besides ‘such income’ for which he had reason to believe to have escaped assessment and, based on such findings, the Courts held that it would be open to the AO to also independently assess or reassess any other income which did not form the subject matter of notice. With respect, this understanding of the courts might hold true in the case of regular assessment, but are surely not so in cases of reassessment, where the power of the AO to reassess an income for which he had valid reasons and which reasons were duly recorded. In the absence of such compliance, it was not possible to hold that his power was all-encompassing.

• The Courts further held that the insertion of the Explanation could not be but for the benefit of the revenue and not the assessee. This understanding based on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Sun Engineering’s case, might be true in the context of the scope of the reopening but cannot be applied to understand the implication of the written law and the Explanation thereto. In any case, taking a legal view on the language of the provision cannot be termed to be beneficial to the assesssee; rather the courts are bound to take a view that is correct in law, irrespective of the party on which the benefit is conferred; such benefit, even where conferred, is intended by the express language used by the parliament. In any case, the decision of the Supreme Court is capable of a different interpretation, as has been recently found by the Karnataka High Court in a decision in the case of The Karnataka State Co-Operative Apex Bank Limited vs. DCIT 130 taxmann.com 114. (Refer Controversy Feature of BCAJ, March, 2022)

• The Courts further held that the word ‘and’ used in the phrase ‘and also’ was conjunctive, which was used to join the first part with the second part, but the word ‘also’ was only for the second part and would be disjunctive; it segregated the first part from the second and thus, upon reading the full section, the phrase ‘and also’ could not be said to be conjunctive. With utmost respect, we find such a circuitous interpretation not tenable and strange and not found to have any precedent.

• The Courts held that the insertion of Explanation 3 to s. 147 did not in any manner override the main section and had been added with no other purpose than to explain or clarify the main section so as to also bring in ‘any other income’ (of the second part of s. 147) within the ambit of tax, which might have escaped assessment, and came to the notice of the AO subsequently during the course of the proceedings. Circular 5 of 2010 issued by the CBDT also made this position clear. There was no conflict between the main s. 147 and its Explanation 3. This Explanation had been inserted only to clarify the main section and not curtail its scope. Insertion of Explanation 3 was thus clarificatory and was for the benefit of the revenue and not the assessee. We do not think that there is any dispute about the purpose of Explanation and its clarificatory nature. What is disagreeable is the use of the Explanation to prove a point that is not borne out of the Explanation or the Memorandum explaining the object behind its insertion. The language and the memorandum explain that the objective of the Explanation was to clarify that an issue, the subject matter of which was not recorded in the reasons, could be taken up by the AO in reassessment if noticed by him. Nowhere it is clarified that an additional issue could be taken up even where the main issue did not survive. Secondly, the reliance on the circular to prove a complex legal point was avoidable. Thirdly, to hold that the clarification was for the benefit of the revenue is unacceptable.

• Lastly, the Court held that If there was ambiguity in the main provision of the enactment, it could be clarified by insertion of an Explanation to the main section of the Act. The same had been done in the instant case. Section 147 was interpreted differently by different High Courts, i.e., whether the second part of the section was independent of the first part or not. To clarify the same, Explanation 3 was inserted by which it had been clarified that the AO could assess the income in respect of any issue which had escaped assessment and also ‘any other income’ (of the second part of s. 147) which came to his notice subsequently during the course of the proceedings under the section. Again there is no dispute in this understanding of the purpose of insertion of Explanation and its meaning. The difficulty is where one reads it in a manner to hold that the Explanation also permitted to make addition in respect of an additional issue even where the main issues do not survive, and thereby rendering the proceedings otiose. With respect, the language of the Explanation and its objective, as explained, nowhere bears this understanding of the courts. As explained earlier, there were two controversies, and the Explanation clarified the legislative stand only in respect of one of them, namely, to cover an additional issue even where the reason for such issue was not recorded. The other controversy being considered here had and has remained unaddressed.

FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF EXTERNAL AND SELF-REGULATION

If there is ONE regressive belief that is
perpetuated by every government of India and has generally taken the
country backward, it is: if something goes wrong, the answer lies in
government control; because if government controls something, it will
deliver optimum results.

Such an approach to situations results in:

a.  stranglehold of babudom1;

b.  distancing citizens’ from liberty;

c. annihilation of self-governing and self-financing institutions into monolithic government bodies;

d.  developing a false narrative that government delivers and delivers for larger good;

e.  cost overruns, inefficiencies, unaccountable ways generally known by the name ‘public service’ amongst others.

Lacking Government oversight:
Look at the last two big scams – where CAs were blamed, but no
significant government employee responsible for oversight faced any
consequences! Did you see any action on SEBI for the co-location scam?
Did you see action on Reserve Bank of India after the collapse of
systemically important NBFC IL&FS right under its nose called
‘supervision’? One can infer that when regulators fail and/or go unpunished, insiders above them were pulling the strings!

Connect the Dots: Two issues have been debated this week – changes in 3 Institutes and the formation of IIA.

Let’s
look at the past sequence of events – NACAS formed to take away
Standard- Setting powers, rotation of auditors through a top secret
report under Modi 1.0, Modiji makes legendary comments at the ICAI event
in 2017, CAs stopped from giving valuation report2/certifications under a few laws and adding other professions in place of CAs3,
NFRA formed to discipline errant firms, reduction of bank audit
branches/quantum of advances subjected to audits, tax audits and GST
audits removed significantly, NFRA ‘report’ on abolition of company
audits except about 3,600 companies, frivolous NFRA reports and
consultations and parliamentary panel report of 2022 on ICAI that makes
inroads into disciplinary powers. This leaves ICAI to be an educational,
licensing and registrar of members and students body. If you connect
the dots, and especially by this government, it is clear that there is a
certain aversion and clear invasion on self-regulation of ICAI. This is
akin to maximising government and minimising governance because lasting
governance comes from people who need to be governed.

_______________________________________________________________________

1. The tacit mechanism invented, nurtured and perpetuated by public servants
where things are complicated to the level where responsibility cannot be
ascertained, outcome remains sub optimal, and results are slowed.

The Parliament Debate: Seeing a string of BJP MPs shinning out during the parliamentary debate was memorable. One MP from Mumbai said there is a need to increase the pass percentage in CA exams. He said he is not able to understand what is the big technique in CAs4? Another HBS educated BJP MP from Jhansi said Indian audited statements are not accepted in NASDAQ,
and once this amendment act is passed, such financials will be globally
accepted. He even said that in CAG, there are no CAs and still they can
audit the entire country. He went over the top when he said some CA
firm he called Batliboi (he didn’t remember the full name), which used
to be a top firm, is finished when you compare it to EY5.
After listening to astute observations, I felt glad that none of the
ICAI council members have stellar qualification like 43% of winning BJP
MPs of 2019 elections who have criminal records!

________________________________________________________________________

2   Under the Income Tax
Rule 11U and 11UA under DCF

3   DD for companies taking banking facilities

4  On the parliament website, his educational
qualification is ‘under matric’ and one wonders whether that is a qualification
to criticize those who clear one of the toughest exams on the planet.

5   In
case you meet the MP, do let him know that same or similar firm was taken over
by EY or calls itself EY


Statistics:
The PSC report says that between 2006 and 2021, 3832 cases were
resolved out of 5829 cases registered. Amongst the 1997 unresolved
cases, 574 (9.8% of total) cases are more than 3 years old and 81 cases
are stayed by the court. Removal from membership between 1-5 years was
done in 48 cases. Totally 267 removals were either permanent debarment
or between 0-5 years. Now compare this to PM Modi’s speech on 1st July
2017 where he said that in the last 11 years, proceedings have been
undertaken against only 25 CAs. You judge the difference between reality
and rhetoric. ICAI statistics are better than most departments, tribunals and even courts which are etymology of the word inefficiency.
The average pendency of normal cases is 2 to 3 years in ICAI. One
cannot deny the scope for improvement, yet it is better than other
judicial and disciplinary mechanisms in a country where decades old
cases are languishing.

Comparables: National Medical Commission has a medical practitioner as Chairman. Advocates Act 19616,
requires 2 out of 3 members of disciplinary committee from Bar Council
and all three have to be advocates. But CAs are treated differently. Could it because of special vengeance blended with arrogance?
As an MP from Kottayam put it: which Secretary has knowledge of
accounting standards and auditing standards to head disciplinary
mechanism? Assuming that few of the retired govt. nominees may read the
standards, how many of them would have applied it practically in audits
so as to understand the standards at the fundamental level so as to
apply the nuances involved for deciding the cases?

________________________________________________________________________
6. Section 9 of Advocates Act

Facts:
The fact is that government nominees are already on ICAI disciplinary
committee. And they are party to the process. All cases are generally
determined unanimously. To hasten the process, timelines could have been
included in the ICAI regulations. Imposing more babudom,
is a precursor to the advent of politicians (like you see politicians
and their siblings on sports bodies, temples, clubs and every other
place where there are assets, popularity and power) and those who have
no skin in the game.

There is nothing wrong in self-regulation so far as there is transparency, speed and appeal mechanism.
There are brilliant minds who understand the situation since they have
been in one, unlike one IIM Bangalore retired professor, to deliver a
balanced verdict in disciplinary matters. Talking about conflict of
interest, one MP from UP said don’t Babus judge themselves and punish themselves? How does the Army disciplinary system work? Government is the crown jewel of conflict of interest if you go by GOI’s logic. In fact, SRO, is an essential character of balanced oversight and not an impediment.

Fitting in: To fit in to the global scheme of things, GOI propounds its own ‘selective global best practices’.
Have frauds, scams, financial mismanagement reduced in other countries
from where these regulations are purported to be taken as global best
practices? If you look closely, this is done because of lack of original thinking for India. Therefore, the easy way is to import
and affix even that which has failed elsewhere and continue to
propagate colonial mindset to the detriment of local ground realities.
Self-governance is the epitome of democracy and responsibility.
Perhaps until the west does it, babudom and in turn mantri mandal won’t believe in it.

ICAI Reforms: Does ICAI need reforms? Yes, of course! Which institution doesn’t with changing times? However, true reform is like true health that comes from inside – cleansing from within, not by inserting artificial objects or tubes permanently. This half-baked government action seems hazy, hasty and hazardous!

IIA: An idea mooted by the PSC also speaks of IIA. Competition does raise the bar. To call statutory responsibility as a monopoly is nothing short of ignorance unless it is malice!
Rigour of education, exams and practical training are critical to
create public accountants. Currently, and gladly, the ICAI is not based
on a regressive reservation model that mocks merit. Nor has ICAI gone
with a begging bowl to the government for funds. It does much work for
backward and dull-witted government bodies. One would be wiser to use
ICAI set up, and create categories of accountants majoring in various
skillsets rather than creating alleged ‘competition’. I am sure ICAI
would be happy to partner with industry and real-life people on the
ground to create this new set of accountants.

President
Kalam said CAs are partners in nation building. And no Bill can take
that away. Like Kautilya said, destiny follows the words of the wise
souls. ICAI’s destiny will surely follow those words.

CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE KHUDIRAM BOSE

In India’s glorious history of freedom struggle, the landmark case was of the Muzaffarpur bomb blast. The hero was Khudiram Bose, who, at the tender age of 19 years, climbed the gallows with a smiling face, chanting the mantra of Vande Mataram. The first-ever bomb attack on the British empire in India goes to the credit of this young man.

He was born on the 3rd of December, 1889, in the Medinipur district of Bengal. His father, Trailokyanath Basu, was a tehsildar at Nandzol village in Medinipur. Mother Lakshmipriyadevi was a pious housewife. Unfortunately, Khudiram lost both his parents at the age of just six. He was then brought up by his sister Anurupadevi and her husband, Amritlalji. Although Khudiram was very bright in his studies, he never enjoyed school education. His sole obsession was the independence of our country. He believed that the most severe disease of all Indians was slavery under British rule.

In February 1906, the Britishers had organised an exhibition for glorifying the ‘success’ of British rule. Khudiram was then just 17. He distributed circulars in protest of the tyrannical Government and shouted the slogan of Vande Mataram. A policeman beat him, but he retaliated, hit back at the policeman and ran away. He was arrested but let out on the grounds of his age.

Khudiram was highly influenced by the novel Anandmath by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay. This novel contained the song ‘Vande Mataram’ that inspired thousands and lakhs of Indians to fight for independence. Khudiram’s mind was filled with patriotism and the thought of supreme sacrifice for the country’s independence. Vande Mataram proved dreadful for the Britishers.

Khudiram voluntarily joined a group of revolutionaries. The revolutionaries admitted him after due testing. In 1905, Lord Curzon, the then Governor-General, planned for partition to cause a divide between Hindus and Muslims. The people very strongly resisted this.

Khudiram learnt the use of knives and pistols. Kolkata’s Chief President Magistrate was Kingsford, a merciless and cruel person who ordered harsh punishments to all freedom fighters and even the nationalist common person. Bipin Chandra Pal founded the Daily ‘Vande Mataram’ to spread the spirit of patriotism. Maharshi Aurobindo was its editor. The British Government filed a suit against the Daily. Thousands of youth gathered outside the court chanting Vande Mataram. Policemen were brutally beating some of them. One 15 year boy Sushilkumar Sen could not tolerate this scene, and he hit back at the policeman. He was arrested for beating the policemen. The Magistrate, Kingsford, ordered a flogging of Sushilkumar.

The revolutionaries planned to kill Magistrate Kingsford. Aurobindo Ghosh and other leaders attended the meeting. Many youths volunteered to kill Kingsford. But the task was entrusted to Khudiram. Another boy of 19, Prafulla, was to help him.

On 30th of April, 1908, Khudiram and Prafulla hid near the Europe Club, Muzaffarpur. When Kingsford’s baggi (house-cart) came on the road, Khudiram threw a bomb. After that, both of them ran away. Khudiram ran overnight about 25 to 30 km along the railway line. He reached Veni station. The news of the first-ever bomb attack had already spread. Khudiram, who was very hungry, sitting in a restaurant, heard people talking about the incident. He learnt that Kingsford was not there in the baggi and did not die. Instead, two of his family members died. The manner in which he expressed surprise on Kingsford surviving raised suspicion in the minds of people, especially the shopkeeper. Khudiram was a new and unfamiliar face in that locality. So, with the greed of a reward, the shopkeeper called the police. The police found two pistols in his pocket. At another location, Prafulla also realised that he would be arrested. So he shot himself, ending his life.

In the Court, a lawyer Kalidas Bose, voluntarily pleaded the case since Khudiram had not engaged any lawyer. The two-month trial ended in an inevitable result – the death sentence for Khudiram.

Khudiram listened to it smilingly without the slightest of fear. The Judge also was surprised. When asked whether he wanted to say anything, Khudiram expressed the desire to narrate how to make a bomb! The Judge obviously refused that.

Advocate Kalidas Bose on his own filed an appeal in the high court against the death sentence. The result was obvious.

Finally, on 19th August, 1908, he was crucified – a smile on his face and Vande Mataram in his mouth!

Kingsford, though he survived, found it risky to continue and left the job. Eventually, he died due to this fear!

Namaskaars to this very young revolutionary – Khudiram!

OTHER MISCONDUCT

Shrikrishna: Arjun, you look quite relaxed today. I am sure you have uploaded all audited accounts comfortably.

Arjun: Yes, Bhagwan. At the time of every signing and uploading, I used to chant your name!

Shrikrishna: Why?

Arjun: At the time of signing, I pray that the blunders committed by us should not be exposed; and at the time of uploading, I pray that the technology should not fail. It is a task in itself!

Shrikrishna: Why do you think of blunders? You got so much time.

Arjun: True, but no accounts in today’s world can ever be perfect! Too much work at a time, no competent assistants, clients own imperfection and indifference; too much of regulation; and above all, our own ignorance and inefficiency, some error or other is inevitable and can be held as ‘negligence’.

Shrikrishna: Professional misconduct! But today, I heard something about ‘other misconduct’.

Arjun: You mean section 22 of the CA Act?

Shrikrishna: Yes, now even other misconduct is largely codified in the sense that Part IV of First Schedule and Part III of Second Schedule of CA Act provide for the ‘other misconduct’.

Arjun: Yes, – for example, you are held guilty by some other civil or criminal court, and the prescribed punishment is of ‘imprisonment’.

Shrikrishna: And also, bringing disrepute to the profession.

Arjun: What case you heard of other misconduct?

Shrikrishna: In one of the CA firms, a partner retired at 65 as per their deed of partnership.

Arjun: Then?

Shrikrishna: He signed the settlement of accounts – based on audited financial statements. But after a few months, when his accounts were to be explained in his income tax scrutiny, he noticed that he had introduced about Rs. 20 lakhs into the firm, and the same had not been credited to his account!

Arjun: Oh! Then where had it gone?

Shrikrishna: To some other account.

Arjun: Surprising! Then what happened?

Shrikrishna: He wrote to his ex-partners; and pointed out the discrepancy. He asked for that amount to be paid to him.

Arjun: Naturally! The partners would have immediately accepted.

Shrikrishna: No, my dear! The partners said, since you have signed the settlement sheet, now you won’t get it!

Arjun: Disgusting! Shameful!

Shrikrishna: Poor fellow has been following up with them for the last 5 years! They are not even responding.

Arjun: It is really a disgrace to our profession. In fact, it is against basic human courtesy. Forget about the profession.

Shrikrishna: True. But there are members like this!
Arjun: And what about auditors?

Shrikrishna: Obviously, they had signed the tax audit. So, the person wrote to the auditors as well.

Arjun: And what was their response?

Shrikrishna: Same thing. No response at all!

Arjun: This is really unbecoming of a professional. How can a CA behave like this with another CA? and that also, with own ex-partner?

Shrikrishna: True, that is why I had often told you that you people are utterly lacking in unity. Since there is no unity amongst yourself, people take advantage. Ultimately the profession suffers.

Arjun: Yes, we should come out of this mindset of distrust, and there should be more cordiality and cooperation among all of us or else we are ourselves to suffer.

Shrikrishna: If your own partner does not pay your legitimate dues, how a client will pay you promptly and smoothly. Think it over seriously and act soon. It is high time you all introspect and improve your ways.

SOME INTERESTING WEBSITES

In this issue, we cover some interesting websites useful for daily use to increase our productivity.

PEXELS.COM

 

We often need to use photos from the web in our presentations, blogs, brochures or websites. Looking up images online and using them is always fraught with copyright and proprietary risks. You never know when you could be sued!

Pexels is a free stock photo and video website and app that helps designers, bloggers, and everyone looking for visuals to find great photos and videos that can be downloaded and used for free. If you see an image or video you like, simply download it – no strings attached! All photos and videos on Pexels are free for commercial use also. The only condition is that you should not profess that the projected pictures endorse your product or service. Of course, you cannot sell the photos or videos unless you have edited them or added value to the original.

If you wish, you could create your account at Pexels, which would help you create collections, follow photographers you love and get a customized, curated homepage depending on your preferences. And, if you’d like to contribute your work to Pexels, they accept photos and videos from everyone.

So go ahead and get world famous with your pics and videos!

Website: https://pexels.com  
Android: https://bit.ly/3uOKzke       
iOS: https://apple.co/3BeoZad

REMOVE.BG


This very simple website does what it says – it just removes the background from any of your photos. More often than not, when we have wonderful pics, they are marred by the background, and it is painfully difficult to remove.

In such cases, you need to head to https://remove.bg and upload your pic there, and within seconds, you can get the same pic without the background. The AI engine that drives the entire process is very efficient and can instantly give you the pic with a transparent background. You could use this for portraits, pets and even objects.

And, if you want more than the original with a transparent background, you may automatically turn that image into a design with another elaborate background with a single click! With various embellishments available, you can surprise yourself and your friends with an excellent pic with a background of your choice!

Website: https://www.remove.bg/

EMICALCULATOR.NET


 
This is a very simple and efficient EMI calculator online. Just enter the principal amount, interest rate, and loan period, and you will instantly get the EMI. It also gives you the calculations and the working for the entire calculation, the principal amount repaid, the interest you are paying each year, and their totals over the entire loan period.

If you are working for a bank or financial institution and have to do these calculations daily, they have a mobile-friendly EMI Calculator widget that you can install on your phone.

If you have a Banking or Financial Website developed on WordPress, they also provide you with a WordPress plugin which you could incorporate directly on your website and allow your users to do the calculations right on your WordPress website.

Website: https://emicalculator.net/
Android: https://bit.ly/3HNrz9B      
iOS: https://apple.co/3rGfA86

MANUALSLIB.COM


 
In this modern age, we purchase and use many devices and gadgets in our homes and offices. They all come with a warranty and a manual. The manual is invariably misplaced and difficult to find when the warranty is over. And after five years, the company website may not have the required manual or may be very difficult to locate.

In comes ManualsLib.com, with manuals of over 3.9 million products belonging to more than 1,07,000 brands. Just type in the Brand Name, Product and Model Number, and you will instantly get a pdf version of the manual you are looking for, no lengthy multi-level searches which may take a while.

They also have an Android App which performs the same function – you may also add manuals and guides to your ‘My Manuals’ list, create folders for easy access and even search inside a document!

A very valuable tool to get your manual instantly at your fingertips.

Website: https://www.manualslib.com/
Android : https://bit.ly/3BinKGX

IPO FINANCING – RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Initial Public Offers (IPO), as public issues of shares/securities are commonly known, have been in the news for several reasons. One is the handsome profits made by allottees in many cases due to the shares listing at a price far higher than the issue price (though some showed losses too). Then expectedly linked to this is that many IPOs have been oversubscribed many times. The other factor is the rapid rise of IPO financing, which also incidentally came to attention recently due to an alleged abusive call made by a prospective borrower to a bank officer who allegedly failed to provide the promised IPO finance. What became widely known was the enormous leverage being available through IPO financing to subscribers. SEBI has also decided to amend some IPO related provisions in the SEBI ICDR Regulations. Finally, the Reserve Bank of India has recently decided to place some very stringent restrictions on IPO financing by NBFCs, so much so that it is very likely that IPO financing could drop down to a miniscule level of what exists today. Further, the question repeatedly raised is whether there is an IPO bubble, that IPOs are priced too high and that the market boom is being taken advantage of by making IPOs. This subject generally also has a colourful history, and it is worth seeing some aspects of the past and the most recent developments.

EARLIER BOOMS IN IPOs
Many may remember the massive rise in IPOs during the Harshad Mehta times. The boom in the stock market also made new issues by companies attractive. Numerous IPOs were oversubscribed. There was actually a grey market for IPOs functioning, albeit with no legal backing, and the grey market quotes were often published in pamphlets and quoted elsewhere. To increase the odds of getting allotment in shares, it was commonly known that people resorted to multiple applications by using names of their family members and even staff and making applications in different combinations of names of such persons. The technology at that time was not advanced enough to weed out such multiple applications. Of course, those were also the times when many companies with dubious backgrounds made IPOs and then ‘vanished’.

DEMATERIALISATION OF SHARES
Dematerialisation of shares and other changes eliminated the earlier practice of multiple applications by the same person. However, a new abuse came to light, particularly surrounding the SEBI rules mandating allocation for retail investors. It was found that lakhs of Demat accounts were opened in Benami or even fake names. Amusingly, for this purpose, some names with photographs were reported to have been picked up from matrimonial sites! Applications were made in such names, financed by others. When shares were allotted, they were sold, and the sale proceeds with the profits paid to the financier. These cases became famous by one of the allegedly involved – Roopalben Panchal. Such persons whose name is ‘borrowed’ for carrying out transactions in shares by others now even have a term – ‘mules’. SEBI’s action in such cases, which saw prolonged litigation though, supplemented with other efforts such as know-your-client verification, stronger penal provisions for using fake names, etc., dealt with this abuse.

CURRENT BOOM IN IPOS AND RESPONSE OF SEBI
Very large amount of money is being raised through IPOs of several companies in recent times. New age web-based companies have finally come to roost, and some of them have offered shares to the public at a significant premium. Apart from this, several other companies have joined the party. What has been particularly notable has been the generally massive response to such issues from the public. Several public issues have seen applications that are many times the issue size.

SEBI has long moved from having a say in determining the pricing of issues. The emphasis is on due disclosure of information sufficient for the investor to make an informed decision, supported by due diligence by merchant bankers and others. Other safeguards include eligibility requirements, minimum holding and lock-in requirements, etc. But other than that, the issue price is generally not controlled.

However, this time, considering factors such as there being offers for sale by existing holders too and for other reasons, SEBI has decided to make certain amendments to the SEBI ICDR Regulations at its Board Meeting held on 28th December, 2021, followed up by formal amendments to the Regulations. The following are some of the important amendments:

a. If an object of the issue is for future inorganic growth, but specific acquisition or investment targets are not identified, in that case, the amount raised for such objects, including for ‘general corporate purposes’ shall not exceed 35% of the total amount being raised. Of this, the amount earmarked for such use for inorganic growth shall not exceed 25% of the issue size.

b. In the case of an offer for sale by companies without a track record, certain limits have been laid down for specific categories of existing shareholders. A shareholder (along with persons acting in concert) who holds more than 20% of the pre-issue shareholding (on a fully diluted basis) shall not offer more than 50% of his pre-issue shareholding. Other shareholders cannot offer more than 10% of their pre-issue shareholding.

c. Credit Rating Agencies will now act as Monitoring Agencies in place of presently recognized monitoring agencies. They will monitor the use of issue proceeds until 100% is utilized, compared to the present 95%.

d. For Anchor Investors, the lock-in now will be 30 days for 50% of shares allocated to them and 90 days for balance shares. This will apply for issues opening on or after 1st April 2022.

e. Modifications have been made to the allocations made regarding Non-Institutional Investors with effect from 1st April 2022.

The amendments thus appear to be intended to ensure only partial exit for existing shareholders in some instances or to anchor investors and generally make other fine-tuning.

HIGHLY LEVERAGED IPO FINANCING AND RESERVE BANK OF INDIA’S RECENT RESTRICTION
Earlier, we referred to financing persons who acted merely as front or were even fake to subscribe for IPOs, which is an abuse of the law. However, what is widely prevalent is also financing by lenders to subscribers to IPOs. The objective of obtaining such finance can be many. One is to acquire a higher quantity of shares of a company whose issue price is perceived by the subscriber/borrower as low, leaving scope for quick profits. However, considering that many issues are heavily oversubscribed, applying for a larger quantity of shares boosts the chances of getting a higher quantity of shares than otherwise. IPO financing thus has become quite common. Thanks to the ever-shortening gap between the date of application for shares and payment and allotment/refund, IPO financing is thus for a very short period – about a week or so. This increases the attractiveness of the finance since the attendant costs are also lower. Further, lenders have shown willingness to lend an amount that is many times the amount contributed by the borrower. Thus, there is enormous leverage. The consequence is that the profits would also be magnified, and so would the losses. The risk of losses is as much to the borrower as is to the lender since if there are huge losses (owing to, say, the price of the allotted shares being quoted far below the issue price), there could be concerns of recovery if there is not adequate other collateral.

The matter of borrowing and lending is under the purview of the Reserve Bank of India, which has taken a strong – and possibly drastic – action. It has issued guidelines dated 22nd October, 2021, stating that, from 1st April 2022, “There shall be a ceiling of Rs. 1 crore per borrower for financing subscription to Initial Public Offer (IPO). NBFCs can fix more conservative limits.”. Thus, non-banking financial companies (‘NBFCs’) shall lend a maximum of Rs. 1 crore per borrower for IPO. While Rs. 1 crore by itself does sound to be a significant sum, considering that IPO financing has been of massive amounts, this would significantly affect IPO financing. To take just one example, in the recent case referred to earlier, which came widely in the news because of an abusive call allegedly made, the amount of IPO financing said to be involved in just this one case was Rs. 500 crores that too for one single IPO. The absolute limit of Rs. 1 crore stated by the Reserve Bank of India thus sounds relatively puny in comparison. Of course, questions are raised about the interpretation of the guidelines. Whether the limit is per IPO and hence a borrower can raise Rs. 1 crore separately for each IPO? Whether the IPO is per NBFC and hence the borrower can borrow Rs. 1 crore each from different NBFCs? And so on. While clarity on this may hopefully come from RBI before the date when it will come into effect, the fact remains that the amount of IPO financing may go down substantially. The concerns of RBI are, of course, valid – that giving of huge financing may be risky for the sector itself, apart from allowing borrowers to take huge unhealthy risks. But whether the answer to this was to place such an absolute limit or whether other solutions were possible? For example, the limit could have been placed in the form of margin – say, 50% whereby the borrower would have to put in as much amount himself as he borrows. Alternatively, the borrower could provide adequate collateral of such nature that may not present difficulties in realizing if recovery has to be made. One will have to see whether RBI makes any changes before the rule comes into effect.

CONCLUSION
There are views that, retail investors are more involved in the stock market, particularly due to the pandemic with numerous people working from home. Apart from acquiring shares in the secondary market, acquisition through IPOs has also seen a rapid rise. Time only will tell us whether this is a bubble or not. But if the restriction on IPO finance comes into effect, that would also contribute to a reduction in amounts subscribed through IPOs.

IBC AND LIMITATION

INTRODUCTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors and connected persons, such as guarantors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in paying a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

One of the crucial aspects of the Code is whether a period of limitation applies for initiating proceedings against the corporate debtor that is very relevant since a time bar would scuttle claims against the company. This provision has seen a great deal of judicial development in recent times. Let us analyse this provision in greater detail.

THE LIMITATION ACT

Before we delve into whether a period of limitation applies to claims under the Code, it is essential to get an understanding of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“the Act”). This is a Central statute that provides for the law of the limitation for initiating suits and other proceedings.

The phrase ‘period of limitation’ is defined under the Act to mean the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule. The phrase ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed under the provisions of this Act.

S.3 of the Act states that every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and the application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

APPLICABILITY TO THE CODE

A question that arises is whether the provisions of the Limitation Act can apply to the Code? An answer to this question is given under s.238A of the Code which was incorporated in the Code by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 with effect from 6th June, 2018. It states that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals under the Code filed before the National Company Law Tribunal / National Company Law Appellate Tribunal / the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be. Thus, it is very clear that the Act’s provisions apply to claims filed under the Code.

The decision of the Apex Court in Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr. [LSI-179-SC-2021(NDEL)] has held that there is no specific period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1963 for an application under the Code before the NCLT. Accordingly, an application for which no period of limitation is expressly provided under the Act, is governed by Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for such an application is three years from the date of accrual of the right to apply. It held that the provisions of the Limitation Act applied mutatis mutandis to proceedings under the IBC in the NCLT/NCLAT. It also held that the words ‘as far as may be’ found in s.238A were to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonised with the subject matter of the legislation and the object which the Legislature had in view. The Courts would not give an interpretation to those words, which would frustrate the purposes of making the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings in the NCLT / NCLAT.

In Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave vs. Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. [2019] 109 taxmann.com 395 (SC), it was held:—

‘6. ……The present case being “an application” which is filed under Section 7, would fall only within the residuary Article 137.’

In Jignesh Shah vs. Union of India [2019] 156 SCL 542 (SC) the Court established the proposition that the period of limitation for making an application under Section 7 or 9 of the Code was three years from the date of accrual of the right to sue, i.e., the date of default.

In B.K. Educational Services (P.) Ltd. vs. Parag Gupta [2018] 98 taxmann.com 213 (SC), the Supreme Court held:—

‘……“The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay in filing such application.’

Again in Sesh Nath Singh (supra), it was held that it was well settled that the NCLT/NCLAT has the discretion to entertain an application/appeal after the prescribed period of limitation. The condition precedent for exercise of such discretion was the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal and/or the application within the period prescribed by limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enables this extension. That section enables a Court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be, satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application and/or preferring the appeal within the time prescribed.

EXCLUDE TIME BEFORE WRONG FORUM
Part III of the Limitation Act lays down the manner of computation of the period of limitation. An important provision in this respect is laid down in s.14 of the Act. It states that in computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has launched civil proceedings in another Court, then such time shall be excluded provided that those proceedings relate to the same matter have been launched in good faith in a Court which cannot entertain it since it has no jurisdiction to do so. In other words, if the first Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the plea and if such plea was filed by the plaintiff in good faith, then the time taken for such plea would be excluded in computing the period of limitation. In Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board vs. Mohanlal & Co. [2016] 14 SCC 199, it was held that s.14 of the Limitation Act had to be interpreted liberally to advance the cause of justice. S.14 would be applicable in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. The Supreme Court in Sesh Nath Singh (supra) has held that:

‘There can be little doubt that Section 14 applies to an application under Section 7 of the IBC. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the IBC does not exclude the operation of Section 14 ….’

Again in Dena Bank vs. C Shivakumar Reddy [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC) it was held that that default in payment of a debt triggered the right to initiate the Corporate Resolution Process. A Petition under Section 7 or 9 of the Code was required to be filed within the period of limitation prescribed by law, which would be three years from the date of default by virtue of Section 238A of the Code read with Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

EXCLUSION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER SARFAESI ACT
Another legislation with similar objectives as the Code is the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”). The SARFAESI Act also provides mechanisms for the recovery of debts by banks and financial institutions. This Act enables secured creditors to take possession of secured assets without going to Court.

In the case of Sesh Nath Singh (supra), the bank had resorted to action under the SARFAESI Act in respect of a loan default by a debtor. This debtor challenged this action by filing a Writ Petition before the Court and the Court granted an interim stay. While the Writ was pending, the bank filed a claim under the Code against the corporate debtor. This action was challenged by the corporate debtor contending that the NCLT should not have entertained the application filed by the financial creditor as the same was barred by the period of limitation. This issue reached the Supreme Court. Hence, the moot point before the Supreme Court was whether prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act qualified for the exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act since they were not civil proceedings before a Court?

Upholding the exclusion of time spent under SARFAESI, the Supreme Court held that it was wrong to say that s.14 could never be invoked until and unless the earlier proceedings had actually been terminated for want of jurisdiction or other cause of such nature. It held that s.14 excluded the time spent in proceeding in a wrong forum, which was unable to entertain the proceedings for want of jurisdiction or other such cause. Where such proceedings had ended, the outer limit to claim exclusion under Section 14 would be the date on which the proceedings ended. The Court observed that in the case on hand, the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act had not been formally terminated. The High Court stayed the proceedings by an interim order. The writ petition was not disposed of even after almost four years. The carriage of proceedings was with the Corporate Debtor. The interim order was still in force, when proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC were initiated, as a result of which the Financial Creditor was unable to proceed further under the SARFAESI Act.

Accordingly, it concluded that since the proceedings in the High Court were still pending on the date of filing of the application under s.7 of the Code in the NCLT, the entire period after the initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act could be excluded. If the period from the date of institution of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act till the date of filing of the application under s.7 of the Code in the NCLT was excluded, the application in the NCLT was well within the limitation of three years. Even if the period between the date of the notice under SARFAESI and the date of the interim order of the High Court staying the proceedings was excluded, the proceedings under Section 7 of IBC were still within limitation of three years.

It also held that the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 were undoubtedly civil proceedings. There was no rationale for the view that the proceedings initiated by a secured creditor against a borrower under the SARFAESI Act for taking possession of its secured assets were intended to be excluded from the category of civil proceedings. Even though the SARFAESI Act enabled a secured creditor to enforce the security interest created in its favour, without the intervention of the Court, it did not exclude the intervention of Courts and/or Tribunals altogether. Hence, the Court held that keeping in mind the scope and ambit of proceedings under the Code before the NCLT / NCLAT, the expression ‘Court’ in s. 14 of the Limitation Act would be deemed to include any forum for a civil proceeding including any Tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act.

EXCLUSION OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY DEBTOR
Another important provision while computing the limitation period is s.18 of the Limitation Act. This states that if an acknowledgement of liability has been made in writing signed by the debtor against whom such property or right is claimed, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed.

In Dena Bank vs. C Shivakumar Reddy [2021] 129 taxmann.com 60 (SC), the Apex Court, while explaining the essence of this provision held that as per s.18 of Limitation Act, an acknowledgement of a present subsisting liability, made in writing in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, had the effect of commencing a fresh period of limitation from the date on which the acknowledgement is signed. Such an acknowledgement need not be accompanied by a promise to pay expressly or even by implication. However, the acknowledgement must be made before the relevant period of limitation has expired. It further held that even if the writing containing the acknowledgement was undated, evidence might be given of the time when it was signed. An acknowledgement may be sufficient even though it was accompanied by refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy or was coupled with claim to set off, or was addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right. The term ‘signed’ was to be construed to mean signed personally or by an authorised agent.

In Sesh Nath Singh (supra), the Court held that the Code did not exclude the application of s.18 or any other provision of the Limitation Act. Again, in Laxmi Pat Surana vs. Union Bank of India & Anr. [LSI-176-SC-2021(NDEL)], the Supreme Court held that there was no reason to exclude the effect of Section 18 of the Limitation Act to proceedings initiated under the IBC.

The issue before the Apex Court in Dena Bank (supra) was whether an offer for one-time settlement signed by the debtor would lead to an exclusion of time under s.18? The Court held that it saw no reason why an Offer of One-Time Settlement of a live claim, made within the period of limitation, should not also be construed as an acknowledgement to attract Section 18 of the Limitation Act. To sum up, an application under s.7 of the IBC would not be barred by limitation, on the ground that it had been filed beyond a period of 3 years from the date of declaration of the loan account of the Corporate Debtor as a Non Performing Asset, if there was an acknowledgement of the debt by the Corporate Debtor before expiry of the period of limitation of 3 years, in which case the period of limitation would get extended by a further period of 3 years.

CONCLUSION
Thus, it is clear that the Limitation Act applies with all its exclusions, even to the Code. Courts are very quick to support this principle and would be wary in holding otherwise.  

S. 195 – Deduction at source – Non-resident – Lower deduction of tax – Indexation – Binding precedent – Order of Tribunal is binding on lower Authorities – Capital gains – Cost of acquisition of the property in the hands of seller is deemed to be the cost for which the said property was acquired by previous owner – Excess tax paid by the Petitioner was directed to be refunded with interest.

12 Rohan Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. ITO (IT) (Bom.)(HC); [W.P No. 1005 of 2008; Date of order: 6th January, 2022 (Bombay High Court)]

S. 195 – Deduction at source – Non-resident – Lower deduction of tax – Indexation – Binding precedent – Order of Tribunal is binding on lower Authorities – Capital gains – Cost of acquisition of the property in the hands of seller is deemed to be the cost for which the said property was acquired by previous owner – Excess tax paid by the Petitioner was directed to be refunded with interest.

Petitioner filed an application under Section 195(2) of the Act requesting him to issue a low tax rate Certificate for Deduction of Tax at Source in respect of consideration for the purchase of immovable property from the seller. According to the Petitioner, the cost of acquisition under Section 49(1)(ii) of the Act in the hands of the seller is deemed to be the cost for which the said property was acquired by Late Mrs. Dolly Jehangir Gazdar. It is also Petitioner’s case that under clauses (29A) and (42A) of Section 2, the period of holding of late Mrs. Dolly Jehangir Gazdar, Mrs. Rhoda Rustom Framjee and Mr. Rustom Framjee is also to be included in the period of holding of the seller for ascertaining whether the said property is held by him as a short-term capital asset or as a long-term capital asset. Therefore, in its application under Section 195(2) of the Act, Petitioner annexed a copy of the draft computation of long-term capital gains of the seller in respect of the transfer of the said property. While computing the capital gains, the Petitioner took the benefit of the option provided in the provisions of Section 55(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, which provides that where a capital asset became the property of the assessee by any of the modes specified in Section 49(1) of the Act and the capital asset became the property of the previous owner before the 1st day of April 1981, cost of acquisition means the cost of the capital asset to the previous owner or the fair market value of the asset on the 1st day of April 1981 at the option of the assessee. Based on the scheme of the Act as is provided in Section 49(1)(ii), clauses (29A) and (42A) of Section 2 and Section 55(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, Petitioner claimed that indexation of the cost of acquisition under the second proviso to Section 48 should be available from the financial year 1981- 82. The Petitioner relied on the Judgement of Special Bench in the case of DCIT vs. Manjula J. Shah (2009) 126 TTJ 145 (SB) (Mum.)(Trib). The application for lower tax was rejected. The Petitioner paid the tax under protest and filed the writ for rejection of application for lower rate of tax.

The Court held that the mere fact that the order of the appellate authority is not acceptable to the department or is the subject matter of an appeal cannot be a ground for not following it unless its operation has been suspended by a competent Court. This has been reiterated by this Court in its order Karanja Terminal & Logistic Private Limited vs. CIT (WP No. 1397 of 2020 dated 31st January, 2022) (Bom.)(HC).

The Court noted that the above decision of ITAT Spl Bench had been affirmed by the Bombay High Court; therefore, the issue is now settled in favour of the Petitioner and therefore directed the department to accept the computation of the capital gains after taking into consideration the index cost and cost of the previous owner. The Court following the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Tata Chemicals Limited [2014] 363 ITR 658 (SC) also directed the revenue to pay interest under Section 244A(1)(b) of the Act for the period from the date of payment of tax, i.e., 7th January, 2011 till date.

Revision — (i) Powers of Commissioner — Reassessment — Order of AO dropping reassessment proceedings after issuance of notice and considering assessee’s objections — Order of AO not administrative order — No jurisdiction in Commissioner to examine correctness of decision taken by AO; (ii) Export — Exemption — Disqualification where shareholding of assessee changes — Documents showing shareholding pattern in assessee continued to be same and share transfers were without beneficial interest — AO dropping reopening proceedings — Finding that shares transferred only to comply with legal requirements and beneficial ownership never transferred — Revision not sustainable

47 CIT vs. Barry-Wehmiller International Resources (P.) Ltd. [2021] 440 ITR 403 (Mad) A.Y.: 2001-02; Date of order: 3rd August, 2021 Ss.10A(9), 147, 148 & 263 of ITA, 1961

Revision — (i) Powers of Commissioner — Reassessment — Order of AO dropping reassessment proceedings after issuance of notice and considering assessee’s objections — Order of AO not administrative order — No jurisdiction in Commissioner to examine correctness of decision taken by AO; (ii) Export — Exemption — Disqualification where shareholding of assessee changes — Documents showing shareholding pattern in assessee continued to be same and share transfers were without beneficial interest — AO dropping reopening proceedings — Finding that shares transferred only to comply with legal requirements and beneficial ownership never transferred — Revision not sustainable

For the A.Y. 2001-02 the assessment of the assessee was reopened. After receiving the response from the assessee, the Assessing Officer dropped the proceedings holding that there was no change in the beneficial shareholding of the company in terms of section 10A(9) of the of the Income-tax Act, 1961 . The Commissioner after examining the records issued notice u/s 263 proposing to revise the order dropping the reassessment proceedings because the Assessing Officer failed to appreciate that the beneficial shareholding of the company had changed with the acquisition of shares in M Inc., U.S.A. company, which owned 100 per cent shares of a Mauritius company, which was the holding company of the assessee.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Commissioner had no jurisdiction to invoke his power u/s. 263 of the Act to examine the correctness of the decision taken by the Assessing Officer dropping the reopening proceedings after issuance of notice u/s. 148 of the Act and after considering the objections filed by the assessee.

ii) The U.S.A. company had addressed the Registrar of Companies in Chennai conveying its no objection to the change of name. The assessee had explained its organisational structure stating that 100 per cent. of the equity capital of MWS was held by MAPL, a company incorporated in Mauritius, that the shareholding pattern in the assessee continued to be the same, that all the shares in the assessee were held by MAPL, Mauritius and that during 2000-01, no share transfers occurred, that only 2 shares were transferred to BW Inc., USA in March 2002 and that too without beneficial interest in the shares and that MAPL continued to hold the beneficial interest in the shares. This was duly supported by necessary records. These facts were taken note of and the Assessing Officer had dropped the reopening proceedings. Thus, it was on an opinion formed by the Assessing Officer and after being satisfied that there was no case made out for reopening and after recording that the ownership or beneficial interest of the assessee had not changed and continued to be with the Mauritius company and therefore, section 10A(9) of the Act was not attracted and accordingly, proceedings under section 147 of the Act were dropped.

iii) The Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the shares were transferred only to comply with the legal requirements and the beneficial ownership was never transferred. Hence, the order passed by the Tribunal did not call for any interference.”

CREDIT BLOCKADES FOR CONVEYANCES

INTRODUCTION
Global economies have banked on tax collections from the Mobility Industry, which has inevitably placed them at the higher end of the tax spectrum. In a VAT chain, taxes collected would be retained by Governments only when the input tax credit is blocked to the subsequent users. Socialist economies have always viewed motor vehicles as ‘luxury’, making the industry a soft target for tax collections. In addition, administrators are aware of the likely diversion of automobiles for personal use even though business enterprises own them. These ideologies have directed stringent tax provisions for motor vehicles and conveyances.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Credit in respect of motor vehicles was blocked during the CENVAT regime. Motor vehicles were excluded from the definition of ‘inputs’ irrespective of the purpose for which they were used. As ‘capital goods’, credit was originally permitted to service providers only in limited cases – (a) tour operators, (b) courier agencies, (c) cab-rent operators, (d) outdoor caterers, (e) goods transporters, and (f) pandal or shamiana operators. In 2010, this list was extended to dumpers and tippers (registered in the name of service provider) used for site formation or mining activities. Components, spares, and accessories for the above listed motor vehicles were considered as permitted credits. In 2012, with the shift from a ‘positive list’ service taxation to a ‘negative list’ taxation, the entire provision was substituted by permitting credits on the basis of end-use (i.e. service description to which the said vehicles were put to use), delinking them from category-based eligibility. In addition, credit was permitted to manufacturers in respect of all motor vehicles, except the following HSNs:

8702

MOTOR
VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSPORT OF TEN OR MORE PERSONS

8703

MOTOR
CARS AND OTHER MOTOR VEHICLES PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THE TRANSPORT OF
PERSONS (OTHER THAN THOSE OF HEADING 8702), INCLUDING STATION WAGONS AND
RACING CARS

8704

MOTOR
VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS

8711

MOTORCYCLES
(INCLUDING MOPEDS) AND CYCLES FITTED WITH AN AUXILIARY MOTOR, WITH OR WITHOUT
SIDE-CARS

In effect, goods carriers (i.e. dumpers and tippers), special purpose motor vehicles (such as Tractors, Crane Lorries, Concrete-Mixers lorries, Work Trucks, etc.) were permitted as ‘Capital Goods’ credit for manufacturers. This position continued until the sub summation of the Central Excise provisions. Some important observations emerging here are as follows:

(a) There has been a constant progression in granting credit to motor vehicles which have been directly used for value-added activity either by a manufacturer or a service provider.

(b) Passenger vehicles were blocked credits except where they were used as commercial passenger vehicles.

(c) HSN was adopted for describing the nature of motor vehicles that are eligible/ ineligible for CENVAT credit. Even if the ‘principal design’ of the vehicle met the description, credits were permissible.

(d) Under the HSN system, Motor-cycles were a distinct category from Motor-Vehicles.

(e) Use Test was not prominently visible in the provisions, and the reliance on HSN classification contained a presumption that the actual use and registered use were the same.

On the other hand, VAT laws permitted credits only if the goods were either re-sold or used as a direct input in manufacturing activity. In all other cases, Motor vehicles and conveyances were treated as ‘non-creditable goods’.

LEGAL CONTEXT – ORIGINAL LAW

Originally enacted section 17(5) blocked credit in respect of motor vehicles and conveyances (‘blocked conveyances’) except when they were used for making specified supplies (collectively referred to as ‘credit qualifying supplies’):

a) supply of such motor vehicles or conveyances

b) transportation of passengers

c) imparting training of such conveyances

In addition, such conveyances were eligible for credit when used for transportation of goods either on own account or as part of any supply (‘qualifying use’). The law was silent on the admissibility of input tax credit on ancillary costs (such as insurance, repair, maintenance, etc.) incurred in respect of such blocked conveyances.

2019 AMENDMENT
In 2018 (w.e.f. 1st February, 2019) the provisions were substituted resulting in the following:

(a) Blocked conveyances list was narrowed to passenger motor vehicles (below 13 capacity), vessels and aircraft. Other modes of conveyances were removed from the blocked list.

(b) Passenger motor vehicles and vessels/ aircraft fell under differently worded provisions.

(c) Clause specifying ‘qualifying use’ for motor vehicles was deleted and merged into the ‘blocked conveyances’ clause – in effect qualifying the nature of the motor vehicles itself rather than specifying a separate qualifying use test.

(d) Credit in respect of the ancillary services (such as insurance, repair and maintenance) were specifically blocked in respect of ‘blocked conveyances’ except when such blocked conveyances were used for credit qualifying supplies.

(e) Credit was made available to manufacturer or insurers of such blocked conveyances as long as they are in the business relatable to such blocked conveyances.

Summary of the eligibility matrix on account of the amendment would be tabulated as follows:

Criteria

Pre-2019 – All Conveyances

Post 2019 – Motor Vehicles

Post 2019 – Aircraft and Vessels

Blocked Conveyances

All motor vehicles & conveyances

Motor vehicles for transportation of passengers

Vessels and Aircraft

Credit Qualifying Supplies

Identical

Identical

Identical

Qualifying Use

Transportation of Goods

Merged in 1st criteria

Transportation of Goods

With the amendment in 2019, the use test for motor vehicles has been merged into the Conveyance Test, while the original provisions have been retained for aircraft and vessels (refer subsequent analysis).

INTER-PLAY – USED VS. INTENDED TO BE USED
Section 16(1) grants input tax credit on all inward supplies based on two entry points (a) use or (b) intention of use. Section 17(5) operates as an exception to the general rule of grant of credit and uses the phrase ‘used’ while enabling credit based on the ‘onward supply test’. Is the overriding nature of 17(5) coupled with the absence of the phrase ‘intention of use’ having an impact on credit eligibility of goods used for onward supply?

Section 17(5) expresses that credit in respect of blocked conveyances (say motor vehicles) would be denied. This first level denial is absolute, implying that all blocked conveyances are ineligible for input tax credit – let’s call it a blanket ban. Having placed a banket ban on blocked conveyances, the law now states that it shall permit a narrow escape route when such blocked conveyances are ‘used’ for credit qualifying supplies. Consequently, while a taxable person may have availed credit of blocked conveyances on ‘use’ or even ‘intention of use’, the only escape route to retain the credit is after establishing that such blocked conveyances have been ‘used’ for credit qualifying supplies. This format of the provisions places a larger onus on the taxable person claiming credit on blocked conveyances. However, this stringent test does not appear to be applicable to non-specified conveyances (such as goods vehicles) not featuring as blocked conveyances. Therefore, while goods vehicles are permitted for input tax credit on mere ‘intention of use’ of such vehicles, passenger vehicles may have to undergo the rigour of whether they have been ‘used’ for the specified purpose.

Some may call this interpretation as hyper-technical and defeating the purpose of granting credit at the time of purchase and deferring it until the goods are actually used. No doubt this interpretation appears to be onerous on the taxpayer, and one would weigh the precedents on this. At this juncture, one may recall the decision of the Supreme Court in BPL Display Devices Ltd. vs. CCE1 where it was held that the exemption which was dependent on usage goods should also be interpreted to include intention of use. Despite the goods being lost in transit, the courts granted the benefit of exemption on the basis that use included intention of use. While this decision is attractive to apply, one may also have to consider the context of section 16(1) r/w 17(5). A reasonable interpretation to resolve this deadlock would be to hold that blocked conveyances which are worded under over-riding provisions would not be eligible for input tax credit. Credit would be permitted only on they been used for permitted purposes. Though this test is narrow in comparison to the wide scope of section 16(1), the effect of this test is only to place the onus on the taxpayer to establish the usage when called upon to do so. This test should not be interpreted as a pre-condition to availment of the credit itself. This fine inter-play of words can be framed into a three-layer water-fall test.

3-LAYER WATER-FALL TEST

 

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1     2004
(174) E.L.T. 5 (S.C.)

ANALYSIS OF 17(5)(a) – CONVEYANCE TEST
Conveyance test blocks input tax credit on motor vehicles for transportation of persons having approved seating capacity of not more than thirteen persons. The phrase ‘motor vehicles for transportation of persons’ has not been enlisted anywhere. One may examine the HSN tariff entry for the inclusions/ exclusions to the phrase ‘motor vehicles for transportation of persons’. Vehicles specified in HSN 8702 and 8703 appear to be part of ‘motor vehicles for transportation of persons’. Tractors (8701), Motor Vehicles for transport of goods (8704), Special purpose motor vehicles (8705), Motorcycles (8711), etc appear to fall outside the scope of the said phrase.

Alternatively, motor vehicles can also be understood from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which defines ‘motor vehicles’ as follows:

“(28) “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding twenty-five cubic centimeters”

The said definition brings within its ambit any motor vehicle (including tractors, cranes, special purpose motor vehicles, motorcycles, etc) used upon roads and includes chassis or trailers. The coverage of the term under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is wider than the scope envisaged under the HSN schedule, and this may pose some interpretational issues between the taxpayer and the revenue. The HSN schedule appears to be more proximate and contextual reference for understanding ‘motor vehicles for passengers’ on account of its framework and listing based on (a) seating capacity (of thirteen persons) (b) principal design of motor vehicles, and (c) their probable usage. Further, historical background of CENVAT provisions also suggests such a reference.

ANALYSIS OF 17(5)(aa) – CONVEYANCE TEST
Clause (aa) applies to vessels and aircraft when used for further supply of such vessels and aircraft or imparting training of such vessels and aircraft. One of the key effects of the 2019 amendment was that aircraft and vessels were carved out from the motor vehicles provisions and drawn up separately. While fresh provisions were drafted for motor vehicles, aircraft and vessels continued under the pre-amendment wordings. On a close comparative analysis, one could narrow down the difference to the qualification on the ‘nature of the conveyance’. For motor vehicles, the law makers have qualified the conveyance based on the purpose of use (i.e. passenger motor vehicles v/s goods motor vehicles) but for aircraft/ vessels, no such qualification has been made. A separate use test has been prescribed for eligibility of input tax credit on aircraft and vessels based on whether they have been used for the transportation of goods.

DE-JURE USE VS. DE-FACTO USE
This directs us to derive the rationale for distinct provisions for motor vehicles and for aircraft/ vessels. One may consider the ‘de-jure use’ (as per principal design and transport office records) or ‘de-facto use’ (actual use) as a reconciliation of the variance. In the case of motor vehicles, there are instances when passenger vehicles are modified with additional functions or features, though they are legally registered as passenger vehicles (refer vanity van case study below). The question arises whether the vehicles used beyond their registered use are permissible for credit as they are not just passenger vehicles after their modification.

The amendment by merging the use criteria with the blocked conveyance criteria seems to emphasise that this would not be permissible. In effect, the amendment is placing a blanket ban based on the de-jure use of the vehicles (i.e. as a passenger transport vehicle) and does not enable the person to avail credit based on ‘actual use’ of the passenger vehicle for goods transportation purposes.

But this is not the case for aircraft and vessels. The use criteria for aircraft and vessels is independently stated in a separate clause and does not qualify the aircraft or vessels itself i.e. the primary provision does not distinguish between cargo aircraft and passenger aircraft. Blanket ban on credit is placed without consideration of the primary purpose/ design. By way of a separate exclusion, the provision permits credit of aircrafts when used for transportation of goods, overcoming the criteria that they may also be passenger aircrafts. The probable reason could be that aircraft and vessels are subject to strict regulations and also have a separate enclosure of carriage of cargo, in addition to passenger seating facility. Therefore, dually designed aircrafts and vessels which are equipped for multiple use would be eligible for credit.

ANALYSIS OF 17(5)(a) (A), (B) & (C) – ONWARD SUPPLY TEST
Onward supply test permits credit on blocked conveyances by listing the credit qualifying supplies. It is essential that the motor vehicles are used for making further supplies. It is important to note that ‘self or incidental use’ would not make them as credit qualifying supplies. One would have to establish an activity of the specified nature (i.e. further supply or transportation or persons or training), qualifying under section 7, in order to fall within the narrow window to escape the blocked credits. By implication, the ‘identity of the motor vehicle’ on the inward leg of supply and that of the outward leg of supply should be directly co-relatable.

Clause (A) – What are the forms of supply i.e., either goods or services or both, which qualify for credit. In other words, does clause 17(5)(a)(i) permit input tax credit only for ‘automobile dealers’ (who are engaged in trading of motor vehicles) or can it also be applied to car rental or leasing companies. Under the GST scheme, the supply of motor vehicles can be in the form of supply of goods or the form of supply of services. Lawmakers have been explicit about the character of supply (i.e. goods or services) when a differential treatment was intended under such a consolidated law. In the absence of any differential treatment in 17(5)(a), the law appears to be covering both supply of motor vehicles as goods or services for the purpose of enabling input tax credit. Accordingly, cab-rental companies, leasing companies etc that purchase motor vehicles for the purpose of leasing, hiring, etc should be permitted to avail input tax credit on their purchases.

Clause (B) permits input tax credit on motor vehicles which are used for further supply of transportation of passengers. As stated above, mere transportation of persons would not meet the permissive criteria for availment of input tax credit. A factory transporting its own employees in an own vehicle would not be permitted to avail input tax credit unless the factory effects a ‘supply’ in the form of recovering a transportation fee from its employees. A tour operator, in the absence of an identifiable supply of transportation of passenger, may not be entitled to input tax credit even-though it performs transportation of passengers as an element of the overall supply. Though the revenue may claim that only SAC 9964 – Passenger transport services qualifies as ‘credit qualifying supply’, this does not emerge from the literal provisions of law. As long as there appears to be an onward supply from the passenger vehicle, the input tax credit may be available.

Clause (C) permits input tax credit on motor vehicles that are used for imparting training or driving such motor vehicles. This clause is oriented towards training schools etc. that purchase motor vehicles for use in training against a training fee. Supply principles discussed in clause (B) would also be applicable here.

Cumulatively clause (A), (B) and (C) are oriented towards a commercial value-added activity, which involves direct use of motor vehicles and excludes those cases where motor vehicles for transportation are on own account.

PARTIAL USE VS. COMPLETE USE
Instances also arise where the passenger motor vehicles are partially used for ‘passenger transportation services’ as well as ‘own purposes’. The law does not provide any guidance on attributability of such credit towards own purpose and commercial purpose. If the literal wordings are to be sole guiding factor, one could take the view that as long as they are used for passenger transportation activity, albeit partially, full credit should be permissible on such passenger motor vehicles based on the actual use criteria. Until the lawmakers do not provide any attribution methodology, a reversal for partial use towards own purposes does not seem to be expected from taxable persons.

ANALYSIS OF 17(5)(ab)
Section 17(5)(ab) blocks input tax credit on general insurance services and repair and maintenance of motor vehicles. However, credit is not blocked on services in respect of such conveyances, which are otherwise eligible for input tax credit. In addition, manufacturers and general insurance companies are also permitted to avail input tax credit on insurance and repair and maintenance activity for all motor vehicles, including passenger vehicles where they are engaged in the direct activity of such motor vehicles.

Importantly, the blockage of input tax credit is only on the ‘service activity’ of repair and maintenance. As an industry practice vide Circular No. 47/21/2018-GST dated 8th June, 2018, automobile dealers bifurcate their spare parts and labour work into goods and services, and taxes are applied accordingly. Applying the classification at the supplier’s end as conclusive of the nature of activity involved, it appears that the procurement of spare parts as part of repair and maintenance activity would be a supply of goods and hence outside the ambit of the said provisions.

One may note that the said provisions were introduced only during the 2019 amendment. Until then, there was ambiguity on whether ancillary activities pertaining to motor vehicles, such as repair and maintenance, were permissible input tax credit. The amendment fortifies the stand that prior to the amendment, such support services or goods availed on spare parts or repair were permissible credit for all motor vehicles (passenger and goods) without any specific bar u/s 17(5). This also derives support from the fact that the amended section 17(5)(b) specifically provides for blocking input tax credit on motor vehicles that have been obtained on lease, hire or rent. If section 17(5)(a) were to be interpreted to block input tax credit on all inward supplies having a direct or indirect connection with a motor vehicle, section 17(5)(b) would be redundant. Both these aspects would affirm the view that section 17(5)(a) prior to amendment did not block credit on repair, maintenance and insurance services.

SECTION 17(5)(b)
Associated to the aspect of credit, section 17(5)(b) blocks input tax credit on leasing, renting and hiring of conveyances. Two exceptions have been carved out in cases where (a) such inward supply is an element of an outward supply of the same category or a composite category; (b) such inward supply was necessitated on account of statutory provisions.

‘Leasing, renting and hiring’ has not been defined in the law specifically. The SAC/rate notifications provide rates/ exemptions on leasing, renting and hiring. The law has covered all three scenarios for using motor vehicles for purposing of blocked credits. Interestingly availment of passenger transport service (which is a separate SAC) does not feature in the said listing. Thus, where an enterprise avails of services of air or road travel under the passenger transportation category, section 17(5)(b) does not block the credits. In addition, if inward supply forms part of an outward supply, even as an element, the same would be eligible for credit on the basis that the inward supply has generated an onward value-added activity.

CASE STUDIES FOR APPLICATION OF LAW
Case 1 Hotel Cab – A Hotel purchases motor vehicles to transport guests and charges a fee as part of the overall accommodation package. In many cases, such activity is provided as a complimentary package to the accommodation services. Section 17(5)(a) states that motor vehicles are eligible under the Onward Supply Test when generating a passenger transportation activity. The hotel certainly has an element of passenger transportation service bundled in a composite package, but the invoice does not explicitly adopt the corresponding SAC for such activity. A literal reading of the provisions suggests that there must be a ‘taxable supply’ of transportation of passengers. Unless the service activity is taxed as a passenger transportation service credit should not be permissible. However, unlike section 17(5)(b)2, the said provision does not mandate a category-to-category correlation between input and output activity. Therefore, a purposive interpretation of the law could suggest that credit should be eligible in respect of motor vehicles if it is bundled as part of the overall service activity.

Case 2 Vanity Van – A celebrity purchases a vanity van registered as a passenger vehicle with modifications to store its vanity materials. The registered use is a passenger vehicle, but the actual use is for storing and transporting the vanity set-up for use by the celebrity. Section 17(5)(a) does not expressly differentiate between registered use or actual use. The HSN schedule however classifies motor vehicles based on the principal design or principal purpose. Where the motor vehicle is principally designed for transportation of passenger they would be classifiable under 8703 and probably the same test would have to be applied for purpose of section 17(5)(a). Therefore, the vanity van being principally designed for transportation of passengers and registered as a passenger vehicle may not be eligible for claim u/s 17(5)(a).

_____________________________________________

2     “Provided
that the input tax credit in respect of such goods or services or both shall be
available where an inward supply of such goods or services or both is used by a
registered person for making an outward taxable supply of the same category of goods or services or both
or as an element of a taxable composite or mixed supply”

3     2008
(232) E.L.T. 475 (Tri. – Del.)

Case 3 Intention to Resale – A Company purchases a motor vehicle for itself to be used for official purposes and has a policy to dispose the same (on payment of taxes) after a period of 1 year or crossing a particular odometer reading. While the Company has an intention at the time of purchase for making a further supply of such vehicles, the same is at a future undecided date. Section 17(5)(a) refers to actual use of such motor vehicles for further supply of such motor vehicles. If one views the said provision as applicable only at the time of availment, credits would not be available in such cases. Subsequent change in use or application to the permitted purposes does not appear to be envisaged in section 17(5)(a). One may consider the decision in Brindavan Beverages Pvt. Limited vs. CCE3 and the decision in CCE vs. Surya Roshni Ltd4 which hold that the eligibility of credit should be examined at the time of availment, and subsequent change in use would not alter the credit position. But alternatively, if the provision is to be interpreted as an end-use test, one may be tempted to claim that since the end purpose of resale, a.k.a. supply has taken place at a future date, credit should be available to the Company.

Case 4 – Automobile dealers purchase ‘Demo Cars’ for demonstration to the prospective customers at the showroom. These demo cars are first registered (either permanently or temporarily) and then sold after extensive usage to the end customers at lower prices. While the cars are initially intended for own use (i.e. demonstration to prospective customers) they do not expressly fall within the ‘permitted use’ list. Though there may be an intention for resale the same to end customers, credit u/s 17(5)(a) is permissible on actual use of the motor vehicles. Moreover, if the erstwhile law principles of testing conditions of eligibility at the time of original availment, are adopted, credit may be a contentious issue. While there are divergent advance rulings on this aspect, it appears the literal wordings of the provisions do not permit credit on subsequent adoption of the goods for the permitted uses.5 The favourable advance ruling holds that since the cars are eventually sold by the automobile dealer, credit should be permissible and the contrary ruling apply the literal provisions of law at the time of purchase without regard to the future use.

Case 5 – Cash Management Company purchase cash carry vans which are customized with high security features for transportation of invaluable items. Pre-2019, the credit was eligible only on transportation of goods. This raised an issue of whether motor vehicles used for transportation of ‘money’ which were not goods was eligible for input tax credit. While the initial advance ruling6 held that input tax credit is not eligible, the appellate advance ruling authority on remand has directed that input tax credit on the same would be available at par with motor vehicles used for transportation of goods7. Post 2019, such vans are outside the blocked conveyance list at the threshold itself and hence eligible for credit.

________________________________________________

4. 2003 (155) E.L.T. 481 (Tri. – Del.) affirmed
in 2007 (216) E.L.T. 133 (Tri. – LB)

5   It
may be noted that there are divergent advance rulings on this aspect – A.M.
Motors [2018 (10) TMI 514]; Chowgule Industries Private Limited [2019 (7) TMI
844]; Khatwani Sales and Services LLP [2021 (1) TMI 692]; Platinum Motocorp LLP
[2019 (3) TMI 1850]

6   CMS
INFO SYSTEMS LTD. [2018 (5) TMI 649] and reversed in 2020 (6) TMI 643

7   Recommendations
made during the 28th meeting of the GST Council on 21st July, 2018

Case 6 – Oil mining companies procure accommodation barges for lodging their employees at on-site drilling locations which are on high-seas. These accommodation barges are vessels that are used for transportation of passengers and for providing accommodation at high-seas. In many cases, these vessels are obtained on lease and do not strictly meet the onward supply test of ‘transportation of passengers’. As discussed above, vessels are governed by the original philosophy and credit is enabled only on onward supplies and/or actual usage for transportation of goods. In the said facts, these accommodation barges are not involved in an onward supply of transportation of passengers and also not involved in the transportation of goods. Therefore, it appears such cases would be blocked from availing input tax credit.

Case 7 – Cost of ownership and operation of Motor Vehicles may also include expenses towards parking or rental space. If a limited scope is attributed to the phrase ‘in respect of motor vehicles’ u/s 17(5)(a), one may contend that ancillary services of motor vehicles should not be blocked for credit purposes. The revenue would be inclined to interpret the said phrase as being wide enough to cover all credits pertaining to motor vehicles, including costs of operation and maintenance. Going by the preceding analysis and the 2019 amendment, one may take the stand ancillary services are not blocked until they are specifically specified u/s 17(5).

Case 8 Charter of Aircraft – Companies avail aircraft on a charter basis for transportation of their executives. The chartered flight operator charges the company based on the actual flying hours, and in many cases, provides the Company exclusive access to the aircraft. The industry follows the divergent practice of either charging GST as (a) hiring/ renting of aircraft – 9966; or (b) passenger transport service – 9964. Under section 17(5)(b), credit is blocked for hiring or renting of aircraft but permitted for passenger transport service.

