Subscribe to the Bombay Chartered Accountant Journal Subscribe Now!

WHISTLE-BLOWER POLICY : A STEP TOWARDS BETTER GOVERNANCE

Article

Background:

Securities Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has prescribed
the listing agreement that is required to be executed between a stock exchange
and a company whose securities are to be listed
on that exchange. Clause 49 of the listing agreement is titled ‘Corporate
Governance’ and lays down the principles of Corporate Governance that are
required to be followed by the listed company. In addition to a list of
mandatory requirements that a listed company is obliged to comply with, there
are a few non-mandatory requirements that have been specified in terms of
Annexure I D of the specimen listing agreement. One such non-mandatory
requirement relates to ‘Whistle-blower Policy’. This article aims
to explore the meaning of ‘Whistle-blower Policy’, the rationale of making it a
part of the Corporate Governance Code (though not mandatory at present) and the
usefulness of such a policy in ensuring better governance.

Corporate Governance Code:

Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of Stock Exchanges
places a non-mandatory requirement for listed companies in India to adopt a
Whistle-Blower Policy. The specific recommendation, placed in Annexure I D to
Clause 49 specifies that:


(i) The company will establish a mechanism for employees
to report to the management concerns about unethical behaviour, actual or
suspected fraud or violation of the company’s code of conduct or ethics
policy.

(ii) The mechanism must provide for adequate safeguards
against victimisation of employees who avail of the mechanism.

(iii) The mechanism must also provide, where senior
management is involved, direct access to the Chairman of the Audit
Committee.

(iv) The existence of the mechanism must be appropriately
communicated within the organisation.

(v) The Audit Committee must periodically review the
existence and functioning of the mechanism.


While this is a non-mandatory requirement, the company also
has a mandatory requirement to disclose, in its report on corporate governance,
the extent of adoption of such non-mandatory requirements. Numerous companies
have adopted the Whistle-Blower Policy in their organisations in their quest to
uphold the highest governance standards or in the fear of being considered late
entrants to the ‘well-governed companies’ club’!

A similar provision for protection of whistle- blowers is
found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which forms part of the United
States Federal Law. S. 806 of this Act protects employees who provide
information or assist in an investigation from discharge, demotion, suspension,
threats, harassment or any form of discrimination. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has
now increased the protection provided to whistle-blowers. The provisions have
made it clear that retaliation against whistle-blowers will not be tolerated. It
is now a criminal offence to retaliate against whistle-blowers, carrying
penalties from a large fine to 10 years in prison.

This raises questions such as — What is really meant by a
whistle-blower policy? And, how does it lead to better governance?

A logical starting point would be to examine the key
components of whistle-blower policy. There are four broad components of
whistle-blower policy:




  •  A
    whistle blower



  •  A
    wrongful or unethical practice



  •  An
    authority



  •  A
    policy




The Four Components of a Whistle-Blower Policy:

A whistleblower:

“A whistle-blower is a person who raises a concern about
wrongdoing occurring in an organisation or body of people. Usually this person
would be from that same organisation. The revealed misconduct may be classified
in many ways; for example, a violation of a law, rule, regulation and/or a
direct threat to public interest, such as fraud, health/safety violations, and
corruption. Whistle-blowers may make their allegations internally (for example,
to other people within the accused organisation) or externally (to regulators,
law enforcement agencies, to the media or to groups concerned with the issues).”

(Source: en.wikipedia.org)

A Wrongful or Unethical Practice:

There are various grievance or complaint mechanisms that are
instituted by organisations. The wrongful practice or unethical conduct that is
sought to be covered under the whistle-blower policy is expected to be grave and
serious in nature, and may involve several parties. These practices may concern
serious disregard to the law of the land (e.g., dealing in narcotics
without a licence), a crime against human rights (e.g., child
trafficking, dealing in human organs), corruption of a high order (e.g.,
supply/use of substandard or expired medicines in a hospital), compromise of the
organisational values (e.g., bribery, unfair trade practices) and similar
serious acts. It is clear that trivial issues or unfounded claims should not be
escalated through this policy.

An Authority:

The policy defines a specific process to be followed for
escalation of information regarding the wrongful or unethical practice. The
person/authority to which the communication may be sent, the manner of sending
communication and the manner in which the information received would be dealt
with is clearly defined in the policy. It is felt that the management is often
the last in the knowledge-chain where a rampant wrongdoing is concerned, as the
employees and other stakeholders are not sure who to report to and not secure as
to how it would impact their relationship with the organisation. Thus, the
authority which deals with the information provided by a whistle-blower must be
independent, senior and responsible — and the policy must provide for
confidentiality of the information as well as the identity of the informer.

A Policy:

A whistle-blower policy is thus an internal policy on access to the appropriate designated authority, by persons who wish to report on unethical or improper practices. The policy is intended to create a platform for alerting the management of the company or those charged with the Governance of the company about potential issues of serious concern, by ensuring confidentiality, protection and expedient action. The Corporate Governance Code in India specifically states that the whistle-blower must have a direct access to the Chairman of the Audit Committee for reporting on wrongdoings by the senior management.

The Response of Corporate India:

Corporate India was slow to respond to the non-mandatory requirements of Clause 49 in general, and the clause relating to the whistle-blower policy in particular. A regulatory recommendation is a law in the making, and it is heartening to find that an increasing number of companies are now realising the need to pay heed to these non-mandatory requirements. A peek at some of the corporate governance reports that form part of the annual reports of companies reveals the status of adoption of this non-mandatory requirement?  (refer Table).


Impacts of unblown whistles — a couple of instances:

A few instances of worms in Dairy Milk bars were reported in Maharashtra, following which ad campaigns roping in Big B and revamping of packaging took place as an effort to win back their eroded image and consumer confidence. This cost Cadbury a good Rs.150 million on packaging expenses and 15% up on advertisement costs.

Coca-Cola India has been fighting a legal battle over allegations that its largest plant in India, at Plachimada has been responsible for environmental damage in the area. In a major step towards holding Coca-Cola accountable for damages it has caused in India, the State Government of Kerala decided to move forward with the formation of a tribunal that will hear and award compensation claims against the Coca-Cola Company. The Kerala State cabinet’s decision is based on the report and recommendations of a high-power Committee which released a report on March 22, 2010 holding Coca -Cola responsible for causing pollution and water depletion in Plachimada in the State of Kerala in southern India. Using the ‘polluter pays principle’, the high-power committee had recommended that Coca- Cola be held liable for Rs. 216 crore (US $ 48 million) for damages caused as a result of the company’s bottling operations in Plachimada.”

(Source?: http://www.indiaresource.org/campaigns/coke/)

Cadbury’s worm battle and Coke’s water contamination combat are classic examples of unblown whistles. If timely alerts were sent out through internal whistle-blowing the companies could have perhaps saved themselves of serious brand tarnishing and grave financial blows.

Whistle-blowers of Global Acclaim:

  • Sherron Watkins of Enron, Coleen Rowley of FBI and Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom awarded ‘The Persons of the Year 2002’ by ‘Time Magazine’ are classic examples of whistle-blowers in America.

  • Sherron Watkins was the Enron Vice-President who wrote a letter to Chairman Kenneth Lay in the summer of 2001 warning him that the company’s methods of accounting were improper. In January, when a Congressional subcommittee investigating Enron’s collapse released that letter, Watkins became a reluc-tant public figure, and the Year of the whistle-blower began.

  • Coleen Rowley was the FBI staff attorney who caused a sensation in May with a memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller about how the Bureau brushed off pleas from her Minne-apolis, Minn., field office that Zacarias Mous-saoui, who is now indicted as a September. 11 co-conspirator, was a man who must be investigated.

  • One month later Cynthia Cooper exploded the bubble that was WorldCom when she informed its board that the company had covered up $?3.8 billion in losses through the prestidigitations of phony book-keeping.

Whistle-blower Policy and Corporate Governance:
Some Thoughts:


Would you blow the whistle?

Mere bringing in the whistle-blower policy in an organisation does not necessarily result in successful functioning of the whistle- blower mechanism. It has to be put into action by creating awareness, propagating the policy, and assuring that no reprisal would be met against the whistle-blowers.

To safeguard themselves from the consequences of reporting a wrongdoing known or observed, employees across organisational hierarchies are tight-lipped and fearful to blow whistle against their colleagues, their business associates (vendors, customers, etc.) or their higher ups. Employees consider silence as golden in the wake of surviving in the workplace. This is detrimental to both the individual and the organisation.

Employees being closer to the organisation would be in a better position to uncover corporate mis-behaviour. Corporates need to decide whether they would welcome alerts through internal whistle-blowing and take corrective actions internally or be faced with the implications of unsolicited alerts from external sources, thereby endangering their goodwill and reputation.

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners have highlighted five reasons for ‘Why Employees Don’t Report Unethical Conduct’:

  • No corrective action
  • No confidentiality of reports
  • Retaliation by superiors
  • Retaliation by co-workers
  • Unsure whom to contact

Several corporate collapses like Enron, WorldCom, Satyam, Global Trust Bank, UTI scam, Siemens bribing scam in Germany to gain contracts, Harshad Mehta and Ketan Parekh scam, have quaked up the investors’ reliance on governance. This has surfaced the need for reinforcement of a mechanism to escalate misconduct to the appropriate authorities at the right time.

Benefits of a whistle-blower policy:

There is no doubt that in today’s fast-paced world and mega corporations, institution of a whistle-blower policy is not a corporate luxury, but an organisational necessity. The benefits of such a policy are many:

  • Fostering good governance by encouraging employees to escalate deceitful actions by colleagues/ seniors/third parties.
  • Promotion of the organisational values thus nurturing a culture of openness in workplace.
  • Sending a clear message that severe action will be taken against unethical and fraudulent acts.
  • Dissuading employees from committing fraud by instilling fear of unfavourable consequences when caught.
  • Early alerts to diffuse a potentially larger disaster.

How to make the Whistle-Blower Policy a success?

The success of the Whistle-Blower Policy largely depends upon various factors viz. the level of tone at the top and the signals that its sends down the level, organisational philosophy and code of conduct; whistle-blower policy campaigning, orientation and awareness in the organisation.

The Whistle-Blower Policy should clearly state that:

  • Anonymity of the informant will be maintained.
  • The authenticity of the information will be confirmed and there will be no reprisal for reporting the information.
  • Appropriate and disciplinary action will be taken after investigation and on confirmation of the information.

While the regulatory requirement may lead to introduction of a Whistle-Blower Policy on paper, whether it is imbibed in spirit or not is determined by the tone at the top.

Tone at the top:

The tone at the top has a cascading effect on organisational pyramid downwards. Unless the organisational philosophy and the leadership positively encourage ethics and integrity, employees may assume that aiding in mounting revenue for the organisation is more a priority than ethics.

It is thus important that the leaders of organisation clearly communicate the organisational philosophy, values and code of conduct to be followed by each employee. Similarly, paying lip service to the whistle-blower policy is not enough; as employees and stakeholders are not encouraged to blow the whistle unless there is a serious commitment to it by the leadership.

Wrap-up:

The utility of whistle -blower policy is not only for private corporations but also larger organisations and Government bodies. The recent news coverage on inadequate preparation of infrastructure for the Commonwealth Games, 2010 has rocked India. The authors humbly submit that a well implemented national whistle-blower policy would have perhaps helped in giving early alerts of the impending fiasco and would have gone a long way in protecting the country from loss of credibility in the international arena.

Demystifying XBRL

Article

Since the inception of the
Internet, many technologies have been tried as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
enablers to move financial information and data between computer systems. In
today’s world information is the key to success for any organisation. Greater
efficiency or advantageous position against competitors can be achieved
depending on how much information and how quickly information can be obtained.
For example, investors and investment analysts want to use their own analytical
tools using the financial data made available by the company or data aggregators
like Bloomberg. They have to copy & paste such information manually. Finance
managers need to compile financial information from different departments into a
spreadsheet for decision-making. However, the format of information may be
different among the different systems. As a result, far more time is needed in
the financial domain for producing the required information and getting the
information ready for analytical purpose. With the creation of eXtensible
Business Reporting Language (XBRL), a new vista is opened.


About XBRL :

It is the language for
electronic communication of business and financial information between
businesses and over Internet. XBRL is an open standard and is freely available
standard language based on eXtensible Mark-up Language (XML) for creating
business reports. As a language, it does not intend to modify any of the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) but to present them in a
suitable format which eases out further analysis and comparison. It can contain
both financial information such as balance sheet, profit & loss account or cash
flow statement and non-financial information, such as sustainability reports,
regulatory reports, loan applications, etc.

XBRL is composed of
specifications about how to structure business and financial data and a common
framework for structuring and naming business and financial information. XML
provides the structure for the data. XBRL Taxonomies define, relate and classify
different business concepts using the list of elements or Tags. Instance
Documents contain the actual facts for financial reports.

Why XBRL ?

There are many organisations
including regulatory bodies that post financial information on the Internet. At
present financial information is generally presented on the Internet in a static
format such as Hyper Text Mark-up Language (HTML) or Portable Document Format
(PDF). These two are the universal languages for web browsers. Both HTML & PDF
are static formats which can enable a person regardless of his physical location
to access relevant financial information easily. However, HTML & PDF Formats are
no better exchange of financial information than ‘Copy & Paste’. They do not
enable “Electronic Data Interchange” (EDI) of financial information. So, the
problem with this system is that the data is not readable by computer systems.

These static formats
i.e.,
HTML & PDF mean that a person is required to access a single file and
then read the information page by page. Any further interaction with the data
requires the user to either ‘Copy & Paste’ or ‘Re-key’ the information or
otherwise render it in an appropriate format for any further use.

Let us take an example,
suppose we want to compare the Net Profit of ten companies for a period of, say,
ten years, then you may need to access 100 discrete files, search in each one
for the required information and then, if found, extract the relevant
information. Thus, interacting with a large population of static data to analyse
it or to input it to a ‘Software Package’ for further processing is a tedious
job. It is time consuming, expensive and error prone also.

However, if such information
is made dynamic, then it would be possible to automatically interact with the
relevant data and avoid the inherent usage costs and increase the quality.

XBRL offers a way to make
financial information dynamic.

XBRL and Business Reporting
Supply Chain :

To resolve the problem of
providing reusable access to timely, accurate, relevant and discoverable
financial and business information, a market-driven open standard consortium,
XBRL International has evolved XBRL. XBRL International connects various
participants in ‘Business and Financial Reporting Supply Chain’ (see figure
below) in the development of a standard-based solution for business and
financial information that is universally open, industry-driven and
internationally endorsed.

Business and Financial
Reporting Supply Chain


XBRL Components:

Tags1:

XBRL tag is a computer code that represents one concept. XBRL uses tags to describe data. For example <Assets> 100</Assets>, the word Assets together with the brackets “<” and “>” is called a tag, and “<…>” is called opening tag and “</….>” is called closing tag.

Taxonomy1:

Taxonomy in general means a catalogue or a set of rules for classification. In XBRL, Taxonomy is a dictionary, containing computer readable definitions of business reporting terms as well as relationships between them and links connecting them to human-readable resources (metadata). A typical Taxonomy consists of a schema (or schemas) and linkbases.

Instance Document1:

An Instance Document is a business report in XBRL format. It contains tagged business facts whose definition can be found in the schema (or schemas) that the Instance Document refers to, together with the context in which they appear and unit description.

How does XBRL work?

Instead of treating financial information as a block of text, XBRL provides a computer-readable tag to identify each individual piece of data. A business reporting document becomes ‘intelligent’ data, allowing the exchange of business reporting data by encoding the information in a meaningful way. XBRL tags give data identity and context which can be understood by a wide range of software applications. It also allows data to interface with databases, financial reporting systems and spreadsheets.

Advantages of XBRL:

XBRL users span over all commercial, business and industrial establishments, the accounting professionals, data aggregators, investment Companies, banks, regulators and all users having a stake in financial statements and reporting. With XBRL, coding the same database can be used for meeting the information needs of all without any need for reprocessing and re-keying. XBRL is so designed that it can be used for distributing financial information in any format viz. HTML documents for web, printed reports and statements, electronic filing with securities and market regulators like SEBI in India and SEC in the USA. It is reliable, efficient, cost-effective, computer-readable, requiring no data entry again and again which is the most time-consuming, expensive and unreliable. Data once converted in the XBRL format can be easily processed by computers.

Since, XBRL provides an XML-based framework it can be used globally for creating, exchanging and analysing financial reports across all software formats.

It is the XBRL Tool that takes care of different software formats and converts the financial state-ments into the XBRL form. Therefore, almost any organisation can benefit from XBRL.

Companies can have their own internal reporting also in XBRL. Let us start with the basic information about a company. With companies going global it has become necessary to standardise financial reporting, not only within the country but across the globe so that we can have comparable and consistent financial data across space and time. A company’s own management can mine the data to reflect different aspects of the company’s working, carry out comparison with competitors and industry leaders and use it as a powerful MIS tool. An investment analyst through the use of XBRL would have timely data across companies to form meaningful conclusions and economists can have consistent information of sufficient granulation to make forecasts and run models. For bankers and credit rating agencies this will obviously be a huge bonanza enhancing the quality of their credit analysis.

The new-generation tools used for improving the decision-making process in the financial domain such as Business Activity Monitoring, Digital Dashboards, Business Intelligence Tools, Data Warehousing and Data Mining are adopting XBRL. An important improvement is for auditors, as XBRL enables continuous auditing. XBRL allows auditors to generate reports within a much shorter time frame as compared to the traditional model.

Worldwide status:

XBRL International which is a non-profit organisation, looks after the promotion and development of XBRL around the world. Some 500 plus organisations are members of XBRL International which include bodies like International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), The Institute of Chartered Accountants of England & Wales, Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountant (CICA), CA Bodies of Australia, Netherlands, Ireland, Singapore, New Zealand, International Federation of Accountant and many others are members of XBRL International. In addition, from the corporate world, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, Dow Jones, Fujitsu, General Electric, Hitachi, IBM, Microsoft, Moody’s Oracle and SAP to mention a few are members of XBRL International. XBRL International has created local jurisdictions in each country where XBRL is already in use or is under development. There are 50 such local jurisdictions.2

IFRS Foundation has released IFRS Taxonomy 2010 on April 30, 2010. IFRS Foundation has also released IFRS Taxonomy 2010 Guide containing guidance on how to use IFRS Taxonomy 2010 from both an accounting and XBRL technology perspective.

India status:

XBRL India which is the provisional jurisdiction of XBRL International in India is looking after the promotion and development of XBRL in India. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) is involved in XBRL India. India has just embarked upon XBRL standard. RBI which is the Regulator for all banks in India has implemented XBRL-based reporting for Capital Adequacy data (RCA – II Return) and has also released taxonomy for two more returns, namely, GPB Return and Form A Return. RBI has plans to convert other returns also on XBRL. * As per Media Reports, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs has also taken a decision to implement XBRL-based reporting for all companies in India from April 1, 2011. However, a notification to this effect is still awaited. SEBI is also planning to develop a platform for XBRL-based filing by all listed companies in India.

XBRL — The future of accounting:

From technical point of view, XBRL is replacing other previously defined XML standards for describing financial information and business reports during the last few years such as FpML, RIXML, or ebXML. A reason for this is the wide support from across the world. This will result in the next wave of innovation in ‘Enterprise Financial System’ because of the impact of XBRL on accounting, financial reporting and business intelligence. IT folks around the world are talking about three waves of innovation in XBRL. The first wave is of ‘Preparatory Software & Services’. This has to happen first as the companies start looking for software to convert their financial statements on XBRL format due to regulatory requirements. The second wave will be of ‘Analytical Tools’ for ‘Investment Analysis’ purpose. The third wave will be ‘Internal Systems’ in which one set of accounts is created that is used for investors, regulators and internal reporting purpose. In the next wave of XBRL-driven innovation, data will flow from operational systems all the way through consolidated internal reporting to external reporting to investors and regulators. This will enable regulators to get the transparency that they mandate and companies to get better internal business information/management information system (MIS).**

References:

(1)    Eva Reyes, Daniel Rodrigues & Javier Dolado: Overview of XBRL technologies for decision-making in Accounting Information Systems.
(2)    Federation of European Accountants: Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) — The Impact on Accountants and Auditors.

(3)    Liv Watson: Enhancing Capital Markets Transparency & Trust.
(4)    Mike Willis — The Language of Accounting in a Digital World.

Enough !

Computer Interface

Information is rushing out to you from all directions —
letters, newspapers, magazines, phone calls, voice mails, SMS, twitter tweets,
facebook alerts and of course — emails on Blackberry and your PC.

There is enormous amount of content flowing in from all
directions. Just look at the developments at Twitter and other social media.

It was named Twitter by its founder, Jack Dorsey, because the
company wanted to capture the feeling of buzzing the world. With a limit of 140
characters, no one could have predicted the success of a communicator of
‘inconsequential information’.

It is estimated that 7.8% of Twitter users come from India,
making India the number 3 user of Twitter after the US and Germany.

Many famous personalities have a large number of followers on
Twitter. Shashi Tharoor, Minister of State for External Affairs has around
3,00,000 followers !

Youtube claims to have more than 350 million monthly visitors
and more than 3 billion photos and videos have been tagged on Flickr.

And what about emails ? For any professional around the
world, it is THE most critical form of communication. If your email server is
down, you might as well take a coffee break !

But, how do you manage the large traffic of emails which
inundates your inbox ? Do you feel overwhelmed ?

By pushing emails into handheld devices like Blackberry, the
ease of access has increased. However, it has also created some societal
problems. Children who are desperate to regain their parents’ attention from
Blackberry are often called ‘Blackberry orphans’. In some cities in Canada,
citizens have been requested to voluntarily turn off their Blackberry after 6.00
p.m. in the evening.

There is a way to manage this information overload.

Technology can help. There are software tools to help you
manage your inbox. It can prioritise your emails by importance, sort them by
senders and filter them. These tools can help you to personalise your email
settings.

Microsoft is now working on a futuristic application
(‘Priorities’) to sense work patterns and modulate the flow of emails — e.g.,
it will force a time lag in delivery of email depending on the urgency of the
email and the time of the day based on work pattern of the recipient.

Help is also available from personal productivity tools. You
can effect a change in your working habits. Some examples :



  •  Don’t start
    the day with powering on your PC and checking your emails. First, work out
    your plan for the day.



  •  Remove the
    mail alert. You will avoid jumping on to the Inbox as soon as you hear the
    alert, irrespective of the urgency of your other work.



  •  Make
    distinction between mails which are urgent, important and a combination of
    both.



  •  Have a few
    hours of ‘email downtime’ in a day when you engross yourself fully in your
    other work.


We live in a knowledge economy and information is the most
valuable commodity. Rather than be overwhelmed with it, you need to figure out
how to ‘tame the beast’. Enough !

levitra

Browsers — Part I

An Analysis of Poverty

Scarcity is not just a physical constraint. It is also a mindset. When scarcity captures our attention, it changes how we think — whether it is at the level of milliseconds, hours, or days and weeks. By staying top of mind,     it    affects what we notice, how we weigh our choices, how we deliberate and, ultimately, what we decide and how we behave…

Because we are preoccupied by scarcity, because our minds constantly return to it, we have less mind to give to the rest of life. This is more than a metaphor. We can directly measure mental capacity or, as we call it, bandwidth…

We can measure executive control, a key resource that affects how impulsively we behave. And we find that scarcity reduces all these components of bandwidth — it makes us less insightful, less forward-thinking, less controlled. And the effects are large. Being poor, for example, reduces a person’s cognitive capacity more than going one full night without sleep. It is not that the poor have less bandwidth as individuals. Rather, it is that the experience of poverty reduces anyone’s bandwidth.

When we think of the poor, we naturally think of a shortage of money. When we think of the busy, or the lonely, we think of a shortage of time, or of friends. But our results suggest that scarcity of all varieties also leads to a shortage of bandwidth. And     because     bandwidth affects all aspects of behaviour, this shortage has consequences.

(Source: Extracts from “Scarcity: Why Having too Little Means so Much” by Sendhil Mullainathan   in the Economic Times dated 06.11.2013)

Sum Payable — s. 43B

Controversies

Issue for consideration :


S. 43B of the Income-tax Act
provides that deductions otherwise allowable in respect of certain sums payable
shall be allowed only in the previous year in which such sums are actually paid,
irrespective of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was
incurred by the assessee according to the method of accounting regularly
employed by him.

All the clauses of S. 43B
(other than clause c) start with the term ‘any sum payable’. The meaning of the
term ‘any sum payable’ has been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions of
High Courts. Some Courts held that no disallowance could take place u/s.43B
where the liability towards the expenditure had arisen but time for payment was
not due. As against this few Courts had held that the deduction for an
expenditure of the specified nature would be allowed only on actual payment of
dues. In order to avoid any further conflict, an amendment has been made vide
the Finance Act, 1989 with retrospective effect form 1-4-1984 by insertion of an
Explanation 2 to provide for the meaning of the said term ‘any sum payable. The
scope of the Explanation however is restricted to clause (a) of S. 43B. Clause
(a) of S. 43B deals with tax, duty, cess or fee and this clause when read with
the Explanation 2 means a sum for which the assessee incurred liability in the
previous year even though such sum might not have been payable within that year
under the relevant law.

The meaning of the term ‘any
sum payable’ has as noted been the subject-matter of conflicting decisions of
High Courts. The issue which has arisen has been whether such term includes
amounts in respect of liability which has accrued but is not due for payment.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the context of clause (a) prior to the
insertion of Explanation 2, held that the term means only such items which have
become due for payment, and not items which have accrued but not become due for
payment and therefore no disallowance prior to the insertion of the Explanation
2 was possible for claims of expenditure which were due but not payable. On the
other hand, the Delhi High Court, in the context of clause (d) relating to
interest on loans or borrowings from financial institutions, has recently held
that the term includes all amounts in respect of which liability has been
incurred, irrespective of whether such amounts are due for payment or not and
accordingly, the claim for allowance of an expenditure would not be allowed
unless it was actually paid.

Srikakollu Subba Rao’s
case :


The issue first came up
before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srikakollu Rao & Co. v.
Union of India,
173 ITR 708.

In this case, the assessee
had challenged the provisions of S. 43B, which had been then recently introduced
with effect from A.Y. 1984-85. Besides challenging the Constitutional validity
of the provisions, the assessee contended that the provisions did not apply to
sales tax. It was further argued that the liability to pay sales tax for the
month of March 1984, which had been disallowed u/s.43B, could not have been so
disallowed.

On behalf of the assessee,
it was pointed out that under the Andhra Pradesh sales tax rules, such tax was
to be paid by the 25th day of the succeeding month. It was urged that where the
statute itself prescribes the date of payment, no exception could be taken,
acting u/s.43B, that the amount was not paid, rendering a justification for its
disallowance. It was urged that S. 43B can have no application to cases where
the statutory liability which was incurred in the accounting year is also not
payable, according to the statute, in the same accounting year.

The Andhra Pradesh High
Court, while accepting these contentions observed that according to it, not only
should the liability to pay the tax be incurred in the accounting year, but the
amount should also be statutory ‘payable’ in the accounting year. According to
the High Court,
S. 43B itself was clear to that extent — it referred to the ‘sum payable’. The
Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that if the Legislature intended, it should
have so provided that any sum for the payment of which liability was incurred by
the assessee would not be allowed unless such sum was actually paid.

Further, keeping in mind the
object for which S. 43B was enacted, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that it
was difficult to subscribe to the view that a routine application of that
provision was called for in cases where the taxes and duties for the payment of
which liability was incurred in the accounting year were not statutorily payable
in that accounting year. In fact, the Andhra Pradesh High Court noted the
subsequent amendment permitting the deduction of taxes and duties paid before
the due date of filing of the income tax return as evidence that taxes and
duties not statutorily payable during the accounting year did not fall to be
disallowed u/s.43B.

The Andhra Pradesh High
Court therefore held that the term ‘sum payable’ meant not only cases where the
liability was incurred, but which were also actually payable within the year.
Accordingly, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that S. 43B did not apply to the
amounts not due for payment within the year.

