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A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 4 dated September30, 2016

Investment by 
Foreign  Portfolio  investors (FPI) in government Securities

This
circular has increased the limit for investments in Government Securities by
FPI in two tranches each of Rs. 100 billion from October 3, 2016 and January 2,
2017 as under, in the table below:

INR Billion

 

Central Government Securities

State Development Loans

Aggregate

 

For All FPIs

Additional for Long Term FPIs

Total

For all FPIs (including Long Term FPIs)

 

Existing Limits

1440

560

2000

140

2140

Revised limits with effect from
October 3, 2016

1480

620

2100

175

2275

Revised limits with effect from
January 2, 2017

1520

680

2200

210

2410

The operational guidelines relating to allocation
and monitoring of limits will be issued by the Securities and exchange Board of
india (SEBI).

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 3 dated September 29, 2016

Exim Bank’s GoI supported line  of Credit of USD 87.00 million to the
government of the Republic of zimbabwe

Exim
Bank has made available, subject to certain terms and conditions, to the
Government of the republic of Zim­ babwe, a Line of Credit of US $ 87 million
for financing renovation / up-gradation of Bulawayo thermal  Power Plant in republic of Zimbabwe. Eligible
goods and servic­ es including consultancy services of the value of at least
75% of the contract price must be supplied by the sellers from india, while the
remaining 25% of the goods and ser­ vices can be procured by the sellers from
outside india.

The
last date for opening letters of credit and disbursement is 60 months from the
scheduled completion date of the project.

Notification No. FEMA 375/2016-RB dated September 9, 2016

Foreign Exchange management (Transfer or issue of Security
by a Person Resident out- side india) (Thirteenth amendment) Regulations, 2016

This
Notification states that Schedule 1, in Annex B, Para­ graph F.8 Notification
No. FEMA. 20/2000-RB dated 3rd may 2000 will be substituted as under: ­

F.8

Other Financial Services

 

 

 

Financial Services activities
regulated by financial sector regulators, viz., RBI, SEBI, IRDA, PFRDA, NHB
or any other financial sector regulator as may be notified by the Government
of India.

100%

Automatic

F.8.1

Other Conditions

 

 

 

i.        Foreign investment in ‘Other
Financial Services’ activities shall be subject to conditionalities,
including minimum capitalization norms, as specified by the concerned
Regulator/Government Agency.

ii.      ‘Other Financial Services’ activities need to be
regulated by one of the Financial Sector Regulators. In all such financial
services activity which are not regulated by any Financial Sector Regulator
or where only part of the financial services activity is regulated or where
there is doubt regarding the regulatory oversight, foreign investment up to
100% will be allowed under Government approval route subject to conditions
including minimum capitalization requirement, as may be decided by the
Government.

iii.    Any activity which is specifically regulated by an
Act, the foreign investment limits will be restricted to those
levels/limit that may be specified in that Act, if so mentioned.

iv.    Downstream investments by any of these entities engaged in “Other
Financial Services” will be subject to the extant sectoral regulations
and provisions of Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of
Security by a Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2000, as amended
from time to time
.”

Twitter Fun of the Month

This month, one of the most talked about topics on twitter
was the advertisement of a pan masala brand where one of the actors who played
the role of James  Bond in the past
featured. This set the twitterati abuzz. Here are some of the tweets that we
found worth sharing with our readers.

@KyaukhaadLega
Bond is now famous Pan-india

@rameshsrivats ­

Pierce Brosnan.

Played James Bond.

Endorses Pan Bahar.

Licensed to kill.

@NSDahiya  – Pierce Brosnan has got supari to kill now.

@ajith27  – Pierce Brosnan says the outrage has given
him much to chew on, Paan unintended

@Vineet_Nag  -I used to think #money is not everything but
then i saw #PierceBrosnan doing an ad film for Pan Parag paan masala !!

@navalmalpani   – We know india is getting ahead in class
when SrK endorses tag heur, and Pierce Brosnan endorses Gutkha . #PanBahar #PierceBrosnan

@Burman_amit   – Pierce Brosnan: “Wy wvem ih von, aemz
von” me:”What??” Pierce Brosnan:Spits Pan Bahar “my name is
Bond, james  Bond” #PanBahar #Pierce- Brosnan

And after the concerned actor feigned ignorance about the
true nature of the product that he had endorsed, the world of twitter had yet
another bout of laughter:

@jujvijay  – Pierce Brosnan says he didn’t know what he
was selling. Guess things didn’t *’paan’*
out as expected #paanbahar #piercebrosnan #Punintended

@iamranjandhar
Pierce Brosnan: ek Pan Bahar dena. Paan Wala: yeh lo. *Pierce Brosnan Gives 5 Rs*
Paan­ wala: Sahab 7.50 Rs. Ka hai. PB: dhai another day!

@news24tvchannel
– James breaks Bond with Paan Ba­ har: Pierce Brosnan accuses company of trappi
#Pierce- Brosnan #PaanBahar #Contract #ad

@askThePankazzzz
– Honestly, deeply hurt to know that Pierce Brosnan doesn’t actually eat Paan
Bahar. tired of these people breaking my trust again & again.

@ind_mnk – A
friend looking for job was not getting one, Pierce Brosnan (Bond 007) in indian
Paan Bahar ad only shows it’s a worldwide recession.!!

And here are some tweets where people are talking about the
controversial US elections where Mr. donald trump and Ms. Hillary Clinton are
engaged in an ugly battle.

@Elizasoul80 – I
wouldn’t vote for a woman just because i’m a woman, just like people shouldn’t
vote for trump just because they’re idiots.

@PetrickSara
Someone said my kid would probably grow up to be president, and i’m not sure if
it was meant as a compliment or an insult.

@WilliamAder – Remember
when we thought “any kid can grow up to be President” was a good thing?

@ericsshadow – I
hear all these trump supporters say­ ing they support him because he speaks his
mind. Well you know who else speaks his mind? My 4 year old.

@marlebean – They
say ignorance is bliss, but trump supporters don’t seem very happy.

On another note, here are a few that are probably from tired
young mothers:

@mommyshorts – Asked
to switch seats on the plane because i was sitting next to a crying baby. Apparently,
that’s not allowed if the baby is yours.

@LurkatHomeMom  – Hell 
hath no fury like a 4 year old whose sandwich has been cut into squares
when he wanted triangles.

@cheeseboy22
Kids everywhere are fighting global warming by leaving doors open and air
conditioning the outside.

And none of our compilations can be complete without quoting
the irrepressible Ramesh Srivats of Bangalore:

@rameshsrivats  – Board of Control for Cricket in india

– if you remove their Control, they’ll remove our Cricket.
and india will be Board.

And here are this month’s recommendations of twitter handles
that you can follow. This time, we thought of shar­ ing the handles of a few
global accounting networks.

TMF – @tmforumorg

Nexia International –
@Nexia_intnl

PwC LLP – @PwC_LLP

Deloitte – @Deloitte

MGK Consulting – @MGK_Consulting

Mazars – @MazarsGroup

PKF international – @PKFI

Prime Global –
@PrimeGlobalAcct

RSM US LLP – @RSMUSLLP

Baker Tilly International
– @BakerTillyint

Moore Stephens
international – @MooreStephens

Still Afraid Of Disclosures

On October 1, finance minister
Arun Jaitley announced that the government was pleased with the windfall from
the four-month black money disclosure scheme that ended on September 30. Indians
have declared hidden assets worth Rs 65,250 crore ($10 billion). The tax
collection, at Rs 30,000 crore ($4.5 billion), will help build many a road and
school. But, by global standards, the haul is small. Could a lighter price have
earned more revenues?

Amnesty schemes being offered in
countries such as indonesia  and  argentina 
are  yielding  huge 
revenues due to low tax and penalty rates. In indonesia, those with
hidden assets abroad need to only pay a flat fee of 1-6 per cent of the value
of the assets depending on how quickly they declare their stash and whether they
repatriate it. There is also no prosecution or penalty. These countries are
clear about maximising revenues, having decided to pardon those who have broken
the law.

India does not fall in that
league. The just-concluded income declaration Scheme (IDS) allowed people to
pay tax, surcharge and penalty adding up to 45 per cent on their past
undisclosed income. The design was better than the earlier scheme that fared
miserably due to the heavy price — 30 per cent tax and an equivalent amount as
penalty — and the lack of trust as to whether there would be penalties even
after coming clean.

Should the government offer a
second chance to those with hidden wealth overseas to come clean? Paring the
tax rate will make it work. Some would argue against india offering frequent
amnesties the way they do in, say, italy. But the US offers an open-ended
offshore voluntary disclosure Program.

One model could be the sort of
permanent amnesty scheme offered by Scandinavian countries and South africa. A person
is allowed to declare her past undeclared income before the case is picked up
for audit. As the government cannot possibly cover a wide range of taxpayers in
audits, such a scheme allows taxpayers to regularise their tax affairs and
start afresh.

Jeffrey owens,  former director of the OECD Centre for
tax  Policy  and 
administration,  says  people 
must  be given enough time to
unwind their past tax affairs before governments move to the new world of tax
transparency. That’s  a valid point. India
will join other countries to follow common reporting standards from next year. This
means exchange of information on account holders across jurisdictions will be
automatic, making it tough for tax dodgers to hide their wealth.

Also, there is no stigma attached
now to offshore voluntary compliance schemes. The OECD has endorsed these
schemes that have been introduced in many countries. India is only rolling with
the tide, and when businesses bring money on to their books, they can repay
loans, avoid bankruptcies and secure fresh credit. Leveraging on higher equity
capital will also make them expand, and help the economy grow.

David Bradbury, head of the OECD
tax Policy and Statistics division, however, reckons that governments should
weigh the benefits and costs, as it can create a perception that voluntary
disclosure schemes are par for the course.

The problem in india is very few
are convinced that non­ disclosure would lead to punitive action. That must
change. Egregious offenders must pay. The US department of justice  puts the information on prosecutions launched
in public domain. Britain’s revenue and customs department too has made it
clear that people can’t get away saying ‘don’t tax me, tax the man behind’.

India will have game-changing
data with automatic information exchange to pursue tax evaders. Having joined
the global war against tax evasion, it should follow Britain and create a
Unique Legal Entity Identifier to trace the real, beneficial owners of companies.
Here, effective sharing of information will help.

Amine of data is already
available with the income-tax department through the annual information returns
that identify potential taxpayers by examining their spending patterns. To
check for evasion, it has been matching the data provided by various agencies
with an individual’s income-tax returns.

What we really need is
intelligent data mining to create rock solid proof of tax evasion. Why not
consider data not filed, but gathered using data-mining techniques, using big
data analytics?

India should also reform its
direct tax regime to lower tax rates, and widen the ridiculously low base. it
also partly  explains  why 
tax  as  a  proportion  of  GDP  has been stagnating at about 16.5 per cent
for the last three decades. The goal must be to at least double india’s tax- GDP
ratio to meet spending commitments. Moving to the goods and services tax (GST)  will certainly provide an opportunity to
reform direct taxes. We can then forget amnesty schemes.

(Source: Article by Hema
Ramakrishnan in the Economic times dated 05.10.2016)

Side Incentives to Promoters and Management by PE Investors – SEBI Seeks to Address Conundrum

Background

Perhaps
a never-ending conflict in listed companies is the one between interests of
Promoters/management on one hand and the public shareholders on the other.
Promoters and members of the public are both shareholders and hence,
effectively have equal rights and benefits. However, Promoters are in charge of
company and would need oversight  to  ensure 
that  they  do 
not  take  any 
undue benefit of such control. The key top executives who run the
company are also particularly relevant in professionally managed companies. The
conflict of interest here is that they may keep their interests above that of
shareholders. Thus, for example, they should not pay themselves excessive
remuneration. these  are two of the
important of challenges in listed companies that are partly sought to be
addressed by good corporate governance measures. The Companies act, 2013, does
contain certain statutory provisions in this regard. A parallel set of
provisions with some differences are provided by SEBI in the SEBI (listing  obligations and disclosure requirements)
regulations, 2015. Generally, it is expected that, in comparison with
parliament, SEBI would act as a more dynamic watchdog for protection in
particular of public shareholders. Hence, it is not surprising that SEBI has
sought to address a peculiar arrangement that is being adopted in connection
with investment in several companies by Private equity investors (“PE
investors”).

Nature of Concern Sought to be Addressed

PE
investors have a special role in listed companies. They usually are not such
substantial shareholders so as to be able to control the listed company.
However, their holding is  sufficiently
big  whereby  they often have agreements with the
management/Promoters (“the management”) such that certain special rights are
given to them. What has now become an issue of concern is a side arrangement
many of such PE investors have entered into with the Promoters/ management of
listed companies. Essentially, what is provided in such arrangement is that the
PE investor will pay a share of profits made by it on its investment in the
listed company to the management. Usually, this share is from the excess
profits made by the PE Investor over and above a certain benchmark return.
Thus,  for example, the PE investor may
agree to pay to the management 20% of the excess of profits over an internal
rate of return of 36% per annum. To take an example in figures, say, the PE
Investor had invested at a cost of Rs. 100 per share and sells the shares at
Rs. 500 after four years. The cost of Rs. 100 would require a sale price of Rs.
342 to give it an internal rate of return of 36% per annum. Thus,  it would have an excess of Rs. 158. The
management would thus be given about Rs. 31.60 per share as 20% share of such
excess.

The
concern that has been raised is whether such arrangements are fair and whether
they require any regulation in terms of ensuring transparency, obtaining
approvals, etc.

SEBI  has issued a consultation paper dated
4th  October 2016 seeking views. While
one will have to wait for the outcome of this consultation and in what form the
regulatory requirements will be issued, the consultation paper is specific
enough to merit a study. The paper gives the specific clauses that SEBI
proposes to insert in the regulations. As will be seen later herein, the Scope
of the requirements are wider than the arrangements between management and the
PE Investor for sharing of excess profits.

Nature of Issues/Problems

There
can be several issues raised in respect of such agreements, some of which have
been highlighted in the consultation paper. One of course is, lack of
transparency – the public shareholders would not even be aware of such side
arrangements. There is a potential conflict of interest between  the 
management  and  the 
public  shareholders on account of
such arrangements. It is possible that the PE 
investor  may  get 
special  treatment over the public
shareholders, though it may not be in violation of the law.

 Another concern is that the management may
become focussed on short term goals which lead to price appreciation of the
shares, since this would help them get a share of the profits under such
arrangements.

In
a sense, the management would be able to get more compensation than otherwise
permissible to them under law. for example, Promoters are not entitled to
employees stock options. Further,  there
are limits to remuneration that can be paid to managerial personnel under the
Companies act, 2013. Of course, the share is not paid out of the funds of the
company. Yet, the concern may be whether the spirit of such provisions is
defeated.

Analysis of the Proposed Amendments

In
regulation 26 of the SEBI (listing obligations and disclosure requirements)
regulations, 2015 (“the regulations”), a new sub-clause 6 is proposed to be
inserted as follows (emphasis provided):­

No
employee, including key managerial personnel, director or promoter
of a
listed entity shall enter into any agreement with any individual shareholder(s)
or any other third party with regard to compensation or profit sharing unless
prior approval has been obtained from the 
Board as well as  shareholders by
way of an ordinary resolution”.

“Provided
that all such  existing agreements
entered into prior to the date of notification and which may continue beyond
such date  shall  be 
informed  to the stock exchanges

for public dissemination and approval 
obtained  from  shareholders 
by  way  of an ordinary resolution in the forthcoming
general meeting
. Provided further that in case approval from shareholders
is not received, all such agreements shall be discontinued “.

Thus,   the proposed clause  divides the requirements in two parts – one
for new agreements providing for such arrangements and the other for existing
agreements. It requires that such agreements shall require prior approval of
Board of directors and the shareholders by way of ordinary resolution. In case
of existing agreements that would continue in the future, the requirements will
be slightly different. The approval of Board of directors is not required.
However, disclosure to stock exchanges would have to be made. Further,  approval of the shareholders by way of
ordinary resolution would have to be obtained in the forthcoming general
meeting of the company. If such approval is not received, then the agreement
for such arrangement would have to be discontinued.

The
requirement applies to such agreements as are described therein. Such agreement
would have to be with “employee, including key managerial personnel, director
or promoter of a listed entity” with “any individual shareholder or any other
third party”. The agreement should relate to “compensation or profit sharing”.
The term “key managerial personnel” would be as per the definition under the
Companies act, 2013.

Thus,  on one hand, the type of agreement as well
the persons between whom the agreement may be made have been widely defined. On
the other hand, the definition is specific and hence would apply only to such
matters and between such persons as specified therein.

Non-Transparent Arrangements till now

As
stated above, there is presently no statutory requirement to disclose such
agreements to the public. hence, such arrangements may not be known even to the
Board of directors,  much less to the
shareholders generally or the stock exchanges/public.

Requirements of Approval

The
requirements of approval are dual. One is from the Board of directors the  second is from the shareholders by way of an
ordinary resolution. For agreements that are to come into force in the future,
such approvals would have to be prior to entering into such agreements and not
after they are entered into.

Covers Agreements for Compensation As Well As Share of
Profits

The
payment to the management may be in the form of compensation or share of
profits. These terms have not been defined and hence may have wide meaning.
This also widens the scope of the requirements from what appears to be the
intent.

Covers Agreements with Share- Holders As Well As Third
Parties

The
agreements may be with individual shareholders of the company or even with
third parties. This may once again result in a scope that is wider than may be
otherwise expected from a requirement that appears to be intended for
agreements with PE investors. For example, would any compensation by a
group/holding/associate company to any person in management be also covered?

Retrospective effect

Of
particular concern is  the  fact 
that  the  requirements will effectively have a
retrospective effect. All existing agreements would be required to be disclosed
to the stock exchanges and also approved by shareholders. Failure to receive
such approval would result in a requirement to discontinue such agreement.

Comments

There
are valid objections raised for and against the requirements.

A
preliminary objection is as to whether such matters should be at all regulated.
Even if regulated, whether disclosures would be adequate to achieve the
objective. Even more, whether the approval of the shareholders serves any real
purpose and whether a group that should not have any say in such matters is
being given a right to veto such arrangements. The compensation/profits do not
go out of the pocket of the company or the shareholders. Indeed, the public
shareholders would also be benefitting in typical cases where the profit is out
of appreciation in the price of the shares.

On
the other hand, there may be a view that even such restrictions are not
sufficient. For one, there is no absolute bar on such agreements. There may be
a view that the conflict of interest that can result is substantial. Moreover,
such arrangements can be a subterfuge for payments for other consideration.

Further,  it is often likely that the
Board/shareholders may be dominated by the Promoters. Unlike related party
transactions, where there are certain restrictions on voting on certain
shareholders, there are no such restrictions here.

Finally,  of course, the new requirements may hit
existing arrangements hard. It is possible that existing agreements may have to
be shelved halfway if they do not receive approval and thus parties may be deprived
of the benefit particularly in respect of benefits that would have already
accrued to an extent.

All
in all, however, initiation of the debate is a step in the right direction and
at the very least, such arrangements would come to the knowledge of parties
concerned. One will have to see how the final draft of the requirements is
issued and then examine their impact.

Nomination in a Flat

Introduction

Nomination is increasingly used
in co-operative housing societies, depository/demat accounts, mutual funds,
Government bonds/securities, shares, bank accounts, etc. a nomination means
that the owner of the asset has designated another person in his place after
his death.

Once a person dies, his interest
stands transmitted to the person nominated by him. Thus,  a nomination is a facility to provide the
society, company, depository, etc., with a face with whom it can deal with on
the death of a person. On the death of the person and up to the execution of
the estate, a legal vacuum is created. Nomination aims to plug this legal
vacuum. A nomination is only a legal relationship created between the society,
company, depository, bank, etc. and the nominee.

A nomination seeks to avoid any
confusion in cases where the will has not been executed or where there are
disputes between the heirs. It is only an interregnum between the death and the
full administration of the estate of the deceased.

While there have been several
Supreme Court decisions on the question of the role of a nomination, recently,
the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the issue in the context of a
flat in a co-operative society.

Which is superior?

A nomination continues only up to
and until such time as the will is executed. No sooner the will is executed, it
takes precedence over the nomination. A nomination does not confer any
permanent right upon the nominee nor does it create any legal right in his
favour. Nomination transfers no beneficial interest to the nominee. A nominee
is for all purposes a trustee of the property. He cannot claim precedence over
the legatees mentioned in the will and take the bequests which the legatees are
entitled to under the will.

The  Supreme Court’s in the case of Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, 55 Comp. Cases
214 (SC),
in the context of a nomination under a life insurance policy
under the insurance act, 1938 has held that it does not have an effect of
conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under
the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. It only indicates the
hand which is authorised to receive the amount on the death of the insured.

Again in Vishin Khanchandani vs. Vidya Khanchandani, 246  ITR 
306  (SC)
,the  Supreme 
Court  examined  the effect of a nomination in respect of a
national  Savings Certificates and held
that nominee is only an administrative holder. any amount paid to the nominee
is part of the estate of the deceased which devolves upon all persons as per
the succession law and the nominee must return the payment to those in whose
favour the law creates a beneficial interest.

Flat In A Co-Operative Housing Society

Let us now consider the position
in the context of a flat in a co-operative society. Section 30 of the
maharashtra Co-operative Societies act, 
1960 (‘the act”)  provides as
follows:

“Section 30 – Transfer of interest on death of member

(1) On the death of  a 
member  of  a 
society,  the society shall
transfer the share or interest of the deceased member to a person or persons
nominated in accordance with the rules, or, if no person has been so nominated
to such person as may appear to the committee to be the heir or legal
representative of the deceased member.

Provided that, such nominee, heir
or legal representative, as the case may be, is duly admitted as a member of
the society:

Provided further that, nothing in
this sub-section or in section 22 shall prevent a minor or a person of unsound
mind from acquiring by inheritance or otherwise, any share or interest of a
deceased member in a society.

(2) Notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-section (1), any such nominee, heir or legal representative,
as the case may be, may require the society to pay to him the value of the
share or interest of the deceased members, ascertained in accordance with the
rules.

(3)  A society may pay all other moneys due to the
deceased member from the society to such nominee, heir or legal representative,
as the case may be.

(4)   All transfers and payments duly made by a
society in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be valid and
effectual against any demand made upon the society by any other person.”

Thus, in the event of the death
of a member of a Society, the Society is required to transfer the member’s
interest to such person as may appear to the Committee to be the heir or legal
representative of the deceased member. The Act does not define the term “heir”.
The Supreme Court in the case of N. Krishnammal vs. R. Ekambaram, 1979 AIR SC
1298, has defined the term as follows:

“…The word “heirs”, as
pointed out by this Court in Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick (1) cannot
normally be limited to “issues” only. It must mean all persons who
are entitled to the property of another under the law of inheritance.”

The Act also does not define who
is a “Legal representative”. Hence, one may refer to the Civil Procedure Code.
Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908defines a “Legal
Representative” as follows:

“(11) ” legal representative
” means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person,
and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and
where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom
the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued;”

High Court Rulings

The Bombay high Court in another case of Om Siddharaj Co-operative
Housing Society Limited vs. The State of Maharashtra & Others, 1998 (4)
Bombay Cases, 506
, has observed as follows in the context of a nomination
made in respect of a flat in a co-operative housing society:

“…….If a person is nominated in
accordance with rules, the Society is obliged to transfer ‘the share and
interest of the deceased member to such nominee. It is no part of the business
of the Society in that case to find out the relation of the nominee with the
deceased member or to ascertain and find out the heir or legal representatives
of the deceased member. It is only if there is no nomination in favour of any
person, that the share and interest of the deceased member has to be transferred
to such person as may appear to the committee or the Society to be the heir or
legal representative of the deceased member….”

Again in  the Gopal
Vishnu Ghatnekar vs. Madhukar Vishnu Ghatnekar, 1981 BCR, 1010
case, the
Bombay high Court has observed, in the context of a nomination made in respect
of a flat in a co-operative housing society, as follows:

“………It  is 
very  clear  on 
the  plain  reading 
of the Section that the intention of the Section is to provide for who
has to deal with the Society on the death of a member and not to create a new
rule of succession. the  purpose of the
nomination is to make certain the person with whom the Society has to deal and
not to create interest in the nominee to the exclusion of those who in law will
be entitled to the estate. The purpose is to avoid confusion in case there are
disputes between the heirs and legal representatives and to obviate the
necessity of obtaining legal representation and to avoid uncertainties as to
with whom the Society should deal to get proper discharge. though,  in law, the Society has no power to determine
as to who are the heirs or legal representatives, with a view to obviate
similar difficulty and confusion, the Section confers on the Society the right
to determine who is the heir or legal representative of a deceased member and
provides for transfer of the shares and interest of the deceased member’s
property to such heir or legal representative. Nevertheless, the persons
entitled to the estate of the deceased do not lose their right to the same. …….
once a person is nominated and the Society transfers the share or interest of
the deceased to him, he becomes the owner. If that is to be accepted it will
follow that if a Society accepts a person as the heir or legal representative
and transfers the share or interest to him, that person will become the owner. That
obviously, cannot he the intention of the legislature. Society has no power,
except provisionally and for a limited purpose to determine the disputes about
who is the heir or legal representative, therefore, follows that the provision
for transferring a share and interest to a nominee or to the heir or legal
representative as will be decided by the Society is only meant to provide for
interregnum between the death and the full administration of the estate and not
for the purpose of conferring any permanent right on such a person to a
property forming part of the estate of the deceased. The idea of having this
section is to provide for a proper discharge to the Society without involving
the Society into unnecessary litigation which may take place as a result of
dispute between the heirs’ uncertainty as to who are the heirs or legal
representatives. ….. it is only as between the Society and the nominee or heir
or legal representative that the relationship of the Society and its member are
created and this relationship continues and subsists only till the estate is
administered either by the person entitled to administer the same or by the
Court or the rights of the heirs or persons entitled to the estate are decided
in the Court of law. Thereafter the Society will be bound to follow such
decision.

……………. To repeat, a Society has a
right to admit a nominee of a deceased member or an heir or legal
representative of a deceased member as chosen by the Society as the member.”

A Single judge in Ramdas Shivram Sattur vs. Rameshchandra
Popatlal Shah 2009(4)Mh LJ 551
has held that a nominee has no right of
disposition of property since he is not an absolute owner. It held that section
30 does not provide for a special rule of Succession altering the rule of
Succession laid down under the personal law.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The position of a nominee in a
flat in a co-operative housing society was recently analysed by the Supreme
Court in Indrani Wahi vs. Registrar of
Co-operative Societies, CA NO. 4646 of 2006(SC).
This decision was rendered
under the context of the West Bengal Co­ operative Societies act, 1983. In the
impugned case, a father died leaving a nomination in favour of his married
daughter. His widow and son challenged the same on various grounds. The matter
traveled from the deputy registrar of Cooperative Societies up to the high
Court and ultimately to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that there
can be no doubt that the holding of a valid nomination does not ipso facto
result in the transfer of title in the flat in favour of the nominee. However,
consequent upon a valid nomination having been made, the nominee would be
entitled to possession of the flat. Further, the issue of title had to be left
open to be adjudicated upon between the contesting parties.it further held that
there can be no doubt, that where a member of a cooperative society nominates a
person, the cooperative society is mandated to transfer all the share or
interest of such member in the name of the nominee. It is also essential to
notice, that the rights of others on account of an inheritance or succession is
a subservient right. Only if a member had not exercised the right of
nomination, then and then alone, the existing share or interest of the member
would devolve by way of  succession  or 
inheritance.  It  clarified 
that  transfer of share or interest,
based on a nomination in favour of the nominee, was with reference to the
concerned cooperative society, and was binding on the said society. The
cooperative society had no option whatsoever, except to transfer the membership
in the name of the nominee but that, would have no relevance to the issue of
title between the inheritors or successors to the property of the deceased. The
Court finally concluded, that it was open to the other members of the family of
the deceased, to pursue their case of succession or inheritance, in consonance
with the law.

Conclusion

Thus, the legal position in this respect is very
clear. A nomination is only a legal relationship and not a permanent transfer
of interest in favour of the nominee. If the nominee claims ownership of an
asset, the beneficiary under the will can bring a suit against him and reclaim
his rightful ownership. However,  the
possession of the flat must be handed over by the society immediately to the
nominee till such time as the succession issue is legally settled.

Knowledge Updation

Arjun (A) — Govind Bolo Hari Gopala
Bolo Radharaman Hari Gopala Bolo Shrikrishna ! Shrikrishna !

Shrikrishna (S) — Arey arjun, today
you are chanting my bhajan! What is the matter?

A — I am in a good mood today; for a
change !

S — Oh, i see. But what makes you so
happy?

A — This   time, 30th  
September date was  extended
without our asking for it. All of us were anticipating no such extra time. So
it was a bonus!

S — How complacent you people are!
You become happy even by such small things. In a way, it is a good quality.

A — Bhagwan,  we 
are  otherwise  slogging 
day  and night – literally reeling
under the pressure. So even small reliefs mean a big thing for us.

S — 
So   this   time,  
you   could   complete  
it   quite comfortably, you mean.

A — Not exactly. But yes. The
nightmare was a little less frightful!

S — and then you enjoyed Diwali!

A —    Well, to some extent yes. Still, the
pressure of time-barring assessments continued. But by and large, there was
relaxation.

S — That  means, now you will wake up directly in next
September !

A — ha  ! ha 
!! ha  !!! not  really. now 
i will have to manage my CPE hours.

S — ‘Manage’? What do you mean? Why
always at the last moment?

A — That is the real fun. We need to
simply enrol for some seminar, relax there; and get CPE credit.

S — But how will you manage the new
things that are coming?

A — what are they?

S —    GST; and that ICDS which was postponed last
year. And many other regulations that are continuously coming.

A —    See, it will keep on happening. There are
experts available. They will study and guide us. Why break our head?

S —That’s  the pity, Arjun. Most of you have almost
given  up 
self-study.  Even CPE  hours 
you  are ‘managing’. not taking it
seriously.

A —So far, lack of self-study has
not been declared as a misconduct!

S —Great thought, Arjun ! are  you the same Arjun who was so inquisitive
about knowledge even on the battlefield? are you the same Arjun who had a quest
for knowledge?

A —Bhagwan,   in  
those   days,   knowledge  
was respected. It had value. Now, no one cares for it. everything can be
managed.

S — Alas! What a downfall !

Not studying in itself may not be a
misconduct; but all misconducts arise out of ignorance and lethargy, why don’t
you understand this? not following the institute’s guidelines also is a
misconduct.

A — What you say is right. That
reminds me, i have just uploaded the returns. But many hard copies of financial
statements are yet to be signed ! and they are also to be uploaded to ROC.

S — you mean, balance sheets are
still to be signed?

A —Yes.   that’s   
usual.   We   sign  
it   backdated. Sometimes, even
the checking continues after the returns are filed.

S —Oh! you may be aware, there were
instances of audit being signed; and email queries continuing even after the
signing date !

A — Yes. My friend was held guilty
of that. But i am very careful about it.

S — Anyway  ! you people 
won’t  improve. But right since
ancient time, you are my favourite Shishya.

I cannot see you not pursuing
knowledge.

A — Lord,  i am your true follower. Whatever i said just
now was the general attitude of CAs. i do my study quite religiously.

S — 
In  fact,  this 
is  the  right 
time  for  knowledge updation. For GST, you must get
geared up. Not only yourself; but see that your staff, articles, clients and
also their accountants get educated. It will be a team-effort. You should
encourage clients to attend the seminars.

A — I agree. One will get the
benefit of early start, i will tell my other CA 
friends also to be a little more serious about studies. Without updated
knowledge, we can’t survive.

S — You said it ! you need to be
constantly awake. Your motto is ‘Ya esha Supteshu Jagarti !’

A —But Bhagwan, too much of
knowledge often leads to a dilemma – one becomes indecisive. Same dilemma i
faced in Mahabharat war.

S —True. But then the knowledge
alone cleared your dilemma. moreover, mere error of professional judgment is
not a misconduct?

A —Then    what 
is  misconduct?  We  may  commit mistakes even when we know all
interpretations.

S — The  misconduct lies in lack of application of
mind.

By your working papers, you should
be able to show that you studied the issue, applied your mind and adopted a
plausible interpretation. it may not be 100% correct.

Others may perceive it differently.

A — I followed. Good that you
mentioned about working papers. i will get them also properly organised. After
one year, we can’t remember anything; and can’t locate anything.

S — Shabbash ! that’s  like a
good Ca. that  is why you are always
blessed, my dear !

A — Please continue to enlighten me
and motivate me.

Bhagwan, Aapko hamara pranam !

Om Shanti.

Note:

This   dialogue 
seeks  to  highlight 
the  importance  of continuous updating of knowledge.

(Ethical dilemma)

Arjun (A) — Oh, I am surrounded by the ocean around!  But not a single drop of water to drink! Hey Shree Ram!
Shrikrishna (S) — What reminds you of that great poetry?  And why you called Shree Ram when I am always around you?
A —    Shrikrishna, sorry. You are not only around me, but always in my heart too. I am just thinking of the present situation. I wanted both Shree Ram and Shrikrishna to help me.
S —    What situation? Which ocean you are thinking of?
A —    Ocean of old notes! High Denomination Notes. HDN! These are in plenty everywhere. But of no use at all !
S —    And you don’t have small value notes to spend. Right?
A —    Absolutely! I did not have money to pay for the cab. Nowadays, you have stopped driving my chariot! So I came here on foot.
S —    Good for health.
A —    Cannot buy provisions and vegetables – and day-to-day things. Literally starving.
S —    That is also good for health. Of late, you all had taken to over-eating!
A —    Jokes apart; but this cancellation of HDNs has spoilt our sleep.
S —    Why? You had so much of it?
A —    No. If I had that kind of money, I would not have continued this ‘magajmari’ in the practice.
S —    Then why are you bothered so much if you don’t have HDNs?
A —    Wherever I go, people keep on asking me about ‘conversion’ round the clock !
S —    Why can’t you tell that Government’s pronouncements are very clear. You can exchange notes at many places.
A —    Oh Lord! Why are you pretending to be ignorant though you are omniscient?
S —    Ha! Ha! Ha! People seek your advice on converting huge black money into white. Is that correct?
A —    Yes. They ask questions about what will happen in income tax? Will they charge tax as well as penalty?
S —    So you give answers. What is there? That’s your usual work.
A —    No Lord! It is not that simple. It is more complicated than even your Bhagwad Geeta!
S —    Really? But what is your dilemma?
A —    See, basically, there are too many questions and no definite answers. There is guess-work and speculation.
S —    Then say, you don’t know the answer. Why are you afraid?
A —    Actually, they ask me whether I can convert their notes into ‘white’ money.
S —    That’s money-laundering.
A —    But many of our CA friends have taken it as an opportunity to earn money! My dilemma is, what should I do? Whether to jump into that game or remain away.
S —    Similar dilemma you were faced with in Mahabharata.
A —    And you had advised me to jump in; and not run away from it. What is your advice now?
S —    Arjun, my advice is the same. ‘jump in’ in the same way.
A —    Oh! So you are advising me to enter into the field of conversion? Simply fall in line with my friends doing this change of colour of money? Bhagwan, you too?
S —    No my dear! I had advised you to jump in the war that time.  Same way, here also jump in the war with the weapons of honesty and straight forwardness. Say ‘No’ to such temptations.
A —    So you mean, honesty is the best policy.  They say, it is true that by honest business practices, one can become a millionaire; but for that, one first needs to be a billionaire!! Ha! Ha!
S —    See, Arjun, whether this withdrawal of HDN was good or bad in economic sense, time alone will decide.  But it was an honest decision; taken with good intentions.
A —    No doubt about it.  It requires lot of courage.  Failure in execution on the part of Administration does not mean the decision was bad.  I agree.  These hoarders of black money had literally spoilt our country.
S —    You said it! No value for truth.  All-pervasive corruption.  All unscrupulous elements.  Bribery, on money, no value for merit.  This had threatened even the national security.
A —    It was necessary to teach a lesson to such economic offenders and enemies of the nation.
S —    If that is your view, and still if you indulge in abetting the money-laundering, it will be the greatest treachery.
A —    But as a part of my profession, I must help my clients.  I should steer them out of the difficulties in financial and tax matters. That is our sacred duty!  Should I give it up? That is my dilemma.
S —    When two such values seem to be conflicting, always remember, there cannot be compromise with honesty. That is one of the noblest virtues.  Moreover, national interests, interests of the society are supreme! They are above all other considerations.  If you help the wrong-doers today, there will be further deterioration, downfall – of the society.  Your posterity is going to live in that kind of the world.  Is it acceptable to you?
A —    You are right.  But our next generation has already migrated!
S —    Why they were required to leave the country?  It was because of the inaction, indifference of the intellectual class.  You used your brilliant brains in protecting and helping; if not encouraging the wrong elements.
A —    Bhagwan, you have opened my eyes.  I must tell this to my CA friends.
S —    Moreover, there could be criminal liability on you people – prosecution under tax laws, prevention of Anti-money laundering Act, FEMA, Benami Transactions Act, and what not! This is abetment.
A —    Yes.  My Lord!  I will caution all my friends.  They should avoid all the jugglery – not just out of fear; but with a positive thought that we should be supporting only good things. Bless me Lord !
S —    Tathaastu.
Om Shanti.
Note:
This dialogue is based on the present situation arising out of cancellation of the HDNs. CAs are expected to give preference to the ‘values’ in life and  national duty. _

FRAUD INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES AND OTHER ASPECTS – PART II

Use of the juxtaposition test in audit to detect fraud

Conventional audit tests look for reasonable evidence to
support the financial statements being audited. Vouching, tracing, casting and
scrutiny of accounts, whether in manual or soft data form, usually include
examination of records or documents, but they are seldom penetrative enough to
detect  duplication, falsification,
manipulation and forgery. In this regard, the additional use of a juxtaposition
test may be very useful in many audit situations to directly ferret out fraud.
What exactly is this juxtaposition test? It is a simple common sense test of
comparison, by placing side by side, two or more pieces of evidence. In simple
words, to juxtapose means to put adjacent to, or to place side by side to
facilitate comparison. It can be used either to detect similarities where none
are expected or differences where there should be none.

Usually in the course of day-to-day business, senior
management executives have to review, sign, or approve various documents,
invoices, even agreements and contracts with external parties such as vendors,
customers, etc. Even within an organisation, there are documents
constantly floating around for approval, such as vouchers, letters, minutes of
meetings. In almost every such situation, the relevant document (say for example
a vendor’s bill), will be seen or examined only one at a time. Two or
more documents (or any other evidence such as CCTV, Audio recordings, pictures
etc) from a particular party will seldom be examined together for comparison.
Usually only very important details, computations, amounts, or specific clauses
are examined and scrutinised more carefully. Consequently a fraud like a
duplicated letterhead bill from a vendor can easily escape detection because
one may not remember what exactly the original letterhead looked like. This
kind of fraud and many other frauds in evidence relied upon can perhaps be
detected by applying this simple juxtaposition test.

This juxtaposition test can be used in myriad number of ways,
in different situations, on different objects. Let us consider the various
places where such a juxtaposition test can be used:

1.  Comparison of external letters / documents for
inexplicable similarities indicating that the source is the same. Eg, multiple
quotations may not be from different parties but actually the same. Similarly
reference letters from two different employers may have some unique
similarities where there should be none. For example the following instances of
two such reference letters from totally different organisations indicate
exactly the same grammatical mistakes, spelling mistakes and english sentences.
These can be easily spotted only by juxtaposition and are outlined below.

 (Above names,
addresses, are purely for academic and demonstrative purposes. Any resemblance
to any entity is purely co-incidental. Nowhere is any fraud suggested or
implied)

2.  Approval signatures. Just as a bank manager
compares a signed cheque or an RTGS form with the specimen signature, it is
imperative for an auditor to see hard copy documents such as vouchers,
agreements, bills, minutes etc., with the specimen signature of those
who have signed. In one case, an auditor specifically asked for a list of
specimen signatures of the approving authorities on agreements, important
documents, records and vouchers. The company initially resisted but relented
and provided him such signatures. There were some sarcastic remarks about him
conducting an investigation instead of an audit. However the auditor was
unruffled and took this step as a routine control testing procedure and his
effort paid rich dividends. He meticulously conducted a sample check comparison
of approval signatures on payment vouchers with specimen signatures provided by
the company to him. He found some signatures which did not match with any
signature on the list given to him. He then went to the CFO of the company to
inquire about these unidentified signatures. The CFO was also surprised because
he too could not identify any of those signatures. After making detailed
inquiries with all departments, it was eventually established that they belonged
to no one and were mere scribbles
. There were no such authorised
signatories and approvals for such vouchers were fictitious and invalid
authorisations. No one bothered to inquire who had authorized them and the
cashier presumed that these were genuine authorisations. In a year almost Rs 80
lacs were so paid through multiple small value vouchers. All that was required
was someone to see whether such signatures were known and valid before permitting
such expenditure. It is important to note that one need not be a signature
verification technical expert. A simple comparison with given signatures is
enough to detect fraud.

