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When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct him to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. Accordingly, limited scrutiny assessment cannot be revised u/s 263 beyond the scope of scrutiny

16 Antariksh Realtors Private Limited vs. ITO [TS-1029-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 22nd October, 2021 Section: 263

When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct him to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. Accordingly, limited scrutiny assessment cannot be revised u/s 263 beyond the scope of scrutiny

FACTS
The assessee, a company engaged in business as a builder and developer, filed its return of income declaring a loss of Rs. 14,34,236. The case was selected under ‘limited scrutiny’ for examination of two issues, viz., (i) Low income in comparison to high loan / advances / investments in shares appearing in balance sheet; and (ii) Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) liability mismatch. The A.O. upon examining these two issues completed the assessment.

Subsequently, after reviewing the assessment order, the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax in charge of the range found that the increase in loan taken by the assessee from Rs. 8.57 crores in the preceding year to Rs. 10.42 crores in the current year was not verified by the A.O. He observed that the A.O. also did not verify the assessee’s claim that all loans and advances given are for the purpose of business, by calling for details of transactions in subsequent years along with supporting documents. He also observed that the A.O. did not verify the capitalisation of interest paid. In view of these facts, the Additional Commissioner submitted a proposal to the PCIT for exercising the powers u/s 263 to revise the assessment order.

The PCIT issued a show cause notice u/s 263. The assessee submitted that the A.O. had thoroughly inquired into the issues for which the case was selected for scrutiny. However, the PCIT was not convinced. He held that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue due to non-inquiry by the A.O. He set aside the assessment order with a direction to examine the relevant details as observed in the revision order and complete the assessment after conducting proper and necessary inquiry.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the two issues which require examination are whether the limited scrutiny for which the assessee’s case was selected encompassed examination of loans taken by the assessee and capitalisation of interest expenditure, and if it was not so, whether the assessment order can be held to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue for not examining the issues relating to loan taken and interest expenditure capitalised.

The Tribunal noted that the PCIT while exercising power u/s 263 has attempted to expand the scope of the limited scrutiny. It observed that the A.O. did examine both the issues for which the assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny and the A.O. had also conducted necessary inquiry on the issues for which the case was selected for scrutiny and he completed the assessment after applying his mind to the materials on record.

The A.O. being bound by CBDT Instruction No. 20/2015 dated 29th December, 2015 and CBDT Instruction No. 5 of 2016 dated 14th July, 2016, could not have gone beyond the scope and ambit of limited scrutiny for which the case was selected. He had rightly restricted himself to the scope and ambit of limited scrutiny. Unless the scope of scrutiny is expanded by converting it into a complete scrutiny with the approval of the higher authority, the A.O. could not have travelled beyond his mandate. The Tribunal held that the assessment order cannot be considered to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue for not examining the loans taken by the assessee and their utilisation as well as capitalisation of interest.

When the A.O. is not empowered to do certain acts directly, the revisionary authority certainly cannot direct the A.O. to do so indirectly by exercising power u/s 263. For this proposition the Tribunal relied upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Su-Raj Diamond Dealers Pvt. Ltd. vs. PCIT, ITA No. 3098/Mum/2019; order dated 27th November, 2019.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law

15 Alfa Laval Lund AB vs. CIT (IT/TP) [TS-1024-ITAT-2021 (Pune)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 2nd November, 2021 Section: 263

The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law

FACTS
The assessee, a foreign company, filed its return of income declaring Nil total income. The assessment of its total income was completed on 27th March, 2015, again assessing Nil total income. Subsequently, the CIT received a proposal from the A.O. for revision based on which the CIT carried out a revision by observing that the assessee had entered into an agreement on 1st October, 2011 with its related concern in India for supply of software licenses and IT support services. The amount of service fee received from the Indian entity, collected on the basis of number of users, was claimed as not chargeable to tax in India within the meaning of Article 12 of the India-Sweden Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The CIT opined that the receipt from the Indian entity was in the nature of ‘Royalty’ and not ‘Fees for Technical Services’. After issuing a show cause notice and considering the reply of the assessee, the CIT set aside the order passed by the A.O. and remitted the matter to the A.O. for treating the amount received from the Indian entity as ‘Royalty’ chargeable to tax u/s 9(1)(vi).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the order of the CIT mentioned that ‘A proposal for revision under section 263 of the IT Act, 1961 was received from DCIT(IT)-1, Pune through the Jt. CIT(IT), Pune vide letter No. Pn/Jt.CIT(IT)/263/2016-17/61 dated 23rd May,. 2016’. It observed that the edifice of the revision in the present case has been laid on the bedrock of receipt of the proposal from the A.O.

The Tribunal having noted the provisions of section 263(1) held that the process of revision u/s 263 is initiated only when the CIT calls for and examines the record of any proceeding under the Act and considers that any order passed by the A.O. is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The twin conditions are sine qua non for the exercise of power under this section. The use of the word ‘and’ between the expression ‘call for and examine the record…’ and the expression ‘if he considers that any order… is erroneous…’ abundantly demonstrates that both these conditions must be cumulatively fulfilled by the CIT and in the same order, that is, the first followed by the second. The kicking point is the CIT calling for and examining the record of the proceedings leading him to consider that the assessment order is erroneous, etc. The consideration that the assessment order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue should flow from and be the consequence of his examination of the record of the proceedings. If such a consideration is not preceded by the examination of the record of the proceedings under the Act, the condition for revision does not get magnetised.

The Tribunal held that it is trite that a power which vests exclusively in one authority can’t be invoked or caused to be invoked by another, either directly or indirectly. The A.O. recommending a revision to the CIT has no statutory sanction and is a course of action unknown to the law. If the A.O., after passing an assessment order finds something amiss in it to the detriment of the Revenue, he has ample power to either reassess the earlier assessment in terms of section 147 or carry out rectification u/s 154. He can’t usurp the power of the CIT and recommend a revision. No overlapping of powers of the authorities under the Act can be permitted.

As revision proceedings in this case triggered with the A.O. sending a proposal to the CIT and then the latter passing an order u/s 263 on the basis of such a proposal, the Tribunal held that it became a case of jurisdiction defect resulting in vitiating the impugned order.

The Tribunal quashed the impugned order on this legal issue itself.

REVENUE RECOGNITION FOR COMPANIES OPERATING IN E-COMMERCE, GAMING AND FINTECH SECTORS

Compiler’s Note: In recent weeks, companies engaged in e-commerce, gaming and fintech have come out with IPOs or are in the process of doing so. These companies operate on very different business models without any ‘brick and mortar’ assets. Given below are the Revenue Recognition policies for a few such companies (from the annual reports where available, or offer documents filed with SEBI).

ONE97 COMMUNICATIONS LTD. (PAYTM)
Revenue Recognition
Revenue is measured based on the consideration specified in a contract with a customer net of variable consideration, e.g., discounts, volume rebates, any payments made to a customer (unless the payment is for a distinct good or service received from the customer) and excludes amounts collected on behalf of third parties. The Company recognises revenue when it transfers control over a product or service to a customer. Revenue is only recognised to the extent that it is highly probable that a significant reversal will not occur.

The Company provides incentives to its users in various forms including cashbacks. Incentives which are consideration payable to the customer that are not in exchange for a distinct good or service are generally recognised as a reduction of revenue.

Where the Company acts as an agent for selling goods or services, only the commission income is included within revenue. The specific revenue recognition criteria described below must also be met before revenue is recognised. Typically, the Company has a right to payment before or at the point that services are delivered. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability. The amount of consideration does not contain a significant financing component as payment terms are less than one year.

Sale of services
Revenue from services is recognised when the control in services is transferred as per the terms of the agreement with the customer, i.e., as and when services are rendered. Revenues are disclosed net of the Goods and Services Tax charged on such services. In terms of the contract, excess of revenue over the billed at the year-end is carried in the balance sheet as unbilled revenue under other financial assets where the amount is recoverable from the customer without any future performance obligation. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability.

Commission
The Company facilitates recharge of talk time, bill payments and availability of bus tickets and earns commission for the respective services. Commission income is recognised when the control in services is transferred to the customer when the services have been provided by the Company.

Service fees from merchants
The Company earns service fee from merchants and recognises such revenue when the control in services have been transferred by the Company, i.e., as and when services have been provided by the Company. Such service fee is generally determined as a percentage of transaction value executed by the merchants. The amounts received by the Company pending settlement are disclosed as payable to the merchants under contract liabilities.

Other operating revenue
Where the Company is contractually entitled to receive claims / compensation in case of non-discharge of obligations by customers, such claims / compensations are measured at amount receivable from such customers and are recognised as other operating revenue when there is a reasonable certainty that the Company will be able to realise the said amounts.

Interest income
For all debt instruments measured either at amortised cost or at fair value through other comprehensive income, interest income is recorded using the effective interest rate (EIR). EIR is the rate that exactly discounts the estimated future cash payments or receipts over the expected life of the financial instrument or a shorter period, where appropriate, to the gross carrying amount of the financial asset or to the amortised cost of a financial liability. When calculating the effective interest rate, the Company estimates the expected cash flows by considering all the contractual terms of the financial instrument but does not consider the expected credit losses. Interest income is included in finance income in the statement of profit and loss.

ZOMATO LTD.
Revenue recognition
The Group generates revenue from online food delivery transactions, advertisements, subscriptions, sale of traded goods and other platform services.

Revenue is recognised to depict the transfer of control of promised goods or services to customers upon the satisfaction of performance obligation under the contract in an amount that reflects the consideration to which the entity expects to be entitled in exchange for those goods or services. Consideration includes goods or services contributed by the customer, as non-cash consideration, over which the Group has control.

Where performance obligation is satisfied over time, the Group recognises revenue over the contract period. Where performance obligation is satisfied at a point in time, the Group recognises revenue when customer obtains control of promised goods and services in the contract.

Revenue is recognised net of any taxes collected from customers, which are remitted to governmental authorities.

Revenue from platform services and transactions
The Group through its platform allows transactions between the consumers and restaurant partners enlisted with the platform. These could be for food orders placed online on the platform by the consumer or through a consumer availing offers from restaurant partners upon a visit to the restaurant. The Group earns commission income on such transactions from the restaurant partners upon completion of the transaction.

The Group is merely a technology platform provider where delivery partners are able to provide their delivery services to the restaurant partners and the consumers. For the platform provided by the Group to the delivery partners, the Group may charge a platform fee from the delivery partners. Up to 28th October, 2019, for orders where the Group was responsible for delivery, the delivery charges were recognised on the completion of the order’s delivery.

In cases where the Group undertakes to run the business for an independent third party, income is recognised on completion of service in accordance with the terms of the contract.

Advertisement revenue
Advertisement revenue is derived principally from the sale of online advertisements which is usually run over a contracted period of time. The revenue from advertisements is thus recognised over this contract period as the performance obligation is met over the contract period. There are some contracts where in addition to the contract period, the Group assures certain ‘clicks’ (which are generated each time viewers on our platform click through the advertiser’s advertisement on the platform) to the advertisers. In these cases, the revenue is recognised when both the conditions of time period and number of clicks assured are met.

Subscription revenue
Revenues from subscription contracts are recognised over the subscription period on systematic basis in accordance with the terms of agreement entered into with the customer.

Sign-up revenue
The Group receives a sign-up amount from its restaurant partners and delivery partners. These are recognised on receipt or over a period of time in accordance with the terms of agreement entered into with such relevant partner.

Delivery facilitation services
The Group is merely a technology platform provider for delivery partners to provide their delivery services to the restaurant partners / consumers and not providing or taking responsibility of the said services. For the service provided by the Group to the delivery partners, the Group may charge a platform fee from the delivery partners.

Sale of traded goods
Revenue is recognised to depict the transfer of control of promised goods to merchants upon the satisfaction of performance obligation under the contract in an amount that reflects the consideration to which the entity expects to be entitled in exchange for those goods. Consideration includes goods contributed by the customer, as non-cash consideration, over which the Group has control.

The amount of consideration disclosed as revenue is net of variable considerations like incentives or other items offered to the customers.

Incentives
The Group provides various types of incentives to transacting consumers to promote the transactions on our platform.

Since the Group identified the transacting consumers as one of our customers for delivery services when the Group is responsible for the delivery services, the incentives offered to transacting consumers are considered as payment to customers and recorded as reduction of revenue on a transaction by transaction basis. The amount of incentive in excess of the delivery fee collected from the transacting consumers is recorded as advertisement and sales promotion expenses.

When incentives are provided to transacting consumers where the Group is not responsible for delivery, the transacting consumers are not considered customers of the Group and such incentives are recorded as advertisement and sales promotion expenses.

Interest
Interest income is recognised using the effective interest method. Interest income is included under the head ‘other income’ in the consolidated statement of profit and loss.

NAZARA TECHNOLOGIES LTD.
Revenue recognition
Revenue arises mainly from income from services, other operating income, other income and dividends.

To determine whether the Company should recognise revenues, the Company follows a 5-step process:
a.    identifying the contract, or contracts, with a customer,
b.    identifying the performance obligations in each contract,
c.    determining the transaction price,
d.    allocating the transaction price to the performance obligations in each contract,
e.    recognising revenue when, or as, we satisfy performance obligations by transferring the promised goods or services.

Revenue from operations
Revenue from subscription / download of games / other contents is recognised when a promise in a customer contract (performance obligation) has been satisfied, usually over the period of subscription. The amount of revenue to be recognised (transaction price) is based on the consideration expected to be received in exchange for services, net of credit notes, discounts, etc. If a contract contains more than one performance obligation, the transaction price is allocated to each performance obligation based on their relative standalone selling price.

Revenue from advertising services, including performance-based advertising, is recognised after the underlying performance obligations have been satisfied, usually in the period in which advertisements are displayed.

Revenue is reported on a gross or net basis based on management’s assessment of whether the Company is acting as a principal or agent in the transaction. The determination of whether the Company acts as a principal or an agent in a transaction is based on an evaluation of whether the good or service are controlled prior to transfer to the customer.

Revenue is measured at the fair value of the consideration received or receivable, considering contractually defined terms of payment, and excluding variable considerations such as volume or cash discounts and taxes or duties collected on behalf of the Government.

Revenue is recognised to the extent that it is probable that the economic benefits will flow to the Company and the revenue can be reliably measured, regardless of when the payment is being made.

A contract liability is an entity’s obligation to transfer goods or services to a customer for which the entity has received consideration (or the amount is due) from the customer and presented as ‘Deferred revenue’. Advance payments received from customers for which no services have been rendered are presented as ‘Advance from customers’.

Unbilled revenues are classified as a financial asset where the right to consideration is unconditional upon passage of time.

Other operating revenue
Other operating revenue mainly consists of Technology Platform / Digital Marketing / Administrative & Business Supporting / Recharge services to subsidiaries and is recognised in the period in which services are rendered.

Revenue is measured at the fair value of the consideration received or receivable, taking into account contractually defined terms of payment and excluding taxes or duties collected on behalf of the Government.

Other income
Interest income is recorded using the effective interest rate (‘EIR’) method. EIR is the rate that exactly discounts the estimated future cash payments or receipts over the expected life of the financial instrument or over a shorter period, where appropriate, to the gross carrying amount of the financial asset or to the amortised cost of the financial liability. Interest income is included under the head ‘finance income’ in the statement of profit and loss account.

Dividends
Dividend income is recognised when the Company’s right to receive dividend is established by the reporting date. The right to receive dividend is generally established when shareholders approve the dividend.

PB FINTECH LTD. (POLICYBAZAR)
Revenue is measured based on the consideration specified in a contract with a customer. The Company recognises revenue as follows:

Sale of services
The Company earns revenue from services as described below:
1) Online marketing and consulting services – includes bulk e-mailers, advertisement banners on its website and credit score advisory services;
2) Marketing support services – includes road-show services;
3) Commission on online aggregation or financial products – includes commission earned for sale of financial products based on the leads generated from its designated website;
4) IT Support Services – includes services related to IT applications and solutions.

Revenue from above services (other than IT Support Services) is recognised at a point in time when the related services are rendered as per the terms of the agreement with the customer. Revenue from IT Support Services is recognised over time. Revenues are disclosed net of the Goods and Service Tax charged on such services. In terms of the contract, excess of revenue over the billed at the year-end is carried in the balance sheet as unbilled trade receivables as the amount is recoverable from the customer without any future performance obligation. Cash received before the services are delivered is recognised as a contract liability, if any.

Revenue from above services is recognised in the accounting period in which the services are rendered. When there is uncertainty as to measurement or ultimate collectability, revenue recognition is postponed until such uncertainty is resolved.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) fees
Income from IPR fees is recognised on an accrual basis in accordance with the substance of the relevant agreements. [Refer Note 29.]

API HOLDINGS LIMITED (PHARMEASY)
Revenue Recognition
Sale of pharmaceutical and related products:
The Group derives revenue primarily from sale of pharmaceutical and related products and rendering of pharmacy support services, business support services, lab test-related services, commission from lab services and technology platform services. Revenue is recognised upon transfer of control of promised products or services to customers in an amount that reflects the consideration the Group expects to receive in exchange for those products or services. Amounts disclosed as revenue are net of trade allowances, rebates and Goods and Services Tax (GST), amounts collected on behalf of third parties and includes reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses, with corresponding expenses included in cost of revenues.

Revenue from the rendering of services and sale of pharmaceutical and related products is recognised when the Group satisfies its performance obligations to its customers as below:

Revenue from sale of pharmaceutical and related products is recognised at the point in time when control of the asset is transferred to the customer, generally on delivery of the products. In determining the transaction price for rendering of services, the Group considers the effect of variable consideration, existence of a significant financing component, non-cash consideration, and consideration payable to the customers, if any. Revenue is recognised net of trade and cash discounts. The Group collects Goods and Services Tax (GST) on behalf of the Government and, therefore, it is not an economic benefit flowing to the Group. Hence, it is excluded from revenue.

Revenue from rendering services
Revenue from pharmacy support services, business support services, lab test services, technology platform services and commission from lab services are recognised as and when services are rendered as per terms of agreement, i.e., at the point in time. The Group collects Goods and Services Tax (GST) on behalf of the Government and, therefore, it is not an economic benefit flowing to the Group. Hence, it is excluded from revenue. In determining the transaction price for rendering of services, the Group considers the effect of variable consideration, existence of a significant financing component, non-cash consideration, and consideration payable to the customers, if any. Revenue is recognised net of trade and cash discounts.

VERANDAH LEARNING SOLUTIONS LTD.
Revenue Recognition
Operating revenue:
Revenue is recognised to the extent that it is probable that the economic benefits will flow to the Company and the revenue can be reliably measured. The Company derives its revenue from Edutech services (online and offline) by providing comprehensive learning programmes.

A. Online revenue:
Revenue from sale of online courses is recognised based on satisfaction of performance obligations as below:
i) Supply of books is recognised when control of the goods is transferred to the customer at an amount
that reflects the consideration entitled as per the contract / understanding in exchange for the goods or services.
ii) Supply of online content is recognised upfront upon access being provided for the uploaded content to the learners.
iii) Supply of hosting service is recognised over the period of license of access provided to the learners at an amount that reflects the consideration entitled as per the contract / understanding in exchange for such services.

B. Offline revenue:
Revenue from offline courses are recognised as revenue on a pro rata based on actual classes conducted by the educators. The Company does not assume any post-performance obligation after the completion of classes. Revenue received for classes to be conducted subsequent to the year-end is considered as Deferred revenue which is included in other current liabilities.

C. Revenue from delivery partner:
License fee is recognised at a point in time upon transfer of the license to customers.

Other operating revenue
Shipping revenue is recognised at the time of delivery to end customers. Shipping revenue received towards deliveries subsequent to the year-end is considered as Deferred revenue which is included in other current liabilities.

ACCOUNTING BY HOLDERS OF CRYPTO ASSETS

According to a crypto research agency CREBACO, Indian crypto investments by October, 2021 had increased to over US $10 billion, with 105 million Indians, i.e., approximately 7.90% of India’s total population, owning cryptocurrency. Currently, numerous cryptocurrencies, crypto coins and crypto tokens are in circulation. Some cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are also used as an alternative to money, though its main use is as investment in an asset class. At the time of writing, over 12,000 different cryptocurrencies, crypto coins and crypto tokens were traded or listed on various crypto exchanges across the globe.

This article discusses the accounting by holders of crypto assets under Ind AS. A question arises that if crypto assets are not legal tenders, then would they fulfil the definition of asset in the first place. In accordance with the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under Ind AS issued by the ICAI ‘An asset is a present economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events. An economic resource is a right that has the potential to produce economic benefits.’ The crypto assets are capable of producing economic benefits because they can be sold at a price and the economic benefits can be realised. Therefore, they would meet the definition of an asset under the Conceptual Framework.

The IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) in its Agenda decision titled Holdings of Cryptocurrencies in June, 2019 defined a cryptocurrency as a crypto asset with all of the following characteristics: ‘(a) a digital or virtual currency recorded on a distributed ledger that uses cryptography for security, (b) not issued by a jurisdictional authority or other party, and (c) does not give rise to a contract between the holder and another party’. Bitcoin, for example, would meet this definition. Cryptocurrencies represent a subset of crypto assets. The terms and applications of the crypto assets vary widely and could change over time. The terms and conditions and the purpose for which they are held by the holders will determine the accounting consequences.

Some crypto assets entitle the holder to an underlying good or service from an identifiable counter-party. For example, some crypto assets entitle the holder to a fixed weight of gold from a custodian bank. In those cases, the holder can obtain economic benefits by redeeming the crypto asset for the underlying. While not money as such, these crypto assets share many characteristics with representative money. Other crypto assets (e.g., Bitcoin) do not entitle the holder to an underlying good or service and have no identifiable counter-party. The holder of such a crypto asset has to find a willing buyer who will accept the crypto asset in exchange for cash, goods or services to realise any economic benefits from the crypto asset.

An entity can directly hold its crypto assets in its own ‘wallet’ or may hold it indirectly. For example, an entity holding an economic interest in crypto assets in the shared wallet of a crypto asset exchange may have an indirect holding of the crypto assets through a claim on the exchange. In this case, in addition to the underlying crypto asset volatility, the holder would also be exposed to counter-party performance risk (i.e., the possibility that the exchange is not holding sufficient crypto assets to cover all customer claims). The holder would need to analyse carefully, among other things, its claim on the crypto exchange to evaluate the nature of the assets held to determine the appropriate accounting treatment.

CAN CRYPTOCURRENCY OR CRYPTO ASSET BE CLASSIFIED AS CASH?
Ind AS 32 indicates that cash represents the medium of exchange and is, therefore, the basis on which all transactions are measured and recognised in the financial statements. The description of cash in Ind AS 32 suggests that cash is expected to be used as a medium of exchange (i.e., used in exchange for goods or services) and as the monetary unit in pricing goods or services to such an extent that it would be the basis on which all transactions are measured and recognised in financial statements (i.e., it could act as the functional currency of an entity). Currently, it is unlikely that any crypto asset would be considered a suitable basis for measuring and recognising all the items in an entity’s financial statements.

At present, crypto assets are not used as a medium of exchange except for Bitcoins to a very limited extent; however, the acceptance of a crypto asset by a merchant is not mandated in most jurisdictions. While some governments are reported to be considering issuing their own crypto assets or supporting a crypto asset issued by another party, at the time of writing El Salvador is the only country that has passed legislation that treats Bitcoin as legal tender (alongside US dollars).

The price of crypto assets is highly volatile when compared to a basket of fiat currencies. Hence, no major Governments or economic actors have stored their wealth in crypto assets. Crypto assets continue to remain a speculative investment. If, in the future, a crypto asset attains such a high level of acceptance and stability that it exhibits the characteristics of cash, a holder would need to consider whether that crypto asset represents a medium of exchange and unit of account to such an extent that it could act as the basis on which the holder recognises and measures all transactions in its financial statements (i.e., it could act as the functional currency of an entity). In 2019, the IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) confirmed that crypto assets currently do not meet the definition of cash equivalents because they are generally, among other things, not convertible to known amounts of cash, nor are they subject to an insignificant risk of change in value.

CAN CRYPTO ASSETS QUALIFY AS FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS?
Ind AS 32 defines a financial instrument as any contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. The first part of the definition of a financial instrument requires the existence of a contract or contractual relationship between parties. A contract is defined by Ind AS 32 as an agreement between two or more parties that has clear economic consequences which the parties have little, if any, discretion to avoid, usually because the agreement is enforceable by law.

Crypto assets generally do not entitle the holder to underlying goods, services or financial instruments and have no identifiable counter-party and consequently would not meet the definition of a contract and qualify as a financial instrument. For example, the individual parties involved in the Bitcoin blockchain do not have a contractual relationship with any other participant in the Bitcoin blockchain. That is, by virtue of owning a Bitcoin, the holder does not have an enforceable claim on Bitcoin miners, exchanges, holders, or any other party. Such holders need to find a willing buyer to realise economic benefits from holding their Bitcoin.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS EQUITY INSTRUMENT?
Ind AS defines an equity instrument as any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting all its liabilities. Although the value of a crypto asset may correlate to the popularity of an underlying platform on which it is used, that, by itself, does not represent a contractual right to a residual interest in the net assets of the platform. Therefore, a crypto asset will not qualify as an equity instrument.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS A DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENT?
Ind AS 109 defines a derivative as a financial instrument or other contract within the scope of Ind AS 109 with all three of the following characteristics:
* Its value changes in response to the change in an ‘underlying’ that is not specific to a party to the contract;
* It requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors;
* It is settled at a future date.

Crypto assets that are not contractual themselves could still be the subject of a contract, for example, a binding agreement to buy Bitcoin from a certain counter-party would constitute a contract, even though the Bitcoin itself does not represent a contractual relationship. Therefore, agreements entered ‘off the chain’ to buy or sell crypto assets would qualify as contracts.

Some contractual rights to buy or sell non-financial items that can be settled net in cash, or for which the non-financial items are readily convertible to cash, are accounted for as if they were financial instruments (i.e., a derivative). A contractual right to buy or sell crypto assets (e.g., a Bitcoin forward entered with an investment bank) could be a derivative even if the crypto asset itself is not a financial instrument, provided the crypto asset is readily convertible to cash or the contract can be settled net in cash. This is like the accounting for commodity contracts that are held in a trading business model (e.g., forward silver contracts may fall within the scope of Ind AS 109, although silver itself is not a financial instrument).

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS INVENTORY?
Although it is often assumed to be the case, Ind AS 102 does not require inventory to be tangible. The standard defines inventory as an asset:
* Held for sale in the ordinary course of business;
* In the process of production for such sale; or
* In the form of materials or supplies to be consumed in the production process or in the rendering of services.

In practice, crypto assets are generally not used in the production of inventory and, thus, would not be considered materials and supplies to be consumed in the production process. Therefore, to this extent crypto assets do not qualify as an item of inventory.

Crypto assets could also be held for sale in the ordinary course of business, for example, by a commodity broker-trader, in which case it would qualify as an item of inventory. Whether crypto assets are held for sale in the ordinary course of business would depend on the specific facts and circumstances of the holder. Normally, Ind AS 102 requires measurement at the lower of cost and net realisable value. However, commodity broker-traders who acquire and sell crypto assets principally to generate profit from fluctuations in price or broker-traders’ margin have the choice to measure their crypto asset inventories at fair value less costs to sell with any change in fair value less costs to sell being recognised in profit or loss in the period of the change.

WILL CRYPTO ASSET QUALIFY AS INTANGIBLE ASSETS?
Ind AS 38 defines an asset as ‘a resource controlled by an entity as a result of past events; and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity’. Ind AS 38 describes four essential features of an intangible asset:
Control – Control is the power to obtain the future economic benefits of an item while restricting the access of others to those benefits. Control is normally evidenced by legal rights, but Ind AS 38 is clear that they are not required where the entity is able to control access to the economic benefits in another way. Ind AS 38 notes that, in the absence of legal rights, the existence of exchange transactions for similar non-contractual items can provide evidence that the entity is nonetheless able to control the future economic benefits expected.
Future economic benefits – Many crypto assets do not provide a contractual right to economic benefits. Instead, economic benefits are likely to result from a future sale, to a willing buyer, or by exchanging the crypto asset for goods or services.
Lacks physical substance – As crypto assets are digital representations, they are by nature without physical substance.
Identifiable – In order to be identifiable, an intangible asset needs to be separable (capable of being sold or transferred separately from the holder) or result from contractual or other legal rights. As most crypto assets can be freely transferred to a willing buyer, they would generally be considered separable.

Crypto assets generally meet the relatively wide definition of an intangible asset as they are identifiable, lack physical substance, are controlled by the holder, and give rise to future economic benefits for the holder. The IFRS Interpretation Committee (IC) confirmed in 2019 that crypto assets would generally qualify as an intangible asset, subject to consideration of detailed facts and circumstances.

CONCLUSION
The accounting of cryptocurrency by holders in most cases would qualify as an intangible asset. However, given the numerous versions of cryptocurrency and other innovations, such as an exchange traded fund of crypto, the accounting conclusion may not be fairly straight forward. One will have to carefully analyse the features and the terms and conditions of the crypto to determine the accounting conclusion. Besides, the accounting would be different for a trader of crypto as against an investor in crypto.

TAXABILITY OF CORPUS DONATIONS RECEIVED BY AN UNREGISTERED TRUST

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Section 2(24)(iia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 defines income to include voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes. Till Assessment Year 1988-89, this included the phrase ‘not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust’, which was omitted with effect from the A.Y. 1989-90. Section 11(1)(d) of the Act, which was inserted with effect from A.Y. 1989-90, provides for exemption in respect of voluntary contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution. However, this exemption applies only when the recipient trust or institution is registered with the income-tax authorities under section 12A or 12AA, as applicable up to 31st March, 2021, or section 12AB as applicable thereafter.

The issue has arisen as to whether such voluntary contributions (referred to as ‘corpus donations’) received by an unregistered trust, not registered u/s 12A or 12AA or 12AB, can be regarded as income taxable in its hands on the ground that it does not qualify for the exemption u/s 11, or in the alternative whether such donations can be regarded as the capital receipt not falling within the scope of income at all.

Several Benches of the Tribunal have taken a view, post-amendment, that a voluntary contribution received by an unregistered trust with a specific direction that it shall form part of its corpus, is a capital receipt and therefore not chargeable to tax at all. As against this, recently, the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal took a view that such a corpus donation would fall within the ambit of income of the trust and hence is includible in its total income.

SHRI SHANKAR BHAGWAN ESTATE’S CASE
The issue had first come up for consideration before the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Shri Shankar Bhagwan Estate vs. ITO (1997) 61 ITD 196.

In this case, two religious endowments were effectuated vide two deeds of endowment dated 30th October, 1989 and 19th June, 1990, respectively, in favour of Shree Ganeshji Maharaj and Shri Shankar Bhagwan by Smt. Krishna Kejriwal. The debutter properties, i.e., estates were christened as ‘Shree Ganeshji Maharaj Estate’ and ‘Shree Shankar Bhagwan Estate’. She constituted herself as the Shebait in respect of the deity. The estates were not registered u/s 12AA as charitable / religious institutions. The returns of income of the two estates for the A.Y. 1991-92 were filed declaring paltry income excluding the donations / gifts received towards the corpus of the estates.

During the course of the assessment proceedings, it was observed from the balance sheet that gifts were received by the estates from various persons. The assessees claimed that the said amounts were received towards the corpus of the endowments and, therefore, could not be taxed. Though the A.O. accepted the fact that the declarations filed by the donors indicated that they have sent moneys through cheques as their contributions to the corpus of the endowments, he held that the receipts were taxable u/s 2(24)(iia). Accordingly, the assessment was made taking the status of the assessees as a private religious trust, as against the status of an individual as claimed by the assessees, and taxing the income of the estates u/s 164, including the amounts received as corpus donations. He also held that the deities should have been consecrated before the endowments for them to be valid in law.

Before the CIT(A), the assessee contended that the provisions of section 2(24)(iia) did not authorise the assessment of the corpus gifts. However, the CIT(A) endorsed the view taken by the A.O. and upheld the assessment of the corpus gifts as income.

Upon further appeal, the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the assessee by holding as under –

‘So far as section 2(24)(iia) is concerned, this section has to be read in the context of the introduction of the present section 12. It is significant that section 2(24)(iia) was inserted with effect from 1st April, 1973 simultaneously with the present section 12, both of which were introduced from the said date by the Finance Act, 1972. Section 12 makes it clear by the words appearing in parenthesis that contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution shall not be considered as income of the trust. The Board’s Circular No. 108 dated 20th March, 1973 is extracted at page 1277 of Vol. I of Sampat Iyengar’s Law of Income-tax, 9th Edn. in which the interrelation between section 12 and section 2(24)(iia) has been brought out. Gifts made with clear directions that they shall form part of the corpus of the religious endowment can never be considered as income. In the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust vs. CIT [1988] 172 ITR 373 it was held by the Bombay High Court that even ignoring the amendment to section 12, which means that even before the words appearing in parenthesis in the present section 12, it cannot be held that voluntary contributions specifically received towards the corpus of the trust may be brought to tax. The aforesaid decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in the case CIT vs. Trustees of Kasturbai Scindia Commission Trust [1991] 189 ITR 5. The position after the amendment is a fortiori. In the present cases, the A.O. on evidence has accepted the fact that all the donations have been received towards the corpus of the endowments. In view of this clear finding, it is not possible to hold that they are to be assessed as income of the assessees. We, therefore, hold that the assessment of the corpus donations cannot be supported.’

The Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee that the voluntary contributions received towards the corpus could not be brought to tax. In deciding the appeal, the Bench also held that the status of the endowments should be ‘individual’ and it was not necessary that the deities should have been consecrated before the endowments, or that the temple should have been constructed prior to the endowments.

Apart from this case, in the following cases a similar view has been taken by the Tribunal that the corpus donation received by an unregistered trust is a capital receipt and not chargeable to tax –

• ITO vs. Smt. Basanti Devi & Shri Chakhan Lal Garg Education Trust

  •  For A.Y. 2003-04 – ITA No. 3866/Del/2007, dated 30th January, 2009
  •  For A.Y. 2004-05 – ITA No. 5082/Del/2010, dated 19th January, 2011

ITO vs. Chime Gatsal Ling Monastery [ITA No. 216 to 219 (Chd) of 2012, dated 28th October, 2014]
• ITO vs. Gaudiya Granth Anuved Trust [2014] 48 taxmann.com 348 (Agra-Trib)
• Pentafour Software Employees Welfare Foundation vs. Asstt. CIT [IT Appeal Nos. 751 & 752 (Mds) of 2007]
• ITO vs. Hosanna Ministries [2020] 119 taxmann.com 379 (Visakh-Trib)
• Indian Society of Anaesthesiologists vs. ITO (2014) 47 taxmann.com 183 (Chen-Trib)
• J.B. Education Society vs. ACIT [2015] 55 taxmann.com 322 (Hyd-Trib)
• ITO vs. Vokkaligara Sangha (2015) 44 CCH 509 (Bang–Trib)
• Bank of India Retired Employees Medical Assistance Trust vs. ITO [2018] 96 taxmann.com 277 (Mum-Trib)
• Chandraprabhu Jain Swetamber Mandir vs. ACIT [2017] 82 taxmann.com 245 (Mum-Trib)
• ITO vs. Serum Institute of India Research Foundation [2018] 90 taxmann.com 229 (Pune-Trib)

VEERAVEL TRUST’S CASE
Recently, the issue again came up for consideration before the Chennai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Veeravel Trust vs. ITO [2021] 129 taxmann.com 358.

In this case, the assessee was a public charitable and religious trust registered under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It was not registered under the Income-tax Act. It had filed its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15, declaring Nil total income. The return of income filed by the assessee had been processed by the CPC, Bengaluru u/s 143(1) and the total income was determined at Rs. 55,82,600 by making additions of donations received amounting to Rs. 55,82,600.

The assessee trust filed an appeal against the intimation issued u/s 143(1) before the CIT(A) and contended that while processing the return u/s 143(1), only prima facie adjustments could be made and no addition could be made for corpus donations. The assessee further contended that corpus donations received by any trust or institution were excluded from the income derived from property held under the trust u/s 11(1)(d) and hence, even though the trust was not registered u/s 12AA, corpus donations could not be included in the income of the trust.

The CIT(A) rejected the contentions of the assessee and held that the condition precedent for claiming exemption u/s 11 was registration of the trust u/s 12AA and hence, in the absence of such registration, exemption claimed towards corpus donations could not be allowed. The CIT(A) relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corpn. vs. Dy. CIT [2008] 297 ITR 1.

Being aggrieved by the order of the CIT(A), the assessee trust filed a further appeal before the Tribunal and contended that the donations under consideration were received for the specific purpose of construction of building and the said donations have been used for construction of building. Therefore, when donations have been received for specific purpose and such donations have been utilised for the purpose for which they were received, they were capital receipts by nature and did not fall within the scope of income.

The assessee relied upon the following decisions in support of its contentions –

(i) Shree Jain Swetamber Deharshar Upshraya Trust vs. ACIT [IT Appeal No. 264 (Mum) of 2016, dated 15th March, 2017]
(ii) ITO vs. Serum Institute of India Research Foundation [2018] 90 taxmann.com 229 (Pune)
(iii) Bank of India Retired Employees Medical Assistance Trust vs. ITO (Exemption) [2018] 96 taxmann.com 277 (Mum)
(iv) Chandraprabhu Jain Swetamber Mandir vs. Asstt. CIT [2017] 82 taxmann.com 245 (Mum)

The Revenue reiterated its stand that in the absence of registration of the trust u/s 12AA, no exemption could be given to it for the corpus donations.

The Tribunal referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and observed that the definition of income u/s 2(24) included voluntary contributions received by any trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purpose; that the provisions of sections 11, 12A and 12AA dealt with taxation of trust or institution and the income of any trust or institution was exempt from tax on compliance with certain conditions; the provisions of section 11(1)(d) excluded voluntary contributions received by a trust, with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution which was subject to the provisions of section 12A, which stated that the provisions of sections 11 and 12 shall not apply in relation to income of any trust or institution, unless such trust or institution fulfilled certain conditions.

The Tribunal held that as per the said section 12A, one of the conditions for claiming benefit of exemption under sections 11 and 12 was registration of the trust as per sub-section (aa) of section 12A; that on a conjoint reading of the provisions, it was very clear that the income of any trust, including voluntary contributions received with a specific direction, was not includible in the total income of the trust, only if such trust was registered u/s 12A / 12AA and the registration was a condition precedent for claiming exemption u/s 11, including for voluntary contributions.

The Tribunal also took support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) wherein it was held that registration u/s 12A was a condition precedent for availing benefit under sections 11 and 12. Insofar as various case laws relied upon by the assessee were concerned, the Tribunal found that none of the Benches of the Tribunal had considered the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) while deciding the issue before them. In this view of the matter, it was held that corpus donations with a specific direction that they form part of the corpus received by the trust which was not registered under sections 12A / 12AA was its income and includible in its total income.

OBSERVATIONS
The issue under consideration is whether the voluntary contribution received by a trust with a specific direction that it shall form part of its corpus can be considered as the ‘income’ of the trust, is a capital receipt, not chargeable to tax, and whether the answer to this question would differ depending upon whether or not the trust was registered with the income-tax authorities under the relevant provisions of the Act.

Sub-clause (iia) was inserted in section 2(24) defining the term ‘income’ by the Finance Act, 1972 with effect from 1st April, 1973. It included the voluntary contribution received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes within the scope of the term ‘income’ with effect from 1st April, 1973. Therefore, firstly, what was the position about taxability of such voluntary contribution prior to that needs to be examined.

The Supreme Court had dealt with this issue of taxability of an ordinary voluntary contribution for the period prior to 1st April, 1973 in the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust [1998] 233 ITR 53 (SC) and it was held that –

Undoubtedly by a subsequent amendment in 1972 to the definition of income under section 2(24), voluntary contributions, not being contributions towards the corpus of such a trust, are included in the definition of ‘income’ of such a religious or charitable trust. Section 12 as amended in 1972 also expressly provides that any voluntary contribution received by a trust for religious or charitable purposes, not being contribution towards the corpus of the trust, shall, for the purpose of section 11, be deemed to be income derived from property held by the trust wholly for charitable or religious purposes. This, however, does not necessarily imply that prior to the amendment of 1972, a voluntary contribution which was not towards the corpus of the receiving trust, was not income of the receiving trust. Even prior to the amendment of 1972, any income received by a religious or charitable trust in the form of a voluntary contribution would be income of the trust, unless such contribution was expressly made towards the corpus of the trust’s fund.

Thus, even prior to the insertion of sub-clause (iia) in the definition of income in section 2(24), the ordinary voluntary contribution received by a religious or charitable trust was regarded as income chargeable to tax and, therefore, no substantial change had occurred due to its specific inclusion in the definition of the term income. At the same time, the position was different as far as a voluntary contribution received towards the corpus was concerned. The settled view was that it was a capital receipt not chargeable to tax. The following are some of the cases in which such a view was taken by different High Courts as referred to by the Supreme Court in the case of R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust (Supra) –
• Sri Dwarkadheesh Charitable Trust vs. ITO [1975] 98 ITR 557 (All)
• CIT vs. Vanchi Trust [1981] 127 ITR 227 (Ker)
• CIT vs. Eternal Science of Man’s Society [1981] 128 ITR 456 (Del)
• Sukhdeo Charity Estate vs. CIT [1984] 149 ITR 470 (Raj)
• CIT vs. Shri Billeswara Charitable Trust [1984] 145 ITR 29 (Mad)

The objective of inserting sub-clause (iia) treating voluntary contributions received by a religious or charitable trust specifically as its income in section 2(24) was not to unsettle this position of law as held by the Courts as explained above. Only ordinary voluntary contributions other than those which were received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust were brought within the definition of ‘income’, perhaps by way of clarification and removal of doubts. The sub-clause (iia) as it was inserted with effect from 1st April, 1973 is reproduced below –

‘(iia) voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly or partly for such purposes not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution’

Thus, the voluntary contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust were expressly kept outside the ambit of the term ‘income’ and they continued to be treated as capital receipts not chargeable to tax. This position in law has been expressly confirmed by the Supreme Court in the above quoted paragraph, duly underlined for emphasis, when the Court clearly stated that the said section 2(24)(iia) covered donations not being the contributions towards corpus.

In such a scenario, a question may arise as to what was the purpose of making such an amendment in the Act to include the voluntary contributions (other than corpus donations) within the definition of ‘income’? The answer to this question is available in Circular No. 108 dated 20th March, 1973 explaining the provisions of the Finance Act, 1973 (as referred in the case of Shri Shankar Bhagwan Estate Supra). The relevant extract from this Circular is reproduced below –

The effect of the modifications at (1) and (2) above would be as follows:
(i) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by private religious trusts will no longer be exempt from income-tax.
(ii) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by a trust for charitable purposes or a charitable institution created or established after 31st March, 1962 (i.e., after the commencement of the Income-tax Act, 1961) will not qualify for exemption from tax if the trust or institution is created or established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste.
(iii) Income by way of voluntary contributions received by a trust created partly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established partly for such purposes will no longer be exempt from income-tax.
(iv) Where the voluntary contributions are received by a trust created wholly for charitable or religious purposes or by an institution established wholly for such purposes, such contributions will qualify for exemption from income-tax only if the conditions specified in section 11 regarding application of income or accumulation thereof are satisfied and no part of the income enures and no part of the income or property of the trust or institution is applied for the benefit of persons specified in section 13(3), e.g., author of the trust, founder of the institution, a person who has made substantial contribution to the trust or institution, the relatives of such author, founder, person, etc. In other words, income by way of voluntary contributions will ordinarily qualify for exemption from income-tax only to the extent it is applied to the purposes of the trust during the relevant accounting year or within next three months following. Such charitable or religious trusts will, however, be able to accumulate income from voluntary contributions for future application to charitable or religious purposes for a maximum period up to ten years, without forfeiting exemption from tax, if they comply with certain procedural requirements laid down in section 11 in this behalf. These requirements are that (1) the trust or institution should give notice to the Income-tax Officer, specifying the purpose for which the income is to be accumulated and the period for which the accumulation is proposed to be made, and (2) the income so accumulated should be invested in Government or other approved securities or deposited in post office savings banks, scheduled banks, co-operative banks or approved financial institutions.

Thus, it can be seen from the Circular that the objective of the amendment made with effect from 1st April, 1973 was to make the trust or institution liable to tax on the voluntary contributions received in certain cases like where it has not been applied for the objects of the trust, it has been received by a private religious trust, or it has been received by a trust created for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste and to make the charitable and religious trusts to apply the contributions only on the objects of the trust and to apply for the accumulation thereof where it has not been so utilised before the year-end. In other words, the intention is expressed to regulate voluntary contributions of an ordinary nature.

This position under the law continued till 1st April, 1989 and the issue deliberated in this article could never have arisen till then as the Act itself had provided expressly that the voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus would not be regarded as ‘income’ and, hence, not chargeable to tax. The issue under consideration arose when the law was amended with effect from 1st April, 1989. The Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 deleted the words ‘not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution’ from sub-clause (iia) of section 2(24) with effect from 1st April, 1989.

The Revenue authorities read sub-clause (iia) as amended with effect from 1st April, 1989, in contrast to the erstwhile sub-clause (iia), to hold that even the voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust would be considered as income chargeable to tax subject to the provisions dealing with exemptions upon satisfaction of several conditions, including that of registration of the trust with the income-tax authority.

The aforesaid interpretation of the Revenue is on the basis of the Circular No. 516 dated 15th June, 1988, Circular No. 545 dated 24th September, 1989, Circular No. 549 dated 31st October, 1989 and Circular No. 551 dated 23rd January, 1990 explaining the provisions of the Direct Tax (Amendment) Act, 1987 [as amended by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989]. The relevant extract dealing with the amendment to section 2(24)(iia) is reproduced below –

4.3 Under the old provisions of sub-clause (iia) of clause (24) of section 2 any voluntary contribution received by a charitable or religious trust or institution with a specific direction that it shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution was not included in the income of such trust or institution. Since this provision was being widely used for tax avoidance by giving donations to a trust in the form of corpus donations so as to keep this amount out of the regulatory provisions of sections 11 to 13, the Amending Act, 1987 amended the said sub-clause (iia) of clause (24) of section 2 to secure that all donations received by a charitable or religious trust or institution, including corpus donations, were treated as income of such trust or institution.

Analysing the impact of the amendment, the eminent jurist Mr. Nani Palkhivala, in his commentary Law and Practice of Income Tax page 156 of the 11th edition, has commented:

‘This, however, does not mean that such capital contributions are now taxable as income. Sometimes express exclusion is by way of abundant caution, due to the over-anxiety of the draftsman to make the position clear beyond doubt. But in such a case, the later omission of such express exclusion does not necessarily involve a change in the legal position. Section 12 still provides that voluntary contributions specifically made to the corpus of a charitable trust are not deemed to be income, and the same exclusion must be read as implicit in section 2(24)(ii-a). It would be truly absurd to expect a charitable trust to disburse as income any amount in breach of the donor’s specific direction to hold it as corpus; such breach in many cases would involve depriving charity of the benefit of acquiring a lasting asset intended by the donor. Under this sub-clause, only voluntary contributions received by such institutions as are specified therein are taxable as income. A voluntary contribution received by an institution not covered in this sub-clause is not taxable as income.’

Further, in the commentary on section 12(1), page 688 of the same edition, it is stated:

‘The correct legal position is as under:
(i) All contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust are capital receipts in the hands of the trust. They are not income either under the general law or under section 2(24)(ii-a).
(ii) Section 2(24)(ii-a) deems revenue contributions to be income of the trust. It thereby prevents the trust from claiming exemption under general law on the ground that such contributions stand on the same footing as gifts and are therefore not taxable.
(iii) Section 12 goes one step further and deems such revenue contributions to be income derived from property held under trust. It thereby makes applicable to such contributions all the conditions and restrictions under sections 11 and 13 for claiming exemption.
(iv) Section 11(1)(d) specifically grants exemption to capital contributions to make the fact of non-taxability clear beyond doubt. But it proceeds on the erroneous assumption that such contributions are of income nature – income in the form of voluntary contributions. This assumption should be disregarded.’

This supports the argument that corpus donations are capital receipts, which are not in the nature of income at all.

Taking a view as is canvassed by the Revenue would tantamount to interpreting a law in a manner that holds that where an exemption has been expressly provided for any income, then it needs to be presumed that in the absence of the specific provision the income is taxable otherwise; such a view also means that any receipt that is not expressly and specifically exempted is always taxable; that a deletion of an express admission of the exemption, as is the case under consideration, would automatically lead to its taxation irrespective of the position in law that such receipt even before introduction of the express provision for exempting it was never taxable. In this regard, a reference may be made to the decision in the case of CIT vs. Shaw Wallace 6 ITC 178 (PC) wherein it was held as under –

‘15. Some reliance has been placed in argument upon section 4(3)(v) which appears to suggest that the word “income” in this Act may have a wider significance than would ordinarily be attributed to it. The sub-section says that the Act “shall not apply to the following classes of income,” and in the category that follows, Clause (v) runs:
Any capital sum received in commutation of the whole or a portion of a pension, or in the nature of consolidated compensation for death or injuries, or in payment of any insurance policy, or as the accumulated balance at the credit of a subscriber to any such Provident Fund.
16. Their Lordships do not think that any of these sums, apart from their exemption, could be regarded in any scheme of taxation of income, and they think that the clause must be due to the over-anxiety of the draftsman to make this clear beyond possibility of doubt. They cannot construe it as enlarging the word “income” so as to include receipts of any kind, which are not specially exempted. They do not think that the clause is of any assistance to the appellant.’

Similarly, the Karnataka High Court in the case of International Instruments (P) Ltd. vs. CIT [1982] 133 ITR 283 held that a receipt which is not an income does not become income, for the years before its inclusion, just because it is later on included as one of the items exempted from income-tax. Thus, it was held that merely because the exemption has been provided it cannot be presumed that it would necessarily be taxable otherwise. Similarly, merely because the voluntary contributions which were capital in nature otherwise were specifically excluded from the definition of income, it cannot be presumed that they were otherwise falling within the definition of income. The Courts in several cases had already held that such voluntary contributions received with a specific direction that they should be forming part of the corpus are receipt of capital nature and not income chargeable to tax. In view of this, the omission of a specific exclusion, w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, provided to it from the definition of income till the date, should not be considered as sufficient to bring it within the scope of the term ‘income’ so as to make it chargeable to tax from the date of the amendment.

All the decisions cited above, wherein a favourable view has been taken, have been rendered for the A.Ys. beginning from 1st April, 1989 onwards post amendment in sub-clause (iia) of section 2(24). Reliance was placed by the Revenue, in these cases, on the amended definition of income provided in section 2(24)(iia) and yet the Tribunals took a view that the corpus donations did not fall within the scope of term ‘income’ as they were capital receipts and, hence, the fact that the exemption otherwise provided in section 11(1)(d) was not available due to non-registration, though argued, was not considered to be relevant at all.

In the case of Smt. Basanti Devi & Shri Chakhan Lal Garg Education Trust, the matter pertaining to A.Y. 2003-04 had travelled to the Delhi High Court and the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed by the High Court (ITA 927/2009, order dated 23rd September, 2009), by taking a view that the donations received towards the corpus of the trust would be capital receipt and not revenue receipt chargeable to tax. The further appeal of the Revenue before the Supreme Court has also been dismissed by an order dated 17th September, 2018, though on account of low tax effect. Therefore, the view as adopted in these cases should be preferred, irrespective of the amendment made with effect from 1st April, 1989.

The Chennai Bench of the Tribunal has disagreed with the decisions of the other Benches taking a favourable view which were cited before it, on the ground that the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation (Supra) had not been considered therein. Nothing could have turned otherwise even if the Tribunal, in favourably deciding those cases, had examined the relevance of the Supreme Court decision. On a bare reading of the decision, it is clear that the facts in the said case related to an issue whether the corporation in question was a local authority or not and, of course, also whether an assessee claiming exemption u/s 11 should have been registered under the Income-tax Act or not. The Court was pleased to hold that an assessee should be registered for it being eligible to claim the exemption of income u/s 11. The issue in that case was not related to exemption for the corpus donation at all and the Court was never asked whether such a donation was exempted or not because of non-registration of the corporation under the Act in that regard.

With utmost respect, one fails to understand how this important fact was not comprehended by the Chennai Bench. The Bench was seriously mistaken in applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decision which has no application to the facts of the case before it. The issue in the case before the Bench was whether receipt of a corpus donation was a capital receipt or not which was not liable to tax in respect of such a receipt, not due to application of section 11, but on application of the general law of taxation which cannot tax a receipt that is not in the nature of income. Veeravel Trust may explore the possibility of filing a Miscellaneous Application seeking rectification of the order.

The issue under consideration here and the issue that was before the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation were distinguished by the Bengaluru Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Vokkaligara Sangha (Supra) as follows –

‘5.3.6 Before looking into the facts of the case, we notice that Revenue has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of U.P. Forest Corporation & Another vs. DCIT reported in 297 ITR 1 (SC). According to the aforesaid decision, registration under section 12AA of the Act is mandatory for availing the benefits under sections 11 and 12 of the Act. However, the question that arises for our consideration in the case on hand is not the benefit under sections 11 and 12 of the Act, but rather whether voluntary contributions are income at all. Thus, with due respects, the aforesaid decision, in our view, would not be of any help to Revenue in the case on hand.’

The Chennai Bench, with due respect, has looked at the issue from the perspective of exemption u/s 11(1)(d). Had it been called upon to specifically adjudicate the issue as to whether the corpus donation was an income at all in the first place, and not an exemption u/s 11, the view could have been different.

Further, if a view is taken that the corpus donations received by a religious or charitable trust would be regarded as income under sub-clause (iia), then it will result in a scenario whereunder treatment of corpus donations would differ depending upon the type of entity which is receiving such corpus donations. If they are received by a religious or charitable trust or institution then it would be regarded as income, but if they are received by any other entity then it would not fall under sub-clause (iia) so as to treat it as income, subject, of course, to the other provisions of the Act.

In the case of CIT vs. S.R.M.T. Staff Association [1996] 221 ITR 234 (AP), the High Court held that only when the voluntary contributions were received by the entities referred to in sub-clause (iia), such receipts would fall within the definition of income and the receipts by entities other than the specified trusts and associations would not be liable to tax on application of sub-clause (iia). In the case of Pentafour Software Employees Welfare Foundation (Supra), a case where the assessee was a company incorporated u/s 25 of the Companies Act, the Madras High Court in the context of the taxability or otherwise of the corpus donations, held that the receipt was not taxable, more so where it was received by a company. An interpretation which results in an illogical conclusion should be avoided.

Reference can also be made to the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2017 wherein, while explaining the rationale of inserting Explanation 2 to section 11(1), it was mentioned that a corpus donation is not considered as income of the recipient trust. The relevant extract from the Memorandum is reproduced below –

‘However, donation given by these exempt entities to another exempt entity, with specific direction that it shall form part of corpus, is though considered application of income in the hands of donor trust but is not considered as income of the recipient trust. Trusts, thus, engage in giving corpus donations without actual applications.’

The issue may arise as to why a specific exemption is provided to such corpus donations under section 11(1)(d) which applies only when the trust or institution receiving such donations satisfies all the applicable conditions, including that of registration with the income-tax authorities. In this regard, as explained by Mr. Palkhivala in the commentary referred to above, this specific exemption should be regarded as having been provided out of abundant caution though not warranted, as such corpus donations could not have been regarded as income in the first place.

The Finance Act, 2021 with effect from 1st April, 2022 requires that such voluntary contributions are invested or deposited in one or more of the forms or modes specified in sub-section (5) maintained specifically for such corpuses. In our view, the amendment stipulates a condition for those who are seeking an exemption u/s 11 of the Act but for those who hold that the receipt of the corpus donation at the threshold itself is not taxable in view of the receipt being of a capital nature, need not be impressed by the amendment; a non-taxable receipt cannot be taxed for non-compliance of a condition not intended to apply to a capital receipt.

In any case, if there exist divergent views on the issue as to whether or not a particular receipt can be regarded as income, then a view in favour of the assessee needs to be preferred.

It may be noted that in one of the above-referred decisions (Serum Institute of India Research Foundation), the Department had made an argument that such corpus donations received by an unregistered trust be brought to tax u/s 56(2). The Tribunal, however, decided the matter in favour of the assessee, on the ground of judicial discipline, following the earlier Tribunal and High Court decisions.

The better view is therefore that corpus donations received by a charitable or religious trust, registered or unregistered, are a capital receipt, not chargeable to income-tax at all.

An assessment order which does not comply with the mandatory procedure laid down in section 144C is non-est and an order u/s 263 revising such an order is a nullity as a non-est order cannot be a subject matter of revision u/s 263

14 Manorama Devi Jaiswal vs. ITO [TS-1054-ITAT-2021 (Kol)] A.Y.: 2014-15; Date of order: 17th November, 2021 Sections: 144C, 263

An assessment order which does not comply with the mandatory procedure laid down in section 144C is non-est and an order u/s 263 revising such an order is a nullity as a non-est order cannot be a subject matter of revision u/s 263

FACTS
In the case of the assessee, the PCIT passed an order u/s 263 wherein he stated that since before completion of final assessment a draft assessment order should have been served on the assessee as per the mandatory provision of section 144C and which the A.O. had not complied with, therefore the assessment order passed by him on 25th September, 2017 was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it challenged the assumption of revisionary jurisdiction assumed by the PCIT.

HELD
The Tribunal noted that the Coordinate Bench has in the case of Mohan Jute Bags Mfg. Co. vs. PCIT [ITA No. 416/Kol/2020; A.Y. 2014-15] held that ‘…the A.O.’s omission to frame draft assessment order breached the Rule of Law and consequently, his non-action to frame draft assessment order before passing the final assessment order was in contravention of the mandatory provision of law as stipulated in section 144C of the Act, consequently his action is arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power which offends Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore an action made without jurisdiction and ergo the assessment order dated 25th September, 2017 is null in the eyes of law and therefore is non-est.’

The Tribunal held that since the mandatory provision of law stipulated in section 144C was not complied with, the assessment order itself becomes a nullity in the eyes of the law and therefore is non-est. When the foundation itself for the assumption of revisionary jurisdiction u/s 263 does not exist, that in this case the assessment order itself is non-est, in such a scenario the PCIT could not have exercised his revisionary jurisdiction in respect of a null and void assessment order. The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the PCIT is also a nullity. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Whether loss of current year can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue which cannot be rectified u/s 154 Interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ in section 115BBD to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue

13 Rakesh Kumar Pandita vs. ACIT [TS-1002-ITAT-2021 (Del)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 22nd October, 2021 Sections: 115BBD, 154

Whether loss of current year can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue which cannot be rectified u/s 154

Interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ in section 115BBD to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue

FACTS
The assessee company filed its return of income for A.Y. 2012-13 declaring a total income of Rs. 26,26,860. The return was processed u/s 143(1) and the total income was determined to be Rs. 31,51,660. In the intimation though the loss of current year adjusted was mentioned at Rs. 22,53,768, the same was not adjusted while computing the total income assessed. The assessee filed an application for rectification u/s 154.

The A.O. was of the opinion that since the assessee has declared income u/s 115BBD and calculated the tax at the special rate of 15%, the same cannot be set off against losses. He accordingly rejected the application made by the assessee u/s 154.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who held that the question whether current year loss can be set off from the income declared u/s 115BBD is a highly debatable issue and a debatable issue cannot be rectified u/s 154.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that in the intimation the loss of the current year has been mentioned at Rs. 22,53,768 and that the assessee has returned income in respect of dividend received from a foreign company u/s 115BBD. It noted that as per sub-section (2), no deduction in respect of expenditure or allowance should be allowed to the assessee under any provision of the Act in computing its income by way of dividends referred to in sub-section (1). The interpretation of ‘expenditure’ or ‘allowance’ to cover current year loss is a highly debatable issue. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee.

NOCLAR (NON-COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS) REPORTING

EMERGENCE OF NOCLAR
In the course of providing professional services to clients or carrying out professional activities for an employer, a Professional Accountant (PA) may come across an instance of Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR), or suspected NOCLAR committed, or about to be committed, by the client or the employer.

Recognising that such situations can often be difficult and stressful for the PAs, and accepting that he or she has a prima facie ethical responsibility not to turn a blind eye to the matter, NOCLAR was introduced to help and guide the PAs in dealing with such situations and in deciding how best to serve the public interest in these circumstances.

Considering the above, the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) had made revisions to the International Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants to define their professional responsibility in relation to NOCLAR in the year 2017.

ICAI, being a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), has considered the revisions made by IESBA in the revised 12th edition of the Code of Ethics which has come into effect from 1st July, 2020 for its members. The Council of ICAI has decided that the provisions, namely, Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR) (Sections 260 and 360), contained in Volume I of the Code of Ethics, 2019, the applicability of which was deferred earlier, be made applicable and effective from 1st April, 2022.

These NOCLAR provisions, as introduced by ICAI, provide detailed guidance in assessing the implications for PAs on any actual or suspected non-compliances of laws and regulations and the possible course of action while responding to them. These provisions primarily cover the non-compliance with laws and regulations that may have an effect on:
a. the determination of material amounts and disclosures in the financial statements;
b. the compliances that may be fundamental to the entity’s business and operations, or to avoid material penalties.

Examples of laws and regulations

 
                    
Examples of other laws and regulations for consideration of PAs while evaluating NOCLAR
1) The real estate sector has remained widely unorganised till the introduction of The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (‘RERA’). Just as while discharging the duty of statutory auditor, for instance under the Companies Act, the auditor shall now be required to coordinate with the RERA professionals and also would require working knowledge of the RERA law to understand the Non-Compliance of Laws and Regulations (NOCLAR).
2) Impact due to Non-Compliance of Foreign Exchange Management Act law will also be covered in the above NOCLAR reporting.
3) Applicability of PF and ESIC laws – based on crossing prescribed number of employees / staff and compliance pertaining to the same.
4) Schedule III Disclosure and Compliance relating to relevant provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the Companies Act, 2013 have been complied for transactions of advanced or loaned or invested funds and vice versa and the transactions are not violative of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
5) In case of regulated entities, the Regulations often require direct reporting to the Regulator (RBI directions in case of banks & NBFCs).

The PA should be more alert in case of susceptible industries, such as banks, diamond companies, the IT industry, the financial sector, hazardous Industries and companies dealing in cryptocurrencies.

The broad objectives of PAs in relation to NOCLAR are:
a. to comply with the principles of integrity and professional behaviour;
b. to alert management or where appropriate Those Charged with Governance (TCWG) of the client or employer, to enable them to rectify, remediate and mitigate the consequences of the identified or suspected non-compliance or deter the commission of the non-compliance where it has not yet occurred; and
c. to take such further action as appropriate in public interest.

APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
Although the purpose of introducing NOCLAR was to provide assistance to PAs, for all their professional engagements, in case there is suspected or actual non-compliance of law and regulations, ICAI has at present made it effective only on:
a. auditors doing audit assignments of listed entities; and
b. employees of listed entities.

Further, the following matters are not included in the scope of NOCLAR:
1. Matters clearly inconsequential – Whether a matter is clearly inconsequential is to be judged with respect to its nature and its impact, financial or otherwise, on the employing organisation, its stakeholders and the general public. For instance, trying to cajole a traffic officer to ignore penalties for traffic violation;
2. Personal misconduct unrelated to the business activities of the client or employer – such as a top employee getting drunk or driving under the influence of alcohol;
3. Non-compliance other than by the client or employer, or those charged with governance, management – for example, circumstances where a professional accountant has been engaged by a client for conducting a due diligence assignment on a third-party entity and the identified or suspected non-compliance has been committed by that third party.

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

The ICAI, in its Code of Ethics-Revised 2019, has introduced new guidance for NOCLAR via section 360 for members in practice and section 260 for members in employment. Both these sections are further discussed in detail below:

Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations during the course of Audit Engagements of Listed Entities – SECTION 360
The professional accountants will have to get ready for higher responsibility to identify and report violations which they come across while performing their work. Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations comprises acts of omission or commission, intentional or unintentional, which are contrary to the prevailing laws or regulations committed by the client, those charged with governance of a client, management of a client or other individuals working for or under the direction of a client. When encountering such non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the accountant shall obtain an understanding of those legal or regulatory provisions and comply with them, including any requirement to report the matter to an appropriate authority and any prohibition of alerting the client, for example, pursuant to anti-money laundering legislation.

Management, with the oversight of those charged with governance, is responsible for ensuring that the client’s business activities are conducted in accordance with the laws and regulations. Usually, corporates have an internal legal, compliance / tax department and also a team of internal / external legal counsel who assist management in complying with laws and regulations and compliances applicable to the company. The company may implement various policies and procedures like monitoring legal requirements and ensuring that operating procedures are designed to meet those requirements. Once the appropriate systems of internal control are operative, it will assist in prevention and detection of non-compliance with laws and regulations. In larger entities these policies may be supplemented by assigning responsibilities to the internal audit / audit committee / compliance function. Non-compliance might result in fines, litigation or other consequences for the client, potentially materially affecting its financial statements. Importantly, such non-compliance might have wider public interest implications in terms of potentially substantial harm to investors, creditors, employees or the general public. Examples of these include the perpetration of a fraud resulting in significant financial losses to investors and breaches of environmental laws and regulations, endangering the health or safety of the employees or the public. The auditor will have to suitably change the engagement letter going forward considering the new responsibilities on management and those charged with governance pertaining to NOCLAR.

When a PA in public practice becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following points are to be considered:
a) Obtain understanding of the matter (nature of the act and the circumstances), discuss it with management and where appropriate TCWG may seek legal counsel;
b) Addressing the matter (rectify, remediate, mitigate, deter, disclose);
c) Check whether management and TCWG understand their legal or regulatory responsibilities;
d) Communication with respect to groups (for financial statement audit);
e) Determining whether further action is needed (timely response, appropriate steps taken by the entity and based on professional judgment by the PA), consulting on a confidential basis with the Institute;
f) Determine whether to disclose the matter to the appropriate authority; and
g) Documentation of the matter.

The PA might determine that disclosure to an appropriate authority is an appropriate course of action in the following scenario:
• The entity is engaged in bribery (for example, of local or foreign government officials for purposes of securing large contracts);
• The entity is regulated and the matter is of such significance as to threaten its license to operate;
• The entity is listed on a securities exchange and the matter might result in adverse consequences to the fair and orderly market in the entity’s securities or pose a systemic risk to the financial markets;
• It is likely that the entity would sell products that are harmful to public health or safety;
• The entity is promoting a scheme to its clients to assist them in evading taxes.

The documentation for compliance related to ethical standards is in addition to complying with the documentation requirements under applicable auditing standards. In relation to non-compliance or suspected non-compliance that falls within the scope of this section, the professional accountant shall document in detail how his responsibility to act in public interest has been met.

Withdrawing from the engagement and the professional relationship is not a substitute for taking other actions that might be needed to achieve the professional accountant’s objectives under this section. However, there might be limitations as to the further actions available to the accountant. In such circumstances, withdrawal might be the only available course of action. The auditor may also refer to the Implementation Guide on Resignation / Withdrawal from an Engagement to Perform Audit of Financial Statements issued by the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board.

Responding to Non-Compliance with Laws and Regulations in case of Employment with Listed Entities – SECTION 260
It is the responsibility of employing organisations’ management and those charged with governance to ensure that their business activities are conducted in accordance with the laws and regulations and to identity and address any non-compliance. Non-compliance with laws and regulations comprises acts of omission or commission, intentional or unintentional, which are contrary to prevailing laws or regulations committed by the following parties:
a) The professional accountant’s employing organisation;
b) Those charged with governance of the employing organisation;
c) Management of the employing organisation; or
d) Other individuals working for or under the direction of the employing organisation.

When encountering such non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the accountant shall obtain an understanding of those legal or regulatory provisions and comply with them, including any requirement to report the matter to an appropriate authority and any prohibition on alerting the relevant party.

If organisations have established protocols and procedures regarding how non-compliance or suspected non-compliance should be raised internally, the PA shall consider them in determining how to respond on timely basis to such non-compliance. For instance, the Ethics Policy or internal whistle-blowing mechanism. The Securities and Exchange Board of India decided recently to increase the maximum reward for whistle-blowers from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 10 crores. Such protocols and procedures might allow matters to be reported anonymously through designated channels. Under CARO 2020, the auditor is required to report whether he has considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during the year by the company. The auditor should be mindful while performing the procedures under this clause and consider complaints received under the whistle-blower mechanism. The auditor should consider whether additional procedures are required to be performed under SA 240 in this regard.

When a senior PA in service becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following steps are to be taken:
a. Obtaining an understanding of the matter,
b. Addressing the matter,
c. Determining whether further action is needed,
d. Seeking advice,
e. Determining whether to disclose the matter to the appropriate authority – and the different scenarios, and
f. Documentation.

Senior professional accountants in service (SPAs) are Directors, officers or senior employees able to exert significant influence over, and make decisions regarding, the acquisition, deployment and control of the employing organisation’s human, financial, technological, physical and intangible resources.

Resigning from the employing organisation is not a substitute for taking other actions that might be needed to achieve the SPA’s objectives under this section. However, there might be limitations as to the further actions available to the accountant. In such circumstances, resignation might be the only available course of action.

When a Professional Accountant in service becomes aware of non-compliance or suspected non-compliance, the following steps are to be taken:
? Subject to established protocols and procedures, inform an immediate superior to enable the superior to take appropriate action;
? If the PA’s immediate superior appears to be involved in the matter, inform the next higher level of authority within the organisation;
? In exceptional circumstances, the PA may decide that disclosure of the matter to the appropriate authority is an appropriate course of action;
? Documentation of the matter, results of discussions, response by superior/s, course of action, the judgments made and the decisions that were taken.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN SA 250 AND NOCLAR
SA 250 requires the auditors to assess the financial implications on the financial statements in case there is a non-compliance of laws and regulations, which is equally applicable in case of NOCLAR. However, section 360 of the Code of Ethics requires the auditor to assess wider public interest implications, in case there is  NOCLAR in terms of potential harm to all the stakeholders of the company, whether financial or non-financial.

Further, SA 250 is required to be complied with by the auditors while doing the audit of entities, whether public or private, whereas NOCLAR is applicable to the audit of listed companies and to the PAs who are under employment of a listed entity.

THE BOTTOM LINE
NOCLAR would require organisations to make their compliances more robust from a financial statement disclosure perspective. If the violation is not appropriately reported, it may attract disciplinary action against the professional accountant. The reporting of NOCLAR is part of the global push towards greater accountability. Considering the various kinds of reporting involved, this might translate into more instances of whistle-blowing.  

CHANGE IS CONSTANT

It’s funny how day by day nothing changes. But when you look back, everything is different – C.S. Lewis

In this series of articles, we have covered various aspects of the ‘Digital Workplace’ and how the world is moving with technology. What had seemed impossible is becoming routine and what was routine is now changing. The world has moved on from going to the office daily to staying at home and managing work using whatever technology is available to ensure that, first and foremost, we remain safe. But with the steady re-opening of the economy, we are again changing our habits and people have started returning to the routine of the pre-pandemic era. Working at office has come a full circle now, from WFH being mainstream, and to WFO (Working from Office) once again becoming mainstream. But while most things have gone back to the pre-pandemic era, there are many things that have changed in the pre- and post-pandemic times. While the ‘Digital Workplace’ is not the ideal way of working at present, technology is constantly improving.

In this concluding article on ‘Digital Workplace’ we highlight three important points that everyone needs to consider to find the right balance between ‘Traditional Workplace’ vis a vis the ‘Digital Workplace’ and ways to prepare for the ‘Future of Digital Offices’.

1. Evaluate worker preferences carefully: Flexible office instead of a fixed and traditional way of working
Yes, the benefits of having an office and the entire team working together are unparalleled. Despite all the talk about ‘Virtual Offices’, we have still not reached a level where virtual offices can replace the existing office with people around us. There are numerous benefits of having the place to work, yet, such offices are not without their own limitations. Travelling to the
office is still the biggest challenge. In fact, the average Indian spends around 7%1 of her time daily in just travelling from home to office. Also, this number can go significantly higher when it comes to travelling in cities like Mumbai with limited public transport
facilities.

While everyone has accepted the importance of the office and travelling to it daily, no one can deny the fact that it does not hurt if employees or even promoters are not able to travel to office daily for the entire year. The existing technology supports such smaller breaks easily. For example, working from somewhere in the mountains once a year while enjoying weekends to ensure that you just don’t have to cancel your trip for a day or two’s work, or simply working while travelling, more popularly known as ‘Staycation’.

How many of you have faced a situation where a good employee has had to leave the office just because he / she has shifted to another city? While earlier it might not have been possible, today, an office can create an exemption and let a person work from home or just give some flexible working hours and WFH specially to female employees who face difficult times to work full time but have performed well in the past.

To make sure your plans align with what your team wants, find workable compromises:
* Avoid tensions that can sour your culture, have important but hard conversations with the team and conduct surveys to discover what most people prefer to do;
* Consider whether allowing your remote workers to stay at home would create a practical or financial burden;
* If remaining at home benefits employees’ mental or physical health, or their overall productivity, consider allowing them to maintain their current set-up.

Most companies have been vague about their plans or haven’t discussed them at all, which has resulted in bigger issues as many employees feel that their employers are disconnected from the reality.

2. Review consumer behaviours: Video calls over travelling
During the pandemic, consumers drastically changed their behaviour, spiking e-commerce and adapting to options like no-contact pickup and pay. As McKinsey & Company points out, this has shifted many of their long-term expectations and companies are having to account for that shift in how they operate and what they offer.

One such change was the most common realisation of 2020 amongst all of us that we do not always need to travel to the client’s place for a meeting and that it can be done with a video call. While this was good till it lasted, gradually we are moving back to the pre-pandemic era and we may see travel increasing again. However, the learnings of the year 2020 should not be wasted completely. With travelling permitted, we may prefer to visit and meet people again, but perhaps many such meetings can be replaced with video calls thanks to Zoom, Google Meet, Microsoft Teams, etc.

But consumers and your team are interconnected. When your workers are happy to buy into your vision, they work better and provide better service so that customers are happy, too. It’s a simple cycle perpetuated by good business practices. Additionally, companies that identify emerging opportunities and provide great empathy during times of change often navigate the change most successfully. So rather than shifting drastically between old and new methods, a business that will evaluate
the situation and review consumer behaviour will gain over others.

3. Capitalise on emerging and proven technologies: Soft copies of records and online documentation over physical files
Prior to Covid-19, companies were using a slew of incredible technologies to stay productive and connected. But the pandemic elevated these technologies and helped leaders understand their importance. Prior to the pandemic, the common office working trait of everyone meant the use of excessive paper and traditionally offices gave a feeling of drowning in paper! People at office love paper and hard copies from every work they do from chairing and attending meetings, to sharing and approving documents, filling forms and so on. In fact, now we use scanning and digital copies, yet paper is often used as the first resort rather than the last. Most of the old physical files which hold a lot of significance psychologically are not actually required regularly. In fact, many people never even opened a file even once during the pandemic and have learned to manage with digital data. The pandemic has helped us to fast-forward ten years into digital adoption in our businesses! Our familiarity with digital files vis a vis physical files has increased significantly.

As the pandemic is coming under control and we move through re-opening, businesses have choices about how to proceed. But how people lived and worked during the crisis will continue to have an influence on how we live and work in the years to come. There is a new, positive mentality emerging that it’s okay to use cutting-edge technology to serve customers better and create a happier, decentralised workforce. Adapting to this new way of thinking will allow you to stay ahead of the pack, but remember that every company is different and there’s no one-size-fits-all solution to anything. To create post-pandemic plans that truly lead you to success, evaluate your own situation and goals. The digital office is here to stay and offers incredible power in all kinds of industries, but how you shape it is entirely up to you.

It is time for us to start moving towards digital adoption of the working system instead of simply accepting what is the traditional system of working with paper. Though we have to agree that nothing will replace physical files and there is always going to be the risk of hacking, system crashing, non-availability of electricity or internet, but… The physical files may be used as a backup but gradually our dependency on them is reducing, so why not start transforming our old physical records into digital ones?

This move may not look that significant today but imagine the music record companies which have moved all their songs into a USB drive or uploaded them on Youtube when it was available. Keeping apace with technology is the only way to survive else we all know what happened to the likes of Kodak, Nokia, etc., all of which had a monopoly. (Kodak was sold for one dollar!)

CONCLUSION
Many things have changed over the last one and a half years, but overall we may not really feel how fast they have been changing around us and even in business on a daily basis. However, there are a lot of things which are improving for the better and as a business if we don’t adopt, we will be at a loss against other businesses who will implement automation and other technology-based features and the one that does not change will feel as if it is working with pen and paper during the time of Excel Calculation.

With this article, we wrap up the ‘Digital Workplace’ series. You can read our last three articles printed in the BCAJ as below:
(1) Digital Workplace – A Stitch In Time Saves Nine (August, 2021);
(2) Digital Workplace – When All Roads Lead To Rome (September, 2021);
(3) Digital Workplace – Finding The Right Balance (October, 2021)

MLI SERIES -ARTICLE 10 – ANTI-ABUSE RULE FOR PEs SITUATED IN THIRD JURISDICTIONS (Part 1)

The authors of the earlier articles in the MLI Series have covered various facets of the Multilateral Instrument (‘MLI’) such as the background and application of the MLI and various other specific articles in the MLI relating to dual resident entities, treaty abuse, transparent entities and method of elimination of double taxation. In this two-part article, the authors attempt to analyse Article 10 of the MLI relating to the anti-abuse rule for Permanent Establishments (‘PEs’) situated in third jurisdictions and some of the intricacies related therein. The first part of this article lays down the background for the introduction of this anti-avoidance rule, the broad structure of the rule, some of the issues arising in its interpretation and the interplay of this rule with the other articles of the MLI and other anti-avoidance measures.

1. BACKGROUND
At the outset, one admits that very limited literature is available in respect of this anti-abuse rule as most discussions on the MLI, at least in the Indian context, focus on the Principal Purpose Test (‘PPT’) and the amendments to the rules relating to the constitution of a PE. However, the anti-abuse rule for PEs situated in third jurisdictions can have significant implications, especially for an Indian payer undertaking compliance u/s 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), given the amount of information required to apply this rule.

Under this rule, the Source State can deny treaty benefits to taxpayers on certain conditions being triggered. Such treaty benefits can be in the form of a lower rate of tax (as in the case of dividends, royalty, fees for technical services) or in the form of narrower scope (such as the narrower definition of royalty under the treaty or the make-available clause). Therefore, when one is undertaking compliance u/s 195, one would need to evaluate the impact of this rule.

While a detailed evaluation of the impact on India has been provided subsequently in this article, before one undertakes an analysis of the anti-abuse rule it is important to understand how the taxation works in the case of a PE in a third state, i.e., in triangular situations and the abuse of treaty provisions that this rule seeks to address.

1.1 Basic structure and taxation before application of the said rule
For the purpose of this article, let us take a base example of interest income earned by A Co, a resident of State R, from money lent to an entity in State S and such income earned is attributable to the PE (say a branch) of A Co in the State PE as it is effectively connected with the activities of the PE. A diagrammatic example of the said structure is provided below:

 

In this particular fact pattern, State S being the country of source would have a right to tax the interest. However, such right may be restricted by the application of the R-S DTAA, particularly the article dealing with interest. If the article on interest in the R-S DTAA is similar to that in the OECD Model Convention1, interest arising in State S payable to a resident of State R, who is the beneficial owner of the income, can be taxed in State S but not at a rate exceeding 15% of the gross amount of the interest.

 

1   Unless specifically
provided, the OECD Model Tax Convention and Commentary referred to in this
article is the 2017 version

Now, State PE, being the country in which the PE of A Co is constituted, will have the right to tax the income of the PE in accordance with the domestic tax laws and in the manner provided in the article dealing with business profits of the R-PE DTAA.

Further, while State PE would tax the profits of the PE, one would apply the non-discrimination article in the R-PE DTAA which generally provides that the taxation of a PE in a particular jurisdiction (State PE in this case) shall not be less favourable than that of a resident of that jurisdiction (State PE). This particular clause in the article would enable one to treat the PE as akin to a resident of State PE and therefore would be eligible to claim the foreign tax credit in State PE for taxes paid in State S2. The OECD Model is silent on whether State PE shall provide credit under domestic tax law or whether it would restrict the credit under the DTAA between State PE and State S. This issue of tax credit, not being directly related to the subject matter of this article, has not been dealt with in detail.

State R being the country of residence, would tax the income of the residence and provide credit for the taxes paid in State S as well as State PE in accordance with the R-S and the R-PE DTAAs.

1.2 Use of structure for aggressive tax planning
Many multinationals use the triangular structure to transfer assets to a jurisdiction which has a low tax rate for PEs and where the residence state provides an exemption for profits of the PE. These structures were typically common in European jurisdictions such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

A common example is of the finance branch set up by a Luxembourg entity in Switzerland3. In this fact pattern, a Luxembourg entity would set up a branch in Switzerland for providing finance to all the group entities all over the world. Given the fact that a finance branch only required movement of the funds, it was fairly easy to set up the structure wherein the funds obtained by the Luxembourg entity (A Co) would be lent to its branch in Switzerland. This finance branch would then lend funds to all the operating group entities around the world acting as the bank of the group and earning interest. Interest paid by the operating entities would be deductible in the hands of the paying entity and taxed in the country of source in accordance with the DTAA between that jurisdiction and Luxembourg. Further, the Swiss branch, constituting a PE in Switzerland, would be subject to very low taxation in accordance with the domestic tax law in Switzerland.

 

2   Refer para 67 of the OECD
Model Commentary on Article 24

3   J-P. Van West, Chapter 1:
Introduction to PE Triangular Cases and Article 29(8) of the OECD Model in The
Anti-Abuse Rule for Permanent Establishments Situated in Third States: A Legal
Analysis of Article 29(8) OECD Model (IBFD 2020), Books IBFD (accessed 16th
November, 2021)

Moreover, the Luxembourg-Swiss DTAA provides that in the case of a PE in a Contracting State, the Resident State (State R) will relieve double taxation by using the exemption method (and not the tax credit method as is generally prevalent in the Indian tax treaties), i.e., the Resident State (State R) would not tax the profits attributable to a PE in the other State. Therefore, the profits attributable to the Swiss branch of A Co would be exempt from tax in Luxembourg.

This would result in the interest being taxed in the country of source (with a deduction for the interest paid in the hands of the payer in the country of source) at a concessional treaty rate, very low tax in the country where the PE is constituted, i.e., Switzerland and no tax in the country of residence, i.e., Luxembourg by virtue of the exemption method followed in the Luxembourg-Swiss DTAA.

Like interest, one could also transfer other assets which resulted in passive income such as shares and intangible assets, resulting in a low tax incidence on the dividend and royalty income, respectively.

Let’s take the example of India, where a resident of Luxembourg invests in the shares of an Indian company through a PE situated in Switzerland. In such a scenario, India would tax the dividend at the rate of 10% due to the India-Luxembourg DTAA (as against 20% under the Act), Switzerland may tax the income attributable to the PE at a low rate and Luxembourg would not tax the income in accordance with the Luxembourg-Switzerland DTAA.

The OECD, recognising the use of PE to artificially apply lower tax rates, attempted to tackle this in the OECD Model Convention by providing further guidance on what would be considered as income effectively connected in the PE. For example, para 32 of the 2014 OECD Model Commentary on Article 10, dealing with taxation of dividends, provides,

It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of shares to permanent establishments set up solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to dividend income. Apart from the fact that such abusive transactions might trigger the application of domestic anti-abuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location can only constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, as explained below, that the requirement that a shareholding be “effectively connected” to such a location requires more than merely recording the shareholding in the books of the permanent establishment for accounting purposes.’

Similar provisions were also provided in the Commentary on Article 11 and Article 12, dealing with interest and royalty, respectively.

However, the above provisions may not necessarily always tackle all forms of tax avoidance. Thanks to the nature of tax treaties applying only in bilateral situations, it may not apply in case of a PE constituted in a third state (State PE). Similarly, one may still achieve an overall low rate of tax by moving the functions related to the activities in the State PE. For example, in the case of a finance branch, one can consider moving the treasury team to State PE with an office, which would constitute a fixed place of business and therefore, the interest income earned from the group financing activities may still be effectively connected to the PE in the State PE.

The OECD Model recognised this limitation and para 71 of the 2014 OECD Model Commentary on Article 24 provides that a provision can be included in the bilateral treaty between the State R and the State S to provide that an enterprise can claim the benefits of the treaty only if the income obtained by the PE situated in the other State is taxed normally in the State of the PE.

1.3 BEPS Action 6
The US was one of the few countries which had provisions similar to the Article in the MLI in its tax treaties even before the OECD BEPS Project. In fact, even though the US is not a signatory to the MLI, the provisions as released by the US were used as a base for further discussion in the BEPS Project. The anti-abuse rule was covered in the OECD BEPS Action Plan 6 dealing with Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances.

The objective of the anti-abuse provision is provided in para 51 of the BEPS Action 6 report, which is reproduced below,

‘It was concluded that a specific anti-abuse provision should be included in the Model Tax Convention to deal with that and similar triangular cases where income attributable to the permanent establishment in a third State is subject to low taxation.’

While the language in the MLI is similar to the suggested draft in the final report of the BEPS Action Plan 6, there are certain differences – mainly certain deletions, in the MLI, which have been discussed in detail in the second part of this article.

It is important to note that while Article 10(1) is included in the MLI as a specific anti-avoidance rule, MLI also contains a general anti-avoidance rule under Article 7 through the PPT. Further, in the Indian context, the domestic law also contains anti-avoidance provisions in the form of general anti-avoidance rules. An interplay between all three is discussed in para 3.5 below.

2. STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 1
2.1 Introduction to Article 10
The language contained in this Article refers to various terminologies that have been defined under Article 2 of the MLI [e.g., Contracting Jurisdiction (‘CJ’), Covered Tax Agreement (‘CTA’)]. Those terminologies referred to in Article 10, which have not been defined under Article 2 of the MLI, have to be interpreted as per Action 6 of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’).

Article 10 of the MLI seeks to deny treaty benefits in certain circumstances.

2.2 Structure
Article 10 of the MLI is structured in six paragraphs wherein each paragraph addresses a different aspect related to the anti-abuse provision. The flow of the Article is structured in such a way that the conditions for attracting the provisions of the article are laid down first, followed by the exceptions and finally the reservation and notification which are in line with the overall scheme of the MLI.

To better understand Article 10, it would be beneficial to understand each paragraph individually. Let us proceed as per the order of the article.

Paragraph 1:
Paragraph 1 brings out the conditions for the applicability of Article 10 in certain circumstances:

‘Where:

a) an enterprise of a Contracting Jurisdiction to a Covered Tax Agreement derives income from the other Contracting Jurisdiction and the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction treats such income as attributable to a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in a third jurisdiction; and

b) the profits attributable to that permanent establishment are exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction,

the benefits of the Covered Tax Agreement shall not apply to any item of income on which the tax in the third jurisdiction is less than 60 per cent of the tax that would be imposed in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction on that item of income if that permanent establishment were situated in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction. In such a case, any income to which the provisions of this Paragraph apply shall remain taxable according to the domestic law of the other Contracting Jurisdiction, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.’

Each underlined word is a condition for the applicability of the article and has its own significance.

An enterprise – The question as to how to interpret the term ‘an enterprise’ and what comes under the purview of the same is covered in the later part of this article.

derives income from the other Contracting Jurisdiction – This emphasises on the aspect that the income earned by the Resident State should be derived from the State S for the Article to get triggered.

income as attributable to a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in a third jurisdiction – In addition to the condition as mentioned above, the income derived by the State PE from State S should be treated as attributable to the PE in State PE by State R.

exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting Jurisdiction – This covers the point regarding the taxability of the profits attributable to the PE in the State R. It focuses on the point that Article 10 would be applicable if the profits attributable to the PE are exempt from tax in State R.

tax in the third jurisdiction is less than 60 per cent – This sentence points out the 60% test which states that the tax in the State PE is less than 60% of the tax that would be payable in the State R on that item of income if that PE was situated in the State R.

In case all the above conditions are satisfied, the benefits of the CTA between the State R and the State S shall not apply to such item of income.

The second part of paragraph 1 gives power to the State S to tax the item of income as per its domestic laws notwithstanding any other provisions of the CTA in cases where the provisions of Article 10(1) are satisfied.

Thus, it can be understood that the provisions of Article 10(1) emphasise on the denial of treaty benefits in order to prevent complete non-taxation or lower taxation of an item of income.

Paragraph 2:
Paragraph 2 states the exceptions where the provisions as set out in paragraph 1 of the Article 10 will not be applicable.

The exception covers the income derived from the State S in connection with or is incidental to active conduct of the business carried on by the PE. However, the business of making, managing or simply holding investments for the enterprise’s own account such as activities of banking carried on by banks, insurance activities carried on by insurance enterprises and securities activities carried on by registered securities dealers will not come under the purview of paragraph 1 of the Article. The business of making, managing or simply holding investments for the enterprise’s own account carried on by other than the above-mentioned enterprises shall come under the purview of paragraph 1 of the Article. A detailed discussion on what is considered as active conduct of business is covered in the second part of this article.

Paragraph 3:
Paragraph 3 of Article 10 provides that even if treaty relief is denied due to the trigger of the provisions of
Article 10(1), the competent authority of State S has the authority to grant the treaty relief as a response to a request by the taxpayer in the State R on the basis of justified reasons for not satisfying the requirements of Article 10(1).

In such situations, the competent authority of the State S shall consult with the competent authority of the State R before arriving at a decision.

Paragraph 4:
Paragraph 4 is the compatibility clause between paragraph 1 through paragraph 3 which mentions ‘in place of or in the absence of’.

This means that if there is an existing provision in a CTA which denies / limits treaty relief in instances of triangular cases (‘Existing Provision’), then such a provision would be modified (i.e. in place of) to the extent paragraph 1 through 3 are inconsistent with the existing provisions (subject to notification requirements analysed below).

However, if there is no existing provision then paragraph 1 through 3 would be added to the CTAs (i.e., in absence of).

Paragraph 5:
Article 10(5) covers the reservation aspect to be in line with the overall scheme of the MLI.

This reservation clause is applicable because Article 10 is not covered under minimum standard and hence the scope for reservation is wide. There are three options available to each signatory:
a) Article to not be applicable to all CTA’s in entirety, or
b) Article to not be applicable in case where the CTA already contains the provision as mentioned in paragraph 4, or
c) Article to only be applicable in case of CTA’s that already contain the provisions as mentioned under paragraph 4 (i.e., the existing provisions to be modified to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 10).

Paragraph 6:
Article 10(6) provides the notification mechanism to assess the impact of the reservations and position adopted by the signatories on the provisions of the CTAs.

In cases where the parties decide to go as per sub-paragraph (a) or (b) of Article 10(5), then they need to notify the depository whether each of its CTA contains the provisions as per Article 10(4) along with the article and paragraph number. In case where all contracting jurisdictions have made such a notification, then the existing provisions shall be replaced by the provisions of Article 10. In other cases, such as in the case of a notification mismatch (i.e., one signatory to the CTA does not notify the provisions of Article 10 whereas the other signatory to the same CTA notifies them), the existing provisions shall ONLY be modified to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 10.

India has not made any reservation. Further, India has not notified any DTAAs which have a provision similar to that in para 4 of Article 10. Therefore, the provisions of Article 10 of the MLI shall supersede the existing provisions of the DTAAs to the extent they are incompatible with the existing provisions.

2.3 Reason as to why the Source Country should not grant DTAA benefits
The main policy consideration for implementation of Article 10 of the MLI is to plug the structure wherein one can artificially reduce the overall tax simply by interposing a PE in a low-tax jurisdiction, which is a major BEPS concern.

Tax treaties allocate the taxing rights between the jurisdictions. A Source State giving up its taxing rights is a result of bilateral negotiation with the Residence State. However, if such Residence State decides to treat such income as attributable to a third state and therefore not taxing such income by virtue of another treaty of which the Source State is a not a party, would be against the intention of the countries who have negotiated the treaty in good faith.

Therefore, if State R gives up its right of taxation of income earned from State S due to the artificial imposition of a PE in a third State, Article 10 of the MLI gives the entire taxing right back to State S.

3. SOME ISSUES RELATED TO INTERPRETATION OF PARA 1 OF ARTICLE 10 OF MLI
Having analysed the broad provisions of Article 10 of the MLI, the ensuing paragraphs seek to raise (and analyse) some of the issues in relation to para 1 of Article 10.

3.1 Definition of PE – Which DTAA to Apply
While considering the situation of denial of treaty benefits laid out in the treaty between State R and State S with regard to the income earned by the PE of an entity of the State R in a State PE, there are two DTAA’s that come under this purview, namely:
i. Treaty between the State R and the State S, and
ii. Treaty between the State R and the third state (PE State).

For the purpose of referring to the definition of PE, the first question that arises is which of the two DTAAs has to be referred to? This issue arises mainly because the term ‘Permanent Establishment’ is not a general term but is a specific term which is defined in the DTAA (generally in Article 5 of the relevant DTAA).

A view could be that since the acceptability or denial of benefits under the DTAA between the State R and State S is evaluated and State S is the jurisdiction denying the treaty benefit, one should look at the DTAA between the State R and State S to determine the PE status. However, the objective of the anti-abuse provision is to target transactions wherein income is not taxed in State R due to a PE in State PE. Further, MLI 10(1) applies only if the Residence State treats the income of an enterprise derived from the Source State as attributable to the PE of a third State. This decision of Residence State is obviously on the basis of its treaty with the PE State as it is a bilateral decision. As the Source State is not a party to this decision, the treaty between Residence State and Source State cannot be applied. Therefore, a better view would be to consider the provisions of the DTAA between the State R and the third state (State PE) for the definition of PE.

It is also important to note that prior to introduction of MLI, Article 5 of the DTAA was referred to in order to establish the PE status. However, post introduction of the MLI, one would also need to evaluate the impact of Article 12 to Article 15 of the MLI which covers the PE status based on Action 7 of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). This, of course, is subject to the CTA between Residence State and PE State not reserving the above articles.

3.2 Whether PE jurisdiction needs to be a signatory to MLI
Article 10 of the MLI merely provides that State S should deny benefit of the DTAA between State R and State S if certain conditions are triggered. One of the conditions is that the income is treated by Residence State as attributable to the PE of the taxpayer in State PE. Having concluded the above, that the PE definition under the DTAA between State R and State PE should be considered, it is not necessary that such DTAA is impacted by the MLI. If the DTAA between State R and State PE is impacted by the MLI, one would need to consider the modified definition of PE in such a situation.

Here, it would be important to look at Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. The same is reproduced below:

Article 34 – General Rule Regarding Third States
A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.

In this particular scenario, it is clear that there is no right or obligation granted to the State PE under the DTAA between State R and State S. State PE can continue to tax the profits of the PE.

Further, by signing MLI Article 10, State S and State R should be deemed to have consented their rights and obligations under the State R-State S treaty as amended by MLI Article 10. Consequently, State PE would not be required to be a signatory to the MLI.

3.3 No taxation in country of residence
Another issue which arises is what if the country of residence does not tax the income irrespective of whether the income is attributable to a PE or not. For example, if dividend income is earned by a resident of Singapore and such income is attributable to the PE of the shareholder in a third jurisdiction, such dividend would not be taxable irrespective of whether the dividend is attributable to a PE in a third state or not.

In such a scenario, Article 10 of the MLI should not apply as the tax rate in State PE is not less than 60% of the tax rate in State R. In any case, as the Source State had given up its right of taxation even when the Residence State did not tax such income and imposing a third jurisdiction in the transaction, would not result in a reduction of taxes in the Residence State.

3.4 Interplay of Article 10 with Article 5
Article 5 of the MLI provides for the elimination of double taxation using the credit method as against the exemption method. It refers to three options for preventing double non-taxation situations arising due to the State R providing relief under the exemption method for income not taxed in the State S.

The interplay between Article 5 and Article 10 comes into play because Article 10 is applicable only in cases where the income is exempt in the State R. So, in order to determine whether or not the income is exempt in the State R, Article 5 will have to be referred to. If the DTAA between State R and State PE provides for the exemption method for elimination of double taxation, but State R has opted to apply Article 5 of the MLI, the credit method would apply and in such a situation, in the absence of exemption granted in State R, the provisions of Article 10(1) shall not apply.

India has opted for Option C under Article 5 which allows a country to apply the credit method to all its treaties where the exemption method was applicable earlier. Therefore, with respect to India only credit method will be applicable as a method to eliminate double taxation.

Given that India’s tax treaties apply the credit method for providing relief from double taxation, the situation contemplated under Article 5 may not be relevant in the Indian context.

3.5 Interplay of Article 10 with PPT / GAAR
The Principle Purpose Test (‘PPT’) rule under Article 7 is the minimum standard and applies to all DTAAs covered under MLI. A question could therefore arise as to which provision would override the other. It is pertinent to note that provisions of Article 29 of the OECD Model clearly specify that Article 29 would apply where the PPT has been met. However, Article 10 of the MLI does not lay down any preference of application of PPT or otherwise. Consequently, it could be possible to take a view that if the specific conditions of Article 10 are met, PPT rule should not apply to deny the treaty benefits.

However, a better and sensible view could be that even if the special anti-abuse provision contained in Article 10 is satisfied, the general anti-abuse provision under Article 7(1) also needs to be satisfied to avail treaty benefits. In other words, where the main purpose to set up or constitute the PE in the third state (State PE) was to obtain tax benefit, such an arrangement should be covered under the mandatory provisions of Article 7(1) of the MLI so as to deny the treaty benefits. In a case where the provisions of MLI Article 10 are applicable, the treaty benefits can be denied based on the applicability of MLI Article 10 itself. In other words, MLI article 7(1) and MLI Article 10 both can co-exist and an assessee needs to satisfy both the tests to avail treaty benefits.

Further, in a case where India is the State S, one will also have to see the applicability of GAAR provisions and its interplay with the provisions of Article 10. Typically, GAAR applies where the main purpose of the arrangement is to obtain tax benefit and the GAAR provisions can kick in to deny the treaty benefits as well. Here it is important to note that both Indian domestic law and OECD recognise that the provisions of GAAR / PPT and SAAR / MLI 10 can co-exist. FAQ 1 under Circular 7 of 2017 states that the provisions of GAAR and SAAR can co-exist and are applicable, as may be necessary, in the facts and circumstances of the case. The same has also been recognised under para 2 of the OECD commentary on Article 29.