Triveni Engineering’s case :


The issue again recently
came up before the Delhi High Court in the case of Triveni Engineering &
Industries Ltd. v. CIT,
320 ITR 430.

In this case pertaining to
A.Y. 1991-92, the assessee had taken a loan from Industrial Finance Corporation
of India (‘IFCI’). As per the terms of the loan, the repayment of the loan along
with interest thereon was to be made in five yearly instalments payable from
November 1996 to November 2000. The assessee provided for the interest accrued
on the loan till the end of the previous year ended 31st March 1991. The
assessing officer disallowed such interest.

The Commissioner (Appeals)
confirmed the disallowance of interest and further held that the claim of
interest was not allowable in terms of S. 43B(d).

Before the Delhi High Court, the assessee claimed that it was entitled to claim interest because interest accrues daily and it accrued as per the mercantile system of accounting adopted by the assessee with respect to the loan obtained by it from IFCI.

The Delhi High Court observed that merely because the interest was debited in the books of account maintained on a Mercantile basis could not mean that the interest had become due and accrued, because admittedly the interest liability would not become due during the relevant previous year but only in November 1996. According to the Delhi High Court, interest could not be said to have ac-crued to become due and payable in the relevant previous year. The Delhi High Court observed that the stand of the assessee was incongruous because on the one hand it claimed that interest became due and accrued in the relevant previous year, however, in the same breath it admitted that the same would be due and payable only with effect from November 1996. According to the Delhi High Court, the concept of debiting the books maintained on the mercantile basis was on the principle that the payment had become due and payable and, since it had become payable, it was therefore debited in the books of account. According to the Court, admittedly the interest was not due and payable from the relevant previous year.

The Delhi High Court observed that S. 43B directly and categorically disentitled the assessee from claiming benefit of interest deduction with respect to interest due and payable to financial institution till the interest was actually paid. According to the Delhi High Court, S. 43B made it abundantly clear that interest can only be allowed when it was actually paid and not merely because it was due as per the method of accounting adopted by the assessee. The Delhi High Court was of the view that any other interpretation that the interest should be allowed even when not actually paid would defeat the very purpose of S. 43B.

The Delhi High Court felt that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, that where the amount was not due for payment before the end of the relevant previous year such amount, though having accrued, could not be disallowed u/s.43B, could not be accepted by it, as it would negate the intention of existence of S. 43B and would render otiose the expression ‘actually paid’ occurring in S. 43B. In view of the categorical language used in S. 43B(d), the Delhi High Court was of the view that it need not refer to the other subsections and exceptions of S. 43B.

The Delhi High Court therefore upheld the disallowance of interest accrued but not due under the provisions of S. 43B.

Observations:

Subsequent to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Srikakollu Subba Rao, Explanation 2 to S. 43B was inserted by the Finance Act 1989 with retrospective effect from 1 April 1984. This explanation, clarifies that ‘any sum payable’ would include sums which were not payable within the year under the relevant law, and therefore to that extent nullifies the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It is however relevant to note that the scope of the said explanation, is restricted in it’s application only to clause (a) of S. 43B, i.e., to any sum payable by way of tax, duty, cess or fee. It is consciously not extended to other clauses of S. 43B, though the language used in those clauses is also identical. At the time when Explanation 2 was inserted, S. 43B already contained clauses(b)    and (d) as well, which also used the term ‘any sum payable’. It therefore appears that the conscious intention was to make the expression applicable specifically and only to clause (a) and not to any other clauses of S. 43B. Even when clauses (e) and (f) were inserted in S. 43B, Explanation 2 was not amended to cover these clauses.

The view taken by the Delhi High Court, that allowing the claim for expenditure without actual payment of interest accrued but not due would defeat the very purpose of S. 43B and render it otiose, also does not seem to be justified. When S. 43B was inserted, the purpose for insertion of S. 43B was explained by the Honourable Finance Minister in his budget speech of 1983-84 as under:

“Several cases have come to notice where tax-payers do not discharge their statutory liability such as in respect of excise duty, employer’s contribution to provident fund, Employees State Insurance Scheme, for long periods of time. For the purposes of their income-tax assessments, they nonetheless claim the liability as deduction even as they take resort to legal action, thus depriving the Government of its dues while enjoying the benefit of non-payment. To curb such practices, I propose to provide that irrespective of the method of accounting followed by the taxpayer, a statutory liability will be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable profits only in the year and to the extent it is actually paid.”

A similar reasoning has been given in the explanatory memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill, 1983. The intention therefore seems to have been to cover cases of non-payment over long periods of time, and not amounts which are not due for payment. S. 43B would continue to apply to such sums which have become due for payment, but have not yet been paid.

Further support for the fact that amounts not due for payment were not intended to be covered by S. 43B can be gauged from the first proviso to S. 43B, which excludes amounts paid before the due date of the filing of the return of income from the applicability of S. 43B.

The better view of the matter therefore seems to be the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, that the meaning of the term ‘any sum payable’ does not include amounts not due for payment, other than taxes, duties, cesses or fees covered by clause (a).

Waiver of interest

Controversies

1. Issue for consideration


1.1 Any amount of tax, specified as payable in a notice of
demand u/s.156, is required to be paid within 30 days of the service of notice
as mandated by S. 220(1) of the Income-tax Act.

1.2 The assessee is liable to pay simple interest @ 1% for
every month or part thereof, for default in payment of the amount of tax
referred to in para 1.1 above, as per S. 220(2) of the Act. The interest levied
u/s.220(2) is to be reduced and the excess interest paid is to be refunded in
cases where the unpaid tax on which interest was levied itself is reduced on
account of orders u/s.154, u/s.155, u/s.245D, u/s. 250, u/s.254, u/s.260A,
u/s.262 and u/s.264.

1.3 A provision has been made for reduction or waiver of the
interest levied or leviable u/s.220(2) by insertion of S. 220(2A) w.e.f.
1-10-1994 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment ) Act, 1984 where-under the CBDT and
now the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner is empowered to reduce or waive the
interest u/s.220(2) on satisfaction of the conditions specified therein.

1.4 The said S. 220(2A) reads as under :

“Notwithstanding anything contained in Ss.(2), the Chief
Commissioner or Commissioner may reduce or waive the amount of interest paid
or payable by the assessee under the said sub-section if he is satisfied
that :

(i) payment of such amount has caused or would cause
genuine hardship to the assessee;

(ii) default in the payment of the amount on which
interest has been paid or was payable under the said sub-section was due to
the circumstances beyond the control of the assessee; and

(iii) the assessee has co-operated in any inquiry
relating to the assessment or any proceeding for the recovery of any amount
due from him.”


1.5 In the context of S. 220(2A), the issue that has come up
for consideration of the Courts, repetitively, is, whether an assessee is
obliged to satisfy all the three conditions laid down in S. 220(2A) for
reduction or waiver of interest or that compliance of any one or two of them
will enable the assessee to seek reduction or waiver of interest. In short, the
issue that is for consideration is whether the compliance of three conditions
specified in S. 220(2A) is cumulative or alternative. Recently, the Karnataka
High Court dissenting from the view of the Kerala, Allahabad and Madras High
Courts held that cumulative compliance of the three conditions is not required
for being eligible for reduction or waiver of interest u/s.220(2A) of the Act.

2. Ramapati Singhania’s case :


2.1 In the case of Ramapati Singhania, 234 ITR 655 (All), the
assessee’s application, made u/s.220(2A), for waiver of interest was rejected
for non-compliance of some of the conditions of the said Section. In the writ
petition filed by the assessee, he inter alia pleaded before the High
Court that for the purposes of seeking a waiver u/s.220(2A) it was not necessary
for him to have complied with all the conditions of the said Section and that he
was eligible for the requested waiver even in circumstances where some of the
conditions of the said Section stood complied with. It was emphasised that
payment of tax on capital gains without permitting the set-off of the amount to
which the petitioner was entitled u/s.50B of the Estate Duty Act, caused genuine
hardship to the assessee and thus the petitioner was justified in not making the
payment of taxes in time.

2.2 The Allahabad High Court observed that to avail of the
benefit, it was for the person seeking the relief to make out a case that the
requirements of those provisions were fulfilled and that on a plain reading of
that provision, it was evident that all the three conditions set out therein
must be satisfied cumulatively and if any of these requirements were wanting in
a given case, the discretion to reduce or waive, might be legitimately refused.

2.3 The Court accordingly upheld the action of the
authorities in denying the waiver of interest charged for delayed payment of
taxes.

3. M. V. Amar Shetty’s case :


3.1 In M. V. Amar Shetty v. CCIT & Anr., 219 CTR 141 (Karn.),
the assessee filed a writ petition being aggrieved by an order dated 21st August
2007 passed by the Chief CIT rejecting his request u/s. 220(2A) of the
Income-tax Act seeking reduction on waiver of the interest payable on the
delayed payment of tax demanded pursuant to a notice issued u/s.156 of the Act
and for defaulting in payment of tax. The petition was rejected by the Single
Judge of the Court, against which an appeal was filed by the assessee before the
Division Bench of the Court.

3.2 It was pleaded for the assessee that the impugned order
passed by the CCIT had been passed in violation of the provisions of S. 220(2A)
of the Act and was passed without an application of mind to the conditions
mentioned under the sub-section and that the request made by the petitioner had
been rejected in an arbitrary manner. It was inter alia submitted that
the finding that the petitioner had not satisfied condition (c) for waiver of
interest charged u/s.220(2A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by not co-operating
with the Department by filing returns or in the assessment proceedings/payment
of tax demand was not correct and it was also submitted that the CCIT had taken
into consideration the report of the AO, which was not made known to the
assessee and therefore, the order impugned was bad on that ground also.

3.3 For the CCIT, it was submitted that the order passed was
just and proper and did not call for any interference by the Court in the appeal
and that the learned Single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition.
Reliance was placed upon two judgments in the cases of G.T.N. Textiles Ltd.
v. DCIT & Anr.,
217 ITR 653 (Ker.) and Ramapati Singhania v. CIT & Ors.,
234 ITR 655 (All.) to submit that all the three conditions laid down in S.
220(2A) should have been satisfied before interest could be waived under the
said provision and that in the instant case the CCIT had categorically held that
condition (iii) of S. 220(2A) had not been fulfilled and therefore, the assessee
was not entitled to relief under the said provisions.

3.4 The Court on consideration of the submissions made by both the sides, was not persuaded to accept the submission made on behalf of the CCIT that, all the three conditions laid down in Ss.(2A) of S. 220 should be satisfied before relief could be given to an assessee under the said provision, as was enunciated in the two judgments referred to above and cited before the Court. The Karnataka High Court accordingly directed for due consideration of the assessee’s request for waiver of interest.

4.  Observations:

4.1 S. 220(2A), begins with a non obstante clause and is a self-contained provision. It overrides the charging provision as contained in S. 220(2). At the same time the said provision restricts the power of the authority concerned to reduce or waive the amount of interest paid or payable by an assessee only on satisfaction of the conditions set out in the three causes of S. 220(2A). For claiming relief u/ s. 220(2A), the assessee has to satisfy the three conditions, namely, (i) he has to show that the payment of the amount has caused or would cause genuine hardship to him, (ii) that the default in payment of the amount of tax on which interest has been paid or was payable was due to circumstances beyond his control, and (iii) further that he had co-operated in the enquiry relating to the assessment or any proceeding for recovery of any amount due from him.

4.2 In G.T.N. Textiles Ltd., 217 ITR 653 (Ker.), the assessee had filed an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge, 199 ITR 347, who had dismissed the original petition challenging the rejection of the application for waiver of interest levied u/ s. 220(2) of the Act. The Court in that case held that the three conditions mentioned above are to be satisfied for the operation of S. 220(2A) of the Act. The Commissioner in the said case had found that one of the necessary conditions for exercising the power u/ s. 220(2A) that the payment of interest has caused or would cause genuine hardship to the assessee was not satisfied in the case of the petitioner who was earning very good income from its business. On the facts of the case, the Kerala High Court upheld the order of the Single Judge.

4.3 In the case of Eminent Enterprises v. CIT, 236 ITR 883 (Ker.), the Kerala High Court again held that even where the first condition was most satisfied, the assessee could not avail waiver of interest.

4.4 Again in the case of Metallurgical & Engineering Consultants (India) Ltd. v. CIT, 243 ITR 547, (Pat.) the Court held that all the three conditions mentioned above are to be satisfied for the operation of S. 220(2A). Where the Commissioner had found that the first condition was not satisfied on the basis of certain facts, and had refused to waive interest u/ s.220(2), there was no scope for the High Court to interfere with such a discretionary order.

4.5 Lately, the Madras High Court in the case of Auro Foods Ltd., 239 ITR 548, held that an assessee for the purposes of waiver of interest u/ s.220(2A) has to satisfy all the three conditions and that non-compliance of anyone of them may expose his petition to rejection by the authorities.

4.6 On a plain reading of S. 220(2A), it is evident that all the three conditions set out therein are to be satisfied cumulatively for seeking a valid relief. Where any of the requirements has not been fulfilled the discretion to reduce or waive may be legitimately refused. Thus satisfaction of one or more but not all conditions may not make an assessee eligible for reduction or the waiver of interest u/ s.220(2A). This is the way the Courts have interpreted the law with the exception of the Karnataka High Court.

4.7 The order of the Karnataka High Court provides for fresh thinking on an almost settled position in law. The Court perhaps has been impressed by the important fact that the provision of S. 220(2A) has been inserted for granting relief to an assessee in circumstances which are found to be judicious by the Court and in a case where the Court finds the case of the assessee to be so judicious, the relief should not be denied on the ground of numerical non-compliance, but instead be granted in a deserving case.

Interest income and mutuality

1. Issue for consideration :

    1.1 Income of certain associations of persons is exempt on the doctrine of mutuality. The common examples of these associations are clubs, societies, trade professional and mutual benefit associations, where the contributors to the fund and the recipients or beneficiaries of the fund are the same persons or class of persons. In other words, such persons are contributing to the common fund for their common good.

    1.2 Receipt of subscription from members to the common fund is exempt on the grounds of mutuality, as in such cases, the contributors and the beneficiaries are the same persons or the same class of persons, and on the same principles, the receipt by the members on distribution is exempt from tax. The difficulty however arises often in cases where the funds are invested for earning interest income; whether such income also qualifies for exemption, on the grounds of mutuality in the hands of the association. The issue gets further complicated if the interest income is earned from investments made with members.

    1.3 For quite some time it was believed that the issue has been settled in favour of non-taxation, as was discussed in the BCAJ in the past. The issue however has reemerged and it appears that the courts presently are divided on this issue under consideration, which fact has made us take note of the same and examine the aspect afresh to ascertain whether the view canvassed in the past requires a reconsideration. While the Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Delhi High Courts have taken the view in a few cases that such interest income is exempt on the grounds of mutuality, the Karnataka, Madras and Gujarat High Courts seem to have taken a contrary view in other cases.

2. Canara Bank Golden Jubilee Staff Welfare Fund’s case :

    2.1 The issue recently came up before the Karnataka High Court in the case of Canara Bank Golden Jubilee Staff Welfare Fund v. Dy. CIT, 308 ITR 202 (Kar.).

    2.2 In this case, the assessee was a society consisting of employees of Canara Bank, established with the object of promoting welfare amongst members who contributed towards the corpus fund. The welfare fund was utilised for advancing loans to members, on which it received interest, which constituted the major portion of its revenue. Surplus funds were kept with the bank, on which interest also was earned. The assessee also earned dividend income on shares.

    2.3 The assessee filed the return of income claiming exemption on the principle of mutuality. The assessment was completed u/s.143(1)(a). Subsequently the income was reassessed, bringing to tax the interest income on investments and dividend income on shares. The Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeals of the assessee. The Tribunal also dismissed the assessee’s appeals.

    2.4 Before the High Court, on behalf of the assessee it was argued that the Society was established for mutual benefit of its members, and funds of the Society, consisting of contribution from the members, were used for advancing loans to members and collecting interest from the members. As such, it was claimed that the income was exempt from tax on the principle of mutuality. It was further claimed that the funds collected by the appellant were used to provide monetary assistance to members, and, as a matter of precaution, the surplus funds were kept in the bank, not with the primary object of earning interest, but to keep such funds in safe custody. Further, such interest earned had been used only for the ultimate benefit of members. It was claimed that while applying the principle of mutuality, it was the source of the deposit that had to be taken into consideration and not the manner in which the funds were applied. Reliance was placed by the assessee on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Chelmsford Club v. CIT, 243 ITR 89 and the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in the case of CIT v. Natraj Finance Corporation, 169 ITR 732.

    2.5 On behalf of the Department, reliance was placed on the earlier Karnataka High Court decision in the case of CIT v. ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund, 234 ITR 308, in which case the High Court had taken the view that such interest income was taxable, to contend that the income in question was taxable.

    2.6 The Karnataka High Court, while discussing the principle of mutuality, observed that the following three conditions should exist before an activity could be brought under the concept of mutuality; that no person can earn from himself, that there is no profit motivation, and that there is no sharing of profits. It noted that the source of funds in the case before it was only from the members of the assessee and that the assessee had not received any donations or other monetary grants from any outside source, apart from the members during the relevant years. It was therefore the member’s contribution which had become the corpus fund which was utilised to advance loans to members and invested, from which the interest and dividend has arisen.

    2.7 The Karnataka High Court noted that the funds of the assessee had been invested in the term deposit with the bank which was not a member of the assessee’s welfare fund, and interest had been earned on such investment. Though the bank formed a third-party vis-à-vis the assessee, it could not be said that the identity between the contributors and the recipients was lost in such a case. The High Court observed that in ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund’s case (supra), the ingredients of mutuality were missing as, apart from contributions made by members, there were other sources of funding of the trust fund, including contributions made by the ITI management and donations. Further, in that case, the object of the trust was to invest the funds of the trust in banks and securities for earning interest to discharge the liabilities and obligations created under the trust.

    2.8 Taking into consideration the objects of the assessee, the source of funds during the relevant years and the applicability of the funds for the benefit of its members, and keeping in mind the interest on investments and dividend earned on shares was only a small portion of the total earned by investment of the surplus funds wholly contributed by the members of the assessee, the Karnataka High Court held that the interest earned on investment and dividend received on shares was deemed income from the property of the assessee contributed by its members, and was governed by the principle of mutuality and was therefore exempt.

2.9 The Court noted with approval a similar view which had been taken earlier by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Natraj Finance Corporation, 169 ITR 733. In that case, the assessee was a firm which lent money to its partners, and during the relevant years, received income on out-standing dues from a former partner and on amounts deposited in a savings account with a bank. The Court held that such interest, considering the quantum of such interest in relation to the total income, was also exempt on the grounds of mutuality, as it could not be said that the assessee was carrying on business in order to derive such a small amount of income.

2.10 The Court also noted that the Delhi High Court also, in the case of DIT(E) v. All India Oriental Bank of Commerce Welfare Society, 130 Taxman 575, has held that the principle of mutuality applies to interest income derived by a co-operative society from deposits made out of contributions made by members of the society. In taking this view, the Delhi High Court took a cue from the decision of the Supreme Court in Chelmsford Club v. CIT, 243 ITR 89, where the Supreme Court had laid down the principle that where a number of persons combine together to a common fund for financing of some venture or object and in this respect have no dealings or relations with any outside body, then any surplus generated cannot in any sense be regarded as profits chargeable to tax.

3. Madras  Gymkhana Club’s  case:

3.1 The issue again recently came up before the Madras High Court in the case of Madras Gymkhana Club v. Dy. CIT, 183 Taxman 333.

3.2 The assessee in this case was a sports club providing various facilities to its members, such as restaurant, gymnasium, library, bar, coffee shop and swimming pool. Apart from the surplus funds derived from such activities, it also received interest income from its corporate members on the investment of surplus funds as fixed deposits with them. It claimed that such interest income was covered by the concept of mutuality and was therefore exempt from tax.

3.3 In the course of reassessment proceedings, the income from investment was subjected to tax along with certain other interest income. Both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal rejected the appeals of the assessee.

3.4 Before the Madras High Court, it was argued on behalf of the assessee that the interest earned by the club out of fixed deposits and other investments made with its own institutional members was covered by the principle of mutuality. On behalf of the Revenue, it was argued that the interest on such investments could not be brought within the concept of mutuality as such investments were in the regular course of business of such club and had no nexus with either membership or regular activities of the club.

3.5 The Madras High Court noted that it had held in an earlier case in Wankaner fain Social Welfare Society v. CIT, 260 ITR 241, that to satisfy the concept of mutuality, the identity was required to be established in relation to the relevant income as regards those contributing to the income and those participating in the distribution of that income. According to the Madras High Court, surplus funds deposited with a member bank enured to the benefit of that member alone, who was in a position to utilise the deposit in any manner it liked, thereby depriving other members of enjoyment of such benefit, which did not satisfy the test of identity of the contributors and the participants. Though the distribution of interest was to all members, there was no identity between the contributors and the participants, inasmuch as the distribution of interest was made both to members with whom funds were deposited and to those with whom funds were not deposited, while the interest was earned only from members with whom funds were deposited.

3.6 The Madras High Court also noted that the club had received donations and gifts as well as sponsorship for programmes and activities, and advertisements. According to the Madras High Court, on a reading of the objects of the club and the provisions for making the investments, the position which emerged was that the investment of surplus funds had nothing to do with the objects of the club. It also noted that substantial amounts had been earned by way of interest from such investment of surplus funds, and that there were no plans for immediate utilisation of such funds.

3.7 The Madras High Court, following the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Bangalore Club, 287 ITR 263, held that the interest earned on investment of surplus funds, being substantial, could not be held to satisfy the mutuality concept and was therefore taxable.

3.8 A similar view had been taken earlier by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Bangalore Club (supra), where the Karnataka High Court had held that interest on surplus funds placed by the club in fixed deposits with member banks was not exempt on the ground of mutuality. The Court noted that the Karnataka High Court had also earlier in the case of ITI Employees Death and Superannuation Relief Fund (supra) held that interest on investments earned by the fund was not exempt on the grounds of mutuality and so also the Gujarat High Court, in the case of Sports Club of Gujarat Ltd. v. CIT, 171 ITR 504, has held that in the case of a club whose object was to promote the game of cricket and other games and sports, which derived income from investments of surplus funds, the income from interest was not from mutual activity and was therefore liable to tax.

4. Observations:

4.1 When one analyses the decisions on the subject, one notices that the difference of opinion between the Courts hinges on the answers to the following questions:

Firstly, for application of the doctrine of mutuality, in order to claim exemption on the ground of mutuality, is it sufficient that an income arise out of an investment of surplus generated from members, or is it necessary that such income should also arise from members only?

Secondly, does the activity of investment with non-members amount to a separate activity, distinct from the main activity of the entity and therefore not covered by mutuality? Is it not sufficient that the funds invested are out of the surplus of the members and the income received on investment is also for the benefit of the members?

Thirdly, is the object for which funds are invested relevant, is it necessary that the investment income should arise out of the main activity in order for the income to qualify for mutuality?

4.2 The Supreme Court in CIT v. Bankipur Club Ltd., 226 ITR 97, held that a host of factors, not one single factor, have to be considered to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the principle of mutuality applies in a given case or not, and further observed that whether or not the persons dealing with each other are a mutual club or not and whether such persons are carrying on a trading activity or an adventure in the nature of trade is largely a question of fact.

4.3 In the case of Chelmsford Club (supra), the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the annual letting value. of the clubhouse of the Chelmsford Club, which provided recreational and refreshment facilities exclusively to its members and their guests, was liable to income-tax. In that case, certain observations of the Supreme Court indicate that the principle of mutuality has to be considered qua the business or the object thereof. However, one must keep in mind the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, where there was no actual income arising other than out of the activity of the club, and therefore the Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider whether the principle of mutuality should be applied to certain incomes separately.

4.4 In the case of Bankipur Club (supra), the Su-preme Court cited from the Halsbury’s Laws of England as under:

“Where a number of persons combine together and contribute to a common fund for the financing of some venture or object and will in this respect have no dealings or relations with any outside body, then any surplus returned to those persons cannot be regarded in any sense as profit. There must be complete identity between the contributors and the participators. If these requirements are fulfilled, it is immaterial what particular form the association takes. Trading between persons associating together in this way does not give rise to profits which are chargeable to tax.

Where the trade or activity is mutual, the fact that, as regards certain activities, only certain members of the association take advantage of the facilities which it offers does not affect the mutuality of the enterprise.

Members’ clubs are an example of a mutual undertaking; but, where a club extends facilities to non-members, to that extent the element of mutuality is wanting …. “.

The Supreme Court in that case  also cited from Simon’s Taxes as under:

…. it is settled law that if the persons carrying on a trade do so in such a way that they and the customers are the same persons, no profits or gains are yielded by the trade for tax purposes and therefore, no assessment in respect of the trade can be made. Any surplus resulting from this form of trading represents only the extent to
which the contributions of the participators have proved to be in excess of requirements. Such a surplus is regarded as their own money and returnable to them. In order that this exempting element of mutuality should exist, it is essential that the profits should be capable of coming back at some time and in some form to the persons to whom the goods were sold or the services rendered …. “

4.5 In the above referred Bankipur Club’s case, the Court was concerned with the clubs’ entitlement to exemption for (i) the receipts or surplus arising from the sales of drinks, refreshments, etc., (ii) amounts received by way of rent for letting out the buildings, and (iii) amounts received by way of admission fees, periodical subscriptions and receipts of similar nature, from its members and guests. The Supreme Court noted that the amounts received by the clubs for supply of drinks, refreshments or other goods as also the letting out of building for rent or the amounts received by way of admission fees, periodical subscription, etc. from the members of the clubs were only for/towards charges for the privileges, conveniences and amenities provided to the members, which they were entitled to as per the rules and regulations of the respective clubs. It also noted that different clubs realised various sums on the above counts only to afford to their members the usual privileges, advantages, conveniences and accommodation. In other words, the services offered on the above counts were not with any profit motive, and were not tainted with commerciality. The facilities were offered only as a matter of convenience for the use of members (and their friends, if any, availing of the facilities occasionally). On that reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the excess-surplus arising from the mutual arrangement, including amounts received from guests (though third parties), was exempt on the grounds of mutuality. Incidentally, one of the assessees in this case was Cawnpore Club, where the income that was sought to be assessed was derived from property let out and also interest received from ED.R., N.s.C., etc. The Supreme Court delinked that case and did not decide it, directing it to be put up for a separate hearing.

4.6 In the case of Chelmsford Club (supra), the Supreme Court observed :

“It is clear that it is not only the surplus from the activities of the business of the club that is excluded from the levy of income-tax, even the annual value of the club-house, as contemplated in S. 22 of the Act, will be outside the purview of the levy of income-tax.”

” …. we are of the view that the business of the appellant is governed by the principle of mutuality – even the deemed income from its property is governed by the said principle of mutuality.”

4.7 From the foregoing, relying on the views of the the Courts and the commentaries on taxation, the emerging view is that the surplus from the activity of mutual benefit association of any form is exempt from taxation and such exemption is not restricted to some specific incomes.

4.8 An incidental  question  that may as well be addressed is whether the activity of investment is an integral part of the object of the mutual benefit association or is an independent activity which aspect would depend upon the facts of each case. Various factors as follows may be helpful in examining this aspect: (i) Whether the investment is a mere temporary deployment of surplus funds, or of a long-term nature? (ii) Whether the intention behind making the investment is merely to see that the funds are not kept idle, but deployed till such time as required? (iii) Is the quantum of investment income small as compared to members’ contributions ? (iv) Whether the surplus has been built up only out of member contributions? Generally, if the investment income is small in relation to member contributions and the investment is primarily with a view to deploy unutilised funds, the investment activity cannot be regarded as an activity independent of the object of the association, and would be part of the surplus qualifying for exemption.

4.9 The rigours surely will be easy when investment is made with the members of the association. However here also, difference might be carved out between an investment made as an investor and the one made in the normal course.