The explanatory notes to the service classification explain 9966 as being renting of transport vehicles where the service recipient defines how and when the vehicle will be operated, schedules, routes and other operational considerations. 9964 has been explained to include scheduled as well as non-scheduled air transport of passengers. In the present facts, there appears to be a wafer-thin line of difference between 9966 and 9964. Having said this, from an input tax credit perspective, it is settled law that the classification by the supplier cannot be altered by the recipient unless the supplier either admits to such alteration or the results of legal proceedings warrant such alteration at the supplier’s end (CCE vs. Sarvesh Refractories (P) Ltd8). Therefore, as a recipient of service, the taxable person ought to claim the credit only of invoices classified as 9967 and would have to reverse the credit on invoices classified as 9964. While this may seem unfortunate, such a practice would ensure stability in tax classifications over the longer run.

CONCLUSION
The automobile sector has been the catalyst of economic growth and a major contributor to the tax exchequer. The visible impact of a high GST tax rate and such credit blockades increases the transportation costs of business enterprises. The Government has recognized this and been progressive in liberalizing this input credit stream. While at the policy level, attempts are being made to widen the credit space, the provisions should not be interpreted as a block credit for all motor vehicles without adhering to the purpose of use of the conveyance. 

_____________________________________________
8. 2002 (139) E.L.T. 431 (Tri. – Kolkata)
affirmed in 2007 (218) ELT 488 (SC)

Recovery of tax — Provisional attachment u/s 281B — Condition precedent for attachment — Authority must form opinion on basis of tangible material that it is necessary to do so for protecting interest of government revenue and that assessee not likely to fulfil demand if raised — Order merely stating likelihood of huge liability being raised and necessary to provisionally attach fixed deposit of assessee — Cryptic, unreasoned, non-speaking and laconic — Specific assertion by assessee that it owned immovable property of substantial value — Apprehension that assessee might not make payment unfounded and without any basis — Orders liable to be quashed

46 Indian Minerals and Granite Co. vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 440 ITR 292 (Karn) Date of order: 12th August,2021 S. 281B of ITA, 1961

Recovery of tax — Provisional attachment u/s 281B — Condition precedent for attachment — Authority must form opinion on basis of tangible material that it is necessary to do so for protecting interest of government revenue and that assessee not likely to fulfil demand if raised — Order merely stating likelihood of huge liability being raised and necessary to provisionally attach fixed deposit of assessee — Cryptic, unreasoned, non-speaking and laconic — Specific assertion by assessee that it owned immovable property of substantial value — Apprehension that assessee might not make payment unfounded and without any basis — Orders liable to be quashed

Pursuant to the search said to have been conducted by the respondents in respect of the petitioner-assessees u/s 132 of the said Act of 1961, assessment proceedings were initiated u/s 153A by the Assessing Officer. During the course of the said proceedings, Assessing Officer passed orders u/s 281B, thereby provisionally attaching the fixed deposits of the petitioners.

The assessee filed writ petition and challenged the orders. The Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) Mere apprehension on the part of the Department that huge tax demands are likely to be raised on completion of the assessment is not sufficient for the purpose of passing a provisional order of attachment. Having regard to the fact that the provisional attachment order of a property of a taxable person including the bank account of such person is draconian in nature and the conditions which are prescribed by the statute for the valid exercise of power must be strictly fulfilled, the exercise of power for order of provisional attachment must necessarily be preceded by formation of an opinion by the authorities that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of protecting the interest of Government revenue. Before an order of provisional attachment is passed, the Commissioner must form an opinion on the basis of tangible material available for attachment that the assessee is not likely to fulfil the demand for payment of tax and it is therefore necessary to do so for the purpose of protecting the interest of the Government revenue. In addition, before passing the provisional attachment order, it is also incumbent upon the authorities to come to a conclusion based on tangible material that without attaching the provisional attachment, it is not possible in the facts of the given case to protect the revenue and that the provisional attachment order is completely warranted for the purpose of protecting the Government revenue.

ii) Except for merely stating that since there was a likelihood of huge tax payments to be raised on completion of assessment and that for the purpose of protecting the revenue, it was necessary to provisionally attach the fixed deposit of the assessee, the other mandatory requirements and preconditions had neither been complied with nor fulfilled or followed prior to passing the order. In view of the fact that the orders were cryptic, unreasoned, non-speaking and laconic, they deserved to be quashed.

iii) In the light of the undisputed fact that the proceedings u/s. 153A of the Act had already been initiated coupled with the fact that section 281 of the Act contemplates that any alienation of any property belonging to the assessee would be null and void, in addition to the specific assertion made by the assessee that it owned and possessed immovable property to the tune of more than Rs. 300 crores, the apprehension of the Department that in the event huge tax payments were to be raised as against the assessee, the assessee might not make payment thereof thus causing loss to the Revenue, was clearly unfounded and without any basis.

iv) The impugned orders dated 26th March, 2021 passed by respondent No. 1 are hereby quashed.”

Reassessment — Notice — Sanction of prescribed authority — To be obtained prior to issue of notice — Approval granted after issue of notice — No valid explanation by cogent material that physical approval was granted before issuance of notice — Approval saying merely “yes, I am satisfied” — Non-application of mind on part of specified authority — Notice not valid

45 Svitzer Hazira Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2021] 441 ITR 19 (Bom) A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 21st December, 2021 Ss. 147, 148 & 151 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice — Sanction of prescribed authority — To be obtained prior to issue of notice — Approval granted after issue of notice — No valid explanation by cogent material that physical approval was granted before issuance of notice — Approval saying merely “yes, I am satisfied” — Non-application of mind on part of specified authority — Notice not valid

For the A.Y. 2014-15, the Assessing Officer digitally issued a notice u/s 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against the assessee and furnished the reasons for reopening. The notice was uploaded at 2.40 p.m. on 31st March, 2019 on the portal under the digital signature of the Assessing Officer and the copy of the approval u/s 151 was signed at 2.55 p.m. on 31st March, 2019 by the specified authority.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the validity of notice on the ground that the notice u/s 148 was issued without prior sanction u/s 151 and that sanction had been granted without application of mind by the specified authority. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) Prior approval of the superior officer as contemplated by section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 operates as a shield against arbitrary exercise by the Assessing Officer of the power conferred on him u/ss. 147 and 148. The power to grant prior approval has been conferred on the superior officer so that the superior officer shall examine the reasons, material or grounds and adjudicate whether they are sufficient and adequate to the formation of necessary belief on the part of the Assessing Officer. Therefore, it is necessary for the superior officer to apply his mind and record his reasons howsoever brief so that the Assessing Officer’s belief is well reasoned and bona fide.

ii) The remark on the part of the superior authority must indicate application of mind by giving reasons for prior approval. The expression “no notice shall be issued” cannot be construed to mean post facto approval. The expression “no notice shall be issued” reflects the intention of the Legislature to indicate that prior approval is the sine qua non before issuance of notice u/s. 148. The sanction to be granted by the authority u/s. 151 has to be prior in point of time of issuance of notice u/s. 148.

iii) There was no prior sanction granted u/s. 151 by the Joint Commissioner before issuance of notice u/s. 148. Therefore, the jurisdictional condition of complying with section 151 was not satisfied. The explanation furnished in the order disposing of the objections of the assessee by the Assessing Officer that initially physical approval was granted and thereafter online approval was granted was not supported by any material on record. In the absence of valid explanation by cogent material the explanation in the order disposing of the objections of the assessee by the Assessing Officer that physical approval was granted before issuance of notice under section 148 could not be accepted.

iv) In his order of sanction, the Joint Commissioner had merely recorded his approval as “Yes, I am satisfied”. There was non-application of mind on the part of the Joint Commissioner while granting sanction u/s. 151.”

Reassessment — (i) Notice u/s 148 — Conditions precedent — New tangible material to show that income has escaped assessment and reason to believe — Notice on ground that assessee did not offer to tax interest and bonus received on surrender of life insurance policy before maturity — Original assessment without scrutiny not relevant — Reopening of assessment unsustainable; (ii) Exemption — Receipt of interest and bonus on surrender of life insurance policy before maturity — Conditions stipulated u/s 10(10D) — Department to prima facie establish which condition was not fulfilled by assessee — Assessee not receiving from insurer under contract of annuity plan — Provision of s. 80CCC(2) not applicable

44 Ami Ashish Shah vs. ITO [2021] 440 ITR 417 (Guj) A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 22nd March, 2021 Ss.143(1), 147, 148, 10(10D) & 80CCC(2) of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — (i) Notice u/s 148 — Conditions precedent — New tangible material to show that income has escaped assessment and reason to believe — Notice on ground that assessee did not offer to tax interest and bonus received on surrender of life insurance policy before maturity — Original assessment without scrutiny not relevant — Reopening of assessment unsustainable; (ii) Exemption — Receipt of interest and bonus on surrender of life insurance policy before maturity — Conditions stipulated u/s 10(10D) — Department to prima facie establish which condition was not fulfilled by assessee — Assessee not receiving from insurer under contract of annuity plan — Provision of s. 80CCC(2) not applicable

The assessee, a non-resident individual, for the A.Y. 2012-13, declared income from house property. After a period of four years, the Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to reopen u/s 147, the assessment made u/s 143(1) and recorded reasons that information was received from the Deputy Director (Investigation) to the effect that the assessee had obtained a life insurance policy on 28th June, 2006 on payment of an annual premium up to the F.Y. 2010-11, that the total amount paid by the assessee was Rs. 50 lakhs and the sum assured was Rs. 50 lakhs and the date of the last premium was 28th June, 2020, that the assessee surrendered the policy prematurely on 15th April, 2011 and received the surrender value which included an amount of accretion on account of interest and bonus on the credit of the assessee in the policy fund and that the assessee did not offer the accretion value to tax which resulted in income escaping assessment. The assessee raised objections on the grounds that any sum received under life insurance, including the sum allocated by way of bonus on life insurance policies did not form part of total income u/s 10(10D) if it did not fall under Exception sub-clauses (a) to (d) provided under such section and that the provisions of section 80CCC(2) was not applicable as he did not claim deduction u/s 80CCC(1) in his return. The objections were rejected.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Even where the proceedings u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are sought to be initiated with reference to an intimation u/s. 143(1), the ingredients of section 147 are required to be fulfilled. Therefore, such an assessment cannot be reopened unless some new or fresh tangible material comes into the possession of the Assessing Officer, subsequent to the intimation u/s. 143(1) and there should exist “reason to believe” that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. According to the Explanatory Notes on the provisions of the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, contained in Circular No. 549, dated 31st October, 1989, issued by the CBDT no distinction u/s. 147 is contemplated between a scrutiny assessment u/s. 143(3) and the assessment u/s. 143(1) and tangible material is necessary to reopen even an assessment made without scrutiny.

ii) Reference to section 80CCC(2) by the Department was misconceived for two reasons: first, section 80CCC dealt with annuity plans whereas the assessee’s case was concerned with life insurance policy; secondly, section 80CCC(2) made any sum received by the assessee from the insurer towards contract for any annuity plan, taxable, provided premium paid for such plan was claimed as allowable deduction u/s. 80CCC(1) . There was no such averment or findings that the amount of premium paid by the assessee had been claimed and allowed as deduction u/s. 80CCC(1). According to section 10(10D) as on 1st April, 2021 as applicable for the A.Y. 2012-13, all that was required for an insurance policy to meet the requirements of section 10(10D) were that: (i) it should be a life insurance policy; (ii) it should be taken by the assessee on his/her life, and (iii) for insurance policies issued after 1st April, 2003, premium payable for any of the years during the term of the policy should not exceed 20 per cent. of the actual capital sum assured. Once these criteria were fulfilled, any sum received under such life insurance policy including bonus (accretions over and above the premiums paid) was exempt income. This amount was nothing, but, bonus, which was otherwise covered u/s. 10(10D). However, for this amount to be taxable, the Department had to prima facie indicate as to which of the conditions of section 10(10D) were not fulfilled or how the amount in question was not exempted under this section. Hence, in the absence of any new tangible material in the possession of the Assessing Officer, subsequent to the intimation u/s. 143(1), the reopening u/s. 147 was unsustainable.”

Penalty — Concealment of income — Search proceedings and income-tax survey — Subsequent addition to income returned — Returns accepted — No concealment of income — Penalty could not be levied

43 Principal ClT vs. Shreedhar Associates [2021] 440 ITR 547 (Guj) A.Y.: 2013-14; Date of order: 14th September, 2021 S. 271 of ITA, 1961

Penalty — Concealment of income — Search proceedings and income-tax survey — Subsequent addition to income returned — Returns accepted — No concealment of income — Penalty could not be levied

The assessee, a partnership firm was involved in the business of real estate development and construction, where it had come out with a scheme “Shreedhar Residency” in the first year 2012-13. The survey u/s 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was conducted on 9th January, 2013 as a part of search operations in Rashmikant Bhatt Group along with other assessees belonging to the very group. The total disclosure was made of Rs. 20 crores, of which Rs. 3.80 crores was of the assessee firm. This was offered as an additional income of a year under survey and the return which was filed by the assessee for the A.Y. 2013-14 on 29th September, 2013. The total income disclosed and declared was Rs. 4,26,92,360 which was inclusive of the said sum of Rs. 3.80 crores. The assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) on 28th December, 2015 without any addition, whereby the return filed by the assessee was accepted. However, the Assessing Officer had initiated the penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) on the ground of concealment. The stand of the assessee is that the amount of Rs. 3.80 crores cannot be treated as concealed income since the same had been declared in the return filed by the assessee. This was not accepted by the Assessing Officer and a penalty was imposed u/s 271(1)(c) at the rate of 100 per cent tax on the income to the tune of Rs. 3.80 crores.

The Commissioner (Appeals) cancelled the penalty. The Tribunal concurred with the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised.

“Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has erred in law and on fact in deleting the penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, amounting to Rs. 1,18,00,000 despite the fact that penalty was levied on admitted net undisclosed income of Rs. 3.80 crores received as ‘on money’, which was unearthed based on diary found and impounded by Investigation Wing during survey proceedings and also admitted by one of the partners in the statement recorded u/s. 131(1A) of the Act and the said ‘on money’ income was not accounted for in the regular books of account of the assessee on the date of survey?”

The Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Income-tax survey had taken place on 9th January, 2013 as a part of search operation of the entire group and out of additional Rs. 20 crores disclosed, Rs. 3.80 crores was attributed to the assessee-firm. The return was filed u/s. 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the assessee for the A.Y. 2013-14 on 29th September, 2013, which was about eight months after the survey which was conducted. The books of account were not closed and it was not a case of any revised return being filed by the assessee. In such circumstances, the Assessing Officer also had not added any other income as the amount of Rs. 3.80 crores had already been declared in the return itself.

ii) There was no concealment of income and hence penalty could not be imposed.”

Method of accounting — Assessee a builder and developer and not construction contractor — AS 7 applicable only in case of contractors — Assessee adopting completed contract method for A.Y. 2006-07 — No income offered in subsequent A.Y. 2007-08 — Result revenue neutral

42 CIT vs. Varun Developers [2021] 440 ITR 354 (Karn) A.Ys.: 2006-07 and 2007-08; Date of order: 8th February, 2021 Ss.80-IB(10), 145 of ITA, 1961

Method of accounting — Assessee a builder and developer and not construction contractor — AS 7 applicable only in case of contractors — Assessee adopting completed contract method for A.Y. 2006-07 — No income offered in subsequent A.Y. 2007-08 — Result revenue neutral

The assessee was a builder and developer and not a construction contractor simpliciter. Assessee adopted completed contract method for the A.Y. 2006-07 onwards. Following the said method the assessee did not offer any income for the A.Y. 2007-08. The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim and made addition applying the percentage completion method.

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

In appeal by the Revenue, the following question was raised before the High Court.   

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the income of the assessee from project ‘Mantri Sarovar’ has to be computed for the A.Y. 2006-07 on the basis of ‘Project completion method’ without appreciating that as per AS-7 and AS-9, the assessee has to follow percentage completion method as the assessee is a builder and developer?”

The Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) U/s. 145(1) of the Act, the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of business” shall be computed in accordance with either the cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. The general provision was subject to accounting standards that the Central Government may notify.

ii) The assessee was a builder and developer and not a construction contractor simpliciter. Accounting Standard 7, titled construction contracts, was applicable only in case of contractors and did not apply to the case of developers and builders as evident from the opinion rendered by the expert advisory committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. No income from the project was offered for the A.Y. 2007-08 on the basis of the project completion method and either method of accounting finally would lead to the same results in terms of profits and therefore, was revenue neutral.

iii) The substantial question of law is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.”

Business expenditure — Capital or revenue expenditure — Tests — Ware-house business — Expenditure incurred to raise floor level of existing godown to avoid damage to goods and to retain customers — No new asset created — Expenditure incurred for carrying on and conducting business and forming integral part of profit-earning process — Deductible revenue expenditure

41 Jetha Properties Pvt. Ltd. vs. CIT [2021] 440 ITR 524 (Bom) A.Y.: 1991-92; Date of order: 9th December, 2021 S. 37 of ITA, 1961

Business expenditure — Capital or revenue expenditure — Tests — Ware-house business — Expenditure incurred to raise floor level of existing godown to avoid damage to goods and to retain customers — No new asset created — Expenditure incurred for carrying on and conducting business and forming integral part of profit-earning process — Deductible revenue expenditure

The assessee was a warehouse keeper. Due to flooding during the rains, when the customer’s goods which were clothing material manufactured for export got damaged the customer cautioned the assessee that if no remedial measure was taken it would have to change its business arrangement with the assessee. Therefore, the assessee raised the floor height to preserve the goods of its customers. Thereafter, the customer raised the warehousing charges from Rs. 1.20 per sq. ft. per week to Rs. 1.50 per sq. ft. per week.

On the question whether the expenditure incurred by the assessee for raising the floor height was revenue expenditure as claimed by the assessee or capital expenditure as claimed by the Department, the Bombay High Court held as under:

“i) The test to be applied whether an expenditure is revenue expenditure or not depends on whether the expenditure is related to the carrying on or conduct of the business and is an integral part of the profit-earning process. If the expenditure is so connected with the carrying on of the business that it may be regarded as an integral part of the profit-earning process, the expenditure cannot be treated as a capital expenditure but is revenue expenditure.

ii) The expenditure was incurred by the assessee wholly and solely to ensure that the existing business with the customer, which offered attractive returns to it was continued uninterrupted. The expenditure incurred by the assessee had direct relation to the business with the customer because the assessee had also received corresponding increased compensation from the customer. The expenditure did not bring into existence any new asset. There was a benefit by way of continuing business with the customer or increase in compensation from the customer. The assessee had achieved both these objectives by incurring the expenditure. The assessee had satisfactorily explained that the expenditure was for the purpose of conducting its business and increase in profit. The expenditure so incurred was related to the carrying on or conducting of warehouse business of the assessee and hence, it was as an integral part of the profit-earning process. The expenditure, therefore, could not be treated as capital expenditure but should be treated as revenue expenditure.”

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Grant of personal hearing where there is variation of income and requested by assessee — Failure to grant personal hearing requested by assessee on passing of draft assessment order — Assessment order and consequential demand and penalty notices set aside — Matter remanded to AO to grant personal hearing through video conferencing

40 Civitech Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2021] 440 ITR 398 (Del) A.Y.: 2018-19; Date of order: 22nd July, 2021 Ss. 143(3), 144B(7) of ITA, 1961

Assessment — Faceless assessment — Grant of personal hearing where there is variation of income and requested by assessee — Failure to grant personal hearing requested by assessee on passing of draft assessment order — Assessment order and consequential demand and penalty notices set aside — Matter remanded to AO to grant personal hearing through video conferencing

The assessee was in real estate business. For the A.Y. 2018-19, a notice was issued against the assessee proposing to make addition to its income. The assessee filed a response and sought personal hearing through video conferencing. Another notice was served with the draft assessment order reducing the addition in response to which the assessee filed a detailed reply with documents and again sought a personal hearing through video conferencing to explain the issues which were complex in nature to the Assessing Officer in correct perspective with the layout plan, the disputed land and the towers which were incomplete. However, no personal hearing was allowed and assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 enhancing the income and consequential demand and penalty notices were issued.

The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“Section 144B(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides an opportunity for a personal hearing, if requested by the assessee. As the option to opt for personal hearing was not enabled, the assessee due to technical glitches could not request for personal hearing on the e-portal. Consequently, it could not be said that the assessee did not opt for personal hearing. Therefore, the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) read with section 144B and the consequential demand and penalty notices were set aside.”

The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer to grant an opportunity of personal hearing to the assessee through video conferencing.

Section 90 of the Act; Protocol to India-Spain DTAA – Protocol containing MFN clause is an integral part of DTAA and gets imported on notification of DTAA itself and does not require separate notification. This condition of Circular is contrary to section 90(1) of the Act read with DTAA and hence not binding on the taxpayer. Also, it cannot have retroactive applicability

7 GRI Renewable Industries SL vs. ACIT  [TS – 79 – ITAT – 2022 – (Pune)] ITA No: 202/Pun/2021 A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 15th February, 2022

Section 90 of the Act; Protocol to India-Spain DTAA – Protocol containing MFN clause is an integral part of DTAA and gets imported on notification of DTAA itself and does not require separate notification. This condition of Circular is contrary to section 90(1) of the Act read with DTAA and hence not binding on the taxpayer. Also, it cannot have retroactive applicability

FACTS
Assessee, a tax resident of Spain, received FTS and royalty income from India. Relying upon MFN clause in India-Spain DTAA read with Article 12 of India-Portugal DTAA assessee claimed taxation at 10% as against 20% provided in India-Spain DTAA. CIT(A) affirmed AO’s order. AO rejected the assessee’s claim on the ground that the MFN clause could not be applied automatically as section 90 requires separate notification. DRP affirmed the order of AO.

Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD
• India entered DTAA with Portuguese (a member of OECD Country) vide notification dated 16th June, 2020. Article 12 of India-Portuguese DTAA provides a tax rate of 10% for FTS and royalty.

•    India-Spain DTAA was signed on 8th February, 1993, entered into force on 12th January, 1995 and was notified on 21st April, 1995. Protocol containing the MFN clause was stated in DTAA to be an integral part of DTAA. It was also signed on 8th February, 1993.

•    CBDT Circular No.3/2022 dated 3rd February, 2022 mandates issuing separate notification for importing of benefits of a treaty with second State into the treaty with the first State by relying on section 90(1) of the Act.

•    This condition of Circular is contrary to section 90(1) of the Act read with DTAA, which treats protocol as an integral part of the DTAA.

•    On notifying the DTAA, all its integral parts get automatically notified. There is no need to notify the individual limbs of the DTAA again to make them operational one by one.

•    Circular issued by CBDT is binding on AO and not on the assessee.

•    Circular prescribing additional stipulation that creates disability cannot operate retrospectively to transactions taking place in any period anterior to its issuance.

Method of valuation of shares adopted by the assessee could be challenged by Assessing Officer only if it was not a recognized method of valuation as per Rule 11UA(2)

30 Him Agri Fesh (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO  [2021] 90 ITR(T) 95 (Amritsar – Trib.) ITA No.: 224 (Asr.) of 2018 A.Y.: 2014-15  Date of order: 7th July, 2021

Method of valuation of shares adopted by the assessee could be challenged by Assessing Officer only if it was not a recognized method of valuation as per Rule 11UA(2)

FACTS
In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer doubted the quantum of the premium received on the issue of shares.

During the course of assessment proceedings, though the Assessing Officer asked the assessee to file a certificate as per Rule 11UA but, the assessee had submitted that Rule 11UA was not applicable to the case of the assessee.

Since the assessee failed to comply with provisions of Rule 11UA, the Assessing Officer calculated the Fair Market Value and made an addition on that basis, u/s 56(2)(viib). The CIT (A) dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

Consequently, the assessee filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT observed that during the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee was not able to submit the report as made by the Chartered Accountant as per Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method due to the negligence of the counsel. However, it had filed the copy of the said valuation report with the CIT(A) but the same was neither considered by her nor any comment was given on the same.

The ITAT was of the opinion that once the assessee had opted for valuation of shares under Rule 11 UA by following the DCF method, then it was not open for the assessing officer or the CIT(A) to adopt a different method of valuation, for determining the fair market value. As per Rule 11UA, the choice is given to the assessee and not to the assessing officer. The assessing officer is duty-bound to examine the working of the DCF method but has no right to change the method of calculating the fair market value of the shares. Once an assessee had exercised its option of opting for the DCF method, then the said method is required to be applied; however that the assessing officer has the power to review the calculations and correct adoption of the parameters applied by the assessee for the purpose of arriving at valuation of the shares by applying the DCF method.

It held that the law has specifically conferred an option upon the assessee that for the purpose of section 56(2)(viib) of the Act, an assessee can adopt any of the methods mentioned u/r 11UA(2). Therefore, in the instant case also, the assessee was free to choose any of the methods mentioned u/r 11UA(2). The method of valuation could be challenged by the Assessing Officer only if it was not a recognized method of valuation (as per Rule 11UA(2)) since the very purpose of certification of DCF valuation by a merchant banker or (at the relevant time) by a chartered accountant was to ensure that the valuation is fair and reasonable.

Since, in the instant case, the CIT (A) had not examined the method adopted by the assessee, the same could not be rejected. On this reasoning, the matter was remanded back to the file of the Assessing Officer with a direction to consider the report filed by the assessee.

It was also directed that the Assessing Officer was bound by the decision rendered in the case of Innoviti Payment Solutions (P.) Ltd. vs. ITO [2019] 102 taxmann.com 59/175 ITD 10 (Bang. – Trib.) wherein it was held that the AO can scrutinize the valuation report and if the AO is not satisfied with the explanation of the assessee, he has to record the reasons and basis for not accepting the valuation report submitted by the assessee and only thereafter- he can adopt his own valuation or obtain fresh valuation report from an independent valuer and confront the assessee. But he has no power to change the method of valuation opted by the assessee if it is one of the methods recognised u/r 11UA(2).  

Expenditure incurred on a new project of starting a hotel chain for expansion of an existing business of real estate development and financing was to be considered as expenditure for the purpose of carrying on existing business and thus allowable as revenue expenditure u/s 37(1)

29 ITO vs. Blue Coast Infrastructure Development Ltd.  [2021] 90 ITR(T) 294 (Chandigarh – Trib.) ITA No.: 143 (Chd) of 2019 A.Y.: 2013-14 Date of order: 23rd July, 2021

Expenditure incurred on a new project of starting a hotel chain for expansion of an existing business of real estate development and financing was to be considered as expenditure for the purpose of carrying on existing business and thus allowable as revenue expenditure u/s 37(1)

FACTS
Assessee-company was engaged in the business of real estate development and financing. It expanded its business into starting a hotel chain. It incurred certain expenses like professional fees in connection with the said project and claimed the same u/s 37 of the Act. However, the Assessing Officer disallowed the same. The CIT (A) deleted the disallowance on the grounds that the business of the assessee was in existence and the expenses were incurred in connection with the expansion of business.

Aggrieved, the revenue filed appeal to the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT dismissed the revenue’s appeal on the following grounds:

The ITAT observed that the CIT (A) had made findings that the assessee’s business was an existing business, whose expansion was under consideration and expenses for the same were incurred. There was no change in management, and there was interlacing of funds, and the genuineness of the expenses was not doubted. The expenses incurred were in the same line of the existing business of the assessee.

The ITAT held that the decision of the CIT (A) was based on the ratio laid down by the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. SRF Ltd. [2015] 59 taxmann.com 180/232 Taxman 727/372 ITR 425, the Mumbai ITAT in Reliance Footprint Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT [2014] 41 taxmann.com 553/63 SOT 124 (URO) as also in decision of the co-ordinate bench in DSM Sinochem Pharmaceuticals India (P) Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2017] 82 taxmann.com 316 (CHD – Trib.).

In Sinochem Pharmaceuticals (supra), the ITAT relied on Calcutta High Court decision in Kesoram Industries & Cotton Mills Ltd. [1992] 196 ITR 845 (Cal.), wherein it was held that if the expenses are incurred in connection with the setting up of a new business, such expenses will be on capital account but where the setting up does not amount to starting of a new business but expansion or extension of the business already being carried on by the assessee, expenses in connection with such expansion or extension of the business must be held to be deductible as revenue expenses. In that case, the expenditure was not related to the setting up a new factory; it pertained to exploring the feasibility of expanding or extending the existing business by setting up a new factory in the same line of business. Thus, since there was an expansion or extension of the existing business of the assessee, the same was to be considered as revenue expenditure.

To conclude, since the CIT (A) relied on the cases referred to above including the decision of co-ordinate bench, the ITAT upheld the findings of the CIT (A) and dismissed the appeal of the revenue.

HOW PREVALENT IS THE CONCEPT OF DE FACTO CONTROL?

INTRODUCTION
An investor with less than a majority of the voting rights may have rights that are sufficient to give it power and the practical ability to direct the relevant activities of the investee unilaterally: typically known as ‘de facto control’. Concluding whether an entity has de facto control over another entity can at times be highly judgemental and challenging. This article considers the requirements of Ind AS 110 Consolidated Financial Statements, analyses them and lucidly summarizes the principles using live examples of de facto control applied by companies.

Extracts of Ind AS 110 Consolidated Financial Statements
B41 An investor with less than a majority of the voting rights has rights that are sufficient to give it power when the investor has the practical ability to direct the relevant activities unilaterally.

B42 When assessing whether an investor’s voting rights are sufficient to give it power, an investor considers all facts and circumstances, including:

(a) the size of the investor’s holding of voting rights relative to the size and dispersion of holdings of the other vote holders, noting that:

(i) the more voting rights an investor holds, the more likely the investor is to have existing rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities;

(ii) the more voting rights an investor holds relative to other vote holders, the more likely the investor is to have existing rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities;

(iii) the more parties that would need to act together to outvote the investor, the more likely the investor is to have existing rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities;

(b) potential voting rights held by the investor, other vote holders or other parties;

(c) rights arising from other contractual arrangements; and

(d) any additional facts and circumstances that indicate the investor has, or does not have, the current ability to direct the relevant activities at the time that decisions need to be made, including voting patterns at previous shareholders’ meetings.

B43 When the direction of relevant activities is determined by majority vote and an investor holds significantly more voting rights than any other vote holder or organised group of vote holders, and the other shareholdings are widely dispersed, it may be clear, after considering the factors listed in paragraph B42 (a)–(c) alone, that the investor has power over the investee.

Application examples

Example 4

An
investor acquires 48 per cent of the voting rights of an investee. The
remaining voting rights are held by thousands of shareholders, none
individually holding more than 1 per cent of the voting rights. None of the
shareholders has any arrangements to consult any of the others or make
collective decisions. When assessing the proportion of voting rights to
acquire, on the basis of the relative size of the other shareholdings, the
investor determined that a 48 per cent interest would be sufficient to give
it control. In this case, on the basis of the absolute size of its holding
and the relative size of the other shareholdings, the investor concludes that
it has a sufficiently dominant voting interest to meet the power criterion
without the need to consider any other evidence of power.

 

Example 5

Investor A holds 40 per cent of the voting rights of an
investee and

twelve other investors each hold 5 per cent of the
voting rights of the

investee. A shareholder
agreement grants investor A the right to appoint, remove and set the
remuneration of management responsible for directing the relevant activities.
To change the agreement, a two- thirds majority vote of the shareholders is
required. In this case, investor A concludes that the absolute size of the
investor’s holding and the relative size of the other shareholdings alone are
not conclusive in determining whether the investor has rights sufficient to
give it power. However, investor A determines that its contractual right to
appoint, remove and set the remuneration of management is sufficient to
conclude that it has power over the investee. The fact that investor A might not
have exercised this right or the likelihood of investor A exercising its
right to select, appoint or remove management shall not be considered when
assessing whether investor A has power.

B44 In other situations, it may be clear after considering the factors listed in paragraph B42 (a)–(c) alone that an investor does not have power.

Application example

Example 6

Investor A holds 45 per cent
of the voting rights of an investee. Two other investors each hold 26 per
cent of the voting rights of the investee. The remaining voting rights are
held by three other shareholders, each holding 1 per cent. There are no other
arrangements that affect decision-making. In this case, the size of investor
A’s voting interest and its size relative to the other shareholdings are
sufficient to conclude that investor A does not have power. Only two other
investors would need to co-operate to be able to prevent investor A from
directing the relevant activities of the investee.

B45 However, the factors listed in paragraph B42 (a)–(c) alone may not be conclusive. If an investor, having considered those factors, is unclear whether it has power, it shall consider additional facts and circumstances, such as whether other shareholders are passive in nature as demonstrated by voting patterns at previous shareholders’ meetings. This includes the assessment of the factors set out in paragraph B18 and the indicators in paragraphs B19 and B20. The fewer voting rights the investor holds, and the fewer parties that would need to act together to outvote the investor, the more reliance would be placed on the additional facts and circumstances to assess whether the investor’s rights are sufficient to give it power. When the facts and circumstances in paragraphs B18–B20 are considered together with the investor’s rights, greater weight shall be given to the evidence of power in paragraph B18 than to the indicators of power in paragraphs B19 and B20.

Application example

Example 7

An investor holds 45 per cent of the voting rights of
an investee. Eleven

other shareholders each hold 5 per cent of the voting
rights of the investee. None of the shareholders has contractual arrangements
to consult any of the others or make collective decisions. In this case, the
absolute size of the investor’s holding and the relative size of the other
shareholdings alone are not conclusive in determining whether the investor
has rights sufficient to give it power over the investee. Additional facts
and circumstances that may provide evidence that the investor has, or does
not have, power shall be considered.

 

Example 8

An investor holds 35 per
cent of the voting rights of an investee. Three other shareholders each hold
5 per cent of the voting rights of the investee. The remaining voting rights
are held by numerous other shareholders, none individually holding more than
1 per cent of the voting rights. None of the shareholders has arrangements to
consult any of the others or make collective decisions. Decisions about the
relevant activities of the investee require the approval of a majority of
votes cast at relevant shareholders’ meetings—75 per cent of the voting
rights of the investee have been cast at recent relevant shareholders’
meetings. In this case, the active participation of the other shareholders at
recent shareholders’ meetings indicates that the investor would not have the
practical ability to direct the relevant activities unilaterally, regardless
of whether the investor has directed the relevant activities because a
sufficient number of other shareholders voted in the same way as the
investor.

B46 If it is not clear, having considered the factors listed in paragraph B42 (a)–(d), that the investor has power, the investor does not control the investee.

ANALYSIS OF THE DE FACTO CONTROL EXAMPLES
As can be seen from the above provisions, the requirements are set out more like principles, and there are no bright-line tests, making the decision on de facto control extremely judgemental. When it is not clear whether the investor has de facto control, the default position is that the investor does not control the investee.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the examples provided under Ind AS 110:

• In Example 4, the investor holds 48% voting rights, and the remaining 52% is widely spread. Here, the conclusion is straightforward. In practice, the starting point for determining de facto control is 45% voting rights, when the remaining 55% is widely spread. However, that does not mean that a 40% voting right with the remaining 60% voting rights widely spread will straight-away disqualify. A 40% voting right may qualify as de facto control if other facts and circumstances indicate that the investor has the practical ability to direct the relevant activities unilaterally of the other entity. For example, the investor may have some formal agreements of support from other major investors, or it may have contractual rights to appoint, remove and remunerate the key management personnel. Here, the emphasis is on contractual rights and not that the investor appoints, removes or remunerates the key management personnel, even without those contractual rights.

• In Example 5, the investor has 40% voting rights, with the remaining 60% voting rights held by 12 investors equally, i.e. 5% each. Typically, the investor in such circumstances will not have de facto control. However, in this example, the investor has contractual rights to appoint, remove and remunerate the decision-makers of the investee and therefore exercises control through a combination of 40% voting rights and contractual rights. Sometimes, contractual rights may be to appoint and remove a majority of the board of directors that drive the relevant activities of the company, which would certainly provide the investor with control. Those contractual rights may either be entered into with all other investors or embedded in the articles of association or other constitutional documents, such as the shareholder’s agreement.

• In Example 6, the investor has 45% voting rights, with two other investors having 26% voting right each. If these two investors get together, the investors voting rights of 45% will not be sufficient to trump the 52% combined voting rights of the other two investors. It does not matter whether the two investors have an agreement or not between themselves to vote against the 45% investor. However, if the 45% investor has an agreement with one of the 26% investors to act in concert, then either the 45% investor or the 26% investor would have control which will depend upon which investor has agreed to support which other investor.

• In Example 7, an investor has 45% voting rights, and the remaining voting rights are held 5% each by 11 other investors. Additionally, there are no other contractual arrangements or matters that change the fact pattern. Here, the 45% investor cannot assume that two other investors holding 5% voting rights each may co-operate with him or have co-operated with him in the past, and as a result, the 45% investor has de facto control. In this example, the 45% investor would not have de facto control, despite a significant size of the investment, absent other facts and circumstances that may change the decision. Although the 45% size is large enough, it cannot be seen in isolation. When seen in the context of the shareholding of the other investors, and the dispersion, and absent any contractual arrangements, the accounting conclusion is that the 45% investor does not have control.

• In Example 8, the investors voting rights of 35% is considered to be of a small size in the context of significant participation by other shareholders in the general body meetings, as well as the existence of three major investors holding 5% each, with which the investor does not have any contractual arrangements. It does not matter that the investor has been able to exercise his voting powers to his advantage for several years; but that alone will not mean that the investor can consolidate the investee as a subsidiary. If this example was extended such that 34% other investors vote at general body meetings, it may indicate the 35% investor exercising control (35% > 34%, total voting is 69%). However, it is highly unlikely that the investee would qualify as a subsidiary for the 35% investor, given that the size of the investment is relatively very low and the presence of other significant investors. Even if the significant investors did not exist, the 35% investor would not qualify for de facto control, unless for example, there is absolutely poor participation at the general body meeting, say other investors holding not more than 10% voting rights vote, and there is no precedence in the past, of that having exceeded 15%.

As can be seen from the above, the principles of de facto control have to be applied to each fact pattern very carefully. Just because an investor is able to exercise his voting powers to his advantage, it does not on its own suggest that the investor should treat the investee as its subsidiary.

EXAMPLES OF DE FACTO CONTROL
A perusal of the examples below suggests that the investors holding should be significant to reach the de facto threshold; in most cases, it is around 45% or more. Other facts and circumstances would have also played a critical role in deciding on de facto control. In the absence of that information, it may not be appropriate to conclude basis the examples exhibited below.

CHOLAMANDALAM
FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LIMITED

 

The Company holds 45.47% of
the total shareholding in CIFCL as at March 31, 2021 (45.50% as at March 31,
2020) and has de-facto control as per the principles of Ind AS 110 and
accordingly CIFCL has been considered as a subsidiary in Ind AS Financial
Statements.

(Source:
2020-21 Annual Report)

TATA
COMMUNICATIONS

 

Tata Sons Pvt Limited is
controlling Tata Communication by virtue of holding 48.90%.

 

On 28 May 2018, Tata Sons
Private Limited (‘TSPL’) and its wholly owned subsidiary, Panatone Finvest
Limited (‘Panatone’), increased their combined stake in the Company to 48.90%
there by gaining de-facto control as per Ind-AS. Accordingly, the Company has
classified TSPL and Panatone as “Controlling Entities” and disclosed
subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates of Controlling Entities and their
subsidiaries as the ‘Affiliates’ of the Controlling entities, effective this
date.

(Source:
2019-20 Annual Report)

 

GODREJ
INDUSTRIES LIMITED

 

During the year, Godrej
Properties Limited has allotted 25,862,068 equity shares (Previous Year:
22,629,310 equity shares) of face value of Rs 5 each through Qualified
Institutions Placement. This has resulted in the dilution of equity holding
of the Company from 49.36% to 44.76%. The Company (GIL) has power and de
facto control over Godrej Properties Limited (GPL) (even without overall
majority of shareholding and voting power). Accordingly, there is no loss of
control of GIL over GPL post the QIP and GIL continues to consolidate GPL as
a subsidiary.

(Source:
2020-21 Annual Report)

RPSG
VENTURES

 

Parent- under de facto
control as defined in Ind-AS 110

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Source:
2020-21 Annual Report)

 

BOMBAY
BURMAH TRADING CORPORATION LIMITED

 

The Company along with its
Subsidiaries holds 39.67% of the paid up Equity Share Capital of Bombay
Dyeing & Manufacturing Corporation (BMDC), a Company listed on the Bombay
Stock Exchange. Based on legal opinion and further based on internal
evaluation made by the Company, there is no de facto control of the Company
over BDMC.

(Source:
2019-20 Annual Report)

 

BRITISH
AMERICAN TOBACCO

 

Investments in associates
and joint ventures – On 30 July 2004, the Group completed the agreement to
combine the US domestic business of Brown & Williamson (B&W), one of
its subsidiaries, with R.J. Reynolds. This combination resulted in the
formation of RAI, which was 58% owned by R.J. Reynolds’ shareholders and 42%
owned by the Group. The Group has concluded that it does not have de facto
control of RAI because of the operation of the governance agreement between
the Group and RAI which ensures that the Group does not have the practical
ability to direct the relevant activities of RAI; in particular, the Group
cannot nominate more than five of the Directors (out of 13 or proportionally
less if there are less than 13 Directors) unless it owns 100% of RAI or some
other party owns more than 50%. In addition, there are no other contractual
arrangements which would give the Group the ability to direct RAI’s
operations. Manufacturing and cooperation agreements between RAI and the
Group have been agreed on an arm’s length basis.

(Source:
2015 Annual Report)

CONCLUSION
In India, several companies have significant promoter ownership, though the promoters may not hold a clear absolute majority, such as a shareholding greater than 50%. Therefore, the concept of de facto control becomes all the more important. As can be seen from the above discussion, even if a promoter is able to exercise his voting powers to his advantage, it may not be appropriate to conclude that the investee is a subsidiary with respect to that promoter unless the absolute and relative size of the holding held by the promoter is substantial, and there are other facts and circumstances including the extent of dispersion of other holdings or contractual arrangements, that suggest that the promoter has control over the investee.  

FRESH CLAIM IN A RETURN FILED IN RESPONSE TO A NOTICE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 148

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
In Volume 53 of BCAJ (January, 2022), we covered the issue of the validity of a fresh claim, made otherwise than by way of revising the return of income. Such fresh claim can be in respect of any deduction, exemption etc., which has not been claimed in the return of income already filed. Yet another facet of this controversy is sought to be addressed here. When it is found that an income chargeable to tax has escaped the assessment, the Assessing Officer is empowered to reopen the case and reassess the income under Section 147. In such cases, the assessee has to be served with a notice u/s 148 requiring him to furnish his return of income. The question that frequently arises, for consideration of the courts, is as to whether the assessee can furnish a return of income in response to the notice issued u/s 148, declaring an income lesser than what has already been declared/assessed prior to issuance of the notice by making a fresh claim for an allowance or deduction therein.

In the case of CIT vs. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. 198 ITR 297, the Supreme Court held that it was not open to the assessee to seek a review of the concluded item, unconnected with the escapement of income, in the reassessment proceeding. Following this decision, several High Courts, including the Madras, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts, have taken the view that the income returned in response to the notice issued u/s 148 cannot be lesser than the amount of income originally declared/assessed. However, recently, the Karnataka High Court has taken a contrary view on the issue after considering the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (supra).

SATYAMANGALAM AGRICULTURAL PRODUCER’S CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING SOCIETY LTD.’S CASE

The issue had earlier come up for consideration of the Madras high court in the case of Satyamangalam Agricultural Producer’s Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. vs. ITO 40 taxmann.com 45.

The assessment years involved in this case were 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000. The assessee was dealing with the marketing of agricultural produce of members, sale of liquor and consumer goods. It had filed its returns of income for the assessment years under consideration and the returns filed were also processed u/s 143(1)(a). Later, the Assessing Officer issued notices u/s 148 on noticing that deduction u/s 80P was wrongly claimed regarding income derived from the sale of liquor. In response to the notices issued u/s 148, the assessee society filed returns of income wherein it also claimed deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) in respect of its interest income on investments with co-operative banks, which was not claimed in filing the first return of income. This being a fresh claim made by the assessee in the returns filed in response to the notice issued u/s 148, it was rejected by the Assessing Officer by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (supra).

The Commissioner (Appeals), as well as the ITAT, confirmed the Assessing Officer’s order. Before the High Court, the assessee contended that the claim made in response to the notice u/s 148 could not have been rejected at the threshold itself since it was never assessed earlier and their returns only processed u/s 143(1); since the proceedings were completed u/s 143(1), the claims made were never considered initially; the assessments to be made u/s 147 were required to be considered as the regular assessments under which such claims could have been made. The assessee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case ITO vs. K.L. Srihari (HUF) 250 ITR 193.

The High Court held that when there was no dispute that the claim made by the assessee about the interest income on investment was not made in the original return, and only a fresh claim was made for the first time in the return filed in pursuance of notice u/s 148, such fresh claims could not be allowed as the proceedings u/s 147 were for the benefit of the Revenue. The High Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (supra) and decided the issue against the assessee.

A similar view has been taken by the High Courts in the following cases –

• CIT vs. Caixa Economica De Goa 210 ITR 719 (Bom)

• K. Sudhakar S. Shanbhag vs. ITO 241 ITR 865 (Bom)

• CIT vs. Keshoram Industries Ltd. 144 Taxman 1 (Calcutta)

THE KARNATAKA STATE CO-OPERATIVE APEX BANK LTD.’S CASE

The issue, recently, came up for consideration before the Karnataka High Court in the case of The Karnataka State Co-Operative Apex Bank Limited vs. DCIT 130 taxmann.com 114.

In this case, for A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee had filed its return of income on 31st October,2007, declaring a total income of Rs. 40,77,27,150. No assessment u/s 143(3) was made for that year. The Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s 148 on 31st March, 2012. The assessee filed the return of income in response to the aforesaid notice on 13th September, 2012 and declared a lower income of Rs. 32,56,61,835 claiming a loss on sale of securities to the extent of Rs. 8,28,65,052, not claimed in the first return of income. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer passed an order u/s 143(3) r.w.s 147 determining the assessee’s income at Rs. 51,71,70,670 and made the following additions:

a) disallowance of contributions made to funds – Rs. 10,86,43,782; and

b) denial of set-off of loss claimed on sale of securities – Rs. 8,28,65,052.

The CIT (A) as well as tribunal did not grant relief regarding the additional claim of loss made by the assessee on account of the sale of securities on the ground that the aforesaid additional claim was not made in the original assessment proceeding. The assessee preferred the further appeal before the High Court raising the following substantial questions of law –

1) Whether the Tribunal is right in applying the ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. Sun Engineering (P.) Ltd. 198 ITR 297 (SC) and holding that concluded issue in the original proceeding cannot be reagitated in reassessment proceedings even though the case of the appellant is distinguishable inasmuch as there was no original assessment proceedings on the facts and circumstances of the case?

2) Whether the Tribunal was justified in law in not appreciating that the notice u/s 148 of the Act was issued to “assess” the income and thus all contentions in law remained open for the appellant to agitate by filling a return in response to the notice u/s 148 of the Act on the facts and circumstances of the case?

3) Whether the Tribunal is justified in law in holding that the appellant is not entitled to make additional claim of loss incurred of Rs. 8,28,65,052/- in the reassessment proceedings under section 147 of the Act on the facts and circumstances of the case?

4) Whether the Tribunal is right in not holding that the appellant is entitled to the additional claim of actual loss incurred of Rs. 8,28,65,052/- on account of sale of government securities on the facts and circumstances of the case?

Before the High Court, the assessee submitted that there was no original assessment for the same assessment year, and only an intimation u/s 143(1) was issued to the assessee. The said intimation u/s 143(1) was not an order of assessment as held by the Supreme Court in the case of ACIT vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P.) Ltd. 291 ITR 500. Therefore, the issue of loss on sale of securities was not considered by the Assessing Officer and has not reached finality. The assessee also urged that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (supra) should not be applied in its case on the ground that in that case the original order of assessment had attained finality and, therefore, it was held that the assessee could not agitate the issues in reassessment proceedings. Further, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Jagan Mohan Rao vs. CIT & Excess Profit Tax 75 ITR 373 in which it was held that the original assessment got effaced upon issuance of notice of reassessment and the subsequent assessment proceedings has to be done afresh. The assessee also relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in ITO vs. Mewalal Dwarka Prasad 176 ITR 529 (SC) and ITO vs. K.L. Sri Hari (HUF) 250 ITR 193 (SC) as well as on the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Mysore Iron & Steel Ltd. 157 ITR 531, Nitesh Bera (HUF) vs. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 585 of 2016, dated 17th February, 2021] and CIT vs. Avasarala Automation Ltd. [Writ Appeal Nos. 1411-1413 of 2004, dated 5th April, 2005].

On the other hand, the revenue relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. (supra) and argued that it still held the field. It was submitted that Section 148 of the Act provided a remedy to the revenue and not to the assessee. If the assessee discovered any omission or any wrong statement in the original return filed after the time limit to revise u/s 139(5) expired, the only remedy which was available to the assessee was to file a return and to seek condonation of delay in filing the return u/s 119 where the time for completion of assessment was not over.

The High Court referred to the decision of a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of V Jagan Mohan Rao (supra) wherein it was held that when there was a reassessment or assessment u/s 147, the original assessment proceeding, if any, got effaced and the reassessment or assessment has to be done afresh. The High Court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mewalal Dwarka Prasad (supra) in which it was held that once proceeding u/s 148 of the Act was initiated, the original order of assessment got effaced. The court noted that in Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. (supra), it was held that in a proceeding for reassessment, the issues forming part of the original assessment could not be agitated, whereas, in Mewalal Dwarka Prasad (supra), it was held that once proceeding u/s 148 was initiated, original order of assessment got effaced.

The High Court further referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.L. Srihari (HUF) (supra), in which the matter was referred to a three judges bench considering divergence of view so taken in the earlier cases. The relevant portion from the decision of the Supreme Court as reproduced in its order by the Karnataka High Court is as follows –

1. By order dated 19th November, 1996, these special leave petitions have been directed to be placed before the three-judge Bench because it was felt that dissonant views have been expressed by different Benches of this court on the scope and effect of reopening of an assessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It has been pointed out before us that the matter has earlier been considered by a Bench of three judges in V. Jagan Mohan Rao vs. CIT and EPT and the observations in the said case came up for consideration before two judges’ Benches of this court in ITO vs. Mewalal Dwarka Prasad [1989] 176 ITR 529 and in CIT vs. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 297 and that there is a difference in the views expressed in said later judgments.

2. We have heard Shri Ranbir Chandra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, and Shri Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents. We have also perused the original assessment order dated 19th March, 1983, as well as the subsequent assessment order that was passed on 16th July, 1987, after the reopening of the assessment under section 147. On a consideration of the order dated 16th, July, 1987, we are satisfied that the said assessment order makes a fresh assessment of the entire income of the respondent-assessee and the High Court was, in our opinion, right in proceeding on the basis that the earlier assessment order had been effaced by the subsequent order. In these circumstances, we do not consider it necessary to go into the question that is raised and the same is left open. The special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed.

In view of the above, the High Court held that, in the case of the assessee, there was no original assessment order and it was only an intimation u/s 143(1), which could not be treated to be an order in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Jhaveri (supra). Therefore, the proceeding u/s 148 was the first assessment and the same could have been done after taking into consideration all the claims of the assessee including the one made in filing the return in response to the notice u/s 148. It was held that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. had no application to the fact of the case. It was also held that even if an intimation u/s 143(1) was considered to be an order of assessment, in the subsequent reassessment proceedings, the original assessment proceeding got effaced and the Assessing Officer was required to conduct the proceedings de novo and to consider the fresh claim of the assessee.

Accordingly, the High Court decided the issue in favour of the assessee and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer for adjudication of the fresh claim made by the assessee in its return filed in response to the notice issued u/s 148.

OBSERVATIONS
The scope of assessment in a case where a notice is issued u/s 148 is governed by section 147 which provides as under (as it existed prior to its substitution by the Finance Act, 2021) –

If the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year).

In Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd.’s case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the reference to ‘such income’ here would mean the income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment as referred in the initial part of the section and, therefore, the scope of assessment u/s 147 is limited only to the income which has escaped the assessment for which the proceeding has been initiated by issuing notice u/s 148. The only other income other than such escaped income which also can be included is any other escaped income which comes to the notice of the Assessing Officer subsequently in the course of the proceeding and which is not forming part of the reasons recorded for the issuance of notice u/s 148.

In the case of V. Jaganmohan Rao (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the case wherein the assessment was reopened with regard to the escaped income which accrued to the assessee as a result of the decision of the Privy Council in a dispute related to title of the property. While finally assessing the income, the Assessing Officer not only taxed such escaped income accruing as a result of the decision of the Privy Council but also assessed the other portion of the income which accrued to the assessee in accordance with the judgement of the High Court. The assessee contested it on the ground that at the time when the original order of assessment was passed, the ITO could have legitimately assessed the other income which was due to be assessed as per the judgment of the High Court and that there was, therefore, an escapement only to the extent of the income accruing as a result of the decision of the Privy Council. It is in this context, the Supreme Court held as under –

Section 34 in terms states that once the Income-tax Officer decides to reopen the assessment he could do so within the period prescribed by serving on the person liable to pay tax a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under section 22(2) and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits or gains. It is, therefore, manifest that once assessment is reopened by issuing a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 the previous under-assessment is set aside and the whole assessment proceedings start afresh. When once valid proceedings are started under section 34(1)(b) the Income-tax Officer had not only the jurisdiction but it was his duty to levy tax on the entire income that had escaped assessment during that year (emphasis supplied).

Subsequent to this decision of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Jaganmohan Rao, several High Courts took the view that the assessee can seek relief even during the course of the reassessment proceeding by relying on the Supreme Court’s observation that the whole assessment proceeding would start afresh in case of reassessment. Later, this issue of whether the assessee can claim reliefs to his benefit during the course of the reassessment proceeding reached the Supreme Court in the case of Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. (supra) in which it was held as under –

37. The principle laid down by this Court in V. Jaganmohan Rao’s case (supra) therefore, is only to the extent that once an assessment is validly reopened by issuance of notice under section 32(2) of the 1922 Act (corresponding to section 148 of the 1961 Act), the previous under-assessment is set aside and the ITO has the jurisdiction and duty to levy tax on the entire income that had escaped assessment during the previous year. What is set aside is, thus, only the previous under-assessment and not the original assessment proceedings. ………..The judgment in V. Jaganmohan Roa’s case (supra), therefore, cannot be read to imply as laying down that in the reassessment proceedings validly initiated the assessee can seek reopening of the whole assessment and claim credit in respect of items finally concluded in the original assessment. The assessee cannot claim recomputation of the income or redoing of an assessment and be allowed a claim which he either failed to make or which was otherwise rejected at the time of original assessment which has since acquired finality. Of course, in the reassessment proceedings it is open to an assessee to show that the income alleged to have escaped assessment has in truth and in fact not escaped assessment but that the same had been shown under some inappropriate head in the original return, but to read the judgment in V. Jaganmohan Roa’s case (supra) as if laying down that reassessment wipes out the original assessment and that reassessment is not only confined to ‘escaped assessment’ or ‘under-assessment’ but to the entire assessment for the year and start the assessment proceedings de novo giving right to an assessee to reagitate matters which he had lost during the original assessment proceeding, which had acquired finality, is not only erroneous but also against the phraseology of section 147 and the object of reassessment proceedings. Such an interpretation would be reading that judgment totally out of context in which the questions arose for decision in that case. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete ‘law’ declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court.

38. …..

39. As a result of the aforesaid discussion we find that in proceedings under section 147 the ITO may bring to charge items of income which had escaped assessment other than or in addition to that item or items which have led to the issuance of notice under section 148 and where reassessment is made under section 147 in respect of income which has escaped tax, the ITO’s jurisdiction is confined to only such income which has escaped tax or has been under-assessed and does not extend to revising, reopening or reconsidering the whole assessment or permitting the assessee to reagitate questions which had been decided in the original assessment proceedings. It is only the under-assessment which is set aside and not the entire assessment when reassessment proceedings are initiated (emphasis supplied). The ITO cannot make an order of reassessment inconsistent with the original order of assessment in respect of matters which are not the subject matter of proceedings under section 147. An assessee cannot resist validly initiated reassessment proceedings under this section merely by showing that other income which had been assessed originally was at too high a figure except in cases under section 152(2). The words ‘such income’ in section 147 clearly refer to the income which is chargeable to tax but has ‘escaped assessment’ and the ITO’s jurisdiction under the section is confined only to such income which has escaped assessment.

Keeping in view the object and purpose of the proceedings under section 147 which are for the benefit of the revenue and not an assessee, an assessee cannot be permitted to convert the reassessment proceedings as his appeal or revision, in disguise, and seek relief in respect of items earlier rejected or claim relief in respect of items not claimed in the original assessment proceedings, unless relatable to ‘escaped income’, and reagitate the concluded matters. Even in cases where the claims of the assessee during the course of reassessment proceedings related to the escaped assessment are accepted, still the allowance of such claims has to be limited to the extent to which they reduce the income to that originally assessed. The income for purposes of ‘reassessment’ cannot be reduced beyond the income originally assessed.

The Karnataka High Court, in the case of The Karnataka State Co-operative Apex Bank Ltd. (supra), observed that divergent views had been taken by the Supreme Court in these two cases i.e. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. (supra) and Mewalal Dwarka Prasad (supra). The High Court also by referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of V. Jagmohan Rao, Mewalal Dwarka Prasad and K.L. Srihari (HUF) (supra) observed that once proceeding u/s 148 was initiated, the original order of assessment got effaced.

In the case of Mewalal Dwarka Prasad (supra), the notice u/s 148 was issued for income escaping the assessment w.r.t three different cash credit entries in the assessee’s books during the year. When the assessee challenged the validity of the notice before the High Court, the High Court upheld its validity but only with respect to one of the cash credit entries, and for the balance two entries, the notice was held to be invalid. The revenue disputed these findings and argued that the High Court should not have examined the tenability of the assessee’s contention with regard to the other two transactions and that aspect should have been left to be considered by the ITO while making the reassessment as it was open to the ITO to examine not only the three items referred to in the notice but also whatever came within the legitimate ambit of an assessment proceeding. In this context, the Supreme Court held that it was not for the High Court to examine the validity of the notice u/s 148 regarding the two items if the High Court concluded that the notice was valid at least in respect of the remaining item. Whether the ITO, while making his reassessment, would take into account the other two items should have been left to be considered by the ITO in the fresh assessment proceeding.

In our respectful submission, in the case of Mewalal Dwarka Prasad (supra), the Supreme Court had dealt with the limited issue about whether the High Court should have considered the validity of notice on the basis of the other items of income when it was held to be valid at least for one of the items of escaped income. In this context, the Supreme Court referred to the decisions of several High Courts and also to its own decision in the case of V. Jaganmohan Rao wherein it was held that when a notice is issued u/s 148 based on a certain item of income that had escaped assessment, it is permissible for the income-tax authorities to include other items in the assessment, in addition to the item which had initiated and resulted in issuance notice u/s 148. As far as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.L. Srihari (HUF) (supra) is concerned, in its final order dated 25th March, 1998, a reference has been made to its earlier order dated 19th November, 1996 (in the same case) whereby the SLPs have been directed to be placed before the three-judges bench on the ground that dissonant views have been expressed in the cases of Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. and Mewalal Dwarka Prasad.

The Calcutta High Court in the case of Keshoram Industries Ltd. (supra) has considered the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of K.L. Srihari (HUF) (supra) and held as under:

8. True as contended by Mr. Khaitan in ITO vs. K.L. Srihari (HUF) [2001] 250 ITR 193 (SC), a three-judges Bench considered the following judgments:

(1)  CIT vs. Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 2971 (SC);
(2)  ITO vs. Mewalal Dwarka Prasad [1989] 176 ITR 529 (SC); and
(3)  V. Jaganmohan Rao vs. CIT and CEPT [1970] 75 ITR 373 (SC).

but observed that:

“In these circumstances we do not consider it necessary to go into the question that is raised and the same is left open…”. (p. 194)…………..

12. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, we are respectfully of the view that in ITO vs. K.L. Srihari (HUF) 250 ITR 193, the Supreme Court did not consider it necessary to go into the views expressed by different Benches of the Supreme Court on the scope and effect of reopening of an assessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act. We, respectfully, are, therefore, of the view that the judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 2971 has neither been dissented from nor overruled.

13. No doubt as contended by Mr. Khaitan, the judgment in CIT vs. Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd.[1992] 198 ITR 297 1 (SC), is a two-judges Bench judgment. By the said judgment, the three-judges Bench judgment in V. Jaganmohan Rao vs. CIT/CEPT [1970] 75 ITR 373 (SC), has not been and could not have been overruled. As noticed supra, the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 2971 has explained the principle laid down in V. Jaganmohan Rao vs. CIT/CEPT[1970] 75 ITR 373 (SC).

The decision of the Karnataka High Court has thrown open some very pertinent and interesting issues, some of which are listed hereunder:

•    Whether an assessment made u/s 143(3) r.w.s 147 is a fresh assessment or re-assessment where it is made in pursuance of an intimation u/s 143(1) or where no assessment was made.

•    Whether there was any conflict of views between the four decisions of the Supreme Court referred to and analyzed by the Karnataka High Court.

•    Whether the three decisions of the Supreme Court, other than the decision in the case of Sun Engineering Works (supra), held that the original assessments which were made got effaced and therefore an altogether fresh assessment is to be made as per the provisions of law.

•    Whether the decision in Supreme Court, being the latest in line, and delivered by the larger bench of three judges, could be said to have laid down the law permitting an assessee to make a fresh claim, when the court confirmed the decision of the Karnataka High Court, 197 ITR 694, which had held that the interest levied u/s 139(8) and 217 in original assessment was required to be deleted.

•    Whether the proceedings for re-assessment are necessary for the benefit of revenue.

• Whether the purpose and objective of the Income Tax Act are to levy tax on real income whenever assessed under the Act.

The decision of the Karnataka High Court, by opening a new possibility for the taxpayers, has thrown a serious challenge for the revenue. It would be better for the Supreme Court to examine the issue afresh and reconcile its views in the four decisions rendered by it, over a period of time, preferably by constituting a larger bench.

S. 179 r.w.s. 264 – Non speaking order – without any reasons – Orders set aside

11 Bhavesh Mohan Lakhwani vs. Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-12 & Anr; [W.P. No. 560 of 2021;  Date of order: 31st January, 2022 (Bombay High Court)]  

S. 179 r.w.s. 264 – Non speaking order – without any reasons – Orders set aside

The Petitioner had challenged the order dated 3rd March, 2020 passed by the Pr. CIT  u/s 264 of the Act rejecting the Petitioner’s Application filed u/s 264. The Petitioner had filed an application u/s 264 of the Act before Pr.CIT challenging the order u/s 179 of the Act dated 28th September, 2018  passed by the  Assessing Officer, against the  Petitioner for recovery of tax demand of Rs. 2,77,01,520 arising out of the assessment of M/s. Laxmi Realty & Advisory Pvt Ltd. The Petitioner being one of the directors of the said M/s. Laxmi Realty & Advisory Pvt Ltd during the relevant A.Y. 2015-16, therefore the Assessing officer had initiated and passed order u/s 179 of the Act against the Petitioner for recovery of tax demand of the said company.

The Hon. Court observed that both the orders under Section 179(1) and Section 264 of the said Act are without giving any reasons. In the order passed u/s 179(1), the Income Tax Officer simply says that there was a reply received from Petitioner, but the same is not being accepted. In the order passed under Section 264 of the said Act, the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax has not even dealt with the submissions made by the Petitioner.

In the circumstances, the Hon. Court set aside both the orders, i.e., the order dated 27th February, 2020, passed under Section 264 of the said Act and the order dated 28th September, 2018, passed under Section 179(1).

The Hon. Court further directed that the Assessing Officer  consider afresh the response filed by Petitioner and pass an order under Section 179(1) of the said Act in accordance with law and before any order is passed, the Petitioner shall be given a personal hearing, and notice of personal hearing shall be communicated to Petitioner at least two weeks in advance. If the Assessing Officer wishes to rely on any judgments or order passed by any Court or Tribunal, he shall provide a copy thereof to the Petitioner and allow him an opportunity to deal with those judgments or distinguish those judgments and those submissions of the Petitioner shall also be dealt with in the order.

Section 43CA does not apply in a situation where allotment letters are issued and part payments received prior to 1st April, 2013

28 Spenta Enterprises vs. ACIT  [TS-63-ITAT-2022(Mum.)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 27th January, 2022 Section: 43CA

Section 43CA does not apply in a situation where allotment letters are issued and part payments received prior to 1st April, 2013

FACTS
In the course of assessment proceedings of the assessee, carrying on the business of builders, developers and realtors, the Assessing Officer (AO) noted that there was a difference between agreement value and market value in respect of some of the properties. He issued a show cause to the assessee. In response, the assessee submitted that only in two cases the stamp duty value on the date of allotment was in excess of their respective agreement values. He further submitted that since allotment letters were issued and initial amounts received prior to coming into force of section 43CA, the provisions of section 43CA did not apply even to these two cases. To substantiate, the assessee submitted ledger copies of the buyer’s accounts and bank statements showing receipt of initial amounts from the buyer. The assessee also relied upon the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Krishna Enterprises vs. ACIT.

The AO, not being convinced by the submissions made by the assessee, added a sum of Rs. 8,26,329 to the total income of the assessee under section 43CA.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted the twin contentions of the assessee, namely that since section 43CA was introduced w.e.f. 1st April, 2013 and the agreements under consideration were entered into prior to 1st April, 2013; the provisions of section 43CA do not apply and because the difference between the ready reckoner rate and sale consideration was only 5%, the same needs to be ignored on the touchstone of the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Krishna Enterprises vs. ACIT. The Tribunal held that the assessee succeeds on both the counts. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the authorities below and decided the issue in favour of the assessee.

Sum accepted as a loan, which is found correct in principle, could not be treated as an amount received since there is a pre-condition of its return to be made to the creditor party. The fact that the creditor company’s name is subsequently struck off is contrary to the factual position in the impugned year

27 ITO vs. Hajeebu Venkata Seeta  [TS-50-ITAT-2022(Hyd.)] A.Y.: 2009-10; Date of order: 5th January, 2022 Section: 56

Sum accepted as a loan, which is found correct in principle, could not be treated as an amount received since there is a pre-condition of its return to be made to the creditor party. The fact that the creditor company’s name is subsequently struck off is contrary to the factual position in the impugned year

FACTS
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee received a sum of Rs. 2,84,00,000 from Synchron Infotech Pvt. Ltd. The amount so received was paid to Legend Infra Homes Pvt. Ltd. The purpose of the transactions was to purchase property from Legend Infra Homes Pvt. Ltd. by Synchron Infotech Pvt. Ltd.

This position was confirmed by bank transactions and copies of ledger account in the books of Synchron Infotech Pvt. Ltd., Legend Infra Homes Pvt. Ltd. and the assessee. The entry in the case of the assessee is that the relevant sum was given to Legend Infra “towards advance for purchase of property on behalf of Synchron”. The ledger account of Legend Infra Homes Ltd. reflected the relevant sums as advances towards the purchase of property on behalf of Synchron and not in the name of the assessee.

