Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

Commodity price risk

fiogf49gjkf0d
Traditionally, higher oil and commodity prices were seen as negatives for global equity markets, but the relation has been more positive in recent times. One reason for this could be that movement in commodity prices— particularly of crude oil—is now seen as an indication of demand in a world that is struggling with feeble economic growth.

It will be interesting to see how things pan out from here as commodity prices are said to have bottomed out and have rebounded considerably from their recent lows.

Since India benefited significantly from lower oil and other commodity prices, investors will be keenly watching the movement as some of the gains could come under pressure. The Reserve Bank of India’s latest monetary policy statement flagged the risk of firming commodity prices. Further increase in prices could not only affect possibilities of monetary accommodation, but also impact margins and earnings in the corporate sector.

(Source: Quick Edit in Mint Newspaper dated 10.06.2016)

India’s Perfect Storm: Environmental and demographic stresses are building up, add to this mess populist leaders

fiogf49gjkf0d
There is a perfect storm brewing for India and South Asia. To weather it will take extraordinary good governance. Unfortunately for us, the Modi government does not seem to be up to the challenge. It may not even have perceived the massive, darkening clouds.

As the storm gathers speed, the government is busy settling scores – with the Congress party or with students at various campuses. Or it is fighting banal electoral battles. Our environment minister reports that western cities are badly polluted – apparently this should console us. Niti Aayog breathlessly assures us that growth and reforms are in full swing and ‘achhe din’ are already here.

Meanwhile, India’s water crisis is a clear sign that a storm of epic proportions is on its way. India’s per capita water availability is now below the threshold level of 1,400 cubic metres per person. If so, India is heading from ‘water stress’ to ‘water scarcity’ and the possibility of internal water wars. In 1951, water availability was 5,000 cubic metres per person; in 2050, it could be just over 1,000 cubic metres.

Even if we get a good monsoon next year, the longterm prospects are dire because water scarcity is driven by excessive groundwater use. Interconnecting India’s rivers, another hopelessly dangerous scheme, will only add to the problem: providing more (free) water will not encourage people to conserve water.

Compounding our misery is global warming which will likely increase water demand and could reduce supply. Higher temperatures will damage agriculture. So will the scarcity of water. If sea levels rise, we will lose coastal land, and millions of people will become refugees and be driven inland. Expect social conflict to increase as a result. Temperature rise could cause glacier melt in the Himalayas. That means floods. Hotter weather will also unleash extreme weather events such as cyclones.

Consider India’s demography. In 30 years, we will have 1.7 billion people. China will have 400 million people fewer than us. Population density in India is about 360 people per square kilometre; it will be 500 by 2050. India is already 4 times as crowded as East Asia.

We celebrate our demographic dividend, but note that in 2050 we will have 1 billion working-age people (15-64 years) as against 0.86 billion today. Note too that in 2015, India created the lowest number of jobs in 6 years: in 8 labour-intensive sectors, it added 1,35,000 jobs.

India will grow old before it grows rich – like China. Or perhaps worse than China since it is unlikely we can match China’s spectacular economic growth. By 2050, 34% of Indians will be over 50, and 19% or 323 million will be over 65. Many young people will be supporting many old people because old people in India don’t have pensions. Some Indian states already have an ageing problem.

What is the quality of our people in physical terms? Per capita calorie consumption is probably below the povertyline measure of 2,400 calories. It is falling with economic growth, not increasing. Low-calorie diets are exacerbated by some of the worst sanitation levels in the world (worse than Bangladesh or Pakistan), leaving hundreds of millions of Indians underweight and stunted. Insufficient calories affect mental capacity as well. Speaking of mental capacity, it is estimated that 50% of rural kids in the 5th standard can’t read a 2nd standard storybook, 75% of these 3rd standard children cannot do two-digit subtraction, and 20% cannot recognise numbers up to 9.

All this might be managed if governance capacity were high. It isn’t. India has 4,000 IAS officers for 1.2 billion souls. The policemen-to-population ratio is one of the lowest in the world. We have 1 judge for 1,00,000 people, and 31 million cases are pending in the courts. We also have 1 MP for 2 million people; in Sri Lanka, the ratio is 1:89,000. Only 3% of Indians are persuaded to pay taxes, so the government has no financial sinews either.

Stir into this mess populist leaders, widening economic inequality, increasing religious polarisation, ethnoreligious extremism and a hyperventilating media – and you have not a strong, progressive India but rather a wobbling Pakistan ready to explode.

(Source: Article by Shri Kanti Bajpai in The Times of India dated 21.05.2016)

Courts should not encroach into executive domain, governance must improve too

fiogf49gjkf0d
A sharp speech in Parliament by finance minister Arun Jaitley has once again foregrounded simmering tension between different organs of the state. According to Jaitley the judiciary was overreaching into legislative and executive domains, a sentiment which other parliamentarians – not necessarily from BJP – share. This bodes ill as the Constitution provides for a separation of powers between legislature, executive and judiciary. Democracy functions smoothly when each branch stays within established boundaries. The legislature’s anxiety is not unfounded as there have been instances when judicial verdicts have pushed the boundaries. It is imperative for the judiciary to be restrained.

In India, it is the Constitution which is supreme. It empowers legislature to make laws and judiciary to interpret them in the event of disputes and litigation. The Constitution’s architects envisaged the judiciary as a counter-majoritarian institution which would uphold it in case of deviations. The judiciary has not been passive in this role. For example, in order to enhance access it has been willing to consider even a postcard mailed to it as material enough to act. But apart from ruling on constitutional issues, judicial restraint is essential if harmonious balance between different branches of government is to be preserved.

The equilibrium can be upset when the broad-based nature of a verdict encroaches on the domain of the legislature or executive. Verdicts such as the recent one in Delhi’s air pollution case have asked for an increase in specific environmental tax. Another instance was when Supreme Court recently set a short deadline for government to create a drought mitigation fund. There are two immediate dangers of overstepping. It upsets the balance of power and triggers friction between different branches of government.

It needs to be pointed out, however, that other branches of government have not been blameless in this regard. The executive’s failures and lack of accountability have often led people to approach the judiciary to get existing laws implemented. In a similar manner, legislature has often been unresponsive to changes in society. To illustrate, the first step to provide formal protection against sexual harassment at the workplace was the outcome of judiciary stepping into a vacuum left by legislature.

If democracy is to function smoothly, other branches of government too must raise their game while the judiciary exhibits restraint, keeping in mind that its job is to interpret laws not make them.

(Source: Editorial in The Times of India dated 18.05.2016)

How to tax with love: Ten ways the income tax department can reform itself to get taxpayer buy-in

fiogf49gjkf0d
There are constant reports of genuine taxpayers claiming harassment and persecution by tax officials. The tax department, many income earners say, starts with the assumption that the taxpayer is in the wrong, deliberately complicates rules, comes after you only because you decided to pay taxes (while ignoring or remaining blissfully unaware of the real tax evaders) and doesn’t seem to be getting any better.

As the Indian economy gets bigger, we invite more foreign investment, and try to expand our tax base, some reforms are needed in the way the tax department does its job. It is one of the few government departments that are in constant touch with citizens. If it continues to operate in an archaic and hostile manner, much of the benefits of policy reforms will never accrue to the economy. Here are ten concrete, doable ideas on what the tax department can do to tax, but with love.

First, treat the taxpayer as a customer. The current tax department mentality is to act like the police and approach the taxpayer as a criminal, unless proved otherwise. It is tough to make people part with their money in any case. The last thing you should do is not be gracious about it. Without the taxpayer, the government can’t function. Seeing the taxpayer as a customer means taking constant feedback, having service benchmarks (eg, turnaround times) and not presuming guilt.

Second, simplify forms. The government has tried but sadly failed to do this. The tax department should download some forms from the Hong Kong or Singapore tax department websites. These are some of the simplest and best forms in the world. Please emulate them.

Third, a good, robust and modern website. India is the land of IT companies. Hire a good company to revamp the customer interface. Again, if you see the taxpayer as a customer, you will approach the website differently. The layout, downloads, language used should all change. Yes, we need an app too.

Fourth, good quality paper. Current tax department communication seems from the 1980s, with cheap quality super thin sheets and envelopes, and poor quality black and white printing. Come on. We are one of the world’s top economies.

Fifth, simpler nomenclature. Names like ITR4 and 26AS intimidate people. Sit down one day and rename and reorganise all the forms that have been amended and become complicated in nomenclature over the years. It’s scary enough to pay taxes. Don’t make it scarier.

Sixth, say thanks and mean it. People who pay taxes are nation builders. Seeing rich people as thieves is a throwback to evil landlord and poor peasant movies of the 1970s. You don’t only become rich by stealing from the poor. You also become rich from creativity, innovation, hard work and enterprise. How can you punish people for that? Not just the top taxpayer, but the top 10% of taxpayers should get a nice letter and memento (not cheap quality please) to thank them.

Seventh, don’t send scary letters. The department officials are under pressure to increase revenue. However, you cannot scare taxpayers. For instance, the department sends letters saying we believe the way things are going you should make 20% more money this year so we hope you will (and better) pay that much more tax. Really? Do we need to be so intimidating?

Eighth, have tax guidance centres. People should be able to go somewhere and figure out how to do their taxes, which doesn’t require a private advisor. Have taxpayer training, inquiry and guidance centres that run well. Again, make them nice. They should not be like a sarkari torture chamber with endless waits and creaky fans. This is the last department that can claim it doesn’t have money.

Ninth, share macro data. Without giving individual details, macro data should be shared with the public to enable us to understand how tax collections are going.

Tenth, share where the tax money was used. Of course, funds are amalgamated at the top. However, it would be nice to hear that your tax last year helped make this road. As Veda Vyasa said in the Mahabharata, a king should collect taxes like a bee collects nectar from flowers, painlessly. It is about time we behaved like a modern, world-class economy when it came to tax collection and learned to tax with love.

(Source: Extracts from Article by Chetan Bhagat in the Times of India dated 11.06.2016)

In debt to dynasty? Rule by the Gandhis has repeatedly pushed the country towards indebtedness

fiogf49gjkf0d
“The Dynasty” is ready to roll its last throw of the dice with Priyanka Gandhi being drafted to play a leading role in Congress’s UP campaign. Given her husband Robert Vadra’s shenanigans during the UPA regime, UP voters must ask: Should we foster a local Benazir Bhutto with Robert Vadra playing the “Mr 10 percent” equivalent of Asif Ali Zardari? However, because this move is an attempt by The Dynasty to perpetuate itself, we need to ask an even more fundamental question: What does loyalty to The Dynasty get the nation? What is the legacy of umpteen years of rule by The Dynasty?

We examine this question here using economic indicators and conclude that the legacy is an unflattering one. It’s a legacy of retaining power through reckless populism. The numbers depict a key narrative: Building a mountain of subsidies without worrying about its disastrous economic consequences.

We collated data on various economic indicators from the World Bank database. We then separated them by the averages obtained during governments ruled or controlled by The Dynasty and governments ruled by non-dynasts. Thus, the UPA-I and UPA-II governments led by Manmohan Singh are classified as part of the legacy of The Dynasty because we all know Sonia Gandhi controlled the levers of that government through the National Advisory Council. In contrast, the government led by P V Narasimha Rao, whom Congress has banished from its collective memory despite his government heralding economic liberalisation in this country, is categorised under governments not controlled by The Dynasty.

The government led by Rajiv Gandhi, who took several steps towards economic liberalisation and heralded the telecom revolution under Sam Pitroda, belongs to The Dynasty. Of course, the government led by Indira Gandhi, under whom poverty increased significantly despite her vote-catching rhetoric of “garibi hatao”, belongs to The Dynasty as well.

After analysing a plethora of economic indicators, we discovered that the elephant in the room relates to subsidies. Governments run by The Dynasty doled out subsidies and other transfers to the tune of Rs 689,600 crore every year, as opposed to Rs 183,300 crore by nondynastic governments. These figures are in real terms deflated to 2011 levels.

And this is not because there was necessarily more money to dole out during the time of the governments run by The Dynasty. Subsidies doled out by them amounted to 9.2% of GDP, almost double that doled out by nondynastic governments (5.3%). Crucially, subsidies under the governments run by The Dynasty increased at almost 13% year-on-year while this growth was about 4% yearon- year under governments run by non-dynasts.

There were other important ways in which governments run by The Dynasty indulged in bad economics though the differences were not as stark as they are for subsidies. First, governments run by The Dynasty spent more indiscriminately when compared to the governments run by non-dynasts. Expenses amounted to 15.6% of GDP on average under governments run by The Dynasty. This ratio was 14.8% for the governments run by non-dynasts. Moreover, expense grew at 9.1% under governments run by The Dynasty and at 5.6% under the governments run by non-dynasts.

Second, governments run by The Dynasty indebted the economy more than governments run by non-dynasts. Total central government debt and the cash deficit was at least twice as much under governments run by The Dynasty as that under the governments run by nondynasts. While the cash deficit does not account for future revenues that would accrue from current capital investments, it has the key benefit of revealing the deficit by eliminating accounting subterfuge.

As the fixed capital formation under governments run by The Dynasty was not very different from that under governments run by non-dynasts, future revenue accrual would not be very different. So the cash deficit does not certainly overstate the profligacy of governments run by The Dynasty. Also, governments run by The Dynasty reduced the servicing of debt (1.6% of gross national income) when compared to 2.6% of gross national income under governments run by the non-dynasts. Thus, governments run by The Dynasty doled out largesse and spent wastefully while indebting future generations of this country.

However, the outstanding difference pertains to the use of subsidies. The conduit between a government and the intended recipient of a subsidy resembles an open sluice with plenty of opportunities for others to dip into the stream before it reaches its final destination. Furthermore, subsidies create significant distortions in asset use. Subsidies also dampen individual incentives.

Thus, the unabashed use of doles despite their pernicious effects stands out as the key economic legacy of governments ruled by The Dynasty. UP voters would be well served by remembering this important fact as charismatic rhetoric is not going to get them “naukri, paisa aur makan”. Recall that “garibi hatao” by Priyanka’s grandmother was little more than charismatically delivered rhetoric.

(Source: The Times of India dated 07.06.2016)

Agricultural Reforms – APMC drama

fiogf49gjkf0d
The battle of wits between farmers, traders and the Maharashtra government is a case study on the political challenge reformers face. The Devendra Fadnavis government recently decided to exclude fruits and vegetables from the list of farm items that have to be mandatorily sold through the Agricultural Produce Market Committees (APMCs). The cartels that control these APMCs have gone on strike. Food prices have climbed in cities such as Mumbai. Farmers have responded by bringing their produce in trucks to sell directly to consumers in some cities.

Any reform involves unsettling rent-seeking groups, often backed by political interests, that benefit from the existing system. Reform beneficiaries are often not as wellorganized. But this is a battle worth fighting. Free markets should benefit both farmers and urban consumers, as the late farmers’ leader Sharad Joshi argued. Let us hope Fadnavis does not blink.

(Source: Quick Edit in Mint Newspaper dated 14-07-2016)

Jumbo cabinet

fiogf49gjkf0d
There are now 78 members in the Narendra Modi cabinet. This means that almost one in four parliamentarians elected on the National Democratic Alliance ticket in 2014 has a ministerial berth. The cabinet’s size is just three short of the constitutional limit imposed by the 91st amendment. Minimum government, anyone?

This newspaper had once hoped that Modi would streamline his cabinet by merging ministries and shutting down irrelevant ones. Those hopes have been belied. Modi said in a recent interview that the expansion is to help the government pursue the February budget’s goals.

The jumbo cabinet headed by Manmohan Singh was an example of spreading political patronage across an unwieldy coalition. In contrast, Modi has a strong political mandate to cut bureaucratic flab rather than add bulk. Jumbo cabinets are not exactly the optimal solution to governance challenges.

(Source: Quick Edit in Mint Newspaper dated 06.07.2016)

Corruption and India Inc – Clarity Begins at Home

fiogf49gjkf0d
India needs to address perceptions of widespread corruption that impact the ease of doing business. It ranks 76 in the International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, and 130 in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index 2015.These statistics matter.

IMF research shows that investment in corrupt countries is almost 5% less than in relatively corruption-free countries. India needs to generate employment for over 12 million youth every year. And jobs need investment.

Increasingly , the party political system is recognising that jobs are a priority . It is more responsive to the call of corporate institutions for increased levels of transparency and ease of doing business. So, it is timely for corporate India to evaluate how it can contribute to the debate on rooting out corruption in public life.

India Inc needs to first demonstrate its commitment to putting its own house in order. A good place to start is with the adoption of a Code of Conduct by each corporate entity .

A Code guides the behaviour of the people within the corporate house. Its coverage can also be extended to value chain partners, thus increasing its impact. And it sets in motion industry dynamics that create a kind of competition to do good, reflected, for instance, in the integrity pacts that corporate entities have entered into in some overseas markets.

Once a baseline is set with a Code, it also creates sustained pressure on the institutition to keep improving on its own standards.

A key element in ensuring a Code is taken seriously is to encourage employees to speak up when they observe its violations. Such whistleblowing is all too often received badly within organisations. This has to change.

One of the principal reasons for corruption in India is the need to gene corruption in India is the need to generate funds to fight elections. The legislated limits on spending per constituency by candidates Rs.70 lakh in bigger states for general elections are widely acknowledged to be breached by most parties. Corporate houses now have more transparent alternatives to fund political parties in the form of electoral trusts that enjoy the sanction of the law.

The operations of these trusts can be scrutinised by stakeholders. By defining predetermined formulae for allocation of the trust funds, corporate entities can put in place transparent, non-discriminatory and nondiscretionary mechanisms that can significantly insulate them from political pressure. With increased public vigil, including demands to open the books of political parties to public scrutiny , electoral trusts may eventually lead the way to state funding of elections.

A wide cross section of India Inc is not fully aware of the reach and extraterritorial jurisdiction of legislation covering bribery and corruption across countries, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the US and the UK Bribery Act.

Indian companies are being increasingly questioned on the adequacy of their internal anti-bribery and anti corruption frameworks by potential or actual business partners, particularly from the US and Britain. The actions of Indian companies could expose the foreign partner to unwanted litigation, scrutiny and reputational risk. We are already seeing a rising trend in FCPA enforcements and actions involving the Indian operations of US companies.

The old adage of `what gets measured, gets improved’ holds just as true in the field of ethics and values. At the recent B20 Anti-Corruption Forum meeting in Shanghai, it was clear that the agenda of the most-powerful industrial economies is increasingly focusing on two key areas: identification of beneficial ownership of legal entities and making government procurement more transparent through the use of technology .

At the Brisbane Summit in November 2014, the G20 leaders adopted high-level principles on beneficial ownership transparency , describing financial transparency as a `high priority’ issue.This question has acquired greater urgency following the leak of the Panama Papers.

With the advent of new technological tools, the calls are increasing for automating government procurement and public services. E-custom clearance programmes and e-procurement processes for public procurement are helping to simplify policies, procedures and rules and removing discretion in these areas. Some countries are pushing for adoption of the HLRM (High Level Reporting Mechanism) ¬ a channel for companies to report corrupt behaviour in public procurement. The idea is then to identify and rate companies based on a `corruption index’.

Corruption increases uncertainty and leads to wastage of public resources and fundamentally undermines the rule of law. It is time for corporate India to play a leadership role by engaging in advocacy around the key issues to be resolved. This may be one of the greatest contributions an Indian corporate entity could make towards nationbuilding.

(Source: Article by Mukund Rajan in the Economic Times dated 06.07.2016)

Representation Made by 4 Organisations on IDS 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d

11th July, 2016
Mr Hasmukh Adhia
Hon. Revenue Secretary
Ministry of Finance
New Delhi

Dear Sir

Subject:- Controversy regarding effective tax rate under IDS 2016

We write to you on behalf of members of our respective organisations and also on behalf of the citizens of India at large.

There is a raging controversy surrounding the effective rate of tax payable under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 [IDS]. This has arisen on account of different interpretations of the reply given to FAQ No. 5 in Circular No. 25/2016 dated 30th June, 2016. The same is reproduced below:

“Question No. 5: Where a valid declaration is made after making valuation as per the provisions of the Scheme, read with IDS Rules and tax, surcharge & penalty as specified in the Scheme have been paid, whether the department will make any enquiry in respect of sources of income, payment of tax, surcharge and penalty?

Answer: No.”

As a result of this FAQ and the reply provided, at various forums, an interpretation has been discussed that the effective rate of tax in such cases could work out to 31% instead of 45%. An illustration will explain this:

Even the senior officers of the Income-tax department are not clear and are giving differing replies. The problem that is caused on account of this confusion is that different people are providing differing advice to potential declarants.

Considering the fact this is an extremely important issue and goes to the very heart of the IDS, there is an urgent need to clarify whether the view that is being advocated by some as illustrated above is correct. The reply to FAQ No. 5 in Circular No. 25 mentioned above needs to be either modified or further clarified with the help of an example.

In the interest of the tax paying community and in the larger interest of the nation, we earnestly request you to kindly issue a clarification on this issue at the earliest. Upon receipt of the same, we shall give it extensive publicity amongst our members as well as amongst the tax paying community.

Assuring you and the Government of India our fullest support in the massive nation building exercise that is in progress,
We remain

Yours sincerely

sd/-
Chetan M. Shah
President
Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society

sd/-
Hitesh Shah
President
Chamber of Tax Consultants

sd/-
Raju C Shah
President,
Ahmedabad Chartered Accountants’ Association

sd/-
Raghavendra Puranik
President,
Karnataka State Chartered Accountants’ Association

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 1 dated July 7, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Discontinuation of Reporting of Bank Guarantee on behalf of service importers

Presently, banks are required to furnish to the CGM-in- Charge, FED, Foreign Investments Division (EPD), RBI, Central Office, Mumbai-400 001 details of invocation of bank guarantee issued by them, on behalf of their resident customers, to non-resident service provider against service imports.

This circular states that, with immediate effect, banks are not required to submit details of invocation of bank guarantee issued by them, on behalf of their resident customers, to non-resident service provider against service imports. They are however required to maintain records of such invocations and furnish the required details to RBI whenever sought.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 81 dated June 30, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Settlement System under Asian Clearing Union (ACU)

This circular states that from July 01, 2016, until further notice, all eligible current account transactions including trade transactions in ‘Euro’ can be settled outside the ACU mechanism.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 80 dated June 30, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) – Approval Route cases

This circular states that all proposal received under the Approval route and exceeding a particular threshold limit will be placed before an Empowered Committee. Final decision will be taken by RBI after considering the recommendations of the Empowered Committee.

GENERAL ANTI-AVOI DANCE RULE (GAAR)

fiogf49gjkf0d
1. Background:

1.1 General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) was first introduced in sections 95 to 102 and 144BA of the Income tax Act by the Finance Act, 2012, w.e.f. A.Y. 2014-15. In view of large scale opposition by Trade and Industry Associations, these provisions were replaced by new sections 95 to 102 and 144BA by the Finance Act, 2013, w.e.f. AY . 2016-17.

1.2 In Para 150 of the Budget Speech while introducing the Finance Bill, 2013, the Finance Minister has stated as follows:

“150. Hon’ble Members are aware that the Finance Act, 2012 introduced the General Anti Avoidance Rules, for short, GAAR. A number of representations were received against the new provisions. An expert committee was constituted to consult stakeholders and finalise the GAAR guidelines. After careful consideration of the report, Government announced certain decisions on 14-1-2013 which were widely welcomed. I propose to incorporate those decisions in the Income tax Act. The modified provisions preserve the basic thrust and purpose of GAAR. Impermissible tax avoidance arrangements will be subjected to tax after a determination is made through a well laid out procedure involving an assessing officer and an Approving Panel headed by the judge. I propose to bring the modified provisions into effect from 1-4-2016.”

1.3 In the Explanatory Statement presented with the Finance Bill, 2013, the reasons for introducing the new provisions are explained as under:

“The General Anti Avoidance Rule (GAAR) was introduced in the Income tax Act by the Finance Act, 2012. The substantive provisions relating to GAAR are contained in Chapter X-A (consisting of sections 95 to 102) of the Income tax Act. The procedural provisions relating to mechanism for invocation of GAAR and passing of the assessment order in consequence thereof are contained to section 144 BA. The provisions of Chapter X-A as well as section 144BA would have come into force with effect from 1st April, 2014.

A number of representations were received against the provisions relating to GAAR. An Expert Committee was constituted by the Government with broad terms of reference including consultation with stakeholders and finalising the GAAR guidelines and a road map for implementation. The Expert Committee’s recommendations included suggestions for legislative amendments, formulation of rules and prescribing guidelines for implementations of GAAR. The major recommendations of the Expert Committee have been accepted by the Government, with some modifications. Some of the recommendations accepted by the Government require amendment in the provisions of Chapter X-A and section 144BA”.

1.4 In 2015 the Finance Minister, in Para 109 of his Budget Speech, stated as under:

“109 Implementation of the General Anti- Avoidance Rule (GAAR) has been a matter of public debate. The investment sentiment in the country has now turned positive and we need to accelerate this momentum. There are also certain issues relating to GAAR which need to be resolved. It has therefore been decided to defer the applicability of GAAR by two more years. Further, it has also been decided that when implemented GAAR would apply prospectively to investments made on or after 1-4-2017”

Accordingly, section 95 was amended to provide that the GAAR provisions contained in sections 95 to 102 will apply from A. Y. 2018-19 ( i.e. accounting year 1-4-2017 to 31.03.2018) and onwards.

1.5 Since the provisions relating to GAAR will come into form on 1.4.2017, the tax provisions which will affect some economic decisions by tax payers are discussed in this Article

2. GAAR Provisions:

2.1 Section 95: This section provides that an arrangement entered into by an assesse may be declared to be an impermissible avoidance arrangement. The tax arising from such declaration by the tax authorities will be determined subject to provisions of sections 96 to 102. It is also stated in this section that the provisions of sections 96 to 102 may be applied to any step or a part of the arrangement as they are applicable to the entire arrangement. Section 95(2) provides that Sections 95 to 102 shall apply from A/Y:2018-19 and onwards. Rule 10U of the Income tax Rules provides that Sections 95 to 102 shall not apply to an arrangement where the tax benefit in the relevant assessment year, to all parties to the arrangement, does not exceed Rs.3 Crore.

2.2 Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement (Section 96):

i) Section 96 explains the meaning of Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement to mean an arrangement, the main purpose of which is to obtain a tax benefit and it –

a) Creates rights or obligations which would not ordinarily be created between persons dealing at arm’s length.

b) Results, directly or indirectly, in misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Income tax Act.

c) Lacks commercial substance, or is deemed to lack commercial substance u/s. 97, in whole or in part, or

d) is entered into or carried out, by means, or in a manner, which are not ordinarily employed for bonafide purposes.

ii) An arrangement whereby there is any tax benefit to the assesse shall be presumed to have been entered into or carried out for the main purpose of obtaining tax benefits, unless the assesse proves otherwise. It will be noticed that this is a very heavy burden cast on the assesse. The Finance Minister has, however, declared on 7/5/2012 that the onus of proof will be on the department who has to establish that the arrangement is to avoid tax before initiating the proceedings under these provisions.

2.3 Lack of Commercial Substance (Section 97):

(i) Section 97 explains the concept of Lack of Commercial Substance in an arrangement entered into by the assesse. It states that an arrangement shall be deemed to lack commercial substance if :

a) The substance or effect of the arrangement, as a whole, is inconsistent with, or differs significantly from, the form of its individual steps or a part of such steps.

b) It involves or includes

• Round Trip Financing
• An accommodating party.
• Elements that have the effect of offsetting Or canceling each other or A transaction which is conducted through one or more persons and disguises the value, location, source, ownership or control of funds which is the subject matter of such transaction.

c) It involves the location of an asset or a transaction or the place of residence of any party which is without any substantial commercial purpose. In other words, the particular location is disclosed only to obtain tax benefit for a party, or

d) It does not have a significant effect upon the business risks or net cash flows of any party to the arrangement apart from any effect attributable to the tax benefit that would be obtained.

ii) For the above purpose, it is provided that round trip financing includes any arrangement in which through a series of transactions :

a) Funds are transferred among the parties to the arrangement, and,

b) Such transactions do not have any substantial commercial purpose other than obtaining tax benefit.

iii) It is further stated that the above view will be taken by the tax authorities without having regard to the following:

a) Whether or not the funds involved in the round trip financing can be traced to any funds transferred to, or received by, any party in connection with the arrangement.

b) The time or sequence in which the funds involved in the round trip financing are transferred or received, or

c) The means by, manner in, or mode through which funds involved in the round trip financing are transferred or received.

iv) The party to such an arrangement shall be treated as “Accommodating Party” whether or not such party is connected with the other parties to the arrangement, if the main purpose of, direct or indirect, tax benefit under the Income tax Act.

v) It is clarified in the section that the following factors may be relevant but shall not be sufficient for determining whether the arrangement Lacks commercial substance.

a) The period or time for which the arrangement exists

b) The fact of payment of taxes, directly or indirectly, under the arrangement.

c) The fact that exit route, including transfer of any activity, business or operations, is provided by the arrangement.

3. Consequence of Impermissible Avoidance Arrangement (Section 98):

3.1 Under section 144 BA, the Commissioner has been empowered to declare any arrangement as an impermissible arrangement. Section 98 states that if an arrangement is declared as impermissible, then the consequences, in relation to tax or the arrangement shall be determined in such manner as is deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the case. This will include denial of tax benefit or any benefit under applicable Tax Treaty. The following is the illustrative list of consequences and it is provided that the same will not be limited to this list.

i) Disregarding, combining or re-characterising any step in, or part or whole of the impermissible avoidance arrangement.

ii) Treating, the impermissible avoidance arrangement as if it had not been entered into or carried out;

iii) Disregarding any accommodating party or treating any accommodating party and any other party as one and the same person;

iv) Deeming persons who are connected persons in relation to each other to be one and the same person;

v) Re-allocating between the parties to the arrangement, (a) any accrual or receipt of a capital or revenue nature or (b) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate;

vi) Treating (a) the place of residence of any party to the arrangement or (b) situs of an asset or of a transaction at a place other than the place or location of the transaction stated under the arrangement.

vii) Considering or looking through any arrangement by disregarding any corporate structure.

viii) It is also clarified that for the above purpose the tax authorities may re-characterise (a) any equity into debt or any debt into equity, (b) any accrual or receipt of Capital nature may be treated as of revenue nature or vice versa or (c) any expenditure, deduction, relief or rebate may be re-characterised.

3.2 It may be noted that if only a part of the arrangement is declared to be impermissible under this section, Rule 10UA provides that the consequences in relation to tax shall be determined with reference to such part only.

4. Section 99: This section provides for treatment of connected persons and accommodating party. The section provides that for the purposes of sections 95 to 102, for determining whether a tax benefit exists –

i) The parties who are connected persons, in relation to each other, may be treated as one and same person.

ii) Any accommodating party may be disregarded.

iii) Such accommodating party and any other party may be treated as one and the same person.

iv) The arrangement may be considered or looked through be disregarding any corporate structure.

5. Section 102 : Some Definitions

i) “Arrangement” means any step in, a part or whole of any transaction, operations, scheme, agreement or understanding, whether enforceable or not, and includes the alienation of any property in such transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding.

ii) “Benefit” includes a payment of any kind whether in tangible or intangible form.

iii) “Connected Person”, in relation to a person who is an Individual, Company, HUF, Firm, LLP, AOP or BOI is defined in more or less the same manner as the term “Related Person” is defined in Section 40A(2). It may be noted that, for this purpose, the definition of the word “Relative” is wider in as much as the definition of “Relative” given in Explanation to Section 56(2) (vi) is adopted, whereas in section 40A(2) the narrower definition of “Relative” given in Section 2(41) is adopted.

iv) “Fund” includes (a) any cash, (b) cash equivalents and (c ) any right or obligation to receive or pay in cash or cash equivalent.

v) “Party” means any person, including Permanent Establishment which participates or takes part in an arrangement.

vi) “Relative” has the same meaning as given in section 56(2) (vi) – Explanation. It may be noted that this definition is very wide as compared to the definition given in section 2 (41) which is adopted for the purpose of explaining related person in section 40A (2).

vii) The definition of a person having substantial interest in the company and other non- corporate body is the same as given in section 40A(2).

viii) “Step” includes a measure or an action, particularly one of a series taken in order to deal with or achieve a particular thing or object in the arrangement.

ix) “Tax Benefit” includes (a) a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount payable under the Income tax Act, (b) an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under the Act, (c) a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount that would be payable under the Act, as a result of tax treaty, (d) an increase in a refund of tax or other amounts under the Act as a result of tax treaty, (e) a reduction in total income or (f) increase in loss in the relevant accounting year or any other accounting year.

x) “Tax Treaty” means Agreements entered into by the Government with any foreign county, territory or Association u/s 90 or 90A.

6. Section 144 BA: Procedure for declaring an arrangement as impressible under sections 95 to 102 is given in this section. This section will come into force from A.Y. 2018-19

i) The Assessing Officer can, at any stage of assessment or reassessment, make a reference to the Commissioner for invoking GAAR. On receipt of reference the Commissioner has to issue a notice to the assesse to make his submissions and give a hearing within such period not exceeding 60 days. If he is not satisfied by the submissions of taxpayer and is of the opinion that GAAR provisions are to be invoked, he has to refer the matter to an “Approving Panel”. In case the assesse does not object or reply, the Commissioner can issue such directions as he deems fit in respect of declaration as to whether the arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement or not. Under Rule 10UC (1)(i) no such direction can be issued after expiry of one month from the end of the month in which the date of compliance of the notice to the assesse u/s 144BA(2) is given.

ii) The Approving Panel has to dispose of the reference within a period of six months from the end of the month in which the reference was received from the Commissioner.

iii) The Approving Panel can either declare an arrangement to be impermissible or declare it not to be so after examining material and getting further inquiry made. It can issue such directions as it thanks fit. It can also decide the year or years for which such an arrangement will be considered as impermissible. It has to give hearing to the assesse before taking any decision in the matter.

iv) The Assessing Officer (AO) can determine consequences of such a declaration of arrangement as impermissible avoidance arrangement.

v) The final order, in case any consequence of GAAR is determined, shall be passed by the AO only after approval by Commissioner.

vi) The period taken by the proceedings before Commissioner and the Approving Panel shall be excluded from time limitation for completion of assessment.

vii) The Central Government has to constitute one or more Approving Panels. Each Panel shall consist of 3 members, including a chairperson. The constitution of the Panel shall be as under.

a) Chairperson – He shall be a sitting or retired judge of a High Court

b) Members – One member shall be IRS of the rank of CCIT or above. One member shall be an academic or scholar having special knowledge of matters such as direct taxes, business accounts and international trade practices.

The term of the Panel shall ordinarily be for one year and may be extended from time to time upto 3 years. The Panel shall have power similar to those vested in AAR u/s 245U. CBDT has to provide office infrastructure, manpower and other facilities to the Approving Panel’s members. The remuneration payable to Panel members shall be decided by the Central Government.

viii) In addition to the above, it is provided that the CBDT has to prescribe a scheme for efficient functioning of the Approving Panel and expeditious disposal of the reference made to it. No such scheme has been prescribed by CBDT so far.

ix) Appeal against the order of assessment passed under the GAAR provisions, is to be filed directly with the ITA Tribunal and not before CIT (A). Section 144 C relating to reference before DRT does not apply to this assessment order and, therefore, no reference can be made to DRT when GAAR provisions are invoked. No appeal can be filed by the AO against the directions given by the Approving Panel.

7. Procedure (Rules 10U to 10UC)

7.1 It is provided in section 100 that the provisions of sections 95 to 102 shall apply in addition to, or in lieu of, any other basis of determination of tax liability. Section 101 gives power to CBDT to prescribe the guidelines and lay down conditions for application of sections 95 to 102 relating to General Anti- Avoidance Rule (GAAR). It may be noted that for this purpose Rules 10U to 10UC and Forms 3CEG to 3CEI have been inserted in the Income tax Rules.

7.2 Rule 10U provides that the GAAR provisions of chapter X-A (Sections 95 to 102) shall not apply in respect of the following:

a) To an arrangement where the tax benefit in the relevant assessment year arising to all the parties to the arrangement does not exceed, in the aggregate, Rs. 3 Crore.

b) To a Foreign Institutional Investor (FII) who is assesse under the Income tax Act and has not taken benefit of DTTA u/s 90 or 90A. Further, such FII should have made investment in listed or un-listed securities with prior permission of SEBI under the applicable Regulations.

c) To a Non-resident, in relation to investment made by him by way of offshore derivative instruments or otherwise, directly or indirectly in a FII.

d) To any income accruing, arising or received by any person from transfer of Investments made before 1-4-2017 by such person.

e) Without prejudice to (d) above, it is clarified in the Rule that GAAR Provisions will apply to any arrangement, irrespective of the date on which it has been entered into, in respect of the tax benefit obtained from the arrangement on or after 1-4-2017. This will mean that if any impermissible arrangement is entered into prior to 1/4/2017, GAAR provisions will apply to the tax benefit obtained after 1/4/2017.

f) The term (a) FII, (b) offshore derivative instrument, (c) SEBI and (d) tax benefit are defined in the Rule.

7.3 Rule 10 UB provides for Forms and Notice for reference u/s. 144BA. If the Assessing Office is of the view that GAAR provisions are to be invoked to a particular arrangement or transaction he has to issue a notice to the assesse seeking his objections, if any, to the applicability of the provisions of Chapter X-A (i.e. Sections 95 to 102). In this notice A.O. has to state

a) Details of the arrangement to which provisions of Chapter X-A are proposed to be applied.

b) The tax benefit arising under the arrangement

c) The basis and reasons for considering that the main purpose of the arrangement is to obtain tax benefit.

d) The basis and reasons as to why conditions provided in Section 96(1) are satisfied.

e) The A.O. has to give a list of the documents and evidence relied upon by him supporting his reasons stated under (c ) and (d) above.

7.4 After receiving the objections from the assesse, the A.O., if not satisfied with the objections, can make a reference to the CIT u/s 144BA (1) in Form No. 3 CEG. If the CIT, after considering the reference by the A.O. and the objections filed by the assesse is satisfied that provisions of chapter X-A are not applicable to the facts of the case, he shall issue directions to A.O. in Form No. 3CEH. Such directions are to be given within a period of 2 months from the end of the month in which the final submissions of the assesse in response to notice issued u/s 144BA (2) are made.

7.5 If the commissioner decides to refer the matter to the Approving panel u/s 144BA(4), he shall record his satisfaction regarding the applicability of the provisions of Chapter X-A in Form No.3CEI and enclose the same with the reference. Rule 10UC provides that no reference shall be made to the Approving panel u/s 144 BA (4) after the expiry of 2 months from the end of the month in which final submissions of the assesse in response to notice u/s 144BA(2) is received.

8. To Sum Up:

8.1 The above GAAR provisions will have far reaching consequences for assesses engaged in the business with Indian or Foreign parties. GAAR is not restricted to only business transactions. Therefore, all assesses who are engaged in business or profession or who have no income from business or profession but have income from some source will be affected by these provisions. It appears that any assesse having any arrangement, agreement, or transaction with a connected person will have to take care that the same is at Arm’s Length Consideration. In particular, an assesse will have to consider the implications of GAAR while (a) executing a WILL or Trust, (b) entering into partnership or forming LLP, (c) taking controlling interest in a company, (f) entering into amalgamation of two or more companies, (c ) effecting demerger of a company, (f) entering into a consortium or joint venture, (g) entering into foreign collaboration, (h) acquiring an Indian or Foreign company or (i) making a Gift. It may be noted that this is only an illustrative list and there may be other transactions which may attract GAAR provisions.

8.2 From the wording of the above provisions of sections 95 to 102, 144BA and Rules it appears that the provisions of GAAR can be invoked even in respect of an arrangement made prior to 1-4- 2017. The CIT or the Approving Panel can hold any such arrangement entered into prior to 1-4- 2017 as impermissible and direct the AO to make adjustments in the computation of income or tax in the assessment year 2018-19 or any year thereafter. As suggested in Para 15.15 of the report of the Standing Committee on Finance on DTC Bill, 2010 GAAR provisions should have been applied prospectively so that they are not made applicable to existing arrangements / transactions. Even in the Press Note issued by the Central Government on 14-1-2013 it was stated that transactions entered into prior to 30-8-2010 will not be made subject to GAAR provisions. This has not been provided in the above sections and, therefore, the above GAAR provisions may have retroactive effect. The only exception made in Rule 10U is with reference to income from transfer of certain investments made prior to 1-4-2017.

8.3 The Government has not yet issued notification for constitution of Approving Panel u/s 144BA. Moreover, the CBDT has not yet issued the scheme for efficient functioning of the Approving Panel and expeditious disposal of the reference made to it.

8.4 The provisions in Rule 10U that GAAR Provisions will not apply where the aggregate tax benefit does not exceed Rs.3 crore, is welcome. Let us hope that in other cases the tax department will take a reasonable view while dealing with commercial arrangements made by tax payers while conducting their economic activities.

8.5 The Concept of GAAR is new in our Country. Therefore, it is necessary to educate the tax payers about the nature of arrangements and transactions which will be considered by the tax department as impermissible arrangements. For this purpose the CBDT should issue detailed guidelines giving illustrations of different types of arrangements which may be considered as impermissible. This can be given in question answer form. Such guidelines will enable tax payers to take care while entering into any arrangement or transaction. This will also reduce litigation.

Silver Jubilee of Economic Liberalisation

fiogf49gjkf0d
Twenty-five years ago Dr. Manmohan Singh presented, what is now described as a path breaking budget unleashing a spate of economic reforms. He opened the doors of our country to the world and India began its transformation from a third world country to a significant player in the global economy. It is said that the government of the day was left no choice but to embark on these reforms such was the state of the economy then. However, credit for taking the plunge must also be given to the then Prime Minister – Mr. P.V.Narasimha Rao. A mention of the Long Term Fiscal Policy presented by Mr. V.P. Singh as the Finance Minister is also not out of place.

Since then, there have been changes of those who have enjoyed power, and India has been ruled by different political parties or political combinations. By and large, there has been a consensus on the direction of economic reform, though on account of political compulsions the parties in power and opposition have made different noises for public consumption. There has certainly been a difference in the pace in which the liberalisation process has moved and at times there has been a derailment on account of reservations of the left parties, whenever they have had a say in policy making.

There is no point in dealing with numbers as each set of statistics, published or relied on by one group of experts would be doubted and challenged by another group. On the ground, the reality is that GDP has grown consistently, purchasing power in the hands of a large majority of the population has increased and the number of those below the poverty line has decreased.

In certain areas there has been a sea change. Communication is one such area. From the time that we applied for a telephone connection and waited for the Black beauty to enter our homes, we are now in a situation where even in the remotest of rural areas a person uses a cell phone. He may not be literate but is a user of this technology. This one single development has been an absolute game changer.

Inbound and outbound foreign investment has increased manifold. 25 years ago, foreign investors were wary of investment in India. Apart from the bureaucratic hurdles, they were not certain about the soundness of the Indian economy. Today, possibly on account of the fact that the investment options in the other parts of the globe have reduced, every investor looks at India with keen interest. In those days the flow was one-way with foreign entities investing in India. Today Indian corporations have also become multinational. Large Indian houses today acquire companies across the globe, going in for mergers and amalgamations even in developed countries.

The movement of skilled labour has also become easier. Till a few years ago IT professionals found lucrative jobs abroad either on account of their own employers in India setting up businesses across the world or even foreign companies hiring these talented individuals. The pace may have reduced somewhat, on account of economic slowdown in those countries, but even today there are job opportunities to be seized. Along with the movement of human resources, the flow of trade has also become smoother. On account of increasing e-commerce, Indian consumers have access to commodities and services from all across the globe and the same is true of consumers of the world who are now able to enjoy Indian goods and services.

There are certainly certain weaknesses and hurdles. Lack of infrastructure remains one serious cause of concern. The quality of road, rail and air transport is a far cry from those in developed countries. The lack of infrastructure seriously hampers India’s economic growth. While successive governments have tried to give a fillip to the sector, both by way of investment and tax reliefs, this sector needs substantial improvement.

The second area that needs attention is the bureaucratic stranglehold on policy-making. Apart from the fact that the speed of decision-making is still extremely slow, what is worrying is the mind-set. More than six decades after independence, the overhang of the”Raj” still remains. While an independent bureaucracy is certainly strength, one with the mind-set that prevails today is certainly an impediment.

The third problem area is that of distribution. The fruits of economic growth have not reached a large part of the population. While successive governments have undoubtedly announced a large number of schemes to help the poor, their implementation is slow and tardy. The uneven distribution is creating economic disparity leading to political unrest which in turn will reduce or halt economic progress.

Our profession has also undoubtedly benefited from economic liberalisation. Apart from the traditional areas of tax, accounting and audit, we now deliver a range of services. There are many chartered accountants who now act as strategic consultants in mergers acquisitions and other forms of business reorganisation. Even in the traditional areas of taxation, international tax has gained importance. Since business has become global, the language of business that is accounting has also attained an international perspective. Ind As, that is IFRS with Indian flavour have become applicable to certain entities with effect from 1st April 2016 and thereafter there will be a gradual adoption by others. The implementation thereof provides an opportunity and a challenge at the same time.

In the balance, this silver jubilee of economic liberalisation deserves celebration. India has undoubtedly come a long way, though the distance to be travelled is also significant. Let us hope that with the passing of the much awaited GST bill, a milestone in India’s economic progress will be reached. We will then take a giant step in the transformation from being a developing country to a world leader!

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 71 dated May 19, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d

Rupee Drawing Arrangement – Submission of statement/returns under XBRL

This circular states that banks have to submit the statement E on total remittances from the quarter ending June 2016 in eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) system which can be accessed at https://secweb. rbi.org.in/orfsxbrl/.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 79 dated June 30, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Deferred Payment Protocols dated April 30, 1981 and December 23, 1985 between Government of India and erstwhile USSR

With effect from June 20, 2016 the Rupee value of the Special Currency Basket has been fixed at Rs. 83.5796140 as against the earlier value of Rs. 80.9604520.

REMEMBERING A FRIEND

fiogf49gjkf0d

Poet Mareez is searching for a person with a truly noble heart; a person who helps one readily but does not make one feel helpless. I do not know about Mareez whether he found one, but I found such a friend in Narayan Varma. He was always ready and willing to help. He helped without making one feel helpless.

I have known him for 65 years. My very first memory of Narayan goes back to the year 1950. In our Sydenham College, on the landing between the ground floor and the first floor, I saw a poster in bold colourful letters. It said “Vote for Narayan Varma”. That was my first “acquaintance” with him. Even in those days he was a leader and a public figure! I did not know him well as he was a couple of years senior and we rarely had an occasion to meet.

Years rolled by. Both of us did our C.A. from different firms. It was BCA Society which brought us closer, particularly the Residential Refresher Courses of Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society where we all studied together and also enjoyed the warmth of true companionship. We shared truly happy times together. Narayan was very active participant and was always congenial and helpful.

Thinking of Narayan a quotation comes to my mind:

“Many people will walk in and out of your life. But only true friends will leave footprints on your heart.”

How very true! Only a few friends leave their footprints on one’s heart. Narayan was one such person, who left his footprints on the hearts of so many of us. He also left footprints on the sands of time. I am reminded of the lines from “A psalm of Life” by Poet Longfellow:

“Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime,
And departing, leave behind us
Footprints on the sands of time”

Narayan was like an elder brother to me, and I benefitted from his words of advice. In early 1970’s, the tax laws in our country were becoming from bad to worse, the tax rates were back breaking. We have so many taxes to deal with; income tax, wealth tax, gift tax, estate duty etc and the combined burden of all these taxes was killing. People thought of migrating. Some even migrated. Though more tax meant more work to us as professionals the atmosphere was becoming stiffing. Imagine a marginal tax rate of 97.75%, with the burden of wealth tax on top. Though I was not in such a tax bracket, it was indeed very depressing. I too started thinking of settling abroad. In desperation I talked with Narayan. I asked, “With a German wife, you can easily migrate, why are you still here?” His spontaneous reply was “Pradeep, somebody’s child may be more beautiful than my child. But still I will love my child more. India is my country; my motherland.” This put an end to my negative thinking. I am indebted to him for this valuable and timely advice.

After the tragic passing away of our daughter Amita in 1987 in the prime of her life (she was just 26 year at that time) we were lost. We wanted to do something in her memory, but did not know what to do. Narayan came up with the suggestion asking us to do something for leadership training of CAs and articles student. We accepted the suggestion. That was the starting point of leadership training courses at our Bombay Chartered Accountants’ Society. We today have Study Circle Meetings, Public Speaking Courses, Workshops on Management Books like and Annual Leadership Camps. All these came about because of the vision of Narayan Varma.

Varma passed away on 25th December 2015 after a long illness. His ailments did not deter him from action. Just a few months before he left us he received an email when in Breach Candy Hospital about someone in Ludhiana providing meals to poor people charging only Re.1/-. This galvanized him into action. From the hospital bed in ICU, he called up our co-workers of Dharm Bharathi Mission, asking them to do something on similar lines! This has resulted in a scheme to provide nutritious rich food packets to children suffering from cancer and undergoing treatment at Tata Memorial Cancer Hospital. This scheme was largely financed by Narayan. Narayan was a true Karma Yogi and toiled till the very end. Inspite of failing health, he came personally to Ghadge Maharaj Sanatorium when the first distribution of food packets was made to the children. Narayan was a person with indomitable spirit. He lived a noble life and is an inspiration to us. We cherish his memory and Endeavour to fulfill his dreams.

On Low Interest Rate Regime, Raghuraman Rajan takes critics head on

fiogf49gjkf0d
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor Raghuram Rajan tore into his critics on Monday, lobbying for a low interest rate regime to spur economic growth, by stating that such views are “hopelessly optimistic” about the powers of the central bank and any clever solutions in the form of unorthodox painless pathways lead to “depressingly orthodox consequences”.

Rajan was speaking at his first public engagement after expressing on Saturday his desire to go back to academia after his term at the central bank comes to an end on September 3. The outgoing central bank governor, dressed in a sharp black suit and maroon tie, was addressing a packed hall of students and members of academia at the foundation day of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR).

In a long speech that went into lucid explanations of how inflation and interest rate dynamics work in a monetary policy, Rajan, the academician, almost spelt out a point by point rebuttal to arguments charging RBI of misguided actions under his command. Defending his hawkish stance on inflation, Rajan said contrary to perceptions, savings rates have gone up in the economy as the savers are finally getting real interest rates in the form of low inflation. “In recent years, our fight against inflation also meant the policy rate came down only when we thought depositors could expect a reasonable positive real return on their financial savings. This has helped increase household financial savings relative to their savings in real assets, and helped bring down the current account deficit,” he said.

Critics in favour of targeting Wholesale Price Index (WPI) because it is low now would be eager to switch to Consumer Price Index (CPI) when WPI starts rising and crosses CPI, which it has done quite a few times in the past.

In fact, WPI is something that gets influenced by what global policymakers do rather than what RBI does and therefore, it should be CPI that needs to be the policy peg, the governor said.

“By focusing on WPI, we could be deluded into thinking we control inflation, even though it stems largely from actions of central banks elsewhere. In doing so we neglect CPI which is what matters to our common man, and is more the consequence of domestic monetary policy,” Rajan said, adding, “In doing so we neglect Consumer Price Index which is what matters to our common man, and is more the consequence of domestic monetary policy.”

Turning to the charge that RBI killed private investment by keeping rates too high, he said the policy rate in effect plays a balancing act.

Monetary policy is not responsible for high interest rates charged to highly indebted customers, but such companies are charged hefty risk premiums by banks as the lenders presume the loans may not get repaid. “This credit risk premium is largely independent of where the RBI sets its policy rate,” Rajan said.