4. CONCLUSION
In the second part of this article, the authors will attempt to analyse some practical challenges arising on account of the difference in the tax rates of the jurisdictions involved and the impact of the anti-avoidance rule on India. The second part will also cover the difference between Article 10 of the MLI and the BEPS Action Plan 6 Report on the basis of which the rule was incorporated in the MLI and Article 29 of the OECD Model.  

 

VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS – ADDING VALUE TO ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE

BACKGROUND
The recently introduced new tax reporting obligations under the three-tier documentation [that is, country-by-country report (CbCR), master file and local file] pursuant to implementation of Action 13 of the action plans on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS1) for companies having cross-border operations, requires maintenance and sharing of the transfer pricing documentation with tax authorities across the globe. While the CbCR will give tax authorities much more information on the global tax footprint of the group, the master file requires it to produce a global ‘overview’ of a multinational entity’s business including its supply chain, allocation of income and transfer pricing policies, and this may include sharing of critical and sensitive information about its business operations. The documentation required has become more robust and in sync with the actual conduct of the operations as against the contractual obligations. Hence, the existing requirement of documentation, which historically has been the cornerstone for supporting the arm’s length standard, needs to be aligned with the new reporting framework. The discrepancy between the two documentation frameworks, if not reconciled, can lead to misinterpretations and ineffective discussions between the taxpayers and tax authorities. This has led to the taxpayers relooking at the way the businesses have been conducted and requiring a much closer alignment between a company’s value chain, operating model and the tax structure.

 

1   BEPS
relates chiefly to instances where the interaction of different tax rules leads
to double non-taxation or less than single taxation. It also relates to
arrangements that achieve no or low taxation by shifting profits away from the
jurisdictions where the activities creating those profits take place – OECD’s
publication on ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’

In line with the above and with the advent of the new framework of documentation, the arm’s length principle (ALP) which was considered to be transaction-based and at most entity-based, has evolved from the entity approach to mapping of the position of the group entities and reconciling the profits allocated according to arm’s length with ‘value creation’. This shift is more so as ALP is seen as being vulnerable to manipulation as it lays emphasis on contractual allocations of functions, assets and risks and this results in outcomes which do not correspond to the value created through the economic activity carried out by the members of the group. Some of the instances of current ALP mismatches are given below:

(a) Benchmarking analysis currently undertaken which considers only one part of the transaction without taking into consideration the holistic analysis of the parties involved in the intercompany transaction.
(b) Commissionaire model wherein the significant people functions contribute highly to the group but draw only a cost plus or fixed return to the entity with the people function.
(c) IP structures without the people function charging royalty to the group entities by claiming to be the legal owner of intangibles while no value creation happens in the said entities.

Hence, for the sustainability of the group’s transfer pricing policy, it becomes necessary to conduct a value chain analysis in order to bridge the gap between the requirements of the existing documentation requirement and the BEPS-driven documentation.

Value chain analysis in simple terms means a systematic way of examining all the activities performed by the business and determining the sources of the competitive advantage which translate into profit for the group. In short, a value chain analysis projects the value creation story of the group by bringing out how and where the value is created and by which entities within the group. This analysis is crucial as it will assist the group to test and corroborate the alignment of the transfer pricing policies with the value creation.

The OECD in its BEPS projects has also recognised value chain analysis as being useful in determining the value drivers and the relevant factors necessary for splitting the profits to the entities creating the value. Further, Actions 8-102: 2015 Final Reports on ‘Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation’ states that the value chain analysis should consider where and how value is created in the operations by considering the following:
(a) Economically significant functions, assets and risks and the key personnel contributing to the same;
(b) The economic circumstances that add to the creation of opportunities to increase profits;
(c) The substance in the value creation and whether the same is sustainable or short-term.

Effectively conducted value chain analysis can lead to transformation in the supply chain in order to align with the value drivers. A value chain analysis thus provides companies with a means to defend their transfer pricing policies, i.e., to prove that the arm’s length price is in sync with the actual functions performed, assets employed and risks assumed.

ORIGIN AND CONCEPT OF VALUE CHAIN
The concept of ‘value chain’ was introduced by Micheal Porter in his book The Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, back in 1985. In simple terms, it refers to the chain of activities performed by a business to transform an input for a product or service into an output that is of value in the market for the customer. Such activities could range from design and development, procurement, production, marketing, logistics, distribution, to after-sales support to the final customer. These activities may be performed by a single entity or a group of entities which are based in different locations that contribute to the overall profitability of the business.

With increasing globalisation, international trade and advent of technology, the value chains of MNEs are dispersed across multiple geographies and entities which have resulted in the evolution of the concept of global value chain (‘GVC’). GVCs are organisational systems that operate across multiple nations and are highly integrated. GVCs help the MNEs to achieve enhanced productivity, efficiency and economies of scale at a global level in this dynamic business environment. Typically, a GVC would involve vertical integration of economic activities which at the same time are divided across countries, specialisation in tasks and business-related functions and reliance on the integrated networks of buyers and suppliers.

 

2   Actions
8 to 10 – Action 8 relates to TP framework for intangibles and cost
contribution agreements, Action 9 relates to TP framework for risks and
capital, and Action 10 relates to TP methods for other high-risk transactions

POST-BEPS – GUIDANCE PROVIDED ON VALUE CHAIN
BEPS is an initiative by the OECD which seeks to ensure that each country gets its fair share of taxes by setting up effective domestic and international tax systems which curb base erosion and profit shifting by multinational corporations by misusing the gaps and mismatches in the present tax systems. As a part of this project, 15 detailed Action Plans were laid down by the OECD across the themes of coherence, economic substance and transparency.

The concept of value chain analysis, though well-known, has gained more significance with the BEPS initiative. From a transfer pricing perspective, the important areas of change lie within the ‘economic substance’ and ‘transparency’ themes. The need for value chain analysis is rooted under both the said themes and is the heart of the BEPS from a transfer pricing perspective.

The OECD3 recognised that there is a need to address the issues arising due to mismatch of economic substance in corporate structures, where the income is parked in low tax jurisdictions under legal entities which lack substance, thus leading to erosion of the tax base of the other high tax jurisdictions.

Some of the guidance available emphasising on the relevance of value chain are reproduced below:

– OECD’s publication on ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ 2013 has highlighted the importance of value chain analysis:
Action 54 – Point (ii) on ‘Restoring the full effects and benefits of international standards’ states that ‘Current rules work in many cases, but they need to be adapted to prevent BEPS that results from the interactions among more than two countries and to fully account for global value chains’.

– BEPS Action Plan 8-10’s final reports, ‘Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation’ released in 2015 lays emphasis on value chain in determining the arm’s length price for transactions with related parties. This was also included in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2017 (‘TPG’), in para 1.51 – Functional analysis, which reads as under:
‘… it is important to understand how value is generated by the group as a whole, the interdependencies of the functions performed by the associated enterprises with the rest of the group, and the contribution that the associated enterprises make to that value creation. It will also be relevant to determine the legal rights and obligations of each of the parties in performing their functions…
Determining the economic significance of risk and how risk may affect the pricing of a transaction between associated enterprises is part of the broader functional analysis of how value is created by the MNE group and the activities that allow the MNE group to sustain profits, and the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction…” para 1.73

 

3   OECD
– Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

4   Action
5 relates to countering harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into
account transparency and substance

– The TPG lays emphasis on the principle of substance over form in para 1.66 which reads as under –
‘The capability to perform decision-making functions and the actual performance of such decision-making functions relating to a specific risk involve an understanding of the risk based on a relevant analysis of the information required for assessing the foreseeable downside and upside risk outcomes of such decisions and the consequences for the business of the enterprise…’

– The public discussion draft of revised guidance on Profit Splits of 20165, contained a section on value chain analysis, which emphasised the following –
• A value chain analysis can be used as a ‘tool to assist in delineating the controlled transactions, in particular in respect of the functional analysis, and thereby determining the most appropriate transfer pricing methodology.’
• A value chain analysis ‘does not, of itself, indicate that the transactional profit split is the most appropriate method, even where the value chain analysis shows that there are factors which contribute to the creation of value in multiple places, since all parties to a transaction can be expected to make some contributions to value creation’.

However, this section was eliminated from the final Guidance as it was thought that overemphasis could unduly uplift the significance of profit splits even in cases where this would not be the best method.

 

5   https://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/BEPS-discussion-draft-on-the-revised-guidance-on-profit-splits.pdf

– In relation to analysis of intangibles, the TPG lays focus on identifying the factors that contribute to value creation and entities that perform economically significant functions in relation to the intangibles which are used by the MNE to create value for the business. The relevant paras are given below:

‘…In cases involving the use or transfer of intangibles, it is especially important to ground the functional analysis on an understanding of the MNE’s global business and the manner in which intangibles are used by the MNE to add or create value across the entire supply chain…’ para 6.3

‘In a transfer pricing analysis of a matter involving intangibles, it is important to identify the relevant intangibles with specificity. The functional analysis should identify the relevant intangibles at issue, the manner in which they contribute to the creation of value in the transactions under review, the important functions performed and specific risks assumed in connection with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles and the manner in which they interact with other intangibles, with tangible assets and with business operations to create value…’ para 6.12.

– BEPS Action Plan 13 on three-tier documentation requires disclosure of certain information in the master file for the MNE group such as key value drivers of
the business, details on intangibles, transfer pricing policies, contribution of the key group entities, etc., which will enable tax administrations access to global documentation leading to enhanced transparency
and thereby provide a mechanism to tackle BEPS problems.

– Both the local documentation and the CbCR could reveal the key data points in relation to the MNCs’ IP activities highlighting the low substance entities generating lower taxable income.

– Also, there are certain countries (such as China, Germany, Spain, Austria, Ecuador, South Africa, etc.) where the tax administrations lay emphasis on documentation of the VCA in the local TP documentation.

WHAT IS VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS (‘VCA’)
VCA can be said to be a blueprint of the MNE’s group operations. The analysis involves a detailed investigation into the functions, assets and risks of the MNE as a whole and thereby evaluating the contribution of each of the activities involved in the value chain to the overall value created by the group. A VCA is a deep-dive analysis of understanding where and how the economic value is created and by which parties within a multinational group.

A VCA reflects the key value drivers for an MNE’s business, sector, or line of activity and identifies the relative contributions to the value-creation process. Value driver is something that contributes to the generation of income for an MNE’s business. Value drivers could also be defined as the performance variables that will actually create the value of the business.

The value drivers may vary across different businesses, industries and sectors. It is important to note that the nature of the business or industry generally defines whether it has more of tangible or intangible value. Most of the service industry players will have greater intangible value while an asset intensive industry will have higher tangible value. For instance:
(a) For Apple, which is one of the leading companies which sells computers, mobile phones and such other electronic devices, their key value drivers would be continuous innovation, unique technology which differentiates their products from the other competitors in the market, brand, customer loyalty, geographic reach, etc.
(b) For an IT company like Infosys which is a multinational company engaged in providing services in the area of information technology, business consultancy, outsourcing and managed services, their key value drivers would be employee productivity, a skilled and trained workforce, a global delivery model, latest technology, acquisitions, etc.
(c) For a company like McDonalds which falls under the fast-food industry, the value drivers would be product quality and customer health, human capital, environment footprint, brand management, sustainable supply chain and packaging waste, etc.
(d) For a company like Paytm which is a leading digital financial services platform, the value drivers would be technology, customer experience, availability of frictionless payment options, etc.

The VCA highlights the economically significant functions performed and risks assumed by the MNE group and also by the individual entities within the group which leads to value creation for the group. Further, by understanding whether an entity is really controlling the function / risk, it becomes easier to understand whether such an entity is adequately remunerated for these activities in line with its value contribution and whether it would need to be remunerated if there is a transfer of such function or risk from that entity to any other group entity. The VCA helps in identifying the commercial or financial relations between the parties and thereby assists in accurately delineating the controlled transactions based on the actual conduct of the parties in the entire value chain. A VCA is therefore a critical and important step for the purpose of drawing conclusions from a tax and transfer pricing perspective to align the value drivers with the functions performed and risks borne by the respective entities in the global value chain.

STEPS FOR UNDERTAKING VCA
There is no ‘right’ way of conducting a value chain analysis because every business will have its own value drivers and value creation story. Further, there are various techniques that can be applied while conducting a VCA to map the activities against the value creation. We explain below some of the steps which need to be considered in performing a VCA:

Step 1: Identification of the value drivers for the business
Value drivers in principle are common for a business operating in a particular industry or sector; however, its importance will vary from business to business. These drivers can be linked to the tangible assets or intangible assets of the business that are created or used for conducting the business, the various processes / systems adopted, customer relationships developed, the skilled workforce, or even the culture of the organisation which leads to value creation. Also, not all the value drivers would draw equal weightage when their contributions in the value chain are analysed. Hence, it is important to evaluate their relative value in the entire value chain by assigning a numerical weightage to them.

Step 2: Mapping the contribution by the legal entities / territories
The next step is to determine and map the contribution to the value generated by the value drivers with the legal entities that are part of the value chain. This will involve conducting a detailed functions, asset and risk analysis for the legal entities, analysing the key tangible and intangible assets employed and the risks assumed by the entities while contributing to the value chain. The OECD guidelines provide a detailed framework on risk analysis – control and management of risks, which would play a vital role in determining their weightage in value creation. Para D.1.2.1.1 of the TPG.

Step 3: Allocate the profits to the legal entities
Based on the results of Steps 1 and 2, the overall profit of the group is calculated and then appropriately allocated to the respective legal entities in line with the weightage assigned to the relative contributions of the entities in the value chain.

Step 4: Alignment with the transfer pricing outcomes
The results of Step 3 can be compared with the existing or proposed transfer pricing for controlled transactions across the group and in alignment with the value created by each of the entities in the value chain. VCA is a corroborative analysis which would help identify the mismatches in the pricing for the individual entities by providing a holistic picture of the allocation of profit results at a group level.

We have illustrated below a case study evaluating the value chain for an MNE group:

 

In relation to the above case study:
• F Co. is the parent company of I Co., S Co. and D Co.
• F Co. is engaged in full-fledged manufacturing activities.
• I Co. and S. Co. are R&D centres of the group.
• I Co. supervises the R&D services performed by S Co.
• D Co. is a full-fledged distributor engaged in distribution of goods in the local jurisdiction.

Value chain – Analysis of the value contribution of each of the parties

Functions
of F Co.

Functions
of I Co.

Functions
of S Co.

Functions
of D Co.

• Manufacture and sale of products

• Legal owner of the IP developed by I Co. and S
Co.

• Provides funding to I Co. and S Co.

• Manages the R&D projects by hiring own
R&D workforce

• Frames its own research budgets, decides on the
termination /

• Designs and develops R&D programme under
the supervision and control of I Co.

• Performs the contract R&D services


Imports (procures) finished goods from F Co. and sells to local customers


Performs local marketing and sales functions

(continued)

 

for the R &D activities

(continued)

 

modification to the R&D projects

• Controls and supervises the R&D activities
performed by S Co.

• Takes all the relevant decisions related to
R&D of S Co.

(continued)

 

under supervision and control of I Co.

• After sales support activities

Risks
borne by F Co.

Risks
borne by I Co.

Risks
borne by S Co.

Risks
borne by D Co.

• Financial risk of failure of R&D projects

• Operates as a full-fledged manufacturer bearing
all the related risks

Responsible for key development activities and
risk management functions of I Co. and S Co. both in relation to the IP
developed through the R&D activities

Limited risks service provider – attrition risk,
foreign currency fluctuation risk, technology risk, etc.

Takes
title to the goods and bears the related risks such as market risks,
inventory risk, credit risk, foreign currency fluctuation risk, etc.

In order to perform an analysis of the value contribution of each of the entities it is essential to understand the functions performed and risks assumed by each of the entities in the value chain. From the above tabulation of the functional and risk analysis of all the entities participating in the value chain of the group, it is evident that the primary functions in the value chain are research and development, procurement, manufacturing, sales and marketing and after sales services. Various entities of the group based in different geographies are engaged in performing the said activities in relation to these functions which leads to creation of value for the group and thereby results in generating profits. The key value drivers for this business are people, technology, marketing intangible (brand), customer base, innovation through R&D, location savings, etc.

In the above case study, from a transfer pricing perspective the following are the key points for consideration:
a) F Co. being the IP owner contractually assumes the financial risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk in relation to the IP developed as a result of the R&D activities performed by I Co. and S Co. However, it does not exercise any control over these risks. Accordingly, in addition to the return on the manufacturing function, F Co. may only be entitled to a risk-free return on the funding activities.
b) I Co. is entitled to returns derived from the exploitation of the intangibles developed as a result of the R&D efforts of I Co. and S. Co., as it performs both the development and risk management functions in relation to the intangibles developed.
c) S Co. needs to be remunerated for its contract R&D services rendered to F Co. based on the function, asset and risk analysis in relation to these activities performed by F Co. In determining the remuneration for S Co., it will be critical to consider the comparability factors such as the skill sets of the employees employed for performing the R&D services, the nature of research being undertaken, etc.
d) D Co. is a full-fledged distributor and needs to be remunerated adequately for the distribution functions performed by it.

In the above case study, based on the steps for conducting the VCA (explained before the case study), the controlled transactions were accurately delineated from the value chain and the key functions performed and risks assumed by the respective group entities in the value chain have been identified and evaluated. On the basis of the evaluation of the contribution of each of the parties, the remuneration in line with the conduct has been discussed in the above section.

In practical scenarios, the value chain analysis could be more complex for large MNEs where the supply chain is fragmented across various geographies with multiple group entities involved in the value chain performing various integrated functions. Accordingly, it is necessary to follow a methodical and step-by-step process while conducting the value chain analysis which forms the basis of tax and transfer pricing analysis for the group at a global level.

Purpose of conducting a value chain analysis in the current environment
a) Supply chain analysis vis-à-vis traditional FAR analysis vis-à-vis value chain analysis

A value chain as a concept is different from a supply chain. A supply chain typically focuses on the ‘flow of goods and services’, while value chain addresses the question of what value the business has created by analysing what it is able to sell in the market and what is the cost of creating that.

Supply chain can be described as a business transformation tool which helps in minimising the costs, maximising the customer satisfaction by ensuring that the products are provided to the customers at the right time and place; whereas value chain provides the competitive advantage which ensures that the competition is taken care of by fulfilling customer satisfaction by adding value. Supply chain is only a component of the value chain.

The value chain analysis supplements the traditional functional analysis and establishes the connection on how the FAR and value drivers contribute value to the MNC. The value chain analysis strengthens the documentation as it evaluates both sides of the contracting parties and provides a justification of the arm’s length principle by highlighting the alignment of the transfer pricing policy with the actual conduct of the parties. The robust documentation will serve as back-up to defend the pricing policy during transfer pricing audits. This will also be relevant during negotiations with the APA / competent authority on the allocation of profits among the parties in the value chain as the documentation clearly highlights the robust functional profile.

b) Globalisation and decentralisation of functions, digitalisation
With the emergence of MNEs across different jurisdictions, the competitiveness of the companies is influenced by the efficiency of the supply chain and the corresponding value created by each of the functions in the value chain. Given the current dynamics, not only the supply chain but also the value chain is shifting towards becoming more sustainable, globalised and digitalised.

Digitalisation is bringing about a change by introducing new operating models and revolutionising the existing models. With this there is bound to be a change in the value drivers of the companies and a shift in the functional profile. Corresponding alignment of the pricing policy with the value creation / contribution of each entity in the value chain is going to be critical in order to ensure appropriate allocation of the profits to the entities.

 

6   In
transfer pricing cases involving intangibles, the determination of the entity
or entities within an MNE group which are ultimately entitled to share in the
returns derived by the group from exploiting intangibles is crucial. A related
issue is which entity or entities within the group should ultimately bear the
costs, investments and other burdens associated with the Development of
intangible asset, Enhancement of the value of intangible asset, Maintenance
of intangible asset, Protection of intangible asset against infringement
and Exploitation of intangibles

c) Assessing the value in the value chain for intangibles
For the purpose of assessing the value, the strong focus is on DEMPE function6. It is important that the profit allocation is based on the functional substance-based contribution towards the DEMPE of the intangibles. The value drivers in the case of intangibles go beyond the legal definition of the intangible. In the case of intangibles, factors such as risks borne, specific market characteristics, location, business strategies and group synergies could contribute to value creation. All the entities performing functions, using assets or assuming risks for contributing to the value of the intangible, must be adequately remunerated for their contribution under the arm’s length principle.

d) Application of profit split method (PSM) for value chain analysis
The main objective of BEPS is that the transfer pricing outcomes are in sync with the economic value created. Hence, it becomes necessary to accurately delineate the actual transaction and its pricing in accordance with the most appropriate method selected to justify the arm’s length principle. The transfer pricing regulations requires selection of the most appropriate method to justify the arm’s length principle. PSM7 could be considered as the most appropriate method as it advocates alignment of profits with the relative values / contribution of the functions, assets and risks.

 

7   PSM
– is applied in cases involving transfer of unique intangibles or highly
integrated operations that cannot be evaluated on an individual basis, i.e.,
they are intrinsically linked

EFFECT OF COVID ON VALUE CHAIN AND NEED TO CONDUCT THE ANALYSIS TO ANALYSE ITS IMPACT FROM A TAX PERSPECTIVE – RISKS OF NOT CONDUCTING A VCA

The Covid-19 pandemic has hit the international trade hard thereby causing concerns of serious disruptions to the global value chains (GVCs). The pandemic has impacted the way companies conduct their operations – consequential changes to the value chains as a stop-gap arrangement or a permanent modification to how the business was undertaken.

Some of the instances of disruption in the value chain are given below:
(a) Lockdowns changed the dynamics of how products were sourced. There was a sudden shift from brick-and-mortar retail chains to digital marketplaces / e-commerce platforms. Unlike historically where the physical stores, sales personnel, advertising, etc., which were value drivers in the value chain, now the value contribution of digital / ecommerce platforms has increased significantly.
(b) MNCs having centralised sourcing for their manufacturing / trading activities, faced challenges due to supply chain disruptions. Many resorted to decentralised sourcing from alternate locations / suppliers.
(c) The pandemic influenced work from home for employees which disrupted the provision of services. Example – employees responsible for performing significant DEMPE functions had to work from remote locations thereby disrupting the significance of the location base.

Both the business operations and the financial markets got disrupted due to the pandemic. For the companies that reorganised their operations to adapt to the evolving economic and business environment, the existing transfer pricing policies may no longer apply in line with the transformation of the value chain. In order to sustain their business operations, some companies moved parts of their supply chains as a result of the pandemic, thereby making existing transfer pricing policies obsolete. Due to the impact on the profitability or disruptions to cash flows, the existing transfer pricing policies may not be complied with due to the inability to compensate the entities in line with the functions they performed. Hence, it would be critical for taxpayers to evaluate whether changes in a value chain result in transfer of value or alteration of the profit potential of group entities in their jurisdiction. Thus, taxpayers need to be alert about such eventualities.

Since the pandemic has impacted the economic conditions significantly, this would have an effect on the APAs entered into covering the pandemic year onwards. Most APAs include specific assumptions about the operational and economic conditions that will affect transactions covered in the APA. Hence, it is critical to determine to what extent the changes will affect the application of existing APAs. Since the pandemic has not affected all companies equally, the individual cases of each taxpayer should be evaluated.

JUDICIAL PRECEDENCE – INDIAN AND GLOBAL
With the above detailed discussion on the concept of value chain and the need for conducting the same, let us look at how value chain analysis has gained significance from the Indian perspective. The transfer pricing provisions in India were enacted in the Income-tax Act in 2001 and since then the transfer pricing law in India has evolved with substantial developments. Though the Indian provisions do not provide detailed guidance on various transfer pricing issues, the Indian tax authorities including the dispute resolution forums and Tax Courts place reliance on international guidelines such as the OECD TP guidelines, the United Nations’ TP Manual and guidelines published by various countries while conducting TP audits and deciding on the complex issues related to transfer pricing.

India has also adopted the BEPS Action Plan 13 – three-tier documentation (country-by-country report, master file and local file) in the local regulations in 2016 with additional requirements for master file compliance, wherein it requires the MNC’s to provide the drivers of profits for the business, the transfer pricing policies and strategies in relation to intangibles and R&D facilities and the detailed functional analysis for principal entities contributing to the profits, revenue or assets of the group as per the specified threshold. Pursuant to the BEPS Action Plans released in 2015, the concept of substance over form, i.e., actual conduct of the parties vis-à-vis the legal form plays a vital role in determination of the arm’s length price for a controlled transaction. The Indian tax authorities during the course of TP investigations attempt to re-characterise the transaction to determine the arm’s length price based on the actual conduct of the parties rather than the contractual arrangements, which is in line with OECD guidelines.

Some of these case laws where emphasis is laid on the value chain analysis are summarised below:
a) In the case of L’Oreal India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-829-ITAT-2019 (Mum)-TP], the Mumbai Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) referred to the Development Enhancement Maintenance Protection and Exploitation (DEMPE) framework while analysing the issue of marketing intangibles arising due to the significant incurrence of Advertising, Marketing and Promotion (AMP) expenses. The ITAT held as follows:
• the sine qua non for commencing the TP exercise is to show the existence of an international transaction and the same had not been shown to have been fulfilled in the instant case, therefore, the issue of traversing to the aspect of determining the validity of the method for determining the ALP of such transaction does not arise at all.
• The assessee had never admitted that the incurring of AMP expenses was an international transaction and had, in fact, since inception canvassed that the said expenses were incurred in the normal course of its own business and not for rendering any DEMPE functions for brand building of its AE.
• Accordingly, the ITAT held that no part of the AMP expenses incurred by the assessee are attributable to rendering of any DEMPE functions for the brands owned by the AE and deleted the adjustment proposed by the Indian Revenue Authorities with respect to the AMP expenses incurred by the assessee.
• The ITAT distinguished the decision of the High Court in the case of Sony Ericsson India Pvt. Ltd. by recording the finding that the presence of AMP as a transaction was accepted by the assessee itself in case of the High Court decision, whereas in the current case the assessee had never made any such admissions.
• The ITAT further remarked that de hors any ‘understanding’ or an ‘arrangement’ or ‘action in concert’, as per which the assessee had agreed for incurring of AMP expenses for brand building of its AE, the provisions of Chapter X could not have been invoked for undertaking a TP adjustment exercise.

From the above case it is evident that the ITAT has laid emphasis on evaluation of the DEMPE functions performed by the entities in the group for determining whether incurring of AMP expenses alone leads to brand-building for the AE for which the assessee needs to be remunerated separately as an international transaction. Accordingly, a detailed value chain analysis for an MNE group which also includes analysis of the DEMPE functions in relation to the intangibles would help in strongly defending its position before the tax authorities.

b) In the case of Infogain India Pvt. Ltd. [TS-392-ITAT-2015 (Del)-TP], the Delhi ITAT upheld the application of the Profit Split Method (PSM) adopted by the assessee on the ground that the activities of the assessee and its associated enterprise were intrinsically linked and both the entities were significantly contributing to the value chain of provision of software services to the end customers. The ITAT, based on the examination of the functions performed by both the parties and weights assigned to each activity, observed that – ‘In the present case, both the parties, i.e., Infogain India (assessee) and Infogain US are making contribution. Therefore, the Profit Split Method is the most appropriate method for determination of ALP.’

c) In the Coca-Cola USA case8, the US Tax Court confirmed an adjustment made by the Internal Revenue Service (‘IRS’) to the income of the company. The issue under examination was that Coca Cola was not adequately compensated (i.e., with royalty) by its group entities for the use of intangibles. While deciding this issue, the IRS laid emphasis on the functions performed by the respective entities in the supply chain, risks control and allocation, DEMPE functions in relation to the intangibles, costs incurred by the different entities on the Advertising, Marketing and Promotion expenses, and contractual arrangements between the group entities. Upon in-depth analysis, the IRS proposed to benchmark the transaction in question using the Comparable Profits Method (CPM) treating unrelated bottlers as comparable parties wherein ‘Return on Assets’ (ROA) was taken as the appropriate Profit Level Indicator. The US Tax Court upheld the contentions of the IRS based on the above economic analysis conducted to derive an approximate royalty payment to Coca Cola Company by the group entities.

 

8   155
T.C. 10 Docket No. 31183-15, US Tax Court, Coca Cola Company & Subsidiaries
vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

d) In the case of Dutch taxpayer Zinc Smelters BV9, the taxpayer was engaged in the business of zinc smelting. The zinc smelting process involved conversion of zinc ore and the related raw materials into pure zinc and the same was distributed in the market. The value chain of this activity comprised of key functions, namely, procurement of raw materials, planning and scheduling of production, undertaking the production activity, planning the logistics and distribution in the market, undertaking support functions such as finance, IT, marketing, etc. Globally, the business of the group was sold, pursuant to which all the functions except the production activity were transferred to a new entity. The question was regarding the remuneration of the taxpayer post the business restructuring. The Dutch Court of Appeals agreed with the ruling of the Dutch tax authority that the key functions of sourcing raw material and thereby conversion of the ore (raw material) into finished product were critical functions in the value chain and were inter-linked. Accordingly, both the taxpayer and the new entity were performing non-routine functions. Hence, profit split was considered as the most appropriate method to determine the arm’s length remuneration for both the entities. For the purpose of profit split, the profit achieved from joint smelting activities of the taxpayer and the new entity were to be determined and then split between both the entities based on their contributions to the revenue generated.

 

9   Case
number ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2020:968  – 17/00714
Zinc Smelter B.V. vs. Dutch Tax Authority

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The taxpayer is required to appropriately report under Clause 18 of Form No. 3CEB10 any transactions arising out of or by being a part of business restructuring11 or reorganisation.

Some of the instances of business restructuring or reorganisation are as follows:
(a) Reallocation of functions, assets and risks within the group.
(b) Transfer of valuable intangibles within the group.
(c) Termination or renegotiation of the existing contractual arrangements.
(d) Shift of responsibility of specific functions from one entity to another entity within the group.

The taxpayers must maintain robust documentation such as agreements, valuation reports (if any), post-restructuring FAR analysis, etc., to substantiate the arm’s length principle. In the changing dynamics of business, it is imperative that taxpayers monitor business operations more closely for any changes.

DOCUMENTATION
As we all know, documentation forms the core of the entire transfer pricing analysis; accordingly, in a post-BEPS world it is even more critical to ensure that the MNE group has adequately documented its transfer pricing policies which are in line with the value contributions by the respective group entities in the value chain, economic functions performed and risks assumed while dealing with controlled transactions.

In order to manage the risks, the MNCs will have to ensure that the documentation is more elaborate and thorough both in the factual description of the functional profile in the value chain and in the related transfer pricing analysis. A well-documented VCA would serve as a foundation for the MNE’s tax and transfer pricing analysis and help achieve consistency across various facets of regulatory compliances.

Some of the key back-up documentation that can be maintained by an MNE group to support the VCA analysis are listed below:
a. Industry reports, management discussions, financial reports – sources to ascertain the key value drivers for business;
b. Functional interview notes / recordings with key business personnel at management level, operational division personnel, process flowcharts, asset evaluation records, organisation structure, responsibility matrix, etc. – to support the functional analysis documented as part of the VCA;
c. Contractual arrangements within the group entities which are in line with the actual conduct and substance of the parties to the arrangements;
d. Back-up documents to justify the rationale adopted by the management in assigning specific weightages to the value drivers in the value chain while determining the value contribution of the respective group entities;
e. Risk analysis assessment in light of the framework of the guidelines provided by OECD for the group entities – documents which demonstrate key decisions made by entities such as board approvals, internal email correspondences, important call minutes, etc.;
f. Documents which support the legal ownership of intangibles with the group entities such as IP registrations in certain jurisdictions, accounting of these assets in the financial reporting as per local requirements, etc.;
g. Documentary evidences to support the DEMPE functions and the value contribution of each of the entities in the value chain;
h. Analysis of the key financial ratios for the group entities such as costs incurred in production, gross level margins, net profit margins, FTE count, net worth, etc.

The above list is illustrative considering that each business would have a different value chain story and hence one would need to maintain robust back-up documentation to support its VCA for the entire MNE group.

 

10 Form
No. 3CEB is a report from an accountant to be furnished under section 92E
relating to international transactions and specified domestic transactions

11           Explanation
to Section 92B of the Income-Tax Act 1961, clarifies the expression
‘international transaction’ to include – ‘….. (e) a transaction of business
restructuring or reorganisation, entered into by an enterprise with an
associated enterprise, irrespective of the fact that it has bearing on the
profit, income, losses or assets of such enterprise at the time of the
transaction or at any future date’

CONCLUSION
In the post-BEPS era it is apparent that one will have to substantiate any tax planning with adequate substance. The profit allocated to different group entities will have to be aligned with value contributed by those entities across the value chain of the MNC. The companies are expected to be transparent with their global operational and tax payment structure in order to be compliant with the BEPS requirement. Therefore, the companies will have to improve the way they explain their operating model and tax approach to the stakeholders.

The BEPS project has changed the dynamics of the international tax landscape in an unprecedented manner. The advanced work on addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy will further change the status quo. Both globalisation and trade frictions in certain countries coupled with the severe impact of the Covid-19 pandemic have forced the MNEs to evaluate their global operations and the value chain distribution. This will create even more challenges in the transfer pricing areas which will have to be dealt with by both the MNEs and the tax administrations of the developing countries. It would be critical for the MNEs to effectively focus on their value chain to achieve the desired business and tax objectives in order to sustain themselves in this evolving business environment.

ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance recently convened a meeting on cryptocurrencies which has attracted a lot of interest as well as concern in various quarters about their investment potential and risks. The Prime Minister also cautioned that cryptocurrencies may end up in the wrong hands and urged for more international co-operation.

Cryptocurrencies have emerged as alternative currencies / investment avenues and are being considered by many as the currency of the future. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins, Ethereum and many others are being considered for a variety of purposes such as a means of exchange, a medium to access blockchain-related products and raising funds for an entity developing activities in these areas. Many large international companies such as Paypal, Tesla, Starbucks, Rakuten, Coca Cola, Burger King and Whole Foods now accept cryptocurrency transactions.

Since the last few months, the Covid-19 pandemic has catapulted the growth of contactless transactions and the growth of cryptocurrencies in India. The crypto culture is fast picking up in India. Many companies all over the world have started accepting or investing in virtual currencies. Concurrently, a new crypto-asset issuance wave has been visible in the start-up world for the purpose of fund-raising. Further, the appreciation in the value of cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin price has increased more than five times at the time of writing this article as compared to the price in January, 2020) and the price volatility has attracted the interest of investors. These developments have also sparked the interest of regulators around the world.

Cryptocurrencies are not controlled or regulated by a government. Regulators around the world have been concerned about cryptocurrencies. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has been concerned about investors’ protection and the anonymity of the transactions.

HOW DO CRYPTOCURRENCIES FUNCTION?
Cryptographic instruments work on the principles of cryptography, i.e., a method of protecting information and communications through the use of codes so that only those for whom the information is intended can read and process it. Crypto assets represent transferable digital illustrations that prohibit any duplication. These are based on the blockchain or distributed ledger technology that facilitates the transfer of cryptographic assets.

Cryptocurrencies are not backed by any sovereign promise as is the case with real currencies. However, digital assets are backed by something. Bitcoin, for example, is backed by the electricity that goes into validating and generating transactions on the network. Gold-backed cryptocurrencies also exist. And some are backed by US dollars.

Governments around the world (including India) have generally adopted a cautious evolution of regulatory approach towards cryptocurrencies. Some countries such as China have banned cryptocurrency, while others like El Salvador have welcomed them into the formal payments system.

It is believed that it is impossible to duplicate the transactions or involve counterfeit currency in the cryptocurrency mechanism. Many cryptocurrencies are decentralised networks based on blockchain technology; it is a list of records that is growing all the time. These are known as blocks that link and secure each type of cryptocurrency. Then there is a single network called mining in which all the funds are kept. In other words, the process by which the cryptocurrency is validated is called mining.

Transactions on public, permission-less blockchains such as the Bitcoin blockchain can be viewed by anyone. The ledger records ownership of Bitcoins and all transactions that have occurred upon it. One can track an activity to particular addresses and addresses to individuals or parties involved in the blockchain. Whenever a transfer is made, this public record is used to verify availability of funds. A new transaction is encoded into the ledger through the mining process. The ledger is virtually undisputable. These features minimise the risk of fraud or manipulation in participant-to-participant transactions on the blockchain itself. The distributed ledger technology has many possible uses that go beyond cryptocurrencies.

FINANCIAL REPORTING PERSPECTIVES
Cryptocurrencies have diverse features with a broad variety of features and bespoke nature. Further, these are emerging at rapid speed. Several new cryptocurrencies have emerged and today there is widespread talk about blockchain technology and cryptoassets.

These factors make it difficult to draw general conclusions on the accounting treatment. To determine which accounting standard applies to cryptocurrencies and assessing the related accounting issues it would be important to understand their characteristics and the intended use for which they are being held by the user. Similar types of cryptographic assets may be accounted for in a similar way.

CLASSIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACCOUNTING
Since the emergence of cryptocurrencies is a new phenomenon, there is no specific guidance from accounting standard-setters and pronouncements that deal with the accounting of such assets from the holder’s perspective. Accounting for cryptocurrencies may potentially fall in a variety of different accounting standards. One must consider the purpose of holding the cryptocurrency to determine the accounting model.

Classification
of cryptocurrencies held for own account

Rationale

Classification as cash or cash currency

• No. Since these are not legal tender and are generally not
issued or backed by any sovereign / government; cryptocurrencies do not
directly affect the prices of goods / services

Classification as financial
instrument

• No. A cryptocurrency does not give
the holder a contractual right to receive cash or another financial asset.
Also, cryptocurrencies do not come into existence as a result of a
contractual relationship. Moreover, cryptocurrencies do not provide the
holder with a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting
all of its liabilities.

 

 (continued)

 

Therefore, currently the cryptocurrencies do not meet the
definition of a financial asset

Classification as property, plant
& equipment

• No. Since cryptocurrencies are not
tangible items

Classification as inventories

• Maybe. AS 2 / Ind AS 2 do not require inventories to be in
physical form, but inventory should consist of assets that are held for sale
in the ordinary course of business. Where cryptocurrencies are for sale in
the ordinary course of business (for example, in case of entities actively
trading in cryptocurrencies), inventory classification would be appropriate;
inventories are measured at the lower of cost and net realisable value

• It must be noted that Ind AS 2 scopes out commodity broker-traders
who measure their inventories at fair value less costs to sell. When such
inventories are measured at fair value less costs to sell, changes in fair
value less costs to sell are recognised in profit or loss in the period of
the change

• On the other hand, where cryptocurrencies are held for
investment / capital appreciation purposes over an extended period, the
definition of inventory would not be met

Classification as intangible assets

• Yes. If a cryptocurrency does not
meet the definition of inventories as stated above, it is likely that the
definition of an intangible asset under AS 26 / Ind AS 38 would be met since
it is an identifiable non-monetary resource controlled by an entity as a
result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to
flow to the entity with no physical form

• Purchased intangible assets are
initially recognised at cost

• AS 26 Amortisation of
Intangibles
is based on the rebuttable presumption that the useful life
of intangibles will not exceed ten years. Under Ind AS 38, the useful life of
an intangible can be assessed as finite or indefinite. Where the useful life
is assessed as finite, such useful life is

 

 (continued)

 

determined based on management’s estimate, reviewed at least
annually. An intangible can be assessed to have an indefinite useful life if
there is no foreseeable limit over which it is expected to generate economic
benefits for the company. Ind AS 38 gives an accounting policy choice of cost
or revaluation method for intangible assets but requires the existence of an
active market if the revaluation method is to be used

DEVELOPMENT FROM INTERNATIONAL STANDARD-SETTING BODIES
Internationally, the Accounting Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF), an IFRS Foundation advisory forum, discussed digital currencies at a meeting in December, 2016. The debate was focused on the classification of a cryptographic asset from the holder’s perspective. Conversations have continued in various accounting standards boards, but no formal guidance has been issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).

In July, 2018, the IASB requested the IFRS Interpretations Committee to consider guidance for the accounting of transactions involving cryptocurrencies. In June, 2019, the Committee concluded that IAS 2 Inventories applies to such assets where they are held for sale in the ordinary course of business. If IAS 2 is not applicable, an entity applies IAS 38 Intangible Assets to holdings of cryptocurrencies.

The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) had put together a discussion paper on digital currencies.

On the other hand, the Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) has issued an exposure draft for public comment on accounting for virtual currencies. In addition, the IASB discussed certain features of transactions involving digital currencies during its meeting in January, 2018 and will discuss in future whether to commence a research project in this area. The discussion paper concluded that, currently, digital currencies should not be considered as cash or cash equivalents since digital currency lacks broad acceptance as a means of exchange as it is not issued by a central bank. A digital currency is not a financial instrument, as defined in IAS 32, since there is no contractual relationship that results in a financial asset for one party and a financial liability for another.

A digital currency may meet the definition of intangible assets, as defined in IAS 38 or Ind AS 38, because a digital currency is an identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance. The discussion paper stated that it is not necessarily clear how ‘held in the ordinary course of business’ should be interpreted in the context of digital currencies more broadly. For example, it is not necessarily clear whether entities that accept digital currencies as a means of payment should be considered to hold them for sale in the ordinary course of business. IAS 2 does not apply to the measurement of inventories held by commodity broker-traders who measure their inventories at fair value less costs to sell and recognise changes in fair value less costs to sell in profit or loss in the period of the change.

FAIR VALUATION
Valuation of cryptocurrencies would be required to be determined in several situations, for example:
*In order to determine the net realisable value under AS 2 / Ind AS 2 or to determine fair value less costs to sell if the broker-trader exception is applied under Ind AS 2;
*In order to determine the revaluation amount under Ind AS 38 when classified as an intangible asset;
*For the purpose of purchase price allocation under business combination under Ind AS 103 when acquired through an acquisition.

Ind AS 113 Fair Value Measurement defines fair value as the price that would be received on selling an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. There is a three-level hierarchy for fair value determination as follows:
Level 1: quoted active market price for identical assets or liabilities;
Level 2: observable inputs other than Level 1 inputs; and
Level 3: unobservable inputs.

Many large traditional shares with an average turnover rate on the Bombay Stock Exchange or the National Stock Exchange are generally considered to be traded in an active market if there are sufficient active trading days within a given period. Data available from CoinMarketCap1 (‘CMC’) for November, 2021 shows that the top five cryptographic assets with the highest market capitalisation have high percentages of average daily turnover ratios (in certain cases up to 50%) with active daily trading. Bitcoin, for example, has a daily trading volume in excess of US $30 billion since the past few months. Looking solely at these statistics, it may be possible to conclude that certain cryptocurrencies have an active market.

Currently, for the other cryptocurrencies, it would be difficult to get a Level 1 valuation for cryptocurrencies as an active market as defined under Ind AS 113 would not be available, although there may be observable inputs that can be used to value these assets. However, the manner and speed at which the cryptocurrencies are evolving, it seems that the fair value hierarchy may keep changing between Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3.

Given the complex nature of cryptocurrencies and relative lack of depth in the market, determining the valuation would not be a straightforward exercise. This is particularly so given the high volatility of prices and the large geographic market dynamics driving the prices. It may be noted that the time at which an entity determines the value of the cryptocurrencies might need careful consideration since the crypto markets may be trading 24/7. For instance,
*Is the valuation time 11:59 PM at the end of 31st March?
*How is the valuation time determined in case of foreign subsidiaries with different time zones?
*Whether the inputs underlying the valuation have been adequately reviewed / challenged given the circumstances existing at the time of closure of business hours?

Ind AS 113 requires the principal market to be determined based on the greatest volume and level of activity for the relevant item. For cryptocurrencies, while CMC includes data from several exchanges, many exchanges serve regional markets only and might not be accessible to entities / individuals in India. Ind AS 113 states that if there is no clear principal market, an entity shall determine fair value with reference to the most advantageous market within the group of active markets to which it has access with the highest activity levels. An entity need not undertake an exhaustive search of all possible markets to identify the principal market but it shall take into account all information that is reasonably available.

Another aspect to be considered for the purpose of determination of fair valuation of cryptocurrencies is whether the cryptocurrencies can be readily exchanged for a ‘real’ currency such as USD or INR. Ind AS 113 requires a Level 1 fair value input to be quoted (with) prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets / liabilities that the entity can access at the measurement date. Certain cryptocurrencies are exchanged for other cryptocurrencies rather than being exchanged for real currencies. Crypto-to-crypto exchange rates are priced based on an implicit conversion of the cryptographic asset into real currencies.

Under Ind AS 113 it can be said that an active market for a cryptocurrency would exist only when crypto-to-real currency rates are published by reliable sources. It would be difficult to classify crypto-to-crypto exchange rates as an active market (and therefore Level 1 fair value). Further, the valuation would also have to be adjusted for illiquidity factors due to the lack of a ready market and the derivation of the prices based on a crypto-to-crypto exchange rate and a secondary crypto-to-real currency exchange.

Due to the factors discussed above, most of the cryptocurrencies will not have an active market and, therefore, they will need to be valued using a valuation technique. The appropriate valuation technique should consider how a market participant would determine the fair value of the cryptocurrency being measured.

Generally, the market approach will be the most appropriate technique for cryptocurrencies. The cost approach or the income approach is likely to be rare in practice. Since cryptocurrency markets are still emerging and not very matured, inputs and information based on discrete / bilateral transactions outside an active market may have to be used. For example, in April, 2021 there was a big crash in Bitcoin prices, reportedly due to tweets about the US regulators’ decision on cracking down on financial institutions for money laundering using cryptocurrencies. Based on CMC website data at the time of writing this article, it does appear that broker quotes are not widely used in this sector as yet. The cryptocurrency market is evolving rapidly and so valuation techniques are also likely to evolve.

FINAL REMARKS
Due to the large diversity in the features of various cryptocurrencies, the pace of innovation and the regulatory developments associated with cryptocurrencies, the facts and circumstances of each individual case will differ. This makes it difficult to determine the appropriate accounting treatment and acceptable valuation technique. And given the increasing acceptance of cryptocurrencies around the world, it is a matter of time before the accounting standard-setters around the world and in India come out with standards / application guidance for cryptocurrencies.  

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS FRAUDS AND UNRECORDED TRANSACTIONS

(This is the fifth article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

BACKGROUND

In the recent past regulators and other stakeholders have been increasingly concerned with the increase in frauds by companies and the perceived lack of attention by the auditors in respect thereof. This trust deficit is attempted to be bridged by CARO 2020 by significantly increasing the reporting responsibilities for auditors with regard to fraud and unreported transactions.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

Clause No.

Particulars

Nature of change, if any

Clause 3(xi)(a)

Frauds noticed or reported:

Enhanced Reporting

Whether any fraud by the
company or any fraud on the company has been noticed or reported during the
year; if yes, the nature and the amount involved is to be indicated

Clause 3(xi)(b)

Reporting on Frauds:

New Clause

Whether any report under
sub-section (12) of section 143 of the Companies Act has been filed by the
auditors in Form ADT-4 as prescribed under rule 13 of the Companies (Audit
and Auditors) Rules, 2014 with the Central Government

Clause 3(xi)(c)

Whistle-Blower Complaints:

New Clause

Whether the auditor has
considered whistle-blower complaints, if any, received during the year by the company

Clause 3(viii)

Unrecorded Transactions:

New Clause

Whether any transactions
not recorded in the books of accounts have been surrendered or disclosed as
income during the year in the tax assessments under the Income-tax Act, 1961
(43 of 1961); and if so, whether the previously unrecorded income has been
properly recorded in the books of accounts during the year

ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Frauds noticed or reported [Clause 3(xi)(a)]:
* The scope has been widened by removing the words ‘officers or employees’.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges which are discussed below in respect of the Clause where there is enhanced reporting as well as the new Clauses:

Frauds noticed or reported [Clause 3(xi)(a)]:
a) Conflict with responsibilities under SA 240:
For complying with SA 240, the auditor is primarily concerned with frauds which cause material misstatements to the financial statements, which are intentional and broadly cover misstatements from fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets. This is in conflict with the CARO requirements whereby the terms ‘noticed or reported’ are very wide. Accordingly, the auditor is required to report not only the frauds noted or detected by him pursuant to the procedures performed in terms of SA 240 and reported by him u/s 143(12), but also frauds detected by the management whilst reviewing the internal controls or internal audit or whistle-blower mechanism or Audit Committee and brought to the auditor’s notice.
b) Concept of materiality: Once a fraud is noticed, it appears that it needs to be reported irrespective of the materiality involved. Whilst there is no clarity in respect thereof in the Guidance Note under this Clause, para 37 of the Guidance Note specifies that whilst reporting on matters specified in the Order, the auditor should consider the materiality in accordance with the principles enunciated in SA 320. Accordingly, the auditors should apply appropriate judgement whilst reporting under this Clause. It may be noted that even the FRRB and QRB in the course of their review reports have not been favourably inclined to the concept of taking shelter under the garb of materiality for reporting under this Clause.
c) Challenges in detection: An auditor may find it difficult to detect acts by employees or others committed with an intent to injure the interest of the company or cause wrongful gain or loss, unless these are reflected in the books of accounts; examples include receiving payoffs from vendors and tampering with QR codes during the billing and collection process. In such cases the auditors would need to corroborate their inquiries based on their knowledge of the business / industry coupled with the results of the evaluation of the internal controls, the robustness of the code of conduct and ethics policies, instances of past transgressions in respect thereof, etc.

Reporting on Frauds [Clause 3(xi)(b)]:
Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to note the following statutory requirements:

Section 143(12) of Companies Act, 2013
Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, if an auditor of a company, in the course of the performance of his duties as auditor, has reason to believe that an offence involving fraud is being or has been committed against the company by officers or employees of the company, he shall immediately report the matter to the Central Government within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed.

Rule 13 of the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 deals with reporting of frauds by auditor and other matters:
(1) If an auditor of a company, in the course of the performance of his duties as statutory auditor has reason to believe that an offence of fraud, which involves or is expected to involve, individually an amount of rupees one crore or above, is being or has been committed against the company by its officers or employees, the auditor shall report the matter to the Central Government.

(2) The auditor shall report the matter to the Central Government as under:
(a) the auditor shall report the matter to the Board or the Audit Committee, as the case may be, immediately but not later than two days of his (acquiring) knowledge of the fraud, seeking their reply or observations within forty-five days;
(b) on receipt of such reply or observations, the auditor shall forward his report and the reply or observations of the Board or the Audit Committee along with his comments (on such reply or observations of the Board or the Audit Committee) to the Central Government within fifteen days from the date of receipt of such reply or observations;
(c) in case the auditor fails to get any reply or observations from the Board or the Audit Committee within the stipulated period of forty-five days, he shall forward his report to the Central Government along with a note containing the details of his report that was earlier forwarded to the Board or the Audit Committee for which he has not received any reply or observations;
(d) the report shall be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Corporate Affairs in a sealed cover by Registered Post with Acknowledgement Due or by Speed Post followed by an e-mail in confirmation of the same;
(e) the report shall be on the letterhead of the auditor containing postal address, e-mail address and contact telephone number or mobile number and be signed by the auditor with his seal and shall indicate his Membership Number; and
(f) The report shall be in the form of a statement as specified in Form ADT-4.

(3) In case of a fraud involving lesser than the amount specified in sub-rule (1), the auditor shall report the matter to the Audit Committee constituted  u/s 177 or to the Board immediately but not later than two days of his knowledge of the fraud and he shall report the matter specifying the following:
(a) Nature of fraud with description;
(b) Approximate amount involved; and
(c) Parties involved.

(4) The following details of each of the frauds reported to the Audit Committee or the Board under sub-rule (3) during the year shall be disclosed in the Board’s Report:
(a) Nature of fraud with description;
(b) Approximate amount involved;
(c) Parties involved, if remedial action not taken; and
(d) Remedial actions taken.

(5) The provision of this rule shall also apply, mutatis mutandis, to a Cost Auditor and a Secretarial Auditor during the performance of his duties  u/s 148 and  u/s 204, respectively.

Form and content of Form ADT-4
a) Full details of suspected offence involving fraud (with documents in support),
b) Particulars of officers / employees who are suspected to be involved in the offence,
c) Basis on which fraud is suspected,
d) Period during which the suspected fraud has occurred,
e) Date of sending report to BOD / Audit Committee and date of reply, if any, received,
f) Whether auditor is satisfied with the reply / observations of the BOD / Audit Committee,
g) Estimated amount involved in the suspected fraud,
h) Steps taken by the company, if any, in this regard, with full details of references.

Guidance Note issued by ICAI
The ICAI has also published a Guidance Note on Reporting of Frauds u/s 143(12) of the Companies Act, 2013 to assist the auditors in discharging their responsibilities. Some of the main issues addressed by the Guidance Note are as under and which need to be kept in mind whilst discharging the responsibilities for reporting under this Clause:
* The requirement is to report only on frauds in the course of performance of duties as an auditor.
* Only frauds committed against the company by its officers or employees are required to be reported. Thus, frauds committed by vendors and outsourced service providers are not required to be reported. The requirements of SA 240 need to be kept in mind. Accordingly only frauds involving financial reporting or misappropriation of assets are covered Thus, the scope for reporting under this Clause is much narrower than under sub-clause (a) discussed earlier.
* If any frauds are detected during the course of other attest / non-attest functions like quarterly reporting and they are likely to have a material effect on the financial statements, the same would also need to be reported.
* There is no responsibility to report frauds if the same are already detected. However, in such cases the auditor should apply professional scepticism as to whether the fraud was genuinely detected through vigil / whistle-blower mechanism and review the follow-up in respect thereof. This could have an impact on reporting under sub-clause (c) discussed subsequently.
* Reporting is required only when there is sufficient reason to believe and there is sufficient knowledge (i.e., evidence) of occurrence. Mere suspicion is not sufficient.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) Reporting by predecessor auditor: The requirement for reporting pertains to any report which has been filed during the financial year under audit. Accordingly, if the auditor has been appointed for the first time, he would need to consider whether the predecessor auditor has reported to the Central Government during the financial year prior to his term being concluded before the AGM. In such cases it is better that the incoming auditor seeks a specific clarification from the predecessor auditor and also obtains a management representation and makes a mention accordingly in his report.
b) Post-balance sheet events: If the auditor has identified the fraud and initiated the communication procedures outlined earlier before the year-end but has filed his report with the Central Government subsequent to year-end till the date of the report, he would need to report on the same specifically under this Clause. In such cases, he should also consider the impact on the financial statements and disclosures of Events subsequent to the balance sheet date under AS 4 and Ind AS 10, as applicable.
c) Monetarily immaterial frauds: Monetarily immaterial frauds below Rs. 1 crore have to be reported by the auditor to the Audit Committee constituted u/s 177. In cases where the Audit Committee is not required to be constituted u/s 177, then the auditor shall report monetarily immaterial frauds to the Board of Directors. In either case, a disclosure needs to be made in the Board Report as outlined earlier. Though there is no specific reporting responsibility under this Clause, it would be a good practice to make a reference to the same under this Clause.
d) Cost audit and secretarial audit: Reporting on fraud u/s 143(12) is required even by the cost auditor and the secretarial auditor of the company and it is possible that a suspected offence involving fraud may have been reported by them even before the auditor became aware of the fraud in the course of his audit procedures under SA 240. In such cases, if a suspected offence of fraud has already been reported by the cost auditor and the secretarial auditor, he need not report the same to the Audit Committee u/s 177 or the Board of Directors and thereafter, where applicable, to the Central Government, since he has not per se identified the suspected offence of fraud. It is, however, advisable that the report factually clarifies the position.

Whistle-Blower Complaints [Clause 3(xi)(c)]:
The establishment of a whistle-blower mechanism is mandatory for certain class of companies and therefore the auditor should consider the requirements prescribed in the Act and in SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (SEBI LODR Regulations) in this regard. Section 177(9) of the Act requires certain class of companies to establish a vigil mechanism for their Directors and employees to report their genuine concerns or grievances:

Requirements under Companies Act, 2013
Section 177(9) read with Rule 7 of the Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014 provides for establishment of a vigil mechanism.

(1) Every listed company and the companies belonging to the following class or classes shall establish a vigil mechanism for their Directors and employees to report their genuine concerns or grievances:
(a) the companies which accept deposits from the public;
(b) the companies which have borrowed money from banks and public financial institutions in excess of fifty crore rupees.
(2) The companies which are required to constitute an Audit Committee shall oversee the vigil mechanism through the committee and if any of the members of the committee have a conflict of interest in a given case, they should recuse themselves and the others on the committee would deal with the matter on hand.
(3) In case of other companies, the Board of Directors shall nominate a Director to play the role of an Audit Committee for the purpose of vigil mechanism to whom other Directors and employees may report their concerns.
(4) The vigil mechanism shall provide for adequate safeguards against victimisation of employees and Directors who avail of the vigil mechanism and also provide for direct access to the Chairperson of the Audit Committee or the Director nominated to play the role of Audit Committee, as the case may be, in exceptional cases.
(5) In case of repeated frivolous complaints being filed by a Director or an employee, the Audit Committee or the Director nominated to play the role of Audit Committee may take suitable action against the Director or employee concerned, including reprimand.

Requirements under SEBI LODR
Regulation 4(2)(d) of the SEBI LODR Regulations also mandates all listed entities to devise an effective whistle-blower mechanism enabling Directors, employees or any other person to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices.

Regulation 46(2)(e) of SEBI LODR Regulations requires a listed company to disseminate on its website details of establishment of its vigil mechanism / whistle-blower policy. Further, the role of the Audit Committee also includes review of the functioning of the whistle-blower mechanism.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) Anonymous complaints:
The auditor needs to consider every complaint received by the company including anonymous complaints while deciding the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures. The auditor should also evaluate whether such complaints are investigated and resolved by the company in an appropriate and timely manner. Further, in case of anonymous complaints he needs to exercise greater degree of professional scepticism to ascertain whether they are frivolous or motivated. Also, any other information which is available in the public domain should also be considered.
b) Companies not covered under the Regulatory Framework: The reporting requirements under this Clause do not distinguish between listed, public interest entities and other entities, including those in the SME sector where there is no regulatory requirement to establish a formal whistle-blower / vigil mechanism. In such cases the auditor needs to make specific inquiries and obtain appropriate representation which needs to be corroborated for adequacy and appropriateness based on the understanding obtained about the entity and its operating and governance environment. Finally, any information which is available in the public domain should also be considered.
c) Forensic investigations: In case a forensic audit /investigation has been initiated pursuant to a whistle-blower complaint, the auditor needs to check the reports issued and discuss the observations and conclusions with the auditor / investigation agency if required and report accordingly.
d) Outsourcing arrangements: The auditor should perform independent procedures, including getting direct confirmation for whistle-blower complaints received which are managed by a third party like an external internal audit firm.

Unrecorded Transactions [Clause 3(viii)]:
Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent to note the following statutory requirements:

Undisclosed income under the Income-tax Act, 1961
‘Undisclosed income’ as per section 158B includes any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or any income based on any entry in the books of accounts or other documents or transactions, where such money, bullion, jewellery, valuable article, thing, entry in the books of accounts or other document or transaction represents wholly or partly income or property which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act, or any expense, deduction or allowance claimed under this Act which is found to be false.

Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme
The Union Budget 2020 was presented by the Finance Minister on 1st February, 2020 with an underlying objective to support the Government’s target of making India a $5 trillion economy by 2025. Several policy and tax-related announcements were made with primary focus on improving the ease of living and the ease of doing business in India. One of the key proposals was introduction of a direct tax dispute resolution scheme, namely, Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme which translates to ‘From Dispute towards Trust’, i.e., trust as the basis of partnering with the taxpayers towards building the nation. The Scheme proposes to settle direct tax disputes relating to personal income tax and corporate tax between taxpayers and the tax Department. The Government of India enacted the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 (‘the Act’) on 17th March, 2020 to give effect to this Scheme.

An overview of the Scheme:
* If a taxpayer elects to take recourse under the Scheme, a proportion of the total tax along with interest and penalty needs to be paid (depending on the type of the pending dispute) for full and final settlement.
* The scheme confers immunity from prosecution, penalty and interest in respect of proceedings for which the taxpayer has opted to avail the Scheme.
* The Act also provides that the tax disputes so settled cannot be reopened in any other proceeding by the Income Tax Department or any other designated authority.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) Scope: The emphasis is on the words surrendered or disclosed which implies that the company must have voluntarily admitted to the addition of such income in the income tax returns filed by the company. What constitutes voluntary admission poses several challenges especially where the company has pending tax assessments which have been decided up to a particular stage and the company chooses not to file an appeal. In such cases, the auditor needs to review the submissions and statements filed in the course of assessment to ascertain whether the additions to income were as a consequence of certain transactions not recorded in the books. This would involve use of professional judgement and consideration of the materiality factor.
b) Submissions under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme: In case the company has opted for disclosures under the said Scheme, a view can be taken that the same constitutes voluntary surrender and disclosure and hence needs to be reported under this Clause with appropriate factual disclosures.

CONCLUSION
Frauds are now an inherent part of corporate life and the auditors will have to live with them. The reporting requirements outlined above will hopefully provide them with the necessary tools to cope with them and provide greater comfort to the various stakeholders. In conclusion, life will never be cushy for the auditors and they would always be on the razor’s edge!

EQUATING EQUITY

Indian Equity markets have been on fire after the 2020 fall. They have beaten many comparable EM indices. What’s going on?

Too much money: Governments / Central banks have printed trillions of notes. And we know that most of the markets are moved by central bankers. The current oversupply is leading to inflation, asset overvaluation, poor yields and low value of money.

Yields: With too much money around, inflation is an obvious result. Real yield of interest (ten-year yield less CPI) has become negative in many countries (in the US it is -4.77, India 1.87%, China 1.41%1). Most of the EU and North America are negative, whereas EMs are positive.

Available asset classes: FDs and fixed income assets are giving sub-optimal returns. Real estate has remained stagnant. Liquid asset classes – Equities and Crypto – have been HOT. Bullion has been good but has limits. In 1981: 10 gm gold = Rs.1,800; 1 kg silver = Rs. 2,700 and the Sensex = 170 points. Come to December, 2021: 10 gm gold = Rs. 48,000 (26 times in 40 years); 100 gm silver = Rs. 67,600 (25 times in 40 years) and Sensex = 57,000 points (335 times in 40 years).

India’s time has come: India is showing a promising position – in both perception and reality. On Deepavali – Bumper Gold sales, GST collection at Rs. 1.3 lakh crores; Corporate profit to GDP ratio at decade high; Exports rise for 11 straight months; Rs. 100 billion in UPI transactions; Card spends hit Rs. 2 lakh crores; New economy companies and Unicorns showcase remarkable innovation. Positive signs include dramatic improvement in infrastructure; Government stepping out of businesses (Air India, LIC listing) and likely to stay out of the way (balance between State control and private enterprise) and stop making silly mistakes (retrospective amendments).

Participation: New demat accounts opened in F.Y.20 were 49 lakhs with the three prior-year average coming to 43 lakhs; whereas, the new demats opened for F.Y.21 were 1.42 crores.

_______________________________________
1 2nd December, 2021
IPO frenzy: It is reported that $4 billion was raised in the PayTM, Nykaa and Policybazar IPOs. But more important is that $2.2 billion was on offer for sale in IPOs by existing investors. This activity has made entrepreneurs wealthy, added market cap and allowed wider public participation.

From my personal experience, Equity has given some of the finest returns to those who are invested for decades and even more if for generations. The combination of liquidity, growth possibility and legacy aspects are matchless. The mantra of the masters has been: Buy Good (select well), Track Well (conviction of analysis and regularity) and Sit Tight (patience to hold) – all these are critical. [‘Warren is pretty good at doing nothing’ – Charlie Munger; ‘Our favourite holding period is forever’ – Warren Buffett.]

The aim obviously should be to Protect Capital – Beat Inflation – Growth in that order. With the invisible tax called inflation attacking capital, one needs an asset class that beats this monster. The goal of ‘financial independence’ makes people want to be rich before they grow old. One Indian expert I read mentioned that one will need to have 50-58 times yearly expenses to be financially independent. Both these targets are impossible to meet unless one beats inflation and gets her savings to grow fast.

However, risks cannot be disregarded and valuations sans P/E seem ridiculous if not bizarre. Many believe that market value and earnings have no correlation. A recently listed company having an annual profit of Rs. 62 crores and Rs. 1 lakh crore market cap, traded at ten times the price of ITC when ITC profits are about Rs. 35 crores per day. In a lighter vein, I thought make up wins against cigarettes!

Elon Musk once said that Tesla doesn’t make cars. It makes factories that make cars. Great businesses / governments / countries don’t focus on producing a great result. They (should) focus on building a system that makes a great result inevitable. The India of our dreams will be that which makes great results inevitable.

 
 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor

MADAN LAL DHINGRA

A few months back I wrote in this column about the greatness and versatility of Lokmanya Tilak (BCAJ issue of August, 2021). It was well received by the readers. We are now in the 75th year of our Independence. Therefore, I thought it would be worthwhile and necessary for us to know about the real heroes of our country and get some inspiration from their life stories.

Today in our profession I find that there is a crisis of courage. Professionals are becoming ‘spineless!’ One of the reasons for this may be that we did not study the real history of valour in our country. The history we studied was written by Britishers which was obviously far from being ‘true and fair.’

Today, I intend to write about the great martyr of India, Madan Lal Dhingra, who made the highest sacrifice for the Independence of our country. Born on 18th February, 1883, he lived a heroic life for just 26 years till he went to the gallows on 17th August, 1909.

As a college student in Amritsar, he thought seriously about India’s poverty and came to the conclusion that the key solution to this plight was ‘Swaraj’ and ‘Swadeshi’. He had observed how Britishers were looting India.

Right from his college days, he took part in or led the agitations to fight against injustice. His father, who was a civil surgeon and in the service of the British Government, hated the movement for Independence. Madan Lal was rusticated from the college; he refused to apologise and went away to look for work. He took on a few odd jobs at a low level, as a clerk or even as a labourer. Everywhere, due to his protest against injustice, he was fired. He then came to Bombay. His elder brother, again a doctor, compelled him to go to London in 1906 and paid for his education in mechanical engineering.

But eventually his own family totally disowned him; so much so that when in August, 2015 he was remembered with great reverence as a martyr, his descendants refused even to participate in the function! They did not even allow converting the ancestral house into a museum. Instead, they sold it to someone else.

While in London, Madan Lal came in contact with the well-known activists for freedom, Shyamji Krishna Varma and Veer V.D. Savarkar. Madan Lal was brilliant in academics and also had other talents. However, he dedicated his life only to the cause of Independence. In England in July, 1909, he assassinated Curzon Wyllie, who was the political adviser to the Secretary of State for India. Madan Lal considered him to be responsible for many tyrannical and inhuman acts in India.

Even during the trial that led to his conviction and death sentence, he showed extraordinary courage. He made very bold statements fearlessly. His historic statement made in the court was privately admired by many British leaders, including Winston Churchill. Churchill reportedly described it as ‘the finest statement ever made in the name of independence’.

He had the courage to warn the judge after his death sentence was announced, ‘I am proud to have the honour of laying down my life for my country. But remember, we shall have our time in the days to come’. He went to the gallows smilingly and said, ‘I may be re-born of the same mother and I may re-die in the same sacred cause till the cause is successful. Vande Mataram’.

His historic statement can be a source of inspiration for all the struggles for Independence around the globe. It is worth reproducing. His statement read as follows:

‘I do not want to say anything in defence of myself, but simply to prove the justice of my deed. As for myself, no English law court has got any authority to arrest and detain me in prison, or pass sentence of death on me. That is the reason I did not have any counsel to defend me.

And I maintain that if it is patriotic in an Englishman to fight against the Germans if they were to occupy this country, it is much more justifiable and patriotic in my case to fight against the English. I hold the English people responsible for the murder of 80 millions of Indian people in the last fifty years, and they are also responsible for taking away £100,000,000 every year from India to this country. I also hold them responsible for the hanging and deportation of my patriotic countrymen, who did just the same as the English people here are advising their countrymen to do. And the Englishman who goes out to India and gets, say, £100 a month, that simply means that he passes a sentence of death on a thousand of my poor countrymen, because these thousand people could easily live on this £100, which the Englishman spends mostly on his frivolities and pleasures. Just as the Germans have no right to occupy this country, so the English people have no right to occupy India, and it is perfectly justifiable on our part to kill the Englishman who is polluting our sacred land.

I am surprised at the terrible hypocrisy, the farce, and the mockery of the English people. They pose as the champions of oppressed humanity – the peoples of the Congo and the people of Russia – when there is terrible oppression and horrible atrocities (being) committed in India; for example, the killing of two millions of people every year and the outraging of our women. In case this country is occupied by Germans, and the Englishman, not bearing to see the Germans walking with the insolence of conquerors in the streets of London, goes and kills one or two Germans, and that Englishman is held as a patriot by the people of this country, then certainly I am prepared to work for the emancipation of my Motherland. Whatever else I have to say is in the paper before the Court… I make this statement, not because I wish to plead for mercy or anything of that kind. I wish that English people should sentence me to death, for in that case the vengeance of my countrymen will be all the more keen. I put forward this statement to show the justice of my cause to the outside world, and especially to our sympathisers in America and Germany.’

Friends, as CAs we are very much concerned with ‘Independence’ and ‘True & Fair’ things. If we inculcate even one per cent of Madan Lal Dhingra’s courage, the profession and the country can regain its past glory!

Namaskaars to such real heroes of India.

REPRESENTATION

On 9th November, 2021, the Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society (BCAS) jointly with other six voluntary professional associations submitted a Representation to the National Financial Regulatory Authority on Consultation Paper – September, 2021 on Statutory Audit and Auditing Standards for Micro, Small and Medium Companies (MSMCs).

 

There had been requests received from many of the members to make an effective representation.

 

To read the Representation – Scan here

IS IT FAIR? INDIAN TAXPAYERS / SAVINGS CLASS AND THE PROPOSED ROLE OF REGULATORS AND MINISTRY OF FINANCE IN GIVING THEM JUSTICE

The purpose of this article is to highlight some injustices being meted out to the individual taxpayers / savings class by the regulators – the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) – along with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and to stop / prevent the same

WHY TAX INCOME TWICE?
The first issue needing to be looked at is – ‘Why does income become taxable a second time when it has already been taxed ONCE?’ This becomes a matter of greater injustice when the individual (who is a salaried employee) retires and becomes a senior citizen. An employee earns salary income on which he has already paid income tax. He invests some savings in shares, debentures, bank fixed deposits and savings accounts. Why should income from these investments be taxed once again under Income Tax Law? He has paid Income Tax on his salary income. Just because there is a change in ‘Head of Income’, should the income become liable to taxation once again? Is there not a possibility that we are positively discouraging financial savings and perhaps encouraging savings in gold and property?

Why is Income Tax treatment differential – by nature of contributor?
Taking this argument a little further, why do we have an Income Tax differential on interest earnings? An employee invests in PPF / PF which gives him tax-free income at interest rates which are 7.00% +. PPF contribution cannot exceed Rs. 1.50 lakhs in the year. For the year 2021-22, it has been stated that PF interest income on an annual private employee’s contribution in excess of Rs. 2.50 lakhs and a government sector employee’s contribution of Rs. 5.00 lakhs will be taxable. Why this separation of private sector and Government sector employees? What is the logic guiding this differentiation? Why the favouritism to Government employees? Are not all taxpayers equal?

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/invest/contributing-over-rs-2-5-lakh-in-epf-you-will-now-have-two-pf-accounts/articleshow/85825052.cms?frm=mailtofriend&intenttarget=no

Why are bank savings and fixed deposit interest rates not at par with other small savings interest plans?
What needs to be understood is why are bank savings and term deposit interest rates so low (between 4.00 – 6.00%) per annum? When small savings interest plans give interest rates around 6.00 – 7.00%, why are bank deposit interest rates so low? Also, except for a very low threshold of tax-free income, these interest earnings are taxable. Can RBI and the Ministry of Finance please explain why bank interest income to the taxpayer has such a low interest rate (and post-tax the rate drops further)?
If the Ministry of Labour is able to get tax-free interest on PF contributions at 7.00+%, why is RBI as regulator failing the bank depositors by accepting rates of interest lower than 6.00% and that, too, as taxable income?

The Table below shows the unfairness of interest taxability for individuals. The RBI and the MOF need to sit down and put an end to this unfairness:

Nature
of interest income

Rate
of interest – % per annum

Taxable
/ non-taxable income

Authority
in charge

PPF Interest (maximum annual
contribution
R1.50
lakhs per person)

7.00%
+

Non-taxable

Ministry of Finance

Interest on PF accumulation

7.00% +

Mainly non-taxable (refer above para for new tax-free / taxable
contribution limit)

Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Labour (EPFO – Board of
Trustees)

Bank Savings and Term Deposit
accounts

<6.00%
mainly at most banks

Taxable after certain tax-free value

Reserve Bank of India and Ministry of
Finance

Debentures and company deposits

7.00 – 9.00%

Taxable

Ministry of Finance

Why are bank savings and term deposits getting such a raw deal on taxability considering that these are the favourite savings options of senior citizens? Net of income tax, these bank interest earnings don’t even cover the consumer inflation rate. Are we not penalising the savings class?

Why are savings and fixed deposits with banks not fully insured?
Another area where the RBI has let down bank depositors very badly is in the security of the deposits made by the individual savings class with banks. As regulator, it is the responsibility of RBI to take care of the interests of bank depositors (savings accounts and / or term deposits). Why cannot RBI mandate that all deposits should be fully insured by bankers? If the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation of India cannot take the load, let this insurance arena be open to other domestic and foreign insurers. The MOF may need to step into this. If other small savings like PPF, Post Office savings, etc., are fully secured, why cannot deposits with banks be made fully secured (through insurance)?

This issue is a lot more complex on behavioural economics. Rightly or wrongly, Indians believe that their money is fully secured with nationalised public sector banks (PSBs). It would be a huge shock to 90% of individual depositors if they were told that they are secured only to a maximum of Rs. 5.00 lakhs per bank, per individual.

https://cleartax.in/g/terms/deposit-insurance-and-credit-guarantee-corporation-dicgc

This is inherently unfair and the RBI / MOF argument that the current limit of Rs. 5.00 lakhs covers 90% of the depositors’ population is misleading and unjust. Nobody should risk losing a major part of their savings just because effective risk mitigation steps are not taken. It is the responsibility of RBI and MOF to take these steps so that the individual savings class is protected. In my view, this would squarely fall in the RBI’s domain. It is RBI’s responsibility to get matters organised at the Government and Ministry of Finance levels.

Why is SEBI not confronting misuse of the dividend payout option by Mutual Funds AMCs?
Another preferred area of investment by the individual taxpayer is Mutual Funds – Dividend Payout option. This is obviously to get a steady stream of income, particularly by a senior citizen and retired individual.

However, there is a catch in these dividend payouts and SEBI needs to be mindful of the same.

https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/sebi-directs-the-renaming-of-dividend-options-of-mutual-fund-schemes-120100501347_1.html

What SEBI should address is the fact that the Mutual Fund AMC cannot distribute dividend that is more than the amount sitting in the difference between the market price and the cost of the units. SEBI has recognised that in certain instances there could be return of capital as dividend which is taxed in the MF holder’s hands. This is unfair. The illustration below will explain the position:
(a) Investments into the MF scheme (cost) – Rs. 10 lakhs;
(b) Dividend declared @10% – Rs. 1 lakh worth of units will be redeemed;
(c) Market value on dividend payout date – Rs. 12 lakhs;
(There is no problem in this since dividend payout is less than the MF units’ appreciation.)
(d) Alternatively, the market value on dividend payout date is Rs. 10.75 lakhs;
(In this case, dividend on MF unit appreciation is Rs. 75,000 and Rs. 25,000 is Capital Units redemption, total dividend Rs. 1 lakh).

In my view, this payout of Rs. 25,000 to the scheme’s unit holders by the AMC is wrong. The individual is also being taxed on Capital Redemption as Dividend. SEBI should actually mandate that dividend paid to the MF unit holder cannot exceed the appreciation of units in his folio. Therefore, in the second instance described above (d), only Rs. 75,000 can be declared as dividend, and thus the real dividend rate becomes 7.50% and not 10.00% for the scheme unit holder concerned. This enables the MF unit holder to take a view on continuing or discontinuing his investment in the scheme. In my opinion, SEBI has realised the problem, but needs to take it further for the sake of the individual investor.

Why the regulators must think of the individual as taxpayer and investor
It is the opinion of the writer that the regulators and the MOF must make the individual income tax payer central to their economic and financial plans. Both RBI and SEBI need to be very conscious of their responsibility to the savings / investing class. They cannot operate in the arena taking care only of the interests of banks / AMCs and totally ignore the individual’s interests.

(The author is grateful to the news links that have facilitated his understanding of the subject and helped develop his point of view)

 

 
 

MICROSOFT WORD TRICKS

Microsoft Word is one of the most overused and probably underutilised softwares across the board. There is so much to explore and discover to make our day-to-day working more productive. Let us see some of the daily-used tricks which make working on Word faster and more effective.

Inserting horizontal lines in Word is super simple, just enter a – (dash) 3 times and press enter and you will immediately get a horizontal line across the screen. If you want a different type of line, you can experiment with = or ~ or * or # and play around till you get what you want.

Inserting a symbol of copyright? Just use (c) and magically it will change to a copyright symbol like this ©. The same holds true for the Trade Mark symbol – enter ™ and watch it change to ™ instantly.

Para numbering in Word is something which all users MUST use. Here again, you start the first para with 1. and automatically it will start para numbering. This is most useful since it numbers all paragraphs serially and, most importantly, if you wish to rearrange your paragraphs, the numbering will change automatically. In cases where you have a large document and need to rearrange the paragraphs in multiple edits, it takes the load off renumbering the paras over and over again.

Writing fractions is very intuitive in Word. Just type it as you would want it – like 1 1/2 and it will transform into 1 ½ as you move ahead!

In all the above cases, be sure to press a space after each word to make it work seamlessly.

All accountants use Excel for Tables – we can’t live without Tables. But what if we need to insert a Table in a Word Document? There are several ways of doing this:

1. You could make a Table in Excel and Copy Paste it into Word directly. This is the easiest and most obvious. Moreover, you could make the pasted Table live in Word, meaning, if you make changes in your original Excel Sheet, the same changes would be reflected in your Word Document, live. This applies not only to Tables, but also to Graphs and Charts which are copy-pasted from Excel.
2. Creating a new Table in Word is also simple – just go to the Insert Menu and click on Table – it will show you a dummy table and you can move your mouse around and insert a Table with as many rows and columns as you like. The other option is to click on Insert Table and specify the rows and columns you want in the Table. In both cases, the Table will be inserted at the point where your cursor is currently located.
3. The next option under Insert Table is to Draw a Table manually. Just click and drag your mouse wherever you want the Table lines to be drawn, and automatically, Word will draw the Table for you.
4. Another way of inserting a Table in your document is to enter the following:
+———+————+———+ Press Enter
Here, the number of dashes that you insert will determine the width of each column. You may enter your data in the cells and move to each next cell with a Tab. When you reach the last column and press the Tab, automatically another row will be inserted and you may continue filling the cells. This way, you are not limited by the number of rows that you declare in the beginning, under the earlier methods.

Did you know that Word also allows you to sort a list of values or text or dates, one below the other? Just select the list and in the Paragraph Tab on the top, click on A?Z and voila! – Your list is sorted instantly.

In the Office 365 ecosystem, in Word Excel or PowerPoint, there is an inbuilt Clipboard which you can use across all the apps during each session and also across devices. On the Home Tab, under Clipboard in the right bottom corner, there is an arrow pointing diagonally downwards – just click on that arrow and you will get the entire clipboard history for your session.

Word and Windows also have the option to insert emojis in your documents in any text area. Just press the Windows Key + ; together and the possible emojis will pop up for you to select.

It is interesting to know that you can open most open PDFs directly in Word, and even edit them. This will work only if the PDF document is not password-protected or encrypted. However, it’s worth a try.

And if you want to share your document with others, just head to File-Transform and you will be able to publish your document on the web and share it with friends / colleagues / clients and the world at large. This could be very useful for quickly making an FAQs page or for collaboration and sharing large documents.

Now that you know what all Word can do, try these simple tricks and enhance your computing experience with Microsoft Word. Happy Wording!

FEMA FOCUS

(A) Amendment in Foreign Direct Investment Limits
The Government of India has liberalised its extant FDI policy and made a few changes in the sectoral caps for FDI in the insurance, petroleum and telecom sectors. These changes are explained as under:

Sr. No.

Sector / Activity

% of Equity / FDI Cap

Entry route

Erstwhile limit

New limit

1

Insurance1 (Refer Note 1)

49%

74%

Automatic

2

Petroleum
refining by the Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), without any disinvestment
or dilution of domestic equity in the existing PSUs2

49%

49%
(100% allowed under automatic route where in-principle approval for strategic
disinvestment of a PSU has been granted by the Government)

Automatic

3

Telecom3

Automatic route up to 49% and beyond that under approval route

100% under Automatic route

Automatic

Note 1: The increase in the sectoral cap for insurance companies from 49% to 74% under the automatic route is subject to several conditions mentioned in the Press Note No. 2 (2021 Series) dated 14th June, 2021. Most of the conditions are the same as mentioned in the FDI Policy, 2020; one major change is with respect to constitution of the Board of Directors for insurance companies due to increase in their limit to 74%. Under the new condition, the Indian insurance company that has received foreign direct investment would need to ensure that the following persons are resident Indian citizens:
• Majority of Directors of such insurance companies;
• Majority of its Key Management Persons; and
• at least one among the Chairperson of the Board, the Managing Director and the Chief Executive Officer

______________________________________________________________________________________________

1   Press Note No. 2 (2021
Series), dated 14-6-2021

2   Press Note No. 3 (2021
Series), dated 29-7-2021

3   Press Note No. 4 (2021
Series), dated 06-10-2021

Further, the definition of Key Management Persons is the same as that defined in the guidelines issued by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (‘IRDAI’) on corporate governance for insurers in India.

(B) Amendment in Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations4
Under the existing Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods & Services) Regulations, 2015 (‘Export Regulations’), the rate of interest payable on advance payment received by the exporter from the buyer was capped at 100 basis points over the LIBOR rate. However, due to impending cessation of LIBOR as a benchmark rate, RBI has now permitted the use of any other applicable benchmark as directed by the RBI instead of the earlier specified only LIBOR rate.

(C) Review of FDI policy on downstream investment made by NRIs on non-repatriation basis5
The Government has now clarified that investments made by NRIs on non-repatriation basis would be deemed to be domestic investments at par with investments made by residents. Accordingly, investments made by an Indian entity which is owned and controlled by an NRI on non-repatriation basis shall not be considered for calculation of indirect foreign investment.

(D) ECB – Relaxation in period for parking of unutilised ECB proceeds in term deposits6
Under the existing ECB Regulations, ECB borrowers are permitted to park unutilised ECB proceeds in term deposits with AD Banks for a maximum period of 12 months cumulatively. However, in view of the Covid situation, RBI has now relaxed this provision and accordingly unutilised ECB proceeds drawn on or before 1st March, 2020 can be parked in term deposits with AD Banks prospectively for an additional period up to 1st March, 2022.

______________________________________________________________________________________________

4   A.P. (Dir. Series 2021-22)
Circular No.13, Dated 28-9-2021

5   Press Note No. 1 (2021
Series), Dated 19-03-2021

6   A.P. (Dir Series) Circular No.
01, Dated 17-6-2021

(E) Appointment of Special Director (Appeals) and his jurisdiction7
The Central Government has changed the jurisdiction of the Regional Special Director (Appeals) for hearing appeals filed against the order passed by the adjudicating authority under FEMA. The Table below prescribes the authority and its jurisdiction for hearing appeals:

Sr. No.

Special Director
(Appeals)

Station

Zone

Sub-zone

Jurisdiction

1.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-23, Delhi

Delhi

Delhi, Chandigarh Jaipur, Jalandhar and Srinagar

Dehradun and Shimla

States of Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal
Pradesh and Union Territory of Chandigarh, Union Territory of Jammu and
Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh, National Capital Territory of Delhi

2.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-20, Kolkata

Kolkata

Kolkata, Guwahati Lucknow and Patna

Bhubaneswar, Allahabad and Ranchi

States of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh,
Sikkim, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Odisha, Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar
Pradesh and Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar

3.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-47, Mumbai

Mumbai

Mumbai, Ahmedabad and Panaji

Surat, Nagpur, Indore and Raipur

States of Maharashtra, Goa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Gujarat, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu

4.

Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-18, Chennai

Chennai

Chennai, Kochi Bengaluru and Hyderabad

Madurai and Kozhikode

States of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and
Telangana, Union Territory of Puducherry and Union Territory of Lakshadweep

    
(F) Amendment in Master Direction on Direct Investment by Residents in Joint Venture (JV) / Wholly-Owned Subsidiary (WOS) Abroad8
RBI has clarified that sponsor contribution by an Indian Party (‘IP’) to an Alternative Investment Fund (‘AIF’) set up in Overseas Jurisdictions, including International Financial Services Centres (‘IFSCs’) as per the laws of the host jurisdiction, will be treated as Overseas Direct Investment (ODI). Accordingly, an IP can set up an AIF in overseas jurisdictions, including IFSCs, under the automatic route, provided it complies with relevant regulations of FEMA 120/2004-RB (‘FEMA 120’).

Further, RBI, in consultation with SEBI, has enhanced the limit of overseas investment by Domestic Venture Capital Funds / Alternative Investment Funds registered with SEBI in equity and equity-linked instruments of off-shore Venture Capital Undertakings from the existing USD 750 million to USD 1,500 million.

Also, for investment by way of swap of shares, it is clarified that an Indian company can issue capital instruments to a person resident outside India under the automatic route if the Indian investee company is engaged in a sector which is under automatic route or with prior Government approval, if the Indian investee company is engaged in a sector under Government route as per Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 dated 17th October, 2019, as amended from time to time.

Additionally, RBI has also issued a clarification in para B.22 of the Master Direction on ODI which pertains to opening of a foreign currency account abroad by an Indian Party. RBI has now clarified that in addition to existing conditions, such account can be opened only if the Indian Party is eligible to make ODI under the provisions of FEMA, 120.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
7    Notification S.O. 3958(E) [F. No. K-11022/15/2021-AD.ED], Dated 24-9-2021
8    A.P.(DIR Series) Circular No. 04 dated 12th May, 2021 and SEBI/HO/IMD/DF6

(G) Clarification for the purpose of computation of late submission fee (‘LSF’)
Under the existing FDI provisions, if there is any delay in filing of any specified reports, such delay can be regularised by payment of LSF instead of going through the compounding process. For the purpose of computing LSF, the earlier Master Direction on Reporting specified that the period of delay would be counted from the day after the 30th day from receipt of funds / allotment or transfer of shares and end on the day preceding the day on which the transaction report is received by the RBI. RBI has now made an amendment in the Master Direction on Reporting and clarified that
the period of delay will now be counted beginning from the day after completion of the prescribed time period and end on the day preceding the day on which the transaction report is received by the RBI. The prescribed time period means the time period mentioned in the relevant regulations from the date of receipt of funds / allotment or transfer of shares, as the case may be.

Accordingly, where FDI regulations provide for a period of 60 days for filing of specified forms, such as filing of Form FC-TRS and Form FDI-LLP(II), the delay period for computing LSF will now start from the end of the stipulated time period, i.e., the 60th day.

(H) Liberalised remittance scheme (‘LRS’) for resident individuals – Change in reporting requirement for AD Banks9
AD Banks are required to submit yearly details of applications received and remittances made by resident individual account holders under the LRS route to RBI. This reporting was required to be made on the Online Return Filing System (ORFS) but now the same is required to be made through the XBRL system by accessing the URL https://xbrl.rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl. Further, in case no data is required to be furnished, AD Banks are required to file Nil figures.

(I) Introduction of Foreign Exchange Transactions Electronic Reporting System (FETERS)10
RBI, in order to collect more information on international transactions using credit card / debit card / unified payment interface (UPI), has introduced FETERS with effect from 1st April, 2021. AD Banks are required to submit details of transactions through credit card / debit card / UPI (including sale and purchase of Forex towards international transactions) along with their economic classification (merchant category code – MCC). The reporting needs to be done through a new
return, namely, ‘FETERS-Cards’ on https://bop.rbi.org.in. The frequency of submission is monthly and the same needs to be done within seven working days from the last date of the month for which reporting is to be made.

______________________________________________________________________________________________
9    A.P. (Dir Series 2021-22) Circular No. 7, Dated 7-4-2021
10    A.P. (Dir Series) Circular No.13, dated 25-3-2021

 

INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND QUALIFYING TEST

BACKGROUND
Independent Directors are meant to be the pillar of corporate governance many of whose tenets are now mandatory in specified large / listed companies. In principle, every Director is expected to exercise a level of independence and even act akin to a trustee while discharging his duties. This is expected even from a Promoter or a Working Director. However, there are conflicts of interest, the reality of which cannot be denied. A Promoter Director or a Working Director cannot, in all fairness, be expected to be able to exercise the level of independence than one who is not so. Hence, a category of Directors was needed who had no connection or conflict that could impinge on their independence. Independent Directors, thus, have to pass through a series of negative conditions to ensure that there is no conflict of interest.

However, merely being independent is not sufficient for a person to discharge the onerous responsibility of acting as a Director when the Board of which he is a member has to oversee at a very senior level. Hence, apart from prescribing a series of disqualifications, the law also lays down that he should have certain knowledge that would enable him to discharge his responsibilities. To be precise, it is passing a certain online self-assessment Test in certain areas that are relevant to his functioning as an Independent Director. He is also required to register his details with a databank in a prescribed manner. The provisions relating to such a Test and for the databank have undergone amendments, including one most recently on 19th August, 2021 which gives exemption from the Test for professionals, including Chartered Accountants of certain standing. We discuss this subject in detail in this article.

OVERVIEW OF QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF AN INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR
There are more disqualifications that make a person ineligible to become an Independent Director than there are qualifications that make him eligible! Being connected with the company or the Promoters in a variety of specified ways makes a person disqualified to be an Independent Director. However, the qualifications / qualities laid down are largely generic and even vague, thus making most people eligible and qualified. Rule 5 of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014 (‘the Rules’) provide that an Independent Director ‘shall possess appropriate skills, experience and knowledge in one or more fields of finance, law, management, sales, marketing, administration, research, corporate governance, technical operations or other disciplines related to the company’s business.’ However, it is up to the Board to assess whether the proposed Independent Director has the required expertise / knowledge. Section 149(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 requires that the Board should assess whether in its opinion he ‘is a person of integrity and possesses relevant expertise and experience.’

However, there is also a specific requirement whereby the Independent Director has to pass an online Test which tests his knowledge on a variety of regulatory and related areas which are relevant for him to perform his functions as a Director.

BROAD SCHEME OF THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO MAINTENANCE OF DATABANK AND PASSING OF ONLINE TEST
There are two sets of requirements linked to each other that an Independent Director has to comply with. Firstly, he has to ensure that his name is entered into a databank maintained in the prescribed manner by the specified Institute. Secondly, he has to pass the specified online self-assessment Test.

Some of these requirements came into force when the provisions relating to Independent Directors were already on the statute. Hence, these provisions had to be introduced giving a transition period for Independent Directors already existing in office. Those aside, the broad scheme is as follows: A person desiring to be appointed as an Independent Director shall, before such appointment, apply to the Institute for inclusion of his name in the databank maintained by it. He may apply even if there is no immediate proposal of his being appointed as such. He also needs to pass the specified online Test within two years of inclusion of his name in such databank. If he does not pass, his name would be removed from the databank. There are categories of persons who are exempted from passing such a Test. Recently, by an amendment made to the Rules on 19th August, 2021, more categories of exempted persons have been added. The overall scheme for this purpose, partly by non-application of mind and partly by a series of amendments, is a little clumsy and also leaves several ambiguous areas.

Note that the requirement of appointment of an Independent Director under the Act applies not only to listed companies but also other categories of public companies, such as those with paid-up capital of at least Rs. 10 crores, turnover of at least Rs. 100 crores, etc.

Requirement of passing Test for being eligible to be appointed as an Independent Director
Rule 6(4) of the Rules requires an Independent Director to pass the specified ‘online proficiency self-assessment Test’ (‘the Test’). This Test has to be passed within two years of inclusion of his name in the databank maintained by the specified Institute. If he does not pass, his name will be removed from the databank.

The Institute in this case is the ‘Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs at Manesar’ as notified under section 150 of the Act.

He has to obtain a score of at least 50% in the aggregate in the Test. He can appear as many times as he wants for the Test, though he should pass it within the time limit of two years from the date on which his name is included in the databank.

Requirement of passing the Test applicable only to Independent Directors
Curiously, the requirement of passing such a Test and even of entering the name in the databank is required only for an Independent Director. Other Directors, who may form half or more of the Board, are not required to pass such Test.

Categories of Independent Directors who are exempt from passing the online Test
While the Test is not exceptionally difficult to pass, it still means that many otherwise highly qualified and / or experienced people would need to take this Test. There may be persons who may be specialists for years or even decades in their respective fields and yet would have to pass the Test. Recognising this, the Rules have been progressively amended and several categories of persons are now exempt from passing it. However, no exemption has been provided from the requirement of entering the name and details in the databank.

The categories that are exempt from passing the Test are described below.

Persons who have been Directors or key managerial personnel of certain types of entities for at least three years are exempted. These entities include listed companies, unlisted public companies with a paid-up capital of at least Rs. 10 crores, bodies corporate incorporated outside India with a paid-up capital of at least US$ 2 million, etc. This exemption will be particularly helpful for Promoters, Working Directors and even key managerial personnel, etc., who have already been associated with listed companies and who would otherwise have been required to take the Test.

Then there are persons who have worked at a senior level with the Government. Those persons who have acted at such a senior level for a period of three years in the pay scale of Director or equivalent or above in any Ministry or Department of the Central or State Government and having experience in specified areas such as commerce, corporate affairs, etc., are exempted from passing the Test.

Similarly exempted are persons who have acted for three years in the payscale of Chief General Manager or above with regulators like SEBI, Reserve Bank of India, the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority, etc., and having experience in handling matters relating to corporate laws, securities laws or economic laws.

Further, persons who have been, for at least ten years, advocates of a high court or in practice as a Chartered Accountant / Company Secretary / Cost Accountant, do not need to pass the Test. This will be helpful to professionals who by virtue of their long standing have adequate knowledge and experience in fields that would be relevant entities requiring the appointment of Independent Directors.

WHAT IF THE DIRECTOR DOES NOT PASS SUCH TEST WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME?
The law requires a person to appear for and pass the Test within the specified time. However, what would happen if he does not bother to appear or he appears and does not pass within the prescribed time? Rule 4 says that ‘his name shall stand removed from the databank of the institute’. The intention of the law seems to be that only those persons who have passed such Test or who pass the Test in the specified time should be appointed as Independent Directors.

However, the clauses are not happily worded. There are no clear answers to questions such as (i) Will it make such person ineligible to be appointed as an Independent Director? (ii) Will he immediately vacate his office as Independent Director? (iii) Will he have to pay any penalty for continuing to act as an Independent Director despite not passing the Test? (iv) What is the role of the company in this regard and whether it is required to remove such Director?

CONCLUSION
By these recent amendments, the law now rightly exempts more categories of persons who have long experience and good knowledge of their respective fields but would still be required to pass the online Test. However, it must be said that the governance of the Board and the regulatory requirements relating to them have over the years become quite complex and elaborate. The exempted categories are generally those having experience / knowledge of specialised areas while governance of the Board can require different skills, knowledge and exposure. Thus, knowledge of various laws and procedures would be helpful and it would be advisable to study the relevant laws. Further, it is necessary to appear for the Test and to pass it to confirm his knowledge. Clearly, the Test is one-time and at present there is no requirement to periodically re-appear for it or undergo some refresher course. But here, too, it may be advisable that even those who have passed the Test earlier may keep updating themselves and even voluntarily appear for it again.

    

PARTNERSHIP FIRM – STAMP DUTY ISSUES

INTRODUCTION
Partnerships are probably one of the oldest forms of doing business. Even today, a majority of the businesses in India are organised as ‘partnerships’. And stamp duty is an important source of revenue for the Maharashtra Government. This article deals with some issues relating to stamp duty which are peculiar to partnerships.

CHARGE OF STAMP DUTY

The Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (‘the Act’), which is applicable to the State of Maharashtra, levies stamp duty u/s 3 of the Act which reads as follows:

‘3. Instrument chargeable with duty
Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in Schedule I as the proper duty therefor respectively, that is to say –
(a) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I, which is executed in the State … …
(b) every instrument mentioned in Schedule I, which is executed out of the State, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done in this State and is received in this State:’

From an analysis of section 3, the following points emerge:
(a) The stamp duty is leviable on an instrument and not on a transaction;
(b) The stamp duty is leviable only on those instruments which are mentioned in Schedule I to the Act;
(c) The stamp duty is leviable on the instrument if it is executed in the State of Maharashtra or on the instrument which, though executed outside the State of Maharashtra, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done in the State and is received in the State. Hence, for example, even if the instrument of partnership is executed outside the State of Maharashtra but if the partnership is located in Maharashtra, and the instrument of partnership is received in Maharashtra, then it would be subject to stamp duty under the Act.
(d) The charge of stamp duty is subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I.

INSTRUMENT
The term ‘instrument’ is defined in section 2(1) of the Act to include every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. However, it does not include a bill of exchange, cheque, promissory note, bill of lading, letter of credit, policy of insurance, transfer of share, debenture, proxy and receipt. Stamp duty is leviable only on a written document which falls within the definition of instrument. If there is no instrument, then there is no duty.

Schedule I
Since stamp duty is levied only on the instruments specified in Schedule I, let us look at Schedule I. Only Article 47 of Schedule I specifically provides for levy of stamp duty on a partnership.

The term ‘instrument of partnership’ and the term ‘partnership’ have not been defined in the Act. Hence, the term ‘partnership’ would have to be understood as defined in the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Stamp duty on formation of partnership
Stamp duty on formation of partnership is levied under Article 47(1). According to this Article, the stamp duty on the instrument of partnership or the deed of partnership depends upon the capital contribution made by the partners as explained below:
(a) If the capital contribution is made only by way of cash, then the minimum amount of stamp duty is Rs. 500. Where the contribution brought in in cash is in excess of Rs. 50,000, the stamp duty is Rs. 500 for every Rs. 50,000 or part thereof. However, the maximum amount of stamp duty payable is Rs. 5,000. In other words, if the capital ranges from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 5,00,000, the stamp duty would range from Rs. 500 to Rs. 5,000. If the capital contributed in cash is in excess of Rs. 5,00,000, then the stamp duty payable would be the maximum amount of Rs. 5,000.
(b) Where capital contributed by the partners is by way of property other than cash, then the stamp duty payable is that leviable on a conveyance under Article 25.