The Assessing Officer held this sum of Rs. 2,84,00,000 to be taxable u/s 56(2)(vi) of the Act and added it to the assessee’s total income. He also observed that the name of Synchron Infotech Pvt. Ltd. had been struck off.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A), who allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held that the sum of Rs. 2,84,00,000 received by the assessee is not without consideration, and consequently, section 56(2)(vi) of the Act does not apply.

Aggrieved, revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that the AO had not invoked section 68 of the Act in order to treat the impugned sums as unexplained cash credit on account of the assessee’s failure to prove the identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of all the parties therein. The Tribunal held that a loan sum accepted as correct in principle could not be treated as an amount received since there is a pre-condition of its return to be made to the creditor party. The Tribunal rejected the arguments on behalf of the revenue and confirmed the action of CIT(A).

AUDITOR’S REPORTING – GROUP AUDIT AND USING THE WORK OF OTHER AUDITORS

The term ‘group’ as defined in Accounting Standard 21 and Indian Accounting Standard 110 includes parent and all its subsidiaries. Consolidated financial statements are the financial statements of a group presented as those of a single enterprise which includes consolidation of financial statements of parent, subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures in accordance with applicable accounting standards. Standard on Auditing (SA) 600, ‘Using the Work of Another Auditor’ establishes standards when an auditor, reporting on the financial statements of an entity (the group—in the case of consolidated financial statements), uses the work of another auditor on the financial information/statements of one or more components included in the financial statements of the entity. ICAI has also issued a Guidance note on Consolidated Financial Statements to provide guidance on the specific issues and audit procedures to be applied to audit consolidated financial statements.

Under the International Standard on Auditing 600 issued by International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, the group auditor is responsible for the direction, supervision, and performance of the group audit and the appropriateness of the group audit report. Where SA 600 applies and when the group auditor has to base his/her opinion on the financial information of the entity as a whole relying upon the statements and reports of the other auditors, the group auditor shall clearly state in his/her report the division of responsibility for the financial information included in a group financial statement of components audited by other auditors and that they have been included as such after performing appropriate procedures. However, it is important to note that it is not blind reliance on the work done by other auditors.

When the group auditor or principal auditor concludes that the financial information of a component is immaterial, the procedures outlined in SA 600 do not apply. Principal auditor should consider materiality portion of financial information which the principal auditor audits, degree of knowledge regarding business of the components, risk of material misstatement in financial information of the components audited by other auditor, whether principal auditor can perform additional procedures before accepting his/her position as principal auditor.

The objective of this article is to highlight some important aspects relating to group audits in India and role and responsibilities of the principal auditor or the group auditor when using the work of other auditors.

ISSUE 1 – ACCESS TO WORKING PAPERS OF COMPONENT AUDITORS
ICAI issued a clarification in May 2000 which provides that an auditor is not required to provide the client or the other auditors of the same enterprise or its related enterprise such as a parent or a subsidiary, access to his audit working papers. The main auditors of an enterprise do not have the right of access to the audit working papers of branch auditors. In the case of a company, the statutory auditor must consider the report of the branch auditor and has a right to seek clarifications and/or to visit the branch if he deems it necessary to do so for the performance of the duties as auditor. An auditor can rely on the work of another auditor without having any right of access to the audit working papers of the other auditor. For this purpose, the term ‘auditor’ includes ‘internal auditor’. The only exception is that the auditor may, at his discretion, in cases considered appropriate by him, make portions of or extracts from his working papers available to the client.

The above clarification is based on the principles of SA 230, Audit Documentation, in accordance with which audit documentation is the property of auditor and SA 200, Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with Standards on Auditing, which provides that the auditor should respect the confidentiality of information acquired in the course of his work and should not disclose any such information to a third party without specific authority or unless there is a legal or professional duty to disclose. In addition to this, Part I of the Second Schedule to the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 provides that “A Chartered Accountant in practice shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he discloses information acquired in the course of his professional engagement to any person other than his client, without the consent of his client or otherwise than as required by any law for the time being in force.”

In line with the above, under SA 600, where another auditor has been appointed for the component, the principal auditor would normally be entitled to rely upon the work of such auditor unless there are special circumstances to make it essential for him to visit the component and/or to examine the books of account and other records of the said component. However, this poses a practical limitation on the principal auditor while conducting a group audit.

ISSUE 2 – RESPONSIBILITY OF PRINCIPAL AUDITOR/GROUP AUDITOR WHILE USING WORK OF ANOTHER AUDITOR
(i) SA 600 requires that the Principal Auditor should perform the following procedures while planning to use the work of another auditor:

• Consider the professional competence of Other Auditor, if other auditor is not a member of ICAI;

•    Obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence, that the work of other auditor is adequate for principal auditor’s purpose. For this purpose, the principal auditor should advise the other auditor of the use that is to be made of the other auditor’s work and report and make sufficient arrangements for co-ordination of their efforts at the planning stage of the audit. The principal auditor would inform the other auditor of matters such as areas requiring special consideration, procedures for the identification of inter-component transactions that may require disclosure and the timetable for completion of audit; and advise the other auditor of the significant accounting, auditing, and reporting requirements and obtain representation as to compliance with them;

• There should be sufficient liaison between the principal auditor and the other auditor. For this purpose, the principal auditor may find it necessary to issue written communication(s), i.e., group instructions to the other auditor;

• The principal auditor should share detailed group audit instructions to other auditor, which may include the following:

• Significant Risk-Group Financial Statement Level (e.g., management override of control, revenue recognition, impairment).

• Group Structure-Details of subsidiary/joint venture and % stake for current year and previous year.

• Significant accounting and auditing issues.

• Timetable of communication, contacts, communication protocols.

In addition to being asked to complete group audit questionnaires and/or provide memoranda of work performed, component auditors may be asked to report directly to group auditors in the form of an audit or review opinion on financial information i.e., the group reporting/consolidation package prepared by component management.

• Principal auditor may require another auditor to submit a detailed questionnaire with reference to the work performed by him, checklist etc.

Consider significant findings of other auditor and perform supplement tests if necessary.

(ii) Regulation 33(8) of SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) (Regulations) 2015

SEBI Circular dated 29th March, 2019 states that the principal auditor is required to send Group Audit / Review Instructions to component auditors for audit/review of the consolidated financial statements / results. Since the audit/review report requires specific assertion on performance of procedures in accordance with the SEBI Circular, it is mandatory that component auditor should respond to the instructions and provide the requisite information.

It is important to note that the parent company management is responsible for ensuring co-ordination between the principal and other auditor to comply with the requirements of SA 600.The requirements specified in the SEBI circular seems to be mandatory for the entities whose accounts are to be consolidated with the listed entity and to the statutory auditors of entities whose accounts are to be consolidated with the listed entity.

The circular requires the principal auditor to communicate its requirements to the component auditors on a timely basis. This communication shall set out the work to be performed, the use to be made of that work, and the form and content of the component auditor communication with the principal auditor. Therefore, the principal auditor is required to send the group audit/review instructions to the component auditor, and if the component auditor does not respond to such instructions on a timely basis, then it may be considered as a non-compliance with the requirements of the circular since the audit/review report (format issued by SEBI) requires specific assertion that “we also performed procedures in accordance with the Circular issued by SEBI under Regulation 33(8) of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, as amended, to the extent applicable”.

Accordingly, if the component auditor does not respond to the questionnaire, checklist or information request sent by the principal auditor, it may be considered as a scope limitation, and the principal auditor may issue a qualified opinion/conclusion in such a situation in accordance with SA 705, Modifications to the Opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report.

ISSUE 3 – CONSIDERATION OF MATERIALITY BY PRINCIPAL AUDITOR
The principal auditor is required to compute the materiality for the group as a whole (which is different from materiality to issue an opinion on the standalone financial statements), which should be used to assess the appropriateness of the consolidation adjustments (i.e., permanent consolidation adjustments and current period consolidation adjustments) that are made by the management in the preparation of CFS. The parent auditor can also use the materiality computed on the group level to determine whether the component’s financial statements are material to the group to determine whether they should scope in additional components and consider using the work of other auditors as applicable.

ISSUE 4 – REPORTING BY PRINCIPAL AUDITOR
SA 600 requires that the report on consolidated
financial statements and standalone financial statements (in a situation where the branch auditors are other than principal auditor), should state clearly the division of responsibility between principal auditor and other auditor. The principal auditor should express a qualified/disclaimer of opinion if:

• Principal auditor cannot use the work of other auditor and is unable to perform sufficient additional procedures as required by SA 600.

• If there is modification in another auditor’s report, then the principal auditor should consider whether the subject of the modification is of such nature and significance, in relation to the entity’s financial information and whether it requires a modification of the principal auditor’s report.
    
It is important to note the requirements in Guidance Note on Audit of Consolidated Financial Statements, which requires that while considering the observations (for instance, modification and /or emphasis of matter/other matter in accordance with SA 705/706) of the component auditor in his report on the standalone financial statements, the parent auditor should comply with the requirements of SA 600. Reference should be made to paragraph 23 of SA 600 which states, “In all circumstances, if the other auditor issues, or intends to issue, modified auditor’s report, the principal auditor should consider whether the subject of the modification is of such nature and significance, in relation to the financial information of the entity on which the principal auditor is reporting, that it requires a modification of the principal auditor’s report.”

Hence, the principal auditor needs to evaluate the observations (modification and /or emphasis of matter) in the component auditor’s report, in his auditor’s report on the CFS. For example, the considerations may include materiality and scope of the component; the assessment of risk of material misstatement for the group; the impact of the modification in light of the materiality thresholds for the group audit, etc.

The principal auditor should document how they have dealt with the qualifications or adverse remarks contained in the other auditor’s report in framing their report on the CFS of the group, considering materiality and risk assessment of the component.

The principal auditor of Consolidated Financial Statements in accordance with an ICAI announcement is required to state if certain components have been audited by other auditor and if such component/s is/ are material to the consolidated financial statements of the Group.

Where the financial statements of one or more components are unaudited, the principal auditor should consider unaudited components in evaluating a possible modification to his/her report on the consolidated financial statements. The evaluation is necessary because the auditor (or other auditors, as the case may be) has not been able to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence in relation to such consolidated amounts/balances. In such cases, the auditor should evaluate both qualitative and quantitative factors on the possible effect of such amounts remaining unaudited when reporting on the consolidated financial statements using the guidance provided in SA 705, Modifications to the Opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report. If such unaudited component/s is/are not material to the consolidated financial statements of the group, the principal auditor is required to state this fact in an ‘Other Matter’ paragraph.

REPORTING ON KAM
Reporting on KAM applies to audit reports issued on consolidated financial statements of listed entities, in addition, to the report issued on standalone financial statements. The Implementation guide to SA 701 refers to SA 600 in case where the parent’s auditor is not the auditor of all the components to be included in the consolidated financial statements. It further states that the group auditor would be required to assess matters that in his professional judgement, are key audit matters from the perspective of consolidated financial statements. This needs to be done at the planning stage and updated during the performance of the audit.

Though there is no mandatory requirement in SA 701 read with SA 600 to mandatorily send group reporting instructions to the auditors (if they are different from group auditors) of unlisted subsidiaries to specifically seek a response to KAM pertaining to these subsidiaries, however, since the group auditor would be required to assess matters that in his professional judgement, are key audit matters from the perspective of
consolidated financial statements, the group auditor may seek a response from component auditor if any KAM is required to be included for that component. This can be done as part of the group audit instructions.

ISSUE 5 – RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMPONENT AUDITOR/OTHER AUDITOR
During planning, performance or completion of the audit, component auditor/other auditors are expected to communicate with the principal auditor immediately if:

• Timing of the work creates an irresolvable problem,

• Instructions are not fully understood,

• It is necessary to vary procedures from those specified,

• Circumstances arise that may result in a qualified opinion,

• Services have been performed without the appropriate pre-approvals or consideration of the independence matters discussed in the group audit instructions,

• Local conditions are such that work cannot be done within the estimated time or fee,

• Issues are identified that may affect work performed outside their territory, or

• Other auditor become aware of events, transactions, or recent or proposed legislative changes that may have a significant impact on the component or other members of the affiliated group (e.g., instances of fraud, significant changes to the level of control reliance, illegal acts, etc.).

The principal auditor will request acknowledgement of receipt of Group Audit Instructions and confirmation of cooperation from other auditor. Other auditor will be required to comply with the Guidance Note on Independence of Auditors (Revised), Code of Ethics issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and the Companies Act, 2013 in relation to the work carried out on the component.

ISSUE 6 – AUDITORS’ REPORTING ON INTERNAL FINANCIAL CONTROLS OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING IN CASE OF CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Section 129(4) of the 2013 Act states that the provisions of the 2013 Act applicable to the preparation, adoption and audit of the financial statements of a holding company shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to the consolidated financial statements. The parent auditor is required to report in the case of consolidated financial statements under Section 143(3)(i) of the 2013 Act on the adequacy and operating effectiveness of the Internal Financial Controls over Financial Reporting, for the components only if it is a company under the 2013 Act.

The auditors of the parent company should apply the concept of materiality and professional judgment while reporting under section 143(3)(i) on the matters relating to Internal Financial Controls over Financial Reporting that are reported by the component auditors. The auditor should also assess the impact, if any, of the subject matter of any qualification, adverse opinion or disclaimer stated by any of the component auditors in their respective components, and any remedial measures effected by the parent company to mitigate the effect of such observations in the component audit reports on the financial reporting process for the consolidated financial statements.

ISSUE 7 – AUDITOR’S REPORTING UNDER CARO 2020
There are certain new/revised clauses in CARO 2020, which are related to consideration of reports of other auditors, e.g.:

• Consideration of reports of the internal auditors
(Clause 3(xiv)),

• Consideration of the issues, objections or concerns raised by the outgoing auditors in case of resignation of auditors during the year (Clause 3 (xviii)),

• Reporting on funds taken by the company from any entity or person on account of, or to meet the obligations of its subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures
(Clause 3(ix)(e)), and

• Reporting on loans where the company has raised loans during the year on the pledge of securities held in its subsidiaries, joint ventures or associate companies and report if the company has defaulted in repayment of such loans raised (Clause 3(ix)(f)).

Additionally CARO 2020 is also applicable to audit report for consolidated financial statements for only one clause i.e. clause (xxi) of CARO requires an auditor to comment on whether there have been any qualifications or adverse remarks by the respective auditors in the Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order (CARO) reports of the companies included in the consolidated financial statements, if yes, details of the companies and the paragraph numbers of the CARO report containing the qualifications or adverse remarks need to be indicated. The following points should be noted in this regard:

• Reporting under this clause is only required for those entities included in the consolidated financial statement to whom CARO 2020 is applicable.

• CARO report is to be included as separate annexure in the audit report to the consolidated financial statements.

• Assessments of responses by component auditors as qualification/adverse remark requires application of professional judgment.

• The concept of materiality is relevant when reporting under CARO. However, if a qualification/adverse remark is given by any individual component, there is a presumption that the item is material to the component. Hence when reporting under clause 3(xxi), the auditor is not required to re-evaluate the materiality from a consolidation perspective. Hence every qualification/adverse remark made by every individual component including the parent should be included while reporting under this clause.

• Qualification/adverse remarks given in parent company’s standalone CARO report are also required to be included.

• In case the audit report of the components has not yet been issued by its auditor, then the principal auditor would include the fact in his/her report.

BOTTOM LINE
Effective two-way communication between the principal auditor and the component auditor is of essence for the group audits, the starting point for which is the clear and timely communication of the requirements by way of group audit instructions. Also, it is equally important for the group management to play an active role for high-quality group audits. Similarly, when the auditor decides to use the work of another auditor e.g., branch auditor in an audit of standalone financial statements, internal auditor or auditor’s expert, the principal auditor should adhere to the procedures prescribed in SA 600 and ensure timely planning and communication along with documentation to demonstrate performance of such procedures. Besides this, the principal auditor is required to communicate important and group-related matters to those charged with governance and group management in a timely manner.  

FUNGIBILITY OF DIRECT TAX AND INDIRECT TAX FOR INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXPAYERS AND INCOME TAX RETURNS FILERS

Kindly refer to my article – ‘India’s Macro-Economic & Financial Problems and Some Macro-Level Solutions’, published in September, 2021 BCAJ. Some professional colleagues and friends have opined that Fungibility of Direct and Indirect Taxes is never possible. No country in the World to their knowledge has such a facility given multiple difficulties etc. I accept their worthy views with a caveat that some country has to start. Why cannot India take the lead in this matter?

Others stated that my suggestion in the article is a solution that is self-defeating. The country loses out on Tax Revenues – Direct and Indirect and nobody gains in this matter. Please see the workings later.

My listing of benefits of tax fungibility is as under (from the above-published article):
1) Possibility of increased Income Tax Returns being filed by Individuals to claim the GST refund.
2) Widening of GST net due to individual income taxpayer asking for GST invoice.
3) The individual taxpayer MUST FEEL rewarded for filing income tax returns. Ultimately, Income Tax has always been a sensitive topic, and one must make the Tax Payer feel rewarded.

So far as individual income taxpayers are concerned, Indirect Tax is apparently unfair for B2C transactions (Business-to-Consumer). In B2B transactions, the business receiving goods and services is able to take an input tax credit of the same for its business and tax payment. While in B2C, this facility is not available. My proposal is aimed at making it
available.

Working:
By the working below, I wish to dispel this argument of Revenue Loss or no net increase in Tax Revenues. Note that this is only applicable to Individual Taxpayers filing ITRs 1 – 4.

Case: Individual ‘A’ (based on the old tax regime of income tax)

1

Total annual income

Rs 22.00 lakhs

2

Taxable annual income

Rs 20.00 lakhs

3

Income tax payable

(@ 21% tax rate (slab computation)

Rs 4.20 lakhs

4

Income available for annual spending (2-3)

Rs 15.80 lakhs

5

Amount spent

(assuming 80% spend on goods and services
and balance 20% savings)

Rs 12.64 lakhs

6

GST invoices available

(on 80% of total purchases)

Rs 10.10 lakhs

7

Value of purchases

GST paid on purchases

(at 15% average GST rate)

Rs 8.80 lakhs

Rs 1.30 lakhs

When filing the Income Tax Return, the individual taxpayer MUST show the amount of GST paid Rs 1.30 lakhs and claim an applicable Income Tax Refund. It is my view that even a 100% GST setoff will not impact Income Tax Revenues but will increase Income Tax Returns filings and add to GST revenues.

Note: Lower the value and percentage of GST Invoices, lower the GST set off against income tax payable. Individual purchasers/Buyers will insist on GST Invoices.

MECHANISM
To all those who already have PAN Cards and are filing any of the above 4 types of Income Tax Returns, the Income Tax office can send out a special code that is linked to the assessee’s PAN Card Number.

Those who have not filed their returns in the past MUST do so for availing GST setoff /refund and make an application to the Income Tax Authorities for the special code.

Every time a GST invoice is collected this special code must get referenced and scanned. That is the responsibility of the purchaser to show his special code card which the seller will scan and link with the GST Invoice. This can be done with safeguards and conditions that are easy to fulfill such as payment via debit/credit card/UPI/Electronic mode and even a threshold per transaction to start with.

Through the above referenced individual code, the Income Tax authorities must capture the GST paid by the individual as they are capturing the other Income and TDS thereon.

This collated information about sellers giving GST invoice details should also go to the GST authorities. They can then find out who is filing GST Returns and who is not.  Is the GST paid by the seller in line with the Sales
Invoice details given by the purchaser? An App or other modes of technology for this purpose could also come in handy.

As stated by me in the September, 2021 BCAJ article, the Revenue authorities must do some original thinking. There is a possible solution which MOST IMPORTANTLY favours the individual income tax payer. This must not be refrigerated but be worked on for 2023-24 implementation.

The key issue we are facing is the issue of Equity for the individual income taxpayer. Already, with Agriculture income out of ambit of the Income Tax Act, there is a high sense of frustration that large landowners and wealthy agriculturists are conveniently excluded.

Note: The author wishes to thank the members of the BCAJ Editorial team for value-added interventions to the article.  

INTERNAL CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS FOR UPCOMING AUDITS

Internal controls are unique to every company and are designed according to the company’s size and structure. A robust framework of internal control protects company’s interests, promotes accountability, and enables the preparation of reliable and accurate financial information. Under the Companies Act, 2013 (‘2013 Act’), the Board of Directors of a company are required to establish internal controls that are adequate and operate effectively. An auditor reporting obligation has been prescribed under section 143(3)(i) of the 2013 Act for reporting on the adequacy and operating effectiveness of internal financial controls with reference to financial statements (‘IFCFS’). The Guidance1 Note on Audit of Internal Financial Controls Over Financial Reporting (‘Guidance Note’) guides some of the implementation challenges.

In the current environment, internal control considerations continue to remain one of the key focus areas of stakeholders. A robust internal control framework is the only tool that can cater to the increased stakeholders’ expectations. This article aims to highlight the key aspects relating to design and operating effectiveness of internal controls that the auditor should consider during the upcoming audits of financial statements prepared under the 2013 Act for F.Y. 2021 – 2022 and onwards.

PLETHORA OF NEW FINANCIAL STATEMENT DISCLOSURES AND AUDITORS REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

Schedule III to the 2013 Act and auditors reporting obligations under Companies (Auditor’s Report) Order, 2020 (‘CARO 2020’) and other2 auditors reporting obligations under the 2013 Act have been overhauled with an aim to strengthen objective decision making by the stakeholders. Though it would be expected that auditors reporting is restricted to matters disclosed in the financial statements, some of the new reporting requirements deviates from this fundamental principle. The following is a snapshot that summarizes the key financial statement disclosures and key auditors’ requirements, including the matters which are common:

New
matters which warrant disclosures in financial statements and require
reporting by auditors (Key)

 

New financial statement
disclosures (Key)

(No
specific auditors reporting obligations prescribed)

 

New auditors reporting
obligations (Key)

(No
specific disclosures in financial statements)

Schedule III and CARO 2020


Agreement of quarterly returns/ statements with books of accounts for
borrowings taken against security of current assets.


Grant of loan/ advances in the nature of loan which are repayable on
demand or granted without specifying any terms or repayment period.


Material uncertainty in repayment of liabilities basis assessment of
financial ratios, etc.


Undisclosed income.


Wilful defaulter.

    Corporate
social responsibility.

Schedule III and other2
reporting matters


Lending and borrowings masking the ‘Ultimate Beneficiary’.


Granular ageing analysis of certain captions e.g., trade receivables
including ageing of disputed and undisputed receivables.


Accounting of scheme of arrangement and explanation for deviation, if
any, with applicable accounting standards.


Transactions with struck off companies.

CARO 2020:


Enhanced reporting of loans, investment, etc
e.g., evergreening3 of loans.


Internal audit.


Whistle blower complaints.


Short term funds used for long term purpose.

     Cash
losses.

Other2
reporting matters:


Compliance with dividend norms.

_____________________________________________________________

1   Issued in September 2015.

2   As prescribed under Rule 11 of the Companies
(Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014.

3   In general parlance it implies an attempt to mask
loan default by giving new loans to help delinquent borrowers to repay/adjust
principal or pay interest on old loans.

A cursory reading of some of the new auditors’ requirements (e.g. lending and borrowings masking the ‘Ultimate Beneficiary’) might give the impression that these requirements expand the boundaries of an audit engagement requiring the auditor to perform procedures that are generally performed in an investigation. However, it might be noted that these reporting obligations have been prescribed in relation to the audit of financial statements. Accordingly, the auditor should consider Standards on Auditing and other guidance in planning and performing the audit procedures to address the risk of material misstatement as stated above. Some of the considerations are as follows:

• Substance vs. legal form– Schedule III to the 2013 Act and CARO 2020 have significantly enhanced the reporting obligations relating to loans, guarantees, etc. The auditor should verify that the controls have been established to critically assess the substance of the transaction irrespective of the legal form. To illustrate – basis relevant facts and circumstances, it might be appropriate to conclude that extension of a loan (such as one day prior to the expiration of tenure) is in substance evergreening of loans even though the loan is not technically ‘overdue’ – which is the trigger for reporting under CARO 2020.

• Critical assessment of funding needs of the borrower and its utilisation of funds- Schedule III provides disclosures relating to conduit lending/ borrowing transactions, etc, masking the ‘Ultimate Beneficiary’ and related matters. Further, management must also provide representations to the auditor that there are no such transactions except for that disclosed in the financial statements. Under the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014, the auditor must comment whether such management representation has been obtained and whether the representation is materially misstated. The auditor should assess whether the controls have been established to evaluate the funding needs of the borrower (prior to granting of loans) and periodically obtain end-use report of the funds from the borrower.

• Efficacy of periodic book close process- The auditor should review existing book close process and assess whether reliable information is generated which enables accurate filing of quarterly returns/ statements with the lenders. Where differences exist – assess whether proper explanations for differences have been documented and approved as per the authority matrix of the company.

• Competence of objectivity of management experts- Controls regarding assessing the competence and objectivity of management experts involved if any e.g., in case of revaluation of property, plant and equipment/ intangible assets, assess compliance with Companies (Registered Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2017 to the extent applicable.

•    Avoid hindsight- Presentation of comparative information for new disclosures pursuant to the requirements of Schedule III might involve making necessary estimates and require the exercise of judgement. The auditor would need to be ensure that the estimates/ judgement involved are based on the information available as at the end of the previous year and without using hindsight information e.g., trade receivable under litigation till end of previous year has been disclosed as disputed trade receivable in the previous year even though such litigation has been disposed of by the end of the current year.

MATERIAL4 UNCERTAINTY RELATING TO GOING CONCERN
Circumstances affecting management’s assessment of going concern might change rapidly in the current environment, e.g., adverse key financial ratios or challenges in the realisation of financial assets and payment of financial liabilities may cast significant doubt on the company’s ability to continue as a going concern. As required under Standard on Auditing, 570, Going Concern, the auditor is required to report in a separate paragraph in the audit report if a material uncertainty relating to going concern exists.

•    Schedule III to the 2013 Act now requires companies to disclose:

•    Certain financial ratios in the financial statements (e.g., debt service coverage ratio) and explain any change in the ratio by more than 25% as compared to the preceding year.

•    Ageing of trade receivables and trade payables.

•    CARO 2020 requires the auditor to comment whether material uncertainty exists on the company’s ability of meeting its liabilities within a period of one year from the balance sheet date.

____________________________________________________________________

4   A
material uncertainty exists when the magnitude of its potential impact and
likelihood of occurrence is such that, in the auditor’s judgment, appropriate
disclosure of the nature and implications of the uncertainty is necessary for
the fair presentation of the financial statements (in the case of a fair
presentation financial reporting framework).

It might be noted that the going concern assessment under Standards on Auditing and reporting under CARO 2020 is not is the same – though there might be interlinkages. Under CARO 2020, the auditor’s responsibility is limited to assessing a company’s solvency i.e. material uncertainty, if any on the company’s ability to meet its liabilities; whereas going concern assessment is a much wider assessment of the entity. The auditor would need to assess whether a material uncertainty exists related to events or conditions that, individually or collectively, may cast significant doubt on the company’s ability to continue as a going concern e.g. a Company that is in the business of selling garments under a brand licensing agreement, might face a material uncertainty relating to going concern, if the license is not expected to be renewed. Another situation might be, where a company has hived off substantially all of its business and, absence of any concrete business plan, might indicate that material uncertainty relating to going concern exist.

The Guidance Note requires the auditor to make appropriate disclosures to state the inherent limitations on IFCFS and the limitations in consideration of such controls operating as at the balance sheet date for the future operations of the company. The assessment of material uncertainty relating to going concern involves judgement about inherently uncertain future or outcomes of events/ conditions. These judgements can be made only on the basis of what is known at the balance sheet date. The outcome of future operations of the company cannot be reliably predicted for all events/ conditions. In the current business and economic environment, what may be a reasonable assumption today may no longer be so, a short time later. Hence there are limitations in the operation of IFCFS for the company’s future operations. Following are examples of uncertainties that might create limitations on IFCFS operating as at the balance sheet date:

• Uncertainties around management’s ability to execute its turnaround strategy such as addressing reduced demand and to renew or replace funding especially where market value of unencumbered assets has deteriorated.

• Effect of business disruptions e.g., disruption of supply chain.

•  Effect of actions of the company on its long-term solvency e.g., deferral of payment of trade payables may affect long term solvency of the company.

• Where support letter has been provided by the Parent company – the uncertainties around the ability of the Parent company to discharge the obligations of the subsidiary as and when they fall due.

Accordingly, where a material uncertainty relating to going concern has been identified, the auditor should assess the inherent limitations on the operation of the IFCFS regarding the future operations of the company and should appropriately disclose such limitations in the audit report pursuant to requirements of the Guidance Note.

MATERIAL PRIOR PERIOD ERRORS
While auditing the financial statements for the current year, material errors in the financial statements of the previous years might be identified. Prior period errors occurs if undisclosed income of previous years is identified in the current year or due to mathematical mistakes, mistakes in applying accounting policies in respect of recognition, measurement, presentation, or disclosure, etc. Examples of prior period errors could be where due to the effects of inadequate controls on cut-offs, excess revenue was recognised in previous years. Another example could be where unaccounted cash was generated from scrap sale of previous years.

•    Schedule III to the 2013 Act requires companies to provide:

•    Details of any transaction not recorded in the books of accounts that has been surrendered/ disclosed as income during the year in the tax assessments, unless there is immunity for disclosure under any scheme. The company is also required to state whether the previously unrecorded income and related assets have been properly recorded in the books of account during the year.

•    Specific disclosures for Ind AS compliant company e.g., changes in other equity due to prior period errors.

•    CARO 2020 has also prescribed reporting obligations for auditors in case of undisclosed income.

Under the Guidance Note, errors observed in previously issued financial statements in the current financial year or restatement of previously issued financial statements to reflect the correction of a material misstatement has been included as an indicator of material weakness5. Where a material weakness in IFCFS exists, the Guidance Note requires the auditor to modify the IFCFS opinion. In determining the type of modification, i.e., qualification, disclaimer, or adverse the auditor should assess its pervasiveness of the material weakness, which might include the following:

• Manner of treatment of the prior period error in the current year’s financial statements . As per the Guidance Note, pervasive effect on the IFCFS include those matters that impacts the audit opinion on the company’s financial statements. It might be noted that under Ind AS 8, the material prior period errors are corrected by restating the comparative amounts unless such restatement is impracticable. Under AS 4, comparatives are not restated but are normally included in the determining net profit or loss for the current period.

•  The root cause which resulted in a material prior period error.

• The combination of the identified material weakness with other aspects of the financial statements, e.g., linkage with data used in management estimates or effect of the prior period error on the disclosures.

• The interaction of the control which failed to detect material misstatement with other controls, (e.g., the interaction of General IT controls, linkage to a transaction-level control or financial reporting process such as controls over the prevention and detection of fraud, significant transactions with related parties, controls over the financial statement close process).

PRIOR PERIOD ERRORS IDENTIFIED BY THE MANAGEMENT
There might be a situation where material prior period errors were identified by the management through its internal controls. Even in such case, the above mentioned considerations would be relevant to assess the consequential implications. As per the Guidance Note, the auditor should report if the company has adequate internal control systems in place and whether they were operating effectively as at the balance sheet date. It should be noted that when forming the opinion on internal financial controls, the auditor is required to test the same during the financial year under audit (and not just as at the balance sheet date) though the extent of testing at or near the balance sheet date may be higher, e.g. if the company’s revenue recognition was erroneous throughout the year but was corrected, including for matters relating to internal control that caused the error, as at the balance sheet date, the auditor is not required to report on the errors in revenue recognition during the year.

Accordingly, the auditor should assess the design and operating effectiveness of the new/ revised controls implemented by the management which aims to augment the book close process and avoid erroneous financial reporting. Where the new/ revised controls operate effectively by the balance sheet date and the auditor concludes that no material weakness exists as at the balance sheet date, the audit opinion on IFCFS would be unmodified.

EXEMPTION TO AUDITORS OF CERTAIN PRIVATE COMPANIES FROM REPORTING ON IFCFS
MCA has exempted auditors from reporting on IFCFS of a private company if such private company’s turnover is less than INR 50 crores as per latest audited financial statements and the aggregate borrowings from banks or financial institutions or anybody corporate at any point of time during the financial year is less than INR 25 crores. However, this exemption can be availed only if the private company has not committed a default in filing its financial statements under section 137 or annual return under section 92 of the 2013 Act. The assessment of the qualifying criteria poses certain challenges – some of them are discussed below:

ASSESSMENT OF TURNOVER CRITERIA
Financial statements under Schedule III do not disclose ‘Turnover’ but instead disclose ‘Revenue from operations.’ The items comprising turnover and revenue from operations are similar to a very large extent, but differences exist – as stated below:

Turnover as
defined under section 2(91) of the 2013 Act means aggregate value of the
realisation of amount made from:

 

  Sale,
supply or distribution of goods or


Services rendered, or both,

 

by the company during a financial year.

Under Schedule III Revenue From
operations
comprise:

 


Sale of products,


Sale of services


Grants or donations received (in case of section 8 companies only) and


Other operating revenues.

It might be noted that there is no specific reference of ‘Other operating revenues’ in the definition of turnover. ‘Other operating revenues’ include revenue arising from a company’s operating activities, i.e., either its principal or ancillary revenue-generating activities, but which is not revenue arising from the sale of products or rendering of services.

In order to derive the amount of turnover, the auditor should:

•  First, consider the amount of sale of products and sale of services as appearing in the latest audited financial statements.

•  Next, the auditor should obtain a breakup of other operating revenues to identify items, if any, that might qualify as turnover e.g., sale of manufacturing scrap would qualify as turnover as it arises during the process of manufacturing of finished goods. Similarly, government grants recognised under other operating revenues should be excluded as it is neither earned from the sale of goods nor the rendition of services.

ASSESSMENT OF BORROWING CRITERIA
One of the conditions for availing the exemption is that if ‘at any point of time’ during the financial year, prescribed borrowings are less than INR 25 crores. This seems to imply that the exemption is available even if borrowings from banks or financial institutions, or any body corporate is less than INR 25 crores in any day of the year under audit. The proposition is explained through the following illustrations:

Borrowings
from banks/financial institutions/body corporate

Exemption
available?

As at 1
April 20X1

2 April
20X1 to 31 March 20X2

Balance
as at 31 March 20X2

Nil

Borrowing
of INR 100 crores raised

INR 100
crores

Yes

INR 500
crores

? Borrowing of INR 100 crores raised on 5
April 2021

? Entire borrowing of INR 600 crores repaid
on 30 March 20X2 (i.e., one day before year end)

Nil

Yes

INR 90
crores

INR 5
crores repaid

INR 85
crores

No

Accordingly, the auditor should obtain the movement of borrowings, if any, from prescribed parties and assess whether the thresholds for availing exemption are met.

IFCFS REPORT ON CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The consolidated financial statements of a private company might include certain subsidiaries/ associates/ joint ventures which are exempted from obtaining auditor’s report on IFCFS at standalone level pursuant to the MCA exemption, as discussed above. This creates quite interesting situations and poses unique challenges to the auditors of the holding company while opining on IFCFS of the consolidated financial statements:

Section 129(4) of the 2013 Act states that the provisions of the 2013 Act is applicable to the preparation, adoption and audit of the financial statements of a holding company shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to the consolidated financial statements. Accordingly, all consolidated financial statements prepared under the 2013 Act should be accompanied with the auditor’s report (including annexures thereon) unless specifically exempted under the 2013 Act. Thus, in the above illustrative scenarios as well, the auditor of the Parent company would need to report on IFCFS of consolidated financial statements.

The Guidance Note provides that reporting on the adequacy of IFCFS on consolidated financial statements would be on the basis of the audit reports as submitted by the statutory auditors at the standalone level. Hence, where IFCFS report has not been provided due to the exemption, auditors of such companies are not required to separately provide an audit report on IFCFS to the auditor of the Parent Company as this would nullify the MCA exemption. Thus, basis the Guidance note, in the above scenarios, the audit report of IFCFS on consolidated financial statements should state that the IFCFS report covers only those companies on which the IFCFS report has been provided at the standalone level. The auditor may consider including a statement in the introductory paragraph of the IFCFS report in this regard as this would clearly set out the coverage and scope of the IFCFS report on consolidated financial statements. The auditor should consider consequential changes to the IFCFS report regarding references of the exempted private company.

In a nutshell

•    Considering the multitude of changes, an early dialogue with the stakeholders, including the auditors, would help mitigate implementation challenges to a large extent. For continuing requirements, auditors should reassess if any change in the audit strategy basis his experience would be necessary.
•    The auditor should consider the consequential effect of observations in IFCFS on other aspects of audit report ,e.g., Reporting on adverse effect on the functioning of the company [Section 143(3)(f)].

THE ESG AGENDA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR C-SUITE AND CORPORATE INDIA

INTRODUCTION
The topic of Environmental, Social and Governance (‘ESG’) aspects of a business has been extensively covered across the global media in the past couple of years. The focus on ESG has been particularly expedited by the Covid-19 pandemic. There is mounting pressure on businesses from all stakeholders – shareholders, investors, regulators, suppliers, customers and communities – to start thinking about their sustainability and wider ESG journey.

ESG – DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA

The business landscape in India is catching up on the ESG agenda. There is a significant growth in ESG-linked capital markets in India, with assets under management of the top 10 ESG mutual funds growing to INR 12,000 crore during 2019-2021 – representing almost a 5x increase in just two years1. From F.Y. 2022-23, SEBI has mandated the top 1,000 listed companies by market capitalisation to disclose ESG data through Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR). At the COP26 summit in November 2021, India announced its goal to be net-zero by 2070. It will be businesses – large and small – which will eventually have to work towards achieving the net-zero goal and key targets around the country’s energy mix and carbon emissions intensity.     

In addition to this business and regulatory imperative, environmental factors are also at play. According to Germanwatch, India is one of the top countries which will be impacted by climate change2. Chennai almost ran out of water in 2019. The year 2021 saw droughts, floods, and landslides in various states in India. The start of the year 2022 was one of the coldest winters in India. The frequency and scale of such events are predicted to only increase in the future. Combining the impacts of such natural disasters with India’s goal to be net-zero by 2070 means that businesses across industry sectors will have to start considering sustainability and ESG parameters to make their operations more resilient for a climate-informed landscape of the future.

 

1   https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/mf/mf-news/esg-fund-assets-jump-4-7-times-in-2-years-may-grow-further/articleshow/88380627.cms

2   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-among-top-10-countries-most-affected-by-climate-change-germanwatch-121012500313_1.html

So, what does this ESG agenda mean for Indian companies?

I have identified three key themes and focus areas for the C-suite to consider while trying to embed ESG parameters into business operations: a) Sustainable/ESG financing, b) Operating model, and c) Stakeholder engagement.

SUSTAINABLE/ESG FINANCING

Sustainability is not an overnight success. Embarking on a sustainability journey involves potential changes to how businesses have operated historically. This requires long-term planning and resources, with capital often being the most important. Organisations that lack enough capital or need additional funds can look at Sustainable/ESG financing. There are growing sustainability-focused capital markets – in India and overseas – that Indian companies can tap into to finance their sustainable business transformations. Depending on the business needs, the funding can take the form of either of the following two mechanisms: 1) ‘Use of proceeds’ instruments (e.g., Green/sustainability bonds/loans), where funds are used to finance specific projects/initiatives with environmental or social benefits. The 2022 Finance Budget has laid out various policies, including launching Sovereign Green Bonds and other initiatives on a private-public partnership model, in order to boost the climate finance ecosystem in India. In September 2021, Adani Green Energy Limited issued green bonds worth $750 million to fund the Capex of its ongoing renewable projects3. 2) ‘ESG-linked’ instruments (e.g., ESG/sustainability-linked loans), where repayment terms are pegged to certain environmental or social performance indicators. Ultratech Cement is already linking its financial commitments with sustainable targets4.

 

3   https://www.adanigreenenergy.com/newsroom/media-releases/Adani-Green-Energy-Continues-to-Ramp-Up-Focus-On-ESG

4   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/glasgow-cop26-how-india-inc-plans-to-meet-net-zero-targets-by-2070-121110300058_1.html

Financial institutions are increasingly moving away from funding traditional environmentally damaging assets and industry sectors. Sustainable/ESG financing can help CFOs access necessary capital as well as a greater capital pool. Additionally, such funding can potentially be at a lower cost, in turn positively impacting the bottom line. ESG/sustainability-linked loans usually involve a reduced interest rate when underlying ESG goals are met. Similarly, organisations can issue Green/sustainability bonds at lower coupon rates to investors who are willing to accept lower returns alongside achieving positive environmental and social outcomes. For organisations, sourcing cheaper Sustainable/ESG financing can help reduce the cost of capital and improve margins whilst advancing their sustainability/ESG agenda. Additionally, through embedding ESG metrics within their strategic decision-making process, an organisation can ensure that funds are utilised in activities/initiatives which can generate maximum environmental and social impact.

OPERATING MODEL – VALUE CREATION FROM ESG
Secondly, from an operating model perspective, there are opportunities for value creation as well as risk mitigation from incorporating ESG parameters into business operations. Organisations can look at value creation by assessing their product/service mix. Companies can consider launching new sustainable products to take advantage of shifting consumer trends and preferences. E.g., the plant-based protein market in India is expected to grow to $650-700 million by 20255. Similarly, the market for vegan food, recycled raw materials, electric vehicles, alternative raw materials to single-use plastics, etc., is on the rise. A global BCG research suggests that within the consumer goods sector, 70% of consumers are willing to pay a 5% price premium for more sustainably manufactured products6. India’s net-zero goals and transition to zero-carbon economy present multiple business opportunities in the areas of green hydrogen, biofuels, electric vehicles and related infrastructure, waste management, etc. Organisations can therefore achieve top-line growth through a combination of ESG/sustainability-focused new product and service launches, entering into new markets, and premium pricing. For SMEs and start-ups, it is a great opportunity to be disruptors in the sustainability domain. Through sustainable products and services, SMEs/start-ups can achieve a competitive advantage vis-à-vis large corporates which lack ESG credentials.

 

5   https://www.cnbctv18.com/environment/global-surge-in-plant-based-cultivated-meat-indian-market-sees-substantial-growth-11012762.htm

6   https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/supply-chain-needs-sustainability-strategy

A strong focus on environmental parameters can help organisations achieve significant resource efficiencies. Through embedding circular economy principles, companies can look at reducing the usage of raw materials and resources, including reusing and recycling them, in turn driving cost savings. A global paper company managed to achieve a 10% increase in EBITDA margins through a combination of emissions costs reductions, resource efficiencies and revenue growth7. By 2030, Ambuja Cement is targeting to save 77 litres of water/tonne of cement produced8. While these ESG-focused efforts require initial investments and often involve a longer payback period, it is not always the case. A private Indian mining company that invested in a water treatment facility on their site was able to recover the investment in just under three years. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by shifting to renewable sources of energy and less carbon-intensive methods can also drive energy savings. Ultimately, such cost savings translate to higher business valuations. The BCG research cited earlier9 also suggests that by being leaders in the ESG domain, companies across industry sectors are able to achieve significant valuation premiums (between 11-14% across consumer goods, steel and chemical sectors) over peers. Businesses can therefore look at significant value creation through a combination of multiple ESG-focused initiatives across their end-to-end value chains.

OPERATING MODEL – RISK MITIGATION BY FOCUSING ON ESG

From a risk mitigation perspective, companies need to start assessing and adapting their supply chains to account for negative impacts from climate change. Almost 5 million hectares of crop in India was affected in 2021 due to climate crisis10.  A negative impact on the agricultural sector can have a knock-on implication on multiple other industry sectors that directly or indirectly rely on agricultural produce for their raw material needs. WWF research predicts that almost 30 cities in India will face acute water crises by 205011. In addition to traditional industry sectors like agriculture, manufacturing, mining, chemicals, this can be a cause of concern for the growing technology sector in India, whose demand for water to cool their data centres will continue to rise. There is a growing sense of urgency for businesses across industry sectors to look at sustainable options and plan for raw material shortages (in India and globally) to avoid potential supply chain disruptions.

Indian companies might also face risks from regulatory changes and/or increased scrutiny. While an earlier blanket ban imposed in 2019 on single-use plastics was held off by the central government, it is now going to come into force from 1st July, 2022. New EPR rules in relation to plastic recycling and use are also coming into effect from 1st July, 202212. Corporates will have to reassess their supply chains to comply with these upcoming regulations. In November 2021, a local municipal corporation in western India, imposed a crackdown on major textile companies discharging trade effluents into the city sewage network citing environmental concerns, leading to factory closures. Proactively implementing sustainable supply chain measures can help organisations mitigate any potential disruptions (and consequential financial loss) from such regulatory changes and/or scrutiny.

 

7   https://www.bain.com/client-results/a-paper-company-takes-bold-steps-to-become-a-sustainability-leader/

8   https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/glasgow-cop26-how-india-inc-plans-to-meet-net-zero-targets-by-2070-121110300058_1.html

9   https://www.bcg.com/publications/2020/supply-chain-needs-sustainability-strategy

10 https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/climate-change/climate-crisis-has-cost-india-5-million-hectares-of-crop-in-2021-80809

Focusing on social aspects like health and safety, employee wellbeing, impact on communities and indigenous populations is also becoming increasing important. Any instances of corruption, bribery, child-labour, human rights abuses, etc. can lead to a negative impact on brand reputation. This might also entail financial risk in the form of a decline in stock prices or reduced valuations, regulatory penalties and fines. Ensuring the right social and governance policies for increased transparency and accountability is becoming critical.

Leading Indian multinationals have already committed to various climate change and sustainability and ESG goals. The likes of the Tata group have put compliance with ESG standards as a top business priority, and more business will follow. For SMEs as well, it will be a business imperative to consider the ESG agenda – particularly where they are suppliers or customers of large Indian and global multinationals which have their own sustainability goals and targets to achieve.

 

11 https://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/water/wwf-identifies-100-cities-including-30-in-india-facing-severe-water-risk-by-2050-74058

12           https://indianexpress.com/article/india/centre-notifies-epr-norms-for-plastic-packaging-waste-7780632/

ESG AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
Lastly, from a stakeholder engagement perspective, the C-suite can place high importance on ESG reporting and sustainability-related disclosures. For listed companies not within the remit of the current SEBI mandate, as well as for private companies, a voluntary disclosure can help achieve a competitive advantage through improved brand credentials. Such a voluntary disclosure can be based on existing domestic requirements in India (SEBI’s BRSR) or any global frameworks (like GRI, UN SDGs, etc.) or a customised basis depending on the commercial priorities. Voluntary disclosures can also help C-suite pre-empt any potential disclosure requests and/or pressure from customers, communities, activists and investors and build more transparent and better working relationship with these stakeholders. Mandatory or voluntary disclosures that show improved performance and results on ESG metrics can help enhance ESG ratings for organisations, which can in-turn enable them to access a larger capital pool and at more favourable terms. The government of India is also looking at obtaining an ESG ranking for the upcoming Initial Public Offering of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, with the aim of attracting a larger and responsible pool of capital13.

Impact investment has gained a lot of traction in India in the past couple of years. According to data from Impact Investors Council, almost $1.2 billion were invested just in the first five months of 202114. Private equity and venture capital groups in India are also increasingly focusing on ESG parameters as part of their investments as well as launching dedicated ESG funds15. Consequently, for SMEs and start-ups, focusing on ESG can be a great catalyst for raising funds to fuel their expansion and growth journey.

CONCLUSION

All of the above three themes – Sustainable/ESG financing, Value Creation and Risk Mitigation from ESG from an Operating Model perspective and Stakeholder Engagement – are in a way interrelated. In practice, it will be difficult to isolate one theme from the other. Progress in one aspect will have a compounding impact on others. Similarly, a negative outcome in one will also mean potential revisions across other ESG initiatives. Therefore, organisations will have to undertake a robust scenario-planning analysis in choosing ESG initiatives to be implemented and engage in continuous monitoring to maximise their ESG impact.

Irrespective of the industry sector, ownership status (public vs. private), the scale of operations (start-up vs. large multinational), it is becoming clear that there are multiple business reasons for organisations to look at ESG.

Climate change is already here (the latest evidence is the unseasonal rain on 6th January, 2022 in my home city of Ahmedabad – for a minute not considering its unintended consequences for the agricultural sector). The time for the C-suite of Indian organisations to act is now. The more proactive they are, the bigger will be the benefits and opportunities for future generations in India.

 

13             https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/ipos/fpos/govt-working-on-esg-ranking-for-lic-ahead-of-public-offer/articleshow/88744950.cms

14 https://www.freepressjournal.in/business/impact-investors-infused-around-12-bn-in-india-amid-the-second-wave-of-covid

15           https://www.livemint.com/companies/news/aavishkaar-capital-launches-250-mn-esg-first-fund-11643022266115.html

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS RESIGNATION OF STATUTORY AUDITORS AND CSR

(This is the eighth and last article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

PART A – RESIGNATION OF STATUTORY AUDITORS

 

BACKGROUND

There have been several instances of resignations by statutory auditors mid-way through their tenures in the recent past. Whilst that may be legally permissible, what is more important is whether there is anything which is more than what meets the eye in the resignation that the incoming auditor needs to know. Also, resignation of an auditor of a listed entity/its material subsidiary before completion of the review/audit of the financial results/statements for the year due to frivolous reasons such as pre-occupation may seriously hamper investor confidence and deny them access to reliable information for taking timely investment decisions.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting pertaining to the aforesaid clause is as under:Whether there has been any resignation of the statutory auditors during the year, if so, whether the auditor has taken into consideration the issues, objections or concerns raised by the outgoing auditors. [Clause 3(xviii)]

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN REPORTING

Before proceeding further it would be pertinent to note certain statutory requirements and professional pronouncements.SEBI Circular [CIR/CFD/CMD1/114/2019 dated 18th October, 2019]

The key requirements in respect thereof are summarised hereunder:

a) All listed entities/material subsidiaries shall ensure compliance with the following conditions while appointing/re-appointing an auditor:

• If the auditor resigns within 45 days from the end of a quarter of a financial year, then the auditor shall, before such resignation, issue the limited review/ audit report for such quarter.

• If the auditor resigns after 45 days from the end of a quarter of a financial year, then the auditor shall, before such resignation, issue the limited review/ audit report for such quarter as well as the next quarter.

• Notwithstanding the above, if the auditor has signed the limited review/ audit report for the first three quarters of a financial year, then the auditor shall, before such resignation, issue the limited review/ audit report for the last quarter of such financial year as well as the audit report for such financial year.

b) The auditor proposing to resign shall bring to the notice of the Audit Committee the reasons for his resignation including but not limited to areas where he has not been provided the necessary information / documents and explanations to matters raised during and in connections with the audit.

c) The above information has to be provided to the company in the format specified in Annexure A of the Circular, as under:

Sr.
No.

Particulars

1

Name of the listed
entity/ material subsidiary:

2

Details of the
statutory auditor:

a. Name:

b. Address:

c. Phone number:

d. Email:

3

Details
of association with the listed entity/ material subsidiary:

a.
Date on which the statutory auditor was appointed:

b.
Date on which the term of the statutory auditor was scheduled to expire:

c.
Prior to resignation, the latest audit report/limited
review report submitted by the auditor and date of its submission.

4

Detailed
reasons for resignation:

5

In
case of any concerns, efforts made by the auditor prior to resignation
(including approaching the Audit Committee/Board of Directors along with the
date of communication made to the Audit Committee/Board of Directors)

6

In
case the information requested by the auditor was not provided, then
following shall be disclosed:

a.
Whether the inability to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence was due
to a management-imposed limitation or circumstances beyond the control of the
management.

 

b.
Whether the lack of information would have significant impact on the
financial statements/results.

 

c.
Whether the auditor has performed alternative procedures to obtain
appropriate evidence for the purposes of audit/limited review as laid down in
SA 705 (Revised).

 

d.
Whether the lack of information was prevalent in the previous reported
financial statements/results. If yes, on what basis the previous
audit/limited review reports were issued.

7

Any other facts
relevant to the resignation:

Declaration
I/ We hereby confirm that the information given in this letter and its attachments is correct and complete.

I/ We hereby confirm that there is no other material reason other than those provided above for my resignation/ resignation of my firm.

Signature of the authorized signatory

Date:
Place:
Enclosures:

d) The listed entity / material subsidiary should cooperate in providing all the information and documents as requested by the auditor.

e) Disclosure should be made by the company as soon as possible but not later than twenty four hours of the Audit Committees’ views.

Duty of Outgoing Auditor [Section 140(2) of Companies Act, 2013]

The auditor who has resigned from a company shall file within a period of 30 days from the date of resignation a statement in Form ADT-3 with the company and the Registrar of Companies. In the case of a government company or any other company-owned or controlled by any of the governments, the auditor shall also file such a statement with the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India.

Clause 8 of Part I of First Schedule of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949

A Chartered Accountant in practice shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he accepts a position as auditor previously held by another chartered accountant without first communicating with him in writing;

The underlying objective is that the member may have an opportunity to know the reasons for the change in order to be able to safeguard his own interest, the legitimate interest of the public and the independence of the existing accountant. It is not intended, in any way, to prevent or obstruct the change. When making the enquiry from the outgoing auditor, the one proposed to be appointed or already appointed should primarily find out whether there are any professional or other reasons why he should not accept the appointment.

The existence of a dispute as regards the fees would not constitute valid professional reasons on account of which an audit should not be accepted by the member to whom it is offered. However, in the case of an undisputed audit fees for carrying out the statutory audit under the Companies Act, 2013 or various other statutes having not been paid, the incoming auditor should not accept the appointment unless such fees are paid.

Implementation Guide on Resignation/ Withdrawal from an Engagement to Perform Audit of Financial Statements Issued by ICAI (the “Implementation Guide”)

In view of the increasing instances of withdrawal from audit engagements mid-way through the tenure, the ICAI has issued the above Implementation Guide that the outgoing and incoming auditors need to be aware. The Implementation Guide identifies various reasons for the resignation of auditors as under:

• SA 210 “Agreeing to the Terms of Audit Engagements” – If the auditor is unable to agree to a change in the terms of the audit engagement and is not permitted by the management to continue the original audit engagement, the auditor shall withdraw from the audit engagement.

• SA 220 “Quality Control for an Audit of Financial Statements” – If the engagement partner is unable to resolve the threat to independence with reference to the policies and procedures that apply to the audit engagement, if considered appropriate, the auditor can withdraw from the audit engagement.

• SA 240, “The Auditor’s Responsibilities relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements” – If, as a result of a misstatement resulting from fraud or suspected fraud, the auditor encounters exceptional circumstances that bring into question the auditor’s ability to perform the audit, the Standard suggests the withdrawal from the engagement as one of the options, subject to following certain procedures and measures.

• SA 315, “Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatements Through Understanding the Entity and its Environment” – Concerns about the competence, integrity, ethical values or diligence of management, or about its commitment to or enforcement of these, may cause the auditor to conclude that the risk of management misrepresentation in the financial statements is such that an audit cannot be conducted. In such a case, the auditor may consider, where possible, withdrawing from the engagement, unless those charged with governance put in place appropriate corrective measures.

• SA 580, “Written Representations”– If the auditor is unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence, then the auditor is expected to determine the implications thereof to decide whether to qualify the opinion or to resign.

• Non-payment of auditor’s remuneration.

• Issuance of a Qualified report.

The Implementation Guide emphasises that the auditor is expected to describe the above specific circumstances, amongst others, while giving the reasons for resignation, instead of mentioning ambiguous reasons such as other preoccupation or personal reasons or administrative reasons or health reasons or mutual consent or unavoidable reasons.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical considerations that could arise whilst reporting under this clause:

a) Modified Report issued by the outgoing auditor:-The nature and extent of the modification should be critically evaluated by the incoming auditor both from a qualitative and quantitative perspective. In doing so he may have to generally rely on oral discussions with the outgoing auditor since he may not be willing to part with the internal documentation and working papers, especially if it is an unlisted / non-public interest entity to which the SEBI circular mentioned earlier would not apply. In such circumstances he should advise the outgoing auditor to communicate in writing the specific reasons for withdrawal as per the Implementation Guide mentioned above to the appropriate level of management and those charged with governance and insist on a copy thereof, especially if the minutes do not reveal much. In such cases, there is no rule, written or unwritten, which would prevent an auditor from accepting the appointment in these circumstances once he has conducted proper due diligence before accepting the audit. He may also consider the attitude of the outgoing auditor and whether it was proper and justified.

b) Performing appropriate due diligence before stepping into the Outgoing Auditors shoes:- It is imperative that the incoming auditor undertakes appropriate inquiries and performs due diligence procedures as under before stepping into the shoes of the outgoing auditor who has withdrawn from the engagement:

(i) Evaluate diligently about the entity, the scope of the mandate, the resources (time, manpower and competence) available to execute the audit and then take a conscious call to accept or not to accept the engagement.

(ii) Have auditors frequently resigned from the entity in the past.

(iii) Evaluate the reasons for issuance of qualified, disclaimer opinion by the outgoing auditor.

(iv) Whether entity is regular in payment of statutory dues.

(v) Review the financial statements to ascertain any indication that the going concern basis may not be appropriate.

(vi) Check and understand accounting policies or treatment of specific transactions that cast doubt on the integrity of the financial information.

(vii) Are there issues arising from communication with the outgoing auditors, professional or otherwise, which suggest that the incoming auditor should decline the appointment.

(viii) Check whether the entity is involved in any long drawn litigation with the regulatory authorities.

(ix) Consider any other information available in the public domain.

CONCLUSION
The regulators have tightened the rules for withdrawal by statutory auditors from the engagement midway through their tenure to ensure that companies do not go scot-free and brush under the carpet any irregularities and misappropriations. The reporting responsibilities under this clause would ensure that there is a proper channel of communication between the incoming and outgoing auditors regarding any adverse matters concerning the entity.

PART B – CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)

BACKGROUND

The provisions dealing with CSR have been in force for a few years and many companies have now ingrained it as part of their DNA. Earlier, the approach of the regulators was more in the nature of ‘comply or report’. However, the emphasis is now on ensuring that companies take their CSR obligations more seriously. Earlier, there was no responsibility on auditors to comment on CSR compliance separately, and only the Board of Directors were required to report on the same. However, reporting under CARO 2020 would ensure greater accountability on companies who were not taking CSR seriously.SCOPE OF REPORTING
The scope of reporting pertaining to the aforesaid clause is as under:

a) Whether, in respect of other than ongoing projects, the company has transferred unspent amount to a Fund specified in Schedule VII to the Companies Act within a period of six months of the expiry of the financial year in compliance with second proviso to sub-section (5) of section 135 of the said Act. [Clause 3(xx)(a)]
b) Whether any amount remaining unspent under sub-section (5) of section 135 of the Companies
Act, pursuant to any ongoing project, has been transferred to special account in compliance with the provision of sub-section (6) of section 135 of the said Act. [Clause 3(xx)(b)]

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN REPORTING

Before proceeding further it would be pertinent to note certain statutory requirements:Additional Disclosures under amended Schedule III
While reporting under this Clause, the auditor will have to keep in the mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:

Where the company covered under section 135 of the companies act, the following shall be disclosed with regard to CSR activities in the financial statements;

1

amount
required to be spent by the company during the year,

2

amount
of expenditure incurred,

3

shortfall
at the end of the year,

4

total
of previous years shortfall,

5

reason
for shortfall,

6

nature
of CSR activities,

7

details
of related party transactions, e.g., contribution to a trust controlled by
the company in relation to CSR expenditure as per relevant Accounting
Standard/ Indian Accounting Standard,

8

where
a provision is made with respect to a liability incurred by entering into a
contractual obligation, the movements in the provision during the year should
be shown separately.

Whilst reporting, the auditor should make a cross reference to the above disclosures made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Other Relevant Statutory Provisions

Section 135(5) and (6) of the Companies Act, 2013

Section 135(5):
The Board of Directors of every eligible company shall ensure that the Company spends in every financial year, at least 2% of the average net profits of the company during the 3 immediately preceding financial years, in pursuance of the CSR policy. The net profit shall be as computed in terms of section 198.

The expression “three immediately preceding financial years” in sub-section (5) shall be read as number of years completed by a newly incorporated company.

“Unspent amount” as referred to in sub-section (5) unless relates to an “ongoing project” shall be transferred to a fund specified in Schedule VII within 6 months of the end of the financial year.

Section 135(6):
Any amount remaining unspent under sub-section (5), pursuant to any ongoing project, fulfilling such conditions as may be prescribed, undertaken by a company in pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy, shall be transferred by the company within a period of thirty days from the end of the financial year to a special account to be opened by the company in that behalf for that financial year in any scheduled bank to be called the Unspent Corporate Social Responsibility Account, and such amount shall be spent by the company in pursuance of its obligation towards the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy within a period of three financial years from the date of such transfer, failing which, the company shall transfer the same to a Fund specified in Schedule VII, within a period of thirty days from the date of completion of the third financial year.

Permissible CSR Activities [Schedule VII read with the Rules]:

Schedule VII prescribes the following broad heads of activities on which the prescribed classes of Companies need to spend to fulfil their CSR obligations:

Sub

Clause

Broad
Area

Projects
or Programmes related to Activities in the following areas

i)@

Hunger,

Healthcare,

Sanitation etc.

• Eradicating extreme hunger, poverty and
malnutrition 

• Promoting health care including
preventive health care and sanitation

• Contribution to the Swatch Bharat Kosh.

• Provision for aids and appliances to
differently abled persons *

i)@

(continued)

• Disaster relief in
the form of medical aid, supply of clean drinking water and food supply*

• Trauma care around
highways in case of accidents*

• Supplementing of
Government Schemes like mid-day meal by corporates through additional
nutrition*

• Enabling access to
or improving delivery of public health systems (also covered under Clause iv
below)*

• Social Business
Projects involving giving medical and legal aid to road accident victims*
(also under Clause ii below)

ii)@

Education and vocational skills

• Promotion of education including special
education and employment enhancing vocational skills amongst:

(i) children,

(ii) women,

(iii) elderly, and

(iv) differently abled.

• Road safety awareness programmes
including drivers training, training
to enforcement personnel, traffic safety*

• Awareness of the above aspects through
print, audio and visual media*

• Setting up of Research Training and
Innovation Centres  for the benefit of
predominantly the rural community covering the following aspects:

(i) Capacity building for farmers covering best
sustainable farm management practices*

(ii) Training agricultural labour on skill development*

• Providing Consumer Protection Services
covering the following aspects:

(i) Providing effective consumer grievance redressal
mechanism*

(ii) Protecting consumer’s health and safety,
sustainable consumption, consumer service, support and complaint resolution*

(iii) Consumer rights to be mandated*

(iv) All other consumer protection programmes and
activities*

• Donations to IIMs for conservation of
buildings and renovation of classrooms (also covered under clause v below)*

• Donations to Non Academic Technopark not
located within an academic institution
but supported by the Department of Science and Technology*

• Research and case studies in the areas
specified in Schedule VII (normally under the respective areas and, if not,
under this clause)*

iii)

Gender
equality

and

empowerment
of

disadvantaged

sections

• Promoting gender equality,

• Empowering women,

• Setting up of hostels, old age homes and
hostels for women and orphans, day care centres and such other

facilities for senior citizens, and

• Measures for reducing inequalities faced
by socially and economically backward groups.

• Slum Rehabilitation Projects and EWS
Housing*

iv)

Environmental

and
ecological

sustainability
and

conservation
of

natural
resources

• Maintaining ecological balance,

• Protection of flora and fauna,

• Maintaining quality of air and water

• Contribution to the Clean Ganga Fund

• Setting up of Research Training and
Innovation Centres for the benefit of predominantly the rural community
covering the following aspects:

(i) Doing own research on the field for individual
crops to find out the most cost optimal and agri-ecological sustainable farm
practices with a focus on water management*.

(ii) To do Product Life Cycle Analysis from the solid
conservation point of view*

• Renewable energy projects*

v)

Heritage,
Art and

Culture

• Protection of natural heritage,

• Protection of art and culture,

• Restoration and maintenance of related
buildings and sites of historical importance and works of art,

• Setting up public libraries,

• Promotion and development of traditional
arts and handicrafts

vi)

Armed
Forces

Measures for the benefit of:

(i) armed forces,

(ii) veterans, and

(iii) war widows.

vii)

Sports

• Training to promote:

(i) rural sports,

(ii) nationally recognised sports,

(iii) paralympic sports, and

(iv) Olympic sports

Any training provided outside India to
sports personnel representing any State or Union Territory at National or
International level.

viii)

Political

Contributions

• Contributions to Prime Ministers National
Relief fund
or

• Contributions to other funds set up by
the Central

Government for socio economic development
and relief and for the welfare of:

(i) Scheduled Castes,

viii)

(continued)

(ii) Scheduled Tribes

(iii) other backward classes and

(iv) women

ix)

Technology

Incubators

Contributions or funds provided to
technology incubators located within academic institutions approved by the
Central Government.

x)

Rural Development Projects

Any project meant for development of rural
India will be covered*

xi)

Slum Development Projects

Any project for development of slums would
be covered

xii)

COVID -19 Related Areas

Funds may be spent for COVID-19 purposes
under the following activities/Funds:

  Eradicating hunger, poverty and
malnutrition $

   Disaster
Management, including relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities $

   Contribution
to PM Cares Fund $

   Contribution
to State Disaster Management Authority $

    Ex-gratia
payment to temporary/casual/daily wage workers for the purpose of fighting
COVID-19 $

   Spending for setting up makeshift
hospitals and temporary COVID care facilities will be eligible under items
(i) and (xii) of Schedule VII. #

     Companies
engaged in R & D activities for new vaccines, drugs and medical devices
in the normal course of business may undertake similar new activities for
COVID-19 related matters for FYs 2020-21, 2021-22 and 2022-23 subject to the
following conditions:

a) Such
activities are carried out in collaboration with institutes or organisations
mentioned in item ix of Schedule VII

b)
Details thereof are disclosed in the Annual Report on CSR Activities

[Inserted
in the CSR Amendment Rules vide notification dated
24th August, 2020]

*As per the MCA Circular dated 18th June, 2014 providing clarifications on various aspects related to CSR activities.

@ The above referred circular provides that the items included under sub clauses (i) and (ii) above, should be interpreted liberally so as to capture their essence.
The above circular has also clarified on certain related aspects as under:

• One off events like marathons, awards, charitable concerts, sponsorship programmes etc. would not qualify as CSR expenditure.
Only activities undertaken in project / programme mode are permissible.
• Expenses incurred in pursuance of legal obligations under Land, Labour or other laws would not quality as CSR expenditure.

$ As per MCA Circular dated 23rd March, 2020.
# As per MCA Circular dated 22nd April, 2021.

Monitoring Unspent Funds:
The provisions dealing with tracking and treatment of unspent funds, excess amounts spent and capital assets created or acquired as per the recent amendments which are crucial to reporting under this clause are tabulated and summarised hereunder:

Note:

The Funds specified under Schedule VII are as under:
• PM National Relief Fund
• Swach Bharat Kosh
• Clean Ganga Fund
• PM CARES Fund
• State Disaster Management Authority
• Skill Development Fund

Excess Amounts Spent:
As per the amended Rules, notified on 22nd January, 2021, any excess amount beyond the prescribed limit can be set off against the spending requirements in the immediately succeeding three financial years subject to the following conditions:

a) The excess amount available for set-off shall not include any surplus arising out of the CSR activities.

b) The Board of Directors shall pass a resolution specifically permitting the same.

The aforesaid carry forward shall not be allowed for excess amounts spent during any financial year ended before 22nd January, 2021.