The central bank also came under fire for the monetary policy failing to show effects on inflation when the economy is supply constrained, especially in case of food inflation. “The reality is that while it is hard for us to control food demand, especially of essential foods, and only the government can influence food supply through effective management, we can control demand for other, more discretionary, items in the consumption basket through tighter monetary policy,” Rajan said. Rajan said the central bank was prepared to face any volatility that may arise due to Brexit. “Brexit can be quite damaging if it happens. Of course, we have factored in some probability of it happening. If it doesn’t happen, you could see some significant rebound. We are preparing for it and monitoring the markets. We have said earlier that we have three lines of defences – good policy, we have pushed out the maturities of foreign borrowings and they are not significantly worrisome at this point, and finally we have plenty of reserves,” Rajan said. “We will do what it takes to moderate market volatility, but once the initial bouts of wave abate, people look for good fundamentals.”

(Source: News Report in Business Standard dated 21.06.2016)

Notification No. FEMA 10 (R) / 2015-RB dated January 21, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Foreign Exchange Management (Foreign currency accounts by a person resident in India) Regulations, 2015

This Notification repeals and replaces the earlier Notification No. FEMA 10/2000-RB dated May 3, 2000 pertaining to Foreign Exchange Management (Foreign currency accounts by a person resident in India) Regulations, 2000.

Further, this Notification contains regulations updated up to June 01, 2016 with respect to Foreign currency accounts by a person resident in India (including changes made vide Notification No. FEMA 10 (R) / (1) / 2016-RB dated June 01, 2016, mentioned above).

Notification No. FEMA 10 (R)/(1)/2016-RB dated June 01, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Foreign Exchange Management (Foreign Currency Accounts by a person resident in India) (Amendment) Regulations, 2016

This Notification has made the following changes in Regulation 10(R): –

Amendment to Regulation 5

A. The existing sub-regulation (E) shall be renumbered as (F).

B. In the re-numbered regulation (F), the existing subregulation (3) shall be substituted by the following namely:

“Insurance/reinsurance companies registered with Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDA) to carry out insurance/reinsurance business may open, hold and maintain a Foreign Currency Account with a bank outside India for the purpose of meeting the expenditure incidental to the insurance/reinsurance business carried on by them and for that purpose, credit to such account the insurance/reinsurance premia received by them outside India.”

C. After the existing sub-regulation (D), the following shall be inserted namely: –

“(E) Accounts in respect of Startups

An Indian startup or any other entity as may be notified by the Reserve Bank in consultation with the Central Government, having an overseas subsidiary, may open a foreign currency account with a bank outside India for the purpose of crediting to it foreign exchange earnings out of exports / sales made by the said entity and / or the receivables, arising out of exports / sales, of its overseas subsidiary.

Provided that the balances in the account shall be repatriated to India within the period prescribed in Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) Regulations, 2015 dated January 12, 2016, as amended from time to time, for realization of export proceeds.

Explanation: For the purpose of this sub-regulation a ‘startup’ means an entity which complies with the conditions laid down in Notification No. G.S.R 180(E) dated February 17, 2016 issued by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.”

Amendment to Schedule 1

In Paragraph 1, in sub-paragraph (1), after the existing clause (vi), the following shall be inserted namely: – “vii) Payments received in foreign exchange by an Indian startup, or any other entity as may be notified by the Reserve Bank in consultation with the Central Government, arising out of exports/ sales made by the said entity or its overseas subsidiaries, if any.

Explanation: For the purpose of this schedule a ‘startup’ means an entity which complies with the conditions laid down in Notification No. G.S.R 180(E) dated February 17, 2016 issued by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.”

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 74 dated May 26, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Export Data Processing and Monitoring System (EDPMS) – Additional modules for caution listing of exporters, reporting of advance remittance for exports and migration of old XOS data

This circular contains details of proposed enhancements to the EDMS system which will be operational from June 15, 2016. The enhancements are in the areas of Caution / De-caution Listing of Exporters, Reporting of Advance Remittance for Exports & Export Outstanding Statement.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 73 dated May 26, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA) Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000 (the Rules) – Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999

This circular states that RBI will upload on its web site www.rbi.org.in all compounding orders passed on or after June 1, 2016.

Further, annexed to this circular are the guidelines, along with examples, used by RBI for calculating the amount imposed under Section 13 of FEMA. The said Annex is as under: –

II. The above amounts are presently subject to the following provisos, viz.

(i) the amount imposed should not exceed 300% of the amount of contravention

(ii) In case the amount of contravention is less than Rs. One lakh, the total amount imposed should not be more than amount of simple interest @5% p.a. calculated on the amount of contravention and for the period of the contravention in case of reporting contraventions and @10% p.a. in respect of all other contraventions.

(iii) In case of paragraph 8 of Schedule I to FEMA 20/2000 RB contraventions, the amount imposed will be further graded as under:

a. If the shares are allotted after 180 days without the prior approval of Reserve Bank, 1.25 times the amount calculated as per table above (subject to provisos at (i) & (ii) above).
b. If the shares are not allotted and the amount is refunded after 180 days with the Bank’spermission: 1.50 times the amount calculated as per table above (subject to provisos at (i) & (ii) above).
c. If the shares are not allotted and the amount is refunded after 180 days without the Bank’s permission: 1.75 times the amount calculated as per table above (subject to provisos at (i) & (ii) above).

(iv) In cases where it is established that the contravenor has made undue gains, the amount thereof may be neutralized to a reasonable extent by adding the same to the compounding amount calculated as per chart.

(v) If a party who has been compounded earlier applies for compounding again for similar contravention, the amount calculated as above may be enhanced by 50%.

III. For calculating amount in respect of reporting contraventions under para I.1 above, the period of contravention may be considered proportionately {(approx. rounded off to next higher month ÷ 12) X amount for 1 year}. The total no. of days does not exclude Sundays / holidays.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 72 dated May 26, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Memorandum of Procedure for channeling transactions through Asian Clearing Union (ACU)

Presently, the minimum amounts for which transactions can be channelized through the ACU mechanism is US $ 25,000 / € 25,000 and thereafter the amounts should be in multiples of US $ 1,000 / € 1,000.

The circular has reduced the minimum as well as multiples amount for which transactions can be channelized through the ACU mechanism. Hence, the new minimum amounts are US $ 500 / € 500 and the amounts should be in multiples of US $ 500 / € 500.

Notification No. FEMA 368/2016-RB dated May 20, 2016

fiogf49gjkf0d
Given below are the highlights of certain RBI Circulars & Notifications

Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) (Seventh Amendment) Regulations, 2016

Vide this amendment a new regulation – Regulation 10A has been inserted in Notification No. FEMA. 20/2000-RB dated 3rd May 2000 – Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or issue of Security by a Person Resident outside India) Regulations, 2000. This Regulation 10A permits deferment of 25% of the total consideration for a period of 18 months with respect to payment for transfer of shares between a resident and non-resident.

The said Regulation is as under: –

“10A. In case of transfer of shares between a resident buyer and a non-resident seller or vice-versa, not more than twenty five per cent of the total consideration can be paid by the buyer on a deferred basis within a period not exceeding eighteen months from the date of the transfer agreement. For this purpose, if so agreed between the buyer and the seller, an escrow arrangement may be made between the buyer and the seller for an amount not more than twenty five per cent of the total consideration for a period not exceeding eighteen months from the date of the transfer agreement or if the total consideration is paid by the buyer to the seller, the seller may furnish an indemnity for an amount not more than twenty five per cent of the total consideration for a period not exceeding eighteen months from the date of the payment of the full consideration.

Provided the total consideration finally paid for the shares must be compliant with the applicable pricing guidelines.”

SEBI imposes restrictions on Wilful defaulters – concerns also for independent directors & auditors

fiogf49gjkf0d
The Securities and Exchange Board of India has joined and followed the Reserve Bank of India in imposing restrictions on `wilful defaulters’ from raising monies from the public. The step is laudable. Defaults, while a necessary risk of lending/investing, are a problem enough for lenders and investors. The tedious laws relating to taking action against them aggravate these problems. However, when persons default not due to difficulties but out of deliberate defiance, law does need to go an extra mile. Naming and shaming them is of course one step. However, now, SEBI, following RBI, has imposed certain restrictions on them from raising capital from the markets.

There are, however, difficulties. The definition of `wilful defaulter’ is felt to be a little too broad. The process for labelling a borrower a `wilful defaulter’ too has raised questions. There are concerns about independent and non-executive directors as to how they will be affected, though at least on paper there is some relief. As will be seen later, such matters have gone in litigation and Court had already read down the rules to some extent. These concerns are more since labelling as `willful defaulter’ would have a cascading effect on companies where such persons may be directors. Generally, auditors too of `wilful defaulters’ would be affected since there are provisions for debarring them from being given more work, etc. if they are found at fault.

Summary of new requirements
There already exist some restrictions on `wilful defaulters’ in the SEBI Regulations. However, now, SEBI has amended its Regulations relating to raising monies by issue of securities and also taking control of companies by `wilful defaulters’.

An issuer who is a `wilful defaulter’ is debarred from making any public issue of its equity securities. This bar will also apply if any of its directors or promoters is a `wilful defaulter’. Public issue of convertible debt instruments or debt securities are also barred in such cases. Further, if it is in default of repayment of principal amount of it debt instruments/debt securities or in payment of interest thereon for more than six months, then too such bar will apply. Certain disclosures are also required in respect of the `wilful default’ where issue is by way of private placement. This will ensure that subscribers know about such past defaults.

The bar does not cover issue of equity securities on `right basis’. However, certain disclosures would have to be made to ensure that the subscribers are made aware of the fact that the issuer is a `wilful defaulter’. Further, the promoters or the promoter group cannot renounce their rights except within the promoter group.

SEBI has also debarred `wilful defaulters’ from making open offers for acquiring shares under the Takeover Regulations. They are also barred from entering into any transaction that could result into attraction of obligation of making such an open offer. However, if someone else makes an open offer, then the `wilful defaulter’ can make a competing bid by way of an open offer. The intention is apparent. `Wilful defaulters’ would thus be prevented from taking control of a listed company or consolidating their stake therein.

Definition of `wilful defaulter’
The SEBI Regulations that impose restrictions on `wilful defaulters’ define the term as follows:-

“wilful defaulter” means an issuer who is categorized as a `wilful defaulter’ by any bank or financial institution or consortium thereof, in accordance with the guidelines on `wilful defaulters’ issued by the Reserve Bank of India and includes an issuer whose director or promoter is categorized as such.”

Thus, SEBI will effectively follow lead of the Reserve Bank  of India. Hence, if a person is categorized as a `wilful defaulter’ by the banks/financial institutions in accordance with the guidelines of RBI, he would also become a `willful defaulter’ for the purposes of SEBI Regulations. Promoter or director of a wilful defaulter would also be categorized a `wilful defaulter’. 

The Master Circular of the Reserve Bank of India on `Wilful Defaulters’ dated 1st July 2014 has defined `wilful default’ as follows:-

“A “wilful default” would be deemed to have occurred if any of the following events is noted:-

(a) The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender even when it has the capacity to honour the said obligations.

(b) The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has not utilised the finance from the lender for the specific purposes for which finance was availed of but has diverted the funds for other purposes.

(c) The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has siphoned off the funds so that the funds have not been utilised for the specific purpose for which finance was availed of, nor are the funds available with the unit in the form of other assets.

d) The unit has defaulted in meeting its payment / repayment obligations to the lender and has also disposed off or removed the movable fixed assets or immovable property given by him or it for the purpose of securing a term loan without the knowledge of the bank/lender.

There are some points that can be observed from the above definition. For a person to be held to be a wilful defaulter, he needs to have made a default in meeting his payment/repayment obligations to the lender. This is a primary and obvious pre-condition. Such a defaulter would thus become a `wilful defaulter’ if he is found to have done one or more additional wrongs. For example, he may have capacity to honor his obligations and yet he defaults. He may have not utilised the finance for the specific purpose for which it was raised but diverted the funds for other purposes, or he has siphoned off the funds and such funds are not available with the unit in the form of other assets. Finally, he has disposed of or removed assets given as security without the knowledge of the lender.

The term diversion or siphoning of funds has been elaborated further and the meaning seems to go not just beyond the ordinary meaning but also to a situation where there can be serious difficulties. For example, “transferring borrowed funds to the subsidiaries / Group companies or other corporates by whatever modalities;” is also deemed to be diversion/siphoning. Now it is of course true that funds are often siphoned off through the subsidiary/group companies route. However, bonafide investments are also needed to be made through such entities. Deeming such investments in hindsight to be siphoning off can be harsh. A similar difficulty arises in respect of another category of deemed siphoning which reads “investment in other companies by way of acquiring equities / debt instruments without approval of lenders”. One trusts that these words are read in context of the original definition and that such deeming would apply only if such investments were in violation of the specific terms on which the finance was given.

Where Independent Directors/Nonexecutive directors are declared as `wilful defaulters’

The SEBI Regulations specifically provide that a person is declared as a `wilful defaulter’, then the companies where he is a director or a promoter would also be deemed to be a `wilful defaulter’. This is irrespective whether the director is a non-executive director or an independent director. This thus would have a wider effect. However, fortunately, this deeming is not the other way round too. If a company is held to be a `wilful defaulter’, its directors are not automatically deemed to be `wilful defaulters’.

As regards independent/non-executive directors, the RBI’s Master Circular does require that the principles for determining whether such a person is a `officer in default’ under the Companies Act, 2013 would be applied here. Thus, unless such an independent/non-executive director can be so held, he would not be considered a `wilful defaulter’.

However, once a persons is held to be a `wilful defaulter’, there is a cascading effect. The other companies where he is also a director would be required by its lender banks/ financial institutions to remove him.

It is interesting to note that the original wide reach of the Rules has been reducedto an extent by the Gujarathas been reducedto an extent by the Gujarat High Court, in Ionic Metalliks vs. Union of India (128 SCL 316 (Gujarat)[2015]), the court has held that the Master Circular, so far as it said that all the directors of the `wilful defaulter’ company would also become `wilful defaulters’ is arbitrary and unreasonable. To this extent, the Circular has been declared as ultra vires the powers of RBI and has been declared to be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The Master Circular now provides for caution and requires, that the conditions under the Companies Act, 2013, for holding a director as officer in default should be applied.

Cut off amount of Rs. 25 lakhs of lending for categoriSation of `wilful defaulters’

Wilful defaulters of any amount would attract various consequences as applicable under law. However, the Master Circular provides that “…keeping in view the present limit of Rs. 25 lakh fixed by the Central Vigilance Commission for reporting of cases of `wilful default’ by the banks/FIs to RBI, any wilful defaulter with an outstanding balance of Rs. 25 lakh or more, would attract the penal measures stipulated at para 2.5 below. This limit of Rs. 25 lakh may also be applied for the purpose of taking cognisance of the instances of ‘siphoning’ / ‘diversion’ of funds”.

Process of declaration of a person as a `wilful defaulter’

An elaborate, transparent and multi-level process has been laid down in the Master Circular to declare a person as a wilful defaulter. A Committee consisting of an Executive Director and two other senior officers of rank of general manager/deputy general manager would examine the evidence whether there was a case of `wilful default’. If it is so concluded, a show cause notice would be issued to the company and its whole-time directors/ promoters and their submissions, including in personal hearing if deemed fit to be given, would be noted. Finally, another Committee headed by Chairman/CEO/MD of the Bank and consisting of two independent directors would review and take a final decision. While this process does sound reasonable, concerns are also raised since the process can be subjective and that it is the lender itself who takes the final decision. In this context, the Gujarat High Court, in the matter of Ionic Metalliks vs. Union of India (ibid) can be usefully referred to for its observations.

Conclusion
`Wilful default’ is something that cannot be generally defended. However, it is necessary that, considering the disclosure, restrictions, etc. that the process of declaring entities and individuals as willful defaulters is fair, transparent and objective. The consequences on persons having no direct role can be devastating in terms of reputation and business both. At the same time, it serves as caution to directors of companies to be extra vigilant in companies on whose board they serve. Considering, the already heavy responsibilities of non-executive/ independent directors under the Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI’s norms on corporate governance, like other laws, this is yet one more reason deterring individuals from coming forward to serve on Board of companies.

Euthanasia– The Right to Die

fiogf49gjkf0d
Introduction
We have all heard that a Will takes effect when a person dies. However, a Living Will is different than a regular Will since it takes effect even when a person is alive. A Living Will is increasingly gaining popularity the world over. It is defined as a document executed by a person in his lifetime which states his desire to have or not to have extraordinary life prolonging measures when recovery is not possible from his terminal condition. It is also known as a medical power of attorney. Its popularity stems from the fact that it lays down the desire of a person as to how he should be medically treated in case he is not in a position to exercise his discretion. The US President Barrack Obama publicly announced that he has prepared a Living Will and encouraged others to also do so. Thus, should a person in a coma or a vegetative state remain so or does he have the right to prescribe beforehand that he desires to end his suffering? Is it valid in India? Let us analyse.

Indian Judicial controversy over Euthanasia
Euthanasia is a derivative of two Greek words and means ‘good death’. The more popular meaning is mercy killing. Thus, it denotes the act of terminating a terminally ill patient / person suffering from a very painful condition in order to putting an end to his suffering. The world over there is a raging controversy over whether euthanasia is valid or not. It is also known as physician assisted suicide. In India, an attempt to commit suicide is a punishable offence under the Indian Penal Code. Hence, the issue which arises is whether a physician assisted suicide or euthanasia is valid? Three Supreme Courts have analysed this issue in great detail.

Smt. Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648
In this case, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of the constitutional validity of the Indian Penal Code which deems attempt to suicide to be a criminal offence. The Court upheld the validity of this section and also discussed certain aspects of euthanasia. It analysed Art. 21 of the Constitution which guarantees the Right to Life and held that to give meaning and content to the word ‘life’ in Article 21, it has been construed as life with human dignity. Any aspect of life which makes it dignified may be read into it but not that which extinguishes it and is, therefore, inconsistent with the continued existence of life resulting in effacing the right itself. The right to die’, if any, is inherently inconsistent with the right to life’ as is death’ with life’. It further held that propagating euthanasia on the view that being in a persistent vegetative state is not of benefit to a patient with terminal illness cannot be an aid to determine whether the guarantee of right to life’ in Article 21 includes the right to die’. The right to life’ including the right to live with human dignity would mean the existence of such a right up to the end of natural life. This also includes the right to a dignified life up to the point of death including a dignified procedure of death. In other words, this may include the right of a dying man to also die with dignity when his life is ebbing out. But the ‘right to die’ with dignity at the end of life cannot be confused or equated with the right to die’ an unnatural death curtailing the natural span of life. The Court raised a question whether a terminally ill patient or one in a persistent vegetative may be permitted to terminate it by a premature extinction of his life? It felt that such category of cases may fall within the ambit of the ‘right to die’ with dignity as a part of right to live with dignity, i.e., cases when death due to termination of natural life is certain and imminent and the process of natural death has commenced. These are not cases of extinguishing life but only of accelerating the process of natural death which has already commenced. Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the debate even in such cases to permit physician assisted termination of life is inconclusive. Thus, the Court did not give any definitive ruling.

Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug vS. UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454
This was the famous case of Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug, the nurse who was in a vegetative state for over 38 years. A Writ Petition was filed by a social activist on her behalf urging the Supreme Court to permit mercy killing since there was no hope of recovery. Disallowing the plea, the Supreme Court embarked upon an extensive disposition on the topic of euthanasia in India and internationally.

The Court explained that euthanasia is of two types : active and passive. Active euthanasia entails the use of lethal substances or forces to kill a person e.g. a lethal injection given to a person with terminal cancer who is in terrible agony. Passive euthanasia entails withholding of medical treatment for continuance of life, for example, if a patient requires kidney dialysis to survive, not giving dialysis although the machine is available, is passive euthanasia. Similarly, if a patient is in coma or on a heart lung machine, withdrawing of the machine will ordinarily result in passive euthanasia. Similarly, not giving lifesaving medicines like antibiotics in certain situations may result in passive euthanasia. Denying food to a person in coma may also amount to passive euthanasia. The general legal position all over the world seems to be that while active euthanasia is illegal unless there is legislation permitting it, passive euthanasia is legal even without legislation provided certain conditions and safeguards are maintained. An important idea behind this distinction is that in “passive euthanasia” the doctors are not actively killing anyone; they are simply not saving him. Active euthanasia is legal in certain European countries, such as, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium but passive euthanasia has a far wider acceptance in the USA, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, etc.

It made a further categorisation of euthanasia between voluntary euthanasia and non voluntary euthanasia. Voluntary euthanasia is where the consent is taken from the patient, whereas non voluntary euthanasia is where the consent is unavailable e.g. when the patient is in coma, or is otherwise unable to give consent. While there is no legal difficulty in the case of the former, the latter poses several problems

It observed that the Constitution Bench of the Indian Supreme Court in Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab, 1996(2) SCC 648 held that both, euthanasia and assisted suicide, are not lawful in India. It further observed that Gian Kaur has not clarified who can decide whether life support should be discontinued in the case of an incompetent person e.g. a person in coma or persistent vegetative state. This vexed question has been arising often in India because there are a large number of cases where a person goes into coma (due to an accident or some other reason) or for some other reason is unable to give consent, and then the question arises as to who should give consent for withdrawal of life support. The Court discussed the question as to when can a person said to be dead and concluded that one is dead when one’s brain is dead. The Court observed that there appeared little possibility of Aruna Shanbaug coming out of her permanent vegetative state. In all probability, she will continue to be in the state in which she is in till her death. The question now was whether her life support system should be withdrawn, and at whose instance? The Court said even though there were no Guidelines in India on this issue, it agreed that passive euthanasia should be permitted India. Accordingly, it framed guidelines for the same till Parliament framed a Law and stated that this procedure should be followed all over India until Parliament makes legislation on this subject:

(i) A decision has to be taken to discontinue life support either by the parents or the spouse or other close relatives, or in the absence of any of them, such a decision can be taken even by a person or a body ofpersons acting as a next friend. It can also be taken by the doctors attending the patient. It must be taken bona fide in the best interest of the patient.

(ii) Such a decision requires approval from the High Court, more so in India as one cannot rule out the possibility of mischief being done by relatives or others for inheriting the property of the patient.

(iii) In the case of an incompetent person who is unable to take a decision whether to withdraw life support or not, it is the Court alone, which ultimately must take this decision, though, no doubt, the views of the near relatives, next friend and doctors must be given due weightage.

(iv) When such an application is filed, a Bench of at least two Judges should decide based on an opinion of a committee of three reputed doctors, preferably a neurologist, a psychiatrist, and a physician.The committee of doctors should carefully examine the patient and also consult the record of the patient as well as taking the views of the hospital staff and submit its report to the High Court Bench.

(v) The Court shall also issue notice to the State and close relatives of the patient e.g. parents, spouse, brothers/ sisters etc. of the patient, and in their absence his next friend. After hearing them, the High Court bench should give its verdict.

(vi) The High Court should give its decision speedily at the earliest, since delay in the matter may result in causing great mental agony to the relatives and persons close to the patient.

Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not lay down any guidelines on the concept of a living Will. Thus, while it upheld passive euthanasia, it did not suggest adhering to guidelines on treatment laid down by the patient himself.

Common Cause vS. UOI, WP (Civil) 215/2005 (SC)
This is the latest decision on the issue of euthanasia. In this case, an express plea was made before the Court to recognise the concept of a Living Will. which can be presented to hospital for appropriate action in the event of the executant being admitted to the hospital with serious illness which may threaten termination of life of the executant. It was contended that the denial of the right to die leads to extension of pain and agony both physical as well as mental which can be ended by making an informed choice by way of people clearly expressing their wishes in advance called “a Living Will” in the event of their going into a state when it will not be possible for them to express their wishes.

The Supreme Court analysed both Gian Kaur and Aruna Shanbaug’s decisions explained above. It held that in Gian Kaur, the Constitution Bench did not express any binding view on the subject of euthanasia rather reiterated that legislature would be the appropriate authority to bring the change.

It felt that in Aruna Shanbaug’s case, the Court upheld the validity of passive euthanasia and laid down an elaborate procedure for executing the same on the wrong premise that the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaurhad upheld the same. Hence, it felt that Aruna’s decision proceeded on an incorrect footing.

Finally the Court held that although the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur upheld that the ‘right to live with dignity’ under Article 21 is inclusive of ‘right to die with dignity’, the decision does not arrive at a conclusion for validity of euthanasia be it active or passive. So, the only judgment that holds the field in regard to euthanasia in India is Aruna Shanbaug which is based on an incorrect understanding of an earlier decision. Considering the important question of law involved which needs to be reflected in the light of social, legal, medical and constitutional perspective and the unclear legal position, the Apex Court held that it becomes extremely important to have a clear enunciation of the law. Thus, it felt that this issue requires careful consideration by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court for the benefit of humanity as a whole. Hence, the matter was placed before the Constitution Bench. The case is still pending and is expected to be disposed of soon.

Recent Legislation
The Government has recently introduced a draft Bill titled “The Medical Treatment of Terminally-Ill Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners)”. The key features of this Bill are as follows:

(a) Every competent person who is a major, i.e., above 16 years (yes you read it right, not 18 years) can take a decision on whether or not he should be given / discontinued medical treatment. Thus, in India, a person cannot drive, cannot drink, cannot vote, cannot marry, cannot contract, cannot be tried for an offence as an adult, before he / she turns 18, but such a person can take a decision about whether or not he wants to live? A bit paradoxical, would you not say?

If such a decision is given to a doctor then it is binding on him, provided the doctor satisfies himself that the patient has given it upon free will. Further, a competent patient is one who can take an informed decision about the nature of his illness and the consequences of treatment or absence of it. It would be very difficult for a doctor to determine whether or not the patient is a competent or incompetent person. How would he also determine the free will of a patient? Most doctors would be wary of taking such a subjective call and hence, in most cases would fear turning off life support systems or withdrawing medical treatment. This provision totally takes away the right to die of a patient.

(b) The doctor must then inform the close relatives about the decision of the patient and wait for 3 days before giving effect to the decision to withdraw treatment.

(c) Any close relative may apply to the High Court for obtaining permission in case of an incompetent patient or a competent one who has taken an uninformed decision. The Court will then appoint 3 experts to examine the patient and then give its decision by following a process similar to the that laid down in Aruna Shanbaug’s case. The Bill states that as far as practicable the Court must dispose of the case within a month. Is this possible? Further, why should a terminally ill patient suffer even for a day let alone a month?

(d) A Living Will / advanced medical directive is one given by a person stating whether to give medical treatment in case he becomes terminally ill. The Bill states that such a living Will is void and not binding on any doctor. It is surprising that while Parliament thought it fit to enact a law on passive euthanasia, it has not yet allowed a living Will. Rather than moving a Court, a Living Will would have been the answer to many vexed questions. One hopes that the final version of this all important law permits a Living Will.

Conclusion
While a Living Will is currently not accepted in India, one must nevertheless prepare one. One never knows when the tide may turn and the same may be legally accepted in India. In any event, it would surely have persuasive value if an application is to be made to a High Court since it indicates the wishes of the patient himself. One hopes that the Parliament and the Medical Council of India join hands to frame detailed guidelines to give legal sanctity to Living Wills. While it is important to permit them, there must also be safeguards to protect against misuse of the same. A Living Will must not become a tool to get rid of old / ill relatives in an easy manner. As rightly remarked by the Supreme Court,

“This is an extremely important question in India because of the unfortunate low level of ethical standards to which our society has descended, its raw and widespread commercialisation, and the rampant corruption, and hence, the Court has to be very cautious that unscrupulous persons who wish to inherit the property of someone may not get him eliminated by some crooked method”.

(Gearing up!)

fiogf49gjkf0d
(Gearing up!)

Arjun (A) —Hey Bhagwan, with great devotion I am offering my pranam to you!

Shrikrishna (S) — What happened to you suddenly? We have been meeting so often, but you never started with such ‘pranam’!

A — Bhagwan, I didn’t say it so expressly earlier. I always bow before you. I pray you and seek blessings from you.

S — You are always blessed. But what is the special reason today?

A — No; I was just wondering how I will cope up with the work of audits and tax returns. The season has started! Next 3 to 4 months is a ‘kurukshetra’ – battlefield for us CAs.

S — But this is going on for so many years. What is frightening you so much this year?

A — I believe, this year they are not going to extend the due date! We are always banking on extension.

S — But why do you need extension every year? Can you not plan the work well in advance?

A — It is easy to say so, but difficult to implement.

S— Why?

A — Every month we are busy meeting some deadline or the other. Recently I am told, a reputed bank recruited many employees. Out of them, 80% are for compliances and only 20% for business promotion!

S — Oh! But don’t you agree that such compliances are required for having financial discipline? And you have so much of automation at your disposal.

A — I agree. Still, it is rather too much.

S — Then that is your work opportunity. Look at it positively.

A — But every year they add something new. Our time goes in updating ourselves.

S— What is new this year?

A — So many things! CARO report is changed. They have added many points. Then Ind ASs. And on the top of it that ICDS in Income Tax!

S — What have you done to keep yourself updated? Good that you have compulsory CPE hours – continuous education. At least something you can know. Thereafter, you can study on your own.

A — What you say is right. But our CAs look at CPE hours also as a compliance! They are rarely interested in the lecture.

S — Then what do they do?

A — They just enrol themselves by paying fees. Then either leave the venue and re-appear at the closing hours to sign the attendance sheet. Otherwise, they doze off in the auditorium, sitting at the back. Or depute a proxy!

S — So, people also ‘manage’ CPE hours

A — Yes. Now I am told, they are going to increase the hours.

S — Unfortunately, many of you don’t appreciate the spirit behind CPE hours. How can one do such a demanding profession without updating the knowledge? You should not only upgrade your own knowledge and skills; but also see to it that your staff and trainees are also properly trained.

A — Ah! These days articles (trainees) are absolutely of no use. They have their own priorities. Exam and leave! I wonder why they join articles. And work-wise mostly they are a big zero!

S — Arjun, tell me how much time you have spent to train up your articles? Do you have proper systems in office? Do you implement what you studied in audit subject?

A — True. We are not ourselves well organised. We have no reference files of audit-clients, we don’t do proper documentation. But we have to work under so many constraints! No space, no manpower……

S— I appreciate that. But what is basically lacking is the will power. Anyway, for audit whatever is essential, have you started doing?

A — Like what?

S — Basically, third party confirmations from banks, debtors, creditors…….

A — Who has time to do all that? Our clients never listen to us.

S — No; but somewhere you need to take a firm stand. If you tell them at the last moment, they will resist. You have to insist or indicate to your client that you would then have to put a remark in the report.

A — What you say is right. We need to be more pro-active and assertive. We need to gear up on all fronts. It is high time. We need to wake up!

S— Yes. I suggest you can also see your last year’s files, make checklist, send mails to clients….

A — Yes. And I think, I should take out some time and study important laws applicable to my clients. This will help me in my audit work also

S— Arjun, be also very particular about your documentation. This makes things easier.

A — Yes. You are right.

S— Infact, you should be alert all the time. This will help you in being pro-active automatically. And that is precisely your Institute’s motto – Ya Esha Supteshu Jagarti!

Om Shanti.

Precedent – Judicial discipline – Tribunal cannot assume power to declare judgement of division Bench of Court as per incuriam and refuse to follow it. [Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, Section 6B]

fiogf49gjkf0d
State of Karnataka vs. Deccan Sales Corporation Ltd [2016] 87 VST 265 (Karn).

Reassessment u/s. 12-A of the Act was passed on the basis of the judgment dated 25.11.2004 of this Court in the case of Pali Chemical Industries, Nippani, Belgaum vs. The Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Zone-I, Bangalore and another reported in 2005 (58) KLJ 54 (HC) (DB), that the chemical fertilizer mixture is not eligible for exemption from turn over tax even if its components have already suffered local tax under the Act.

The Tribunal after noticing that, while delivering the judgment in Pali Chemical Industries case, the decision in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Kothari Industrial Corporation, reported in 2000-01 (5) K.C.T.J. 193 was not noticed or brought before the Hon’ble High Court by the parties concerned in Pali Chemical Industries case, held that the judgment in Pali Chemical Industries case cannot be considered as a binding precedent.

The High Court observed that we would like to place on record that we are very much disturbed by the tendency exhibited by the lower authorities in refusing to follow the law laid down by this Court saying that the same is not binding on them merely because other binding precedents are not taken into consideration in those judgments. It appears that the Tribunal has assumed the power to declare the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court as per incuriam and thereby refused to follow the judgment. The justification for such a course of action is that it is permitted to do so by another Division Bench. If this tendency is not nipped in the bud, we are afraid that there will be total lawlessness especially in the branch of Taxation Law.

The High Court further held that if another Division Bench of this Court is not persuaded to accept the said view, the only course open is to place relevant papers before the Hon’ble Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matter.

It is high time that the lower authorities learn to maintain judicial discipline and stop showing disrespect to the constitutional ethos. Breach of discipline has great impact on the credibility of the judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that practicability and certainty is a hallmark of the judicial jurisprudence developed in the country in the last six decades.

Precedent – Stay – Strictures – Recovery of demand by adjustment of refund from stayed demand – In identical case for different years of the same assessee such mode of recovery was set aside by the High Court and revenue was unable to show how facts were different this time around. Recovery was set aside. Warning that officers would in future be personally liable.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Larsen & Toubro Ltd vs. UOI 2016 (335) E.L.T. 215 (Bom)

The Bombay High Court held that officers after officers are reluctant to take decisions for the consequences might be drastic for them. No officer is acting independently and following judgments of this Court, but waiting for the superiors to give them a nod. Even the superiors are reluctant given the status of the assessee and the quantum of the demand or the refund claim. We are sure that some day we would be required to step in and order action against such officers who refuse to comply with the Court judgments and which are binding on them as they fear drastic consequences or unless their superiors have given them the green signal. If there is such reluctance, then, we do not find any enthusiasm much less encouragement for business entities to do business in India or with Indian business entitles. Such negative reactions / responses hurt eventually the National pride and image. It is time that the officers inculcate in them a habit of following and implementing judicial orders which bind them and unmindful of the response of their superiors. That would generate the right support from all, including those who come forward to pay taxes and sometimes voluntarily. Hereafter if such orders are not withdrawn despite binding Division Bench judgments of this Court that would visit the officials with individual penalties, including forfeiture of their salaries until they take a corrective action. If any approval or nod is required from superiors that should also be granted expeditiously and while obeying the court orders, the officers can always reserve the Revenue’s rights to challenge them in appropriate legal proceedings. A copy of order be sent to the Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Government of India and the Chairman, Central Board of Excise and Customs.

Non-compete fees- Income or capital- Discontinuation of business pursuant to noncompete agreement- A. Y. 2000-01- Section 28(va) inserted w.e.f. 01/04/2003 is not retrospective- Amount received pursuant to negative covenant is capital receipt-

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. TTK Healthcare Ltd.; 385 ITR 326 (Mad):

The assessee was manufacturing condoms and gloves and the LI group was in the business of manufacturing rubber contraceptives all over the world on its own and through its subsidiaries. Assessee entered into a non compete agreement with the LI group for discontinuing its condom business. LI group paid 4,99,000 pounds as noncompete fees to assessee. The assessee claimed the noncompete fees to be capital receipt. The Assessing Officer treated the amount as revenue receipt. The Tribunal held that the amount was capital receipt.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The litmus test whether a compensation received by the assessee towards a negative covenant of noncompete clause is whether or not the impairment is one of the assessee’s sources of income and if the answer is that the injury has been caused to one of its sources of income, then it is enough to render the compensation received in that process a capital receipt. At any rate, w.e.f. April 1, 2003, by virtue of introduction of section 28(va) in the Income-tax Act, 1961 all monies received pursuant to a negative covenant become liable for the incidence of taxation, thus obliterating the distinction between the two that was available till then.

ii) The amount of 4,99,000 pounds paid by LI group was liable to be treated as a measure of compensation towards the negative covenant between the assessee and the LI group. It was not necessary that the assessee shelves all its other sources of income as well, for the receipt of compensation to amount to capital receipt.”

Charitable purpose- Cancellation of registration- Section 2(15) and 12AA(3) of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2009-10- Disqualification for exemption where receipts from commercial activities exceed Rs. 25 lakhs- No change in nature of activities- Assessee entitled to continued registration-

fiogf49gjkf0d
DIT(Exem) vs. Khar Gymkhana; 385 ITR 162 (Bom):

The assessee is a charitable trust covered by the last limb in the definition u/s. 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 “general public utility”. In the A. Y. 2009-10, the assessee was not eligible for the exemption in view of the fact that receipts from commercial activities exceeded Rs. 25 lakh. There was no change in the nature of activities. DIT(Exemption) cancelled the registration on this ground. The Tribunal restored the registration.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) CBDT circular No. 21 of 2016 dated 27/05/2016 clarified that it shall not be mandatory to cancel the registration already granted u/s. 12AA to a charitable institution merely on the ground that the cut off specified in proviso to section 2(15) is exceeded in a particular year without there being any change in the nature of activities of the institution.

ii) The Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee was entitled to continued registration u/s. 12A of the Act and in setting aside the cancellation of its registration on the ground that its receipts from commercial activities exceeded Rs. 25 lakh in the year.”

Business expenditure: Section 37(1) of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2003-04- Assessee paid stamp duty for a contract executed with State Road Transport corporation in course of business- Since stamp duty paid by appellant during year under consideration was a compulsory statutory levy and it would not restrict profits of future years and was incurred wholly and exclusively for purpose of business- It must be allowed in its entirety in year in which it was incurred and it could not be spread over a number of years-

fiogf49gjkf0d
Prithvi Associates vs. ACIT; [2016] 71 taxmann.com 163 (Guj):

The assessee paid stamp duty in relation to contract executed with Maharashtra State Road Transport corporation. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the said expenditure. CIT(A) allowed the claim but the Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee the Gujarat High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The payment of stamp duty is not for business expediency but it is in the nature of a compulsory levy under the Bombay Stamp Act. It is legally settled that accounting practice cannot over ride the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Stamp duty paid by the appellant during the year under consideration is a compulsory statutory levy and would not restrict the profits of the future years and ordinarily revenue expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business must be allowed in its entirety in the year in which it is incurred and it cannot be spread over a number of years.

ii) If any statutory expense is required to be paid, in view of decision of the Apex Court in India Cements Ltd. vs. CIT [1966] 60 ITR 52, such expense is required to be allowed in the same year. The Apex Court in the case of Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. Jt. CIT [2015] 372 ITR 605/231 Taxman 5/55 taxmann.com 361 also observed that as per the ordinary rule revenue expenditure incurred in a particular year is to be allowed in that year.

iii) Thus, if the assessee claims that expenditure in that year, the department cannot deny it. However, in a case where the assessee himself wants to spread the expenditure over a period of ensuing years, it can be allowed only if the principle of ‘matching concept’ is satisfied, which upto now has been restricted to cases of debentures. Therefore, it is rightly observed by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the expense is required to be allowed in the same year.

iv) In view of above, the Tribunal has committed an error in law in confirming the disallowance of Rs. 12,28,560 towards stamp duty expenses actually incurred by the appellant for executing contract with Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed.”

Cash credit- Section 68 of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 1983-84- The assessee is bound to be provided with the material used against him apart from being permitted to cross examine the deponents- The denial of such opportunity goes to root of the matter and strikes at the very foundation of the assessment order and renders it vulnerable-

fiogf49gjkf0d
H. R. Mehta vs. ACIT(Bom); ITA No. 58 of 2001 dated 30/06/2016 (www.itatonline.org)

In the A. Y. 1983-84, the assessee had taken loan of Rs. 1,45,000/- which the Assessing Officer treated as non genuine and made addition of the amount as unexplained cash credit u/s. 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal upheld the addition.

On appeal by the assessee, the Bombay High Court held as under:

“i) On a very fundamental aspect, the revenue was not justified in making addition at the time of reassessment without having first given the assessee an opportunity to cross examine the deponent on the statements relied upon by the ACIT. Quite apart from denial of an opportunity of cross examination, the revenue did not even provide the material on the basis of which the department sought to conclude that the loan was a bogus transaction.

ii) In the light of the fact that the monies were advanced apparently by the account payee cheque and was repaid vide account payee cheque the least that the revenue should have done was to grant an opportunity to the assessee to meet the case against him by providing the material sought to be used against assessee in arriving before passing the order of reassessment. This not having been done, the denial of such opportunity goes to root of the matter and strikes at the very foundation of the reassessment and therefore renders the orders passed by the CIT (A) and the Tribunal vulnerable.

iii) In our view the assessee was bound to be provided with the material used against him apart from being permitting him to cross examine the deponents. Despite the request dated 15th February, 1996 seeking an opportunity to cross examine the deponent and furnish the assessee with copies of statement and disclose material, these were denied to him. In this view of the matter we are inclined to allow the appeal.”

Book profits- Section 115JB of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 2008-09- Mesne profits (amount received from a person in wrongful possession of property) is a capital receipt and not chargeable to tax either as income or as “book profits” u/s 115JB- As the department has implicitly accepted Narang Overseas vs. ACIT 100 ITD (Mum) (SB), it cannot file an appeal on the issue in the case of other assesses-

fiogf49gjkf0d
CIT vs. Goodwill Theatres Pvt. Ltd. (Bom); ITA No. 2356 of 2013 dated 06/06/2016 (www.itatonline.org)

The Bombay High Court had to consider two questions in an appeal filed by the Department:

(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case and in law, the Tribunal was correct in holding that mesne profits are capital receipts in the hands of the assessee and not revenue receipts chargeable to tax?

(b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case and in law, the Tribunal was correct in holding that mesne profits, can not be part of book profit u/s. 115JB, as it was held as capital assets?”.

The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“(i) The Tribunal has held that the mesne profits received by the Assessee for the unauthorized occupation of its premises from Central Bank of India is a receipt of capital nature and thus not taxable. To reach the above conclusion, the impugned order placed reliance upon the decision of Special Bench of the Tribunal in Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd., vs. ACIT 100 ITD (Mum) S.B. The issue before the Special Bench in Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd. (supra) was whether the mesne profits received by an assessee is revenue or capital in nature. The Special Bench, in its order placed reliance upon the definition of mesne profits in Section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under: “Mesne profits of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession.”

ii) On the basis of above, it held that any amount received from a person in wrongful possession of its property, would be mesne profits and it is capital in nature.

iii) We find that the issue before the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd was to determine the character of mesne profits being either capital or revenue in nature. The Special Bench of the Tribunal in Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd held that the same is capital in nature. There is no doubt that the issue arising herein is also with regard to the character of mesne profits received by the Assessee. In this case also, the amounts are received by the Assessee from a person in wrongful possession of its property i.e. after the relationship of landlord and tenant has come to an end. Once the Special Bench order of the Tribunal in Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd has taken a view on the character of mesne profits, then unless the Revenue challenges the order of the Special Bench of the Tribunal it would be unfair of the Revenue to pick and choose assessees where it would follow the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd. The least that is expected of the State which prides itself on Rule of Law is that it would equally apply the law to all assessees’s.

(iv) We make it clear that we have not examined the merits of the question raised for our consideration. We are not entertaining the present appeal on the limited ground that the Revenue must adopt an uniform stand in respect of all assessees. This is more so as the issue of law is settled by the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd., (supra). The fact that even after the dismissal of its Appeal (L) No.1791 of 2008 for non-removal of office objections on 25th June, 2009, no steps have been taken by the Revenue to have the appeal restored, is evidence enough of the Revenue having accepted the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd. Thus, the question as framed in the present facts does not give rise to any substantial question of law.”

Business Expenditure- Capital or revenue- A. Y. 1997-98- Test of enduring benefit not to be mechanically applied- Expenses incurred for software development- Rapid advancement and changes in software industry- Difficult to attribute endurability- Expenditure to be treated as revenue

fiogf49gjkf0d
Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. vs. CIT; 384 ITR 386 (Cal):

The assessee was engaged in the manufacture and production of aluminium and related products. Bauxite was a basic raw material for manufacturing aluminium. The assessee claimed deduction of expenditure incurred on development of application software to help the assessee in planning the production and bauxite grade control in mines treating it as differed revenue expenditure and amortised a part of it debiting it to the profit and loss account. The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction on the ground that the expenditure was capital in nature incurred with a view to obtain an asset or advantage of a permanent nature. The Tribunal upheld the disallowance.

On appeal by the assessee Calcutta High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The software industry was one such field where advancements and changes happened at a lightening pace and it was difficult to attribute any degree of endurability. The software used by the assesee was a application software which needed to be updated due to the rapid advancements in technology and increasing complexity of the features. Disallowance of the expenditure incurred on software development was erroneous.”

Advance ruling- Application for advance ruling- A. Y. 2012-13- Bar of application where matter is pending consideration before Income-tax Authorities- Mere notice u/s. 143(2) without any specific queries would not mean matter was pending before Income-tax Authorities- Such notice would not bar an application for advance ruling-

fiogf49gjkf0d
LS Cable and System Ltd vs. CIT; 385 ITR 99 (Del):

Assessee’s application for advance Ruling for the A. Y. 2012-13, was rejected on the ground that the matter was pending before the Assessing Officer at the time of application in view of the fact that the notice u/s. 143(2)(ii) was issued by the Assessing Officer.

The Delhi High Court allowed the assessee’s writ petition and held as under:

“i) Mere issuance of a notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act, by merely stating that “there are certain points in connection with the return of income on which I would like some other information” did not amount to the issues raised in the application filed by the assessee before the Authority for Advance Ruling being already pending before the Assessing Officer.

ii) There was no statutory bar to the Authority for Advance Rulings considering the application.”

Appeal to High Court- Section 260A of I. T. Act, 1961- A. Y. 1996-97- Plea urged for first time in appeal before High Court- Not permissible- Capital vs. revenue receipt- Income from other sources- Casual and non-recurring receipts- Auction sale of property mortgaged with bank set aside by Supreme Court- Auction purchasers and judgment debtors compromising in execution proceedings- Amount received by auction purchaser not casual and non-recurring receipt but capital receipt not taxable-

fiogf49gjkf0d
Girish Bansal vs. UOI; 284 ITR 161 (Del):

Auction sale of property mortgaged with bank was set side by the Supreme Court. Auction purchaser(assessee) and judgment debtors compromised the execution proceedings wherein the assessee purchaser received Rs. 10 lakhs as a settlement amount. For the A. Y. 1996-97, the assessee claimed the amount as the non-taxable capital receipt. The Assessing Officer treated the amount as the casual and non-recurring receipt u/s. 10(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and assessed it as income. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Assessing Officer.

On appeal by the assessee before the Delhi High Court the Department sought consideration of the amount received by the assessee as revenue receipt. The High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Department could not be permitted to shift its stand from one forum to another. The consistent case of the Department was to be tested at various levels for its correctness. It was possible that in the interregnum there might be decisions of the Supreme Court which might support or negate the case of the Department. That would then have to be taken to its logical end. Under these circumstances the Court was not prepared to permit the Department to urge a new plea for the first time in the High Court.

ii) The Assessing Officer was in error in proceeding on the basis that a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs received by the assessee was in the nature of a casual and nonrecurring receipt which could be brought to tax u/s. 10(3) of the Act. The Assessing Officer having held that it could not be in the nature of capital gains it was not open to the Department to seek to bring it to tax under the heading revenue receipt. What was in the nature of a capital receipt could not be sought to be brought to tax resorting to section 10(3) read with section 56 of the Act.

iii) The question is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”

Deduction of tax at source- The contract of employment not being the proximate cause for the receipt of tips by the employee from a customer, the same would be outside the dragnet of sections 15 and 17 of the Income-tax Act and hence outside section 192.

fiogf49gjkf0d
ITC Ltd. vs. CIT. (2016) 384 ITR 14 (SC) The assessees are engaged in the business of owning, operating, and managing hotels. Surveys conducted at the business premises of the assesses allegedly revealed that the assessees had been paying tips to its employees but not deducting taxes thereon. The Assessing Officer treated the receipt of the tips as income under the head “Salary” in the hands of the various employees and held that the assessees were liable to deduct tax at source from such payment u/s. 192 of the Income tax Act, 1961. The assessees were treated by the Assessing Officer as assessees-in-default under section 201(1) of the Act. The Assessing Officers in various assessment orders worked out the different amounts of tax to be paid by all the aforesaid assessees u/s. 201(1), as also interest u/s. 201(1A) of the said Act for the assessment years 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06.

The Commissioner of Income –tax (Appeals) vide his common order dated November 28, 2008 allowed the various appeals of the assessees holding that the assessees could not be treated as assesses-in-default u/s. 201(1) of the Act for non-deduction of tax on tips collected by them and distributed to their employees. Appeals filed by the Revenue to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal came to be dismissed by the Tribunal by relying upon its own order for the assessment year 1986-87 in the case of ITC and the case of Nehru Palace Hotels Limited. Against the said orders of the Tribunal, appeals were preferred by the Revenue to the High Court.

The High Court held, after considering sections 15, 17 and 192 of the Income-Tax Act, that tips would amount to “ profit in addition to salary or wages” and would fall u/s. 15(b) read with section 17(1)(iv) and 17(3)(ii). Even so, the High Court held that when tips are received by employee directly in cash, the employer has no role to play and would therefore be outside the purview of section 192 of the Act. However, the moment a tip is included and paid by way of a credit card by a customer, since such tip goes into the account of the employer after which it is distributed to the employees, the receipt of such money from the employer would, according to the High Court, amount to “salary” within the extended definition contained in section 17 of the Act. The High Court concluded that the receipt of the tips constituted income at the hands of the recipients and were chargeable to the income-tax under the head “Salary” u/s. 15 of the Act. That being so it was obligatory upon the assessees to deduct taxes at source from such payment u/s. 192 of the Act.

Further, since the assessees were declared to be assessees-in-default u/s. 201 of the Act, the High Court found that despite the fact that the assessees did not deduct the said amount based on a bone fide belief and no dishonest intention could be attributed to any of them, yet the High Court held that levy of interest u/s. 201(1A) would follow, as the payment of simple interest under the said provision was mandatory.

The Supreme Court, on appeal by the assessees, observed that on the facts of the present case, it was clear that there was no vested right in the employee to claim any amount of tips from his employers. Tips being purely voluntary amounts that may or may or may not be paid by customers for services rendered to them would not, therefore, fall within section 15(b) at all. Also, it was clear that salary must be paid or allowed to an employee in the previous year “by or on behalf of” an employer. Even assuming that the expression “allowed” is an expression of width, the salary must be paid by or on behalf of an employer. Section 15(b) necessarily has reference to the contract of employment between employer and employee, and salary paid or allowed must therefore have reference to such contract of employment. On the facts of the present case, it was clear that the amount of tips paid by the employer to the employees had no reference to the contract of employment at all. Tips were received by the employer in a fiduciary capacity as trustee for payment that were received from customer. There was, therefore, no reference to the contract of employment when these amount were paid by the employer to the employee.

The Supreme Court noted that it was nobody’s case that the amount of tips received by the employees in the present cases were not taxable in their hands. The learned counsel for the assessees had stated that they were so taxable as income from other sources. The question that it had to determine was therefore somewhat different, namely whether the person responsible for paying salary income to his employee is liable to deduct the tax of the employee and pay it over on an estimated basis u/s. 192 of the Income-tax Act.

The Supreme Court held that contract of employment in the present cases, not being the proximate cause for the receipt of tips by the employee from a customer, the same would be outside the dragnet of sections 15 and 17 of the Income-tax Act.

The Supreme court further held that interest u/s. 201(1A) could only be levied when a person is declared as an assessee-in-default. Having found that the appellants in the present cases were outside section 192 of the Act, the appellant could not be stated to be assessees-in-default and hence no question of interest therefore arose.

University – Exemption – Conditions Precedent – University must exist solely for education and must be wholly or substantially financed by Government

fiogf49gjkf0d
Visvesvraya Technological University vs. ACIT (2016) 384 ITR 37 (SC)

The appellant University, namely, Visvesvaraya Technological University (VTU) had been constituted under the Visvesvaraya Technological University Act, 1994. It discharged functions earlier performed by the Department of Technical Education, Government of Karnataka. The University exercised control over all Government and Private Engineering Colleges within Karnataka.