Article 25 on Conveyance
Since Article 25 is made applicable to an instrument of partnership, the relevant provisions of Article 25 are summarised below:
* It levies a stamp duty on movable property @ 3% of the value of the property;
* It levies a stamp duty on immovable property. The stamp duty depends upon the location of the property, that is, whether it is in a rural area or in an urban area and also upon the class of municipality. The stamp duty for the city of Mumbai is 5%. Further, this duty is based on the stamp duty ready reckoner value of the property.

ADMISSION OF PARTNER OR ADDITIONAL CAPITAL BY PARTNERS
Since admission of a partner requires a fresh instrument of partnership, the question of payment of stamp duty under Article 47 would arise. However, it would be restricted only to the share of contribution brought in by the incoming partner or additional contribution brought in by the existing partners. If the incoming partner does not bring in any capital, stamp duty payable would be the minimum sum of Rs. 500.

If in an existing partnership additional capital is brought in by one or more partners, would it attract stamp duty under Article 47(1)? It is submitted that if a fresh partnership deed is not executed, then stamp duty is not payable, otherwise it would be payable only on the additional capital. The following decisions under the Income-tax Act have held that a registered document is not required when a partner introduces his immovable property into a partnership firm as his capital contribution but a registered document is required when a partner wants to withdraw an immovable property from the firm:

(a)    Abdul Kareemia & Bros. vs. CIT [1984] 145 ITR 442
    (AP)
(b)    CIT vs. S.R. Uppal [1989] 180 ITR 285 (Punj & Har)
(c)    Ram Narain & Bros. vs. CIT [1969] 73 ITR 423 (All)
(d)    Janson vs. CIT [1985] 154 ITR 432 (Kar)
(e)    CIT vs. Palaniappa Enterprises [1984] 150 ITR 237
    (Mad)

RETIREMENT OF A PARTNER OR DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP
Earlier, there was no express provision for levy of stamp duty in the case of retirement of a partner. Now, it is expressly provided for and the stamp duty payable is the same as in the case of dissolution as discussed below.

Where on dissolution of a partnership (or on retirement of a partner), any property is taken as his share by a partner other than a partner who brought in that property as his share of contribution in the partnership, stamp duty is payable as on a conveyance under Article 25, clauses (a) to (d), on the market value of the property so taken by a partner. In any other case, stamp duty of only Rs. 500 is payable.

The implications of these provisions are as follows:
(a) If a partner has introduced certain property in a partnership and on dissolution of the partnership or on his retirement from that partnership he takes that property, then the stamp duty of only Rs. 500 would be payable.
(b) If a partner has introduced certain property in partnership and on dissolution of the partnership or on retirement of another partner from that partnership that partner takes the property, then the stamp duty as is leviable on a conveyance under Article 25 would be payable. Hence, if the property is an immovable property, then the stamp duty would be 5% as explained above. If the property is a movable property, then stamp duty would be payable at the rate of 3%.
(c) If the property acquired by the firm itself has been given to a partner on retirement or dissolution, then stamp duty of only Rs. 500 is payable.

An issue arises in the case of simultaneous admission-cum-retirement of partners done by the same deed: would the stamp duty be payable on the amount brought in by the incoming partner (gross amount) or this amount should be net of the withdrawals? Section 5 of the Act states that if an instrument relates to several distinct matters, it shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of duties with which separate instruments each relating to separate matters would have been chargeable under the Act. Hence, the stamp duty on the instrument of partnership should be payable with reference to the gross amount brought in by the incoming partner and should not be with reference to the net amount. In addition, the stamp duty would be payable also as on a deed of retirement, under Article 47(2).

ARRANGEMENTS RESEMBLING
A PARTNERSHIP
In several cases, the owner and the builder enter into a profit-sharing arrangement, which is quite similar to that under a partnership. An issue in such a case would be whether the arrangement is one of a Development Rights Agreement or a partnership. The stamp duty consequences on the owner and the developer would vary depending on the nature of the arrangement.
    
Section 4 of the Partnership Act defines a partnership as ‘the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all’. Thus, a partnership must contain three elements:
(a) there must be an agreement entered into by all the persons concerned;
(b) the agreement must be to share the profits of a business; and
(c) the business must be carried on by all or any of the persons concerned acting for all.

ELEMENT OF PROFIT-SHARING
Sharing of profits is an essential element of a partnership. The instrument must demonstrate that what is happening in effect is that it is the net profits that are being shared and not the gross returns. Various English decisions such as Lyons vs. Knowles, 1863 3 B&S, 556 have held that a mere agreement to share gross returns of any property would be very little evidence of a partnership between them and there is much less possibility of there being a partnership between them. In certain English cases such as Cox vs. Coulson (1916) 2 KB 177 (lessee of a theatre and manager of a theatrical company), French vs. Styring [1857] Eng R 509 (joint owners of a race horse – expenses jointly borne), it was held that the mere circumstance of their sharing gross returns would be very little evidence of the existence of a partnership.

In Sutton & Co. vs. Gray (1894) 1 QB 285, S, a share broker, entered into an agreement with G, a sub-broker, that G should introduce his clients to S, receive half the brokerage in respect of the transactions of such clients put through on the Exchange by S and should bear the losses in respect thereof; it was held that this did not create a partnership between S and G as no partnership was intended and that the agreement was merely to divide gross returns and not the profits of a common business.

Further, section 6 of the Partnership Act is also relevant. It provides that the sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in the property does not of itself make such persons partners.

The relevant extracts are given below :

‘6. Mode of determining existence of partnership – In determining whether a group of persons is or is not a firm, or whether a person is or is not a partner in a firm, regard shall be had to the real relation between the parties, as shown by all relevant facts taken together.
Explanation I – The sharing of profits or of gross returns arising from property by persons holding a joint or common interest in that property does not of itself make such persons partners.
Explanation II – the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business, or of a payment contingent upon the earning of profits or varying with the profits earned by a business, does not of itself make him a partner with the persons carrying on the business; and, in particular, the receipt of such share or payment
(a) by lender or money to person engaged or about to engage in any business,
(b) by a servant or agent as remuneration,
(c) by the widow or child of a deceased partner, as annuity, or
(d) by a previous owner or part-owner of the business, as consideration for the sale of the goodwill or share thereof,
does not of itself make the receiver a partner with the persons carrying on the business.’

A relevant case in this respect is the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Vijaya Traders, 218 ITR 83 (Mad). In this case, a construction partnership was entered into between two persons, wherein one partner S contributed land while the other was solely responsible for construction and finance. S was immune to all losses and was given a guaranteed return as her share of profits. The other partner who was the managing partner was to bear all losses. The Court held that the relationship is similar to the Explanation 1 to section 6 and there were good reasons to think that the property assigned to the firm was accepted on the terms of the guaranteed return out of the profits of the firm and she was immune to all losses. The relationship between them was close to that of lessee and lessor and almost constituted a relationship of licensee and licensor and was not a valid partnership.

MUTUAL AGENCY CONCEPT
Mutual agency is also a key condition of a partnership. Each partner is an agent of the firm and of the other partners. The business must be carried on by all or any partner on behalf of all.

What would constitute a mutual agency is a question of fact. For instance, in the case of K.D. Kamath & Co., 82 ITR 680 (SC), the Court held that control and management of the business of the firm can be left by agreement between the parties in the hands of one partner to be exercised on behalf of all the partners.

Consequently, in the case of M.P. Davis, 35 ITR 803 (SC), it was held that the provisions of the deed taken along with the conduct of the parties clearly indicated that it was not the intention of the parties to bring about the relationship of partners but they only intended to continue under the cloak of a partnership the pre-existing and real relationship of master and servant. The sharing of profits or the provision for payment of remuneration contingent upon the making of profits or varying with the profits did not itself create a partnership.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Sanjay Kanubhai Patel, 2004 (6) Bom C.R. 94 had an occasion to directly deal with this issue. The Court after reviewing the Development Rights Agreement held that it is settled law that in order to constitute a valid partnership, three ingredients are essential. There must be a valid agreement between the parties, it must be to share profits of the business and the business must be carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The third ingredient relates to the existence of mutual agency between the parties concerned inter se. The Court held that merely because an agreement provided for profit-sharing it would not constitute a partnership in the absence of mutual agency.

LLP
To incorporate a Limited Liability Partnership, the partners need to execute an LLP agreement. This agreement would lay down the respective capital contributions, whether they would be in the form of cash or property, etc. This Act has now been amended for an express provision of levying stamp duty on an LLP agreement. Article 47 of Schedule I to the Act now even applies to an instrument of an LLP.

AOP Deed
If, instead of a partnership, an association of persons is selected as an entity for the development business, then the above discussion would apply to the same. The law now contains an express provision that stamp duty on joint venture agreements would be also governed by Article 47.

Conversion of firm into company
The conversion of a firm into a company under Chapter XXI of the Companies Act, 2013 / Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956 should not attract any incidence of stamp duty, as there is a statutory vesting of the assets of the firm in the company and there is no transfer. This view is supported by the decision in the cases of Vali Pattabhirama Rao 60 Comp Cases 568 (AP) and Rama Sundari Ray vs. Syamendra Lal Ray, ILR (1947) 2 Cal 1 which state that under Part IX of the Companies Act there is a statutory vesting of the assets of the firm in the company and there is no transfer. Therefore, there is no conveyance and hence there should not be any incidence of stamp duty.

CONCLUSION
From the above discussions it would be clear that a proper structuring of the transaction and a proper drafting of the relevant documents is essential to achieve the desired results.


 

CONCEPT OF ‘PERSON’ UNDER GST

GST, as an indirect tax, is collected by a person from another person for onward payment to the Government. Though it is a destination-based consumption tax on businesses, the charge and legal liability to pay tax has to be vested onto a specific person (the subject). In case such subject is missing, the taxing statute would lose its purpose as the implementation of the same would become impossible. The word ‘person’ encompasses within its fold not only natural persons like individuals but also artificial persons like firms, AOPs, trusts, companies, etc.

The term ‘person’ has been defined u/s 2(84) of the Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 as under:

(84) ‘person’ includes —
(a) an individual;
(b) a Hindu Undivided Family;
(c) a company;
(d) a firm;
(e) a Limited Liability Partnership;
(f) an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, in India or outside India;
(g) any corporation established by or under any Central Act, State Act or Provincial Act or a Government company as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013);
(h) any body corporate incorporated by or under the laws of a country outside India;
(i) a co-operative society registered under any law relating to co-operative societies;
(j) a local authority;
(k) Central Government or a State Government;
(l) society as defined under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860);
(m) trust; and
(n) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the above.

As can be seen from the above, the term ‘person’ has been very widely defined to cover, apart from individuals, different types of entities / associations / societies, etc., as well as Government at different levels, i.e., Central, State as well as local authorities. However, mere inclusion in the definition of person would not result in liability of GST unless such person gets covered within the charging provision u/s 9 of the CGST Act, 2017.

CHARGING SECTION & LIABILITY TO PAY TAX
Section 9(1) imposes a levy of GST on all intra-state supplies of goods or services, or both. Having so imposed the tax, the said provision also defines that the tax shall be paid by ‘the’ taxable person. The definition of the term taxable person u/s 2(107) read with the provisions of section 22 would suggest that the taxable person shall generally be the supplier. The exceptions to this general rule are provided in subsequent provisions as under:

• Section 9(3) provides that in notified cases, the tax on supply shall be paid on reverse charge basis by the recipient;
• Section 9(4) provides that in notified cases, the tax on supply received from unregistered persons shall be paid by the registered person on reverse charge basis; and
• Section 9(5) provides that in case of notified services, the tax shall be paid by the Electronic Commerce Operator (ECO) through which the said services are supplied, by treating such ECO as the supplier.

Thus, the important terms emanating from the charging section are taxable person, registered person, supplier and recipient, and in order to enforce levy of tax on a person, a person needs to be classified under any of the said baskets. If a person is not a taxable person, or a registered person or a supplier or a recipient, the liability to pay tax cannot be fastened on him. In other words, the person needs to be specified as ‘a person liable to pay tax’ in one of the persons mentioned above for
the liability to be fastened on him. The above position was laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of service tax while dealing with Rule 2(d)(xii) and (xvii) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 which cast responsibility on the service receiver to pay service tax. The levy was struck down in the case of Laghu Udyog Bharati vs. UoI [1999 (112) ELT 356 (SC)] as well as in UoI vs. Indian National Shipowners Association [2010 (017) STR 0J57 (SC)].

In the context of GST also, this aspect has been dealt with by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Mohit Minerals Private Limited vs. UoI [2020 (33) GSTL 321 (Guj)]. The issue before the Court was the validity of Entry 10 of Notification 10/2017-IT (Rate) which casts liability on the importer to pay tax on the freight component of goods imported on CIF basis. The liability to pay tax was cast on a notional value, being 10% of the CIF value of the goods imported. One of the contentions raised before the Court challenging the validity of the rate entry was that the privity of contract was between a foreign shipping line as a supplier and the foreign exporter of goods as a recipient and the Indian importer was not a privy to the transaction. As such, the importer could not be treated as a recipient of service and, therefore, the liability to pay tax u/s 9(3) was not triggered. This was accepted by the Gujarat High Court which held as under:

148. In our opinion, the writ-applicant cannot be made liable to pay tax on some supposed theory that the importer is directly or indirectly recipient of the service. The term ‘recipient’ has to be read in the sense in which it has been defined under the Act. There is no room for any interference or logic in the tax laws.
149. If the definition of the term ‘recipient’ is overlooked or ignored, then the writ-applicant would become the recipient of all the goods which goes into the manufacture / production of goods and all the services which have been availed by the foreign exporter for such purposes. Such reasoning which leads to a harsh and arbitrary result has to be avoided, particularly when the term has been expressly defined by the Legislature. Thus, the writ-applicant cannot be said to be the recipient of the supply of the ocean freight service and no tax can be collected from the writ-applicant.

The principle emanating from the above decision is that a person has to be either a supplier or a recipient in order to be held liable to pay tax. In view of the specific deeming fiction in the law itself treating an E-Commerce Operator as a deemed supplier in some cases, even such ECO may be held liable for payment of tax.

PERSON: CONCEPT OF DISTINCTNESS
GST is a transaction tax driven by contract, whether oral or written. This necessitates that all the elements essential for a valid contract need to be present before the levy can be triggered. Keeping this aspect in mind and to achieve the concept of consumption-based tax, i.e., tax revenue should flow to the State where the consumption takes place, section 25 provides that a person who has obtained / is required to obtain registration in one or more State / Union Territory shall, in respect of each such registration, be treated as a distinct person. Further, Schedule I, Entry 2 deems supply of goods or services between such distinct persons as supply, even if made without consideration.

At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the service tax provisions wherein establishment of a person in a taxable territory and any of his other establishments in a non-taxable territory were treated as distinct establishments of the same person. The implication of this provision was that the Indian HO and its foreign branch were treated as separate entities, though their accounts were ultimately consolidated and for all legal purposes they were treated as one entity.

The above provision had resulted in certain litigation. In 3I Infotech Limited vs. Commissioner [2017 (51) STR 305 (Tri-Mum)], the issue before the Tribunal was liability to pay tax on expenditure incurred by the foreign branches of an Indian company but disclosed in the financial statements which were prepared on a consolidated basis. In this case, a show cause notice proposed recovery of service tax under reverse charge on expenses of such foreign branches. The Tribunal, however, set aside the demand and held as under:

12. We note that Rule 3(iii) of Taxation of Services (Provided from Outside India and Received in India), Rules, 2006 includes ‘business auxiliary services’ but is restricted to such as are received by a recipient located in India for use in relation to business or commerce. The thrust of the Rules is to identify the manner of receipt of service in India in the three categories, viz., in relation to the object of the service, the place of performance and the location of the recipient. We are concerned with the residuary aspect of location of recipient. The Adjudicating Commissioner has not rendered a finding that the appellant is the recipient of service, indeed, he could have done so only by examining the relationship between the appellant and branch in the context of the payments effected to the foreign service provider which he, probably, did not feel obliged to do in the absence of any allegation to that effect in the show cause notice. Unless the recipient is located in India, section 66A cannot be invoked.

Similarly, in the context of airlines, the Tribunal was seized with the question of determining whether or not service tax was payable under reverse charge on payment made to foreign service providers for the centralised reservation system. The challenge was primarily because the payments were made by the Head Office of the airlines. Therefore, in case of international airlines, the entire payment was made by the airlines from their base country, including for bookings done from India from where the said airlines operated. A show cause notice was issued to the foreign airlines to recover service tax under reverse charge mechanism to the extent payments were made pertaining to India bookings. The matter was ultimately decided by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of British Airways vs. Commissioner [2014 (36) STR 598 (Tri-Del)] wherein the Court set aside the demand and held as under:

46. In view of the foregoing discussions, M/s British Airways, India, has to be treated as a separate person. If that be so, in view of the admitted position that the contract between CRS / GDS companies is not with M/s British Airways, India and is only (sic) that M/s British Airways, UK, the present appellant cannot be held to be the recipient of the services so as to make him liable to pay service tax, on reverse charge basis, in terms of the provisions of section 66A. The said issue stands discussed by the Learned Member (Technical) in his impugned order, by giving an example with which I am in full agreement.

The above decisions indicate that while determining who is the recipient of service the one who is entering into the contract becomes more relevant, even if it is the same legal entity. The challenges would be more especially when this deeming fiction becomes applicable in the context of domestic branches. Let us try to understand the challenges with the help of a few examples:

1. A company incurs marketing expenses for its products which are sold through its regional branches. For accounting and MIS purposes, the company distributes the expenses to the regional branches and the expenses (along with the corresponding ITC) appears in the trial balance of each such branch, though there is only one corresponding invoice. The issue that would arise is who is the recipient of service, who is eligible to claim the input tax credit, and what will be the implications of the Schedule I Entry 2.

2. Similarly, issues may arise in the context of cases where the liability to pay tax is under reverse charge. For instance, a company having a centralised transport department books freight from its Head Office in State A for movement of goods from State B to State C. The company is registered in all the three States. The issue that would remain is whether the RCM liability is to be paid in State A from where the expense has been incurred or State B / C where the services are consumed?

3. The branch office situated in Gujarat has incurred certain expenses towards marketing and promotion. However, the vendor has raised the invoice to the Head Office and disclosed it accordingly in its GST returns, while the expense has been booked by the Gujarat office as it had raised the PO. Who can claim the input tax credit in such cases?

4. Even in case of revenue, while the main revenue would be tagged to the respective locations from where the supply has been made, there can be instances for other income where such identification is not available, or the identification is done erroneously. Let’s take the example of canteen charges which are collected by the company from the employees’ salary on a monthly basis. It is possible that the charges for all employees may be accounted for in one State only. Will there be any implications if the company pays the tax on such recoveries in the State where the recovery is accounted, or the company would be mandatorily required to make payment in the State to which the revenue pertains?

Each of the above situations needs changes at the organisational level, with a need to incorporate branch level accounting, sensitising the personnel with the importance of synchronisation of the invoicing location vis-à-vis the PO location vis-à-vis the accounting location (be it for income / expenditure). A lapse on any one aspect would have substantial impact on the organisation, including financial costs, as claiming of credit in wrong location would not only result in denial of input tax credit at the wrong location and recovery along with interest / penalty, but the correct location may lose out on such credits if not identified within the appropriate timelines. Similarly, even in case of revenue, if the tax is paid from the wrong location, it is likely that the tax authorities might still demand tax from the branch which was actually liable to pay the tax as a supplier of service, resulting in duplicate tax as well as bearing the same, along with interest / penalties as applicable.

Further, the deeming fiction is also inserted to associations where mutuality applies w.r.e.f. 1st July, 2017 wherein activities or transactions between such associations and their members are deemed to be supply. This is to negate the applicability of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Calcutta Club Ltd. [2019 (29) GSTL 545 (SC)] wherein it was held that in the case of mutual associations, no VAT / Service Tax was leviable. However, the amendment has not been notified till date and in most likelihood will also be subjected to judicial scrutiny from the GST perspective.

INTERPLAY BETWEEN TAXABLE PERSON AND REGISTERED PERSON
The term ‘taxable person’ has been defined u/s 2(107) as under:

(107) ‘taxable person’ means a person who is registered or liable to be registered u/s 22 or u/s 24;

On a plain reading, it is apparent that any person who is liable to be registered or has voluntarily obtained registration is treated as a taxable person. A person is liable to be registered u/s 22 in the following cases:
• Turnover crossing the prescribed limit,
• Liability of successor in case of succession by way of transfer of business, or
• Liability of transferee on transfer of business / part thereof by way of merger, de-merger, etc.

Similarly, section 24 lays down the situation in which a person shall be liable to obtain registration notwithstanding the turnover limit prescribed u/s 22. However, section 22/24 merely determines the point when a person becomes liable to registration and treats such person as a taxable person. Once the registration is obtained by such person, either in view of section 22/24 or voluntarily, such person becomes a registered person. A ‘registered person’ has been defined u/s 2(94) to mean a person registered u/s 25 but does not include a person holding a Unique Identity Number.

The fundamental difference between a taxable person and a registered person forthcoming from the above is that the concept of taxable person is meant to determine a person who is liable to comply with the GST provisions, including obtaining registration, collecting and paying taxes. Such a person, when he complies with the provisions by obtaining registration, becomes a registered person and the procedural aspects of the GST law, such as input tax credit, filing of returns, assessments, etc., become applicable to such registered persons. For instance, the levy provision u/s 9(1) provides that the tax shall be paid by the taxable person. There can be instances where a person liable to obtain registration has failed to do so. Such a person cannot shirk away from his liability to pay tax on supplies made merely because he is not registered, as long as such person continues to be a taxable person, i.e., there is a liability on him to obtain registration. Similarly, liability to pay is cast on a taxable person in the following cases:

• In case of interest u/s 50, for cases where there is a failure to pay, the liability to pay interest is cast on ‘person’, i.e., both, a person already registered, as well as a person liable to registration but not registered.

However, the term ‘registered person’ is referred primarily in provisions relating to claiming of any benefit / procedural aspects. For example, the provisions relating to claim of input tax credit (section 16), exercising option to pay tax under composition scheme (section 10) or filing of returns / refund claims, etc., (Chapter IX) refer to a registered person. This is because the said provisions deal with the procedural aspects which a person cannot comply with unless such person has obtained registration and becomes a registered person.

Therefore, if it is ultimately held that a person was required to obtain registration but failed to do so, he is likely to lose out on claim of input tax credit as section 16(1), the enabling section, entitles only a registered person to take input tax credit. In view of the decision in the case of Spenta International Limited vs. Commissioner [2007 (216) ELT 133 (Tri-LB)], it is a settled position of law that eligibility of credit has to be decided at the time of receipt of inputs.

Therefore, it is apparent that unless a person obtains registration he shall not be entitled to take input tax credit on inward supplies received prior to grant of registration. However, the exception granted u/s 18(1)(a) in case of registration u/s 22/24 and voluntary registration u/s 25(3) will be available, though the same is restricted only to the extent of inputs held in stock. This is a departure from the position under the CENVAT regime where the Karnataka High Court has, in the case of mPortal India Wireless Solutions Private Limited [2012 (27) STR 134 (Kar)] held that registration is not a prerequisite for claim of CENVAT Credit.

LIABILITY TO PAY TAX UNDER ‘REVERSE CHARGE’
While section 9(1), which is the general section, imposes a liability to pay tax on the taxable person supplying the goods, sections 9(3) and 9(4) provide for cases where the liability to pay tax has been shifted to the recipient of the goods or services, or both. However, there is a difference in both the provisions.

Section 9(3) notifies the category of goods or services or both where the tax is payable by the recipient of such goods or services, or both. However, section 9(4) notifies the class of registered persons who shall on receipt of notified supply of goods or services or both, be liable to pay tax under reverse charge. The primary distinction in case of reverse charge u/s 9(3) and 9(4) is that section 9(3) applies to a recipient receiving the notified goods or services or both, as defined u/s 2(93), while section 9(4) applies to notified class of registered person receiving the notified goods or services or both. Therefore, for applicability of reverse charge u/s 9(3), a person needs to be classified as ‘recipient’,” while in the case of the latter, the person needs to be both, recipient as well as registered person.

It therefore becomes essential to analyse who is the recipient in the context of GST. The same is defined u/s 2(93) as under:

(93) ‘recipient’ of supply of goods or services or both, means —
(a) where a consideration is payable for the supply of goods or services or both, the person who is liable to pay that consideration;
(b) where no consideration is payable for the supply of goods, the person to whom the goods are delivered or made available, or to whom possession or use of the goods is given or made available; and
(c) where no consideration is payable for the supply of a service, the person to whom the service is rendered,
and any reference to a person to whom a supply is made shall be construed as a reference to the recipient of the supply and shall include an agent acting as such on behalf of the recipient in relation to the goods or services or both supplied;

It is evident that the definition merely refers to ‘the person’. The person may or may not be a taxable person / registered person. In such a situation, the liability to pay tax in case of supplies notified u/s 9(3) shall be on the recipient. This, coupled with the provisions of section 24(iii) which provides for compulsory registration in case of persons liable to pay tax under reverse charge, would trigger the need for registration even if such person is otherwise not liable to registration.

Therefore, in cases where the supply is notified u/s 9(3), the recipient (if not a registered person) would need to analyse whether or not an exemption has been granted for such supply. For instance, in case of reverse charge on security services / rent-a-cab services, there is no exemption provided under the exemption notification. Therefore, even if there is a single instance of such payments, the liability to obtain registration and pay the tax would get triggered.

This would apply even in cases where there is an exemption from obtaining registration. For instance, a supplier exclusively engaged in making exempt supplies is not required to obtain registration u/s 22(1) even if his aggregate turnover exceeds Rs. 20 lakhs as the same applies only to taxable supplies. However, if such a person receives security services / rent-a-cab services which are notified u/s 9(3), such person would be required to obtain registration in view of section 24(iii) and pay the tax (with no corresponding credits) and comply with the prescribed provisions.

It is also important to note that in quite a few cases exemption has also been granted. For instance, a charitable trust carrying out charitable activities and not liable to pay GST u/s 9(1) would not be liable to obtain registration u/s 22. However, if the same trust purchases software from outside India, the same will be taxable as import of service (which does not require to be in the course or furtherance of business) and in such cases the liability to obtain GST registration and comply with the provisions gets triggered. However, in view of Entry 10 of Notification 9/2017-IT (Rate), such services and certain other cases are exempted from the levy of tax and, therefore, the need to obtain registration does not get triggered in such cases.

However, when it comes to section 9(4), the liability to pay tax triggers only when the person is a registered person, i.e., he has obtained registration u/s 25 and is covered within the class of registered persons notified therein. Currently, the notified class of registered persons liable to pay tax u/s 9(4) on supplies received from unregistered suppliers is a promoter as defined u/s 2(zk) of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF TAXABLE PERSONS
Under the GST law, a person also has an option to obtain registration as a Casual Taxable Person (‘CTP’) / Non-resident taxable person (’NRTP’). The terms ‘casual taxable person’ and ‘non-resident taxable person’ have been defined u/s 2 as under:

(20) ‘casual taxable person’ means a person who occasionally undertakes transactions involving supply of goods or services or both in the course or furtherance of business, whether as principal, agent or in any other capacity, in a State or a Union Territory where he has no fixed place of business.
(77) ‘non-resident taxable person’ means any person who occasionally undertakes transactions involving supply of goods or services or both whether as principal or agent or in any other capacity, but who has no fixed place of business or residence in India;

As can be seen from the above, registration as NRTP / CTP is applicable in case of a supplier intending to make a taxable supply of goods or services or both from a State / Union Territory where such supplier, being a taxable person, has no permanent fixed place of business in the said State / Union Territory. The only distinction between NRTP and CTP is that while the concept of NRTP applies to a person who has no fixed place of business / residence in India, the concept of CTP applies to a person who has a fixed place of business / residence in India, but not in the State / UT from where such person occasionally makes the taxable supply.

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court in Commercial Tax Officer, Bharatpur vs. Bhagat Singh [2021 (46) GSTL 3 (SC)] held that a person can be treated as casual taxable person even if he carries out a single transaction. There is no need for multiple transactions in order to obtain registration as a Casual Taxable Person.

The need to opt for CTP / NRTP would generally apply in cases where goods are sent for exhibition in a different State and sold at the exhibition itself. Similarly, even Event Management Companies can opt for this concept to optimise credits (especially on inward supplies falling under the property basket). However, in case of handicraft goods, an exemption has been granted from obtaining registration.

It is, however, important to note that CTP / NRTP is compulsorily required to obtain registration u/s 24(ii) and 24(v), respectively. Therefore, a person who has a fixed place of business in Maharashtra and is not liable to be registered u/s 22(1) or 24 and intends to make a taxable supply in Gujarat where he has no fixed place of business, will be required to obtain registration even if his turnover from Gujarat or aggregate turnover is not likely to cross the threshold limit prescribed u/s 22(1). Secondly, the need to register as CTP / NRTP will be triggered only in a case where taxable supply of goods or services or both is intended to be made. This was recently held by the AAR in the case of Ascen Hyveg Pvt. Ltd. [2021 (48) GSTL 386 (AAR–GST–Har)].

E-COMMERCE OPERATOR
In these modern times, online service providers through their online portals have started providing the service of connecting the supplier and the recipient for a charge. The transaction is between the supplier and the recipient but is facilitated by the online portals (such as OLA, Uber, Zomato, etc.). The online portals charge a fee from the supplier or recipient or both. At times, what happens is that both supplier as well as recipient are not registered and, therefore, the transaction escapes the tax net.

Keeping this aspect in mind, the liability to pay tax on such transactions was cast on such online portals, i.e., E-Commerce Operators, through which the services are being supplied. The relevant definitions are:

(45) ‘electronic commerce operator’ means any person who owns, operates or manages digital or electronic facility or platform for electronic commerce;
(44) ‘electronic commerce’ means the supply of goods or services or both, including digital products over digital or electronic network;

Currently, the notified class of services where the liability to pay tax is cast on the ECO are:
• Service by way of transportation of passengers by radio-taxi, motor-cab, maxi-cab and motorcycle;
• Service by way of providing hotel accommodations except where the person actually supplying the service is liable for registration u/s 22(1), i.e., his turnover exceeds the threshold limit;
• Services by way of housekeeping, such as plumbing, carpentering, etc., except where the person actually supplying the service is liable for registration u/s 22(1), i.e., his turnover exceeds the threshold limit;
• Restaurant services supplied through ECO (Swiggy, Zomato, etc.) are also likely to be covered u/s 9(5) w.e.f. 1st January, 2022.

It is imperative to note that in the above cases the liability to pay tax is shifted to the ECO. This is not a case of reverse charge. Therefore, from suppliers’ perspective, especially unregistered suppliers, no tax can be demanded from such suppliers where the ECO has already paid the tax. Further, such unregistered suppliers, supplying exclusively through E-commerce operators are also exempted from obtaining registration if their turnover exceeds Rs. 20 lakhs.

The ECO is also required to collect tax at source @ 1% on the net value of taxable supplies (other than notified supplies) made through it by the registered suppliers.

PERSON – PRINCIPAL – AGENT RELATIONSHIPS UNDER GST
The transactions of principal / agency are governed by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the terms of the arrangement between such parties. Under GST, the supply of goods by a principal to his agent or by an agent to his principal is deemed to be a supply for the purpose of section 7, even if made without a consideration. However, the same does not extend to services. Therefore, any movement of goods by a principal to his agent or otherwise, be it intra-state or interstate, has to be under the cover of a tax invoice.

It is also important to note that the liability of the principal and his agent in respect of goods supplied / received by the agent shall be joint and several, and in case the agent fails to make payment of the due tax, the same can be recovered from the principal.

However, the deeming fiction has not been extended to services. This can lead to certain issues. Let’s take the example of an agent paying the GTA for transport services. The agent is also a registered person and the GTA recognises the agent as the recipient of service. In such cases, the question arises as to who shall pay GST under reverse charge? And if the agent has discharged the liability under reverse charge, can the same be demanded again from the principal?

Even under the pre-GST regime, there have been disputes on taxability in case of P2A transactions. The primary dispute has been determining whether the relationship of principal – agency exists between the two parties or not, be it travel agents, advertising agencies, freight forwarders, etc. For instance, in case of discounts / incentives given by vehicle manufacturers to the dealers where the Department had alleged Business Auxiliary Services, the Tribunal had stuck down the demand, concluding that such discounts were nothing but a reduction in purchase price (Refer Commissioner vs. Sai Service Station Ltd. [2014 (35) STR 625 (Tri-Mum)].

Even in case of freight forwarders, where the freight forwarders traded in cargo space and the Department had demanded service tax on the trading profits, the demand was set aside in the case of Greenwich Meridian Logistics (I) Pvt. Ltd. [2016 (43) STR 215 (Tri-Mum)]. Similarly, in case of advertising agencies, the Tribunal had in the case of Euro RSCG Advertising Ltd. [2007 (7) STR 277 (Tri-Bang)] held that the agency was liable to pay tax only on the amounts collected from the advertiser / client and not the publisher. It is, however, important to note that the basis for this dispute was that the freight charges / print advertising charges were exempt from service tax, which is not so in the context of GST. It is therefore unlikely that the disputes will continue under GST.

As can be seen from the above, even though the tax was discharged on the transaction complying with the principles of destination-based taxation (as the POS was correctly disclosed), the authorities still issued demand notice without appreciating the fact that the tax liability was exhausted. This demonstrates that while dealing with service transactions taxpayers will have to be very careful in taking positions, as any position is likely to be scrutinised by tax authorities and any instances involving non-payment of tax are likely to be looked at adversely.

Of course, on the issue of discharge of liability / person liable to pay tax, in the context of Service Tax, the Tribunal has, in the case of Reliance Securities Ltd. vs. Commissioner [2019 (20) GSTL 265 (Tri-Mum)], held that if the agent has paid the service tax liability, the principal would not be liable to pay tax on the same again on his share. It remains to be seen whether the said principle will be followed in the context of GST also.

PERSONS – WAREHOUSE / GODOWN OWNER / OPERATOR AND TRANSPORTERS
Apart from the above, there are various instances where a person, though not being a taxable person (i.e., registered or not liable to be registered), is required to comply with various requirements under the law. For instance, a warehouse / godown owner / operator and transporter who is not registered is required to maintain records of the consignor, consignee and other relevant details of the goods in the manner prescribed u/r 58. Such person is required to obtain a unique enrolment number by making an application in Form GST ENR-01 / ENR-02, respectively.

In addition, the following details are required to be maintained by such persons:
• In case of warehouse / godown owner / operator, period for which particulars of goods remain in the warehouse along with particulars relating to receipt, dispatch, movement and disposal of such goods;
• In case of transporter, record of goods transported, delivered and stored in transit along with the GSTIN of the consignor and the consignee.

The Proper Officer has the powers to carry out inspection, search and seizure at the premises of the above suppliers, i.e., transporter or warehouse / godown owner / operator u/s 67. Such officer also has powers to issue directions to the custodian of the goods to not remove, part with or deal with such goods without prior approval.

Similarly, when the goods are in movement, it is the responsibility of the transporter to ensure that the prescribed documents are in possession for verification during the movement. If the vehicle is intercepted during movement and the prescribed documents are not available with the transporter in support of the goods being transported, they are liable to confiscation.

PROCEEDINGS A PERSON MAY BE SUBJECTED TO
On the basis of the classification of a person, either as a taxable person, a registered person or otherwise, a distinction exists in the provisions relating to assessment, audit, recovery and penalties. While the concept of self-assessment u/s 59 refers to the registered person requiring such person to self-assess his liability, the option of provisional assessment u/s 60 is made available to a taxable person. Therefore, if a person has doubts over whether he is liable to be registered, he has an option to opt for provisional assessment.

Similarly, separate provisions have been prescribed u/s 63 for a taxable person who fails to obtain registration or has obtained registration but the same has been cancelled u/s 29(2). The reason for the assessment u/s 63 not being applicable to a taxable person registered under GST is that the taxable person who is registered is to be subjected to scrutiny u/s 61, assessment u/s 62 in case of non-filing of returns, audit by tax authorities u/s 65, and special audit u/s 66.

However, in case of recovery proceedings u/s 73 or u/s 74, the provisions refer to ‘the person’, implying that the provisions shall apply to both, a taxable person (thus including a registered person) and a person who is not liable to be registered and opts to be an unregistered person. The appeal provisions have also been similarly drafted.

However, depending on the nature of the contravention, the person on whom penalty can be imposed is based on the nature of contravention. For instance, penalty for specific offences listed u/s 122 is applicable only on a taxable person, while penalty for failure to furnish information return u/s 150 or statistics is leviable on any person. Similarly, the general penalty prescribed u/s 125, which deals with levy of penalty for any offence not covered above, is leviable on any person, irrespective of whether such a person is a registered person or not.

CONCLUSION
The GST law recognises different classes of persons and classification of a person would make such person liable to either pay tax, claim credit or be subject to various proceedings, or even require such person to comply with other provisions of the law. Therefore, it is always important that it is determined which particular provisions are applicable to a person, and whenever any proceedings are being commenced on such a person, it is ensured that such person can be subjected to the said proceedings else the very basis of the proceedings can be challenged before the courts.  

KEY AUDIT MATTERS IN AUDIT REPORT – RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

Compilers’ Note: Since the last few years, transactions between related parties have been in the limelight. Investors and regulators have been questioning these ‘Related Party Transactions (RPT)’, especially the determination of the ‘Arm’s Length Pricing’ for the same. Audit Committee members and Auditors also need to verify and confirm RPT and whether the same are at ‘arm’s length’. Given below are a few illustrations of audit reports for the year ended 31st March, 2021 where the auditors have included RPT as ‘Key Audit Matters’ in their reports and the procedures followed by them to verify the same.

SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LTD.

3

Related Party Transactions

Principal Audit Procedures

 

Refer Note No. 39 to the Standalone Financial Statements.

 

We identified the accuracy and completeness of disclosure of
related party transactions as set out in respective notes to the Standalone
Financial Statements as a key audit matter due to:

 

• the significance of transactions with related parties during
the year ended 31st March, 2021

 

• compliance with applicable laws and Regulatory Directives

 

• the fact that related party transactions are subject to the
compliance requirements under the Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI (LODR), 2015

Obtaining an understanding of the Company’s policies and
procedures in respect of the capturing of related party transactions and how
management ensures all transactions and balances with related parties have
been disclosed in the Standalone Financial Statements

 

• Obtaining an understanding of the Company’s policies and
procedures in respect of evaluating arm’s length pricing and approval process
by the audit committee and the Board of Directors

 

• Designing and performing audit procedures in accordance with
the guidelines laid down by ICAI in the Standard on Auditing (SA 550) to
identify, assess and respond to the risks of material misstatement arising
from the entity’s failure to appropriately account for or disclose material
related party transactions, which includes obtaining necessary approvals at
appropriate stages of such

 

 

(continued)

transactions as mandated by applicable laws and regulations

 

• Assessing management evaluation of compliance with the
provisions of section 177 and section 188 of the Act and SEBI (LODR), 2015

 

• Evaluating the disclosures through reading of statutory
information, books and records and other documents obtained during the course
of our audit

 

• Our examination has showed that the related party transactions
have been evaluated and disclosed appropriately

DLF LTD.

Related Party Transactions (as described in Note 44 to
the standalone Ind AS financial statements)

The Company has undertaken transactions with its related parties
in the ordinary course of business at arm’s length. These include making new
or additional investments in its subsidiaries; lending loans to related
parties; sales and purchases to and from related parties, etc., as disclosed
in Note 44 to the standalone Ind AS financial statements

 

We identified the accuracy and completeness of the related party
transactions and its disclosure as set out in respective Notes to the
financial statements as a key audit matter due to the significance of
transactions with related parties and regulatory compliances thereon, during
the year ended 31st March, 2021

Our procedures / testing included the following:

 

• Obtained and read the Company’s policies, processes and
procedures in respect of identifying related parties, obtaining approval,
recording and disclosure of related party transactions;

 

• Read minutes of shareholder meetings, Board meetings and
minutes of meetings of those charged with governance in connection with
Company’s assessment of related party transactions being in the ordinary
course of business at arm’s length;

 

• Tested related party transactions

 

(continued)

with the underlying contracts, confirmation letters and other
supporting documents;

 

• Agreed with the related party information disclosed in the
financial statements with the underlying supporting documents, on a sample
basis.

SUN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LTD.

Identification and disclosures of Related Parties (as described in Note 50 of
the standalone Ind AS financial statements)

The Company has related party transactions which include,
amongst others, sale and purchase of goods / services to its subsidiaries,
associates, joint ventures and other related parties and lending and
borrowing to its subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures

 

Identification and disclosure of related parties was a
significant area of focus and hence considered as a Key Audit Matter

Our audit procedures amongst others included the following:

 

• Evaluated the design and tested the operating effectiveness of
controls over identification and disclosure of related party transactions

 

• Obtained a list of related parties from the Company’s
management and traced the related parties to declarations given by Directors,
where applicable, and to Note 50 of the standalone Ind AS financial
statements

 

• Read minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors and
Audit Committee to trace related party transactions with limits approved by
Audit Committee / Board

 

• Tested material creditors / debtors, loan given / loans taken
to evaluate existence of any related party relationships; tested transactions
based on declarations of related party transactions given to the Board of
Directors and Audit Committee

 

• Verified the disclosures in the standalone Ind AS financial
statements for compliance with Ind AS 24

COFFEE DAY ENTERPRISES LTD.

Identification and compliance of related party transactions
(RPTs)

In view of the significance of the matter, the auditor of the
subsidiary has reported that the

(continued)

The Group has numerous transactions with related parties during
the year. The related party balances as at 31st March, 2021 and
related party transactions are disclosed in Note 31 to the consolidated
financial statements

 

Transactions with related parties mainly comprise transactions
between the Group and other entities which are directly / indirectly
controlled by the shareholders with significant influence of the Group

 

We identified related party transactions as a key audit matter
because of risks with respect to completeness of disclosures made in the
consolidated financial statements; compliance with statutory regulations
governing related party relationships such as the Companies Act, 2013 and
SEBI Regulations and the judgment involved in assessing whether transactions
with related parties are undertaken at arm’s length

(continued)

following audit procedures were applied in this area, among
others, to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence:

 

• We tested key controls to identify and disclose related party
relationships and transactions in accordance with the relevant accounting
standard and also tested controls on the required approval process of such
related party transactions

 

• We carried out an assessment of compliance with the listing
regulations and the regulations under the Companies Act, 2013, including
checking of approvals as specified in sections 177 and 188 of the Companies
Act, 2013 with respect to the related party transactions. In cases where the
matter was subject to varied interpretations, we have relied on opinions
obtained by management from independent legal practitioners

 

• We considered the adequacy and appropriateness of the
disclosures in the consolidated financial statements, relating to the related
party transactions

 

• For transactions with related parties, we inspected relevant
ledgers, agreements and other information that may indicate the existence of
related party relationships or transactions. We also tested completeness of
related parties with reference to the various registers maintained by the
Company statutorily

 

• We have tested on a sample basis, Management’s assessment of related
party transactions for arm’s length pricing

EROS INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LTD.

Related Party Transactions (Refer Note 44)

The Company has undertaken transactions with its related parties
in the ordinary course of business at arm’s length. These include
transactions in the nature of investments, loans, sales, etc.,

Our procedures / testing included the following:

 

• Obtained and read the Company’s policies, processes and
procedures in  respect of

(continued)

as disclosed in Note 44 to the standalone Ind AS financial
statements.

 

Considering the significance of transactions with related
parties and regulatory compliances thereon, related party transactions and
their disclosure as set out in respective notes to the financial statements
have been identified as key audit matters

(continued)

related parties, obtaining approval, recording and disclosure of
related party transactions;

 

• Read minutes of shareholder meetings, Board meetings and
minutes of meetings of those charged with governance in connection with
Company’s assessment of related party transactions being in the ordinary
course of business at arm’s length;

 

• Tested related party

 

(continued)

transactions with the
underlying contracts, confirmation letters and other supporting documents;

 

• Agreed the related party information disclosed in the
financial statements with the underlying supporting documents, on a sample
basis;

 

• Also reviewed the assessment of the recoverability from the
related parties based on group’s cash flow plan prepared by the Management.

TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY – AN OVERVIEW

1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND BACKGROUND
Digitalisation and globalisation have had a profound impact not only on the world economy, but also on the lifestyles of people. Digitalisation and the advent of Artificial Intelligence have further accelerated the impact in the 21st century. These changes have brought with them challenges to the age-old taxing rules of international business income which have resulted in multinational enterprises (MNEs) not paying their fair share of tax despite their huge profits.

In 2013, the OECD ramped up efforts to address the challenges in response to growing public and political concerns about tax avoidance by large multinationals. Implementation of the 15 Action Plans of the BEPS package, agreed to 2015, is well underway, but gaps remain. Globalisation has aggravated unhealthy tax competition.

In March, 2018, the OECD released the document Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation — Interim Report, 2018 as a follow-up to the 2015 final report on Action 1 of the project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. The 2018 Interim Report did not include any specific recommendations, indicating instead that further work would be carried out to understand the various business models in existence in the digital economy.

In January, 2019, the OECD released a Policy Note for renewed international discussions to focus on two ‘pillars’: one pillar addressing the broader challenges of the digitalization of the economy and the allocation of taxing rights, and a second pillar addressing remaining BEPS concerns. Following the Policy Note in February, 2019, the OECD released a Public Consultation Document describing the two-pillar proposals at a high level. The OECD received extensive comments from stakeholders and held a public consultation in March, 2019.

At the end of January, 2020, the OECD released a Statement by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the Two-Pillar Approach. With respect to both pillars, the documents included new details on the proposed approaches and identified key issues under consideration and areas where more work was to be undertaken.

In October, 2020, the OECD released detailed reports on the Blueprints on Pillar One and Pillar Two; an Economic Impact Assessment of the Pillar One and Pillar Two proposals; a Cover Statement by the Inclusive Framework on the work to date; future steps and a Public Consultation Document requesting comments on the Blueprints on both pillars.

On 1st July, 2021, the OECD released a Statement on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising From the Digitalisation of the Economy (July Statement), reflecting the agreement of 130 of the member jurisdictions of the Inclusive Framework on some key parameters with respect to both pillars.

On 8th October, 2021, the OECD published an updated Statement (October Statement) regarding the conceptual agreement on the Two-Pillar Solution and the framework for the implementation of the same. And 136 out of 140 jurisdictions of the Inclusive Framework have agreed to the October Statement. The four jurisdictions which did not join the October Statement are Pakistan, Kenya, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka.

The 136 jurisdictions which have joined the Two-Pillar Solution represent more than 90% of the world’s GDP. An agreement is reached on a Detailed Implementation Plan that envisages implementation of the new rules by 2023.

The Two-Pillar Solution will ensure reallocation of excess profits of the large and profitable companies based on ‘nexus approach’ and that the MNEs will pay a minimum tax rate of 15%. This solution also aims to address concerns of the developing countries of having a fair share of tax revenue from MNEs who have a large customer base in these countries.

2. ISSUES UNDER THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL TAXATION RULES
A key part of the OECD / G20 BEPS Project is addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy which has undermined the basic rules that have governed the taxation of international business profits for the last one century.

The existing international tax rules are based on agreements made in the 1920s and are enshrined in the global network of bilateral tax treaties.

There are two main issues:
(1) The old rules provide that the profits of a foreign company can only be taxed in another country where the foreign company has a physical presence. One hundred years ago, when digital technologies were non-existent and business revolved around factories, warehouses and movement of physical goods, this made perfect sense. However, in today’s digitalised world, MNEs often conduct large-scale business in a jurisdiction with little or no physical presence in that jurisdiction.
(2) Secondly, most countries only tax the domestic business income of their MNEs but not foreign income on the assumption that foreign business profits will be taxed where they are earned.

The growth of importance of intangibles like brands, copyrights and patents, and companies’ ability to shift profits to jurisdictions that impose little or no tax, means that MNE profits often escape taxation. This is further complicated by the fact that many jurisdictions are engaged in unfair tax competition by offering reduced taxation, and even zero taxation, to attract foreign direct investment and its attendant economic benefits.

OECD estimates that corporate tax avoidance costs anywhere from USD 100 to 240 billion annually, or from four to ten percent of global corporate income tax revenues. Developing countries are disproportionately affected because they tend to rely more heavily on corporate income taxes than advanced economies. Lack of global consensus on taxing MNE profits has given rise to unilateral measures at the national level, such as Digital Services Taxes (DST) and the prospect of retaliatory tariffs.

Such an outcome could cost the global economy up to 1% of its GDP. Again, this would hit developing countries harder than more advanced economies. The implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution aims to avoid trade wars, provide certainty and prevent unilateral domestic tax measures that would adversely impact trade and investment.

3. EVOLVING TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION
3.1 Pillar One
Pillar One aims to ensure a fairer distribution of profits and taxing rights among countries with respect to the largest MNEs which are the beneficiaries of globalisation. Tax certainty is a key aspect of the new rules, which include a mandatory and binding dispute resolution process for Pillar One, but with the caveat that developing countries will be able to benefit from an elective mechanism in certain cases, ensuring that the rules are not too onerous for low-capacity countries. The agreement to re-allocate profit under Pillar One includes the removal and standstill of DST and other relevant, similar measures, bringing an end to trade tensions resulting from the instability of the international tax system. It will also provide a simplified and streamlined approach to the application of the arm’s length principle in specific circumstances, with particular focus on the needs of low-capacity countries.

Pillar One would bring dated international tax rules into the 21st century, by offering market jurisdictions new taxing rights over MNEs, whether or not there is a physical presence.

a) Under Pillar One, 25% of profits of the largest and most profitable MNEs above a set profit margin (residual profits) would be reallocated to the market jurisdictions where the MNE’s users and customers are located; this is referred to as Amount A.
b) Pillar One also provides for a simplified and streamlined approach to the application of the arm’s length principle to in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities, referred to as Amount B.
c) Pillar One includes features to ensure dispute prevention and dispute resolution in order to address any risk of double taxation, but with an elective mechanism for some low-capacity countries.
d) Pillar One also entails the removal and standstill of DST and similar relevant measures to prevent harmful trade disputes.

3.2 Certain aspects of Amount A and Amount B
a) Computation of Amount A

Amount A would be computed for in-scope MNEs (i.e., ‘covered entities’ to which Pillar One applies), as 25% of residual profit (residual profit is defined as profit in excess of 10% of revenue) will be allocated to market jurisdictions with nexus using a revenue-based allocation key.

Revenue will be sourced to the end jurisdiction where the goods or services are ultimately used or consumed.

The base profit or loss of the in-scope MNE to be used for computation of Amount A will be determined by reference to the financial accounting income, with a few adjustments. (These rules are yet to be prescribed.)

b) Computation of Amount A in a case where marketing and distribution activities are undertaken in the relevant jurisdiction
In case the relevant market jurisdiction is already allocated a portion of the residual profit, a safe harbour will apply to cap the total residual profits allocated to such marketing jurisdiction under Amount A. Further work is expected to be undertaken to determine this safe harbour.

c) How would tax certainty be achieved for Amount A?
A dispute prevention and resolution mechanism will be introduced to avoid double taxation of Amount A. Such dispute resolution mechanism is expected to be mandatory and binding on jurisdictions. An elective binding dispute resolution mechanism will be made available on issues related to Amount A for developing economies which are eligible for deferral of their BEPS Action 14 review and have no or low levels of dispute. Interestingly, India has agreed to this Clause in the context of Pillar One, despite its consistent resistance to mandatory arbitration.

d) Computation of Amount B
Amount B would be based on the arm’s length return for in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities. The work on simplifying the computation of Amount B and streamlining the same is expected to be completed by the end of 2022. A safe harbour rate or other guidance may be provided for determining arm’s length return to compute Amount B. However, till such time one needs to follow the general principles enshrined in the Transfer Pricing Regulations.

e) How would Pillar One be implemented?
Amount A will be implemented through a Multilateral Convention (MLC) which will be developed and opened for signature in 2022, and Amount A is expected to come into effect in 2023. Unlike the MLI, which although multilateral, amends bilateral tax treaties, the MLC will operate multilaterally and along with the MLI.

3.3 Important elements of Pillar One
i) The scope of Amount A is restated without change as MNEs with a global turnover above €20 billion and profitability above 10% of profit before tax. These thresholds will be calculated using an average mechanism (yet to be described in detail).
ii) Amount A will allocate 25% of ‘residual profits’, which is defined as profit before tax in excess of 10% of revenue, to market jurisdictions with nexus using a revenue-based allocation key.
iii) A mandatory and binding dispute resolution mechanism will be available for all issues related to Amount A. For certain developing countries, an elective binding dispute resolution mechanism will be available. The eligibility of a jurisdiction for the elective binding dispute resolution mechanism will be regularly reviewed. If a jurisdiction is found to be ineligible, it will remain ineligible in all subsequent years.
iv) The removal of all DSTs and other relevant similar measures with respect to all companies will be required by the Multilateral Convention (MLC) through which Amount A is to be implemented. No newly-enacted DSTs or other relevant similar measures will be imposed on any company from 8th October, 2021 and until the earlier date of 31st December, 2023 or the coming into force of the MLC.
v) The October Statement reiterates that the MLC through which Amount A is implemented will be developed and opened for signature in 2022, with Amount A coming into effect in 2023.

3.4 Pillar Two
Pillar Two aims to discourage tax competition on corporate income tax through the introduction of a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15% that countries can use to protect their tax bases (the GloBE rules). Pillar Two does not eliminate tax competition, but it does set multilaterally agreed limitations on it. Tax incentives provided to spur substantial economic activity will be accommodated through a carve-out. Pillar Two also protects the right of developing countries to tax certain base-eroding payments (like interest and royalties) when they are not taxed up to the minimum rate of 9%, through a ‘subject to tax rule’ (STTR).

Governments worldwide agree to allow additional taxes on the foreign profits of MNEs headquartered in their jurisdictions at least to the agreed minimum rate. This means that tax competition will now be supported by a minimum level of taxation wherever an MNE operates.

A carve-out allows countries to continue to offer tax incentives to promote business activity with real substance, like building a hotel or investing in a factory.

3.5 Pillar Two seeks to reduce tax competition and protect tax base by introducing a minimum global corporate tax. It consists of the following:
i) An Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) which imposes a top-up tax on a parent entity in respect of the low-taxed income of a constituent entity;
ii) An Undertaxed Payment Rule (UTPR) which denies deduction or requires an adjustment to the extent the low-taxed income of a constituent entity is not subject to tax under the IIR. IIR and UTPR together are called the Global anti-Base Erosion Rules (GloBE);
iii) A treaty-based STTR that allows jurisdictions to impose limited source taxation on certain related party payments subject to tax below a minimum rate.

The IIR is to be applied in the country in which the parent is situated, whereas the UTPR and the STTR apply in the case of the subsidiary.

3.6 Which entities are covered?
MNEs that meet the €750 million revenue threshold under BEPS Action 13 (Country-by-Country Reporting) would be subject to the GloBE rules. However, even if the above thresholds are not met, countries are free to apply the IIR to MNEs headquartered in their States.

The exclusion from the GloBE rules also includes Government entities, international organisations, pension funds or investment funds that are Ultimate Parent Entities (UPE) of an MNE Group or any holding vehicles used by such entities.

UTPR will not apply to MNEs in the initial phase of their international activity, i.e., those MNEs whose tangible assets abroad do not exceed €50 million and who do not operate in more than five jurisdictions. Such exclusion is limited for a period of five years after the MNE comes within the scope of the GloBE rules for the first time. For MNEs which are covered by the GloBE rules when they come into effect, UTPR will not apply for five years and the period of five years shall commence at the time the UTPR Rules come into effect.

3.7 Income Inclusion Rule
The IIR will operate to impose a top-up tax using an Effective Tax Rate (ETR) test that is calculated on a jurisdictional basis. The minimum tax rate specified is 15%. Accordingly, in a situation where the constituent entity has not been subjected to tax of at least 15%, the jurisdiction of the parent entity will collect top-up tax.

3.8 Undertaxed Payment Rule
The UTPR applies in a situation where the transaction is not subject to IIR. It allocates top-up tax from low-tax constituent entities. The minimum ETR for the UTPR is 15%.

3.9 Subject To Tax Rule
The members have agreed on a minimum rate of 9% for the STTR and therefore covered payments, which are subjected to tax in the residence jurisdiction at a rate lower than 9%, will be subject to STTR in the payer jurisdictions. [This is a bilateral solution applicable in case of Interest, Royalties and other specified payments. Where a treaty partner country taxes such income below the STTR rate of 9% in its jurisdiction, then the other partner may tax the differential rate so as to ensure that such payments are taxed minimum at the STTR rate.]

3.10 Implementation
As the GloBE rules relate to amendments in domestic tax laws, model rules will be developed by the end of November, 2021 defining the scope and setting out the mechanics of the rules. It is expected that Pillar Two will be brought into law in 2022, to be effective in 2023 and UTPR to apply from 2024. Implementation of the GloBE rules is not mandatory on jurisdictions. However, if such rules are implemented, a common approach is to be followed and the rules and implementation are to be undertaken in the manner provided in Pillar Two.

A model treaty provision will be developed by the end of November, 2021 incorporating the STTR.

3.11 Important Elements of Pillar Two
i) It is restated that Inclusive Framework members are not required to adopt the GloBE rules but if they choose to do so, they should implement and administer the rules in a way that is consistent with the outcomes provided for under Pillar Two, including the model rules and guidance agreed to by the Inclusive Framework. It is also restated that Inclusive Framework members accept the application of the GloBE rules applied by other Inclusive Framework members.
ii) The design of Pillar Two is restated, including the GloBE rules, consisting of the IIR and the UTPR, and the STTR. Exclusion from the UTPR will be available for MNEs in the initial phase of their international activity (i.e., MNEs with a maximum of €50 million tangible assets abroad that operate in no more than five other jurisdictions). This exclusion is limited to five years after the MNE comes into the scope of the GloBE rules for the first time. In respect of existing distribution tax systems, there will be no top-up tax liability if earnings are distributed within four years and taxed at or above the minimum level.
iii) The minimum tax rate for purposes of the IIR and UTPR will be 15%.
iv) The substance-based carve-out is modified from the July Statement, with a transition period of ten years. (Detailed guidelines are provided for the same.)
v) A de minimis exclusion is provided for those jurisdictions where the MNE has revenues of less than €10 million and profits of less than €1 million.
vi) The nominal tax rate used for the application of the STTR will be 9%.
vii) Pillar Two will apply a minimum rate on a jurisdictional basis. Consideration will be given to the conditions under which the United States Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) regime will co-exist with the GloBE rules, to ensure a level playing field.
viii) The October Statement reiterates that Pillar Two generally should be brought into law in 2022, to be effective in 2023. However, the entry into effect of the UTPR has been deferred to 2024.

4. LIKELY IMPACT OF TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION
Under Pillar One, taxing rights on more than USD 125 billion of profit are expected to be reallocated to market jurisdictions each year. With respect to Pillar Two, with a minimum rate of 15%, the global minimum tax is estimated to generate around USD 150 billion in additional global tax revenues per year. The precise revenue impact will depend on the extent of the implementation of Pillar One and Pillar Two, the nature and scale of reactions by MNEs and Governments and future economic developments.

In terms of the investment impact, the Two-Pillar Solution is expected to provide a favourable environment for investment and growth. The absence of an agreement may have led to a proliferation of uncoordinated and unilateral tax measures (e.g., Digital Services Taxes and Equalisation Levy) and an increase in tax and trade disputes which would have undermined tax certainty and investment and resulted in additional compliance and administration burdens. It is estimated that these disputes could reduce global GDP by more than 1%.

5. FURTHER COURSE OF ACTION
Model rules to implement Pillar Two will be developed in 2021 with an MLC to implement Pillar One finalised by February, 2022. Inclusive Framework members have set an ambitious deadline of 2023 to bring the new international tax rules into effect.

6. IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION
6.1 Impact of the Two-Pillar Solution on tax payments by MNEs
Each Pillar addresses a different gap in the existing rules that allows MNEs to avoid paying taxes. First, Pillar One applies to about 100 of the biggest and most profitable MNEs and reallocates part of their profit to the countries where they sell their products and provide their services, where their consumers are located. Without this rule, these companies can earn significant profits in a market jurisdiction without paying much tax there.

Under Pillar Two, a much larger group of MNEs (any company with over €750 million of annual revenue) would now be subject to a global minimum corporate tax of 15%.

6.2 Coverage of MNEs in Two-Pillar Solution
The BEPS Project aims to ensure that all taxpayers pay their fair share of tax. While it is true that the reallocation of profit under Pillar One would apply to only about 100 companies now, these are the largest and most profitable ones.

There is also a provision to expand the scope after seven years once there is experience with implementation. Pillar One also includes a commitment to develop simplified, streamlined approaches to the application of transfer pricing rules to certain arrangements, with particular focus on the needs of low-capacity countries which are very often the subject of tax disputes.

The objective of Pillar Two is to ensure that a much broader range of MNEs (those with a turnover of at least €750 million, which will be several companies) pay a minimum level of tax, while preserving the ability of all companies to innovate and be competitive.

For other smaller companies, the existing rules continue to apply and the Inclusive Framework has a number of other international tax standards like the BEPS actions to reduce the risks of tax avoidance and ensure that they pay their fair share.

6.3 Developing Countries – Beneficial Impact
Developing countries make up a large part of the Inclusive Framework’s membership and their voices have been active and effective throughout the negotiations. The OECD estimates that on average, low-, middle- and high-income countries would all experience revenue gains as a result of Pillar One, but these gains would be expected to be larger (as a share of current corporate income tax revenues) among low-income jurisdictions. Overall, the GloBE rules will relieve pressure on developing countries to provide excessively generous tax incentives to attract foreign investment; at the same time, there will be carve-outs for activities with real substance. Specific benefits aimed at developing countries include:

i) Protecting their tax base by implementing the Subject to Tax Rule in their bilateral tax treaties ensuring minimum overall 9% tax on income from interest and royalties to MNEs (refer para 3.9 for further details).
ii) The simplified and streamlined approach to the application of the arm’s length principle to in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities, as low-capacity countries often struggle to administer transfer-pricing rules and will benefit from a formulaic approach in those cases.
iii) A lower threshold for determining the reallocation of profit under Pillar One to smaller economies.

The Two-Pillar Solution acknowledges the calls from developing countries for more mechanical, predictable rules and generally provides a redistribution of taxing rights to market jurisdictions based on where sales and users are located, often in developing countries. It also provides for a global minimum tax which will help put an end to tax havens and lessen the incentive for MNEs to shift profits out of developing countries. Developing countries can still offer effective incentives that attract genuine, substantive foreign direct investments. Importantly, this multilaterally agreed solution avoids the risk of retaliatory trade sanctions that could result from unilateral approaches such as digital services taxes.

6.4 Impact on profit-shifting by MNEs via tax havens, etc.
Harmful tax competition and aggressive tax planning have done great harm to the world economy. Tax havens have thrived over the years by offering secrecy (like bank secrecy) and shell companies (where the company doesn’t need to have any employees or activity in the jurisdiction) and no or low tax on profits booked there. The work of the G20 and the OECD-hosted Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes has ended bank secrecy (including leading to the automatic exchange of bank information), and the OECD BEPS Project requires companies to have a minimum level of substance to put an end to shell companies along with important transparency rules so that tax administrations can apply their tax rules effectively. Pillar Two will now ensure that those companies pay a minimum effective tax rate of 15% on their profits booked there (subject to carve-outs for real, substantial activities). Many countries including the UAE have introduced Economic Substance Regulations and related reporting each year to avoid shell companies.

6.5 Exclusions for certain business activities
There are four exclusions from the Two-Pillar solutions; these are, mining companies, regulated financial services, shipping companies and pension funds. The OECD Document clarifies that the exclusions that are provided for ‘relate to types of profit and activities that are not part of this problem either because the profit is already tied to the place where it is earned (for example, regulated financial services and mining companies will have to have their operations in the place where they earn their income), or the activity benefits from different taxation regimes due to their specific nature (such as shipping companies and pension funds).’ In any case, these types of businesses are still subject to all the other international tax standards on transparency and BEPS to ensure that tax authorities can tax them effectively.

7. IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINES
A detailed Implementation Plan has also been agreed upon. It contains ambitious deadlines to complete work on the rules and instruments to bring the Two-Pillar Solution into effect by 2023.

PROPOSED TIMELINES
A. Pillar One
a) Early 2022 – Text of a Multilateral Convention and Explanatory Statement to implement Amount A of Pillar One;
b) Early 2022 – Model rules for domestic legislation necessary for the implementation of Pillar One;
c) Mid-2022 – High-level signing ceremony for the Multilateral Convention;
d) End 2022 – Finalisation of work on Amount B for Pillar One;
e) 2023 – Implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution.

B. Pillar Two
a) November, 2021 – Model rules to define scope and mechanics for the GloBE rules;
b) November, 2021 – Model treaty provision to give effect to the subject to tax rule;
c) Mid-2022 – Multilateral Instrument for implementation of the STTR in relevant bilateral treaties;
d) End 2022 – Implementation framework to facilitate coordinated implementation of the GloBE rules;
e) 2023 – Implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution.

The detailed Implementation Plan provides for a clear and ambitious timeline to ensure effective implementation from 2023 onwards. On Pillar One, model rules for domestic legislation will be developed by early 2022 and the new taxing right in respect of re-allocated profit (Amount A) will be implemented through a multilateral convention with a view to allowing it to come into effect in 2023. India and many other countries may see changes in their domestic tax laws to include provisions of Pillar One. Similarly, one may see the end of unilateral measures such as the Equalisation Levy once the agreement is finalised, as stated by our Finance Minister recently. Meanwhile, work will be developed on Amount B and the in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities in scope, by the end of 2022. As for Pillar Two, model rules to give effect to the minimum corporate tax will be developed by November, 2021, as well as the model treaty provision to implement the subject to tax rule. A multilateral instrument will then be released by mid-2022 to facilitate the implementation of this rule in bilateral treaties.

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The October Statement marks an important milestone in the BEPS 2.0 project on fundamental changes to the global tax rules, with all OECD and G20 countries (including the European Union) now supporting the agreement on key parameters. However, more work will be required to reach agreement on some key design elements of the two Pillars. In addition, there is significant work to be done to fill in the substantive and technical details in the development of the planned model rules, treaty provisions and explanatory material. That work will need to be completed quickly in order to meet the timelines reflected in the implementation plan. It should be noted that while the October Statement provides that the work will continue to progress in consultation with stakeholders, the implementation plan provides limited time to policymakers to engage with businesses and other stakeholders.

It is said that technology has made our life simple in many respects but extremely complicated when it comes to determination of source rules for taxation. The Two-Pillar Solution is anything but a simplified, zero-defect multi-prong solution. The OECD Document admits that even the minimum corporate tax rate of 15% is a compromise, as a majority of jurisdictions have a higher corporate tax rate. But then it is said that we all live in an imperfect world, striving towards perfection which is nothing but a mirage.

Acknowledgement: The authors have relied upon various OECD publications and statements, etc., in July and October 2021 for this write-up.)

 

Vivad Se Vishwas – Pending appeal – Application for condonation of delay pending before CIT(A) – Notice of hearing issued – Application under VSV rejected by Pr. CIT on the ground that appeal was not admitted – Held not justified

4 Stride Multitrade Pvt. Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT Circle – 13(2)(2) [Writ Petition (L) No. 12932 of 2021; Date of order: 21st September, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Vivad Se Vishwas – Pending appeal – Application for condonation of delay pending before CIT(A) – Notice of hearing issued – Application under VSV rejected by Pr. CIT on the ground that appeal was not admitted – Held not justified

The petitioner challenged the order of rejection passed by the Pr. CIT under the provisions of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 (‘VSV’ Act).

The petitioner had filed its original return of income tax for A.Y. 2017-18 on 30th October, 2017 declaring total income at loss of Rs. 23,92,61,385. The case was selected for scrutiny and respondent No. 1 passed an assessment order dated 19th December, 2019 u/s 144. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed an appeal before respondent No. 3 u/s 246A on 6th February, 2020. The time limit for filing the appeal u/s 246A expired on 18th January, 2020 but the appeal was filed on 6th February, 2020 along with an application for condonation of delay. The delay was of 19 days. On 24th January, 2020 the petitioner had paid the filing fees for the appeal.

On 20th January, 2021, the petitioner received a communication from the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre, inquiring with it whether it would wish to opt for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2020, or would like to contest the appeal. The petitioner was told to furnish the ground-wise written submission in support of the grounds of appeal along with supporting documents and evidences if it was not opting for the VSV Scheme, 2020.

The Court observed that since this communication has come from the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is asking the petitioner to furnish a ground-wise written submission on the grounds of appeal, it would mean that the condonation of delay application had been allowed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Therefore, for respondent No. 2 to say that there is no order condoning the delay and, hence, the application / declaration of the petitioner under the VSV Act is rejected, is incorrect.

Moreover, section 2(1)(a)(i) of the VSV Act provides for a person in whose case an appeal or a writ petition or special leave petition has been filed either by himself or by the Income Tax Authority, or by both, before an appellate forum and such appeal or petition is pending as on the specified date, is entitled to make a declaration under the Act. The petitioner has admittedly made its declaration in Form 1 on 21st January, 2021, i.e., within the prescribed period.

The Central Board of Direct Taxes issued a Circular dated 4th December, 2020 in which question 59 and the answer thereto reads as under:

‘Q.59. Whether the taxpayer in whose case the time limit for filing of appeal has expired before 31st January, 2020 but an application for condonation of delay has been filed is eligible?

Answer: If the time limit for filing appeal expired during the period from 1st April, 2019 to 31st January, 2020 (both dates included in the period), and the application for condonation is filed before the date of issue of this Circular, and appeal is admitted by the appellate authority before the date of filing of the declaration, such appeal will be deemed to be pending as on 31st January, 2020.’

Therefore, where the time limit for filing of appeal has expired before 31st January, 2020 but an appeal with an application for condonation is filed before the date of the Circular, i.e., 4th December, 2020, such appeal will be deemed to be pending as on 31st January, 2020. In the answer to question 59 the expression used is ‘an appeal is admitted by the appellate authority before the date of filing of the declaration’. This has been dealt with by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Sethi vs. Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-10 and Ors. in Writ Petition (C) 2291/2021 and CM APPL. 6677/2021 dated 3rd March, 2021 wherein it is held that an appeal would be ‘pending’ in the context of section 2(1)(a) of the VSV Act when it is first filed till its disposal and the Act does not stipulate that the appeal should be admitted before the specified date, it only adverts to its pendency. The Court opined that the respondent could not have wrongly equated admission of the appeal with pendency. The Court, therefore, held that the appeal would be pending as soon as it is filed and until such time that it is adjudicated upon and a decision is taken qua the same. The Court agreed with the view expressed by the Division Bench in Shyam Sunder Sethi (Supra).

The Court held that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) himself has addressed a letter dated 20th January, 2021 asking the petitioner to furnish ground-wise submissions on the grounds of appeal if he was not opting for the VSV Scheme, 2020. This itself would also mean that the delay has been condoned. The order of rejection dated 26th February, 2021 is bad in law and is accordingly set aside. The respondent is directed to process the forms filed by the petitioner under the provisions of the VSV Act.

Reopening of assessment – Beyond four years – Precondition – Failure on part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary – No power to review

3 Ananta Landmark Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT Central Circle 5(3)
[Writ Petition No. 2814 of 2019; Date of order: 14th September, 2021 (Bombay High Court)]

Reopening of assessment – Beyond four years – Precondition – Failure on part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary – No power to review

The petitioner had filed its return for A.Y. 2012-13 u/s 139 along with its audited profit and loss account, balance sheet and auditor’s report. It received a notice u/s 143(2) and also u/s 142(1) calling upon it to furnish the documents mentioned as per the annexure to the notice. There were four relevant items mentioned in the annexure… By its letter dated 14th August, 2014, the petitioner submitted all the documents asked for and also clarified that the tax audit report in Form 3CD for the A.Y. 2012-13 was not applicable.

Thereafter, the petitioner received another notice calling upon it to provide certain details, one of which was ‘details of interest expenses claimed u/s 57’. These details were provided vide a letter dated 3rd December, 2014. A personal hearing was granted at which even further details were sought. The petitioner provided even more documents and details by its letter of 17th December, 2014.

After considering all the details supplied, an assessment order dated 20th February, 2015 was passed accepting the petitioner’s explanations and computation of income. But more than four years after this assessment order, the petitioner received yet another notice dated 26th March, 2019 u/s 148 stating as under:

‘I have reasons to believe that your income chargeable to tax for the A.Y. 2012-13 has escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961’.

In response, the petitioner, without prejudice to its rights and contentions, sought the reasons for this belief. The respondent by its letter dated 28th May, 2019 provided the reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment. In short, the issue raised in the reopening was in regard to deduction claimed u/s 57.

The petitioner responded by its letter dated 19th June, 2019 filing its objections to the reopening of the assessment. According to it, there was no failure to truly and fully disclose material facts and, in any case, it was a mere change of opinion and there was no fresh tangible material for initiating reassessment proceedings. Respondent No. 1 then passed an order dated 30th September, 2019 with reference to the objections raised by the petitioner to the issuance of notice u/s 148.

It was stated by the Department that subsequent to the assessment proceedings it was noticed that the assessee had wrongly claimed deduction u/s 57. Accordingly, the A.O. found reasons to decide on reopening the assessment. This issue had gone unnoticed by the A.O. during the course of the original assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2012-13 and therefore the jurisdictional requirement u/s 147 was fulfilled and reopening u/s 147 cannot be challenged. Further, the A.O. has not had any discussion in respect of the points on which assessment has been reopened, thus it can be hardly stated that the A.O. had formed an opinion on such points during the original assessment proceedings.

The High Court held that the A.O. had no jurisdiction to issue the notice u/s 148. It further observed as follows:

A) It is settled law that where the assessment is sought to be reopened after the expiry of a period of four years from the end of the relevant year, the proviso to section 147 stipulates a requirement that there must be a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all necessary material facts. Since in the present case the assessment is sought to be reopened after a period of four years, the proviso to section 147 is applicable.

B) It is also settled law that the A.O. has no power to review an assessment which has been concluded. If a period of four years has lapsed from the end of the relevant year, the A.O. has to mention what is the tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment and that there has been a failure to fully and truly disclose material facts.

C) After a period of four years even if the A.O. has some tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is an escapement of income from assessment, he cannot exercise the power to reopen unless he discloses what was the material fact which was not truly and fully disclosed by the assessee. Considering the reasons for reopening, the Court noticed that except stating that a sum of Rs. 7,66,66,663 which was chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary, there is nothing else in the reasons. The Court held that a general statement that the escapement of income is by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment is not enough. The A.O. should indicate what is the material fact that was not truly and fully disclosed to him. In the affidavit in reply, it is stated that the reassessment proceedings was based on audit objections.

D) The Court held that the reason for reopening an assessment should be that of the A.O. alone and he cannot act merely on the dictates of any another person in issuing the notice. The Court said that in every case the Income Tax Officer must determine for himself what is the effect and consequence of the law mentioned in the audit note and whether in consequence of the law which has come to his notice he can reasonably believe that income has escaped assessment. The basis of his belief must be the law of which he has now become aware. The opinion rendered by the audit party in regard to the law cannot, for the purpose of such belief, add to or colour the significance of such law. Therefore, the true evaluation of the law in its bearing on the assessment must be made directly and solely by the Income Tax Officer.

E) In the present case, the reasons which have been recorded by the A.O. for reopening of the assessment do not state that the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. The reasons for reopening an assessment have to be tested / examined only on the basis of the reasons recorded at the time of issuing a notice u/s 148 seeking to reopen an assessment. These reasons cannot be improved upon and / or supplemented, much less substituted by affidavit and / or oral submissions.

F) As regards the ground that the A.O. had not held any discussion in respect of those points on which assessment was reopened and hence he had not formed any opinion and thus the window of reopening of assessment would remain open for the A.O. on those points, these were not the grounds in the reasons for reopening. The entire case of the respondent while issuing the reason for reopening was ‘failure to disclose truly and fully material facts’.

G) As regards the ground that the disclosure of material facts with respect to the setting off of the interest expenses u/s 57 might be full but it cannot be considered as true, and hence it is failure on the part of the assessee, the mere production of books of accounts or other documents are not enough in view of Explanation 1 to section 147, etc., the words used are ‘omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year’. It postulates a duty on every assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. What facts are material, and necessary for assessment, will differ from case to case. In every assessment proceeding, the assessing authority will, for the purpose of computing or determining the proper tax due from an assessee, require to know all the facts which help him in coming to the correct conclusion. From the primary facts in his possession, whether on disclosure by the assessee or discovered by him on the basis of the facts disclosed, or otherwise, the assessing authority has to draw inferences as regards certain other facts; and ultimately, from the primary facts and the further facts inferred from them, the authority has to draw the proper legal inferences and ascertain the proper tax leviable on a correct interpretation of the taxing enactment..

Thus, when a question arises whether certain income received by an assessee is capital receipt or revenue receipt, the assessing authority has to find out what primary facts have been proved, what other facts can be inferred from them, and taking all these together to decide what should be the legal inference. There can be no doubt that the duty of disclosing all the primary facts relevant to the decision of the question before the assessing authority lies on the assessee.

H) Whether it is a disclosure or not within the meaning of section 147 would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature of the document and circumstances in which it is produced. The duty of the assessee is to fully and truly disclose all primary facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. It is not part of his duty to point out what legal inference should be drawn from the facts disclosed. It is for the Income Tax Officer to draw a proper reference. In the case at hand, the petitioner had filed its annual return along with computation of taxable income along with MAT (minimum alternate tax) calculation as per provisions of section 115JB, audited annual financials including auditor’s report, balance sheet, profit and loss account and notes to accounts, annual tax statement in Form 26AS u/s 203AA in response to the notices received u/s 142(1) and 143(2). The petitioner also explained how the borrowing costs that are attributable to the acquisition or construction of assets have been provided for, what are the short-term borrowings and from whom have they been received. It also gave details of interest expenses claimed u/s 57 in response to the further notice of 10th October, 2014 u/s 142 (1), attended personal hearings and explained and gave further details as called for in the personal hearing vide its letter dated 17th December, 2014 – and after considering all this, the assessment order dated 20th February, 2015 was passed accepting the return of income filed by the assessee.

The A.O. had in his possession all primary facts and it was for him to make necessary inquiries and draw a proper inference as to whether from the interest paid of Rs. 75,79,35,292 an amount of Rs. 7,66,66,663 has to be allowed as deduction u/s 57 or the entire interest expenses of Rs. 75,79,35,292 should have been capitalised to the work in progress against claiming just Rs. 7,66,66,663 as deduction u/s 57.

The A.O. had had all the material facts before him when he made the original assessment. When the primary facts necessary for assessment are fully and truly disclosed, he is not entitled to change of opinion to commence proceedings for reassessment. Even if the A.O. who passed the assessment order may have raised too many legal inferences from the facts disclosed, on that account the A.O. who has decided to reopen the assessment is not competent to reopen assessment proceedings. Where on consideration of the material on record one view is conclusively taken by the A.O., it would not be open to him to reopen the assessment based on the very same material in order to take another view. As noted earlier, the petitioner has filed the annual returns with the required documents as provided for u/s 139. There was nothing more to disclose and a person cannot be said to have omitted or failed to disclose something when he had no knowledge of such a thing. One cannot be expected to disclose a thing or said to have failed to disclose it, unless it is a matter which he knows or knows about. In this case, except for a general statement in the reasons for reopening, the A.O. has not disclosed what was the material fact that the petitioner had failed to disclose.

The Court observed that the petitioner had truly and fully disclosed all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. Not only material facts were disclosed truly and fully, but they were carefully scrutinised and figures of income as well as deduction were reworked carefully by the A.O. In the reasons for reopening, the A.O. has, in fact, relied on the audited accounts to say that the claim of deduction u/s 57 was not correct, and the figures mentioned in the reason for reopening of assessment are also found in the audited accounts of the petitioner. In the reasons for reopening, there is not even a whisper as to what was not disclosed. In the order rejecting the objections, the A.O. admits that all details were fully disclosed. Thus, this is not a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened on the reasonable belief that income had escaped assessment on account of failure of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts that were necessary for computation of income, but this is a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened on account of change of opinion of the A.O. about the manner of computation of the deduction u/s 57.

Consequently, the petition is allowed. The notice dated 26th March, 2019 issued by respondent No. 1 u/s 148 seeking to reopen the assessment for the A.Y. 2012-13 and the order dated 30th September, 2019 are quashed and set aside.

Refund – Withholding of refund – Condition precedent – A.O. must apply his mind before withholding refund – Reasons for withholding must be recorded in writing and approval of Commissioner or Principal Commissioner obtained – Discretion to withhold refund must be exercised in judicious manner – Withholding of refund without recording reasons – Not sustainable

16 Mcnally Bharat Engineering Company Ltd. vs. CIT [2021] 437 ITR 265 (Cal) A.Y.: 2017-18; Date of order: 6th August, 2021 Ss. 143(1), 241A and 244A of ITA, 1961

Refund – Withholding of refund – Condition precedent – A.O. must apply his mind before withholding refund – Reasons for withholding must be recorded in writing and approval of Commissioner or Principal Commissioner obtained – Discretion to withhold refund must be exercised in judicious manner – Withholding of refund without recording reasons – Not sustainable

For the A.Y. 2017-18, the assessee declared loss in its return of income and claimed refund of the entire tax deducted at source. The assessee received a notice u/s 143(2) and an intimation u/s 143(1) regarding the refund payable thereunder with interest for the A.Y. 2017-18 u/s 244A. Subsequently, the refund was withheld u/s 241A by the A.O. without assigning any reasons.

The Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) The very essence of passing of the order u/s 241A was application of mind by the A.O. to the issues which were germane for withholding the refund on the basis of statutory prescription contained in section 241A. The power of the A.O. under the provisions of section 241A could be exercised only after he had formed an opinion that the refund was likely to adversely affect the Revenue and with the prior approval of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as an order for refund after the assessment u/s 143(3) pursuant to a notice u/s 143(2) was subject to appeal or further proceedings.

ii) Having not done so, the officer had acted arbitrarily. At the point of time when the refund was notified, there was no other demand pending against the assesse either for a prior or a subsequent period. The procedure followed by the A.O. did not also show proper application of two independent provisions as in section 241A and section 143 wherein once a refund was declared after scrutiny proceedings and such refund was withheld, a reasoned order had to follow because the assessment in such a case was done after production of materials and evidence required by the A.O. No reasons were assigned by him by referring to any materials that the refund declared would adversely affect the Revenue.

iii) That apart, the assessee was a public limited company whose accounts were stringently scrutinised at the internal level. It was, therefore, more important to apply the provisions more cautiously while withholding the refund after it had been declared on completion of assessment on scrutiny. The assessee became entitled to the refund immediately on the completion of the assessment and the refund having been notified. The A.O. could not have withheld the refund to link such refund with any demand against the assessee for a subsequent period when such demand was not in existence on the date when the refund was notified.

iv) The competent officer being authorised under the statute to withhold the refund if he had reasons to believe that it would adversely affect the Revenue, could or could have withheld the refund after the refund had been declared only after assigning reasons and not otherwise. The A.O. had withheld the refund without assigning any reason though the statute mandated the recording of reasons. Having not done so, the A.O. had acted arbitrarily. The withholding of the refund for the A.Y. 2017-18 was not sustainable and therefore was set aside and quashed. The assessee was entitled to refund with interest till the actual date of refund.’

Penalty – Penalty u/s 271AAB in search cases – Income-tax survey – Survey of assessee firm pursuant to search and seizure of another group – No assessment u/s 153A – Where search u/s 132 has not been conducted penalty cannot be levied u/s 271AAB

15 Principal CIT vs. Silemankhan and Mahaboobkhan [2021] 437 ITR 260 (AP) A.Y.: 2016-17; Date of order: 12th July, 2021 Ss. 132, 133A, 153C, 271AAB and 260A of ITA, 1961

Penalty – Penalty u/s 271AAB in search cases – Income-tax survey – Survey of assessee firm pursuant to search and seizure of another group – No assessment u/s 153A – Where search u/s 132 has not been conducted penalty cannot be levied u/s 271AAB

In the course of a search conducted u/s 132A against an entity, the statements of its partners were recorded u/s 132(4). Pursuant thereto, a survey u/s 133A was conducted in the assessee firm and a notice was issued u/s 153C, whereupon the assessee filed a return admitting additional income. The Tribunal, referring to the proposition of law that no penalty u/s 271AAB could be imposed when search u/s 132 was not conducted against the assessee and the consistent view taken by the Tribunal, held that the imposition of penalty u/s 271AAB was illegal.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) When the return of income is filed in response to a notice u/s 153C by an assessee in whose case search has not been conducted u/s 132, penalty u/s 271AAB cannot be imposed. Penalty under the provision can be imposed only when a search has been initiated against the assessee.

ii) No penalty u/s 271AAB could be imposed when admittedly a search u/s 132 had not been conducted in the assessee’s premises. The notice issued u/s 153C was incidental to the search proceedings of the searched party and could not be a foundation to impose penalty against the assessee u/s 271AAB. The legal position was based on the clear and unequivocal meaning transpiring from the words used in the section and cannot yield to any other interpretation. The view had been consistently followed by the Tribunal and was binding on the Department in such cases. No contrary view either of any High Court or the Supreme Court had been placed.

iii) In the light of the settled proposition of law, the provisions of section 271AAB could not be invoked to impose penalty on the assessee on whom search was not conducted. There was no perversity or illegality in the finding of the Tribunal. No question of law arose.’

Housing project – Special deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Open terrace of building not to be included for computation of built-up area – Time limit for completion of project – Date of approval of building plan and not date of lay-out – Completion certificate issued by local panchayat would satisfy requirement of section – Assessee entitled to deduction

14 CIT vs. Shanmugham Muthu Palaniappan [2021] 437 ITR 276 (Mad) A.Y.: 2010-11; Date of order: 15th June, 2021 S. 80-IB(10) of ITA, 1961

Housing project – Special deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Open terrace of building not to be included for computation of built-up area – Time limit for completion of project – Date of approval of building plan and not date of lay-out – Completion certificate issued by local panchayat would satisfy requirement of section – Assessee entitled to deduction

The assessee developed housing projects and claimed deduction u/s 80-IB(10) for the A.Y. 2010-11. The Tribunal held that (a) the open terrace area of the building should not be included while computing the built-up area for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s 80-IB(10), (b) the time limit for completion of the eligible project should not be computed from the date on which the lay-out was approved for the first time but only from the date on which the building plan approval was obtained for the last time, and (c) the completion certificate issued by the local panchayat would satisfy the requirements of the section instead of the completion certificate issued by Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority which had originally approved the plan.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘The Tribunal was right in holding that, (i) the open terrace area should not be included while computing the built-up area for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s 80-IB(10), (ii) the time limit for completion of the eligible project should not be computed from the date on which the lay-out was approved for the first time, but only from the date on which the building plan approval was obtained for the last time, and (iii) the completion certificate issued by the local panchayat would satisfy the requirements of the section instead of the completion certificate issued by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority which had originally approved the plan.’

EQUIPMENT INSTALLED AT CUSTOMER PREMISES – WHETHER LEASE OR NOT?

To determine whether a contractual arrangement contains a lease under Ind AS 116 Leases, can be very tricky and complex. This is particularly true for equipment installed at the customer’s premises such as a solar panel or a set-top box. This article includes an example of a set-top box to explain the concept in a simple and lucid manner.

The provisions in Ind AS 116 Leases relevant to analysing whether an arrangement contains a lease are given below:

9 At inception of a contract, an entity shall assess whether the contract is, or contains, a lease. A contract is, or contains, a lease if the contract conveys the right to control the use of an identified asset for a period of time in exchange for consideration.

B9 To assess whether a contract conveys the right to control the use of an identified asset for a period of time, an entity shall assess whether, throughout the period of use, the customer has both of the following:
(a) the right to obtain substantially all of the economic benefits from use of the identified asset; and
(b) the right to direct the use of the identified asset.

B14 Even if an asset is specified, a customer does not have the right to use an identified asset if the supplier has the substantive right to substitute the asset throughout the period of use. A supplier’s right to substitute an asset is substantive only if both of the following conditions exist:
(a) the supplier has the practical ability to substitute alternative assets throughout the period of use (for example, the customer cannot prevent the supplier from substituting the asset and alternative assets are readily available to the supplier or could be sourced by the supplier within a reasonable period of time); and
(b) the supplier would benefit economically from the exercise of its right to substitute the asset (i.e., the economic benefits associated with substituting the asset are expected to exceed the costs associated with substituting the asset).

B17 If the asset is located at the customer’s premises or elsewhere, the costs associated with substitution are generally higher than when located at the supplier’s premises and, therefore, are more likely to exceed the benefits associated with substituting the asset.

B24 A customer has the right to direct the use of an identified asset throughout the period of use only if either:
a. the customer has the right to direct how and for what purpose the asset is used throughout the period of use; or
b. the relevant decisions about how and for what purpose the asset is used are predetermined and:

i. the customer has the right to operate the asset (or to direct others to operate the asset in a manner that it determines) throughout the period of use, without the supplier having the right to change those operating instructions; or
ii. the customer designed the asset (or specific aspects of the asset) in a way that predetermines how and for what purpose the asset will be used throughout the period of use.

B25 A customer has the right to direct how and for what purpose the asset is used if, within the scope of its right of use defined in the contract, it can change how and for what purpose the asset is used throughout the period of use. In making this assessment, an entity considers the decision-making rights that are most relevant to changing how and for what purpose the asset is used throughout the period of use. Decision-making rights are relevant when they affect the economic benefits to be derived from use. The decision-making rights that are most relevant are likely to be different for different contracts, depending on the nature of the asset and the terms and conditions of the contract.

B26 Examples of decision-making rights that, depending on the circumstances, grant the right to change how and for what purpose the asset is used, within the defined scope of the customer’s right of use, include:
a. rights to change the type of output that is produced by the asset (for example, to decide whether to use a shipping container to transport goods or for storage, or to decide upon the mix of products sold from retail space);
b. rights to change when the output is produced (for example, to decide when an item of machinery or a power plant will be used);
c. rights to change where the output is produced (for example, to decide upon the destination of a truck or a ship, or to decide where an item of equipment is used); and
d. rights to change whether the output is produced, and the quantity of that output (for example, to decide whether to produce energy from a power plant and how much energy to produce from that power plant).

B 30 A contract may include terms and conditions designed to protect the supplier’s interest in the asset or other assets, to protect its personnel, or to ensure the supplier’s compliance with laws or regulations. These are examples of protective rights. For example, a contract may (i) specify the maximum amount of use of an asset or limit where or when the customer can use the asset, (ii) require a customer to follow particular operating practices, or (iii) require a customer to inform the supplier of changes in how an asset will be used. Protective rights typically define the scope of the customer’s right of use but do not, in isolation, prevent the customer from having the right to direct the use of an asset.

EXAMPLE – SET-TOP BOX
In the telecom industry, assets such as mobile phones and set-top boxes would generally be considered as low value and therefore the telecom entities can avail the recognition exemption under Ind AS 116. This example is used to merely illustrate the concept of ‘how and for what purpose’ with regard to equipment installed at customer premises. Additionally, it is also relevant to entities where it is determined that the assets are not low in value, for example, a solar panel or where the entity chooses not to avail the low value exemption.

FACT PATTERN
Telco, a well-integrated internet, telephony and content services provider, installs a set-top box to be placed in the customer’s premises. Telco offers two kinds of set-top boxes which in turn are dependent on the services required by the customer:
(a) The set-top box has no use to the customer other than to receive the requested television, internet, or telephony services. Telco has pre-programmed the set-top box to deliver the specified services and controls what content or internet speed is delivered. The set-top box has no additional functionality and the customer cannot use it to receive any other services from any other service provider.
(b) Other set-top boxes have multiple features. The most sophisticated ones offer a wide range of functionality, including the ability to record and replay, reminders for programmes or to access content and services provided by third parties.

The asset is an identified asset as per paragraph 9 of Ind AS 116. The customer obtains substantially all of the economic benefits from the use of the set-top box as per paragraph B9 of Ind AS 116. Assume that either the set-top is not low value, or the customer does not avail the low value exemption. In such a case, whether the arrangement above contains a lease as defined under Ind AS 116?

ANALYSIS
Firstly, the asset is an identified asset in accordance with Ind AS 116.9. Secondly, the supplier does not have a substantial substitution right in accordance with paragraph B14 and B17, because it would not be economically beneficial for the supplier to replace the equipment located in the premises of the customer. Lastly, the customer obtains substantially all of the economic benefits from the use of the set-top box as per paragraph B9.

We now proceed to consider whether or not the customer directs how and for what purpose the equipment is used.

Whether or not the customer directs how and for what purpose the equipment is used in accordance with Ind AS 116.B24(a) depends on its functionality. For simple set-top boxes, with no functionality for the customer other than to receive the requested services, it can be argued that the customer does not direct how and for what purpose they are used. The customer has no more control over the set-top box than he would over similar equipment located elsewhere, including at the operator’s premises. Can it be argued that the customer has the right to direct the use of the equipment because its use is predetermined, and the customer has a right to operate the asset, because the customer can switch it on or off and can choose which programmes to watch [see Ind AS 116.B24(b)]? The author believes that merely being able to switch on or switch off the set-top box does not mean that the customer is operating the identified asset. Therefore, he believes that there is no lease in the extant case.

The more functionality the set-top box has for the customer, the more likely it is that the customer has the right to direct its use, and therefore the arrangement contains a lease. However, there is no ‘bright-line’ test and judgement will need to be applied in determining the point at which the customer is considered to direct how and for what purpose the equipment is used, and therefore whether the arrangement contains a lease.

CONCLUSION
The author believes that the arrangements involving set-top boxes with limited functionality will not constitute a lease. On the other hand, an arrangement where the underlying asset is a set-top box with multiple functionalities may constitute a lease. Each entity will need to apply judgement to make that determination.

ALLOWABILITY OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT FEES IN COMPUTING CAPITAL GAINS

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Many investors in the stock market, especially high net-worth individuals or investors who have no investing experience, use the services of portfolio managers to manage their share and / or debt portfolios. Such services of expert portfolio managers are used to maximise the returns on investments. The portfolio managers charge the investors an annual fee for their services. Such fee is normally charged as a percentage of the value of the portfolio and may also include a fee linked to the performance of the portfolio. For instance, if the likely returns at the end of the year exceed a particular threshold percentage, the portfolio manager may get a percentage of the excess return over the threshold rate of return by way of a fee. Often, particularly for high net-worth individuals, such fees may constitute a substantial amount. Such fees include STT, stamp duty and other charges and are apart from the brokerage on purchase and sale of shares.

Investors have sought to claim deduction of such portfolio management fees in the computation of capital gains. There have been several conflicting decisions of the Tribunal on the deductibility of portfolio management fees while computing the capital gains. While the Mumbai Bench has held in several cases that such portfolio management fees are not deductible, the Pune, Delhi and Kolkata Benches, and even some Mumbai Benches of the Tribunal, have held that such fees are an allowable deduction in the computation of capital gains.

DEVENDRA MOTILAL KOTHARI’S CASE
The issue first came up before the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Devendra Motilal Kothari vs. DCIT 132 ITD 173, a case relating to A.Y. 2004-05.

In this case, the assessee declared certain long-term capital gains (LTCG) and short-term capital gains (STCG) after setting off the long-term capital losses and short-term capital losses. In the course of assessment, the A.O. noticed that the assessee had added portfolio management fees of Rs. 85,63,233 to the purchase cost of the shares while computing the capital gains. According to the A.O., the fees paid by the assessee for portfolio management services were not a part of the purchase cost of the shares. He, therefore, asked the assessee to explain why these fees should not be disallowed while computing the capital gains. The assessee submitted that the fees and other charges formed part of the cost of purchase and / or expenditure incurred by him and therefore must be taken into account whilst determining the chargeable capital gain. The assessee claimed that such fees and other expenses incurred by him as an investor, including fees for managing the investments, constituted the cost of purchase and were allowable for the purpose of computing the STCG or LTCG.

The A.O. disallowed the claim of the assessee while computing the STCG and LTCG, holding that these did not form part of the cost of acquisition of the shares.

In the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), it was contended by the assessee that the portfolio management fees constituted the cost of purchase of shares and securities and therefore was allowable as deduction while computing the capital gains. It was also submitted that without payment of these fees, no investments could have been made by the assessee and the question of realisation of capital gains would not have arisen. Alternatively, it was also contended that the portfolio management fees paid could be allocated between the purchase and sale of shares for the purpose of computing capital gains.

The Commissioner (Appeals) requested the assessee to submit a working, allocating the portfolio management fees paid in connection with the purchase and sale of shares, and also in relation to the opening and closing stock of shares during the year under consideration. The assessee submitted that the management fees paid was an allowable expenditure for the purpose of computing capital gains. Alternatively, it was also submitted that these fees could be allocated on the basis of the values of opening stock, long-term purchases, short-term purchases, long-term capital sale, short-term capital sale and closing stock, and based on such allocation, deduction may be allowed while computing LTCG and STCG.

The Commissioner (Appeals) found, on the basis of two portfolio management agreements filed with him, that the quantification of the fees was based on either the market value of the assets or the net value of the assets of the assessee as held by him either at the beginning or at the end of each quarter. He held that the assessee could not explain as to how the fees paid to the portfolio managers on such explicit basis could be considered differently so as to constitute either the cost of acquisition of the assets or expenditure incurred for selling such assets. He noted in this context that nothing was furnished by the assessee to establish any such nexus.

