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Unexplained investment: S. 69 of I. T. Act, 1961: Assessee explained source of disputed jewellery and also offered 20% thereof to buy peace: AO rejected explanation and made full addition: Tribunal accepted the explanation but retained the offered 20%: No

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48 Unexplained investment: S. 69 of I. T. Act, 1961:
Assessee explained source of disputed jewellery and also offered 20% thereof
to buy peace: AO rejected explanation and made full addition: Tribunal
accepted the explanation but retained the offered 20%: Not justified: No
addition can be sustained:

Sonia Magu Vs. CIT; 185 Taxman 402(Del):

In a search and seizure operation, certain  jewellery was recovered from the assessee. The assessee explained the source of the said jewellery. Notwithstanding the
explanation, she also offered 20% of the disputed jewellery and was ready to
pay tax thereupon in order to buy peace and to avoid litigation. The Assessing
Officer did not accept the explanation and the offer and accordingly added the
full value of jewellery as undisclosed income. The Commissioner (Appeals)
accepted that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the source of
purchase/acquisition of the disputed jewellery. However, he gave only partial
relief to the assessee in view of the voluntary offer of the assessee whereby
20% of the disputed jewellery amount was offered to tax and retained the
addition of the 20% amount. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the
Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that it was the amount offered by the
assessee herself.

On appeal filed by the assessee, the Delhi High Court
allowed the assessee’s claim and held as under:

“i) The assessee maintained her stand that she had been
accounting for the entire jewellery including the source thereof.
Notwithstanding the same, only with a desire to buy peace and to avoid
litigation, she had offered 20% of the excess jewellery. That offer was,
thus, conditional. She would have paid the tax on the aforesaid amount, had
the Assessing Officer accepted the offer, thereby giving a quietus to the
matter. Instead, the Assessing Officer ignored that offer and proceeded to
deal with the matter on merits and fastened the liability of much higher
amount upon the assessee. In those circumstances, the assessee was
constrained to take up the matter in detail. She maintained her stand that
she had proper explanation for the purchase of the aforesaid jewellery. Her
stand was vindicated inasmuch as the Commissioner (Appeals) accepted her
explanation in respect of the entire jewellery. Once the assessee was able
to duly explain the source of purchase of the entire disputed jewellery, the
Commissioner (Appeals) committed an error in falling back on the conditional
offer made by the assessee before the Assessing Officer along with the
return in Form 2B.

ii) From the language of the offer made, it was clear
that it was an offer without prejudice and was not in the nature of
‘admission on the basis of which she could be fastened with the liability
which otherwise did not exceed’. Provision of section 23 of the Indian
Evidence Act would clearly be applicable to such a case. That apart, it is
trite law that the principle of estoppel has no application in the Act.

iii) The matter can be looked into from another angle as
well. Once the assessee has given a satisfactory explanation regarding the
purchase/acquisition of the disputed jewellery, the necessary consequence
would be that there was no unexplained asset in the hands of the assessee.
In such a situation, it is neither proper nor legally permissible for the
revenue to still fasten the assessee with the liability of tax. It would be
a clear ground of illegal extraction of tax from the assessee. Therefore,
the addition as an unexplained investment in jewellery was to be deleted and
the appeals were to be allowed.”


 


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Review: Appeal to High Court: S. 260A of I. T. Act, 1961: There is no power of substantive review:

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46 Review: Appeal to High Court: S. 260A of I. T. Act, 1961:
There is no power of substantive review:

CIT Vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.; 319 ITR 390 (Bom):

Dismissing the review petition filed by the Revenue against
the order in a Notice of Motion, the Bombay High Court held as under:

“i) There is distinction between substantive review and
procedural review. Substantive review must be conferred, whereas procedural
review is inherent in every court or Tribunal.

ii) Relying in the provisions of Section 260A(7) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, it is submitted that once the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure pertaining to appeals is made applicable to appeal, the power
of review which is conferred by the Civil Procedure must also be so read. The
Code of Civil Procedure has distinct provisions in so far as appeals and
review are concerned. Similarly, section 96 is the provision pertaining to
first appeals. Section 100 pertains to second appeals and section 114 is a
power of review. Order 41 provides for first appeal. Order 47 provides for
review. In other words, there are distinct provisions in the Code of Civil
Procedure pertaining to appeals and review. In that context, Section 260A(7)
has to be read to mean the provisions pertaining to appeals and not provisions
pertaining to review.

iii) The power of substantive review having not been
conferred under the Income-tax Act, 1961, the review petition, as filed, was
not maintainable.”

 


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ITAT: Powers: A Y 1993-94 and 1994-95: Power to set aside and issue directions: No power to place restrictions on power of AO to determine income: Direction not to assess income at a figure less than that declared in the return or more than the figure as

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44 ITAT: Powers: A Y 1993-94 and 1994-95: Power to set aside
and issue directions: No power to place restrictions on power of AO to determine
income: Direction not to assess income at a figure less than that declared in
the return or more than the figure as assessed u/s. 144: Direction beyond powers
of Tribunal:


CIT Vs. H. P. State Forest Corporation Ltd.; 320 ITR 54 (HP):

The assessee is a state government corporation. The accounts
of the assessee were not audited by the office of the Controller and Auditor
General. Therefore, the Assessing Officer treated the assessee’s returns for the
A Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95 as non est and passed an assessment order u/s. 144 of
the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal set aside the assessment and directed the
assessment afresh with the audited accounts submitted by the assessee, with a
further direction that the income to be assessed was not to be at a figure less
than that declared by the assessee in its return. On a rectification application
by the assessee, the Tribunal allowed the application, but directed that the
income should not be assessed at a figure more than that assessed by the
Assessing Officer u/s. 144.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Himachal Pradesh High Court
held as under:

“i) Once the returns are treated as non est, such returns
could not be used even against the assessee.

ii) When the Tribunal was directing assessment de novo, no
fetters as to the upper or lower limit of income to be assessed could have
been placed by the Tribunal on the Assessing Officer. He had to go through the
audited accounts, apply his mind and frame the assessments afresh in
accordance with the duly audited accounts placed on record. The Tribunal’s
directions to firstly, assess the income at a figure not less than that
declared in the assessee’s returns; and, secondly, upon the rectification
application, to assess the income at a figure not higher than that assessed
u/s. 144, were unsustainable.”


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Rectification: Limitation: S. 154 of I. T. Act, 1961: Assessment order appealed against: Limitation to begin from the date of the order giving effect to the appellate order:

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45 Rectification: Limitation: S. 154 of I. T. Act, 1961:
Assessment order appealed against: Limitation to begin from the date of the
order giving effect to the appellate order:

CIT Vs. Tony Electronics Ltd.; 185 Taxman 121 (Del):

In the case of the assessee, the assessment order was passed
u/s. 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on 24/11/1998, making various
additions. The Commissioner (Appeals) gave partial relief to the assessee. The
matter had gone to the Commissioner (Appeals) again. Therefore, orders recording
appeal’s effects had to be passed three times. On 30/01/2006, the Assessing
Officer issued a show cause notice u/s. 154, and passed a rectification order
u/s. 154 on 26/04/2006, withdrawing certain deductions which were allowed in the
assessment order dated 24/11/1998. The Tribunal quashed the rectification order
on the ground that the same was barred by limitation.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court reversed the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“i) The legal position with which there cannot be any
quarrel, is that once an appeal against an order passed by an authority is
preferred and is decided by the appellate authority, the order of the said
authority merges with the order of the appellate authority. With this merger,
the order of the original authority ceases to exist and the order of the
appellate authority prevails with which the order of the original authority is
merged. To all intents and purposes, it is the order of the appellate
authority that would be seen.

ii) Once the doctrine of merger is understood in its true
sense as explained in a number of judgments, and relying on the interpretation
given to the word “any” or “order” given to sub-section (7) of section 154 by
the Apex Court, the inescapable conclusion would be that the original order of
assessment had ceased to operate on the decision given by the Commissioner
(Appeals), and had merged with the orders of the appellate authority. The
final order, passed by the appellate authority was dated 28/06/2004, and
acting thereupon, the Assessing Officer passed an assessment order, giving the
appeal effect thereto, on 23/07/2004. Thus, it was the order dated 28/06/2004,
passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) which remained on record to all intents
and purposes, as the original order of assessment had been merged.

iii) Once the matter was viewed from that angle, it was no
explanation that the error sought to be rectified occurred in the original
assessment order and was not the subject-matter of the appeal. Obviously, it
was an error of calculation which could not have been the subject-matter of
the appeal.

iv) The Tribunal misdirected itself in law by calculating
limitation u/s. 154(7) with reference to the date of the original order of
assessment. As a consequence, the order of the Tribunal was to be set aside
and the rectification order passed by the Assessing Officer was to be upheld
and restored.”

 


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Charitable trust: Exemption u/s. 11 of I. T. Act, 1961: A Ys. 1990-91 and 1991-92: Educational trust: Trust deed empowering trust to start educational agencies for earning income to achieve objectives of trust: Educational agencies earning income: Section

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43 Charitable trust: Exemption u/s. 11 of I. T. Act, 1961: A
Ys. 1990-91 and 1991-92: Educational trust: Trust deed empowering trust to start
educational agencies for earning income to achieve objectives of trust:
Educational agencies earning income: Section 11(4A) not applicable: Trust is
entitled to exemption u/s. 11:

CIT Vs Brihdaranyak Mandal (Trust): 319 ITR 363 (All):

The assessee is a trust with the objectives to educate the
general masses about the ancient glory and cultural heritage of the country; to
acquaint them with nature and environment; to impart Vedic education; and to
work in order to spiritually uplift the masses in general, leading them to
involve in social welfare activities. The author was unable to get funds by way
of donations. Clause (4) of the trust deed empowered the trust to start
educational agencies for earning income to achieve the aims and objectives of
the trust. Thus, the author started educational agencies and raised funds. For
the A Y 1990-91, the Assessing Officer held that the trust is not valid on the
ground that the author in his individual capacity earned funds and, hence, the
provisions of section 11(4A) were applicable. The Commissioner (Appeals) held
that the trust was valid but its income could not be exempted u/s. 11 because it
was hit by sub-section (4) of section 11. For the AY 1991-92, the Assessing
Officer made a protective assessment. The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the
trust as a valid one and that its income was from business; and, hence, the
provisions of section 11(4A) were not applicable. The Tribunal held that the
trust was valid and was entitled to exemption u/s. 11.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under:

“The Revenue had not sought reference in questioning the
validity of the findings recorded by the Tribunal. The Tribunal had found that
the activities of the educational agency were carried out by the trust as clause
(4) of the trust deed empowered the trust to start educational agencies for
earning income to achieve the aims and objectives of the trust. The Tribunal had
further found that the surplus was transferred to the trust and utilized in the
purchase of land and construction of a sabha bhavan. Thus section 11(4A) was not
applicable.”

 

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Educational institution : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2004-05 to 2007-08 : Merely because an educational institution accumulates income, it does not go out of consideration of S. 10(23C)(vi); If accumulation of surplus is wi

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25. Educational
institution : Exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2004-05
to 2007-08 : Merely because an educational institution accumulates income, it
does not go out of consideration of S. 10(23C)(vi); If accumulation of surplus
is within parameters of Section, it will be entitled to benefit of S.
10(23C)(vi).

[Maa Saraswati
Educational Trust v. UOI,
194 Taxman 84 (HP)]

The assessee-trust was
established for educational purpose. The Commissioner declined to grant approval
to the assessee for exemption u/s. 10(23C)(vi) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on
the ground that it had accumulated huge income and had been generating profit.

The Himachal Pradesh High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by the assessee and held as under :

“(i) The requirements for
approval u/s.10(23C)(vi) are : (1) the educational institution should exist
solely for educational purpose and not for the purpose of profit; (2) it
should not be an educational institution wholly or substantially financed by
the Government; (3) it should be an educational institution genuinely existing
for educational purpose and not for the purpose of profit; (4) its aggregate
annual income exceeds
Rs. 1 crore; and (5) it should be approved by the prescribed authority.

(ii) Under the third
proviso, it is made clear that the educational institution is entitled to
apply its income or accumulate it for application wholly or exclusively to the
objects for which it is established and in a case where more than 15% of its
income is accumulated on or after 1-4-2002, the period of the accumulation of
the amount exceeding 15% of the income shall, in no case, exceed five years.
Therefore, it is not as if the educational institution cannot generate any
surplus. Generating surplus and accumulation of income will not disqualify an
institution for the benefits of S. 10(23C).

(iii) Surplus is to be
understood in contradistinction to generation of income with the sole motive
of profit if one has to properly understand the legislative intent of S.
10(23C)(vi). Merely because an educational institution accumulates income, it
does not go out of consideration of S. 10(23C)(vi); it goes out only if
application of income is for the purposes other than education, since the
institution is to be established and maintained solely with the object of
imparting education.

(iv) In the instant case,
going by the accounts, prima facie, it appeared that there was no
question of generation of profit, though there was accumulation of surplus,
but in case the accumulation of surplus was within the parameters, the
assessee was entitled to succeed. In that context, the contention of the
assessee that there was no accumulation of income had also to be considered.”

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Capital gains : Computation : Depreciable asset : S. 50 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Land is not a depreciable asset : S. 50 not applicable where land forms part of whole undertaking which is transferred.

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24. Capital gains :
Computation : Depreciable asset : S. 50 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Land is not a
depreciable asset : S. 50 not applicable where land forms part of whole
undertaking which is transferred.

[CIT v. Coimbatore Lodge,
328 ITR 69 (Mad.)]

The assessee was running a
lodge. The assessee transferred the lodge and claimed exemption u/s. 54EC of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for exemption.
The Commissioner (Alleals) and the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled
to exemption u/s.54EC of the Act.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“Land is not the
depreciable asset. S. 50 of the Act deals only with the transfer of
depreciable assets. Once the land forms part of the assets of the undertaking
and the transfer is of the entire undertaking as a whole, it is not possible
to bifurcate the sale consideration in a particular asset.”


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Manner of Disclosure of Accounting Policies

From Published Accounts

1 ITC
Limited — (31-3-2009)

Significant Accounting Policies

It is corporate policy :

Convention :

To prepare financial statements
in accordance with applicable Accounting Standards in India.

A summary of important
accounting policies is set out below. The financial statements have also been
prepared in accordance with relevant presentational requirements of the
Companies Act, 1956.

Basis of accounting :

To prepare financial statements
in accordance with the historical cost convention modified by revaluation of
certain Fixed Assets as and when undertaken as detailed below.

Fixed assets :

To state Fixed Assets at cost of
acquisition inclusive of inward freight, duties and taxes and incidental
expenses related to acquisition. In respect of major projects involving
construction, related pre-operational expenses form part of the value of assets
capitalised. Expenses capitalised also include applicable borrowing costs.

To capitalise software where it
is expected to provide future enduring economic benefits. Capitalisation costs
include licence fees and costs of implementation/system integration services.

The costs are capitalised in the
year in which the relevant software is implemented for use.

To charge off as a revenue
expenditure all upgradation/enhancements unless they bring similar significant
additional benefits.

Depreciation :

To calculate depreciation on
Fixed Assets and Intangible Assets in a manner that amortises the cost of the
assets after commissioning, over their estimated useful lives or, where
specified, lives based on the rates specified in Schedule XIV to the Companies
Act, 1956, whichever is lower, by equal annual instalments. Leasehold properties
are amortised over the period of the lease.

To amortise capitalised software
costs over a period of five years.

Revaluation of assets :

As and when Fixed Assets are
revalued, to adjust the provision for depreciation on such revalued Fixed
Assets, where applicable, in order to make allowance for consequent additional
diminution in value on considerations of age, condition and unexpired useful
life of such Fixed Assets; to transfer to Revaluation Reserve the difference
between the written-up value of the Fixed Assets revalued and depreciation
adjustment and to charge Revaluation Reserve Account with annual depreciation on
that portion of the value which is written up.

Investments :

To state Current Investments at
lower of cost and fair value; and Long-Term Investments, including in Joint
Ventures and Associates, at cost. Where applicable, provision is made where
there is a permanent fall in valuation of Long-Term Investments.

Inventories :

To state inventories including
work-in-progress at lower of cost and net realisable value. The cost is
calculated on weighted average method. Cost comprises expenditure incurred in
the normal course of business in bringing such inventories to its location and
includes, where applicable, appropriate overheads based on normal level of
activity. Obsolete, slow moving and defective inventories are identified at the
time of physical verification of inventories and, where necessary, provision is
made for such inventories.

Sales :

To state net sales after
deducting taxes and duties from invoiced value of goods and services rendered.

Investment income :

To account for Income from
Investments on an accrual basis, inclusive of related tax deducted at source.

Proposed dividend :

To provide for Dividends
(including income-tax thereon) in the books of account as proposed by the
Directors, pending approval at the Annual General Meeting.

Employee benefits :

To make regular monthly
contributions to various Provident Funds which are in the nature of defined
contribution scheme and such paid/payable amounts are charged against revenue.

To administer such Funds through
duly constituted and approved independent trusts with the exception of Provident
Fund and Family Pension contributions in respect of unionised staff which are
statutorily deposited with the Government.

To administer through duly constituted and approved independent trusts, various Gratuity and Pension Funds which are in the nature of defined benefit/contribution schemes. To determine the liabilities towards such schemes, as applicable, and towards employee leave encashment by an independent actuarial valuation as per the requirements of Accounting Standard-15 (revised 2005) on ‘Employee Benefits’. To determine actuarial gains or losses and to recognise such gains or losses immediately in Profit and Loss Account as income or expense.

To charge against revenue, actual disbursements made, when due, under the Workers’ Voluntary Retirement Scheme.

Lease rentals?:

To charge rentals in respect of leased equipment to the Profit and Loss Account.

Research and Development?:

To write off all expenditure other than capital expenditure on Research and Development in the year it is incurred. Capital expenditure on Research and Development is included under Fixed Assets.

Taxes on income?:

To provide current tax as the amount of tax payable in respect of taxable income for the period.

To provide deferred tax on timing differences between taxable income and accounting income-subject to consideration of prudence. Not to recognise deferred tax assets on unabsorbed depreciation and carry forward of losses unless there is virtual certainty that there will be sufficient future taxable income available to realise such assets.

Foreign currency translation?:

To account for transactions in foreign currency at the exchange rate prevailing on the date of transactions. Gains/Losses arising out of fluctuations in the exchange rates are recognised in the Profit and Loss Account in the period in which they arise. To account for differences between the forward exchange rates and the exchange rates at the date of transactions, as income or expense over the life of the contracts.

To account for profit/loss arising on cancellation or renewal of forward exchange contracts as income/ expense for the period.

To account for premium paid on currency options in the Profit and Loss Account at the inception of the option.

To account for profit/loss arising on settlement or cancellation of currency option as income/expense for the period.

To recognise the net mark-to-market loss in the Profit and Loss Account on the outstanding portfolio of options as at the Balance Sheet date, and to ignore the net gain, if any.

To account for gains/losses in the Profit and Loss Account on foreign exchange rate fluctuations relating to monetary items at the year end.

Caims?:

To disclose claims against the Company not acknowledged as debts after a careful evaluation of the facts and legal aspects of the matter involved.

Segment reporting?:

To identify segments based on the dominant source and nature of risks and returns and the internal organisation and management structure.

To account for inter-segment revenue on the basis of transactions which are primarily market-led.

To include under ‘Unallocated Corporate Expenses’ revenue and expenses which relate to the enterprise as a whole and are not attributable to segments.

which had read down Rule 3.

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2 which had read down Rule
3.


[Bhel Workers Union and
Another v. Union of India and Another,
(2010) 324 ITR 26 (SC)]

In the cases before the
Supreme Court, the appellants had challenged the validity of Rule 3 of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962, as amended by the Income-tax (Twenty-second Amendment)
Rules, 2001 which amended the method of computing valuation of perquisites
u/s.17(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. According to the appellants, the amended
Rule 3 was inconsistent with the parent Act and also ultra vires Article 14 of
the Constitution.

Writ petitions filed by the
appellants were dismissed by the High Court, aggrieved by which appeals were
filed before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed
that the amended Notification was the subject matter of appeals in the case of
Arun Kumar v. Union of India reported in (2007) 1 SCC 732. A three-Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court did not strike down Rule 3 of the Rules, but read
down the Rule to make it in line with S. 17(2)(ii) of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that
as the point involved in the present appeals had been concluded by the aforesaid
judgment, the same were disposed of in terms thereof.

The Supreme Court noted that
subsequent to the aforesaid judgment, the Legislature has added an Explanation 1
to S. 17(2) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2007, with effect from April 1, 2002,
taking away the effect of the judgment on or after April 1, 2002. According to
the appellant, however, the year 2001-02 which was also covered under Rule 3 had
not been affected by the amendment. Since, there was no challenge to the amended
provision before the Supreme Court, it declined to record any opinion on the
same and disposed of the appeals noticing the subsequent amendment brought out
by the Legislature.

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Income-tax return — Must be filed in the form prescribed by the statutory authority.

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3 Income-tax return — Must
be filed in the form prescribed by the statutory authority
.

[Union of India & Others
v. I.T. Bar Association, Lucknow,
(2010) 324 ITR 80 (SC)]

By the impugned order, the
High Court had permitted the assessees to file income-tax returns in Form Saral
2D instead of Form ITR-1 to ITR-8. It has been stated by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent that this order was passed by the High
Court because of paucity of time and non-availability of adequate number of
forms. The Supreme Court held that whether the return should be filed in a
particular Form was not the business of the Court. It is for the statutory
authority to decide the same. The Supreme Court however, noted that the original
time for filing the return had been already expired, but the learned Additional
Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, had stated that
the time for filing the return in the prescribed Form was being extended in
relation to all categories of assessees. The Supreme Court noted this position
and set aside the impugned order with a direction that all the assessees, who
had already filed return in Form Saral 2D, pursuant to the impugned order passed
by the Allahabad High Court or any other High Court in the country, should file
return in the prescribed Form by the extended date.

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Refund — Interest on amount to be refunded would partake the character of ‘amount due’ u/s.244A.

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1 Refund — Interest on
amount to be refunded would partake the character of ‘amount due’ u/s.244A.


[CIT v. H.E.G. Ltd.,
(2010) 324 ITR 331 (SC)]

For A.Y. 1993-94, the amount
paid by the assessee towards TDS was

`45,73,528. The tax
paid after original assessment was `1,71,00,320. The total of TDS amounting to
`45,73,528 plus tax paid after original assessment of `1,71,00,320 stood at
`2,16,73,848. In other words, the total tax paid had two components, viz. TDS +
tax paid after original assessment. The assessee was entitled to the refund of
`2,16,73,848 (consisting of `1,71,00,320 and `45,73, 528 which payment was made
after 57 months and which is the only item in dispute). The assessee claimed
statutory interest for delayed refund of `45,73,528 for 57 months between April
1, 1993 and December 31, 1997 in terms of S. 244A of the Income-tax Act. The
Supreme Court held that the assessee was entitled to interest for 57 months on
`45,73,528. The principal amount of `45,73,528 has been paid on December 31,
1997, but net of interest which, as stated above, partook of the character of
‘amount due’ u/s.244A. The Supreme Court further held that the interest
component would partake of the character of the ‘amount due’ u/s. 244A.

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Income from undisclosed sources — Should be taxed in the year of receipt — Matter remanded for fresh adjudication.

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Glimpses of Supreme Court Rulings

Kishor Karia
Chartered Accountant
Atul Jasani
Advocate

8 Income from undisclosed sources — Should be taxed in the
year of receipt — Matter remanded for fresh adjudication.

[Fifth Avenue v. CIT, (2009) 319 ITR 132 (SC)]

The appellant, a registered partnership firm consisted of 15
partners. The firm was being managed by three partners by name, Irfan Razak, K.
Rahman Khan and Sadath Ali Khan. The firm constructed a commercial complex known
as ‘Fifth Avenue’ consisting of ground + three floors. The building consisted of
82 commercial shops. The building was under construction till the end of
January, 1993. Different shops were sold by the firm under different sale deeds
to several buyers. On January 5, 1993, exercising the powers u/s.132 of the
Income-tax Act, M/s. India Builders Corporation (which was also a partnership
firm) was searched. During the search, a document pertaining to the
appellant-firm was seized. Based on the documents seized during the search
conducted in the premises of one of the partners of the appellant-firm, the
proceedings were initiated. According to the Revenue, while selling different
portions of the building apart from the sale consideration shown in the sale
deeds, the firm had also received additional sale consideration by cash which
had not been accounted and the consideration shown in the sale deeds were
received by the firm through cheques. An enquiry was conducted and the Assessing
Officer held that the unaccounted income of the assessee-firm had to be brought
to tax. Accordingly, the appellant-firm was called upon to pay tax
Rs.1,52,49,240 and also ordered for separate penalty proceedings u/s.271(1)(c)
of the Act challenging the order passed by the Assessing Officer. The appellant-assessee
filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The
Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) after hearing the parties allowed the
appeal on the ground that the document seized was not while conducting a search
on the premises of the assessee and there was nothing to show that unaccounted
money was received by the firm and that the computer printout could not be
linked with the transaction pertaining to the appellant. Therefore, the appeal
filed by the assessee was allowed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals),
against which, the Revenue took up the matter in appeal before the Tribunal,
Bangalore Bench. The Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, after examining the legality and
the correctness of the order passed by the Assessing Officer and so also the
order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) came to the conclusion
that even though the document was seized from the premises of a partner of the
appellant-firm — India Builders Corporation, as the document was pertaining to
the appellant-firm and that the seizure of the document from the premises of
India Builders Corporation had not been denied by the appellant-firm,
considering the provisions of S. 3(18) of the General Clauses Act and also the
presumption attached u/s.132(4A) of the Income-tax Act, held that the partners
of the appellant-firm have received unaccounted money in cash and the same had
to be brought into assessment. According to the Tribunal, the statement of Mr.
Ziaulla Sheriff disclosed that he was a partner of 10% share and his son, Yunuz
Zia, was also a partner of 10% share and Irfan Razack was the main partner
managing the affair of the firm and that Irfan Razak was examined on February
24, 1993. In his evidence he had denied the receipt of cash on behalf of the
appellant-firm, but he had admitted the contents of the seized printout
material. Relying upon the evidence of Irfan Razak, the Tribunal came to the
conclusion that the partners of the firm accepted the contents of the printout
taken from the computer in respect of the appellant-firm from India Builders
Corporation and, therefore, came to the conclusion that the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) has committed an error in allowing the appeal. Accordingly,
the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) was set aside and
the order passed by the Assessing Officer was restored.

The Karnataka High Court in the appeal filed before it held
that even though the appellant-firm’s premises was not searched, when an
important document was seized by the authorities from the premises of the
partners of the appellant-firm, it was for the appellant to show that the
appellant or any of its partners did not receive such money by way of cash which
had not been disclosed in the return filed by the appellant. When the appellant
was contending that it had not received cash from the purchasers and that the
sale consideration shown in the sale deeds alone was paid to the appellant, the
onus was on the appellant to examine its partners to dispel such contentions.
When the appellant had admitted the seizure of the documents in question from
the premises of its partners, Ziaulla Sheriff and Yunus Zia, it was for them to
explain that this particular document was not pertaining to the partnership
concern of the appellant and it is also for them to show under that
circumstances the said document was in possession of its partners and similarly
it was for them to show the said document had nothing to do with the business
activities of the appellant. It was held that the Tribunal was justified in
reversing the finding of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).

The High Court however noted that the Tribunal while
considering the matter pertaining to penalty proceedings initiated u/s.272(1)(c)
of the Income-tax Act had remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to
ascertain and give a finding whether the entire unaccounted money of
Rs.2,32,28,173 was received in the A.Y. 1993-94 and whether the same was
received by the partners of the appellant-firm on different dates and that the
amount so received had to be spread over based on the actual receipt of the
money in different assessment years. Relying upon the order of the Tribunal
rendered in penalty proceedings, it was contended before the High Court that
even in quantum appeal, the matter had to be reconsidered by the Assessing
Officer in order to ascertain whether the amount of Rs.2,32,28,173 was received
by the partners of the firm during the A.Y. 1993-94 or not.

The High Court observed that the search material showed that
payments were made on different dates. The High Court found that the entire
unaccounted money had been brought into tax for the A.Y. 1993-94, which in fact
was not fully correct. The High Court was therefore, of the view that the order
passed by the Assessing Officer had to be set aside and the matter had to be
remanded to the Assessing Officer to find out whether Rs.2,32,28,173 was
received by the partners of the appellant-firm during the A.Y. 1993-94 or not,
and based on such finding, the assessment had to be completed. The High Court
held that it was for the appellant and his partners to explain and produce
relevant documents before the Assessing Officer to show that when and how the
aforesaid amount of Rs.2,32,28,173 was received by them. If the partners of the
appellant-firm were unable to produce any material evidence, then it was for the
Assessing Officer to complete the assessment, treating that the amount had been
received by the partners of the appellant-firm during the A.Y. 1993-94 only. The High Court further held that in view of the assessment being set aside,
at the request of the assessee, the assessee would not raise any question of
limitation.

In an
appeal before the Supreme Court it was con-tended by the appellant that the
High Court had failed to answer the question as to whether the amount allegedly
paid by the purchasers on different dates to the managing partners of the firm
could be brought to tax in the hands of the appellant firm. The Supreme Court
found merit in the contention of the appellant, but as the other question was
remanded by the High Court to the Assessing Officer, the Supreme Court also
remanded the issue to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration in accordance
with law.

Warehousing income : Whether business income or income from property : S. 22 and S. 28 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Income would be business income if dominant purpose was commercial activity and it would be income from property if dominant ob

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10 Warehousing income :
Whether business income or income from property : S. 22 and S. 28 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Income would be business income if dominant purpose
was commercial activity and it would be income from property if dominant object
was to lease property.


[Nutan Warehousing Co. P.
Ltd. v. Dy. CIT,
326 ITR 94 (Bom.)]

The assessee-company was
carrying out warehousing activities since 1972. For the A.Y. 2001-02, the
Assessing Officer assessed the warehousing charges as income from business and
the rental income as income from house property. In appeal, the Commissioner of
Income Tax (Appeals) treated even the warehousing charges as income from house
property. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the assessee,
the Bombay High Court remanded the matter and held as under :

“(i) The question whether
the income received by the assessee from a transaction entered into in respect
of immovable property should be treated as income from house property or as
income from business, would have to be resolved on the basis of the
well-settled tests laid down by the law in decided cases. What is material in
such cases is the primary object of the assessee while exploiting the
property. If the primary or the dominant object is to lease or let out
property, the income derived from the property would have to be regarded as
income from house property. Conversely, if the dominant intention of the
assessee is to exploit a commercial asset by carrying on a commercial
activity, the income would have to be treated as income from business. What
has to be deduced is as to whether the letting out of the property constitutes
a dominant aspect of the transaction or whether it was subservient to the main
business of the assessee.

(ii) The terms of the
warehousing agreements were not considered by the Tribunal. Merely styling an
agreement as a warehousing agreement would not be conclusive of the nature of
the transaction since it was for the Tribunal to determine as to whether the
transaction was a bare letting out of the asset or whether the assessee was
carrying on a commercial activity involving warehousing operations.



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Presumptive tax : Civil construction business : S. 44AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 : Assessment of income at 8% u/s.44AD : Assessee is not under any obligation to explain individual entry of cash deposit in bank, unless such entry has no n

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8 Presumptive tax : Civil
construction business : S. 44AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2005-06 :
Assessment of income at 8% u/s.44AD : Assessee is not under any obligation to
explain individual entry of cash deposit in bank, unless such entry has no nexus
with gross receipts.


[CIT v. Surinder Pal
Anand,
192 Taxman 264 (P&H)]

The assessee is in the
business of civil construction. For the A.Y. 2005-06, the income of the assessee
from civil construction business was computed at the presumptive rate of 8% of
the gross receipts u/s.44AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The AO made an addition
in respect of the cash deposited in the bank account during the year. On appeal,
the Commissioner (Appeals) held that the assessee was not required to maintain
regular books of account as the return had been filed u/s.44AD and the turnover
was below Rs.40 lakhs. It was also recorded that since the cash deposits in the
bank statement were lower than the business receipts shown by the assessee and
in the bank statement there were withdrawals as well as deposits, the addition
was unjustified. The Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under :

“(i) Ss.(1) of S. 44AD
clearly provides that where an assessee is engaged in the business of civil
construction or supply of labour for civil construction, income shall be
estimated at 8% of the gross amount paid or payable to the assessee in the
previous year on account of such business or a sum higher than the aforesaid
sum, as may be declared by the assessee in his return of income,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in S. 28 to S. 43C. This
income is to be deemed to be the profits and gains of the said business
chargeable to tax under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession’. However, the said provisions are applicable where the gross
amount paid or payable does not exceed Rs.40 lakhs.

(ii) Once under the
special provision, exemption from maintenance of books of account has been
provided and presumptive tax at the rate of 8% of the gross receipt itself is
the basis for determining the taxable income, the assessee is not under any
obligation to explain individual entry of cash deposit in the bank, unless
such entry has no nexus with the gross receipts.

(iii) In the instant case,
the stand of the assessee before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal
that the amount in question was on account of business receipts had been
accepted. The Revenue could not show with reference to any material on record
that the cash deposits were unexplained or undisclosed income of the assessee.

(iv) Therefore, no
question of law arose from the Tribunal’s order and the Revenue’s appeal was
to be dismissed.”

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Reassessment : S. 143(2), S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1994-95 and 1995-96 : Return filed in response to notice u/s.148 : Notice u/s.143(2) mandatory before proceeding to pass reassessment order.

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9 Reassessment : S. 143(2),
S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1994-95 and 1995-96 : Return
filed in response to notice u/s.148 : Notice u/s.143(2) mandatory before
proceeding to pass reassessment order.


[CIT v. Rajeev Sharma,
192 Taxman 197 (All.); 232 CTR 309 (All.)]

For the A.Y. 1994-95, the
assessee had filed original return of income on 29-3-1996. On 26-12-2000, the
Assessing Officer issued a notice u/s.148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In
response to the said notice, the assessee informed that he had already filed
return of income on 29-3-1996 and requested the Assessing Officer to withdraw
the said notice u/s.148. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer issued notice
u/s.143(2) and u/s.142(1) informing the assessee that notice u/s.148 was pending
and had not been withdrawn as requested by him. Thereafter, the assessee filed
return on 7-2-2002. The AO thereafter completed the assessment u/s.147 of the
Act. In appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) the assessee contended that
since no notice was issued u/s.143(2) after filing of return in response to
notice u/s.148, reassessment was not valid. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected
the contention holding that when the assessee had filed return in response to
notice u/s. 148, non-issuance of notice u/s.143(2) after filing return would not
be fatal. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal holding that after filing
of return in response to notice u/s.148, a notice u/s.143(2) should have been
issued being mandatory in nature.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The provisions
contained in S. 143(2) are mandatory and the Legislature, in its wisdom by
using the word ‘reason to believe’, has cast a duty on the Assessing Officer
to apply his mind to the material on record and after being satisfied with
regard to escaped liability, to serve notice specifying particulars of such
claim. In view of the above, after receipt of return in response to notice
u/s.148, it shall be mandatory for the Assessing Officer to serve a notice
u/s.143(2) assigning reason therein.

(ii) In the absence of any
notice issued u/s.143(2) after receipt of fresh return submitted by the
assessee in response to notice u/s.148, the entire procedure adopted for
escaped assessment shall not be valid.

(iii) In the instant case,
in response to the notice issued u/s.148, the assessee sent a letter to drop
the proceedings. Therefore, vide letter dated 18-12-2001, the Deputy
Commissioner informed that proceeding would not be dropped and gave last
opportunity to file return. Along with letter dated 18-12-2001, notices
u/s.143(2) and u/s.142(1) were also sent. In consequence thereof, the assessee
filed return on 7-2-2002. After filing of return, the Assessing Officer should
have applied his mind and after considering the material on record on ‘reason
to believe’, notice u/s. 143(2) should have been issued afresh.

(iv) Since return was
filed on 7-2-2002 in response to notice u/s.148, earlier notice dated
29-3-2001 would not be treated as valid notice for the purpose of escaped
assessment. The Legislature, in its wisdom had categorically provided that
after receipt of notice u/s.148 a fresh return may be filed and in consequence
thereof, the Assessing Officer has to apply his mind to the contents of fresh
return and then issue a notice u/s.143(2). The satisfaction, under reason to
believe, must be recorded by the Assessing Officer after applying his mind to
the contents of fresh return before issuing a notice u/s.143(2).

(v) Therefore, the appeals
were to be dismissed and the judgments of the Tribunal were to be upheld.”

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Estate duty — Valuation of goodwill — Super Profits method — There is no hard and fast rule regarding multiplier to be applied for evaluating goodwill — Value would depend on the nature of business and prevailing market conditions — Property passing on de

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10 Estate duty — Valuation of goodwill — Super Profits method
— There is no hard and fast rule regarding multiplier to be applied for
evaluating goodwill — Value would depend on the nature of business and
prevailing market conditions — Property passing on death — Claim pending
adjudication on date of death — Not a property available at the time of death.


[Controller of Estate Deputy v. Nalini V. Saraf, (2009) 319
ITR 303 (SC)]

One V. G. Saraf passed away on October 18, 1984. He was a
partner in M/s. Saraf Trading Corporation, a partnership firm carrying on
business as commission agents and exporters of tea. It exported tea to U.S.S.R.
The firm was constituted under deed of partnership dated November 27, 1963. The
firm had three partners. The deceased had fifty per cent share in profit and
loss. On September 16, 1981, the firm was reconstituted with the admission of
one more partner and a minor. The Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, inter
alia, held that for determining the value of goodwill, there were two methods of
valuation, namely, super profits method and total capitalisation method. The
Assistant Controller
preferred the super profits method. Applying the super profits method, the
Assistant Controller applied the multiplier of three years’ purchase, whereas
the assessee-respondent contended that 3X was excessive. The Assistant
Controller further held that refund of income-tax, which became due after the
demise of V. G. Saraf, constituted property of the deceased, which was also
disputed by the legal representatives of the deceased.

On the facts, the Tribunal found that at the relevant time,
the market conditions in the U.S.S.R. were not congenial; that there was huge
volatility in the tea export business even otherwise; and in the circumstances,
the Tribunal applied the multiplier of one year’s purchase instead of three
years’ purchase. This finding was upheld by the High Court.

The Supreme Court noted that in this case, the method was not
in dispute. The Supreme Court held that there was no hard and fast rule
regarding the multiplier to be applied for evaluating the goodwill of the firm.
It all depended on the nature of the business and the prevailing market
conditions. Hence, the Supreme Court was of the view that this aspect was a pure
question of fact and did not call for interference by the Supreme Court.

On the question as to whether the refund in question, which became payable
after the death, the Tribunal and the High Court concurrently held that the
refund had not become due (crystallised) on October 18, 1984, when V. G. Saraf
passed away. In fact, on that day, the claim for refund under the Act was
pending adjudication. Such refund stood determined only after the deceased.
Hence, the Supreme Court held that such refund could not be considered to be a
property available at the time of the death.

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Rectification of mistake — Whether power subsidy received by an assessee is revenue receipt or capital receipt has to be decided on the facts of each case after examining the scheme of subsidy and therefore cannot be a subject matter of rectification on t

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9 Rectification of mistake — Whether power subsidy received
by an assessee is revenue receipt or capital receipt has to be decided on the
facts of each case after examining the scheme of subsidy and therefore cannot be
a subject matter of rectification on the basis of some subsequent decision of
the Supreme Court.


[Mepco Industries Ltd. v. CIT, (2009) 319 ITR 208 (SC)]

The appellant, engaged in the business of manufacture of
potassium chlorates, had its factory in the Union Territory of Pondicherry. The
appellant received power subsidy for two years, which it initially offered as
revenue receipt in its return of income. In the petition filed u/s.264 of the
Act, the assessee pleaded that the subsidy amount was a capital receipt, hence
not liable to be taxed, and accordingly, it sought revision of the assessment
orders for the A.Ys. 1993-94 and 1994-95. In the revision petitions, the
appellant had pleaded that the subsidy amount was a capital receipt, and for
that purpose, it relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
CIT v. P. J. Chemicals Ltd. reported in (1994) 210 ITR 830. The revision
petitions filed by the appellant u/s.264 of the Act stood allowed by the
Commissioner of Income-tax by order dated April 30, 1997. Subsequent to the said
order, on September 19, 1997, the Supreme Court in the case of Sahney Steel and
Press Works Ltd. (1997) 228 ITR 253 held that incentive subsidy admissible to
Sahney Steel and Press Works Limited was a revenue receipt, and hence, it was
liable to taxed u/s.28 of the Act. This decision was based on a detailed
examination of the subsidy scheme formulated by the Government of Andhra
Pradesh. It stated that incentives would not be available unless and until
production had commenced. In that matter, the Supreme Court found that
incentives were given by refund of sales tax and by subsidy on power consumed
for production. In short, on the facts and circumstances of that case, the
Supreme Court had come to the conclusion that the incentives were production
incentives in the sense that the assessee was entitled to incentives only after
entering into production. It was also clarified that the scheme was not to make
any payment directly or indirectly for setting up the industries.

Following the said judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. (1997) 228 ITR 253, delivered on September
19, 1997, the Commissioner of Income-tax passed an order of rectification dated
March 30, 1998. The only ground on which the rectification was sought to be made
by the Commissioner of Income-tax was that power tariff subsidy given to the
appellant herein was admissible only after commencement of production.
Consequently, according to the Commissioner of Income-tax, power tariff subsidy
constituted operational subsidies, they were not capital subsidies, and in the
circumstances, applying the ratio of judgment of this Court in the case of
Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. (1997) 228 ITR 253, the Commissioner of
Income-tax sought to rectify its earlier order dated April 30, 1997, by invoking
S. 154 of the Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed writ
petitions before the Madras High Court, which took the view that, in view of the
subsequent decision of this Court, in the case of Sahney Steel and Press Works
Ltd. (1997) 228 ITR 253, the Department was entitled to invoke S. 154 of the Act
and that the Commissioner was right in treating the receipt of subsidies as a
revenue receipt. This decision of the learned single Judge was affirmed by the
Division Bench of the Madras High Court.

On appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court held that on
the facts of the present case, it was of the view that the present case involved
change of opinion. The Supreme Court observed that the Government grants
different types of subsidies to the entrepreneurs. The subsidy in Sahney Steel
and Press Works Ltd. (1997) 228 ITR 253 (SC) was an incentive subsidy linked to
production. In fact, in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. (1997) 228 ITR 253
(SC) (at page 257), the Court categorically stated that the scheme in hand was
an incentive scheme and it was not a scheme for setting up the industries. In
the said case, the salient features of the scheme were examined and it was
noticed that the scheme formulated by the Government of Andhra Pradesh was
admissible only after the commencement of production. The Supreme Court held
that in income-tax matters, one has to examine the nature of the item in
question, which would depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, it
was concerned with power subsidy, whereas in the case of CIT v. Ponni Sugars
and Chemicals Ltd.
reported in (2008) 306 ITR 392, the subsidy given by the
Government was for repaying loans. Therefore, in each case, one has to examine
the nature of subsidy. This exercise cannot be undertaken u/s.154 of the Act.
There is one more reason why S. 154 in the present case was not invokable by the
Department. Originally, the Commissioner of Income-tax, while passing orders
u/s.264 of the Act on April 30, 1997, had taken the view that the subsidy in
question was a capital receipt not taxable under the Act. After the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. (1997) 228 ITR 253, the
Commissioner of Income-tax took the view that the subsidy in question was a
revenue receipt. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the case before it
was a classic illustration of change of opinion.

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Block assessment: S. 158BD of I. T. Act, 1961: Block period from 01/04/1996 to 28/10/2002: Notice for filing return: Satisfaction must be of the officer issuing notice and not of another officer: No assessment pursuant to notice: Assessee cannot be asked

New Page 1

Reported:


51 Block assessment: S. 158BD of I. T. Act, 1961: Block
period from 01/04/1996 to 28/10/2002: Notice for filing return: Satisfaction
must be of the officer issuing notice and not of another officer: No assessment
pursuant to notice: Assessee cannot be asked to file a return again: Notice
calling for return “as a company” : Status of assessee for earlier year accepted
as individual: Notice invalid.

[Subhas Chandra Bhaniramka Vs. Asst.; 320 ITR 349 (Cal)]

 

By a notice dated 18/08/2005, the Asst. Commissioner, Central
Circle called upon the petitioner to file a return of undisclosed income in the
status of a company for the block period from 01/04/1996 to 28/10/2002 u/s.
158BD(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. As the petitioner was assessed as an
individual, the petitioner filed the return in that status. However, the Asst.
Commissioner of the Central Circle by a letter intimated that since jurisdiction
was with the Asst. Commissioner of Circle 38, proceedings initiated u/s. 158BD
of the Act had been dropped. Thereafter, the petitioner received notice u/s.
158BD of the Act issued by the Asst. Commissioner of Circle 38 calling upon him
to file a return in the status of a company for the block period. The petitioner
requested him to furnish a certified copy of the satisfaction required for
issuing the notice u/s. 158BD. But it was not furnished.

 

The Calcutta High Court allowed the writ petition filed by
the petitioner and held as under:

 


“i) Under the Act “an individual” and “a company” are
separate entities. In the assessment for the assessment year 2004-05 the
Department had accepted the status of the petitioner as an individual.
However, by notice dated 31/08/2007 the petitioner was requested to file a
return “as a company”. The notice also described the petitioner “as a
company”. Since the Department had accepted the status of the petitioner as an
“individual”, and as the status of the petitioner had been incorrectly
described in the notice dated 31/08/2007, the notice was ex facie bad and
illegal.

ii) Since proceedings u/s. 158BD may have financial
implications, the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer must reveal the mental
and the dispassionate thought process of the Assessing Officer in arriving at
a conclusion and must contain reasons which should be the basis of initiating
the proceedings u/s. 158BD. Therefore, though section 158BD contains the word
“satisfy” and does not contain the words ” record his reasons” as postulated
in section 148, before proceeding, the Assessing Officer has to record his
reasons for being “satisfied”, which in the instant case was absent. There was
nothing on record to show that there was subjective and independent
satisfaction.

iii) Though the affidavit revealed that the Asst.
Commissioner of the Central Circle had recorded his satisfaction, there was
nothing to show that the Asst. Commissioner of Circle 38 had been satisfied.
He could not use the satisfaction recorded by the other officer. Therefore,
the proceeding was illegal.

iv) Since the earlier notice had not been declared invalid
by any court of law and a return was filed pursuant thereto, on which no
assessment had been made, the Asst. Commissioner of Circle 38 could not call
for another return.

v) The respondents had tried to justify the act by
supplementing reasons in their affidavit. The validity of an order has to be
judged from the order itself. The act which was not within the parameters of
section 158BD could not be validated by additional or supplementary grounds
later brought by way of affidavits.”


 

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Reassessment: Proviso to S. 147 and 148 of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2002-03: Assessment u/s. 143(3): Notice u/s. 148 beyond 4 years: Conditions not satisfied: Notice invalid:

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Not Reported
:

50 Reassessment: Proviso to S. 147 and 148 of I. T. Act,
1961: A. Y. 2002-03: Assessment u/s. 143(3): Notice u/s. 148 beyond 4 years:
Conditions not satisfied: Notice invalid:


[Bhavesh
Developers Vs. AO (Bom); W. P. No. 2580 of 2009 dated 12/01/2010]


 

The petitioner assessee was engaged in the business of
developing and constructing buildings. The petitioner was entitled to deduction
u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the same was granted by the
Assessing Officer. For the A. Y. 2002-03 the Assessing Officer had passed the
assessment order u/s. 143(3) of the Act on 17/01/2005 allowing deduction of Rs.
3,85,75,992/- u/s. 80-IB(10) of the Act. Subsequently, he issued a notice u/s.
148 dated 30/03/2009 for reopening the assessment. The following reasons were
recorded for reopening the assessment:

 

“On verification of case records, it is seen that the
assessee is claiming deduction u/s. 80-IB for an amount of Rs. 3,85,75,992/-.
However, as per details filed and P & L A/c. it is further observed that during
the year assessee has other income of Rs. 50,13,307/- which mainly comprises of
society deposit of Rs. 47,80,517/-, stilt parking Rs. 1,25,000/- and Sundry
Credit Balances of Rs. 1,07,712/-. Since this income does not qualify as the
income eligible for deduction u/s. 80-IB, I have reason to believe that the
income to this extent has escaped assessment and it is a fit case for issuing
notice u/s. 148 of the I. T. Act, 1961.”

 

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition challenging
the validity of the notice and held as under:

“i) In support of the claim for deduction u/s. 80-IB(10),
the assessee had placed certain material before the Assessing Officer. The
material that was filed with the return of income included a duly filled up
Form 10CCD. The form contained details as specified, including item 19, the
total sales of the undertaking; in item 21, the profits and gains derived by
the undertaking from the eligible business; and, in item 22, disclosed that
the deduction has been claimed under sub-section (10) of section 80-IB. The
form was certified by a Chartered Accountant. The statement of total income
and the balance sheet as on 31st March 2002 was appended to the return. The
profit and loss account for the year ending 31st March 2002 contained a
disclosure of other income in the amount of Rs. 50,13,307.16. Schedule G to
the Balance Sheet contains a break-up of the other income of Rs. 50.13 lakhs.
In addition to this disclosure, during the course of the assessment
proceedings, a letter was addressed on behalf of the assessee, by its
Chartered Accountant to the Assessing Officer. The letter inter alia contains
an explanation of the other income as reflected in the profit and loss
account. The assessee also furnished to the Assessing officer a statement of
sales and other income for each wing and for the flats comprised in the
construction as of 31st March 2002.

ii) In this background, it would be necessary to scrutinize
the basis on which a notice was issued u/s. 148 for reopening the assessment.
Ex-facie, the reasons which have been disclosed to the assessee would show
that the inference that the income has escaped assessment is based on the
disclosure made by the assessee itself. The reasons show that the finding is
based on the details filed by the assessee and from the profit and loss
accountant. Quite clearly, therefore, it was impossible for the Assessing
Officer to even draw the inference that there was a failure on the part of the
assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his
assessment for A. Y. 2002-03.

iii) Significantly, the reasons that have been disclosed to
the assessee do not contain a finding to the effect that there was a failure
to fully and truly disclose all necessary facts, necessary for the purpose of
assessment. In these circumstances, the condition precedent to a valid
exercise of the power to reopen the assessment, after lapse of four years from
the relevant Assessment Year, is absent in the present case.”


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Business expenditure: Deduction only on actual payment: Ss. 43B and 36(1)(va) of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2002-03: Employee’s contribution to PF: Paid beyond due date under PF Act but before due date for filing return of income: Deduction allowable in the r

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Not Reported
:

49 Business expenditure: Deduction only on actual payment:
Ss. 43B and 36(1)(va) of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2002-03: Employee’s contribution
to PF: Paid beyond due date under PF Act but before due date for filing return
of income: Deduction allowable in the relevant year:


[CIT
Vs. Animil Ltd. (Del); ITA No1063 of 2008 dated 23/12/2009]


 

In the previous year relevant to the A. Y. 2002-03 the
assessee had paid the employer’s contribution and the employees’ contribution
towards Provident Fund and ESI after the due date, as prescribed under the
relevant Act/Rules. The Assessing Officer made additions of Rs. 42,58,574/-
being employees’ contribution u/s. 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rs.
30,68,583/- being employer’s contribution u/s. 43B of the Act. The CIT(A)
deleted the addition and the Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A).

In appeal u/s. 260A of the Act, by the Revenue, the following
question was raised:

“Whether the ITAT was correct in law in deleting the
addition relating to employees’ contribution towards Provident Fund and ESI
made by the Assessing Officer u/s. 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?”

 


The Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and
held as under:

“If the employees’ contribution is not deposited by the due
date prescribed under the relevant Acts and is deposited late, the employer
not only pays interest on delayed payment but can incur penalties also, for
which specific provisions are made in the Provident Fund Act as well as ESI
Act. Therefore, the Act permits the employer to make the deposit with some
delay, subject to the aforesaid consequences. In so far as the Income-tax Act
is concerned, the assessee can get the benefit if the actual payment is made
before the return is filed, as per the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in CIT Vs. Vinay Cement Ltd., 213 CTR 268 (SC).”

 


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Interest on borrowed capital : Deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1986-87 to 1988-89 : Amount borrowed at 16% interest and invested in 4% non-cumulative preference shares : No evidence that transaction not genuine : No part of intere

New Page 2

7 Interest on borrowed
capital : Deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1986-87 to
1988-89 : Amount borrowed at 16% interest and invested in 4% non-cumulative
preference shares : No evidence that transaction not genuine : No part of
interest could be disallowed.


[CIT v. Pankaj Munjal
Family Trust,
326 ITR 286 (P&H)]

For the A.Ys. 1986-87 to
1988-89, the assessee had claimed deduction of interest at the rate of 16%
borrowed for purchase of 4% non-cumulative preference shares. The Assessing
Officer restricted the allowance to 4% and disallowed the balance interest. The
Tribunal allowed the full claim.

In reference at the instance
of the Revenue, the following question of law was raised :

“Whether, on the facts and
in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in
allowing interest as claimed by the assessee at a higher rate on borrowings to
the nominal fixed return on investments made in purchase of shares out of such
borrowings from family concerns ?”

The Punjab and Haryana High
Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) It is not the case of
the Revenue that the assessee had not paid interest to the lender. Merely
because the assessee had invested the borrowed amount for the purchase of 4%
non-cumulative preference shares, it could not be presumed that the
transaction was colourable. The Revenue had not brought on record any evidence
to show that the interest paid by the assessee on the borrowed amount was
highly exorbitant and no such interest rate was ever prevalent in the market.

(ii) Therefore, the
Tribunal was right in law in allowing interest as claimed by the assessee.”

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Writ petition — Even if small fraction of cause of action accrued within the territories of a State, the High Court of that State will have jurisdiction

New Page 1

16 Writ petition — Even if small fraction of cause of action
accrued within the territories of a State, the High Court of that State will
have jurisdiction


[Rajendran Chingaravelu v. R. K. Mishra, Addl. CIT,(2010) 320
ITR 1 (SC)]

Investigation — When the bona fides of a passenger carrying
an unusually large sum, and his claims regarding the source and legitimacy have
to be verified, some delay and inconvenience is inevitable. The inspection and
investigating officers have to make sure that the money was not intended for any
illegal purpose. In such a situation, the rights of the passenger will have to
yield to public interest. Any bona fide measures taken in public interest, and
to provide public safety or to prevent circulation of black money, cannot be
objected to as interference with the personal liberty or freedom of a citizen.

The appellant, a computer engineer, who was lucratively
employed in the United States of America for more than ten years, returned to
India with his earnings and took up employment in Hyderabad in the year 2006. He
wanted to buy a property at Chennai. But his attempts were not fruitful. He was
advised that if he wanted to buy a good plot, he must be ready to pay
considerable part of the sale price in cash as advance to the prospective
seller. When the appellant ultimately identified a prospective seller, he wanted
to go to Chennai with a large sum and finalise the deal. He contacted the
Reserve Bank of India, ICICI Bank (his banker) and the airport authority to find
out whether he could carry a large sum of money in cash while travelling. He was
informed that there was no prohibition. Thereafter, he drew Rs.65 lakhs from his
bank. He travelled by air from Hyderabad to Chennai on June 15, 2007, carrying
the said cash. At the Hyderabad airport, he disclosed to the security personnel
who checked his baggage that he was carrying cash of Rs.65 lakhs along with a
bank certificate certifying the source and withdrawals. After the contents of
his bags were examined by the security personnel, he was allowed to board the
aircraft without any objection. But when the flight reached Chennai, some police
officers and others (who were later identified as officers of the Income-tax
Investigation Wing) rushed in, and loudly called out the name of the appellant.
When the appellant identified himself, he was virtually pulled from the aircraft
and taken to an office in the first floor of the airport. He was questioned
there about the money he was carrying. The appellant showed them the cash and
the bank certificate evidencing the withdrawals and explained as to how the
amounts formed part of his legitimate declared earnings which were drawn from
his bank’s account. He also explained to them the purpose of carrying such huge
amount. The officers recorded his statement. After a few hours, the second
respondent came in and asked the appellant to sign some papers without allowing
him to read them and without furnishing him copies. It became obvious to the
appellant that the officers of the Income-tax Department were suspecting him of
carrying the money illegally. They even attempted to coerce him to admit that
the amount was being carried by him for some illegal purpose. Having failed,
they seized the entire amount under a mahazar, gave him a receipt and permitted
him to leave. In this process, he was detained for about 15 hours without any
justifiable reason. To add insult to the injury, the Tax Intelligence Officers
prematurely and hurriedly informed the newspapers that they had made a big haul
of Rs.65 lakhs in cash, making it appear as though the appellant was illegally
and clandestinely carrying the said amount, and they had successfully caught him
while he was at it. The next day all three leading Tamil newspapers (Daily
Thanthi, Dinamalar, Dinamani) as also an English daily — The Hindu, prominently
carried the news of the seizure from him. The news reports disclosed his name,
profession, his native place in Tamil Nadu, his place of employment. The news
report also stated that he was not able to satisfactorily explain the source of
the amount and that the officials had found discrepancies between what was drawn
by him from the bank and what he was carrying. Ultimately, two months later,
after completing the investigation and verification, as nothing was found to be
amiss or irregular, the seized money was returned to him, but without any
interest.