For the assessment year 2004-05 to 2009-10 notices u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were issued to the appellant-University assessee. Eventually returns were filed for the assessment years in question declaring “nil” income and claiming exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act. The aforesaid claim of exemption was negated by the Assessing Officer who proceeded to make the assessments. The same view has been by all the authorities under the Act and also by the High Court.

The question, therefore, that arose before the Supreme Court in the present appeals was the entitlement of the appellant-University-assessee to exemption from payment of tax under the provisions of section 10(23C) (iiiab) of the Act.

The Supreme Court observed that the entitlement for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) was subject to two conditions. Firstly the educational institution or the university must be solely for the purpose of education and without any profit motive. Secondly, it must be wholly or substantially financed by the Government. Both conditions would have to be satisfied before exemption could be granted under the aforesaid provision of the Act.

The Supreme Court noted that the relevant principles of law which governed the first issue, i.e., whether an educational institution or a university, as may be, exists only for educational purpose and not for profit was no longer res integra and was decided by it in Queen’s Educational Society vs. CIT(372 ITR 699).

The Supreme Court, in the present case, found that during a short period of a decade, i.e., from the year 1999 to 2010 the appellant University had generated a surplus of about Rs.500 crore. There was no doubt that the huge surplus had been collected/accumulated by realising fees under different heads in consonance with the powers vested in the University u/s. 23 of the VTU Act. The difference between the fees collected and the actual expenditure incurred for the purposes for which fees were collected is significant. In fact the expenditure incurred represented only a minuscule part of the fees collected. No remission, rebate or concession in the amount of fees charged under the different heads for the next academic year(s) had been granted to the students.

As against the above, the amount of direct grant from the Government has been meagre. The University nevertheless had grown and the number of private engineering colleges affiliated to it had increased from about 64 to presently about 194. The infrastructure of the University has also increased offering educational avenues to an increasing number of students in different and varied subjects.

Between 1994 and 2009 the University had actually spent about Rs.504 crore on infrastructure and the available surplus in the year 2010 which was in the range of Rs. 440 crore was also intended to be applied for different infrastructural work.

Even in a situation where direct Government grants had not been forthcoming and allocation against permissible heads like salary, etc. had not been made the University had thrived and prospered. There could, however, be no manner of doubt that the surplus accumulated over the years had been ploughed back for educational purpose. In such a situation, following the principles laid down in Queen’s Educational Society (supra), the Supreme Court  held that the first requirement of section 10(23C)(iiiab), namely, that the appellant University existed “solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profits” was satisfied.

As to the further question as to whether the appellant University was wholly or substantially financed by the Government which was an additional requirement for claiming benefit u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act, it was not in dispute that grants/direct financing by the Governtment during the six (06) assessment years in question, i.e., 2004-05 to 2009-10 had never exceeded 1 per cent of the total receipts of the appellantuniversity assessee.

The argument advanced before the Supreme Court by the University that fees of all kinds collected within the four corners of the provisions of section 23 of the VTU Act must be taken to be receipts from sources of finance provided by the Government. The rates of such fees are fixed by the Fee Committee of the University or by authorized Government Agencies (in case of Common Entrance Test). It was , therefore, contended that such receipts must be understood to be funds made available by the Government as contemplated by the provisions of section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that receipts by way of fee collection of different kinds continued to be a major source of income for all universities including private universities. Levy and collection of fees was invariably an exercise under the provisions of the statute constituting the University. In such a situation, if collection of fees was to be understood to be amounting to funding by the Government merely because collection of such fees was empowered by the statue, all such receipts by way of fees may become eligible to claim exemption u/s. 10(23C) (iiiab). Such a result would virtually render the provisions of the other two sub-sections, namely, 10(23c)(iiiad) and 10(23c)(vi) nugatory and could not be understood to have been intended by the Legislature and must, therefore, be avoided.

According to the Supreme Court, it would therefore, be more appropriate to hold that funds received from the Government contemplated u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act must be direct grants/contributions from government sources and not fees collected under the statute.

Before the Supreme Court , reliance had been placed on the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in CIT vs. Indian Institute of Management [370 ITR 81], particularly, the view expressed that the expression “wholly or substantially financed by the Government” as appearing in section 10(23C) could not be confined to annual grants and must include the value of the land made available by the Government. The Supreme Court noted that in the present case, the High Court in paragraph 53 of the impugned judgment has recorded that even if the value of the land allotted to the University (114 acres) was taken into account the total funding of the University by the Government would be around 4 per cent to 5 per cent of its total receipt. That apart what was held by the High Court in the above case, while repelling the contention of the Revenue that the exemption u/s. 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act for a particular assessment year must be judged in the context of receipt of annual grants from the Government in that particular year, is that apart from annual grants the value of the land made available; the investment by the Government in the buildings and other infrastructure and the expenses incurred in running the institution must all be taken together while deciding whether the institution is wholly or substantially financed by the Government. The Supreme Court held that situation before it, on facts, was different leading to the irresistible conclusion that the appellant university did not satisfy the second requirement spelt out by section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act. The appellants University was neither directly nor even substantially financed by the Government so as to be entitled to exemption from payment of tax under the Act.

The Supreme Court for the aforesaid reasons dismissed the appeals.

Wealth Tax – Asset – Definition – Urban Land – Exclusions –Land occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority would not include land occupied by any building which is still under construction.

fiogf49gjkf0d
Girdhar G. Yadalam vs. CWT (2016) 384 ITR 52 (SC)

The assessee, a Hindu undivided family which was the coowner of a land measuring 30,663.04 sq. metres, situated at survey No.67/2, 67/3, 67/4 and 67/5 of Adugodi Village and a portion of survey No.151 of Kornamangala Village of Begur Hobli of Bangalore South Taluq, Bangalore District, bearing City Survey No.CTS/2. The assessee entered into various development agreements with one M/s. Prestige Estates Properties Private Ltd. for construction of residential flats. The assessee claimed that it had retained ownership of the land until flats are fully constructed and possession of the assessee’s share was handed over to it. The development agreement constituted only permissive possession according to the assessee for the limited purpose of construction of flats. The assessee contended that the assessee continued to be the owner of the land for the financial years 1995-96 and subsequent years till the sale of flats. Notice u/s. 17 of the Act was issued to the assessee and he filed return of wealth of Rs.8,48,000 on August 20, 2003. After considering the contention to not to treat the property as urban land, the Assessing Officer brought it to tax under an order dated March 31, 2005. An appeal was filed before the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Bangalore. The appeal stood allowed in the light of an earlier order of the Tribunal. The Revenue thereafter filed an appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal following its earlier decision dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Revenue took up the matter in further appeals before the High Court of Karnataka. The High Court upset the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal holding that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of clause (ii) of Explanation 1(b) to section 2 (ea)(v) of the Act, as the building had not been constructed and was still under construction during the assessment year.

The Supreme Court at the outset noted that in the present case it was concerned with the interpretation that is to be accorded to the provisions of Explanation 1(b) to section 2(ea)(v) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. This Explanation defines “urban land”.

The Supreme Court observed that it was not in dispute that “urban land” is to be included to calculate “net wealth” for the purpose of wealth tax under the Act. However, certain lands are not to be treated as “urban land” which are mentioned in Explanation 1(b). But section 2(ea) of the Act was inserted by the Finance Act 1992 (Act No.18 of 1992), with effect from April 1, 1993. The purpose was to exempt some of the lands from wealth-tax with the objective of stimulating investment in productive assets. It is in that context that the land occupied by any building which has been constructed with the approval of the appropriate authority is excluded from the definition of urban land. On a plain reading of the said clause it becomes clear that in order to avail of the benefit, the following conditions have to be satisfied:

(a) The land is occupied by any building;
(b) Such a building has been constructed;
(c) The construction is done with the approval of the appropriate authority.

The Supreme Court noted that notwithstanding the aforesaid plain language; an endeavour of the Counsel for the assessee was to impress upon the Court to read the said clause to include even that land where the construction of building activity has been started. He, thus, wanted that the words “has been constructed” is to be read as “is being constructed”.

The Supreme Court held that on the plain language of the provision in question, the benefit of the said clause would be applicable only in respect of the building “which has been constructed”. The expression “has been constructed” obviously cannot include within its sweep a building which is not fully constructed or in the process of construction. The opening words of clause (ii) also become important in this behalf, where it is stated that “the land occupied by any building”. The land cannot be treated to be occupied by a building where it is still under construction.

No doubt, the purpose and objective of introducing section 2(ea) in the Act was to stimulate productive assets. However, the event when such a provision is to be attracted is also mentioned in Explanation 1(b) itself carving out those situations when the land is not to be treated urban land. The Legislature in its wisdom conferred the benefit of exemption in respect of urban vacant land only when the building is fully constructed and not when the construction activity has merely started.

Bombay Stamp Act – Amalgamation – Scheme of amalgamation is not chargeable to stamp duty. It is the order of court sanctioning the scheme that is chargeable. [ Bombay Stamp Act,1958, Section 3,2(1)]

fiogf49gjkf0d
The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Maharashtra vs. Reliance Industries Ltd AIR 2016 BOMBAY 108 Full Bench.

The Reliance Industries Limited and Reliance Petroleum Limited, Jamnagar Gujarat entered into a scheme of amalgamation u/ss. 391 & 394 of the Companies Act 1956. Company petitions were filed by the transferor company in Gujarat High Court and the transferee company in Bombay High court. The Scheme was sanctioned by both the High Courts. Accordingly, stamp duty was paid in Gujarat of Rs 10 crore. When the order sanctioning the Scheme of amalgamation was presented for stamp duty adjudication in Maharashtra, the Company claimed set off of the stamp duty paid in Gujarat which was refused.

The full bench of the Bombay High court held that as the scheme of arrangement or amalgamation has no effect or force unless or until it was sanctioned by the court, it is the order sanctioning the scheme that would be an instrument u/s. 2(l) and not the scheme of amalgamation. Hence, the Company was not entitled for rebate of stamp duty paid in Gujarat.

Expectations from an Advisor

fiogf49gjkf0d
“Look for what’s missing. Many Advisors can tell a President how to improve what’s proposed or what’s gone amiss. Few are able to see what isn’t there”
 
Donald Rumsfeld

Over the years that I have been in the profession. I have seen the role of an advisor undergo a radical change and marked shift on the expectations that one has from the advisor. And over these years, I have seen a few things remain constant. The constants are the bedrock of the traits of an advisor and foundation without which no advisor can be successful. The changes emanate from the evolution of the profession and the changes in the ecosystem in which we operate.

Let’s first talk of the changes; I would describe them as:

– execution is the key

– the broad basing of the recipients

– recognising that change is the only constant and

– no man is an island.

Let me elaborate.

It is all about execution. There was a point of time when what was expected from an advisor was advice and the execution was left in-house. While clients do have execution capabilities, they now expect the advisor to be fully involved and lead the execution process. The reason is simple. The challenges at the execution level impact the advice and its efficacy. Whether the Registrar of Companies (ROC) will approve a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) carrying on financial services or whether SEBI permits an AIF to be an LLP are issues to which the advice reading the law may be different from how execution happens at the ground level.

There was a point of time when the recipient of the advice was the only constituent who the advisor had to address. No longer so. The wider constituents who can be impacted by the advice today expect their interests to be addressed. This is critical from the view point of the advisor too. Increasingly, if the client is accused for breaking a law, the advisor could have his reputation sullied or be held to abet.

The world is in a constant flux of change. Just in the field of taxation, we grew up to say that tax and equity are strangers. One merely has to look at what the law says and no more, no less. No longer so. BEPS is making changes which will have deep rooted impact on the way a MNC operates. Street protests are held if a MNC is perceived as not paying ‘fair’ taxes. The world of taxes and equity are not as strangers as it seemed!! We need to recognise this change as advisors; in fact, the result of the actions we advise today will be evaluated after a few years and we need to anticipate changes and advice accordingly

Finally, the need is to collaborate with other specialists. An accounting advice has tax and financial implications; a tax advice has accounting and financial implications and, most important, all of these need to dovetail into the overall business objectives of an organisation. As advisors, we tend many a time to forget the overall business objective and focus on the little area of specialisation we have. The broad basing of the objective, the ability to relate to the bigger picture and interaction with other Advisors to provide holistic advice is the key to success.

Let us now look at a few constants which I have experienced over the decades;

– the spirit of partnership

– client before self

– tenacity and

– ethics and values

The identification of the advisor with the client and proactively finding solutions is a key constant. Most times, clients do not know the right questions to ask. It is for the advisor to prompt the client to the right question and guide them in the spirit of partnership.

Client before self may sound like a cliché!! It is not and I have seen the most successful advisors, when proposed an assignment by a client, respond that it is not necessary to carry out the assignment!! Indeed, sometimes the client believes in a complex solution which may mean larger fees to the advisor but the solution can be quite simple. It is for the advisor, at all times, to put client’s interest first. In fact, the best advisors have the ability to tell a client that he is not the right advisor but someone else is!!

Solutions provided by an advisor may be difficult to implement and often the client wants short cuts. Building substance to a transaction is a difficult process. It may be the only way to sustain a structure. An advisor needs to be firm with his convictions and not go down the path of least resistance; howsoever convenient it may sound in the short run

Last, but the most important, is ethics and integrity. Short term gains which compromise integrity come up all the time in a variety of ways. Some of these, like referral fees, may sound innocuous but pose conflicts of interest. Similarly, disclosure of interests or potential conflicts is critical. At the end of the day, an advisor has just one reputation to protect and its compromise is the end of the journey.

IND AS ROAD MAP – CORPORATE vs. NBFC

fiogf49gjkf0d
One of the key issues with the Ind AS roadmap is the alignment of implementation dates between NBFC companies and non NBFC companies. For example, phase 1 non NBFC companies go live on Ind-AS from 1-4-2016, with a transition date of 1-4-2015. The first Ind AS financial year will be 2016-17. In the case of NBFC, phase 1 companies will go live on Ind-AS from 1-4-2018, with a transition date of 1-4-2017. The first Ind AS financial year will be 2018-19. In the case of NBFC company, early adoption of Ind AS is prohibited. This poses a unique challenge to a consolidated group that has an NBFC company and a non NBFC company. Consider the diagram below.

When the NBFC is on the top of the structure, the problem is very acute. In this case, the non NBFC companies below the NBFC Parent company (M Co, T Co & S Co) will prepare Ind AS for financial year 2016-17 as they are in phase 1. For 2016-17, the NBFC Parent will prepare stand-alone and CFS under Indian GAAP, since it is prohibited from early adopting Ind AS. For purposes of consolidation by the NBFC Parent; M Co, T Co & S Co will have to continue preparing their accounts under Indian GAA P as well. Therefore M Co, T Co & S Co will end up preparing accounts both under Indian GAAP & Ind AS, which will be a huge burden.

When a NBFC is below a non NBFC company, the NBFC will prepare Indian GAAP accounts for standalone purposes and to enable non NBFC parent to prepare Ind AS CFS, the NBFC will also prepare Ind AS accounts. In the above diagram, the NBFC subsidiary will prepare Indian GAAP stand-alone financial statements since it is prohibited from early adopting Ind AS. However to enable M Co to prepare Ind AS CFS, the NBFC subsidiary will also need to provide Ind AS numbers to M Co.

Conclusion
A group that has NBFC and non NBFC companies will bear a huge burden of preparing financial statements under both Indian GAAP and Ind AS. RBI/ MCA can remove this burden by allowing NBFCs, particularly those that are not systemically important to early adopt Ind AS.

In the author’s opinion, in such an instance, NBFC should have the option of earlier adoption of Indian AS. A clarification will avoid confusion and duplication.

Business loss/speculation loss – 37(1)/43(5) – A. Y. 2009-10 – Loss suffered in foreign exchange transactions entered into for hedging business transactions cannot be disallowed as being “notional” or “speculative” in nature. S. Vinodkumar Diamonds is not good law as it lost sight of Badridas Gauridas 261 ITR 256 (Bom)

fiogf49gjkf0d

CIT vs. M/s. D. Chetan & Co. (Bom); ITA No. 278 of 2014 dated 01/10/2016:
www.itatonline.org:

The assessee is engaged in the
business of import and export of diamonds. during the assessment proceedings,
the Officer found that Respondent assessee explained that the amount of
rs.78.10 lakhs claimed as loss was on account of having entered into hedging
transactions to safeguard variation in exchange rates affecting its
transactions of import and export by entering into forward contracts. The
Assessing Officer by order of assessment dated 27th december 2011 disallowed the
claim on the ground that it is a notional loss of a contingent liability debited
to Profit and Loss Account.  Resultantly,
the same was added to the assessee’s total income. The Cit (appeals) allowed
the assessee’s appeal inter alia relying upon the decisions of tribunal in
Bhavani Gems vs. ACIT (ITA No.2855/Mum/2010 dt.30.3.2011) and the Special Bench
decision in the case of DCIT vs. Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait ((2010) 132 TTJ
(Mumbai) (SB) 505). The Cit (appeals) on facts found that the transaction of forward
contract was entered into during the course of its business. It held that it
was not speculative in nature nor was it the case of the Assessing Officer that
it was so. Thus the loss incurred as forward contract was allowed as a business
loss. The Tribunal upheld the finding of the Cit (appeals). The tribunal found
that the transaction of forward contract had been entered into for the purpose
of hedging in the course of its normal business activities of import and export
of diamonds.

On appeal by the revenue, the
high Bombay Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held as under:

“i) The Tribunal has, while
upholding the finding of the Cit (appeals), independently come to the
conclusion  that  the 
transaction  entered  into 
by the assessee is not in the nature of speculative activities. Further,  the hedging transactions were entered into so
as to cover variation in foreign exchange rate which would impact its business
of import and export of diamonds. These concurrent finding of facts are not
shown to be perverse in any manner. In fact, the Assessing Officer also in the
Assessment Order does not find that the transaction entered into by the
assessee was speculative in nature.

 ii) The reliance placed on the decision in S.
Vinodkumar Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. vs. Addl.CIT ITA 506/MUM/2013 rendered on 3rd may
2013 in the revenue’s favour would not by itself govern the issues arising
herein. This is so as every decision is rendered in the context of the facts
which arise before the authority for adjudication. Mere conclusion in favour of
the revenue in another case by itself would not entitle a party to have an
identical relief in this case. In fact, if the revenue was of the view that the
facts in S. vinodkumar are identical/similar to the present facts, then
reliance would have been placed by the revenue upon it at the hearing before
the tribunal. The impugned order does not indicate any such reliance. It
appears that in S. vinodkumar, the tribunal held the forward contract on facts
before it to be speculative in nature in view of section 43(5) of the act. However,
it appears that the decision of this court in CIT vs. Badridas Gauridas (P) Ltd.
261 ITR 256 (Bom) was not brought to the notice of the tribunal when it
rendered its decision in S. vinodkumar (supra). in the above case, this court
has held that forward contract in foreign exchange when incidental to carrying
on business of cotton exporter and done to cover up losses on account of
differences in foreign exchange valuations, would not be speculative activity
but a business activity.”

Business expenditure – TDS – Disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) – A. Y. 2006-07 – Professional services- Subscription to e-magazines – No rendering of professional services – Tax not deductible at source on subscription – Disallowance of subscription not justified

fiogf49gjkf0d

CIT vs. India Capital Markets P. Ltd.; 387 ITR 510 (Bom):

For the A. Y. 2006-07, the
Assessing Officer disallowed the payment made to Bloomberg being data services
charges of Rs. 4.74 lakh on account of non-deduction of tax at source u/s
40(a)(ia) of the income-tax act, 1961. The Assessing Officer was of the view
that the payment made by the assessee to Bloomberg was in the nature of
consultative services and so the assessee was liable to deduct tax at source. The
Commissioner (appeals) found that the payment made to Bloomberg was essentially
a subscription for a financial e-magazine and was not liable to deduction of
tax at source and accordingly there would be no occasion to invoke section
40(a)(ia) of the act. He therefore deleted the addition. The tribunal upheld
the decision of the Commissioner (appeals).

On appeal by the revenue, the
Bombay high Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The 
Commissioner (appeals) and the tribunal had reached a concurrent finding
of fact that payments made  to  Bloomberg 
were  for  subscription 
to e-magazines and therefore, there was no occasion to deduct tax under
the act. Thus,  section 40(a)(ia) could
not have been invoked.

ii)  The  
submission on behalf of the revenue that B’s magazines/information was
backed by solid research carried out by its employees and made available on the
website would not by itself result in B rendering any consultative services. It
was not the case of the Revenue that specific queries raised by the asessee
were answered by B as part of the consideration of rs. 4.34 lakh. The
information was made available to all subscribers to e-magazines/journal of B.
therefore, in no way could the payments made to B be considered to be in the
nature of any consultative/professional services rendered by B to the assessee.

iii) The Tribunal was justified
in deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer u/s. 40(a)(ia) of
the act.”

Business expenditure – A. Y. 1985-86 – Accrued or contingent liability – Mercantile system of accounting- Customs duty – Seller challenging increase in payment of customs duty before Supreme Court – Mere challenge to demand would not by itself lead to cessation of liability- Assessee cannot be denied deduction of amounts paid for purchase of goods

fiogf49gjkf0d

CIT vs. Monica India (No. 1); 386 ITR 608 (Bom):

The assessee was following
mercantile system of accounting. For the A. Y. 1985-86, the assessee had
claimed expenditure on accrual basis which included customs duty of Rs. 1.78
crore. The same was allowed by the Assessing Officer. The Commissioner in
exercise of his powers u/s. 263 of the income-tax act, 1961 held that the
amount of rs. 1.78 crore was a contingent liability as the assessee had
challenged it in the Supreme Court and the payment of it to the customs
department was postponed and thus could not be allowed as an expenditure for the  subject 
assessment  year.  The   tribunal
held that the assessee was following the mercantile system of accounting and
therefore, the liability was to be allowed as deduction on accrual basis and
further held that the liability to pay the customs duty by the assesee was a
part of the sale price to the two sellers, and consequently, ought to be
allowed as an expenditure for purchase of goods.

On appeal by the revenue, the
Bombay high Court upheld the decision of the tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The  
agreements  between  the 
parties  provided that the consideration
payable for the purchase of goods included within it, the duty of customspayable
on the imported goods as a part of the cost incurred by  the 
seller. Therefore,   the cost of
purchase of goods was not only the expenses incurred by the seller from the
opening of the letter of credit but continued to run till the execution of the
contract. The mere fact that the seller of the goods had obtained a stay, would
not by itself result in an unascertained or unqualified liability.

ii) Moreover, since the assessee was following
the mercantile system of accounting mere challenge to the demand by the seller
might not by itself lead to the liability ceasing. Although the seller of the
goods might not be able to claim deduction since it was paid in terms of
section 43B of the act, this would not deprive the assessee of the deduction of
amounts paid by it for purchase of goods. Thus, the assessee would be entitled
to deduct the amount of rs 1.78 crore 
as  consideration paid  for the goods in the assessment year.”

Appellate Tribunal – Power to admit additional grounds/evidence – Section 254, read with Rules 11 and 29 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 – A. Y. 2007-08 – In terms of section 254(1), Tribunal while exercising its appellate jurisdiction, has discretion to allow to be raised before it new or additional questions of law arising out of record after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to other party

fiogf49gjkf0d

VMT Spinning Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT; [2016] 74 taxmann.com 33
(P&H):

For
the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessee challenged assessment order before the
Commissioner (appeals) which was partly allowed. This led to filing of cross-
appeals before the tribunal i.e., one by the revenue and the other by the
assessee. In the memorandum of appeal filed before the Tribunal, the assessee
raised an additional ground with regard to calculation of minimum alternate tax
to be carried forward to the subsequent year. According to the assessee, in the
assessment order, the same had not been correctly calculated. As said ground
had not been raised before the Commissioner, the tribunal refused to adjudicate
upon the same as according to the tribunal prior leave of the tribunal through
an application in writing should have been obtained before raising the
additional ground. An oral request made by the assessee to raise said
additional ground was not considered enough.

On
appeal by the assessee, the Punjab and Harayana High Court held as under:

“i)
Appeals to the tribunal are preferred u/s. 254(1) which provides that after hearing
the contesting parties, the tribunal  may
pass such orders that it thinks fit. In section 254(1) the usage of the words
‘pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit’ gives very wide powers to the
tribunal and such powers are not limited to adjudicate upon only the issues
arising from the order appealed from. Any interpretation to the contrary would
go against the basic purpose for which the appellate powers are given to the
tribunal u/s. 254 which is to determine the correct tax liability of the assessee.

 ii)
Rules 11 and 29 of the income-tax (appellate tribunal) rules, 1963 are  also 
indicative  that the powers of the
tribunal,  while considering an appeal
u/s. 254(1) are not restricted only to the issues raised before it. Rule 11 of
the 1963 rules provides that the appellant, with the leave of the tribunal can
urge before it any ground not taken in the memorandum of appeal and that the
tribunal while deciding the appeal is not confined only to the grounds taken in
the memorandum of appeal or taken by leave of the tribunal under rule 11.

iii)
Rule 29, is to the effect that though parties to the appeal before the
tribunal  shall not be entitled to
produce additional evidence but if the tribunal desires the production of any
document or examination of any witness or any affidavit to be filed, it can,
for reasons to be recorded, do so.

iv)
A harmonious reading of section 254(1) of the act and rules 11 and 29 of the
rules coupled with basic purpose underlying the appellate powers of the
tribunal which is to ascertain the correct tax liability of the assessee leaves
no manner of doubt that the tribunal while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction, has discretion to allow to be raised before it knew or additional
questions of law arising out of the record before it. What cannot be done, is
examination of new sources of income for which separate remedies are provided
to the revenue under the act.

v)
Rule 11 in fact confers wide powers on the tribunal, although it requires a
party to seek the leave of the tribunal. It does not require the same to be in
writing. It merely states that the appellant shall not, except by leave of the
tribunal, urge or be heard in support of any ground not set forth in the
memorandum of appeal. In a fit case it is always open to the tribunal to permit
an appellant to raise an additional ground not set forth in the memorandum  of 
appeal.  The   safeguard 
is  in the proviso to rule 11
itself. The proviso states that the tribunal 
shall not rest its decision on any other ground unless the party who may
be affected thereby has had a sufficient opportunity of being heard on that
ground. Thus,  even if it is a pure
question of law, the tribunal cannot consider an additional ground without
affording the other side an opportunity of being heard. even in the absence of
the proviso, it would be incumbent upon the tribunal to afford a party an
opportunity of meeting an additional point raised before it.

vi)
Moreover,  even  though 
rule  11  requires 
an appellant to seek the leave of the tribunal,  it does not confine the Tribunal to a
consideration of the grounds set forth in the memorandum of appeal or even the
grounds taken by the leave of the tribunal. In other words, the tribunal can
decide the appeal on a ground neither taken in the  memorandum 
of  appeal  nor 
by  its  leave. The only requirement is that the
tribunal cannot rest its decision on any other ground unless the party who may
be affected has had sufficient opportunity of being heard on that ground.

vii) in the present case, the tribunal ought to have exercised its
discretion especially in view of the fact 
that  the  assessee 
intends  raising  only  a
legal argument without reference to any disputed questions  of 
fact. The   matter is  remanded 
to the tribunal for adjudicating upon the additional ground on merits.”

Appellate Tribunal – Power to grant stay – Section 254(2A) – A. Y. 2009-10- Tribunal has power to grant stay for a period exceeding three hundred and sixty five days

fiogf49gjkf0d

Principal CIT vs. Carrier Air Conditioning and Refrigeration
Ltd.; 387 ITR 441 (P&H):

In
the appeal filed by the Revenue before the Punjab and haryana high Court, the
following questions were raised:

“i)  Whether the hon’ble income-tax appellate
tribunal has acted in contravention of the second proviso to section 254(2a) of
the income-tax act, 1961 as the combined period of stay has exceeded 365 days?

ii)  Whether the order of the income-tax tribunal
be treated as void ab initio in the light of the third proviso to section
254(2a) of the income-tax act, 1961, which provides that stay of demand stands
vacated after expiry of 365 days even if delay in disposal of appeal is not
attributable to the assessee?”

The
high Court held as under:

“Where the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the
assessee, the tribunal has the power to grant extension of stay beyond 365 days
in deserving cases.”

Shipping Companies – Computation of income – Tonnage Tax Scheme – Income generated from slot charter could be computed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter-XII-G and requirement of producing certificate referred to in section 115 VX would not apply.

fiogf49gjkf0d

CIT vs. Trans Asian Shipping Services (P) Ltd. (2016) 385
ITR 637 (SC)

The  question that arose before the Supreme Court
for consideration pertained to “slot charter”, i.e. should the “slot charter”
operations of “tonnage tax company” be carried on only in “qualifying ships” to
include the income from such operations to determine the “tonnage income” under
“tonnage tax scheme” in terms of the provisions of Chapter XII-G of the act? in
other words, is the income derived from “slot charter” operations of a “tonnage
tax company” liable to be excluded while determining the “tonnage income”
under  the  “tonnage 
tax  scheme”  if such operations are carried on in ships
which are not “qualifying ships” in terms of the provisions of that Chapter of
the act and the relevant provisions of the income-tax rules, 1962?

The
Supreme Court noted the tonnage tax Scheme, namely, Chapter XII-G of the
income-tax act, 1961 (the “act”) which contains special provisions for assessments
relating to income of shipping companies. under this Chapter, shipping
companies are  given  a 
choice  to either get income from
the shipping business computed in accordance with the provisions contained in
the act meant for computation of income in respect of business or profession or
opt for methodology of computing income as per the special formula provided in
that Chapter which accords a different treatment and different manner of
computation of income for the shipping business.

U/s.115VA
option is given to  the  shipping 
company, which is operating “qualifying ships”, as defined in certain
115 VD,  to get its income computed in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII-G, irrespective of those
stipulations otherwise contained in sections 28 to 43C for computation of
business income. once such an option is exercised and income is computed in
accordance with the provisions of the said Chapter, a fiction is created by
deeming the said income to be the profits and gains of such business chargeable
to tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”.

For
a shipping company to be eligible to exercise such an option, there are certain
conditions to be fulfilled, which are as under:

(i)
In the first place, the assessee has to be a “company”. The word “company” is
defined in section 2(17) of the act. 
Such a company may have various business and one such business may be
the business of operating qualifying ships. However, it is only that income which
is generated from “the business of operating qualifying ships” that will be
computed as per the special provisions in Chapter XII-G. Income from other
business will be computed in the same manner as provided in sections 28 to 43C.
In case the business of the company is to operate qualifying ships only, then
the income from that sole business will be under this Chapter.

 (ii) 
Income from the business  of  operating 
qualifying ships shall be computed under Chapter XII-G  only if such an option is specifically
exercised by the assessee-company. This requirements is particularly mentioned
in section 115VP of the act. Such an option, when given, is to remain in force
for a period of ten years from the date on which the said option is exercised,
and this period is prescribed in section 115VQ
of the act. However, it can be renewed within one year from the end of the
previous year in which the option ceases to have effect (section 115VR). in
certain circumstances stipulated in section 115VS of the act, there is a
prohibition to opt for the scheme.

The
scheme that is to be opted for computation of income under this Chapter is
known as “tonnage tax scheme” (for short “TTS”) as defined in clause (m) of
section 115V of the act.

(iii)
Though these special provisions relate to income of shipping companies, it is
only that income which is received from business of “operating qualifying
ships” that is eligible for computation under this Chapter.

The
Supreme Court observed that it is only income from the business of operating
qualifying ship that has to be computed in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter XII-G. as per section 115VB of the act, 
a company is regarded as operating a ship if it operates any ship which
is owned by it or a ship which is chartered by it and it also includes a case
where even a part of the ship has been chartered by it in an arrangement such
as slot charter, space charter joint charter, etc.

The
Supreme Court further noted that the respondent­ assessee owned a qualifying
ship and fulfilled all other conditions as well as to make it a qualifying
company u/s. 115VC.  The income that was
generated from the said qualifying ship was exigible to tax as per the special
provisions contained in Chapter XII-G, as the assessee had exercised the
requisite option in this behalf. However, in addition to operating its
qualifying ship, in the relevant assessment years, i.e., 2005-06 and 2008-09 it
had also “slot charter” arrangements in other ships. In the relevant income-tax
return filed by the assessee, the assessee- had also included the income earned
from such slot charter arrangements for the purpose of computation thereof
under Chapter XII-G. it was in this context the question had arisen as to
whether the assessee was eligible to include the income derived from activities
through “slot charter” arrangements as relevant shipping income to determine
the deemed tonnage in terms of rule 11Q of the Income-tax Rules.

The
Assessing Officer was of the view that the income earned under slot charter
arrangement did not qualify for coverage to be given special treatment in
Chapter XII-G as this income was not generated by the assessee from its own
ship, i.e, it is neither from the ship owned by the assessee nor from the
entire ship chartered by the assessee. he took the view that in order to avail
of the benefit of Chapter XII-G, the assessee was supposed to show that the
ship operated by it was qualifying ship and for this purpose it was incumbent
upon the assessee to produce a “valid certificate indicating its net tonnage”
as provided in section 115VX(1)(b) of the act. However, the assessee had
submitted such valid certificate only in respect of its own ship and did not
submit the same in respect of ship chartered by the assessee under the slot
charter arrangement. The contention of the assessee was that the requirement of
producing “valid certificate” is to be insisted only for assessee’s own ships
and for the ships hired fully. This contention was not accepted by the
Assessing Officer. The assessee had also argued that as per the method of
computation provided u/s. 115VG of the act read with rule 11Q of the rules,
income for full ship is to be computed on the basis of “net tonnage” shown in
the valid certificate, whereas income of part of the ship is computed as
“deemed tonnage”. This argument was also rejected by the Assessing Officer on
the ground that there was a requirement of producing valid certificate even for
part of the ship and in the absence thereof income from slot charter
arrangement could not be included for the purpose of computation of tonnage
income under the tonnage tax scheme.

The
order of the Assessing Officer was upheld by the Commissioner of income-tax
(appeals) resulting into dismissal of appeal filed by the assessee. Even the
income-tax appellate tribunal  accepted
the view taken by the Assessing Officer and dismissed the appeal filed before
it by the assessee thereby upholding the order of the Assessing Officer.
However, in further appeal that was preferred by the assessee to the high  Court u/s. 260a of the act, the assessee has
succeeded in getting its way through as the high Court has found merit in its
contention. thus,  the high Court had
allowed the appeal of the assessee holding that the income earned by the
assessee under slot charter arrangement comes under the definition of “deemed
tonnage tax” as per Explanation to 
sub-section  (4)  of 
section  115VG  of  the
act,  and, therefore, exclusion of this
while assessing the same under the said special provisions was not appropriate.
in other words, the high Court held that the assessee was eligible for tonnage
on slot charter related income also.

On
appeal by the revenue, the Supreme Court noted that the assessee was a company
as defined u/s. 2(17) of the act and was also in the business of operating
qualifying ship(s). it was also not in dispute that it owned a qualifying ship
and fulfillment of this condition permitted the assessee to exercise its option
for computation of income from the business of operating qualifying ships under
Chapter XII-G of the act. The assessee exercised the option in this behalf, as
per section 115VP of the act in respect of assessment years in question.
Therefore,  the assessee was a qualifying
company u/s. 115VC of the act. In fact, the income that was generated from the
qualifying ship owned by the assessee was also assessed under the special
provisions contained in Chapter XII-G of the act. The dispute, however,
pertained to the income from the slot charter arrangements which the assessee
had made in other ships during the concerned assessment years. The ships where
slot charter were arranged were obviously not owned by the assessee.
Further,  as only some slots were
chartered, full ships were not chartered.

According
to  the 
Supreme  Court,  in 
this  context, the first question
would be as to whether such a slot charter could be treated as “operating
ships” within the meaning of section 115VB of the Act? This provision
specifically provides that for the purpose of Charter XII-G, a company would be
regarded as operating a ship “if it operates any ship whether owned or
chartered by it and includes a case where even a part of the ship has been
chartered by it in an arrangement such as slot charter, space charter or joint
charter”. The Supreme Court held that it was clear from the above that slot
charter was specifically included as an instance of a ship chartered by the
company.

Further,    the Supreme Court observed  that 
section 115VG(4)  was in two parts
in so far as computation of tonnage was concerned. When it came to tonnage of a
ship, a certificate as mentioned in 115VX was to be produced. The second part
of this provision talks about “deemed tonnage” in contradistinction to the
“actual tonnage” mentioned  in  the 
certificate.  The Supreme Court
held that thus, it was not only the actual tonnage that was mentioned in the
certificate referred to in 115VX of the act which this provision dealt with. In
addition, deemed tonnage was also to be included if there was such a deemed
tonnage, and that deemed tonnage was to be added to the actual tonnage which is
indicated in the certificate. Explanation to s/s. (4), inter alia, mentions
that in so far as slot charter arrangements are concerned, purchase of such
slot charter should be treated as deemed tonnage. according to the Supreme
Court the legislature  had, thus, clearly
visualied that in so far as deemed tonnage was concerned, there would not be
any possibility of producing a certificate referred to in section 115VX of the
act. When the provision is read in this manner, it becomes amply clear that section
115Vd of the act which talks of a qualifying ship, contemplates the situation
in which the entire ship is either owned or chartered. Similar is the position
which inheres in section 115VX of the act as it refers to “the tonnage of a
ship”. Therefore, whenever the question of a tonnage of a ship crops up and the
said tonnage is to be determined, it has to be in accordance with the valid
certificate indicating its tonnage and it is a compulsory obligation of the
assessee to produce such a certificate. However, this requirement of producing
a certificate would not apply when entire ship is not chartered and the
arrangement pertains only to purchase of slots, slot charter and an arrangement
of sharing of break-bulk vessel.

The
Supreme Court further held that calculation of income arising from carriage of
goods on slot basis has, in the wisdom of the legislature, been disconnected
from the capacity of a ship, on account of impossibility of getting such
information in relation to ships on which slot charter is undertaken. This
aspect has due recognition in note 3 of the form 66. Thus, the act and the
rules for computation on tonnage tax specifically and categorically
differentiate the requirement of the certificate with regard to owned ship and
slot charter. In law, the said rule also recognises that identification of the
vessel for slot charter cannot be done. Also, note 3 below form no.66, in terms
of rule 11T, recognises the reason for prescribing a separate formula for slot
charter.

The
Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the high Court and dismissed the
appeal of the revenue.

Business Loss – A licensee/assessee may be entitled to claim the forfeited amount of licence fees paid on cancellation of license by Excise Department as business loss but in a case where the licensee/ assessee transfers his licence and forfeiture of licence take place thereafter the loss cannot be allowed.

fiogf49gjkf0d

CIT vs. Preetam Singh Luthra (2016) 386 ITR 408 (SC)

The Assessing Officer (AO) denied
to set off the loss on account of forfeiture of licence fee of Rs.3,93,67,000,
against income as claimed by the assessee and added the said amount of Rs.3,93,67,000
as unexplained investment.

In appeal preferred by the assessee,
the Commissioner (appeals) held that the addition made by the assessing Officer
at Rs.3,93,67,000, which was actually Rs.2,32,33,500 was not sustainable on
account of later confiscation of the amount so deposited and accordingly, the
entire addition was directed to be deleted.

Dissatisfied with the order of
the Commissioner (Appeals), the Revenue filed appeal before the Tribunal. The
Tribunal, after considering the arguments of for the parties, placing reliance
on the judgment passed by the madras high Court in the case of CIT vs. Chensing
Ventures [2007] 291 ITR 258 (Mad) held that since the assessee was allotted the
licence by the excise department, which was later on transferred to one Shankar
lal Patidar but the said licence was cancelled by the excise department and the
amount of licence fees deposited by the petitioner was forfeited by the excise
department, the assessee was entitled to set off on account of such forfeiture.

The High Court dismissed the
appeal filed by the Revenue holding that no question of law arose in the
matter.

On  further appeal by the revenue, the Supreme
Court held that if the licence fee stood forfeited, the licensee/ assessee may
be entitled to claim the forfeited amount as a business loss. However in the
present case, from the grounds urged before the high Court which facts had not
been controverterd by the assessee, it appeared that the respondent had transferred
the licence on 25th june, 2005 to one Shankarlal Patidar and the forfeiture of
the said licence took place thereafter on 1st august, 2005. According to the
Supreme Court, if that be so, the loss, if any, on account of forfeiture was
sustained not by the respondent-assessee but by the transferee-Shankarlal
Patidar.

The Supreme Court therefore
concluded that the tribunal and the high Court had overlooked the aforesaid
vital fact, and therefore the orders passed by the learned tribunal and the
high Court were required to be reversed. Consequently, the Supreme Court set
aside the order of the High Court affirming the order of the Tribunal and the
Commissioner of income-tax (appeals) passed in favour of the assessee and
affirmed the order of the Assessing Officer disallowing the aforesaid claims of
the assessee.

Business Income or Income from House Property – Assessee having one business of leasing its property and earning rent therefrom – Rent received from property should be treated as business income-

fiogf49gjkf0d

Rayala Corporation Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT [2016] 386 ITR 500 (SC)

The appellant-assessee, a private
limited company, was having house property, which had been rented.  The issue that arose before the Supreme Court
was whether the income so received should be taxed under the head “Income from
house property” or “Profit and gains of business or profession”. the  reason for which the aforestated issue had
arisen was that though the assessee was having the house property and was
receiving income by way of rent, the case of the assessee was that the assessee
company was in business of renting its properties and was receiving rent as its
business income, the said income should be taxed under the head “Profits and
gains of business or profession” whereas the case of the revenue was that as
the income was arising from house property, the said income should be taxed
under the head “income from house property”.

According to the Supreme Court,
the law laid down by it in the case of Chennai Properties and Investments Ltd.
vs. CIT (2015) 373 ITR 673 (SC) showed the correct position of law and looking
at the facts of the case in question, the case on hand was squarely covered by
the said judgment.

The Supreme Court noted the
submissions made by the counsel appearing for the revenue which were to the
effect that the rent should be the main source of income or the purpose for
which the company was incorporated should be to earn income from rent, so as to
make the rental income to be the income taxable under the head “Profits and gains
of business or profession”.

The Supreme Court observed that
it was an admitted fact in the instant case that the assessee company had only
one business and that was of leasing its property and earning rent therefrom. Thus,
even on the factual aspect, the Supreme Court did not find any substance in
what had been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the revenue.

The  Supreme Court held that the business
of the company was to lease its property and to earn rent and
therefore, the income so earned should be treated as its business income
and that the high Court was not correct while deciding that the income
of the assessee should be treated as income from house property,

Rate of Taxation and Deemed Short-term Capital Gains

fiogf49gjkf0d

Issue for consideration

Any
profits or gains arising from the transfer of a property, held as a capital
asset, is liable to be taxed under the head “capital gains”. Such gains are
classified into short term capital gains and long term capital gains, where the
former is subjected to tax at the ordinary rates, while the later qualifies for
concessional rate of taxation, besides being eligible for the benefit of
reinvestment related exemptions from tax.

Ordinarily,
a short term capital gains arises on transfer of a short term capital asset and
long term capital gain arises on transfer of a long term capital asset. An
asset held for a period exceeding 36 months is usually treated as a long term
capital asset. Under a fiction of section 50 however, the act provides for a
separate treatment for an asset on which depreciation has been claimed, even
where such an asset is otherwise held for a period exceeding 36 months.

Section
50 has been the subject matter of two important controversies; one relating to
the eligibility of the deemed short term capital gains to the benefit of
sections 54E, 54f, 54EC, etc. and the other relating to the eligibility of such
gains for the concessional rate of taxation. While the former has now been
settled with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs.
V.S. Dempo Co. Ltd. 387 ITR 354, the later continues to be debatable as is
confirmed by conflicting decisions of the courts on the subject. While the Pune
and the Kolkata Tribunal are against conferring the benefit of concessional
rate on the deemed short term capital gains, a series of decisions of the
Mumbai Tribunal favour the grant of the benefit of concessional rate of
taxation for such gains.

Reckitt Benckiser (India)
Ltd.’s case

The  issue recently arose in the case of Reckitt
Benckiser (India) Ltd. vs. ACIT, 181 TTJ 384(Kol.) before the Kolkata Tribunal
involving the determination of rate of tax payable by the assessee on capital
gains arising from the sale of flats on which depreciation was claimed. In the
year under consideration, flats owned by the assessee were sold and since the
sold flats were held by the assessee for more than 36 months, the capital gains
arising from the sale thereof was offered to tax by the assessee at the
concessional rate applicable to long-term capital gains. Since the flats sold
by assessee were depreciable assets, the AO invoked the provisions of section
50 and brought to tax the capital gains arising from the sale thereof at normal
rate applicable to short-term capital gains.

On
appeal, the CIT(A) upheld the action of the AO on the issue, by observing that
the provisions of section 50 were clearly applicable to the capital gains
arising on account of sale of depreciable assets not only for computation but
also for the rate of tax.

The
Tribunal, on hearing the arguments from both the sides on the issue and perusal
of the relevant material available on record, held that the relevant provisions
of section 50 as applicable in the context were very clear and specific, as
rightly held by the learned CIT (A). As per the said provisions, which were
overriding in nature, the capital gains arising from the sale of depreciable
assets was chargeable to tax at the rate applicable to short-term capital
gains, irrespective of the holding period. Certain judicial pronouncements,
relied upon by the appellant, were found to be not applicable in the context,
involving the issue relating to rate of tax applicable to the capital gains
arising from sale of depreciable assets. The Tribunal did not find merit in
ground raised by the assessee and dismissed the same.

Smita Conductors Ltd.’s case, 152 ITD 417 (Mum.)

The  issue arose before the Tribunal in the case
of Smita Conductors Ltd. vs. DCIT, 152 ITD 417(Mum.) wherein the assessee had
filed an additional ground for contesting the tax rate applied in case of
capital gains computed u/s 50 r.w.s 50C of the income-tax act. In that case,
the assessee had sold a flat after holding the same for more than 36 months. It
had claimed depreciation on the flat and had claimed that the gains arising
thereon be taxed at the concessional rate u/s. 112.

In
the appeal to the Tribunal,  it was
submitted that the flat sold by the assessee had been held for a long time
exceeding more than three years and, therefore, the capital gains, though
required to be computed u/s. 50 of the it act, had to be treated as long term
capital gain in view of the judgment of the high Court of Bombay in case of Ace
Builders Ltd.,281 ITR 410, in which it had been held that the factum of deemed
short term capital gains u/s. 50 of the it act was applicable only to
computation of capital gains, and for the purpose of other provisions of the
act, such as section 54EC, the capital gains had to be treated as long term
capital gains, if the asset was held for more than three years. it was
contended that section 50(1) made it quite clear that the capital gains in
respect of depreciable asset was deemed as short term capital gains for the
purposes of sections 48 and 49 of the it act, which related to computation  of capital gains. Therefore, the deeming
provision was only limited to the provisions for computation of capital gains.

Reference
was made to the decision of the mumbai bench of the Tribunal in case of
Mahindra Freight Carriers vs. DCIT, 139 TTJ 422, in which it had been held that
prescriptions of section 50 were to be extended only to stage of computation of
capital gains and, therefore, capital gain resulting from transfer of depreciable
asset which was held for more than period of three years would retain the
character of long term capital gains for all other provisions of the act and
consequently qualify for set off against brought forward loss of long term
capital gains. reference was also made to another decision of mumbai bench of
the Tribunal in case of Prabodh Investment & Trading Company Vs. ITO in
(ITA No. 6557/Mum/2008), in which following the judgment of the high Court of
Bombay in case of Ace Builders P. Ltd. (Supra), the Tribunal held that section
50 created a legal fiction only for a limited purpose i.e. for the purpose of
sections 48 and 49 and for the purposes of section 54E, the gains had to be
treated as long term capital gains. the Tribunal in that case also accepted the
arguments of the assessee that in case capital gains was assessed as long term
capital gain the rate of tax as provided in section 112 of the it act would
apply.

It
was explained that provisions of section 50, deeming the capital gains as short
term capital gains was only for the purposes of section 48 and 49, which
related to computation of capital gains. The deeming provisions therefore was
to be restricted only to computation of capital gain and for the purpose of
other provisions of the act, the capital gain has to be treated as long term
capital gain. it was, therefore, argued that in the case of the assessee, rate
of tax applicable to long term capital gain had to be applied as per the
provisions of section 112 of the IT act.

The
same view had been taken by the mumbai bench of Tribunal in case of Manali
Investments vs. Assistant CIT, 139 TTJ 411, in which it had been held that the
prescriptions of section 50 were to be extended only to the stage of
computation of capital gain and, therefore, capital gain resulting from
transfer of depreciable asset, which was held for more than three years would
retain the character of long term capital gain for the purpose of all other
provisions of the act.

It
was highlighted that the flat had been held for 15 to 20 years, which was
supported by the fact that cost of the flat as shown in the balance sheet was
only Rs.1, 30,000/-, and if the flat was held for more than three years, the
tax rate as provided in section 112 of the it act applicable in respect of capital
gains arising from transfer of long term capital asset, had to be applied.

The  Tribunal held that, for the purpose of
computation of capital gains, the flat had to be treated as short term capital
gains u/s. 50 of the it act, but for the purpose of applicability of tax rate,
it had to be treated as long term capital gains if held for more than three
years. It accordingly directed the AO to compute the capital gains from the
sale of flat and apply the appropriate tax rate, after necessary verification
in the light of observations made in the order.

Observations

The
basis of the claim for the benefit of concessional rate of taxation for the
deemed gains, besides being founded in law, has largely been founded on the
decisions of the high Courts delivered in the context of the eligibility of
such deemed gains for the benefit of exemption u/s. 54E, 54EC, etc. the   high Courts have consistently held that such
gains are eligible for the benefit of exemption u/s. 54E, 54EC, etc. CIT vs.
Assam Petroleum 263 ITR 587 (Gau), CIT vs. Ace Builders 281 ITR 240 (Bom), CIT
vs. Pole Star Industries, 41taxmann.com 237 (Guj), Aditya Media Sales Ltd.,
38taxmann 244 (Guj), Rajiv Shukla 334 ITR 0138 (Del) and CIT vs. Delite Tin
Industries in ITA no. 118 of 2008 dated 26/09/2008. The Bombay high Court is
deciding the case of delite tin industries (supra), had followed its own
decision in the case of ace Builders (supra). The Special leave Petition of the
income tax department against the said decision has been rejected by the Supreme
Court vide order dated 20/10/2009 in SlP. (c) no. 21450 of 2009, 322 itr (st)
8. The delhi high Court in the case of rajiv Shukla (supra) has taken note of
the said dismissal of SLP by the apex court. The issue has recently been
settled in favour of allowability of the benefit in the case of CIT vs. V.
S.Dempo Co. Ltd. (supra).

The   issue under consideration had also arisen
before the Pune bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rathi Bros. Madras Ltd.
vs. ACIT in ITA No. 787/PN/2813. In a decision dated 30/10/2014, the Tribunal
decided the issue against the assesssee, interestingly, by holding that the
issue on hand has been decided by the decision of the Bombay high Court in the
case of ace Builders (supra). the Tribunal noted that the Bombay high Court in
para 23 of the order while confirming the grant of benefit of exemption u/s.54,
had observed that the deemed short term capital gains, though taxable at the
ordinary rates would nonetheless be eligible for the tax exemption. It is
respectfully submitted that such observations, not made in the context of the
case, should not have been the guiding force in adjudicating an issue that was
otherwise decided by the co-ordinate bench in favour of the assessee. The issue
before the high Court was about the eligibility of an assessee for the benefit
of section 54E and not for the concessional rate of taxation u/s. 112 of the
Act. In any case, the final findings of the Court on the issue before it are
clearly placed in para 25 of the order, which has no observations on the
subject of rate of taxation.