Example of an unidentifiable signature

3.  Juxtaposition check can be even within a
document. In the above case, the cashier did not have readily all the specimen
signatures. The juxtaposition test is sometimes missed out even when it is
possible on one single document. A huge purchase order of over Rs. 60 lakh was
executed without anyone realising that all the three signatures of the buyer,
checker and approver were the same. The human mind becomes so cluttered with
other information on any given document that focus is given only on critical
information such as value, rate, date, vendor, description of the material and
the existence of approval signatures. The human mind gets switched off beyond
that to examine deeply by applying any test for deception or wrongdoing. In
this case since the three signature were side by side (juxtaposed) on the
voucher. Just by looking at the three signatures, one could easily see that
they were by the same person.

(above is just an imaginary voucher with assumed names,
product and signatures for demonstration purposes; any resemblance is
co-incidental and unintentional and nowhere is any such person or entity
connected with fraud).

In the same manner, the juxtaposition test can be used to
compare:

(a) Vendors’ bills. Usually printing and stationery
bills, transport bills, courier charges, and similar regular expenditure
related bills are the ones most likely to be duplicated or replicated. By
juxtaposing these expenses, we will be in a position to identify anomalies and
perhaps spot a fictitious bill.

(b) Agreements and contracts lying between two or
more departments such as legal department, commercial department, purchase
department etc. It is expected that these are identical copies, but
wrongdoers even make alterations in copies of different departments for ulterior
motives of facilitating fraud.

(c) Documents with different ages. A two year old
document when compared with a recent document will have a difference in the
physical condition. Over a period of time, paper yellows out, creases, smudges
with handling and even tears a little. 
However, new documents have a crisp, whiter look and usually do not have
many smudges. In one case an auditor compared bills from a  suspected supplier for a two year period and
applied a juxtaposition test. Though he did not find anything anomalous in the
content matter,  he noticed that one of
the oldest bills was absolutely white and crisp. This stood out in complete
contrast with all the bills of that year. On a detailed investigation, it was
revealed that the bill was inserted recently because the original one had been
removed for a wrongful purpose of alteration. 

There are many such examples of the juxtaposition test on
documents; but  one may well ask whether
this test is going to be useful in the paperless environment with soft data,
spreadsheets, data on audio recordings, videos, CCTVs etc. The answer is
yes, very much. In some of the future articles in BCAS journal,  further examples and illustrations of usage
of juxtaposition test will be given. _

SECTION B: REVISED AS 10 ‘PROPERTY, PLANT & EQUIPMENT’ APPLICABLE FROM ACCOUNTING YEARS COMMENCING FROM 1ST APRIL 2016 ONWARDS FOLLOWED IN FY 2015-16

NHPC Ltd. (31-3-2016)

From Notes to Financial Statements

Note 29, para 15:

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs has notified revised AS-10,
“Property, Plant & Equipment” on 30.03.2016, to be applicable for
accounting periods commencing on or after that date. Para 9 of revised AS-10 permits
Unit of Measure Approach which allows capitalisation of expenditure of capital
nature incurred for creation of facilities, over which the company does not
have control but the creation of which is essential principally for
construction of the project.  Further,
the transitional provision in revised AS-10 allows retrospective capitalisation
of costs charged earlier to the statement of profit and loss but eligible to be
included as a part of the cost of a project for construction of property, plant
and equipment in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 9. The Unit of
Measure Approach also exists in Para 9 of Ind AS-16, “Property, Plant &
Equipment.” It strengthens the accounting policy no.2.3.4 on capital work in
progress. Had this policy not been adopted but implemented from 01.04.2016, the
para 88 of Revised AS-10 on transitional provision would automatically take
care of capitalisation of such expenditure. 
As such, significant accounting policy no.2.3.4 and consequential
accounting treatment of enabling assets as followed in FY 2014-15 has been
continued. Accordingly, an amount of Rs.176.21 crore (Previous year Rs.173.61
crore) has been included in Fixed Assets as Tangible Assets/CWIP.

From Auditors’ Report

Emphasis of Matters

We draw attention to the following matters in the Notes to
the financial statements:

a)    
to e) … not reproduced

f)

Auditor’s Comment tor’s
Comment

Management’s reply

 

Accounting policy no.2.3.4 On capital work in progress read with
note no. 29 Para 15 to the financial statements about the capital expenditure
incurred for creation of facilities over which the company does not have
control but the creation of which is essential principally for construction
of the project is charged to “expenditure attributable to construction (eac)”
as the same is in line with revised as-10 notified on 30.03.2016 As para 88
of the revised accounting standard which stated about transitional provision
that shall result into the same treatment.

Disclosure through note is a statement of fact.

 

DEEMED COST EXEMPTION ON FIXED ASSETS AND INTANGIBLES

Introduction

The application of the deemed cost
exemption to fixed assets and intangible assets has led to peculiar issues and
challenges. Let us first consider the wording of the exemption followed by the
clarifications provided by the Ind AS Transition Facilitation Group (ITFG).

Paragraph D7AA of Ind AS 101

D7AA – Where there is no change in
its functional currency on the date of transition to Ind ASs, a first-time
adopter to Ind ASs may elect to continue with the carrying value for all of its
property, plant and equipment as recognised in the financial statements as at
the date of transition to Ind ASs, measured as per the previous GAAP and use
that as its deemed cost as at the date of transition after making necessary
adjustments for decommissioning liabilities. If an entity avails the option, no
further adjustments to the deemed cost of the property, plant and equipment so
determined in the opening balance sheet shall be made for transition
adjustments that might arise from the application of other Ind ASs. This option
can also be availed for intangible assets covered by Ind AS 38, Intangible
Assets
and investment property covered by Ind AS 40 Investment Property.

Salient features of the exemption

1.  The
entity can continue with the carrying amount under previous GAAP for all of its
fixed assets, investment property and intangible assets after making necessary
adjustment for decommissioning liabilities. The ITFG opined that if a first
time adopter chooses the D7AA option, then the option of applying this on
selective basis to some of the items of property, plant and equipment and using
fair value for others is not available.

2.  The exemption is
available to an entity only where there is no change in the functional currency
on the date of transition to Ind AS.

3.  No further adjustments to
the deemed cost so determined in the opening balance sheet shall be made for
transition adjustments that might arise from the application of other Ind ASs

4.  The exemption is an
additional option under Ind AS. An entity may choose not to use this option,
and instead use other first time adoption options. For example, in the case of
fixed assets, an entity may choose to:

a.  state retrospectively all
the fixed assets in accordance with Ind AS principles

b.  selectively choose to
fair value some fixed assets and use Ind AS principles for other fixed assets.

ITFG Clarification Bulletin 3 – Issue 9

The Company has chosen to continue
with the carrying value for all of its property, plant and equipment as recognised
in the financial statements as at the date of transition to Ind AS, measured as
per the previous GAAP. The Company has recorded capital spares in its previous
GAAP financial statements as a part of inventory, which under Ind AS would
qualify to be classified as fixed assets. Would such a reclassification be
required under Ind AS? Would such a reclassification taint the deemed
cost exemption?

As per paragraph D7AA, once the
company chooses previous GAAP as deemed cost as provided in paragraph D7AA of Ind
AS 101, it is not allowed to adjust the carrying value of property, plant and
equipment for any adjustments other than decommissioning costs. In this case, a
question arises whether the company may capitalise spares as a part of
property, plant and equipment on the date of transition to Ind AS. It may be
noted deemed cost exemption as the previous GAAP is in respect of carrying
value of property, plant and equipment capitalised under previous GAAP on the
date of transition to Ind AS. The ITFG opined that this condition does not
prevent a company to recognise an asset whose recognition is required by Ind AS
on the date of transition. The ITFG opined that the Company should recognise
‘capital spares’ if they meet definition of PPE as on the date of transition,
in addition to continuing carrying value of PPE as per paragraph D7AA of Ind AS
101.

ITFG Clarification Bulletin 5 – Issue 4

The Company has chosen to continue
with the carrying value for all of its property, plant and equipment as
recognised in the financial statements as at the date of transition to Ind AS,
measured as per the previous GAAP. The company has previously taken a loan for
construction of fixed assets and paid processing fee thereon. The entire
processing fees on the loan were upfront capitalised as part of the relevant
fixed assets as per the previous GAAP. The loan needs to be accounted for as
per amortised cost method in accordance with Ind AS 109, Financial
Instruments
. Whether the Company is required to adjust the carrying amount
of fixed assets as per the previous GAAP to reflect accounting treatment of
processing fees as per Ind AS 109?

When the option of deemed cost
exemption is availed for property, plant and equipment under paragraph D7AA of
Ind AS 101, no further adjustments to the deemed cost of the property, plant
and equipment shall be made for transition adjustments that might arise from
the application of other Ind AS. Thus, once the entity avails the exemption
provided in paragraph D7AA, it will be carrying forward the previous GAAP
carrying amount.

Paragraph 10 of Ind AS 101, inter
alia
, provides that Ind AS will be applied in measuring all recognised
assets and liabilities except for mandatory exceptions and voluntary exemptions
other Ind AS. Processing fees is required to be deducted from loan amount to
arrive at the amortised cost as per the requirements of Ind AS 109. In view of
this, with respect to property, plant and equipment, the company shall continue
the carrying amount of PPE as per previous GAAP on the date of transition to
Ind AS since it has availed the deemed cost option provided in paragraph D7AA
of Ind AS 101 for PPE. In the given case, the Company need to apply the
requirements of Ind AS 109 retrospectively for loans outstanding on the date of
transition to Ind AS at amortised cost. The ITFG opined that the adjustments
related to the outstanding loans to bring these in conformity with Ind AS 109
shall be recognised in the retained earnings on the date of transition. Consequently,
the carrying value of PPE as per previous GAAP cannot be adjusted to reflect
accounting treatment of processing fees.

ITFG Clarification Bulletin 5 – Issue 5 

The Company received government
grant to purchase a fixed asset prior to Ind AS transition date. The grant
received from the Government was deducted from the carrying amount of fixed
asset as permitted under previous GAAP, i.e. AS 12, Accounting for Government
Grants. The Company has chosen to continue with carrying value of property,
plant and equipment as per the previous GAAP as provided in paragraph D7AA of
Ind AS 101. As per Ind AS 20, Accounting for Government Grants and
Disclosure of Government Assistance
, such a grant is required to be
accounted by setting up the grant as deferred income on the date of transition
and deducting the grant in arriving at the carrying amount of the asset is not
allowed.

In this situation, whether the
Company is required to add to the carrying amount of fixed assets as per
previous GAAP and reflect the addition as deferred income in accordance with
Ind AS 20?

The ITFG opined that when the
option of deemed cost exemption under paragraph D7AA is availed for property,
plant and equipment, no further adjustments to the deemed cost of the property,
plant and equipment shall be made for transition adjustments that might arise
from the application of other Ind AS. Accordingly, once an entity avails the
exemption provided in paragraph D7AA, it will have to be carry forward the
previous GAAP carrying amounts of PPE. Consequently, the company shall
recognise the asset related government grants outstanding on the transition
date as deferred income in accordance with the requirements of Ind AS 20, with
corresponding adjustment to retained earnings.

Salient feature of the ITFG responses

The ITFG has provided conflicting
responses. In the context of accounting for the government grants and
processing fees, the ITFG opined that the impact of accounting for government
grants and processing fees should be adjusted against retained earnings.
Consequently, the previous GAAP carrying amount of fixed assets should not be
tampered with in order to comply with the requirements of D7AA. On the other
hand, the ITFG in the context of reclassification between inventory and fixed
assets, opined that the reclassification was necessary, and that such
reclassification would not result in non-compliance of D7AA.

The author also feels that too much
focus has been put on complying with the technical requirement of D7AA rather
than on the substance and the spirit of the exemption. This has led to a very
absurd interpretation. For example, in the case of fixed asset related
government grants, the grant amount was deducted from fixed assets under Indian
GAAP. However, the ITFG requires an entity to ignore the same and recreate the
deferred income on grant by adjusting the retained earnings. In subsequent
years, the deferred income would be released to the P&L account under Ind
AS. This effectively means that the government grant gets accounted twice; once
under Indian GAAP by deducting the grant amount from fixed assets and again
under Ind AS through creation of deferred income on Ind AS transition date.
Similarly the ITFGs response in the case of processing fee results in its being
treated as borrowing cost twice – once under Indian GAAP and again under Ind
AS.

Practical issue not dealt with by ITFG

Whether D7AA exemption is available
to service concession arrangements (SCA)?

Paragraph D22 of Ind AS 101
requires an operator of SCA to apply SCA accounting retrospectively. If it is
not practical to apply SCA accounting retrospectively, then the operator may
use the previous GAAP carrying amounts as the carrying amount at that date.
Assuming that there is no change in functional currency, whether in addition to
the above exemption, D7AA option is available?

One argument is that since
paragraph D22 contains specific requirements for intangible assets recognised
in accordance with the standard, the transitional provisions in D22 will apply
to intangible assets arising under the SCA. For all other intangible assets,
exemption in paragraph D7AA may be used.

The second argument is that there
is nothing in paragraph D7AA to suggest that it does not apply to SCAs. Hence,
the company can apply exemption under paragraph D7AA to all intangible assets,
i.e., SCA related intangible assets as well as all other intangible assets
covered within the scope of Ind AS 38.

The application of second view will
give rise the following additional issues:

  While the company continues the same carrying
amount as under previous GAAP, it will need to reclassify those amounts based
on requirements of Ind AS. For e.g., toll road classified as PPE under Indian
GAAP will be reclassified as intangible or financial asset, as applicable, at
the Indian GAAP carrying amount.

   Accounting for premium payable by operator to
grantor (negative grant): Companies may have followed one of the following
treatment under Indian GAAP:

    Certain companies have
created liability at undiscounted amount.

    Certain companies have
not created liability for negative grant under Indian GAAP.

In both the above cases, the
related question would be when the financial liability amount is reflected as
per Ind AS 109, whether the corresponding adjustment should be made to retained
earnings or to the intangible asset. Some may even argue that the strict
requirements of D7AA means that no adjustment is made to the financial
liability amount and consequently the corresponding adjustment is also not
made.

Conclusion

There are numerous questions around
the practical application of D7AA. These issues were not probably conceived
when D7AA was hurriedly introduced in Ind AS 101. The drafting of D7AA has
resulted in numerous unanswered questions. The ITFG has also provided
conflicting guidance on the subject. Besides some of the recommendations, for
example, in the case of processing fees and government grant accounting are
counter-intuitive and are against the spirit and intention of the exemptions.
In light of the above, the author would recommend that a broader view may be
taken on this issue, and in light of the lack of clarity arising from a not so
clear drafting of D7AA, companies may be allowed more room for different
interpretations. _

Section 195 – payments made to non-residents for rent for office outside India, advertisement in foreign journals and exhibition expenses being business profits are not taxable in India in absence of a PE in India

12.  [2016] 74
taxmann.com 191 (Delhi – Trib.)

ITO vs. Brahmos Aerospace (P.) Ltd.

A.Y.:2011-12, Date of order: 14th September, 2016

Facts

The Taxpayer had made payments to certain non-residents
(NRs). The payments pertained to rent for office outside India, advertisements
and expenses for participation in exhibition outside India. Mistakenly, the
Taxpayer had withheld tax on the said payments at minimum rates and hence
Taxpayer applied for rectification u/s. 154 of the Act. However, the AO
contended taxes were required to be withheld @ 20% and rejected rectification
application of the taxpayer. The CIT(A) allowed the appeal of the Taxpayer.
Against the order of CIT(A), the revenue appealed to the Tribunal.

Held

  The payments made to non-residents were in
respect of rent, advertisement and exhibition expenses. Such payments are in
the nature of business receipts of the payee and are taxable in India only if
the NR has a PE in India in terms of the relevant DTAA2 .

2   The decision does not mention DTAA of any
specific country and also does not refer to any specific Article (such as,
Article 7 read with Article 5) of any DTAA.

  Since the NR does not have PE in
India, the receipts from the Taxpayer are not chargeable to tax in India.
Consequently, the Taxpayer is not required to withhold tax on such payments.

Subsequently concluded APA which accepted that the taxpayer was not a contract manufacturer for relevant years under appeal have considerable bearing on TP dispute and can be admitted as an evidence before the Tribunal

11.  ITA Nos.
779/Mds/2014, 801 Mds/2015 & 810/Mds/2016

Lotus Footwear Enterprises Ltd (India Branch) vs. DCIT

A.Y.s: 2009-10 to 2011-12,

Date of Order: 21st September, 2016

Facts

The Taxpayer was engaged in manufacture of footwear for its
associated enterprise (AE) in BVI. For FY 2009-10 to 2011-12, assessment orders
were passed basis the directions of the DRP. Certain adjustments were made
under TP by regarding the taxpayer to be a contract manufacturer. It is not
clear as to what was the claim of the taxpayer and basis on which the TPO
concluded that the taxpayer was a contract manufacturer permitting TP
adjustment during the years under appeal.

Taxpayer appealed against the assessment orders before the
ITAT and assailed the additions made on account of transfer pricing
adjustments.

Taxpayer had signed an APA in 2016 for FY 2014-15 to 2018-19,
with a roll back for three years from FY 2011-12 to FY 2013-14.

The APA was signed on the basis that for the years covered by
APA and the three earlier years for which roll back was claimed, the business
model of the taxpayer was that of a contract manufacturer and such change was
effected only after F.Y. 2010-11 (A.Y. 2011-12) due to multiple labour strikes
in its units. It was also claimed that roll back which was applicable for
earlier 4 years including one of the years under appeal viz. F.Y. 2010-11 (A.Y.
2011-12) was not made applicable, as for the relevant year, as per the facts
which the taxpayer could furnish before APA authorities, the taxpayer was not a
contract manufacturer. Thus, for F.Y. 2010-11, APA authorities had accepted the
contention of the taxpayer that it was not a contract manufacturer as against
departmental contention that the taxpayer was a contract manufacturer.

It is in this background that taxpayer relied on APA and
claimed that its contention about it not being a contract manufacturer during
the relevant years of appeal is to be accepted.

Held

Tribunal concurred that APA should be considered while
deciding the appeal of the Taxpayer, for the following reasons:

   The APA rollback period was reduced to three
years only after considering and accepting the submissions of the Taxpayer that
it was not a contract manufacturer in FY 10-11 and the years prior to it.

   Nature of business of the Taxpayer as
determined under APA would have considerable bearing on the ALP study of the
international transactions of the Taxpayer for the FYs under consideration.

   Since the APA was concluded in May 2016, the
Taxpayer did not have the opportunity to submit it to the lower authorities.

Having regard to the above, the additional evidence was
admitted and the matter was set aside for fresh consideration.

Article 5 of India-Switzerland DTAA – on facts, subsidiary company and its managing director (MD) constituted fixed place PE and dependent agent PE of the taxpayer in India

10.  I.T.A.No.1742/Mds/2011

Carpi Tech SA vs. ADIT

A.Y.: 2008-09, Date of Order: 24th August, 2016

Facts

Taxpayer a company resident in Switzerland, was engaged in the
business of water proofing and providing drainage systems. During the relevant
assessment year, the Taxpayer had received certain amounts for undertaking a
project for an Indian company.

The Taxpayer contended that the project was only for 40 days (i.e.,
less than six months), and it did not have ‘continuous presence’ or ‘business
connection’ or ‘permanent establishment’ in India. Therefore, receipts from
such project is not chargeable to tax in India. The Taxpayer also had an Indian
subsidiary1 (“Sub Co”).

In the course of inquiry, the AO found that the Taxpayer had also
executed a project in financial year 2004-05 and 2005-06. The duration of the
said project was 105 days. Between the two projects, the time lag was three
years.

During the intervening period, the MD of Sub Co was making efforts
to secure other projects for the Taxpayer in India. The website of the Taxpayer
mentioned office-cum-residential address of the MD for correspondence. The MD
was given a power of attorney (PoA) to undertake the activities of the Taxpayer
in India. Further Sub Co also had a PoA to represent the Taxpayer in its
projects in India.

Based on these as well as several other facts, the AO concluded
that Sub Co and its MD were dependent agents exclusively acting for the Taxpayer
and that the income was subject to tax under Article 7. The DRP upheld the
order of the AO. 

1   While the decision mentions Indian company
as a subsidiary, the facts appear to indicate that though the name of Indian
company was similar to the name of the Taxpayer, all the shares were held by
two individual shareholders one of whom was MD of the company. Thus, impliedly,
the Taxpayer did not have any shares in the Indian company.

Held

   The facts and the documents indicates that
all the actions related to the project were undertaken by or routed through Sub
Co or its MD. The MD was also holding PoA from the Taxpayer and signed all
documents on behalf of the Taxpayer.

  It is not necessary that place of business
should be exclusively available to the Taxpayer. What is required is that to
constitute a PE, business must be located at a single place for reasonable
length of time though the activity need not be permanent, endless or without
interruption. In Sutron Corporation vs. DIT [2004] 268 ITR 156 (AAR) and
in Motorola Inc vs. DCIT [2005] 95 ITD 269 (Del) (SB), residence of
country manager was held to be fixed place of business since it was used as an
office address.

   The residence of MD from where all activities
of the Taxpayer in relation to Indian project, such as participation in bids,
correspondence with customers, signing of contracts, execution of the project
and closure of the project etc. was carried on triggered a fixed place
PE for the Taxpayer in India.

   Sub Co incurred all the project-related
expenses. The Taxpayer reimbursed these expenses

   The activities of the Taxpayer and Sub Co
were intertwined and Sub Co participated in economic activities of the
Taxpayer. Sub Co was the face of the taxpayer in India and had a PoA to
represent the Taxpayer in India. Thus the premises of Sub Co also resulted in a
fixed place PE for the Taxpayer in India.

  Further the Taxpayer was relying on the skills and knowledge of the
MD. His role was critical to all the aspect of the contract through the stage
of signing to its execution.

  There was no evidence for the claim of the
Taxpayer that MD of Sub Co was independent agent because he represented other
companies. While an independent agent would be required to have objectivity in
execution of tasks of its principal, role played by MD could not be easily
separated from services of the Taxpayer. MD was acting exclusively or almost
exclusively for the Taxpayer.

   The functions performed by MD or Sub Co could
not be considered as preparatory or auxiliary in character. The Taxpayer had
not demonstrated that it had a mere passing, transient or casual presence in
India. Accordingly, Sub Co and MD constituted fixed place PE and dependent
agent PE of the Taxpayer in India.

Article 7 & 5 of India-UAE DTAA; – In absence of a specific article on Fee for technical service (FTS), income from services rendered in the normal course of business is to be classified as business income; in absence of a Permanent establishment (PE) in India, income from such services is not taxable in India

9.  [2016] 75
taxmann.com 83 (Bangalore – Trib.)

ABB FZ-LLC vs. ITO

A.Y: 2012-13, Date of Order: 28th October, 2016

Facts

The Taxpayer was a company incorporated in and resident in
UAE. The Taxpayer had entered into an agreement with an Indian company for
providing certain services. In consideration, the Taxpayer received certain
fee.

According to the Taxpayer, in absence of a specific article
on FTS in the India-UAE DTAA, income from services is to be classified as
business profit under Article 7. Further, in absence of a PE in India, the fee
is not chargeable to tax in India. The Taxpayer however, did not dispute that,
the receipt was FTS in terms of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act.

AO however, contended that if a DTAA does not have any clause
for taxation of any item of income, such income is to be taxed in accordance
with the Act. Since the Act has a specific provision for taxing FTS, such
specific provision would prevail over the general provision of DTAA.
Accordingly, AO applied provisions of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act and taxed
the fee as FTS. The Dispute resolution panel (DRP) confirmed the view of the
AO.

Held

   If royalty or FTS is derived from regular
business activities of the Taxpayer, it is to be regarded as business income
under the Act as well as DTAA. However, if these items of income are separately
classified, then taxation would be as applicable to that classification.

   Income is derived by the taxpayer from
providing services, which is a regular business activity, and hence such income
from such services is to be classified as business income under the DTAA.

   Absence of a specific provision in the DTAA
is not an omission but an agreement between the two contracting states not to
separately classify such income as FTS. Once the income is classified as
falling within the ambit of other article of the DTAA, thereafter, scope of
assessing such income cannot be expanded by importing classification from the
Act and taxing such income under that classification in the Act.

  Accordingly, in absence of specific Article
dealing with FTS in India-UAE DTAA, the fee received by taxpayer would be
taxable in terms of Article 7 and in absence of a PE of the Taxpayer in India,
such income is not chargeable to tax in India.

–    Reliance in this regard can be placed on the
Tribunal decision in the case of IBM India Pvt Ltd vs. DDIT (ITA Nos.489 to
498/Bang/2013),
wherein the Tribunal held that even if the payments were
not covered by Article 7, they would be covered under Article 23 (other income)

INTERNATIONAL WORKERS AND SOCIAL SECURITY AGREEMENTS – GROWING SIGNIFICANCE – AN OVERVIEW

In view of significant increase in
the mobility of cross border workers / employees in the recent years, issues
relating to social security benefits to such International Workers [IWs] have
acquired immense importance. Consequently, Social Security Agreements [SSAs],
being bilateral instruments, entered into by various countries to protect the
social security interests of such international workers has assumed lot of
significance. India is not remaining far behind in this respect. In this
article, we have attempted to give an overview of SSAs and social security
issues of International Workers.


 1.  Background

     Foreign nationals coming
for employment in India were earlier excluded from the provisions of the
Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 [EPF Act] as
their remunerations in most cases far exceeded above the statutory threshold
limit.

    On the other hand,
Indian citizens working overseas (other than countries having operational SSA
with India and fulfilling relevant conditions prescribed therein) are subjected
to all contributions to the social security fund of the country where they
work, irrespective of the time spent in another country. Often, the amount so
contributed would stand forfeited, since like the Indian Provident Fund, all
social security schemes are subject to long-term rules of withdrawal, causing
the Indian expatriate or his employer heavy losses.

    In order to create level
playing field and to pressurise other countries to enter into SSAs with India,
‘International Worker’ is introduced as a concept and they are bound to comply
with PF provisions, regardless of their remuneration break-up.

    In October 2008,
Government of India made fundamental changes in the Employees’ Provident Funds
Scheme, 1952 [EPFS] and Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 [EPS] by bringing
International Workers [IWs] under the purview of the Indian social security
regime. The Government of India had vide its notifications dated 1st
October, 2008 introduced Para 83 to the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952
and Para 43-A to the Employees’ Pension Scheme, 1995 creating Special
provisions in respect of the International workers [Special provisions].

    In September 2010, the
Ministry of Labour and Employment [MoLE)] issued a notification further
amending the EPFS and EPS vis-à-vis the IWs. However, the notification raised a
lot of issues which required clarifications. In May 2012, the MoLE vide its
notification dated 24th May, 2012 made further amendments in the
Employees’ Provident Scheme to clarify various issues.

    An important
clarification is that IWs who are covered under an SSA that India has signed
with other countries and that are in force can withdraw their PF accumulations
immediately on cessation of employment in establishments covered under EPF Act
in India and will not have to wait till 58 years of age to get access to their
PF accumulations. Further, the definition of excluded employee (who need not
contribute to Provident Fund in India) has been expanded to cover exemption
granted under bilateral economic agreements.


 2.  Social Security

     The term ‘Social
Security’ has been explained by the International Labour Organisation as the
protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public
measures, against economic and social distress that otherwise would be caused
by the stoppage or substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness,
maternity, employment injury, unemployment, invalidity, old-age and death; the
provision of medical care; and the provision of subsidies for families with
children.

     The key social security
legislations in India with respect to employees are:

 (i)  The Employees’ Provident
Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952; (ii) The Employees’ State
Insurance Act, 1948; (iii) The Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923; (iv) The
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; and (v) The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

    The Social Security
contributions have significant importance while structuring international
assignments for employees. Any social security benefit payable in the host
country may become an added cost to the employer, especially in situations
where there are restrictions for withdrawal. It is in this context that SSAs
executed between countries come into perspective and they need to be carefully
evaluated to help reduce the financial implications. At times, secondment
arrangements are structured to ensure that the expatriate employee continues to
derive social security benefits in the home country during the period of
assignment.


 3.  Social Security Agreement

a.  Social Security Agreement

    A Social Security
Agreement is a bilateral instrument to protect the social security interests of
workers posted in another country. Being a reciprocal arrangement, it generally
provides for equality of treatment and avoidance of double
coverage/contribution.

 b.  Main provisions covered
in a SSA

     Generally a Social
Security Agreement covers 3 provisions. They are:

 a) Detachment:
Applies to employees sent on posting in another country, provided they are complying
under the social security system of the home country.

b)  Exportability of
Pension:
Provision for payment of pension benefits directly without any
reduction to the beneficiary choosing to reside in the territory of the home
country as also to a beneficiary choosing to reside in the territory of a third
country.

c)  Totalisation of
Benefits:
The period of service rendered by an employee in a foreign
country is counted for determining the “eligibility” for benefits,
but the quantum of payment is restricted to the length of service, on pro-rata
basis.

 c.  Articles forming part of
a typical SSA

    The brief description of
the Articles contained in the latest India-Australia SSA signed on 18-11-2014,
are as follows:

Sr. No.

Part / Article No.

Description of Part / Article

 

Part I

General Provisions

1.

Article 1

Definitions

2.

Article 2

Legislative Scope

3.

Article 3

Personal Scope

4.

Article 4

Equality of Treatment

5.

Article 5

Export of Benefits

 

Part II

Provisions and Coverage

6.

Article 6

Purpose and Application

7.

Article 7

Diplomats and Government Employees

8.

Article 8

Avoidance of Double Coverage

9.

Article 9

Secondment from Third States

10.

Article 10

Exceptions

11.

Article 11

Certificate of Coverage

 

Part III

Provisions relating to Australian Benefits

12.

Article 12

Residence or presence in India

13.

Article 13

Totalisation

14.

Article 14

Calculation of Australian Benefits

 

Part IV

Provisions relating to Benefits of India

15.

Article 15

Totalisation of Insurance period

16.

Article 16

Calculation of Indian Benefits

 

Part V

Miscellaneous and Administrative Provisions

17.

Article 17

Lodgement of Documents

18.

Article 18

Payment of Benefits

19.

Article 19

Exchange of information and Mutual Assistance

20.

Article 20

Administrative Arrangement

21.

Article 21

Exchange of Statistics

22.

Article 22

Resolution of Disputes

23.

Article 23

Review of Agreement

 

Part VI

Transitional and Final Provisions

24.

Article 24

Transitional Provisions

25.

Article 25

Entry into Force

26.

Article 26

Termination

 


4.  Status of various Operating Indian SSAs

 India presently has 17 operating
SSAs, the brief details of which are given below:

Sr. No.

Country

Date of Signing

Date of entry into Force

Duration of Detachment

Exportability of Pension

Totalisation 
Benefits

1 .

Belgium

03-11-06

01-09-09

60

A

A

2.

Germany

08-10-08

01-10-09

48

N/A

N/A

3.

Switzerland

03-09-09

29-01-11

72

A

N/A

4.

Denmark

17-02-10

01-05-11

60

A

A

5.

Luxembourg

30-09-09

01-06-11

60

A

A

6.

France

30-09-08

01-07-11

60

A

A

7.

Korea

19-10-10

01-11-11

60

A

A

8.

Netherlands

22-10-09

01-12-11

60

A

N/A

9.

Hungary

02-02-10

01-04-13

60

A

A

10.

Finland

12-06-12

01-08-14

60

A

A

11

Sweden

26-11-12

01-08-14

24

[Extendable for additional 24 months]

A

A

 

 

 

 

 

 

12.

Czech

09-06-10

01-09-14

60

A

A

13.

Norway

29-10-10

01-01-15

60

A

A

14.

Austria

04-02-13

01-07-15

60

A

A

15.

Canada

06-11-12

01-08-15

60

A

A

16.

Australia

18-11-14

01-01-16

60

A

A

17.

Japan

16-11-12

01-10-16

60

A

A

 (Abbreviations used:- A:
Available  NA: Not Available.)

 4.1     Administrative
Agreements

          In all cases where
India has signed SSAs except in case of SSA with Switzerland, Canada and
Hungary, Administrative arrangements have been entered into or Administrative
Agreements have also been signed, concerning the implementation of the
agreement on social security.

 4.2     SSAs with Portugal
& Quebec

        In addition to above mentioned 17 operating SSAs,
SSA with Portugal has been signed on 04-03-13 and SSA with Quebec has been
signed on 26-11-13. However, both these SSA have not been notified so far and
have, therefore, not entered into force.

4.3     SSA with Germany

          The SSA with
Germany was executed on 8th October, 2008 and came into effect on 1st October,
2009. This agreement however covered only the detachment provisions, as per
which, individuals on short term contract up to 48 months (extendable to 60
months with the prior consent of the appropriate authority) can avail
detachment from host country social security. Since this agreement did not
address exportability of pension and totalisation of contribution periods, the
Governments of India and Germany have negotiated and signed a comprehensive
social security agreement on 12th October, 2011. This agreement is
to subsume the SSA signed on 8th October 2008. However, a
notification bringing into effect the new agreement is still awaited. The new
comprehensive agreement with Germany envisages the following benefits to Indian
nationals working in Germany:

  (i)   The employees of the home country
deputed by their employers, on short-term assignments for a pre-determined
period of less than 5 years, need not remit social security contribution in the
host country. For example, in case of deputation of an Indian employee to
Germany vide a short term contract of up to five years, no social security
contribution would need to be paid under the German law by the employee
provided he continued to make social security payment in India.

 (ii)  The benefits under the
SSA shall be available even when the Indian company sends its employees to
Germany from a third country.

 (iii)  Indian workers shall
be entitled to the export the social security benefit if they relocate to India
after the completion of their service in Germany.

 (iv)  Self-employed Indians
in Germany would also be entitled to export of social security benefit on their
relocation to India.

 (v)   The period of
contribution in one contracting state will be added to the period of
contribution in the second contracting state for determining the eligibility
for social security benefits (totalisation).

4.4   Negotiations with USA
and UK

USA: USA has
entered into Totalisation Agreements i.e. SSAs with 25 countries including the
UK, South Korea, Australia, Japan and Chile etc. For almost a decade,
India and USA have had talks on the totalisation agreement, however, without
much success. India sends the highest numbers of temporary workers to the USA,
who mostly work for the tech companies.

The current social security laws in
the US, including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, allow an
employee to withdraw pension on only after a minimum qualifying period i.e. 10
years while the visa regime does not ordinarily permit the employee to stay
beyond 10 years. Therefore, Indian employees who travel to USA for a period
less than 10 years forego their social security contributions when they return.
This has ended up being a significant issue on account of the large number of
Indian employees in USA.

It however seems that the due to
lack of political will, US is holding back the signing of the agreement since
it believes that India is likely to gain disproportionately from such an
agreement. However, whenever the long pending agreement between India and US is
executed and comes into force, it will benefit a large number of Indians
working in the US, with regard to social security contributions.

UK: The recent maiden visit of the
UK Prime Minister in November, 2016 gave a ray of hope to the supporters of
proposed SSA between India and UK. As the UK is one of the prime destinations
for outbound employees from India, a SSA will favourably impact the cost of
employment for employers in both countries.

 

5.    Some relevant Questions and Answers in respect of IWs and SSAs

 4.1   Who is an International
Worker?

       An IW may be an Indian worker or a foreign
national. IW means any Indian employee having worked or going to work in a foreign
country with which India has entered into a social security agreement and being
eligible to avail the benefits under social security programme of that country,
by virtue of the eligibility gained or going to gain, under the said agreement.

       An employee other
than an Indian employee, holding other than an Indian Passport, working for an
establishment in India to which the EPF Act applies, is also an IW.

 4.2   Is an Indian worker
holding Certificate of Coverage [COC], an International Worker?

      Merely holding the
COC does not make an employee an International Worker. He/she becomes IW only
after being eligible to avail the benefits under social security programme of
any country. After obtaining COC, the employee is exempted from contributing to
the social security systems of the foreign country with whom India has SSA,
hence he/she is not eligible to avail the benefits under the social security
programme of that country.

 4.3   Who is an ‘excluded
employee’ under these provisions?

 a) A detached IW contributing
to the social security programme of the home country and certified as such by a
Detachment Certificate for a specified period in terms of the bilateral SSA
signed between that country and India is an ‘excluded employee’, under relevant
provisions; or

 b) An IW, who is contributing
to a social security programme of his country of origin, either as a citizen or
resident, with whom India has entered in to a bilateral comprehensive economic
agreement containing a clause on social security prior to 1st
October, 2008, which specifically exempts natural persons of either country to
contribute to the social security fund of the host country (e.g. para 4 of
Article 9.3 of CECA between India and Singapore provides that “Natural
persons of either Party who are granted temporary entry into the territory of
the other Party shall not be required to make contributions to social security
funds in the host country).

 4.4   Who all shall become
the members of the EPFS?

 a)  Every IW, other than an
‘excluded employee’- from 1st October, 2008.

 b)  Every excluded employee,
on ceasing the status – from the date he ceases to be excluded employee.

 4.5   Which category of establishments shall take cognizance of provisions
relating to IWs?

       All such
establishments covered/coverable under the EPF Act (including those exempted
under section 17 of the Act) that employ any person falling under the category
of ‘International Worker’ shall take cognisance of relevant provisions.

 4.6   Whether PF rules will
apply to an employee if his salary is paid outside India?

       Yes, the provisions
will apply irrespective of where the salary is paid. The PF contributions are
liable to be paid on wages, DA, and Retaining Allowance, if any, payable to the
employee. Hence, if salary is payable by establishment in India contribution
shall be payable in India and other rules will also apply accordingly.

 4.7   Whether PF will be
payable only on the part of salary paid in India in case of split payroll?

      In case of split payroll
the contribution shall be paid on the total salary earned by the employee in
the establishment covered in India.

 4.8   ‘Monthly Pay’ for
calculating contributions to be paid under the EPF Act?

      The contribution
shall be calculated on the basis of monthly pay containing the following
components actually drawn during the whole month whether paid on daily, weekly,
fortnightly or monthly basis: • Basic wages • Dearness allowance (all cash
payments by whatever name called paid to an employee on account of a rise in
the cost of living) • Retaining allowance • Cash value of any food concession.

 4.9   What portion of salary
on which PF would be payable in case an individual has multiple country
responsibilities and spends part of his time outside India?

      Contribution is
payable on the total salary payable on account of the employment of the
employee employed for wages by an establishment covered in India even for
responsibility outside India.

 4.10 Is there a minimum
period of days of stay in India which the employee can work in India without
triggering PF compliance?

        No minimum period is
prescribed. Every eligible International Worker has to be enrolled from the
first date of his employment in India.

 4.11 Is there a cap on the
salary up to which the contribution has to be made by both the employer as well
as the employee?

        No, there is no cap
on the salary on which contributions are payable by the employer as well as
employee.

 4.12 Is there a cap on the
salary up to which the employer’s share of contribution has to be diverted to
EPS?

        No, there is no cap
on the salary up to which the employer’s share of contribution has to be
diverted to EPS, 1995 and the same is payable on total salary of the employee.

 4.13 Should the eligible
employees from any country other than the countries with whom India has entered
a social security agreement contribute as International Workers?

         Yes, International
Workers from any country can be enrolled as members of EPF.

4.14 Regarding Indian
employees working abroad and contributing to the Social Security Scheme of that
country with whom India has a Social Security Agreement, are they coverable for
PF in India or treated as excluded employees?

        No, only employees
working in establishments situated and covered in India may be covered in
India.

4.15 Regarding Indian
employees working abroad and contributing to the social security scheme of a
country with which India DOES NOT have a Social Security Agreement, are they
coverable for PF in India?

       If an Indian employee
is employed in any covered establishment in India and sent abroad on posting,
he is liable to be a member in India as a domestic Indian employee, if
otherwise eligible. He is not an International Worker.

4.16 Whether foreign
nationals employed in India and being paid in foreign currency are coverable?

       Yes, foreign
nationals drawing salary in any currency and in any manner are to be covered as
IWs.

4.17 Whether foreigners
employed directly by an Indian establishment are coverable?

        Foreigners employed
directly by an Indian establishment would be coverable under the EPF Act as
IWs.

 

4.18 What is the criterion
for receiving the withdrawal benefit for services less than 10 years under EPS,
1995?

       Only those employees
covered by a SSA will be eligible for withdrawal benefit under the EPS, 1995,
who have not rendered the eligible service (i.e. 10 years) even after including
the totalisation benefit, if any, as may be provided in the said agreement. In
all other cases of IWs not covered under SSA, withdrawal benefit under the EPS,
1995 will not be available.