The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court
listing the following four acts on the part of the income-tax officials as
objectionable and violative of his fundamental rights : (i) his illegal
detention for more than 15 hours at the Chennai airport; (ii) illegal seizure of
the cash carried by him despite his explanation about the source and legitimacy
of the funds with supporting documents; (iii) failure to return the seized
amount for more than two months without any justification; and (iv) prematurely
and maliciously disclosing to the media a completely false picture of the
incident. The said acts, according to him, tarnished his reputation among his
friends, relatives and acquaintances, by being dubbed as some sort of a
criminal. The said writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground
that no part of the cause of action arose within Andhra Pradesh.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court did not
examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2)
of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of
the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a right to
sue) accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that
State will have jurisdiction. In this case, the genesis for the entire episode
of search, seizure and detention was the action of the security/intelligence
officials at Hyderabad airport (in Andhra Pradesh), who having inspected the
cash carried by him, alerted their counterparts at the Chennai airport that the
appellant was carrying a huge sum of money, and required to be intercepted and
questioned. A part of the cause of action, therefore, clearly arose in
Hyderabad. The Supreme Court also noticed that the consequential income-tax
proceedings against the appellant, which he challenged in the writ petition,
were also initiated at Hyderabad. Therefore, according to the Supreme Court the
writ petition ought not to have been rejected on the ground of want of
jurisdiction.

Considering the facts of the case, the Supreme Court
requested Mr. Gopal Subramanium, the learned Solicitor General to take notice
and suggest a solution. He agreed to have the matter examined as to whether
there was a need for issue of guidelines. Taking note of the issue, the Central
Board of Direct Taxes, Ministry of Finance issued a Circular dated November 18,
2009, setting out the guidelines to be followed by Air Intelligence Units or
Investigation Units while dealing with air passengers with valuables at the
airports of embarkation or destination, to avoid any undue convenience to them.

The Supreme
Court observed that when the bona fides of a passenger carrying an unusually
large sum, and his claims regarding the source and legitimacy have to be
verified, some delay and inconvenience is inevitable. The inspection and
investigating officers have to make sure that the money was not intended for
any illegal purpose. In such a situation, the rights of the passenger will have
to yield to public interest. Any bona fide measures taken in public interest,
and to provide public safety or to prevent circulation of black money, cannot
be objected to as interference with the personal liberty or freedom of a
citizen. According to the Supreme Court the actions of the officers of the
investigation wing in detaining the appellant for questioning and verification,
and seizing the cash carried by him, were bona fide and in the course of
discharge of their official duties and did not furnish a cause of action for
claiming any compensation.

 

The Supreme Court however held that the appellant’s grievance in
regard to media being informed about the incident even before completion of
investigation, was justified. The Supreme Court there is a growing tendency
among investigating officers (either police or other departments) to inform the
media, even before the completion of investigation, that they have caught a
criminal or an offender. Such crude attempts to claim credit for imaginary
breakthroughs should be curbed.

 

The Supreme
Court however was of the view that the bona fides of the intelligence wing
officials at Chennai was not open to question, though their enthusiasm might
have exceeded the limits when they went to press in regard to the seizure.

Bad debts: S. 36(1)(vii), (2) of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y. 2001-02: Assessee share broker purchasing shares for clients and paying money: Money not recoverable from client: Deduction allowable as bad debt:

New Page 1

Reported:

 

42 Bad debts: S. 36(1)(vii), (2) of I. T. Act, 1961: A. Y.
2001-02: Assessee share broker purchasing shares for clients and paying money:
Money not recoverable from client: Deduction allowable as bad debt:

CIT vs. Bonanza Portfolio Ltd.; 320 ITR 178 (Del):

The assessee was in the business of share broking. In the
course of its business, the assessee purchased shares on behalf of its clients
and paid the purchase money. The brokerage received by the assessee was shown as
income in its books of account of the immediate previous year. Since the balance
amount of Rs. 50,30,491/- could not be recovered from the client, the assessee
wrote-off the amount as bad debt. The assessee claimed the deduction of the said
amount as bad debt. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground
that the conditions for allowing the amount as bad debt, as stipulated in
section 36(1)(vii) and read with sub-section (2), were not satisfied. The
Tribunal held that the conditions are satisfied and allowed the claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as hereunder:

“i) The money receivable from the client had to be treated
as bad, and since it became bad, it was rightly considered as bad debt and
claimed as such by the assessee in the books of account.

ii) Since the brokerage payable by the client was a part of
the debt and that debt had been taken into account in the computation of the
income, the conditions stipulated in section 36(1)(vii) and (2) stood
satisfied.”

 


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Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC r/w S. 10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Assessee is entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC for remaining 10% of profit, which was to suffer tax after applying S. 10A/10B.

New Page 1

Reported :

26. Export profit :
Deduction u/s.80HHC r/w S. 10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Assessee
is entitled to deduction u/s.80HHC for remaining 10% of profit, which was to
suffer tax after applying S. 10A/10B.

[CIT v. Ambatturre
Clothing Ltd.,
194 Taxman 79 (Mad.)]

The assessee, an export
concern was entitled to deduction u/s.10A/10B and u/s.80HHC of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. For the A.Y. 2003-04 the assessee had claimed deduction u/s.10A/10B
of the Act and the same was allowed. The assessee had also claimed deduction
u/s.80HHC for the remaining 10% of the profit, which to suffer tax after
applying S. 10A/10B. The claim was allowed by the Assessing Officer.
Subsequently, the Assessing Officer rectified the assessment order u/s.154 and
withdrew the deduction allowed u/s.80HHC, holding that it amounted to double
deduction. The Tribunal cancelled the rectification order.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) According to the
Assessing Authority, such a claim made u/s.80HHC in respect of the remaining
10% of the profits amounted to a claim of double deduction, which was not
permissible. On the said basis, the Assessing Authority took the view that the
said issue was an apparent mistake on the face of the record, which he
rectified by passing his order dated 11-6-2007.

(ii) When we examine the
issue raised in this appeal, at the very outset, it will have to be pointed
out that even u/s.10A(6)(iii) of the Act, there is a specific
provision, which reads as under :

“No deduction shall be
allowed u/s.80HH or u/s.80HHA or u/s.80-I or u/s.80-IA or u/s.80-IB in
relation to the profits and gains of the undertaking; “

(iii) The very statutory
provision prescribing a prohibition in respect of the deductions in relation
to the profits and gains itself, has not specifically included S. 80HHC.
Apparently, it therefore would only mean that there was no prohibition for
claiming any deduction u/s. 80HHC while applying the benefits provided u/s.10A
of the Act. If that is the statutory prescription, by which the assessee was
entitled to claim a benefit u/s.80HHC in relation to the profits and gains
while invoking S. 10A, it will have to be concluded that the assessment order
in having allowed such a deduction of the remaining 10% of the profits earned
by the assessee, was not erroneous.

(iv) In any event, having
regard to such a statutory prescription available for the assessee to claim
the benefit u/s.80HHC in respect of the profits earned from S. 10A of the Act,
there is absolutely no scope for the Assessing Authority to have invoked S.
154 of the Act, in order to state that, that can be considered as an error
apparent, inasmuch as there was no error at all, much less, apparent error to
be rectified by the Assessing Authority.

(v) This conclusion of
ours is apart from the conclusion of the Tribunal in having held that in that
situation what was held by the Assessing Authority in the original assessment
order was a possible view and that cannot be considered as an error apparent
on the face of the records.”

 


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Search and seizure : Block assessment : S. 158BD of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Documents seized considered for assessment of third person : Notice could not be issued on assessee u/s.158BD.

New Page 2

Reported :


53 Search and seizure :
Block assessment : S. 158BD of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Documents seized
considered for assessment of third person : Notice could not be issued on
assessee u/s.158BD.

[Superhouse Overseas Ltd.
and Anr. v. Dy. CIT,
325 ITR 448 (All.)]

Search and seizure operation
u/s.132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was carried out at the residence of one T. A
diary was seized and proceedings u/s.158BC were initiated in the case of T.
Notices u/s.158BD were issued in the name of the petitioners.

The petitioners filed writ
petitions before the Allahabad High Court and challenged the notices. The
petitioners pointed out to the Court that the material on the basis of which the
notices u/s. 158BD were issued, had been considered by the Settlement Commission
in the case of E, an association of persons and the Settlement Commission had
passed an order u/s.245D(4) of the Act in which on the basis of the diary,
income had been determined and that in pursuance of the order of the Settlement
Commission, the association of persons had duly deposited the tax.

The Allahabad High Court
allowed the writ petitions and held as under :

“Once the diary which was
the basis for the issue of the notices u/s.158BD had been considered in the case
of the association of persons and the income arising thereof had been assessed
in the case of the association of persons, the notices u/s.158BD did not survive
and were liable to be quashed.”

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 Limitation : A.Y. 2004-05 : Reopening of assessment on certain items and reassessment completed : Revision in respect of other items u/s.263 : Period of limitation to be counted from the original assessment.

New Page 2

Reported :

52 Revision : S. 263 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 Limitation : A.Y. 2004-05 : Reopening of assessment on
certain items and reassessment completed : Revision in respect of other items
u/s.263 : Period of limitation to be counted from the original assessment.

[Ashoka Buildcom Ltd. v.
ACIT,
191 Taxman 29 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05 the
original assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by an
order dated 27-12-2006. Subsequently the assessment was reopened by issuing a
notice u/s. 148, dated 6-3-2007 on the basis that the benefit u/s.72A had been
wrongly allowed to the assessee. Reassessment was completed by an order u/s.147
dated 27-12-2007 withdrawing the benefit given to the assessee u/s.72A of the
Act. Thereafter, on 30-4-2009 the Commissioner issued notice u/s.263 proposing
to revise the assessment order dated 27-12-2007.

The assessee filed writ
petition and challenged the notice on the ground that what is sought to be
revised is the original assessment order dated 27-12-2006 and not the
reassessment order dated 27-12-2007 and accordingly the notice u/s.263, dated
30-4-2009 is beyond the period of limitation and hence invalid. The Bombay High
Court allowed the petition, quashed the notice and held as under :


“(i) While seeking to
exercise his jurisdiction u/s. 263, the Commissioner did not find any error
in the order of reassessment dated 27-12-2007 as regards the disallowance of
the assessee’s claim on the basis of the provisions of S. 72A. The impugned
notice adverted to issues which, as a matter of fact, did not form either
the subject-matter of the notice that was issued u/s.148 on 6-3-2007, nor
the order of reassessment thereupon which was passed on
27-12-2007. The jurisdiction u/s.263 was sought to be exercised with
reference to issues which were unrelated to the grounds on which the
original assessment was reopened and reassessment was made.

(ii) Ss.(2) of S. 263
stipulates that no order shall be made U/ss.(1) after the expiry of two
years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be
revised was passed. That period of two years from the end of the financial
year in which the original order of assessment dated 27-12-2006 was passed,
had expired on 31-3-2009. Hence, the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction
in respect of the original order of reassessment was barred by limitation.

(iii)
Where an assessment has been reopened u/s. 147 in relation to a particular
ground or in relation to certain specified grounds and subsequent to the
passing of the order of reassessment, the jurisdiction u/s.263 is sought to
be exercised with reference to issues which did not form the subject of the
reopening of the assessment or the order of reassessment, the period of
limitation provided for in Ss.(2) of S. 263 would commence from the date of
the order of assessment and not from the date on which the order reopening
the
reassessment has been passed.

(iv) The submission of
the Revenue was that when several issues are dealt with in the original
order of assessment and only one or more of them are dealt with in the order
of reassessment passed after the assessment has been reopened, the remaining
issues must be deemed to have been dealt with in the order of reassessment.
Hence, it had been urged that the omission of the Assessing Officer, while
making an order of reassessment, to deal with those issues u/s. 143(3), read
with S. 147, constituted an error which could be revised in exercise of the
jurisdiction u/s.263. The submission could neither be accepted as a matter
of first principle, based on a plain reading of the provisions of S. 147 and
S. 263, nor was it sustainable in view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court.

(v) For those reasons,
the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction u/s.263 was barred by
limitation.”



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Reassessment : S. 147 and S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : AO issuing notice u/s.148 on basis of information given by Dy. Director and directions from Dy. Director and Addl Commissioner : AO not applying his mind : Notice and reassessment p

New Page 2

Reported :

50 Reassessment : S. 147 and
S. 148 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1998-99 : AO issuing notice u/s.148 on
basis of information given by Dy. Director and directions from Dy. Director and
Addl Commissioner : AO not applying his mind : Notice and reassessment
proceedings not valid.

[CIT v. SFIL Stock
Broking Ltd.,
325 ITR 2852 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the
return of income filed by the assessee was processed u/s.143(1) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, on the basis of the information given by the
DDIT (Investigation) that the assessee was allegedly the beneficiary of a bogus
claim of long-term capital gain, the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s.148 of
the Act and made an addition of Rs.20,70,000 in the reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal quashed the reassessment proceedings holding it to be illegal.

The Delhi High Court upheld
the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) The first sentence
of the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer was mere information
received from the DDIT (Investigation). The second sentence was a direction
given by the same Deputy Director to issue a notice u/s.148. The third
sentence again comprised a direction given by the Additional Commissioner to
initiate proceedings u/s.148 in respect of cases pertaining to the relevant
ward.

(ii) The Assessing
Officer referred to the information and the two directions as reasons on the
basis of which he was proceeding to issue notice u/s.148.

(iii) These could not be
the reasons for proceeding u/s.147/148 of the Act. As the first part was
only an information and the second and the third parts of the reasons were
mere directions, it was not at all discernible as to whether the Assessing
Officer had applied his mind to the information and independently arrived at
a belief that, on the basis of the material which he had before him, income
had escaped assessment.

(iv) There was no
substantial question of law for consideration.”



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Rectification : S. 154 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Interest u/s.234B not levied in assessment order relying on decision of Supreme Court : Subsequent retrospective amendment : Order not erroneous : Rectification not valid.

New Page 2

Reported :


51 Rectification : S. 154 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Interest u/s.234B not levied in assessment order relying
on decision of Supreme Court : Subsequent retrospective amendment : Order not
erroneous : Rectification not valid.

[Shriram Chits
(Bangalore) Ltd. v. JCIT,
325 ITR 219 (Karn.)]

For the A.Y. 1998-99, the
assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Act. Following the judgment of the
Supreme Court in CIT v. Ranchi Club Ltd.; 247 ITR 209 (SC) interest was
not levied u/s. 234B of the Act. Subsequently, in view of the subsequent
retrospective amendment to S. 234B by the Finance Act, 2001 the Assessing
Officer rectified the assessment order u/s.154 of the Act and levied interest
u/s.234B of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the order of rectification.

The Karnataka High Court
allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and held as under :


“(i) In view of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Max India Ltd.; 295 ITR 282,
it was not possible for the Assessing Officer to reopen the case since the
Assessing Officer had rightly passed the order relying upon the judgment of
CIT v. Ranchi Club Ltd.; 247 ITR 209 (SC) while passing the order of
assessment.

(ii) Just because there
was a subsequent amendment, the Assessing Officer could not reopen the file.
The order of rectification was not valid.”



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Loss return : Delay in filing : Condonation of delay : S. 119(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : CBDT has power to condone the delay.

New Page 2

Reported :


49 Loss return : Delay in
filing : Condonation of delay : S. 119(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05
: CBDT has power to condone the delay.

[Lodhi Properties Co.
Ltd. v. Dept. of Revenue,
191 Taxman 74 (Del.)]

For the A.Y. 2004-05 the
assessee had filed return loss seeking carry forward of loss. The last date for
filing was 1-11-2004. The assessee’s representative reached the Central Revenue
building at around 5.15 p.m. on 1-11-2004. He was sent from one room to the
other and by the time he reached the room where his return was to be accepted,
it was already 6.00 p.m., when he was told that the return would not be accepted
because the counter had been closed. In such circumstance the return was filed
on the next day, i.e., on 2-11-2004. The assessee filed an application
u/s.119(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the CBDT for condonation of delay of
one day.

On a writ petition filed by
the assessee challenging the order of rejection, the Revenue contended that
since it was a case of a loss return, there was no provision under the law for
condoning the delay and that S. 119(2)(b) does not apply to such a case.

The Delhi High Court allowed
the writ petition and held as under :


“(i) The CBDT has the
power u/s.119(2) to condone the delay in the case of a return which is filed
late and where a claim for carry forward of losses is made.

(ii) In the instant
case, the impugned order u/s. 119 passed by the CBDT was a non-speaking one.
Normally, the matter would have been remanded to the CBDT to consider the
application of the assessee afresh. However, in the instant case, the delay
was only of one day and the circumstances had been explained and had not
been controverted by the respondents. A sufficient cause had been shown by
the assessee for the delay of one day in filing the return. If the delay was
not condoned, it would cause genuine hardship to the assessee. Thus, in the
circumstances of the case, instead of remanding the matter to the CBDT, the
delay of one day in filing of the return was to be directed to be condoned.”



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Capital gains : Transfer : A.Y. 1993-94 : Renunciation of right to subscribe to rights shares : Short-term capital loss : Renunciation in favour of general public : Does not amount to transfer : Loss notional : Not deductible.

New Page 2

Reported :

48. Capital gains : Transfer
: A.Y. 1993-94 : Renunciation of right to subscribe to rights shares :
Short-term capital loss : Renunciation in favour of general public : Does not
amount to transfer : Loss notional : Not deductible.

[CIT v. United Breweries
Ltd.,
325 ITR 485 (Kar.)]

As a holding company of a
company M, the assessee had the right to subscribe to 61,26,394 rights shares in
M. The assessee subscribed only to 22,75,650 shares and renounced the right to
subscribe 1,54,100 shares for a consideration of Rs.22,84,000. As a result the
right to subscribe to the balance 38,50,744 rights shares was lost. The assessee
claimed that before the rights issue of shares, the market quotation of shares
in M was Rs.80 per share and after the rights issue was completed the market
price came down to Rs.70 per share. The assessee therefore contended that on
account of this diminution in the value of shares by Rs.10 per share the
assessee incurred a loss to right to subscribe to 38,50,744 shares at the rate
of Rs.10 per share and that the total net loss was Rs.3,62,23,440. The Assessing
Officer rejected the claim of the assessee. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s
claim.

On appeal by the Revenue the
Karnataka High Court reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) There was no
transfer of the rights in the rights shares in question by the transferor to
the transferee. In other words, the rights were renounced by the assessee in
favour of unknown persons and that too for ‘nil consideration’. Though the
transferor was the assessee, the act of transfer was not complete inasmuch
as there was no transfer in favour of the transferee. Transfer in favour of
an unknown person could not be a transfer.

(ii) When a share can be
sold at a profit either in the open market or at the face value at Rs.10,
there was no question of suffering of loss in the facts of the case. The
loss was only notional. As there was no transfer by way of renunciation, the
question of allowing capital loss in respect of notional loss would not
arise.”



levitra

Bad debts : S. 36(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : No evidence that amount not taken into account in computing income of prior years : Bad debt allowable as deduction.

New Page 2

Reported :

47. Bad debts : S.
36(1)(vii) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : No evidence that amount not taken into
account in computing income of prior years : Bad debt allowable as deduction.

[CIT v. Dwarika
Industrial Development and Chains (P) Ltd.,
325 ITR 211 (All.)]

In the relevant year, a sum
of Rs.6,27,735 was lying under the head ‘sundry debtors’, which the company was
not able to realise as this money was due and payable by one NB. The assessee
had sent several letters directing the debtor to pay the amount, but the debtor
did not even acknowledge the same. The assessee therefore, wrote off the said
amount as bad debt and claimed deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act,
1961. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the
conditions for allowance of the bad debt as provided u/s.36(2)(i) have not been
clearly brought out. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee’s claim on
the ground that the Assessing Officer has not pointed out that this debt has not
been taken into account in computing the income in any earlier or previous year.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Allahabad High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :


“(i) It was the specific
case of the assessee that the amount represented the sales effected to NB,
but because of the fact that there was no documentary evidence in support of
the claim as also the acknowledgement of the letters, the said amount was
written off. The Assessing Officer did not make any comment on this issue
and instead proceeded on the ground by simply saying that merely because the
amount has become bad the assessee cannot claim to reduce the income and
placed reliance on S. 36(2)(i) of the Act.

(ii) In our opinion, the
Commissioner (Appeals) had rightly observed that the Assessing Authority did
not find any material on record to show that the said amount has not been
taken into account in computing the income of any previous years.

(iii) That being the
position, in our considered opinion, the Tribunal had rightly upheld the
deletion.”



levitra

Disallowance of expenditure : S. 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 14A are constitutionally valid : They apply w.e.f. A.Y. 2007-08 : Rule 8D is not ultra vires S. 14A : It applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2008-09.

New Page 2

Unreported :


46 Disallowance of
expenditure : S. 14A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 14A are
constitutionally valid : They apply w.e.f. A.Y. 2007-08 : Rule 8D is not


ultra vires
S. 14A : It applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2008-09.


[Godrej & Boyce v. DCIT (Bom.),
WP No. 758 of 2010 dated 12-8-2010]

In the writ petition
challenging the validity of S. 14A and Rule 8D, the Bombay High Court has held
as under :


“(i) S. 14A supersedes
the principle of law that in the case of a composite business, expenditure
incurred towards tax-free income could not be disallowed and incorporates an
implicit theory of apportionment of expenditure between taxable and
non-taxable income. Once a proximate cause for disallowance is established,
which is the relationship of the expenditure with income which does not form
part of the total income, a disallowance u/s.14A has to be effected.

(ii) The test which has
been enunciated in Walfort for attracting the provisions of S. 14A is that
“there has to be a proximate cause for disallowance which is its
relationship with the tax exempt income”. Once the test of proximate cause,
based on the relationship of the expenditure with tax exempt income is
established, a disallowance would have to be effected u/s.14A.

(iii) The provisions of
Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 14A are constitutionally valid. Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of
S. 14A are not retrospective. They apply w.e.f. 1-4-2007 i.e., from
A.Y. 2007-08.

(iv) In the affidavit in
reply that has been filed on behalf of the Revenue an explanation has been
provided for the rationale underlying Rule 8D. In the written submissions
which have been filed by the Additional Solicitor General it has been
stated, with reference to Rule 8D(2)(ii) that since funds are fungible, it
would be difficult to allocate the actual quantum of borrowed funds that
have been used for making tax-free investments. It is only the interest on
borrowed funds that would be apportioned and the amount of expenditure by
way of interest that will be taken (as ‘A’ in the formula) will exclude any
expenditure by way of interest which is directly attributable to any
particular income or receipt (for example, any aspect of the assessee’s
business such as plant/machinery, etc.).

(v) Rule 8D is not
ultra vires
the provisions of S. 14A. The Assessing Officer cannot
ipso facto
apply Rule 8D, but can do so only where he records
satisfaction on an objective basis that the assessee is unable to establish
the correctness of its claim.

(vi) Rule 8D is
prospective and applies w.e.f. A.Y. 2008-09. For prior years the Assessing
Officer has to enforce the provisions of S. 14A(1).

(vii) U/s.14A(1), it is
for the Assessing Officer to determine as to whether the assessee had
incurred any expenditure in relation to the earning of income which does not
form part of the total income. The Assessing Officer would have to arrive at
his determination after providing an opportunity to the assessee to furnish
its accounts and to place on record all relevant material in support of the
circumstances which are considered to be relevant and germane.

(viii) The argument that
dividend on shares/units is not tax-free in view of the dividend
distribution tax paid by the payer u/s.115-O is not acceptable, because such
tax is not paid on behalf of the shareholder, but is paid in
respect of the payer’s own liability.”



levitra

Impounding of documents : Scope of power u/s.131(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961 : Document does not include passport : Passport cannot be impounded u/s.131.

New Page 1

Reported :

25 Impounding of documents : Scope of power u/s.131(3) of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : Document does not include passport : Passport cannot be
impounded u/s.131.

[Avinash Bhosale v. UOI, 322 ITR 381 (Bom.)]

In a writ petition challenging the authority of impounding of
the passport with reference to S. 131(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Bombay
High Court held as under :

“(i) In Suresh Nanda’s case (2008) 3 SCC 674, the Supreme
Court was dealing with power of a Court to impound a document and, in that
context, held that ‘document’ does not include a passport.

(ii) If by an interpretative process the Supreme Court held
that even a Court cannot impound a passport, then, it would be highly
inappropriate to interpret the term ‘documents’ used in S. 131(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961, so as to enable the executive authorities to impound the
passport.

(iii) A passport cannot be impounded u/s.131 of the Act.”

levitra

Assessment : Validity : Block period 1-4-1990 to 20-8-2000 : Copies of seized material not provided to assessee, nor assessee given opportunity to cross-examine person whose statement AO relied upon : Fatal to proceedings : Addition cannot be sustained.

New Page 1

Reported :

23 Assessment : Validity : Block period 1-4-1990 to
20-8-2000 : Copies of seized material not provided to assessee, nor assessee
given opportunity to cross-examine person whose statement AO relied upon : Fatal
to proceedings : Addition cannot be sustained.

[CIT v. Ashwani Gupta, 322 ITR 396 (Del.)]

In an appeal against the block assessment order the
Commissioner (Appeals) found that the Assessing Officer had passed the
assessment order in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as
he had neither provided copies of the seized material to the assessee, nor had
he allowed the assessee to cross-examine the person on the basis of whose
statement the addition was made. He therefore held that the entire addition made
by the Assessing Officer was invalid and accordingly deleted the addition. The
Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The Revenue had accepted the findings of the Tribunal
on facts as also the position that there had been a violation of the
principles of natural justice. However, its plea was that the violation of the
principles of natural justice was not fatal so as to jeopardise the entire
proceedings.

(ii) The Tribunal correctly held that once there was a
violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as seized material was
not provided to an assessee, nor was cross-examination of the person on whose
statement the Assessing Officer relied upon, granted, such deficiencies would
amount to a denial of opportunity and, consequently, would be fatal to the
proceedings.

(iii) No substantial question of law arose.”


levitra

Business expenditure : Expenditure on prospecting, etc. of minerals : Applicability of S. 35E of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : Assessee in business of prospecting or exploration of ores and minerals and not in business of mining ores and minerals

New Page 1

Reported :

24 Business expenditure : Expenditure on prospecting, etc. of
minerals : Applicability of S. 35E of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 :
Assessee in business of prospecting or exploration of ores and minerals and not
in business of mining ores and minerals : No possibility of commercial
production : S. 35E not workable : S. 35E not applicable : Assessee entitled to
deduction of entire expenditure.

[CIT v. ACC Rio Tinto Exploration Ltd., 230 CTR 383
(Del.)]

The assessee company is engaged in the business of
prospecting and exploring ores and minerals. For the A.Y. 2001-02, the Assessing
Officer disallowed the claim for deduction of the expenditure on the ground that
the provisions of S. 35E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were applicable to the case
of the assessee and that the expenditure will be allowable in the year of
commercial production. The Assessing Officer rejected the contention of the
assessee that the provisions of S. 35E are not applicable since the assessee is
engaged in the business of exploring and prospecting of ores and minerals and
that it was not engaged in commercial production of any mineral. The CIT(A)
found that the activity of exploration constituted a separate activity by itself
as different and distinct from commercial production and allowed the assessee’s
claim. The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A).

On the appeal filed by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court
upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Upon a plain reading of the provisions of S. 35E, it
is apparent that unless and until there is commercial production, the
provisions of S. 35E(1) would be unworkable. The expression ‘year of
commercial production’ referred to in S. 35E(2) is defined in S. 35E(5)(b).
Unless and until there is actual commercial production, the phrase ‘year of
commercial production’, appearing in S. 35E(2), would be rendered meaningless.

(ii) The Tribunal has, on facts, come to the conclusion
that the assessee-company’s objects did not include mining of ores or minerals
or commercial production, in the sense understood within the meaning of S.
35E. Consequently, the Tribunal agreed with the assessee’s contention that
there would never be commercial production of any mineral or ore as a part of
the activities of the assessee.

(iii) Consequently, the provisions of S. 35E would not be
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as there was no
possibility of any commercial production.”


levitra

Revision : S. 197 and S. 264 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : An order rejecting application u/s.197 for lower rate for deduction of tax is an order which can be revised u/s.264.

New Page 1

Unreported

22 Revision : S. 197 and S. 264 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : An
order rejecting application u/s.197 for lower rate for deduction of tax is an
order which can be revised u/s.264.

[Larsen & Toubro Ltd. & Anr. (Bom.), W.P.(L) No. 694
of 2010, dated 28-4-2010]

On 29-10-2009, the petitioner had made an application to the
Assessing Officer u/s.197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for issuing a certificate
authorising MMRDA to deduct tax at source at a lower rate of 0.11% from the
payments made by it to the petitioner under a contract. The application was
rejected by the Assessing Officer. The petitioner therefore preferred a revision
petition u/s.264 to the Commissioner. The Commissioner rejected the application
inter alia on the ground that when the Assessing Officer rejects an
application u/s.197, he does not pass an ‘order’ as envisaged in S. 264 and
consequently, a revision u/s.264 is not maintainable.

The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the
petitioner challenging the order of the Commissioner and held as under :

“(i) The Commissioner is manifestly in error when he holds
that the rejection of an application u/s.197 by the Assessing Officer does not
result in an order and that the revisional power which is vested in the
Commissioner u/s.264 would not be attracted.

(ii) The Assessing Officer when he rejects an application
is bound to furnish reasons which would demonstrate an application of mind by
him to the circumstances which are mandated both by the statute and by the
Rules to be taken into consideration. Hence, it would be impossible to accept
the view that the rejection of an application u/s.197 does not result in an
order.

(iii) The expression ‘order’ for the purposes of S. 264 has
a wide connotation. The Parliament has used the expression ‘any order’. Hence,
any order passed by an authority subordinate to the Commissioner, other than
an order to which S. 263 applies, is subject to the revisional jurisdiction
u/s.264. A determination of an application u/s.197 requires an order to be
passed by the Assessing Officer after application of mind to the circumstances
which are germane u/s.197 and the rules framed U/ss.2A.

(iv) The Commissioner was, therefore, manifestly in error
when he held that there was no order which would be subject to his revisional
jurisdiction u/s.264.”


Reported :

23 Assessment : Validity : Block period 1-4-1990 to
20-8-2000 : Copies of seized material not provided to assessee, nor assessee
given opportunity to cross-examine person whose statement AO relied upon : Fatal
to proceedings : Addition cannot be sustained.

[CIT v. Ashwani Gupta, 322 ITR 396 (Del.)]

In an appeal against the block assessment order the
Commissioner (Appeals) found that the Assessing Officer had passed the
assessment order in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as
he had neither provided copies of the seized material to the assessee, nor had
he allowed the assessee to cross-examine the person on the basis of whose
statement the addition was made. He therefore held that the entire addition made
by the Assessing Officer was invalid and accordingly deleted the addition. The
Tribunal confirmed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

On appeal by the Revenue, the Delhi High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The Revenue had accepted the findings of the Tribunal
on facts as also the position that there had been a violation of the
principles of natural justice. However, its plea was that the violation of the
principles of natural justice was not fatal so as to jeopardise the entire
proceedings.

(ii) The Tribunal correctly held that once there was a
violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as seized material was
not provided to an assessee, nor was cross-examination of the person on whose
statement the Assessing Officer relied upon, granted, such deficiencies would
amount to a denial of opportunity and, consequently, would be fatal to the
proceedings.

(iii) No substantial question of law arose.”


levitra

Reassessment : S. 147, S. 148 and S. 154 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Reason to believe : Where the AO has option to rectify the assessment order u/s.154, reopening of assessment u/s.147 is not justified.

New Page 1

Unreported

20 Reassessment : S. 147, S. 148 and S. 154 of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2004-05 : Reason to believe : Where the AO has option to
rectify the assessment order u/s.154, reopening of assessment u/s.147 is not
justified.

[Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Bom.), W. P. No.
85 of 2009, dated 1-4-2010]

In the case of the petitioner, the assessment for the A.Y.
2004-05 was completed by an order dated 27-12-2006 passed u/s.143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. Subsequently, the Assessing Officer issued a notice
u/s.148, dated 7-4-2008 for reopening the assessment. Briefly, the reasons given
for reopening the assessment are as under :

“(i) The following deductions have been wrongly allowed in
the assessment order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act :


(a) Deduction of Rs.10,84,07,449 as loss of plantation
division, being 40% of the loss on sale of tea is wrongly allowed. Rule 8
applies to income and not for loss.

(b) Deduction of Rs.3,07,50,000 u/s.54EC has been
wrongly allowed since the transfer of the asset is on 29-9-2003 and the
date of allotment of the bond is 31-3-2004, which is beyond the prescribed
period of six months.

(c) Loss of Rs.1,33,49,654 of a unit eligible for
deduction u/s.10B has been wrongly allowed to be set off against normal
business income and this has resulted in excessive deduction u/s.10B to
that extent.

(ii) Deduction of loss of Rs.10,84,07,449 from
plantation division has been allowed twice and as such there is
computation error.



The Bombay High Court quashed the notice u/s. 148, dated
7-4-2008 and held as under :

“(i) Loss from plantation division : Rule 8 creates
a legal fiction, as a result of which the income which is derived from the
sale of tea is to be computed as if it is income derived from business. In the
present case, the Assessing Officer, while issuing a notice for re-opening the
assessment, observed that the provisions of Rule 8 are applicable ‘only in the
case of income’ and the claim of the assessee to set off 40% of losses against
normal business profits could not be allowed. On this basis the Assessing
Officer has formed the opinion that the loss of Rs.10.84 crores attributable
to the business activity of the assessee involving the manufacture and sale of
tea was liable to be disallowed. It is on the basis of Rule 8 that the
Assessing Officer seeks to postulate that the loss attributable to the
business activity of the assessee would have to be disregarded on the ground
that it is not allowable expenditure. This inference which is sought to be
drawn by the Assessing Officer is contrary to the plain meaning of the
charging provisions of the Act; and to Rule 8, besides being contrary to the
position in law as laid down by the Supreme Court. The assessee was lawfully
entitled to adjust the loss which arose as a result of the business activity
under Rule 8.

(ii) Deduction u/s.54EC : The assessee transferred
the asset on 29-9-2003. The period of six months was due to expire on
28-3-2004. The assessee invested an amount of Rs.3.07 crores on 19-3-2004. A
receipt was issued on that date by the National Housing Bank. A debit was
reflected in the bank account of the assessee to the extent of the sum
invested on 19-3-2004. The certificate of bond was issued by the National
Housing Bank on 9-6-2004, which refers to the date of allotment as 31-3-2004.
For the purpose of the provisions of S. 54EC, the date of the investment by
the assessee must be regarded as the date on which the payment was made and
received by the National Housing Bank. This was within a period of six months
from the date of the transfer of the asset. Consequently the provisions of S.
54EC were complied with by the assessee. There is absolutely no basis in the
ground for re-opening the assessment.

(iii) Loss incurred by eligible unit u/s.10B : While
re-opening the assessment, the Assessing Officer has proceeded on the basis
that S. 10B provides an exemption and that in respect of the Crab Stick Unit
the assessee had suffered a loss of Rs.1.33 crores. The Assessing Officer has
observed that since the income of the unit was exempt from taxation, the loss
of the unit could not have been set off against the normal business income.
However this was allowed by the assessment order and it is opined that the
assessee’s income to the extent of Rs.1.33 crores has escaped assessment. The
Assessing Officer while re-opening the assessment ex-facie proceeded on
the erroneous premise that S. 10B is a provision in the nature of an
exemption. Plainly, S. 10B as it stands is not a provision in the nature of an
exemption, but provides for a deduction. The provision as it earlier stood was
in the nature of an exemption. After the substitution of S. 10B by the Finance
Act, 2000, the provision as it now stands provides for a deduction.
Consequently, it is evident that the basis on which the assessment has sought
to be re-opened is belied by a plain reading of the provision. The Assessing
Officer was plainly in error in proceeding on the basis that because the
income is exempted, the loss was not allowable. All the four units of the
assessee were eligible u/s.10B. Three units had returned a profit, while the
Crab Stick Unit had returned a loss. The assessee was entitled to a deduction
in respect of the profits of the three eligible units, while the loss
sustained by the fourth unit could be set off against the normal business
income. In the circumstances, the basis on which the assessment is sought to
be re-opened is contrary to the plain language of S. 10B.

(iv) Computational error : The other ground on which
the assessment is sought to be re-opened is the computational error in the
assessment order resulting in the deduction of the loss from plantation
division of Rs. 10.84 crores twice. There can be no dispute about the position
that the computational error that has been made by the Assessing Officer in
the present case is capable of being rectified u/s.154(1). Where the power to
rectify an order of assessment u/s.154(1) is adequate to meet a mistake or
error in the order of assessment, the Assessing Officer must take recourse to
that power as opposed to the wider power to re-open the assessment. The
assessee cannot be penalised for a fault of the Assessing Officer. The
provisions of the statute lay down overlapping remedies which are available to
the Revenue, but the exercise of these remedies must be commensurate with the
purpose that is sought to be achieved by the Legislature. The re-opening of an
assessment u/s.147 has serious remifications. Therefore, before recourse can
be taken to the wider power to reopen the assessment on the ground that there
is a computation error, as in the present case, the Assessing Officer ought to
have rectified the mistake by adopting the remedy available u/s.154 of the
Act.

All statutory powers have to be exercised
reasonably. Where a statute confers an area of discretion, the exercise of that
discretion is structured by the requirement that discretionary powers must be
exercised reasonably. The remedies which the law provides are tailored to be
proportional to the situation which the remedy resolves. Where the statute
provides for several remedies, the choice of the remedy must be appropriate to
the underlying basis and object of the conferment of the remedy. A simple
computational error can be resolved by rectifying an order of assessment
u/s.154(1). It would be entirely arbitrary for the Assessing Officer to reopen
the entire assessment u/s.147 to rectify an error or mistake which can be
rectified u/s.154. An arbitrary exercise of power is certainly not a
consequence which the Parliament contemplates. We, therefore, hold that in this
case the Revenue has an efficacious remedy open to it in the form of a
rectification u/s.154 for correcting the computational error and that
consequently recourse to the provisions of S. 147 was not warranted.

 For all the aforesaid
reasons, we are of the view that the Assessing Officer could not possibly have
formed a belief that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment within
the meaning of S. 147.”

Recovery of tax : Company : Directors liability u/s.179 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1990-91 : Liability does not extend to penalty payable by the company.

New Page 1

Unreported

21 Recovery of tax : Company : Directors liability u/s.179 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 1990-91 : Liability does not extend to penalty
payable by the company.

[Dinesh T. Tailor v. TRO (Bom.), W.P. No. 641 of 2010,
dated 27-4-2010]

The petitioner was a director of a company called Yazad
Investment & Finance Pvt. Ltd. up to 14-10-1989. By an order u/s.179 of the
Income-tax Act, 1961 the Assessing Officer raised a demand of Rs. 12.74 lakhs
against the petitioner, which is the liability of the said company for the A.Y.
1990-91 by way of tax and also the penalty u/s.271(1)(c) payable by the company.

On a writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the
said order, the Bombay High Court set aside the said order u/s.179 for
reconsideration and also held that the liability of a director u/s.179 does not
extend to the penal liability payable by the company. The High Court held as
under :

“(i) S. 179(1) refers to ‘any tax due from a private
company’ and every director of the company is jointly and severally liable for
the payment of ‘such tax’, which cannot be recovered from the company. The
expression ‘tax due’ and, for that matter the expression ‘such tax’ must mean
tax as defined for the purposes of the Act by S. 2(43).

(ii) ‘Tax due’ will not comprehend within its ambit a
penalty.”


levitra

MAT credit : Interest u/s.234B of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Credit for brought forward MAT is to be given from gross demand before charging interest u/s.234B.

New Page 1

Unreported

19 MAT credit : Interest u/s.234B of Income-tax Act, 1961 :
A.Y. 2000-01 : Credit for brought forward MAT is to be given from gross demand
before charging interest u/s.234B.

[CIT v. Apar Industries Ltd. (Bom.), ITA No. 1036 of
2009, dated 6-4-2010]

In an appeal filed by the Revenue for the A.Y. 2000-01, the
following question was raised before the Bombay High Court :

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case,
the Tribunal erred in law in holding that credit for brought forward MAT is to
be given from gross demand before charging interest u/s.234B of the Income-tax
Act, 1961 ?”

Following the judgment of the Delhi High Court in CIT v.
Jindal Exports Ltd.,
314 ITR 137 (Del.), the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) The sum represented by the available MAT credit would
fall within the expression ‘tax . . . . already paid under any provision of
this Act’ in S. 140A(1).

(ii) The expression tax paid ‘otherwise’ in S. 234B(2)
would take within its sweep any tax paid under a provision of the Act,
including the MAT credit.

(iii) The amendment to Explanation (1) of S. 234B by the
Finance Act, 2006 is clarificatory.

(iv) Credit for brought forward MAT is to be given from
gross demand before charging interest u/s.234B.”


levitra

Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80IB of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Interest on delayed payment of sale price is part of sale price : It is derived from the industrial undertaking : Is eligible for deduction u/s.80IB.

New Page 1

Unreported

18 Industrial undertaking : Deduction u/s.80IB of Income-tax
Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Interest on delayed payment of sale price is part of
sale price : It is derived from the industrial undertaking : Is eligible for
deduction u/s.80IB.

[CIT v. Vidyut Corporation (Bom.), ITA(L) No. 2865 of
2009, dated 21-4-2010]

The assessee was engaged in manufacturing electrical fittings
and appliances and was eligible for the deduction u/s.80IB of the Income-tax
Act, 1961. The assessee sells its manufactured products mainly to M/s. Bajaj
Electricals Ltd. Payment is normally made on delivery of goods. In case of delay
the assessee also receives interest for delayed payment. For the A.Y. 2000-01
the Assessing Officer disallowed the claim for deduction u/s.80IB in respect of
interest for delayed payment. The Commissioner and the Tribunal allowed the
assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) What is received by the assessee from the purchaser is
a component of interest towards delayed payment of the price of the goods
sold, supplied and delivered by the assessee. There can be no dispute about
the position that the price realised by the assessee from the sale of goods
manufactured by the industrial undertaking constitutes a component of the
profits and gains derived from the eligible business. The purchaser, on
account of delay in payment of the sale price also pays to the assessee
interest. This forms a component of the sale price and is paid towards the lag
which has occurred in the payment of the price of the goods sold by the
assessee.

(ii) On these facts, therefore, the payment of interest on
account of the delay in payment of the sale price of the goods supplied by the
undertaking partakes the same nature and character as the sale consideration.
The delayed payment charges consequently satisfy, together with the sale
price, the first degree test which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in
Liberty India v. CIT, 317 ITR 218.”


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Annus horribilis

Editorial

The year 2009 has been a year which most Chartered
Accountants in India would like to forget and put behind them as a bad dream.
Not only did the world economy and the Indian economy slow down, impacting
individual professional practices and careers, but the profession as a whole
suffered major blows to its credibility and standing, which plumbed new depths
during the year.

The month of January began with the arrest of a Council
member (possibly for the first time) along with his partner for abetting and
assisting in perpetration of a management fraud. The year also witnessed various
allegations against some office bearers and Council members regarding certain
actions and certain expenditures, and adverse media publicity for the Institute
in this regard. As if this were not enough, during the recent elections, we
witnessed frenzied voter wooing by candidates and electoral malpractices. How
much worse can things get for the profession ?

The image of the profession, which had a good standing in
public perception so far as compared to other professions, and had been built up
so assiduously over the years, has been badly dented in the course of events of
a single year. It is difficult to build up a reputation — it can be easily
destroyed overnight. Chartered Accountancy was one of the few professions of
which one could be proud to be a member of — all of us have joined the
profession because of its image. Today, even students talk about the untoward
happenings in the profession, and wonder what is in store for the future. As
professionals, is it not time for members to stop playing selfish politics and
combine together to rebuild the image of the profession ?

One can compare our profession with others and claim
superiority, or point out that the ills which plague the nation and Indian
society are bound to have an impact on our profession as well, instead of taking
corrective action. This is the easy way out, and will unfortunately lower the
status and dignity of the profession, which as a body of educated intellectuals,
should stand apart from the rest.

Our newly elected Council members have been elected with the
high hopes and expectations of the common members of the profession reposed in
them that they will act and take steps to stem the decline in standards of
public life in the profession. Image building cannot happen through mere public
relations and advertisements. It can happen only through principled decisions
and actions taken in the best interests of the profession, untainted by
considerations of personal impact. It calls for individual sacrifices for the
greater good of the profession.

The tasks ahead for the new Council are many and difficult.
Besides gearing up the members of the profession to meet the challenges thrown
up by introduction of IFRS, the Direct Taxes Code, GST and the new Companies
Act, the Council needs to usher in adequate transparency in the functioning of
the Institute. In this era of transparency, where the Right to Information Act
is invoked even in case of judges of the Supreme Court, no public organisation
can ignore the need for transparency. Can we introduce some manner of disclosure
for Council members to disclose their professional interests ? Can some form of
progress reports be given to the public at regular intervals in relation to
disciplinary proceedings which have a public bearing, so that the public is
aware and kept abreast of the reasons for delay in completion of proceedings ?
Today, it is not only important to take action, but as important to be seen as
having taken it.

It is also important that the rationale behind various
decisions is conveyed to the general membership, and that members are kept
abreast of the happenings at the Institute. Only then will members feel that
they are also an integral part of the Institute. After all, the Council members
are the duly elected representatives of the members.

There are many more changes which the profession is looking
forward to — follow-up of the amendment of the CA Act and the Companies Act to
permit functioning of CA practices as LLPs, electoral reforms and electronic
voting, amendments to the Code of Conduct — all these and many more items will
ensure that the new Council has its hands full throughout its term.

All of us offer our best wishes and support to the new
Council members in tackling the difficult tasks ahead. In their success as a
Council, lies our success as a profession.

I wish each one of you a happier and more professionally satisfying 2010.

Gautam Nayak

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Bogus Tax Refunds and Demands

Editorial

A recent news report of a fraud of Rs. 11 crores committed by 
issuance of bogus income tax refunds by the electronic mode comes as no surprise
to most of us. The fraud seems to have been facilitated by obtaining the
password of certain officials authorised to issue refunds. Such a fraud was
inevitable, given the lax systems and procedures followed by the Income Tax
Department.

The entire computerisation efforts have been pushed through
in a hurry, without creating the necessary environment for a robust, secure and
efficient system. Computerisation can be successful only if the personnel
involved are properly trained in the use of the systems as well as on the need
for security measures associated with the systems. Anyone who has visited an
income tax office is aware of the lack of security consciousness on the part of
the personnel of the Income Tax Department, particularly given the confidential
nature of the documents that they are dealing with. There have been instances
galore of details of income tax returns of various individuals and entities
being surreptitiously obtained from the Income Tax Department’s records by
rivals or enemies, though such information is being refused to be parted with
under the Right to Information Act. A proper retraining of the departmental
staff on the need for security and secrecy is, therefore, absolutely essential
to prevent future frauds.

The tragedy is that while such bogus refunds have been
siphoned off from the system, genuine refunds due to taxpayers are still pending
for more than a year; though it was promised that post-computerisation, such
refunds would be issued within four months of filing of the income tax returns.
While there is a significant improvement from the position that prevailed five
years ago, where one had to wait for almost three years for a tax refund, there
definitely is scope for improvement in the speed of processing of tax returns,
given the fact that such processing is now fully computerised. The only reason
that one can think of for not granting the tax refunds in time is the need for
tax authorities to show higher tax collections, to meet projected targets. One
only hopes that the pretext of the tax refund fraud is not used to further delay
the process of issuance of legitimate refunds due to taxpayers.

The system of unrealistic tax collection targets and the
pressure to meet these targets at all costs is detrimental to a taxpayer
friendly service. Such pressures result in large additions made during the
course of scrutiny assessment, whether justified or not, delays in clearance of
rectification applications, delays in passing orders to give effect to appellate
orders of the Tribunal and Commissioner (Appeals), besides delays in the
issuance of legitimate refunds. A large part of taxpayer grievances are on
account of the actions of tax authorities trying desperately, in whatever way
possible, to meet unrealistic targets set for them. Unless this problem is
tackled at the root itself, taxpayers would continue to suffer.

The enforcement of recovery of recently raised demands has
already begun in full swing, even while the appeals are being filed. All
demands, whether based on justifiable additions to income or not, are being
sought to be recovered. The CBDT has also recently clarified that recovery of
high-pitched demands should not be stayed merely because the addition is
substantial (see Spotlight on page xxx), and that instruction number 1914 would
apply to all recovery proceedings. One only hopes that a balanced view is taken
by the tax authorities while seeking to enforce recovery of demands. In the
pressure to meet collection targets, taxpayers should not be pressurised so much
that their business suffers on account of recovery of unjustified tax demands.
The government is seeking to stimulate the economy by reducing tax rates. Tax
authorities should not defeat that purpose of encouraging growth of business by
putting unwarranted financial pressure on businesses, just to try and meet
unachievable tax targets.

Tax authorities also need to keep in mind that instruction
number 1914 clarifies that appeal effects have to be given within two weeks from
the receipt of the appellate order and rectification applications should also be
decided within two weeks of the receipt of such applications. According to the
CBDT, undue delay in giving effect to appellate orders or in deciding 
rectification applications should be dealt with very strictly by the Chief
Commissioners or Commissioners. One hopes that these instructions would also be
followed by the tax authorities. After all, recovery and refund are two sides of
the same coin!

Gautam Nayak

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US & Globalisation

Editorial

President Obama’s visit to India a few days back was against
the backdrop of the toughest two years that the United States of America has
experienced since the 1930s. Unemployment in the USA is at an alarmingly high
level and there have been protests against outsourcing of work to India. Just
before his arrival, the US President also suffered a setback in the mid-term
elections to the Senate and the Congress. The President was frank when he said
he needed to create jobs back home and that is why he was in India. But the
visit of the President was possibly more ceremonial and it offered little in
terms of path-breaking policy or new agreements.

Obama, in his address to the Parliament, endorsed India’s bid
for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. While the statement pleased
everybody, one must not forget that Bill Clinton during his presidency had made
a similar promise to Japan. And Japan is yet not a permanent member of the UN
Security Council. It is also not out of place to mention that according to
Wikileaks, Hillary Clinton considers India as a self appointed frontrunner for
the permanent seat on the UN Security Council. So let us not get elated with the
promise of support to India. It is still a distant dream.

President Obama, at the Town Hall Meeting with students at
St. Xavier’s College, dealt with the issue of terrorism originating from
Pakistan. While we all commemorate the 2nd anniversary of 26/11, we need to
think about the point that the US President made when he mentioned that when
India is on the move economically, it is India that has the biggest stake in
Pakistan’s stability. We must appreciate that if Pakistan is stable, it has a
stable government, possibly the incentive to promote terrorism will itself be
diminished. It will help India to concentrate on issues of economic development.
Sometimes when we look at the problem from a different angle, it becomes
possible to find a solution. Certainly terrorism or support to terrorism in any
form is unacceptable, but can’t there be a novel way to tackle it effectively?

Another issue which Obama dealt with was how the USA looks at
globalisation. In the past, the USA was an extremely dominant player in the
world economy and it could set the terms while negotiating with others. It did
not matter if economies of other countries were not so open. Other countries
required goods and services from the USA and they could be obtained only on the
terms set by the USA. Today, things have changed. Now there is competition from
other countries like China, Brazil and India. This competition is perceived as a
threat by many in the USA. Today, the USA expects reciprocity from its trading
partners. It wants access to their markets. It wants India to open sectors like
banking, insurance, retail, etc. At the same time, today, the USA, which
advocates an open economy, is itself taking steps to protect its own industry
and Obama was justifying this protectionism followed by them. It is also true
that the President of the USA, like our own government, has also to consider
what is politically feasible and practical, which in terms of economic theory
may not be the best option.

So today, to get a good deal, whether as a nation or as a
private enterprise, we have to learn to understand our strengths as well as
weaknesses and negotiate well. It has become a matter of relative economic
strength, negotiating capacity and capability. Our mindset that Indians have to
sign on the dotted line while dealing with western countries has to change. At
the same time, we have to be efficient, quality conscious and professional in
our approach in our dealings. Let us hope we are able to make the most of the
opportunity that lies before the nation.

Indra Nooyi, Chairperson and CEO of Pepsico, who was one of
the important members of the delegation that accompanied President Obama to
India, explained the point made by the President subtly during the course of a
freewheeling interview to a television news channel. While stating that
globalisation was good and the process should not be reversed, she pointed out
that each country evolves a model that is right for that country. Each country
should evolve its own brand of capitalism but not retreat into protectionism.
She was frank yet subtle when she said that President Obama knows intellectually
that (big) business was very important. She was confident that the President
will be friendlier to business going forward. Similarly, while talking about the
need for India to develop its infrastructure, she said it was not the thought
that was lagging; it was the lack of will of the democratic system to make it
happen. The Prime Minister had to make sure he had to get it through the
political system.

The interview also gave some insight into Indra Nooyi’s HR
skills, her view of the world, how there is power diffusion from the
Judah-Christian world to the multi–religion world of the East and the Middle
East. She adroitly avoided giving a direct reply when asked if she would be the
next head of the Tata Group. Indra Nooyi, who was born and brought up in Chennai
and comes from a modest background, is proud of her Indian origin; but then she
also praised the USA for its incredible meritocracy. While she said she believed
in capitalism and as the CEO of a large multinational, advocated the opening of
markets, she also admitted that compulsions of a head of the government are
different. Running a country is far difficult than being the CEO of a large
corporate. Persons like her are in a sense, world citizens. They have a global
view, wide vision and a down-to-earth approach. They are intelligent and have
worked hard. But even they have to make sacrifices and lose out on the simple
pleasures of life to reach the position where they are today. And occasionally
that becomes obvious. One then realises that these persons are also ordinary
mortals like you and I.

Sanjeev Pandit

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National Pride

Editorial

I am privileged to communicate with you as the editor of this
prestigious Journal. It is a daunting task to keep up to the high standards for
this Journal set by Gautam Nayak and others in the past. It has been our
endeavour to bring you thought-provoking articles and features to keep you
abreast with changes occurring on the professional front.

Recently, the Government of India unveiled the symbol for the
Indian Rupee and the Rupee has become one of the few currencies along with the
Dollar, Pound, Euro and Yen to have a unique symbol. The symbol will distinguish
the Indian Rupee from that of other countries which have rupee or rupiah as
their currency. Amidst all the euphoria surrounding the new symbol, it should be
remembered that just a symbol for the currency will not have an economic impact
or the country will not overnight become an economic giant in the world. At the
same time it is true that today, India has come a long way since it faced the
balance of payments crisis in 1990-91. There is a greater confidence in the
Indian Rupee than at any time in the recent history. The symbol for the Rupee is
a reminder that we must work harder and in a disciplined manner to make India
economically a strong nation, a country that the world will look up to. It is
then that the symbol will have real significance in the financial world.

In the last few years India has made its mark in the service
sector, it has also become a hub for manufacturing many items. We are poised to
go up the value chain. At the same time we are one of the most corrupt countries
in the world, evasion of taxes is rampant, efficiency of our labour in many
fields is still abysmally low as compared to many developed nations, and many
citizens take pride in not working to their full capacity. Disputes amongst
states over borders and sharing of river waters raise their head with
regularity. There is a vast difference in economic development of various
regions. The divide between rural Bharat and urban India is a cause for concern.
On the social front, the country is divided on the basis of religion and caste.

