I HIGH COURT
38. (2026) 44 Centax 42 (Bom.) Kanakia Spaces Realty Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India dated 24.06.2026.
An SCN issued after amalgamation to a dissolved transferor is jurisdictionally void and section 87 cannot preserve proceedings against an entity without legal existence.
FACTS
Petitioner’s transferor company merged into the petitioner under a sanctioned amalgamation scheme. Transferor consequently stood dissolved, and its name was removed from corporate records. Before GST implementation, it had filed service tax returns and informed the respondent regarding amalgamation and credit transfer. Automatic migration nevertheless generated a GST registration in the dissolved transferor’s name. Petitioner repeatedly informed the respondent that the transferor had ceased to exist. Respondent subsequently cancelled that registration after determining NIL liability. Despite these disclosures, the respondent issued an SCN under section 74 against the dissolved transferor. The respondent thereafter confirmed GST, interest and penalty through an order against that entity. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Hon’ble High Court.
HELD
The Hon’ble High Court held that proceedings initiated against a company dissolved pursuant to amalgamation were without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Section 87 applies only during the period between the appointed date and the amalgamation order and cannot authorize issuance of an SCN to an entity that has ceased to exist. Accordingly, the demand was quashed, while leaving it open to the authorities to initiate lawful proceedings against the petitioner. Relying on Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Maruti Suzuki India Limited, [2019] 416 ITR 613, dated 25.07.2019, which held that informed proceedings against a dissolved amalgamating company are legal nullities and Vodafone Idea Limited vs. Union of India, (2026) 42 Centax 455, dated 12.02.2026, which clarified that section 87 cannot sustain proceedings against a non-existent entity after amalgamation. Accordingly, the Court held that the impugned proceedings were unsustainable in law.
39. (2026) 44 Centax 203 (Cal.) M.M. Motors v. Senior Joint Commissioner of Revenue dated 13.07.2026.
Adjudication order digitally authenticated within statutory limitation remains valid, although served later and enforceability commences only upon service as per section 169.
FACTS
Petitioner faced adjudication under section 73 for April 2018 to March 2019. Respondent digitally signed the adjudication order on 30 April 2024, the extended limitation’s final day and uploaded the order and Form GST DRC-07 on the common portal on 1st May 2024. The petitioner preferred a statutory appeal after making the prescribed pre-deposit. The appellate authority disposed the appeal by varying the original demand and issued a consequential demand. The petitioner though did not question merits of the appeal; however, challenged the respondent’s competence and validity to enforce the adjudication order which, though based on digital signature within limitation, the service of the order was made after the expiry of limitation period. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Hon’ble High Court.
HELD
The Hon’ble High Court held that the limitation under section 73 governs the issuance of the order and not its subsequent service. Digital authentication on 30.04.2024 completed the adjudication within the prescribed limitation, while uploading the order on 01.05.2024 merely effected service under section 169. Such subsequent communication neither altered the date of issuance nor rendered the order time-barred, although the order became enforceable only upon valid service. Relying on R.K. Upadhyaya vs. Shanabhai P. Patel, (1987) 3 SCC 96 dated 28.04.1987, which distinguishes issuance within limitation from subsequent service as separate statutory acts, the Court held that the CGST Act consciously separates issuance under section 73 from service under section 169. Consequently, the petitioner’s challenge was rejected and the writ petition was dismissed.
40. 2026 (7) TMI 575 Kuehne Nagel Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs The Union of India & Ors.(Guj) dated 02.07.2026.
When an original refund claim was unlawfully rejected and decided in favour of Appellant as per Court’s direction, interest must be computed from original claim’s date and not from subsequent application.
FACTS
Petitioner filed an original refund application. Respondent declined to process that application despite supporting certification submitted by the petitioner. Petitioner earlier challenged that refusal before the Hon’ble High Court. The refusal was set aside and the respondent was directed to process the refund claim lawfully. Following that decision, the petitioner filed another refund application. Respondent sanctioned refund of Rs.2,29,32,535/- but rejected claimed interest of Rs.29,51,700/- under section 56 of the CGST Act. Respondent treated the later application as the relevant date for determining delayed-refund interest. Being aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Hon’ble High Court.