In
Rathi Bros.’ case (supra), the Tribunal, under an error, did not follow the
decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of  P.D. Kunte and Co., by observing that in the
said case the issue though raised, had remained to be adjudicated by the Tribunal.
The fact of the matter, as was noted by the AO, is that the said assessee had
filed an MA on the ground that the issue had remained to be adjudicated by the Tribunal
and the Tribunal had rectified the error by adjudicating the issue and deciding
the issue in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal had followed the decision of
the Bombay high Court in the case of Ace Builders (supra). Accordingly, it was
the decision in the case of Rathi Bros. that requires rectification. It seems
that the order in the MA was lost sight of while adjudicating the issue.

On
a comprehensive reading of the various provisions of the income-tax act,
namely, sections 2(14), 2(29A), 2(42A), 45, 48, 49, 50 and section 112, all of
which are relevant to the issue under consideration, the following things
emerge:

  • A distinction is made in the scheme of taxation of
    capital gains by classifying such gains into short term capital gains and
    long term capital gains. Such a classification is primarily based on the
    nature of capital asset, namely short-term capital asset and long-term
    capital asset which distinction is founded on the period of holding of a
    capital asset.
  • An exception has been made, where under the deeming
    fiction of section 50 treats even a long-term capital asset as a
    short-term capital asset.
  • The deeming fiction of section 50 however has a limited
    application in as much as the fiction created there under has the effect
    of qualifying the application of only sections 48 and 49 and no other provisions
    of the act.
  • The  said  deeming 
    fiction  of  section 
    50  has  been introduced  as 
    a  special  provision  with 
    effect  from 01/04/1988 by
    the taxation  laws   (A&MP)  act,1986 with the objective of providing
    a working solution to the problems of identifying the cost of acquisition
    and indexing such cost in cases of depreciable assets whose cost kept on
    varying year after year.
  • No parallel amendments have been carried out in any of
    the other provisions of the act, clearly conveying the legislative intent
    that the other provisions continued to operate with full force.
  • Even otherwise there is nothing in section 50 which has
    the effect of overriding the other provisions of the act, including
    section112, but for the provisions of section 2(42A), which override has a
    very limited application. The said override cannot convert a long-term
    capital asset into a short-term capital asset, as has been now recently
    confirmed by the Supreme Court. In our considered opinion, section 50 will
    apply and operate even without the said override.
  • Section 50 is a special provision for computation of
    capital gains in case of depreciable assets and it is incorrect to apply
    the same fiction in deciding the rate of tax at which the income so
    computed is to be taxed.
  • There is no provision, implied or express, in
    section112, to indicate that the benefit of the concessional rate of tax
    thereunder would be denied to the gains computed under the deeming fiction
    of section 50 of the Act.
  • The logic and the rationale applied by the Supreme
    Court for granting the benefit of sections 54E, 54EC, etc. shall equally
    apply in conferring the benefit u/s.112 of the concessional rate of
    taxation.

Principles of Corporate Governance put to test!

fiogf49gjkf0d

In the past few days, there have
been two events which have caused sadness to professionals. The first event was
the will of God, whose wishes one has simply to accept. This was the untimely
demise of Rajesh Kapadia, an eminent Chartered accountant and a past president
of the Society. He was a man with sterling qualities, thoroughly professional
and yet humble to the core. I have had the good fortune of having worked with
him and have greatly benefited from the interactions. With his departure, the
profession has suffered a loss which cannot be made good.

The second event was the will of
men, the removal of Cyrus Mistry, as the chairman of Tata Sons, an entity which
virtually controls the Tata group. The name Tata has a special place in the
heart of nearly all Indians. The name, the brand may have been valued, but to
me, it was invaluable, and I hope it remains so. This was a group that carried
on business, with the object of creating wealth for all stakeholders and the
public. The concept that a businessman was a trustee was a principle that the
group followed in letter and spirit. This was because nearly 2/3rd of the
group’s wealth, belonged to various Tata Trusts which are public charitable
trusts. Philosophers, business commentators, and management gurus have lauded
the ethical standards of this group.

In this context, the removal of
Cyrus Mistry as the chairman of Tata Sons, caused shock and surprise, and the
manner in which it took place left a tinge of sadness in the mind. One would
like to believe that the wise gentlemen, who took this step, must have had
compelling reasons for taking the drastic action that they did. They would have
had interests of all stakeholders at heart. A change of guard, even a sudden one
is not unknown in industrial groups, but that it should happen in the Tata
Group is bound to create waves.

Firstly, the incumbent Cyrus
Mistry was not a hurried choice, but had been appointed after a long search and
deliberations. He had plenty of experience, was echnically sound and also had
to some extent a lineage. It is true that, in his four-year tenure the fortunes
of the group were not exactly ascendant. But that was the position with many
industrial groups. It was known that there were differences of opinion in
regard to various business decisions like divesting of assets, ownsizing of
businesses that were taken during his tenure.

There is very little in the
public domain which would lead one to believe that, change of chairman was
being considered much less imminent. Therefore, the manner in which Cyrus
Mistry was removed and the speed of the actions thereafter left one really
surprised. From what has been reported in the media, the action does not appear
to be fair, even if it may have been legally right and necessary. These
observations are from what has appeared in the press, and one is conscious that
these reports are not necessarily accurate.

In the action that was taken, it
appears that at least two principles of governance were not fully adhered to.
Firstly, in an action of this magnitude, it is imperative that all the
stakeholders are informed to the extent possible. These would be shareholders,
lenders, business affiliates, associates and in the case of the Tata Group the
public at large. This is because a majority stake in the Group’s fortunes is
held by public charitable trusts. By their very definition, every member of the
public is interested in those trusts. One is aware that if information as
sensitive as this is placed in the public domain, there would be some fallout
articularly in the form of an effect on share prices. But I am sure that a
group as strong as the Tata Group would not be unduly concerned with these
short-term effects.

Secondly, one has to be fair in
regard to the person against whom action is taken and also appear to be fair.
From what is reported in the media, Cyrus Mistry was not aware of the proposed
action and the notice, if at all it was given, appears to be very short. At the
cost of repetition, there is anguish, not for the removal of an individual,
because that must have been necessary for safeguarding the interest of the
Group, at least in the minds of those men who took the decision, but in taking
that action, some principles of governance appear to have been compromised.

I hope that the action does not
lead to litigation, and the public is quickly and fully informed as to the
rationale behind the decision, and the speculation is put to an end.

The Rhythm of Pain and Pleasure

fiogf49gjkf0d

As human beings, we tend to
realise happiness only through experiences of pleasure. Happiness is a
psychological state of mind that portrays enthusiasm and exuberance in all that
we do. But as soon as pain sets in, we tend to shrink and shrug seeking
providential help and support to live through that phase. It has not been
possible to understand as to why there are imbalances in times of pain and
pleasure.

If one carefully observes and
becomes sensitive to the whole process of living, the reasons for going through
these phases of pain and pleasure can be identified. But then, each one of us
is caught up in myriad ways and methods of living that we fail to understand,
or, fathom the depths in the rhythm of experiencing pain and pleasure.

Why do we need to understand this
rhythm? Is it because we have to shorten the phase of pain or eliminate it
altogether? If so, let us accept that it is an artificial method that goes
against the natural ways of living. It is a fact of life that all living
creatures have to go through these phases whether they want it or not. It is
healthy to accept that our lives are ordained with both pleasure and pain.

While having accepted that pain
and pleasure are part of life, we need to delve into the details of it so that
our awareness builds, to go through the process with equanimity. This then
provides the required space not just for ourselves but also builds standards for
a moral and robust society.

Phases of pleasure and pain are
incidental to the actions of the past. Call it the cause and effect of karma
theory or the Newton’s third law of motion, the pattern of the inevitable
cannot be brushed aside. Any attempt to artificially ward off evil will have
its repercussion of disturbing the rhythm with further consequences flowing
from it. In the alternative, it provides us a great sense of responsibility and
maturity to accept pain gracefully as a necessary part of our life. It brings in the required
humbleness to balance arrogance and pride that we experience in phases of pleasure.

We have the parable of Kisa
Gotami and Buddha where Kisa returns without the mustard seeds from a household
untouched by death. Let us accept that pleasure and pain with all its rhythm
are part of life and accept this fact
with grace. Let us not have the choice but let us go through `pain and pleasure’ with absolute
awareness. This helps us in building psychological strength to go through any
crisis and act with humility in benevolent situations without any trace of
arrogance or pride.

The rhythm of pain and pleasure,
when accepted with absolute awareness, has a great deal of impact on our day to
day living, which has a positive influence on our health. A matured
psychological thought process sets in, resulting in preventing us from over
indulgence. Apart from having a benign influence on our health, we can also
realise our full potential and inner creativity by accepting the rhythm of
`pain and pleasure’.

There is so much to fathom from
what people have said of pain and pleasure:

“The end is the beginning of all
things, suppressed and hidden, awaiting to be released through the rhythm of
pain and pleasure…Pain itself destroys pain. Suffering itself frees man from
suffering.”- Jiddu Krishnamurthy

“On attaining the state of
non-attachment and nonaversion, the soul becomes indifferent to worldly pleasure
and pain. ” – Jain wisdom

It is often seen that people
appreciate listening to what others have said and what others have got to say.
But to digest and put these into practice, requires tremendous energy and
conviction. One must be willing to let go. This state of mind brings equanimity
in both pleasure and pain, and this will pave the way for understanding the
essence of life.

While all through our life we are
taught to gain, to accumulate and have comfort,
we fail to understand that there are several natural ethical ways of making a living. We are more secure in natural
actions and surroundings, but every artificial and conditioned behaviour
carries with it the attachment, and hence the aspiration for pleasure with a
sense of exclusion to pain. It is a forgone conclusion that life has to be
lived with all its travails and triumphs and the detached mind alone
understands the rhythm of life in its whole perspective.

When something is done naturally
and acted upon with conviction, it does not create `fear’. This allows one to
accept any outcome whether it ends in pain or pleasure. Everything is important
and significant, absolute attention on the process means it brings in no fear of the outcome. This develops an attitude of resilience and one remains calm in
every situation of adversity and stress. Equally so, every achievement or
progress is looked upon as a team effort or a support from providence.

If we want to be ethical and
bring balance into our lives, let us all try to provide equal space for both
pleasure and pain, by understanding its rhythm.

The reporting season is drawing to a close !

fiogf49gjkf0d

The audit season has come to a close and the tax season has got stretched in organically due to Income Declaration Scheme (IDS) into October. Hopefully, when you receive this journal you have enough time and mind space to go through all that which this Issue contains.

Income Declaration
Scheme (IDS)

IDS
window ended with declarations amounting to Rs. 65,250 crores (from 64,250
disclosures) which should result in tax revenues of Rs. 29,262 crores. We are
not sure whether this amount meets the estimated collection expectations or not.
I am using the word, expectation, unlike many who use the word ‘target’, which
I believe is inappropriate.  It is now a trend
that targets are set for tax collection and then officials are made to work
towards it. Such verbiage results in application of methods that are
inconsistent with the fundamental features of Indian taxation system. In the
same breath I hope that this is a definitive beginning of an endeavour to end
the menace of black money and all the evils related to it. Let’s hope that we
will soon have some data in a b road form as to the nature of persons who have
declared and whether they include the usual suspects who generate, hoard and
circulate cash. Till this ‘target’ is not dealt with, we can be sure that cash
economy is here to stay.

Internal Financial
Controls (IFC)

On the accounting side we had the
first time reporting on Internal Financial Controls by auditors on the design
and operative effectiveness of IFC over financial reporting. While the concept
did have its origins in the same realm from where the company law was drafted, butthe
‘one size fits all’ applicability was a dampener. IFC was made a part of every auditor’s
report, be it of a newly started enterprise, to relatively small marketing
subsidiary of a foreign parent  to listed
mega enterprises. . The ministry of corporate affairs did not bring out any
guidance, relief, or progressive application. Such progressive approach could
have allowed reporting to mature and given smaller enterprises some breathing
time.. The present reporting requirement seemed like asking for use of a water
hose to kill a mosquito .  A ray of
relief came when the ICAI brought out the second technical publication on IFC
and covered reporting situations in a more practical, rational and realistic
way. This publication did bring sense by negating the effect of the overarching
reporting requirement of the law. It also enunciated situations where auditors
comments could be more relevant and serve the purpose of the reporting. While
many of us, whether in Industry or profession know that while the concept is
useful, it needs to be made more specifically relevant so that’s the benefits
can be tangibly felt by the company to which it applies.  The Society on its part did bring out a  small booklet that was published well in time.

GST

GST journey has been like the
story of a Bollywood blockbuster. A large part of the story was drama and suspense
for a long time. The story has taken a strong turn since the passage of the constitutional
amendment. Now the story is shaping to become a action packed thriller till the
end of this fiscal. I guess till the bill is finally drafted, all inputs are
taken and procedure laid out, it will remain that way since the producers and directors of GST seem to desperately want to meet the timeline of 1st
April 2017 which will be a fitting time for an interval. From then onwards, most
of us would wish that the story turns out to be all romance and not turn into a
tragedy or a horror show.

I will not go into the details of
the current stage of evolution of GST. However, For every practitioner, even at
the cost of repetition, emphasis, or inspiration I have to say that GST is
certainly the biggest show in the professional calendar of FY1617 and many
years beyond, .From its sheer impact, opportune timing, wide relevance and of
course the thrill of being an early mover, the GST story is definitely not to
be missed. Irrespective of how the story shapes post interval, you should know
that you can choose not to just watch it, play a part in it. Whatever you
choose, whether enter the cast or watch from the balcony, I wish us all a
pleasant experience.

Ease of doing
business (EoDB) –

The focus on ease of doing
business still remains on the agenda of the government. It is indeed heartening
that EoDB is very much on the implementation radar of this government. This
project, if one may call it so, is an important step towards transforming India
in to a investment destination of choice. I do not see it only from foreign
investment perspective, but also as a means to incentivise local entrepreneurial
talents and pursuit. . . As much as we are aware of, our laws – their
structure, applicability, procedures and interpretation by lower rungs of administrators
remains an issue of concern for entrepreneurs since decades. It’s major fall
out could be serious constraint on job creation and poverty elevation, which
are both part of stated policy and a need of the hour. It cannot be forgotten
that by 2020 we will have 1.35 billion people, amongst them; more than 900
million will be in the working age. All the noise of Make in India to EoDB is
not just a political gimmick but a wakeup call or even an alarm or a siren
sounding loudly.

The centre alone cannot be responsible
for EoDB, but states have to chip in and work towards a common goal. In this
context a 98 point action plan was formulated by the centre and states
together. The points included, single window clearances setting, monitoring
time lines for registrations, self certification instead of inspections amongst
other things. These points had to be adopted at state level to bring India out
of the dungeon of the ridiculous and roar into the 50th rank by 2017. The timeline
does remain to be stiff and ambitious, and rightly so, considering the urgency..
The good news is that 25 states have completed 75% of the 98 points action plan
goals.  

Juxtapose a recent report by The National
Academies of Engineering, Sciences and Medicine, USA which reported that Indian
migrants to the US were the most entrepreneurial and contributed billions of
dollars to the economy. If we look at it from our national perspective, two
aspects stand out. The entrepreneurial capabilities of Indians and wonders that
right environment can do to actualise those capabilities. With deregulation and
further reduction in excessive and irrelevant reporting requirements which
place a burden on small and medium businesses, we can reach from the ridiculous
towards relevant.

Kashmir situation

As I write this I am spending
time with professor Meem Hai Zaffar, PhD from Srinagar. He is a thorough
Kashmiri – a pluralist, rooted in Local as well as national traditions of culture
and philosophy. He tells me that even today; the cultural traditions prevalent
in Kashmir have tremendous cultural unity with rest of India. This includes
inter religious connection rising way above borders of religions, in the words
of traditional songs to customs. The multi cultural ethos and expansive values
find expression in local songs, folklore, shrines, and so on. He tells me that
the deep cultural tradition of Kashmir, going back to Kashyap Rishi of the
yore, to Lal -Ded to Nund Rishi is alive. I wanted to share this conversation, as
we normally hear only political facet of things in media, whereas culture is
what binds people and nations.

Wishing you a happy Dussehra and a joyous Diwali!

Raman Jokhakar

Co-chairman

Journal Committee

VALUES OF LIFE

fiogf49gjkf0d
“Values are our personal beliefs we would
like to live by”

Values of life make life of a human
being valuable. It is the values chosen and practiced by a person that make
life of a person valuable. Values are our personal beliefs we live by. One
would certainly like to know the `values
the pursuit of which improve the quality of life – add value to life. Krishna in Chapter 13 of Gita, in Shlokas 7 to
11, teaches Arjun the values which are essential, and enumerates 20 values. These twenty values are: (1) Amanitvam
(which may be loosely translated as humility;
(2) Unpretentiousness; (3) Non injury; (4) Forgiveness, (5) Uprightness, (6)
Service to the teachers, (7) Purity; (8) Steadiness; (9) Self control; (10)
Indifference to sense objects; (11) Absence of egoism; (12) Repeated perception
of the pain of birth, old age, death and diseases; (13) Non-attachment; (14)
Non-identification of self with relatives; (15) Evenness of mind in both
favourable and unfavourable times; (16) Unwavering devotion; (17) Constancy in
self-knowledge; (15) Giving up undesirable company; (19) Consistency in self
knowledge; and (20) Perception of the end of true knowledge.

Truly a long and a formidable list. The path of the Seeker is like
walking on Razor’s Edge. As Kathopanishad says:

Having rushed through Gita a number
of times I started believing that I have understood the above verses describing
`values’ till I came across a book
called “Moolyo” (Values – The Gate to
Self Realization) written by Swami Viditatmanandji. Reading this treatise was an eye opener. Shri Viditatmanandji
in simple language has explained the meaning of these 20 values. In this
article I propose to deal with just one of them; the very first quality of `Amanitvam.

There are many words in Sanskrit
which cannot be adequately translated in English. There is no exact equivalent.
Amanitvam” is one such word. The
English equivalent is ‘humility’ which does not really bring out the import of the word “Amanitvam”.

I like the word “Amanitvam”. It is a quaint little word with deep-rooted meaning. I liked it
even more when I read the meaning as
explained by Swami Viditatmanandji.  Amanitvam can be best understood by
understanding its opposite term “Manitvam”.
Manitvam is the (negative) quality of
having very high expectations for the recognition one’s qualities, achievements,
status, education etc. It is generated from the false pride about one’s own
self. We expect respect for our position
for example –
 “I am the boss”, “I am
rich”, “I am a scholar”.   “I am an
elder” ……. We get disturbed when expected respect
is
not accorded or extended.
Being free from such feelings is Amanitvam.

We have to realize that we are
complete. We do not require anything to become complete. We have to understand
that “I” am the soul, the Atma which is complete. We do not need outside
appreciation to be complete. As Ishavasya Upnishads says:

Amanitvam” means “neither
begging for respect, nor hankering for praise or appreciation”, and not being disturbed even when one does not get
a well deserved credit.

Let us learn : a bird sings whether anyone appreciates or not. A
flower spreads its fragrance without wanting any praise from anyone. Sun rises
and shines on everyone without seeking
namaskar
. Hence one has to go on doing one’s work like them, without
waiting to be asked or appreciated.

To stop begging for respect is the
first step towards adding value to life. Amanitvam truly is the most
important value. That is why Krishna places
it first in the list of values. The world may not recognize the
goodness of a person, but not to be perturbed by non-appreciation is the first
step in our progress as the seeker.

Ultimately Amanitvam reflects the basic philosophy of Gita, viz; one has a right to work but not to
the fruits thereof.  We have to do our
duty irrespective of whether it is appreciated or not.  I conclude
by quoting
from a song in an old
film “Yatrik”:

Narendra Modi’s essential vision of Indian institutions – Creating prosperity for India will involve changing the rules of the game

fiogf49gjkf0d
In an annual lecture organized by NITI Aayog on 26 August, Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked: “There was a time when development was believed to depend on the quantity of capital and labour. Today, we know that it depends as much on the quality of institutions and ideas.” Modi’s comment seems to be inspired, partly, from Why Nations Fail (2012) by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. In their thought-provoking book, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that institutions, and they alone, determine the prosperity of a nation. Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish between two kinds of institutions. The first refers to rules of the game—formal laws and informal norms. The second is in the nature of organizations.

Douglas North makes a distinction: “If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs are the players.” Geoffrey Hodgson clarifies that North’s treatment of organizations as players does not rule out their becoming institutions themselves, especially when intra-organizational conflicts are taken into account. Since Modi went on to talk about NITI Aayog, which he set up as an evidence-based think tank, he was most probably talking about the second kind of institution—the organization. But his repeated reference to “ideas”—and transformative ones at that—means he did not preclude the first kind. After all, the concept of limited liability was just an idea before New York made it a law in 1811 and moved towards becoming the financial centre of the world.

“Inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills,” say Acemoglu and Robinson, need to be supported by “inclusive political institutions, that is, those that distribute political power widely in a pluralistic manner and are able to achieve some amount of political centralization…” If NITI Aayog is an example of a new organization set up by the Modi government, the monetary policy framework has brought in new rules for fighting inflation. The goods and services tax (GST) council can be an example of the inclusive political institution that Acemoglu and Robinson talk about. The GST council centralizes indirect tax collection while providing both the states and centre a voice in setting tax rates.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory is not without sceptics. Jared Diamond has criticized it for ignoring geography; Arvind Subramanian says it fails to explain the development trajectory of both India and China. With India too poor for its level of political institutions and China too behind in its institutions for its level of income, Subramanian says Acemoglu and Robinson fail to explain the development trajectory of “one-third of humanity”.

Francis Fukuyama blames it for not elaborating on what makes an inclusive institution as opposed to an “extractive” one. Crucially, Fukuyama does not find the theory original as he says there is “no real difference between the ‘extractive/inclusive’ distinction” in Acemoglu-Robinson “and the ‘limited/open’ access distinction” in Violence and Social Orders (2009) by North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast. The latter three have argued that limited access order—the default state of human societies—create political stability by limiting economic and political participation. Not many nations have been able to break out of this by creating open access order which maintains political stability along with open economic and political participation.

While agreeing that the institutions are important, the critics don’t think they alone can explain prosperity. But Modi’s focus on institutions is not misplaced either. The critics of Acemoglu and Robinson will be satisfied with his verbiage. India’s bridge to open access order will involve changing the rules of the game—creating competitive markets and liberal institutions, not just seeking higher cash flows under the same old rules.

But when speaking of organizations as institutions, Modi will also have to focus on institutional design. Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta argue that “limited effectiveness of its public institutions” is both “a critical factor explaining India’s modest record in governance and development” and a result of poor institutional design. Therefore, even if the monetary policy framework is a commendable development, it does not take away from the challenge of appointing the right people to man the monetary policy committee. Creating a culture of evidence-based thinking at NITI Aayog is also an institutional design problem. An institution in place tasked with evidence-based thinking is not enough

(Source: Editorial in Mint Newspaper dated 07.09.2016)

Taxability of Foreign Salary Credited to NRE Bank Account

fiogf49gjkf0d
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

Section 5 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) lays down the scope of total income. Sub-section (2) of that section lays down the scope of the total income of a nonresident. It provides as under:

“(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the total income of any previous year of a person who is a non-resident includes all income from whatever source derived, which:
(a) is received or is deemed to be received in India in such year by or on behalf of such person; or
(b) which accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in India during such year.”

Explanation 2 to this section clarifies that income, which has been included in the total income of a person on the basis that it has accrued or arisen or is deemed to have accrued or arisen to him, shall not again be so included on the basis that it is received or deemed to be received by him in India.

It is usual to come across cases where a person, not resident under the Act, receives some money in India, the income whereof has accrued outside India; for example, Indian citizens employed abroad, regarded as non-residents for the purposes of the Act, depositing their salary in India for the services rendered out of India . Similarly, crew of a foreign ship or an Indian ship who leave India on account of their employment on the ship, non-residents under the Act, depositing the salary In India, is another example.

Many such persons, may request their foreign employers to credit their salaries to their Non-Resident (External) bank accounts (“NRE accounts”) maintained with banks in India. An issue has arisen before different benches of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the taxability in India of such foreign salaries credited to NRE accounts. While the Agra bench of the tribunal has taken the view that such salaries are not taxable in India, the Kolkata bench of the tribunal has recently taken a contrary view, holding that such salaries are taxable in India.

Arvind Singh Chauhan’s case
The issue first came up before the Agra bench of the tribunal in the case of Arvind Singh Chauhan vs. ITO 147 ITD 509.

In this case, the assessee was a crew member of a ship, who was employed with a Singapore company. His employment letter was issued by the foreign employer’s agent in India. He worked on merchant vessels and tankers plying on international routes. His salary was directly credited by his employer to his NRE account with HSBC Bank in Mumbai.

His stay in India during the relevant previous year was less than 182 days, and hence his residential status was nonresident. In the income tax return filed by the assessee, the salary received from the Singapore company was not offered to tax. However, his income from pension received from Government of India and interest were offered for taxation.

During the course of assessment proceedings, when the assessee was asked to show cause as to why the salaries received from the Singapore company for services rendered as a crew member of a ship should not be taxed in India, the assessee argued that since such salary was accruing and arising outside India, it was outside the scope of section 5(2).

As regards the fact that the salary was directly credited to a bank account in India, the assessee argued that salary income deposited in a bank account in India directly from the bank account of his employer outside India and as such was not taxable in India. Reliance was placed on the decisions in the cases of DIT vs. Prahlad Vijendra Rao 198 Taxmann 551 (Kar), DIT vs. Diglan George Smith 40(1) ITCL 419 and ITO vs. Lohitakshan Nambiar (ITA No 1045/Bang/09 dated 12.4.2010).

The AO did not accept the assessee’s explanation, on the ground that since the assessee’s status for income from pension and interest was that of resident, as a result his status for all sources of income was to be taken as a resident. In addition the AO held that the salary income accrued in India by relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT vs. Shri Govardhan Ltd 69 ITR 675, for the proposition that if an assessee acquires a right to receive income, the income is said to have accrued to him, even though it may be received later on its being ascertained. According to the AO by receiving the appointment letter in India from the agent of the foreign employer and details of salary to be paid, the assessee got the right to receive the salary. Importantly, the AO relied on the fact that the salary cheques were credited to the assessee’s account with HSBC bank in India and hence the income was received in India.

The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the AO, holding that the salary income accrued in India as well as was received in India, and was therefore taxable in India.

The Tribunal noted the fact that the AO had himself noted the number of days of the assessee’s stay outside India as per his passport, and categorically found that his status u/s. 6 was that of a non-resident. The tribunal held that the AO was wrong in holding that the assessee was a resident in India on account of the fact that he had offered interest and pension income in his taxable income, given the fact that both the pension and interest accrued and were received in India, the pension being payable by a former employer in India. The mere taxability of such pension and interest in India would not result in the inference that the assessee was a resident of India, since such incomes were taxable in India even in the case of a non-resident.

Examining the scope of total income in the case of a nonresident, the tribunal noted that it was only when one of the 2 conditions – i.e. income was received or was deemed to be received in India by or on behalf of the nonresident or income accrued or arose or was deemed to accrue or arise to the non-resident in India – was fulfilled, that the income of a non-resident could be brought to tax in India. The tribunal held that salary was compensation for services rendered by an employee, and therefore situs of its accrual was the situs of services being rendered, for which salary was paid. It noted that in the case of CIT vs. Avtar Singh Wadhwan 247 ITR 260, the Bombay High Court had held that income from salary, even in the case of crew of an Indian vessel operating in international waters, was to be treated as having accrued outside India. According to the tribunal, it was incorrect to assume that an employee got a right to receive the salary just by getting an appointment letter, because unless services were rendered, no right to receive salary accrued to an employee. Therefore, according to the tribunal, the assessee got the right to receive salary income when he rendered the services, and not when he received the appointment letter.

The tribunal next considered the aspect of whether the income was received in India, since the salary cheques were credited to the assessee’s account with HSBC, Mumbai. According to the tribunal, the law was clear that receipt of income for this purpose referred to the first occasion when the assessee got the money in his own control, real or constructive. What was material was the receipt of income in its character as income, and not what happened subsequently, once the income, in its character as such, was received by the assessee or his agent. An income could not be received twice or on multiple occasions. The bank statement of the assessee clearly revealed that these were US dollar denominated receipts from the foreign employer credited to the NRE account of the assessee with HSBC, Mumbai.

The tribunal noted that the assessee was in lawful right to receive those monies as an employee at the place of employment, i.e. at the location of his foreign employer. It was a matter of convenience that the monies were thereafter transferred to India. According to the tribunal, these monies were at the disposal of the assessee outside India, and it was in exercise of his rights to so dispose of the money, that monies were transferred to India. The tribunal referred to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. A P Kalyanakrishnan 195 ITR 534, where the assessee’s pension from the Malaysian government was remitted by the Accountant General of Malaysia to the Accountant General, Madras, for onward payment to the assessee. While rejecting the contention of the revenue that the pension was to be regarded as having been received in India, the court in that case had observed that the pension payable to the assessee had accrued in Malaya, and only thereafter by an arrangement embodied in the letter…………, the pension had been remitted to the assessee in India and been made available to him. The Madras High Court had therefore held that the assessee had to be regarded as having received the income outside India and that the pension had been remitted or transmitted to the place where the assessee was living, as a matter of convenience, which would not constitute receipt of pension in India by the assessee.

According to the tribunal, once an income was received outside India, whether in reality or on constructive basis, the mere fact that it had been remitted to India would not be decisive on the question as to whether the income was to be treated as having been received in India. The tribunal observed that the connotation of an income, having been received and an amount having been received were qualitatively different. The salary amount was received in India in this case, but the salary income was received outside India. The tribunal further noted that it was elementary that an income could not be taxed more than once, but, if at each point of receipt, the income was to be taxed, it may have to be taxed on multiple occasions. The tribunal therefore held that in a situation in which the salary had accrued outside India, and thereafter, by an arrangement, salary was remitted to India and made available to the employee, it would not constitute receipt of salary in India by the assessee, so as to trigger taxability under section 5(2)(a). The tribunal therefore deleted the addition of the salary amount credited to the NRE bank account in India.

Tapas Kr Bandopadhyay’s case
The issue again came up recently before the Kolkata bench of the tribunal in the case of Tapas Kr Bandopadhyay vs. DyDIT 70 taxmann.com 50.

In this case, the assessee was a marine engineer, who was a non-resident. During the year, he was engaged with an Indian company and a Singapore company as a marine engineer, working in international waters, and received remuneration from both the companies. His contract of service with the Indian/foreign shipping company was executed in India with an agent, before joining the ship. His residential status was non-resident, on account of the fact that he was outside India for more than 182 days, sailing in international waters. The salary incomes were received by credit to the assessee’s NRE accounts with banks in India.

The assessee claimed that the salary incomes were exempt from tax, being received from outside India in foreign currency. The assessing officer accepted the residential status of the assessee as a non-resident, after verification of the passport and other details. He, however, asked the assessee to show cause as to why the incomes received in India by way of credit to the NRE accounts maintained in India should not be taxable, since the income received in India was taxable in case of nonresidents. The assessee responded by stating that the entire amount was received in foreign currency outside India and were credited to his NRE accounts in India, and that the amounts received in foreign currency could not be deemed to be received in India. It was also pointed out that only foreign currency could be deposited in NRE account, and hence the amounts credited to the NRE account were received outside India. The assessing officer rejected the assessee’s contention that amounts received in foreign currency were not taxable in India, and observed that any income received or deemed to be received in India was taxable in India, irrespective of the currency in which such amounts were received.

The assessing officer observed that income received in India was taxable in all cases (whether accrued in India or elsewhere), irrespective of residential status of the assessee. According to the assessing officer, the meaning of the term “income received in India” was significant. If the place where the recipient got the money on the first occasion under his control was in India, it would be income received in India. In the case before him, since the income was remitted by the employer to the bank accounts of the assessee maintained in India, the assessee got the money under his control for the first time in India. The assessing officer, therefore, taxed the salaries for the services rendered overseas, received by the assessee by credit to his bank accounts from his employers.

Before the Commissioner (Appeals), on behalf of the assessee, it was argued that:

(a) The assessee was a non-resident rendering services outside India.

(b) The payments were being made by a foreign company outside India and the foreign company did not have any permanent establishment in India.

(c) The point of payment was to be taken into consideration for determining the provisions of section 5(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act and the point of payment should be considered as the point of receipt.

(d) It was immaterial that the payment was being transferred by the foreign company or remitted by the foreign company to the NRE accounts in foreign exchange in India, because payments had been made by the foreign company outside India and the point of payment was to be taken as the point of receipt.

(e) The amount which was received by the assessee from the foreign company was in foreign exchange and therefore income could not be said to have been received in India, where payment had been received in foreign currency.

(f) The provisions of section 5(2)(a) had to be interpreted in a manner that it did not render the section meaningless. If interpretation as made out by the Department was adopted, then definitely the section would be otiose and meaningless, because no benefit would be given to non-residents, even if all the conditions had been satisfied.

(g) The true interpretation of the provisions of section 5(2)(a) to be adopted for income received or deemed to be received in India, was that the payments had been made in India in Indian currency and the recipient of the payments had received payments in Indian currency.

The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the assessee’s arguments, and upheld the order of the assessing officer.

Before the tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Prahlad Vijendra Rao (supra) and of the Bombay High Court in the case of Avtar Singh Wadhwan (supra). Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Agra bench of the tribunal in the case of Arvind Singh Chauhan (supra).

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that income will get included in the total income of a non-resident through any of the four modes prescribed in section 5(2). All the four modes stood on their own legs, or else the enactment would be rendered redundant. There was no specific section in the Act, which dealt with income accruing or arising to any person only in India, though section 5(2) (b) used the term “accrues or arises to him in India”. The context of this term was provided by section 5(1)(c), which mentioned that total income of a person resident in India included all income from whatever source, which accrued or arose to him outside India. This was the reason that the main charging section, section 4, did not make any reference to the words “in India”, as it had to provide a basis of charge for both – income accruing or arising to a person in India as well as income accruing and arising to a person outside India. The charging section did not have a territorial bias. Similarly, section 15(a) also did not reflect any locational preference, as salary could become due to an assessee anywhere in the world. Salary due from an employer was taxable, whether paid or not.

Reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. L W Russell 53 ITR 91, where the Supreme Court had held as under:

“the expression ‘due’ followed by the qualifying clause ‘whether paid or not’ shows that there shall be an obligation on the part of the employer to pay that amount, and a right on the employee to claim the same.”

Therefore, it was argued that taxation of salary was on the basis of the contractual right of the employee to receive his salary, and nothing else, and it had no relation with location or place of services rendered or to where the amount had become due. The place where it had become due and the place where service was rendered did not form a basis of charge u/s. 15.

It was further argued on behalf of the revenue that though the assessee had rendered services outside India, he had received salary in India by way of fund transfer from the foreign company directly to the NRE account of the assessee in India. It was argued that the receipt contemplated u/s. 5(2)(a) was actual receipt. Hence, such income was actually received in India and was taxable in India. Reliance was placed on the Third Member decision of the Mumbai bench of the tribunal in the case of Capt A L Fernandez vs. ITO 81 ITD 203, which was claimed to be directly on the point. The Bombay and Karnataka High Court decisions relied upon by the assessee were sought to be distinguished by the revenue, on the ground that they were rendered in the context of taxability u/s. 5(2)(b), and not section 5(2)(a), and that they did not frame any question of law.

The tribunal noted that the scheme of the Act was such that the charge of tax was made independent of territoriality, residency and currency. According to the tribunal, the assessee was only trying to introduce one more layer to the entire transaction, that the assessee had the control over his money in the form of salary income in international waters, and for the sake of convenience, he had instructed the foreign employer to send the monies to his NRE account in India. The assessee’s argument was that what was brought into India was not the salary income, but only the salary amount. The tribunal, however, held that there was no evidence brought on record to prove that the assessee had control over his salary income in international waters.

The tribunal further observed that if this argument of the assessee were to be accepted, then the assessee went scot-free, not paying tax anywhere in the world on this salary income. According to the tribunal, the provisions of section 5(2)(a) were probably enacted keeping in mind that income has to suffer tax in some tax jurisdiction. The tribunal observed that it believed that such provisions would exist in tax legislation of all countries.

The tribunal held that if the argument of the assessee were to be accepted, it would make the provisions of section 5(2)(a) redundant. A statutory provision was to be interpreted to make it workable rather than redundant. In case of non-residents, the scope of total income had four modes, one of which was receipt in India from whatever source derived. If this was construed to mean that income from whatever source should first accrue or arise in India, and then it should be received in India to be included u/s. 5(2)(a), then section 5(2)(a) would lose its independence and would become a subset of section 5(2)(b). There would then not be any need for having section 5(2)(a) on the statute.

The tribunal noted that the issue before the Bombay High Court in the case of Avtar Singh Wadhwan (supra) was about the place of accrual of income, and the court held that income accrued in the place where the services were rendered, which in that case, was admittedly outside India. According to the tribunal, the Bombay High Court did not deliberate upon the fact whether the receipt of the income was in India, as the issue was only about the place of accrual of income in the context of section 5(2) (b). This decision was followed by the Karnataka High Court in case of Prahlad Vijendra Rao (supra).

Addressing the argument of the assessee that salary was received on the high seas, and by way of convenient arrangement, was directed to be deposited in the NRE account of the assessee in India, the tribunal raised the question whether a person could receive salary on high seas. According to the tribunal, the only possibility of receiving salary on board a ship on high seas was to receive it in physical currency. The tribunal observed that it was not the assessee’s case that the physical currency got deposited in the NRE account. The money was transferred from the employers account outside India to the assessee’s NRE account in India.

Referring to the decision of the Agra bench of the tribunal in the case of Arvind Singh Chauhan (supra), the Kolkata tribunal observed that this decision was based on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Kalyanakrishnan (supra). In that case, the facts were distinguishable from the facts of the case before it, as the income in that case was taxable in Malaysia. In the case before the Kolkata tribunal, the income did not suffer tax in any other jurisdiction nor was it received in any other tax jurisdiction. The receipt in the NRE account in India was the first point of receipt by the assessee, and according to the tribunal, prior to that, it could not be said that the assessee had control over the funds that had been deposited in the NRE account by the employer. Based on the Madras High Court decision, the Agra bench had held that the assessee had a lawful right to receive the salary as an employee at the place of employment, i.e. at the location of his foreign employer, and it was a matter of convenience that the monies were thereafter transfer to India. The Kolkata tribunal observed that in section 5(2) (a), right to receive salary was not the relevant criterion, but the relevant criterion was the receipt of payment, which was admittedly in India. The Kolkata tribunal therefore expressed its doubts as to the applicability of the Madras High Court decision in Kalyanakrishnan’s case to the facts before it.

Finally, the Kolkata tribunal placed reliance on the Third Member decision of the Mumbai tribunal in the case of Capt A L Fernandes (supra), where the Mumbai tribunal held that there was a clear finding and there was no dispute that the salary was received in India. Since the ships were not regarded as part of India, the services were rendered outside India. However, since the salary was received in India, it was held to be taxable in India u/s. 5(2)(a). According to the Kolkatta tribunal, this decision clearly laid down that receipt in India of salary for services rendered on board a ship outside the territorial waters of any country would be sufficient to give the country where it was received, the right to tax the income on a receipt basis. The Kolkatta tribunal also noted that the Third Member decision was not brought to the notice of the Agra tribunal, when it decided the issue.

Since a Third Member decision was equivalent to a Special Bench decision, the Kolkata tribunal followed the Third Member decision, holding that salary was received in India by credit to the NRE account of the employee was taxable in India by virtue of the provisions of section 5(2)(a).

Observations

The issue really is whether the assessee can be said to have obtained control over his salary at the place where his employer is located, and therefore whether the receipt of the salary is outside India. While the Agra bench of the tribunal was of the view that the assessee obtained control over his salary at the place where his employer was located, as he had a right to receive the salary at that location, the Kolkatta bench was of the view that the assessee had not obtained control over his salary at the location of the foreign employer merely on account of the contract of employment.

Interestingly, the Supreme Court in the cases of Raghava Reddi vs. CIT 44 ITR 720 and Standard Triumph Motor Co Ltd v CIT 201 ITR 391, has held that crediting the account of the assessee in the books of the payer Indian company amounted to a receipt by the foreign company in India.

In Raghava Reddi’s case, the Supreme Court observed:
“This leaves over the question which was earnestly argued, namely, whether the amounts in the two account years can be said to be received by the Japanese company in the taxable territories. The argument is that the money was not actually received, but the assessee firm was a debtor in respect of that amount and unless the entry can be deemed to be a payment or receipt, clause (a) cannot apply. We need not consider the fiction, for it is not necessary to go to the fiction at all. The agreement, from which we have quoted the relevant term, provided that the Japanese company desired that the assessee firm should open an account in the name of the Japanese company in their books of account, credit the amounts in that account, and deal with those amounts according to the instructions of the Japanese company. Till the money was so credited, there might be a relation of debtor and creditor; but after the amounts were credited, the money was held by the assessee firm as a depositee. The money then belonged to the Japanese company and was held for and on behalf of the company and was at its disposal. The character of the money changed from a debt to a deposit in much the same way as if it was credited in bank to the account of the company. Thus, the amount must be held, on the terms of the agreement, to have been received by the Japanese company, and this attracts the application of section 4(1)(a). Indeed, the Japanese company did dispose of a part of those amounts by instructing the assessee firm that they be applied in a particular way. In our opinion, the High Court was right in answering the question against the assessee.”

In Standard Triumph Motor Co Ltd’s case, royalty income payable to the assessee was credited by the Indian company to the account of the assessee in its books of account at the end of each year. The Supreme Court observed:

“the credit entry to the account of the assessee in the books of the Indian company does amount to its receipt by the assessee and is accordingly taxable and it is immaterial when did it actually receive it in the UK.”

Therefore, where the foreign employer were to credit the account of the employee in its books of account in respect of the liability to pay salary, and were then to remit the money to India, it would amount to receipt of the salary income outside India in the first place on credit of the salary to the employee’s account.

One of the aspects, which needs to be borne in mind, is the issue of non-taxability of such income in any country, if it is not taxed on a receipt basis in India. Today, one of the major issues which countries are seeking to tackle is the issue of double non-taxation, through amendment of tax treaties. The Kolkata tribunal, in a way, seeks to address this aspect through its decision, though no tax treaties were involved in this case.

In the case of Capt A. L. Fernandes, the other issue which was decided by the Mumbai tribunal was that the salary income actually accrued or arose in India, on account of the contract of employment being signed in India, and all rights flowing from that also being enforceable in India, and therefore the concept of deemed accrual u/s 9(1) was irrelevant for the purpose. Therefore, the corollary of sections 9(1)(ii) and 9(1)(iii) could not be applied for the purpose. Interestingly, the Kolkata tribunal did not refer to or follow this aspect of the decision, when deciding the case before it, though in the facts of the case before it, the contracts of employment were signed in India.

Possibly, this is on account of the fact that the Bombay High Court had clearly held in the case of Avtar Singh Wadhwan (supra) that the relevant test to be applied to decide if income accrued to a non- resident in India or outside India, is where services are rendered, and not where the contract is signed. The Karnataka High Court also, in the case of Prahlad Vijendra Rao (supra), held that u/s. 15 of the Act, even on accrual basis, salary income is taxable i.e., it becomes taxable irrespective of the fact whether it is actually received or not; only when services are rendered in India it becomes taxable by implication. However, if services are rendered outside India, such income would not be taxable in India.

Lastly, while perhaps the view of the Kolkata Tribunal does seem to be the better position based on a strict reading of the provisions, one also needs to consider the fact that in both the cases, the salaries were credited to an NRE account with a bank in India. For all practical purposes, under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, such an account is treated as the equivalent of a foreign bank account of the depositor outside India – transfers from Non-Resident Ordinary accounts (which are nonrepatriable) to such NRE accounts are governed by the procedures applicable to repatriation of funds overseas, transfer of funds from such accounts overseas is freely permissible, interest on such accounts is not taxable, etc. Given this situation, should amounts received in such NRE bank accounts not be regarded as having been received outside India? What purpose would be served by having Indian citizens open overseas bank accounts to receive their foreign salaries in the first instance, just to save on tax on such salaries?

The CDBT has come out with clarifications in the past, regarding the residential status of seafarers operating on ships in international waters, and taxability of their salary. In order to avoid further litigation, and unnecessary reduction of inflows into NRE accounts, it would be better for the CBDT to clarify that such foreign salaries credited to NRE accounts of seafarers or other NRIs would not be regarded as having been received in India.

COMPILERS NOTE

This month’s
Twitter Treats would obviously be dominated by the event that has shaken up the
whole of India – Demonetization of the currency notes. Since 8th November
evening, thousands of tweets on this subject have been sent out. Here are some
of the interesting ones:

@patelameet 

Earthquake
measuring 10 on the Rich – chor scale hits the black money hoarders in India
#indiafightscorruption

@joshikhushboo7

Country’s
detoxification on! #DeMonitization

@rishibagree              

Journalist
snubbed his driver when he asked Rs 500 advance After #DeMonetisation
same journo called the driver & gave him 12 months advance

@b50

I saw one
shop accept an old Rs 500 note for a Rs80 item and give back change,
smilingly. The customer told her God Bless You. Respect.

@DrGarekar

#IncomeTax
must be taught from Nursery so that paying taxes become ingrained in DNA of
every child as he grows to adulthood & start earning

@PawanDurani

UPA which
said Rs 30 is sufficient for daily expense of a common man in India for
a day is complaining about Rs 2000 withdrawal limit #Irony

@navinkhaitan

Congratulations
those who got the Rs 2000 note U hv successfully cleared Level1 Level2:
Find someone to accept the note n give u change

@anilkumble1074

Massive
googly bowled by our Hon. PM @narendramodi today. Well done Sir! Proud of you!!

@patelameet 

More notes
will be counted tonight in India than votes in USA #indiafightscorruption

@kapsology

ATMs giving
only Rs 2000 note if you withdraw Rs 2000. Iss note ka achaar
daale kya? No one is going to give change for it in the market.

@FortunateYogi

I want to
have a meal of Rs. 80 and all I have is a 2000 note, for which no
one gives me change. #MyExperience #ConfusedModiSarkar

@coolfunnytshirt

One out of
many positive side effects of #Demonitization – It has unmasked many
‘neutral’, ‘unbiased’ and ‘apolitical’ people on our TL.

@gauravcsawant

My first Rs
2000
note. Almost didn’t want it to go. Then the vegetable vendor said: the
more it changes hands better for all of us :))

@rameshsrivats 

Maybe we can
call this ATM calibration issue a Why-2K problem?

@rameshsrivats 

Good that we
are diverting cash from shady purposes to shaadi purposes.

@rameshsrivats 

ATM:
Welcome. Please enter PIN.

Rahul: Here,
take.

ATM: Ouch!
Not that pin.

And here are
some more tweets worth reading!

@graphic_foodie

I never love
my husband more than when he does my tax return #truelove

ObamaMalik                 

How do
illegal people pay income tax if they have no social security for their
tax form? I am legal. I have social security. I pay tax

@ashwinmushran

Pay Service
Tax!
Then told there is now a Service Tax half yearly return! Then
pay accountant to file that you’ve paid service Tax! Repeat

@aquasaurabh

After Income
Declaration Scheme
to tackle black money the Govt has Patriotism Declaration Scheme
fr just 5 cr #ADHMReleaseDrama @karanjohar

@mkvenu1

“Sin
tax” under GST regime is being lowered drastically to enable the “sinners”
to generate more cash. They help fund elections, after all.

@JamuntinI

God may even
forgive your Sins, taxation dept., wouldn’t. Sin tax @ 40% for your
Smoke…probably. #GST Update.

@rameshsrivats  

Now that a
real estate tycoon is winning the US elections, Congress must be seriously
looking at Robert Vadra.

@rameshsrivats  

Watching
NDTV. The Congress spokesperson is putting full nonsense. He should be treated
like a 1,000 rupee note, & discontinued immediately.

And here is
the list of a few bollywood actors’ twitter
handles that you may want to follow:

Madhuri
Dixit Nene – @madhuridixit

Shah Rukh
Khan – @iamsrk

Alia Bhat –
@aliaa08

Dilip Kumar
– @TheDilipKumar

Deepika
Padukone – @deepikapaduokne

Priyanka
Chopra – @priyankachopra

Karan Johar
– @karanjohar

Aamir Khan –
@aamir_khan

Anil Kapoor
– @AnilKapoor

Anupam Kher
– @AnupamPKher

Rishi
Kapoor – @chintskap
_

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO INVESTOR ADVISERS’ REGULATIONS – WIDE RANGING IMPLICATIONS INCLUDING TO CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

SEBI has issued on 7th October 2016 a consultation paper
proposing some amendments to regulations relating to investment advisors and
investment advice generally. Some of the proposed changes affect Chartered
Accountants, Company Secretaries, lawyers and other professionals directly. The
changes generally would make the regulations relating to investment advisors
much stricter. They will also make the categorisations between various types of
advisers sharper, so much so that they may end up being mutually exclusive.

Curiously, this paper has
invited widespread criticism on the grounds that SEBI perhaps did not expect.
Clearly, there were certain valid concerns SEBI has had to address through the
proposals. However, partly due to over-reach and partly due to
ill-drafted/ill-conceived proposals, there has been a strong opposition.
However, considering that amendments are inevitable, it is necessary to
consider the background and also the proposals as they presently stand.

Background of the provisions

SEBI had in 2013 notified regulations
relating to investment advisers (the SEBI (Investment Advisers) Regulations
2013 or “the Regulations”). These Regulations created a fresh category of
persons who assist investors in making investments. The others include
portfolio managers, mutual fund distributors, stock brokers, etc. This
category was created for a specific objective and to resolve certain conflicts
of interest that arose when the adviser was also the seller/distributor of
products.

An investor who approaches an
intermediary faces a concern about the objectivity of the intermediary. On one
hand, the investor expects that the intermediary will give him impartial advice
on which product he should invest in, taking into account his needs and
circumstances. On the other hand, the intermediary usually is paid by the
organisation (i.e., mutual fund, etc.) whose product he distributes. In
any case, he has his further own self interest to serve which may motivate him
to push those products that give him the highest of commissions/remuneration.
The result can not only be costly for the investor in terms of his effectively
paying high cost for making investments, but he may also end up holding
investments that are not suited to him. Mis-selling of units is such a serious
issue that it has actually been made a category of fraudulent practice under
the PFUTP Regulations. Generally, code of conduct relating to intermediaries
too lay stress on their taking into account interests of their clients above self-interest.

However, obviously, this is not
enough. So long as there is conflict of interest, temptations will remain and
no regulations can resolve it merely by mandating against it or banning it. The
Investment Advisers Regulations created a neat solution. It created a category
of intermediaries – Investment Advisers – who would focus on giving advice and
not distributing products. Thus, they will render skilled advice to clients
taking into account their needs and circumstances and thus suggest a portfolio
or investment products that serve their needs. More importantly, their fees
will be directly paid by such clients. The Investment Advisers thus have
motivation as well as interest in focussing only the interests of clients. They
are generally not permitted to accept remuneration/commission from entities
whose products they may recommend.

The Regulations go further and
mandate a higher level of professionalism in such Investment Advisers. They are
required to carry out proper client analysis and document it. Acting as
Investment Advisers would require prior registration. A certain level of
qualifications and also certification is also mandated for such persons.

However, while Investment
Advisers generally were required to obtain registration, exemption from
registration was given to certain persons. For example, persons who give
investment advice as part as incidental to their other activities are not
required to register. A good example is of Chartered Accountants who may give
such advice as part of their practice of rendering tax and related advice to
their clients. Similarly, distributors of products may also give such advice. Such persons are not required to be registered.

This may now undergo a
significant change as per the proposals made in the Consultation Paper.

No exemption to Chartered
Accountants and others who render investment advice incidentally

Chartered Accountants, Company
Secretaries, lawyers, stock brokers, etc. who give investment advice
incidental to their primary activity of professional practice will now require
registration as Investment Advisers. The result will be that such persons will
now have to focus on their core activity and cannot, even if asked, render
investment advice to their clients.

It is not as if such persons
are not qualified or otherwise unregulated. Further, it is also not as if they
have conflict of interest. Yet, this requirement is proposed.