4.19 How long can an Indian
employee retain the status of “International Worker”?

      An Indian employee
attains the status of “International Worker” only when he becomes
eligible to avail benefits under the social security programme of other country
by virtue of the eligibility gained or going to gain, under the said agreement on
account of employment in a country with which India has signed SSA. He/she
shall remain in that status till the time he/she avails the benefits under EPF
Scheme. In other words, once an IW, always an IW.

4.20 Whether the
International Worker will earn interest even after cessation of service after
three years also in view of provisions of inoperative accounts?

      Since the provisions
of inoperative accounts are not applicable in case of international workers,
the restriction of earning interest will not apply. The international worker
shall continue to earn interest upto the age of 58 years or otherwise becomes
eligible for withdrawal.

4.21 Under what circumstances
accumulations in the Fund are payable to an International Worker?

        On retirement from
service in the establishment at any time after the attainment of 58 years. On
retirement on accounts of permanent and total incapacity for work due to bodily
or mental infirmity. A member suffering from tuberculosis or leprosy or cancer.

        In respect of a
member covered under a social security agreement entered into between the
Government of India and any other county on such grounds as may be specified in
that agreement till the time he/she avails the benefits under a social security
programme covered under that SSA.

4.22 Under what condition the
contributions received in the PF account are payable along with interest to
International Worker?

      The full amount
standing to the credit of a member’s account is payable if anyone of the
circumstances mentioned under amended Para 69 of the EPF Scheme, 1952 is
fulfilled, namely: i) on retirement from service in the establishment at any
time after 58 years of age; ii) on retirement on account of permanent and total
incapacity for work due to bodily or mental infirmity, duly certified by the
authorised medical officer; and iii) in accordance with the terms and
conditions provided in an SSA.

 4.23 Is there a cap on the
salary up to which the contribution has to be made under the EDLI Scheme, 1976
by the employer?

       Yes, the amended cap
on the salary up to which contribution has to be made under the EDLI Scheme,
1976 is Rs. 15,000.

 5.    SSA Provisions Explained – Based on India-Belgium SSA

 5.1   How it is that double
coverage is avoided after an agreement?

      When you are employed
either in India or Belgium and sent on a posting to the other contracting
Country, you and your employer would normally have to pay Social Security
Contributions/taxes to both countries for the same work. With the agreement in
place, this double coverage is eliminated and you are required to pay
Contributions/taxes to only one country, provided your posting in the other
country is for no more than 60 months.

 5.2  How does it help
employees who work or have worked in both countries to augment their
eligibility for monthly retirement, disability or survivors benefits?

 a. When you have Social
Security insurance periods in both India and Belgium, you may be eligible for
benefits from one or both countries.

b. Should you have enough
insurance periods under one country’s system, you will get a regular benefit
from that country.

c. If
you do not have enough insurance periods, the agreement may help you augment
your eligibility for a benefit by letting you add together your Social Security
insurance periods in both countries, only for the purpose of deciding your
eligibility.

d. However, each country will
pay a benefit based solely on your periods of insurance under its pension
system.

e. Although each country may
count your insurance periods in the other country, they are not actually
transferred from one country to the other.

f.  Since your insurance
periods remain on your record in the country where you earned them, they can
also be used to qualify for benefits there.

 5.3   What is a detachment
certificate?

      A detachment certificate is otherwise a
“Certificate of coverage” issued by one country (indicating the details of
coverage/membership under its social security system) that serves as proof of
exemption from Social Security contributions/taxes on the same earnings in the
other country.

 5.4   How to obtain a
Certificate of coverage?

      To seek an exemption
from coverage under the Belgian system, the employee must be working in an
establishment covered or coverable under Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation
(EPFO), the Indian Liaison agency. Both the employer as well as the employee
must jointly request a certificate of coverage, in the prescribed format, from
the jurisdictional Regional Provident Fund Commissioner of EPFO.

5.5   I am holding a
Certificate of coverage. When does the date of exemption from the other
country’s social security system start?

      The certificate of
coverage carries a provision for indicating the effective date of your
exemption (based on the information provided in your joint application) from
paying Social Security contributions/taxes in the other country. Normally, this
date shall be on or after the date you started working in the other country but
cannot be a date earlier than the date of effect of the Agreement.

 5.6 Who are all eligible
for applying for a certificate of coverage?

         There are 2
categories of employees eligible for applying for a Certificate of coverage.

a.Those already deputed on a
pre-determined short-term assignment and working in Belgium should apply for a Certificate
of coverage for the period from 1st Sept. 2009 to the date of
completion of the deputation.

b.Those to be deputed on or
after 1st Sept. 2009 should apply for a certificate of coverage for
the entire period of deputation in Belgium.

 5.7   How to ascertain
whether an employee is coverable under the Indian or Belgian Social Security
system?

 a.    
An Indian national working in Belgium

Nature of employment

Coverage under

1.  Sent on
short-term posting by an Indian employer for a period of less than 5 years

Indian system

2.  Sent on
Long-term posting by an Indian employer for a period of more than 5 years

Belgian system

3.  On local
employment by an Indian employer directly in Belgium

Belgian system

4.  On local
employment by a Non-Indian employer directly in Belgium

Belgian system

 

b.    A Belgium
national working in India

Nature of employment

Coverage under

1.   Sent
on short-term posting by a Belgian employer 
for a period of less than 5 years

Belgian system

2.  Sent on
Long-term posting by a Belgian employer for a period of more than 5 years

Indian system

3.  On local
employment by a Belgian employer directly in India

Indian system

4.  On local
employment by a Non- Belgian employer directly in India

Indian system

 

5.8   What benefits are due
to an employee covered under the Indian system administered by EPFO?

S. No.

Benefit

Nature

To whom payable

1.

Provident fund benefit (EPF

A lump sum cash benefit that gets
accrued in a member’s account by way of the contributions remitted and the
interest earned thereon.

1.  Member: on leaving
employment on superannuation or disability.

Or

2.  Survivors, if the
member is not alive.

2. 

Pension benefit (EPS)

A Monthly cash benefit paid into the
credit of the beneficiary’s bank account.

1.  Member: on leaving
employment on superannuation or disability. Or

2.  Widow/widower and
the eligible children: if the member is not alive. Or

3.  Nominee/Parents: if
the member dies without leaving any family.

 

3.

Insurance benefit (EDLI)

A lump sum cash benefit.

1.  To the survivors on
death of the member.

2.  The death should
have occurred during employment.

 


5.9   Whom does the agreement
help?

       The agreement helps the employee,
her/his family and the employer.

5.10 How does the agreement help
the employee?

 The
agreement helps at 3 stages.

a) During the period while the employee is
working;

b) At the time of claiming the benefits and

c) At the time of receiving the benefits.

        While working

a. If both the Indian and Belgian Social Security
systems cover an employee’s work, the employer along with the employee would
normally have to pay Social Security contributions to both countries for the
same work. The agreement eliminates this double coverage so that contributions
are paid to only one system.

 b.Under the agreement, an eligible Belgium
national employed in India will be covered by India, and that employee and the
employer will pay Social Security contributions only to India. If an Indian
national is employed in Belgium, she/he will be covered by Belgium, and that
employee and the employer shall pay Social Security contributions only to
Belgium.

 c.On the other hand, if an employer sends an
employee from one country to work for that employer in the other country for
five years or less, that employee will continue to be covered by her/his home
country and that she/he will be exempt from coverage in the host country. For
example, if an Indian employer sends an employee to work for that employer in
Belgium for no more than five years, the employer and the employee will
continue to pay only Indian Social Security contributions and will not have to
pay in Belgium.

When claiming the benefits

a. An employee may have contributed to the Social
Security systems in both India and Belgium but not have enough insurance
periods to be eligible for benefits in one country or the other. The agreement
makes it easier to qualify for benefits by allowing totalisation of such Social
Security contributory periods in both countries.

b. If an employee has Social Security insurance
periods in both India and Belgium, she/he may be eligible for benefits from one
or both countries. If she/he meets all the basic requirements under one
country’s system, she/he will get a regular benefit from that country. If she/he
does not meet the basic requirements, the agreement may help her/him qualify
for a benefit by allowing totalisation of insurance periods in both the
countries.

c. If she/he does not qualify for regular
benefits, she/he may be able to qualify for a partial benefit from India,
against the contributions made to India, based on totalisation of both Indian
and Belgian insurance periods.

d. Similarly, she/he may be entitled for a partial
Belgian benefit against the contributions made to Belgium, based on totalisation
of both Belgian and Indian insurance periods.

At the time of receiving the benefits

        The benefits under Indian social
security system is not payable outside India. An employee from Belgium was at a
loss being not able to get the due benefits on her/his relocation outside
India. Now, the agreement provides for making payment of benefits to the member
irrespective of whether she/he lives in India or Belgium or a third country.

5.11 Can you tell me an example how the employees
are benefited under the Agreement?

        A member who worked in India and
contributed to EPS, 1995 for 7 years is now living in Belgium after
contributing under the Belgian system for 20 years. He is more than 58 years
old.

 Entitlement

a. Without the Agreement:

        The member has less than the 10 years of
pensionable service required to qualify for member’s pension under EPS, 1995
and hence is not entitled to receive any pension benefit.

 b. With the Agreement

  Eligibility to Pension under EPS 1995 can be
claimed by totalizing the insurance periods spent under the Indian system (7
years) with the Belgian system (20 years).

  Since the total insurance period will work out
to 27 years (7+20), which is more than the required minimum eligible service of
10 years, the member becomes eligible to get pension under EPS, 1995.

  However, this totalised period shall be
considered for deciding the eligibility only and hence, the actual pension will
be sanctioned taking into account the period spent under the EPS, 1995 (7
years) as the pensionable service.

  Such a pension is payable to the member’s bank
account either in Belgium or in India.

7.    Conclusion

       India’s move to require IWs to
contribute to the Indian social security system has encouraged many countries
to negotiate and execute SSAs with India. The SSAs significantly benefit Indian
workers employed abroad, especially those on short-term contracts.

        In cases where employees are suspended
but their employment is not terminated, in the home country, it is difficult to
ascertain whether the same would trigger provisions of EPF Act and the SSAs. In
some cases, it is difficult to ascertain whether the relationship is in the
nature of employment or assignment and hence whether provisions of EPF Act and
the SSAs would be applicable.

      Application and interpretation of SSAs
and the social security law in India with respect to expatriates is still
evolving. There are open questions when it comes to secondment and deputation
arrangements, especially in light of possible tax implications.

      It is advisable that readers should
carefully examine the provisions of the SSAs before providing any structuring
and other guidance relating to mobility of IWs. _

HOME OFFICE AS PE

Background

Permanent Establishment (PE) confers taxation right
to host country to tax business profits. Once PE is constituted, business
profits are taxable at rate applicable to non-resident. Most common is the
creation of fixed place PE, Agency PE, Service PE, rules of which are designed
to cater to different forms of business. Increasingly, transactions entered
into by non-residents are scrutinised from PE perspective. Often, a foreign
enterprise appoints employees/agents in India to conduct its business. Such employees
use their home as office to work for foreign enterprise. Recently, the Chennai
Tribunal in case of Carpi Tech SA (TS-587-ITAT-ITAT-2016) held that residence
cum office of Indian director creates permanent establishment in India for
activities carried out in India for short period of time. This article proposes
to analyse some of the nuances of the decision.

Facts of the case:

–  The Taxpayer, a company resident in
Switzerland, undertook Geo Membrane waterproofing project for NHPC in India
(the NHPC project). The NHPC project lasted for less than 40 days.

–  Mr. V. Subramanian (Mr. V) is one of the
directors of the Taxpayer since its incorporation. He was designated as project
representative and/or project coordinator of the Taxpayer in India. He held a
Power of Attorney to undertake all activities on behalf of the Taxpayer.

   I Co was engaged in the same business as the
Taxpayer. Further, I Co was also given a Power of Attorney to represent the
Taxpayer in its projects in India. Additionally, Mr. V is the Managing Director
of I Co.

–    Mr. V’s residential address is also used as
office address of I Co. Further, the same address is also used as communication
address by the Taxpayer in India for all its official purposes.

   The Taxpayer was of the view that in the
absence of a PE under the India – Swiss DTAA (‘DTAA’), its income from NHPC
project was not taxable in India. Hence, it disclosed NIL income in its tax
return for the tax year under consideration.

The Tax Authority, based on the directions received
by the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) in India, held that the Taxpayer created
a PE in India in terms of Article 5 of the DTAA as below:

  Fixed place PE at the residential-cum-office
address of Mr. V/ I Co

Agency PE due to functions performed by Mr. V
/ I Co on behalf of the Taxpayer

The Taxpayer filed an appeal before the Chennai
Tribunal against the DRP order.

Issue before the Tribunal

Whether income of the Taxpayer from the NHPC
project was taxable in India under provisions of the DTAA?

Key arguments of the Taxpayer

–   Duration of the NHPC project was very short
(40 days). Such duration also does not meet six months threshold to create a PE
in India. Taxpayer’s earlier projects in India were undertaken three years back
and such previous projects may not be relevant for examining PE in the current
tax year.

  Type of activities undertaken in India by Mr.
V on behalf of the Taxpayer (i.e. design, manufacture, supply and installation
of exposed PVC Geo composite Membrane) fell under installation PE provisions of
the DTAA. However, the threshold of six months is not fulfilled to create a PE.

–    Mr. V’s residential-cum-office address is
merely a mailing address. Mere existence of books of account and bank account
at Mr. V’s residence-cum-office cannot either conclusively or inferentially
point to emergence of a fixed PE.

   Mr. V is an independent
agent of the Taxpayer. He is representing other unrelated companies also in
India in the ordinary course of his business and is not exclusively working for
the Taxpayer. The POA provided to Mr. V was a specific one and it did not
provide any continuous or general authority to Mr. V to act on behalf of the
Taxpayer. Hence, it does not create an Agency PE also.

Tribunal’s ruling

Fixed
PE

   Residence-cum-office premises of Mr. V
created a fixed PE of the Taxpayer, due to the following reasons:

    Business of the Taxpayer is conducted from
the address of Mr. V.

   All correspondences related to participation
in bids, correspondence with customers, signing of contracts, execution of the
project and closure of the project etc. were initiated or routed through
the same address.

   Authority of Advance Rulings (AAR) in the
case of Sutron Corporation (268 ITR 156) supports that residence of country manager
can create a fixed PE if the same was used as an office address by taxpayer.

   Once Fixed PE test is satisfied, there is no
need to evaluate Construction PE clause under the special inclusion list.

   In any case, services rendered by the
Taxpayer were more in the nature of repair and supply of material rather than
building site, construction, installation or assembly project to fall under the
Construction PE provisions. Hence, the 182 days threshold of Construction PE
was not relevant.

   I Co also created a PE of the Taxpayer for
the following reasons:

    Activities of I Co and the Taxpayer are
interlinked such that the role played by the director as an agent of the
Taxpayer and I Co (which rendered similar services) cannot be easily separated.
Further, I Co participates in the economic activities of the Taxpayer.

    I Co and the Taxpayer were carrying out
identical nature of work in India. Their names and letter heads were also
similar.

    I Co was the face of the Taxpayer in India.
I Co held POA and was the authorised representative of the Taxpayer for the
NHPC project.

    I Co incurred all expenses in India to
execute the NHPC project which were later reimbursed by the Taxpayer. I Co
appointed vendors to render services locally and made payments to them.

Agency PE

   Mr. V was held to be acting as a dependent
agent of Taxpayer, based on the following:

    Mr. V was holding a POA on behalf of the
Taxpayer and was also the project coordinator/representative for NHPC project.

    The Taxpayer was relying on the skills and
knowledge of Mr. V. His role was critical to all the aspect of the contract
through the stage of signing to its execution.

    Mentioning Mr. V’s address on the website as
well as letterheads of the Taxpayer were indicating the fact that Mr. V was the
face of the Taxpayer in India and was representing the Taxpayer in all
practical matters.

    No evidence was provided to prove that Mr. V
was an independent agent. On the other hand, he was acting exclusively or
almost exclusively for the Taxpayer. Hence, to that an extent, the same is not
in furtherance of his ordinary course of business.

–      The role of Mr. V for the Taxpayer and I Co
was such that it cannot be separated. There existed a unison of interest to a
great extent, while as an independent agent there would be required an
objectivity in execution of the tasks of the non-resident company.

–      Activities performed by I Co and Mr. V cannot
be said to be of preparatory or auxiliary character to qualify for PE
exclusion.

   I Co represented by Mr. V or Mr. V himself
created a PE of the Taxpayer in India.

Analysis of The Tribunal decision:

In summary, the Tribunal held that Mr V. as also I Co
constituted PE in India based on following reasoning:

   Residence-cum-office premises of Mr. V
created a fixed PE of the Taxpayer on account of its usage for business purpose
of Taxpayer.

   Fixed place PE can be constituted even if its
activities in India are for 40 days.

  Once fixed place PE is constituted there is
no need to analyse Construction PE. In any case, repair and supply of material
does not fit within Construction PE.

   I Co created PE of Taxpayer on account of
similarity of activities, identical nature of work and reimbursement of all
expenditure incurred in India by I Co.

   Mr V. created agency PE as it held POA on
behalf of Taxpayer; Taxpayer relied upon the skills of Mr V; Mr V worked
exclusively or almost exclusively for Taxpayer.

Aforesaid aspects have
been analysed in the ensuing paragraphs-

Place of disposal test:

   Indian jurisprudence as also OECD Commentary
has considered satisfaction of disposal test as pre-requisite for constitution
of fixed place PE. Disposal test postulates that foreign enterprise has right
or control over premises which constitutes fixed place PE. In this case,
Tribunal has not specifically provided any positive observation on satisfaction
of disposal test. Perhaps Tribunal has presumed satisfaction of disposal test
given the dependence of Taxpayer on Mr V. and use of premises of Mr V for official
purpose/communication.

–    OECD’s revised proposal concerning the
interpretation & application of Article 5 (Permanent Establishment) of the
OECD Model Tax Convention (2011) stated that home office can constitute PE in
limited situations. OECD revised proposal stated that home office of employee
should not lead to an automatic conclusion of PE and would be dependent on
facts of each case. It is further stated that where a home office is used on a
regular and continuous basis for carrying on business activities for an
enterprise and it is clear from the facts and circumstances that the enterprise
has required the individual to use that location to carry on the enterprise’s
business (e.g. by not providing an office to an employee in circumstances where
the nature of the employment clearly requires an office), the home office may
be considered to be at the disposal of the enterprise.

   Incidentally, disposal test is also not dealt
with by AAR in Sutron Corporation (supra) which is relied upon by
Tribunal.

Duration
Test:

–     A fixed place PE can exists only if place of
business has certain degree of permanence. There is no standard time threshold
provided by treaty and thus duration test involves subjectivity. Much depends
upon individual facts and nature of operations of Taxpayer.

   Conventionally, it is understood that six
months’ time period should be satisfied for constitution of PE. However, there
are special situations where nature of a business of a foreign enterprise
requires it to be carried on only for a short period of time, then in such
cases a shorter period will suffice duration test.

   The Tribunal relied upon decision of Fugro (supra)
wherein PE was constituted for 91 days of work carried on in India. As against
that there are other precedents which has held that no PE is constituted in
India in following situations:

    a foreign enterprise in State S for 27 days
for one project and 68 days for another project [ABC, In re (1999) 237
ITR 798 (AAR)]

    a vessel in India for 2.5 months [DCIT
vs. Subsea Offshore Ltd, (1998) 66 ITD 296 (Mum) ]
or a sailing ship
crossing over to Indian waters for 10 days [Essar Oil Ltd vs. DCIT, (2006)
102 TTJ 614 (Mum)
]

    A foreign enterprise engaged in dredging and
which had its project office in India for 153 days [Van Oord Atlanta B. V.
vs. ADIT, (2007) 112 TTJ 229 (Kol)
]

  The performance of work under an agreement
had been accomplished by the occasional visits of the applicant’s personnel for
site visits and meetings. The nature of service was such that most of the
services were rendered outside India. The aggregate period spent in India by
the personnel was 24 days in the first year and 70 days in the next year. Two
or three employees of the applicant stayed in India for about a month [Worley
Parsons Services Pty. Ltd, In re (2009) 312 ITR 317 (AAR)]

    The assessee was engaged in the business of
telecasting cricket events. Its employees and representatives (TV crew,
programmer and engineers, other technical personnel, etc.) cumulatively stayed
in India for less than 90 days [Nimbus Sport International Pte. Ltd. vs.
DDIT, (2012) 145 TTJ 186 (Del)]

    The assessee was engaged in the activity of
supervision of plant and machinery for steel and allied plants in India. For
one project, it deputed foreign technicians to India who stayed in India for
220 days [GFA Anlagenbau Gmbh vs. DDIT, TS-383-ITAT-2014-HYD]

Interplay between fixed place PE and Construction
PE

   The Tribunal held that once fixed place PE is
constituted there is no need to analyse Construction PE. In other words, the
Tribunal held that fixed place PE overrides Construction PE.

   Aforesaid observations are not in sync with
following illustrative decisions of the Tribunal and AAR which has held that
Article 5(3) overrides article 5(1). In other words, there cannot be fixed
place PE unless time threshold specified under Construction PE is satisfied.

    GIL Mauritius Holdings Ltd. vs. ACIT
(2012) 143 TTJ 103 (Del)

    ADIT vs. Valentine Maritime (Mauritius)
Ltd. (2010) 3 taxmann.com 92 (Mum)

    Sumitomo Corporation vs. DCIT (2007) 110
TTJ 302 (Del)

    DCIT vs. Hyundai Heavy Industries Ltd.
(2010) 128 TTJ 4 (Del)

   The Tribunal additionally held that repair
and supply of material does not fall within the purview of installation,
construction or assembly project. As against that OECD and UN Commentary on
Article 5 at para 17 observed that renovation involving more than maintenance
or redecoration would fall within Construction PE.

Agency PE

  The Tribunal held that Taxpayer had Agency PE
in India on account of factors like Taxpayer reliance on Mr V’ skills, granting
of POA to Mr V and exclusive service to Taxpayer.

   Mr V was dependent on the Taxpayer and he was
taxpayer’s Indian representative.

   Whilst the aforesaid may be sufficient for
creation of dependent agent but for creation of dependent agent PE following
additional condition needs to be satisfied:

              agent has and habitually
exercises in that State, an
authority to negotiate and enter into
contracts for or on behalf of the enterprise.

   The Tribunal has not dealt explicitly with
satisfaction of aforesaid conditions of authority to enter contracts by Mr V or
by ICo.

Conclusion

Decision of the Tribunal is likely to create
litigation for foreign enterprise which has a minuscule presence in India and
is dependent upon Indian agent/employee for Indian business. The Tribunal has
considered overall presence of Taxpayer in India as also surrounding circumstances
like commonality of directors; active role paid by Mr V; holding of POA;
exclusive nature of arrangement with Mr V; similarity in names of Indian
company; reimbursement of all expenditure of Indian company by Taxpayer to
reach to the conclusion that Taxpayer has PE in India.

Similar was the decision of Aramex International
Logistics Pvt Ltd (2012) 22 taxmann.com 74 (AAR) wherein AAR held that
dependence of group company in conducting business in India creates PE. In this
case, Taxpayer a Singaporean Company engaged in business of door-to-door
express shipments by air and land entered into an agreement with its Indian
subsidiary (ICO) to look after movement of packages within India, both inbound
and outbound. AAR held that where a subsidiary is created for purpose of
attending business of a group in a particular country, that subsidiary must be
taken to be a permanent establishment of that group in that particular country.

It may be noted that none of the decisions have
dealt with base conditions which are the pre-requisites for constitution of PE.
It will be interesting to see how decisions will be dealt with by higher forums
where satisfaction of fundamental conditions of PE will be tested.
 _

INTER STATE SALE VIS-À-VIS INTRA STATE SALE

Introduction

Whether transaction is Inter State
or Intra State sale is always a very delicate issue. The nature of transaction
depends upon facts of case. By now, there are number of precedents laying down
tests for deciding nature of inter-state sale. However, it still cannot be said
that it is a settled law.

Section 3(a) of the Central Sales
Tax Act (CST Act) lays down the principles to define inter-state sale.

Although, section 3(b) also
describes certain transaction to be inter-state sale but the same is not
discussed here.

Section 3(a) reads as under:

“S.3. When is a sale or purchase of
goods said to take place in the course of inter-State trade of commerce.- A
sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of
inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase-


 a. occasions the movement of goods from one
State to another; or ……………..…”

Thus, normal understanding is that
the sale which is linked with inter-state movement of goods is inter-state
sale. And it is also expected that same goods are moved, which are subject
matter of sale. 

If the goods sold and goods
actually moving are different then it is difficult to say that there is
inter-state sale in the hands of seller. However, we find contrary judgments on
the issue as discussed here under.


Inter State sale under section 3(a) –
Scenario I

State of Tamil Nadu vs. Sun Paper
Mill Ltd. & Ors. (23 VST 191)(Mad)

The facts in this case, in words of
Hon. High Court are as under:

“The assessee – first respondent is
a public limited company, which is engaged in the business of manufacture and
sale of papers. They are dealers in newsprint and assessed on the file of the
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Ambasamudram, in TNGST 802529/93-94. The
relevant assessment year is 1993-1994. The assessee has effected sales of
newsprint to the tune of Rs. 25,07,671 during the assessment year to Tvl. Kerala
Sabdam and Tvl. Kollam Muthari, Kollam and claimed those sales as inter-state
sales. But the assessing officer rejected their claim on the ground that the
newsprints sold to them were not moved to another State. They were moved only
to Sivakasi and later the said newsprints were converted into news magazine in
Pioneer Press (P) Limited, Sivakasi and then the same were moved to Kerala.
Therefore, the assessing officer assessed the said turnover under the Tamil
Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Aggrieved by that order, the assessee filed
an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (CT), Tirunelveli in CST
AP No. 345 of 1995. The Commissioner allowed the appeal on the ground that the
movement of goods from the State of Tamil Nadu to Kerala would certainly form
an inter-State transaction. Later, the Joint Commissioner (CT)(SMR) suo motu
revised the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and treated the
transaction as local sales.

Assessee pursued the matter further
and ultimately came before Hon. Madras High Court by way of a Writ Petition.
After hearing parties, Hon. High Court ruled as under:

“After taking note of the
principles enunciated in the above Supreme Court judgments, we have to find out
whether there is movement of goods. The present case falls u/s. 3(a) of the
Act. There are two ingredients in the section, i.e., (i) it must be a sale of
goods; (ii) the sale occasions the movement of goods from one State to another.
In respect of sale, there is no dispute. We have to see here whether there is
sale occasioning the movement of goods. In the case on hand, the seller and the
buyer contemplated movement of goods from Tamil Nadu to Kerala. At the
instruction of the buyer, the goods were dispatched to Sivakasi, wherein
conversion took place and after conversion, the goods were moved to Kerala.
Because of conversion, it cannot be held that there is no movement of goods. It
is only for the purpose of section 5(3) of the Act that any goods undergoing
commercial change is relevant. It is not for the purpose of determining the
inter-state sale u/s. 3(a) of the Act.

Mere stoppage at Sivakasi and
conversion would not alter the character of the transaction. The stoppage and
conversion occurred only at the instance of the buyer at Kerala. There is no
dispute in respect of the contract. The goods were moved pursuant to the
contract. The goods dispatched to Sivakasi were not meant to be sold in the
open market. There is no restriction that the goods should be moved intact. It
is not for the Revenue to suggest that the goods must reach as it is. The
authorities, who are acting as guardian of the Revenue, must examine and
consider the transaction from the standpoint of a businessman. The yardstick is
that of a prudent businessman. Otherwise, first, the goods have to go to Kerala
and then betransported back to Sivakasi for conversion and once again after
conversion, it must go to Kerala. To avoid multiplicity of transaction, the
seller sent the goods to Sivakasi at the instance of the buyer and after conversion,
the same were sent to Kerala. There is no material available to show that the
goods are meant to be in Sivakasi. It is not the contention of the petitioner
that the goods were not moved from Tamil Nadu to Kerala. Stoppage and
conversion do not make the transaction a local sale. After applying the
principles enunciated in the judgments cited supra and also taking into
consideration the facts involved, we are of the view that the transaction
involved is only an inter-State sale.”


Inter State sale under section 3(a) –
Scenario II

Tamil Nadu Petro Products Ltd. vs.
Assistant Commissioner (CT), Fast Track Assessment Circle II, Chennai and
another’s (95 VST 118)(Mad)

The facts in this case, as narrated
by the High Court are as follows:

“2. The controversy which led to
the petitioner seeking for the clarification arose under the following
circumstances. HLL are engaged in the manufacture of detergents and they are
registered dealers on the file of the Assistant Commissioner (CT), Fast Track
Assessment Circle-II, Greams Road, Chennai, under the provisions of the TNGST
Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, (CST Act). HLL placed purchase order
dated 15.06.2000, for sale of LAB and for delivery of the same at M/s. Ultra
Marine and Pigments Limited, Ranipet, (Job Worker). The said purchase order was
raised by HLL from their Mangalore office. The job worker is required to
manufacture Acid Slurry from LAB and such product is stock transferred to the
factory of HLL at Mangalore. Therefore, the question arose as to whether the
petitioner can avail the concessional rate of tax on production of form-XVII
declaration.”

The following argument on behalf of
Revenue further clarifies the controversy:  

“5. Mr. Manokaran Sundaram, learned
Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submitted that the
petitioner entered into a contract with HLL, Mangalore for supply of LAB; a raw
material for manufacture of detergent and as per the agreement, it had to be
supplied and delivered to their job worker at Ranipet and later after
conversion of raw material as Acid Slurry, the same would be transported to
HLL, Mangalore for further processing and manufacturing as detergents.
Referring to the purchase order dated 15.06.2000, it is submitted that it
clearly shows the dealer at Mangalore had placed the purchase order and in
pursuance to the same, the petitioner had effected sale to the dealer at
Mangalore and the transaction is clearly an interstate sale and the only
difference being delivery has been made to the job worker at Ranipet and after
completion, for onward transmission to the purchaser at Mangalore.”

After examining controversy, the
Hon. High Court held as under:

“12. Undoubtedly, the products sold
by the petitioner was not the product which was moved out of the Ranipet
factory on stock transfer to HLL Mangalore. Thus, the factory at Ranipet had
manufactured a commercially distinct product than what was sold by the
petitioner to HLL. In other words, the products sold by the petitioner was LAB,
the product which was manufactured from LAB was Acid Slurry. In my view, it
would be unnecessary to test the present transaction based on whether the
product manufacture within the State was an intermediary product for
manufacture of another product outside the state.

14. If the case on hand is tested
on the anvil of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is not in dispute
that the contract of sale with the petitioner stood completed within the State
of Tamil Nadu upon delivery of the goods at Ranipet. The movement of the goods
after undergoing a process of manufacture and after being converted into a
commercially different product is an independent transaction and the
transaction could not be treated as an interstate element.”

Thus, the transaction of sale by
seller to buyer (HLL) is held to be intra state sale.


Conclusion

It can be seen that on similar
facts, the same High Court has given different rulings. Thus, the situation
becomes very uncertain. The dealer community remains in great confusion about
the correct tax to be collected from buyer. It is felt that the latert judgment
specifies correct scope of section 3(a) of CST Act for inter-state sale. The
goods sold and moved to other State should be same goods, else it will create
an unexpected situation.

It is expected that the controversy
will get settled by the later judgment. _

ONUS OF LIABILITY TO PAY SERVICE TAX

Preliminary

Service providers often face
practical difficulties (due to financial constraints, non-recoveries from
clients etc.) in paying service tax to the Government in time resulting in
interest and other penal consequences. In such situations, issues arise as to
whether service providers can direct service tax authorities to recover tax
dues from their debtors. This aspect and related issues are discussed hereafter
with the help of a Delhi High Court ruling, special leave petition against
which has been dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Relevant Extracts from the Finance
Act, 1994 as amended (“Act”)

Section 68 of the Act (payment of service tax)

(1)  Every person providing
taxable service tax to any person shall pay service tax at the rate specified
in section 66B in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed.

(2)  Notwithstanding anything
contained in s/s. (1), in respect of such taxable services as may be notified
by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, the service tax thereon
shall be paid by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed at the
rate specified in section 66B and all the provisions of this Chapter shall
apply to such person as if he is the person liable for paying the service tax
in relation to such service;

Provided that the Central
Government may notify the service and the extent of service tax which shall be
payable by such person and the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such
person to the extent so specified and the remaining part of the service tax
shall be paid by the service provider.

Section 87 of the Act (recovery of any amount due to Central
Government)

Where any amount payable by a
person to the credit of the Central Government under any of the provisions of
this Chapter or of the rules made thereunder is not paid, the Central Excise
Officer shall proceed to recover the amount by one or more of the modes
mentioned below:

(a) the Central Excise Officer
may deduct or may require any other Central Excise Officer or any officer of
customs to deduct the amount so payable from any money owing to such person
which may be under the control of the said Central Excise Officer or any
officer of customs;

(b) (i)   the Central Excise Officer may, by notice in
writing, require any other person from whom money is due or may become due to
such person, or who holds or may subsequently hold money for or on account of
such person, to pay to the credit of the Central Government either forthwith
upon the money becoming due or being held or at or within the time specified in
the notice, not being before the money becomes due or is held, so much of the
money as is sufficient to pay the amount due from such person or the whole of
the money when it is equal to or less than that amount;

     (ii)  every person to whom
a notice is issued under this section shall be bound to comply with such
notice, and in particular, where any such notice is issued to a post office,
banking company or an insurer, it shall not be necessary to produce any pass
book, deposit receipt, policy or any other document for the purpose of any
entry, endorsement or the like being made before payment is made,
notwithstanding any rule, practice or requirement to the contrary;

    (iii) in a case where the
person to whom a notice under this section is sent, fails to make the payment
in pursuance thereof to the Central Government, he shall be deemed to be an
assessee in default in respect of the amount specified in the notice and all
the consequences of this Chapter shall follow;

                        …………….

Delhi High Court Ruling in Delhi
Transport Corporation (DTC) vs. CST (2015) 51 GST 511 (DEL)
(2015-TIOL-961-HC-DEL-57

Facts in Brief

With the objective of augmenting
its revenue, DTC entered into contracts with seven agencies
(contractors/advertisers) providing space to such parties for display of
advertisements on bus queue shelters and time keeping booths. Two of the said
contracts contained similar stipulations including clause No 9 which reads as
under:

“It shall be
responsibility of the contractor/advertiser to pay direct to the authority and
MCD concerned the advertisement tax or any other taxes levy payable or imposed
by any authority and this amount will be in addition to the license fee quoted
above”

According to the Revenue, on the
basis of inputs received from its anti-evasion branch, DTC having engaged
itself in aforementioned contracts had failed to pay tax on services. Hence
show cause notices were issued by the revenue demanding service tax on receipts
by DTC on account of “sale of space or time for advertisement” along with
interest and penalty.

DTC submitted replies to the
effect that it is an autonomous body of government of NCT of Delhi created
under the Road Transport Act and had no intention to violate the provisions of
the taxing statutes. They further submitted that the obligation for
registration under the Service Tax Rules had escaped the notice of its accounts
department and chartered accountant/auditors and thus, the omission was neither
intentional nor deliberate. It was submitted that after the requirement had
come to its notice, DTC had taken requisite steps for registration. It further
stated that since it was obliged to provide transport services to the public at
large at subsidised rates, it was incurring losses and consequently depended on
grants from the government and for this reason it was moving the Central
Government to grant exemption. DTC further stated that in terms of the
contractual arrangement, the liability towards statutory taxes, including
service tax, was to be borne by the contractors engaged by it and that all such
contractors, except the two mentioned above, were paying the service tax
chargeable in their respect pursuant to supplementary bills raised from time to
time and further that all such remittances received were duly deposited with
the service tax department.

DTC resisted the show cause
notices also on the ground that the two contractors  had taken a stand contradictory to the
contractual terms in such regard, failing to abide by their obligation in terms
of clause 9 (as quoted earlier), in spite of directions of this Court on the
petitions u/s. 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. DTC informed the
Revenue that it intended to institute contempt/execution proceedings against
the said contractors for failure to deposit the service tax in spite of
contractual obligation and the directions of the High Court. It added that the
amount of service tax to the extent realized from the contractors was deposited
with the service tax department.

The show cause notices were
confirmed upon adjudication. In reaching at conclusions, the adjudicating
authority repelled the contentions of DTC objecting to the assessment for the
extended period of five years holding that the assessee contravened the
relevant statutory provisions thereby indulging in “suppression of
material facts”. In addition to penalty u/s. 77 of the Act, penalty was
imposed u/s. 78 of the Act, declining benefit of section 80, referring in this
context to the facts that the assessee had neither applied for service tax
registration nor discharged its service tax liability even though it had been
made aware of the obligations.

Appeal before CESTAT

The order of Commissioner
(Adjudication), service tax was challenged before CESTAT. As noted by the
CESTAT in (para 5 of) the impugned order, DTC did not assail the conclusion of
the adjudicating authority as to the classification of the service nor
impeached the quantum of service tax that was confirmed. Its contentions were
restricted to the following (para 11) :

“5. … that since under
agreements with advertisers, the reciprocal obligation of the parties
covenanted that the recipient of the service would be liable for tax, the
appellant was under a bona fide belief that the liability to remit service tax
stood transferred to the recipient qua the agreements; that this was a bona
fide belief which caused the failure to file returns and remit service tax.
Therefore, the extended period of limitation invoked while issuing the first
show cause notice dated 04/01/2008 is unjustified and for the same reasons,
penalty u/s. 78 of the Act should not have been imposed, by exercising
discretion u/s. 80 of the Act.”

The appellant relied on the
Supreme Court Ruling in Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited vs. Dewan Chand Ram
Saran (2012) 35 STT 664 (SC)
to urge that having entered into the contracts
in the nature mentioned above, it was a legitimate expectation that the service
tax liability would be borne by the contractors/advertisers and thus, there was
no justification for the appellant being held in default or burdened with the
penalty u/s. 78 of the Act. It was argued that in the wake of orders of this
Court on the applications of the two contractors u/s. 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, fastening the liability of service tax (in the event of it being
imposed) on such contractors, the revenue ought not to insist upon such payment
by DTC. The CESTAT, however, held that such considerations would not transfer
the substantive and legislatively mandated liability to service tax from the
appellant (the service provider) to the advertisers (the service recipients).

The CESTAT rejected the claim of
DTC as to “bona fide belief” by observing in para 13 as under:

“6. A bona fide belief
is a belief entertained by a reasonable person. The appellant is a public
authority and an instrumentality of the State and should have taken care to ascertain whether it was liable to tax in
terms of the provisions of the Act
. There is neither alleged, asserted nor
established that there is any ambiguity in the provisions of the Act, which
might justify a belief that the appellant/service provider, was not liable to
service tax. It is axiomatic that no person can harbour a “bona fide
belief” that a legislated liability could be excluded or transferred by a
contract.
The appellant was clearly and exclusively liable to service tax
on rendition of the taxable service of “sale of space or time for
advertisement”. This liability involved the non-derogable obligation to
obtain registration, file periodical ST-3 returns and remit service tax on the
consideration received during the period covered by such ST-3 returns. These
were the core and essential obligations the appellant should have complied
with. We therefore find no basis for the claim that the appellant harboured a
bona fide belief.”

Accordingly, the appeals of DTC
were dismissed by CESTAT.

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS OF
THE DELHI HIGH COURT

–   There is no dispute that services provided are taxable within the
meaning of section 65 (105) (zzzn) and that the appellant is liable to pay
service tax thereupon. We, however, do not agree with the views of CESTAT that
the service tax liability could not have been transferred by way of a contract.
The reliance of DTC on the ruling in Rashtriya Ispat case (supra) on
this score was correct and it appears that the same has not been properly
appreciated by CESTAT. Noticeably, the claim of the assessee in that case was
also founded on contractual terms similar to the one relied upon by the
appellant here. [Para 17]

   The service tax liability in Rashtriya Ispat case arose out of
contract given out for transportation of goods. The contractor engaged had
undertaken to “bear and pay all taxes, duties and other liabilities in
connection with discharge of his obligation”. The contractor had invoked
the arbitration clause for raising a dispute as to its liability to pay service
tax. The claim petition was dismissed by the arbitrator which award was
challenged by a petition u/s. 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act before a
Single Judge of Bombay High Court. The learned Judge held that insofar as the
service liability is concerned, the appellant (Rashtriya Ispat which had given
the contract was the assessee and liable to tax. The appeal preferred against
the said order on the petition was dismissed by the division bench of the High
Court. [Para 18]

   Against the backdrop of the above-noted facts in civil appeal
carried to Supreme Court, it was observed
as under:-

     “37. As far as the
submission of shifting of tax liability is concerned, as observed in para 9 of
Laghu Udyog Bharati vs. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 418, service tax is an
indirect tax and it is possible that it may be passed on. Therefore, an
assessee can certainly enter into a contract to shift its liability of service
tax.