He held that the quarterly payment of fees by the assessee to the portfolio manager had no nexus either with the acquisition of the assets or the transfer of specific assets. He also held that it was just not possible to break up the fees paid by the assessee to the portfolio manager so as to hold that the same was relatable to the expenditure incurred solely for the purchase or transfer of assets. The assessee was paying these fees to the portfolio managers even on the interest accrued to him and the dividend received and it was therefore not acceptable that these fees were exclusively paid for acquiring or selling of shares as claimed by the assessee. The disallowance made by the A.O. of the assessee’s claim for deduction of portfolio management fees while computing the capital gains was therefore confirmed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Before the Tribunal, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that he had entered into an Investment Management Agreement with four concerns for managing his investments and fees was paid to them for these services. These fees were paid for the advice given by the Investment Management Consultants for purchase and sale of particular shares and securities as well as for the advice given by them not to sell particular shares and securities. Thus, it was contended that the expenditure incurred on the payment of these fees was in connection with the acquisition / improvement of assets as well as in connection with the sale of assets. Therefore, the fees were deductible in computing the capital gains arising to the assessee from the sale of assets, i.e., shares and securities, as per the provisions of section 48.

Without prejudice to the contention that the portfolio management fees was deductible u/s 48 in computing capital gains and as an alternative, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that this expenditure was deductible even on the basis of Real Income Theory and the Rule of Diversion of Income by Overriding Title. It was contended that these fees were in the nature of a charge against the consideration received by the assessee on the sale of shares and securities, and therefore were deductible from the sale consideration, being Diversion of Income by Overriding Title.

It was argued on behalf of the Revenue that the relevant provisions in respect of computation of income from capital gains were very specific and the Real Income Theory could not be applied while computing the income from capital gains. It was submitted that portfolio management services were generally not required in the case of investment in shares and that was the reason why there was no provision for allowing deduction for portfolio management fees in the computation of capital gains. It was contended that the income can be taxed in generic terms applying the Real Income Theory, but this theory was not relevant for allowance of any deduction.

The Revenue further argued that the basis on which the portfolio management fees was paid by the assessee was such that there was no relationship with the purchase or sale of shares. Even without making any purchase or sale of shares and securities, the assessee was liable to pay a substantial sum as portfolio management fees.

The Tribunal noted that u/s 48 expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with transfer and the cost of acquisition of the asset and cost of any improvement thereto, were deductible from the full value of the consideration received or accruing to the assessee as a result of transfer of the capital assets. While the assessee had claimed a deduction in computing the capital gains, he had, however, failed to explain as to how the fees could be considered as cost of acquisition of the shares and securities or the cost of any improvement thereto. According to the Tribunal, the assessee had also failed to explain as to how the fees could be treated as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the sale of shares and securities.

On the other hand, the basis on which the fees were paid by the assessee showed that the fees had no direct nexus with the purchase and sale of shares, and the fees was payable by the assessee, going by the basis thereof, even without there being any purchase or sale of shares in a particular period. Also, when the Commissioner (Appeals) required the assessee to allocate the fees in relation to purchase and sale of shares as well as in relation to the shares held as investment on the last date of the previous year, the assessee could not furnish such details nor could he give any definite basis on which such allocation was possible.

The Tribunal concluded, therefore, that the fees paid by the assessee for portfolio management was not inextricably linked with the particular instance of purchase and sale of shares and securities so as to treat the same as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such sale, or the cost of acquisition / improvement of the shares and securities, so as to be eligible for deduction in computing capital gains u/s 48.

Even though the assessee was under an obligation to pay the fees for portfolio management, the mere existence of such an obligation to pay was not enough for the application of the Rule of Diversion of Income by an Overriding Title. The true test for applicability of the said rule was whether such obligation was in the nature of a charge on source, i.e., the profit-earning apparatus itself, and only in such cases where the source of earning income was charged by an overriding title it could be considered as Diversion of Income by an Overriding Title. The Tribunal noted that the profit arising from the sale of shares was received by the assessee directly, which constituted its income at the point when it reached or accrued to the assessee. The fee for portfolio management, on the other hand, was paid separately by the assessee to discharge his contractual liability. In the Tribunal’s view, it was thus a case of an obligation to apply income which had accrued or arisen to the assessee and it amounted to a mere application of income.

The Tribunal further held, following the Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Udayan Chinubhai 222 ITR 456, that the Theory of Real Income could not be applied to allow deduction to the assessee which was otherwise not permissible under the Income-tax Act. What was not permissible in law as deduction under any of the heads could not be allowed as a deduction on the principle of the Real Income Theory.

The Tribunal therefore dismissed the assessee’s appeal, holding that the portfolio management fees was not deductible in computing the capital gains.

This view of the Tribunal was followed in subsequent decisions of the Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the cases of Pradeep Kumar Harlalka vs. ACIT 143 TTJ 446 (Mum), Homi K. Bhabha vs. ITO 48 SOT 102 (Mum), Capt. Avinash Chander Batra vs. DCIT 158 ITD 604 (Mum), ACIT vs. Apurva Mahesh Shah 172 ITD 127 (Mum) and Mateen Pyarali Dholkia vs. DCIT (2018) 171 ITD 294 (Mum).

KRA HOLDING & TRADING (P) LTD.’S CASE
The issue again came up before the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of KRA Holding & Trading (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT 46 SOT 19, in cases pertaining to A.Ys. 2002-03 and 2004-05 to 2006-07.

For A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee paid fees of Rs. 69,22,396 to a portfolio manager, consisting of termination fee of Rs. 59,15,574 and annual maintenance fee of Rs. 10,06,823. The capital gains on the sale of shares were disclosed net of such fees.

The A.O. disallowed such fees on the ground that the payment constituted ‘profit sharing fee’ paid to the portfolio manager and that the same was not authorised by or borne out of any agreement between the assessee and the portfolio manager or the SEBI (Portfolio Managers) Rules & Regulations, 1993.

Before the Commissioner (Appeals), the assessee submitted that the expenditure was incurred in connection with the acquisition of shares. Therefore, the expenditure was required to be capitalised as done by the assessee in the books of accounts. As per the assessee, this expenditure was part of the cost of acquisition of shares as there was a direct and proximate nexus between the fees paid to the portfolio manager and the process of acquisition of the securities and the sale of securities.

Without prejudice, the assessee argued that part of the fee was attributable to the act of selling of securities and, therefore, part of the fees could be said to be expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer. Further, it was argued that the fee was paid wholly and exclusively for acquiring and selling securities during the year under review. Therefore, the fees so paid should be loaded on the shares / securities purchased and sold during the year in the value proportion. In respect of the shares purchased during the year, the fees loaded would be the cost of acquisition and in respect of shares sold during the year the fees loaded would represent expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer.

The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the assessee’s appeal.

It was argued on behalf of the assessee before the Tribunal, that section 48 allowed deduction of any expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with transfer and this expenditure being an outflow to the assessee, should be loaded to the cost of the investments. It was claimed that what was taxable in the hands of the assessee was the actual income that reached the assessee and, therefore, the fees paid to the portfolio manager had to be deducted from the capital gains earned by the assessee.

Reliance was placed on behalf of the assessee on the jurisdictional High Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Smt. Shakuntala Kantilal 190 ITR 56 (Bom) for the proposition that when the genuineness and certainty and necessity of the payments was beyond doubt, and if it was only a case of absence of the enabling provisions in section 48, ‘such type of payments were deductible in two ways, one, by taking full value of consideration, i.e., net of such payments, or deducting the same as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer.’ As per the High Court, the Legislature, while using the expression ‘full value of consideration’, has contemplated both additions as well as deductions from the apparent value. What it means is the real and effective consideration. The effective consideration is that after allowing the deductible expenditure. The expression ‘in connection with such transfer’ was certainly wider than the expression ‘for the transfer’. As per the High Court, any amount, the payment of which is absolutely necessary to effect the transfer, will be an expenditure covered by this clause.

On behalf of the Revenue it was contended that (i) the expenditure in question was directly unconnected with the securities in question and the same cannot be loaded to the cost of the acquisition; (ii) securities is a plural word, whereas the capital gains is calculated considering each capital asset on standalone basis, and for this there is need for identification of the asset-specific expenditure, be it for arriving at the cost of acquisition or for transfer-specific expenditure. Reliance was placed on the Mumbai Tribunal decision in Devendra Motilal Kothari (Supra).

In counter arguments, it was stated on behalf of the assessee that the Tribunal decision was distinguishable on facts. In that case, the assessee claimed the deduction which was calculated based on the global turnover reported by the portfolio manager, and where such turnover also included the dividend income, the basis was unscientific and unspecific, etc. Further, it was pointed out that the assessee in that case failed to discharge the onus of establishing the nexus that the fee paid to the portfolio manager was incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer of the assets; whereas, in the case being considered by the Pune Tribunal, the assessee not only demonstrated the direct nexus of the expenditure to the acquisition and sale / transfer of the securities successfully but also the fee in question was strictly on the NAV of the securities and not on the dividends or other miscellaneous income. It was claimed that the basis was totally and exclusively capital-value-oriented, consistently followed by the assessee and it constituted an acceptable basis. It was argued that when the expenditure of fee paid to the portfolio manager was genuine and an allowable claim, the claim must be allowed under the provisions of section 48.

The Tribunal observed that the scope of section 48 as per the binding judgment of the High Court in Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra) was that the claim of bona fide or genuine expenditure should be allowable in favour of the assessee so long as the incurring of the expenditure was a matter of fact and the necessity of making such a payment was the imminent requirement for the transfer of the asset. According to the Tribunal, it was now binding on its part to take the view that the expression ‘in connection with’ had wider meaning than the expression ‘for the transfer’.

The Tribunal observed that for allowing the claim of deduction in the computation of the capital gains, the expenditure had to be distinctly and intricately linked to the asset and its transfer. The onus was on the assessee to demonstrate the said linkage between the expenditure and the asset’s transfer. It was evident and binding that if the expenditure was undisputedly, necessarily and genuinely spent for the asset’s transfer within the scope of the provisions of section 48, the claim could not be disallowed for want of an express provision in section 48.

The Tribunal noted the following facts:
(i) the assessee made the payment of fee to the portfolio manager and the genuineness of the said payment was undisputed;
(ii) the Revenue authorities had also not disputed the requirement or necessity of the said payments;
(iii) quantitatively speaking, in view of the adverbial expression ‘wholly’ used in section 48(i), the payment of fee @ 5% was only restricted to the NAV of the securities and not the global turnover, including the other income;
(iv) regarding the purpose of payment in view of the adverbial expression, ‘exclusively’ used in section 48(i), the same was intended only for the twin purposes of the acquisition of the securities and for the sale of the same;
(v) the NAV was defined as the ‘net asset value of the securities of the client’ and the assessee calculated the fee linked to the securities’ value only and not including other income, such as interest or dividend, etc.

The Tribunal was of the opinion that:
(i) the expenditure was directly connected to the asset and its transfer;
(ii) it was genuinely incurred as accepted by the Revenue;
(iii) it was a bona fide payment made as per the norms of the ‘arm’s length principle’ since the portfolio manager and the assessee were unrelated;
(iv) the necessity of incurring of expenditure was imminent and it was in the normal course of the investment activity;
(v) the provisions of section 48 had to be read down in view of the ratio in the case of Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra) to accommodate the claim of such expenditure legally.

According to the Tribunal, the expression ‘in connection with such transfer’ enjoyed much wider meaning and, therefore, the fee paid to the portfolio manager had to be construed to have been expended for the purposes of acquisition and transfer of the investment of the securities. The Tribunal was of the view that the expression ‘transfer’ involved various sub-components and the first sub-component must be of purchase and possession of the securities. Unless the assessee was in possession of the asset, he could not transfer the same. Therefore, the expression ‘expenditure’ incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with ‘such transfer’ read with ‘as a result of the transfer of the capital asset’ mentioned in section 48 and 48(i) must necessarily encompass the transfer involved at the stage of acquisition of the securities till the stage of transfer involved in the step of sale of the impugned securities. Such an interpretation of section 48 of the Act was a necessity to avoid the likely absurdity.

The Tribunal therefore held that the expenditure was allowable u/s 48.

The view taken by the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in this case has been followed by the Pune and other Benches of the Tribunal in the cases of DCIT vs. KRA Holding & Trading (P) Ltd. 54 SOT 493 (Pune), Serum International Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [IT Appeal No. 1576/PN/2012 and 1617/PN/2012, dated 18th February, 2015], RDA Holding & Trading (P) Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [IT Appeal No. 2166/PN/2013 dated 29th October, 2014], Hero Motocorp Ltd. vs. DCIT [ITA No. 6282/Del/2015 dated 13th January, 2021], Amrit Diamond Trade Centre Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA No. 2642/Mum/2013 dated 15th January, 2016], Shyam Sunder Duggal HUF vs. ACIT [ITA No. 2998/Mum/2011 dated 22nd February, 2019] and Joy Beauty Care (P) Ltd. vs. DCIT [ITA No. 856/Kol/2017 dated 5th September, 2018].

OBSERVATIONS
A portfolio manager’s services, his fees and many related aspects are governed by the SEBI (Portfolio Managers) Regulations, 2000. Services include taking investment decisions on behalf of the client that can largely be classified into three parts:
a. identifying the scrip and the time and value of purchase,
b. decision as to retention of an investment, and
c. identifying the scrip and the time and price for exit.

The services do not include brokerage. Fees, though composite, are payable for performing the above-listed functions. The Regulations require the portfolio manager to share the manner of charging the fees and, importantly, for each service rendered to the client in the agreement. These fees are annually charged on the basis of the value of the portfolio or any other agreeable basis. In addition, though not always, fees are charged by sharing a part of the profit that accrues to the client.

In the context of section 48 of the Income-tax Act, the part of the fees attributable to the advisory services leading to the purchase should qualify to be included in the cost of acquisition and the other part of the fees attributable to the advisory services leading to the sale of the scrip should qualify to be included in the expenses incurred for the transfer. Unless otherwise stated in section 48, deduction of these parts of the fees should not be resisted. At the most, there could be a need to scientifically identify the parts of the fees attributable to these activities and allocate the parts rationally. Paying a lump sum or a composite fee should not be a ground for its blanket disallowance, nor should the manner of such payment take away the fact that the major part of the fees is paid for advising or deciding on various components of the purchase and sale of the scrip. No one pays the fees to a portfolio manager only for advice to retain the investment, though that part is relevant, but it is not a deciding factor for seeking the services of the portfolio manager. Besides, the advice to continue to retain a scrip is intended to fetch a better price realisation for the scrip and such advice should therefore also be construed as advice in relation to the sale of the investment.

Even otherwise, this should not discourage the claim for its allowance once it is accepted that the fees are paid mainly for advice on purchase and sales of investment; in the absence of a provision similar to section 14A, no part of an indivisible expenditure can be disallowed.

The issue in case of composite charges should not be whether it is allowable or not, at the most it could be how much out of the total is allowable. Even the answer here should be that no part of it could be disallowable where no provision for its segregation exists in the Act. [Maharashtra Sugars Ltd. 82 ITR 452(SC) and Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation Ltd. 242 ITR 450(SC).]

As regards the fees representing the sharing of profit, we are of the considered opinion that such part is diverted at source under a contract which is not an agreement for partnership and surely is for payment for services offered.

The lead dissenting decision in the case of Devendra Motilal Kothari (Supra) was delivered against the claim for allowance, largely on account of the inability of the assessee to provide the basis for allocation of expenses on rational basis. This part is made clear by the Tribunal in its decision, making it clear that the expenditure could have been allowed in cases where the allocation was made available.

The other reason for dissenting with the decision of the Pune Bench in the KRA Investment case (Supra) was that the Bench had followed the Bombay High Court decision in Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra ) which, as noted in Pradeep Harlalka’s case (Supra), was overruled by the same Court in its later decision in Roshanbanu’s case (Supra). With great respect, without appreciating the facts in both the cases and, importantly, the part that had been overruled, it was incorrect on the part of the Mumbai Bench to proceed to disallow a legitimate claim simply because the decision referred to or even relied on was overruled. The reasons and rationale provided by the Court and borrowed by the Pune Bench for allowance of the expenditure could not have been ignored simply by stating that the decision relied upon by the Bench was overruled.

The Pune Bench of the Tribunal in KRA Holding & Trading’s case (Supra), placed substantial reliance on the Bombay High Court decision in the case of Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra) while deciding the matter. In Pradeep Kumar Harlalka’s case (Supra), the Tribunal noted that in the case of CIT vs. Roshanbanu Mohammed Hussein Merchant 275 ITR 231 (Bom), the Bombay High Court had observed that the decision in the case of Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra) was no longer good law in the light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions in the cases of R.M. Arunachalam vs. CIT 227 ITR 222, VSMT Jagdishchandran vs. CIT 227 ITR 240 and CIT vs. Attili N. Rao 252 ITR 880. All these decisions were rendered in the context of deductibility of mortgage debt and estate duty u/s 48 as expenditure incurred for transfer of the property.

Had the Bench looked into the facts of both the court cases and the conclusions arrived at therein, it could have appreciated that it was only a part of the decision, unrelated to the allowance of the expenditure of the PMS kind that was overruled.

It’s important to note that the following relevant part of the Shakuntala Kantilal decision continues to be valid:
‘The Legislature while using the expression “full value of consideration”, in our view, has contemplated both additions to as well as deductions from the apparent value. What it means is the real and effective consideration. That apart, so far as (i) of section 48 is concerned, we find that the expression used by the Legislature in its wisdom is wider than the expression “for the transfer”. The expression used is “the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer”. The expression “in connection with such transfer” is, in our view, certainly wider than the expression “for the transfer”. Here again, we are of the view that any amount the payment of which is absolutely necessary to effect the transfer will be an expenditure covered by this clause. In other words, if without removing any encumbrance including the encumbrance of the type involved in this case, sale or transfer could not be effected, the amount paid for removing that encumbrance will fall under clause (i). Accordingly, we agree with the Tribunal that the sale consideration requires to be reduced by the amount of compensation.’

These parts of the decision are not overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court. With due respect to the Bench of the Tribunal that held that the expenditure on fees was not allowable simply because the decision of one court was found, in the context of the facts, to be not laying down the good law, requires reconsideration. The fact that the many parts of the decision continued to be relevant could not have been ignored. It is these parts that should have been examined by the Tribunal to decide the case for allowance or, in the alternative, it should have independently adjudicated the issue without being influenced by the observation of the Apex Court made in the context of the facts in the case before it.

In Shakuntala Kantilal, the Bombay High Court examined the meaning of the terms ‘full value of consideration’ (to mean the real and effective consideration, including both additions to and deductions from the apparent value), and ‘expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer’ (to mean any amount the payment of which is absolutely necessary to effect the transfer), in deciding the matter regarding deductibility of compensation paid to previous intending buyer of the property.

In R.M. Arunachalam’s case (Supra), the Supreme Court examined the deductibility of estate duty paid as cost of improvement of the inherited asset. In this decision, the Supreme Court did not examine any issue relating to full value of consideration, cost of acquisition or expenses in connection with transfer at all. The Court specifically refused to answer the question regarding diversion of income by overriding title, which involved the question whether apart from the deductions permissible under the express provision contained in section 48, deduction on account of diversion was permissible, since the issue had not been raised before the Tribunal or the High Court.

In V.S.M.R. Jagdishchandran’s case (Supra), the Supreme Court considered whether the discharge of a mortgage debt created by the owner himself amounted to cost of acquisition of the property deductible u/s 48. The Court in this case did not examine the issue regarding full value of consideration or expenditure in connection with transfer. In Attili N. Rao’s case (Supra), the assessee’s property had been mortgaged with the Excise Department for payment of kist dues, the property was auctioned by the Government and the proceeds, net of the kist dues, was paid to the assessee. In this case, two of the questions before the Supreme Court were whether the charge was to be deducted in computing the full value of consideration, or could it be regarded as an expenditure incurred towards the cost of acquisition of the capital asset. The Supreme Court did not answer these questions while holding that the gross realisation was to be considered for computation of capital gains.

The Supreme Court, therefore, does not seem to have specifically overruled the Bombay High Court decision in the case of Shakuntala Kantilal (Supra), specifically those aspects dealing with the expenses in connection with the transfer.

On the other hand, in a subsequent decision in Kaushalya Devi vs. CIT 404 ITR 536, the Delhi High Court had an occasion to examine a situation identical to that prevailing in the Shakuntala Kantilal case. While holding that the payment of liquidated damages to the previous intending purchaser was an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with the transfer, the Delhi High Court observed that,

…the words ‘wholly and exclusively’ used in section 48 are also to be found in section 37 of the Act and relate to the nature and character of the expenditure, which in the case of section 48 must have connection, i.e., proximate and perceptible nexus and link with the transfer resulting in income by way of capital gain. The word ‘wholly’ refers to the quantum of expenditure and the word ‘exclusively’ refers to the motive, objective and purpose of the expenditure. These two words give jurisdiction to the taxing authority to decide whether the expenditure was incurred in connection with the transfer. The expression ‘wholly and exclusively’, however, does not mean and indicate that there must exist a necessity or compulsion to incur an expense before an expenditure is to be allowed. The word ‘connection’ in section 48(i) reflects that there should be a causal connect and the expenditure incurred to be allowed as a deduction must be united, or in the state of being united with the transfer, resulting in income by way of capital gains on which tax has to be paid. The expenditure, therefore, should have direct concern and should not be remote or have an indirect result or connect with the transfer. A practical and pragmatic view in the circumstances should be taken to tax the real income, i.e., the gain.

The Delhi High Court further observed that: ‘the words “wholly and exclusively” require and mandate that the expenditure should be genuine and the expression “in connection with the transfer” require and mandate that the expenditure should be connected and for the purpose of transfer. Expenditure, which is not genuine or sham, is not to be allowed as a deduction. This, however, does not mean that the authorities, Tribunal or the Court can go into the question of subjective commercial expediency or apply subjective standard of reasonableness to disallow the expenditure on the ground that it should not have been incurred or was unreasonably large. In the absence of any statutory provision on these aspects, discretion exercised by the assessee who has incurred the said expenditure must be respected, for interference on subjective basis will lead to unpalatable and absurd results. As in the case of section 37 of the Act, jurisdiction of the authorities, Tribunal or Court is confined to investigate and decide as to whether the expenditure was actually incurred, i.e., the expenditure was genuine and was factually expended and paid to the third party’.

If one applies this ratio to the deductibility of portfolio management charges in computing capital gains, the portfolio manager is paid for the services of advising on what shares to buy and when to buy and sell the shares, and of carrying out the transactions. To the extent that the services are rendered in connection with the purchase of the shares, the fees constitute part of the cost of acquisition of the shares, and to the extent that the fees relate to the sale of shares, the fees are expenses incurred wholly and exclusively for the transfer of the shares. In either situation, the fees should clearly be deductible in computing the capital gains, as held by the Pune Bench of the Tribunal.

If one analyses the facts of the cases as well, it can be clearly observed that the decision in Devendra Motilal Kothari’s case was to a great extent influenced by the fact that the assessee was unable to apportion the fee between the purchases, sales and the closing stock on a rational basis, whereas in KRA Holding & Trading’s case, the assessee was able to demonstrate such bifurcation on a reasonable basis. Therefore, if a rational allocation of the fees is carried out, there is no reason as to why such fees should not be allowed as a deduction, either as cost of acquisition or as expenses in connection with the transfer.

It may also be noted that as observed by the Tribunal in Joy Beauty Centre’s case (Supra), the Department had filed an appeal in the Bombay High Court against the Pune Tribunal’s decision in the case of KRA Holding & Trading (Supra). The appeal has been admitted by the Bombay High Court only on the question of whether the income was in the nature of business income or capital gains. Therefore, the Pune Tribunal’s decision in respect of allowability of portfolio management fees has attained finality.

There is no dispute that the objective behind the hiring of the portfolio manager’s services is to seek advice on purchase and sale of scrips, which expenses, without much suspicion, are allowable in computing the capital gains.

It would be inequitable to disallow a genuine expenditure incurred for earning a taxable income on the pretext that no express and specific provision for its allowance exists in the Act. In our opinion, the existing provisions of section 48 are wide enough to support the deduction of the fees.

Any attempt to isolate a part of the expenditure for disallowance should be avoided on the grounds of the composite expenditure and the expense in any case representing either the cost of acquisition or an expense in connection with the transfer.

As clarified by the Tribunal in the KRA Holding’s case, where the assessee demonstrated the direct nexus of the expenditure to the acquisition and sale / transfer of the securities successfully, and also the fee in question was strictly on the NAV of the securities and not on the dividends or other miscellaneous income, such fee should be allowable in computing the capital gains.

The better view of the matter, therefore, seems to be that portfolio management fees are deductible in computing the capital gains, as held by the Pune, Delhi, Kolkata and some Mumbai Benches of the Tribunal.

Exemption u/s 10(10C) – Amount received under early retirement option scheme of bank – Exemption not claimed in return but later in representation to Principal Commissioner on basis of Supreme Court ruling in case of another employee – That exemption not claimed in return of income not material – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption

13 Gopalbhai Babubhai Parikh vs. Principal CIT [2021] 436 ITR 262 (Guj) A.Y.: 2004-05; Date of order: 20th January, 2021 Ss. 10(10C) and 264 of ITA, 1961

Exemption u/s 10(10C) – Amount received under early retirement option scheme of bank – Exemption not claimed in return but later in representation to Principal Commissioner on basis of Supreme Court ruling in case of another employee – That exemption not claimed in return of income not material – Assessee entitled to benefit of exemption

The assessee was a bank employee and opted for the scheme of early retirement declared by the bank. In his return of income for the A.Y. 2004-05, he did not claim the benefit of exemption u/s 10(10C) on the amount received under the early retirement option scheme. Thereafter, relying on the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of a similarly situated employee of the same bank, to the effect that the employee was entitled to the exemption u/s 10(10C), the assessee filed applications before the Principal Commissioner and claimed exemption u/s 10(10C) under the scheme. The Principal Commissioner was of the view that the assessee, unlike in the case before the Supreme Court, had not claimed such deduction in his return, and secondly, the assessee was expected to file a revision application u/s 264 and not file a representation in that regard. Therefore, he rejected the claim of the assessee.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) On the facts, the assessee was entitled to the exemption u/s 10(10C) for the amount received from his employer bank at the time of his voluntary retirement under the early retirement option scheme. Even if the assessee had not claimed the exemption in his return of income for the A.Y. 2004-05, he could claim it at a later point of time. The orders passed by the Principal Commissioner rejecting the benefit of exemption u/s 10(10C) are set aside.

ii) It is declared that the writ applicant is entitled to claim exemption u/s 10(10C) for the amount of Rs. 5,00,000 received from the ICICI Bank Ltd. at the time of his voluntary retirement under the scheme in accordance with the law. It is clarified that this order has been passed in the peculiar facts of the case and shall not be cited as a precedent.’

Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Resolution of disputes – Sum payable by declarant – Difference between appeal by assessee and that by Revenue – Lower rate of deposit of disputed tax where appeal is preferred by Revenue – Appeal to Tribunal by Revenue – Tribunal remanding matter to A.O. – Appeal from order by assessee before High Court – High Court restoring Revenue’s appeal to Tribunal – Appeal was by Revenue – Assessee entitled to lower rate of deposit of disputed tax

12 Cooperative Rabobank U.A. vs. CIT [2021] 436 ITR 459 (Bom) A.Y.: 2002-03; Date of order: 7th July, 2021 Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Resolution of disputes – Sum payable by declarant – Difference between appeal by assessee and that by Revenue – Lower rate of deposit of disputed tax where appeal is preferred by Revenue – Appeal to Tribunal by Revenue – Tribunal remanding matter to A.O. – Appeal from order by assessee before High Court – High Court restoring Revenue’s appeal to Tribunal – Appeal was by Revenue – Assessee entitled to lower rate of deposit of disputed tax

The assessee was a bank established in the Netherlands. It filed its return for the A.Y. 2002-03 declaring Nil income. The assessment order was passed assessing the business profits attributable to its permanent establishment at Rs. 31,25,060. The Commissioner (Appeals) deleted the addition. The Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal which remanded the issue to the A.O. Against the order, the assessee filed an appeal before the High Court on 23rd September, 2015 u/s 260A. The assessee also filed a Miscellaneous Application before the Tribunal which was rejected by an order dated 21st August, 2018. Thereafter, on 29th August, 2018, the High Court passed an order setting aside both the orders of the Tribunal, viz., the order dated 1st April, 2015 restoring the issue to the file of the A.O., as well as the order dated 21st August, 2018 dismissing the Miscellaneous Application filed by the assessee. The High Court directed the Tribunal to decide the matter afresh.

Meanwhile, the assessee made a declaration in Form 1 along with an undertaking in Form 2 according to the provisions of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. The assessee indicated an amount payable under the 2020 Act as Rs. 7,50,014 which was 50% of the disputed tax. On 28th January, 2021, Form 3 was issued by the designated authority indicating the amount payable as Rs. 15,00,029 which was 100% of the disputed tax.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) A plain reading of the Table in section 3 of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 suggests that in the case of an eligible appellant, if it is a non-search case, the amount that is payable would be 100% of the disputed tax, and if it is a search case it would be 125% of the disputed tax. However, in a case where the appeal is filed by the Income-tax authority, the amount payable shall be one-half of the amount calculated for payment of 50% of disputed tax or 100%.

ii) The Court had sent back the matter to the Tribunal and what was before the Tribunal was a matter by the Revenue. Factually as well as in law, it was the Revenue’s matter which stood revived. It was also not the Revenue’s case that it had not accepted the decision of the Court. The whole process resurrected under the orders of the High Court was not the proceedings in the Tribunal by the assessee but of the Revenue preferred u/s 253 of the 1961 Act where the Revenue was the appellant. Maybe the appeal by the Revenue is revived at the instance of the assessee because of its proceedings in the High Court, but that would by no stretch of imagination make the appeal before the Tribunal an appeal by the assessee u/s 253. Hence, the first proviso to section 3 of the 2020 Act would become applicable and, accordingly, the amount payable by the assessee would be 50% of the amount, viz., 50% of the disputed tax.’

Charitable purpose – Exemption u/s 11 – Conditional exemption where trust is carrying on business – Meaning of ‘business’ – Trust running residential college – Maintenance of hostel in accordance with statutory requirement – Maintenance of hostel did not amount to business – Trust entitled to exemption

Dayanand Pushpadevi Charitable Trust vs. Addl. CIT 11 [2021] 436 ITR 406 (All) A.Y.: 2010-11; Date of order: 23rd June, 2021 Ss. 2(13), 2(15) and 11 of ITA, 1961

Charitable purpose – Exemption u/s 11 – Conditional exemption where trust is carrying on business – Meaning of ‘business’ – Trust running residential college – Maintenance of hostel in accordance with statutory requirement – Maintenance of hostel did not amount to business – Trust entitled to exemption

The assessee was registered as a charitable trust. The trust was also recognised and registered u/s 12A as an institution whose objects were charitable in nature. The trust ran a dental college which was a residential institution. In pursuance of the statutory obligation imposed by the Dental Council of India requiring all students to reside in the halls of residence or hostel built by the institute within its campus, the assessee ran a hostel for residence of the students (both boys and girls) admitted in the institute. The hostel fees charged from the students included a mess fee. The A.O. concluded that the hostel activities of the trust were separable from its educational activities and would fall within the meaning of ‘business’ u/s 2(13) and could not be treated as ‘charitable purposes’ u/s 2(15). The benefit of section 11 was denied to the assessee.

The assessment order was affirmed in appeals both by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal.

But the Allahabad High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) Under sub-section (4A) of section 11, income of any business of a trust in the nature of profit and gains of such business can be exempted under sub-section (1) of section 11 only if two preconditions mentioned in the sub-section are fulfilled. The first condition is that the business must be incidental to the attainment of the objectives of the trust. The crucial word in sub-section (4A) is “business” which has to be understood according to the meaning provided u/s 2(13). Any interpretation or meaning given to the word “business” in the literal parlance cannot be read into the Act as the word “business” has been defined in the Act itself.

ii) The applicability of sub-section (4A) of section 11 presupposes income from a business, being profits and gains of the business, and hence the test applied is whether the activity which is pursued is integral or subservient to the dominant object or is independent of or ancillary or incidental to the main object or forms a separate activity in itself. The issue whether the institution is hit by sub-section (4A) of section 11 will essentially depend upon the individual facts of the case where considering the nature of the individual activity, it will have to be tested whether it forms an incidental, ancillary or connected activity and whether it was carried out predominantly with the profit motive in the nature of trade or commerce.

iii) Having regard to the object and purpose for which the institution in question had been established by the trust and the mandate of the Dental Council of India in the Gazette Notification of the year 2007, its activity in maintaining the hostel by charging hostel fee (for its maintenance and providing mess facility) was an integral part of the main activity of “education” of the assessee. The hostel and mess facility sub-served the main object and purpose of the trust and were an inseparable part of its academic activity. The hostel fee could not be said to be income derived from the “business” of the trust. The activity being directly linked to the attainment of the main objectives of the trust, the requirement of maintaining separate books of accounts with regard to such activity for seeking benefit of exemption u/s 11(1) was, therefore, not attracted.

iv) There was no material on record with the Revenue to hold that the hostel activity was a separate business. From any angle, it could not be proved by the Revenue that the income from the hostel fee could be treated as profits and gains of the separate business or commercial activity. The assessee was entitled to exemption u/s 11.’

Assessment – Faceless assessment – Variation in income to assessee’s prejudice – Personal hearing not given before passing assessment order and consequential notices though requested – Assessment order and subsequent notices of demand and penalty set aside

10 Satia Industries Limited vs. NFAC [2021] 437 ITR 126 (Del) Date of order: 31st May, 2021 Ss. 144B(7)(vii), 156 and 270A of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Faceless assessment – Variation in income to assessee’s prejudice – Personal hearing not given before passing assessment order and consequential notices though requested – Assessment order and subsequent notices of demand and penalty set aside

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the assessment order and the consequential notice, issued u/s 156, towards tax demand and u/s 270A for initiation of penalty proceedings on the ground that no personal hearing was granted despite a request being made.

The High Court set aside the assessment order and the consequential notices issued u/s 156 towards tax demand and u/s 270A for initiation of penalty proceedings and gave liberty to the Department to proceed from the stage of issuing a notice-cum-draft assessment order with directions to afford an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

Assessment – Faceless assessment – Writ – Request by assessee for personal hearing – Orders passed and consequential notices of demand and penalty without affording personal hearing – No information on whether steps enumerated in provision taken – Proceedings under assessment order and subsequent notices stayed while notice on writ petition issued

9 Lemon Tree Hotels Limited vs. NFAC [2021] 437 ITR 111 (Del) A.Y.: 2018-19; Date of order: 21st May, 2021 Ss. 143(3), 144B, 144B(7), 156, 270A and 274 of ITA, 1961

Assessment – Faceless assessment – Writ – Request by assessee for personal hearing – Orders passed and consequential notices of demand and penalty without affording personal hearing – No information on whether steps enumerated in provision taken – Proceedings under assessment order and subsequent notices stayed while notice on writ petition issued

For the A.Y. 2018-19, a notice-cum-draft assessment order was issued to the assessee calling upon it to file its objections. Since the matter was complex both on the facts and on law, the assessee made a request for a personal hearing to the A.O. But orders were passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144B and consequential notices of demand were issued u/s 156 and for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 274 r.w.s. 270A.

The assessee filed a writ petition contending that the order and notices were passed in breach of the principles of natural justice. The Delhi High Court, while issuing notice on the writ petition, stayed the operation of the order passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 144B and the consequential notices of demand issued u/s 156 and for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 274 r.w.s. 270A, on the grounds that the Department did not inform whether steps under sub-clause (h) of section 144B(7)(xii) had been taken.

The High Court observed that in faceless assessment, prima facie, once an assessee requests for a personal hearing the officer in charge, under the provisions of clause (viii) of section 144B(7) would, ordinarily, have to grant a personal hearing. According to the provisions of section 144B(7)(viii), the discretion of the officer in charge of the Regional Faceless Assessment Centre is tied in with the circumstances covered in sub-clause (h) of section 144B(7)(xii).

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Powers of Tribunal – Tribunal cannot transfer case from Bench falling within jurisdiction of a particular High Court to Bench under jurisdiction of different High Court Appeal to High Court – Writ – Competency of appeal – Competency of writ petition – Meaning of ‘every order’ of section 260A – Order must relate to subject matter of appeal – Order transferring case – Appeal not maintainable against order – Writ petition maintainable

8 MSPL Ltd. vs. Principal CIT [2021] 436 ITR 199 (Bom) A.Ys.: 2005-06 to 2008-09; Date of order: 21st May, 2021 Ss. ss. 255 and 260A of ITA, 1961 r.w.r. 4 of ITAT Rules, 1963; and Article 226 of Constitution of India

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Powers of Tribunal – Tribunal cannot transfer case from Bench falling within jurisdiction of a particular High Court to Bench under jurisdiction of different High Court

Appeal to High Court – Writ – Competency of appeal – Competency of writ petition – Meaning of ‘every order’ of section 260A – Order must relate to subject matter of appeal – Order transferring case – Appeal not maintainable against order – Writ petition maintainable

The assessee was engaged in the business of mining, running a gas unit and generating power through windmills. The relevant period is the A.Ys. 2005-06 to 2008-09. Following centralisation of the cases at Bangalore, the assessments were carried out at Bangalore and in all the assessment orders the A.O. was the Assistant Commissioner. The first appeals against the assessment orders were preferred before the Commissioner (Appeals) at Bangalore, after which the appeals were filed before the Tribunal at Bangalore. On 20th August, 2020, the President of the Tribunal passed an order u/r 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 directing that the appeals be transferred from the Bangalore Bench to be heard and determined by the Mumbai Benches of the Tribunal.

The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the order. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ and held as under:

‘i) Section 255 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 deals with the procedure of the Appellate Tribunal. Sub-section (1) of section 255 says that the powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal may be exercised and discharged by Benches constituted by the President of the Appellate Tribunal from among the Members thereof. Sub-section (5) says that the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure and that of its various Benches while exercising its powers or in the discharge of its functions. This includes notifying the places at which Benches shall hold their sittings. This provision cannot be interpreted in such a broad manner as to clothe the President of the Tribunal with jurisdiction to transfer a pending appeal from one Bench to another Bench outside the headquarters in another State.

ii) The Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of section 255 of the Act to regulate the procedure of the Appellate Tribunal and the procedure of the Benches of the Tribunal. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 empowers the President to direct hearing of appeals by a Bench by a general or special order, and sub-rule (2) deals with a situation where there are more than two Benches of the Tribunal at any headquarters and provides for a transfer of an appeal or an application from one Bench to another within the same headquarters. Thus, this provision cannot be invoked to transfer a pending appeal from one Bench under one headquarters to another Bench in different headquarters.

iii) Section 127 of the Act deals with transfer of any case from one A.O. to another A.O. In other words, it deals with transfer of assessment jurisdiction from one A.O. to another. While certainly the appropriate authority u/s 127 has the power and jurisdiction to transfer a case from one A.O. to another subject to compliance with the conditions mentioned therein, the principles governing the section cannot be read into transfer of appeals from one Bench to another Bench that, too, in a different State or Zone for the simple reason that it is not a case before any A.O.

iv) A careful reading of section 260A(1) would go to show that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from “every order” passed in appeal by the Tribunal if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. The expression “every order” in the context of section 260A would mean an order passed by the Tribunal in the appeal. In other words, the order must arise out of the appeal, it must relate to the subject matter of the appeal. An order related to transfer of the appeal would be beyond the scope and ambit of sub-section (1) of section 260A.

v) Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the power to issue directions, orders or writs by any High Court within its territorial jurisdiction would extend to a cause of action or even a part thereof which arises within the territorial limits of the High Court, notwithstanding the fact that the seat of the authority is not within the territorial limits of the High Court.

vi) The writ petition was maintainable because the petitioner had no other statutory remedy. Having regard to the mandate of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the Bombay High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petitions.

vii) The fact that the assessee may have expressed no objection to the transfer of the assessment jurisdiction from the A.O. at Bangalore to the A.O. at Mumbai after assessment for the assessment years covered by the search period, could not be used to non-suit the petitioner in his challenge to the transfer of the appeals from one Bench to another Bench in a different State and in a different Zone. The two were altogether different and had no nexus with each other.

viii) The orders dated 19th March, 2020 and 20th August, 2020 were wholly unsustainable in law.’

Section 92C of the Act and CUP method – Arm’s length price of interest-free debt funding of an overseas Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), with a corresponding obligation on the SPV to use it for the purpose of acquisition of a target company abroad, under CUP method is Nil

Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT [(2021) 129 taxmann.com 398 (Mum-Trib)] [ITA No.: 298/Mum/2014] A.Y.: 2009-10 Date of order: 30th August, 2021

Section 92C of the Act and CUP method – Arm’s length price of interest-free debt funding of an overseas Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), with a corresponding obligation on the SPV to use it for the purpose of acquisition of a target company abroad, under CUP method is Nil

FACTS
The assessee (an Indian resident entity – TIML) was, inter alia, engaged in the radio broadcasting business and wanted to acquire shares of a UK operating company (Virgin Radio, referred as Target Company below) to expand its radio business and thereby provide horizontal synergy. Acquisition of the target company was pursuant to a bid process and in the final bid proposal submitted for acquisition of the target company, TIML stated as under:

i) An SPV will be formed specifically for the purpose of acquiring the target company and such SPV will be wholly owned by TIML;
ii) The transaction will be financed wholly from internal resources of the group.

As part of implementation of a successful bid acquisition, TIML acquired two UK entities from third parties, viz., TIML Global and TIML Golden (UK SPV). These UK entities were typical £1 companies without substance and were used by TIML as SPVs for acquiring shares of the target company.

Further, as mentioned in the bid proposal, the financing of the acquisition was implemented through internal resources of the group. The taxpayer (TIML) was financed by its own Indian parent and these funds were used by TIML to grant interest-free loan to its UK SPV to acquire the target company.

The structure below depicts the underlying subsidiaries of the taxpayer and the mode in which the target company got acquired by TIML’s subsidiary:

As regards benchmarking of the loan, the assessee contended that the acquisition of the target company was to expand its own radio business and hence the activity of issuing interest-free loan to its subsidiary was in the nature of stewardship and the loan was in the nature of quasi capital. Accordingly, it had not charged any interest. The TPO held that benchmarking of this loan transaction was required to be done on the footing as if an independent entity would have charged interest on such a transaction. The TPO adopted the CUP method and imputed interest at 13% treating the transaction as an unsecured loan.

DRP confirmed the addition of imputed interest but reduced interest rate to 12.25%. Being aggrieved, the assessee appealed before the ITAT.

HELD
Nature of transaction
• The transaction was not a loan simpliciter to the UK SPV but an advance with a corresponding obligation that the funds were to be used in the manner specified by the lender TIML.
• The entire amount of funds remitted to the UK SPV was to be, and in fact was, spent on the acquisition of the target company and this specific end-use of funds was an integral part of the entire transaction.
• Accordingly, the transaction of remittance to the UK SPV cannot be considered on a standalone basis but in conjunction with the restricted use of these funds.

Benchmarking of loan under CUP
• The transaction between TIML and its UK SPV should be compared with such transactions where remittance is made to an independent enterprise with the corresponding obligation to use the funds remitted for acquiring a target company already selected by, and on the terms already finalised by, the entity remitting the funds.
• Funding transactions between the owner of the SPV and the SPV belong to a genus different from transactions between lenders and borrowers.
• The moment funding is done by the owner to the SPV, it will render parties as associated enterprises. Since the comparable transaction will be between AEs, such transaction cannot be used in CUP.
• Even if it is assumed that such transaction is hypothetically possible, since borrower has no discretion to use the funds, the concept of commercial interest rates does not apply.
• If there must be an arm’s length consideration under the CUP method, other than interest for such funding, it must be net effective gains – direct and indirect – attributable to the risks assumed by the sponsor of the SPV. In other words, in an arm’s length situation when an SPV is created and such SPV is a mere conduit, the net gains of that project or purpose must go to the person(s) sponsoring the SPV. In this regard, support was drawn from Rule 8(1) of the Nigerian Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Regulations, 2018, which states that ‘A capital-rich, low-function company that does not control the financial risks associated with its funding activities, for tax purposes, shall not be allocated the profits associated with those risks and will be entitled to no more than a risk-free return. The profits or losses associated with the financial risks would be allocated to the entity (or entities) that manage those risks and have the capacity to bear them.’
• However, in the present case this aspect of whether net gains of the UK SPV can be attributed to TIML was considered as academic because the financial statement of the UK SPV reflected a loss figure.

ITAT gave a caveat in its ruling by stating that it has adjudicated on the limited issue of arm’s length price adjustment of interest-free loan to the SPV under the CUP method and not under any other method. Also, that ruling cannot be an authority for the proposition that ALP adjustment cannot be made under any other TP method in respect of interest-free debt funding to the overseas SPV.

If an assessee admits certain undisclosed income of the company in which he is a Director, on the basis of incriminating material found and seized during search, since income / entries in such seized material belonged to company, impugned additions made in hands of assessee on account of such undisclosed income of company was unjustified and liable to be deleted

12 JCIT vs. Narayana Reddy Vakati [2021-88-ITR(T) 128 taxmann.com 377 (Hyd-Trib)] ITA No.: 1226 to 1230 (Hyd) of 2018 A.Ys.: 2010-11 to 2014-15; Date of order:
21st April, 2021

If an assessee admits certain undisclosed income of the company in which he is a Director, on the basis of incriminating material found and seized during search, since income / entries in such seized material belonged to company, impugned additions made in hands of assessee on account of such undisclosed income of company was unjustified and liable to be deleted

FACTS
During survey, a loose sheet bundle was impounded containing details of certain receipts and payments. The assessee admitted the same to be income from undisclosed sources. The same was assessed as additional income in the hands of the assessee. However, the assessee did not offer the said income to tax in his return of income. Hence, a show cause notice was issued as to why undisclosed income admitted during the search / post-search proceedings should not be added to his total income. The assessee stated that the income was inappropriately admitted in his hands instead of the company. He also furnished year-wise statements stating that these amounts do not belong to him.

However, the A.O. concluded that the assessee’s reply could not be accepted. The assessee had not retracted from his disclosure of income till filing of return. There was an almost 16-month gap from the search. In this period, he never brought his version before the DDIT (Inv.) or before the A.O. that the amounts disclosed pertained to the company.

Therefore, the A.O. concluded that the assessee adopted this device to evade taxes on admitted income by offering the same in the hands of the company and never furnished the required information such as books of accounts, receipts and payments account, etc., and submitted a reply to the show cause notice at the last minute deliberately to avoid verification of the transactions. Hence, the assessee’s reply was not considered.

On further appeal to the CIT(A), the assessee submitted that though he had admitted certain amount in his hands in the course of his statement u/s 132(4), the seized material forming the basis of the additions belonged to the company. Hence, while filing return of income he had reconciled the material and submitted a letter to the A.O. to the effect and pleaded with him to assess the said admitted income in the hands of the company. He also contended that the A.O. neither accepted his plea nor made any attempt to verify the facts set out by him in the letter. Therefore, in the absence of any seized material found during the course of search belonging to the assessee, no addition can be made.

The CBDT in its Circular in letter F.No.286/98/20l3-lT (Inv-II), dated 18th December, 2014, instructed the A.O. not to obtain disclosures and rather focus on gathering evidences during the search. Thus, the additions in the hands of the assessee were made only on the basis of the statement made uls. 132(4) which was given by the assessee in a state of confusion and without thinking of the consequences and its impact in the future. The CIT(A) observed that the claim of the assessee was not contradicted by the A.O. The income had to be taxed in the right hands irrespective of the admission made during the search, on the basis of evidences found or gathered during the assessment proceedings. The A.O. assessed the income on substantive basis in the hands of the assessee and on protective basis in the hands of the company. As the material and the entries in the statements related to the business of the company, the CIT(A) held that income was not taxable in the individual’s hands and accordingly deleted the addition made by the A.O. Aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that there is not even an indication in the Revenue’s grounds that the impugned additions pertain to the assessee himself rather than his company. The Apex Court’s landmark decision in ITO vs. C.H. Atchaiah [1996] 84 Taxman 630/218 ITR 239 (SC) had held long back that the A.O. can and must tax the right person and the right person alone. The Tribunal also relied on another landmark decision in the case of Saloman vs. Saloman and Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22, that in corporate parlance a company is very much a body corporate and a distinct entity apart from its Director.

Therefore, it upheld the action of the CIT(A) in deleting the additions made by the A.O.

Provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) will not apply to a case where there was an allotment prior to A.Y. 2014-15 – The amended provisions cannot apply merely because the agreement was registered after the provision came into force

11 Naina Saraf vs. PCIT [TS-897-ITAT-2021 (Jpr)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 14th September, 2021 Sections: 56(2)(vii), 263


Provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) will not apply to a case where there was an allotment prior to A.Y. 2014-15 – The amended provisions cannot apply merely because the agreement was registered after the provision came into force

FACTS

The assessee, a practising advocate of Rajasthan High Court, e-filed the return of income declaring therein a total income of Rs. 27,38,450. In the course of assessment proceedings before the A.O., the assessee filed a registered purchase deed in respect of purchase of immovable property and various other details required by the A.O. The A.O. completed the assessment accepting the returned income.
 

Subsequently, the PCIT observed that the assessee had purchased an immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 70,26,233 as co-owner with 50% share in the said property and the stamp duty value thereof was determined at Rs. 1,03,12,220; therefore, the difference of Rs. 32,85,987 was to be treated as income from other sources. The PCIT held that the A.O. having failed to invoke section 56(2)(vii)(b) during assessment proceedings, the order he had passed was erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. He invoked the jurisdiction u/s 263 and issued a show cause notice, and after considering the submissions of the assessee, passed an order u/s 263 on the ground that there was no agreement and therefore the assessee cannot be given benefit of the first proviso to section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii). The PCIT set aside the assessment order passed by the A.O. and directed him to complete the assessment afresh after giving an opportunity to the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that on 23rd September, 2006, the assessee applied for allotment of Flat No. 201 at Somdatt’s Landmark, Jaipur. The flat was allotted vide allotment letter dated 6th March, 2009 on certain terms and conditions mentioned in the allotment letter. The assessee agreed to the allotment by signing the letter of allotment on 11th November, 2009 as a token of acceptance. Prior to the registration of the transaction on 9th December, 2014, the assessee had paid Rs. 45,26,233 against the total sale consideration of Rs. 65,57,500. The allotment letter contained all substantive terms and conditions which created the respective rights and obligations of the parties and bound the respective parties. The allotment letter provided detailed specifications of the property, its identification and terms of the payment, providing possession of the subject property in the stipulated period and so on. The seller had agreed to sell and the assessee agreed to purchase the flat for an agreed price mentioned in the allotment letter.

 
The Tribunal held that,

i) What is important is to gather the intention of the parties and not to go by the nomenclature. There being an offer and acceptance by the competent parties for a lawful purpose with their free consent, the Tribunal held that all the attributes of a lawful agreement are available as per the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Such agreement was acted upon by the parties and pursuant to the allotment letter the assessee paid a substantial amount of consideration of Rs. 45,26,233 as early as in the year 2008 itself. For all intents and purposes, such an allotment letter constituted a complete agreement between the parties. Relying on the decisions in the cases of Hasmukh N. Gala vs. ITO [(2015) 173 TTJ 537] and CIT vs. Kuldeep Singh [(2014) 270 CTR 561 (Delhi HC)] rendered in the context of the provisions of section 54, the Tribunal was convinced that the assessee had already entered into an agreement by way of allotment letter on 11th November, 2009 in A.Y. 2010-11;

ii) the pre-amended law which was applicable up to A.Y. 2013-14 never contemplated a situation where immovable property was received for inadequate consideration. It was only in the amended law specifically made applicable from A.Y. 2014-15 that any receipt of immovable property for inadequate consideration has been subjected to the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b), but not before that. Therefore, the applicability of the said provisions could not be insisted upon in the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2014-15;

iii) in the present case, since there was a valid and lawful agreement entered into by the parties long back in A.Y. 2010-11 when the subject property was transferred and substantial obligations discharged, the law contained in section 56(2)(vii)(b) as it stood at that point of time did not contemplate a situation of receipt of property by the buyer for inadequate consideration. The Tribunal held that the PCIT erred in applying the said provision;

iv) the Tribunal did not find itself in agreement with the contention of the DR that allotment was provisional as it was subject to further changes because of some unexpected happening which may be instructed by the approving authority, resulting in increase or decrease in the area and so on because, according to the Tribunal, it is a standard practice to save the seller (builder) from unintended consequences;

v) the Tribunal, relying on the decision of the Ranchi Bench in the case of Bajranglal Naredi vs. ITO [(2020) 203 TTJ 925], held that the mere fact that the flat was registered in the year 2014, falling in A.Y. 2015-16, the amended provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b)(ii) could not be applied;

vi) the assessment order subjected to revision is not erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Non-compliance with section 194C(7) will not lead to disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)

10 Mohmed Shakil Mohmed Shafi Mutawalli vs. ITO [TS-889-ITAT-2021 (Ahd)] A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 16th September, 2021 Sections: 40(a)(ia), 194C

Non-compliance with section 194C(7) will not lead to disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia)

FACTS
The original assessment u/s 143(3) was finalised on 26th March, 2014 determining total income of Rs. 9,15,737. Subsequently, the CIT passed an order u/s 263 directing the A.O. to make a fresh assessment after granting an opportunity to the assessee on the issue of non-deduction of tax on freight payment of Rs. 10,63,995. Subsequently, assessment u/s 143(3) was finalised on 16th February, 2015 wherein the A.O. held that only submission of the PAN of the transporter was not sufficient with respect to payment to the transporter. Consequently, the claim of transport expenses of Rs. 10,63,995 was disallowed.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who dismissed it, holding that the assesse had not complied with the provisions of section 194C(7).

The assessee then preferred an appeal to the Tribunal and submitted copies of the documents submitted before the lower authorities, which included copies of invoices, transportation bills, along with particulars of truck number, PAN, phone numbers and complete addresses of the transporters.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that,
i) The A.O. has neither disproved the genuineness of the evidences furnished before him nor made any further verification / examination related to claim of such expenditure debited to the P&L Account;
ii) The CIT(A) has sustained the disallowance merely on technical basis that the assessee has failed to comply with the provisions of section 194C(7);
iii) The Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal has, in the case of Soma Ghosh vs. DCIT 74 taxmann.com 90 held that if the assessee complies with the provisions of section 194C(6), no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) is permissible even though there is a violation of provisions of section 194C(7). The Karnataka High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Marikamba Transport Co. 57 taxman.com 273 held that in the case of payment made to a sub-contractor, non-filing of Form No. 15I/J is only a technical defect and the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) should not be attracted in such a case.

The Tribunal held that since the assessee has furnished copies of PAN along with copies of invoices of the transportation bill comprising the complete address of the transporter, phone number and complete particulars of the goods loaded through the transporter and the A.O. has not taken any steps to disprove the genuineness of the transportation expenses, it is not appropriate to disallow the claim of transportation expenses simply for a technical lapse u/s 194(7). This ground of appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Assessee not liable to deduct tax at source from asset valuer’s fees paid by the lender bank and later recovered from the assessee

9 Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. vs. DCIT [TS-955-ITAT-2021 (Mum)] A.Y.: 2011-12; Date of order: 30th September, 2021 Sections: 40(a)(ia), 194J

Assessee not liable to deduct tax at source from asset valuer’s fees paid by the lender bank and later recovered from the assessee

FACTS
In the course of assessment proceedings, the A.O. observed from Form No. 3CD that the assessee had paid a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs to Sigma Engineering (Rasayani Unit) from which tax had not been deducted at source. The A.O. disallowed the sum of Rs. 3,00,000 u/s 40(a)(ia).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) and submitted that it had availed credit facilities from State Bank of India (SBI) by mortgaging assets. The SBI had appointed Sigma Engineering Consultant for submitting a valuation report of the assets to secure their advances. Sigma raised a bill of Rs. 3,30,900 which included service tax. SBI made payment of the said amount and debited the sum from the assessee’s account. The assessee submitted that since it was a payment made to a banking company, it was not liable to deduct TDS. The CIT(A) upheld the action of the A.O.

Still aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that the services of the consultant were utilised for the purpose of SBI in order to secure the assets mortgaged to it. The consultant was appointed by SBI and after submission of the report, the bank settled the fee and recovered it from the assessee. Although the charges were ultimately collected from the assessee, but the services were provided exclusively for the purpose of securing mortgaged assets assigned to the bank. TDS provisions would be applicable only when the services are utilised and respective payments are made directly to the service provider. In this case the assessee neither appointed the consultant nor paid the consultancy charges but was only the observer and, therefore, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act do not apply.

PERSON IN CONTROL (PIC): NEW MODIFICATION IN THE ENTITY

Cementing the path for a notable modification in the manner that the promoters and more than 5,000 publicly-listed corporate entities operate in India, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), in a consultation paper has suggested doing away with the concept of promoters and shifting to ‘person in control.’ It has proposed the change to put an end to the present definition of promoter group with an idea to streamline the disclosure encumbrance. Apart from this, SEBI has announced a few other proposals that include (a) decreasing the minimum lock-in period (tenure an investor can hold on to the securities) after an initial public offer (IPO) for promoters’ portion of a minimum 20% from the current three years to one year, and the lock-in period for holding more than 20% from one year to six months; and (b) decreasing the lock-in period for pre-IPO shareholders (those who invest in the entity even before the public issue) from the current one year to six months.

The notion of the promoter is a heritage from history when a corporate body or a group of companies (say, a business house like Tata, Birla and so on) would establish a business unit; for example, a power or steel or fertilizer plant, by pledging some funds of their own and financing the remainder of the project cost by borrowings from banks or financial institutions, on top of raising funds from the capital market. This business unit would remain linked with the establishment – virtually all through the life-span of the project – having a fundamental interest in safeguarding its constant profitability and progress and consistently work for achieving this goal, thereby obtaining the position of what one may label as ‘once a promoter, always a promoter’.

FIRST LESSONS IN INTERPRETATION OF CONTROL
In order to move with the times, SEBI in its Board meeting on 6th August, 2021 gave in-principle assent to move from the concept of promoter to ‘controlling shareholders’ as was recommended in the Consultation Paper dated 11th May, 2021 which dealt with the evaluation of the structure relating to promoters and the promoter group. Although the Consultation Paper has mentioned many other viewpoints and aspects, restructuring the definition of the promoter group rationalising the disclosure needs for group entities is one of the key changes proposed. This seems to be a branding modification in the configuration of the company law.

The Companies Act, 2013 along with the SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018 has defined the term promoter ‘as a person who has been named as such in a prospectus or is identified by the company in the annual return in section 92; or a person who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly, as a shareholder, director or otherwise; or a person with whose advice, directions or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act.’ A person or group of people to be categorised as a ‘promoter group’ should have at least 20% equity share capital.

As per the Consultation Paper issued by SEBI, a controlling shareholder is to be defined as ‘A person who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly whether as a shareholder, Director or otherwise.’ The concept of controlling shareholders would restructure the tactic followed by controllers while levying any compulsions and transferring the responsibility of obeying statutory compulsions over to the controlling shareholders.

According to Regulation 2(1)(e) of the Takeover Regulations, 2011, the term ‘control’ has been defined as the right to appoint the majority of the Directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner. In an identical manner, the term control has been defined u/s 2(27) of the Companies Act, 2013 as well.

Though the clarification of the term control given by the SEBI has been swinging, in the case of Subhkam Ventures vs. SEBI, the SEBI pronounced that defensive agreements, namely, positive votes extended to the nominee Director of the investor on issues such as amendment of the articles of association, alterations in share capital, consent of the annual business plan, reorganisation of the investee entity, the nomination of significant officers of the entity, etc., all these qualify as gaining of control by the investor.

However, on appeal the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) opined that control is a power by which, on the one hand, an investor can instruct an entity to do what it wants to do. It was also explained by the SAT that the power by which an investor can prohibit an entity from doing what the latter wants to do cannot by itself qualify as ‘control’. SEBI appealed against the SAT order before the Supreme Court. However, the Court could not pronounce its verdict due to the removal of the case owing to the departure of the investor.

The interpretation of the term ‘control’ came up before the Whole-Time Member (WTM) of SEBI for judgment in the case of Kamat Hotels vs. SEBI. The WTM had to resolve, inter alia, whether there had been a takeover of control by the Noticees just by virtue of entering into a contract under which they were allowed a number of privileges that would activate an open offer under the Takeover Code, 1997. The WTM judged that the determination of ‘control’ because of the existence of positive voting rights in light of the realities of the case was inappropriate. The WTM, with regard to the privileges accessible to the Noticees as per the contract specified as above, made an obiter pronouncement in its order: ‘It is apparent that the scope of the covenants, in general, is to enable the Noticees to exercise certain checks and controls on the existing management for the purpose of protecting their interest as investors rather than formulating policies to run the target company.’

However, since the contract ended on 31st July, 2014 and the terms and clauses that allegedly bestowed ‘control’ on the Noticees under the contract were no longer compulsory on the promoters of Kamat Hotels, therefore, the WTM opted that the determination of ‘control’ was no longer appropriate.

On the basis of earlier precedents, it looks like determination of ‘control’ shoots from several ideologies which when applied to a given group of particulars and situations offers scope for various interpretations. In this background, SEBI had proposed a Consultation Paper in March, 2016 in which the definition of ‘control’ under the Takeover Regulations was considered to be
amended as: ‘(a) the right or entitlement to exercise at least 25% of voting rights of a company irrespective of whether such holdings give de facto control, and / or (b) the right to appoint the majority of the non-Independent Directors of a company’. However, the same has not yet been executed.

IS IT THE RIGHT TIME TO MOVE FROM THE WORD ‘PROMOTER’?
Many will give a quick answer to the above question by saying ‘yes’ since the concept of ‘promoter’ has become stagnant. The concept of promoter embraces all types of casual people, blood relatives who have been suing are also treated as promoters. In short, persons who have no control whatsoever of the organisation are treated as promoters. This gives an incorrect feeling to the investors of the organisation.

SEBI should make the concept smarter, fluid and accurate rather than completely abolishing the responsibility of the leading shareholder. This can be done by employing global yardsticks. Expressions like a person acting in concert or persons in control are understood throughout the world and these will surely describe who is overseeing the entity. The minority shareholder will be better off if this modification is implemented. But it is clear that the concept of promoter has not gone away and the only change is in the terminology which has moved on from ‘promoter’ to ‘person in control’. This is a step forward because once a Promoter need not always be a Promoter.

SEBI CHASING CHANGING SCENARIO
During the previous decade, the investor scene in India experienced a radical deviation whereby a new class of shareholders has arisen as leading investors, namely, private equity funds (PEF), alternate investment funds (AIFs), mutual funds, etc. Due to this the shareholding of the promoters has come down and total promoters’ holdings in the prominent 500 listed entities by market value is on a downhill journey since 2009 when it had topped at 58%.

The new class of shareholders invests in new-age and tech businesses (although unlisted) by means of what is termed as ‘control deals’ even prior to these going in for an initial public offer (IPO) and continue to retain shares post-listing, many times being the biggest public shareholders, holding special privileges such as the right to appoint Directors.

Although the actual ‘ownership’ and ‘controlling rights’ of a company have transferred to PEFs or AIFs, the establishment that introduced the business firm continues to possess power (notwithstanding its shareholding having been reduced to a minority) as the current regulation lists it as a promoter. The market watchdog needs to fix this glitch by changing the emphasis from promoters to controlling shareholders, or the so-called ‘person in control’ (PIC). Nonetheless, it also needs to be asked whether the new class is indeed keen to take control?

These organisations signify a collection of tens of thousands of investors. However, in the case of mutual funds these run into lakhs of investors. They gather money from individual investors and many of them are high net-worth individuals and invest in companies with the prime aim of producing handsome returns. In a basic way they are financial investors, would stay invested in an entity as long as the target is achieved, otherwise they will depart; on the other hand, the role of a PIC necessitates that he stay invested over the long term. The question is, does SEBI really expect promoters to play the role of PICs.

From its suggestions on minimum lock-in period, it does not seem to be so. Post an IPO, the SEBI allows the promoter to discard his or her portion of a minimum of 20% within one year against the existing three years. Besides, holding of more than 20% can be discarded in six months instead of one year.

It is even contemplating to entirely get rid of the condition of minimum shareholding for a person to qualify as a promoter. If a unit, for instance, PEF, can dispose of its shareholding obtained before its IPO (even though big enough to give it the position of a promoter) within one year of the public issue or the condition of minimum shareholding itself is relinquished, how can it be imagined to be fair to the role of a ‘person in control’?

Irrationally, the watchdog does not even want the public to recognise the individuality of investors behind the issuer. As per the relaxed disclosure obligations, the issuer need not furnish financial statements of group entities associated with the one being listed; it need not name financial investors as promoters in IPOs; and it need not specify precise corporate entities which are part and parcel of the promoter group. How can an entity whose basis of funding is masked in privacy infuse confidence?

Today, many of the listed companies are professionally administered and much of the activity is positioned around the Board of Directors, including several Independent Directors. It also includes the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) supported by numerous teams, including the audit committee, remuneration committee, etc., for crystal-clear operations. Could the PIC role be delegated to the CEO or the BoD? The answer to this is not in the affirmative.

The members of the Board, including the CEO, are professionals. They are nominated and obtain their power from the shareholders even though by majority vote or any other method approved by them. If the majority shareholders vacate, then it is doubtful that the current CEO or BoD will continue. Further, if the former leaves within a short period, which is highly possible as per the new regulations suggested by the market regulator, then the case for the CEO or BoD serving as PIC becomes less likely. When the person who established the entity is reduced to a minority and the new group of shareholders who have majority share are reluctant to sneak into the former’s shoes, it will be tantamount to impelling the listed entity into a position of a ‘ship without a commander’.

The market watchdog should re-look at its suggestions keeping two essential principles in mind. These are, (i) the voting or controlling power of an investor must be proportional to his investment or the shares held by him, and (ii) solidity of the management. In the present situation, where the majority of shareholding is entrusted in PEFs or AIFs, they should be made accountable to accept the role of a PIC and remain invested in the entity over a reasonably long period. The market regulator must not decrease the lock-in period. It should also not abandon the prerequisite of minimum shareholding for an entity to remain in control of the firm and demand complete clarity on funding bases. Amazingly, the complete workout of the transition from promoters to controlling shareholders will prove to be pointless unless the SEBI effectively tackles the elephant in the room, viz., the definition of ‘control’.

NEW MODIFICATION IN A NUTSHELL

SEBI has recommended decreasing the minimum lock-in periods post a public issue for promoters and pre-IPO shareholders.

The consultation paper suggested a three-year transition period for moving from the promoter to the person in control concept.

If the object of the issue involves an offer for sale or financing other than for capital expenditure for a project, then the minimum promoters’ contribution of 20% should be locked in for one year from the date of allotment in the IPO.

The promoters’ holding in excess of minimum promoters’ contribution shall be locked in for a period of six months as opposed to the existing requirement of one year from the date of allotment in the IPO.

Control Person means any person that holds a sufficient number of any of the securities of an issuer so as to affect materially the control of that issuer, or that holds more than 20% of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer.

Control Person means any individual who has a Control relationship with the Fund or is an investment adviser of the Fund.

Control Person means a Director or executive officer of a licensee or a person who has the authority to participate in the direction, directly or indirectly, through one or more other persons, of the management or policies of a licensee.

The changes in the nature of ownership could lead to situations where the persons with no controlling rights and minority shareholding continue to be classified as promoters.

It will lighten the disclosure burden for firms.

The regulator has proposed to eliminate the present definition of promoter group because it would rationalise the disclosure burden.

It is necessitated by the changing investor landscape in India where concentration of ownership and controlling rights do not vest completely in the hands of the promoters or the promoter group.

This is because of the emergence of new shareholders such as private equity and institutional investors.

The investor focus on the quality of board and management has increased, thereby reducing the relevance of the concept of promoter.

It also suggested doing away with the current definition of promoter group since it focuses on capturing holdings by a common group of individuals.

It often results in capturing unrelated companies with common financial investors.

AUDITOR’S EVALUATION OF GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT

(This is the second article of the two-part series on Going Concern.
The first part appeared in the BCAJ edition of October, 2021.)

The first part of this article on Going Concern had touched upon the various aspects of going concern assessment by management; this part will attempt to highlight the various factors that an auditor should consider while evaluating the going concern assessment performed by the management, disclosure in the financial statements based on the outcome of the evaluation, and reporting considerations under various scenarios in the auditors’ report.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the on-going economic developments have changed the traditional way of doing business and have created significant challenges for some of the industries to save their existence and to survive in the present economic environment.

Our regulators have also acknowledged the criticality of the situation and, to save the interest of investors and users of the financial statements, have increased their focus on the disclosures and reporting requirements related to going concern assumption used in the preparation of financial statements, and introduced new provisions in the reporting requirement wherever needed.

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India has also introduced guidance with respect to the assessment and evaluation of the going concern assumption in the present economic environment and also an implementation guide to assist auditors to comply with the additional reporting requirements.

Although the above amendments and additional guidance were introduced to assist auditors in discharging their responsibilities and to save the interest of the users of the financial statements, they have significantly increased the responsibilities of the auditors and the criticality of their role in the true and fair reporting of the financial statements.

SA 570 (Revised) states that the auditor’s responsibilities are to obtain sufficient audit evidence on the appropriateness of management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting in the preparation of the financial statements and to conclude, based on the audit evidence obtained, whether a material uncertainty exists about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

The auditor needs to be cognizant of this responsibility to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence on the appropriateness of the going concern assumption throughout the audit, and should start this evaluation from the audit planning stage, while understanding the entity’s business and assessing the risks of material misstatement in accordance with SA 315 Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement Through Understanding the Entity and its Environment, by considering whether there are any conditions or events that, individually or in aggregate, raise significant doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time and, if so, whether any preliminary assessment has been done by the management for those identified events and conditions.

If any such events or conditions are identified by the auditor at the audit planning stage or at any time thereafter, for instance, defaults on repayment of borrowings, legal action taken by creditors due to long outstanding, penalty imposed by regulators due to non-compliance that have a significant effect on the cash flows of the company, etc., then the auditor should also consider the possible effect of it on the identified Risks of Material Misstatements for other account captions and, accordingly, needs to plan and perform additional audit procedures to address them. For instance, the auditor may need to increase the risk of material misstatements for related account captions like creditors, borrowings, contingent liabilities, earlier cash flow projections, impairment of inventory or intangibles, etc., and perform extended audit procedures either by increasing the sample size or additional audit steps to address the risk identified from the development.

In the case of events and conditions that are identified and for which going concern assessment is performed by the management, the auditor is required to perform adequate audit procedures, if the other audit procedures performed as part of the audit are not sufficient to enable the auditor to conclude whether management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting is appropriate in the circumstances.

AUDIT PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATION OF GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT
Given below are examples of some of the audit steps that can be considered for evaluating the appropriateness of management’s assessment of going concern:
– Understanding the specific conditions and events considered by the management and their possible financial implications,
– Indicators or events that may be identified by the auditors during the audit and their possible financial implications on the cash flow projections,
– Ensuring that the possible cash inflows and outflows from business, during the projection period, are reasonable and are in line with the management’s future business projections that were approved by the Board earlier,
– Whether Covid consideration has been taken into account by the management while taking the critical assumptions like revenue growth rate, discount rate, timing of cash inflows and outflows, and if yes, the evidence considered by the management to support them,
– Sensitivity analysis on the assumptions made by the management,
– One-off cash inflows should be supported by adequate documentation to substantiate that realisation is certain,
– Adequate provisions have been made towards any future contingencies and events,
– Guarantees and commitments to related and non-related parties and to their creditors or lenders,
– Any subsequent events that may have an impact on the going concern assessment made by the management,
– Inquire with the management as to its knowledge of events or conditions beyond the period of management’s assessment that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern,
– Where an auditor relies on a ‘support letter’ as evidence, the auditor should also evaluate the financial strength and capability of the parent or group company issuing the support letter to evaluate whether the parent or group company has the financial ability to discharge the obligations of the company. Further, the support letter should cover at least twelve months from the date of the financial statements and should be executed in a way so as to create a legal binding on the parent or group company to provide financial support when needed,
– Written representations from management regarding their plans for future action and the feasibility of these plans

Going concern evaluation considerations for small and medium enterprises
In case of small and medium enterprises, there can be a situation where the management has not performed a detailed, documented going concern assessment; in such cases the auditor should discuss with management the basis for the intended use of the going concern basis of accounting and whether events or conditions exist that, individually or collectively, may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. The auditor should also remain alert throughout the audit for audit evidence of events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.

GOING CONCERN EVALUATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
In case of consolidated financial statements, the auditor of the parent entity is also required to report on the going concern assumption used by the management for the preparation of consolidated financial statements. In this case, the auditor of the parent entity needs to perform the evaluation of going concern assumption of the entities that are getting consolidated, by placing reliance on the audit report issued and work performed by the component auditors (if the parent auditor is not the auditor for all components).

However, the auditor needs to perform adequate audit procedures, in accordance with the guidance given in SA 600 Using the Work of Another Auditor, on the work performed by the component auditors such as review of work papers of going concern evaluation, minutes of meetings with management and component auditors, subsequent events, etc., before concluding the evaluation of going concern assumption for the consolidated financial statements.

Period covered for going concern assessment
Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements requires management to consider at least twelve months from the end of the reporting period for the going concern assessment; similar guidance is given in SA 570 (Revised) as well.

Here it is important to highlight that twelve months is the minimum period prescribed both by Ind AS 1 and SA 570 (Revised), and if the auditor, based on the audit evidence obtained, believes that the period of assessment should be extended beyond twelve months from the date of the financial statements, then the auditor should request management to do so.

However, if management is unwilling to make or extend its assessment, a qualified opinion, or a disclaimer of opinion in the auditor’s report may be appropriate, because it may not be possible for the auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting in the preparation of the financial statements.

One example for the above scenario could be an entity whose license to do business is expiring in the thirteenth month from the end of the financial year and the cost of renewing the license is substantially high; in this case, the auditor may need to request management to extend its going concern assessment beyond twelve months to assess the certainty to renew the license and the source of finance to fund its renewal fees.

Reporting considerations
Based on the audit evidence obtained, the auditor needs to conclude whether in his judgement a material uncertainty exists related to events or conditions that, individually or collectively, may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, and accordingly needs to ensure the compliances with respect to the disclosures in the financial statements and reporting in the auditors’ report.

The Table below lists the scenarios and the related disclosure and reporting requirements as per Ind AS 1 and SA 570 (Revised) that the auditor needs to ensure:

Scenarios*

Events or conditions
have been identified and a material uncertainty exists

Events or conditions
have been identified but no material uncertainty exists

Financial statements

Disclosure in the financial statements

• Principal events or conditions and management’s evaluation of
the significance of those events or conditions

• Principal events or conditions and management’s evaluation of
the significance of those events or conditions

 

(continued)

• Management’s plans to deal with these events or conditions

• Fact that there is a material uncertainty related to these
events or conditions that cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to
continue as a going concern

(continued)

• Management’s plans that mitigate the effect of these events or
conditions

• Significant judgements made by management as part of its
assessment

*Reference can be made to the Annual Reports referred to in the first part of the Going Concern article to gain a practical understanding of the disclosures required to be made in the financial statements under various scenarios.

Like the Ind AS 1, AS 1 also does not provide any specific disclosure guidance on the material uncertainty and requires specific disclosures only when the entity has intentions or requirement to liquidate or curtail materially the scale of its operation, and as a result of which the financial statement needs to be prepared on an alternate basis.

(b) Scenarios for reporting in the auditor’s report:

Scenarios*

Events or conditions
have been identified and a material uncertainty exists*

Auditors’ report

Management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting in the
financial statements is inappropriate

Auditor to express an adverse opinion regardless of whether or
not the financial statements include disclosure of the inappropriateness of
management’s use of the going concern basis of accounting, and reporting of
it under u/s 143(3)(f);

Reference can be drawn to the Annual Report of Mercator Limited
for the year ended 31st March, 2020

Going concern basis of accounting is
appropriate, but a material uncertainty relating to going concern exists

Separate section in the auditors’
report
with a heading that includes reference to the fact that a material
uncertainty related to going concern exists, and reporting of it u/s
143(3)(f);

Reference can be made to the Annual
Reports of:

• Vodafone Idea Limited for the year
ended 31st March, 2021

• SpiceJet Limited for the year ended
31st March, 2020

Scenarios*

Events or conditions
have been identified and a material uncertainty exists*

Going concern basis of accounting is appropriate but adequate
disclosure of material uncertainty is not made in the financial statements

Qualified or adverse opinion, based on the pervasiveness of the
inadequacy of disclosure, and reporting of it u/s 143(3)(f) when sufficient
appropriate audit evidence regarding the appropriateness of the management’s
use of the going concern is obtained, but adequate disclosure of a material
uncertainty is not made in the financial statements

Management concluded going concern
basis of accounting is not appropriate and considered alternate basis of
accounting

Emphasis of Matter paragraph, to draw
the user’s attention, when the alternate basis of accounting is acceptable to
auditor

*As per the requirement of CARO 2020 clause (xix), the auditor is also required to comment on the material uncertainties, with respect to the company’s ability to honour its obligation existing at the balance sheet date and that are due for payment within a period of one year.

It is worth mentioning here that the auditor should not consider communicating key audit matters as a substitute for reporting in accordance with SA 570 (Revised) when a material uncertainty exists. Accordingly, a separate heading that includes reference to the material uncertainty related to going concern needs to be included before key audit matters as per the Appendix of SA 570 (Revised).

PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT
Just as going concern assessment requires significant judgement by management, the evaluation of going concern assessment also requires significant professional judgement by the auditors. The example below demonstrates one such scenario:

Illustration
Company A is into the business of providing e-learning solutions and had started its operations two years back with a share capital of Rs. 50 lakhs. The company received the first round of funding of Rs. 50 crores from a PE investor in the first year of its operations; however, due to significant spend on advertising and e-learning content development, the company is running into significant losses.

The company is in the third year of its operations and expected to start generating positive cash flows by the end of the fifth year. The historical year-on-year revenue growth is 100% and the promoter is in discussion with the PE investors for the second round of funding. The company is not able to borrow from bankers due to unavailability of asset base and adequate guarantee.

The management strongly believes that the second round of funding is going to happen within the next few months considering past revenue growth and positive future outlook in the e-learning sector.

Analysis
In the present scenario, there are events and conditions that cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern; however, the management based on evidence like growth potential in the industry, past revenue trends and current negotiations with PE investors, has concluded that the going concern assumption holds good.

Based on the above conclusion of management, the auditor may consider the following points for evaluating the management’s assessment:
(a) Industry analysts’ research reports on the growth potential of the industry,
(b) Evidence of negotiations with potential investors to assess the progress of the next round of funding, like non-binding term sheets, email communications, etc.,
(c) Normal gestation period in similar industries to generate positive cash flows,
(d) Evidence to support future projections and cash flows that may include sales orders, inquiries from present and prospective customers, reasonability of assumptions like growth rate, estimated expenditure to run operations, etc.,
(e) Sensitivity analysis on the assumptions to see the implications in case there is a deviation,
(f) Present litigations against the company, if any, specifically on account of non-payment of dues,
(g) Alternate plan with management, in case the funding does not take place.

Considering the above facts, the auditor needs to conclude whether a material uncertainty exists regarding the going concern assumption for the preparation of financial statements and accordingly should exercise his professional judgement on the basis of the available evidence to conclude whether the going concern basis of accounting is appropriate.

Based on the above evaluation, the auditor needs to ensure the adequacy of relevant disclosures made by the management in the financial statements and appropriate reporting of going concern in the auditors’ report.

Documentation
As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the evaluation of going concern assessment requires significant professional judgement and involves various critical factors that require detailed evaluation and discussion with management before drawing a conclusion, and as such it becomes very critical for the auditor to ensure adequate audit documentation demonstrating the audit procedures performed and evidence obtained by the audit team, to conclude the going concern assumption.

Given below are the main points that the auditor should consider while documenting the going concern evaluation:
– Events and conditions identified during the audit that the auditor believes may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue on a going concern basis;
– Minutes of meetings with management, discussing all such identified events and conditions and management responses addressing those events and conditions. Here it is important to highlight that the audit team while documenting these minutes of meetings should also ensure that such documentation should also cover the date and place of the meeting, the names of the participants and their designations, and acknowledgment from the participants of the matters discussed therein;
– Details of the business plan and other factors considered by the management to support the going concern assumption;
– Audit procedures performed and evidence obtained by the audit team to validate the management plan and assumptions;
– Minutes of meetings of any discussion / consultation held by the audit team with the senior audit partners or industry experts within the firm;
– Adequate documentation demonstrating the reliance placed on the Subject Matter Experts and audit procedures performed in accordance with the guidance given in SA 260 Using the Work of an Expert;
– Conclusion drawn by the auditor based on the audit procedures performed and evidence obtained;
– Disclosure implications in the financial statements, based on the conclusion drawn and whether it has been complied by the management while preparing the financial statements;
– Reporting implications in the auditors’ report based on the above evaluation and disclosures made in the financial statements;
– In cases where the auditor concludes that an emphasis of matter or a modified opinion is required to be issued, evidences of communication with Those Charged With Governance should also be documented as part of audit documentation.

TO SUMMARISE
The above discussion highlights that the evaluation of going concern assessment has become more critical and complex in the present economic environment and the auditor needs to adopt a more vigilant approach to address it effectively. The auditor, along with the various guidances that have been issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to assist the auditors to address the challenges in going concern, should also draw reference from other audits, of events and conditions that have raised significant doubts on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern with their possible outcome, while concluding the evaluation of going concern assessment.

 

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS DEPOSITS, LOANS AND BORROWINGS

BACKGROUND
Companies need funds on a regular basis and tap various sources for the same, from retail / small depositors (commonly referred to as public deposits) to large lenders. In respect of public deposits there are stringent guidelines laid down by the RBI and the MCA which need to be complied with, including for amounts which are deemed to be in the nature of deposits. Further, the lenders and depositors also need an assurance that the companies are using the same for the stated purposes and not as a funding tool within group entities and would be able to repay the same as per the stipulated terms as well as an assurance about the future stability and liquidity of the company. The Companies Act, 2013 (‘the Act’) has also laid down stringent provisions to regulate the same, especially in respect of non-financial companies. CARO 2020 has also accordingly enhanced the reporting requirements substantially.

SCOPE OF REPORTING

The scope of reporting can be analysed under the following clauses:

Clause No.

Particulars

Nature of change, if any

Clause 3(v)

Deemed Deposits:

Enhanced Reporting

In respect of deposits accepted by the company or amounts which are deemed to be deposits:

• Whether the directives issued by the Reserve
Bank of India and the provisions of sections 73 to 76 or any other relevant
provisions of the Companies Act and the rules made thereunder, where
applicable, have been complied with;

• In case of any contraventions

 

in respect of the above, the nature of such
contraventions be stated;

• If an order has been passed by the Company Law
Board or the National Company Law Tribunal or the Reserve Bank of India or
any court or any other tribunal, whether the same has been complied with or
not;

 

Clause 3(ix)(a)

Default in repayment of loans / other borrowings
and interest:

Enhanced Reporting

• Whether the company has defaulted in repayment
of loans or other borrowings or in
the payment of interest thereon to any lender;

• If yes, the period and the amount of default to
be reported as per the format below:

• Nature of borrowing including debt securities

• Name of lender*

• Amount not paid on due date
• Whether principal or interest

• No. of days delay or unpaid
• Remarks, if any

* lender-wise details to be provided in case of
defaults to banks, financial institutions and Government
           

Clause 3(ix)(b)

Wilful defaulter:

New Clause

Whether the company is
declared a wilful defaulter by any bank or financial institution or other
lender.

Clause 3(ix)(c)

Application of term loans for prescribed
purposes:

New Clause

• Whether term loans were applied
for the purpose for which the loans were obtained;

• If not, the amount of
loan so

 

(continued)

diverted and the purpose
for which it is used may be reported.

 

Clause 3(ix)(d)

Short-term funds utilised for long-term purposes:

New Clause

• Whether funds raised on
short-term basis have been utilised for long-term purposes;

• If yes, the nature and
amount to be indicated.

Clause 3(ix)(e)

Funds borrowed for meeting obligations of group
companies:

New Clause

• Whether the company has
taken any funds from any entity or person on account of or to meet the
obligations of its subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures;

• If so, details thereof
with nature of such transactions and the amount in each case.

Clause 3(ix)(f)

Loans raised against pledge of securities of
group companies:

New Clause

• Whether the company has
raised loans during the year on the pledge of securities held in its
subsidiaries, joint ventures or associate companies;

• If so, give details
thereof; and

• Report if the company has
defaulted in repayment of such loans raised.

 

CLAUSE-WISE ANALYSIS OF ENHANCED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Deemed Deposits [Clause 3(v)]:
• The scope has been enhanced to cover amounts which are deemed to be in the nature of deposits as per the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014.
Default in repayment of loans / other borrowings and interest [Clause 3 (ix)(a)]:
• The scope of this clause has been extended to cover all borrowings other than loans and hence would include debentures, commercial paper, subordinated debt and inter-corporate deposits.
• The scope of the clause has been expanded to all borrowings from any lender and not just restricted to borrowings from financial institutions, banks, Government or dues to debenture holders, as was the case earlier.
• The scope of reporting has been extended to interest on the borrowings in addition to repayment of principal amount.
• If there is a default in the repayment of borrowings, the format for reporting, the period and amount of default has now been prescribed.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges, which are discussed below, in respect of the clauses where there are enhanced reporting requirements as well as new clauses:

Deemed Deposits [Clause 3(v)]:
a) Inclusive nature of the definition: The Act vide section 2(31) provides an inclusive definition of deposits by stating that deposits include:
• any receipt of money by way of deposit or loan or in any other form by a company; but
• does not include such categories of amounts as may be prescribed in consultation with the RBI (no such amounts have been prescribed till date).

In spite of the inclusive nature of the definition, Rule 2(1)(c) of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 2014, makes certain exclusions from the definition of deposits. These are broadly indicated hereunder:
• Amounts received from the Central or State Government or guaranteed by them, as also from any other statutory or local authorities constituted under an Act of Parliament or any State Legislature;
• Amounts received from foreign Governments or other prescribed foreign sources / entities, subject to the provisions of FEMA and the regulations framed thereunder;
• Amounts received from banks, public financial institutions, insurance companies and regional financial institutions;
• Amounts received against issue of commercial paper or similar instruments in accordance with the RBI guidelines;
• Amount received by one company from another company (inter-corporate deposits);
• Amounts received towards subscription of securities, including share application money, in pursuance of an offer made in accordance with the provisions of the Act. However, such amounts need to be allotted or adjusted within 60 days. If the same are not refunded within 15 days from the completion of 60 days the same would be treated as deposits. Also, no adjustment of such amounts for any other purpose would be permissible;
• Any amounts received from a person who at the time of receipt was a Director of the company, provided that he has submitted a declaration that the amount is not given out of funds acquired by him by borrowings from others;
• Amount raised through issue of bonds or debentures which are secured by a first or ranking pari passu with the first charge on the assets of the Company (other than intangible assets) referred to in Schedule III and which are compulsorily convertible into shares within a period of five years;
• Any amount received from an employee subject to the following conditions:

(i) It does not exceed his annual salary under a contract of employment; and
(ii) It is in the nature of a non-interest-bearing security deposit;
• The following amounts received in the course of or for the purposes of business:
(i) Advances for supply of goods or provision of services provided they are appropriated / adjusted against the supply of goods or provision of services within 365 days from the date of receipt of the advance, unless they are the subject matter of dispute;
(ii) Advance received in connection with the consideration for immovable property under an agreement or arrangement, provided the same is adjusted against the property in terms of the agreement or arrangement;
(iii) Security deposit for the performance of a contract for the supply of goods or provision of services;
(iv) Advances received under a long-term contract for supply of capital goods, other than those under (ii) above.
Accordingly, deposits which are technically not in the nature of deposits by virtue of the definition but substantially having the character of deposits are also required to be reported upon.

b) Higher risk of non-compliance: The risk of non-compliance would be even higher in case of deemed deposits. The auditor should obtain the list of amounts received in the course of, or for the purposes of, the business of the company (e.g., advances, security deposits, credit balances, etc.) and assess whether these amounts comply with the above requirements to determine whether such amounts would constitute deemed deposits. He should also review the internal control systems and processes of the client to ensure that there are adequate checks and balances in place to ensure that there is no non-compliance with the requirements. For example, for any advance / deposits / amount received by a company from a vendor, there would be internal checks to ensure that the balance is appropriated against supply or goods / services
provided by the vendor within the stipulated time limit of 365 days.

Default in repayment of loans / other borrowings and interest [Clause 3 (ix)(a)]:
a. Companies adopting Ind AS: Such companies are likely to face certain specific challenges which need to be kept in mind whilst considering the various reporting requirements which are as under:
• The borrowings need to be considered on the basis of the legal form rather than on the basis of the substance of the arrangements as is required in terms of Ind AS 32 and 109. Accordingly, redeemable preference shares though considered as financial liabilities / borrowings under Ind AS, will not be considered for reporting under this clause since legally they are in the nature of share capital. Similarly, optionally or fully convertible debentures though considered as compound financial instruments or equity under Ind AS, will not be considered for reporting.
• The interest charged to the P&L Account is computed on the basis of the Effective Interest Rate (EIR) method which would include certain other charges. However, for identifying the unpaid interest the contractual payments need to be considered.
• Ind AS 107 requires disclosure of the maturity analysis of the financial liabilities showing the contractual repayments under different liquidity buckets. The auditors shall cross-check the work papers for reporting under this clause with the Ind AS disclosures. Similar considerations would apply to the disclosures with respect to the defaults in loan repayments under paragraphs 18 and 19 of Ind AS 107 as well as under Schedule III.

b. Reschedulement proposals: If the company has submitted an application for reschedulement to the lenders, which is under different stages of processing, the same would also be considered as a default and need to be reported. However, if the application for reschedulement of loan has been approved by the bank or financial institution concerned during the year covered by the auditor’s report, the auditor should state in his audit report the fact of reschedulement of loan. The Guidance Note issued by ICAI has clarified that where reschedulement of loan has been approved subsequent to the balance sheet date, the auditor should report the defaults during the year. However, he may mention this fact in the remarks column.

c. Covid-19 restructuring proposals: In case a company which has availed of the concessions in terms of the Covid regulatory package notified by the RBI, the compliance with the same would not be considered as a default. In such cases, the auditor may consider making an appropriate reference in the report.

d. Challenges for NBFCs and highly leveraged companies: Such companies are likely to face certain specific challenges which need to be kept in mind whilst considering the various reporting requirements which are as under:
• The auditor shall review the company’s internal control systems and test the design and operating effectiveness of the company’s treasury activities and liquidity management to identify defaults on a timely basis since it would not be practical to verify each individual case of default due to the volume of transactions. The auditors shall also verify the procedures that the company has in place to avoid any defaults in repayment of loan or payment of interest. Further, in such cases the auditor can also consider obtaining and reviewing the latest credit rating report and whether there is a mention about any defaults. Similarly, any decline in credit rating should trigger an element of professional scepticism about whether there is a default by the company. Finally, an appropriate representation should be obtained from the management.
• In respect of NBFCs which have issued subordinated debt and perpetual instruments (PDI) in terms of the RBI guidelines, care would need to be taken to check whether any events / triggers have taken place in terms of the RBI guidelines to make repayments, especially of the principal amounts and whether the same have been complied with. The key RBI guidelines which need to be kept in mind are as under:
(i) Subordinated debt is not redeemable at the instance of the holder or without the consent of the supervisory authority of the NBFC;
(ii) Non-deposit-taking NBFCs with asset size of Rs. 500 crores and above shall issue PDI as plain vanilla instruments only. However, they may issue PDI with a ‘call option’ for a minimum period of ten years from the date of issue and the call option shall be exercised only with the prior approval of RBI.

Wilful defaulter [Clause 3 (ix)(b)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this clause, the auditor will have to keep in mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:
Where a company is a declared wilful defaulter by any bank or financial institution or other lender, the following details shall be given:
a. Date of declaration as wilful defaulter,
b. Details of defaults (amount and nature of defaults),
* ‘wilful defaulter’ here means a person or an issuer who or which is categorised as a wilful defaulter by any bank or financial institution (as defined under the Act) or consortium thereof, in accordance with the guidelines on wilful defaulters issued by the Reserve Bank of India.

Whilst reporting, the auditor should make a cross-reference to the above disclosures made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Before proceeding further, it is important to analyse the key requirements as per the RBI guidelines for identification and classification of wilful defaulters, since that acts as the trigger-point.

Key requirements as per the RBI Guidelines (RBI Circular RBI/2014-15/73DBR.No.CID.BC.57/20.16.003/2014-15 dated 1st July, 2014):
Wilful default: A ‘wilful default’ would be deemed to have occurred if any of the following events is noted:
• The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender even when it has the capacity to honour the said obligations;
• The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has not utilised the finance from the lender for the specific purposes for which finance was availed but has diverted the funds for other purposes;
• The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has siphoned off the funds so that the funds have not been utilised for the specific purpose for which finance was availed, nor are the funds available with the unit in the form of other assets;
• The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has also disposed of or removed the movable fixed assets or immovable property given for the purpose of securing a term loan without the knowledge of the bank / lender.

The identification of the wilful default should be made keeping in view the track record of the borrowers and should not be decided on the basis of isolated transactions / incidents. The default to be classified as wilful should be intentional, deliberate and calculated. The key trigger-points for identification of wilful default indicated by RBI are:
• Diversion of funds
• Siphoning of funds

Diversion of funds:
This would be construed to include any one of the undernoted occurrences:
a) Utilisation of short-term working capital funds for long-term purposes not in conformity with the terms of sanction;
b) Deploying borrowed funds for purposes / activities or creation of assets other than those for which the loan was sanctioned;
c) Transferring borrowed funds to the subsidiaries / group companies or other corporates by whatever modalities;
d) Routing of funds through any bank other than the lender bank or members of the consortium without prior permission of the lender;
e) Investment in other companies by way of acquiring equities / debt instruments without approval of lenders;
f) Shortfall in deployment of funds vis-à-vis the amounts disbursed / drawn and the difference not being accounted for.

Siphoning of funds:
The term ‘siphoning of funds’ should be construed to occur if any funds borrowed from banks / FIs are utilised for purposes unrelated to the operations of the borrower, to the detriment of the financial health of the entity or of the lender. The decision as to whether a particular instance amounts to siphoning of funds or diversion of funds would have to be a judgement of the lenders based on objective facts and circumstances of the case. Generally, siphoning of funds would occur when the funds are diverted to group companies without proper approvals.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) If the company has not been declared a wilful defaulter but has received a show cause notice in accordance with the RBI Circular, the auditor may consider disclosing this fact under this Clause. In case a show cause notice is not received by the company, the auditor should also obtain a representation letter from the management that the company has neither been declared as a wilful defaulter nor has it received any show cause notice. This would normally be the case when the company has defaulted and the same has been reported under Clause 3(ix)(a) earlier.

b) It is possible that the company is legally disputing the bank’s / financial institution’s declaration of the company as wilful defaulter. In that case, the auditor shall consider performing the audit procedures under Standard on Auditing SA 501 Audit Evidence – Specific Considerations for Selected Items that requires the auditors to perform certain procedures, as indicated hereunder, as also make appropriate disclosures whilst reporting under this Clause as well as in the financial statements under the amended Schedule III.
• Obtain a list of litigation and claims;
• Where available, review the management’s assessment of the outcome of each of the identified litigation and claims and its estimate of the financial implications, including costs involved;
• Seek confirmation from the entity’s external legal counsel about the reasonableness of management’s assessments and provide the auditor with further information if the list is considered by the entity’s external legal counsel to be incomplete or incorrect;
• If the entity’s external legal counsel does not respond appropriately to a letter of general inquiry, the auditor may seek direct communication through a letter of specific inquiry;
• Consider meeting the entity’s external legal counsel to discuss the likely outcome of the litigation or claims, for example, where the matter is a significant risk.

c) It is possible that the company may not have been declared as wilful defaulter as at the date of the balance sheet but has been so declared before the audit report is issued. As per paragraph 6 of SA 560 Subsequent Events, the auditor shall perform audit procedures designed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that all events occurring between the date of the financial statements and the date of the auditor’s report that require adjustment of, or disclosure in, the financial statements have been identified. It is, therefore, clarified that the auditor should also consider whether the company has been declared as wilful defaulter as on the date of the audit report. The declaration of the company as a wilful defaulter will be published on the RBI website after the lender has followed the due process in terms of the above-referred RBI Circular.

Application of term loans for prescribed purposes [Clause 3 (ix)(c)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:

While reporting under this Clause, the auditor will have to keep in mind the amended Schedule III disclosures which are as under:
Where the company has not used the borrowings from banks and financial institutions for the specific purpose for which these had been taken at the balance sheet date, the company shall disclose the details of where they have been used.

‘Utilisation of borrowed funds and share premium’
This Clause is applicable in case where the company has advanced or loaned or invested funds (either borrowed funds or share premium or from any other source) to any other person(s) or entity(ies) (Intermediaries) with the understanding that the Intermediary shall, inter alia, directly or indirectly lend or invest in the other persons or entities identified in any manner whatsoever by or on behalf of the company (Ultimate Beneficiaries). In such a case, the company shall provide in the financial statements certain details such as: date and amount of funds advanced or loaned or invested in Intermediaries with complete details of each Intermediary; date and amount of fund further advanced or loaned or invested by such Intermediaries to other Intermediaries or Ultimate Beneficiaries along with complete details of the Ultimate Beneficiaries; and, declaration that relevant provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the Companies Act have been complied with for such transactions and the transactions are not violative of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Whilst reporting, the auditor should make a cross-reference to the above disclosures made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) In case of any loans / advances / payments to related parties or promoters / promoter group entities or any investments made in other companies, auditors need to exercise greater professional scepticism to ensure that the payments are genuine and for the purposes as per the sanctioned terms.

b) Reference should be made to the RBI Circular on wilful defaulters referred to earlier to identify possible instances of diversion of funds, since the purpose for which the funds are used / diverted are required to be reported / disclosed. Some instances of diversion of funds are:
• Payment to capital goods vendors from CC limits when there was shortfall in term loan sanctioned;
• Meeting company’s margin money from CC limits for expansion / modernisation / technical upgradation of existing project;
• Investment in subsidiary / Group companies;
• Investment in capital market or payment of long-term debt from the existing CC limits;
• Purchase of immovable properties / assets for personal use of the promoters / directors / KMPs;
• Current ratio of less than one may indicate that the company has diverted working capital loans for long-term purposes.

c) Under Ind AS, certain loans may be treated as compound financial instruments (part debt, part equity). The auditor shall cover the entire proceeds of the loans from the bank / FI for the purpose of reporting under the Clause.