It is possible that some such
persons may obtain the required registration to enable them to continue giving
such advice to their clients. However, it is more likely that the
categorisation of persons will become more distinct and separate with each group
focussing on their own activities.

Mutual Fund distributors to be
debarred from giving investment advice

As explained earlier,
intermediaries such as mutual fund distributors face the very conflict of
interest that is the focus of the Investment Advisers Regulations. They are
paid by the mutual fund/AMC whose products they sell though the investor may
expect that they are given impartial advice suited to their circumstances. Such
distributors under the Regulations were not required to be registered as Investment
Advisers, if they gave advice that is incidental to the selling of such
products. The Consultation Paper now proposes to wholly prohibit them from
giving such advice even incidental to selling.

Categorisation between Research
Analysts and Investment Advisers

Research Analysts and
Investment Advisers provide similar functions in relation to giving of
investment advice. However, the nature of their functions and approach is
significantly different and thus requirements relating to their registration
and functioning are covered under separate Regulations. A proposal now makes
this categorisation even sharper.

The Consultation Paper observes
that investment advice is often given in electronic and broadcasting media. A
certain level of exemption is presently provided under the Investment Advisers
Regulations to such advice that is widely available to public. It is now
proposed to divide such advice being given. Simply stated, generic advice in
such media to public at large can be given by research analysts while client
specific advice can be given by Investment Advisers.

Another recommendation further
clarifies this divide. Research Analysts would be required to send their
recommendations to all classes of its clients at the same time. The reason is that
their recommendations are generic and product related and not client specific.
Thereafter or independently, the role of the Investment Adviser would arise
where the investor would take the help of such Adviser to decide whether such
recommendation is suitable for his needs and circumstances.

Investment tips via social
media and the like

This proposal has seen very
strong criticism. While the criticism is justified, the evil that is sought to
be addressed also needs to be considered.

It is too often found – as
evidenced by several orders of SEBI – that there are persons who use the
internet and social media for giving tips in dubious scrips whose price and
trading are manipulated to trap unsuspecting investors. Tips are given by SMS,
whatsapp, social media, etc. Often, these scrips are what are known as
“penny stocks” who rarely have any intrinsic value but are quoted at low
prices. The price of the shares are manipulated and huge volume is also seen in
stock exchange which tempts investors into investing. The investing public may
be influenced by the low price and hence, there is expectation that loss too
can be low. The shares, after some time, see their price and volumes both
crashing with investors then left holding the valueless shares. In some cases,
SEBI has identified persons who carry out such manipulative/fraudulent
activities and debar/punish them. At other times, it may be difficult even to
identify who they are.

The Consultation Paper now
seeks to wholly debar giving of such tips unless such persons who give tips are
themselves registered as Investment Advisers and thus subjected to the
regulatory requirements. Moreover, giving of such tips in violation of such
requirements will be treated as a fraudulent act inviting stringent punishment.

This proposal has invited very
strong criticism. The objection obviously is not against action against such
dubious/fraudulent tippers. It is the blanket and overreaching ban against all
type of tips on internet and social media irrespective of who is giving such
types, of what type and in what manner. To give a most basic example, a person
may recommend in passing to his friend a particular share in a conversation
over WhatsApp. This may not be well researched and even accurate. Yet, such a thing is so common. Such a tip may attract severe punishment.

It is common to find
whatsapp/facebook groups where investment advice is freely taken/given amongst
like minded persons. There are countless blogs that discuss investments and it
is likely that some sort of recommendation may be given on such blogs. Critics
have given example of comments of persons like Warren Buffet and the like who
discuss their investments publicly.

It is felt that SEBI has not
thought through this issue well and their recommendation may restrain free
discussion of stocks and investments generally. It is even stated that such
restriction amounts to severe and unjustified restraint on freedom of speech.

One will have to see how SEBI
deals with this criticism and what modified form of regulation it comes out
with.

Ban on schemes, competition,
games, etc. relating to stock market

SEBI has observed that many
persons organise competition, games, etc. relating to stock market which
may involve predicting the price of shares on stock markets. The paper makes it
clear that SEBI does not approve or endorse such schemes and thus the public
may engage in such schemes at their own risk. However, SEBI goes a step beyond
such hands-off/caveat emptor approach and notes that the public may end up
suffering losses. Hence, the paper recommends a total ban on such schemes, etc.

Client Agreement by Investment
Advisers

Client agreements have always
been a concern in respect of intermediaries in securities markets. There may be
non-uniformity or even sheer non-existence of such agreements. Or the terms may
be one-sided or opaque. Certain minimum level of protection of clients may not
be provided. Hence, SEBI often provides for certain standard form of such
agreements with certain minimum requirements that cannot be deviated from. For
Investment Advisers, the paper recommends a “Rights and Obligation” document.
The paper recommends a certain minimum provisions in such document including
various disclosures by the Investment Adviser. The result would be that, while
avoiding over-formalisation, a certain level of protection as well as
disclosure would be available to the client.

Other recommendations

The Paper generally seeks to
make several other amendments. The Regulations particularly relating to Investment
Advisers will thus see substantial amendments.

Conclusion

Intermediaries are considered
to be the gatekeepers to securities markets who deal with investors directly.
It is then inevitable that such intermediaries will face considerable
regulation and supervision. It is also expected that SEBI would ensure that,
through registration, it creates a requirement whereby only qualified persons
who comply with certain basic requirements as well as ethics are only permitted
to operate. Further, conflicts of interests are also avoided. This has resulted
in not only multiple categories of such intermediaries but increasingly complex
regulatory requirements. Whatever shape the final requirements may come in
following the consultation paper, they will only increase such requirements
which eventually will also increase costs of compliance. The multiple
categories will ensure that there is sharp specialisation and many
intermediaries and even professionals like Chartered Accountants will have to
give up certain activities they may otherwise be engaging in. The investors
will have advantage of such specialisation but will then have to go to multiple
intermediaries to fulfill their simple desires of investing in capital market
products. _

Payments To non-residents law and procedure (Withholding Tax provisions under section 195 of the act)

The
subject of “withholding tax provisions (TDS) from payments made to
non-residents” is always mired in controversies.  Being 
part  of  the 
International  Tax Law, the
subject is dynamic. It is a complex subject as it involves computation of
income in the hands of non- residents. Provisions are very harsh and fraught
with severe penalties. Therefore, an attempt has been made in this write-up to
explain the law and procedure of various aspects of withholding taxes from the
payments made to non-residents, in brief, in the simple format of questions and
answers.

1.0  Introduction

Section
195 of the income-tax act, 1961 (the “act”) contains the provisions to deduct
tax at source (worldwide it is popularly known as “Withholding  tax”) from any payment made to a
non-resident.

Section
195(1) provides that, “any person responsible for paying to a non-resident not
being a company, or to a foreign company, any interest (not being interest
referred to in section 194LB  or section
194LC) or section 194LD or any other sum chargeable under the provisions of the
act (not being income chargeable under the head “salaries”) shall, at the time
of credit of such income to the account of the payee or at the time of payment
thereof in cash or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode,
whichever is earlier, deduct income-tax thereon at the rates in force. ….”

The
dissection of the above provision reveals that—

(i)  The obligation to deduct tax at source is
cast on every person making payment, be it individual, company, partnership
firm, government or a public sector bank etc. The term ’person’ as defined in
section 2(31) of the act is relevant here.

 (ii)  
The payee may be any type of entity (i.e. individual, company etc.).

(iii)  The payee must be a non-resident under the
act.

(iv)  The payment may be for interest other than
following types of interest:

(a)
Section 194LB – interest from infrastructure debt fund; or

(b)
Section  194LC    
interest  income  from 
Indian company before 1st July 2017;

(c)
Section 194LD – interest on certain bonds and government securities.

[In
all above types of interest payments the rate of TDS is 5 %.]

(v)   Payment of salaries is not covered by
section 195 of the act.

(vi)  Tax deduction has to be made at the time of
credit or payment of the sum to the non-resident, whichever is earlier.

(vii)
There is no threshold for deduction of tax at source. It therefore means
payment of even one rupee to a non-resident would attract TDS provisions.

In
the backdrop of above basic provisions, let us proceed to understand in detail
the law and procedure to comply with the provisions of withholding tax at
source u/s 195 of the act.

2.0   Questions and
answers

2.1     What kind of
payments to non-residents would attract withholding tax provisions under the
act? Is there any threshold exemption for deduction of tax at source?

Ans:  Section 195 casts an obligation on the person
who is making any payment to a non-resident to deduct tax at source. The
sweeping language of the section brings almost every payment, made to a
non-resident, which is chargeable to tax, within its ambit. The exclusions here
are in respect of payment of certain types of interest on borrowings (refer
para 1 herein above) and salaries. Section 192 of the act deals with TDS
provisions relating to salary paid to a non-resident, which is chargeable to
tax in India.

There
is no threshold exemption from obligation to deduct tax u/s 195. However, tax
is deductible only if income is chargeable to tax in the hands of  a non-resident and not otherwise.

The
crux of the provisions of section 195 is that the income in the hands of the
recipient must be chargeable to tax. Thus, 
if any income is exempt in the hands of the non-resident, the resident
making payment to such a non-resident need not deduct tax at source u/s 195.
(CBDT Circular no.  786 dated 7th
February, 2000 has clarified this issue).

The  hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd and Another vs. CIT (1999) 239 ITR 587
(SC) has held that the scheme of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 195
and section 197 leaves no doubt that the expression “any other sum chargeable
under the provisions of this act” would mean “sum” on which income-tax is
leviable. In other words, the said sum is chargeable to tax and could be
assessed to tax under the act. The consideration would be whether payment of
the sum to the non-resident is chargeable to tax under the provisions of the
act or not. That sum may be income or income hidden or otherwise embedded
therein. the  scheme of tax deduction at
source applies not only to the amount paid which wholly bears “income”
character such as salaries, dividend, interest on securities, etc., but also to
gross sums, the whole of which may not be income or profits of the recipient.”

in
this regard, it is important to note that in the subsequent decision in the
case of Ge India technology  (P) ltd (327
itr 456)(SC), the SC has dealt with the above aspect and other aspects relating
to section 195 in detail and has made important observations as follows:

 “7. ……. The most important expression in
section 195(1) consists of the words “chargeable under the provisions of the
act”. A person paying interest or any other sum to a non-resident is not liable
to deduct tax if such sum is not chargeable to tax under the income-tax act.
For instance, where there is no obligation on the part of the payer and no
right to receive the sum by the recipient and that the payment does not arise
out of any contract or obligation between the payer and the recipient but is
made voluntarily, such payments cannot be regarded  as 
income  under  the  income-tax
act. It may be noted that section 195 contemplates not  merely 
amounts,  the  whole 
of  which  are pure income payments, it also covers
composite payments which has an element of income embedded or incorporated in
them. Thus,  where an amount is payable
to a non-resident, the payer is under an obligation to deduct TAS  in respect of such composite payments. The
obligation to deduct TAS is, however, limited to the appropriate proportion of
income chargeable under the act forming part of the gross sum of money payable
to the non-resident. This obligation being limited to the appropriate
proportion of income flows from the words used in section 195(1), namely,
“chargeable under the provisions of the act”. It is for this reason that  vide 
Circular  no.   728 
dated  30-10-1995 that the CBDT
has clarified that the tax deductor can take into consideration the effect of
DTAA in respect of payment of royalties and technical fees while deducting
TAS….

….
While deciding the scope of section 195(2) it is important to note that the tax
which is required to be deducted at source is deductible only out of the
chargeable sum. this  is the underlying
principle of section 195. hence, apart from section 9(1), sections 4, 5, 9, 90
and 91 as well as the provisions of DTAA are also relevant, while applying tax
deduction at source provisions. reference to ito(tdS) u/s. 195(2) or 195(3)
either by the non­ resident or by the resident payer is to avoid any future
hassles for both resident as well as non­ resident. in our view, section 195(2)
and 195(3) are safeguards. the  said
provisions are of practical importance. this 
reasoning of ours is based on the decision of this Court in transmission
Corpn. of A.P. ltd.’s  case (supra) in
which this Court has observed that the provision of section 195(2) is a
Safeguard. from  this it follows that
where a person responsible for deduction is fairly certain then he can make his
own determination as to whether the tax was deductible at source and, if so,
what should be the amount thereof.”

8.
If the contention of the department that the moment there is remittance the
obligation to deduct TAS arises is to be accepted then we are obliterating the
words “chargeable under the provisions of the act” in section 195(1). The said expression
in section 195(1) shows that the remittance has got to be of a trading receipt,
the whole or part of which is liable to tax in India. The payer is bound to
deduct TAS only if the tax is assessable in India. If tax is not so assessable,
there is no question of TAS being deducted. [See : Vijay Ship Breaking Corpn.
vs. CIT [2009] 314 ITR 309 (SC)].

Applicability  
of   the   judgment  
in   the   case  
of Transmission Corporation (supra)

10.
In transmission Corpn. of A.P. ltd.’s case (supra) ‘a non-resident had entered
into a composite contract with the resident party making the payments. The said
composite contract not only comprised supply of plant, machinery and equipment
in India, but also comprised the installation and commissioning of the same in
India. It was admitted that the erection and 
commissioning  of  plant 
and  machinery  in India gave rise to income-taxable in
India. it was, therefore, clear even to the payer that payments required to be
made by him to the non-resident included an element of income which was
exigible to tax in India. The only issue raised in that case was whetherTDS was
applicable only to pure income payments and not to composite payments which had
an element of income embedded or incorporated in them. The controversy before
us in this batch of cases is, therefore, quite different. In transmission
Corpn. of A.P. ltd.’s  case (supra) it
was held that TAS was liable to be deducted by the payer on the gross amount if
such payment included in it an amount which was exigible to tax in India. it
was held that if the payer wanted to deduct TAS 
not on the gross amount but on the lesser amount, on the footing that
only a portion of the payment made represented “income chargeable to tax in
India”, then it was necessary for him to make an application u/s. 195(2) of the
act to the ito(tdS) and obtain his permission for deducting TAS at lesser
amount. Thus,  it was held by this Court
that if the payer had a doubt as to the amount to be deducted as TAS he could
approach the ito(tdS) to compute the amount which was liable to be deducted at
source. In our view, section 195(2) is based on the “principle of
proportionality”. The said sub-section gets attracted only in cases where the
payment made is a composite payment in which a certain proportion of payment
has an element of “income” chargeable to tax in India. it is in this context
that the Supreme Court stated, “if no such application is filed, income-tax on
such sum is to be deducted and it is the statutory obligation of the person responsible
for paying such ‘sum’ to deduct tax thereon before making payment. He has to
discharge the obligation to tdS”. if one reads the observation of the Supreme
Court, the words “such sum” clearly indicate that the observation refers to a
case of composite payment where the payer has a doubt regarding the inclusion
of an amount in such payment which is exigible to tax in India. in our view,
the above observations of this Court in transmission  Corpn. of A.P. ltd.’s  case (supra) which is put in italics has been
completely, with  respect,  misunderstood 
by  the  Karnataka high  Court to mean that it is not open for the
payer to contend that if the amount paid by him to the non-resident is not at
all “chargeable to tax in India”, then no TAS is required to be deducted from
such payment. This interpretation of the high Court completely loses sight of
the plain words of section 195(1) which in clear terms lays down that tax at
source is deductible only from “sums chargeable” under the provisions of the income-
tax act, i.e., chargeable under sections 4, 5 and 9 of the income-tax act.”

Thus,  there is no need to deduct tax at source in
respect of all incomes, which are exempt and/or not taxable under the act.

An
illustrative list of income under the act, which is exempt in the hands of
non-residents, is as follows:

(i)   Section 10(4) – interest on NRE account and
notified securities;

(ii)  Section 
10(6BB)  tax  paid 
on  behalf  of  the
non-resident by an Indian Company which is engaged in the business of operation
of aircraft;

(iii)
Section 10(6C) – income by way of royalty or fees arising to a foreign company
in respect of projects connected with security of India;

(iv)
Section  10(8a)  and 
(8B)    income 
of  a consultant/individual         out   
of   funds   made available to an international
organization under a technical assistance grant between the agency and the
government of a foreign State/ Government of India;

(v)
Section 10(15)(iv) etc. – income by way of interest and

(vi)
Section 10(15a) – any payment made by an Indian company engaged in the business
of operation of aircraft, to acquire aircraft or an aircraft engine on lease
from the Government of a foreign State or a foreign enterprise.

(vii)
amounts not liable to tax as per the provisions of the respective DTAAs.

Besides
the above income, if any other income of a non-resident is exempt from tax in
India, then there is no necessity to deduct tax at source by the payer.

2.2     Who has to
deduct tax at source u/s. 195 of the act?

Ans:  Section 195 casts an obligation on the person
who is making any payment to a non-resident to deduct tax at source. The only
condition is that the sum payable must be chargeable to tax in the hands of the
non-resident. The only exception is payment of salaries and specified interest
income.

2.3   Can a payer
obtain a “lower” or “nil” deduction certificate from the income tax
authorities? if yes, what is the procedure for the same?

Ans: yes, the
payer can make an application to the Assessing Officer to obtain a certificate
for “lower” or “nil” deduction of tax u/s. 195 (2) of the act. No particular
form has been prescribed for making an application and therefore, the payer can
apply on a plain paper or a letterhead giving all facts and supporting
documents justifying its claim for lower deduction or nil deduction of tax.

Alternatively,  the payer or the payee can make an
application for an advance ruling u/s. 245n of the act. The decision given by
the AAR would be binding on the applicant for the transaction for which the
ruling is sought and on the Commissioner and other income tax authorities
subordinate to him in respect of the applicant and the said transaction.

2.4   Can a payee
obtain a “lower” or “nil” deduction certificate from the income tax
authorities? if yes, what is the procedure for the same?

Ans:  a payee can apply to the AO for lower
deduction or NIL deduction certificates if the income received by him is either
not chargeable to tax or chargeable at the lower rate than what is prescribed
for withholding. Such an application can be made either u/s. 195 (3) or 197 of
the act.

Section
195(3) read with rule 29B provides for application by payee only in a case
where the income in the hands of the non-resident is not chargeable to tax in
Indian and therefore the payment is to be made without deduction of tax at
source i.e. nil tax. Whereas, the application is to be made u/s. 197 r.w. rule
28AA where the deduction is to be made at a lower rate or nil rate. Section197
covers provisions for application of certificate for lower or nil deduction for
host of other sections (e.g. from section 192 to 194 lBC)  along with section 195 of the Act.

Rule
28AA and rule 29B prescribes various conditions that a payee must fulfill in
order to be eligible to get a certificate.

2.5 At what rate tax is required to be deducted u/s. 195 of
the act?

2.5.1
income-tax act vs. double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA)

Clause
(iii) of the section 2 (37A) of the Act specifies the rates in force for the
purposes of deduction of tax at source u/s. 195. Accordingly,  one has to apply the rate/s prescribed in the
finance  act of the relevant year or the
rates specified in a DTAA entered into by the Central Government, whichever  is 
applicable  by  virtue 
of  provisions of section 90 of
the act. In view of provisions of section 90(2) of the act, in case of a
remittance to a country with which a DTAA is in force, the tax should be
deducted at the rate provided in the finance 
act of the relevant year or at the rate provided in the DTAA, whichever
is more beneficial to the assessee. This position has been clarified by the
CBDT vide Circular no.  728, dated 30th
October, 1995. However, the provisions of section 90(4) provide that the relief
or benefit from any agreements or DTAA shall be available to a non resident  assessee 
only  on  obtaining 
from  him, a certificate of his
being a resident in a country outside India (TRC), issued by the government of
that country or specified territory.

2.5.2
CBDT Circular no. 333 dated 2-4-1982

Even
before insertion of section 90(2) reproduced above by the finance  (no. 2) act, 1991, with retrospective effect
from 1-4-1972, the CBDT had clarified vide Circular No. 333 dated 2- 4-1982
that where a specific provision is made in the DTAA, the provisions of the DTAA
will prevail over the general provisions contained in the income-tax act and
where there is no specific provision in the DTAA, it is the basic law i.e. the
provisions of the income-tax act, that will govern the taxation of such income.

The
said circular has been accepted and explained by various judicial authorities.
Hence, if a particular payment to non-resident is subject to deduction of tax
at source under the act, but under the relevant DTAA the same is not chargeable
to tax or taxable at a lower rate in India, then such lower/nil rate shall be
applicable.

2.5.3
Levy of Surcharge and the education Cess

The
rates prescribed under the act are to be increased by the Surcharge @ 2 or 5
per cent for foreign companies (as the case may be) and @ 15 per cent for non-residents
other than a company [12% in case of a co-operative society or firm]. Also,
there will be a further levy of the education Cess (@ 3 per cent on the tax and
surcharge amount.

However,  wherever theTDS rate is applied as prescribed
under a DTAA, then the same would be final and the Surcharge and the Education
Cess would not be applicable. Since DTAAs are agreements between the two
sovereign States, the rate prescribed therein is the maximum rate (i.e. the
upper ceiling), regardless of subsequent imposition of surcharge or cess, etc.

In
CIT vs. Srinivasan (K.) [1972] 83 ITR 346 the Supreme Court held that
income-tax includes surcharge. Therefore, 
the term “income tax” as included in tax treaties include surcharge as
well.

In
the following decisions it has been held that in cases where DTAA benefit
applies,TDS cannot be made at a higher rate in terms of section 206AA of the
act:


[2015] Serum Institute of India Ltd (68 Sot 254) (ITAT  Pune)


[2015] Infosys BPO ltd (154 itd 816)(ITAT 
Bang)


[2016]  Wipro  ltd 
(ITA  Nos.   1544 to 1547/ Bang/2013)(ITAT  Bang)


[2016] Bharti Airtel Ltd (67 taxmann.com 223) (ITAT  del)

A
contrary decision was earlier rendered in the case of  [2012] 
Bosch  ltd.   (141 
ITD 38)(ITAT  Bang).

2.5.4    Specific Rates prescribed in certain
Sections of the act

2.5.4.1
Section 115A of the act

The
CBDT has, in the context of section 115A [which prescribes special rates of tax
on dividends, interest, income from mutual funds, royalty and fees for
technical services payable to a non-resident (not being a company) or a foreign
company] clarified vide Circular no. 740 dated 17th  April, 1996 that if the DTAA provides for a
lower rate of taxation, the same would be applicable.

2.5.4.2
Presumptive rates of taxes

The  ratio of the above Circular would equally
apply to other special provisions applicable to non-resident such as provisions
contained in sections 44B (Special provisions for computing profits and gains
of shipping business in case of non-residents), 44BBA (Special provisions for
computing profits and gains in connection with the business of operation of
aircraft in case of non-residents), 44BBB (Special provisions for computing
profits and gains of foreign companies engaged 
in  the  business 
of  civil  construction, etc., in certain turnkey power
projects), etc.

Section
44BB prescribes a presumptive rate of 10% in respect of profits and gains in
connection with the business of exploration etc., of mineral oils.
However,  such presumptive rate would not
be applicable, if such income is otherwise covered by section 44D (i.e. Payment
of royalty and FTS  prior to 1-04-2003)
or section 115A (Payment of interest, dividends, royalties or FTS ). [ABC, in
re 234 ITR 37 (AAR)].

Following
the ratio of SC decision in the case of GE India Technology Centre (P.)
Ltd.  (supra), the ITAT  in the case of Frontier Offshore Exploration
(India)  Ltd.  vs. 
DCIT  [2011]  10 
taxmann.com 250 (Chennai) relating to payment to a non­ resident engaged
in the business of prospecting / exploration etc. of mineral oil, covered u/s
44BB of the act, held that obligation to deductTDS is limited to the
appropriate portion of income chargeable to tax.

2.5.4.3 Section 206AA of the act

This
section provides for furnishing of Permanent account number (Pan)  by any person who is entitled to receive any
sum/ income/amount on which tax is to be deducted under Chapter XVII-B  of the income tax act (includes section 195)
to the person responsible for deducting such tax, failing which tax shall be
deducted at higher of any of the following rates;

a)  The rate specified in the relevant provision
of the act,

b)  The rate or rates in force,

c)  The rate of twenty Five Percent.

However,
CBDT has notified a new Rule 37BC in the Income Tax Rules, 1962 vide
Notification no. 53/2016 dated 24th June, 
2016 providing a relaxation from deduction of tax at a higher rate u/s.
206AA in respect of certain payments. The provisions of section 206AA shall not
apply in cases where the deductee does not have a Pan and the payment made to him
is in the nature of interest, royalty, fees for technical services or payments
on transfer of any capital asset and the deductee furnishes the following
details and documents to the deductor:

(i)  Name, E-mail id, contact number;

(ii)
Address  in  the  country  or 
specified  territory outside India
of which the deductee is a resident;

(iii)
A certificate of his being resident in any country or specified territory
outside India from the Government of that country or specified territory if the
law of that country or specified territory provides for issuance of such
certificate;

(iv)
Tax Identification Number of the deductee in the country or specified territory
of his residence and in case no such number is available, then a unique number
on the basis of which the deductee is identified by the Government of that
country or the specified territory of which he claims to be a resident.

2.5.5   No TDS from
payments to foreign shipping companies or agents

The  CBDT, vide Circular no. 723 dated 19th September,
1995 had clarified that there would be no overlapping of section 172 which
provides for recovery of tax from foreign shipping companies and section 194C
& section 195, where payments are made to shipping agents of non-resident
ship owners or charterers of carriage of passengers, etc. shipped at a port in
India. The agent acts on behalf of the non­ resident ship owner or charterers
and therefore he steps into shoes of the principal and accordingly, the
provisions of section 172 shall apply and those of section 194C & 195 will
not apply. Therefore,  a resident making
payment of freight to the foreign shipping companies or their agents will not
be required to deduct TDS u/s. 195 or 194C.

2.6 What is the procedure of claiming tax treaty
benefit  while  remitting 
sum  u/s.  195  of
the act?

Ans:   Sections 90(4) and 90(5) were inserted by
the Finance Act  2012  and 
2013  respectively  to provide that any non-resident assessee who
seeks to obtain the benefit of the relevant DTAA applicable, shall avail so
only if he presents a Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) of the country of which
he is a resident for tax purposes as well 
as  any  other 
prescribed  particulars  as may be notified. Further, by Notification
No. 39/ f.no.142 /13/2012, rule 21AB was inserted which prescribes the
necessary particulars to be submitted along with the TRC u/s. 90(5) for  claiming 
treaty  benefits.  This 
includes  a self declaration by
the assessee in form 10F and it shall contain the Status, nationality, tax
Identification Number of the assessee in the country of which he claims to be a
resident, address of the assessee in that country and the period of residential
status of the assessee as mentioned in the TRC. however,  the Non­ resident shall not be required to
submit form 10F   if  the 
TRC already  contains  all 
such information as specified in form 10F.

2.7 What is the procedure to comply with the provisions of
WHT u/s. 195 of the act?

Section
195(6) of the income-tax act, 1961 provides that a person responsible for paying
any sum to a non-resident shall furnish such information as may be prescribed
under rule 37BB. The said rule 37BB provides that form no. 15CA and/or
form  no. 15CB shall be furnished for the
purpose of payment to a non-resident. Form No. 15CA is to be filed and
submitted online by  the  deductor 
i.e.  payer  and 
form 15CB is to be issued by the practicing Chartered accountant (C.A).
However, form 15CA is required to be filed only when the transaction falls
under reportable category irrespective of chargeability of tax. Form 15CA
contains four parts, A, B, C and D. When a transaction does fall into
reportable category and amount chargeable to tax does not exceed Rs. five lakh,
then part A of the form needs to be filed. But if it is taxable, one needs to
check the amount of the transaction.

If
the  transaction  value 
(payment  to  non­ resident) exceeds Rs. 5 lakh,

(a)
Part B of Form No.15CA needs to be filed after obtaining,­

(i)  A 
certificate  from  the 
Assessing  Officer u/s. 197; or

(ii)
An order from the Assessing Officer under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of
section 195;

Or

(b)
Part  C 
of  form   no.15CA 
after  obtaining  a certificate in Form No. 15CB from a
Chartered accountant.

Whereas,
if the transaction is below Rs. 5 lakh, only Part A of form 15CA needs to be
filed. The limit of Rs. 5 lakh is, however, not a threshold limit for
chargeability of tax or deduction of tax at source. In other words, even if
there is an exemption from submission of form 
15CB, the payer needs to deduct tax at source and deposit it with the
Government.

2.8 What are the consequences of failure to deduct tax at
source u/s. 195 of the act?

Ans:  There  
are severe consequences  for  failure 
to deduct tax at source while making payment to a non-resident. Besides
attracting levy of interest and penalty, such payments will not be allowed as
deduction in the hands of the payer while computing the profits and gains from
business and profession under the act [refer provisions of section 40(a)(i)].
Moreover, the payer may be regarded as an ‘agent’ of the non-resident u/s.163
of the act and the tax may be recovered from him. Thus,  one needs to be extremely careful in applying
provisions of the act for deduction of tax at source, from payments made to
non-residents.

Looking
at the serious repercussions of non- deduction of tax at source as a payer one
must always take a conservative view and deduct tax at source.

3.0 Some typical payments to non-residents which attracts
TDS provisions

In
following table some typical payments which are of practical importance are
covered. The idea is to give a bird’s eye view only and not a detailed or
reasoned analysis of provisions or taxability.

Some
Typical Payments to Non-Residents

Relevant
sections under the IT act

Relevant
Articles of a DTAA

Taxability
under the Act (TDS)

Withholding
Tax rate under a DTAA

 

Remarks

Interest from government or an
Indian concern on moneys borrowed or debt incurred by them in foreign
currency.

 

Sec. 115A

 

Article 11

 

20%

 

10%/15%

 

WTH rate differs from treaty to treaty.

Interest on bonds of an Indian
company issued in accordance with such scheme as the Central
Government notifies

 

Sec. 115AC

 

Article 11

 

10%

 

10%/15&

Interest on Infrastructure Debt Fund

Sec. 115A & 194LB

Article 11

5%

10%/15%

It is better to take shelter under the
domestic tax laws rather than DTAAs.

Certain income from units of a business
trust to non-resident 

Sec. 194LBA

Article 11

5%

10%/15%

Interest by an Indian Company or a
business trust in respect of money borrowed in foreign currency under a loan
agreement or by way of issue of long-term bonds

 

Sec. 115A & 194LC

 

Article 11

 

5%

 

10%/15%

Interest on rupee denominated bond of
an Indian Company or Government securities to a FII or a QFI

 

Sec. 115A & 194LD

 

Article 11

 

5%

 

10%/15%

Dividend u/s 115-O

Sec. 9(1)(iv) & 115A

Article 10

NIL

10%/15%

 

Dividend (other than u/s 115-O)

 

Sec. 9(1)(iv) & 115A

 

Article 10

 

20%

 

10%/15%

WTH rate differs from treaty-to-treaty

Purchase Consideration for immovable property (LTCG)

 

Sec. 45 & 195

 

Article 13

 

20%

No rates are prescribed as normally
taxed as per the domestic tax laws of both the countries.

Taxed per the domestic tax laws of both
countries.

 

Rent

 

Sec. 22 to

Sec. 27

 

Article 6

 

30%

 

Taxed in the country of source. No rate
is prescribed.

Taxed per the domestic tax laws of
country of source.

Commission on Imports

Sec. 9(1)(i)

Article 12

30%

10%/15%

WTH rate differs from treaty-to-treaty

Commission on exports

Sec. 9(1)(i)

N.A

Not taxable as Indian Income

N.A

Income does not accrue or arise in
India

4.0 Conclusion

The
subject of withholding tax from payments to non­ resident is faced with many challenges.
The Government’s intention is to protect the tax base of India and collect
revenue from the non-residents at source as it is difficult to catch them once
they are gone or money is transferred to them. As a payer one has to take
conservative view and deduct tax at source as far as possible. Failure to do so
may not only make him an assessee in default, but could also make him a
representative assessee u/s. 164 of the act and the tax may be recovered from
him. Other penal provisions may also follow. Therefore,  it is always advisable to obtain a lower
deduction certificate from the Assessing Officer or go for an advance ruling.

Notification No. FEMA 5(R)/2016-RB dated September 8, 2016

CORRIGENDUM  – G.S.R. 389(E) –
dated September 8, 2016

Foreign  Exchange  management 
(deposit)  Regulations, 2016

By a Corrigendum dated September
8, 2016 published in the Gazette of india, extraordinary, Part-ii, Section 3,
Sub-section (i), the following changes have been made to Notification No. FEMA
5(R)/2016-RB relating to Foreign exchange management (deposit) regulations,
2016: ­

Paragraph 6(3) of Schedule i has
been substituted as under: ­

“loans  outside india – authorised dealers may allow
their branches/correspondents outside india to grant loans to or in favour of
non-resident depositor or to third parties at the request of depositor for bona
fide purpose against the security of funds held in the NRE accounts in india
and also agree for remittance of the funds from india, if necessary, for
liquidation of the outstanding.”

Previously, third party loans
could be given for bona fide purpose except for the purpose of relending or
carrying on agricultural / plantation activities or for investment in real
estate business. With this amendment restriction on user of funds has been
removed.

Impact of Ind AS on Demerger Transactions

Demerger
is a business reorganisation where one or more business unit is hived off into
a separate entity. There could be a number of reasons why a demerger is done;
for example, to unlock the value in a business, to focus on a particular
business or to seek external participation in the transferor or resulting
company. It involves separation of business, unlike an amalgamation, which
entails consolidation or merger of businesses.

Demerger
is generally achieved through a scheme of compromise or arrangement in a court
process u/s. 391 to 394 of the Companies act, 1956. The demerged company
(transfer or company, referred to as TCO in this article) transfers a business
unit on a going concern basis to a resulting company (transferee company
referred to as RCO in this article).

In
order to become a tax neutral or tax compliant scheme, the demerger should be
compliant with section 2(19AA) of the income-tax act, which, inter alia,
requires that the demerger should be pursuant to a scheme u/s. 391 to 394 of
the Companies act,  1956 and that the
transfer of assets and liabilities should take place at the book values of the
transferor company by ignoring revaluation, if 
any. The   tax neutrality  provisions 
provide  neutrality to all parties
concerned, viz., the transferor company, the transferee company and the
shareholders of the transferor and transferee company. From the transferor
company perspective, there will be no capital gains on the transfer. Further
there will be no deemed divided nor dividend distribution tax with respect to
the distribution to the shareholders. The shareholders of the transferor
company too will not have to bear the incidence of capital gains tax.

Appendix
a Distribution of Non-cash Assets to Owners of Ind AS 10 Events after the
Reporting Period deals with accounting for distribution of assets other than
cash (non­ cash assets) as dividends to its owners (shareholders) acting in
their capacity as owners. The appendix applies to the non-reciprocal
distributions of non-cash assets (e.g. items of property, plant and equipment,
intangible assets, businesses as defined in Ind AS 103, ownership interests in
another entity or disposal groups as defined in Ind AS 105) by an entity to its
owners acting in their capacity as owners. The appendix addresses only the
accounting by the entity that makes a non-cash asset distribution, not the
accounting by recipients.

The   appendix 
does  not  apply 
to  a  distribution 
of  a non-cash  asset 
that  is  ultimately 
controlled  by  the same party or parties before and after
the distribution. This exclusion applies to the separate, individual and
consolidated financial statements of an entity that makes the distribution. A
group of individuals shall be regarded as controlling an entity when, as a
result of contractual arrangements, they collectively have the power to govern
its financial and operating policies so as to obtain benefits from its
activities, and that ultimate collective power is not transitory.
therefore,  for a distribution to be
outside the scope of this appendix on the basis that the same parties control
the asset both before and after the distribution, a group of individual
shareholders receiving the distribution must 
have,  as  a 
result  of  contractual 
arrangements, such ultimate collective power over the entity making the
distribution.

The
Appendix does not apply when an entity distributes some of its ownership
interests in a subsidiary but retains control of the subsidiary. The entity
making a distribution that results in the entity recognising a non-controlling
interest in its subsidiary accounts for the distribution in accordance with Ind
AS 110.

When
an entity declares a distribution and has an obligation to distribute the
assets concerned to its owners, it must recognise a liability for the dividend
payable. Consequently, this appendix addresses the following issues:

(a)
When should the entity recognise the dividend payable?

(b)
How should an entity measure the dividend payable?

(c)
When an entity settles the dividend payable, how should it account for any
difference between the carrying amount of the assets distributed and the
carrying amount of the dividend payable?

When to Recognise a Dividend Payable

The
liability to pay a dividend shall be recognised when the dividend is
appropriately authorised and is no longer at the discretion of the entity,
which is the date:

(a)   When declaration of the dividend, e.g. by
management or the board of directors, is approved by the relevant authority,
e.g. the shareholders, if the jurisdiction requires such approval, or

(b)   When the dividend is declared, e.g. by
management or the board of directors, if the jurisdiction does not require
further approval.

Since
the demerger is to be approved by the court, a question may emerge as to
whether the dividend liability is accounted when the demerger is approved by
the shareholders or when finally approved by the court. If the court approval
is substantive and not a mere formality, then the dividend liability shall be
recorded when the final court approval is received. If the court approval is
treated as a mere formality, then dividend liability should be recognized on
approval from shareholders. Under the indian jurisdiction, the court order
would generally be treated as substantive and determine the acquisition date.
However, this issue is not very relevant for the purposes of this article.

Measurement
of a Dividend Payable

An
entity shall measure a liability to distribute non-cash assets as a dividend to
its owners at the fair value of the assets to be distributed. At the end of
each reporting period and at the date of settlement, the entity shall review
and adjust the carrying amount of the dividend payable, with any changes in the
carrying amount of the dividend payable recognised in equity as adjustments to
the amount of the distribution.

Accounting For Any Difference between the Carrying Amount of
the Assets Distributed and the Carrying Amount of the Dividend Payable when an
Entity Settles the Dividend Payable

When
an entity settles the dividend payable, it shall recognise the difference, if
any, between the carrying amount of the assets distributed and the carrying
amount of the dividend payable in profit or loss.

Example:   Non – Cash Asset Distributed To Shareholders

TCO
is an Ind-AS and a listed company. TCO has two divisions, hardware
manufacturing and software. TCO is professionally managed and has a widely
dispersed shareholding. There is no group of shareholders that controls TCO.
TCO’s accounting period ends at 31st march 2017. On 29th march 2017, the
shareholders of TCO approve a non-cash dividend in the form of demerger of the
hardware division. The hardware division will be hived off into a resultant
company (RCO). The shareholders of TCO shall become the shareholders of RCO in
the same proportion. The court approves the demerger scheme on 20th July 2017,
and the demerger is executed.

In
TCO’s separate  financial  statements at 29th march 2017 and 31st march
2017, the net assets of the hardware division, is  carried 
at INR 250. The   fair  value of the hardware  division 
at 29th march and 31st  march 2017
is INR 350. The fair value increases to INR 400 when the non-cash asset is distributed
on 20th July  2017. For simplicity, it is
assumed that there is no change in the carrying amount of the net assets of the
hardware division from 29th march 2017 to 20th july 2017.

In
this example, for illustration purposes only, we have assumed that the court
order is a mere formality1 and hence the dividend liability is recognised on
approval of the demerger by the shareholders. On that basis, the dividend is a
liability in the books of TCO when the annual financial statements are prepared
as at 31st march 2017. At 31st march 2017 TCO would record a dividend liability
of INR 350 with a corresponding debit to its equity. In TCO’s separate
financial statements, the net assets in hardware division of INR 250 are
classified as held for distribution to owners. When the non-cash asset is
distributed on 20th July 2017, the fair value has increased by INR 50. At that
date, TCO shall record an additional dividend liability of INR 50 with a
corresponding debit to equity.

The
non-cash asset is distributed on 20th July 2017 at which point the fair value
of the division is INR 400. The difference between the carrying amount of the
net assets distributed (INR 250) and the liability (INR 400) which is INR 150,
is recognised as a gain in profit or loss of TCO.

———————————————————————————————-

1    Under the Indian Jurisdiction, the court
order would generally be treated as substantive and determine the acquisition
date.

The
above example included the following assumptions:

1.  TCO is an Ind-AS and a listed company. TCO
needs to provide an auditor’s certificate of compliance with Ind AS, in order
for the court to approve the demerger scheme. Effectively,  this means that TCO needs to comply with
Ind-AS  standards. RCO is the resulting
company.

2.  TCO and RCO are not controlled by the same
party or parties before and after the demerger.

TCO
needs to address  the  following challenges from an income-tax angle
arising from the above demerger scheme:

1.  TCO is a listed company and hence should
comply with the accounting standards in a court scheme, as per SEBI
requirements. If TCO was a non-listed entity, to which Ind AS was applicable,
SEBI  requirements for providing an
auditor’s certificate with respect to Ind AS compliance would not apply.
Therefore, if TCO is a non-listed entity, there is a possibility, not to comply
with Ind AS to account for the demerger. However, additional consequence may
have to be examined, such as, the registrar of Companies, enforcing compliance
with Ind AS or auditors providing a matter of emphasis in the audit report.

2.
Under Ind AS the transfer of the non-cash asset is recorded  at 
fair  value  and 
the  resultant  gain/loss is taken to the P&l.  Would this be considered as a revaluation and
hence not meet the condition of section 2(19AA)?  one 
view is that TCO records a gain/loss on distribution of the assets,
which is not the same as revaluation of assets in the books of TCO. Therefore
with respect to this matter it may be argued that section 2(19AA) is not
violated.

3.  On the other hand, if it is concluded that
the scheme is not in compliance with section 2(19AA), there could be an issue
of dividend distribution tax (DDT) on the distribution of non-cash assets.
arguments  against this possibility would
be (a) Companies act 2013, prohibits any dividend distribution in kind – hence
the demerger cannot be treated as dividend for income- tax purposes also (b)
the legal form of the transaction as a ‘demerger’ cannot be disregarded.

4.  Fair valuation is at the core of Ind AS. TCO
may have used the fair value option to determine the deemed cost at the
transition date to Ind AS for certain assets such as PPE or investments.
Alternatively, TCO may have used fair value option as a regular basis of
accounting for certain assets, where such a basis is allowed/ required. Fair
valuation may have resulted in an upwards or downwards adjustment. When TCO has
used such fair valuation under Ind AS, compliance with the condition u/s. 2(19AA)
to consummate the demerger transaction at book value will become challenging.

5.  In our example, TCO records a profit of INR
150 on the distribution of non-cash assets. Whilst this would not be taxable
from a normal income tax computation perspective, if  TCO is under mat, this credit would be counted
for the purposes of determining the profits for MAT purposes.

From
the perspective of RCO, the following aspects need to be considered:

1.  Under Ind AS, from an RCO perspective, this
would be treated as a business restructuring transaction. RCO will have to
account for the assets and liabilities at book value, because under Ind AS, a
change in the geography of assets, arising from the restructuring, does not on
its own result in accounting for the exchange at fair value. The difference
between the fair value of shares issued by RCO to the shareholders and the book
value of assets and liabilities received from TCO will be debited to equity.
Assuming the fair value of shares issued by RCO to the shareholders is INR 445;
the amount to be debited to equity would be INR 195 (INR 445 – INR 250).

2.  In other words, RCO will not be able to
create a goodwill for INR 195, and hence will not be able to derive any tax
benefits from goodwill.

Conclusion

It  does 
not  appear  fair 
that  Ind  AS 
should  result  in an unintended consequence for TCO with
respect to demerger  schemes  under 
the  income-tax  act. 
At the same time, it is not appropriate to try and meddle with Ind AS
and create more differences between IASB IFRS and Ind AS. The finance  ministry and the Income-tax authorities
should move into swift action to resolve these issues by making suitable
changes in the income-tax act. If this is not done, the restructuring of
businesses will be hampered. Consequently, all this will have a negative impact
on the indian economy in the long run.

Accounting and ‘Brexit’ the World’s Most Complex Divorce

Introduction

The
UK  voters’ decision to exit the EU came
as a surprise to many observers, as well as the markets, and the vote has
triggered political, economic and financial uncertainty which is likely to
impact Indian entities having operations in the UK . There has been an
immediate impact on the financial markets, both in the UK  and across the world, with the pound
significantly weakening against other currencies and share prices fluctuating
as the market reacts to the decision. The decision is expected to risk upto
75,000 jobs in EUROpe and a loss upto 10 billion pounds in tax revenue as per a
recent article in the  financial  express.

From
the time of announcement of Brexit till current date, the exchange rates in relation
to the pound have been volatile as given below:­

   The pound to EURO rate has moved from
1.31099 in June 2016 to 1.10846 in October 2016.

   The pound to dollar rate has moved from
1.46079 in June 2016 to 1.22144 in October 2016.

   The pound to INR rate has moved from 98.07
in June 2016 to 81.40 in October 2016.

In
fact, the pound to EURO rate post June 2016 has never touched such lower levels
in the past two and half years. Further, 
the Bank of England has cut the interest rate to a historic low of 0.25%
post the Brexit announcement.

In
view of this volatility, let us see the possible impact on some of the key
captions in the financial statements from an Ind-AS perspective for Indian
entities having operations in the UK :­

Foreign Currency Transactions

Ind-AS
21, the  effects of Changes in
foreign  exchange rates allows, for
practical reasons, entities to use an appropriately average exchange rate for a
reporting period if it approximates the actual rate. In case of entities who
have operations in the UK  which use a
weighted average rate, a sudden and significant change in foreign currency
exchange  rates,  may 
affect  the  way 
the  average  is calculated.

As
per Ind-AS 21, foreign currency monetary items shall be translated using the
closing exchange rate i.e assets and liabilities to be received or paid in a
fixed or determinable number of units of currency. e.g., entities in India will
have to restate their debtors, creditors, borrowings etc. held in GBP and this
could have volatility in the profit and loss account due to the exchange rate
movement.

Ind-AS
21 defines the concept of functional currency as the currency of the primary
economic environment in which the entity operates. An entity would record all
transactions in its books of accounts in the functional currency. Some factors
which determine the functional currency of an entity include:­

Currency
in which sales prices for its goods and services are denominated and settled;
and

Currency
of the country whose competitive forces and regulations mainly determine the
sale prices of its goods and services.

For
Indian entities, with functional currency as INR, the same is not expected to
change. however,  if such an entity has a
subsidiary in the UK , it may have to monitor and reassess the UK   subsidiary functional currency in light  of 
the  BreXit.  this  
is  because,  going 
forward, entities may adjust their trading relationships with entities
in the EU  and the rest of the world, as
a result of trade negotiation and trade agreements between the UK  and other 
countries.  In these  circumstances,  entities 
need to monitor the primary economic environment in which they operated,
and assess if there is a change in the functional currency.

Investment in Subsidiaries, Associates and Joint Ventures

Entities
in India may have investments in subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures in
the UK. Under Ind-AS, these investments will be carried at cost or at fair
value as  per  Ind-AS 109. 
The   volatility  in 
exchange  rates and interest rates
could have a possible impact on the separate financial statements of the Indian
entity from an impairment perspective. e.g., the entity may have to re-build
the underlying cash flow projections for the UK 
business considering any change expected in the business outcomes due to
the Brexit. These cash flow projections will have to be further adjusted for
the exchange rate/ discount rate assumptions. Accordingly, this may trigger an
impairment provision in the separate financial statements of the Indian entity.

In
case of consolidated financial statements, the impact of the translation from
the functional currency of the UK 
subsidiary (e.g. GBP) to the reporting currency of the parent Indian
entity (e.g. INR) is recognised in other comprehensive income and accumulated
as a separate component of the equity. This is reclassified from equity to the
profit and loss on disposal of the subsidiary investment. As per the standard,
a write-down of the carrying amount either because of losses / impairment does
not trigger any reclass from equity. However, 
there could be a possible impairment to the goodwill on consolidation of
the subsidiary/net investment in the associate or the joint venture in the
consolidated financial statements of the Indian entity.

Impairment of assets with indefinite/ finite useful life

Entities
are expected to have at least a high-level overview on what the effects of
Brexit might be on the key financial assumptions  used 
to  determine  recoverable 
amounts and  other potential  consequences for the entity. Cash flow
projections used in impairment assessment should be adjusted for changes in
possible business outcomes due to Brexit. Further,  discount rates used should also be reassessed
to reflect the current market assessment of the time value of money considering
the change in the interest rates. Accordingly, recoverable amounts may undergo
a change, resulting in impairment provisions in certain cases.

Similarly,
property, plant and equipment and intangible assets with a finite useful life are
tested for impairment when  factors  are 
present  that  indicate 
the  recorded value of a
non-current asset (or asset group) may not be recoverable. This may require
appropriate re-assessment.

Defined benefit plans

Market
volatility could have implications for the measurement of the pension asset or
liability under defined benefit schemes. For example, decline in equity markets
and  potential  changes 
in  interest  rates 
as  explained above could have a
significant effect on the fair value of plan assets and the funded status of
plans, as well as the defined benefit obligation. This would have an impact
especially in case of Indian entities having subsidiaries / plan assets for its
branches located in the UK.

Entities/Groups
operating cross border pension schemes within the EU will also need to closely
watch the changes, if any, that could make such schemes no longer operational
e.g., an entity may have UK -based cross-border pension schemes for employees
across the EU may find that those schemes can no longer operate in EU member
states. Conversely, it may be that a cross-border pension scheme that is based
in an EU member state can no longer be used for UK  employees. The replacement or relocation of
these pension arrangements will then become necessary and may bring about
change in the pension liabilities recorded.

Income Taxes

Determining
whether deferred tax assets qualify for recognition under Ind-AS12 income taxes
often requires an extensive analysis of the positive and negative evidence for
the realisation of the related deductible temporary differences and an
assessment of the likelihood of sufficient future   taxable  
income.   Volatile   economic  
conditions add complexity to this analysis and may be a source of
negative evidence.

Provisions

Ind-AS37
Provisions, Contingent liabilities and Contingent assets requires the discount
rate that is used to calculate the present value of expected expenditures to
reflect current market assessments of the time value of money and risks
specific to the liability. Changes in interest rates and other economic
indicators following the outcome of the referendum may well affect the
estimates of future cash flows inherent in the provision. Accordingly,
provisions may be required to be restated.

Due
to stability in exchange rates in the past, entities in the UK  may have entered into long term purchase and
sales contracts which may now become onerous due to the significant fall in the
exchange rates. Consequently, losses on such contracts will be required to be
provided for.

Business Combination

Para
45 – 49 of Ind-AS103 deals with the concept of measurement period which states
that, post the acquisition date, if there is any change in the fair value of
assets and  liabilities,  the 
same  can  be  adjusted 
back  to  the purchase price allocation on the
acquisition date only if the adjustment / change takes place during the
measurement period. However, the measurement period shall not exceed one year
from the acquisition date. In case of business combinations which have taken
place in the pre-vote period and where measurement period is over, any further
change in the fair value of assets and liabilities may have an impact in the
profit or loss in the period of change.

Financial Reporting Considerations

As
per Ind-AS1 (para 125) – ‘an entity should disclose information   about  
the assumptions   it   makes  
about the future, and other major sources of estimation uncertainty at
the end of the reporting period, that have a significant risk of resulting in a
material adjustment to the carrying amounts of assets and liabilities within
the next financial year.’

Entities
should  consider  whether 
the  potential  effects of Brexit materially change their
previously disclosed judgements and sources of estimation uncertainty, or
whether an entity is exposed to any new factors resulting from the vote. These
disclosures should be tailored to an entity’s facts and circumstances,
including a discussion of the entity’s affected operations and the specific
effects on its operations, liquidity and financial condition.

E.g.,
Changes in the sensitivity of reasonably possible outcomes related to goodwill
impairment assumptions.

Ensuring
valuation methodologies are adequately explained due to market volatility, key
assumptions are disclosed and appropriate consideration is given to the use of
sensitivity analysis e.g. impact due to change in exchange rate by 1%, change
in interest rate by 1% etc.

Reassessment
of going concern assumption for entities exporting significantly to the UK  or UK 
entities with a high level of import from the EU who do not have
adequate risk management processes in place.