Yet, today we have a chance; a chance to develop at a faster
pace and catch up with the developed economies of the world. But this will need
efforts and determination to work together. On this background, symbols like
that of the Indian currency, the Ashoka pillar, the national flag or the
national anthem invoke national pride and the awareness that India is one great
nation and all Indians are an integral part of it beyond religion, caste, creed,
community or the state that they belong to. Today, when the national anthem is
played in theatres, everyone, without exception, stands up in respect; many in
soft voice sing along. This may appear insignificant at first sight, but such
small acts have great potential in nurturing national pride, unifying Indians
and ushering unity in diversity. Efforts towards making each Indian a proud
citizen must begin right from childhood — in schools, homes and everywhere. If
national pride stems from within each citizen, it will be easier to tackle many
chronic problems such as corruption, anarchy in the legal system and communal
disharmony. Convergence of individual and national goals would lead to a strong
India.

While talking about national pride, one is painfully and
constantly reminded of peoples’ representatives, members of legislatures
behaving irresponsibly, creating a ruckus and destroying national property. MLAs,
MLCs and at times even MPs show scant respect to parliamentary democracy. The
recent free for all in the Bihar Assembly was not an exception. Microphones were
dismantled; chairs, desks and even footwear were hurled freely. A lady MLC
belonging to a national political party was seen on television throwing flower
pots around as if it was a discus throw competition. It is hard to believe that
these are the persons who make laws for us ! Marshals and security guards had to
be called in to evict these unruly MLAs. Some MLAs could be seen smiling as they
were being whisked away. Possibly, they were proud of what they had done or were
enjoying and basking in the attention that they were receiving. Several MLAs
were suspended for the rest of the assembly session. Some have submitted
resignations as MLAs to their party chief, which predictably will not be
accepted. All this was widely publicised in electronic and print media. The
world will have also watched all this drama with a chuckle.

Such incidences surely do not augur well for the national
pride. Every proud citizen of India feels sad and ashamed at such behaviour of
our representatives. Can there not be a more dignified way of protest ? Is it
not possible to make a point and still maintain the decorum ? Can any
provocation be a justification for such behaviour ? Is there no accountability ?
Who will pay for the damage to the state property ? We have rules of discipline
in schools, colleges and offices and these are by and large implemented.
Legislatures also have rules, yet one regularly sees events like this. Are
politicians above law ? Perhaps politicians in general and peoples’
representatives in particular need regular orientation and refresher courses on
acceptable conduct in the assembly and outside.

Incidences like this hurt our national pride. Do we deserve
such persons to be our representatives ? Are citizens not exercising their
franchise to vote correctly during elections or not exercising it at all and
hence we get this ? We need to think of solution to this on the eve of
Independence Day.

I wish you all a very Happy Independence Day. Let us be proud
Indians and work for a strong and vibrant India.

Sanjeev Pandit

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Wealth tax : Asset : S. 2(ea) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99 : Commercial asset used by assessee in business of letting out properties : Not an asset : Not chargeable to tax.

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Reported :

30. Wealth tax : Asset : S.
2(ea) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 : A.Ys. 1997-98 and 1998-99 : Commercial asset
used by assessee in business of letting out properties : Not an asset : Not
chargeable to tax.

[CIT v. Shankaranarayana
Industries & Plantations (P.) Ltd.,
194 Taxman 189 (Kar.)]

The assessee-company had
developed a property into a commercial complex and was deriving rental income
therefrom. Relying on the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996, the Assessing Officer
charged wealth tax on the said commercial complex for the A.Ys. 1997-98 and
1998-99, on the ground that the property was used for the commercial purposes
and was not excluded from the definition of the term ‘asset’ in S. 2(ea) of the
Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The Commissioner and the Tribunal accepted the claim of
the assessee and held that the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties and accordingly, the commercial complex in question was excluded from
the definition of the word ‘asset’ as is clear from the Circular of the Board.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. The High Court
considered the amendments to S. 2(ea) of the Act by the Finance (No. 2) Act,
1996 and the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998. The High Court also considered the
memorandum explaining the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1996, the CBDT Circular No. 762,
dated 18-2-1998 explaining the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996 and
held as under :

“(i) After the amendment
came into force, the Central Board of Direct Taxes issued Circular No. 762,
dated 18-2-1998, explaining the substantive provisions of the Act relating to
direct taxes. The said amended Section was in force only for two years and by
the Finance Act (No. 2), 1998, the same underwent a radical change, wherein it
is said that any property which is in the nature of commercial building or
complex do not fall within the definition of the word ‘asset’ as defined
u/s. 2(ea) of the Act.

(ii) It is in this
background, the assessee claims that, as the asset in question is the business
asset of the assessee, and as the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties, as is clear from the Explanatory Note appended to the Bill as well
as the Circular issued by the CBDT after passing of the amendment, the asset
which he had let out did not fall within the definition of the word ‘asset’
and therefore, the company is not liable to pay wealth tax.

(iii) The explanatory note
and the CBDT Circular make it very clear that prior to the Finance (No. 2)
Act, 1996, the commercial properties were not included within the definition
of the word ‘asset’. Therefore, it was felt that if residential houses have
been taken as assets, there seems to be no reason why commercial properties
other than those used by the assessee wholly and substantially in the business
or his profession, will also be not taken as assets. Therefore, by an
amendment, commercial buildings which are not occupied by the assessee for the
purposes of his business or profession other than the business of letting out
property, shall be brought to tax under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.

(iv) Therefore, it is
clear that the intention was to stimulate investment in productive assets.
Therefore, the Parliament thought it fit to abolish the amended Act, excluding
the business assets, i.e., the commercial establishments, which are not
used by the assessee or which are let out, as they are not stimulative
investment. However, as is clear from the aforesaid Explanatory Note, the CBDT
circular and the subsequent action of further amending the said Section, it is
clear that the intention was not to tax business assets used by the assessee
for the purpose of his business or profession and also the business assets
which are let out, if the assessee is in the business of letting out
properties. All other types of commercial properties were brought to tax under
the Wealth-tax Act.

(v) Both the Appellate
Authorities after carefully going to the aforesaid Circulars, amendments,
Explanatory Note and keeping in mind the intention in enacting the Wealth-tax
Act as well as drastic amendment in the year, we are of the opinion that the
assessee was justified in claiming the exclusion of the properties which are
the subject of the matter of the proceedings, from wealth tax. We do not find
any error or illegality in the findings recorded by the Tribunal. Therefore,
no case of interference is made out.”

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TDS : Salary : S. 192 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1998-99 : Assessee was an Indian company engaged in food processing business : Pursuant to a technical collaboration agreement, employees of Japanese company were deputed to India for workin

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Reported :


29. TDS : Salary : S. 192 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1992-93 to 1998-99 : Assessee was an Indian company
engaged in food processing business : Pursuant to a technical collaboration
agreement, employees of Japanese company were deputed to India for working in
assessee-company : Assessee deducted tax at source u/s.192 only on salary and
perks disbursed by it to employees of Japanese company : Assessee not liable to
deduct tax at source in respect of payments made by foreign company to its
employees.

[CIT v. Indo Nissin Food
Ltd.,
194 Taxman 144 (Kar.)]

The assessee was an Indian
company engaged in the food processing business. Pursuant to a technical
collaboration agreement entered into between the assessee-company and the
Japanese company, the employees of the Japanese company were deputed to India
considering their expertise in the business and they were working in the
assessee-company during the relevant assessment years. The assessee had deducted
the tax at source u/s.192 based on the salary and perks disbursed by it to the
employees of the Japanese company working with it. The Assessing Officer imposed
penalty u/s.271C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the assessee
company had failed to deduct tax at source in regard to the payments made by the
Japanese company to its employees who were working with the assessee-company.
The Tribunal deleted the penalty holding that the assessee was not liable to
deduct the tax at source in respect of the payments made by the foreign company.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Karnataka High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

(i) It was not in dispute
that the assessee had paid salary to the employees who had been deputed from
the foreign company. S. 192 envisages the assessee to deduct the tax at source
in respect of the payments made by it to the employees. Therefore, the
assessee was required to deduct income-tax at source on the amount payable or
paid by it to its employees.

(ii) There was no record
to show that the amount paid by the foreign company to its employees was made
known to the assessee or the said amount was also disbursed to the employees
of the foreign company through the assessee. Therefore, it was not possible to
accept the arguments advanced by the Revenue, as S. 192 does not deal with
such cases. In the circumstances, when the payment was not made by the
assessee or the amount was not paid by a foreign company through the assessee,
the assessee was not required to deduct the tax at source u/s.192(1).

(iii) When there was no
violation of S. 192(1), the question of initiating the proceedings u/s.271C
did not arise.”

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Revision : S. 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Where AO adopts one of courses permissible in law or where two views are possible and AO takes one of possible views, Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with vi

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Reported :


28. Revision : S. 263 of
Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 2001-02 and 2002-03 : Where AO adopts one of
courses permissible in law or where two views are possible and AO takes one of
possible views, Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with
view of AO even if there has been a loss of revenue: When a regular assessment
is made u/s.143(3), a presumption can be raised that order has been passed upon
application of mind and, though this presumption is rebuttable, yet there must
be some material to indicate that AO had not applied his mind to invoke
provisions of S. 263 : Validity of an order u/s.263 has to be tested with regard
to position of law as it exists on the date of the order.

[CIT v. Honda Seil Power
Products Ltd.,
194 Taxman 175 (Del.)]

For the A.Ys. 2001-02 and
2002-03, assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
allowing the claim for deduction u/s.80HHC and u/s.80-IB. The Commissioner
invoked the provisions of 263, on the ground that the Assessing Officer had not
applied the provisions of S. 80-IB(13)/80-IA(9) and had wrongly calculated the
deduction u/s.80HHC. The Commissioner, therefore, directed the Assessing Officer
to recalculate the allowable deduction u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal held that the
Assessing Officer had taken one of the possible views prevailing at the relevant
point of time and, therefore, his action could not be said to be ‘erroneous and
prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue’. Accordingly, the Tribunal
cancelled the order of the Commissioner passed u/s.263.


On appeal by the Revenue,
the Delhi High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held as under :



“(i) In cases where the
Assessing Officer adopts one of the courses permissible, in law, or where two
views are possible and the Assessing Officer has taken one of the possible
views, the Commissioner cannot exercise his powers u/s.263 to differ with the
view of the Assessing Officer, even if there has been a loss of revenue.


(ii) It is also clear that
while passing an order u/s.263, the Commissioner has to examine not only the
assessment order, but also the entire record. Since the assessee has no
control over the way an assessment order is drafted and since generally the
issues which are accepted by the Assessing Officer, do not find mention in the
assessment order and only those points are taken note of on which the
assessee’s explanations are rejected and additions/disallowances are made, in
the instant case, the mere absence of the discussion of the provisions of S.
80-IB(13), r/w. S. 80-IA(9), would not mean that the Assessing Officer had not
applied his mind to the said provisions.


(iii) When a regular
assessment is made u/s. 143(3), a presumption can be raised that the order has
been passed upon an application of mind. No doubt, this presumption is
rebuttable, but there must be some material to indicate that the Assessing
Officer had not applied his mind.


(iv) In the instant case,
there was no material
to indicate that the Assessing Officer had not applied his mind to the
provisions of
S. 80-IB(13), r/w. S. 80-IA(9). The presumption, that the assessment order
passed u/s.143(3) by the Assessing Officer had been passed upon an application
of mind, had not been rebutted by the Revenue. No additional facts were
necessary before the Assessing Officer for the purpose of construing the
provisions of S. 80-IB(13), r/w S. 80-IA(9). It was only a legal consideration
as to whether the deduction u/s.80HHC was to be computed after reducing the
amount of deduction u/s.80-IB from the profits and gains.


(v) There was no doubt
that the Assessing Officer had allowed the deduction u/s.80HHC without
reducing the amount of deduction allowed u/s.80-IB from the profits and gains.
He did not say so in so many words, but that was the end result of his
assessment order. It could not be said that the Assessing Officer had failed
to make any enquiry because no further enquiry was necessary and all the facts
were before the Assessing Officer.


(vi) The validity of an
order u/s.263 has to be tested with regard to the position of law as it exists
on the date on which such an order is made by the Commissioner. From the
narration of the facts in the Tribunal’s order, it was clear that on the date
when the Commissioner had passed his order u/s.263, the view taken by the
Assessing Officer was in consonance with the view taken by the several Benches
of the Tribunal. Therefore, the conclusion of the Tribunal, that the
Commissioner could not have invoked his jurisdiction u/s.263, was correct. As
a result, the Tribunal was correct, in law, in cancelling the order passed by
the Commissioner u/s.263.”

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Manufacture — Twisting and texturising partially oriented yarn amounts to manufacture in terms of S. 80-IA of the Act.

New Page 1

15 Manufacture — Twisting and texturising partially oriented
yarn amounts to manufacture in terms of S. 80-IA of the Act.


[CIT v. Emptee Poly-Yarn P. Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 665 (SC)]

The short question which arose for determination in a batch
of civil appeals before the Supreme Court was : Whether twisting and texturising
of partially oriented yarn (‘POY’ for short) amounted to ‘manufacture’ in terms
of S. 80-IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?

The Supreme Court observed that it has repeatedly recommended
to the Department, be it under the Excise Act, the Customs Act or the Income-tax
Act, to examine the process applicable to the product in question and not to go
only by dictionary meanings, but this recommendation is not being followed over
the years.

The Supreme Court having examined the process in the light of
the opinion given by the expert, which had not been controverted, held that POY
was a semi-finished yarn not capable of being put in warp or weft, it could only
be used for making a texturised yarn, which, in turn, could be used in the
manufacture of fabric. In other words, POY could not be used directly to
manufacture fabric. According to the expert, crimps, bulkiness, etc. were
introduced by a process, called as thermo mechanical process, into POY which
converts POY into a texturised yarn. According to the Supreme Court, if one
examined this thermo-mechanical process in detail, it would become clear that
texturising and twisting of yarn constituted ‘manufacture’ in the context of
conversion of POY into texturised yarn.

 

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Minimum Alternative Tax — For making an addition under clause (b) of S. 115JB, two conditions must be jointly satisfied, namely, (i) there must a debit to the profit and loss account, and (ii) the amount so debited must be carried to the reserve.

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14 Minimum Alternative Tax — For making an addition under
clause (b) of S. 115JB, two conditions must be jointly satisfied, namely, (i)
there must a debit to the profit and loss account, and (ii) the amount so
debited must be carried to the reserve.


[National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. v. CIT, (2010)
320 ITR 374 (SC)]

The assessee was required to sell electricity to State
Electricity Board(s), Discoms, etc., at tariff rates notified by the CERC. The
tariff consists of depreciation, Advance Against Depreciation (AAD), interest on
loans, interest on working capital, operation and maintenance expenses, return
on equity.

On May 26, 1997, the Govt. of India introduced a mechanism to
generate additional cash flow, by allowing companies to collect AAD by way of
tariff charge. The year in which normal depreciation fell short of the original
scheduled loan repayment instalment (capped at 1/12th of the original loan) such
shortfall would be collected as advance against future depreciation.

According to the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR), the
assessee supplied electricity at tariff rate notified by the CERC and recovered
the sale price, which became its income; that, in future the said sale price was
neither refundable nor adjustable against future bills.

However, according to the Authority of Advance Ruling (AAR),
when it came to computation of book profit, the assessee deducted the AAD
component from the total sale price and only the balance amount net of the AAD
was taken into the profit and loss account and book profit. Consequently, the
AAR ruled that reduction of the AAD from the ‘sales’ was nothing but a reserve
which had to be added back on the basis of clause (b) of Explanation 1 to S.
115JB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The Supreme Court held that on reading Explanation 1, it was
clear that to make an addition under clause (b) two conditions must be jointly
satisfied :

(a) There must be a debit of the amount to the profit and
loss account.

(b) The amount so debited must be carried to the reserve.

Since the amount of AAD was reduced from sales, there was no
debit in the profit and loss account, the amount did not enter the stream of
income for the purposes of determination of net profit at all, hence clause (b)
of Explanation 1 was not applicable. It was not an appropriation of profits. AAD
was not meant for an uncertain purpose. AAD was an amount that is under
obligation, right from the inception, to get adjusted in the future hence, could
not be designated as a reserve. AAD was nothing but an adjustment by reducing
the normal depreciation includible in the future years in such a manner that at
the end of the useful life of the plant (which is normally 30 years), the same
would be reduced to nil.

According to the Supreme Court the AAD was a timing
difference, it was not a reserve, it was not carried through the profit and loss
account and that it was ‘income received in advance’ subject to adjustment in
future and, therefore, clause (b) of Explanation 1 to S. 115JB was not
applicable.

 

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Manufacture — Duplication from the master media of the application software commercially to sub-licence a copy of such application software constitutes manufacturing of goods in terms of S. 80-IA.

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13 Manufacture — Duplication from the master media of the
application software commercially to sub-licence a copy of such application
software constitutes manufacturing of goods in terms of S. 80-IA.


[CIT v. Oracle Software India Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 546 (SC)]

The assessee, a 100% subsidiary of Oracle Corporation, USA,
was incorporated with the object of developing designing, improving, producing,
marketing, distributing, buying, selling and importing of computer software. The
assessee was entitled to sub-licence the software development by Oracle
Corporation, USA. The assessee imported master media of the software from Oracle
Corporation, USA which it duplicated on blank discs, packed and sold in the
market along with relevant brochures. The assessee made a payment a lump-sum
amount to Oracle Corporation, USA for the import of master media. In addition
thereto, the assessee also had to pay royalty at the rate of 30% of the price of
the licensed product. The only right which the assessee had was to replicate or
duplicate the software. It did not have any right to vary, amend or make value
addition to the software embedded in the master media. According to the assessee,
it used machinery to convert blank CDs into recorded CDs which along with other
processes became a software kit. According to the assessee, the blank CD
constituted raw materials. According to the assessee, the master media could not
be conveyed as it is. In order to sub-licence, a copy thereof had to be made and
it was the making of this copy which constituted manufacture or processing of
goods in terms of S. 80-IA and consequently the assessee was entitled to
deduction under that Section. On the other hand, according to the Department, in
the process of copying, there was no element of manufacture or processing of
goods. According to the Department, since the software on the master media and
the software on the recorded media remained unchanged, there was no manufacture
or processing of goods involved in the activity of the copy or duplicating,
hence, the assessee was not entitled to deduction u/s.80-IA. According to the
Department, when the master media was made from what was lodged into the
computer, it was a clone of the software in the computer and if one compared the
contents of the master media with what was there in the computer/data bank,
there was no difference, hence, according to the Department, there was no change
in the use, character or name of the CDs even after the impugned process was
undertaken by the assessee.

The Supreme Court observed that duplication could certainly
take place at home, however, one should draw a line between duplication done at
home and commercial duplication. Even a pirated copy of a CD was a duplication,
but that did not mean that commercial duplication as it was undertaken in the
instant case should be compared with home duplication which may result in
pirated copy of a CD.

The Supreme Court held that from the details of Oracle
applications, it found that the software on the master media was an application
software. It was not an operating software. It was not a system software. It
could be categorised into product line applications, application solutions and
industry applications. A commercial duplication process involved four steps. For
the said process of commercial duplication, one required master media, fully
operational computer, CD blaster machine (a commercial device used for
replication from master media), blank/
unrecorded compact disc also known as recordable media and printing
software/labels. The master media was subjected to a validation and checking
process by software engineers by installing and rechecking the integrity of the
master media with the help of the software installed in the fully operational
computer. After such validation and checking of the master media, the same was
inserted in a machine which was called the CD Blaster and a virtual image of the
software in the master media was thereafter created in its internal storage
device. This virtual image was utilised to replicate the software on the
recordable media.

According to the Supreme Court, if one examined the above
process in the light of the details given hereinabove, commercial duplication
could not be compared to home duplication. Complex technical nuances were
required to be kept in mind while deciding issues of the above nature. The
Supreme Court held that the term ‘manufacture’ implies a change, but every
change is not a manufacture, despite the fact that every change in an article is
the result of a treatment of labour and manipulation. However, this test of
manufacture needs to be seen in the context of the above process. If an
operation/process renders a commodity or article fit for use for which it is
otherwise not fit, the operation/process falls within the meaning of the word
‘manufacture’. Applying the above test to the facts of the present case, the
Supreme Court was of the view that, in the instant case, the assessee had
undertaken an operation which rendered a blank CD fit for use which it was
otherwise not fit. The blank CD was an input. By the duplicating process
undertaken by the assessee, the recordable media which was unfit for any
specific use got converted into the programme which was embedded in the master
media and, thus, the blank CD got converted into recorded CD by the aforestated
intricate process. The duplicating process changed the basic character of a
blank CD, dedicating it to a specific use. Without such processing, blank CDs
would be unfit for their intended purpose. Therefore, processing of blank CDs,
dedicating them to a specific use, constituted a manufacture in terms of S.
80-IA(12)(b) read with S. 33B of the Income-tax Act.

 

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Capital gains — Gains/loss arising on renunciation of right to subscribe is a short-term gain — Deduction u/s.48(2) is to be applied to the long-term capital gains before set-off of short-term loss, if any.

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11 Capital gains — Gains/loss arising on renunciation of
right to subscribe is a short-term gain — Deduction u/s.48(2) is to be applied
to the long-term capital gains before set-off of short-term loss, if any.


[Navin Jindal v. ACIT, (2010) 320 ITR 708 (SC)]

The assessee was a shareholder in Jindal Iron and Steel
Company Limited (‘JISCO’, for short). The said company announced in January,
1992, an issue of 12.5% equity secured PCDs (party convertible debentures) of
Rs.110 for cash at par to shareholders on rights basis and employees on
equitable basis. The issue opened for subscription on February 14, 1992, and
closed on March 12, 1992. As the assessee held 1500 equity shares of JISCO, the
assessee received an offer to subscribe to 1875 PCDs of JISCO on rights basis.
The assessee renounced his right to subscribe to the PCDs in favour of Colorado
Trading Company on February 15, 1992, at the rate of Rs.30 per right. The
assessee received, accordingly, Rs.56,250 for renunciation of the right to
subscribe to the PCDs. Against the aforesaid sale consideration, the assessee
suffered a diminution in the value of the original 1500 equity shares in the
following manner : the cum-rights price per share on January 3, 1992, was
Rs.625, whereas ex-rights price per share on January 6, 1992, was Rs.425,
resulting in a loss of Rs.200 per share. Consequently, the capital loss suffered
by the assessee was Rs.3,00,000 (1,500 x 200) as against the receipt of
Rs.56,250 on renunciation of 1875 PCDs.

During that year on August 7, 1991, the assessee sold 8460
equity shares of JSL at Rs.240 for a total consideration of Rs.20,30,400, whose
cost of acquisition was Rs.3,63,200 and, consequently, the transaction resulted
in a long-term gain for the assessee in the sum of Rs.16,67,200. Similarly, on
June 20, 1991, the assessee sold 7000 equity shares of Saw Pipes Limited (‘SPL’,
short) at the rate of Rs.103 each, for a total consideration of Rs.7,21,000 from
which the assessee deducted Rs.70,000 towards cost of acquisition, resulting in
a long-term gain of Rs.6,51,000. In all, under the caption, ‘long-term gain’ the
assessee earned Rs.23,18,200 (Rs.16,67,200 + Rs.6,51,000).

The Supreme Court observed that the question of loss was not
in issue in the civil appeals before it. The only question which it had to
decide was the nature of the loss. The Assessing Officer had accepted the
computation of loss on renunciation of the right to subscribe to the PCDs at
Rs.2,43,750, but treated the same as long-term capital loss.

The Supreme Court observed that S. 48 deals with the mode of
computation of income chargeable under the head ‘Capital gains’. Under that
Section, such income is required to be computed by deducting from the full value
of the consideration received as a result of the transfer of the capital asset,
the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer
and the cost of acquisition of the asset. U/s.48(1)(b) of the Act, it is further
stipulated that where the capital gain arises from the transfer of a long-term
capital asset, then, in addition to the expenditure incurred in connection with
the transfer and the cost of acquisition of the asset, a further deduction, as
specified in S. 48(2) of the Act, which is similar to standard deduction,
becomes necessary.

The Supreme Court noted that the basic controversy in the
batch of civil appeals before it concerned the stage at which S. 48(2) of the
Act becomes applicable.

The Supreme Court noted that from the said figure of
Rs.23,31,200, the Assessing Officer had deducted the loss of Rs.2,43,680 as a
long-term loss and applied S. 48(2) deduction to the figure of Rs.20,87,450.
Consequently, the Assessing Officer worked out the net income at Rs.8,28,980 as
against the figure of Rs.6,77,530 worked out by the assessee. The above analysis
showed the controversy between the parties. The assessee treated Rs.2,43,750 as
a short-term loss, and, therefore, he applied the standard deduction u/s. 48(2)
to the long-term gain of Rs.23,18,200 from sale of shares of JSL and SPL,
whereas the Assessing Officer applied S. 48(2) deduction to the figure of
Rs.20,87,450 which is arrived at on the basis that the loss suffered by the
assessee of Rs.2,43,680 was a long-term loss.

The Supreme Court held that the right to subscribe for
additional offer of share/debentures on rights basis, on the strength of
existing shareholding in the company, comes into existence when the company
decides to come out with the rights offer. Prior to that, such right, though
embedded in the original shareholding, remains inchoate. The same crystallises
only when the rights offer is announced by the company. Therefore, in order to
determine the nature of the gain/loss on renunciation of right to subscribe for
additional shares/debentures, the crucial date is the date on which such right
to subscribe for additional shares/debentures comes into existence and the date
of transfer (renunciation) of such right. The said right to subscribe for
additional shares/debentures is a distinct, independent and separate right,
capable of being transferred independently of the existing shareholding, on the
strength of which such rights are offered.

The right to subscribe for additional offer of
shares/debentures comes into existence only when the company decides to come out
with the rights offer. It is only when that event takes place, that diminution
in the value of the original shares held by the assessee takes place. One has to
give weightage to the diminution in the value of the original shares, which
takes place when the company decides to come out with the rights offer. For
determining whether the gain/loss of renunciation of the right to subscribe is a
short-term or long-term gain/loss, the crucial date is the date on which such
right to subscribe for additional shares/debentures comes into existence and the
date of renunciation (transfer) of such right.

The Supreme Court was therefore of the opinion that the loss
suffered by the assessee amounting to Rs.2,43,750 was short-term loss. According
to the Supreme Court, the computation of income under the head ‘Capital gains’,
as computed by the assessee was correct.

Manufacture or production of article or thing — Activity of extraction of marble blocks, cutting into slabs, polishing and conversion into polished slabs and tiles would amount to ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ for the purpose of claiming deduction u/s.80-

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12 Manufacture or production of article or thing — Activity
of extraction of marble blocks, cutting into slabs, polishing and conversion
into polished slabs and tiles would amount to ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ for
the purpose of claiming deduction u/s.80-IA of the Act.


[ITO v. Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd., (2010) 320 ITR 79
(SC)]

In the batch of civil appeals before the Supreme Court, a
common question of law which arose for determination was : Whether conversion of
marble blocks by sawing into slabs and tiles and polishing amounted to
‘manufacture or production of article or thing’, so as to make the
respondent(s)-assessee(s) entitled to the benefit of S. 80-IA of the Income-tax
Act, 1961, as it stood at the material time.

According to the Supreme Court, to answer the above issue, it
was necessary to note the details of stepwise activities undertaken by the
assessee(s) which read as follows :

(i) Marble blocks excavated/extracted by the mine owners
being in raw uneven shapes had to be properly sorted out and marked;

(ii) Such blocks were then processed on single blade/wire
saw machines using advanced technology to square them by separating waste
material;

(iii) Squared up blocks were sawed for making slabs by
using the gang-saw machine or single/multiblock cutter machine;

(iv) The sawn slabs were further reinforced by way of
filling cracks by epoxy resins and fiber netting;

(v) The slabs were polished in polishing machine; the slabs
were further edge-cut into required dimensions/tiles as per market requirement
in perfect angles by edge-cutting machine and multidisc cutter machines;

(vi) Polished slabs and tiles were buffed by shiner.

The Supreme Court further noted that the assessee(s) had been
consistently regarded as a manufacturer/producer by various Government
departments and agencies. The above processes undertaken by the respondent(s)
had been treated as manufacture under the Excise Act and allied tax laws.

At the outset, it was observed by the Supreme Court that in
numerous judgments, it had been consistently held that the word ‘production’ was
wider in its scope as compared to the word ‘manufacture’. Further, the
Parliament itself had taken note of the ground reality and amended the
provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by inserting S. 2(29BA) vide the Finance
Act, 2009, with effect from April 1, 2009.

The Supreme Court noted that the authorities below had
rejected the contention of the assessee(s) that its activities of polishing
slabs and making of tiles from marble blocks constituted ‘manufacture’ or
‘production’ u/s.80-IA of the Income-tax Act. There was a difference of opinion
in this connection between the Members of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
However, by the impugned judgment, the High Court had accepted the contention of
the assessee(s) holding that in the present case, polished slabs and tiles stood
manufactured/produced from the marble blocks and, consequently, each of the
assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction u/s.80-IA. Hence, the civil
appeals were filed by the Department.

The Supreme Court also noted that in these cases, it was
concerned with assessees who were basically factory owners and not mine owners.

The Supreme Court held that in each case one has to examine
the nature of the activity undertaken by an assessee. Mere extraction of stones
may not constitute manufacture. Similarly, after extraction, if marble blocks
are cut into slabs that per se will not amount to the activity of manufacture.
From the details of process undertaken by each of the respondents it was clear
that they were not concerned only with cutting of marble blocks into slabs but
were also concerned with the activity of polishing and ultimate conversion of
blocks into polished slabs and tiles. The Supreme Court found from the process
indicated hereinabove that there were various stages through which the blocks
had to go through before they become polished slabs and tiles. In the
circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that on the facts of the cases
in hand, there was certainly an activity which would come in the category of
‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ u/s.80IA of the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court
held that in the judgment in Aman Marble Industries P. Ltd. (2003) 157 ELT 393
(SC), it was not required to construe the word ‘production’ in addition to the
word ‘manufacture’.

Before concluding, the Supreme Court thought it fit to make
one observation. The Supreme Court observed that if the contention of the
Department was to be accepted, namely, that the activity undertaken by the
respondents herein was not a manufacture, then it would have serious revenue
consequences. As stated above, each of the respondents was paying excise duty,
some of the respondents were job workers and activity undertaken by them had
been recognised by various Government authorities as manufacture. To say that
the activity would not amount to manufacture or production u/s.80-IA would have
disastrous consequences, particularly in view of the fact that the assessees in
all the cases would plead that they were not liable to pay excise duty, sales
tax, etc. because the activity did not constitute manufacture. Keeping in mind
the above factors, the Supreme Court was of the view that in the present cases,
the activity undertaken by each of the respondents constituted manufacture or
production and, therefore, they would be entitled to the benefit of S. 80-IA of
the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Interest-tax — Interest on bonds and debentures bought by a non-banking financial company as and by way of investment would not be liable to interest-tax.

New Page 2

19 Interest-tax — Interest on bonds and debentures bought by
a non-banking financial company as and by way of investment would not be liable
to interest-tax.

[Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sahara India Savings and
Investment Corporation Ltd.,
(2010) 321 ITR 371 (SC)]

In a batch of civil appeals before the Supreme Court the main
issue which arose for determination was : Whether ‘interest’ which the assessee
earned on bonds and debentures was chargeable to tax in view of the definition
of the term ‘interest’ in S. 2(7) of the Interest-tax Act, 1974 ?

One of the objects of the respondent company for which the
company was incorporated was to buy, sell, invest or otherwise deal in
securities, bonds or fixed deposits issued by any institution, body corporate,
corporation, establishment constituted under any Central or State laws or any
other securities in which the company may be required to invest under any law in
force.

The Supreme Court held that S. 2(7) defines the word
‘interest’ to mean interest on ‘loans and advances including commitment charges,
discount on promissory notes and bills of exchange, but not to include interest
referred to u/s.42(IB) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, as well as
discount on treasury bills’. S. 2(7), therefore, defines what is interest in the
first part and that first part confines interest only to loans and advances,
including commitment charges, discount on promissory notes and bills of
exchange. Therefore, it is clear that the interest-tax is meant to be levied
only on interest accruing on loans and advances but the Legislature, in its
wisdom, has extended the meaning of the word ‘interest’ to two other items,
namely, commitment charges and discount on promissory notes and bills of
exchange. In normal accounting sense, ‘loans and advances’, as a concept, are
different from commitment charges and discounts and, keeping in mind the
difference between the three, the Legislature, in its wisdom, has specifically
included in the definition u/s.2(7) commitment charges as well as discounts. The
fact remains that interest on loans and advances will not cover u/s.2(7)
interest on bonds and debentures bought by an assessee as and by way of
‘investment’. Even the exclusionary part of S. 2(7) excludes only discount on
treasury bills as well as interest u/s.42(IB) of the Reserve Bank of India Act,
1934. Reading S. 2(7) as a whole, it was clear to the Supreme Court that
‘interest on investments’ was not taxable as interest u/s.2(7) of the said 1974
Act.

Search and seizure — Block assessment — If the assessment is to be completed u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 158BC, notice u/s.143(2) should be issued within prescribed time.

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 20 Search and seizure — Block assessment — If the assessment
is to be completed u/s.143(3) r.w. S. 158BC, notice u/s.143(2) should be issued
within prescribed time.

[Asst. CIT v. Hotel Blue Moon, (2010) 321 ITR
362 (SC)]

The point that came up for our determination before the
Supreme Court was, whether issue of notice u/s.143(2) of the Act within the
prescribed time for the purpose of block assessment under Chapter XIV-B of the
Act is mandatory for assessing undisclosed income detected during search
conducted u/s.132 of the Act. While according to the Department, issue of a
notice u/s.143(2) is not an essential requirement in block assessment under
Chapter XIV-B of the Act. According to the assessee, service of notice on the
assessee u/s.143(2) of the Act within the prescribed period of time is a
pre-requisite for framing the block assessment under Chapter XIV-B of the Act.
The Appellate Tribunal held, while affirming the decision of the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals), that non-issue of notice u/s.143(3) is only a procedural
irregularity and the same is curable.

In the appeal filed by the assessee, the High Court,
disagreeing with the Tribunal, held that the provisions of S. 142 and Ss.(2) and
Ss.(3) of S. 143 will have mandatory application in a case where the Assessing
Officer in repudiation of the return filed in response to a notice issued
u/s.158BC(a) proceeds to make an inquiry. Accordingly, the High Court answered
the question of law framed in the affirmative and in favour of the appellant and
against the Revenue.

The Revenue thereafter applied to the Supreme Court for
special leave under Article 136, and the same was granted.

The Supreme Court held that S. 158BC(b) provides for enquiry
and assessment. The said provision reads “that the Assessing Officer shall
proceed to determine the undisclosed income of the block period in the manner
laid down in S. 158BB and the provisions of S. 142, Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 143,
and S. 144 and S. 145 shall, so far as may be, apply.” An analysis of this
sub-section indicates that, after the return is filed, this clause enables the
Assessing Officer to complete the assessment by following the procedure like
issue of notice u/s.143(2)/142 and complete the assessment u/s.143(3). This
Section does not provide for accepting the return as provided u/s.143(1)(a). The
Assessing Officer has to complete the assessment u/s.143(3) only. In case of
default in not filing the return or not complying with the notice
u/s.143(2)/142, the Assessing Officer is authorised to complete the assessment
ex parte u/s.144. Clause (b) of S. 158BC by referring to S. 143(2) and (3) would
appear to imply that the provisions of S. 143(1) are excluded. But S. 143(2)
itself becomes necessary only where it becomes necessary to check the return, so
that where block return confirms to the undisclosed income inferred by the
authorities, there is no reason, why the authorities should issue notice
u/s.143(2). However, if an assessment is to be completed u/s.143(3) read with S.
158BC, notice u/s.143(2) should be issued within one year from the date of
filing of block return. Omission on the part of the Assessing Authority to issue
notice u/s.143(2) cannot be a procedural irregularity and the same is not
curable and, therefore, the requirement of notice u/s.143(2) cannot be dispensed
with.

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Industrial undertaking — Deduction u/s.80-IB — DEPB/Duty drawback benefits flow from the schemes framed by the Central Government or from S. 75 of the Customs Act or from S. 37 of the Central Excise Act, hence incentives profits are not profits derived fr

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18 Industrial undertaking — Deduction u/s.80-IB — DEPB/Duty
drawback benefits flow from the schemes framed by the Central Government or from
S. 75 of the Customs Act or from S. 37 of the Central Excise Act, hence
incentives profits are not profits derived from the eligible business u/s.80-IB.

[Liberty India v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (2009)
317 ITR 218 (SC)]

The appellant, a partnership firm owned a small-scale
industrial undertaking engaged in manufacturing of fabrics out of yarns and also
various textile items such as cushion covers, pillow covers, etc., out of
fabrics/yarn purchased from the market. During the relevant previous year
corresponding to the A.Y. 2001-02, the appellant claimed deduction u/s.80-IB on
the increased profits of Rs. 22,70,056 as profit of the industrial undertaking
on account of DEPB and duty drawback credited to the profit and loss account.

The Assessing Officer denied deduction u/s.80-IB on the
ground that the said two benefits constituted export incentives, and that they
did not represent profits derived from the industrial undertaking. In this
connection, the Assessing Officer placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in CIT v. Sterling Foods reported in (1999) 237 ITR 579.

Aggrieved by the said decision, the matter was carried in
appeal to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who came to the conclusion
that duty drawback received by the appellant was inextricably linked to the
production cost of the goods manufactured by the appellant; that, duty drawback
was a trading receipt of the industrial undertaking having direct nexus with the
activity of the industrial undertaking and consequently, the Assessing Officer
was not justified in denying deduction u/s.80-IB. According to the Commissioner
of Income-tax (Appeals), the DEPB Scheme was different from the Duty Drawback
Scheme inasmuch as the DEPB substituted value-based Advance Licensing Scheme as
well as the Passbook Scheme under the Exim Policy; that entitlements under the
DEPB Scheme were allowed at pre-determined and pre-notified rates in respect of
exports made under the Scheme and, consequently, DEPB did not constitute a
substitute for duty drawback. According to the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals), credit under DEPB could be utilised by the exporter himself or it
could be transferred to any other party; that such transfer could be made at
higher or lower value than mentioned in the passbook and, therefore, DEPB cannot
be equated with the duty drawback, hence, the appellant who had received Rs.
20,95,740 on sale of DEPB licence stood covered by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Sterling Foods (1999) 237 ITR 579. Hence, to that extent, the appellant
was not entitled to deduction u/s.80-IB.

Against the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals) allowing deduction on duty drawback, the Revenue went in appeal to the
Tribunal which following the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT
v. Ritesh Industries Ltd., reported in (2005) 274 ITR 324, held that the amount
received by the assessee on account of duty drawback was not an income derived
from the business of the industrial undertaking so as to entitle the assessee to
deduction u/s.80-IB.

The decision of the Tribunal was assailed by the assessee(s)
u/s.260A of the 1961 Act before the High Court. Following the decision of this
Court in Sterling Foods (1999) 237 ITR 579, the High Court held that the
assessee(s) had failed to prove the nexus between the receipt by way of duty
drawback/DEPB benefit and the industrial undertaking, hence, the assessee(s) was
not entitled to deduction
u/s.80-IB(3).

On a civil appeal(s), the Supreme Court observed that the
1961 Act broadly provides for two types of tax incentives, namely,
investment-linked incentives and profit-linked incentives. Chapter VI-A which
provides for incentives in the form of tax deductions essentially belong to the
category of ‘profit-linked incentives’. Therefore, when S. 80-IA/80-IB refers to
profits derived from eligible business, it is not the ownership of that business
which attracts the incentives. What attracts the incentives u/s.80-IA/80-IB is
the generation of Profits (operational profits).

The Supreme Court noted that according to the assessee(s),
DEPB credit/duty drawback receipt reduces the value of purchases (cost
neutralisation), hence, it comes within first degree source as it increases the
net profit proportionately. On the order hand, according to the Department, DEPB
credit/duty drawback receipts do not come within first degree source as the said
incentives flow from the incentive schemes enacted by the Government of India or
from S. 75 of the Customs Act, 1962. Hence, according to the Department, in the
present cases, the first degree source is the incentive scheme/provisions of the
Customs Act.

The Supreme Court held that DEPB is an incentive. It is given
under the Duty Exemption Remission Scheme. Essentially, it is an export
incentive. No doubt, the object behind DEPB is to neutralise the incidence of
customs duty payment on the import content of export product. This
neutralisation is provided for by credit to customs duty against export product.
Under DEPB, an exporter may apply for credit as a percentage of the FOB value of
exports made in freely convertible currency. Credit is available only against
the export product and at rates specified by the DGFT for import of raw
materials, components, etc., DEPB credit under the Scheme has to be calculated
by taking into account the deemed import content of the export product as per
basic customs duty and special additional duty payable on such deemed imports.
Therefore, in view, the Supreme Court DEPB/Duty drawback were incentives which
flow from the schemes framed by Central Government or from S. 75 of the Customs
Act, 1962, hence, incentives profits were not profits derived from the eligible
business u/s.80-IB. They belong to the category of ancillary profits of such
undertakings.

The Supreme Court further held that S. 75 of Customs Act,
1962 and S. 37 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, empower the Government of India
to provide for repayment of customs duty and excise duty paid by an assessee.
The refund is of the average amount of duty paid on materials of any particular
class or description of goods used in the manufacture of export goods of
specified class. The Rules do not envisage a refund of amount of an amount
arithmetically equal to customs duty or Central Excise duty actually paid by an
individual importer-cum-manufacturer. The Supreme Court held that basically the
source of the duty drawback receipt lied in S. 75 of the Customs Act and S. 37
of the Central Excise Act.

In the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that profits
derived by way of such incentives did not fall within the expression ‘profits
derived from industrial undertaking’ in S. 80-IB.

Companies — Special provisions — Minimum Alternate Tax — In determining the book profit of a private limited company whether depreciation should be allowed as per Income-tax Rules or as per the Companies Act — Matter referred to Larger Bench.

New Page 2

17 Companies — Special provisions — Minimum Alternate Tax —
In determining the book profit of a private limited company whether depreciation
should be allowed as per Income-tax Rules or as per the Companies Act — Matter
referred to Larger Bench.


[Dynamic Orthopedics P. Ltd. v. CIT, (2010) 321 ITR
300 (SC)]

The appellant-assessee, a private limited company, was
engaged in the manufacture and sale of orthopedic appliances. In the return of
income filed, the assessee returned an income of Rs.1,50,730. In the profit and
loss account, depreciation was provided at the rates specified in Rule 5 of the
Income-tax Rules, 1962 (‘Rules’, for short). While completing the assessment of
income, the Assessing Officer recomputed the book profit for the purpose of S.
115J of the Income-tax Act, 1961, (‘Act’, for short), after allowing
depreciation as per the Schedule XIV to the Companies Act. The rates of
depreciation specified in Schedule XIV to the Companies Act, 1956 (‘1956 Act’,
for short) were lower than the rates specified under Rule 5 of the Rules.

Being aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee took up
the matter before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) [‘CIT(A)’ for short],
who came to the conclusion that the assessee was a private limited company. It
was not a subsidiary of public company. Therefore, placing reliance on S. 355 of
the 1956 Act, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that S. 350 of the
1956 Act was not applicable to the assessee and, in the circumstances, the
Income-tax Officer had erred in providing depreciation at the rates specified
under Section Schedule XIV to the 1956 Act. Consequently, the Commissioner of
Income-tax (Appeals) held that the assessee was right in providing depreciation
in its accounts as per Rule 5 of the Rules.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner of Income-tax
(Appeals), appeal was preferred by the Department to the Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal (‘Tribunal’, for short). By judgment and order dated January 13, 1999,
the Tribunal held that since the assessee was a private limited company, S. 349
and S. 350 were not applicable to the facts of the case and, in the
circumstances, the Income-tax Officer had erred in directing the assessee, which
was private limited company, to provide for depreciation as per Schedule XIV to
the 1956 Act, which was not applicable to private limited companies (see S. 355
of the 1956 Act). Consequently, the appeal filed by the Department before the
Tribunal stood dismissed.

Aggrieved by the said decision of the Tribunal, the
Department preferred appeal before the High Court of Kerala which held that S.
115J of the Act was introduced in the A.Y. 1988-89. S. 115J of the Act read with
Explanation (iv), as it stood at the material time, was a piece of legislation
by incorporation and, consequently, the provisions of S. 205 of the 1956 Act
stood incorporated into S. 115J of the Act, hence, the Income-tax Officer was
right in directing the assessee to provide for depreciation at the rate
specified in Schedule XIV to the 1956 Act and not in terms of Rule 5 of the
Rules.

On a civil appeal being filed by the assessee, the Supreme
Court observed that the view of the High Court, in the present case, was similar
to view taken by it in the case of CIT v. Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. reported in
(2002) 253 ITR 378 (Ker.), which High Court’s judgment stood reversed by the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. v. CIT
reported in (2008) 300 ITR 251.

However, the Supreme Court was of the view that its judgment
in Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. v. CIT reported in (2008) 300 ITR 251 needed
reconsideration for the following reasons : Chapter XII-B of the Act containing
‘Special provisions relating to certain companies’ was introduced in the
Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988.
In fact, S. 115J replaced S. 80VVA of the Act. S. 115J (as it stood at the
relevant time), inter alia, provided that where the total income of a company,
as computed under the Act in respect of any accounting year, was less than
thirty per cent of its book profit, as defined in the Explanation, the total
income of the company, chargeable to tax, shall be deemed to be an amount equal
to thirty per cent of such book profit. The whole purpose of S. 115J of the Act,
therefore, was to take care of the phenomenon of prosperous ‘zero tax’ companies
not paying taxes though they continued to earn profits and declare dividends.
Therefore, a minimum alternate tax was sought to be imposed on ‘zero tax’
companies. S. 115J of the Act imposes tax on a deemed income. S. 115J of the Act
is a special provision relating only to certain companies. The said Section does
not make any distinction between public and private limited companies. In our
view, S. 115J of the Act legislatively only incorporates the provisions of Parts
II and III of Schedule VI to the 1956 Act. Such incorporation is by a deeming
fiction. Hence, we need to read S. 115J(1A) of the Act in the strict sense. If
we so read, it is clear that, by legislative incorporation, only Parts II and
III of Schedule VI to the 1956 Act have been incorporated legislatively into S.
115J of the Act. If a company is a MAT company, then be it a private limited
company or a public limited company, for the purposes of S. 115J of the Act, the
assessee-company has to prepare its profit and loss account in accordance with
Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the 1956 Act alone. If the judgment in
Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. (2008) 300 ITR 251 is to be accepted, then the very
purpose of enacting S. 115J of the Act would stand defeated, particularly, when
the said Section does not make any distinction between public and private
limited companies. It needs to be reiterated that, once a company falls within
the ambit of it being a MAT company, S. 115J of the Act applies and, under that
Section, such as assessee-company was required to prepare its profit and loss
account only in terms of Part II and III of Schedule VI to the 1956 Act. The
reason being that rates of depreciation in Rule 5 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962,
are different from the rates specified in Schedule XIV to the 1956 Act. In fact,
by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1988, the linkage between the two has been
expressly de-linked. Hence, what is incorporated in S. 115J is only Schedule VI,
and not S. 205 or S. 350 or S. 355. This was the view of the Kerala High Court
in the case of ACIT v. Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. reported in (2002) 253 ITR
378, which has been wrongly reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. v. CIT reported in (2008) 300 ITR 251.

For the aforesaid reasons, the Registry was directed to place
the civil appeal before the learned Chief Justice for appropriate directions as
the Bench was of the view that the matter needed reconsideration by a larger
Bench of the Supreme Court.

 

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Budget 2010 – A Significant Change for the Better?

Editorial

This year’s Finance Bill was
unusual for most of us. We have now got so accustomed to encountering wholesale
changes in direct tax laws (normally, over 100 clauses), that on seeing only 55
clauses dealing with direct tax amendments, we were left wondering as to whether
we had gone through the full text of the Finance Bill or whether we had missed
out on some part. One feels that the Finance Minister, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee,
must be complimented for this.

However, when one realises that
this reduction in amendments was more on account of the fact that wholesale
amendments would come in shortly in the form of the Direct Taxes Code (DTC), and
not actuated by thought of the need for stability in tax laws, one realises that
perhaps nothing has changed in the attitude of the Finance Ministry.

This is brought home by the
fact that the bane of previous Finance Bills—retrospective amendments—still
continues. One sees many such amendments this year as well. One often wondered
whether the Government would be able to save much time and effort by just
inserting a provision in the tax laws that in case any decision of the Tribunal,
High Courts or Supreme Court takes a view adverse to that held by the Tax
department, the law would be deemed to have been amended with retrospective
effect from 1961 (or the date of the relevant provision) to clarify that the Tax
department’s view is the correct one. The one positive feature this time is that
some of the retrospective amendments result in correction of earlier drafting
anomalies or are in favour of the taxpayer. One hopes that this positive trend
continues instead of the usual one-sided retrospective amendments.

The reduction in the fiscal
deficit also seems to be a good thing, given the profligacy of the government in
the past. However, when one looks back at last year, one realises that last
year’s budget bore the brunt of the earlier year’s election year budget, and
contained certain expenditure such as arrears for government employees due to
implementation of the Pay Commission recommendations. Such expenditure is absent
in 2010-11. Further, divestment of public sector undertakings is also expected
to rake in sizeable amounts, along with the auction of 3G spectrum. Hence the
magic of
reduction of deficit is not something which can be sustained, but is more due to
one-time items. Nevertheless, it is a good beginning towards financial reform.

The one thing for which the
Finance Minister must be really complimented is for doing away with the
accounting jugglery of non-accounting for oil and fertilizer subsidies by issue
of bonds, which was being recognised as expenditure only in the year of
redemption. This is a long overdue reform, as the Government itself certainly
should not resort to such window-dressing of accounts.

This time, while the service
tax rate itself has remained unchanged, contrary to expectations, the service
tax provisions seem to be fairly harsh. To tax sale of residential houses, where
the inputs are already subjected to various taxes such as VAT and service tax,
does seem unjustified. It is obvious that builders will pass on the entire
additional tax burden to buyers, irrespective of the actual effective tax burden
on the builders—one more excuse to raise prices. The very fact that homes in
India are still unaffordable for the vast majority of us, is all the more reason
why such a tax ought not to have been levied. One hopes that this amendment will
be reviewed. When air travel has just become affordable to a large number of
people, taxing domestic air travel also seems premature. These amendments would
be more appropriate when the Goods and Service Tax (GST) is actually
implemented, so that the impact is not as much, due to the full set off on taxes
paid on inputs being available against the final tax payable.

With a fresh date of 1st April
2011 now being announced for both GST and the DTC, the same date as for
implementation of IFRS , and with the Companies Bill expected to be shortly
passed, we have to unlearn what we already know and gear ourselves up to go back
to our studies to learn the major part of our professional areas of practice
afresh. Maybe we should now ask for a practice holiday, like a tax holiday, to
enable us to equip ourselves through this relearning!

Gautam Nayak

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The European Economic Crisis

Editorial

The recent crisis in various European countries (four of the
worst affected being commonly referred to as PIGS — Portugal, Ireland, Greece,
Spain) has again thrown the budding worldwide economic recovery into a spin. The
near default by Greece and the heavy cost of the bailout by the European Union
has had a huge effect on markets worldwide, and is bound to affect various
countries around the world. Italy is thanking its stars that the ‘I’ in PIGS no
longer stands for Italy but for Ireland, but the rest of the world is wondering
whether Italy too would go the same way as the others, given some of the common
economic parameters that it has with those countries.

This is the other side of globalisation that we see. The
Euro, the common currency for Europe, which was hailed as a significant step for
integration of the European economy when it was implemented, is now in danger of
having countries break away from it. It was a well-known fact that the European
Union consisted of diverse economies — some well-developed and economically
conservative, while others not so well developed but profligate in their
spending without having the economic resources to do so. Conservative Germans
are rightly indignant at having to bail out profligate Greece, but because of
the Euro, and the impact on their banks and economy, have no choice but to
support Greece. Greece has its hands partly tied in tiding over the crisis
because it is part of the Euro, and therefore unable to devalue its currency. It
naturally expected the European Union to bail it out.

India too has important lessons to learn from the European
crisis. India is similar to Europe in the sense that India too consists of
various states having a common currency, just as Europe consists of various
countries having a common currency. Each state has its own finances and
expenditure, just as each country in Europe has its own finances and
expenditure. Just as Greece merrily continued to spend, without the requisite
revenues, relying totally on the European Union to bail it out, in India too we
have various states which have launched various populist programmes without the
funds to sustain such programmes, hoping that the Central Government would bail
them out if they were to land in difficulty.

Perhaps the one major difference is that the Indian federal
revenues and the federal expenses are a far higher percentage of the total
Government revenues and expenses than the common revenues and expenses of the
European Union are to the total European revenues and expenses. Also, in India,
certain major economic decisions are taken by the federal government, which
decisions may be the prerogative of the individual countries in Europe.

The Greek crisis was caused by the fact that during the
economic boom, Greece did not use the opportunity to carry out much-needed
reforms. Tax evasion is still rampant in Greece, resulting in significant
leakage of tax revenues due to the government. The Greek government has been
merrily spending without regard to its revenues, thereby running large deficits.

In India too, the reforms agenda has been lagging of late.
Tax evasion is still fairly high, though it has reduced in recent times. The
Indian government’s increase in spending in recent times probably outshadows
that of Greece. The fuel subsidy, the fertiliser subsidy, the food subsidy, and
various other schemes have resulted in drastic increases in the government
deficit. The worry is that there does not seem to be any significant efforts to
reduce the deficit through reduced government spending. So far, the government
has been able to manage on account of one-time collections, such as
disinvestment of public sector companies, auction of telecom spectrum, etc. The
question is — how long can sale of capital assets continue to sustain government
expenditure ?

Sooner or later, the government will run out of options and
have to either increase taxes (which seems difficult under the current
scenario), improve tax compliance, or reduce Government spending (which again
seems unlikely, given the populist measures that are generally resorted to).
Improvement of tax compliance to boost tax revenues seems the only possible
realistic way. Such measures will be required, and we cannot bank on the fact
that since we are currently growing at a brisk pace as compared to the rest of
the world, and are a popular investment destination, we would be immune from
similar economic crises. It does not take long for business confidence to
evaporate, and it is far better that we take measures before we are forced to do
so.

We are fortunate that we have an economist at the helm of
affairs of our country in such times. However, given the fact that the current
government has to adjust to the whims and fancies of other political parties in
order to survive, the room for much-needed reform is practically limited. Can
our opportunistic politicians not cast aside their personal greed and agenda for
the time being, and act in the country’s best interest by supporting the
government in its economic reforms ?

Our economy is already feeling the effects of the European
crisis. Our stock markets have stumbled, the rupee has become volatile against
other currencies, and exporters to Europe will shortly start feeling the crunch.
Foreign capital may flow out from the Indian stock markets to safer assets.
Interest rates and inflation may move up. One does not know how long the problem
will continue and how much the European economy will worsen before things
improve for the better.

The silver lining in the crisis may be that the bubble in the
Indian real estate sector, which was primarily caused by inflows from abroad,
may deflate, causing real estate prices to return to reasonable levels. One
hopes and wishes that the Indian economy continues its steady growth without too
many hiccups.

Gautam Nayak

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Professional Growth

Editorial

It has been my privilege over the past 3 years to communicate
with you as the editor of this prestigious journal. I have enjoyed interacting
and sharing my thoughts with so many of you on various issues impacting us as
professionals. It is now time for me to hand over the reins to my Joint Editor
of the past two years, Sanjeev Pandit.

As has been the practice for the past couple of years, this
year too, the July issue of the journal contains certain special pages. The idea
behind the special issue was that on the anniversary of the Society’s founding
every year, we should take stock of the direction that the profession is taking
and of the environment in which it is functioning, and look at what we should be
doing as professionals in the future.

In the special pages in this issue, we have the views of
Justice Ajit P. Shah, retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, on various
aspects of the law and the judicial and legal framework in India, which affect
our clients, and us both as professionals as well as citizens of this country.
Based on discussions with him, one is left with the distinct impression that
there is so much to be done to improve the judicial and legal framework, to
ensure that justice is done to all. One hopes that the Government gives as much
importance to the improvement of the judicial and legal framework, as it gives
to the improvement of infrastructure in our country. Proper laws and proper
interpretation and enforcement of such laws is one of the crucial factors
facilitating growth of business and industry, as much as a proper infrastructure
is a factor, besides being essential to ensure that all citizens enjoy their
constitutional rights.

In the special pages, we also carry an article by Shri T. N.
Manoharan, past President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India,
who has recently been awarded the Padma Shri by the Government in recognition of
the sterling role played by him in the rescue of Satyam as a
Government-appointed director. He shares with us his views on the various
developments which can have a significant impact on us as professionals, whether
in practice or in employment.