4.10 The rigours will also be eased in cases where an investment of the association’s funds has been made pending the use of surplus funds on activi-ties of the association.

4.11 With utmost respect for the Madras High Court, the insistence on commonality between the contributors and the beneficiaries in case of investments, seems to be misplaced. The test of commonality is required to be satisfied w.r.t. the members’ contributions, and not w.r.t. the interest income arisng out of deployment of such members’ contributions. It is also helpful that the interest income that arises out of the deployment of surplus funds of members is earned for the members’ benefit, who surely are the participants on distribution of such an income.

4.12 An important principle of mutuality is that the members receive back that which was their own. The fact that in the meanwhile the funds belonging to them were deployed would not materially alter the applicability of the principle where the income remains, in reality, the income of the members.

4.13 The issue however continues to be contentious as is evident from the conflicting decisions of the Courts including the decision in the case of Rajpath Club Ltd., 211 ITR 379 (Guj.), Gulmarg Association & Anr., 90 TTJ 184 (Ahd.) and Sagar Sanjog CHS Ltd. ITA No. 1972, 1973 and 1974/Mum./2005.

4.14 The better view in the meanwhile seems to be that interest income of a mutual benefit association earned on its investments is exempt from tax under the doctrine of mutuality and the case for its exemption is stronger where the deployment of funds is merely a part of and incidental to the object of the association.

Payment to Non-Resident in Respect of Income Not Chargable to Tax — Obligation of TDS u/s.195

Closements

Introduction :

1.1 U/s.195(1) of the
Income-tax Act (the Act), any person responsible for paying (Payer) to a
Non-Resident or Foreign Company (Payee) any interest or ‘any other sum
chargeable under the provision of the Act’ (hereinafter referred to as taxable
income) is required to deduct tax at source (TDS/TAS). Such TDS is required to
be made either at the time of crediting the income to the account of the Payee
or at the time of payment thereof, whichever is earlier at the rates inforce.
The provision applies to all the Payers, including individual and HUF. The only
specific exclusion provided is in respect of payment of dividend which is exempt
by virtue of payment of Dividend Distribution Tax. Some relief is provided to
the Government, Public Sector Banks, etc. with regard to the timings of the TDS
with which we are not concerned in this write-up. The scope of the provision is
wide and therefore, the implications thereof have far-reaching effect in large
numbers of cases as the number of such payments has increased manifold with the
development of the economy and growth of cross border transactions in the last
decade — S. 195(1).

1.2 The provision is also
made that if the Payer considers that the whole of such a sum would not be
chargeable to tax in the hands of the Payee, he may make an application to the
Assessing Officer (AO) to determine the appropriate portion of such taxable
income by passing a general or special order and upon such determination, the
Payer is obliged to deduct tax only on the portion so determined — S. 195(2).

1.3 The provision is also
made that the specified recipient of such a sum can also make an application to
the AO in the prescribed form for grant of a certificate authorising him to
receive such sum without TDS and upon grant of such a certificate, the Payer is
required to make payment without TDS. These provisions are largely used by
foreign banks operating in India for receiving payments from their customers
without TDS. — S. 195(3)/(5) read with Rule 29B.

1.4 Provision for receiving
income without TDS or with TDS at a lower rate has also been made by following
appropriate procedure of making application to the AO and obtaining appropriate
certificate to that effect with which we are not concerned in this write-up — S.
197. We may clarify that the provisions relating to receipt of income without
TDS by furnishing appropriate declaration in the prescribed form (such as
15G/15H) contained in S. 197A are applicable only to Resident Payees. Therefore,
Non-Resident Payees cannot avail of this facility. In this write-up, we are also
not concerned with other exceptions provided from the operations of TDS
provisions.

1.5 The Apex Court in the
case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. LTD. (239 ITR 597) has held that the
expression ‘taxable income’ used in S. 195(1) applies to any sum payable to the
Non-Resident even if such a sum is a trading receipt in the hands of the payee,
if, the whole or part thereof is chargeable to tax under the Act. These
provisions are not only limited to the sums which are of ‘Pure Income’ nature.
Based on this judgment, it was rightly felt that in the profession as well by
the Payers of such income that the TDS is required to be made u/s.195(1) only
if, the income is chargeable to tax (partly or wholly) under the Act and in
cases where, the income itself is not chargeable to tax (Non-taxable income)
question of making any TDS should not arise. Other principles emerging from the
said judgment of the Apex Court are not considered as the same are not relevant
for this write-up. We have analysed this judgment of the Apex Court in this
column in the October, 1999 issue of this Journal.

1.6 In view of the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. referred
to in para 1.5 above (hereinafter referred to as Transmission Corporation’s
case), the litigation on many issues with regard to the obligation to make TDS
should have got substantially reduced. However, the Revenue interpreted the
effect of the above judgment little differently and felt that it is not for the
assessee to decide whether the income is chargeable in the hands of the Payee or
not, and hence, the litigation on the obligation to make TDS continued, even on
such aspects.

1.7 Pending the issue
referred to para 1.6 above, S. 195(6) was introduced by the Finance Act, 2008
(with effect from 1-4-2008) providing that the Payer shall furnish the
information relating to payments of such sums in the prescribed form and manner.
For this Rule 37BB was introduced and the procedure for making remittances is
provided for which the certificate of Chartered Accountant in the prescribed
Form 15CB is required to be obtained by the Payer before making remittance to
the Payee (New Procedure for Remittance). Earlier, there was a requirement for
obtaining certificate of Chartered Accountant for making remittance to the
Non-Resident, but the same was operating under the Circulars issued by CBDT.

1.8 The effect of judgment
of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation’s case came up for consideration
before the Karnataka High Court (320 ITR 209) in the case of M/s. Samsung
Electronics Co. Ltd. and other cases (hereinafter referred to as ‘Samsung’s
case’) in the context of obligation to make TDS in respect of payments made to
Non-Resident Payees for supply of shrinkwrapped standardised software. In this
write-up, we are not concerned with the character of payment for the supply of
such software. However, various views expressed/observations made by the
Karnataka High Court in relation to the provision of S. 195 and the obligations
of the Payer to make TDS under the same, as well as the effect of the Apex
Court’s judgment in Transmission Corporation’s case, raised large number of
practical and legal issues.

1.8.1 In Samsung’s case, the High Court expressed various views in relation to S. 195 having far-reaching implications such as: S. 195(1) is neither a provision for ascertaining the tax liability of a Non-Resident, nor for determining whether u/s.9 of the Act, any income is deemed to have accrued or arisen to Non -Resident in India; the provision applies once the payment is made to a Non-Resident; it provides limited relief from such obligation if, the payer is able to demonstrate before the AO that the entire payment does not bear the character of income, but only a part of thereof bears such character, etc. According to the Court, the question of character of income being paid to Non-Resident Payee can only be decided in the regular assessment and cannot be determined in the proceedings u/s.195 and such questions are not relevant for determining the obligation to make TDS u/s.195. According to the Court, even in the proceeding u/s.195(2), the AO cannot embark upon exercise of determining the actual tax liability and entertain the plea that income is not chargeable to tax. The question of character of income and the tax liability of Payee cannot even be considered by the Appellate Authority in appeal proceedings against the order of the AO passed u/s.201 and if so, it was also not open to the Appellate Tribunal to venture on finding an answer to vary question in the further appeal to the Tribunal as it is not a proper exercise of its appellate powers. The Payers and the profession were shocked by these views as practically it was almost impossible to comply with the obligation to make TDS in terms of these views.

1.8.2 In particular, the following findings of the High Court read with other observations made in Samsung’s case created a situation referred to in para 1.8.1. (pages 245-246):

“If one is allowed the liberty of giving a rough and crude comparison to the manner in which the provisions of S. 195 of the Act operate on a resident payer who makes payment to a non-resident recipient and if the payment bears the character of semblance of an income receipt in the hands of the non -resident recipient, then the obligation on the part of the resident payer who makes such a payment to the non-resident recipient is like a guided missile which gets itself attached to the target, the moment the resident -assessee makes payment to the non-resident recipient and there is no way of the resident payer avoiding the guided missile zeroing in on the resident payer whether by way of contending that the amount does not necessarily result in the receipt of an amount taxable as income in the hands of the non-resident recipient under the Act or even by contending that the non-resident recipient could have possibly avoided any liability for payment of tax under the Act by the overall operation of different provisions of the Act or even by the combined operation of the provisions of a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and the Act as is sought to be contended by the respondents in the present appeals.

The only limited way of either avoiding or warding off the guided missile is by the resident payer invoking the provisions of S. 195(2) of the Act and even here to the very limited extent of correcting an incorrect identification, an incorrect computation or to call in aid the actual determination of the tax liability of the non-resident which is in fact had been determined as part of the process of assessing the income of the non-resident and by using that as the basis for claiming a proportionate reduction in the rate at which the deduction is required to be made on the payment to the non-resident. Except for this method, there is no other way of the resident payer avoiding the obligations cast on it by the provisions of S. 195(1) of the Act and as a consequence of such default when is served with a demand notice in terms of S. 201 of the Act.

This position is the clear legal position that emerges on analysing the full effect of the provisions of S. 195 of the Act in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd.’s case (1999) 239 ITR 587.”

1.8.3 Subsequently, it was expected that the CBDT will come out with some clarification to relieve the Payers from the abnormal hardship created by the above judgment but that never happened. Fortunately, the Delhi High Court in the case of Van Oord ACZ India (189 Taxman 232) and Special Bench of ITAT (Chennai) in the case of M/s. Prasad Production (125 ITD 263) took a different view on the major issue and explained the correct effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation’s case. These gave some relief to the Payers, but the issues survived due to the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Samsung’s case.

G. E. India Technology Centre P. Ltd. v. CIT, 327 ITR 456 (SC):

2.1 The above-referred judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Samsung’s case came up for consideration before the Apex Court (in a batch of appeals filed by various assessees — reported as GE India Technology Centre P. Ltd). For the purpose of deciding the issue, the Court noted the facts of the leading case of Sonata Information Technology Ltd. In that case, the assessee was distributors of imported pre- packaged shrink-wrapped standardised software from Microsoft and other suppliers outside India. The assessee made payments for such softwares to suppliers without making TDS on the ground that such payments represent purchase price of the goods. The Income-tax Officer (TDS) (ITO), however, took the view that such payments are in the nature of royalty, as the sale of software included a licence to use the same and accordingly, the same represents income deemed to accrue or arise in India. The first Appellate Authority upheld the view of the ITO. However, the Appellate Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee and held that such payment did not give rise to any taxable income in India and therefore, the assessee was not liable to deduct Tax At Source (TAS). When the matter came up before the Karnataka High Court at the instance of the Revenue, the contention was raised for the first time on behalf of the Revenue that unless the Payer makes an application to the ITO u/s.195(2) and has obtained permission to make for non-deduction of the TAS, it was not permissible for making payment without making deduction of TAS. This contention was accepted by the High Court for which a strong reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation’s case.

2.2 At the outset, the Court noted that the short question which arises for determination in this batch of cases, is as follows (page 458):

“whether the High Court was right in holding that the moment there is remittance the obligation to deduct tax at source (TAS) arises? Whether merely on account of such remittance to the non-resident abroad by an Indian company per se, could it be said that income chargeable to tax under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘I.T. Act’) arises in India”

2.3 To decide the issue on hand, the Court referred to the provisions of S. 195 and in particular, also noted the New Procedure for Remittance contained in S. 195(6). The Court, then, explained the scheme of S. 195 and other relevant provisions under which the statutory obligation is imposed on the Payer to deduct tax while making payment to non-resident and the consequences of the default, if any, committed by the Payer in that respect. The Court, then, stated that the most important expression contained in S. 195 (1) is ‘chargeable under the provisions of the Act’. Therefore, a person making payment to a non-resident is not obliged to deduct tax if, such sum is not chargeable to tax under the Act. While explaining the effect of this expression, the Court further stated as under (pages 460/461):

“….It may be noted that S. 195 contemplates not merely amounts, the whole of which are pure income payments, it also covers composite payments which have an element of income embedded or incorporated in them. Thus, where an amount is payable to a non-resident, the payer is under an obligation to deduct TAS in respect of such composite payments. The obligation to deduct TAS is, however, limited to the appropriate proportion of income chargeable under the Act forming part of the gross sum of money payable to the non-resident. This obligation being limited to the appropriate proportion of income flows from the words used in S. 195(1), namely, ‘chargeable under the provisions of the Act.’ It is for this reason that vide Circular No. 728, dated October 30, 1995 the Central Board of Direct Taxes has clarified that the tax deductor can take into consideration the effect of the DTAA in respect of payment of royalties and technical fees while deducting TAS….”

2.4 Proceeding further, the Court noted that S. 195(1) is in identical terms with S. 18(3B) of the 1922 Act. Under those provisions, in the case of Cooper Engg. Ltd. (68 ITR 457 — Bom.), it was pointed out that if the payment made by the resident to the non-resident does not represent taxable income in India, then no tax is required to be deducted, even if the Payer has not made any application u/s.18(3C) [similar to S. 195(2) of the Act], the Court, then, explained effect of S. 195(2) as under (page 461])?:

“….The application of S. 195(2) pre-supposes that the person responsible for making the payment to the non -resident is in no doubt that tax is payable in respect of some part of the amount to be remitted to a non-resident, but is not sure as to what should be the portion so taxable or is not sure as to the amount of tax to be deducted. In such a situation, he is required to make an application to the Income-tax Officer (TDS) for determining the amount. It is only when these conditions are satisfied and an application is made to the Income- tax Officer (TDS) that the question of making an order u/s.195(2) will arise. In fact, at one point of time, there was a provision in the Income-tax Act to obtain a NOC from the Department that no tax was due. That certificate was required to be given to the RBI for making remittance. It was held in the case of Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping International Joint Stock Company v. ITO, (1971) 81 ITR 162 (Cal.) that an application for NOC cannot be said to be an application u/s.195(2) of the Act. While deciding the scope of S. 195(2) it is important to note that the tax which is required to be deducted at source is deductible only out of the chargeable sum. This is the underlying principle of S. 195. Hence, apart from S. 9(1), S. 4, S. 5, S. 9, S. 90, S. 91 as well as the provisions of the DTAA are also relevant, while applying tax deduction at source provisions…..”

2.5 The Court, then, stated that the application to the ITO u/s.195(2) or u/s.195(3) is to avoid any further hassles for both residents as well as non-residents. The said provisions are of practical importance. Referring to the judgment in Transmission Corporation’s case, the Court pointed out that in that case the Apex Court has observed that the provisions of S. 195(2) is a safeguard. Based on this, the Court, then, further stated as under (pages 461/462):

“From this it follows that where a person responsible for deduction is fairly certain, then he can make his own determination as to whether the tax was deductible at source and, if so, what should be the amount thereof.”

2.6 Dealing with the contention raised on behalf of the Revenue that the moment there is remittance, the obligation to deduct TAS arises, the Court stated that if this is accepted, then we are obliterating the words ‘chargeable under the provisions of the Act’ in S. 195(1). Referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Ship Breaking Corpn. (314 ITR 309), the Court stated that the Payer is bound to deduct TAS only if, the tax is assessable in India. If tax is not so assessable, there is no question of TAS being deducted. Referring to the scheme of deduction of TAS contained in Chapter XVII-B, the Court stated that on analysis of various provisions contained therein, one finds the use of different expressions, however, the expression ‘sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act’ is used only in S. 195. In no other provision this expression is found. Therefore, the Court is required to give meaning and effect to the said expression. Therefore, it follows that the obligation to deduct TAS arises only when there is a sum chargeable under the Act. S. 195 is to be read in conformity with charging provision (S. 4, S. 5 and S. 9). The Court stated that we cannot treat S. 195 to mean that the moment there is remittance, the obligation to deduct TAS arises. If such a contention is accepted, it would mean that on mere remittance income would be said to arise or accrue in India. While interpreting a Section, one has to give weightage to every word used in the Section. Again, the Act is to be read as an integrated code and one cannot read the charging Section of the Act de hors the machinery provision as held by the Apex Court in the case the Eli Lilly (312 ITR 325).

2.6.1 Explaining further, the effect of the above referred contention of the Revenue, the Court stated as under (page 463):

“….If the contention of the Department that any person making payment to a non-resident is necessarily required to deduct TAS, then the consequence would be that the Department would be entitled to appropriate the monies deposited by the payer even if the sum paid is not chargeable to tax because there is no provision in the Income- tax Act by which a payer can obtain refund. S. 237 read with S. 199 implies that only the recipient of the sum, i.e., the payee could seek a refund. It must therefore follow if the Department is right, that the law requires tax to be deducted on all payments, the payer, therefore, has to deduct and pay tax, even if the so-called deduction comes out of his own pocket and he has no remedy whatsoever, even where the sum paid by him is not a sum chargeable under the Act. The interpretation of the Department, therefore, not only requires the words ‘chargeable under the provisions of the Act’ to be omitted, it also leads to an absurd consequence. The interpretation placed by the Department would result in a situation where even when the income has no territorial nexus with India or is not chargeable in India, the Government would nonetheless collect tax….”

2.7 Dealing with another argument of the Revenue that huge seepage of the revenue can take place if the Payers are free to decide to deduct or not to deduct TAS, the Court stated that according to the Revenue, S. 195(2) is a provision requiring the Payer to give information so that the Revenue is able to keep track of the remittances made to non-residents outside India. The Court did not find any merit in this contention. For this, the Court noted that the Payer when he makes remittance, he claims a deduction or allowance of sum as an expenditure and if there is default in making TAS, such expenditure will get disallowed as provided in S. 40(a)(i). This provision ensures effective compliance of S.

195.    The Court also noted the New Procedure for Remittance introduced in the form of 195(6) with effect from 1-4-2008 and stated that it will not apply for the period under consideration. Finally, the Court took the view that there are adequate safeguards created in the Act, which would prevent the revenue leakages.

2.8 The Court, then, considered the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court in Transmission Corporation’s case and stated that the only issue raised in that case was whether TDS was applicable only to pure income payments and not to composite payments, which had an element of income embedded therein. The controversy before the Court in the present cases is, therefore, quite different. In that case, it was held by the Court that if the Payer had a doubt as to the amount to be deducted as TAS, he could approach to the ITO to compute the amount on which deduction of TAS has to be made. Explaining the effect of the said judgment, as well as the effect of S. 195(2), the Court concluded as under (pages 465/466):

“…..In our view, S. 195(2) is based on the “principle of proportionality”. The said sub-section gets attracted only in cases where the payment made is a composite payment in which a certain proportion of payment has an element of “income” chargeable to tax in India. It is in this context that the Supreme Court stated, “If no such application is filed, income-tax on such sum is to be deducted and it is the statutory obligation of the person responsible for paying such ‘sum’ to deduct tax thereon before making payment. He has to discharge the obligation to TDS”. If one reads the observation of the Supreme Court, the words ‘such sum’ clearly indicate that the observation refers to a case of composite payment where the payer has a doubt regarding the inclusion of an amount in such payment which is exigible to tax in India. In our view, the above observations of this Court in Transmission Corporation case (1999) 239 ITR 587 (SC) which are put in italics have been completely, with respect, misunderstood by the Karnataka High Court to mean that it is not open for the payer to contend that if the amount paid by him to the non-resident is not at all ‘charge-able to tax in India’, then no TAS is required to be deducted from such payment….”

2.9 On merits of the cases on hand, the Court noted that the ITO and the First Appellate Authority have taken a view that the payment for supply of software constituted royalty, whereas the Appellate Tribunal has held otherwise and accepted the contention of the Appellant(s). However, the High Court did not go into merits of the cases. Therefore, the cases are remitted to the High Court for de novo consideration on merits.

Conclusion:

3.1 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, now it is the settled that if the payment is made to a non-resident, which is not a taxable income in India, then no tax is required to be deducted u/s.195.

3.2 For the above purpose, it is open to the Payer to decide whether such payment is at all chargeable to tax in India as the income of the Payee. For this purpose, the Payer can take into account the relevant provisions of the Act as well as applicable Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA). If, in the process, the Payer is fairly certain about the non-taxability, he need not deduct TAS.

3.3 In view of the above judgment of the Apex Court, for the purpose of determination taxability of the remittance being made to non-resident, it is also open to the Payer to determine the character of income in the hands of non-resident Payee.

3.4 There are adequate safeguard in the Act to prevent revenue leakages, notwithstanding the above view of the Apex Court on the provisions of S. 195.

3.5 In the above judgment, the Court has also relied on its judgment in the case of Eli Lilly & C0. India Pvt. Ltd. (312 ITR 225). In this case, the Court dealt with the liability for TDS u/s.192 in respect of ‘Home Salary’ paid by the foreign company outside India to expatiates, seconded to the Indian company. We have analysed this judgment in this column in the May/June, 2009 issues of this journal. For the effect of the same and other consequences of default for non-compliance of TDS provisions, reference may be made to the same.

Concealment Penalty — Whether mens rea is essential ?

Closements

Introduction :


1.1 S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act (the Act) provides for
levy of penalty (Concealment Penalty) in cases where the assessee has concealed
particulars of his income (‘Concealment of Income) or furnished inaccurate
particulars of such income (Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars). Explanation 1 to
S. 271(1) provides a legal fiction whereunder any addition or disallowance is
deemed to represent Concealed Income for the purpose of levy of Concealment
Penalty, provided conditions of the Explanation are satisfied. The Explanation
provides that (i) where the assessee fails to offer an explanation in respect of
any facts, material to the computation of total income or offers an explanation
for the same, which is found to be false, or (ii) where the assessee is not able
to substantiate the explanation offered by him and fails to prove that the same
is bona fide and that all the facts relating to the same and material to
the computation of his income have been disclosed by him, then the amount added
or disallowed shall be deemed to represent Concealed Income. This Explanation
shifts the burden of proof from the Department to the assessee. In substance,
the Explanation provides for a deeming fiction whereunder any addition or
disallowance made to the total income shall be regarded as Concealed Income for
the purpose of levy of Concealment Penalty under the circumstances mentioned
therein (hereinafter this Explanation 1 is referred to as the said Explanation).
The said Explanation has undergone change from time to time and the same was
last substituted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, which was
subsequently amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 1986 with effect from 10-9-1986.

1.2 Various issues are under debate with regard to the
provisions relating to levy of Concealment Penalty. One such issue is with
regard to nature of this penalty and whether mens rea is essential
ingredient for invoking the provisions for imposing Concealment Penalty.

1.3 Recently in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Dilip N. Shroff (291 ITR 519), it was, inter alia, held that the order
imposing such penalty is quasi-criminal in nature and ‘Concealment of Income’
and ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’, both refer to deliberate act on the
part of the assessee. In substance, the Court expressed the view that mens
rea
is essential ingredient for invoking provisions relating to the
Concealment Penalty. Therefore, this became one of the major defences for the
assessee in the matter of levy of Concealment Penalty.

1.4 Subsequently, another Bench of the Apex Court while
dealing with similar provisions relating to the levy of penalty under the
Central Excise Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder (the Excise Act),
expressed a doubt about the correctness of the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra) on the principle laid down therein that
for levy of such Concealment Penalty deliberate act of ‘Concealment of Income’
or ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’ on the part of the assessee is essential.
This Division Bench felt that correct position in law in this regard is laid
down in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Chairman, SEBI’s case
[(2006) 5 SCC 361], wherein it is held that such penalty provisions are for
breach of civil obligation and hence mens rea is not an essential
ingredient of such provisions. In short, it is held that willful concealment is
not essential for attracting such civil liabilities of penalty. Accordingly, the
issue was referred to larger Bench.

1.5 Recently, the Apex Court (larger Bench consisting of
three judges) delivered the judgment on the issue referred to paras 1.2 and 1.4
above in the case of Dharmendra Textiles Processors, disapproving the above
principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra).
This may have far-reaching consequences in the matter of levy of Concealment
Penalty in day-to-day practice and also in terms of litigation on the issues
relating to levy of Concealment Penalty. Therefore, it is thought fit to
consider the same in this column.


Dilip N. Shroff v. JCIT, 291 ITR 519 (SC) :

2.1 In the above case, the brief facts were: For the A.Y.
1998-99, the assessee had computed long-term capital loss of Rs.34.12 lakhs on
transfer of 1/4th interest in property at Mumbai and the same was computed by
taking Fair Market Value (FMV) of the property as on 1-4-1981 as the cost of
acquisition as provided in S. 55(2)(b) of the Act and, it seems, on that basis
Indexed Cost was determined. The FMV was determined (based on the Registered
Valuer’s Report) at Rs.2.52 crores. However, for the purpose of assessment, such
valuation was obtained from the District Valuation Officer (DVO), who had
determined such FMV at Rs.1.44 crores. This had resulted into a long-term
capital gain of Rs.3.09 crores as against long-term capital loss of Rs.34.12
lakhs computed and shown by the assessee. On these facts, Concealment Penalty of
Rs.68.78 lakhs was imposed, which was confirmed by the First Appellate authority
as well as the Appellate Tribunal. The appeal preferred by the assessee before
the High Court u/s.260A of the Act was dismissed in limine. Under this
circumstance, the issue relating to the levy of Concealment Penalty came up
before the Apex Court in the above case.

2.2 The Apex Court allowed the appeal of the assessee by
taking a view that ‘Concealment of Income’ as well as ‘Furnishing of Inaccurate
Particulars’, both refer to deliberate act on the part of the assessee and mere
omission or negligence would not constitute a deliberate act.

2.3 In the above case, the Apex Court also made the following
important observations :


(i) By reason of such concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars alone, the assessee does not ipso facto become liable for penalty. Imposition of penalty is not automatic. Levy of penalty is not only discretionary in nature, but such discretion is required to be exercised on the part of the Assessing Officer, keeping the relevant factors in mind.

(ii) While considering the scope of the Explanation, the Court stated that if the ingredients contained in the main provisions as also the Explanation appended thereto are to be given effect to, despite deletion of the word’ deliberate’, it may not ‘be of much significance. The expression ‘conceal’ is of great importance. It signifies a deliberate act or omission on the part of the assessee. Such deliberate act must be either for the purpose of ‘Concealment of Income’ or ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’.

(iii) The term ‘inaccurate  particulars’ is not defined.
 
Furnishing of an assessment of value of the property may not by itself be furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Even if the Explanations are taken recourse to, a finding has to be arrived at having regard to clause (A) of Explanation 1 that the Assessing Officer is required to arrive at a finding that the explanation offered by an assessee, in the event he offers one, was false. He must be found to have failed to prove that such explanation is not only not bona fide but all the facts relating to the same and material to the income were not disclosed by him. Thus, apart from his explanation being not bona fide, it should have been found as of fact that he has not disclosed all the facts which were material to the computation of his income.

iv) The order imposing penalty is quasi-criminal in nature and, thus, the burden lies on the Department to establish that the assessee had concealed his income. Since the burden of proof in penalty proceedings varies from that in the assessment proceedings, a finding in an assessment proceeding that a particular receipt is income cannot automatically be adopted, though a finding in the assessment proceeding constitutes good evidence in the penalty proceedings. In the penalty proceedings, thus, the authorities must consider the matter afresh, as the question has to be considered from a different angle.

v) Before a penalty can be imposed, the entirety of the circumstances must reasonably point to the conclusion that the disputed amount represented income, and that the assessee had consciously concealed the particulars of his income or had furnished inaccurate particulars thereof.

vi) ‘Concealment of Income’ and ‘Furnishing Inaccurate Particulars’ are different and both refer to deliberate act on the part of the assessee. A mere omission or negligence would not constitute a deliberate act of suppressioveri or suggestiofalsi. Although it may not be very accurate or apt, but suppressioveri would amount to concealment, suggestiofalsi would amount to furnishing of inaccurate particulars.