Entities
in India will need to consider some of the above accounting  and 
financial  reporting  implications 
of  this exit and monitor and
assess how subsequent events / government decisions in the UK  and the EU may possibly bring a change to
their own operations and/or investment strategies.

Capital Subsidies and Accounting

It is well settled for the last
many years, that the question as to whether subsidies are income receipts or
capital receipts depends upon whether they are intended to supplement
the trade receipts or received otherwise {see Seaham harbour dock Co.
Crook 16 tC 333 (hl) and CIT vs. Poona Electric Supply 14 ITR 622 (Bom).} it
would depend upon the nature and content of the subsidy, the scheme, its
objective and the purpose for which subsidy is given. In other words, the ‘purpose’
test is decisive and not the mode or manner or time or source of payment.

In Sadichha Chitra vs. CIT 189 ITR
774, the Bombay high Court referred to the decision in CIT vs. Ruby Rubber
Works 178 ITR 181 and held that nature of the subsidy depends on the purpose
for which it is granted. In that case, the subsidy was in the form of refund of
entertainment tax  already  collected 
as  income.  It agreed 
with  the opinion of the M.P. high
Court in CIT vs. Dusad Industrial 162 ITR 784.

Following observations by the
Bombay high Court are apposite. “In a given case, subsidy may be granted with
the object of supplementing trade receipts and profits of the recipient.
In another case, the scheme of subsidy may have been formulated by the
authority concerned to assist the assessee in acquiring a capital asset or for
the growth of the industry generally in public interest without any objective
of supplementing trade receipts or recoupment of revenue expenses. Whether the
receipt of subsidy amount is a capital receipt or revenue receipt would depend
upon the nature and content of the subsidy the scheme, its objective and the
purpose for which subsidy is given.”

In CIT vs. Chaphalkar Brot. 351 ITR
309, the Bombay high Court held that subsidy granted to encourage setting up of
multiplexes (a capital asset) was a capital receipt.

The following observations of the
Supreme Court in Ponni Sugars case 306 ITR 392 at page 401 are extremely
relevant.

“The judgement of the house of
lords shows that the source of payment or the form in which the subsidy
is paid, or the mechanism through which it is paid is immaterial and
that what is relevant is the purpose for payment of assistance. Ordinarily,
such payments would have been on revenue account, but since the purpose of the
payment was to curtail obliterate unemployment and since the purpose was dock
extension, the house  of lords  held that payment was of capital nature.

In the above case 306 ITR 392,
the Supreme Court reviewed the entire case law on the subject and reiterated
that the character of the receipt of the subsidy under a scheme has to be
determined with respect to the purpose for which the subsidy is granted. In
other words, one has to apply the purpose test. The point of time at which the
subsidy is paid is not relevant. The source is not material. If the object of
the subsidy is to enable the assessee to run the business more profitably, then
the receipt is on revenue account. On the other hand, if the object of the
assistance under the subsidy scheme is to enable the assessee to set up a new
unit or to expand an existing unit, the receipt of subsidy would be on capital
account. See also CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. 339 ITR 632 (Bom.)

Same view was taken by CBDT in
its Circular no.142 dated 1st   august,
1974 in respect of 10% Central outright Grant Subsidy Scheme. In the said
circular, it is stated that since the scheme is framed by the Govt. for the
growth of industries and not for supplementing the trade profits, it is a
capital receipt.

The following parapraphs from
different chapters of a report on industrial dispersal by Planning Commission
in the year 1980 for a similar Central Government subsidy introduced in the
fourth  five  year plan for backward areas, where the
quantum of subsidy was linked to capital investment is relevant and confirm
that such Government subsidies are not for acquiring fixed assets but for
locating projects in backward areas and level of capital investment is merely
used for calculating the quantum of subsidy.

Para 3.15 and 3.16 of the Report
……………..

“3.15 The approach to industrial
dispersal followed in the first three plans had some effect, but the results
achieved were   not   considered  
satisfactory.   Thus    the  
fourth Plan states:

“In terms of regional development, there has
been a natural tendency for new enterprises and investments to gravitate
towards the already overcrowded metropolitan areas because they are better
endowed with economic and social infrastructure. Not enough has been done to
restrain this process. While a certain measure of dispersal has been achieved,
a much larger-effort is necessary to bring about greater dispersal of
industrial activity.

(fourth five year Plan, page 11,
para 1.23)”

3.16 In its approach to industrial
development, the fourth Plan lays great stress on the need for industrial
dispersal:

“The requirement of non-farm
employment is so large and so widely spread throughout the country that a
greater dispersal of industrial development is a matter of necessity. Even from
the narrow and immediate economic view point, the society stands to gain by
dispersed development.

The cost of providing necessary
infrastructure for further expansion of existing large urban and industrial
centres is often much larger than what it might be if development was
purposefully directed to occur in smaller towns and rural areas.”

Thus,  it is certain that the primary condition for
this Government  subsidy  is  not  acquisition 
of  fixed  assets and hence, this is not a grant related
to assets in terms of Ind AS 20.

Since, as mentioned above, the
Grant is not supposed to compensate any particular cost of any particular asset
and is a capital receipt which when invested in business generates income to
compensate for higher costs of operations in backward region, in accordance
with Ind AS 10, no amount of Government Grant can be taken to profit and loss
account of any year.

In the following paragraph, the Ind
AS 20 seems to suggest that Government Grant results in a benefit for an entity
when compared to other entries which do not get the grant while the fact for
this Grant is exactly the opposite. The Government Grant, in this case, is
given to compensate for the benefits which other entities enjoy by virtue of
operating in developed regions.

“5. the  receipt of government assistance by an entity
may be significant for the preparation of the financial statement for two
reasons. Firstly,  if resources have been
transferred, an appropriate method of accounting for the transfer must be
found. Secondly, it is desirable to give an indication of the extent to which
the entity has benefited from such assistance during the reporting period. This
facilitates comparison of an entity’s financial statements with those of prior
periods and with those of other entities.”

Guidance note under Indian GAAP
states that it is generally considered appropriate that accounting for Govt.
grants should be based on the nature of the relevant grant. Grants which have
the characteristics similar to those of promoters’ contribution should be
treated as part of shareholders’ funds. Income approach may be more appropriate
in cases of other grants. (as.12-Para 5-4).

This paragraph which supports the
view that when subsidy granted is for capital purposes, it should be treated as
shareholder funds i.e. part of reserves. But this para is not there in ind. AS/IFRS. Para 12 of Ind AS-20”. (Accounting for Government grants and
disclosures of Govt. assistance) clearly states that. “Govt. grants shall be
recognized in profit and loss a/c. on a systematic basis over the periods in
which the entity recognises as expenses the related costs for which the grants
are intended to compensate. (Emphasis Supplied). Thus matching
concept/principle is adopted and it can apply to grants of a revenue nature
which seek to compensate revenue expenses incurred over a period.

Ind AS-20, however suddenly takes
a U-turn. Definition of Govt. grant says that grants related to assets are
Govt. grants whose primary condition is that an entity qualifying
for them should purchase, construct or otherwise acquire long term assets.
Subsidiary conditions may be attached restricting the type or location of the
asset. This makes it amply clear that the definition is merely talking of
qualifying or eligibility condition. It is significant to note that it uses the
expression ‘primary or subsidiary conditions for eligibility’ and not primary
purpose of giving the grant. then  it
talks of  transfer  of 
resources
,  but  recognises 
in  para  4  that
Govt. grants take many forms varying both in the nature of the assistance and
in the conditions attached to it. (Emphasis supplied).

Then after citing capital
approach and income approach in para 14 and 15, para 19 states that “Grants are
sometimes received as part of a package of financial or fiscal aids to which
number of conditions may be attached. In such cases, care is needed in
identifying conditions giving rise to costs and expenses which determine
period over which, the grant will be earned. It may be appropriate to
allocate a part of a grant on one basis and part on another? (emphasis
supplied).

There can be no dispute that
revenue grants given to compensate for costs and expenses (such as employee
expenses, interest, waiver of taxes) can be treated as on revenue account.

However, it appears that para 20
takes a complete u-turn from the established principles and says that “a Govt.
grant that becomes receivable as compensation  for expenses or losses already incurred or for
the purpose and giving immediate financial 
support with no further related costs (?) (without defining or
specifying the purpose or nature of the financial support) shall be recognised
in profit and loss of the period in which it becomes receivable. the expression
‘giving immediate financial support’ is too vague and cannot be read in
derogation to the basic principles laid down by the Supreme Court and old
accounting standards and CBDT‘s own view held earlier. It will be against the
principles of commercial accounting adopted by the accounting community so far.

Para 21, surprisingly still
recognises this doctrine of making distinction between grants awarded for the
purpose of giving immediate financial support rather than as an incentive to
undertake specific expenditure. Para 22 again speaks of expenses or
losses.

By para 34 read with appendix –
i, confusion is worst confounded. it talks of “grants related to costs” being
deferred income and appendix –a which really deals with Govt. assistance which
are not to be related to specific operating activity, quietly takes them into
account as ‘transfer of resources’ to start or continue to run their business
in underdeveloped area.

It is respectfully submitted that
there is an urgent need to clarify this confusion and make it clear whether the
accounting standards advocate or support the view of treating all subsidies as
revenue receipts to be treated as income–immediate or deferred in derogation
with established principles laid down by the S.C. or reason for departure, if
any, which means that the distinction between capital receipts and revenue
receipts are no longer relevant in accounting. Also whether article 265 of the
constitution of india is no longer relevant or valid. it may be noted that
income computation and disclosure standards, which have to be now mandatorily
followed u/s.145 also make an exception in the preamble to the effect that if
the legal position is different from that adopted in the ICDS, legal position
is to be followed. Some view is taken in Accounting Standards for SMC notified
on 7th December 2006 by ministry of Corporate affairs. Para 4.1.1 of
the preface to the accounting Standards issued by ICAI States as under:

“However, if a particular
accounting standard is found to be not in accordance with law, the provision of
the said law will prevail and the financial statements should be prepared in
conformity with such law.

Para 4.2 says

“The accounting  Standards 
by their very nature cannot and do not override the local regulation
which govern the preparation and presentation of financial statements in the
country.

Before parting with the subject,
it is necessary to deal with one important aspect. The finance  act, 2015 has inserted sub cl.(xviii) in
s.2(24) defining ‘income’ inclusive–wise to include within its sweep
‘assistance in the form of a subsidy or grant. But it also excludes those
subsidies and grants which are deducted while calculating actual cost under
explanation10 to section 43(1), thus indirectly recognising the distinction
between capital subsidy and income subsidy. But it may be argued that this is
the later law and hence, even otherwise, there is no conflict between AS 20 and
legal provision.

But the words “assistance”
clearly supports the reasoning of the Supreme Court cited above. The word
‘assistance’ means the provision of money, resources or information to help
someone. Thus the word ‘assistance’ seems to have been used in the sense of
supplement (the trade receipts). At least, it is capable of being interpreted
so. if two interpretations are possible, the courts have always adopted that
interpretation which is in favour of the taxpayer and which will uphold the
constitutional validity of the taxing provision (see 131 ITR 597 S.C).

If the amendment in section
(24(xviii) is taken to mean that it includes each and every kind of subsidy –
whether capital or revenue – it will be clearly violative of the constitution –
both article 265 and entry 82 and 86 – leave alone the Supreme Court decisions.
Thus, the provision will have to be read down to cover only income subsidies.
object of Govt. assistance can never be to take away something given by the
Govt. by one hand and taken away by the other hand.

Thus,  both in equity and law, capital subsidies can
in no sense and no manner be treated as income liable to tax. Equity and law or
accounting may be strangers, but they need not be sworn enemies!

INDIA ON THE CUSP OF CHANGE!

On 8th
November 2016, the Prime Minister may have possibly altered the course India
was taking. He announced demonetisation of Rs. 1000 and Rs. 500 notes which
constituted 86% of the currency in circulation. For its sheer magnitude, his
courageous decision deserves kudos. I would like to compare this decision to
that of his predecessor (as the then Finance Minister) in 1991, which broke the
shackles of the Indian economy. His announcement will have possibly the same
impact if not greater.

The decision
of demonetisation has been taken for three reasons-to tackle the menace of
counterfeit notes, consequentially to turn off the terror funding tap, and last
but not the least to bring holders of unaccounted money to book. To what extent
the decision will succeed in achieving the objectives only time can tell. The
announcement took virtually everyone by surprise and has been applauded by the
majority. The world is looking at India with expectation. Economists differ on
the possible outcomes, as they do in most cases. Political parties, while
supporting the intent have raised questions about tardy implementation, a major
part of them being justified.

The ordinary
citizen has borne the brunt of the difficulties of the currency crunch, and the
problem is far more serious in the villages than in the cities where plastic
money and various forms of electronic transactions have already taken root.
Indians however are patiently bearing the” inconvenience”, to put it mildly, in
the hope that the decision will be of great benefit to the country, reduce
corruption and result in punishing the persons engaged in illegal activities
and evasion of taxes. One hopes that, as far as the drive against the
unaccounted wealth is concerned, this is only the beginning of a series of
actions which the Prime Minister has promised to take.

Much has
already been said about the economic downturn on account of cash crunch. If
long term benefits are to be realised, a limited fall in economic growth should
be acceptable. In any case, this decision will garner much more for the
government coffers, than the two amnesty schemes for foreign/domestic
unaccounted wealth and income could get. If Rs.15 lakh crore is the money in
high denomination notes and 30% of it is not returned / deposited or exchanged,
that itself would amount to Rs. 4.5 lakh crore.

While the
intent of the Prime Minister in this initiative cannot be doubted, there are
certain concerns which need to be addressed. The first is in regard to the
notices that various persons have been receiving on their depositing cash in
their bank accounts and the surveys that are being carried out. While the
Income tax Department certainly has the power to enquire into the source of
money, such actions should not lead to inspector raj which could, in turn, lead
to abuse of power. Even prior to demonetisation, there were complaints of tax
terrorism. There must be a balance between seeking information and
inconvenience to the public.The use of authority must be judicious.

The second
aspect which the government must brace itself for is a possible rise in crime.
If reports are to be believed, a large part of the underworld, particularly the
foot soldiers are unemployed, as hawala, gambling, extortion have halted or
reduced due to non-availability of cash. For a few days, they would survive on
what they have earned in the past, but if society does not create alternative
sources of employment, retrain them or assimilate them into the mainstream
economy,there would be many unemployed youth on the streets who could cause
problems for other sections of society.

While these
problems are certainly a cause for concern, the move to demonetise currency
notes has several benefits, some intended, others unintended. There seems to be
a fall in terrorist activities, both internal and external, with their sources
of funds having totally been choked. This lull in activity is probably an
opportunity to launch a social/ political offensive, so that the menace can be
contained, if not eradicated.

Demonetisation
has also given a fillip to the drive for financial and digital inclusion.
Banks, both in public sector and private sector, are making a serious attempt
to reach the rural areas. This is a drive which the government must
wholeheartedly support with the funds now at its command. Secondly, a much
larger number of people – consumers, manufacturers, traders and service
providers have started making and accepting payment in the cashless mode. This
will ensure that transactions are recorded and costs in making them are cut.

As I write
this editorial, the Finance Minister presented a bill in the Lok Sabha
proposing additional tax liability in respect of the undisclosed income,
voluntarily declared, assessed or income unearthed after a search. In addition,
the said bill contains a scheme whereby the declarant can pay only 50%, 25%
would have to be deposited in a scheme known as Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan
Yojana 2016 (PMGKY), and the declarant would be entitled to retain the balance
25%. After the demonetisation announcement, a detailed article had been worked
on by two of our illustrious past presidents Pradip Kapasi and Gautam Nayak.
However, as they were in the process of finalising it, the Taxation Laws
(Second Amendment) Bill, 2016 was moved. It has now been passed in the Lok
Sabha and awaits presidential assent. Reading the clauses in the bill, the
article would have required complete rewriting. After considering the
limitation of time given the deadline for printing of this issue, it was
impossible to make the changes and provide a detailed analysis of the
amendments, which would be expected by readers. The two authors would however
endeavour to carry out the necessary changes in their article and a sincere
attempt will be made to place that article on the BCAS website. This is of
course presuming that more changes are not made! As an information to readers,
I have attempted to summarise the provisions of the bill in regard to the
enhanced tax liability, surcharge and penalty under the Income-tax Act in
respect of such undisclosed money, etc., which makes the PMGKY seem a
worthwhile alternative. Readers may kindly note that this is only a prima facie
view as I do not possess the ability of the eminent past presidents.

Category of Income

Rate of Tax

Surcharge

Penalty

Total liability

If unexplained income is declared in return of income

60%

15%

nil

75%

If unexplained income is determined by
assessing officer

60%

15%

7.5%

82.5%

Education cess would also be payable at 3% of the above
tax and surcharge.

A separate
penalty is also provided if income is found after a search which is carried out
after the bill receives presidential assent, and undisclosed income is
unearthed as a consequence thereof.

The
cumulative effect of the demonetisation, and the amendments in tax provisions
will have to be seen as time progresses.

To conclude, the last quarter of 2016 has seen
the Indian Premier taking a pathbreaking decision. If all goes well, the year
2017 should see the rise of a brighter sun on the Indian horizon.

19. Appellate Tribunal – Power to consider new ground etc. – Sections 142(2A) and (2C) – A. Y. 2005-06 – Tribunal has power to consider the question of validity of extension of time u/s. 142(2C) of the Act – Amendment by Finance Act, 2008 is prospective and not retrospective

Principal CIT vs. Nilkanth Concast P.
Ltd.; 387 ITR 568 (Del):

The relevant year is the A. Y. 2005-06. In
the appeal filed by the Revenue before the Delhi High Court, the following
questions were raised:

“i)  Whether the ITAT is
competent to adjudicate the order of the AO under proviso to section
142(2C), which is not provided u/s. 146A 
or 153?

ii)  Whether the ITAT is
competent to admit an issue for the first time where there is no material in
the assessment order or in the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) on the basis of quite the issue of validity of the order of the
Assessing Officer under the proviso to section 142(2C) could be raised
and considered?”

iii)  Whether the AO is
competent to extend the period of filing the audit report on the express
request of the nominated auditor under proviso to section 142(2C) r.w.s.
142(2A) ?”

The High Court held as under:

“i)  The powers of the Tribunal
are wide enough to consider a point which may not have been urged before the
Commissioner(Appeals) as long as the question requires to be examined in the
interest
of justice.

ii)  The Tribunal had not
exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the question whether the Assessing
Officer was justified in extending the time for the auditor nominated u/s.
142(2C), to submit the audit report.

iii)  Under proviso to
section 142(2C) of the Act, there was no power with the Assessing Officer to suo
moto
extend the time for filing audit report prior to April 1, 2008. The
power was subsequently provided by amending the proviso by the Finance
Act, 2008 and the amendment was prospective in nature.

iv) The Assessing Officer was
not competent to extend the period for filing the audit report on the request
of the nominated auditor. It could be done only on the request made on behalf
of the assessee.”

APARIGRAHA (NON-POSSESSION)

An Ashramite of Gandhi
Ashram was required to adopt “Ekadash Vrats” – Eleven vows. Vows are not
just rules but has a much more deeper meaning. A vow requires unflinching
determination; determination which does not bend before discomfort and
difficulties. According to Gandhiji, “Taking vows is not a sign of weakness,
but of strength to do at any cost something that one ought to do constitutes a
vow”. Further, according to him, “to do something ‘as far as possible’ provides
a fatal loop hole. To do something ‘as far as possible’ is to succumb to the
very first temptation. Vows are necessary for the purpose of self-purification
and self-realisation.

What are these eleven
vows? They are (1) Truth, (2) Ahimsa. (3) Brahmacharya, (4) Control of the
palate, (5) Non-stealing, (6) Non-possession, (7) Fearlessness, (8) Removal of
untouchability, (9) Bread labour – work, (10) Tolerance – Equality of Religions
and (11) Humility.

Of the above eleven vows,
the one of non-possession also called ‘Aparigraha’ is to my mind a very
important one. Non-possession is allied to non-stealing according to Gandhiji.
If we posses something, if we hold on to something which is not required by us,
it amounts indirectly to stealing. We are depriving others of what we hold on
to, which they need and we do not. A bird, an animal does not think of what it
will need tomorrow and worry about it.

It is true of course, that
a human being cannot possibly live like a bird, without a house, without
clothes and without providing for his needs for food. However, one can keep
one’s needs to a minimum and do with little. As we reduce our dependence on
material things, our happiness and inner satisfaction and peace increase. We
have to learn to simplify our lives.

But what do we see around
us, and what do we actually put in practice? The homes of the rich are stuffed
full of material things. Hundreds of saris, dresses, scores of costly purses
and shoes and dozens of shirts, etc. This is not uncommon…. And yet the
urge to collect more and more is never satisfied. On the other hand, millions
do not get even two square meals a day; so many go hungry to bed every night,
many do not have even a spare set of clothes.We have to learn to “Share and
Care”. We cannot, like Marie Antoinette, the French Queen, say that “If they do
not have bread, let them eat cake.”

According to Gandhiji, the
principle of Non-possession (Aparigraha) is applicable not only to
things but also to thoughts. We should not clutter up our brains with too much
of needless information and useless knowledge. Wrongful thoughts keep us away
from the rightful path and come in the way of our search for God.

What would happen if all
of us start observing “Aparigraha” – non-accumulation – and accept it as
a governing value of our lives? Then there would be no more poverty, and no
needy persons. As Gandhiji has said, “there is enough in this world for
everyone’s need but not for everyone’s greed.” There would neither be rich
persons nor poor persons. The divide between the haves and have-nots would
disappear. It may not be possible to totally observe ‘Aparigraha’ in our
day to day life. But we can certainly reduce senseless accumulation of
possessions and wealth which even our great grandchildren will not need.

Is it even possible to
follow ‘Aparigraha’? I know of some professionals who do follow it. In
their case, whatever they earn in excess of their needs goes straight for
charity. Recently, I came across one person who since the last 42 years is
keeping only 20% of his income for himself and gives away 80%! And believe me,
his income is not all that great.

So let us begin. Begin
now, today itself. Begin small but begin. Let us go through our possessions. Is
it necessary to keep 30 shirts? Or 300 sarees? 12 pairs of shoes? 20 ties?

Friends, without waiting
any longer, we should have a fresh look at our wealth and our incomes and start
the process of ‘Aparigraha’ – of non-accumulation. It would certainly
simplify our lives and make us a lot more happier.

Power of Attorney holder – Authorised for signing various documents – Suit filed by Power of Attorney holder – Power of Attorney holder deposing in court on his personal knowledge of each and every detail of transaction – Evidence of Power of Attorney holder of Plaintiff readiness and willingness admissible [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order VI Rule 14, Order XLI Rule 27].

Santosh
Vaidya vs. Namdeo Budde and Ors AIR 2016 (NOC) 584 (BOM.)

Respondents-plaintiffs,
through their power of attorney holder by name Dhairyasheel, instituted Special
Civil Suit for specific performance of contract against the Appellant defendant
no. 1 and defendant no. 2.

The
case was that defendant  no.  1 was the owner of field HR at Mouza
Hudkeshwar and he entered into an agreement in favour of the Plaintiff and
defendant  no. 2 for the sale thereof. It
was also agreed that defendant no. 1 will execute the sale-deed within 1 1/2
years from the date of the agreement and remaining consideration would be paid
accordingly. It was further agreed that in case there was any legal impediment
in getting the sale- deed registered, further time of 1 1/2 years would be
extended. The defendant no. 1 having not complied with the obtaining of
permissions and no objections from the authorities, was not entitled to cancel
the agreement nor could he do so since the agreement itself provided for
extension by another 1 1/2 year. Plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 again informed
defendant no. 1 that they were ready and willing to get the sale-deed
registered and then defendant no. 1 also realised his mistake of not obtaining
the necessary documents of no objections etc. and agreed to make compliance.
however, defendant no. 1 still did not produce no objections from the competent
authority and therefore, Plaintiff had no alternative but to file suit for
specific performance of contract thereafter.

It
was held by the high Court that rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure
categorically shows that a person authorised is entitled to file and prosecute
the suit till its disposal. In the light of the above provision, it is not
possible to accept the submissions about the incompetence of the power of attorney
holder to file the suit.

The
counsel for the appellant then argued that the power of attorney holder had no
personal knowledge about the execution of agreement and, therefore, his
evidence is worthless and should not have been relied upon by the appellate
judge.

On perusal of the evidence of two witnesses of
the defen­ dant namely; appellant nos. 1 and 2, does not even show a semblance
of evidence that there was no readiness and willingness on the part of the
Plaintiff and defendant no. 2. It was clear from the entire record that the
power of attorney holder had full personal knowledge about the entire
transaction and that Plaintiff and defendant no. 2 were ready and willing to
perform their part of contract. In the wake of the above factual position in
this case, the power of attorney holder could validly depose about the
readiness and willingness. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Protected Tenant’s right to property – Landholder cannot sell the land without first offering the same to the ‘Protected Tenant’ – Land can be sold only if the ‘Protected Tenant’ does not exercise his right to purchase the said land. [Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (21 of 1950), Sections 40, 32; Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 – Section 40]

B.
Bal Reddy vs. Teegala Narayana Reddy and Ors.. AIR 2016 SUPREME COURT 3810

One
teegala Shivaiah was a Protected tenant in respect of agricultural lands. The
respondents were the heirs and successors of said teegala Shivaiah who died
sometime in the year 1964. The land holders who were recorded as owners of the
said land sold the said land to various buyers who in turn further effected
sales.

Respondents,  after 
obtaining  succession  certificates from Dy. Collector and Mandal
Revenue Officer, filed an application u/s. 32 of the act for restoration of possession
of the said land. The deputy Collector mandal revenue Officer directed
restoration of the physical possession the Respondents. The succession
certificate as well as the order of restoration was set aside by the joint  Collector. The high Court reversed the order
of the joint  Collector on the point of
restoration of possession.

The
Supreme Court held that section 38-d of the act prescribes the procedure to be
followed when the land holder intends to sell the land held by a Protected
tenant. Accordingly, the land must first be offered by issuing a notice in
writing to the Protected tenant and it is only when the Protected tenant does
not exercise the right of purchase in accordance with the procedure, that the
land holder can sell such land to any other person. The court further held, it
is well settled that the interest of a Protected tenant continues to be
operative and subsisting so long as ‘protected tenancy’ is not validly
terminated. Even if such Protected tenant 
has lost possession of the land in question, that by itself does not
terminate the ‘protected tenancy’.

Hence,
the appeals were dismissed.

Insurance claim– Cannot be denied on the ground that no premium had been paid – Notice to insured before the policy lapses, must be issued. [Insurance Act (4 of 1938)]

Jammu
and Kashmir Bank Ltd., Jammu vs. Tania Jamwal and Others. AIR 2016 JAMMU AND
KASHMIR 114

The
Claimants-respondents  had an insurance
policy named, “jeevan  Saral Policy”. As
per the arrangement/ authorisation of the deceased policy holder, the premium
amount was to be debited by the insurance company from the account of the
deceased policy holder through electronic clearing system, provided there were
sufficient funds in the bank account, which was being maintained by j & K
Bank ltd.  This was an inter-se
arrangement between the Policy holder’s bank and the insurance company.

The
deceased policy holder passed away and the claimants claimed the amount of
insurance policy. the insurance company 
rejected the claim on the ground that the policy had already lapsed due
to non-payment of premium.

The
high Court held that if for any reason the amount in question could not be
debited in time, it was the sole duty of the insurance company to appraise the
deceased policy holder. But in the present case, the insurance company did not
bring it to the notice of the deceased policy holder, moreover, the bank, while
rejecting the requisition of the insurance 
company  mentioned  “miscellaneous”  in  its
reasons memo as a result of which the insurance company suffered a confusion.
if there was any procedural lapse/ wrong, the same was between the insurance
company and  the  bank 
for  which  the 
policy  holder  cannot 
be held responsible.

TS-489-AAR-2016 MERO Asia Pacific Pte Ltd Date of Order: 17th August, 2016

On Facts, a single contract for offshore supply and onshore
services was to be treated as composite and indivisible contract – if goods
were delivered in India with the seller bearing the risk, insurance and customs
duty till the point of completion of project work in India, supply  was 
to  be  regarded 
as  completed in India.

Facts

The
taxpayer was a resident of Singapore and was engaged  in 
the  business  of 
executing  contracts  in relation to structural glazing and wall
cladding works. The Taxpayer had set up project offices (PO) in India for the
purpose of executing the work subcontracted to it by one of the Indian
contractor.

In
terms of sub-contract, taxpayer was required to design the curtain wall and
façade, supply materials and carry out installation and other works in India.
Taxpayer was also responsible for delivering goods at construction site in India.

The
taxpayer contended that the supply of goods outside India was to be considered
as a separate contract from the installation work contract. Further as title to
the goods passed outside India and the payment for offshore supply was also
received outside India, income from offshore supply of goods did not accrue or
arise in India. Even if the PO created a business connection or Permanent
establishment (PE) in India, income from offshore supply was not directly or
indirectly attributable to the PO in India. Hence, such income was not taxable
in India.

The
issues before the AAR were: (i) whether the amount received by the taxpayer for
offshore supply of goods was taxable in India; and (ii) if yes, what was the
extent of profit that could be attributed to the business connection and/or PE
in India.

AAR Ruling

Held 1: on the issue of whether contract was divisible

a.
A single contract was entered into by the taxpayer for all the activities of
designing, supply and installation work. the 
contract did not provide any bifurcation between  supply 
of  goods  and 
erection/installation in  the  contract 
either  in  the 
context  of  taxpayer’s work and responsibilities or with
respect to the payment schedule.

 b. Further, payment schedule of the contract
was linked to different milestones of the work, viz., designing, drawing,
supply  and  commissioning 
of  the  entire work. Major milestones were not linked
to supply/sale of plant and materials.

c.
Merely picking up one portion of contract, selectively to show that it
represents independent scope of work is incorrect. Hence, in the present
situation, division is imaginary and artificial.

d.
Even though  the  invoices 
showed  that  sale 
of materials was in Singapore, taxpayer was responsible for delivering
and steering materials at site and was responsible for the risk and insurance
until completion of the project in India. The customs duty for clearance of
goods at Indian port was also paid by the taxpayer. All these factors indicate
that the offshore supply was completed in India and not in Singapore.

e.
The Sale of Goods act makes it clear that property in goods passes when the
parties intend it to pass. in the present case, having regard to the conduct of
the parties as narrated above,  the
intention of the parties was that the property in goods was to pass only when
the installation and erection of entire works was completed in India.

Held 2: On role of PO in offshore supply of Goods and profit
attribution

a.
PO had come into existence much before the design of material and offshore
supply. PO had its own designing team and was working on the contract much
before supply of goods and material started.

b.
PO was also actively involved in designing, selecting and procuring supplies. The
PO cleared the goods from  customs  in  India  and 
paid  customs  duty. 
In these circumstances, taxpayer’s contention that the PO had no role in
supply of goods and materials or that no profit was attributable to the PO in India
was incorrect.

Held 3: Attribution of profits

Since the contract was a composite
one, entire amount was taxable in India.

TS-545-ITAT-2016(Del) International Management Group (UK) Ltd. vs. ACIT (IT) A.Y.: 2010-11, Date of Order: 4th October, 2016

Article 13 of the india-uK DTAA, S. 9(1)(vii) of the act – (i) profits
to the extent of the activities carried on through Service PE should be taxable
as business profits under the DTAA; (ii) additional income satisfying make
available condition which is not attributable to PE in india should be taxed as
FTS under the DTAA; (iii) Source rule exclusion applicable to FTS under the act
does not apply as services are utilised for business or earning income from a
source in india

Facts

Taxpayer,   a  UK   tax 
resident,  was  engaged 
in  the business of event
management and talent representation activities in sports events. The taxpayer
entered into a memorandum of understanding (mou) with Board of Control for
Cricket in india (indian entity) for assistance in establishment,
commercialisation and operation of indian Premier league  (‘event’). The services under the MoU, inter
alia, included advising and assisting indian entity  in connection with the following aspects.

Structure of the league.

League rules and regulations.

Franchisee agreements.

Legal implementation budget.

Media rights agreements.

Trading and auction of the
players.

Hospitality guidelines in
relation to the league.

Provision of legal handbooks.

On the basis of the mou, a
service agreement was entered into between taxpayer and the indian entity for
holding the cricket event in india. For this purpose, the taxpayer had deputed
its employees and other third party freelancers for undertaking on-ground
implementation, event management and supervision activities in india. However,
due to some reasons, the venue for the event was shifted from india to South
africa and the remaining services were rendered outside india. During the year under
consideration, the length of stay of taxpayer’s employees and freelancers
exceeded 90 days in india. Accordingly, 
Service Permanent establishment (Pe) 
of the taxpayer was established in india.

The taxpayer contended that:

 
Amount attributable to the services rendered in South africa were not
taxable in india as they were not attributable to PE in india;

 
Once income was attributable to Service Pe, it cannot be taxed under
fee  for technical Services (FTS) as both
are mutually exclusive;

 
Even if FTS article is applied, the services do not make available any
technical knowledge or skill, etc.; and

– Income attributable to such
services is not taxable in india under the DTAA.

Taxpayer argued that even u/s.
9(1)(vii) of the act, the amount was protected by source rule exclusion as the
services were utilised by indian entity for the business outside india.

However, the ao Held that even
the amount received by the taxpayer, 
which was not attributable to the service Pe, was also taxable in india
as FTS under the act, as well as under the DTAA.

Upon filing of objections against
order of AO, the Dispute resolution Panel (DRP) directed that the balance
consideration be taxed as FTS on a protective basis and regarded as business
income to be attributed to the PE on substantive basis. Aggrieved, the
taxpayer, as well as the AO, preferred an appeal before ITAT.

Held 1: Attribution to PE

– As per article 7, income which
is attributable to a PE is taxable in the state in which PE is situated. Further,  as per FTS article, income which is
effectively connected with a PE is taxable as business income and FTS article
ceases to apply.

– For income from services which
are in the nature of FTS, to be regarded as “effectively connected” with the
Pe, one of the following conditions should be established:

i.   PE should be engaged in the performance of
such services or it should be involved in actual rendering of such services, or

ii.  PE should arise as a result of its own
activities, or

iii. PE should,
at least, facilitate, assist or aid in the performance of such services,
irrespective of the other activities that the PE performs.

– Also,  the 
term  “effectively  connected” 
should  not be understood to mean
the opposite of “legally connected” but something in the sense of “really
connected”. Therefore,  the activities
mentioned in the contract should be connected to the PE not only in the form
but also in substance.

– In the contract under
consideration, activities carried by the taxpayer outside india were not
concerned with the functioning of the PE but were carried out by the head
office of the Taxpayer itself. Thus the activities carried on outside india
cannot be treated as being effectively connected with the PE in india and hence
will be taxable as FTS under the DTAA.

 
The  contention of the taxpayer
that the contract with indian 
entity  itself  was 
effectively  connected  with the PE in india and hence, the whole of
the revenue involved in the contract should be considered as effectively
connected is incorrect.

Held 2: Make available condition

– Technology is considered “made
available” only when the service recipient is enabled to absorb and apply the
technology contained therein.  In order
to satisfy the make available test, the technical knowledge, experience, skill
etc. must remain with the service recipient even after the rendering of the
services has come to an end and the service receiver is at liberty to use the
acquired technical knowledge, skill, know-how and processes in his own right.

 
In the present case, indian entity is enabled to absorb and apply the
information and advice provided by the taxpayer for conducting sporting events.
The documentation and material provided enables indian entity to use the
know-how and documentation independent of the services of the taxpayer in the
future. Furthermore,  it may not be
appropriate to say that in the absence of the taxpayer, the indian entity, on
its own, cannot hold/organise the event.

 
Thus,  the services provided by
the taxpayer to indian entity satisfy the ‘make available’ condition. Hence,
income from such services was taxable as FTS under the DTAA.

Held 3: source rule exclusion

– In this case, it was an
established fact that indian entity was carrying on business in india and not
outside india.

 
The source of income of the indian entity was in india, and not outside
india.

– The source of income of indian
entity could not be regarded as being outside india merely because performance
of the event was outside india. Thus, 
the consideration for services outside india is taxable as FTS even
under the act.

20. Assessment – Transfer pricing – DRP is superior to AO- AO is bound by decision of DRP – ESPN Star Sports Mauritius

S. N.
C. ET Compagnie vs. UOI; 388 ITR 383 (Delhi):

In this
case, the DRP declared that the Assessing Officer lacked jurisdiction to deal
with an issue. However, the Assessing Officer passed a final assessment order
ignoring the order of the DRP.  

The Delhi
High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)  The
language used by the Assessing Officer while disagreeing with the binding order
of the DRP was wholly unacceptable.

ii)  The
draft assessment order dated 28/03/2014 and the final assessment order dated
28/01/2015, passed by the Assessing Officer were void ab initio and
liable to be quashed on that basis.”

Section 10A – Claim for deduction u/s. 10A cannot be denied merely beause the assessee has inadvertently omitted to furnish the relevant details relating to deduction u/s. 10A in the appropriate columns of the return of income filed electronically

10.  ACIT vs. Albert A. Kallati
ITAT  Mumbai `A’ Bench
Before B. R. Baskaran (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM)
ITA No.: 2888/Mum/2013
A.Y.: 2009-10. Date of Order: 3rd August, 2016.
Counsel for revenue / assessee: Reepal Tralshawala / Sachchidanand Dubey

FACTS
The assessee, a manufacturer of diamond studded gold jewellery having manufacturing unit located in SEZ, filed his return of income for the year under consideration on 30.9.2009.  Subsequently, he revised his return of income twice.  In all the three returns of income, the assessee did not show any claim for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act, even though the total income was shown at Rs. Nil in the original return. Hence, the Assessing Officer (AO) did not allow deduction u/s. 10A of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who called for a remand report wherein the AO submitted that the assessee had been allowed deduction u/s.10A of the Act in AY 2006-07 to 2008-09.  Before the CIT(A) the assessee submitted the relevant details relating to deduction u/s. 10A which were inadvertently omitted to be furnished int eh appropriate columns of the return of income filed electronically. The CIT(A) was convinced that there was a genuine mistake and accordingly, he directed the AO to allow the deduction.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD
The Tribunal observed that there was no dispute with regard to the fact that the assessee is eligible for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act for the year under consideration.  The AO did not allow the claim, since it was not claimed in the return of income.  However, the conduct of the assessee shows that he assessee had intended to claim the same, but the relevant details were omitted to be entered in the return of income.  The Tribunal held that the inadvertent omission so made should not come in the way of the assessee to claim the deduction, which he is legally entitled to.  The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

The appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.

Sections 40(a)(ia), 194I – U/s. 194I tax is not required to be deducted on reimbursements and therefore, the amount so reimbursed cannot be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(ia)

9.  Aditya Birla Minacs Worldwide Ltd. vs. ACIT
ITAT Mumbai `A’ Bench
Before B. R. Baskaran (AM) and Amit Shukla (JM)
ITA No.: 4549/Mum/2014
A.Y.: 2007-08. Date of Order: 2nd August, 2016
Counsel for assessee / revenue: Ronak G. Doshi / A. Ramachandran

FACTS
The assessee reimbursed rent and parking charges amounting to Rs. 71.49 lakh to its holding company, PSI Data System Ltd.  The holding company had entered into a rent agreement with M/s Golf Links. The assessee entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with its holding company on 1.4.2006 pursuant to which the assessee company would occupy a portion of premises taken on lease by the holding company and the holding company shall apportion the rent payment with the assessee company in the ratio of space actually utilised by the assessee.  The MOU also provided that all statutory liabilities in relation to rental facilities such as TDS, service tax, are the responsibilities of the holding company.  

During the year under consideration, the assessee reimbursed a sum of Rs. 71,49,545 to its holding company as its share of rental expenditure incurred by the holding company. The assessee did not deduct tax at source from the said payment on the reasoning that the liability to deduct tax at source from the rent payment paid to the landlord was taken up by the holding company.  The landlord, M/s Golf Links, had obtained a certificate u/s. 197(1) for non-deduction of tax at source, therefore, the holding company did not deduct tax at source from the rent paid by it to the landlord.  The holding company had obtained no deduction certificate for payments covered by sections 194A, 194C and 194J.  It was also submitted to the AO that the holding company was of a bonafide belief that reimbursement of rent from the assessee would not form part of its income in its hands and hence it did not obtain  specific certificate for payments covered by section 194I.  

The AO held that the assessee should have deducted tax from rent payments made by the assessee to its holding company. He disallowed Rs. 71,49,545 by invoking provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Act.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who upheld the action of the AO.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal noted that the rental agreement has been entered into between the holding company and the land lord and hence the inference drawn by the tax authorities is against the facts available on record. The Tribunal observed that an identical issue was considered by the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Prime Broking Co. (I) Ltd. vs. ACIT (ITA No. 6627/Mum/2010 dated 19.10.2012) and the Tribunal held that the provisions of section 194I shall not apply to reimbursement of rent.  The decision rendered by the Tribunal has since been upheld by the Bombay High Court vide its order dated 9th June, 2015 reported in 2015-TIOL-1472-HC-Bom-IT.

The Tribunal further observed that the return of income of the holding company for the year under consideration has been accepted. Since the payment received from the assessee towards rent has been offered in the return of income filed by the holding company, the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) cannot be applied to the case of the assessee as per the second proviso thereto, which is held to be retrospective by the Delhi High Court in the case of Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd. (377 ITR 635)(Del).  

Considering the ratio of the judgments of the Bombay High Court and the Delhi High Court, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and directed the AO to delete the addition made u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act relating to reimbursement of rent.

Section 41(1) – Amounts shown in Balance Sheet cannot be deemed to be cases of “cessation of liability” only because they are outstanding for several years. The AO has to establish with evidence that there has been a cessation of liability with regard to the outstanding creditors.

8.  ITO vs. Vikram A. Pradhan

ITAT  Mumbai `F’ Bench
Before Jason P. Boaz (AM) and Sandeep Gosain (AM)
ITA No.: 2212/Mum/2012
A.Y.: 2008-09.  Date of Order: 24th August, 2016
Counsel for revenue / assessee: M. V. Rajguru / None

FACTS

In the course of assessment proceedings the Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the assessee’s balance sheet reflected creditors of Rs. 33,44,827.  Upon enquiry, the assessee submitted that these are old creditors pertaining to the period when he carried out business in Indore and that these have been carried forward for past 7 to 8 years and are unpaid due to disputes with the creditors.

The AO considered the entire creditors balance outstanding aggregating to Rs. 33,44,827 as income of the assessee by invoking section 41(1) as cessation of liability for the reason that these are old amounts and pertain to assessee’s old place of business and still remain unpaid.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who after considering the material on record and also referring to the judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Sugauli Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. 236 ITR 518 (SC) and UOI vs. J. K. Synthetics Ltd. (199 ITR 14)(SC) held that in the case on hand there was no write back of liability payable to creditors which is disclosed in the assessee’s balance sheet.  He also observed that no independent inquiries were carried out by the AO to establish that these creditors have written off the debts appearing in their respective account.  He held that the AO was not justified in unilaterally deciding that the amounts reflected as liabilities in the balance sheet of the assessee have ceased to exist within the meaning of section 41(1) of the Act.  He allowed the appeal.

Aggrieved, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Tribunal.

HELD

The Tribunal observed that the AO has failed to cause enquiries to be made with or notices issued to creditors to ascertain from them whether they have remitted the dues from the assessees in their books of account.  The fact that the creditors outstanding balances were not written back in the assessee’s books of account, but rather stood reflected in the asseessee’s balance sheet clearly establishes that there is no cessation of liability.  On the contrary, it is an acknowledgement by the assessee of existing debts it owes to its creditors.  It further observed that no material has been brought on record by the AO to show that there was remission or cessation of liability.  When the AO was of the view that there was cessation of liability in the case on hand, it was incumbent upon him to cause necessary enquiries to be made in order to bring on record material evidence to establish the requirement for invoking the provisions of section 41(1) of the Act.  The very fact that the assessee reflects these amounts as creditors in his Balance Sheet is an acknowledgement of his liability to these creditors and this also extends the period of limitation u/s.18 of the Limitation Act.  Once the assessee acknowledges that the debts to creditors are outstanding in his Balance Sheet, that he is liable to pay his creditors, Revenue cannot suo moto conclude that the creditors have remitted their liability or that the liability has otherwise ceased to exist, without bringing on record any material evidence to the contrary.  Since the AO had not brought on record any material evidence to establish that there was cessation of liability in respect of the outstanding creditors reflected in the Balance Sheet, the Tribunal concurred with the finding of the CIT(A) that the addition of Rs. 33,44,827 u/s. 41(1) of the Act is unsustainable.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue.

Sections 271(1)(c), 271AAA – Penalty levied u/s. 271(1)(c) to a case covered by section 271AAA is void

7.  Nukala Ramakrishna Eluru vs. DCIT
ITAT  Vishakapatnam Bench
Before V. Durga Rao (JM) and G. Manjunatha (AM)
ITA Nos.: 189 to 192/Vizag/2014
A.Ys.: 2005-06 to 2008-09.   Date of Order: 16th September, 2016.
Counsel for assessee / revenue: C. Subramanyam / T.S.N. Murthy

FACTS

On 16.11.2007,  a search u/s. 132 of the Act was conducted in the residential as well as business premises of the assessee, engaged in the business of rearing and trading of fish and other ancillary business activities.   During the course of search, department unearthed details of investments made in the purchase of immovable properties standing in the name of the assessee and his family members  including business concerns.  The assessee filed his return of income for AY 2008-09 on 30.09.2008 declaring total income of Rs. 75,39,560.  This return of income was revised on 14.9.2009 and a total income of Rs. 1,82,84,170 was declared in the revised return of income.  Subsequently, this return of income was again revised and in the final revised return of income the income disclosed was Rs. 4,10,32,920.

The AO assessed the total income of the assessee to be Rs. 4,10,32,990. He initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and after asking the assessee to explain why penalty should not be levied for concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, he levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the CIT(A) who directed the AO to levy penalty on the difference between Rs. 1,82,84170 (being total income in first revised return) and Rs. 75,39,560 (being total income in the original return of income).

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal where it was contended on his behalf that the levy of penalty for AY 2008-09 u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act was void ab initio.

HELD

In the present case on hand, on perusal of the facts available on record we find that the search had taken place on 16.11.2007 which falls under the assessment year 2008-09 which is the year before us.  The year before us was therefore, covered by the Explanation of specified previous year as per Explanation (b) to section 271AAA of the Act.  It is not in dispute that the income in question has been assessed as income of the assessment year 2008-09 i.e. specified previous year.  The AO himself has treated the undisclosed income of the assessee as such.  Once we come to the conclusion that the year before us is a specified previous year and the undisclosed income belongs to this year, an inevitable finding in view of the discussions above is that the provisions of section 271AAA will come into play to deal with penalty for concealment of particulars of income.  It is clear from the above fact that the AO has not invoked the correct provisions of law for levying penalty for concealment of income.  Therefore, we are of the view that the AO erred in levying penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, when a specific provision is provided by way of section 271AAA to deal with penalty provisions, in cases where search took place on or after 1.6.2007.

The Tribunal considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also the ratio of the decision of the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Subhash M. Patel in ITA No. 256/AHD/2012 dated 20.7.2012, held that the penalty order passed by the AO under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, is void ab initio and liable to be quashed.

The Tribunal quashed the penalty order passed by the AO u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act for AY 2008-09.

The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.

Sections 51 and 56 – Clause (ix) of section 56(2) (inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2015) which lays down that amount of advance received for sale of property shall be treated as income if the same is forfeited and negotiations do not result in transfer of such capital asset and corresponding proviso to section 51 (inserted with effect from 01-04-2015) which states that if the amount of advance received was treated as income in pursuance of section 56(2)(ix), then no deduction of the said amount shall be done in computing the cost of acquisition when the said property is ultimately sold, do not have a retrospective effect.

[2016] 160 ITD 426 (Mumbai Trib.) ITO vs. Fiesta Properties (P.) Ltd.
A.Y.: 2010-11 Date of Order: 11th August, 2016

Section 41(1) read with Sections 28(i) and 51- Prior to 01.04.2015, if an assessee builder had received advance towards sale property held by it as a capital asset and the same was standing as liability in balance sheet of the assessee and if the actual sale transfer didn’t materialise, then the said amount would not be taxable u/s. 41(1) on writing off of corresponding amount by transferee but would be deducted u/s. 51 from cost of acquisition in computing capital gain when the property is ultimately sold.

FACTS

The assessee company was engaged, interalia, in the business of construction of properties. During the year under consideration, the assessee company had shown income mainly from rent under the head ‘Income from house property’ and also ‘Income from business’.

During the course of assessment proceedings, the AO noted that there was a liability of Rs.3.74 crore as shown in the balance sheet of the assessee, in the name of M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust. The said liability was created in the year 1995, when the assessee had received the said amount from the said trust as an advance for sale of assessee’s property. The AO conducted enquiries from M/s. Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust, who vide their letter dated 29.11.2012 replied that the liability had been written off in the year under consideration.

AO was of the view that the assessee being in the business of construction had trading liability and hence, the cessation of said liability should be treated as income of the assessee u/s. 41(1) of the Act. Accordingly, he added the said amount of Rs.3.74 crore to the total income of the assessee. The AO also observed that though both the assessee as well as M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust, contended that the transaction was in respect of transfer of property, but both the parties failed to furnish any proof that the transaction was for an immovable property. Without any documentation, a property transaction of the magnitude of Rs. 3.74 crore in the year 1995 was beyond comprehension. Since there was no supporting evidence, the AO held that the advance received by the assessee from M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust was an interest-free unsecured deposit in the course of the business of the assessee company. Thus, on the ground of cessation of the liability, the AO added the amount of Rs. 3.74 crore u/s. 41(1) of the Act.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before CIT(A). It was submitted that the impugned amount was received by the assessee with regard to sale of property located at Chennai. The assessee also furnished copies of the correspondences between itself and M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah Trust indicating that all through, the intention of the advance received was for transfer of the assessee’s property at Madras and when the deal did not materialise, the said M/s Dawat-E-Hadiyah started demanding its money back. Copies of all these correspondences were also furnished before the AO. After considering the entire submissions it was held by CIT(A) that impugned amount was not taxable in the hands of the assessee either u/s. 41(1) or u/s. 28(iv) or under any other provisions of the Act and that whenever the impugned property is sold by the assessee, the cost of acquisition of the property shall be reduced by the amount of Rs.3.74 crore for the purpose of computation of capital gains in view of provisions of section 51 of the Act.

On revenue’s appeal before the Tribunal:

HELD

The admitted facts on record are that assessee has been showing its rental income from its properties, including the impugned property located at Madras and the same has also been assessed by the AO under the head ‘Income from house property’. These properties have been undoubtedly shown as capital assets in the balance-sheet and never have been declared as stock-in-trade. This position has all along been accepted by the revenue.

Further, as far as the assessee is concerned, the liability of Rs.3.74 crore is still outstanding in the name of aforesaid party. The CIT(A) has recorded a clear and categorical finding that correspondence between the assessee company and said party revealed that the transaction was in respect of assessee’s property located at Madras. But, the transaction could not be completed. This factual finding could not be rebutted by the Ld DR. Thus, as per facts and records brought before us, aforesaid property is undoubtedly capital asset of the assessee company. Under these circumstances, it has been rightly held by the CIT(A) that the impugned amount of advance received towards sale of immovable property being capital asset of the assessee company, cannot be taxed under the provisions of section 41(1) or section 28(iv) of the Act, especially due to the fact that the legislature has provided the specific provision in this regard, i.e. section 51 of the Act.

Clause (ix) of section 56(2), inserted w.e.f. 01-04-2015, clearly lays down that amount of advance received for sale of property shall be treated as income if the same is forfeited and negotiations do not result in transfer of such capital asset. Also proviso, introduced with effect from 01-04-2015 to section 51, states that if the amount of advance received was treated as income in pursuance of section 56(2)(ix), then no deduction of the said amount shall be done in computing the cost of acquisition when the said property is ultimately sold.