Short-term funds utilised for long-term purposes [Clause 3 (ix)(d)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:

Refer to Clause 3(ix)(c) earlier.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) The auditor is required to state the nature of application of funds if the company has financed long-term assets out of short-term funds. The auditor can determine the nature of application of funds only if there is a direct linkage between the funds raised and the asset. The determination of direct relationship between the particular funds and an asset from the balance sheet may not always be feasible. The auditor shall obtain adequate audit evidence supporting the movement in funds. If the quantum of long-term funds raised is less than the funds used for long-term assets, this may imply that some of the long-term assets have been financed through short-term funds.

b) Often, it may not be possible to establish a direct link between the funds and the assets / utilisation, since money is fungible. The auditor shall determine the overall deployment of the source and application of funds of the company. The auditor may also review the cash flow statement to determine whether short-term funds have been used for long-term purposes. Instances where short-term funds would have been utilised for long-term purposes would include, for example, where the company has utilised funds from bank overdraft facilities in long-term investments or long-term projects or fixed assets. Similarly, there may be cases where the company raises monies from public deposits due for repayment within two to three years for the purpose of acquiring long-term investments, unless the company is able to demonstrate that a bulk of these deposits are renewed.

c) In case of NBFCs and Ind AS companies the ALM / Maturity Analysis disclosures need to be referred to for the purposes of identifying any maturity mismatches. Further, in such cases the auditor should also check whether the company’s treasury / finance department uses any liquidity / working capital management tools and if so to check the design and operating effectiveness of the internal controls around the same. If the quantum of long-term funds raised is less than the funds used for long-term assets, this may imply that some of the long-term assets have been financed through short-term funds. These considerations would equally apply to all entities where the volume of borrowings is significant.

Funds borrowed for meeting obligations of group companies [Clause 3 (ix)(e)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:
Refer to Clause 3(ix)(c) earlier.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:
a) Identifying subsidiaries and associates: Since this Clause requires to separately report on funds borrowed for meeting the obligations of subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates, the identification thereof is of paramount importance. The Guidance Note has clarified that these terms should be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Act which could be different, in certain cases, from what is defined in the Accounting Standards in the case of subsidiaries which is examined as under:
Section 2(87) of the Act defines ‘subsidiary company’ or ‘subsidiary’ in relation to any other company, means a company in which the holding company – (i) controls the composition of the Board of Directors; or (ii) exercises or controls more than one-half of the total voting power either at its own or together with one or more of its subsidiary companies. Thus, the Act emphasises on legal control which is similar to what is considered for the purpose of Accounting Standard 21 (AS 21) – Consolidated Financial Statements for companies adopting Indian GAAP. The concept of control and, therefore, subsidiary relationship under Ind AS 110 is much broader. Existence of factors such as, de facto control, potential voting rights, control through de facto agents, power to enforce certain decisions, etc., have to be considered, which are not considered for the purpose of section 2(87). Hence, for companies adopting Ind AS there could be differences between what is disclosed in the accounts and what is required for reporting under this Clause, which would need to be reconciled to ensure completeness of reporting. The auditors of Ind AS companies will need to take utmost care about this distinction while dealing with this Clause.

The definition of ‘associate’ under the Act extends to an entity that is significantly influenced by the investor company. Significant influence may be achieved in cases where the company is accustomed to act as per the directions of the investor company. Such a significant influence may be as a result of shareholders’ agreements, too. Therefore, the definition of ‘associate’ can be quite broad vis-a-vis the Accounting Standards.

b) Determining the reporting boundaries: This presents several challenges and raises certain issues which are discussed below:
• The Clause refers to any funds taken from any entity. However, both these terms have not been defined;
• Whilst the Guidance Note has specified that the word entity would include banks, FIs, companies, LLPs, Trusts, Government or others irrespective of the legal form, normally in case of trusts and others the purpose for which the funds have been given may not be clearly specified in the absence of any statutory requirements and lack of proper documentation. This would make it difficult for the auditor to establish a proper audit trail for the utilisation of funds, and hence he needs to exercise a heightened degree of professional scepticism. He should also consider obtaining a suitable management representation in this regard;
• Further, whilst the funds would include both short-term and long-term funds as clarified in the Guidance Note, there is no clarity as to whether it would cover both borrowed funds and share capital. A plain reading seems to suggest that even funds raised by issue of shares should be considered. In such cases, the auditor should refer to the Offer Letter / Prospectus to identify whether the funds are to be utilised for granting loans and advances to or making investments in or meeting other obligations of group companies. The same should also be corroborated with the reporting under Clause 3(x)(a) and (b).
• Finally, the auditor should consider the procedures performed for reporting under Clause 3(ix)(c) earlier wherein he would have identified diversion of funds, and if required he should cross-reference the same for reporting purposes.

c) Challenges for NBFCs, highly leveraged companies and companies with a large number of group companies: Such companies are likely to face certain specific challenges which need to be kept in mind whilst considering the various reporting requirements which are as under:
• The auditor shall review the company’s internal control systems and test the design and operating effectiveness to identify whether there is proper monitoring of the usage of funds as per the sanctioned terms or approved purposes;
• The auditor shall review the company’s internal control systems and test the design and operating effectiveness to identify whether related parties and the transactions with them are identified and appropriately recorded. He should also perform adequate and appropriate procedures under SA 500 on Related Parties. In particular, the auditor shall inspect or inquire about the following for indications of the existence of related party transactions or transactions that the management has not previously identified or disclosed to the auditor:
a) Bank, legal and third-party confirmations obtained as part of the auditor’s procedures;
b) Minutes of meetings of shareholders and of those charged with governance;
c) Such other records or documents as the auditor considers necessary in the circumstances of the entity;
d) The entity’s ownership and governance structures;
e) The types of investments that the entity is making and plans to make; and
f) The way the entity is structured and how it is financed.

Loans raised against pledge of securities of group companies [Clause 3 (ix)(f)]:
Additional disclosures under amended Schedule III:

Registration of charges or satisfaction with Registrar of Companies
Where any charges or satisfaction are yet to be registered with the Registrar of Companies beyond the statutory period, details and reasons thereof shall be disclosed.
Whilst reporting, the auditor should make a cross-reference to the above disclosures made in the financial statements to ensure that there are no inconsistencies.

Keeping in mind the above reporting requirements, the following are some of the practical challenges that could arise in reporting under this Clause:

a) Identifying subsidiaries and associates: Similar considerations as discussed under Clause 3(ix)(e) earlier would apply.

b) Negative lien / residual / floating charge: There may be cases where the company has a negative lien on its investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures and associate companies. It may be noted that such negative lien is not a pledge. Sometimes, loan agreements have a general or residual or floating charge on all securities without specific pledge of any security. Reporting under this Clause will be applicable only when the securities held in the subsidiaries, etc., are pledged for obtaining such loan by the company.

c) Validity / legality of pledge: In case of any doubts on the validity or legality of the pledge, the auditor may consider obtaining confirmation from the company’s lawyers by performing the procedures as per SA 501 referred to earlier. For this purpose the auditor should be aware of the requirements as under:
• Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013 dealing with registration of charges;
• Section 12 of the Depositories Act, 1996 read with Regulation 58, SEBI (Depositories and Participants) Regulations, 1996.
In case the auditor based on his inquiries and / or discussion with the legal personnel observes any non-compliance with respect to the above, he should consider inviting attention to the same in his report so that the lender / pledgee is aware of the same.

d) The auditor may consider giving a reference to the reporting of defaults under Clause 3(ix)(a) earlier in case of any defaults without specifying the extent of default.

Impact on the audit opinion:
Whilst reporting on these Clauses, the auditors may come across several situations wherein they may need to report exceptions / deviations. In each of these cases, they would need to carefully evaluate the impact of the same on the audit opinion by exercising their professional judgement to determine the materiality and relevance of the same to the users of the financial statements. These are broadly examined hereunder:

Nature
of exception / deviation

Possible
impact on the audit report / opinion

The company has not complied with the RBI
directives or sections 73 to 76 or other applicable provisions of the Act or
relevant Rules or orders of any statutory authority which may have
implications on the main audit

• Modified opinion under SA 706

• Key audit matter under SA 701

 

(continued)

report due to non-compliance with the
following SAs:

• Consideration of laws and regulations (SA
250)

• Fraud (SA 240).

[Clause 3(v)]

 

• In extreme cases, where there are
continuing defaults in repayment of loans / borrowings by the company, there
may be uncertainties around the appropriateness of Going Concern assumption
in the financial statements. The auditor shall follow the requirements of SA
570 (Revised) Going Concern in such cases.

• Restructuring of loan subsequent to the
balance sheet date but before the date of auditor’s report.

[Clause 3(ix)(a)]

• Modified opinion under SA
706

• Emphasis of matter under
SA 705

• Key audit matter under SA
701 (in case of restructuring subsequent to the Balance Sheet date)

 

Where the company has been declared a
wilful defaulter, there may be uncertainties around the appropriateness of
Going Concern assumption in the financial statements. The auditor shall
follow the requirements of SA 570 (Revised) Going Concern in such
cases

[Clause 3(ix)(b)]

• Modified opinion under SA 706

• Key audit matter under SA 701 (where the
Company is disputing the same)

Where the company has not applied term
loans for the purpose for which the loans were obtained, there may be
uncertainties around the appropriateness of Going Concern assumption in the
financial statements. The auditor shall follow the requirements of auditing
standards, in particular SA 240 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to
Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements

[Clause 3(ix)(c)]

Modified opinion under SA 706

Where the company has taken any funds from
any entity or person on account of or to meet the obligations of its
subsidiaries,  associates or joint
ventures, the

Modified opinion under SA 706

(continued)

auditor may have to consider   the impact of impairment or provisioning
and whether the same is consistent with the purpose of loans taken by the
company and whether there is a breach in the loan covenants. The auditor
shall consider requirements of the auditing standards, in particular SA 240 The
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial
Statements

[Clause 3(ix)(e)]

 

Where the company has raised loans during
the year on the pledge of securities held in its subsidiaries, joint ventures
or associate companies and if the company has defaulted in repayment of such
loans, the auditor may have to consider audit issues such as requirements of
the auditing standards, in particular SA 570 Going Concern and SA 240 The
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of Financial
Statements

[Clause 3(ix)(f)]

Modified opinion under SA 706

In such cases, it is imperative that the Board’s Report contains explanations / comments on every reservation / adverse comment in the audit report as per section 134(3)(f) of the Companies Act, 2013 and that there is no factual inconsistency between the two.

CONCLUSION
The above changes have cast onerous reporting responsibilities on the auditor, especially towards the lenders for various critical aspects as under:
• Identifying defaults on timely basis.
• Monitoring the end use of funds.
• Providing red flags towards Going Concern and fraud-related issues.

Accordingly, the auditors would need to exercise greater degree of professional scepticism during the course of their audits.

Statutory Audit – BCAJ Survey on Perspectives on NFRA Consultation Paper

STATUTORY AUDIT – BCAJ SURVEY ON PERSPECTIVES ON NFRA CONSULTATION PAPER

The BCAJ carried out a dipstick survey in October 2021 considering the National Financial Reporting Authority’s (NFRA) Consultation Paper [September 2021.] that brings out ideas to suggest that Statutory Audit fees are a burden, that only public interest entities require audit and that entities having Rs. 250 crores net-worth should be subjected to audit. The survey sought the views of Companies (Clients of Auditors) who avail the services of CA firms to carry out Statutory Audits.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE RESPONDENTS

64.9% of respondents represented Private Limited Companies, 16.2.% Group Companies (comprising of several companies of all sizes), 10.8% Listed/ Public Limited Companies, 4.1% One Person Companies and 4.0% regulated companies (such as NBFCs).

 

KEY HIGHLIGHTS

Survey Questions and Responses

 

  1. VALUE PROPOSITION: In your view, which of the following areas does a Statutory Audit add VALUE in your business? [Select one or more options]

Other Comments by Survey Participants: Statutory Audit: eases Foreign Operations; Facilitates in quoting for tenders.

  1. COST vs VALUE: In the growth cycle of your company do you feel Statutory Audit is not a compliance burden / a ‘cost’ and adds value as mentioned in Q1 above to management / owners ? [Select one option]

  1. FEES: Do you feel that the Statutory Audit Fees in your experience are generally commensurate to the scope, time, effort, and risk involved for the Auditor? [Select the most appropriate option]

  1. PUBLIC INTEREST: Do you feel requirement of statutory audit should be SOLELY based on Public Interest criteria OR statutory audit serves multiple purposes especially for companies which are not Public Interest Entities such as for MSME companies? [Select one option]

  1. OPTION: If audit was not mandatory or was optional would you still get your accounts audited for reasons other than “Compliance with the Act” since audited accounts give strength, sanctity, and dependability to financials? [Select one option]

  1. CONSEQUENCES: If you chose not to opt for statutory audit and later require loans, or get notices, or require certificates under various laws – would you be willing to go through “Audit” of those areas for above purposes later on for more than one year? [Select one option]

  1. CEASE TO BE A COMPANY – Hypothetically, if some categories of companies were to be exempted from Statutory Audits and other heavy compliances, would you rather wish to carry the business in a non-corporate format and therefore should be given an opportunity to change over to LLP or other modes for ease of operating without any questions / hassles from tax departments or MCA? [Select one option]

  1. BURDENSOME COMPLIANCES – In your view, which are the TOP THREE most burdensome compliances thrust upon small and medium companies from a financial reporting point of view?

DO TAXPAYERS UNDERTAKE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES TO PAY TAXES?

Hope you all had a beautiful Deepavali and a great start to the Samvat year 2078!

We have been seeing a much larger tax base in the last few years but we don’t see any specific ‘return on taxes paid’. There is no differentiation between a taxpayer and a non-taxpayer. When so few people pay taxes, I think tax cannot be an obligation but must be treated as an investment and taxpayers as investors in India.

On the other hand, taxpayer money is used to appease voters with freebees to the extent that taxpayers are thrown out of the system entirely. For example, if your child aspires to study medicine in Maharashtra, then you will be shocked to know that 74% seats are ‘reserved’, or rather awarded without merit. Reservation is a Government racket to strangulate a child to struggle excessively, or to get ejected out of the system for which his parents have paid, or the child goes out of the country, never to return. But it becomes vicious and ridiculous, once a student has done MBBS, then all pass-outs should be equal. But, even for MD, there is reservation. Government gives free seats to compensate its failure to give adequate education facilities to those who cannot afford it. So it gives out-of-turn seats directly. If Government gave money and extra classes for those who need it, so that they could compete, then one can build a meritocratic system that will give self-respect and not false entitlement. Reservation in most forms is racism and discrimination when it continues forever.

On the financial front, there are examples where Government extracts excessive taxes from taxpayers. Take the cost of buying a car as reported a while back. If a taxpayer wants to buy a vehicle worth Rs. 15 lakhs, she would have to earn about Rs. 21.42 lakhs because income tax takes away Rs. 6.42 lakhs. Out of Rs. 15 lakhs, the car dealer gets Rs. 9.8 lakhs only and Government ‘siphons’ off as taxes Rs. 5.2 lakhs. Add to it the taxes on fuel. On a retail price of Rs. 105.5, taxes amount to Rs. 57.2 (54%) and the dealer cost of petrol is Rs. 44.4 (42%). A sum of Rs. 3.9 is the commission per litre. Going back to earning this Rs. 105.5, a taxpayer needs to earn much more pre-tax. For other than ‘sin goods’, how can taxes be more than the transaction value?

Plus, let’s not forget that for Government nothing is enough – as per the MOS for Petroleum, the Union Government’s tax collection jumped 88% to Rs. 3.35 lakh crores for F.Y. 2020-21 from Rs. 1.78 lakh crores. This is also detrimental to encouraging consumption which is often the missing link in the virtuous cycle. Does Government take back as taxes what it spends? Imagine if taxes were reduced to 10-15% of the base value of cars for taxpayers. That would be some incentive or solace for paying direct taxes. And for those who believe Government can offer the best social services and taxes go towards that, one knows that Government is more often than not a benchmark of inefficiency and wastage, if you ignore corruption.

Facilities to taxpayers: They don’t exist. Most public services are paid for use by taxpayers: tolls, water, airport charges, train tickets or infra costs when you buy a home. Costs like defence must come from the massive natural resources that Government controls and not from the small income tax paying base. We should have reservations for taxpayers in top colleges in every segment, medical insurance top-up at any age for taxpayers who have paid taxes for 30 years or more, stamp duty set-off based on value add only for property purchase, fast track judicial service, and so on. Then we can even start to talk about honouring taxpayers. Till then, its harrowing taxpayers!

 
 
Raman Jokhakar
Editor

FATE IS THE FIFTH FACTOR

Readers will be aware that in the Bhagawad Geeta there is no mention or promotion of any religious community. The word religion – is used in the Geeta to mean ‘duty’, just as there is a religion (duty) of a king, of a teacher, a student, or of Brahmans and of Kshatriyas (warriors). It is a practical guide for day-to-day life and not necessarily a treatise with high level ‘philosophy’. Shrikrishna gives very practical tips in His message to Arjun.

In the 18th chapter, 14th stanza, Shrikrishna describes five factors responsible for performing a task,

Adhishthaan means ‘body’. It is believed that the soul (Atman) stays in our body and gets all the tasks performed. Thus, if there is no body then nothing can be done. We can achieve all things only through our body. Therefore, it is also said – Which means that the body is the first medium of achieving all religions – or discharging all duties.

Karta – The doer. In philosophical or spiritual terms, the soul gets everything done. Karta also refers to or ego. Everybody feels that he/she is doing the work. In reality, however, everybody is merely an instrument in the hands of the Supreme Power (or God). It is a false belief – ego – if one feels that one is doing the task oneself; it is the Supreme Power that gets it done through him/her.

Karanam – is resources or equipment or tools. In spiritual terms, it is our mind and various organs (indriyas). All our organs are the instruments in the hands of the soul – which is the real doer.

Cheshta – is ‘efforts’. Different types of efforts or actions.

Thus, the body, the doer, the equipment and actual efforts are the first four factors.

Daivam – The fifth factor is ‘Fate’ or ‘Destiny’ or even the unknown that is beyond our control. It is the power that controls the organs. Thus, despite the presence of all four factors, sometimes the task is not performed or completed successfully. Destiny is the fifth but equally important factor.

This is the beauty of Indian philosophy. Even the Gods cannot escape Destiny. Ram, Krishna and all other Gods also suffered in their lives in some way or other. They also tasted failures. They committed mistakes and even received ‘curses’. They also got ‘punished’ at times. That was their Destiny.

Therefore, the message is, we need to be down-to-earth. We should never boast about our physical power, wealth, resources, intellect and so on. We should always take into consideration the Destiny factor while planning anything. That is why we have Plan A, Plan B and so on.

At the same time, Destiny is not the sole factor. We should not be fatalists. Destiny helps only those who help themselves; or who have the first four factors in place. God favours the brave.

We experience this in every walk of life. In examinations, sports, wars, artistic performances, court proceedings, and even routine tasks like travelling, cooking, etc. Success can never be guaranteed. In cricket, it is often described as ‘glorious uncertainty’.

We professionals always need to bear this in mind. We experience this very often.

Let us offer our ‘Namaskaar’ to this very realistic philosophy.

PARADOX

‘Oh, hell! What a disgusting profession! I wonder why I chose it!’ A Chartered Accountant was cursing his profession.

‘What happened?’ I asked in a sympathetic tone.

He continued, ‘It’s very easy to say from the dais – “A dignified profession”. But in reality nobody cares for our profession.’

‘But people feel very highly about a CA. Your course is so difficult. The passing percentage is so low.’

The CA: ‘But what’s the use? You become “out-dated” every six months! Many things change every day! Zindagi mein kitne saal padhate rahane ka ? (How long to keep on learning and studying in life?)’

I pointed out, ‘But your signature is valuable. Government requires your signature on many documents and certificates – Not only on financial statements.’

‘But that is only a responsibility, a burden without commensurate rewards. There’s too much of regulation. It is impossible to keep track…’

I said, ‘Audit is your monopoly.’

He countered: ‘That is killing us. Nobody really wants audit. Nobody wants to pay tax. So our services are unwelcome…’

‘But you alone can guide the clients to comply with all laws and the rules and regulations.’

‘The client has no value for all these things. He says that all that we are doing is for ourselves; just to save our skin. He never feels any value addition in those regulations and compliances’.

I ventured, ‘But since these things are mandatory, you get fees…’

‘Fees? Bah! This is the most unremunerative profession. Payment of our fees is at the bottom of the ladder. And they bargain even for small amounts.’

‘But due to the system of articleship, you get good assistants at low cost?’

‘Articles? The less said about them the better. Everybody dictates to us – clients, staff, articles, regulators – and also the wife at home!’

‘But you do get the satisfaction of rendering good service?’

‘Satisfaction? There is nothing but frustration. Don’t you know that without corruption you cannot give results.’

I pointed out that there are many opportunities in the corporate sector. There are many other avenues and a variety of other services that one can render.

The CA agreed with me and added, ‘But for that you need not be a CA. And in corporates there is slogging like glorified slaves… No personal life… No independence. There is hypocrisy everywhere. And now everything is technology-driven. There is no application of mind.’

I said, ‘But don’t your clients maintain a long relationship with you?’

The CA responded sceptically with, ‘As soon as the fees are increased, the relations come to an end! There is no loyalty.’

The discussion was endless. We stopped after two hours – with his final remark, ‘I wonder why people go for this course at all! It was a wrong decision on my part. This profession has no future’.

We dispersed.

Next morning, I received a WhatsApp massage from my CA friend: ‘Pleased and proud to inform you that my son has passed his CPT exam and will be joining the CA course…’

In the Mahabharat, there is a very interesting chapter called ‘Yaksha-Prashna.’ It is an enlightening dialogue between Yudhishtira and a ‘super’ human being, Yaksha. He asks, ‘What is the most paradoxical situation in the world?’

Yudhishtira replies, ‘Everybody knows that death is inevitable; yet they behave as if they are immortal’.

I think many CAs feel that this profession has no future, yet their next generation takes up the course. Perhaps this applies to all professions.

SUPREME COURT FORMULATES GUIDELINES FOR COMPOUNDING; HOLDS THAT CONSENT OF SEBI NOT REQUIRED

BACKGROUND
An interesting feature of the SEBI Act, 1992 is that one can potentially be prosecuted u/s 24 for violating any provision of the Act and even any of the rules and regulations made thereunder. Further, the punishment can be in the form of imprisonment for as long as ten years, or a fine of up to Rs. 25 crores. Non-payment of the penalty imposed is also punished stringently, with a minimum prison term of one month and a maximum of ten years; or with a fine of Rs. 25 crores. This is quite unlike other laws under which only specified serious violations can be prosecuted as offences. In a sense, the provisions of the SEBI Act, at least on paper, sound more stringent than even the Indian Penal Code that has varying punishments for different offences.

Fortunately, prosecution is not generally initiated indiscriminately under the SEBI Act. However, the fear of being prosecuted remains. The question that arises is how does a person, who is willing to make amends for the wrong he has committed get relief from prosecution? For this purpose, the SEBI Act has enabling provisions for compounding of offences. Section 24A provides that offences, other than those punishable with imprisonment only or with both imprisonment and fine, can be compounded by the Securities Appellate Tribunal or the court before which the proceedings are pending.

Considering that there is no violation in the Act that is punishable by imprisonment only or by both imprisonment and fine, the conclusion is that all offences are compoundable and thus any prosecution proceeding can be compounded (see later herein for certain remarks of the Supreme Court). This is because there is a common provision for prosecution u/s 24, unlike other laws that have separate punishments prescribed for different violations.

The question that came up before the Supreme Court in Prakash Gupta vs. SEBI (order dated 23rd July, 2021, [2021] 128 taxmann.com 362 [SC]) was whether, for compounding an offence by a Court / SAT, the consent of SEBI is a prerequisite? In other words, if SEBI vetoes the application for compounding and does not grant consent, can the offence still be compounded? The Supreme Court, while dealing with this question, ruled on several aspects and thereafter even laid down guidelines for compounding. These were made, the Court said, in the absence of explicit provisions in the law which gap it attempted to fill. Thus, the ruling has relevance on several aspects of the subject.

PROVISIONS OF LAW
As stated earlier, section 24A of the SEBI Act enables compounding of offences and the authority for this purpose is the SAT or the court before which the proceedings are pending. SEBI has notified settlement regulations which deal with settlement of civil proceedings and compounding of offences. The Regulations provide that the principles as applicable for settlement of civil proceedings would also apply for compounding. General principles have been laid down for three categories of proceedings. In respect of the offence of non-payment of penalty, such amount of penalty with interest and legal charges as deemed appropriate by SEBI would be proposed before the court. Generally, the amount for compounding the offence would be as per the guidelines laid down in the Schedule to the Regulations. If the application for compounding is made after framing of charges by the court, then this amount would be increased by 25%, apart from legal charges and other terms as approved by the whole-time panel of SEBI as set up under the Regulations.

However, there are many areas where there is silence or lack of clarity. Is there an inherent right to compounding? Can all offences be compounded as a matter of right? If there are some offences which cannot be compounded, which are those and who decides this? Whether such a decision can be questioned and, if so, on what grounds?

If the person rights the wrong, compensates the party that is wronged, etc., does compounding become a matter of right? In this context, is compounding of offences under the SEBI Act at par with compounding with, say, under the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonouring of cheques?

Finally, is the consent of SEBI necessary for compounding or is it solely at the discretion of the court to compound the offence? What is the relevance and weight of the views of SEBI in the matter?

These are some of the issues discussed in the decision.

IS THE OFFENCE OF NON-PAYMENT OF PENALTY COMPOUNDABLE?
Section 24(2) treats non-payment of penalty levied under the Act as an offence over and above the violation in respect of which the penalty is levied. The question is whether this offence is compoundable. In principle, considering that the offences of violation of the provisions of the Act / Regulations / Rules are compoundable, the answer should have been yes. However, the Court dwelt on what seem to be ambiguous words used in the provision. It appeared to the Court that since there was a minimum prison term of one month provided, one view could be that imprisonment is mandatory. Section 24 says that an offence punishable with imprisonment and fine cannot be compounded. In which case, as per this view, the offence of non-payment of penalty cannot be compounded. However, since this specific issue was not before the Court, it did not give a final ruling on it and kept it for consideration at a future date. In the author’s opinion, considering the framework not only of the section but also of the settlement regulations, the better view should be that non-payment of penalty should also be compoundable.

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF COMPOUNDING OF OFFENCES
In passing, and as a matter of academic interest, it is interesting to note that originally compounding itself was an offence and continues to be so to a certain extent. Compounding generally meant a person accepts consideration for not prosecuting an offence. This could be even by a police officer, or others in authority, and could thus be a bribe. However, the position has changed over time. There were less grave situations where it may not be worth the effort to prosecute a person. For offences such as under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the intention may be to make dishonouring of cheque an offence a means to make such a person honour the cheque. Hence, if the party is willing to pay off its dues, the court may generally be inclined to allow compounding. There may also be situations where the offence is not very grave, the offender may have realised his wrong and regretted it, and even the injured person may be willing to let the matter go (perhaps also on receipt of some compensation). Hence, compounding of offences could be lawfully done if the law provided for it. Different laws have provided for compounding in different ways and hence the question was how should the provisions of the SEBI Act be interpreted.

Serious wrongs that cannot be compounded
The Court noted that there may be offences that are not cured merely by compensating the injured person or even if the injured person is not interested in pursuing the proceedings. There are wrongs that are public in nature and have wider implications. The yardstick applied cannot be a single and uniform one.

WHETHER CONSENT OF SEBI IS NECESSARY FOR COMPOUNDING
In the matter before the Court, the appellant had applied for compounding before a lower court. When the views of SEBI were sought, SEBI refused to grant consent to such compounding and the Additional Sessions Judge before whom the proceedings were initiated thus rejected the application. The appellant approached the High Court which, citing earlier precedents, affirmed the decision.

The Supreme Court held that the wording of section 24A is clear. There is no mandatory requirement of consent of SEBI for the Court to allow compounding. The Court would consider the views of SEBI but the decision of whether or not to compound the offence would rest with the Court. The important question, however, is what weight should the Court assign to the views of SEBI.

VIEWS OF SEBI ON WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW COMPOUNDING
The Court elaborately discussed the object of the SEBI Act and the role of SEBI as an expert body in the securities markets. It noted that SEBI has a duty to protect the interests of investors and generally the capital market. It also reviewed the mechanism laid down by SEBI for consideration of applications for compounding and also the independent High-Powered Advisory Committee (‘HPAC’) set up to provide advice on the matter. The Court held that the views of SEBI on whether or not compounding should be allowed should be respected and followed unless the view taken can be shown to be arbitrary or mala fide.

The Court also considered the aspects that SEBI takes into account and as laid down in the guidelines issued by SEBI. In particular, the matters in respect of which compounding / settlement would ordinarily not be allowed were noted.
All in all, the Court held that while the consent of SEBI is not a prerequisite, the views / recommendations of SEBI would ordinarily be followed.
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE COURT FOR CONSIDERING COMPOUNDING APPLICATIONS
As if to not only give the last word but provide a comprehensive framework for compounding, the Court laid down specific guidelines that would effectively fill the gap existing today. The Supreme Court laid down four guidelines that the Court / SAT should consider while disposing of applications for compounding:
a. The factors enumerated by SEBI in its Circular of 20th April, 2007 and accompanying FAQs should be considered, though not as exhaustive.
b. The application for compounding has to be made to SEBI which places the same before the HPAC. The recommendation of HPAC should be placed before the Court / SAT which should give due deference to such opinion. It should differ if it has cogent reasons and only if the reasons provided by SEBI / HPAC are mala fide or manifestly arbitrary.
c. The offences under the SEBI Act are not comparable with other laws where restitution of the injured party is a strong ground for allowing compounding. Most offences under the SEBI Act are of a public character and restitution may not always be enough. In any case, for this purpose the opinion of SEBI should be relied upon.
d. Finally, and this point is an extension of the third one, the Court / SAT should consider whether the offence is private or public in nature. If of a public nature, it would affect the public at large. Such offences should not be compounded even if restitution has taken place.
CONCLUSION

Not only has the Supreme Court given a categorical ruling on the role of SEBI and its views on compounding, it has also given a detailed framework on how compounding applications should be considered and what principles and considerations ought to be followed in the matter. The Court applied these principles also to the case before it and held that the matter did not deserve to be compounded, considering the facts and also the views of SEBI. With a fairly comprehensive framework laid down including the weight to be assigned to the opinion of SEBI, one can trust now that applications for compounding will be more transparent and reason-based.

GAMING NOT GAMBLING

INTRODUCTION
While the difference in the spelling of gaming and gambling is only of two letters, there is a world of difference between the two in reality. India’s online gaming market is growing by leaps and bounds and there is keen interest in setting up gaming ventures and investing in / acquiring Indian gaming companies. In India, gaming is a permissible activity, but gambling is either prohibited or heavily regulated. Some recent court decisions have helped clear the regulatory shroud covering gaming activities.

LEGAL ECOSYSTEM


Let us first understand the various laws which deal with this subject:
(a) Under the Constitution of India, the Union Government is empowered to make laws regulating the conduct of lotteries.
(b) Under the Constitution, the State Governments have been given the responsibility of authorising / conducting lotteries and making laws on betting and gambling.
(c) Hence, we must look at the Acts of each of the 28 States and seven Union Territories regarding gambling / gaming.
(d) The following are the various laws which regulate / restrict / prohibit gambling in India:

Public Gambling Act, 1867: This Central Legislation provides for the punishment of public gambling in certain parts of India. It is not applicable in Maharashtra and other States which have repealed its application.
Maharashtra Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887: It applies in Maharashtra and regulates gaming in the State.
Other State legislations: Acts of other States, such as the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955, the Madras Gambling Act, etc., are more or less similar to the Public Gaming Act, 1867 as the object of these Acts is to ban / restrict gambling. The State Acts repeal the applicability of the Public Gambling Act in their respective States.

* Section 294-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: This section provides for punishment for keeping a lottery office without the authorisation of the State Government. Section 30 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: This Section prevents any person from bringing a suit for recovery of any winnings won by way of a ‘wager.’
* The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998: This Central Legislation lays down guidelines and restrictions on conducting lotteries.

* The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: It requires maintenance of certain records by entities engaged in gambling.

Some States which expressly permit gambling are

* Sikkim: The Sikkim Casino Games (Control and Tax Rules), 2002 permits setting up of casinos in Sikkim.

* The Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Act, 2008, along with the Sikkim Online Gaming (Regulation) Rules, 2009 provides for licences to set up online gaming websites (for gambling and also betting on games like cricket, football, tennis, etc.) with the servers based in Sikkim. Other than this law, India does not have any specific laws targeting online gambling or gaming.

* Goa: An amendment to the Goa, Daman and Diu Public Gambling Act, 1976 provides for casinos to be set up only at five star hotels or offshore vessels with permission. This is the reason Goa has floating casinos or casinos in five star hotels.

* West Bengal: The West Bengal Prize Competition and Gambling Act, 1957 excludes ‘skill-based’ card games like poker, bridge, rummy and nap from its operation. Thus, in West Bengal a game of poker is expressly excluded from the definition of gambling.

* Nagaland: The Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 regulates online games of skill in the State of Nagaland.

PUBLIC GAMBLING ACT
Since this is a Central Act on which several State Acts have been based, we may examine this Act. Section 1 of this Act has laid down three conditions all of which must be fulfilled in order that a place is treated as a common gaming house:
(a) It must be a house, walled enclosure, room or place;
(b) cards, dice, tables or other instruments of gaming are kept in such place; and
(c) these instruments are used for profit or gain of the occupier whether by way of charging for the instruments or for the place.

It is a moot point whether these definitions can even be extended to online gaming ventures.

Section 3 of the Act levies a penalty for owning or keeping or having charge of a common gaming house. The penalty is a fine not exceeding Rs. 200 or imprisonment for any term up to three months. It may be noted that the public gaming house concept can even be extended to a private residence of a person if gambling activities are carried on in such a place. Thus, casual gambling at a house party may be treated, if all the conditions are fulfilled, as gambling and the owner of the house may be prosecuted.

Exception u/s 12: Even if all the above-mentioned three conditions are fulfilled, if it is a game of mere skill, the penal provisions do not apply. What is a game of skill is a question of fact and has been the subject matter of great debate. In Chamarbaugwalla vs. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628, it was held that competitions which involve substantial skill are not gambling activities.

In State of AP vs. K. Satyanarayana, 1968 AIR 825 (SC), the Court analysed whether a game of rummy was a game of skill and held as follows:
• Rummy is not a game of mere chance like three cards;
• It requires considerable skill as fall of cards (is) to be memorised;
• The skill lies in holding and discarding cards;
• It is mainly and preponderantly a game of skill;
• Chance is a factor but not the major factor.

The Court held that rummy is not a game of chance but a game of skill.

In Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs. State of TN, 1996 2 SCC 226, the Court analysed whether betting on horses is a game of chance or mere skill:
• Gambling is payment of a price for a chance to win. Gaming may be of skill alone or both skill and chance;
• In a game of skill chance cannot be entirely eliminated but it depends upon the superior knowledge, training, attention, experience and adroitness of the players;
• A game of chance is one in which chance predominates over the element of skill, and a game of skill is one in which the element of skill dominates over the chance element;
• It is the dominant element which determines the game’s character;
• In horse-racing, the person betting is supposed to have full knowledge of the horse, jockey, trainer, owner, turf, race system, etc.;
• Horses are given specialised training;
• Books are printed giving details of the above, which are studied.

Hence, betting on horse-racing is a game of skill since skill dominates over chance.

In Bimalendu De vs. UOI, AIR 2001 Cal 30, it was held that Kaun Banega Carodpati, which was aired on TV channels, was not a game of chance but a game of skill. Elements of gambling, i.e., wagering and betting, were missing from this game. Only a player’s skill was tested. He did not have to pay or put any stake in the hope of a prize.

In M.J. Sivani vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770, video games parlours were held to be common gaming houses. Video games are associated with stakes of money or money’s worth on the result of a game, be it a game of pure chance or of mixed skill or chance. For a commoner it is difficult to play a video game with skill. Hence, they are not a game of mere skill.

In this respect, the Nagaland Prohibition of Gambling and Promotion and Regulation of Online Games of Skill Act, 2015 defines games of skill to include all such games where there is preponderance of skill over chance, including where the skill relates to strategising the manner of placing wagers or placing bets or where the skill lies in team selection or selection of virtual stocks based on analyses or where the skill relates to the manner in which the moves are made, whether through deployment of physical or mental skill and acumen. It further states that games of skill may be (a) card-based, (b) action / virtual sports / adventure / mystery, and (c) calculation / strategy / quiz-based. This is one of the first examples of a statutory definition of what constitutes a game of skill. ‘Gambling’, on the other hand, has been defined by this Act to mean and include wagering or betting on games of chance (meaning all such games where there is a preponderance of chance over skill) but does not include betting or wagering on games of skill.

Thus, the facts and circumstances of each game would have to be examined as to whether it falls within the domain of mere skill and hence is a game, or is it more a game of chance and hence gambling.

MAHARASHTRA PREVENTION OF GAMBLING ACT, 1887
This Act is similar in operation to the Public Gambling Act but has some differences. It defines the term ‘gaming’ to include wagering or betting except betting or wagering on horse races and dog races in certain cases.

‘Instruments of gaming’ are defined to include any article used as a subject matter of gaming or any document used as a register or record for evidence of gaming / proceeds of gaming / winnings or prizes of gaming.

The definition of common gaming house includes places where the following activities take place:
• Betting on rainfall;
• Betting on prices of cotton, opium or other commodities;
• Betting on stock market prices;
• Betting on cards.

The imprisonment under this Act extends up to two years and the fine is also higher. Police officers have been given substantial powers to search and seize and arrest under this Act.

INDIAN PENAL CODE
Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever keeps any office or place for drawing any lottery not authorised by the Government is punishable with a fine of up to Rs. 1,000. What is a lottery has not been defined. Courts have held that it includes competitions in which prizes are decided by mere chance. However, if the game requires skill then it is not a lottery. A newspaper contained an advertisement of a coupon competition which included coupons to be filled by the newspaper buyers with names of horses selected by them as likely to finish 1st, 2nd or 3rd in a race. The Court held that the game was one of skill since filling up the names of the horses required specialised knowledge about the horses and some element of skill – Stoddart vs. Sagar (1895) 2 QB 474.

Further, it must verify and maintain the records of the identity of all its clients / customers.

RECENT MADRAS HIGH COURT DECISION ON ONLINE RUMMY / POKER
In the recent case of Junglee Games India vs. State of Tamil Nadu, WP No. 18022/2020, the Madras High Court had occasion to consider whether an amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 which ended up banning online rummy / poker was unconstitutional. The amended statute prohibited all forms of games being conducted in cyberspace, irrespective of whether the game involved being a game of mere skill, whether such game was played for a wager, bet, money or other stakes. The High Court held that gambling is often equated with gaming and the activity involved chance to such a predominant extent that the element of skill that may also have been involved could not control the outcome. A game of skill, on the other hand, might not necessarily be such an activity where skill must always prevail; however, it would suffice for an activity to be regarded as a game of skill if, ordinarily, the exercise of skill could control the chance element involved in the activity such that the better skilled would prevail more often than not. It held that the wording of the amending Act was so crass and overbearing that it smacked of unreasonableness in its every clause and could be seen to be manifestly arbitrary.

Whatever may have been the pious intention of the Legislature, the reading of the impugned statute and how it might operate amounted to the baby being thrown out with the bath. It even held that broadly speaking, games and sporting activities in the physical form could not be equated with games conducted in virtual mode or in cyberspace. However, when it came to card games or board games such as chess or scrabble, there was no distinction between the skill involved in the physical form of the activity or in the virtual form. The Court held that such distinction was completely lost in the amending Act as all games were outlawed if played for a stake or for any prize.

It came out with a very interesting take on the difference – ‘Seen from the betting perspective, if the odds favouring an outcome are guided more by skill than by chance, it would be a game of skill. The chance element can never be completely eliminated for it is the chance component that makes gambling exciting and it is the possibility of the perchance result that fuels gambling.’

The Bench categorically held that there appeared to be a little doubt that both rummy and poker were games of skill as they involved considerable memory, working out of percentages, the ability to follow the cards on the table and constantly adjust to the changing possibilities of the unseen cards. The Madras High Court laid down the principle that the betting that a State can legislate on has to be the betting pertaining to gambling; ergo, betting only on games of chance. At any rate, even otherwise, the judgments in the cases of Chamarbaugwalla (Supra) and K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra) also instruct that the concept of betting in the Constitution cannot cover games of skill. It concluded that the amendment to the Tamil Nadu Gaming Act, 1930 was capricious, irrational and without an adequate determining principle such that it was excessive and disproportionate.

RECENT DECISION ON FANTASY SPORTS LEAGUES
One of the biggest revolutions in the gaming industry has been that of Online Fantasy Sports Leagues, be it in cricket, football, hockey, etc. Time and again there have been writs filed before the High Courts to decree these as games of chance.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Varun Gumber vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2017 Cri LJ 3827 and the Order dated 15th September, 2017 passed by the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid judgment, have held that the fantasy games of Dream 11 were games of mere skill and their business has protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, i.e., freedom to carry out trade / vocation / business of one’s choice.

In Gurdeep Singh Sachar vs. Union of India, Cr. PIL Stamp No. 22/2019, the Bombay High Court held that success in Dream 11’s fantasy sports depended upon a user’s exercise of skill based on superior knowledge, judgement and attention, and the result thereof was not dependent on the winning or losing of a particular team in the real world game on any particular day. It was undoubtedly a game of skill and not a game of chance. The attempt to reopen the issues decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in respect of the same online gaming activities, which are backed by a judgment of the three-judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra), that, too, after dismissal of the SLP by the Apex Court, was wholly misconceived. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP [SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 43346 of 2019] against this decision inasmuch as it related to whether or not it involved gambling. Again, on 31st January, 2020, the Supreme Court reiterated on an application seeking clarification of its earlier Order, that it does not want to revisit the issue as to whether gambling is or is not involved.

In the cases of Ravindra Singh Chaudhary vs. Union of India, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20779/2019 and Chandresh Sankhla vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2020 SCC Online Raj 264, the Rajasthan High Court dismissed a petition against Dream11. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in D. Siluvai Venance vs. State, Criminal O.P. (MD) No.6568/2020 has passed a similar order. Recently, the Supreme Court in Avinash Mehrotra vs. State of Rajasthan, SLP (Civil) Diary No(s). 18478/2020, dismissed an SLP against the Rajasthan High Court Order in the Ravindra Singh case (Supra). It held that the matter was no longer res integra as SLPs have come up from the Punjab & Haryana and the Bombay High Courts and have been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

All of the above judgments analysed what was a fantasy league. They held that any fantasy sports game was a game which occurred over a pre-determined number of rounds (which may extend from a single match / sporting event to an entire league or series) in which participating users selected, built and acted as managers / selectors of their virtual team. The drafting of a virtual team involved the exercise of considerable skill as the user had to first assess the relative worth of each athlete / sportsperson as against all athletes / sportspersons available for selection. The user had to study the rules and make evaluations of the athlete’s strengths and weaknesses based on these rules. Users engaged in participating in fantasy sports read and understood the rules of the game and made their assessment of athletes and the selection of athletes in their virtual team on the basis of the anticipated statistics of their selection.

It was held that the element of skill and the predominant influence on the outcome of the fantasy league was more than any other incidents and, therefore, they were games of ‘mere skill’ and not falling within the activity of gambling. It did not involve risking money or playing stakes on the result of a game or an event, hence, the same did not amount to gambling / betting. It was even held that the fantasy sports formats were globally recognised as a great tool for fan engagement as they provided a platform to sports lovers to engage in their favourite sport along with their friends and family. This legitimate business activity having protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution contributed to Government Revenue not only vide GST and income tax payments, but also by contributing to increased viewership and higher sports fan engagement, thereby simultaneously promoting even the real world games.

FEMA
The Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 and the Consolidated FDI Policy state that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of any sort is prohibited in gambling and betting, including casinos. Thus, no FDI is allowed in any gambling ventures, whether online or offline. However, if the ventures are gaming ventures, then there are no sectoral caps or conditions for the FDI and there are no restrictions for foreign technology collaboration agreements. And, 100% FDI is allowable in gaming ventures, online and offline. Thus, one comes back to the million-dollar question – is the venture one of gambling or gaming? The tests explained above would be applicable even to determine whether FDI is permissible in the venture.

Similar tests may also be used under the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security) Regulations, 2004 for overseas direct investments in a foreign company. If it is an online gaming company, then it would constitute a bona fide business activity and foreign investment should be permissible.

CONCLUSION
Recent judicial thinking seems to be changing along with the times. When one looks at the Court decisions delivered on new topics such as cryptocurrencies, fantasy sports, online poker, etc., it is clear that the trend is to allow businesses in these sunrise areas. If the Legislature also moves at the same speed and in the same direction, we would have a wonderful environment which could spawn exciting businesses!

 

PROPRIETY IN ADJUDICATION

Legacy laws were legislated independently and hence administered by their respective Governments. However, the GST law has been designed on the unique concept of ‘Pooled sovereignty’ between the Centre and the States. This dual nature of GST has made the administration of this novel legislation a critical challenge before the GST Council. Unlike the ‘origin-based’ Central Sales Tax law (also a Central legislation) where the collection and retention of taxes was with the respective State Governments, the GST design faces the peculiarity of implementing a ‘destination consumption law’ with revenue being collected and administered in the State of origin but ultimately accruing to the State of consumption. Moreover, the Central and State administrations are not only implementing their respective laws under which they have been appointed, but are also entrusted with implementing the parallel GST law. Intense discussions have taken place between the Central and State administrations and the final handshake was made as follows:

–    Single administrative interface;
–    Efficient use of respective administrative expertise;
–    Vertical and quantitative division of taxpayer base (except for enforcement and vigilance action); and
–    Cross-empowerment of critical administration functions (except matters involving the place of supply).

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION OF GST ACT
Sections 3, 4 and 5 provide for the administration of the Act – Section 3 handles appointments at various levels of officers and deemed officers appointed under the erstwhile enactment as GST officers; Section 4 empowers the Board / Commissioner to appoint such other persons as GST officers; Section 5 enables the Board to equip any officer appointed under sections 3 or 4 with functions and duties under the Act. It also enables the Commissioner to delegate his powers to any subordinate officer. Section 6 codifies the cross-empowerment principle as agreed by the GST Council, enabling the appointed GST officers to cross-administer the functions conferred under the correspondent enactments. In this background, three phrases have been adopted for the purpose of assignment of administrative functions, viz., ‘adjudicating authority’, ‘proper officer’ and ‘authorised officer’. This article attempts to decode whether these terms are mutually exclusive or overlapping with each other. It is to be noted that this article only decodes the Central Tax Notifications / Circulars. One may have to examine the flow of the respective State Notifications in order to fix the jurisdiction of said officers.

PROPER OFFICER – DEFINITION AND ROLE
As a starting point, let us look at the respective definitions under the GST Act:

Proper Officer – Section 2(91) defines ‘proper officer’ in relation to any function to be performed under this Act, which means the Commissioner or the Officer of the Central Tax who is assigned that function by the Commissioner in the Board;

Section 2(24): ‘Commissioner’ means the Commissioner of Central Tax and includes the Principal Commissioner of Central Tax appointed u/s 3 and the Commissioner of Integrated Tax appointed under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act;
Section 2(25) r/w/s 168, ‘Commissioner in the Board’… shall mean a Commissioner or Joint Secretary posted in the Board and such Commissioner or Joint Secretary shall exercise the powers specified in the said sections with the approval of the Board.
(Note – In Central Tax administration, NOT all Commissioners are empowered to perform the function of assignment. It is only that Commissioner who is posted in the Board who is entitled to perform such assignment of functions.)

In order to confer specific jurisdiction to individual officers, the respective Commissioners have, through instructions / Notifications, identified the ‘proper officers’ on the principle of cross-empowerment, functional and geographical division and vested them with the requisite functions. The role of proper officer has been envisaged as follows:

Section

Function

Issue
orders

Chapter VI

Registration / Amendment / Cancellation

Yes, for registration, cancellation,
suspension, revocation

Chapter X

Refunds

Yes, for sanction or rejection

Section 60

Provisional assessment

Yes, for finalisation of provisional
assessment

Section 61

Scrutiny of returns

No

Section 62

Assessment of non-filers

Yes, best judgement order

Section 63

Assessment of unregistered persons

Yes, best judgement order

Section 65

Audit

No

Section 66

Special audits

No

Section 67

Inspection, search and seizure

No

Section 68

Inspection of goods in movement

No

Section 70

Summon attendance

No

Section 71

Access of business premises

No

Section 73/74

Demands of taxes

Yes, for ascertaining raising demands

Section 79

Recovery of taxes

No

ADJUDICATING AUTHORITY – DEFINITION AND ROLE

Adjudicating Authority – Section 2(4) defines ‘adjudicating authority’ which means any authority, appointed or authorised to pass any order or decision under this Act, but does not include the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, the Revisional Authority, the Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, the National Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Tribunal and the Authority referred to in sub-section (2) of section 171.

The term ‘adjudicating authority’ has been used in ‘Chapter XVIII-Appeals & Revisions’. The section provides for the remedy of appeal only against the orders of the ‘adjudicating authority’. The critical point to be noted is that this phrase is being used for the first time under the Chapter of Appeals and is conspicuously absent in the provisions granting powers to issue orders under the Assessment / Adjudication provisions of the enactment. There seems to be a prima facie disconnect in empowerment of execution and decision-making functions under the Act. It appears that certain functions have been distributed to proper officers but the issuance of orders (decision-making) has been conferred on a separate category of officers called ‘adjudicating authority’. One therefore has to look into the enactment to identify whether the said terms are overlapping or mutually exclusive to each other.

Authorised Officer – Role
In several instances, the enactment empowers senior officer(s) to ‘authorise’ a Central Tax Officer with specific functions. Section 67 empowers the Joint Commissioner to authorise officers to inspect the premises of a taxpayer. Section 65 empowers the Joint Commissioner to authorise the audit of a taxpayer by a particular officer including visiting the said premises. Therefore, these are officers who are permitted to perform a specific task under an authorisation having a limited operation over a ‘particular taxpayer for a specific function’.

Identification – ‘Proper Officer’
An officer after having been appointed under the Act, is required to be granted jurisdiction to perform his task under the Act. Proper officers are conferred powers on the following basis: (a) Geography, (b) Cross-empowerment / division, (c) Functions, and (d) Monetary limits (if any).

A) Geographical jurisdiction
Notification 2/2017-CT dated 19th June, 2017
appoints Central Tax Officers for the purpose of section 3 of the CGST Act and assigns geographical jurisdiction to Commissioners (aka Executive Commissionerate), Commissioners (Appeals) and Commissioners (Audit). The said Notification divides the entire Central Administration at State / District levels for the purpose of administration. Each Commissioner has issued public notices assigning jurisdiction to various ranges based on geographical parameters (such as PIN codes, etc.). Correspondingly, State Commissioners are expected to exercise similar powers and assign such jurisdiction to officers in their administration. Similarly, Notification 14/2017-CT dated 1st July, 2017 seeks to appoint officers of the Directorate-General of GST Intelligence / Audit as Central Tax Officers with all-India jurisdiction and confers powers corresponding to the specified level of Central Tax Officers. Section 3 of the GST Act also deems officers appointed under the legacy laws as officers appointed under the said Act.

B) Cross-empowerment jurisdiction
In terms of the 9th GST Council minutes, the Centre and States have mutually agreed to a ‘vertical division’ of the taxpayer base in each State (except for enforcement and vigilance functions). Vertical division of the taxpayer base entails clear demarcation of taxpayers being administered by the Centre and the State at each State’s level. The GST Council vide CBEC Circular No. 1/2017-GST dated 20th September, 2017 provided for such division based on turnover, business and geographical parameters. State-level committees have issued trade notices demarcating the taxpayer base between both the administrations. Having been assigned respective administrative powers for a set of taxpayers, section 6 of the CGST Act empowers the ‘cross-empowered proper officer’ to administer in parallel the corresponding GST law, i.e., the proper officer issuing orders under the CGST Act shall be empowered to issue parallel orders under the SGST Act with due intimation to the jurisdictional officer1. The GST Council has also decided that cases involving ‘place of supply’ would have to be handled by the Central Tax administration even if the taxpayer has been assigned to the State administration.

Notification 39/2017 dated 13th October, 2017 has been issued u/s 6(1) of the CGST Act empowering State officers for the purpose of sanction of refund u/s 54 or 55 except Rule 96 of the CGST Rules, 2017 in respect of registered persons located in the territorial jurisdiction of the said State officers. CBIC letter dated 22nd June, 2020 states that the said Notification has been issued only to place a restriction on State officers from issuing refunds under Rule 96 of the CGST Rules. In the absence of a Notification it should be understood that all powers are cross-empowered to the corresponding administration by virtue of section 6.

C) Functional jurisdiction
CBEC Circular No. 3/3/2017 dated 5th July, 2017 has assigned functions to specified class of officers in exercise of powers u/s 2(91). The summary of the functions assigned to the Central Tax Officers is as follows:

Proper
officer

Powers
& functions

Principal Commissioner / Commissioner of
Central Tax

• Extension of period of seizure of goods
beyond six months

• Extension for payments of demands up to
three months

Additional or Joint Commissioner of Central
Tax

• Authorisation of inspection, search of
premises, seizure of goods, documents, books or things, inventory / disposal
of perishable goods

• Authorisation of access to business
premises for inspection of books of accounts, records, etc.

• Permission for transfer of properties by
defaulter

• Disposal of conveyance in detention
proceedings

Deputy or Assistant Commissioner of Central
Tax

• Processing of refund applications

• Provisional assessment proceedings

• Assessment of unregistered persons

Summary assessments in special cases

• Audit

• Adjudication above a specific limit

• Recovery of excess taxes collected

• Recovery of taxes

• Penalties under various sections

• Detention proceedings

• Confiscation of goods or conveyances

• Transitional provisions

• Re-credit of rejected refunds

• Other specified procedural matters

Superintendent of Central Tax

• Non-accountal of goods

• Scrutiny of returns

• Assessment of non-filers

• General audit / special audit
observations / findings

• Seizure of books of accounts

• Summon for submission of evidences

• Adjudication up to specific limit

• Other specified procedural matters

Inspector of Central Tax

Detention proceedings

(Note – Assignment of powers to a specified officer would include assignment of such powers to the superiors of the specified officers.)

CBEC Circular dated 31st May, 2018-GST, dated 9th February, 2018 has also clarified that Audit Commissionerates and DGGSTI shall exercise powers
of issuance of show cause notices but the adjudication of
the same would be done by the Executive Commissionerates having jurisdiction over the principal place of business.

D) Monetary jurisdiction
The Central Tax administration (vide CBEC Circular dated 31st May, 2018-GST, dated 9th February, 2018) has assigned monetary jurisdiction to Superintendents, Assistant / Deputy Commissioners and Additional / Joint Commissioners for the purpose of adjudication of matters. A significant point is that the said monetary limits would extend only to matters of adjudication and other powers (such as summary assessments, etc.) are not subjected to any monetary limits.

ANALYSIS
The prima facie observation emerging from the above Notifications / Circulars is that though ‘proper officers’ have been conferred certain powers, the phrase ‘adjudicating authority’ u/s 2(4) has not been mentioned anywhere. Generally, one may hasten to conclude that none of the officers have been empowered to adjudicate (i.e., issue orders) in terms of section 2(4) of the GST Act. The adjudication function, being a special and distinct function, has not been conferred on any officer and hence no orders can be issued until the adjudication function is conferred on officers.

The said argument may face stiff resistance when one probes further into the enactment. Chapter II on Administration provides for identification of ‘proper officers’ for various functions of the Act. As tabulated above, various sections under the enactment empower the proper officers to perform certain functions. While some sections specifically empower officers with issuance of orders, others transfer the proceedings to its conclusion. For example, though sections 61, 65 and 66 entrust certain functions / powers, the respective provisions do not empower them to issue orders for the purpose of concluding the proceedings. Section 61 empowers the proper officer to scrutinise the GST returns and seek related clarifications from the taxpayers, but directs that any adverse observation should result in appropriate action such as audit, adjudication, etc. The proper officer does not derive the power of issuance of orders under the said section and the ascertainment of proper officer for issuance of orders would have to be performed under a separate section. Similar implications appear to operate in case of audits conducted u/s 65. The audit function may be entrusted to a specific group of officers but the section does not specifically empower them to adjudicate the matter, and the issue is required to be adjudged only by the proper officer empowered to issue orders in terms of section 73/74 of the GST Act.

The corollary is that all proper officers may not be adjudicating authorities but all adjudicating authorities would necessarily have to be proper officers under the section. The empowerment of a person as a proper officer is delegated to the respective Commissioner but the empowerment of the person as an adjudicating authority emerges from the provisions of the statute and is not the subject matter of delegation.

Another corollary of this approach is that not all actions of proper officers are appealable under the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the GST Act. It is only orders issued by an adjudicating authority which are eligible for a statutory appeal under the Chapter of Appeals / Revisions. For example, section 65(6) requires the proper officer performing the audit to issue his ‘findings’ from the audit. The Act has consciously used the phrase ‘findings’ in contradistinction to ‘orders’. These findings would not be appealable orders for the purpose of XVIII since these are not decisions of adjudicating authorities or arising out of an adjudication proceeding under the Act. However, orders which are issued under sections 62, 63 or 64 in the case of assessment of non-filers, summary assessments or protective assessments, are in the nature of a decision-making function (adjudication function) and hence would be appealable before the respective appellate authority.

To reiterate, assignment of ‘proper officer’ is a consequence of the Commissioner’s order but the assignment of a decision-making function is consequent to the statutory provision itself. Conferment of the status of adjudicating authority stands at a higher pedestal and cannot be altered by any order / Notification. Thus one may conclude that the carving out of a separate category of ‘adjudicating authorities’ is for the purpose of tagging their orders as appealable orders under the Act. Adjudicating authorities are a ‘sub-set’ of proper officers and not a distinct category of officers.

SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT IN THE SAYED ALI & CANNON INDIA CASES
The Supreme Court in Sayed Ali (2011) 265 ELT 17 (SC) examined the aspect of appointment of Customs (Preventive) officers and assignment of functions as proper officers for administration of the Act. The Court observed that appointment of officers of customs for a particular geographical area does not ipso facto confer powers of a ‘proper officer’ and in the absence of specific adjudication functions being assigned, Customs (Preventive) officers were held as incompetent to issue show cause notices.

Applying the Sayed Ali case, the Supreme Court once again in Cannon India [2021 (376) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)] examined a bill of entry assessed by the Customs Officer (Appraising) and cleared for home consumption. The Director of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) subsequently raised the issue of short assessment of duty in terms of section 28(4) of the Customs Act. Section 28(4) r/w/s 2(34) assigned the function of demands and recovery to ‘the proper officer’. The Court emphasised on the article ‘the’ as conveying that ‘the proper officer’ is the specified officer who has been assigned the function u/s 28(4) and not any other officer. Section 28(4) being a power of re-assessment of the original assessment ought to be conferred only on ‘the officer’ who performed the original assessment and not on any other officer. According to the Court, where the same powers are conferred to different officers on a particular subject matter, then the exercise of powers by one of the officers would be to the exclusion of the other, and hence any subsequent reassessment ought to be made by the original officer who exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter. Moreover, the Court stated that DRI officers were not conferred powers of administration of the Customs Act since the Notification conferring powers did not trace itself back to section 6 of the Customs Act which empowered the Central Government to appoint other Central officers for the purpose of the Customs Act. Accordingly, adjudication proceedings initiated by the DRI officers were quashed in the absence of jurisdiction. The analogy emerging from these decisions is that there has to be a specific conferment of powers for performance of a function under the law and once such power is conferred to a particular officer, it operates to the exclusion of all other officers even though they may exercise jurisdiction over the taxpayer.

The Proper Officer – As adjudicating authority
To understand the interplay between ‘Proper officer’, ‘Authorised officer’ and ‘Adjudicating authority’, one may take the example of audit proceedings. Section 65 specifies that the Commissioner may, by general / special order, authorise any officer to perform an audit of a taxpayer. The provision uses the phrase ‘authorised officer’ in the section, i.e., officer who has been assigned the audit of the taxpayer. However, in section 65(6) the provisions state that on conclusion of the audit, ‘the proper officer’ shall inform the audit findings and their reasons. In section 65(7), it has been stated that where audit results in short payment of taxes, ‘the proper officer’ may initiate action u/s 73/74 which states that the ‘proper officer’ in such cases shall issue a show cause notice directing the taxpayer to pay the said amount. The reference to ‘the proper officer’ continues in the said section and 73(9) enables the said proper officer to issue appropriate orders.

Two questions arise here: (a) Firstly, which Commissioner is authorised to perform the task of assignment of audit cases. While practically the Commissioner (Audit) performs this task, Notification 2/2017-CT does not specify such powers being granted to the Commissioner (Audit). The said Notification merely states that the Commissioner (Audit) would exercise powers over the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the corresponding Commissioner(s). The nature of the powers to be exercised has not been specified in the said Notification. Even Board Circular No. 3/3/2017 only appoints the Commissioners with the proper officer functions and does not specifically grant an audit function to the Commissioner (Audit). In contrast, the Central Excise law contained Notification 30/2014-CT dated 14th October, 2014 r/w Notification 47/2016 dated 28th September, 2016 which specifically granted Audit and SCN issuance functions (adjudication powers introduced subsequently) for conferring jurisdiction. The GST provisions appear to have some shortcomings to this extent;

(b) Secondly, who is the ‘proper officer’ for conclusion of audit proceedings and adjudication of the subject matter? It is fairly clear that ‘authorised officers’ u/s 65(1)/(2) are distinct from ‘proper officers’ referred in 65(6)/(7) and 73/74. It also appears that the proper officer referred to in both sections implies ‘the’ proper officer who is assigned the adjudication function. Therefore, ‘the proper officer’ referred to in 65(6)/(7) should be the same officer as is being referred to in 73/74. Notification 2/2017 r/w Circular 3/3/2017 dated 31st May, 2018 implies that the Executive Commissionerate has been vested with both powers, i.e., ‘conclusion of audit proceedings’ [section 65(6)/(7)] as well as ‘adjudication of demands’ (section 73/74). It appears that the function of the Audit Commissionerate / officers terminates with the performance of the audit (i.e., visit, examination, etc.) but reporting of audit findings and adjudication (where required) would need to be performed by the Executive Commissionerate only. Alternatively, it appears that the ‘proper officer’ who is assigned the function of conclusion of audit u/s 65(6)/(7) should be the same officer issuing the show cause notice u/s 73(1), and in view of Circular dated 3rd March, 2017, the proper officer for adjudication u/s 73(9) should be the officer functioning in the Executive Commissionerate. Despite this ambiguity, the conclusion remains that ‘authorised officers’ are distinct from ‘the proper officer’ and those proper officers functioning as decision-making authorities u/s 73/74(9) would function as adjudicating authorities, making their orders amenable to statutory appeal.

State Administration – CGST Act
State administration has been conferred with powers to administer the Central enactment in respect of taxpayers assigned to the State. Section 6(1) of the CGST Act considered ‘officers’ appointed under the SGST Act as being authorised to be ‘proper officers’ for the purpose of the CGST Act. The respective State Commissioners in terms of the powers drawn from section 3 of the respective State enactments have designated proper officers on functional and geographical basis. Though the Commissioner exercising powers from the SGST Act appoints them as proper officers for the purpose of the SGST Act, the said State officers have not been assigned functions for the purpose of the CGST Act. Moreover, section 6(1) does not explicitly confer the rights of assignment of proper officer functions to the Commissioners (State) for the purpose of Central enactment. This probably should continue to be the prerogative of the Commissioner (Central Tax) only. This is because the phrase ‘proper officer’ under the CGST Act is an appointment u/s 2(91) of the CGST Act and the said section only permits the assignment of functions by the ‘Commissioner in the Board’. Commissioner in the Board only refers to Commissioner as designated by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes. State Commissioners would not be the Commissioners as understood in terms of section 2(91) of the CGST Act and hence the assignment of functions to their subordinates for the purpose of the SGST Act does not automatically result in assignment of functions for the purpose of the CGST Act. In simple terms, section 6 enables the Central enactment to authorise the State administration as proper officers (i.e., borrow the man-power) but the power of assignment of functions (supervisory powers) to these sets of officers would continue to vest with the Commissioner in the Board and such power of assignment has not been delegated to the State Commissioner.

State Administration – IGST Act
Section 4 of the IGST Act is pari materia to section 6(1) of the CGST Act. A similar issue would emerge when a State officer administers the IGST Act. This would be so insofar as the State administration is presiding over the state of registration of the taxpayer. But an additional issue that also emerges is where a State administration exercises its powers over a taxpayer who is not registered in their State. For example, any movement of goods from Mumbai to Chennai could entail movement through an intermediate State (say, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, etc.). The ‘place of supply’ of such transaction would be Tamil Nadu and the taxable person would be administered in Maharashtra. Strictly speaking, no revenue accrues (directly or indirectly) from this transaction to the State of Karnataka, though in practice the State administration has exercised its power to intercept goods which originate from Mumbai and are destined for Chennai.

Section 4 of the IGST Act appoints officers of the SGST as proper offices for the IGST Act. SGST has been defined under 2(111) of the CGST Act as ‘respective’ State GST officers. Therefore, section 4 of the IGST Act borrows the State administration from the ‘respective’ State only and so the respective State GST officer should ideally refer to the State administration having jurisdiction over the registration of the taxpayer. Though the State of Karnataka cannot exercise its domain over the said movement by virtue of ‘place of business’ or ‘place of supply’, the practice has been to exercise domain by virtue of the ‘geographical presence’ of the goods under movement. None of the Central Tax notifications confer proper officer functions on the basis of geographical presence of goods. Rather, they appear to have been assigned with reference to the place of business of the taxpayer. On a reading of section 68 r/w/s 129 of the CGST Act, it appears that ‘the proper officer’ referred therein cannot extend to all States’ proper officers and would be limited only to the ‘respective State proper officers’ from the movement that emerges. But the High Court in Advantage India Logistics Private Limited vs. UOI (2018) 19 GSTL 46 (MP) held otherwise. The Court upheld the jurisdiction of an MP State officer to intercept goods moving from Gurgaon (Haryana) to Mumbai (Maharashtra). This results in a very precarious situation and it is important that all stake-holders take cognisance of this issue.

DGGSTI as ‘proper officer’
In this context, the Notifications empowering the Directorate-General GST Intelligence (an arm of DRI) would be worth examining:
– Notification 14/2017-Central Tax invokes its powers from sections 3 and 5 of the CGST Act and appoints the officers of the Director-General of GST Intelligence (erstwhile Director-General of Central Excise Intelligence) as officers with all-India jurisdiction;
– The said Notification invests them with all the powers as have been invested in the corresponding rank of officers under the Central Tax Administration;
– However, the Notification appointing DGGST officers as Central Tax officers has not been issued u/s 4 of the GST Act. The officers of the DGGI, which is a special wing of the DRI, have not been appointed as ‘Central Tax Officers’ in terms of section 4 of the CGST Act.
– Moreover, the Commissioner in the Board has not conferred the ‘proper officer’ function to the officers of the DGGI.
– This gives rise to a similar anomaly as was prevalent under the Customs legislation and under consideration in the Cannon India case.

Thus, DGGSTI being officers appointed directly by the Central Government, are not officers specified in section 3 of the GST Act though a Notification has been issued invoking the said power. Section 4 has not been invoked by the said Notification for appointment of the DGGSTI officer for purposes of the CGST Law. To this extent, Notification 14/2017 carries the similar lacuna as was being considered in the aforesaid case and consequently the said officers cannot be termed as ‘proper officers’ in terms of section 2(34) of the said Act.

COMPTROLLER & AUDITOR-GENERAL OF INDIA (C&AG)
There has been a recent trend where C&AG officers have been seeking information from taxpayers on the Transitional Credit Claim under GST. Neither section 3 nor 4 have appointed the officers of the C&AG as Central Tax Officers under the statute. Accordingly, such officers cannot be categorised as ‘proper officers’ under either the CGST or the SGST Act. Except section 108 of the CGST Act, none of the sections even mentions officers of the C&AG to verify the books of accounts of the taxpayer. It is only section 108 of the CGST Act which makes reference to the objections of the C&AG for the purpose of enabling the revisional authority to revise any orders of proceedings conducted under the GST Act. But this does not enable the C&AG to directly scrutinise, assess or even adjudicate the records of the taxpayers. Thus, the C&AG cannot be permitted to directly seek or audit the records of the taxpayers and form any conclusion on the legality of their tax liability.

CONCLUSION
The onus of proving sufficient jurisdiction is on the officer asserting it. Unless the jurisdiction has been conclusively established, the officer cannot proceed on the subject matter. In conclusion, one may recollect the decision of the Supreme Court in Hukum Chand Shyam Lal (1976 AIR 789) which observed as follows: ‘It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performances are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice.’ The complex legal and administrative systems adopted under GST have to be meticulously handled by the Administrators in order to ensure the smooth and efficient function of the administration. Though this has been undertaken to a large extent, certain gaps need to examined and addressed so that there is clarity on the proper officer before whom the taxpayers are answerable.

FAQs ON AMENDED SCHEDULE III-DIVISION II RELATED TO ‘APPLICABILITY’

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) notified the amendments to Schedule III to the Companies Act, 2013 on 24th March, 2021. There are a few questions regarding the broader issue of applicability of the amendments. These are listed below and so are the responses thereto which are the personal views of the author.

The responses are provided with reference to Division II of Schedule III that applies to non-NBFC companies following Ind AS, but may mutatis mutandis apply to Division I (applicable to entities applying AS) and Division III (applicable to NBFC entities applying Ind AS) of Schedule III as well. The ICAI has issued an Exposure Draft (ED) for public comments on the Guidance Note on Schedule III. The discussions in this article are largely consistent with the ED.

Whether the amended Schedule III applies to consolidated financial statements (CFS), those that are prepared on an annual basis, or a complete set prepared for interim purpose?

Attention is drawn to the guidance available in the pre-amended Schedule III Guidance Note of the ICAI. Paragraph 12.1 of the pre-amended Schedule III Guidance Note states as follows: ‘However, due note has to be taken of the fact that the Schedule III itself states that the provisions of the Schedule are to be followed mutatis mutandis for a CFS. MCA has also clarified vide General Circular No. 39/2014 dated 14th October, 2014 that Schedule III to the Act read with the applicable Accounting Standards does not envisage that a company while preparing its CFS merely repeats the disclosures made by it under stand-alone accounts being consolidated. Accordingly, the company would need to give all disclosures relevant for CFS only.’

The Guidance Note further elaborates on what is to be included and what needs to be excluded in the CFS. However, those inclusions / exclusions are not based on clear and consistent principles. A somewhat similar position is also taken in the ED. However, those are subject to further discussions and may undergo a change in the final Guidance Note. Therefore, which additional Schedule III disclosures are to be included or excluded in the CFS will involve a lot of judgement and guesswork till such time as the ICAI publishes its Guidance Note on the amended Schedule III.

The author believes that since most of the incremental disclosures in the amended Schedule III are regulatory in nature and beyond the requirements of accounting standards, those should not be mandated to CFS which are prepared on an annual basis or a complete CFS set prepared for an interim purpose. Alternatively, the ICAI may consider the application of the principle of materiality, which should be applied by each entity, considering their facts and circumstances. The ICAI may only provide broad guidelines on how the materiality principle will apply, without being prescriptive.

In accordance with amended Schedule III an entity reclassifies lease liabilities presented as borrowings separately as lease liabilities, i.e., borrowings and lease liabilities are presented as separate sub-headings under financial liabilities. Should the entity present a third balance sheet in accordance with paragraph 40A of Ind AS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements?

As per paragraph 40A of Ind AS 1, an entity shall present a third balance sheet as at the beginning of the preceding period in addition to the minimum comparative financial statements if the retrospective application, retrospective restatement or the reclassification has a material effect on the information in the balance sheet at the beginning of the preceding period. If lease liabilities that were presented as borrowings, and under amended Schedule III, it is reclassified as current and non-current financial liabilities, the author does not believe that it is material enough that a third balance sheet would be required in such cases. Nonetheless, the author’s view is that the lease liabilities should be included in determining the debt-equity ratio which is required to be disclosed as per amended Schedule III. Since most of the other changes required under revised Schedule III are regulatory in nature and are additional information rather than reclassification, a third balance sheet may not be required.

In case a company has a non-31st March year-end, whether amended Schedule III shall apply to the 31st December, 2021 or the 30th September, 2021 year-end financial statements?

The MCA Notification that notifies the amendment to Schedule III states that ‘the Central Government makes the following further amendments in Schedule III with effect from 1st day of April, 2021.’ This creates confusion whether the amendments apply for the financial years beginning on or after 1st April, 2021 or the financial years that end after 1st April, 2021. The author’s view is that the amendments shall apply to financial statements relating to the financial year beginning on or after 1st April, 2021 for the following three reasons:

• Firstly, the amendments are made to align with CARO’s requirement and CARO 2020 is applicable for the financial year beginning on or after 1st April, 2021.
• Secondly, the amendments also align with the Companies (Accounts) Amendments Rules, 2021 which are applicable for the financial year commencing on or after 1st April, 2021. Consequently, amended Schedule III will not apply to the 31st December, 2021 or the 30th September, 2021 year-end financial statements.
• Lastly, going by recent experience, the regulators’ intent is to apply amendments on a prospective basis rather than on a retrospective basis.

Whether amended Schedule III applies to stand-alone interim financial statements that commence on or after 1st April, 2021?

The relevant paragraphs of Ind AS 34 Interim Financial Reporting are quoted below:

‘9. If an entity publishes a complete set of Financial Statements in its interim financial report, the form and content of those statements shall conform to the requirements of Ind AS 1 for a complete set of Financial Statements.
10. If an entity publishes a set of condensed Financial Statements in its interim financial report, those condensed statements shall include, at a minimum, each of the headings and sub-totals that were included in its most recent annual Financial Statements and the selected explanatory notes as required by this Standard. Additional line items or notes shall be included if their omission would make the condensed interim Financial Statements misleading.’

Based on the above, if a complete set of stand-alone interim financial statements is presented, all amended Schedule III disclosures are required, including their comparatives. When condensed financial statements are presented as interim financial statements, critical Accounting Standard disclosures that were not included in the last set of published financial statements are required to be provided. Distinction needs to be made between regulatory disclosures required as per Schedule III and those required by Accounting Standards. Therefore, considering the amended disclosures under Schedule III are other than accounting standard disclosures, these are not required to be included in condensed interim financial statements; but may be provided voluntarily.

With regard to quarterly and half-yearly SEBI results – SEBI LODR requires Schedule III format to be used for SEBI results. Schedule III amendments make no changes in the format of Statement of Profit and Loss. However, there are a few new line items inserted, or the grouping is changed in the format of the Balance Sheet, for example, lease liabilities to be shown as current and non-current financial liabilities on the face of the balance sheet, security deposits given to be shown under other financial assets instead of loans, current maturities of long-term borrowings to be shown separately within borrowings under the heading current liabilities instead of other financial liabilities, etc. These format changes need to be made in half-yearly results since the SEBI format is aligned to the Schedule III format. Comparative figures also need to be re-grouped / re-classified, wherever required, with appropriate notes.

Whether comparative numbers are required for interim or annual financial statements for periods / year commencing on or after 1st April, 2021 and contain the amended Schedule III disclosures in the current year / period for the first time?

Schedule III, Ind AS 34 Interim Financial Reporting, Conceptual framework for Financial Reporting under Ind AS and Ind AS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements, require comparative numbers to be presented. Comparative numbers are required for stand-alone financial statements, CFS, full set of interim financial statement and condensed interim financial statement.

CONCLUSION

The process of gathering the information for the incremental Schedule III disclosures and providing comparative numbers in the initial year or period of implementing amended Schedule III will be a cumbersome and onerous exercise, particularly aging
analysis of receivables, payables, or capital work in progress. Additionally, many of the disclosure requirements may be required at the CFS level. Therefore, proper planning and system modification is advised to comply with the amended Schedule III.

TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PROMOTER

BACKGROUND
As the securities laws increasingly seek to lay down sound principles of corporate governance and also push towards greater professionalisation of company management, a question has arisen whether the unique concept of promoters in securities and corporate laws needs a close relook. So much so, that even SEBI has realised this and is considering whether this concept should be dropped or re-conceptualised.

In India, promoters have been given a central role, focus and obligations in listed companies owing to historical and other reasons. While on their own they have hardly any special rights, they have multiple and even onerous responsibilities and it is increasingly felt that they need to be reconsidered considering the changing reality. The present law is so stringent that even reclassification of a person from promoter to non-promoter is a lengthy, difficult and complicated affair. It is almost as if being a promoter is a one-way street, i.e., till death do you part!

In a recent major proposed public issue, the question came up yet again about who should be classified as a promoter and why would this status be so keenly shunned. It was reported that certain top investors / management did not desire to be termed as ‘promoters’. The question is when and how is a person deemed to be a promoter and when can he claim that he is no longer a promoter.

HOW DID THE CONCEPT OF PROMOTER COME INTO BEING?

To appreciate this, we need to understand the term and then consider how various laws define and treat promoters. Promoters, traditionally, are those enterprising persons who conceive a business idea, set up a company and seek investors to finance the business. They would run the business and later even hand it over to another management. The investors would participate in the ownership / profits / appreciation. Thus, they could be seen as persons with ideas but without the financial means to implement them. They need investors who are willing to share the risk for what they expect to be substantial rewards, without usually participating in the day-to-day management of the company.

In western countries, promoters / management typically hold a small share in the capital. Their returns would come as appreciation of such holding and remuneration for running the company. In India, traditionally, promoters are families who typically own a substantial part, usually 50% or more, of the equity. Thus, they have very substantial control in the company by virtue of their own investment. As we will see, even the law expects them to have a significant own stake, or what is termed nowadays as ‘skin in the game’. Their control over the company would usually continue through succeeding generations. Since the promoter family would have dominant control, the challenge for the regulator is more of balancing the interests of these family promoters with those of the public / minority shareholders.

Thus, a multitude of provisions under the Companies Act, 2013 and various SEBI regulations have focused on identifying these promoters and placing various responsibilities and liabilities on them.

THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF PROMOTERS AND OBLIGATIONS ON THEM

To begin with, the term is defined very widely. Persons who are in ‘control’ of the company are deemed to be promoters. The term ‘control’ is also given a very wide definition. While majority shareholding is usually enough to give them ‘control’, even certain special rights under agreements are deemed to be ‘control’. Once such promoters are identified by these criteria, specified relatives and entities connected with them in the specified manner are also deemed by law to be part of the promoter group. The list of such persons is usually quite long.

The promoters are required to have a minimum significant percentage of capital after a public issue. Thus, the public issue cannot be a means of their exit. Further, their shareholding is subject to a lock-in for one to three years. Extensive disclosures are required about the history and background of each of the promoters. They have to make regular disclosures of their shareholding and changes or charges (such as pledge, etc.) made thereon.

Interestingly, they are also the fulcrum around which the independence of directors is tested. Any person who is connected with them in any of the specified ways is deemed to be not independent. This is again an extension of the presumption that the promoters are in control and hence if one is connected with them, one loses one’s independence.

Importantly, if anything goes wrong in the company, they could be very likely seen as the primary suspects for blame and punishment. This, again, is linked with their being presumed to be in control. Of course, in many situations those who are not directly involved in the day-to-day management may not be presumed to be liable.

Deeming as promoters starts with a public issue
One facet of this subject, the complications of which we will discuss later, is that the deeming of persons / group(s) as promoters begins with a public issue under securities laws. This category becomes defined and even frozen at this stage and the persons who form part of this group are identified. Unlike being in active management, being a promoter is not necessarily a choice. Being a relative or connected in one of the many specified ways is sufficient for a person to be deemed a promoter.

EXITING FROM THE PROMOTER GROUP

While it is easy to become a promoter, often even without a choice, the difficulty is in exiting. One cannot just ‘resign’ as a promoter or exit the group through a mere declaration. Even severing of financial or other ties may not always help one to get out of the category.

It is not as if a promoter is trying to escape responsibility. There may be members of the family who have no connection with the company. There may even be separations / divisions in the family. The promoters themselves could have so low a shareholding that they have literally no say, whether as directors or shareholders. Yet they continue to be promoters and remain subject to multiple restrictions, obligations and liabilities.

Regulation 31A of the SEBI LODR Regulations lays down the procedure for declassification from promoter to non-promoter. It requires, to begin with, the fulfilling of several conditions demonstrating that the person is no more connected with the promoter or even the company. The next step is obtaining the approval of the Board of Directors of the company. Then the approval of the shareholders is required. Finally, the stock exchange has to approve the reclassification. This process may easily take months and its outcome is quite uncertain. The process becomes even more difficult if the promoters seeking exit have disputes with the other promoters, which is something that is often seen in families.

Of course, it can be argued that in cases where some of the qualifications or connections that made a person a promoter no longer exist and so the person ought to thereby become a non-promoter. However, one wished there were specific and clear provisions regarding this.

COMPANIES WITHOUT PROMOTERS

Fortunately, there are provisions in the SEBI Regulations for companies with ‘no identifiable promoters’. This is particularly so in case of companies with professional managements. However, to qualify for this one would have to escape the wide net cast by the very broad definition of ‘promoter’ and ‘promoter group’.

SEBI’S ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE LAW


SEBI has been making attempts to address some of these issues. Indeed, two consultation papers have been recently issued by SEBI to discuss how to simplify the reclassification and how to narrow down the definition. These, however, at best scratch the surface. So the only way out is to squarely avoid becoming a promoter. And the best way is to do this, as stated earlier, at the time of the public issue.

But even that is not easy! The definition of promoters is very wide and even persons having a significant say in management, whether by way of shareholding or by agreements or otherwise, could be classified as promoters. Litigation on this issue (e.g., the decision of SAT in the Subhkam Ventures case, dated 15th January, 2010, read with the ruling of the Supreme Court on appeal) has been inconclusive. SEBI had attempted to specify some bright line tests in this regard to lay down specific criteria / clauses in an agreement which could make a person a promoter. But nothing real came out of this either.

The problem is further complicated because multiple laws have placed requirements on promoters. These include the Companies Act, SEBI Insider Trading Regulations, SEBI Takeover Regulations, SEBI Listing Regulations, the SEBI ICDR Regulations, certain laws made by the RBI, etc. Thus, there are multiple regulators involved. All this makes a change difficult and complex.

However, such changes are now the need of the hour. As SEBI has rightly pointed out in its recent consultation paper dated 11th May, 2021 on redefining the term ‘promoter’, the holding of promoters has decreased steadily from 58% in 2009 to 50% in 2018 in the top 500 companies. More importantly, the holding of institutional investors has substantially increased from 25% in 2009 to 34% in 2018. Many companies capitalising on new technology are professionally managed companies with no identifiable promoters. Hence, now the responsibilities and obligations are increasingly sought to be placed on the Board of a company rather than on the promoters.

Robust corporate governance with active involvement of institutional investors would be a better long-term objective rather than focusing on family-centred promoters. However, considering that these consultation papers propose small changes rather than a proper overhaul, the concerns remain. Hence, for now, even if not easy, prevention would be a better strategy for management / investors of new companies than the very difficult cure.  

CRYPTOCURRENCIES: TRAPPED IN A LEGAL LABYRINTH (Part – 2)

In the last issue, BCAJ, July, 2021, we looked at the legal background of cryptocurrencies and various issues relating to them. We continue examining the legal problems associated with Virtual Currencies (VCs) in India.
This month, we take up the FEMA provisions in relation to VCs

RBI PUTS TO REST 2018 CIRCULAR

In May, 2021, the RBI issued a Circular to all banks asking them not to refer to its own Circular of April, 2018 cautioning customers against VCs. This was in light of the fact that the Supreme Court in Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India, WP(C) No. 528/2018, order dated 4th March, 2020 (SC) had held that the RBI Circular of April, 2018 was liable to be set aside on the ground of being ultra vires the Constitution (explained in detail in last month’s feature). Therefore, the RBI directed banks that in view of the order of the Supreme Court, the April, 2018 Circular was no longer valid and hence could not be cited or quoted from. It, however, added that banks may continue to carry out customer due diligence processes in line with regulations governing standards for Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and obligations of regulated entities under Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, in addition to ensuring compliance with relevant provisions under the Foreign Exchange Management Act.

CAN LRS BE USED FOR INVESTING IN CRYPTOCURRENCIES?

The Liberalised Remittance Scheme or LRS is a Scheme of the RBI under which any individual resident in India can remit abroad up to US $250,000 per financial year for permissible capital and current account transactions.

The million-dollar question is can the LRS be used for buying foreign crypto assets such as Bitcoins, Dogecoins? Alternatively, can a resident carry out a crypto arbitrage, i.e., buy cryptocurrencies from abroad and sell them in India? This is an issue on which there is no express prohibition under the LRS and there is more confusion than clarity.

When the LRS was introduced in February, 2004, the RBI stated that it could be used for any current or capital account transactions, or a combination of both. In May, 2007, the RBI clarified that remittances under the LRS were allowed only in respect of permissible current or capital account transactions. However, in June, 2015 the RBI introduced a novel concept of defining the permissible capital account transactions for an individual under the LRS. It defined them as follows:

(i) Opening of foreign currency account abroad with a bank;
(ii)    Purchase of property abroad;
(iii)    Making investments abroad;
(iv)    Setting up wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures abroad;
(v)    Extending loans, including loans in Indian Rupees, to Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) who are relatives as defined in the Companies Act, 2013.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India (Supra) examined various facets of cryptocurrencies. The ratio of this decision is relevant even for determining the issue under LRS. Various important issues were examined in this case and one of the most important of these was ‘Are Virtual Currencies (VCs) “currency” under Indian laws?’ After examining various provisions of law, the Apex Court concluded that it was not possible to accept the contention that VCs were just goods / commodities and could never be regarded as real money! This decision has been analysed in great detail in last month’s feature.

One may consider whether VCs can be considered to be securities and, hence, permissible under the LRS as an investment in securities. FEMA defines a security to mean shares, stocks, bonds and debentures, Government securities as defined in the Public Debt Act, 1944, savings certificates to which the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 applies, deposit receipts in respect of deposits of securities and units of the Unit Trust of India established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Unit Trust of India Act, 1963 or of any mutual fund, and includes certificates of title to securities, but does not include bills of exchange or promissory notes other than Government promissory notes or any other instruments which may be notified by the Reserve Bank as security for the purposes of this Act. VCs are not shares, stocks, bonds, debentures, Government securities, savings certificates, deposit receipts in respect of deposits of securities or units of any mutual fund. Hence, it is not possible to contend that purchase of VCs from abroad tantamounts to an investment in securities.

The truth of the matter is that the RBI is not comfortable with the LRS being used to buy VCs. RBI’s view is that VCs are not currencies. Hence, bankers are shy to allow the LRS to buy VCs. However, what would be the position if a resident were to use the balance standing in his foreign bank account to buy VCs? How would the bankers then restrict the usage? The moot point is can the RBI have jurisdiction in such a case? Can one use credit cards and buy VCs on the ground that they are goods / intangibles and hence the transaction is a current account transaction and credit cards can be used on the internet for any permissible current account transaction? Some Indian banks have started asking their customers remitting money abroad for investment purposes to provide a declaration that such funds will not be used for buying cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins.

In fact, some private banks have gone a step forward and added a clause in the LRS declaration which doesn’t stop at cryptocurrencies but also wants customers to declare that funds would not be used to buy units of mutual funds or any other capital instrument of a company dealing in Bitcoins / cryptocurrencies / virtual currencies. Further, the LRS declaration even stipulates that the source of funds for LRS remittances should not come from investments in Bitcoins or cryptocurrencies. Clearly, a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater!

One point to be considered when dealing with this issue is that under FEMA one cannot do indirectly what one cannot do directly. Thus, if the RBI considers that VCs cannot be bought under the LRS, then one cannot buy them indirectly.

Another issue to be considered is that when remitting money under the LRS one needs to file Form A2 and fill in the Purpose Code. What Purpose Code would the bank show for cryptocurrencies – would it be Capital Account / Foreign Portfolio Investment? Without this clarity, a bank would not allow remittance for buying VCs.

ARE VCs GOODS?

In the aforesaid case of Internet and Mobile Association of India (Supra), the RBI contended that Virtual Currencies are not legal tender but tradable commodities / digital goods. If this proposition is upheld then the question which arises is whether the buying and selling of VCs would attract the provisions under FEMA relating to export and import of goods?

The Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015 defines ‘software’ to mean any computer programme, database, drawing, design, audio / video signals, any information by whatever name called in or on any medium other than in or on any physical medium. VCs are also computer programmes stored in a virtual medium and, hence, the question arises whether they can be considered goods.

If a resident buys VCs from abroad would it be treated as import of goods? In this case, the provisions of the Master Direction on Import of Goods and Services amended up to 1st April, 2019 would be applicable.

Similarly, if a resident pays for foreign services / goods availed of by him by way of VCs, then would the payment by VCs be treated as an export of goods and the receipt of the foreign services / goods as an import? In this case, the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015 read with the Master Direction on Export of Goods and Services amended up to 12th January, 2018 would be applicable. If one considers the payment by VCs to be an export and the receipt of goods from abroad to be an import, then this would constitute a set-off of export receivables against import payables. The FEMA Regulations permit a set-off of exports against imports only if it is in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. A payment by VCs is not prescribed under the FEMA Regulations, and hence it is a moot point whether the same would be permissible.

(To be
concluded)
 

RESOLVING THE INSOLVENT

Taxation laws have always mingled with other regulatory laws and this interplay has resulted in better application of the tax laws. The intermingling of the GST law with the recently-enacted Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 poses interesting facets of the GST law. Though both laws have a different orientation, they converge on the issue of tax recovery from a defaulter. The said laws also have an interesting commonality, i.e., they are claimed as reformist action carrying the same ‘magnitude of 1991’ (the year when economic reforms were carried out under the duo of PM Narasimha Rao and FM Manmohan Singh).

This article is an attempt to identify the points of convergence of these revolutionary laws in the context of corporate insolvencies.

Generally speaking, a defaulting / sick enterprise will also have statutory defaults (referred to as ‘Crown debts’). Under the erstwhile provisions, Crown debts were given priority over other financial / trade debts. Empirical evidence suggests that sick enterprises burdened with Crown debts impair the productivity of assets and deter the overall recovery of the enterprise. Permitting tax recoveries would defeat the ultimate motive of rejuvenating a sick enterprise and this has been expressed in the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC) report in 2015:

‘2. Executive Summary
The key economic question in the bankruptcy process…
The Committee believes that there is only one correct forum for evaluating such possibilities and making a decision: a creditors’ committee, where all financial creditors have votes in proportion to the magnitude of debt that they hold. In the past, laws in India have brought arms of the Government (legislature, executive or judiciary) into this question. This has been strictly avoided by the Committee. The appropriate disposition of a defaulting firm is a business decision, and only the creditors should make it.’

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE INSOLVENCY & BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) is the bankruptcy law of India which aims at creating a single law for insolvency and bankruptcy for corporates and non-corporates. It is a comprehensive code for resolving insolvencies which erstwhile laws failed to achieve. Hitherto, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (‘SICA’), the Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (‘RDDBFI’), the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI’) and the Companies Act, 2013 provided for insolvency of companies. The Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 were made applicable to individuals and partnership firms. But the thrust of the IBC law is to identify sickness under a ‘liquidity approach’ rather than a ‘balance sheet approach’ at the earliest point of time, i.e., default in payment of any debt obligation.

At the end of it, the insolvency process results in two eventualities: (a) recovery of the enterprise through a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP); or (b) liquidation of the enterprise and distribution of assets to the stakeholders.

SUPREMACY OF THE CODE OVER ALL LAWS (INCLUDING GST)

The law was given teeth through blanket overriding provisions over all other Central and State laws. This was a learning from the erstwhile laws and the intent of the Legislature was to give corporate revival primacy over liquidation. Section 238 of the Code gives it supremacy over all other laws insofar as an insolvency resolution process is concerned and it cannot be eclipsed by resorting to remedies available under the ordinary law of the land. The IBC law has withstood the constitutional challenge in the famous Swiss Ribbons case (2019) 4 SCC 17 which gave further impetus to this legislation.
Central or State Government as an operational creditor
In terms of section 5(20) r/w/s 5(21) of IBC 2016, an operational creditor has been defined as a person to whom a debt in respect of goods or services is due and includes debt payable under any law to the Central and State Government. Contrary to the erstwhile laws which prioritised Crown debts, this law has relegated Government dues to the class of operational creditors. CBEC Circular 134/04/2020-GST, dated 23rd March, 2020 also clarifies that the GST dues would stand as ‘operational debt’ and no coercive action is permitted to be taken by the proper officer for recovery of debts due prior to the CIRP date. It would be seen under the IBC process that operational creditors have a limited power in revival of the enterprise. Section 30(1) only assures the liquidation value of the Corporate Debtor to operational creditors.

Participation in the insolvency resolution process – operational creditors

The insolvency process commences with an insolvency application filed by a financial creditor, operational creditor or corporate debtor (or its member) himself. Operational creditors are permitted to file for initiation of insolvency in case of default of any debts due to them. The date of admission of the application for insolvency by the NCLT acts as the ‘insolvency commencement date’. On and from this date, a blanket moratorium is announced against the institution and the continuation, execution of any suit or decree under any law against the Corporate Debtor. In addition, a complete bar is placed on transferring, encumbering, alienating, recovering, etc., of any assets or rights of the Corporate Debtor. This date serves as a reference point for ascertainment of debts / claims settled under the insolvency resolution process.

A public announcement is made of the CIRP containing the details of the insolvency and seeking submission of claims against the Corporate Debtor. Operational creditors are required to submit their claims for dues from the Corporate Debtor within the specified time frame. It is based on these claims that the resolution professional (RP) draws up the statement of debts due by the Corporate Debtor and the available assets against such claims. The RP is required to verify the claims, including contingent claims, for arriving at the creditors’ pool of the Corporate Debtor.

________________________________________________________________________

1   For respective GSTIN registration

It is at this juncture that statutory authorities (including Central / State Governments1) have to enter the insolvency process and present their claim of unpaid taxes from the Corporate Debtor. Unless a claim is filed, Governments are not permitted to seek a share in the resolution plan of the creditor. These claims are subject to verification and admission by the IRP / RP. Therefore, if the merits of the claim itself are disputed, the IRP / RP may not consider the same as a valid claim. The Central / State Government being in the status of operational creditors, is not permitted to vote as part of the Committee of Creditors (COC) which is the prerogative of the financial creditors. They are mute spectators to the resolution process and would have to accept the decision of the COC as being in the overall interests of all stakeholders.

AGITATING THE RESOLUTION PLAN

Under the revived insolvency law, the financial creditors that comprise the COC are given supreme powers over the resolution of the Corporate Debtor. The law-makers believe that the financial creditors contributing risk capital stand to lose most in an insolvency and therefore would make all efforts to seek suitors who are willing to revive the company. In case a resolution plan is successfully drawn up and approved by the COC, the same would be approved by the NCLT and given statutory force. In terms of section 31 of the IBC, the approved resolution plan would be binding on all stakeholders, including Central / State Governments.

In all likelihood creditors (including Central / State Governments) would be aggrieved by the reduction in the settlement of dues under the resolution plan. Section 61(3) recognises that all resolution plans would entail some pain to stakeholders, yet the commercial wisdom of COC has been given statutory force. IBC limits the scope of any appeal against the order of NCLT (affirming the COC decisions) only in cases where:

* Approved resolution plan is in contravention of any law for the time being in force
* Material irregularity in exercise of powers by IRP / RP
* Debts owed to operational creditors have not been provided for in the resolution plan
* Insolvency costs are not provided for
* Or any other prescribed criteria.

The Supreme Court, in the case of Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Private Limited vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (2021) SCC Online SC 313, has unequivocally stated that the Legislature has consciously precluded any ground to challenge the ‘commercial wisdom’ of the COC before the NCLT and that decision is ‘non-justiciable’. Effectively, on approval of the plan by the NCLT, all operational creditors including the Central / State Governments, lose their right to claim any further dues on the fairness doctrine. Discretion on the rationing of the limited funds of the Corporate Debtors rests in the domain of the financial creditors jointly through the COC.

In the context of GST, though the Centre / State would have ascertained their respective dues, they can at the most stake their claims and it would be for the COC to ascertain the eligible claim and provide for the settlement of the said claim on a liquidation-value basis depending on the availability of assets of the Corporate Debtor and the proposal by the incoming resolution applicant. Despite the Centre / State having a self-assessed GST liability available on record, they are bound by the resolution plan and have to strictly abide by the same. Importantly, paragraph 67 of the above decision also states that debts in respect of the payment of dues arising under any law including the ones owed to Centre / State which do not form part of the resolution plan, stand extinguished. This conclusion seals the fate of all adjudicated / unadjudicated GST dues pertaining to the periods up to the CIRP date and the Centre / States cannot proceed to recover any amounts not provided in the resolution plan. Reference can also be made to the decision in Essar Steel India Ltd. Committee of Creditors vs. Satish Kumar Gupta (2020) 8 SCC 531,

‘107. For the same reason, the impugned NLCAT judgment [Standard Chartered Bank vs. Satish Kumar Gupta, 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 388] in holding that claims that may exist apart from those decided on merits by the resolution professional and by the Adjudicating Authority / Appellate Tribunal can now be decided by an appropriate forum in terms of section 60(6) of the Code, also militates against the rationale of section 31 of the Code. A successful resolution applicant cannot suddenly be faced with “undecided” claims after the resolution plan submitted by him has been accepted as this would amount to a hydra-head popping up which would throw into uncertainty amounts payable by a prospective resolution applicant who would successfully take over the business of the corporate debtor. All claims must be submitted to and decided by the resolution professional so that a prospective resolution applicant knows exactly what has to be paid in order that it may then take over and run the business of the corporate debtor. This the successful resolution applicant does on a fresh slate, as has been pointed out by us hereinabove. For these reasons, NCLAT judgment must also be set aside on this count.’

ROLE OF INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION PROFESSIONAL

The CIRP process involves appointment of an IRP / RP for management of the affairs of the Corporate Debtor. The powers of the board of directors stand suspended and vested in the hands of the RP (section 17/25). It provides that the IRP / RP would act and execute in the name and on behalf of the Corporate Debtor and keep the same as a going concern. In terms of section 148 of the CGST / SGST Act r.w. Notification 11/2020-CT dated 21st March, 2020, a special process has been identified for management of the affairs of the Corporate Debtor by the IRP / RP until conclusion of the insolvency resolution process. In terms of the proviso, this Notification would be applicable only to such class of persons who have defaulted in filing the outward supplies statement (GSTR1) or return (GSTR3B) under the GST law.