Union of India and Others v. Dharmendra Textiles Processors and Others, 306 ITR 277 (SC) :

3.1 In the above case (as well as other cases), when it came up before another Division Bench, the question was whether the provisions of S. llAC of the Excise Act (as inserted by the Finance Act, 1996 with the intention of imposing mandatory penalty on persons who evaded payment of taxes) should be read to contain mens rea as essential ingredient, and whether there is scope of levying penalty below the prescribed minimum. The Revenue’s stand was that the said Section should be read as penalty for statutory offence and once there is a default, the authority has no discretion in the matter of imposing penalty and the authority, in such cases, was duty bound to impose penalty as prescribed. On the other hand, on behalf of the assessee reference was made to S. 271(1)(c) of the Act taking the stand that S. llAC of the Excise Act is identically worded and in a given case, it was open to the authority not to impose any penalty. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra). The Division Bench was of the view that the basic scheme for the imposition of Concealment Penalty under the Act and penalty u/s.llAC of the Excise Act is common, and was of the view that the law laid down in Chairman, SEBI’S case (supra) is correct and had doubted the correctness of the above principle laid down in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra). Accordingly, the matter was referred to Larger Bench, effectively to decide whether mens rea is essential ingredient of S. llAC of the Excise Act, and whether the authority has any discretion in the matter of levy of penalty u/s.llAC of the Excise Act, when there is a breach. We are not concerned with the issue relating to discretion of the authority as to levy or not to levy the penalty under the said S. llAC (as, in this context, there is a difference between the two provisions, particularly on account of the said Explanation) and other background of the said case in this write-up and therefore, the same is not referred to.

3.2 On behalf of the Revenue, it was, inter alia, contended that in S. 11AC of the Excise Act, no reference to any mens rea is made and this is clear from the other relevant provisions also. It was further contended that the reliance on the judgment in the case of Dilip N:Shroff (supra) is misplaced, as in that case the question relating to discretion of the authority as to levy or not to levy the penalty was not the basic issue. In fact, S. 271(1)(c) of the Act provides for some discretion and therefore, that decision has no relevance. S. nxc provides for a mandatory penalty once the breach is committed. So far as the present case is concerned, the only dispute is whether the discretion has been properly exercised, which is a question of fact. Reliance was placed on the Chairman, SEBI’s case (supra).

3.3 On behalf of the assessee, it was, inter alia, contended that the factual scenario in each case has to be examined. It was further contended that S. 271C of the Act uses the expression ‘shall be liable’, whereas S. 271B uses the expression ‘shall pay’ in support of the contention that there is a discretion to reduce the penalty. The reference, for this purpose, was also made to S. 271F and S. 272A of the Act. It was further contended that even if it is held that the Section gives the impression that the imposition of penalty is mandatory, yet there was scope for exercise of discretion as held by the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, (106 STC 604). It was also contended that various degrees of culpability envisaged in S. llAC cannot be placed on the same pedestal. Certain further arguments were made with reference to S. llAC of the Excise Act and the rules made there under, with which we are not concerned in this write-up, as the same primarily may be relevant in the context of the Excise Act.

3.4 After considering the arguments of both the sides, the Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Excise Act and the rules made thereunder as well as the provisions of S. 271 and S. 271C of the Act. The Court then stated that in Chairman, SEBI’s case (supra), after referring to the statutory scheme, it was pointed out that there was a scheme attracting the imposition of penalty in that Act (SEBIAct) under different circumstance (i.e., penalty with reference to breach of civil obligation and penalty related to criminal proceedings). The Court further stated that in that case, after referring to certain provisions of the SEBI Act, the Court has held as under (pages 294/295) :

“The scheme of the SEBI Act of imposing penalty is very clear. Chapter VI-A nowhere deals with criminal offences. These defaults for failures are nothing but failures or default of statutory civil obligations provided under the Act and the Regulations made thereunder. It is pertinent to note that S. 24 of the SEBI Act deals with the criminal offences under the Act and its punishment. Therefore, the proceedings under Chapter VI-A are neither criminal nor quasi-criminal. The penalty leviable under the Chapter or under these Sections is penalty in cases of default or failure of statutory obligation or in other words breach of civil obligation. In the provisions and scheme of pen-alty under Chapter VI-A of the SEBI Act, there is no element of any criminal offence or punishment as contemplated under criminal proceedings. Therefore, there is no question of proof of intention or any mens rea by the appellants and it is not an essential element for imposing penalty under the SEBI Act and the Regulations …. “.

3.5 After referring to the view expressed by the Apex Court in Chairman, SEBl’s case (supra), the Court stated that the Apex Court in catena of decisions has held that mens rea is not an essential element of imposing penalty for breach of civil obligation. For this, the Court made reference to various decisions of the Apex Court under different statutes dealing with this issue and taking similar view. Amongst this, the Court also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Tranvancore Agency (171 ITR 455), in which the Court was concerned with the levy of penalty u/ s. 271(I)(a) (since omitted from A.Y. 1989-90) for failure to furnish the return of income as required u/s.139(1) of the Act. In that case, the Court compared these provisions with S. 276C of the Act dealing with prosecution in cases where the person willfully fails to furnish the return of income as required u/s. 139(1) of the Act. In that case, having referred to both these Sections, the Court has stated that “it is clear that in the former case what is intended is a civil obligation, while in the latter what is imposed is a criminal sentence”. In that case, the Court has concluded that in the proceedings u/ s.271(I)(a) of the Act, the intention of the Legislature seems to emphasis the fact of loss of revenue and to provide a remedy for such a loss, although no doubt, an element of coercion is present in the penalty. Therefore, accordingly to the Court in that case, there is nothing in S. 271(I)(a), which required that mens rea must be proved before the penalty can be levied under that provision.

3.6 Dealing with the judgment of the Apex Court, in the case of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (supra), on which also heavy reliance was placed on behalf of the .assessee, the Court stated that the same is not of any assistance, because the same proceeded on the basis of a concession and in any event, did not indicate the correct position in law.

3.7 The Court then referred to settled position of interpretation that the Court cannot read anything into the statutory position or stipulated condition, when the language is plain and unambiguous. The Court also referred to various decisions of the Apex Court relating to the principle of construction of statutory provisions. The Court, then, dealing with the principle of interpretation of the statute, stated as under (pages 300-301) :

“Two principles of construction – one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole, appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity, and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or Section must be construed together and every clause of a Section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. ‘An intention to produce an unreasonable result’ said Danckwerts L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou, (1965) 3 All ER 539 (CA) (All ER page 544 I) ‘is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available’. Where to apply words literally would ‘defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result’, we must ‘do some violence to the words’ and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction (Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRe, (1963) AC 557(HL) where at AC page 577 he also observed: (All Er page 664-1)’. This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such (that it rarely emerges)”.

3.8 Dealing with the judgment in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra), the Court stated as under (page 302) :

“It is of significance to note that the conceptual and contextual difference between S. 271(I)(c) and S. 276C of the Income-tax Act was lost sight of in Dilip N. Shroff’s case (2007) 8 Scale 304 (sc)

The Explanations appended to S. 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act entirely indicate the element of strict liability on the assessee for concealment or for giving inaccurate particulars while filing the return. The judgment in Dilip N. Shroff’s case (2007) 8 Scale 304 (SC) has not considered the effect and relevance of S. 276C of the Income-tax Act. The object behind the enactment of S. *272(1)(c) read with the Explanations indicates that the said section has been enacted to provide for remedy for loss of revenue. The penalty under that provision is a civil liability. Wilful concealment is not an essential ingredient for attracting civil liability as is the case in the matter of prosecution u/ s.276C of the Income-tax Act”.

should be read as 271(1)(c)

3.9 Finally, in the context of the issue under consideration, the Court took the view (so far as it is relevant for this write-up) that Dilip N. Shroff’s case was not correctly decided. In this context, the Chairman, SEBI’s case has analysed the legal position in the correct perspective. The Court then stated that the matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench to deal with the matter in the light of this decision, only so far as cases where there is challenge to the vires of the relevant provisions and rules made under the Excise Act.

Conclusion:

4.1 From the above judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, it is now clear that mens rea is not an essential ingredient of the provisions dealing with Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c). It is also clear that the nature of such Concealment Penalty is not quasi-criminal, but the same is for breach of civil obligation and therefore, willful concealment is not essential for levy of such penalty.

4.2 In view of the above, the cases relating to the levy of Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) will have to be decided on the basis of provisions of S. 271(1)(c) read with the Explanations (Explanation 1 in particular) to S. 271.

4.3 From the judgment of the larger Bench of the Apex Court, it seems that the same overrules the judgment of the Apex Court in the Dilip N. Shroff’s case only to the extent it holds that deliberate act on the part of the assessee will have to be proved for levy of Concealment Penalty (i.e., mens rea is essential ingredient of the provisions) and the order imposing such penalty is quasi-criminal in nature. It seems that the other observations made by the Apex Court in Dilip N. Shroff ‘s case in the context of Concealment Penalty u/s.271(1)(c) should continue to hold good, as the larger Bench of the Apex Court was not specifically concerned with those points as well as the language of the S. 271(1) (and the Explanations thereto) of the Income-tax Act.

IFRS for SMEs in India

Article

Background :



Published by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
on 9 July 2009, International Financial Reporting Standard for Small and
Medium-Sized Entities (‘IFRS for SMEs’) is a simplified version of full IFRS
aimed at responding to the compelling need expressed by both developed and
emerging economies for a rigorous and common set of accounting standards for
smaller and medium-sized businesses that is much simpler than full IFRSs. Prior
to its release, the standard-setters engaged themselves in comprehensive
dialogue with SMEs worldwide in order to ensure that the document finally
released would meet the needs and capabilities of small and medium-sized
entities (SMEs), which are estimated to account for over 95% of all companies
around the world.

Application :

The IFRS for SMEs has the potential to revolutionise and
harmonise financial reporting by private companies across the world. It remains
a stand-alone product that is separate from the full set of International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs).

Thus, it is available for any jurisdiction to adopt whether
or not it has adopted the full IFRSs. Also it is incumbent upon each
jurisdiction to determine which entities should use the standard.

In particular, the IFRS for SMEs will :


  • provide improved comparability for users of accounts


  • enhance the overall confidence in the accounts of SMEs


  • reduce the significant costs involved of maintaining
    standards on a national basis, and


  •  provide a platform to growing businesses that are
    contemplating entering the public capital markets in due course of time and
    thus give them an opportunity to prepare themselves for adopting full IFRSs.


South Africa is an example of a country that required all
companies to use IFRS and has responded very positively to benefits for SMEs
proposed by the new standard. It had adopted the Exposure Draft which preceded
the IFRS for SMEs in October 2007 as a ‘Statement of Generally Accepted
Accounting Practice for SMEs in South Africa’ in a bid to reduce the reporting
burden on SMEs and provide them with a simpler accounting framework that was
easier to understand and apply than full IFRS. Further, it has quickly published
the final version of the IFRS for SMEs (without any change to the text) as a
‘Statement of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice’ with relevant entities
allowed to apply it for annual financial statements authorised for issue after
13th August 2009.

In India, the concept paper on Convergence with IFRS, issued
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India aims to converge Indian
accounting standards to the equivalent of full IFRS for all public interest
entities effective 1st April 2011. In its present form, companies with turnover
exceeding Rs.100 crores or with borrowings in excess of Rs.25 crores qualify as
‘public interest entities’. This is expected to include a significant number of
unlisted entities. The concept paper refers to use of IFRS for SMEs only for
non-public interest entities.

Basis :

The principles enshrined in this standard have been derived
from IFRS foundation itself. However, so as to ensure that it addresses the
specific needs of users of SMEs’ financial statements and cost-benefit
considerations, many of the complexities inherent in the full IFRSs have been
removed. Furthermore a cost-benefit approach has been taken in developing the
IFRS for SMEs, with the emphasis being on easing the financial reporting burden
on private companies.

The key differences are enumerated below :


  • Topics not relevant to SMEs have been omitted.


  • Where full IFRSs allow accounting policy choices, the
    IFRS for SMEs allows only the easier option.


  • Many of the principles for recognising and measuring
    assets, liabilities, income and expenses in full IFRSs have been simplified.


  •  Significantly fewer disclosures are required.


  • The standard has adopted a simplified redrafting so as to
    facilitate ease of understanding and translation.


  • Moreover to further reduce the reporting burden for SMEs,
    revisions to the IFRS will be limited to once every three years.

Full IFRS

IFRS for SMEs

Numbered by
Standard


Organised by topic (e.g.,
inventories)

Around 3,000
potential disclosures


Around 300 potential disclosures

Around 2,800 pages
in length

Less than 230 pages

Updated several
times a year

Anticipated to be
updated on a 3-yearly basis

Unlike full IFRS, the IFRS for SMEs contains illustrative
financial statements and a disclosure checklist. With around only 300 potential
disclosure requirements, compared to 3,000 under full IFRS, the advantages of
the IFRS for SMEs in terms of the amount of time to be spent preparing the
financial statements are already clear. The point is underlined however, by the
Illustrative Financial Statements that the IASB has prepared to accompany the
Standard. At just 17 pages in length, they compare favourably to full IFRS
financial statements which often run to over 100 pages.

Omitted topics :

The IFRS for SMEs does not address the following topics that
are covered in full IFRSs :


  • Earnings  per share
  • Interim financial reporting
  • Segment reporting
  • Special accounting for assets held for sale.

Examples of options in full IFRSs NOT included in the IFRS for SMEs :

  • Financial instrument options, including available for sale, held-to-maturity and fair value options

  • The revaluation model for property, plant and equipment, and for intangible assets

  • Proportionate consolidation for investments in jointly-controlled entities

  • For investment property, measurement is driven by circumstances rather than allowing an accounting policy choice between the cost and fair value models
  • Various options  for government grants.

Conclusion:

The potential of this new standard is that SMEs catapult themselves to a position where stakeholders (lenders and investors) would be able to assess company performance from financial statements that use directly comparable, authoritative, internationally recognised principles, regardless of the company’s country of origin. Further this transition to IFRS framework for them would be at a significantly reduced cost, as the standard has endeavored to reduce the complexities in accounting for transactions and disclosure of financials as compared to full IFRSs.

GST — Issues and Policies

Article

Government without treasury is unknown in history. Government
raises revenue mainly through taxation or borrowing. Taxes matter both for the
government and the governed. We all know we need to pay taxes for public
services, but still most of us complain about taxes and avoid them, if possible.

2. Tax policy, its design and tax administration are the
reflection of the economic reality and the social and cultural factors of the
society. Tax policy of a country is shaped by ideas and interest, global
economic reality, administrative constraints, political institutions and
technological developments. A tax policy needs to delicately balance the
objectives of revenue, the need to facilitate economic growth and stability and
equity. Political economy necessitates balancing of growth and equity. Though
there is no alternative to growth, growth without equity is neither desirable
nor sustainable. A policy oriented towards growth cannot, therefore, ignore the
need to put in place measures to protect and ensure the welfare of the weak and
vulnerable sections of the population.

3. Evolving a tax policy and designing a tax system for a
fast developing and increasingly open economy is more challenging. India’s
international trade-to-GDP ratio exceeded 35%. The task becomes complex in view
of internationalisation of economic activities arising from globalisation and
liberalisation. Lowering the level of protection available to domestic
manufacturers of goods by reduction of customs tariffs, entering into free trade
agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, and liberalisation of international
trade have direct bearing on the competitiveness of the domestic industry and
thereby their very survival. These developments necessitate the need to tune the
tax policy in line with the changing economic environment without loss of time.
Tax reform in a globalised world has become a necessity for survival rather than
a matter of choice. The nation took a conscious decision to embark on the path
of fundamental tax reforms.

4. Indirect tax policy and system in India has been
undergoing fundamental changes. It is a well-accepted thinking that high tax
rates do not necessarily result into higher revenue, but are likely to
discourage compliance and distort economic activities. High tax rates may not
also seem to be an effective method to distribute income and wealth. Peak basic
rate of customs duty on manufactured non-agricultural products was reduced from
more than 300% in 1990–91 to 10% in 2007-08. During the same period, ad
valorem
basic excise duty was also reduced from 110% to the CENVAT rate of
14%.

5. The process of globalisation making competitiveness a
global issue and not a country-specific issue made many countries to reduce the
direct tax rates, both on corporates and persons, and customs tariffs and
simultaneously increase their reliance on domestic consumption taxes. In many
countries and regions, there is a shift from direct to indirect taxes.
Globalisation led to significant reduction in customs tariffs and consequent
reduction in reliance from customs revenue. During the period 1990-91 to
2007-2008, customs revenue has grown only by 404% as against 607% growth in
domestic consumption tax revenue. Ensuring the competitiveness of the tax system
is an inevitable response to the broader picture of global economic integration
resulting into global competition.

6. The Hon’ble Finance Minister in his Budget speech 2006
stated the intention to move towards comprehensive goods and service tax (GST)
by April, 2010. The scope of the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers
(ECFM) has been expanded to deal with issues relating to GST. The institution of
Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers is one of the most successful
innovations in fiscal federalism. GST is considered to be the single largest tax
reform of the country in the domestic taxation. Adoption of Value Added Tax
(VAT) at the Central level and also by all the States for taxation of goods and
services has given enough confidence to all the stake-holders to move towards
GST at the national level.

7. Major problem afflicting taxation of goods and services
today is the tax cascading arising on account of the partial nature of the taxes
and also of multiple and overlapping taxes. Current tax structure results into
varying degree of taxes on goods and services depending upon the nature of
inputs used. No credit is allowed on CST paid on interstate sales. Even if the
statutory rate is the same, effective tax rate varies from product to product,
depending upon the quantum of hidden taxes paid on inputs and the structure of
production and distribution chain.

8. Indirect taxation in India, therefore, provides
opportunities for planning and arbitration. Simplified system of taxation
reduces the cost of compliance and cost of collection considerably and would
enable the business to plan its activities. GST reduces the scope for ad hoc
decisions and political compromises apart from reducing the compliance cost.

9. The core objective of GST is to remove barriers for trade
by creating a common national-level domestic market. A major reform of such
magnitude does require change of ideas, attitudes and mind-sets. This may cause
discomfort mainly on account of fear of the unknown. If one appreciates the
economic advantage of GST and appreciates its necessity in the context of the
global economic competition, then apprehensions and misgivings may not have any
place.

10. Consumption tax on goods and services on the basis of
value addition known as VAT or GST has been emerging as the tax of the future.
The global experiences support that VAT is the most effective mechanism to raise
revenue efficiently. The fact that more than 145 countries in the world across
the ideological spectrum adopted VAT to tax domestic consumption of goods and
services substantiates the view that VAT has now become a main feature of
indirect revenue system.

11. GST or VAT is a broad-based tax levied on multiple stages of production and distribution with the taxes on inputs credited against taxes on output. Revenue is secured by being collected throughout the process of economic transactions, but without distorting production decisions. It is collected at each stage of the transaction and the amount of tax is calculated on the prices of the goods and services at the rate applicable after deduction of the amount of VAT borne directly on various inputs used for providing output goods or services. Taxes collected at intermediate stages are only pass-through transactions. Collection of tax being at each stage of the transactions with input credit scheme, VAT has inherent incentive for tax compliance. Being a consumption tax imposed on goods and services, the tax burden is to be borne by ultimate consumers.

12. VAT is the single largest source of revenue in some countries and one of the most important sources in many more. Increase in VAT collection is not at the expense of income tax. VAT and income tax are in fact complementary to each other and one is not a substitute for other. VATis a simple way of collecting sales tax. No fiscal innovation is ever spread so widely in such a wide variety of countries.

13. GST designed with the objective of economic efficiency and neutrality requires:

  •     Harmonisation of tax base, tax rates, tax laws and procedures.

  •     To avoid cascading effect by providing credit of total amount of tax paid on inputs.

  •     To levy tax on destination  basis.

  •     To ensure  uniformity  in law and procedure.

14. The relevant questions to be responded while designing GST are, –

  •  Whether GST can address the fiscal tasks imposed by trade liberalisations and other economic factors?

  •  Whether a single GST in a federal country would affect the political equilibrium reflected in the country’s fiscal structures?

  •  Whether GST addresses the concern of vertical equity?

Equity and distributional effects of GST are matters of concern and academic debate. It is difficult to design VAT to meet the needs of vertical equity. However, experiences all over the world show that at present VATis the best form of general consump-tion tax available.

15. One of the critical areas in designing single GST is sub-national jurisdiction in levying of VAT. GST design in a federal country needs to take into account:

  •     the fiscal autonomy  of provinces;

  •     to use tax as an instrument to achieve social or economic objectives; and

  •     risk and  rewards  of ownership  of the tax.

16. Considering the revenue needs of provinces to meet their developmental objectives, provinces do expect sufficient fiscal space to mobilise revenue. The Constitution of India clearly demarcates the taxation power between the Centre and the States. GST model needs to strike a balance between harmonisation which is critical for economic efficiency and creation of common domestic market and fiscal autonomy of the Centre and the States required to discharge their obligations.

17. Though the desirable objective is broader base with lower rate, preferably single rate, the need to protect and ensure the interest of the economically weaker sections by way of exemptions, reduced rates or zero rates for basic services like food, medicines cannot be totally ignored especially in a developing or transitional economy. Equity aspects of VATare a matter of concern. It may be inevitable to introduce some degree of explicit progressivity within the VATsystem itself. In such cases, reduced rate is generally considered as the preferred choice. Minimising distortion and at the same time accommodating the different economic and social objectives is the real challenge for designing the GST system. However, experiences show that introducing specific measures inevitably creates complexities and resultant cost and goes contrary to the demand for simplification. It is also a challenge to balance the procedural requirements to eliminate the possibility of non-compliance and fraud and at the same time ensuring that the level of compliance cost does not affect the ability to compete. Ideal model may not be politically acceptable and administratively feasible.

18. Different forms of eST exist in different countries. What is important is designing an appropriate GST to suit the specific needs and environment and then running it efficiently. Differences among various GST systems indicate the objective reality of history and politics of member countries. European Union’s VAT is the much talked about VAT. However, there is a strong view that the Sixth VAT Directives of EU need major revision to cope with the realities of the expanded, more integrated and more developed EU of today.

19. The single-rate structure usually considered as an ideal and recommended by experts is followed only by Denmark among the EU countries. Most EU countries have a standard rate with two reduced rates. The average effective VAT rate as compared with the standard rate among EU member states varies widely and the percentage of variation is in the range of 8% to 32% of the standard rate. In EU, about  one-third  of the tax base is subject to non-standard  rates including  zero rate. Exemptions also vary  widely  from country  to country.  VAT in EU differs on many important  aspects. Variations are in relation  to the tax base, treatment  of foreign trade-origin or destination,  and the method  of collection.

20. GST model followed by New Zealand, Singapore and Australia with broad base and single rate is no doubt a clean model. But it may be difficult to replicate such model in a federal structure with strong identity of units and also in developing or transitional economies.

21. Despite differences, almost all the VAT models in the world follow the principle to tax consumption on destination basis and is applied on a transaction basis using the invoice – credit (output tax minus input tax) method basis. Origin-based income type VAT exists in Italy, Japan and some American states. China already initiated the process to have eST by the year 2013. Countries that do not have VATare US, Iraq, Iran, Cuba, some oil-rich countries and large number of small island countries basically in the Caribbean and Pacific.

22. Selectivity and discretion erode tax base and tend to create powerful special interest groups apart from introducing complexity in the system. Single national-level eST does avoid issues relating to interstate transactions. However in a democratic polity with federal structure and assignment of tax powers, it may be difficult to achieve, if not impossible, the ideal comprehensive value added consumption tax at the national level. The other model is taxing consumption at uniform rates across goods and services. This will avoid tax-induced distortions, bring simplicity and minimise the pressures for favourable treatment for some goods or services over others. However, fiscal autonomy warrants power to decide the tax rates to meet the revenue needs notwithstanding harmonisation of law and procedure.

23. Independent VAT applied simultaneously on the same tax base by two different and overlapping jurisdictions leads to high administrative and compliance cost. The only way in which sub-national units can effectively levy VAT is on origin basis. In such cases, if the rates are not uniform, results would be highly distortionary.

24. Destination-based consumption VAT through invoice-credit method requires physical border controls. In the absence of border controls, the alternative approach is to put through some form of clearing house mechanism to deal with the state transactions. Considering the magnitude of transactions, this approach requires a sound and extensive IT infrastructure.

25. One of the most critical VAT design issues is consideration of local conditions including support the level of the threshold limit above which firms . from trade and industry. Good GST design makes must register. One view is to set the threshold limit good VAT administration easier and bad design too high rather than too low. Dealing with a large makes good administration almost impossible. number of very small taxpayers inevitably results in
some loss in administrative efficiency. It is preferable to include all firms above a fairly high threshold in the tax base. The other view is that high threshold limit reduces the tax base and encourages growth of informal sector. A balanced and a pragmatic view needs to be taken. There are also challenges to make GST work in a system, which relies on self-assessment.

26. Desirable features of VATdesign such as single rate, zero rating instead of exemptions, refund of input tax credit, that cannot be adjusted against taxes due on outputs may not necessarily be feasible in the context of the economic realities. Features like more than one rate, few exemptions, and too high or too low thresholds may be inevitable at a particular point of time for successful adoption in the first place. However, experiences show that it is extremely difficult to remove such features at a later stage.

27. The clean system is critical in lowering compliance cost for business and administration cost for Government. The fundamental choice is between concessions to some with high rates or no concessions with low tax rates. This needs to be explained and communicated well so as to evolve a consensus.

28. VAT provides a competitive advantage to the country that implements it. It removes hidden taxes on exports. Many goods and services that bore no taxes are in fact have hidden taxes paid on most of their inputs. The resulting pattern of effective rates on products and industry vary widely and bear little relation to the Jegislativ,e intent. In India, the study shows that the tax incidence on different commodity groups varies widely. Elimination of exemptions and concessions reduces administrative cost as well as the influence of special interest groups on tax policy. Self-imposing nature of GST leads to increase in revenue productivity. VAT also strengthens the information base of the tax administration, resulting in improved compliance not only of VAT,but also of other taxes.

29. Critical factors for successful implementation of GST are political commitment, adequate and advance preparation, investment in tax administration, extensive public education programme and consideration of local conditions including support from trade and industry. Good GST design makes good VAT administration easier and bad design makes good administration almost impossible.

30. “Tax Administration is Tax Policy” says Milka Casanegra. The real tax system is that which is administered, not that which appears in the formal law. VATcan certainly be designed to fit into the tax administration of the country.

31. The most basic lesson learnt from international experiences in implementing GST is that doing it right is in most respects a matter more of art than of science. It is extremely critical to keep the administrative dimensions at the Centre rather than at the periphery while designing the GST system. Poor administrative system creates a wedge between theory and practice and thus encourages the spread of informal economy. A good policy is only as good as it is administered. It is important to keep in mind the administrative realities. Reform of the tax system is not a one-time affair. It is a dynamic process in which the responses are to be calibrated continuously.

32. Successful implementation of GST requires an effective consultative and communication process. Consultative process helps to improve the quality of decision-making. It may not be possible to have consensus with many interest groups and the public on all issues. As long as the decisions are fair and reasonable, and consistent with the stated core objectives, consensus develops after the decisions deliver satisfactory results. It is equally important to appropriately package the proposal.

33. There are no disagreements between the Centre and the States and trade and industry on the issue of common tax base, rates and laws and procedures. The issues are more on details and the mechanism required to achieve the stated objectives. Considering the consensus and the enthusiasm of the stakeholders and the appreciation of the necessity and economic benefits of GST, there is every reason to believe that the country is on the right path and will reach its destination.

Service of Arbitration Award — On Advocate — Not proper service — Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — S. 31(5), S. 2(4).

New Page 1

15. Service of Arbitration
Award — On Advocate — Not proper service — Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 — S. 31(5), S. 2(4).