These provisions are not clarificatory in nature. These provisions lay down a substantive law creating additional tax liability upon an assessee and, therefore, this cannot have retrospective effect. Further, with the insertion of these provisions, it becomes clear that earlier the law was not like this. Thus, for the year before us, i.e. A.Y. 2010-11, the then existing provisions of section 51 shall be applicable which clearly provides that the amount of advance received should be reduced from the cost of acquisition of asset.

Thus, the action of CIT(A) in directing the AO to delete the addition of Rs.3.74 crore which was made by the AO u/s. 41(1) of the Act, is hereby upheld.

9. Genuineness of trust – a breach/contravention of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950-would not result in the trust being disqualified from being approved u/s. 80G.

D.I.T. (Exemptions) Mumbai vs. Shri Sai
Baba Charitable Trust. [ Income tax Appeal no. 902 of 2014 dt : 15/10/2016
(Bombay High Court)].

[D.I.T. (Exemptions) Mumbai vs. Shri Sai
Baba Charitable Trust., [dated 13/11/2013 ; A Y: 2011-12. Mum. ITAT ]

The assessee is a Charitable Trust duly
registered u/s. 12AA Act. On 2nd December, 2011, the assessee Trust
applied to the Director of Income Tax (Exemption) for renewal of Certificate /
approval u/s. 80G. The application was rejected by the Director of Income Tax
(Exemption). This rejection was on the ground that the Trust had obtained
unsecured loan of Rs. 50 lakh from third parties without obtaining prior
approval of the Charity Commissioner as required u/s. 36A(3) of the Bombay
Public Trust Act, 1950. Thus, concluding that the assessee is not a genuine
trust.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed an
appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned order held that there is
no dispute that the assessee fully satisfied the conditions specified in
section 80G(5) of the Act for approval there under. It further observed that
there is no requirement under the Act that a breach / contravention of the
Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 would result in the trust being disqualified from
being approved u/s. 80G of the Act. It held that the very fact that the Revenue
had not initiated any action u/s. 12AA of the Act to revoke its registration
would imply that the activities of the Trust are genuine.

Moreover, the Tribunal also records the fact
that the Charity Commissioner has not taken any action against the assessee for
violation of the provisions of section 36A of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950
in having borrowed funds without its prior permission. In the aforesaid circumstances,
the appeal of the assessee was allowed.

The Revenue appealed before the High Court
and urged that the Trust is not a genuine trust in as much as it has been
borrowing funds on regular basis from third persons and has been repaying it by
borrowing further funds from other parties on regular basis.

The Hon. High Court find that the impugned
order of the Tribunal has on the basis of the clear provision of section 80G
recorded that the assessee completely satisfies/fulfils all the conditions
specified in section 80G(5) for the purposes of availing benefit u/s. 80G. This
coupled with the fact that the Revenue itself has also not taken any
proceedings to have the registration cancelled, would itself imply that the
Revenue does consider the Trust to be a genuine trust.

It is an undisputed position that the assessee
satisfies all conditions for approval of the trust u/s. 80G. Therefore, it is
not open to the Authorities to refuse approval by imposing conditions which are
not mentioned in Section 80G. In the above circumstances, the impugned order of
the Tribunal was upheld. Therefore,
the appeal was dismissed.

8. Interpretation – SUBLATO FUNDAMENTO CEDIT OPUS – Once the foundation is removed, the superstructure falls.

Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS vs.
M/s.Oberoi Constructions Pvt.Ltd. [Income tax Appeal no 573 of 2014 dt :
01/10/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[Commissioner of Income Tax, TDS vs.
M/s.Oberoi Constructions Pvt.Ltd., [dated 06/10/2013 ; A Y: 2006-07. Mum. ITAT
]

The assessee is in construction business.
During the AY: 2006 – 07, the assessee had paid share application money to one
M/s. Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. The Assessing Officer added the amount
of Rs.10.35 crore as deemed dividend on a substantive basis in the hands of
Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and on a protective basis in the hands of its
director Mr. Vikas Oberoi in their assessment orders. Being aggrieved, both
M/s.Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Vikas Oberoi challenged their
orders of assessment holding that they are in receipt of deemed dividend. Their
appeals were allowed by the CIT(A) holding that they could not be charged to
tax on the amount of Rs.10.35 crores as recipients of deemed dividend u/s.
2(22)(e).

Being aggrieved by the order of CIT(A), the
Revenue filed an appeal to the Tribunal which was dismissed. Thereafter, the
Revenue filed an appeal to High court, being in the case of M/s.Siddhivinayak
Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. Vikas Oberoi. The High Court by orders dated 4th
July 2014 and 8th June 2016, respectively, dismissed both the
Revenue’s appeals from the orders of the Tribunal holding that M/s.
Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Vikas Oberoi cannot be charged to tax as
recipients of deemed dividend.

In the meantime, pending the aforesaid
proceedings, the ACIT (TDS) passed an order dated 11th February 2011
u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act holding the assessee to be an assessee in
default for not having deducted tax on the deemed dividend of Rs.10.35 crore
paid to M/s. Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. The assessee, being aggrieved,
filed an appeal to the CIT (A). The appeal of the assessee was allowed by the
CIT (A) holding that as in the appellate proceedings in respect of M/s.
Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr. ikas Oberoi, the addition of income
to the extent of Rs.10.35 crore u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act on substantive and
protective basis had been deleted, there was no taxable income which had to
suffer tax deduction at source. Consequently, no failure to deduct tax could
arise.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue carried the
issue in further appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal upheld the order of the
CIT (Appeals) holding that once the addition made on account of deemed dividend
is deleted in the hands of the recipient of the amount of Rs.10.35 crore, there
could be no failure to deduct tax at source thereon. Thus, the consequent
demand u/s. 201(1) and 201(1A) upon the assessee was not justified.

Being aggrieved, the Revenue filed an appeal
before High Court. The High Court held that both the CIT (A) as well as the
Tribunal in these (TDS) proceedings have held that as the very basis for
holding the assessee liable for failure to deduct tax did not subsist, the TDS
proceedings must also fail. This was in view of the orders passed in the case
of recipients i.e. M/s.Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr.Vikas Oberoi in
appeal by the authorities under the Act including this Court that they were not
liable to any tax as they had not received any deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e).
Once the foundation is removed, the superstructure falls (sublato fundamento
Cedit opus
). The grievance of the Revenue is that in TDS proceedings, one
must ignore the orders passed in the hands of the recipients i.e.
M/s.Siddhivinayak Realities Pvt. Ltd. and Mr.Vikas Oberoi.

The Court observed that the officers of the
Revenue while administering the TDS provisions are not outside the scope of the
Act and orders passed under the Act in respect of the character of the payment
made under the Act are binding upon them. The fact that at the time the order
of the ACIT (TDS) was passed, there was basis to do so does not mean that
orders passed on income in the hands of the recipients will have no bearing in
deciding its validity. One must not ignore the fact that this order of the TDS
officer is tentative in nature and its existence would depend upon the nature
of receipt in the hands of the recipient and subject to the orders passed in
respect thereof by appropriate court. In the above view, the appeal was
dismissed.

Section 54F – The assessee cannot be denied deduction u/s. 54F, if the assessee makes investment in residential house within the time limit prescribed u/s. 54F but is unable to get the title of the flat registered in his name or unable to get the possession of the flat due to fault of the builder.

10.   [2016] 159 ITD 964 (Mumbai Trib.) (SMC)

Rajeev B. Shah vs. ITO
A.Y.: 2010-11      Date of Order: 8th July, 2016

FACTS

During the year under consideration, the assessee had sold one plot of land and had claimed deduction u/s. 54F for investment of sale proceeds in an under-construction flat.

The Developer had allotted, flat No. 602 of 6th floor, to the assessee.

The AO rejected the claim of deduction u/s. 54F of the Act on the ground that the property was incomplete and document related to purchase of property was not registered even after three years of the said investment.

Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeal before the CIT(A), who also confirmed the action of the AO by stating that merely because a so-called letter of allotment was issued in a building which was never given permission for construction beyond two floors, it cannot be said that for the purpose of section 54F, the appellant’s obligation ended as soon as he issued the cheque.

Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeal before the Tribunal.

HELD

We find that the facts in question are not disputed and the only issue is that whether assessee is eligible for deduction u/s 54F, when the assessee has made investment in purchase of residential house within the time limit prescribed u/s. 54F but is unable to get the title of the flat registered in his name or is unable to get the possession of the flat due to fault of the builder.

The intention of the assessee is very clear that he has invested almost the entire sale consideration of land in purchase of this residential flat. It is another issue that the flat could not be completed and the suit, directing the builder to complete the construction, filed by the assessee, is pending before the Hon’ble BombayHigh Court.

It is impossible for the assessee to complete formalities such as taking over possession for getting the flat registered in his name and this cannot be the reason for denying the claim of the assessee for deduction u/s. 54F of the Act.

Hence, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.

7. Reopening of assessment – the reasons for reopening must be based on some material – the material used by the AO for forming his opinion must have some bearing or nexus with escapement of income – If not, the reopening notice would be clearly without jurisdiction: Section 148.

Director of Income Tax (IT) vs. Doosan
Heavy Industries & Construction Co.  
[ Income tax Appeal no. 670 of 2014, dt : 04/10/2016 (Bombay High
Court)].

[Director of Income Tax (IT) vs. Doosan
Heavy Industries & Construction Co,. [ITA No. 3930/MUM/2006, 3897/MUM/2006,
746/MUM/2007; Bench : L ; dated 19/07/2013; AYs: 2000-2001, 2003-2004. Mum.
ITAT ]

The Assessee is a Project Contractor. It
awarded a contract by Kondapalli Power Corporation Ltd.(KPCL), Andhra Pradesh
to set up a power plant on a turnkey basis. Further, KPCL had awarded an
onshore contract to the Assessee for supply of goods and services along with
the commissioning of the plant. KPCL also awarded an offshore supply contract
to Hanjung DCM Co. Ltd. (Hanjung) for supply of equipment valued at US$ 103
million. The equipment valued at US$ 103 million was supplied by Hanjung and
taken delivery of outside India by the Assessee for and on behalf of KPCL. The
aforesaid equipment was lost during its transit after the Assessee took
delivery from Hanjung. As the insurance claim was not honoured, the Assessee
filed a suit against the Insurance Company for recovery of US$ 103 million. The
regular assessment proceeding was completed for the subject  A.Y. u/s. 143(3).

A reopening notice was issued by the
Assessing Officer for the subject A.Y. and the reasons to believe that income
chargeable to tax has escaped assessment u/s. 147 of the Act. During the course
of assessment proceedings, it was noticed that there was another contract
titled “Offshore Equipment Supply Contract” also dated 1st February,
1998 entered into between M/s. Lanco Kondapalli Power Private Limited and M/s.
Hanjung DCM Co. Ltd. (Hanjung). The AO had reason to believe that income of US$
51.5 million chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Issue notice u/s. 148.

The assessee during the assessment
proceedings consequent to reopening notice dated 26th March 2004
submitted that the same is without jurisdiction and, therefore, must be
quashed. Nevertheless, the AO proceeded on the basis that in the suit filed by
the Assessee in the Secunderabad Court against the Insurance Company it had
claimed to have supplied equipment valued at US$ 103 million which was lost.

The Assessing Officer placed reliance on
para 5 of the plaint, which reads as under :

“ 5. MAIN SUPPLY CONTRACT “

Under the terms
of contract dated 15th February 1998 (“Supply Contract”) between
Plaintiff and LKPL, Plaintiff agreed to supply equipment, materials and design
for the construction of LKPL’s combined cycle power plant at Kondapalli IDA,
Andhra Pradesh in India (the “Kondapalli Project”). The value of this Supply
Contract was about US$ 103 million.” It was on the aforesaid basis that the AO
sought to justify his reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax has
escaped assessment and, therefore, proceeded to hold even on merits against the
Assessee.

On appeal, the CIT(A) examined all the
facts. These facts included not only the suit as filed but also the terms of
the contract and scope of work, in particular the responsibility of the parties
there under. Based on this examination, the CIT(A) concluded that in terms of
its obligation to insure the goods/equipment during transit, the appellant had
taken out an Insurance policy as a contractor with KPCL as the principal. Based
on this policy coupled with the plaint as filed, the CIT(A) observed that the
plaint has to be read as a whole. So read, the nature of the relationship
between the parties as described in paragraph 4 thereof, which, as extracted in
the order, reads as under :

“4. A brief reference to the parties
involved in relation to the subject matter of this suit is as follows :

a. Lanco Kondapalli Power Pvt. Limited (formerly a public limited
company) (‘LKPL’) is the owner of the Kondapalli Power Project.

b. Plaintiff is the EPC
contractor for the Kondapalli Power Project, and an assured under the policy
issued by Defendant.

 i. Encon Services Limited (‘Encon’) is the subcontractor of Plaintiff
for transportation of the GT & GTG from Kakinada to Machilipatnam.

j.   Seaways Shipping Limited
(‘SSL’) was appointed by Encon for inland transportation of GT & GTG from
Kakinada to Machilipatnam, and was the character of ‘Jala Hamsa’ and ‘AmethiI’.

n. Aistom are the suppliers of the GT & GTC, from whom Plaintiff
arranged to procure the replacement equipment for ensuring completion of the
project.”

The CIT(A) came to the conclusion that on
the basis of the words used in para 5 of the plaint, it cannot be established
that the assessee had supplied (as owner) the equipment, material and design,
and that the word “supply” only refers to the responsibilities of the assessee
for setting up of the power project as per the onshore contract. The reasons as
recorded do not therefore suggest any link between the material found by him and
his conclusion that there was reason to believe that the income chargeable has
escaped assessment. He, therefore, concluded that there was no reason to form a
belief that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal, by
the impugned order, confirmed the finding of the CIT(A).

The Hon. High Court observed that at the
stage of a notice of reopening, the AO does not have to “establish” that any
income has escaped assessment. However the AO must simply be shown to have
formed an opinion, which, in turn, is supported by reasons. The reasons
themselves must be based on some material. A minimum requirement one would
expect in the face of this scheme of things is that the material used by the AO
for forming his opinion must have some bearing or nexus with escapement of
income. If not, the reopening notice would be clearly without jurisdiction. In
the present case, the material used by the AO for purportedly forming this
opinion is the description of the assessee of itself as “a supplier” of the
equipment in an EPC contract, which inter alia required it to take offshore
delivery of the equipment from a foreign vendor and supply and install the same
onshore. Mere description as a “supplier” in a suit by the assessee against the
insurance company claiming an insurance claim for loss of equipment, when the
assessee insured the equipment jointly with the purchaser, can possibly have no
connection with the escapement of any income arising out of sale of the
equipment. Since that was the only material used by the AO for issuance of the
reopening notice, the notice is without any legal basis or justification. In
these circumstances, the order of the coordinate bench for Assessment Years
1999-2000 and 2002-2003 also supports the Respondent’s contention that they
were not suppliers of the equipment and no income assessable to tax has escaped
assessment. It’s obligation was to insure the goods/equipment during transit
done by it either on its own or through a subcontractor.

The Hon. High Court also found that, the
contract provided that the contractor, i.e. Assessee will provide/arrange at
its own cost in the joint name of the owner and contractor a comprehensive
insurance cover to the project, including any damage to the goods during transit.
It was in that context that the Assessee had made a claim for insurance. Taking
into account the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the CIT(A) and by
the Tribunal, and that nothing has been shown to indicate that the finding is
perverse the appeal was dismissed.

6. Penalty – CIT(A) could not have imposed penalty on a new ground which was not the basis for initiation of penalty – penalty could be only on the ground on which it was initiated – Not liable for penalty : u/s. 271(1)(c)

CIT vs. Acme Associates. [ Income tax
Appeal no 640 of 2014 dated : 17/10/2016 (Bombay High Court)].

[Acme Associates vs. ACIT. [ITA No.
649/MUM/2011; Bench : I; dated 13/09/2013 ; A Y: 2005- 2006.( MUM.)  ITAT ]

The assessee is in the business of Real
Estate Development. For the A.Y. 2005-06, the assessee has filed its ROI ,
declaring a income of Rs. 2.04 crore claiming 100% deduction u/s. 80IB(10).
During the course of the assessment proceedings, the AO noticed that two
buyers, viz. Ms. Sulbha M. Waghle and Mr. Mangesh G. Waghle had entered into
joint agreement for purchase of flats which in the aggregate exceeded 1,000
sq.ft. Consequently, AO disallowed the deduction claimed u/s. 801B(10) and
initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) on the aforesaid ground for furnishing
inaccurate information/concealing income.

The assessee carried the issue in appeal to
the CIT(A). During pendency of the appeal, a search action u/s. 132 was carried
out on the assessee group. Consequent to which, notices u/s.153A were issued to
the assessee including one for the subject A Y 2005-06. In the above
circumstances, the assessee withdrew its appeal for A.Y. 2005-06 pending before
CIT(A). Thereafter, by order dated 30th March, 2010, the AO imposed
penalty upon assessee u/s. 271(1)(c). This was on the very ground on which the
AO had initiated penalty proceedings viz. selling of flats to two members of
the family which in the aggregate was in excess of 1000 sq.ft. of built up
area. Therefore concluding that the Assessee has furnished incorrect
particulars of income/concealed particulars of income. Consequently, a penalty
was imposed.

Being aggrieved, the assessee carried the
order of the AO imposing penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) to CIT(A). The CIT (A)
confirmed the penalty imposed by the AO. However, the confirmation was on a
completely new and different ground viz. that during search proceedings, the
assessee had made disclosure that the project in respect of which deduction
u/s. 801B(10) was being claimed was not completed before the due date i.e. 31st
March 2008. Thus confirming the order dated 30th March, 2010.
It is to be noted that CIT(A) in its order did not deal with the issue on which
the AO had initiated and confirmed the penalty upon the assessee.

Being aggrieved, the assessee filed a
further appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the initiation and
confirmation of penalty by the AO u/s. 271(1)(c) was not on the ground that the
project was not completed by the due date, on which the CIT (A) confirmed the
penalty. Thus, the Tribunal held that this could not be done by the CIT(A) as
the penalty proceedings were initiated on account of selling flats of an area
in excess of 1000 sq.ft. i.e. a ground different from the ground on which
the   CIT(A) confirmed the penalty. The
order also noted the fact that at the time when the return of income was filed
on 31st October 2005, it was not possible to predict whether the
project would be completed on or before the specified date 31st
March 2008. Further, the Tribunal also examined the issue on which the
Assessing Officer had imposed penalty, namely, selling of two flats to the
members of same family, the area of which in the aggregate exceeded 1000 sq.ft.
built up and held that no material was brought on record that assessee had
constructed a flat of more than 1000 sq.ft. built up area or that the assessee
had sold any unit of more than 1000 sq.ft. It renders a finding of fact that
after units had been sold the buyers had joined two flats resulting in a flat
in excess of 1000 sq.ft. In the aforesaid view, the Tribunal held that there is
no furnishing of inaccurate particulars and/ or concealing of income warranting
the imposition of penalty u/s. 271(1)(c).

The Hon. High Court in the revenue appeal
held that, it was the original ground on basis of which penalty was initiated,
that the assessee was required to offer explanation during penalty proceedings
to establish that the claim as made in the return of income was not on account
of furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income or concealment of income vis-a-vis
of selling flat having area 1000 sq.ft. The AO under the Act also considered
the assessee’s explanation in the context in which the penalty proceedings were
initiated and did not rightly place any reliance upon the subsequent events. In
an appeal from the order of the Assessing Officer, the CIT(A) could not have
imposed penalty on a new ground which was not the basis for initiation of
penalty. The appeal before the CIT(A) was with regard to issue of penalty u/s.
271(1)(c) only on the ground on which the penalty proceedings were initiated in
the assessment order. Although the powers of CIT(A) are coterminous with that
of the AO, the imposition of penalty could be only the ground on which it was
initiated. This is not the case, where the CIT(A) had independently initiated
penalty proceedings on a new ground in an order in quantum proceedings in
appeal from the Assessment Order. This alone could lead to the imposition of
penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) on the new ground. The ground on which the penalty was
initiated and penalty imposed by the AO, namely, that the flat had been sold in
the project which was in excess of 1000 sq.ft., the Tribunal has recorded a
finding of fact that the flats were sold individually by two separate
agreements individually to the purchasers in joint names. However, two flats
were subsequently joined by the purchasers aggregating the size of two flats to
1000 sq.ft. built up purchased from the assessee. This is finding of fact which
has not been shown to be perverse or arbitrary. In the above view, revenue
appeal was dismissed.

28. TDS – Interest u/s. 28 of Land Acquisition Act- capital gain or income from other sources – Sections 45, 56 and 194A – Interest assessable as capital gain – Tax not deductible at source on such interest

Movaliya Bhikhubhai Balabhai vs. ITO; 388
ITR 343 (Guj):

Pursuant to acquisition of land of the
assessee, by a Court order dated 23/03/2011, additional compensation was
awarded with interest. The executive engineer proposed to deduct tax at source
of Rs. 2,07,416/- u/s. 194A. The assessee made an application to the Assessing
Officer u/s. 197 to issue certificate
for Nil deduction of tax. The Assessing Officer rejected the application.

The Gujarat High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the assessee and held as under:

“i)  In the case of CIT vs.
Ghanshyam (HUF) 315 ITR 1 (SC
), the Supreme Court held that it is clear
that whereas interest u/s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not treated
as a part of income subject to tax, interest earned u/s. 28, which is on
enhanced compensation or consideration making it exigible to tax u/s.
45(5).  The substitution of section 145A
by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2009 was not in connection with the decision of the
Supreme Court in CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) 315 ITR 1 (SC), but brought to
mitigate the hardship caused to the assessee on account of the decision of the
Supreme Court in Rama Bai vs. CIT 181 ITR 400 (SC), whereby it was held
that arrears of interest computed on delayed or enhanced compensation shall be
taxable on accrual basis.

ii)  Therefore, the words
“interest received on compensation or enhanced compensation” in section 145A of
the Act have to be construed in the manner interpreted by the Supreme Court in CIT
vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) 315 ITR 1 (SC)
. As a necessary corollary, therefore,
the payment made u/s. 28 of the 1894 Act is interest as envisaged u/s.
145A  and cannot be treated as income
from other sources.

iii) The Assessing Officer was not
justified in requiring the deduction of tax at source u/s. 194A in respect of
such interest. The assessee was, therefore, entitled to refund of the amount
wrongly deducted u/s. 194A .”

27. Revision – Limitation – Section 263 – A. Y. 2007-08 – Reassessment in respect of items other than item sought to be revised by Commissioner – Period of limitation begins from original assessment – Not from date of reassessment in which item was not in question

I. G. Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
Principal CIT; 388 ITR 135 (All):

For the A. Y. 2007-08, the assessment u/s.
143(3) was completed on 31/10/2011. Sales tax incentive received from UP
Government was treated as revenue receipt, but the sales tax subsidy received
from the Maharashtra Government was not treated as revenue receipt and
accordingly was accepted as capital receipt. Subsequently, a reassessment order
u/s. 147 was passed on 15/03/2015 making disallowance u/s. 40(a)(i), on account
of non-deduction of tax at source. Thereafter, on 08/06/2016, the Principal
Commissioner issued notice u/s. 263, on the ground that the sales tax subsidy
accruing to the assessee under the scheme of the Government of Maharashtra was
not brought to tax as revenue receipt.

The Allowed High Court allowed the writ
petition filed by the assessee challenging the notice u/s. 263 and held
as under:

“i)  Limitation prescribed u/s.
263(2) for exercise of power u/s. sub-section (1) thereof is two years from the
end of financial year in which the order sought to be revised was passed.

ii)  The reassessment order was
not for review or reassessment of the entire case but only in respect of a
particular item. In all other respects, the original assessment order was
maintained, and addition made by assessment order dated 26/03/2015 was added in
the income assessed in the original assessment order. Though the notice u/s.
263(1) referred to the reassessment order, in fact, it referred to a
discrepancy in the regular assessment order dated 31/10/2011, wherein the
incentive of value added tax from Maharashtra Government received by the
assessee was allowed to be deducted. This incentive had no concern with the
reassessment proceedings in the order dated 26/03/2015.

iii)  Since the notice issued
by the Principal Commissioner was in reference to a discrepancy in the original
assessment order dated 31/10/2011 and not the reassessment order dated
26/03/2015, the limitation would run from the dated of the regular order of
assessment and therefore, the notice was barred by limitation prescribed u/s.
263(2). Impugned notice dated 08/06/2016 is quashed.”

26. TDS – Payment of salary to priests and nuns of catholic institutions – Ultimate beneficiaries congregation or dioceses with benefit of exemption from tax – No liability to deduct tax at source

Holy Cross Primary School vs. CBDT; 388
ITR 162 (Mad):

The assessee filed writ petition for
quashing of the letter dated 07/10/2015 of the Income-tax Department and the
Circular of the Director of Treasuries dated 26/10/2015 insisting in deduction
of tax at source from the salaries of the religious nuns and priests in the
service of the assessee school contending that, the concerned religious priests
and nuns did not take the salaries, but were ultimately depositing it with the
concerned diocese or congregation or institution only which are exempt from tax.

The Madras High Court allowed the writ
petition and held as under:

“Tax need not be deducted at source in so
far as the payments of salaries of the religious priests and nuns of the
catholic institutions who were attached to the respective congregation or
dioceses who were already exempted from the purview of the income tax liability
as on the date of the order.”

25. Capital gains – Section 50C: A. Y. 2006-07 – Stamp duty value higher than sale price- Reference to DVO – Valuation by DVO binding on AO

Principal CIT vs. Ravjibhai Nagjibhai
Thesia; 388 ITR 358 (Guj):

In the A. Y. 2006-07, the assessee sold his
land for a consideration of Rs. 16 lakh. The Stamp Valuation Authority valued
the property at Rs. 2,33,70,600/-. The case was therefore referred to the DVO
at the request of the assessee u/s. 50C(2). The DVO valued the property at Rs.
24,15,000/-. However, the Assessing Officer passed the assessment order before
the report of the DVO was received treating the difference of Rs. 2,17,70,600/-
as undisclosed income. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal deleted the
addition and held that the capital gain has to be computed u/s. 50C on the
basis of the valuation by the DVO.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Gujarat High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  Once a reference was made
by the Assessing Officer u/s. 50C of the Act, to the DVO, for valuation of the
capital asset, the Assessing Officer was obliged to complete the assessment in
conformity with the estimation made by the DVO.

ii)  Under sub-section (2) of
section 50C, it was such lower valuation which was required to be taken into consideration
for the purposes of assessment. There was no legal infirmity in the orders of
the appellate authorities warranting interference.”

The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965

Editor’s
note
: According to the Payment of Bonus
Act, eligible employees are to be paid bonus within a period of 8 months from
the close of the financial year i.e. on or before 30th November. The purpose of
this article is to make readers aware of the basic provisions of this welfare
legislation.

Introduction

The
Payment of Bonus act, 1965 gives to the employees a statutory right to a share
in the profits of his employer. Prior to the enactment of the act some
employees used to get bonus, but that was so if their employers were pleased to
pay the same. The payment was voluntary, with no vested right in the employee.
With the passing of the act, employees covered by the act had a right to Bonus.

Object

The
object of the act is to maintain peace and harmony between labour and capital
(i.e. employees & employers), by allowing the employees to share the
prosperity of the establishment reflected by the profits earned by the
contributions made by capital, management and labour.

Applicability

The
act applies to

a)  Every factory

b)  Every other establishment employing 20
(twenty) or more persons.

A
state government can, however, apply the act to any establishment employing
less than 20 but not less than 10 persons.

c)  The Government of Maharashtra by notification
dt:- 11th  April 1984 has expanded the
scope by making the same applicable, where 10 or more persons are employed in
any establishment or factory.

Once
the act applies, it shall continuously remain in force, irrespective of number
of employees falling in number i.e. once covered always covered.

 Applicability to Public Sector

A
Public sector establishment which sells any goods produced or manufactured by
it or renders any services in competition with the private sector and earns
income from such sale or services shall be covered by the act.

Eligibility

Every
employee who is drawing a salary or wages up to Rs.21,000/- per month and has
worked for a minimum period of 30 days in a particular year is entitled to get
Bonus. as per the above ceiling, all employees drawing wages  up 
to  Rs.21,000/- per  month 
shall  be  eligible for Bonus irrespective of their
grade/designation i.e. manager/part-time/casual/seasonal employee etc.(w.e.f.
01/04/2014 by Gazette Notification Dated : 1st jan, 2016)

Sum with Reference to Which Bonus is Payable

For
the purpose of calculation of Bonus Salary or Wages includes Basic Salary,
dearness allowance / Special allowance only, but does not include other
allowances such as overtime, house rent allowance, Conveyance, travelling
allowance, monthly Bonus, Contribution to Provident fund,  retrenchment compensation, Gratuity or
commission.

Amount of Bonus

An
employee who is drawing salary or wages not exceeding Rs.7,000/- per month, is
entitled to get bonus on entire salary/wages or minimum Wages, whichever is
higher.

An
employee who is drawing salary or wages between Rs.7,000/- per month and
Rs.21,000/- per month, the Bonus payable to him is to be calculated as, if his
salary or wages were Rs.7,000/- per month. An employee drawing a salary or wage
exceeding Rs.21, 000/- per month is not entitled to get Bonus as per payment of
Bonus act.

Minimum & Maximum Bonus (Limits)

The
quantum of bonus depends on allocable surplus, which is explained in the
following paragraph. An employer is bound to pay his employees every year a
minimum Bonus of @ 8.33% of the yearly salary or wage or Rs.100/- whichever is
higher, whether he has allocable surplus or not. if in any year the allocable
surplus exceeds the amount of minimum Bonus payable to the employees, the
maximum Bonus payable by the employer to his employee in that particular year
is @ 20% of the yearly salary or wages. Hence, 
Bonus  is  payable 
to  the  employee 
between 8.33% & 20% as per availability of allocable surplus. An
employer is not required to pay bonus in excess of 20% even if bonus is linked
with production or productivity.

Available
surplus & allocable surplus

The
Bonus payable under the Act is linked with profits of the company. The employer
has to calculate “Gross Profit” of his establishment in the manner specified in
section 4. Then from Gross Profit so calculated, he has to deduct the sums
referred to in section 6 as prior charges. The balance amount is the “available
surplus”. A percentage of available surplus calculated in accordance with the
provisions of sub-section (4) of section 2 is described as “allocable surplus”.

Where
allocable surplus exceeds the amount of minimum Bonus  payable 
to  the  employee, 
the  employer  must pay to every employee in respect of that
year Bonus in proportion to the salary or wages earned by the employee during
the year subject to a maximum of 20% of such salary or wage.

What is set on & Set Off Of Allocable Surplus

Set on :-

Where
for any year the allocable surplus exceeds the amount of maximum Bonus payable
to the employees, then the excess shall (subject to limit of 20% Bonus of total
salary/wages) be carried forward for being set on in the succeeding year and so
on to be utilised for the purpose of payment of Bonus.

Set off:-

Where
for any year there is no surplus or the surplus in respect of that year falls
short of the amount of minimum Bonus payable i.e. 8.33% to employees and there
is no amount or sufficient amount carried forward and Set On which can be
utilised for the purpose of minimum Bonus, then 
such  minimum  amount 
or  the  deficiency 
as  the case may be shall be
carried forward for being Set off in succeeding year and so on.

Deductions from bonus:-

Where
in any year the employer has paid any amount to an employee as customary/pooja
bonus, then he can deduct such amount from Bonus payable to the employee for
that year.

If
any employee is found guilty of misconduct causing financial loss to the
employer, the employer can deduct the amount of loss from the amount of Bonus
payable to the employee for the year in which he was found guilty of misconduct.

Time limit for payment of bonus:-

Bonus
must be paid within a period of 8 months from the close of accounting year as
per income-tax act i.e. April to March.

If
any dispute about the payment of Bonus is pending before any authority, then
Bonus must be paid within one month from the date of award by any such
authority.

Remedy for recovery of bonus:-

If
any employer fails to pay Bonus to the employee, he can make an application for
recovery of Bonus to the competent Authority. The authority may issue a
certificate to the collector to recover the same as arrears of land revenue
i.e. by way of attachment of Property and assets. However,  the time limit for application to the
authority is one year from the date on which Bonus amount became due.

Productivity bonus :-

Bonus
paid on production or productivity or under a formula different from that under
the act can be allowed, but subject to the Provisions of the act in respect of
the payment of minimum or maximum Bonus. However, attendance bonus or any other
allowances are outside the purview of payment of Bonus act.

If an entity has a number of departments, under takings or
branches, should they be treated as separate establishments or as one composite
establishment?

If
an establishment consists of different departments or undertakings or has
branches, whether situated in the same place or in different places, unless a
separate balance-sheet and profit and loss account are prepared and   maintained  
by   such or  branches, 
they  should  be same 
establishment  for  the departments/undertakings treated  as 
parts  of  the purpose 
of  computation formula  different 
from  that  under 
the  act,  i.e. 
bonus linked with production or productivity; but subject to the
provisions of the act in respect of payment of minimum of  bonus, 
and  once  they 
are treated  as  part 
of  the and maximum bonus. Same
establishment, they should continue to be treated as such.

Is bonus payable to contractors employees

Section
32 provides that the act shall not apply to certain classes of employees.
Clause (vi) of the said section refers to “employees employed through
contractors on building operation”. This clause has been deleted by the Payment
of Bonus amendment ordinance, 2007 with retrospective effect from 1st April 2006.
The said class of employees is therefore, entitled to get april 2006. bonus
with effect from 1st April 2006.

Excluded
categories :-


Following
establishments / entities are excluded from application of the Bonus Act:


L.I.C. of India

Reserve Bank of India

Unit Trust of India

Universities & other Educational
Institutions

Any other establishments permitted by
Government for a specified period and subject to specified conditions.


Newly
set-up establishment :-

A newly set-up establishment is
exempted from paying Bonus to its employees in the first 5 (Five) years, if it
does not make any profit. If however, employer derives profit in any of the
first five years, it loses the exemption under the Act and he has to pay Bonus
for that year. The provisions of Set-On & Set-Off are not applicable in
such cases.


Employee
disqualified from receiving Bonus :-

Employee is disqualified from receiving
Bonus if he is dismissed from the service for       (A) Fraud (B) Riotous or Violent
behavior while on the premises of the establishment     (C) Theft, misappropriation or sabotage of
any property of Establishment.


Agreement
or Settlement of Bonus
:-

Employees can enter into an agreement
or a settlement with their employer for granting them bonus under a formula
different from that under the Act, i.e. bonus linked with production or
productivity; but subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of payment of
minimum and maximum bonus.


Attendance
Bonus
:-

As attendance bonus which was being
paid by the establishment was outside the purview of the Payment of Bonus Act,
1965. Workmen / employees of the establishment can claim the bonus payable
under the act over and above the attendance bonus


Is
a Seasonal Worker entitled to get Bonus?

Section 8, relates to the eligibility
for Bonus. The only requirement of that section is that the employee should
have worked in an establishment for not less than thirty working days in an
accounting year. Therefore, if a seasonal worker has worked in an establishment
for more than thirty working days, he shall be entitled to get bonus.


Manner of payment of
Bonus in State of Maharashtra.

If
Bonus amount is more than Rs.3,000/- then it has to be paid by Account Payee
Cheque or by Bank transfer.


Records
to be Maintained:-

A register in “Form No. A” showing
Computation of Allocable Surplus.

A register in “Form No. B” showing
Set-On & Set-Off of the allocable surplus.

A register in “Form
No. C” showing details of the Bonus due to each of the    employee & deductions under Section 17
& 18 and the amount actually disbursed.


Submission of annual Return:-

 

Purpose

When to Submit

Form/ Return

By Whom

To Whom

Relevant Section / Rule

1

2

3

4

5

6

Submission of
Annual Return

Within 30 days
after the expiry of time limit specified under the act

Form – D

Every employer

Labour Officer of
the concerned area

Section 26 read
with rules 5.


Offences
/ Punishments:-

If any persons contravenes the
provision of the Act or any rule made there under or fails to comply with any
directions given to him he would be punished with imprisonment up to six (6)
months or with fine up to Rs.1,000/- or both.

 THE PAYMENT OF BONUS (AMENDMENT)
ACT, 2015 w.e.f  1st
APRIL, 2014

(Gazette Notification Dated 1st Jan., 2016)

Theamendment
in The Payment of Bonus Act received the assent of the President on the 31st
December, 2015, and isdeemed to have come into force on 1st April 2014.

Key provisions of Amendment Act
– Eligibility of employees:

The Act
provides for enhancing Bonus calculation ceiling from the existing Rs 3,500 to
Rs7,000 per month or the Minimum wages for the Scheduled Employment whichever
is higher .

It also
enhances the eligibility limit for payment of bonus from Rs 10,000 per month to
Rs 21,000 per month.

Calculation of bonus: In regard to employees drawing
salary more than Rs. 3,500/-p.m. as per Section 12 of the Act, the bonus was
computed on a maximum salary of Rs. 3,500/=p.m.
only. Now the Amendment Act  has raised
this calculation ceiling of bonus to Rs.
7,000 per month
from present from 
Rs  3,500/-  per 
month  ceiling.  Accordingly, 
the  Maximum  Bonus 
payable  to  an employee 
under  the  Payment 
of  Bonus  Act  (20% 
of  Rs.  3,500X12) 
worked  out  to  Rs.8,400/=pa. Because of the salary
ceiling being raise to Rs 7,000/= p.m. the Bonus of 20%would now become Rs. 16,800/= for the year or more if
minimum wages are more than Rs.7000/- pm.

The Act has been amended
retrospectively from 1st April 2014.
In respect of the Financial Year, April 1, 2014
to 31st March 2015 Bonus was due to be paid with the close of 8 months of the
Accounting Year i.e. November 30, 2015.


Retrospective applicability
stayed

Courts in at least 8 States have already stayed the retrospective
applicability of the Amendment act referred to above.


Conclusion

The aim of this article is to make readers aware of The Payment of Bonus
Act, a welfare legislation. The same should be followed in letter and
spirit.

Section A: Adverse Conclusion on Interim Ind AS Results

Surana industries Ltd. (results for quarter ended 30th
June 2016 as filed with the Bombay Stock Exchange)

From Auditors’ Review report

Basis
of adverse conclusion

3.  i.  We
refer to note no.6 relating to investment in its subsidiary Surana Power
limited  (SPL).  The carrying value of the investment in
SPL  as at 30th June,  2016 was Rs.41,850 lakh. In addition, the
Company has also issued a financial guarantee of Rs.10,000 lakh to the lenders
against the loans taken by SPL.  
The   net worth of this subsidiary
had fully eroded and its current liabilities exceed its current assets. The
independent auditor of the subsidiary had given an adverse audit opinion on its
financial statements for the year ended 31st march, 2016 stating that the going
concern assumption is not appropriate and the carrying value of the assets of
the subsidiary may also be impaired.

No
provision has been considered by the management for the diminution in the value
of the investments in this subsidiary and for the likelihood of the devolvement
of the guarantee on the Company.

ii.
Attention is invited to note no 5 regarding certain investments in subsidiaries
(having a carrying value aggregating to Rs.11,463.62 lakh) that were approved
for divestment due to continuing adverse market scenario which was impacting
the survival of the parent company. These investments are carried at cost and
have not been assessed for any impairment to the carrying values.

iii.
Inventory as at 30th  June,  2016 aggregated to Rs.16,428.37 1akh, for
which the quantity, quality and 
realisable  value  were 
not  assessed  and determined by the management. in the
absence of  evidence  for 
physical  existence  of 
inventory as  at 30th   June, 
2016  and  net realisable value of inventory, we are
unable to comment on the adjustments that may be required to the carrying
values of the inventory.

iv.
The Company has not recognised recompense interest expense amounting to rs,
1,396 lakh for the quarter ended 30th June, 
2016. Further,  during the year
ended 31st  March, 2016, the Company had
not recognised recompense interest expense amounting to Rs.5,148.36 lakh for
the year then ended and had reversed recompense interest expense amounting to
Rs.7,630.28 lakh recognised in earlier years.

v.
We refer to note no 4 relating to the non­ compliance with the repayment of the
loans as per the debt covenants agreed in the CDR package and paragraph (iv)
above relating to the non­ recognition of recompense interest for the quarter
ended 30th June, 2016 and the period then ended.

The
financial results for the quarter ended 30th June,  2016 have been prepared on a going
concern  basis  in 
spite  of  negative 
net  worth after considering the
impact of the modifications mentioned in paragraphs (i) and (iv) above.

The
ability of the Company to continue as a going concern is significantly
dependent on the bringing in of new investor to revive the operations of the Company
and successful outcome of the ongoing negotiations with the lenders and
therefore, we are unable to comment if the going concern assumption is
appropriate and any effect it may have on the financial results for the quarter
ended 30th June, 2016.

vi.
We refer to note 7 of the results wherein it is stated that the Company has
adopted Indian accounting Standards (Ind AS) notified under the Companies (Indian
accounting Standards) rules, 2015 as amended by the Companies (Indian
accounting Standards) (amendment) rules, 2016 and is implementing the same in a
phased manner and that in the opinion of the Company, the presentation of the
results under Ind AS will not have any material impact on the recorded amounts
of income and expenditure for the quarters ended june  30, 2016 and 30th june,  2015. In the absence of adequate information
and completion of transition to Ind AS, we are unable to determine if these
results comply with the recognition and measurement principles of Ind AS 34
(“interim financial  reporting”)

Paragraph
3(i) to 3(v) were matters of adverse opinion in the Audit Report issued by us
for the year ended 31st  march, 2016
under the previous GAAP (in accordance with the accounting Standards specified
in the Annexure to the Companies (Accounting Standards Rules, 2006).

Adverse Conclusion

4.  Based 
on  our  review 
conducted  as  stated 
above, due to the significance and the possible effects of the matters
described in paragraph 3 above, the accompanying  Statement 
has  not  been 
prepared in accordance with Ind AS and other accounting principles
generally accepted in India and has not disclosed the information required to
be disclosed in terms of regulation 33 of the SEBI (listing obligations and
disclosure requirements) regulations, 2015, as modified by Circular No.
CIR/CFD/FAC/62/2016 dated 5th July, 2016, including the manner in which it is
to be disclosed and the Statement may contain material misstatements.

From Notes below Unaudited Financial Results

The
auditors have modified their limited review report on the above results. The
management responses are as under:

i. Observation

As
above

Our Submission:

Based
on the preliminary negotiations with prospective buyers, the company currently
is of the opinion that actual realisable value of the current assets of the
subsidiary company will be sufficient to discharge its current liabilities. The
company is also in discussions with some financial institutions who have
evinced interest in restarting the project by pumping in additional equity and
debt required for completing the project. These 
discussions are being held at tripartite level between the prospective
financial institution, leader  of the
Consortium and the Company. Consequently, the company does not envisage any
prospective devolvement of liability on account of revocation of guarantee.
Accordingly, the company has not made any provision in this regard.

In
view of the ongoing negotiations with the prospective buyers and the lenders
and also considering the expected realisable value of the assets the Company
will be able to realise the carrying value of the said investment.

The
audit  report for the year ended
31st  march, 2016 was also modified in
respect of the above matter under the previous GAAP  (in accordance with the accounting Standards
specified in the Annexure to the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006).

ii. Observation

As
above

Our Submission:

In
view of the ongoing negotiations with the prospective buyers and the lenders
and also considering the expected realizable value of the assets the Company
will be able to realize the carrying value of the said investments in SGPL and
SMML.

The
Audit  Report for the year ended
31st  march, 2016 was also modified in
respect of the above matter under the previous GAAP  (in accordance with the accounting Standards
specified in the Annexure to the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006).

iii.  Observation

As
above

Our Submission

During
the previous year the physical verification of stock has been carried out by
the stock auditors appointed by the lenders based on which the stocks have been
provided to the extent of deterioration identified on a scientific basis.

With
regard to the balance stock, the same shall be assessed at the time of
resumption of production and appropriate adjustments as required shall be done.
We are of the opinion that any such adjustment so arising will not be material.

The
audit  report for the year ended
31st   march, 2016 was also modified in
respect of the above matter under the previous GAAP  (in accordance with the accounting Standards
specified in the Annexure to the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006).

iv. Observation:

As
above

Our Submission

The  Company has not provided for recompense
interest of Rs. 14,174.64 lakh (including Rs. 1,396 lakh for the quarter ended
30th June 30, 2016) because as per master circular of RBI on CDR and also as
per the MRA occurs only when the company has generated cash surplus after
paying out all its obligations.

Further,   as 
per  the  master 
restructuring  agreement under
article viii para 8.1

“Right
to Recompense

If
in the opinion of the lenders, the profitability and the cash flows of the
Borrower so warrant, the Lenders shall be entitled to receive recompense for
the reliefs and sacrifices extended by them within the CDR parameters with the
approval of the CDR-Empowered Group.”

Accordingly,
as the lenders have not formed any opinion about the profitability and cash
flows of the company to service the recompense interest as on date, the need to
recognize the recompense interest does not arise.

Also
considering the factors stated in note 
(2) above, the Company is of the opinion that the going concern
assumption is appropriate.

The
Audit Report for the year ended 31st 
march, 2016 was also modified in respect of the above matter under the
previous GAAP”  (in accordance with
the Accounting Standards Specified in the Annexure to the Companies (Accounting
Standards) Rules, 2006)

v. Observation:

As
above

Our Submission:

Company
could not comply with debt repayment schedule as embedded in the CDR package
for want of non release of sufficient working capital funding by the lenders as
per the package. Consequently, the company was not in a position to restart its
operations in Raichur in time and could not adhere to the debt repayment
schedule.

As
mentioned in response to observation (v), there is no non-compliance of debt
covenants as per the CDR package and the need to recognize recompense interest
does not arise.

The
negotiations with the concerned parties, including the consortium of lenders,
are on for restarting the operations of the Raichur Plant and further the
operational capabilities of the Gummidipoondi Plant have been improving over
the past years. Accordingly, the company is of the opinion that the assumption
of going concern is appropriate.

The
Audit Report for the year ended 31st March, 2016 was also modified in respect
of the above matter under the previous GAAP 
(in Accordance with the Accounting Standards specified in the Annexure
to the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules, 2006).

vi. Observation:

As
above

Our Submission:

Covered
by note 7 above and the responses to the individual items as mentioned above.

vii. Observation:

As
above

Our Submission

Covered
by responses to the individual items as mentioned above.

LIFTING THE CORPORATE VEIL

Introduction

A company is a separate legal entity with a perpetual succession and an identity distinct from its members. Members may come and go but a company continues to exist independent of its members. This is a principle of law which has been laid down since the time the very first statute dealing with companies came into existence. However, there are times when the Courts decide to look behind the company, i.e., lift or pierce the corporate veil and ascertain who are the real beneficiaries behind the entity. Such scenarios are very few and far between but they do exist and are resorted to by the Courts in the rarest or rare cases.

Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Estate Officer UT Chandigarh vs. M/s. Esys Information Technologies P Ltd, CA No 3765/2016 (“Esys’s case”) had an occasion to deal with the circumstances when the corporate veil may be lifted.

Corporate Identity

Section 9 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that from the date of incorporation of a company, all its members shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is formed and the company shall be capable of owning property and shall have a perpetual succession. Thus, this section lays down the corporate identity of a company which is distinct and separate from its members.

Factual Matrix of Esys’s Case

Esys,a subsidiary of a Singapore company, was allotted a site at an Information Technology Park at Chandigarh under the Allotment of Small Campus Site in Chandigarh Information Services Park Rules, 2002. Esys was supposed to carry out construction of a campus site but before doing so, 98% of its shareholding was transferred by its Singapore-based holding company to a Dubai-based group company. The Dubai-based group company, in turn, transferred its controlling stake to another company, known as Teledata Informatics Ltd. In neither case was permission obtained for the transfer of shares. The Estate Officer concluded that since the shareholding changed hands after land allotment and that too without the prior permission of the Estate Officer, there was a violation of the terms of the allotment letter. The particular clause of the allotment letter being referred to by the Officer stated that the transfer of the site would not be allowed for 10 years from the date of allotment without the prior permission. It may be allowed in the event of merger or split of the allottee and that too after obtaining prior permission. Further, all cases of transfer were subject to payment of prescribed transfer charges.

As a result of the transfers, not only did the Dubai-based company became the owner of the land but it was further transferred to Teledata. This fact of transfer to Teledata was suppressed on oath by the Director of Esys but was discovered by the Estate Officer from an affidavit filed by the Director before the High Court of Singapore in another matter. In that affidavit the Director had very clearly conceded that Teledata was the new owner of Esys. The Estate Officer concluded that the manner in which the transfer was made was not permissible as per the Rules and terms of the allotment letter. The holding company and its subsidiaries were two distinct legal entities and hence, the corporate veil should be lifted so as to unearth the mala fide, dishonest and fraudulent design of the allottee. Accordingly, the Officer contended that this amounted to an illegal transfer of the land and also ordered that the allotted site be resumed. The Appellate Authority upheld this Order of the Estate Officer.

High Court’s verdict

The Punjab and Haryana High Court overruled the verdict of the Appellate Authority. It refused to lift the corporate veil in the case under discussion. It stated that there was neither a transfer of the allotted site nor a merger of the allottee. The allottee was a juristic entity and continued to remain as such. It relied upon an old decision of Saloman vs. Saloman, 1897 AC 22(1) which held that a company is separate and distinct legal entity. It also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Bacha F. Guzdar vs. CIT, 27 ITR 1(SC) where the Court held that that a shareholderhas got no right in the property of the company. His only rights are the right to vote and right to dividend, if declared, but that does not, either individuallyor collectively, amount to more than a right to participate in the profits of the company. The company was a juristic person and was distinct from the shareholders. It was the company which owned the property and not the shareholders. It also discussed the judgment in the case of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. ITO, AIR 1964 SC 1486 which held that a shareholder does not own the property of the corporation or carries on the business with which the corporation is concerned. The High Court further held that the argument that the principle of lifting of the corporate veil should be applied, did not arise in the impugned case since the shareholders were distinct from the company and there was no change in the name of the allottee. The allotment continued in the name of the company. Change in shareholding could not be construed to be violative of the allotment letter as the company was a distinct and separate entity and composition of share holding did not change the nature of the company. It accordingly set aside the Officer’s site resumption order.

Based on this the Estate Officer appealed to the Supreme Court where a pointed question was raised by the Supreme Court to the director as to whether the shares of Esys have been transferred to Teledata? The director stated on oath that they have not been which was in fact, contrary to the truth.

When can the Veil be Lifted?

The Supreme Court held that in Juggilal Kamlapat vs. CIT 73 ITR 702 (SC), it has been laid down that it is true that from juristic point of view a company is a legal personality entirely distinct from its members and it is capable of enjoying rights and being subjected to rights and duties which are not the same as those enjoyed or borne by its members but in certain exceptional cases the Court is entitled to lift the veil of corporate entity and to pay regard to the economic realities behind the legal facade. For example, the Court has power to disregard the corporate entity if it is used for tax evasion or to circumvent tax obligation or to perpetrate fraud. It further discussed the decisions of Jai Narain Parasrampuria vs. Pushpa Devi Saraf, 2006 (7) SCC 756;State of U.P vs. Renusagar Power Co., AIR 1988 SC 1737 wherein the Supreme Court held that it was well settled that the corporate veil could in certain situations can be pierced or lifted. In the expanding horizon of modern jurisprudence, lifting of corporate veil was permissible. Its frontiers were unlimited. It must, however, depend primarily on the realities of the situation. The aim of legislation was to do justice to all the parties. The principle behind the doctrine was a changing concept and it was expanding its horizon Whenever a corporate entity was abused for an unjust and inequitable purpose, the court would not hesitate to lift the veil and look into the realities so as to identify the persons who are guilty and liable therefor. The Apex Court observed that the corporate veil even though not lifted was becoming more and more transparent in modern company jurisprudence. It held that the case of Saloman vs. Saloman, 1897 AC 22(1) was still popular but the veil has been pierced in many cases. The lifting of the veil has been held to be permissible in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. AIR 1986 SC 1370 which held that it may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates lifting the veil, or fraud or improper conduct is intended to be prevented or a taxing statute or a beneficent statute is sought to be evaded or where associated companies are inextricably connected as to be in reality, part of one concern.