 ……………

39. The provisions concerning service tax are relevant only as
between the appellant as an assessee under the statute and the tax authorities.
This statutory provision can be of no relevance to determine the rights and
liabilities between the appellant and the respondent as agreed in the contract
between two of them. There was nothing in law to prevent the appellant from
entering into an agreement with the respondent handling contractor that the
burden of any tax arising out of obligations of the respondent under the
contract would be borne by the respondent.”
[Para 19]

  The above ruling of Supreme Court in the case of Rashtriya Ispat,
however, cannot detract from the fact that in terms of the statutory provisions
it is the appellant which is to discharge the liability towards the Revenue on
account of service tax. Undoubtedly, the service tax burden can be
transferred by contractual arrangement to the other party. But, on account of
such contractual arrangement, the assessee cannot ask the Revenue to recover
the tax dues from a third party or wait for discharge of the liability by the
assessee till it has recovered the amount from its contractors.
[Para 20]

   The
directions of this Court on the two petitions u/s. 9 of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act (instituted by the two contractors) would only govern the
rights and obligations arising out of the contracts entered upon by DTC with
the contractors. It may be that in terms of the said orders, DTC would be in a
position to recover the amount of service tax paid by it to the Revenue
respecting the services in question. The
fastening of liability on such account by such order on the contractors is,
thus, a matter restricted to claims of the appellant against such parties. It
would have no bearing insofar as the claim of the Revenue against the appellant
for recovery of the tax dues is concerned.
[para 21]

   We agree with the observations of CESTAT that the plea of
“bona fide belief” is devoid of substance. The appellant is a public
sector undertaking and should have been more vigilant in compliance with its
statutory obligations. It cannot take cover under the plea that contractors
engaged by it having agreed to bear the burden of taxation, there was no need
for any further action on its part. For purposes of the taxing statute, the
appellant is an assessee, and statutorily bound to not only get itself
registered but also submit the requisite returns as per the prescription of law
and rules framed thereunder. [Para 22]

For the foregoing reasons, it was
held that the imposition of service tax liability and the levy of interest
thereupon cannot be faulted. For the same reasons, the penalties imposed under
sections 76 and 77 of the Act, were upheld. However, penalty u/s. 78 of the
Act  was dropped invoking provisions of
section 80 of the Act.

SLP before the Supreme Court

   SLP against the foresaid ruling of Delhi High Court ruling was
dismissed by the Supreme Court through a short order [Ref (2016) 55 GST 763
(SC)].

Recovery of service tax by the
service providers from the service recipient – Some judicial considerations.

   Since the commercial understanding is between the service provider
and service recipient, if service recipient does not pay taxes to the service
provider, the latter is entitled to file civil suit in terms of applicable
commercial laws and obtain appropriate orders. As far as service tax department
is concerned, it should, ordinarily deal only with person liable to pay service
tax, who is an ‘assessee’ under the Act. In this regard attention is drawn to a
Court ruling in Damodar Valley Corpn. vs. CCE&ST (2014) 41 taxmann.com
58 (JHARKHAND)
, wherein the High Court set aside a direction of the
department to the service recipient to pay Service tax to the service provider,
essentially because no opportunity of hearing was given by department to the
service recipient.

   In Bhagwati Security
Services vs. UOI [2013] 31 STR 537 (All)
, it was held that that, since
service tax is an indirect tax and is a statutory liability, even if agreement
between parties is silent as to levy of service tax, service providers may
bring suit before Courts to seek collection of service tax from the service
recipient, inasmuch as service providers are merely a collecting agency who
collect service tax from recipient and pay it to Government.

   As regards recovery of levy / increase in service tax, useful
reference can be made to the ruling in Satya Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pearey
Lal Bhawan Association (2015) 39 STR 429 (DEL)
and 39 STR J173 (SC). In
the said ruling in particular, it was held that, section 64A of the Sale of
Goods Act, 1930 is also applicable for service tax. However, in a contrary
view, it was held in Multi Engg & Scientic Corp. vs. Bihar State
Electricity Board (2015) 39 STR 414 (PAT)
that liability to pay service tax
is on service provider and in absence of any agreement to the contrary,
reimbursement of service tax cannot be claimed from service recipient. Section
64A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 was held inapplicable to services. 

Summation

In light of foregoing discussions,
it can be reasonably summed up as under :

   Under the service tax law service provider is liable to pay
service tax, excepting in cases notified in terms of section 68 (2) of the Act
read with Notification No. 30/2012 – ST dated 20/06/2012 (as amended), in which
case the persons liable to pay service tax shall be as prescribed in Rule 2(d)
of Service Tax Rules, 1994 (Rules).

   In terms of section 65B (12) of the Act, ‘assessee’ means a person
liable to pay tax and includes his agent. Hence, in appropriate cases, agents
of service providers / persons specified in Rule 2(d) of Rules could be liable
to pay service tax.

   Being an indirect tax, service tax can be recovered by the service
provider from the service receiver, subject to commercial understanding to the
contrary.

   Though service tax burden can be transferred by contractual
agreement by a service provider to the service receiver, such consideration would
not transfer the substantive and legislatively mandated liability to service
tax from a service provider to the service recipients. Further, service
providers cannot ordinarily ask the service tax department to recover tax dues
from a third party or wait for discharge of their liability till it has
recovered the amounts from their clients.

   In appropriate cases, service providers can in terms of applicable
commercial laws seek directions / orders from the Court as regards tax amount
due to them which is not paid by their clients.

   Section 87 of the Act which in particular empowers service tax
department to recover service tax from an assessee’s debtors can be usually
invoked in extreme cases where a service provider fails to pay service tax to
the government. _

Section 28, 41(1) – In a case where assessee has filed confirmation from creditors along with PAN number, amounts payable to creditors cannot be added to income merely on the ground that the assessee could not produce creditors

11.  ITO vs. Mahesh N. Manani
ITAT  Mumbai `B’ Bench
Before Shailendra Kumar Yadav (JM) and Rajesh Kumar (AM)
ITA No.: 389/Mum/2014
A.Y.: 2010-11.  Date of Order: 4th August, 2016.
Counsel for revenue / assessee: Shivaji Ghode / None

FACTS
During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that sundry liabilities at the end of the year were shown at Rs. 90,00,563 as against the previous years amount of Rs. 19,69,537.  He issued notice u/s. 133(6) of the Act, which were not returned back but there was no response received.  Therefore, assessee was asked to produce the creditors with their relevant income-tax records for verification. However, the creditors did not come before the AO. The AO added this sum of Rs.90,00,563 to the total income of the assessee.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal to the CIT(A) where elaborate reasoning was given for assessee not being able to produce creditors. The assessee also filed confirmatory letters from all the 8 creditors which contained complete names, addresses and even income tax particulars of the creditors. The CIT(A) remanded the matter to the AO with a direction to make enquiries/ investigation as he thinks fit to ascertain the facts of the matter.  

In the remand proceedings, the AO instead of making any enquiries asked the assessee to produce the creditors which the assessee could not do for the very reasons mentioned in the submissions filed before CIT(A). The CIT(A) observed that through the letter calling for remand report specifically directed the AO to make an enquiry, investigation as was necessary and thereafter submit a factual report, the AO did not do any enquiry at his end.  The CIT(A) allowed the appeal and held that that the assessee on his part has primarily discharged his onus cast upon him to establish the credits in his books whereas AO except harping on the point that the assessee has failed to produce them along with records has not brought any material to establish that the liabilities were fictitious.  

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The AO was not justified in rejecting the claim of the assessee mainly on the ground that assessee could not produce creditors. It is not in dispute that the assessee has filed confirmation from creditors along with PAN number.  This view is fortified by the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case CIT vs. Orissa Corporation (P.) Ltd. [159 ITR 78 (SC)].  In view of this, CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition.  

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue.

21. Business expenditure – Section 37 – A. Y. 2005-06- Capital or revenue expenditure – Assessee engaged in oil exploration – Expenses on dry dockings of rigs and vessels – is expenditure on maintenance of assets – deductible

CIT
vs. ONGC Ltd; 387 ITR 710 (Uttarakhand):

The assessee was engaged in oil exploration.
For the A. Y. 2005-06, the Assessing Officer disallowed expenditure on dry
docking of its rigs and vessels treating the same as capital expenditure. The
Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim for deduction. The Tribunal found that
under the Merchant Shipping Act, every floating rig and vessel has to undergo a
compulsory survey at specified intervals in order to determine whether it is
seaworthy and can withstand the safety standards laid out. Under such survey,
the structural and mechanical fitness of a floating installation is tested. The
expenses on dry docking were on account of removing the old paint and
repainting the rigs and vessels, overhauling the propellers, thrusters, gears
and electric motors, repair and replacement/upgrading of the obsolete
equipment. Such expenses were, therefore, only for maintaining and preserving
the existing assets. It was deductible.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Uttarakhand High Court upheld the decision
of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The expenditure on dry docking is revenue expenditure and hence
deductible.”

Family Court Proceedings – Admissibility of Electronic Records – Privileged Communication – Video clippings recorded through pin hole camera with hard disk memory is primary evidence – Section 65B compliance not required. [Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 122, 14, 62,65B; Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 13, 14]

Preeti Jain vs. Kunal Jain and
Ors. AIR 2016 RAJASTHAN 153

A husband filed for dissolution
of the marriage u/s. 13 of the family 
Courts act, 1984 against his wife on the grounds of cruelty and
adultery. It was alleged that the applicant had in his possession a video
clipping recorded through a pin hole camera establishing his wife’s extra­
marital relationship.

Counsel for the wife submitted
that the electronic record placed before the family court did not satisfy the
mandate of section 65B (4) of the indian evidence act, 1872, which requires a
certificate (signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in
relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the
relevant activities,  whichever  was 
appropriate,  through  which the material was electronically
recorded) stating that the contents of the electronic recordings were true to
the best of his knowledge and belief. The prayer of the wife was dismissed.

It was held by the high Court
that it is the discretion of the family court to receive or not to receive the
evidence, report, statement, documents, information etc. placed before it on
the test, whether it does or does not facilitate an effective adjudication of the
disputes before it. Section 65B of the act of 1872 only deals with the
secondary evidence qua electronic records. It does not at all deal with the
original electronic records, as in the instant case, where the pinhole camera,
with a hard disk memory on which the recording was done has been submitted
before the family Court. Reliance was placed in the case of Anvar P.V. vs. P.K.
Basheer (2014)10 SCC 473:

“If an electronic record is
produced as a primary evidence u/s. 62 of the evidence act, the same is
admissible in evidence without compliance with the conditions of Section 65B of
the act of 1872.”

Hence, petition was dismissed.

PART B: RTI Act, 2005

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Real time updates for Right to Information cases via email, SMS

The Central Information Commission (CIC) has taken an e-leap and would function like an e-court with all its case files moving digitally and the applicant being alerted about case hearings through an SMS and email. So now one can get real time updates while filing a complaint or appeal under Right to Information (RTI) Act.

Starting mid of September 2016, CIC would move to a new software, which would make the hearings faster and more convenient. As soon as an RTI applicant files an appeal or a complaint, he would be given a registration number and would get an alert on email and mobile phone about his case. The case would then be electronically transferred immediately to the concerned information commissioner’s registry electronically.

All this would be done within hours. At present, the process takes a few days.

The new system would also alert the RTI applicant about the date of hearing. An automatic SMS and email would be generated. Apart from this, the applicant would get an email in advance listing out the records given by him to CIC and the government’s submissions in his case. A senior CIC official told ET, “At present, the appellant and the ministry sometimes appear in the case without knowing what the submissions are. So this would help both sides in preparing for the case.”

The Commission would be able to expedite the processing of applications with the new software. At present, it also has to deal with complaints of loss of case files and non registration of cases. The facility would not only benefit the appellants but also information commissioners.

When a commissioner would open a case file on his computer, he would get a ready background of the specific case and also details about the appellant. The official said, “We would know if he has more appeals pending. This could facilitate hearing of multiple appeals of the same person on a given day. It would directly impact pendency as more cases would be disposed in a day.” CIC has already scanned 1.5 lakh files and converted them into electronic files.

(Source : Economic Times, September 05, 2016)

Denialistan: Top 10 excuses Pakistan trots out after terrorist attacks on India

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Pakistan’s long history of bleeding India with a thousand cuts follows a familiar pattern. Deny, defy, and mollify are the main aspects of its terrorism policy. Here are the top 10 excuses and explanations that Pakistan, also known as Denialistan, wheels out every time it is in the international spotlight for initiating yet another terror strike against India.

1. India has jumped to conclusion too soon: first reaction usually given even as attack is still going on, because the Indian media had already begun to name Pakistan as the place of origin of terrorists. But as the timeline of both Mumbai 26/11 and Pathankot showed, evidence surfaced very early. Ajmal Kasab was caught and squealed like a piglet to the cops while his terrorist friends were still burning down the Taj. In Pathankot, unknown terrorist scum used the phone from a cab driver he killed to tell Ammi in Pakistan he’s going to get his 72 virgins.

2. They are not Pakistanis: next line of defence. Worked very well in the case of the attack on Parliament when all the piglets were killed. They tried it in Mumbai even after Ajmal was captured. Unfortunately for Pakistan, a small, courageous section of Pakistani media outed its own disgusting terrorism backing establishment. In Pathankot, they are trying to throw Kashmiris under the bus, getting PakMil proxies such as United Jihad Council to claim the cannon-fodder were Kashmiri.

3. Where’s the proof? Standard, argumentative line thrown on TV, even when you have slapped them in face with proof (phone records, tapes, transcripts, testimony from captured terrorists, etc). When it gets too uncomfortable, claim the evidence is all fabricated.

4. It is an internal job done by RAW to defame Pakistan: Used when either the truth is blindingly obvious or when the Sloppy Joe Indian side fails to gather enough evidence.

5. They are non-state actors: Invented by the terroristin- uniform Pervez Musharraf, darling of India’s chattering classes and conclave society. Fact that he was caught on phone discussing terrorist deployment in Kargil did not stop them from inviting him to their soirees. But why blame them, the great statesman Atal Bihari Vajpayee rescued him from international ignominy.

6. Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism: Playing the victim card after nurturing tens and thousands of terrorists and creating an ambient ecosystem for terrorism, including state – and constitutionally-mandated bigotry and systemic slaughter of minorities.

7. Pakistan is a frontline ally in war on terror: Line wheeled out to extract rent money from credulous Americans stuck in Afghanistan. Never mind if the US tax $$$ they funnel to Terroristan also kill AMERICAN soldiers in Afghanistan.

8. Islam is a religion of peace: Wheeled out for the rest of the world, although Pakistan has little to do with Islam, apart from being its worst example.

9. Pakistan will act against terrorism in all its forms: Increasingly used of late because plausible deniability has become very difficult.

10. Pakistan will fight shoulder-to-shoulder with India against terrorism: The latest offered by its civilian establishment, now that the country is swirling into a black hole. From its military establishment, which will lose its lolly and perks if this happens: Yeah, dream on.

(Source: Article by Shri. Chidanand Rajghatta in The Times of India dated 12-01-2016)

Double bubble trouble

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Sustaining anything in the region of 7% growth should be good enough in a troubled and risk-laden world.

Three months ago, a Brookings Institution-Financial Times tracking index warned of emerging economies risk “leading the world economy into a slump, with lower growth and a rout in markets”. Those words will echo in many minds at the end of this past week, as the world suddenly looks like a dangerous place, and emerging markets even more so. Over the past year, stocks and currencies have dipped in many emerging markets, including India. Over a five-year period, global stock indices have virtually doubled relative to plunging values in emerging markets. Money has been pulled out of emerging markets for several months. And if the last few days’ trends are anything to go by, the story is far from being over. George Soros is only one of many doomsayers.

Two of the original Bric economies that set the pace for a decade have slipped into recession — and a strengthening dollar has accentuated the decline. In dollar terms, Brazil’s economy has shrunk in the last couple of years by 25 per cent, while Russia’s economy has shrivelled 40 per cent. China, while continuing to grow, is beset by transition issues and has become the primary source of global instability. The big risk is cross-country contagion through bankruptcies — and India has its share of debtladen candidates for that scenario. Yet, through it all, India continues to look stable and healthy.

That’s if you view the country from outside. The perspective from within is quite different. Despite much activity by eager-beaver ministers in the Modi government, change on the ground has been slow and very much on the margin. Corporate profits in relation to GDP are at a decadal low. Corporate investment intentions have shrunk further, even as the number of stalled projects remains virtually unchanged. In the infrastructure sectors, power generation has grown less than three per cent, and the railways have missed their freight traffic targets. Investment by the railways too has fallen short, causing the finance ministry to trim fiscal support. The commercial banks’ books will look worse in coming quarters as the Reserve Bank gets less indulgent about undeclared bad loans — provoking (so one hears) some troubled bank chiefs to beat a path to the Prime Minister’s Office. External trade has continued to shrink. The one bright spot remains tax collection. But one-third of the way into its tenure, the Modi government has not really been able to get on top of its inherited economic problems.

Anxious to show results, government personalities talk of increasing government spending, and easing up on fiscal consolidation. However well-intentioned, the idea runs up against the fact that state deficits are already set to grow on account of state governments taking on the bulk of accumulated discom debt, under the ‘UDAY ’ programme. So the combined deficit of Centre and states will climb over the next couple of years. Unless the government wants to risk hard-won economic stability, there is no room for further fiscal slackening, given that it has implications for government borrowing and will put pressure on interest rates. In any case, the government’s capacity to spend more is a known constraint, as the railways have shown this year.

This will be a frustrating scenario for a government that bravely promised a return to rapid economic growth. But the global as well as domestic situation compels realism in the expectations about what is feasible. Economies don’t grow at eight per cent and more when exports are plunging, and when a good bit of the banking system needs intensive care. In fact, shooting for that target could lead to macroeconomic bungling. Sustaining anything in the region of seven per cent growth, give or take a bit, should be good enough in a troubled and risk-laden world.

(Source: Weekend Ruminations by Shri T N Ninan in Business Standard dated 09-01-2016 )

Amendment in Rules

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N o . VAT. 1 5 1 5 / C R – 1 5 8 / Ta x a t i o n – 1 d a t e d 30.12.2015

Maharashtra Government has amended the Maharashtra Value added Tax Rules, 2005. Rule 52B has been added under which if the claimant dealer has purchased goods covered under Entry 13 of Schedule D -Aerated and Carbonated non-alcoholic beverages, whether or not containing sugar or other sweetening matter or flavor or any other additives and under Entry 14 of Schedule DCigar and cigarettes, then he will be entitled to set-off in respect of the said goods only to the extent of aggregate of the tax paid or payable under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 on interstate resale of the corresponding goods and the taxes paid on the purchase of said goods if resold locally under the Act.

The set-off in respect of said goods shall be claimed only in the month in which corresponding sales of such goods is effected by the claimant dealer. Above conditions are not applicable to the purchases of such goods which are sold in the course of export of goods out of the territory of India. (Applicable wef 1-1-2016).

Restructuring of Maharashtra Sales Tax Department

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Trade Circular 20T of 2015 dated 31.12.2015

With the view to provide single window system to dealers, the Department has undertaken restructuring of work allotment which entails changing the present functional set up into a single desk multi functional setup wherein dealers will be allocated to the officers to be called as Nodal officers. Under this system, each dealer will have a Nodal Officer who will look after functions of amendment and cancellation of registration, returns follow up, audits/ assessments/issue based audits, processing of refunds, issuance of CST forms, cross checks and recovery of dues etc.

Downloading of Digitally Signed Registration Certificate

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Trade Circular 19T of 2015 dated 21.12.2015

In order to ensure immediate availability of the (TIN) registration certificate to the applicant, a facility has been made available to download the digitally signed (TIN) registration certificate from the website www.mahavat.gov.in Detailed procedure explained in this circular. The registration officer shall continue to send the physical copy of (TIN) registration certificate to the applicant on the address mentioned in the application through India post.

M/s. G. E. Capital Transportation Financial Services Ltd. V. State of Haryana and Another, [2013] 63 VST 329 (P&H)

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VAT – Turnover of Sales – Deemed Sale – Transfer of Right to Use Goods – Rentals Received or Receivable in Given Period Only Taxable, Section 2 (2C) (iv) of The Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

FACTS
The appellant entered into agreement for lease of vehicles. The assessment orders were finalized by taking aggregate amount of all installments payable for the entire term of the lease periodfor the month in which the vehicles were delivered to the lessee. The appellate authorities including the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The appellant filed appeal before the P & H High Court against the said order of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal.

HELD
The definition of tax period in terms of rule 2 (2f) of the Rules means a period of time usually a month, quarter or a year for which tax payable by a dealer is quantified. The turnover is aggregate of the goods sold or purchased by a dealer during a tax period in terms of rule (2g) of the Rules. Since the transfer of right to use in the vehicles is the sale falling within the definition of section 2(f), therefore, rentals received or receivables during the tax period is the sale price received by the dealer, exigible to tax in a financial year. The right to use vehicles is dependent upon monthly payment of rentals and therefore, the monthly rentals received or receivable by the dealer is a turnover and consequently the sale price. The lease rentals received or receivable during the tax period only, as a right to use goods, is the turnover forming part of sale price. Accordingly, the High Court allowed appeal filed by the appellant company and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal.

M/S.Vikas Poha Mill vs. Divisional Dy. CCT, [2013] 63 VST 132 (Chhatisgarh)

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Sales Tax – Sale of Poha and Murmura – Are Forms of Rice – Are “Cereals” – Exempt from Payment of Tax, Entry 23 of Part II of Schedule II of The Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1956.

FACTS
The Petitioner manufacturer of Poha and Murmura claimed exemption from payment of tax on sale of it being covered by the term “Cereals” under Notification dated March 30, 1994 read with section 14 of the CST Act, 1956. The department rejected the claimas the sale of Poha and Murmura is covered by specific entry 23, Part IV of Schedule II of the Act and also held that it is not covered by the term cereals, as there is a separate schedule entry. The petitioner filed writ petition before the Chhattisgarh High Court against the aforesaid assessment order.

HELD
The State has placed Poha and Murmura in the separate entry for the purpose of exigibility to taxation. However, in the exemption notification the word cereals includes, inter alia “rice” as enumerated in (i) to (x) in section 14 of the CST Act. All the terms used are the basic products, not other forms of the product. The term rice includes beaten and puffed rice both. Thus, the exemption is granted to all the goods, as specified in the State Act, the State can not get any advantage from the fact that there has been a separate entry for exigibility to tax in respect of Poha and Murmura. Accordingly, Poha and Murmura are one form of rice and entitled to exemption under the above stated notification. The exemption has been granted to Cereals which are enumerated after “that is to Say”. The term “Cereals” used in section 14( i) of the CST Act clearly means “rice “ and other like products of rice like Poha and Murmura. Thus, rice including Poha and Murmura are included within the definition of Cereals and as such covered by the notification dated March 30, 1994 for the purpose of exemption. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ petition and the matter was referred back to the assessing officer to make assessment a fresh in the light of law decided by the High Court.

[2015-TIOL-12-ARA-ST] M/s J. P. Morgan Services India Private Ltd.

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Provision of a car to an employee by the employer during the course of his employment and only because the employee is in service is covered by section 65B(44)(b) of the Finance Act, 1994 and will not amount to service.

Facts
The applicant desires to hire cars from car leasing companies and under the scheme those cars would be made available to such employees who are firstly continuing to be the employees and secondly who accept the option to have the car for their personal as well as official use and in lieu of this, the company was to charge the said employees the same amount which it would be paying to the car leasing company from which they hire the car. The question before the authority is whether the amount to be charged to its employees for the use of the vehicles is subject to service tax.

Held
The Authority noted that the service of “making available” a car to the employee is being rendered by the applicant. In this context, both the conditions of clause (b) of section 65B (44) are fulfilled. Firstly, it is in the course of the employment because the agreement between the applicant and employee clearly suggests that this will be during the course of his employment only. Second condition is also satisfied that it is only because the employee is in service and in that sense the service becomes in relation to his employment. Since both these conditions are fulfilled, it is held that the transaction will not amount to service.

[2016-TIOL-166-CESTAT-ALL] M/s Tanya Automobiles Pvt. Ltd vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Meerut-I

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When value of goods used is shown separately in invoice and VAT/Sales Tax has been paid, the transaction has to be treated as sale and cannot be a service transaction.

Facts
Appellant is an Authorised Service Station of Motor Vehicles and was paying service tax on the labour charges only and not on value of spare parts and lubricants used in the course of servicing of the motor vehicles. Department demanded service tax on the entire amount of invoice including the value of spare parts on the contention that without the use of spare parts and consumables in the course of servicing of vehicles, the service is not complete and therefore is an integral part of service. It was further observed that benefit of Notification No. 12/2003-ST is also not available as they are not issuing separate invoices for sale of spares.

Held
The Tribunal noted the decision of Samtech Industries vs. Commissioner of Central Excise [2014-TIOL-643- CESTAT-DEL] upheld by the Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad [2015(38) STR 162] and the CBEC letter dated 27.09.2013 addressed to the CCE, Meerut specifically providing that service tax on cost of goods supplied during repair does not appear sustainable. The Tribunal held that the cost of items supplied/sold with a documentary proof specifically indicating value of goods, demand of service tax on the cost of goods supplied during repair is not sustainable.

[2016-TIOL-149-CESTAT-DEL] M/s National Engineering Industries Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur

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Where commission is paid by the Indian buyers directly to the
appellant instead of the commission alongwith price being first remitted
to the foreign supplier and then the foreign supplier remitting the
commission amount, such direct receipts are deemed to be receipts in
foreign exchange.

Facts
The appellant used to find
buyers in India for the products of a foreign company. The Indian buyers
made payments directly to the foreign seller and the foreign seller
paid commission to the appellant. In some cases buyers opted to pay the
commission directly to the appellant and in such cases commission part
shown in the invoice was not paid on to the seller by the buyer. The
Commissioner (Appeals) held that the service was delivered in India even
though the commission was received from foreign supplier and therefore,
it will not be tantamount to export of service and upheld the primary
order. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed.

Held
The
Tribunal held that in case of the commission received from foreign
supplier, the service rendered clearly satisfies the requirement of
export of service as has been held in the case of Paul Merchants Limited
vs. CCE, Chandigarh [2013 (29) STR 267 (Tri.-Del). Even in the other
situation where the commission is paid by the Indian buyers to the
appellant, in effect, the commission was paid on behalf of the foreign
supplier only and can be deemed to have been paid in foreign exchange as
the buyers would have had to remit the commission part also to the
foreign supplier who would have in turn sent it to the appellant and
thus this arrangement makes the procedure simple. Further, relying on
the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of J. B. Boda – 1997
(229) ITR 271 (SC), where such payments are deemed to be received in
foreign exchange the appeal is allowed.

[2016-TIOL-132-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Sharayu Motors vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Mumbai.

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When issue is settled by the Larger Bench, penalties can be set aside considering the bonafide of the Appellant. Target incentive received from manufacturer in the nature of trade discount not exigible to service tax.

Facts
The Appellant received certain amount from financial institutions as commission for marketing of Auto Loan products and also an amount from manufacturers of car under the head Target Incentive Scheme. Department demanded service tax under ‘business auxiliary service’ in relation to the aforesaid receipts and also imposed penalties. In the matter of incentives it was argued that the issue is well settled by the judgement of the Tribunal in favour of the Appellant in the case of Commissioner of Service Tax vs. Sai Service Station Ltd [2013-TIOL-1436- CESTAT-MUM} and in case of commission from financial institution, it was stated that the issue is settled against them by the larger bench of the Tribunal in the case of Pagariya Auto Centre vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad [2014-TIOL-2875-CESTAT-MUM], however penalties should be set aside in relation thereto.

Held
The Tribunal confirmed the demand along with interest in relation to the amount received from financial institution for promoting their products by considering the decision of the larger bench in the case of Pagariya Auto Centre (supra). However, it was held that since the issue has been settled by the Larger Bench, Appellant could have entertained a bona fide belief and therefore penalties are set aside by invoking provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act,1994. Further relying on the decision of Sai Service Station (supra) demand against the amounts received as incentives is set aside.

[2016-TIOL-12-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Bharat Forge Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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When service tax paid under reverse charge is available as CENVAT
credit, the non-payment would not result in any financial benefit and
therefore deserves waiver of penalty.

Facts
The
Appellant availed External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) and raised
capital in overseas market and availed services of Lead Managers based
abroad having no office in India. The department demanded service tax on
the fees paid to the lead managers abroad u/s. 66A of the Finance Act,
1994 and imposed penalties u/s. 76,77 and 78 of the Act. Entire amount
of service tax was paid before the issue of Show Cause Notice and only
the penalties are disputed.

Held
The Tribunal noted
the prompt payment of service tax before the issue of Show Cause Notice
and the payment of interest soon after passing the adjudication order
which showed the genuineness of the Appellant. It was held that whatever
tax is paid is available as CENVAT credit and thus there is no
intention to avoid payment of service tax. Non-payment would not result
in any financial benefit and therefore penalty is waived u/s. of the
Finance Act, 1994.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 126 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs. P.B. Bobde

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As hiring and renting can be distinguished from each other, service tax cannot be levied on hiring of cabs under category of rent-a-cab service.

Facts
The Appellant entered into a contract for supply of vehicles on hiring basis & did not pay service tax based on a view that hiring of vehicles is not liable for service tax under category of ‘Rent a cab Service’.

Held
The Tribunal relied upon recent judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Uttrakhand in the case of CC&CE vs. Sachin Malhotra 2014-TIOL-2039-HC-UKAND-ST [digest reproduced in the January 2015 issue of BCAJ]. In that case, the High Court noted that, even though the word “hire” is used in rent-a-cab scheme, both are different transactions. In case of hiring, control of vehicle is retained by owner irrespective of the fact whether he himself drives vehicle or engages a driver and customer merely pays charges for travelling in such vehicle. But in case of “rent-a-cab” service, rent is paid as per terms of contract and vehicle is used by the person as his own & he is free to take it anywhere as per his choice, but subject to terms & conditions of contract. The Hon’ble High Court held that unless control of vehicle is passed on to hirer under rent-a-cab scheme, there does not arise any service tax liability as envisaged by provisions of section 65(91) of the Finance Act, 1994. In the light of this judgment, the matter was decided in favour of assessee.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 26 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Kelly Services India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Gurgon-II

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Under Explanation to section 67, in case of associated concerns, when assessee paid service tax on book adjustment made prior to 10.05.2008, interest cannot be demanded for period prior to 10.05.2008.

Facts
For services received from overseas associated concern in FY 2006-07 and 2007-08, the assessee made book entries for consideration payable. Consideration for such services was paid in January 2011. An explanation was inserted u/s. 67 w.e.f. 10.05.2008, that in case of associated enterprise, the gross value charged shall include book entries made in the books of accounts of person liable to pay tax. Therefore service tax was discharged based on book entries, under reverse charge in January 2009 along with applicable interest. However, while quantifying interest, only period after 10.05.2008 was considered. However, department contended that interest is required to be paid prior to 10.05.2008 commencing from the date of book entries.

Held
The Hon’ble Tribunal noted that the Appellant did not contest interest paid for the period after 10.05.2008 but, only interest attributable for the period commencing from due date pertaining to the date of book entries up-to 10.05.2008, when explanation was inserted. It was noted that even in the Order-in- Original, the levy of interest is held to have commenced only after 10.05.2008. Relying upon decision of CESTAT in Sify Technologies Ltd. vs. CCE & ST [ Appeal No.ST/279/2010 dated 08-11-2010] on similar issue, the Hon’ble Tribunal observed that legislative intention of such amendment by way adding explanation was to introduce new provision and not to remove any doubts in existing provision. Decision of Larger Bench of the Tribunal in case of Commissioner of Customs vs. Skycell Communications Ltd. [2008 (232) ELT 434] was also relied upon which clarified that Explanation placing restrictions prejudicial to the assessee will not be retrospective. Consequently, the Tribunal held that there is no liability to pay interest on the book adjustments made prior to 10.5.2008.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 243 (Allahabad – CESTAT) Amit Pandey Physics Classes vs. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Kanpur

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Even though some portion of service tax as determined by central
excise officer is paid before issuance of show cause notice (SCN), such
prepayment cannot be reduced while quantifiying penalty u/s. 78.

Facts
The
appellant neither declared services in returns nor paid the service
tax. He admitted his mistake during investigation and paid around 75% of
such liability prior to issuance of SCN. In the SCN, penalty u/s. 78
was imposed on entire service tax liability by ignoring such service tax
already paid. It was contended that service tax liability was not
correctly determined as amount already paid was ignored and hence, after
considering service tax already paid, penalty should be levied only on
25% of service tax which remained unpaid.

Held
The
Hon’ble Tribunal observed that since the assessee was aware of the
provisions of service tax and yet failed to pay tax on due date, central
excise officer correctly determined total service tax liability of
assessee in terms of provisions of section 73(2). Accordingly,
imposition of penalty u/s. 78 was on total tax liability quantified in
SCN was also held to be correct.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 171 (Mumbai – CESTAT) Owens Corning (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Belapur

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Possession of components of capital goods in subsequent years is not
necessary for availing balance 50% CENVAT credit as per Rule 4(2)(b) of
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004

Facts
The Appellant, a
manufacturer of glass fibre, was using ‘bushings’ as components and
availed 50% of CENVAT credit in respect thereof as part of capital
goods. In subsequent year, such ‘bushings’ were re-exported for remaking
& assessee availed balance 50% CENVAT credit. By applying
provisions of Rule 4(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, revenue rejected
subsequent availment on ground that such capital goods were not in their
possession at the time of availment & ‘bushings’ received in
subsequent year are newly manufactured goods.

Held
The
Tribunal noticed that as per Rule 4(2)(b) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004,
balance CENVAT credit can be availed in sub-sequent financial year
provided capital goods other than components, spares & accessories,
refractories & refractory materials, moulds and dies, are in
possession of manufacturer of final product or output service provider.
It was held that ‘bushings’ being components, condition of possession of
same in subsequent year for availing balance 50% CENVAT credit is not
applicable.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 203 (New Delhi – CESTAT) Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi-III vs. Denso Haryana (P.) Ltd.

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Provision of ‘intellectual property service’ is complete on the date
of transfer/permission to use the same. When such date is before
introduction of service tax on such services, even though royalty
payments are received over a period of time including period post
introduction of service, service tax not leviable.

Facts
The
agreement for transfer of technology and right to manufacture and sell
products using same technology was entered into before levy of service
tax on ‘Intellectual Property Services’ came into force. As per payment
terms, consideration was required to be paid by making one-time lump sum
payment in addition to a running royalty based on number of products
manufactured using technology transferred. The revenue initiated
proceedings against appellants to recover service tax under reverse
charge in capacity of service recipient on amounts of royalty paid after
period in which ‘Intellectual Property Services’ were brought into
service tax net, based on the contention that appellants were providing
continuous supply of service.

Held
Relying upon
decision in the case of Modi-Mundipharma (P.) Ltd. vs. CCE [2010] 24 STT
343 (New Delhi – CESTAT), the Tribunal held that transfer of technology
in the present case cannot be held to be continuous supply of service
merely because of periodic payments. Provision for service was complete
as soon as technology was transferred. Revenue’s contention that use of
technology over number of years covered by periodic payments would form
the basis for continuous supply of service was rejected. Since transfer
of technology took place before introduction of service tax on
intellectual property services, it was held as not liable to service
tax.

2015 (40) STR 1069 (Tri.-Mum.) Bank of Baroda vs. CST, Mumbai

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If the assessee has a bona fide belief and service tax liability is paid voluntarily for the period beyond normal period of limitation, liability of interest does not arise.

Facts
The appellant paid service tax under protest along with interest for a disputed matter during the pendency of the proceedings. At the adjudication stage, the matter was contested on merits as well as on limitation. The adjudicating authority confirmed service tax demand with interest but dropped penalties. The service tax liability was not contested further in view of the clarification on the subject matter. However, interest liability was contested for extended period as they had no intention to evade service tax. Department argued that irrespective of the intention to evade service tax or otherwise, interest liability arises.

Held
In view of the clarification, the appellant’s appeal failed on merits. With respect to the liability of interest, the Gujarat High Court in the case of Gujarat Narmada Fertilizers Co. Ltd. 2012 (285) ELT 336 (Guj.), had observed that if the period of limitation had expired and if the assessee has paid service tax voluntarily, SCN was not valid. Further, having regard to the intention of legislature it was held that in any case, it was not open for department to recover interest. The above decision was held to be squarely applicable in the present case since the appellant had a bona fide belief which was undisputed by the department. Accordingly, demand of interest was set aside.

2015 (40) STR 1146 (Tri.-Mum.) CCE, Nasik vs. Deoram Vishrambhai Patel

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Renting of property by individual co-owners is a service provided in individual capacity and not as association of persons.

Facts
The respondents are co-owners of a property which was neither divided nor legally partitioned. A Joint agreement was executed with banks to let out the said premises and collect rent and charges for amenities. Though first appellate authority had decided the case in favour of revenue for a partial demand of service tax, penalties were set aside except penalties u/s. 77 (1) (a) and 77 (2) of the Finance Act, 1994. Department filed an appeal arguing that there was no documentary evidence to prove the partition of property and the agreement was a composite agreement for renting out entire property and commonly used for business. Further it was stated that the Small Scale Service Provider’s exemption was available ‘qua service’ and not ‘qua service provider’ and therefore, in the present case, the exemption was not available. Since there was intentional suppression of facts, penalties u/s. 76 and 78 of the Act were applicable. Relying on Shiv Sagar Estate 1993 (201) ITR 953 (Bom.), the Respondents contested that adjudicating authority grossly erred in holding him and his brothers as association of person.

Held
The Tribunal observed that since service providers were individuals, co-owners of the property were not liable to pay service tax jointly or severally. The property was jointly owned; lease agreements were entered in their individual capacity, the monthly rent was received by each co-owner equally and all the co-owners had obtained separate service tax registration. As was evident from records, they had paid appropriate service tax before initiation of investigation. Therefore, penalties u/s. 76 and 78 were not imposable.

The End of an Era – A tribute to Narayan Varma

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On 24th of December, an icon of our profession Narayan Varma, Narayanbhai to all of us, breathed his last. I am writing this editorial, a tribute to him saddened by the feeling that he will not be there to correct my mistakes. For the last 30 months, my editorial has passed under his watchful eyes. This time, this piece will reach you without having had the benefit of his critical examination.

Born in 1931, Narayan Varma was a one-man institution. This small piece is inadequate to describe this doyen of the profession, yet to pay my respects, I must make this attempt. He was truly a giant, in every sense of the term, and a gentle one at that.

The words BCAS and Narayan Varma are inseparable. To Narayanbhai, the Society was like his very own child. He was involved in every activity, be it core subjects like taxation, accounting, auditing or offbeat areas like human resources. He was the President of the BCAS in the year 1978 -79. While the Society was very dear to him, he also actively participated in other institutions. He was the President of the Chamber of Tax Consultants (CTC) for the years 1988-1990. While his contribution to the profession was a sterling one, his role as a social activist was equally significant. He made the Right to Information Act, his mission and made it into a movement.

My first interaction with Narayanbhai, was nearly 3 decades ago at a Residential Refresher Course (RRC). I was a young enthusiastic Chartered accountant, participating in group discussions vociferously, in a manner bordering on irreverence. He heard me patiently, and encouraged me to express my views even though they differed from that of the group. During my journey at the Society from a member of various committees to its President, I had the opportunity of sharing many a moment with him. He always came across as a thorough professional, a visionary, but above all, a lovely human being. He was popular with young members and often acted as a bridge between them and seniors. Being young at heart he empathised with the thoughts of youngsters. As a mentor he nurtured a large talent pool, and with his departure we have lost a father figure.

The Journal, the flagship of the Society was very dear to him. He chaired the Journal committee in 1984. He was a member of the Editorial Board from the time it was constituted in 1991. He was the publisher of the Journal for more than two decades. He floated many new ideas. Many features that are popular today in the Journal, were his ideas. Namaskaar, the feature with which the Journal begins today was encouraged by him, the features RTI (Right to Information), Cancerous Corruption were contributed by him. He did not fear failure, and always attempted to tread new paths. He has so many achievements to his credit that if one were to list all of them one would have to possibly devote one entire issue of the Journal for that purpose.

If one were to select three of his qualities which one would do well to inculcate in ones persona, I would choose, pride in the profession he belonged to, his love for innovation and his adherence to democratic principles.

He always made it known to all concerned that this was a profession that did not get the recognition that it deserved. In fact, after he departed I had an occasion to speak to the past president of the ICAI – Mr. T.N. Manoharan. He mentioned that it was Narayanbhai’s idea that all Chartered Accountants should describe themselves with the designation `CA’. He pursued this idea tirelessly with the ICAI, and today it is an accepted designation.