[Karmyogi Shelters P.
Ltd.
v. Benarsi Krishna Committee & Ors., AIR 2010 Del. 156]

The petition u/s.34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 had been filed which was barred by time
and hence was dismissed. It was admitted fact that the Award had been made
available to the counsel for the appellant, and had not been directly served on
the appellant. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition as being
time-barred. On further appeal it was observed that if an action has to be taken
in a particular manner it must be in that manner only, else will be held not to
have been done at all. The Court observed that so much judicial time had been
wasted in entertaining arguments which would have been unnecessary, had the
Award been served on the party concerned, namely, the appellant. In view of S.
2(h) of the Act, there was no justifiable reason to depart from succinct and
precise definition of the word ‘party’, which means a party to an arbitration
agreement. Factually, these words cannot take within their sweep an ‘agent’ of
the party which is incompetent to take the requisite action envisaged under the
statute.

In these circumstances, the
view of the learned Single Judge that service of the Award on the Advocate of
the appellant was sufficient compliance with the statutory provision could not
be sustained and was set aside.

levitra

Power of Attorney executed out of India — Adjudication of stamp duty — Kerala Stamp Act S. 31, S. 18.

New Page 1

13. Power of Attorney
executed out of India — Adjudication of stamp duty — Kerala Stamp Act S. 31, S.
18.


[Anitha Rajan v. The
Revenue Divisional Officer, Thrissur District & Ors.
, AIR 2010 Kerala 153]

The petitioner purchased
land at Thrissur District, from the legal heirs of late Gangadharan as per the
original sale deed dated 16-3-2009, registered at Sub-Registrar’s office,
Triprayar. The property conveyed to the petitioner as per the sale deed belonged
to late Gangadharan. The sale deed was executed by his wife Smt. Rathnabhai and
his children Sri. Ajayan, Smt. Jisha, Smt. Usha, Smt. Ajitha and Smt. Anitha.
Sri. Ajayan, one of the vendors was employed in Dubai. Sri. Ajayan had executed
the original power of attorney on 1-3-2009 on non-judicial stamp paper of the
value of Rs.150 appointing his mother Smt. Rathnabhai as his power of attorney
to execute a sale deed in respect of the lands conveyed to the petitioner. The
original power of attorney was executed at Dubai in the presence of the
Vice-Counsel in the Indian Consulate at Dubai and is attested by him.

After the sale deed was
executed, the petitioner moved the respondent for effecting mutation in the
Revenue records. The respondent thereupon sent letter to the petitioner
informing her that the original power of attorney executed at Dubai had to be
produced before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Thrissur for adjudication. The
petitioner moved the application to condone the delay in producing the document
for adjudication. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Thrissur passed order
rejecting application on the ground that it was not produced before her within
the time limit of three months stipulated in S. 18(1) of the Kerala Stamp Act,
1959.

The petitioner challenged
the said order.

The petitioner contends that
it was not mandatory to produce every power of attorney executed out of India
before the Revenue Divisional Officer and that only instruments executed out of
India which are chargeable with duty, but are not duly stamped, that require to
be stamped within three months and that only such documents are required to be
produced before the Collector for adjudication u/s.31 of the Kerala Stamp Act,
1959.

The Court held that S. 31 of
the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959 (which is para materia with S. 31 of the Indian Stamp
Act, 1899) empowers the District Collector to adjudicate on the proper stamp
duty payable on an instrument which is brought before him for the purpose of
adjudication of the stamp duty. U/s.32 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959, the
District Collector is empowered to determine the duty payable on that
instrument. However, the second limb of the proviso to Ss.(3) of S. 32 of the
Kerala Stamp Act stipulates that nothing contained in that Section shall
authorise the Collector to endorse any instrument executed or first executed out
of India and brought to him after the expiration of three months after it has
been first received in the State. Power of attorney is executed on Indian
non-judicial stamp paper of the value of Rs.150 which was the proper stamp duty
payable during the relevant time on that power of attorney under Article 44(f)
of the Schedule to the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959. As the power of attorney was duly
stamped, it was not necessary for the power holder or the petitioner to produce
the original before the Collector as required u/s.18 and u/s.31 of the Kerala
Stamp Act, 1959 for the purpose of adjudication. It is only in cases where an
instrument is brought before the Collector u/s.31 that the Collector is
empowered to adjudicate whether it is properly stamped or not.

In the instant case, the
respondents have no case that the proper stamp duty payable on the power of
attorney has not been paid. Since power of attorney, though executed at Dubai is
engrossed on Indian non-judicial stamp paper of the value of Rs.150 which
represents the proper stamp duty payable in respect of the said instrument, it
was not necessary to produce the said instrument before the Revenue Divisional
Officer, who has been appointed by the Government of Kerala to exercise all the
powers of the Collector u/s.18, u/s.31 and u/s.32 of the Kerala Stamp Act, 1959.
The restrictions imposed in S. 18(1) and proviso (b) to Ss.(3) of S. 32 of the
Kerala Stamp Act do not therefore apply. Further, the said
power of attorney was acted upon by the Sub-Registrar, Triprayar when he
registered the original sale deed.

levitra

‘Spouse’ — Does not include second wife — Hindu Marriage Act — S. 5.

New Page 1

14. ‘Spouse’ — Does not
include second wife — Hindu Marriage Act — S. 5.


[Lagadapati Raja Gopal v.
Sunkara Krishna Murthy,
AIR 2010 (NOC) 881 (A.P.)]

The issue before the High
Court was in respect of filing of false affidavit by a returned candidate in
respect of disclosure of his assets. Election petition was filed alleging the
non-disclosure of assets of second wife by the returned candidate. The word
‘spouse’ has been understood to connote a husband or wife, which term itself
postulates subsisting marriage. Therefore, the word ‘spouse’ in Ss.(1) of S. 5
of Hindu Marriage Act cannot be interpreted to mean a latter spouse when a
second marriage is contracted if the former spouse is living.

The second wife can be said
to be a spouse only when her marriage is performed in accordance with law. Even
if the returned candidate contracted second marriage, such marriage is void
ipso jure
and second wife cannot come within the meaning of spouse in view
of the fact that her marriage with the returned candidate was void as the first
marriage of the returned candidate was subsisting. Therefore, the column where
the affidavit was to be furnished by the returned candidate, the word ‘spouse’
would only mean a legally wedded wife. Admittedly, the returned candidate had
given the particulars required in the nomination affidavit about the details of
his first wife. Therefore, for not showing the assets of the second wife, it
cannot be said that the returned candidate gave false affidavit. The allegation
of not furnishing the assets of the second wife cannot be said to be a false
affidavit under any one of the provisions under the Representation of the People
Act, 1951 or under the Constitution or under any other law from the time being
in force.

levitra

Appellate Tribunal — Jurisdiction of Benches — Appeal wrongly placed before Single Member while Division Bench having jurisdiction — Order to be recalled. Central Excise Act, 1944 — S. 35D.

New Page 1

11. Appellate Tribunal —
Jurisdiction of Benches — Appeal wrongly placed before Single Member while
Division Bench having jurisdiction — Order to be recalled. Central Excise Act,
1944 — S. 35D.


[Commissioner of C. Ex.
Jammu v. Ultra Home Care Coils P. Ltd.
, (2010) (258) ELT 249 (Trib.-Del.)

An application for recall of
the order and for vacating the stay order was filed. It is the contention of the
applicant that the stay application in appeal was wrongly placed before the
Single Member when the matter clearly involves the issue in relation to
interpretation of exemption Notification and consequently, the jurisdiction to
deal the same is vested with the Division Bench and therefore, the order passed
by the Single Member is without jurisdiction.

The Tribunal observed that
the records apparently disclosed that the matter involves interpretation of
exemption Notification No. 56/2002-CE, dated 14-11-2002. The provision of S.
35D(3) reads thus :

“The President or any other
member of the Appellate Tribunal authorised. On this behalf by the President
may, sitting singly, dispose of any case which has been allotted to the Bench of
which he is a member where —

(a) in any disputed case,
other than a case where the determination of any question having a relation to
the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment
is in issue or is one of the points in issue, the difference in duty involved
or the duty involved.”

Records apparently disclosed
that the matter was placed before the Single Member merely because the amount
involved was less than Rs.10 lakhs. There was no specific order by the President
allotting the matter to the Single Member. Thus, the same could not have been
heard and decided either on merits or for any interim relief by the Single
Member. Therefore, the order in stay application had to be recalled and the said
stay application was restored and fixed for fresh hearing.

levitra

Adjournment of hearing — Genuine ground for adjournment necessary — Central Excise Act, 1944, S. 35B.

New Page 1

12. Adjournment of hearing —
Genuine ground for adjournment necessary — Central Excise Act, 1944, S. 35B.


[Commissioner of C.Ex.
Jaipur-II v. Shri Ram Steel Inds.,
(2010) 258 ELT 154 (Trib.) (Del.)]

When the case was adjourned
by the Tribunal on the last occasion the parties were represented by their
advocates and the date was given with the consent of the advocates. It was
specifically made known to the representatives of the parties that the matter
would not be adjourned any further. On the next date of hearing none were
present on behalf of the assessee. The Tribunal proceeded with the matter ex-parte
and decided the Department’s appeal on merits.

A letter seeking adjournment
was received after completion of the hearing and delivery of order in the open
Court. The adjournment was sought on the ground that ring ceremony of niece had
to be attended on the day fixed for hearing.

The Tribunal held that the
application was without substance as date was fixed with the consent of the
parties and adjourned on several occasions. The Tribunal also observed that the
ground disclosed in application can never be a ground for adjournment.

Further, the representatives
of parties were not entitled to presume that the Tribunal would be obliged to
adjourn the matter the moment request for the same is sent. The practice of
seeking adjournment by sending application by post or by courier or by faxing
was highly objectionable. Adjournment is not a matter of right. Nobody can take
the Tribunal for granted and presume and assume that matter would be adjourned
the moment request for the same is made. Genuine ground for adjournment is
necessary. Further, the order on adjournment is always in the discretion of the
Tribunal and the same is to be exercised judiciously. Application for
adjournment was rejected.

levitra

Deficiency in service by builder : Consumer Protection Act, 1986 S. 2(1)(g).

New Page 3

  1. Deficiency in service by builder : Consumer Protection Act,
    1986 S. 2(1)(g).

[ Madan Builders v. R. K. Saxena, AIR 2009 (NOC)
2551 (NCC)]

Complainant purchased two shops in commercial complex. The
builder instead of providing two lifts as promised in advertisement and
brochure provided only one lift and that too was not a glass capsule lift as
promised. The reason was stated that glass capsule lift was not approved by
local administration. The Commission held that there was false representation
for luring complainant to make investment. Even the two shops booked by
complainant were changed by builder, without his consent and were allotted to
some other party. It was held that the deficiency in service was apparent as
builder failed to provide facilities as promised in representation made as per
advertisement and brochure. Thus the complainant was entitled to compensation
with interest.

levitra

Memorandum of understanding — Void contract : Civil Court cannot refuse to entertain suit even if based on void contract.

New Page 3

  1. Memorandum of understanding — Void contract : Civil Court
    cannot refuse to entertain suit even if based on void contract.

[ Govind Goverdhandas Daga and Mohan Brindavan Agrawal,
Field Mining and Ispat Ltd.,
(2009) Vol. 111(8) Bom L.R. 3524]

Plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 entered into Memorandum of
Understanding with Defendant No. 2 who was a director of Defendant No. 1
company. As per the MOU it was agreed that each family was to hold equal
shares in Defendant No. 1 company either directly or through family members.

The Plaintiffs paid Rs.3 lacs each as share application
money. As defendants failed to abide by the MOU the plaintiffs filed suit for
specific performance and permanent injunction. Defendants filed application
under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of plaint contending that Memorandum
of Understanding was never acted upon by the parties and was entered into by
the director i.e. Defendant No. 2 in his individual capacity. Defendant
No. 1 had nothing to do with the said memorandum of understanding, no cause of
action disclosed and suit hit by provisions of Companies Act and Coal Mines
Act. Civil Judge rejected the plaint.

On further appeal the Court held that even if we assume
that the Memorandum of Understanding is void and illegal yet there was no law
which prohibits institution of suits and taking of its cognisance. Assuming
Memorandum of Understanding to be void that still does not prohibit plaintiffs
from approaching the court and deciding the question of its validity on merit.

The Court will always have to consider the facts, evidence
and the law to find out if the contract between the parties is enforceable or
not. The court may ultimately refuse its specific performance and may also
hold the contract to be void but there is nothing which prohibits the civil
court from entertaining such a suit.

Thus a party to void contract is still entitled to
institute a suit for enforcement of the contract and in the alternative to
pray for refund of the money.

levitra

Award — Enforcement of foreign award.

New Page 3

  1. Award — Enforcement of foreign award.

[ Hugo Neu Corporation v. M/s. Llyods Steel Inds. Ltd.,
AIR 2009 (NOC) 2483 (Bom.); 2009 (5) AIR Bom R. 158]

A petition was filed u/s.47 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking Enforcement of an Award dated 10th October
1999, made in United States of America.

The question raised for consideration was whether the party
viz., the petitioner applying for enforcement of a Foreign Award has at
the time of the application produced before the Court the documents stipulated
by S. 47(1)(a) to (c) and whether the petitioner has produced a copy of the 26
Award duly authenticated in the manner required by the law of U.S.A.

There was no dispute that the Award is a foreign Award. To
that extent the evidence had also been produced. There was no dispute that
there was an agreement for Arbitration.

It was held that the petition should be accompanied by the
Award or a duly authenticated copy thereof. As per Rule 803-C of the Bombay
High Court O.S. Rules. Reading S. 47(1) so also Rule 803(C)(c) together, all
that was required was that the party applying for enforcement of Foreign Award
shall at the time of the application produce before the Court, the original
Award or copy thereof.

In facts of present case admittedly, the petitioner had
produced a copy of the Award duly authenticated under the law prevailing in
U.S.A.

The petitioner had also filed the affidavit to satisfy the
Court that the copy of the Award accompanying the Arbitration petition was
duly authenticated in the manner required by the law of the country in which
it was made. Respondent does not dispute the manner in which the
authentication has been done.

The Court held that a duly authenticated copy of the Award
was already filed and what was lacking was proof of the manner in which it was
authenticated but even that aspect has now been clarified by the affidavit and
the objection raised was overruled.

levitra

Total disablement. Tanker driver said to have suffered 100% disability due to amputation of right leg up to knee joint in an accident : Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 S. 2(1)(e)

New Page 2

16 Total disablement. Tanker driver said to have suffered
100% disability due to amputation of right leg up to knee joint in an accident :
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 S. 2(1)(e)


The claimant-appellant, a tanker driver, while driving his
vehicle from Ayanoor towards Shimoga met with an accident with a tractor coming
from the opposite side. As a result of the accident, the appellant suffered
serious injuries and also amputation of the right leg up to the knee joint. He
thereupon moved an application before the Com-missioner for workmen’s
compensation, praying that as he was 25 years of age and earning Rs.3,000 per
month and had suffered 100% disability, he was entitled to a sum of Rs.5 lacs by
way of compensa-tion. The Commissioner determined the same at Rs.2000 per month.
The Commissioner also found that as the claimant had suffered an amputation of
his right leg up to the knee, he was said to have suffered a loss of 100% of his
earning capacity as a driver and accordingly determined the compen-sation
payable to him at Rs.2,49,576 and interest @ 12% p.a. thereon from the date of
the accident.

On appeal by the insurance company the High Court held that
the loss of a leg on amputation amounted to a 60% reduction in the earning
capacity and as the doctor had opined to a 65% disability, this figure was to be
accepted and accordingly reduced the compensation. The claimant on further
appeal placed reliance on Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata & Anr.,
(1976) 1 SCC 289, wherein a carpenter who had suffered an amputation of his left
arm from the elbow, the Court held that this amounted to a total disability as
the injury was of such a nature that the claimant had been disabled from all
work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. The
expression ‘total disablement’ has been defined in S. 2(1)(e) of the Act as
follows :

“(1) ‘total disablement’ means such disablement whether of
a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates workman for all work which
he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such
disablement.”


The question for consideration before the Court was whether
the disablement incapacitated the respondent for all work which he was capable
of performing at the time of the accident. The appellant herein had also
suffered a 100% disability and incapacity in earning his keep as a tanker driver
as his right leg had been amputated from the knee. Additionally, a perusal of S.
8 and S. 9 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would show that the appellant would
now be disqualified from even getting a driving licence.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment of the High Court was
set aside and order of the Commissioner restored.

[ K. Janardhan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2008 SC
2384]

levitra

Adjournment of hearing — Unaware of decision.

New Page 3

  1. Adjournment of hearing — Unaware of decision.

[Sunil Shipping Agency v. Commissioner of Customs (ACC &
Exports) Mumbai,
2009 (242) ELT 541 (Trib.-Mumbai)]

An application was moved before the Tribunal for waiver in
relation to the requirement of pre-deposit of the amount ordered to be paid
under the impugned order. The appellant had relied on the decision of Bombay
High Court in Commissioner of Customs (E.P.) v. Jupiter Exports, (2007)
213 ELT 641 (Bom.). The DR also submitted its arguments and relied on various
decisions of High Court and Tribunal.

With reference to the decision relied on by the DR. the
Advocate for the appellant submitted that he was not aware of the said
decision and therefore, time should be granted to him to go through the same
and to make submissions and for that purpose matter should be adjourned.

The Tribunal rejecting the request for adjournment held
that merely because the advocate for a party is unaware of the decisions cited
by the opposite party that cannot be a ground for adjournment of the hearing.
The advocate for the party very well can go through the judgment and make his
submission. Therefore, the question of adjournment of the matter on the said
ground cannot arise. On merits the application were disposed of directing the
appellants firm to deposit the amount.

levitra

Stamp duty : Transfer of agricultural land by great grandfather in favour of great grandson, exempted from payment of stamp duty : Indian Stamp Act, 1899.

New Page 2

15 Stamp duty : Transfer of agricultural land by great
grandfather in favour of great grandson, exempted from payment of stamp duty :
Indian Stamp Act, 1899.


The petitioner was a minor and great grandson of one Shri
Bhag Singh. The petitioner is son of pre-deceased father Shri Kuldeep Singh who
expired on 31-8-1999. The petitioner was also son of a pre-deceased grandfather
Shri Baldev Singh, who died on 24-7-2002. Shri Bhag Singh, great grand-father of
the petitioner executed a transfer deed, dated 23-1-2003 registered with sub-Tehsil
in respect of agricultural land. The value of the land disclosed was Rs.30 lacs.
The petitioner being the transferee did not affix any stamp duty on the ground
that Notification dated 21-12-2001 issued u/s.9(1)(a) of
the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 granted exemption in case transfer of immovable
property is made by the great grandfather to the great grandson. The collector
issued notice to the petitioner and held that he was liable to pay stamp duty
holding that the petitioner was not covered in the category of class I – heirs.

The High Court observed that no stamp duty would be
chargeable in case of transaction or transfer by an owner of agricultural land
or rural residential property to his class I heirs as defined in the schedule
u/s.8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The schedule u/s.8 of the Succession
Act specifies heirs in class I, which includes son of a pre-deceased son of a
pre-deceased son. The aforementioned schedule reads thus :

“Heirs in class I and class II

class I

Son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a pre-deceased son;
daughter of a pre-deceased son; son of a pre-deceased daughter, daughter of a
pre-deceased daughter; widow of pre-deceased son; son of a pre-deceased son of
a pre-deceased son; widow of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son.”


Therefore, the petitioner was covered by the phrase ‘son of a
pre-deceased son of pre-deceased son’. In other words, the transfer made in this
case was by a great grandfather in favour of a great grandson, which was covered
by the phrase used in the Schedule of Class I heirs. Therefore, notification
dated 21-12-2001 would cover the case of the petitioner and it would fully apply
to the transfer deed, which was registered on 23-1-2003.

[ Gurdial Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR
2008 Punjab and Haryana 146]



levitra

Hindu Law : Daughter of coparcener in Joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara Law gets right of coparcener from the year 2005: Hindu Succession Act, 1956, S. 6 (as amended in 2005)

New Page 2

14 Hindu Law : Daughter of coparcener in Joint Hindu Family
governed by Mitakshara Law gets right of coparcener from the year 2005: Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, S. 6 (as amended in 2005)


Respondent No. 1 the plaintiff filed the suit for partition
of the properties. The plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are brothers, defendant
Nos. 4 and 5 are their sisters, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of defendant
No. 1. Krushna, the father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1, 4 and 5 died
in the year 1991 while living jointly with his sons. There had been no partition
of the suit properties by metes and bounds. As defendant No. 1 avoided the
request of the plaintiff for amicable partition of the suit properties, the
plaintiff filed the suit.

The lower Court decreed the suit preliminarily in part on
contest against defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and ex parte against defendant No.
5 with costs.

The Court held that the (Amendment) Act, 2005 was enacted to
remove the discrimination as contained in S. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
by giving equal rights and liabilities to the daughters in the Hindu Mitakshara
Coparcenary property as the sons have. The said Act came into force with effect
from 9-9-2005 and the statutory provisions create new right. The provisions are
not expressly made retrospective by the Legislature. Thus, the Act itself is
very clear and there is no ambiguity in its provisions. The law is well settled
that where the statute’s meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be
interpolated. The words used in provisions are not bearing more than one
meaning. The amended Act shall be read with the intention of the legislation to
come to a reasonable conclusion. Thus, looking into the substance of the
provisions and on conjoint reading, Ss.(1) and (5) of S. 6 of the said Act are
clear and one can come to a conclusion that the Act is prospective. It creates
substantive right in favour of the daughter. The daughter got a right of
coparcener from the date when the amended act came into force i.e.,
9-9-2005.

The contention that the daughters, who are born only after
2005, will be treated as coparceners, is not accepted. If the provision of the
Act is read with the intention of the legislation, the irresistible conclusion
is that S. 6 (as amended by Act 39 of 2005) rather gives a right to the daughter
as coparcener, from the year 2005, whenever they may have been born. The
daughters are entitled to a share equal with the son as a coparcener.

[Pravat Chandra Pattnaik & Ors v. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik
and Anr.,
AIR 2008 Orissa 133]


levitra

Dowry : Gifts given at time of customary thread-changing ceremony on birth of girl not dowry : IPC, 1860]

New Page 2

13 Dowry : Gifts given at time of customary thread-changing
ceremony on birth of girl not dowry : IPC, 1860]


Three accused, viz., Narayana Murthy (A-1), his father
Kannappa (A-2) and mother Shivabhushan-amma (A-3), were tried by the Sessions
Judge, Bangalore City, u/s.498-A and u/s.304-B of IPC and S. 3, S. 4 and S. 6 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. During the pendency of trial A-2 died. The
learned Trial Judge found the evidence of prosecution witnesses insufficient and
lacking for holding A-1 and A-3 guilty of the offences alleged against them and,
accordingly, they were acquitted of the charges.

On appeal by the State, the Division Bench of the High Court
convicted A-1 for offences u/s.498A and u/s.304-B of IPC and sentenced him to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years u/s.304-B, IPC. The
High Court, however, acquitted A-1 for offence u/s.3, u/s.4 and u/s.6 of the DP
Act, 1961, whereas the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Judge
in favour of A-3 has been upheld. On 3-9-1989 the marriage of Jagadeshwari, was
celebrated. An amount of Rs.4,000 in cash and five sovereign gold ornaments
allegedly were given to A-1 in dowry at the time of the marriage. After the
marriage, Jagadeshwari started living with A-1, A-2 and A-3 in their house. It
was alleged that after marriage, A-1 to A-3 started harassing Jagadeshari for
not bringing sufficient dowry and were compelling her to bring more dowry from
her parental house. Jagadeshari during her pregnancy period stayed at the house
of her parents for about five months. She gave birth to a female child. It was
alleged that on the day fixed by the parents of Jagadeshari for performing the
customary thread-changing ceremony of the child, A-1 refused to participate in
the said ceremony and he made demand of a gold ring, silver plate and silver
panchpatre as dowry. Since the father of Jagadeshari was not financially sound
to fulfil the demanded articles, he gifted a steel panchapatre and steel plate
to A-1. A-1 expressed his displeasure and went back
to his house. After a few days, Ravichandra (brother) took his sister
Jagadeshwari and her child to the house of A-1, A-2 and A-3 and told them that
his parents would try to meet their demand of dowry articles within a short
time, but still they continued to ill treat and harass Jagadeshari.

Jagadeshari alleged to have bolted the door of the kitchen
from inside and poured kerosene on her body and set herself on fire. Parents of
the deceased, on receipt of information of the death of their daughter through
one of the relatives, rushed to the house of the accused and on visual
inspection they noticed extensive burn injuries on the dead body of Jagadeshari.
On the following day, the father of the deceased lodged a complaint with Police
Station.

The Supreme Court observed that there was no evidence to show
that there was any cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demand of
dowry. The complaint does not reveal that the accused had raised demand of dowry
either in cash or kind at the time of marriage. Further, the Court observed that
gift given at the time of performing customary thread-changing ceremony in
connection with birth of girl child is prevalent in the society and such gifts
cannot come within the ambit of dowry.

[ Narayana Murthy v. State of Karnataka and Anr.,
AIR 2008 SC 2377]


levitra

Auction sale of property by bank held illegal and arbitrary — Valuation of house by bank at much lower rate than it was valued at time of taking loan : Securitisation & Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, S. 13.

New Page 2

12 Auction sale of property by bank held illegal and
arbitrary — Valuation of house by bank at much lower rate than it was valued at
time of taking loan : Securitisation & Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, S. 13.


The petitioner and his wife had taken a loan of Rs.4,80,000
from State Bank of Patiala for purchasing a double-storey constructed house. The
approved valuer of the bank valued the house at Rs.6,14,294. There was default
committed by the petitioner in payment of instalments and the account of the
petitioner and his wife was classified as NPA illegally and no satisfactory
explanation was given as to why the valuer gave the valuation of house in
question at Rs.4,16,000 in Sept. 2005 when the same was valued by the bank’s
approved valuer in June 2003 at Rs.6,14,294 and thereafter conducted auction
sale of property at throw-away price.

The Court held that wide powers have been given to the banks
under the provisions of the Act for selling the secured asset itself without
invoking adjudicatory process. Even the action taken by the bank under this Act
cannot be challenged in the Civil Court. Therefore, the statutory powers vested
under this Act with the banks and the financial institutions must be exercised
reasonably and bona fide. The presumption that public officials will
discharge their duties honestly, reasonably, bona fide and in accordance
with the law may be rebutted by establishing circumstances which reasonably
probabilise the abuse of that power. If there is no credible explanation
forthcoming, the Court can assume that the impugned action was improper.

The Courts observed that in the last five years the prices of
real estate have increased day by day. When a house was purchased in 2003 for
Rs.6,00,000, how its value was assessed at Rs.4,16,000 in the year 2005. The
valuation report was apparently a procured one. No reason has been given for
difference of valuation with the earlier report, and the house in question had
been sold for less than the value of valuation report given at a time when loan
was obtained by the borrower. Therefore, the above facts with unexplained
circumstances was sufficient to hold that the auction/sale was conducted
illegally, unreasonably, unfairly and mala fide and consequently the same
was declared to be illegal and void. In the instant case, the borrower was a
poor mason belonging to the lower strata of society and he had taken the small
house loan for purpose of purchasing the house in question and he was ready to
regularise his account with agreed interest within four months. The borrower
must therefore be given an opportunity to clear the defaulted instalments within
a period of four months; accordingly the auction sale of property conducted by
the bank, held illegal and arbitrary.

[ Bhupinder Singh v. State Bank of Patiala & Ors.,
AIR 2008 Punjab and Haryana 148]



levitra

Bring back substance

Accountant Abroad

When ‘true and fair’ accounts disclose either favourable
results that are factually unsupportable, or a position much worse than
warranted due to an ‘accounting quirk’, with no bearing on actual performance,
we are bound to wonder what is going on.

Arbitrary losses may arise when a company is forced to
separate its foreign exchange credits from the transactions that they cover,
even when inventory is costed at the FE rate for all decision-making purposes.
Or results may be burdened with the ‘value’ of options granted to a company’s
directors, when all we ever wanted was a note on the options granted, their
pricing, and how much they made when exercised. Worse, if the company cancels
the options, the grant cost allocable to future years becomes an immediate
revenue hit, even though it will never actually be paid.