HELD
The Hon’ble High Court held that the petitioner’s entitlement to interest must be determined with reference to the original refund application and not the subsequent application, which was necessitated by the respondent’s unlawful rejection of the original claim. Accordingly, the later filing could not displace the date of the initial refund application for the purposes of section 56. Relying on Kuehne Plus Nagel Private Limited vs. Union of India, 2025 (12) TMI 310, dated 06.11.2025, which held that a duly supported original refund claim must be processed in accordance with law. Court set aside the impugned order insofar as it denied interest and directed the respondent to reconsider the petitioner’s claim by treating the original refund application as the relevant date.
41. (2026) 38 Centax 331 (Guj.) Jyoti Agro vs. Deputy Commissioner of State Tax dated 08.01.2026.
Refund satisfying substantive statutory conditions cannot be denied merely because portal restrictions or technical defects obstructing the prescribed electronic filing procedure.
FACTS
Petitioner exported goods and accumulated unutilised ITC from zero-rated supplies and filed a refund application under section 54(3) of the CGST Act with supporting documents. Shipping bills could not be uploaded because the portal restricted file size. Respondent also declined to accept their hard copies and rejected the application for alleged defects in the undertaking and declaration. After re-credit, the portal prevented another refund application for the same period. Petitioner therefore filed an application under the “Any Other” category with documents. Respondent issued a deficiency memo citing Rule 89(5) and absence of ledger debit, therefore Petitioner was compelled to reverse the entire ITC once again. Aggrieved, Petitioner approached the Hon’ble High Court.
HELD
The Hon’ble High Court held that substantive entitlement to refund cannot be defeated by portal limitations or procedural technicalities. The petitioner had made bona fide efforts to comply with the statutory requirements, furnished the necessary documents, and subsequently reversed the entire ITC through Form GST DRC-03. Relying on Shree Renuka Sugars Limited vs. State of Gujarat (2023) 8 Centax 235 dated 13.07.2023, which held that technical defects cannot defeat a refund where the substantive statutory conditions are satisfied, the Court directed the respondent to verify the documents and decide the petitioner’s fresh manual or electronic refund application on merits. It further held that no objection on the ground of limitation could be raised and an appropriate order was to be passed within six weeks.
42. [2026] 188 taxmann.com 168 (Telangana) SDE Engineers Ltd vs. Commercial Tax Officer dated 03-07-2026.
After examining the lease rent agreements between the parties, the Hon’ble Court held that the activity of leasing office spaces along with all amenities and furniture, including movable assets like furniture, fixtures and equipment, does not constitute transfer of right to use goods liable for VAT.
FACTS
The petitioners are engaged in construction of high-rise buildings in the industrial technology park and the same are let out to software companies in terms of the lease agreement along with all facilities and amenities such as IP floor, centralized air conditioning, raw power supply up to the distribution board, light fittings and functional toilets, portable drinking water facility, electricity, sub-station, DG Power Pack, sewage power plant, fully equipped kitchen and cafeteria, furniture, other fixtures etc. The movability of certain amenities is not disputed by the petitioners. The VAT Department levied tax on rental income received by the petitioners on immovable property along with facilities like generators, air conditioners, transformers, lifts and other amenities like furniture and fit-outs to the lessees under section 4(8) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax, 2005. The question of law before the Hon’ble Court was “whether the rent received by the petitioners towards immovable property would be amenable to tax under the APVAT Act and under section 5E of the APGST Act (a Pre-GST Act levying tax on transfers the right to use any goods) and whether the petitioners are liable to pay tax for the rental income received on the supply of interiors, furniture and fixtures?” The primary contention of the petitioners was that the entire consideration received by them from the IT companies was by way of rent, and that service tax had been paid on the entire consideration so received.