Innovation was his mantra. He always yearned to start something new. Many ventures, such as the Budget Booklet, were popularised by him. He was a visionary and realised that, in the new world chartered accountants would have to think differently, and would have to acquire skills and the mindset which management students had. He was instrumental in structuring a new course for Chartered Accountants in the field of business consultancy jointly with the Jamnalal Bajaj Institute of Management Studies. Many young Chartered Accountants benefitted from this course and their careers reached new heights. These innovations were not limited to the professional sphere. Even in the social field, he preached innovation. He published the RTI Booklet, which helped many citizens. He has been an avowed RTI activist, was a guiding force to the Public Concern for Governance Trust (PCGT), and an inspiration for Dharma Bharati Mission. When he participated in the activities of all these organisations, he came across as a very sensitive person.

The third quality which endeared him to me was that he was a true democrat and respected views of others. I recall a large number of meetings of the Society, the Editorial Board, the Journal Committee when he put across for consideration his innovative ideas. At times those were rejected because his thinking was well ahead of the times. Yet, after his ideas were rejected he willingly went along with the decision of the majority. Despite being a Titan, he took extreme care to ensure that his overpowering personality did not dwarf others.

If we are truly to pay our respects to this great soul, we should try to inculcate in ourselves his sterling qualities. We should follow his ideals, we should not only become good professionals, we should try to become responsible citizens and above all good human beings. If we take steps in that direction, we will have paid homage to him.

LEARNING TO BE HAPPY

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Every one of us wants to be happy. Like the Kings and Queens of fairy tales we want to “Live Happily ever after”. But in reality very few of us are happy and that too never forever. The reason is not far to seek. For being happy, we must know where happiness lies. Without first understanding where happiness lies we go on searching for it in the wrong places and do not find it. We are like that fellow who lost his keys in the house, but was searching for it below a lamp post, as there was more light there! It is very clear that if we want to go to Delhi, we must board a train going to Delhi. Boarding a train going to Chennai, and then running in the corridor of the compartment in the direction of Delhi, will not take us to Delhi.

Happiness is the purpose and the goal of our lives, and yet…. all of us are pursuing a course which will never give happiness and is sure to yield unhappiness.

For being happy, we have to first understand where happiness lies. We believe that it lies in wealth, possessions, power and position in life. We believe that acquiring these will make us happy and we will live happily ever after. We blindly chase these and at the end of the day find that happiness has eluded us. That is because, in the first place, happiness is not in the 3 Ps (Possession, Power, Position), where we were seeking.

I had read this quotation in a booklet called “P.S. I Love You”:

“A newspaper survey asked, “Who are the happiest people?” These were the four winning answers:

A craftsman or artist whistling over a job well done

A child building sand castles

A mother bathing her baby

A doctor who has finished a difficult operation and saved a life.

You will note that money, power and possessions play no part in any of the answers.”

Happiness is certainly not in possessions and power. If it was so, then money, power and possessions should bring us eternal happiness.

Take the case of a person who loves eating “rasgullas”. To him rasgullas embody happiness. If asked to eat them, a first few will certainly result in making him feel great momentarily but after say, the sixth one, he would not enjoy rasgullas anymore. If forced to eat more he would become miserable. Similarly, to a person who enjoys only spicy food, rasgullas will not bring any happiness. Happiness then is not in rasgullas or spicy food! Happiness is also not in material possessions. The same is true of power and position in life. They do not bring happiness. Happiness is not in them. The issue is: Where is Happiness?

It is said that “Happiness is a State of Mind”. So true. A disturbed mind can never be happy. A peaceful mind, a mind at rest can be happy. As children, generally our minds were at rest. Any disturbance also did not last for long. We were neither pursuing possessions nor were we craving for power and prestige. We were content with what we had. The trouble started as we grew older. People around and particularly the media, TV, Newspapers, Bill Boards and hoardings brainwashed us into believing that material things make one happy, hence we started pursuing the wrong dreams. In other words, we boarded the wrong train which has taken us further away from our true destination. If we want to be happy, we have to stop the pursuit of wrong goals, get down from the wrong train, and board the right one. We all would agree that as children we were a lot more happier. Let us then become more like children who do not grieve about the past or worry about the future. Let us learn to live in the present. Let us learn to look at life with wonder-filled eyes. Let us remember those lines of Sahir:

Friend, happiness lies in living in the present and being content with whatever we have.

Is a 2008-like financial crisis in the making ? – Volatility in the financial markets shows fears over China are widespread

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Are we headed for a 2008-like financial crisis? George Soros, the man with the reputation of breaking the Bank of England thinks so. “When I look at the financial markets, there is a serious challenge which reminds me of the crisis we had in 2008,” Soros was quoted as saying by Bloomberg. The veteran hedge fund manager is worried about China and thinks it is finding the adjustment difficult. Volatility in the financial markets last week showed that the fear is widely shared across the world.

The Chinese economy is slowing and is being steered towards a more sustainable growth model, which is not dependent on manufacturing exports. However, dealing with past excesses and ensuring a soft landing is an issue. China contributes about 16% to world gross domestic product (GDP) and has provided strength to the global economy after the 2008 financial crisis. A sharp slowdown in China will not only affect overall global growth, but will be particularly harsh for its close trading partners.

A sharp slowdown will have a disproportionate impact on commodity exporters. In fact, the slowdown in China is one of the biggest reasons for the weaknesses in commodity prices.

Weakening economic activity is not the only problem. China is also witnessing serious capital flight. To be sure, policymakers want a weaker currency but are worried about disorderly depreciation. It is being reported that the central bank burnt at least $100 billion in December 2015 alone to defend the renminbi. The worry is that China will once again use weaker currency to support economic activity, which has prompted some of the businesses and households to move out of renminbi-denominated assets. There is also a high-debt angle to the story. According to McKinsey, total debt in China in mid-2014 was at 282% of GDP, which is higher than the debt of some of the advanced economies, such as the US and Germany, and has quadrupled from the level in 2007. Over-investment and slower growth would naturally make debt servicing difficult.

There are layers of issues confronting China at this stage which will keep the financial markets guessing. However, as things stand today, it is difficult to argue that the world is close to a 2008-like financial crisis. In 2008, part of the US economy was engaged in excessive speculation, expecting that good times will continue, and when financial conditions tightened, the result was a collapse in asset prices—a perfect Minsky moment—which brought the financial system to a standstill.

Conditions in China are a little different. China is not essentially struggling to contain speculation and assetprice inflation, but is shifting to a different growth model. It has accumulated excesses in terms of over-investment in various sectors, but debt is mostly concentrated with state-owned enterprises. In fact, households in China are in a lot better shape than they were in the US in 2008. Further, the US was far more financially integrated with the rest of the world than China is today, which will limit the impact. Also, unlike the US, China’s financial system is tightly controlled by the state.

This is not to suggest that a crisis in China will not have any impact on the global economy, but it is unlikely to be close to 2008. However, commodity export-dependent economies will remain in a difficult spot, as demand will remain capped because of a slowdown in China and weak global growth.

What does this mean for India? Policymakers in India will have to remain vigilant and find ways to grow at a time when global growth is likely to remain tepid for an extended period. India will also have to convince global investors that it does not belong to the typical commodityexporting emerging market pack, and is also not suffering from some of the problems that China is facing. Foreign portfolio flows could become more volatile because of a change in investor preference away from emerging markets.

India should, therefore, prepare the ground for attracting foreign direct investment, which is more serious in nature and is likely to be attracted to a long-term growth promise.

(Source: Extracts from the Editorial in Mint dated 11-01-2016)

[2016] 67 taxmann.com 47 (Delhi – Trib.) Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. ACIT A.Y.:2011-12, Date of Order: 11th February, 2016

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Section 9(1) of the Act and Article 5 of India- Japan DTAA – In absence of authority to undertake core business activity or to conclude contracts, specific authority granted under power of attorney to an employee of LO will not result in constitution of PE of nonresident.

Facts
The Taxpayer, a Japanese Company, was headquartered in Japan. The Taxpayer established a Liaison Office (“LO”) in India. The Taxpayer had executed a Power of Attorney (“POA”) in favor of one of the employees of the LO.

The Taxpayer contended that purchase orders were directly raised by Indian customers on the HO of the Taxpayer, the HO directly sent quotation/invoices to Indian customers and all these documents were signed and executed by the HO directly without any involvement of LO. Further, the POA in favour of the employee was LO specific and did not grant any authority to the employee to undertake any core activities on behalf of the Taxpayer or to sign and execute the contracts. The Taxpayer also submitted documents supporting its contentions.

While the authority granted under POA was LO specific, without rebutting the documents submitted by the Taxpayer or bringing on record any other material, the AO held that the Taxpayer had granted unfettered powers to the employee and hence, the LO constituted PE in India of the Taxpayer. The AO also observed that the LO was operating beyond the scope of permission granted by RBI.

Held
POA showed that the authority granted to the employee was LO specific. Hence, the conclusion drawn by the AO that the authority granted is unfettered was incorrect. The POA did not demonstrate that the employee was authorised to undertake either the core business activity or to sign and execute the contracts. Therefore, AO’s observation that it was beyond the scope of RBI permission was perverse.

While the Taxpayer had supported its contention with documentary evidence, the AO had not rebutted the evidence nor did he bring on record any material in support of the conclusion that the Taxpayer had PE in India.

It has been brought on record that purchase orders were directly raised by Indian customers on the Taxpayer. The Taxpayer directly sent quotation/invoices to Indian customers and all these documents were signed and executed by the Taxpayer directly without any involvement of LO. No material has been brought on record to show that LO carried on core activities in India.

Accordingly, the LO of the Taxpayer did not constitute PE in India of the Taxpayer.

[2016] 67 taxmann.com 105 (Delhi – Trib.) Vertex Customer Management Ltd. A.Y.: 2004-05, Date of Order: 4th March, 2016

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Section 9(1)(i) of the Act; Article 5, 13 of India-UK DTAA –Indian company to whom Taxpayer outsources some of its business in a continuous, real and intimate manner results in business connection under the Act; (ii) on facts, the Taxpayer did not have ‘fixed place PE’ or ‘service PE’ or ‘dependent agent PE’ under DTAA Where PE is remunerated on arm’s length basis, no further profit can be attributed; Amount paid as consideration for equipment use, qualifies as royalty, even if it is paid at cost

Facts
The Taxpayer was a company resident in the UK (“UKCo”). It was engaged in providing sales related outsourcing services to its clients. The Taxpayer had a group company, which was resident of India (“ICo”). The Taxpayer had outsourced certain services to ICo. The Taxpayer incurred certain expenses in respect of treasury, taxation, and finance to facilitate ICo in delivering its services to the customer. ICo reimbursed such expenses to the Taxpayer. Taxpayer had claimed that since payments received from ICo were towards reimbursement of expenses and hence not taxable in India.

Further, the Taxpayer had granted ICo right to use certain equipments outside India. In its return of income, the Taxpayer claimed that consideration received from ICo for equipment use was in the nature of royalty in terms of Article 13(3)(b) of India-UK DTAA . It also claimed that since the reimbursement was on cost basis, it was not taxable.

However, the AO concluded that Taxpayer had Permanent Establishment (PE) in India in terms of India-UK DTAA and it also had ‘business connection’ in terms of the Act. Accordingly, he taxed profit attributable to the PE. He also attributed the reimbursement of expenses and royalty in hands of the Indian PE of the Taxpayer.

The questions before the Tribunal were as follows.
(i) Whether the Taxpayer had a business connection in India?
(ii) Whether the Taxpayer had a fixed place PE in India?
(iii) Whether the Taxpayer had a service PE in India?
(iv) Whether the Taxpayer had a dependent agent PE in India?
(v) If a transaction is at an arm’s length price, whether any further profit can be attributed to PE?
(vi) Whether in absence of any income element, mere expense reimbursement could be considered royalty chargeable to tax in terms of India-UK DTAA ?

Held
(i) ‘Business Connection’ in India
On the basis of various decisions on the issue, it is apparent that there should be a continuous, real and intimate connection between the activity carried on by the non-resident (NR) outside India and the activities carried on in India. Further, such activity should contribute to the profits of the NR in his business. The relationship between the NR and the resident should be something more than mere trading on principal-toprincipal basis.

In the present case the Taxpayer secures orders from its customers on behalf of the ICo and outsources the job to ICo. There is a continuous relationship between the Taxpayer and ICo in India. The contract entered by the Taxpayer outside India are carried out in India. The responsibility of the Taxpayer vis-à-vis its customer is concluded in India. The responsibility of the Taxpayer cannot be segregated and will complete only after ICo provides services to the customers. Hence, the Taxpayer had a continuous, real and intimate connection resulting in business connection in India in terms of section 9(1)(i) of the Act.

(ii) Fixed place PE in India
To constitute a fixed place PE, all the following conditions should be satisfied.

(a) There is a place of business.
(b) Such place is at the disposal of the Taxpayer.
(c) Such place is fixed.
(d) Business of the Taxpayer is wholly or partly carried on through such place.

In case of the Taxpayer, it was not established whether the premises of ICo or client was made available to the Taxpayer. Thus, ICo’s premises cannot be said to be at the disposal of Taxpayer since it has no right to occupy the premises but is merely given access for the purpose of work. Also the services provided in India were in the nature of Business process outsourcing (BPO) services and back office operations. Thus, relying on India UK DTAA and the decision in DIT vs. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. [2007] 292 ITR 416 (SC), the Tribunal held that the Taxpayer did not have a fixed place PE in India.

(iii) Service PE in India
In the absence any material brought on record to show that of the Taxpayer having deputed its employees to India, question of ‘Service PE’ cannot arise.

(iv) Dependent agent PE in India
An agent is not considered an independent agent if: (a) he performs activities wholly or almost wholly for the non-resident and its group companies; and (b) the transactions between the agent and the non-resident are not on arm’s length basis. In absence of any material on record to show that ICO was a dependent agent of Taxpayer, the Taxpayer cannot be said to have ‘dependent agent PE’ in India.

(v) Attribution of further profit
No further profit can be attributed to the PE in respect of transaction if transfer pricing analysis has fully captured functions performed, assets deployed and risks assumed. Thus even if it is accepted that the taxpayer has PE in India, since the PE is remunerated at arm’s length price, no further profit can be attributed to the PE.

(vi) Reimbursement characterized as royalty.
The reimbursement on cost basis as consideration received for equipment use qualifies as royalty under India-UK DTAA . The amount claimed by the Taxpayer as reimbursement on cost basis is similar to the consideration received for equipment use. Accordingly, the amount should also be treated as royalty.

Forms substituted

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MVAT UPDATE

NO . VAT / Adm – 2 0 1 6 / 1 B / / Adm – 8 Extra . ord.17,18,19 dated 24.2.2016

The Commissioner of sales tax, Maharashtra State in respect of the periods starting on or after 01.04.2016 has substituted Form No. 423 – for Tax Collection at Source, Form No. 424 for Tax Deduction at Source by an employer, MVAT returns in Forms 231 to 235 requiring invoice wise details to be submitted.

Customs, Excise and Service Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2016

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Indirect Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2016

Chapter XI of Finance Bill, 2016 has introduced the Indirect Tax Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2016 in order to reduce litigation and an environment of distrust in addition to increasing the compliance cost of the tax payers and administrative cost for the Government. The Scheme shall come into force with effect from 01.06.2016. This scheme is applicable to the declarations made up to 31.12.2016.

All the appeals pending before the Commissioner (Appeals) as on 01.03.2016 under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or the Customs Act, 1962 or the Finance Act, 1994 are eligible for settlement under the Dispute Resolution Scheme. However, if the impugned order is in respect of certain specified cases, the same cannot be settled under the Dispute Resolution Scheme, 2016.

Further, the cases of eligible assessees can be concluded by paying disputed tax along with interest and penalty equal to 25% of the penalty imposed under the impugned order. The eligible assessees are required to make declaration for settlement after enactment of the Finance Act 2016 between 01.06.2016 and 31.12.2016.

Changes in Service Tax Rules

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Notificaiton No. 19/2016-ST dated 01. 03. 2016

Vide this Notification, following changes are made in Service Tax Rules, unless otherwise stated, which will be effective from 01.04.2016 :

1. Rule 2(1)(d)(i)(D)(II) is being modified so that legal services provided by a senior advocate shall be on forward charge.

2. Rule 2(1)(d)(EEA) making service recipient, that is, mutual fund or asset management company as the person liable for paying Service tax is being deleted. Meaning thereby, services provided by mutual fund agents/distributors to a mutual fund or asset management company are being put under forward charge.

3. Rule 2(1)(d)(i)(E), which provides for liability of service receiver to pay Service tax under Reverse Charge in relation to support services provided or agreed to be provided by Government or Local authority with certain exceptions.

4. Rule 6(1): Following benefits presently available to individual or proprietary firm or partnership firm, are being extended to One Person Company (OPC) whose aggregate value of taxable services provided from one or more premises is up to Rs. 50 lakh in the previous financial year:
a) Quarterly payment of Service tax and
b) Payment of Service tax on receipt basis

5. Rule 6(7A): The Service tax liability on single premium annuity (insurance) policies is being rationalised and the effective alternate Service tax rate (composition rate) is being prescribed at 1.4% of the total premium charged, in cases where the amount allocated for investment or savings on behalf of policy holder is not intimated to the policy holder at the time of providing of service.

6. Service tax assessees above a certain threshold limit shall also submit an annual return for the financial year, in such form and manner as may be specified by the CBEC, by the 30th day of November of the succeeding financial year;

The Central Government may, subject to such conditions or limitations, specify by notification, an assessee or class of assesses who may not be required to submit the annual return

7. Sub-Rule 2 has been inserted to provide that an assessee, who has filed the annual return by the due date, may submit a revised return within a period of 1 month from the date of submission of the said annual return.

8. Sub-Rule 2 has been inserted to provide that where the annual return is filed by the assessee after the due date, the assessee shall pay to the credit of the Central Government, an amount calculated at the rate of Rs. 100 per day for the period of delay in filing of such return, subject to a maximum of Rs. 20,000/-.

Changes in Reverse Charge Mechanism

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Notification No. 18/2016 dated 01. 03. 2016

This Notification has proposed changes in Reverse Charge Mechanism by amending Notification No. 30/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 which will be effective from 01.04.2016 :

1. In Paragraph I, in clause (A), sub-clause (ib) is omitted to provide that services provided by mutual fund agents/ distributors to a mutual fund or asset management company are being put under forward charge;

2. In Paragraph I, in clause (A), sub-clause (ic) is substituted by “provided or agreed to be provided by a selling or marketing agent of lottery tickets in relation to a lottery in any manner to a lottery distributor or selling agent of the State Government under the provisions of the Lottery (Regulations) Act,1998 (17 of 1998)”, to bring in line with changes made in section 65B(44) of the Finance Act;

3. In Paragraph I, in clause (A), sub-clause (iv), item (B) has been substituted to provide that legal services provided by a senior advocate shall be on forward charge.

4. The words “support services” have been omitted from Serial No.6 making any service provided by Government taxable .

Definition of Support Services stand deleted

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Notification No. 15/2016-ST & 17/2016 dated 01. 03. 2016

The Finance Act, 1994 was amended vide the Finance Act, 2015 so as to make any service (and not only support services) provided by Government or local authorities to business entities taxable from a date to be notified later. 1st April, 2016 has already been notified as the date from which any service provided by Government or local authorities to business entities shall be taxable. Consequently, 1st April, 2016 is also being notified as the date from which the definition of support services shall stand deleted from the Finance Act, 1994.

Rationalisation of Interest Rates :

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Notification No. 13/2016 –ST & 14/2016

Interest rates on delayed payment of duty/tax across all indirect taxes is proposed to be made uniform at 15%, except in case of service tax collected but not deposited with the Central Government, in which case the rate of interest will be 24% from the date on which the service tax payment became due.

Further, for the amount collected in excess of the tax assessed or determined, rate of interest would be 15% as against 18%.

In case of assessees, whose value of taxable services in the preceding year/years covered by the notice is less than Rs. 60 lakh, the rate of interest on delayed payment of service tax will be 12%.

Government Exempted Services provided by Bio Incubators :

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Notification No. 12/2016 dated 01. 03. 2016

Vide this Notification, services provided by Bio Technology Incubators which are approved by Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council (BIRAC) to the incubates are being exempted from Service Tax with effect from 1st April, 2016.

Exemption to Software recorded on Media bearing RSP

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Notification No. 11/2016 dated 01. 03. 2016

By this Notification Service Tax has been exempted w.e.f. 1st March, 2016 on Information Technology Software if such software is:

(1) recorded on a media which is notified under Chapter 85 of the CETA ;
(2) on which RSP is required to be declared;
(3) the value of the package of such media domestically procured or imported, has been determined under Section 4A of the CE Act;
(4) Excise Duty / CVD has been paid by the manufacturer / importer on RSP basis;
(5) the service provider has to make a declaration on the invoice that no amount in excess of the declared RSP has been recovered from the customer;
(6) E xemption from excise to the extent of value liable for service tax in case of customized software which does not require RSP (Notification no. 11/2016 – CE refers).

Amendment in Point of Taxation Rules, 2011

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Notification No. 10/2016-ST dated 01. 03. 2016

Section
67A is proposed to be amended to obtain specific rule making powers in
respect of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011. Point of Taxation Rules, 2011
are being amended accordingly. The amendment in the Rules would come
into force with effect from the date of enactment of the Finance Bill,
2016.

SERVICE TAX UPDATE – Changes in Abatement Notification No. 26/2012

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Notification No. 08/2016 dated 01. 03. 2016
CBEC vide this notification has made the following changes in Abatement Notification No. 26/2012, which will be effective from 1st April 2016 :

Notification No.2 :
Transport of Goods by Rail (other than service specified below): Taxable Value 30%: Subject to condition that Cenvat Credit of Input & Capital Goods used for providing the said service is not availed. Earlier, credit of Input service was also not allowed along with Inputs & Capital Goods. However, now Cenvat credit of Input Service is allowed.

Notification No.2A :
Transport of goods in containers by rail by any person other than Indian Railways : Taxable Value 40% : Subject to condition that Cenvat Credit of Input & Capital Goods used for providing the said service is not availed. This is a newly inserted entry.

Notification No.3:
Transport of passengers, with or without accompanied belongings, by rail : Taxable Value 30% : Subject to condition that Cenvat Credit of Input & Capital Goods used for providing the said service is not availed. Earlier credit of Input service was also not allowed along with Inputs & Capital Goods. However, now Cenvat credit of Input Service is allowed.

Notification No.7:
Services of goods transport agency in relation to transportation of goods OTHER THAN USED HOUSEHOLD GOODS : Taxable Value 30% : Subject to condition that Cenvat Credit of Input, Input Service & Capital Goods used for providing the said service is not availed. Earlier, this was applicable for “Services of goods transport agency in relation to transportation of goods”. So, all goods including household goods were covered. Now, same is omitted from this Entry & separate entry No. 7A is provided for the same.

Notification No.7A:
Services of goods transport agency in relation to transportation of USED HOUSEHOLD GOODS : Taxable value 40% : Subject to condition that Cenvat Credit of Input, Input Service & Capital Goods used for providing the said service is not availed. This is a newly inserted entry.

Notification No.8:
Services provided by a foreman of chit fund in relation to chit: Taxable value 70% : Subject to condition that Cenvat Credit of Input, Input Service & Capital Goods used for providing the said service is not availed. This is a newly inserted entry.

Notification No.9:
Transport of passengers, with or without accompanied belongings, by- a) a contract carriage other than motorcab. b) a radio taxi c) a Stage carrier : Taxable value 40%: Subject to condition that Cenvat Credit of Input, Input Service & Capital Goods used for providing the said service is not availed.

Notification No.10:
Transport of goods in a vessel : Taxable value 30% : Subject to condition that Cenvat Credit of Input & Capital Goods used for providing the said service is not availed. Earlier, credit of Input service was also not allowed along with Inputs & Capital Goods. However now, Cenvat credit of Input Service is allowed.

Notification No.12:
Construction of a complex, building, civil structure or a part thereof, intended for a sale to a buyer, wholly or partly except where entire consideration is received after issuance of completion certificate by the competent authority : Taxable value 30% : Subject to condition that (i) CENVAT credit on inputs used for providing the taxable service has not been availed. This entry was earlier also in existence, however it includes categories such as carpet area less than 2000 sq.ft. or more than that etc. (ii) The value of land is included in the amount charged from the service receiver. Now these categories are removed and such taxable service is charged at 30% of total value.

Notification No.11 :
Substituted (Defin. of ‘Package Tour’ given at para-2 is omitted)

Service by Tour Operator in respect of : (i) tour, only for arranging or booking accommodation : Taxable value 10 : This abatement of 90% cannot be claimed in such cases where the invoice, bill or challan issued by the tour operator, in relation to a tour, only includes the service charges for arranging or booking accommodation for any person and does not include the cost of such accommodation.; (ii) other than (i) above : Taxable value 30 : CENVAT credit on inputs, capital goods and input services other than input services of a tour operator, used for providing the taxable service is not availed.

Changes in Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012 dated 01. 03. 2016

[A] New Entries inserted to exempt services :

(1) Entry 9B w.e.f. 01.03.2016: Services provided by the Indian Institutes of Management (IIM), as per the guidelines of the Central Government, to their students, by way of the following educational programmes, except Executive Development Programme, –

a. two year full time residential Post Graduate Programmes in Management for the Post Graduate Diploma in Management, to which admissions are made on the basis of Common Admission Test (CAT ), conducted by the IIM;

b. fellow programme in Management;

c. five year integrated programme in Management.

(2) Entry 9C: Services of assessing bodies empanelled centrally by Directorate General of Training, Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship by way of assessments under Skill Development Initiative (SDI) Scheme.

(3) Entry 9D: Services provided by training providers (Project implementation agencies) under Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana under the Ministry of Rural Development by way of offering skill or vocational training courses certified by National Council For Vocational Training.

(4) Entry 12A and 14A w.e.f. 01.03.2016: Restoration of certain exemptions withdrawn last year for projects, contracts in respect of which, contracts were entered into before withdrawal of the exemption. [Refer changes discussed supra under newly proposed Section 102 and Section 103 of the Finance Act, for details].

(5) Entry 14 (ca): Services by way of construction, erection, commissioning, installation of original works pertaining to low cost houses up to a carpet area of 60 sq. m. per house in a housing project approved by the competent authority under the “Affordable housing in partnership” component of PMAY or any housing scheme of a State Government.

(6) Entry No. 23(bb): Service of transportation of passengers, with or without accompanied belongings, by a stage carriage, was in the Negative list of services vide Section 66D(o)(i) of the Finance Act. With the proposed deletion of said entry under the Negative List, a new entry is being inserted under the Mega Exemption Notification so as to exempt services by a stage carriage other than air conditioned stage carriage.

(7) Entry No. 26(q): Services of general insurance business provided under ‘Niramaya’ Health Insurance scheme launched by National Trust for the Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disability Act, 1999 (44 of 1999).

(8) Entry No. 26C: Services of life insurance business provided by way of annuity under the National Pension System regulated by Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority of India (PFRDA) under the Pension Fund Regulatory And Development Authority Act, 2013 (23 of 2013).

(9) Entry No. 49: Services provided by Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) to persons governed under the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952).

(10) Entry No. 50: Services provided by Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDA) to insurers under the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India Act, 1999 (41 of 1999).

(11) Entry No. 51: Services provided by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) set up under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992) by way of protecting the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate, the securities market.

(12) Entry No. 52: Services provided by National Centre for Cold Chain Development under Ministry of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmer’s Welfare by way of cold chain knowledge dissemination.

(13) Entry No. 53 w.e.f 01.06.2016: Services by way of transportation of goods by an aircraft from a place outside India upto the customs station of clearance in India.

[B] Withdrawal of Exemption :

(1) Entry No. 6(b) & (c) has been amended to withdraw exemption in respect of the following: Services provided by a senior advocate to an advocate or partnership firm of advocates and to a person other than a person ordinarily carrying out any activity relating to industry, commerce or any other business or profession; and a person represented on an arbitral tribunal to an arbitral tribunal.

Hence, Service tax in the above instances would be levied under forward charge. However, legal services provided by a firm of advocates or an advocate other than senior advocate is being continued i.e. under Reverse Charge.

(2) Entry 14(a): Exemption to construction, erection, commissioning or installation of original works pertaining to monorail or metro is being withdrawn. However, the said services, where contracts were entered into before 01.03.2016, on which appropriate stamp duty, was paid, shall remain exempt.

(3) Entry No. 23(c): Exemption to services for transport of passengers, with or without accompanied belongings, by ropeway, cable car or aerial tramway is being withdrawn by deletion of this entry.

[C] Expansion of Scope :

(1) Entry No. 13: Scope expanded to also cover the following: Services provided by way of construction , erection, commissioning, installation, completion, fitting out, repair, maintenance, renovation, or alteration of:

(ba) a civil structure or any other original works pertaining to the ‘In-situ rehabilitation of existing slum dwellers using land as a resource through private participation’ under the Housing for All (Urban) Mission/Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana, only for existing slum dwellers;

(bb) a civil structure or any other original works pertaining to the ‘Beneficiary led individual house construction / enhancement under the Housing for All(Urban) Mission/ Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana’.

(2) Entry 16 : The threshold exemption limit of consideration charged for services provided by a performing artist in folk or classical art form of (i) music, or (ii) dance, or (iii) theatre, has been extended from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 1.5 lakh per performance (except brand ambassador).

[D] New definitions inserted :

(1) “approved vocational education course” means, –

(i) a course run by an industrial training institute or an industrial training centre affiliated to the National Council for Vocational Training or State Council for Vocational Training offering courses in designated trades notified under the Apprentices Act, 1961 (52 of 1961); or

(ii) a Modular Employable Skill Course, approved by the National Council of Vocational Training, run by a person registered with the Directorate General of Training, Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship.

(2) “senior advocate” has the meaning assigned to it in Section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961).

(3) “(oa) “educational institution” means an institution providing services by way of:

(i) pre-school education and education up to higher secondary school or equivalent;

(ii) education as a part of a curriculum for obtaining a qualification recognised by any law for the time being in force;

(ii) education as a part of an approved vocational education course;”

These definitions will be effective from the date of enactment of the Finance Bill, 2016.

M/s. G. K. Micro Metal Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of M. P. Ltd Others, [2013] 64 VST 147 (MP)

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VAT – Entries in Schedule – Aluminium Granules (Powder) – Are Same as Aluminium, Entry 36 of Part III of Schedule II of The Madhya Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2002.

FACTS
The assessee dealer, a company, sold aluminium powder and had paid sales tax @ 4% treating it aluminium covered by Entry 36 of Part II of the Schedule II of the Act. The department levied tax @12.5% under residual entry. The company filed writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) against aforesaid assessment order.

HELD
Under Entry 36 of Part II of Schedule II of the Act, rate of tax on sale of aluminium is 4%. The company is selling aluminium granules (Powder). It is used as aluminium. There is no different use. Since the nature of the product is the same and use is the same, the petitioner company is not liable to pay tax 12.5% under residual entry. The residual entry would not be applicable when a specific rate of tax entry has been prescribed on a particular commodity. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the writ Petition filed by the company and directed the assessing authority to reassess the tax liability of the company after calculating payment of rate of tax payable by the company at four per cent on sale of aluminium granules (powder).

M/s. MRF Ltd. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, [2013] 64 VST 103 (Mad)

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Inter-State Sales – Delivery of Goods – Against Allotment Letter – Subsequent Dispatch of Goods Outside the State – Local Sale – Purchase Tax Payable – At Last Point, Section 3(a) of The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and Item 74 of Schedule I of The Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act 1959.

FACTS
The appellant company purchased rubber from State Trading Corporation against allotment letter. Delivery thereof was given within the State of Tamil Nadu by STC and the appellant dealer subsequently dispatched it to its branches outside the State of Tamil Nadu. Since goods were sent by the appellant dealer outside the State, the STC charged CST on such sales to applicant. The enforcement department visited place of business of the appellant dealer and found that delivery is given within the State as such did not accepted claim of inter-State purchase of appellant dealer and levied purchase tax at last point, despite tax paid by selling dealer under the CST Act treating it as inter-State sale. The Tribunal confirmed the order of lower authorities. The appellant filed revision petition before the Madras High Court against the order of Tribunal.

HELD
The terms and conditions of allocation of natural rubber shows that they are general in character, that whenever there is a movement of rubber in the course of inter-State trade, as an incidence of sale, certainly, as per the clause, central sales tax provisions would stand attracted. Therefore, the inclusion of a clause referring the to furnishing of C forms as regards inter-State sale in the general conditions, per se, would not in any manner, speak on the character of the transaction. There is nothing on the record to show that the parties intended on the facts of the case that allotment was intended to result in the movement of goods to various branches of the assessee. The application of the delivered rubber to any particular unit outside the State is a matter of choice and the discretion of the assessee and the seller, at no point of time, was involved in this. On a reading of facts of the case, the High Court held that the assessee after having purchased the goods had issued dispatch instruction for movement of goods to other State. Thus there was no link between the purchase and dispatch. It is difficult to say that the movement is nothing but an inter- State sale. Accordingly, the claim of applicant for inter-State purchase was rejected by the High Court and confirmed the levy of purchase tax as last point purchase. However, since selling dealer had charged CST @4% and remitted to the Government and rate of purchase tax is 5%, the State was directed to give necessary adjustment in respect of four per cent tax paid by selling dealer STC as the payment made in respect of the assessment made on the assessee as last purchaser and that the balance tax payable by the assessee would be only to the extent at one percent. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the applications with above direction for adjustment of CST paid by selling dealer towards payment of purchase tax by the appellant.

M/s. Paul Varghese vs. CCT, [2013] 64 VST 6 (Ker)

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Sales Tax – Penalty – Levied Under Special Provision – Then Penalty Under General Provision Cannot be Levied for Same Offence, sections 17(4), (5A) and 45A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

FACTS
The Petitioner had opted for simplified procedure of assessment u/s. 17 (4) of the Act and the assessment was completed accordingly, subsequently, upon investigation, the dealer was reassessed and subjected to penalty u/s. 17(5A) of the Act. Further, the dealer was also subjected to penalty u/s. 45A of the Act.

The dealer filed a writ petition before the Kerala High Court against the levy of penalty under the general provision of the act contained in section 45A of the Act particularly when penalty order for same offence u/s. 15(5A) was levied and accepted.

HELD
Admittedly, the liability u/s. 17(5A) of the act for levy of penalty upon reassessment of an order of simplified assessment passed u/s. 17(4) of the Act had become final. The dealer is not liable to be punished for the same offence by referring to the general provision of section 45A as to the failure to maintain proper accountants and non response to the notice, which stands on a much lower pedestal. Even though sections 17(5A) and 45A are distinct and different, governing separate situations, the offence involved is measured in greater scales, imposing punishment in a mandatory manner, that too by “three times” of the tax effect in respect of the years 1998- 1999 and 1991-2000, while leaving the rest in respect of 2000-2001 as the turnover did not touch the limit to suffer any tax liability in respect of 2000-2001 for imposing the “mandatory penalty” u/s. 17(5A), there is no question of considering the same for imposing the “discretionary penalty” u/s. 45A as well. When a “special provision’ is there the “general provision” has to be excluded, so as to give way to the former. In the instant case, section 17(5A) is the special provision and section 45A is the general provision, which in term has to yield to the former. Accordingly, the High Court allowed writ petition filed by the dealer and levy of penalty u/s. 45A of the Act was set aside.

[2016-TIOL-08-ARA-ST] M/s Godaddy India Web Services Pvt. Ltd.

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Promotion and marketing, branding etc. without securing orders or facilitating provision of service are naturally bundled services of support and accordingly are covered under Rule 3 of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012.

Facts
The Applicant proposes to enter into a “service agreement” with a foreign company providing web services to customers across the world. Services to be provided include marketing and promotion services, direct marketing, branding, offline marketing by conducting road shows, arranging seminars, supervising third party customer care center services, payment processing etc. for a consideration of cost plus mark-up of 13% in US dollars. The Applicant is not authorised to enter into any contract on behalf of the foreign company or secure orders or facilitate the provision of services. The question before the authority is whether the aforesaid services are support services naturally bundled in terms of section 66F of the Act and if so, whether the place of provision is outside India and whether the service qualifies as export in terms of Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.

Held
The Authority noted that the services proposed to be provided are with a sole intention of promotion of the brand of the foreign company by augmenting its business and therefore would support their business interests in India. Further it was held that the definition of ‘intermediary’ under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 excludes a person who provides the “main service” on his own account. Supporting the business of the foreign company is the main service and processing payments and supervision of third party call centers are ancillary and incidental to the main service of support which is offered as a package for a lumpsum payment. Thus in view of these indicators the proposed services are support services naturally bundled in the normal course of business and fall under Rule 3 of the POPS as per which the place of provision is the location of the service receiver. There is no contract between the applicant and the customers of the foreign company in India and no consideration is received from the Indian customers. The benefit of the service accrues to the foreign company outside India and thus the support service is provided outside India i.e. the location of the service receiver. Further since the payment is received in convertible foreign exchange and all other clauses of Rule 6A of the service tax rules are satisfied the service qualifies to be an export.

2016 (41) STR 454 (Tri.-Mum.) Commr. Of C Ex. Nashik vs. Sahastronics Controls Pvt. Ltd.

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If any service is provided for fulfilment of a condition of the contract, the services are provided to self and hence, not taxable.

Facts
The Respondent was awarded with a contract on build, own, operate and transfer (BOOT) mode by Nasik Municipal Corporation for micro processor based energy saving devices and its maintenance. As per the contract, post commencement of operations, the operations and maintenance of these devices was to be done by the Respondent and if a device/s did not function optimally, then to that extent, they would not get remuneration. The remuneration was fixed as a percentage of operating profit to be arrived after reducing the cost from the savings in electricity consumption. Show Cause Notice was issued proposing to demand service tax on operating profit. The adjudicating and first appellate authority took a view that service was rendered to self as Respondent was required to maintain the equipments in order to earn revenue and the ownership of the equipment was with them and accordingly, dropped the demand. The department challenged the order before the Tribunal.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the lower authorities have given their findings on the basis of the facts and documents on record. As per grounds of appeal, no allegations are made which contradicts with the findings of the lower authority and hence the Appeal was dismissed.

2016 (41) STR 441 (Tri-Mum.) Maharashtra Chamber of Housing Industry vs. C.C.E, C. & ST, Mumbai

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New plea/ground regarding limitation cannot be taken at the stage of second appeal.

Facts
In the present case, the Appellant was challenging the leviability of service tax on amounts received from nonmembers. During the hearing a new ground of demand getting barred by limitation was raised.

Held

Since the Appellant had neither raised the limitation ground at adjudication stage nor in the first appeal, it was held that no new ground can be raised at the second appeal stage.

[2016] 66 taxmann.com 244 (Chennai-CESTAT) – Sify Technologies Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, LTU, Chennai.

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When CENVAT credit is systematically allocated between departments providing taxable services and those providing exempt services, Rule 6(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 becomes applicable and Rule 6(3) cannot be invoked.

Facts
Appellant had 3 types of departments namely Department A (providing taxable services), Department B (providing exempt services) & Department C (administrative department). The Appellant apportioned input service tax credit earned by Department C, between Departments A & B in the ratio of their respective turnover. It was submitted that when the records clearly demarcated the extent of credit allocable the credit cannot be disallowed without bringing any cogent evidence to demonstrate that those services were not relevant. Whereas department contended that once the assessee comes under Rule 6(2) of CENVAT Credit Rules, the application of Rule 6(2) and 6(3) simultaneously is not possible. As assessee failed to comply with the conditions prescribed by Rule 6(3) read with Rule 6(3A) of CENVAT Credit Rules, the entire CENVAT credit was disallowed.

Held
The Tribunal observed that the Appellant had already reversed credit allocated to Department B which provided exempt services. It held that Rule 6(3) of CENVAT Credit Rules contains overriding provisions which are independent of provisions of Rule 6(1) and (2). Since proper records were maintained which enabled substantial allocation of CENVAT credit in respect of taxable as well as exempt services, its case would get covered under Rule 6(2). Therefore, there cannot be a presumption by the Revenue that such method falls under Rule 6(3) of CENVAT Credit Rules. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to adjudicating authority to a limited extent to examine allocation of the credit received by Department A through Department C.

[2016] 66 taxmann.com 77 (Chennai CESTAT) – Smt. A Vijaya vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem.

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In multi-level marketing; profit earned by first level distributor from sale of manufacturer’s product on his own account and volume based incentive / commission received by him on his purchases would not be liable for service tax under Business Auxiliary Services. However, commission earned on purchases made by next level distributor sponsored by him would attract service tax.

Facts
Appellants being individuals and household agents (i.e. first level distributors) bought products from ‘Amway’ for sales to retail customers at MRP. They also identified second level distributors and sold Amway products to them for further retail sale. First level distributors had three types of income namely (i) profit from products purchased from Amway at Distributor’s Acquisition Price and sold at amount not exceeding product’s MRP (ii) volume based commission based on purchases made by them from Amway and (iii) commission earned from Amway on the basis of purchases made by second level distributor sponsored by them in the chain of direct marketing. Department levied service tax on gross commission earned by distributors under category of “Business Auxiliary Services” on the ground that they not only made retail sale by direct marketing, but they also engaged in sales promotion on behalf of Amway by appointing 2nd line and 3rd line distributors.