A deferred tax ‘liability’ arises with virtually every ‘fair
value’ revaluation (even when there is no intention to sell), despite deferred
tax not being a liability at all under the International Accounting Standards
Board’s own definition.

The requirement to split land and buildings in property
revaluations, to calculate deferred tax on only the building portion of the
revaluation, then split that portion between ‘recover through use’ and
‘recover through sale’ and apply different tax rates over different time
horizons, is enough to convince you that we are dealing with the ramblings of an
unhinged mind.

Little wonder that we come across instances of exasperated
non-compliance.

A note in the accounts of one public company: ‘In view of
the size of the property portfolio, and the complexity of determining the
residual value and anticipated sale dates of these properties, and the fact that
any deferred tax liability raised will be offset by deferred tax assets,
management believe that an exercise to determine the requisite amounts would
require expenditure well in excess of any expected benefit.’


Arbitrary and indiscriminate :

The reverse effect can arise too. British Telecom’s pension
fund deficit doubled to £ 5.8 bn in the second quarter of 2009. Yet its IAS 19,
Employee Benefits,
‘mark-to-market’ measure of liabilities showed a £1 bn
improvement ! Said a spokesman : ‘While BT is obliged to report the IAS
19 figure each quarter, it has no relevance to the funding of the
scheme.’
To what, pray, does it have relevance ?

Banks continue to be the main beneficiaries of
‘compliance-generated’ profits. Years ago Enron showed that the most deceitful
words in the accounting lexicon are ‘off balance sheet’, yet banks still dodge
toxic asset impairment recognition by using credit derivatives held in
off-balance sheet vehicles.

General Electric in the US agreed in July to pay a settlement
of $ 50m (£ 30m) without admitting or denying wrongdoing following Securities
and Exchange Commission allegations that it fiddled its accounting repeatedly,
to preserve its reputation for ‘making the numbers’.

The SEC refers to discoveries by inhouse accountants of
misstatements that more senior executives ordered them to ignore. Two (out of
four) violations descended to the level of fraud, including an Enron-type scheme
to inflate profits by booking phony sales. In none of these cases has there been
a breach of standards or a murmur from the auditors. Yet giving such accounts
the true and fair imprimatur insults readers’ intelligence. The abiding
principle of preferring substance to rule-based form has all but been abandoned.

Our accounting rules have descended into farce and do not
lack mirth; however, they utterly lack commonsense.

Excerpted from an article by Emile Woolf
(Source : Accountancy, October 2009)

levitra

Worldwide Tax View — Substance over form : Where is the limit ?

Article

Introduction :


Laws and regulations are the intentions of legislators
captured in words. The challenge is to choose a formulation that captures such
intentions in a way that it is clear and covering exactly those situations that
are desired to be covered. The subjects to the law should be able to understand
the rules, and also to trust that once the rules are interpreted in the
appropriate way, it is clear which situation is covered by the rules and which
one is not. Thus, the subjects can accordingly structure their behaviour or in
other words : Choose the right form for their actions.

To ensure non-discriminatory enforcement of laws and
regulations, choosing a formal approach is very logical. It rules out
arbitrariness or at least mitigates the same. In other words, the form of a
situation — a transaction, determines the legal consequences. For long, most
countries have used the formal approach.

However, more and more countries have come to the realisation
that taxpayers were choosing forms for their transactions that led them to a
beneficial tax treatment. This may and does in practice, lead to undesired
behaviour. Especially in cases where the form of the transaction has no or
little connection with its actual substance and such form is chosen merely to
get a better tax result, the ability to look beyond the form may be justified.
An example could be where a parent company provides funding to its 100 percent
loss-making subsidiary company, without a repayment obligation, and without
charging interest. Calling such funding a loan, and not (quasi) equity, would
not do justice to the substance of the transaction.

What should be avoided, however, would be a requalification
of any transaction to a form that puts the taxpayer in the worst position.
Striking the balance is not easy.

The approach of a few countries towards the issue of
substance over form has been reflected below, to provide a better framework for
understanding the issue.

Country overview :

United States of America (US) :

The US has included several rules in its legislation to
codify the substance-over-form concept. Illustrations include : The rule on
conduit financing and on domestic reversed hybrid entities.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is permitted to re-characterise
cross-border conduit financing transactions, including back-to-back loans which
are undertaken for tax avoidance purposes. Specifically, the IRS is authorised
to disregard an intermediate company in a multiparty financing arrangement if
the company is used as part of a tax avoidance plan, for example, if the company
is put in place to take advantage of reduced withholding under a US tax treaty.
In that case, the overall transaction will be analysed without recognition being
given to the conduit entity and the US domestic withholding rate or that of
another tax treaty will be applied.

The Domestic Reversed Hybrid rules, finalised in 2002,
provide a check on certain abusive double-dip financing arrangements between
related parties. If a payment from a domestic entity to a related Domestic
Reversed Hybrid entity is treated as a dividend under either US or foreign law,
and if the Domestic Reversed Hybrid entity makes a payment to a related foreign
interest holder which is deductible in the US and entitled to a reduced treaty
rate, then the payment by the Domestic Reversed Hybrid entity is treated as a
dividend. Thus, there will be no deduction and the treaty withholding rate will
be governed by the Article relating to dividends.

The IRS in the US and the US courts have consistently taken
the view that transactions are to be taxed according to their economic substance
rather than their legal form (Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d
Cir. 1966).

In the matter of Burger King v. State Tax Comm’n, (416
NE2d 1024) (NY Ct. Apps. 1980), the Tax Commission assessed a restaurant sales
tax on purchases of packaging material. The assessment was based on the fact
that the restaurant did not charge its customers a line item on the receipt for
packaging. Based on this, the state argued, the packaging was not being ‘resold’
as required for exemption from sales tax. In ruling for the restaurant, the
court overlooked the form of the transaction (i.e., the absence of a line
item for packaging on the customer receipt) and looked to the substance to
determine if a resale had occurred.

The Supreme Court, in F. & R. Lazarus & Co., (308 US 252)
(1939)
, summarised the doctrine as follows : In the field of taxation,
administrators of the laws and the courts are concerned with substance and
realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly binding.

China :

The tax authorities introduced general anti-avoidance rules
effective from January 1, 2008. The Chinese tax authorities are authorised to
make adjustments to arrangements that can result in a reduction of tax payable
and which are made without any justifiable commercial or business reason.
According to the draft administrative regulations on special tax adjustments,
the following may result in the involved enterprise becoming a target of an
investigation : abuse of tax incentives; treaty shopping; abuse of form of
organisation; frequent trading with companies located in a tax haven; and any
other business arrangements without bona fide commercial purposes.

The form and substance of an arrangement will be reviewed.
The tax authority may redefine the arrangement based on the business substance,
cancel an enterprise’s tax benefits, and re-identify or reallocate revenue,
costs, income, losses and tax deductions between the involved parties. An
anti-avoidance case must be reported to the State Administration of Taxation
(SAT) for its approval.

Germany :

Under the German law (S. 42 of the AO – Tax Procedure Act) substance over form is applied if an in-appropriate legal structure is chosen that leads to a tax advantage for which the taxpayer cannot provide significant non-tax reasons.

A legal structure is considered inappropriate if the taxpayer or a third party generates a tax benefit that is not intended by the law. The amended Section also includes a clear hierarchy, i.e., specific anti-abuse rules according to applicable tax laws have to be applied on a step-by-step basis, after which the general anti-abuse provision can become applicable.

As the legal definition of ‘abuse of form’ is some-what vague, the German tax courts had established a long-term practice based on numerous cases regarding ‘base companies’ which are placed in a low-tax jurisdiction and have no or only insignificant substance.

The recent German anti-treaty-shopping rule (5. SOd EStG) increases the substance requirements for non-German companies to benefit from withholding tax relief, in particular with respect to dividends or royalties provided for by the double tax treaties (DTT) or EU directive. A foreign company is in general entitled to neither full nor partial tax relief if:

  • there are no economic or other relevant reasons for its interposition,

  • not more than 10% of its aggregate gross revenue for the relevant financial year is generated from the company’s own economic activities, or

  • it fails to participate in the open market place with business operations that are adequately equipped for the business purpose pursued by the company.

United Kingdom (UK):

In Furniss (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson, House of Lords, (55 TC 324) (1984) (AC 474), the case involved a disposition of shares by family members, who disposed of shares in two family companies to an investment company incorporated in the Isle of Man. The shares were subsequently sold to another company. The reason for interposing the Isle of Man company was to provide capital gains tax relief. On the question whether the two transactions were in substance a single transaction, it was held that: In ascertaining the substance of a transaction, the courts must look at the entirety of a composite trans-action if it appears that it was designed and intended to be carried through as a whole. The court is not bound to take each step in isolation in order to ascertain the legal rights and liabilities of the tax-payer at the beginning and end of each step. The court can and should have regard to the result which the transaction as a whole was designed to achieve. Further, the court may disregard a transaction and treat it as fiscally a nullity even though there is a change in the legal position of the parties before and after the scheme is carried through, if that change can be regarded as a mere change of form with no enduring legal consequences.

In  Commissioners    of Inland    Revenue    v. Duke    of Westminster (19 TC 490, 520,524) (1936) (AC 1), it was held, as is commonly used as supporting comment in various commentaries on substance-over form matters, that: Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax incidence under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax.

In WT Ramsay Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (54 TC 101) (1982) (AC 300), it was held that: If it can be seen that a document or transaction was intended to have effect as part of a nexus or series of transactions, or as an ingredient of a wider transaction intended as a whole, there is nothing in the doctrine to prevent it being so regarded. It is the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of any transaction to which it is sought to attach a tax or a tax consequence, and if that emerges from a series or combination of transactions intended to operate as such, it is that series or combination which may be regarded.

The above ruling provides a logical summary of addressing the legal nature of each transaction in a series of transactions.

First, it established that there is nothing in the Westminster principle which compels a consideration of individual transactions separately from a preconceived chain or series of transactions of which they form merely a part.

Secondly, it established that where one finds a series of preconceived transactions which are entered upon solely for fiscal purposes and are clearly interconnected and mutually dependent upon one another, one should look at the overall transaction to ascertain what has been and what was intended to be achieved.

Thirdly, it established that if what one finds on such a consideration is that nothing whatsoever has been achieved because the individual steps taken cancel one another out, one is entitled then to ignore the fiscal consequences which might otherwise have resulted from each of those individual steps considered in isolation. That represents the substance of the general principle deducible from the decision.

In conclusion, the fact that transactions may be circulating or are merely paper transactions is further not conclusive. Thus, where no commercial purpose in relation to the transactions is evident apart from tax avoidance which in the absence of the transactions would have been payable, the series of transactions should be looked at as a whole in relation to intention and motivation.

Netherlands:

It is generally accepted that artificial or simulated transactions may be ignored by the tax administration and the Courts of Appeals through a determination of the facts rather than the form (substance over form).

In addition, there are two specific provisions to combat tax avoidance or evasion (i.e., transactions the main purpose of which is avoidance or evasion of tax) :

The just levying provision (richtige heffing), under which the legal act in dispute may be ignored for tax purposes. This procedure is subject to prior approval by the Ministry of Finance and involves a lot of administrative work. Therefore, this procedure is not commonly used.

The abuse of law doctrine (jraus legis), which is not laid down in tax law but is an interpretation method developed in case law. Under this provision, the spirit of the law is decisive, rather than the exact wording. The transaction in dispute may be converted to the closest equivalent which does not give rise to an abuse of law. The abuse of law procedure can be used only as a last resort.

In general, the results of both  procedures are the same for the taxpayer.

In the recent Supreme Court decision (HR 17-10-2008,42954), the merger exemption for capital duty payment was denied, as it was held that interposing an English company for a short period of time, and based on a pre-determined step plan, lacks a real function.

From a series of Supreme Court decisions it can be deduced that abuse of law is present when the chosen structure is predominantly or exclusively motivated by tax savings and also is in contradiction with the meaning of the law. If the motivation is exclusively to save tax, and no commercial justification for the chosen structure exists, abuse of law can be present as well. However, if the legislature has recognised a tax-saving route, but deliberately did not close this route, the courts are not inclined to apply the abuse of law doctrine.

India:

The most important Indian case addressing the substance-over-form question is without doubt McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (154 ITR 148) (SC). The case was about a mitigation of sales tax by having the buyers separately pay the excise duty, whereby such excise duty would not be included in the taxable basis for sales tax.

The Commercial Tax Officer was of the view that the excise duty paid directly to the Excise authorities or deposited directly in the State Exchequer in respect of Indian liquor by the buyers before removing the same from the distillery could be said to form part of the taxable turnover of the appellant distillery for the purpose of the Sales Tax Act.

The Court, however, came to the conclusion that excise duty did not go into the common till of McDowell and did not become a part of the circulating capital. Therefore, the Sales Tax authorities were not competent to include in the turnover of the appellant the excise duty which was not charged by it but was paid directly to the excise authorities by the buyers of the liquor.

The Supreme Court took the view that tax planning was legitimate so long as it was strictly within the four corners of the law and any ‘colourable’ device or dubious methods to minimise tax incidence were not legally permissible.

The Court reaffirmed the view of English cases while examining a legally valid transaction, and held that the Revenue should proceed objectively and not hypothetically attribute ‘motives’ behind the taxpayer’s action.

In the case of the Commissioner of Income-tax v. A. Raman and Co, (67 ITR 11,17) (SC), it was stated that: The law does not oblige a trader to make the maximum profit that he can get out of his trading transactions. Income which accrues to a trader is taxable in his hands. Income which he could have, but has not earned, is not made taxable as income accrued to him. Avoidance of tax liability by so arranging commercial affairs that charge of tax is distributed is not prohibited. A taxpayer may resort to a device to divert the income before it accrues or arises to him. Effectiveness of the device depends not upon considerations of morality, but on the operation of the Income-tax Act. Legislative injunction in tax statutes may not, except on peril of penalty, be violated, but may lawfully be circumvented.

In the case Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, (8 ITR 522), it was stated that: The tax authority is entitled and is indeed bound to determine the true legal relation resulting from a transaction. If the parties have chosen to conceal by a device the legal relation, it is open to the tax authorities to unravel the device and to determine the true character of the relationship. But the legal effect of a transaction cannot be displaced by probing into the ‘substance of the transaction’.

In Simon in Latilla v. I.R.C. (11 ITR Suppl. 78, 79) (HL), it was stated that: Tax planning may be legitimate, provided it is within the framework of law. Colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by resorting to dubious methods. It is the obligation of every citizen to pay their taxes honestly without resorting to subterfuges.

In CIT v. Abhayananda Rath Family Benefit Trust, (255 ITR 436) (Orissa HC), the assessee set up a trust for his minor son’s benefit. The income of the minor child from the trust was to be accumulated during his minority. In other words the income of the minor child from the transferred assets was not includible in the total income of the assessee. However, the contention of the Revenue that the trust has been created by the assessee for the purpose of avoidance of tax was rejected by the Court, as ‘Evading payment of tax’ is quite different from ‘tax planning’.

According to the Orissa High Court, a person may plan his finances in such a manner, strictly within the four corners of the tax statute that his tax liability is minimised or made nil. If this is done and observed strictly in accordance with and taking advantage of the provisions contained in the Act, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that payment of tax has been evaded.

In the context of payment of tax, ‘evasion’ necessarily means, ‘to try illegally to avoid paying tax’. But, as in the instant case, a trust has been created in accordance with law and creation of such a trust is not hit by any of the provisions contained in the Act.

Analysis:

It appears from the above, that there is no single approach towards the issue of substance over form. A clear tendency exists for tax authorities to try and counter any kind of undesired outcome (in their eyes) of a certain piece of legislation by applying the substance-over-form doctrine. This puts, more than in many other situations, a strong responsibility on the shoulders of the judicial system to protect the rights of the taxpayer.

The following common denominator can, however, be found in most countries: If a taxpayer has multiple avenues available to structure his transaction, he is free to choose the most tax-efficient avenue, provided a certain level of commercial justification for the choice exists, and tax considerations are not the only reason.

The OECD leaves it to the individual countries to introduce anti-abuse legislation, legislation that can be applied without interference by the OECD model convention (and vice versa). The OECD does subscribe to the concept of (economic) substance over (legal) form.

Looking at the current situation in India, the Indian tax authorities are clearly exploring the limits to the substance-over-form concept with their secondary line of argumentation in the Vodafone case, which involves an attempt to lift the corporate veil of the companies that were interposed between the Hong Kong ultimate parent and the Indian operating company. This seems to indicate that the tax authorities want to go beyond the earlier decision in the Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (263 ITR 706) (SC), where the existence, and beneficial ownership for claiming benefits under the treaty between India and Mauritius, of a Mauritian group company were respected based on a valid certificate of residence of that company issued by the appropriate Mauritius authorities. From Mukundrary K. Shah v. Commissioner of Income tax, (143 Taxman 743) (Calcutta HC)t and Deputy Commissioner of Income tax v. GVS Investment (p) Ltd, (92 TTJ 706)( Delhi ITAT) a principle emerges that the corporate veil can be lifted only where the transaction is found to be sham, bogus or contrived. The corporate veil can be lifted so as to expose any person to liability, who has committed a fraud upon the public from their sheltered position. In addition, from Mafatlal Holdings Ltd v. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, (85 TTJ 82) (Mumbai ITAT)1 and Additional Commissioner of Income-tax v. Nestle India, (94 ITJ 53) (Delhi ITAT), it is clear that the onus is on the tax authorities to prove that a transaction is sham or bogus, before resorting to lifting the corporate veil.

Conclusion:

The substance-over-form doctrine is used most often in an anti-abuse context by the tax authorities. This implies that it should be applied with care. It should also be applied in a consistent way. A requalification of only certain elements of a transaction, to come to the maximum tax cost for the tax-payer, will not do. The substance of the total trans-action structure should be reviewed. Only when the chosen form is illegal or legal, but lacking commercial reality and just aimed at receiving a beneficial tax treatment, a challenge based on the substance-over-form doctrine should succeed. And, also the tax authorities are required to stay within the four corners of the law.

Adoption of IFRS in India

Background :

    Users of financial statements have always demanded transparency in financial reporting and disclosures. However, the willingness and need for better disclosure practices have intensified only in recent times. Globalisation has helped Indian companies raise funds from offshore capital markets. This has required Indian companies, desirous of raising funds, to follow the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) of the investing country. The different disclosure requirements for listing purposes have hindered the free flow of capital. This has also made comparison of financial statements across the globe impossible. A movement was initiated by an international body called International Organisation of Securities Commissions to harmonise diverse disclosure practices followed in different countries. This would ease free flow of capital and reduce costs of raising capital in foreign currencies.

IFRS v. U.S. GAAP :

    The policy makers in India have also realised the need to follow IFRS and it is expected that a large number of Indian companies would be required to follow IFRS from 2011. This poses a great challenge to the preparers of financial statements and also to the auditors. There is an urgent need to understand the nuances in IFRS implementation. The biggest difference between U.S. GAAP and IFRS is that IFRS provides much less overall detail. Its guidance regarding revenue recognition, for example, is significantly less extensive than GAAP. IFRS also contains relatively little industry-specific instructions. Because of long-standing convergence projects between the IASB and the FASB, the extent of the specific differences between IFRS and GAAP has been shrinking. Yet significant differences do remain, any one of which can result in significantly different reported results, depending on a company’s industry and individual facts and circumstances.

    Some of the examples are :

    • IFRS does not permit Last-In, First-Out (LIFO).

    • IFRS uses a single-step method for impairment write-downs rather than the two-step method used in U.S. GAAP, making write-downs more likely.

    • IFRS has a different probability threshold and measurement objective for contingencies.

    • IFRS does not permit debt for which a covenant violation has occurred to be classified as non-current unless a lender waiver is obtained before the balance sheet date.

IFRS compliance in India :

Applicability of IFRS in India :

The convergence note of ICAI states that IFRS is applicable from 2011. IFRS in India would cover the following public interest entities in its first wave.

• Listed companies

• Banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and financial institutions

• Turnover in preceding year exceeding 100 crores

• Borrowing in preceding year exceeding 25 crores

• Holding or subsidiary of the above

First-time adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards :

Applicability to Financial Statements :

• IFRS-1 is applicable to the following financial statements :

1. First annual financial statement in which the entity adopts International Financial Reporting Standards, by an explicit and unreserved statement of compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards.

2. Each interim financial report that the entity presents as part of its first annual financial statement in which the entity adopts International Financial Reporting Standards by an explicit and unreserved statement of compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards.

Period :

• The first IFRS reporting period for entities in India having accounting period beginning on 1 April would be 1 April 2011 to 30 June 2011. For an entity whose accounting period begins on 1 January, the first IFRS reporting period would be 1 January 2012 to 31 March 2012.

Date of transition :

• As per Institute of Chartered Accountants of India’s announcement, an entity in India should have its financials as per IFRS on 1 April 2010 which is the date of transition to International Financial Reporting Standards for entities whose accounting periods begin on 1 April. The entity is required to prepare and present opening IFRS statement of financial position as at the date of transition to International Financial Reporting Standards.

• An entity that presented financial statements in the previous year containing an explicit and unreserved statement of compliance with IFRS would not be a first-time adopter of IFRS even though it contains a qualified audit report.

Accounting policies :

• The entity cannot change its accounting policy during the periods presented in its first IFRS financial statements. For an entity whose accounting period begins on 1 April, the periods presented would be 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011 and 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012. No voluntary change in accounting policies is permitted during the period 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2012.

• The entity should adopt accounting policies that are in compliance with each IFRS effective as at 30 June 2011, if the entity prepares and presents an interim financial report or 31 March 2012.

• The adjustments due to changes in accounting policies from previous GAAP to International Financial Reporting Standards at the date of transition to International Financial Reporting Standards should be adjusted directly in retained earnings or a specific reserve such as IFRS transition reserve.

De-recognising of some old assets and liabilities :

The entity should eliminate previous GAAP assets and liabilities from the opening balance sheet if they do not qualify for recognition under IFRSs. [IFRS 1-10(b)] For example :    

  • IAS 38 does not permit recognition of expenditure on any of the following as an intangible asset: research, start-up, pre-operating, and pre-opening costs, training, advertising and promotion, moving and relocation if the entity’s previous GAAP had recognised these as assets; they are eliminated in the opening IFRS balance sheet.

  •     If the entity’s previous GAAP had allowed accrual of liabilities for ‘general reserves’, restructurings, future operating losses, or major overhauls that do not meet the conditions for recognition as a provision under IAS 37, these are eliminated in the opening IFRS balance sheet.

  •     If the entity’s previous GAAP had allowed recognition of reimbursements and contingent assets that are not virtually certain, these are eliminated in the opening IFRS balance sheet.

Recognition of some new assets and liabilities:

Conversely, the entity should recognise all assets and liabilities that are required to be recognised by IFRS even if they were never recognised under previous GAAP. [IFRS 1.10(a)] For example:

IAS 39 requires recognition of all derivative financial assets and liabilities, including embedded de-rivatives. These were not recognised under many local GAAPs.

IAS 19 requires an employer to recognise its liabilities under defined benefit plans. These are not just pension liabilities but also obligations for medical and life insurance, vacations, termination benefits, and deferred compensation. In the case of ‘over-funded’ plans, this would be a defined benefit asset.

IAS 37 requires recognition of provisions as liabilities. Examples could include an entity’s obligations for restructurings, onerous contracts, decommissioning, remediation, site restoration, warranties, guarantees, and litigation.

Deferred tax assets and liabilities would be recognised in conformity with IAS 12.

Reclassification:

The entity should reclassify previous GAAP opening balance sheet items into the appropriate IFRS classification. [IFRS 1.10(c)] Examples:

IAS 10 does not permit classifying dividends declared or proposed after the balance sheet date as a liability at the balance sheet date. In the opening IFRS balance sheet these would be reclassified as a component of retained earnings.

If the entity’s previous GAAP had allowed treasury stock (an entity’s own shares that it had purchased) to be reported as an asset, it would be reclassified as a component of equity under IFRS.

Items classified as identifiable intangible assets in a business combination accounted for under the previous GAAP may be required to be classified as goodwill under IFRS 3, because they do not meet the definition of an intangible asset under IAS 38. The converse may also be true in some cases. These items must be reclassified.

IAS 32 has principles for classifying items as financialliabilities or equity. Thus mandatory redeemable preferred shares that may have been classified as equity under previous GAAP would be reclassified as liabilities in the opening IFRS balance sheet.

Note that IFRS 1 makes an exception from the ‘split-accounting’ provisions of IAS 32. If the liability component of a compound financial instrument is no longer outstanding at the date of the opening IFRS balance sheet” the entity is not required to reclassify out of retained earnings and into other equity the original equity component of the compound instrument.

The reclassification principle would apply for the purpose of defining reportable segments under IFRS 8.

The scope of consolidation might change depending on the consistency of the previous GAAP requirements to those in IAS 27. In some cases, IFRS will require consolidated financial statements where they were not required before.

Some offsetting (netting) of assets and liabilities or of income and expense items that had been acceptable under previous GAAP may no longer be acceptable under IFRS.

Retrospective  adjustments:

An entity need not make retrospective adjustments for complying with all IFRS from the inception/ origination of asset/liability. An entity may opt for the following exemptions:

1. Not applying IFRS 3 to business combinations that occurred before 1 April 2010

2. Taking fair value at the date of transition or re-valuation done before transition date as deemed cost for property, plant & equipment, intangible assets and investment property

3. Recognise all actuarial gains and losses that are unrecognised at 1 April 2010, even though the entity follows corridor approach for recognising actuarial gains and losses

4. Ignore unrecognised cumulative translation differences at the date of transition

5. Need not separate liability and equity component of a compound financial instrument where the liability component is not outstanding as at 1 April 2010

6. Take the values of assets and liabilities of the subsidiary stated in the parent’s consolidated financial statements after removing consolidation adjustments where the subsidiary adopts IFRS later than parent

 7. Take the values of assets and liabilities of the subsidiary stated in its separate financial statements if the parent adopts IFRS later than the subsidiary

 8. Designate a financial asset as available for sale or at fair value through profit or loss and a financialliability as at fair value through profit or loss at 1 April 2010

 9. Not apply IFRS 2 to equity instruments that vested before 1 April 2010

 10. Apply transitional provisions in IFRS 4 to insurance contracts at 1 April 2010

11. Not add to or deduct from the cost of the asset for changes in existing decommissioning, restoration and similar liabilities as specified in IFRIC 1 that occurred before  1 April  2010

12. Determine as at 1 April 2010 whether an arrangement contains a lease on the basis of the facts and circumstances existing on 1 April 2010

13. Take transaction value as fair value of financial assets and financial liabilities

14. Apply transitional provisions in IFRIC 12 to Service Concession Arrangements at 1 April 2010.

 IFRS 1 prohibits retrospective application in the following cases:
    
1. Not apply de-recognition requirements of IAS 39 to transactions that resulted in de-recognition under previous GAAP and that occurred before 1 January 2004

2. Measure all derivatives at fair value at 1 April 2010

3. Designate derivative as hedge instruments from 1 April 2010.

4. Attribute to the owners of the parent and to the controlling interests even if this results in non-controlling interests having a deficit balance

5. Account for changes in parent’s controlling interest in a subsidiary that does not result in loss of control as equity transaction.

The adjustments to be made to the values of assets and liabilities at 1 April, 2010 reflect the changes in accounting policies. No adjustments are required for changes in estimates made under previous GAAP.

Set of financial statements:

An entity’s first IFRS financial statements should contain :

1. Three statements of financial position (i) As at 31 March 20P (ii) As at 31 March 2011 (iii) As at 1 April 2010

2. Two statements of comprehensive income (i) For the period ended on 31 March 2012 (ii) For the period ended on 31 March 2011

3. Two statements of cash flows (i) For the period ended on 31 March 2012 (ii) For the period ended on 31 March 2011

4. Two statements of changes in equity (i) For the period ended on 31 March 2012 (ii) For the period ended on 31 March 2011

Annual  reconciliation:

IFRS 1 requires the following reconciliation in that entity’s financial statements for the period ended on 31 March 2012 :

1. Reconciliation of equity reported under Inter-national Financial Reporting Standards and previous GAAP for (a) 1 April 2010 (b) 31 March 2011.