HELD
After considering the terms of the lease agreement between the parties, the Hon’ble Court observed that the petitioners have not parted with possession or control of the properties, except to the limited extent of permitting the tenants to use them as part of the common amenities and facilities provided under the lease. It further observed that, in several instances, such facilities are intended for the common use of more than one tenant and that rentals are charged on a per-square-foot basis and not separately in respect of furniture and fixtures. After examining the legislative rationale behind the enactment of Article 366(29A) and various judicial pronouncements, the Hon’ble Court held that the VAT department could not have, merely on the basis of presumption, bifurcated the composite lease rentals into components attributable to movable and immovable properties. Referring to Para 97 of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited [2006] 2 STR 161 (SC), and upon comparing the ingredient stated therein with the facts of the present case, and the terms and conditions of the lease deeds, the Court held that the said requirement is not satisfied since the goods were not specifically identified for delivery as per any clause of the lease deeds. The Court further held that the agreement only prescribed that the petitioners shall provide the service of making available certain facilities and amenities that could be suspended by the petitioners and that the furniture, fixtures and equipment were replaceable. The Court also held that there is no legal right to use goods, insofar as the agreement does not specifically prescribe the same and that effective control and possession are with the landlord and the legal consequences of use are not transferred to the tenants. It held that the goods are not used to the exclusion of the petitioner and that common facilities, including a cafeteria, are commonly used by employees of several IT companies, including the employees of petitioners stationed in the building. The Hon’ble Court thus concluded that the rent paid by the tenants to the petitioners/landlords towards the furniture, equipment, and other movable items provided in the kitchen and cafeteria, in respect of which the tenants have paid rent, would not be amenable to tax under the APGST Act (VAT regime), as such payments arise out of a contract of service.
43. [2026] 188 taxmann.com 508 (Orissa) Magnum Estates (P.) Ltd. vs. Additional Commissioner, GST (Appeals) dated 15-07-2026.
When the amount of interest was wrongly mentioned in DRC-07 as tax, the Court set aside the order of the first appellate authority after observing that although the Order-In-Original is rectified, the First Appellate Authority cannot rectify his order.
FACTS
In the course of Audit under section 65 of the GST Act, the petitioner was found to have availed wrong input tax credit in respect of exempt supply. The petitioner reversed the credit, but no interest was paid. Therefore, a show cause notice was issued demanding interest and penalty. In DRC-07, the amount of interest is wrongly shown as demand towards tax, preventing the petitioner from filing the appeal without making payment of pre-deposit. The petitioner filed an appeal before the First Appellate Authority, which was dismissed on 29-09-2025. In the meantime, the Original Authority rectified the Order-in-Original exercising power under section 161 of the GST Act on 28-01-2016.
HELD
The Hon’ble Court declined to entertain the petition on merits as it involved verification of facts. However, the Hon’ble Court perceived that if the petitioner is directed to avail the alternate remedy available under section 112 and were asked to pay pre-deposit of interest, when the law does not require them to do so, justice would not be sub-served. The Court was informed that although the Order-in-Original was subsequently modified, the appellant authority is unable to modify the Order-In-Appeal, as the period for rectification under section 161 of the CGST Act has already lapsed and there is no provision to recall the order of the First Appellate Authority. In these circumstances, the Hon’ble Court set aside the Order of the First Appellate Authority and the matter was remitted to the Appellate Authority for deciding the appeal on merit afresh without being swayed by the earlier order.
II GSTAT
44. [2026] 188 taxmann.com 445 (GSTAT – NEW DELHI) Manoranjan Dash vs. Commissioner, Odisha, Commissionerate of CT GST dated 08-07-2026.
No additional pre-deposit is required for filing an appeal before the Tribunal where the mandatory pre-deposit already paid at the first appellate stage exceeds the pre-deposit required on the balance tax amount that remains in dispute after the relief granted by the First Appellate Authority.
FACTS
The appellant preferred an appeal to the First Appellate Authority against the said Order confirming excess Input Tax Credit to the tune of Rs.11,34,474/-, paying 10% pre-deposit to the extent of Rs.1,13,447/-. The Learned First Appellate Authority reduced the total amount to Rs.1,02,012/- towards tax. As the appellant had already deposited a pre-deposit of Rs.1,13,447/- which was much in excess of the 10% of the confirmed tax demand as per the First Appellate Authority’s order, i.e. Rs.10,201, the appellant did not pay additional pre-deposit, treating that the pre-deposit paid at the first appellate level is sufficient to cover the pre-deposit requirement at the second appeal.
HELD
Referring to the decision of Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court in the case of Ashirwad Food Industries vs. Union of India [2026] 183 taxmann.com 563/114 GST 463/107 GSTL 89 (Jharkhand), the Tribunal held that no further pre-deposit is required to be made under section 112 of the Act