Held
While deciding the case, the Hon’ble Tribunal applied the ratio laid down in similar case by Principal Bench of New Delhi CESTAT in Final order Nos. 51818 51855/2015 dated 09/06/2015 in case of Mr. Charanjeet Singh & others (Batch of 38 appeals). It observed that Amway products are not sold on the shelf but only through distributors and that Amway products cease to belong to Amway once they are purchased by a distributor and ownership of goods gets transferred to the distributor. It held that “Business Auxiliary Services” would cover promotion, marketing or sale of those goods which belong to client and not those goods which belong to distributor themselves. Hence, sale of these goods by distributors/ sub-distributors would not constitute service to Amway. Further it concurred with the decision of the Principal Bench on the aforesaid case in which Tribunal held that any incentive or commission received by the distributor from Amway for buying certain quantum of goods during a month cannot be treated as consideration received for promotion or marketing or sale of goods, more so, as this commission is not linked to goods sold by the first level distributor but his purchases, it is in the nature of volume discounts. However, commission received by Appellants on the basis of volume based purchases of Amway products made by their sales group i.e. group of second level of distributor appointed by Amway as identified qua the Appellants is held to be liable for service tax, on the ground that by sponsoring such second level distributors, the Appellants in fact promote sales of Amway products and commission paid for the same is also linked to sales made by Amway company directly to such second-level distributors.

[2016] 68 taxmann.com 147 (New Delhi-CESTAT) – Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi- III vs. Fiamm Minda Automotive Ltd.

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The manufacturer is eligible to take CENVAT credit of service tax, inadvertently paid by job worker whose activities are exempt from service tax.

Facts
The Respondent Manufacturer availed CENVAT credit of service tax charged and collected by the job workers. CENVAT credit was denied contending that such services were not liable to service tax.

Held
Tribunal observed that job workers were registered with service tax department and paid service tax which was accepted and retained as statutory dues by department. Also proper invoices evidencing service tax payment were issued. It was therefore held that when service tax is paid by the service provider and the CENVAT credit thereof is availed by recipient of service in conformity with statutory provisions, such credit cannot be denied at recipient’s end merely on the ground that activities were exempt from service tax.

Property held by a Hindu Female is her Absolute Property – N’est-ce pas?

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Introduction
The above Title, ‘Isn’t a Hindu Female’s Property, her Absolute Property?’, may appear as a rhetoric question to readers! However, having said that it would be interesting to note that the question is not as cut and dried as it appears and this issue has travelled all the way to the Supreme Court on numerous occasions. Thus, while it is quite easy to understand in theory that right to property is a vested right of a Hindu female under the Hindu Succession Act, it becomes quite difficult to understand its implications given the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The issue is thrown into sharper focus by the seeming dichotomy under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”), which deals with property of a Hindu female. A recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Jupudy Pardha Sarathy vs. Pentapati Rama Krishna, Civil Appeal No. 375/2007 (Jupudy’s case) has analysed the position laid down by various judgments on this subject.

Section 14 of the Act
The Act governs the position of a Hindu intestate, i.e., one dying without making a valid Will. The Act applies to Hindus, Jains, Sikhs, Buddhists and to any person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or a Jew. The Act overrides all Hindu customs, traditions and usages and specifies the heirs entitled to such property and the order of preference among them. Section14 which is the crux of the issue needs to be studied closely.

Section14(1) states that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whenever it may be acquired by her, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Thus, the Act lays down in very clear terms that in respect of all property possessed by a Hindu female, she is the full and absolute owner and she does not have a limited/restricted right in the same. The explanation to this sub-section defined the term, “property” to include both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift (from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage), or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever. Thus, an extremely wide definition of property has been given under the Act. Property includes all types of property owned by a female Hindu although she may not be in actual, physical or constructive possession of that property – Mangal Singh & Ors vs. Shrimati Rattno, 1967 SCR (3) 454. The critical words used here are “possessed” and “acquired”. The word “possessed” has been used in its widest connotation and it may either be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law. In the context in which it has been used in section 14(1) it means the state of owning or having in one’s hand or power – Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs. Setra Veerayya and Ors. (1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 968. The use of the words ‘female Hindu’ is very wide in scope and is not restricted only to a ‘wife’ – Vidya (Smt) vs. Nand Ram Alias Asoop Ram, (2001) 1 MLJ 120 SC.

In Deen Dayal & Anr. vs. Rajaram, (1971) 1 SCR 298, it was held that, before any property can be said to be “possessed” by a Hindu woman as provided in section 14(1), two things are necessary: (a) she must have a right to the possession of that property and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively. However, this section cannot make legal what is illegal. Hence, if a female Hindu is in illegal possession of any property, then she cannot validate the same by taking shelter under this section.

Section 14(2) carves out an exception to section14(1) of the Act. It states that nothing contained in sub-section (1) of section 14 shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. Thus, if a female Hindu acquires any property under any instrument and the terms of acquisition, as laid down by such instrument, itself provided for a restricted or a limited estate in the property then she would be treated as a limited owner only. In such an event, she cannot have recourse to section 14(1) and contend that she is an absolute owner.

Whether sub-section (1) or (2) of section 14 apply to a particular case depends upon the facts of the case – Seth Badri Pershad vs. Smt. Kanso Devi, (1969) 2 SCC 586. In this decision it was further held that sub-section (2) of section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-section (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property. It further approved of the observations of the Madras High Court Rangaswami Naicker vs. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387 that section14(2) made it clear that the object of section 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc. by virtue of which a women’s right was restricted.

Factual Matrix of Jupudy’s case
A person had 3 wives and his 1st wife had predeceased him. His 3rd wife had no child and so, under his Will, he left her a house to be enjoyed for her life and after her life it was to go to his son from his 2nd wife. He also left her certain washroom facilities and right to fetch water from the well during her lifetime. All of these were also to devolve on his son after her death. The focussed issue before the Apex Court was whether the right to these properties so bequeathed on the 2nd wife was her absolute property by virtue of section 14(1) or whether it was a limited estate u/s. 14(2) since she was made an owner only for her lifetime?

Decisions on Section14
Several decisions of the Supreme Court have analysed section14(1) and section14(2) in depth. Some of the important ones are discussed below.

R.B.S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493

The Supreme Court held that by section14(1) the legislature converted the interest of a Hindu female, which under the customary Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited interest, into an absolute interest and by the Explanation thereto gave to the expression “property” the widest connotation. The Court held that the Act conferred upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance, and swept away the traditional limitations on her powers of dispositions which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate. She was under the Act regarded as a fresh stock of descent in respect of property possessed by her at the time of her death.

Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628

If a lady is entitled to a share in her husband’s properties then the suit properties must be held to have been allotted to her in accordance with section14(1), i.e., as an absolute owner inspite of the fact that the deed in question mentioned that she would have only a life interest in the properties allotted to her share.

Eramma vs. Verrupanna, 1966 (2) SCR 626

The Supreme Court held that mere possession of property by a female does not automatically attract section 14(1) of the Act.

MST. Karmi vs. Amru, AIR 1971 SC 745

A person died leaving behind his wife. His son pre-deceased him. He gave a life-interest through his Will to his Wife. It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the Will of her husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Act. Section14(2) would apply to such a situation and it would not become an absolute estate. The female having succeeded to the properties on the basis of her husband’s Will she cannot claim any rights over and above what the Will conferred upon her. This is one of the important decisions which have gone against the tide of conferring absolute ownership on the Hindu female.

V. Tulasamma vs. Sesha Reddi, (1977) 3 CC 99

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court clarified the difference between sub-section (1) and (2) of section 14, thereby restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life interest in a property to his wife. case involved a compromise decree arising out of decree for maintenance obtained by the widow against her husband’s brother in a case of intestate succession. The compromise allotted properties to her as a limited owner. The Supreme Court held that this was a case where properties were allotted in lieu of maintenance and hence, section14(1) was clearly applicable. Thus, the widow became the absolute owner of these properties.

The Court held that legislative intendment in enacting s/s. (2) was that this subsection should be applicable only to cases where the acquisition of property is made by a Hindu female for the first time without any pre-existing right. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance, such acquisition would be pursuant to her pre-existing right not be within the scope and ambit of section 14(2) even if the instrument allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property. S/s. (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of s/s. (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to s/s. (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property. It further held that a Hindu woman’s right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is’ concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow. Though the widow’s right to maintenance is not a right to property, it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right in the property, i.e. it is a jus ad rem, not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court.

Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. Mohinder Singh, AIR 1987 SC 2251 / Gurdip Singh vs. Amar Singh 1991 SCC (2) 8

The provisions of section 14(1) of the Act were applied because it was a case where the Hindu female was put in possession of the property expressly in pursuance to and in recognition of the maintenance in her/where the wife acquired property by way of gift from her husband explicitly in lieu of maintenance.

Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC 312

The Apex Court dealt with a life estate granted to a Hindu woman by a Will as a limited owner and the grant was in recognition of pre-existing right. Tulasamma’s decision was followed and section 14(1) was held to apply. The Supreme Court also held that the contrary decision in the case of Mst. Karmi cannot be considered an authority since it was a rather short judgment without adverting to any provisions of section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither made any mention of any argument raised in this regard nor there was any mention of the earlier decisions on this issue.

Nazar Singh vs. Jagjit Kaur, (1996) 1 SCC 35 / Santosh vs. Saraswathibai, (2008) 1 SCC 465 / Subhan Rao vs. Parvathi Bai, (2010) 10 SCC 235

Applying Tulasamma’s decision it was held that lands, which were given to a lady by her husband in lieu of her maintenance, were held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner notwithstanding the several restrictive covenants accompanying the grant. According to the Court, this proposition followed from the words in sub-section (1) of section14, which insofar as is relevant read: “Any property possessed by a female Hindu … shall be held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner.”

Shakuntala Devi vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 390

A Hindu wife was bequeathed a life interest for maintenance by her husband’s Will with a condition that she would not have power to alienate the same in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife, the property was to revert back to his daughter as an absolute owner. It was held that u/s.14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property.

Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8 SCC 75 / Sharad Subramanyan vs. Soumi Mazumdar (2006) 8 SCC 91

The Supreme Court in these well-considered decisions held that the antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in determining whether subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act would come into play. Any acquisition of possession of property by a female Hindu could not automatically attract section14(1). That depended upon the nature of the right acquired by her. If she took it as an heir under the Act, she took it absolutely. If while getting possession of the property after the Act, under a devise, gift or other transaction, any restriction was placed on her right, the restriction will have play in view of section14(2) of the Act. Therefore, there was nothing in the Act which affected the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act did not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deemed fit. His Will could not be challenged as being hit by section 14(1) of the Act. When he validly disposed of his property by providing for a limited estate to his wife, the widow had to take it as the estate fell. This restriction on her right so provided, was really respected by section 14(2) of the Act. Thus, in this case where the widow had no pre-existing right, the limited estate granted to her under her husband’s Will was upheld u/s. 14(2).

Nazar G. Rama Rao vs. T. G. Seshagiri Rao (2008) 12 SCC 392

The Court held that if no issue was framed and also no evidence was led to substantiate the plea that the female was occupying the premises in lieu of maintenance, section 14(1) cannot automatically apply to every case.

Final Verdict in Jupudy’s case
After analysing a host of decisions and the legal principles, the Supreme Court in Jupudy’s case held that the bequest under the Will to the 3rd Wife was in the nature of maintenance even though the express words maintenance were not mentioned in the Will. She was issueless and the husband was duty bound to maintain her. Hence, he gave her the house and access to incidental facilities. Accordingly, section14(1) applied and the limited right stood enlarged into an absolute estate by virtue of a pre-existing right of maintenance. The Court observed that no one disputed the genuineness of the Will and the fact that the 3rd Wife continued to enjoy the said property in lieu of her maintenance and hence, the decision of G. Rama’s case cannot apply here.

Conclusion
Section14(1) is a very important piece of legislation when it comes to ensuring protection of a Hindu female’s rights over property. It ensures that a lady is an absolute owner in respect of her property. However, it is also essential that this is provision is used as a shield and not a sword. Section14(2) ensures that what was originally acquired as a limited owner does not automatically enlarge into absolute ownership. One important principle which emerges from the numerous Court cases is that, applicability of these two sub-sections has to be tested on the facts of each case and there cannot be one straight-jacketed approach to all cases. Due care should be taken in drafting a Will under which a Hindu lady is getting a limited estate to demonstrate that it is in effect a restricted interest and not something in lieu of maintenance.

Will – Transfer of property – Will becomes effective only after death of testator – Limitation Act, does not strictly apply for granting probate.

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The State of Meghalaya & Anr vs. Bimol Deb & Anr. ; AIR 2015 Meghalaya 48 (HC).

Writ petition was filed challenging the order of additional Dy. Commissioner (Revenue), Shillong on granting the probate. It was submitted that, as per the Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010, no one can make a Will to transfer the property from one living person to another living person and that the Will in question was not a Will at all, but it was made for the purpose of transfer of land by the testator of the Will.

The Hon’ble Court observed that The Meghalaya Land Transfer Act, 1971 is a law passed by the State legislature. There is no definition that, “transfer of property” shall also include within its meaning “WILL” under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines “transfer of property” as an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself, and one or more other living persons; and ‘to transfer property’ is to perform such act”.

The definition of “WILL” can be found only in the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in Section 2(h) “WILL” means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.”

Now, the word “convey” in section 5 has been further defined in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 in section 2(10). “Conveyance” includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos (between living persons) and which is not specifically provided for by Schedule I”.

The upshot of the above legal position is that, ‘transfer of property’ will include only between living person and the same is the meaning of conveyance also which will include only between living persons. However, Will is a testament by a legal declaration bequeathing the right of property to a living person in future. A Will becomes effective only after the death of the testator. A Will is a last wish of a dead person.

Analysing various provisions of The Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010, the Court held that, if we read the definition of “Transfer of property” and “Conveyance” quoted and discussed above, it becomes very apparent that, by including “WILL” within the meaning of “Conveyance”, the State legislature has rewritten the definition of “conveyance” which is an illegal exercise of power; but the State legislature in the first place has no power to alter the definition of conveyance legislated by the Parliament. The inclusion of “WILL” has to be struck down as illegal since the State legislature cannot overstep in the field of Union list while legislating law. The issue of succession is solely in the field of the Union list and not in the Concurrent list. Safe legal inference can be drawn that the insertion of WILL in clause 2(d) of the Meghalaya Land Transfer Amendment Act, 2012 quoted above is a blatant case of illegal legislation and is liable to be struck out. The subsequent amendment in section 3A restricting the devolution of property only to immediate family members will have to meet the same fate and to be struck down. The Court also observed that as per the limitation is concerned Article 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not strictly apply for granting probate.

Tribunal – Early hearing – Application must be considered :

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Payadhi Foods P. Ltd. vs. UOI 2015 (325) ELT 705 (Cal.) (HC)

The Petitioner filed an application for early hearing of a pending appeal before the CESTAT which was dismissed on the ground that the appeal would be considered in due course.

The Hon’ble court observed that the appeal which was filed in the year 2010 had not reached to its logical conclusion as yet. The Court observed that though it was not oblivious of the reality where the docket of the Tribunal is burdened with enormous litigation filed before it, but equally this Court cannot lose sight of the responsibilities of the statutory authority to render justice effectively and expeditiously. When an application is taken out seeking for an early hearing of the said appeal, the Tribunal ought to have fixed the date but should not have thrown the said application at the threshold that it will be taken up in due course. The court observed that the justice would be sub-serve if the CESTAT is directed to fix up a date and hear out the said appeal within the time frame.

Gift Deed – Cancellation – Suspicious Circumstances – It is settled principles of law that negative cannot be proved

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Smt. Sita Sundar Devi vs. Savitri Devi & Ors. AIR 2015 Patna 217 (HC)

Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration that the gift deed dated 09.05.1967 purportedly executed by him in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 4 is fraudulent, illegal and void. The plaintiff also prayed for cancellation of the gift deed.

The lower court recorded the finding that the plaintiff had no cause of action and, therefore, was not entitled to any relief. The court below also found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the gift deed was obtained from him by fraud and as such, the gift deed is not a fraudulent, fabricated and illegal document. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that it is settled principles of law that a registered document is presumed to be genuine unless the contrary is proved. However, this presumption is rebutable. Once the plaintiff denied its execution with his knowledge and alleged fraud describing how the fraud was played on him, it was for the defendant to have explained the facts, which have been denied by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff has shown the circumstances and the reason as to why he would have gifted his entire property to the the defendants, who are not close relatives without making any provision either for himself or for his wife and the daughter, grand-daughters etc. When these facts were brought on record, it was for the defendants to have satisfactorily explained the matter.

The court further observed that, it is the case of the defendants that plaintiff has purchased the stamp, therefore, it was for the defendants to prove this fact because the plaintiff has denied in so many words and it is settled principles of law that negative cannot be proved.

Once the plaintiff denied the facts, the presumption of genuineness of the gift deed stands rebutted and the onus shifted on the defendants to prove positively the fact asserted by the defendants.

It is settled principles of law that for proving fraud, the circumstance is to be shown satisfactorily to the conscience of the Court because no direct evidence will be found. Here, the plaintiff has proved the fact that he has his wife, daughter, grand-daughters and son-in-law whom he loves. Now the question is, can it be believed that one person will gift all the properties to some persons, who are either not related or distantly related without making provision even for himself and his wife? The court held that, this cannot be the natural conduct of a person.

This is one of the strong circumstances which raises a strong suspicion about the genuineness of the gift deed as there is no explanation at all. Can it be believed that the plaintiff’s love and affection towards his wife, daughter, grand-daughters and son-in-law and even towards himself was lesser than the love and affection towards the defendants?

The other aspect is that in fact the plaintiff was in need of money when he was ailing and was being treated. In such circumstances, he would have sold the property for arranging money but he did not sell. Rather, he obtained assistance from the defendants and then gifted everything, which again creates a strong doubt.

All these are the circumstances, which have been proved by the plaintiff, which clearly indicate that in fact the defendants played a fraud on the plaintiff and got the gift deed executed by him.

In view of above, the Court held that the plaintiff had been able to prove that the defendants fraudulently got the gift deed executed. As such the gift deed was not a genuine document and no title passed on the defendants on the basis of this gift deed.

Nominations – Securities – Nominee continues to hold the Securities in trust and as a fiduciary for claimants under succession law : Succession Act 1925 Section 58:

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Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar vs. Jayshree Jayant Salgaonkar AIR 2015 Bom 296

The issue arose as to whether the decision of a learned single Judge of Court in Harsha Nitin Kokate vs. The Saraswat Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors. 2010(112) Bom. LR 2014 was per incuriam and not a good law wherein the Court had considered the provisions of section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 and Bye-Law 9.11 under the Depositories Act, 1996, and found that once a nomination is made, the securities in question: automatically get transferred in the name of the nominee upon the death of the holder of the shares.

In the present matter the Hon’ble Court observed that The Depositories Act, 1996. is an act to provide for regulation of depositories in securities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

This Act has nothing whatever to do with succession or disposition inter vivos. Plainly, the Depositories Act is concerned with the regulation of depositories, i.e., those entities providing depository services, and not in relation to the holders of the securities in such services, or the manner in which those security-holders might choose to conduct their affairs or to leave the distribution of these securities either to be governed by actions and deeds inter vivos, testamentary succession or inheritance.

A nomination, though said to be a ‘testament’, requires no probate or other proof ‘in solemn form’. Witnesses need not be in the presence of the nominator. Witnesses need not act at the instance of the nominator. Witnesses need not see the nominator execute the nomination. No nomination can be assailed on the ground of importunity, fraud, coercion or undue influence; section 61 of the Indian Succession Act is wholly defenestrated, as is section 59. There can be no codicil to a nomination. There is no particular form for a will, but there are requirements attendant to its proper making. These do not apply to all nominations. Even the requirement of witnesses is a matter of prudence rather than statute. If that be so, no nomination per se requires attestation, and if that be so, it is admissible in evidence u/s. 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 without the evidence of any witness (simply because a witness to a nomination is not, in any sense, an ‘attesting witness’). But no Will can be so read in evidence without such evidence. From the fundamental definitions to the decisions cited, it is clear that a nomination only provides the company or the depository a quittance. The nominee continues to hold the securities in trust and as a fiduciary for the claimants under the succession law. Nominations u/ss 109A and 109B of the Companies Act and Bye-Law 9.11 of the Depositories Act, 1996 cannot and do not displace the law of succession, nor do they open a third line of succession.

Judicial Process – Judicial Composure and Restraint – Judicial accountability and discipline are necessary to the orderly administration of justice.

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State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr vs. Anil Kumar Sharma & Anr. (2015) 6 SCC 716

The substantial question of law that was raised in this appeal was, as to what extent a High Court can exercise its powers in issuing directions on judicial side, relating to the procedure to be adopted in criminal trials. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, referring the observation in A. M. Mathur vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta (1990) 2 SCC 533, observed that judicial restraint and discipline are necessary to the orderly administration of justice. The duty of restraint and the humility of function has to be the constant theme for a Judge, for the said quality in decision-making is as much necessary for the Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary.

Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the court as well to other co-ordinate branches of the State, the executive and the legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process.

No person, however high, is above the law. No institution is exempt from accountability, including the judiciary. Accountability of the judiciary in respect of its judicial functions and orders is vouchsafed by provisions for appeal, revision and review of orders.

The Apex Court held that in view of law laid down by the Court, as discussed above, the High Court had clearly erred in law in treating the writ petition, which was filed for quashing of an FIR and had become infructuous, as a Public Interest Litigation, and issuing sweeping directions, without there being sufficient data and material before it to pass directions. There is no requirement u/s. 173 Code of Criminal Procedure for the Investigating Officer to produce the accused along with the charge-sheet. The High Court did not care to see that where there are several accused and only some of them could be arrested and remanded to judicial custody, and others are on bail, how all of them can be produced together by the police.

DAUGHTER’S RIGHT IN COPARCENARY – IV

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The 2005 amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the Act”) by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (“the Amendment Act”) and the issue of daughter’s right in coparcenary property have now been a subject matter of substantial litigation all over the country. My articles in BCAJ published in January 2009, May 2010 and November 2011 made an attempt to explain the legal position as per the cases decided by several High Courts.

In the article published in May 2010, we had examined the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Valliammal vs. Muniyappan (2008 (4) CTC 773) which had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheela Devi & Ors. vs. Lal Chand & Anr. reported in (2006) 8 SCC 581; 2007(1) MLJ 797 (SC) and other decided case law and come to the following conclusion:- “Therefore, it is clear that a daughter would get benefit of the Amendment Act only if her father is alive at the time of coming into force of the Amendment Act.”

Amongst varying controversial issues arising out of the Amendment Act, one of the major issues was as to whether the Amendment Act had retrospective effect and in which type of cases a daughter of a coparcener would get right in coparcenary property by birth.

With a view to make this article self-explanatory, it is necessary to reproduce here Section 6(1) of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act:-

“6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.
– (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, –

(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;
(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;
(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son,and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.”

While several High Courts have considered the question of retrospectivity, there was no consistency in the approach. The different views taken by High Courts on the question are reflected in the following case law:-

In the case of Pravat Chandra Pattnaik & Ors. vs. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik & Anr., AIR 2008 Orissa 133, the Orissa High Court held that looking into the substance of the provisions (of section 6), it is clear that the Act is prospective. It creates substantive right in favour of a daughter from the date when the amended Act came into force i.e. 9.9.2005, whenever she may have been born.

In the case of Sugalabai vs. Gundappa A. Maradi & Ors. (2007) 6 AIR Kart. R 501, the Karnataka High Court held that as soon as the Amendment Act was brought into force, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son and that there is nothing in the Amendment Act to indicate that the same will be applicable only in respect of a daughter born on or after the commencement of the Amendment Act.

The Madras High Court in the case of Valliammal vs. Muniyappan (2008 (4) CTC 773) held that the father of the daughter claiming interest in the coparcenary property having died prior to the Amendment Act and the succession having opened to the properties in question before such amendment the daughter was not entitled to any share in the coparcenary property.

In the case of Sadashiv Sakharam Patil vs. Chandrakant Gopal Desale – ( (2012)1 Mah LJ 197; (2011) 5 Bom C.R. 726), the Bombay High Court held that for the purpose of getting benefit of the amended provision it is not necessary that the birth of the daughter should also be after commencement of the amending act and that by virtue of the Amendment Act, the daughter of a coparcener becomes by birth a coparcener even if she was born before the Amendment Act coming into force.

In Vaishali Ganorkar vs. Satish Ganorkar (AIR 2012 Bom 101), the division bench of the Bombay High Court (headed by Chief Justice Mr. Mohit Shah) disagreeing with some other High Courts’ decisions to the contrary, held that only daughters born after 9th September 2005 (being the date of commencement of the Amendment Act) would get benefit under the Amendment Act. It also held that the new rights granted to a daughter which would affect vested rights would be on a wholly different footing and cannot be applied retrospectively. Although appeal to Supreme Court against the said decision was dismissed (2012 (5) Bom CR 210) the question of law was kept open.

In another case of Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari vs. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari reported in AIR 2014 Bom 151, the division bench of the Bombay High Court (also headed by Chief Justice Mr. Mohit Shah) has reconsidered its own earlier decision cited above and held that a bare perusal of sub-section (1) of section 6 would clearly show that the legislative intent in enacting clause (a) is prospective i.e. daughter born on and after 9th September 2005 will become a coparcener by birth but the legislative intent in enacting clauses (b) and (c) are retroactive and give rights to the daughter who was already born before the amendment and who is alive on the date of amendment coming into force. The court has further held that however if the daughter of a coparcener had died before 9th September 2005, her heirs would have no right in the coparcenary property.

It appears that in view of lack of clarity in the language of the provisions of amended section 6(1) of the Act, different High Courts had put emphasis on some particular wording in the Section in support of their decisions. Thus, while there were different decisions from High Courts, there was no finality and the confusion (and resultant litigation) continued.

Now, the controversy as to whether the Amendment Act is retrospective or not has been settled by a very recent decision of the Supreme Court dated 16th October 2015 in the case of Prakash and Ors vs. Phulavati and Ors. (2015 (6) Kar LJ 177) which has not yet been reported in any official reporter.

In that case the plaintiff Phulavati filed a suit before Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) Belgaum for partition and separate possession to the extent of oneseventh of her share in the coparcenary property held by her late father Yeshwant, who had died on 18th February 1988. During the pendency of the suit the Amendment Act was passed and the plaintiff amended the plaint to claim a share as per the Amendment Act. The suit was contested and the Trial Court partly decreed the same in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon preferred first appeal before the Karnataka High Court claiming that she had become coparcener under the Amendment Act and was entitled to inherit the coparcenary property equal to her brothers. The High Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Sekar vs. Geetha and others (AIR 2009 SC 2649) and held that any development of law inevitably applies to a pending proceeding and in fact it is not even to be taken as a retrospective applicability of the law but only the law as it stands on the day being made applicable. Therefore, the High Court considered the case in light of the provisions of the Amendment Act. The High Court (AIR 2011 Kar 78) held that the plaintiff was entitled to a share in the coparcenary property. In appeal by the defendant Prakash to the Supreme Court it was held that the rights of a daughter under the Amendment Act are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born.

The effect of the Amendment Act is now clear. Therefore the law now stands that a daughter of a coparcener, who is living as on 9th September 2005, shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son and have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she would have been a son. It is irrespective when such daughter is born.

Let us hope that this final legal position now prevails without any further complications.

When Regulators Overlap: Competition Commission of India and the Draft Indian Financial Code 2015

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The Indian regulatory landscape is dotted with several sectoral regulators. Each of these specialised sectoral regulators is entrusted the task of maintaining the market dynamics of its own sector and preventing market failure. However, often their regulatory mandates overlap with each other, and nowhere is this blurring of boundaries more pronounced than in the efforts to foster and fuel competition in the Indian economy.

The Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) is a specialised sector-agnostic regulator tasked with preserving and promoting competition. Given its pansector mandate, it is no surprise that the CCI often ventures into the domain of sectoral regulators. Many sectoral regulators, such as the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Insurance Regulatory & Development Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission and the Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board, are also meant to independently encourage competition in their respective markets. Given the already existing jurisdictional tension among regulators with overlapping functions, the Government of India (‘GoI’) has further obscured the sectoral delineations with the Draft Indian Financial Code 2015 (‘Draft 2015 Code’) which was released on July 23, 2015 by the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (‘FSLRC’).

The Draft 2015 Code seeks to regulate the financial sector and financial agencies, including the Financial Authority, the Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’), the Financial Redress Agency, the Resolution Corporation, the Financial Stability and Development Council and the Public Debt Management Agency (together called the ‘Financial Regulators’). When in place, it will replace a plethora of existing laws and attempt to bring coherence and efficiency to financial regulation in India.

The Competition Act, 2002 (‘Competition Act’) currently allows sectoral regulators to make references to the CCI on competition law issues and vice versa. Furthering this theme of inter-regulator cooperation, the Draft 2015 Code seeks to impose an obligation on the CCI to make a reference to the Financial Regulator, albeit as a nonvoting participant, when it undertakes any proceedings under the Competition Act where at least one of the parties is a financial services provider. In such cases, the Financial Regulator would be entitled to nominate a member or senior official to attend CCI proceedings. On the other hand, under the Draft 2015 Code, the Financial Regulator would be obligated to make a reference to the CCI to report any conduct of a financial service provider which it believes to be in violation of the Competition Act.

However, the Draft 2015 Code goes further and empowers the CCI to intervene in the issuance of any regulations, guidance or codes proposed by the Financial Regulators, if it feels they will, or are likely to, create any restriction or distortion of competition in the market for financial products or financial services (‘Negative Effect’). The CCI may comment even when the Negative Effect has been created on account of ‘a feature or combination of features of a market that could be dealt with by regulatory provisions or practices’. ‘Features of a market’ include both the structure of the market for financial products/ services as well as the conduct of financial service providers and/or consumers (even if this conduct is not in the market for the concerned financial product/services).

However, the CCI’s powers, as envisaged under the Draft 2015 Code, do not stop at the provision of commentary alone. The Financial Regulator in question is also required to respond to the CCI outlining what action it proposes to take to address the concerns raised by the CCI or provide reasons if it is not adopting any such actions. Nonetheless, if the CCI continues to remain of the opinion that a Negative Effect is/will be created, the CCI may issue binding directions to the Financial Regulator requiring it to take particular actions to remedy the same. These binding directions would need to be submitted to the Central Government and receive parliamentary approval. While the intention behind the Draft 2015 Code may have been to advance and nurture free and fair competition in the market for financial services and products it does raise certain fundamental issues which need closer scrutiny.

Vast increase in the powers of the CCI – While the requirement of parliamentary approval of any binding directions by the CCI does signal an acknowledgment by the FSLRC that these powers should be exercised sparingly by the CCI; given the absence of any specific guidelines to this effect, the end result could be a vast increase in the CCI’s powers. This could result in significant distortion of the boundaries between sectoral regulators and the CCI, particularly when the Financial Regulators are trying to address distinct structural and/or conduct related issues in the market.

CCI review of policy decisions in the financial services/products market – The CCI is a pan-sectoral regulator with the mandate to promote competition across all markets in India. However, the Draft 2015 Code empowers the CCI to influence policy decisions of the Financial Regulators if it is of the opinion that these decisions cause a Negative Effect in the market. While Financial Regulators focus on correcting specific issues in the markets for financial services/products, the CCI’s intervention could alter the focus of the policy actions in question.

Intervention in proceedings before the CCI – As mentioned earlier, any proceeding under the Competition Act where at least one of the parties is a financial services provider, the Financial Regulator would be entitled to nominate a member or senior official to attend the CCI’s proceedings, albeit as a non-voting participant. Such a nomination mechanism appears to be a reasonable way to lend sectoral expertise to the CCI’s proceedings, but the extent to which the said nominee may participate in the proceedings is not clear. Even without a vote, any active intervention by the nominee could influence the proceedings. This is especially so in cases where a Financial Regulator is a party to the proceeding., This provision may create due process issues that could effect enforcement under the Competition Act since the procedural guidelines on the conduct of nominees during the CCI’s proceedings are pending and unclear.

Competition regulators in other jurisdictions have not been granted similar powers of review and oversight into the financial sector. Whilst the Draft 2015 Code is a positive step towards harmonising various financial norms and regulators, it could blur the line between the mandates of financial and competition regulators. Comprehensive guidelines that delineate the extent of CCI oversight on the market for financial services and products in India, as distinct from its own mandate under the Competition Act could bring welcome clarity. Equally, some clarity on the role and participation of other stakeholders in CCI proceedings is also needed.

Treatment of Capital Expenditure on Assets Not Owned by the Company

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Sometimes, circumstances force an entity to incur capital expenditure which is not represented by any specific or tangible assets. For example, an entity may agree with a local authority to pay the cost or part of the cost of roads to be built by the authority. In this case also, the roads will remain the property of the Municipal body. Whether such expenditure should be capitalised or not, is a matter of debate and the solution will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Consider two scenario’s as given below. The discussion is based on Indian GAAP, but would be equally relevant for Ind-AS purposes as well.

Scenario 1
The Company had to incur expenditure on the construction/ development of certain assets, like electricity transmission lines, railway sidings, roads, culverts, bridges, etc. (hereinafter referred to as enabling assets) for setting up a new refinery. This was required in order to facilitate construction of project and subsequently to facilitate its operations. The ownership of these enabling assets does not vest with the company. The moot question is whether such expenditure can be capitalised or has to be charged to the profit and loss account immediately. This question was raised in 2011 with the Expert Advisory Committee (EAC), and its view and the basis of conclusion was as follows:

View of EAC along with the basis of conclusion [published in CA Journal January 2011]

The expenditure on enabling assets should be expensed by way of charge to the profit and loss account of the period in which the same is incurred. As per the Committee, an expenditure incurred by an enterprise can be recognised as an asset only if it is a resource controlled by an enterprise. For example, the entity having control of an asset can exchange it for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners.

Further, an indicator of control of an item of fixed asset would be that the entity can restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from that asset. In the given case the entity does not have control over the enabling assets and should therefore charge the same as an expense in the profit and loss account.

Author’s comments

In the author’s view, there is sufficient justification in existing literature to support capitalisation of the enabling assets as part of the overall cost of the refinery. This is discussed below.

As per paragraph 9.1 of AS-10, “The cost of an item of fixed asset comprises its purchase price, including import duties and other non-refundable taxes or levies and any directly attributable cost of bringing the asset to its working condition for its intended use; any trade discounts and rebates are deducted in arriving at the purchase price. Examples of directly attributable costs are: (a) site preparation; (b) initial delivery and handling costs; (c) installation cost, such as special foundations for plant; and (d) professional fees, for example fees of architects and engineers. Further paragraph 10.1 states, “Included in the gross book value are costs of construction that relate directly to the specific asset and costs that are attributable to the construction activity in general and can be allocated to the specific asset.”

Paragraph 8 of AS-16 states, “The borrowing costs that are directly attributable to the acquisition, construction or production of a qualifying asset are those borrowing costs that would have been avoided if the expenditure on the qualifying asset had not been made. When an enterprise borrows funds specifically for the purpose of obtaining a particular qualifying asset, the borrowing costs that directly relate to that qualifying asset can be readily identified.” In the given case, the costs incurred on the enabling assets is directly related to the construction of the refinery. The expenses on the enabling assets are required solely for the purpose of bringing the refinery to its working condition for its intended use. For example, without the electricity transmission lines, the refinery will not be ready for its intended purpose.

Interestingly, the EAC [Volume 24 – Query no. 9] had dealt with a similar issue in 2004 with regards to the expenditure incurred on the catchment area of a hydroelectric power project. In the said matter, a dam was being constructed across a river for the purpose of creation of a reservoir so that water is stored and used for the purpose of generating electricity. The reservoir is dependent upon the catchment area for water. Continuous soil erosion results in sedimentation, and reduces the capacity of the reservoir and efficiency of the project (emphasised). Substantial expenditure was incurred towards extensive catchment area treatment measures. In the said matter, EAC opined that the expenditure on the catchment area treatment is capitalised with the cost of the dam. For determining which expenditure is directly attributable to bring the asset to its working condition for its intended use, factors such as whether the concerned expenditure directly benefits or is related to that asset may be considered. In other words, there has to be some nexus between the expenditure and the benefit/relationship with the asset.

The ‘unit of account’ (should not be confused with component accounting) concept is another interesting concept in accounting. Under this concept, it would be argued that what is being constructed is the refinery, and not the roads, culverts, etc. which are all required to construct the refinery. The enabling assets are required not for their own individual purposes but for the purposes of the refinery. The expenditure on the enabling assets is required as part of the cost of constructing the refinery. Therefore the entire project cost including those incurred on the enabling assets will be captured as cost of constructing the refinery. Once that is done, the refinery itself will be bifurcated into various components, so that component accounting can be applied.

In the EAC opinion it is argued that, the entity having control of an asset can exchange it for other assets, employ it to produce goods or services, charge a price for others to use it, use it to settle liabilities, hold it, or distribute it to owners. Further, an indicator of control of an item of fixed asset would be that the entity can restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from that asset. Unfortunately, the argument presupposes the refinery and enabling assets as separate unit of accounts (should not be confused with component accounting). In the author’s view, the unit of account or the asset under construction is the refinery (and not the enabling assets), and all the costs (including on the enabling assets) are related to constructing the refinery. The entity has control over the refinery and restrict the access of others to the benefits derived from the refinery. Thus by looking at the refinery as the unit of account, it is argued that all expenses directly related to constructing the refinery (including costs on enabling assets) should be capitalised.

The EAC opinion will have significant implications for a lot of companies that are in the process of constructing huge projects. In light of the various submissions above, the EAC may reconsider its position. The author is aware that this gap is likely to be plugged in the revised AS 10 under Indian GAAP.

Scenario 2
A mining company has to transport coal through road transport to the nearest railway siding which is around 40 k.m. away from the mines. The existing two lane road is also extensively used by local villagers causing inconvenience, traffic jams and accidents due to which blockage of roads and delay in delivery is a common phenomena. Hence, there was a business necessity and compulsion to widen this road to liquidate the coal stock and to maintain continuity of production. To find a solution to the management problem of transporting the coal, the company widened the two lane road to four lane. The road belongs to and is owned by the State Government. The question is whether expenses incurred for widening of two lanes road to four lanes which is not owned by the company can be recognised as intangible asset.

The appropriate standard would be AS 26 Intangible Assets. As per paragraph 14 of AS 26, an enterprise controls an asset if the enterprise has the power to obtain the future economic benefits flowing from the underlying resource and also can restrict the access of others to those benefits. From the facts of the case neither the land to be acquired for widening the road nor the road will be the property of the company. These will remain the property of the State Government. Further, it is noted that the nearby villagers will also be beneficiaries. From this, it appears that although the work of widening the road will facilitate unrestricted movement of coal for the company, the company does not enjoy control in terms of restriction of access of others to the benefits arising from the widened road facility. Therefore, one may argue that the ex penditure incurred on widening and construction of road on the land which is not owned by the company does not meet the definitions of the terms ‘asset’ and ‘intangible asset’. Accordingly, some may argue that such expenditure cannot be capitalised as an intangible asset.

However the author believes, similar to Scenario 1, the unit of account is not the road but the mine. Hence the above argument of control is not a valid argument. Nonetheless, this fact pattern is different from the one in Scenario 1. In Scenario 1, the expenditure was incurred for and incidental to the construction of an asset (the refinery). The company controls the refinery and hence the capital expenditure including the incidental expenditure incurred for construction should be capitalised as cost of refinery. In Scenario 2, no new asset is created and the expenditure incurred on widening the lane is with respect to an already functioning mine. Paragraph 60 of AS 26 is relevant here, which states “Subsequent expenditure on a recognised intangible asset is recognised as an expense if the expenditure is required to maintain the asset at its originally assessed standard of performance.” This is a matter of judgement. The company should carefully evaluate whether the expenditure incurred on widening the road has increased the originally assessed standard of performance of the mine. If for example, substantially more coal can be produced and transported, because transportation bottlenecks have been removed, one may argue that the originally assessed standard of performance of the mine is increased, and therefore the cost of widening the road will be capitalised as an intangible asset. One will have to make this assessment very carefully.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 415 (Delhi) Pepsico India Housing (P.) Ltd. v ACIT A.Ys.: 2002-03. Date of Order: 22.12.2015

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Section 92C of the Act – if taxpayer has exported goods to AE at cost and AE, in turn, has sold them at its purchase price, the transaction meets arm’s length standard, ALP adjustment addition is not justified.