2. Reconciliation of total comprehensive income under International Financial Reporting Standards with that reported under previous GAAP for the period 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011.

3. Explanation of material adjustments in the statement of cash flows – IFRS 1 requires reconciliations in that entity’s interim financial reports presented during the period 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2012 between International Financial Reporting Standards and previous GAAP.

Quarterly  Interim  reconciliation:

The reconciliation required for a quarterly interim financial report as at 30 September 2011 is:

1. Reconciliation of equity as at 30 September 2011between that reported under International Financial Reporting Standards and that re-ported under previous GAAP.

2. Reconciliation of total comprehensive income for the period ended 30 September 2011 and 30 September 2010 between that reported under International Financial Reporting Standards and that reported under previous GAAP.

3. Reconciliation of total comprehensive income for the year to date period ended 30 September 2011 and 30 September 2010 between that reported under International Financial Reporting Standards and that reported under previous GAAP.

4. Explanation of material adjustments to statement of cash flows for the period ended 30 September 2011 and 30 September 2010 between that reported under International Finanial Reporting Standards and that reported – under previous GAAP.

5. Explanation of material adjustments to statement of cash flows for the year to date period ended 30 September 2011 and 30 September 2010.

Management fees : Are you following the best practices ?

Article

1.0 Introduction :


One of the most widely contested issues by Indian tax
authorities during a transfer pricing audit is the amount paid for intra-group
services to group companies often referred to as management or intra-group
fees/charges. In fact, compensation for intra-group services has been one of the
important transfer pricing challenges globally for taxpayer and authorities
alike.

At the same time, management fees can be one of the more
important and legitimate tax planning tools for effectively lowering taxable
income in a particular tax jurisdiction, if it is structured in a proper manner.
Hence it is obvious that tax authorities look at this mechanism as a profit
extraction technique and adopt a strict posture while investigating the
inter-company affairs. Further it is imperative that the Multinational
Enterprise (MNE) group which is formulating an intra-group management fee
policy, must consider the tax implications in both the jurisdictions. It is also
equally important to consider other aspects such as withholding tax, indirect
tax levies, international tax and regulatory issues while formulating an
intra-group management fee policy.

This article (in two parts) seeks to outline certain key
aspects that need to be considered while formulating a management fee policy and
also the broad approach to be followed in this regard. The analysis here is
mainly from an Indian perspective (i.e., mainly with reference to a
foreign MNE proposing to charge management fees to its Indian group company to
which support services are rendered, and also with reference to an Indian MNE
proposing to charge management fees to its overseas group companies). At various
places, the article also highlights the practical approach currently being
followed by the Indian tax authorities and issues encountered by taxpayers based
on transfer pricing assessments recently completed.


There is no specific mention of intra-group services (though
there is for cost sharing arrangements) in Indian transfer pricing provisions [i.e.,
S. 92 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (ITA)]. The law is still emerging in India and
therefore reliance is also placed on, and useful inferences have been drawn
from, the international tax practices followed in some other developed
countries, along with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD Guidelines)
1
and the Guidance Note of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India on
transfer pricing.


2.0 Concept of intra-group services and management fees :


An intra-group service is a service performed by one member
of a multinational group for the benefit of one or more group companies. The
intra-group services may be performed by a parent company or a sister company
for any one or more of the group companies. In a transfer pricing context, such
intra-group services become significant when they are rendered to related
parties located in different tax jurisdictions.


The OECD Guidelines state that generally every MNE group
arranges for a broad range of services to be available to its members, in
particular, administrative, technical, financial and commercial services. Such
services may include management, coordination and control functions for the
entire group.
2 In
essence, intra-group services encompass a broad range of services that can
potentially be provided by the parent/group company to another group company (or
across group companies). In general, the categories of services that could be
regarded as intra-group services include the following :




  • management services;



  • administrative services;



  • coordination, control and administrative services;



  • research and development;



  • product development;



  • technical services;



  • purchasing, marketing and distribution;



  • engineering services;



  • staff & HR related matters, such as recruitment and training;



  • financial services;



  • legal services; and



  • other commercial services that typically can be provided with regard to the
    nature of the MNE’s business.



Some of the intra-group services (basic administrative,
financial or support services) could be referred to as routine in nature. The
identification and treatment of these services are generally straightforward and
simple. However, the issue of charging for services may become complex as the
nature of services moves from routine to more sophisticated.

3.0 Broad parameters for designing a policy for charging for intra-group
services :


Considering the importance of charging arm’s-length management fees from the perspective of both the service provider and the service recipient, the basic principles involved in designing a management fee policy are discussed here. Broadly speaking, the OECD Guidelines” outline two main issues that should be addressed when evaluating intra-group services in the context of transfer pricing, namely:

  • determining whether the activities undertaken by a parent company or group service centre genuinely constitute intra-group services (i.e., whether the payer is receiving a benefit); and

  • how to determine an arm’s-length consideration for such services (in accordance with the benefit received).

3.1 Determining whether intra-group services have been rendered:

The OECD Guidelines provide a basis to determine whether a service has been rendered. The OECD Guidelines broadly state that when one group member performs an activity for one or more group members, it will be regarded as a service rendered if and only if the activity provides the respective group member with economic or commercial value that might conceivably enhance the recipient’s commercial position.’ It also provides another simple way to ensure that a legitimate service is being rendered by considering whether an independent enterprise in similar circumstances would be willing to pay for the same service conducted by another independent entity or whether it would perform that service in-house. In other words, the OECD Guidelines are based on the principle of willingness to pay for an activity from an independent enterprise vis-a-vis performing it in-house. Simply stated, if the activity is not one for which the independent enterprise would have been willing to payor perform for itself, the activity ordinarily should not be regarded as a chargeable intra-group service under the arm’s-length principle.

The US regulations u/ s.482 of the Internal Revenue Code (US regulations) are also based on the same lines. Similarly, the position of the Australian Tax Office (ATO) with regard to head office activities is that services are chargeable only when the activity has conferred a benefit to an assessee. The ATO also takes the view that where a benefit is provided to an entity by way of a service and there is a real connection between the entity’s operations and the associate, the entity would be expected to pay for the services.

This test involving a willingness to payor existence of a benefit (benefit rule), as enunciated above is, by far, the most important factor that determines whether a related-party service recipient would pay for an intra-group service and, therefore, in turn, whether the service provider can justify a charge for the provision of the intra-group services. The objec-tive of the benefit rule is not only to determine the quantum of benefit, but also the relative proximity of the benefit derived to the intra-group services rendered. Therefore, one should determine how direct or remote the benefits derived are in relation to the activity performed under the guise of intra-group services. A direct or perceived benefit from the service rendered must be identified. Conse-quently, allocations are not to be made if the prob-able benefit to other members is so indirect or re-mote that unrelated parties would not have ‘charged for similar  services.

Further, such management fee charge is to be consistent and commensurate with the relevant benefits intended for the services, based on the facts known when the services were rendered, and not based on benefits realised later on. In other words, the use of hindsight is to be avoided.

Consequently at a practical level, with a view to determining whether intra-group services have been rendered, each service must be evaluated on the basis of whether it provides a group member with economic or commercial value that enhances its commercial position in the market where it operates.

This is also relevant because certain services are not chargeable at all. The OECD Guidelines identify certain services or activities that are deemed to be non-beneficial for the recipient. As a result, those activities cannot be regarded as chargeable intra-group services. The main categories of non-beneficial services identified in the OECD Guidelines are:

  • shareholder/custodial activities;
  • stewardship  / duplicative  services;
  • services that provide incidental benefits;
  • passive association benefits; and
  • on-call services.

The same are briefly  discussed hereunder:

3.1.1  Shareholder services/Custodial activities:

Shareholder activities are regarded as activities that a group member performs solely because of its ownership interest in one or more of the group members (in its capacity as a shareholder). Such an activity may be performed by one group member for related group members, even though those members do not need the activity and would not be willing to pay for it if it were performed by an independent enterprise. Consequently, under the OECD Guidelines, this type of shareholder activity would not justify a charge to the recipient company.

On reading of OECD Guidelines, the Canadian Regulations, and the US Regulations, an illustrative list of services/ costs that are regarded as share-holder activities are mentioned below :

  • costs of activities relating to the legal structure of the parent company and include expenses associated with the issuance of stock and maintenance of shareholder relations (e.g., costs of issuing shares, share transfer expenses, meetings of shareholders and costs of the supervisory board);

  • costs relating to the reporting and legal requirements of the parent company (e.g., consolidation of financial reports, maintenance of shareholder records, filings of prospectuses and income tax returns);

  • costs incurred by a parent company to raise funds for acquisition of a new company in its own rights;

  • costs of managerial and control (monitoring) activities related to the management and protection of the investment as such in participations;

  • costs of visits and reviewing subsidiary performance on a regular basis; and

  • costs of financing or refinancing the parent’s ownership participation in the subsidiary.

However, merely because an activity has been per-formed for the benefit of the owner does not, per se, mean that it is a shareholder activity for which an allocation is not warranted. This is because there may be activities performed for the interest of the owner, which conform to the shareholder activity definition provided in the OECD Guidelines, but which could nevertheless be regarded as chargeable based on surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In such cases, the OECD Guidelines advise that whether the activities fall within the definition of shareholder activities as defined in the OECD Guidelines is to be determined based on whether under comparable facts and circumstances, the activity is one that an independent enterprise would have been willing to pay for or to perform for itself.

3.1.2  Duplicative Services:

Duplicative services or stewardship services are those that a group member offers to any other member, which can be considered duplicate in the sense that the service is already performed by the recipient or by a third, unrelated party on its behalf. In that case, no intra-group services should be considered to be rendered by the group member.

Such stewardship or duplicative expenses are illustrated in the US Regulations in the context of a financial analysis for a subsidiary’s borrowing needs. When the subsidiary does not have personnel qualified to make the analysis, and does not make the analysis, the cost of the financial analysis done by the parent is required to be allocated to the subsidiary. If, however, the subsidiary has qualified financial staff that makes the analysis, the review of the analysis by the parent’s financial staff is duplicative and an allocation of such costs is not to be made to the subsidiary in such cases.

However, at the same time, it is also recognised that there may be some exceptions, i.e., a temporary circumstance or an opportunity to eliminate critical business risk. The instances of elimination of critical business risk would come into play, for example, while taking a second legal opinion or performing an external audit to avoid a risky or wrong business decision. In other words, when a valid business reason exists, those duplicate services may be considered intra-group services eligible for a management fee payment.

3.1.3  Services that provide incidental benefits:

The OECD Guidelines highlight another set of services which do not warrant an allocation – namely, services that result in an ‘incidental benefit’. This refers to services performed by one group member, such as a shareholder or coordinating centre, for a particular group member or a set of group members, such that it also incidentally provides a benefit to other group members.

To illustrate, a situation of reorganisation decision or acquisition/ disinvestment deal being carried out by a parent or a sister company results in economies of scale or some other benefit for some other group member not directly involved in the process/deal. In this case, though there is a service element, the same cannot be charged for since it only provides indirect benefit.

3.1.4 Passive association benefit:

This is another category of activities that does not justify an allocation under the benefit test. A mere ‘status as a member of a controlled group’ in case of a taxpayer generally will not be considered as adequate to justify provision of a benefit to the tax-payer for which an arm’s-length charge or allocation will be required.. ,

For example, an enterprise deriving incidental benefits simply because of its affiliation with the parent or the group per se; like in the form of a higher credit rating cannot be said to be receiving a service and does not warrant a management fee payment. However, if the higher credit rating is due to a guarantee provided by a group member, then an intra-group service charge would be required”.

3.1.4  On-call services:

The OECD Guidelines refer to another category of services in the context of intra-group services, i.e., services provided ‘on-call”. The availability of those services generally requires the existence of a support group of some sort and an understanding between the group members about the nature of the assistance being provided in any field of operation whenever required and on an on-call basis. For example, a parent company or a group service centre may be on-hand (always ready/prepared) to provide assistance in matters of legal, finance, technicalor tax issues at any time.

The aspect that merits consideration here is whether the ‘availability’ of that service in itself is considered as a separate service (for chargeability) over and above the service fee compensation for the actual service rendered. The justification provided in the OECD Guidelines for considering such availability as a separate service rendered is that it is common knowledge that independent enterprises incur so-called ‘stand-by charges’ to ensure availability of those services when the need for them arises. An example of that service is the appointment of any legal, technical or financial service provider on a ‘retainer basis’.

These services are not necessarily a regular requirement and may vary in terms of frequency and importance from year to year. Therefore, one must ascertain the potential need of the stand-by service option for the recipient of the service. In cases in which the service requirement is remote or could be easily procured from other sources without an ‘on-call’ service option, the availability of that option is redundant and, hence, unjustified. Therefore, to evaluate whether an ‘on-call’ service is rendered, one must consider the benefit that the’ on-call’ arrangement offers to the group over a period of several years (given the sporadic nature of the occurrence of those service needs), rather than only for the year of taxation under consideration).

In sum, it would be necessary to justify intra-group services from the point of view of an independent enterprise and whether that enterprise would be willing to pay for the service in question or perform the same service in-house.

Also, special attention and close scrutiny should be paid to certain non-chargeable categories of services such as the shareholder activities, duplicative services, services providing incidental benefits, passive association benefits and on-call services as the OECD Guidelines (and perhaps even the laws of the overseas countries of the subsidiaries of Indian MNE) regard above-referred services as non-beneficial activities for the recipient entity, for which a charge is not justified.

Having discussed the nature of services for which the charge is required, the second aspect that is equally important is how to determine an arm’s-length consideration for such services (in accordance with the benefit received). This aspect would be discussed in detail in the second part of this article.

4.0 Documentation to justify that the services are rendered and benefits accrue to the service recipient:

The documentation process for intra-group services is vitally important to establish before the tax authorities the legitimacy of any intra-group service charges, including management fees. Even though the Indian regulation has prescribed detailed transfer pricing documentation requirements in general, no specific guidance has been given in the context of intra-group services. However, it would not be correct to assume that a taxpayer does not have to prepare the necessary documentation to substantiate any and all intra-group charges within an MNE. Further, it is pertinent to note that under the Indian regulations, the primary onus to prove that the international transactions are at arm’s length is on the taxpayer and the tax authorities have powers to make appropriate adjustments where such onus is not adequately discharged by the taxpayer.

Also, mere existence of services agreement or invoice would not be sufficient to justify the arm’s-length nature of management fee charge. Neither do the service agreement nor the invoice demonstrate that the services are actually rendered and the recipient has benefited from such services.

The most important and crucial aspect is the documentation of the fact that intra-group services were rendered by the service provider and the benefits were received by the service recipient. Thus, apart from documenting the aspects such as description of the business operations of the group and the tax-payer, detailed analysis of functions performed, assets employed and risk assumed, etc. which are mentioned in S. 92D read with Rule LOf), one must demonstrate that the service recipient benefited from the provision of the intra-group service and the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt”.

The following documents would be useful in demonstrating that the services were actually rendered and benefits were received by the taxpayer:

  • A written, binding service contract between the companies which shall include details of the group companies providing and receiving management services; detailed nature and extent of services to be provided; basis for determining the fees to be charged; etc. The description of the services in the service contract assumes significance. If the description of the services to be provided appears incomplete, unclear and dis-jointed in the contract or if the description is entirely missing, the tax authorities could dispute the arm’s-length nature of services.

  • A detailed narrative of the services actually rendered during the year under consideration along with documents such as copies of time sheets or cost centre reports, etc. to demonstrate the services rendered. Other documentation could also include letters, manuals, instructions, proof of visits, written advice, periodic activity reports and any other documents or data which tend to confirm that the services were rendered for the benefit of the recipient and are justifiable on an ‘arm’s-length’ basis.

  • A detailed narrative of benefits received; examples to illustrate those benefits; supporting documentation, to establish the existence of a benefit like correspondence, memoranda, manual, directives, etc., indicating a benefit to the recipient of the intra-group service; job descriptions of staff at the service provider and the recipient to identify services and to prove that there is no duplication of services, etc.

In fact, the Indian tax authorities are insisting on some of the above documents during the course of transfer pricing assessment in order to satisfy themselves of the arm’s-length nature of management fee charges. In cases where the taxpayer fails to furnish the requisite documentation, the tax authorities have been disallowing the entire management fee charge by treating the arm’s length value of the said management fee paid as Nil. In contrast, the US and Canadian IRS have adopted an increasingly proactive and more sophisticated approach towards examining transfer pricing policies in respect of intra-group support services.

Concluding remarks:

In the realm of transfer pricing, intra-group service transactions present as many challenges as opportunities to the multinational taxpayer. Needless to say, the management fee policy should be designed with the above background in mind such that it does not result in either overcharging or under-charging of management fees and also considering other tax and regulatory aspects. Any under or overcharging could result in adverse tax implications for the group as a whole. Further, as transfer of services is less obvious than transfer of goods, documentation of service transfer has to be robust. One of the major aspects that enable tax authorities to challenge the management fee charge is the lack of a comprehensive and thorough identification, evaluation, and documentation process that can effectively present the best possible arguments to justify any charges for intra-group services. In the context of an aggressive audit and litigation environment like the one that currently prevails in India, the best defense for a multinational with intra-group service transactions is a thorough evaluation process, with the help of transfer pricing experts that results in adequate documentation to present the most persuasive case to tax authorities.

In the next part of this article, we shall discuss how to determine and justify an arm’s-length consideration for such intra-group services.

A step towards decoding the complex IFRS

Article

A shift from country-specific Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is
proving to be an inevitable move virtually for all organisations around the
world. It is imperative to be prepared to contend the extensive impact of this
regulatory change on business practices, accounting practices and organisation
as whole.

The paragraphs below give a bird’s-eye view of the
following :



  • What is
    IFRS ?



  •  Indian
    initiative



  • Process of
    conversion



  •  Overview of
    key difference

  •  Challenges
    under IFRS



  •  Impact and
    considerations out of IFRS



What are accounting standards ?

Accounting standards are authoritative statement on how
transactions should be recorded and disclosed in the financial statements. They
ensure uniformity amongst the various entities of the readers of financial
statements. The compliance to standards is mandatory to ensure that the accounts
are true and fair. This uniformity is now proposed to be spread from local
boundaries to across the world with the advent of single global accounting
standard, namely, IFRS.

Introduction to IFRS :

IFRSs are adopted by the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB), the independent standard-setting body of the International
Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (IASC Foundation).

More than 100 countries now require or permit the use of
IFRSs or are converging with the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB)
standards. EU recognised IFRS in 2005 and the SEC has in its announcement on
November 2007 permitted IFRS without reconciliation with US GAAP for non-US
companies.

Many of the accounting standards forming part of the IFRS are
known by the earlier name of International Accounting Standards (IAS), which
were issued between 1973 and 2001 by the board of International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC). In April 2001, IASB adopted all IAS and continued
their development calling new standards as IFRS which consist of :



  • IFRS
    standards issued after 2001



  • IAS
    standards issued before 2001



  • Interpretations originated from International financial Reporting
    Interpretations Committee (IFRIC)



  • Standing
    Committee Interpretations (SIC) issued before 2001



Indian initiative towards IFRS :

The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), the
apex accounting body in India has issued a ‘Concept paper on convergence
with IFRS in India’
in October 2007. The document lays down the
convergence strategy. All public interest entities would have to adopt IFRS from
1st April 2011.

Financial statements under IFRS :

Generally in India we have the following as financial
statements :



  • Balance
    Sheet



  • Profit &
    Loss Account



  • Cash Flow



  • Significant
    Accounting Polices and Notes to Accounts


Under IFRS the financial statements would comprise :



  • Statement
    of financial position as at end of the period



  • Statement
    of comprehensive income for the period



  • Statement
    of changes in equity for the period



  • Statement
    of cash flow for the period



  •  Notes,
    comprising a summary of significant accounting policies and other explanatory
    information



  •  Statement
    of financial position as at the beginning of the earliest comparative period
    when an equity applies an accounting policy retrospectively or makes a
    retrospective restatement of items in its financial statements, or when it
    reclassifies items in its financial statement.


The old format as per Schedule VI of the Indian Companies Act
would not be relevant and the financial statements would have to reflect items
as prescribed by the relevant IFRS.

Key differences between IFRS and Indian GAAP :

The adoption of IFRS affects more than a company’s accounting
policies, processes, and people. Ultimately, most aspects of a company’s
business and operations are affected potentially.

IFRS is a principle-based approach to standard-setting. It is
less reliant on bright lines and detailed rules as compared to the US GAAP.

At various places IFRS provides scope of judgment and
requires information to be presented on the basis of substance rather than rule.
For example, redeemable preference shares may be treated as liability and
convertible debentures as equity.

While applying IFRS, usage by an investor is kept in mind and
requirement of the law and management takes a backseat. For example, in
case of the business combination the acquirer under IFRS could be different than
the legal acquirer (like in case of reverse merger for tax benefit or other
purposes).

Financial statements under IFRS place more reliance on the
management estimate. For example, in case of depreciation of assets
which, under IFRS, would have to be based on estimated useful life as against
the present Indian requirement to follow Schedule XIV of the Companies Act,
1956.

The fair value concept is embodied in many of the IFRS (like
IAS 30 on Financial Instruments, IAS 40 Investment Property, etc.). The concept
of fair value poses several issues on valuation, valuation models and accuracy
and reliability of the same for the purpose of accounting and presentation of
financial statements.

A few other examples where there is departure from Indian Accounting Standards are:

  • Major overhauling cost for fixed assets which can be capitalised under IFRS (provided it meets certain criteria) as against the present requirement to expense out the same

  • Inventory for service organisation for work which is in progress (already covered by proposed Indian Accounting Standard)

  • Prior period items to be given effect retrospectively in opening equity

  • Proposed dividend is not required to be reflected in financial statements under IFRS

  • Under IFRS, provision made for dismantling of asset or for site closure can be capitalised

  • Under IFRS, EPS to be disclosed separately for continuing and discontinuing operations

Challenges under IFRS :

  • Joint ventures: Consolidation proportionate or otherwise may become an issue. Consolidation method may impact the structure of new arrangements

  • Debt/equity: Possible reclassification of preference shares as liabilities

  • Subsidiaries and associates: Different rules may impact the current treatment

  • Valuation:    Greater  use of fair value

  • Detailed hedge documentation, and ongoing effectiveness testing is required to achieve hedge accounting under IFRS

  • Embedded derivatives: Possible requirement to fair value components of other instruments, including long-term contracts

  • Contracting: Different rules will present  different opportunities, challenges, management and accounting issues

  • Financial communications will have to address changes in presentation of financial information as well as fundamental change towards fair value accounting and its impacts on traditional ratios and performance indicators

  • Systems  and processes

– Data requirements

– Calculation  methodologies

– Integration

  •  Uncertainly about Income-tax Dept. response

  •  Requires multi-disciplinary participation

  • Aiming at a moving target

– Uncertain timetable for implementation

– Uncertainty about final form of IFRS


Conversion/convergence to IFRS :

The conversion to IFRS will have to be managed like any other large-scale project. Sufficient time must be incorporated into project plan, proper resources must be secured and all key players must be in-volved in critical decision-making.

IFRS is more than an exercise for the accounting and finance department. Its impact is far reaching, affect-ing areas from internal control and sales to research and development.

Typically the following three phases will be involved in convergence/conversion to IFRS :

Impact and  considerations out of IFRS :

  • First-time adoption could be a mammoth task and hence it is essential to ensure that proper care and diligence is exercised so that there are no spill-over impacts in subsequent periods. IFRS 1 deals exhaustively with the first-time adoption.

  • To ensure that the judgment, estimated and fair valuation concepts are not misused by the Management, lot of reliance would have to be placed on independent valuers.

  • Proper planning is required for transition to IFRS and hence to ensure that the company must have a proper road map / strategy and resources to migrate to IFRS.

  • Emphasis on transparent and exhaustive disclosure which would mean that the source of data, compilation process and methodology are more robust.

  • To ensure that the commercial colour of the transaction is correctly reflected in the accounting of the same. For example, Spy to park non-performing assets may be required to be consolidated.

  • More data analysis, narrative accounting and hence more qualitative accountants and more time will be required to review.

  • The taxation team will have to work closely with the accounts teams to examine IFRS impact on the new financing structures implemented within the group. Further there is also uncertainty regarding the response to the Income-tax Department regarding change to IFRS.

  • Under income-tax based on view that the Tax Department may take, there could be cash flow related implication which would have to be understood/ captured and addressed appropriately.

  • The CFO will need to focus on the underlying commercial nature of transactions and events. Other areas where more judgment is required include property, leases, revenue recognition, provisions and consolidation policy.

  • Convergence to IFRS will have an impact on the processes which lead to recording of a specific transaction and necessitate re-engineering of those process and related internal controls.

IFRS would benefit all the users of financial statements. It would take accounting and financial reporting to a new level. However, it would in the initial years put too much burden on the preparers and reviewers of financial statements.

Lot of research and development is still under progress for various items like fair value, etc. and the evolved version would lead to better and more narrative financial statements. IFRS for SME is yet to be released; the same is expected to reduce the compliance requirement and the cost for ‘private entities’ /’non-publicly accountable entities’.

IFRS in India is an opportunity for Indian enterprises to be in line with the global companies and would in turn help raise finances globally. It would be a boon to the accounting fraternity as it would expose them to international arena and would help service the global  accounting  market.

Perspective of the Profession, a decade from today

Article

Introduction :


The Accountancy Profession is one of the oldest and
traditional professions of the modern society since its evolution. The
professions of accountancy, law and medicine are the three learned professions
classically known as the professions of divinity, law and medicine. From the
Indian context, the profession of Chartered Accountancy is in a crucial
transition stage as it has to measure up to the global standards and overcome
challenges that will be encountered over the next decade successfully. The
profession should continue to contribute as a partner in nation-building as
India is one among the fastest growing economies in the world. The Bombay
Chartered Accountants’ Society which has served commendably the profession and
the nation for the last 59 years has entered the Diamond Jubilee Year and to
commemorate the occasion has organised the Diamond Jubilee Conference with
topics that would kindle the thoughts of the intellectuals who will attend as
delegates and stimulate the strategies to be adopted for the sustenance, growth
and glory of the profession in the years to come.

There are a few peculiar constraints in which Indian
accountancy profession has been operating in public practice. The first and
foremost is that the law does not allow more than 20 partners in a firm and
secondly, the status ‘Limited Liability Partnership’ (LLP) is not in vogue as
the concerned Bill is yet to be passed by the Parliament. Besides, most of the
firms in India belong to the SMP category. Even if we construe that firms having
more than 10 partners are big in size, there are hardly 128 firms falling in
this classification. There are also a few firms who are having less than 10
partners, but have employed large number of qualified paid assistants and
trained staff. Even if these firms are kept apart, the rest can certainly be
considered as small and medium in nature.

Impact of information technology :

The impact of information technology in the field of audit
and assurance service is going to be tremendous, as the business community is
already using technology extensively in every facet of its activity. Auditing
will have to be done not just in the computerised environment but by using the
systems and technological tools. Auditing firms will have to adopt automation in
the process to deliver reports timely and qualitatively. On-line and real-time
basis financial information presentation to shareholders will replace the
present general purpose financial statements now prepared annually. Focus of the
assurance service would be on the evaluation of the input data and that of the
results reflected as part of the outputs generated since arithmetical accuracy
shall be taken for granted and therefore will not be required to be verified.

In the USA, xml-based language for financial reporting called
extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) has been developed enabling
electronic deciphering of the data in a harmonious manner. There are about 11
countries (Jurisdictions) which have assumed jurisdiction to implement and use
XBRL platform.