An interesting point which he makes is the need for us to
consolidate into larger firms by taking advantage of the provisions for limited
liability partnerships (which will hopefully soon become a reality for us
chartered accountants) and multidisciplinary firms. This is something which each
one of us needs to seriously look at, as it is becoming almost impossible for
one person to understand and specialise in different areas of practice, given
the rapid developments in different spheres. I am sure that this will be brought
home to all of us in the next couple of years when we will simultaneously see
the new Direct Taxes Code replacing the Income Tax Act, the Goods and Services
Tax replacing VAT, excise duty, and service tax, International Financial
Reporting Standards replacing the current accounting standards and the new
Companies Act replacing the current Companies Act. There would be serious
consequences of any errors on our part in not understanding these new
provisions, and therefore it makes sense for us to focus on a few areas rather
than try and do whatever work comes our way.

If one wants to capitalise on the fact that our clients
require a variety of services, larger firms with like-minded professionals
focussing on different areas of practice make sense, as one is able to provide
variety as well as quality. Limited liability partnerships restrict our
liability to our own deeds, removing one of the significant barriers to
formation of partnership firms. Of course, a partnership (whether an LLP or
otherwise) does involve some amount of give and take from each partner. One has
to understand that the advantages of a partnership far outweigh the sacrifices
that one is required to make in a partnership, provided that one has like-minded
partners.

Quality is one aspect which many of us have chosen to ignore,
but can continue to do so only at increasing risk. Even a professional indemnity
policy cannot provide us total protection from risk, as one has to ensure that
one has taken the necessary precautions and not acted in a negligent manner.
Focus on quality rather than quantity is one of the best methods in which one
can contain risk in one’s practice. In fact, doing this may make one realise
that it is far more rewarding to focus on lesser work carried out with greater
quality services, rather than try and do much more work at the cost of quality.
Clients ultimately realise the quality of work that is being provided to them,
and in the long run, are willing to pay better for services of a higher quality.
Of course, there will always be clients who will try to belittle the services
provided, to avoid paying higher fees. We must realise that we are better off
without such clients, and focus on retaining only those clients who appreciate
the services provided to them. This is something that may call for sacrifices in
the short term, in the form of losing some clients or spending more time on
updating one’s knowledge and in providing the same services, but will yield
significant rewards in the long term.

I am sure that the Society, and the journal in particular,
will continue to facilitate your quest for increasing your knowledge and
improving the quality of your services as it has done in the past. Personally
for me, the past 3 years have been highly satisfying due to the feedback
received from so many of you appreciating the improvements made to the journal.
I would like to thank each one of you for your feedback and support over the
past 3 years, and I am sure that my successor will also continue to enjoy that
support.

Gautam Nayak

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Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Total turnover to exclude freight and insurance : Deduction allowable on foreign exchange gain : Deduction allowable on enhanced profit on account of disallowance of PF/ESIC.

New Page 1

Unreported
 


39 Free Trade Zone : Deduction u/s.10A of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2003-04 : Total turnover to exclude freight and insurance :
Deduction allowable on foreign exchange gain : Deduction allowable on enhanced
profit on account of disallowance of PF/ESIC.


[CIT v. Gem Plus Jewellery India Ltd. (Bom.); ITA No.
2426 of 2009 dated 23-6-2010]

The following questions were raised in the appeal filed by
the Revenue :

“(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the exemption u/s.10A of the
Act should be computed after excluding freight and insurance from the total
turnover ?

(b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to grant
exemption u/s.10A on foreign exchange gain earned on realisation of export
receipts in the year of export and to exclude the gains on sales of earlier
years from the profits of the year under consideration and allow in those
years ?

(c) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to grant
the exemption u/s.10A of the Act on the assessed income, which was enhanced
due to disallowance of employer’s as well as employees’ contribution towards
PF/ESIC ?”

The Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal,
answered the questions in favour of the assessee and held as under :

“(a-i) Ss.(4) of S. 10A provides the manner in which the
profits derived from the export shall be computed. U/ss.(4), the profits of
the business of the undertaking are multiplied by the export turnover and
divided by the total turnover of the business carried on by the undertaking.
Total turnover of the business would consist of the turnover from export and
the turnover from local sales.

(a-ii) In Explanation (2) to S. 10A, the expression ‘export
turnover’ is defined to mean the consideration in respect of export of
articles, etc., received in or brought into India by the assessee in
convertible foreign exchange but so as not to include inter alia freight and
insurance. Therefore in computing the export turnover, the Legislature has
made a specific exclusion of freight and insurance charges.

(a-iii) The export turnover in the numerator must have the
same meaning as the export turnover which is a constituent element of total
turnover in the denominator. Freight and insurance do not have an element of
turnover. These two items would have to be excluded from the total turnover.

(b-i) The Tribunal has followed a decision of its Special
Bench in coming to the conclusion that foreign exchange earned on the
realisation of export receipts in a year other than the year in which the
goods were exported would have to be considered in the year of export for the
for the purposes of exemption u/s.80HHC. The Tribunal has, however, directed
the Assessing Officer, while granting a deduction to the assessee u/s.10A in
the export to exclude the amount from the profits of the year under
consideration simultaneously. This is to ensure that the assessee does not
obtain a deduction twice over.

(b-ii) It has not been disputed on behalf of the Revenue
that the foreign exchange was realised by the assessee within the period
stipulated in law. The assessee realised a larger amount because of a foreign
exchange fluctuation. The fact that this forms part of the sale proceeds would
have to be accepted in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this
Court in CIT v. Umber Export India, (ITA 1249 of 2007 decided on 18-2-2009).

(biii) In the present case, the assessee has realised a
larger amount in terms of Indian Rupees as a result of a foreign exchange
fluctuation that took place in the course of the export transaction.

(b-iv) For the aforesaid reasons, the question of law is
answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assesee.

(c-i) The assessed income was enhanced due to the
disallowance of the employer’s as well as employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC
and the only question which is canvassed on behalf of the Revenue is whether
on that basis the Tribunal was justified in directing the Assessing Officer to
grant the exemption u/s.10A.

(c-ii) On this position, in the present case it can-not be
disputed that the net consequence of the disallowance of the employer’s and
the employees’ contribution is that the business profits have to that extent
been enhanced. There was an add back by the Assessing Officer to the income.
All profits of the unit of the assessee have been derived from manufacturing
activity. The salaries paid by the assessee relate to the manufacturing
activity. The disallowance of the PF/ESIC payments has been made because of
the statutory provisions. The plain consequence of the disallowance and the
add back that has been made by the Assessing Officer is an increase in the
business profits of the assessee.

(c-iii) The contention of the Revenue that in computing the
deduction u/s.10A the addition made on account of the disallowance of PF/ESIC
payments ought to be ignored cannot be accepted. No statutory provision to
that effect having been made, the plain consequence of the disallowance made
by the Assessing Officer must follow. The question shall accordingly stand
answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.”
 

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Appellate Tribunal : Powers and duty : A.Y. 1997-98 : Order passed relying on decision not cited in the course of arguments : Assessee to be given opportunity to deal with distinguishable features of case relied on : Matter remanded.

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Reported :

40 Appellate Tribunal : Powers and duty : A.Y. 1997-98 :
Order passed relying on decision not cited in the course of arguments : Assessee
to be given opportunity to deal with distinguishable features of case relied on
: Matter remanded.


[Inventure Growth and Securities Ltd. v. ITAT; 324 ITR
319 (Bom.)]

In respect of the A.Y. 1997-98, the Tribunal decided an
appeal relying on the decision of the co-ordinate Bench which was not relied on
by either parties. The assessee therefore, filed a miscellaneous application
u/s.254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the Tribunal, while
relying on the decision of the co-ordinate Bench, had not furnished an
opportunity to the assessee to deal with the decision which had not been cited
by either side when arguments were heard. The application was dismissed.

On writ petition filed by the assessee the Bombay High Court
set aside the order of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) It could not be laid down as an inflexible provision
of law that an order of remand on a miscellaneous application u/s.254(2) would
be warranted merely because the Tribunal had relied upon a judgment which was
not cited by either party before it. In each case, it was for the Court to
consider as to whether a prima facie or arguable distinction had been made and
which should have been considered by the Tribunal.

(ii) The distinguishing features in the case of Khandwala
Finace Ltd., which had been pointed out by the assessee were sufficient to
hold that an opportunity should be granted to the petitioner to place its case
on the applicability or otherwise of the decision in Khandwala Finance Ltd.
before the Tribunal. Therefore the appeal and the cross-objections were to be
restored for fresh consideration on the merits before the Tribunal.”

 

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Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Profits of business : Expl. (baa) : Insurance claim relating to stock-in-trade not to be excluded.

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Unreported :


38 Export profit : Deduction u/s.80HHC of Income-tax Act,
1961 : A.Y. 2000-01 : Profits of business : Expl. (baa) : Insurance claim
relating to stock-in-trade not to be excluded.


[CIT v. The Pfizer Ltd. (Bom.); ITAL No. 128 of 2009
dated 18-6-2010]

The assessee is engaged in the manufacture and export of
pharmaceuticals and animal health products. For the A.Y. 2000-01, while
computing deduction u/s.80HHC, the Assessing Officer excluded 90% of the amount
of insurance claim which was related to the stock-in-trade of the assessee. The
Tribunal held that the insurance claim formed part of the income of the business
of the assesee and was liable to be considered as part of the profits of the
business in view of Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHC. The Tribunal was of the view
that the insurance claim was not in the nature of brokerage, commission,
interest, rent or charges and therefore was not any other receipt of a similar
nature within the meaning of Explanation (baa). The Tribunal, therefore, held
that 90% of the insurance claim could not be excluded.

On appeal by the Revenue the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as :

“(i) Receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest,
rent or charges in Explanation (baa) have been held, by the judgment of the
Supreme Court in CIT v. K. Ravindranathan Nair; 295 ITR 228 (SC), to
constitute independent incomes. Being independent incomes unrelated to export,
the Parliament contemplated that 90% of such receipts would have to be reduced
from the profits of business as defined in Explanation (baa).

(ii) The rationale for excluding 90% of the receipts by way
of brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges is that these are
independent incomes and their inclusion in the profits of business would
result in a distortion. In determining whether any other receipt is liable to
undergo a reduction of 90%, the basic prescription which must be borne in mind
is whether the receipt is of a similar nature and is included in the profits
of business. To be susceptible of a reduction the receipt must be of a nature
similar to brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges.

(iii) In the present case, the insurance claim, it must be
clarified, is related to the stock-in trade and it is only an insurance claim
of that nature which forms the subject matter of the appeal. Now it cannot be
disputed that if the stock-in-trade of the assessee were to be sold, the
income that was received from the sale of goods would constitute the profits
of the business as computed under the head profits and gains of business or
profession. The income emanating from the sale would not be sustainable to a
reduction of 90% for the simple reason that it would not constitute a receipt
of a nature similar to brokerage, commission, interest, rent or charges.

(iv) A contract of insurance is a contract of indemnity.
The insurance claim in essence indemnifies the assessee for the loss of the
stock-in-trade. The indemnification that is made to the assessee must stand on
the same footing as the income that would have been realised by the assessee
on the sale of the stock in trade.

(v) In these circumstances, we are clearly of the view that
the insurance claim on account of the stock-in-trade does not constitute an
independent income or a receipt of a nature similar to brokerage, commission,
interest, rent or charges. Hence, such a receipt would not be subject to a
deduction of 90% under clause (1) of Explanation (baa).”
 

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Deduction u/s.80RR of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1999-00 to 2001-02 : Dress designer is artist entitled to deduction u/s. 80RR.

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 Unreported :

36 Deduction u/s.80RR of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Ys. 1999-00
to 2001-02 : Dress designer is artist entitled to deduction u/s. 80RR.

[CIT v. Tarun R. Tahiliani (Bom.); dated 14-6-2010]

The assesse is a dress designer. For the A.Ys. 1999-00 to
2001-02 the assessee claimed deduction u/s.80RR of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in
respect of the design fees received from persons not resident in India in
convertible foreign exchange. The Assessing Officer rejected the claim holding
that the assessee is not an author, or a playwright, artist, musician, actor or
a sportsman, and hence did not fall within one of the categories to whom a
deduction can be allowed. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s claim.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Bombay High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal and held as under :

“(i) Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue submitted
that (i) The expression ‘artist’ in S. 80RR must be restricted to the field of
fine arts; (ii) The purpose of the provision is to showcase Indian culture
abroad; and (iii) The field of design is an area of technical expertise and
not an art form.

(ii) In a circular (No. 31) of the Board dated 25-10-1969,
it was clarified that the expression artist includes photographers and T.V.
cameramen for S. 80RR. By circular (No. 675) dated 3-1-1994, the Board
clarified that a script writer is a playwright and that a director is an
artist for the purpose of S. 80RR. However, a producer does not fall in any of
the stated categories.

(iii) The expression ‘artist’ is not defined by the
statute. Hence, the Parliament must have intended that an artist must be
understood in its ordinary sense. No artificial constructs or deeming
fictions. There is nothing in the statutory provision which would confine the
meaning of the expression to a person
engaged in fine arts.

(iv) Simply stated, an artist is a person who engages in an
activity which is an art. Artist, as we understand them, use skill and
imagination in the creation of aesthetic objects and experience. Drawing,
painting, sculpture, acting, dancing, writing, film-making, photography and
music all involve imagination, talent and skill in the creation of works which
have an aesthetic value. A designer uses the process of design and her work
requires a distinct and significant element of creativity. The canvass of
design is diverse and includes graphic design and fashion design. An artist as
part of his or her creative work, seeks to arrange elements in a manner that
would affect human senses and emotions. Design, in a certain sense, can be
construed to be a rigorous form of art or art which has a clearly defined
purpose. Though the field of designing may be regarded as a rigorous facet of
art, creativity, imagination and visualisation are the core of design.

(v) Dress designing has assumed significance in the age in
which we live, influenced as it is by the media and entertainment. As a dress
designer, the assessee must bring to his work a high degree of imagination,
creativity and skill. The fact that designing involves skill and even
technical expertise does not detract from the fact that the designer must
visualise and imagine. A designer is an artist.

(vi) The Tribunal was not in error in holding that the
assessee is an artist for the purposes of S. 80RR.”

 

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Export profit : S. 80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In computing the amount deductible u/s.80HHC(3)(b) freight and insurance is not to be included in the direct cost.

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Unreported :


37 Export profit : S. 80HHC of Income-tax Act, 1961 : In
computing the amount deductible u/s.80HHC(3)(b) freight and insurance is not to
be included in the direct cost.


[CIT v. King Metal Works (Bom.); ITA(L) No. 801 of 2010,
dated 7-7-2010]

In this case, the following question was raised before the
Bombay High Court :

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case
and in law, the Tribunal has erred in holding that while computing direct cost
attributable to export, the freight and insurance amounting to Rs.1,71,87,614
should be excluded for arriving at export profits while computing the
deduction u/s.80HHC ?”

The High Court answered the question in favour of the
assessee and held as under :

“(i) U/s.80HHC(3)(b), the export turnover has to be reduced
by the direct and indirect cost attributable to export in order to arrive at
profits derived from export.

(ii) While defining the expression ‘export turnover’, the
Parliament has evinced an intent to exclude freight and insurance attributable
to the transport of goods or merchandise beyond the customs station. Such
freight and insurance has to be excluded from the sale proceeds received in
India by the assessee in convertible foreign exchange. The object of the
exclusion of freight and insurance is to ensure that the benefit of the
deduction u/s.80HHC is confined to profits derived from export.

(iii) The case of the Revenue is that though freight and
insurance is excluded from the export turnover as a result of Explanation (b)
to Ss.(4C) of the Section, freight and insurance must be treated as direct
cost and must then be deducted from the export turnover. According to the
Revenue, freight and insurance would be ‘cost directly attributable to the
trading goods exported out of India’ within the meaning of Explanation (d) to
Ss.(3).

(iv) In considering the tenability of the submission which
has been urged on behalf of the Revenue, it has to be noted that for the
purposes of the formula in clause (b) of Ss.(3), the export turnover has to be
reduced by direct and indirect cost attributable to export. Freight and
insurance is expressly to be excluded from the sale proceeds received by the
assessee, in computing the export turnover. Freight and insurance cannot be
regarded as costs directly attributable to the trading goods within the
meaning of clause (b) of Explanation to Ss.(3).

(v) As a matter of fact, freight and insurance attributable
to the transport of goods or merchandise beyond the customs station is already
excluded from the sale proceeds in computing the export turnover. Such freight
and insurance cannot be regarded as part of the direct costs attributable to the
trading goods. To do so, would result in a situation where freight and insurance
attributable to the transport of the goods beyond the customs station, which has
already been reduced from the sale proceeds received by the assessee, would, in
addition, be added back as a part of the direct cost incurred by the assessee.
The language of the Section, in our view, does not warrant such a conclusion.”

 

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ICAI and Its (Student) Members

Editorial

In the month of July, results of the CA final examination
were announced. Only about 3.5% of students passed both the groups in the old
course, while the corresponding percentage in the new course was a little better
at 6.5%. There is great anguish amongst the student community on account of such
dismal results. Details of the recent results are given in the feature `ICAI and
its Members’ in this issue of the Journal. If the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India were to publish statistics of students passing the final CA
examination within five years from the date of their enrolment to the course, it
will certainly be an eye-opener.

It is time that all of us take a closer look at the CA course
– its structure, entry requirements, education, training, examination system and
other aspects.

Over the last few years, many changes have taken place;
examinations have been renamed and eligibility criteria for the students
changed. CPT was introduced to attract young talented students to the course,
just as students take up engineering, medicine or law after passing the Higher
Secondary Examination. On one hand, we are asking students to join the CA course
after Higher Secondary level, while on the other, we seek recognition for the CA
course as equivalent to master’s degree for the purpose of doing PhD. One really
needs to decide whether the CA course should be placed as an undergraduate
course or a post-graduate course. Today, it is neither.

When CPT was introduced, it was expected that students will
give up their college education (or opt for a correspondence degree course) and
concentrate on CA. But that expectation has been belied, possibly due to the
uncertainty of passing CA examinations. So today the students attend (do they
really?) college, coaching classes and office and are also expected to study for
the examinations.

The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), of which
our Institute is a member, through the International Accounting Education
Standards Board (IAESB), issues International Education Standards (IES) and
other documents on training for professional accountants. IES1 `Entry
Requirements to a Programme of Professional Accountant Education’ in paragraph 2
states, “The aim of this IES is to ensure that students hoping to become
professional accountants have an educational background that enables them to
have a reasonable possibility of achieving success in their studies, qualifying
examinations and practical experience period. To fulfil this requirement, member
bodies may require certain entrants to take pre-entry proficiency tests.” Does
CPT or the commerce education that is imparted today at the undergraduate level
ensure that the students have a fair chance of passing the final examination
within a reasonable period? The answer is in the negative.

Often, students choose their career based on the cost of the
course and monetary prospects rather than their aptitude. In courses which have
tougher entry points, generally only students with the right aptitude and
calibre enter and ultimately most of them taste success. An easy entry and
subsequent difficult examinations reminds one of Abhimanyu in Mahabharat, who
had the expertise to enter the battle formation of `Chakravyuha’ but did not
know how to exit. This is an injustice to students who join the course in a
herd, but even at the end of five years, are unable to clear the final
examination. It creates a large pool of disheartened and disillusioned youth
whose qualification is ‘CA fail’. This does not augur well either for the
society in general or students and the profession in particular.

Coming to the course content, one wonders if the syllabus has
become too unwieldy for the students to handle. Even if one presumes that
students do not refer to the bare text of various laws, accounting and auditing
standards, the amount of reading that is required is voluminous. A student
passing IPCC in the first attempt appears for the final examination within a
period of about 2 to 2½ years. During this period, he is serving articles and
possibly would have appeared for college examinations as well. Even with the
maximum available leave, can a student acquire the level of knowledge that is
expected to qualify as a CA?

Most professional courses have a semester pattern with
evaluation spread over the duration of the course. This may not be possible for
the CA course, but can we think of permitting appearing only for one group at a
time or modular examination with say two papers at a time? That may reduce the
burden on students. By giving an option of appearing for both the groups at the
final examination, we are abetting failure.

At the final examination, a large number of subjects require
expert level knowledge. Does the education and training imparted ensure that?
Even in the best law schools in India, what the students get is a solid
foundation in law to understand and interpret legal issues with core knowledge
of basic laws. While it is absolutely necessary that standards of the course
should consistently remain high, we need to be clear in our mind as to what we
mean by high standards. A student passing the final examination must have
knowledge of core subjects, analytical capability and high ethical standards;
and last but not the least, he/she ought to have developed the capacity to
learn. Framework to IES, in paragraph 21, states, “In a constantly changing work
environment, both learning to learn and a commitment to lifelong learning are
integral aspects of being a professional accountant.”

Today, for a chartered accountant, there are a large number
of career options apart from the traditional areas of taxation and auditing. One
may consider permitting choice of subjects at the final CA examination rather
than expecting the student to have expert knowledge in a large number of
subjects. In fact, many years back, the final examination consisted of three
groups and for one group, a student had a choice of selecting from three
combinations.

There are few things that students need to keep in mind.
Success in any examination requires comprehension of the subject, retention of
knowledge, recalling and applying the same and finally, the presentation. Most
students rely heavily on retention without giving adequate emphasis on the other
aspects. While retention is essential, it is certainly not sufficient.

At the same time, one wonders whether in an era where
information is just a click away, can we have open book examinations in some
subjects that will test the students’ analytical capacity and application of
knowledge? When Late Jal Dastur, CA, wrote papers consisting of case studies for
conferences, he would cite all the relevant sections of the Company Law and yet,
the case studies would be so interesting and challenging.

Students, today, have lost the habit of writing and therefore, the capacity to express themselves in the written form. Also, due to extensive use of computers, there is hardly any occasion for the use of a pen between two examinations. As a result, students are unable to complete the paper. Maybe, in future, some of the papers will be in the nature of multiple choices or online tests requiring little writing. But it is also a fact that in the commercial world, written communication has its own importance, whether one is making submissions to the tax authorities or writing a report in the corporate world. The scheme of Sunday Test Papers, with all its drawbacks, gave students practice of writing answers, kept the students in touch with the syllabus and ensured regular evaluation. It was in the interest of the students.

Students who take up engineering, medicine or law have the benefit of classroom training. Even qualified CAs need to attend CPE programmes. Is it fair to expect CA students to gain expert level knowledge with only self study? Examination results have demonstrated that coaching classes have not helped the students. However, we have done precious little to provide a substitute. With the advent of information technology, we should be able to provide students with structured online training and facilities to resolve doubts and queries quickly through the medium of the Internet and toll-free numbers. A modest beginning has been done with the launch of the CA Shiksha portal.

One aspect that has been ignored is the timely mentoring of students. All the principals have this duty toward their students. It is important that mentoring should include advice to move to an alternate career option at an appropriate time and not after valuable years have been lost after futile examination attempts.

I leave these thoughts with you.

Where is the Wealth of Commons?

Editorial

By the time this communication reaches you, the Commonwealth
Games would have commenced. Over the last three weeks, the Commonwealth Games
have hogged the headlines in the print media and have been the topic of debates
/ discussions on numerous prime-time shows. Much has been said about corruption,
the callous approach in which the Organising Committee, sections of the
bureaucracy, and other agencies have functioned. The object of this editorial is
not to debate upon the absolute chaos which one is witnessing, but to dwell upon
much larger issues which have emerged through debate and discussion on the
Games. The Commonwealth Games are supposed to promote the principles of the
Commonwealth Organisation. Most of us are unaware of the Singapore Declaration
of 1971, in which, promotion of the principles of human rights and good
governance is a significant aspect.

The debate that has been carried on in the media brings to my
mind four specific aspects which we as a nation must address if we are to become
a country that merits the attention of the world. The organisation of the games
reflects four ills which are unique not to the Games but pervade the national
scene. Lack of prioritisation, degeneration of national character, lack of
foresight or vision and finally, our love for the event rather than the object
behind it.

The first is lack of prioritisation. It is said that the
ultimate cost of the Games is going to be equal to the cost of agricultural debt
waiver. Assuming that there is some degree of exaggeration, the money disbursed
is going to reach some pockets, whether they are of corrupt politicians,
bureaucrats or the resident or foreign agencies. The real point is that even if
the money was spent more efficiently, it was not going to benefit the common
sportsman at all. In my view, the organisation of the Games was flawed right
from the conceptualisation stage. The whole objective of hosting the Games was
to create a sporting infrastructure, which would be available to sportsmen at
large. Creating world-class facilities at one location would never serve any
purpose since the access to them is limited to a few. The resources should have
been utilised to create different facilities across the country or at least, the
facilities should have been spread out much more than they are today. It is here
that there is a gross error in priorities.

In a country where resources are scarce, we must see that
they are spent with the right priorities. Despite all its promises, even the
current government has been unable to allocate enough resources for education.
Spending on the health sector is also meeting the same fate. Sixty-three years
after independence, our development is extremely skewed. While we may have made
substantial progress in the field of infrastructure, particularly in the field
of communications, unless we pay attention to the basic pillars of human
infrastructure that is education and health, we will fail miserably in achieving
the dream of a powerful Indian nation. Even when we spend on education and
health, we need to get our priorities in place. We tend to pay a lot of
attention to higher education like creation of better management and engineering
institutes while the real need is to improve the quality of primary and
secondary education. Even in the health sector, we tend to concentrate on super
speciality hospitals while the need is to create a vast network of primary
health centres that will cater to the needs of the common man.

The second problem is in regard to the steady degeneration of
national character. A Union Minister commenting on the collapse of a bridge said
that the bridge in question was not to be used by sportsmen but by members of
the public. The statement is shocking to say the least. Another bureaucrat has
gone on record to say that the standards of hygiene in other parts of the world
are different from ours. This has become a common phenomenon in public life. We
break with impunity the laws we make, and think nothing about the breach of
ethical standards. The problem is that we do not seem to feel aggrieved. It is
this silent acceptance that perpetrates the decay of moral standards. It is only
if we perceive that there is a problem, will we strive to rectify it, otherwise
we will simply lower the bar and that does not augur well for us as a nation.

The next characteristic which was displayed in the
organisation of the Games is a complete lack of foresight or vision. The Games
were allotted to us as early as 2005. Yet, for the first three years from that
date, we did nothing of note in that regard. It is reported that tenders for
work were floated as late as in 2008. Again this lack of foresight / vision is
not unique to the Games .The site of the new Mumbai airport was selected more
than a decade ago. If there are environmental issues today, they would have
existed even then. It is only now that we are looking at environmental
clearances. Further, the site at which the new airport is proposed is such that
experts state that it is not capable of expansion and it will suffer from
congestion in about 25 years. This reflects a complete lack of vision. Today,
the vision is limited to the next election.

The last aspect is our love for events rather than for the
objective behind those events. Out of the aggregate spending for the Games, a
significant quantum is supposedly to be spent on the opening and closing
ceremonies. The programmes planned are such that the limelight is on actors and
not on sportsmen. Success in the Games is to be measured by the creation of
sports persons who will dominate the world of sports and not a spectacle that
the world will see and quickly forget. This is true of many of our festivals and
programmes. The Ganapati festival is an illustration. While it was initiated all
those years ago with the object of ensuring social bonding, people seem to have
lost sight of this very objective.

Having highlighted all these problems and issues, I believe
there is still hope. This is for the reason that whatever ills the media may
suffer from, it has made people aware. The Right to Information Act has created
a virtual revolution. The youth of today give strength to this hope. In them, I
see the urge to act. The ‘meter jam’ agitation is a case in point. It reflects
the non acceptance of injustice. If the “educated” class can lend a helping hand
and contribute their might, things will gradually change. Young India has a vast
pool of talent. All we need to do is harness it to create quality in public
life!

Once the games are over, all the discussion will be forgotten
and the country will bask in the “glory” of the medals that we are likely to
garner in the absence of participation of top sportsmen and athletes. It is this
national apathy which the organisers are banking on and we, the educated class,
must strive to avoid. We must demand an inquiry. Into the shoddy organisation,
total lack of governance and gross wastage of national resources contributed by
the diligent citizens of this country.


Anil Sathe
Joint Editor

Money Makes the world go round

Editorial

The last month has witnessed some big-ticket entertainment,
coming not only from a cricket league but also from the spectacle of a Union
Minister and a powerful cricket czar exchanging public blows in relation to the
affairs of the league, resulting in the revelation of various alleged
malpractices being indulged in the organisation of the tournament. Various other
public personalities and organizations have also been dragged into the fight,
with their actions also coming under the public scanner. The last month also
witnessed the arrest of a senior income tax official at Thane, while in the
process of collecting bribes; the official seeking to implicate her senior. What
is the connection between the two events?

Both these happenings are evidence of the fact that the urge
to make money at any cost has permeated all spheres of our society and resulted
in the debasement of the functioning of various organisations and institutions.
The IPL has generated tons of money for the organisation (and others?), and, in
the bargain, seems to have attracted all sorts of malpractices to generate
further funds. The allegations indicate that the IPL seems to have been run as a
closed club to generate unimaginable sums of money for those who were fortunate
enough to be close to the organisers. The fight seems to have been caused by the
desire on the part of the organisers to keep gatecrashers out of the party.

Over the years, unfortunately, one has seen politics becoming
a highly profitable business, just as organised crime has always been highly
profitable. The unimaginable amounts that a politician—the son of a labourer—had
earned during his short stint as Chief Minister of a mineral-rich state, would
put most businessmen to shame, and would probably suffice to meet the needs of
quite a few generations. The mind-boggling amounts which some bureaucrats and
tax officials are rumoured to demand and earn in a year far exceed an entire
lifetime’s earnings of most people. Entertainment and sports are now big money
spinners, and the combination of the two, which the IPL represents, is a highly
potent mixture. No wonder IPL has attracted the attention of businessmen,
politicians and, as rumoured, perhaps even the underworld.

As the old song goes, “Money makes the World go Round”. It is
true that money greases the wheels of business and commerce. Nobody disputes
that everybody requires a certain amount of money to lead a decent life. Making
money is fine, so long as it is not at the cost of throwing values to the winds.
The problem really arises when the greed for money overtakes all other human
emotions and values and the pursuit of money is seen as an end in itself, and
not as a means to achieve the end of leading a quality life.

Unfortunately, in India, the general values of life seem to
be taking a backseat more and more to the business of making money at any cost.
Corruption is just one offshoot of this trend. Power is seen to be associated
with money. A person with money power believes that the law can be manipulated
to his advantage to serve his own ends. While the common man is invariably
harassed for minor transgressions of the law, even major violations are swept
under the carpet if the right influence is exercised. Are we therefore
unfortunately metamorphing into an unequal society, with different rules for the
haves and the have-nots? This has the potential to create unrest and
dissatisfaction, which could create difficulties for the entire country.

For truly sustainable progress and development, it is
essential that every person has equal opportunity, and is treated equally under
the law. For proper functioning of civilised society, enforcement of laws has to
be evenhanded and firm—having laws which are selectively enforced is a sureshot
recipe for chaos. Only a society which rewards merit and innovation can progress
in the long run.

A related question is whether we, as a generation, are guilty
of not doing enough to impart true education to our succeeding generations,
thereby increasing the potential for chaos? With children more and more exposed
to the outside world, the influence of parents (or grandparents) over children
is not as much as it used to be in the past. Extra efforts are required to
counteract stronger negative external influences. Our education system, being
based on secular ideals, does not make any attempt to inculcate human values in
our children. These values are to be found in all religions—respect for others’
lives, property, etc. In running down religion in the name of secularism, are we
doing ourselves a disservice? The products of our education system may be
wizards at making money—but have they been brought up with values conducive to
being members of a civilised and peaceful society, where everybody can live in
harmony?

Each one of us needs to take some time out to think—are we
merely enjoying the fruits of our forefathers’ efforts, or are we making efforts
to contribute to a value-based society, so that our successors too will be able
to live in a better world? In what way can each of us contribute to restoring a
sense of values in society collectively?

Gautam Nayak

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Writ petition — Dispute between Government Undertaking and Union of India could be ordinarily proceeded with only after receipt of permission of COD — As the matter was covered by decision of Supreme Court, as an exception, High Court was directed to deci

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  1. Writ petition — Dispute between Government Undertaking and
    Union of India could be ordinarily proceeded with only after receipt of
    permission of COD — As the matter was covered by decision of Supreme Court, as
    an exception, High Court was directed to decide the matter on merits.

[Delhi Development Authority and Anr. v. UOI & Ors.,
(2009) 314 ITR 342 (SC)]

By a writ petition the Delhi Development Authority (DDA)
sought to challenge an order dated 9-9-2005 of the Addl. CIT, Rg. 32, New
Delhi requiring the petitioner to get the accounts of DDA audited u/s.142(2A)
of the Act. According to the petitioner, it had not applied for the COD
clearance as it was not required since the dispute was frivolous and in
support of its contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Canara Bank v. National Thermal Power Corporation, (2001) 1
SCC 43, (2001) 104 Comp. Cas. 97.

The Delhi High Court however held that it was not possible
at the admission stage to arrive at the conclusion that the dispute raised was
a frivolous one as was sought to be contended. According to the High Court the
decision in the Canara Bank’s case turned on its own facts and was
distinguishable. The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition since the
petitioner had not within one month of the filing of the writ petition,
applied to the COD for permission to litigate. It was however clarified that
the time spent in the litigation would not be counted towards the period of
completion of the assessment and also that the petitioner was not precluded
from approaching the COD for resolution of the dispute.

On appeal the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily it
would not have differed with the view taken by the High Court, but as the
matter was covered by the decision in Rajesh Kumar v. Dy. CIT, (2006)
287 ITR 91 (SC), it directed the High Court to consider the writ petition
filed by the petitioner on merits.

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Refund : Interest u/s.244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : TDS certificates submitted during assessment proceedings : Delay on refund not attributable to assessee : S. 244A(2) not attracted : Assessee entitled to interest u/s.244A.

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Reported :


27. Refund : Interest
u/s.244A of Income-tax Act, 1961 : A.Y. 2001-02 : TDS certificates submitted
during assessment proceedings : Delay on refund not attributable to assessee :
S. 244A(2) not attracted : Assessee entitled to interest u/s.244A.

[CIT v. Larsen & Toubro
Ltd.,
235 CTR 108 (Bom.)]

For the A.Y. 2001-02, the
assessment was completed by an order dated 31-3-2003 passed u/s. 143(3) of the
Income-tax Act, 1961. TDS certificates were filed in the course of the
assessment proceedings. Interest u/s.244A was denied on the ground that the TDS
certificates were not furnished with the return of income. The Tribunal found
that tax was deducted and deposited in the exchequer in time and that the
proceedings resulting in refund, has not been delayed for reasons attributable
to assessee. The Tribunal accordingly directed the Assessing Officer to pay
interest u/s. 244A for the period from
1-4-2001 to the date of refund.

On appeal by the Revenue,
the Bombay High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal and held
as under :

“(i) S. 244A(2) provides
that in the event the proceedings resulting in refund has been delayed for
reasons attributable to the assessee, the period of delay so attributable
shall be exclude from the period for which the interest is payable. In the
present case, S. 244A(2) is clearly not attracted. The proceedings resulting
in the refund was not delayed for reasons attributable to the assessee.

(ii) Though the TDS
certificates were not submitted with the return and were filed during the
course of the assessment proceedings, the Tribunal has noted that tax was in
fact deducted at source at the right time. In the circumstances, the Tribunal
was correct in holding that since the benefit of TDS has been allowed to the
assessee, interest u/s. 244A could not be denied only on the ground that the
TDS certificates were not furnished with the return of income. Tax was
deducted and deposited in the exchequer in time.

(iii) S. 244A(2) is not
attracted. The appeal, therefore, does not raise any substantial question of
law and is dismissed.”

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Co-operative Housing Society – Builders have to execute the conveyance: Consumer Protection Act:

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23 Co-operative Housing Society – Builders have to execute
the conveyance: Consumer Protection Act:


Environ Emanual Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd vs. The Environ
Enterprises INC, dated 19.9.2008; Consumer Complaint No. 91 /2008. (Consumer
Grievances Redressal Forum, Konkan Bhavan, Navi Mumbai)

The complainant society is a duly registered co-operative
housing society under the Maharashtra Co-op. Societies Act. In the year 2003,
the opponent builder handed over the possession of the flats to the members of
the society. But, the conveyance deed had not been executed to transfer the land
and building in favour of the society. The society visited the opponent a number
of times and placed their demand before them in writing. The complainant society
had filed this complaint as the opponent had provided defective service to the
complainant society. The complainant society further prayed that order may be
issued to provide occupation certificate, building completion certificate,
documents pertaining to ownership of building to the complainant society, and
also to register the conveyance deed in favour of the society.

The Consumer Forum held that as per the provisions of law, it
is the duty of the opponent builder to register the conveyance deed in favour of
the complainant society.

As the opponent builder had not registered the conveyance
deed in favour of the complainant society, the Consumer Forum was of the opinion
that as per the provisions of the Act, it was the responsibility of the builder
to take initiative to register the society of the flat owners. It was also the
responsibility of the builder to take initiative to register the conveyance deed
in favour of the society. Even though a period of three years has elapsed since,
the opponent has not registered the conveyance deed in favour of the society. As
per the Forum, this act of the opponent was not acceptable. As per Sec. 2(1)(g)
of Consumer Protection Act, this act of the opponent comes under the purview of
“defective services”. The opponent builder was directed to comply with all the
legal procedures to register the conveyance deed in favour of the society within
a period of two months from the date of the order.

 

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Appellate Tribunal – Exparte order: Tribunal must decide appeal on merits, if assessee files submissions in writing

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22 Appellate Tribunal – Exparte order:  Tribunal must
decide appeal on merits, if assessee files submissions in writing


Chemipol vs. UOI

(2009) 244 ELT 497 (Bom)

The appellant’s appeal before the CESTAT was dismissed for
non prosecution. The application filed by the appellant for setting aside the
order of dismissal for non prosecution was rejected by the Tribunal.

In a further appeal, the Hon’ble High Court observed that the
Tribunal has no power to dismiss an appeal for default on the part of an
appellant in making an appearance. Even if the appellant is absent, the Tribunal
is required to decide the appeal on the merits. The Tribunal presently has its
benches only in four or five places in India. An appellant, who on account of
his place or residence or business being far away from the place of sitting for
the Tribunal, may not, except at a high cost, be able to attend the hearing;
especially when we know that matters are usually adjourned for several times. In
such an event, if the appellant files on record his submissions in writing, the
Tribunal must decide the appeal on the merits and on the basis of the said
submissions. In that case, the Tribunal would not have a power to dismiss the
appeal; but where the appellant, in spite of notices, is persistently absent,
and the Tribunal, considering the facts of the case, is of the view that the
appellant is not interested in prosecuting the appeal, can, in the exercise of
its inherent power, dismiss the appeal for non prosecution. The conclusion of
the Tribunal that the appellant is not interested in prosecuting the appeal must
be arrived at based on the facts of each case, and not merely on account of the
absence of the appellant on a solitary occasion.

In the present case, the Tribunal had dismissed the appeal on
account of the absence of the appellant only on the occasion. The fact that the
appellant immediately thereafter applied for restoration of the appeal, shows
his intention: that he was interested in prosecuting the appeal, and maybe he
had a justifiable cause for his absence on one occasion. In the circumstances,
the Tribunal ought to have restored the appeal into the file.

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The issuance of IFRS standards in India

Accounting Standards

The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
roadmap issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) stated that the IFRS
standards would be submitted to the MCA by 30 April 2010. It is widely believed
that The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) would facilitate the
notification of the IFRS standards in the Companies Accounting Standard Rules
through the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACAS).

As per the roadmap issued by the MCA, there shall be two
separate sets of accounting standards u/s.211(3C) of the Companies Act, 1956.
The first set shall comprise the Indian Accounting Standards which are converged
with the IFRS and apply to the specified class of companies. The second set
shall comprise the existing Indian Accounting Standards and apply only to the
companies not covered in any of the phases of the roadmap or till the date of
applicability of IFRS for companies covered in
later phases.

Under IFRS, there are 29 International Accounting Standards (IAS)
and 9 IFRS, 11 Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC) interpretations and 16
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC)
interpretations, a total of 65. At the end of March, more than 40 of these
promulgations were not yet issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India.

Under the circumstances, corporate entities have raised
questions on how the commitment made in the roadmap can be achieved. More
importantly, entities do not know if they should start preparing for IFRS as
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or there will be
certain changes/exceptions to those standards. If there are changes, what will
those changes be ? Particularly, what is not clear is, whether Indian companies
will be able to use all the options allowed under IFRS or ICAI/MCA shall remove
certain options while adopting IFRS in India. For example, under IFRS, IAS-19
provides a number of alternatives to account for actuarial gains and losses,
such as the corridor approach, full recognition to income statement, full
recognition to reserves instead of the income statement. In India, it may be
possible that some of these alternatives may not be allowed.

The author is not in agreement that the alternative
accounting available under IFRS should be eliminated. This would not provide a
level playing field to Indian entities vis-à-vis international companies which
will have this benefit. It may be noted that Australia introduced IFRS
initially by eliminating multiple alternatives under IFRS. However, at a later
date they realised that this was not workable and reverted back to a full IFRS

providing all the options available under IFRS to Australian companies.

Considering the number of pending standards, there is a clear
need to significantly accelerate the process of issuing the IFRS standards. Any
time provided for public exposure will further delay the issuance of these
standards. Currently issuance and notification of standards happens on a
standard by standard basis. This process, if followed for IFRS, will take a long
time and there is no way that the 30 April deadline would be met. To smoothen
the process, the ICAI/NACAS should expose and notify all standards at one go.


For companies covered by the convergence roadmap, we may mention that it is
more of an operational issue and the ICAI/NACAS/MCA will resolve the  same
in due course. The Indian Government is committed to achieve convergence with
IFRS in  India. Thus, entities should not slow down their conversion
efforts.

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Fair Value or Fear Value?

Accounting Standards

Fair value accounting is an integral aspect of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In good times, everyone likes fair value
accounting, however, in bad times they are complaining. With the adoption of
IFRS from 2011 by India, the debate on fair value accounting has exacerbated.
Some argue that fair value accounting is procyclical and caused the recent
credit crisis. However subsequent research done by SEC indicates that financial
institutions collapsed because of credit losses on doubtful mortgages, caused by
sub-prime lending, and not fair value accounting.

Those criticising fair value accounting do not seem to
provide any credible alternatives. Do we take a step back to historical cost
accounting, wherein financial assets are stated at outdated values and hence not
relevant or reliable? Is there any better way of accounting for
derivatives
, other than using fair value accounting ? For example, in the
case of long-term foreign exchange forward contracts there may not be an active
market. For such contracts, entities obtain MTM quotes from banks. In practice,
significant differences have been observed between quotes from various banks.
Though fair value in this case is judgmental, is it still not a much better
alternative than not accounting or accounting at historical price ?

Some years ago an exercise was conducted by a global
accounting firm to determine employee stock option charge. By making changes to
the input variables, all within the allowable parameters of IFRS, option expense
as a percentage of reported income was found to vary as much as 40% to 155%.
However, since then the IASB has issued an Exposure Draft on fair value
measurement, and overtime subjectivity and valuation spread is expected to
reduce substantially.

The next question is what kind of assets and liabilities lend
themselves better to fair value accounting. Whilst many non-financial assets
under IFRS are accounted at historical cost, biological assets are accounted at
fair value. Unfortunately many biological assets are simply not subject to
reliable estimates of fair value. Take for instance, a colt which is kept as a
potential breeding stock, grows into a fine stallion. The stallion starts
winning race events and is also used in Bollywood films. The stallion earns
substantial amount for its owner from breeding and other services. The stallion
gets older, his utility decreases. Eventually the stallion dies of old age and
the carcass used as pet food. At each stage in the life of the horse, the fair
value would change significantly, but estimating the fair values could be
extremely subjective and difficult. In many ways, the stallion reminds one of
fixed assets. Changes in fair value of fixed assets are not recognised in the
income statement, then why should the treatment be different in the case of
biological non-financial assets ?

In India the debate on fair value has got confused because of
lack of understanding of IFRS. For example, a common misunderstanding is that
all assets and liabilities are stated at fair value. However, the truth is that
under IFRS many non-financial assets such as fixed assets or intangible
assets are stated at cost less depreciation.
In the case of investment
properties, a company is allowed to choose either the cost option or fair value
option for accounting. The apprehension of using fair value accounting for
investment properties is driven by tax considerations. However, one may note
that IFRS financial statements are driven towards the needs of the investor and
not of any regulator. Therefore, the income-tax authorities should ensure that
IFRS is tax neutral.

Being an emerging economy, without deep markets in many
areas, India would have specific challenges. Many of the challenges in
determining fair valuation applicable to emerging economies may also apply to
any other developed economy. However, lack of expertise and experience in
emerging economies may amplify the problem. Additional education might be needed
on how to make estimates and judgments and the disclosure of fair value in
financial statements.

Many emerging economies do not have a deep and active market
for long-term maturities, and in the case of corporate bond there may not be an
active market at all. Valuation of such bonds would be difficult as there would
be no market to mark, and estimating discount rate for longer-term maturities
could be challenging. A country may have only one risk premium that covers all
maturities but not broken up for specific duration or industry sector — this can
compound the problem.


Any valuation that involves tax and foreign exchange as a
variable will add another dimension of complication in the case of emerging
economies.
This is because tax rates and regulations are not stable and
change quite frequently. Also, experience indicates that foreign exchange
reference rates announced by the central bank or a regulatory body may be
significantly different from the market. In the case of foreign exchange forward
contract, there may not be an active market beyond one year. Significant
differences have been observed in the MTM quotes from various banks on long-term
forward contracts.

If one has to value a corporate bond that is not actively
traded, the discount rate would be the base rate plus a credit rating-based
credit spread. There are various discounting curves available such as the
zero-coupon interest rate, yield to maturity rate, MIBOR, Fixed Income Money
Market and Derivative Association (FIMMDA) rate, etc. FIMMDA issues credit
rating-based credit spread on a monthly basis. Reuters issues credit spread on a
daily basis but only for AAA rated instruments. The reliability of the valuation
of the bond would depend upon (a) the reliability of the base rate used (b) the
availability and reliability of the credit rating for the instrument, and (c)
the reliability of the credit spread. If a company uses a particular curve to
discount a corporate bond (say, YTM curve) which is different from the
acceptable practice in the market (say, FIMMDA), then the value would differ
from how the market determines it.

Similar issues would also arise in the case of valuation of
government bonds. Many of them may be very illiquid, particularly the state
government bonds. Quotes from different brokers often differ significantly. Also
it is difficult to know if the brokers are acting as principal or agents and
whether the broker will fulfil the deal at the committed price. Valuing them in
the absence of a market may yield different results, as risk premium for state
governments may not be available and would certainly not be the same as that of
the central government. As per RBI requirements state government securities are
valued applying the YTM method by marking it up by 25 basis point, above the
yields of the central government securities of equivalent maturity. However,
under
IFRS this approximation may not work, as it is clear that
different states have different risk profiles, which impacts their valuation.

Under IFRS a company may have to fair value its foreign currency convertible bond listed on a foreign securities exchange. However, in many instances at the reporting period there may be no trade as it may not be actively traded. This could lend itself to potential abuse as insignificant trades at the reporting date may inaccurately determine the fair value of the bonds. The appropriate thing to do in such situations is to make an adjustment to the quoted price based on a detailed analysis so as to measure the bond at its fair value.

It is also common in an emerging economy that an entity is required to estimate fair value of an unquoted instrument, without the benefit of detailed cash flow forecasts, management budgets, or robust multiples. An entity may own an insignificant amount, say, 10% of another entity, and therefore may not be legally entitled to obtain that information from the investee. In many cases, local benchmark companies or their financial information may simply not be available on which to base the valuation. It may be noted that RBI requires unquoted equity instruments to be valued at break-up value from the company’s latest available balance sheet, and in its absence, at Re.1 per company. Such valuations would not be acceptable under IFRS.

When estimating fair value in an emerging economy, modelling a non-financial variable could be extremely difficult. For example, under IFRS, acquisition accounting requires fair valuation of contingent liabilities of the acquiree. If the contingent liabilities were with regard to tax, in many developed economies there is a settlement system and past experience on which an estimate can be based. However, in emerging economies the litigations tend to be very long-drawn and uncertain, eventually resulting in a full liability or no liability at all. The tax authorities that influence the variable may change their behavior rapidly, thereby making the historical behaviour an inaccurate basis on which to predict future behaviour.

Sometimes market dynamics work in a very complicated manner in emerging economies. It may be difficult to determine the principal or most advantageous market due to regulatory or political circumstances. For example, a commodity market may have been cornered by a few selected players, and though in legal terms, all market participants can trade in the market, in actual terms it may be restrictive. Whether such a market should be considered in determining the fair value, if the market participant is not entirely clear whether it will be allowed entry and trade without any restriction ? Such questions would be more common in emerging economies.

Highest and best use is a concept that underscores fair valuation. As people are supposed to act rationally, a fair value measurement considers a market participant’s ability to generate economic benefit by using the asset in its highest and best use. However, highest and best use is subject to the restrictions of what is physically, legally and financially feasible. This could be a difficult area particularly in emerging economies, in the absence of clear laws or the manner in which they are implemented. For example, a builder that owns a piece of land, may not be clear, whether he will be allowed to construct 10 floors or 20 floors and whether the property development is restricted by laws in terms of its usage, for example, only for residential or commercial purposes, etc. This could make the valuation of the land a difficult task.

The above are issues that emerging economies may face more prominently than developed economies. In any system or methodology, fair valuation cannot be expected to provide, the same results if different valuers were valuing it. This is because it is not a science but an art and no guidance or methodology can ever make it a science. However, some additional guidance from the IASB on the above issues will certainly be helpful in bringing about clarity and consistency on how these issues are handled and in collapsing the range within which the fair value should fall. Issuance of guidance that specifically deals with fair valuation issues in emerging economies, will also reduce the resistance in these economies towards fair valuation.

To sum up, fair value accounting does not create good or bad news; rather it is an impartial messenger of the news. However, IASB should look at improvements in terms of providing guidance on a regular basis to reduce judgment and subjectivity as well as restricting the use of fair value accounting only to those assets and liabilities that lend themselves better to fair value accounting. IASB should also focus on providing specific guidance on the fair value challenges that emerging economies such as India would face.

Tax Deduction at Source u/s.195

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 195 of the Income-tax Act provides for tax deduction
at source from payment of interest or any other sum chargeable under the
provisions of the Income-tax Act (other than salaries or dividend specified in
S190) to a non-resident or a foreign company at the prescribed time at the rates
in force.

1.2 U/s.195(2), where the payer considers that the whole of
such sum so payable to a non-resident would not be income chargeable of the
recipient, he can make an application to the Assessing Officer to determine the
appropriate proportion of such sum chargeable to tax, and thereupon shall deduct
tax u/s.195(1) only on that proportion of the sum chargeable to tax. Similarly,
sections 195(3) and 197 provide for the payee making an application to the
Assessing Officer for issue of a certificate that income-tax may be deducted at
lower rates of tax or not deducted on payment to be received by him, where such
lower rate or non-deduction is justified.

1.3 The issue has arisen before the courts as to whether, in
a case where the payment to the non-resident or a foreign company does not
comprise any income chargeable to tax in India at all (for example, in case of
payment for purchase of goods imported from the non-resident), whether the payer
has necessarily to apply to the tax authorities for a certificate u/s.195(2) or
whether the payment can be made to such non-resident or foreign company without
any deduction of tax at source, and without obtaining any such certificate
u/s.195(2) or u/s.195(3) or u/s.197.

1.4 While the Karnataka High Court has taken the view that it
is mandatory to obtain such a certificate from the tax authorities, the Delhi
High Court has taken a contrary view that in such cases, the payer can make the
payment without the need for such certificate.

2. Samsung Electronics’ case :


2.1 The issue came up before the Karnataka High Court in the
case of CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 320 ITR 209. Various other appeals
of different resident payers were also decided vide this judgment.

2.2 In this case, the assessee payer was a branch of a Korean
company engaged in the development, manufacture and export of software for use
by its parent company. The software developed by it was for in-house use by the
parent company. During the relevant years, the assessee imported ready-made
software products from US and French companies for its own use. It did not
deduct tax at source from payments made to the US and French companies on the
ground that the payment to the foreign companies was for purchase of products,
and was not in the nature of royalty, and was not chargeable to tax in India.

2.3 The Assessing Officer held that the payment was in the
nature of royalty, that the assessee was bound to deduct tax at source on the
payments, and accordingly treated the assessee as an assessee in default
u/s.201(1), and also levied interest u/s.201(1A). The Commissioner (Appeals)
dismissed the assessee’s appeals against this order.

2.4 The Tribunal held that the payment was not in the nature
of royalty in terms of the relevant provisions of the Double Taxation Avoidance
Agreements. It also held that it was not incumbent on the assessee to deduct any
amount u/s.195.

2.5 Before the Karnataka High Court, it was argued on behalf
of the Department that the payment was in the nature of royalty on which tax was
required to be deducted at source u/s.195. It was argued that the transaction
was a licence and was therefore in the nature of royalty. It was further claimed
that the assessee was bound to deduct tax u/s.195 and that it could not contend
that it was not the income of the recipient. Reliance was placed on the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. v.
CIT, 239 ITR 587.

2.6 It was argued by the assessee that the nature of payment
was not royalty even u/s.9(1)(vi), on account of the fact that the non-resident
supplier had merely sold a copyrighted article and not the copyright itself,
relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Consultancy
Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 271 ITR 401. It was therefore claimed that
the payment was for purchase of articles/goods in connection with the business
carried on by the assessee. It was further claimed that under the Double
Taxation Avoidance Agreements, since the non-resident recipients had no
permanent establishments in India, the entire income of the non-residents
attributable to the payments was not taxable in India. It was therefore claimed
that there was no obligation on the part of the payer to deduct any amount.

2.7 It was also contended by the other assessees that there
was no obligation on their part to deduct any amount from the payments, as they
were fully and bona fide satisfied that the amount was not taxable in the hands
of the non-resident in India. They had therefore not chosen to apply for any
relief or concession in terms of S. 195(2) and (3). It was further argued that
the words used in S. 195 are ‘chargeable to tax’ and hence a person deducting
tax u/s.195 would have to necessarily first see whether the same was chargeable
to tax and then only, if it was so chargeable, he was to deduct tax. It was
contended that if a person was not liable to be charged to tax, then the payer
could not be held to be a person in default u/s.201.

2.8 The Karnataka High Court considered the decision of the
Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of AP’s case (supra) and of the
Calcutta High Court in P. C. Ray & Co. (India) Private Limited v. ITO, 36 ITR
365, wherein the Calcutta High Court had held that if the term ‘chargeable under
the provisions of this Act’ means actually liable to be assessed to tax, in
other words, if the sum contemplated was taxable income, a difficulty is
undoubtedly created as to complying with the provisions of the Section.’ The
High Court in that case had held that what was contemplated was not merely
amounts, the whole of which were taxable without deduction, but amounts of a
mixed composition, a part of which only might turn out to be taxable income as
well; and the disbursements, which were of the nature of gross revenue receipts,
were yet sums chargeable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act and came
within the ambit of the Section.

2.9 The Karnataka High Court therefore rejected the arguments
of the assessees that the expression ‘any other sum chargeable under the
provisions of this Act’ would not include cases where any sum payable to
non-resident was trading receipts, which may or may not include ‘pure income’.
According to the Karnataka High Court, the language of S. 195(1) was clear and
unambiguous and cast an obligation to deduct appropriate tax at the rates in
force.

2.10 The Karnataka High Court observed that S. 195 was not a charging Section, nor a Section providing for determination of the tax liability of the non-resident receiving the payments from the resident. The amount deducted by the resident was only a provisional tentative amount, which was kept as a buffer for adjusting this amount against the possible tax liability of the non-resident. Deduction of the amount u/s.195 was not the same as determination of the liability of the non-resident, who may be or may not be liable to pay any tax. Determination of tax liability could only be on the basis of the return of income filed by the non-resident. According to the Karnataka High Court, the only scope and manner of reducing the obligation for deduction imposed on a resident payer in terms of S. 195(1) was by the method of invoking the procedure u/s.195(2) of making an application to the Assessing Officer to determine by general or special order the appropriate proportion of such sum so chargeable, and upon such determination alone, being allowed the liberty of deducting the proportionate sum so chargeable to tax to fulfil the obligations u/s.195(1).