Creation and Acquisition of Capital Assets:
As per the amended Rules, any CSR amounts may be utilised by a Company towards creation or acquisition of capital assets, only if the assets are held by any of the following:

a) A company registered under Section 8 of the Act, or a Registered Public Trust or Society having charitable objects and a CSR Registration Number; or

b) Beneficiaries of the said CSR project in the form of Self-Help Groups or Collective Entities; or

c) A public authority.

In case of any such assets existing prior to the amendment i.e. 22nd January, 2021, the same shall be transferred within 180 days from the commencement date.

Keeping in mind the above reporting as well as requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under these clauses:

a) Reporting Issues and Challenges in the Initial Period of Applicability:- The amendments are prospective from 22nd January, 2021. Accordingly only the unspent amount for F.Y. 2020-21 in respect of other than ongoing projects needs to be transferred to the fund specified in Schedule VII within six months from the end of the financial year. This is the case even if the Company has unspent amounts in earlier years. However, if the Company has made provisions for unspent amounts of the earlier years, which remains outstanding as on 31st March, 2021 the same should be transferred to the separate bank account or Schedule VII fund as the case may be within the prescribed periods as indicated earlier. The auditors should ensure that appropriate factual disclosures are made where deemed necessary. Further, there could be several other practical issues which could be encountered in the first year of reporting, few of which are discussed hereunder together with their possible resolution by the auditors, coupled with appropriate reporting of all relevant facts as deemed necessary based on their best judgement:

Issues

Possible
Resolution

A Company has a running project that was
commenced few years back and is expected to continue for next 2 years. Can
this be considered as an Ongoing project?

Subject to the definition of ongoing
project in terms of the timeline, the Board of Directors can henceforth
consider and approve this current running project as an Ongoing Project with
reasonable justification.

A CSR project was undertaken and
subsequently abandoned by Implementing Agency due to lack of additional
funds. Can this be considered as an Ongoing project? 

Subject to the definition of ongoing
project in terms of the time line, the Board of Directors can henceforth  consider and approve the aforesaid project
as an Ongoing Project with reasonable justification.

A Company contributed a certain amount to
the Implementing Agency for the construction of a hospital. It paid the full
amount in F.Y. 2020-21, whereas the hospital is expected to be completed in
F.Y. 2022-23. Can this be considered as an Ongoing project? 

If the Company has already paid the whole
amount of its CSR obligations during F.Y. 2020-21, then it is not required to
consider it as Ongoing Project. However, it is the duty of the Board as per
Rule 4 (5) to satisfy itself that the funds so disbursed have been utilized
for the purpose and in the manner as approved by it and the CFO or the person
responsible for financial management need to certify to that effect. Hence
the Company needs to have a report from the Implementation Agency for the
spends and utilization of funds and report it in the Board Report for F.Y.
2020-21 with facts and details. Further, a mandatory impact assessment
needs to be done by a Monitoring Agency in case of companies with mandatory
spending of Rs. 10 crores or more in the three immediately preceding
financial years and for individual project outlays in excess of Rs.1 crores as
per the amended Rules.

b) Monitoring in case of Multiple Projects:– In case of companies having huge CSR budgets and financing multiple projects, both ongoing and others, a robust internal control mechanism would have to be implemented to monitor project-wise utilisation to ensure that unspent amounts are transferred on a timely basis and their subsequent utilisation in case of ongoing projects, which needs to be verified by the auditors to enable them to report compliance under Clause 3(xx)(b). Whilst there is no requirement to maintain separate special bank accounts for each project it is desirable to ensure proper monitoring and greater transparency. The Board may consider laying an appropriate policy in this regard.

c) Funds Utilised towards acquisition of Capital Assets in earlier periods:- For companies that have utilised funds in earlier periods and shown them as capital assets, it is mandatory to transfer the same within 180 days from 22nd January, 2021 to the prescribed authorities /entities as indicated earlier. Though no specific reporting is required under these clauses, it would be incumbent on the auditors to verify the same as part of their audit and in case the report is dated after the expiry of the said period, he may consider drawing attention to the same since it is a statutory requirement. Similar factual disclosure could be considered in the case where the period of 180 days has not elapsed on the date of signing, and the same are not transferred.

d) Transactions with Related Parties:- In many companies, CSR obligations are fulfilled by transferring the funds to group entities registered as NPOs under Section 8/25 of the Companies Act, 2013 / 1956. In such cases, care should be taken to ensure that the same are towards approved projects. The monitoring of the same is done in accordance with the revised guidelines on monitoring and impact assessment, including the need for involving an external agency, if required, as discussed earlier. In case of any lapses or deficiencies noticed the same should be factually reported under Clause 3(xx)(b) based on materiality and use of judgement.

CONCLUSION
The additional reporting requirements have placed very specific responsibilities on the auditors to supplement the revised regulatory landscape of CSR of “comply or pay up”, which views CSR spending more as a tax then a social obligation. As is always the case, it is the auditors who have to bell the cat!

MEASURE OF …

The measure of wealth is freedom.
The measure of health is lightness.
The measure of intellect is judgment.
The measure of wisdom is silence.
The measure of love is peace.
– Naval Ravikant

Chartered Accountants are in the profession of ‘recognition’ and ‘measurement’. Much of life, in its wider and deeper sense, needs measuring with each passing year, or in our context, at least at the end of the fiscal year.

What matters may not be in the line of sight. Contemporary wisdom measures and turns on a sharp spotlight on what matters. Wisdom articulates the reality of things with a purpose: to make us aware of the starkness of what matters, the urgency of action and the futility of much of what we believe to be important in the short term. ‘Non-recognition’ of this can be our stupidity, lethargy or even careless disregard. I have been following the writings of Naval for a while and thought of sharing them and leaving you with questions I ask myself.

The measure of wealth is freedom. We gather wealth but, for a long time, run short of freedom. Even on vacation, work chases us. How much freedom do we have on our time and actions? Wealth without freedom is futile. Freedom TO and Freedom FROM are two types of categories. While money gives us the freedom to overcome many life problems, how free do we become from other problems?

The measure of health is lightness. How much lightness do we feel in our bodies? How much space do our minds have to let ‘light’ occupy it rather than the clutter of million thoughts? Are we trading off health with time to our profession?

The measure of intellect is judgment. We often learn this over time. A lot of our work hones judgment. Naval writes: “…wisdom is knowing the long-term consequences of your actions. Wisdom applied to external problems is judgment. … knowing the long-term consequences of your actions and then making the right decision to capitalize on that.” How do I figure out the difference between direction and effort? Can I figure out what’s really stupid and then avoid it? Am I able to see beyond the immediate and look far into the future?

The measure of wisdom is silence. When wisdom is applied, the outcome is silence. The closer you are to the truth, the more silent you become inside. How much silence or evenness do we feel within? By being the way I am, am I becoming something that I would not want to?

You can reflect on the rest of Naval’s words. I wish to end this page with a conversation I had with my daughter. She told me about ellipsis. ‘…’ the three dots we sometimes use to end a sentence. I think the measure of life is an ellipsis, in the sense that it goes on, that there are no full stops. Its spirit is continuance. It is open-ended, uncertain and full of possibilities. The ellipsis holds hope in the unsaid. As we begin the new fiscal and come out of one patch of uncertain time, will it not be brave to accept the certainty of uncertainty?

 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor    

CELEBRATING 75 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE JAGANNATH SHANKARSHETH

In the last few months, through this column, we gratefully remembered Lokmanya Tilak, Madanlal Dhingra and Ramprasad Bismil. They sacrificed everything and dedicated their lives for the freedom of our country. Today, we will try to know about a man who made a yeomen contribution to the development of Mumbai and also, in turn, our country – Shri Jagannath Shankarsheth (JSS) – popularly known as Nana Shankarsheth. His surname was ‘Murkute’. Born on the 10th of February, 1803, he passed away on the 31st of July, 1865.

He was born in a wealthy family engaged in the business of jewellery and diamonds. His reputation and credibility were so high that Arabs, Afghans and other foreign merchants preferred to place their money in the custody of JSS; rather than with banks. JSS was a prominent Indian philanthropist and educationist.

JSS took leadership in many areas of Mumbai’s civil life. He founded the School Society and the Native School of Bombay, the first of its kind in Western India. It changed names from time to time, and finally, it is known as ‘Elphinstone Educational Institute’ (Elphinstone College) today! Many leaders of our country were educated in that college. The Students’ Library and Scientific Society first opened their girls’ schools. Despite the opposition from some orthodox citizens, JSS provided funds to them. He also founded the English School, the Sanskrit Seminary and Sanskrit Library, all located in Girgaum, South Mumbai. He has also instituted a well-known scholarship in his name for the topper in the subject of Sanskrit in the SSC Board, who continues further studies in Sanskrit.

In 1845, along with Sir Jamsethjee Jeejeebhoy, JSS formed the Indian Railway Association to bring railways to India. This Association was eventually incorporated as the Great Indian Peninsula Railway (GIP), presently ‘Central Railway’. JSS and Jeejeebhoy were the only two Indian Directors of GIP Railways. He participated in India’s first train journey between Mumbai and Thane, which took about 45 minutes.

JSS, Sir George Birdwood and Dr. Bhau Daji Lad initiated some of the major reconstruction efforts of the city in 1857. They transformed the then congested city into a spacious one, with monumental buildings. JSS was first Indian member of the Legislative Council of Mumbai under the Act of 1861 and became a member of the Bombay Board of Education. He was also the first Indian member of the Asiatic Society. JSS generously donated to a school in Grant Road and also a theatre. He also helped the British Government in the banning of the inhuman custom of ‘Suttee’ (widow burning). Thanks to his efforts, Hindus got a cremation ground at Sonapur. He donated generously to many temples.

During the first war of independence in 1857, the British suspected his involvement; but acquitted him for want of evidence. Bombay Association was the first political organisation in Mumbai founded by JSS on the 26th of August, 1852.

His memorials are – a marble statue at Asiatic Society of Mumbai, then the erstwhile Girgaum road was renamed as JSS Road and Nana Chowk at Grant Road. The Government of Maharashtra has recently allotted a large plot of land in the Antop Hill area, Wadala, to build a memorial of Shri Jagannath Shankarsheth.

Let us offer our grateful Namaskaar to this great philanthropist, educationist, visionary leader of our country.

BOOK EXTRACT

BANKING DECEITS: ROGUE CREDIT CULTURE

“A diamond is forever” is the tag line of De Beers, the world’s household name for diamonds. Nirav Modi diamonds, which aspired to be the Indian De Beers brand equivalent, however failed to get its name etched as a diamond jeweller forever.

The unassuming Nirav Modi, owner of the once famed brand, grew up in Belgium, got admitted to Wharton School but failed to continue. He moved back to India in 1990 when he was 19. He trained for the diamond jewellery business under the sharp eyes of his uncle Mehul Choksi, promoter of another scam-hit, stock-market listed company, Gitanjali Gems.

In 1999, Nirav Modi branched out on his own, under the banner of Firestar Diamonds, starting his own diamond jewellery-making facility in India. Meanwhile the diamond industry was undergoing two major shifts. First, brands loomed large on the landscape that was once ruled by mom-and-pop boutiques and family jewellers. Clients began moving to branded jewellery – assurance of ethics was needed to repose trust. Second, design started taking precedence – shifting to ‘wearable’ creativity instead of just traditional diamonds and stones.

Nirav Modi took full advantage of these shifts in consumer preference. He realized that the luxury jewellery market was red hot, pushing into the ultra-luxe retail jewellery market in 2010. With the tagline “Haut Diamantaire”, he launched an eponymous jewellery business branded NIRAV MODI with 8 boutiques worldwide, including high street luxury stores in London, New York and Hong Kong.

Nirav Modi was just flying higher and higher in the $275 billion global jewellery market. Firestar group turnover grew to a whopping Rs 14,700 crore ($2 billion) by 2016-17 and he expressed his vision of having 100 stores by 2025. His name became the stamp of corporate India’s growing global status.

His diamonds sparkled on Hollywood red-carpets, adorning the necks and earlobes of celebrities like Kate Winslet. Back home in India, the Nirav Modi brand was splashed on hoardings across Delhi and Mumbai bearing the image of its global brand ambassador, actor and former Miss World, Priyanka Chopra.

Then came out the fraud – the mega heist structured by the borrower, aided by the lender. Nirav Modi used the classical method of relying on bank insiders, greasing palms and dodging technology, more than using it.

His lender, Punjab National Bank (PNB) stunned markets when it declared in February 2018 that its Mumbai branch in Fort area has lost over Rs 11,000 crore ($1.5 billion). Nirav Modi, three of his relatives (his wife, brother and uncle Mehul Choksi) and three firms (Diamonds R US, Solar Exports and Stellar Diamonds) in which Modi and Choksi were partners, got embroiled in one of the largest scams in the Indian financial market.

How was the fraud committed? It began with the diamond firms approaching PNB for financing import of rough diamonds. The much popular Letter of Credit (LC) facilities were opened by the bank, in favour of Nirav Modi’s firms, which allowed credit for a certain period. Nirav Modi bribed his way to obtain the LCs without any security, which is the primary requirement for any such facility. What these LCs allowed were imports for which payment can be made by the importer to the bank later that is, after the agreed credit period.

Based on the strength of the LCs, Nirav Modi firms got PNB to open Letters of Undertakings (LoUs) apparently for one year (though legally, it could not exceed three months), on foreign branches of certain Indian banks (LoU is a bank guarantee which allows bank’s customer to raise money from another Indian bank’s foreign branch in the form of short-term credit). When these LoUs were shown at the foreign branches, these banks remitted funds to PNB’s Nostro Accounts (accounts PNB had with the overseas banks). The available funds were then drawn and utilized by Nirav Modi’s team.

It was expected that Nirav Modi’s firms would settle their obligations with PNB on the expiry of the LoU period. This last leg did not happen; and this was the problem and obviously the swindle!

About 150 LoUs were fake – issued by a few PNB employees. Based on these unauthorized LoUs, PNB employees misused SWIFT network to transmit messages to foreign banks communicating details of sanctioned LoUs; by wilfully not recording these SWIFT messages in the bank’s core system. These omissions made the transactions by-pass the main PNB banking control system.   

When the news of the fraud got flashed all over – ironically on a Valentine’s Day – Nirav Modi’s abrupt upsurge to eminence came crashing down.

Why did he cheat? A logical reason could be his need for continuous funding. The pace of growth of his business was so fast and furious, it was perhaps difficult for him to fund his enormous marketing cost, super-model remunerations, new luxury-stores and investing in working capital.

Nirav Modi tagline “Say Yes, Forever” was literally followed by the lax Indian bank by continuing to heed his request for incessant loan-guarantees, fraudulently or otherwise.

Nirav Modi’s troubles mirror those of another Indian tycoon, Vijay Mallya. [Both Nirav Modi and Vijay Mallya are holed up in UK with the Indian government desperately trying to lock them up in Indian jails.]

When corporate tycoons run away with the money they have borrowed from banks, what credit culture are we talking about? It is sheer corporate crime of the highest order.  

Instances abound on entrepreneurs running away after loan defaults, especially when they have the ability to pay but do not do so. These instances raise doubts on the prevalent credit habits among the Indian corporates. It is true that all businesses cannot be painted with the same brush. But thousands including big names like Winsome Diamonds, Zoom Developers, Varun Industries, S Kumars and DSQ Software have taken the banking system to the cleaners.

Exasperated over the behaviour of certain borrowers, India’s largest banker lamented in 2017 that they no longer trusted ‘steel companies’. It was a sad day. Arundhati Bhattacharya, ex-State Bank of India chief, slammed steel firms for being non-transparent in their data presentation to the banks – disappointed over the way the industry misrepresented by twisting facts, while seeking loans. It was a bank-chief’s way of expressing annoyance over corporate India’s attitude towards taking bank funding and servicing thereof.

Many woes of non-payment in the Indian economy are due to past instances of political gridlocks, delayed permissions and economic slowdown. But it does not provide the license to any borrower, not to repay its liabilities willingly. Poor business conditions leading to banking defaults are excusable, but not when the borrower wilfully defaults. Sadly, numerous borrowers default in paying bank debts even when economic situations improve. This is poor corporate culture.

Tailpiece

Credit is oxygen to business. Its adequate flow is a necessity for any business to function effectively. The loans disbursed need to be supervised and recovered by the lenders, in accordance with the lending terms. But what if the borrower does not, purposefully? This is a significant issue of banking fraud. Money borrowed if properly utilised for intended purposes are often duly paid-back. But if the borrowed sums are either siphoned off, money laundered or used for unapproved projects, it becomes a huge hoax.  

Not returning money borrowed are deceptions which render short term gains to the borrowers but obliterate their long term wellbeing.

Extract from the book: CORPORATE FRAUDS: BIGGER, BROADER, BOLDER  by Robin Banerjee
Chapter 6 titled “Banking Deceits”, Pages 114-118

ABOUT THE BOOK

Think of East India Company. This business outfit came to India to do business and then stayed on to loot for 200 years. And this is not a solitary instance of corporate artifice.

Look around, and you will find businesses are cheating on you and me.

Take instances like banking mischiefs, which have been long known. It happens both ways. When banks are cheated and when banks cheat on us.

Many rich hide their wealth. Money laundering, creating shell companies, offshore banking and hiding ill-gotten wealth from the taxmen, are practised by many of the who’s who of our society.

Converting black money into white and vice versa is rather popular. Try to buy a home, and the chances are that a proportion needs to be paid in black. And you will need to figure out ways to acquire it!

Stock markets are somewhere we place our confidence to maximise our savings. But it’s full of potholes. Instances of insider trading, penny stocks, short selling, falsified profit numbers of companies are rather common.
Our way of knowing how companies perform is through their accounting numbers. But there are various ways to doctor them. This is a colossal  value destroyer.

There are numerous such stories and anecdotes in the book – over 350 of them. Simply written in understandable form, for all of us to understand. A recommended reading for all professionals.

SHOCK

A very interesting case was going on in the Court. The issue was very sensitive, and there were many stakeholders. The case had many social and financial ramifications. One party to the dispute was very influential and financially sound. The opponent party was aggrieved was not so resourceful.

The influential party had engaged a very reputed counsel who had an enviable track record of success. He and his client both were celebrities. The other party was a mediocre person. He could not afford a senior counsel. He had engaged a not so well-known junior counsel.  People had concluded that it was then a one-sided battle.

However, contrary to the expectations of all, the junior counsel fought it brilliantly. He had taken it as a challenge. And merits were really on his side. In the good old days, such merits had a good value in courts of law. Today, truth has to live with a lot of fear, and it does not come out that easily. It gets buried under money or muscle power!

Many experienced lawyers say that they win the cases not because of merits or their arguing skills, but just because the opponent’s lawyer is often not well prepared. In this case, the senior counsel, as usual, was very well prepared and had not taken it lightly. Still, the junior posed a great challenge to the senior. He made such brilliant arguments so beautifully that the people in the courtroom were pleasantly surprised. They were impressed. The senior was often put into a defensive position.

The balance had clearly tiled on the juniors side. The mediocre party was completely satisfied with his counsel’s performance.

He could barely afford the juniors counsel’s fees but had no means to purchase the decision.

The court was adjourned. The decision was to be announced the next day. The senior counsel was a little embarrassed, while the junior appeared to be triumphant. Many people congratulated him and even the media persons were all praise for him. The curiosity about the decision was mounting!.

The next day the proceedings resumed. The influential party and his counsel were very cool. The other party was very anxious. There was a pin-drop silence when the court started reading the judgement. The contents appeared to be quite balanced, though a little in favour of the smaller party.

However, unfortunately, the final verdict went against the junior; everybody was stunned! The influential party and his counsel were smiling as if they knew the outcome beforehand.

The junior counsel stood up and exclaimed –“I am shocked by this decision!” The court looked at him with a frown. It took it as an offence. People were confused about reacting, although they held the same opinion. There were anxious moments in the Court.

However, a very senior and respected counsel came to the rescue of junior counsel. He said, “My Lord, please forgive my learned young friend. He is new and has not much experience. Had he been experienced enough, he would not have been even half as much shocked as he is today!”

BOMBAY HIGH COURT ON RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS – A RULING RELEVANT TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

BACKGROUND
A recent decision of the Bombay High Court not only lays down and confirms important principles of law but also has implications for corporate governance and rights of shareholders (‘activists’ or otherwise). The decision has seen differing views and reactions. Some support it as laying down correctly the law. Others hold that a more purposeful view of the provisions could have been taken as they believe the conclusions drawn impact the spirit of good corporate governance. Be as it may be, these important legal conclusions of the court are valuable to review. This decision is in the matter of Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. vs. Invesco Developing Markets Fund ((2021) 131 Taxmann.com 321 (Bom.)).

This ruling is under appeal before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Interestingly, parallel proceedings are also pending before the National Company Law Tribunal/National Company Law Appellate Tribunal for the same matter. Indeed, the core question of whether the NCLT has sole jurisdiction over such matters to the exclusion of the High Court is itself being pursued. Thus, we are likely to see further developments, including possibly a different view of the facts and/or law, in the matter.

SUMMARY OF CORE FACTS AND ISSUES
The core issue is whether shareholders have the unfettered right to call a general meeting and place resolutions for consideration by shareholders? Does the Board of Directors have any discretion or power to review and reject any of such resolutions or they are bound to call (or, in default, the shareholder group would itself call) such general meeting? Is the only thing the Board is expected to check is whether the procedural requirements of calling such general meetings are complied with? Or can the Board consider the merits of such resolutions in terms of their legality, whether such resolutions could result in violations of law by the company, etc.?

The matter concerned Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. (ZEEL), a listed company. Two shareholders (‘the Shareholders’), holding, in the aggregate, 17.88% of the equity share capital of ZEEL, served a requisition under section 100 of the Companies Act, 2013 on ZEEL to convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) to consider primarily two categories of resolutions (aggregating to nine resolutions in all). The first three resolutions proposed the removal of three existing directors. The remaining six resolutions proposed the appointment of six specified individuals as independent directors. Two of the first three resolutions became redundant since two of the specified directors resigned voluntarily. Interestingly, the promoters of the company held only 3.99%.

The independent directors of ZEEL met and considered the matter. The Board of ZEEL considered various legal opinions and concluded that the notice of EGM was invalid and hence decided not to call the EGM. The reasons for holding that the notice was invalid were several and which were considered by the High Court. Since, under section 100, if the Board does not call the EGM, the Shareholders themselves could call it, ZEEL approached the High Court with three prayers. The first was to declare that the notice was illegal, ultra vires, invalid, bad in law and incapable of implementation. The second sought a declaration that the rejection by ZEEL to convene the EGM was valid in law. The third prayer sought an injunction against the Shareholders from holding the EGM themselves.

These prayers, including the grounds for rejection of such requisition, became the issues for consideration by the Court.

DOES THE HIGH COURT HAVE ANY JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN SUCH PETITIONS OR DOES THE NCLT HAVE SOLE JURISDICTION?
The Shareholders claimed that, in view of Section 430 of the Act, the High Court had no jurisdiction and the NCLT/NCLAT had sole jurisdiction over this matter. The Court rejected this contention stating that the relevant Rules that set out the provisions which NCLT has sole jurisdiction on does not include Section 100 and other relevant provisions. Thus, the Court concluded that it did have jurisdiction over such matters.

CAN SHAREHOLDERS PASS RESOLUTIONS WHICH HAVE LEGAL INFIRMITIES? CAN THE BOARD REJECT A REQUISITION ON SUCH GROUNDS?
This was the core and substantive issue before the Court. The Shareholders claimed that so long as the requirements of Section 100 are complied with, the Board was bound to call the EGM. Indeed, it was argued that Section 100 mandated the Board to do this by use of the word ‘shall’. The only principal substantive requirement the Board of Directors are required to check is whether the procedural requirements of Section 100 are complied with (e.g., the minimum percentage of shareholders specified (10%) have sought the holding of such EGM). This is the sole test that is relevant to decide whether the requisition is ‘valid’ (as specified in section 100(4)) or not. Effectively, the argument, as the Court highlighted, was that even if the resolutions could have resulted in ZEEL committing illegalities, the Board had no say and was bound to call the EGM.

ZEEL countered this by pointing several issues in the resolutions which made them illegal to be proceeded with and would also mean committing illegalities by ZEEL if such resolutions were passed. The appointment of six independent directors could possibly exceed the limit of 12 directors on the Board. ZEEL operated in areas that were regulated by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (‘MIB’). Any change in the Board required prior approval of the MIB. The resolutions, however, proposed the appointment first and made it subject to approval, meaning the approval, if received, would be a post-facto approval. Thus, the removal or appointment of directors would mean violation of the MIB rules for which the company would suffer.

Appointment of independent directors could be made, in law, only by following a specified procedure. The Nomination and Remuneration Committee is required to review the merits of the proposed independent directors and recommend them to the Board. The Board thereafter, at their discretion, appoints such directors and this appointment has to be then approved by the shareholders. Thus, it was a three-step process mandated by law. ZEEL contended that the requisition sought to bypass the first two steps and, thus, again, the company would be held to commit violation if it allowed the resolutions. Indeed, it was contended, the shareholders could only ‘approve’ an appointment already made and not directly appoint an independent director itself.

ZEEL even questioned whether the directors proposed for appointment by certain substantial shareholders could be held to be ‘independent’, despite their respective merits and qualifications. In the ordinary course, nominee directors are by definition, not independent directors.

Thus, ZEEL contended on these and other grounds that if the EGM was allowed to be proceeded with and the resolutions passed, ZEEL would be committing several violations of law.

The High Court, in the very eloquently written judgment, held that the Board could not proceed with a requisition that would, if implemented, result in the company committing violations of law. Citing early precedents from the UK (where the law had thereafter changed, but the rulings still had merit) and also elsewhere, as well as decisions of Indian courts, the Court held that the Board was not bound to convene an EGM if the resolutions resulted in the company committing illegalities. Particularly for listed companies (and ZEEL was a listed company), there were certain specified requirements to be followed for the appointment of independent directors, and these could not be bypassed. The prior approval of the MIB for changes in the Board was required while the resolutions proposed that it could be obtained later on.

An issue arose whether the Board of Directors could consider extreme situations and possibilities to decide whether the resolutions may end up in the company committing illegalities. The Court held that the Board could and cited the philosopher Karl Popper and held that the test of illegality was to be checked from every angle, even extreme ones. It observed, ‘Any hypothesis has to be tested, repeatedly, for failure; including testing at the margins or extremities. It is no use saying that a hypothesis fits a median situation. The question is whether the hypothesis survives a test or collision against a polarity? If it does, then it is sound; if not, it must fail throughout and considered unsound’. To demonstrate this, the Court asked the counsel for the Shareholders whether a resolution proposing that the company engage in gambling business (illegal in India) could be allowed? The counsel replied that this was an extreme or outlandish proposition. The Hon’ble Court held that even such extreme tests were necessary to test the proposition raised. If the argument of the Shareholders was accepted, even a ‘madcap resolution’ would end up being allowed.

The Court also made another important point. It observed that even the Board of Directors itself could not propose such resolutions in the manner in which they were proposed as there would be violations of law. The shareholders are not on any higher pedestal, and the same criteria are applied. Had the Board proposed such resolution, could a shareholder object before a court against such proposals and seek injunctions? The Court answered in the affirmative.

Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the Board of ZEEL to reject the requisition and granted the injunctions prayed. The EGM was directed not to be held by the Board or by the requisitioning shareholders.

IMPLICATIONS ON RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY
With due respect, some aspects are worthy of consideration and debate. Concerns have been raised whether the court ruling would disempower shareholders and put brakes on even healthy shareholder activism. It could, it is argued, excessively empower an existing board having support of a small minority of shareholders and exclude the majority shareholders from exercising their rights. In particular, the issue raised was whether the process of screening prospective directors through the Nomination and Remuneration Committee was for the benefit of shareholders or could be used to supplant and exclude them? Indeed, this would mean that the shareholders could not even appoint directly those board members who would form this Committee. These, it is respectfully submitted, are valid points but it is also respectfully submitted that the answer lies in an amendment of the law, which, perhaps in hindsight, does seem to have lacuna which the present decision has thrown up.

In any case, it is respectfully submitted, that the Hon’ble Court is right in holding that the Board could not allow resolutions to be passed and implemented resulting in the company violating legal requirements. As the Court pithily observed, ‘Sometimes, it happens that a company must be saved from its own shareholders, however well-intentioned’.

IBC AND MORATORIUMS

INTRODUCTION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘the Code’) has become one of the most dynamic and fast-changing legislations. Not only has the Government been modifying it from time to time, but the Judiciary is also playing a very active role in ironing out creases and resolving controversies. The Code provides for the insolvency resolution process of corporate debtors. The Code gets triggered when a corporate debtor commits a default in payment of a debt, which could be financial or operational. The initiation (or starting) of the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code may be done by a financial creditor (in respect of default of financial debt) or an operational creditor (in respect of default of an operational debt) or by the corporate itself (in respect of any default).

One of the important facets of this resolution process is a moratorium on legal proceedings against the corporate debtor contained u/s 14 of the Code. This provision has seen a great deal of judicial development in recent times. Let us analyse this crucial section in greater detail.

MORATORIUM
Once the insolvency resolution petition against the corporate debtor is admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), and after the corporate insolvency resolution process commences, the NCLT declares a moratorium prohibiting institution or continuation of any suits against the debtor; execution of any judgment of a Court / authority; any transfer of assets by the debtor; and recovery of any property against the debtor. The moratorium continues till the resolution process is completed. Thus, total protection is offered to the debtor against any suits / proceedings. In Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. vs. Hotel Gaudavan (P.) Ltd. [2018] 145 SCL 428 (SC), it was held that even arbitration proceedings are stayed during this period.

An extract of the relevant provisions is given below:

Moratorium.
14. (1) Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the insolvency commencement date, the Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, namely:—
(a) the institution of suits or continuation of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including execution of any judgment, decree or order in any court of law, tribunal, arbitration panel or other authority;
(b) transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the corporate debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein;
(c) any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its property including any action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002);
(d) the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor.
…………………….
(2) The supply of essential goods or services3 to the corporate debtor as may be specified shall not be terminated or suspended or interrupted during the moratorium period.
…………………….
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to:—
(a) such transactions, agreements or other arrangements as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator or any other authority.
(b) a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.’

(4) The order of moratorium shall have effect from the date of such order till the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process:
Provided that where at any time during the corporate insolvency resolution process period, if the Adjudicating Authority approves the resolution plan under sub-section (1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of the corporate debtor under section 33, the moratorium shall cease to have effect from the date of such approval or liquidation order, as the case may be.”

The Supreme Court in P. Mohanraj vs. Shah Brothers Ispat P Ltd. [2021] 125 taxmann.com 39 (SC) has explained that the object of a moratorium provision such as s.14 of the Code was to see that there was no depletion of a corporate debtor’s assets during the insolvency resolution process so that it could be kept running as a going concern during this time, thus maximising value for all stakeholders. The idea was that it facilitated the continued operation of the business of the corporate debtor to allow it breathing space to organise its affairs so that new management may ultimately take over and bring the corporate debtor out of financial sickness, thus benefitting all stakeholders, which would include workmen of the corporate debtor. The Apex Court further explained that while s.14(1)(a) referred to monetary liabilities of the corporate debtor, s.14(1)(b) referred to the corporate debtor’s assets. Together, these two clauses formed a scheme that shielded the corporate debtor from pecuniary attacks against it in the moratorium period so that the corporate debtor got breathing space to continue as a going concern in order to rehabilitate itself ultimately. Relying on this explanation, the Supreme Court did not allow cheque bouncing proceedings to continue against the corporate debtor u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It held that a quasi-criminal proceeding that is contained in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act would, given the object and context of s.14 of IBC, amount to a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of s.14(1)(a) of the Code. Hence, the moratorium would attach to such a proceeding.

In the case of Sandeep Khaitan vs. JSVM Plywood Industries Ltd. [2021] 166 SCL 494 (SC) the Apex Court dealt with an issue of whether the High Court has inherent powers under s.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to make such orders against the corporate debtor to give effect to any order under that Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice? The Court held that the power under s.482 of the CrPC may not be available to the Court to allow the breach of a statutory provision. The words ‘to secure the ends of justice’ in s.482 cannot mean to overlook the undermining of a Statute, i.e., the provisions of s.14 of the Code.

Similarly, in Anand Rao Korada v Varsha Fabrics P Ltd. [2019] 111 taxmann.com 474 (SC), in order to recover labour dues, the High Court ordered the auction of the assets of the corporate debtor after issuance of the moratorium. The Supreme Court set aside this Order and held that if the assets of the company were alienated during the pendency of the proceedings under the IBC, it would seriously jeopardise the interest of all the stakeholders. The sale or liquidation of assets had to be in accordance with the IBC only.

RECOVERY OF PROPERTY
In Rajendra K Bhutta vs. MHADA [2020] 160 SCL 95 (SC), a society redevelopment project was blessed by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA). The developer went into insolvency, MHADA wanted to take over possession of the land given to the developer for demolition and redevelopment. The Supreme Court disallowed this owing to the moratorium u/s. 14(1)(d). It held that under s.14(1)(d) what was referred to was the ‘recovery of any property’ of the corporate debtor. It was clear that when recovery of property was to be made by an owner under s.14(1)(d), such recovery would be of property that was ‘occupied by’ a corporate debtor. The expression ‘occupied by’ would mean or be synonymous with being in actual physical possession of or being actually used by, in contra-distinction to the expression ‘possession’, which would connote possession being either constructive or actual and which, in turn, would include legally being in possession, though factually not being in physical possession. Since it was clear that the Joint Development Agreement had granted a license to the developer (i.e., the corporate debtor) to enter upon the property, with a view to do all the things that were mentioned in it, it is obvious that after such entry, the property would be ‘occupied by’ the developer. Section 14(1)(d) of the Code, when it speaks about recovery of property ‘occupied’ refers to actual physical occupation of the property. Hence, MHADA’s plea for repossession of the land was turned down.

NATURAL PERSONS NOT PROTECTED
In the above referred decision of P.Mohanraj (supra), the Supreme Court also held that it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in s.14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons, i.e., its Directors in charge of its affairs continued to be statutorily liable under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Accordingly, criminal proceedings could continue unabated against the Managing Director / Other Directors who have drawn the bounced cheque.

Similarly, in Anjali Rathi vs. Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. [2021] 130 taxmann.com 253 (SC), the Supreme Court allowed proceedings to be carried out against the promoters of a corporate debtor which was a developer for failing to honour the terms of settlement entered into with home buyers.

PERSONAL GUARANTOR NOT SHIELDED
Another novel issue arose in SBI vs. V. Ramakrishnan [2018] 96 taxmann.com 271 (SC) of whether the moratorium extended to the personal guarantor of a corporate debtor also? The Court held that the moratorium under s.14 cannot possibly apply to a personal guarantor. This decision has since been given the shape of law by inserting sub-section (3) in s.14 which expressly provides that the moratorium under s.14 will not apply to a surety in a contract of guarantee to a corporate debtor.

WILFUL DEFAULTER PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE
An interesting question arose before the Calcutta High Court in the case of Gouri Prasad Goenka vs. State Bank of India, LSI-473-HC-2021(CAL). Here the corporate debtor had gone into insolvency resolution. However, the question was whether wilful defaulter proceedings could be initiated against the promoter, in view of the moratorium imposed u/s 14? The Court held that whole-time directors and promoters who were in charge of the affairs of the defaulting company during the relevant period, when the default was committed, could not be said to be absolved of their act of wilful default committed prior to final approval and acceptance of a resolution plan. The moratorium in no way prevented this. The wilful defaulter declaration proceeding were to disseminate credit information for cautioning banks and financial institutions so as to ensure that further bank finance was not made available to them and not for recovery of debts or assets of the corporate debtor, which could hamper the corporate resolution process.

PMLA ATTACHMENT OF ASSETS
In Directorate of Enforcement vs. Manoj Kumar Agarwal [2021] 126 taxmann.com 210 (NCL-AT), the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was determining whether an attachment order passed by the Enforcement Directorate under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 before the start of the resolution process of the corporate debtor could survive in view of s.14?

The NCL-AT held that the aim and object of the PMLA for attaching the property alleged to be involved in money laundering was to avoid concealment, transfer or dealing in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceedings relating to the confiscation of such proceeds of crime under PMLA. Thus, Provisional Attachment Order was issued for a period not exceeding 180 days from the date of Order. Now if s.14(1)(b) of IBC relating to the moratorium was seen, the NCLT was required to pass an order declaring a moratorium, inter alia prohibiting ‘transferring, encumbering, alienating or disposing of by the Corporate Debtor any of its assets or any legal right or beneficial interest therein? thus the moment an insolvency was initiated, the property of the corporate debtor was protected by such a moratorium. Thus, both the provisions sought to protect the property of corporate debtor from transfer etc. till further actions take place. It further held s.14 would be attracted in all such cases. Once the moratorium was ordered, even if the Enforcement Directorate moved the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA, further action before the Adjudicating Authority under PMLA must be said to have been prohibited. Section 14 of IBC will hit the institution and continuation of proceedings before Adjudicating Authority under PMLA.

CONCLUSION
The provisions relating to the moratorium are very important to protect the assets and going concern of the corporate debtor. However, Courts are quick to ensure that while it is a shield for the debtor it cannot be used as a shield by its promoters / directors.

NO CONSTRUCTIVE CREDITS!

INTRODUCTION
In the previous article, we discussed clause (h) of Section 17(5) of the CGST Act, 2017 which deals with the restriction on claim of input tax credit in cases where goods are lost, stolen, destroyed, written off or disposed of by way of gift or free samples. In this article, we will discuss clauses (c) & (d) of Section 17(5) which restrict claim of input tax credit on goods or services received in the construction of an immovable property.

PROVISIONS UNDER GST REGIME
Let us first refer to the relevant provisions for ease of reference:

‘(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of Section 16 and sub-section (1) of Section 18, input tax credit shall not be available in respect of the following, namely:

(c) works contract services when supplied for construction of an immovable property (other than plant and machinery) except where it is an input service for further supply of works contract service;

(d) goods or services or both received by a taxable person for construction of an immovable property (other than plant or machinery) on his own account including when such goods or services or both are used in the course or furtherance of business.

Explanation — For the purposes of clauses (c) and (d), the expression ‘construction’ includes re-construction, renovation, additions or alterations or repairs, to the extent of capitalisation, to the said immovable property’;

Clause (c) above restricts the availability of input tax credit in respect of works contract services supplied for construction of immovable property other than plant and machinery while clause (d) restricts the availability of input tax credit on goods or services or both received for construction of immovable property other than ‘plant or machinery’ on his own account including when such goods or services or both are used in the course or furtherance of his own business. On a plain reading, one may feel that clauses (c) and (d) are similar, with the only distinction being that the former applies to works contract services received while the latter applies to independent goods or services being received for the same activity, i.e., construction of immovable property. However, there are various nuances, which will be discussed later.

THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
This is the primary condition for an inward supply to be covered under the blocked credit list. It, therefore, becomes important to analyse the scope of the term ‘immovable property’. While the same is not defined under the GST law, one may refer to the definition u/s 2(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which defines the same as under:

‘Immovable Property includes land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.’

Even the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 defines the term ‘immovable property’ in a similar manner:

‘Immovable property includes land, buildings, rights of ways, lights or any other benefit arising out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, standing crops or grass.’

Ongoing through the above set of definitions, it is apparent that land, along with anything attached or fastened to it, is an immovable property. However, when something is attached/ fastened to an immovable property, the nature of attachment/ fastening needs to be looked into before concluding if such thing is also a part of the immovable property. In Triveni Engineering & Industries Limited [2000 (120) ELT 0273 SC], the Hon’ble SC had held that installation or erection of turbo alternator on the concrete base specially constructed on the land cannot be treated as a common base and, therefore, it follows that the resultant structure would be an immovable property and therefore, cannot be treated as ‘excisable goods’.

On the contrary, in the case of Solid & Correct Engineering Works [2010 (252) E.L.T. 481 (S.C.)], the Court held that attachment of plant with nuts and bolts intended to provide stability and prevent vibration not covered as attached to the earth and hence not immovable property. It was more so as such attachment was easily detachable from foundation and not permanent in nature.

In Craft Interiors Private Limited [2006 (203) ELT 529 (SC)], the SC dealt with the issue of whether furniture attached to an immovable property can be treated as immovable property or not? The SC held that furniture items, such as storage cabinets, kitchen counters, etc., which are erected at customer site and cannot be dismantled/removed in complete or semi-knocked conditions, are immovable in nature and, therefore, not excisable. On the other hand, the Court also held that items like desks and chairs, are easily movable and therefore, excisable.

In WeWork India Management Private Limited [2020 (37) GSTL 136 (AAAR – GST – Kar)], the issue before the Appellate Authority was eligibility to claim the input tax credit on detachable sliding & glass partitions. Observing that the sliding/ partitions could be removed without any damage, the Authority held that the same was a movable property and, therefore, the same was not hit by clause (c)/(d) of Section 17(5).

Therefore, while determining whether a property is movable or not, following needs to be taken care of:

• What is the degree of permanency of the attachment to the land?
• Whether the goods attached/ fastened can be detached without causing substantial damage to it?
• Is the identity of the goods post-removal lost?

THE IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY SHOULD NOT BE IN THE NATURE OF PLANT AND MACHINERY
In case the resultant immovable property is in the nature of ‘plant and machinery’, the credit is not blocked. What constitutes ‘plant and machinery’ has been explained by way of explanation to Section 17(5) as under:

‘For the purposes of this Chapter and Chapter VI, the expression ‘plant and machinery’ means apparatus, equipment, and machinery fixed to earth by foundation or structural support that are used for making outward supply of goods or services or both and includes such foundation and structural supports but excludes —

(i) land, building or any other civil structures;
(ii) telecommunication towers; and
(iii) pipelines laid outside the factory premises’.

The terms ‘apparatus’, ‘equipment’ and ‘machinery’ are not defined under the CGST Act, 2017 or the rules made thereunder. Therefore, to understand the said terms, let us refer to their dictionary meaning:

  

 

Apparatus

Equipment

Machinery

Oxford Dictionary

The equipment needed for a particular activity or purpose

The items needed for a particular purpose

Machines as a whole or parts of machine

Collin’s Dictionary

Apparatus is the equipment, such as tools and machines, which is
used to do a particular job or activity

Equipment consists of the things which are used for a particular
purpose

Machines, machine parts, or machine systems collectively

MacMillan Dictionary

The machines, tools and equipments needed for doing something,
especially something technical or scientific

The tools, machines, or other things that you need for a
particular job or activity

The moving or working parts of a machinery

Black’s Law Dictionary

An outfit of tools, utensils or
instruments adapted to accomplishment of any branch of work or for
performance of experiment or operation. A group or set of organs concerned in
performance of single function.

Whatever is needed in equipping; the articles comprised in an
outfit

Complex combination of mechanical parts

(continued)

 

A generic word of the most comprehensive significance
which may mean
implements
and an equipment of things provided, and adapted as a means to some end

 

 

 

Ongoing through the above, anything which can perform a specific function or operation or undertaking any process can qualify as apparatus or equipment or machinery and will, therefore, consequently be treated as ‘plant and machinery’.

The above explanation refers only to such plant and machinery which has been fixed to earth by foundation or structural support, i.e., this explanation is specifically for cases where there can be a dispute as to whether the ‘plant and machinery’ are classifiable as immovable property or not. For instance, elevators for a building are plant and machinery, but are of such a nature that once installed, it is impossible to uninstall them without any damage to the structure. However, it is apparent that the elevator is machinery, and therefore, the legislature has specifically carved out an exception that permits the claim of input tax credit for such transactions.

However, in the case of Las Palmas CHS [2020 (41) GSTL 548 (AAAR-Mah)], the issue raised before the Appellate Authority was whether input tax credit could be claimed on receipt of inward supply of elevator, if the cost of such elevator was recovered from the members? The Authority held in the negative as Section  17(5)(c) applied only when the input works contract services were used for further making an outward supply of works contract services. However, it seems that the Authority has not analysed whether the elevator qualified as ‘plant and machinery’ and thereby eligible for input tax credit.

In P K Mahapatra [2020 (40) GSTL 99 (AAAR – GST – Chhattisgarh)], the issue before the Appellate Authority was to determine whether input tax credit could be claimed on the installation of private railway siding? Once again, the Authority denied the benefit concluding that the same amounted to an immovable property, without going into whether the railway siding could have been treated as plant and machinery or not? In fact, the CESTAT has, in the case of India Cements Ltd. [2017 (3) GSTL 144 (Tri – Hyd)], already held that CENVAT credit can be claimed on railway siding.

This takes us to the includes clause which provides that foundation and structural supports in relation to apparatus, equipment or machinery will also be included within the scope of ‘plant and machinery’. This would primarily cover expenses incurred towards civil works done for installing the goods purchased. However, in Maruti Ispat & Energy Private Limited [2018 (18) GSTL 847 (AAR – GST)], the Authority held that input tax credit on inputs/ input services used for constructing a foundation for installation of ‘plant and machinery’ was hit by Section 17(5)(c) as the same was ‘other structures’ referred to in Explanation to Section 17(5) defining the scope of ‘plant and machinery’.

What is important is the third clause, i.e., the excludes clause, which excludes the following from the scope of ‘plant and machinery’:
(i) land, building or any other civil structures;
(ii) telecommunication towers; and
(iii) pipelines laid outside the factory premises.

It is imperative to note that an inward supply may fall under the means or includes clause and therefore be classifiable as ‘plant and machinery’. However, if such inward supply gets covered under any of the above entries provided in the excludes clause, the same would not be considered ‘plant and machinery’ and, therefore, covered under the blocked credits.

The above provisions bring to limelight the interplay between the concept of land, building and civil structures and ‘plant and machinery’. Indeed, in the past, various decisions have held that if the land, building or any other civil structure thereon is so constructed to act as a plant, the functional utility of the asset would be pre-dominant and the asset could indeed be classified as a ‘plant and machinery.’ For instance, the House of Lords, in the case of IRC vs. Barclay Curle & Co. has held that a concrete dry dock is a plant [76 ITR 62 (House of Lords)]. Similarly, one may also refer to the following decisions, though in the context of Income Tax, where different civil structures have been held to be a plant:

• Dam – Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply [(122 ITR 288 (Bom)]
• Nursing Home – Dr. B Venkata Rao [243 ITR 81(S.C)]
• Cold Storage – Kanodia Cold Storage [(100 ITR 155(All)]

• Safe deposit vault – Central Bank of India [(102 ITR 270 (Bom)]

The claim of input tax credit on the above structures, which otherwise are classifiable as plant is hit, in view of the excludes clause in the definition of ‘plant and machinery’. The next two entries, i.e., telecommunication towers and pipelines laid outside the factory premises, are industry-specific restrictions on claim of credit, similar to the restriction on the claim of an input tax credit on the purchase of motor vehicles and there, does not appear to be much scope to escape from the purview of Section 17(5)(c) for the  specific industries.

PLANT OR MACHINERY

As stated above, explanation to Section 17(5) defines the scope of ‘plant and machinery’ as a whole. However, clause (d) carves out an exception for ‘plant or machinery’ and not ‘plant and machinery’. This, unless one undertakes a liberal or purposive interpretation, the Explanation to Section 17(5) cannot be used to examine whether a particular item is ‘plant or machinery’ as the same deals with ‘plant and machinery’. Therefore, the common parlance meaning needs to be applied while analysing the said terms.

The dictionary meanings of term ‘plant’ are reproduced below for reference:

Oxford Dictionary – Machinery used in an industrial or manufacturing process.

Collin’s Dictionary – Plant is a large machinery that is used in industrial processes.

MacMillan Dictionary – Large machines and equipment’s used in factory.

Black’s Law Dictionary – The fixtures, tools, machinery and apparatus which are necessary to carry on a trade or business. Physical equipment to produce any desired result or an operating unit.

The above dictionary definitions give plant a wider scope for interpretation, and machinery is included within the purview of the term ‘plant’. The term ‘plant’ was interpreted on multiple occasions by Courts in the context of Income Tax, where it was defined to be an instrument which is utilized to carry on the business, and which is not merely the setting in which the business is carried on. The Courts have on multiple occasions held that when an immovable property has been so constructed as to facilitate the carrying on of the operations of a particular business, the said immovable property can be treated as ‘plant’ and not merely ‘building’.

One may refer to the decisions in the case of C.I.T vs. Kanodia Warehousing Corpn [121 ITR 996(All)], Benson vs. Yard Arm Club Ltd. [1979 Tax L.R 778(Cr.D)], C.I.T vs. Bank of India Ltd. [118 ITR 809 ,818-9 (Bom)], George Mathew vs. C.I.T [43 ITR 535 at 540 (Kar)], Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works vs. C.I.T [52 ITR 615 (Mysore)] and C.I.T vs. Elecon Engineering Co Ltd. [96 ITR 672 at 686-689 (Guj)] affirmed by the Supreme Court [166 ITR 66 (S.C)] where an extremely wide meaning has been given to the term ‘plant’.

If a view that a particular immovable property is classifiable as a plant survives, one can escape from the purview of Section 17(5)(d) since the entry itself does not apply. Therefore, the phrase “on his own account” becomes irrelevant in such a case. However, the same would not apply for Section 17(5)(c) since the same refers to ‘plant and machinery’, which is specifically defined u/s 17(5).

THERE SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) apply for the activity of construction. The term ‘construction’ has been defined by way of an explanation as under:

For the purposes of clauses (c) and (d), the expression ‘construction’ includes re-construction, renovation, additions or alterations or repairs, to the extent of capitalisation, to the said immovable property;

The definition is provided in an inclusive manner, and therefore, the general parlance meaning of the word ‘construction’ would be applicable. Generally, the word construction is used in a situation where a new building or a structure comes into existence when none existed beforehand. In distinction, reconstruction would be a more appropriate term where an existing building is demolished, and a fresh structure is being brought into existence. Nevertheless, it was held that the general meaning of construction would take in its’ fold not only the creation of a new building but also a case of demolition of an existing building and re-construction of the building (Sadha Singh S Mulla Singh vs. District Board AIR 1962 Pun 204).

While the terms ‘construction’ and ‘re-construction’ both envisage a situation of a new civil structure coming into existence, the later inclusive words like renovation, addition or alteration or repairs are all intended to cover existing structures where certain activity is carried out. In this context, it may be useful to refer to the erstwhile service tax legislation wherein a distinction was made between construction, repair, renovation or restoration of a building or civil structure and ‘completion and finishing services’. Separate sub-clauses governed these activities under the positive list regime of service tax, and abatement was denied for ‘completion and finishing services’. Similarly, a separate valuation rule was provided for ‘completion and finishing services’. Various controversies arose in the said legislation where the assessee argued the classification of activities like plumbing, glazing, electrical work, painting, etc., as construction activities being eligible for the abatement/lower valuation, whereas the Revenue contended that the activities do not constitute construction but completion and finishing services. For example, whether plumbing activities would constitute completion and finishing or construction activity is a matter pending before the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner vs. Sai Shraddha Plumbing Private Limited 2019 (28) GSTL J71 (SC). The outcome of the said decision may perhaps open up an opportunity for claiming input tax credit.

Further, the Explanation restricts the scope of construction activity. Accordingly, a receipt of works contract services u/s 17(5)(c) or goods or services or both u/s 17(5)(d) can be said to be towards the construction of immovable property only to the extent the cost has been capitalized in the books of accounts.

To capitalize means to expense the cost over the useful life rather than in the period in which it is incurred. In accounting, capitalisation occurs when a cost is included in the value of an asset. The matching principle requires companies to record expenses in the same accounting period in which the related revenue is incurred. For example, office supplies are generally expensed in the period when they are incurred since they are expected to be consumed within a short period of time. However, some larger office equipment may benefit the business over more than one accounting period. These items are fixed assets, such as computers, cars, office buildings, significant renovation and repair works to the building, etc. The cost of these items is recorded on the general ledger as the historical cost of the asset. Hence, these costs are said to be capitalized,
not expensed.

Therefore, if the taxpayer has satisfied this condition also, whereby he has capitalised the cost of works contracts service or goods/ services received for repairs, renovation, alteration, etc. of immovable property, only then does the restriction under clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) get triggered.

This also raises an interesting question. Let us take an example of a partnership firm that has constructed a shopping mall, to be given on rental basis post-construction. The activity of renting is liable to GST and for the purpose of income tax, is treated as income from house property. Being a partnership firm, it is not required to get its accounts audited under the Partnership Act or under the Income Tax Act, 1961 as Section 44AB does not apply since the rental income is treated as ‘income from house property’ and not ‘business income’. In such a circumstance, the firm can always take a view to expense out the entire construction cost upfront, in which case the inward supply received cannot be said to be used for construction of an immovable property and therefore, would entitle the partnership firm to claim full input tax credit. This view of course would be subject to litigation.

MEANING OF ‘OWN ACCOUNT’
One of the phrases used in Section 17(5)(d) and not in Section 17(5)(c) is that the construction of the immovable property should be on recipients ‘own account’. The term ‘own account’ is defined in various dictionaries
as under:

Collin’s Dictionary – If you take part in a business activity on your own account, you do it for yourself, and not as a representative or employee of a company

MacMillan Dictionary – for yourself, not for someone else

Lexico – For one’s own purpose; for oneself

Black’s Law Dictionary – To have a good legal title; to hold as property; to have a legal or rightful title to; to have; to possess.

Therefore, the construction of an immovable property on his ‘own account’ means something that a person or a company does for itself. The rights and benefits of the constructed immovable property are enjoyed by the person who has actually got the construction
work done.

This interpretation of term ‘own account’ is likely to cause disputes. A mall owner, while constructing a mall, has the intention to lease the entire mall and earn income from it. Although the asset appears in its books, and therefore legally one may say the construction is for own account, it can be argued that the intention is not to use it for his own operations but allow other tenants to use it, thereby the benefit of the construction is not to his ‘own account’. Therefore, the same should not be covered under the blocked credits list.

This aspect has already seen judicial scrutiny in the case of Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd. & Others vs. Chief Commissionerof CGST [2019-TIOL-1088-HC-ORISSA-GST] wherein the Hon’ble High Court allowed ITC on the construction of a mall by laying a principle that the creation of an asset will generate revenue which will be subject to GST. The Appeal against the said order is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the matter is awaiting finality.

CONCLUSION
The intention of clauses (c) and (d) is clear, which is to deny the input tax credit in relation to immovable property. However, the manner in which the provisions are worded and the possibility of varied interpretation makes the said clauses a land mine for litigation. Already, the Hon’ble Orissa HC, in the case of Safari Retreats, has agreed with one of the views perhaps contrary to the legislative intent. However, the fact cannot be ruled out that the intention of the Government is to deny the input tax credit on such inward supplies, and therefore, retrospective amendment of this provisions may not be ruled out. Consequently, one has to be careful while taking a position w.r.t claim of input tax credit having an overlap with clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) of the CGST Act, 2017.

QUALIFIED OPINION – IMPAIRMENT TESTING NOT CARRIED OUT FOR INVESTMENT IN A MATERIAL SUBSIDIARY

DISH TV INDIA LTD (31st MARCH 2021)

From Auditors’ Report (Standalone)
Basis of Qualified Opinion
As stated in Note 41 to the accompanying standalone financial statements, the Company has a non-current investment in and other non-current loans to its wholly-owned subsidiary amounting to Rs. 515,412 lacs and Rs. 74,173 lacs respectively. The wholly-owned subsidiary has negative net current assets and has incurred losses in the current year, although it has a positive net worth as of 31st March 2021. As described in the aforementioned note, management, basis its internal assessment, has considered such balances as fully recoverable as of 31st March 2021. However, the management has not carried out a detailed and comprehensive impairment testing in accordance with the principles of Indian Accounting Standard – 36, “Impairment of Assets” and Indian Accounting Standard – 109, “Financial Instruments”. In the absence of sufficient appropriate evidence to support management’s conclusion, we are unable to comment upon adjustments, if any, that may be required to the carrying value of these non-current investments and non-current loans and its consequential impact on the accompanying standalone financial statements.

Our opinion for the year ended 31st March 2020 was also modified in respect of this matter.

From Auditors’ Report on Internal Financial Controls regarding Financial Statements
Qualified Opinion
According to the information and explanations given to us and based on our audit, the following material weakness has been identified in the operating effectiveness of the Company’s internal financial controls with reference to financial statements as of 31st March 2021: As explained in Note 41 and Note 42 to the standalone financial statements, the Company has performed an internal assessment to estimate the fair value of its investment in its subsidiary, which in our view is not a detailed and comprehensive test in accordance with the principles of Indian Accounting Standard – 36 “Impairment of Assets” and Indian Accounting Standard – 109 “Financial Instruments”. As a result, the Company’s internal financial control system towards estimating the fair value of its investment in its subsidiary were not operating effectively, which could result in the Company not providing for adjustment, if any that may be required to the carrying values of non-current investment and other non-current loans, and its consequential impact on the earnings, reserves and related disclosures in the accompanying standalone financial statements.

From Notes to Financial Statements
Note 41
The Company has non-current investments (including equity component of long term loans and guarantees)
in and non-current loans to its wholly-owned subsidiary, Dish Infra Services Private Limited (‘Dish Infra’), amounting to Rs. 515,412 lacs and Rs. 74,173 lacs respectively. Dish Infra’s net worth is positive although it has incurred losses in the current year. Based on internal assessment, the management believes that the realisable amount from Dish Infra will be higher than the carrying value of the non-current investments and other non-current loans. Hence, no impairment has been considered. The internal assessment is based on the ability of Dish Infra to monetise its assets including investments in new-age technologies, which will generate sufficient cash flows in the future.

From Directors’ Report
Details of Audit Qualification, as per Auditors’ Report dated 30th June 2021, on the Standalone Financial Results of the Company for the Financial Year 2020-21: Not reproduced

Management Response:
(a) The Company as of 31st March 2021, has non-current Investment (including equity component of long term loans and guarantees) in and non-current loans to its wholly-owned subsidiary, Dish Infra Services Private Limited (‘Dish Infra’), amounting to Rs. 5,15,412 lacs and Rs. 74,173 lacs respectively. Dish Infra’s net worth is positive although it has incurred losses in the current year. Based on internal assessment, Management believes that the realisable amount from Dish Infra will be higher than the carrying value of the non-current investments and other non-current financial assets. Hence, no impairment has been considered. The internal assessment is based on the ability of Dish Infra to monetise its assets including investments in new-age technologies, which will generate sufficient cash flows in the future.

(b) The Company has a well-defined system in place to access the appropriateness of the carrying value of its investments and estimation is performed with proper laid down process based on valuation models, usually applied in such cases. The model is refined from time to time to provide appropriateness, accuracy and fair value at a particular point in time. Our internal valuation team has performed the assessment of valuation models, specifically in the testing of key assumptions, the accuracy of inputs used in the models to determine the fair value.

 

TAXABILITY OF EXPORT COMMISSION PAID TO A NON-RESIDENT AGENT

Rapid globalisation and the increasing use of technology has resulted in a significant increase in foreign remittances from India. Given the onerous responsibility of a practitioner to certify the tax liability of the non-resident recipient to a foreign remittance, it is imperative that one is aware of the various interpretations available, and takes an informed view while issuing Form 15CB.

Over a series of articles, the authors seek to analyse the withholding tax implications and some of the issues arising on some of the common remittances. While all forms of remittances may not be covered in this article, the authors’ objective is to provide comprehensive coverage of the limited types of remittances.

In this first part of the series, we have analysed payments regarding export commission.

1. BACKGROUND
Let us consider the payment of export commission to an agent situated outside India. The activities undertaken by such an agent would typically include marketing the goods in the country of sale, identifying the buyer, coordinating with the buyer on the logistical aspects of the sale, and placing the order for the goods with the buyer. The activities of such an agent may also include receiving goods from the principal and delivering it to the buyer. For such activities, the agent may charge a fixed commission to its principal situated in India.

2. WHETHER THE INCOME OF SUCH AGENT WOULD ACCRUE OR ARISE IN INDIA?
Section 5 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) provides that income of a non-resident would be taxable in India if such income:

a. Is received or is deemed to be received in India; or

b. Accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In the case of export commission paid to a non-resident agent, generally such income is paid outside India and is therefore, not received in India. Therefore, one would need to evaluate whether such income is accruing or arising in India or is deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In this regard, Circular No. 23 of 1969 throws some light on the matter by providing the following:

“3.4 A foreign agent of Indian exporter operates in his own country and no part of his income arises in India..”

Therefore, the Circular provided that in respect of a non-resident agent, commission income from export would not be considered as accruing or arising in India.

While the Circular has since been withdrawn, the principle emanating from the Circular should apply even after the withdrawal.

There are various judicial precedents which have held that the income of such agent would not be considered as accruing or arising in India.

The Delhi ITAT in the case of Welspring Universal vs. JCIT [2015] 56 taxmann.com 174, held:

“4…….In the context of rendering of services for procuring export orders by a non-resident from the countries outside India, there can be no way for considering the actual export from India as the place for the accrual of commission income of the non-resident. One should keep in mind the distinction between the accrual of income of exporter from exports and that of the foreign agent from commission. As a foreign agent of Indian exporter operates outside India for procuring export orders and further the goods in pursuance to such orders are also sold outside India, no part of his income can be said to accrue or arise in India.”

Interestingly, in the above case, the Tribunal distinguished between the source of income for the foreign agent vis-à-vis that for the exporter. The source of income for the exporter, as held by the Chennai ITAT in the case of DCIT vs. Alstom T & D India Ltd. (2016) 68 taxmann.com 336, would be the place where the manufacturing activities are undertaken or where the export contract has been entered into. On the other hand, for the foreign agent, the source of his income i.e. commission on the sale of goods would depend on where the services are rendered by such agent.

Prior to the amendment in Explanation to section 9(1)(vii) of the Act, the Supreme Court in the case of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. DCIT (2007) 288 ITR 408 held that even if the services are considered as fees for technical services (‘FTS’), if such services are not rendered in India, the income arising from such services would not be considered as accruing or arising in India. While the above decision of the Apex Court has been overruled by the amendment vide Finance Act 2010 (with retrospective effect from 1st June, 1976), the principle arising from the decision would still apply in the case of services rendered (to the extent the same is not considered as FTS) outside India.

The Karnataka High Court in the case of PCIT vs. Puma Sports India (P.) Ltd. (2021) 434 ITR 69 held that commission paid to a non-resident agent for placing orders with manufacturers outside India would not be liable to tax in India as such services were rendered as well as utilized outside India. Therefore, no taxing event had taken place within the territories of India. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP filed by the Revenue against the above High Court order (2022) 134 taxmann.com 60.

3. WHETHER SUCH INCOME IS DEEMED TO ACCRUE OR ARISE IN INDIA UNDER SECTION 9(1)(i)
The next question which arises is whether such income is deemed to accrue or arise in India under section 9 of the Act. While the question as to whether such income is considered as FTS under section 9(1)(vii) of the Act has been analysed in the ensuing paragraphs, let us first evaluate whether section 9(1)(i) of the Act could bring the commission income of a non-resident agent from services rendered to the principal outside India, to tax in India.

Section 9(1)(i) of the Act deems the following income to accrue or arise in India:

a.    Income accruing or arising, directly or indirectly, through or from any business connection in India;

b.    Income accruing or arising, through or from any property in India;

c.    Income accruing or arising, through or from any asset or source of income in India; or

d.    Income accruing or arising, through the transfer of a capital asset situated in India.

With regards to the first limb, the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. R.D. Aggarwal and Co. (1965) 56 ITR 20, has laid down the broad principle for defining the term ‘business connection’. In the context of section 42(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, similar to the provisions of section 9(1)(i) of the Act, the Apex Court held as follows:

“The expression “business connection” undoubtedly means something more than “business”. A business connection in section 42 involves a relation between a business carried on by a non-resident which yields profits or gains and some activity in the taxable territories which contributes directly or indirectly to the earning of those profits or gains. It predicates an element of continuity between the business of the non-resident and the activity in the taxable territories: a stray or isolated transaction is normally not to be regarded as a business connection. Business connection may take several forms: it may include carrying on a part of the main business or activity incidental to the main business of the non-resident through an agent, or it may merely be a relation between the business of the non-resident and the activity in the taxable territories, which facilitates or assists the carrying on of that business. In each case the question whether there is a business connection from or through which income, profits or gains arise or accrue to a non-resident must be determined upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

A relation to be a “business connection” must be real and intimate, and through or from which income must accrue or arise whether directly or indirectly to the non-resident. ….

….  Income not taxable under section 4 of the 1922 Act of a non-resident becomes taxable under section 42(1) of the 1922 Act, if there subsists a connection between the activity in the taxable territories and the business of the non-resident, and if through or from that connection income directly or indirectly arises.”

Therefore, in order for business connection [other than the provisions of Significant Economic Presence (‘SEP’), which have been discussed subsequently in this article] to exist, there needs to be a business activity continuously undertaken in the country. In other words, in the absence of any business activities undertaken in India, a business connection may not be constituted.

This is also evident from Explanation 1 to section 9(1)(i) of the Act which provides as follows:

“(a) in the case of a business, other than the business having business connection in India on account of significant economic presence, of which all the operations are not carried out in India, the income of the business deemed under this clause to accrue or arise in India shall be only such part of the income as is reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in India ;”

Therefore, except in the case of a business connection on account of the SEP provisions, only such part of the income as is reasonably attributable to operations carried out in India can be considered as income deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In this regard, the Supreme Court, in the case of CIT vs. Toshoku Ltd. (1980) 125 ITR 525, had analysed whether the export commission paid to non-resident agents would be considered as income deemed to accrue or arise in India.

In that case, the assessee was an exclusive sales agent of tobacco in Japan and France for an Indian exporter. The assessee, for its services rendered, received commission from the Indian exporter. Without evaluating whether ‘business connection’ of the non-resident assessee was constituted in India, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any activities undertaken by the non-resident assessee in India, no income could be considered as attributable to any operations in India and therefore, no income could be considered as deemed to accrue or arise in India.

The second limb of section 9(1)(i) of the Act refers to income accruing through or from a property situated in India. Arguably, sale of goods may not be considered as sale of property. Moreover, even in case such sale of goods is considered as sale of property, one may be able to argue that section 9(1)(i) refers to income accruing through or from a property situated in India and income from the sale of such property would not qualify as income from a property (such as rental income) nor as income through a property. Additionally, one can also argue that the commission income, being income from services rendered in relation to the sale of goods, is one step further away from income from sale of property and income through or from property.

The third limb of section 9(1)(i) of the Act refers to income accruing or arising through or from any asset or source in India. As discussed above, income from services rendered towards sale of goods may not be considered as income accruing or arising through or from any asset in India. Interestingly, the AAR in the case of Rajiv Malhotra, In re (2006) 284 ITR 564, held that export commission would be considered as income accruing or arising through or from a source of income in India.

In that case, the assessee was organising an exhibition in India and had appointed foreign agents to furnish information to foreign participants about the exhibition and for booking space in the exhibition. Such agents would be rendering the services outside India, and no services by the agents were rendered in India. The agents were responsible for planning, directing and executing the sales campaign for the assessee and the exhibition in the foreign jurisdictions. The agent would receive the commission only on participation by the exhibitors in the exhibition in India.

The AAR held that the fact that the income of the agent was dependent on the participation by the exhibitors (customers) in India would mean that the source of income for the non-resident agent would be considered to be in India. The AAR further also held that the fact that the services by the agents were rendered outside India would be of no consequence.