Facts
The taxpayer was an Indian company and a membercompany of Pepsico Group. During the relevant assessment year, the taxpayer had exported certain goods, which, based on the functions performed by the taxpayer, could be classified in two categories. In respect of the first category of goods, the taxpayer performed all the functions and undertook risks similar to that of a normal trader in ordinary course of business. In respect of second category of goods, the taxpayer acted as mere facilitator and performed the function of a service provider. The taxpayer grouped all the exports together and benchmarked them.

According to the taxpayer, it enjoyed Star Export House status. To retain it, it had to export certain minimum value of goods. The sellers and the prices of the goods that it exported were finalized by the buyers and the taxpayer acted as mere facilitator. Hence, it exported the goods at the same price at which it purchased them. The loss incurred by it was due to forex rate fluctuations.

In his report, the Transfer Pricing officer (TPO) observed that: the taxpayer had incurred losses by exporting the goods to its AE at the same price at which it purchased; the taxpayer had not even recovered cost incurred on storage, transportation and interest; as per OECD transfer pricing guidelines, two or more transactions can be aggregated only if they are closely interlinked or continuous or form one integral whole and cannot be analysed separately.

The TPO further observed that not recovering remuneration from AE amounts to shifting of profits and, there was no justification for the taxpayer to undertake forex risk. Therefore, TPO determined the ALP and the adjustment to the income of the taxpayer.

Held

It was an admitted fact that the loss incurred by the taxpayer was only on account of foreign exchange fluctuation as the commodities were sold to the AE at the same rate at which these were purchased from the local market.

On a similar issue, in DCIT vs. Global Vantedge P Ltd4 (ITA Nos. 1432 & 2321/ Del/2009 and 116/Del/2011) the ITAT held that ALP adjustment cannot exceed  the amount received by the AE from the customer and the actual value of international transactions (i.e. the amount received by the taxpayer in respect of international transactions).

In the present case, the taxpayer had sold goods to AE at the same price at which they were purchased from the local market. The AE, in turn, had sold them to the customers at the same price at which they were purchased from the taxpayer.

Hence, the international transactions with AE met the arm’s length standard. Therefore, addition on account of arm’s length price of international transactions was not justified.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 247 (AAR – New Delhi) Cummins Ltd. Date of Order: 12.01.2016

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Article 13 of India-UK DTAA – Fee for supply management service was neither Fee for Technical Services (FTS) nor royalties in terms of Article 13 of India-UK DTAA – not taxable in India in absence of Permanent Establishment (PE) in India.

Facts
The applicant was a company incorporated in the UK. An Indian company (“IndCo”) was engaged in the production of turbochargers. IndCo purchased turbocharger components directly from suppliers in UK and US. The applicant had entered into Material Suppliers Management Service Agreement with IndCo. In terms of the Agreement, IndCo paid supply management service fee @5% of the base prices of the suppliers to the applicant.

The issues before the AAR were:
(i) Whether supply management service fee was FTS or royalties in terms of Article 13 of India-UK DTAA ?

(ii) Depending on answer to (i), as the applicant did not have PE in India, whether the payments were chargeable to tax in India?

(iii) If supply management service fee was not chargeable to tax in India, whether they were subject to transfer pricing provisions under the Act?

(iv) Depending on answer to (i) and (ii), whether IndCo was liable to withhold tax on supply management service fees?

Held

IndCo engaged the applicant only to ensure market competitive pricing from the suppliers. The applicant maintained contract supply agreement with suppliers after identifying the products availability, capacity to produce and competitive pricing. The applicant did not impart its technical knowledge and expertise to IndCo which enabled it to acquire such skills and use them in future. Therefore, the services did not satisfy the ‘make available’ condition under India-UK DTAA .

Relying on the decisions in De Beers India Minerals Private Ltd. (346 ITR 467) and Measurement Technologies Limited (AAR No.966 of 2010), services in the nature of procurement services can never be classified as technical or consultancy in nature and they do not make available any technical knowledge, experience, know-how etc.

The services rendered in this case were managerial in nature. With effect from 11th February, 1994, managerial services were taken out from the ambit of FTS under India-UK DTAA and ‘make available’ clause was inserted. This clearly showed the intention to exclude managerial services and include ‘make available’ requirement.

As the services were related to identification of products and competitive pricing and not to the use of, or the right to use any copyright, patent, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process etc., they cannot qualify as royalties under Article 13 of India-UK DTAA .

Since the applicant had no PE in India, service fee was not chargeable to tax in India and hence, IndCo was not liable to withhold taxes.

PS: AAR held that the issue whether transfer pricing provisions applies is not applicable.

TS-10-ITAT-2016(Mum) Accordis Beheer B V vs. DIT A.Ys.: 2006-07. Date of Order: 13.01.2016

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Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA); Section 112 of the Act – Buy-back of shares under a scheme of arrangement was not “reorganisation” as contemplated in Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA, transfer did not qualify for participation exemption; however, the transfer qualified for concessional rate u/s. 112 of the Act

Facts
The taxpayer was a resident of Netherlands. It held 38.24% of shares of an Indian company (“IndCo”) whose shares were listed on Indian stock exchanges. During the relevant year, IndCo proposed a scheme of arrangement for buy-back of its shares. The said scheme was approved by the jurisdictional High Court. The taxpayer tendered all the shares held by it and received consideration resulting in capital gains. The taxpayer contended that in terms of Article 13(5)3 of India-Netherlands DTAA , the capital gains were not chargeable to tax in India.

According to the Tax Authority, since the taxpayer sold its shares to IndCo, which was an Indian resident, capital gain did not qualify for participation exemption under Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA . Further, according to him the concessional rate of 10% provided in the second proviso to section 112 of the Act was not applicable in case of the taxpayer and hence levied tax on capital gain @20%.

The moot point before the Tribunal was whether the shares tendered in the scheme by the taxpayer constituted “reorganisation” in terms of Article 13(5) of India-Netherlands DTAA .

Held
As regards whether buy-back is “reorganisation”

Since the scheme was approved by High Court, there was no colourable device.

Reorganisation should involve major change in financial structure of a corporation, resulting in alteration in rights and interests of security holders. In the present case, upon implementation of the scheme there was no change in the rights and interests of the shareholders. Only change was that pursuant to reduction of share capital the percentage of shareholding of the promoter group had gone up. That cannot be considered as change in the rights and interests of shareholders.

The reorganisation contemplated in section 390 of the Companies Act 1956 consists of either consolidation of shares of different classes, or division of shares into different classes, or both.

Transfer of shares pursuant to a buy-back scheme could not fall under the ambit of the term “reorganisation” since the objective of the scheme was not financial restructuring, but providing exit to non-resident shareholders.

As regards rate of tax

Having regard to the decisions in Cairn U.K. Holdings Ltd. (2013)(359 ITR 268)(Del) and ADIT vs. Abbott Capital India Ltd. (65 SOT 121)(Mum Trib), the taxpayer is entitled to the concessional rate of 10% under section 112 of the Act.

[2015] 64 taxmann.com 162 (AAR – New Delhi) Satyam Computer Services Ltd Date of Order: 01.12.2015

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Sections 9, 195 of the Act – Payment of penalty decreed by Foreign Court, being payment to Government, not subject to tax and hence, will not be subject to tax withholding under the Act.

Facts
The applicant was an Indian company. The shares of the Applicant were listed on Indian stock exchanges. The Applicant had also issued American depository shares which were listed on New York Stock Exchange. SEC of USA had filed complaint with US Court for violation of American Securities Law by the Applicant. The Applicant filed its consent and undertaking with SEC without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint and agreed to pay penalty. The US Court levied civil penalty on the Applicant. The Court further decreed that “amount ordered to be paid as civil penalties pursuant to this Judgment shall be treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes”.

The AAR examined the issue whether penalty payable pursuant to decree of US Court, which was paid to US Court/Government of USA was liable to tax withholding under the Act.

Held
Penalty pursuant to the decree of Court will not be subject to tax liability. Consequently, question of tax withholding u/s. 195 of the Act will not arise.

[2016] 65 taxmann.com 246 (AAR – New Delhi) Aberdeen Claims Administration Inc. Date of Order: 19.01.2016

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Sections – 4, 5, 9, 45, 48 of the Act –Settlement amounts received by FIIs pursuant to waiver of right to sue for damages caused by fraud in financial statements was compensation for not pursuing the suit and involved surrender of capital asset (viz., “right to sue”); though it was a capital receipt, as the computation provisions failed, capital gains could not be calculated; hence, it was not taxable as capital gains.

Facts
Several FIIs were holding American depository shares and equity shares of an Indian listed company (“IndCo”). There was public disclosure by the CEO of the Indian company about manipulation of financial results of IndCo. As a result, the price of securities of IndCo dropped steeply and the FIIs were forced to dispose of the securities, suffering huge losses. Several investors initiated class action litigation against IndCo. While initially claims of FIIs were also consolidated with those of the other investors, subsequently, the FIIs filed request for exclusion with the Court. The FIIs then separately negotiated the terms of settlement with IndCo and its auditors pursuant to which IndCo and its auditors agreed to pay settlement amount to FIIs.

The issue before the AAR was whether the settlement amount received by FIIs from IndCo and its auditors was taxable in terms of the Act.

The FIIs contended as follows.

As regards sections 4, 5 & 9 of the Act

Since the settlement amounts were not received in the ordinary course of business of the Applicant, and the Applicant is not engaged in the business of suing and seeking settlement from third parties, they would not qualify as “income” for the purposes of the Act.

Since section 9 of the Act refers to only specific streams of income the settlement amounts cannot be said to be deemed to accrue or arise in India in terms thereof.

The settlement amounts were linked to a law suit that arose outside India and was not determined on the basis of value of the underlying shares of IndCo. The suit was linked to allegation of fraud/negligence. The settlement amounts were not sourced in India. Hence, the territorial nexus principle was not fulfilled. This was established from the fact that the FIIs had sold the shares prior to initiation of the action.

Therefore, the settlement amounts cannot be brought to tax u/s. 9 read with Section 4 and Section 5 of the Act. This is on the basis that the settlement amounts were not connected with the Applicant’s business in India but for release of claims of FIIs against IndCo and its auditors. Therefore, the settlement amounts have no territorial nexus with India.

As regards section 45 of the Act
The settlement amounts were received on account of destruction of capital assets (i.e. the right to sue IndCo and its auditors).

Assuming that the settlement amounts were subject to Section 45 of the Act cost of acquisition and cost of improvement of a right to sue cannot be computed. Hence, owing to failure of computation mechanism no Capital Gains could arise under Section 48 and Section 55 (3) of the Act2.

The settlement amounts were received as compensation for the injury inflicted on capital asset of the trading (Equity and ADS shares held FIIs) and therefore not subject to Section 45 of the Act.

A ‘right to sue’ is property (and thus Capital Asset as defined under Section 2 (14) of the Act). Inherently, as a matter of public policy, a ‘right to sue’ is not transferable. Thus, there cannot be any transfer of a right to sue under Indian law. Consequently, any capital receipt arising from a right to sue cannot be considered capital gains u/s. 45 of the Act. The Gujarat High Court has accepted this proposition in Baroda Cement and Chemicals vs. C.I.T. (158 ITR 636). Also, in Vania Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. C.I.T. (191 ITR 647), the Supreme Court has laid down that receipt on account of destruction of capital assets is not subject to capital gains.

The tax authority contended as follows.
The FIIs were pass-through entities engaged in the business of trading in securities and the loss was incurred by them in the course of that business. The recipients of the settlement amounts were the FIIs (and not participating investors) who were in the business of purchase and sale of securities.

Unlike an investor, Mutual Funds change their portfolios frequently and sometimes prefer even booking losses. The FIIs decide to move out of a market on local as well as international factors. The buying and selling of shares is done very regularly and frequently. These are characteristics of a trader and not of an investor. Merely because in order to attract investments the Government has decided to treat the gains of FIIs as capital gains, the same does not alter the basic character of the activity but only changes the matter of taxability.

Any fall in price of share cannot be regarded as destruction of asset. Rise and fall in prices of securities, be it for one reason or the other, is a normal business incidence and neither the rise in price creates an asset nor the fall in price destroys an asset. Capital receipt arises only when receipt is for destruction of the profit making apparatus or crippling of the recipient’s profitmaking apparatus. However, when the structure of the recipient’s business is so fashioned as to absorb the shock as one of the normal incidents of business activity the compensation received is no more than a surrogatum for the future profits surrendered. Hence, it should be treated as a revenue receipt and not a capital receipt.

The settlement amounts received were not for relinquishment or extinguishment of the right to sue but as a compensation for the loss of potential income suffered in the course of their business operations.

Held

In Union of India vs. Raman Iron Foundry, AIR 1974 SC 265, the Supreme Court has held that the only right which the party aggrieved by the breach of the contract has, is the right to sue for damages, which is not an actionable claim and it is amply clear from the amendment in section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, which provides that a mere right to sue for damages cannot be transferred.

However, in CIT vs. Mrs Grace Collis and other 2001 248 ITR 323, the Supreme Court has held that the expression “extinguishment of any rights therein” does include the extinguishment of rights in a capital asset independent of and otherwise than on account of transfer. Hence, the right to sue can be considered for the purpose of capital gains u/s. 45 of the Act.

In CIT vs. B.C. Srinivasa Setty (1981 128 ITR 294), the Supreme Court has held that the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code and a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply was not intended to fall within the charging section. It was further held that none of the provisions pertaining to the head ‘capital gains’ suggests that they include an asset in the acquisition of which no cost of acquisition at all can be conceived. It is clear that if right to sue is considered as a capital asset covered under the definition of transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Act, its cost of acquisition cannot be determined. In the absence of such cost of acquisition, the computation provisions failed and capital gains cannot be calculated. Therefore, right to sue cannot be subjected to income tax under the head ‘capital gains’.

Since the settlement amounts have been received against surrender of right to sue, it cannot be considered for the purpose of capital gains u/s. 45 of the Incometax Act.

The settled legal position is that FIIs are not engaged in trading business. The facts also show that the shares were purchased as investors and not as traders and in the books of accounts also they were treated as capital investment.

While the settlement amounts were relatable to shares (i.e., if shares would not have been purchased the question of class action or right to sue would not have arisen), they were received not as part of business profit or to compensate the future income but as a result of surrender of the claim against IndCo and its auditors. Hence, even in accordance with the principle of surrogatum, such amounts were not assessable as income because they did not replace any business income.

Decoding Residence Rule through not so rhyming POEM – How Melodious is the Indian POEM – an Analysis

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“Residence” is one of the primary factors to fasten the tax liability
on any tax payer in a country, be it an individual, a company or any
other entity. Determination of a residential status of an assessee
assumes significant importance in international taxation. Elaborate
rules are prescribed in tax laws of every country and/ or in tax
treaties prevalent worldwide. One of such rules for residence of
companies accepted and followed worldwide is that of Place of Effective
Management. Finance Act, 2015 amended Section 6(3)(ii) of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 dealing with Residence of companies from the “Control and
Management Principle” to the “Place of Effective Management” (POEM).
POEM is dealt with by both, the OECD and UN in their Model Commentaries.
In December 2015, CBDT came out with Draft Guidelines on determination
of POEM for a Company. This write-up highlights crucial aspects
regarding determination of residential status of a company taking into
account the concept of POEM.

Backdrop
Corporate
Residency has been one of the most important issues across the world.
With businesses moving across countries and with digital economy being
the flavour of the 21st century, countries are in a tiff to make sure
that they don’t lose their pie of taxes. The steps taken by the G20
Nations to prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) are in this
direction. In case of multinational companies, the structures adopted
are such that it becomes difficult to ascertain where its control and
management are situated. Countries worldwide have introduced various
concepts like POEM, Place of Management (POM), Control and Management (C
& M), Central Control & Management etc. to ascertain the
residency based on overall control and management of the company.

Concept of Corporate Residency before the Amendment

As
per Section 6(3) of the Act before the Amendment, the Income-tax law
was as under – “A company is said to be resident in India in any
previous year, if –

(i) It is an Indian company; or
(ii) During that year, the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly in India.” (Emphasis Supplied)

Hence,
a foreign company was treated as resident only if the control and
management of its affairs were situated wholly in India during that
year. It meant, even if a part of control was outside India, the company
was not regarded as resident and hence, it was subjected to tax only on
income sourced in India.

In the erstwhile definition it was
easy for a foreign company (which was controlled and managed from India)
to avoid Indian taxes on global income by artificially shifting/
retaining part of its C & M outside India. Typically, resident
Indians who have set up overseas companies could use the erstwhile
definition to their advantage.

It may be noted that the term
“Control and Management” was not defined in the Act. However, in general
parlance, it was understood that control and management did not mean
conducting day to day management of the company, but it referred to the
head and brain of the company that take major decisions for effective
functioning and managing of the company.

C & M being not
defined in the Act was a major bone of contention between the taxpayers
and revenue authorities. Let us look at some of the judicial rulings on
the interpretation of C & M:

C & M as per Indian Courts
In
Subbayya Chettiar (HUF) vs. CIT (19 ITR 168) (SC) Honourable Supreme
Court observed that C&M signifies the controlling and directive
power, the head and brain; and “situated” implies the functioning of
such power at a particular place with some degree of permanence.

In Narottam & Pereira Ltd. (23 ITR 454),
the Bombay High Court held that Control of a business does not
necessarily mean the carrying on of the business, and therefore, the
place where trading activities or physical operations are carried on is
not necessarily the place of control and Management. The High Court
disregarded the presence of strong manager overseas in favour of
controlling directors being situated in India. It was held that the
direction, management and control, ‘the head, seat and directing power’
of a company’s affair is situated at the place where the directors’
meetings are held and consequently, a company would be resident in India
if the meetings of directors who manage and control the business are
held in India.

In the case of Radha Rani Holdings (P) Ltd. [2007] 16 SOT 495 (Del),
it is provided that the situs of the Board of Directors of the company
and the place where the Board actually meets for the purpose of
determination of the key issues relating to the company, would be
relevant in determining the place of control and management of a
company1.

The meaning of the expression ‘control and management’
as used in section 6(3) (ii) of the Act was the subject matter of
judicial interpretation in the past. The legal position is well-settled
that the expression “control and management” means the place where the
‘head and brain’ of the company is situated and not the place where the
day-today business is conducted.

Professor Klaus Vogel, in his treatise, has observed that what is decisive is not the place where the management directives
take effect, but rather the place where they are given (Klaus Vogel on
Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd Edition, Para 105 on page 262). Thus,
it is “planning” and not “execution” which is decisive.

Finance Act – 2015 and Explanatory Memorandum on POEM

In
order to protect its tax base and to align provisions of the Act with
the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA s) entered into by India
with other countries, the concept of POEM was introduced vide amendment
to Section 6(3)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’).

According
to the amended definition, a company would be resident in India if it
is incorporated in India or its ‘place of effective management’ (POEM),
in that year, is situated in India.

POEM has been defined to
mean a place where key management and commercial decisions that are
necessary for the conduct of the business of an entity as a whole are,
in substance made.

The said amendment has significant impact
on various foreign companies incorporated by Indian MNC’s for Outbound
Investments and business operations outside India.

POEM and its Implications

Some
questions which may come to readers’ mind are (i) whether POEM is
different from the concept of C & M and if yes, how? (ii) What is
the impact of such difference? Before answering these questions, let us
analyse the definition of POEM in detail. We may compare and contrast
the concept of C & M while dissecting the definition of POEM.

POEM as defined by the Finance Act, 2015 has four limbs as follows:-

  • Key Managerial and Commercial decisions
  • Necessary for the Conduct of Business
  • Of an entity as a whole
  • in substance made.

Important
Factors relevant to POEM in India 1) Place where Board Meetings are
held O ne of the primary factors which may lead to effective management
rests with the place where the board meetings are held. Key Managerial
and Commercial Decisions are always meant to be understood as strategic
ones taken by the highest authority of the company. The Board of every
company is considered to be the head and brain of the company. However,
mere holding of board meetings might not hold ground if decisions are
made/taken at some other place. C & M Many courts have ruled that
one of the most important factors to determine C & M of a company is
where its head and brain i.e. Board of Directors is situated. Thus
location of board and decisions taken by them was crucial even for
determination of C & M as it is in the case of POEM.

2) Key Managerial and Commercial Decisions:-

The
intention of the legislation becomes clear from the word “key” inserted
in the definition of POEM. It implies that the decisions should be more
of strategic and should be above the day to day operational decisions.
It tries to distinguish the secretarial decisions taken at the board
meetings.

Similar was the stand in determination of C & M.

3) Operational management vs. broader top level management

The
decisions taken by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating
Officer might be managerial and commercial in nature but may not always
“key” in nature. For example, procurement of goods from vendors,
inventory management, offers and discounts for increase in sales etc.
would be classified as managerial and commercial decisions but not
strategic in nature. Such decisions might not be relevant for the
determination of POEM.

However, the decisions of opening a
new branch or launching of a new product, pricing policies, expansion of
the current facilities etc. which would have significant impact on the
business and on the company as a whole might be taken by the Board or
the Top Management of the Company. Such decisions would be more relevant
in establishing POEM.

All these factors are/were relevant in the determination of C & M as well.

4) Other relevant factors

There
are other relevant factors in the determination of POEM. They are the
place where the accounting records are maintained; the Place of
incorporation of the company; the primary residence of the directors of
the company, the details of the stewardship functions by the parent
company etc. The parent company should restrict itself from actual
running of the subsidiary. The guidance or influence of the parent
company should be limited.

All these factors are/were relevant in the determination of C & M as well.

From
the above discussion, one may conclude that POEM is a fact and
circumstance specific concept and hence, all relevant facts and
circumstances must be examined on case by case basis. POEM refers to
comprehensive control over the entity as a whole during the year and is
not the same thing as a part of the control of the entity residing in
India for the whole of the year. It may be possible that a MNC has a
flat structure and shared powers or large scale autonomy in the
organisation where there could be more than one place where C & M
are situated. However, when one looks at the Company as a whole (which
is the requirement under POEM) then, one would be able to narrow down
POEM to one place/country.

OECD/UN perspective on POEM

The
OECD Model Commentary2 states that “The place of effective management
is the place where key management and commercial decisions that are
necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business are in substance
made. The place of effective management will ordinarily be the place
where the most senior person or group or persons (for example Board of
Directors) make its decisions, the place where the actions to be taken
by the entity as a whole are determined”.

According to the UN Model Commentary in determining the POEM, the relevant factors are as follows:–

(i) the place where a company is actually managed and controlled;

(ii)
the place where the decision-making at the highest level on the
important policies essential for the management of the company takes
place;

(iii) the place that plays a leading part in the management of a company from an economic and functional point of view; and

(iv) the place where the most important accounting books are kept.

To summarise, the criteria generally adopted to identify POEM are:

– Where the head and the brain is situated.
– Where defacto control is exercised and not where the formal power of control exists.
– Where top level management is situated.
– Where business operations are carried out.
– Where directors reside.
– Where the entity is incorporated
– Where shareholders make key management & commercial decisions.

Different Shades of POEM, POM and PCMC

POEM
is interpreted differently by different countries. Countries like
China, Italy, South Africa, Russia etc. have adopted the concept of POEM
in their Domestic tax laws. However, countries like The U.K.,
Australia, Germany etc. although do not have the concept of POEM but
they have adopted the concept of ‘Central Management’ and ‘Control or Place of Management
and control as residence test for companies in their Statutes. Further,
POEM has been interpreted by countries in their own ways. This
interpretation can be observed from the reservations and observations of
various countries to the OECD Commentary.

BEPS and POEM
Final
Report of OECD on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), [Action
Point 6 on “preventing the granting on treaty benefits in inappropriate
circumstances”] prefers that in case of Tie-breaker for the
determination of treaty residence of a person other than individual, be
done by the Competent Authorities of respective states.

Draft Guidelines by CBDT on POEM

The
CBDT released draft guidelines for determination of POEM of a Company
on 23rd December 2015. A brief summary of the principles enumerated in
the draft guidelines is as follows –

POEM adopts the concept of substance over form.

The Company may have more than one place of management but it can have only one POEM at any point of time.

Residential
status of a person under the Act is determined every year. Accordingly,
for the purpose of the Act, POEM must be determined on year to year
basis. The determination would be based on facts and circumstances of
each case.

The
process of determining the POEM would primarily be based on whether a
company is engaged in ‘active business’ outside India or otherwise.

For
this purpose, a company shall be said to be engaged in ‘active
business’ outside India if all of the above conditions are satisfied –

For this purpose, an average of the data of the current financial year and two years prior shall be taken into account.

POEM guidelines for companies engaged in active business outside India:

The
POEM of a company engaged in active business outside India shall be
presumed to be outside India if the majority of meetings of the
company’s Board of Directors (BOD) are held outside India.

However,
in case the Board of Directors are standing aside and not exercising
its powers of management and such powers are being exercised by the
holding company or by any other persons resident in India, the POEM
would be considered to be in India.

Issues: Indian
Guidelines provide both objective and subjective criteria. On the one
hand it provides to look at the objective criteria for operations of
business such as earnings, assets, employee base, etc. (see the diagram)
while on the other hand, it also looks at actual control &
Management by BOD. Worldwide only control & management criteria
(decision making by BOD) are used. Indian Provisions for POEM are a
departure from International practice in that sense. POEM guidelines for
companies other than those engaged in active business outside India For
companies other than those engaged in active business outside India
(i.e. passive business), determining the POEM would be a two-stage
process:

First stage would be identifying/ascertaining person or
persons who are making the key management and commercial decisions for
conducting the company’s business as a whole.

Second stage would be the place where these decisions are being made.

Thus,
the place where management decisions are taken would be more important
than the place where the decisions are implemented. Some guiding
principles for determining the POEM are as follows:

Location where the company’s Board regularly meets and makes decisions can be the POEM of the company, provided the Board:

• retains and exercises its authority to govern the company; and

• in substance, makes key management and commercial decisions necessary for the conduct of the company’s business as a whole.


However, mere holding of a formal Board meeting would not be
conclusive. If key decisions by the directors are taken at a place which
is different from the location of the Board meetings, then such place
would be relevant for POEM.

A company may delegate (either
through board resolution or by conduct) some or all authority to
executive committee consisting of key senior management. In these
situations, location of the key senior managers and the place where such
people develop policies and make decisions will be considered as POEM.

The location of the head office
will be very important in considering the POEM because it often
reflects the place where key decisions are made. The following points
need to be considered for determining the location of the head office:


The place where the company’s senior management (which may include the
Managing Director, Whole Time Director, CEO, CFO, COO, etc.) and support
staff are located and that which is considered as the company’s
principal place of business or headquarters would be considered as the
head office.

• If the company is decentralised, then the
company’s head office would be the location where senior managers are
predominantly based or normally return to, following travel to other
locations, or meet when formulating or deciding key strategies and
polices for the company as a whole.

• In cases where the senior
management participates in meetings via telephone or video conferencing,
the head office would be the location where the highest management and
their direct support staff are located.

• In cases where the
company is so decentralised that it is not possible to determine its
head office, then the same may not be considered for determining the
POEM.

• Day-to-day routine operational decisions undertaken by
junior/middle management would not be relevant for determining the POEM.

• In the present age, where physical presence is no longer
required for taking key management decisions, the place where the
majority of the directors/ persons taking the decisions usually reside
would be considered for the POEM.

• If the above guidelines do
not lead to clear identification of the POEM, then the place where the
main and substantial activity of the company is carried out or place
where accounting records of the company are kept would be considered.

POEM to be a fact-based exercise: Examples of isolated instances would not necessarily lead to POEM

Issues:
If
a MNC holds its one of the Global Board Meetings in India, where
significant decisions are taken for its worldwide operations say group
policies are framed – can it lead to POEM? Perhaps not, being isolated
or one of its kind of meetings.

Place where accounting records
are kept may be considered for determination of POEM. This may lead to a
practical problem. What if mirror accounts are kept at two places?

Merely keeping accounting records should not lead to establishment of POEM.

Passive
Income: – Trading with a group company is considered as passive income.
When Transfer Pricing Regulations are in place this kind of provision
is uncalled for.

Objective and Subjective Criteria: – Ultimately
nothing seems to be clear. Each provision is with a caveat leaving to
lot of subjectivity and powers to Assessing Officers.

Local
Management: – It is provided that place of local management may not lead
to POEM but what is ‘local management’ is not defined.

As POEM
is sought to be clarified by way of guidelines, a moot question arises
whether guidelines be binding or override the provisions of law? In
fact, it is provided in the guidelines that they are neither binding on
the Income-tax department nor on the taxpayers. In such an event, what
is the sanctity of such guidelines?

Some Silver Linings

A
foreign company being completely owned by an Indian company would not
necessarily lead to POEM in India (Example – TATA Motors owning Jaguar
PLC).

One or some of the directors of a foreign company residing in India would not necessarily lead to POEM in India.

Local management of the foreign company situated in India would not be conclusive evidence for establishing the POEM in India.

Mere
existence in India of support functions that are preparatory or
auxiliary in nature would not be conclusive evidence for establishing
the POEM in India.

Other key points of the Guidelines

Guidelines
provide that the principles enumerated in the guidelines are only for
the purpose of guidance. In such cases, no single principle will be
decisive in itself.

POEM to be a fact-based exercise – a
‘snapshot’ approach cannot be adopted and activities are to be seen over
a period of time and not at a particular time.

In case the POEM is in India as well as outside India, POEM shall be presumed to be in India if it is mainly/ predominantly in India.

Prior
approval of higher tax authorities would be required by the tax officer
in case he proposes to hold a foreign company as resident in India
based on its POEM. The taxpayer must be given the opportunity to be
heard.

Does Guidelines on POEM sound similar to CFC Rules?

POEM, a step closer to CFC rules
Various
efforts have been undertaken by the Government of India to simplify the
Income-tax law in India5. The Finance Minister Shri Arun Jaitley at the
time of scrapping the Direct Tax Code (DTC) had mentioned that there is
no need of introducing DTC. Suitable amendments to the Income-tax law
would be made for the purpose of simplification.

The erstwhile
DTC contained the ‘Controlled Foreign Corporation’ Rules (CFC rules).
CFC rules, in principle, targets the offshore entities which are used to
park income in low or NIL tax jurisdictions. Similarly, POEM too tries
to achieve a similar objective. The guidelines defining ‘active business
outside India’ and ‘passive income’ are akin to provisions or
objectives of CFC Rules. No country in the world has such conditions for
determination of POEM which tries to achieve dual purposes.

Comments on the draft POEM Guidelines

Arbitrary use of powers

POEM, as a provision in the law specifically targets the unacceptable
tax avoidance structure(s). The use of shell/conduit companies is
discouraged. Considering subjectivity involved while determining POEM,
the draft guidelines are issued to narrow down its wide scope. However,
it has been specified that the guidelines are not binding on tax
authorities nor it is binding on the taxpayers. In such a case
guidelines are infructuous. Tax payers may fear that the provisions of
POEM may be applied harshly and interpreted in the widest possible sense
in favour of revenue.

Residency assumed, unless proved otherwise?
– The draft guidelines in current form seem to suggest that it’s assumed that you are resident barring a few exceptions.
– The wide subjectivity of guidelines can hamper Indian Entrepreneurship in the long run.
– Subsidiaries of Indian MNC’s particularly wholly owned subsidiaries
outside India would be facing an uphill task of establishing that the
POEM is not in India.
– The definition of passive income seems to be very wide and hamper genuine business transactions.

Whether the guidelines would have a retrospect effect??

Considering the wide scope of POEM, it was mentioned in the Explanatory
Memorandum of the Finance Act 2015 that the guiding principles would be
followed soon. However, it is unfortunate that the guiding principles
(in a draft format) have been issued at the fag end of the Financial
Year. In such cases, a question arises that whether these principles
would be applicable with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2015? The
answer seems to be “yes” as these are merely guidelines and not the law.
There is no question of retrospective effect. In fact what guidelines
say is supposed to be followed by companies in the normal course.

Summation
For
the purpose of determining POEM, it is the de facto control and
management and not merely power to control which must be checked. In the
redefined corporate tax residency regime of the domestic tax law (in
line with international principles), place of effective management has
become one of the relevant factors for the purpose of determining
residential status of a company. In such a scenario, the company would
be deemed to be resident of the Contracting State from where it is
effectively controlled and managed. The draft guidelines leave much to
the discretion of the Income-tax Authorities. We hope that the tax au
thorities are made accountable for their actions and certain fundamental
binding principles are laid down so that unnecessary litigation is
avoided. It is expected that the final guidelines will be modified and
litigation prone issues would be addressed. It would be interesting to
see how the Government and Income-tax authorities would view or evaluate
structures of various companies going forward. Prudence suggests that
applicability must be postponed for at least one year so that
unnecessary hardships to tax payers can be avoided. Further, this would
give an opportunity for hygienic check to taxpayers for their outbound
structures.

Sales made to Diplomatic Authorities etc.

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No.VAT.1515/C.R.102/Taxation-dated 15.1.2016

The Government of Maharashtra has amended Notification issued for the grant of refund of tax collected by any registered dealer on his sales made to the diplomatic authorities or international bodies or organisations.

Amendment in Schedule A

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No.VAT.1515/CR-169/Taxation-1 dated 2.1.2016

Maharashtra Government has amended Schedule A by inserting Entry 12B to exempt drugs and medical equipments used in dialysis for treatment of patients suffering from kidney disease as may be notified from time to time by the state government in the official gazette with effect from 2.1.2016.

2016 (42) STR 247 (All.) Prosper Build Home Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India

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Department cannot initiate proceedings for recovery of disputed dues without adjudication.

Facts
The petitioner admitted liability of service tax on specified transactions during the recording of statement. Consequently, the petitioner was arrested for non-deposit of service tax vide section 89(1)(d) of the Finance Act, 1994 i.e. for failure to deposit service tax collected beyond a period of six months from the due date. After the due process of prosecution, bail was granted and an interim order was passed directing a deposit of 25% of entire outstanding. On obtaining legal advice post prosecution it was known that service tax was not liable on material supplied free of cost. The said fact was represented to the department. However, ignoring the submissions and on the basis of statements recorded, department started adopting coercive methods to recover disputed dues. Therefore the present writ petition is filed objecting recovery of service tax by department without formal adjudication u/s. 73 of the Finance Act, 1994. The revenue contended that the matter is still under investigation and the process to issue SCN was under contemplation.

Held
The High Court held that since there was no assessment order against the petitioner, he cannot be forced to pay an amount merely because he admitted the service tax liability in statements recorded. Department has the liberty to initiate appropriate action for recovery only after service tax liability is confirmed vide adjudication order and is not deposited. In case the petitioner misuses or does not comply with the terms of bail order or interim order, department can apply for cancellation of the bail order or vacation of the interim order.

[2016-TIOL-1105-CESTAT-HYD] Commissioner C& CE & ST, Hyderabad vs. State Bank of Hyderabad

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When excess payment made is not in dispute, denial of adjustment against subsequent liability on a mere procedural lapse and strict interpretation is not justified.

Facts
The Assessee made an excess payment of service tax in the month of October 2007, June and September, 2008 and adjusted the same in the months of April, July and October 2008 without following the procedure provided under Rule 6(4A) and 6(4B) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The department contended that since the amount was adjusted suo-motto without intimating and being in excess of the prescribed limit, the same was recoverable with interest and penalties. Commissioner (Appeals) dropped the demand and the Revenue is in Appeal.

Held

The Tribunal noted the undisputed fact of excess payment of service tax which is required to be adjusted against the liability for subsequent period. It was held that Rule 6(1A) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 provides for adjustment of service tax paid in advance. Similarly Rule 6(3) of the said rules cannot be given a narrow interpretation of adjustment only at the time of refund to the client. Thus non-observance of a procedure is only technical lapse and therefore condonable. It was further held that refund can be claimed of the excess paid in which case interest is also payable to the assessee. When one opts for adjustment so as to eliminate the hassles of refund by foregoing the interest, strict interpretation and denying adjustment would result in unjust enrichment of the revenue which can never be the intention of the Rule.

[2016-TIOL-947-CESTAT-MUM] M/s Electronica Finance Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune-III

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In case of a Hire-Purchase contract the taxable event is the date of entering into the contract, installment payments are only obligations of the hirer.

Facts
The Appellant is engaged in lease financial business and has discharged service tax at the applicable rate prevailing on the date of entering into the hire purchase agreement. The department contends that service tax is payable at the rate prevalent when the lease rental is being paid and accordingly there is a demand for the differential service tax liability. It was argued that service tax liability is factored in the EMI that is fixed for their client and therefore the applicable rate is the rate prevailing on the date of the agreement only.

Held
The Tribunal relied upon the decision in the case of Art Leasing Ltd vs. CCE [2007 (8) STR 162 wherein it is held that the installment payments are only obligations of the hirer whereas the taxable event occurs when the contract is entered into. Therefore the contention that service is continued to be provided during the payment of installments is not correct. Accordingly it was held that rate of service tax will be the rate prevalent on the date of contract and the demand for differential liability is set aside.

(Note: The ratio of the aforesaid decision may be applied to the applicability of Rule 5 of the Point of Taxation Rules, 2011 wherein, in case of new services and new levies where the payment is received after the applicability of the new levy, the new rate is made applicable. As per the aforesaid decision, if the taxable event occurs prior to the applicability of the new levy, new rate cannot be made applicable merely because the payment is received later.)

[2016-TIOL-1035-CESTAT-HYD] M/s Aster Pvt. Ltd vs. CC & CE, Hyderabad-III

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II. Tribunal

Failure to intimate the department under Rule 6(3A) of the CENVAT Credit Rules is a mere procedural lapse and denial of benefit of proportionate reversal of credit is not justified.

Facts
The Appellant is a manufacturer availing the benefit of Notification No. 6/2006-CE and clearing goods at a NIL rate of duty. A show cause notice was issued demanding 10%/5% of the value of exempted goods under Rule 6(3)(i) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (CCR) on the contention that common inputs and input services were used in the manufacture of exempted and dutiable goods and no separate accounts were maintained. It was argued that assessees not maintaining separate accounts have two options under the CCR i.e. either pay 5% or 10% of the value of exempted goods or do a proportionate reversal of CENVAT credit on inputs and input services attributable to manufacture of exempted goods as per the formula prescribed under Rule 6(3A) of CCR. The second option being beneficial was chosen and credit was reversed. The department argued that no intimation was provided as required under Rule 6(3A) of the CCR and therefore they were bound to pay as per the first option.

Held
The Tribunal observed that sub-rule 6(3) provides for two options and it was noted that Rule 6(3A) of the CCR did not provide that failure to intimate would make the assessee lose the choice of a proportionate reversal of credit. It was held that failure to intimate would not automatically result in application of Rule 6(3)(i) and such a procedural lapse was condonable and denial of a substantive right was unjustified. Further the revenue’s plea of remanding the matter was also rejected on the ground that the amount of credit proportionately reversed along with interest formed a part of the reply to the show cause notice and the same was never disputed.

(Note: Readers may note that Notification No. 13/2016-CE(N.T) has inserted a new sub-rule (3AA) in the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 effective from 01/04/2016 providing that on failure to exercise the option under sub-rule 6(3) and follow the procedure provided under sub-rule 6(3A), the Central Excise officer may allow the assessee to follow the procedure and pay the proportionate amount on payment of interest @ 15% from the due date of payment, till the date of payment thereof. Accordingly intimation to the department now appears mandatory.)

2016 (42) S.T.R. 6 (Kar.) C.C.E. & S.T. vs. Mangalore Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd.

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The Court is bound by an earlier decision of its co-ordinate Bench even if such decision was not challenged by Revenue due to its policy decision

Facts
Facts In a dispute relating to availment of CENVAT credit on certain services, the Respondent assessee relied on the earlier judgement of co-ordinate Bench of the Court which upheld the availability of credit. The department contended that since the amount involved in the said judgement was below the monetary ceiling prescribed, no appeal was filed against it. Therefore the said judgement has no value of precedence and the Court should decide the present dispute afresh.

Held
The Court rejected the argument of the department and held that a decision attains finality in absence of any challenge before higher Court. Reason for nonchallenging has no relevance and accordingly dismissed the appeal filed.

[2016] 68 taxmann.com 180 (Madras HC) – Eveready Industries India Ltd. vs. CESTAT

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Once refund is granted under section 11B, it cannot be said to be “erroneous refund” in terms of section 11A of Central Excise Act and recourse available for recovery of such refund is only by way of following procedure laid down in section 35E of the Act and not section 11A.

Facts
The final assessment was completed and refund was determined. The assessee filed application for refund but was granted refund under section 11B only for part of the amount. However, thereafter, by invoking section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the very same Assistant Commissioner, who sanctioned refund earlier, issued Show Cause Notice followed by order directing recovery of refund sanctioned. This order for recovery of refund was confirmed by Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal. Before the High Court, it was contended that refund application is allowed under section 11B and department has not followed procedure laid down by section 35E (2) of Central Excise Act, 1944 therefore it is not open for department to take recourse u/s. 11A. The department contended that where there is erroneous refund, the same can always be recovered by initiating proceedings u/s. 11A without taking recourse to section 35E.