2.11 The Karnataka High Court therefore held that in the absence of an application u/s.195(2), the payer was obliged to deduct tax at source u/s. 195(1), even though the payment did not contain any element of income of the non-resident chargeable to tax in India.

    Van Oord’s case :

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Van Oord ACZ India (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (unreported — ITA No. 439 of 2008 dated 15th March 2010, available on www.itatonline.org).

3.2 In this case, the assessee was an Indian subsidiary of a Netherlands company, and was engaged in the business of dredging, contracting, reclamation and marine activities. During the relevant year, the assessee reimbursed mobilisation and demo-bilisation cost to its parent company. This cost related essentially to transportation of dredger, survey equipment and other plant and machinery from countries outside India to the site in India and the transportation of such plant and machinery on com-pletion of the contract, including fuel cost incurred on transportation. These services were contacted by the parent company and were provided by vari-ous non-resident entities. The assessee reimbursed such cost to the parent company on the basis of invoices received by the parent company from the non-resident entities.

3.3 The assessee filed an application to the As-sessing Officer for issue of nil tax withholding certificate in respect of reimbursement of various costs to the parent company. The Assessing Officer issued a certificate of deduction of tax at source at 11%, and the assessee deducted tax at source accordingly on Rs.6.98 crore. In the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer disallowed payments of Rs.8.66 crore made to the parent company u/s.40(a) (i), on the ground that the assessee had defaulted in deducting tax at source u/s.195.

3.4 The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the disal-lowance made by the Assessing Officer. The Tribu-nal confirmed the addition, stating that the asses-see was mandatorily liable to deduct tax at source u/s.195, and that it was not necessary to determine whether such payment was chargeable to tax in In-dia in the hands of the non-resident. The Tribunal further held that the assessee was a dependent agent permanent establishment of the parent foreign company and therefore the reimbursement of expenses to the foreign parent company was to be subjected to tax.

3.5 Before the Delhi High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the amount reimbursed to the parent company was not chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the parent company, and that the assessee was consequently not liable to deduct tax at source u/s.195. It was argued that the obligation to deduct tax at source u/s.195 was predicated on the condition that tax was payable by the non-resident on the payments received by it, and once it was established that no such tax was payable by the non-resident, the assessee could not be treated to be in breach of its obligations.

3.6 It was pointed out that the reason for fastening the obligation to deduct tax at source of the payment to non-resident only in a situation where such payment was chargeable to tax in India was that it was not the intention of the law to fasten an absolute liability on the remitter to deduct tax at source from the payment to the non-resident, and then subject the non-resident to the rigorous process of filing return and seeking refund and assessment on the basis of such return. Where the remitter was of the opinion that some part of the income may be chargeable to tax in India, the remitter could approach the Assessing Officer to determine the ap-propriate portion of the income that would be sub-ject to tax in India and the rate on which tax was to be deducted at source. Reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP Ltd. (supra) and various other cases for the proposition that the obligation to deduct tax at source is triggered only when the payment to be made to the non-resident is chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the non-resident recipient.

3.7 On behalf of the Department, it was argued that S. 195 only determines the proportion of liability and presupposes the existence of liability. It was pointed out that the assessee itself had applied for determination of extent of liability. The statutory obligation of the assessee with regard to deduct tax at source was fully crystallised, and therefore there was no justification on the part of the assessee not to deduct tax at source, particularly when the order passed u/s.195(2) had attained finality.

3.8 The Delhi High Court noted that the issue before the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP (supra) was whether tax at source was to be deducted by the payee on the entire amount paid by it to the recipient or whether it was to be deducted only on the component of pure income profits. It was therefore in the context of whether tax deductible was to be on the gross sum of trading receipts paid to non-residents or whether only on the income component. It was in that context that the Supreme Court held that “any other sum chargeable under the provision of this Act” would include the entire amount paid by the assessee to non-residents. The observations of the Supreme Court therefore needed to be read in that context. The Delhi High Court noted that the Su-preme Court was not concerned in that case with a situation where no tax in the hands of the recipient was payable at all. The Delhi High Court noted that certain observations in the judgment clearly depicted the mind of the Supreme Court that liability to deduct tax at source arose only when the sum paid to the non-resident was chargeable to tax. Once that is chargeable to tax, it was not for the assessee to find out how much of the amount of the receipts was chargeable to tax, but it was its obligation to deduct tax at source on the entire sum paid by the assessee to the recipient.

3.9 The Delhi High Court relied on certain other decisions of the High Courts, including that of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Estel Communications (P) Ltd., 217 CTR 102 and the Karnataka High Court in the case of Jindal Thermal Power Company Limited v. Dy. CIT, 182 Taxman 252, where Courts had taken the view that there was no obligation to deduct tax at source since there was no tax liabil-ity of the non-resident in India. The Delhi High Court noted the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Samsung Electronic Co. Ltd. (supra), and observed that the context in that case was different. The Delhi High Court expressed its disagreement with some of the observations made in that judgment of the Karnataka High Court.

3.10 The Delhi High Court therefore held that the obligation to deduct tax at source arises only when the payment was chargeable under the provisions of the Income-tax Act. The Delhi High Court noted that in the case before it, the income-tax authorities had accepted that the foreign company was not liable to pay any tax in India by accepting the foreign company’s tax return u/s.143(1) and refunding the tax deducted at source. Therefore, the assessee could not be regarded as having defaulted in deduction of TDS u/s.195.

    Observations :

4.1 This issue was also again very recently considered by the Special Bench of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal at Chennai, in the case of ITO v. Prasad Production Ltd., (ITA No. 663/Mds/2003, dated 9th April 2010 — unreported, available on www.itatonline.org).

4.2 The Tribunal in this case considered the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Samsung’s case (supra) as well as that of the Supreme Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP (supra). The Tribunal noted that both the Department as well as the assessee were relying upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Transmission Corporation of AP. It therefore focussed on the observations in that judgment. It noted the provisions of the follow-ing paragraph on page 588 :

“The consideration would be — whether payment of the sum to the non-resident is chargeable to tax under the provisions of the Act or not ? That sum may be income or income hidden or otherwise embedded therein. If so, tax is required to be deducted on the said sum, what would be the income is to be computed on the basis of various provisions of the Act including provisions for computation of the business income, if the payment is a trade receipt. However, what is to be deducted is income-tax pay-able thereon at the rates in force. Under the Act, total income for the previous year would become chargeable to tax u/s.4. Ss.(2) of S. 4, inter alia, provides that in respect of income chargeable U/ss.(1), income-tax shall be deducted at source where it is so deductible under any provision of the Act. If the sum that is to be paid to the non-resident is charge-able to tax, tax is required to be deducted.”

4.3 The Tribunal also noted the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Eli Lilly & Co., 312 ITR 225, as under :

“To answer the contention herein we need to examine briefly the scheme of the 1961 Act. S. 4 is the charging Section. U/s.4(1), total income for the previous year is chargeable to tax. S. 4(2), inter alia, provides that in respect of income chargeable U/ss.(1), income-tax shall be deducted at source whether it is so deductible under any provision of the 1961 Act which, inter alia, brings in the TDS provisions contained in Chapter XVII-B. In fact, if a particular income falls outside S. 4(1), then the TDS provisions cannot come in.”

4.4 From these two decisions of the Supreme Court, the Tribunal concluded that it was abundantly clear that the charging provisions could not be divorced from the TDS provisions, and that S. 195 would be applicable only if the payment made to the non-resident was chargeable to tax.

4.5 The Tribunal also noted the material difference between the provisions of Ss.(2) and Ss.(3) of S. 195. U/ss.(2), the payer made the application for deduction of tax at lower rates. U/ss.(3), the payee could make an application for deduction of tax at lower rate or without deduction of tax. According to the Tribunal, the reason for such difference was that where the payer had a bona fide belief that no part of the payment bore income character, S. 195(1) itself would be inapplicable and hence there would be no question of going into the procedure prescribed in S. 195(2). Ss.(3) deals with a situation where the payer wants to deduct tax from the payment, but the payee believed that he was not chargeable to tax in respect of that payment. Hence the payee was given an opportunity to seek approv-al of the Assessing Officer to receive the payment without deduction of tax.

4.6 The Tribunal interestingly observed that by deciding whether the payment bore any income character or not, the payer was not determining the tax liability of the total income of the payee, but merely considering the chargeability in respect of the payment that he was making to the payee.

4.7 The tribunal also considered the fact that for the purposes of remittances to non-residents, a chartered accountant’s certificate was prescribed as an alternative to the procedure u/s.195(2). This was evident from the CBDT Circular 767, dated 22-5-1998. It noted that the certification covered all types of payment, whether purely capital or revenue in nature, but exempt either under the act or the relevant Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement or payments bearing pure income character. The Tribunal held that the new format of the CA certificate clearly established the legal position of S. 195 that the payer need not undergo the procedure of S. 195 at all if he was of the bona fide belief that no part of the payment was chargeable to tax in India.

4.8 The Tribunal therefore held that if the asses-see had not applied to the Assessing Officer u/s. 195(2) for deduction of tax at a lower or nil rate of tax under a bona fide belief that no part of the payment made to the non-resident was chargeable to tax, then he was not under any statutory obligation to deduct tax at source on any part of the payment.

4.9 When one looks at the provisions of S. 195(1), the language is clear that it applies only to income chargeable to tax, and not to other items at all. As analysed by the Special Bench of the Tribunal, the Karnataka High Court seems to have misapplied the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of AP. The better view seems to be that of the Delhi High Court and that of the Special Bench of the Tribunal that if the income is not chargeable to tax in India in the hands of the non-resident recipient, the payer need not obtain a certificate u/s.195(2) for not deducting tax at source.

4.10 In any case, an appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Karnataka High Court has been admitted by the Supreme Court and has been fixed for hearing on 18th August 2010, on which date one hopes that this controversy will ultimately be laid to rest.

Netting of interest and S. 80HHC

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 80HHC, inserted by the Finance Act, 1983 w.e.f. 1st
April, 1983 for grant of deduction in respect of the profits derived from
exports of goods and merchandise, has since undergone several changes. The
relevant part of the provision, at present, relevant to this discussion, reads
as under :

Explanation : For the purposes of this Section, :


(baa) ‘profits of the business’ means the profits of the
business as computed under the head ‘Profits and gains of business or
profession’ as reduced by :

(1) ninety per cent of any sum referred to in clauses (iiia),
(iiib), (iiic), (iiid) and (iiie) of S. 28 or of any receipts by way of
brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar
nature included in such profits; and

1.2 ‘Profits of the business’ as defined in clause (baa) of
the Explanation requires that the profits derived from exports is computed under
the head ‘Profits and gains of business and profession’ and such profits
determined in accordance with S. 28 to S. 44D is to be further adjusted on
account of clause (baa), namely, ninety percent of any receipts by way of
brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar
nature included in such profits
.

1.3 The issue that is being fiercely debated, is concerning
the true meaning of the terms ‘interest, etc.’ and ‘receipts’ used in Expln.
(baa). Whether the terms individually or collectively connote net interest, etc.
i.e., the gross interest income less the expenditure incurred for earning
such income ? A related question, in the event it is held that the terms connote
netting of interest, is should netting be allowed where the interest income is
computed as business income ?

1.4 The issue believed to be settled by the decision of the
Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of Lalsons, 89 ITD 25 (Delhi) became
controversial due to the decisions of the Madras and Punjab and Haryana High
Courts. Again, these decisions of the High Court were not followed by the
decision of the Delhi High Court, upholding the ratio of the Lalsons’ decision.
The peace prevailing thereafter has been short-lived in view of the recent
decision of the Bombay High Court, dissenting form the decision of the Delhi
High Court.

2. Shri Ram Honda Equip’s case :


2.1 The issue arose for consideration of the Delhi High Court
in Shri Ram Honda Power Equip, 289 ITR 475 wherein substantial questions of law
concerning the interpretation of S. 80HHC, Ss. (1) and (3) and clause (baa) of
the Explanation, were raised before the High Court as under :

(a) Does the expression ‘profits derived from such export’
occurring in Ss.(3) r/w Expln. (baa) restrict the profits available for
deduction in terms of Ss.(1) to only those items of income directly relatable to
the business of export ?

(b) Does the expression ‘interest’ in Expln. (baa) connote
net interest, i.e., the gross interest income less the expenditure
incurred by the assessee for earning such income ?

(c) If the expression ‘interest’ implies net interest, then
should netting be allowed where the interest income is computed to be business
income ?

2.2 The two broad issues identified by the Court from the
three questions referred to it were the determination of the nature of interest
income and the issue of netting of interest. The Court noted that the first step
was to determine whether in a given case the income from interest was assessable
as a ‘business income’, computed in terms of S. 28 to S. 44, or as an ‘income
from other sources’ determined u/s.56 and u/s.57 and to ascertain thereafter,
whether while deducting ninety percent of interest therefrom in terms of Expln.
(baa), gross or net interest should be taken in to account.

2.3 It was contended on behalf of the assessee that profits cannot be arrived at by any businessman without accounting
for the expenditure incurred in earning such interest; that the entire clause
(baa) had to be read along with the scheme of S. 80HHC(1) and (3) and given a
meaning that did not produce absurd results; that the interpretation should
reflect a liberal construction conforming to the object of encouraging exports;
that use of the term ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘brokerage,
commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipts of a similar nature’
was indicative that such amounts were the ‘net’ amounts and only net interest
was includible in the profits; hence once interest income had been computed as
business income, then netting had to be allowed.

2.4 It was further urged that as per the mandate of clause
(baa) the profits and gains of business or profession had to be first computed
as per S. 28 to S. 44, including S. 37, which envisaged accounting for the
expenditure incurred by an assessee for earning the income. The assessees also
relied on paragraph 30.11 of Circular No. 621, dated. 19-12-1991 which provided
for ad hoc 10 percent deduction to account for the expenses. It was
further urged that the Legislature wherever desired had used the expression
‘gross’ as in S. 80M, S. 40(b), S. 44AB, S. 44AD and S. 115JB, making it clear
that the Legislature in terms of S. 80HHC intended that the interest to be
accounted for in computing the profits should be net interest; that the language
of the Section was unambiguous and therefore there was no need to supply the
word ‘gross’ as qualifying the word ‘interest’. Therefore, applying the same
rule of causus omissus, such word could not be read into the Section.
Reliance was placed on the decision in Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd., 155 ITR
120 (SC).

2.5 On the issue of netting, it was submitted on behalf of
the Revenue that even where the interest income was determined to be business
income, netting should not be permitted; that there could be no casus omissus,
in other words, the Court ought not to supply words when none exist; that just
as the assessees argued the Legislature if intended would have used the term
‘net’ and would have said so and in the absence of such a clear enunciation, the
word ‘interest’ has to be interpreted to mean ‘gross interest’; that applying
the strict rule of construction in interpreting the statutes, the expression
‘interest’ occurring in clause (baa) could only mean gross interest and that the
treatment in either case should be uniform.

2.6 On behalf of the Revenue it was further urged that the Legislature had permitted the retention of 10% of interest income to compensate for expenses laid out for earning such income, therefore any further deduction of the expenditure incurred for earning such interest, if permit-ted, would amount to a double deduction which clearly was not envisaged; that clause (baa) of the Explanation to S. 80HHC envisaged a two-step process in computing profits derived from exports, first, the AO was required to apply S. 28 to S. 44 to compute the profits and gains of business or profession. In doing so, the AO might find that certain incomes, which had no nexus to the ex-port business of the assessee, were not eligible for deduction and therefore ought to be treated as income from other sources. Once that was done, then 90% of the receipts referred in clause (baa) had to be deducted in order to arrive at the profits derived from profits. Reliance was placed on the decision of K. Venkata Reddy v. CIT, 250 ITR 147 (AP) in support of this submission. Even if the interest earned was to be construed as part of the business income, the netting should not be permitted since the statute did not specifically say so relying on the judgments in IPCA Laboratory Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, 266 ITR 521 (SC), CIT v. V. Chinnapandi, 282 ITR 389 (Mad.) and Rani Paliwal v. CIT, 268 ITR 220 (P & H).

2.7 The Delhi High Court found merit in the contention of the assessee that not accepting that interest in the context referred to net interest, might produce unintended or absurd results. The Court referring to the decision of Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. CIT, 183 ITR 1 (SC) highlighted that the underlying principle of netting appeared to be logical as no prudent businessman would allow taxation of the interest income de hors the expenditure incurred for earning such income. The words ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘receipts by way of interest, commission, brokerage, etc.’, was a clear pointer to the fact that only net interest would be includible in arriving at the business profit; once business income had been determined by applying accounting standards as well as the provisions contained in the Act, the assessee would be permitted to, in terms of S. 37, claim as deduction, expenditure laid out for the purposes of earning such business income. The Court noted with approval the proposition for netting of income found from Circular No. 621, dated 19-12-1991 of the CBDT.

2.8 The Court observed that object of S. 80HHC was to ensure that the exporter got the benefit of the profits derived from export and was not to depress the profit further; if the deduction of 90% was of the gross interest itself, the amount spent in earning such interest would depress the profit to that extent by remaining on the debit side of the P&L Account; therefore, it could only be the net interest which could be included in the profits; if netting were not to be permitted, the result would be that the profits of the exporter would be depressed by an item that was expenditure incurred on earning interest, which did not form part of the profit at all; such could not have been the intention of the Legislature.

2.9 The Court did not approve of the contention that the treatment of clause (a) of S. 80HHC(3) should be no different from clause (b) of the same sub-section as the said clause (baa) was relatable only to clause (a) of S. 80HHC(3) and not to clause thereof; the provisions operated in distinct areas and no inter-mixing was contemplated.

2.10 For all these reasons, the Court held that the word ‘interest’ in clause (baa) to the Explanation in S. 80HHC was indicative of ‘net interest’, i.e., gross interest less the expenditure incurred by the assessee in earning such interest. The Court affirmed the decision of the Special Bench of the ITAT in Lalsons Enterprises (supra) holding that the expression ‘interest’ in clause (baa) of the Explanation to S. 80HHC connoted ‘net interest’ and not ‘gross interest’.

2.11 The Court noted that in deciding the issue in Rani Paliwal’s case (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court, without any detailed discussion simply upheld the Tribunal’s order and therefore did not follow the ratio of the said decision in these words: “We are afraid that there is no reasoning expressed by the High Court for arriving at such a conclusion. For instance, there is no discussion of the CBDT Circular and in particular para 32.11 thereof which indicates that netting is contemplated in Expln. (baa). Also, it does not notice the effect of the words ‘included in such profits’ following the words ‘receipts by way of interest….’ in the said Explanation. We are therefore unable to subscribe to the view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rani Paliwal (supra).” The Court accordingly differed with the views of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rani Paliwal’s case.

2.12 While differing with the decision of the Madras High Court in Chinnapandi’s case, the Court observed as under: “The Madras High Court in CIT v. V. Chinnapandi (supra) held that even where the interest receipt is treated as business income, the deduction within the meaning of Expln. (baa) is permissible only of the gross interest and not net interest. The High Court appears to have followed the earlier judgment in K. S. Subbiah Pillai & Co. (supra) without noticing that in K. S. Subbiah Pillai (supra), the interest receipt was treated as income from other sources and not as business income. Also, the High Court in V. Chinnapandi (supra) chose to follow Rani Paliwal (supra), which, as explained earlier, gives no reasoning for the conclusion therein. Also, V. Chinnapandi (supra) does not advert to either the CBDT Circular or the judgment of the Special Bench in Lalsons (supra), with which we entirely concur on this aspect.”

2.13 The Court accordingly held that the net interest i.e., the gross interest less the expenditure incurred for the purposes of earning such interest, in terms of Expln. (baa), only be reduced from the profits of the business in cases where the AO treated the interest receipt as business income.

    Asian Star Co. Ltd.’s case:

3.1 Recently the issue again arose before the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Asian Star Ltd. in appeal No. 200 of 2009. In a decision delivered on March 18/19, 2010 the Court was asked to consider the following question of law:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Tribunal was correct in holding that net interest on fixed deposits in banks received by the assessee-company should be considered for the purpose of working out the deduction u/s.80HHC and not the gross interest?”

3.2 The assessee carried on the business of the export of cut and polished diamonds. A return of income for A.Y. 2003-04 was filed, declaring a total income of Rs. 13.91 crores, after claiming a deduction of Rs.13.22 crores u/s.80HHC. The assessee had debited an amount of Rs. 21.46 crores as interest paid/payable to the Profit and Loss Account net of interest received of Rs. 3.25 crores. The assessee was called upon to explain as to why the deduction u/s.80HHC should not be recomputed by excluding ninety percent of the interest received in the amount of Rs.3.25 crores. By its explanation, the assessee submitted that during the year, it received interest on fixed deposits. The assessee stated that it had borrowed monies in order to fulfil its working capital requirements and the Bank had called upon it to maintain a fixed deposit as margin money against the loans. The assessee consequently contended that there was a direct nexus between the deposits kept in the Bank and the amounts borrowed.

3.3 The Assessing Officer, found that the explanation of the assessee could not be accepted since a plain reading of Explanation (baa) to S. 80HHE suggested that ninety percent of the receipts on account of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or receipts of a similar nature were liable to be excluded while computing the profits of the business. In appeal, the CIT (Appeals) held that the assessee had established a direct nexus between interest-bearing fixed deposits and the ‘interest charging’ borrowed funds and he directed the Assessing Officer to allow the netting of interest income and interest expenses. The view of the CIT (Appeals) was confirmed in appeal by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the finding of the Appellate Authority was based on the existence of a nexus between borrowed funds and fixed deposits. The Tribunal followed its decision in the case of Lalsons Enterprises, 89 ITD 25 (Delhi).

3.4 The Revenue contended that for computing the profits and gains of the business for S. 80HHC, ninety percent of the receipts by way of interest had to be reduced from the profits and gains of business or profession and the ‘receipts’ to be so reduced were the gross receipts; consequently, the gross receipts by way of interest could not be netted against expenditure which was laid out for the earning of those receipts; the reduction provided by the law was independent of any expenditure that was incurred in the earning of the receipts; that non -operational income should be excluded as it had no nexus with the export turnover, while on the other hand, it depressed profits by including expenditure which had been incurred for those very items which led to a consequence which could not have been intended by the Parliament having regard to the beneficial object underlying the provision.

3.5 The summary of the assessee’s contentions was that (i) The words ‘any receipts’ denoted the nature and not the quantum of the receipt;
    The expression, therefore, required the nature of the receipts to be examined; (iii) Explanation (baa) referred to any receipts of a similar nature ‘included in such profits’. The words ‘such profits’ meant profits and gains of business or profession computed u/s.28 to u/s.44D; (iv) Profits could only be arrived at after the deduction of expenditure from income and the net effect thereof constituted profits; (v) Explanation (baa) did not use the expression ‘gross or net’. However, having regard to the purpose and object of the provision and the nature of the language used in the Explanation, ninety percent of the receipts that was required to be excluded had to be computed with reference to inclusion of such receipts in profits and gains of business which in turn involved both credit and debit sides of the profit and loss account; (vi) For purposes of Explanation (baa), income from other sources would not come within the purview of the Explanation; Only business income had to be considered and interest in the nature of business income had to be taken into consideration; (vii)Receipts by way of interest in Explanation (baa) denoted the nature of the receipts and inclusion in ‘such profits’ would denote the quantum of the receipts; (viii) The words used by the Legislature suggested what was included in the total income or had gone into the computation of total income. Consequently, both debit and credit sides of the profit and loss account would have to be consid-ered; (ix) The words ‘such profits’ could only mean such profits as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act; (x) The words ‘receipt’ and ‘income’ in Explanation (baa) were interchangeably used and consequently, receipts would have to be read as income; (xi) The correct interpretation was to take into consideration netting and exclude all expenses which had a direct nexus with the earning of the income; (xii) The provision being an incentive provision under Chapter VIA, must be beneficially construed in order to encourage exports; (xiii)

The word ‘profits’ denoted profits in a commercial sense; (xiv) the object of the exclusion contained in Explanation (baa) was to sequester certain non-operational income which did not bear a direct nexus with export income and as a consequence, the exclusion could not be confined only to credit side of the profit and loss account, but must extend equally to the debit side, subject to the rider that a clear nexus has to be established.

3.6 The Bombay High Court explaining the rationale underlying the exclusion noted that : Ss.(3) of S. 80HHC was inserted by the Finance Act of 1991, with effect from 1st April 1992; the adoption of the formula in Ss.(3) was to disallow a part of the concession when the entire deduction claimed could not be regarded as being derived from export; S. 80HHC had to be amended several times since the formula had resulted in a distorted figure of export profits where receipts such as interest, rent, commission and brokerage which did not have a direct nexus with export turnover were included in the profit and loss account and resultantly became a subject of deduction; by the amendment, the position that emerged was that receipts which did not have any element of or nexus with export turnover would not become eligible for deduction merely because they formed part of the profit and loss account; this aspect of the history underlying S. 80HHC, had been elaborated upon in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Lakshmi Machine Works, 290 ITR 667.

3.7 The Court further noted that; the Explanation (baa) had to be read in the context of the background underlying the exclusion of certain constituent elements of the profit and loss account from the eligibility for deduction; what Explanation (baa) postulated was that, in computing the profits of business for S. 80HHC, the profits of business had to be first computed under the head profits and gains of business or profession, in accordance with S. 28 to S. 44D; once that exercise was complete, those profits had to be reduced to the extent provided by clauses (1) and (2) of Explanation (baa); that such receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or other receipts of a similar nature, though included in the profits and gains of business or profession, did not bear a nexus with the export turnover and consequently, though included in the computation of profits and gains of business or profession, ninety percent of such receipts had to be excluded in computing the profits of business for S. 80HHC; the reason for the exclusion was borne out by the Circular issued by the CBDT on 19-12-1991 which noted that the formula then existing often presented a distorted figure of export profits when receipts like interest, commission, etc. which did not have an element of turnover were included in the profit and loss account; the Court was required to give a meaning to the provision consistent with the underlying scheme, object and purpose of the statutory provision; the Parliament considered it appropriate to exclude from the purview of the deduction u/s.80HHC, certain receipts or income which did not have a proximate nexus with export turnover though such items formed part of the profit and loss account and form a constituent element in the computation of the profits or gains of business or profession u/s.28 to u/s.44D. The interpretation which Court placed on the provisions of S. 80HHC and on Explanation (baa) must be consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of CIT v. K. Ravindranathan Nair, 295 ITR 228 295 ITR 228 where the Supreme Court held that processing charges, though a part of gross total income constituted an item of independent income like rent, commission and brokerage and consequently, ninety percent of the processing charges had to be reduced from gross total income to arrive at business profits, and Lakshmi Machine Works (supra) where the issue before the Supreme Court was whether excise duty and sales tax were included in the total turnover for the purpose of working out the formula contained in S. 80HHC(3) and the Supreme Court held that the object of the Legislature in enacting S. 80HHC was to confer benefit on profits accruing with reference to export turnover and the Supreme Court in that case had observed that ‘commission, rent, interest, etc. did not involve any turnover’ and ‘therefore, ninety percent of such commission, interest, etc. was excluded from the profits derived from?the?export,’?just?as?interest, commission, etc. did not emanate from export turnover, so also excise duty and sales tax had to be excluded.

3.8 The Court explained the resultant position in law as that while prescribing the exclusion of the specified receipts the Parliament was, however, conscious of the fact that the expenditure incurred in earning the items which were liable to be excluded had already gone into the computation of business profits as the computation of business profits under Chapter IV is made by amalgamating the receipts as well as the expenditure incurred in carrying on the business; since the expenditure incurred in earning the income by way of interest, brokerage, commission, rent, charges or other similar receipts had also gone into the computation of business profits, the Parliament thought it fit to exclude only ninety percent of the receipts received by the assessee in order to ensure that the expenditure which was incurred by the assessee in earning the receipts which had gone into the computation of the business profits is taken care of; the reason why the Parliament confined the reduction factor to ninety percent of the receipts was stated in the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill of 1991; the Parliament, therefore, confined the reduction to the extent of ninety percent of the income earned through such receipts since it was cognizant of the fact that the assessee would have incurred some expenditure in earning those incomes and therefore it provided an ad hoc deduction of ten percent from such incomes to account for the expenses incurred in earning the receipts; the distortion of the profits that would take place by excluding the receipts received by the assessee which were unrelated to export turnover and not the expenditure incurred by the assessee in earning those receipts was factored in by the Parliament by excluding only ninety percent of the receipts received by the assessee; the Parliament thought it fit to adopt a uniform formula envisaging a reduc-tion of ninety percent to make due allowance for the expenditure which would have been incurred by the assessee in earning the receipts, though in a given case it might be more or less as it was considered to be reasonable parameter of what would have been expended by the assessee; in order to simplify the application of the law, the Parliament treated a uniform expenditure computed at ten percent to be applicable in order to ensure that there is no distortion of profits by exclusion of income not relatable to export profits.

3.9 In view of the objective of the Parliament behind the introduction of the Explanation (baa) and its desire to provide uniformity of the treatment and the fact that the deduction of S. 80HHC was related to export turnover, the Bombay High Court held that the ratio and the findings of the Supreme Court in the case of the Distributors (Baroda) P. Ltd. v. Union of India, 155 ITR 120 were not relevant in the context of the issue under consideration by the Court; it was in order to obviate a distortion that the Parliament mandated that ninety percent of the receipts would be excluded; consequently, while the principle which had been laid down by the Supreme Court in Distributors (Baroda)’s case must illuminate the interpretation of the words ‘included in such profits’, the Court could not, at the same time, be unmindful of the reduction which was postulated by Explanation (baa), the extent of the reduction and the rationale for effecting the reduction.

3.10 The Bombay High Court noted with approval the decisions of the High Courts in the cases of K. S. Subbiah Pillai & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT, CIT v. V. Chinnapandi, Rani Paliwal v. CIT and CIT v. Liberty Footwears. In view of number of reasons advanced and after a careful consideration the Bombay High Court was not inclined to follow the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equipments as the simi-larity between the provisions of S. 80HHC and S. 80M which was relied upon in the judgment of the Delhi High Court missed the comprehensive position as it obtained u/s.80HHC.Such similarity of the provisions should not result into an assumption that the provisions were identical, when they were not as the Parliament had adopted a fair and reasonable statutory basis of what may be regarded as expenditure incurred for the earning of the receipts. Once the Parliament had legislated both in regard to the nature of the exclusion and the extent of the exclusion, it would not be open to the Court to order otherwise by rewriting the legislative provision. The Court observed with respect that the Delhi High Court had not adequately emphasised the entire rationale for confining the deduction only to the extent of ninety percent of the excludible receipts.

3.11 The displeasure of the Bombay High Court with the decision of the Special Bench in Lalsons Enterprises’s case, can best be explained in the Court’s own words “We are affirmatively of the view that in its discussion on the issue of netting, the Tribunal in its Special Bench decision in Lalsons has transgressed the limitations on the exercise of judicial power. The Tribunal has in effect, legislated by providing a deduction on the ground of expenses other than in the terms which have been allowed by the Parliament. That is impermissible. In the present case, it is necessary to emphasise that the question before the Court relates to the deduction u/s.80HHC. An assessee may well be entitled to a deduction in respect of the expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business in the computation of the profits and gains of business or profession. However, for the purposes of computing the deduction u/s.80HHC, the provisions which have been enacted by the Parliament would have to be complied. A deduction in excess of what is mandated by the Parliament cannot be allowed on the theory that it is an incentive provision intended to encourage export. The extent of the deduction and the conditions subject to which the deduction should be granted, are matters for the Parliament to legislate upon. The Parliament having legislated, it would not be open to the Court to deviate from the provisions which have been enacted in S. 80HHC.”

3.13 The Bombay High Court allowed the appeal of the Revenue by holding that the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the net interest on fixed deposits in the bank received by the assessee should be considered for the purposes of working out the deduction u/s.80HHC and not the gross interest.

4.Observations:

4.1 The issue has been clearly identified and argued and is further highlighted by sharply contrasting views of the High Courts on the subject. The Apex Court alone can bring finality to this fiercely contested issue.

4.2 As we understand from the reading of the Bombay High Court decision, the case of an exporter for netting of interest, etc. having nexus with the export activity is fortified. It is in cases where such receipts have no nexus with the export activity that a shadow of serious doubt has been cast by the recent decision of the Bombay High Court.

4.3 In bringing a finality to the issue, in addition to the issues which are very succinctly brought to the notice of the Courts by the contesting parties, the following aspects will have to be conclusively adjudicated upon;

4.3.1 While in a good number of cases, it maybe true that the ends of the justice will be met by allowing a deduction of 10% of the income, such a benchmark will be found to be woefully inad-equate in cases where the activity is conducted in an orderly manner, as a business. For example, a broker or a commission agent paying a sizeable amount to a sub-broker or sub-agent or lender of funds advancing loans out of borrowed funds bearing interest. In the examples given, the expenditure surely would exceed the benchmark of 10% of income. The allowance of 10% of income, in such cases, cannot be considered to be reasonable by any standard. In such cases, at least, it will be fair to read that the receipt in question is the net receipt, more so as in the cases of person who had accounted only net receipt in the books.

4.3.2 The allowance of any direct expenditure may have always been presumed and it is for avoiding any controversy in relation to an indirect expenditure that the 10% allowance is granted by the Legislature.

4.3.3 The direct expenditure, if not allowed, will give absurd results inasmuch as the same has the effect of depressing the export profit, otherwise eligible for deduction. If such receipts were to be taken out of the business profits on the footing that they had no connection with the business profits or turnover, it would only be reasonable to hold that expenditure having nexus with such receipts should also be taken out of the business profits on the same footing.

4.3.4 The result surely will be different in case where the assesssee is found to have maintained separate books of account or where the accounting is net of direct cost.

4.3.5 The result will also be different in cases where the assessee on his own had treated the receipt as also the income under a separate head of income.

4.3.6 It is an accepted principle of interpretation that the law has to be read in the context in which has placed. RBI v. Peerless General Finance Investment Co. Ltd., 61 Comp Case 663. The Delhi High Court clarified that it was inclined to adopt this contextual approach further enunciated by the Madras High Court in CIT v. P. Manonmani, 245 ITR 48 (Mad.) (FB). The context in which the word ‘receipt’ is used in Expln. (baa) may mean such receipts as reduced by the expenditure laid out for earning such income. The possible way to reconcile this is as was done by the Delhi High Court by reading the expression ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest….’ as referring to the nature of receipt, which in the context of S. 80HHC connotes ‘income’.

4.3.7 Paragraph 32.10 of Circular No. 681, dated 19-12- 1991 reads as under: “The existing formula often gives a distorted figure of export profits when receipts like interest, commission, etc., which do not have element of turnover are included in the P&L Account. It has, therefore, been clarified that ‘profits of the business’ for the purpose of S. 80HHC will not include receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest, rent, charges or any other receipt of a similar nature. As some expenditure might be incurred in earning these incomes, which in the generality of cases is part of common expenses, ad hoc 10% deduction from such incomes is provided to account for these expenses.”

4.3.8 Circular No. 621 explained the provisions of the amendment and in so explaining has favoured netting, as has been highlighted by the Delhi High Court. If that is so, the full effect, though benefi-cial, shall be given to such interpretation advanced by the Circular of the CBDT in preference to the Notes and the Memorandum. Full effect may be given to the above-referred CBDT Circular which acknowledges that ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission, interest’, etc., are ‘incomes’ and in order to give effect to this expression, the principle of netting will have to be applied.

4.3.9 Due weightage will have to be given to the true meaning of the words ‘included in such profits’ which precede the words ‘receipts by way of brokerage, commission and interest’.

4.3.10 The ratio of the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd., though considered by the Courts, will have to be revisited in order to conclusively appreciate the meaning of the words and the expressions ‘receipts by way of’ ‘included in such profits,’ ‘such profits’ and ‘computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act’.

4.3.11 The three different expressions, namely, ‘any sums’, ‘receipts’ and ‘profits’, used by the Parliament will have to be reconciled.

4.4 This controversy has plagued a good number of cases and it will be in the fitness of the things that the Government adopts a reconciliatory approach and issues a dispensation or a directive for addressing the issue that does not clog the wheels of justice.

Reopening of a block assessment

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 Chapter XIV-B, inserted in the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1995 w.e.f. 1-7-1995, provides for a special assessment procedure for taxing an undisclosed income detected as a result of a search action u/s.132 that took place on or after 1st July, 1995 but before 31st May, 2003.

    1.2 The chapter contains complete mechanism for computation and assessment of the total undisclosed income of the block period and includes mechanisms for filing of a return of income, issue of a notice, payment of taxes, interest and penalty. The chapter, as considered by the Courts, is a code by itself.

    1.3 The regular income, i.e., the disclosed income of the block period continues to be governed by the general provisions of the Income-tax Act including those providing for regular assessment of such income.

    1.4 The provisions for special assessment, under Chapter XIV-B, of undisclosed income and that for regular assessment u/s.143(3), operate in different fields and run parallel to each other for assessment of income of an year; one for taxing an undisclosed income, while the other for bringing to tax a disclosed income.

    1.5 Chapter XIV-B also provides for an application of all those provisions of the Act other than those that are specifically differentiated under Chapter XIV-B. In other words, unless otherwise provided in Chapter XIVB, the provisions contained in general law of the Act will apply to the assessment of an undisclosed income even for a block period, except in cases where the chapter provides for any specific departure from the general provisions of the Act by specially providing a different course.

    1.6 An interesting issue that arises, in the context, is about the possibility of reopening a block assessment made under Chapter XIVB and the consequent reassessment of the undisclosed income of the block period. The Courts have been asked to examine the possibility of application of provisions of S. 147 and S. 148 for reopening of a completed block assessment. While the Gujarat High Court finds it to be not possible, the Gauhati High Court has held that it is possible to reopen a completed block assessment.

2. Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat)’s case, 307 ITR 1 (Guj.) :

    2.1 In the case of CIT v. Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat), 307 ITR 1, certain loose papers were found and seized during the search proceedings u/s.132 of the Act from the residential premises of one of the erstwhile partners of the petitioner-firm and his statement was recorded. An order u/s.158BD of the Act was made on a total income of Rs.40,50,900 after taking approval of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Rajkot for the block period in the status of AOP pursuant to the return of income for the block period filed showing a total undisclosed income at Rs.30,00,000. The assessment was made after various details and explanation were called for, vide notice issued under Chapter XIVB.

    2.2 Subsequently a notice u/s.148 of the Act was issued seeking to reassess the income for the block period by stating that there was a reason to believe that the income for the block period had escaped assessment within the meaning of S. 147 of the Act and that the notice was issued after obtaining the necessary satisfaction of the Commissioner. In spite of repeated letters asking for the reasons recorded u/s.148(2) of the Act, the same were not supplied. In a correspondence addressed to one of the ex-partners it was stated that it was not obligatory to supply reasons recorded and the addressee was directed to file return immediately. It is at this stage that the petitioner had approached the Court challenging the impugned notice issued u/s.148 of the Act.

    2.3 The principal issue raised in the petition was whether it was open to the assessing authority to issue notice u/s.148 of the Act in respect of an assessment framed for a block period under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

    2.4 On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that S. 147 of the Act permitted an Assessing Officer to reassess an income which had escaped assessment for any assessment year. Emphasising the language of the provision, it was contended that an assessment Chapter XIB was not in respect of any assessment year but was for the block of years and as such it was impossible for the Assessing Officer to form a belief that any income chargeable to tax for any assessment year had escaped assessment.

    2.5 Based on the provisions of S. 147 of the Act and the proviso therein it was submitted that the scheme would fail in the case of assessment for the block period as the limitation u/s.147 that has been prescribed for issuance of notice has been reckoned from the end of a particular assessment year and as such it was not possible to specify the assessment year, in the case of a block assessment, from the end of which the time limit could be computed.

    2.6 The provisions of S. 151 and S. 153 of the Act were also relied upon by the petitioners to point out that the condition for obtaining the sanction of the higher authority as provided by S. 151 of the Act in cases where four years had expired from the relevant assessment year could not be complied with and fulfilled, as in respect of the block period there was no relevant assessment year w.r.t which the time limit could be observed. Similarly, S. 153 of the Act also provided different period of limitation as against the provisions of S. 158BE of the Act which provides for time limit for completion of block assessment.

    2.7 It was also contended that the order of block assessment was passed after the approval of the Commissioner and therefore a reopening with the sanction of the subordinate authority was bad in law.

    2.8 On behalf of the Revenue, it was submitted that S. 158BH of the Act specifically provided that save as otherwise provided in Chapter XIVB, all other provisions of the Act shall apply to assessment made under Chapter XIVB. It was, therefore, contended that when one considered the definition of ‘block period’ as provided in S. 158B(a) of the Act, it was clear that the said term covered the period comprising previous years relevant to 10/6 assessment years preceding the previous year in which the search was conducted u/s.132 of the Act and therefore, wherever the words ‘assessment year’ appeared in Chapter XIV of the Act relating to procedure for assessment, the term ’block period’ had to be read in the place of ‘assessment year’ to make the scheme workable.

2.9 Referring to Ss.(2) of S. 158BA of the Act, it was submitted for the Revenue that for the purpose of charging tax not only S. 113 of the Act was mate-rial, but even S. 4 had to be considered as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, 297 ITR 322. It was submitted that the Apex Court has considered the entire scheme of Chapter XIVB of the Act and had come to the conclusion that computation of undisclosed income had to be made u/s. 158BB in the manner provided in Chapter IV of the Act and therefore, the application of the said Chapter was not ruled out by the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act; that non obstante clause appearing in S. 158BA of the Act had to be read in juxtaposition with S. 158BH of the Act; that the concepts of ‘previous year’ and ‘total income’ were retained in Chapter XIVB of the Act and, therefore, ap-plication of Chapter XIV of the Act could not be ruled out from the block assessment procedure.

2.10 To begin with, the Gujarat High Court observed that in the aforesaid circumstances, when one considered the entire scheme relating to procedure for assessment/reassessment as laid down in the group of Sections from S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act and compared the same with special procedure for assessment of search cases under Chapter XIVB of the Act, it became apparent that the normal procedure laid down in Chapter XIV of the Act had been given a go by when Chapter XIVB of the Act itself laid down that the said Chapter provided for a special procedure for assessment of search cases and the stand of the Revenue that S. 158BH of the Act permitted all other provisions of the Act to apply to assessment made under Chapter XIVB of the Act did not merit acceptance.

2.11 The Apex Court decision, the Court proceeded further, on which great emphasis has been placed on behalf of the Revenue in fact went on to support the view adopted by the petitioner. The Court noted that the controversy before the Apex Court was in relation to the rate of tax which was to be applied to the undisclosed income assessed in terms of Chapter XIVB of the Act and the Apex Court in that case was concerned mainly with computation of undisclosed income u/s.158BB(1) of the Act. The Gujarat High Court pointed out that it had already noticed that S. 158BH of the Act provided for invoking other machinery provisions to an assessment made under Chapter XIVB of the Act which did not require other provisions of the Act to be applied to a block assessment to be made under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

2.12 The Apex Court decision, the Court further noted, also provided for a harmonious construction on the basis of reading of the mode of computation provided in Chapter IV of the Act and provided under Chapter XIVB of the Act by stating that S. 158BH inter alia, provided that other provisions of the Act should apply if there was no conflict between the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act and other provisions of the Act. The Court further noted that in a situation where there was a conflict between the provisions of block assessment procedure prescribed under Chapter XIVB of the Act and other provisions of the Act, it would be the special procedure prescribed under Chapter XIVB of the Act which had to prevail.

2.13 The Court further noted that the entire scheme under Chapter XIV of the Act, more particularly from S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act pertaining to reassessment and the special procedure for assessing the undisclosed income of the block period under Chapter XIVB of the Act, were separate and distinct from each other and in the circumstances, as per the established rules of interpretation, unless and until a plain reading of the two streams of assessment procedure did not result in the procedures being independently workable, only then the question of resolving the conflict would arise; to the contrary, in the present case, in the light of the provisions of S. 158BH of the Act, once there was a conflict between the two streams of procedure, as laid down by the Apex Court, the provisions of Chapter XIVB of the Act shall prevail and have primacy.

2.14 Thus, viewed from any angle, the Court held, the stand of the Revenue did not merit acceptance. Once assessment had been framed u/s.158BA of the Act in relation to undisclosed income from the block period as a result of search there was no question of the Assessing Officer issuing notice u/s.148 of the Act for reopening such assessment as the said concept was abhorrent to the special scheme of assessment of undisclosed income for block period. At the cost of repetition it was required to be stated and emphasised that the first proviso u/d 158BC(a) of the Act specifically provided that no notice u/s.148 of the Act was required to be issued for the purpose of proceeding under Chapter XIVB of the Act.
 
Peerchand Ratanlal Baid (HUF)’s case :

3.1 The brief facts in the case of CIT v. Peerchand Ratanlal Baid (HUF), 226 CTR 189 (Gau.) were that a search in the Baid Group of Companies had taken place u/s.132 in the year 1995 . The assessee, a HUF, as the proprietor of one of the group companies, filed the return for the block period 1986-87 to 1996-97 showing undisclosed income of Rs.60 lakhs. The assessment was completed u/s.158BC of the Act, determining an undisclosed income of Rs.1,17,25,416. The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal against the aforesaid order of assessment which was partly allowed and the undisclosed income for the block period was revised to Rs.24,37,850. Subsequently it was found that some of the documents seized in the case of another group company i.e., M/s. Baid Commercial Enterprises, for the same block period i.e., 1986-87 to 1996-97, pertained to the assessee. Accordingly, the AO initiated the proceedings for reopening asking the assessee to explain why the amount of Rs.59,18,246 covered by the aforesaid seized documents or any part thereof should not be added to the total undisclosed income of the assessee for the block period. The explanation given by the assessee having been found to be unsatisfactory the AO added a sum of Rs.13,66,715 to the undisclosed income of the assessee for the block period revising the assessed income to Rs.38,04,570.

3.2 The Gauhati High Court while upholding the order of the Tribunal allowing the appeal of the assessee on merits and other facets of the case, the Court at the request of the counsel appearing for the assessee, adjudicated a question raised by him to the effect that it was not within the power and jurisdiction of the assessing authority to issue notice u/s.148 of the Act in respect of an assessment for a block period made under Chapter XIV-B of the Act by placing reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat) v. JCIT, 307 ITR 1 (Guj.).

3.3 The Gauhati High Court expressed its inabil-ity to subscribe to the views recorded by the Gujarat High Court and the reasons contained in support thereof. In reaching the aforesaid conclusion the Court relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, 297 ITR 322 (SC) which in the respectful opinion of the Court succinctly summed up the situation and provided adequate justification for the Court’s respectful disagreement with the views of the Gujarat High Court expressed in Cargo Clearing Agency’s case (supra).

3.4 Culling from the decision on the said case of Suresh N. Gupta (supra), the Court observed that each ‘previous year’ under the Act was a distinct unit of time for the purpose of assessment and the block period under the scheme of Chapter XIVB; it was an expanded unit of time comprising of 10/6 assessment years preceding the previous years; that the unit of time in both situations above remains constant; that it was open for Parliament to treat 10/ 6 previous years as one unit of time for the purposes of assessment for the block period; that the concept of previous year was retained in Chapter XIVB of the Act; that the non obstante clause in S. 158BA had to be read in juxtaposition with S. 158BH and if so read, other provisions of the Act would be applicable to the scheme under Chapter XIVB, if no conflict arose upon such application.

3.5 The principles noted above, the Court observed, took adequate care of the contrary view of the Gujarat High Court holding that S. 147 could not have any application to a block assessment which was made for 10/6 years without reference to any particular assessment year, as S. 147 of the Act provided only for reassessment of escaped income of any assessment year specified therein.

3.6 As regards the observation of the Gujarat High Court to the effect that all material, in course of block assessment following a search, was available with the AO and therefore the conditions precedent for the exercise of power u/s.147/148 were not satisfied, the Gauhati High Court stated that “we may straightway point out that the aforesaid view does not take care of the situation that has arisen in the present case, details of which have been set out hereinabove. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to understand that the view expressed in Cargo Clearing Agency (supra) cannot be considered to be comprehensive covering all situations to justify exclusion of the power u/s.147/u/s.148 from the provision of the special procedure for block assessments contemplated by Chapter XIVB of the Act”.

3.7 The question of limitation dealt with by the Gujarat High Court, in the considered view of the Court, had to be understood in the context of the separate period of limitation provided by S. 158BE of the Act for completion of block assessments and not for reopening such assessment for the block period; that in the absence of any separate and specific period of limitation for reopening of block assessments in Chapter XIVB, on the ratio of the judgment in CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta (supra), the provisions contained in Chapter XIV prescribing the period of limitation for reopening of assessment must be understood to be applicable to assessments under Chapter XIVB of the Act inasmuch as such application would not bring in any conflict between the provisions of Chapter XIVB and those contained in Chapter XIV.

3.8 The exclusion of S. 148 by the first proviso to S. 158BC(a) of the Act was understood by the Court to be in the context of the notice that was required to be issued by the AO following action taken u/ s.132 and/or S. 132A of the Act; that such notice, in the fact of a concluded assessment for any of the assessment years included in the block period, might partake the character of reopening such an assessment, to clarify which the first proviso to S. 158BC(a) had been inserted; that the question that confronted the Court in the case under consideration was in relation to a stage after conclusion of the assessment for the block period, whereas the afore-said proviso dealt with the stage of initiation of the block assessment proceeding. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing discussions while dismissing the appeal of the Revenue, the Gauhati High Court deemed it proper and appropriate to record their conclusion that the provisions of S. 147 and S. 148 would apply to an assessment for a block pe-riod made under Chapter XIVB of the Act.

Observations :

4.1 The controversy surrounds one of the important clauses that saves the application of the other provisions of Income-tax Act, contained in Chapter XIVB. It reads as under :

“Save as otherwise provided in this chapter, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to assessment made under this chapter.”

4.2 On a bare reading of the provisions of Chapter XIVB, it is confirmed that there are no express or apparently implied provisions in the chapter which provides for reopening of a completed block assessment. It is therefore to be examined whether the general provisions for reopening and reassessment as applicable to a regular assessment con-tained in Chapter XIV, particularly u/s.147 to u/s. 153 can be applied to the case of the block assessment under Chapter XIVB for its successful reopen-ing and succeeding reassessment.

4.3 Again on a bare reading of the abovementioned clause, it is apparent that it is possible to apply all those provisions of the Act in situations and circumstances not dealt with by Chapter XIVB. In other words, the general provisions of the Act would not apply where express provision is made in Chapter XIVB, so however, they will apply with equal force where the chapter does not contain any express provision to deal with an unspecified situation. Reopening of a completed block assessment, as noted above, is one such situation which has not been expressly dealt with by Chapter XIVB.

4.4 In the above stated analysis, on a primary reading of the provisions, one is likely to concur with the decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of Peerchand Ratilal Baid (HUF) which has for the reasons noted has held that subject to compliance of other conditions it is possible to reopen a completed block assessment.

4.5 Having observed that it is possible to reopen a block assessment, it remains to be seen that whether the ratio of the decision in the case of Cargo Clearing Agency (Gujarat) would nonetheless hold water. The Gujarat High Court decision is a very well reasoned and detailed decision has ruled out the possibility of reopening of a completed block assessment and has supported the conclusion with various findings in law.

4.6 The Gujarat High Court in Cargo Clearing Agency’s case in particular held that; (1) while S. 147 of the Act permits reassessment of income that has escaped assessment for any assessment year, assessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act is for a block period of 10/6 years without reference to any particular assessment year, (2) reassessment of escaped income u/s.147 of the Act is made where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment either due to the failure of the assessee to file return or failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts for the purposes of assessment or where material already on record had not been processed. In a case of block assessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act escapement of undisclosed income, following a search, cannot be envisaged, as all the materials recovered in the course of the search are available with the AO and there can be no case of non-disclosure of ma-terial facts by the assessee, (3) S. 158BA and S. 158BH, read in juxtaposition, leads to the conclusion that in the absence of any provision for reassessment under Chapter XIVB of the Act the provisions contained in S. 147 under Chapter XIV will not apply to assessments made for the block period, (4) the period of limitation for completion of block assessment provided for by S. 158BE of the Act is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by S. 153 of the Act. It, therefore, cannot be envisaged that the period of limitation u/s.153 of the Act would apply to block assessment. Any such application of the provisions contained in S. 153 will make the scheme visualised u/s.158BE unworkable, and (5) under Chapter XIVB of the Act certain provisions contained in Chapter XIV have been specifically incorporated, whereas certain other provisions have been specifically excluded. S. 148 has been excluded by the first proviso to S. 158BC(a), whereas S. 142, S. 143, S. 144 and S. 145 have been specifically incorporated by sub-clause (b) of S. 158BC.

4.7 Amongst several reasons advanced by the Gujarat High Court for coming to the conclusion, the two that stand apart for our consideration are :

  •  the Supreme Court’s decision in Suresh Gupta’s case was noted and its implications were considered by the Court while holding that it was not possible to read the provisions of reopening into the chapter of block assessment by suitably modifying the provisions of S. 147 to S. 153 of the Act.

  •  the scheme of block assessment per se ruled out any possibility of a reopening of a block assessment altogether.

4.8 The entire present controversy can be considered and appreciated in light of the legislative intent expressed at the time when Chapter XIVB was introduced vide the Memorandum Explaining the Provisions in the Finance Bill, 1995. The purpose and the object for introducing the said Chapter was explained in the following terms :

“Special procedure for assessment of search cases. Searches conducted by the IT Department are important means of unearthing black money. How-ever, under the present scheme, valuable time is lost in trying to relate the undisclosed incomes to the different years. Tax evaders generally manage to divert the focus to procedural and legal issues and often invent new evidence to explain undisclosed income. By the time search-related assessments are completed, the effect of the search is considerably diluted. Legal battles continue for many years to decide which income is assessable in which assessment year. No finality is reached and the seized assets remain with the Department for a long time. In order to make the procedure of assessment of search cases cost effective, efficient and meaningful, it is proposed to introduce a new scheme of assessment of undisclosed income determined as a result of search u/s.132 or requisition u/s.132A. Under this scheme, the undisclosed income detected as a result of any search initiated, or requisition made, after 30th June, 1995, shall be assessed separately as income of a block of years. Where the previous year has not ended or the due date for filing a return of income for any previous year has not expired, the income recorded on or before the date of the search or requisition in the books of account or other documents, maintained in the normal course, relating to such previous years shall not be included in the block.”

4.9 The memorandum referred to above, is a pointer to the fact that undisclosed income, in other words, the income which has not been disclosed and which has not been taxed, has to be assessed by adopting a special procedure. The special procedure has been evolved to save valuable time which is otherwise lost in the process of co-relating the un-disclosed income to different assessment years by obviating the legal battles involving issues of procedure and interpretation of law. The Legislature found it necessary to arrive at a cost effective, efficient and meaningful procedure to avoid litigations which continue for many years to decide which income, or part of income, is assessable in which assessment year.

4.10 Looking from several angles, to us the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court is a better view inasmuch as the reassessment of escaped income u/ s.147 of the Act is made in cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment either due to the failure of the assessee to file return or failure to disclose fully or truly all material facts for the purposes of assessment or where material already on record had not been processed. It therefore pre-supposes a failure on the part of the assessee to comply with the requirements of the law. In a case of block assessment, on the contrary, under Chapter XIVB of the Act, the escapement of undisclosed income, following a search, cannot be envisaged at all, as all the material recovered in the course of the search is available with the AO and there can be no case of non-disclosure of material facts by the assessee. Not using such material indicates a possible failure on the part of the AO for which no power can not be vested in him to confer benefit for inaction. Moreover, the Gujarat High Court did examine the implications of Suresh N. Gupta’s decision in coming to the conclusion advanced by the Court.

Governance – Rethinking Takeover Regulations in UK in the Wake of Kraft’s Conquest of Cadbury

Accountant Abroad

Workers at the Cadbury plant
in Keynsham, in the west of England, thought they had a sweet deal. In the
middle of a takeover bid for the British confectioner last year, the U.S. food
company Kraft pledged that the factory, earlier slated for closure by Cadbury,
would remain open if it won the company. When the deal wrapped, though, the
pledge soured. Too much of Keynsham’s production had apparently been shifted to
Poland to reverse its closure, Kraft lamented. The plant, after more than 75
years making chocolate, will shut next year, its staff of 400 among the early
casualties of the $ 18 billion deal.

Few hostile bids for a
British firm and a beloved brand have ruffled the country’s business and
political chiefs the way Kraft did. But the debate took a twist. Although the
Americans were excoriated for their U-turn, the pivotal role of short-term
Cadbury investors in handing the firm to Kraft sparked calls for a rethink of
the way takeovers are governed in the U.K.