Though not considered in this decision but the Supreme Court in Vodafone International Holdings BV vs. UOI, 341 ITR 1 (SC) had also dealt with this issue by stating that lifting of the corporate veil is readily applied in the cases coming within the Company Law, Law of Contract, and Law of Taxation. Once the transaction is shown to be fraudulent, sham, circuitous or a device designed to defeat the interests of the shareholders, investors, parties to the contract and also for tax evasion, the Court can always lift the corporate veil and examine the substance of the transaction. The Court is entitled to lift the veil of the corporate entity and pay regard to the economic realities behind the legal facade meaning that the court has the power to disregard the corporate entity if it is used for tax evasion. This principle is also applied in cases of a holding company – subsidiary relationship- where in spite of being separate legal personalities, if the facts reveal that they have indulged in dubious methods for tax evasion. This decision examined the concept of whether a transaction should be “looked at” or “looked through”. The amendments made by the Finance Act, 2012 to section 9 and section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which introduced the concept of taxation of Indirect Transfers, are nothing but an extension of the doctrine of lifting of the corporate veil.

Apex Court’s Decision

After considering various factors, the Supreme Court overruled the decision of the High Court in Esys’s case. It also held that prima facie from the affidavit of the director filed in Singapore, there was a transfer in favour of Teledata. Inspite of a direction to disclose the facts, there was a concealment of material facts. Esys was guilty of concealing the truth and thus, it held that the provisions of the allotment letter have been clearly violated and the Estate Officer was within his rights to resume possession of the land.

Fallout of this Decision

This decision raises several unanswered questions. Was this view taken by the Supreme Court merely because the director lied on on oath or would the doctrine of lifting the veil be applied in all cases where shares of a company are transferred? It appears that the Court was driven towards this view because of the concealment by the director. However, if there was no concealment, would the decision of the Supreme Court been different? It is relevant to note that the allotment letter contained no restriction on the transfer of shares of the allottee! All that it prohibited was a transfer of the site.

This question is relevant in several other situations. In case of transfer of shares of a company owning a valuable piece of land at Mumbai would stamp duty be levied @ 0.25% as on a transfer of shares or 5% as on conveyance of property? The Mumbai ITAT in the case of Irfan Abdul Kader Fazlani, ITA No. 8831/Mum/11 has held that section 50C cannot be applied to the sale of shares of a property owning company. The veil cannot be pierced in such a case to contend that what is being sold is actually land and building.

Similar questions also arise in flats where collector’s charges are to be paid. These charges are currently being avoided because what is being sold are shares of the company and not the property per se.

Further, if shares of such a company are long-term capital assets but the land held by the company is short-term capital asset, then would the gain on sale of shares be treated as short-term capital gain? A similar question was placed before the Karnataka High Court in Bhoruka Engineering Industries Ltd vs. DCIT, 356 ITR 25 (Kar). In that case, shares of a listed company were sold through the exchange and capital gains exemption was claimed u/s. 10(38). The only asset of the company was land. The AO contended that the veil should be lifted since what had been sold was virtually land and hence, the exemption should be denied.

The High Court denied this plea of the Department and held that the transaction was real, valuable consideration was paid, all legal formalities were complied with and what was transferred was the shares and not the immovable property. The finding of the assessing authority that it was a transfer of immovable property was contrary to the law and contrary to the material on record. It held that they committed a serious error in proceeding on the assumption that the effect of transfer of share was transfer of immovable property and therefore, if the veil of the company was lifted what appeared to them was transfer of immovable property. According to the High Court, such a finding was impermissible in law.

Conclusion

One can only hope that the lifting of the veil is resorted to in select cases, such as, those where there are instances of fraud or deceit. A wrong use of this decision could open up a Pandora’s box and it could be like Vodafone’s case being revisited all over again – one only hopes this purdah is not lifted easily!! _

24. Income – Accrual – Mercantile system of accounting- Section 145(1) – A. Ys. 2007-08 and 2009-10 – Nonconvertible unsecured debentures issued by group company – Group company in financial difficulties – Resolution passed by board of directors of assessee to waive interest on debentures for six years – The Tribunal holding that even though assessee following mercantile system of accounting interest did not accrue – Neither perverse nor arbitrary – Notional interest cannot be brought to tax

CIT vs. Neon Solutions Pvt. Ltd; 387 ITR
667 (Bom):

The assessee
subscribed 2 % non-convertible unsecured debentures issued by one of its group
companies in 2003. As the company which issued the debentures was in financial
difficulties, waiver of interest on the debentures till March 31, 2010 was
approved at a meeting of the debenture holders in 2004. A resolution was passed
by the board of directors of the assessee to this effect.

The Assessing
Officer brought to tax the notional interest at the rate of 2 %  on the debentures for the A. Ys. 2007-08 and
2009-10 on the ground that the waiver of interest was unbelievable. The
Tribunal deleted the addition and held that even in the mercantile system of
accounting, income could be regarded as accrued only if there was certainty of
receiving it and not when it was waived.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The
order of the Tribunal was based on the facts and its findings were not found to
be perverse or arbitrary. It found that the various resolutions passed by the
company and the communications exchanged between the parties established the
fact that the interest on the debentures was waived for six years and that
there was no reason to disbelieve the resolution waiving the interest.

ii)  Amalgamation of the
issuing company with the also establishes the fact that it was in financial
difficulties. Moreover, for the A. Ys. prior to 2007-08 no additions were made
by the Department on account of notional interest.

iii)  No question of law
arose.”

23. Business expenditure – Gratuity – Sections 36(1)(v), 40A(9) – A. Ys. 2007-08 to 2009-10 – Application by assessee for approval of scheme neither approved nor rejected by Competent Authority – Finding that assessee complied with conditions stipulated for approval – Assessee entitled to allowance

CIT vs. Jaipur Thar Gramin Bank; 388 ITR
228 (Raj):

The assessee is a co-operative society doing
banking business. For the A. Ys. 2007-08 to 2009-10, it claimed deduction u/s.
36(1)(v), of the sum paid on account of employer’s contribution to the gratuity
scheme created by it exclusively for the benefit of its employees under an
irrevocable trust. It claimed that it had filed an application to the competent
authority for approving the gratuity scheme. The  Assessing Officer disallowed the expenditure
on the ground that formal order had been passed by the competent authority. The
Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the claim for deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Rajasthan High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  The assessee could not be
made to suffer for the inaction of the authorities and the Assessing Officer
ought not to have disallowed the claims of contribution to gratuity scheme
merely because the Commissioner had not granted approval to the gratuity
scheme.

ii)  The assessee was sponsored
by the UCO bank, a Government of India undertaking and held duly complied with
the conditions laid down for approval u/s. 36(1)(a) of the Act.

iii)  Both the appellate
authorities had found the expenses allowable based on material and evidence on
record. The assessee had fulfilled the condition laid down for approval having
created a trust with the Life Insurance Corporation of India and had deposited
the amount.

iv) The Tribunal was justified
in holding that the claims were proper and allowable. No question of law
arose.”

6. Reassessment – Full and true disclosure – Giving value of land in a certificate of registered architect and engineer supplied in response to a query would not amount full and true disclosure of the actual asset of plot – Reopening was valid

M/s. Girilal and Co. vs. ITO and Ors.(2016) 387 ITR 122
(SC)

The appellant, a partnership firm, was engaged in the
business of construction of building and development of real estate. In the
year 2000, the appellant/firm was engaged in developing two housing projects on
a plot bearing CTS No. 329 B(Part) of village Kondiwita in Andheri (East)
Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as “the said plot”). The said plot was acquired
by the appellant originally as a capital asset but portion thereof was
converted at different point of time into stock-in-trade. The appellant on
October 29, 2001 filed its return of income for the assessment year 2001-02. On
May 1, 2003, an assessment order was passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act determining
the total income at Rs. 12,36,393 after allowing deduction u/s. 80-1B (10) of
the Act. After scrutiny of the said return of income, a notice dated March 15,
2007, was served on the appellant u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act” ) inter alia alleging that the
appellant’s income chargeable to tax for the assessment year 2001-02 has
escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147 of the Act. Vide
communication dated April 11, 2007, the appellant sought the reason recorded
for reopening the assessment which were made available to the appellant on
April 12, 2007. It was found that the appellant had not correctly disclosed the
actual *assets of the said plot and hence, the appellant was not entitled for
deduction u/s. 80(1B)(10) of the Act. It was noted that the information
regarding the actual size of the plot used for the construction was only
available in the valuation report and hence, the case was covered under
Explanation 2(c)(iv) of section 147 of the Act. The appellant objected to the
assumption of jurisdiction u/s. 148 for the reason that the appellant had
disclosed all the facts fully and truly and respondent No. 1 was fully aware of
the floor space index. Respondent No.2 rejected the objections. Being
aggrieved, the appellant preferred a writ petition before the High Court
challenging the notice dated March 15, 2007 issued u/s. 147 of the Act. The
High Court vide impugned judgment dated December 12, 2007 dismissed the
writ petition. The High Court was of the opinion that as there was no true
disclosure of the exact size of the plot when the new construction commenced it
prima facie could not be said that there were no reasons to believe. The
information was in the annexures and consequently Explanation 2(c)(iv) of
section 147 of the was applicable. 
Accordingly, to the High Court, the question was whether the petitioners
considering the size of the plot and part of it having already been developed
could claim the benefit u/s. 80-1B (10) of the Income-tax Act. The issue as to
whether the size of the plot of land to be considered at the time the new
construction is being put up or whether the building already constructed
including various deduction like R. G. Area, set back had to be considered in
computing the size of the plot was an issue which it did not wish to answer at
the stage in the exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction.

Before the Supreme Court, the Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant/firm submitted that there was no reason to
reopen the assessment when in the return filed by the appellant full disclosure
of all the relevant facts was made. On this basis, it was further argued that
it was merely a case of change of opinion which was not a valid ground for
reopening of the assessment. He drew the attention of the Supreme Court to the
communication dated February 10, 2003 addressed by the appellant to the
Assessing Officer. In para 11 thereof, there was a mention about the land in
question. The Supreme Court rejected the aforesaid submissions of the learned
senior counsel for the appellant as according to the Supreme Court, in para 11,
only the value of the land was stated and in support, a certificate from the
registered architect and engineer was filed. The Supreme Court held that it was
clear from the above that this information was supplied as there was some query
about the value of the land. Obviously, while going to this document the
Assessing Officer would examine the value of the land. However, the reason for
issuing notice u/s. 148 of the Income-tax Act was that the appellant had not
correctly disclosed the actual *assets of the plot and hence, it was not
entitled for deduction u/s. 80-IB (10) of the Act. The income-tax authority
itself had mentioned in the notice u/s.148 of the Act that such information was
available only in the valuation report. Giving the information in this manner
was of no help to the appellant as the Assessing Officer was not expected to go
through the said information available in the valuation report for the purpose
of ascertaining the actual *construction of the plot.

On the facts of this case, therefore, the Supreme Court found
that the Revenue was right in reopening the assessment and the High Court had
rightly dismissed the writ petition of the appellant challenging the validity
of the notice u/s. 148 of the Act.

*
Note: This should be the size of the plot.
_

22. Business expenditure – A. Y. 1999-00 – Same business or different business – tests – Expenditure incurred in setting up new line of same business is deductible

CIT vs. Max India Ltd. (No.1); 388 ITR 74
(P&H):

For the A. Y. 1999-00, the Assessing Officer
made disallowance of Rs. 6,70,78,483/- on account of expenses for setting up
new business. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal allowed the
deduction.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Punjab and
Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i)  While determining whether
two or more lines of businesses of the assessee are the same “business” or
“different businesses” regard must be had to the common management of the main
business and other lines of businesses, unity of trading organization, common
employees, common administration, a common fund and a common place of business.
For evaluating the “same business”, the test of unity of control and the nature
of business is to be applied.

ii)  The Commissioner (Appeals)
after appreciating the evidence produced on record had observed that various
businesses carried on by the assessee including health care constituted the
same business of the assessee. The Appellate Tribunal was right in law in
allowing the expenses in setting up new business of Rs. 6,70,78,483 treating it
as revenue in nature.”

RATE OF TAX APPLICABLE TO CAPITAL GAINS ON LOSS OF EXEMPTION BY A CHARITABLE OR RELIGIOUS TRUST

Issue for Consideration

A charitable or religious trust is entitled to exemption
under sections 11 and 12 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, provided that it is
registered u/s. 12AA and fulfils other requirements of sections 11 to 13. Under
sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d), if a benefit is provided to a specified person
or the specified investment pattern is not adhered to, the benefit of the
exemption is lost and the income of the trust so losing the exemption is
taxable at the maximum marginal rate by virtue of the provisions of section
164(2).

Normally, for all assessees, long term capital gains is
chargeable to tax under the provisions of section 112 at the rate of 20%, while
certain types of short term capital gains arising on sale of equity shares on a
recognised stock exchange is chargeable to tax at the concessional rate of 15%
under the provisions of section 111A.

The issue has arisen before the tribunal as to what should be
the rate of taxation in respect of income in the nature of a long term capital
gains, in the case of a charitable or religious trust, losing exemption on
account of violation of section13. While the Mumbai bench of the tribunal has
taken the view that such gain is taxable at the rate of 20% u/s. 112, the
Chennai bench of the tribunal has taken a contrary view, holding that such gain
is taxable at the maximum marginal rate as per section 164(2) of the Act.

Jamsetji Tata Trust’s case

The issue first came up for consideration before the Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal in the case of Jamsetji Tata Trust vs. Jt.DIT(E), 148
ITD 388 (Mum).

In this case, the assessee trust sold certain shares of Tata
Consultancy Services Ltd, and acquired preference shares of Tata Sons Ltd. It
earned long-term capital gains on sale of the shares of TCS, which was exempt
u/s. 10(38), dividends, which were exempt u/s. 10(34), and other interest and short
term capital gains. It claimed exemption u/s. 11 in respect of the interest and
short term capital gains, besides the exemptions under sections 10(34) and
10(38) in respect of the dividends and the long term capital gains.

The assessing officer denied the benefit of the exemption
u/s. 11, by invoking the provisions of section 13(1)(d), on the ground, that by
holding equity shares of TCS and Tata Sons, the assessee had violated the
investment pattern specified in section 11(5). The assessing officer taxed the
entire income of the trust, including the dividends, the long-term capital
gains, the short term capital gains as well as the interest income at the
maximum marginal rate, by applying the provisions of section 164(2).
The Commissioner(Appeals) upheld the order of the assessing officer.

Before the Tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued
that the denial of exemption u/s. 11 was not justified, that the assessee was
entitled to the exemptions u/s. 10, and that only the income from the investments
attracting the provisions of section 13(1)(d) was taxable at the maximum
marginal rate. It was further argued that the rate of tax on the short term
capital gains arising from sale of shares should have been the rate prescribed
u/s. 111A, and not the maximum marginal rate.

On behalf of the revenue, it was argued that the denial of
exemption u/s. 11 was justified. As regards the rate of tax, it was argued that
since the provisions of section 164(2) were applicable, the maximum marginal
rate was to be applied to the entire taxable income of the assessee, and not
separate rates on income of separate nature.

The Tribunal, after considering the arguments of the assessee
and the revenue and after analysing the provisions of the Income-tax Act, held
that only the income arising from the prohibited investments was ineligible for
the benefit of the exemption u/s. 11, and attracted tax at the maximum marginal
rate, and not the entire income. The Tribunal further held that the income
which was exempt u/s. 10 (dividends and long term capital gains) could not be
brought to tax under sections 11 and 13, since those sections did not have
overriding effect over section 10. Once the conditions of section 10 were
satisfied, no other condition could be fastened for denying the claim u/s. 10.

Addressing the issue of whether the rate u/s. 111A of 15% or
the maximum marginal rate u/s. 164(2) was to be applied to the short term
capital gains, the Tribunal noted that section 164(2) did not prescribe the
rate of tax, but mandated the maximum marginal rate as prescribed under the
provisions of the Act. It observed that section 111A was a special provision
legislated for providing for rate of tax chargeable on short term capital gains
on sale of equity shares or units of an equity oriented fund, which was
subjected to securities transaction tax (STT) and as such  the maximum marginal rate for income from
specified short term gains should be the rate prescribed therein.

According to the Tribunal, when the short term capital gains
arising from the sale of shares subjected to STT was chargeable to tax at 15%,
then the maximum marginal rate, referred to in section 164(2), on such income
could not exceed the maximum rate of tax provided u/s. 111A of the Act. It
accordingly held that the short term capital gains on sale of shares already
subjected to STT was chargeable to tax at the maximum marginal rate, which
could not exceed the rate provided u/s. 111A of the Income-tax Act.

India Cements Educational Society’s case

The issue again came up before the Chennai bench of the
tribunal in the case of DDIT vs. India Cements Educational Society 157 ITD
1008
.

In this case, the assessee was a Society registered u/s.
12AA. It sold a plot of land and advanced the sale proceeds of the land to a
company in which the president of the Society and his wife were directors. It
claimed exemption in respect of capital gains arising on such sale on the
ground that the sale proceeds were reinvested in a specified capital asset.

The assessing officer denied exemption u/s. 11 to the Society
on the ground that the amount advanced to the company was not an approved
investment u/s. 11(5). He therefore taxed the income of the Society and the
maximum marginal rate under the provisions of section 164(2).

The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s appeal,
holding that the assessing officer had not proved what benefit accrued to the
specified person from the advancement of the amount to the company, and that
mere making of an advance to third parties could not be treated as utilisation
for investment in capital asset within the meaning of section 11(5). He
therefore held that while the benefit of exemption u/s. 11 was available, the
making of the advance out of the sale proceeds was not an investment in a new
capital asset. In the context of the issue under consideration, the
Commissioner(Appeals) held that the capital gains to be assessed as per section
48, was to be taxed at the rate prescribed u/s. 112 of the Act, and not at the
‘maximum marginal rate’ adopted by the assessing officer.

Before the tribunal, on behalf of the assessee, it was argued
that the entire income of the Society, other than the capital gains, continued
to be exempt u/s. 11 of the Act and that the capital gains alone was to be
taxed in terms of section 164(2) on account of the alleged violation of the
conditions of section 13 of the Act by applying the maximum marginal rate
Reliance was placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of DIT(E)
vs. Sheth Mafatlal Gagalbhai Foundation Trust 249 ITR 533, and the decision of
the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs. Fr Mullers Charitable
Institutions 363 ITR 230,
for the proposition that whenever there was a
violation u/s. 11(5), then only income from such investment or deposit which
was made in violation of section 11(5) was liable to be taxed, and violation
u/s. 13(1)(d) did not result in denial of exemption u/s.11 for the entire total
income of the assessee. Reliance was also placed on the CBDT circular number
387 dated 6.4.1984 152 ITR 1 (St.), where it was stated in paragraph 28.6 that
where a trust contravened the provisions of section 13(1)(c) or 13(1)(d), the
maximum marginal rate of income tax would apply only to that part of the income
which had forfeited exemption under those provisions.

In the context of the issue under consideration, It was
further argued by the assessee that, in view of the decision of the Karnataka
High Court in the case of Fr Muller’s Charitable Institutions (supra),
the rate of tax applicable for taxing the capital gains was the rate prescribed
u/s. 112. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Mumbai bench of the
tribunal in the case of Jamsetji Tata Trust (supra), which had held, in
the case of short term capital gains on sale of shares subject to STT, that the
maximum marginal rate on capital gains could not exceed the rate provided u/s.
111A. This decision had been followed by the Mumbai bench in the case of Mahindra
and Mahindra Employees Stock Option Trust vs. DCIT 155 ITD 1046,
where the
tribunal had held that capital gain was to be assessed by applying the
provisions of section 112, even if the income was assessed as per section 164.

The tribunal examined the provisions of sections 11 and 13.
It noted that in the case before it, there was a violation of section 13(1)(c),
as the Society had invested funds in a limited company, where the trustee was
the managing director and his wife was a director. Following the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Rattan Trust 227 ITR 356 and the
decision of the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Nagarathu Vaisiyargal
Sangam 246 ITR 164
, the tribunal held that the assessing officer was
justified in applying the provisions of section 13(1)(c), and denying exemption
u/s. 11 to the Society.

Analysing the provisions of section 164(2), the Tribunal,
observed that the income of a charitable or religious trust, which was not
exempt u/s. 11 or 12 was charged to tax as if such exempt income was the income
of an AOP. The proviso to that section provided that where the non-exempt
portion of the relevant income arose as a consequence of the contravention of
the provisions of section 13(1)(c) or (d), such income would be subjected to
tax at the maximum marginal rate.

Considering both the decisions of the Mumbai bench of the
Tribunal, cited before it, the Chennai bench of the tribunal, in the context of
the issue under consideration, found that the Mumbai bench had not considered
the meaning of the term ‘maximum marginal rate’ as defined in section 2(29C),
whereunder the term was defined to mean the rate of income tax (including
surcharge on income tax, if any) applicable in relation to the highest slab of
income in the case of an individual, association of persons or, as the case may
be, body of individuals as specified in the Finance Act of the relevant year.
The Chennai bench of the tribunal observed that on account of section 2(29C),
the two decisions of the Mumbai bench could not be said to have laid down the
correct proposition of law.

The Chennai bench of the Tribunal therefore held that the
benefit of section 112 to assess the gain from the transfer of the capital
asset could not be given to the Society, and that the long-term capital gains
was chargeable at the maximum marginal rate u/s. 164(2) r.w.s. 2(29C) of the Act.

Observations

A similar question has arisen in the case of private trusts,
where the individual share of beneficiaries is unknown, known as discretionary
trusts. Under the provisions of section 164(1), the income of such trusts is
also taxable at the maximum marginal rate. The issue has been decided by Delhi
and Gujarat High Courts, in the cases of CIT vs. SAE Head Office Monthly
Paid Employees Welfare Trust (2004) 271 ITR 159 (Del)
and Niti Trust vs.
CIT (1996) 221 ITR 435 (Guj)
, that the long term capital gains earned by a
discretionary trust is not taxable at the maximum marginal rate u/s. 164(1),
but at the concessional rate of tax u/s. 112. These decisions have not been
considered by the Chennai bench of the Tribunal. The language of both sections
164(1) and 164(2) being similar, the ratio of these decisions would apply
squarely to section 164(2) as well.

Section 2(29C) while defining the term ‘maximum marginal
rate’ provides for adoption of the highest slab rate prescribed for an
individual, etc.  This rate, in
certain cases, varies w.r.t . the nature of income and head of income and in
such cases the rate specially provided for becomes the maximum marginal rate
for taxing such income. In cases where the rate is specifically provided for in
a particular provision of the Act, it is that rate that should then be taken to
represent the maximum marginal rate. The decisions above referred to support
such a view.

Alternatively, it can be contested that both the provisions
are independent and operate accordingly. he language of neither section
111A/112 nor section 164(2) indicates that one has a specific overriding effect
over the other. None of these provisions could be said to be general. The
principle generalia specialibus non derogant providing that a specific
provision prevailing over a general provision also cannot be readily applied.
While section 111A/112 is a provision applicable to specific types of income of
all assessees, section 164(2) applies to all incomes of specific types of
assessees. In any case, if a view is to be taken then the better view is to
treat section 112 as a special provision.

It needs to be kept in mind that section 112 provides for a
rate of tax for long term capital gains, irrespective of the type of assessee
who earns the capital gains. This rate applies not only to individuals and
HUFs, but also to partnership firms, associations of persons, domestic
companies, as well as foreign companies. While an individual is liable to tax
at slab rates of tax, partnership firms and domestic companies are liable to a
flat rate of tax of 30%, and foreign companies are liable to tax at a flat rate
of 40%. Yet, for all these different types of entities liable to different
rates of tax, the rate of tax u/s. 111A or section 112 is the same, i.e. 15%
and 20% respectively. This indicates that the rate applicable to such types of
capital gains should not differ, irrespective of the rate of tax applicable to
the other income of the entity.

On the other hand, the provisions of section 164(2) are
intended to ensure that the trust losing exemption on account of the violation
of the provisions of sections 13(1)(c) or 13(1)(d) does not benefit by paying a
lower rate of tax by taxing such incomes at the maximum marginal rate. However,
till assessment year 2014-15, a trust would claim exemption under the
provisions of section 10 in respect of income such as dividends, long term
capital gains on sale of equity shares on which STT was paid, etc.,
irrespective of whether the remainder of its income was exempt u/s. 11 or not.
The question of payment of tax at the maximum marginal rate did not arise in
the case of such income which was exempt. That being the case, where certain
incomes, such as long term capital gains or short term capital gains is liable
to tax at lower rates of tax than normal income, the question of taxation at
the maximum marginal rate should equally not apply. The maximum marginal rate
should therefore apply to income which is otherwise not taxable at a
concessional rate of tax.

If one also examines the format of the income tax returns for
charitable and religious trusts in Form No 7, as well as the forms applicable
to discretionary trusts in Form No 5, there is a specific reference in schedule
SI – Income Chargeable to tax at special rates, to specific rates of 15% under
section 111A for specified types of short term capital gains and of 20% u/s.
112 for long term capital gains. This clearly indicates that such gains are not
intended to be taxed at the maximum marginal rates.

The view that is beneficial to the assessee should be adopted
in a case where two views are possible. Besides, whenever there is a difference
of opinion between two benches of the Tribunal, such a difference is required
to be referred to a Special Bench of the Tribunal for consideration. The
Chennai bench of the tribunal chose to not to follow the decisions of the Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal, though cited before it, on the ground that the Mumbai
bench had overlooked a certain provision of the Act, rather than referring the
issue to a Special Bench.

The better view therefore is that of the Mumbai
bench of the Tribunal, that even if a charitable or religious trust loses
exemption u/s. 11 by virtue of the provisions of sections 13(1)(c) or 13(1)(d),
the short term capital gains covered by section 111A or long term capital gains
covered by section 112, is chargeable to tax at the rates specified in those
sections, and not at the maximum marginal rate specified in section 164(2). _

ANALYSIS OF “EQUALISATION LEVY” AND SOME ISSUES

1.    Background

The Finance Act,
2016  (FA) in the  chapter VIII (comprising clauses 163 to 180)
has introduced a new tax i.e “equalisation levy” on consideration received or
receivable for any specified services.

The article deals with
some of the important provisions of the chapter and the issues arising there
from.

The Government of India
constituted a committee on taxation of E- commerce. The said committee made
proposal for equalisation levy on specified transactions. The Committee took
cognisance of the Report on Action 1 of Base Erosion & Profit Shifting
(BEPS) Project, wherein very significant work has been undertaken for identifying
the tax challenges arising from digital economy, the possible options to
address them and constraints likely to be faced. The Committee also noted that
this report has been accepted by G-20 countries, including India and OECD,
thereby providing a broad consensus view on these issues. The committee
submitted its report in February, 2016 and accepting the proposal contained in
the report, the Government has introduced this chapter.

The committee stated in
its report that “The significant difference, between an ‘Equalisation Levy’
that is proposed to be imposed on gross amount of payments, and the withholding
tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961 would be that under the latter, withholding
tax is only a mechanism of collecting tax, whereas an ‘Equalisation Levy’ on
gross payments would be a final tax.”

As far as
constitutionality of the provision is concerned, the committee expressed the
view that “Equalisation levy on gross amounts of transactions or payments made
for digital services appears to be in accordance with the entries at Serial
Number 92C70 and 9771 of the First List in the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India. The existing precedent in the form of the Service Tax
appears to remove any ambiguities and doubts in this regard. Thus this
committee is of the view that Equalisation Levy as a tax on gross amounts of
transactions, imposed by the
Union through a statute made by the
Parliament, would satisfy the test of constitutional validity.”

It is noteworthy to look
at the memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance bill so as to
understand the rationale for imposition of the levy.

“……..The Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has recommended, in Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project under Action Plan 1, to impose a
final withholding tax on certain payments for digital goods or services
provided by a foreign e-commerce provider or imposition of a equalisation
levy on consideration for certain digital transactions received by a
non-resident from a resident or from a non-resident having permanent
establishment in other contracting state.

Considering the
potential of new digital economy and the rapidly evolving nature of business
operations it is found essential to address the challenges in terms of taxation
of such digital transactions as mentioned above. In order to address these
challenges, it is proposed to insert a new Chapter titled “Equalisation
Levy” in the Finance Bill, to provide for an equalisation levy of 6 % of
the amount of consideration for specified services received or receivable by a
non-resident not having permanent establishment (‘PE’) in India, from a
resident in India who carries out business or profession, or from a
non-resident having permanent establishment in India
.”

The objective of the
Government is to impose tax on the consideration received by the non-resident.
The rationale is, on the one hand the consideration paid is tax deductible
while computing the income of the payer, the same escapes the source country
taxation, because payee does not have a permanent establishment in India or
otherwise. The equalisation levy is quantified with reference to the
consideration received by the non resident. The equalisation levy is charged at
the rate of 6% on the amount of consideration received or receivable by the non
resident.

2.    Scope
of the levy

2.1.  Section163
provides that the provisions of the chapter extends to the whole of India,
except Jammu and Kashmir and the same will come into force from the date of its
applicability notified by the Central Government i.e appointed date. The
Government has appointed 1st day of June,2016 as the date on which
Chapter VIII would come into force.

2.2.  The
provisions will apply to the consideration received or receivable for specified
services provided on or after the appointed date. By implication, any
consideration received after the appointed date for the services provided
before the appointed date shall be outside the provisions of this chapter. The
provisions of the chapter will not apply to the consideration received or
receivable for the services provided outside the territorial jurisdiction. This
obviously would require determining the place of provision of the services. For
determining the place of provision of services, one may have to look at the
provisions of the service tax act and the rules framed thereunder. Generally,
place of provision of service is the location of the service receiver.

3.    Important
Definitions

Section 164 defines
various terms used in the chapter. It also provides that any words and
expressions which is used in the chapter but not defined in the chapter will
have the same meanings as it has under the Income tax act (ITA) or the rules
there under if the same have been defined there under. Some of the important
terms defined in the chapter are:

i)   “equalisation
levy” means the tax leviable on consideration received or receivable for any
specified service under the provisions of this Chapter;  It may be noted that though the word levy is
used in the nomenclature, it is clearly a tax.

ii)  “specified
service” means online advertisement, any provision for digital advertising
space or any other facility or service for the purpose of online advertisement
and includes any other service as may be notified by the Central Government in
this behalf. The committee on E-commerce has recommended more services to be
subject to equalisation levy and the Government has accordingly retained the
power to notify more services as specified services.

iii)  “online”
means a facility or service or right or benefit or access that is obtained
through the internet or any other form of digital or telecommunication network;

iv) “permanent
establishment” includes a fixed place of business through which the business of
the enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. The definition is an inclusive
definition and is on the same line as is in section 92F(iiia) of the ITA.

4.    Charge
of levy

4.1.  Section
165 deals with the charge of the equalization levy. It provides that the
equalisation levy @6% be charged on the amount of consideration received or
receivable for providing specified services. The other conditions are:

a)  The
service provider has to be non-resident and

b)  It
should receive consideration for the services from

            i)   a 
person resident in India who is carrying on business or profession or

            ii)  a non resident having a permanent
establishment (PE) in India (hereinafter referred to as ‘specified persons’ or
‘assessee’).

4.2.  It
also provides for the cases when the equalisation levy will not be charged.
They are:

i)   when
the non resident who is providing the specified services has a permanent
establishment in India and such services are effectively connected to the said
permanent establishment i.e when the non-resident offers the income from the
specified services as a part of its PE profit.

ii)  when
the aggregate amount of consideration received or receivable for the specified
services from each of the specified persons in a previous year is INR one lakh
or less.

iii)  when
the specified persons makes the payment towards specified services not for the
purposes of carrying on its business or profession. In such a case even if the
payment exceeds INR one lakh, the same will not be subject to equalisation levy
since the same is not claimed as deduction for the purposes of computing the
taxable income of the specified persons.

It is pertinent to note
that as per the Article 7 of any double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA),
non residents are taxable in their country of residence as far as the taxation
of the business profits is concerned. They can be taxed in the source country
only if they carry on business in the source country through a permanent
establishment  and in such case also only
to the extent of the income attributable to the permanent establishment. Equalisation
levy is sought to be imposed on the business income of the non resident when
the non resident has no PE in India. Hence, to that extent the tax is not
consistent with the provisions of the DTAA. However, it may be noted that the
scope of the DTAA is confined only to the taxes covered under Article 2. Since
this is a new tax, none of the existing DTAA would have covered the same.
However, a question may arise that whether equalisation levy be regarded as an
identical or similar tax to the existing taxes covered by the Article 2? Most DTAA
provides to include similar taxes imposed subsequently to be included within
the scope of Article 2 subject to certain conditions. Hence, if the answer to
the question is yes, then imposition of equalisation levy on the business
profits of the non resident when it has no PE in India may not be regarded as
compatible with Article 7 of the DTAA. The current imposition presupposes that
it is not.. The stand of the Government appears to be that it is not a tax on
the income (and hence, it it has been kept outside the ITA and imposed by the
Finance Act) and therefore there is no inconsistency between the treaty
provisions and the imposition of equalisation levy.

5.    Collection
and Recovery

5.1.  Section
166 provides for the collection and recovery of the equalisation levy. It
designates the specified persons as assessee and cast an obligation on them to
deduct the amount of equalisation levy from the amount of consideration paid or
payable to the non resident towards the provision of the specified services.

5.2.  There
is no obligation to deduct the levy from the consideration if the aggregate
amount payable to a non resident in a previous year is INR one lakh or less.
The wording seems to suggest that the limit of one lakh rupees is qua
each non resident. The assessee has to pay levy so deducted during a month to
the credit of the Central Government by the 7th of the next calendar
month. Delay in the payment would be visited with the simple interest @ 1% per
month or part thereof. In addition to the interest, the assessee would be
liable to a penalty of INR 1000 per day of delay. However, it is provided that
such penalty should not exceed the amount of the levy.

5.3.  The
liability to pay the levy would be there irrespective of the fact whether the
assessee has deducted the same from the payment made to the non resident. When
the assessee fails to deduct the levy, in addition to the interest, penalty
equivalent to the amount of levy is imposable on the assessee. In such a case a
question would arise as to whether the levy so paid will increase the cost of
the services availed or it will appear as a separate item in the books of
accounts. In both the cases, in my view the amount should be deductible while
computing the income of the assessee.

5.4.  The
possible three scenarios which can arise in view of the above provision is
illustrated by the respective accounting entries:

a.  Assessee
makes payment of Rs. 100 towards specified services to X and deduct tax there
from:



Specified Services A/c.          Dr.     100

      To X                                                                                                                 100

 

X A/c                           Dr.
    100

To Bank                                          94        

To Equalisation Levy                                   06

 

Equalisation Levy 
      Dr.     6

To  Bank                                            6

b. Assessee has as a
part of agreement agreed to bear the equalisation levy

Specified Services A/c.              Dr.      106.38

         To X                                                106.38

X A/c                           Dr.
106.38

         To
Bank                                               100      

         To
Equalisation Levy                           06.38

Equalisation Levy       
Dr.  6.38

         
To  Bank                             6.38

(In both the above cases, the payment of
Equalisation levy by the assessee would be regarded as deducted from the
payment made to X)

c.  Assessee
fails to deduct but makes the payment of the levy as envisaged u/s. 166(3)

Specified Services A/c.              Dr.      100

      To X                                                  100

X A/c                          Dr.
  100

      To
Bank                                             100 

Equalisation Levy       
Dr.  6

     
To  Bank                              6

Would the 3rd scenario survive? The act has
envisaged the same. In this case the assessee may save the tax of 0.38 but he
will be exposed to the penalty equivalent to the amount of equalisation levy
u/s. 171. However, it may be noted that penalty is discretionary and may not be
levied in appropriate cases.

5.5.  As
noted above, the levy is not chargeable when the non resident providing the
service has a PE in India and the specified service is effectively connected to
such PE. The assessee is either a person resident in India or a PE of a non
resident in India. The assessee before deducting the levy will have to ensure
that the non resident providing the service has no PE in India and even if it
has a PE in India, the said service is not effectively connected to the said
PE. They may have to possibly depend on the declaration from the non -resident
in this respect.

5.6.  Whether
a non-resident has a PE in the source country or not is generally a contentious
issue and it is very rare that the taxpayer and the tax authorities would agree
at the initial stage. If it is ultimately found or held that the levy was not
chargeable, can the refund be granted to the assessee? There are provisions in
the chapter for grant of the refund to the assesse on processing the statement
furnished by the assessee. Such a case may not be covered by the said refund
provision and also because there are limitations of the time to grant refund
under such cases. Can the refund be claimed on the ground that the levy is
without any authority of law and hence the limitation should not apply? 

6.    Procedure
and Penalties

6.1.  Section
167 imposes an obligation on every assessee to furnish a statement in the
prescribed format in respect of all specified services during the financial
year. The government has notified Equalisation Levy Rules, 2016 and prescribed
Form No. 1 as the prescribed form of the statement. The rules provide that the
said form should be furnished annually on or before 30th June in
respect of the preceding financial year. The form should give information in
respect of all the specified services chargeable to equalisation levy during
the financial year.

6.2.  The
assessee would be entitled to revise the statement if he notices any errors or
omissions at any time within two years from the end of the financial year in
which the specified service was provided. He may also furnish the statement in
the aforesaid period if he has not furnished the statement within the
prescribed time.

6.3.  The
Assessing officer may serve a notice on any assessee to furnish the statement
if he has not furnished the same within thirty days from the date of service of
the notice. However, the section does not provide any time limit within which
the AO may serve the said notice. On a harmonious reading of the provisions,
one may take a view that the said notice has to be served within the aforesaid
period of two years. What is the basis on which the AO can issue such notice
has not been provided. What are the rights available to the assesse when he
receives the notice, can he challenge the issue of the notice by the AO?  Section 172 provides that an assessee who
fails to furnish the statement within the time prescribed under the rules or
the time prescribed by the AO in his notice, would be liable to pay a penalty
of INR 100 for each day of failure.

6.4.  The AO, before imposing any penalty under the
chapter has to give the assessee an opportunity to advance his case as to why
the penalty should not be imposed. If the assessee proves that that there was a
reasonable cause for the failure and the AO is satisfied about the same, AO
should not impose any penalty. The order imposing the penalty has been made
appealable to CIT(A) and the order of CIT(A) 
has been made appealable to the Tribunal.  Provision of section 249 to 251 and section
253 to 255 of the ITA has been made applicable to such appeals. Section 178 of
the FA, 2016 list down various other sections of the ITA which would apply in
relation to equalisation levy as they apply in relation to income tax.

6.5.  Section
168 provides for the processing of the statement and issue of intimation to the
assessee after carrying out adjustment in respect of arithmetical accuracy and
computation of interest. The intimation is required to be sent within one year
from the end of the financial year in which the prescribed statement under
clause 167 is furnished.

6.6.  Section
169 empowers the AO to rectify the intimation for any mistake apparent from
record and provides that the intimation be amended within one year from the end
of the financial year in which the same was issued. The AO may rectify the
mistake on his own or on the same being brought to his notice by the assessee.
Any rectification which has the effect of increasing the liability of the
assessee or reducing the refund entitlement to the assessee, be made only by
making an order and after giving the assessee a show cause to that effect and a
reasonable opportunity of being heard. If in consequence of any order, any
amount is payable by the assessee, the rules provides the AO to serve a notice
of demand in form no.2 specifying the amount payable by the assessee. The
chapter is silent about the appellability of this order. Under the rules, it is
provided that the intimation u/s. 168 is deemed to be notice of demand. If the
intimation is deemed as notice of demand under the ITA and the same is in
consequence of an order, then the appeal provisions under the ITA should also
follow.

7.    Consideration
to be exempt from tax in the hands of non resident

7.1.  A new
clause (50) has been introduced in section 10 of the Income-tax act, whereby
any income arising from specified services which is chargeable to equalisation
levy under chapter VIII of the FA 2016 is exempt from the charge to the income
tax. The said clause is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:

‘(50) any
income arising from any specified service provided on or after the date on
which the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Finance Act, 2016 comes into force
and chargeable to equalisation levy under that Chapter.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause,
“specified service” shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (i) of
section 164 of Chapter VIII of the Finance Act, 2016.’

7.2.  In
other words income of the non resident from provision of the specified services
to the assessee under chapter VIII of the Finance Act, 2016 is exempt from
income tax in the hands of the non resident if the same is chargeable to
equalisation levy. However, it does not mean that the income of the non
resident from the specified services would be charged to income tax if the same
is not chargeable to equalisation levy for any reason. The charge to income tax
has to be independently established under the ITA.

8.    Disallowance
of payment in the hands of payer

8.1.  A new
clause (ib) has been introduced in section 40 of the Income-tax act with effect
from 1st June,2016. Section 40 provides for the cases when the
amount is not permitted to be deducted from computing the income under the head
“profits and gains of business or profession” or permitted to be deducted
subject to certain conditions. The said clause is reproduced hereunder for
ready reference:

 (ib)
any consideration paid or payable to a non-resident for a specified service on
which equalisation levy is deductible under the provisions of Chapter VIII of
the Finance Act, 2016, and such levy has not been deducted or after deduction,
has not been paid on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of
section 139:

        Provided
that where in respect of any such consideration, the equalisation levy has been
deducted in any subsequent year or has been deducted during the previous year
but paid after the due date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139, such
sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous
year in which such levy has been paid;”.

8.2.  In
this respect, the following may be noted:

a) Chapter
VIII of the FA 2016 provides for due dates of payment of the equalisation levy
and consequence of the delayed payment. For the purpose of section 40(ib) of
the ITA, the same is irrelevant. The relevant date for the same will be the due
date of furnishing the return of income u/s. 139 of the ITA.

b) Section
166(3) of the Finance Act envisages a situation when the assessee fails to
deduct the levy from the amount paid or payable to a non resident. As per the
said section, the assesse e is liable to pay the levy even if he has not
deducted the same from the payment. Section 40(ib) of the ITA envisages
situation of deduction of the levy and payment thereof thereafter. Can a view
be taken that cases u/s. 166(3) of the FA are not covered by section 40(ib) of
the ITA? Whether in such a case, provision of section 43B of the ITA would be
applicable and the compliance thereof would be necessary?.

c) What will
be the impact of non discrimination article of the relevant double tax
avoidance agreement (DTAA) on section 40(ib) of the ITA? Relevant extract of
article 24(4) of the OECD and UN model convention (both are identical) is
reproduced hereunder for ready reference:

24(4) Except where the provisions of paragraph 1
of Article 9, paragraph 6 of Article 11 or paragraph 4 of Article 12, apply,
interest, royalties and other disbursements paid by an enterprise of a
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the
purpose of determining the taxable profits of such enterprise, be deductible
under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a resident of the
first-mentioned State….
.

Section 40(ib) disallowance is applicable in
respect of consideration paid or payable to non-resident for specified services
and not to the resident. Hence, prima facie, the assessee can invoke the
said article of the relevant DTAA. Article 24(6) provides that the provisions
of non discrimination article will not be restricted to the taxes covered under
article 2 and the same extends its applicability to taxes of every kind and
description. In view of this, equalisation levy would be covered by the
non-discrimination article notwithstanding what is the scope of article 2. The
question that may still survive is whether payment towards specified services
would be covered within the words “other disbursements” appearing in article 24(4)?

It may be noted that any consideration received
or receivable by a resident from the provision of the specified services to the
assessee is not subject to equalisation levy and hence, there is no question of
any deduction from the payment and consequential disallowance. In fact, to this
extent there is discrimination. However, the existing provision of Article 24
does not specifically recognise such discrimination. Can revenue argue that the
payment to resident is not subject any equalisation levy at all and hence,
there is no discrimination within the meaning of Article 24(4)?

9.    Challenges

9.1.  A
question that arises is whether it is a tax on the income of the non resident?
According to the Government, it is not a tax on the income of the non resident.
In fact the income of the non resident which is subject to the levy is
specifically made exempt from income tax. By exempting the income under the ITA
which is subject to equalisation levy, whether the Government has weaken its
case that it is not a tax on income or a tax akin to tax on income?

9.2.  Who is
the person chargeable to tax? Under the FA, the assessee is the person making
payment towards the specified services and claiming the said payment as
expenditure while computing its taxable income. Whether he is charged to tax or
it is the non resident?

9.3.  In tax
jurisprudence, it is well settled that following four factors are essential
ingredients to a taxing statute:-

a.  subject
of tax;

b.  person
liable to pay the tax;

c.  rate at
which tax is to be paid, and

d.  measure
or value on which the rate is to be applied.

9.4.  From
the analysis of the provisions of the chapter, it is clear that the subject of
tax is the specified services. From the harmonious reading of the section 165
and 166, it appears that the person liable to pay tax is non resident, but the
collection and the recovery is made from the persons paying the considerations
towards the specified services by way of deduction and they are being regarded
as assessee. It is interesting to note that the non resident receiving the
consideration has no obligation whatsoever under the chapter. What is the
difference between a person charged to tax and a person liable to pay tax? Can
a person who is charged to tax be not liable to tax? Can not the person who is
liable to tax and who is also regarded as assessee, should be considered as the
person charged to tax? Is it that in the scheme of equalisation levy, these questions
does not matter? These questions pose a significant challenge to the new tax.
_

TS-752-ITAT-2016(DEL)-TP Aithent Technologies Pvt Ltd vs. DCIT A.Y.: 2008-09, Date of Order: 21st September, 2016

Sections 92B, 92F of the act – Transaction between indian HO
and foreign BO – is not subject to transfer pricing provisions

Facts

An
Indian company (‘Taxpayer’ or ‘HO’) had a branch office (BO)  in Canada. The taxpayer had entered into
certain transactions with its BO.  The
TPO/AO considered such transactions as ‘international transaction’ and determined
the arm’s length price (ALP) of the transactions.

The
issue before ITAT  was whether the TPO/AO
was justified in treating the transactions between the HO and BO as an
international transaction.

Held


According to principle of mutuality, no person can earn income nor suffer
losses from dealings with self. There cannot be a valid transaction of sale
between BO and HO. Hence, profit on such sales is not includible while
computing total income of ho. reliance in this regard was  placed 
on  Calcutta  tribunal’s 
decision  in  the case of Betts Hartley Huett & Co.
Ltd. vs. CIT (1979) (116 ITR 425).


A transaction can be treated as an international transaction, only if it is a
transaction between two or more associated enterprises (AEs).   Since BO 
is not a separate enterprise, one cannot treat a transaction between HO and
BO as an international transaction.


“Enterprise” has been defined u/s. 92F(iii), to include a  permanent 
establishment.  Thus,   a 
BO   can  be treated as an enterprise. Nevertheless,
the definition of ‘international transaction’ when considered in juxtaposition
to the definition of ‘enterprise’, give prima facie impression that all the
transactions between a BO  and its HO are
to be subjected to the transfer pricing provisions.


However, this prima facie impression loses its substance, when  the  HO
in question is an indian entity. This is for the reason that the indian entity
is taxable in india on its worldwide income, including the income earned
outside india through its branch.


When the accounts of the indian HO and BO 
are aggregated, income of the HO would be set off with an equal amount
of expense of the BO,  leaving thereby no
separately identifiable income on account of transactions between HO and BO.

   Thus, 
over or under invoicing between the HO and BO will always be tax neutral
in the case of an indian entity having a PE outside india. ALP adjustment for
such transactions will result in charging tax on income which is more than the
amount legitimately due to the exchequer and hence, impermissible.

  The aforesaid rationale is restricted only to
transactions between the indian HO and its foreign Bo.  In case where HO is a foreign entity, it is
taxable in india only on its indian income and hence, there may be an allurement
to such foreign entities to resort to over invoicing, to mitigate tax burden in
india. Hence, the above discussion does not apply to a case where the
transaction is between a foreign entity and its BO in india.

   In 
the present case as the HO is an indian 
entity which offered the income earned from india as well as that earned
by its BO  to tax in india, transactions
between such indian HO and BO are not subject to TP provisions

P.S.:

i.   The ruling does not provide any clarity
about the nature of the transaction between indian HO and BO and the basis on
which ALP adjustment was suggested by the AO

ii.  PE of indian Company is considered as
resident in india. Hence,  transactions
between HO and BO  are unlikely to be
regarded as within the ambit of Indian Transfer Pricing Provisions.

TS-528-ITAT-2016(Mum) Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited vs. ITO A.Y.: 2012-13, Date of Order: 25th August, 2016

Article 13,15  of  India-UK 
DTAA, S.  9(1)(vii) of the act – Fees
paid to UK LLP for legal services in relation to acquisition of banking company
and setting up of USA branch qualifies as payment made for the purpose of
earning income from a source outside india. article 15, being a specific
provision dealing with legal services, overrides the general provisions of
article 13 dealing with technical and consultancy services – fees paid to UK
LLP is not taxable in india under the act 
as also DTAA

Facts

The
taxpayer, an indian company, was engaged in the business of banking. The
taxpayer  was contemplating the option of
acquiring banking company and/or setting up of a branch in US.  For this purpose, the taxpayer entered into
an agreement with a UK LLP to obtain certain legal services.

During
the relevant year, the employees of the taxpayer travelled to the USA.  During their visit, UK LLP made presentations
and discussed various legal or regulatory requirements in the USA in relation
to setting up of branch and acquisition of banking company in the USA.

The   taxpayer 
contended  that  the 
services  rendered by the UK LLP
were utilised for the purpose of earning income from a source outside india.
Hence, it cannot be deemed to accrue or arise in india by virtue of the source
rule exclusion u/s 9(1)(vii) of the act. Further, under the India-UK  DTAA (DTAA), such income is covered under
article 15 on independent Personal Services (IPS) and in absence of
satisfaction of conditions specified therein, the payment made to UK LLP is not
taxable in india even in terms of DTAA.

However,
ao contended that in absence of actual creation of a new source of income, the
source rule exclusion under the act is not applicable in respect of payments
made to UK LLP which is taxable as royalty/FTS under the act. Further, as
services rendered by the UK LLP had made available technical knowledge, skill
and experience to the employees of the taxpayer, the payment made to the UK LLP
qualifies as FTS under the DTAA.

Held

Taxability under the Act


The payment was made by the taxpayer to the UK LLP on account of the first
phase of the agreement. Under the first phase, the UK LLP was required to
educate the Taxpayer’s officials on various legal/regulatory requirements of
USA in relation to setting up of a bank branch and acquisition of banking
company.


The  nature of services indicated that
the payments were made with a view to carry on business and to create a new
source of income outside india, by way of establishment of new branch or
acquisition of a banking company.


The source rule exclusion is not restricted only to a case where there is an
existing source of income. As long as the payment is made for creation of a new
source of income, it is covered by the source rule exclusion.

Taxability under DTAA

  Article 15, being a specific provision
dealing with independent professional services of    lawyers, overrides the general provisions
of article 13 dealing with a broader category of technical or consultancy
services1.


As Held by the Special bench of the tribunal 
in the case of Clifford Chance2, article 15 applies not only to
individuals but also to firms3. As the services were rendered outside india and
none of the employee of the UK LLP was present in india for more than 90 days,
such income is not taxable in india under article 15 of the DTAA.

A. P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 5 dated October 6, 2016

Import   data    Processing  
and   monitoring System (IDPMS)

This
circular states that IDPMS will go live from October 10, 2016 and all Banks
must use IDPMS  for reporting and
monitoring of the import transactions. Operational directions / guidelines with
respect to IDPMS  are mentioned in this
circular and are also available in the help menu on EDPMS Portal under “import
process” tag.