Held

The High Court held that a careful look at the scheme of sections 11A, 11B and 35E would show that an application for refund is not to be dealt with merely as an administrative act. Section 11B is a complete code in itself. Hence, power exercised u/s. 11B is that of an adjudicating authority and order passed is certainly one of adjudication. Therefore, it must be presumed that before according sanction for refund, an adjudicating authority had actually followed the procedure under section 11B and passed an order of adjudication. Section 11A(1) prescribes the procedure for recovery of any duty of excise, which is erroneously refunded. The power u/s. 35E is not actually to correct any error directly on the part of an adjudicating authority. This power is available only for directing the competent authority to take the matter to the Commissioner (Appeals).

Hon’ble High Court made reference to its own judgment in case of Madurai Power Corpn. vs. Dy. CCE 2008 (229) ELT 521, where Court had occasion to consider interplay between section 11A and section 35E of Central Excise Act, 1944. It held that no one can have a quarrel with the proposition that sections 35E and 11A operate in different fields and are invoked for different purposes. However if the department’s interpretation of section 11A is accepted, it would lead to a situation of recognizing power of recovery in a subordinate authority when refund is already granted by a superior authority after adjudication, which is obviously not the legislative intent. It was held that harmonious reading of provisions of sections 11A and 35E indicates that section 11A does not contemplate overriding section 35E. Hence once refund application is allowed u/s. 11B, such refund cannot be said to be erroneous refund in terms of section 11A (1). The recourse available for recovery of refund sanctioned in terms of section 11B is therefore to follow procedure laid down in section 35E and not section 11A.

[2016] 68 taxmann.com 156 (Madras HC) – S. L. Lumax Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai-IV Commissionerate

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Benefit of CENVAT credit cannot be denied to assessee once the depreciation mistakenly claimed under income tax law on same duty component is given up by assessee. Tribunal cannot modify the Order-in-Original to the extent it is not appealed by the department before Commissioner (Appeals).

Facts
Appellant utilised MODVAT credit of duty paid on import of machinery in 1999 and also claimed depreciation in respect of same duty component in their income tax returns for that year and subsequent years. After detection of this mistake in 2002, all income tax returns were revised but for one year in which the time limit for filing of revised return had expired. Therefore, in the said year, a rectification application was made u/s. 154 of the Income Tax Act along with revised computation and depreciation claim was given up. Income Tax Department accepted the revised return for other years, but rejected the rectification application. The attempt of filing a rectification application was allowed by Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals) on 30/04/2005, but on further appeals by aggrieved parties, it failed upto the Supreme Court. In the proceedings under central excise law, show cause notice was issued denying claim of MODVAT credit. However, in the Order-in-Original, it was held that they would be eligible for credit after the date of acceptance of withdrawal of depreciation by the department i.e. filing of revised return or as the case may be date of order of Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals) accepting the claim for rectification application u/s. 154 (30/04/2005) and ordered recovery of credit accordingly. No appeal was preferred by the Excise Authorities against the said Order-in-Original. However, against the recovery of MODVAT credit, appellant filed the appeal. The appeal was allowed by Commissioner (Appeals), but department preferred an appeal before Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the department’s appeal and restored the Order-in-Original and also modified the portion by which assessee was held as entitled to CENVAT credit from 30/04/2005. The Appellant preferred appeal before High Court raising a substantial question of law as to whether the Tribunal was justified in restoring Order-In-Original directing recovery of MODVAT credit by disregarding the admitted fact that claim for depreciation was given up under income tax law.

Held
Hon’ble High Court observed that the appellant started up with a claim for two benefits and ended up losing both the benefits. It is only after the detection by the department, an attempt was made to withdraw one of the two benefits. The mistake was explained on the ground that its head office and factory are located in different States. It was held that once the claim for depreciation under Income Tax Act was given up, the benefit of MODVAT credit cannot be denied. It further held that order of Tribunal modifying the Order-in-Original to the extent it allowed credit after 30/04/2005 is also not correct as the said order was not appealed against by the department before Commissioner (Appeals). As regards the year in which appellant gave up depreciation but lost legal battle with Income Tax Department, the Original Authority is directed to work out the amount of depreciation given up for the purpose of finding out the extent to which benefit is available.

[2016] 68 taxmann.com 286 (Kerala HC) – Kanjirappilly Amusement Park & Hotels (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of India.

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Removal of sub-clause (j) of section 66D i.e. Negative List resulting in levy of service tax on “access to amusement facilities and admission to entertainment events” does not amount to parliament encroaching upon Entry 62 of List II of Constitution.

Facts
The issue before the High Court was whether the removal of “admission and access to entertainment event and amusement facilities” [section 66D(j) of the Finance Act, 1994] from the Negative List of ‘Services’ by an amendment made by Finance Act 2015 and the consequent levy of service tax on such activity would result in the Union Parliament trenching upon the exclusive field assigned to the State, under Entry 62 List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. It was argued that resort to the residuary entry can be had only when it is found that the object of tax is not available in any of the other entries in List II and List III. Further there can be no service element found, since what the petitioners offer is amusement and entertainment and what the recipients get is also amusement and entertainment, which clearly is covered by Entry 62. Under Kerala Local Authorities Entertainments Tax Act, 1961 the levy of tax is with reference to the price for admission to any entertainment at the prescribed rates. The measure applicable to amusement parks is also provided based on the investment and area in which such park is situated at the rates fixed by the local authority within the range of rates provided in the table. Hence the activity is already taxed by the States. Further before legislative competence of the Parliament can be traced to the residuary entry, the legislative incompetence of the State Legislature has to be clearly established. The Petitioners broadly relied upon the following decisions:

a. Single Judge of this Court in Kerala Classified Hotels & Resorts Association vs. Union of India [2013] 35 taxmann.com 568 (Ker.), which was affirmed by a Division Bench in Union of India vs. Kerala Bar Hotels Association [2014] 51 taxmann.com 365 (Ker.).

b. Decision of the High Court of Madras in Mediaone Global Entertainment vs. Chief CCE [2013] 36 taxmann.com 57. The respondents sought dismissal of the writ petitions on the ground of “aspect theory” and there being two distinguishable aspects involved, one the services offered by the petitioners and the other the amusements and entertainments enjoyed by the entrants.

Held

The fact that admission/access to entertainment events and amusement facilities are included in the negative list itself is a pointer that the same partakes a service and the Parliament initially exempted it from the levy. When it is argued that the amusement and entertainment is offered, the corollary is that what is offered for amusement for a fee is essentially a service offered for consideration. There is also definitely an element of service in providing a facility, which would result in the enjoyment of an activity capable of being termed as an amusement or entertainment for a fee. Union Parliament therefore has the legislative competence to tax the aspect of service in an amusement park. The argument that the field being entirely occupied by Entry 62 List II, as the Entertainments Tax Act of the State provides a measure of tax based on the investment made and the area covered; which takes in the entire facilities offered and the same having been taxed by the State and therefore there could be no further tax levied on the service i.e. the provision of such facilities, was not accepted by the Court. Relying upon State of W.B. vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd. [2004] 10 SCC 201, the Court held that the Courts have been cautioned not to mix up the object of taxation and the measure employed. Further Relying upon All-India Federation of Tax Practitioners vs. Union of India [2007] 7 SCC 527 and Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India vs. UOI [1989] 46 Taxman 47 (SC,) the Court held that the Supreme Court has time and again, after the Finance Act, 1994 came into force, upheld the tax levied on ‘services’ as being available to the Parliament under the residuary clause. In such circumstances, it cannot at all be said that the field is entirely covered by Entry 62 List II. Amusements are covered by Entry 62 List II and the aspect of ‘service’ involved when the facilities for amusement are offered for a price cannot be ignored. The Decision of Single Bench and Division Bench in the case of Kerala Classified Hotels & Resorts Association (supra) to the extent they dealt with constitutional validity of service tax on supply of food in restaurant by way of service in the context of Article 366(29A)(f) was distinguished on the ground that there is no question of a deeming provision being employed in the present case. Also the Court did not concur with Madras High Court to the extent it expressed a view in Mediaone Global Entertainment’s case (supra) that what is not taxable under section 66B is “tax on admission to entertainment events or access to amusement facilities”, the reason being, “tax on admission or entry of such events is covered in the State List, which is subjected to Entertainment Tax”. In this regard the Court held that Parliament is quite aware of their power. This is because even dehors inclusion in the Negative List the Parliament would not be able to trench upon the field specifically set apart for the States under List II. Therefore, the Negative List also did not refer to ‘amusement’ but tax on admission on entry of such events quite understanding the power to levy service tax on such facilities offered by one to another for a consideration. However, the High Court refrained from referring the matter to a Division Bench on the ground that the issue dealt with in the said case and in the instant cases is on different subjects and distinct transactions.

Note:
In Godfrey Philips India Ltd., the Apex Court held that luxuries is an activity of enjoyment. It further held that tax on luxury could only be levied on an activity and cannot be on goods or items of luxury. ‘Service’ also refers to “an activity”. In the present case also, the High Court expressed a view that ‘amusements’ refer to ‘activities’. However, apparently it did not examine the proposition as to whether, activities of amusement can be said to fall under Entry 62 List II, on the same reasoning as given by Supreme Court in Godfrey’s case, stating that no such ground was raised before it.

[2016-TIOL-824-HC-MAD-ST] N Bala Baskar vs. Union of India and Others

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I. High Court

The service receiver to whom the burden of tax is ultimately passed on is not entitled to challenge the levy as the liability is imposed on the service provider. Further in case of a joint development agreement, the land owner and the third parties avail of construction services from the builder.

Facts
The petitioner has entered into a joint development agreement with one of the Respondents for the property owned by him and his siblings for construction of a Residential Complex. 65% of the built up area is to be handed over to the petitioner against conveyance of 35% of undivided share of land. In terms of the agreement, the builder viz. one of the respondents issued a letter demanding service tax and VAT. A writ petition is filed challenging the payment of service tax on a mere exchange of property and the provisions of section 66B and 66E(b) of the Finance Act, 1994 and thereafter the prayer was modified to challenge only the circular No 151/2/2012 dated 10/02/2012 and the recommendations of the TRU dated 20/01/2016.

Held
The Hon. High Court held that the writ petition is not maintainable as the law makes the service provider liable to pay service tax and it is open for him to either pass on the burden or not. After having entered into an agreement for development and accepting the burden of service tax to the extent liable, the petitioner cannot now challenge the circulars imposing an obligation upon persons who have entered into such contracts. If the person to whom the burden is ultimately passed is allowed to challenge a levy, the same will lead to a disastrous consequence considering the number of consumers. Further it was also noted that the agreement for development gave rise to a bouquet of rights for the builder, one was construction of an area, a part of which could be sold to third parties along with undivided share of land. The petitioner did not stand on a different footing than those persons except that the consideration was paid in the form of undivided share of land and not by cash and therefore the petition was dismissed.

“Glass wall” vis-à-vis Construction Contract

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 Introduction

Under Sales Tax Laws, there are certain
provisions whereby a dealer can discharge his tax liability by way of a
simple method, called ‘composition scheme’, instead of the regular
method of working out liability to pay tax. Such ‘composition scheme/s’
are normally designed for smooth sailing, particularly in relation to
works contracts.

However, sometimes a method, which looks simple
and easy, may become very heavy and burdensome, just because of its
interpretation. Dealer/s opting for compositions scheme/s have to be
very careful. One recent judgment on interpretation of a ‘construction
contract’ may be an example.

Construction Contract

Under
erstwhile Maharashtra Works Contract Act,1989, a composition scheme of
5% was announced for ‘Construction Contract/s’. In other words, if the
contract executed by the contractor was covered by a notified
construction contract, then the contractor could adopt this composition
scheme, attracting a composition rate of 5%.

Notification

The
relevant notification, notifying ‘construction contract’ under Works
Contract Act, was dated 8.3.2000, which is reproduced below for ready
reference:

“Notification No.WCA -25.00/C.R.-39/Taxation-1 dated the 8 th March,2000.

In
exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 6A of
the Maharashtra Sales Tax on the Transfer of Property in Goods involved
in the Execution of Works Contracts (Re-enacted) Act, 1989 (Mah.XXXVI of
1989), the Government of Maharashtra hereby notifies the following
contracts to be the construction contracts for the purpose of
sub-section (1) of the said section 6A, namely: –

A. Contracts for construction of –

 (1)
Building, (2) Roads, (3) Runways, (4) Bridges, Flyover bridges, Railway
overbridges, (5) Dams, (6) Tunnels, (7) Canals, (8) Barrages, (9)
diversions, (10) Rail tracks, (11) Causeways, Subways, Spillways, (12)
Water supply schemes, (13) Sewerage Works, (14) Drainage works, (15)
Swimming pools, (16) Water purification plants.

B. Any
contract incidental or ancillary to the contracts mentioned in paragraph
A above, if such contracts are awarded and executed before the
completion of the said contracts mentioned in A above.”

A look
at the above notification shows that two categories of transactions were
covered by above notification. One category was Part (A), which was
relating to main activity of construction, and, the other category i.e.
Part (B) covered incidental contracts to above main contract, subject to
the condition that they should be executed prior to completion of main
contract.

Controversy in case of Permasteelisa (India) Pvt. Ltd. (Sales Tax Reference No.55 of 2014 dated 6.5.2016) (BHC)

The facts leading to above judgment are noted by the Hon. High Court in para (4) of judgment as under:

“4
The Applicant is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956. It is also a registered dealer under the MVAT Act.
The Applicant is engaged in activity of fixation of glass walls. It is
the case of the Applicant that these glass walls also known as curtain
walls are used in the construction of modern buildings. These glass
walls are permanent walls and are constructed instead of usual brick
walls. In the modern age of architecture these glass walls have replaced
the traditional brick walls and many buildings are constructed and
developed using glass walls. If the glass walls are erected for a
building, then brick walls are not required as these glass walls have
all the characteristics of traditional brick walls as a result of which
there are modern high rise buildings and skyscrapers. In applying the
rates as applicable under the Work Contracts Act, the Applicant has
relied upon the Notification dated 8 March 2000 in terms of which
certain contracts specified therein are identified as construction
contract eligible for beneficial rate of tax. According to the
Applicant, the activities it undertakes are in respect of construction
contracts or contracts incidental or ancillary to the construction
contracts as set out in the Notification dated 8 March 2000 and it has
raised invoices and filed returns accordingly.”

Contention of dealer

As
the Maharashtra Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, held that the activity
undertaken by the dealer did not fall within the said notification of
‘construction contract’, the dealer preferred a reference to Bombay High
Court and submitted that the glass walls are replacing traditional
bricks walls.

The arguments were two fold. One, it was a
contract for construction of building covered by Part A. In the
alternative, it was argued that it was covered by Part B as an
incidental contract. The meaning of ‘building’ in Development Control
Regulation for Greater Mumbai,1991 (DCR) was cited. Further literature
was submitted explaining the “glass walls” concept. On behalf of
department the submission was that the contract for glass walls was
neither a building construction contract nor incidental contract.

Observation of High Court

Hon. High Court referred to the contract terms for given transaction. In para 12 the Hon. High Court observed as under.

“12.
We are of the view that the contracts for construction of glass walls
executed by the Applicant would not constitute ‘contracts for
construction of buildings’ as mentioned in paragraph ‘A’ of the
Notification dated 8 March 2000 nor would they constitute contracts
incidental or ancillary to any contract as mentioned in paragraph ‘B’ of
the Notification dated 8 March 2000 issued under section 6A(I) of the
Works Contract Act and would not be covered by the said Notification. In
the judgment and order dated 9 July 2010 of the Tribunal in Second
Appeal No.106 of 2007, the case of the Applicant is interalia recorded.
In paragraph 3 it is stated as follows: “…

The work is carried out as under:

“i) Contract for structural glazing is entered into on completion of foundation and plinth.

ii) O n signing of the contracts intensive planning and designing is undertaken by Architect and Structural Engineers.

 iii) A luminum, silicon and glass of the desired prescription is ordered.

iv) U pon completion of 5th Slab, structural glazing commences from the bottom i.e. first slab.

v) Structural glazing gets completed along with concrete construction.

vi) I nstead of convention brick wall, glass walls are used.

vii)
Structural glazing of the building is something without `brick walls’.
Instead of “brick wall” a “glass wall” is constructed.

It is
further recorded in paragraph 4 that in respect of the assessment, the
Applicant’s case was that it had undertaken the contract of fabrication
and erection of structural glazing works and the work of aluminum
glazing contract would qualify as a construction contract made for
building liable to composition rate of tax. Being aggrieved by the
Assessment Order passed by the Sales Tax Officer, the Applicant had
filed an Appeal before the Deputy Sales Tax Commissioner (Appeals) and
in the order dated 1 November 2006, the Commissioner of Sales Tax
(Appeals) has recorded that the Applicant contended that “he is a dealer
dealing in structural glazing aluminum cladding, doors and windows and
doors of buildings in Corporate Offices.”

After referring to
further judgments cited and an order of Advance Ruling in Karnataka on
the very same activity, in para 17 the Hon. High Court concluded its
decision as under:

“17 The fabricated structural glazings
prepared by the Applicant are transported to the site by the Applicant
and affixed on the exterior portion of the building, which building is
constructed by the building contractor who is a third party. There is no
dispute that Applicant is not a building contractor, in that, it is not
in the business of construction and erection of buildings. The activity
of affixing glass and erecting glass walls with aluminium frame work
requires an altogether different expertise, and is ordinarily
sub-contracted by the building contractor. The contention that some of
the walls in the building are not required to be constructed by laying
bricks and they are substituted by affixing the glass would not carry
the case of the Applicant further. We are also unable to accept the
contention that the work of the Applicant would be covered under the
term “incidental or ancillary activity to the construction of the
building” as that would have to have a direct nexus to the construction
of the building itself. Therefore, the alternative argument that the
contract would get covered by paragraph B of the said Notification which
includes incidental or ancillary contract to the contract of
construction also cannot be accepted. What meaning is to be attached to
the word “building” as mentioned in the Notification would have to be
determined considering the facts and circumstances of each case. In our
view, the reliance on the definition of ‘building’ in the Regulation
2(3)(11) of DCR is misplaced and would not assist the Applicant in any
manner. That definition is in the context and purposes of DCR and cannot
be imported and applied in the facts and circumstances of the present
case.”

The Hon. High Court has rejected the plea of the dealer about its contract being covered by category of Construction contract.

Conclusion

While
effecting the transaction, a dealer contemplates liability by making
reference to available provisions. The composition schemes are meant for
easy method of working of tax liability on works contracts. The dealer
may not be seeking any tax saving, but basically looks at an easy and
smooth method of working.

Under above circumstances, if the
dealer is caught in litigation in regard to interpretation litigation,
it may cost him heavily as the tax liability may exceed even his profit
margin.

It is pertinent to note that under present MVAT Act also
there is almost a similar notification for ‘construction contracts’.
Dealers will have to interpret its scope in terms of this judgment. It
may be suggested that the Government should clarify the scope of such
notifications in more specific terms so that dealers (contractors) can
compute their liability with certainty.

WITHDRAWAL OF AN APPEAL

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Right of Appeal

It has been clearly laid down by the Apex Court from time to time that the right of appeal is a matter of substantive right and this right becomes vested in a party when the proceedings are first initiated, even before a decision is given in the matter. Such a right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment.

In this regard, some judicial considerations are as under :

  • In Janaradan Reddy vs. The State, AIR 1951 SC 124 and in Ganpat Rai vs. Agarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd, AIR 1952 SC 409, Supreme Court upheld the principle that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure but it is a matter of substantive right.
  • An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention is clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication [Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Limited vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others (1983) 13 ELT 1277 (SC)].
  • At various instances different courts including the Apex Court has decided that if the right of appeal is vested and the assessee chooses not to exercise that right and later on files a special leave petition, then in such a case the authority may refuse to undertake the matter and reject the case and instruct the assessee to proceed only through the appeal route [Alembic Glass Industries Ltd. vs. UOI (1998) 97 ELT 28 (SC)]
  • Right of appeal is creature of the statute and can never be termed as an inherent right. Example of inherent right is filing a suit provided the same is not barred by limitation. Appeal right is conferred by the statute but one thing important here is that while conferring the right of appeal, the statute may impose certain restrictions such as limitation or pre – deposit of penalty or limiting the area of appeal to questions of law etc. Such limitations as specified in the statute shall be strictly followed [Raj Kumar Shivhare vs. Asstt. Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2010) 253 ELT 3 (SC)] ? R ight of appeal is a substantive right that is provided by the statute and it automatically vests in the aggrieved party. Therefore all the rights it carries with it that in itself means that such a right cannot be negated or taken away. [CCE & CU vs. Met India Ltd. (2010) 20 STR 560 (GUJ)]
  • Though right of appeal is statutory right under the Central Excise Act 1944 but it is not an absolute right and hence is bound by the provisions of section 35F. [Vibha Fluid Systems Engineering Pvt. Ltd. vs. UOI (2013) 287 ELT 29 (GUJ)]

The result of an appeal filed by an aggrieved person can be:

  • Affirmed: where the reviewing court agrees with the result of the lower court’s ruling(s) or
  • Reversed: Where the reviewing court disagrees with the result of the lower court’s rulings(s), and overturns their decision or
  • Remanded: where the reviewing court sends the case back to the lower court.

Can an appeal once filed be withdrawn?

Though, it is generally well settled that right of appeal by an aggrieved person is to be construed liberally, there is very limited clarity on the issue as to whether an appeal once filed by an aggrieved person can be withdrawn.

Neither the Central Excise Act 1944 / Customs Act, 1962 / Finance Act, 1994 nor the Rules made under therespective statutes nor the CEGAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 contain any specific provision to permit an aggrieved person to withdraw his appeal, either with the permission of the appellate authority or without such permission. This issue becomes very important inasmuch appellate authorities are vested with powers of enhancement of demands and hence usually due caution is exercised by appellate authorities while entertaining such requests, from aggrieved persons.

One would wonder as to why an aggrieved person would want to withdraw an appeal after it is filed. Some examples / situations are given hereafter for ease of understanding:

a) Cases where there are mistakes apparent for record in an order passed by adjudicating authority / appellate authority against which an application for rectification is filed but the same is not disposed off. Hence, an appeal is filed, to protect the interest of the aggrieved person. Subsequent to the filing of appeal, relief is granted in rectification.

b) A services exporter has substantial unutilised CENVAT credit and is uncertain as to its utilisation against service tax payable on taxable services that may be provided in future. Hence, refund for unutilised CENVAT credit is applied for, which is rejected. In order to protect his interest, an appeal is filed. However, subsequent to the filing of appeal, the said services exporter has local transactions where service tax is payable. Issues arise in such cases as to whether an appeal filed can be withdrawn and service tax payable on local transactions be set off against unutilised CENVAT credit.

Some Judicial Considerations under Indirect Taxes

  • When this question came up in Mahindra Mills Ltd. vs. CCE (1987) 31 ELT 295 (Special Bench – New Delhi),] the Tribunal held that while the parties have no absolute right of withdrawal of the appeal, the request therefor was being allowed in the circumstances of that case.
  • When a similar request came from the appellant in another case (after considerable arguments had been heard for the appellant) a majority of the members held in the case of MRF Ltd vs. CCE (1987) 32 ELT 588 (Special Bench – New Delhi) that in the circumstances of that case the request for withdrawal must be declined, while the minority opinion was that it may be granted.
  • In a later decision in Jenson and Nicholson (India) Ltd. vs. CCE (1989) 41 ELT 665 (Special Bench – New Delhi), the Tribunal held that the powers of the Appellate Tribunal are similar to the powers of an Appellate Court in the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence the Tribunal has the right (though under no specified rule) to grant permission to the appellant to withdraw his appeal. [in this regard reliance was placed on Hukumchand Mills vs. IT Commissioner Bombay – AIR 1967 SC 455 and New India Life Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. IT Commissioner, Bombay – AIR 1958 Bombay 143].
  • The facts in Ramakrishnan Steel Industries Ltd. vs. Superintendent – (1993) 66 ELT 563 (MAD) were rather unusual. When the appeal by the department before the Tribunal was pending the department intimated the assessee that it had been decided to withdraw the appeal and directing the assessee to pay in accordance with the order of the Collector (Appeals) against which order the appeal to the Tribunal had been preferred by the department. The assessee duly complied and intimated the Tribunal also of the same and intimated they have no objection to the appeal being allowed to be withdrawn. But somehow the department had failed to intimate the Tribunal of its decision to withdraw the appeal. Hence, the Tribunal decided the appeal on merits by allowing the appeal of the department. The High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal holding that the decision to withdraw the appeal having been taken by the authority who had earlier ordered the filing of the appeal, the department was stopped from going back on the decision to withdraw when the assessee had, in pursuance of the communication, taken the necessary action to comply with the request therein about payment of duty.
  • In Ralson Carbon vs. CCE (1999) 108 ELT 608 (CEGAT – New Delhi) the Tribunal permitted withdrawal on the basis of declaration under Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme (KVSS).

A peculiar situation arose for consideration in Shiv Herbal Research Lab. P. Ltd vs. CCE & CU (2002) 139 ELT 133 (Tri – Mumbai). In that said case the appellant intimated the Tribunal that they had filed a declaration under KVSS and the appeal may be treated as withdrawn. Accordingly the Tribunal permitted withdrawal of the appeal. Evidently the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. Later the appellant applied for restoration of the appeal pointing out that “an order u/s. 90(4) of the Finance Act 1998 for full and final settlement under the KVSS has not been passed”. The Tribunal declined to restore the appeal though the factual situation of certificate u/s. 90(2) not having been issued does not appear to have been controverter or disbelieved.

Judicial Considerations under Income Tax
In respect of proceedings under the Income Tax Act, it was held by the Supreme Court, in CIT vs. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria (1967) 66 ITR 433 (SC) that an appellant having once filed an appeal, cannot withdraw the same. In fact the Calcutta High Court held in Bhartia Steel and Engineering Co. P. Ltd. vs. ITO (1974) 97 ITR 154 (CAL) that even if the Tribunal had dismissed an appeal as withdrawn, the said order would be a nullity as having been passed without jurisdiction and the appeal will have to be treated as pending.

Conclusion

In the absence of specific provisions for withdrawal of an appeal under the Indirect Tax Laws (Service tax, Central Excise & Customs), practical issues / difficulties are faced by aggrieved persons, in particular. This issue needs to be addressed through amendments, in the Indirect Tax statutes / CESTAT (Procedures) Rules, 1982, as considered appropriate.

Income Tax Officer vs. Kondal Reddy Mandal Reddy ITAT ‘B’ Bench, Hyderabad Before P. Madhavi Devi (JM) and B. Ramakotaiah (AM) ITA No. 848/Hyd/2015 A.Y.: 2010-11. Date of Order: 13th May, 2016 Counsel for Revenue / Assessee: B.R. Ramesh / K.C. Devdas

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Section 50C and 54F – For the purpose of exemption u/s. 54F the consideration determined as per section 50C is to be adopted – For exemption entire investment in new house to be considered irrespective of source of funds
Facts

The issue before the Tribunal was whether the actual sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed or the deemed sale consideration u/s. 50C is to be adopted for allowing the deduction u/s. 54F.

During the assessment proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act, the A.O. observed that the assessee had sold a plot of land for a consideration of Rs.20 lakh as per sale deed while vendees had paid the stamp duty, registration charges etc., on the value of Rs.89.6 lakh. Therefore, he invoked the provisions of section 50C and brought the difference of Rs.69.6 lakh to tax as the capital gains. Against the same, the assessee claimed deduction u/s. 54F qua the investment of Rs.1.37 crore made by him for construction of a residential house. The A.O. however, held that the sale consideration of Rs.20 lakh mentioned in the sale deed alone was eligible for exemption under section 54F and not deemed consideration arrived at by invoking the provisions of section 50C. On appeal, the CIT(A) agreed with the assessee.

Being aggrieved, the revenue appealed before the Tribunal and placed reliance upon two court decisions in support of its contention that the “full value of the sale consideration” as mentioned in Section 54F refers to the “consideration” actually received by the assessee and not the deemed consideration received under section 50C. The cases relied upon were as under
• CIT vs. George Henderson & Co. Ltd. 66 ITR 622 (SC);
• CIT vs. Smt. Nilofer L Singh 309 ITR 233 (Del.)

Held

The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Mumbai tribunal in the case of Raj Babbar vs. ITO (56 SOT 1) and of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Gouli Mahadevappa vs. ITO (356 ITR 90). As held in the said decisions, the Tribunal observed that when the capital gain is assessed on notional basis, the entire amount invested, should get benefit of deduction irrespective of the fact that the funds from other sources were utilised for new residential house. Thus, in the case of the assessee, the sum of Rs. 1.37 crore invested was eligible for benefit u/s 54F and not the sum of Rs. 20 lakh as contended by the revenue. According to the Tribunal, the decision relied upon by the revenue in the case of George Henderson & Co. Ltd. and Nilofer L Singh were distinguishable on facts. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed and the order of the CIT(A) was upheld.

Baberwad Shiksha Samiti vs. CIT (Exemption) ITAT Jaipur Bench Before T. R. Meena (AM) and Laliet Kumar (JM) ITA No. 487/JP/2015 A.Y.: 2010-11. Date of Order: 12th February, 2016 Counsel for Assessee / Revenue: Mahendra Gargieya / D. S. Kothari & Ajay Malik

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Section 263 – Where the AO has accepted the claims by the assessee after making proper inquiry, the CIT cannot proceed to revise the order by holding another possible view.
Facts

The assessee, running educational institutes, had filed its return of income on 25.01.2011 declaring nil income. It had claimed exemption under section 10(23) (iiiad) and section 11. The assessment was completed under section 143(3) by the AO at the returned income. According to the CIT (Exemption) the order of the AO was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue for the following reasons:

a) The assessee had applied for registration u/s 12A on 04.02.2011 and it was not registered u/s 12AA before completion of assessment;

b) The assessee had not included in its gross receipt the sum of Rs. 51.05 lakh received from the State Government on account of students’ scholarship. If the said amount is added to the total receipts declared by the assessee, the gross receipts were more than Rs. 1 crore and thus, the assessee won’t be eligible to claim exemption u/s 10(23)(iiiad);

c) The assessee was not entitled to depreciation of Rs. 7.62 lakh as the capital expenditure incurred by the assessee was already allowed in the year of purchase of assets as application of income;

The assessee claimed that the order passed by the AO was not erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue for the following reasons:

a) Proviso to section 12A(2) inserted w.e.f. 01.10.2014 provides that where registration has been granted to the trust u/s 12AA, then the provision of section 11 and 12 shall apply in respect of any income derived from the property held under trust of any assessment years for which assessment proceedings are pending before the AO as on the date of such registration. The assessee claimed, since it is a beneficial proviso which is to remove the un-intended hardship, the proviso has a retrospective effect;

b) Scholarship amount was received for disbursement to the students whose names were given by the Government. The assessee cannot retain any part of the scholarship for its benefit and any amount remaining unclaimed has to be returned back to the Government. The assessee was merely acting as a conduit. After examination of this issue the AO had allowed exemption u/s 10(23)(iiiad);

c) The assessee had not claimed any capital expenditure as application of income in as much as in all earlier years, the assessee had claimed exemption u/s 10(23) (iiiad). Even otherwise also, the assessee claimed that u/s 11, both, depreciation as well as capital expenditure are allowable citing several decisions;

However, the CIT(Exemption) did not agree with the assessee and restored the matter back to the AO for making proper enquiry. According to him the benefit under proviso to section 12A(2) inserted w.e.f. 01.10.2014 cannot be given to the assessee who has filed application for registration on 04.02.2011. As regards scholarship – according to him since the assessee had not fully disbursed the scholarship amount by the year end, the said receipt was includible in the gross receipts of the assessee. Thus, according to him, the assessee was not entitled to claim exemption u/s 10(23)(iiiad) as its gross receipt exceeded Rs. 1 crore. As regards depreciation, the CIT(Exemption) relied on the Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Escorts Ltd. vs. Union of India (199 ITR 43) and Lissie Medical Institutions vs. CIT (348 ITR 43) and held that it was a double deduction on the same assets.

Held

The Tribunal noted that before assessing the income of the assessee u/s 143(3 )a detailed questionnaire was issued by the AO and the assessee had furnished requisite details / information / accounts, etc. Thus, according to the Tribunal, the AO had concluded the matter after making detailed inquiry. Further, the Tribunal noted that on the issues raised by the CIT, there are decisions by the courts as well as the ITAT which have decided the matter in favour of the assessee. Thus, according to the Tribunal, the AO had formed one of the views while the CIT (Exemption) had formed another view on same facts and circumstances and therefore, change of opinion was not permissible under the law. Hence, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Exemption) and allowed the appeal of the assessee.

[2016] 157 ITD 626 (Delhi Trib.) Chander Shekhar Aggarwal vs. Asst. CIT A.Y. 2011-12. Date of Order:11th January, 2016

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Section 199, read with Section 198 and rule 37BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 – Clause (ii) of Rule 37BA(3) has no applicability where assessee follows cash system of accounting. Consequently the said assessee, following cash basis, is entitled to credit of entire amount of TDS being offered as income even though the amount in respect of which tax is deducted is not received and therefore not offered as income.

Facts

The assessee was following cash method of accounting. The assessee had declared income of about Rs. 9 crore in the return filed for the relevant assessment year. The assessee had claimed credit of tax deducted at source (TDS) of Rs. 80 lakh.

The AO allowed the credit of TDS of Rs. 71 lakh only and disallowed the credit of balance TDS even though the balance TDS was offered as income by the assessee.

The CIT-(A) upheld the order of the AO. She held that the credit of TDS was to be allowed in terms of rule 37BA(2) and as such, the credit would be allowable on pro rata basis in the year in which the certificate was issued and also in future where balance of such income was found to be assessable as per the mandate of section 199. Any amount which had not been assessed in any year but referred in the TDS certificate could not be claimed u/s. 199.

On second appeal before the Tribunal, the following was held

Held

Sub-section (1) of section 199 provides that any deduction made in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Chapter and paid to the Central Government shall be treated as a payment of tax on behalf of the person from whose income tax deduction was made. Also, section 198 provides that all sums deducted in accordance with Chapter XVII-B shall, for the purposes of computing the income of an assessee, be deemed to be income received. The admitted facts of the instant case are that the TDS has been offered as income by the assessee in his return of income.

The tax deducted by the deductor on behalf of the assessee and offered as income by the assessee in his return of income is to be allowed as credit in the year of deduction of tax. Rule 37BA provides that credit for TDS should be allowed in the year in which income is assessable. Further clause (ii) of rule 37BA(3) provides that where tax has been deducted at source and paid to the Central Government and the income is assessable over a number of years, credit for tax deducted at source shall be allowed across those years in the same proportion in which the income is assessable to tax. This rule is only applicable where entire compensation is received in advance, but the same is not assessable to tax in that year and is assessable in a number of years. However, such rule has no applicability, where assessee follows cash system of accounting.

This can be supported from the illustration that suppose an assessee, who is following cash system of accounting, raises an invoice of Rs. 100 in respect of which deductor deducts tax of Rs. 10 and deposits to the account of the Central Government. Accordingly the assessee would offer an income of Rs. 100 and claim TDS of Rs. 10. However, in the opinion of the revenue, the assessee would not be entitled to credit of the entire TDS of Rs. 10 but would be entitled to proportionate credit only. Now assume that Rs. 90 is never paid to the assessee by the deductor. In such circumstances, Rs. 9 which was deducted as TDS by the deductor would never be available for credit to the assessee though the said sum stands duly deposited to the account of the Central Government.

Rule 37BA(3) cannot be interpreted so as to say that tax deducted by the deductor and deposited to the account of the Central Government is though income of the assessee but is not eligible for credit of TDS in the year when such TDS was offered as income. This view is otherwise also not in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 198 and 199. The proposition as laid out by the Commissioner (Appeals), therefore, cannot be countenanced.

In view of the aforesaid, the assessee would be entitled to credit of the entire TDS offered as income by him in his return of income.

(2016) 134 DTR 113 (Mum) Sunil Gavaskar vs. ITO A.Ys.: 2001-02 & 2002-03 Date of Order: 16th March, 2016

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Section 80RR : Income earned as a cricket commentator by the assessee is income earned from the exercise of profession of sportsman.
Facts

The assessee had received income in the form of foreign remittances, on which deduction was claimed u/s 80RR, in pursuance to an agreement, dated 10th May, 1999 with M/s ESPN Star Sports for rendering services on an exclusive basis as a presenter, reporter and commentator and various other allied services described in the said agreement. The CIT(A) rejected the claim of the assessee on the ground that this deduction is available to a person who is sportsman or a person belonging to any one of the categories as mentioned in the said section and the income must be derived as a result of carrying out that very activity only. But in the case of assessee, since assessee was no more a sportsman or a cricketer and in any case since the impugned income was not earned as a result of playing cricket, and therefore, the assessee was not eligible to claim the deduction u/s 80RR.

Held

Since, the term sportsman has not been defined in the Act and the impugned provisions are beneficial provisions intending to provide the benefits to the public at large, therefore, it would be appropriate to analyse the expression sportsman as is used commonly by the society in generic sense. The Tribunal referred to the meaning of the term sportsman in Wikipedia and from that definition, it noted that the term sportsman may also be used to describe a former player who continues to remain associated and engaged, for the promotion of the related sport activities. The facts of the case are that the assessee has been undoubtedly a cricketer of international stature. It has been shown before the Tribunal that the assessee has been playing cricket matches in India and abroad, even after he had stopped playing tournaments of international and national levels.

Thus, the term sportsman includes not only persons who actively played in the field in the impugned year but also a person who had been actively playing in the field in earlier years and thereafter, he continued to remain associated with the related sport and promoted the same sport, but from outside the field. The Tribunal relied on the fact that in section 80RR, it has been no where mentioned that the sportsman should be the person who is currently playing in the field or the person earning income directly from playing in the field only. Thus, the broader objective of section 80RR is met if the term sportsman is defined in a wider sense, as seems to have been intended by the legislature also. In this backdrop, it can certainly be said that the assessee was a sportsman during the year for the purpose of section 80RR.

Any income derived by the sportsman during the course of his profession which arise out of core activity (i.e. activity of playing in the field), and also other subsidiary & allied activities which are linked to and have nexus with the core activity of the sports, should also be included in the scope of the income eligible for deduction u/s 80RR. The Tribunal proceeded to clarify that any type of income which has remote or no connection with or which is independent of the core activity would not be covered in this section. Further, those activities which go beyond the parameters of profession and take the shape of business activities shall also not fall in the scope of income derived during the course of profession in the context of section 80RR. The

Tribunal concluded that the impugned income had been derived by the assessee in the exercise of his profession as a ‘sportsman’ and allowed the claim of the assessee

[2016] 69 taxmann.com 122 (Kolkata – Trib.) New Alignment vs. ITO ITA No. 504/Kol/2014 A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 6th April, 2016

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Section 40(a)(ia) – Second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) inserted by Finance Act, 2012 is declaratory and curative in nature, and therefore, should be given retrospective effect from the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance Act, 2004.

Facts

The assessee firm, engaged in business as civil contractor, paid labour charges amounting to Rs. 1,27,44,615 without deducting tax at source u/s. 194C of the Act. Since the income-tax was not deducted at source, the Assessing Officer (AO) invoked the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act and disallowed the sum of Rs. 1,27,44,615.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the order of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it contended that in view of the amendment to the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act by insertion of the second proviso, the AO be directed to verify if the payees have declared the receipt from the assessee in their return of income and if they have so declared then the addition u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act be deleted by the AO.

Held

The Tribunal having noted the provisions of section 201, second proviso inserted to the section 40(a)(ia) and the justification of the amendment of section 40(a)(ia) as given by the Explanatory Memorandum while introducing the Finance Bill, 2012 observed that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act are meant to ensure that the assessees perform their obligation to deduct tax at source in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such compliance will ensure revenue collection without much hassle. When the object sought to be achieved by those provisions are found to be achieved, it would be unjust to disallow legitimate business expenses of an assessee. Despite collection of taxes due, if disallowance of genuine business expenses is made then that would be unjust enrichment on the part of the Government as the payee would have also paid the taxes on such income. In order to remove this anomaly, this amendment has been introduced. The Tribunal noted that the disallowance is not to be made subject to satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in the second proviso.

Keeping in view the purpose behind the introduction of the second proviso, the Tribunal held that the second proviso can be said to be declaratory and curative in nature and therefore, should be given retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005 being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004. The Tribunal also observed that the Delhi High Court has in the case of CIT vs. Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd. [2015] 61 taxmann.com 45 has taken a view that the insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act is retrospective and will apply from 1.4.2005.

The alternative prayer made on behalf of the assessee to remain the issue to the AO for verification as to whether payees have included the receipts from the assessee in their returns of income in terms of the decision referred to above was accepted.

This ground of the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.