The above decision of the AAR was also followed in the decision by the same authority in the case of SKF Boilers and Driers (P.) Ltd., In re (2012) 343 ITR 385.

In the view of the authors, with the utmost respect to the AAR, the above decisions of the AAR may not be considered as an appropriate analysis of the matter on account of the following reasons:
a. The AAR did not consider the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Toshoku Ltd. (supra), wherein the commission received by non-resident agents was considered to be accruing or arising outside India and hence not taxable; and

b. The AAR did not consider the impact of Explanation 1(a) to section 9(1)(i) of the Act. Even if the decision of the AAR is considered, the fact that no operations of the agent are actually undertaken in India would result in no attribution of income of the agent to be deemed to accrue or arise in India.

Therefore, subject to the applicability of the SEP provisions, analysed in para 6 below, export commission earned by a non-resident agent would not be deemed to accrue or arise in India under section 9(1)(i) of the Act.

4. WHETHER THE SERVICES RENDERED BY THE AGENT CAN BE CONSIDERED AS FEES FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES
The other sub-clauses of section 9(1) of the Act – dealing with salary, interest and royalty would not be applicable in this case. One would now need to analyse whether the services rendered by the commission agent would be considered as FTS under section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. There are various decisions discussing various facets of the FTS clause, and this article does not cover all such case laws on the matter. This article covers those case laws relevant to the type of payment, i.e. export commission and the taxability thereof.

The crux of the matter is whether the consideration received by a commission agent would be considered as towards rendering of services. In this regard, one may refer to the Ahmedabad ITAT in the case of DCIT vs. Welspun Corporation Ltd. (2017) 77 taxmann.com 165, wherein it has been held that the agent receives the commission on securing order and not for the provision of the services. The reasoning provided by the ITAT is as under:

“Even proceeding on the assumption that these non-resident agents did render the technical services, which, is an incorrect assumption any way, what is important to appreciate is that the amounts paid by the assessee to these agents constituted consideration for the orders secured by the agents and not the services alleged rendered by the agents. The event triggering crystallization of liability of the assessee, under the commission agency agreement, is the event of securing orders and not the rendition of alleged technical services. In a situation in which the agent does not render any of the services but secures the business any way, the agent is entitled to his commission which is computed in terms of a percentage of the value of the order. In a reverse situation, in which an agent renders all the alleged technical services but does not secure any order for the principal i.e. the assessee, the agent is not entitled to any commission. Clearly, therefore, the event triggering the earnings by the agent is securing the business and not rendition of any services. In this view of the matter, the amounts paid by the assessee to its non-resident agents, even in the event of holding that the agents did indeed render technical services, cannot be said to be ‘consideration for rendering of any managerial, technical or consultancy services’…..The work actually undertaken by the agent is the work of acting as agent and so procuring business for the assessee but as the contemporary business models require the work of agent cannot simply and only be to obtain the orders for the product, as this obtaining of orders is invariably preceded by and followed by several preparatory and follow up activities. The description of agent’s obligation sets out such common ancillary activities as well but that does not override, or relegate, the core agency work. The consideration paid to the agent is also based on the business procured and the agency agreements do not provide for any independent, standalone or specific consideration for these services.”

Therefore, the Ahmedabad ITAT in the above case held that the consideration received by the agent is towards the procurement of business and not for services rendered.

However, generally, the revenue authorities also seek to tax the export commission as FTS, given the sheer number of judicial precedents on the issue. Therefore, it is important to analyse whether such commission can be classified as FTS under section 9(1)(vii).

The term ‘fees for technical services’ broadly covers the following categories of services:

• Managerial services;

• Technical services; and

• Consultancy services.

The terms ‘managerial’, ‘technical’ or ‘consultancy’ have not been defined in the Act, and therefore, one would need to understand these terms in common parlance.

4.1 MANAGERIAL SERVICES
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the terms ‘manage’ to mean the following:

“To conduct; to carry on the concerns of a business or establishment.”

Further, the term ‘manager’ is defined to mean the following:

“One who has charge of corporation and control of its business or branch establishment, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent judgment.”

Having looked at the dictionary meaning of the term ‘manage’, the question arises as to what is meant by managerial services, specifically – managing a particular function of an entity such as purchase or sales or managing the entity as a whole, akin to a director of a company.

The issue as to what is meant by ‘managerial services’ and whether the services rendered by a commission agent would constitute managerial services have been analysed by the Mumbai ITAT in the case of Linde AG vs. ITO (1997) 62 ITD 330, albeit in the context of a procurement agent. In the said case, the assessee procured certain materials and spares required to set up a fabrication plant in Gujarat. These purchases were charged from the Indian concern, i.e. Gujarat State Fertilizers Company, at cost plus 4% procurement charges. Referring to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of J.K. (Bombay) Ltd. vs. CBDT & Anr. (1979) 118 ITR 312 in the context of section 80-O of the Act, the ITAT held as under:

“Their Lordships of Delhi High Court referred to an article on ‘Management Sciences’ in 14 Encyclopaedia 747, wherein it is stated that the management in organisations include at least the following:

(a) discovering, developing, defining and evaluating the goals of the organisation and the alternative policies that will lead towards the goals;

(b) getting the organisation to adopt the policies;

(c) scrutinising the effectiveness of the policies that are adopted and

(d) initiating steps to change policies when they are judged to be less effective than they ought to be.

The third category is managerial service. The managerial service, as aforesaid, is towards the adoption and carrying out the policies of a organisation. It is of permanent nature for the organisation as a whole. In making the stray purchases, it cannot be said that the assessee has been managing the affairs of the Indian concern or was rendering managerial services to the assessee.”

Therefore, while holding that procurement services would not constitute managerial services, the ITAT explained that managerial services would refer to carrying out the organisation’s policies as a whole.

In this regard, as the broad range of services rendered by an export agent as well as a procurement agent is similar, albeit, for two different ends of a transaction, their taxability would also be similar. Therefore, any decision in respect of taxability of income of a procurement agent (for procurement outside India) would equally apply to the export commission earned by an agent.

The Authority for Advance Rulings in the case of Intertek Testing Services India (P.) Ltd., In re (2008) 307 ITR 418 held the term ‘managerial services’ to mean the following:

“Thus, managerial services essentially involves controlling, directing or administering the business.”

In the context of export commission, the Delhi High Court in the case of DIT (International Taxation) vs. Panalfa Autoelektrik Ltd. (2014) 272 CTR 117, held as follows:

“The services rendered, the procurement of export orders, etc. cannot be treated as management services provided by the non-resident to the respondent-assessee. The non-resident was not acting as a manager or dealing with administration. It was not controlling the policies or scrutinising the effectiveness of the policies. It did not perform as a primary executor, any supervisory function whatsoever.”

This differentiation between ‘execution’ and ‘management’ has also been explained by the Mumbai ITAT in the case of UPS SCS (Asia) Ltd. vs. ADIT (2012) 50 SOT 268, wherein it has been held that:

“Ordinarily the managerial services mean managing the affairs by laying down certain policies, standards and procedures and then evaluating the actual performance in the light of the procedures so laid down. The managerial services contemplate not only execution but also the planning part of the activity to be done. If the overall planning aspect is missing and one has to follow a direction from the other for executing particular job in a particular manner, it cannot be said that the former is managing that affair. It would mean that the directions of the latter are executed simplicity without there being any planning part involved in the execution and also the evaluation of the performance. In the absence of any specific definition of the phrase “managerial services” as used in section 9(1)(vii) defining the “fees for technical services”, it needs to be considered in a commercial sense. It cannot be interpreted in a narrow sense to mean simply executing the directions of the other for doing a specific task. …….. On the other hand, ‘managing’ encompasses not only the simple execution of a work, but also certain other aspects, such as planning for the way in which the execution is to be done coupled with the overall responsibility in a larger sense. Thus it is manifest that the word ‘managing’ is wider in scope than the word ‘executing’. Rather the latter is embedded in the former and not vice versa.”

The Chennai ITAT in the case of DCIT vs. Mainetti (India) P. Ltd. (2011) 46 SOT 137 held that canvassing for orders would not constitute managerial services.

Similarly, Madras High Court in the case of Evolv Clothing Co. (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT (2018) 407 ITR 72 held that market survey undertaken incidental to the services of a commission agent would also not be considered as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii).

Further, as regards whether one can argue that one is providing managerial services if one is managing the purchase/sales function, the ITAT in the case of Linde AG (supra) held as under:

“The Learned Departmental Representative brought to our notice a concept of ‘marketing management’ but such marketing services are to be, as aforesaid, on a regular basis, i.e. when the purchases of the assessee on a permanent or semi-permanent or at regular interval basis. It does not include the purchases made only to be utilised for a particular venture taken up by the assessee, which in this case is fabrication of a new scientific plant. It being a one-time job and not marketing management of making purchases by the assessee for the new concern.”

Therefore, one can conclude based on the above observation by the Mumbai ITAT that if the purchase or sales function of the entire organisation has been completely outsourced to an agent, then the services rendered by such agent may be considered as managerial services. For example, if an entity within the entire MNE group is in charge of undertaking the entire purchase or sales function of all the entities within the MNE and such entity is also deciding the policies of such function, one may possibly consider such services managerial services.

4.2 TECHNICAL SERVICES
The second limb of the definition of FTS is ‘technical service’. The Merriam – Webster dictionary defines the term ‘technical’ to mean “as having special and usually practical knowledge especially of a mechanical or scientific subject”

Similarly, the Collins dictionary defines the term as “of, relating to, or specializing in industrial, practical, or mechanical arts and applied sciences”.     

Therefore, in common parlance, one may say that technical services would mean services which require application of industrial, mechanical or applied sciences.

The Madras High Court in the case of Skycell Communications Ltd. & Anr. vs. DCIT & Ors (2001) 251 ITR 53 has provided guidance as to what would be considered as ‘technical services’ as under:

“Thus while stating that “technical service” would include managerial and consultancy service, the Legislature has not set out with precision as to what would constitute “technical” service to render it “technical service”. The meaning of the word “technical” as given in the New Oxford Dictionary is adjective 1. of or relating to a particular subject, art or craft or its techniques: technical terms (especially of a book or article) requiring special knowledge to be understood: a technical report. 2. of involving, or concerned with applied and industrial sciences: an important technical achievement. 3. resulting from mechanical failure: a technical fault. 4. according to a strict application or interpretation of the law or the rules: the arrest was a technical violation of the treaty.

Having regard to the fact that the term is required to be understood in the context in which it is used, “fee for technical services” could only be meant to cover such things technical as are capable of being provided by way of service for a fee. The popular meaning associated with “technical” is “involving or concerning applied and industrial science”.”

Interestingly, the Memorandum of Understanding to the DTAA between India and US provides as follows:

“Article 12 includes only certain technical and consultancy services. But technical services, we mean in this context services requiring expertise in a technology.”

While the term ‘technology’ refers to machines and processes, the term ‘technical’ would be wider and would cover applied and mechanical sciences and would mean a kind of specialized or complex knowledge.

Therefore, the meaning under the MOU in the India – US DTAA may be restricted in application to the India – US DTAA only as it provides a narrower meaning than used in common parlance.

Having understood the meaning of the term ‘technical services’, the issue arises is whether the services rendered by a commission agent could be considered as ‘technical services’. In this regard, the Delhi High Court in the case of Panalfa Autoelektrik Ltd. (supra) held as follows:

“The non-resident had not undertaken or performed “technical services”, where special skills or knowledge relating to a technical field were required. Technical field would mean applied sciences or craftsmanship involving special skills or knowledge but not fields such as arts or human sciences.”

On the other hand, the Cochin ITAT in the case of ITO vs. Device Driven (India) (P.) Ltd. (2014) 29 ITR (T) 263 held that export commission in case of software was considered as technical services. In this regard, the ITAT held as under:

“Software is a highly technical product and it is required to be developed in accordance with the requirements of the customers. Even after the development, it requires constant monitoring so that necessary modifications are required to be carried out in order to make it suitable to the requirements. The work of the assessee company also does not end upon developing and installing the software at the client’s site. As stated earlier, it requires on-site monitoring, especially when the customized software is developed. Hence, in our view, it cannot be equated with the commodities, where the role of the Commission agent normally ends after supply of goods and receipt of money. Hence, in the case of software companies, the sales agent should also possess required technical knowledge and then only he could procure orders for the company by understanding the needs of clients and further convincing them..….. As per the clauses of the agreement, which are extracted above, the Commission agent is responsible in securing orders and for that purpose only he has to assist the assessee company in all respects including identifying markets, making introductory contacts, arranging meeting with prospective clients, assisting in preparation of presentations for target clients. His duty does not end on securing the orders, but he has to monitor the status and progress of the project, meaning thereby the Commission agent is responsible for ensuring supply of the software and also for receiving the payments. All these activities, in our view, could be carried on only by a person who is having vast technical knowledge and experience. Hence, we agree with the tax authorities’ view that the payment made to Shri Balaji Bal constitutes the payment made towards technical services.”

Interestingly, the Cochin ITAT equated the nature of product sold by the agent with the nature of services rendered by the agent. With due respect to the Cochin ITAT, the authors are of the view that it may not be appropriate to equate the product sold with the service rendered. The ITAT in the above case did not list out any specific services required to be rendered by an agent distributing software that would be different from that distributing other commodities. For example, even if one sells an iron rod, one is required to have certain knowledge of the product sold to enable him to match the client’s requirement with the product and sell the product. Further, identifying markets, arranging meeting with prospective clients, preparing presentations for target clients, and ensuring that the product is smoothly delivered is something an agent selling any product may be required to undertake.

In this regard, the Ahmedabad ITAT in the case of Welspun Corporation Ltd. (supra) has succinctly segregated the nature of service from the nature of product sold. It has held as follows:

“Just because a product is highly technical does not change the character of activity of the sale agent. Whether a salesman sells a handcrafted souvenir or a top of the line laptop, he is selling nevertheless. It will be absurd to suggest that in the former case, he is selling and the latter, he will be rendering technical services. The object of the salesman is to sell and familiarity with the technical details, whatever be the worth of those technical details, is only towards the end of selling. In a technology driven world that we live in, even simplest of day to day gadgets that we use are fairly technical and complex. Undoubtedly when a technical product is being sold, the person selling the product should be familiar with technical specifications of the product but then this aspect of the matter does not any way change the economic activity.”

On the other hand, it is also important to highlight that the above Cochin ITAT decision was upheld by the Kerala High Court in the case of the same assessee in Device Driven (India) P Ltd. vs. CIT (2021) 126 taxmann.com 25. However, the Kerala High Court did not analyse the services rendered by the agent to determine whether the services were ‘technical services’ but relied more on the argument that the services were rendered for earning source outside India, and therefore, not accruing or arising in India.

4.3 CONSULTANCY SERVICES
The last limb of the definition of the term FTS is ‘consultancy services’.

In common parlance, ‘to consult’ would mean ‘to advise’. With regards to the overlap with technical services, the MOU in the India – US DTAA provides as under:

“By consultancy services, we mean in this context advisory services. The categories of technical and consultancy services are to some extent overlapping because a consultancy service could also be a technical service. However, the category of consultancy services also includes an advisory service, whether or not expertise in a technology is required to perform it.”

The Supreme Court in the case of GVK Industries Ltd. & Anr. vs. ITO & Anr. (2015) 371 ITR 453 evaluated the meaning of ‘consultancy services’ under section 9(1)(vii). In the said case, a non-resident company rendered services related to raising finance for the assessee, which included, inter alia, financial structure and security package to be offered to the lender, making an assessment of export credit agencies worldwide and obtaining commercial bank support on the most competitive terms, assisting the appellant loan negotiations and documentation with lenders and structuring, negotiating and closing the financing for the project in a co-ordinated and expeditious manner.

“The word ‘consultation’ has been defined as an act of asking the advice or opinion of someone (such as a lawyer). It means a meeting in which a party consults or confers and eventually it results in human interaction that leads to rendering of advice. The NRC had acted as a consultant. It had the skill, acumen and knowledge in the specialized field i.e. preparation of a scheme for required finances and to tie-up required loans. The nature of service rendered by the NRC, can be said with certainty would come within the ambit and sweep of the term ‘consultancy service’ and, therefore, it has been rightly held that the tax at source should have been deducted as the amount paid as fee could be taxable under the head ‘fees for technical services’.”

Similarly, the AAR in the case of Guangzhou Usha International Ltd., In re (2015) 378 ITR 465 held that where the agent was not only identifying new products but also generating new ideas for the principal after market research, evaluating credit, finance, organisation, production facility, etc. and on the basis of the evaluation, giving advice to the principal, the services rendered by such agent would be considered as ‘consultancy services’.

However, the Delhi High Court in the case of Panalfa Autoelektrik Ltd. (supra) as well as the Mumbai ITAT in the case of Linde AG (supra) have held that services rendered by an agent would not constitute ‘consultancy services’.

On similar lines, the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Grup Ism (P.) Ltd. (2015) 378 ITR 205 held that export commission would not be considered as ‘consultancy services’ even though the nomenclature of the transaction as per the agreement was of ‘consultancy services’. It held as follows:

“‘Consultancy services’ would mean something akin to advisory services provided by the non-resident, pursuant to deliberation between parties. Ordinarily, it would not involve instances where the non-resident is acting as a link between the resident and another party, facilitating the transaction between them, or where the non-resident is directly soliciting business for the resident and generating income out of such solicitation. The mere fact that CGS confirmed that it received consultancy charges from the assessee would not be determinative of the issue. The actual nature of services rendered by CGS and MAC needs to be examined for this purpose.”

From the above jurisprudence, it is clear, in the view of the authors, that export commission by itself would not be considered as ‘consultancy services’. However, if the agent provides advisory services along with the export commission, one may need to evaluate the predominant nature of services to determine the characterisation of the transaction.

5. WHETHER THE WITHDRAWAL OF CIRCULAR NO. 23 OF 1969 WOULD RESULT IN TAXABILITY

As discussed above, the CBDT Circular No. 23 of 1969 had clarified non-taxability in India for commission earned by a foreign non-resident agent. This Circular was subsequently withdrawn stating that it did not reflect the correct position under section 9 of the Act. In this regard, the question therefore, arises is whether the withdrawal of the Circular can result in the taxation of the commission earned by a foreign agent.

In this regard, the Delhi ITAT in the case of Welspring Universal vs. JCIT (supra) held as follows:

“11. ….The legal position contained in section 5(2) read with section 9, as discussed above about the scope of total income of a non-resident subsisting before the issuance of circular nos. 23 and 786 or after the issuance of circular no. 786 has not undergone any change. It is not as if the export commission income of a foreign agent for soliciting export orders in countries outside India was earlier chargeable to tax, which was exempted by the CBDT through the above circulars and now with the withdrawal of such circulars, the hitherto income not chargeable to tax, has become taxable. The legal position remains the same de hors any circular in as much as such income of a foreign agent is not chargeable to tax in India because it neither arises in India nor is received by him in India nor any deeming provision of receipt or accrual is attracted. It is further relevant to note that the latter Circular simply withdraws the earlier circular, thereby throwing the issue once again open for consideration and does not state that either the export commission income has now become chargeable to tax in the hands of the foreign residents or the provisions of section 195 read with sec. 40(a)(i) are attracted for the failure of the payer to deduct tax at source on such payments.

12. Ex consequenti, we hold that the amount of commission income for rendering services in procuring export orders outside India is not chargeable to tax in the hands of the non-resident agent and hence no tax is deductible under section 195 on such payment by  the payer.”

The authors are also of a similar view that the legal position upheld by various courts does not change, and the export commission earned by a non-resident agent may still not be liable to tax in India.

6. WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SEP CAN TRIGGER IN THE CASE OF EXPORT COMMISSION
The Finance Act, 2018 has introduced the significant economic presence (‘SEP’) provisions in India. Explanation 2A to section 9(1)(i) of the Act extends the definition of business connection to include SEP and SEP has been defined to mean the following:

(a) transaction in respect of any goods, services or property carried out by a non-resident with any person in India including provision of download of data or software in India, if the aggregate of payments arising from such transaction or transactions during the previous year exceeds such amount as may be prescribed; or

(b) systematic and continuous soliciting of business activities or engaging in interaction with such number of users in India, as may be prescribed:

Further, the Proviso to the Explanation also provides that the transactions or activities shall constitute SEP, whether or not:

(i) the agreement for such transactions or activities is entered in India; or

(ii) the non-resident has a residence or a place of business in India; or

(iii) the non-resident renders services in India

In other words, the SEP provisions apply even if such services are rendered outside India if it is undertaken with any person in India and if the aggregate payments during the year exceed the threshold prescribed.

Further, the CBDT vide Notification No. 41/2021/F.No.370142/11/2018-TPL dated 3rd May, 2021, has notified the thresholds to mean INR 2 crore in the case of payments referred to in clause (a) above and 3 million users in clause (b) above.
The authors have analysed the SEP provisions in detail in their article in the March, 2021 edition of BCAJ Journal.

Therefore, now, if the services rendered by the commission agent exceed INR 2 crore in a financial year, such non-resident agent may be considered as having a business connection in India due to the SEP provisions under section 9(1)(i) of the Act.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, the authors have analysed the taxability of export commission in detail. To summarize, the commission earned by a non-resident in respect of agency services rendered for exports, where no activities are undertaken in India, would not be taxable in India under the Act. However, one would need to evaluate if there are any additional services rendered by such an agent, such as managing the entire purchase or sale function of an organisation which could result in taxability under the Act or the relevant tax treaty as FTS. Moreover, one may need to also evaluate if the payments to the agent during the year exceed INR 2 crore, in which case the SEP provisions may apply, resulting in taxability of the commission earned by such non-resident agent on account of the business connection being constituted in India. In such a scenario, one may still be able to apply the provisions of the DTAA and such income may not be taxable in the absence of a PE of such agent in India, subject to the requirement of documents such as tax residency certificate, etc as well as fulfilling the conditions as may be provided in the OECD Multilateral Instrument, if applicable.
 

S. 148 – Reopening of assessment – Within 4 years – original assessment completed u/s. 143(3) – Change of opinion on the same set of facts – Not permissible

10 M/s. Gemstar Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & 3 Ors. [W.P. No 1005 of 2008; Date of order: 6th January, 2022 (Bombay High Court)]

S. 148 – Reopening of assessment – Within 4 years – original assessment completed u/s. 143(3) – Change of opinion on the same set of facts – Not permissible

The petitioner challenged the notice dated 12th December, 2007 issued u/s 148 of the Act, on the ground, inter-alia, that respondents are relying on the same material to take a different view. The Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order dated 17th March, 2005, and conclusively took one view. Therefore, it could not be open to reopen the assessment based on the very same material with a view to take another view.

The reasons for issuing notice u/s 148 is contained in a communication dated 27th December, 2007 and the same reads as under:-
“On close scrutiny of the assessment record, it is observed that the assessee company has claimed deduction u/s. 80IB(10) as it is engaged in the development and building approved housing project. Contrary to the provisions of the statute, the housing project includes shops. As a result, the company is not entitled to deduction u/s. 80IB(10). In the light of the aforesaid fact that I have reason to believe that the granting of deduction u/s. 80IB(10) of Rs.1,42,50,816/- has resulted escapement of income within the meaning of Section 147.”

In the assessment order itself, it was recorded that a show-cause notice was issued on 17th January, 2005 requiring the assessee to substantiate the claim of deduction. In paragraph 7.1 of the assessment order, it was recorded that the petitioner has filed detailed submissions vide letter dated 10th March, 2005 and has shown cause as to why it was entitled to the claim of deduction under section 80IB(10).

It is settled law that the Assessment Officer has no power to review an assessment that has been concluded. The Assessing Officer, before he passed the assessment order, had in his possession all primary facts necessary for assessment and then he made the original assessment. When the primary facts necessary for assessment are fully and truly disclosed, the Assessing Officer is not entitled to a change of opinion to commence proceedings for reassessment. Where on consideration of the material on record, one view is conclusively taken by the Assessing Officer, it would not be open to reopen the assessment based on the very same material with a view to take another view.

The Court observed that this is not a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened on the reasonable belief that income had escaped the assessment on account. This is a case wherein the assessment is sought to be reopened on account of change of opinion of the Assessing Officer about the manner of computation of deduction under section 80IB(10) of the Act.

The Court was satisfied that not only material facts were disclosed to the petitioner truly and fully, but they were carefully scrutinized, and figures of income, as well as deduction, were viewed carefully by the Assessing Officer.

In the circumstances, the petition was allowed and the notice under section 148 of the Act, dated 12th December, 2007, was quashed.

S. 148 – Reopening of assessment – Non-application of mind by AO while recording the reasons – Non-application of mind by PCIT while granting approval u/s. 151 of the Act – CBDT directed to train their officers

9 Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited. v/s. Income Tax Officer Ward 4(3)(1) & Anr;  [W.P. No. 3581 of 2021; Date of order: 20th December, 2021; A.Y.: 2015-16 (Bombay High Court)]

S. 148 – Reopening of assessment – Non-application of mind by AO while recording the reasons – Non-application of mind by PCIT while granting approval u/s. 151 of the Act – CBDT directed to train their officers

The Petitioner had challenged the issuance of notice for A.Y. 2015-2016 dated 31st March, 2021 issued u/s 148 of the Act, and the order rejecting the objections dated 23rd July, 2021.

The assessment had been completed u/s 143(3) of the said Act on 28th September, 2017. The Petitioner submitted that the reasons recorded for reopening indicate total non-application of mind in as much as in the tabular form, it is stated that Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited for F.Y. 2014-15 had been a beneficiary through fund trail of Rs. 3.72 Crores. Then again, it is mentioned that the above mentioned bogus entities managed, controlled and operated by M/s. Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited for providing bogus accommodation entries, hence, all the transactions entered into between the above-mentioned entities and the assessee/beneficiary are bogus accommodation entries in nature.

The Court observed how can a company provide bogus entry to itself. Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited is alleged to be a beneficiary identified through fund trail, and its PAN number is shown to be AAQCS2595H. Petitioner, who is the assessee, is also Sharvah Multitrade Company Private Limited, and its PAN number is AAQCS2595H. Therefore, this clearly shows total non-application of mind by the Assessing Officer Mr. Suryavanshi. His statement in the reasons “…………… and after careful application of mind ……..” is risible. Thus there was total non-application of mind by the A.O. while recording the reasons.

The Court further observed that there had been total non-application of mind while filing the affidavit in reply to the petition by the same officer – Mr. Shailendra Damodar Suryavanshi, Income Tax Officer, Ward 4(3)(1), Mumbai. In the affidavit in reply, the same Mr. Suryavanshi states, “as Annexure – 2 is the copy of the approval u/s 151 of the Act ”. There was no annexure – 1 mentioned anywhere. Moreover, in the affidavit filed in the Court, even this annexure was missing. This further displayed total non-application of mind by this officer.

The Department Counsel tendered a copy of the approval u/s 151 of the said Act, which he had in his file where it says “In view of reasons recorded, I am satisfied that it is a fit case to issue notice u/s 148 ”. PCIT, Mumbai Anil Kumar, signed this.

The Court observed that if this PCIT only read the reasons recorded, he would have raised a query about how can an entity provide bogus entry to itself. That shows total non-application of mind by the said Mr. Anil Kumar as well.

The Court further observed that one Vijay Kumar Soni, Range 4(3), Mumbai, has recommended a grant of approval. That shows non-application of mind even by this Vijay Kumar Soni. The Court wondered whether the officers of respondents ever bothered to read the papers before writing the reasons or recommending for approval or while granting approval.

The Court observed that in the objections filed by petitioner vide its letter dated 10th May, 2021, the petitioner raised these points and alleged lack of application of mind. The said Mr. Suryavanshi while rejecting the objections, by an order dated 23rd July 2021, first of all, makes a false statement that “the assessee’s above submissions and objections have been carefully considered and the same are dealt with as under ” but he does not deal with the objection of the assessee of lack of application of mind. The said Mr. Suryavanshi is totally silent about the objections raised on non-application of mind.

In view of the above, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned reassessment proceedings for A.Y. 2015-16 as wholly without jurisdiction, illegal, arbitrary, and liable to be quashed.

A copy of this order was directed to be sent to the Chairman, CBDT, to formulate a scheme whereby the officers are trained on how to apply their minds and what all points should be kept in mind while recording the reasons. The Chairman, CBDT, may also advise the concerned Commissioners not to grant approval u/s 151 of the said Act mechanically but after considering the reasons carefully and scrutinizing the same.

TDS — Credit for — Assessee an airline pilot and employee of airline company — Company deducting tax at source but not paying it into government account — Assessee cannot be denied credit for tax deducted at source

39 Kartik Vijaysinh Sonavane vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 440 ITR 11 (Guj) A.Ys.: 2009-10 and 2011-12; Date of order 15th November, 2021 S. 205 of ITA, 1961

TDS — Credit for — Assessee an airline pilot and employee of airline company — Company deducting tax at source but not paying it into government account — Assessee cannot be denied credit for tax deducted at source

The assessee was a pilot by profession and an airline company employee. The company deducted tax at source of Rs. 7,20,100 and Rs. 8,70,757 for the A. Ys. 2009-10 and 2011-12 respectively in his case but did not deposit it in the Central Government account. The assessee was denied credit for the tax deducted at source and recovery notices for tax with interest were raised against the assessee.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“The Department was precluded from denying the assessee the benefit of the tax deducted at source by the employer during the relevant financial years. Credit shall be given to the assessee and if in the interregnum any recovery or adjustment was made by the Department, the assessee shall be entitled to the refund thereof with the statutory interest, within eight weeks.”

TDS — Commission — Expenses incurred on doctors by assessee, a pharmaceutical company — Doctors not legally bound to prescribe medicines suggested by assessee — No principal-agent relationship — Payments cannot be construed as commission — No liability to deduct tax at source

38 ClT(TDS) vs. INTAS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. [2021] 439 ITR 692 (Guj) A.Ys.: 2011-12 to 2013-14; Date of order: 11th August, 2021 S. 194H of ITA, 1961

TDS — Commission — Expenses incurred on doctors by assessee, a pharmaceutical company — Doctors not legally bound to prescribe medicines suggested by assessee — No principal-agent relationship — Payments cannot be construed as commission — No liability to deduct tax at source

The assessee was a pharmaceutical company. Pursuant to a survey u/s 133A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 carried out at the premises of the assessee, e-mails and other correspondences that ensued between the sales executive and the general manager, seized during the survey operations, suggested that the doctors had acted as the agents of the assessee, by prescribing the medicines of the assessee over a period of time, and therefore, the expenses incurred by the assessee on the doctors towards taxi fares, air fares, etc., for attending regional conferences or scientific conferences were required to be treated as commission received or receivable as contemplated u/s 194H. The Assessing Officer treated the assessee as an assessee-in-default u/s 201(1) for non-deduction of tax at source u/s 194H of the Act on such payments.

The Commissioner (Appeals) restricted the addition to expenditure incurred on the doctors under various heads and held that the expenses incurred on other stakeholders did not fall within the definition of the term commission. Both the Department and the assessee filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee’s appeals and dismissed the appeals filed by the Department.

On appeals by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) According to the provisions contained in section 194H of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Explanation to the section, any payment received or receivable by a person for rendering medical services is excluded from the purview of section 194H. The Explanation to section 194H cannot be interpreted so widely as to include any payment receivable, directly or indirectly for services in the course of buying or selling goods.

ii) In the absence of an element of agency between the assessee and the doctors, the provisions of section 194H could not be invoked. The doctors were not bound to prescribe the medicines as suggested by the assessee. There was no legal compulsion on the part of the doctors to prescribe a particular medicine suggested by the assessee, and therefore, the doctors had not acted as the agents of the assessee.

iii) There was no illegality or infirmity in the order of the Tribunal in holding that the expenditure incurred on the doctors could not be classified as commission. No question of law arose.”

TDS — Commission to insurance agent — Scope of S. 194D — Arrangement for foreign travel of agents — Expenses paid directly to service providers — Tax not deductible at source on payments to service providers

37 CIT  vs. SBI Life Insurance Company Ltd. [2021] 439 ITR 566 (Bom) Date of order: 22nd October, 2021 S. 194D of ITA, 1961

TDS — Commission to insurance agent — Scope of S. 194D — Arrangement for foreign travel of agents — Expenses paid directly to service providers — Tax not deductible at source on payments to service providers

The assessee respondent is engaged in the business of underwriting life insurance policies. The assessee’s business comprises of individual life and group business. The Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee had incurred foreign travel expenses for its agents who were working for soliciting or procuring insurance business for the assessee and opined that foreign travel expenses incurred by the assessee on its agents were covered under the words “income by way of remuneration or reward whether by way of commission or otherwise” used in section 194D of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since the assessee had not deducted tax at source, the Assessing Officer treated the assessee as an assessee in default.

The order was set aside by the Commissioner (Appeals) and this was affirmed by the Tribunal.

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue and held as under:

“i) U/s 194D the obligation to deduct is on the person who is paying and the deduction to be made at the time of making such payment.

ii) Factually and admittedly no amount had been paid to the agents by the assessee as a reimbursement of expenses incurred by the agent on foreign travel. The assessee had made arrangement for foreign travel for all the agents and paid expenses directly to those service providers. Therefore, as no amount was paid to the agents by the respondent, the obligation to deduct Income-tax thereon at source also would not arise.”

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity — Assessment not finalised in pursuance of return of income — Notice u/s 148 issued before issuing notice u/s 143(2) for assessment u/s 143(3) — Impermissible

36 Loku Ram Malik vs. CIT [2021] 440 ITR 159 (Raj) A.Y.: 1999-00; Date of order: 3rd May, 2017 Ss. ss. 143, 143(2), 143(3) & 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice u/s 148 — Validity — Assessment not finalised in pursuance of return of income — Notice u/s 148 issued before issuing notice u/s 143(2) for assessment u/s 143(3) — Impermissible

The assessee showed the investment in a plot of land at a certain value in his return of income filed on 6th December, 1999. The Assessing Officer processed the return u/s 143(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 11th August, 2000. Thereafter, the assessee revised the balance sheet and profit and loss account on 16th August, 2000 enhancing the investment in such property. The Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s 148 on 14th September, 2000, based on the revised balance sheet filed by the assessee and then issued a notice u/s 143(2) on 3rd October, 2000.

In appeal, the assessee challenged the validity of the notice u/s. 148. The Tribunal upheld the issuance of notice u/s 148 though the Assessing Officer could have issued a notice u/s 143(2) to make the regular assessment u/s 143(3).

The Rajasthan High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) The order u/s 143(1)(a) was confirmed on 11th August, 2000 when the return was filed and the notice u/s 148 came to be issued before the assessment could have been done.

ii) The Tribunal had committed an error in upholding the notice issued u/s 148.”

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice not specifying failure to disclose any material facts truly and fully by assessee — Notice and subsequent order invalid

35 Coca-Cola India P. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 440 ITR 20 (Bom) A.Y.: 1998-99; Date of order: 21st September, 2021 Ss. 147 & 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice not specifying failure to disclose any material facts truly and fully by assessee — Notice and subsequent order invalid

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the assessee filed a second revised return declaring a loss as a result of demerger of its bottling division. The Deputy Commissioner issued notices u/s 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 along with a questionnaire. The assessee furnished the reasons for filing the revised returns of income and provided clarifications in response to the various queries raised and the balance sheet and the profit and loss account. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order dated 30th March, 2001 u/s 143(3), computing the assessee’s total income at nil after setting off earlier years’ losses. Aggrieved by certain disallowances made by the Deputy Commissioner, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Commissioner, by an order u/s 263 directed the Deputy Commissioner to pass a fresh assessment order after considering the issues identified in his order. Thereafter, an order u/s 143(3) read with section 263 was passed. After the expiry of four years, the Deputy Commissioner issued a notice u/s 148 to reopen the assessment u/s 147.

The assessee filed a writ petition and challenged the notice. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) According to the proviso to section 148 of the Income-tax Act, if the notice is issued to reopen the assessment u/s 147 after the expiry of four years from the relevant assessment year, it will be time barred unless the assessee had failed to disclose material facts that were necessary for the assessment of that A.Y. and if there is no failure to disclose, it would render the notice issued as being without jurisdiction.

ii) The reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment did not state that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment of the assessment year 1998-99. The notice issued u/s 148 after a period of four years for reopening the assessment u/s 147 and the consequential order passed were quashed and set aside.”

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice issued on basis of information received subsequent to search and seizure of another party — Nexus between undisclosed loan activity of searched party and assessee not established — Notice and consequential assessment order quashed and set aside

34 Peninsula Land Ltd. vs. ACIT [2021] 439 ITR 582 (Bom) A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 25th October, 2021 Ss. 132, 147 & 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment — Notice after four years — Condition precedent — Notice issued on basis of information received subsequent to search and seizure of another party — Nexus between undisclosed loan activity of searched party and assessee not established — Notice and consequential assessment order quashed and set aside

For the A.Y. 2012-13, an order u/s 143(3) read with section 153A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was passed on 30th December, 2016 against the assessee. After a period of four years, the Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s 148 dated 30th March, 2019 for reopening the assessment u/s 147 of the Act. He recorded reasons that information was received from the Deputy Director that a search and seizure operation was conducted u/s 132 in the case of an entity EE and based on the statement recorded of the partner of EE and documentary evidence found in the search, an undisclosed activity of money lending and borrowing in unaccounted cash was found being operated at the premises of EE, that the assessee had indulged in lending of cash loan and the amount of Rs. 30 lakhs had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147. Consequent reassessment order was passed on 5th September, 2019.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i) Under the substituted section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment that is enough to confer jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. But the Assessing Officer has no power to review an assessment which has been concluded. After a period of four years even if the Assessing Officer has some tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment, he cannot exercise the power to reopen unless he discloses what was the material fact which was not truly and fully disclosed by the assessee.

ii) The reasons for the reopening of assessment have to be tested or examined only on the basis of the reasons recorded at the time of issuing a notice u/s 148 seeking to reopen the assessment. These reasons to believe cannot be improved upon or supplemented much less substituted by affidavit or oral submissions. The reasons for reopening an assessment should be those of the Assessing Officer alone who is issuing the notice and he cannot act on the dictates of any another person in issuing the notice. The tangible material upon the basis of which the Assessing Officer entertains reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment can come to him from any source, but the reasons for the reopening have to be only of the Assessing Officer issuing the notice.

iii) In the reasons for the reopening, the Assessing Officer had not stated anywhere that one BS was an employee of the assessee. Further, he did not even disclose when the search and seizure u/s 132 was carried out in the case of the entity EE, whether it was before the assessment order dated 30th December, 2016 against the assessee was passed or afterwards. The reasons for reopening were absolutely silent on how the search and seizure on EE or the statement referred to or relied upon in the reasons recorded had any connection with the assessee.

iv) The notice dated 30th March, 2019 issued u/s 148 and the subsequent order dated 5th September, 2019 passed were without jurisdiction and hence, quashed and set aside. Any consequent notice or demand, if issued, was also quashed and set aside.”

Perquisite — Exceptions — Treatment of prescribed ailment in approved hospital — Application for approval filed by hospital before outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic — Renewal denied on ground that State Government Authority had revoked approval granted to assessee for treating Covid-19 patients — Order of Principal CIT rejecting application unsustainable

33 Park Health Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. Principal CIT [2021] 439 ITR 643 (Telangana) Date of order: 28th September, 2021 S. 17(2)(viii) Proviso (II)(B) of ITA, 1961

Perquisite — Exceptions — Treatment of prescribed ailment in approved hospital — Application for approval filed by hospital before outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic — Renewal denied on ground that State Government Authority had revoked approval granted to assessee for treating Covid-19 patients — Order of Principal CIT rejecting application unsustainable

The assessee was a hospital, and it was granted approval by the Principal Chief Commissioner under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 initially in the year 2011-12, with each renewal being valid for three years and the last of the renewal granted being valid till 21st March, 2020. The assessee made an application on 13th January, 2020 seeking renewal of approval granted two months prior to the expiry of the validity period of the existing approval granted. While the application was pending for renewal of approval, the Covid-19 pandemic struck and the assessee was granted approval by the State Government Department of Public Health and Family Welfare for providing treatment for Covid-19 patients. Thereafter, based on complaints, the State Government Medical and Health Officer, on 3rd August, 2020 revoked the permission granted to the assessee. The assessee submitted its explanation and sought for recalling the revocation order. While the explanation offered by the assessee was under consideration by the State authorities, the second respondent issued a notice dated 12th October, 2020 calling upon the assessee to show cause why the cancellation order of the State Government should not be considered for deciding the application for recognition under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii). The assessee submitted in its letter to the Principal Chief Commissioner that when it made the application for renewal of approval, there was no Covid-19 pandemic outbreak, that the State Government Department of Public Health and Family Welfare revoked the permission for Covid-19 treatment only and not for other medical treatments, that the State authority’s action was based on misinformation and baseless propaganda made by the media without taking into consideration the actual facts, that the assessee was under the process of getting permission again for Covid-19 treatment from the State Government Department of Public Health and Family Welfare and requested to grant the renewal of application under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii). The Principal Chief Commissioner rejected the application for renewal of approval by an order dated 19th October, 2020.

On a writ petition challenging the order, the Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

“i) The order rejecting the renewal of approval under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii) had been passed by the Principal Chief Commissioner by traversing beyond the notice and was in violation of principles of natural justice causing prejudice to the assessee. The order read with the notice showed that it was passed as a chain reaction to the order of the State Government, which dealt with determination of corona virus disease as a respiratory disease and it was a prescribed disease under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of rule 3A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

ii) The order indicated that it had taken into consideration various issues which had not been mentioned in the notice issued to the assessee. The only ground mentioned in the notice was with regard to the State Government revoking the mandate given for covid treatment, whereas the order, apart from dealing with the revocation of mandate for covid treatment by the State Government, also dealt with other aspects as to the nature of the corona virus disease being a respiratory disease and the assessee having resorted to excessive, exorbitant and unconscionable pricing being a misconduct or an offence, without putting the assessee on notice of the allegations and to offer its explanation. The claim of the Principal Chief Commissioner that Covid-19 treatment was a respiratory disease was not backed by any material or scientific data. Since the notice issued relied only on the revocation of permission for providing medical treatment for Covid-19 by the State Government, and the revocation having been lifted by the State authority by proceedings dated 13th September, 2020 and the assessee was permitted to provide treatment for Covid-19 patients, the very basis of the notice dated 12th October, 2020 issued was removed.

iii) The order rejecting the renewal of approval granted under proviso (ii)(b) to section 17(2)(viii) was unsustainable.”

ACCOUNTING FOR SPONSORSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION
Companies may enter into sponsorship agreements for World Cup events or Olympic games as a means of building their brands or advertising their products. Consider a scenario, where an entity enters into an arrangement with the owners of the Cricket World Cup event to use the World Cup brand in its products or activities for one year ending one month after the event is concluded. To gain that right, the entity pays INR 100 million.

Question 1
On Day 1, Should the entity account for this amount as an intangible asset or advance against future sales promotion expenses?

Question 2
Assume that the entity shall exploit the brand for the entire year starting from the date of acquisition and ending one month after the event is concluded. How will the INR 100 million be debited to profit and loss, when the amount is capitalised as an intangible asset and when it is presented as an advance? Will the P&L charge differ under either approach?

Accounting Standard References from Ind AS 38 Intangible Assets

Paragraph 8
An intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance.

An asset is a resource: (a) controlled by an entity as a result of past events; and (b) from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity.

Paragraph 29
“Examples of expenditures that are not part of the cost of an intangible asset are:
(a) costs of introducing a new product or service (including costs of advertising and promotional activities);
(b)…….
(c)………..”

Paragraph 69
“……Other examples of expenditure that is recognised as an expense when it is incurred include:
(a) ………
(b) …..
(c) expenditure on advertising and promotional activities (including mail order catalogues).
(d) …………….”

Paragraph 70
Paragraph 68 does not preclude an entity from recognising a prepayment as an asset when payment for goods has been made in advance of the entity obtaining a right to access those goods. Similarly, paragraph 68 does not preclude an entity from recognising a prepayment as an asset when payment for services has been made in advance of the entity receiving those services.

Paragraph 97
The depreciable amount of an intangible asset with a finite useful life shall be allocated on a systematic basis over its useful life. Amortisation shall begin when the asset is available for use, i.e., when it is in the location and condition necessary for it to be capable of operating in the manner intended by management. ……….The amortisation method used shall reflect the pattern in which the asset’s future economic benefits are expected to be consumed by the entity. If that pattern cannot be determined reliably, the straight-line method shall be used.

Response to Question 1
View A: INR 100 million should be recognised as an intangible asset

The sponsorship arrangement can be accounted for as an acquisition of a right to use the World Cup brand, and therefore can be recognized as an asset. The right to use the Cricket World Cup Brand represents a license to use a brand for a defined period, in this case, one year.

The definition of an intangible asset requires that the asset is identifiable, controlled by the entity, and that future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity from the use of the asset. These requirements are met, as the asset is identifiable through a contractual right, the entity has control over the licence and future economic benefits will flow to the entity from that licence.

View B: INR 100 million should be recognised as an advance for future services to be received
Paragraph 29 of Ind AS 38, provides examples of costs that do not form part of the cost of an intangible asset. One of the examples is the cost of introducing a new product or service including cost of advertising and sales promotion expenses. This requirement seems to suggest that sales promotion activities are expenditure and are not capitalised as intangible asset. The benefit of the sales promotion activity is to enhance the value of the brand and the customer relationship of the entity, which in turn generates revenue. As the brand and customer relationship of the entity are internally generated brands, and are not recognised as assets of the company, expenses to enhance those internally generated intangibles should not be recognised as an intangible asset. Additionally, the Cricket World Cup brand will not be used in isolation but will be used in conjunction with the entity’s brand, and therefore the arrangement is a co-branding arrangement.

In substance, the right to use the World Cup Brand is no different from an advertising activity, that enhances the value of the entity’s brand value. This is an internally generated brand and should not be capitalised as an intangible asset. Till such time the services are received; INR 100 million should be presented as an advance (or prepaid expense) in accordance with paragraph 70.

Response to Question 2
Basis paragraph 97 the intangible asset is amortized from the date the asset is available for use till the date the license is used, i.e., amortisation ends one month after the event is concluded. The amortisation method used shall reflect the pattern in which the asset’s future economic benefits are expected to be consumed by the entity. If that pattern cannot be determined reliably, the straight-line method shall be used. The pattern of consumption will be significant when the actual event is unfolding; however, because it cannot be estimated reliably, the amortisation will happen on a straight-line basis, over the one-year period of the licence.

When INR 100 million is presented as an advance, the expensing will not be different from the one that is undertaken with respect to amortisation of intangible assets. Typically, for a supply of services, an expense is recognised when the entity receives the services. Services are received when they are performed by a supplier in accordance with a contract which is equally over the contractual period of one year, as the World Cup brand is utilised over that period.

CONCLUSION
The question raised in this article is a very interesting question with respect to whether a payment for future services constitutes an advance for a service or an intangible asset. Under the present case, the author believes that the argument to capitalize the INR 100 million as an intangible asset is much stronger, because the payment represents a payment for acquiring a licence to use the World Cup Brand. Additionally, it may be noted that many global companies have capitalised such payments under IFRS as intangible assets. However, the other view of presenting the payment as an advance, cannot be ruled out.

With regards to the expensing in the profit or loss, the charge will generally be agnostic to whether the payment is capitalised as an intangible asset or presented as an advance. If presented as an advance, the cash outflow will be classified as operating, and if presented as intangible asset, the cash outflow will be classified as investing. As regards EBITDA, it will be higher (favourable) when the payment is treated as an intangible compared to when presented as an advance, because EBITDA will not include the amortisation charge, but expensing of the advance will be included in the EBITDA.

CONTROVERSIES

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Charitable institutions generally receive donations (voluntary contributions) from various donors for carrying out their charitable activities. Earlier, till A.Y. 1972-73, section 12(1) provided that voluntary contributions would not be included in income, while section 12(2) provided that voluntary contributions from another trust referred to in section 11, would be deemed to be income from property held in trust for charitable purposes. These voluntary contributions now fall within the definition of ‘income’ by virtue of insertion of section 2(24)(iia) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, with effect from A.Y. 1973-74. Such contributions (other than corpus donations) are also deemed to be income from property held under trust for charitable purposes, by virtue of section 12(1) of the Act, since A.Y. 1973-74. The exemption under section 11 of a charitable trust, registered under section 12A/12AA (now section 12AB), is therefore now computed by considering such voluntary contributions and adjusting the same by the application and accumulation of income, for charitable purposes, by applying the various sub-sections of section 11.

At times, charitable institutions receive grants from other institutions or persons, Indian or foreign, Government or non-government, with the condition that such grants are to be utilised only for specific purposes (“tied-up grants”). In most such cases, there is also a stipulation that in case the tied-up grants are not used for the specified purposes within a specific period of time, the unutilised amounts are to be refunded to the grantor of the aid.

The issues in the context of taxation have arisen before the courts as to whether such tied-up grants could be termed as voluntary contributions and whether, where not utilized during the year, are income of the recipient institution, as the same are to be refunded and represent a liability to be discharged in the future. While the Bombay High Court has taken the view that such grants are voluntary contributions, the Delhi High Court has taken the view that such receipts are not voluntary contributions and are liabilities and not in the nature of income of the recipient institution. A similar view has been taken by the Gujarat High court following the Delhi High court decision.

GEM & JEWELLERY EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL’S CASE
The issue had first come up before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Gem & Jewellery Export Promotion Council 143 ITR 579.

In this case relating to A.Y. 1967-68, the assessee was a company set up for the advancement of an object of general public utility, i.e., to support, protect, maintain, increase and promote exports of gems and jewellery, including pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, diamonds, synthetic stones, imitation jewellery, gold and non-gold jewellery and articles thereof, whose income was applied only for charitable purposes as defined in section 2(15).

The assessee received grants-in-aid from the Government of India for meeting the expenditure on specified projects. Some of the conditions on which those grants-in-aid were given were the following:
1. The funds should be kept with the State Bank of India, the total expenditure should not be more than the expenditure approved by the Central Government for each project; separate accounts should be kept for Code and non-Code projects and the accounts were to be audited by chartered accountants approved by the Government.
2. Any amount unspent was to be surrendered to the Government by the end of the financial year unless allowed to be adjusted against next year’s grant.
3. The grant should be spent upon the object for which it had been sanctioned. The assets acquired wholly or substantially out of grant-in-aid would not, without prior sanction of the Central Government, be disposed of, encumbered or utilised for purposes other than those for which the grant was sanctioned.

At that point of time, relying on section 12(1), which provided that any income derived from voluntary contributions applicable solely to charitable or religious purposes would not be includible in the total income, the assessee claimed that the grants-in-aid were in the nature of voluntary contributions, and were therefore not taxable, whether spent or not. The assessing officer taxed such unspent grants-in-aid, allowing accumulation of 25% of such amount.

In first appeal, the assessee’s claim was allowed, holding that such grants-in-aid were not taxable, being voluntary contributions. Before the Tribunal, the Department argued that the grants-in-aid could not be considered as voluntary contribution for the purpose of section 12(1), having regard to the fact that the grants were made subject to conditions mentioned above. The Tribunal confirmed the first appellate order, holding that the amounts given by the Government were voluntary contributions and were not in the nature of any price paid for any benefit or privilege, nor were they for any consideration. According to the Tribunal, the conditions imposed by the Government did not change the nature of the payment, which was initially a voluntary contribution.

Before the Bombay High Court, on behalf of the revenue, it was argued that while making contributions, the Government imposed certain conditions and having regard to the fact that the conditions governed the grants, the grants could not be considered to be a donation or a voluntary contribution or, in other words, it was not a pure and simple gift by the Government.

The Bombay High Court observed that it was well known that grants-in-aid were made by the Government to provide certain institutions with sufficient funds to carry on their charitable activities. The institutions or associations to which the grant was made had no right to ask for the grant. It was solely within the discretion of the Government to make grants to institutions of a charitable nature. The Government did not expect any return for the grants given by it to such institutions. There was nothing which was required to be done by these institutions for the Government, which can be considered as a consideration for the grant.

The Bombay High Court noted the meaning of the words ‘voluntarily contributed’ as held in Society of Writers to the Signet vs. CIR 2 TC 257, as “the meaning of the word ‘voluntary’ is ‘money gifted voluntarily contributed in the sense of being gratuitously given’.” The Bombay High Court held that the conditions attached to the grant did not affect the voluntary nature of the contribution. The conditions were merely intended to see that the amounts were properly utilised, and therefore did not detract from the voluntary nature of the grant.

The Bombay High Court accordingly held that the grants-in-aid were voluntary contributions, and were exempt under section 12(1), as it then stood.

SOCIETY FOR DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES’ CASE
The issue again came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of DIT vs. Society for Development Alternatives 205 Taxman 373 (Del).

In this case, relating to A.Y. 2006-07 and 2007-08, the assessee was a society, which was registered under Section 12A and Section 80G. It was undertaking activities relating to research, development and dissemination of (i) Technologies for fulfillment of basic needs of rural households (ii) Solutions for regeneration of natural resources and the environment and (iii) Community based institution strengthening methods to improve access to for the poor.

It had received grants for specific purposes/projects from the government, non-government, foreign institutions etc. These grants were to be spent as per the terms and conditions of the project grant. The amount, which remained unspent at the end of the year, got spilled over to the next year and was treated as unspent grant. The Assessing Officer treated such unspent grants as income of the assessee, invoking the provisions of section 12(1). This section then provided that any voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly for charitable or religious purposes (other than corpus donations) were, for purposes of section 11, deemed to be income from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes.

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition, noting that:
1. The amounts were received/sanctioned for a specific purpose/project to be utilized over a particular period.
2. The utilisation of the said grants was monitored by the funding agencies who sent persons for inspection and also appointed independent auditors to verify the utilisation of funds as settled terms.
3. The assessee had to submit inter/final progress/work completion reports along with evidences to the funding agencies from time to time.
4. The agreements also included a term that separate audited accounts for the project would be maintained.
5. The unutilised amount had to be refunded back to the funding agencies in most of the cases.
6. All the terms and conditions had to be simultaneously complied with, otherwise the grants would be withdrawn.
7. The assessee had to utilise the funds as per the terms and conditions of the grant. If it failed to utilise the grants for the purpose for which grant was sanctioned, the amount was recovered by the funding agency.

The Commissioner (Appeals) was therefore of the view that the assessee was not free to use the funds voluntarily as per its sweet will and, thus, these were not voluntary contributions as per Section 12. He concluded that these were tied-up grants, where the appellant acted as a custodian of the funds given by the funding agency to channelise the same in a particular direction. The Tribunal upheld the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Delhi High Court agreed with the findings of the Tribunal, holding that these were not voluntary contributions, and were therefore not income under section 12(1).

A similar view has been taken by the Gujarat High Court in the case of DIT(E) vs. Gujarat State Council for Blood Transfusion, 221 Taxman 126, for AY 2009-10, holding that the grant received from the State Government was not income of the trust for the purposes of section 11.

OBSERVATIONS
Though both the Bombay and Delhi High Court decisions were decided in favour of the assessee and held that the tied-up grants were not taxable, since the law in both the years was different, the ratio of these decisions is opposite to that of each other – while the Bombay High Court has held that tied-up grants are ‘voluntary contributions’, the Delhi High Court has taken the view that these tied-up grants are not ‘voluntary contributions’.

The Bombay High Court, in examining whether the tied-up grants were voluntary contributions or not, looked at the receipt from the perspective of the grantor – was the grant voluntary, or was it for some consideration, and held that since it was voluntary from the viewpoint of the donor, the receipt was a voluntary contribution; and applying the then applicable law, it held that voluntary contributions were not income, as the definition of ‘income’ at the relevant time did not include voluntary contributions. The Bombay High Court did not have to consider the subsequent amendment, under which such amounts were independently in the nature of income.

The law presently applicable provides that a ‘voluntary contribution’ is an income, and hence it has become necessary to examine whether a tied-up grant, not spent by the year end or not accumulated, is a voluntary contribution, more so where it is attached with the condition of refunding the unspent amount. Following the Bombay High Court, the receipt is a voluntary contribution, and once so accepted, the same has to be subjected to the rules of application and accumulation. In contrast, where the Delhi High court is followed, the receipt in the first place shall not be construed as a voluntary contribution and would not be subjected to the rules of application and accumulation.

In order for a receipt to be regarded as a voluntary contribution and for it to bear the character of income, the recipient has to have some element of domain over the receipt – the freedom to apply such income as it desires. If the recipient has to necessarily spend the receipt as per the directions of the grantor, and under the supervision of the donor, it has no control over such spending and over such amounts. Such receipts should be considered as held in trust for the grantor and when spent, the expenditure be held to be the expenditure of the grantor, and not that of the recipient trust, which disburses the amounts. Besides, where the unspent amount is refundable, it is a liability and cannot be regarded as income at all.

The Hyderabad bench of the Tribunal has therefore held, in the case of Nirmal Agricultural Society vs. ITO 71 ITD 152, that ‘The grants which are for specific purposes do not belong to the assessee-society. Such grants do not form corpus of the assessee or its income. Those grants are not donations to the assessee so as to bring them under the purview of section 12 of the Act. Voluntary contributions covered by section 12 are those contributions freely available to the assessee without any stipulation which the assessee could utilise towards its objectives according to its own discretion and judgment. Tied-up grants for a specified purpose would only mean that the assessee, which is a voluntary organisation, has agreed to act as a trustee of a special fund granted by Bread for the World with the result that it need not be pooled or integrated with the assessee’s normal income or corpus. In this case, the assessee is acting as an independent trustee for that grant, just as same trustee can act as a trustee of more than one trust. Tied-up amounts need not, therefore, be treated as amounts which are required to be considered for assessment, for ascertaining the amount expended or the amount to be accumulated.’

According to the Tribunal, such unspent grants should be shown as a liability, and the expenditure incurred for the specified purposes adjusted against such liability, and not be treated as the expenses of the assessee. Only any non-refundable credit balance in the liability account of the grantor would be treated as income in the year in which such non-refundable balance was ascertained.
 
A similar view has been taken by the Mumbai bench of the Tribunal in the case of NEIA Trust v ADIT ITA No 5818-5819/Mum/2015 dated 24th December 2019 (A.Y. 2011-12 and 2012-13), where the Tribunal has held:
‘upon perusal of stated terms & conditions, it could not be said that the funds received by the assessee were not in the nature of voluntary contributions rather they were more in the nature of specific grants on certain terms and conditions and liable to be refunded, in case the same were not utilized for specific purposes. It is trite law that entries in the books of accounts would not be determinative of the true nature / character of the transactions and the same could not be held to be conclusive. Therefore, the mere fact that the assessee credited the receipts as corpus contribution, in our considered opinion, would not make much difference and would not alter the true nature of the stated receipts. The said funds / receipts, as stated earlier, were more in the nature of specific grants and represent liability for the assessee and liable to be refunded in case of non-utilization.’

The Hyderabad Bench decision in Nirmal Agricultural Society’s case has also been followed by the Tribunal in the cases of Handloom Export Promotion Council vs. ADIT 62 taxmann.com 288 (Chennai) and JB Education Society vs. ACIT 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd).

Besides, in the cases of various Government Corporations set up to implement Government policies, grants received from the Government by such corporations have been held not to constitute income of the Corporation, since the Corporation acts as an agency of the Government in spending for the Government schemes. The funds therefore really belong to the Government, until such time as the funds are spent. This view has been taken by the High Courts in the following cases:
•    CIT vs. Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance Corpn. 284 ITR 582 (Kar.)
•    Karnataka Municipal Data Society vs. ITO 76 taxmann.com 167 (Kar)

The position may be slightly different in case of grants from the Government and a few specified bodies, with effect from A.Y. 2016-17. Clause (xviii) of section 2(24) has been inserted in the definition of ‘income’, which provides for taxation of grants from the Central Government, State Government, any authority, body or agency as income. Such grants would therefore be taxable as income of the recipient trust, and the fact anymore may or may not be material that the receipt is not a voluntary contribution. This inserted provision in any case would not apply to grants received from other non-governmental organisations.

In case the Government tied-up grant is refundable if not spent, can it be regarded as income at all post insertion of clause (xviii)? One way to minimize the harm on the possible application of clause (xviii) of section 2(24) could be to tax such unspent receipts in the year in which the fact of the non-utilisation is final; even in such a case, a possibility of claiming deduction for the refund of unspent amount should be explored. Alternatively, in that year, the expenditure, where incurred, should be treated as an application of income. The other possible view is that clause (xviii) applies only to recipient persons, other than charitable organisations, to whom the specific provisions of clause (iia) of section 2(24) applies, rather than generally applying the provisions of clause (xviii) to all and sundry.

The better view therefore seems to be that of the Delhi and Gujarat High Courts, that tied-up grants are not voluntary contributions and/or income of the recipient institution.

Book profits — Company — Provision for bad and doubtful debts — Corresponding amount reduced from loans and advances on assets side of balance sheet and at end of year loans and advances shown net of provision for bad debts — Provision not to be added in computation of book profits

32 Principal CIT. vs. Narmada Chematur Petrochemicals Ltd. [2021] 439 ITR 761 (Guj) A.Y.: 2004-05; Date of order: 14th July, 2021 S. 115JB of ITA, 1961

Book profits — Company — Provision for bad and doubtful debts — Corresponding amount reduced from loans and advances on assets side of balance sheet and at end of year loans and advances shown net of provision for bad debts — Provision not to be added in computation of book profits

The assessee claimed deduction u/s 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and after setting off unabsorbed loss and depreciation of the preceding years, the assessee filed a nil return for the A.Y. 2004-05 and declared the book profits under the provisions of section 115JB. The Assessing Officer made various disallowances in his order u/s 143(3).

The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition made on account of bad and doubtful debts holding that the provision for bad and doubtful debt was not a provision for a liability but for diminution in value of assets and therefore, clause (c) of the Explanation to section 115JB would not be applicable. The assessee and the Department filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that since the assessee had simultaneously obliterated the provision from its accounts by reducing the corresponding amount from the loans and advances on the assets side of the balance-sheet and consequently, at the end of the year shown the loans and advances on the assets side of the balance sheet as net of the provision for bad debts, it would amount to a write-off and such actual write-off would not be hit by clause (i) of the Explanation to section 115JB.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Tribunal was right in deleting the addition on account of the provision for bad and doubtful debts in the computation of the book profits for computation of minimum alternate tax liability in the light of clause (i) of the Explanation to section 115JB. No question of law arose.”

Section 195 read with Section 40(a)(i) of the Act – Section 40(a)(i) is applicable on failure to deduct tax on payments made for FTS and does not encompass fees for professional service

6 Chandan Mohon Lal vs. ACIT  [TS – 1123 – ITAT –  2021 (Del)] ITA No: 1869/Del/2019 A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 9th December, 2021

Section 195 read with Section 40(a)(i) of the Act – Section 40(a)(i) is applicable on failure to deduct tax on payments made for FTS and does not encompass fees for professional service

FACTS
The assessee was an advocate practicing in the field of Intellectual Property Laws. During the relevant year, the assessee had made payments to various persons/entities outside India towards professional/technical fees without deducting TDS. AO disallowed expenditure under Section 40(a)(i) of the Act. AO held that payments were chargeable to tax as they were made to persons from non DTAA countries, and in respect of DTAAs countries, the assessee had not furnished TRCs. CIT(A) affirmed AO’s order. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed to ITAT.

HELD
Reimbursement of expenses
• The assessee had made foreign remittances in respect of (a) amounts recovered in a court proceeding on behalf of the client in litigation (b) official fee for international application (c) publication and trade fair services.

• Payments representing reimbursements for official purposes and trade fair services were not in the nature of income chargeable to tax. Accordingly, provisions of Section 195 were not applicable.

Fees for technical services vs. Professional fees
• Non-resident attorneys had rendered the following professional services outside India:

? Filing of application for grant/registration of IPRs.
??Filing of Form/responses/petitions in relation to activity leading to, or in the process of, grant/registration.

??Maintenance of such grant/registration or services in relation thereto, as required under law, such as, annuity payment, renewal fee, restoration of patent, etc.

??Undertaking compliances for effecting change in the ownership/address etc., of such intellectual property.

• Non-resident attorneys had rendered services outside India. Accordingly, income received in respect thereof could not be treated as income received in India, or deemed to be received in India, or as income accrued or arisen in India.

• The Act considers legal/professional services and FTS as two distinct and separate categories. A conjoint reading of Sections 40(a)(i) and 40(a)(ia) brings out a clear distinction between FTS and fees for professional services. Section 40(a)(ia) encompasses both FTS and fees for professional services. However, Section 40(a)(i) is applicable only in case of failure to deduct tax on payments made for FTS.
• This could be because, as per Section 5 and Section 9 of the Act, legal/professional fee payment to a non-resident does not accrue or arise in India, or is not deemed to accrue or arise in India.

• In reaching its conclusion, ITAT placed reliance on under noted decisions1 where similar view was expressed.

Source Rule exclusion
• Indian/overseas clients had engaged the assessee for availing certain services. In turn, the assessee had engaged foreign attorneys to perform certain services required to be performed in foreign jurisdictions. Clients were not concerned whether work was done by the assessee or someone else.

• Thus, the source of income of the assessee through services rendered by non-resident attorneys in foreign jurisdictions was located outside India.

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1    NQA Quality Systems Registrar Ltd. vs. DCIT: 92 TTJ 946; ONGC vs. DCIT, Dehradun: 117 taxmann.com 867 (Delhi-Trib.); Deloitte Haskins & Sells vs. ACIT: [2017] 184 TTJ 801 (Mumbai –Trib.)

Exemption u/s 54 was available even if the new residential property was purchased in the joint names of assessee, her daughter and son in law

26 ITO vs. Smt. Rachna Arora [2021] 90 ITR(T) 575 (Chandigarh – Trib.) ITA No.: 1112 (Chd) of 2019 A.Y.: 2015-16      Date of Order: 31st March, 2021                    

Exemption u/s 54 was available even if the new residential property was purchased in the joint names of assessee, her daughter and son in law    

FACTS
Assessee sold a residential property and invested entire amount on purchase of a new residential property in joint names of assessee with her daughter and son in law and claimed exemption under Section 54. Assessing Officer held that assessee was entitled for claim of exemption only to extent of her share in new residential property.

The CIT (A) allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Consequently, the revenue filed an appeal before the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT confirmed the order passed by the CIT(A) and dismissed the revenue’s appeal on the following grounds:

The CIT(A) had followed the ratio contained in the decision of Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Dinesh Verma 2015 233 Taxman 409 (Punj. & Har.)

The Hon’ble High Court in the case of Dinesh Verma (supra) held that the assessee would be entitled to the benefit of exemption u/s 54B only on the amount invested by him after the sale of his original property and not on the amount invested by his wife jointly in the same property. The high court also held that the plain reading of provisions of section 54 of the Act indicated that in order to claim the benefit of exemption u/s 54, the assessee should, invest the capital gain arising out of sale of residential property in purchase of another residential property within stipulated time. Nothing contained in Section 54 precluded the assessee to claim the exemption in case the property was purchased jointly with close family members, who are not strangers or unconnected to her provided the assessee invested the entire amount of Long Term Capital Gain.