And that’s exactly what the
Takeover Panel, the independent body that sets the rules for deals involving
U.K. firms, is doing — undertaking a review of the mergers and acquisitions
process with an eye on reform. The government is poised to unveil its own
recommendations for change, Business Secretary Vince Cable said to a
parliamentary committee on July 20.

Few would dispute any
British claim of being the takeover capital of Europe. According to Dealogic,
which tracks global M&A, the U.K. has seen more than twice as many of its
companies bought since 2005 as any of Europe’s other leading economies. Among
the conquests : airport operator BAA bought by Spain’s Ferrovial, British Energy
bought by France’s EDF and iconic car maker Jaguar and steel maker Corus taken
over by India’s Tata Group.

Chalk at least some of that
up to the Anglo-Saxon brand of capitalism, one that European continental
regulators have often resisted. France, for instance, has bluntly protected its
‘national champion’ companies from hostile offers. With boards and the
government less able to meddle in the takeover process in Britain, says Roger
Barker, head of corporate governance at the London- based Institute of
Directors, it is “very much an outlier in terms of the openness of our market
for corporate control.”

To make deals tougher for
acquirers to execute, the Takeover Panel is considering ways to grant
longer-term shareholders in a target firm more power to decide the fate of an
offer. One proposal being considered would see the threshold for an acquisition
increased from 50% plus one of the voting rights to 60% or higher. Another would
disenfranchise investors who buy a target’s shares after an offer has been made
by denying them the right to vote on the bid.

Both ideas have their flaws.
U.K. corporate law permits a shareholder to control a company with 50% plus one
by, for instance, issuing resolutions to dismiss the board and appoint a new
one. That such a stake would no longer grant ownership seems incongruous.
Depriving newer investors of the right to vote on a takeover, meanwhile, makes
presumptions about their motives and desirability that won’t always be fair.
After all, the reason there are short-term shareholders is that some long-term
shareholders sell out. They are voting with their feet. Disenfranchising on
those grounds, says Michael McKersie — an assistant director at the Association
of British Insurers, which represents major investors in U.K. stocks — “is just
a form of discrimination.”

Other proposals, though, are
less fraught. Giving shareholders in a bidding company a say in the process
seems sensible, since those left holding stock in the combined entity have far
more to lose from a poorly judged acquisition. Big deals involving a British
buyer sometimes require approval from the bidding company’s shareholders. For
instance if Kraft were a U.K. company, it would have needed shareholders to
approve the move for buying out Cadbury.

The City is not anticipating
revolutionary change within the Takeover Panel’s recommendations. Any radical
measures to ensure that deals are decided on the basis of long-term-shareholder
value rather than short-term speculation, would be more likely to come from the
government. The Institute of Directors’ Barker, for one, is betting on the
government to take some significant action. Officials are already mulling plans
to subject big deals to greater regulatory scrutiny before an offer has
officially been tabled. That’s far too late to help workers at the Cadbury plant
in Keynsham. But it just might make the deal’s aftertaste a touch less bitter !

(Source : Time, 16-8-2010)

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Investor Protection – Shareholder Nominees As Directors

Accountant Abroad

A new rule in the US makes
it easier for minority investors to remove

profligate and ineffective board
members


We have witnessed in recent
times how SEBI has been introducing measures to regulate market players in its
quest to protect small investors. There has been some speculation that the
regulator may introduce provisions to force companies to appoint directors
representing small investors and employees. In this context the following report
on the fallout of a new SEC ruling allowing investor nominees for board
positions makes interesting reading.

The Securities and Exchange
Commission, the US securities market regulator, recently voted in favour of a
proposal that requires companies to put candidates nominated by investors on the
proxy statements sent to stockholders before director elections. Such candidates
can be put up by investors or groups that will be eligible to offer nominees.
The new regulations will let investors owning 3% of a company nominate directors
on corporate ballots, a step that may help shareholders oust board members
accused of non-performance and a failure to boost shareholder value.

The SEC acted in response to
investor complaints that company-selected directors failed to rein in
compensation and risk-taking that led to more than $ 1.79 trillion of writedowns
in the financial sector during the credit crisis. Business groups, including the
US Chamber of Commerce, have fought the change, arguing that labour unions and
pension funds will misuse the threat of proxy fights to seek concessions that
would harm companies.

SEC chairperson Mary
Schapiro said before the vote : “These rules reflect compromise and weighing
competing interests; as with all compromises, they do not reflect all the views
of any one person or group. They are rational, balanced and necessary to enhance
investor confidence in the integrity of our system of corporate governance.” The
SEC has considered permitting so-called proxy access since 2003, only to back
away in the face of opposition from corporations and concern that the agency
would lose a law suit.

The Chamber of Commerce, the
nation’s biggest business lobby, is weighing the possibility of filing a
lawsuit. The organisation had worked with Washington-based lawyer Eugene Scalia
about a year ago to analyse the SEC’s rule-making process on the matter.

“Using the proxy process to
give labour unions, pension funds and others greater leverage to try to ram
through their agenda makes no sense,” David Hirschmann, chief executive officer
of the Chamber’s capital markets unit, said in a statement. The business lobby
“will continue to fight this flawed approach using every method available.” he
said. Scalia, a partner at Gibson Dunn & Crutchei; has won suits against the SEC
over rules for mutual funds and fixed-indexed annuities on the grounds that the
agency made procedural missteps in writing regulations.

Under the SEC’s proxy access
rule, shareholders will be able to nominate at least one director and as much as
25% of a company’s board. Investors will be required to hold the minimum amount
of stock at least through the date of the election, and couldn’t use the rule if
they hold the shares for the purpose of changing control of the company.

“Smaller reporting
companies” with less than $ 75 million in market capitalisation will be exempt
from the rule for three years, the SEC said. Nominating dissident directors
previously required that shareholders mail a separate ballot with the names of
competing candidates and persuade other investors to vote along with them.
Activist investors such as Carl Icahn and Nelson Peltz have waged proxy fights
to get their candidates elected to boards of companies they said were
under-performing.

Various institutional
investors and the bodies representing pension and labour funds have opined to
the effect that the process was time-consuming and too expensive for all but the
wealthiest shareholders. One of the lessons of this current economic downturn is
to be mindful that governance is a significant risk factor and the new
regulation that affords greater accountability will go a long way towards
mitigating that risk. However, the rule won’t necessarily cut costs for
investors because of filing requirements the SEC has mandated. The legal costs
for meeting the process may ultimately be as much as the printing costs sought
to be avoided.

As for possibilities of
litigation arising out of the new rule, one view is that the SEC is susceptible
to litigation, because the rule doesn’t allow shareholders to reject proxy
access if they don’t want it or set “different parameters for ownership
thresholds and holding periods”. There is room for a very serious legal
challenge on the grounds that the rule is internally inconsistent. It will be
interesting to see how investors respond to the new opportunity handed out to
them.

(Source :Bloomberg/Financial Express, 30-8-2010—
excerpted & edited report)

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New plea — Pure question of law can be raised at any time — Civil Procedure Code section 96.

New Page 1

4 New plea —
Pure question of law can be raised at any time — Civil Procedure Code section
96.


[ Ashok Kumar Dulichand
Sharma v. Jethmal Motilal Jedia & Ors., AIR 2010 (NOC) 36 Bom.]


The plaintiff had filed a
suit for declaration that the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant No.
1 was void. The plaintiff had also prayed that the agreement of sale and the
power of attorney executed were null and void. The suit was dismissed. In appeal
before the Court, the appellant plaintiff contented that the registration of
sale deed is void, since the power of attorney itself was not registered as
contemplated by section 32 and section 33 of the Registration Act, 1908. The ld.
counsel for the respondent objected to such a plea being considered on two
counts. First, that such a plea is not raised in the Trial Court and second; had
such plea been raised in the Trial Court, the respondent would have shown that
his case falls in the proviso to section 33.

The Court held that the
first ground needs to be rejected because this was purely a question of law and
could be raised at any time and in any case. As far as the second ground is
concerned, such exemption is granted to a person executing power of attorney and
not to the person in whose favour it is executed. The plaintiff never claimed
such an exemption and was a fit person. Thus the person authorised must hold
registered power of attorney and if he does not hold registered power of
attorney, the registration at his instance is void. The registration of the sale
deed is, therefore, void.


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Precedent — Binding nature — Only ratio decidendi of judgment which constitutes binding precedent.

New Page 1

3 Precedent
— Binding nature —
Only ratio
decidendi
of judgment which
constitutes binding precedent.


[Amar Kumar Mahto & Anr. v.
State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2010 Patna 19]

A review application had
been filed by the petitioner for review of order of the learned Single Judge
passed even in absence of the learned counsel for the petitioner, writ
application of the
petitioner was dismissed on merits.

The petitioner relied upon
the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kishori Prasad v.
State of Bihar, [reported in 2008(2) PLJR 458] and contended that when the
counsel for the petitioner was not present, the ordinary course open to the
learned Single Judge was either to postpone the hearing of the case or dismiss
it for want of prosecution. But in no circumstance could the same be decided on
merits.

The respondents, in reply,
referred to a later decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Kedar Nath Tripathi v. The State of Bihar, [reported in 2008(3) PLJR 470]. He
submitted that the later Division Bench in the case of Kedar Nath Tripathi
(supra)
considered the decision of the earlier Division Bench in the case of
Kishori Prasad (supra), and explained the same as not laying down correct
proposition of law.

The Court observed that the
doctrines of ‘binding precedent’ and ‘per incurium’ are deeply embedded
in the judicial system and have been discussed and explained in long series of
judicial pronouncements of English Courts as well as the Supreme Court and the
different High Courts of this country.

Doctrines of ‘decision
per incuriam
’ and ‘decision sub silentio’ are exceptions to the fundamental
rules of administration of justice, which require certainty in law and
consistency in judicial decisions for the system to work efficiently and in the
interest of society. Hence, the doctrine of binding precedent was evolved by the
English Courts, laying down that judicial propriety and decorum demand the same
to be followed by the Judges as a rule to ensure uniformity in law and judicial
decisions, unless certain exceptional circumstances are held to exist. Thus,
judicial discipline requires a Co-ordinate Bench to follow the judgment of an
earlier Co-ordinate Bench rendered on the issues of law for general application.
That is why in absence of a law laid down or interpreted by the Apex Court under
Article 141 for universal application, the law laid down by one High Court on
the same issue also has a persuasive value for the other Courts in the country.
This indispensable foundation for dispensation of justice has been evolved to
provide at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the
conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal
rules and to avoid, to the maximum, uncertainty and confusion in the application
of law in the process of healthy development of social fabric. But it is not
that the whole judgment and all observations and findings therein are to be
taken as binding precedent by a subsequent Co-ordinate Bench. It is only the ‘ratio
decidendi
’ of the judgment which constitutes a binding precedent.

The ‘obiter dicta’ of
a Judge has also no precedential value. It is only a considered enunciation of
law by the Judge on points arising or raised in the case directly, which has a
precedential value, and not the unnecessary statements or opinion, out of
context, made beyond the occasion, unnecessary for the purpose at hand or made
by way of passing remark.

Decisions rendered ‘per
incuriam
’ also fall outside the category of binding precedent. Hence
decisions, contrary to the provisions of the Act or patently erroneous are not
to be treated as binding precedent. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’ and
‘per incuriam’ are those decisions rendered in ignorance of some clear statutory
provision or in ignorance of some law laid down by the Apex Court or a clear
decision of a Co-ordinate or Larger Bench of the same Court on the question of
law of universal
application.

But merely a different
opinion or a possible different interpretation of law cannot be a ground to hold
an earlier decision of a Co-ordinate Bench as rendered ‘per incuriam’ or ‘sub
silentio’ or not a binding precedent.

Thus, it is only a decision,
rendered contrary to law, statutory or Judge-made, or a binding precedent, or an
obligatory authority, and patently erroneous, is ‘per incuriam’. In the
circumstances, the Court found that there was no merit in the review
application.

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Liability of legal heirs — Partner — Loan borrowed by firm on mortgage — Partnership Act 1932 section 18 and section 22.

New Page 1

1 Liability
of legal heirs — Partner — Loan borrowed by firm on mortgage — Partnership Act
1932 section 18 and section 22.


[Smt. Bramaramba v. T.
Madhawarao & Co. & Ors., AIR 2010 (NOC) 244 (Mad.)]

Loan was borrowed by firm on
mortgage. Promissory note was executed by partners in name and on behalf of
firm. Partners admitted borrowing and execution of promissory note.
Subsequently, partnership dissolved on account of death of one of partners. The
Court held that remaining partners were personally liable to discharge the debt.
The estate of deceased partner also answerable to suit debt apart from mortgaged
property. However, legal heirs of deceased partner were not personally liable
for suit debt, but were entitled to share of balance amount of sale proceeds of
mortgaged property in auction. Amount due under promissory note, not binding on
legal heirs.

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WHISTLE-BLOWER POLICY : A STEP TOWARDS BETTER GOVERNANCE

Article

Background:

Securities Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has prescribed
the listing agreement that is required to be executed between a stock exchange
and a company whose securities are to be listed
on that exchange. Clause 49 of the listing agreement is titled ‘Corporate
Governance’ and lays down the principles of Corporate Governance that are
required to be followed by the listed company. In addition to a list of
mandatory requirements that a listed company is obliged to comply with, there
are a few non-mandatory requirements that have been specified in terms of
Annexure I D of the specimen listing agreement. One such non-mandatory
requirement relates to ‘Whistle-blower Policy’. This article aims
to explore the meaning of ‘Whistle-blower Policy’, the rationale of making it a
part of the Corporate Governance Code (though not mandatory at present) and the
usefulness of such a policy in ensuring better governance.

Corporate Governance Code:

Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of Stock Exchanges
places a non-mandatory requirement for listed companies in India to adopt a
Whistle-Blower Policy. The specific recommendation, placed in Annexure I D to
Clause 49 specifies that:


(i) The company will establish a mechanism for employees
to report to the management concerns about unethical behaviour, actual or
suspected fraud or violation of the company’s code of conduct or ethics
policy.

(ii) The mechanism must provide for adequate safeguards
against victimisation of employees who avail of the mechanism.

(iii) The mechanism must also provide, where senior
management is involved, direct access to the Chairman of the Audit
Committee.

(iv) The existence of the mechanism must be appropriately
communicated within the organisation.

(v) The Audit Committee must periodically review the
existence and functioning of the mechanism.


While this is a non-mandatory requirement, the company also
has a mandatory requirement to disclose, in its report on corporate governance,
the extent of adoption of such non-mandatory requirements. Numerous companies
have adopted the Whistle-Blower Policy in their organisations in their quest to
uphold the highest governance standards or in the fear of being considered late
entrants to the ‘well-governed companies’ club’!

A similar provision for protection of whistle- blowers is
found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which forms part of the United
States Federal Law. S. 806 of this Act protects employees who provide
information or assist in an investigation from discharge, demotion, suspension,
threats, harassment or any form of discrimination. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has
now increased the protection provided to whistle-blowers. The provisions have
made it clear that retaliation against whistle-blowers will not be tolerated. It
is now a criminal offence to retaliate against whistle-blowers, carrying
penalties from a large fine to 10 years in prison.

This raises questions such as — What is really meant by a
whistle-blower policy? And, how does it lead to better governance?

A logical starting point would be to examine the key
components of whistle-blower policy. There are four broad components of
whistle-blower policy:




  •  A
    whistle blower



  •  A
    wrongful or unethical practice



  •  An
    authority



  •  A
    policy




The Four Components of a Whistle-Blower Policy:

A whistleblower:

“A whistle-blower is a person who raises a concern about
wrongdoing occurring in an organisation or body of people. Usually this person
would be from that same organisation. The revealed misconduct may be classified
in many ways; for example, a violation of a law, rule, regulation and/or a
direct threat to public interest, such as fraud, health/safety violations, and
corruption. Whistle-blowers may make their allegations internally (for example,
to other people within the accused organisation) or externally (to regulators,
law enforcement agencies, to the media or to groups concerned with the issues).”

(Source: en.wikipedia.org)

A Wrongful or Unethical Practice:

There are various grievance or complaint mechanisms that are
instituted by organisations. The wrongful practice or unethical conduct that is
sought to be covered under the whistle-blower policy is expected to be grave and
serious in nature, and may involve several parties. These practices may concern
serious disregard to the law of the land (e.g., dealing in narcotics
without a licence), a crime against human rights (e.g., child
trafficking, dealing in human organs), corruption of a high order (e.g.,
supply/use of substandard or expired medicines in a hospital), compromise of the
organisational values (e.g., bribery, unfair trade practices) and similar
serious acts. It is clear that trivial issues or unfounded claims should not be
escalated through this policy.

An Authority:

The policy defines a specific process to be followed for
escalation of information regarding the wrongful or unethical practice. The
person/authority to which the communication may be sent, the manner of sending
communication and the manner in which the information received would be dealt
with is clearly defined in the policy. It is felt that the management is often
the last in the knowledge-chain where a rampant wrongdoing is concerned, as the
employees and other stakeholders are not sure who to report to and not secure as
to how it would impact their relationship with the organisation. Thus, the
authority which deals with the information provided by a whistle-blower must be
independent, senior and responsible — and the policy must provide for
confidentiality of the information as well as the identity of the informer.

A Policy:

A whistle-blower policy is thus an internal policy on access to the appropriate designated authority, by persons who wish to report on unethical or improper practices. The policy is intended to create a platform for alerting the management of the company or those charged with the Governance of the company about potential issues of serious concern, by ensuring confidentiality, protection and expedient action. The Corporate Governance Code in India specifically states that the whistle-blower must have a direct access to the Chairman of the Audit Committee for reporting on wrongdoings by the senior management.

The Response of Corporate India:

Corporate India was slow to respond to the non-mandatory requirements of Clause 49 in general, and the clause relating to the whistle-blower policy in particular. A regulatory recommendation is a law in the making, and it is heartening to find that an increasing number of companies are now realising the need to pay heed to these non-mandatory requirements. A peek at some of the corporate governance reports that form part of the annual reports of companies reveals the status of adoption of this non-mandatory requirement?  (refer Table).


Impacts of unblown whistles — a couple of instances:

A few instances of worms in Dairy Milk bars were reported in Maharashtra, following which ad campaigns roping in Big B and revamping of packaging took place as an effort to win back their eroded image and consumer confidence. This cost Cadbury a good Rs.150 million on packaging expenses and 15% up on advertisement costs.

Coca-Cola India has been fighting a legal battle over allegations that its largest plant in India, at Plachimada has been responsible for environmental damage in the area. In a major step towards holding Coca-Cola accountable for damages it has caused in India, the State Government of Kerala decided to move forward with the formation of a tribunal that will hear and award compensation claims against the Coca-Cola Company. The Kerala State cabinet’s decision is based on the report and recommendations of a high-power Committee which released a report on March 22, 2010 holding Coca -Cola responsible for causing pollution and water depletion in Plachimada in the State of Kerala in southern India. Using the ‘polluter pays principle’, the high-power committee had recommended that Coca- Cola be held liable for Rs. 216 crore (US $ 48 million) for damages caused as a result of the company’s bottling operations in Plachimada.”

(Source?: http://www.indiaresource.org/campaigns/coke/)

Cadbury’s worm battle and Coke’s water contamination combat are classic examples of unblown whistles. If timely alerts were sent out through internal whistle-blowing the companies could have perhaps saved themselves of serious brand tarnishing and grave financial blows.

Whistle-blowers of Global Acclaim:

  • Sherron Watkins of Enron, Coleen Rowley of FBI and Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom awarded ‘The Persons of the Year 2002’ by ‘Time Magazine’ are classic examples of whistle-blowers in America.

  • Sherron Watkins was the Enron Vice-President who wrote a letter to Chairman Kenneth Lay in the summer of 2001 warning him that the company’s methods of accounting were improper. In January, when a Congressional subcommittee investigating Enron’s collapse released that letter, Watkins became a reluc-tant public figure, and the Year of the whistle-blower began.

  • Coleen Rowley was the FBI staff attorney who caused a sensation in May with a memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller about how the Bureau brushed off pleas from her Minne-apolis, Minn., field office that Zacarias Mous-saoui, who is now indicted as a September. 11 co-conspirator, was a man who must be investigated.

  • One month later Cynthia Cooper exploded the bubble that was WorldCom when she informed its board that the company had covered up $?3.8 billion in losses through the prestidigitations of phony book-keeping.

Whistle-blower Policy and Corporate Governance:
Some Thoughts:


Would you blow the whistle?

Mere bringing in the whistle-blower policy in an organisation does not necessarily result in successful functioning of the whistle- blower mechanism. It has to be put into action by creating awareness, propagating the policy, and assuring that no reprisal would be met against the whistle-blowers.

To safeguard themselves from the consequences of reporting a wrongdoing known or observed, employees across organisational hierarchies are tight-lipped and fearful to blow whistle against their colleagues, their business associates (vendors, customers, etc.) or their higher ups. Employees consider silence as golden in the wake of surviving in the workplace. This is detrimental to both the individual and the organisation.

Employees being closer to the organisation would be in a better position to uncover corporate mis-behaviour. Corporates need to decide whether they would welcome alerts through internal whistle-blowing and take corrective actions internally or be faced with the implications of unsolicited alerts from external sources, thereby endangering their goodwill and reputation.

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners have highlighted five reasons for ‘Why Employees Don’t Report Unethical Conduct’:

  • No corrective action
  • No confidentiality of reports
  • Retaliation by superiors
  • Retaliation by co-workers
  • Unsure whom to contact

Several corporate collapses like Enron, WorldCom, Satyam, Global Trust Bank, UTI scam, Siemens bribing scam in Germany to gain contracts, Harshad Mehta and Ketan Parekh scam, have quaked up the investors’ reliance on governance. This has surfaced the need for reinforcement of a mechanism to escalate misconduct to the appropriate authorities at the right time.

Benefits of a whistle-blower policy:

There is no doubt that in today’s fast-paced world and mega corporations, institution of a whistle-blower policy is not a corporate luxury, but an organisational necessity. The benefits of such a policy are many:

  • Fostering good governance by encouraging employees to escalate deceitful actions by colleagues/ seniors/third parties.
  • Promotion of the organisational values thus nurturing a culture of openness in workplace.
  • Sending a clear message that severe action will be taken against unethical and fraudulent acts.
  • Dissuading employees from committing fraud by instilling fear of unfavourable consequences when caught.
  • Early alerts to diffuse a potentially larger disaster.

How to make the Whistle-Blower Policy a success?

The success of the Whistle-Blower Policy largely depends upon various factors viz. the level of tone at the top and the signals that its sends down the level, organisational philosophy and code of conduct; whistle-blower policy campaigning, orientation and awareness in the organisation.

The Whistle-Blower Policy should clearly state that:

  • Anonymity of the informant will be maintained.
  • The authenticity of the information will be confirmed and there will be no reprisal for reporting the information.
  • Appropriate and disciplinary action will be taken after investigation and on confirmation of the information.

While the regulatory requirement may lead to introduction of a Whistle-Blower Policy on paper, whether it is imbibed in spirit or not is determined by the tone at the top.

Tone at the top:

The tone at the top has a cascading effect on organisational pyramid downwards. Unless the organisational philosophy and the leadership positively encourage ethics and integrity, employees may assume that aiding in mounting revenue for the organisation is more a priority than ethics.

It is thus important that the leaders of organisation clearly communicate the organisational philosophy, values and code of conduct to be followed by each employee. Similarly, paying lip service to the whistle-blower policy is not enough; as employees and stakeholders are not encouraged to blow the whistle unless there is a serious commitment to it by the leadership.

Wrap-up:

The utility of whistle -blower policy is not only for private corporations but also larger organisations and Government bodies. The recent news coverage on inadequate preparation of infrastructure for the Commonwealth Games, 2010 has rocked India. The authors humbly submit that a well implemented national whistle-blower policy would have perhaps helped in giving early alerts of the impending fiasco and would have gone a long way in protecting the country from loss of credibility in the international arena.

Demystifying XBRL

Article

Since the inception of the
Internet, many technologies have been tried as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
enablers to move financial information and data between computer systems. In
today’s world information is the key to success for any organisation. Greater
efficiency or advantageous position against competitors can be achieved
depending on how much information and how quickly information can be obtained.
For example, investors and investment analysts want to use their own analytical
tools using the financial data made available by the company or data aggregators
like Bloomberg. They have to copy & paste such information manually. Finance
managers need to compile financial information from different departments into a
spreadsheet for decision-making. However, the format of information may be
different among the different systems. As a result, far more time is needed in
the financial domain for producing the required information and getting the
information ready for analytical purpose. With the creation of eXtensible
Business Reporting Language (XBRL), a new vista is opened.


About XBRL :

It is the language for
electronic communication of business and financial information between
businesses and over Internet. XBRL is an open standard and is freely available
standard language based on eXtensible Mark-up Language (XML) for creating
business reports. As a language, it does not intend to modify any of the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) but to present them in a
suitable format which eases out further analysis and comparison. It can contain
both financial information such as balance sheet, profit & loss account or cash
flow statement and non-financial information, such as sustainability reports,
regulatory reports, loan applications, etc.

XBRL is composed of
specifications about how to structure business and financial data and a common
framework for structuring and naming business and financial information. XML
provides the structure for the data. XBRL Taxonomies define, relate and classify
different business concepts using the list of elements or Tags. Instance
Documents contain the actual facts for financial reports.

Why XBRL ?

There are many organisations
including regulatory bodies that post financial information on the Internet. At
present financial information is generally presented on the Internet in a static
format such as Hyper Text Mark-up Language (HTML) or Portable Document Format
(PDF). These two are the universal languages for web browsers. Both HTML & PDF
are static formats which can enable a person regardless of his physical location
to access relevant financial information easily. However, HTML & PDF Formats are
no better exchange of financial information than ‘Copy & Paste’. They do not
enable “Electronic Data Interchange” (EDI) of financial information. So, the
problem with this system is that the data is not readable by computer systems.

These static formats
i.e.,
HTML & PDF mean that a person is required to access a single file and
then read the information page by page. Any further interaction with the data
requires the user to either ‘Copy & Paste’ or ‘Re-key’ the information or
otherwise render it in an appropriate format for any further use.

Let us take an example,
suppose we want to compare the Net Profit of ten companies for a period of, say,
ten years, then you may need to access 100 discrete files, search in each one
for the required information and then, if found, extract the relevant
information. Thus, interacting with a large population of static data to analyse
it or to input it to a ‘Software Package’ for further processing is a tedious
job. It is time consuming, expensive and error prone also.

However, if such information
is made dynamic, then it would be possible to automatically interact with the
relevant data and avoid the inherent usage costs and increase the quality.

XBRL offers a way to make
financial information dynamic.

XBRL and Business Reporting
Supply Chain :

To resolve the problem of
providing reusable access to timely, accurate, relevant and discoverable
financial and business information, a market-driven open standard consortium,
XBRL International has evolved XBRL. XBRL International connects various
participants in ‘Business and Financial Reporting Supply Chain’ (see figure
below) in the development of a standard-based solution for business and
financial information that is universally open, industry-driven and
internationally endorsed.

Business and Financial
Reporting Supply Chain


XBRL Components:

Tags1:

XBRL tag is a computer code that represents one concept. XBRL uses tags to describe data. For example <Assets> 100</Assets>, the word Assets together with the brackets “<” and “>” is called a tag, and “<…>” is called opening tag and “</….>” is called closing tag.

Taxonomy1:

Taxonomy in general means a catalogue or a set of rules for classification. In XBRL, Taxonomy is a dictionary, containing computer readable definitions of business reporting terms as well as relationships between them and links connecting them to human-readable resources (metadata). A typical Taxonomy consists of a schema (or schemas) and linkbases.

Instance Document1:

An Instance Document is a business report in XBRL format. It contains tagged business facts whose definition can be found in the schema (or schemas) that the Instance Document refers to, together with the context in which they appear and unit description.

How does XBRL work?

Instead of treating financial information as a block of text, XBRL provides a computer-readable tag to identify each individual piece of data. A business reporting document becomes ‘intelligent’ data, allowing the exchange of business reporting data by encoding the information in a meaningful way. XBRL tags give data identity and context which can be understood by a wide range of software applications. It also allows data to interface with databases, financial reporting systems and spreadsheets.

Advantages of XBRL:

XBRL users span over all commercial, business and industrial establishments, the accounting professionals, data aggregators, investment Companies, banks, regulators and all users having a stake in financial statements and reporting. With XBRL, coding the same database can be used for meeting the information needs of all without any need for reprocessing and re-keying. XBRL is so designed that it can be used for distributing financial information in any format viz. HTML documents for web, printed reports and statements, electronic filing with securities and market regulators like SEBI in India and SEC in the USA. It is reliable, efficient, cost-effective, computer-readable, requiring no data entry again and again which is the most time-consuming, expensive and unreliable. Data once converted in the XBRL format can be easily processed by computers.

Since, XBRL provides an XML-based framework it can be used globally for creating, exchanging and analysing financial reports across all software formats.

It is the XBRL Tool that takes care of different software formats and converts the financial state-ments into the XBRL form. Therefore, almost any organisation can benefit from XBRL.

Companies can have their own internal reporting also in XBRL. Let us start with the basic information about a company. With companies going global it has become necessary to standardise financial reporting, not only within the country but across the globe so that we can have comparable and consistent financial data across space and time. A company’s own management can mine the data to reflect different aspects of the company’s working, carry out comparison with competitors and industry leaders and use it as a powerful MIS tool. An investment analyst through the use of XBRL would have timely data across companies to form meaningful conclusions and economists can have consistent information of sufficient granulation to make forecasts and run models. For bankers and credit rating agencies this will obviously be a huge bonanza enhancing the quality of their credit analysis.

The new-generation tools used for improving the decision-making process in the financial domain such as Business Activity Monitoring, Digital Dashboards, Business Intelligence Tools, Data Warehousing and Data Mining are adopting XBRL. An important improvement is for auditors, as XBRL enables continuous auditing. XBRL allows auditors to generate reports within a much shorter time frame as compared to the traditional model.

Worldwide status:

XBRL International which is a non-profit organisation, looks after the promotion and development of XBRL around the world. Some 500 plus organisations are members of XBRL International which include bodies like International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), The Institute of Chartered Accountants of England & Wales, Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountant (CICA), CA Bodies of Australia, Netherlands, Ireland, Singapore, New Zealand, International Federation of Accountant and many others are members of XBRL International. In addition, from the corporate world, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, Dow Jones, Fujitsu, General Electric, Hitachi, IBM, Microsoft, Moody’s Oracle and SAP to mention a few are members of XBRL International. XBRL International has created local jurisdictions in each country where XBRL is already in use or is under development. There are 50 such local jurisdictions.2

IFRS Foundation has released IFRS Taxonomy 2010 on April 30, 2010. IFRS Foundation has also released IFRS Taxonomy 2010 Guide containing guidance on how to use IFRS Taxonomy 2010 from both an accounting and XBRL technology perspective.

India status:

XBRL India which is the provisional jurisdiction of XBRL International in India is looking after the promotion and development of XBRL in India. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) is involved in XBRL India. India has just embarked upon XBRL standard. RBI which is the Regulator for all banks in India has implemented XBRL-based reporting for Capital Adequacy data (RCA – II Return) and has also released taxonomy for two more returns, namely, GPB Return and Form A Return. RBI has plans to convert other returns also on XBRL. * As per Media Reports, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has also taken a decision to implement XBRL-based reporting for all companies in India from April 1, 2011. However, a notification to this effect is still awaited. SEBI is also planning to develop a platform for XBRL-based filing by all listed companies in India.

XBRL — The future of accounting:

From technical point of view, XBRL is replacing other previously defined XML standards for describing financial information and business reports during the last few years such as FpML, RIXML, or ebXML. A reason for this is the wide support from across the world. This will result in the next wave of innovation in ‘Enterprise Financial System’ because of the impact of XBRL on accounting, financial reporting and business intelligence. IT folks around the world are talking about three waves of innovation in XBRL. The first wave is of ‘Preparatory Software & Services’. This has to happen first as the companies start looking for software to convert their financial statements on XBRL format due to regulatory requirements. The second wave will be of ‘Analytical Tools’ for ‘Investment Analysis’ purpose. The third wave will be ‘Internal Systems’ in which one set of accounts is created that is used for investors, regulators and internal reporting purpose. In the next wave of XBRL-driven innovation, data will flow from operational systems all the way through consolidated internal reporting to external reporting to investors and regulators. This will enable regulators to get the transparency that they mandate and companies to get better internal business information/management information system (MIS).**

References:

(1)    Eva Reyes, Daniel Rodrigues & Javier Dolado: Overview of XBRL technologies for decision-making in Accounting Information Systems.
(2)    Federation of European Accountants: Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) — The Impact on Accountants and Auditors.

(3)    Liv Watson: Enhancing Capital Markets Transparency & Trust.
(4)    Mike Willis — The Language of Accounting in a Digital World.

GAPS in GAAP – Accounting Standards v. law of the land

Accounting Standards

As per our framework, Indian Accounting Standards can be
overridden by the laws of the land and court orders. SEBI was concerned that
companies were taking accounting and tax advantage of this by obtaining orders
u/s.391, u/s.394 and u/s.101 of the Companies Act that did not require
compliance with accounting standards. For example, companies used ‘securities
premium’ to write off current expenses such as doubtful debts, deferred tax
liability, impairment, etc. by filing a petition for capital reduction.

Consequently SEBI decided to put an end to this, by a
suitable amendment of the listing agreement as follows : “The company agrees
that, while filing for approval any draft scheme of
amalgamation/merger/reconstruction, etc. with the stock exchange, it shall also
file an auditor’s certificate to the effect that the accounting treatment
contained in the scheme is in compliance with all the Accounting Standards
u/s.211(3C) of the Companies Act, 1956.”

A question arose whether the amendment was also applicable to
the schemes of unlisted subsidiaries/associates/joint ventures of a listed
entity. It is clear that SEBI has jurisdiction only over listed entities and not
unlisted subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures of listed entities or
unlisted companies. For example, where the scheme involves an unlisted
subsidiary and a third party, the listed company is not required to file an
auditor’s certificate of compliance with accounting standards with the stock
exchange as it is not a party to the scheme. Thus, the unlisted subsidiary of
the listed entity can obtain the accounting arbitrage, which the listed entity
itself could not.

The other related question is what accounting treatment would
apply in the consolidated financial statements (CFS). Take for instance an
unlisted subsidiary of a listed entity which has got the court approval on a
scheme which is not in compliance with the accounting standards. Can the listed
entity use the treatment prescribed in the court scheme in its CFS ? The SEBI
Circular does not provide any specific guidance on the matter. The author
believes that the Circular is applicable only to a scheme filed by a listed
entity or where it is a party to the scheme. It does not apply to a scheme filed
by a non-listed subsidiary, associate or joint venture, even if it results in a
non-compliance with the accounting standards at CFS level of the listed entity.

This is because SEBI’s rights are more preemptive and apply
only to a listed entity. In other words, under the current listing agreement (as
modified by the amendment) SEBI can stop a listed company from filing a scheme
with the High Court that is not in compliance with the accounting standards.
However, it cannot stop a listed entity’s subsidiary from filing a scheme that
does not comply with accounting standards. Neither can it stop the listed entity
from applying the accounting treatment under the scheme sanctioned by the High
Court in the financial statements of the subsidiary or in its own CFS.

Consequently, there has been a raft of schemes filed by
subsidiaries of listed entities which are not in compliance with the accounting
standards. Let’s take a simple example. Listed entity (LCO) wants to amalgamate
another company into its own self. The amalgamation accounting results in
significant recognition of intangibles and goodwill. LCO is worried that in
subsequent years owing to impairment and amortisation, its future profits would
be adversely impacted. It therefore wants to use S. 391, S. 394 or S. 101 to
write off the intangibles and goodwill against securities premium or reserves.
Unfortunately, SEBI’s Circular preempts that, as LCO is not able to obtain a
certificate from the auditors that the accounting treatment is in compliance
with the accounting standards. To circumvent this problem, LCO floats a
subsidiary, and achieves the relevant objective in the financial statements of
the subsidiary and consequently in the CFS of LCO.

Whilst SEBI’s effort to prevent bad accounting practices is
laudable, because of jurisdictional issues, it may not have been able to achieve
its objective completely. The right medicine would be for the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs to amend S. 391, S. 394 and S. 101 of the Companies Act, to
prevent such accounting arbitrage. The author understands that these sections
will be amended along with the introduction of IFRS in India, since IFRS does
not allow a legal override of accounting standards.

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IFRS Conversion in India on Fast Track

Accounting Standards

Understanding the need for a well-coordinated approach, the
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) recently set up a high-powered group
comprising various stakeholders such as National Advisory Committee on
Accounting Standards (NACAS), SEBI, RBI, IRDA, ICAI, IBA and CFOs of industries.
The Core Group is supported by two sub-groups. The first sub-group would assist
the Core Group in identification of changes required in various laws,
regulations and accounting standards for convergence with IFRS. The second
sub-group would interact with various stakeholders in order to understand their
concerns on the issue of convergence with IFRS, identify problem areas and
ascertain the preparedness of the stakeholders for such convergence.

A joint meeting of the Core Group and the two sub-groups was
held on 6 August 2009. At the meeting, the ICAI presented the details of a
comprehensive capacity building programme which it is carrying on to prepare the
Chartered Accountancy (CA) profession for this transition and stated that a
large number of professionals have undergone training and the process is being
accelerated. The Chairman of the Accounting Standards Board of ICAI informed
that the convergence project is at an advanced stage of completion. CFOs present
in the meeting stated that industry was getting prepared. They also requested
amendments to the Companies Act and other Regulations and also the early
exposure of accounting standards which are IFRS compliant, to enable them to
prepare for meeting the deadline.

The main purpose of the Core Group is to issue a road map in
the near term for convergence to enable adherence to the targeted date of 2011.

The author strongly supports the formation of the Core Group
and the issuance of the proposed road map. We congratulate the Ministry of
Company Affairs for its unprecedented and historic action of bringing all the
concerned regulators on a common platform to achieve smooth convergence to IFRS
in India.

We believe that the proposed road map as a minimum should
contain the following :

(i) The date of transition to IFRS and the requirement of
comparable numbers

(ii) Whether IFRS would be applied as they are or there
would be certain carve-in or carve-out to those standards. This is important
so that the entities, which start preparing for conversion, are clear about
the standards that are applicable to them

(iii) Whether the first-time adoption rules under IFRS 1
First-time Adoption of IFRS would be applicable

(iv) The direct and indirect tax implications of transition
to IFRS, including implications under the new direct tax code

(v) Legal amendments needed to the key statutes to achieve
convergence. For example, Companies Act, 1956, Banking Regulation Act
(including its Third Schedule), SEBI Regulations/Guidelines and the Listing
Agreement, RBI Guidelines to Banks/NBFCs, IRDA Regulations, Electricity Act
tax laws especially Income-tax Act, etc. The road map should also cover
whether and how these amendments can be carried out prior to the transition
date

(vi) The ICAI has taken more than seven years to issue the
financial instruments standards from the date of the first issuance of IAS 39
Financial Instruments : Recognition and Measurement. These standards are still
to be notified under the Companies Accounting Standard Rules. If all the IFRS
are to be notified under the Companies Accounting Standard Rules, whether and
how it can be done at least one year prior to the transition date — for
example, would there be a fast tracking process.

Conversion to IFRS is a tedious task involving significant
time, cost and efforts. The experience indicates that for large groups,
convergence to IFRS may take even more than one year. Thus, entities need to
start preparing for transition to IFRS well in advance. To facilitate the same,
the road map should be absolutely clear on the above aspects.

We recommend the MCA should avoid any changes to IFRS. This
will enable Indian entities to be fully IFRS compliant and give an ‘unreserved
and explicit statement of compliance with IFRS’ in their financial statements.
Generally, the financial statements which are fully IFRS compliant have a higher
brand value globally as compared to the financial statements that are not fully
IFRS compliant. Also, most developed stock exchanges require financial
statements to be fully compliant with IFRS for listing purposes. If IFRS are not
adopted as they are, significant efforts involved in the conversion process may
not yield the desired benefits to converting companies and to the nation.

This article is dedicated to the loving memory of my friend
Rahul Roy, who became the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India at a young age of 33, a record impossible to break. Rahul was a great
professional, a great author and orator but more importantly a good human being.
I have penned 4 small lines in his memory . . . .

Tomorrow may or may not be

The next moment we may or may not see

But no time can wither your loving memories

Those I’ll cherish till the end of time.

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Advocate – Enrolment – Disqualification of persons above the age of 45 years from being enrolled as Advocates – Not proper : Advocates Act, section 24(1)(e)

New Page 1

26 Advocate – Enrolment – Disqualification of persons above
the age of 45 years from being enrolled as Advocates – Not proper : Advocates
Act, section 24(1)(e)


M.R. Kondal vs Bar Council of India & Ors

AIR 2009 HP 85

Rule 3 of the Enrolment Rules of 2006, framed by the Bar
Council of Himachal Pradesh, disqualifies persons above the age of 45 years from
being enrolled as advocates.

The rationale for the said rule was that those who retire
from various government, quasi-government and other institutions may use their
past contacts to canvass for cases on being enrolled as advocates. If this were
to occur, the dignity and repute of the profession would be jeopardised.

The petitioner, at the time of filing the petition, was aged
52 years. In the year 1994, he joined the LL.B course and successfully completed
the same in the year 1997. He also obtained the LL.M. degree in September 2000.
The petitioner is aggrieved by Rule 3 of the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh,
Advocates Enrolment Rules, 2006.

According to the petitioner, the State Bar Council has no
authority to put a condition of the maximum age as prescribed under the
aforesaid rules. It is also alleged that the criteria so laid down had no nexus
with the object sought to be achieved.

The Hon’ble Court observed that there was no specific
provision in section 7 of the Act, which enumerates the functions of the Bar
Council of India, empowering it to fix the maximum age beyond which entry into
the profession would be barred. The functions of the Bar Council of India
enumerated in section 7 also do not envisage laying down a stipulation
disqualifying persons otherwise qualified from entering the legal profession,
merely because they have completed the age of 45 years.

No material had been placed on record that there was any
material available with the State Bar Council to show that state government or
quasi government servants indulge in undesirable activities after entering the
profession. Therefore, the rule was discriminatory since it only debars those
persons from entering the profession who have completed 45 years of age; and
there was nothing to show what the criteria was for fixing the age limit of 45
years.

The rules which lay down that a person who has completed the
age of 45 years shall not be entitled to be enrolled as an advocate was struck
down as being void and unconstitutional.

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GAPS in GAAP – ED of Ind-AS 41 First-time Adoption of Indian Accounting Standards

Accounting standards

On 31 May 2010, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India (ICAI) issued Ind-AS 41, an exposure draft (ED) on the Indian equivalent
of IFRS 1 First-time Adoption of IFRS. There are some differences, which
apparently appear minor but have some significant consequences. Going ahead
there will be two sets of accounting standards in India, one is the Indian GAAP
and the other IFRS converged Standards which are likely to be known as ‘Indian
Accounting Standards (Ind-AS).’

Ind-AS will be issued by the ICAI and will have to be
notified in the Companies (Accounting Standards) Rules through NACAS. It will be
a separate body of accounting standards which may not always be the same as IFRS
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (hereinafter
referred to as ‘IFRS’). In other words there may be differences between the
converged standards notified in India and IFRS. This is clear from the EDs on
the converged standards issued by the ICAI so far. Other than Ind-AS 41, we see
differences in other standards, for example, the discount rate used for
long-term employee benefits and the recognition of actuarial gains/losses. Ind-AS
is likely to force a government bond rate for discounting and would require full
recognition of actuarial gains/losses. IFRS requires the use of a high-quality
corporate bond rate and the government bond rate is permitted as a fallback only
where there is no deep market for corporate bond. IFRS allows the corridor
approach, which permits not to recognise the actuarial gains/losses within the
corridor, and the deferral of actuarial gains/losses beyond the corridor amount.
Also under IFRS, full recognition in other comprehensive income or P&L is
permitted as other alternatives.

Many entities around the world are able to make a dual
statement of compliance on their financial statements, which is an unreserved
statement that the financial statements are in accordance with IFRS and the
standards notified in their local jurisdiction. This is only possible where
there are no differences between IFRS and the standards notified or else those
differences may be minimal and have either no impact on the entity or the impact
is immaterial. The advantage of making a dual statement of compliance is that
the financial statements can be used within India as well as in almost all major
capital markets in the world which accept IFRS financial statements. If Indian
companies fail to make dual statement of compliance, they may need to reconvert
again in accordance with IFRS, at the time of foreign listing.

Any Government would be challenged in making a decision as to
whether to adopt full IFRS or to make certain deviations which are deemed
necessary. As already stated, the advantage of adopting full IFRS is that it
would certainly help entities that are having or seeking foreign listing. Also
Indian entities that have several foreign subsidiaries which use IFRS, would
prefer to have the entire group on IFRS, rather than for different companies of
the group to be on different national versions of IFRS. However, such companies
as a percentage of total companies in India may be small and hence the
Government may not deem fit to impose full IFRS on all the companies in India.
This then brings us to the next point, what kind of changes from IFRS should the
Government consider when notifying Ind-AS. Certainly not the changes that are
being contemplated, with regards to the discount rate and the accounting for
actuarial gains and losses. Some countries have only a corporate bond market and
virtually no government bond market. An Indian entity that has a subsidiary in
such a country will not be able to use a government bond rate, as none exists.
In which case, a question on how to comply with Ind-AS may arise. With regards
to accounting for actuarial gains/losses, the author believes that if the
multiple options are available to entities in other countries, Indian entities
should not be deprived of that benefit. It is interesting to note that Australia
started off eliminating multiple options when it first notified the IFRS
standards. However, it later fell back to allowing the full range of options
under IFRS.

Other challenges under Ind-AS to making a dual statement of
compliance are :

  1. There are
    numerous differences between IFRS 1 and Ind-AS 41, which have been described
    elsewhere in this article. If these differences are relevant to a company,
    then dual statement of compliance may not be possible.

  2. Ind-AS 41 allows
    a company not to provide comparative numbers in accordance with Ind-AS. The
    companies that use this option will not be able to provide a dual statement of
    compliance as this will not be in accordance with IFRS.

  3. Another option
    for Indian companies is to present Ind-AS comparatives for 2010–11 in addition
    to the Indian GAAP comparatives. A company which intends to comply with both
    Ind-AS and IFRS in its first Ind-AS financial statements may consider this
    option to be more suitable. This option is, however, not without challenges.
    IFRS 1.22 covers the scenario where a company presents comparative information
    or a historical summary in accordance with both IFRS and Indian GAAP. It
    requires a company to label such comparative information prominently as the
    Indian GAAP information, as not being prepared in accordance with IFRS, and to
    disclose the nature of the main adjustments that would make the Indian GAAP
    comparatives comply with IFRS, although quantification is not required. If all
    the notes (including narratives) contain Indian GAAP comparative information,
    labelling of such information may be very challenging. Besides presentation of
    Indian GAAP comparative in the first Ind-AS financial statements is a huge
    challenge as the Ind-AS format for the income statement and balance sheet are
    significantly different from the Schedule VI formats. Furthermore, the Ind-AS
    disclosure requirements are more extensive than those of the Companies Act and
    Indian GAAP. It is therefore difficult to see how the Indian GAAP and Ind-AS
    financial statements could be presented in the same document, without amending
    the presentation/disclosure of Indian GAAP numbers significantly.

(4)        It
is a well-accepted position in India that if the requirement of an accounting
standard are not in conformity with law, the law will prevail over accounting
standards. This aspect is recognised in paragraph 4.1 of the Preface to the
Statements of Accounting Standards. The ED of Ind-AS 41 and other exposure
drafts issued by the ICAI contain a reference to the Preface. We understand
that as part of IFRS conversion exercise, the MCA will also modify the
Companies Act, 1956, to remove existing inconsistencies with Ind-AS. However,
there may be other laws prescribing treatments contrary to Ind-AS or such
inconsistencies may arise in future. We believe that any such inconsistency
with law if any will not allow Indian companies to make a dual statement of
compliance with IFRS.

 

(5)        The
Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) of the ICAI has been issuing opinions on
matters relating to application of accounting standards. If the
opinions/interpretations on Ind-AS are not in accordance with global
interpretations/ practice or the views of the IASB, then differences would
arise though the basic standards themselves may be the same or similar.

 

(6)        A
final set of converged standards have not yet been notified. It is expected
that there may be some differences between the notified standards and IFRS, as
discussed elsewhere in this article. We also understand that many corporate
entities are making strong representations on issues that are very significant
to them, such as the accounting of foreign exchange gains/losses on long-term
loans, or the prohibition on the percentage of completion method in the case of
real estate companies. At this point in time, it is a matter of conjecture as
to how these issues would be resolved.

 

(7)        There
is no clarity on the application of Schedule VI and Schedule XIV and what their
role would be under Ind-AS.

 

(8)        In
future, differences between notified standards and IFRS may arise, if the
Ind-AS do not keep pace with the changes in IFRS or where there are
disagreements. This feature is clearly visible in many jurisdictions that have
converged to IFRS in the past.

 

Differences with IFRS 1 :

 

Most of the first-time
exemptions/exceptions in Ind-AS 41 are in line with IFRS 1. However, the ICAI
has made few changes while adopting IFRS 1 in India. The changes broadly are :

 

(i)         IFRS
1 provides for various dates from which a standard could have been implemented.
For example, a company would have had to adopt the de-recognition requirements
for transactions entered after 1 January 2004. However, for Ind-AS 41 purposes,
all these dates have been changed to coincide with the transition date elected
by the company adopting Ind-AS;

 

(ii)        Deletion
of certain exemptions not relevant for India. For example, IFRS 1 provides an
exemption to a company that adopted the corridor approach for recording
actuarial gain and losses arising from accounting for employee obligations. In
India, since corridor approach is not elected, the resultant first-time
transition provision has been deleted;

 

(iii)       Adding
new exemptions in Ind-AS 41. For example, paragraph D 26 has been added to
provide for transitional relief while applying AS 24 (Revised 20XX) —
Non-current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations. Paragraph D 26
allows a company to use the transitional date circumstances to measure such
assets or operations at the lower of carrying value and fair value less cost to
sell; and

 

(iv)       Under
IFRS 1, equity and comprehensive income reconciliation to the previous GAAP is
required for the comparative year only. Under Ind-AS, such reconciliation is
required for the comparative (if presented) as well as the current year.

 

There are other interesting differences as
well. If a company becomes a first-time adopter later than its subsidiary,
associate or joint venture, it compulsorily needs to measure, in its
consolidated financial statements, the assets and liabilities of the subsidiary
(or associate or joint venture) at the same carrying amounts as in the
financial statements of the subsidiary (or associate or joint venture). The ED
of Ind-AS 41 also contains the same exemptions/ requirements. However, these
exemptions/requirements are based on Ind-AS financial statements; without any
reference/fallback to IFRS. This indicates that if a parent, subsidiary,
associate or joint venture of an Indian company is already using IFRS in its
separate/consolidated financial statements, the company will not be able to use
those financial statements in its transition to Ind-AS. This will create
considerable workload for Indian companies that have global operations.

 

Ind-AS 41 will be applicable to the first
set of annual Ind-AS financial statements prepared by a company. The first
Ind-AS financial statements are defined as the first annual financial
statements in which a company adopts Ind-AS by an ‘explicit and unreserved
statement of compliance with Ind-AS.’ The ED does not recognise or allow any
fallback on IFRS for this purpose. This indicates that companies, which are
already IFRS compliant, e.g., in accordance with the option given by the SEBI
or to comply with foreign listing requirements, will not be allowed to use
these financial statements to claim compliance with Ind-AS for the first time
and on an ongoing basis. Rather, they will need to prepare their opening
balance sheet in accordance with Ind-AS again. This will create additional
work-load for Indian companies listed on US and other foreign stock exchanges
or have used the voluntary option of SEBI and have already transitioned to
IFRS.

 

Conclusion :

 

Overall the author believes that Ind-AS
should not make any departures from the full IFRS standards unless they are
required in the rarest of rare cases. This will ensure that we receive the full
benefit of adopting full IFRS standards. So far it appears that the departures
that are expected to be made (discount rate on long-term employee benefits or
accounting of actuarial gains/losses) are unwarranted. As the standards are not
yet notified, and as companies make strong representations, it is not clear at
this stage, what exceptions would be made to the full IFRS standards. The
Government will have to exercise judgment on what departures to make; this
could be in the area of foreign exchange accounting, loan loss provisioning in
the case of banks, completed contract accounting in the case of real estate
companies, etc. There has to be a solid technical argument for making these
exceptions, and a balance achieved between interest of various stakeholders,
such as the company, investors, national interest, etc.

Gaps in GAAP – Compensated absences (such as annual leave) – Whether long-term or short-term under IAS 19s?

Accounting Standards

Fact pattern :


In India, employees are entitled to fixed annual leave, say
20 days, per completed year of service. The employees have a right to utilise
the leave at any time after entitlement or alternatively seek cash compensation
on resignation/retirement. Based on past experience, employees generally do not
utilise their leave entitlement immediately. Rather they carry forward a
substantial portion of the unutilised leaves (usually representing the maximum
ceiling imposed by the company — this could range from 180-300 days) up to
retirement/resignation. The carry forward leave is then encashed at the time of
retirement/resignation.

The value of leave liability if determined based on
short-term or long-term classification under IAS 19, may provide materially
different provision amounts. This is because long-term classification involves
discounting and use of the PUC actuarial valuation method.


Question:





  •  From IAS 19 perspective, whether compen sated absences
    are short-term or other long-term employee benefits ?


  •  How is the presentation of the liability done under IAS
    1 — whether current or non-current ?



Term


Definition pre-2007 amendment


Definition post-2007 amendment


Short-term
employee benefits


Short-term employee benefits are
employee benefits (other than termination benefits) which fall due
wholly
within twelve months after the end of the period in which the
employees render the related service.


Short-term employee benefits are
employee benefits (other than termination benefits) that are due to be
settled
within twelve months after the end of the period in which
the employees render the related service.


Other long-term employee benefits


Other long-term employee benefits
are employee benefits (other than post-employment benefits and termination
benefits) which do not fall due wholly within twelve months
after the end of the period in which the employees render the related
service.


Other long-term employee benefits
are employee benefits (other than post-employment benefits and termination
benefits) that are not due to be settled within twelve months
after the end of the period in which the employees render the related
service.

Paragraph 8

extracts


Short-term employee benefits include
items such as : short-term compensated absences (such as paid annual leave
and paid sick leave) where the absences are expected to occur within
twelve months after the end of the period in which the employees render the
related employee service.


Short-term employee benefits include
items such as : short-term compensated absences (such as paid annual leave
and paid sick leave) where the compensation for the
absences is due to be settled
within twelve months after the end of
the period in which the employees render the related employee service.

Discussion:

Requirements of IAS 19:

Position before amendment of IAS 19 in 2007:

Before the 2007 annual improvements project, paragraph 7 of
IAS 19 stated that short-term benefits (which include compensated absences) fall
due within twelve months from the end of the reporting period when the employee
has rendered the service. Short-term compensated absences were described in
paragraph 8 as benefits ‘expected to occur’ within twelve months after the end
of the period. Other long-term employee benefits were defined as employee
benefits which are expected to ‘fall due’ more than twelve months from the end
of the period. Therefore, a compensated absence which is due to the employee but
is not expected to occur for more than twelve months, was not an ‘other
long-term employee benefit’ as defined in paragraph 7 of IAS 19, nor was it a
short-term compensated absence as described in paragraph 8 of IAS 19.

Amendment in annual improvement project 2007:

The IASB’s intention was to require measurement based on
expected time of settlement. With a view to resolve the above conflict, the IASB
amended the definition of short-term employee benefits and other long-term
employee benefits to replace the terms ‘fall due’ and ‘expected to occur’ with
‘due to be settled.’ It has made a similar amendment in paragraph 8 as well.

Basis for conclusion paragraphs BC4B and BC4C to the amendment provide as below?:

“BC4B?.?.?.?.?the IASB concluded that the critical factor in distinguishing between long-term and short-term benefits is the timing of the expected settlement. Therefore, the IASB clarified that other long-term benefits are those that are not due to be settled within twelve months after the end of the period in which the employees rendered the service.

BC4C?.?.?.?.?The IASB noted that this distinction between short-term and long-term benefits is consistent with the current/ non-current liability distinction in IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements. However, the fact that for presentation purposes a long-term benefit may be split into current and non-current portions does not change how the entire long-term benefit would be measured.”