Texonomy, the relevant dictionary, has been developed, which
provides a tag with a standardised definition to each data element in the
financials. India is exploring the possibility of assuming jurisdiction to adopt
XBRL to facilitate the listed companies to upload their financial statements
using this language with the stock exchanges to make the global investor to
understand, analyse and compare them in a uniform manner. This would require the
audit function to validate the inputs and certify the outputs. If more and more
nations assume jurisdiction, Indian Professionals may even get outsourcing work
in this field.

Electronic filing of statutory forms and returns is gaining
momentum. Over the next decade the e-filing initiative will be complete in all
the Departments of the Central and State Governments and professional firms
would equip themselves to meet this obligation of their clients.

Corporate governance and role of audit :

In view of the growing importance of corporate governance the
role of audit will undergo a change. Financial debacle of many corporations in
the US like Enron, Worldcom and a few others; the not long ago sub-prime crisis
in the US and the present financial crisis of banks leading to bail-out plan by
the US Government by pumping in 700 billion dollars are all leading to closer
evaluation of the risk assessment and management functions in an entity. Similar
financial crisis is engulfing banks in Europe also and G7 nations are pondering
on methodologies to prevent major banks from failing. Regulations like SOX in
the US will emerge in a stringent way in the rest of the world and the role of
audit will transform to a different level involving objective evaluation and
reporting.

Audit findings and reporting can no longer be elusive on
non-detection of collusive frauds at the management level. The stakeholders
would expect more information and assurance on the risks and uncertainties
arising out of the decisions taken by the management. Independent assurance on
the reliability of systems, procedures and controls that generate the
information and the reliability of such information which forms the basis for
business policies and decision-making, would be expected. Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) will assume new dimensions and the audit reporting and
monitoring will encompass the various initiatives taken as part of CSR including
sustainability and growth. All these developments would result in more
opportunities as well as risks for the profession which can be ably met by
enhancing the skill sets and equipping itself with modern audit tools.

Yet another development for which the profession should be
prepared is the possibility of more disciplinary proceedings and adverse
developments in the context of professional indemnity. In the US, PCAOB does the
oversight function. In India, till now, we are used to peer-review mechanism to
ensure quality in attestation services. Peer review does not lead to
disciplinary proceedings and even an adverse finding results in refusal of
issuance of peer review certificate. Henceforth the scenario will change.
Quality Review Board (QRB) will replace peer review board and any adverse
finding will lead to disciplinary proceedings. The change in the disciplinary
mechanism will also expedite the disposal time of a case. More claims may lead
to popularisation of insurance policies with reference to professional
indemnity.

Convergence of standards:

The phenomenon of globalisation has resulted in free flow of funds with no hindrance on account of geographical borders and regulations have also been giving way facilitating cross-border investments. Not only the multinational companies positioned outside India are establishing in India, Indian companies are also growing stronger to position themselves in the international business arena. More and more acquisitions of foreign businesses by Indian enterprises and establishment of subsidiaries abroad would take place in the next decade. Shareholders and other investors would be spread across the globe which has initiated the debate on converging or adopting a common set of International Accounting Standards and Auditing and Assurance Standards.

About 102 countries including members of European Union, Australia and New Zealand, China and Pakistan have adopted IFRS. IASB and FASB have entered into a memorandum of understanding to work for convergence of US GAAP and IFRS. India and Canada have prepared a roadmap to converge with IFRS by the year 2011.

These developments would call for expertise inIFR S; International AAS. Fortunately, the Indian Standards are formulated keeping the International Standards as the basis and therefore the differences to be synchronised are limited. Indian professionals, if they have command over IFRS, can look forward to global opportunities seeking their services.

International taxation:

Yet another potential area for professional development on account of the globalisation; ecommerce; cross-border investments and the consequent convergence will be the evolution of international taxation as a wider area of practice. Hitherto, the scope in this discipline is restricted to a section of professionals who are specialising in this field. Soon the scope will expand at par with domestic taxation practice. Expertise in DTAAs of specific countries could be an area of exclusive specialisation for a professional.

Transfer pricing area of practice is now confined to income-tax law. With the proposed replacement of service tax and VAT legislations by Goods and Services Tax (GST) legislation by 2010, the scope of transfer pricing may extend to the service sector area too. In India, where the contribution to the GDP by the service sector is more than 51%, the scope would be greater and at the same time calls for establishing supportive knowledge bank and data base to meet the expectations.

Management consultancy services:

In the olden days, the practice area of a Chartered Accountant was confined to core areas, such as auditing and accounting and later encompassed taxation field. It is difficult now to introspect whether the statutory work conferred exclusively on Chartered Accountants was a boon that provided recognition and a steady source of revenue or was a bane that prevented them to expand their horizon of operation as a business advisor. Nevertheless, the present scenario demands focussed attention of the practitioners in the field of ‘Management Consultancy Services’ that promises to keep them busy at least for the next few decades.

The wide range of services that flows in the consultancy field include services relating to project appraisal and funding by way of private equity or debt syndication or other ineans; Funding through IPO; International Finance and Currency Management; Valuation; Due Diligence; Merger and Acquisitions; Risk Assessment; Restructuring of Business; ERP Implementation; Internal Audit; System Audit; Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO); Investment Banking and Wealth Management. Knowledge in these areas would bring immense opportunities and there will be no dearth of work for those who possess the skill set in these areas.

The basic difference between statutory work and consultancy work is that in the case of the former, a client is compelled to engage a Chartered Accountant to prevent penal consequences for non-compliance, whereas in the case of the latter, the client approaches on his own volition for value addition. In the case of statutory work, the client perceives it to result in an expenditure, whereas in consultancy, the benefit accrues either in the form of increase in revenue or reduction in expenditure, thereby enhancing his willingness to pay adequate compensation for the services. Therefore, the ability of the professional to do proper billing of services commensurate with ‘the time and expertise utilised is far greater with reference to consultancy services than for statutory work.

Re-orientation:

The profession of Chartered Accountancy is facing many challenges in India in view of globalisation and unprecedented growth in the economy. These challenges demand re orientation in the approach and attitude of the profession. The emerging areas of opportunities and risks indicated above call for different skill sets, knowledge and delivery mechanism. Even with reference to statutory work such as statutory audit or tax audit, one is expected to be proficient in Accounting Standards, Auditing and Assurance Standards and in the relevant laws. But, there is one significant difference between the consultancy field and the traditional practice encompassing statutory audit and that is the competitive environment. A Chartered Accountant has to compete with multinational entities, corporate bodies and other professionals in the Management Consultancy field, whereas it is a monopoly situation so far as statutory work is concerned. Nevertheless, the profession needs to acquit creditably in both the fields in order to maintain its credibility in the eyes of the public in general and that of the Government and Regulators in particular. Thus, in order to effectively compete and to deliver qualitatively, the profession needs to address many challenges during the next decade from now and some of these challenges are highlighted hereinafter.

Acquisition of skill sets:

Knowledge in the new areas of consultancy work may be acquired by studying the relevant literature and accessing information through web. Attending workshops and training programmes focusing on specific topics would be useful. Participating in the execution of work by other professionals or mentor firms will help to provide the confidence required to handle assignments independently. Templates of reporting would serve as a model in the initial implementation of work. Mid-size firms can even afford to organise periodical in-house training programmes for partners and the senior staff. Individual empowerment by undergoing specialised post-qualification courses seems to be inevitable. Every professional who has the competence in the consultancy field should groom and train others to create teams within the organisation. Forums like ICAI and BCAS should empower the profession by organising appropriate training programmes, workshops and symposiums.

Positioning of divisions:

Indian firms should grow stronger to a level where they are in a position to create divisions demarcating audit and assurance division; tax and allied services division; and consultancy division. Even if there are three partners, each one should attempt to specialise, so as to head and lead one of these divisions and build working teams. In the emerging scenario, specialisation is the order of the day. A specialist in audit, another one in tax and yet another professional having proficiency in consultancy can come under one roof to constitute a strong firm and render multifarious services to the client. There were two proposals relevant to the growth of the firms that were pending viz., Limited Liability Partnership Bill and approval of regulations to allow multi-disciplinary partnership firms. While the first is still pending, the latter has come through recently.

Human resource development:

Attracting new talent in the profession to practice appears to be a Himalayan task. About 90% of the newly qualified Chartered Accountants prefer to go for employment and only the remaining few have the passion to join a practising firm and a very few among them end up setting up their own office. If we trace back the history, there has been a cyclic pattern among the newly qualified in switching over in their option between practice and employment. The span of each such cycle was a period of 5 to 7 years. However, the recent financial crisis in the US and Europe is expected to marginally spill over in Asia and may enhance the number of entrants into the profession.

Expansion by mergers and consolidation will be the order of the profession in the decade to follow. Although size per se is not quality, it helps to comprehend wider horizon of services to be rendered to the client and enables undertaking work of greater magnitude. Prior to mergers, networking arrangements may surface to provide the required under-standing and compatibility over a period of time.

Geographical spread:

Another challenge faced by Indian firms is that most of them are operating in one centre. Getting assignment of certain works would depend on the extent of geographical presence in more cities. Therefore, one would do well to identify professionals/firms in different geographical locations and develop an understanding for mutual reference and execution of works. Once the reliability and compatibility is established, then merger can be contemplated by converting the firm in the other location as a branch. By this approach, a small firm also can evolve itself into a bigger firm by developing branches in many centres. No doubt, this is easy to say but challenging to accomplish. But, if there is a sustained approach and zeal, nothing is impossible. Firms can also look for international affiliation. There are many associations at the global level which identify member firms in different countries so as to strengthen the ability to serve clientele across the globe by cross reference. The initial cost of becoming a member of any such association and annual membership fee may appear burdensome, but it should be viewed as an investment and not as expenditure. The return on investment is bound to take some time, but it should be worth the wait in the globalised scenario. Further, such an affiliation can be used for securing templates or database as may be helpful in handling new avenues of assignments.

Infrastructure:

Generally, infrastructure takes a back seat and it is a non-priority item for many firms. This mindset should drastically undergo a change. Every firm should aspire to have stability in the place of operation and allocate a percentage of earnings every year for acquiring modem gadgets and tools. Further, every firm should spend in installing and documenting systems, procedures and controls to secure and enhance operational efficiency. Knowledge database should be developed leading to industry-wise specialisation and also in select areas like transfer pricing. Every firm should also periodically address and review the investment planning for every partner in the firm. Such planning should include securing of housing and conveyance facility for the partner’s family.

Billing standards:

It can be said without fear of contradiction that many firms are unable to recruit youngsters for two reasons. One is inability to pay near to market salary and secondly, not being able to guarantee partnership and provide lucrative practice with variety of work exposure in view of the limited areas of operation. While the second one can be addressed by tackling the challenges identified above, the first one can be handled only by proper billing ofthe services rendered. Underbilling of services cripples the growth potential of a firm.

Service rendered, in many cases, is not properly identified and added on to the billing. Invariably, it is the practice of annual billing or common fee package for multifarious services that paves the way for underselling of the services. Many do not even consider the manhours spent as one of the imp or- desert peace. Prosperity is welcome, but not at the ‘tant ingredients for billing. Of course, in deserving cost of peace of mind. Contentment is a great virand exceptional cases, rendering services for a low ‘ tue to be given up. No one is poor if he is contented cost or free of charge may be justified, but that policy and the one who lacks it can never be considered or approach should not be extended to all clients. rich, irrespective of the wealth that he may possess. A professional who renders services backed by knowledge, values and competence always does the billing with absolute confidence unmindful of losing the client. He not only demands greater value for services, but also commands respect and credibility. In the long run, such a professional experiences that quality begets qualitative client, irrespective of the cost of services.

In order to facilitate proper billing, ICAI has prescribed norms for charging fees for various services rendered. These norms can be relied upon to convince and persuade the client to compensate for the services rendered. A firm should develop the practice of billing as per these norms and make the client to fall in line to recognise the value of services. While exploitation by excessive billing is to be condemned, underbilling is undesirable and to be desisted.

Quality  and values:

Most important challenge for a professional firm is to ensure quality in anything it does and to adhere to the ethical norms laid down for the profession. The first one can be ensured by building quality team in the organisation and the latter by imbibing values and appreciating that growth should not be at the cost of ethics. Adherence to values is a challenging task these days as many players around us in the system do not attach any significance to this aspect. The dividing line between profession and business is getting blurred, of late. Hope it does not vanish in the days to come. If it happens, it would be quite unfortunate and the onus is on us not to allow it to happen.

Aspiration to become rich in the shortest possible time can be the root cause for deviation from established principles and best practices. We read in history that Gautam Buddha deserted all the prosperity and left the palace in search of peace. On the contrary, many in today’s world seem to be joining the race in search of prosperity and in the process desert peace. Prosperity is welcome, but not at the cost of peace of mind. Contentment is a great virtue to be given up. No one is poor if he is contented and the one who lacks it can never be considered rich, irrespective of the wealth that he may possess.

Therefore, whatever is stated above urging against underbilling should not be misconstrued as an advice to exploit the client or to do excessive billing either. Fee-based approach in everything we do would be fatal in the long run, whereas value-based approach would bring reputation. Mahatma Gandhi said that there is enough for everyone’s need but not for the greed. The Father of the Nation also indicated that ‘ends’ do not justify the ‘means’. It might pay to be unethical in the short run, but in return one loses self-esteem and peace of mind, which is too precious a price one should dread to pay. When we charge the fee, let it be a consideration only for our services and not a price for compromising on values and principles. Quality in service without compromising on ethical values leads not only to prosperity in the long run, but undoubtedly helps us to command respect.

Conclusion:

There is tremendous scope for the profession to grow and expand. There is acute shortage of finance professionals which factor influences in the flow of more and more work to existing firms. Business entrepreneurs, these days, require professional firms to do the hand-holding in the establishment of their business as well as in the expansion and restructuring plans. They expect a professional to be part of the decision-making process, instead of merely providing inputs for decision making. If only the SMPs can address the above-discussed challenges with enthusiasm and right attitude, they can perform with competence and efficiency and make a mark in the profession. Not only they shall prosper, but they would also contribute to the economic growth of the nation. In matters of innovation and empowerment, let us swim with the current, but in matters of values and principles, let us stand like a rock. I wish BCAS to grow from strength to strength and continue to excel in serving the profession in the centuries to follow.

GAPs in GAAP – Accounting for joint ventures Proportionate consolidation v. equity method

Accounting Standards

Under Indian GAAP (AS-27 Financial Reporting of Interests
in Joint Ventures
), an interest in a joint venture (jointly controlled
entity — JCE) is accounted for using the proportionate consolidation method.
Under this method the venturers report their respective proportion of the JCE’s
assets, liabilities, income and expenses in its consolidated financial
statements.


Under IFRS, IAS-31 requires the application of proportionate
consolidation method for joint ventures but also allows the application of
equity method as an alternative method. Under the equity method an interest in a
JCE is initially recorded at cost and adjusted thereafter for the
post-acquisition change in the venturer’s share of net assets of the JCE. The
profit or loss of the venturer includes the venturer’s share of the profit or
loss of the JCE.

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued an
Exposure Draft (ED) 9 Joint Arrangements which is intended to replace
current IAS-31. Unlike IAS-31, the ED proposes that a joint venture shall be
accounted using the equity method only. In other words, proportionate
consolidation method which is the preferred method under current IAS-31 will no
longer be available and the alternative method, i.e., equity method in
current IAS-31 becomes the only method to be followed.

The IASB is of the view that the removal of options from IFRS
will reduce the possibility of similar transactions being accounted for in
different ways. Further, the IASB believes that the proportionate consolidation
method has certain technical flaws and is not consistent with the Framework
for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements
. When a party
to an arrangement has joint control of an entity, it shares control of the
activities of the entity. It does not, however, control each asset, nor does it
have a present obligation for each liability of the JCE. Rather, each party has
control over its investment in the entity. If the party uses proportionate
consolidation to account for its interest in a JCE, it recognises as assets and
liabilities a proportion of items that it does not control or for which it has
no obligation. These supposed assets and liabilities do not meet the definition
of assets and liabilities in the Framework.

A number of respondents to the ED have questioned the IASB’s
decision to require only equity method for joint ventures. At the time of
issuance of current IAS-31, the same Framework was applicable. At that
time, the IASB has clearly recognised that proportionate consolidation better
reflects the substance and economic reality of a venturer’s interest in a JCE.
Against this background, the ED does not offer any compelling arguments for
removal of proportionate consolidation method.

While the IASB has indicated that proportionate consolidation
has technical flaws and is not consistent with the Framework, it does not
explain as to why the equity method is considered more appropriate to account
for interests in a JCE ? How does the application of the equity method enhance
the faithful representation of joint ventures in the financial statements of the
venturer ? Further, the removal of proportionate consolidation will lead to the
same accounting treatment for ‘joint control’ and ‘significant influence,’ which
is inappropriate.

Significant impact on Indian entities :

In India, a number of entities in sectors such as real
estate, infrastructure development, oil and gas, etc. carry out significant
activities through joint ventures. For example, KSK Power or GMR Infrastructure
carry out significant activities through joint ventures. If such entities need
to apply equity method to their interests in joint ventures, it is possible that
their financial statements will not reflect any significant economic activity.
If equity accounting is to be used, the infrastructure holding company will not
be able to present proportionately the activities and revenues of its various
joint ventures. This may have several consequential implications on matters such
as borrowing capacity, satisfaction of debt covenants, performance evaluation of
key executives, key ratios, explaining performance to investors and analysts,
etc. In certain cases, these entities may even have to reconsider their overall
business strategy and significant contracts.

IASB’s view is that the enhanced disclosure requirements of
the proposed IFRS would provide better information about the assets and
liabilities of a joint venture than is provided by using proportionate
consolidation. The exposure draft proposes the disclosure of summarised
financial information for all individually material joint ventures to help meet
the needs of users of financial statements. In the author’s view, this line of
argument is inappropriate and disclosures cannot justify equity accounting of
joint venture. Besides in many cases, disclosures on their own may not provide
any solution, for example, in the case of project bidding where qualification
requirements are linked to the revenues recorded in the financial statements of
the bidding entity.

As IFRS would eventually apply to Indian entities, it is high
time that Indian companies and local standard-setters started paying more
attention to IFRS exposure drafts. Companies that would be significantly
impacted should make suitable representations to the IASB along with the local
standard-setters.

levitra

GAPs in GAAP — IFRS Convergence Roadmap

Accounting standards

There are numerous matters
on the IFRS convergence roadmap that still remain to be effected upon or need
clarification. More importantly, the standards are not yet notified under the
Companies Act. So no one knows what the final standards will actually look like.
Nor has the requisite amendment to the Companies Act been made, to amend the
relevant provisions that are in conflict with IFRS, such as S. 78, S. 391, S.
394, Schedule VI, Schedule XIV, etc. In this article, we take a look at some of
the issues relating to applicability of the roadmap itself.

The Ministry of Corporate
Affairs (MCA) roadmap set out is as follows.

The first set of Accounting
Standards (i.e., converged accounting standards) will be applied to specified
class of companies in phases :

(a) Phase-I :

The following categories of
companies will convert their opening balance sheets as at 1st April, 2011, if
the financial year commences on or after 1st April, 2011 in compliance with the
notified accounting standards which are convergent with IFRS. These companies
are :

(a) Companies which are
part of NSE — Nifty 50

(b) Companies which are
part of BSE — Sensex 30

(c) Companies whose shares
or other securities are listed on stock exchanges outside India

(d) Companies, whether
listed or not, which have a net worth in excess of Rs.1,000 crores.

(b) Phase-II :

The companies, whether
listed or not, having a net worth exceeding Rs.500 crores, but not exceeding
Rs.1,000 crores will convert their opening balance sheet as at 1st April, 2013,
if the financial year commences on or after 1st April, 2013 in compliance with
the notified accounting standards which are convergent with IFRS.

(c) Phase-III :

Listed companies which have
a net worth of Rs.500 crores or less will convert their opening balance sheet as
at 1st April, 2014, if the financial year commences on or after 1st April, 2014,
whichever is later, in compliance with the notified accounting standards which
are convergent with IFRS.

In a subsequent
clarification from the MCA it was clarified that the date for determination of
the criteria is the balance sheet at 31st March, 2009 or the first balance sheet
prepared thereafter when the accounting year ends on another date. The
clarification has resolved some questions, but unfortunately has raised many
other questions.

We take a look at some
unanswered questions.

A company gets listed at 1st
April, 2009. 31st March, 2009 it had a networth of Rs.450 crores. At 31st March,
2010 it has a networth of Rs.550 crores which is likely to grow substantially in
following years. How would such a company comply with IFRS ?

Technically, based on MCA
clarification, such a company never applies IFRS since at 31st March, 2009 it
was unlisted and had a networth of less than Rs.500 crores. However this
conclusion seems counterintuitive. In the author’s view, the 31st March, 2009
date should be seen as a dynamic date rather than a static one. Since at 31st
March, 2010, the company was listed and had a networth of greater than Rs.500
crores, in the author’s view, it should be included in phase II of IFRS
implementation.

A listed company has a
networth of Rs.990 crores and Rs.1020 crores at 31st March, 2009 and 31st March,
2010, respectively. Should such a company be included in phase I or II of IFRS
implementation ?

For reasons mentioned above,
the 31st March, 2009 should not be seen as a static, but as a dynamic date. On
that basis the company should be included in phase I of IFRS implementation, as
it has a networth of greater than Rs.1000 crores at 31st March, 2010.

A company with a small
networth of Rs.200 crores, has listed its FCCB on a foreign exchange. Other than
that, the company’s securities are neither listed in India nor abroad. On 1st
April, 2009 the company delists its FCCB. Assume that the company’s networth
will not grow significantly in the future. Should such a company be included in
phase I of IFRS implementation ?

If the testing date of 31st
March, 2009 is seen as static, then the company is included in phase I of IFRS
implementation. However, if the testing date of 31st March, 2009 is seen as
dynamic, then the company is not covered in any of the phases of IFRS
implementation. More importantly it would be counterintuitive to include such
companies for IFRS implementation, as they are neither significant, nor listed
in India or abroad subsequent to the testing date of 31st March, 2009.

It is important that the MCA
provides answers to the above questions to facilitate smooth transition to IFRS.
In the absence of any clarification forthcoming from the MCA, companies are
advised to apply a ‘better safe than sorry’ policy and interpret the
requirements of the roadmap conservatively. A point to be noted is that the
roadmap allows earlier adoption of IFRS voluntarily. Where companies are
reluctant to do so, they should seek a conclusive response from MCA in all
borderline cases discussed above before taking any position on this matter.

levitra

Gaps in GAAP – Multiple Element Contract

Accounting Standards

Recently the ICAI issued an Exposure Draft of Monograph on
‘Revenue Recognition for Arrangements with Multiple Deliverables’ inviting
comments. The author is pleased to respond to the Exposure Draft.


Overall, the author does not agree with the issuance of the
proposed Monograph for the following summary reasons :

    1. After having made a public announcement of convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) effective April 1, 2011, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) or any of its committees should not take any action which may go against the spirit of the said announcement.

    2. As hereinafter discussed, certain requirements of the Monograph may not be in compliance with IFRS.



IAS 18 contains guidance with regard to multiple element
contracts, which provides that ‘Recognition criteria are usually applied
separately to each transaction. However, in certain circumstances, it is
necessary to apply the recognition criteria to the separately identifiable
components of a single transaction in order to reflect the substance of the
transaction. For example, when the selling price of a product includes an
identifiable amount for subsequent servicing, that amount is deferred and
recognised as revenue over the period during which the service is performed.’
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC), at its
November 2006 meeting, has considered that the multiple element issue was wide
and complicated, needing a full scope debate and amendment of IAS 18, rather
than an interpretation, and therefore decided not to take this item onto its
agenda. Therefore, issuance of the proposed Monograph in India is not
recommended since it may conflict with the outcome of the said project.

The Monograph is an adaptation of ‘EITF 00-21 : Revenue
Arrangements with Multiple Deliverables’
under US GAAP. Since US GAAP
follows rule-based approach as compared to principle-based approach under IFRS,
application of the Monograph based on US GAAP requirements will significantly
reduce scope of judgment by the preparers and limit flexibility available under
IFRS. In addition, some of these requirements may be contrary to IFRS. The
following are a few examples in this regard :


(i) As per the Monograph, if there is objective and reliable evidence of fair value, i.e., Specific Objective Evidence (SOE) for all units of accounting in an arrangement, the arrangement consideration should be allocated to the separate units of accounting based on their relative fair values (the relative fair value method). In cases, where there is objective reliable evidence for undelivered elements only, then the residual method is used to allocate the arrangement consideration.

This implies that if there is no objective evidence of fair value, for either delivered or undelivered element, then no revenue can be recognised until all elements are delivered. Take for instance, a company selling version V1 of a product, plus an entitlement to receive updated version V2, due to be released in the next one year. As there is no SOE of fair value of V2, since it has not been sold separately, as it has not yet been released, under the Monograph, sales cannot be recognised on despatch of V1.

Paragraph 13 of IAS 18 and paragraph 11 of the Appendix to IAS 18 provide guidance on the accounting treatment of multiple elements under IFRS. Paragraph 13 states that “in certain circumstances, it is necessary to apply the recognition criteria to the separately identifiable components of a single transaction in order to reflect the substance of the transaction”. As per paragraph 11 of the Appendix to IAS 18, “when the selling price includes an identifiable amount for subsequent servicing, that amount is deferred and recognised as revenue over the period during which the service is performed. The amount deferred is that which will cover the expected costs of the services under the agreement, together with a reasonable profit on those services”.

While IAS 18 does not provide any specific guidance on how that allocation should be determined, it does not require SOE of fair values; rather, cost of services plus reasonable profit may be an indicator of fair value. An entity may also estimate fair value based on a statistical approach or market practice. We believe that in cases where revenue recognition has been deferred under the Monograph due to a lack of SOE of fair value, it would be unreasonable to conclude that no fair value can be established under IFRS, just because SOE of fair value is not available.

(ii) As it is evident from (i) above, the Monograph gives precedence to the relative fair value method over the residual method; whereas there is no such preference under IFRS. As part of issuance of IFRIC 13, IFRIC has examined this issue and noted that IAS 18 does not specify which of these methods should be applied, or in what circumstances. The IFRIC decided that the interpretation should not be more prescriptive than IAS 18(refer Basis for Conclusions paragraph BC 14 to IFRIC 13). Under IFRS, therefore either method or other methods such as cost methods or management estimates would be acceptable.

(iii) The Monograph requires that under the residual method, the amount of consideration allocated to the delivered item(s) equals the total arrangement consideration less the aggregate fair value of the undelivered item(s). The residual method therefore has the effect of allocating all discounts to the delivered element, rather than apportioning the discount among all elements. For example, a company sells one product for INR 10 million with one year’s post-sale services (PSS) and a renewal rate of PSS has been fixed at INR 2 million (20%) at the end of the first year (giving a fair value of INR 2 million for the PSS element). Under the residual method, the company will be able to recognise INR 8 million when the licence is delivered (total contract price of 10 million less 2 million being fair value of the undelivered element).

Under IFRS,while the above may be an acceptable method of recognising revenue on delivered element; one could question the allocation of entire discount to the delivered element. Under IFRS one may allocate the discount to both the delivered and undelivered element, for example, in proportion of the fair value of the undelivered elements and of the residual amount determined for the delivered element. In the example above, this would have the consequence of allocating the discount both on the delivered licence element and on the undelivered PSS element, for example, 84% of it allocated to the delivered licence element and 16% allocated to the PSS. Thus, applying the residual method and then apportioning the discount among delivered and undelivered elements would result in recognition of INR 8.4 million of revenue on delivery of the product software, whereas the residual method alone would restrict the amount of revenue recognised upon delivery of the licence to INR 8 million.

For the above reasons, the author does not believe that the Research Committee should pursue this Monograph till the time further guidance is provided by the IASB. Any such action by the Committee may put a question mark over ICAI’s commitment to converge with IFRS.