Based on the principle, he held that in the instant case, since the entire investment is made by the assessee herself, albeit in joint names with daughter and son-in-law, the assessee is entitled to exemption u/s 54. The ITAT also observed that the Ld. DR was neither able to controvert the facts of the present case as noted by the CIT(A) nor had he pointed out how the decision in the case of Dinesh Verma (supra) was applicable against the assessee in the facts of the present case.

A society formed with the primary object of construction of chambers for its members and their allotment is eligible to be registered u/s 12AA since the objects amount to advancement of object of general public utility within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act

25 Building Committee (Society) Barnala vs. CIT (Exemption) [2021] 89 ITR(T) 1 (Chandigarh – Trib.) ITA No.: 1295 (Chd) of 2019 Date of Order: 18th May, 2021

A society formed with the primary object of construction of chambers for its members and their allotment is eligible to be registered u/s 12AA since the objects amount to advancement of object of general public utility within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act

FACTS
Assessee-society applied for registration u/s 12AA. However, the CIT (Exemption) rejected the application of the assessee inter alia holding that genuineness of the activities of the assessee could not be established; and that the assessee had not incurred any expenditure for activities of general public importance. Main ground for rejecting the application was that purpose for which the society was formed was for the benefit of specific group of professionals which does not come within the purview of ‘advancement of object of general public utility’ under Section 2(15) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal to the ITAT.

HELD
The ITAT analysed the case on hand in the context of provisions of Section 2(15) which define ‘charitable purpose’ and Section 12AA which provide for grant of registration.

The ITAT observed that the bye-laws of the society provided that society was established for the welfare, construction and allotment of chambers in the District Court Complex, Barnala for the members of District Bar Association, Barnala. It further provided that all the incomes/earnings would be solely utilized and applied towards the promotion of its aims and objectives only as set forth in the memorandum of association, and that the society will work on no profit and no loss basis. Bye-laws also provided social welfare activities such as growing of trees for environments, de-addiction drug campaign, welfare of girl child, and also provide legal awareness among the general public.

The CIT (Exemptions) proceeded only on the basis that since the society was formed for construction of building for members, benefits thereof only restricted to the members, and not to the general public at large and failed to comprehend the role of Bar Association in judicial dispensation. Attainment of justice for all the parties of the case and the society at large is the main object of our judicial system.

The Bench and Bar were the essential partners in judicial dispensation, and therefore, considering the importance of Bar Association in every adjudicating body, particular space was being earmarked and maintained for Bar Association and for litigants. Thus, since working space for professionals was an integral part of infrastructure for judicial dispensation, the ITAT held that the CIT (Exemptions) was wrong in rejecting the assessee’s application u/s 12AA, disregarding the bye-laws and not considering the object of the assessee from a larger perspective.
    

Since income from TDR is inextricably linked to the project and its cost, the cost of building has to be deducted against the income from sale of TDR. TDR receipts cannot be considered in isolation of assessee’s obligation under the SRA agreement to complete the SRA project

24 DBS Realty vs. ACIT  [TS-1096-ITAT-2021(Mum)] A.Ys.: 2010-11 and 2011-12; Date of order: 24th November, 2021 Section: 28

Since income from TDR is inextricably linked to the project and its cost, the cost of building has to be deducted against the income from sale of TDR. TDR receipts cannot be considered in isolation of assessee’s obligation under the SRA agreement to complete the SRA project

FACTS
The assessee, a partnership firm, engaged in the business of real estate development entered into an agreement with the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) to develop a project over a plot of land spread over 31.9 acres. The said plot of land was purchased by the assessee for a consideration of Rs. 44.21 crore and handed over to SRA as per SRA scheme. As per the terms of the agreement with SRA, the assessee was to develop the SRA project at its own cost. In return of the land surrendered to SRA and the project cost to be incurred the assessee was granted Land TDR of 93,623 sq. mts. and construction TDR of 4,78,527 sq. mts.

Since the assessee was required to fund the entire cost of the project itself, the TDR granted to the assessee in a phased manner was sold from time to time to incur the cost of the project. In the process, the assessee received various amounts aggregating to about Rs. 304 crore in financial years 2009-10 to 2013-14.

In the course of assessment proceedings for the assessment year under consideration, the Assessing Officer (AO) called upon the assessee to explain why the amount received from the sale of TDR should not be treated as income of the assessee in respective assessment years. In response, the assessee submitted that since it is following percentage completion method for recognising the revenue from the SRA project and since 25% of the total estimated project is not completed till date, TDR income cannot be treated as income but has to be shown as current liability.

The AO did not accept the contentions of the assessee and held that the amount received by the assessee from sale of TDR has to be added to the income of the assessee in the respective assessment years.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that-

(i) sale of TDR is integrally connected to the SRA project, hence, cannot be considered in isolation;

(ii) since SRA is not funding the project, the assessee has to incur the cost of project by utilizing the amount received from sale of TDR;

(iii) the very idea of granting TDR to the assessee is for enabling it to finance the project;

(iv) since the project is not complete even to the extent of 25%, no amount is taxable, much less, the amount received from sale of TDR, that too, without looking at the corresponding cost incurred by the assessee.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the issue for its consideration is whether the amount received by the assessee from the sale of TDR granted in respect of the SRA project is taxable in the year of receipt or the assessee’s method of revenue recognition following percentage of completion method is acceptable. It also noted that the assessee has received certain amount from the sale of TDR in A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14 as well.

While completing the assessment, the AO accepted the method of accounting followed by the assessee. However, PCIT held the assessment orders to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue since AO failed to tax the amount received by the assessee from the sale of TDR. While setting aside the assessments, the PCIT directed the AO to assess the amounts received from the sale of TDR.

However, while deciding the assessee’s appeals challenging the aforesaid direction of PCIT, the Tribunal held that percentage completion method followed by the assessee is a well-recognised method as per ICAI guidelines and judicial precedents; the sale of TDR cannot be considered in isolation of assessee’s obligation under the SRA agreement to complete the SRA project; the assessee was under obligation to complete the project as per the agreement; the TDR was granted to provide finance to the assessee to complete the project. Thus, the assessee’s income from TDR cannot be considered independently without taking the corresponding expenses, more so when the TDR receipts are directly linked to execution of the project. Since income from TDR is inextricably linked to the project and its cost, the cost of building has to be deducted against the income from sale of TDR.

Since the project has been stalled due to dispute and litigations and the assessee has not been able to complete the project, the bench observed that though assessee has earned income from sale of TDR, however, no income from SRA project, as yet, has been offered to tax. It also observed that the Tribunal has in appeals against orders passed under Section 263 has recorded findings touching upon the merits of the issue, which indeed, are favourable to the assessee and the said order of the Tribunal was not available before the AO or CIT(A) the applicability of the said order to the facts of the case needs to be examined.  The Tribunal set aside the order of CIT(A) and restored the issue to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication after examining the applicability of the order of the Tribunal for A.Ys. 2012-13 and 2013-14.

Where premises were let along with furniture and fixture and rent for furniture and fixtures has been bifurcated by the assessee, deduction under Section 24(a) held to be allowable even for rent of furniture and fixture, etc Reimbursement of member’s share of contribution for repairing the entire society building held to be not taxable as it has no income element in it

23 Lewis Family Trust vs. ITO  [TS-1121-ITAT-2021(Mum)] A.Y.: 2012-13 ; Date of order: 30th November, 2021 Sections: 23, 24

Where premises were let along with furniture and fixture and rent for furniture and fixtures has been bifurcated by the assessee, deduction under Section 24(a) held to be allowable even for rent of furniture and fixture, etc

Reimbursement of member’s share of contribution for repairing the entire society building held to be not taxable as it has no income element in it

FACTS I
The assessee, in its return of income, declared rental income of Rs 57,56,998 under the head `Income from House Property’ and claimed deduction under Section 24(a) of the Act. The Assessing Officer (AO) on perusal of the leave and license agreement, found that the assessee trust had let out premises along with furniture, fixtures and decoration, air-conditioning, etc, and the rent for furniture and fixtures has been separately bifurcated by the assessee. The AO held that rent of premises amounting to Rs. 34,54,199 is only taxable under the head `income from house property’ and deduction under Section 24(a) allowable in respect thereof and rent of furniture, fixtures, etc amounting to Rs. 23,02,799 would get taxed under the head `income from other sources’ and therefore, standard deduction @ 30% thereon would not be allowable.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) where it contended that the total rent has been bifurcated into rent for premises and hire charges for furniture, fixtures, etc. only for the purpose of enabling property tax charged by MCGM at a lower amount and there was no intention to defraud the income-tax department; furniture is attached with the property and cannot be removed without damaging the wall or the floor; and that without furniture rent cannot be equivalent to the amount agreed upon. The CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

FACTS II
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, the assessee made a payment of Rs. 4,45,266 towards members’ share of contribution for repairing the entire society building. This payment was made by account payee cheque through regular banking channels by the assessee to the housing society. Since repairs costs were to be borne by the tenant, the assessee got a sum of Rs. 4,45,266 reimbursed from the lessee bank. The AO taxed this sum of Rs. 4,45,266 under the head `income from other sources’.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to CIT(A) who confirmed the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD I
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had received composite rent from its tenant State Bank of Patiala. The lessee bank had treated the entire payment of rental and hire charges as the composite payment and had charged tax at source in terms of Ssection 194I of the Act. It observed that this aspect is not a relevant consideration for determining the taxability of rental under the head of income in the hands of the assessee. However, it noted that for A.Y. 2010-11, the AO, in order giving effect to order of CIT(A), had accepted the stand of the assessee vide his order dated 19th March, 2014 and in scrutiny assessments framed for A.Ys. 2016-17 and 2018-19 also the stand of the assessee has been accepted. Applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Radhasoami Satsang [193 ITR 321 (SC)], namely that the revenue cannot take a divergent stand for one particular year, ignoring the rule of consistency, the Tribunal allowed this ground of appeal filed by the assessee.

HELD II
The Tribunal held that since the assessee had merely got the reimbursement of the amount paid by it to the society, there is no income element in it. Hence, it held that the reimbursement received by the assessee cannot be taxed under the head `income from other sources’.

CSR expenses, if given by way of donation to a trust eligible for 80G deduction, can be claimed under Section 80G. Restriction under Explanation 2 Section 37 does not apply to claim under section 80G

22 Naik Seafoods Pvt. Ltd. vs. PCIT  [TS-1157-ITAT-2021(Mum)] A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 26th November, 2021 Sections: 37, 80G, 263

CSR expenses, if given by way of donation to a trust eligible for 80G deduction, can be claimed under Section 80G. Restriction under Explanation 2 Section 37 does not apply to claim under section 80G

FACTS
During the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration, assessee company in its computation of total income disallowed a sum of Rs. 2.80 lakh being CSR expenses debited to Profit & Loss Account but claimed the same under Section 80G. While assessing assessee’s total income under Section 143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer (AO) did not disallow the claim so made under Section 80G.

The PCIT issued a show-cause notice to the assessee interalia observing that claim of Rs. 1.40 lakh has been made under Section 80G regarding CSR expenses of Rs. 2.80 lakh. CSR expenses are the assessee’s responsibility as per the Companies Act, 2013, and if it is spent through other trusts, then also, as per Rule 4(2) of CSR Rules, it is spent on behalf of the assessee. Therefore, the assessee cannot give a donation of CSR expenses even if it is given to a trust eligible for an 80G deduction. Hence, the same is not allowable. Failure of AO to consider CSR expense as disallowable as rendered the assessment order erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue.

In response, the assessee made its submission (the submission made by the assessee to the PCIT on this issue is not reproduced in the order of the tribunal). However, the PCIT rejected the submission by holding that since both CSR expense and 80G donations are two different modes of ensuring fund for public welfare, treating the same expense under two different heads would defeat the very purpose of it. In the budget memorandum as well, the legislative intent was to ensure that companies with certain strong financials make the expenditure towards this purpose and by allowing deduction, the Government would be subsidizing one-third of it by way of revenue foregone thereon and hence the same was required to be disallowed in the assessment. Failure of the AO to examine the CSR expense as disallowable expense and to examine disallowance of deduction under Section 80G rendered the order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. He set aside the order of the AO with a direction to the AO to examine the above aspects with regard to allowability of deduction claimed under Section 80G as per law and frame a fresh assessment after affording an opportunity to the assessee of being heard.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where relying on the decisions of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of FNF India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT in ITA No. 1565/Bang./2019 dated 5th January, 2021 and Goldman Sachs Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. JCIT in ITA(TP) No. 2355/Bang./2019 it supported the action of the AO by contending that Explanation 2 under Section 37 is restricted to Section 37 only and nothing more and since the Explanation has been inserted below Section 37, it can be invoked only when expenditure is claimed as deduction as being for the purpose of business under Section 37 of the Act. Since the assessee has not claimed the said expenditure under Section 37 but has claimed it under Section 80G and the Act nowhere states that expenditure disallowed in terms of Explanation 2 to Section
37 cannot be allowed by way of deduction in terms of Section 80G.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the Bangalore bench of the Tribunal in FNF India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT (supra) while deciding the issue of deduction under Section 80G relating to donations which is part of CSR has remitted the issue to the AO to verify the additions necessary to claim deduction under Section 80G of the Act with a clear direction to the AO. Since in the present case the AO himself allowed the deduction under Section 80G, as claimed by the assessee, and the issue is debatable issue and the AO has taken one of the possible view, the Tribunal held that PCIT cannot invoke the provisions of Section 263 of the Act in order to bring on record his possible view.

AUDIT QUALITY MATURITY MODEL – WHAT IS YOUR SCORE?

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has issued the Audit Quality Maturity Model – Version 1.0 (“AQMM” or the “Model“) in June, 2021. In the ICAI Council meeting held on 9th January, 2021, it was decided that both the Peer Review Board and the Centre for Audit Quality (CAQ) would need to develop an ecosystem that is acceptable to both. Such a collaborative approach would have the advantage of the CAQ developing the quality standards and the Peer Review Board testing the said standards.

Quality has always been the focus of ICAI. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court told Bar Council of India’s lawyer, while asking to refrain from lowering the standards of entrance exams for law schools, “Look at how ICAI does it for Chartered Accountants. They control intake and also the quality.” The audit profession always had an enhanced focus on quality. The Model spells out the expectations from the audit firms in terms of audit quality, and Peer Review Board can test the implementation of these standards.

AQMM is initially recommendatory. In the Explanatory Memorandum on Applicability of AQMM, it is stated that the ICAI Council will review, after one year, the date from which it would become mandatory. Its applicability to firms is determined based on the firm’s audit clients. If a firm has the below types of audit clients, AQMM applies to them:
– A listed entity; or
– Banks other than co-operative banks (except multi-state co-operative banks); or
– Insurance companies.
Firms auditing only branches are not covered in the applicability.

MODEL TO MEASURE AUDIT QUALITY OF DIFFERENT FIRMS
When the user or consumer selects any service or product, he looks for the highest quality. Then why should audit as a service not have the highest quality that audit firm can deliver? It should have. However, how to measure the quality of audit that different firms provide? The final output, i.e. the audit report, is written based on Standards on Auditing. Nevertheless, the underlying audit on which it is based is a quality that stakeholder expects. Has the firm evaluated its audit quality? To answer these questions, ICAI has issued AQMM – the Model that has a scoring system based on the firm’s competencies. With this, the firm will be able to evaluate, in an objective manner, the quality of its audit and will also get guidance on its quality improvement areas. Every competency against which the firm scores low points indicates room for improvement.

Even though it is recommendatory, the drive has to come from within. By very nature itself, the audit profession has far-reaching consequences if quality is not followed. It is not similar to any other generic service available in the market. Through his audit report, the auditor assures various stakeholders of the financial statements of entities that carry out businesses affecting the entire economy. Every audit firm should regularly evaluate whether its service is of the highest quality. Just like good product brands enjoy a good reputation in the market due to their highest standards on quality, audit as a service also need to go through rigorous quality checks before it is delivered to the stakeholders. One may argue that when auditing standards are followed, it is good enough to ensure that audit quality is maintained. However, such an argument is not correct. The auditing standards help the auditor obtain reasonable assurance on the financial statements that he seeks to provide his opinion. However, complying with auditing standards, which is bare minimum expectation from auditor, by itself does not speak of audit quality. If one understands the difference between a product and another similar product that has gone through quality tests, AQMM exactly does that to the audit as a service. It adds quality tests to an audit being delivered by the auditor.

For an audit firm’s quality system, a quality audit is a critical part of the system. The audit landscape has changed over the years and is changing rapidly. Technology supports the audit in a big way – be it data analytics, various audit software being used by the audit firms or artificial intelligence in various audit tools.

VARIOUS QUALITY CONTROL MEASURES
There are several initiatives taken by the regulators to improve and review the audit quality. For example, ICAI has already issued Standard on Quality Control (SQC) 1, which requires the firms to establish system of quality controls. ICAI has also established the Financial Reporting Review Board (FRRB) that reviews general purpose financial statements and auditor’s reports to determine compliance with disclosure and presentation requirements. ICAI has also established Peer Review Board to conduct peer reviews. Since 2007, the Central Government has constituted Quality Review Board. AQMM is another such initiative that aims to improve audit quality.

AUDIT COMPETENCIES INCLUDED IN AQMM
AQMM is meant to identify which audit competencies are good, which are lacking and develop a roadmap for upgrading where the competencies are lacking. It is a self-evaluation guide for the audit firms to know their level of audit maturity. The guide looks at the overall firm as a whole and not only audit process. It considers the firm’s HR department, administration, IT support, legal department, etc. From an operations perspective, it considers the engagement team, leadership team, audit tools, networking team, MIS, etc.

The Model considers a firm’s competencies in the following three main areas:

1. Practice Management – Operation.
2. Human Resource Management.
3. Practice Management – Strategic / Functional.

Each of these areas is further sub-divided into specific elements in that area. The Model provides a scoring mechanism, i.e. the firm shall based on self-evaluation, calculate its score based on the score criteria and basis given in the Model. Therefore, this Model is like a marking mechanism for the audit firms to understand their Audit Quality Maturity. The Model provides various competencies that the firm should have. A score is given based on the presence or absence of such competency. For example, if the firm has the stated competency, it will get the score indicated in the Model. If the firm does not have such competency, it gets a zero score for such (non)competency. The Model also provides negative points for certain negative observations, which are described later in the article. The total maximum score that the Model provides is 600 points divided as a maximum of 280 points for Practice Management – Operation, a maximum of 240 points for Human Resource Management and a maximum of 80 points for Practice Management – Strategic / Functional. However, the Model does not give the basis for allotting a specific score to a particular competency. Therefore, there could be differing views where one may argue that a specific competency should have been given more weightage than to the other.

Let us understand the competencies included in each of the above areas.

1. Practice Management – Operation
The total of 280 points in this area is sub-divided into the following competencies:

Competencies

Maximum score

Practice areas of the firm

12

Work flow – practice manuals

16

Quality review manuals or audit tool

24

Service delivery – effort monitoring

36

Quality control for engagements

80

Benchmarking of service delivery

16

Client sensitisation

16

Technology adoption

64

Revenue, budgeting and pricing

16

Total

280

As expected, this area has maximum scoring because a large part of audit quality is reflected in the operational practice management of the firm. Within this, quality control for engagements carries the highest score. Quality control includes: competencies related to partner / quality review; percentage of engagements with ‘satisfactory’ rating based on a quality review; proportion of engagements without findings requiring significant improvements by ICAI or other regulatory bodies; audit documentation in compliance with Standard on Quality Control (SQC) 1; availability of accounting and auditing knowledge resources in soft copy archive form for Q&As, thought leaderships, dedicated technical desk, etc.; time spent on understanding the business of the client, identification of risks and planning audit engagement, etc.
How can firms improve their score in this area?

Though the scoring matrix gives a detailed break-up for various competencies, there are specific competencies that, in my view, the firms should focus on initially. These are very important from an audit quality perspective and will help them significantly improve the score.
These are:

1. Develop standard templates for the firm for engagement letters, management representation letters, audit documentation, audit reports, etc. The firms can also consider using templates issued by ICAI.

2. Develop standard checklists to ensure compliance with accounting and auditing standards.

3. Develop a practice manual of the firm that contains audit methodology ensuring compliance with auditing standards and their implementation.

4. Focus on the audit planning stage, including maintenance of documentation for hours budgeted, etc. Discuss and document client’s business understanding, risk assessment of material misstatement in accordance with Standard on Auditing 315, Identifying and Assessing the Risk of Material Misstatement through Understanding the Entity and its Environment.

5. Monitor audit progress, backlogs, unfinished engagements and client interactions so that audit can be completed within agreed timelines.

6. Use of audit tools, analytics, artificial intelligence-based audit procedures, etc.

7. Implement quality review process in the firm.

2. Human Resource Management
The total of 240 points in this area is sub-divided into the following competencies:

Competencies

Maximum score

Resource planning and monitoring as per
firm’s policy

28

Employee training and development

44

Resources turnover and compensation
management

104

Qualification skill set of employees and use
of experts

32

Performance evaluation measures carried out by the firm

32

Total

240

As this area relates to Human Resources (HR), its focus is on resources turnover and compensation. This competency has a maximum score compared to any other competency in the three main areas. Audit quality largely depends on the staff working on the engagement. Therefore, HR forms a critical area to ensure that quality staff is available for audits and resources turnover is well managed to ensure timelines are met. It is given that resources turnover cannot be eliminated, and therefore, the Model recognises this fact by stating the question as “Does the firm identify measures to keep the employee turnover minimal?” Compensation structuring goes hand in hand with resources turnover. This also includes building appropriate team structure, maintaining minimal employee turnover ratio, retention policy, identification of employee relationship with the firm, statutory contributions and other benefits made available by the firm, revolving door for audit staff, engagement level reviews and performance evaluation, access to technology and favourable remote working policies, gender diversity, holiday policies, staff well-being policies, employee surveys, recruitment policies and compensation mapped to knowledge and experience, etc. Many firms run specific programs to increase gender diversity. With additional family responsibilities compared to men, women may find path to leadership difficult which demands more of their time. There could have been more specific parameters to assess the quality of the resources and score based on such parameters, for example, the average number of years of audit experience per person the firm has, industry specialisation of the firm, etc.

How can firms improve their score in this area?

To start with, firms may consider implementing the following steps:
1. Develop a pyramid structure required to carry audits.
2. Determine training hours in a year per employee.
3. Maintain minimal employee turnover ratio, develop revolving door policy, holiday policy, compensation
policy.
4. Develop written key performance indicators for employees and partners.

3. Practice Management – Strategic / Functional
The total of 80 points in this area is sub-divided into the following competencies:

Competencies

Maximum score

Practice management

20

Infrastructure – Physical and others

48

Practice credentials

12

Total

80

Though this area shows a lesser score than the other two areas, this also has negative scoring. For negative scoring (non)competencies, the score considered is zero when such criteria are absent. If such criteria are present, it will give a negative score to the firm in this Model. For example, if the practice has an advisory as well as a decision, to not allot work due to unsatisfactory performance by the CAG office, it gets a negative five score. But if the firm does not have such non-competency, then the score is zero. Similar is the case if the firm has a negative assessment in the report of the Quality Review Board or if there has been a case of professional misconduct on the part of a member of the firm where he has been proved guilty.

Therefore, though the total shows a lesser maximum score in this area, there are many attributes that need to be considered here. Infrastructure competency in this area has a lot of significance. It includes branch network, centralised/decentralised branch activities, information security, data analytics tools, adequate infrastructure such as internet, etc., for remote working. As the name of the competency goes, it covers both types of infrastructures – physical and others. In the current times, physical infrastructure is losing relevance. As we have seen during the Covid pandemic, remote working has become a new normal. Technology has overcome the need for having a physical infrastructure, office space, meeting rooms, etc. For similar reasons, it is possible for the firms to work for clients in different geographies globally without having a branch presence in such geography. During Covid times, many global companies have outsourced their work to low-cost countries. It is possible for such country entrepreneurs to deliver the output only because of technology, without having any place of business in the client’s country/region. Therefore, the competency of physical infrastructure has become irrelevant now. Another concern over this competency is its relevance to audit quality. Having more branches and, therefore, getting higher score in the Model has no relation to the firms’ audit quality. A small firm with no branch may also have a very good quality in its audits. Therefore, keeping other factors the same, if such a firm scores less than other firms with more branches, does such score really speak of audit quality? Of course, not. The other competency of Practice Management includes balanced mix of experienced and new assurance partners, the firm’s independence as per ICAI Code of Ethics, Companies Act, 2013 and other regulatory requirements, whistle-blower policy, etc.

If based on the evaluation of performance by a government body or regulatory authority has resulted in debarment or blacklisting of the firm, it will have negative scoring.

How can firms improve their score in this area?

Some of the initial steps firms can consider in this area are:
1. Develop network through branches, affiliates, etc.
2. Get good connectivity through an intranet, internet, VPN and other means.

DETERMINING A FIRM’S LEVEL
Based on the total score, the Model defines four levels of firms. Level 1 is very nascent, and level 4 is a firm that has adopted standards and procedures significantly. These four levels are based on percentage in each section as less than 25%, 25% to 50%, 50% to 75% and above 75%. AQMM also clarifies that the status should not be publicised or mentioned by audit firms on any public domain such as professional documents, visiting cards, letterheads or signboards, etc., as it may amount to solicitation in view of the provisions of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

CONCLUSION
Though AQMM is recommendatory, it is an excellent tool for self-evaluation by audit firms. Having said that, one may argue that a lesser score does not necessarily mean that audit quality is not ensured by the firm. But there needs to be an objective assessment of the quality, and AQMM would go a long way in such assessment. If audit firms follow the Model and improve their competencies, it will bring high quality across the audit profession. Therefore, it is a welcome step of providing such a standard Model to audit firms. In the coming years, if the firms voluntarily adopt this Model and improve their competencies, they will gain higher credibility in the eyes of the client given that their product, i.e. audit, has assured quality.

[The views expressed in this article by the author are personal.]

DOES TRANSFER OF EQUITY SHARES UNDER OFFER FOR SALE (OFS) DURING THE PROCESS OF LISTING TRIGGER ANY CAPITAL GAINS?

The calendar year 2021 was a blockbuster year for Indian primary markets, with 63 companies collectively garnering Rs. 1.2 lakh crore through initial public offerings. The Indian primary market witnessed the largest and most subscribed public offers in this period. A large part of public offering was by way of Offer For Sale (OFS), i.e. promoters offloading (selling) their stake in companies to financial institutions / public. What follows the transfer of equity shares is the determination of capital gains income and income-tax liability thereon.

Finance Act, 2018 brought a paradigm shift in taxation of long-term capital gains arising from the transfer of equity shares and equity-oriented mutual funds. Finance Act, 2018 withdrew the exemption granted on long-term capital gains arising on transfer of equity shares and equity-oriented mutual funds. With the withdrawal of exemption, special provisions in the form of Sections 112A and 55(2)(ac) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) were inserted to determine capital gains income.

This article seeks to examine capital gains tax liability arising from the transfer of equity shares under an OFS in an IPO process under the new taxation regime.

BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE PROVISIONS
Section 112A of the Act provides for a tax rate of 10% in case where (a) total income includes income chargeable under the head capital gains (b) capital gains arising from the transfer of long-term capital asset being equity shares (c) securities transaction tax is paid on acquisition and transfer of those equity shares1.

Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act provides a special mechanism for computation of cost of acquisition in respect of assets covered by Section 112A. Cost of acquisition of equity shares acquired prior to 1st February, 2018 is higher of (a) or (b) below:

(A) Cost of acquisition of an asset.
(B) Lower of:

1. Fair market value of the asset as on 31st January, 2018, and
2. Full value of consideration received or accruing on the transfer of equity shares.

The essence of the insertion of Section 55(2)(ac) is to provide grandfathering in respect of gains up to 31st January, 2018 regarding equity shares. This is with a rider that adopting fair market value does not result in the generation of loss.


1   Section 112A(4) of the act provides relief
from payment of securities transaction tax on acquisition of shares in respect
of certain transaction covered by Notification No. 60/2018 Dated 1st
October, 2018.

CASE UNDER EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS

Mr. A, an individual, is the promoter of A Ltd. Mr. A had subscribed to equity shares of A Ltd. on 1st April, 2011 when the company was unlisted at their face value of Rs. 10. Since then, Mr. A has been holding these equity shares as a capital asset. Mr. A decides to sell the equity shares under the IPO process as an offer for sale at Rs. 1,000 per share in February, 2022. The question to be examined is: what should be the cost of acquisition of the shares, and how should one compute the capital gains?
In this case, the transfer of shares is covered by Section 112A of the Act since (a) total income of Mr. A includes income chargeable under the head ‘capital gains’; (b) capital gains arise from the transfer of long-term capital asset2 being equity shares; (c) in terms of Section 98 (entry no. 6) r.w.s. 97(13)(aa) of Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, Mr. A is required to pay securities transaction tax on the transfer of equity shares; (d) the requirement of payment of securities transaction tax on acquisition of equity shares is relieved in terms of Notification No. 60/2018 dated 1st October, 20183 as shares were acquired when equity shares of A Ltd. were not listed on a recognised stock exchange.

The provisions of Section 112A cover the case on hand and therefore the cost of acquisition of equity shares shall be determined in terms of Section 55(2)(ac), which requires identification of three components, namely cost of acquisition, fair market value as on 31st January, 2018 and full value of consideration. In the facts of the case, the cost of acquisition of each equity share is Rs. 10, and the full value of consideration accruing on the transfer of each share is Rs. 1,000. What remains for determination is the fair market value of the asset as on 31st January, 2018 to compute the cost of acquisition under Section 55(2)(ac).

Before determining the fair market value of equity shares as on 31st January 2018, one may refer to Section 97(13)(aa) of Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004, which provides that sale of unlisted equity shares under an OFS to the public in an initial public offer and where such shares are subsequently listed on recognised stock exchange shall be considered as taxable securities transaction and securities transaction tax is leviable on the same.

From the above, it is pertinent to note that when the equity shares are transferred under an OFS, such shares are unlisted and are listed on a recognised stock exchange only subsequent to the transfer. Further, the practical experience of applying for shares under an IPO suggests that consideration for equity shares is paid, and equity shares are credited to the purchaser’s account, prior to the date of listing of equity shares on a recognised stock exchange. This also corroborates that when the promoter transfers the equity shares under an OFS, such shares are still unlisted.

2   Equity
shares held by Mr. A qualifies as ‘long-term capital asset’ as equity shares
are held for a period exceeding 12 months.

3   Notification
No. 60/2018/F. No.370142/9/2017-TPL.

Determination of fair market value of equity shares as on 31st January, 2018

Clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act provides a methodology for the determination of fair market value.

Sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) provides that where equity shares are listed on a recognised stock exchange as on 31st January, 2018, the highest price prevailing on the recognised stock exchange shall be the fair market value. In the present case, shares will only be listed post the IPO in February, 2022 (i.e. Equity shares were not listed on a recognised stock exchange as on 31st January, 2018). Accordingly, the case is not covered by said sub-clause.
Sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) does not apply to the present case as the subject matter of transfer is equity shares and not units of equity-oriented mutual fund/business trust.
Sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) provides that where equity shares are not listed on any recognised stock exchange as on 31st January, 2018, but listed as on the date of transfer, the fair market value of equity shares shall be the indexed cost of acquisition up to F.Y. 2017-18.

The literal reading of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act suggests that the case of Mr. A will not be covered by said sub-clause as equity shares are not listed as on the date of transfer.

Considering the above, an important issue arises that when the fair market value of an asset cannot be determined basis the methodology provided in clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac), what shall be the impact of the same?

TAX AUTHORITIES MAY PUT FORTH FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS
With the withdrawal of exemption under Section 10(38) of the Act, the intent of insertion of Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act is to provide grandfathering of gains on equity shares up to 31st January, 2018. The legislature, in its wisdom, may provide the grandfathering in any manner.

In respect of equity shares, which are not listed on a recognised stock exchange as on 31st January, 2018, legislature has provided for the benefit of indexation in terms of sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act.
In the case under consideration, Mr. A’s equity shares were unlisted as on 31st January, 2018 and the transfer of shares took place subsequently. And although the equity shares held by Mr. A were not listed as on the date of transfer, considering the legislative intent, the case of Mr. A shall be covered by sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act. Accordingly, capital gains computation does not fail. In this regard, reference may be made to Supreme Court (‘SC’) ruling in the case of CIT vs. J. H. Gotla [1985] 156 ITR 323. In this case, the taxpayer had suffered a significant business loss in the earlier assessment years, which were carried forward. The taxpayer gifted certain oil mill machinery to his wife. A partnership firm was floated where the wife and minor children were partners. Income earned by wife and minor children from the firm was clubbed in the hands of the taxpayer, who claimed set-off of clubbed income against the business losses carried forward. Tax authorities denied such set off on the ground that for setting off losses business was required to be carried on by taxpayer and in this case, business was carried out by the firm and not the taxpayer. SC allowed the set-off of losses in the hands of the taxpayer against the clubbed income and made the following observations on interpretation of the law:

“Now where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the Court might modify the language used by the legislature so as to achieve the intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction. The task of interpretation of a statutory provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the legislature from the language used. If the purpose of a particular provision is easily discernible from the whole scheme of the act which, in the present case, was to counteract, the effect of the transfer of assets so far as computation of income of the assessee was concerned, then bearing that purpose in mind, the intention should be found out from the language used by the legislature and if strict literal, construction leads to an absurd result, i.e., result not intended to be subserved by the object of the legislation found out in the manner indicated above, then if other construction is possible apart from strict literal construction, then that construction should be preferred to the strict literal construction. Though equity and taxation are often strangers, attempts should be made that these do not remain so always so and if a construction results in equity rather than in injustice, then such construction should be preferred to the literal construction.”

In the present case, legislative intent for providing grandfathering benefit in respect of equity shares which are not listed as on 31st January, 2018 and transferred subsequently can be gathered from the language employed in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act and accordingly, the said sub-clause covers the case of Mr. A.

AS AGAINST THE ABOVE, THE TAXPAYER MAY SUBMIT AS UNDER
The computation of capital gains is carried out in terms of Section 48 of the Act. The computation of capital gains begins with the determination of full value of consideration which is reduced by (a) expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with transfer, (b) cost of acquisition of capital asset, and (c) cost of improvement of a capital asset. Accordingly, the before mentioned are four important elements of computing capital gains.

Section 55(2) of the Act provides for the determination of the cost of acquisition of capital assets for the purpose of Sections 48 and 49 of the act. Section 55(2)(ac) is a special provision for determining the cost of acquisition in certain specified cases. Unlike Section 55(2)(b) of the act4, Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act is not optional. Once the taxpayer’s case is covered by provisions of Section 55(2)(ac), the cost of acquisition of a specified asset has to be determined under that Section.

Clause (a) of Explanation to Section 55(2)(ac) defines the term ‘fair market value’ in an exhaustive manner, and accordingly, no other methodology can be read into Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act to determine the fair market value.

In order to determine the cost of acquisition under Section 55(2)(ac), one of the important components is the fair market value of the asset as on 31st January, 2018. In the absence of a determination of the same, the exercise of determination of cost of acquisition under Section 55(2)(ac) of the Act cannot be completed.

The SC, in the case of CIT vs. B. C. Srinivasa Setty [1981]128 ITR 2945, held that since the cost of acquisition of self-generated goodwill cannot be conceived, the computation of capital gains fails. On failure of computation provision, it was held that such asset is not covered by Section 45 of the Act and hence not subjected to capital gains. Similarly, in the case of Sunil Siddharth Bhai vs. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 509 (SC)6, where the taxpayer had contributed capital asset to a partnership firm, it was held that full value of consideration accruing or arising on transfer of capital asset cannot be determined and accordingly such asset is beyond the scope of capital gains chapter. Also, in the case of PNB Finance Ltd. vs. CIT [2008] 307 ITR 757, on the transfer of undertaking by the taxpayer pursuant to the nationalisation of the bank, SC held that undertaking comprises of various capital assets and in the absence of determination of cost of acquisition of undertaking, the charge fails and accordingly, capital gains cannot be charged.

4   Section
55(2)(b) of the act provides an option to taxpayer to either adopt the actual
cost of acquisition or fair market value as on 1st April, 2001 where capital
asset is acquired prior to 1st April, 2001.

5   Rendered
prior to insertion of Section 55(2)(a) of the Act.

6   Rendered
prior to insertion of Section 45(3) of the Act.

Reference may also be made SC ruling in case of  Govind Saran Ganga Saran vs. CST [1985] 155 ITR 144 rendered under Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (‘Sales Tax Act’) as applied to the Union Territory of Delhi. The case revolved around the interpretation of Sections 14 and 15 of the Sales Tax Act. Cotton yarn was classified as one of the goods of special importance in inter-state trade or commerce as envisaged by Section 14 of the Sales Tax Act. Section 15 of the Sales Tax Act provided that sales tax on goods of special importance should not exceed a specified rate and further that they should not be taxed at more than one stage. The issue arose because the stage itself had not been clearly specified, and accordingly, it was not clear at what stage the sales tax shall be levied. The Financial Commissioner held that in the absence of any stage, there was a lacuna in the law and consequently, cotton yarn could not be taxed under the sales tax regime. The Delhi High Court reversed the decision of the Financial Commissioner. However, SC held that the single point at which the tax may be imposed must be a definite ascertainable point, and in the absence of the same, tax shall not be levied. While rendering the ruling, SC has made the following observations which are worth quoting:

“The components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The first is the character of the imposition known by its nature which prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and the fourth is the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity.”

The SC ruling in the case of Govind Saran Ganga Saran (supra) has been approved by Constitution Bench of SC in case of CIT vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466. In the facts of the case, the measure or value to which the rate will be applied is uncertain in the absence of determination of cost of acquisition, and accordingly, a levy will be fatal.

The cardinal principles of interpreting tax statutes centre around the observations of Rowlatt J. In the case of Cape Brandy Syndicate vs. Inland Revenue Commissioner [1921] 1 KB 64, which has virtually become the locus classicus. In the opinion of Rowlatt J.:
“. . . . . . . . . in a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.”8

AUTHOR’S VIEW
Considering that: (a) in terms of a literal reading, fair market value of equity shares as on 31st January 2018 cannot be determined, (b) computation provision and charging provision both together form an integrated code, and on the failure of computation provision, charge fails, (c) judicial precedents holding that uncertainty or vagueness in legislative scheme lead to the levy becoming invalid, and (d) requirement of taxing provisions to be construed in terms of language employed only, in the view of the author, the taxpayer stands on a firm footing that in the absence of a determination of the fair market value of equity shares as on 31st January, 2018 in terms of methodology supplied in Section 55(2)(ac) of the act, cost of acquisition of equity shares cannot be determined. In the absence of a determination of the cost of acquisition, the computation mechanism fails. Accordingly, one may vehemently urge that the equity shares transferred under the OFS are beyond the capital gains chapter.

One may also note that the issue discussed herein may not be restricted in its applicability to promoters transferring their equity shares under an offer for sale. It may equally apply to private equity players, institutions, financial investors, individuals etc., who have either subscribed to the shares of an unlisted company or have purchased the shares of an unlisted company from the market and are selling the shares under an offer for sale.

One shall note that courts may be slow in adopting a position of total failure of charge and transfer of capital asset falling beyond the provisions capital gains chapter. Further, considering the impact of the position stated above, one may expect high-rise litigation.

[The views expressed by author are personal. One may adopt any position in consultation with advisors.]

________________________________________________________________
8    The above passage has been quoted with approval in several SC rulings. Illustratively, refer PCIT vs. Aarham Softronics [2019] 412 ITR 623 (SC), CIT vs. Yokogawa India Ltd. [2017] 391 ITR 274 (SC), Orissa State Warehousing vs. CIT [1999] 237 ITR 589 (SC), Smt. Tarulata Shyam vs. CIT [1977] 108 ITR 345 (SC), Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust [1975] 101 ITR 234 (SC), CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd. [1965] 55 ITR 741 (SC), CIT vs. Shahzada Nand and Sons [1966] 66 ITR 392 (SC).

THE GHOST OF B.C. SRINIVASA SETTY IS NOT YET EXORCISED IN INDIA

In this article, the taxability of capital gains arising on the transfer of internally generated goodwill and other intangible assets has been deliberated upon. We have also discussed whether the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty [1981] 128 ITR 294 (SC) still holds the field in the case of self-generated goodwill and other internally generated intangible assets. Before we do so, it would be relevant to understand briefly the history of past litigation on this issue and the series of judicial amendments made.

DECISION IN B.C. SRINIVASA SETTY’S CASE AND INSERTION OF SECTION 55(2)(a)
The question as to whether ‘goodwill’ generated in a newly commenced business can be described as an ‘asset’ for the purposes of Section 45 came for consideration before a 3-judge bench of the hon’ble supreme court in the case of B.C. Srinivasa Setty’s case (supra).

While concluding that the self-generated goodwill was undoubtedly an asset of the business, the court, however held that self-generated goodwill was not an asset within the contemplation under Section 45.

The court took note of the provisions relating to capital gains and laid down the important principle that the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply, it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section. The court observed that Section 48(ii) required deduction of the cost of acquisition from the full value of consideration in computing the capital gains chargeable under Section 45. Thus, the court held that what is contemplated under the provisions of Section 45 and 48 is an asset for which it is possible to envisage a cost of acquisition. Taking note of the fact that in case of goodwill of a new business acquired by way of generation, no cost element can be identified or envisaged, the court reached the conclusion that the goodwill of a new business, though an asset could not be regarded as an asset within the contemplation of the charge under Section 45.

In paragraph 12 of the said judgement, the court has observed that in the case of internally generated goodwill, it is not possible to determine the date when it comes into existence. It has been observed that the date of acquisition of the asset is a material factor in applying the computation provisions pertaining to capital gains. It has been held that the ‘cost of acquisition’ mentioned in Section 48 implies a date of acquisition.

To overcome the above decision in B.C. Srinivasa Setty’s case (supra), Section 55(2)(a) was inserted vide Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1st April, 1988. The said section originally contained two clauses. Clause (i) dealt with capital asset being goodwill of a business acquired by purchase from a previous owner, and clause (ii) dealt with the residual clause.

However, a reading of the memorandum to Finance Bill, 1987 would indicate that the amendment sought to deal with two classes of goodwill being – a) purchased goodwill and b) self-generated goodwill.

Section 55(2)(a)(ii), which dealt with the latter, i.e.  self-generated goodwill, provided that for the purposes of Sections 49 and 50, the cost of acquisition of such self-generated goodwill would be taken to be nil.

The said section has been amended from time to time to include various classes of intangible assets.

PERIOD OF HOLDING AND LEVY OF TAX IN CASE OF SELF-GENERATED GOODWILL AND INTERNALLY GENERATED INTANGIBLE ASSETS

As discussed earlier, in order to overcome the decision in B.C. Srinivasa Setty’s (case), Section 55(2)(a)(ii) [currently Section 55(2)(a)(iii)] was inserted to deem the ‘cost of acquisition’ of the self-generated goodwill and other classes of internally generated intangible assets to be nil.

However, while making such an amendment, the legislature has not made any amendment to the provisions of the act to provide for the manner of computation of the period of holding in case of such assets.

As discussed earlier, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the date of acquisition in case of self-generated goodwill cannot be determined. The court has also observed that the date of acquisition is a material factor in applying the computation provisions relating to capital gains. It has also been held that the ‘cost of acquisition’ mentioned in Section 48 implies a date of acquisition.

The date of acquisition is a material factor in applying computation provisions considering that 2nd proviso to Section 48 replaces the ‘cost of acquisition’ in Section 48(ii) with ‘indexed cost of acquisition’ in case of gains arising from transfer of a long-term capital asset. The determination of whether a capital asset is a long-term capital asset would entail the determination of the period of holding in the hands of the assessee, which would, in turn, require the date of acquisition. Since the date of acquisition in the case of self-generated goodwill cannot be determined, the computation under Section 48 would not be possible.

By providing that the cost of acquisition in case of self-generated goodwill and other internally generated intangible assets as referred to in Section 55(2)(a) would be nil, the legislature may overcome the issue relating to the benefit of indexation under 2nd proviso to Section 48. However, this is not the end of the matter.

It would be pertinent to note that once the capital gains under Section 48 are computed and the charge under Section 45 is attracted, the tax payable on such capital gains would have to be determined based on whether such capital gain is a ‘short-term capital gain’ under Section 2(42B) or a ‘long-term capital gain’ under Section 2(29B). This exercise would, in turn, involve the determination of whether the capital asset is a ‘short-term capital asset’ under Section 2(42a) or a ‘long-term capital asset’ under Section 2(29AA).

A combined reading of sub Sections 42A, 42B, 29AA and 29B of Section 2 would indicate the following:

•    The period of holding of a capital asset will have to be determined in the hands of the assessee. In determining the same one will have to reckon the actual period for which the capital asset has been held by the assessee.

•    Having determined the period of holding in respect of the capital asset in the hands of an assessee, one will have to examine whether the capital asset would fall within the definition of ‘short-term capital asset’ under Section 2(42A) read with the provisos thereto based on such period of holding.

•    If such capital asset meets the definition of ‘short-term capital asset’, the gain arising from the transfer of the same would amount to short-term capital gain by virtue of Section 2(42B).

•    If such capital asset does not meet the definition of ‘short-term capital asset’ under section 2(42A), it will become a ‘long-term capital asset’ by virtue of  Section 2(29AA). Thus, in order to invoke the residuary provision of Section 2(29AA), such a capital asset must clearly not be a ‘short-term capital asset’ within the meaning of Section 2(29AA). Thus, where it cannot be conclusively concluded that a capital asset is not a ‘short-term capital asset’, it cannot, by virtue of the residuary provision under Section 2(29aa), become a ‘long-term capital asset’.

•    This is clear from the fact that ‘long-term capital asset’ has been defined to mean a capital asset that is not a ‘short-term capital asset‘. Firstly, the use of the word ‘means’ in Section 2(29AA) indicates that the definition given under Section 2(29aa) to the term ‘long-term capital asset’ is exhaustive. In this regard, reliance is placed on Kasilingam vs. P.S.G. College of Technology [1995] SUPP 2 SCC 348 (SC), wherein it has been held that the use of the term ‘means’ indicates that the definition is a hard and fast definition. Secondly, Section 2(29AA) defines a ‘long-term capital asset’ to mean a capital asset which is not a short-term capital asset. Thus, only where a capital asset is conclusively found not to be a ‘short-term capital asset’ within the meaning contemplation of Section 2(42A), it would fall within the purview of Section 2(29AA), and any gain arising from the transfer of the same would be a ‘long-term capital gain’ by virtue of Section 2(29B).

Since the period of holding of self-generated goodwill and other internally generated intangible assets cannot be determined, it would not be possible to conclusively rule out that such capital assets are not ‘short-term capital assets’ under Section 2(42A). Resultantly, such assets cannot be ‘long-term capital assets’. As a result, it would not be possible to determine whether the capital gains arising from the transfer of such assets are ‘short-term capital gains’ or ‘long-term capital gains’.

A fortiori, the applicable tax rates in respect of such capital gains cannot be determined as the nature of capital gains is unknown.

It may be noted that the impossibility in determination of the period of holding would further impact an assessee who acquires it from such previous owner who generated the goodwill or other intangible assets, under any of modes provided in clauses (i) through (iv) of Section 49(1).

In such case, by virtue of explanation 1(b) to Section 2(42A), in determining the period of holding in the hands of such assessee, the period of holding of the previous owner is required to be included. Since, the period of holding in the hands of the previous owner cannot be determined, the period of holding in the hands of the assessee would also be
indeterminate.

Can one argue that where the period of holding in the case of the previous owner is indeterminate, such period will have to be ignored for the purposes of explanation 1(b) to Section 2(42A)? However, such a view is clearly contrary to the mandate of the said explanation which provides that the period of holding of the previous owner ‘shall be included’.

Such being the case, it would also not be possible to determine the tax rates applicable to an assessee who acquires self-generated goodwill or internally generated intangible assets under the modes mentioned in Section 49(1)(i) to (iv), upon subsequent transfer of such assets by him.  In Govind Saran Ganga Saran vs. CST, 1985 SUPP SCC 205 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 447 at page 209:

‘6. The components which enter into the concept of a tax are well known. The first is the character of the imposition known by its nature which prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy, the second is a clear indication of the person on whom the levy is imposed and who is obliged to pay the tax, the third is the rate at which the tax is imposed, and the fourth is the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability. If those components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity.’

From the above extract, it can be observed that there are four components of tax:

•    The first component is the character of the imposition,
•    The second is the person on whom the levy is imposed,
•    The third is the rate at which tax is imposed, and
•    The fourth is the value to which the rate is applied for computing tax liability.

Further, the court has held that if there is any ambiguity in any of the above four concepts, the levy would fail.

In the following cases, the ratio laid down in Govind Saran Ganga Saran’s case (supra) has been  followed:

•    CIT vs. Infosys Technologies Ltd. [2008] 297 ITR 167 (SC) (para 6);
•    CIT  vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466 (SC) (para 39);
•    Commissioner of Customs (Import) vs. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018] 95 taxmann.com 327 (SC) (para 42);
•    CIT vs. Govind Saran Ganga Saran [2013] 352 ITR 113 (Karnataka) (para 15);
•    CIT vs. Punalur Paper Mills Ltd. [2019] 111 taxmann.com 50 (Kerala) (para 9).

Thus, it is clear that the rate of tax is one of the important components of tax and any uncertainty in the legislative scheme in defining it will be fatal to the levy.
Thus, in case of self-generated goodwill and other intangible assets, the charge under Section 45 in respect of capital gains upon transfer of the same would fail as the rate of tax cannot be determined. The charge would fail not only in respect of the assessee who acquired it through self-generation but also another assessee who acquires it from the former under modes provided in Section 49(1).

COMPARISON WITH SECTION 45(4) AS RECAST BY FINANCE ACT, 2021
Section 45(4), as inserted by Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 1st April, 2021, creates a charge in respect of profits or gains arising from a receipt of any money or capital asset or both by a specified person from a specified entity in connection with the reconstitution of such specified entity. It also provides the formula for the determination of such profits
or gains.

The said section provides that such profits or gains shall be chargeable to income tax as income of such specified entity under the head ‘capital gains’ and shall be deemed to be the income of such specified entity of the previous year in which the specified person received such money or capital asset or both.

It may be noted that in a given case, a specified person may receive two or more capital assets from the specified entity, comprising of a combination of short-term and long capital assets. In such a case, it would not be possible to apportion the aggregate profits or gains between short-term and long-term capital gains as no such mechanism has been provided in Section 45(4).

Further, there may be cases where only cash is received by the specified person from the specified entity. In such case, there is no transfer of a capital asset (be it long-term or short-term) by the specified entity to the specified person.

However, irrespective of the above situations, the entire profit or gain as determined by applying the provisions of Section 45(4) would be chargeable to tax in the hands of the specified entity under the head ‘capital gains’.

Thus, Section 45(4) is indifferent to whether there is actually a transfer of a capital asset, let alone whether such capital asset is long-term or short-term. Likewise, it is indifferent to the classification of the gains as ‘short-term capital gains’ or ‘long-term capital gains’. The trigger point in Section 45(4), unlike Section 45(1), is not the transfer of a short-term or long-term capital asset, but is rather the receipt of any money or capital asset or both by a specified person from a specified entity in connection with the reconstitution of such specified entity.

Further, Section 45(4), unlike Section 45(1), provides the mechanism for the computation of the profits and gains. The said computation is independent of the existence of any capital asset or, if it existed, the nature of such capital asset (i.e. short-term or long-term), unlike the computation under  Section 48.

At this juncture, the question that would arise is what rate of tax would apply to the capital gains under Section 45(4). This is for the reason that the tax rate is dependent on the classification of the gains as ‘short-term capital gains’ or ‘long-term capital gains’ as discussed earlier.

According to the authors, the normal tax rates applicable to the assessee as per the first schedule to the relevant finance act would be applicable. This would be similar to the case of short-term capital gains other than those referred to in  Section 111A.

A reference may be made to Section 2(1) of the Finance Act, 2021. The said Section, subject to exceptions under Sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the said Act, provides for charge of income-tax at the rates specified in part I of the first schedule. In other words, the tax rates mentioned in Section 2(1) read with part I of the first schedule of the Finance Act, 2021 would generally apply for computing the tax chargeable subject to the exceptions provided in Sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the said Act. One of the exceptions under Section 2(3) of the Finance Act, 2021 is with respect to cases falling under Chapter XII of the Income Tax Act where the said Chapter prescribes a rate. In such a case, the rate provided in the said Chapter would be applicable and not the rates provided in Part I of First Schedule to the Finance Act, 2021.

It may be noted that Section 111A, falling within Chapter XII, deals with short-term capital gains arising from transfer of certain capital assets and provides the rate of tax in respect of the same. Sections 112 and 112A deal with long-term capital gains and provide the tax rates in respect of the same. However, with regard to short-term capital gains other than those covered under Section 111A, no rate of tax is provided either in Chapter XII or any other provisions of the Income Tax Act. Thus, by virtue of Section 2(1) read with Section 2(3) of the Finance Act, 2021, with respect to such short-term capital gains, the rates provided  in Part I of First Schedule to Finance Act, 2021 would apply.

The capital gains under Section 45(4) are not covered by Sections 111A, 112 and 112A. Such gains, therefore, form part of normal income and would suffer normal rates of tax as provided in Part I of First Schedule to Finance Act, 2021.

From the above, it can be observed that wherever the legislature has sought to do away with the requirement of the classification of the gains as short-term or long-term, it has done so.

However, the above would not apply in the case of self-generated goodwill and other internally generated intangible assets. Unless the period of holding of these assets is found, it cannot be determined whether they are ‘long-term capital assets’ or ‘short-term capital assets’ and the gains arising from the transfer thereof as short-term capital gain or long-term capital gain. In the absence of such determination, it would not be known whether such gain would fall under Section 112 and hence covered by Section 2(3) of the Finance Act. Unless its case is conclusively excluded from Section 2(3) of the Finance Act, Section 2(1), which provides for the normal rate cannot be pressed into service. Thus, the determination of the correct rate of tax becomes impossible, thereby frustrating the very levy.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, it would not be unreasonable to take a stand that the charge under Section 45 and the subsequent levy of tax in respect of capital gains arising from transfer of capital assets, being self-generated goodwill and other intangible assets, would fail, despite the amendment under Section 55(2)(a). Thus, it would not be wrong to state that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Srinivasa Setty’s case (supra) is still good law, and the same continues to hold the field.

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS REPORTING ON FINANCIAL POSITION

(This is the seventh article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

BACKGROUND

One of the most important assumptions underlying the preparation of the financial statements is ‘going concern’. The trigger for the same rests on two underlying pillars- namely, cash losses and the ability to meet the existing financial liabilities within the foreseeable future, generally within one year from the balance sheet date.

The reporting requirements discussed hereunder on the above two pillars are very relevant in the scenarios whereby the companies are facing financial stress, or net worth has been eroded or in case of companies where there are significant doubts on their continuing as a going concern. These situations are particularly relevant in current times of stress on the business due to the COVID pandemic.

SCOPE OF REPORTING
The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

Clause No.

Particulars

Nature of change, if any

Clause 3(xvii)

Cash Losses:

New Clause

Whether the company has
incurred cash losses in the financial year and in the immediately preceding
financial year, if so, state the amount of cash losses.

Clause 3(xix)

Financial Position
Including Financial Ratios:

New Clause

On the basis of the
financial ratios, ageing and expected dates of realisation of financial
assets and payment of financial liabilities, other information accompanying

(continued)

 

the financial statements,
the auditor’s knowledge of the Board of Directors and management plans,
whether the auditor is of the opinion that no material uncertainty exists as
on the date of the audit report that company is capable of meeting its
liabilities existing at the date of balance sheet as and when they fall due
within a period of one year from the balance sheet date.

 

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING

The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges, which are discussed below:

Cash Losses [Clause 3(xvii)]

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) No clarity on the definition of Cash Losses: The term ?cash losses’ is neither defined under the Companies Act, 2013 nor in the Accounting Standards / Indian Accounting Standards. However, the ICAI, in its Guidance Note on Terms Used in the Financial Statements issued in 1983, has defined the term ?Cash Profit’ as ?the net profit as increased by non-cash costs, such as depreciation, amortisation, etc. When the result of the computation is negative, it is termed as cash loss’. This definition is too inclusive and needs to be updated to keep pace with the changing trends and developments on the accounting front in the past couple of decades, like accounting for Deferred Tax, Unrealised Forex gains or losses, fair value adjustments, actuarial gains and losses for employee benefits etc. While the ICAI Guidance Note has touched upon some of these aspects, there is no authentic guidance/clarity, making it open to differing interpretations and difficulty in comparing and analysing different entities. It would be desirable to disclose the mode of arriving at the cash loss in the financial statements. Necessary changes could be considered by the ICAI and / or the regulators.

b) Companies adopting Ind AS: For such entities, the profit/loss after tax excludes items considered under Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) and hence it is imperative that proper care is taken to identify and give effect to only the cash components of items recognised in OCI like realised fair value/revaluation changes and forex gains and losses. For this purpose the cash component recognised under OCI should be considered for the period under report. Further, for computation of the cash profit/loss for the immediately preceding financial year, the restatements, if any, as per Ind AS-8 – Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors, especially for prior period errors relating to periods earlier than the corresponding previous year. This should be clearly disclosed whilst reporting under this clause.

Financial Position including Financial Ratios [Clause 3(xix)]:

Before proceeding further it would be pertinent to note the following statutory requirements:

Additional Disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this Clause, the auditor will have to keep in the mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:

The following ratios need to be disclosed:
a) Current Ratio

b) Debt Equity Ratio

c) Debt Service Coverage Ratio

d) Return on Equity Ratio

e) Inventory Turnover Ratio

f) Trade Receivables Turnover Ratio
g) Trade Payables Turnover Ratio

h) Net Capital Turnover Ratio

i) Net Profit Ratio

j) Return on Capital Employed

k) Return on Investment

Explanation to be provided for any changes by more than 25% compared to the preceding year.

Whilst reporting, the auditor should refer to the above disclosures for the relevant ratios such as current ratio, inventory turnover ratio, trade receivables turnover ratio, trade payables turnover ratio and capital turnover ratio, amongst others, made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Before proceeding further, it is important to analyse the definition of Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities under Ind AS-32 since these terms are neither defined under the Companies Act, 2013 nor under Indian GAAP, since the reporting is with respect to these items as opposed to the other items in the financial statements.

Accordingly, companies to whom Ind AS is not applicable should also consider the said  definitions for identifying financial assets and liabilities.

Definition of Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities under Ind AS-32

A financial asset is any asset that is:
(a) cash;

(b) an equity instrument of another entity;

(c) a contractual right:

(i) to receive cash or another financial asset from another entity; or

(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that are potentially favourable to the entity; or

(d) a contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments and is:
(i) a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to receive a variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments; or

(ii) a derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments. For this purpose the entity’s own equity instruments do not include puttable financial instruments classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 16A and 16B, instruments that impose on the entity an obligation to deliver to another party a pro rata share of the net assets of the entity only on liquidation and are classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 16C and 16D, or instruments that are contracts for the future receipt or delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments.

A financial liability is any liability that is:
(a) a contractual obligation :

(i) to deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or

(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that are potentially unfavourable to the entity; or

(b) a contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own equity instruments and is:

(i) a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to deliver a variable number of the entity’s own equity instruments; or

(ii) a derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments. For this purpose, rights, options or warrants to acquire a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments for a fixed amount of any currency are equity instruments if the entity offers the rights, options or warrants pro rata to all of its existing owners of the same class of its own non-derivative equity instruments. Apart from the aforesaid, the equity conversion option embedded in a convertible bond denominated in foreign currency to acquire a fixed number of the entity’s own equity instruments is an equity instrument if the exercise price is fixed in any currency. Also for these purposes the entity’s own equity instruments do not include puttable financial instruments that are classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 16A and 16B, instruments that impose on the entity an obligation to deliver to another party a pro rata share of the net assets of the entity only on liquidation and are classified as equity instruments in accordance with paragraphs 16C and 16D, or instruments that are contracts for the future receipt or delivery of the entity’s own equity instruments. As an exception, an instrument that meets the definition of a financial liability is classified as an equity instrument if it has all the features and meets the conditions in paragraphs 16A and 16B or paragraphs 16C and 16D.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) Inclusive nature of various parameters/data points: This clause requires the auditors to comment based on the following parameters/data points:

• Financial Ratios

• Ageing and expected dates of realisation of financial assets and repayment of financial liabilities

• Other information accompanying the financial statements in the Annual Report e.g. Directors Report, MD&A etc.

• Auditors knowledge of the plans of the Board of Directors and other management plans.

Whilst the parameters described in this clause appear to be inclusive, the auditors would have to go on the basis of the data and information which is available, except for the financial ratios, which are now mandatory as per Schedule III requirements. Certain specific challenges, especially for non-NBFC entities and MSMEs, are highlighted subsequently since they may not have all the information stated above, or the same may be sketchy or incomplete.

b) Companies adopting Ind AS: Such companies are likely to face certain specific challenges which need to be kept in mind whilst considering the various reporting requirements which are as under:

• The financial liabilities need to be considered based on the legal form rather than the substance of the arrangements as is required in terms of Ind AS-32 and 109. Accordingly, redeemable preference shares though considered financial liabilities/borrowings under Ind AS will not be considered for reporting under this clause since legally they are in the nature of share capital. Similarly, optionally or fully convertible debentures though considered compound financial instruments or equity under Ind AS will not be considered for reporting.

• Ind AS-107 requires disclosure of the maturity analysis of the financial liabilities showing the contractual repayments under different liquidity buckets. The auditors shall cross-check the work papers for reporting under this clause with Ind AS disclosures.

c) Challenges for non NBFCs and Small and Medium Enterprises: Non NBFCs, may not have a formalised Asset Liability Management (ALM) system, which is required to be maintained in terms of the RBI guidelines to identify liquidity and maturity mismatches. Accordingly, the auditors of such entities would need to take greater care to review the data and come to appropriate conclusions to report under this clause. It would not be a bad idea to impress upon the Management of such entities to adopt the RBI guidelines and build up an appropriate ALM framework to the extent possible and based on cost-benefit analysis. In the case of MSMEs, whilst it may not be possible to have formalised ALM reporting systems, the auditors would have to ensure that data about the ageing of financial assets and liabilities is generated based on appropriate assumptions as per the conditions in which the entity is working. Further, in terms of capabilities, MSME entities may not be equipped enough to ensure the quality of the data and the controls governing the same. A greater degree of professional scepticism needs to be exercised in such cases, as discussed below.

d) Applying significant judgements and heightened level of professional scepticism: The auditors would have to use professional judgement and an increased level of professional scepticism in respect of the following matters whilst performing their audit procedures for reporting under this clause:

(i) Financial Ratios:
• Financial ratios may not always provide conclusive evidence, and hence auditors will have to also consider various other documents / information as discussed in the following bullets rather than relying only on the quantitative thresholds which they represent. An example is that of an ideal current ratio of 1.33:1 which is the benchmark to reflect strong liquidity. However, for a capital intensive industry even a lower current ratio may be acceptable due to higher level of funds blocked in long term capital intensive assets.

• These ratios cannot be standardised for all the entities, and the same needs to be tailored to the industries. A comparison would also be required with the peer group/competitors. It would be a good practice for auditors to obtain from the Management the basis of certain key ratios based on specific facts and circumstances.

• Each entity operates under different conditions hence ratios relevant to entities shall be considered whilst reviewing the data.

• While calculating ratios auditor should ensure that proper classification is done for current and non-current assets and liabilities. The same may not always be in line with the definition under Schedule III or under the Accounting Standards since certain items which may be current under these definitions may not necessarily be payable within the following year. An example could be the provision made for leave encashment which could be entirely classified as current as per the definitions under Schedule III or the accounting standards since legally the entity does not have an unconditional right to defer settlement beyond the next twelve months if all the employees decide to encash their leave though practically this is a remote possibility. Accordingly, for analysis and reporting under this clause, only the current portion as identified by the actuary would need to be considered since that is the most likely amount which would be settled within the next twelve months.

(ii) Expected date of realisation of financial assets and financial liabilities:  In the case of NBFCs it will be easy to verify the expected date of realisation of assets and liabilities as those entities will have Asset Liabilities Management mechanism to analyse the due dates, as required in terms of the RBI guidelines. However, such a mechanism may not exist in case of other entities. Consequently, the auditor will have to put extra effort while reviewing the expected date of realisation of assets and repayment of liabilities in entities other than NBFCs, especially where the contractual terms are not specified. The auditors should prevail upon such entities to develop and strengthen their MIS and internal controls to capture the necessary data, and the same should be subject to proper verification in accordance with relevant auditing standards.
(iii) Other Information accompanying the Financial Statements:  These documents generally comprise the Directors Reports and Management Discussion and Analysis Report, wherever required to be prepared. As per SA-720 – The Auditor’s Responsibility in Relation to Other Financial Information, the auditors are expected only to review the said information included as a part of the Annual Report accompanying the audited financial statement for any material factual inconsistencies and also include the same in the audit report. Further, in many cases there  are practical challenges in getting this data before finalising the accounts and issuing the audit report. However the auditor should ensure that at least draft versions of these documents are made available by the Management. Finally, he should not only read the same for inconsistencies but also perform certain procedures as outlined below.

(iv) Review of the Board of Directors and Management Plans:
• Since the plans are forward-looking, the auditors would not be in a position to confirm the correctness thereof. However, while reviewing these plans, they will have to look into the historical performance and review various assumptions considered for the preparation of these plans and corroborate the same based on their understanding of the entity and the business in which it operates and other publicly available information.

•  Auditors will also have to ensure that approved plans are in line with industries / peer group estimates.

(v) Audit Documentation: While taking the above judgements, auditors would have to ensure adequate documentation of the audit procedures performed as above to arrive at appropriate conclusion(s). In addition, they should also obtain Management Representation on specific aspects as deemed necessary. However, the Management Representation Letter shall not be a substitute for audit procedures to be performed but would serve as additional evidence.

CONCLUSION
The additional reporting responsibilities have placed very specific responsibilities on the auditors to provide early warning signals on the financial health of an entity.  As is the case with most of the other clauses, where the auditors are expected to be playing varied and versatile roles, this clause is no exception since they are expected to play the role of a soothsayer!.

MLI SERIES- ARTICLE 6 – PURPOSE OF A COVERED TAX AGREEMENT AND ARTICLE 7 – PREVENTION OF TREATY ABUSE

1. BACKGROUND
Multinational companies and large global conglomerates transitioned from country-specific operating models to global business models – thanks to the continuously-improving information and communication technology, internet reach and integrated supply chains. However, the tax laws failed to catch up with the speed and advancement of such business models, leading to gaps in the interplay between domestic and international tax laws resulting in double non-taxation of income. Companies artificially shifted profits to low tax jurisdictions or tax havens where they had little or no business, famously referred to as ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’). BEPS led to widespread tax evasion causing serious concerns to the already revenue deficit developing economies unable to collect their fair share of taxes.

The bilateral tax treaties signed by the countries also could not prevent improper use of treaties by companies to pay no or minimum taxes leading to treaty shopping or tax treaty abuse. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) has been trying to address such issues through its model tax convention or commentary by introducing concepts such as ‘beneficial owner’,conduit companies’, ‘object and main purpose of arrangement or transaction’ etc. over the years. However, multi-nat`ional companies continued treaty shopping and evaded billions in taxes.