While paragraph BC4B indicates that short-term/ long-term classification should be based on expected settlement, reference to IAS 1 in paragraph BC4C means that a leave may be treated as long-term only if the entity has an unconditional right to defer settlement of liability for at least twelve months after the reporting period.

In other words, whilst the IASB’s intention was to measure such liability based on expected time of settlement, the confusing wordings in IAS 19, both pre and post revision, lend itself to two views.

Position in India?:

In Indian GAAP, the requirements of accounting standard are in line with pre-revised IAS 19. The ICAI has taken a view to treat compensated absences as other long-term employee benefits. Consequently, the practice under Indian GAAP is to treat the leave liability as long-term. In the few IFRS accounts published by Indian companies, it appears that leave liability has been provided based on long-term classification. However, that may not necessarily be what other companies would do, as they start adopting IFRS in 2011.

Further points to consider?:

   i) The IASB has also recognised this issue and has tentatively approved a proposal to amend paragraph BC4C in the basis for conclusion to delete the reference to consistency with IAS 1 and add a sentence to paragraph BC4B to clarify that the definitions of short-term employee benefits and other long-term employee benefits are based on the timing of when the entity expects the benefit to become due to be settled. This indicates that IASB preference is to treat accumulated absences as long-term.

    ii) Globally there appears to be a mixed practice and a mixed view on this issue.

Authors view?:

Under IAS 19?:

The long-term classification for measurement of liability under IAS 19 seems more relevant to India given that this is how it has been accounted for so far, this is the intent of the IASB as well as this is based on ICAI guidance. However, given the confus-ing drafting and reference to IAS 1 in the BC, and the use of the words ‘due to be settled’, the short-term view is also sustainable.

Under IAS 1?:

With regards to presentation under IAS 1 as current or non-current, the same would be current liability because the entity does not have an unconditional right to defer settlement of the liability for at least twelve months after the reporting period.

Sum Payable — s. 43B

Controversies

Issue for consideration :


S. 43B of the Income-tax Act
provides that deductions otherwise allowable in respect of certain sums payable
shall be allowed only in the previous year in which such sums are actually paid,
irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was
incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly
employed by him.

All the clauses of S. 43B
(other than clause c) start with the term ‘any sum payable’. The meaning of the
term ‘any sum payable’ has been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions of
High Courts. Some Courts held that no disallowance could take place u/s.43B
where the liability towards the expenditure had arisen but time for payment was
not due. As against this few Courts had held that the deduction for an
expenditure of the specified nature would be allowed only on actual payment of
dues. In order to avoid any further conflict, an amendment has been made vide
the Finance Act, 1989 with retrospective effect form 1-4-1984 by insertion of an
Explanation 2 to provide for the meaning of the said term ‘any sum payable. The
scope of the Explanation however is restricted to clause (a) of S. 43B. Clause
(a) of S. 43B deals with tax, duty, cess or fee and this clause when read with
the Explanation 2 means a sum for which the assessee incurred liability in the
previous year even though such sum might not have been payable within that year
under the relevant law.

The meaning of the term ‘any
sum payable’ has as noted been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions of
High Courts. The issue which has arisen has been whether such term includes
amounts in respect of liability which has accrued but is not due for payment.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the context of clause (a) prior to the
insertion of Explanation 2, held that the term means only such items which have
become due for payment, and not items which have accrued but not become due for
payment and therefore no disallowance prior to the insertion of the Explanation
2 was possible for claims of expenditure which were due but not payable. On the
other hand, the Delhi High Court, in the context of clause (d) relating to
interest on loans or borrowings from financial institutions, has recently held
that the term includes all amounts in respect of which liability has been
incurred, irrespective of whether such amounts are due for payment or not and
accordingly, the claim for allowance of an expenditure would not be allowed
unless it was actually paid.

Srikakollu Subba Rao’s
case :


The issue first came up
before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srikakollu Rao & Co. v.
Union of India,
173 ITR 708.

In this case, the assessee
had challenged the provisions of S. 43B, which had been then recently introduced
with effect from A.Y. 1984-85. Besides challenging the Constitutional validity
of the provisions, the assessee contended that the provisions did not apply to
sales tax. It was further argued that the liability to pay sales tax for the
month of March 1984, which had been disallowed u/s.43B, could not have been so
disallowed.

On behalf of the assessee,
it was pointed out that under the Andhra Pradesh sales tax rules, such tax was
to be paid by the 25th day of the succeeding month. It was urged that where the
statute itself prescribes the date of payment, no exception could be taken,
acting u/s.43B, that the amount was not paid, rendering a justification for its
disallowance. It was urged that S. 43B can have no application to cases where
the statutory liability which was incurred in the accounting year is also not
payable, according to the statute, in the same accounting year.

The Andhra Pradesh High
Court, while accepting these contentions observed that according to it, not only
should the liability to pay the tax be incurred in the accounting year, but the
amount should also be statutory ‘payable’ in the accounting year. According to
the High Court,
S. 43B itself was clear to that extent — it referred to the ‘sum payable’. The
Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that if the Legislature intended, it should
have so provided that any sum for the payment of which liability was incurred by
the assessee would not be allowed unless such sum was actually paid.

Further, keeping in mind the
object for which S. 43B was enacted, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that it
was difficult to subscribe to the view that a routine application of that
provision was called for in cases where the taxes and duties for the payment of
which liability was incurred in the accounting year were not statutorily payable
in that accounting year. In fact, the Andhra Pradesh High Court noted the
subsequent amendment permitting the deduction of taxes and duties paid before
the due date of filing of the income tax return as evidence that taxes and
duties not statutorily payable during the accounting year did not fall to be
disallowed u/s.43B.

The Andhra Pradesh High
Court therefore held that the term ‘sum payable’ meant not only cases where the
liability was incurred, but which were also actually payable within the year.
Accordingly, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that S. 43B did not apply to the
amounts not due for payment within the year.

Triveni Engineering’s case :


The issue again recently
came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Triveni Engineering &
Industries Ltd. v. CIT,
320 ITR 430.

In this case pertaining to
A.Y. 1991-92, the assessee had taken a loan from Industrial Finance Corporation
of India (‘IFCI’). As per the terms of the loan, the repayment of the loan along
with interest thereon was to be made in five yearly instalments payable from
November 1996 to November 2000. The assessee provided for the interest accrued
on the loan till the end of the previous year ended 31st March 1991. The
assessing officer disallowed such interest.

The Commissioner (Appeals)
confirmed the disallowance of interest and further held that the claim of
interest was not allowable in terms of S. 43B(d).

Before the Delhi High Court, the assessee claimed that it was entitled to claim interest because interest accrues daily and it accrued as per the mercantile system of accounting adopted by the assessee with respect to the loan obtained by it from IFCI.

The Delhi High Court observed that merely because the interest was debited in the books of account maintained on a Mercantile basis could not mean that the interest had become due and accrued, because admittedly the interest liability would not become due during the relevant previous year but only in November 1996. According to the Delhi High Court, interest could not be said to have ac-crued to become due and payable in the relevant previous year. The Delhi High Court observed that the stand of the assessee was incongruous because on the one hand it claimed that interest became due and accrued in the relevant previous year, however, in the same breath it admitted that the same would be due and payable only with effect from November 1996. According to the Delhi High Court, the concept of debiting the books maintained on the mercantile basis was on the principle that the payment had become due and payable and, since it had become payable, it was therefore debited in the books of account. According to the Court, admittedly the interest was not due and payable from the relevant previous year.

The Delhi High Court observed that S. 43B directly and categorically disentitled the assessee from claiming benefit of interest deduction with respect to interest due and payable to financial institution till the interest was actually paid. According to the Delhi High Court, S. 43B made it abundantly clear that interest can only be allowed when it was actually paid and not merely because it was due as per the method of accounting adopted by the assessee. The Delhi High Court was of the view that any other interpretation that the interest should be allowed even when not actually paid would defeat the very purpose of S. 43B.

The Delhi High Court felt that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, that where the amount was not due for payment before the end of the relevant previous year such amount, though having accrued, could not be disallowed u/s.43B, could not be accepted by it, as it would negate the intention of existence of S. 43B and would render otiose the expression ‘actually paid’ occurring in S. 43B. In view of the categorical language used in S. 43B(d), the Delhi High Court was of the view that it need not refer to the other subsections and exceptions of S. 43B.

The Delhi High Court therefore upheld the disallowance of interest accrued but not due under the provisions of S. 43B.

Observations:

Subsequent to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srikakollu Subba Rao, Explanation 2 to S. 43B was inserted by the Finance Act 1989 with retrospective effect from 1 April 1984. This explanation, clarifies that ‘any sum payable’ would include sums which were not payable within the year under the relevant law, and therefore to that extent nullifies the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is however relevant to note that the scope of the said explanation, is restricted in it’s application only to clause (a) of S. 43B, i.e., to any sum payable by way of tax, duty, cess or fee. It is consciously not extended to other clauses of S. 43B, though the language used in those clauses is also identical. At the time when Explanation 2 was inserted, S. 43B already contained clauses(b)    and (d) as well, which also used the term ‘any sum payable’. It therefore appears that the conscious intention was to make the expression applicable specifically and only to clause (a) and not to any other clauses of S. 43B. Even when clauses (e) and (f) were inserted in S. 43B, Explanation 2 was not amended to cover these clauses.

The view taken by the Delhi High Court, that allowing the claim for expenditure without actual payment of interest accrued but not due would defeat the very purpose of S. 43B and render it otiose, also does not seem to be justified. When S. 43B was inserted, the purpose for insertion of S. 43B was explained by the Honourable Finance Minister in his budget speech of 1983-84 as under:

“Several cases have come to notice where tax-payers do not discharge their statutory liability such as in respect of excise duty, employer’s contribution to provident fund, Employees State Insurance Scheme, for long periods of time. For the purposes of their income-tax assessments, they nonetheless claim the liability as deduction even as they take resort to legal action, thus depriving the Government of its dues while enjoying the benefit of non-payment. To curb such practices, I propose to provide that irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the taxpayer, a statutory liability will be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable profits only in the year and to the extent it is actually paid.”

A similar reasoning has been given in the explanatory memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 1983. The intention therefore seems to have been to cover cases of non-payment over long periods of time, and not amounts which are not due for payment. S. 43B would continue to apply to such sums which have become due for payment, but have not yet been paid.

Further support for the fact that amounts not due for payment were not intended to be covered by S. 43B can be gauged from the first proviso to S. 43B, which excludes amounts paid before the due date of the filing of the return of income from the applicability of S. 43B.

The better view of the matter therefore seems to be the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, that the meaning of the term ‘any sum payable’ does not include amounts not due for payment, other than taxes, duties, cesses or fees covered by clause (a).

Quantum of Exclusion of Export Profit From Book Profit— MAT

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 U/s.115JB, Minimum
Alternative Tax (MAT) is payable by a company, if the Income-tax payable on the
total income as computed under the Income-tax Act (the Act) in respect of any
assessment year is less than the specified percentage of its book profit. In
such an event, the book profit is deemed to be the total income of the company,
on which the tax is payable at the rate of specified percentage. S. 115JB was
introduced by the Finance Act, 2000 with effect from 1-4-2001 to replace the
earlier version of MAT contained in S. 115JA. Initially, the specified
percentage was 7.5%, which is gradually increased and presently the same is 18%
as per the last amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect from
1-4-2010.

1.2 For the purpose of
determining the MAT liability, every company is required to prepare its profit &
loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of
Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies’ Act, 1956. There are some
other provisions also in this respect with which we are not concerned in this
write-up.

1.3 Explanation 1 to S.
115JB defines the book profit (hereinafter referred to as the said Explanation).
Under the said Explanation, the book profit means the net profit as shown in the
profit & loss account for the relevant previous year, which is to be increased
by certain specified items (upward adjustments) and the profit so increased is
required to be reduced by certain specified items (downward adjustments), if
such items are debited to profit & loss account.

1.4 One of the downward
adjustments is contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation which deals with
the exclusion of export profit eligible for
deduction u/s.80HHC(3)/(3A). The said Clause reads as under :

“the amount of profits
eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC, computed under clause (a) or clause (b) or
clause (c) of Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A), as the case may be of that Section, and
subject to the conditions specified in that Section;”

1.5 S. 80HHC provides for
deduction of export profit while computing the total income as provided in the
Section. Earlier, quantum of such deduction was 100% of the export profit.
However, the Government decided to phase out this deduction with a view to
provide a sunset clause for this incentive available to exporters. For this
purpose, the Finance Bill, 2000 introduced Ss.(1B) with effect from 1-4-2000,
which provided restriction on the extent of deduction available u/s.80HHC(1).
Accordingly, the quantum of deduction u/s.80HHC in respect of export profit
available u/s.80HHC(1) was to be reduced to specified percentage every year,
with effect from A.Y. 2001-02 and was to be completely phased out by the A.Y.
2004-05. In the A.Y. 2001-02, such deduction was to be restricted to 80% of the
deduction of export profit determined u/s.80HHC(1) and for the A.Y. 2002-03 the
same was to be restricted to 70% and so on (this restricted amount of deduction
hereinafter referred to as the reduced export profit). Ss.(1B) also provided
that no deduction shall be allowed u/s.80HHC from the A.Y. 2005-06.

1.6 The Circular No. 794,
dated 9-8-2000 [162 CTR (St.) 9], while explaining the provisions of the Finance
Bill 2000, in para 43.5, clarifying the impact of new MAT provisions, pointed
out that the export profit u/s.10A/10B/80HHC/80HHD, etc. are kept outside the
purview of these provisions, as these are being phased out. In the context of S.
115JB similar clarification was also found in the Memorandum explaining the
provisions of the Finance Bill, 2000, as well as in the speech of the Finance
Minister.

1.7 In view of the
provisions for phasing out deduction available u/s.80HHC and the provision for
excluding export profit from the book profit made in Clause (iv) of the said
Explanation for the purpose of levy of MAT, the issue was under debate as to
whether the entire amount of export profit should be excluded from the book
profit or only reduced export profit should be excluded in view of the
provisions contained in S. 80HHC(1B). To clarify the issue, if the export profit
determined u/s.80HHC(3) is Rs.100, then for the purpose of computation of book
profit for the A.Y. 2001-02, the amount to be excluded by way of export profit
should be Rs.100 (i.e., entire export profit) or Rs.80 (i.e.,
reduced export profit). This issue was decided against the assessee by the
Bombay High Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd.

1.8 Recently, the Apex Court
had on an occasion to consider the issue referred to in para 1.7 above in the
same case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. and the issue is now finally settled. Though, S.
80HHC is effectively no more operative from A.Y. 2005-06, in a large number of
pending cases, this issue is relevant and therefore, it is thought fit to
consider the same in this column.


CIT
v.
Ajanta Pharma Ltd., 318 ITR 252 (Bom)


2.1 The issue referred to in para 1.7 above, came up before the Bombay High Court in the above case in the context of A.Y. 2001-02. The brief facts in the above case were that the assessee company was assessed u/s.115JB for the A.Y. 2001-02. While computing the book profit, the assessee claimed that the entire export profit computed u/s.80HHC(3) should be deducted and not the reduced export profit as provided u/s.80HHC(1B). The Assessing Officer restricted the deduction to 80%, being the amount of reduced export profit. The First Appellant Authority as well as the Appellate Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and took the view that for such purposes, the entire export profit is eligible for deduction. Accordingly, at the instance of Revenue, the issue referred to in para 1.7 above came up for consideration before the Bombay High Court.

2.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that while computing book profit u/s. 115JB,?only reduced export profit as provided u/s. 80HHC(1B) should be excluded from the book profit and not the amount of entire export profit. As per the Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2000, the reason to introduce S. 115JB was to simplify the MAT provisions. Considering the language of Clause (iv) of the said Explanation, the export profit eligible for deduction should be equal to the amount of actual deduction allowed u/s.80HHC while computing the total income of the assessee under the normal provisions of the Act. If this is not done, an absurdity will be created to the extent that while full deduction is not allowed in respect of export profit u/s.80HHC, for the purpose of S. 115JB, the full amount of export profit will be excluded. This was never the intention of the Legislature while interpreting the provisions of law. An interpretation that results in an absurd situation is to be avoided. It was alternatively contended that even if one takes a view that eligible export profit is referable to only S. 80HHC(3) without applying the restriction contained in Ss.(1B), one has to bear in mind the expression ‘subject to the conditions specified in that Section’ contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation (hereinafter referred to as the said conditions). Accordingly, the restriction contained in Ss.(1B), being a condition for allowing deduction u/s.80HHC, has to be considered while determining the quantum of export profit to be excluded from the book profit u/s.115JB. It was also contended that the Finance Minister’s speech and the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill cannot by itself be used to interpret literal meaning of Act.

2.3 On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee-company, various contentions were raised, which, inter alia, include : Considering the expression, ‘eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC’ used in the said Clause (iv), the entire export profit requires to be excluded from the book profit that being the amount eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC. The provision for exclusion of export profit contained in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation is to ensure that the export profits are not subjected to MAT. In the past also, in different provisions made in the Act for the levy of MAT, the export profits have been kept outside the purview of MAT. Therefore, the policy adopted by the Legislature of encouraging/boosting export was considered to be of such importance that the Legislature wished to forego taxes thereon, including MAT. Referring to the dictionary meaning of the expression ‘eligible’, it was contended that it would be beyond any doubt that the word ‘eligible’ has to be read to mean type or class or nature of profit (i.e., qualitative description of profits) and can never take within its ambit, a particular proportion or quantum thereof. The amount quantified for deduction u/s.80HHC(1B) is only a subclass or part of the type/class or nature of profit eligible and hence, the same cannot be considered for this purpose. In short, it was pointed out that Clause of the said Explanation refers to entire export profit and not reduced export profit. It was submitted that the quantum set out u/s.80HHC(1B), is not a condition and the same only provides the extent of deduction available u/s.80HHC(1). This is also supported by the language of S. 80HHC(1), which specifically allows ‘a deduction to the extent of profits referred to in Ss.(1B)’. It was also contended that if two views are possible of interpretation of the said Clause (iv), then the view in favour of the taxpayer ought to be adopted.

2.4 To decide the issue on hand, at the outset, the Court first noted the following settled position with regard to interpretation of a taxing statute [pages 258/259]:

“With the above background, let us now consider the provisions. What the Legislature ought to have done or what language or words or expression ought to have been used, is not for the Courts to consider.?The duty of the Court, in the event, where literal interpretation would defeat the intent of the Legislature or lead to an absurdity or the like would be to ascertain the Parliamentary intent, by applying the rules of statutory interpretation as followed in our jurisdiction. A word of caution, it is only in the event when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurdity or defeat the object or intent of the legislation and not otherwise. The principle of all fiscal legislation is that if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however, great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the State, seeking to recover tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however, apparently within the spirit of the law the case might?otherwise?appear?to?be.?The?taxing?statutes cannot be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The Court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed, it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency [CST v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1047; (1961) 12 STC 182].”

2.5 The Court, then, proceeded to decide the issue and referred to the provisions of S. 80HHC, as well as S. 115JB, as applicable to the case under consideration. The Court also referred to the earlier version of MAT contained u/s.115J as well as u/s.115JA. After tracing the history of the provisions relating to MAT, the Court stated as under (page 261)?:

“Insofar as MAT companies are concerned, that reduction of export profit while computing the book profits was not available when S. 115J was introduced from April 1, 1988. The benefit was given subsequently from April 1, 1989. Similarly the reduction was not available in the case of S. 115JA which was introduced with effect from April 1, 1997. The benefit was extended only from April 1, 1998. This intent of the Legislature must be considered while interpreting the provisions. The other aspect would be that if Ss.(1B) is not read while computing the book profits and which contains the sunset clause it would mean that even after April 1, 2005, MAT companies could claim deduction of export profits, while computing book profits which would be an absurdity.”

2.6 Proceeding further, referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. P. Varghese (131 ITR 597), the Court noted that in that judgment it was observed that it is well-recognised rule of construction that the statutory provisions must be so construed if possible that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. If the situation arises where the construction suggested by the Revenue would lead to wholly unreasonable and unjust result, which could never have been intended by the Legislature, then it must be avoided. The Court also noted that this judgment also supports the rule of interpretation that the speech made by the mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the Bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and the purposes for which the legislation was enacted. Therefore, the Finance Minister’s speech can be relied upon by the Court for the purposes of ascertaining what was the reason for introducing that clause. The Court also referred to various judgments of the Apex Court dealing with principles of statutory interpretation and in particular, dealing with principles of interpretation of taxing statute.

2.7 After referring to the judicial pronouncements with regard to principles of statutory interpretation, the Court stated as under (Page 266):

“The principles elucidated earlier of statutory construction can now be considered for interpreting the provisions of S. 115JB vis-à-vis S. 80HHC. Does a literal reading of S. 80HHC read with S. 115JB(2), Explanation 1(iv), lead to an absurdity and/or does not make clear Parliamentary intent considering the law as it stood before S. 115JB was introduced. In S. 115J and S. 115JA the expression used were ‘profits eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC.’ S. 115JB also uses the expression ‘profits eligible for deduction.’ There really can be no difficulty in understanding what this means. Only those profits which are eligible and computed in terms of Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A) and quantified in terms of Ss.(1B). The computation whether under Ss.(3) or Ss.(3A) are for the purpose of Ss.(1) or Ss.(1A). S. 80HHC(1) permits a deduction to the extent of profits referred to in Ss.(1B). The only question is whether the expression in clause(a), (b) or (c) of Ss.(3) consequent on introduction of Ss.(1B) to S. 80HHC will have a meaning different from the meaning than what was originally understood, considering clause (iv) to Explanation 1 of S. 115JB.”

2.8 Referring to the argument made on behalf of the assessee that for the above purposes, provisions contained in Ss.(1B) should be ignored, the Court stated as under (Page 267):

“…….If the construction sought to be given by the counsel for the assessee is accepted it would make Ss.(1B) irrelevant for the purpose of S. 115JB. Ss.(1B) provides for deduction in terms set out therein. Ss.(3) sets out the method of computation of profits. The computation of profits is, therefore, for the purpose of working out the deduction of profits available u/s. 80HHC(1B). Earlier it was in terms of Ss.(1). Now, S. 80HHC(1) in term refers to Ss.(1B) . All the provisions are interrelated and cannot be read de hors one another. If Ss.(1B) is not read in Ss.(1), then the expression ‘no deduction shall be allowed in respect of the assessment beginning on the first day of April, 2005, and any subsequent year’, shall be rendered otiose.”

2.9 The Court also considered the argument made on behalf of the assessee that the provisions of Ss.(1B) is not a condition, but in the nature of computation and stated that even if we accept this proposition and proceed on that finding, nevertheless it is impossible of reading S. 80HHC(3) or (3A) independent of S. 80HHC(1B). The Court also noted that basically the argument of the assessee is based on the Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 2000. However, at the same time, in the Notes on Clauses, it is clearly stated that the profits will be reduced by certain adjustments which are eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC. The profits eligible for deduction are Reduced export profits in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). According to the Court, there is nothing in the Finance Minister’s speech of February 29, 2000 to hold otherwise. Noting the argument made on behalf of the assessee that if two views are possible, the view favourable to the taxpayer should be adopted, the Court stated that the question is whether there are two views possible in this case. According to the Court, no two views are possible, but the only view is that the MAT companies are entitled to the same deduction of export profits u/s.80HHC, as any other company involved in export in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). Once that be the case, this argument is also devoid to merit.

2.10 The Court finally concluded as under (page 268):

“……To our mind, the language is clear. The literal meaning does not in any way defeat the object of the Section and/or lead to any absurdity. The object of S. 115JB is to allow even MAT companies to avail of the benefit of deduction. If we consider the assessee’s arguments that MAT companies are entitled to full deduction of export profits, it will lead to anomaly, whereby the companies which are paying tax on total income under the normal rules, for them the deduction of export profits will be lesser than what MAT companies are entitled to. Is this a possible view? When S. 115J was originally introduced, MAT companies were not entitled to deduction of profits u/s.80HHC while working out the book profits…….”

“……Can it now be argued that MAT compa-nies considering S. 115JB(2), Explanation 1(iv) are entitled to be placed in a better position than the other companies entitled to the export deduction under 80HHC, though earlier they constituted one class? No rule of construction nor the language of the S. 80HHC read with S. 115JB, in our opinion, will permit such construction. If such construction is not possible, then both the classes of companies will be entitled to the same deduction. This would contemplate that both would be entitled to deductions of profits in terms of S. 80HHC(1B). So read, it would be a harmonious construction…..”

Ajanta Pharma Limited v. CIT, 327 ITR 305 (SC):

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Bombay High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court at the instance of the assessee. To consider the issue, the Court referred to the facts of the case and noted that the following question of law is raised in the Civil Appeal:

“whether for determining the ‘book profits’ in terms of S. 115JB, the net profits as shown in the profit and loss account have to be reduced by the amount of profits eligible for deduction u/s.80HHC or by the amount of deduction u/s. 80HHC?”

3.2 To decide the question, the Court noted the provisions of S. 115JB and S. 80HHC as applicable to the case of the assessee. After referring to relevant provisions, the Court also noted and analysed in brief, the earlier provisions relating to MAT contained in S. 115JA. The Court, then, stated that from these provisions it is clear that S. 115JA is a self-contained code and will apply not-withstanding any other provisions in the Act. The Court then stated that S. 115JB, though structured differently, stood inserted to provide for payment of advance tax by MAT Companies. S. 115JB is the successor to S. 115JA. In essence, it is the same as S. 115JA with certain differences. Accordingly, S. 115JB continues to remain a self-contained code.

3.3 Referring to the object for which S. 80HHC was enacted, the Court noted that the Section provides for tax incentive to exporters. At one point of time, S. 80HHC(1) laid down that an amount equal to an amount of deduction claimed should be debited to profit & loss ac-count and credited to reserve account to be utilised for business purposes. Ss.(1) of 80HHC is concerned with eligibility, whereas Ss.(3) is concerned5 with computation of quantum of deduction. Prior to amendment made by the Finance Act, 2000, the exporters were allowed 100% deduction in respect of the export profit. Thereafter, the same has been reduced in a phasewise manner, as provided in Ss.(1B). The Court also noted that the deduction is available in respect of eligible goods and the same is not available to all assessable entities. Referring to S. 80AB, the Court noted that computation of deduction is geared to an amount of income, whereas the quantification of deduction u/s.80HHC(3) is geared to export turnover and not to the income. On the other hand, S. 115JB refers to levy of MAT on deemed income. This shows that the S. 80HHC and S. 115JB operate in different spheres.

3.4 Dealing with S. 80HHC, the Court further stated that S. 80HHC(1) refers to ‘eligibility’, whereas S. 80HHC(3) refers to computation of tax incentive. According to the Court, S. 80HHC(1B) deals with ‘extent of deduction’ and not with the eligibility.

3.5 The Court then referred to the argument raised on behalf of the Revenue, with regard to applicability of other conditions of S. 80HHC incorporated in Clause (iv) of the said Explanation and noted that based on this, the Revenue contends that the quantum of export profit for this purpose should be subject to Ss.(1B) of 80HHC. The Court then pointed out that according to the Revenue, both ‘eligibility’ as well as ‘deductibility’ of the profit have got to be considered together while applying the said Clause (iv). Rejecting this contention, the Court stated that if the dichotomy between ‘eligibility’ of profit and ‘deductibility’ of profit is not kept in mind, S. 115JB will cease to be a self-contained code. According to the Court, for the purposes of S. 80HHC(3)/(3A), the conditions are only that the relief should be certified by a chartered accountant. Such condition is not a qualifying condition, but it is a compliance condition. Therefore, one cannot rely upon the last sentence of the said Clause (iv) to obliterate the difference between ‘eligibility’ and ‘deductibility’ of profits as contended on behalf of the Revenue.

3.6 Comparing the relevant provisions of S. 115JB and S. 80HHC, the Court concluded as under (page 310):

“As earlier stated, S. 115JB is a self-contained code. It taxes deemed income. It begins with a non obstante clause. S. 115JB refers to computation of ‘book profits’ which have to be computed by making upward and downward adjustments. In the downward adjustment, vide clause (iv) it seeks to exclude ‘eligible’ profits derived from exports. On the other hand, u/s. 80HHC(1B) it is extent of deduction which matters. The word ‘thereof’ in each of the items u/s.80HHC(1B) is important. Thus, an assessee earns Rs.100 crores then for the A.Y. 2001-02, the extent of deduction is 80% thereof and so on which means that the principle of proportionality is brought in to scale down the tax incentive in phased manner. However, for the purposes of computation of book profits which computation is different from normal computation under the 1961 Act/computation under Chapter VI -A. We need to keep in mind the upward and downward adjustments and if so read, it becomes clear that clause (iv) covers full export profits of 100% as ‘eligible profits’ and that the same cannot be reduced to 80% by relying on S. 80HHC(1B). Thus, for computing ‘book profits’ the downward adjustment, in the above example, would be Rs.100 crores and not Rs. *90 crores. The idea being to exclude ‘export profits’ from computation of book profits u/s.115JB which imposes MAT on deemed income. The above reasoning also gets support from the Memorandum of the Explanation to the Finance Bill, 2000.”

* In the given example, this should be Rs.80 crores.

Conclusion:

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is settled that for the purpose of excluding the export profit from the book profit while applying the MAT provisions, the entire export profit will be excluded and not the reduced export profit. Primarily, the decision of the Court seems to have been rested on the finding that both provisions (S. 80HHC & S. 115JB) operate in different spheres, S. 115JB is a self-contained code, S. 80HHC(1) deals with the ‘eligibility’, whereas S. 80HHC(3) deals with computation of quantum of deduction, S. 80HHC(1B) deals with the extent of deduction and not with the eligibility, there is dif-ference between the ‘eligibility’ and ‘deductibility’ of profits and the view also gets support from the Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2000.

4.2 Interestingly, in the above judgment, the arguments raised on behalf of the assessee, as well as the view expressed by the Bombay High Court on such argument and the reasons given by the High Court for reaching the conclusion are neither referred to nor dealt with. It appears that perhaps the same arguments must have been raised by the assessee before the Apex Court, which were raised before the High Court.

4.3 On a careful reading of both the judgments, one may notice that the Apex Court has taken a view that while determining the amount of export profit for exclusion from the book profit, provisions of S. 80HHC(1B) are not to be taken in the account, whereas the Bombay High Court had taken exactly contrary view. One of the reasons given by the High Court for taking such a view was that if, while computing the book profit, Ss.1(B) is not to be read with Ss.(1) of S. 80HHC, then there would an absurdity as in such an event, MAT companies would claim deduction of export profit even after 1-4-2005 (refer para 2.5 and para 2.8 above). This reason is also to be treated as impliedly overruled as otherwise, an interesting academic issue may arise as to whether on account of the view taken by the Apex Court, whether MAT companies can attempt to claim the benefit of Clause (iv) of the said Explanation even after A.Y. 2004-05.

4.4 After giving judgment in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd., the Bombay High Court in the case of Al-Kabeer Exports Ltd. (233 CTR 443) has also taken a view that the export profit for exclusion from the book profit under the said Clause (iv) has to be computed strictly in accordance with the provisions of S. 80HHC and not on the basis of adjusted Book Profit. For this, the High Court had also placed reliance on it’s judgment in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. referred to in para 2 above. Prior to this, the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Syncom Formulations (I). Ltd. [106 ITD 193 (Mum.)] had taken a view that for such purpose, the determination of export profit should be based on the adjusted book profit and not on the basis of regular provision of the Act as applicable to the computation of profits and gains of business. The judgment of the High Court in the case of Ajanta Pharma Ltd. also gave an impression that it has overruled the decision of Special Bench in the case of Syncom Formulations (I) Ltd. (supra). Now, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court reversing the judg-ment of the Bombay High Court, even the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Al-Kabeer Exports Ltd. may not be regarded as good law and in that context, the view taken by the Special Bench of ITAT in the case of Syncom Farmulations (I) Ltd. (supra) gets support from the judgment of the Apex Court.

Exemption for Educational Institution

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration :


1.1 S. 10(23C) of the Income-tax Act contains 3 clauses for
granting exemption to universities or other educational institutions — (iiiab),
(iiiad) and (vi). The common requirement for exemption under all these three
clauses is that the university or other educational institution should exist
solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

1.2 There has been a debate as to the meaning of the term
‘not for purposes of profit’. The tax authorities have sought to interpret this
requirement as meaning that an Institute which earns a surplus would not be
eligible for the benefit of exemption u/s.10(23C).

1.3 While the Uttarakhand High Court has supported this view
of the tax authorities by holding that in a case of surplus, the educational
institution is not eligible for the exemption, the Bombay High Court and the
Punjab and Haryana High Courts have taken a contrary view that the institution
cannot be regarded as existing for purposes of profit simply because it has a
surplus, and would continue to be eligible for the exemption.

2. Queens’ Educational Society’s case :


2.1 The issue came up before the Uttarakhand High Court in
the case of CIT v. Queens Educational Society, 319 ITR 160.

2.2 In this case involving various educational societies
registered under the Societies Registration Act and imparting education to
children, the assessees had claimed exemption u/s.10(23C)(iiiad), on the ground
that they existed solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of
profit.

2.3 The Assessing Officer rejected the claim for exemption.
The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the benefit of exemption, and the Tribunal
upheld the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).

2.4 The Uttarakhand High Court disapproved the observations
of the Tribunal as hypothetical when the Tribunal noted that there was hardly
any surplus left after investment into fixed assets, that the assessees were
engaged in imparting education and had to maintain a teaching and non-teaching
staff and to pay for the salaries and other expenses, that it became necessary
to charge fees from students for meeting all these expenses, that the charging
of fee was incidental to the prominent objective of the trust of imparting
education, that the school was initially being run in a rented building and the
surplus enabled the Society to acquire its own property, computers, library
books, sports equipment, etc. for the benefit of the students, and that the
members of the Society had not utilised any part of the surplus for their own
benefit. The High Court also noted the Tribunal’s observations that profit was
only incidental to the main object of spreading education, and that if there was
no surplus out of the difference between the receipts and outgoings, the trust
would not be able to achieve its objects.

2.5 The Uttarakhand High Court observed that the reasons
recorded by the Tribunal were hypothetical, and that the Tribunal failed to
appreciate that the profit percentage was 30% and 27% of the total receipts.
According to the Uttarakhand High Court, the law was well settled that is the
profit was proved by an educational Society, then that would be income of the
society as a surplus amount remained in the account books of the Society after
meeting all the expenses incurred towards imparting education. The Uttarakhand
High Court relied on observations of the Supreme Court in the case of
Aditanar Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT,
224 ITR 310 for this
proposition.

2.6 The Uttarakhand High Court observed further that the
objects clause contained other noble and pious objects and the Society had done
nothing to achieve those objects except pushing the main object of providing
education and earning profit. According to the Uttarakhand High Court, with the
profit which it had earned, the Society had strengthened or enhanced its
capacity to earn more rather than to undertake any other activities to fulfil
other noble objects for the cause of poor and needy people or advancement of
religious purposes. The High Court observed that the investment in fixed assets
might have been connected with the imparting of education, but the same had been
constructed and/or purchased out of income from imparting education with a view
to expand the institution and to earn more income.

2.7 The Uttarakhand High Court therefore held that the
Society was not eligible for exemption, as it was existing for purposes of
profit, as evidenced by the surplus earned by the Society.

3. Vanita Vishram Trust’s case :


3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Mumbai High
Court in the case of Vanita Vishram Trust v. CCIT, (unreported — Writ
Petition Nos. 366 & 367 of 2010, dated 6th May 2010 — available on
www.itatonline.org).

3.2 In this case, the assessee was a public charitable trust
registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. It had been running primary
and secondary schools and colleges in Mumbai since 1929 and in Surat since 1940.
Its main object was education of women. Its memorandum provided that no portion
of the income or property of the Association would be paid directly or
indirectly by way of dividend, bonus or otherwise to the members of the
Association, and that the surplus if any, was not to be paid or distributed
amongst the members of the Association, but to be transferred to another
institution or institutions having similar objects. Till A.Y. 2004-05, the trust
was allowed exemption u/s.10(22) and u/s.10(23C)(vi).

3.3 The assessee filed applications for continuation of
approval u/s.10(23C)(vi) with the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax (CCIT). The
CCIT held that the trust had other objects, such as construction of ashrams for
Gujarati Hindu women, and was therefore not existing solely for education. He
also noted that since the trust had a surplus in excess of 12% of the receipts
from its activities, which was invested in making additions to assets and
increasing bank deposits, it was not entitled to the exemption. He therefore
rejected the applications for approval.

3.4 Before the Bombay High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that for nearly 80 years, the assessee had been carrying on only the activity of conducting schools and colleges and had not carried on any other activity. It was also argued that the incidental existence of a surplus generated from the activity of conducting schools and colleges would not detract from the character of the assessee as existing solely for educational purposes and not for profit, and that the entire surplus was utilised only for the purpose of education, there being a specific provision in the Memorandum under which no part of the profits could be distributed. It was further argued that the existence of a surplus did not disentitle an institution to the grant of approval, and that the purpose of the surplus was to build up corpus for the capital enhancement of the educational institutions conducted by the trust, which was not a commercial purpose, but a purpose directly proximate to the main object of conducting educational institutions.

3.5 On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the threshold requirement of S. 10(23C)(vi) was the existence of an educational institution or university, and its existence solely for educational purposes and not for profit.

3.6 Noting the fact that the trust had carried on only the running of schools and colleges for the last 80 years, the Bombay High Court noted that even in the past, the tax authorities had held the trust to be existing solely for educational purposes. The Bombay High Court noted that in a reference made to a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court u/s.256(1) on the issue of whether the same assessee (as was now before it) was entitled to exemption u/s.10(22) on interest earned on surplus funds of the school run by it, the Division Bench had observed that merely because a certain surplus arose from the operations of the trust, it could not be held that the institution was run for the purpose of profit, so long as no person or individual was entitled to any portion of the profit and the profit was utilised for the purpose of promoting the objects of the institution.

3.7 In that case, the Division Bench had relied on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution (supra), in holding that as a principle of law, if after meeting the expenditure, a surplus resulted incidentally from an activity law-fully carried on by the educational institution, the institution would not cease to be one which was existing solely for educational purposes since the object was not to make profit. The Bombay High Court noted the findings of the earlier Division Bench in the case of the same assessee holding that the assessee existed only for educational purposes which consisted of running educational institutions, and not for earning profits.

3.8 The Bombay High Court also pointed out the provisions of the third proviso to S. 10(23C), which permitted an accumulation not exceeding 15% for a period of not more than 5 years. According to the Bombay High Court, this provision established that the Parliament did not regard the accumulation of income by a university or other educational institution as a disabling factor, so long as the purpose of accumulation was the application of the income wholly and exclusively to the objects for which the institution had been established. The Parliament had however placed a limit on the amount and period of such accumulation.

3.9 Referring to the decision of the Uttarakhand High Court in Queens’ Educational Society’s case, the Bombay High Court observed that that case seemed to be distinguishable, as the assessee in that case was construed to be one which existed with the object of enhancing the income and of earning profits as opposed to the provision of education. However, with reference to the observations of the Uttarakhand High Court that though it was entitled to pursue other noble and pious objects, the assessee had done nothing to achieve them and had only pursued the main object of providing education and earning profit, the Bombay High Court observed that the requirement that the institution must exist solely for educational purposes would militate against an institution pursuing other objects. The Bombay High Court therefore disagreed with the views expressed by the Uttarakhand High Court that the benefit of the exemption should be denied on the ground that the assessee had only pursued its main object of providing education and had not pursued the other objects for which the trust was constituted.

As observed by the Bombay High Court, if the assessee were to pursue other objects, it would clearly violate the requirement of existing solely for educational purposes.

3.10 The Bombay High Court therefore directed the CCIT to grant approval to the assessee u/s. 10(23C)(vi) as an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.

3.11 A similar view was taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Pinegrove International Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 188 Taxman 402, where the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that merely because profits have resulted from activity of imparting education would not result in change of character of institution that it existed solely for educational purposes.

4.Observations:

4.1 Since all the three High Courts in the above cases have referred to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Aditanar Educational Institution (supra ) in support of the view taken by each of them, and relied on the same observations, it is necessary to understand the ratio of that decision and those observations of the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case.

4.2 In Aditanar’s case (supra ), the Supreme Court was considering a case of a Society which was running various schools, and had received donations. The tax authorities sought to tax the donations, on the ground that the Society was not an educational institution, but merely a financing body. While holding that the Society itself was also an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes, the Supreme Court observed as under:

“We may state that the language of S. 10(22) of the Act is plain and clear and the availability of the exemption should be evaluated each year to find out whether the institution existed during the relevant year solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. After meeting the expenditure, if any surplus results incidentally from the activity lawfully carried on by the educational institution, it will not cease to be one existing solely for educational purposes since the object is not one to make profit. The decisive or acid test is whether on an overall view of the matter, the object is to make profit. In evaluating or appraising the above, one should also bear in mind the distinction/difference between the corpus, the objects and the powers of the concerned entity. The following decisions are relevant in this context: Governing Body of Rangaraya Medical College v. ITO, (1979) 117 ITR 284 (AP) and Secondary Board of Education v. ITO, (1972) 86 ITR 408 (Orissa).”

4.3 The Supreme Court therefore impliedly approved the ratio of these two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Orissa High Court. In Rangaraya Medical College’s case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court had held that merely because certain surplus arose from the society’s operations, it could not be held that the institution was run for purpose of profit, so long as no person or individual was entitled to any portion of the said profit and the said profit was utilised for the purpose and for the promotion of the objects of the institution.

4.4 In Secondary Board of Education’s case, the Orissa High Court held:

“One of the sources of income of the Board is profits from compilation, publication, printing and sale of textbooks. The profits so earned enter into the Board fund. The income and expenditure of the Board is controlled and the entire expenditure is to be directed towards development and expansion of educational purposes. Even if there is some surplus, it remains as a part of the sinking fund to be devoted to the cause of education as and when necessary. This being the objective and there being various ways of control of the income and expenditure, the Board of Secondary Education cannot be said to be existing for purposes of profit. It exists solely for purposes of education.”

4.5 It therefore appears that so long as the main object is provision of education, surplus arising from any of the activities would not disentitle the claim for exemption, so long as the surplus can be utilised only for education. This view is also supported by the permitted accumulation.

4.6 Further, the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Pinegrove’s case, has rightly observed that there is a definite purpose behind allowing setting up of educational institutions by private sector, including trusts/societies. Various educational colleges could not have been established for want of funds, and the Government which lacked funds thought that the private sector could assist in this regard. The Court observed that in every educational institution, there is bound to be a profit to support growth of the educational infrastructure and activities. Interestingly, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that in computing the surplus, capital expenditure has also to be deducted, as that is also an expenditure on the objects of the trust.

4.7 As rightly observed by the Bombay High Court in Vanita Vishram’s case, where S. 10(23C) itself now permits an accumulation of income up to 15% of the income of the trust, a trust cannot be penalised by treating it as existing for purposes of profit merely because it earns and accumulates such a surplus. In any case, today it is restricted from accumulating a surplus exceeding a particular level and beyond a particular period. As observed by the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case, there is a clear distinction between the objects, which is that of education, and the powers, which is to spend on objects or accumulate surplus.

4.8 The Uttarakhand High Court seems to have misinterpreted the observations of the Supreme Court in Aditanar’s case, regarding the corpus, objects and powers, to mean that the assessee should pursue other objects as well. As rightly pointed out by the Bombay High Court, if this interpretation were adopted and the assessee pursued other non- educational objects, it may in fact result in total denial of the benefit meant only for educational institutions.

4.8 The better view therefore is that of the Mumbai and Punjab & Haryana High Courts, that an educational trust cannot be held to be existing for purposes of profit and not for education merely because it earns a surplus from its activities.

Whether amendment relating to payment of P.F., etc. by ‘due date’ of furnishing return is retrospective ? — S. 43B

Introduction :

    1.1 With a view to prevent assessees from claiming deduction in respect of statutory liabilities, etc. even when they are disputed and not paid to appropriate authority, S. 43B was introduced w.e.f. A.Y. 1984-85. The provision, effectively, provides that deduction in respect of items specified therein will be allowed only on the basis of actual payment. Though originally the provision was introduced to cover statutory liabilities within its ambit, subsequently, the scope thereof is widened from time to time to include within its net bonus and commission payment to employees as well as interest payable to financial institutions, etc. Lastly, to nullify the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (245 ITR 428), even the employers’ liability in respect of provision for leave salary has also been brought within its ambit. Unfortunately, at the initial state, the provisions are introduced in the Income-tax Act (the Act) for a specific purpose (many times justifiable) and then, the scope thereof gets widened to unrelated items even if the judiciary explains the correct effects of the provisions originally introduced. S. 43B is a classic example of this nature.

    1.2 Large number of litigations were found on the effect of provision of S. 43B and finally, an attempt was made to carry out some rationalisation in the provision by the Finance Act, 1987, which introduced the first ‘proviso’ to S.43B w.e.f. A.Y. 1988-89 (hereinafter referred to as the said ‘proviso’). This is inserted with a view to provide deduction of statutory dues, etc. at the end of the previous year if, they are actually paid by the assessee on or before the ‘due date’ applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income u/s.139(1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘due date’) in respect of previous year in which the liability to pay such dues was incurred with certain further conditions with which we are not concerned in this write-up. Accordingly, with this rationalisation, such amount of outstanding at the year end and paid by the relevant ‘due date’ became eligible for deduction under the said ‘proviso’, which was made effective from 1-4-1988. However, this ‘proviso’, at that time, did not apply to items covered (contribution to P.F., etc.) under clause (b) of S. 43B, under which the conditions for allowing deductions were most stringent. In the context of this ‘proviso’, the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. (224 ITR 677) took the view that though the ‘proviso’ is introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1-4-1988, the same will apply retrospectively and the benefit thereof will be available even in respect of the assessment year prior to A.Y. 1988-89. The effect of this judgment was considered in this column in the May, 1997 issue of the Journal.

    1.3 Presently, S. 43B covers various items listed in clauses (a) to (f). Till the amendment was made by the Finance Act, 2003 (w.e.f. 1-4-2004), the said ‘proviso’ was applicable to all the clauses of S. 43B except clause (b) of S. 43B. Contribution to employees welfare fund (such as P.F., etc.) was governed by 2nd proviso to S. 43B, under which the payment thereof was required to be made by the due date under the relevant law, rule, etc. in the manner provided in the said 2nd proviso.

    1.4 S. 43B(b) covers the employers’ contribution to any Provident Fund (P.F.) or Superannuation Fund or Gratuity Fund or any other fund for the welfare of the employees (hereinafter referred to as contribution to employees welfare fund). As stated in Para 1.3 above, this was earlier not covered by the said ‘proviso’ and accordingly, payment covered by S. 43B (except the contribution to employees welfare funds) were eligible for deduction if the payment in respect thereof is made by the relevant ‘due date’. The Finance Act, 2003 omitted the said 2nd proviso to S. 43B and amended the said first ‘proviso’ w.e.f. 1-4-2004 and made the first ‘proviso’ also applicable to clause (b) dealing with contribution to employees welfare funds (hereinafter this amendment is referred to as Amendment of 2003). Accordingly, all the items covered in S. 43B [i.e., clauses (a) to (f)] are eligible for deduction if amount is paid by the relevant ‘due date’ even if the same is outstanding at end of the relevant year. We are concerned with the effect of this Amendment of 2003 in this write-up.

    1.5 The issue was under debate as to whether the amendment of 2003 will apply to the assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 as the amendment was expressly made effective from 1-4-2004. After this amendment, various Benches of the Tribunal started taking a view that the amendment is clarificatory in nature and is applicable retrospectively even to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05. For this, reliance was being placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors (P) Ltd. referred to in Para 1.2 above. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of Vinay Cement Ltd. (213 CTR 268) dismissed the SLP filed by the Department against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Ltd. (284 ITR 619) in a case dealing with the assessment year prior to A.Y. 2004-05, by stating that the assessee will be entitled to claim the benefit in S. 43B for that period particularly in view of the fact that he has made the contribution to P.F. before filing of the return. Many of the High Courts also took similar view that the amendment of 2003 is clarificatory in nature and is applicable to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 [Ref. : 297 ITR 320 (Del.), 313 ITR 144 (Mad.), 313 ITR 161 (Del.), 213 CTR 269 (Kar.) etc.]. However, the Bombay High Court in the case of Pamwi Tissues Limited (313 ITR 137) took a view that the said amendment of 2003 is applicable only from the A.Y. 2004-05. This was followed by the Bombay High Court in other cases also. Therefore, the debate continued and the assessees within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court were suffering the disallowance for the prior years in such cases.

    1.6 Recently, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the issue referred to in Para 1.5 above in the case of Alom Extrusions Ltd. and the issue is now finally resolved. Though the law is amended from the A.Y. 2004-05, in respect of the prior years, many matters are pending and are under litigation (especially in the State of Maharashtra). Therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

CIT v. Pawmi Tissues Limited, 313 ITR 137 (Bom.)

2.1 The issue referred to in Para 1.5 above came up before the Bombay High Court in the above case at the instance of the Revenue in the context of the A.Y. 1990-91. The following question was raised before the Court (Page 138) :
 
“The substantial question of law which arises in the present appeal is regarding the correct inter-pretation of S. 43B, S. 2(24)(x) read with S. 36(1)(va) and as to the claim of deductions as claimed by the assessee in respect of the PF, EPF and ESIC contributions especially in the facts and circumstances of the case and in law.”

2.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended that insofar as the provident fund dues are concerned, the amendment is made applicable from the A.Y. 2004-05. In the earlier years, the employers’ contribution to P.F. if not paid within the due date under the relevant law was not eligible for deduction. For this, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Godavari (Mannar) Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. (298 ITR 149).

2.3 On behalf of the assessee, attention was drawn to the judgment of Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Limited (supra) to contend that while considering the same issues for the A.Y. 1992-93, the issue was decided in favour of the assessee following the earlier judgments of the same High Court in other cases. It was further pointed out that the Revenue preferred Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court in the case reported as Vinay Cement Limited and the SLP was dismissed. Consequently, the said judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the case of George Williamson (Assam) Limited got approved. Relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Employees Welfare Association (4 SCC 187), it was pointed out that if the Supreme Court has given reasons for dismissing the SLP, that still attracts Article 14 of the Constitution and consequently, it would be a binding precedent.

2.4 After considering the contentions of both the sides, the High Court decided the issue against the assessee and allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue with the following observations [Page 139] :

“In our opinion, the dismissal of the special leave petition as held in CIT v. Vinay Cement Ltd., (2009) 313 ITR (St.) 1 cannot be said to be the law decided. In State of Orissa v. M. D. Illyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275, the Supreme Court has held that a decision is a precedent on its own facts and that for a judgment to be a precedent it must contain the three basis postulates. A finding of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of fact is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the individual effect of the above.”

2.5 In view of the above judgment of the Bombay High Court, the view also prevailed that the said Amendment of 2003 is prospective and applicable only from the A.Y. 2004-05.

CIT v. Alom Extrusions Limited, 2009 TIOL 125 SC IT:

3.1 The issue referred to in Para 1.5 above came up for consideration before the Apex Court in a batch of civil appeals with the lead matter in the case of Alom Extrusion Ltd. For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted the first and the second provisos prior to the amendment of 2003 and the said ‘proviso’ (the first proviso) after such amendment.

3.2 For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court considered the scheme of the Act and the historical background and the object of introduction of the provisions of S. 43B. The Court also referred to the earlier amendments made in 1988 with introduction of the first and second provisos. The Court also noted further amendment made in 1989 in the second proviso dealing with the items covered in S. 43B(b) (i.e., contribution to employees welfare funds). After considering the same, the Court stated that it becomes clear that prior to the amendment of 2003, the employer was entitled to deduction only if the contribution stands credited on or before the due date given in the Provident Fund Act on account of second proviso to S. 43B. This created further difficulties and as a result of representations made by the industry, the amendment of 2003 was carried out which deleted the second proviso and also made first proviso applicable to contribution to employees welfare funds referred to in S. 43B(b).

3.3 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia, contended that even between 1988 and 2004, the Parliament had maintained a clear dichotomy be-tween the tax duty, etc. on one hand and contribution to employees welfare funds on the other. This dichotomy continued up to 1st April, 2004 and hence, the Parliament consciously kept that dichotomy alive up to that date by making the amendment of 2003 effective from 1-4-2004. Accordingly, the amendment of 2003 should be read as amendatory and not as curative.
 
3.4 Disagreeing with the argument of the Department, the Court stated that there is no merit in the appeals filed by the Department for various reasons such as : originally S. 43B was introduced from 1-4-1984 with certain objectives and the conditions thereof were relaxed in 1988 in the context of tax duty and other items [except for contribution to employees welfare funds covered in S. 43B(b)] to remove the hardships. This relaxation appears to have not been made applicable to contribution to employees welfare funds for the reason that the employers should not sit on the collected contributions and deprive the workmen of the rightful benefits under Social Welfare Legislations by delaying payment of contribution to welfare funds. The Court then further observed as under :

“However, as stated above, the second proviso resulted in implementation problems, which have been mentioned hereinabove, and which resulted in the enactment of Finance Act, 2003, deleting the second proviso and bringing about uniformity in the first proviso by equating tax, duty, cess and fee with contributions to welfare funds. Once this uniformity is brought about in the first proviso, then, in our view, the Finance Act, 2003, which is made applicable by the Parliament only with effect from 1st April, 2004, would become curative in nature, hence, it would apply retrospectively with effect from 1st April, 1988.”

3.5 The Court then referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Allied Motors [P] Ltd. (supra) in which the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f. 1-4-1988 (referred to in Para 1.2 above) was held as retrospective in nature. After considering the said judgment , the Court finally decided the issue in favour of the assessees and held as under :

“Moreover, the judgment in Allied Motors (P) Limited (supra) is delivered by a Bench of three learned Judges, which is binding on us. Accordingly, we hold that the Finance Act, 2003, will operate retrospectively with effect from 1st April, 1988 [when the first proviso stood inserted].”

3.6 To support its conclusion, the Court also drew support from another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of J. H. Gotla (156 ITR 323) with the following observations :

“Lastly, we may point out the hardship and the invidious discrimination which would be caused to the assessee(s) if the contention of the Department is to be accepted that the Finance Act, 2003, to the above extent, operated prospectively. Take an example — in the present case, the respondents have deposited the contributions with the R.P.F.C. after 31st March (end of accounting year) but before filing of the Returns under the Income-tax Act and the date of payment falls after the due date under the Employees’ Provident Fund Act, they will be denied deduction for all times. In view of the second proviso, which stood on the statute book at the relevant time, each of such assessee(s) would not be entitled to deduction u/ s.43-B of the Act for all times. They would lose the benefit of deduction even in the year of ac-count in which they pay the contributions to the welfare funds, whereas a defaulter, who fails to pay the contribution to the welfare fund right up to 1st April, 2004, and who pays the contribution after 1st April, 2004, would get the benefit of deduction u/s.43-B of the Act. In our view, therefore, Finance Act, 2003, to the extent indicated above, should be read as retrospective. It would, therefore, operate from 1st April, 1988, when the first proviso was introduced. It is true that the Parliament has explicitly stated that the Finance Act, 2003, will operate with effect from 1st April, 2004. However, the matter before us involves the principle of construction to be placed on the provisions of Finance Act, 2003.”

Conclusion :

4.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, the amendment of 2003 referred to hereinbefore is applicable to assessment years prior to A.Y. 2004-05 also and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Pawmi Tissues Ltd. (supra) is no longer a good law.

4.2 In many cases, especially within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court, the assessees have suffered disallowances and the matters are pending. In such cases, the assessees will be entitled to get the benefits of such deductions.

Partition — Co-owner — Possession of vendee — Transfer of Property Act, S. 44 & Partition Act, S. 4.

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5 Partition — Co-owner —
Possession of vendee — Transfer of Property Act, S. 44 & Partition Act, S. 4.

[Ram & Ors. v. Ram Kishan
& Ors.,
AIR 2010 Allahabad 125.]

The plaintiffs and
defendants were co-owners of house. The defendants sold their share in the house
in favour of defendant No. 1, namely, Shri Ram Kishan who took possession
forcibly. Therefore
the plaintiff filed the suit for cancellation of the sale and prayed for
mandatory injunction against the defendant No. 1.

The Allahabad High Court
observed that when the stranger to the family acquires an interest in an
immovable property or dwelling house of an undivided family, he has the right to
seek partition. S. 4 of the Partition Act gives a right to a member of the
family, who has not transferred his share, to purchase the transferee’s share,
when the transferee files a suit for partition.