The IRP / RP would be deemed to be a ‘distinct person’ of the Corporate Debtor and is required to take separate registration numbers in each of the States where the Corporate Debtor was previously registered. In effect, a separate GSTIN (under the PAN of the Corporate Debtor) should be obtained by the IRP / RP and all inward / outward supply transactions from the date of appointment of the IRP / RP would have to be reported under the new GSTIN. This ensures that pre-CIRP dues would be governed by the resolution plan / liquidation order and an IRP / RP being a fiduciary, be responsible for acts done after its appointment under a fresh registration – refer Circular (Supra). Moreover, non-filing of prior period returns would not act as a bar on filing subsequent period returns and the new registration would facilitate regularising the compliance subsequent to the appointment of IRP / RP.

Recognising that the creation of a new registration would cause temporary technical challenges, the said Notification waives the time limit of section 16(4) and GSTR2A reflection under Rule 36(4) of the CGST law. Interestingly, as per the Circular (Supra), this waiver is permitted only for the first return filed by the IRP / RP after seeking the registration u/s 40. The IRP / RP is permitted to account for inward supplies which are received since its appointment and cannot expand the claim of credit to supplies prior to such date.

At the customer’s front, invoices raised by the Corporate Debtor during the interregnum (i.e., from the CIRP commencement date and date of registration by IRP / RP) would be eligible as input tax credit in the hands of the recipient despite the erstwhile GSTIN being reflected in such invoices. Separately, the said Notification also permits the RP to seek refund of the amounts lying in the electronic cash ledger in the erstwhile registration.

STATUS OF THE ERSTWHILE REGISTRATION

In terms of the Circular (Supra), the erstwhile registration is required to be placed under suspension by the proper officer after the CIRP date and cannot be cancelled by the proper officer. In case the registration is already cancelled, the proper officer has been directed to revoke the cancellation and bring the same to suspension status.

It may be noted that the new registration granted to the IRP / RP is for the limited timeframe from the CIRP date up to the approval / rejection of the resolution plan. In the event that the resolution plan of the resolution applicant is approved and the Corporate Debtor continues in the same legal form, the law appears to be silent on the continuation of the new registration or reverting to the erstwhile registration. On the basis that the law is silent and that IRP / RP registration is a temporary measure, it can be concluded that the Corporate Debtor would revert to the original registration and the proper officer would have to revoke the suspension placed on the original registration.

Naturally, section 39(10) and the GSTN portal may pose the technical challenge of prohibiting the Corporate Debtor from filing returns after the resolution date on account of default of prior period returns. Due to this hindrance and given the fact that the IRP / RP has filed the returns for the corresponding period, one may consider availing a third registration after the date of approval of the resolution plan by the NCLT. Of course, where the resolution plan involves an amalgamation or merger, the general GST provisions including transfer of input tax credit, would take over for this purpose.

SCENARIO ON LIQUIDATION

Where the COC fails to draw up a resolution plan within the specified / extended time lines or the resolution plan is rejected or contravened, the NCLT would direct that the company be liquidated and the assets be distributed to the stakeholders under a waterfall mechanism. The liquidation order shall be deemed to be a notice of discharge to the officers, employees and workmen of the Corporate Debtor and the liquidator takes charge of all the matters of the Corporate Debtor. In terms of section 53 of the IBC, the distribution of assets / liquidation value to workmen, secured creditors and unsecured creditors would be made prior to meeting the Crown debts. In all likelihood, a Corporate Debtor would not have sufficient assets and the dues would have to be written off by the Central / State Governments.

Unlike the Notification issued w.r.t. the resolution process, the GST law has not provided for the continuation or creation of a new registration in the eventuality of the company entering into liquidation. A liquidator appointed u/s 34 of the IBC law may inherit a going concern and would have to perform a piecemeal liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. The liquidation process may entail GST implications which the official liquidator may be liable to discharge. The law appears to be silent
on the status of the IRP / RP registration or the erstwhile pre-CIRP registration during such process and the Board should clarify this practical issue faced by liquidators.

SIGNIFICANCE OF DISTINCT PERSON REGISTRATION

Section 168 of the law mandates a fresh registration by the IRP / RP in fiduciary capacity and such registration has been treated as a distinct person. Curiously, this Notification, though procedural in nature, raises concerns on the substantive provisions of section 25 which define distinct person. The assets / inventory which are in possession under the older GSTIN are now to be considered the property of the new IRP / RP GSTIN as being ‘distinct person’ under law. While one may be tempted to invoke Schedule I and deem a notional supply among these GSTINs, we should be conscious of the purpose of the Notification. The said Notification is directed towards procedural aspects and not alteration of substantive rights / liabilities of the taxpayer. The rights and liabilities under law would continue under the supervision of the IBC process and GST should not treat this registration as a distinct person in the strict sense. Under the IBC law, sections 17, 18, 24 and 25 define the role and responsibilities of the IRP / RP as being responsible for the management of affairs and ensuring compliance of legal requirements under the IBC and other laws. The Supreme Court in Arcellor Mittal (India) Ltd. vs. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) 2 SCC 1, states that the RP is taking over the Corporate Debtor in an ‘administrative capacity’ and not in an adjudicatory capacity. This conclusion should put at rest any doubts on the distinct person concept which has been introduced through section 168 of the law.

INTERESTING FACETS OF INPUT TAX CREDIT AT CUSTOMER’S END

GST dues which are collected and payable by the Corporate Debtor may remain unpaid or would be settled at a reduced value under a resolution / liquidation plan. This may result in violation of section 16(2)(c) of the GST law requiring the recipient to establish that input tax has been paid to the Government. Does the settlement of the resolution plan by the Corporate Debtor have any bearing on the ITC claim of the recipient? One theory would claim that the debt due by the Corporate Debtor (i.e., output tax) itself would stand ‘extinguished’ on approval of the resolution plan and thus the taxes are not ‘unpaid taxes’ to the Government causing invocation of the said provision. Section 16(2) pre-supposes a legally sustainable claim and non-payment of such claim would result in denial of ITC. But where the claim itself has been extinguished one may say that section 16(2) stands complied with. Moreover, Government being a stakeholder of the resolution plan, has accepted the haircut (though by statutory force whose validity has not been challenged at appellate forums), it should be estopped from now staking a new claim at the recipient’s end.

The alternative theory would claim that taxes which are not realised by the Government are not ITC and this makes it justifiable for the Revenue to deny the claim. The fallout of this approach would be that the recipient of input from the Corporate Debtor would be under double jeopardy – having paid the tax portion to the Corporate Debtor it would still be denied the ITC by the Government.

INPUT TAX CREDIT LYING IN BALANCE / REFUNDS DUE AS ON CIRP DATE

The Corporate Debtor may be entitled to the ITC lying unutilised as on the CIRP date [for example, Input – 100; Input as per 2A – 150; Output – 350]. The question for consideration is whether the Government’s claim would be 250 or 350? Government in every likelihood may proceed to confirm its demand (vide an order) for gross amount of 350 and this poses a question on the ‘debt’ which is due to the Government. Claim u/s 2(6) refers to a ‘right to payment’ whether or not such right is disputed / undisputed, etc. Debt has been defined u/s 2(11) as being a ‘liability or obligation’ in respect of a claim which is due from any person. Regulation 9-14 places the responsibility of verification of the claims and ascertainment of the ‘best estimate’ on the IRP / RP.

GST being a VAT model, the references to output tax and input tax are made to ascertain the net value addition. Though they are distinct and independent concepts, the scheme of the legislation is to arrive at the net tax liability after reduction of amounts lying as credit. The scheme of section 49 of the GST law (also refer ‘self-assessed tax’) and returns also depict that the ‘liability or payment’ to the Government would be computed after deduction of the ITC eligible to the Corporate Debtor. But the answer may be different to the extent of input which is eligible but lying unclaimed by the Corporate Debtor (50). This is because the statutory scheme requires that ITC should be claimed for it to be eligible for a deduction against output tax. Where the claim is not made by the Corporate Debtor or its representative (IRP / RP), in all likelihood that amount would stand lapsed and cannot be claimed as a set-off in ascertaining the debt due to the Government.

Where refunds are due by the Government, it may be within its statutory right to internally adjust these amounts. Section 54(10) of the GST law empowers the officer to recover the said amounts. Where such adjustments are made prior to the moratorium, the Government would be within the framework to justify the adjustment. But once a moratorium is declared, section 14(1)(a) bars any transfer, encumbrance, alienation or disposal of the assets of the Corporate Debtor. The Government may be barred from adjusting the refunds due to the Corporate Debtor with outstanding dues. In such scenarios, the IRP / RP would have to pursue the refund claim from the Government and transfer the outstanding dues to the decision of the COC under the resolution plan. But in case of liquidation, Regulation 29 expressly permits mutual credits or set-off prior to ascertainment of the net amount payable by the Corporate Debtor.

FATE OF ALTERNATIVE RECOVERIES – JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS, ETC.

GST law has amply empowered authorities to recover their tax dues from refund adjustments, garnishee proceedings, etc. Whether these provisions which can be invoked in the normal course of business operations have a bearing on the Corporate Debtor? The moment the CIRP process is initiated, the moratorium shields the Corporate Debtor from any further liabilities and also protects all its assets from alienation from the Corporate Debtor. This effectively restricts the taxman from approaching banks / debtors and recovering the taxes forcefully. Under general law, the right of the creditor in invoking the personal guarantees granted by directors was under consideration before the Court in SBI vs. V. Ramakrishnan & Ors. (2018) 17 SCC 394, wherein it was held that the moratorium does not insulate the guarantors of the debt and their independent and co-extensive liability would continue unhindered. On these lines, the liability of directors under GST would also stand on an independent footing.

Section 88 provides for joint and several liabilities over the directors of the company unless they prove that such non-recovery was not on account of any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty in relation to the affairs of the company. While this provision is specific to cases involving liquidation, it does not specifically provide for cases where the Corporate Debtor is taken over by a resolution applicant. Therefore, Centre / State may not be in a position to invoke the said provision in case of reduction of debt due to the respective Governments.

In the alternative, the taxman would like to go after the transferee of business (especially in case of a takeover / merger by resolution applicant) u/s 85 which provides for recovery action against the transferee of the business for recovery of taxes from such transferee. While the said provisions are open-ended, it would be contrary to the IBC provisions which give finality to dues to the resolution applicant and hence any such claims would have to be eclipsed into the resolution plan (refer Arcellor Mittal’s case, Supra). Another viewpoint would be that the resolution plan would have the effect of determination of tax dues and no other forum or civil authority is permitted to alter these dues from the Corporate Debtor.

Implications over criminal or personal penalties against directors, etc.
Parallel proceedings such as prosecution, personal penalties are permitted to be invoked against the directors of Corporate Debtors. The said proceedings would not form part of the insolvency process and would remain unaffected by the resolution plan. The affected persons would have to contest these matters at the appropriate forum on merits and cannot take shelter under the resolution scheme.

CONCLUSION


The taxman should appreciate the macro-economic aspects of introducing this legislation. It is here where the taxman should don the entrepreneur hat and swallow the bitter pill for a better future of the enterprise and of the economy as a whole. It was stated by the Court that ‘What is important is that it is the commercial wisdom of this majority of creditors which is to determine, through negotiation with prospective resolution application, as to how and in what manner the corporate resolution process is to take place’. It is only when such an approach is adopted that the IBC resolution process would yield the desired results.

GROSS VS. NET REVENUE RECOGNITION

The analysis of gross vs. net revenue recognition under Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with Customers can be a highly complex and judgemental exercise. This analysis particularly impacts new-age digital, internet-based companies across several sectors. The revenue number in the P&L is very crucial, because the valuation of the entity is largely dependent upon it. In this article, we look at this issue under different scenarios, using a base set of facts. The views expressed herein are strictly the personal views of the author under Ind AS standards. Additional evaluation and consideration may be required with regards to IFRS standards, particularly the views of the regulator where a filing is considered.

Accounting Standard references – Ind AS 115 Revenue from Contracts with Customers

Revenue
Revenue is defined as ‘Income arising in the course of an entity’s ordinary activities’.

Customer
As per paragraph 6 of Ind AS 115, ‘A customer is a party that has contracted with an entity to obtain goods or services that are an output of the entity’s ordinary activities in exchange for consideration.’

Consideration payable to customer
As per paragraph 70 of Ind AS 115, ‘Consideration payable to a customer includes cash amounts that an entity pays, or expects to pay, to the customer (or to other parties that purchase the entity’s goods or services from the customer). Consideration payable to a customer also includes credit or other items (for example, a coupon or voucher) that can be applied against amounts owed to the entity (or to other parties that purchase the entity’s goods or services from the customer). An entity shall account for consideration payable to a customer as a reduction of the transaction price and, therefore, of revenue unless the payment to the customer is in exchange for a distinct good or service (as described in paragraphs 26-30) that the customer transfers to the entity. If the consideration payable to a customer includes a variable amount, an entity shall estimate the transaction price (including assessing whether the estimate of variable consideration is constrained) in accordance with paragraphs 50-58.’

As per paragraph 71 of Ind AS 115, ‘If consideration payable to a customer is a payment for a distinct good or service from the customer, then an entity shall account for the purchase of the good or service in the same way that it accounts for other purchases from suppliers. If the amount of consideration payable to the customer exceeds the fair value of the distinct good or service that the entity receives from the customer, then the entity shall account for such an excess as a reduction of the transaction price. If the entity cannot reasonably estimate the fair value of the good or service received from the customer, it shall account for all of the consideration payable to the customer as a reduction of the transaction price.’

Basis of Conclusion in IFRS 15

Ind AS 115 does not contain the basis of conclusion of IFRS 15. However, since the two standards are the same, the IFRS 15 basis of conclusion can be used for interpretation of Ind AS 115.

BC
255

In
some cases, an entity pays consideration to one of its customers or to its
customer’s customer (for example, an entity may sell a product to a dealer or
distributor and subsequently pay a customer of that dealer or distributor).
That consideration might be in the form of a payment in exchange for goods or
services received from the customer, a discount or refund for goods or
services provided to the customer, or a combination of both

BC
257

The
amount of consideration received from a customer for goods or services, and
the amount of any consideration paid to that customer for goods or services,
could be linked even if they are separate events. For instance, a customer
may pay more for goods or services from an entity than it would otherwise
have paid if it was not receiving a payment from the entity. Consequently,
the boards decided that to depict revenue faithfully in those cases, any
amount accounted for as a payment to the customer for goods or services
received should be limited to the fair value of those goods or services, with
any amount in excess of the fair value being recognised as a reduction of the
transaction price

ANALYSIS

Step 1 – Who is the customer – merchant or wallet user?
As per the definition in paragraph 6, only the merchant should qualify as the customer of Pay Co and not the wallet user as in case of the wallet user, there is no consideration attached. However, in the case of those services wherein a fee is also charged from the wallet user, they, too, would be considered as customers of Pay Co.

Step 2 – Whether transaction with merchant and wallet user are distinct?

Based upon the contractual agreement, Pay Co earns commission from the merchant on every payment made through Pay Co’s platform. On the other hand, wallet users are offered incentives from time to time under different schemes launched by Pay Co. Generally, the incentives are offered as a promotional campaign for a short duration of time rather than on each transaction. The intent of cash-back / super cash offered is not to give discount / credits to the wallet user on a transaction-by-transaction basis, but to promote the usage of the payment platform. The cash-back offered to a wallet user can also be more than the commission earned from the merchant as the cash-backs are purely sales-focused and not for any particular transaction.

The contractual agreement with the merchant is long term in nature; however, the cash-backs offered to wallet users are offered only sporadically and completely unrelated to the merchant agreement. Additionally, the commission is earned by Pay Co from all its merchants; however, the cash-back / super cash is given only to a handful of wallet users. Hence, these are two distinct transactions with no relation to each other. In rare cases, the incentives provided to the wallet user are required as per the contract with the merchant; therefore, in such cases, the transaction with the merchant and the wallet user would not be considered as distinct.

Step 3 – Whether the incentives to the wallet user should be charged as marketing expense or netted off from the commission earned from the merchant?

It may be noted that there is no differential commission charged from merchants whose users are incentivised versus those whose users are not incentivised. Where Pay Co does not receive any consideration from the wallet user, the user is not considered as a customer of Pay Co and thus any cash-back / super cash offered to the user is treated as a marketing or promotional expense.

Where Pay Co charges a convenience fee from users, the user is considered as a customer of Pay Co based on the definition of customer under Ind AS 115. Consequently, any cash-back / super cash offered to the wallet user is recorded as reduction from revenue to the extent of the convenience fee earned from the wallet user. The super cash is netted of with revenue (as reduction) to the extent of revenue amount, i.e., only to the extent of convenience fee and any further amount of super cash on said transaction will be recorded as marketing expense and will not be adjusted against commission earned from the merchant, because the transaction with the merchant and with the wallet user are considered distinct / separate.

In a rare case, where the incentive is paid to the wallet user, on the basis of the agreement with the merchant, the same is deducted from revenue. If this results in negative revenue, the same is presented as marketing expenses, because revenue by definition cannot be a negative number.

The above principles are used in the Table below, and the responses to different scenarios are also depicted thereafter:

 

 

 

 

 

Figures
in INR

 

Scenario
A

Scenario
B

Scenario
C

Scenario
D

Scenario
E

Commission from merchant

100

100

100

100

100

Convenience fee

0

0

20

20

0

Cash-back / super cash

10

110

10

25

25

Contractual?

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

 

 

 

 

 

 

Revenue

90

0

110

100

100

Marketing expense

0

10

0

5

25

ANALYSIS OF SCENARIOS

In Scenario A, the cash-back / super cash is contractual, i.e., the incentive is paid to the wallet user as per the contractual terms with the merchant. The obligation to pay the incentive to the wallet user is not distinct or separate from the transaction with the merchant. Consequently, the incentive is reduced from revenue.

In Scenario B, the incentive is again contractual, therefore the incentive is reduced from revenue, which results in a negative revenue. The negative revenue of INR 10 is presented as marketing expense, because by definition revenue cannot be negative.

In Scenario C, the incentive is not contractual. A convenience fee is charged to the wallet user. Therefore, both the merchant and the wallet user are customers. The net revenue from the merchant customer is INR 100, the net revenue from the wallet user customer is INR 10 (20-10) and the total revenue is INR 110.

In Scenario D, the incentive is not contractual. A convenience fee is charged to the wallet user. Therefore, both the merchant and the wallet user are customers. The revenue from the merchant is INR 100, which is presented as revenue, and the revenue from the wallet user a negative revenue of INR 5 (20-25), which is presented as a marketing expense.

In Scenario E, only the merchant is the customer and INR 100 is the revenue. The INR 25 incentive paid to the wallet user is a marketing expense, because it is not paid to a customer or to the customer’s customer in a linear relationship.

CONCLUSION


Ind AS 115 does not establish clear-cut rules on several matters. For example, one may argue that negative revenue should be combined with positive revenue and the net number should be presented as revenue, instead of presenting negative revenue as an expense. These are matters on which the ICAI will need to develop a point of view.

EQUALISATION LEVY ON E-COMMERCE SUPPLY AND SERVICES, PART – 2

In the first of this two-part article published in June, 2021, we analysed some of the issues relating to the Equalisation Levy on E-commerce Supply and Services (‘EL ESS’) – what is meant by online sale of goods and online provision of services; who is considered as an E-commerce Operator (‘EOP’); and what is the amount on which the Equalisation Levy (‘EL’) is leviable.

In this part, we attempt to address some other issues relating to EL ESS such as those relating to the situs of the recipient, turnover threshold and specified circumstances under which EL ESS shall apply. We also seek to understand the interplay of the EL ESS provisions with tax treaties, provisions relating to Significant Economic Presence (‘SEP’), royalties / Fees for Technical Services (‘FTS’) and the exemption u/s 10(50) of the ITA.

1. ISSUES RELATING TO RESIDENCE AND SITUS OF CONSUMER

Section 165A(1) of the Finance Act, 2016 as amended (‘FA 2016’) states that the provisions of EL ESS apply on consideration received or receivable by an EOP from E-commerce Supply or Services (‘ESS’) made or provided or facilitated by it:
a) To a person resident in India; or
b) To a non-resident in specified circumstances; or
c) To a person who buys such goods or services or both using an internet protocol (‘IP’) address located in India.

The specified circumstances under which the ESS made or provided or facilitated by an EOP to a non-resident would be covered under the EL ESS provisions are:
a) Sale of advertisement, which targets a customer who is resident in India, or a customer who accesses the advertisement through an IP address located in India; and
b) Sale of data collected from a person who is resident in India or from a person who uses an IP address located in India.

Therefore, the EL ESS provisions apply to a non-resident EOP if the consumer, to whom goods are sold or services either provided to or facilitated, is a person resident in India, or one who is using an IP address located in India.

Interestingly, the words used in the EL provisions are different from those used in the provisions relating to SEP and the extended source rule in Explanations 2A and 3A to section 9(1)(i) of the ITA, respectively. The EL ESS provisions refer to the recipient of the ESS being a ‘person resident in India’, whereas the SEP provisions in Explanation 2A refer to the recipient of the transaction being a ‘person in India’. Similarly, the extended source rule in Explanation 3A refers to certain transactions with a person ‘who resides in India’.

While the terms ‘person in India’ and person ‘who resides in India’ referred to in Explanations 2A and 3A, respectively, refer to the physical location of the recipient in India, the term ‘person resident in India’ used in the EL provisions would refer to the tax residency of a person. While the EL ESS provisions do not define the term ‘resident’, one would interpret the same on the basis of the provisions of the ITA, specifically section 6.

This may lead to some challenging situations which have been discussed below.

Let us take the example of an EOP who is selling goods online. While such an EOP may have the means to track its customers whose IP address is located in India, how would it be able to keep track of customers who are residents in India but whose IP address is not located in India? This would be typically so in a case where a person resident in India goes abroad and purchases some goods through the EOP. Further, it would also be highlighted that unlike citizenship, the residential status of an individual is based on specific facts and, therefore, may vary from year to year and one may not be able to conclude with surety, before the end of the said previous year, whether or not one is a resident of India. A similar issue would also arise in the case of a company, especially a foreign company having its ‘Place of Effective Management’ in India and, therefore, a tax resident of India.

Similarly, let us take the example of a foreign branch of an Indian company purchasing some goods from a non-resident EOP. In this case, as the branch is not a separate person but merely an extension of the Indian company outside India, the provisions of EL ESS could possibly apply as the goods are sold by the EOP to ‘a person resident in India’.

While one may argue that nexus based on the tax residence of the payer is not a new concept and is prevalent even in section 9 of the ITA, for example in the case of payment of royalty or fees for technical services (‘FTS’), the main challenges in applying the payer’s tax residence-based nexus principle to EL are as follows:
a) While the payments of royalty and FTS may also apply for B2C transactions, the primary application is for B2B transactions. On the other hand, the EL provisions may primarily apply to B2C transactions. Therefore, the number of transactions to which the EL provisions apply would be significantly higher;
b) In the case of payment of royalty and FTS, the primary onus is on the payer to deduct tax at source u/s 195, whereas the primary onus in the case of EL ESS is on the recipient. The payer would be aware of its tax residence in the case of payment of royalty and FTS and, hence, would be able to determine the nexus, whereas in the case of EL the recipient may not be in a position to determine the tax residential status of the payer.

Given the intention of the provisions to bring to the tax net, income from transactions which have a nexus with India and applying the principle of impossibility for the non-resident EOP to evaluate the residential status of the customer, one of the possible views is that one may need to interpret the term ‘person resident in India’ to mean a person physically located in India rather than a person who is a tax resident of India.

However, in the view of the authors, from a technical standpoint a better view may be that one needs to consider the tax residency of the customer even though it may seem impossible to implement in practice on account of the following reasons:
a) Section 165A(1) of the FA 2016 has three limbs – a person resident in India, a non-resident in specified circumstances, and a person who uses an IP address in India. The reference in the second limb to a non-resident as against a person who is not residing in India indicates the intention of the law to consider tax residency.
b) The third limb of section 165A(1) of the FA 2016 refers to a person who uses an IP address in India. If the intention was to cover a person who is physically residing in India under the first limb, this limb would become redundant as a person who uses an IP address in India would mean a person who is physically residing in India at that time. This also indicates the intention of the Legislature to consider a person who is a tax resident rather than a person who is merely physically residing in India under the first limb.
c) Section 165 of the FA 2016 dealing with Equalisation Levy on Online Advertisement Services (‘EL OAS’) applies to online advertisement services provided to a person resident in India and to a non-resident person having a PE in India. Given that the section refers to a PE of a non-resident, it would mean that tax residence rather than physical residence is important to determine the applicability of the EL OAS provisions. In such a case, it may not be possible to apply two different meanings to the same term under two sections of the same Act.

2. SALE OF ADVERTISEMENT

As highlighted above, one of the specified circumstances under which ESS made or provided or facilitated by an EOP to a non-resident would be covered under the EL ESS provisions, is of sale of advertisement which targets a customer who is resident in India, or a customer who accesses the advertisement through an IP address located in India.

The question which arises is in respect of the possible overlap of the EL ESS and the EL OAS provisions. In this respect, section 165A(2)(ii) of the FA 2016 provides that the provisions of EL ESS shall not apply if the EL OAS provisions apply. In other words, the EL OAS application shall override the application of the EL ESS provisions.

EL OAS provisions apply in respect of payment of online advertisement services rendered by a non-resident to a resident or to a non-resident having a PE in India. However, the application of EL ESS provisions is wider. For example, the EL ESS provisions can also apply in the case of payment for online advertisement services rendered by a non-resident to another non-resident (which does not have a PE in India), which targets a customer who is a resident in India or a customer who accesses the advertisement through an IP address located in India.

3. ISSUES IN RESPECT OF TURNOVER THRESHOLD

Section 165A(2)(iii) of the FA 2016 provides that the provisions of EL shall not be applicable where the sales, turnover or gross receipts, as the case may be, of the EOP from the ESS made or provided or facilitated is less than INR 2 crores during the previous year. Some of the issues in respect of this turnover threshold have been discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.

3.1 Meaning of sales, turnover or gross receipts from the ESS

The first question which arises is what is meant by ‘sales, turnover or gross receipts’. The term has not been defined in the FA 2016 nor in the ITA. However, given that the term is an accounting term, one may be able to draw inference from the Guidance Note on Tax Audit u/s 44AB issued by the ICAI (‘GN on tax audit’). The GN on tax audit interprets ‘turnover’ to mean the aggregate amount for which the sales are effected or services rendered by an enterprise. Similarly, ‘gross receipts’ has been interpreted to mean all receipts whether in cash or kind arising from the carrying on of business.

The question which needs to be addressed is this – in the case of an EOP facilitating the online sale of goods, what should be considered as the turnover? To understand this issue better, let us take an example of goods worth INR 100 owned by a third-party seller sold on the portal owned by an EOP whose commission or fees for facilitating such sales is INR 5. Let us assume further that the buyer pays the entire consideration of INR 100 to the EOP and the EOP transfers INR 95 to the seller after reducing the facilitation fees.

In such a case, what would be considered as the turnover for the purpose of determining the threshold for application of EL ESS? As the EL provisions provide that the consideration received or receivable from the ESS shall include the consideration for the value of the goods sold irrespective of whether or not the goods are owned by the EOP, can one argue that the same principle should apply in the case of the computation of turnover as well, i.e., turnover in the above case is INR 100?

In the view of the authors, considering the facilitation fee earned by the EOP as the turnover of the EOP may be a better view, especially in a scenario where the EOP is merely facilitating the sale of goods and is not undertaking the risk associated with a sale. One may draw inference from paragraph 5.12 of the GN on tax audit which, following the principles laid down in the CBDT Circular No. 452 dated 17th March 1986, provides as below:

‘A question may also arise as to whether the sales by a commission agent or by a person on consignment basis forms part of the turnover of the commission agent and / or consignee, as the case may be. In such cases, it will be necessary to find out whether the property in the goods or all significant risks, reward of ownership of goods belongs to the commission agent or the consignee immediately before the transfer by him to third person. If the property in the goods or all significant risks and rewards of ownership of goods belong to the principal, the relevant sale price shall not form part of the sales / turnover of the commission agent and / or the consignee, as the case may be. If, however, the property in the goods, significant risks and reward of ownership belongs to the commission agent and / or the consignee, as the case may be, the sale price received / receivable by him shall form part of his sales / turnover.’

Moreover, section 165A(2)(iii) of the FA 2016 also refers to sales, turnover or gross receipts of the EOP.

Therefore, in the view of the authors, in the above example the turnover of the EOP would be INR 5 and not INR 100.

3.2 Whether global turnover to be considered

Having evaluated the meaning of the term ‘turnover’, a question arises as to whether the global turnover of the EOP is to be considered or only that in relation to India is to be considered. Section 165A(2)(iii) of the FA 2016 provides that the turnover threshold of the EOP is to be considered in respect of ESS made or provided or facilitated as referred to in sub-section (1). Further, section 165A(1) of the FA 2016 refers to ESS made or provided or facilitated by an EOP to the following:
(i) to a person resident in India; or
(ii) to a non-resident in the specified circumstances; or
(iii) to a person who buys such goods or services or both using an IP address located in India.

Accordingly, the section is clear that the turnover in respect of transactions with a person resident in India or an IP address located in India is to be considered and not the global turnover.

3.3 Issues relating to application of threshold of INR 2 crores

Another question is whether the turnover threshold of INR 2 crores applies to each person referred to in section 165A(1) independently or should one aggregate the turnover for all the persons who are covered under the sub-section.

This issue is explained by way of an example. Let us assume that an EOP sells goods to the following persons during the F.Y. 2021-22:

Person

Value of goods sold
(in lakhs INR)

Applicable clause of
section 165A(1)

Mr. A, a person resident in India

50

(i)

Mr. B, a person resident in India

125

(i)

Mr. C, a non-resident under specified circumstances

100

(ii)

Mr. D, a non-resident but using an IP address located in India

25

(iii)

Total

300

 

In the above example, the issues are as follows:
a) As each clause of section 165A(1) refers to ‘a person’, whether such threshold is to be considered qua each person. In the above example, the transactions with each person do not exceed INR 2 crores.
b) As each clause of section 165A(1) is separated by ‘or’, does the threshold need to be applied qua each clause, i.e., in the above example the transactions with persons under each individual clause do not exceed INR 2 crores.

In other words, the question is whether one should aggregate the turnover in respect of sales to all the persons which are covered u/s 165A(1). In the view of the authors, while a technical view that the turnover threshold of INR 2 crores applies to each buyer independently and not in aggregate is possible, the better view may be that the turnover threshold applies in respect of all transactions undertaken by the EOP in aggregate.

Interestingly, the Pillar One solution as agreed amongst the majority of the members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, provides for a global turnover of the entity of EUR 20 billion.

4. INTERPLAY BETWEEN PE AND EL ESS

One of the exemptions from the application of the EL ESS is in a scenario where the EOP has a PE in India and the ESS is effectively connected to such PE. The term ‘permanent establishment’ has been defined in section 164(g) of the FA 2016 to include a fixed place through which business is carried out, similar to the language provided in section 92F(iii) of the ITA. The question arises whether the definition of PE under the FA 2016 would include only a fixed place PE or whether it would also include other types of PE such as service PE, dependent agent PE, construction PE, etc.

In this regard, one may refer to the Supreme Court decision in the case of DIT (International Taxation) vs. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.1 wherein the Apex Court held that the definition of PE under the ITA is an inclusive definition and, therefore, would include other types of PE as envisaged in tax treaties as well.

However, in the view of the authors, ‘Service PE’ may not be considered under this definition under the domestic tax law as the duration of service period for constitution of Service PE is different under various treaties and the definition under a domestic tax law cannot be interpreted on the basis of the term given to it under a particular treaty when another treaty may have a different condition. A similar view may also be considered for construction PE where under different tax treaties the threshold for constitution of PE also is different.

5. INTERPLAY BETWEEN EL ESS AND ROYALTY / FEES FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES

Section 163 of the FA 2016 provides that the EL ESS provisions shall not apply if the consideration is taxable as royalty or FTS under the ITA as well as the relevant tax treaty. Similarly, section 10(50) of the ITA also exempts income from ESS if such income has been subject to EL and is otherwise not taxable as royalty or FTS under the ITA as well as the relevant tax treaty.

Accordingly, one would need to apply the royalty / FTS provisions first and the EL ESS provisions would apply only if the income were not taxable as royalty / FTS under the ITA as well as the tax treaty.

Interestingly, when the EL provisions were introduced, the exemption u/s 10(50) of the ITA applied to all income and this carve-out for royalty / FTS did not exist. This amendment of taxation of royalty / FTS overriding the EL provisions was introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 with retrospective effect from F.Y. 2020-21.

Prior to the amendment as mentioned above, one could take a view that transactions which, before the introduction of the EL provisions, were taxable under the ITA at a higher rate, would be subject to EL ESS at a lower rate.

In order to understand this issue better, let us take an example of IT-related services provided by a non-resident online to a resident. Such services may be considered as FTS u/s 9(1)(vii) of the ITA as well as under the tax treaty (assuming the make available clause does not exist). Prior to the amendment made vide Finance Act, 2021, one could take a view that such services may be subject to EL (assuming that the service provider satisfies the definition of an EOP) and therefore result in a lower rate of tax in India at the rate of 2% as against the rate of 10% as is available in most tax treaties. However, with the amendment vide the Finance Act, 2021, one would need to apply the royalty / FTS provisions under the ITA and tax treaty first and only if such income is not taxable, can one apply the EL ESS provisions. Therefore, now such income would be taxed at the FTS rate of 10%.

An interesting aspect in the royalty vs. EL debate is in respect of software. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence (P) Ltd. vs. CIT (2021) (432 ITR 471) held that payment towards use of software does not constitute royalty as it is not towards the use of the copyright in the software itself. In fact, the Court reiterated its own view as in the case of Tata Consultancy Services vs. the State of AP (2005) (1 SCC 308) that the sale of software on floppy disks or CDs is sale of goods, being a copyrighted article, and not sale of copyright itself.

It is important to highlight that the facts in the case of Engineering Analysis (Supra) and the way business is at present undertaken are different as software is no longer sold on a physical medium such as floppy disks or CDs but is now downloaded by the user from the website of the seller. A question arises whether one can apply the principles laid down by the above judgment to the present business model.

In the view of the authors, downloading the software is merely a mode of delivery and does not impact the principle emanating from the Supreme Court judgment. The principle laid down by the judgment can still be applied to the present business model wherein the software is downloaded by the user as there is no transfer of copyright or right in the software from the seller to the user-buyer.

Accordingly, payment by the user to the seller for downloading the software may not be considered as royalty under the ITA or the relevant tax treaty.

The next question which arises is whether such download of software can be subject to EL ESS.

Assuming that the portal from which the download is undertaken is owned or managed by the seller, the first issue which needs to be addressed is whether sale of software by way of download would be considered as ESS.

Section 164(cb) of the FA 2016 defines ESS to mean online sale of goods or online provision of services or online facilitation of either or a combination of activities mentioned above.

While the Supreme Court has held that the sale of software would be considered as sale of copyrighted material, the ‘goods’ being referred to by the Court are the floppy disk or CD – the medium through which the sale was made. In the view of the authors, the software itself may not be considered as goods.

Further, such download of software may not be considered as provision of services as well.

One may take inference from the SEP provisions introduced in Explanation 2A of section 9(1)(i) of the ITA, wherein SEP has been defined to mean the following,
‘(a) transaction in respect of any goods, services or property carried out by a non-resident with any person in India including provision of download of data or software in India…’

In this case, one may be able to argue that if the download of software was considered as sale of goods or services, there was no need for the Legislature to specifically include the download of data or software in the definition and a specific mention was required to be made, is on account of the fact that download of software does not otherwise fall under transaction in respect of goods, services or property.

Accordingly, it may be possible to argue that download of software does not fall under the definition of ESS and the provisions of EL, therefore, cannot apply to the same. However, this issue is not free from litigation.

In this regard, it is important to highlight that in a scenario where the transaction is in the nature of Software as a Service (‘SaaS’), it may not be possible to take a view that there is no provision of service and such a transaction may, therefore, either be taxed as FTS or under the EL ESS provisions, as the case may be, and depending on the facts.

6. INTERPLAY BETWEEN EL AND SEP PROVISIONS

Section 10(50) of the ITA exempts income arising from ESS provided the same is not taxable under the ITA and the relevant tax treaty as royalty or FTS and chargeable to EL ESS. Therefore, while the provisions of SEP under Explanation 2A of section 9(1)(i) of the ITA may get triggered if the threshold is exceeded, such income would be exempt if the provisions of EL apply.

In other words, the provisions of EL supersede the provisions of SEP.

7. ORDER OF APPLICATION OF EL ESS

A brief chart summarising the order of application of EL ESS has been provided below:

8. WHETHER EL IS RESTRICTED BY TAX TREATIES

One of the fundamental questions which arises in the case of EL is whether such EL is restricted by the application of a tax treaty. The Committee on Taxation of E-commerce, constituted by the Ministry of Finance which recommended the enactment of EL in 2016, in its report stated that EL which is enacted under an Act other than the ITA, would not be considered as a tax on ‘income’ and is a levy on the services and, therefore, would not be subject to the provisions of the tax treaties which deal with taxes on income and capital.

However, due to the following reasons, one may be able to take a view that EL may be a tax on ‘income’ and may be restricted by the application of the tax treaties:
a. The speech of the Finance Minister while introducing EL in the Budget 2016, states, ‘151. In order to tap tax on income accruing to foreign e-commerce companies from India, it is proposed that …..’;
b. While EL is enacted in the FA 2016 itself and not as part of the ITA, section 164(j) of the FA 2016 allows the import of definitions under the ITA into the relevant sections of the FA 2016 dealing with EL in situations where a particular term is not defined under the FA 2016. Further, the FA 2016 also includes terms such as ‘previous year’ which is found only in the ITA;
c. In order to avoid double taxation, section 10(50) of the ITA exempts income which has been subject to EL. Now, if EL is not considered as a tax on ‘income’, where is the question of double taxation in India;
d. While under a separate Act the assessment for EL would be undertaken by the Income-tax A.O. Further, similar to income tax, appeals would be handled by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be;
e. The Committee, while recommending the adoption of EL, stated that such an adoption should be an interim measure until a consensus is reached in respect of a modified nexus to tax such transactions. Therefore, it is clear that the EL is merely a temporary measure until India is able to tax the transactions and EL would take the colour of a tax on ‘income’.

This view is further strengthened in a case where Article 2 of a tax treaty covers taxes which are identical or substantially similar to income tax. Most of the tax treaties which India has entered into have the clause which covers substantially similar taxes. In such a scenario, one may be able to argue that even if one considers EL as not an income tax, it is a tax which is similar to income tax on account of the reasons listed above and therefore would get the same tax treatment.

Further, one may consider applying the principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) to determine whether EL would be restricted under a tax treaty. Article 31(1) of the VCLT provides that:
‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.’

The object of a tax treaty is to allocate taxing rights between the contracting states and thereby eliminate double taxation. In case EL is held as not covered under the ambit of the tax treaty, it would defeat the object and purpose of the tax treaty and lead to double taxation. In this regard, it may be important to highlight that while India is not a signatory to the VCLT, VCLT merely codifies international trade practice and law.

However, courts would also take into account the intention of the Legislature while adopting EL. EL has been adopted in order to override the tax treaties as such treaties were not able to adequately capture taxing rights in certain transactions.

9. CONCLUSION


On 1st July, 2021, more than 130 countries out of the 139 members of the OECD / G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS released a statement advocating the two-pillar solution to combat taxation of the digitalised economy and unfair tax competition. While the details are yet to be finalised, it is expected that the implementation of Pillar One would result in the withdrawal of the unilateral measures enacted, such as the EL. However, given the high threshold agreed for application of Pillar One, it is expected that less than 100 companies would be impacted by the reallocation of the taxing right sought to be addressed in the solution. Therefore, whether such unilateral measures would be fully withdrawn or only partially withdrawn to the extent covered by Pillar One, is still not clear. Further, the multilateral agreement proposed under Pillar One would be open for signature only in the year 2022 and is expected to be implemented only from the year 2023. Accordingly, EL provisions would continue to be applicable, at least for the next few years.

Reopening of assessment – Information of shell companies – Right to cross-examination – Violation of the principle of natural justice – These pleas to be raised at time of reassessment – Reopening justified

8 M/s Amber, Bhubaneswar vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle-2(1) & Others [Writ petition (C) No. 14369 of 2019; Date of order: 5th July, 2021; Orissa High Court]

Reopening of assessment – Information of shell companies – Right to cross-examination – Violation of the principle of natural justice – These pleas to be raised at time of reassessment – Reopening justified

The petitioner filed its return of income for the A.Y. 2012-13 electronically on 28th September, 2012 disclosing a total income of Rs. 34,80,490. These tax returns were subjected to scrutiny under CASS and an assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) on 15th November, 2014 by the A.O. purportedly being satisfied with the genuineness of the transactions and documents, etc., disclosed by the petitioner.

Being aggrieved by certain disallowances of expenses in the aforementioned assessment order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Thereafter, the impugned notice u/s 147 was issued to the petitioner by the A.O. on 29th March, 2019 pursuant to which the petitioner sought the reasons for such reopening. The petitioner filed objections on 18th June, 2019. On 26th June, 2019, the A.O. rejected the objections and on 26th July, 2019 issued a notice u/s 142(1) seeking further details from the petitioner. The petitioner then filed the writ petition against the rejection order.

The petitioner submitted that the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion of the A.O. and, therefore, was bad in law. The reasons for which the assessment was sought to be reopened had already been considered in detail by the A.O. in the original assessment order.

On behalf of the Income-tax Department, it was submitted that the objections of the petitioner had been considered
in sufficient detail by the A.O. and had been rightly rejected.

The Court observed that the reasons for reopening of the assessment, as disclosed by the Department in its communication dated 17th May, 2019, inter alia state how the DTIT Investigating Unit-1, Kolkata in its letter dated 15th January, 2019 passed on information in the case of beneficiaries identified in the ‘Banka Group of Cases’. Apparently, a search and seizure / survey operation was conducted in the case of the Banka Group on 21st May, 2018. It was found that there were various paper / shell companies controlled by one Mr. Mukesh Banka for the purpose of providing accommodation entries in the nature of unsecured loans or in other forms. It appeared that the petitioner firm was one of the beneficiaries who had obtained accommodation entries in the financial year 2013-14 from two such paper companies controlled by the said Mr. Mukesh Banka, the details of which had been set out in the reasons for reopening the assessment as furnished to the petitioner.

The said information appears to have been analysed by the Department vis-à-vis the case record of the petitioner for the A.Y. 2012-13. It transpired that in the original assessment proceedings the petitioner had furnished the ledger accounts of both the above ‘shell’ companies for the financial year 2011-12 and these showed that the petitioner had taken loans of Rs. 15 lakhs from them. The statement made by Mr. Mukesh Banka u/s 132(4) was also set out in the reasons for the reopening. It needs to be noted that while the original assessment u/s 143(3) was completed on 15th November, 2014 and an assessment order passed, the information gathered by the Department pursuant to the search and seizure operation on the Banka Group of Companies emerged only on 21st May, 2018 and thereafter. Clearly, this information was not available with the Department earlier. Prima facie, therefore, it does not appear that the reassessment was triggered by a mere change of opinion by the A.O. Further, it is not possible to accept the plea of the petitioner that such opinion was based on the very same material that was available with the A.O. The fact of the matter is that there was no occasion for the A.O. to have known of the transactions involving the petitioner and the shell companies controlled by Mr. Mukesh Banka.

It was then contended by the petitioner that despite the petitioner asking for copies of the statement of Mr. Mukesh Banka and seeking cross-examination, this was denied to him and, therefore, there was violation of the principle of natural justice.

The Court observed that the non-supply of the copy of Mr. Banka’s statement (which incidentally has been extracted in full in the reasons for reopening), or not providing an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Banka at the stage of objections, shall not vitiate the reopening of the assessment. Such opportunity would be provided, if sought by the petitioner and if so permitted in law, in the reassessment proceedings. Consequently, the Court reserved the right of the petitioner to raise all the defences available to it in accordance with law in the reassessment proceedings, including the right to cross-examine the deponents of the statements relied upon by the Department in the reassessment proceedings, The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

Revision – Application for revision – Conditions precedent – No appeal filed against assessment order and expiry of time limit for filing appeal – Application for revision valid

42 Aafreen Fatima Fazal Abbas Sayed vs. ACIT [2021] 434 ITR 504 (Bom) A.Y.: 2018-19; Date of order: 8th April, 2021 S. 264 of ITA, 1961

Revision – Application for revision – Conditions precedent – No appeal filed against assessment order and expiry of time limit for filing appeal – Application for revision valid

The petitioner is an individual and for the A.Y. 2017-18 had offered in the return of income, long-term capital gains of Rs. 3,07,60,800 which had arisen on surrender of tenancy rights for that year. The assessment for A.Y. 2017-18 was completed u/s 143(3) vide assessment order dated 24th December, 2019. For A.Y. 2018-19, the petitioner had received income from house property of Rs. 12,69,954 and income from other sources of Rs. 14,35,692, making a total income of Rs. 27,05,646. After claiming deductions and set-off on account of deduction of tax at source and advance tax, the refund was determined at Rs. 34,320.

However, while filing return of income on 20th July, 2018 for the A.Y. 2018-19, the figure of long-term capital gains of Rs. 3,07,60,800 was wrongly copied by the petitioner’s accountant from the return of income filed for the A.Y. 2017-18, and the same was mistakenly included in the return for the A.Y. 2018-19. The return filed by the petitioner for the A.Y. 2018-19 was processed u/s 143(1) vide order dated 2nd May, 2019 and a total income of Rs. 3,34,66,446, including long-term capital gains of Rs. 3,07,60,800 purported to have been inadvertently shown in the return of income was determined, thereby raising a tax demand of Rs. 87,40,612. Upon perusal of the order u/s 143(1) dated 2nd May, 2019, the petitioner realised that the amount of Rs. 3,07,60,800 towards long-term capital gains had been erroneously shown in the return of income for the year under consideration.

Realising the mistake, the petitioner filed an application u/s 154 before the A.O. on 25th July, 2019 seeking to rectify the mistake of misrecording of long-term capital gains in the order u/s 143(1) as being an inadvertent error as the same had already been considered in the return for the A.Y. 2017-18, assessment in respect of which had already been completed u/s 143(3). The petitioner had not received any order of acceptance or rejection of this application. In the meantime, the petitioner also made the grievance on the e-filing portal of the Central Processing Centre on 4th October, 2019 seeking rectification of the mistake where the taxpayer was requested to transfer its rectification rights to AST, after which the petitioner filed letters dated 17th October, 2019, 20th February, 2020 and 24th November, 2020 with the A.O., requesting him to rectify the mistake u/s 154.

In order to alleviate the misery and bring to the notice of the higher authorities the delay in the disposal of the rectification application, the petitioner approached the Principal Commissioner u/s 264 on 27th January, 2021, seeking revision of the order of 2nd May, 2019 passed u/s 143(1), narrating the aforementioned facts and requesting the Principal Commissioner to direct the A.O. to recalculate tax liability for the A.Y. 2018-19 after reducing the amount of long-term capital gains from the total income of the petitioner for the said year.

However, instead of considering the application on merits, the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-19, vide order dated 12th February, 2021, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner on the ground that the same was not maintainable on account of the alternate effective remedy of appeal and that the assessee had also not waived the right of appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as per the provisions of section 264(4).

The petitioner therefore filed this writ petition and challenged the order. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) The assessee had not filed an appeal against the order u/s 143(1) u/s 246A of the Act and the time of 30 days to file the appeal had also admittedly expired. Once such an option had been exercised, a plain reading of the section suggested that it would not then be necessary for the assessee to waive such right. That waiver would have been necessary if the time to file the appeal had not expired. The application for revision was valid.

ii) The order dated 12th February, 2021 passed by the Principal Commissioner, the respondent No. 2, is set aside. We direct respondent No. 2 to decide the application filed by the petitioner u/s 264 afresh on merits and after hearing the petitioner, pass a
reasoned / speaking order in line with the aforesaid discussion for grant of relief prayed for in the said application.

Obiter dicta: Where errors can be rectified by the authorities, the whole idea of relegating or subjecting the assessee to the appeal machinery or even discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court, is uncalled for and would be wholly avoidable. The provisions in the Income-tax Act for rectification, revision u/s 264 are meant for the benefit of the assessee and not to put him to inconvenience.’

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Scope of – Act deals with disputed tax – Application for revision u/s 264 relating to tax demand – Applicant eligible to make declaration under Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act

41 Sadruddin Tejani vs. ITO [2021] 434 ITR 474 (Bom) A.Ys.: 1988-89 to 1998-99; Date of order: 9th April, 2021 S. 264 of ITA, 1961 and Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020

Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 – Scope of – Act deals with disputed tax – Application for revision u/s 264 relating to tax demand – Applicant eligible to make declaration under Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act

The petitioner was engaged in the business of retail footwear. He had filed declarations in Form 1 and undertaking in Form 2 in respect of each of the A.Ys. 1988-89 to 1997-98, u/s 4(1) of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 on 18th November, 2020. However, the same was rejected on 30th January, 2021.

Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed a writ petition and challenged the order of rejection. The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and held as under:

‘i) The Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 is aimed not only to benefit the Government by generating timely revenue but also to benefit the taxpayers by providing them with peace of mind, certainty and saving time and resources rather than spending the same otherwise. The Preamble clearly provides that this is an Act to provide for resolution of disputed tax and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The emphasis is on disputed tax and not on disputed income.

ii) For a declarant to file a valid declaration there should be disputed tax in the case of such declarant. The definition of “tax arrears” clearly refers to an aggregate of the amount of disputed tax, interest chargeable or charged on such disputed tax, etc., determined under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. From a plain reading of the provisions of the 2020 Act and the Rules, it emerges that the designated authority would have to issue Form 3 as referred to in section 5(1) specifying the amount payable in accordance with section 3 of the 2020 Act in the case of a declarant who is an eligible appellant not falling u/s 4(6) nor within the exceptions in section 9 of the 2020 Act.

iii) The assessee had filed an application u/s 264 for adjustment or credit of Rs. 12,43,000 paid in respect of the tax demands of the A.Ys. 1988-89 to 1998-99 as according to him this amount had been adjusted only against the demand for the A.Y. 1987-88. While this application was pending, the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020 was enacted, followed by the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Rules, 2020. The assessee filed applications under the 2020 Act and Rules. The assessee having filed a revision application u/s 264 for the A.Ys. 1988-89 to 1998-99 for adjustment of Rs.12,43,000 which application was pending before the Commissioner, admittedly being an eligible appellant, squarely satisfied the definition of “disputed tax” as contained in section 2(1)(j)(F) of the 2020 Act. This was because if the revision application u/s 264 were rejected, the assessee would purportedly be liable to pay a demand of Rs. 88,90,180 including income tax and interest. The assessee as eligible appellant had filed a declaration u/s 4 with the designated authority under the provisions of section 4 of the 2020 Act in respect of tax arrears, which included the disputed tax which would become payable as may be determined. This was not only a case where there was a disputed tax but also tax arrears as referred to in section 3 of the 2020 Act.

iv) The designated authority had not raised any objection under any provision of the 2020 Act or Rules with respect to the declarations or undertakings furnished by the assessee, nor passed any order let alone a reasoned or speaking order rejecting the declarations. The designated authority had summarily rejected the declarations without there being any such provision in the 2020 Act or the Rules. There was also no fetter on the designated authority to determine the disputed tax at an amount other than that declared by the assessee. The designated authority under the 2020 Act was not justified in rejecting the declarations filed by the assessee.

v) Accordingly, we set aside the rejections. We direct respondent No. 2 to consider the applications made by the petitioner by way of declarations dated 18th November, 2020 in Form 1 as per law and proceed with them according to the scheme of the Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act and Rules in the light of the above discussion within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. The petition is allowed in the above terms.’

Deduction of tax at source – Condition precedent – Mere entries in accounts – No accrual of income and no liability to deduct tax at source

40 Toyota Kirloskar Motor (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (TDS) LTU [2021] 434 ITR 719 (Karn) A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 24th March, 2021 S. 201(1) of ITA, 1961

Deduction of tax at source – Condition precedent – Mere entries in accounts – No accrual of income and no liability to deduct tax at source

The assessee is a joint venture and is a subsidiary of Toyota Motor Corporation, Japan. It is engaged in manufacturing and sale of passenger cars and multi-utility vehicles. The assessee follows the mercantile system of accounting and as per its accounting policies, at the end of the financial year, i. e., 31st March of every year, the assessee makes provision for marketing expenses, overseas expenses and general expenses on an estimated basis in respect of works contracts services which are in the process of completion but the vendor is yet to submit the bills to ascertain the closest amount of profits / loss. The aforesaid provision is made in conformity with Accounting Standard 29. Subsequently, as and when invoices are received from the vendors the invoice amount is debited to the provisions already made with corresponding credit at the respective vendor’s account. The assessee also deducts tax at source as required under the provisions of the Act and remits the same along with interest to the Government.

For the A.Y. 2012-13, the assessee had made a provision towards marketing, overseas and general expenses to the extent of Rs. 1114,718,613. However, at the time of filing of the return of income the provision which remained unutilised as per the books of accounts as on 30th April, 2012 and on 31st October, 2012 in respect of overseas and domestic payments, respectively, for an amount of Rs. 9,27,41,239 was not claimed as deduction u/s 40(a)(i) and (ia) and the same was offered to tax. Subsequent to filing of the return, the assessee received invoices from the vendors for the A.Y. 2012-13 and the amount mentioned in the invoices was debited to the provision already made with a corresponding credit to the respective vendors’ account. The amount indicated in the invoices for a sum of Rs. 5,589,454 was utilised against the provision and the deduction of tax at source along with interest was also discharged at the time of credit of the invoice amount to the account of the vendor. Subsequently, the amount which remained unutilised, i.e., a sum of Rs. 8,71,32,988 in the provision account after completion of negotiation / finalisation of services, was reversed in the books of accounts of the assessee. The assessee received a communication on 30th July, 2013 asking it to furnish details of computation of income, audit report in Form 3CD for the year ending 31st March, 2012 reflecting the details of disallowances made u/s 40(a)(i) and (ia). The assessee thereupon furnished the information vide communication dated 12th August, 2013.

The A.O. initiated the proceedings u/s 201 and also u/s 201(1A) and treated the assessee as assessee-in-default in respect of the amount made in the provision, which was reversed / unutilised for a sum of Rs. 8,71,32,988 and the amount of deduction of tax at source and interest on the aforesaid amount u/s 201(1A) was computed at Rs. 14,18,327 and Rs. 25,195 was levied for late remittance of tax deducted at source. Thus, a total sum of Rs. 17,10,879 was determined as payable by the assessee.

The Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed the order passed by the A.O. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal preferred by the assessee.

In appeal before the High Court, the assessee raised the following question of law:

‘Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in affirming the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in treating the appellant as “assessee-in-default” u/s 201(1) for non-deduction of tax at source from the amount of Rs. 8,74,32,988 when such amount had not accrued to the payee or any person at all?’

The Karnataka High Court allowed the appeal and held as under:

‘i) In the instant case, the provisions were created during the course of the year and reversal of entry was also made in the same accounting year. The A.O. erred in law in holding that the assessee should have deducted tax as per the rate applicable along with interest. The authorities under the Act ought to have appreciated that in the absence of any income accruing to anyone, the liability to deduct tax at source on the assessee could not have been fastened and, consequently, the proceeding u/s 201 and u/s 201(1A) could not have been initiated.

ii) For the aforementioned reasons, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

iii) In the result, the impugned orders dated 31st October, 2017, 20th June, 2014 and 11th March, 2014 passed by the Tribunal, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the A.O., respectively, are hereby quashed. In the result, the appeal is allowed.’

Business expenditure – Year in which expenditure is deductible – Business – Difference between setting up and commencement of business – Incorporation as company, opening of bank account, training of employees and lease agreement in accounting year relevant to A.Y. 2012-13 – Licence for business obtained in February, 2012 – Assessee entitled to deduction of expenditure incurred for business in A.Y. 2012-13

39 Maruti Insurance Broking Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dy. CIT [2021] 435 ITR 34 (Del) A.Y.: 2012-13; Date of order: 12th April, 2021 S. 37 of ITA, 1961

Business expenditure – Year in which expenditure is deductible – Business – Difference between setting up and commencement of business – Incorporation as company, opening of bank account, training of employees and lease agreement in accounting year relevant to A.Y. 2012-13 – Licence for business obtained in February, 2012 – Assessee entitled to deduction of expenditure incurred for business in A.Y. 2012-13

The assessee was incorporated on 24th November, 2010. The first meeting of its board of directors was held on 29th November, 2010 when certain decisions were taken, including, according to the assessee, setting up of its business; appointment of the chief executive officer and the principal officer; approval of the draft application for obtaining a broker’s licence in the prescribed form under Regulation 6 of the IRDA (Insurance Brokers) Regulations, 2002 (in short ‘2002 Regulations’) [this application had to be filed for obtaining the licence]; a decision as to the registered office of the assessee; and a decision concerning the opening of a current account with HDFC Bank at Surya Kiran Building, 19, K.G. Marg, New Delhi 110001.

On 29th November, 2010 itself, an agreement was executed between the assessee and Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL). Via this agreement, the persons who were employees of MSIL were sent on deputation to the assessee and to meet its objective, were made to undergo a minimum of 100 hours of mandatory training as insurance brokers. These steps were a precursor to the application preferred by the assessee with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) for issuance of a direct-broker licence. The application was lodged with the IRDA on 1st December, 2010. While this application was being processed, presumably by the IRDA, the assessee took certain other steps in furtherance of its business. Accordingly, on 1st June, 2011, the assessee executed operating lease agreements for conducting insurance business from various locations across the country. Against these leases, the assessee is said to have paid rent as well. The assessee set up 29 offices in 29 different locations across the country for carrying on its insurance business. The assessee was finally issued a direct broker’s licence by the IRDA on 2nd February, 2012.

For the A.Y. 2011-12, the assessee filed return of income on 30th September, 2011 declaring a business loss amounting to Rs. 57,582. For the A.Y. 2012-13, the return of income was filed on 29th September, 2012 declaring a net loss of Rs. 2,78,22,376. In this return, the assessee claimed the impugned deduction, i. e., business expenses amounting to Rs. 2,77,99,046. The A.O. held that since the licence was issued by the IRDA on 2nd February, 2012, the assessee’s business could not have been set up prior to that date, and therefore the entire business expenditure amounting to Rs. 2,78,22,376 was required to be disallowed and capitalised as pre-operative expenses.

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the A.O. The Tribunal sustained the view taken by both the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as the A.O.

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) The Income-tax Act, 1961 does not define the expression “setting up of business”. This expression finds mention though (sic) in section 3 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which defines “previous year”. The previous year gets tied in with section 4 of the Act, which is the charging section. In brief, section 4, inter alia, provides that income arising in the previous year is chargeable to tax in the relevant assessment year. Firstly, there is a difference between setting up and commencement of business. Secondly, when the expression “setting up of business” is used, it merely means that the assessee is ready to commence business and not that it has actually commenced its business. Therefore, when the commencement of business is spoken of in contradiction to the expression “setting up of business”, it only refers to a point in time when the assessee actually conducts its business, a stage which it necessarily reaches after the business is put into a state of readiness. A business does not, metaphorically speaking, conform to the “cold start” doctrine. There is, in most cases, a hiatus between the time a person or entity is ready to do business and when business is conducted. During this period, expenses are incurred towards keeping the business primed up. These expenses cannot be capitalised.

ii) The assessee did all that was necessary to set up the insurance broking business. The assessee after its incorporation opened a bank account, entered into an agreement for deputing employees (who were to further its insurance business), gave necessary training to the employees, executed operating lease agreements, and resultantly set up offices at 29 different locations across the country. Besides this, the application for obtaining a licence from the IRDA was also filed on 1st December, 2010. The Authority took more than a year in dealing with the assessee’s application for issuance of a licence. The licence was issued only on 2nd February, 2012 although the assessee was all primed up, i. e., ready to commence its business since 1st June, 2011, if not earlier. The assessee was entitled to deduction of the expenses incurred for the business in the A.Y. 2012-13.’

Business income – Scope of section 28(iv) – Amalgamation of companies – Excess of net consideration over value of companies taken over – Not assessable as income

38 CIT (LTU) vs. Areva T&D India Ltd. [2021] 434 ITR 604 (Mad) A.Y.: 2006-07; Date of order: 25th March, 2021 S. 28(iv) of ITA, 1961

Business income – Scope of section 28(iv) – Amalgamation of companies – Excess of net consideration over value of companies taken over – Not assessable as income

The assessee is engaged in the business of manufacturing heavy electrical equipment. Three companies were amalgamated with the assessee company and on amalgamation the assets stood transferred to the assessee company with effect from 1st January, 2006. The net excess value of the assets over the liability of the amalgamating company amounted to Rs. 54,26,56,000 and had been adjusted against the general reserve of the assessee company. In the assessment proceedings for the A.Y. 2006-07, the assessee was called upon to explain why the said excess asset, which was taken over as liability during the current year, should not be taxed u/s 28(iv). The explanation offered by the assessee was not accepted and the A.O. held that the said amount had to be charged to Income-tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business’ u/s 28(iv).

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim and deleted the addition. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) For applicability of section 28(iv) the income must arise from business or profession and the benefit which is received has to be in a form other than in the shape of money. The provisions of section 28(iv) make it clear that the amount reflected in the balance sheet of the assessee under the head “Reserves and surplus” cannot be treated as a benefit or perquisite arising from business or exercise of profession.

ii) The difference in amount post amalgamation was the amalgamation reserve and it cannot be said that it was out of normal transaction of the business being capital in nature, which arose on account of amalgamation of four companies, it cannot be treated as falling u/s 28(iv).’

ACTIONABLE CLAIMS – TAXABILITY UNDER GST

INTRODUCTION
The levy of tax on ‘actionable claims’ has seen substantial litigation under the Sales Tax / VAT regimes. The primary reason for that was that the definition of goods under the Sales Tax / VAT regimes excluded actionable claims. Similarly, under the GST regime, too, actionable claims are generally excluded from the purview of taxability. Therefore, it is important to understand what constitutes an ‘actionable claim’.

The definition of actionable claim is provided u/s 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as under:
‘actionable claim’ means a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property, or to any beneficial interest in movable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognise as affording grounds for relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent;

It is apparent from the above definition that an actionable claim is a claim, or rather a right to claim, either an unsecured debt or any beneficial interest in movable property which is not in the possession of the claimant. So far as the first limb of the definition is concerned, it seems to cover only unsecured debts. Therefore, it should cover cases such as bill discounting where a business sells its receivables to another person, generally a banking and financial institution, and receives the consideration upfront, though a lower amount than what is receivable. The receivable is subsequently realised by the bank and the difference between the amount realised and the amount paid for bill discounting is its margin / profit.

The second limb of the definition has been analysed in detail by the courts. In the context of lottery tickets, the division Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of H. Anraj & Others vs. Government of Tamil Nadu [(1986) AIR 63] had held that lottery tickets were goods and therefore liable to sales tax. However, the said decision was later set aside by the Constitution Bench in the case of Sunrise Associates vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others [(2006) 5 SCC 603-A]. While doing so, the Court had laid down the following principles:

• The fact that the definition of goods under the State laws excluded actionable claims from its purview would demonstrate that actionable claims are indeed goods and but for the exclusion from the definition of ‘goods’, the same would have been liable to sales tax.
• An actionable claim is only a claim which might connote a demand. Every claim is not an actionable claim. A claim should be to a debt or to a beneficial interest in movable property which must not be in the possession of the claimant. In the context of the above definition, it is a right, albeit an incorporeal one. In TCS vs. State of AP [(2005) 1 SCC 308] the Court has already held that goods may be incorporeal or intangible.
• Transferability is not the point of distinction between actionable claims and other goods which can be sold. The distinction lies in the definition of an actionable claim. Therefore, if a claim to the beneficial interest in movable property not in the vendee’s possession is transferred, it is not a sale of goods for the purposes of the sales tax laws.
• Some examples of actionable claims highlighted by the Court include:

  •  Right to recover insurance money,
  •  A partner’s right to sue for an account of a dissolved partnership,
  •  Right to claim the benefit of a contract not coupled with any liability,
  •  A claim for arrears of rent has also been held to be an actionable claim,
  •  Right to the credit in a provident fund account.

• An actionable claim may be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent.
• A lottery ticket can be held to be goods as it evidences transfer of a right. However, it is the right which is transferred that needs to be examined. The right being transferred is claim to a conditional interest in the prize money which is not in the purchasers’ possession and would fall squarely within the definition of an actionable claim and would therefore be excluded from the definition of goods.

In the context of transferrable REP licenses which gave permission to an exporter to take credit of exports made, the Larger Bench in the case of Vikas Sales Corporation vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [2017 (354) E.L.T. 6 (SC)] held that the Exim License / REP Licenses were goods since they were easily marketable and had a value independent of the goods which could be imported using the said licenses, and therefore they could not be treated as actionable claims.

Actionable claims vis-à-vis GST
Section 9 of the CGST Act, 2017, which is the charging section for the levy of GST, provides that the same shall be levied on a supply of goods or services, or both. The terms are defined u/s 2 as under:

(52) ‘goods’ means every kind of movable property other than money and securities but includes actionable claim, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before supply or under a contract of supply;
(102) ‘services’ means anything other than goods, money and securities but includes activities relating to the use of money or its conversion by cash or by any other mode, from one form, currency or denomination, to another form, currency or denomination for which a separate consideration is charged;

Unlike the Sales Tax / VAT regimes where actionable claims were excluded from the definition of goods, GST law specifically provides that goods shall include actionable claims. Thereafter, Schedule III treats the supply of actionable claims – other than lottery, betting and gambling – as being neither a supply of goods nor a supply of service, thereby excluding the supply of actionable claims from the purview of GST. However, what is the scope of coverage of actionable claims?

Section 2(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 defines actionable claim to have the same meaning as assigned u/s 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The definition under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has been given above.

GST on lottery tickets
The intention of the Legislature to tax lotteries is loud and clear from the fact that Schedule III entry only treats actionable claim – other than lottery, betting and gambling – as neither a supply of goods nor a supply of service. The Rate Notification for goods also specifically provides the rate applicable on lotteries as 28%. Further, Rule 31A of the Valuation Rules also clearly provides a specific method to determine the value of supply in case of lottery tickets.

Despite such clarity, the issue of the validity of the levy of tax on lottery tickets has been raised before several courts. The Calcutta High Court, in the case of Teesta Distributors vs. UoI [2018 (19) GSTL 29 (Cal)] had upheld the levy of GST on lottery tickets and held as under:
• The Centre or the State Government had not exceeded their jurisdiction in promulgating the statutes for the levy of GST on lottery tickets,
• The levy did not violate any constitutional or fundamental rights,
• The differential rate of tax was permissible and it was not discriminatory. Further the Government was within its rights to have the same,
• The definition of goods as per the Constitution of India is an inclusive definition with a very wide sweep to cover both tangible as well as intangible products.

The issue again came up before the Larger Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Skill Lotto Solutions India Private Limited vs. UoI [2020 – VIL – 37 – SC]. Dismissing the petition, the Court held as under:
• The definition of goods u/s 2(52) does not violate any constitutional provision nor is it in conflict with the definition of goods given under Article 366(12). Therefore, there is nothing wrong with actionable claims being included within the scope of goods u/s 2(52).
• The decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Sunrise Associates holding lottery as actionable claims was a binding precedent and not obiter dicta.
• Schedule III entry, while treating actionable claims sans lottery, betting and gambling outside the purview of supply of goods or services for the purpose of section 7, was not discriminatory in nature.
• On the issue of the validity of Rule 31A which determined the value of taxable supply based on the price of the ticket without excluding the prize money component thereof, the Court held that the value of taxable supply is a matter of statutory regulation, and when the value is to be transaction value to be determined as per section 15, it is not permissible to compute the value of taxable supply by excluding the prize which has been contemplated in the statutory scheme. Therefore, while determining the value of supply, prize money was not to be excluded.

GST on activities of betting, gambling
The terms ‘betting’ or ‘gambling’ have not been defined under the CGST Act, 2017. But there is a similarity between the two. Both generally refer to setting aside a certain amount in expectation of a much larger amount on the basis of the occurrence or non-occurrence of a particular future event. The person who collects the amount promises to pay the prize money on the occurrence of the said event. However, the distinction between betting and gambling would be that betting would be something which would depend on an event where the activity is done / carried out by a different person altogether, for example, horse racing, sports, etc., while gambling would involve the person himself undertaking the activity.

The fact that Schedule III specifically excludes betting or gambling from the scope of actionable claims would demonstrate that there is not an iota of doubt as to whether or not the activity of betting or gambling is an actionable claim. The only question that would need consideration is whether the specific activities of betting / gambling which require a certain skill set would be liable to tax or not. The reason behind this is because the Supreme Court has, in the case of Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan vs. State of TN [1996 AIR 1153] held as under:

The expression ‘gaming’ in the two Acts has to be interpreted in the light of the law laid down by this Court in the two Chamarbaugwala cases, wherein it has been authoritatively held that a competition which substantially depends on skill is not gambling. Gaming is the act or practice of gambling on a game of chance. It is staking on chance where chance is the controlling factor. ‘Gaming’ in the two Acts would, therefore, mean wagering or betting on games of chance. It would not include games of skill like horse racing. In any case, section 49 of the Police Act and section 11 of the Gaming Act specifically save the games of mere skill from the penal provisions of the two Acts. We, therefore, hold that wagering or betting on horse racing – a game of skill – does not come within the definition of ‘gaming’ under the two Acts.

The above decision clearly lays down that any activity which involves application of skill would not be treated as betting or gambling. In the context of card games such as rummy and bridge, the Bombay High Court has, in the case of Jaywant Sail and Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others held that the same involves application of skill and the same cannot be treated as betting / gambling.

Whether the above precedents would apply under the GST regime as well and can it be claimed that when the application of a skill set is involved, the same would not classify as betting / gambling? This issue had come up before the Bombay High Court in the case of Gurdeep Singh Sachar vs. UOI [2019 (30) GSTL 441 (Bom)]. In this case, the petitioner had filed a criminal PIL against a gaming platform which allowed participants, upon payment of fees, to create fantasy teams and the performance of each player would be calculated based on the actual performance of the players during a sports event. From the fees collected from the participants, the portal would retain certain amounts for itself as service charges and the balance amount would be used for paying the prize money to participants. The portal was paying GST under Rule 31A(3) only to the extent of the amounts retained by it.

The petition alleged that the portal was violating the provisions of the Public Gaming Act, 1867 as well as the provisions of Rule 31A of the CGST Rules, 2017 which required payment of tax on the entire value and not after reducing the prize money component – which has also been confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Skill Lotto (Supra). Relying on the decision in the case of Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan (Supra), the High Court held that the online game conducted by the portal involved application of skill and, therefore, the same could not be treated as betting / gambling. Since there was an application of skill, the provisions of the Public Gaming Act, 1867 were not applicable in view of the specific provision of section 12 thereof which provided that the Act shall not apply in cases involving the application of skill.

On the GST front, the Court held that the activities carried out by the portal did amount to actionable claims; however, the same could not be treated as lottery, gambling or betting. Therefore, the same would be covered under Entry 3 of Schedule III and hence the said activities were outside the purview of the levy of tax. Since tax itself was not payable, the question of operation of Rule 31A (3) was not applicable.

However, while dealing with the issue of rate of tax, the Court held that the portal was right in discharging tax at 18% on the platform fee, i.e., the amounts retained by it from the escrow account. In a way, the Court held that the platform fee does not partake the character of actionable claim but is in the nature of an independent service rendered by the platform.

So far as taxability on the recipient of the prize money is concerned, the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling has, in the case of Vijay Baburao Shirke [2020 (041) GSTL 0571 (AAAR-MH)] held that the prize money is not a consideration either for supply of goods or supply of service. An interesting observation made by the Authority has held that not every contract becomes taxable under the GST law. The AAAR further held that every supply is a contract but every contract is not a supply.

GST on chit funds
Chit funds are regulated by the Chit Funds Act, 1982. This is a unique financing model. Under this, a person generally known as trustee or foreman, organises the fund. And people participate in it by contributing a fixed amount on a monthly basis. A chit is prepared for each participant and every month one chit is drawn and the participant whose name comes out receives the money. The activity is carried on regularly till the name of each participant is drawn out. In other words, each participant has a right to receive the money. Generally, the trustee or foreman retains his charge for organising the fund.

In the above business model, the issues that would need consideration are:
• Is there an element of actionable claim present in the above model?
The Supreme Court has, in the context of service tax in the case of UoI vs. Margdarshi Chit Funds Private Limited [2017 (3) GSTL 3 (SC)] held that in a chit business, the subscription is tendered in any one of the forms of ‘money’. It would, therefore, be a transaction in money. Once it has been held that chit fund is nothing but a transaction in money, it would be incorrect to treat it as an actionable claim.

However, even if one analyses the definition of actionable claim for academic purposes, it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion that there is an element of actionable claim present in the said model. In pith and substance, the chit fund is nothing but a financing model where a person periodically invests funds and the same amount is received back by him, albeit after some reduction on account of foreman / trustee charges. The person whose name comes out first is set to gain more as he gets to use the sum for a longer period compared to the person who receives it at the end.

However, the fact is that the participant enjoys the claim to a movable property, i.e., the prize money. And the only issue that remains is what is the legal remedy that a participant whose name has been picked in the lot has in case the foreman fails to pay the prize money. In this respect, reference to section 64 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 is important. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that civil courts shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of any dispute. The issue as to whether Consumer Forums have jurisdiction over chit fund matters is already in dispute with contrary decisions by the Madras High Court in N. Venkatsa Perumal vs. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [2003 CTJ 261 (CP)] and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Margadarsi Chit Fund vs. District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum [2004 CTJ 704 (CP)]. Therefore, it can be said that there is substantial confusion over whether or not civil courts can have jurisdiction over civil matters, specifically in view of the extant provisions of the Chit Fund Act, 1982 and perhaps, the finality of this issue can be a basis to determine whether chit funds can actually be treated as actionable claims.

Whether the foreman / trustee is liable to pay GST on the charges retained by him?
The answer to the above question would depend on the classification which one accords to the chit fund business. If one takes a view that the activity of a chit fund is nothing but a transaction in money, the charges retained by the foreman / trustee would be liable to GST. The Rate Notification prescribes the GST rate at 12% on services provided by the foreman / trustee subject to the condition that input tax credit on inputs used for providing such service has not been claimed by the foreman / trustee. However, there is still no clarity on whether the foreman or trustee shall be liable to pay GST only on the charges retained by him or on the whole amount collected from the participants. Under the Service Tax regime (though the levy was stuck down in the Delhi Chit Funds Association case), an abatement was provided in relation to the service provided by the foreman / trustee. Taking a cue from the same, one may take a position that a foreman / trustee is liable to pay GST only on the commission retained by him and not on the entire amount.

However, if one takes an aggressive view and treats the participation in chit fund as an actionable claim, the question of taxability of the amounts retained by the foreman / trustee should not arise since it would be a consideration for a transaction which is neither a supply of goods nor a supply of service.

In the context of GST on chit funds, an application for a ruling was filed before the AAR seeking clarity on whether or not additional amount collected from participants for delay in paying the monthly amounts were includible in the value of taxable service. The Authority in the case of Usha Bala Chits Private Limited [2020 (39) GSTL 303 (AAR-GST-AP)] held that the additional amount received was classifiable as principal supply of financial and related services and therefore liable to GST @ 12% under Entry 15 of Notification 11/2017-CT Rate dated 28th June, 2017.

GST on assignment of escalation claims
In case of infrastructure companies, substantial amounts are stuck in escalation claims which are subject to conclusion of arbitration proceedings. In order to manage cash flows and monetise the same, such companies at times assign such escalation claims to financing companies. The arrangement is that all the future proceeds of the said escalation claim are assigned to another party which would upfront pay a discounted amount to such infrastructure companies. Once the escalation claim is settled, the entire amount sanctioned would be received by the financing company on which the infrastructure company would have no rights.

It appears that the above transaction would qualify as assignment of actionable claim. The construction company has a right to claim the escalation costs from the clients, which they assign to another company which would squarely fall within the ambit of actionable claim.

The issue, however, would remain with respect to the payment of tax on reaching of finality of such actionable claims. It is important to note that the escalation claim is for receipt of consideration for a supply made by the infrastructure company. Generally, such contracts are in the nature of ‘continuous supply of services’ and therefore the tax on the same is payable at the time when the client accepts the provision of service. The question that would arise is who would be liable to pay the tax on such underlying service in such cases – the contractor / infrastructure company, or the assignee company to which the right has been assigned?

The fact remains that the service has been provided by the infrastructure company and therefore the liability to pay tax thereon shall also be on the infrastructure company. However, one also needs to keep in mind that the journey of an escalation claim reaching finality is generally long. It might happen that the escalation claim approved in 2021 might pertain to a service performed in 2011, i.e., at the time of levy of service tax when the service might have been exempted, while under the GST regime the same becomes taxable. In such a situation, the issue of whether or not the liability to pay tax on such service would arise on account of transition provisions [see section 142(11)] is something which one might need to analyse.

GST on vouchers
Vouchers are pre-paid instruments (PPI) that facilitate purchase of goods and services, including financial services, remittances, funds transfers, etc., against the value stored in / on such instruments. Such PPIs in India are regulated by the Reserve Bank of India which recognises three different kinds of instruments, namely:
• Closed system PPI: Issued by an entity for facilitating the purchase of goods or services from that entity only. For example, vouchers issued by broadcasting companies, telecoms, etc., which can be used against services provided only by such service providers.
• Semi-closed system PPI: Issued by banks as well as non-banks for purchase of goods or services, remittance facilities, etc., for use at a group of clearly identified merchant locations / establishments which have a specific contract with the issuer (or contract through a payment aggregator / payment gateway) to accept the PPIs as payment instruments. Sodexo vouchers is an example of such PPIs.
• Open system PPI: Issued by banks for use at any merchant for purchase of goods and services, including financial services, remittance facilities, etc. Cash withdrawal at ATMs / Points of Sale (PoS) terminals / Business Correspondents (BCs) is also allowed through these PPIs.

The closed system PPIs are not regulated by the RBI. However, the issuance of the same denotes an agreement by the issuer to supply certain goods or services, as the case may be. But the question that would need analysis is whether such vouchers can be constituted as an actionable claim or it is just an instrument to receive consideration for an agreement to supply goods or services? While the former appears to be a more appropriate answer, the fact remains that the PPI is nothing but a means to receive the consideration for supply of goods or service and therefore the same should be liable to GST at the time of issuance.

Therefore, if at the time of issuance all the elements for the levy of tax are known, i.e., recipient, nature of supply, place of supply, tax rate, etc., then GST should be paid at that moment itself by the person who issues the voucher. There would, however, be an issue of the value on which such issuer would be discharging tax. For example, for a voucher of Rs. 100, the company issuing the voucher would be receiving only Rs. 70, the price at which it sells to the distributor. The distributor might sell the voucher to the retailer for Rs. 85 who would further sell it to the consumer for Rs. 100. The question that would remain is whether the issuer would be charged tax on Rs. 100 or on Rs. 70? A more appropriate solution for this would be to look at the nature of the arrangement, i.e., whether the transaction is a P2P arrangement or a P2A arrangement, to determine the correct course of action.

Another issue which might be faced is in case where the goods or service to be supplied is not known. For example, a retailer, say Big Bazaar, issues a voucher of Rs. 1,000 which can be redeemed at any of its outlets for purchase / sale of goods or services or both, which may be taxable or exempt. In such a case, whether the retailer would be required to pay tax at the time of issuance of the voucher or its redemption shall remain open since all the elements for the levy of tax are not known at that time. In such a case, in view of specific provisions contained in sections 12(4) / 13(4), the tax would be payable at the time of redemption of the voucher. This view has been upheld by the AAR in the case of Kalyan Jewellers India Limited [2020 (32) GSTL 689 (AAR-TN)].

However, the above situation would change in case of semi-close and open system PPIs which are regulated by RBI and recognised as a legal means of tender and, therefore, more aptly classified as ‘money’ as defined u/s 2(75) of the CGST Act, 2017. Once the said PPIs are classified as money, the same are excluded from the definition of goods as well as service and therefore the question of payment of GST on the same does not arise. Similarly, once PPIs are classified as money, the need to analyse whether such PPIs would be treatable as actionable claim or not should also not remain.

GST on assignment of debts – secured / unsecured
Assignment or sale of secured / unsecured debts by banks is a common exercise undertaken to reduce their loan book. The debt could be of varied nature, such as loan for properties, business loans, etc., and may be secured or unsecured. However, all debts are not actionable claims which is apparent on a perusal of the definition of actionable claims as per which all debts other than a debt secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property are treated as actionable claims.

So far as the debt which gets classified as ‘actionable claims’ is concerned, there is no doubt regarding its non-taxability in view of the Schedule III entry. However, an issue arises in the context of debt which has been secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property and treated as actionable claim. It is important to note that even the said debt is a property for the bank and has all characteristics to be treated as goods, i.e., utility, capability of being bought and sold and, lastly, capability of being transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed. Therefore, while such debt does not qualify to be an actionable claim, the question that remains for consideration is whether the same would classify as goods for the purpose of GST. Can a view be taken that such debt is nothing but money receivable by a bank and therefore, even otherwise, it continues to be nothing but a transaction in money and hence cannot be treated either as goods or service?

The Board has attempted to clarify on this issue as under:

Sr.
No. and Question

Answer

40.  Whether
assignment or sale of secured or unsecured debts is liable to GST?

Section 2(52) of the CGST Act, 2017 defines
‘goods’ to mean every kind of movable property other than money and
securities but includes actionable claims. Schedule III of the CGST Act, 2017
lists activities or transactions which shall be treated neither as a supply
of goods nor a supply of services and actionable claims other than lottery,
betting and gambling are included in the said Schedule. Thus, only actionable
claims in respect of lottery, betting and gambling would be taxable under
GST. Further, where sale, transfer or assignment of debt falls within the
purview of actionable claims, the same would not be subject to GST.

Further, any charges collected in the
course of transfer or assignment of a debt would be chargeable to GST, being
in the nature of consideration for supply of services

However, the above clarification seems to have not taken into consideration the fact that the definition of actionable claims covers only debts other than those that have been secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property. Therefore, this is going to be an open issue for the banking sector while dealing with such transactions.

GST on partners’ remuneration
Whether remuneration received by a partner from a partnership firm is liable to GST or not has been a controversy since the introduction of GST. In the case of CIT vs. R.M. Chidambaram Pillai [(1977) 106 ITR 292 (SC)] the Court held that the partners’ remuneration was nothing but a share in profit.

Even the Board has clarified in the FAQ that partners’ salary will not be liable to GST. The AAR in the case of Arun Kumar Agarwal [2020 (36) GSTL 596 (AAR-Kar)] has also held that partners’ salary is not liable to GST in view of Entry 1 of Schedule III which keeps the employer-employee transactions outside the purview of GST. Importantly, while dealing with the issue of share in profits, the AAR has held that the same is mere application of profit and therefore cannot be liable to GST. Perhaps this reasoning can be applied while dealing with the partners’ remuneration since the Supreme Court has already held in the context of Income-tax that partners’ profit is nothing but application of profits.

Other transactions
The Tribunal has, in the case of Amit Metaliks Limited vs. Commissioner [2020 (41) GSTL 325 (Tri-Kol)], held that compensation / liquidated damages payable on cancellation of agreements is nothing but an actionable claim and therefore cannot be treated as consideration. The reasoning accorded by the Tribunal was that the compensation was nothing but debt in present and future and, therefore, was an actionable claim.

In the case of Shriram General Insurance Company vs. Commissioner [2019 (31) GSTL 442 (Tri-Hyd)], the Tribunal held that surrender / discontinuance charges retained by the insurance company on premature termination of a unit-linked insurance policy was not consideration for a taxable service provided, but rather a transaction in an actionable claim which was excluded from the levy of service tax.

The AAR in the case of Venkatasamy Jagannathan [2019 (27) GSTL 32 (AAR-GST)] has held that an agreement to receive a share in profit from shareholders for strategic sale of equity shares over and above the specified sale price per equity share was nothing but an actionable claim and, therefore, could not be treated as supply of goods or services.

In Ascendas Services (India) Private Limited [2020 (40) GSTL 252 (AAAR-Kar)], the Authority held that bus passes were not actionable claims as the same were merely a contract of carriage.

CONCLUSION


What constitutes actionable claim involves substantial application of thought. However, the benefits of a transaction being treated as an actionable claim are many, the primary one being exclusion from the levy of tax itself. Therefore, one needs to be careful while analysing such transactions as the monetary impact might be substantial.  

Reassessment – Validity – Sections 147 and 148 – Failure to furnish reasons recorded by A.O. – Furnishing of reasons while matter pending before Tribunal to cure default in first instance – Order of Tribunal remanding matter and subsequent assessment and demand notice set aside

47. New Era Shipping Ltd. vs. CIT [2020] 430 ITR 431 (Bom.) Date of order: 27th October, 2020 A.Y.: 2004-05

Reassessment – Validity – Sections 147 and 148 – Failure to furnish reasons recorded by A.O. – Furnishing of reasons while matter pending before Tribunal to cure default in first instance – Order of Tribunal remanding matter and subsequent assessment and demand notice set aside

Upon receipt of notice u/s 148 for the A.Y. 2004-05, the assessee requested for the reasons for the notice. No reasons were furnished and the A.O. passed a reassessment order u/s 147. The reasons were ultimately furnished to the assessee before the Tribunal which remanded the matter to the A.O.

The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) It was not open to the A.O. to refuse to furnish the reasons for issuing notice u/s 148. By such refusal, the assessee was deprived of the valuable opportunity of filing objections to the reopening of the assessment u/s 147. The approach of the A.O. was contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

ii) On the facts, the furnishing of reasons for reopening of the assessment at the stage when the matter was pending before the Tribunal could not cure the default in the first instance. The remand ordered by the Tribunal and the consequential assessment order and demand notice issued on the basis thereof were set aside.’

Loss – Set-off – Deduction u/s 10B – Scope of sections 10B and 70 – Assessee having three industrial units two of which export-oriented – Assessee not claiming deduction u/s 10B – Deduction cannot be thrust on it – Assessee entitled to set off losses from export-oriented units against profits of domestic tariff area unit

46. Karle International Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2020] 430 ITR 74 (Karn.) Date of order: 7th September, 2020 A.Y.: 2008-09

 

Loss – Set-off – Deduction u/s 10B – Scope of sections 10B and 70 – Assessee having three industrial units two of which export-oriented – Assessee not claiming deduction u/s 10B – Deduction cannot be thrust on it – Assessee entitled to set off losses from export-oriented units against profits of domestic tariff area unit

 

The assessee was a private limited company engaged in the business of manufacture and export of readymade garments. For the A.Y. 2008-09 the assessee filed the return of income declaring total income of Rs.12,89,760. The assessee had three units, two of which were export-oriented, and showed profit and loss from all of them. The assessee had set off losses of the units against the profits of the unit making profits and offered the balance to tax under the head ‘Income from business’. The A.O., inter alia, held that losses of the export-oriented units could not be allowed to be set off against the profits of unit No. I.

 

The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal upheld the decision of the A.O.

 

The Karnataka High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i) It is a well-settled legal proposition that where the assessee does not want the benefit of deduction from the taxable income, it cannot be thrust upon the assessee. Section 10B is not a provision in the nature of an exemption but provides for a deduction of such profit and gains as are derived by 100% export-oriented undertakings from the export of articles or things or computer software.

 

ii) Section 10B does not contain any prohibition that prevents an assessee from setting off losses from one source against income from another source under the same head of income as prescribed u/s 70. Section 10B(6)(ii) restricts the carrying forward and setting off of loss under sections 72 and 74 but does not provide anything regarding intra-head set-off u/s 70 and inter-head set-off u/s 71. The business income can be computed only after setting off business loss against the business income in the year in accordance with the provisions of section 70.

 

iii) Section 10A is a code by itself and section 10A(6)(ii) does not preclude the operation of sections 70 and 71. Paragraph 5.2 of the Circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated 16th July, 2013 [(2013) 356 ITR (St.) 7] clearly provides that income or loss from various sources, i. e., eligible and ineligible units under the same head, are aggregated in accordance with the provisions of section 70.

 

iv) The assessee was entitled to set off the loss from the export-oriented unit against the income earned in the domestic tariff area unit in accordance with section 70.’

Housing project – Special deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Principle of proportionality – Projects comprising eligible and ineligible units – Assessee can be given special deduction proportionate to units fulfilling conditions laid down in section 80-IB(10)

45. Devashri Nirman LLP vs. ACIT [2020] 429 ITR 597 (Bom.) Date of order: 26th November, 2020 A.Ys.: 2007-08 to 2011-12

Housing project – Special deduction u/s 80-IB(10) – Principle of proportionality – Projects comprising eligible and ineligible units – Assessee can be given special deduction proportionate to units fulfilling conditions laid down in section 80-IB(10)

The assessee’s housing projects DG and VV comprised 105 and 90 residential units, respectively. The assessee was denied the deduction u/s 80-IB by the A.O. on the ground that the area of five residential units in DG and three residential units in VV exceeded 1,500 square feet which was in breach of the conditions prescribed in clause (c) of section 80-IB(10).

The Commissioner (Appeals) directed the A.O. to allow deduction u/s 80-IB(10) on a proportionate basis. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals filed by both the assessee and the Department.

On appeals by the assessee and the Department, the Bombay High Court held as under:

‘i) Clause (c) of section 80-IB(10) does not exclude the principle of proportionality in any manner.

ii) The Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to deduction u/s. 80-IB(10) on proportionate basis. The view taken by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal need not be interfered with.’

Exempt income – Disallowance u/s 14A – Disallowance of expenditure incurred to earn exempt income – No evidence of such expenditure – Failure by A.O. to record dissatisfaction – No disallowance could be made u/s 14A

44. CIT vs. Brigade Enterprises Ltd. (No. 2) [2020] 429 ITR 615 (Karn.) Date of order: 22nd October, 2020 A.Y.: 2009-10

Exempt income – Disallowance u/s 14A – Disallowance of expenditure incurred to earn exempt income – No evidence of such expenditure – Failure by A.O. to record dissatisfaction – No disallowance could be made u/s 14A

The assessee was engaged in the business of real estate development. For the A.Y. 2009-10 the A.O. made a disallowance u/s 14A.

The Commissioner (Appeals) sustained the disallowance of the interest disallowed u/s 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, to the extent of Rs. 1,09,99,962 u/s 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) and deleted the disallowance of interest u/s 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) to the extent of Rs. 15,27,310. The Tribunal, inter alia, held that there was no material on record to substantiate that overdraft account was utilised for making tax-free investments and the investment proceeds were from the public issue of shares. Therefore, it could not be held that funds from the overdraft account from which interest had been paid had been invested in mutual funds which yielded income exempt from tax. Thus, deletion of disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) to the tune of Rs. 15,27,310 was upheld.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

‘i) The A.O. had not rendered any finding with regard to the incorrectness of the claim of the assessee either with regard to its accounts or that he was not satisfied with the claim of the assessee in respect of such expenditure in relation to exempt income as is required in accordance with section 14A(2) for making a disallowance under Rule 8D.

ii) Thus, the Tribunal had rightly concluded that the A.O. had not recorded the satisfaction with regard to the claim of the assessee for disallowance u/s 14A read with Rule 8D(2). Section 14A was not applicable.’

Business expenditure – Deduction u/s 37 – Company – Discount on employees stock option plan – Deductible

43. CIT (LTU) vs. Biocon Ltd. [2020] 430 ITR 151 (Karn.) Date of order: 11th November, 2020 A.Y.: 2004-05

Business expenditure – Deduction u/s 37 – Company – Discount on employees stock option plan – Deductible

The following question of law was raised before the Karnataka High Court:

‘Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Tribunal was right in holding that the discount on issue of Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP) is allowable deduction in computing the income under the head profits and gains of the business?’

The High Court held as under:

‘i) From a perusal of section 37(1) it is evident that the provision permits deduction of expenditure laid out or expended and does not contain a requirement that there has to be a pay-out. If an expenditure has been incurred, section 37(1) would be attracted. Section 37 does not envisage incurrence of expenditure in cash.

ii) An assessee is entitled to claim deduction under the provision if the expenditure has been incurred. It is well settled in law that if a business liability has arisen in the accounting year, it is permissible as deduction even though the liability may have to be quantified and discharged at a future date.

iii) Section 2(15A) of the Companies Act, 1956 defines “employees stock option” to mean option given to whole-time directors, officers or the employees of the company, which gives such directors, officers or employees the benefit or right to purchase or subscribe at a future date to securities offered by the company at a pre-determined price. In an employees stock option plan, a company undertakes to issue shares to its employees at a future date at a price lower than the current market price. The employees are given stock options at a discount and the same amount of discount represents the difference between the market price of shares at the time of grant of option and the offer price. In order to be eligible for acquiring shares under the scheme, the employees are under an obligation to render their services to the company during the vesting period as provided in the scheme. On completion of the vesting period in the service of the company, the option vests with the employees.

iv) The expression “expenditure” also includes a loss and therefore, issuance of shares at a discount where the assessee absorbs the difference between the price at which they are issued and the market value of the shares would be expenditure incurred for the purposes of section 37(1). The primary object of the exercise is not to waste capital but to earn profits by securing consistent services of the employees and, therefore, it cannot be construed as short receipt of capital.

v) The deduction of the discount on the employees stock option plan over the vesting period was in accordance with the accounting in the books of accounts, which had been prepared in accordance with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Employee Stock Option Scheme and Employee Stock Purchase Scheme) Guidelines, 1999. For A.Y. 2009-10 onwards, the A.O. had permitted the deduction of the employees stock option plan expenses. The Revenue could not be permitted to take a different stand with regard to the A.Y. 2004-05. The expenses were deductible.’

Appeal to ITAT – Duty of Tribunal to consider issue on merits – Document not filed due to mistake of counsel for assessee – Dismissal of appeal not justified – Appeal should have been decided on merits

42. Swetha Realmart LLP vs. CIT [2020] 430 ITR 159 (Karn.) Date of order: 3rd November, 2020 A.Y.: 2016-17

Appeal to ITAT – Duty of Tribunal to consider issue on merits – Document not filed due to mistake of counsel for assessee – Dismissal of appeal not justified – Appeal should have been decided on merits

 

For the A.Y. 2016-17, the assessee had filed an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal, by an order dated 29th May, 2020, dismissed the appeal inter alia on the ground that in the absence of documentary evidence in support of the assessee’s claim that the property sold in question was not a depreciable asset, no ground is made out to interfere with the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).

 

The assessee filed an appeal before the High Court against this order of the Tribunal. The following question was raised:

 

‘Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in law in dismissing the appeal instead of disposing the matter on its merits.’

 

The Karnataka High Court allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under:

 

‘i) It is trite law that for the fault committed by counsel, a party should not be penalised.

 

ii) Due to inadvertence, the senior chartered accountant engaged by the assessee could not comply with the directions of the Tribunal to file documents. The Tribunal, in fact, should have adjudicated the matter on the merits instead of summarily dismissing it. The order of dismissal was not valid.

 

iii) The substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

 

iv) In the result, the order passed by the Tribunal is quashed. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal. Needless to state that the assessee shall file the audited accounts and computation of income as directed by the Tribunal within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order passed today before the Tribunal. Thereupon, the Tribunal shall proceed to adjudicate the appeal on its merits.’

Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers of Commissioner (Appeals) – Sections 246 and 251 of ITA, 1961 – Commissioner (Appeals) has power to consider claim not raised in return or revised return

41. Sesa Goa Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [2020] 430 ITR 114 (Bom.) Date of order: 12th March, 2020 A.Y.: 2005-06


 
Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) – Powers of Commissioner (Appeals) – Sections 246 and 251 of ITA, 1961 – Commissioner (Appeals) has power to consider claim not raised in return or revised return

 

The Bombay High Court held as under:

 

‘i) Appellate authorities under the Income-tax Act, 1961 have very wide powers while considering an appeal which may be filed by the assessee. The appellate authorities may confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or remand the case to the Assessing Officer. This is because, unlike an ordinary appeal, the basic purpose of a tax appeal is to ascertain the correct tax liability of the assessee in accordance with law.

 

ii) The Commissioner (Appeals) has undoubted power to consider a claim for deduction not raised in the return or revised return.’

 

Sections 9(1)(vi) and 44BB – As source of income is the place where income-generating activity takes place, hire charges paid under bare-boat charter agreement were deemed to accrue and arise in India and were liable to tax in India – On facts, fixed place PE of vessel providers was constituted in India – Since vessel was used in connection with prospecting of mineral oil, payment was covered u/s 44BB and hence could not be treated as royalty

11. [2021] 124 taxmann.com 56 (AAR-New Delhi) SeaBird Exploration FZ LLC, In re
A.A.R. Nos. 1284 and 1285 of 2012 Date of order: 14th January, 2021

Sections 9(1)(vi) and 44BB – As source of income is the place where income-generating activity takes place, hire charges paid under bare-boat charter agreement were deemed to accrue and arise in India and were liable to tax in India – On facts, fixed place PE of vessel providers was constituted in India – Since vessel was used in connection with prospecting of mineral oil, payment was covered u/s 44BB and hence could not be treated as royalty

FACTS

The applicant was a company incorporated in the UAE and was also a tax resident of UAE. It was engaged in the business of rendering geophysical services to the oil and gas exploration industry which involved seismic data acquisition and processing. The applicant was providing such offshore services to oil companies in India. For performing its services, the applicant required seismic survey vessels, or vessels fitted with a special kind of equipment. Accordingly, the applicant entered into a bare-boat charter agreement (BBC agreement) with two different vessel-providing companies (VPCs) for hire of two seismic survey vessels on global usage basis. The BBC agreements were neither location specific nor utilisation specific and the applicant was free to use them in any part of the world. It was required to pay hire charges irrespective of whether or not the vessels were in use. Under the BBC agreement, the vessel owner makes the ship available to the charterer and then it is for the latter to maintain and operate it in the manner it desires. The vessel owner has no role to play either in navigation or any other day-to-day operations of the ship which is at the complete disposal of the charterer. The Masters, officers and crew of the vessel are to be ‘servants’, with all operational expenses to be borne by the hirer.