Considering the above, a need was felt for international cooperation to tackle the BEPS risks by arriving at a consensus-based solution. The OECD developed a strategy to address BEPS issues in a harmonized and comprehensive manner to counter weaknesses in the taxation system and confront gaps and mismatches in tax treaties. Hence, the concept of Multilateral Instrument (‘MLI’) was introduced whereby existing tax treaties stood modified to incorporate treaty-related BEPS measures via a single instrument called MLI. Multiple action plans were devised as a part of the BEPS project, and one such plan was Action Plan 6 – Prevention of tax treaty abuse.

2. OVERVIEW OF ACTION PLAN 6

BEPS Action Plan 6 deals with a variety of measures to control treaty abuse. It recommended a three-way approach to deal with treaty abuse, i.e., a) introduction of a preamble to the treaty; b) introduction of purpose based anti-abuse provision called ‘principal purpose test’; and c) introduction of objective based anti-abuse provision called ‘limitation on benefits’. These recommendations have been considered in the MLI.

The MLI contains multiple articles, which are divided into 7 parts. Part III, containing Articles 6 to 11, deals with the prevention of treaty abuse. Article 6 covering ‘Purpose of Covered Tax Agreement’ and Article 7 on ‘Prevention of Treaty Abuse’ has been discussed in this article.

Primarily, BEPS Action Plan 6 includes, inter-alia, introduction of title and preamble to every treaty as a minimum requirement along with the insertion of the clause on principal purpose test as well as limitation on benefits.

3. ARTICLE 6 OF MLI – PREAMBLE AS MINIMUM STANDARD

The preamble text which is introduced / replaced by MLI reads as under:

‘Intending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes covered by this agreement without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions)’.

The main crux of the preamble as the minimum standard is to indicate the intention of the treaty countries to:

a) Eliminate double taxation;

b) Restrict opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion/avoidance strategies; and

c) Discourage treaty shopping or treaty abuse.

There is a possibility that the existing treaties may already have a preamble on similar lines. However, considering that multiple nations have commonly agreed upon the comprehensive text, it is desired that the countries adopt modified language of preamble as a substitute or in absence of the current text. However, if two countries believe that the language of preamble in the tax treaty is sufficient, they may continue with the text of preamble in the tax treaty by making a reservation without adopting change as suggested above.

The preamble forms part of the tax treaty and sets the tone and context in the right manner. It constitutes a statement of the object and purpose of the tax treaty.

With regards to the methodology of incorporating new preamble into existing treaties, it being a minimum standard, the countries who subscribe to MLI are presumed to have agreed to the change unless otherwise notified. If a country remains silent on its position without expressing any explicit reservation, it will be presumed that the country has agreed to the adoption of the minimum standard.

4. OPTIONAL ADDITION TO PREAMBLE
MLI provides an option to add following text in the preamble discussed above:

?Desiring to further develop their economic relationship and to enhance their cooperation in tax matters’

The additional text is offered as an option to the signatories of MLI with respect to the treaties that do not already have such a language as a part of its preamble. Only when both the countries expressly agree to adopt additional language will their tax treaty stand modified to include said text as part of the preamble. For example, the UK and Australia have opted for the inclusion of additional language as a part of the preamble. Hence, the UK-Australia tax treaty will have this additional language in addition to the language required as a minimum standard.

5. INDIA’S POSITION TO PREAMBLE AND OPTIONAL ADDITION
India is silent on the adoption of Article 6. Therefore, preamble text as stated above, being a minimum standard shall be deemed to have been adopted by India for its tax treaties. However, India has not opted for optional addition, and hence the same will not be included in the tax treaties.

6. IMPACT OF PREAMBLE ON INDIA’S EXISTING TREATIES

The impact of India’s adoption under Article 6 on few important tax treaties entered into by India is discussed below:

Country

Whether
the country is a signatory to MLI?

Whether
treaty with India is notified for MLI purpose?

Impact

Singapore

Yes

Yes

The existing preamble in the tax treaties contain objective of
prevention of double taxation and fiscal evasion.

The preamble language is likely to get widened with new preamble
which provides for
?without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance and anti-treaty shopping objective.’

 

Netherlands

United Kingdom

France

UAE

Mauritius

Yes

No

New preamble shall not be added and
hence existing treaty shall continue to operate as it is.

The existing preamble provides for
its object as ‘the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains and for the
encouragement of mutual trade and investment.’

Germany

Yes

No

New preamble not to be added and hence existing treaty shall
continue to operate without any change.

USA

No

Not
Applicable

India-USA treaty shall remain
unchanged. However, based on BEPS Action Plan, countries may amend treaty
based on bilateral negotiations.

China

Yes

No

Neither country had notified counterparty. However, both the
countries recently amended tax treaty based on the bilateral negotiations.
The treaty has been amended based on the measures recommended in BEPS Action
Plan.

 

The amended tax treaty includes new preamble including optional
additional text. The same is reproduced as under:

 

‘Desiring to further develop their economic
relationship and to enhance their cooperation in tax matters, Intending to
eliminate double taxation with respect to taxes on income without creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining
reliefs provided in this Agreement for the indirect benefit of residents of
third States).’

7. INTENT OF PREAMBLE
The main intention behind binding countries which are signatory to the MLI to include new preamble as a minimum requirement is to ensure prevention of inappropriate use of tax treaties leading to double non-taxation or reduced taxation. However, recognizing what is ‘appropriate’ vis-à-vis ‘inappropriate’ use of tax treaty is often complex and strenuous.

In a situation where a company is set up with no / minimum business activity in a particular jurisdiction it may be viewed to be a typical case of inappropriate use of tax treaty. Further, in case of a company being engaged in genuine commercial activities which incidentally leads to double non-taxation may not viewed to be a case of inappropriate use of tax treaty. In such cases, the effect of double non-taxation is not on account of any tax evasion arrangement but in line with the overall object and intent of the tax treaty.

The tax treaty also intends to encourage economic development and co-operation amongst countries. One such case is of India-Mauritius tax treaty wherein the preamble manifests the philosophy of encouraging mutual trade and investment as object of the treaty. In the landmark judgment of Union of India vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan ([2003] 263 ITR 706), the Supreme Court referred to the text of the preamble of the Mauritius Treaty and legitimized treaty shopping as being consistent with India’s intention at the time when the Mauritius treaty was entered. It is pertinent to evaluate whether Supreme Court would have rendered the decision on similar lines if preamble would not bear reference to the text relating to economic development. Further, it would be interesting to see how Courts interpret tax treaties considering the text of new preamble in the tax  treaties.

Mandatory adoption of new preamble is a step in right direction as an anti-abuse measure which keeps a check on treaty shopping and would help countries in collecting taxes in a fair and equitable manner.

8. ARTICLE 7 OF MLI – PREVENTION OF TREATY ABUSE
The BEPS Action Plan 6 Report provides for three alternatives to mitigate treaty abuse viz. the principal purpose test (‘PPT’), simplified limitation of benefit (‘SLOB’) provision and detailed limitation of benefit (‘DLOB’) provision. Under Action Plan 6, as a minimum standard, countries are provided with a choice between adopting the following options for prevention of Treaty Abuse:

(i) Only PPT.

(ii) PPT along with SLOB.

(iii) PPT along with DLOB.

(iv) DLOB supplemented by a mechanism that would deal with conduit arrangements not already dealt with in tax treaties.

The MLI provides for the PPT and SLOB provisions. However, it does not include a draft of the DLOB provision since it may require substantial bilateral customization and may be difficult to incorporate in a multilateral instrument. Further, since the PPT, by itself, can constitute compliance with the minimum standard, the same has been provided for as the default option for prevention of treaty abuse under Article 7 of MLI. However, countries are free to adopt either of the other three approaches as provided above.

9. CONCEPT OF PPT
The concept of PPT provides that where having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that one of the principal purposes of any transaction or arrangement was to obtain treaty benefit, such benefit would be denied unless it is established that the granting of such benefit would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the provisions of the treaty.

The concept of PPT may be dissected as under:

(i) Overriding Provision – The provisions of the PPT are notwithstanding other provisions of the treaty, namely they override the other provisions of the treaty.

(ii) Subjective Test – The test of PPT is subjective. While all relevant facts and circumstances needs to be considered in determining fulfilment of PPT, what constitutes the principal purpose of an arrangement and whether the principal purpose was to obtain a treaty benefit may be subject to varying interpretations.

(iii) Onus of Proof – The onus of proof (namely reasonable basis) required for the tax department to contest non-compliance of PPT is lower than the onus of proof (namely establish with certainty) required for the taxpayer to contend that granting of benefit is in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty.

(iv) Application of PPT – PPT may fail even if one of the principal purposes of the transaction or arrangement was to obtain treaty benefit. One way to interpret this could be that where the transaction or arrangement would not have taken place or would have taken place in a different manner in the absence of the treaty benefit, then in such cases principal purpose may be said to have been to obtain treaty benefit.

(v) Transaction or Arrangement – The MLI does not define the terms ‘transaction’ or ‘arrangement’. However, the term ‘arrangement’ is defined in section 102(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘IT Act’), although for the limited purpose of Chapter XA relating to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule. However, these terms could be interpreted widely and may also include setting up an entity in a particular jurisdiction.

(vi) Benefit – The term ‘benefit’ has also not been defined in the MLI. However, the same has been defined in section 102(3) to include a payment of any kind, whether intangible or intangible form. Further, section 102(10) defines ‘tax benefit’ to include reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax, increase in refund, reduction in incomeor increase in loss. The term ‘benefit’ in the context ofMLI is also intended to be wide in nature to cover the above.

(vii) Taxability in case PPT is not satisfied – Where PPT is not satisfied, the benefit under the treaty may be denied. However, the taxability may not be altered under the treaty by recharacterizing the transaction, disregarding an arrangement, looking through the transaction etc.

(viii) Object and purpose of tax treaty – Even where the PPT is not satisfied, treaty benefit may still be granted where it is proved that the granting of such benefit is in accordance with the objects and purpose of the treaty. The object and purpose of treaty may be gauged from the treaty’s preamble, text of the relevant provision etc. Typically, treaties/treaty provisions include elimination of double taxation, promotion of exchange of goods and services, movement of capital and persons, fostering economic relations, trade and investment, provision of certainty to taxpayers, elimination of discrimination etc. as their objects.

Some of the situations where PPT may be applied to deny treaty benefits are setting up of an intermediate holding company for treaty shopping, assignment of the right to receive a dividend to a beneficial treaty country, holding of board meetings in a particular country to demonstrate residence of the entity in such country etc. Further, some of the situations where the treaty benefit may be provided under the exception to the PPT Rule (i.e. treaty benefit in accordance with object and purpose of tax treaty) include choice of a treaty country for setting up a new manufacturing plant as compared to setting up in a country with no treaty, allowing benefit to an investment fund or a collective investment vehicle set up in a country where majority investors are of that country while some minority investors may be of a different country etc.

In addition to the PPT, the MLI also provides an option to include an additional para empowering the competent authority of a contracting state to grant the treaty benefit upon request from the person even where the same has been denied as a result of the operation of PPT. This shall be the case where the competent authority determines that such benefits would have been granted even in the absence of the transaction or arrangement.

10. APPLICATION OF PPT TO COVERED TAX AGREEMENTS
The PPT applies ‘in place of’ or ‘in absence of’ any existing similar provisions in the treaty. Where a similar PPT provision (which either covers all benefits or is applicable to specific benefits under treaty) is already present in the treaty and the same is notified by both the parties to the CTA, the said provision would be replaced by the PPT under the MLI. Thus, the scope of existing PPT provisions under a CTA would get expanded by the operation of the MLI. Where no such provision is present, the PPT under MLI would be added to the treaty. Further, where only one of the parties to the CTA notifies a similar existing provision in the treaty or where none of the parties to the CTA notify a similar existing provision, the PPT under MLI would apply and prevail over the existing provision and the MLI PPT would supersede the existing provision to the extent that such existing provision is incompatible with the MLI PPT.

However, the optional para empowering the competent authority to grant treaty benefit would only apply where both the parties to CTA have chosen to adopt the same.

11. CONCEPT OF SLOB
As discussed earlier, the SLOB provision is an optional provision which may be adopted as a supplement to the PPT. It provides for objective conditions for entitlement to benefits under a CTA. Basically, the SLOB test provides that a resident of a contracting state would be entitled to treaty benefits which are otherwise available under the CTA only where such resident:

(i) Is a ‘qualified person’; or

(ii) Is engaged in active conduct of business; or
(iii) At least 75% beneficial interest in such person is directly or indirectly owned by equivalent beneficiaries; or

(iv) Is granted benefit by the competent authority irrespective subject to fulfilment of PPT.

However, the following benefits under the treaty are not subject to the SLOB test:

(i) Determination of residence of dual resident entities (Para 3 of Article 4).

(ii) Corresponding adjustment (Para 2 of Article 9).

(iii) Mutual agreement procedure (Article 25).

Some of the important concepts for test of SLOB are outlined below:

Qualified person

(i) Individual,

 

(ii) Contracting jurisdiction,
political subdivision or local authority thereof or instrumentality thereof,

 

(iii) Entity whose principal class of
shares is regularly traded on stock exchange(s),

 

(iv) Mutually agreed NGOs,

 

(v) Entities established and operated
to administer retirement benefits etc.,

 

(vi) Person other than individual, if
at least 50% of shares of the person are owned directly or indirectly by
persons who are residents and qualify for treaty benefit under (i) to (v)
above. The shares should be held on at least half the days of a twelve-month
period that includes the time when the benefit would otherwise be provided.

Active conduct of business

(i) Person must be engaged in active conduct of business in the
residence state and income derived from the other state emanates from or is
incidental to such business.

 

(ii) Following activities do not qualify as “active conduct of
business”:

 

? Holding company,

 

? Overall supervision or administration of a group of companies,

 

? Group financing (including cash pooling),

 

? Making or managing investments.

Equivalent beneficiaries

(i) Treaty
benefit would be available if equivalent beneficiaries directly or indirectly
own at least 75% of the beneficial interest of the resident income recipient.
The interest must be held on at least half of the days of any twelve-month
period that includes the time when the benefit would otherwise be accorded.

 

(ii) Equivalent
beneficiary means a person, who would have been entitled to an equivalent or
more favourable benefit either under its domestic law or treaty or any other
international instrument.

12. APPLICATION OF SLOB TO CTAs
The SLOB applies to a CTA only where both the parties to CTA have chosen to apply it. Where only one of the parties or none of the parties have adopted the SLOB, the PPT would apply.

Further, where one of the parties to a CTA has chosen to apply the SLOB while the other party has not, the first party has an option to opt-out of Article 7 in its entirety namely Article 7 (including PPT) would not apply in such a case. In order to discourage such a situation, MLI provides the party not applying the SLOB to opt for either of the following:

(i) Symmetrical application of SLOB: SLOB would apply symmetrically under CTAs with parties that have originally chosen to apply SLOB. For example, where State X has opted for SLOB while State Y has opted only for PPT, State Y may opt for application of SLOB symmetrically to X-Y treaty. In such a case from the perspective of State Y, SLOB clause would apply only for the limited purpose of X-Y treaty. SLOB would not be applicable to any of the Y’s treaties with other States where such other States have not chosen to apply SLOB.

(ii) Asymmetrical application of SLOB: In the earlier example, where State Y opts for asymmetrical application, State X would test both PPT and SLOB while granting treaty benefits while State Y would only test for PPT.

It may be noted that opting for either of symmetrical or asymmetrical option is not mandatory for State Y. If none of the options is opted, the SLOB shall not apply, and only PPT shall apply. However, State X would then have an option of opting out of the entire Article 7, and if such option is exercised, neither PPT nor SLOB shall apply. However, in such a scenario it is expected that countries should endeavour to each a mutually satisfactory solution that meets minimum standard for preventing treaty abuse. In the context of Indian treaties, considering that India has opted for Article 7, the application of PPT or PPT and SLOB would depend upon how the other country chooses to apply Article 7. The impact of Article 7 on select Indian tax treaties is discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

SLOB also applies ‘in place of’ or ‘in absence of’ similar provisions in the CTA. Where a treaty already has existing similar SLOB provisions, the states may notify the same and the MLI SLOB shall apply in place of the existing SLOB provision upon notification by both the states. The application of SLOB would be similar to that or PPT as discussed in
para 10.1.

13. INDIA’S POSITIONS ON ARTICLE 7
India has chosen to apply PPT as an interim measure in its final notification. However, where possible, it intends to adopt a LOB provision, in addition to or in replacement of PPT, through bilateral negotiation. India has not opted to apply the optional provision empowering the competent authority to grant treaty benefit even where PPT is not met. Further, India has also opted to apply the SLOB to all  its treaties.

14. IMPACT OF ARTICLE 7 ON INDIA’S TREATIES
The impact of MLI on some of India’s prominent tax treaties is outlined in the Table below. The analysis in the below Table is considering that India has opted for PPT and SLOB provisions.

Treaty Partner

Notification
by Treaty Partner

Impact
of Article 7 of MLI

USA

Not adopted MLI

Since USA has not adopted MLI, none of the
provisions of MLI would apply to India – US Treaty. Accordingly, neither PPT
nor SLOB would apply to India – US Treaty.

Mauritius
/ China

Not
covered treaty with India as a CTA

Since treaty with
India is not notified as a CTA by Mauritius, none of the provisions of MLI
(including PPT and SLOB) would apply to India – Mauritius treaty.

 

Neither India nor
China have notified India-China tax treaty as CTA. However, both the
countries recently

(continued)

 

 

amended tax treaty based on the bilateral negotiations.
India-China tax treaty has been amended vide protocol notified by CBDT vide
Notification No. 54/ 2019 dated 17th July, 2019 where PPT has been
incorporated under Article 27A of the treaty.

Japan / France

Only
PPT

Only PPT would
apply to the treaty.

UAE / Australia / Singapore
/ Netherlands / Luxembourg / UK

PPT plus
optional provision empowering competent authority to grant treaty benefit
despite failure of PPT

Only PPT would apply.

 

Since India has not adopted the optional
provision empowering competent authority, the same would not apply to any of
India’s CTAs.

Russia

PPT and SLOB

Both PPT and SLOB
would apply.

Denmark

PPT and
Symmetrical Application of SLOB

Both PPT and SLOB would apply.

Greece

PPT and Asymmetrical Application of SLOB

Greece would
apply
only PPT in granting
treaty benefit while India would apply both PPT and SLOB in granting treaty
benefit

15. INTERPLAY OF PPT, SLOB AND GAAR

In the case of CTA where both PPT and SLOB apply, since SLOB deals with whether a particular “person” per-se is eligible for treaty benefit and provides for objective criteria as compared to PPT, the fulfilment of SLOB needs to be tested first. Where the SLOB itself is not fulfilled, treaty benefit would not be available irrespective of the fulfilment of PPT.

Once the SLOB is fulfilled, as a next step, the arrangement or transaction resulting in the income would also need to satisfy the PPT. Where SLOB is met, however, in case where a particular arrangement or transaction does not meet PPT, treaty benefit in respect of income from such arrangement or transaction may still be denied.

It is also pertinent to consider the interplay of PPT and General Anti-Avoidance Rules (‘GAAR’) under the IT Act. The table below provides a comparative analysis of these provisions.

Particulars

PPT

GAAR

Subject matter of test

Transaction or arrangement.

Arrangement which inter-alia includes a transaction.

Applicability

One of the principal
purposes is to obtain treaty benefit.

 

Tainted element test not
required to be fulfilled.

(i)
Main purpose is to obtain tax benefit; and

(ii) Any of the four tainted elements are
present (namely creates rights or obligations not at arm’s length, results in
misuse or abuse of provisions, lacks commercial substance or entered in
manner not ordinarily employed for bona fide purpose).

Consequences

Denial
of treaty benefit.

Disregarding or recharacterization of
arrangement, disregarding parties to arrangement, reallocation of income
between parties, reassessment of residency or situs, looking through
corporate structure etc.

Carveouts

Treaty benefit provided
where the same is in accordance with object and purpose of treaty.

None.

Safeguards
for judicious application

None.

Invocation to be approved by
Approving Panel.

Grandfathering

None.

Income from investments made prior to 1st April, 2017
grandfathered.

Threshold

None.

Applicable only where the tax benefit
exceeds Rs. 3 crores in a financial year.

It may be noted from the above that the test under PPT is more stringent than under GAAR. Accordingly, it is less likely that GAAR would apply where the PPT is satisfied. However, it would be interesting to see the manner in which GAAR provisions may apply where treaty benefit is provided under the exception to the PPT rule taking into account the object or purpose of the treaty.

16. CONCLUSION
With the introduction of the preamble in all CTAs, the same is likely to assume increasing significance in the interpretation of tax treaties and the provision of benefits thereunder, including by judicial forums. Any double non-taxation or treaty shopping case is likely to be subject to extensive scrutiny. Further, group holding structures, cross border transactions and arrangements planned by multinational corporations would need extensive examination with respect to the fulfilment of PPT in addition to already existing anti-avoidance measures. Further, since many countries have not opted for SLOB, the impact of SLOB provisions would be limited to select treaties entered into by India.

The importance of commercial substance and rationale is likely to assume prime significance and it is imperative that business decisions be driven by commercial factors rather than primarily by tax reasons. Going forward, the significance of adequate documentation for demonstrating the commercial rationale of entering into any transaction / arrangement cannot be undermined.

THE MISSING MIDDLE – MADHYODAYA

Can we say that DONE includes NOT DONE/HALF DONE, just as income includes loss? How do we factor in the impact of not doing something? While Budget making is super difficult as there are innumerable impossible expectations from diverse interest groups, one can break up its OUTCOMES into the following baskets:

1.    Antyodaya  – pulling out those in dire need for basics – health, education, food, homes, water. These must reach them to bring them out of despair and helplessness and find dignity and opportunities.

2.    Madhyodaya – rising of the taxpayers, MSMEs, risk-takers, working-class, consumers etc.; the middle class

3.    Bhavishyodaya – beneficial creation whose outcome is in the future and will result in situation change. Includes infrastructure, investments, and the like that are like sowing seeds, building today that will bring enduring benefit and transform the landscape of living and doing business.

1 and 3 only aim to bring as many people into the middle class: the oil and wheel of the economy. Yet, Madhyodaya is often ignored, although the middle class should become as big as it can, where most populace should ideally be. Balance of these results in Sarvodaya – the RISE of ALL.

For Madhyodaya to occur, amongst other things, we need an entire system purged of a lot of dross by Arresting absurdities, undoing unFAIRNESS, and reducing REVENUE BLINDNESS . UNDOING these is equally important as DOING so many other things, and they are mutually exclusive. The Union Budget could have looked more closely  at these.

__________________________________________________________________
1    Coined by Shri Deen Dayal Upadhyay, one of the founding fathers of the BJP.
2  
 Perpetual endemic that affects tax officers, and doesn’t allow them to
apply the law fairly due to blindness caused by collection targets.
Take STT, as an example: It was introduced when the tax on capital gains was abolished, and a more efficient source-based mechanism was brought in 2004. However, this government brought tax back, but ‘forgot’ or ‘ignored’ or ‘winked’ at the STT’s reversal, I guess. So today, you pay STT and tax on CG. Although it is tax, you cannot adjust it against tax on capital gains. It is an irrecoverable tax (unlike TDS or TCS) on loss where you still pay even when you incur loss – an unheard of structure in the tax world. For 2022-23 STT is estimated 60% higher at Rs. 20,000 Cr (collection of STT in 2019-20 was Rs. 6,000 Cr and Rs.12,500 Cr in September 2021 compared to an estimate of Rs. 12,500 Cr for the  year 2021-22).

Crypto tax seems to suggest such a line of thinking to tax it without set off amongst other things when several crore people are reported to hold crypto. Since it is not currency – it can have GST implications. It is imperative that north block understands that the middle class is constantly trying to grow their tax paid savings to beat insidious inflation and taxes to stay afloat. On a lighter note, a wise man commented: the plausible cause of no tinkering of personal taxes and procedures could be the debilitated Rs. 4,000 crore  tax portal!

While we congratulate FM for doing away with 1,486 union laws from GOI’s attic, the point is this: let’s do the same in tax laws and eradicate the absurd, unfair, arbitrary, outdated, complex, litigative and all that with the potential for abuse by administrators!

 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor            

RAMPRASAD BISMIL

We are in the platinum jubilee year of our independence. Therefore, through this column, I am making a small attempt to introduce to the readers those martyrs and patriots who sacrificed everything for our independence; and about whom most of us may not be aware of the inspiring details. It is our sacred duty to offer our Namaskaars to them. I wrote on Lokmanya Tilak (BCAJ issue of August, 2021) and Madanlal Dhingra (BCAJ issue of December, 2021).

Today, I am writing about a not very commonly known martyr – Ramprasad Bismil. He was hanged by the Britishers at Gorakhpur on 19th December, 1927. He was born in 1897 to a very poor family at Shahjahanpur in Uttar Pradesh. His father Murlidhar left his job in the municipality and became a small trader. Income was very meagre.

Ramprasad learnt Hindi and Urdu. Since, his father, who was not very educated, refused to give money for buying books, Ramprasad started ‘stealing’ the money from his house. His father stopped it. Ramprasad went into bad company and took up habits of smoking and other drugs. As a result, he ducked the 5th standard twice. At his mother’s request, he was admitted to an English School. There was a priest in a nearby temple who influenced Ramprasad. He then became rather religious. Thanks to a good friend called Sushilchandra Sen, he gave up all bad habits. A gentleman named Munshi Indrajit introduced him to Arya Samaj, founded by Swami Dayanand Saraswati. Ram got inspiration by reading good books. His father drove him out of the house. While wandering in the jungle, he came across Guru Somdev. Under his guidance, Ram learnt yoga, religion and political science. He studied upto 9th standard.

Bhai Paramanand, another revolutionary involved in Lahore conspiracy had written a book ‘Tavarikh-e-Hind’ which greatly influenced Ram and he vowed to dedicate his life to the struggle for India’s freedom. He met Lokmanya Tilak at the Lucknow Congress. Ram joined the revolutionary group. The revolutionary movement needed funds. Ram borrowed Rs. 400 from his mother and sold literature about revolutions. He wrote and published a book ‘How America secured freedom’.  Also, a small booklet titled ‘My message to my countrymen’. Both these things were banned by the British Government. Ram earned Rs. 600 and repaid his mother’s loan. He helped the revolutionaries in procuring knives, rifles, pistols and other weaponry. He gained knowledge about the weapons and their prices. He secured a revolver from a Superintendent who was about to retire. The Superintendent was afraid; but Ram ‘created’ a document that he was the son of a resourceful landowner, and ‘obtained’ signatures of three persons to convince the Superintendent! Then he sold some banned revolutionary publications under the ‘guise’ of an ambulance service group in the Congress session.

There was an occasion when his three pseudo revolutionary friends attempted to kill him by betrayal. Ram escaped very luckily. The police were hunting for Ram. His mother who was always supportive, advised him to escape to Gwalior.

There, he started farming and animal husbandry; but never gave up his revolutionary movement. He wrote many books – like Bolshevic revolution, Man ki Tarang, Catherin, Swadeshi Rang; and also translated a few books – like Yogic Sadhana written by Maharshi Aurobindo. He is still recognised as a good writer in Hindi literature.

Then he again started paying attention to his very poor family. His publication business was not very successful. So, he took up a job as a manager in a factory. Then he collected some capital and started a factory of silk clothes. It was running well. From the money earned, he got his sister married. He entrusted the factory to a trusted friend and again turned to freedom struggle. He was focused on raising funds for the revolutionary movement, including looking after their families.

Once he was travelling from Shahjahanpur to Lucknow by train. He observed that on every station, the station master used to handover a money-bag to the guard of the train. There was not much security arrangement. So Ram planned an attack on a train at Kakori Station. He did it on 9th August, 1925 on the train ‘8 down’. The British Government was stunned! All the people involved in this attack except Chandrashekhar Azad were arrested. The trial continued for about 18 months; and 4 persons – Ramprasad, Ashfakulla, Roshansingh and Rajendra Lahiri were sentenced to death. Ram went to the gallows with a smiling face, chanting mantras from Sanskrit scriptures. His mother met him on the previous day and expressed her pride for his supreme sacrifice. Ram pledged that he would like to be born 1000 times of the same mother and sacrifice everything for the country.

While in jail, he had at least two good opportunities to escape. However, he avoided it on one occasion since Roshansingh’s brother who was a clerk in that jail would have come into serious trouble. On another occasion, a policeman expressed his trust in Ram and avoided tying him by a chain. Ram honoured the trust reposed in him and did not run away!

He secretly wrote his autobiography “Bismil ki Atmakatha” while in jail. It was published in 1929 but immediately banned. Finally, it was again published when India became free.

Friends, for want of space, I have avoided many details which reveal the calibre and character of this great son of our country! It is important to note that Ramprasad did all this within a short life of just 30 years! I feel, our country’s present plight is because we forgot them!

Namaskaars to Ramprasad Bismil.   

TAX PLANNING? BE CAREFUL

Shrikrishna: Arjun, you are looking very worried today. I’m sure the compliance pressure of tax deadlines keeps you under stress.

Arjun: Yes, Bhagwan. That stress is always there. We are now quite used to it. But there is something else.

Shrikrishna: Really? And what’s that?

Arjun: That my friend, Ritesh…

Shrikrishna: Yes. I know him. His office is adjoining yours. Right?

Arjun: Yes. He is in deep trouble.

Shrikrishna: What happened?

Arjun: A girl closely known to him got married into a business family.

Shrikrishna: Very good. When?

Arjun: About 15 years ago.

Shrikrishna: Oh! Then what is the problem now?

Arjun: Her in-laws are Ritesh’s clients. The entire group.

Shrikrishna: Good.

Arjun: At their request, Ritesh suggested ideas of tax planning. He built up a good amount of capital in her name. Actually, she was only a home-maker. Not even a graduate! She was shown to be earning some salary over the years.

Shrikrishna: So, where’s the problem?

Arjun: Now, she is separating from her husband.

Shrikrishna: Oh! After 15 years? This is kaliyug. No relations are permanent.

Arjun: And she is claiming a big amount in alimony. A good amount of capital stands in her name. She says she is a housewife and has no source of income.

Shrikrishna: So what? There must be some documentation. Some evidence of employment.

Arjun: No, Bhagwan. Ritesh had shown her as his employee. And her salary was ‘paid’ in cash. Later, she was shown to be in employment with some group company.

Shrikrishna: Oh! Interesting.

Arjun: There is no documentation whatsoever. All returns of the family members including her return were filed through Ritesh’s office; and she is demanding the tax records from him.

Shrikrishna: He has to give them to her – Isn’t it?

Arjun: True. But that will bring the family into trouble. She has great nuisance value.

Shrikrishna: It’s better to settle it amicably.

Arjun: She has threatened that she will approach the Institute if the CA refuses to give the file. Now, he is in a dilemma.

Shrikrishna: Arjun, I have always been telling you to give up the short-sighted approach. There are many instances of separation of spouses even after 30 to 40 years of married life. Social life is now vitiated.

Arjun: I agree. You have been warning me – not to do anything in good faith.

Shrikrishna: Due to the inevitable dispute between any two persons, the things done with good intentions are viewed maliciously afterwards. The context in which a thing is done is conveniently forgotten.

Arjun: Anything can misfire. So, careful and timely documentation is essential.

Shrikrishna: Yes. There are instances where two of the Directors sign the financials; meetings are not held. Secretarial record is lacking. And when there is a dispute among Directors, they disown everything. They say, they were never shown any balance sheet, no meetings were ever called. And the two Directors are in collusion with the auditor. They have manipulated the accounts with the help of the auditor.

Arjun: True. I have heard of such cases. Then, what is the remedy?

Shrikrishna: Documentation! Working papers! Secretarial records, minutes. The faintest of inks is stronger than the strongest of memories! And, preferably, keep a balance sheet copy signed by all Directors or partners or trustees, managing committee members… and so on.

Arjun: Very good advice. An eye-opener.

Shrikrishna: This is not a complete solution. It only protects you from allegations that they were kept in the dark. After all, every small thing should be properly documented with signatures of the persons concerned.

Arjun: Thank you, Bhagwan. I will always keep this in mind. Please bless me.

Shrikrishna: Tathaastu!

!! OM SHANTI !!

(This dialogue is based on the common experience of loose documentation, weak tax planning, breaking relationships in the society and the consequences on the profession.)

TELEGRAM

In the world of instant messaging, Whatsapp is the number one. However, with increasing discovery of security issues in Whatsapp, Telegram is fast catching up. Telegram is a Whatsapp alternative which is fast, simple, secure and available across devices. You can send media and files without any size limitation (Whatsapp has limitations) – your entire chat history will require no disk space on your device and will be securely stored in the Telegram cloud for as long as you need it.

In Whatsapp if you create groups there is a limitation of 256 members. On Telegram, you can create groups with 2,00,000 members!

Telegram can be used on multiple devices simultaneously. This makes it so much more flexible to handle. Also, if you change your mobile number, you can easily migrate to the new number without any problem – in your settings you just go and change your number.

You can also create polls on the fly – no need to have any programming knowledge. In a group conversation just tap on attachments and the option for poll will be visible. Once you tap on that, you can create your own poll, define your questions, propose multiple choice answers and launch your poll instantly. The group members can respond – the results are visible online. Very neat!

There is a facility to neatly organise your chats in folders. So you can have a folder for your office chats, family chats or any other topic of your choice. Once you create folders and assign groups and any individual conversations there, it becomes very easy to search / locate any conversation.

There are a host of options when you send messages – you can send silent messages, schedule messages for a later date and time, send self-destructing messages, edit or delete messages after sending them and even save messages for future reference. There is an option for setting reminders for yourself, too! And just like Whatsapp, you could share your live location to your contacts / groups.

If you wish to send YouTube videos or GIFs you may search directly from your text-send window. Telegram has its own browser also, so if you click on a link, it will open in Telegram itself. It also has powerful photo and video editing tools and an open sticker / GIF platform to cater to your creative genes. It is 100% free, without ads, and there is no third-party access to your data.

In terms of privacy, Telegram offers many features – you can turn notifications on / off for multiple actions, individually or for groups. You can choose not to be added to groups by random people and also by your friends.

For those interested in maximum privacy, Telegram offers Secret Chat. Messages can be programmed to self-destruct after a pre-determined time frame after reading. This feature is now available in normal chats also.

All in all, Telegram is a growing, safe and secure platform for instant messaging. Try it out today!

Android: http://bit.ly/2Povr7E /iOS: https://apple.co/2VjExqd  

AMENDMENTS TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

The Securities and Exchange Board of India has amended, vide Notification dated 9th November, 2021, certain provisions concerning related party transactions as contained in the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (the LODR Regulations). These amendments will come into force from 1st April, 2022, except for certain specific provisions which shall come into effect from 1st April 2023. These amendments are a follow-up to the decisions taken at SEBI’s Board Meeting held on 28th September, 2021. Those decisions, in turn, are partial / modified implementation of the recommendations made by the Working Group constituted by SEBI on related party transactions vide its report dated 22nd January, 2020 (released by SEBI on 27th January, 2020). Let us take a look at these amendments.

BACKGROUND
Related party transactions, generally stated, are specified transactions between a company and certain parties related to it in a manner defined under the relevant law. Related party transactions are a sensitive issue where there is scope of benefit to the company but which also carry serious potential of abuse. Hence, not just company law and securities laws, but even tax and other laws provide for safeguards against abuse in such transactions.

In the case of companies, the concerns are special. The scheme of management of a company is that shareholders appoint a Board of Directors to run the company. While the Board oversees the running of the company and meets regularly to review the progress, lays down strategy, etc., the actual day-to-day running is carried out by full-time employees. Hence, there are layers between the actual owners – the shareholders – and those who run the company. If transactions are carried out between the company and directors / senior management (or entities connected to them), there is obviously a conflict of interest. Steps and controls would have to be laid down in law to ensure that this conflict of interest does not prejudice the company / its shareholders. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, usually, in Indian companies, there is a dominant group of shareholders, referred to as the promoters, who have ownership and management control over the company. Transactions with such promoters (or entities connected to them) would also have a similar conflict of interest which needs to be resolved.

At the same time, considering the manner in which businesses are generally run, related party transactions are unavoidable. Arguably, related party transactions could actually result in more efficiency and other benefits. Hence, related party transactions do not deserve a total ban. Both the Companies Act, 2013 (the Act) and the LODR Regulations have elaborate provisions to regulate related party transactions. As often pointed out earlier in this column, it is unfortunate that both the Act and the LODR Regulations regulate related party transactions in differently worded provisions. Thus, questions such as who are related parties, what is a related party transaction, how should they be regulated, etc., are answered differently by the Act and by the LODR Regulations.

What makes it worse is that SEBI keeps amending and reforming the LODR Regulations at a rapid pace – and thus the gap widens further. While there have been attempts earlier to narrow these differences, these are far from adequate. SEBI has now made some further amendments which we will discuss here. Note that the LODR Regulations apply to companies whose shares (and, in certain cases, debt securities) are listed on stock exchanges.

AMENDMENT TO THE DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTIES
The present definition, inter alia, deems only those members of the promoter group who hold 20% or more of the shares of the company as related parties. This part has been amended and now all members of the group shall be deemed to be related parties. The definition of promoter group itself is quite widely framed. Each of the members of the group, whether holding shares or not, will now be deemed to be a related party (as discussed earlier, with effect from 1st April, 2022).

The definition is amended even further whereby any person holding 20% or more of the equity share capital at any time during the immediately preceding financial year shall be deemed to be a related party. And with effect from 1st April, 2023 this limit will be lowered to 10% for a person to be deemed to be a related party. It appears that SEBI considers a higher, even if non-majority, shareholding a source of influence sufficient enough to consider a person as a related party and thus transactions with such persons requiring to be regulated!

The shareholding of 20% / 10% should be by a person and the concept of ‘group’ or ‘persons acting in concert’ is not made applicable. That said, it is also provided that the 20% equity shareholding (or 10% with effect from 1st April, 2023) may be held by such person directly or on a beneficial interest basis as provided in section 89 of the Act. Section 89, as amended a few years back, now has a more elaborate definition of what constitutes beneficial interest. A concern may arise here. It is stated that the holding may be direct or on a beneficial interest basis. While this results in clarity that transactions with such an entity shall be related party transactions, the question is whether the transactions should be with such beneficial owner or the company. Let’s take an example. In listed company L, a company A holds 25% shares. The beneficial owner in company A, as per section 89, is one Mr. P. Thus, Mr. P would be deemed to be a related party. The question is whether transactions with only Mr. P would be deemed to be a related party transaction and not transactions with the company A?

AMENDMENTS TO DEFINITION OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The present definition considers any transaction involving transfer of resources, services or obligations between a company and a related party as a related party transaction. It is now provided, to simplify things a little, that transactions between the holding company and related parties of its subsidiaries will be related party transactions for the holding company. Similarly, transactions between a subsidiary and the related party of the holding company would also be deemed to be related party transactions.

However, with effect from 1st April, 2023 a further twist is given to this to widen the scope even further. If the effect of any transaction is such that it is for the benefit of any related party as now defined (i.e., related parties of the holding company / subsidiaries), even then it will be deemed to be a related party transaction. While the intention seems to be clear, that is, to cover structuring whereby related parties get the benefits indirectly, the amendment does not give any further guidance as to how does one ascertain that a particular transaction is for the benefit of such newly-deemed related parties? This may create challenges for the Audit Committee and the Board.

The definition is further amended whereby certain transactions are now explicitly excluded. An issue of specified securities on a preferential basis that is in compliance with the SEBI ICDR Regulations will not be a related party transaction. Payment of dividends, bonus or rights issues, buybacks, etc., will not be related
party transactions if they are uniform across all shareholders in proportion to their shareholding. Acceptance of fixed deposits by banks or non-banking financial companies will not be related party transactions if the terms offered are the same as offered to all shareholders / public, provided that disclosure of such transactions is made to the exchanges every six months in the prescribed format.

AMENDMENTS TO PROVISIONS RELATING TO MATERIAL RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
The scheme of the LODR Regulations is that related party transactions above the specified threshold are deemed to be material transactions requiring approval of shareholders. While such thresholds are laid down, the Board of Directors is also required to lay down a policy on materiality of related party transactions and how they should be dealt with, including clear thresholds. At present, a transaction with a related party would be considered as material if it, taken together with previous transactions in the financial year, exceeds 10% of the annual consolidated turnover as per the audited financial statements of the preceding financial year. It is now provided that if the transaction (taken along with earlier transactions in that financial year) exceeds Rs. 1,000 crores, then, too, the transaction will be deemed to be a material transaction. Thus, if the amount crosses 10% of such annual consolidated turnover or Rs. 1,000 crores, whichever is lower, it would be treated as material. This amendment will affect relatively large companies.

The present Regulations provide that related party transactions shall require prior approval of the Audit Committee. An amendment now requires that even ‘subsequent material modifications’ to related party transactions shall require such approval. The Regulations, however, do not define what constitute ‘material modifications’. Instead, the Regulations require the Audit Committee to define this term and make it a part of the policy on materiality of related party transactions.

It is now also provided that a related party transaction to which the subsidiary, and not the holding listed company, is a party and which transaction exceeds 10% of the consolidated turnover as per the preceding financial year’s audited financial statements, then the prior approval of the Audit Committee of the listed company would be required. With effect from 1st April, 2023, this clause will have effect if the value of such transaction exceeds 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary.

The purpose of making a separate category of material related party transactions is to make them subject to approval by shareholders. It is now provided that even material modifications to related party transactions shall require approval of shareholders. Moreover, all approvals of shareholders of related party transactions will now have to be prior approvals.

CONCLUSION
This latest series of amendments to related party transactions seems aimed more towards expanding the scope to ensure that transactions are not structured in a manner that in substance they benefit related parties but in form they do not get caught in the net. The broad structure and scheme, however, remains the same. That is to say, non-material transactions may be approved at the level of the company and material transactions would require approval of the shareholders. Thus, there continues to be no outright ban on related party transactions. Also, no approval of any authority such as the Government or SEBI is required. The approvals remain internal and there are also elaborate disclosure requirements. Thus, stakeholders have a say in and have knowledge of such transactions.  (Also refer detailed analysis on Page 26)

SALE DEED SANS CONSIDERATION IS VOID

INTRODUCTION
One of the first lessons learnt in Contract Law is that agreements without consideration are void ab initio. The Latin Maxim for the same is ‘ex nudo pacto non oritio action’. Of course, there are some statutory exceptions to the above under the Indian Contract Act, 1872; for example, one of the exceptions is a gift made for natural love and affection. However, by and large one cannot have an agreement for which there is no consideration. Recently, this issue was examined once again by the Supreme Court of India in the context of a sale deed without consideration. Let us examine this important proposition in the light of this recent decision.

WHAT IS CONSIDERATION?

Under the Indian Contract Act, consideration has been defined to mean any act or abstinence on the part of one party to the contract at the desire of the other. Such act or abstinence may be past, present or future. Thus, it is a valuable consideration, in the sense of the law and it may be in the form of some right, interest, profit, benefit, etc., which accrues to one of the parties to the contract or it may also be some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other party.

It is important to note that unlike in many other countries, e.g., the USA, adequacy of consideration is immaterial in India. If there exists a consideration for a contract and the parties to the contract have consented to the same, then the Courts would not examine whether the consideration is adequate for the contract or not. The Act does not require that the value of the consideration by one party must be equivalent to the value of the goods / services provided or promises made by the other party. Thus, if two parties contract to sell a horse for Rs. 1,000 and the seller has freely consented to the same, then there exists a valid consideration for the horse. Under the Contract Act, consideration must be something which the law can consider of value but it need not necessarily be money or money’s worth. Sir Pollock in his famous book on Contracts has opined that ‘It does not matter whether the party accepting the consideration has any apparent benefit thereby or not; it is enough that he accepts it and the party giving it does thereby undertake some burden, or lose something which in contemplation of law must be of some value’. Section 25 of the Act provides that an agreement to which the consent of the promisor is freely given is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate; but the inadequacy of the consideration may be taken into account by the Court in determining whether the consent was freely given. Of course, this position of adequacy of consideration has been altered to some extent by the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the introduction of deeming provisions such as sections 50C, 50CA, 56(2)(x), etc.

Under the Act, consideration may move from the party to the contract or even any other person who is a stranger to the contract. Based on this, the Madras High Court has held in the case of Chinnaya vs. Ramayya (1881) 4 Mad 137 that consideration in India can move from a person who need not be a party to the contract. In this case, a mother agreed to gift certain properties to her daughter in consideration for her daughter agreeing to maintain her uncle (mother’s brother). After the death of the mother, the daughter refused to maintain her uncle and in response to a suit filed by the uncle, she stated that the uncle was not privy to the contract as no consideration had flown from him to her. The Court upheld the maintenance suit of the uncle and held that under the Act consideration could flow from a third party, i.e., in this case the mother, and hence there was a valid consideration to the contract between the daughter and her uncle.

Similarly, under the Act the consideration need not flow directly to a party to the contract, it can also flow to a third party and that would be treated as a valid consideration. An important case in this respect is that of Keshub Mahindra & Other, 70 ITR 1 (Bom). In this case, three brothers were substantial shareholders and in the employment of a company. The brothers agreed to transfer some of their shares in the company to certain foreign entities in return for a good business relationship of the company with these foreign entities on favourable payment terms. The Gift Tax Officer held that since the brothers had not directly received any consideration for the sale of their shares, there was a gift by them to the foreign entities. Negating this argument, the Bombay High Court held that under the Indian Contract Act, consideration can not only flow from a third party but it can also flow to a third party. The Court held that the term consideration was defined in the Contract Act. Although the shareholders of the company were distinct from the company, as per the definition of the term consideration there was nothing to show that the benefit of the act or abstinence of the promisee must go directly to the other party only, i.e., the promisor. A contract can arise even though the promisee does an act or abstains from doing something for the benefit of a third party, i.e., the company in this case, and that was a good consideration for the three brothers to transfer their shares.

In this backdrop of consideration let us examine the ratio of the Supreme Court decision.

APEX COURT’S VERDICT
The Supreme Court’s verdict in Kewal Krishan vs. Rajesh Kumar & Ors., CA No. 6989-6992/2021, Order dated 22nd November, 2021 is relevant on the subject of consideration. In this case, the appellant had executed a power of attorney in favour of his brother. The Power of Attorney holder executed two sale deeds for selling immovable properties of the appellant. One was for selling to his wife and the other to his son. The appellant objected to these sales on various grounds. One of them was that the entire sale consideration for acquiring suit properties was not paid by the purchasers. Accordingly, it was prayed that the sale deeds should be set aside.

The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence adduced to show that the purchasers had indeed paid the consideration as shown in the sale deeds. It examined section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in this respect. This section deals with the definition of sale of immovable property. It defines a sale (in respect of immovable property) to mean a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. In Samaratmal vs. Govind, (1901) ILB 25 Bom 696, the word ‘price’ as used in the sections relating to sales in the Transfer of Property Act was held to be in the sense of money.

The Apex Court in Kewal’s case (Supra) went on to hold that a sale of an immovable property had to be for a price. The price may be payable in future. It may be partly paid and the remaining part can be made payable in future. The payment of price was an essential part of a sale covered by section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. If a sale deed in respect of an immovable property was executed without payment of price and if it did not provide for the payment of price at a future date, it was not a sale at all in the eyes of law. It was of no legal effect. Therefore, such a sale would be void. It would not impact the transfer of an immovable property.

The Court deduced that since no evidence was provided to show payment of sale consideration, the sale deeds would have to be held as void being executed without consideration. Hence, the sale deeds did not affect in any manner the share of the appellant in the suit properties. In fact, such a transaction made by the Power of Attorney holder of selling the suit properties on the basis of the power of attorney of the appellant to his own wife and minor sons was nothing but a sham transaction! Thus, the sale deeds did not confer any right, title and interest on his wife and children as the sale deeds were to be ignored being void. It further held that a document which was void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea could be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings. As no title was transferred under the said sale deeds, the appellant continued to have undivided share in the suit properties.

Thus, it is clear that for a sale transaction presence of consideration in the form of money would be a must. If the consideration is anything other than money, i.e., in kind, then it would be an exchange and not a sale. However, a sale can also take place where instead of the buyer paying the seller, some debt owed by the seller to the buyer is set off. For instance, in Panchanan Mondal vs. Tarapada Mondal, 1961 (1) I.L.R. (Cal) 619, the seller agreed to sell a property to the buyer for a certain price by one document and by a second document he also agreed to buy another property of the buyer for the same amount. Instead of the buyer paying the seller and vice versa, they agreed to set-off the two amounts. It was held that the transactions were for execution of two sale agreements.

INCOME-TAX CONSEQUENCES
One related issue would be could section 56(2)(x) of the IT Act be invoked by the Department against the purchaser? Since the agreements were without consideration could it be held that the buyer received the immovable property without payment of adequate consideration, and conversely could section 50C be invoked on the seller as being a transfer less than the stamp duty ready reckoner value? One would have to go back to the decision of the Supreme Court for the answer.

The Court has clearly held that the sale deeds did not affect in any manner the share of the appellant in the properties. It was nothing but a sham transaction. The sale deeds did not confer any right, title and interest on the buyers and the seller’s share remained intact. Hence, in such a scenario there is no receipt of immovable property by the buyer and there is no transfer by the seller. Accordingly, it stands to reason that neither section 50C could be invoked on the seller nor could section 56(2)(x) be invoked on the buyer.

STAMP DUTY CONSEQUENCES
A sale deed is liable to be stamped with duty as on a conveyance. However, what happens when the sale deed is held to be a sham as in the above case? The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 provides for the refund of stamp duty paid in case it has been used on an instrument which is afterwards found to be absolutely void in law from the beginning. An application for refund must be made to the Collector, normally within a period of six months from the date of the sale deed. Some amount is deducted while making refund of Stamp Duty, which is as follows – for stamps falling in the category of e-payment (simple receipt / e-challan and e-SBTR), 1% of the duty amount is deducted with a minimum of Rs. 200- and a maximum of Rs. 1,000. For stamp categories other than mentioned above a deduction of 10% of the duty is made.

CONCLUSION
This Supreme Court decision has once again highlighted the importance of consideration in the context of any agreement. Due care and caution should be exercised as to the manner and mode of consideration. Failure to do so could invalidate the entire transaction as seen above.  

INDEPENDENT REPORT FOR SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURES

Compiler’s Note: Sustainability reporting is fast gaining importance across all major economies. SEBI has also mandated the top listed companies to make disclosures related to Sustainability (or ESG as they are popularly called). Investors are increasingly asking for independent verification of the data included in these reports. Given below are two instances of large multinational entities who have obtained independent reports on the performance data included in the Sustainability Reports for 2020. In a recent development, the IFRS Foundation announced on 3rd November, 2021 the formation of the new International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB). The ISSB will develop a comprehensive global baseline of high-quality sustainability disclosure standards which are focused on enterprise value.

(Readers may also refer to BCAJ August, 2021 (Page 79) for an illustrative Independent Assurance statement obtained by a large company in India.)

A.P. MOLLER – MAERSK A/S

Independent Assurance ReportTo the stakeholders of A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S,

A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S engaged us to provide limited assurance on the Performance data stated on page 44 in their Sustainability Report for the period 1st January – 31st December, 2020 (the Performance data).

Our conclusion

Based on the procedures we performed and the evidence we obtained, nothing came to our attention that causes us not to believe that the Performance data in the A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S Sustainability Report are free of material misstatements and prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the Sustainability Accounting Principles as stated on pages 46-47 (the ‘Sustainability Accounting Principles’).

This conclusion is to be read in the context of what we state in the remainder of our report.

What we are assuring

The scope of our work was limited to assurance over Performance data as stated on page 44 in the A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S Sustainability Report, 2020. Scope 3 carbon emissions have not been in the scope for our review of the 2020 Performance data.

Professional standards applied and level of assurance

We performed a limited assurance engagement in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000 (Revised) ‘Assurance Engagements other than Audits and Reviews of Historical Financial Information’ and in respect of the greenhouse gas emissions, in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3410 ‘Assurance engagements on greenhouse gas statements’. Greenhouse gas quantification is subject to inherent uncertainty because of incomplete scientific knowledge used to determine emission factors and the values needed to combine emissions of different gases. A limited assurance engagement is substantially less in scope than a reasonable assurance engagement in relation to both the risk assessment procedures, including an understanding of internal control, and the procedures performed in response to the assessed risks; consequently, the level of assurance obtained in a limited assurance engagement is substantially lower than the assurance that would have been obtained had a reasonable assurance engagement been performed.

Our independence and quality control

We have complied with the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants, which includes independence and other ethical requirements founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour. The firm applies International Standard on Quality Control 1 and accordingly maintains a comprehensive system of quality control, including documented policies and procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements. Our work was carried out by an independent multidisciplinary team with experience in sustainability reporting and assurance.

Understanding reporting and measurement methodologies

The Performance data need to be read and understood together with the Sustainability Accounting Principles on pages 46-47 which Management are solely responsible for selecting and applying. The absence of a significant body of established practice on which to draw to evaluate and measure non-financial information allows for different, but acceptable, measurement techniques and can affect comparability between entities and over time.

Work performed

We are required to plan and perform our work in order to consider the risk of material misstatement of the Performance data. In doing so and based on our professional judgement, we:

*    Conducted interviews with management at corporate and Brand level responsible for the sustainability strategy, management and reporting;

*    Performed an assessment of materiality and the selection of topics for the Sustainability Report and comparison with the results of a media search;

*    Read and evaluated reporting guidelines and internal control procedures at corporate level and reporting entity level regarding the Performance data to be consolidated in the 2020 Sustainability Report;

*    Conducted analytical review of the data and trend explanations submitted by all reporting entities to A.P. Moller – Maersk Accounting & Controlling for consolidation; and

*    Evaluated evidence.

Statement on other sustainability information mentioned in the report
The management of A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S is responsible for other sustainability information communicated in the 2020 Sustainability report. The other sustainability information on pages 4-43 of the Sustainability report comprises the sections Introduction, Strategic sustainability priorities, Responding to a pandemic, Responsible business practices and Progress overview regarding A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S’s 2020 sustainability approach, activities and results.

Our conclusion on the Performance data on page 44 does not cover other sustainability information and we do not express an assurance conclusion thereon. In connection with our review of the Performance data, we read the other sustainability information in the 2020 A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S Sustainability Report and, in doing so, considered whether the other sustainability information is materially inconsistent with the Performance data or our knowledge obtained in the review, or otherwise appear to be materially misstated. We have nothing to report in this regard.

Management’s responsibilities

The management of A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S is responsible for:

*    Designing, implementing and maintaining internal control over information relevant to the preparation of the Performance data and information in the Sustainability Report that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error;

*  Establishing objective Sustainability Accounting Principles for preparing Performance data; and

*  Measuring and reporting the Performance data in the Sustainability Report based on the Sustainability Accounting Principles.

Our responsibility

We are responsible for:

* Planning and performing the engagement to obtain limited assurance about whether the Performance data for the period 1st January-31st December, 2020 are free from material misstatements and are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the Sustainability Accounting Principles;

* Forming an independent conclusion based on the procedures performed and the evidence obtained; and

* Reporting our conclusion to the stakeholders of A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S.

VOLKSWAGEN AG

Independent Auditors’ Limited Assurance Report

The assurance engagement performed by Ernst & Young (EY) relates exclusively to the German version of the combined non-financial report 2020 of Volkswagen AG. The following text is a translation of the original German Independent Assurance Report.

To Volkswagen AG, Wolfsburg

We have performed a limited assurance engagement on the separate non-financial report of Volkswagen AG according to § 289b HGB (‘Handelsgesetzbuch’: German Commercial Code), which is combined with the separate non-financial report of the group according to § 315b HGB, consisting of the disclosures in the Sustainability Report 2020 highlighted in colour for the reporting period from 1st January, 2020 to 31st December, 2020 (hereafter combined non-financial report). Our engagement exclusively relates to the information highlighted in colour as detailed above in the German PDF version of the Sustainability Report. Our engagement did not include any disclosures for prior years.

Management’s responsibility

The legal representatives of the Company are responsible for the preparation of the combined non-financial report in accordance with §§ 315c in conjunction with 289c to 289e HGB.

This responsibility includes the selection and application of appropriate methods to preparing the combined non-financial report as well as making assumptions and estimates related to individual disclosures which are reasonable in the circumstances. Furthermore, the legal representatives are responsible for such internal controls that they have considered necessary to enable the preparation of a combined non-financial report that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

Auditor’s declaration relating to independence and quality control

We are independent from the Company in accordance with the provisions under German commercial law and professional requirements and we have fulfilled our other professional responsibilities in accordance with these requirements.

Our audit firm applies the national statutory regulations and professional pronouncements for quality control, in particular the bylaws regulating the rights and duties of Wirtschaftsprüfer and vereidigte Buchprüfer in the exercise of their profession [Berufssatzung für Wirtschaftsprüfer und vereidigte Buchprüfer] as well as the IDW Standard on Quality Control 1: Requirements for Quality Control in audit firms [IDW Qualitätssicherungsstandard 1: Anforderungen an die Qualitätssicherung in der Wirtschaftsprüferpraxis (IDW QS 1)].

Auditor’s responsibility

Our responsibility is to express a limited assurance conclusion on the combined non-financial report based on the assurance engagement we have performed.

We conducted our assurance engagement in accordance with the International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 (Revised): Assurance Engagements other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information, issued by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). This Standard requires that we plan and perform the assurance engagement to obtain limited assurance about whether the combined non-financial report of the Company has been prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with §§ 315c in conjunction with 289c to 289e HGB. In a limited assurance engagement the assurance procedures are less in extent than for a reasonable assurance engagement and therefore a substantially lower level of assurance is obtained. The assurance procedures selected depend on the auditor’s professional judgment.

Within the scope of our assurance engagement, which has been conducted between September, 2020 and February, 2021, we performed amongst others the following assurance and other procedures:

  • Inquiries of relevant managerial employees of the group regarding the conducting of the materiality analysis as well as the selection of topics for the combined non-financial report, the risk assessment and the concepts of Volkswagen for the topics that have been identified as material,
  • Inquiries of relevant managerial employees responsible for data capture and consolidation as well as the preparation of the combined non-financial report, to evaluate the reporting processes, the data capture and compilation methods as well as internal controls to the extent relevant for the assurance of the combined non-financial report,
  • Identification of likely risks of material misstatement in the combined non-financial report,
  • Inspection of relevant documentation of the systems and processes for compiling, aggregating and validating data in the relevant areas in the reporting period,
  • Analytical evaluation of disclosures in the combined non-financial report at parent company and group level,
  • Inquiries and inspection of documents on a sample basis relating to the collection and reporting of selected data,
  • Evaluation of the implementation of group management requirements, processes and specifications regarding data collection through onsite visits at selected sites of the Volkswagen Group:

*    Audi AG (Ingolstadt, Germany)

*    Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG (Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen, Germany)

*    FAW-Volkswagen Automotive Co. Ltd. (Changchun, China)

*    SAIC Volkswagen Automotive Co. Ltd. Shanghai (Anting, China)

*    Scania Latin America Ltda. (São Paulo, Brazil)

*    SEAT S.A. (Martorell, Spain)

*    ŠKODA AUTO a.s. (Mladá Boleslav, Czech Republic)

*    Volkswagen AG (Wolfsburg, Germany)

*    Volkswagen AG (Kassel, Germany)

*    Volkswagen de México, S.A. de C.V. (Puebla, Mexico)

  • Comparison of disclosures with corresponding data in the group management report, which is combined with the management report of Volkswagen AG,
  • Evaluation of the presentation of disclosures in the combined non-financial report.

Assurance conclusion

Based on our assurance procedures performed and assurance evidence obtained, nothing has come to our attention that causes us to believe that the combined non-financial report of Volkswagen AG for the period from 1st January, 2020 to 31st December, 2020 has not been prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with §§ 315c in conjunction with 289c to 289e HGB.

Intended use of the assurance report

We issue this report on the basis of the engagement agreed with Volkswagen AG. The assurance engagement has been performed for the purposes of the Company and the report is solely intended to inform the Company as to the results of the assurance engagement and must not be used for purposes other than those intended. The report is not intended to provide third parties with support in making (financial) decisions.

Engagement terms and liability

The ‘General Engagement Terms for Wirtschaftsprüfer and Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaften [German Public Auditors and Public Audit Firms]’ dated 1st January, 2017 are applicable to this engagement and also govern our relations with third parties in the context of this engagement (www.de.ey.com/general-engagement-terms). In addition, please refer to the liability provisions contained therein at No. 9 and to the exclusion of liability towards third parties. We assume no responsibility, liability or other obligations towards third parties unless we have concluded a written agreement to the contrary with the respective third party or liability cannot effectively be precluded.

We make express reference to the fact that we do not update the assurance report to reflect events or circumstances arising after it was issued unless required to do so by law. It is the sole responsibility of anyone taking note of the result of our assurance engagement summarised in this assurance report to decide whether and in what way this result is useful or suitable for their purposes and to supplement, verify or update it by means of their own review procedures.

SHARE ISSUE COSTS Vs. SHARE LISTING EXPENSES

Initial Public Offer (IPO) costs involve a combination of share issue costs and listing expenses. Share issue costs are debited to equity whereas listing expenses are charged to the P&L. Therefore, it becomes important to allocate the total costs incurred in an IPO to share issue costs and other than share issue costs, i.e., listing expenses.

‘An entity typically incurs various costs in issuing or acquiring its own equity instruments. Those costs might include registration and other regulatory fees, amounts paid to legal, accounting, and other professional advisers, printing costs and stamp duties. The transaction costs of an equity transaction are accounted for as a deduction from equity to the extent they are incremental costs directly attributable to the equity transaction that otherwise would have been avoided. The costs of an equity transaction that is abandoned are recognised as an expense’. [Ind AS 32.37].

An entity issues new equity shares and may simultaneously list them. In such a case, a portion (e.g., accountants’ fees relating to prospectus), or the entire amount of certain costs (e.g., cost of handling share applications) should be recognised in equity.

The Table below provides a basis of allocation:

Type
of cost

Allocation
(share-issue,
listing or both?)

Stamp duties for shares, fees for legal and tax advice related
to share issue

Share issue

Underwriting fees

Share issue

Listing fees paid to stock exchange / regulator

Listing

Accountants’ fees relating to
prospectus

Both – in practice IPO documents
typically relate both to the share offer and the listing

Valuation fees in respect of valuation of shares

Share issue

Valuation fees in respect of
valuation of assets other than shares (e.g., property) if the valuation is
required to be disclosed in the prospectus

Both, because IPO documents typically
relate to both the share offer and the listing. However, if the valuation is
not required to be disclosed in the prospectus, such costs are not directly
attributable to the IPO and should be expensed

Tax and legal entity restructuring costs in anticipation of the
IPO

P&L Expense. Corporate restructurings are undertaken as a
housekeeping matter to facilitate the listing process and are not directly
attributable to the issue of new shares

Legal fees other than those relating
to restructuring in IPO above

Both – legal advice is typically
required both for the offer of shares to the public and for the listing
procedures to comply with the requirements established by the relevant
securities regulator / exchange. However, some legal fees may relate
specifically to share issue or to listing

Prospectus design and printing costs

Both – although in cases where most prospectus copies are sent
to potential  new shareholders, the
majority of such costs might relate to the share issue

Sponsor’s fees

Both – to the extent the sponsor’s
activities relate to identifying potential new shareholders and persuading
them to invest, the cost relates to the share issue. The activities of the
sponsor related to compliance with the relevant stock exchange requirements
should be expensed in P&L

‘Roadshow’ and advertising costs

Although the ‘roadshow’ might help to sell
the offer to potential investors and hence contributes to raising equity, it
is usually also a general promotional activity. Therefore, the same needs to
be allocated between share issue costs and listing expenses

Merchant Bankers / Manager’s costs

Both – they need to be allocated on a
rational basis between share issue costs and listing expenses

Costs of general advertising aimed at enhancing the entity’s
brand; and fees paid to the public relations firm for enhancing the image and
branding of the entity as a whole

These are not related to issuance of equity shares and should be
charged to P&L

‘Transaction costs that relate to the issue of a compound financial instrument are allocated to the liability and equity components of the instrument in proportion to the allocation of proceeds. Transaction costs that relate jointly to more than one transaction (for example, costs of a concurrent offering of some shares and a stock exchange listing of other shares) are allocated to those transactions using a basis of allocation that is rational and consistent with similar transactions.’ [Ind AS 32.38]. Another basis may also be appropriate if those can be justified in the given situation. Cost of listing existing shares will be charged to P&L. Cost of issuing new shares will have to be allocated to listing expenses (charged to P&L) and share issue costs (charged to equity).

An allocation between listing and issue of shares should not result in the costs attributed to either of the two components being greater than the costs that would be incurred if either were a stand-alone transaction. Significant judgement may be involved in determining the allocation. The IFRS Interpretations Committee (IAS 32 Transaction Costs to be Deducted from Equity, September, 2008) discussed this issue and noted that judgement may be required to determine which costs relate solely to activities other than equity transactions – e.g., listing existing shares – and which costs relate jointly to equity transactions and other activities. The IFRIC decided not to add this issue to its agenda.

An IPO may involve selling the shares of existing investors, such as in an Offer for Sales (OFS). All or a portion of allocated costs may be reimbursed by the existing investors, irrespective of whether the IPO is successful or not. For example, if INR 100 is incurred with respect to OFS shares and INR 60 is reimbursed, the entity will charge INR 40 to the P&L, this being in
the nature of listing shares that are already issued. When shares are listed without any additional issue of share capital (i.e., a placing of existing shares), no equity transaction has occurred and, consequently, all expenses should be recognised in profit or loss as incurred.

Example – Accounting for IPO costs

List Co is seeking a listing on the stock exchange; 1/3rd of the shares is fresh issuance, the other 1/3rd is the sale of shares of existing investor under OFS, and the remaining 1/3rd relates to already existing shares of the promoter that will survive the listing of the entity.

List Co incurs a total expenditure of INR 99 and receives reimbursement of INR 20 from OFS investors. Of the INR 99, the total listing cost (on the basis of allocation) is INR 60. The Table below presents the allocation of the cost and the amounts to be charged to share issue costs in equity and the amount to be charged to P&L, being in the nature of listing expenses:

 

 

New
shares

INR

Existing
shares

INR

New
shares

INR

Total cost allocated @ 1/3rd each

33

33

33

Reimbursement from OFS investors

(20)

Listing expenses charged to P&L

20

(1/3rd share of
INR 60)

33

33

Share issue costs charged to equity

13

Based on the above, the total cost incurred by List Co is INR 99, of which INR 20 is reimbursed by the OFS investor. Therefore, List Co incurs a net cost of INR 79. Of the INR 79, only INR 13 relates to share issuance and is debited to equity, and the remaining INR 66 relates to listing and should be charged to P&L. INR 66 can also be determined by aggregating the amounts in the 2nd last row.

Costs that are related directly to a probable future equity transaction should be recognised as a prepayment (asset) in the statement of financial position. The costs should be transferred to equity when the equity transaction is recognised or recognised in profit or loss if the issue or buy-back is no longer expected to be completed.

Sometimes, merchant bankers are paid contingent fees linked to a successful IPO. These costs need to be provided for as the services are received if the IPO event is probable and outflow of resources is expected.

It may also be noted that in the cash flow statement the costs should be included as follows:
(i) costs which have been expensed – in operating cash flows,
(ii) costs deducted from equity – in financing cash flows.