These are two valuable
rights of the members of the undivided family. Particularly when the right to
joint possession is denied to a transferee in order to prevent a transferee who
is an outsider from forcing his way into a dwelling house in which the other
members of the transferor’s family had a right to live. Without there being any
physical formal partition of an undivided immovable property, a co-sharer cannot
put his vendee in possession. It was a settled law that the purchaser of a co-parcener’s
undivided interest in the joint family property was not entitled to the
possession of what he had purchased. He can only claim a right to sue for
partition of the property and seek allotment of that which on partition might be
found to fall to the share of the co-parcener whose share he had purchased. It
was therefore obvious that even if the sale deed whereby the undivided share has
been alienated was legally permitted to be executed, the transferee cannot force
his way into the dwelling house of the co-owners until and unless he files a
suit for partition and obtains an order from the Court or makes a settlement
with the
co-owners who have not transferred their shares.

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Firm — Registration — Reconstitution of firm — No separate registration necessary — S. 60 and S. 63 of Partnership Act.

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3 Firm — Registration —
Reconstitution of firm — No separate registration necessary — S. 60 and S. 63 of
Partnership Act.


[Noble Kuries v.
Sebastian Antony & Ors.,
AIR 2010 Kerala 99.]

Whether a fresh registration
of the partnership firm is required consequent to its reconstitution to maintain
a suit in view of S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act and whether
non-intimation of reconstitution of the partnership firm to the Registrar of
Firms would affect maintainability of the suit.

On account of some of the
partners retiring and another person coming in, the partnership firm was
reconstituted on 1-4-1986. S. 59 of the Act deals with registration of the
partnership. There is no provision in the Act which states that when there is
reconstitution of a firm which is already registered, a further registration is
required after such reconstitution. What is required is only intimation to the
Registrar of Firms about the reconstitution/change as provided u/s.60 to u/s.63
of the Act. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Bharat Sarvodaya
Mills v. Mohatta Bros.,
(AIR 1969 Gujarat 178) held that no separate
registration is necessary where there is reconstitution of a continuing firm. In
this case the firm had obtained registration from the Registrar of Firms. Hence
after reconstitution of that firm it was not necessary to have a fresh
registration of the reconstituted firm.

Then the question is what
are the consequences of not intimating the Registrar of Firms about
reconstitution even if it is assumed so, on the maintainability of the suits. S.
60 to S. 63 of the Act require any change in the constitution of a registered
partnership firm to be intimated to the Registrar of Firms. But neither the Act,
nor the Rules provide any time limit for that.

Thus, there could be no time
limit for intimation of the reconstitution or other change in a registered
partnership to the Registrar of Firms, though intimation has to be given within
a reasonable time.

Editor’s Note: The
Partnership Act 1932 as applicable in Maharashtra provides for time limit for
intimating changes in the constitution and other particulars of a registered
partnership firm to the Registrar of Firms.

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Limitation — Acknowledgement of debt — On each repayment of loan limitation get extended — Limitation Act, S. 18, S. 19.

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4 Limitation —
Acknowledgement of debt — On each repayment of loan limitation get extended —
Limitation Act, S. 18, S. 19.

[Dena Bank, Durg v. Smt.
Chameli Bai and Ors.,
AIR 2010 Chhattisgarh 49]

The Bank filed a civil suit
for recovery of loan advance to the defendant for purchase of tractor and
trolley. The loan was repayable in half-yearly instalments in seven years with
interest The Bank pleaded that the defendant kept depositing various amounts and
thus on each repayment of loan, the limitation period got extended by three
years.

The Court held that the
period of limitation for suits relating to accounts for the balance due on a
mutual, open and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands
between the parties, is three years and the time from which period begins to run
is to be computed from the close of the year, in which the last item admitted or
proved is entered in the account; such year is to be computed as in the account
as per Article 1 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.

In the present case also,
the account between the parties was at all times an open and current one. From
the transactions reflecting from the statement of account, it was clear that it
was mutual during the relevant period. As per S. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1891,
the plaintiff-Bank has submitted statement of account duly certified by the Bank
officer and the same is a prima facie evidence of the existence of such
entries, and the same may be treated as sufficient evidence to hold that the
defendant No. 1 deposited the sums towards repayment of loan on various
occasions. Thus, by virtue of S. 19 read with aforesaid Article 1 of the
schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, fresh extended period of limitation of
three years is to be computed from the close of the year in which the last item
is admitted or proved as entered in the account.

The Suit was not barred by
limitation.

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Appeal by Department — Measures to reduce litigation.

New Page 1

2 Appeal by Department —
Measures to reduce litigation.

[Commr. of Central Excise
v. Techno Economic Services P. Ltd.,
(2010) 255 ELT 526 (Bom.)]

While dismissing an appeal
filed by the Revenue wherein the amount in dispute was Rs.1,21,219 the Court
noted that number of appeals are being filed before the Court; wherein the
customs duty and/or central excise duty involved was negligible. It was noticed
that most of the times the duty impact ranges between

`2 to 3 lakh; wherein,
normally, senior advocates appear on behalf of the Revenue assisted by two
junior advocates. In spite of engaging multiple advocates, adjournments were
sought. The matters were allowed to remain pending in the Court for a
substantially long period of time. With the result, they come up for hearing on
more than two or three occasions. Adjournments were always taken and granted by
the Court considering the substantial cause shown for the adjournment. All this
results in payment of heavy professional charges to the advocates appearing for
the Department. Sometimes the expenses incurred by the Revenue were
disproportionate to the stakes involved in the appeal and/or petition filed by
the Department.

In the aforesaid scenario,
the Court took the judicial notice of the fact that the Centre and the States
had acquired the ‘government is the largest litigant’ tag, accounting for 70% of
the 3 crore cases — over 2.1 crore pending in various Courts.

The Court, observed that the
Central Government had formulated a National Litigation Policy (NLP) to shed the
tag ‘Largest Litigant’. Thus, keeping in view the policy of the Central
Government, it invited attention of the Chairman of the Central Board of Excise
and Revenue (‘the Board’) to consider the necessity of taking policy decision
not to file cases; wherein the duty/tax impact was negligible. The similar
policy was already in vogue so far as the Income-tax Department was concerned.
The Central Board of Direct Taxes vide its Circular dated 27th March, 2000
followed by other Circulars dated 24th October, 2005 and 15th May, 2008 had
taken a policy decision not to file appeals or references wherein the tax effect
is less than the amount prescribed in the instructions issued from time to time,
so as to reduce litigation before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The
said policy decision taken by the CBDT had reduced the volume of litigation,
with the result, their officers were in a position to concentrate on the cases
involving heavy stakes.

It has, therefore, become
necessary for the Board to impress upon the Departmental heads not to go for
appeals and litigation wherein tax or duty impact was not substantial, otherwise
it results in harassment to the assessees and creates unnecessary burden on the
infrastructure of the Revenue Department. The ‘let the Court decide’ attitude
needs to be given go-bye.

The Chairman of the Central
Board of Excise and Revenue shall consider the necessity of issuing a Circular,
on the lines of the Circulars issued by the CBDT, so as to reduce litigations
arising out of indirect tax legislations.

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Appeal — Merger of order — Once the Appellate Authority disposes a matter, the order passed by the subordinate authority gets merged in such order.

New Page 1

1 Appeal — Merger of order —
Once the Appellate Authority disposes a matter, the order passed by the
subordinate authority gets merged in such order.


[Box and Carton India P.
Ltd. v. Commissioner of C. Ex. Delhi,
2010 (255) ELT 423 (Trib. Del.)]

The applicant had filed a
rectification application before CESTAT alleging various mistakes apparent on
the record in the order and pleaded that the order needs to be rectified.
Against the said order of the CESTAT the applicant had also approached the
Supreme Court and the appeal was dismissed by the Court. The applicant in the
rectification proceedings submitted that the issue raised in the rectification
application was not raised in the appeal before the Supreme Court and therefore
the principle of merger cannot be applied.

The CESTAT held that it was
a settled doctrine of merger that once the Appellate Authority is seized with
the matter, and particularly in relation to the merits of the case, whatever
order is passed in such proceedings by the Appellate Authority, becomes a final
order and becomes an executable order. In other words, once the proceedings in
appeal are disposed off by an order by the Appellate Authority, the order passed
by the subordinate authority, gets merged in such order.

Once the party takes the
step to take the matter at appellate stage on conclusion of the proceedings at
original stage and the Appellate Court, considering the matter on merits,
disposes the same either by way of reversal, modification or confirmation, the
operative order would be that of the Appellate Authority. It would all depend
upon exercise of powers by the Appellate Authority. Once the Appellate Authority
finds no case for interference in the order passed by the lower authority and
dismisses the appeal, the order of the original authority would get merged in
the order of the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the order which would be
executable will be that of the Appellate Authority.

The Tribunal considering the
law laid down by the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Kunhayammed v.
State of Kerala,
(2000) 6 SCC 359 held, that an order passed by the Apex
Court in its appellate jurisdiction either by reversing, modifying or confirming
the order of the lower court or lower authority would result in merger of order
of the lower Court or the lower authority in the order of the Apex Court,
irrespective of the fact as to whether such order of the Apex Court is a
speaking order or a non-speaking order.

It was further held that
once the applicant had approached the Supreme Court against such order and
having tried to get it set aside, it was not permissible for the applicant
thereafter to approach the Tribunal under the guise of rectification of the
order and to seek de novo hearing of the appeal. What in essence the
applicant was seeking in the matter was not the correction of the order, but
reassessment of the matter on the ground that the Tribunal failed to take note
of the fact that the documents which the Commissioner was expecting the parts to
produce were already in possession thereof. Undoubtedly, this could have been
the ground for the appellants before the Apex Court in the appeal field by the
appellants.

In any case, it is settled
law that the party is not entitled to raise the points in piecemeal by way of
different proceedings in that regard. If the party does not raise a point at an
appropriate stage and the matter stands concluded by final order, then the party
would be debarred from raising such point thereafter by reopening the matter.
That is principle embedded in Explanation 4 of S. 11 of the CPC. Considering the
same, it is not permissible to allow the applicant to raise issue under the
guise of filing rectification of application.

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Service Concession Arrangements — IFRIC 12/SIC-29

Article

Introduction :


Service concession arrangements apply to public-private
partnerships for execution of infrastructure projects for i.e., roads, bridges,
tunnels, etc. This interpretation will impact infrastructure companies in India
once they converge their financial statements from April 1, 2011. This
interpretation deals with accounting treatment to be followed by operator. This
article will deal with the concept enshrined in this interpretation as well as
accounting and disclosure norms to be followed by the operator. Considering
increasing thrust given by the Government for Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP)
for execution of infrastructure projects, this
interpretation will govern accounting by operators in future.

Service concession arrangements typically involve two
parties, grantor (government or public sector entity) and operator (private
sector entity). The operator constructs, upgrades, operates and maintains
infrastructure for a specified period of time. The operator is paid for its
services over the period of arrangement. Such arrangements are also known as
Build-Operate- Transfer (BOT) projects, a rehabilitate-operate-transfer or a
public-private concession arrangement.

This interpretation applies only if the following two
conditions are satisfied as provided in para 5 of this interpretation :

  • The grantor controls or regulates what services the
    operator must provide with the infrastructure, to whom it must provide them
    and at what price.

and

  • The grantor controls — through ownership, beneficial
    entitlement or otherwise — any significant residual interest in the
    infrastructure at the end of the term of the arrangement.

Accounting treatment :


  • Revenue recognition :



The operator shall account for revenue and costs relating
to construction services and upgrade services in accordance with IAS 11 :
Construction Contracts. The operator shall account for operation services in
accordance with IAS 18 : Revenue Recognition. The contract revenue is measured
at the fair value of the consideration receivable.

  • Operator’s rights over the infrastructure :



The arrangement does not convey the right to control the
use of public infrastructure and therefore infrastructure cannot be recognised
as plant property and equipment as per IAS 16. The operator has only access to
operate the infrastructure in accordance with the terms of contract on behalf
of the grantor. The assets provided by the grantor if form part of the
consideration payable by the grantor, then the same will be recognised as
plant property and equipment, measured at fair value at initial recognition.
In this case, the operator shall also recognise a liability in respect of
unfulfilled obligations it has assumed in exchange for assets.





  • Consideration
    receivable — Intangible asset or financial asset ?



This is one of the important accounting issues which has to
be dealt with by the operator for consideration received or receivable for the
performance of construction or upgrade services. This consideration received
or receivable shall have to be recognised at fair value. However, the
consideration may be rights to :

3 Financial Asset

3 Intangible Asset

Financial Asset :

The operator shall recognise a financial asset when it has an
unconditional right to receive cash or other financial asset from or at the
discretion of the grantor. The operator is said to have an unconditional right
when the grantor guarantees determinable amount or meets shortfall, if any,
between amounts received from users of public service and guaranteed
determinable amount even if the payment is contingent on the operator, ensuring
that the infrastructure meets specified quality or efficiency requirements (Para
16 of IFRIC 12).

The operator shall classify the financial asset either as a
loan or receivable, an available-for-sale financial asset or fair value through
profit and loss account (Para 24 and 25 of IFRIC 12). Generally, the entity
would classify the financial asset as a loan or receivable considering lesser
complexity involved and measure the same at amortised cost using effective
interest method in the profit or loss account.

Intangible Asset :

The operator shall recognise an intangible asset to the
extent it receives a right (a licence) to charge the users of public service.
The assets need to be recorded as per fair value of consideration receivable in
accordance with IAS 38 : Intangible Assets. The operator has a licence to charge
users of the public service and therefore meets the definition of an intangible
asset. In this case, the revenue is conditional and bears demand risk, unlike a
financial asset where operator is insulated from demand risk and guaranteed a
sum of money (Para 17 of IFRIC 12).

In case the operator is paid for construction services partly
by a financial asset and partly by an intangible asset, it will be necessary to
account for each separately and recognise the consideration received/receivable
at fair value. This situation may arise if the government partly finances the
project cost.




  • Resurfacing
    obligations :
    The operator’s resurfacing obligation arises as a consequence of use of the road during the operating phase. It is recognised and measured in accordance with IAS 37 : Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets i.e., at the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the end of the reporting period (Para IE 19 of IFRIC 12).


    •     Borrowing costs :


    The operator generally requires huge capital commitment and has recourse to debt funds for execution of infrastructure projects. IAS 23 : Borrowing Costs permits borrowing costs to be capitalised as part of cost of qualifying asset to the extent they are directly attributable to its acquisition, construction or production until the asset is ready for intended use or sale. The intangible asset meets the definition of qualifying asset as licence to charge public for use of infrastructure takes a substantial time for construction and up-gradation. A financial asset does not meet the definition of qualifying asset and hence the borrowing costs are not capitalised and the same are expensed as and when incurred (Para 22 of IFRIC 12).

    •     Amortisation of Intangible asset :


    The operator requires to account for an intangible asset in accordance with IAS 38 : Intangible Assets. IAS 38 provides for number of amortisation methods i.e., straight-line method, the diminishing balance method and the unit of production method. The method selected should reflect expected pattern of consumption of the expected future economic benefits embodied in the asset and the same should be applied consistently from period to period, unless there is a change in the expected pattern of consumption of those economic benefits.

        Disclosure norms :

    SIC-29 governs disclosure norms for operator companies and specifies appropriate disclosure that needs to be provided in the notes.

    All aspects of a service concession arrangement shall be considered in determining the appropriate disclosures in the notes. An operator and a grantor shall disclose the following in each period (Para 6 and 6A of SIC-29) :

    •     a description of the arrangement;
    •     significant terms of the arrangement that may affect the amount, timing and certainty of future cash flows (e.g., the period of the concession, re-pricing dates and the basis upon which re-pricing or re-negotiation is determined);


    •     the nature and extent (e.g., quantity, time period or amount as appropriate) of :


    •     rights to use specified assets;


    •     obligations to provide or rights to expect provision of services;


    •     obligations to acquire or build items of property, plant and equipment;


    •     obligations to deliver or rights to receive specified assets at the end of the concession period;


    •     renewal and termination options; and


    •     other rights and obligations (e.g., major overhauls);


    1.    changes in the arrangement occurring during the period; and

     2.   how the service arrangement has been classified.

     3.   An operator shall disclose the amount of revenue and profits or losses recognised in the period on exchanging construction services for a financial asset or an intangible asset.

    Relevant extract from published accounts : Illustrative Notes to Account from Consolidated Financials of Noida Toll Bridge Company Limited (NT-BCL) where they applied the interpretation of IFRIC 12 : Service Concession Arrangements for the year ended 2009. The Company has prepared their finan-cial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

    Service Concession Arrangement entered into between X & Co, NTBCL and Grantor :
    A Concession Agreement entered into between the NTBCL, X & Co Limited and the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, Government of Uttar Pradesh, conferred the right to the Company to implement the project and recover the project cost, through the levy of fees/toll revenue, with a designated rate of return over a period of 30 years concession period commencing from 30th December 1998 i.e., the date of Certificate of Commencement, or till such time the designated return is recovered, whichever is earlier. The Concession Agreement further provides that in the event the project cost with the designated return is not recovered at the end of 30 years, the concession period shall be extended by 2 years at a time until the project cost and the return thereon is recovered. The rate of return is computed with reference to the project costs, cost of major repairs and the shortfall in the recovery of the designated returns in earlier years. As per the certification by the independent auditors, the total recoverable amount comprises project cost and 20% designated return. NTBCL shall transfer the Project Assets to the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority in accordance with the Concession Agreement upon the full recovery of the total cost of project and the returns thereon.

    Revenue recognition — Operation services :                                                           Revenue is recognised to the extent that it is probable that the economic benefits will flow to the Group and the revenue can be reliably measured. Revenue comprises :

    Toll revenue :
    Toll revenue is recognised in respect of toll collect-ed at the Delhi-Noida Toll Bridge and the attributed share revenue from prepaid cards.

    Licence fee :
    Licence fee income from advertisement hoardings and office premises is recognised on an accruals basis in accordance with contractual obligations.

    Service charges :
    Service charges are recognised on accrual basis in respect of revenue recovered for the various business auxiliary services provided to the parties.

    Recognition of Concession Agreement as an Intangible Asset :

    Basis of accounting for the service concession :
    The Group has determined that IFRIC 12 Service Concession Arrangement is applicable to the Concession Agreement and hence has applied it in accounting for the concession.

    The directors have determined that the intangible asset model in IFRIC 12 Service Concession Arrangements is applicable to the concession. In particular, they note that users pay tolls directly so the grantor does not have the primary responsibility to pay the operator.

    In order to facilitate the recovery of the project cost and 20% designated returns through collection of toll and development rights, the grantor has guaranteed extensions to the terms of the Concession, initially set at 30 years.

    The Group has received an ‘in-principle’ approval for development rights from the grantor. However the Group has not yet entered into any agreement with the grantor which would constitute an assurance from the grantor to facilitate the recovery of shortfalls. Management recognises that the development right agreement when executed will give rise to intangible assets in their own right.

    Disclosures for Service Concession Arrangement as prescribed under SIC-29 Service Concession Ar-rangements — Disclosure have been incorporated into the financial statements.

    Significant assumptions in accounting for the intangible asset :

    On completion of construction of the Delhi -Noida Toll Bridge (6th February 2001), the rights under the Concession Agreement have been recognised as an intangible asset, received in exchange for the construction services provided. Construction costs include besides others, expenditure incurred and provisions for outstanding capital commitments on the Ashram Flyover, which was significantly completed on the date of recognition of the in-tangible asset. This section of the bridge was commissioned on 30th October 2001. The intangible asset received has been measured at fair value of the construction services as of Rs. 5,338,586,459 as on the date of commissioning. The Group has recognised a profit of Rs.1,548,095,840, which is the difference between the cost of construction services rendered (the cost of the project asset of Rs.3,790,490,619) and the fair value of the construction services.

    The Directors have concluded that as operators of the bridge, they have provided construction services to NOIDA, the grantor, in exchange for an intangible asset, i.e., the right to collect toll from road-users during the Concession year.

    Accordingly, the Group has measured the intangible asset at cost, i.e., the fair value of the construction services as at 6th February 2001, the date of completion of construction and commissioning of the asset.

    Key assumptions used in establishing the cost of the intangible asset are as follows :

    •     Construction of the DND Flyway commenced in 1998 and was completed on 6th February 2001. The exchange of construction services for an intangible asset is regarded as a trans-action that generates revenue and costs, which have been recognised by reference to the stage of completion of the construction. Contract revenue has been measured at the fair value of the consideration receivable. Hence in each of the years of construction, construction revenue has been calculated at cost plus 17.5% and the corresponding construction profit has been recognised through retained earnings.


    •     Management has capitalised qualifying finance expenses until the completion of construction.
    •     The intangible asset is assumed to be received only upon completion of construction. Until then, management has recognised a receivable for its construction services. The fair value of construction services have been estimated to be equal to the construction costs plus margin of 17.5% and the effective interest rate of 13.5% for lending by the grantor. The construction industry margins range between 15-20% and management has determined that a margin of 17.5% is both conservative and appropriate. The effective interest rate used on the receivable during construction is the normal interest rate which grantor would have paid on delayed payments.


    •     The intangible asset has been recognised on the completion of construction, i.e., 6th February 2001.
    •     The management considers that they will not be able to earn the designated return under the Concession Agreement over 30 years. The Company has an assured extension of the concession as required to achieve project cost and designated returns. An independent engineer had earlier certified the useful life of the Delhi- Noida Toll Bridge as 70 years. The intangible asset was being amortised over the same years on straight-line basis. Based on the independent professional experts’ advice obtained during the current year, the Company has reestimated the life of the bridge to be of 100 years. The method of amortization of the intangible asset has also been changed during the current year from straight-line to unit of usage method.

    Maintenance obligations :
    Contractual obligations to maintain, replace or restore the infrastructure (principally resurfacing costs and major repairs and unscheduled maintenance which are required to maintain the Bridge in operational condition except for any enhancement element) are recognised and measured at the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date. The provision is discounted to its present value at a pre-tax rate that reflects current market assessments of the time value of money and the risks specific to the liability. Development rights will be accounted for as and when exercised.

    Conclusion :
    Infrastructure companies were following different practices as regards accounting for service concession arrangements. However this interpretation will bring out uniformity in accounting practices to be followed by infrastructure companies. The key issues to be addressed are determination of fair value of consideration for construction services rendered, which requires proper valuation and income tax consequences.

Concealment Penalty — Whether Disallowed Claim For Expenditure Amounts to “Furnishing Inaccurate ‘Particulars’ ”

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 Under the Income-tax Act (the Act), to safeguard the
interest of the Revenue against non-disclosure of correct income in the return
of income furnished by the assessee, various provisions are made including the
provisions for imposition of penalty for concealment of income. A penalty
u/s.271(1) c) of the Act (‘Concealment Penalty’) can be imposed in cases where
the assessee has concealed the particulars of his income (‘Concealed Income’) or
furnished inaccurate particulars of his income (‘Furnishing Inaccurate
Particulars of Income’). The action of imposition of penalty should clearly
bring out whether the penalty is imposed on account of concealed income or for
furnishing inaccurate particulars of income.

1.2 Explanation 1 to S. 271(1) provides legal fiction
whereunder any addition or disallowance is deemed to represent the concealed
income for the purpose of levy of concealment penalty once the condition
provided in the Explanation are satisfied (hereinafter this Explanation 1 is
regarded to as the said Explanation). The said Explanation shifts the burden of
proof from the Department to the assessee as regards the concealed income. In
substance, the said Explanation provides for a deeming fiction whereunder any
addition or disallowance made to the total income is regarded as concealed
income for the purpose of levy of concealment penalty under the circumstances
mentioned therein. The said
Explanation has undergone change from time to time and the same was last
substituted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 and the same was
subsequently amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1986 w.e.f. 10-9-1986. It may also be noted that it is a
settled law that the issue of concealment of income for the purpose of imposing
concealment penalty is to be decided on the basis of the law in force at the
time of furnishing return of income.

1.3 In the context of the levy of concealment penalty,
various issues are under debate. By and large, in practice, once any claim of
expenditure made in the return of income is disallowed [or any addition is made
to the returned income], the assessing authority initiates proceedings for
imposition of concealment penalty. In most such cases, once such
disallowance/addition is confirmed by the First Appellate Authority, generally
the assessing authority imposes concealment penalty, though it is a settled
position in law that mere disallowance of expenditure or addition to income by
itself does not give rise to concealed income.

1.4 In the context of imposition of concealment penalty,
various issues are under debate. One such issue is : whether disallowance of
claim of expenditure treating the same as incorrect amounts to furnishing
inaccurate particulars of income, attracting provisions relating to concealment
penalty.

1.5 Earlier, the Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff
(291 ITR 519), inter alia, held that the order imposing such penalty is
quasi-criminal in nature and the concealment of income and furnishing inaccurate
particulars of Income, both, referred to deliberate act on the part of the
assessee. In substance, the Court expressed the view that mens rea is essential
ingredient for invoking provisions relating to concealment penalty. The Apex
Court, in this case, also made various other important observations with regard
to provisions relating to concealment penalty.

1.6 Subsequently, another Division Bench of the Apex Court,
in the context of similar provisions relating to the levy of penalty under
Central Excise Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder (the Excise Act), had to
consider some of the views expressed in the above referred judgment of Dilip N.
Shroff (Dilip N. Shroff’s case). At the instance of this Division Bench of the
Apex Court, the relevant issue was referred to a Larger Bench (consisting of
three Judges) and that is how the Larger Bench in the case of Dharmendra
Textiles Processors (306 ITR 277) considered the effect of the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra). Primarily, the latter
judgment was concerned with the levy of penalty under the Excise Act. The Larger
Bench in this case (Dharmendra Textile’s case), did not agree with the view
taken in Dilip N. Shroff’s case. We have analysed this judgment in this column
in the December, 2008 issue of the Journal. In our write-up, we have expressed
the view that the judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case overrules the judgment
of Dilip N. Shroff’s case only to the extent it holds that deliberate act on the
part of the assessee will have to be proved for the levy of concealment penalty
(i.e., mens rea is essential ingredient of the provisions) and the order
imposing such penalty is quasi-criminal in nature, but the other observations
made in Dilip N. Shroff’s case in the context of concealment penalty
u/s.271(1)(c) should continue to hold good, as the Apex Court in the case of
Dharmendra Textile’s case was neither specifically concerned with those
observations, nor with the provisions of S. 271(1) (and the Explanation thereto)
of the Act.

1.6.1 Unfortunately, subsequent to the judgment in the case
of Dharmendra Textile’s case, by and large in most cases, the Department appears
to have taken a view that once the disallowance/addition is confirmed at the
Appellate level and the final total income is higher than the returned income,
provisions relating to levy of concealment penalty get attracted.

1.6.2 In various decisions of the Tribunal, the effect of the
judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case came up for consideration under different
circumstances and on different set of facts. In most such cases, by and large,
the different Benches of the Tribunal have not accepted the extreme stand taken
by the Department on the effect of the judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case and
in those decisions, the effect of the said judgment is explained under different
circumstances [Ref. Gem Granite — 18 DTR 358 (Chennai), Mrs. Najma Kanchwalla —
24 DTR 369 (Mumbai), Glorious Reality (P) Ltd. — 29 SOT 292 (Mumbai), Veejay
Service Station — 22 DTR 527 (Delhi), V.I.P. Industries Ltd. — 21 DTR 153
(Mumbai), etc.]. Apart from this, the Delhi High Court in the case of Escorts
Finance Ltd. (ITA No. 1005 of 2008) also explained the effect of Dharmendra
Textile’s case. After considering the said judgment of the Apex Court, the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Haryana Warehousing Corporation
also took the view that no concealment penalty can be levied where the assessee
has made a bona fide claim of exemption by making proper and adequate disclosure
in the return of income even if the claim of such exemption is not accepted.
Even the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills considered
the judgment in the case of Dharmaneda Textile and did not agree with the
extreme view of the Department, though in the context of the provisions under
the Excise Act.

1.6.3 A very detailed and well-reasoned decision explaining the effect of the judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case is found in the case of Kanbay Software India [P] Ltd. — 22 DTR 481 (Pune). In this decision, various aspects of concealment penalty have been considered in detail.

1.7 Notwithstanding the above, the controversy with regard to the effect of Dharmendra Textile’s case continued. In spite of various decisions of the Apex Court and the High Courts explaining the provisions relating to concealment penalty, by and large, the Department is invoking these provisions in most cases where any disallowance of expenditure/claim of deduction or addition to income is confirmed at the Appellate level. In this scenario, the judgment of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile’s case gave a fillip to the existing practice, adding fuel to the fire, and the problem got aggravated, notwithstanding the subsequent development on the issue referred to hereinbefore. The Department continued to hold a view that the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case is no longer a good law. On the other hand, the view held in the profession, by and large, was that the Larger Bench in the Dharmendra Textile’s case overrules the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case only to the extent it holds that mens rea is essential ingredient of the provisions relating to concealment penalty and the provisions are quasicriminal in na-ture and except for this, the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case is still a good law.

1.8 Recently, the Apex Court in the case of Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. had an occasion to consider the issue referred to in para 1.7 above and hence the judgment of the Apex Court in that case becomes relevant and important in relation to the matters concerning concealment penalty. Therefore, it is thought fit to consider the same in this column.

CIT v. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd.
— 322 ITR 158 (SC) :

2.1 The above case relates to A.Y. 2001-02. The brief facts of the said case were : The assessee had furnished return of income showing a loss of Rs.26,54,554. The assessee had claimed deduction of expenditure by way of interest (Rs.28,77,242) on borrowing for the purpose of purchase of shares of IPL by way of its business policy. The assessee did not earn any income from those shares and the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the claim of the said interest expenditure by invoking provision of S. 14A. Accordingly, the income was assessed at Rs.2,22,688.

2.2 In response of show-cause notice regarding concealment penalty, the assessee, inter alia, contended that all the details given in the return of income were correct and it was neither a case of concealment of income, nor a case of furnishing any inaccurate particulars of such income. It was also pointed out that the disallowance is made in the as-sessment solely on account of different view taken on the same set of facts and hence, at the most, the same could be termed as difference of opinion and not a case of concealed income or a case of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income as contemplated in provisions relating to concealment penalty. It was also pointed out that the assessee is an invest-ment company and in the earlier A.Y. (i.e., 2000-01) similar disallowance is deleted by the First Appellate Authority and that view has also been confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal. The AO did not accept the contentions of the assessee and imposed a penalty of Rs.11,37,949. The First Appellate Authority deleted the penalty and the appeal of the Department before the Appellate Tribunal also did not succeed. The High Court also confirmed the order of Appellate Tribunal. Under these circumstances, the issue with regard to the said penalty came-up before the Apex Court at the instance of the Department.

2.3 On behalf of the Department, it was, inter alia contended that the claim of interest expenditure was totally without any legal basis and was made with mala fide intentions and the claim was also not accepted by the First Appellate Authority and hence it was obvious that such claim did not have any basis. It was also pointed out that the issue of deductibility of such expenditure in the earlier year is pending before the High Court. It was further contended that otherwise also, the expenditure of interest is not eligible for deduction u/s.36(1)(iii) of the Act as under the said provision, only the amount of interest paid on capital borrowed for the purpose of business/profession could be claimed and the present case was not in respect of the capital borrowed for such purposes. Attention was also drawn to the provisions of S. 10(33) to show that expenditure incurred in relation to exempt income is not deductible. In short, the contention was that the assessee had made a claim, which was totally unacceptable in law and thereby had invited the provisions relating to concealment penalty and had exposed itself to such provisions.

2.4 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that the language of the provision of concealment penalty had to be strictly construed, this being part of a taxing statute and more particularly the one providing for penalty. Accordingly, unless the wording directly covered the assessee and the factual situation therein, there could not be any penalty under the Act. It was also pointed out that there was no case of concealed income or the case of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income in the return furnished by the assessee.

2.5 After considering the contentions of both the sides, the Court proceeded to consider the issue further and after referring to the relevant provisions of the Act, the Court noted that the provisions suggest that for imposing concealment penalty, there has to be concealed income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Court then noted that the present case is not the case of concealed income and that is not the case of the Department either. On behalf of the Department, it was suggested that by making incorrect claim for the expenditure of interest, the assessee has furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Dealing with this contention, after referring to the dictionary meaning of the word ‘particulars’, the Court stated that the same used in S. 271(1)(c), would embrace the meaning of the de-tails of claim made. It is an admitted position that in the present case no information given in the return was found to be incorrect or inaccurate. It is not, as if, any statement made or any details supplied were found to be factually incorrect. Therefore, at least, prima facie, the assessee cannot be made guilty of furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. While dealing with the interpretation of the Department that ‘submitting an incorrect claim in law for the expenditure on interest would amount to giving inaccurate particulars of such income’, the Court stated that such cannot be the interpretation of the concerned words. According to the Court, the words are plain and simple and in order to expose the assessee to concealment penalty, unless the case is strictly covered by the provision, the penalty provision cannot be invoked. According to the Court, by any stretch of imagination, making an incorrect claim in law cannot tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Court also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Atul Mohan Bindal (317 ITR 1), in which the Court considered the same provisions. After referring to judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case, as also to the judgment in the case of Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills (supra), the Court in that case reiterated on page 13 of the judgment that : ‘It goes without saying that for applicability of S. 271(1)(c), conditions stated therein must exist’.

2.6 After mentioning the above position in law, the Court referred to the Dilip N. Shroff’s case and stated as under (pages 164-165) :

“Therefore, it is obvious that it must be shown that the conditions u/s.271(1)(c) must exist before the penalty is imposed. There can be no dispute that everything would depend upon the return filed because that is the only document where the assessee can furnish the particulars of his in-come. When such particulars are found to be inaccurate, the liability would arise. In Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT, (2007) 6 SCC 329, this Court explained the terms ‘concealment of income’ and ‘furnishing inaccurate particulars’. The Court went on to hold therein that in order to attract the penalty u/s.271(1) (c), mens rea was necessary, as according to the Court, the word ‘inaccurate’ signified a deliberate act or omission on behalf of the assessee. It went on to hold that clause (iii) of S. 271(1)(c) provided for a discretionary jurisdiction upon the assessing authority, inasmuch as the amount of penalty could not be less than the amount of tax sought to be evaded by reason of such concealment of particulars of income, but it may not exceed three times thereof. It was pointed out that the term ‘inaccurate particulars’ was not defined anywhere in the Act and, therefore, it was held that furnishing of an assessment of the value of the property may not by itself be furnishing inaccurate particulars. It was further held that the Assessing Officer must be found to have failed to prove that his explanation is not only not bona fide but all the facts relating to the same and material to the computation of his income were not disclosed by him. It was then held that the explanation must be preceded by a finding as to how and in what manner, the assessee had furnished the particulars of his income. The Court ultimately went on to hold that the element of mens rea was essential. It was only on the point of mens rea that the judgment in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT was upset”.

2.7 The Court then dealt with the judgment of Dharmendra Textile’s case and the effect thereof on Dilip N. Shroff’s case and explained as under (page

165) :

“. . . . . . The basic reason why the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT was overruled by this Court in Union of India v. Dharmendra Textiles Processors, was that according to this Court the effect and dif-ference between S. 271(1)(c) and S. 276C of the Act was lost sight of in the case of Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT. However, it must be pointed out that in Union of India v. Dharmendra Textile Processors, no fault was found with the reasoning in the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT, where the Court explained the meaning of the terms ‘conceal’ and ‘inaccurate’. It was only the ultimate inference in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT to the effect that mens rea was an essential ingredient for the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) that the decision in Dilip N. Shroff v. Joint CIT was overruled.”

2.8 The Court then noted that in the present case, it is not concerned with mens rea and also stated that it has seen the meaning of the word ‘particu-lars’ earlier. The Court then stated as under (pages165-166) :

“. . . . . . Reading the words in conjunction, they must mean the details supplied in the return, which are not accurate, not exact or correct, not according to truth or erroneous. We must hasten to add here that in this case, there is no finding that any details supplied by the assessee in its return were found to be incorrect or false. Such not being the case, there would be no question of inviting the penalty u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act. A mere making of the claim, which is not sustainable in law, by itself, will not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the income of the assessee. Such claim made in the return cannot amount to the inaccurate particulars.”

2.9 The Court then referred to the argument based on S. 14A of the Act and the points raised and reiterated that such claim of excessive deductions, knowing that they are incorrect, amounted to concealed income. Further, the Court noted that it was tried to be argued that the falsehood in accounts can take either of two forms : (i) an item of receipt will be suppressed fraudulently or (ii) an item of expenditure may be falsely (or in an exaggerated amount) claimed. According to the Department, both types of items are to reduce the taxable income and therefore, amount to concealed income as well as furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. Rejecting these contentions, the Court stated as under (page 166) :

“We do not agree, as the assessee had furnished all the details of its expenditure as well as income in its return, which details, in themselves, were not found to be inaccurate, nor could be viewed as the concealment of income on its part. It was up to the authorities to accept its claim in the return or not. Merely because the assessee had claimed the expenditure, which claim was not accepted or was not acceptable to the Revenue, that by itself would not, in our opinion, attract the penalty u/s. 271(1)(c). If we accept the contention of the Revenue, then in case of every return where the claim made is not accepted by the Assessing Officer for any reason, the assessee will invite penalty u/s.271(1)(c). That is clearly not the intendment of the Legislature.”

2.10 The Court then also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sree Krishna Electricals (27 VST 249) rendered under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act in connection with the penalty proceedings wherein the authorities had found that there were some incorrect statements made in the return, though the said transactions were reflected in the accounts of the assessee. The Court then quoted the following observations from the judgment in that case (page 167) :

“So far as the question of penalty is concerned, the items which were not included in the turnover were found incorporated in the appellant’s account books. Where certain items which are not included in the turnover are disclosed in the dealer’s own account books and the assessing authorities include these items in the dealer’s turnover disallowing the exemption, penalty cannot be imposed. The penalty levied stands set aside.”

2.10.1 Referring to the above-referred observations in the context of penalty proceedings under the Sales Tax Act of Tamil Nadu, the Court stated that the situation in the present case is still better as no fault has been found with the particulars submitted by the assessee in his return. Accordingly, the Court held that the First Appellate Authority, the Tribunal and the High Court have correctly reached the conclusion and accordingly, dismissed the appeal filed by the Department as without merit.

Conclusion :

3.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, the settled position is again reiterated that mere disallowance of claim for expenditure by itself would not tantamount to furnishing inaccurate particulars of income and accordingly, in such cases no concealment penalty can be levied on that basis, notwithstanding the judgment of the Apex Court in Dharmendra Textile’s case. We hope that this principle reiterated by the Apex Court will be followed by the Department in spirit. We also hope that the Department will not initiate proceedings for the levy of concealment penalty in such cases.

3.2 From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is now clear that the judgment of the Apex Court in Dilip No. Shroff’s case is overruled by the judgment in Dharmendra Textile’s case only to the extent it holds that the element of mens rea is essential for levy of concealment penalty and the other observations in Dilip N. Shroff’s case will continue to hold good, except perhaps the observations with regard to nature of concealment penalty.

Whether Reassement u/s.147 is Permissible on a Mere ‘Change of Opinion’

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 S. 147 authorises and permits the Assessing Officer (AO)
to assess or re-assess the income chargeable to tax, if he has reason to believe
that income for relevant years has escaped assessment. This is popularly known
as power of reassessment.

1.2 Provisions of S. 147 have been substituted by the Direct
Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 with effect from 1-4-1989 (New Provisions).
Primarily, the New Provisions confer jurisdiction to reopen the reassessment,
when the AO, for whatever reason, has ‘reason to believe’ that the income has
escaped assessment.

1.2.1 Under the New Provisions, the above-referred power of
reassessment cannot be exercised after the end of four years from the end of the
relevant assessment year in cases where the original assessment is made
u/s.143(3) or S. 147, unless in such cases, the income chargeable to tax
has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of failure of the
assessee to make return u/s.139 or in response to notice u/s.142(1)/148 or by
reason of failure of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts
necessary for such assessment (‘failure to disclose material facts’). In this
write-up we are not concerned with this provision.

1.3 Prior to substitution of the provisions of S. 147 w.e.f.
1-4-1989 as aforesaid (i.e., New Provisions), S. 147 providing for
reassessment was divided into two separate clauses [(a) and (b)], which laid
down the circumstances under which income escaping assessment for the past
assessment years could be assessed or re-assessed (Old Provisions). Under the
Old Provisions, clause (a) empowered the AO to initiate proceedings for
re-assessment in cases where he has ‘reason to believe’ that by reason of the
omission or failure of the assessee to make return u/s.139 or by reason of the
‘failure to disclose the material facts’, the income chargeable to tax has
escaped assessment. Under clause (b) of the Old Provisions, the AO was empowered
to initiate reassessment proceedings if, in consequence of information in his
possession, he has ‘reason to believe’ that income chargeable to tax has escaped
assessment, even if there is no omission or failure on the part of the assessee
as mentioned in clause (a).

1.4 From the comparison of the Old Provisions with the New
Provisions relating to re-assessment, it would appear that to confer
jurisdiction under clause (a) of the Old Provisions, it would appear that two
conditions were required to be satisfied, namely, (i) the AO must have ‘reason
to believe’ that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, and (ii) such
escapement has occurred by reason of ‘failure to disclose material facts’, etc.
on the part of the assessee. On the other hand, under the New Provisions, the
existence of only first condition (i.e., ‘reason to believe’) is
sufficient to confer the jurisdiction on the AO to initiate the reassessment
proceedings (except, of course, in cases covered by the circumstances mentioned
in Para 1.2.1 above).

1.5 Various issues are under debate with regard to powers of
the AO to make reassessment under the New Provisions. In large number of cases,
reassessment proceedings are being initiated merely on account of ‘change of
opinion’ on the issues decided at the time of original assessment. In such
cases, the issue has come up before the Courts in the past as to whether, under
the New Provisions, the AO is empowered to initiate reassessment proceedings on
a mere ‘change of opinion’. By and large, the Courts have taken a view that
reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’.
However, the issue still survives and in practice, such re-assessment
proceedings are being initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’ by giving one
reason or the other.

1.6 Recently, the issue referred to in Para 1.5 above came up
for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Kelvinator of India Ltd.
and the same is finally resolved by the Apex Court. Considering the importance
of the issue in day-to-day practice, it is thought fit to consider the said
judgment in this column.


CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., 256 ITR 1
(Del.) — Full Bench :


2.1 In the above case, the issue referred in Para 1.5 above
was referred to the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. In that case, the facts
were : The assessee had furnished the return of income for the A.Y. 1987-88 on
29-6-1987. The assessee had maintained guest houses at different places on which
it had incurred total expenditure of Rs.3,33,926 consisting of rent
(Rs.1,76,000), depreciation (Rs.66,441) and other expenses (Rs. 91,485). As it
did not claim deduction for these expenses, revised return was filed on
5-10-1989 along with a letter mentioning that out of the above amount of
Rs.3,33,926, the rent and depreciation should be allowed as deduction u/s.30 and
u/s.32 of the Act, relying on the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case
of Chase Bright Ltd. (177 ITR 124). Accordingly, disallowance of the expenses
u/s.37(4) of the Act was restricted to only Rs.91,485 and the relevant order was
passed on 17-11-1989. Subsequently, notice u/s.148 was issued on 20-4-1990 for
reopening of the assessment u/s.147. Though as per the reasons recorded for
reopening, the assessment was reopened on the alleged ground of various
disallowable claims, but except for the above referred two items of
disallowances, neither any claim was disallowed, nor any addition was made on
completion of reassessment. In support of the reassessment, the AO had relied
upon the order of the CIT(A) for the A.Y. 1986-87, which was passed on 7-7-1990,
although the assessment was reopened on 2-4-1990. In the appeal filed against
the reassessment order, the CIT(A) quashed the reassessment proceedings on the
ground that it was a case of mere ‘change of opinion’ on the part of the AO as
no new fact or material was available with the AO The Appellate Tribunal also
upheld the decision of the CIT(A) and it was held that New Provisions of S. 147
are applicable in this case and it was also a case of mere ‘change of opinion’.

2.2 On the above facts, the Revenue made an application for
referring the following questions to the High Courts (para 5) :

“Whether, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in
holding that the proceedings initiated u/s.147 of the said Act were invalid on
the ground that there was a mere ‘change of opinion’ ?”

2.3 The above-referred application was rejected by the
Tribunal and hence, at the instance of the Revenue, a petition was filed
u/s.256(2) before the Delhi High Court for direction to Tribunal for referring
the above-referred question to the High Court.

2.4 Before the High Court, the counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, referred to the provisions of S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (the 1922 Act) and the Old Provisions as well as the New Provisions of S. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act). He also pointed out that the proviso to S. 147 under the New Provisions is in pari materia with Clause (a) of S. 147 under the Old Provisions. It was, inter alia, further contended that the ‘change of opinion’ is relevant only for the purpose of Clause (b) of S. 147 under the Old Provisions, the initiation of reassessment proceedings is permissible when it is found that the AO has passed the assessment order without any application of mind and the same can be found out from the order of assessment itself. When the order of the assessment does not contain any discussion on a particular issue, then the same may be held to have been rendered without any application of mind. It was further contended that from the reasons recorded by the AO, it is apparent that reliance has been placed upon the tax audit report which would have come within the purview of the expression ‘information’ as contemplated in 147 and hence, the re-assessment cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction. For this purpose, reliance was placed on various judgments of the Courts including the judgments of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Praful Chunilal Patel (236 ITR 832) and a Delhi High Court case of Bawa Abhai Singh (253 ITR 83). It was also contended that Circular No. 549, dated 31-10-1989 issued by the CBDT (Circular No. 549) cannot be relied upon for the purpose of construction of New Provisions inasmuch as the Circular cannot override the statutory provisions.

2.5 On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that the expression ‘reason to believe’ contained in S. 147 denotes that the belief must be based on the change of fact or subsequent information or new law. Income escaping assessment must be founded upon or in consequence of any information which must come into the possession of the AO after completion of the original assessment. It was also pointed out that the said Circular No. 549 clearly shows that S. 147 was amended only to allay fear of all concerned that prior thereto an arbitrary power was conferred upon the AO and the CBDT, who has the authority to interpret the law, has issued the said Circular No. 549, which should govern the case. Reliance was also placed on various judgments of the Courts in support of contentions raised.

2.6 After considering the contentions raised on behalf of both the parties, the Court proceeded to consider the issue and for that purpose noted the provisions regarding reassessment under 1922 Act as well as the Old Provision and the New Provision under the Act. The Court also noted the said Circular No. 549. The Court then also referred to the various judgments of the Courts rendered under 1922 Act as well as the Old Provisions and the New Provisions of the Act dealing with the issue, wherein the view was taken that reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’. Referring to the New Provisions, the Court noted the following observations (head notes) of the Delhi High Court (234 ITR 170) in the case of Jindal Photo Films Ltd. (page 13):

“The power to reopen an assessment was conferred by the Legislature not with the intention to enable the Income-tax Officer to reopen the final decision made against the Revenue in respect of questions that directly arose for decision in earlier proceedings. If that were not the legal position, it would result in placing an unrestricted power of review in the hands of the assessing authorities depending on their changing moods.”

2.7 After considering the above, the Court stated that although the referring Bench had prima facie agreed with the decision of this Court in the case of Jindal Photo Films Ltd. (supra), but doubt was sought to be raised by the Revenue in view of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Praful Chunilal Patel (supra). Accordingly, the Court considered the said judgment of the Gujarat High Court and noted that in that case it was held that the word ‘assessment’ would mean the ascertainment of the amount of taxable income and the tax payable thereon. In other words, where there is no ascertainment of amount of taxable income and the tax payable thereon, it can never be said that such income was assessed. It was further held that merely because during the assessment proceedings the relevant material was on record, it cannot be inferred that the AO must necessarily have deliberated over it and taken in to account while ascertaining the taxable income or that he had formed an opinion in respect thereof. If looking back, it appears to the AO (albeit, within four years from the end of the relevant assessment year) that particular item even though reflected on the record was not subjected to assessment and was left out while working out the taxable income earlier, that would enable him to initiate the proceedings for reassessment. After referring to this view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in that case, the Court disagreed with the same and stated as under (page 15):

“We are, with respect, unable to subscribe to the aforementioned view. If the contention of the Revenue is accepted the same, in our opinion, would confer an arbitrary power upon the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer who had passed the order of assessment or even his successor officer only on the slightest pre-text or otherwise would be entitled to reopen the proceeding. Assessment proceedings may be furthermore reopened more than once. It is now trite that where two interpretations are possible, that which fulfils the purpose and object of the Act should be preferred.”

2.8 The Court then also considered the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bawa Abhai Singh (supra) on which reliance was placed by the Revenue to contend that reassessment proceedings can be initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’. The Court then noted that in that case it was held that the Old Provisions and the New Provisions are contextually different. Under the New Provisions, the only condition for initiating the reassessment proceeding is that the AO should have ‘reason to believe’ that income has escaped assessment, which belief can be reached in any manner and is not qualified by any pre-condition of faith and true disclosure of material fact by the assessee as contemplated under the Old Provisions in clause    of S. 147. Accordingly, the power to re-open the assessment under the New Provisions is much wider and can be exercised even after the assessee has disclosed fully and truly all material facts. After noting this part of the said judgment, the Court stated that it is evident that this judgment cannot be considered as an authority for the proposition that mere ‘change of opinion’ would also confer jurisdiction upon the AO to initiate reassessment proceedings as was contended on behalf of the Revenue.

2.9 Dealing with the meaning of the expression ‘reason to believe’, the Court noted the following view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the earlier referred judgment of Bawa Abhai Singh (supra), on which reliance was placed on behalf of the Revenue (page 16):

“The crucial expression is ‘reason to believe’. The expression predicates that the Assessing Officer must hold a belief?.?.?.?. by the existence of reasons for holding such a belief. In other words, it contemplates existence of reasons on which the belief is founded and not merely a belief in the existence of reasons inducing the belief. Such a belief may not be based merely on reasons but it must be founded on information. As was observed in Ganga Saran and Sons P. Ltd. v. ITO, (1981) 130 ITR 1 (SC), the expression ‘reason to believe’ is stronger than the expression ‘is satisfied’. The belief entertained by the Assessing Officer should not be irrational and arbitrary. To put it differently, it must be reasonable and must be based on reasons which are material. In S. Narayanappa v. CIT, (1967) 63 ITR 219, it was noted by the Apex Court that the expression ‘reason to believe’ in S. 147 does not mean purely a subjective satisfaction on the part of the Assessing Officer, the belief must be held in good faith; it cannot be merely a pretence. It is open to the Court to examine whether the reasons for the belief have a rational nexus or a relevant bearing to the information of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant for the purpose of the Section. To that limited extent, the action of the Assessing Officer in initiating proceedings u/s. 147 can be challenged in a Court of law.”

2.10 To decide the issue, the Court then further stated that it is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statute that the entire statute should be read as a whole and the same has to be considered thereafter chapter by chapter and then section by section and ultimately word by word. It is not in dispute that the AO does not have any jurisdiction to review his own order. His jurisdiction is confined to only rectification of apparent mistakes u/s.154 and the said powers cannot be exercised where the issues are debatable. According to the Court, what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly by taking recourse to provisions relating to reassessment. For this, the Court observed as under (page 15):

“It is a well-settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. If the Income-tax Officer does not possess the power of review, he cannot be permitted to achieve the said object by taking recourse to initiating a proceeding of reassessment or by way of rectification of mistake.

2.11 The Court then considered the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue that the said Circular No. 549 cannot be considered, as the Circular cannot override the statutory provisions. In this context, the Court reiterated the settled position with regard to the binding effect of the Circular issued by the CBDT for which reference was made to the judgments of Apex Court in the cases of UCO Bank (237 ITR 889) and Anjum M. H. Ghasswalla (252 ITR 1). The Court, then, felt that if the AO is permitted to reopen the completed assessment on a mere ‘change of opinion’, then the powers of the AO become arbitrary. In this context, the Court observed as under (page 19):

“Another aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of. A statute conferring an arbitrary power may be held to be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. If two interpretations are possible, the interpretation which upholds constitutionality, it is trite, should be favoured.

In the event it is held that by reason of S. 147 if the Income-tax Officer exercises his jurisdiction for initiating a proceeding for reassessment only upon a mere change of opinion, the same may be held to be unconstitutional. We are therefore of the opinion that S. 147 of the Act does not postulate conferment of power upon the Assessing Officer to initiate reassessment proceeding upon his mere change of opinion.”

2.12 While taking a view that on a mere ‘change of opinion’ reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated, even if the detailed reasons have not been recorded in the original assessment order for accepting the claim of the assessee, finally, the Court stated as under (pages 19/20):

“We also cannot accept the submission of Mr. Jolly to the effect that only because in the assessment order, detailed reasons have not been recorded an analysis of the materials on the record by itself may justify the Assessing Officer to initiate a proceeding u/s.147 of the Act. The said submission is fallacious. An order of assessment can be passed either in terms of Ss.(1) of S. 143 or Ss.(3) of S. 143. When a regular order of assessment is passed in terms of the said Ss.(3) of S. 143, a presumption can be raised that such an order has been passed on application of mind. It is well known that a presumption can also be raised to the effect that in terms of clause (e) of S. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. If it be held that an order which has been passed purport-edly without application of mind would itself confer jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to reopen the proceeding without anything further, the same would amount to giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong.”

CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., 320 ITR 561 (SC):

3.1 The above-referred judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court came up for consideration before the Apex Court to decide the issue referred to in para 1.5 above.

For this purpose, the Court noted the Old Provisions as well as the New Provisions of S. 147. The Court then stated that on going through the changes made under the New Provisions, we find that for the purpose of reopening, two conditions were required to be fulfilled under the Old Provisions, but under the New Provisions they are given go by and only one condition has remained, namely, that once the AO has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, that confers the jurisdiction for reopening. Therefore, under the New Provisions, power to reopen is much wider. However, one needs to give schematic interpretation to the words, ‘reason to believe’, failing which S. 147 would give arbitrary powers to AO to reopen assessment on the basis of a mere ‘change of opinion’. One must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between the power of review and power of reassessment. The AO has no power to power to review; he has the power to reopen. Having made these observations, the Court then held as under (pages 564/565):

“But reassessment has to be based on fulfilment of certain pre-conditions and if the concept of ‘change of opinion’ is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of ‘change of opinion’ as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, the Assessing Officer has power to reopen, provided there is ‘tangible material’ to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to S. 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, the Parliament not only deleted the words ‘reason to believe’, but also inserted the word ‘opinion’ in S. 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the companies against omission of the word ‘reason to believe’, the Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word ‘opinion’ on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer.”

3.2 In support of the aforesaid view, the Court also relied on the said Circular No. 549 and reproduced the following portion therefrom (page 565):

“7.2 Amendment made by the Amending Act, 1989, to reintroduce the expression ‘reason to believe’ in S. 147. — A number of representations were received against the omission of the words ‘reason to believe’ from S. 147 and their substitution by the ‘opinion’ of the Assessing Officer. It was pointed out that the meaning of the expression, ‘reason to believe’ had been explained in a number of Court rulings in the past and was well settled and its omission from S. 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion. To allay these fears, the Amending Act, 1989, has again amended S. 147 to reintroduce the expression ‘has reason to believe’ in place of the words ‘for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is of the opinion’. Other provisions of the new S. 147, however, remain the same.”

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the Apex Court, it is now clear that even under the New Provisions, reassessment proceedings cannot be initiated on a mere ‘change of opinion’. One of the major reasons for taking such a view also appears to be the fact that if the AO is permitted to reopen the assessment on a mere ‘change of opinion’, S. 147 would give arbitrary powers to the AO to reopen reassessment. Therefore, the concept of ‘change of opinion’ is treated as inbuilt test to check the abuse of power by the AO.

4.2 If the AO is permitted to reopen concluded assessment on a mere ‘change of opinion’, his power may become arbitrary and statute confirring arbitrary power may be held unconstitutional as held by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the above case.

4.3 From the above judgment read with the Full Bench Judgment of the Delhi High Court, it seems that the completed assessment can be reopened only when there is a tangible material available with the AO to form a belief that taxable income has escaped assessment. The belief entertained by the AO should not be irrational and arbitrary. It must be reasonable and must be based on reasons which are material.

4.4 We may also state that if the return of income is processed u/s.143(1) without making any assessment u/s.143(3)/147, then such determination of income does not amount to ‘assessment’ [Ref. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Broker P. Ltd., 291 ITR 500 – SC]. Therefore, in such cases, it seems that the above-referred judgment of the Apex Court may not be of any use to contest the assessment proceedings initiated u/s.147.