The applicant contended before the AAR that the source of income can be in India only if income-generating activity was contingent upon use in India. However, in this case the source of income was connected to delivering and transferring control of the vessel to the applicant and not its subsequent utilisation in India. Since the vessels were given on hire outside India, there was no source of income in India and no income could be said to accrue or arise or deem to accrue or arise in India under the Act. Further, even if it was held that income arising from the global BBC agreement was taxable in India, income should be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 44BB. And, since section 44BB applies, income cannot be taxed as ‘royalty’ u/s 9(1)(vi).

HELD


VPCs derive income from hiring of the seismic vessels which are used for marine acquisition of seismic data and are in the nature of scientific equipment. Any consideration received for use or right to use such scientific equipment would be in the nature of royalty unless the consideration was covered under the provisions of section 44BB.

Section 44BB(2)(a) of the Act provides that: the amount paid or payable (whether in or out of India) to the assessee or to any person on his behalf on account of the provision of services and facilities in connection with, or supply of plant and machinery on hire used, or to be used, in the prospecting for, or extraction or production of, mineral oils in India. Plant includes ship and since the vessel was used in connection with prospecting of mineral oil, hire charges were covered u/s 44BB. Therefore, they could not be treated as royalty in view of specific exclusion under Explanation 2(iva), to section 9(1)(vi). Once payment was covered u/s 44BB, it could not be brought within the purview of section 9(1)(vi). Accordingly, the income of the VPCs was not in the nature of royalty. The issue considered in the present case is identical with that discussed in Wavefield Inseis ASA, In re [2010] 230 CTR 106 (AAR) and, therefore, ruling of that decision is squarely applicable.

Source of income is the place where income-generating activity takes place. In case of business income, it is the place where business is conducted. The business activity of seismic vessel can only be at the place where it is utilised for acquisition of seismic data and not at the place where the contract for hiring was signed or where the ship was delivered. Deciding accrual of business income on the basis of the place of delivery may result in an anomalous situation.

In the case of a seismic vessel, the business is not conducted by the Master, crew or manpower on board but by scientific equipment on the vessel which emits seismic waves and recaptures them. Hence, to decide the place of business of seismic vessels it is not relevant whether the agreement is for time charter or for BBC.

In GVK Industries vs. ITO (371 ITR 453) (SC), the Supreme Court held that the ‘source state taxation’ rule confers primacy to right to tax on a particular income or transaction to the state / nation where the source of the said income is located. Relying on this decision, the appellant submitted that to apply the source rule it was necessary to establish nexus with taxable territory. The source rule was in consonance with the nexus theory and did not fall foul on the ground of extra-territorial operation. Source was the country where income or wealth was physically or economically produced.

The payer (i.e., the applicant) was executing the contract in the Indian territory. The services of the seismic vessels were utilised within Indian territory. Thus, all the parameters of the ‘source rule’ as explained by the Supreme Court were fulfilled and, hence, the business activity of the VPCs had a clear nexus with the Indian territory. There was existence of a close, real, intimate relationship and commonality of interest between non-resident VPCs and the applicant, which satisfied the requirements for ‘business connection’ and ‘territorial nexus’. Since the business of the VPCs was carried out through the seismic vessels deployed in Indian territory, the fixed place PE of the VPCs was constituted in India.

Section 14A – Even suo motu disallowance made by an assessee u/s 14A needs to be restricted to the extent of exempt income

16. Chalet Hotels Ltd. vs. DCIT Mahavir Singh (V.P.) and Rajesh Kumar (A.M.) ITA No. 3747/Mum/2019 A.Y.: 2015-16 Date of order: 11th January, 2021 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue:Madhur Agarwal / V. Sreekar


 

Section 14A – Even suo motu disallowance made by an assessee u/s 14A needs to be restricted to the extent of exempt income

 

FACTS

The A.O., while assessing the total income of the assessee, invoked the provisions of section 14A read with Rule 8D and disallowed a sum of Rs. 27,15,12,687 and of Rs. 2,14,47,136 under Rule 8D(2)(iii). Thereby, he disallowed a total sum of Rs. 29,29,59,823 u/s 14A.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) where, in the course of the proceedings it claimed that the assessee has earned exempt income only to the extent of Rs. 13,17,233 and the same may be adopted for making disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii).

 

The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made by the A.O. under Rule 8D(2)(ii), i.e., interest expenditure amounting to Rs. 27,15,12,687, but confirmed the disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) being administrative expenses at Rs. 5,86,52,973 as against the exempt income claimed by the assessee at Rs. 13,17,233. The CIT(A) restricted the disallowance to the amount suo motu computed by the assessee at Rs. 5,86,52,973.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

 

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the short point of dispute is whether the disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) is to be restricted to the extent of exempt income, i.e., dividend income earned by the assessee at Rs. 13,17,233 or the disallowance as suo motu computed by the assessee at Rs. 5,86,52,973.

Having gone through the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maxopp Investments Ltd. (Supra) wherein the Supreme Court has categorically held that the disallowance cannot exceed the exempt income the Tribunal deleted the suo motu disallowance made by the assessee at Rs. 5,86,52,973 and restricted the disallowance to the extent of the exempt income claimed by the assessee at Rs. 13,17,233.

Sections 43CA and 263 – In a case where the A.O. has taken a possible view after inquiring into the matter and appreciating the facts and documents filed by the assessee, the PCIT has no jurisdiction to set aside the assessment

15. Ranjana Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. PCIT George George K. (J.M.) and B.R. Baskaran (A.M.) ITA No. 4308/Mum/2019 A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 11th January, 2021 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: N.R. Agrawal / Bharat Andhle

Sections 43CA and 263 – In a case where the A.O. has taken a possible view after inquiring into the matter and appreciating the facts and documents filed by the assessee, the PCIT has no jurisdiction to set aside the assessment

FACTS

The assessee e-filed its return of income for A.Y. 2014-15 declaring a total income of Rs. 1,60,260.

Vide an allotment letter dated 12th June, 2010, the assessee agreed to sell to Mr. Vasant Kumar Pujari, the buyer, Flat No. A-302 in Kailash Heights for a consideration of Rs. 36,65,000. He (the assessee) received an account payee cheque for Rs. 2,50,000 dated 22nd June, 2010 as token advance. Thereafter, he received Rs. 18,32,500 up to 20th December, 2012. The sale agreement was registered on 26th June, 2013. On the date of registration, the stamp duty value of the said flat was Rs. 57,48,160 which was reflected in the AIR on the Department website. In the course of assessment proceedings, a notice was issued u/s 142(1) asking the assessee to furnish the date of property purchased / sold details. (These were contained in the AIR information generated by the Department from the ITES.)

The assessment of total income of the assessee was completed u/s 143(3) and an order dated 8th September, 2016 was passed u/s 143(3) accepting the returned income.

Subsequently, the PCIT, after issuing a show cause notice to the assessee and rejecting its contentions, set aside the order passed u/s 263 and directed the A.O. to examine the issue after giving sufficient opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The PCIT held that:
i) the agreement does not mention allotment of the flat vide allotment letter dated 12th June, 2010;
ii) allotment letter is not forming part of the registered agreement;
iii) the assessee has not filed any evidence of having filed the allotment letter with the Stamp Duty Authority;
iv) the agreement does not mention about booking amount claimed to have been paid by the assessee vide the allotment letter;
v) the agreement mentions that the purchaser has perused the commencement certificate, plans and other documents and has approached the promoters for allotment of the flat. The allotment letter is dated 12th June, 2010 and the commencement certificate is dated 28th June, 2010 which contradicts the clauses in the agreement.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal observed that according to the learned PCIT, the business income should have been computed by taking the deemed consideration as on the date of registration and not on the date of agreement to sell as per the observations in the revisionary order. Besides, the Tribunal also found that this issue has been specifically raised by the A.O. in the notice issued u/s 142(1) wherein a copy of the AIR as generated by the ITES was attached and the assessee was called upon to reconcile the entries appearing therein. The assessee had duly filed reconciliation vide letter dated 24th August, 2016 submitting a copy of the sale agreement and also the necessary details of the said deal. The A.O., after examining such details, accepted the business income of the assessee based on the stamp value as on the date of the agreement to sell.

The Tribunal held that the A.O. has taken a possible view after inquiring into the matter and appreciating the facts and documents filed by the assessee. Since the A.O. took a possible view, the PCIT has no jurisdiction to set aside the assessment. The Tribunal found itself inclined to quash the revisionary proceeding on this count alone.

On merits, the Tribunal held that the assessee has a fool-proof case as the income has been assessed pursuant to sections 43CA(3) and (4) which clearly provide that if the date of agreement and the date of registration are not the same, the stamp value as on the date of agreement shall be taken for the purpose of computing the income of the assessee and not the date of registration.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the assessee by setting aside the order of the PCIT.

Sections 45, 48 and 50CA – There is no provision in the Act authorising the A.O. to refer valuation of shares transferred for the purpose of calculating capital gains – Sale consideration disclosed in the share purchase agreement ought to be adopted for calculating the long-term capital gains in the case of transfer of shares – Section 50CA of the Act inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2018 clearly indicates that prior to that date there was no provision under the Act authorising the A.O. to refer for valuation of shares for the purpose of calculating capital gains

14. ACIT vs. Manoj Arjun Menda George George K. (J.M.) and B.R. Baskaran (A.M.) ITA No. 1710/Bang/2016 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 4th January, 2021 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee:  Rajesh Kumar Jha / V. Srinivasan

Sections 45, 48 and 50CA – There is no provision in the Act authorising the A.O. to refer valuation of shares transferred for the purpose of calculating capital gains – Sale consideration disclosed in the share purchase agreement ought to be adopted for calculating the long-term capital gains in the case of transfer of shares – Section 50CA of the Act inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2018 clearly indicates that prior to that date there was no provision under the Act authorising the A.O. to refer for valuation of shares for the purpose of calculating capital gains

FACTS

The assessee, an individual, filed his return of income for A.Y. 2012-13 declaring a total income of Rs. 7,22,25,230. Vide Share Purchase Agreement dated 20th October, 2011, the assessee along with other shareholders sold their entire shareholding in Millennia Realtors Private Limited (MRPL) to Ambuja Housing & Urban Infrastructure Company Limited (AHUIC) for a consideration of Rs. 66.81 crores. The purchasers also agreed to pay Rs. 17.76 crores as accrued interest on debentures. Thus, the total amount payable by AHUIC to the shareholders of MRPL worked out to Rs. 84.58 crores. The assessee held 13.29% of the shareholding in MRPL and hence received Rs. 11.24 crores for his portion of the shares sold. In his return of income, he computed long-term capital loss and carried forward the same.

In the course of the assessment proceedings, the assessee submitted copies of the share purchase agreement and the valuation report dated 20th October, 2011 referred to in the share purchase agreement. The A.O., based on the information sought by him u/s 133(6) from Oriental Bank of Commerce, the bankers of MRPL, and also the property consultant who facilitated the transfer of shares of MRPL, came to the conclusion that the fair market value of the shares of MRPL disclosed in the share purchase agreement was on the lower side. Therefore, he held that to arrive at the correct FMV the shares need to be valued and said that the most appropriate way to value them is the Net Asset Valuation method (NAV).

After adopting valuation under the NAV method, the A.O. held that the sale consideration of the shares transferred by the assessee and the other shareholders has to be taken as Rs. 166.72 crores against Rs. 66.81 crores as agreed upon in the sale / purchase agreement dated 20th October, 2011 and the assessee’s share in the consideration works out to Rs.24.52 crores against Rs. 11.24 crores. Accordingly, the A.O. arrived at the long-term capital gain of Rs. 3,33,23,661 as against the loss of Rs. 9,94,59,651 as calculated by the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who, following the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of George Henderson & Co. Limited [66 ITR 622 (SC)] and other judicial pronouncements, held that there is no provision under the Income-tax Act empowering the A.O. to refer a matter for valuation in relation to the transfer of a capital asset, being transfer of shares. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the assessee.

But the aggrieved Revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where, on behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the issue in question is squarely covered by the decision of the Tribunal in the case of another shareholder, viz., Raj Arjun Menda, in ITA No. 1720/Bang/2016 (order dated 20th February, 2020).

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the co-ordinate bench in the case of Raj Arjun Menda (Supra) has decided an identical issue in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal held that the transfer of the assets being the shares of a company, there is no provision under the Act for referring the matter for valuation. Accordingly, the Tribunal in that case confirmed the order of the CIT(A) and held that the consideration disclosed in the share purchase agreement dated 20th October, 2011 should be adopted for the purpose of computation of long term-capital gains on the sale of shares.

Following the decision in the same case, viz., Raj Arjun Menda (Supra), the Tribunal held that the CIT(A) is justified in holding that the sale consideration disclosed in the sale purchase agreement ought to be adopted for calculating the long-term capital gains in the case of transfer of shares. It also mentioned that section 50CA inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2018 would have no application to the instant case since it was dealing with A.Y. 2012-2013. In other words, section 50CA inserted w.e.f. 1st April, 2018 clearly indicates that prior to that date there was no provision authorising the A.O. to refer the shares for valuation for the purpose of calculating capital gains.

Whereas a part of a composite itinerary, the employee of the assessee employer availing LTC has travelled to a foreign sector along with destination in India, the assessee employer cannot be faulted for not deducting tax at source from LTC allowed to employee, given that such amount was no longer exempt to the employee u/s 10(5)

29. 124 taxmann.com 354 State Bank of India vs. ACIT, TDS IT Appeal No. 1717 (Mum.) of 2019 A.Y.: 2012-13 Date of order: 27th January, 2021

 

Whereas a part of a composite itinerary, the employee of the assessee employer availing LTC has travelled to a foreign sector along with destination in India, the assessee employer cannot be faulted for not deducting tax at source from LTC allowed to employee, given that such amount was no longer exempt to the employee u/s 10(5)

 

FACTS

During the course of a survey u/s 133A it was found that certain employees of the assessee have claimed LTC (Leave Travel Concession) facility wherein ‘travel to places outside India was involved’. It was noted that some of the employees had taken a very circuitous route, involving travel abroad to one or more domestic destinations. The A.O. noted that the admissible LTC in these cases was treated as tax-exempt u/s 10(5) and that such exemption was not available in cases where the employee travels out of India. The A.O. contended that to that extent, the assessee was in error in not deducting tax at source in respect of such payment of the LTC facility. The A.O. also noted that ‘the employees travelled to the Indian destinations not by the direct and shortest route but by a circuitous route, including a foreign journey. Thus, the A.O. held that the LTC payment should have been included in the income of the employees concerned while deducting tax at source from the salaries, and the assessee is required to be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting the related tax at source. The assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(A) who upheld the A.O.’s contention.

 

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal.

 

HELD

There is no specific bar in the law on travel eligible for exemption u/s 10(5), involving a sector of overseas travel, and in the absence of such a bar the assessee employer cannot be faulted for not inferring such a bar. The reimbursement is restricted to airfare, on the national carrier, by the shortest route as is the mandate of rule 2B. The employee has travelled, as a part of that composite itinerary involving a foreign sector as well, to the destination in India. The guidance available to the assessee employer indicates that in such a situation the exemption u/s 10(5) is available to the employee, though to the extent of farthest Indian destination by the shortest route, and that is what the assessee employer has allowed.

 

Due to the position with respect to taxability of such LTC in the hands of the employee, the assessee employer cannot be faulted for not deducting tax at source from the LTC facility allowed by him to the employees. Once the estimation of income in the hands of the employee under the head ‘income from salaries’ by the employer was bona fide and reasonable, the assessee employer cannot be held to be in default.

 

The appeal of the assessee employer was allowed.

Sections 143(2) and 143(3) – Assessment order passed by a jurisdictional officer in a case where the notice u/s 143(2) was not issued by him but by a non-jurisdictional officer is bad in law and void ab initio

28. [2021] 123 taxmann.com 395 (Luck.)(Trib.) ITO vs. Arti Securities & Services Ltd. A.Y.: 2014-15 Date of order: 6th November, 2020

Sections 143(2) and 143(3) – Assessment order passed by a jurisdictional officer in a case where the notice u/s 143(2) was not issued by him but by a non-jurisdictional officer is bad in law and void ab initio

FACTS

In an appeal filed by the Revenue, the assessee filed an application under Rule 27 of the ITAT Rules and raised two issues – one related to limited scrutiny and another related to jurisdiction. The Tribunal admitted the application of the assessee and heard and decided the jurisdictional ground.

The assessee had e-filed return of income on 26th September, 2014 declaring income of Rs. 11,11,750 and the case was selected for scrutiny u/s 143(2) vide notice issued by DCIT, Circle-4, Kanpur and DCIT-6, Kanpur on the same date, i.e., 3rd September, 2015. As per assessment order dated 29th December, 2016 read with transfer memo dated 16th May, 2016, the case was transferred from DCIT-6, Kanpur to Income-tax Officer-6(1), Kanpur on the ground of monetary limit vide order dated 28th April, 2016 passed by the Pr. CIT-2, Kanpur. The jurisdictional Income-tax Officer, Kanpur did not issue any notice u/s 143(2) and completed the assessment without issuing any notice u/s 143(2).

The jurisdictional A.O. started the proceedings from 18th May, 2016 by mentioning that case records were received from DCIT-6, Kanpur because of change of monetary limit.

In the course of appellate proceedings, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that on this copy of the order sheet there is no mention of issue of notice u/s 143(2), nor is there any mention of any order passed by the Commissioner u/s 127. Besides, when the first notice u/s 143(2) was issued on 3rd September, 2015, Revenue was aware of the fact that as per monetary limit for ITR of Rs. 11,11,750, the competent A.O. to issue notice u/s 143(2) was the Income-tax Officer-6(1), Kanpur.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that
i) The assessee filed return of income declaring income of Rs.11,11,750;
ii) The jurisdictional A.O. was the Income-tax Officer, Ward-6, Kanpur (as per CBDT instruction No. 1/2011);
iii) Two notices u/s 143(2) were issued by DCIT-4, Kanpur and DCIT-6, Kanpur on the same date, i.e., 3rd September, 2015;
iv) The statutory notice u/s 143(2) has not been issued by the jurisdictional A.O.;
v) No order u/s 127 has been passed by the CIT transferring the case from DCIT-6 to Income-tax Officer-6, Kanpur.

Considering the ratio of the decisions of the Tribunal in the case of Krishnendu Chowdhury vs. ITO [2017] 78 taxmann.com 89 (Kol.); Sukumar Chandra Sahoo vs. Asst. CIT [IT Appeal No. 2073 (Kol.) of 2016, dated 27th September, 2017] and Bajrang Bali Industries vs. ACIT [IT Appeal No. 724 (LKW) of 2017, dated 30th November, 2018], the Tribunal allowed the jurisdictional ground taken by the assessee and held that the notice u/s 143(2) was not issued by an officer having jurisdiction on the assessee and who had passed the assessment order, therefore in view of non-issue of statutory notice u/s 143(2), the assessment order is bad in law and void ab initio and hence all further proceedings including the order passed by the learned CIT(A) is bad in law and, therefore, the appeal filed by Revenue against the order of the CIT(A) does not stand and is dismissed.

The appeal of the Revenue was dismissed by allowing one of the grounds of the assessee raised under Rule 27 of the ITAT Rules.

Section 45 – In a case where notional income has been received by the assessee as per development agreement and no real income has been received as the developer vanished and there was neither any development nor any area received by the assessee, capital gains will not be chargeable to tax if the possession is taken back by the assessee and there was no development

27. [2020] 122 taxmann.com 169 (Hyd.)(Trib.) Santosh Kumar Subbani vs. ITO
A.Y.: 2007-08 Date of order: 13th November, 2020

Section 45 – In a case where notional income has been received by the assessee as per development agreement and no real income has been received as the developer vanished and there was neither any development nor any area received by the assessee, capital gains will not be chargeable to tax if the possession is taken back by the assessee and there was no development

FACTS

For A.Y. 2007-08, the assessee had not filed his original return of income. The A.O., having received information with regard to transfer of property by the assessee through a sale-cum-development-agreement-cum-GPA with M/s 21st Century Investments & Properties Ltd., vide document No. 5126/2007 dated 26th March, 2007, issued a notice u/s 148, in response to which the assessee filed the return of income admitting to total income of Rs. 74,380 from other sources and agricultural income of Rs. 1,65,340.

As per the information received by the A.O., under the development-agreement-cum-GPA, the assessee transferred the land, admeasuring 0.15 guntas, at Nizampet. The agreement provided that the developer has to complete the development within 24 months and the assessee has to receive 5,000 square feet built-up area.

The assessee submitted before the A.O. that the developer did not perform the construction activity and argued that there is no case of capital gains. The A.O. conducted inquiries through an Inspector and found that no development had taken place on the said land. However, since, the assessee has handed over the property as per the agreement dated 26th March, 2007 to the developer, in the view of the A.O.  it was hit by section 2(47)(v) and accordingly he assessed the SRO value of Rs. 11,89,883 as sale consideration and determined a short-term capital gain of Rs. 4,38,029.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who dismissed the appeal.

HELD


The Tribunal noted that after entering into the agreement, the developer has vanished and no real development took place till date as verified and confirmed by the A.O. through the Departmental Inspector and hence no developed area was received by the assessee. It is clear that there was no real income except notional income as per the development agreement which has never been received by the assessee. According to the Tribunal, the issue which decides the taxability of capital gains is whether the possession is lying with the developer or taken over by the assessee. During the course of appeal proceedings, upon inquiry by the Tribunal, the AR submitted that till date the development agreement was not cancelled and no public notice was issued by the assessee for cancellation of the same.

The Tribunal held that the issue is required to be remitted back to the file of the A.O. with a direction to decide the capital gains after verifying whether or not the possession is taken back by the assessee and whether the assessee has cancelled the development agreement. In case the possession is taken back by the assessee and there has been no development, the assessee succeeds in the appeal.

CSR RULES AMENDMENT – AN ANALYSIS

1. BACKGROUND
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be defined as a company’s sense of responsibility towards the community and environment (both ecological and social) in which it operates. Companies can fulfil this responsibility through waste and pollution reduction processes, by contributing educational and social programmes, by being environmentally friendly and by undertaking activities of similar nature. CSR is not charity or mere donations. CSR is a way of conducting business by which corporate entities visibly contribute to the social good.

The Companies Act, 2013 has formulated section 135, Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility) Rules, 2014 and Schedule VII which prescribe mandatory provisions for companies to fulfil their CSR. This article aims to analyse these provisions (including all the amendments therein).

Applicability of CSR provisions
o On every company including its holding or subsidiary having:
* Net worth of Rs. 500 crores or more, or
* Turnover of Rs. 1,000 crores or more, or
* Net profit of Rs. 5 crores or more
o during the immediately preceding financial year, and
* A foreign company having its branch office or project office in India, which fulfils the criteria specified above.

However, if a company ceases to meet the above criteria for three consecutive financial years then it is not required to comply with CSR provisions till such time as it meets the specified criteria.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs, vide Notification dated 22nd January, 2021 in exercise of the powers conferred by section 135 and sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 469 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), notified rules to further amend the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules, 2014. These rules are to be called the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021.

They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. As per the Notification, section 21 of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 has come into force with effect from 22nd January, 2021.

2. The top ten points relating to changes in CSR rules are as follows
CSR expenditure
(i) Surplus from CSR activities to be ploughed back in same project or transferred to Unspent CSR Account and spent as per policy and annual action plan, or transferred to Fund within 6 months of the end of the financial year.
(ii) Excess amount spent shall be set off within three succeeding financial years subject to conditions (i.e., surplus arising out of CSR activities shall not be considered and the Board of the company shall pass a resolution to that effect).
(iii) CSR amount may be spent for creation / acquisition of capital asset to be held in the manner prescribed.
(iv) Specific exclusion of sponsorship activities for deriving market benefits from the scope of CSR activities.

Governance
(v) Eligible implementing entities through which a company shall undertake CSR activities will be required to register themselves with the Central Government w.e.f. 1st April, 2021.
(vi) Responsibility of the Board to ensure that the funds so disbursed have been utilised for the purposes and in the manner as approved by it and the CFO or the person responsible for financial management shall certify to the effect.
(vii) CSR Committee to formulate Annual Action Plan for CSR activities.
(viii) Companies with average CSR obligation of Rs. 10 crores or more in three preceding years to undertake impact assessment through an independent agency for projects of Rs. 1 crore or more which have been completed not less than one year before the impact study and the report to be placed before the Board and in the Annual Report of CSR.

Reporting
(ix) Earlier, only the contents of the CSR policy were required to be disclosed on the company’s website. Now, composition of CSR Committee, CSR Policy and projects approved by the Board are required to be disclosed.
(x) New format inserted for disclosure to be included in the Board’s Report.

3. The provisions relating to amendment of the Companies Act are tabulated below:

Section

Description

Amendment

Earlier
provision

Implication

135(5)

CSR spending

If the company has not completed 3
years
since incorporation, then 2% of average net profit during such
immediately preceding financial year

The Board to ensure that the company
spends at least 2% of the average net profit made during 3 immediately
preceding financial years

This provision is to rationalise the
method of computation of net profit for the purpose of CSR

In case of newly-incorporated entities,
the amount of CSR expenditure will be increased

135(5)

2nd proviso

Unspent amount not relating to an
ongoing project

The unspent amount not relating to an
ongoing project shall be transferred to a Fund specified in Schedule
VII within 6 months of the end of the financial year

If the company fails to spend the
amount, the Board is required to specify the reasons for not spending

This is a welcome step and the
corporates will be benefited

In case the amount cannot be spent, it
can be transferred to a Fund, avoiding non-compliance

135(6)

Unspent amount relating to an ongoing
project

The company is required to transfer the
amount to a special ‘Unspent CSR Account’ within 30 days from
end of financial year and spend it within 3 financial years from date
of such transfer

No corresponding provision

This is a welcome step and the corporates
will be benefited

This will enable corporates to plan
their cash flows and park the excess amount in ‘Unspent CSR Account’ to be
utilised within next 3 F.Y.s

135(7)

Contravention w.r.t. sections 135(5) and
135(6)

Fine equal to:

In case of company – 2X of the amount required to be
transferred, or Rs. 1 crore, whichever is less

In case of officers – 1/10th of the amount
required to be transferred, or Rs. 2 lakhs, whichever is less

No corresponding provision

Provision for fine introduced

4. The provisions relating to amended CSR Rules as per the Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021 are tabulated below:

Rule

Description

Amendment

Earlier
provision

Implication

4

CSR implementation

Eligible implementing entities through
which a company shall undertake CSR will require to register themselves
with Central Government w.e.f. 1st April, 2021

No corresponding provision

Welcome step from the point of view of
governance

Responsibility of the Board to ensure that the funds so disbursed
have been utilised for the purposes and in the manner as approved by
it and the CFO or the person responsible for financial management shall certify
to the effect

5(2)

CSR Committee

Committee to formulate annual action
plan
for CSR activities

Institute transparent monitoring
mechanism for implementation of projects

This is a new provision

Shall help in formulation of
Board-governed annual plan. This would lead to good governance

Board may alter such plan based
on recommendation of CSR Committee

7

CSR expenditure

Board to ensure administrative overheads
not to exceed 5% of total CSR expenditure for financial year

Contribution to corpus, expenditure on
CSR projects approved by Board on recommendation of CSR Committee, excluding
items not falling under Schedule VII

New provisions and welcome ones

This was required as corporates
necessarily need to incur some administrative expenses

Surplus from CSR activities not to be treated as business profit and
be ploughed back in same project or transferred to Unspent CSR
Account
and spent as per policy and annual action plan or transfer to
Fund
within 6 months from the end of financial year

New provision

Shall benefit the corporates in
smoothening their cash flow and also compliance of the CSR provision

Excess amount spent shall be set off within 3
succeeding financial years subject to conditions (i.e., surplus
arising out of CSR activities shall not be considered and Board of the
company shall pass a resolution to that effect)

New provision

Shall benefit the corporates in
smoothening their cash flow and also compliance of the CSR provision

CSR amount may be spent for creation
/ acquisition of capital asset to be held in the manner prescribed

 

8

CSR reporting

Companies with average CSR
obligation of Rs. 10 crores or more in 3 preceding years to undertake impact
assessment
through an independent agency for projects of Rs. 1 crore or
more which have been completed not less than 1 year before the impact study

No corresponding provision

New provision

Will lead to good governance

The report to be placed before the
Board
and in the Annual Report of CSR

Company may book the expenditure
towards CSR which shall not exceed 5% of total CSR expenditure or Rs. 50
lakhs, whichever is less

9

Display of CSR activities on website

Company to disclose composition of CSR Committee,
CSR Policy and projects approved by the Board

Company to disclose the contents of the
CSR policy

 

10

Format for Annual Report on CSR

New format inserted for disclosure to be included in the Board’s
Report

No corresponding provision

Procedural, to clarify the definitions
and meanings

2(b)

Meaning of administrative overheads

General management and administrative
expenditure, excluding direct expenses towards a particular project

No corresponding provision

2(d)

Meaning of CSR activities

Excludes sponsorship activities for deriving market benefits for its
products

As per Schedule VII

2(f)

Meaning of CSR Policy

Definition amended to widen the scope
of Committee to recommend formulation of annual action plan

2(g)

Meaning of international Org.

As defined u/s 3 of UN (Privileges and
Immunities) Act

No corresponding provision

2(i)

Meaning of ongoing project

Project already commenced, multi-year
project, i.e., not less than 1 year but not exceeding 3 years

No corresponding provision

2(j)

Meaning of public authority

As defined under the RTI Act

No corresponding provision

6

CSR Policy

Omitted

List of CSR projects which a company
plans to undertake and monitoring process

This provision was omitted as the
provision relating to annual plan has been introduced

5. Impact Analysis
(I) The new rules will give the corporates thenecessary flexibility in spending in case of ongoing projects.
(II) Those corporates that are unable to spend for any reason will be able to comply with the rules if they transfer the amount to a special Fund
(III) The new rules will bring in more transparency and will involve experts in impact analysis.
(IV) The quality of governance through the Board will be a notch higher
(V) The reporting and disclosure will improve.

ERRATA
We regret that in the BCAJ issue dated January, 2021 (Vol. 52-B, Part 4), certain inadvertent errors have crept in on three different pages. In all cases, lines / cross-headings that should have been deleted have appeared with a ruling line across them. On Page 5, the lines ‘Since we all try to avoid… feel negative emotions’, have a ruling line across them. Similarly, one line on Page 30 and six lines on Page 31 also have ruling lines across them.
The errors are sincerely regretted

STRATEGY: THE HEART OF BUSINESS – PART I

Every business, every entity designs and pursues a strategy or multiple strategies to deliver its purpose. Crafting and, more importantly, successfully executing strategies is at the heart of running and growing great businesses. Strategy is the path to winning. In this two-part series, I will share some key approaches and methods which helped me over the years in accomplishing this critical aspect of a CEO’s role and mission, i.e., delivering sustainable long-term value for all stakeholders.

The broad elements of establishing a successful enterprise are depicted below (Figure 1):

At the core is setting the Vision and Strategy. The delivery mechanism is enabled through a robust process framework. This will need to encompass many critical dimensions such as being customer-driven, innovation-led, focusing on environment, health and safety, as well as upholding sustainability. A customer-focused entity strives to understand and meet the current and future needs. While delighting customers is the goal, the business should also endeavour not to dissatisfy patrons. Innovation can come through new technologies on products or in processes or people-oriented or even in the business model. The organisation will need to embed a culture of continuously improving all its activities challenging the status quo relentlessly. Sustainability and EHS should feature at the centre of all its actions. Above all, these are made possible by the people and hence talent management is important.

Each of these is an important subject in its own right. In this article I will explore some key elements pertaining to the two critical components of strategy, (i) Strategy Planning, and (ii) Strategy Deployment, and share some points on the planning dimension.

Any enterprise is guided by its Vision, Mission and Values (VMV). The first crucial framework which needs to be in place is this VMV which the enterprise stands for and lives by. VMV is articulated and communicated extensively so that not only are the employees clear about the direction of the organisation, but all the external stakeholders also know the fundamental purpose of the enterprise that they are engaging with.

Setting the VMV:
The Vision and Mission convey the raison d’être or the purpose of the enterprise. The Values are the fundamental tenets around which the enterprise conducts its affairs and are expected to be upheld at all times. While evaluating core partnerships or even acquisitions, VMV, therefore, is often the first parameter to be assessed in terms of compatibility between the conducting units. In Figure 2, a method of creating the VMV is depicted in a self-explanatory manner:

Some of the advantages that I have experienced in adopting this process are as follows:

(1)    Seeking inputs from all stakeholders gives different perspectives about their views of the business as well as expectations from the enterprise. Not only does this give a 360-degree view but also helps in eliminating blind spots which can be there in an internal exercise;

(2)    Doing a brainstorming session with the senior leadership team as well as middle management is a valuable exercise. In such intense sessions, often there is introspection of the opportunities and competencies of the enterprise which gives leads on the direction to take. Seeking external expert assistance to hold such sessions is fruitful to make the discussions even more extensive;

(3)    Sharing the initial output across the units in a capsulated form can engage the team from across the enterprise. Inputs received can be evaluated at the centre and necessary modifications can be made enhancing the quality of the output. This also has immense value in making the VMV a co-created exercise;

(4)    Finally, once the VMV is approved by the Board, a detailed communication programme is essential. Every word in the VMV is explained and the whole thrust of the organisation is shared and clarified to every team member.

The VMV once set may not change frequently, but it is not cast in stone. Such a comprehensive exercise is undertaken periodically, say once in three or four years, to incorporate the dynamic nature of business.

Strategy Planning Process:
Flowing from the VMV will be the next critical task of setting the Strategic Goal or Target, and crafting the Strategy. The strategy planning process (SPP) can be with both short and long-term perspectives. In the short term this is also aligned to the year’s business and operating plan or budget. The elements in building the SPP are diagrammatically represented in Figure 3 (right).

A word on each of the key steps:
a)    The approach is to blend both the outside-in and the inside-out outlooks of the business. So inputs are sought from the various stakeholders on the different aspects of the business as well as their needs and expectations of performance;

b) Environment scanning using PESTLE dimensions of political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental outlooks is performed to judge the context for the strategy;

c) Coupled with this is the internal assessment of SWOT in terms of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. The enterprise also judges its core competencies so as to play from a position of power;

d) Put together, the above leads to a definition of the opportunity and throws up both strategic challenges and strategic advantages as well. A good way is to encapsulate the strategic target in terms of a quantified crisp goal or an inspiring statement. This helps immensely in communicating the strategic objective to the team and for a common engagement to go for an aligned purpose. For example, the call for a ‘5 trillion economy by 25’, ‘India Shining’, etc.

e) At this juncture, it is also important to specify the customer segments or markets which are targeted. The analysis of SWOT, core competencies and competitive positions will also lead to what would be the offering or the customer value proposition which brings about a differentiation in the marketplace. This is at the crux of strategy planning – the decision of what we want to be and equally what we do not want to be. Strategy is all about making a choice;

f) Thereafter strategic initiatives are thought out clubbing two of these elements. For example, SO – how do we leverage our strengths to tap into the opportunities, etc. (vide Figure 4; next page);

g) From these lists the next step would be to prioritise the ones to be taken up in terms of time dimensions and ease of execution;

h) These can be woven into the four perspectives to form a balanced scorecard;

i) A Strategy Map1 can be prepared which encapsulates the entire strategy flow across the perspectives and highlights the strategic actions as well;

j) This will lead to individual projects both at the company level as also at individual or functional levels2.

Creating the connect:
For any strategy or plan to succeed, the most critical element is to get across the connect with people. It is important that every team member not only knows his or her work plan but also is clear on how this connects with the larger goal of the function / department as well as that of the enterprise. This is fundamental to get a high engagement of each employee who will approach work with great interest as the significance of the tasks becomes clear.

A great way to bring in a structured connect is by using the Strategy Deployment Matrix (SDM). A pictorial representation of SDM is given in Figure 5 (at right). The SDM provides a link between the enterprise priorities and the individual department’s goals or actions. Furthermore,it brings together the department goals with thedifferent projects planned to deliver those goals. Alongside, the projects are connected with the team members who are part of the different projects. This also facilitates the time planning for each team member who is associated with the projects. With these, the SDM provides a fine alignment of the individual’s tasks / time with the projects designed to deliver departmental goals which itself is aligned to the enterprise priorities. So the SDM in a single matrix provides a clear picture of how all of it is well aligned to move in an integrated, coordinated manner.

Strategy, the dominant success factor:
A strategic approach is essential for a structured delivery of growth in business. It is important that the strategy flows from the larger aspirations of the enterprise and is also carved out in time dimensions of short and long term. While a strategy construct emanates from having a normal view of things, the environment now is volatile and ever changing. A number of disruptors, too, can emerge in a short span of time3. It is therefore necessary that strategies are also prepared to meet different contexts. A scenario planning exercise with appropriate strategies is also necessary.

The strategic plan is created to seize opportunities and its execution is important as well. This equation is pictorially represented in Figure 6.

Finally, a good Strategy is the heart of running and changing a winning business.


References

  1. Strategy Maps: Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton
  2. Excel in what you do: Pg. 20,BCAJ, August, 2020
  3. Governance & Internal Controls: The Touchstone of Sustainable Business – Part II: Disruptions Pg. 13,BCAJ, June, 2020

PODCASTING – THE NOVEL MODE OF STORYTELLING FOR YOUR PROFESSIONAL BRAND

When it comes to knowledge-sharing by professionals, we have three options at present:

1)    Written form: Books, articles, etc.,
2)    Video form: YouTube channels, preparing videos that give information, and
3)    Audio form: Podcasting, pre-recorded messages.

While the first two forms are quite common, Audio Form Podcasting has been gaining in popularity of late. Writing articles is not easy but the more difficult part in today’s time is to find people who read! Videos have an edge over the written form but the creation of videos can be quite expensive and time-consuming. Further, in videos the focus has to be on the appearance of the person, lights, backgrounds, animation and so on. This is the reason why the third alternative, Podcasting, is gaining ground in knowledge-sharing. With ‘Smart Speakers’ like Alexa, Google Home, Apple Homepod, etc., finding their way into our day-to-day lives, Podcasts are gaining acceptance in the same way that FM radio did in the 2000s.

A human voice speaks louder and adds much more meaning through tone and inflection than the printed form. The journey from radio to Podcasts has marked a full circle. The radio was superseded by television, television by cable, cable by internet videos and, with technological advancement, internet videos are now at par with Podcasts. Podcasting, thus, represents a new platform for story-telling.

According to survey reports by Stitcher, an average Podcast listener stays connected for 22 minutes daily. This is one reason why including Podcasting in your digital branding strategy will prove to be beneficial. Podcasts give you an opportunity to build a deep, personalised and rich relationship with your target audience. With smart speakers, the music apps supporting and aiding Podcasts, people prefer to listen to Podcasts quite frequently while doing other work instead of holding a phone in their hands or sitting in front of their screens to watch a video – or holding a book and reading it. Of course, videos and books have their own advantages, but Podcasting is creating and filling a niche.

UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS PODCASTING

When you search for it on Wikipedia, this is what it says, ‘A Podcast is an episodic series of spoken word digital audio files that a user can download to a personal device for easy listening’. Streaming applications and Podcasting services provide a convenient and integrated way to manage a personal consumption queue across many Podcast sources and playback devices.

When we talk about our profession, the most commonly accepted meaning of Podcast is a collection of audio calls or audio messages. It’s as simple as it sounds. A consultant / professional generally answers clients’ calls every now and then, explaining various concepts without clients’ queries and interruptions. To make life easier and to save on time and energy, the recorded version of such explanations / advisories can be converted to Podcasts and uploaded.

Now imagine someone calls you and asks, what is ‘Seamless ITC’ under GST? All you need to do is share the link to the Podcast uploaded by you and ask them to clarify their doubts. This also does some branding for you because the person may share it with others who may have the same query. Podcasts have an edge over videos and books because these can be heard while travelling by train or driving a car. One may not have to take out special time for the same.

HOW TO START A PODCAST

Podcasting in general terms is simple – recording an audio and uploading it on some platform which can be accessed by a subscriber of that particular service. For example, JioSaavn Music, Gaana and other music apps have started their Podcast services, too. The most commonly used hosts these days are Spotify and Anchor FM.

The following quick steps may help you to plan your Podcast:
* Come up with a concept (a topic, name, format and target length for each episode; for example, you can start with a series of topics on GST);
* Design an artwork and write a description to ‘brand’ your Podcast;
* Record and edit your audio files (such as MP3s). A microphone is recommended;
* Find a place to host them (as mentioned above, you may begin with Spotify); and
* Upload your Podcast on these platforms and the rest will be taken care of.

Now that we know what is Podcasting, let us deep-dive into some FAQs:

(1) What are the equipments / software required for a podcast?

As a beginner, you can start even with the mobile phone record option. Find a place where there is no external noise and disturbance and keep your mobile on ‘Airplane Mode’ so that your recording is not disturbed by calls / notifications.

Nevertheless, this may not suffice if you want to start recording at a professional level. For that we recommend that you use the following tools to the extent possible:

Microphone

The foremost piece of equipment you’ll require is a microphone. You may opt for a set that includes the microphone, a durable steel housing and a broadcast arm that keeps the mic off the table, etc. The good news is that apart from the normal recorder, Playstore, IOS stores and web browsers also have special recording applications / websites (Spreaker Studio, Anchor, Podbean, SoundCloud) which may assist you in having a really good Podcast recorded using a very basic mic (maybe the mic of your headphone). You may choose either of these at the beginner level. Having tried both, we can vouch that both work well provided you pick a quiet place for recording.

Headphones

A set of noise-cancelling headphones is advisable instead of normal headphones once you start recording regularly. A successful Podcast is less about pricey equipment and more about the experience you provide to your listeners. So we do not recommend higher spending on these equipments to start with, but once you are a regular, noise-cancelling headphones will help in better hearing and can help you provide better sound quality for upload.

Recording and editing software

Most of the Podcast creators use Garageband (for Mac Users) or Audacity (for Windows), which turn your laptop or tablet into a full-fledged recording studio. Both these companies offer free versions of their software which lets you record live audio, edit files, change the speed / pitch of your recordings, cut and splice, and output your Podcast to a digital sound file. You need good software as Podcasts cannot be like a normal phone call where you just start speaking on content and end after 30 to 60 minutes. When you start recording, you will realise that there will be a need for Intro Music, Background noise editing, lots of cuts and retakes. Good software ensures that all these things are mixed in a way that a Podcast sounds like an uninterrupted recording.

(2) How long should your Podcast be?

This question may arise to everyone planning to begin Podcasting. To answer this, we did reach out to people and also had surveys; and what we concluded was: Podcasts should be as long as they need to be! But since this doesn’t answer the basic FAQ, here are a few tips that you may keep in mind while considering the length of your Podcast. The length should ideally depend on the frequency of uploading. So here is a tip that we wish to share:
(i) If you plan to Podcast once or twice a week or month, the length can be 60 minutes or more; and
(ii) If you plan to Podcast daily, the length should be between five and 15 minutes.

However, the ideal length that a normal user may want to listen to a Podcast will be 20 to 25 minutes. Remember the 30-minute daily soap operas on TV? They used to run on the same psychology and that’s why there used to be a lot of series that used to run for half an hour daily.

(3) What should be the structure of the Podcast?

All Podcasts no matter what they are about, who makes them, how they are made or their length, follow three structures:

(a) Interview or Q&A structure:

This is by far the most popular structure of Podcasts. This is as simple as it sounds and requires less time for preparation. All you need to do is start interviews on specific topics or have a candid chat with industry leaders in a Q&A format. We have seen people calling leaders on Podcasts while they ask them candid questions like – what made you think you wish to practice GST, what advice would you like to give our fellow professionals, etc. A tip to share here – you may also consider having an interview with someone who can guide fellow professionals on the importance of mental and physical health.

This structure works as a branding for both the interviewer and the interviewee.

(b) Educational structure:

This is a series of Podcasts where you cover a topic which educates the listeners. The topic could be technical or non-technical. To begin with, you may consider having a series of educational Podcasts on Ind AS covering all the Ind AS’s in different segments. For this structure, some time and efforts have to be put in for preparing the content.

(c) Entertaining structure:
Again, this is a kind of series which is slowly gaining ground. In such a series, you may just call people from the same profession and talk about something which may entertain the listeners. You may have a series where you cover ‘Financial Lessons to be learnt from Bollywood Movies!’ or something like ‘Management Lessons to be learnt from Mahabharat!’ You may also just want to call people and explore their hidden talent and reveal to the listeners how fellow professionals could also be singers or comedians.

Irrespective of the structure that you choose, there are still some basics that you should cover in every Podcast: An intro, one key takeaway from the Podcast, a call to action, a thank you or a shout-out and closing remarks.

(4) What are the basic steps in publishing a Podcast?

Have a Podcast cover art design
While this may sound bizarre, a cover art will make a difference to listeners. We have often read and been taught ‘Don’t Judge A Book By Its Cover’. But it’s crazy how we always judge a book by its cover! So think about it – there are a series of Podcasts shown when someone searches, say, Podcasts by CAs; but one factor because of which a listener may choose your Podcast is your cover art. Here are some quick tips to consider while designing the cover art for your Podcast – 1/4th text, originality, lovely colour schemes and images that speak about the topic.

How to publish your podcast on Apple, Spotify, Google, etc.
This is the most interesting part about Podcasting. Unlike YouTube or Instagram, where you can directly upload a video or go live and have your content on its channel, Podcasting works differently. Currently, Google, Apple Podcasts or even Apps like JioSaavn, etc., do have a space for Podcasts but they do not allow users to upload content directly. You need a Host for your Podcast, for example, Anchor.fm, when you upload your Podcast the same will be published on the platform and from the Host it will be distributed to all the Podcast providers and based on its AI and other aspects, they will show it on their platforms.

(5) What after the Podcast is published?

Once the Podcast is published, you may consider sending a link of the same to your newsletters list, update it on your social media accounts like Twitter / LinkedIn, send a broadcast on WhatsApp, attach the link in your email signature and, lastly, ask your colleagues to share it. You can also get regular subscribers to your post on Podcasting and you can interact with them.

So far we have seen how and why Podcasting is needed to expand your professional brand, but if you are still not convinced, the following benefits may convince you to start your series:

The benefits of Podcasting


There are a variety of reasons for firms to Podcast regularly these days. The most common motivation is generating awareness about the firm, engagement and thought leadership. There are more altruistic reasons as well, which may include sharing information / insights or creating an online community. Regardless of your motivation or objective, Podcasting can provide reliable results to expand a brand for your firm. An important point to note here is that there is no violation of the Code of Ethics since we are not in any way targeting to solicit clients. Our aim in Podcasting our series should be knowledge-sharing and expanding the brand value for the firm.

If you’re still unsure whether Podcasting is right for your firm, answer the following questions:
* Are you looking to build a relationship between your firm and your audience?
* Do you have valuable information to share?
* Are you able and willing to talk about your expertise on a regular basis?
* Do you want your firm to have recognition worldwide?

If you answered yes to one or more of the above questions, then Podcasting is something that you may just want to begin.

DAUGHTER’S RIGHT IN COPARCENARY – PART VI

I am overwhelmed that my articles on the subject have evinced considerable interest. The amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘the Act’) by the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 (‘the Amendment Act’) and the issue of daughters’ right in coparcenary property have now been the subject matter of substantial litigation all over the country. Through my articles published in the BCAJ in January, 2009; May, 2010; November, 2011; February, 2016; and May, 2018, I made an attempt to analyse and explain the legal position as per the various cases decided by several High Courts and by the Supreme Court of India.

It cannot be disputed that the amendments were beneficial to society and a step towards ensuring equality between males and females in an HUF. However, in view of the imprecise language of the Amendment Act and lack of clarity about what exactly was intended by the Legislature, the amendment was the subject matter of a plethora of court cases all over the country and ultimately some cases went up to the Supreme Court.

In view of the cases decided by the Supreme Court till then, my article published in February, 2016 expressed a hope that the legal position then explained was final. Unfortunately, further decisions came from the Supreme Court. I say unfortunately because as explained in my last article published in May, 2018, confusion was created by two different decisions of the Supreme Court and I had to end the article with the fervent hope that the Apex Court would review its decisions to resolve the conflict.

I am glad to note that the Supreme Court has now tried to resolve the conflict in its recent decision in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma and others, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 1.

The confusion created by the Supreme Court can be explained in brief as under:

‘The Supreme Court in the case of Sheela Devi vs. Lal Chand [(2006), 8 SCC 581] held that the Amendment Act would have no application in a case where succession was opened in 1989, when the father had passed away. In the case of Eramma vs. Veerupana (AIR 1966 SC 1880), the Supreme Court held that the succession is considered to have opened on the death of a person. Following that principle in the case of Sheela Devi (Supra), the father passed away in 1989 and it was held that the Amendment Act which came into force in September, 2005 would have no application’.

Based on this, the Madras High Court applied the decision to other cases.

Even in the case of Prakash vs. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36 which was decided in 2016, the Supreme Court held that ‘the rights under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born’.

Thus, there is a plethora of cases deciding that the father of the claiming daughter should be alive if the daughter makes a claim in the coparcenary property. Moreover, it is necessary that the male Hindu should have been alive on the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act. Thus, at that stage the legal position was that the rights of a daughter under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Consequently, I closed my February, 2016 article with the hope that this final legal position would prevail without any further complications.

Unfortunately, this did not happen and in the case of Danamma vs. Amar (2018) 3 SCC 342 the Supreme Court held differently. The principle laid down in earlier cases was not followed and (without considering its own decision in the case of Sheela Devi) it was held that a daughter would have a share even if her father was not alive on the date of coming into force of the Amendment Act. This decision caused confusion. In my June, 2018 article I could end only by expressing the fervent hope that the Apex Court would review its decision in the Danamma case so that the apparent conflict is resolved without resulting in further litigation. Both these decisions were re-ordered by a Bench of two judges. Later, it was decided to refer the issue to a larger Bench.

Therefore, it is heartening to note that the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, after considering all previous decisions, including some High Court cases, has now taken a view which possibly settles all the confusion created earlier and lays down the law which is now final and binding on all. In the recent case of Vineeta Sharma (Supra), the Supreme Court has overruled its earlier decision in the cases of Prakash vs. Phulavati and partly overruled the Danamma decision of interpretation of the Amendment Act.

The final legal position as emerging from this decision can be summarised as follows:
(i) A daughter of a coparcener who is living as on9th September, 2005 shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as a son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she would have been a son;
(ii) This position applies regardless of when such daughter is born;
(iii) It is not necessary that the father on account of whom a daughter gets a right should be alive.

Hopefully, this closes the chapter of controversies regarding the interpretation of the Amendment Act. I can only express the wish that the legal ingenuity of lawyers does not extend to raising any new issues and allows the final legal position to stand.

IS BIG TECH CARTELISING AGAINST INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY?

Few weeks back, WhatsApp called out users to either accept their new policy or get bumped off. A while ago, the sitting US President was de-platformed from Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. Around the same time, Amazon servers took off websites that they felt violated their policies. Google and Apple took the Parler app off their platform.
Big tech companies are monopolies, or rather megapolies (if one can coin that word to include size). Governments and users consent to and tolerate mega techs to get away with privacy and security issues. Politicians benefit from these platforms, shareholders make money from them and users fall for free services.
In the case of POTUS, the de-platforming is not an issue but permanent de-platforming is. No right to appeal is an issue. The lack of identity of these companies is a problem. (Google calls itself a marketing company, like the Big Four firms call themselves audit firms as and when it suits them!) Hiding identity and masquerading makes it all the more difficult to put a finger on wrongdoing.
Big tech today has the power to decide who has the right to assemble digitally and who has the right to speak digitally and what they can say. But when tech companies act together – either explicitly or sequentially and ‘embolden each other’ – it seems more like a cartel. Imagine if all these companies had converted free services into paid, people would have been up in arms, but not so when it concerns our civil liberties. What happened in the last few months is a kind of signalling.
More important was the subject matter – free speech and its control. We are made to believe that these are private companies. Well, if you get bumped out of one service provider, you can go elsewhere. But can free speech be privatised in a global townhall? Big tech normally talks big about freedom of speech and the like. In practice it’s not so! Add to it the leftist bias amongst those who farm the content, as already admitted by a tech honcho. This bias makes platforms more spacious for only one type of ideology. Effectively, if a cartel takes a coordinated decision, it is like a government decision and you just can’t contest it.
Free markets and capitalism have a wild and wicked side on which monopolies thrive. And the winner takes all. Can private companies disconnect your phone? Can they censor your speech? There is a difference between being a platform / medium and having editorial rights. I remember one government handle blocked me for voicing my opposing views and concerns. But do I have effective free speech rights on private platforms against a government handle? No!
Today, there is little one can do to protect these issues from monopolistic practices and especially from a free speech protection perspective. Even America doesn’t have much in its legal framework.
Big tech has taken over much of the competition. There are very few options to choose from. Should some of these services be treated as essential services and be paid for? Should there be an unbiased redressal mechanism? Do we need laws to deal with a specific situation like India just announced last week?
Tech corporations want people to live by rules and standards or community guidelines. But whose standard should be ‘the standard’? We don’t know! However, we do know that an individual and his civil liberties alone can be the centre point. An Individual is and should remain the sovereign. The time has come for an Online Bill of Rights so that no one can decide for us. What we have now is a situation where so many aspects of our lives are taken over by tech oligarchies without any rights!
 

Raman Jokhakar
Editor

Section 147 – Reassessment – Oversight, inadvertence or mistake of A.O. or error discovered by him on reconsideration of same material is mere change of opinion and does not give him power to reopen a concluded assessment

7. Dell India (P) Ltd. vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore [Writ Appeal No. 1145 of 2015, dated 27th January, 2021 (Karnataka High Court)(FB)]

Section 147 – Reassessment – Oversight, inadvertence or mistake of A.O. or error discovered by him on reconsideration of same material is mere change of opinion and does not give him power to reopen a concluded assessment

By the order dated 2nd September, 2015, a Division Bench of the Court directed that this writ appeal should be placed before the Chief Justice for considering the issue of referring the following three questions to a larger Bench. The said three questions are as under:

‘1.        Whether the Division Bench judgment in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Rinku Chakraborthy [2011] 242 ITR 425 lays down good law?

2.        Whether the judgment in Rinku Chakraborthy (Supra) is per incurium in view of the fact that it relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kalyanji Mavji & Co. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax 1976 CTR 85, which has been specifically overruled by the Apex Court in the case of Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society vs. Commissioner of Income-tax [1979] 110 ITR 996?

3.        Whether “reason to believe” in the context of section 147 of the Income-tax Act can be based on mere “change of opinion” of the A.O.?’

The scope of the adjudication is limited to deciding the three questions of law framed by the Division Bench.

The assessee company manufactures and sells computer hardware and other related products. It provides warranty services to the customers and the price of the standard warranty period is covered by the sale price of the computer hardware and other products. The assessee company also provides extended or upsell warranty which covers the period beyond the standard warranty. It charges an additional amount as consideration for this. Although the assessee company recovers the consideration for extended warranty with the price of the products along with sales tax or service tax, as the case may be, the revenue in connection with extended warranty is recognised and offered to income-tax proportionately over the period of the service contract, which spreads beyond the financial year in which the sale in relation to the product concerned is made. The assessee has adopted the ‘deferred revenue’ system under the mercantile system of accounting.

During the assessment proceedings, the A.O. examined the issue of deferred revenue by calling for details from the assessee. He agreed with the accounting system followed by the assessee as regards accounting of the consideration for extended warranty.

A notice u/s 148 was issued to the assessee. While arriving at the net revenue of Rs. 31,10,85,96,000 for the A.Y. 2009-10, reduction of Rs. 2,16,89,00,773 was made as smart debits deferred revenue account. It is alleged in the reasons that the said income of Rs. 2,16,89,00,773 had escaped assessment for the A.Y. 2009-10.

The assessee replied to the notice u/s 148 and objected to the reasons recorded. It submitted that the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment for the A.Y. 2009-10 are based on mere change of opinion and hence cannot be termed as valid reasons. It was submitted that as the A.O. has taken a different view for different assessment years, it amounts to merely a change of opinion. The Joint Commissioner of Income-tax, by a letter dated 24th February, 2015, rejected the objections raised by the assessee and directed it to appear for the reassessment proceedings for the A.Y. 2009-10.

Being aggrieved by the said notice u/s 148 and the rejection of its preliminary objections to the said notice, a writ petition was filed before the learned single Judge of the High Court. The Judge rejected the petition on the ground that there was no error in initiation of the proceedings u/s 148.

The assessee submitted that in the case Rinku Chakraborthy [2011] 242 CTR 425 the Division Bench had concluded that where an A.O. erroneously fails to tax a part of the assessable income, there is an income escaping assessment and, accordingly, the A.O. has jurisdiction u/s 147 to reopen the assessment. In doing so, it relied on the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Kalyanji Mavji and Company [1976] 1 SCC 985. It is further submitted that the observations made in the case of Kalyanji Mavji and Company (Supra) are no longer good law in their entirety, in the light of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society [1979] 4 SCC 248 where the Apex Court held that those particular observations in Kalyanji Mavji and Company did not lay down the correct position of law. In the light of the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society, it is clear that a mistake, oversight or inadvertence in assessing any income would not give the power to an A.O. to reopen the assessment by exercise of powers u/s 147. That would amount to a review, which is outside the scope of section 147.

The subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society was not brought to the notice of this Court in the case of Rinku Chakraborthy. He urged that there are specific provisions in the Act for correcting errors / mistakes such as the power of rectification u/s 154 and one cannot resort to section 147 to correct errors or to review an earlier order.

The Division Bench held that the decision in the case of Rinku Chakraborthy is based only on what is held in clause (2) of paragraph 13 of the decision in the case of Kalyanji Mavji and Company. The decision rendered in the latter case was by a Bench of two Judges. Subsequently, a larger Bench of three Judges in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society has clearly held that oversight, inadvertence or mistake of the A.O. or error discovered by him on the reconsideration of the same material does not give him power to reopen a concluded assessment. It was expressly held that the decision in the case of Kalyanji Mavji and Company on this aspect does not lay down the correct law. The decision in the case of Rinku Chakraborthy is based solely on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kalyanji Mavji and Company and in particular what is held in clause (2) of paragraph 13. The said part is held as not a good law by a subsequent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society.

The second question was answered in the affirmative, in view of the consistent decisions of the Apex Court holding that ‘reason to believe’ in the context of section 147 cannot be based on mere change of opinion of the A.O.

The third question was answered in the negative. The Court observed that in view of settled law, framing of question No. 3 was not warranted at all.

DEDUCTION FOR CONTRIBUTION BY EMPLOYER TO SPECIFIED FUNDS – SECTION 40A(9)

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
For an employer, staff welfare expense is normally an allowable business deduction under section 36 or 37 in computing his income under the head ‘Profits and Gains of Business or Profession’. However, the allowability of business deductions is restricted by the provisions of section 40A. Section 40A(9), inserted by the Finance Act, 1984 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1980, provides that no deduction shall be allowed in respect of any sum paid by the assessee as an employer towards the setting up or formation of, or as contribution to, any fund, trust, company, AOP, BOI, society or other institution for any purpose. Exceptions are provided, for permitting deductions, for payment of contributions to specified funds being recognised provident fund, approved superannuation fund, approved gratuity fund and towards a pension scheme referred to in section 80CCD [i.e., sums paid for the purposes and to the extent provided by or under clauses (iv), (iva) or (v) of section 36(1)], or for payments required by or under any other law.

The issue has come up before the High Courts as to whether all contributions to funds, other than those specified, are hit by the embargo of section 40A(9) leading to disallowance of expenditure, or whether the provisions for disallowance apply only to funds which merely accumulate and do not spend such contributions on staff welfare. While the Kerala High Court has taken the view that in terms of section 40A(9) the payment of contributions would be disallowed where the contribution is to a fund other than the specified funds, the Bombay and Karnataka High Courts have taken a more liberal view, holding that the prohibition does not apply to contributions to genuine funds and the deduction would be allowed irrespective of section 40A.

ASPINWALL & CO.’S CASE

The issue had come up before the Kerala High Court in the case of Aspinwall and Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT 295 ITR 533.

In this case, pertaining to assessment years 1990-91, 1991-92 and another year post assessment year 1980-81, the assessee had made a contribution to the Executive Staff Provident Fund, which was not a recognised provident fund, and claimed a deduction for such contribution. Such contribution had been allowed to it as a deduction u/s 37 for A.Y. 1979-80 by the Kerala High Court vide its decision reported in 194 ITR 739, and also for A.Y. 1977-78 by the Kerala High Court in a decision reported in 204 ITR 225 u/s 36(1)(iv), following its own earlier decision. The A.O. had disallowed such contribution.

The assessee contended before the Kerala High Court that in view of the decisions of the High Court in the earlier years in its own cases, it was entitled to get deduction for the amount paid to the unrecognised provident fund u/s 36(1)(iv) or (v), or in the alternative u/s 37. On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that the earlier decisions of the Kerala High Court would not apply to the assessment years in question in view of the insertion of sub-section (9) to section 40A with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1980.

The Kerala High Court analysed the provisions of section 40A(9) to hold that after the insertion of sub-section (9), no deduction be allowed in respect of any sum paid by the assessee as an employer towards contribution to a provident fund, except where such amount was paid for the contribution to a recognised provident fund and for the purposes of and to the extent provided by or u/s 36(1)(iv). The High Court noted that section 37(1) was a general provision which stated that any expenditure, other than of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee, laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession, was to be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’. According to the High Court, in view of the provisions of section 40A(9), no deduction could be allowed in respect of any sum paid towards contribution to a provident fund by taking recourse to the residuary section 37(1).

The Kerala High Court analysed the Explanatory Notes to the Finance Act, 1984 in relation to section 40A(9) to hold that the intention of the Legislature was to deny the deduction in respect of sums paid by the assessee as employer towards contribution to any fund, trust, company, etc., for any purposes, except to a recognised fund and that, too, within the limits laid down under the relevant provisions. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Sajjan Mills Ltd. vs. CIT 156 ITR 585, where the Supreme Court had held that unless the conditions laid down in section 40A(7) were fulfilled, a deduction could not be allowed on general principles under any other provisions of the Act relating to computation of income under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’, the Kerala High Court held that section 40A had to be given effect to, notwithstanding anything contained in sections 30 to 39 of the Act, and
in view of that no deduction could be allowed in respect of any contribution towards an unrecognised provident fund.

The Kerala High Court noted that the deduction u/s 36(1)(iv) was subject to the prescribed limits, which limits had been laid down in Rules 75, 87 and 88 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. Section 40A(9) referred to the purposes and the extent provided by or u/s 36(1)(iv), and therefore only such amounts, within the prescribed limits, could be allowed as a deduction.

The Kerala High Court, therefore, held that no deduction could be allowed u/s 37(1) in respect of contribution to the unrecognised provident fund, having regard to the provisions of section 40A(9).

This decision of the Kerala High Court was followed again by the Kerala High Court in the case of TCM Ltd. vs. CIT 196 Taxman 129 (Ker), where the issue related to the deduction for a contribution to an Employees’ Welfare Fund.

STATE BANK OF INDIA’S CASE

The issue came up again recently before the Bombay High Court in the case of Pr. CIT vs. State Bank of India 420 ITR 376.

In this case, the assessee claimed expenditure of Rs. 50 lakhs incurred towards contribution to a fund created for the welfare of its retired employees. The A.O. disallowed such expenditure, invoking the provisions of section 40A(9).

The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim, observing that the assessee had made such contribution to a fund for the medical benefits specially envisaged for the retired employees of the bank. In the opinion of the Tribunal, section 40A(9) was inserted to discourage the practice of creation of bogus funds and not to disallow the general expenditure incurred for welfare of the employees. The Tribunal also noted that the A.O. had not doubted the bona fides of the assessee in creation of the fund, and that such fund was not controlled by the assessee. Proceeding on the basis that the A.O. and the Commissioner (Appeals) had not doubted the bona fides in creation of the trust and that the expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for the employees, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and deleted the disallowance.

The Bombay High Court, on appeal by the Revenue, analysed the provisions of section 40A(9) to hold that the case of the assessee did not fall in any of the clauses of section 36(1) mentioned in section 40A(9), i.e., clauses (iv), (iva) or (v). It referred to the provisions of the Explanatory Memorandum and the Notes to the Finance Act, 1984 when section 40A(9) was introduced to hold that the purpose of inserting sub-section (9) in section 40A was not to discourage the general expenditure by an employer for the welfare activities of the employees. The Bombay High Court was of the view that the purpose of insertion of section 40A(9) was to restrict the claim of expenditure by the employers towards contribution to funds, trust, association of persons, etc., which were wholly discretionary and which did not impose any restriction or condition for expending such funds, which had possibility of misdirecting or misuse of such funds after the employer claimed benefit of deduction thereof. Basically, according to the Bombay High Court, the inserted provision was not meant to hit the allowance of the general expenditure by an employer for the welfare and the benefit of the employees.

The Court placed reliance on its earlier decisions in the cases of CIT vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 252 ITR 43 where a donation to a club created for social, cultural and recreational activities of its members was allowed, by holding the expenditure to be on staff welfare activity; CIT vs. Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. 261 Taxman 251, where contributions to various clubs and facilities meant for use by staff and their family members were held allowable; and Pr. CIT vs. Indian Oil Corporation, ITA No. 1765 of 2016, where expenditure on setting up or providing grant-in-aid to Kendriya Vidyalaya Schools where children of staff of the assessee would receive education, was held to be allowable as a deduction.

The Bombay High Court in the case was not asked to examine or consider the ratio of the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Aspinwall Ltd. (Supra) and the said decision remains to be dissented with. In fact, the Court relied on another decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of PCIT vs. Travancore Cochin Chemicals Ltd. 243 ITR 284 to support its action to allow the deduction. It held that the contribution to a fund for the healthcare of retired employees was an allowable deduction and was not disallowable u/s 40A(9).

A similar view was also taken by the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Motor Industries Co. Ltd. 226 Taxman 41, where the Court held that the contribution made by the assessee towards a benevolent fund created for the benefit of its employees was entitled to deduction, notwithstanding section 40A(9), though there was no compulsion under any other law for making such contribution. The Karnataka High Court relied on its earlier decision in the case of the same assessee, in ITA 3 of 2002 dated 2nd November, 2007. Such contribution was made pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding embodying the terms of a settlement arrived at between the management and employees of the company.

OBSERVATIONS


It is interesting to note that both the Kerala as well as the Bombay High Courts relied on the same Explanatory Memorandum to the Finance Act, 1984 explaining the rationale behind introduction of sub-section (9) in section 40A, for arriving at diametrically opposite conclusions. The Explanatory Notes read as under:

(ix) Imposition of restrictions on contributions by employers to non-statutory funds.
16.1 Sums contributed by an employer to a recognised provident fund, an approved superannuation fund and an approved gratuity fund are deducted in computing his taxable profits. Expenditure actually incurred on the welfare of employees is also allowed as deduction. Instances have come to notice where certain employers have created irrevocable trusts, ostensibly for the welfare of employees, and transferred to such trusts substantial amounts by way of contribution. Some of these trusts have been set up as discretionary trusts with absolute discretion to the trustees to utilise the trust property in such manner as they may think fit for the benefit of the employees without any scheme or safeguards for the proper disbursement of these funds. Investment of trust funds has also been left to the complete discretion of the trustees. Such trusts are, therefore, intended to be used as a vehicle for tax avoidance by claiming deduction in respect of such contributions, which may even flow back to the employer in the form of deposits or investment in shares, etc.
16.2 With a view to discouraging creation of such trusts, funds, companies, association of persons, societies, etc., the Finance Act has provided that no deduction shall be allowed in the computation of taxable profits in respect of any sums paid by the assessee as an employer towards the setting up or formation of or as contribution to any fund, trust, company, association of persons, body of individuals, or society or any other institution for any purpose, except where such sum is paid or contributed (within the limits laid down under the relevant provisions) to a recognised provident fund or an approved gratuity fund or an approved superannuation fund or for the purposes of and to the extent required by or under any other law.
16.3 With a view to avoiding litigation regarding the allowability of claims for deduction in respect of contributions made in recent years to such trusts, etc., the amendment has been made retrospectively from 1st April, 1980. However, in order to avoid hardship in cases where such trusts, funds, etc., had, before 1st March, 1984, bona fide incurred expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure) wholly and exclusively for the welfare of the employees of the assessee out of the sums contributed by him, such expenditure will be allowed as deduction in computing the taxable profits of the assessee in respect of the relevant accounting year in which such expenditure has been so incurred, as if such expenditure had been incurred by the assessee. The effect of the underlined words will be that the deduction under this provision would be subject to the other provisions of the Act, as for instance, section 40A(5), which would operate to the same extent as they would have operated had such expenditure been incurred by the assessee directly. Deduction under this provision will be allowed only if no deduction has been allowed to the assessee in an earlier year in respect of the sum contributed by him to such trust, fund, etc.’

The Kerala High Court interpreted the Memorandum to mean that the intention of the Legislature was to deny the deduction in respect of the sums paid by the assessee to all funds, trusts, AOPs, etc., other than those specified in section 36(1)(iv), (iva) and (v), while the Bombay High Court understood it to mean that the inserted provision applied only to trusts which were discretionary, with possibility of misdirection or misuse of such contributions, and not applicable to any genuine expenditure.

The intention of the Legislature behind the amendment may be gathered from paragraph 16.1 of the Explanatory Notes, where the types of cases of misuse sought to be plugged have been set out. The amendment is intended to apply in cases where the employer had discretion in utilisation of funds and in investment of funds without any safeguards, and which could be used as tools of tax avoidance by claiming deduction in respect of such contributions, which could flow back to the employer in the form of deposits or investment in shares, etc. It was certainly not intended to apply to genuine staff welfare trusts, where the amount of contributions was expended on staff welfare, where the contribution was really in the nature of staff welfare expenses. Clearly, the amendment was not targeted to curtail the allowance of staff welfare expenditure but only to curb misuse of claim for deduction of a payment disguised as staff welfare expenditure, of amounts not intended to be spent on staff welfare expenditure.

The Kerala High Court itself, in CIT vs. Travancore Cochin Chemicals Ltd. 243 ITR 284, while considering a payment towards proportionate share of expenses of assessee for running of a school wherein children of the assessee’s employees were studying, had held that such expenditure was expenditure for the smooth functioning of the business of the assessee and also expenditure wholly and exclusively for the welfare of the employees of the assessee and, thus, allowable.

In Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. vs. CIT 349 ITR 386, the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the provisions of section 40A(9) and their applicability to payments made to schools claimed as welfare expenses towards providing education to its employees’ children. The Tribunal and High Court had concluded that those payments made by the assessee constituted ‘reimbursement’ to schools promoted by the assessee, and accordingly had upheld the disallowance. The Supreme Court on appeal observed that section 40A(9) of the Act was inserted as a measure for combating tax avoidance. Noting that the A.O. had observed that certain payments had been made to educational institutions other than those promoted by the assessee, in view of these facts, the Supreme Court further directed the ITAT to record a separate finding as to whether the claim for deduction was being made for payments to the school promoted by the assessee or to some other educational institutions / schools and thereafter apply section 40A(9). The action of the Court indicates that the expenditure where incurred for payments to funds, etc., not promoted by the assessee, were to be separately considered.

In Kennametal India Ltd. vs. CIT 350 ITR 209 (SC), the Tribunal had held that the amount paid by a company towards employees’ welfare trust had been reimbursed. The Supreme Court on appeal held that there was a difference between the reimbursement and contribution; the assessee could make a claim for deduction in case of the reimbursement, if the quantified amount was certified by the Chartered Accountant of the assessee. This decision supports the case for allowance of the expenditure on payment by way of reimbursement.

Having noted the above, it is possible for the Government to contend that the language of section 40A(9) is fairly clear and not ambiguous and may not permit the luxury of interpreting the provision by examining the intent behind the insertion of the provision. In simple words, it prohibits the allowance of all those payments specified therein, unless the same are covered by the provisions of section 36(1), clauses (iv), (iva) and (v). At the same time, it has to be appreciated that there is nothing in the language that provides for the disallowance of expenditure, including the reimbursement thereof, which is wholly and exclusively incurred for the purposes of the business. In cases where the contribution can be shown to be expenditure of such a nature, in our considered opinion, there can be no disallowance.

Again, the allowance of expenditure or payment would, to a large extent, depend upon the factual position relating to the contribution, its size, its objective and the composition of the recipient fund / trust. A distinction can be drawn between cases where:
1. the trusts are controlled by the employer, provisions of section 40A(9) may apply;
2. the contributions by the employer are of large amounts intended to remain invested by the trust and where the trustees have the discretion to invest the funds with the employer, the provisions of section 40A(9) may apply;
3. the contributions by the employer are to meet the annual staff welfare expenditure incurred by the trust, provisions of section 40A(9) may not apply;
4. the expenditure is in the nature of staff welfare or reimbursement thereof, the provisions of section 40A(9) should not apply.

The better view of the matter seems to be that the provisions relating to disallowance would not apply to genuine staff welfare expenditure or reimbursement thereof, even though routed through funds, trusts, AOPs, etc.

Offence and prosecution – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Section 276C, read with section 132

7 Income Tax Department vs. D.K. Shivakumar [Criminal Revision Petition No. 329 to 331 of 2019; Date of order: 5th April, 2021; Karnataka High Court]

Offence and prosecution – Wilful attempt to evade tax – Section 276C, read with section 132

During a search, the assessee tore a piece of paper containing details of alleged unaccounted loan transactions. It was found that the assessee had advanced huge amount of loan to these persons / entities. He did not disclose the said unaccounted financial transactions in his returns of income and further, the statements of several persons disclosed that the assessee had received huge amount of interest on the said unaccounted loan, which was not reflected in the books of accounts or in the returns of income.

The Revenue filed complaints before the Special Court; the only circumstance relied on by the Revenue / complainant in support of the alleged charges was that during the search action, certain unaccounted loan transactions with several persons / entities were detected and the said unaccounted financial transactions were not disclosed in the returns of income for the relevant years and that the assessee had received huge amount of interest on the said unaccounted loans. The Special Court discharged the assessee mainly on the ground that the ‘complaints filed by the complainant estimating the undisclosed income of the accused and launching the prosecution is without jurisdiction’ and that the piece of paper torn by the respondent / accused was not a document lawfully compelled to be produced as evidence and that the same was not ‘obliterated, nor rendered illegible’ making out the offences under sections 201 and 204 of IPC but reserved the Revenue’s liberty to launch fresh prosecution after estimating the undisclosed income of the assessee / accused by the jurisdictional A.O. on the basis of the materials produced by the authorised officer for the search and such other materials as were available with him. Accordingly, the Special Court had discharged the assessee of the charges.

On the criminal revision petition filed by the petitioner / Revenue, the High Court observed that the allegations, even if accepted as true, did not prima facie constitute offences u/s 276C(1). The gist of the offence under this section is the wilful attempt to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable or underreporting of income. What is made punishable is ‘attempt to evade tax, penalty or interest’ and not the ‘actual evasion of the tax’. The expression ‘attempt’ is nowhere defined under the Act or IPC. In legal parlance, an ‘attempt’ is understood to mean ‘an act or movement towards commission of an intended crime’. It is doing ‘something in the direction of commission of offence’. Viewed in that sense ‘in order to render the accused / respondent guilty of attempt to evade tax, penalty or interest, it must be shown that he has done some positive act with an intention to evade any tax, penalty or interest’ as held by the Supreme Court in Prem Dass vs. ITO [1999] 5 SCC 241 that a positive act on the part of the accused is required to be established to bring home the charge against the accused for the offence u/s 276C(2).

The Court further held that there is no presumption under law that every unaccounted transaction would lead to imposition of tax, penalty or interest. Until and unless it is determined that unaccounted transactions unearthed during search are liable for payment of tax, penalty or interest, no prosecution could be launched on the ground of attempt to evade such tax, penalty or interest. Therefore, the prosecution initiated against the assessee was bad in law and contrary to procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of the Income-tax Act and, thus, the revision petitions were dismissed.

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake u/s 254(2) – Powers of Tribunal – Jurisdiction limited to correcting ‘error apparent on face of record’ – Tribunal cannot review its earlier order or rectify error of law or re-appreciate facts – Assessee has remedy of appeal to High Court

37 Vrundavan Ginning and Oil Mill vs. Assistant Registrar / President [2021] 434 ITR 583 (Guj) Date of order: 18th March, 2021 Ss. 253, 254, 254(2), 260A of ITA, 1961

Appeal to Appellate Tribunal – Rectification of mistake u/s 254(2) – Powers of Tribunal – Jurisdiction limited to correcting ‘error apparent on face of record’ – Tribunal cannot review its earlier order or rectify error of law or re-appreciate facts – Assessee has remedy of appeal to High Court

In the appeal filed by the assessee against the order passed by the A.O., the Commissioner (Appeals) granted relief to the assessee in respect of the addition on account of understatement of net profit by lowering the value of closing stock and confirmed the addition made by the A.O. The assessee filed a further appeal before the Tribunal on the grounds that the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in (a) confirming the addition made on account of purchases by holding that the purchases of raw cotton from the partners were bogus, (b) confirming the addition made on account of purchases of raw cotton from the relatives of the partners holding them to be unexplained / unsubstantiated, and (c) confirming the addition made on account of alleged suppression in value of closing stock by discarding / disregarding the method of valuation consistently followed and accepted in the past assessments.

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner (Appeals) rightly held that the assessee did not follow either of the methods of valuation of closing stock, i.e., either on the basis of cost price or market price, whichever was lower, rather the assessee followed net realisable value which was an ad hoc method and without any basis, that the net realisation method was neither based on cost price nor calculated on the basis of market price and there was no scientific method of calculation of the net realisable value, and that there was no infirmity in the orders of the authorities below.

Thereafter, the assessee filed a miscellaneous application u/s 254 contending that (a) the copies of returns filed in which agricultural income disclosed by the partners in the hands of the Hindu Undivided Family were furnished, (b) the partners in turn disclosed share in the HUF income in their individual returns and had claimed exemption u/s 10(2) and such exemption claimed was not disturbed by the A.O., (c) the purchases from the partners and relatives were made at market rate and comparable purchase vouchers along with a chart were furnished indicating no excess payment to the partners and relatives, (d) there was complete quantity tally on day-to-day basis, and (e) there was no rejection of book results and that 20% disallowance was sustained by the Tribunal while adjudicating ground Nos. 1 and 2 without taking into account the above stated facts, and therefore the order of the Tribunal needed to be rectified to such extent and consequential required relief was to be granted on ground No. 3 in respect of the addition on account of alleged suppression in value of closing stock.

The Tribunal held that the power of rectification u/s 254 could be exercised only when the mistake which was sought to be rectified was an obvious patent mistake and apparent from the record and not a mistake which was required to be established by arguments and a long-drawn process of reasoning on points on which there could conceivably be two opinions. It was further held that after a detailed discussion the disallowance was restricted to 20% of the purchase made from the partners and relatives of the partners and 80% of the purchases made by the assessee were allowed; and qua ground No. 3 relating to the addition made on account of suppression in the value of closing stock, the issue was discussed and thereafter it was concluded that the assessee adopted an ad hoc method for the valuation of closing stock without any basis and that the scope of sub-section (2) of section 254 was restricted to rectifying any mistake in the order which was apparent from record and did not extend to reviewing of the earlier order. The Tribunal rejected the miscellaneous application filed by the assessee.

The Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

‘i) Section 254(2) makes it clear that a “mistake apparent from the record” is rectifiable. To attract the jurisdiction u/s 254(2), a mistake should exist and must be apparent from the record. The power to rectify the mistake, however, does not cover cases where a revision or review of the order is intended. A mistake which can be rectified under this section is one which is patent, obvious and whose discovery is not dependent on argument. The language used in section 254(2) is that rectification is permissible where it is brought to the notice of the Tribunal that there is any mistake apparent from the record. The amendment of an order, therefore, does not mean obliteration of the order originally passed and its substitution by a new order which is not permissible, under the provisions of this section. Further, where an error is far from self-evident, it ceases to be an “apparent” error. Undoubtedly, a “mistake” capable of rectification u/s 254(2) is not confined to clerical or arithmetical mistakes. It does not cover any mistake which may be discovered by a complicated process of investigation, argument or proof. An error “apparent on the face of the record” should be one which is not an error that depends for its discovery on an elaborate argument on questions of fact or law.

ii) The power to rectify an order u/s 254(2) is limited. It does not extend to correcting errors of law or re-appreciating factual findings. Those properly fall within the appellate review of an order of a court of first instance. What legitimately falls for consideration are errors (mistakes) apparent from the record.

iii) The language used in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is different from the language used in section 254(2). Power is conferred upon various authorities to rectify any “mistake apparent from the record”. Though the expression “mistake” is of indefinite content and has a large subjective area of operation, yet, to attract the jurisdiction to rectify an order u/s 254(2) it is not sufficient if there is merely a mistake in the order sought to be rectified. The mistake to be rectified must be one apparent from the record. A decision on a debatable point of law or disputed question of fact is not a mistake apparent from the record.

iv) The Appellate Tribunal, in its own way, had discussed qua ground No. 3 the issue relating to the addition made on account of suppression in the value of closing stock and had recorded a particular finding. If the assessee was dissatisfied, then it had to prefer an appeal u/s 260A, and if the court was convinced, then it could remit the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of ground No. 3. As regards the findings recorded by the Tribunal, so far as ground No. 3 was concerned, the assessee could seek appellate remedies. The power to rectify an order u/s 254(2) is limited.’

Section 115JB(2)(i) – Where an amount debited for diminution in value of Investments and Non-Performing Assets is in nature of an actual write-off, clause (i) of Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB is not attracted and thus the aforesaid amount is not to be added back while computing book profits

33 Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. [2021] 85 ITR(T) 1 (Kol-Trib)] IT Appeal No. 50 (Kol) of 2009 A.Y.: 2002-03; Date of order: 3rd December, 2020

Section 115JB(2)(i) – Where an amount debited for diminution in value of Investments and Non-Performing Assets is in nature of an actual write-off, clause (i) of Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB is not attracted and thus the aforesaid amount is not to be added back while computing book profits

FACTS

While computing profit for the year, the assessee had debited an amount in the Profit & Loss Account for diminution in value of Investments and Non-Performing Loans & Advances and had reduced the same from the asset side of the balance sheet to the extent of the corresponding amount. The assessee contended that the amount so debited to the P&L account is in the nature of an actual write-off and not in the nature of mere provision and, thus, should not be added back while computing book profits u/s 115JB.

The A.O. added back the amount debited for diminution in Investment and NPA (Non-Performing Assets) while computing the book profits treating it as unascertained liability as envisaged in clause (c) of Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB. The CIT(A) held that the said amount could not be treated as unascertained liability and allowed the assessee’s appeal.

Aggrieved by the order, Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal upheld the action of the A.O. Aggrieved by this order, the assessee filed an appeal before High Court which remanded back the matter with a direction to proceed and determine the issue in the light of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Vodafone Essar Gujarat Ltd. [2017] 397 ITR 55 (Guj), i.e., whether clause (i) of Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB would be attracted or not in the facts of this case.

HELD


To determine whether the amount so debited to the P&L account for diminution in Investment and NPA was an instance of write-off or a provision, the Tribunal observed that the Gujarat High Court in CIT vs. Vodafone Essar Gujarat Ltd. (Supra) explained a situation where a provision created in respect of assets would be considered as a write-off and not as a provision as per clause (i) of Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB.

The Gujarat High Court had held that
a) where an assessee debits an amount to the P&L account and simultaneously obliterates such provision from its account by reducing the corresponding amount from the respective assets on the asset side of the balance sheet, and
b) consequently, at the end of the year, shows the respective assets as net of the provision, it would amount to an actual write-off and such actual write-off would not attract clause (i) of the Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of section 115JB.

In the present case, the Tribunal observed that the provision for diminution in Investment / Provision for NPA was not a mere provision but an actual write-off. Provision for Investments / Provision for NPA was created by the assessee by debiting the P&L account and simultaneously the corresponding amount from Investments / Loans & Advances shown on the asset side of the balance sheet was also reduced / adjusted and Investments / Loans & Advances were recorded in the books, net of provision.

Hence, applying the above principle laid down by the Gujarat High Court, the Tribunal finally held that the said provision for diminution in Investments and Provision for NPA would amount to an actual ‘write-off’ and therefore would not attract clause (i) of the Explanation.

Thus, the action of the CIT(A) on the issue was confirmed by the Tribunal and the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

ITAT holds that amendments of Finance Act, 2021 to section 43B and 36(1)(va) apply prospectively

32 Crescent Roadways Pvt. Ltd. [2021] TS-510-ITAT-2021 (Hyd)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 1st July, 2021 Section 43B, 36(1)(va)

ITAT holds that amendments of Finance Act, 2021 to section 43B and 36(1)(va) apply prospectively

FACTS

The assessee company had remitted employees’ contribution towards PF, ESI before the due date of filing return u/s 139(1) – but after the due date prescribed in the corresponding PF, ESI statutes. For the year under consideration, the A.O. disallowed the amounts on the ground that they had been remitted after the due date prescribed in the corresponding statute, i.e., under the PF / ESI Acts. On appeal, the CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal with the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal held that the legislative amendments incorporated in sections 36(1)(va) and 43B by the Finance Act, 2021 are prospective in application and are therefore applicable w.e.f. 1st April, 2021. Therefore, the disallowance of employees’ contributions towards PF, ESI for the A.Y. under consideration was not sustainable and accordingly deleted the additions made on account of such disallowance.

ITAT holds that corrigendum to the valuation report to be considered in ascertainment of value u/s 56(2)(viib)

31 I Brands Beverages Pvt. Ltd. [2021] TS-546-ITAT-2021 (Bang)] A.Y.: 2015-16; Date of order: 13th July, 2021 Section 56(2)(viib)

ITAT holds that corrigendum to the valuation report to be considered in ascertainment of value u/s 56(2)(viib)

FACTS

The assessee, who was engaged in the manufacture and sale of beverages, allotted 4,80,000 shares of a nominal value Rs. 10 per share at a premium of Rs. 365 per share following the discounted cash flow method as per the valuation report. The A.O. noted that the value per share as per projections was Rs. 37.49 per share and it was mistakenly arrived at as Rs. 374.95 per share, and therefore assessed the difference of Rs. 16.2 crores as income u/s 56(2)(viib). On appeal with the CIT(A), the assessee submitted a corrigendum to the valuation report as additional evidence, contending it to be read with the original valuation report which showed the fair market value at Rs. 374.95 per share. The CIT(A), based on a remand report called from the A.O., held that additional evidence in the form of corrigendum was not admissible and confirmed the additions made by the A.O.

Aggrieved, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD


The Tribunal observed that the corrigendum to the original report was issued on account of error and it formed part of the original valuation report. It further held that the corrigendum could not be treated as additional evidence by the CIT(A) and therefore there was no reason to reject it. The Tribunal holds that the corrigendum and the original report shall constitute the full report to be examined by the A.O. and accordingly remits the matter to the A.O. for determination of value per share.

DIGITAL WORKPLACE – A STITCH IN TIME SAVES NINE

Till the beginning of the year 2020, working from home instead of travelling a couple of hours daily to office was looked upon as just an excuse by employers. The major change in work style that we saw in 2020 was a paradigm shift from the physical workplace to the digital workplace. The pandemic and lockdowns all over the world forced people to work from home, or stay without working. While initially it seemed almost impossible for firms to survive in a digital environment, all of us have coped quite well.

Clearly, the pandemic is proving to be a blessing in disguise for firms at all levels. Those in the service industry realised that a Zoom call could replace travelling, they were not required to travel to the office daily and, most importantly, it has resulted in huge cost savings on real estate. Of course, physical meetings and the ‘office culture’ won’t be replaced by the complete digital workspace and irrespective of what we call the ‘new normal’, it is believed that once restrictions are over, people will get back to the normal office and physical workplace. But life and office culture will never be the same again. Even if the digital office will not replace the physical office, there is no denying that it will change the way we look at our office and no one can afford to ignore it. To understand this even better, let us first understand the concept of the Digital Workplace.

WHAT IS A DIGITAL WORKPLACE?

Initially, the Digital Workplace was meant to complement the physical office. The idea was to facilitate easy working for employees who may have difficulties in travelling or are working from different locations. However, most people used to travel for even the slightest work, or for meetings, and the ‘9 to 5’ culture was at its prime with employees expected to reach the office physically to be counted as working on a particular day. Remember the struggle we put up with when it was raining just to reach office safe and dry, or come back walking (or rather, wading) during the deluge of 26th July, 2005 in Mumbai? For the last few years, companies have been spending money on technology and remote working but still always expected employees to travel to the office unless it was not possible. However, 2020, the pandemic year, has changed everything. With no scope to travel to the office, everyone was literally forced to adapt to remote working. The proof of the concept was put to use and now businesses have started operating at full capacity at the Digital Workplace.

A Digital Workplace is the basic set of digital tools that employees use to get work done. These include Instant Messaging apps to Meeting Tools and online storing of documents, and even automated workflows to manage the work. Essentially, ‘the Digital Workplace is the virtual, modern version of the traditional workplace where work can be done through devices, anytime, anywhere’.

However, let’s see what a Digital Workplace is not. It is much more than having apps as a part of office workflow. It is more than accessing office files from anywhere. But when the flow of work and monitoring of performance to get measurable results are seamlessly integrated, we can see the Digital Workplace emerge. It starts by understanding what it really is and how it can help your organisation deliver measurable business value.

Why shifting to a Digital Workplace will help an organisation and employees

  •  Talent attraction: A survey1 says that over 60% of employees would not mind being paid less if they get flexibility to work from anywhere. People have started realising the importance of staying at home and spending time with the family, getting those extra few minutes of sleep as they don’t need to rush to catch a train / bus to the office, and so on. Additionally, Work from Home (WFH) means employees can afford a bigger house at a better location rather than fitting in a smaller house to avoid travelling for work daily, or maybe even have a Staycation working with laptops while sipping ginger tea at Shimla!

 

  •  Improved inclusivity: The one good part of opting for a Digital Workplace is that we can have talent without geographical barriers. With a physical workplace, we were restricted to hiring talent within our cities. But now, someone with an office in Mumbai can hire talent from Delhi or Dubai. The physical location of the employee, except for the time zone, hardly matters.

 

  •  Economical: Having a Digital Workplace is economical not only for firms, but also for employees. While firms can save on real estate rents, electricity, stationery and support staff to facilitate working at the office, for employees the savings come as reduction in transportation costs, parking charges, travelling time, need for spending on professional wardrobes, lunch and dinner, the need to eat outside and so on.

 

  •  Less stress of commuting: One of the biggest worries for people living in big cities in India and all over the world is commuting. While many countries have the best of infrastructure, India is still developing the same and incidents like the 2017 stampede at Elphinstone Road railway station during rush hours may be terrifying, but these are a regular risk of travelling on local trains in metro cities. Besides, commuting in public transport exposes employees to the risk of losing their valuables, including office assets, due to theft or damage on account of extraordinary rush on a frequent basis.

 

1   Business Line

 

WHAT SHOULD YOUR DIGITAL WORKPLACE INCLUDE?

Technically and practically, a Digital Workplace should include all the technology tools that we need to operate in our profession. These tools should broadly take care of four categories of work: how your employees can communicate, how they can collaborate, how they can connect and how they can deliver the final services and evaluate the work done. Let us take a closer look at each of these:

1. Communications at a Digital Workplace:

We aren’t in a place now where we can meet at the cafe or share ideas at the water cooler in the office. Considering these restrictions, it becomes important that while we have a Digital Workplace we also give employees freedom to communicate which they would have otherwise done at the office. In fact, with a DigiWorkplace around, the communications aren’t restricted to a team or a location. Employees in Mumbai can also communicate with those in Delhi. The basic communication tools should include the following:

  •  Emails – Currently, Google Workspace is very widely used for emails. However, there are many other players like Outlook and the Indian Zoho. Each of these offers its unique advantage over the others. But Gmail, since it gives auto integration to other widely-used apps like Google Drive, Google Photos and Android Phones, has become more popular amongst users. Gmail also provides its search functionality to its email, which means that searching past emails with Gmail is always faster. Though all these companies do provide their free email accounts, it is always advisable to buy a company domain (@yourcompany.com or .in, etc.) instead of using standard emails like ‘@gmail.com’. These are paid services but the company domain always gives a better impression. Besides, all the companies provide additional services for paid versions vis-a-vis free versions.

 

  •  Instant messaging apps – A Digital Workplace will definitely need an instant messaging app wherein the employees can keep working while having chats on their queries going on. One of the most common messaging apps that comes in handy with Gmail is Google Hangouts. The whole purpose of such instant messaging apps is to facilitate official messages, calls and video calls so that our personal space on WhatsApp or any other personal app isn’t disturbed. Another app which has found its market in the corporate world for instant messaging is ‘Slack’ which comes with all features of instant messaging, calling and video calling. One good part about Slack is that it can be integrated with almost all the other apps and portals.

 

  •  Other basic communications – Other basic communication toolkits at any Digital Workplace would include customised portals or intranet which may have options to publish news, have blogs or articles, introduce new employees, celebrate birthdays, etc., such as ProofHub, a project-planning software with tools like discussions, notes, Gantt charts, to-do lists, calendaring, milestones, timesheets, etc. Such intranet communication software if implemented well, can solve a lot of communication shortcomings of the Digital Workplace.


2. Collaborations at the Digital Workplace:

To solve business problems and operate productively, organisations must have the ability to leverage knowledge across the enterprise with online, seamless, integrated and intuitive collaboration tools that enhance the employees’ ability to work together. A collaboration toolkit at the workplace should include:

  •  Productivity is a collaborative tool that can’t be ignored. Having tools which can enhance productivity of employees can help them to enable knowledge and perform their work more efficiently. A Digital Workplace should have tools which can help all employees to collaborate on projects / files together. These can include a common drive, word processors, live spreadsheets, presentations, CRMs. Google WorkSpace does give an option for all of these in one place.

 

  •  Business Applications – To make it easier to collaborate, a Digital Workplace should have basic business applications where employees can work simultaneously. An HR system like FreshTeams which is accessible both on portals and on mobiles indeed suffices as an end-to-end HR function. From on-boarding to maintaining documents and to managing approvals, FreshTeams has us covered for everything. Managing employees’ expenses is another worry that we may face while having a Digital Workplace. However, Expensify is one software that can indeed be very useful. Other business applications that are a must-have for a Digital Workplace include ERPs and CRMs like Tally, SAP, QuickBooks and the recent favourite Zoho.

3. Connect:

Self-sufficiency no longer guarantees effectiveness. Employees need tools that allow them to connect across the organisation, leverage intellectual property and gain insight from one another. The Digital Workplace delivers on these goals by fostering a stronger sense of culture and community within the workplace.

Connectivity apps or data in general help employees to know each other’s profiles, their locations, expertise, etc., to reach out easily. A basic data should include employee directory, organisation chart and rich profile.

4. Deliver the result:

The phrase ‘meet your customer where your customer is’ can take a whole new meaning with a Digital Workplace. While face-to-face interactions delivering reports or presentations have gone for a toss, there are still ways to provide your clients with the same sentiments. Professionals may shift to virtual communication networks like Google Meet, Webex, Zoom, Zoho Meetings, etc. As we deliver results in virtual form, we share some tips to have the same level of interaction as in the physical form:

  •  Hold all the meetings, whether internal or external, on video. You need not keep your video off. Having videos turned on during meetings gives a personal touch;

  •  Send emails or catch up casually with inactive clients to let them know you are still thinking about them and their business;
  •  Try and accommodate to the apps that your clients use so that they do not have to struggle in meetings;
  •  Practise – This is one quality that should always remain, irrespective of whether the presentations are online or offline. Practise screen-sharing, slide moves and presentation flow on how it may look on the communication networks while delivering the same to the client.

LIMITATIONS OF DIGITAL WORKPLACE:

While we see giant leaps in the Digital Workplace, it has its own drawbacks. There are platforms that specialise in making collaboration easier and more effective, but the most important component which is missing in the Digital Workplace is ‘social interaction’. It is not merely limited to non-verbal communication where there are no feelings while reading chats / emails, but a Digital Workplace literally means that staff does not spend quality time together like being in office, so the chances of having team bonding are less. This, too, can lead to communication difficulties since misunderstandings are more likely.

Another sad part is the fact that we are used to seeing employees and colleagues face-to-face, or in real face-time. As far as possible, employees should also meet in person from time to time and use the video call function for important meetings. When an actual meeting is not possible, it is advisable to arrange a video call at least once a month without an official agenda to have team bonding.

CONCLUSION


The way the Digital Workplace is evolving, it may not replace the existing physical office or completely do away with it. We are seeing that companies have already started calling their employees back to offices and soon ‘Work From Home’ may not be available to all. But what this pandemic has shown us is that it is possible to work from home and that there are both advantages and limitations of working from home, but with technology evolving, things are getting better and better. We believe that even if we may not move to a compulsory ‘Work From Home’ culture anytime soon, travelling will become optional and companies will give optional WFH to their employees for a few days in a month. Above all, from the firm’s point of view, the Digital Workplace will become more important as it will be able to cater to the workforce from all over the world without having to spend additional sums on their relocation, etc. Besides, a foolproof Digital Workplace system means the firm can outsource routine and monotonous work to people at remote locations at much cheaper rates and it may work like the Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) model.

In our articles over the next few months, we will also be discussing other considerations for having a Digital Workplace that shall include:

  •  Comparisons between a Physical WorkPlace vs. a Digital Workplace vs. a Virtual Workplace vs. Co-Working Spaces;
  •  How we can manage various functions of our firm – HR, Finance, Marketing, etc., using our Digital Workplaces;
  •  Interviews with industry leaders and practical examples of Digital Workplaces.

(The authors of this article are in no way connected with or influenced by any of the apps or portals mentioned herein, except that they are users. The apps and portals mentioned are recommendatory as they have been useful to us)

COVID IMPACT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING

Yes, you read it right. Just as humans are affected by Covid, internal controls over financial reporting, too, are affected by Covid. As we all know by now, Covid attacks when the immune system is weak. Similarly, operations, and therefore the performance of companies, get affected when their internal controls have deficiencies and weaknesses. When the tide will go down is uncertain. But there are many interrelated implications on financial reporting arising from the pandemic. The way of carrying out operations has changed significantly for a lot of companies either due to the nature of their own operations, or due to the impact felt by their suppliers or customers.