At a particular reporting date, the IPO may be in progress. To the extent the costs incurred are identified as listing expenses, the same should be charged to P&L. To the extent the costs are identified as share issue costs, the same may be parked in an advance account if the IPO is probable. Once the IPO occurs and shares are issued, the advance amount should be debited to equity. If the IPO is not probable, or was probable but is no longer probable, then the entire expenses should be charged to P&L.

Reopening of assessment – Within 4 years – Regular assessment completed u/s 143(3) after verifying the issue – Changing of opinion – Reopening bad in law

8 Conopco Inc. vs. UOI & Anr. [W.P. No. 7388 of 2008; Date of order: 17th December, 2021; A.Y.: 2004-05 (Bombay High Court)]

Reopening of assessment – Within 4 years – Regular assessment completed u/s 143(3) after verifying the issue – Changing of opinion – Reopening bad in law

The petitioner / assessee challenged the notice dated 13th March, 2008 issued u/s 148 and the order dated 14th October, 2008 passed by the A.O. rejecting its objections to the proposed reopening of the assessment.

The petitioner was issued 420,000 shares of Rs. 10 each in Ponds (India) Limited at the time of its incorporation in 1977. It was allotted a further 159,250 equity shares of Rs. 10 each by way of a rights issue at Rs. 90 per share in 1987. Further, 51,39,75,000 equity shares of Rs. 1 each were issued by way of bonus shares from time to time. Upon merger of Ponds (India) Ltd. with Hindustan Lever Ltd. and thereafter, the petitioner was holding 6,00,86,250 shares of Rs. 1 each of Hindustan Lever Ltd.

It filed a return of income for the A.Y. 2004-2005 on 14th October, 2004 declaring long-term capital gain of Rs. 10,108,653,163. It paid Rs. 1,010,865,316 as tax on long-term capital gain @ 10% as per the proviso to section 112 and surcharge of Rs. 25,271,633 @ 2.5%.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the petitioner vide letter dated 10th November, 2006 answered the questions raised by respondent No. 2 as to why the rate of tax on capital gains in its case should be computed @ 10% and the applicability of the first proviso to section 48. The petitioner submitted a without-prejudice working of capital gains without considering the benefit of the first proviso to section 48. The A.O. thereafter passed an assessment order dated 15th November, 2006 computing the income of the petitioner after accepting its contentions.

Thereafter, the petitioner received the impugned notice dated 13th March, 2008 proposing to reassess its income for A.Y. 2004-2005 on the alleged belief that its income had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147.

The Court observed that in the reasons for reopening provided by the A.O. vide a letter dated 11th September, 2008, the main contentions of the A.O. were (i) the petitioner admitted to the working of capital gains without considering the benefit of the first proviso to section 48; and (ii) tax had to be calculated @ 20% against 10% determined while passing the assessment order.

It is settled law that before a proceeding u/s 148 can be validly initiated certain preconditions which are jurisdictional have to be complied with. One such condition is that the A.O. must have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and such reasons must be recorded in writing prior to the initiation of the proceedings. The second condition is that reassessment must not be based merely on change of opinion by a succeeding A.O. from the view taken by his predecessor.

The Court held that both these conditions have not been complied with. In the reasons recorded, the A.O. has opined that the rate of tax to be applied to the capital gains that arose to the petitioner was 20% in terms of section 112(1)(c) and not 10% as was determined whilst passing the order u/s 143(3).

Further, the Court observed that the A.O. had examined all the relevant provisions of the Act, including sections 48 and 112, and completed the assessment by applying the rate of income tax as per the proviso to section 112(1). It was also clear from the reasons that during the assessment proceedings the A.O. had asked why capital gain should not be taxed @ 20% as provided u/s 112(1)(c)(ii) and in response the petitioner vide letter dated 10th November, 2006 had submitted an explanation and revised (without prejudice) the working of the capital gain without considering the benefit of the first proviso to section 48. It was also clear from the reasoning given by respondent No. 2 that the issue now sought to be raised in the purported reassessment proceedings was very much examined by the A.O. and he had completed the assessment proceedings after giving due consideration to the submissions made by the petitioner.

Therefore, the reassessment proceedings are initiated purely on change of opinion with regard to the rate of tax payable by the petitioner on the long-term capital gain made by it on the sale of shares of Hindustan Lever Ltd. The issue of applicability of the first proviso to section 48 as well as the rate of tax u/s 112 were discussed and considered at the time of the said assessment proceedings u/s 143(3).

The Court further observed that the reasons of reopening the assessment have to be based / examined only on the basis of reasons recorded at the time of issuing a notice u/s 148 seeking to reopen the assessment. These reasons cannot be improved upon and / or supplemented, much less substituted, by an affidavit and / or oral submissions.

Once a query has been raised by the A.O. through the assessment proceeding and the assessee has responded to that query, it would necessarily follow that the A.O. has accepted the petitioner’s submissions so as not to deal with that issue in the assessment year. Even if the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) does not reflect any consideration of the issue, it must follow that no opinion was formed by the A.O. in the regular assessment proceedings. It is also settled law that once all the material was placed before the A.O. and he chose not to refer to the deduction / claim which was being allowed in the assessment order, it could not be contended that the A.O. had not applied his mind while passing the assessment order.

When a query has been raised, as has been done in this case, with regard to a particular issue during regular assessment proceedings, it must follow that the A.O. had applied his mind and taken a view in the matter as is reflected in the assessment order. It is clear that once a query has been raised in the assessment proceedings with regard to the rate at which capital gains should be taxed u/s 112(1)(c)(ii) and the petitioner has responded to the query to the satisfaction of the A.O. as is evident from the facts in the assessment order dated 15th November, 2006, he accepts the petitioner’s submissions as to why taxation should be only 10% u/s 112 read with section 148, it must follow that there is due application of mind by the A.O. to the issue raised. Non-rejection of the explanation in the assessment order would amount to the A.O. accepting the view of the petitioner, thus taking a view / forming an opinion. Where on consideration of the material on record one view is conclusively taken by the A.O., it would not be open to reopen the assessment based on the very same material with a view to take another view.

Accordingly, the petition was allowed.

Waiver of interest – Charged u/s 215 –The phrase ‘regular assessment’ means first order / original assessment

7 Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT & Ors. [ITA No. 100 of 2002; Date of order: 20th December, 2021; A.Y.: 1985-86; (Bombay High Court)] [Arising out of ITAT order dated 30th August, 2001]

Waiver of interest – Charged u/s 215 –The phrase ‘regular assessment’ means first order / original assessment
    
On 4th September, 1985, the applicant filed its return of income for A.Y. 1985-86 disclosing a total income of Rs. 1,53,41,650. The A.O. passed an assessment order dated 28th March, 1988 u/s 143(3) and, after making various additions and disallowances, assessed a total income of Rs. 2,74,47,780. In the assessment order, he inter alia directed interest to be charged u/s 215. He levied interest of Rs. 13,67,999 u/s 215 vide the computation sheet.

Aggrieved by the action of the A.O. in charging interest u/s 215, the appellant filed an application dated 8th July, 1988 for waiver of interest u/s 215(4) read with Rule 40 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (the Rules). The DCIT passed an order dated 20th March, 1989 under Rule 40(1) holding that the delay in finalisation of the assessment was not attributable to the appellant and waived the interest u/s 215 beyond one year of the filing of the return of income. The DCIT accordingly recalculated the interest chargeable u/s 215 at Rs. 4,13,630 and waived the balance of Rs. 4,40,020.

The appellant received a show cause notice dated 6th March, 1990 u/s 263 from the Commissioner of Income-tax (CIT). It filed its objections by a letter dated 26th March, 1990 objecting to the proposed action. The CIT then passed an order dated 30th March, 1990 u/s 263 setting aside the assessment in its entirety with directions to the A.O. to reframe the assessment after proper verification and application of mind.

In compliance with this order u/s 263, the A.O. passed a fresh assessment order dated 9th March, 1992 u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 263. The A.O. gave effect to the order dated 30th March, 1990 by making certain additions and disallowances and computed the income of the appellant at Rs. 4,04,37,692. There was no direction in the said order regarding the charging of interest u/s 215. However, in the computation sheet annexed to the said order, interest of Rs. 23,91,413 u/s 215 had been charged. The A.O. had also charged interest u/s 139(8).

Aggrieved by the various additions and disallowances made and the interest under sections 215 and 139(8) levied by the A.O., the appellant filed an appeal before the CIT (Appeals). The said appeal was disposed of vide an order dated 28th September, 1992 holding that interest could not be charged under sections 215 or 139(8) unless it has been charged earlier or it falls within the meaning of sections 215(3) or 139(8)(b).

Being aggrieved by the order of the CIT (Appeals) with regard to the issue of levy of interest u/s 215, the A.O. filed an appeal before the Tribunal. While challenging the said order, the A.O. accepted that part of the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) which deleted the levy of interest u/s 139(8) and confined the appeal to the deletion of interest u/s 215(6). The Tribunal restored the interest levied by the A.O. by way of the computation sheet annexed to the said order.

It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the phrase ‘regular assessment’ in the ITA has been used in no other sense than the first order of assessment passed under sections 143 or 144 and any consequential order passed by the Income-tax Officer giving effect to subsequent orders passed by a higher authority cannot be treated as regular assessment. It was further submitted that in the regular assessment there was no direction to charge interest u/s 215 and therefore interest cannot be charged in the reassessment order.

The Department fairly accepted that the word ‘regular assessment’ needs to be interpreted as the original assessment. However, it was submitted that if the appellant was seeking waiver of interest, it was required to file a new application for waiver after the order of reassessment and in the absence of such application the Tribunal was justified in restoring the order of the A.O. directing the appellant to pay interest as per section 215.

The High Court observed that section 215 makes it clear that the assessee is required to pay interest where he has paid advance tax less than 75% of the assessed tax; the assessee is required to pay simple interest @ 15% p.a. from the first day of April following the financial year up to the date of regular assessment.
    
The Supreme Court has summed up in the case of Modi Industries Ltd. and Others vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax and Another ([1995] 216 ITR 759) by saying that the expression ‘regular assessment’ has been used in the ITA in no other sense than the first order of assessment under sections 143 or 144. Any consequential order passed by the ITO to give effect to an order passed by the higher authority cannot be treated as a regular assessment.

The Court observed that for A.Y. 1985-86, in the regular assessment proceeding completed on 28th March, 1988, the total income was determined at Rs. 2,74,47,780 and interest u/s 215 amounting to Rs. 13,67,999 was charged. In the facts of the case, since the interest u/s 215 was charged in the regular assessment order, the A.O. had the power to charge interest u/s 215 while carrying out the reassessment.

Further, the Court observed that section 215(4) empowers the A.O. to waive or reduce the amount of interest chargeable u/s 215 under circumstances prescribed in Rule 40 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. One such prescribed circumstance is:
(1) When without any laches or delay on the part of assessee, the assessment is completed more than one year after the submission of the return; or…….

Finally, the Court observed that the order of the Dy. CIT, Bombay dated 20th March, 1989 held that the delay in finalisation of assessment is not attributable to the assessee and therefore it is not liable to pay interest u/s 215 beyond the period of one year from the date of filing of the return. Accordingly, the appellant was held to be liable to pay an amount of Rs. 4,40,020. The order of the Dy. CIT had not been challenged by the Revenue or the appellant, with the result that the said order attained finality. In the absence of a challenge to the order under Rule 40(1), the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of CIT vs. Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. (217 ITR 216). Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to waiver of interest for a period of one year. The appellant is entitled to the benefit of the order dated 20th March, 1989 passed under Rule 40(1) only to the extent stated therein.

Therefore, it was held that the appellant was liable to pay an amount of Rs. 4,13,630as per the order dated 20th March, 1989.

Vivad se Vishwas Scheme – Declaration – Condition precedent – Appeal should be pending on specified date – Application for condonation of delay in filing appeal filed before specified date and pending before Commissioner (Appeals) – Communication from Commissioner (Appeals) of NFAC asking assessee to furnish ground-wise submissions in appeal – Implies delay condoned – Order of rejection set aside

31 Stride Multitrade Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2021] 439 ITR 141 (Bom) A.Y.: 2017-18;
Date of order: 21st September, 2021 S. 246A of ITA, 1961; Ss. 2(1)(a)(i), 2(1)(a)(n) of Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020

Vivad se Vishwas Scheme – Declaration – Condition precedent – Appeal should be pending on specified date – Application for condonation of delay in filing appeal filed before specified date and pending before Commissioner (Appeals) – Communication from Commissioner (Appeals) of NFAC asking assessee to furnish ground-wise submissions in appeal – Implies delay condoned – Order of rejection set aside

For the A.Y. 2017-18, the assessee declared loss in its return of income. An assessment order was passed u/s. 144. The assessee filed an appeal u/s 246A before the Commissioner (Appeals) with an application for condonation of delay of 19 days in filing the appeal. Thereafter, the assessee received a communication from the Commissioner (Appeals) of the National Faceless Appeal Centre inquiring whether the assessee wished to opt for the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme or would contest the appeal. The assessee admittedly made its declaration in form 1 on 21st January, 2021, within the specified date of 31st January, 2020 u/s 2(1)(a)(n) of the 2020 Act. The Principal Commissioner rejected the declaration of the assessee under the 2020 Act on the ground that there was no order condoning the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) Section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 provides that a person in whose case an appeal or a writ petition or special leave petition has been filed either by himself or by Income-tax authority or by both, before an appellate forum and such appeal or petition is pending as on the specified date is entitled to make a declaration under the Act. The specified date u/s 2(1)(a)(n) of the 2020 Act is 31st January, 2020. Where the time limit for filing of appeal has expired
before 31st January, 2020 but an appeal with an application for condonation of delay is filed before the date of the Circular, i.e., 4th December 2020 [2020] 429 ITR (St.) 1, issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes such appeal will be deemed to be pending as on 31st January, 2020.

ii) The communication dated 20th January, 2021 from the Commissioner (Appeals) asking the assessee to furnish ground-wise written submissions on the grounds of appeal itself would mean that the delay had been condoned by the Commissioner (Appeals). Therefore, it was incorrect for the Principal Commissioner to state that there was no order condoning the delay and hence, reject the declaration of the assessee under the 2020 Act.

iii) The time limit to file appeal had expired on 18th January, 2020 and the condonation of delay application was filed on 6th February, 2020, before 4th December, 2020, the date of the Board’s Circular. The appeal would be pending as required under the 2020 Act. The order of rejection of the assessee’s declaration under the 2020 Act was bad in law and accordingly set aside. The Principal Commissioner was directed to process the forms filed by the assessee under the provisions of the 2020 Act.’

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Absence of any incriminating documents or evidence against assessee discovered during course of search – Jurisdiction to assess third person could not be assumed

30 Principal CIT vs. S.R. Trust [2021] 438 ITR 506 (Mad) A.Ys.: 2009-10 to 2015-16; Date of order: 24th November, 2020 Ss. 132 and 153C of ITA, 1961

Search and seizure – Assessment of third person – Absence of any incriminating documents or evidence against assessee discovered during course of search – Jurisdiction to assess third person could not be assumed

The assessee was a charitable trust. A search was conducted u/s 132 of one SG who was a doctor and managing trustee of the assessee which established and administered a hospital. Simultaneously, a search action was conducted in the case of one TJ who
supplied medical and surgical equipment and other accessories to the hospital run by the assessee. Pursuant to the search, the Department was of the prima facie view that funds were siphoned off through TJ allegedly resorting to huge inflation of expenses through salaries paid to staff members by transfer of funds to the bank accounts of the employees as if salaries were paid to them. Based on the seized documents, a notice u/s 153C was issued for the A.Ys. 2009-10 to 2015-16 against the assessee. An order u/s 143(3) read with section 153C was passed.

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal found that TJ did not admit that money was paid back to the managing trustee of the assessee-trust, that the materials seized did not indicate any inflation of purchase by the assessee and that the deposits in the bank account of the managing trustee of the assessee stood explained. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal held that there was no material brought on record to prove the nexus between withdrawal of the amount from the bank account of TJ and the deposits made in the bank accounts of the managing trustee of the assessee.

The appeal filed by the Department was dismissed by the Madras High Court. The High Court held as under:

‘i) The Tribunal was right in holding that the A.O. ought not to have assumed jurisdiction u/s 153C. In proceedings u/s 153C, in the absence of any incriminating documents or evidence discovered during the course of search u/s 132 in the case of searched person against the assessee, the jurisdiction under the provisions of section 153C could not be assumed. The Commissioner (Appeals) had allowed the appeals filed by the assessee as confirmed by the Tribunal.’

ii) The order of the Tribunal was confirmed. No question of law arose.

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 – Query raised with regard to a particular issue during regular assessment implies A.O. has applied his mind – Reassessment on change of opinion – Impermissible

29 Principal CIT vs. EPC Industries Ltd. [2021] 439 ITR 210 (Bom) A.Y.: 2007-08; Date of order: 26th October, 2021 Ss. 147, 148 of ITA, 1961

Reassessment – Notice u/s 148 – Query raised with regard to a particular issue during regular assessment implies A.O. has applied his mind – Reassessment on change of opinion – Impermissible

For the A.Y. 2007-08, the A.O. issued a notice u/s 148 to reopen the assessment u/s 147 on the ground that the assessee had claimed deduction for depreciation on the assets acquired with the bank loan, which the bank had written off under a one-time settlement as bad debts and the write-back by the assessee was to be treated as income. The assessee’s objections were rejected. In the reassessment order the A.O. brought to tax the waiver of principal amount of bank loan as income of the assessee u/s 41(1) / 28(iv).

The Tribunal held that the assessment was reopened based on information which was already on record and no new tangible material was brought on record to suggest escapement of income in respect of waiver of loan on one time settlement by the bank which was claimed by the assessee as deduction. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) The reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment u/s 147 has to arise not on account of a mere change of opinion but on the basis of some tangible material. Once there was a query raised with regard to a particular issue during the regular assessment proceedings, it must follow that the A.O. had applied his mind and taken a view in the matter as reflected in the assessment order.

ii) A query was raised by the A.O. in the original assessment in respect of the waiver of loan on account of the one-time settlement with the bank and the assessee had filed a detailed submission as to why the principal amount waived by the bank on account of the one-time settlement was not taxable. Reassessment on a change of opinion was impermissible. No question of law arose.’

SAFE HARBOUR RULES – AN OVERVIEW (Part 2)

In this concluding Part 2 of the Article (the first Part appeared in the December issue of the BCAJ), we focus on dealing with Indian Safe Harbour Rules by providing an overview of the Indian Safe Harbour Rules and their important aspects, including certain judicial pronouncements

1. RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND RULES
1.1 Section 92CB – Power of Board to make safe harbour (SH) rules
(1) The determination of –
(a) income referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 9; or
(b) arm’s length price u/s 92C or u/s 92CA,
shall be subject to SH rules.
(2) The Board may, for the purposes of sub-section (1), make rules for safe harbour.

Explanation – For the purposes of this section, ‘safe harbourmeans circumstances in which the income-tax authorities shall accept the transfer price or income, deemed to accrue or arise under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 9, as the case may be, declared by the assessee.

Section 92CB(1) provides that the determination of Arm’s Length Price [ALP] u/s 92C or u/s 92CA shall be subject to SH rules. It has been substituted with effect from A.Y. 2020-21 to provide that apart from the determination of ALP, the determination of the income referred to in section 9(1)(i) shall also be subject to SH rules.

Section 9(1)(i) covers various types of income, e.g., income through or from any business connection in India, any property in India, etc. Further, it has various Explanations including
(a) Explanation 2 (Agency business connection),
(b) Explanation 2A (Significant economic presence or SEP),
(c) Explanation 3A (Extended source rule for income from advertisements, etc.).

Explanation to section 92CB defining SH is amended to provide that SH would also include circumstances in which income tax authorities shall accept the income u/s 9(1)(i) declared by the assessee. The amendment is effective from A.Y. 2020-21. Rules 10TA to 10TG contain the relevant SH rules relating to international transactions.

1.2 Application of SH rules prior to their introduction w.e.f. 18th September, 2013
In the following cases, inter alia, it has been held that the SH provisions in respect of TP were not applicable to the A.Ys. prior to the introduction of section 92CB / rules thereunder:
(a) PCIT vs. B.C. Management Services (P) Ltd. [2018] 89 taxmann.com 68 (Del)
(b) PCIT vs. Fiserv India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 17/2016, dated 6th January, 2016 (Del)
(c) PCIT vs. Cashedge India Pvt. Ltd. ITA No. 279/2016, dated 4th May, 2016 (Del)
(d) Delval Flow Controls (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2021] 128 taxmann.com 260 (Pun-Trib)
(e) Rolls Royce India (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2018] 97 taxmann.com 651 (Del-Trib)
(f) Rampgreen Solutions (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2015] 64 taxmann.com 451 (Del-Trib).

1 However, in DCIT vs. Minda Acoustic Ltd. it was held that the SH rules can always be adopted as guidance in respect of the A.Ys. prior to their insertion.

 

1   [2019] 107
taxmann.com 475 (Del-Trib)

1.3 Application of definitions provided in Rule 10TA – Whether or not the assessee opts for the safe harbour
An important point to be kept in mind is that the definitions provided in rule 10TA shall not be applicable for the determination of ALP u/s 92C as per rule 10B. 2 The Pune bench of the ITAT in the case of Delval Flow Controls (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT (Supra) has held that unless an assessee opts for SH rules, rule 10TA cannot have across–the-board application. The ITAT in this regard observed as follows:
‘13. The emphatic contention of the Learned DR that section 92CB providing that the arm’s length price u/s 92C or u/s 92CA shall be subject to safe harbour rules and hence the application of rule 10TA(k) across the board is essential whether or not the assessee opts for the safe harbour, in our considered opinion does not merit acceptance. Section 92CB unequivocally states that the arm’s length price u/s 92C or u/s 92CA shall be subject to safe harbour rules. It only means that if there is an eligible assessee who has exercised the option to be governed by the safe harbour rules in respect of an eligible international transaction after complying with the due procedure, then the determination of the ALP shall be done in accordance with the safe harbour rules in terms of section 92CB of the Act and ex consequenti, the application of other rules will be ousted. The sequitur is that where such an option is not availed, neither section 92CB gets triggered nor the relevant rules including 10TA(k). In that scenario, determination of the ALP is done de hors the safe harbour rules.’

1.4 Reference to rule 10TA(k) – Exclusion of gains on account of foreign currency fluctuations relating to revenue transactions
Rule 10A contains certain definitions for the purposes of the said rule and rules 10AB to 10E. The said rule does not contain the definitions of ‘operating expense’, ‘operating revenue’ and ‘operating profit margin’. Rule 10TA for the purposes of the said rule and rules 10TB to 10TG, inter alia, contains the definitions of the aforesaid terms in rule 10TA(j), (k) and (l), respectively, w.e.f. 18th September, 2013.

Rule 10TA(k)(ii) provides that the term operating revenue does not include income arising on account of foreign currency fluctuations.

The assessees have taken a stand for long that foreign exchange gains arising out of revenue transactions form part of operating revenue and should accordingly be considered while computing operating profit margins for the purposes of computation of ALP under rules 10A to 10E. It has been argued that in the absence of any clear definition of operating revenue, the explicit exclusion of foreign exchange gain under rule 10TA(k)(ii) relating to SH cannot be applied for the computation of ALP under rules 10A to 10E.

The Tax Department, on the other hand, has been arguing that section 92CB provides that the ALP determination shall be subject to SH rules and the explicit exclusion of foreign exchange gain under rule 10TA(k)(ii) makes foreign exchange gains as non-operating. Further, for computation of operating margin, the said exclusion should be applied even in respect of transactions entered into prior to 18th September, 2013.

The ITAT and High Courts in a catena of cases have held that the SH rules have no retrospective application and are applicable prospectively only in respect of transactions entered into after 18th September, 2013. Further, in cases where the assessees have not opted for SH rules, the exclusion provided in rule 10TA(k)(ii) is not applicable and the foreign exchange gains should be considered as part of the operating margins.
The issue of exclusion of foreign exchange gain / loss for the purposes of computing ALP in TP proceedings is no more res integra in view of, inter alia, the following judicial precedents:
a) Fiserv India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-437-HC-2016 (Del)-TP]
b) Ameriprise India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-174-HC-2016 (Del)-TP]
c) DCIT vs. GHCL Ltd. ITA No. 976/Ahd/2014 dated 5th March, 2021 (ITAT Ahd)
d) NEC Technologies India Ltd. [TS-221-ITAT-2016 (Del)-TP]
e) Subex Ltd. [TS-181-ITAT-2016 (Bang)-TP]
f) Visa Consolidated Support & Services [TS-162-ITAT-2016 (Bang)-TP]
g) SAP Labs India (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2012] 17 taxmann.com 16 (Bang)
h) Four Soft Ltd. (ITA No. 1495/HYD/2010) (Hyd ITAT)
i) Trilogy E Business Software India Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT [23 ITR(T) 464) (Bang ITAT)]
j) Capital IQ Information Systems (India) (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2013] 32 taxmann.com 21 (Hyd-Trib)
k) S. Narendra vs. ACIT [2013] 32 taxmann.com 196 (Mum-Trib)
l) Cordys R&D (India) (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2014] 43 taxmann.com 64 (Hyd-Trib)
m) Techbooks International (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2014] 45 taxmann.com 528 (Del-Trib).

In the above cases, the courts have held that if the foreign exchange gain / loss is related to the operations undertaken by the assessee, such gain / loss would be considered as part of operating revenue or operating expenses. It is to be noted that foreign exchange gain / loss in respect of capital transactions cannot be considered as part of operating revenue or operating expenses.

 

2   [2021]128
taxmann.com 260 (Pun-Trib)

1.5 Issue relating to interpretation of KPO / BPO / ITeS
Rule 10TA(e) contains the definition relating to ‘information technology-enabled services’ and rule 10TA(g) defines ‘knowledge process outsourcing services’. Rule 10TA does not contain a separate definition relating to ‘business process outsourcing services’ (BPO). Interpretational issues have arisen in respect of characterisation of transactions into various categories of services like ITeS, KPO and BPO which have a very thin line of distinction.

3 In this connection, the Special Bench of the ITAT Mumbai in the case of Maersk Global Centres (India) (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT, after analysing the relevant definitions in rule 10TA, held as under:
73. On a careful study of the material placed before us to highlight the distinction between BPO services and KPO services, we are of the view that even though there appears to be a difference between the BPO and KPO services, the line of difference is very thin. Although the BPO services are generally referred to as the low-end services while KPO services are referred to as high-end services, the range of services rendered by the ITeS sector is so wide that a classification of all these services either as low end or high end is not always possible. On the one hand, KPO segment is referred to as a growing area moving beyond simple voice services suggesting thereby that only the simple voice and data services are the low-end services of the BPO sector, while anything beyond that are KPO services. The definition of ITeS given in the safe harbour rules, on the other hand, includes inter alia data search integration and analysis services and clinical data-base management services, excluding clinical trials. These services which are beyond the simple voice and data services are not included in the definition of KPO services given separately in the safe harbour rules. Even within the KPO segment, the level of expertise and special knowledge required to undertake different services may be different.’

4 However, the Delhi High Court in the case of Rampgreen Solutions (P) Ltd. vs. CIT after considering the Special Bench decision of Maersk Global Centres (India) (P) Ltd. (Supra), held as follows:
‘34. We have reservations as to the Tribunal’s aforesaid view in Maersk Global Centres (India) (P) Ltd. (Supra). As indicated above, the expression “BPO” and “KPO” are, plainly, understood in the sense that whereas BPO does not necessarily involve advanced skills and knowledge, KPO, on the other hand, would involve employment of advanced skills and knowledge for providing services. Thus, the expression “KPO” in common parlance is used to indicate an ITeS provider providing a completely different nature of service than any other BPO service provider. A KPO service provider would also be functionally different from other BPO service providers, inasmuch as the responsibilities undertaken, the activities performed, the quality of resources employed would be materially different. In the circumstances, we are unable to agree that broadly ITeS sector can be used for selecting comparables without making a conscious selection as to the quality and nature of the content of services. Rule 10B(2)(a) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 mandates that the comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions be judged with reference to service / product characteristics. This factor cannot be undermined by using a broad classification of ITeS which takes within its fold various types of services with completely different content and value. Thus, where the tested party is not a KPO service provider, an entity rendering KPO services cannot be considered as a comparable for the purposes of Transfer Pricing analysis. The perception that a BPO service provider may have the ability to move up the value chain by offering KPO services cannot be a ground for assessing the transactions relating to services rendered by the BPO service provider by benchmarking it with the transactions of KPO services providers. The object is to ascertain the ALP of the service rendered and not of a service (higher in value chain) that may possibly be rendered subsequently.

35. As pointed out by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Maersk Global Centres (India) (P) Ltd. (Supra), there may be cases where an entity may be rendering a mix of services some of which may be functionally comparable to a KPO while other services may not. In such cases a classification of BPO and KPO may not be feasible. Clearly, no straitjacket formula can be applied. In cases where the categorisation of services rendered cannot be defined with certainty, it would be apposite to employ the broad functionality test and then exclude uncontrolled entities, which are found to be materially dissimilar in aspects and features that have a bearing on the profitability of those entities. However, where the controlled transactions are clearly in the nature of lower-end ITeS such as Call Centres, etc., for rendering data processing not involving domain knowledge, inclusion of any KPO service provider as a comparable would not be warranted and the transfer pricing study must take that into account at the threshold.’

Thus categorisation of services as BPO, KPO or ITeS could pose a problem in application of appropriate SH rates. In addition, there could be an ambiguity as to what is covered within the term ‘market research’ included in the definition of KPO services. In view of the distinct SH rates for each category, an inappropriate classification could result in larger tax implications.

1.6 Eligible assessee for the purpose of SH
Eligible assessee has been defined under rule 10TB to mean a person who has exercised a valid option for application of SH rules in accordance with rule 10TE, and
(i) is engaged in providing software development services or ITeS or KPO services, with insignificant risk, to a foreign principal;
(ii) has advanced any intra-group loan;
(iii) has provided a corporate guarantee;
(iv) is engaged in providing contract R&D services wholly or partly relating to software development, with insignificant risk, to a foreign principal;
(v) is engaged in providing contract R&D services wholly or partly relating to generic pharmaceutical drugs, with insignificant risk, to a foreign principal;
(vi) is engaged in the manufacture and export of core or non-core auto components and where 90% or more of total turnover during the relevant previous year is in the nature of original equipment manufacturer sales; or
(vii) is in receipt of low value-adding intra-group services from one or more members of its group.

Foreign principal referred to above means a non-resident associated enterprise. Various factors have also been provided which the A.O. or the TPO shall have regard to in order to identify an eligible assessee with insignificant risk [referred to in points (i), (iv) and (v) above] which are as follows:

a) The foreign principal performs most of the economically significant functions involved along with those involved in research or the product development cycle, as the case may be, including the critical functions such as conceptualisation and design of the product and providing the strategic direction and framework, either through its own employees or through its other associated enterprises, while the eligible assessee carries out the work assigned to it by the foreign principal;
b) The capital and funds and other economically significant assets including the intangibles required are provided by the foreign principal or its other associated enterprises, while the eligible assessee is provided remuneration for the work carried out;
c) The eligible assessee works under the direct supervision of the foreign principal or its associated enterprise which not only has the capability to control or supervise but also actually controls or supervises the activities carried out or the research or product development, as the case may be, through its strategic decisions to perform core functions, as well as by monitoring activities on a regular basis;
d) The eligible assessee does not assume or has no economically significant realised risks, and if a contract shows that the foreign principal is obligated to control the risk but the conduct shows that the eligible assessee is doing so, the contractual terms shall not be the final determinant;
e) The eligible assessee has no ownership right, legal or economic, on any intangible generated or on the outcome of any intangible generated or arising during the course of rendering of services or on the outcome of the research, as the case may be, which vests with the foreign principal as evident from the contract and the conduct of the parties.

2. PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED TO APPLY SH RULES
In order to apply SH rules, the procedure as provided in rule 10TE needs to be followed, a summary of which is given below:
a) Application in Form 3CEFA to be furnished to the A.O. on or before the due date for furnishing of return of Income.
b) The assessee should make sure that the return of income for the relevant A.Y. or the first of the A.Ys. is furnished before making an application in Form 3CEFA.
c) The assessee needs to clarify whether he is applying for one A.Y. or more than one A.Y. Such option exercised will continue to remain in force for a period of five years or the period specified in the form, whichever is less. It is to be noted that in respect of option for SH exercised under rule 10TD(2A), i.e., w.e.f. 1st April, 2017, the period of five years is reduced to three years.
d) The assessee needs to furnish a statement to the A.O. with respect to the A.Y. after the initial A.Y. providing details of eligible transactions, their quantum and the profit margins or the rate of interest or commission shown. Such statement needs to be furnished before furnishing the return of income of that particular year.
e) The SH option shall not remain in force for the A.Y. after the initial A.Y. if
i. The eligible assessee opts out of SH by furnishing a declaration to the A.O.; or
ii. The same has been held to be invalid by the respective authority, i.e., TPO or the Commissioner, as the case may be.
f) Upon receipt of the Form 3CEFA, the A.O. shall verify whether the assessee is an eligible assessee and the transaction is an eligible international transaction.
g) In case the A.O. doubts the eligibility, he shall make a reference to the TPO for determination of the eligibility.
h) The TPO may require the assessee to furnish necessary information or documents by notice in writing within a specified time.
i) If the TPO finds that the option exercised is invalid, he shall serve an order regarding the same to the assessee and the A.O. However, an opportunity of being heard is to be given to the assessee before passing the order declaring the option invalid.
j) If the assessee objects to the same, he shall file an objection within 15 days of receipt of the order with the Commissioner to whom the TPO is subordinate.
k) On receipt of the objection, the Commissioner shall pass appropriate orders after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
l) Where the option is valid, the A.O. shall verify that the Transfer Price in respect of the eligible international transactions is in accordance with the circumstances specified in rules 10TD(2) or (2A), and if the same is not in accordance with the said circumstances, the A.O. shall adopt the operating profit margin or rate of interest or commission specified in said sub-rules, as applicable.
m) In the A.Y. after the initial A.Y., if the A.O. has reasons to doubt the eligibility of an assessee or the international transaction for any A.Y. due to change in facts and circumstances, he shall make a reference to the TPO for determining the eligibility.
n) The TPO on receipt of a reference shall determine the eligibility and after providing an opportunity of being heard to the assessee, pass an order and serve the copy of the same on the assessee and the A.O.
o) For the purposes of rule 10TE:
i. No reference to the TPO by the A.O. shall be made after two months from the end of the month in which Form 3CEFA is received by him;
ii. No order shall be passed by TPO after two months from the end of the month in which reference from the A.O. is received by him;
iii. Order shall be passed within a period of two months from the end of the month in which objection filed by the assessee is received by the Commissioner.
p) If no reference is made or order has been passed within the time limit specified above, the option for SH exercised by the assessee shall be treated as valid.

The SH rules provide for a time-bound procedure for determination of the eligibility of the assessee and the international transactions. In case the action is not taken by any of the Income Tax authorities within the prescribed time lines as provided in the rules, the option exercised by the assessee shall be treated as valid.

In a case where the Commissioner passes an order against an assessee by holding that the option of SH is invalid (after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard), in absence of clarity in rule 10TE, it appears that the only recourse available with the assessee is to either determine the ALP as per the normal TP assessment route or to file a writ petition in the High Court.

3. OBSERVATIONS REGARDING REVISED SH
The erstwhile TP SH thresholds, especially for IT and ITeS (20% / 22%), Contract R&D (30%) were set so high that it was not commercially viable for most companies to show any interest in the SH and therefore there were hardly any taxpayers opting for it, leaving the SH as having largely failed to achieve its purpose.

In contrast, the APA Scheme introduced in 2012 has been a roaring success even though it is a lot more intensive and a time-consuming negotiation process than opting for the SH, which works on a self-declaration basis. The APA route is preferred as it calls for lesser annual compliance requirements and determination of the agreed TP method which is a closer approximation of the ALP and the option of converting to a bilateral APA route which would avoid any economic double taxation for the multinational group.

3.1 No comparability adjustment and allowance
Rule 10TD(4) provides that no comparability adjustment and allowance under the 2nd proviso to section 92C(2) [reference to the 3rd proviso to section 92C(2) seems to have remained inadvertently] shall be made on the transfer price declared by the eligible assessee and accepted under rules 10TD(1) and (2), or (2A), as the case may be.

For international transactions undertaken for the period up to 31st March, 2014, the 2nd proviso to section 92C(2) provided that if the variation between ALP determined as per the MAM and the price at which the international transaction has actually been undertaken does not exceed notified percentage (not exceeding 3%), the price at which the international transaction is actually undertaken shall be deemed to be the ALP.

For international transactions undertaken from 1st April, 2014, the 3rd proviso to section 92C(2) was inserted to employ a ‘range’ concept for determination of ALP where more than one price is determined by the MAM. It provides that if more than one price is determined by the MAM, the ALP in relation to an international transaction shall be computed in the prescribed manner, i.e., rule 10CA(7). The proviso to rule 10CA(7) provides that the variation between ALP determined under the rule and the actual price does not exceed the notified percentage, then the actual price shall be deemed to be the ALP.

For the A.Y. 2020-21, Notification No. 83/2020 dated 19th October, 2020 provides the manner and limits of price variation (not exceeding 1% of the actual price in respect of wholesale trading and 3% of the actual price in all other cases).

Thus, the objective of rule 10TD(4) is that in cases where the option of the SH has been accepted, there would be no further allowance on account of comparability adjustment.

3.2 Maintenance, keeping and furnishing of information and documents
It is important to keep in mind that the provisions of rule 10TD(5) provide that section 92D relating to maintenance, keeping and furnishing of information and documents by certain persons, i.e., (i) One who has entered into an international transaction, as prescribed in rule 10D; and (ii) a constituent entity of an international group in respect of an international group as prescribed in rule 10DA, will be applicable irrespective of the fact that the assessee exercises his option for SH in respect of any such transaction.

3.3 Furnishing of report from an accountant by persons entering into international transactions
Rule 10TD(5) also provides that provisions of section 92E relating to a report from an accountant to be furnished by persons entering into international transactions will be applicable irrespective of the fact that the assessee exercises his option for SH in respect of any such transaction.

3.4 Non-applicability of SH rules in certain cases
Rule 10TF provides that SH rules contained in rules 10TA to 10TE shall not apply in respect of eligible international transactions entered into with an AE located in:
(a) any country or territory notified u/s 94A; or
(b) in a no-tax or low-tax country or territory.

Section 94A(1) containing enabling powers provides that the Central Government may, having regard to the lack of effective exchange of information with any country or territory outside India, specify by Notification in the official Gazette such country or territory as a notified jurisdictional area in relation to transactions entered into by any assessee.

In exercise of its powers, earlier the Central Government had, vide Notification No. 86/2013 dated 1st November, 2013 notified Cyprus as a ‘notified jurisdictional area’. However, subsequently the said Notification was rescinded vide Notification No. 114/2016 dated 14th November, 2016 and Notification No. 119/2016 dated 16th December, 2016 with effect from the date of issue of the Notification. CBDT, vide Circular No. 15 of 2017 dated 21st April, 2017, clarified that Notification No. 86/2013 had been rescinded with effect from the date of issue of the said Notification, thereby removing Cyprus as a notified jurisdictional area with retrospective effect from 1st November, 2013. Thus, no such Notification is in operation now.

Rule 10TA(i) defines ‘no-tax or low-tax country or territory’ to mean a country or territory in which the maximum rate of income-tax is less than 15%.

3.5 Applicability of the Mutual Agreement Procedure
OECD TP Guidelines in para 4.117 have recommended modification of the SH outcome in individual cases under mutual agreement procedures (MAPs) to mitigate the risk of double taxation where the SH are adopted unilaterally.

However, Indian SH rules have taken an opposite view as compared to OECD TP Guidelines and have provided that MAPs shall not apply.

Rule 10TG provides that where transfer price in relation to an eligible international transaction declared by an eligible assessee is accepted by the Income-Tax Authorities u/s 92CB, the assessee shall not be entitled to invoke MAP under a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.

3.6 Impact of TP litigations in the preceding years on the choice for SH
In the Indian scenario, the existing SH as an alternate dispute resolution mechanism has not proved itself as an attractive option. SH, as compared to other available options, has showcased bleak growth. This is evident as the Indian taxpayers have maintained a safe distance from SH over the years.

There are a number of dispute resolution mechanisms available for a taxpayer in India which, although time–consuming, generally yield the desired outcome for the taxpayer. Further, the price / margin to be offered under the Indian SH is perceived to be on the higher side compared to the benchmarks and outcome obtained via other mechanisms.

In some cases, where SH rates were relied upon by the TPO without performing any benchmarking, the same have been rejected by the ITAT and the lower margin of the taxpayer is accepted. This is another reason that makes the SH route less lucrative and the reason for the taxpayer’s reluctance to opt for the SH, as the margins lower than those prescribed by the SH in certain segments are well accepted.

However, in many cases where prolonged TP litigation has been going on for many years and the differential tax impact is not significant, the assessees have opted for the SH regime in order to avoid long litigation and have certainty.

4. IMPLICATIONS OF SECONDARY ADJUSTMENTS
As per section 92CE, secondary adjustment means an adjustment in the books of accounts of the assessee and its AE to reflect that the actual allocation of profits between the assessee and its AE are consistent with the transfer price determined as a result of primary adjustment, thereby removing the imbalance between the cash account and the actual profit of the assessee. Such secondary adjustment is now mandated under the following scenarios where primary adjustment to transfer price
(i) has been made suo motu by the assessee in his return of income;
(ii) made by the A.O. has been accepted by the assessee;
(iii) is determined by an APA entered into by the assessee u/s 92CC on or after 1st April, 2017;
(iv) is made as per the SH rules framed u/s 92CB; or
(v) is arising as a result of resolution of an assessment by way of the MAP under an agreement entered into u/s 90 or u/s 90A for avoidance of double taxation.

Primary adjustment has been defined in section 92CE(3)(iv) to mean the determination of transfer price in accordance with the arm’s length principle resulting in an increase in the total income or reduction in the loss of an assessee.

4.1 Significant hardships and issues that can arise due to secondary adjustment
The stated purpose of secondary adjustment is to remove the imbalance between the cash account and the actual profit of the taxpayer and to reflect that the actual allocation of profit is consistent with the ALP determined as a result of the primary adjustment. The issues that can arise due to the same are as follows:
a. Enforcing the recording of such adjustment in the books of accounts of the AE would be difficult for the Indian taxpayer, especially in cases where the primary adjustment is on account of the SH option, or suo motu offering to tax. The Government had clarified that SH margins are not necessarily ALP but only an option to avoid litigation. In such cases, to mandate the AE to record the adjustment would be unfair.
b. The taxpayer may be prompted not to accept the primary adjustment in the first place but instead litigate the same. The provisions provide that secondary adjustment should be made if primary adjustment made by the A.O. is accepted by the taxpayer. This would discourage the taxpayer from making suo motu adjustments or opting for SH provisions. When the Government is looking at reducing litigation, these new proposals are not going to help achieve that objective.

4.2 Impact of secondary adjustment on adoption of SH
As provided in the 1st proviso to section 92CE, secondary adjustment will not be required in cases where the primary adjustment made in any previous year does not exceed Rs. 1 crore. In view of the same, where the scale of operations of an assessee is small and likely primary adjustment as per the SH rules does not exceed Rs. 1 crore, the secondary adjustment will not be applicable. In such cases, there will not be any impact on adoption of SH rules even if there is a primary adjustment.

Example
In the case of two assessees who are engaged in the manufacture and export of core auto components (where the SH rules provide that the operating profit margin declared in relation to operating expenses should not be less than 12%), the impact of secondary adjustment on adoption of SH will be as follows:

Amount in crores

Sr. No.

Particulars

Assessee A

Assessee B

1.

Operating Revenue (in crores)

Rs. 80

Rs. 20

2.

Operating Expense (in crores)

Rs. 75

Rs. 18.5

3.

Operating Profit (in crores)

Rs. 5

Rs. 1.5

4.

Operating Profit margin (3 ÷ 2)

6.67%

8.12%

5.

SH margin required

12%

12%

6.

Operating profit as per SH rules (5 x 2) (in crores)

Rs. 9

Rs. 2.22

7.

Primary adjustment to be made (6 – 3) (in crores)

Rs. 4

Rs. 0.72

8.

Whether secondary adjustment required

Yes

No

As we can observe from the above example, in case of assessee A the primary adjustment to be made is Rs. 4 crores. Accordingly, secondary adjustment will be required and this will have an impact on the decision of assessee A to opt for SH. On the other hand, in case of assessee B the primary adjustment to be made does not exceed Rs. 1 crore. Accordingly, secondary adjustment will not be applicable and it will not have any impact on the adoption of SH.

Further, section 92CE(2A) provides that where the excess money or part thereof has not been repatriated within the prescribed time [on or before 90 days from the due date of filing of return u/s 139(1)], the assessee may at his option pay additional income tax @ 18% on such excess money or part thereof as the case may be.

Where the additional income tax as specified above is paid by the assessee, section 92CE(2D) provides that such assessee shall not be required to make secondary adjustment under sub-section (1) and compute interest under sub-section (2) from the date of payment of such tax.

5. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES AMIDST COVID-19
CBDT vide Notification dated 24th September, 2021 has notified the SH margins for F.Y. 2020-21 and they are the same margins which were applicable for F.Ys. 2016-17 to 2019-20.

Enterprises which have undertaken international transactions during F.Y. 2019-20 and F.Y. 2020-21 may have to perform a pilot analysis for verifying whether their margins are in compliance with the margins prescribed by the SH rules. If not, they can always opt out of SH rules for the relevant A.Y. by making a declaration to that effect to the A.O. as envisaged under rule 10TE.

SH rules were introduced by the CBDT to establish a simpler mechanism to administrate companies undertaking international transactions and also to reduce the amount of litigation. Prescribing the same margins for the coming years would work against the purpose for which they were introduced.

The Covid-19 pandemic has given rise to a number of problems, posing great challenges at least from a TP perspective. Due to the changing business risk environment and difficulty in determining the ALP, it was hoped that the SH margins would be reduced to provide more breathing space to businesses. However, the CBDT vide Notification No. 117/2021, dated 24th September, 2021, extended the validity of the provisions of the SH rules to A.Y. 2021-22 without making any changes or adjustments on account of the pandemic.

6. SAFE HARBOUR RULES FOR SPECIFIED DOMESTIC TRANSACTIONS
Rules 10TH and 10THA to 10THD contain the provisions relating to SH rules for Specified Domestic Transactions.

Rule 10THA defines the eligible assessee to mean a person who has exercised a valid option for application of SH rules in accordance with the provisions of rule 10THC and (i) is a Government company engaged in the business of generation, supply, transmission or distribution of electricity; or (ii) is a co-operative society engaged in the business of procuring and marketing milk and milk products.

In view of the limited application of SH rules for specified domestic transactions only to specified businesses relating to electricity and milk and milk products, the same is not elaborated in this article.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Introduction of SH was a crucial step towards reduction of TP litigations, allowing the Department to focus its resources on significant issues and improving the ease of doing business ranking and investment climate in India from a tax perspective. It has also ensured the reduction of the compliance burden on the taxpayers, enabling them to focus more on their core activities.

In order to make SH rules more attractive to the assessees, the requirement to still maintain detailed TP documentation (TP Study), including benchmarking, may be dispensed with. Only a brief note about the business and ownership structure with brief FAR details should be enough. That will reduce cost of compliance and make this SH simpler to comply with. Where later on the eligibility for SH is questioned, there can be a requirement made to the taxpayer to compile and present more detailed information at that point in time.

In view of the Covid-19 pandemic where the business entities have been impacted adversely to a great extent, a reduction in the compliance burden along with reasonable SH margins would enable them to get back on their feet. However, given the recent CBDT Notification to extend the validity of the SH margins without any adjustment on account of the pandemic, it may be advisable for the taxpayers to evaluate the comparable margins of the industry and the impact of Covid-19 on the industry, before opting for the SH application.

_________________________________________________________________
3    [2014] 43 taxmann.com 100 (Mum-Trib) (SB)
4    [2015] 60 taxmann.com 355 (Del)

CLAIM FOR RELIEF OF REBATE OUTSIDE REVISED RETURN OF INCOME

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
It is usual to come across cases where an assessee, in filing the return of income, fails to make a claim for relief on account of a rebate or deduction or exemption and also overlooks the filing of the revised return within the time prescribed u/s 139(5). His attempt to remedy the mistake by staking a claim for relief before the A.O. or the CIT(A) afresh is usually dismissed by the authority. At times, even the appellate Tribunal or the courts have not appreciated the bypassing of the statutory remedy entrusted u/s 139(5), more so after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd., 284 ITR 323 was delivered, a decision interpreted by the authorities and at times by the Courts to have laid down the law that requires an assessee to stake a fresh claim, not made while filing the return of income, only by revising the return within the prescribed time.

Several Benches of the Tribunal and the Courts, after due consideration of the said decision of the Apex Court, have permitted the assessee to stake a fresh claim, which claim was not made while filing the return of income or by revising the same in time, either by filing an application during the course of the assessment or, at the least, while adjudicating the appeal. At a time when it appeared that the law was reasonably settled on the subject, the recent decision of the Kerala High Court has warned the assessee that the last word on the subject has not yet been said. It held that the claim for relief, not made vide a return, revised or otherwise, could not be made before the A.O. or even before the appellate authorities.

RAGHAVAN NAIR’S CASE
The issue recently came up for the consideration of the Kerala High Court in the case of Raghavan Nair, 402 ITR 400. The assessee had received a certain sum of money during F.Y. 2014-15 pertaining to A.Y. 2015-16 by way of compensation for land acquired from him for a Government project. The assessee offered the receipt for taxation in filing the return of income under the head capital gains. During the course of the scrutiny assessment, the assessee claimed that the compensation received was not taxable in the light of section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The assessee requested for the relief vide a letter which was denied by the A.O., against which the assessee filed a writ petition before the Court.

The Court noted that the assessee, when he was made to understand that he had no liability to pay tax on capital gains, could not file a revised return since the time for filing the revised return had expired by the time he came to know that there was no such liability to pay tax.

At the hearing, the Court held that it was the duty of the A.O. to refrain from assessing an income even if the same had been included by mistake by the assessee in his return of income filed. The Court held that the decision of the Supreme Court was not applicable to the facts of the case by explaining the implication of the decision of the Apex Court as: ‘The question that arose in Goetze (India) Ltd.’s case (Supra) was whether an assessee could make a claim for deduction other than by filing a revised return. As noted above, the question in the case on hand is whether the A.O. is precluded from considering an objection as to his authority to make an assessment u/s 143 merely for the reason that the petitioner has included in his return an amount which is exempted from payment of tax and that he could not file a revised return to rectify the said mistake in the return. The decision of the Apex Court in the Goetze case has, therefore, no application to the facts of the present case.’

The High Court held that this was a clear case where the A.O. had penalised the assessee for having paid tax on an income which was not exigible to tax. It noted that in the light of the mandate under article 265 of the Constitution, no tax should be levied or collected except by authority of law. The Court relied on the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Shelly Products 129 Taxman 271:

‘We cannot lose sight of the fact that the failure or inability of the Revenue to frame a fresh assessment should not place the assessee in a more disadvantageous position than in what he would have been if a fresh assessment was made. In a case where an assessee chooses to deposit by way of abundant caution advance tax or self-assessment tax which is in excess of his liability on the basis of the return furnished, or there is any arithmetical error or inaccuracy, it is open to him to claim refund of the excess tax paid in the course of the assessment proceeding. He can certainly make such a claim also before the authority concerned calculating the refund. Similarly, if he has by mistake or inadvertence or on account of ignorance, included in his income any amount which is exempted from payment of Income-Tax, or is not income within the contemplation of law, he may likewise bring this to the notice of the assessing authority, which if satisfied, may grant him relief and refund the tax paid in excess, if any. Such matters can be brought to the notice of the authority concerned in a case when refund is due and payable, and the authority, on being satisfied, shall grant appropriate relief. In cases governed by section 240 of the Act, an obligation is cast upon the Revenue to refund the amount to the assessee without his having to make any claim in that behalf. In appropriate cases, therefore, it is open to the assessee to bring facts to the notice of the authority concerned on the basis of the return furnished, which may have a bearing on the quantum of the refund, such as those the assessee could have urged u/s 237 of the Act. The authority, for the limited purpose of calculating the amount to be refunded u/s 240 of the Act, may take all such facts into consideration and calculate the amount to be refunded. So viewed, an assessee will not be placed in a more disadvantageous position than what he would have been, had an assessment been made in accordance with law.’

Accordingly, the Court held that the A.O. should not have taxed the income that was not liable to tax even where the assessee had offered such an income for taxation and had not filed the revised return of income.

PARAGON BIOMEDICAL INDIA (P) LTD.’S CASE
The issue recently again came before the Kerala High Court in the case of Paragon Biomedical India (P) Ltd. 438 ITR 227 (Ker). In this case, the assessee had claimed a deduction u/s 10B which was disallowed by the A.O. In the appeal to the CIT(A), the assessee modified the claim for deduction from section 10B to section 10A, which was allowed by the CIT(A). On appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in allowing the alternative claim of deduction u/s 10A and confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) that permitted the assessee to claim the deduction under a different provision of law than the one that was applied for while filing the return of income.

On further appeal, the High Court, however, reversed the order of the Tribunal and held the order to be contrary to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Goetze (India) Ltd. (Supra) and Ramakrishna Deo 35 ITR 312. In the light of the said decisions, the High Court termed the orders of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal as both illegal and untenable. The Court, in deciding the case, found that the decisions in the cases of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. 229 ITR 383 (SC) and Goetze did not conflict with each other, as NTPC’s decision did not in any way relate to the power of the A.O. to entertain a claim for deduction otherwise than by filing a revised return.

OBSERVATIONS
Article 265 of the Constitution of India provides that any retention of tax collected, which is not otherwise payable, would be illegal and unconstitutional. Retaining the mandate of the Constitution, the Board vide Circular 14(XL-35) dated 11th July, 1955 reiterated that the taxing authority cannot collect or retain tax that is not authorised by law and further that it was the duty of the assessing authority to ensure that a relief allowable to an assessee in law shall be allowed to him even where such a claim is not made by him in filing the return of income.

An A.O. has been vested with the power to assess the total income and in doing so he has wide powers to bring to tax any income, whether or not disclosed in the return of income. He also has the powers to rectify any mistakes. The Board has invested in him the power to grant the reliefs and rebates that an assessee is entitled to but has failed to claim while filing the return of income. [CBDT Circular No. 14 dated 11th July, 1955]. This Circular is relied upon by the Courts to hold that an A.O. is duty-bound to grant such reliefs and rebates that an assessee is entitled to, based on the records available, even where not claimed by the assessee in filing the return of income or otherwise.

Section 139(5) provides for filing of a revised return of income in cases where the return furnished contains any omission or any wrong statement within the prescribed time independent of the powers and the duties of the A.O. It was a largely settled understanding that an assessee could make a claim for a relief or rebate, during the course of assessment, by filing a petition without filing a revised return of income even after the time of filing such return has expired. The Apex Court, however, in one of the decisions (Goetze), held that a rebate or a relief can be claimed by an assessee only by filing of a revised return of income. This decision has posed various challenges, some of which are:

• Whether an A.O. can entertain a petition outside of the revised return and allow a relief claimed by the assessee.
• Whether an A.O. is duty-bound to allow a relief even where not claimed in the return filed by the assessee where no petition or revised return is filed.
• Whether an A.O. is bound to allow such a relief where the material for such relief is available on his records though no petition or revised return is filed.
• Whether an A.O. is required to allow a petition for a modified claim for relief, which was otherwise claimed differently in the return of income filed, without insisting on the revised return of income.
• Whether an appellate authority, being CIT(A) or the Tribunal, can entertain a petition for a relief not claimed or allowed in any of the above situations.

Section 143, as noted above, has invested the A.O. with wide powers in assessing the total income and bringing to tax the true or real income of the assessee, whether or not disclosed in the return of income, even where no return has been filed by an assessee. Sections 250(5) and 251(1) have invested a CIT(A) with powers that are consistently held by the Courts to be coterminus with the powers of an A.O.; he can do everything that an A.O. could have done and has all those powers which an A.O. has, besides the power of enhancement of an income that has not been brought to tax by the A.O. in the course of adjudicating an appeal, subject to a limitation in respect of the new source of income. The appellate Tribunal is vested with powers u/s 254(1) that are held to be wide enough to include entertaining a claim for the first time, subject to certain limitations.

By now it is the settled position in law that the appellate authorities have the power to entertain a new or a fresh claim for relief made by the assessee for the first time before them subject to providing an opportunity to the A.O. to put up his case. This is clear from the reference to the following important decisions:

The Supreme Court in the case of Jute Corporation of India Ltd., 187 ITR 688 dealt with a case where the assessee, during the pendency of its appeal before the AAC, raised an additional ground claiming deduction of certain amount on account of liability of disputed purchase tax, not claimed while filing the return of income. The AAC permitted the assessee to raise the additional ground and after hearing the ITO, accepted the assessee’s claim and allowed the deduction. However, the Tribunal held that the AAC had no jurisdiction to entertain the additional ground or to grant relief to the assessee on a ground which had not been raised before the ITO. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court, following its decision in the case of Kanpur Coal Syndicate, 53 ITR 225, delivered by a Bench of three judges and dissenting from its later decision in the case of Gurjaragraveurs (P) Ltd., 111 ITR 1 delivered by a Bench of two judges, held as under:

‘The Act does not contain any express provision debarring an assessee from raising an additional ground in appeal and there is no provision in the Act placing restriction on the power of the appellate authority in entertaining an additional ground in appeal. In the absence of any statutory provision, the general principle relating to the amplitude of the appellate authority’s power being coterminous with that of the initial authority should normally be applicable. If the tax liability of the assessee is admitted and if the ITO is afforded an opportunity of hearing by the appellate authority in allowing the assessee’s claim for deduction on the settled view of law, there appears to be no good reason to curtail the powers of the appellate authority u/s 251(1)(a). Even otherwise an appellate authority while hearing an appeal against the order of a subordinate authority has all the powers which the original authority may have in deciding the question before it, subject to the restrictions or limitations, if any, prescribed by the statutory provisions. In the absence of any statutory provision, the appellate authority is vested with all the plenary powers which the subordinate authority may have in the matter. There appeared to be no good reason to justify curtailment of the power of the AAC in entertaining an additional ground raised by the assessee in seeking modification of the order of assessment passed by the ITO.’

The Supreme Court in the case of Nirbheram Deluram, 91 Taxman 181 (SC) held that the first appellant authority could modify an assessment on a ground not raised before an A.O. following Jute Corporation of India Ltd.’s case (Supra) which had held that the first appellate authority could permit an additional ground not raised before the A.O.

The Kerala High Court, in the case of V. Subhramoniya Iyer, 113 ITR 685, held that the first appellate authority had the power to substitute the order of an A.O. with his own order and the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ahmedabad Crucible Co., 206 ITR 574 held that the powers of the first appellate authority extended beyond the subject matter of assessment, which powers were held to include the power to make an addition on a ground not considered by the A.O.

The Supreme Court in the National Thermal Power Corporation case (Supra) confirmed the judicial view that in cases where a non-taxable receipt was taxed or a permissible deduction was denied, there was no reason why the assessee should be prevented from raising the claim before the second appellate authority for the first time, so long as the relevant facts were on record pertaining to the claim. This condition of the availability of the evidence on records is also waived where the fresh issue relates to the moot question of law or goes to the root of the appeal. Even otherwise, the courts are liberal in upholding the powers of the second appellate authorities generally to entertain a lawful claim.

This understanding and the contours of law are not sought to be disturbed even by the decision of the Apex Court delivered in the Goetze case, which rather confirmed that the said decision was independent of the powers of the appellate authorities. In fact, the appellate authorities regularly entertained a fresh claim by relying on the said decision. It is this settled position of law, even post-Goetze, that is sought to be disturbed by the recent Kerala High Court decision in the case of Paragon Biomedical (Supra) when holding that the claim made before the A.O., outside the revised return of income, was not entertainable. Even when the CIT(A) entertained and allowed such a claim, the said claim was found to be not permissible in law by the Court.

And even prior to the decision of the Kerala High Court, the Madras High Court in the case of Shriram Investments Ltd. (TCA No. 344 of 2005) and the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Litostroj, 54 SOT 37 (URO) following the said Madras High Court decision, had held that relief could have been claimed only by filing a revised return of income.

We are of the considered opinion that the position in law settled by the series of Supreme Court decisions permitting the assessee to raise a new or a fresh claim before the appellate authorities is nowhere unsettled by the decision in Paragon Biomedical and a few other cases. In fact, had these decisions of the Supreme Court been cited before the High Court, the decision of the Court would surely have been otherwise. The case before the Kerala High Court was not represented by the assessee before the Court and the representative of the Revenue seems to have failed to bring these cases to the notice of the Court. [Please see Pruthvi Stock Brokers Ltd., 23 taxmann.com 23 (Bom); Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., 130 taxmann.com 352 (Kar); Ajay G. Piramal Foundation, 228 Taxman 332 (Del).]

The real issue of the assessee’s power to claim a relief or a rebate outside of a revised return of income, under a petition to the A.O. during the course of assessment, appears to have been soft-pedalled by the Courts either by holding that the A.O. was duty-bound, under the Circular No. 14 of 1955, to allow the relief on his own based on records available, as was done in the cases of Sesa Goa Ltd., 117 taxmann.com 548 (Bom) or CMS Securitas, 82 taxmann.com 319 (Mum) or Perlos, ITA No. 1037/Madras/2013, to name a few, and alternatively by holding that the claim for relief, made outside the revised return before the A.O. was not a new or a fresh claim but was a modified claim based on a mistaken provision of law or the quantum or the failure to claim a relief for which the reports and other material were available on record, as was held in the cases of Malayala Manorama, 409 ITR 358 (Ker), Ramco Engineering, 332 ITR 306 (P&H), Influence, 55 taxmann.com 192 (Del), Shri Balaji Sago Agro, 53 SOT 15 (Mad), Perlos, ITA No. 1037/Madras/2013 and also in Raghavan Nair (Supra), 402 ITR 400 by the same Kerala High Court. [Please also see Sam Global, 360 ITR 682 (Del), Jai Parabolic, 306 ITR 42 (Del), Natraj Stationery, 312 ITR 22 (Del) and Rose Services, 326 ITR 100 (Del).]

A fresh claim for relief is different from a revised claim for relief. In cases where a claim has been made while filing the return of income and is modified or is enhanced or is made under a different provision of the law, the case can be classified as a case of a revised claim, and not a fresh claim. The outcome can be different in cases where the evidence in support of the fresh claim is available on record, from cases where such evidence is not available on record.

The issue of an assessee’s right to claim a relief or a rebate, outside the revised return of income post Goetze, has been addressed directly in the case of CMS Securitas Ltd., 82 taxmann.com 319 by the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in favour of the assessee, while the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Litostroj, 54 SOT 37 (URO), following an unreported decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Shriram Investments Ltd. [T.C. (A) No. 344 of 2005, dated 16th June, 2011] restored the matter to the file of the A.O. to verify the facts, instead of upholding the power of the CIT(A) to entertain a fresh claim.

In Goetze the question raised in the appeal by the assessee related to whether the assessee could make a claim for deduction other than by filing a revised return by way of a letter before the A.O. The deduction was disallowed by the A.O. on the ground that there was no provision under the Act to make an amendment in the return of income by an application at the assessment stage without revising the return. In the appeal, the assessee had relied upon the decision in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. (Supra) to contend that it was open to the assessee to raise the points of law even before the appellate Tribunal. The Court noted that the said decision dealt with the power of the Tribunal to entertain a claim where the facts relating to the law were available on record, and that it did not in any way relate to the power of the A.O. to entertain a claim for deduction otherwise than by filing a revised return; and that the NTPC decision could not be relied upon to allow the claim before the A.O. outside the revised return of income. The appeal of the assessee was dismissed by clarifying that the issue in the case was limited to the power of the assessing authority and did not impinge on the power of the appellate Tribunal u/s 254.

The better view therefore is that the appellate authority certainly has the right to consider a fresh or revised claim made by the assessee in appeal, and certainly so in respect of a claim made for which the relevant facts are already on record.

Besides the issue under consideration w.r.t. section 139(5), the issues regularly arise where a fresh claim is sought to be made while filing the return in response to a notice u/s 153A / 153C, abated or not, or section 148, or where such a claim is sought to be made in a revision application u/s 264 or by filing rectification u/s 154 or on application u/s 119(2)(b).

A fresh claim was held to be permissible in the return filed in response to notice u/s 153A / 153C in case of abated assessment [JSW Steel Ltd., 422 ITR 71 (Bom), B.G. Shirke Construction Technology (P) Ltd., 79 taxmann.com 306 (Bom)] and where assessment was unabated and incriminating documents were found for that year [Sheth Developers (P) Ltd., 210 Taxman 208 (Mag)(Bom), Neeraj Jindal, 393 ITR 1 (Del), Kirit Dahyabhai Patel, 80 taxmann.com 162 (Guj), Shrikant Mohta, 414 ITR 270 (Cal)]. In contrast, the courts in a few other cases have held that the assessee is not permitted to stake such a fresh claim that was not made in the return filed u/s 139.

In the context of the return of income filed in response to a notice u/s 148, it was held that a fresh claim was not permissible in the cases of Caixa Economica De Goa, 210 ITR 719 (Bom), Satyamangalam Agricultural Producer’s Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd.,357 ITR 347 (Mad) and K. Sudhakar S. Shanbhag, 241 ITR 865 (Bom).

In contrast, a fresh claim was held to be permissible in filing a revision application u/s 264. [Vijay Gupta, 386 ITR 643 (Del), Assam Roofing Ltd., 43 taxmann.com 316 (Gau), S.R. Koshti, 276 ITR 165 (Guj), Sharp Tools, 421 ITR 90 (Mad), Shri Hingulambika Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. 81 taxmann.com 157 (Kar), Agarwal Yuva Mandal, 395 ITR 502 (Ker), EBR Enterprises, 415 ITR 139 (Bom), Kewal Krishan Jain, 42 taxmann.com 84 (P&H).]

In the cases of Curewel (India) Ltd., 269 Taxman 397 (Del) it was held permissible to place a fresh claim while an assessment is being made afresh in pursuance of an order setting aside the original order of assessment. But see also Saheli Synthetics (P) Ltd., 302 ITR 126 (Guj).

In filing an application for rectification u/s 154, it was held permissible to file a fresh claim [Nagaraj & Co. (P) Ltd., 425 ITR 412 (Mad), Anchor Pressings (P) Ltd., 161 ITR 159 (SC), Gujarat State Seeds Corpn. Ltd., 370 ITR 666 (Guj) and NHPC Ltd., 399 ITR 275 (P&H).]

An assessee who has missed making a claim in the return of income, may explore the possibility of filing an application to the CBDT u/s 119(2)(b) for permitting the filing of a revised return of income after the expiry of the time u/s 139(5). [Mrs. Leena R. Phadnis,387 ITR 721 (Bom), Mahalakshmi Co-operative Bank Ltd., 358 ITR 23 (Kar) and Labh Singh, 111 taxmann.com 53 (HP).]