This article highlights how Covid might have impacted the internal controls of companies. Needless to say, when the internal controls have been affected by the pandemic, the auditors of such companies need to consider its impact on their reporting on the adequacy and operating effectiveness of internal controls with reference to financial statements as prescribed u/s 143(3)(i) of the Companies Act, 2013.

The pandemic has hit all organisations globally and India is no exception. Considering this, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) issued a Circular dated 20th May, 2020 encouraging listed entities to make timely disclosures about the impact of Covid on their companies. One of the items in the list of information that the Circular states listed companies may consider disclosing is internal financial reporting and controls.

The users of the financial statements, various stakeholders, including investors, lenders, suppliers and customers, Government agencies and so on, are keen to know to what extent the company has been affected by the pandemic. As stated in the ‘Guidance Note on Audit of Internal Financial Controls over Financial Reporting’ issued by The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (GN on IFC) for the purpose of auditor’s reporting u/s 143(3)(i) of the Companies Act, 2013, ‘internal financial controls over financial reporting’ shall mean ‘a process designed to provide a reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.’ Therefore, to prepare reliable financial statements, internal controls over financial reporting are imperative. If such internal controls are affected by Covid and if the company has not taken adequate steps, the financial statements prepared may not be reliable for external purposes and the stakeholders will lose confidence in the entity’s financial reporting. From the governance perspective, it is important for the Audit Committee and management that new processes for financial statements closure and reporting of results and financial / operational controls are appropriately documented.

EXTENDED REPORTING TIMELINES

SEBI has given extended timelines to listed entities to report their results in 2020 as well as for the 2021 year-end. This was brought out considering that companies were facing challenges to complete the preparation of financial information due to the impact of Covid on their people and processes. However, the question is was the challenge faced by the companies related only to reduced manpower at work to complete the tasks, or did the company effectively use the additional time to ensure that its procedures as required by its internal control framework were completed like in any other year? If it is the latter, it will show how the company is impacted by Covid, how it has assessed such impact and reacted to it. But if the companies have used the extended timeline for slowing down the pace, it shows that the company has not assessed the impact of Covid on its processes.

IMPACT ON FINANCIAL CLOSURES


The shift to remote working is testing the operational endurance and the resilience of critical processes across companies. The financial close is no exception which is facing multiple problems in conducting an efficient and effective close process. The financial closure process of a company is a combination of various documents and components. As explained in the GN on IFC, control activities may be categorised as policies and procedures that pertain to:
(A) Performance reviews
(B) Information processing
(C) Physical controls
(D) Segregation of duties

(A) Performance reviews refer to overall analytical procedures of actual performance with budgets, forecasts, etc. However, it is very likely that the budgets, forecasts, prior period actuals, etc., did not include the impact of Covid at all, or had considered its impact based on information available at that time. In the absence of the robustness of a performance review, what controls does the company need to establish to ensure the reliability of financial information? Let’s understand this by way of an example. A company manufactures white goods such as dishwashers, washing machines, etc. Its volume of production in a given period is predictable as the company had established its plant many years ago. For F.Y. 2019-20, the company was able to run its normal operations throughout the year, except the last week near the year-end due to the lockdown. However, in F.Y. 2020-21, the lockdown was extended and therefore production was completely shut for part of the year. While reviewing the performance of F.Y. 2020-21 and comparing the same with the previous year, the variance can be quantified for that attributable to the period when the plant was shut.

(B) Information processing controls are application controls and general IT controls. Before Covid, these controls were usually based on the assumption that applications were being accessed by users through LAN. This identifies the user and has security firewalls to protect the data in the system to ensure its reliability. In the period of the pandemic, where many organisations had to close their offices and allow employees to work from home, IT systems are being accessed by employees through their home networks. The reduced number of employees may result in reduced controls being adhered to. Vulnerability of security for data protection and its unauthorised access pose a significant threat to the reliability of the financial close process. Further, there is heightened risk of data leakage. For example, a company has IT security through which tenders submitted by potential suppliers can be accessed by the procurement department only through the office LAN. During Covid, when staff is working on their home networks, such control cannot be implemented and needs to be modified without compromising on the security of the data. IT processes or controls that have an increased volume or that need to be performed differently due to changes in work environment or personnel, are likely to have additional risks in areas such as the following:

Access termination – Increased number of access termination requests and fewer people available to process them – this may increase the risk of unauthorised access due to terminated personnel not being removed in time. In many organisations, there is an exit form which the employee fills and after approval from the HR it is handed over to IT to ensure that all access given to that employee is terminated and confirmed by IT by signing the same form showing the date and time of termination. In the Covid scenario, the exiting personnel, HR staff and IT staff are all at different locations. To ensure coordination amongst them for terminating the access immediately when the employee leaves, different controls need to be put in place.

Change management – Verbal approvals may be accepted rather than waiting for approvals to be documented through a ticketing system, and thus there may be increased use of emergency IDs which may not be subject to the same degree or timeliness of monitoring as usually occurs. Whenever any change is required in the IT environment, many companies have a hard copy documentation system showing the requester, the approver and details of the changes made, followed by subsequent testing and implementation. During Covid, such hard copy documentation may not be possible given that the requester, approver, programme writer, testing team and implementation team are at different locations. This may require modification of the existing IT change management controls.

Execution of review controls – The questions to be answered are:
(a) What changes are made to the review process of access control, change management and other IT environment processes?
(b) To what extent are the company’s IT risks affected by the new way of working and what are the mitigating controls introduced to deal with the security threat to the IT systems that process financial data?

Many organisations are changing their strategies to take advantage of digital technology, such as storing data on cloud which can be accessed from anywhere by the authorised personnel. Even if the employee working on such data is not able to access the company’s server from her remote location, such data need not be copied on the workstation of the employee when it is available on cloud. With such changes in strategy, it is obvious that the relevant risk control matrix of the company will undergo a change. The new risks identified will be because the majority of employees are working from different locations. Controls to mitigate such risks, for example, data security risk as discussed above, will be plotted against each of such processes.

(C) Physical controls relate to the existence of assets and authorisations for their access. In the Covid scenario, such authorised person holding custody of the physical assets is away from the office or location of the assets for prolonged periods. How does the company ensure the existence of its assets when the person entrusted with their physical custody no longer has their custody? How has the company changed its internal controls which earlier were physical controls? For example, during partial lockdown, earlier internal controls might have been modified in respect of frequency of physical verification, the authority performing such verification, etc. Such modified controls may also consider any new digital technology implemented by the company or any supplemental controls to the original pre-Covid controls.

Safeguarding inventory
Safeguarding inventories is the responsibility of the management which is required to establish procedures to ensure the existence, condition and support valuation of all inventory. There may be transactions as at the yearend where the company has transferred the control of assets, but where physical possession is with the company such as bill-and-hold arrangements. The internal control framework relating to safeguarding and monitoring of inventories would need to include these considerations, e.g., assessing the inventory shrinkage by location, product type, or other disaggregated basis, comparing the actual inventory value of each location to an expected range, and investigate any individual locations that are outside of the expected range.

Further, with scenarios like localised lockdown, travel restrictions, etc., physical inventory counting would be challenging and in some cases impractical. In certain situations where the conventional method of physical verification is not practicable, management may establish internal controls to undertake physical verification remotely via video calls with the help of technology.

Environmental and safety norms
Companies may be using sensitive chemicals and industrial gases for producing goods. Some of these items are required to be stored in temperature-controlled containers and to be continuously monitored. If there is any leakage of hazardous gases or chemicals, the implications on the company could be very severe and even lead to closure of the factory, thereby affecting the going-concern assessment. Localised lockdowns imposed by various State Governments might induce stress on the monitoring mechanism relating to compliance with environmental and safety norms.

(D) Segregation of duties as a control was put in place by companies to ensure that employees preparing the information, authorising the information, recording the information and holding the custody of the documents are different. In the Covid scenario, the flow of physical documents to different employees performing these different roles is not possible. Further, many organisations had severe staff absences for prolonged periods as even the staff was affected by the pandemic. This requires delegating their responsibility to other staff and modifying internal controls around it. Has the company modified its internal control system and does the revised internal control system ensure effective segregation of duties, this is the question that companies need to answer.

Fraud risks
Fraud risks change in such a time of crisis, as new opportunities are created for internal as well as external parties. Incentives for committing fraud – both misappropriation of assets and financial reporting fraud – may also be heightened, especially if significant terminations are likely or employees suffer significant personal financial stress. As stated in the GN on IFC, ‘When planning and performing the audit of internal financial controls, the auditor should take into account the results of his or her fraud risk assessment.’ In the years when the company is hit by the Covid pandemic, fraud risk assessment of the auditor is expected to be different from the earlier years. The risk of fraud has increased significantly due to changes in the way of working. Such risks can range from the basic documentation process where scanned documents are being relied upon, which can be forged, as against the original signed documents; to frauds in complex transactions where significant estimation is involved such as fair valuation, etc., since these estimates are also significantly impacted by Covid. Some of the areas where fraud risk has increased are:

(i) Physical document approvals are replaced by email approvals in the Covid period. Such approvals carry the risk of emails being compromised.
(ii) Due to the new style of working, the demand for certain goods and services has significantly increased. This has created an opportunity in procurement fraud.
(iii) Owing to lockdown situations, many customers may be facing financial difficulties to pay their dues within the credit period. This increases the risk of financial reporting fraud by resorting to unethical means of recording receipts from debtors which are not genuine.

The auditors, while planning and performing the audit of internal financial control, will need to take into account as well as document how their audit plan is different from the earlier years due to higher risks of fraud, i.e., what is their audit response to such risks.

ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Ind AS 1 requires the entity to disclose information about the assumptions it makes about the future, at the end of the reporting period, that have a significant risk of resulting in a material adjustment to the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities within the next financial year. In the Covid scenario, the future holds a lot of uncertainty and it will need the company to demonstrate its internal controls for arriving at the estimates, or its estimation process. It may have an impact inter alia on going-concern assessment, impairment of assets, fair valuation, etc., that is, financial statement items that are based on assumptions of the future. Companies faced difficulties in estimating the impact of Covid on their operations beyond the short term. This is an inherent risk because of uncertainty about the future which was never experienced before in history and has resulted from the global pandemic. Due to the disrupted supply chain and distribution models, uncertainty over pricing, etc., projecting future cash flows with acceptable precision is not possible for many companies. Coordination with management experts, such as those heading the strategy department, valuation specialists, etc., when performing impairment tests, assessing fair values of assets such as investment properties, investments, etc., and performing actuarial calculations and analyses, can be more challenging. Many auditors have considered these matters as key audit matters for their audit of the financial year ended 31st March, 2021. The question is do internal controls over the estimation process of the company consider the uncertainty brought by Covid?

Exceptions identified during control testing
It is likely that management will identify exceptions during its testing of controls because controls were designed for a totally different environment. To ensure that sufficient time is available for remediation before the year-end, management will need to modify the design of existing controls and test the operative effectiveness of the new controls during the year. If such remediation does not take place by the year-end, it will have consequences of communication with audit committees and modification in the auditor’s report. Further, in the absence of controls being effective, auditors may need to modify their strategy to evaluate the impact of ineffective controls. Therefore, companies should change their plan of testing controls affected by Covid earlier than usual in the year. If the company has had to incorporate new controls during the year, these controls should be documented in its internal control documentation and appropriately tested.

Planned changes in RCM
Each entity’s internal controls will be uniquely impacted by Covid, e.g., entities with significant dependence on technology will have different challenges to address than those with a more manual control environment. With a majority of staff working from home, manual controls maintained through hard copy documents cannot be adhered to. Technology-dependent controls may need revision with new technology suitable for the new environment. Hence, it is imperative that on a holistic basis the potential changes or shifts in focus, both in terms of scoping and risk assessment, testing approaches, etc., are made and additional controls or control modifications of existing controls are undertaken to address the risks arising from Covid. Based on the experience of Covid, companies will start making changes in their risk control matrix. It will include identification of additional risks posed by Covid, new controls to mitigate those risks, modification to existing controls in view of the ‘new normal’ and removal of some controls which have become redundant. This might include automation of all key manual controls to reduce dependency on people and physical access to the work environment, increased use of continuous monitoring and detection and defining indicators which would suggest that controls may not be operating effectively.

Changes to the design of management’s control may also require the auditor to alter the combination of testing procedures (i.e., inquiry, inspection, observation and re-performance). This includes making inquiries on the changes in the company’s mode of carrying out operations in response to Covid. For example, changes due to people working remotely, and consequently the change in the company’s policies and procedures, including execution of controls, segregation of duties, etc. This would also include evaluating the electronic or digital evidence made available by management, and the controls around the same, specifically with reference to review, reliability, security and storage of such evidence by the management.

Enhancing disclosures
The pandemic would also have wide-ranging implications on the financial statements. Hence, it is crucial that the management adequately presents their ‘side of the story’ in detail. Disclosures might include entity-specific information on the past and expected future impact of Covid on the strategic orientation and targets, operations, performance of the entity as well as any mitigating actions put in place to address the effects of the pandemic. Updating the information included in the latest annual accounts to adequately inform stakeholders of the impact of Covid, in particular in relation to significant uncertainties and risks, going-concern, impairment of non-financial assets and presentation in the statement of profit or loss, have garnered renewed focus.

SNAPSHOT
In short, the way Covid has impacted internal controls over financial reporting of companies is as follows:
a) New normal – The way companies carry out day-to-day transactions from initiation to closure that involves authorisations, recording, cash receipts or payments, etc., has changed. Given that these processes have undergone changes, all pre-Covid controls may not be relevant and new controls may be needed.
b) Risks change due to Covid – Not only are the new processes susceptible to new risks, but existing risks may also be heightened due to the change in the environment. In addition to this, there are certain inherent risks of dealing with the ‘unknown’, i.e., how long the pandemic will continue, what will be its severity and the resulting impact on the organisation, etc.
c) Controls must also change accordingly – Companies will need to thoroughly review their risk control matrix in light of the new risks. It will require addition of new controls (e.g., those relevant to new technology), changes in the existing controls (such as approval process through emails or physical verification of assets through virtual means, etc.), or removal of some of the irrelevant controls (like those related to physical documentation).
d) Audit of internal controls over financial reporting – With the new risk-control matrix, the auditors will need to plan their integrated audits in light of the changed processes of the client, the revised design of controls and testing their operating effectiveness. The auditors will need to evaluate ‘what could go wrong’ with increased audit scepticism considering the high fraud risk in the new reality, the risk of non-compliance with laws and regulations, the impact of uncertainty on the estimation process of the company, and so on.



NEXT STEPS

Companies establish criteria for internal controls over financial reporting. These are dynamic in nature and as the circumstances change, companies need to revisit internal controls on identified risks. The impact of Covid will require them to relook at their existing criteria and identify what changes are required to be carried out to achieve the objective. Many companies have prepared their own checklists to ensure that the internal controls criteria are updated based on the current environment.

At the same time, auditors need to be aware of what changes are being carried out by their clients in their criteria for internal controls and plan their audits accordingly. This may require the auditor to obtain samples of the period when operations were severely affected by Covid (and  therefore have a modified design of internal controls) and when operations were running normally.

A dialogue between the clients and auditors is imperative to discuss the exceptions observed in management testing, changes being made in internal controls, effective date of incorporating the changes, plan of management testing of such controls and ensuring that those are operating effectively.

(The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author)

VALUATION OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

The billion-dollar acquisitions that we read about, especially of early-stage companies, raise the question, how do deal makers arrive at the deal price? There is seldom a transaction wherein the buyer and the seller would agree on the future outcome of certain critical parameters which could be a point of negotiation, or even the cause of some potential deals falling through with the two parties unable to reconcile on the deal price. It is contingent consideration that helps in breaking this deadlock between two parties because it enables the buyer to pay a part of the deal price to the seller only on the achievement of certain pre-agreed critical milestones. While such contingent consideration is commonly observed in M&A deals, there are several complexities when it comes to the valuation aspects of such consideration.

1. INTRODUCTION TO CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

Ind AS 103, Para 37 requires the consideration transferred in a business combination to be measured at fair value which is to be calculated as the sum of the acquisition-date fair value of assets transferred by the acquirer, the liabilities incurred by the acquirer to the former owners of the said business, and the equity interests issued by the acquirer. In fact, contingent consideration is one of the forms of consideration as described in Ind AS 103 and it has to be recorded at the acquisition-date fair value as a part of the total consideration. Contingent considerations are typically employed in transactions to bridge the valuation gap between the buyers’ and the sellers’ differences of opinion regarding the target entity’s future economic prospects. It helps to get the buyer and the seller on the same page when it comes to the valuation of the target entity. Let us examine this basic concept by way of an example:

Company A intends to acquire Company B. Company B has just introduced a new product line that is expected to generate significant sales. Company B’s owners have projected a significant amount of sales from the proposed product line and are considering the same to influence the deal size. Company A, on the other hand, believes that there is a risk of uncertainty in the achievement of targets contemplated by the seller and hence there is a disagreement on the deal valuation. By incorporating a contingent consideration clause in the purchase agreement, the seller accepts part of the business risk along with the buyer and also participates in any upside post-transaction.

Contingent consideration may be contingent on different events, for example, on the launch of a product, on receiving regulatory approval, or reaching a certain revenue or income milestone. The achievement of such events often spans over more than a year. Thus, it is necessary to understand the acquisition date as well as the post-acquisition treatment of such contingent consideration.

2. CLASSIFICATION AND MEASUREMENT OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION

2.1 Liability vs. equity classification
The classification of consideration is essentially driven by the mode of settlement of such consideration. Consideration settled in cash is always classified as a liability. In a scenario where the consideration is to be settled by issue of certain instruments of the buyer, one needs to determine whether the number of instruments to be issued are fixed and determined at the acquisition date. In a scenario where the number of instruments is fixed, then such consideration is classified as equity, and where the number of instruments to be issued is not fixed, then such consideration is to be recognised as a liability. Refer to Figure 2.1.1 for a simplified approach to determining equity vs. liability.

Figure 2.1.1: Classification of contingent consideration

Example: A fixed monetary amount to be settled in a variable number of shares would be classified as a liability.

Contingent consideration classified as a liability is required to be re-measured at its fair value at each reporting period. For example, a consideration depending on revenue achieved over the next three years from acquisition will need to be fair-valued at the end of each year / quarter. Whereas, a consideration classified as equity is not required to be fair-valued post the initial recognition since the consideration has already been determined and locked as at the acquisition date.

3. VALUATION OF CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION / EARN-OUTS

The methods to be followed and the approach will be driven by the way the payment of such contingent consideration or earn-outs is structured. The pay-outs are structured based on a single or more than one metric. The Table below illustrates the various metrics which are commonly observed for contingent consideration:

Financial matrices

Non-financial matrices

Revenue

Gross profits

EBITDA

Profit before tax

Cash flows targets

Stock price

Result of clinical trials

Software development / R&D milestones

Employee retention targets

Customer retention targets

Closing of a future transaction

Number of units sold

Mostly, contingent consideration is paid on achievement of certain revenue or profit targets. Additionally, such payments may be spread over more than just one year. The pay-outs can either be linear pay-outs or non-linear pay-outs.

3.1 Linear pay-outs
Pay-outs which are dependent on a single metric and are expressed in terms of a fixed percentage or the product of a financial or some non-financial parameters, are referred to as linear pay-outs. Considerations that vary based on different levels of revenue or other parameters are non-linear pay-outs. For example:

Target will receive a payment at some future date as follows:

  •  If EBIT < $1 million, the payoff is zero;
  •  If EBIT = $1 million, the payoff is a 10x multiple of EBIT.

The valuation method will be driven by the structure of the contingent consideration pay-outs. There are two broad valuation approaches used to value a contingent consideration.
i) Probably weighted expected return method, more commonly referred to as ‘PWERM’, or scenario-based method (‘SBM’); and
ii) Option pricing method, also referred to as the ‘OPM’.

3.1.1 Probably weighted expected return method (PWERM)
The PWERM assesses the distribution of the underlying matrices based on estimates of the forecasts, scenarios and probabilities. The pay-out computed is then discounted to present value using a discount rate corresponding to the risk inherent in the inputs considered while computing the compensation. The following are the steps followed:
i) Estimate scenarios of outcomes and associated probabilities.
ii) Compute the expected payoffs using the scenario probabilities.
iii) Discount expected payoffs to present value using risk-adjusted discount rates.

Illustration 3.1.1.1

• INR 100 crores payment contingent upon obtaining FDA approval.
• Approval expected in one year.

Solution:

Particulars

Payment

Probability

Prob.-weighted payment

Approval
obtained

Approval
obtained

INR
100

INR
0

75%

25%

INR
75

INR
0

Total

Discount
rate

Present
value factor

 

100%

10%

INR
75 crores

 

0.91

Fair
value of contingent consideration

INR
68 crores

Advantages:
i)    Management controls scenarios and probabilities: The scenarios and probabilities are generally prepared by the management because they would be the best source for such data points.
ii)    Understandable: The computation and the flow are understandable to a reader with basic financial knowledge.
iii)    Flexible: The model can be structured to fit most pay-out scenarios.

Disadvantages:
i)    Management controls scenarios and probabilities: While this has been discussed under advantages, management control over these inputs is also counter-intuitive since management tends to be overly optimistic or pessimistic in its assumptions.
ii)    Lots of subjective assumptions: Most of the methods / inputs are subjective and involve judgement, which at times is not the most ideal approach to value such pay-outs.
iii)    Discount rate: Since the methods involve multiple scenarios, it is challenging to estimate the appropriate discount rate.
iv)    Path dependencies: Pay-out scenarios which are path dependent, i.e., the result of one scenario is related to one or more dependent scenarios, are difficult to model in the PWERM. It can lead to multiple nodes and is prone to errors.

3.2 Non-linear pay-outs
Non-linear contingent considerations are either not strictly linear, or they pay a fixed amount based on a milestone correlated with the broader economy; thus, they require an OPM as their complexity and discounting cannot be adequately captured in a PWERM; for example, if the buyer pays INR 50 crores if EBITDA is at least INR 75 crores in the first three years, or if the buyer pays 40% of revenues above INR 50 crores in year two, subject to a maximum of INR 40 crores. Another, more complicated, example: The buyer pays 40% of revenues in years one to three, subject to a minimum of INR 10 crores and a cap of INR 40 crores. In such an arrangement, a PWERM will not work since it’s impossible to adjust the discount rate to align with the risk of such a complex pay-out structure. An option-pricing model is generally used to value such arrangements.

3.2.1 Option-pricing methods
The payoff structures for contingent consideration arrangements that have a non-linear structure are similar to those of options in that payments are triggered when certain thresholds are met. Accordingly, some option-pricing methods may be appropriate for valuing contingent consideration that have a non-linear payoff structure and are based on metrics that are financial in nature (or, more generally, for which the underlying risk is systematic or non-diversifiable). The OPM is implemented by modelling the underlying metrics based on a log-normal distribution that requires two parameters:

* The expected value: The management expectation of the matrices over the term of the arrangement. This is generally provided by the management.

* The volatility (standard deviation) of the metric: The volatility of the metric measures the potential variability from the expected value. This is generally determined by using market-based data. However, volatility for financial metrics like revenue and EBITDA cannot simply be computed using the movement in stock prices of the comparable companies. It needs to be appropriately levered and unlevered to capture the variability in achievement of the metrics.

There are two widely used option-pricing methods, viz., the Black-Scholes Model (‘BSM’) and the Monte Carlo simulation model.

3.2.1.1 Option-pricing method – Black-Scholes Model
BSM treats a pay-out arrangement just like an ordinary option which enables use of the standardised Black Scholes – Merton formula. This approach can work for simpler pay-out structures, for example, if the selling shareholder earns the pay-out only if the target metric hits a threshold, or for linear pay-outs with caps or floors. The consideration is assumed to represent a call option on the future performance of the seller.

Illustration for BSM
Earn-outs are contingent upon the target of achieving a benchmark EBIT of INR 11,25,000 within three years. The EBIT is currently INR 10,00,000. At the end, the acquirer will pay additional consideration equal to the excess EBIT over the benchmark.

The discount rate is 10% and the risk-free rate is 3%. Volatility of earnings is 14% based on historical EBIT.

The inputs to the Black-Scholes Model for this example are:

i)    The current INR 10,00,000 level of earnings is the value of the underlying,
ii)    the benchmark of INR 11,25,000 serves as the exercise price,
iii)    the term is three years,
iv)    the volatility is 14%,
v)    the risk-free rate is 3%, and
vi)    the dividend rate is 0%.

Based on the above inputs, calculations for the Black-Scholes Model can be incorporated into an Excel spreadsheet. The resulting call option value of INR 84,413 will be the value of the contingent consideration.

3.2.1.2 Option-pricing method – Monte Carlo Simulation Model
For more complex structures, a Monte Carlo simulation is preferred. Arrangements that pay over multiple periods or multiple metrics are subject to combined caps or a floor. A Monte Carlo simulation considers the correlation between matrices and pay-outs over multiple periods. The Monte Carlo simulation repeats a process many times attempting to predict all the possible future outcomes. At the end of the simulation, several random trials produce a distribution of outcomes that can be analysed. Random numbers are used to measure possible outcomes and the likelihood of their occurrence. Generally, simulation software are used to generate random numbers. These random numbers are generated based on the applicable distribution driven by the metric triggering the pay-outs.

The following are the important considerations of key inputs for valuing contingent considerations using an option-pricing model:

Discount rate applied based on risk of target metric
For earn-outs that require this kind of discount rate, either the top-down or bottom-up approach may be used to develop the rate. These approaches are well known in the valuation field. They rely on the concept of beta (ß), which reflects the level of market risk reflected in an instrument.

In the top-down approach, ß is based on the deal’s rate of return adjusted for the difference in market risk between the target metric and the overall enterprise value. Adjustments can reflect many relevant factors, such as the general risk in the target metric, leverage, term, size premium and entity-specific risk. In the bottom-up approach, ß is the target metric adjusted for term, size, entity-specific risk and other relevant valuation factors. The bottom-up approach may rely on statistical analysis of the target metric from the entity or its peers.

Volatility
Valuation techniques that rely on options modelling or Monte Carlo simulation require a volatility of the target metric. There are four ways in which such volatility can be computed:

i)    Historical changes in the target metric for the acquired entity and public comparable companies,
ii)    Entity volatility based on the relationship between the target metric and the enterprise value,
iii)    The difference between analyst forecasts and actual results for peer companies, and
iv)    Fitting a distribution to management’s estimates.

With any of these methods, a discussion with management is recommended since a derived volatility may fail to accurately incorporate the economics of the entity’s situation.

Both option-pricing models can get complex and difficult to comprehend for a lot of professionals and they have their share of advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages:
i)    Manage complex payoff structures: Can accommodate a wide range of complex payoff structures.
ii)    Objective assumptions: Most inputs are governed by market-related inputs making it less subjective than the PWERM.
iii)    Discount rate: Since the computations are made using random numbers and volatility, generally risk-adjusted discount rates are used, reducing the need of subjectivity inherent in building discount rates for financial matrices.

Disadvantages:


i)    Perceived to be complex and time-consuming.
ii)    Rigid: OPMs are based on a prescribed formula and are perceived as rigid relative to the PWERM.
iii)    Difficulty in converting real-world cash flows into risk-free cash flows: It is challenging at times to convert the pay-out structure into models to be used with the OPMs.

Valuation of contingent consideration and selection of the appropriate methods for doing so can be quite challenging. Such valuations are continuously evolving as new literature on methods and approaches is published around the world. The selection of methods to value these arrangements is driven by the complexity of the pay-outs and the experience and the qualifications of the valuer to be able to appropriately apply these methods.

The complexity of contingent consideration is not limited to its valuation but has several accounting and taxation implications which need to be considered and analysed. The accounting and tax aspects vary, based on the accounting standard being followed as well as the structure of the transactions. A discussion on these aspects would warrant an independent article, which we intend to cover over the next few issues.

INTRODUCTION TO ACCREDITED INVESTORS – THE NEW INVESTOR DIASPORA

Investors and investments have, over the decades, evolved with respect to form, structure, taxation and compliances involved. The constant need to test and re-invent has led to newer market participants exploring the investment universe.

However, one of the foremost principles of investment and investing, that is, investors should invest in financial products after knowing the risks and returns associated with them, and therefore take an informed decision regarding their investments in line with their risk-return profile, continues to prevail.

SEBI Consultation Paper: On 24th February, 2021, SEBI introduced a ‘Consultation Paper on the Introduction of the Concept of Accredited Investors’ (‘Consultation Paper’) in the Indian securities market.

The Consultation Paper made a case for introduction of the concept of Accredited Investors (AI) in the Indian securities market and covered the following aspects:

  •  Benefits to the Indian Securities Market
  •  Proposed AI eligibility criteria for various categories of investors, namely, Individuals, HUFs, Family Trusts, Bodies Corporate and Non-Resident Investors
  •  Process and validity of accreditation
  •  Procedure for implementation

SEBI Press Release (SEBI PR): Subsequently, on 29th June, 2021, SEBI via PR No. 22/2021, inter alia proposed a formal introduction of the framework for AI in the Indian securities markets.

This article covers the following aspects:

(A) CONCEPT OF AI

The AI framework as proposed by SEBI in India and prevalent framework across different economies; impact on the Indian securities markets vis-à-vis Private Equity, Venture Capital, Portfolio Management Services (PMS) and the Startup ecosystem.

AI, or as they are colloquially called Professional or Qualified Investors, amongst others are a class of investors who possess expert understanding of various financial products, the risks and returns associated with them, coupled with the financial capacity to absorb losses, enabling them to take relatively higher risk in their investing endeavours.

Hence, they are classified as a distinct group to recognise their ability to take informed decisions regarding investments and to selectively eliminate the need for extensive regulatory protection. Such investors may also enjoy relaxations with respect to disclosure requirements, filings of offer documents / prospectus, etc., and enhanced flexibility in respect of investor reporting.

Across the globe, other jurisdictions have also similarly demarcated this investor class considering their distinct knowledge and investment experience, alongside financial capacity.

(B) WHY HAVE ACCREDITED INVESTORS

The investment ecosystem in India today restricts investments in various asset classes based on the capacity of the investor to digest risks associated with that investment. This ability to digest risks is determined by minimum investment thresholds and high net worth requirements.

However, over time, investors have gained requisite knowledge to demonstrate an understanding of the asset class along with the ability to take on the risks associated with such investments.

Therefore, identifying this new investor diaspora as an ‘Accredited Investor’ enables achieving the premise of risk-reward balance coupled with the opportunity to allow investors to invest in asset classes that they understand and follow which would fill in the gap in the current investment and securities regulations. This model has also been successfully implemented globally (see ‘Accredited Investor Ecosystem Globally’ below) and has resulted in the creation of this new investor diaspora.

Overall economic boost in the investment universe and promotion of asset classes which hitherto were inaccessible to a large set of investors would be visible.

(C) THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR FRAMEWORK AS PROPOSED BY SEBI IN INDIA1 AND ACROSS DIFFERENT ECONOMIES:

(I) The eligibility criteria for Resident Investors, Non-Resident Indians and Foreign Entities as proposed by SEBI are as detailed below:

Category of investor

Eligibility criteria for Indian
investor to be an Accredited Investor

Eligibility Criteria for Non-Resident
Indians and Foreign Entities to be Accredited Investors

Individuals, HUFs and Family Trusts

Annual income >= INR 2 crores; or

Net worth >= INR 7.5 crores with not
less than INR 3.75 crores of financial assets; or

Annual Income >= INR 1 crore + Net
worth >= INR 5 crores; with not less than INR 2.5 crores of financial
assets;

Annual income >= USD 300,000; or

Net worth >= USD 1,000,000; with not
less than USD 500,000 of financial assets; or

Annual income >= USD 150,000 + Net
worth >= USD 750,000; with not less than USD 375,000 of financial assets

Trusts (other than Family Trusts)

Assets Under Management >= INR 50
crores

Assets Under Management >= USD 7.5
million

Bodies Corporate

Net worth >= INR 50 crores

Net worth >= USD 7,500,000

Others

Central and State Governments,
Developmental agencies such as SIDBI, NABARD, etc., set up under the aegis of
Government(s), funds set up by Government(s) and QIB’s as defined under SEBI
(ICDR) Regulations, 2018

Multilateral agencies, Sovereign Wealth
Funds, International Financial Institutions and Category – I FPIs

 

1   SEBI Consultation Paper dated 24th
February, 2021

Manner of determination of annual income, net worth and value of real estate assets
(i) The income and asset details which need to be considered for assessment of eligibility criteria shall be as per the data furnished in the Income-tax Returns filed for the immediately preceding financial year and the financial year in which assessment is being made.

(ii) For calculation of net worth, the value of the primary residence of the investor shall not be included.

(iii) In case the assets of the investor accounted for the assessment of eligibility criteria are in the form of real estate, a ‘ready reckoner rate’ as published by the respective local bodies shall be considered.

Manner of determination of annual income and net worth in case of joint accounts

In case of joint accounts held by individuals, the account shall be considered as an AI account only in the following scenarios:

(i) The First holder of the account is an AI;

(ii) The Joint holders are parent(s) and child(ren), where at least one person is independently an AI;

(iii) The Joint holders are spouses and their combined income / net worth meets eligibility criteria.

Manner of determination of financial capacity in case of bodies corporate

For bodies corporate, the latest statutorily audited information as on the date of application shall be considered for assessment of eligibility.

For trusts, the calculation of Assets Under Management shall be based on the valuation data as included in the Statutory Audit Report of the preceding financial year or as on the date of application.

(II) Accredited Investor Ecosystem Globally

Country

Accredited Investor criteria

Regulation

United States of America

Earned income exceeding USD 200,000 (or
USD 300,000 together with a spouse) in each of the prior two years and
reasonable expectation of a similar earning for the current year, or

SEC Reg 501(d)

United States of America




(continued)

has a net worth over USD 1,000,000,
either alone or together with a spouse (excluding the value of the primary
residence

SEC Reg 501(d)

Singapore

Net personal assets exceeding SGD 2
million (or equivalent in foreign currency), or in case of Corporates – Net
Assets exceeding SGD 10 million (or equivalent foreign currency) or

Income in preceding 12 months should be
not less than SGD 300,000 (or equivalent in foreign currency)

Section

4A(1)(a) of the Securities and Futures
Act (SFA)

Australia

Net assets of at least AUD 2.5 million, or

A gross income for each of the last 2
financial years of at least AUD 250,000

Section 708(8) of the Corporations Act,
2001

United Kingdom

‘Experienced Investor’ definition in the
UK:

A body corporate which has net assets in
excess of
€ 1,000,000 or which is part of a group which has net assets in excess of €
1,000,000;

Trustee of a trust where the aggregate
value of the cash and investments which form part of the trust’s assets is in
excess of € 1,000,000;

An individual whose net worth, or joint
net worth with that person’s spouse, is greater than € 1,000,000, excluding
that person’s principal place of residence

Section 3 of Financial Services
(Experienced Investor Funds) Regulations, 2012

When compared to global benchmarks, the financial parameters (vis-à-vis income and net worth) laid down by SEBI are on the higher side and may indicate a sense of conservative caution which is understandably needed in the advent of the sensitivity and adaptability concerns that surround this critical regulation. However, over time SEBI may consider re-evaluating these parameters as soon as AI investment becomes mainstream and with the imminent need to reduce entry barriers (income and net worth) for a seamless functioning of these crucial market participants.

(D) IMPACT ON THE INDIAN SECURITIES MARKETS VIS-À-VIS PRIVATE EQUITY, VENTURE CAPITAL, PMS AND STARTUP ECOSYSTEM

The Indian financial and securities market ecosystem is evolving with the Startups and the alternative investment space is fast maturing.

The proposed regulations as detailed below create a base for a thriving market and a soft regulatory regime. While the market for customised products for elite investors may not be readily available in the Indian securities market at this juncture, putting in place the required enabling framework will propel innovation in and development of the securities market in time to come.

Category of market participant

Associated effects under proposed
regulations2

Impact (Author’s view) and SEBI PR

Investors

Recognition as AI will help in availing
intended benefits

Portfolio diversification through access
to customised investment products or structured products;

more investment products due to lower
entry barriers such as minimum investment size

Alternative Investment Funds (AIF)

(Venture Capital, Private Equity and
Startups)

 

and

 

PMS players

Flexible participation for AI under the
AIF and PMS regulations

This is a welcome step and a much-needed
initiative opening up the investment ecosystem to AIs who were hitherto
restricted from such investments owing to prevalent minimum investment norms

 

AIFs3 and PMS4
would be able to attract capital from AIs for this fast-growing asset class
helping Startup and Venture Capital investments get the much-needed push
without the minimum investment norm requirements.

Alternative
Investment Funds

 

and

 

Portfolio
Management Services players

Beneficial interrelationship of AI with
AIF and PMS

for AI’s with minimum investment of INR
10 crores (PMS) or INR 70 crores (AIF)

Accredited Investors with minimum
investment of

INR 70 crores with AIF may avail
relaxation from regulatory requirements such as portfolio diversification
norms, conditions for launch of schemes and extension of tenure of the AIF

OR
INR 10 crores with registered

Alternative
Investment Funds

 

and

 

Portfolio
Management Services players

 

 

 





 

(continued)

PMS provider may avail relaxation from
regulatory requirements with respect to investments in unlisted securities
and shall be able to enter into bilaterally negotiated agreements with the
PMS provider

 

The above benefits shall be instrumental
for availing better means for investment structuring, pooling of capital,
co-investments, etc.

 

However, the threshold of INR 70 / 10
crores seems to be on the higher side and may merit reconsideration

Investment Advisers (IA)

Optimal engagement with IA

The terms of the agreement may be determined
mutually between the IA and the AI client, without diluting the fiduciary
responsibility cast on IAs under the SEBI Investment Advisors Regulations.

AI shall be in a better
position to bargain since the limits and modes of fees
can be governed through bilaterally negotiated contractual terms

 

2   SEBI PR
dated 29th June, 2021

3   As an illustration, the minimum capital
commitment required to participate in AIFs is INR 1 crore. In case of an
Accredited Investor, the manager may accept a capital commitment less than INR
1 crore

4   As an illustration, any entity may enter into
an agreement with a Portfolio Manager to avail customised asset management,
i.e., portfolio management service with a minimum capital of INR 50 lakhs. Such
capital may be made available to the Portfolio Manager in the form of cash or securities.
In case of a client who is an Accredited Investor, the Portfolio Manager may
accept capital and manage a portfolio of less than INR 50 lakhs

Accreditation Agencies
Accreditation Agencies (AA) can be Market Infrastructure Institutions (MIIs), i.e., Stock Exchanges, Depositories and / or subsidiaries of such MIIs. The modalities of accreditation, including documentation, fees, etc., will be specified by the AA separately.

Accreditation, once granted, shall be valid for a maximum period of one year from the date of accreditation.

The investor shall submit the necessary data and documents to the AA for ascertaining its eligibility to be an Accredited Investor. If eligible as per the approved criteria, the Accreditation Agency shall provide a certificate to this effect, clearly indicating the period of validity. Each certificate of accreditation shall have a unique certificate number.

The AI shall provide a copy of the Accreditation Certificate to the financial product / service provider along with a declaration to the effect that:

(i) The Investor is aware that being an AI, it is expected to have the necessary knowledge or means to understand the features of the investment product / service, including the risks associated with the investment and also has the ability to bear the financial risk associated with the investment.

(ii) The Investor is aware that the investment product / service in which it is proposing to participate may have a relaxed and flexible regulatory framework and may not be subject to the same regulatory oversight as retail products / services.

(E) WELCOME TO THE AI IN INVESTING AND ITS BALANCE
SEBI continues to pursue its ambitious attempts to harmonise the Indian securities market with the staggered introduction of global best practices in investments while giving due recognition to sophisticated market participants for better regulation.

While from a risk minimisation and mitigation perspective for market participants SEBI will need to ensure a robust recognition process and monitor the impact on the asset classes, short-term liquidity boost and transparency of information by parties looking to on-board AI’s with investor protection and interest would remain the paramount factor.

We hope that the accreditation, and acceptance, of specialist investors further propels the quantum of investments into new asset classes and helps drive the Indian economy to greater heights.

SHOULD CHARITY SUFFER THE WRATH OF SECTION 50C?

INTRODUCTION
In this article, the applicability of section 50C in the case of a charitable trust has been deliberated upon. Before we proceed any further, a basic understanding of the method of computation of capital gains in the case of a charitable trust would be very helpful.

COMPUTATION OF ‘INCOME’ IN THE CASE OF A CHARITABLE TRUST

Section 11 of the Income-tax Act deals with computation of income from property held for charitable and religious purposes. Section 11(1) provides the incomes that shall not be included in the total income of the previous year of the person in receipt of the income.

It is well settled that the ‘income’ as referred to in section 11(1) must be computed in accordance with commercial principles and not in accordance with the ordinary provisions of the Act.

In this regard, reference may be made to the following materials:
• Board Circular No. 5P (XX-6), dated 19th June, 1968;
• CIT vs. Ganga Charity Trust Fund [1986] 162 ITR 612 (Guj);
• CIT vs. Trustee of H.E.H. the Nizam’s Supplemental Religious Endowment Trust [1981] 127 ITR 378 (AP);
• CIT vs. Rao Bahadur Calavala Cunnan Chetty Charities [1982] 135 ITR 485 (Mad);
• CIT vs. Janaki Ammal Ayya Nadar Trust [1985] 153 ITR 159 (Mad) (para 13);
• CIT vs. Programme for Community Organisation [1997] 228 ITR 620 (Ker) upheld in CIT vs. Programme for Community Organisation [2001] 248 ITR 1 (SC);
• CIT vs. Rajasthan and Gujarati Charitable Foundation [2018] 402 ITR 441 (SC); and
• DIT(E) vs. Iskcon Charities [2020] 428 ITR 479 (Karn) (para 7).

Section 11(1A) and computation of capital gains in the hands of a charitable trust:
Section 11(1A) provides that for the purposes of section 11(1), where a capital asset held wholly for charitable or religious purposes is transferred and the whole or any part of the net consideration is utilised for acquiring another capital asset to be so held, then, the capital gain arising from the transfer shall be deemed to have been applied to charitable or religious purposes to the extent specified thereunder.

Given that the exemption u/s 11(1)(a) is subject to condition of application or accumulation, the Legislature found that such condition mandating application or accumulation of capital gains could lead to eroding the corpus of the trust. Hence, with a view to ease the onerous condition of requiring application or accumulation of capital gains for religious or charitable purposes, the Legislature introduced section 11(1A) vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971 with effect from 1st April, 1962. This is forthcoming from the Circular No. 72, dated 6th January, 1972.

It may be noted that section 11(1A) only deems acquisition of another capital asset held for charitable or religious purposes as application for the purposes of section 11(1). This is clear from the preamble of section 11(1A), which uses the words ‘for the purposes of sub-section (1)’.

It may be noted that the computation of capital gains will also have to be made u/s 11(1) by applying commercial principles as capital gains is also an ‘income’ u/s 11(1) and cannot receive any different treatment. Reference may be made to the Board Circular No. 5P (XX-6), dated 19th June, 1968 which provides that even income under the head ‘capital gains’ will have to be computed under commercial principles in case of a charitable trust.

APPLICABILITY OF PROVISIONS OF SECTION 50C

For section 50C to apply, the following prerequisites must be satisfied:
i) Consideration received or accruing as a result of a transfer of a capital asset is less than the value adopted or assessed or assessable by any Authority of a State Government for the purpose of stamp duty in respect of such transfer; and
ii) The capital asset being transferred is land or building, or both.

Section 50C is a deeming provision which deems the Stamp Duty Value (SDV) adopted, assessed or assessable as the full value of consideration for the purpose of computation of capital gains u/s 48.

It is well settled that the scope of a deeming provision must be restricted to the purpose for which it is created and must not be extended beyond such purpose. Such legal fiction must be carried to its logical conclusion and must not be taken to illogical lengths. One should not lose sight of the purpose for which the legal fiction was introduced. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgments in CIT vs. Mother India Refrigeration Industries P. Ltd. [1985] 155 ITR 711 [SC] and CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd. [1965] 55 ITR 741 [SC].

Thus, the provisions of section 50C, which deem the SDV as the full value of consideration for the purposes of section 48, cannot be extended to the case of a charitable trust, in whose case the capital gains must be computed in accordance with commercial principles.

Even otherwise, it may be noted that there can be no room for importing a deeming fiction of Chapter IV-E in computing the income of a charitable trust on commercial principles u/s 11(1).

In the following judgments it has been held that section 50C has no application in case of charitable or religious trusts:
• ACIT vs. Shri Dwarikadhish Temple Trust, Kanpur (ITA No. 256 & 257/Lkw/2011, dated 21st August, 2014) (paras 4.3-6.2);
• ACIT vs. The Upper India Chamber of Commerce [ITA No. 601/Lkw/2011, dated 5th November, 2014 (2014) 46-B BCAJ 282] (paras 4 & 5).

It would also be pertinent to note that section 50C was inserted into the Income-tax Act much after section 11(1A) was introduced. However, the Legislature has not chosen to make an amendment to section 11(1A) after insertion of section 50C, thereby indicating that the Legislature does not intend to take away the benefit of section 11(1A) in the case of a trust with the introduction of section 50C into the statute book.

Wherever the Legislature has sought to provide for application of normal provisions of the Act in the case of a charitable trust, it has expressly provided so. It has done so because it is aware that the income of a charitable trust is to be computed in accordance with commercial principles. [See Explanation (ii) to section 11(1A) and Explanation 3 to section 11(1).]

However, it has consciously chosen not to import the fiction of section 50C into sections 11(1) and 11(1A) and hence section 50C would not be applicable in the case of a charitable trust.

It is a settled principle of interpretation that law has to be interpreted in the manner that it has been worded. Nothing is to be read into and nothing is to be implied in it while reading the law. There is no intendment to law. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment in CIT vs. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. (1999) 237 ITR 24 (SC).

Even otherwise, it may be noted that section 50C is incompatible with the scheme of sections 11(1) and 11(1A) as there cannot be an application or accumulation of any artificial income or consideration created by way of a deeming fiction.

In CIT vs. Jayashree Charity Trust [1986] 159 ITR 280 (Cal), it was held that though section 198 provides that the amounts deducted by way of income tax are deemed to be ‘income received’, what is deemed to be income
can neither be spent nor accumulated for charitable purposes. Hence, the deeming provisions of section 198 should not be construed in a way to frustrate the object of section 11.

It may also be noted that a charitable trust cannot be expected to do the impossible act of applying / accumulating / investing a notional consideration which it has neither received nor is going to receive. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgments in Krishnaswamy S. Pd. vs. Union of India [2006] 281 ITR 305 (SC) and Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited vs. CIT [2021] 125 taxmann.com 42 (SC).

The interpretation that section 50C does not apply to charitable trusts saves the provisions of section 11 from the vice of the absurdity of requiring the application / accumulation / investment of a notional consideration.

Thus, the provisions of section 50C do not apply to the case of a charitable trust.

NON-APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 50C BY APPLYING MISCHIEF PRINCIPLE

By applying the Mischief rule, or Heydon’s rule of interpretation, while interpreting the provision, the real intention behind the enactment of the statute needs to be gone into in order to understand what mischief it seeks to remedy. This principle of interpretation finds support of the judgment in K.P. Varghese vs. ITO [1981] 131 ITR 597 (SC).

The overarching reason for insertion of section 50C would be to curb generation of black money by understating the agreed consideration on records. Under the erstwhile provisions, the A.O. without any evidence to the contrary could not question the consideration stated to have been agreed between the parties to a transaction by presuming the market value to be the full value of consideration. Hence, in order to plug evasion of taxes by understating consideration, section 50C has been inserted into the statute books. In Gouli Mahadevappa vs. ITO [2013] 356 ITR 90 (Karn), it has been held that the ultimate object and purpose of section 50C is to see that the undisclosed income of capital gains received by the assessees should be taxed.

In the case of a charitable trust, there can be no motivation whatsoever to generate any black money as the entire income generated is exempt from taxation if the conditions u/s 11 are met.

In case of a charitable trust, deposit of sale consideration into a Fixed Deposit amounts to utilisation as envisaged in section 11(1A). In this regard, reference may be made to Board Circular No. 833 of 1975 dated 24th September, 1975 and the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in CIT vs. Hindusthan Welfare Trusts [1994] 206 ITR 138 (Cal). Hence, a mere investment in a Fixed Deposit could amount to utilisation.

Thus, when there is no motivation to generate black money in case of a charitable trust, the mischief sought to be remedied by section 50C does not arise.

It may be noted that even qua the buyer of the land or building, the provisions of section 56(2)(x) do not apply by virtue of exception provided in clause (VII) of proviso to section 56(2)(x). Therefore, neither party will have any tax advantage in fixing a consideration lower than the actual consideration.

As discussed earlier, section 11(1A) was brought into the statute to do away with the erosion of the corpus. Thus, when the intention of the Legislature was to ensure that there is no erosion of corpus by way of requiring application of actual income, it can never be the intention of the Legislature to import section 50C into section 11(1A) and require the application or utilisation of an artificial sum, thereby eroding the corpus.

It can never be the intention of the Legislature to give a benefit with one hand and then take the same away with the other. Hence, a sincere attempt must be made to reconcile the provisions to ensure that the benefit given by the Legislature is not taken away. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment in Goodyear India Ltd. vs. State of Haryana [1991] 188 ITR 402 (SC).

Thus, even applying the mischief rule of interpretation, section 50C cannot be applied in the case of a charitable trust.

IMPACT OF DECISIONS RENDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECTIONS 50C AND 54-54H ON SECTION 11(1A)

Under section 11(1A)(a)(i), if the entire net consideration is utilised in acquiring another capital asset, the whole of such capital gains arising from the transfer shall be deemed to have been applied to charitable or religious purposes.

It may be noted that the definition of ‘Net consideration’ in Explanation (iii) to section 11(1A) is similar to that contained in Explanation 5 to section 54E(1), Explanation (b) to section 54EA(1), Explanation to section 54F(1) and section 54GB(6)(c).

In certain judgments, it has been held that though section 50C must not be applied for the purposes of computing ‘net consideration’ as referred to in sections 54F and 54EC, the capital gains referred to therein will also have to be computed without giving effect to the provisions of section 50C. In the said judgments, it has been held that the capital gains for the purposes of section 45(1) will have to be computed in accordance with section 48 read with section 50C. Thus, the effect would be that though the exemptions under sections 54F and 54EC are based on capital gains computed without applying the provisions of section 50C, the capital gains for the purposes of section 45(1) would be determined after applying the provisions of section 50C, thereby effectively taxing the difference between the deemed consideration as determined u/s 50C and the actual consideration agreed between the parties to the sale.

The same may be demonstrated by way of an illustration:

Particulars

Amount (Rs.)

Amount (Rs.)

Full value of consideration (actual sale consideration – Rs. 20 lakhs
or SDV – Rs. 36 lakhs, whichever is higher) [A]

 

36,00,000

Less: Indexed cost of acquisition [B]

 

(1,93,506)

Income chargeable under the head capital gains [C] = [A] – [B]

 

34,06,494

Less: Exemption u/s 54F [D]

 

(18,06,494)

Actual sale value [D1]

20,00,000

 

Less: Indexed cost of acquisition [D2]

(1,93,506)

 

Capital gain u/s 54F [D3] = [D1] – [D2]

18,06,494

 

Net consideration received

20,00,000

 

Amount invested in new asset

20,00,000

 

Deduction u/s 54F(1)(a) [since the net consideration is invested,
entire capital gains is exempt] [D4]

18,06,494

 

Taxable long-term capital gains [E] = [C] – [D]

 

16,00,000

From the above illustration it is clear that though the assessee has invested Rs. 20,00,000 in the acquisition of a new asset which is equal to the net consideration of Rs. 20,00,000, the assessee is suffering tax on a long-term capital gain of Rs. 16,00,000 (Rs. 36,00,000 – Rs. 20,00,000), which is nothing but the difference between the deemed sale consideration u/s 50C of Rs. 36,00,000 and the actual sale consideration of Rs. 20,00,000.

The above implications have been approved in:

• Shri Gouli Mahadevappa vs. ITO [2011] 128 ITD 503 (Bang) upheld in Gouli Mahadevappa vs. ITO [2013] 356 ITR 90 (Karn);
• Jagdish C. Dhabalia vs. ITO [TS-143-HC-2019 (Bom)];
• Mrs. Nila V. Shah vs. CIT [2012] 21 taxmann.com 324 (Mum) / [2012] 51 SOT 461 (Mum).

Without going into the correctness of the said judgments, the ratios laid thereunder have no application in the context of charitable trusts for the following reasons:

• The same were laid down in the context of sections 54F and 54EC and not in the context of section 11(1A).
• Sections 54F and 54EC form part of Chapter IV, whereas section 11 forms part of Chapter III. Thus, section 11 is to be applied prior to the stage of computation of income under Chapter IV which deals with computation of total income, and hence section 50C which forms part of Chapter IV would have no application in the context of section 11.
• Unlike section 54F which deals with exemption from chargeability u/s 45, section 11(1A) provides for computation of capital gains deemed to be applied to charitable or religious purposes. As held by various courts, ‘Application’ can be only of real income.
• Even if one were to conclude that section 50C would be applicable to the case of a charitable trust, the fiction imported for determining the full value of consideration will necessarily have to be imported into the utilisation of such consideration. This is based on the principle of parity of reasoning, which has been upheld by the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Lakshmi Machine Works [2007] 290 ITR 667 (SC) and CIT vs. HCL Technologies Ltd. [2018] 404 ITR 719 (SC).
• The Board, vide Circular No. 5P (XX-6), dated 19th June, 1968, has itself stated that the income of the trust (including capital gains) must be computed by applying commercial principles. Thus, no notional income u/s 50C can be brought to tax in case of a charitable trust.
• The courts have reached the said conclusions keeping in mind the mischief sought to be remedied by section 50C. As discussed above, the mischief sought to be remedied by application of section 50C does not arise in the case of a charitable trust.
• Sections 11(1) and 11(1A) being exemption provisions with beneficial purposes, must be interpreted liberally. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment in Government of Kerala vs. Mother Superior Adoration Convent [2021] 126 taxmann.com 68 (SC), wherein the five-judge Bench’s decision in Commissioner of Customs vs. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018] 9 SCC 1 (SC), was distinguished on the ground that the said judgment did not refer to the line of authorities which made a distinction between exemption provisions generally and exemption provisions which have a beneficial purpose.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the above, it may be argued that section 50C does not have any application in the case of a charitable trust. Hence, the capital gains as referred to in section 11(1A) will have to be computed without applying the provisions of section 50C. Any other interpretation will lead to the absurd result of requiring a charitable trust to apply / accumulate / invest notional gains which have never accrued or arisen to it, which can never be the intention of the Legislature.

 

Poem For Independence Day

CARO 2020 SERIES: NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS INVENTORIES AND OTHER CURRENT ASSETS

(This is the second article in the CARO 2020 series that started in June, 2021)

NEW CLAUSES AND MODIFICATIONS

Whilst the clause on reporting in respect of inventories has been present in the earlier versions, too, CARO 2020 has modified parts of the first clause and added certain reporting requirements in respect of current assets which are given below.

Modifications
a. Whether in the opinion of the auditor the coverage and procedure for physical verification of inventories is appropriate;
b. Whether any discrepancy in excess of 10% or more in the aggregate for each class of inventory was noticed and the same was properly dealt with in the books of accounts.

Additional Reporting
a. Whether at any point of time during the year the company has been sanctioned working capital limits in excess of Rs. 5 crores in aggregate from banks or financial institutions, on the basis of security of current assets;
b. Whether the quarterly returns or statements filed by the company with such banks or financial institutions are in agreement with the books of accounts and if not, to give details.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN REPORTING
The reporting requirements outlined above entail certain practical challenges which are discussed below:

Verification of inventory:
a. On the appropriateness of coverage and procedure for physical verification of inventory, the auditor will have to observe the performance of the management’s physical count taking procedure, control over movement of inventory, adequacy of design and effective operations of internal controls.

b. Apart from ensuring that proper written instructions are issued, it is also incumbent for the auditor to point out specific areas where the instructions are not clear or other procedural lapses like inadequate segregation of duties, cut-off procedures not adhered to especially for sales and work-in-progress in continuous process industries, as may be observed. It is important for the auditor to comment on the specific areas where he feels that the procedures are not adequate rather than commenting that the ‘procedures are generally adequate’.

c. Covid-19: The onset of Covid-19 has caused significant disruptions in the business operations of companies which could pose challenges in conducting physical verification of inventories. This, in turn, would make it difficult for auditors to ensure compliance with SA 501, Audit Evidence-Specific Considerations for Selected Items, which requires the auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding the existence and conditions of inventories. SA 501 requires attendance at location/s of physical inventory count, unless impracticable, and performing audit procedures on inventory records to determine whether the records accurately reflect actual inventory count results. Some of the challenges may be broadly analysed under the following situations:

Management does not conduct an inventory count (not even any alternative audit procedure) on the balance sheet date:
In such cases, as per Key Audit Considerations amid Covid-19 issued by ICAI on physical inventory (ICAI’s Covid guidance), the management should inform the auditors and those charged with governance about the reasons for the same. However, if carrying out a count is not feasible, the auditor would need to evaluate the reasonableness of the circumstances and the internal controls with respect to the existence and condition of inventory. Depending upon the materiality, the auditor may use his judgement to modify his audit report in accordance with SA 705 (Revised) Modifications to the Opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report. Further, its impact on auditor’s opinion on internal financial controls u/s 143(3)(i) of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘ICFR’) also needs to be evaluated, in addition to reporting under this clause regarding coverage of physical verification of inventory.

Physical verification conducted at a date other than the balance sheet date:
In such cases, the design and operating effectiveness of controls over inventory would need to be evaluated before reporting. Further, the following considerations are also relevant:
i.    Whether the inventory records are properly maintained;
ii.    Understanding reasons for differences in the physical verification count and the inventory records;
iii.    Performing roll-backward procedures, if the inventory count is done after the year-end or roll-forward procedures, if inventory count is done during the interim period;
iv.    Evaluating whether any adjustment is required in roll-forward or roll-backward procedures due to differences observed as in (ii) above;
v.    To consider whether the time between inventory count date and balance sheet date reflects appropriate assessment of the physical condition of the inventory.

Impracticable for auditor to attend the physical count:
This issue is relevant for the auditor to issue an audit opinion on the financial statements and not on CARO 2020. However, in order to have complete discussion on physical verification of inventory, specifically its increased importance during Covid pandemic times, the same is also discussed here.

  •  In the event that it is impractical for the auditor to physically attend the inventory count process, the auditor can perform alternative audit procedures to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding the existence and condition of the inventory. In addition, to evaluate design and test the operating effectiveness of internal control over physical verification of inventory, the following may be considered:

i. Prepare a document substantiating the impracticality and unreasonableness of observing the count in person, given the Covid-19 situation;
ii. Use of web or mobile-based video-conferencing technologies (i.e., Microsoft Teams, Facetime, WhatsApp). In this case, care should be taken by the auditor that if inventory items cannot be identified with a unique reference number, etc., there is no chance of replacement of inventory during / after the count to avoid double counting. It would be advisable to retain the recording thereof as part of the audit documentation;
iii.    Consider using an external party, e.g., an independent CA firm in that location (ICA) or Internal Auditor (IA), in which case the auditor needs to evaluate
a. Objectivity and independence of ICA / IA;
b. Inquire for any relationships that may create a threat to their objectivity;
c. Evaluate their level of competence;
d. Determine the nature and extent of work to be assigned;
e. Communicate planned use of ICA / CA with those charged with governance;
f. Obtain written agreements from the entity for the use of ICA / IA for providing direct assistance;
g. Direct, supervise and review the work performed by ICA / IA providing direct assistance, including provide instruction / work programme, including sample selection, communicate management’s inventory count instructions, etc., and, if possible, supervise the count while it is in progress.

When inventory is under the custody and control of a third party, e.g., bonded warehouse, job worker / contractor, etc., the auditor shall verify the procedures undertaken by the management to evaluate the existence and condition of that inventory. This could be by way of obtaining confirmation from the third party as to the quantities and condition of inventory held on behalf of the entity and / or perform inspection or other procedures appropriate in the circumstances. The auditor needs to focus on whether inventory with third party is for a longer than normal period and obtain reasons for the same.

In the event the entity has specialised inventory where inventory count is not based on a normal physical verification process but on the confirmation of quantity / quality by an expert, the auditor will review the certification obtained by the entity and compare it with the book records. For example, in the case of coal, tonnage is calculated by considering the height, width, length of the stock yard and the moisture content in the coal to arrive at its tonnage. The entity will normally take the help of engineers in this process who would be internal or external experts.

a. Appropriate coverage: Even if the company has instituted proper procedures for physical verification, it is imperative that the coverage thereof is adequate and appropriate with respect to the nature, size, materiality, location, feasibility of conducting physical verification and risk of material mis-statement involved. This could involve significant judgement and an interplay of several factors, some of which are discussed hereunder:

• Classification of inventory – This is important for assessing the extent of coverage as also for evaluating the impact of discrepancies. Whilst the class of inventory is broadly specified in the Accounting Standards for manufacturing and trading companies, the same is not clear for service companies since all of it may not be amenable for quantification. Further, even if the classification for manufacturing and trading companies is appropriate to determine the adequacy of verification, an A-B-C analysis is desirable for which the basis would need to be evaluated for reasonableness. Further, the auditor also needs to examine whether there is a control system in place to identify and mark slow-moving, obsolete or damaged inventory.

• Periodicity of verification – The auditor would need to verify the periodicity of such verification and whether all the material items of inventory have been covered at least once in a year or as per the systematic plan as designed by the management. This would depend upon the nature of inventory, the A-B-C classification discussed above and the number of locations involved.

b. Dealing with discrepancies: The auditor should, based on his understanding of the business and operating effectiveness of internal controls, verify explanations provided by the management for discrepancies between inventory as per the books and as physically verified and steps taken by them to reconcile. Some of the common causes for discrepancies are:
• Incorrect data entry on receipt
• Issues not recorded
• Misplaced stocks
• Loss due to theft or natural calamity
• Human errors or incorrect unit of measurement used
• Inventory records not updated
• Supplier frauds
• Goods distributed as free samples
• Weight loss / gain due to passage of time

Under the modified (changed) reporting requirement, the auditor will have to report on any discrepancy noticed in excess of 10% or more in the aggregate for each class of inventory. Each class of inventory will have to be identified as per AS 2, ‘Valuation of Inventories’ / Indian Accounting Standard (Ind AS) 2, ‘Inventories’ and the internal policies of the management. The count at the time of physical verification will have to be compared with the book records and discrepancies in excess of 10% or more in the aggregate for each class will have to be reported. It may be worth it to note that the threshold limit of discrepancies of 10% should be applied to the value and not to the quantity. Hence, if the inventory has been valued other than at cost, e.g., net realisable value (NRV), the discrepancy of 10% needs to be compared with NRV.

It is worthwhile to note that this clause deals with discrepancies observed during physical verification only and not with discrepancies observed during audit. Further, even if the management has a valid explanation for the discrepancies, the fact needs to be brought out while reporting under this clause.

Working capital facilities:
a. This is a new reporting requirement wherein the auditor has to review quarterly returns or statements filed by the company with banks and financial institutions in case the sanctioned working capital limits with them are in excess of Rs. 5 crores in aggregate and to report if these are not in agreement with the books of accounts.

b. Collation of all working capital facilities: For calculating the limit of Rs. 5 crores, it is important to note that sanctioned amounts (not disbursed amounts) and both fund and non-fund-based amounts are required to be considered at any point of time during the year (as against only at the year-end) on the basis of security of current assets. This could present challenges in identifying the completeness thereof since sanctioned facilities as well as non-fund-based facilities are not reflected in the books of accounts. Accordingly, the auditor would need to make specific inquiries and obtain a representation and corroborate the same with the requisite documentary evidence like sanctioned letters, confirmations from the lenders, review of the minutes, ROC filings for charge created, etc. The aggregate of the sanctioned limit from all banks and financial institutions is also required to be collated. In case of a company which operates from multiple locations and working capital facilities are negotiated locally, care should be taken to ensure that all such sanctioned facilities are combined for the purpose of reporting under this clause. The auditor will also have to cross-verify the same with the relevant disclosures, if any, in the financial statements.

c. This clause is not applicable to unsecured sanctions or sanctions on the basis of security other than current assets or withdrawals above the sanctioned limit, e.g., in case the company has a combined sanctioned working capital limit of Rs. 4.75 crores but the same is overdrawn by Rs. 0.30 crore. In this case, the total outstanding working capital facility is in excess of Rs. 5 crores, however, since the aggregate sanctioned limit is less than Rs. 5 crores, this clause would not be applicable.

d. Considering the discussion in paragraphs (b) and (c) above, in case the sanctioned working capital limit exceeds Rs. 5 crores, the auditor is required to review quarterly returns and statements filed by the company with such banks / financial institutions and report if they are in agreement with the books of accounts and, if not, give details thereof.

The auditor will have to consider materiality of discrepancies, its relevance to the users of financial statements and their professional judgement while reporting discrepancies.

e. Each bank and financial institution may have its own requirements of submission of statements and returns. These submissions may be monthly, quarterly, yearly or of any other frequency, including event-based. However, for the purpose of reporting under this clause only quarterly statements / returns and that too which have relevance with the books of accounts of the company need to be considered, compared and reported.

Though this clause is applicable only if sanctioned working capital limits are provided based on the security of current assets, however, the responsibility of the auditor is to compare all the information provided in the quarterly statements / returns which can be compared with the books of accounts and is not restricted only to current assets. Such information may include aging of inventory and receivables, trade payable, property plant and equipment, other information, etc. So long as information can be compared with the books of accounts, it will be the responsibility of the auditor to report.

f. Challenges for MSMEs: Reconciliation of the details of statements / returns submitted to the lenders with the books of accounts on a quarterly basis could pose difficulties in case of MSMEs since they may not be regular in updating their accounting records. These MSMEs will have to keep their books of accounts updated based on which statements / returns submitted to banks and financial institutions can be compared, failing which their auditor will issue a disclaimer while reporting under this clause.

g. It is hoped that the introduction of this reporting requirement would lead to better discipline and improvement in internal controls which would result in a win-win situation for companies, lenders and auditors.

IMPACT ON THE AUDIT OPINION

Whilst reporting under these clauses, the auditor may come across several situations where he may need to report exceptions / deviations. In each of these cases, he would need to carefully evaluate the impact and exercise his professional judgement keeping in mind materiality and relevance to the users of financial statements, not only for reporting under these clauses but also on his opinion on ICFR and / or audit opinion on the financial statements, too. These are broadly examined hereunder:

Nature of exception /
deviation

Possible impact on the
audit report / opinion

The coverage and procedure for physical verification of
inventory is not adequate and / or appropriate

• Modification of opinion on ICFR;

 

• Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, audit
opinion on financial statements

Physical verification of inventory not conducted by the company

• Modification of opinion on ICFR;

 

• Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, audit
opinion on financial statements

Discrepancies in the returns / statements submitted to banks /
financial institutions

• Depending upon the nature of the discrepancy, modification on
audit opinion or reporting on ICFR reporting, if the discrepancy is in the
books of accounts

In such cases, it is imperative that the Board’s Report contains explanations / comments on every reservation / adverse comment in the audit report as per section 134(3)(f) of the Companies Act, 2013 and that there will not be any factual inconsistency between the two if, in the auditor’s judgement, the matter / observation may have any adverse effect on the functioning of the company.

CONCLUSION


The above changes have cast onerous responsibilities on the auditors by making them indirectly responsible to the lenders. Hence, they would also need to go beyond what is stated in the order since the devil lies in the details!

MLI SERIES MAP 2.0 – DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK UNDER THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION

1. INTRODUCTION
‘Like mothers, taxes are often misunderstood, but seldom forgotten’ – Lord Bramwell

Lord Bramwell’s words reiterate that one cannot escape the rigours of taxation as it is inevitable. There is considerable certainty regarding the levying of taxes by a State, but the certainty buck stops there. The functional features of taxation have led to various complexities, eventually paving the way for tax uncertainty. Tax uncertainty is on account of various factors; the OECD-IMF report on tax certainty1, inter alia identifies an ineffective dispute resolution mechanism as one of the factors for tax uncertainty. Due to the uncertainty element, genuine taxpayers have suffered the wrath inter alia through prolonged disputes, thus losing faith in the system. On the other hand, tax shenanigans have benefited through tax avoidance, leaving the administration with empty coffers. Tax revenue being the cornerstone of a stable economy, the economic impact that tax uncertainty causes is undesirable for all the stakeholders concerned. Therefore, fostering tax certainty remains at the top of the agenda and a need-of-the-hour measure for the States.

As we draw the curtains on this insightful Multilateral Instrument (MLI) Series, we will focus majorly on the dispute resolution framework under the MLI in this final edition. This measure marches to foster tax certainty. However, unlike the other substantive provisions in the MLI, the success of the dispute resolution mechanism relies on an effective procedural framework which will be the focus of our discussion.

 

1   2019 Progress Report on Tax Certainty (July,
2019)

2. TAX TREATY DISPUTE RESOLUTION – PRE-BEPS ERA

‘No matter how thin you slice it, there will always be two sides’ – Baruch Spinoza
The purpose of tax treaties is to reduce barriers to cross-border trade and investment. The advent and growth of multinational corporations in India created a significant increase in tax treaty and transfer pricing disputes. Characterisation of receipts, arm’s length pricing, treaty entitlement, permanent establishment (PE) and attribution of income, etc., are common cross-border taxation disputes. A tax treaty will only achieve its goals if the taxpayers can trust the Contracting States to apply the treaty in letter and spirit.

If one Contracting State tax authority does not do so, the affected taxpayer has the right to contest this action of the tax authority through that state’s legal system. However, the domestic dispute resolution mechanism may be laborious, time-consuming and expensive.

Therefore, to resolve the double taxation issues, the tax treaty provides for a mechanism by way of Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP)2, whereby the competent authorities (CA) of the relevant jurisdictions consult each other and endeavour to resolve the differences or difficulties in the interpretation or application of the tax treaty.

However, despite the advantages that MAP offers to resolve disputes, various shortcomings and challenges puncture its effectiveness. Some of the shortcomings in the MAP framework are:

Shortcomings of the MAP 1.0 framework


No impetus and mandate on the CA to solve a dispute.


No deadline or timetables to resolve the disputes; hence the process is
protracted unreasonably and time-consuming.


Lack of domestic law support such as non-implementation of MAP due to
domestic law conflict.


Lack of training and capacity-building initiatives by Governments for its CA
on international tax issues owing to financial constraints.

Shortcomings of the MAP 1.0 framework (Continued)


Lack of guidance in MAP processes for taxpayers in emerging economies on the
procedural and administrative aspects for initiating the MAP.


Lack of dedicated and experienced resource personnel to focus on MAP, leading
to an increase in MAP inventory.


Lack of transparency from the taxpayers’ perspective as they are not involved
in the process; hence, taxpayers are apprehensive about resorting to MAP.


From a taxpayer’s perspective, there are risks of double taxation due to
denial of corresponding adjustments in other state or re-opening of tax
assessments in the other state, delay in issuing refunds, etc3.

 

2   Article 25 of the Model Conventions (Pre-2017
editions)

From India’s standpoint, despite being one of the developing countries to have a large inventory of MAP cases, the MAP framework has not been effective owing to the shortcomings identified in the Table above. Lack of procedural guidance from the CBDT, clarity, transparency in the process and, more importantly, an extremely time-consuming process with non-TP cases taking more than 100 months to arrive at a resolution4 are some of the pain points. Hence, the need for a more effective MAP framework was imperative considering the ever-increasing inventory leading to tax uncertainty.

3. MAP 2.0 – BEPS MEASURES

The introduction of the BEPS Action Plan (AP) provided various measures to eliminate the scope for tax avoidance. However, the implementation of these measures involved changes in the domestic laws and tax treaty (through MLI). Therefore, with the introduction of BEPS measures and also with the existing MAP framework being inefficient, the possibility of growing tax uncertainty was inevitable. To ensure certainty and predictability for business / taxpayers, AP 14 – Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective was initiated. BEPS AP 14 dealt with various aspects to improve the dispute resolution mechanisms (in addition to remedies under domestic laws) and suggested some best practices that countries could emulate to achieve certainty in a time-bound and effective manner.

 

3   Carlos
Protto Mutual Agreement Procedures in Tax Treaties: Problems and Needs in
Developing Countries and Countries in Transition – Intertax, Volume 42, Issue
3; and Jacques Malherbe: BEPS – The Issues of Dispute Resolution and
Introduction of a Multilateral Treaty

4   OECD MAP 2016 Statistics

5   Information related to the Inclusive
Framework is available at
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-about.html


Minimum Standards: Minimum Standards are certain provisions to which all countries and jurisdictions within the BEPS inclusive framework5 have committed and must comply with. AP 14 included a minimum standard for participating countries that should ensure the following aspects:

(i)    Proper Implementation & Process: Treaty-related obligations on MAP are fully implemented in good faith6 and MAP cases are resolved on time.
(ii)    Prevention & Resolution of Disputes: The administrative processes should promote the prevention and timely resolution of treaty-related disputes.
(iii)    Availability & Accessibility to MAP: Taxpayers meeting the requirements under Article 25(1) of the OECD Model Convention can access the MAP.

In addition to the above, the AP 14 also provided certain best practices for implementation. The AP also addressed those members of the Forum for Tax Administration (FTA) who will undertake a peer review mechanism for effective implementation of the minimum standards7. It is to be noted that India is a member of the FTA.

The AP 14 report, which contains the minimum standard and best practice recommendations, is transposed into the CTAs by introducing it in the MLI. Part V of the MLI – Improving Dispute Resolution, focuses on Article 16 dealing with a strengthened MAP Framework for an effective resolution of treaty disputes, and Article 17 –Corresponding Adjustments, deals with MAP accessibility for transfer pricing cases to eliminate economic double taxation.

3.1 Article 16 – MAP 2.0
The salient feature of Article 16 and India’s position is as follows:

Article

Scope

Inference

16(1)

 

First sentence

Taxpayer considers that action of one or both the contracting
states will result in taxation that is not
according to the CTA
. Therefore, irrespective of the remedy under
domestic law, the dispute can be presented to the CA of either contracting state

Availability and flexibility in access to MAP: Aggrieved taxpayer can
approach for MAP resolution either of the contracting states and not
necessarily its resident jurisdiction

[Continued]

 

Second sentence

The time limit for presenting the case must be within three
years
from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation

Time Limit: For initiating MAP, the aggrieved taxpayer must
present his grievance within a minimum time limit of three years. This is to
ensure that there is no late claim made to burden the tax administration8
and at the same time give adequate time to the taxpayers to initiate MAP
access

India’s Position:

 

Article 16(1) First
sentence:

India has reserved the right
to the application of this First sentence. As per India’s view, residents of
the contracting state must approach only their respective CA to access the
MAP.

Consequent to its reservation, India is bound to introduce a
bilateral consultation or notification process if the Indian CA considers the
objection raised by the taxpayer in a MAP request as being not justified. The
recent MAP guidance issued by India9 addresses this aspect,
wherein India will notify the treaty partner about the reasons for which the
MAP application cannot be accepted and solicit the treaty partner’s response
to arrive at a decision.

 

Article 16(1) Second
sentence:

India has not reserved this sentence as the existing CTA that
India has entered into contains the specified time limit of three years
except for four CTAs10 where the existing timeline for initiating
the MAP is less than three years. India has notified these four CTAs. These
four CTAs will be modified by Article 16(1) of the MLI to include a minimum
time limit of three years, where an aggrieved taxpayer can initiate MAP with
the respective CA where the taxpayer is a resident

 

6   Echoing Article 31 and 32 of Vienna
Convention

7   OECD (2015), Making Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris

Article

Scope

Inference

16(2)

 

First sentence

 

 

 

 

 

 

Second sentence

If objection appears to be justified and the CA is not able to
achieve a satisfactory solution by himself, then the case must be resolved by
mutual agreement with the CA of the other state – Bilateral MAP

Bilateral MAP – This clause ensures that where the CA cannot
resolve cases unilaterally, the CA concerned must enter into discussions with
his counterpart CA for a resolution

The contracting states’ settled MAP agreement must be
implemented irrespective of the timeline prescribed under the domestic laws

Implementation of MAP agreement: This clause is to provide
certainty to taxpayers that implementation of MAP agreements will not

[Continued]

 

 

be obstructed by any time limits in the domestic law of the
jurisdictions concerned

India’s Position:

 

Article 16(2) First
sentence:

There is no reservation clause for the said
provision. Further, all the CTAs India has entered into contain the said
clause except for the CTAs with Greece and Mexico. India has duly notified
these two CTAs, which do not contain the language equivalent to Article 16(2)
First sentence. Both Greece and Mexico must make a similar matching
notification by including the India treaty in their notification list
according to which the First sentence of Article 16(2) shall apply to these
treaties.

 

Article 16(2) Second
sentence:

India has not made any reservation to this clause as most of the
treaties it has entered into contain a similar language. However, India has
notified ten CTAs which do not contain the language specified in
Article 16 (2) Second sentence. Therefore, Article 16(2) Second sentence will
apply to these ten CTAs, if these treaty partners make a similar matching
notification by including the India treaty in their notification list.
Failure to notify by any of these ten treaty partners will result in a
mismatch notification, whereby the CTA retains status quo, i.e., it
remains unaltered by the MLI provision

Article

Scope

Inference

16(3)

 

First sentence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Second
sentence

If any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation or
application of CTA, then the CA shall endeavour to resolve this by mutual
agreement

Dispute Prevention: Cases may arise concerning the interpretation or
the application of tax treaties that are generic and do not necessarily
relate to individual cases. In such a scenario, this provision makes it
possible to resolve difficulties arising from the application of the
Convention

CAs may also consult together to eliminate double taxation in
cases not provided under CTA

This provision enables the competent authorities to deal with
such cases of double taxation that do not come within the scope of the
provisions of the Convention. For example, resident of a third state having
PE in both the contracting states

India’s Position:

 

Article 16(3) First
sentence:

There is no reservation clause for this provision. Further, all
the CTAs India has entered into contain the said clause except for two
treaties,

[Continued]

i.e., with Australia and Greece. India has duly notified these
two treaties which do not contain the language equivalent to Article 16(3)
First sentence. Therefore, both Australia and Greece shall notify the treaty
with India, according to which Article 16(3) First sentence shall apply to
the CTA concerned and be modified. Failure to notify by these two treaty
partners will result in a mismatch notification, whereby the CTA retains status
quo,
i.e., it remains unaltered by the MLI provision

 

Article 16(3) Second
sentence:

There is no reservation clause for this provision. Further, a
majority of the CTAs that India has entered into contain the said clause
except for six CTAs11. India has notified the six CTAs
which do not contain the language specified in Article 16(3) Second sentence.
Therefore, the Article 16(3) Second sentence will apply to these six CTAs if
these treaty partners make a similar matching notification by including India
in their notification list. Failure to notify by any of these six treaty
partners will result in a mismatch notification, whereby the CTA retains status
quo,
i.e., it remains unaltered by the MLI provision

 

8   Para 20 – Commentary on Article 25, OECD
Model Convention, 2017

9   MAP Guidance/2020, F.No 500/09/2016-APA-I,
Dated 7th August, 2020, CBDT, Government of India

10  Belgium, Canada, Italy and UAE

3.2 Article 17 – Corresponding Adjustments

Article

Scope

Inference

17(1)

 

 

Unilateral corresponding
adjustment

– Normally, in a transfer pricing adjustment, a taxpayer in a Contracting
Jurisdiction (State A), whose profits are revised upwards, will be liable to
tax on an amount of profit which has already been taxed in the hands of its
associated enterprise in another Contracting Jurisdiction (State B)

 

In such a scenario, State B shall make an appropriate adjustment
to relieve the economic double taxation

Mitigating economic double taxation: The provision is a
replicated version of Article 9(2) of the OECD Model Convention. Further, the
provision is to ensure that jurisdictions provide access to MAP in transfer
pricing cases

India’s Position:

 

India has made its reservation under Article 17(3)(a) for the
right not to include the corresponding adjustment clause in the CTAs, which
already contains a similar  clause
[Article 9(2) in the respective tax treaties]. Therefore, Article 17(1) will
have no impact on those CTAs. However, in respect of those CTAs that do not
contain the corresponding adjustment clause [for example, the India-France
CTA12], the corresponding adjustment clause will be included to
modify the same

3.3 The interplay of other articles of MLI with MAP

Part V of the MLI includes mechanism Article 16 of the MLI. As mentioned earlier, the introduction of the BEPS measure through MLI may create significant disputes in the form of disagreement on CTA interpretation, application of anti-abuse provisions and denial of treaty benefits, etc. To effectively address these disputes and eliminate double taxation, taxpayers access MAP to address their dispute through the framework and minimum standard under Article 16 of the MLI. Further, apart from the generic framework under Article 16, there are situations where other substantive provisions of MLI allow taxpayers to access MAP to resolve tax treaty disputes.

 

11  Australia, Belgium, Greece, Philippines,
Ukraine and UK

12  Synthesised Text between India and France CTA
available at
https://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/dtaa/synthesised-text-of-mli-and-india-france-dtac-indian-version.pdf

India’s position concerning these other substantive provisions is as follows:

Article

Particulars

Scope
– MAP accessibility

India’s
Position

4(1)

Dual Resident Entities

If a person other than an individual is resident in more than
one state, the CA shall endeavour to determine residency for CTA

 

In the absence of an agreement, the person shall not be entitled
to relief or exemption from tax except to the extent and manner agreed by the
CA. In effect, CAs can agree and provide relief at their discretion

India has notified 91 treaties (except Greece and Libya).
Further, India has agreed to the discretion of CAs to provide relief in a
case where dual residency is not resolved

 

Australia and Japan have reserved application of discretionary
relief. Hence, discretionary relief cannot be granted under these treaties by
the competent authorities

7(4)

Principal Purpose Test (PPT)

Deny treaty benefits if reasonable to conclude that one of the
principal purposes of the arrangement is to obtain tax benefits

 

Based on MAP request, the CA can provide treaty relief after
consideration of facts and circumstances

India has not opted for the discretionary relief provision as it
has notified the same under Article 7(17)(b). Therefore, once the treaty
benefits are denied, the CAs cannot provide any relief at their discretion

 

Notwithstanding the above, the taxpayer can avail the treaty
benefit if it can be established that the tax benefit is in accordance with
the object and purpose of the CTA

 

 

 

[Continued]

 

as stipulated  under
Article 7(1) without resorting to MAP. Under this circumstance, the tax
authorities can grant treaty benefits

7(12)

Specified Limitation of Benefits (SLOB)

If a person is not a qualified person as per para 7(9) nor
entitled to benefits as per para 7(10)/7(11), the CA may grant relief subject
to certain conditions and requirements

India has opted for the provision of SLOB in addition to PPT13

However, the provision of SLOB shall apply to Indian tax
treaties only if the other contracting states have also notified SLOB
provisions

10(3)

PE situated in a third jurisdiction

Suppose the benefit of CTA is denied under
para 10(1) regarding the income derived by a resident. In that case, the CA
of another contracting state (source state) may nevertheless grant these
benefits subject to consultation with the resident state CA

India is silent on this Article. Accordingly, the Article will
be applicable subject to notification and reservations made by the other
contracting jurisdiction as per Articles 10(5) and 10(6) of the MLI

From India’s standpoint, Article 7 has a significant impact. The application of PPT to evaluate treaty entitlement would create significant interpretation issues and the taxpayers may explore MAP compared to the domestic dispute mechanism.

 

13  A total of 14 countries including India have
opted for SLOB. Greece opted for asymmetric application as per Article 7(b) of
MLI; this thereby allows India to adopt SLOB along with PPT even though Greece
shall apply only PPT

14  OECD (2019), Making Dispute Resolution More
Effective – MAP Peer Review Report, India (Stage 1): Inclusive Framework on
BEPS: Action 14, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD
Publishing, Paris,
https://doi.org/10.1787/c66636e8-en

4. MAP 2.0- DOMESTIC MEASURES TAKEN BY INDIA

  •  The BEPS AP 14 had suggested a peer review mechanism to ensure adequate implementation of the suggested minimum standard and recommendations. As a result, the peer review undertaken for India in 201914 highlighted India’s progress on the MAP programme and suggested recommendations for more effective functioning of the MAP. According to the peer review and BEPS AP 14, the Indian tax authorities have taken significant steps to reform the MAP framework and make it productive. Two significant reforms include:

  •  The CBDT amended Rule 44G of the Income-Tax Rules and substituted it with the erstwhile Rules 44G and 44H15. The amended Rule deals extensively with the implementation and the procedural framework for the MAP process.

  • In line with the BEPS AP 14 recommendation, India had released a detailed guidance note on MAP16. The MAP guidance addresses many of the open issues on procedural aspects of MAP and, more importantly, clarifies key practical nuances absent in the pre-BEPS era regime for the taxpayers to resort to.

  •  Broad features of the MAP guidance issued by the Indian tax administration, which acts as a handy tool for taxpayers in understanding the MAP framework, are as follows:

Part

Nature

Brief
aspects covered

A

Introduction and basic information

This part addresses the following aspects:

Manner of filing MAP request (Form 34)

Contents of an MAP application

Procedure to be followed in case MAP is filed in the home
country against the order of the Indian tax authority

Procedure to be followed by CA of India upon receipt of a MAP
request

Participation of Indian CA in multilateral MAP cases

Communication of views between CAs through a position paper

India has committed to resolving the MAP cases within an average
timeframe of 24 months

B

Access and denial of MAP

Access to MAP

Provide instances where MAP can be filed

Commitment to provide MAP access in a situation where domestic
anti-abuse provisions are applied Clarification of MAP access in case of an
order under section 201

[Continued]

 

B

 






 

 

 

 

Access and denial of MAP

The situation where MAP access will be granted but Indian CA
will not negotiate any outcome other than what was achieved earlier – such as
Unilateral APA, Safe Harbour, order of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In
these circumstances, Indian CA will request the other treaty partner to
provide correlative relief

Denial of MAP in situations where

Delay in filing MAP application

The objection raised by the taxpayer is not justified – Treaty
partner will be consulted before denial

Incomplete / defective application is not rectified within a
reasonable time, or non-filing of additional information within the time
limit

Cases settled through Settlement Commission

Cases before Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR)

Issues governed by domestic law

C

Technical issues

The CA can negotiate and eliminate all or part of the
adjustments provided it does not reduce the returned income

Recurring issues can be resolved as per prior MAP. However,
issues cannot be resolved in advance

Interest and penalty are consequential and hence not part of MAP

Indian CA will make secondary adjustment as per law

MAP cannot be proceeded with where BAPA or Multilateral APA is
filed

Suspension of collection of taxes will be as per Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) entered into with treaty partner; in its absence, the
domestic law provision will apply

Adjustment of taxes paid by payer according to order under
section 201 of the Act

D

Implementation
of outcomes

India is committed to implementing MAP outcomes in all cases
except when an order of ITAT is received for the same year before
implementing MAP outcome. In such a case, India will intimate the treaty
partners and request them to provide correlative relief. In addition,
taxpayers are provided with 30 days to convey their acceptance of the outcome

 

15  Notification No. 23/2020, CBDT dated 6th
May, 2020

16  MAP Guidance/2020, F.No 500/09/2016-APA-I,
dated 7th August, 2020, CBDT, Government of India

5. REFLECTIONS

  •  Based on the discussions in the earlier paragraphs, on juxtaposing the Indian tax treaties with the MLI provisions of Articles 16 and 17, a substantial number of existing CTAs already contain the provisions recommended by the MLI. Therefore, the ineffectiveness of MAP in the pre-BEPS era (MAP1.0) may be attributed largely to procedural infirmities and hassles.
  •  Therefore, for MAP 2.0, the need of the hour is to address the existing shortcomings. In this regard, the Indian tax administration’s recent measures to introduce revised rules and the guidance note on MAP are noteworthy and laudable. They reflect India’s approach to resolve treaty-based tax disputes and stick to its commitment to the BEPS inclusive framework. Further, the implementation of reforms based on the FTA-MAP peer review recommendations on BEPS AP 14 also reflect the approach of the Indian tax administration to rectify its defects in the MAP process.

  •  India’s MAP statistics further support the view that MAP 2.0 is heading in the right direction. One can observe that the timeline for resolving MAP cases has considerably reduced considering that the time taken for MAP resolution was more than five years in the MAP 1.0 era17. Speedy resolution of tax disputes fosters certainty and promotes faith in the system. It is imperative to mention that India’s positive outlook to resolve disputes is also reflected with the OECD conferring India and Japan with the MAP award for effective co-operation to resolve transfer pricing cases18.

MAP caseload as at 2019-end inventory and time
frame of resolving

Particulars

TP
cases

Others

Cases started before 1st January, 2016

380

96

Cases started after 1st January, 2016

410

65

The average time before January, 2016 cases – to resolve MAP
[months]

64.86

61.97

Average time after January, 2016 cases – to
resolve MAP
[months]

18.48

19.02

  •  Amidst all the positive changes that the Indian tax authorities have brought in for an effective MAP 2.0, there are still some aspects that require consideration:

  •  Suspension of collection of taxes – India, in its MAP guidance, has stated that in respect of countries with no MoU, the CBDT Circular governs the suspension of tax collection. However, the Circulars / provisions of stay come with certain riders; for example, u/s 254 the Tribunal does not have the power to grant stay beyond 365 days in certain situations19. Therefore, such impediments could put taxpayers in a difficult situation and could impair the outcome of the MAP. Hence, a more flexible approach to suspending tax collection, pending a mutually agreeable procedure, is desirable.

  •  Resolution for recurring issues – Currently, the aggrieved taxpayer must apply for MAP resolution every year regarding recurring issues. Hence, the Indian MAP guidance precludes the CA from resolving in advance or prior to an order by the Income-tax authorities on recurring issues. For speedier disposal of recurring issues under MAP, the Government may consider introducing a simplified process. Such a mechanism will assist in reducing the timelines for MAP resolution for recurring issues and foster certainty. Further, in the case of change in the CA in future years, the incumbent CA should maintain consistency and follow the prior years’ MAP position without any deviation.

  •  ITAT order overrides MAP settlement – The India MAP guidance suggests that the ITAT order will supersede the MAP settlement in cases where the implementation of MAP settlement has not taken place. The rationale behind this is that the ITAT is an independent statutory appellate body and the CA cannot deviate from it. This proposition is against the commitment granted under the treaty. Besides, in practice, most transfer pricing cases are usually remanded back to the field officers setting aside the original assessment. Considering that a faceless regime for ITAT is on the anvil, it is our humble view that India should reconsider this proposition and make suitable legal amendments to give effect to MAP settlements.


CONCLUSION

The existing MAP regime in India can foster tax certainty only by rectifying its flaws and defects. Thanks to the BEPS initiative and the MLI, the MAP framework has indeed got overhauled. The measures adopted by India by aligning towards its global commitment by providing necessary amendments to domestic law, clarifications and resolving disputes in a shorter period signals that the process is heading in the right direction. Measures undertaken through MAP 2.0 for an efficient dispute resolution framework may not be perfect and completely defect-free. Yet, the measures taken are laudable, bringing an element of clarity and certainty for taxpayers. After all, what is coming is better than what is gone!

 

17  April, 2014 – December, 2020 about 790 cases
overall were resolved under MAP; Source – Ministry of Finance Annual Report,
2020-21

18  https://www.oecd.org/tax/dispute/mutual-agreement-procedure-2019-awards.htm

19  Pepsi Foods Limited [2021] 126 taxmann.com 69
(SC) – The Supreme Court has held that ITAT can grant stay beyond 365 days, if
the delay in disposal of appeal is not attributable to the assessee

SATYAMEVA JAYATE VS. PROPAGATING LIES

We are entering the seventy-fifth year of India’s independence. Satyameva Jayate – the only words on the state emblem – was meant to be the beacon not only for Government but for our people as the only surviving ancient civilisation became a nation. It encapsulates the essence of the entire Bharatiya traditions.

However, with each passing day, not only in India, not only in Governments or businesses, it is increasingly harder to find what is true. Take the example of the Government proclaiming in Parliament that there were no deaths due to lack of oxygen in the second wave1. At one level it may be ‘true’ but reality backed up by evidence tells a different tale.

Truth is harder to sight. This is so because it is surrounded, if not eclipsed, by half-truth, post-truth, selective truth, lies as truth, packaged truth, paid research truth, legitimised / justified truth, cognitive bias, counter-factual views as news, promising something without expected minimum due care, fake news, possible views, misrepresenting, misleading propaganda, false equivalence and more. It is everywhere – from billboards to institutions, from school textbooks to television.

This Editorial is dedicated to where we see such propagation of lies and how and why we should call its bluff. We all are surrounded by lies (from subtle to blatant), perhaps we have sensed it too, but not noticed it very clearly. Yet, nothing is more important today than extracting ‘the true’ and setting it apart from that which is untrue. The ability to do this and its consistent application will be the true celebration of Bharat, its nationhood and its civilisational heritage.

Take the example of cigarettes. It took 50 years for them to be declared as bad for health in America (one billion people smoke today and governments count on revenues from cigarette sales2). On the other hand, marijuana is incapable of causing deaths3 but is illegal, cigarette smoking annually kills 50 lakh people and yet cigarettes are legal and can be purchased anywhere. In fact, a study says that alcohol is 100 times more lethal than marijuana!

In the area of medicine, according to doctors, for insulin-resistant people giving insulin actually kills. The number of diabetics is increasing like nobody’s business4, but the real cause and therefore the way to cure it, is shoved under the carpet. The real cause is not sugar alone but secretion of insulin due to eating and eating too often. Eating is today a global pandemic for industrialised countries. We are likely to die from excess food rather than starvation as was the case a few hundred years ago. While all this is going on, a private medical association recommends, approves products from anti-bacterial paints (for protection from viral transmissions) to LED bulbs (that kill 85% germs), to Pepsico’s Tropicana Fruit Juice (the first medical association to endorse food) when it has high fructose corn syrup that leads to fatty liver and inflammation (NAFLD)!

Let’s look at the Media (of course not all media, but enough above the acceptable threshold and in the mainstream). It has remained at the forefront of propagating lies. If media were a virus, it would have numerous variants popping their heads out at the opportune time. One variant is the ‘outrage’ variant and the second can be called the ‘silent’ variant. They both selectively create outrage or complete silence when reporting, depending on the circumstances favourable to their agenda. Other variants, and they are global, are: fear, hate, blame, anxiety, negativity, victimhood, sensationalism, rhetoric… for which immunity gained by spotting the truth is the only way to not succumb. Many suffer from diarrhoea of words but constipation of thoughts5.

What about the web? If you search Ayurveda on Wikipedia, the second sentence (the authorship of which is attributed to the same private medical association) calls it the practice of quacks – whereas Sushrut is the father of surgery, having done at least eight types of surgery from plastic surgery to dental surgery to treating fractures and removing stones, full 3,500 years ago! As you can imagine, this has been put up with a purpose, whereas if you look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica, it simply gives facts and not selected negative opinions.

 

1   https://www.livemint.com/news/india/no-deaths-due-to-lack-of-oxygen-were-specifically-reported-by-states-uts-during-second-wave-govt-told-parliament-11626801416761.html

2   28% + up to 21% cess, but
is fairly low compared to many countries. Approximately Rs. 53,750 crores is
the revenue collection

3   https://www.healthline.com/health-news/can-marijuana-kill-you#More-concerns-with-more-availability

4   In a ten-year period
between 2007 and 2017, diabetics increased from 40.9 m to 72.9 m in India.
Globally, 171 m people in 2000; likely to reach 366 m as per WHO

5 Adapted from what Dr. A.
Velumani wrote recently on social media

It’s there in professions, too. People give ‘possible views’ (we never knew that the possibility of something can become a professional view for there are infinite possibilities and they cannot fit the law just because they are possible). Many of these are outrageously over the top. Here is one: schools selling notebooks to students could ‘possibly’ be treated as service requiring registration under GST.

One actress put out videos stating how firecrackers during Diwali made her run out of breath due to her asthma; and later she celebrated her wedding with a lavish fireworks show. Look at the advertising around us, which often sells what you don’t need and even can’t afford by exploiting fears and insecurities. Or for that matter see who are called our heroes? They are not just actors and entertainers, but rather soldiers, scientists, entrepreneurs, sports persons and many others. The Punjab CM recently tweeted that three goals were scored by Punjab players at the Olympics hockey competition and made it sound as if Punjab alone got the goals. Whereas, in a team sport, players (from six different states in this case) got the ball to a player who then scored a goal.

The top court pushed back a plea for President’s Rule in Bengal due to the killing of innocents in post-poll violence by 15 days but took suo motu cognizance of the death of a judge in Jharkhand. Courts often take suo motu cognizance, but defer cognized facts for another day. Some say it’s because the common man is expendable. Who doesn’t remember the Rs. 1 fine on a top lawyer for criminal contempt of the Supreme Court for ‘scandalising the court’ on Twitter. He had the wisdom to know what behaviour is expected and the ability to pay a reasonable fine. But these selective approaches to the truth continue even from the keepers of the law!

Reservation, a national menace today, was meant to be continued for ten years (1951-61). It is now a mega tool of inducement for votes, appeasement and killing meritocracy. In fact, it is an outright promotion of benefits based on caste (birth-based) rather than class (economic need). This has made people covet and convert to get benefits. This is legitimising the unjust. This is a race, not to the top, but to the bottom.

Each Independence Day let’s increase our ability to extract ‘the true’ and set it apart from lies with courage and sharpness. As professionals, this is what we are trained for and are expected to deliver. Unfortunately, it cannot be defined by laws and depends on context many a time. At a mundane level truth is evidenced by a measurable reality (existence of something or occurrence of something), often it is what is beneficial and not just convenient (punish the wealthy for non-serious offences with a fine rather than imprisonment for they give taxes and generate jobs which can be used for the welfare of many rather than killing their business), sometimes it is worthy of one’s role (Federer was asked for a pass at the Australian Open by a security guard in 2019) and so on. Times are such where the false is promoted as true and so one must prefer and promote the truth. In the words of a famous author: 

Sometimes high-ranking people and institutions sacrifice truth for something else like peace, etc. Martin Luther wrote ‘Peace if possible, truth at all costs.’ Because when truth is lost, all else that remains will be detrimental and ephemeral. In the words of Carl Sagan: If it can be destroyed by the Truth, it deserves to be destroyed by the Truth.

Happy 75th Independence Day! Jai Hind!

Raman Jokhakar
Editor